

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

Monterey, California



THESIS

**BATTLE STATIONS: AN ANALYSIS OF DESIGN,
DEVELOPMENT, IMPLEMENTATION, AND TRAINING
EFFECTIVENESS**

by

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March 1998

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
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
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
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I. INTRODUCTION

A. BACKGROUND

On July 30, 1997, the first group of Naval recruits embarked on what the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Navy ETCM (SW) John Hagan called "the most significant improvement made at Recruit Training Center (RTC) in my 30 years in the Navy"¹ - Battle Stations. Battle Stations comprises currently an eight hour, eight event, rite of passage that all recruits must complete in order to graduate from the Navy's boot camp. Its objective is "to galvanize the basic warrior attributes of sacrifice, dedication, teamwork, and endurance in each recruit through the practical application of basic Navy skills and Core Values learned during Recruit Training as the apex of the training program."² Since then, much publicity has surrounded the Battle Stations program. Navy Times, The Chicago Tribune, and All Hands represent only a sampling of news media that have run featured stories on it; while numerous political and military leaders, such as the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), the Secretary of the Navy (SECNAV), and U.S. Representative Steve Buyer (R-IN) among others, have lauded it. It can be summed up by CAPT Cory Whitehead, commanding officer at RTC: [Battle Stations is] "one of the most important things the Navy's done in boot camp in the last decade"³ by producing a newer and better breed of Sailors.

¹ *Navy News* Edition 39/97.

² Reported at the 1997 Flag Manning Conference.

³ CAPT Cory Whitehead in "Battle Stations!" *All Hands*, p. 24.

Battle Stations capstones the Navy's change of philosophy that has been implemented at RTC during the past two years. According to CAPT Whitehead, "the whole Navy is going through a much-needed culture change."⁴ The Navy is changing in response to a new generation of all-volunteer recruits. According to Defense Department spokesman Tom Begines, "there is increased awareness of respect for individuals in basic training of all services."⁵ RADM Kevin Green, commander of Naval Training Center (NTC), Great Lakes, agrees: "We are in the business of sharing power with more junior people."⁶ Recruits are treated with respect and taught about teamwork and selflessness, with emphasis on forming technical skills and developing Navy core values of honor, courage, and commitment. These changes in the traditional boot camp environment came about as "officials acknowledged that the movie image of a ruthless drill sergeant...had sometimes turned the experience into a trauma for the most devoted recruit - and it had produced too many military dropouts."⁷ Attrition rates from boot camp have remained rather consistently high over the last two years at approximately 14 percent⁸ that was also attributed to a cultural change in new recruits. Additionally, many mid-grade Naval officers have been complaining about the perceived decline in the quality and attitude of

⁴ CAPT Whitehead in "Navy of 90's Turns Recruit Friendly," p. 8.

⁵ Reported in "Navy of 90's Turns Recruit Friendly," p. 8.

⁶ RADM Green in "Navy of 90's Turns Recruit Friendly," p. 8.

⁷ Newbart, p. 8.

⁸ Correspondence with LT Fink, Student Control Officer, NTC Great Lakes.

Sailors coming into the Navy from boot camp.⁹ They indicated that boot camp was not, among other things, adequately preparing recruits in basic seamanship skills in preparation for the fleet.

At the same time, the Marine Corps was questioning its basic training philosophy. The Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Charles Krulak, determined that recruits needed "a defining moment and culminating event"¹⁰ in order for all Marines to share a common bond which forms the Marine ethos.¹¹ He commissioned the creation of a 54 hour event near the end of recruit training that would not only test the recruits' physical strength but also build teamwork and minimize individualism. He named this event "The Crucible," and it forms the cornerstone of the Marine recruits' experience. High-ranking Navy officials saw The Crucible as an answer to their boot camp concerns and directed officials at NTC to develop a similar program.

Combining the Navy's philosophical change in boot camp, the perceived culture shift in today's recruits, and a program already created by its sister-service, the Navy developed Battle Stations, heralding it as the key to building the Navy's future Sailors. Battle Stations scenarios are based on heroic actions of Navy medal awardees

⁹ Kreisher, p. 16.

¹⁰ Interview with LtCol Becker, Director of Training, Parris Island.

¹¹ The Marine ethos, as described by LtCol Becker, is the common bond that all Marines share because they are Marines. To Marines, boot camp creates a strong sense of brotherhood and *esprit de corps*; a fraternity that all Marines belong to for the rest of their lives. All Marines are riflemen first. Their individual occupation in the Marine Corps is secondary, since they all endured the same boot camp experience. It is this experience that every Marine can relate to, and which non-Marines are not privy. The Marine ethos is then this feeling that Marines belong to a special and unique organization.

(Congressional Medal of Honor, Silver Star, Bronze Star), simulate actual shipboard activities, and are meant to foster and instill team spirit into the recruits. But is all the attention worth it? *Is* the Navy bringing better-quality sailors into the fleet? Is there any way to measure the effectiveness of Battle Stations to ensure the Navy is getting its money's worth? And why, exactly, was Battle Stations created? What methodology was utilized to ensure a top training system? Based on the publicity that Battle Stations has received from both the civilian and military press, one could conclude it has been an overwhelming success. However, no formal study has been conducted on the events surrounding the creation, implementation, and subsequent outcomes of the Battle Stations program. This thesis intends to do just that, focusing on formal training procedures, techniques, and the rationale behind the creation and implementation of Battle Stations.

B. PURPOSE OF THE STUDY

The purpose of this thesis is to study the rationale behind the creation of Battle Stations and to determine its effectiveness as a training tool during the recruit training process. Additionally, this thesis will seek to determine the extent to which sound and effective training methodology supports Battle Stations' implementation and associated events.

C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS

1. Is the current training methodology and philosophy behind "Battle Stations" effective and is it implemented for the correct reasons?
2. Is the training beneficial in creating the highest quality recruit coming into the fleet, or is it costly compared to the outcome?

3. Was the creation of "Battle Stations" done for the betterment of recruit training or as a political response to a similar program by a sister service?
4. Is "Battle Stations" utilizing correct and up-to-date training methodologies in its program?
5. Can other training methods and philosophies be implemented to improve recruit readiness using the "Battle Stations" scenario?
6. Are the individual stations used in "Battle Stations" based on real-life scenarios that recruits will have to face in the fleet? And, if not, why not?
7. What is the basis for developing each specific station in the Battle Stations program, and does it provide any training benefit to the recruit?
8. Is Battle Stations meant to measure technical proficiency in basic seamanship skills or build camaraderie and teamwork amongst sailors? Or both?
9. Is Battle Stations meeting its intended objectives?

D. SCOPE OF THE THESIS

As noted earlier, Battle Stations reflects a relatively new concept in the Navy's recruit training process. Even though it has received much publicity, the program has not been studied systematically. One main reason is tied to the fact that relatively few sailors who went through the first Battle Stations program have entered the fleet. After boot camp, the majority of Sailors continue on to one of the Navy's many rating-specialty A-schools.¹² A-school can last as long as 18 months for some ratings; therefore, the fleet is only now receiving the influx of Battle Stations Sailors. To determine if Battle Stations has made any measurable impact in fleet operations or Sailor quality at sea would be premature and requires additional study beyond the scope of this thesis.

¹² A-schools are schools the majority of Sailors attend immediately after boot camp to learn their specific rating skills.

Suggestions for fiscal allocation and other constraints will be described which may influence the program's overall effect. Presently, Battle Stations has not been funded within RTC's budget for construction, station repairs, facilities, etc. All costs are estimated by personnel who design and construct the various settings for each event. According to Battle Stations Division Officer, LT Bradshaw, allocation plans are being formulated for the FY 98 budget.¹³

Battle Stations is not considered a completed project at RTC. Facilitators expect to expand Battle Stations to 12 hours and add five additional scenarios.¹⁴ Also, plans have been made to move Battle Stations to a permanent location in a presently unused hall at RTC. Given sufficient resources, props will be upgraded to support greater realism and existing scenarios are to be modified in an effort by facilitators to improve the program.

Recruits are not subjected to any form of evaluation to determine if they have satisfactorily completed Battle Stations. Passing marks for the recruits are based on observations by the Battle Stations facilitators. Virtually all recruits complete Battle Stations except for those with extenuating circumstances (see Chapter IV). It is an event they must complete, not pass.¹⁵

¹³ Interview with LT Bradshaw.

¹⁴ Reported at the 1997 Flag Manning Conference.

¹⁵ Interview with STSCS (SS/SW) Dahl.

E. METHODOLOGY

This thesis examines the Battle Stations program during recruit training at RTC to determine the rationale behind its creation, to determine a set of program evaluation measures and to map a blueprint for an effective training program. The methodology used is a qualitative analytical approach to related literature. Fundamental instructional design strategies found in literature will be applied to Battle Stations to determine its effectiveness. Research was conducted using literature reviews on effective training management issues and theories of rites of passage. Several articles from various newspapers and magazines were also utilized that reported on the Battle Stations program.

Detailed in-depth interviews were conducted with Battle Stations personnel: the creators of the programs, the program's division officer and staff chiefs, several facilitators and personnel who construct the events, the Director and Assistant Director of Training at RTC, and the RTC Command Master Chief. Additional interviews were conducted with Marine Corps personnel at their basic training sites in Parris Island, SC, and Camp Pendleton, CA, to contrast The Crucible with Battle Stations and discover the rationale behind its creation. Interviews were also conducted with recent graduates of Battle Stations and the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Navy (MCPON). Finally, the program itself was viewed in its entirety, along with participation in selected events.

F. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY

The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows: Chapter II presents a literature review to include a discussion of training techniques, methodologies, models, and organizational ritual theories. Chapter III consists of the history of Battle Stations and The Crucible with the rationale behind their creation. Additionally, issues concerning the development, format, and implementation of Battle Stations will be addressed. Chapter IV describes Battle Stations in detail to include an overview of the program, a description of the current eight events, and the graduation ceremony. Chapter V evaluates the program using information from the literature review. The final chapter provides recommendations for the Navy and Battle Stations based on literature review.

II. LITERATURE REVIEW

A. INTRODUCTION

This chapter provides a literature review on theory for building a successful training program and measuring the effectiveness of the program. First, it describes a widely-accepted six-step model which describes how to construct an effective training program.¹⁶ This model incorporates recognized models, such as the Kirkpatrick Model, and builds upon its theories. These six stages are as follows:

1. Evaluate needs and goals.
2. Evaluate training design.
3. Evaluate operation.
4. Evaluate learning.
5. Evaluate usage and endurance of learning.
6. Evaluate payoff.¹⁷

Within these steps, the concepts of training effectiveness and realism in training through the use of simulation will be discussed.

Battle Stations proclaims itself as a culminating event for recruits, a moment that brings them together and defines them as Sailors in the U.S. Navy for the first time. Therefore this chapter will also discuss theories of ceremonies and rites within an organization. A comparison of Battle Stations to the above theories will be presented in Chapter V.

¹⁶ Brinkerhoff, 1987; Carolan, 1993; Montante, 1996.

¹⁷ Brinkerhoff, p. 27.

Much training design and evaluation research has focused on training practices in non-military organizations, despite the fact that all services have applied tenants of instructional system design in their training program. For the purpose of this thesis, terms such as “companies” and “employees” within the literature should be equated to “the Navy” and “recruits,” respectively.

B. THE SIX STAGES OF EFFECTIVE TRAINING EVALUATION

1. Introduction

Training programs succeed when companies show a need for it, participants know they need it, and they believe it will work. According to Noe, et al.:

Training refers to a planned effort by a company to facilitate the learning of job-related knowledge, skills, or behavior by employees. The goal of training efforts is for employees to master the knowledge, skill, or ability emphasized in training programs and to apply it in their day-to-day activities.¹⁸

A focused and in-depth needs assessment is conducted to pinpoint specific problems within the existing (if there is one) training program or to identify new tasks to be learned. This assessment needs to start from the beginning by analyzing the needs of the company and all elements that can affect training. The assessment should be detailed and complete, involving all levels of personnel from upper management to line-workers. Furthermore, the company needs to scrutinize itself and the training program continually while the process is being developed and executed. Data should be collected and analyzed to update and strengthen areas that need modifying. Finally, follow-up analysis

¹⁸ Noe, et al. p. 341.

from employees who have completed the program and their supervisor is needed to discover how well the training program is developing employees' and management's needs and skills.

This concept appears to form simple template for organizations to use. However, training programs fail by ignoring simple principles, and it happens more often than not. Most commonly, training is truly needed, but when implemented poorly or not at all it does not solve the problems it was meant to.¹⁹ Companies incorrectly think training programs can serve as a quick-fix to all sorts of problems, and personnel within the organization grow frustrated and uninterested when they do not see immediate results. Other problems include programs that are implemented correctly but may not be needed in the first place. At other times, the training was not done well. Further, training may be needed and done well, but for some reason, the training never gets used. And even when training goes well and serves real needs, it might be excessive or inefficient, taking too long and costing too much money.²⁰

Successful training programs take many forms. The range may include single-workshop lectures to multiyear seminars that result in major policy change. However, one central theme emerges: "All [training] is alike in that it approaches improving individual or organizational performance through learning."²¹ Learning must be transformed into some tangible and beneficial output to the company.

¹⁹ Brinkerhoff, p. 2.

²⁰ Brinkerhoff, p. 3.

²¹ Brinkerhoff, p. 5.

Muchinsky states that "learning can be conceptualized as the process of encoding, retaining and using information" and can be segmented into three parts: declarative knowledge, knowledge compilation, and procedural knowledge.²² Declarative knowledge is knowledge about facts and things. It involves memorizing and understanding the "how's" and "why's" of the task at hand. A person must understand the basic skills and required performance of the task, but not necessarily become proficient in performing the task expertly.

Proficiency of the skill comes during the knowledge compilation stage. Performance becomes easier, more accurate, and streamlined as an individual fully comprehends the skills.²³

Muchinsky also states that "procedural knowledge refers to knowledge about how to perform various cognitive activities."²⁴ Individuals have virtually automated the skill, and can concentrate elsewhere while simultaneously performing the task.

Additionally, three major classes of abilities are important for performance of the skill acquisition phases: general intellectual ability, perceptual speed ability, and psychomotor ability.²⁵ General intellectual ability is vitally important during the first stage of skill acquisition. Attention to detail during this new activity is key to understanding, and an individual must develop this characteristic to ensure thorough knowledge is gained.

²² Muchinsky, p. 176.

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ Ibid.

Perceptual speed abilities encompass an individual's skill of not only how to perform the task but also to demonstrate a more efficient method of performing it. These abilities develop into psychomotor skills that determine the final level of task performance, and an individual's ability to retain and apply the skills.²⁶ As learning increases, individuals or employees gain some new skill, knowledge, or ability (SKA). The employee will then take the new SKA and put it to some use in the company. The company will then have one less deficiency in its overall process.

The Six-Stage model develops these concepts to form an iterative model that will benefit both the employee and the company. The model appears circular because it is a never-ending process. Once the program is implemented, steps become intertwined and occur simultaneously. Additionally, the cycle never stops; companies should continuously critique and assess their program for improvement.

Brinkerhoff states that "the model derives directly from the cycle of key training decisions."²⁷ Each stage is divided into key questions that should be asked when developing the program and useful procedures that could be implemented. Specifics and details of each stage will be described later in the chapter. Table 1 gives a brief summary of each stage and questions that should be asked.

²⁶ Muchinsky, p. 177.

²⁷ Brinkerhoff, p. 26.

