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**THE MULTINATIONAL CORPS NORTHEAST (MNC NORTHEAST)
A MEANINGFUL AND EFFECTIVE CONTRIBUTION BY THE
GERMAN ARMY TO THE GOALS OF NATO ENLARGEMENT?**

BY

COLONEL JOHANN BERGER

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19980527 021

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THE MULTINATIONAL CORPS NORTHEAST (MNC Northeast)

A meaningful and effective contribution by the German
Army to the goals of NATO Enlargement?

by

Colonel Johann Berger

Colonel Jeff McCausland
Project Advisor

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U.S. Army War College
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013

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ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: Colonel Johann Berger

TITLE: The Multinational Corps Northeast (MNC Northeast) - a meaningful and effective contribution by the German Army to the goals of NATO Enlargement?

FORMAT: Strategy Research Project

DATE: 01 April 1998 PAGES: 39 CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

Within the framework of a changed security situation in Europe NATO enlargement and the attempt of an improved security architecture in Europe obviously became important. German participation to achieve this could follow various avenues. One is the creation of an additional multinational Corps. In one of Europe's traditional important geostrategic areas, the Baltic Sea region, a new multinational corps (MNC Northeast) shall be established. This Danish-German-Polish element combines first time NATO and new NATO members. This article tries to answer the question whether this will be a meaningful and efficient contribution to the goals of NATO enlargement and German security interests. In combination with new structures, multinationality and the perception of the neighboring states the categories of the chosen level, the costs, the location and deployment are examined.

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THE MULTINATIONAL CORPS NORTHEAST (MNC NORTHEAST)

CHANGES - A NEW NATO

The more distant we get from the heady days of the fall of the Berlin Wall, the more evident it becomes that we have entered a new era. This "new" world seems to be more peaceful; as there is no longer the threat from the Warsaw Pact. The NATO alliance has achieved great things over the past six years. It has redefined peace and security in Europe and has tried to adopt new strategic tasks. NATO enlargement is the most used expression. But concerning such changes a great deal of critical comments and questions have arisen.

"NATO: Out of Area or Out of Business"¹, "What's the worth of NATO Enlargement?"², "New NATO stumbles on a deep distrust within Russia's elite"³ - these titles reflect the uncertainty of the new situation in NATO. In particular the population and a lot of politicians of the most important ally, the U.S., show a lot of skepticism towards NATO enlargement⁴.

With the end of the Cold War, a unique opportunity has occurred to build an improved security architecture throughout the Euro-Atlantic area. The aim of such an improved security architecture is to provide increased stability and security in the Euro-Atlantic area without creating dividing lines again⁵. The benefits of common defense and integration are important to protect the further democratic development of any new members.

Therefore, enlargement will contribute to enhanced stability and security for all countries in the Euro-Atlantic area by "encouraging and supporting democratic reforms, including civilian and democratic control over the military, fostering in new members of the Alliance the patterns and habits of cooperation, consultation and consensus building which characterize relations among current allies,...."⁶.

Several principles of the enlargement carry special importance. First, European security architecture must apply to all countries in Europe. Second, the continuing important role of Partnership for Peace (PfP) and Enhanced PfP must be ensured. Third, the enlargement of the European Union and at the same time the improvement of relations with Russia must be considered.

Within this spectrum Germany has a special role and responsibility. This is based on its political and economic importance within Europe, its geostrategic location and history. German support for this transformation is more than rhetorical. The participation in NATO's IFOR and SFOR activities in the former Yugoslavia and frequent participation in PfP exercises and exchange programs are examples of Germany's interest and support to establish a "new" NATO. The Bundeswehr and its Army are being developed into an instrument commensurate with the conditions of the present and a definite orientation towards the future. For this reason the German Defense Minister, Volker Ruehe, is busy pushing forward visible signs of German support for the NATO

enlargement. One might be the creation of an additional multinational Corps. The idea is part of the German strategy to add substance to NATO's political decision to expand by creating interlocking security commitments among Germany's neighbors.

" If you want stability, you either export it or you import instability. It seemed clear to me that if you wanted an open border with Poland like the one we have with France, you had to have both countries in one alliance and stability on both sides."⁷

The purpose of this paper is to analyze whether the creation of an additional multinational Corps could be an efficient German contribution which meets the political, military, strategic and organizational goals of NATO, Germany and other participants in Europe. The serious public discussions within the Alliance concerning its future situation and the advantages and disadvantages of NATO's enlargement show the current importance of this question. Especially with the U.S., the debate about costs and preservation of efficiency of the Alliance is considerable⁸.

As final decisions about the deployment of this new multinational Corps have not been made and the creation process is still ongoing, sources are only available through December 31, 1997. Furthermore, this paper will be limited to only one strategic area - the Baltic Sea.