Table 1. Six-Stage Model for Evaluating Training

Evaluation Stage	Key Evaluation Questions	Useful Procedures/Suggestions
I. Goal Setting (What is the need?)	• How great is the need, problem, opportunity? • Would the training make a worthwhile difference? • Would training work and be likely to pay off? • Are criteria available to judge whether it paid off or not? • What are the needs, tasks, organization and personnel of the company?	Organizational audits Performance/records analysis Observations Surveys Document reviews
II. Program Design (What will work?)	• What type of training would work best? • Is design A better than design B? • What is wrong with design C? • Is the selected design appropriate?	Literature/expert reviews Panels/Pilot tests Checklists
III. Program Implementation (Is it working?)	• Has it been installed as it is supposed to be? • What problems are cropping up? • What really took place? • Did trainees like it? • Cost	Direct observation Trainer/trainee feedback Records analysis
IV. Immediate outcomes (Did they learn it?)	• Did trainees learn it? • How well did they learn it? • What did they learn?	Knowledge and performance tests Observations Work-sample analyses
V. Intermediate or usage outcome (Are they retaining and/or using it?)	• How are trainees using it? • How well are they using it? • What parts are they using?	Self, peer, supervisor reports Surveys Site visits/Observation
VI. Impacts and worth (Was the training worthwhile and effective?)	• What difference does using it make? • Has the need been met? • Is it effective?	Audits Performance/records analyses Observations/Surveys Reviews and Hearings

Source: Robert O. Brinkerhoff, *Achieving Results from Training*, pp. 28-29

This model is meant to clarify and inform the many decisions that must be made if training is to succeed. Each stage involves learning and information gathering, and has specific roles within the cycle. Stage I begins with information collection. Brinkerhoff states that "training problems or opportunities are analyzed, needs are assessed, and tentative training goals are assessed in terms of their potential for worthwhile organizational benefits."²⁸ The stage concludes with a decision as to whether training is the right solution and can produce results. Stage II can then focus on the specific training design that is needed for the organization.

Stage III centers on implementation of the program. Brinkerhoff remarks that "successful implementation of training designs requires close monitoring and on-the-spot problem solving. Thus, Stage III guides process evaluation."²⁹ By focusing on details, it encounters and corrects problems and provides recommendations while the training process is first being run.

Stage IV, V, and VI track the program's results. Stage IV ascertains if and how well employees/trainees learned the desired objectives. Stage V searches if the newly-acquired skills are being utilized in the company, or if only parts are being used. Finally, Stage VI discovers if the training was effective.

²⁸ Brinkerhoff, p. 37.

²⁹ Brinkerhoff, p. 38.

2. Stage I - Evaluate Needs and Goals

Williams states that "the first step in measuring training's effectiveness is assessing a company's...goals."³⁰ A needs assessment is vitally important to determine whether training is necessary; and if so, the type and design of the program to follow. Many goals, however, are not specifically spelled out, or are vague in meaning. Therefore, an analysis must be conducted to ensure what exactly the training program will entail, and to design the program that will produce the desired and appropriate results.

Assessing the company's needs and situation starts with the pre-training environment. Evidence suggests that events prior to training can influence training effectiveness.³¹ Employees start to learn about the way training is viewed early in the company. From observing management, employees can tell how much emphasis is put on training and whether it should be taken seriously. Additionally, employees can assess how much control, participation, and input they will have in the process.

There are direct results from these observations. Trainees with more supportive supervisors entered training with stronger beliefs that training would be useful. Additionally, trainees who expected some form of follow-on training or assessment of the program reported stronger intentions to transfer what they learned back to their jobs.³²

³⁰ Williams, p. 43.

³¹ Muchinsky, p. 176.

³² Ibid.

Conversely, trainees with little incentive to learn or apply new skills in their work environment demonstrated a lower motivation to learn.

Another factor is employee input. Allowing trainees to specify what area they wanted training increased their motivation to learn. However, trainees who were allowed to choose a course but were then assigned to a different course of study were less motivated and learned less than trainees who did not participate in the training choice.³³ Differing topics from what employees choose to learn have shown conclusively to contribute to the training program's lack of effectiveness.

Muchinsky states that along with the pre-training environment, the design of training programs begins with a training needs analysis and climaxes with the training results assessment.³⁴ This analysis serves an important step in developing objectives, designing an evaluation, and choosing a training method. Assessing training needs forms the bulk of Stage I. It asks questions to focus on and plan the training program. Such questions are: Where is the organization today? Is it close to desired goals?³⁵ Why do you think you need training? What is the problem? What will be taught? How long will it take? And does the company employ subject matter experts to act as trainers?³⁶ These

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ Muchinsky, pp. 179-180.

³⁵ Williams, p. 44.

³⁶ Chase, pp. 29-30.

questions can be answered with a classic three-step process that encompasses organizational analysis, task analysis, and personnel analysis.³⁷

Noe, et al., states that organizational analysis “involves determining the appropriateness of training, given the company’s strategy, its resources available for training, and support by managers and peers.”³⁸ The company’s strategy determines where the training should focus its efforts and what subjects to cover. Strategic objectives also exert a major impact on whether resources should be devoted to addressing a certain training objective. Managers/leaders need to be clear on the prevailing strategy of the company to ensure employees and trainees receive training on relevant topics and the right amount of training.

Resources are needed to ensure the company allocates the budget, time, and expertise to conduct the training. An insufficient budget can limit the type of program or instructors assigned to it. (Do we hire outside help or use company expert employees?) Numerous consultants specialize in many different aspects of training. Is this person the right one for the situation? Also, managers need to consider the timing of the training. Is it needed right now? Or do more important and immediate tasks need to be accomplished? Training must be done with full support and dedication of management and supervisors or else it will fail to reach its goals.

³⁷ Muchinsky, p. 180.

³⁸ Noe, et al., p. 344.

Various studies have found that peer and manager training support is critical.³⁹

Training progresses more effectively when management provides a supportive climate that encourages trainees to explore and share their ideas. Positive attitude must be displayed or else employees will not think management takes training seriously, and consequently, results will diminish. Also, trainees demonstrated more transfer of skills from training to their job when they were influenced to use what they had learned and rewarded for doing so.⁴⁰ Peer support is also regarded as an invaluable tool. Once fellow workers accept and believe in the program, peer pressure and support are extremely influential in getting other workers to buy into the program.

Task analysis is used to determine the training objectives that will be related to the performance of particular activities or job operations.⁴¹ Four major steps are involved. First, management must develop task statements or specify the tasks performed on the job. Additionally, the relative importance of these tasks must be identified. Second, these tasks should be grouped into homogeneous clusters to make them manageable to analyze.

Third, a SKA analysis must be conducted. Skill refers to the capability to perform job tasks with ease and precision. Knowledge refers to the amount of information needed to perform the job. Ability refers to mental capabilities necessary to perform a job

³⁹ Noe, et al., p. 345.

⁴⁰ Muchinsky, p. 180.

⁴¹ Muchinsky, p. 181.

function. Finally, using the SKA, training personnel develop an instructional program linking the analysis to the training objectives.⁴²

Personnel analysis asks two questions: Who needs training? And what kind of training do they need? During this analysis, performance appraisal is utilized to determine employees' strengths and weaknesses, and determine a base-line of knowledge. This analysis will also allow management to stress certain areas of the program and de-emphasize others that are not necessary. Additionally, an analysis of the employees will determine which type of training program best fits employees' interests and learning capacity.

The analyses can be accomplished utilizing various methods. Each method is determined by the specific company scenario. One method is not better than any other method. However, some method must be used to collect the data. Examples include: attitude surveys by employees, behaviorally anchored rating scales to measure employees' job performance, interviewing, knowledge tests, work sample tests, and front end analysis.⁴³

A final characteristic of Stage I incorporates how a company knows that it needs to conduct a training program analysis. Several kinds of problems or conditions can precipitate training.⁴⁴ Each condition is unique to the company's environment and has

⁴² Muchinsky, pp. 181-182.

⁴³ Brinkerhoff, pp. 60-69.

⁴⁴ Brinkerhoff, p. 45.

specific questions to be asked during Stage I. Battle Stations appears to exhibit the condition known as “ ‘Training is a Given’ Beginning.” Brinkerhoff notes that this condition, “while it does not represent ideal practice,”⁴⁵ is done because someone *said* it will be done. Training of this sort is mandated by a manager, chief executive officer, or external authority. Commonly, employees skip directly to Stage II simply because management has ordered a program change. Disregarding the Stage I analysis because management has decreed that a training program will be created or modified is not advised. The preferred approach is to work in close contact with management and seek out the problem that motivated the mandated change. This teamwork will help decide long-range topics and applications that would promote the greatest benefit for the company. Attention should also be on assessing employee groups, organizational areas, and performance dimensions.⁴⁶ Key questions that should be asked include:

- What problems or opportunities could training address?
- Where could training make the most worthwhile contribution?
- What sort of training is preferred?
- What kind of training has the biggest payoff?⁴⁷

Two related questions should be considered: What alternatives to training, and what alternative training goals might be worthwhile? This condition of mandated change

⁴⁵ Brinkerhoff, p. 44.

⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷ Brinkerhoff, p. 47.

is common, but should not become standard operating procedure. Training will only survive if it adds value to the organization.⁴⁸

3. Stage II - Evaluate Training Design

After assessing a company's needs and translating them into objectives, the next step involves designing a training program to fit and execute these objectives in the best manner. Many training strategies could be utilized: lectures to group-building techniques, on-site to off-site methods, simulation to computer-assisted training. Training program designs can be categorized in numerous ways. Stage II involves deciding on the important questions to ask in a particular training design situation that will answer the questions referred to in Table 1, and develop an optimal training format.

There are several criteria to consider when designing a training program:⁴⁹

- **Criterion 1: Clarity and Definition** - Plans must be made clear and communicated explicitly. Needs, goals, objectives, processes, methods, resources, and inputs must all be spelled out to ensure clarity of the program.
- **Criterion 2: Theoretical Adequacy of the Training Design** - Designs must be theoretically sound and incorporate learning theory to reflect analyses conducted in Stage I. Theoretical knowledge requires a knowledge of current research and designs through the fields of educational psychology and instructional design.
- **Criterion 3: Compatibility** - A design must fit its environment and the culture of the company. The design should be consistent with company terminology, policy, and values and must also coincide with employee education levels, and employee work demands.

⁴⁸ Brinkerhoff, p. 45.

⁴⁹ Brinkerhoff, pp. 85-89.

- **Criterion 4: Practicality and Cost Effectiveness** - The design must be economically feasible. It must also not make unreasonable demands on employees, management, and available resources.
- **Criterion 5: Responsiveness to Needs** - Stage I identified the needs and objectives of the training program. The design must address all of the needs and objectives.
- **Criterion 6: Superior to Alternatives** - Alternatives must be continually and systematically compared. Alternatives to the entire training program must be included as an option. If an alternative mode is found to be better, it must be the one to be implemented.
- **Criterion 7: Adult-Learning Practices** - Designs should make every effort to reflect state-of-the-art methods and avoid obsolete ones. However, the design should try not to be stylish just to keep up with fads, as this aspect violates preceding criteria.
- **Criterion 8: Legality and Ethics** - The content of this criterion seems obvious but must be stated and considered. It relates to laws, policies, and value systems of employees. Programs that are biased to race, religion, sex, or infringe on human rights should not be considered. Whereas other criteria may be balanced and compromised for the best outcome, this criterion should never be violated.

Using the criteria stated above, a training method must be decided upon. Several different methods are used today. As previously stated, the method needs to be based on the training objectives. Methods can be grouped into several different categories: presentation techniques, hands-on techniques, off and on-site methods.⁵⁰ Each method brings its own strengths and weaknesses, and must be chosen carefully. Some techniques include: lectures, audiovisual material, conferences, distance learning, on-the-job learning, apprenticeships, role playing, and job rotation. With the advent of modern

⁵⁰ Noe, et al. p. 359; Muchinsky, p. 185.

technology, additional techniques are becoming popular e.g. computer-aided instruction, simulation, and virtual reality.⁵¹

Another important step of Stage II dictates documenting the training process. Documentation allows for evaluation of the program. Evaluation depends on complete and accurate description of the training's intended operation and outcomes. This description then becomes the reference for evaluative judgments about the training design.⁵² The suggested method for documenting a training design uses a three-worksheet format, with each separate worksheet describing a different aspect of the design.

The first worksheet is a participant/outcome analysis.⁵³ This worksheet documents four items: who will receive the training, what immediate learning outcome will employees receive if the program is successful, the job-usage objectives that will be transferred, and the organizational benefits.⁵⁴ This worksheet will also be useful to communicate the intent to future employees, managers, or interested parties after the training is complete.

The second worksheet shows the major process components in the design and the intended relationship between components. The third worksheet is used to depict the

⁵¹ Ibid.

⁵² Brinkerhoff, pp. 80, 83.

⁵³ Brinkerhoff, p. 80.

⁵⁴ Ibid.

detailed operation of each component by showing the resources the component needs, the process by which the outcome is achieved, and a list of the intended outcomes.⁵⁵

Since Battle Stations utilizes a simulation-type training design (see Chapter III), details of a proper simulation training design warrant further discussion. A simulation is a model of a process or activity. It may represent virtually any function, situation, or idea within the company. It allows trainees to see the outcome and impact of their decisions and actions in an artificial, risk-free environment. Simulations also provide additional benefits. First, simulations "produce powerful experiences, providing insight and skills for participants to use as a basis for changing their behavior."⁵⁶ The power behind a simulation includes experiential learning, rather than just passive knowledge. When this outcome occurs, people are more likely to change in response to it.⁵⁷ Another simulation outcome is that it "offers a chance for individuals to increase their self-awareness and monitor their own behavior, specifically regarding how they interact with the other team members."⁵⁸ Simulation offers much more than just a realistic training environment - it permits the trainees to view their own actions and behavior, and it stresses teamwork by interactive role playing.

The first step in deciding whether to use a simulation is to analyze the training situation. Once a simulation is decided upon, trainers and facilitators need to prepare for

⁵⁵ Brinkerhoff, pp. 82-83.

⁵⁶ Slack, p. 79.

⁵⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁸ Solomon, p. 102.

their assignment. Four tips are recommended: attend a simulation as a participant and observer, hone skills by utilizing learning games, co-facilitate another simulation, and start with small simulation exercises.⁵⁹ The simulation design itself should ensure the training meets its objectives. Designers should omit any interactive features that do not contribute to the training goals.⁶⁰ This action decreases costs and eliminates distraction of unnecessary scenarios. Also, the actual team that works together in the company should experience the simulation as a team.⁶¹ This practice ensures smooth transition back into the work place, and allows employees to feel more comfortable together while on the job.

Simulations should not be relied upon as the sole source of learning. Solomon states that effective simulations “take the best of the experiential and combine it with more traditional learning methods.”⁶² This technique is conducted with some form of lecture preceding the exercise. A lecture sets up for the trainees exactly what they will encounter, and provide instruction for them to meet their training objective. Similarly, a debrief is just as important. Slack says,

The carefully structured debriefing periods are as crucial to the learning process as the simulation themselves. [Facilitators] can reinforce the learning process by asking people to reflect on the barriers that cause

⁵⁹ Slack, p. 84.

⁶⁰ Lierman, p. 51.

⁶¹ Solomon, p. 104.

⁶² Solomon, p. 102.

problems, and then having them design corrective actions to break through those barriers.⁶³

Good team-building experiences include in-depth debriefing at the conclusion of the exercises.

Facilitators are equally crucial to an effective simulation. Slack notes that facilitators need "to be confident that they can handle the issues and tensions."⁶⁴

Additionally, Solomon points out that simulations work if "the facilitator makes a strong connection between the simulation and the daily work environment."⁶⁵ Facilitators must be knowledgeable in the subject area they are overseeing.

The very heart of simulation is the realism the design provides for trainees. Slack stresses,

The primary success factor in designing a simulation is the modeling of issues that face participants in their real work lives. The more real the simulation is, the more directly people can apply its lessons to their jobs. The most effective simulations are those with high "face validity." Participants should say afterwards, "That was realistic."⁶⁶

Nearly all literature on simulation emphasizes realism as the major factor in the effectiveness of the training program. Slack continues, "Realistic scenarios require careful administration. Many materials and props may be required for creating a realistic

⁶³ Slack, p. 82.

⁶⁴ Slack, p. 84.

⁶⁵ Solomon, p. 104.

⁶⁶ Slack, p. 80.

environment.”⁶⁷ And Lierman asks, “How will the simulation recreate the control and displays seen by the trainees in the actual work environment? How accurate do these...representations have to be?”⁶⁸ Slack adds, “The most believable simulations describe scenarios and people with a journalist’s sense of accuracy and a playwright’s sense of drama.”⁶⁹

The result of using a simulation yields numerous outputs beyond the impact of training in a representative environment that trainees will experience at their jobs. First, simulation allow trainees to make errors and see the effects of their errors without experiencing real-life consequences. Similarly, simulation permits trainees to “practice emergency procedures before being exposed to hazardous situations in real life.”⁷⁰

Behavior and learning patterns are also affected. Slack points out that trainees learn to focus not just on their behavior, but “on how to improve the ways in which work gets done. [Trainees] direct their energies toward the systematic causes then to change their individual behavior accordingly.”⁷¹ Finally, trainees should take what they experienced back to their jobs. Simulation should make such an impact that trainees relate their happenings during training to on-the-job tasks.

⁶⁷ Slack, p. 89.

⁶⁸ Lierman, p. 52.

⁶⁹ Slack, p. 80.

⁷⁰ Muchinsky, p. 191.

⁷¹ Slack, p. 83.

How is a successful simulation evaluated? Four levels are offered: First, did the trainees say that it was a good experience and that they learned something that will influence them? Second, was there a transfer of knowledge? Next, does trainees' behavior change to demonstrate the ability to transfer and apply the learning? Finally, does the training produce results for the company as a whole by reducing costs, increasing productivity, improving quality, or increasing profits?⁷² These levels may take months to observe, but will produce results if done correctly.

4. Stage III - Evaluate Operation

Stage III begins with the training program ready to be implemented. The purpose of Stage III is meant to monitor the implementation of the decided design and to make any necessary changes to help guide it to a successful conclusion. Inevitably, there will be differences from the plan on paper and what actually occurs.

At this stage, the training plan needs to be fine-tuned while in motion. During Stage III, the program is observed to determine what is actually taking place, then compared to what is supposed to be taking place.⁷³ As any problems are noticed, the program is modified to make it more effective. Modifications may consist of simple adjustments to instructions and aids to a complete redesign of the program itself. In any case, Brinkerhoff states that the Stage III process is "one of observing and assessing the

⁷² Solomon, p. 108.

⁷³ Brinkerhoff, p. 94.

program's progress, noting discrepancies, making revisions, and trying it out again, then re-observing and reassessing to see if progress is acceptable."⁷⁴

Particulars of Stage III include several topics. With the program running, staff and facilitators can improve their abilities. They can observe each other and comment on problems they encounter. Documentation of problems is also key. It serves as a management tool so budgets and records can be maintained and interpreted. Brinkerhoff notes that when problems do arise, "a record of what has taken place in the program up to that point is a great aid to problem solving and troubleshooting."⁷⁵ Stage III also ensures that trainees are not distracted by events that could interfere with the learning process.⁷⁶ Equipment, training aids and any other factors, including the location, are all checked for operability and feasibility. The above items should be checked before starting the program to ensure the program runs smoothly with no interruptions or diversions.⁷⁷

Means to achieve Stage III goals include interviewing trainees to obtain their evaluation. Rating forms or surveys could also be utilized. Trainee follow-up could also be useful by gathering the participants at some time after the program and hear their comments after they have re-entered the workplace. Additionally, a non-participant observer could submit his/her evaluation, and add a "common sense" check to the

⁷⁴ Brinkerhoff, p. 96.

⁷⁵ Brinkerhoff, p. 98.

⁷⁶ Noe, et al., p. 356.

⁷⁷ Ibid.

program. In any case, trainee reactions are important. As Brinkerhoff notes, "If trainees do not like a training program, chances are there is a problem that needs fixing."⁷⁸

5. Stage IV - Evaluate Learning

Beginning with Stage IV, the model focuses on the overall effectiveness of the training program. Effectiveness is key to the total usefulness of the training program. If training is not effective or if employees are not increasing their overall knowledge, then time and money have been wasted.

Stages IV, V, and VI are all comparable to the popular Kirkpatrick Model for evaluating training programs. The model, developed in 1959, is widely used to evaluate corporate training programs.⁷⁹ The Kirkpatrick Model accomplish several goals: It acknowledges the importance of the trainees' attitudes regarding instruction and measures learning through examination. Additionally, it attempts to measure the positive behavioral skill transfer resulting from the training.⁸⁰ Stages IV, V, and VI will utilize these concepts in its evaluation of the training program.

The primary purpose of Stage IV is to "determine the extent to which changes have occurred."⁸¹ The guiding question of this stage is, "Did the training accomplish its immediate outcome?"⁸² Additionally, Stage IV evaluates the changes in skills,

⁷⁸ Brinkerhoff, p. 112.

⁷⁹ Oberman, p. 48.

⁸⁰ Ibid.

⁸¹ Brinkerhoff, p. 113.

⁸² Brinkerhoff, p. 114.

knowledge, and attitudes the training has or has not accomplished. The Kirkpatrick Model recommends the following assessments to measure the above concerns.⁸³

First, the trainees' attitude and degree of satisfaction are critical to the successful transfer of training principle into the trainees' work function. Certain questions must be addressed and answered by the trainees: relevance of instruction to the trainees' job; to what degree the activities and demonstrations helped the trainee understand the program's content; the competence, role, and style of the instructor; and usefulness of the instructional material.

Next, the Kirkpatrick model determines the trainee's mastery of the course objectives. It demonstrates the program's effectiveness in providing the trainee with the ability to understand the principles, facts, techniques, and skills presented in the training. It also measures both cognitive learning and behavioral skills.⁸⁴ Cognitive learning reflects whether the trainees gained knowledge of the learning objectives. This assessment is usually checked by knowledge tests. In order to be effective, knowledge tests must accurately reflect the training goals. Behavioral skills test whether trainees can exhibit a full understanding of the newly acquired skills. This test is usually conducted through practical demonstration.⁸⁵ Other forms of assessing the goals of Stage IV include

⁸³ Oberman, p. 48.

⁸⁴ Ibid.

⁸⁵ Ibid.

achievement tests, interviews with trainees, or self-assessments by trainees who judge their own achievement level.

6. Stage V - Evaluate Usage and Endurance of Learning

For training programs to be successful, trainees must use their newly-acquired training in their workplace. As Oberman puts it, Stage V “focuses on the ability to transfer the knowledge and task skills from the classroom to the trainee’s job function.”⁸⁶ In other words, Stage V evaluates actual job performance and its outputs over trainees ability to merely perform the learned skills. To measure an increase in performance, managers must know where the trainees stood before starting the training program. Therefore, it is recommended that a baseline of the trainee’s skill level be established beforehand.⁸⁷

Two characteristics of the work environment are particularly important: the opportunity for trainees to use their new skills, behaviors, and knowledge; and the ability to demonstrate new attitudes in a climate that favorably promotes transfer of learned skills and behaviors.⁸⁸ If trainees are not given the opportunity to use their new skills, transfer of knowledge and skill is unlikely to occur. One way to avoid this pitfall is to involve management in the training process. Management that gets involved and shows

⁸⁶ Ibid.

⁸⁷ Ibid.

⁸⁸ Noe, et al., p. 357.

visible support and interest transfer the motivation to their employees, which, in turn, gets them excited and enables them to display support for the program.

Stage V asks several guiding questions to be used when measuring the transfer of skills and knowledge:⁸⁹

- Who is using the training?
- What aspects of training are being used?
- How is the training being used?
- When, where, and how often is the training being used?
- How else is training being used?
- How well is training being used?
- How do trainees know whether they are using the training correctly?

Answer to these questions can be accomplished by interviewing, observation, questionnaires, and performance appraisals.⁹⁰

7. Stage VI - Evaluate Payoff

Stage VI completes the cycle of developing an effective training program. Once a program has been researched, designed, and implemented, the real test is to see if the training program is effective. Effectiveness is the bottom line determination if the effort and time was cost-effective and produced results. Stage VI focuses on determining whether training did achieve the purposes it aimed for in the first place.

⁸⁹ Brinkerhoff, pp. 148-150.

⁹⁰ Brinkerhoff, p. 158.

The Kirkpatrick Model identified four levels of criteria to evaluate training programs: reaction, learning, behavior, and results.⁹¹ Reaction documents the trainees' immediate reactions to the training.⁹² It measures impressions and feelings about the training: Did trainees feel it was useful? Did the participants like the program?⁹³ The reaction criteria are treated as a measure of the face validity in the training program. Most trainers believe that initial receptivity provides a good atmosphere for learning in the instructional program.⁹⁴ This aspect is best measured by evaluations at the end of the program or by some other form of documentation, such as interviews.

Learning criteria evaluate how much has been learned in the training program.⁹⁵ This criterion asks the simple question, Did the trainees learn what they what they were supposed to learn? A post-test can be administered with scores being compared to a pre-test that established a baseline knowledge (as recommended in Stage V).

Behavioral criteria refer to actual changes in performance once the employee is back on the job.⁹⁶ Did the participants apply their new learning? This criterion is best judged by managers' observations and follow-ups to employees' initial reaction.⁹⁷

⁹¹ Muchinsky, p. 203; Chase, p. 33.

⁹² Carolan, p. 18.

⁹³ Chase, p. 33.

⁹⁴ Muchinsky, p. 203.

⁹⁵ Ibid.

⁹⁶ Muchinsky, p. 205.

⁹⁷ Chase, p. 33.

Results criteria asks the obvious, big-picture question: Did the training have any measurable business or company impact? Additionally, did it produce a return on investment for the money it spent?⁹⁸ Common sense dictates that the average job performance of the trained group should exceed that of an untrained group.⁹⁹ Direct observation can measure the group performance, along with management surveys of employees, performance records analysis, and studies on the company's productivity.¹⁰⁰

Training should never contain a fixed beginning and end; the process is on-going. To succeed, training must be reinforced continually and accommodate a company's changing needs.¹⁰¹ The Six-Stage Model, along with the Kirkpatrick Model, is a recommended tool to build or revise any training program. It requires time, effort, and thought, along with an educational effort.¹⁰² Following these models should guide any company into creating and implementing a productive and successful training program.

Battle Stations not only merits literature review as a training program, but also as a rite of passage for recruits. The Navy Times describes Battle Stations as "boot camp's new rite of passage."¹⁰³ Battle Stations' facilitators stress the importance of the program as a rite of passage which concludes with a ceremonial graduation and recruits receiving

⁹⁸ Ibid.

⁹⁹ Muchinsky, p. 205.

¹⁰⁰ Brinkerhoff, pp. 189-190.

¹⁰¹ Carolan, p. 18.

¹⁰² Brinkerhoff, p. 234.

¹⁰³ Burlage, p. 4.

their "Navy" ball cap. This ball cap is meant to symbolize the recruits' acceptance into the Navy by successfully completing Battle Stations, and coincides with recruits being called "Sailors" for the first time. Therefore, literature review will be conducted on rites and ceremonials in organizations to determine if Battle Stations and its graduation ceremony exhibits characteristics of an effective rite of passage.

C. RITES AND CEREMONIALS IN ORGANIZATIONS

Beyer, et al., defines organizational culture as "a network of shared understandings, norms, and values that are taken for granted and lie beneath the surface of organizational life."¹⁰⁴ These understandings and norms are what defines an organization. In order to preserve this culture, an organization must find ways to communicate its norms and values in some tangible way. Preservation is conducted through ceremonials within the organization. Ceremonials act to "consolidate the numerous forms of ideological expressions in a given culture into one converged form."¹⁰⁵ Along with ceremonials, other communication forms assist in perpetuating cultural norms and values: rites, rituals, symbols and myths, to name a few. A rite can be defined as a "relatively elaborate, dramatic, planned set of activities that combines various forms of cultural expressions and often has both practical and expressive

¹⁰⁴ Beyer, et al., p. 6.

¹⁰⁵ Trice, p. 227.

consequences.”¹⁰⁶ Therefore, a ceremonial is a “system of several rites connected with a single occasion or event.”¹⁰⁷

Rites and ceremonials exhibit additional characteristics. The activities as defined are carried out through social interactions, usually for the benefit of an audience.¹⁰⁸ Also, rites and ceremonials produce consequences at the practical or expressive level with intended and recognized (manifest) results, or unintended and largely unrecognized (latent).¹⁰⁹ Results at the practical level exhibit tangible outcomes where the results ‘do things’ while results at the expressive level convey cultural messages or ‘say things.’¹¹⁰ For example, Beyer, et al., uses rites for training new managers to illustrate these points:¹¹¹ Practical, manifest consequences show a thorough evaluation of trainees’ potential and improvement in administrative skills to choose the best-qualified candidate, while a practical, latent consequence shows the relative priorities placed on various areas of company performance and is reinforced throughout management. An expressive, manifest consequence displays the transformation of the successful trainee’s social identity within the company’s culture, while an expressive, latent consequence enhances

¹⁰⁶ Beyer, et al., p. 6.

¹⁰⁷ Trice, p. 234.

¹⁰⁸ Trice, p. 235.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid.

¹¹⁰ Beyer, et al., p. 8; Trice, p. 235.

¹¹¹ Beyer, et al., p. 10.

the prestige of the managerial role within the company and motivates others to strive for that level.

Ceremonials are grouped into six categories: rites of passage, degradation, enhancement, renewal, conflict-reduction, and integration.¹¹² Each rite contains distinctive characteristics. Since Battle Stations exhibits characteristics of a rite of passage, it will be described further.

Rites of passage create "marked changes in status for the individuals involved."¹¹³ Additionally, rites of passage can be grouped in three subsets: rites of separation, transition, and incorporation.¹¹⁴ To illustrate these three subsets, Beyer, et al., utilize the example of basic training. Rites of separation begin when the recruit reports to boot camp. The recruit is stripped of his/her past identity and status, and forced to endure repeated humiliation as he/she learns the basics of a new lifestyle. Rites of transition occur during basic training when the raw recruits learn the practical skills associated with their new identity. The recruit is repeatedly tested, presumably to determine what new permanent role he/she is capable of assuming in the organization. Rites of incorporation begin with the assignment to a new unit, followed by parades and graduation, culminating with the issuing of new insignia.

¹¹² Trice, p. 236.

¹¹³ Beyer, et al, p. 9.

¹¹⁴ Ibid.

Rites of passage produce several effects. First, it transfers persons into their new persona. Next and less obvious, rites of passage produce a social consequence. It acts to fill vacant social roles with persons who are as much as possible like present and previous occupants of the role into which they have moved.¹¹⁵ This act minimizes disturbance during the transfer, while also socializing new members and quickening their organizational identity.¹¹⁶ It also ensures the status quo will continue by new members being educated on the organization. However, a latent consequence emerges by maintaining the status quo - change and diversity may not be a priority to the organization, nor does it appear to be desired.¹¹⁷

Other consequences may occur that directly tie into training. For individuals, testing and training during the rite of transition serve to "structure his/her expectations of, and commitments to a new organizational role."¹¹⁸ The trainee experiences organizational approval of his/her new status and gains some insight to further demands and expectations. For other members, training may reduce anxieties concerning the change and transmit cues that the trainee is competent, even though they may not be skilled completely.¹¹⁹ Facilitators of the rite may possess a preconceived notion that trainees are competent solely by the fact trainees are invited to participate in the rite.

¹¹⁵ Trice, p. 248.

¹¹⁶ Ibid.

¹¹⁷ Trice, p. 249.

¹¹⁸ Trice, et al., p. 47.

¹¹⁹ Ibid.

Therefore, according to Trice, et al., the impact of training ceremonials “rests with the belief in and acceptance by system members and not with empirical determinations.”¹²⁰

Evaluation of ceremonial effects becomes complex. One approach would devise a system that assesses latent and manifest consequences of both practical and expressive results. However, as Trice indicates, “This has rarely, if ever, been done.”¹²¹ He proposes several solutions. Practical outcomes are easily measured. However, he states that expressive effects should be treated in the same fashion by designing research directed at assessing if the expressive effect did occur and in what strength.¹²² To measure these effects would assume more “extensive evaluation research design that have been typically used.”¹²³ For this reason, measuring expressive effects has traditionally lacked focus.

Additionally, the ceremonial itself may be poorly executed or superbly done. An evaluation on implementation as well as outcomes should be emphasized. If the ceremonial is not conducted well, effects will be lost.¹²⁴

Finally managers play a key role in ceremonials. Beyer, et al., notes that managers must learn to assess “not only the technical consequences of those they

¹²⁰ Trice, et al., p. 48.

¹²¹ Trice, p. 260.

¹²² Trice, p. 261.

¹²³ Ibid.