THE BALTIC SEA AREA

Why the Baltic Sea area? History shows, this area has always been an area of strategic importance for all of Europe. In geopolitical terms, the Baltic Sea area includes Russia, Finland, Sweden, Denmark, Germany, Poland, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. This is a real kaleidoscope of nations with different interests, histories, languages and cultures which are held together by the Baltic Sea. During the Cold War large forces of the antagonistic Blocs collided in this area. For Russia, the Baltic Sea between Denmark, Sweden and Norway was always an area of vital interest. Here, it had one of the rare possibilities to have access to "warm" harbors and to lines of transport and economy. The historical changes in Europe at the beginning of the nineties decisively altered the political landscape in this area of divergent interests. Today, the Baltic Sea has been rediscovered as a link between nations and as an important lane of trade and traffic.

Naturally, these developments have a large impact on the security policy of the neighboring countries and for all of Europe. The security and stability of the whole continent will depend on the answers to several key questions regarding the future of Europe, the future of NATO and relations between the U.S. and Russia.⁹

The Baltic Sea can be regarded as a testing ground for the practical relevance of the fundamental future challenges of security and stability in Europe. For example, will Russia use the area as a strategic bridgehead or as a means of being integrated into free world trade and as a gate to the West? This will depend on the cooperation of a variety of countries with different interests and policies. Some countries are European Union members and are in the process of determining their future relationships. Some countries are NATO members with a clear position, role, and course for the future. Some countries want to become members of NATO and the European Union. And there is Russia. It wants and has to be taken into account according to its historical role, its importance and size. Russia does not want to be excluded and isolated again, but respected as an important special partner.

At the moment, there seems to be no real threat posed by Russia, but changes in its geostrategic situation have to be considered. The current, sometimes confusing, statements of Russia's president related to the Iraq crisis are proof of the continuing doubts about Russia's policy. The independence of the Baltic states has reduced Russia's access to the Baltic Sea and heightened the problem of the isolated Kaliningrad enclave with its large concentration of units. This presents a danger that if unsatisfied, might push former Russian hard-liners to initiate a

military putsch from this area. This has to be monitored carefully¹⁰.

NATO with its enlargement and integration efforts and Germany with its special role to support these efforts have to consider this region in a very special way. This area offers many possibilities. The projects of the "Partnership-for-Peace (PfP)" and the "Enhanced Partnership-for-Peace (EPfP) Program" can reduce tensions with Russia. At the same time, they can meet the military goals of a future enlargement of NATO territory and the addition of further members. This development will help to install a new reduced headquarters yet geographically extended NATO structure. The naval elements of the different countries, including non-NATO states like Sweden and Finland or the Baltic states, have already shown that the "PfP Program" can lead in the desired direction. Joint exercises like "BALTIC SWEEP 96", seminars about principles, doctrines and training and mutual harbor visits demonstrate a positive development¹¹. The Baltic Sea has become a meeting place. The integration of the other services is necessary and possible to support this development. Cooperation among the land components along the coasts could contribute with a bridging function towards a future vision - "Mare Balticum means Mare Pacem".

NEW STRUCTURES

After a long period of discussion and debate within NATO the final decisions on a new NATO command structure were made at the NATO summit of the Defense Ministers in December 1997. Of the 65 existing headquarters and staffs only 17 will remain for the future Area of Responsibility (AOR) of Europe and 6 for the future AOR of the Atlantic¹². These decisions and the ongoing process of improving and reducing the structure of the German Armed Forces and Germany's participation in multinational military formations are also reasons to research the creation of a further multinational Corps.

During the last trilateral meeting on August 29 - 31, 1997 in Omulew, Poland, the three Ministers of Defense (Germany, Poland and Denmark) agreed in principle that the work on the creation of a trilateral, German-Danish-Polish Corps, called "Multinational Corps Northeast (MNC Northeast)", shall begin. The plan is to develop the new headquarters from the existing German-Danish Corps LANDJUT. This is to be synchronized with Poland's NATO membership. The initial goal is to establish a working structure by the end of 1999. The new headquarters will be part of the NATO force structure and be assigned to NATO¹³.

The question arises why Germany shows continued interest and emphasis for an additional multinational element when nearly all major German Army units are already multinational and the obvious disadvantages of multinationality are considered? Why choose the

Corps level for this new multinational element? How shall this Corps be tailored? What is an appropriate location and deployment? What are the costs and what about burden sharing? What signal will be sent to all states along the Baltic Sea and to Russia? These questions shall be examined and answered in the following sections.

WHY A FURTHER MULTINATIONAL ELEMENT?

First, let us look at multinationality within the German Army. With the exception of the IV German Corps in Potsdam there are no remaining national corps and in some cases multinationality is found even at brigade level¹⁴.

Since the founding of NATO, multinationality has always been part of the organizational structure of the Alliance. The cooperation between the different Armed Forces was concentrated on specific defense missions in specific defensive regions. The Standing Naval Forces Atlantic (STANAVFORLANT) or the Allied Mobile Force Land (AMFL) are examples. But multinationality was most often found in the participation of different nations in the formation of headquarters. The Post-Cold War era has created new dimensions concerning the creation of multinational forces. Following the Gulf War, the turmoil in the Caucasus region and in Africa as well as the beginning decay of Yugoslavia, NATO took the opportunity to expand the multinationality of its forces. The Implementation Force (IFOR) and the Stabilization Force (SFOR) in

the former Yugoslavia are well known examples. At the same time, major units or headquarters on a bilateral or multilateral basis were created by its members. An example for this is the German-Netherlands Corps. Multinationality became a successful means to fight against problems within NATO's member states such as reduced military budgets, personnel reductions and reduced efforts in equipment / weaponry modernization. The creation of further multinational units clearly prevents an ongoing erosion of national forces. National forces can be transformed into more powerful units.¹⁵ Standardization, joint training and doctrine efforts and combat effectiveness within the German Netherlands Corps or in the Multinational Division Central (MNDC) are valuable examples.

All these units have different levels of multinationality with different effects for organization and command structure. In particular the question of multinational command authority is always a special problem¹⁶. The spectrum can be found to reach from the model of "lead nation principle" over "framework type" to "integration model". The "lead nation principle", found in the II German/US Corps, gives the lead and control to one nation. The staff is configured on a national basis. Integration of the partner is small but can be increased on a mission type basis. However cooperation is very close in peace time. In the "framework type", practiced in the ACE Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC), one nation offers the framework and is responsible for

command and control, administration and logistics. The other participating nations are represented by common mutual agreements. Last, but not least, the "integration model" can be found in the German Netherlands Corps. The headquarters is occupied on a mutual balanced proportional basis and the top ranks are allocated by the rotation principle. Based on first hand experience with the different models¹⁷, the "integration model" probably will be the best suited for the MNC Northeast. There are several reasons for this suitability.

The first deals with the number of participants. With Poland as the first new NATO member in this geographical area, three nations will be integrated into the new corps. This will be a most practical and convenient solution as it meets several basic conditions. To use the core of the existing bilateral Corps LANDJUT has the advantage that two armies, the Danish and the German, already know for over 20 years how to operate together and have identified the strong and weak points of the organization. The Corps' Area Of Responsibility (AOR) is the Baltic Region, so the Danish, German and Polish Armies already have a great deal of experience in military cooperation. This has been practiced on the division level in many "PfP"- exercises like the "BALTIC COOPERATION" series. A trilateral partnership on the division level already exists since October 1997. Therefore the integration of this new NATO member will present no large-

scale psychological difficulties. The definition of participation and occupation of positions can be easily agreed on.

Establishing a corps in this way will have a positive impact on costs and burden sharing. It will save resources in the affected countries and support efforts to slim and strengthen NATO command structure within the enlargement process. The need for a new headquarters where the new NATO members are integrated can also easily be met. The creation of the headquarters for the MNC Northeast out of the HQ of the Corps LANDJUT has the further advantage that only one nation, Poland, has to be integrated. Danish and German participation can be reduced. The experience and knowledge of the remaining staff elements will allow for a quick integration of the new member.

Using multinational organization guidelines, participation of three or four nations in such a corps seems to be a well balanced solution allowing for inclusion of standardized training and doctrine, as well as responsibility in the areas of national laws.

In the German White Paper 1994 the Minister of Defense expressed the importance of multinational elements as an "important step on the road to a European defense and at the same time strengthening the links with the partners in North-America". In addition, "They create a framework within which smaller nations can continue to bring their limited force contingents effectively to bear in these alliances".¹⁸

The new missions such as crisis management or Peacekeeping within the framework of NATO, Western European Union (WEU) or the United Nations demand new roles for armed forces. Multinationality underscores Germany's resolve to act in a spirit of solidarity together with its allies. Consequently, new multinational units can enhance Cooperative Security and meet the goals of NATO enlargement.

Finally, multinational units ensure a so-called military educational effect which will create a common mental attitude¹⁹. This is necessary to ensure capable group cohesion, common understanding and military efficiency among soldiers of different nations. A location like a corps Headquarters will provide a very good opportunity for military everyday "culture" for the new NATO members. This will contribute to one of the basic goals of NATO enlargement - the transfer of values and an understanding of democracy to the new members. The German concept of "Innere Fuehrung" - soldiers are citizens in uniform too -, should become an experience for them.

WHY THE CORPS LEVEL?

Why is the corps level appropriate to further multinational projects? The answer to this question includes a variety of ideas and considerations from the tactical to the strategic level. As experience in the Bundeswehr has shown, matters concerning education, law, and personnel affairs are very difficult to

handle at division or brigade level. The higher the organizational level, the lower will be the impact of these national day to day working matters. Therefore national "nitty-gritty" disturbances can be better handled at a higher organizational level because of the specified tasks performed there.

Common language is one of the prerequisites for a military unit to operate smoothly. The higher level of organization will allow for more staff officers who are well-trained and educated. This will minimize the problems presented by language diversity. At the corps level these aspects are fulfilled the best. The common language will be English.

Since the personnel of the Corps LANDJUT will form the basic core of this new multinational Corps Standing Operation Procedures and a common understanding already exist for two nations. The integration of English speaking Polish personnel will, therefore, be easier.