¹²⁴ Ibid.

supervise, but also their possible expressive consequences as rites.”¹²⁵ Managers must know whether the ceremonial, expressive side of their programs reinforces or undermines desired, existing cultures and beliefs.¹²⁶ Because of ceremonials desired practical effects, rites are often designed by technical experts who are unaware of expressive consequences.

Additionally, managers also need to learn and practice ceremonial skills.¹²⁷ Flair for the dramatic and expressive speech demonstrate clear assets for the rite. They also must think creatively in order to modify the rite or express new ideas and values. Managers must constantly evaluate the rite to ensure it is producing requires effects and update it accordingly. Similarly, managers must believe in the expressive consequences along with the practical. Managers who are insensitive to expressive consequences may discontinue them on technical grounds, thereby unintentionally losing their expressive benefits.

Finally, symbols are an additional culture form that help define ceremonials. Trice defines symbols as “words, objects, conditions, acts, or characteristics of persons which refer to, or stand for, the relations among men, and between men and their environment.”¹²⁸ Symbols convey important cultural messages and meaning to its

¹²⁵ Beyer, et al., p. 21.

¹²⁶ Ibid.

¹²⁷ Trice, et al., p. 666.

¹²⁸ Trice, p. 229.

members with the use of language, setting, etc. during a rite.¹²⁹ Therefore, Preston states, "rather than concentrating on how symbols...might be created and presented, it is important to look at how they are recognized and understood."¹³⁰ Symbols not only exist in the ceremonial or rite but in everyday experiences at work. Similarly, managers must understand what the symbol is representing. Preston points out that studies show the manager is "often hindered and confused by what appears to be contradictory symbols of culture."¹³¹ Managers, therefore, must be clear on what they perceive the symbol represents and how it will be viewed by trainees.

This chapter reviewed literature on the characteristics and construction of an effective training program utilizing the Six-Stage and Kirkpatrick models. Additionally through literature review, this chapter presents a description of ceremonials within organizations and how they help continue an organization's culture via effective leadership. These concepts will be utilized to compare the creation, implementation, and effectiveness of Battle Stations in Chapter V. Meanwhile, Chapters III and IV will describe the Battle Stations in detail from its conception to its current configuration.

¹²⁹ Preston, p. 19.

¹³⁰ Preston, p. 27.

¹³¹ Preston, p. 28.

III. BATTLE STATIONS HISTORY

A. INTRODUCTION

This chapter describes the rationale and process behind the creation of Battle Stations. Battle Stations was ordained by senior leadership, the CNO in conjunction with senior CNO staff.¹³² Some questions immediately come to mind:

- Why did the CNO order this program?
- What background research was conducted to see if this program was needed or would work?
- What problem was Battle Stations intended to correct or solve?
- Once created, how did the program evolve to its present eight-scenario format, with plans to expand to thirteen scenarios?
- What research went into its design?

This chapter will answer these and other questions about the history of Battle Stations.

Battle Stations is closely linked with the Marine Corps' equivalent program, The Crucible. The Crucible was implemented before Battle Stations and plays a key role in the formation of Battle Stations. This chapter will also briefly describe The Crucible program and how it came to be. Interviews with Crucible and other Marine Corps personnel and a direct observation of the program were conducted for this chapter.

¹³² Interview with STSCS (SS/SW) Dahl. STSCS Dahl is one of the original designers of Battle Stations. He was personally hand-picked, along with other senior enlisted personnel, to construct, design, and implement the program. He is still presently assigned to Battle Stations at RTC. The history of the program is pieced together mainly from a direct and in-depth interview with him and other facilitators, along with related information from published articles.

Finally, Battle Stations raises several questions and issues about its content, format, and purpose. Even though it has been lauded by senior Navy officials as one of the best Navy programs ever, Secretary of Defense William Cohen called RTC and the addition of Battle Stations, "a model,"¹³³ others are not quite ready to support it fully. Even the MCPON, ETCM (SW) John Hagan, remarks,

When completely executed and fully resourced as planned, Battle Stations will be the best thing that has happened to Naval recruit training. If Battle Stations development is stopped mid-stream or watered down, it will be just another gimmick.¹³⁴

The remainder of this chapter will discuss issues raised since the implementation of Battle Stations to include the rationale for program's creation, its training methodology, the realism of the scenarios, and the program's effectiveness.

B. RATIONALE

The history of the Battle Stations program is relatively simple, but based is embedded in a much broader issue facing the Navy. According to Otto Kreisher, "The Navy...has been criticized by some veterans and defense analysts for creating...a 'kinder and gentler' recruit training, which they feared would not produce combat-ready warriors."¹³⁵ This sentiment, which is echoed by Naval officers and senior enlisted personnel,¹³⁶ eventually led to the creation of Battle Stations.

¹³³ As reported in "Navy of 90's Turns Recruit Friendly," p. 8.

¹³⁴ Phone conversation with ETCM (SW) John Hagan.

¹³⁵ Kreisher, p. 15.

¹³⁶ Ibid.

According to Navy officials, "About five years ago, members of the Naval fleet complained that the newly trained sailors coming from boot camp were not prepared to work on a ship."¹³⁷ These complaints led to separate studies on recruit training by a Pentagon commission and a House National Security Committee.¹³⁸ The House Committee concluded, "Of all the factors that conspire to diminish military readiness, perhaps none is as troubling as a reduction in the amount and quality of training," and reported that the military's level of training is "barely getting by."¹³⁹ According to the commanding officer of RTC, "Our youngsters are arriving here and they don't have the military bearing or the desire or the stamina; they don't meet our requirements."¹⁴⁰

In attempting to toughen recruit training, the Navy faced an additional problem: to train and instill military discipline into today's youth, many of whom were brought up on different values than a generation ago. Frequently, recruits come from single-parent households, broken and abusive homes, and/or crime-ridden inner cities. They have a mistrust of adults and little respect for authority.¹⁴¹ LCDR O'Dowd also notes that another problem in attempting to toughen today's recruits is physically conditioning people who "often consider the walk from a mall's parking lot to the stores an ordeal."¹⁴²

¹³⁷ Newbart, p. 8.

¹³⁸ Kreisher, p. 16.

¹³⁹ Spence, Floyd, Report to House Committee on National Security.

¹⁴⁰ CAPT Cory Whitehead in "Tougher by Design," p. 16.

¹⁴¹ Presentation by LCDR O'Dowd.

¹⁴² Ibid.

The men and women who join the Navy today are more technologically sound and computer savvy, but are, in general, less physically fit.

The result of the criticism by military and Congressional members, and the change in recruit personal characteristics, produced a mind-set shift in the design of recruit training. Newbart states that under this change, the Navy "is more in tune with reaching 1990's teenagers and with teaching complicated military technology."¹⁴³

Psychological and sociological studies were conducted by RTC to determine the best ways to treat people with similar adverse backgrounds. These studies determined that changes in training philosophy and content must be made.¹⁴⁴ Newbart says of today's recruits, "To train the members of the MTV generation... there are interactive videos, academic resource centers with multimedia, even access to electronic mail."¹⁴⁵

Along with increased technical requirements demanded of the Sailor Navy, there came an increased re-awareness of the Navy's need to instill core values - honor, courage, commitment - throughout the recruit training curriculum. Navy officials wanted recruits to emerge from boot camp with a whole new attitude about themselves, their goals, their shipmates, and the Navy. To accomplish this vision, RTC scrapped the traditional role model of the Recruit Division Commander (RDC).¹⁴⁶ Instead, "recruits are treated with

¹⁴³ Newbart, p. 8.

¹⁴⁴ Presentation by LCDR O'Dowd.

¹⁴⁵ Newbart, p. 8.

¹⁴⁶ RDC is the Navy's equivalent to a drill instructor. RDCs are responsible to train a group of recruits during boot camp.

respect, leaders talk about 'empowering' junior sailors, and trainers worry about maximizing learning curves."¹⁴⁷ As the commander of NTC described it,

The new Navy requires warrior-technicians and our training has been changed to reflect these new realities. We are working to build discipline and genuine confidence, rather than perpetuating a climate of intimidation.¹⁴⁸

At the same time the Navy was rethinking its boot camp philosophy and goals, the Marine Corps was conducting a similar change with its recruit training process. The Commandant of the Marine Corps redefined the purpose of Marine boot camp which led to the development and implementation of a 54-hour culminating event which they called "The Crucible." The Crucible occurs at the end of recruit training where Marines participate in various exercises and activities to challenge them physically and mentally. A detailed description of The Crucible will be presented later in this chapter.

In January, 1997, the CNO and Chief of Naval Education and Training (CNET) observed The Crucible.¹⁴⁹ Witnessing the event, they sought to implement a similar program. Based solely on their observations, they contacted the commander of NTC, RADM Green, and requested that he quickly develop some type of program comparable to The Crucible.¹⁵⁰ According to STSCS Dahl, the task was delegated to senior enlisted personnel at RTC with the guidance of creating a program that is "physically and

¹⁴⁷ Newbart, p. 8.

¹⁴⁸ RADM Kevin Green in "Tougher By Design," p. 17.

¹⁴⁹ Interview with STSCS (SS/SW) Dahl.

¹⁵⁰ Ibid.

mentally challenging with some degree of risk.”¹⁵¹ Five Chief Petty Officers who were assigned to RTC at the time were tasked with the assignment: STSCS Dahl, BUC Conahan, DCCM Reger, BMCM Likely, and FCC Caft. STSCS Dahl is still assigned to Battle Stations.

The five senior enlisted personnel, with limited guidance from the Director of Training at RTC and RADM Green, formulated a plan. Development began in March and was modeled after *The Crucible*.¹⁵² Navy personnel took what the Marine Corps had developed and copied its format without assessing background information on how the Marine Corps developed it. Nor did they discuss pros and cons of *The Crucible* and apply it to the Navy’s situation. Additionally, no research was conducted to determine if *The Crucible*’s format would provide any benefit for the Navy, nor was there any research conducted on how to develop a new training program properly.¹⁵³ According to STSCS (SS/SW) Dahl, “its distinctly ‘Navy’ flavor was designed to take into account...what it means to be a sailor.”¹⁵⁴ In addition to their guidance, they decided to apply the Navy core values, to stress team work in all scenarios, and to include Naval history into the formulation of the events. Working by themselves and under pressure to create some type of program, they came up with the present format which is described in Chapter IV. Program ideas were finalized after approval through the Director of Training

¹⁵¹ Ibid.

¹⁵² Newcomb, p. 24.

¹⁵³ Interviews with LT Bradshaw and STSCS (SS/SW) Dahl.

¹⁵⁴ STSCS (SS/SW) Dahl in “Battle Stations!” *All Hands*, p. 24.

and RADM Green, but no approval was sought of CNET or the CNO. Approval came from within RTC's chain-of-command.¹⁵⁵

Six months later in July, 1997, Battle Stations was implemented. According to STSCS Dahl, they "didn't want to emulate the 'Crucible,' [they] wanted something that would work for the Navy."¹⁵⁶ Drawing strictly on their own experiences, they developed scenarios that seemed to stress team-building and the Navy core values, and contained some practical fleet application. Additionally, the team decided to use Naval historical references of Medal of Honor recipients to tie-in each scenario's objective with the idea of teamwork and the Navy's core values, similar to the basis of each station in The Crucible. The references used were also researched by the team. The team worked to staff, train, and pilot the scenarios. Certain factors were taken into account, such as the limited facilities and materials available at RTC to construct each scenario, and nighttime work hours in order to accommodate regular recruit training during the day. With six scenarios complete and work still in-progress for six additional scenarios, the first set of recruits completed Battle Stations on July 30, 1997.

C. THE CRUCIBLE

With Battle Stations being modeled after The Crucible and the Navy relying on the impressions regarding its success, this section will describe how The Crucible was formed and the thought-process behind its creation.

¹⁵⁵ Interviews with LT Bradshaw and STSCS (SS/SW) Dahl.

¹⁵⁶ Kreisher, p. 17.

General Charles Krulak was appointed Commandant of the Marine Corps in July, 1995. At that time, he brought with him innovative ideas how to reshape the Marine Corps' boot camp. He saw changes in how the Marine Corps will be fighting in the future, and changes in the type of recruit entering the Marine Corps. He based his thinking about the changes on two ideas: the changing nature of warfare and the changing nature of society.¹⁵⁷ According to General Krulak, the changing nature of warfare pertained to the changing responsibilities that he foresaw for today's Marine warrior. General Krulak argued that today's Marine is different from Marines of the past in that his/her duties are numerous: the warrior must be able to lend aid to a wounded child, be a peacekeeper between warring tribes, and be a fighting warrior; and this would all occur within three city blocks. The changing nature of society referred to General Krulak's desire to join parents, churches, and schools in combating the war against drugs, alcohol, gangs, and sex which is dominant in today's youth.¹⁵⁸ As a result, General Krulak decided to revamp boot camp by taking the Marine ethos and building on it, which resulted in longer and tougher boot camp, culminating with a "defining moment in their life"¹⁵⁹ - "The Crucible."

In General Krulak's opinion, The Crucible is built around "strictly teamwork," with the driving idea of "selflessness" being the overwhelming theme. General Krulak

¹⁵⁷ CNN interview with General Krulak.

¹⁵⁸ Ibid.

¹⁵⁹ Ibid.

deduced that "sooner or later, all Marines will go back into society; [he] wants them going back better for being a Marine."¹⁶⁰ He deduced and listed three objectives of The Crucible:

1. Build up the recruits, yet make them understand there is nothing wrong with the idea of selflessness.
2. Make recruits understand that being part of a team is nothing to worry about but should be viewed as a positive experience.
3. Encourage recruits to demonstrate not only the utmost confidence in their own ability but confidence in their teammates as well.¹⁶¹

He indicated the objective of The Crucible is not to wash people out or to demonstrate boot camp skills but to stress selflessness and teamwork.

Working groups were formed to create The Crucible.¹⁶² The first group consisted of drill instructors and personnel of every rank from Sergeant up to Lieutenant Colonel. This group devised concepts, offered and discussed ideas, and developed a basic framework for The Crucible. Individuals offered their experience for ideas, and the group revised and debated it. A second working group was constituted consisting of the Commandant and other senior officers, who consolidated and analyzed the concepts created by the first working group. After careful and detailed planning, The Crucible began in December, 1996.

¹⁶⁰ Ibid.

¹⁶¹ Ibid.

¹⁶² Telephone interview with LtCol Becker.

The Crucible encompass 54 hours where recruits experience 32 different activity stations. Each station is based on basic skills learned during boot camp and is related to some heroic event in Marine Corps history.¹⁶³ It is physically demanding with many stations involving stops on the confidence course.¹⁶⁴ The entire 54 hours is spent outdoors where recruits sleep, eat, and train in a simulated war environment. Examples of stations that recruits must pass are live fire exercises, pugil stick competitions, obstacle course maneuvers, and multiple-mile hikes in full combat gear. Other stations are designed as deliberate team-building exercises in which recruits must think and act together to accomplish the task. These tasks also utilize objectives Marines must attain in a combat environment. An example of this type of station is where recruits must cross a rope bridge with a 50 pound ammunition box. Recruits are not graded on their individual accomplishment of the stations; everyone passes. It is an exercise in teamwork.

At the conclusion of The Crucible, recruits participate in a graduation ceremony. At Camp Pendleton, CA, recruits are engaged in an eight mile hike through the hills overlooking the Pacific Ocean. Up to this point in training, all personnel are referred to as "recruits." Drill instructors time it so at the five mile point, the group of recruits are at the summit of one of the hills at sunrise. Here drill instructors hold the graduation ceremony. At sunrise, recruits receive their Eagle-Globe-Anchor (the Marine Corps

¹⁶³ Interview with Major Hamester.

¹⁶⁴ Ibid. The confidence course is a series of events designed to build confidence in recruits by negotiating physically challenging obstacles. Such obstacles include the use of monkey bars, 30 foot platforms, simulated trenches with barbed wire, etc. It is a regular training event during boot camp.

emblem) and their insignia to the next higher rank for those who make promotion.¹⁶⁵ For the first time, they are referred to as "Marines."