Unity of effort must exist for units to be efficient in combat and other difficult missions. Consequently, on the battlefield battalions, regiments, brigades and even divisions have to be smoothly functioning units. There can be no time delays, misinterpretations of orders, and problems on the use of equipment. In reality a mixture of different weapons and support systems, little or no standardization of systems, different training standards, and widely separated existing skills without

doubt will complicate missions. These detrimental effects will not disappear, but using the corps level they can be minimized. In addition, the variety of available force multipliers such as artillery, combat helicopters, etc., even may increase the efficiency of national brigades and divisions. These can be tailored and provided in a proportional mix to the multinational forces. Enough highly trained personnel in the corps headquarters can ensure synergy for a common task²⁰. Additionally a corps structure since October 28 1997 can be built on the very close contact that has already been established with the creation of the trilateral partnership between the Danish Division, the German 14th Mechanized Infantry Division and the Polish 12th Mechanized Infantry Division²¹.

The corps level multinational solution will offer the other nations in the Baltic Sea Area the opportunity to "participate" even though they are not NATO-members. Other interested nations like the Baltic states or Sweden can very easily establish a liaison element at the headquarters. There they can observe how work is done in NATO staffs. This ensures that in planning and conducting PfP exercises, where they are participants too, an increased efficiency and capability for common operations is achievable.

HOW SHALL THIS CORPS BE TAILORED?

The new corps should follow the practice of the multinational Corps LANDJUT. In peacetime, no units are directly subordinate to this headquarters. The new corps staff is only a planning staff and therefore, will be a powerful instrument with recognizable organic forces only during exercises. As mentioned, the organization of the headquarters should follow the "integration principle". Concerning corps troops, nations may use the pooling system as a principle. Training affiliation of the corps troops will be subject to further considerations. Today Denmark has offered electronic warfare and air defense systems, as well as, participation in artillery assets. Germany plans to provide additional target acquisition assets. Possibilities for helicopter support, as well as, psy-ops assets are subject to further examination. Poland will offer its participation during the next Trinational Working Group (TNWG) meeting. Rotational posts between the three nations could be the commander, deputy commander and the chief of staff. In accordance with NATO procedures, the tour of duty should be three years. All other posts in the headquarters will be allocated to the nations after detailed decisions are made. The internal structure of the headquarters has not been decided yet. For real missions, the Danish Division, the 14th German Mechanized Infantry Division and the 12th Polish Mechanized Division will be assigned as national contributions.

Several key tasks are planned for the new corps. They include a main defense role for Article V operations after NATO assignment, participation in peace support operations and multinational crisis management operations and planning , preparation and conduct of humanitarian aid and disaster relief operations. In summary, the new MNC Northeast will pose no threat to any state in peacetime. As a result, the planned assignment of the three divisions for Article V purposes²² will ensure that Russia has no reason to declare this as escalatory. In this way, the creation of a major unit does not effect restrictions of NATO force strength based on the Organization for Security in Europe (CSE) obligations. Russia has insisted that the future enlarged NATO will not exceed the fixed ceilings of conventional weapons of the valid CFE Treaty of 1990²³. The intent of NATO not to deploy permanently major foreign units within the new Eastern European countries²⁴, will also be supported by the creation of only a multinational corps HQ. An organization at this level creates no foreign or additional forces along the border area between Russia and Poland. On the other hand, the planned NATO assignment of the corps when Poland is integrated in NATO in 1999²⁵ will contribute to greater Polish security. For the Polish population a corps size unit is an obvious sign of integration into the Western Alliance.

WHAT IS THE APPROPRIATE LOCATION AND DEPLOYMENT?

One location of the MNC Northeast could be the current one of the Corps LANDJUT in Schleswig-Holstein in northern Germany. However, this would be at the most western part of the Area of Responsibility (AOR) of the participating nations. This would not fulfill the expression of the political will and the goal of integration of a new NATO member from Eastern Europe. It would also not demonstrate that the Baltic Sea area is an area of strategic importance and a possible future NATO region. The same political and strategic arguments apply with respect to a deployment of the headquarters to Denmark. A better alternative would be to place the HQ's in the former Eastern Germany, in the New Bundeslaender, or in Poland. Independent of the "2+4-Treaty" questions, the use of the current location of the IV GE Corps in Potsdam is too remote from the Baltic Sea area. Since this is the last German national Corps headquarters, its elimination would raise sensitive political and economic questions for this area concerning infrastructure.

To deploy the HQ's in a different location in Eastern Germany like Neubrandenburg or Eggessin would provide not only a wrong political signal but also violate existing laws and international agreements. The deployment of foreign or multinational forces in the New Bundeslaender is restricted by the "2+4-Treaty" dated September 12, 1990. A multinational headquarters deployed in this area would be an obvious deployment of foreign forces in the New

Bundeslaender which would be in contradiction to article 5 of the "2+4-Treaty"²⁶. Therefore, the new MNC HQ's must be placed in Poland. But where should the HQ's be installed within Poland? To place it deep in Polish territory, especially in the East or Northeast would provoke Russia. Russia has attempted to prohibit the creation of any kind of military infrastructure for additional forces above brigade level in the potential new members of NATO²⁷. Therefore Poland has offered Stettin (Szeczin) as a location. Distance, length of recognizable movements and time to deploy a fully established corps in Eastern Poland will give a clear signal to Russia that this corps will not threaten her. This Polish proposal offers a good solution for all. Additionally the deployment of this trilateral headquarters in Poland ensures a visible political and military sign for a closer integration of Germany's Eastern neighbor into the Western European community and into NATO.

The location of such a multinational HQ's on Polish territory might also provide further positive benefits. The relations between the civil and military communities could remove prejudices and the problematic question of the relationship between society and the military within the former communist country. As the Polish population is able to have contact with Western soldiers and their families, their own soldiers will become more accepted as a normal part of society. This will

facilitate the transition from an authoritarian system to a more democratic one.

WHAT ABOUT COSTS AND BURDEN SHARING?

Worldwide throughout 1997 the press pointed out and questioned the possible costs of NATO's enlargement. The "U.S. are deeply concerned about the costs"²⁸, a "Transatlantic Ghost debate"²⁹ or "Contest of the Armament Giants"³⁰, all these discussions contributed more to emotional rumors than to reasonable considerations. Meanwhile, a NATO-study based on a realistic threat assessment, the need of infrastructure and the cost sharing over a 10 years period³¹ concluded that the costs are reasonable. With the creation of the MNC Northeast and its planned deployment in Poland, Germany can provide a positive signal for all members that it is willing to pay its share of costs. This could include the deferral of funding for Germany to the new member states. As Minister Ruehe has announced, Germany will renounce planned NATO investments in Germany for benefits of infrastructure investments in the countries of the new Eastern European members of NATO³². With the establishment of the corps, an essential initiative is begun towards standardization and interoperability. It will also help Poland stabilize its political-economic system and increase support and societal acceptance for the costs they have to pay for barracks, housing areas, technical sites. This stimulus which will affect the

regional domestic economy also will strengthen the integration of new member states and will be an important motor for a European security system. The enhancement of stability, one goal of NATO enlargement and German security policy, could be achieved through the improvement of the economic situation.

Finally, all participants can practice better resource management for personnel and training. For new members like Poland, to ensure security and stability is more cost-effective within an alliance as opposed to a national solution.

WHAT SIGNAL WILL IT PROVIDE ALL STATES ALONG THE BALTIC SEA AND TO RUSSIA?

Sweden

Traditionally, Sweden, although neutral, has been interested in close contact with NATO, adherence to Western policy, and access to Western economies. Because of its close relationship to NATO, Sweden was called the "17th ally of NATO". As Sweden is now a member of the European Union, the concept of ideological neutrality is obviously non-existent but a so-called "non-alignment" status is maintained. This status allows Sweden the option of traditional aid - now also military - for the small, vulnerable Baltic states. With its "third way" policy of "non-alignment" and traditional reputation of finding solutions to political problems, Sweden can help stabilize the Baltic Sea region. Key elements in this region are its desire for a

partnership with NATO³³, a demonstrated willingness to support the Baltic states and efforts to improve the relations between Russia and Western Europe. Traditionally, Sweden is a large contributor for peace support operations. In the new multinational corps Northeast, Sweden will find a useful instrument for close participation and contact with NATO and the Baltic states since one of the main tasks of MNC NE will be support and conduct of UN peace support operations and training³⁴. The possibility that the HQ of MNC NE could be also used as Force HQ for humanitarian and rescue operations, as well as, for disaster relief under "other than NATO relevant organizations" provides a basis for close teamwork.

Finland

Finland, in particular also is affected by this new development in Europe and the prospects of NATO enlargement. In June 1996 Finish President Martti Ahtisaari said "We have left behind the neutrality of the Cold War era and aspire to the realization of the goals of the European Union"³⁵. Finland became a member of NATO's PfP in May 1994 and shortly after joining the European Union in February 1995, it became an observer in the Western European Union (WEU). Finland with its geographic proximity to Russia and the difficult history of Finnish-Russian relations has occupied a sensitive position in Europe's security situation. Since 1994, Finland has used the EU and PfP to further

its political and military integration within Europe, to overcome its isolation and even to attain indirect security guarantees. It has done this while avoiding unnecessary provocation's of Russia. Russia has clearly indicated its apprehension about a Finish membership in any European military alliance. Consequently, the formation of the MNC NE would also offer Finland the opportunity to participate in military activities within the Western Alliance for peace support operations and other similar PfP events.

The Baltic States

Although the Baltic states regained their sovereignty in 1991, their geostrategic and political situation with the common border with Russia remains very difficult. Over the last 60 years, border disputes, Russian concerns about the "near abroad" in the Baltic states, the situation of the Kaliningrad area and the fact that Russia has not officially recognized their independence contribute to their fervent wish for integration into the European Union and participation in NATO. However these issues will make the process of integrating these countries within NATO very difficult. Therefore, every sign of partnership, support and integration of the Baltic States with the European Union is of help. In the past years, Germany has created various flexible instruments of cooperation with these states, including military and security policy³⁶. In this sense, the new MNC Northeast also will be a valuable pacemaker, not only for

military cooperation, but also in the further integration of these countries in the Baltic Sea area.