The Marine Corps hierarchy has claimed The Crucible as a major success as a training tool for recruits.¹⁶⁶ They say it has strengthened the bond that all Marines share as part of a fraternity, and it has accomplished all the goals Gen. Krulak set out for it. But how is the effectiveness of The Crucible measured? According to the Commanding Officer Weapons Field Training Battalion Camp Pendleton, Colonel Duggan, effectiveness cannot be measured.¹⁶⁷ According to Colonel Duggan, it is an intangible that can only be measured through attitudes of Marines. Presently, the effectiveness of The Crucible as a training tool for Marine recruits is not measured.

This chapter discussed the rationale and thought-process behind the Navy's creation of Battle Stations and its draw on the Marine Corps' sister program, The Crucible. It has been shown that the driving force behind Battle Stations' creation and design was The Crucible which had already been established by the Marine Corps. The next chapter will provide an overview of the Battle Stations program with detailed description on how it functions and the content of each scenario.

¹⁶⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶⁶ CNN interview with General Krulak.

¹⁶⁷ Interview with Colonel Duggan.

IV. BATTLE STATIONS OVERVIEW

A. INTRODUCTION

This chapter provides an overview and description of each scenario, and the subsequent graduation ceremony, to include its objective, setting, associated historical reference, and recruit requirements. This portrait of Battle Stations will provide a baseline to compare to the literature review conducted in Chapter II. Presently, there are eight scenarios with plans to expand to thirteen. A complete description of each scenario is listed in Appendix A. These descriptions are utilized by facilitators as instructions to guide them during the program. Additional data were collected by direct observation of the program.

B. OVERVIEW

Battle Stations falls under a separate entity under the Director of Training at RTC. It is commanded by a Lieutenant, and staffed with a Leading Chief Petty Officer (LCPO), an Assistant Leading Chief Petty Officer (ALCPO), a Support/Logistics Chief, and 17 facilitators, mostly chief petty officers and first class petty officers. They administer Battle Stations to recruits along with associated maintenance of the scenarios, record keeping, and continued development of the program. Facilitators are not assigned as

RDCs while assigned to Battle Stations. The need for facilitators is great since Battle Stations is being conducted five nights per week, Sunday through Thursday nights.¹⁶⁸

Before being allowed to participate in Battle Stations, facilitators are trained by Battle Stations staff. As a new program, Personnel Qualification Standards (PQS) have not been created for it, which is the norm for any activity which requires training in the Navy. Instead, facilitators must complete an in-house Job Qualification Requirement (JQR), which is provided in Appendix B. The Battle Stations Facilitator JQR was developed by the Battle Stations staff, and requires the facilitator to demonstrate knowledge in such areas as First Aid, Battle Stations operation, and team-building skills. The JQR must be signed by Battle Stations ALCPO, LCPO, Division Officer, with final qualification by the Director of Training.

Battle Stations facilitators and RDCs do not directly communicate during the recruit training process. However, to assist RDCs in preparing recruits for Battle Stations, facilitators provide an RDC Package (Appendix C). The package provides instructions for RDCs to help prepare their recruits for Battle Stations, and also instructs RDCs on administrative matters that must be completed prior to the start of Battle Stations. RDCs must follow strict timelines during normal recruit training; no time is set aside to train recruits specifically for Battle Stations.

¹⁶⁸ Interview with STSCS (SS/SW) Dahl. Battle Stations utilizes 20 facilitators. STSCS (SS/SW) Dahl estimates he needs 32 personnel to effectively run Battle Stations five nights per week.

RDCs are instructed not to inform recruits directly about Battle Stations or what is expected of them.¹⁶⁹ However, RDCs know what scenarios face the recruits, and train accordingly. RDCs stress these pertinent areas by simply informing recruits that "they will see this again and should pay attention."¹⁷⁰ However, these areas may happen at any time during recruit training, and minimal time is allowed to ensure all other recruit requirements are completed. Graduates of Battle Stations lament concern that information they needed to complete the program successfully had been lost during the stressful and crowded recruit training regime.¹⁷¹ Even though RDCs are not permitted to talk about the specific Battle Stations scenarios, they do talk about the program itself, but in a circumspect manner. Recruits undoubtedly hear rumors of something called Battle Stations they must pass to graduate. With rumors come the many stories that give the aura and mystique of Battle Stations. Recruits typically do not know what to make of the stories, whether they are true, false, or exaggerated. RDCs build on this aura by reminding recruits that Battle Stations is in their future, but do not expand on the issue; they leave the recruits "hanging."

One week before Battle Stations, RDCs finally reveal to the recruits that they indeed must go through a program called Battle Stations to graduate from recruit training. Each company is broken down into approximately four teams of 15-20 recruits.¹⁷² Final

¹⁶⁹ Interview with LT Bradshaw.

¹⁷⁰ Interview with STSCS (SS/SW) Dahl.

¹⁷¹ Interview with recruits from Companies 509 and 510.

¹⁷² Interview with STSCS (SS/SW) Dahl.

administrative matters are completed by RDCs ensuring recruits are prepared to start Battle Stations. Additionally, a master schedule is created displaying which team goes to which scenario. Each team starts at a different spot in the program since each scenario can only efficiently handle one team of approximately 20 recruits. All scenarios are not conducted in the same building. Consequently, recruits are required to “double time,” or run at a moderate pace, in formation between each scenario. The total distance covered is approximately $\frac{3}{4}$ mile.¹⁷³ Along the way, recruits are often led in “jodies”¹⁷⁴ for motivation purposes. Before entering a scenario, the group of recruits may be engaged in calisthenics while in formation. While traveling between scenarios, facilitators are continually acting in the quintessential drill instructor role by encouraging recruits through extreme motivational techniques. Double-timing is only conducted during the summer months. During winter months, recruits are simply marched from scenario to scenario.

Battle Stations must be passed by all recruits in order to fulfill graduation requirements from recruit training. There are four situations where recruits would fail Battle stations:¹⁷⁵

¹⁷³ Interview with FCC (SW) Keth.

¹⁷⁴ Jodies are songs or chants routinely sang by recruits while engaged in physical exercise, especially to cadence during formation runs.

¹⁷⁵ These reasons are not standard doctrine for Battle Stations. According to STSCS (SS/SW) Dahl, there is no formal, written doctrine for recruit failure. The reasons given are what has been observed with previous recruit drop-outs, or are perceived reasons.

1. Recruits fail to enter the pool from the swim tower.
2. Recruits fall-back or completely fall-out of double-timing between scenarios
3. Recruits quit on their own accord, or are in an unauthorized absence status from Battle Stations.
4. Recruits fail due to disciplinary reasons: foul language, fighting, failure to participate in a specific scenario, etc. This category also includes recruits who fail due to physical limitations or injuries.

However, Battle Stations personnel agree it is extremely rare that a recruit fails Battle Stations. As of November 19, 1997, there have only been 95 failures out of 18,349 participants.¹⁷⁶ Facilitators do not fail recruits strictly on performance levels at each scenario. However, a proposal is pending to change this rule. Titled "Three Strikes," (Appendix D) this proposal would increase the challenge of Battle Stations by allowing facilitators to charge strikes to recruits who fail certain performance levels at different scenarios. Three accumulated strikes and the recruit would fail Battle Stations.

Once Battle Stations begins, all scenarios follow a similar format. Recruits are gathered at the scenario where facilitators read to the recruits from a pre-written script describing the scenario. These scripts for each scenario are provided in Appendix A. The scripts contain the following information: the objective of the scenario, safety brief, and a Naval historical reference pertaining to the scenario. The objective tells the recruit the purpose of the scenario, what the recruit is supposed to accomplish, and any initial

¹⁷⁶ Reported at the 1997 Flag Manning Conference.

direction. The safety brief warns of actual dangers or precautions in the scenario. The historical reference is a feature of the program.

Each scenario uses examples of Medal of Honor recipients and other heroic deeds accomplished by enlisted personnel in the past. The intent is that performing an event based on Naval heritage will 'operationalize' the recruits' sense of pride in their service.¹⁷⁷

Noting how The Crucible utilized references to Marine Corps history, creators specifically researched Naval history for applicable heritage situations to apply to each scenario.¹⁷⁸ The entire script is explained to the group of recruits in a friendly, lecture-type atmosphere by the facilitator. This indoctrination lasts approximately 15 minutes when the scenario begins.

During each actual scenario, recruits are tested on a specific task. Facilitators encourage teamwork, group participation, and desire recruits to get "caught-up" in what they are doing. Facilitators do not participate. They monitor for safety issues, provide guidance, and to keep the scenario and the recruits moving.¹⁷⁹ After the scenario is completed, facilitators provide a debrief. They discuss with the recruits what they saw, point out mistakes, and provide how the historical reference applies now that recruits participated in the events. If a particular recruit did an exceptional job or stood-out, he/she is recognized; and the facilitator demonstrates why their action was exemplary.

¹⁷⁷ Newcomb, p. 24.

¹⁷⁸ Interview with STSCS (SS/SW) Dahl.

¹⁷⁹ Direct observation, November 20, 1997.

However, recruits are not individually graded and scenario results vary with each group of recruits.

Battle Stations starts approximately at 11:30 p.m. and last until approximately 7:00 a.m. the next morning, or about one hour per scenario. Safety is stressed by facilitators constantly monitoring for any physical difficulties exhibited by recruits. Dehydration is a major concern, and facilitators ensure recruits are constantly drinking water, especially during the summer months. Specific care is given to recruits who demonstrate G6PD and Sickle Cell traits.¹⁸⁰ They are marked with a red flag during Battle Stations and are kept hydrated during the program.

The remainder of this chapter will describe each scenario, including the graduation ceremony. In addition to the specifics provided in Appendix A, a brief overview and additional procedures of the scenario will be given, collected from direct observations made while attending an actual Battle Stations event. Narrative in the following sections was gathered by direct observation by the author and is meant to amplify what is referenced in Appendix A.

1. Scenario 1 - General Quarters

A general quarters drill initiates the Battle Stations program. Recruits are awakened after approximately two hours of sleep by an actual general alarm that is installed on surface ships. Recruits also hear a similar announcement over the ship's

¹⁸⁰ According to LT Bradshaw, recruits exhibiting these traits require extra care that they remain hydrated. A recruit with these traits had died from dehydration.

public address system (IMC) that they would hear onboard ship during a general quarters announcement. Recruits are required to get into full battle dress¹⁸¹ in under four minutes (the standard onboard ships) and to collect personal gear for the abandon ship scenario later in the night. Personal gear is carried in two seabags by two recruits for the rest of the group.

Facilitators then brief the recruits on what lies ahead of them for the rest of the night. They explain to the recruits the value of Battle Stations, while admonishing them that they are responsible to fight and defend their “ship” and must work together to achieve success. After receiving final instructions while recruits are standing at the position of attention, recruits head outdoors where they are formed up by group. Each event is allotted one hour, and this scenario is the shortest. Once formed, facilitators lead their groups in motivational chants and physical exercise. Finally, each group is run in formation to their respective starting point in Battle Stations. Since General Quarters is the starting scenario, there is no debrief for this event. The facilitators’ goal is to get the recruits awake and in the correct frame of mind for their upcoming challenges.

2. Scenario 2 - *Forrestal* Escape Scuttle

As referenced in Appendix A, recruits pass a fellow recruit through a simulated, vertical escape scuttle without allowing the recruit to touch any of its sides. This exercise represents a shipboard environment where a fire is present and causes the surrounding

¹⁸¹ Battle dress is defined as full dungaree uniform, dungarees tucked into socks, shirts buttoned to the top, kevlar helmet, web belt attached with two full canteens of water and gas mask, and appropriate outdoor gear, if needed.

surface to become red-hot. The alternative objective stresses teamwork by making the recruits work together to pass the individual and to be creative in exercising their technique. The scenario's historical reference is a fire onboard the *USS Forrestal* where 134 sailors died.

The prop used to simulate this glowing, vertical escape scuttle is an approximately eight foot by four foot piece of plywood with a hole cut in the middle matching the dimensions of an escape scuttle. The plywood is supported on end, and the hole is approximately four feet above the ground. The "heat" is simulated with red paint around the hole. The event is held in the main drill hall, and took approximately 15-20 minutes to complete by the entire group of recruits.

The scenario's format is borrowed from an internet article on team-building skills that one of the designers had read.¹⁸² The scuttle itself is modeled off an *Oliver Hazard Perry* (FFG-7) class frigate, which is the missile magazine scuttle located near the electronics' technician shop, and was built from personal experience by one of the facilitators.¹⁸³

Recruits ultimately passed each other through the scuttle which is built too high to simply jump through it. Even though it meant to simulate extremely hot metal, the plywood was touched by nearly every recruit. Additionally, the last recruit had no choice

¹⁸² Interview with STSCS(SW/SS) Dahl. As one of the original designers, he said team members had found an article entitled "Titanic Port Hole" which presented the format as a team-building exercise.

¹⁸³ Interview with GMCS Werley. He was assigned to this class ship, which gave him the idea and design for the model.

but to grab onto the scuttle and pull himself through it. Once the event is completed, recruits are engaged in physical exercise to pass time until the group is ready for the next scenario.

3. Scenario 3 - Emergency Sortie

The objective of this scenario, as referenced in Appendix A, is to “work together as a team to perform deck seamanship tasks, including emergency egress procedures.”

This goal is accomplished by the recruits simulating an emergency sortie onboard RTC’s indoor ship trainer, *USS Marlinespike*. Each recruit is assigned an on-deck position from a Sea and Anchor Detail onboard ship. These positions range from Signaller of the Watch and Boatswain’s Mate of the Watch, to Line Handlers (pier and onboard ship), Line Captains, and Safety Observers. The recruits are required to perform all tasks as if they were actually getting a ship underway.

However, the trainer is limited. Notably, the ship rests on land, so the line handlers, captains and safety observers, which comprise the majority of positions, cannot feel the strain on the lines, the pull and drifting of the ship, any atmospheric effects (wind, currents, rain, etc.), or any other external forces. From personal observation, the best technical training recruits obtain is proper line tensioning and mooring to various types of cleats. Recruits who are assigned positions in the pilothouse are limited to perform tasks that are required in the fleet. All positions from a regular Sea and Anchor Detail are not included in the scenario. The positions that are manned neither receive a true sense of activity nor stress what happens in a real detail in the fleet.

The scenario is designed to mimic circumstances surrounding Hurricane Hugo that struck Charleston, South Carolina, in 1989. It stresses how most surface ships were required to get underway in less than 24 hours, and how the crews worked together to ensure the safety of the ship by getting out to sea. It also emphasizes that civilian vessels left pierside were washed ashore during the immense storm.

The trainer does simulate most aspects of a typical surface ship, and uses real attached equipment, such as line, cleats, jack staff, 1MC, etc. Facilitators do provide guidance especially if they see a major safety violation. Action may be stopped if the recruits' action become too confused or out-of-hand. Sea and Anchor Detail is standard duty all recruits will have to undergo once they enter the fleet in sea billets. Training for the *USS Marlinespike* occurs during the normal boot camp process. However, training prior to Battle Stations occurs up to five weeks before the event, and does not recur.¹⁸⁴ Some RDCs re-train on the *Marlinespike* but only three days prior to Battle Stations. During regular boot camp training, they are taught responsibilities for all positions, and are not specifically trained for their Battle Stations' position.

4. Scenario 4 - Firefighting

According to Appendix A, the objective of this scenario is for "the recruit team use provided Watch, Quarter, and Station Bill (WQSB) assignments to man a repair locker and make efforts to control and extinguish fires as an organized fire party." This

¹⁸⁴ Interview with STSCS (SS/SW) Dahl.

scenario is conducted at the fire fighting trainer. The trainer consists of water, Aqueous Film Forming Foam (AFFF), and carbon dioxide firefighting hoses and apparatus; several compartments where controlled fires could be burned; and numerous pieces of firefighting equipment. The historical reference is the *USS Stark* incident when it was struck by an Iraqi Exocet missile, and centers on the heroic firefighting abilities that were required to save the ship.

The trainer is housed in a separate hall. Before beginning the exercise, recruits are briefed on safety and their goal. The group is configured into two or three fire teams by position from the WQSB. Another general alarm is sounded followed by an actual fire announcement that one would hear onboard ship, including class of fire, compartment number, and which repair locker is to take action. The teams then spring to action.