Russia

Ever since the discussions about NATO enlargement began, Russian politicians and generals have rejected the idea. The Russian government declared NATO enlargement to be the biggest mistake the Western States have made since the end of the Cold War³⁷.

Russia tried with all verbal means to prevent NATO enlargement. Every attempt to create new enlargements, like the deployment of the MNC Northeast, will be declared as a threat and will increase tensions. The realization that NATO would not be intimidated and would remain on course as demonstrated in the decision for new NATO members in 1999 on December 16, 1997 caused a change in Russian policy. Yeltsin announced a reduction in Russian forces in Northwest Russia of up to 40%³⁸. One reason for this might be that Russia hopes to convince NATO and the Baltic states that Baltic membership is not necessary. If this strategy is successful, Russia would have achieved one goal in this area - to keep the U.S. out of the Baltic Sea region. In January 1998, the Russian minister of defense, Marshal Sergejew, visited the Corps LANDJUT in Rendsburg. He was invited by the German minister of defense to get a realistic picture of the core of future MNC Northeast. He pointed out his general objection to its deployment

but was less clear in connection with the geographical location of the new element. Nevertheless, the question about Russia's attitude towards the MNC Northeast will ultimately be a question about the precise deployment zone and the configuration of permanently attached units.

CONCLUSION AND SUMMARY

"Today's ceremony is a profound sign of NATO's transformation and how far we have overcome the divisions of Europe. We are setting the tone for the new millennium - a tone of confidence and optimism for all the peoples of our Euro-Atlantic area"³⁹.

With this statement, Secretary General Solana expressed very clearly and simply the character of the new period for NATO, a new structured Europe and the Transatlantic Dimension. The new NATO strategy, the new goals of NATO policy and new members will have an enormous impact on the whole strategic situation in Europe. With the Euro Atlantic Partnership Council, the PfP, and Enhanced PfP programs NATO created instruments which include Russia and improve the possibility for peaceful cooperation in Europe. The key word for NATO is "stability". This also applies to every aspect of German policy. Germany is viewed by the Eastern European countries not only as a competent partner but possesses with the Bundeswehr an instrument which seems to be an example of social integration and competent organization.

Therefore, the creation of a trilateral corps in the Baltic Sea area will be a useful contribution to achieve greater stability.

There are good political, military and geographical reasons for this German-Danish-Polish project at Stettin. The basic idea for the planned corps is not to be a threat, but rather to be an expression to push stability eastward and make a clear visible contribution towards this goal. The question of this paper, whether a multinational corps could be a meaningful and effective contribution towards the goals of NATO's enlargement and German security policy can be answered affirmatively.

It will help stabilize an important European region which has always been a critical and strategic area of special interest to Russia for access to the Western world. Its creation will show Russia and all other neighbouring nations that European and NATO decisions are neither prevented by Russia's threats nor dependent on its good will. The deployment will provide a signal that the military integration of Eastern European countries in NATO will not threaten the Russian Federation. It is also important that the multinational headquarters will be established on the territory of new NATO members. Together with the intensification of common training and exercises within the Enhanced PfP program it may help to lower tensions especially with respect to the situation of Kaliningrad. It also might enhance cooperation between Russia, the Baltic states and other forces and enhance the possibility for the naval forces to make the Baltic Sea a

peaceful meeting place. It also will give a positive signal to the Baltic States, since they may be able to participate in land force activities such as training for peace support operations or disaster relief. The same opportunity to have closer contacts at a time and scale of their own choosing may be provided to the neutral Nordic states of Sweden and Finland.

The new corps can be created under sound economic, organizational and resource conditions since it will use personnel and equipment from the current Corps LANDJUT. Germany and Denmark have trained together in common operations over many years making a proper fitting into new structures of NATO less complicated.

The new corps will integrate a partner from Eastern Europe and will therefore promote interoperability, standardization and understanding of common strategic concepts and necessary SOP's between the armed forces of the participating nations. The location of the HQ will help Poland better handle the difficult questions and tasks of financial resourcing and burden sharing and make the population aware that a new political orientation is ongoing and that economic progress can be made.

The mission and tasks for the corps will support all political goals of NATO and the participating countries. Its integration in NATO force structure will underscore its role as a main defense force for Article V operations. It also will document the equal integration of new members.

Last but not least, it should also give a clear signal to the U.S. and its citizens that the European nations and, especially Germany, are willing and able to pay their portion of the costs for the NATO enlargement process. However, the integration of new Eastern European members can not be calculated solely through a financial analysis. NATO for more than 40 years has fostered freedom, stability and cooperation among its members. To assure Poland, with its hundreds of years of European history a stable democracy, freedom and prosperity is a moral question too. As mentioned previously NATO enlargement has a very important transatlantic dimension. The U.S., as the global power, and Europe, as a global economic player, are bound to build a new transatlantic community. A northern hemisphere of stability through a cooperative balance between the U.S., the European Union and Russia supports a global coexistence. Every small step and every contribution by one of the players is useful and will lead step-by-step to the final goal. The creation of the MNC Northeast is a "step" in this effort to reach a common goal.