However, the hall exhibits extremely poor acoustics which results in barely audible instructions and fire announcements. Compartments located on-site did not simulate a shipboard repair locker, and all equipment was pre-staged. Recruits are required to don complete firefighting gear to include firefighting ensembles and the oxygen breathing apparatus (OBA). Also, fires were not lit, and water did not flow through the hoses. Due to water restrictions by the city of North Chicago where RTC is located, water could not be turned on in the middle of the night.¹⁸⁵ Consequently, fires could not be lighted. Recruits went through the motions with the hoses, role-playing

¹⁸⁵ Interview with HTC Tilton. Water is contracted from the city, not the Naval base. Therefore, city personnel are not available to provide water at the time Battle Stations occurs. RTC is presently negotiating with the city to provide water.

positions from team leader to hose handler. Facilitators were force to stop the event twice due to a complete breakdown of communication and proper firefighting procedures that are standard in the Navy. Recruits were taught these skills during the established boot camp curriculum.

5. Scenario 5 - Search and Rescue

This scenario is conducted in conjunction with the firefighting scenario. Its objective is to search a simulated smoke-filled, darkened shipboard compartments for personnel casualties. All personnel must be accounted for. The historical reference is the *USS Holland* where a chemical spill forced a similar search and rescue operation.

The egress portion was conducted by recruits still dressed in firefighting gear. The chamber was dark, but no smoke or smoke-making machine was utilized; nor was heat simulated. Additionally, the chamber is not outfitted with battle lanterns. Casualties were portrayed by other recruits who were designated by facilitators as either dead or wounded. A stretcher was provided to negotiate through the chambers, but no casualties were placed on it. Also, recruits were not permitted to carry any simulated dead personnel out of the chamber.

6. Scenario 6 - Shaft Alley Rescue

The objective of this scenario is to negotiate a 150 lb. dummy strapped to a Neil Robertson stretcher through the Confidence Course. The scenario is called a shaft alley rescue because of its historical reference to the *USS Oklahoma*, where sailors had to rescue shipmates who were trapped in shaft alley (shaft alley is normally the deepest and

least-accessible compartment on a ship, usually three to six platforms below the lowest deck).

The Confidence Course is located indoors and contains various stations. Shaft alley rescue utilizes eight of these stations. Recruits are donned in gas masks and kapok life preservers, to simulate a water-filled compartment, and split in two groups. Each group starts at opposite ends of the course and is given their dummy to negotiate through it. There is no time limit to complete it, and recruits are expected to be creative in trying to complete the course with the dummy. Facilitators monitor the groups by directing them to the next station, and ensuring safety of the recruits. They are constantly prompting and motivating the recruits, and only provide direction if the recruits commit an error in positioning the stretcher. The entire scenario may be shortened due to time constraints, such as succeeding recruit groups waiting to commence the scenario.

The Confidence Course is not designed for this scenario. It is a standard confidence course on which recruits train during their regular boot camp curriculum. None of the stations simulate any shipboard environment. The course does not compare favorably to other confidence courses in length or degree of challenge, such as US Marine Corps Base Camp Pendleton or NAB Little Creek. The weight of the dummy is an arbitrarily picked number.¹⁸⁶

¹⁸⁶ Interview with STSCS (SS/SW) Dahl.

7. Scenario 7 - Repel Boarders

The objective of this scenario is to demonstrate shooting proficiency with the M-16 rifle while wearing gas masks and firing in adverse conditions. The historical reference is a Medal of Honor winner from the Vietnam War. This petty officer, who was in charge of two-boat patrol, single-handedly destroyed seven junks and fifty sampans, along with other accomplishments listed in Appendix A. This scenario challenges the recruit to "become part of the Navy's history or a statistic in the enemy's body count."

Recruits do not shoot live ammunition - the rifles are a M-16 shell, but modified to shoot a beam of light at a target on an indoor range. Additionally, recruits are required to wear their gas masks, while sounds of combat and a strobe light is being operated within the range. Recruits are required to fire a series of ten volleys from the standing, kneeling, and prone positions. Scores are tabulated and averaged for the group. Recruits who score lower than the tabulated mean score are considered dead, and are treated as such. Extra physical exercise may be then administered as a result of their unsatisfactory score.

8. Scenario 8 - Abandon Ship

This scenario is set at the recruit training pool. The objective is to simulate abandoning ship, perform survival techniques, and utilize previously taught swimming skills. The historical reference is the *USS Indianapolis* incident where, after sinking, only

316 sailors out of a crew of 1200 survived. The Sailors that did survive demonstrated superior water survival skills over several nights in shark-infested waters.

Recruits are dressed in swim suits and their dungaree uniform, minus their boots. Some recruits are randomly given a kapok life preserver to wear. All recruits are then required to jump off a ten foot platform, simulating that an abandon ship order has been given. Unlike standard procedure, water temperature, direction and distance to nearest land, and if that land is friendly or not, is not given. Each recruit must enter the water from this platform. Refusal to do so results in failure from Battle Stations. Once in the water, recruits must tread water until all recruits are in the water. They are not allowed to touch bottom or the sides of the pool. Recruits without kapoks must work together with the recruits with life preservers to stay afloat, or utilize water survival skills learned in boot camp. There is no set time limit; treading water lasts approximately 10-15 minutes.

There are also two Navy life rafts inflated and tied in the pool. On command, the recruits must swim to the rafts and embark. They must enter the life raft and perform proper initial survival skills, such as deploying the sea painter, closing the entrance to keep out the elements, and demonstrating proper seating within the raft. During the exercise, facilitators also use a garden hose to simulate rain or sea spray which may actually occur during rescue operations or survival at sea. The scenario is completed when the facilitators are satisfied with the recruits' performance.

9. The Graduation Ceremony

Battle Stations is completed approximately 7:00 a.m. the following morning.

Recruits are then treated to a special breakfast that includes no-limit portions of food and increased time to eat. Recruits are then taken back to their barracks where they receive time to prepare for their graduation ceremony. Graduation marks the time when recruits are no longer considered recruits, but because they have successfully completed Battle Stations, they are considered "Sailors."

Recruits are dressed in clean dungaree uniform and gather in their barracks. After a short, motivational speech by the RDCs, a video of the CNO, and the commander of NTC and the commanding officer of RTC is shown to congratulate the recruits on their completion of Battle Stations.¹⁸⁷ Finally, the recruits ceremonially receive their accolade: their "Recruit" ball cap is exchanged for a "Navy" ball cap.¹⁸⁸ Recruits are lined up and approach their RDCs. The RDCs remove the "Recruit" ball cap, and give the recruit his/her "Navy" ball cap. The "Recruit" ball cap is thrown in a discard pile by the recruit. RDCs encourage the recruits to cheer and congratulate their fellow shipmates. Rituals may also occur that are specific to each recruit's company¹⁸⁹ such as an RDC, who is a boatswain's mate, may "pipe over the side" the discarded "Recruit" ball cap.

¹⁸⁷ On this particular day of observation, the tape could not be shown due to mechanical failure.

¹⁸⁸ The "Navy" ball cap is permitted to be worn on any Naval base or ship, and is in accordance with Uniform Regulations, Sec. 3501, Paragraph 8a.

¹⁸⁹ Recruits are berthed by companies. RDCs in charge of the companies may utilize traditions learned within their specific rating to add flare to the ceremony.

At first, a festive and congratulatory atmosphere was encouraged by the RDCs. As the ceremony progressed, recruits appeared to be more relaxed and satisfied with the results they had accomplished. Recruits seem to be truly relieved of their final test of boot camp. After the ceremony, recruits are usually given the remainder of the day for personal time.

This chapter provided an in-depth overview of the workings and content of Battle Stations with focus on descriptions of each scenario and the graduation ceremony. Chapter V will combine this information and the data presented in Chapter III to make a comparison utilizing the literature review introduced in Chapter II. This analysis will lay the foundation to make recommendations on the Battle Stations program and evaluate its effectiveness as a training tool.

V. BATTLE STATIONS ANALYSIS

A. INTRODUCTION

[Battle Stations] is a true test with no rest periods – and our recruits are charged up by their new challenge.¹⁹⁰ - RADM Kevin Green, Commander, Naval Training Center, Great Lakes

I see Battle Stations as the single most significant improvement...in my 30 years in the Navy.¹⁹¹ - Master Chief Petty Officer of the Navy, ETCM (SW) John Hagan

Battle Stations is the capstone event that gives recruits the key skills and confidence they need to graduate and take to the fleet.¹⁹² - ADM Jay Johnson, Chief of Naval Operations

These quotes express the excitement that Battle Stations has received since its introduction into the Navy's boot camp. Navy personnel exhibit much pride in the creation of Battle Stations that will help mold Sailors' needs into the 21st century. They claim Battle Stations represents the apex of boot camp training that will emulate and instill the Navy's core values into recruits.¹⁹³ With such a public and lauded program that will train recruits for years to come, it is assumed that much thought and analysis went into the design, development, and implementation of the program to ensure peak performance and high productivity.

¹⁹⁰ RADM Green in "Battle Stations!" *All Hands*, p. 28.

¹⁹¹ *Navy News* Edition 39/97.

¹⁹² ADM Jay Johnson in "Battle Stations!" *All Hands*, p. 23.

¹⁹³ Taken from the Battle Stations objective, as given at the Flag Manning Conference.

This chapter first discusses training and design issues raised from research on the Battle Stations program. The next section then applies the theory of instructional design and rites of passage presented in Chapter II to the Battle Stations program and these issues in order to analyze if the program is designed and implemented effectively. It will compare the Six-Stage method presented earlier to the methodology and rationale behind the creation and development of Battle Stations presented in Chapters III and IV. Each stage will be applied to Battle Stations to illustrate both proper training methodology utilized by the creators and facilitators, and any flaws that may occur in the program. Additionally, it will analyze the effectiveness of the program to discover if the present training of recruits is producing optimum results. The analysis will also answer questions posed in Chapter I on the overall structure and history of Battle Stations.

B. BATTLE STATIONS ISSUES

This section presents a discussion of serious methodological issues concerning the design and implementation of the Battle Stations program. Many high-level officials in and out of the Navy are quick to praise Battle Stations. However, is it worth all the praise it has received? It is questioned whether Battle Stations has been thoroughly researched to ensure the program is the best as the Navy can offer, and if the program is producing a quality product reflecting the objectives set for it. Several fissures in the Battle Stations' foundation seem to be evident, beginning with the apparent speed in which the program was established, the make-up of the program, and the similarities between it and The Crucible. These topics will be addressed in this section.

The immediate question is why was Battle Stations created? Whereas The Crucible was a planned change to Marine Corps boot camp by a range of military personnel with a wide range of inputs, Battle Stations seemed to be a response by the Navy to something the Marine Corps had already implemented. The Crucible had working groups consisting of all ranks of Marines, officer and enlisted. These groups supplied numerous ideas and concepts based on a wide range of career experiences. The Marine Corps, like the Navy, did not conduct in-depth research on how to design training program. However, input was varied from many different ranks. Their brainstorming process was well-structured utilizing two different working groups who monitored and analyzed every aspect in-depth.¹⁹⁴ Final approval was at the Commandant's level. In contrast, the Battle Stations design team comprised of five senior enlisted personnel who conceived ideas from their own experience at sea with little background research conducted in any area of education, training program design, and evaluation. They did not even research the origin of The Crucible.

Next, what is the purpose of Battle Stations? The published objective is to "galvanize the basic warrior attributes of sacrifice, dedication, teamwork, and endurance."¹⁹⁵ It is also designed to instill in Navy recruits a common bond, "all sailors are sailors first." This attitude is the ethos the Marine Corps creates with its recruits after boot camp. However, others possess contrary views of the purpose of Battle Stations.

¹⁹⁴ Interview with LtCol Becker.

¹⁹⁵ Reported at Flag Manning Conference.

The CNO describes Battle Stations as the "...event that gives recruits the key skills and confidence..."¹⁹⁶ Battle Stations' objective focuses only on the teamwork aspect, not the seamanship skills the CNO proclaims that recruits obtain through the program. Other Navy officials support the CNO's statement: "There is an emphasis on connecting boot camp with a sailor's real-life experiences at sea, something officials concede was grossly lacking in the past."¹⁹⁷ There seems to be a conflict between RTC officials who are stressing teamwork, and other Navy officials who stress Battle Stations provides much-needed seamanship skills for Sailors entering the fleet.

Battle Stations itself poses some questions. Foremost, if Battle Stations is expected to be the culminating event for recruits, does it provide the essential bonding and awe that recruits can all relate to, even years into the future? There is also the question of realism in the training. Most scenarios lack the realism, both in the construction and in the application, the event is supposed to imitate. Some scenarios do represent as much realism as possible for teaching seamanship skills on land, such as the *USS Marlinespike* team trainer. But for such a highly-praised event of recruit training, other scenarios lack the descriptive atmosphere. Props are of poor quality; many of them are not good enough for fleet use. Some props are so damaged, they are held together by "duct tape and ingenuity."¹⁹⁸ The lack of realism is echoed by recruits who, when asked

¹⁹⁶ ADM Jay Johnson in *All Hands*, p. 23.

¹⁹⁷ Newbart, p. 8.

¹⁹⁸ Ramos, p. 14.

about the program, consistently criticized about that point.¹⁹⁹ This lack of realism could distract from RTC's goal of Battle Stations as a culminating event. If a secondary goal of Battle Stations is to teach seamanship skills, the lack of realism may limit the teaching value of these tasks and may not be appropriate to fleet applications.

There are other aspects of the fledgling program that need to be addressed. Presently, all recruits complete Battle Stations except for rare reasons. A proposition has been drafted to create a more definitive set of rules to evaluate individual recruits based on performance at each scenario. If Battle Stations is to teach the values of teamwork and sacrifice, this system seems to be inappropriate. If the system is set into place, emphasis seems to shift to measurable skills, and not the intangibles of teamwork and bonding. Additionally, recruits criticize the relative lack of physical challenge in Battle Stations.²⁰⁰ Is this an important criterion for the program? As compared to The Crucible, Battle Stations is conducted completely indoors, except when recruits are running to various buildings. During The Crucible, the recruits participate outdoors for the entire time. Recruits seem to imply they do not take Battle Stations seriously if they are not physically challenged. Additionally, their attention may shorten if scenarios are simple enough that recruits have time after completion to think about anything else besides Battle Stations and further upcoming obstacles.

¹⁹⁹ Interviews with recruits from Companies 509/510.

²⁰⁰ Ibid.

Finally, the measurement of Battle Stations' overall effectiveness is questioned. With no quantitative grades provided, personnel - from the CNO and CNET down to fleet captains, RTC leaders, Battle Station designers and facilitators, fleet personnel, and recruits themselves - cannot know if the program is doing what they intended it to. A system may have to be put in place to measure the output taking into consideration content, form, and objectives to measure. Feedback allows facilitators the means to re-evaluate and update the program. No systematic feedback from recruits nor commanding officers at follow-on A-schools or in the fleet is being gathered. However, facilitators concede Battle Stations is not yet complete. They are fine-tuning scenario designs and locations but have no immediate plans for feedback or any other administrative tasks.

The next section will analyze Battle Stations and will address these issues, utilizing the Six-Stage model as discussed in Chapter IV.

C. BATTLE STATIONS ANALYSIS

1. Stage I Comparison

Stage I of the Six-Stage training method focuses on goal setting and needs analysis. It first discusses the pre-training environment as a way to motivate trainees about training. The pre-training environment of Battle Stations appears adequate. Recruits are already immersed in a much broader training environment. RDCs who act as the recruits' supervisors demonstrate strong motivation toward the upcoming Battle Stations event. RDCs are continually alluding toward this "final event" and emphasize its importance. Recruits are told that what they learn and experience during Battle

Stations will be utilized substantially in the fleet, and they will realize the importance of this training. Recruits also believe that follow-on training will be provided in the form of actual fleet experience. They are told with increased knowledge comes increased responsibility, which essentially should lead to promotions.

The only characteristic of Battle Stations' pre-training environment that contradicts with the model comes in the form of employee input. Recruits are not allowed any input into the Battle Stations program. However, combining the aspects of the broader objective to complete boot camp, the military environment and its internal workings, and the fact that recruits have not been exposed to this type of training before, it is not plausible to allow recruit input.