(word count : 6003)

ENDNOTES

¹ Fred Kempe, "NATO: Out of Area or Out of Business", The Wall Street Journal, (Issue, date and page unknown)

² Klaus-Dieter Frankenberger, "Was ist die NATO-Erweiterung wert?", Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 06 February 1997, page unknown.

³ Dieter J. Opitz, "Neue Nato stoesset in Russlands Elite auf tiefstes Misstrauen", Berliner Morgenpost, 27 August 1997, 7.

⁴ Juergen Koar, "Was nicht kaputt ist, sollte man nicht reparieren", Stuttgarter Zeitung, 15 July 1997, 5.

⁵ Studie ueber die Erweiterung der NATO, PO (95)177, Uebersetzung aus dem Englischen, Bundessprachenamt, Auftragsnummer C 4767, 19 September 1995, NATO Restricted, 1.

⁶ Ibid, 2-3

"...promoting good-neighbourly relations, which would benefit all countries in the Euro-Atlantic area, both members and non-members of NATO, emphasizing common defense planning and extending its benefits and increasing transparency in defense planning and military budgets, reinforcing the tendency toward integration and cooperation in Europe, strengthening the Alliance's ability to contribute to European and international security... and strengthening and broadening the Trans-Atlantic partnership."

⁷ Frederick Kempe, "Ruehe walks softly, but thinks big", The Wall Street Journal, 07 August 1997, page 6

⁸ Col. Alexander A.C. Gerry, AUS (Ret.) "The NATO Enlargement Debate", The Officer, Reports by the Defense Education Trust Fund of the Reserve Officers Association of the United States, December 1997, page 25 - 32

"About 14 hearings have taken place in the U.S. Congress in the month of October on NATO enlargement. It would not be fair to say there has been insufficient debate on the subject, since for the original ratification of the Washington Treaty creating NATO there were only 16 hearings in all. The hearings established that some of the anticipated major objections have not materialized, e.g., the issue of stationing U.S. troops in Europe, the commitment to common defense of new member-states under Article 5, the relationship with Russia, and the ratification itself. The remaining hurdle is coming to terms with the costs of enlargement, yet to be determined."

⁹ Vizeadmiral Weissert, "Political Aspects of Defense Cooperation in the Baltic Sea Region", Briefing concept for the Minister of Defense made by the ministers planning staff, September 18 1996, 1 and 2,

"The security and stability of our continent will depend on the answers to four key questions:

- What kind of Europe do we want?

- What kind of Alliance do we want with regard to its mission and geographical scope?

- What kind of relationship do we want between Europe and North-America within the framework of the New NATO?

- And finally, what kind of political, strategic and economic partnership do we want between Europe and NATO on the one hand and Russia on the other?"

¹⁰ Peer, H. Lange, "Militarisierung oder Demilitarisierung des Gebietes Kaliningrad / Das sicherheitspolitische Schlüsselpapier in der Ostseeregion", Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP), Ebenhausen, 1993, 32 pages

¹¹ Ulrich Otto, "Partnership for Peace und die Hanse / Zusammenarbeit der Ostseeflotten nach Ende des Kalten Krieges", Marineforum, Heft 3 1997, 8-12.

A whole series of further activities has to be mentioned here. So there are a lot of common activities in the fields of SAR-missions, humanitarian aid and training for Peacekeeping missions. One of the highlights has been the naval exercise "US-BALTOPS '96". In this exercise more than 40 naval units from all countries along the Baltic Sea - including Russian destroyers - and from the U.S., UK, Belgium and the Netherlands participated.

¹² Karl Feldmeyer, "Spaete Einigung", Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, December 04 1997, 14

¹³ OTL i.G. Hasenkamp, "Sachstand Aufstellung eines trilateralen DEU-DAN-POL Korps", BMVg, Fue S III 1, December 01 1997, 1-2.

¹⁴ "Das deutsche Heer - Sicherheit durch Multinationalitaet" BMVg Fue H III 1, October 05 1995, 39 - 43.

Multinationale Verbaende mit deutscher Heeresbeteiligung sind das ACE Rapid Reaction Corps (ARR), das Europaeische Korps (EUROKORPS), das II GE/US Korps, das V US/GE Korps, das I. GE/NL Korps, das Korps LANDJUT, die multinationale Division Central (MND C), die ACE Mobile Force Land (AMFL) und die NATO Composite Force (NCF) sowie die Deutsch-Franzoesische Brigade (GE/FR Brig)

¹⁵ Winfried Vogel, "Die multinationalen Korps", Truppendienst, Nummer 6/1996, 476-481.

¹⁶ Jon Whitford and Thomas-Durell Young, "Multinational Command Authorities: the Need for Change in NATO", Defense Analysis Vol.13, Nr 1/1997, 35-57.

¹⁷ Ruediger Moniac, "Die Farbe der Uniform hat keine Bedeutung mehr", Die Welt, October 07 1997, 2.

This article gives an impressive overview of the improvements and the current results in common military cooperation between nations, including questions of national laws.

¹⁸ White Paper 1994, BMVg, 56-57.

¹⁹ Wolfgang Roysl, "Multinationale Streitkraefte als militaerpaedagogischer 'Lernort'", Oesterreichische Militaerische Zeitschrift, 3/97, 273.

²⁰ OTL i.G. Hasenkamp, "Minutes of the 1st Meeting of the Trinational Working Group on a Multinational Corps Northeast (MNC NE)", BMVg Fue S III 1, 1-2, Restricted.

"As a principle nations may use the pooling system. Training affiliation of the corps troops is subject to further consideration." In the following sequences there are proposals for integration of force multipliers like EW, RPV/UAV, improved ADA, helicopter support, psy-ops and arty contribution and considerations which nation will ensure parts of the force mix.

²¹ Karl Feldmeyer, "Die Vorlaeufer des Dreier-Korps in Stettin", Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, October 28 1997, 4.

²² OTL i.G. Hasenkamp, "Minutes of the 1st Meeting of....", Ibid, 2.

²³ RO, "Moskau lenkt im Stationierungsstreit ein", Berliner Zeitung, July 19 1997, 1 and

"Verhandlungen ueber das NATO-Russland-Dokument - Strittige Substanz Kapitel V", BMVg (internal draft), April 16 1997, 1.

²⁴ RO, ibid, 1.

²⁵ OTL i.G. Hasenkamp, ibid, 2.

²⁶ Dr. Fleck, "Moeglichkleiten und Grenzen multinationaler Streitkraeftestrukturen in den neuen Bundeslaendern", BMVg R II 4, June 19 1997, 2-4.

In article 5, section 3 is declared that "after the finish of the withdrawal of the Soviet Forces from the terrain of the current German Democratic Republic and Berlin, German Armed Forces can also be deployed and located in this part of Germany, which might be allocated in the same way to military alliances like others in the reminder of Germany.Foreign forces ... are neither to deploy nor to move in this part of Germany."

Additional in the preambel in section 7 is common agreed that "....all participants are determined to consider the security interests of each other." For German policy decisions according these questions each single case is to check in accordance with the current political situation by considering especially Russian security interests.

²⁷ "Bericht des Bundesministers der Verteidigung vor dem Verteidigungsausschuss am 11. Juni 1997 zur 'Grundakte ueber gegenseitige Beziehungen, Zusammenarbeit und Sicherheit zwischen der NATO und der Russischen Foederation' vom 27.Mai 1997", BMVg Planungsstab, June 11 1997, 4.

²⁸ SWN, "USA ueber Kosten besorgt", Sueddeutsche Zeitung, October 17 1997, 5.

²⁹ Hanns-Jochen Kaffsack, "Transatlantische Gespensterdebatte", Berliner Morgenpost, July 07 1997, 4.

³⁰ Gerhard Gnauck, "Wettstreit der Ruestungsgiganten", Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, July 22 1997, 12.

³¹ Thomas Gack, "Die Neuen brauchen nicht das teure amerikanische Kriegsgeraet", Der Tagesspiegel, December 03 1997, 2.

³² AFP, "NATO-Beitrittslaender sollen die Hauptlast tragen", Sueddeutsche Zeitung, October 04 1997, 7.

Germany pays with approx. 170 million dollars annually a quarter of the NATO infrastructure programs and with approx. 90 million dollars one fifth of the military budget.

³³ Ann-Sofie Dahl, "Die kuenftigen Beziehungen Schwedens zur NATO: Es geht nicht um das OB, sondern um das Wie", NATO-Brief, May-June 1997, 20.

Surprisingly in Sweden no claims have been heard when the command in Bosnia went from UN to NATO. The change of identity of the Swedish soldiers when they are now wearing the NATO barets took place as unnoticed as the decision to take part in NATO's program of PfP.

³⁴ OTL i.G. Hasenkamp, "Minutes of the 1st Meeting of...", *ibid*, 1.

³⁵ David Arter, "Finland: From Neutrality to NATO?", European Security, Vol.5, Nr.4 1996, 614.

³⁶ "Kooperation - ein entscheidender Faktor fuer Stabilitaet und Frieden in Europa", BMVg (internal paper), 1997, 5.

Since 1994 Germany, under Danish coordination, supports the built-up of the "baltic Battalion" (BALTBAT) for peacekeeping operations. Moreover since 1997 Germany has the lead in coordination of the international support for the creation of a common countermine naval unit, the "Baltic Squadron" (BALTRON) of the Baltic States. Participants for support are Belgium, Denmark, France, Iceland, Netherlands, Norway, United Kingdom, U.S. as well as Finland, Poland and Sweden. Operational readiness shall be installed till by the end of this year.

³⁷ Heinz Kluss, "Die Kraenkung sitzt tief", Truppenpraxis/Wehrausbildung, 6/1997, 356.

³⁸ DW/JH, "Jelzin kuendigt Truppenabbau an", Die Welt, December 04 1997, 1.

³⁹ Solana, Secretary General of NATO, statement at the ceremony of the signing of the protocols of accession with the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, < <http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/1997/s971216f.htm>, accessed January 05 1998, 1.

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Thomas Gack, "Die Neuen brauchen nicht das teure amerikanische Kriegsgeraet", Der Tagesspiegel, December 03 1997, 2.

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