Next, Stage I centers on organizational, task, and personnel analysis. The analysis determines if training is needed, if it can be afforded by the organization, and which personnel need how much training. Additionally, Stage I asks how an organization knows it needs a training program. Battle Stations conducted none of the suggested analysis. As evident in Chapter III, Battle Stations was conceived by high-ranking Navy officials for two interrelated reasons: First, the Navy was receiving criticism from a perceived public notion of the softening of boot camp, which led to a change in boot camp philosophy. Second, the Marine Corps had already acted upon a change in their philosophy by creating The Crucible. Top officers in the Navy witnessed The Crucible and decided a similar program was needed. They ordered officers at the Navy's recruit training command to develop such a program. This method of determining if training is

needed is termed "Training is a Given" which is categorized by someone saying training will be done.

As determined in Chapter II, this method is not optimal, but it does contain key questions needing to be asked, such as what problems could training assess, or could training make a worthwhile contribution? From information gathered on the Battle Stations program, its designers did not answer these questions. Virtually no analysis using prescribed methods was conducted by anyone in the Navy to determine if a new training program was necessary, and if so, how to construct it.

Additionally, personnel assigned to create Battle Stations were chosen strictly on availability. The design team were personnel assigned to RTC with no effort exerted to search Navy-wide for properly-trained personnel in training design. The design team consisted of only senior enlisted members with years of combined fleet experience. No officers or junior personnel were involved except for officers in the chain-of-command whose function served to approve or disapproved the group's ideas.

2. Stage II Comparison

Stage II focuses on a training program's design. Research recommends utilizing eight criteria to determine the best type of training program design. Once a design is chosen, additional criteria should be followed to ensure design correctness and maximum output is achieved. Finally, literature advises documenting the building process. Documentation allows for future evaluation of the program, and it provides reference when problems arise.

Battle Stations personnel did not utilize any criteria to choose a training program design. They imitated the existing Crucible design. Some scenario formats, such as the *Forrestal* Escape Scuttle, were blindly borrowed from existing ideas without analyzing if the format is applicable or useful to accomplish Battle Stations' objectives. Additionally, Battle Stations personnel followed the procedure in which personnel from The Crucible designed their program - working groups. Whereas The Crucible design team utilized personnel from all ranks and two separate working groups, Battle Stations utilized only senior enlisted in one working group.

No documentation was kept recording the creative design process of Battle Stations. All history was passed verbally to the author. However, Battle Stations does provide written RDC packages and scenario briefs for facilitators. The RDC package provides new facilitators with the Battle Stations objective and instructions, while scenario briefs describe each individual scenario and the Naval heritage associated with it.

By modeling Battle Stations off The Crucible, the design team utilized the simulation design for its training program. Literature recommends facilitators to prepare for their assignment in a simulation program by attending other simulations or utilize learning games. Battle Stations facilitators did not accomplish either suggestion.

Literature also highly recommends that simulation training be as realistic as possible. Battle Stations does attempt to be realistic as possible given its facilities; however, the rationale behind the realism can be questioned. For example, the *Forrestal*

escape scuttle simulates a burning vertical scuttle on a Navy ship. Vertical scuttles onboard ships are rare. This scenario's idea was borrowed from an article along with the assistance from personal experience of a facilitator who was assigned a ship class that contained this unique characteristic. Additionally, the scuttle is represented by a piece of wood. Whereas the dimensions of the scuttle may be correct, the overall feel of red-hot metal on a burning ship is not accurately portrayed.

Other scenarios lack the full realism which degrades the activity it is supposed to represent. The Emergency Sortie scenario does not accurately simulate numerous aspects of getting a ship underway. Technical skills, such as line tensioning, mooring, and compensating for atmospheric effects on the ship are noticeably missing. Also, not all positions for a normal Sea and Anchor Detail are represented in the scenario. Positions that are represented are manned by recruits with little knowledge of those position's duties.

In the Firefighting scenario, fires are not even lit. Similarly in the Search and Rescue scenario, recruits attempt the objective of rescuing a shipmate from a smoky compartment, with no smoke provided. However simulating actual shipboard procedures, recruits don firefighting equipment and are trained to use proper firefighting tactics and commands.

The Shaft Alley Rescue scenario does not simulate any rescue that would happen from the shaft alley of a Naval ship. The Confidence Course stations do not simulate any shipboard environment except for the hardship of carrying personnel out of a

compartment on a stretcher. Additionally, the dummy was already strapped into the stretcher. No training was provided on proper techniques of securing personnel in a stretcher, or how to maneuver a stretcher through an irregular environment with injured personnel.

During the Repel Boarders scenario, recruits wearing gas masks utilize an altered M-16 rifle that fire a beam of light during a simulated combat environment. Recruits fire actual M-16s during their boot camp instruction, why not here? The exercise does allow recruits to test their marksmanship, but M-16s are not utilized onboard Naval ships. Nor would Sailors fire any weapon unless they were assigned to a security team or designated in a rating that uses firearms, such as Gunner's Mate.

Finally during Abandon Ship, recruits must jump from a ten foot platform into a pool which is meant to simulate a ship in the ocean. Recruits must then tread water and enter a life raft while demonstrating proper life raft procedures. Jumping from a platform simulates a reasonable representation of a ship. However, the platform's height could be raised to represent the height of Naval ships more accurately. Also, the pool is maintained as a controlled environment which is not representative of an open-water environment. The life rafts are actual Navy life rafts with all the accessories contained inside. Recruits are also required to utilize actual drown-proofing techniques which could be used in an open water environment.

Battle Stations does follow some prescribed literature on simulation. Before and after each scenario, facilitators brief and debrief recruits as prescribed. They explain to

recruits what is expected of them before each scenario, and spend time afterwards to review highs and lows encountered during the exercise. Additionally, facilitators appear motivated and confident in their job. They seem able and fit to handle issues and tensions that may arise with recruits. Facilitators are also experienced, senior enlisted personnel with varied ratings, and therefore, knowledgeable in the subject area presented by Battle Stations. However, examinations are not administered to new facilitators to ensure they meet the requisite knowledge and skill requirements.

The model presents four questions to measure an effective simulation:

1. *Did the trainees say that it was a good experience and they learned something that will influence them?* According to interviews with recent Battle Stations graduates from Companies 509 and 510, they expressed that they enjoyed Battle Stations. They felt it better prepared them for actual tasks in the fleet. They also felt that Battle Stations instilled teamwork and camaraderie between them. However, recruits almost unanimously agreed that Battle Stations needed more realism which could challenge them more physically and mentally.

2. *Was there a transfer of knowledge?* The answer is unknown. This question can really only be answered after recruits take their Battle Stations experience to the fleet and attempt to apply what they should have learned. Battle Stations does not conduct any feedback from the recruits or commands after recruits leave boot camp. However, graduates from the first Battle Stations classes would just now be entering the fleet. Evaluation from fleet commanders would be premature. Additionally from

personal observations, recruits did not conduct many of the scenarios correctly, or expressed they did not know how to perform their assigned tasks.

3. *Do trainees' behavior change to demonstrate the ability to transfer and apply the learning?* Again, this answer is unknown for the same reasons cited in question number two. Furthermore, Battle Stations only partially contributes to the behavior change that boot camp as a whole is supposed to indoctrinate into recruits. Recruits who were interviewed all expressed a change in their personal beliefs and attitudes on teamwork and pride.²⁰¹ However, interviews were conducted only days after recruits completed Battle Stations. Recruits naturally still felt a high *esprit de corps* and degree of satisfaction. Whether this behavior change is carried over to the fleet is to be determined.

4. *Does the training produce results for the company as a whole by reducing costs, increasing productivity, improving quality, or increasing profits?* As above, these results cannot be measured until the fleet receives a large influx of Battle Stations Sailors. If the Navy desires these results, it must ensure the training and behavior change recruits received during Battle Stations stays with them in the fleet, and spreads to Sailors who did not experience Battle Stations. If this change occurs, the Navy will theoretically spend less money on re-training Sailors once they reach the fleet, less time and money on

²⁰¹ Ibid.

behavior-related problems and discharges, and concentrate more time on improving techniques and procedures.

In summary, the Navy conducted no analysis on a type of training program that would be beneficial to their needs; they merely applied the existing Crucible design. This design utilizes a simulation design type. Battle Stations simulation employs some of the recommendations suggested by the model and utilizes some of the characteristics. Overall, however, the Battle Stations scenarios only minimally followed the recommendations of a proper simulation.

3. Stage III Comparison

The purpose of Stage III is intended to monitor the implementation of the training program and to make any necessary changes to guide it to a successful conclusion through the use of observations, feedback, and continuous monitoring. This stage should be conducted in the infancy of the program to identify problems early and make the necessary changes without much difficulty to trainees. Battle Stations is accomplishing this stage to a point. Since the first group of recruits graduated Battle Stations, two additional scenarios have been added. Battle Stations personnel have consistently attempted to upgrade and improve the program. As an example, by the completion of this thesis Battle Stations have augmented live fires into the Firefighting scenario.²⁰² Additionally, facilitators admit Battle Stations is not quite complete. They confess two

²⁰² Telephone conversation with LT Bradshaw, March 10, 1998.

elements are holding up further development of the program: people and facilities.²⁰³

However, these changes are still occurring nearly two years after the program had started.

Battle Stations personnel are attempting to fix scenario problems and equipment shortages; however, changes are not being documented as recommended by the model. Equipment shortages and degradation, which should have been checked for operability and repaired in the initial phases of the program per the model, continue to be a major distraction.

Battle Stations is being observed and fixed through facilitator inputs as the model recommends. The model also recommends trainee input through surveys and interviews. This recommendation is not being implemented, and trainee input is not being considered.

Finally, Stage III also suggests costs be considered. At the time of this research, Battle Stations did not possess a formal budget, nor were funds directly allocated for it. Appendix E lists a proposed budget for Battle Stations that facilitators desired to submit to RTC for Fiscal Year 1998. Its development came solely from rough estimates by the CPO in charge of maintenance and repair of scenario props and equipment. It contains only a dollar estimate for each scenario with no breakdown into specifics. No formal budget analysis was conducted by Battle Stations personnel with estimates mainly based on repair and equipment needs for the scenarios.²⁰⁴

²⁰³ Burlage, p. 4.

²⁰⁴ Interview with BUC Conahan.

4. Stage IV Comparison

Stage IV begins the in-depth analysis of the training program's overall effectiveness. Its immediate question asks if the training accomplishes its immediate outcome. To achieve this outcome, the objectives of the training must be known. What is the objective of Battle Stations? The objective claimed by facilitators and the publicly perceived objective appear to differ and cause confusion. The objective as stated by Battle Stations is "to galvanize the basic warrior attributes of sacrifice, dedication, teamwork, and endurance in each recruit through the practical application of basic Navy skills and core values learned during recruit training as the apex of the training program."²⁰⁵ This objective seems to emphasize strictly behavior and team building skills to instill a Navy ethos into Sailors. This sentiment is supported by Battle Stations facilitators and officers within the chain-of-command at RTC.

However, others seem to define the objective of Battle Stations differently. The CNO is quoted as saying Battle Stations "gives recruits the key skills...they need...[to] take to the fleet."²⁰⁶ The Navy Times report the design of Battle Stations is "to test recruits' skills in fundamentals like teamwork and firefighting."²⁰⁷ Yet in another article by the Navy Times, Battle Stations is described as being "oriented around technical seamanship skills."²⁰⁸ And even in another article, Battle Stations is reported to be

²⁰⁵ As published at the 1997 Flag Manning Conference.

²⁰⁶ ADM Jay Johnson in "Battle Stations!" *All Hands*, p. 23.

²⁰⁷ Burlage, p. 4.

²⁰⁸ Ramos, p. 12.

“designed to test the recruits’ stamina, initiative, teamwork, and ability to work under stress.”²⁰⁹ Is the objective then to teach recruits just teamwork skills, or is it to teach them technical skills they can utilize in the fleet, and additional skills such as stamina and the ability to work under stress? The objective is clearly stated on paper by Battle Stations personnel, but is receiving a variety of interpretations. It may be concluded that Battle Stations personnel feel unsure or confused about the true objective.

A training program’s objective contains a direct relationship to the type of program design that is chosen to fulfill the objectives. As discussed in Stage II, a program design must properly portray the objectives of the company. If Battle Stations’ objective is instilling teamwork into recruits, then its simulation design may not be the optimum choice to meet this objective. Battle Stations officials herald the physical aspects of the program. Working guidance dictated “the event should be physically challenging with a degree of risk.”²¹⁰ This guidance may not be the best way to instill teamwork and dedication into recruits. Additionally, the “Three Strikes” proposal (Appendix D) seem to stress and define technical skills as the guidance to fail recruits from the program vice teamwork attributes. As illustrated, the objectives of Battle Stations is defined in one aspect; however, program changes, attitudes, and views by others indicate a different objective.

²⁰⁹ Kreisher, p. 18.

²¹⁰ Newcomb, p. 26.

Stage IV of the Six-Stage model also recommends assessment of the cognitive learning and behavioral skills of the trainees. The model recommends administering knowledge tests for checking cognitive learning, and practical demonstration tests by trainees to measure behavioral skills. No follow-up tests are given to Battle Stations graduates to measure if skills were learned and maintained; nor are interviews conducted with graduates to determine what they learned from the program.

5. Stage V Comparison

Stage V evaluates actual performance of trainees after they have taken their learned skills back to the work place. The model first recommends a baseline skill level be established to allow comparison. For Battle Stations, all recruits, unless they are inter-service transfers, or bring military experience from high school or from the Delayed Entry Program (DEP),²¹¹ enter boot camp with no military knowledge.

The other aspect of Stage V recommends trainee evaluation of the skills they were supposed to learn while actually performing their assigned jobs. This evaluation should be performed through trainee performance appraisals, interviews with company management, and questionnaires. Battle Stations does not perform any type of follow-up survey or questionnaire with graduates or their superiors, nor are there any plans to do so.²¹² No information is gathered by Battle Stations personnel from recruits' follow-on

²¹¹ DEP is a recruiting program which allows potential-recruits to delay up to one year from entering boot camp.

²¹² Interview with LT Bradshaw.

commands to determine if Battle Stations knowledge is being utilized or is evident.

However with the first Battle Stations class graduating in July, 1996, recruits would just be arriving into the fleet at the time of this research.

6. Stage VI Comparison

Stage VI encompasses the other five stages and determines if the training was effective overall. Effectiveness is measured with four criteria: reaction, learning, behavior, and results. All four criteria depend on performance appraisals, observations, and trainee/management input to determine the overall effectiveness. As already noted, Battle Stations does not conduct any type of follow-on surveying, nor does it plan to. Therefore, effectiveness, as the Six-Stage model prescribes, is not being measured, and consequently cannot be measured.

As previously mentioned, the first Battle Stations graduates are just now entering the fleet. Nevertheless, Navy officials may be disappointed with its outcomes if they look at Battle Stations as a whole to determine its effectiveness utilizing the entire model. Compared to the Six-Stage model, the Navy and Battle Stations have not followed the template for an effective training program. As shown, numerous recommendations set forth by the model have not been followed during the creation and implementation of Battle Stations. Arguably the most detrimental features of the existing program are the lack of a clear objective and the lack of any background research when Battle Stations was being originally conceived.

Battle Stations does apply some of the recommendations presented by the model. Facilitators are motivated and express great interest in the program which is positively received by the recruits. Facilitators are also continually evaluating and attempting to upgrade the scenarios' qualities while repairing faulty props and striving for increased funds for new equipment. Additionally, they plan to incorporate additional scenarios, and realism is represented well in some of the scenarios.

Overall, the Battle Stations program would benefit from a proper training needs analysis to determine if the program is warranted; and if so, what changes are needed. This assessment should be completed soon before more money and time are spent on a program with good intentions but poor implementation. The program, if kept in its present format, will not be successful if changes are not implemented. The Six-Stage model concludes that Battle Stations is not following the guidelines for an effective training program. Battle Stations is following some recommendations, but aggregately the program appears to "act before thinking." One can only conclude that such a program with those aforementioned characteristics appear successful in the beginning, but in the long run, slips into ambiguity with little long-term results.

D. BATTLE STATIONS AS A RITE OF PASSAGE

Along with being a novel training program, Battle Stations can also be classified what the Navy Times describes as "the Navy's end-of-boot camp rite of passage."²¹³

²¹³ Ramos, p. 12.

Literature review on rites of passage concluded that effectiveness evaluation is complex and rarely completed in a formal manner (see Chapter II). Utilizing characteristics described in the literature review, an evaluation can be determined. However as noted earlier, the impact of training ceremonials rests with the belief in and acceptance by members and not with empirical determinations.

Battle Stations assumes the form of a rite of transition within the entire boot camp process. Battle Stations does serve the rite of passage purpose of filling vacant social roles with persons who are similar to previous occupants. However a latent consequence of rites of passage seems to be evident as a result of Battle Stations: Because all recruits must participate in Battle Stations, it is assumed they possess the requisite knowledge and skills to complete Battle Stations successfully. A determination has not been made to this effect, but from personal observation, recruits do not exhibit the confidence and skill levels that is appropriate to participation in the Battle Stations' scenarios. Still, it has been shown that the needed knowledge may not be grasped by recruits due to the unclear objectives Battle Stations presents.

Another characteristic of a successful rite of passage concerns its execution. If the rite is not presented well, its effects will be lost. It has been concluded that Battle Stations is not executed in an optimum manner. Therefore, the effect of Battle Stations as a rite of passage is degraded. Recruits may remember completing Battle Stations all through their Naval career. However, it seemed to lack the characteristics and ambiance to be the bonding event that all Sailors will reminisce about for years to come. Combined

with the characteristics that ceremonials should exhibit flair and that managers need to understand expressive consequences, the graduation ceremony appears weak and anti-climactic. There seemed to be no attempt above the minimum to make the ceremony a memorable event marked with showmanship and grandeur. Recruits were in their working uniform vice a dress uniform, and the ceremony was held in the confines of their barracks vice some elaborate setting.

Additionally, as rites of passage are meant for an audience, Battle Stations graduation had no outside spectators, only the graduating recruits and RDCs were present. The ceremony, as observed by the author, only had taped videos of high-ranking Navy officials congratulating the recruits. (The day the author observed graduation, the VCR had a mechanical failure, and the videos could not be shown. While facilitators attempted to remedy the situation, recruits were standing at attention just waiting for them.)

Once the presentation of the "Navy" ball caps began, an overused song²¹⁴ was played on a portable cassette player in an attempt to create a patriotic atmosphere. Recruits were strongly encouraged, one might say forced, to appear proud and to congratulate their fellow graduates. This environment seemed ineffective and weak to capture the grand moment of recruits finally graduating from their culminating exercise of boot camp. For recruits to be encouraged to display emotions that should come

²¹⁴ "God Bless the USA" by Lee Greenwood.

naturally during a monumental occasion, this tactic appears detrimental to the ceremony's objective.

Finally, two elements of rites of passage are connected concerning Battle Stations: manager roles and symbols. Managers need to know not only the technical consequences but the expressive consequences of those participating in the ceremonial. They must learn, practice, and present ceremonial skills with dramatic flair and expressive speech. Battle Stations facilitators understand the technical consequences i.e. to successfully complete assigned tasks within the scenarios. They also continually practice skills involved in being a facilitator for Battle Stations. However, a part of the Battle Stations ceremonial that appears borderline effective and not fully comprehended by facilitators is the symbolic graduation ceremony and presenting of the "Navy" ball cap.

According to research, symbols convey important cultural messages and meaning between people and their environment. The symbolic presentation of the "Navy" ball cap also appeared anti-climactic. The "Navy" ball cap is authorized to be worn as part of a Sailor's uniform. However, once Sailors enter the fleet, they obtain a ball cap of the command to which they are attached. Beyond boot camp, the "Navy" ball cap is rarely, if at all, seen or worn. By contrast, Marines receive the eagle-globe-anchor insignia at their graduation from The Crucible. The eagle-globe-anchor will be worn by Marines on their uniform for their entire military career. It symbolizes the organization to which all Marines belong. The "Navy" ball cap does not symbolize the Navy nor convey the same meaning.

This chapter raised several key issues concerning the development, implementation, and effectiveness of the Battle Stations program. Additionally, analysis of the program utilizing the Six-Stage model has revealed several shortcomings of the training program. Chapter VI will provide recommendations for Battle Stations and the Navy based on this research and comparison.

VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The Navy has been criticized for an apparent softening of boot camp training. Additionally, Navy officers have been complaining about the perceived decline in recruit quality and attitude from recent boot camp graduates. The Navy credited these perceptions to a change in the culture of incoming recruits. The Marine Corps observed similar changes in their recruits at the same time. They developed The Crucible which the Marine Corps hoped would solve their recruit problems. The Navy, witnessing the apparent success of The Crucible, drew on the design, operation, and objective to develop its program called Battle Stations.

Since its implementation, Battle Stations has received much publicity and notoriety from Congressmen, the Secretary of Defense, and numerous high-ranking Navy officers. They all claim Battle Stations has advanced boot camp more than anything else in recent Naval history, and recruits graduating from it have increased in overall quality. But is Battle Stations the effective training program that many believe it is? This question sums up the thrust of this thesis.

A. CONCLUSION

Research has developed a Six-Stage model of instructional systems development that encompasses all the qualities of a properly functioning effective training program. This thesis has revealed that Battle Stations does not display most qualities of an effective training program. The creation of Battle Stations was done primarily in response to the

Marine Corps' creation of The Crucible. Little research was conducted by the Navy to determine even if a Battle Stations-type program was needed to answer its boot camp and recruit concerns. Its current training methodology is barely effective when compared to characteristics presented by the Six-Stage model. Battle Stations drew almost solely on the plan used by the Marine Corps in developing and designing The Crucible. In doing so, it ignored many recommendations by the Six-Stage model on an effective training program. Most notably, Battle Stations appears to lack clear objectives. Some officials in the Navy claim Battle Stations increase basic seamanship skills Sailors need when they first enter the fleet. However, Battle Stations and RTC personnel assert its main objective is to build teamwork amongst recruits.

Similarly, the scenarios that comprise Battle Stations do not completely follow proper research guidelines. Scenario themes were created from fleet experiences that may or may not emphasize teamwork which contributes to the unclear objectives of Battle Stations. By utilizing a simulation training program, many scenarios lack realism or produce little applicability for future fleet use. Additionally, the graduation ceremony is particularly weak with much improvement needed to convey the grandeur of completing the culminating event of boot camp. It is merely another exercise that must be completed to graduate boot camp and arrive into the fleet.

Finally, Battle Stations contains no true measurement of its effectiveness. Feedback is not utilized nor is there an established set of criteria to measure any aspect of recruit performance. While a true assessment of its effectiveness in the fleet cannot be

determined yet, indications point that Battle Stations will not be overwhelmingly effective in accomplishing its training goals.

The idea of Battle Stations seems to be an innovative idea that could help sagging morale within the Navy and improve negative public perception toward the perceived softening of the Navy. Redeeming qualities of the program do exist; however, overall, the program does not appear to contain quality craftsmanship in terms of instructional design. The effects of Battle Stations on Sailors have yet to be determined since many are just now entering the fleet. Further studies will be needed to assess the effectiveness of this program.

Based on the analysis made in Chapter V, recommendations are provided concerning the Battle Stations program. These recommendations utilize the strategies described in the Six-Stage model and literature review on rites of passage.

B. RECOMMENDATIONS

Once the initial enthusiasm of the new program decreases, Battle Stations will need to make improvements and changes if it plans on achieving its goal as a culminating event for recruits during boot camp. The Navy needs to decide if it desires to continue with its present format and make appropriate changes, or start from the beginning, which may lead to an entirely different concept.

Since no research was done previously, the Navy needs to take a step back and decide if a culminating-event exercise is really needed for the betterment of boot camp and document its findings. A proper analysis of boot camp and its effects on recruits,

while considering the vision of the Navy, should be conducted to determine if additional training programs should be added to the boot camp curriculum or whether the existing curriculum merely needs modification.

If an additional training program is determined to be most beneficial, then a proper needs, organizational, and task analysis should be conducted to pinpoint exactly what this new training program should be, what its objectives will be, how much funding is required, and how many and what kind of personnel are needed to support this program. All levels of Navy personnel need to be involved in this analysis from the CNO and CNET to commanding officers, mid-grade officers, enlisted personnel, and even recruits. Recruits may not have the requisite knowledge to add pertinent content, but they can inform senior personnel on the format that would interest them. The more interest trainees exhibit in the training program, the more knowledge will be absorbed. This analysis should be conducted as a new and separate project by the team, not borrowing existing models and claiming them as new. The team needs to think originally and “out of the box,” not relying on traditional designs and ideas.

As for recommendations to improve the existing Battle Stations, Navy officials need first to identify a clear and concise objective and vision for what they want the program to accomplish. Will Battle Stations measure technical skills or build teamwork? Deciding upon the objective is key to further improvement of the program.

Once the objective is clarified, it must be determined whether a simulation training program contains the best design to accomplish the objectives. Additional research should be conducted investigating alternative training designs to meet the

objectives. Again, all ranks of Naval personnel should provide active input as a working group.

If the simulation design is retained, further recommendations can be made using observations from the present Battle Stations design. Feedback is not being collected or utilized. To assist further development, Battle Stations must develop a feedback system from both recruits and fleet commanding officers. Feedback should be in the form of surveys, interviews, and a quantitative analysis of enlisted evaluations. This information will allow Battle Stations facilitators insight to the effectiveness of the program. It will also provide comments and suggestions on how to fine-tune and improve the program. In addition, records should be kept on all changes to document these changes for future facilitators. The MCPON agrees, "RTC needs to back fit lessons learned in Battle Stations to training done earlier in boot camp to make it more dynamic and interactive when possible."²¹⁵

The scenarios should increase realism and applicability to the fleet. Some scenarios, such as the *Forrestal* Escape Scuttle and the Repel Boarders, provide limited practical usefulness to recruits when they enter the fleet. Senior fleet enlisted and officers should provide inputs to the working teams on their thoughts to the most applicable types of scenarios because they directly use and evaluate the quality of recruits from boot camp.

The Navy needs to support the Battle Stations mission fully in terms of financial and personnel support. Money allocation for teaching the Sailors of tomorrow's Navy

²¹⁵ Phone conversation with ETCM John Hagan.

should be a top priority. Additionally, the top personnel should be assigned duty to Battle Stations. As the MCPON recommends, "The Navy needs to push for the RDC's and staff quality to improve by striving for the top five percent of CPOs/LCPOs."²¹⁶

Battle Stations is still considered a rite of passage for recruits. However, it does not appear to instill the awe that facilitators hoped it would. Navy personnel need to heighten the Navy/Sailor ethos created by Battle Stations. The Crucible accomplishes this bonding by preaching that all Marines are riflemen first, and presenting recruits with the symbol of the Marine Corps, the eagle-globe-anchor insignia. The "Navy" ball cap does little for instill Naval pride into recruits. It is viewed more as a reward for completing Battle Stations than an earned symbolic representation of the organization that now allows recruits to be called Sailors. The graduation ceremony also could increase the sense of awe it attempts to produce. Staging the ceremony in the confines of the barracks with mediocre props severely degrades the effectiveness of the ceremony. Graduates should be in dress uniform, and the ceremony should be conducted in a public arena. Recruits from other companies should be present so they can see and gain a sense of the importance of completing Battle Stations and what it means to the Navy as a whole. It will also provide motivation for other recruits to strive and gain the status that Battle Stations graduates have achieved.

²¹⁶ Ibid.

APPENDIX A

BATTLE STATIONS

GENERAL QUARTERS SCENARIO

OBJECTIVE: (paraphrased and read to the recruit teams with the scenario) When directed by the commanding officer or the ship's standard operating procedures the ship will go to general quarters. Manning the ship at general quarters ensures all stations are manned and ready to fight or control damage to the ship. (briefly explain GQ manning)

CHECK LIST:

- (1) Identify G6PD and sickle cell traits. Ask if any breathing problems or a cold in the last 24 hours.
- (2) Training Time Out procedures reviewed.
- (3) ID cards in left breast pocket
- (4) Dog tags to be worn.
- (5) Ball caps carried in gas mask carriers.
- (6) Recruits are in proper battle dress.
- (7) Canteens full and are with recruits.
- (8) Ensure two seabags per team
- (9) Double tie shoe laces.
- (10) Identify any recruits who have pink eye or have had it within the last 10 days.
- (11) Brief failure criteria.
 - Double time: Fall behind one ship's length, one half lap, or walking.
 - Pool: Failure to jump from the tower.
 - Core Values: any breach of core values.
- (12) FEMALE ONLY..Brief that hip or groin pain, recruit will immediately notify the facilitator.

TIME: 1 Hour

EQUIPMENT: Battle helmets, Gas masks, ID cards, Dog tags, Seabags

CASUALTIES: None.

TEAM COMPOSITION: As assigned

SAFETY BRIEF: Brief the team on TRAINING TIME OUT POLICY.

INCIDENT PLAN: In case of medical emergency contact Medical 1017 representative or Ambulance.

EVOLUTION 1: GQ called away, RDC's and facilitators motivate recruits.

EVOLUTION 2: Facilitators brief GQ and musters all members.

EVOLUTION 3: Team disembarks.

DEBRIEF: None required for this event. NOTE: Battle helmets placed on the DECK at the pool.

BATTLE STATIONS

FORRESTAL ESCAPE SCUTTLE SCENARIO

OBJECTIVE: (paraphrased and read to the recruit teams with the scenario) The recruit team will pass each member through a verticle escape scuttle without letting the individual touch the sides of the hole. This is a team-building exercise designed to help recruits build confidence in each other as shipmates.

SCENARIO: (read to recruits) As you should remember from your Damage Control classes, in July, 1967 a bomb dropped on the flight deck of the USS Forrestal. The resulting fire spread below to the hanger deck and ultimately resulted in the deaths of 134 sailors and injury to hundreds of others. You will remember the footage you saw of the Chief who made an early attempt to attack the fire and entered the scene with an extinguisher, he never came out! What you couldn't see was the hundreds of sailors who were trapped below who had to find a way to fresh air and safety! Fire is unforgiving at sea and any ship can become a floating "torch" with countless flammable hazards to feed the fire. Even if you aren't directly fighting the fire you may find yourself cut off and having to rely on your shipmates to help you survive.

You and your shipmates must get from one compartment to another. The only way to get there from here is through an emergency escape scuttle located in a red-hot bulkhead. Each member of the team must make it through without touching the sides or they will be severely burned. Only confidence in each one of your shipmates will make it possible to overcome this obstacle.

TIME: 1 Hour.

EQUIPMENT: Provided prop for escape scuttle.

CASUALTIES: Not required.

TEAM COMPOSITION: No specific assignments.

SAFETY BRIEF: Any attempt to "jump" through the obstacle could result in serious injury. Ensure recruits understand prior to event that they must be "passed" through.

INCIDENT PLAN: In case of medical emergency contact Medical 1017 representative or Ambulance.

EVOLUTION 1: Each team organizes and passes individual members through the scuttle.

DEBRIEF: Facilitator will discuss the teamwork aspect and attempt to tie in Courage and Commitment to the team effort.

NOTE: It will be useful to allow the team about a 15 minute period to figure out how they will approach the obstacle prior to allowing them to begin. During piloting the first and last recruit present a big challenge for the team and their approach will be useful in the debrief.

BATTLE STATIONS

EMERGENCY SORTIE SCENARIO

OBJECTIVE: (paraphrased and read to the recruit teams with the scenario) The recruit team will utilize the MARLINESPIKE trainer to demonstrate the ability to work together as a team to perform DECK SEAMAN tasks, including emergency procedures in a simulated environment.

SCENARIO: (read to recruits) The USS MARLINESPIKE has been ordered to sortie due to an approaching hurricane. This is an event encountered by sailors on the East coast sometimes more than once a year, usually when word comes there is only the duty section on board and what makes this time special is that you, the crew of the MARLINESPIKE have just recently reported aboard and have very little experience. Still, the job must be done, drawing on what your instructors before have taught you and using the ability to come together as a team you must get this vessel underway.

The peril for a ship left in port during a hurricane is almost unbelievable. On September 20, 1989 Hurricane HUGO, a category four hurricane with winds sustained at over 100 miles per hour struck the Charleston Naval Base in South Carolina. During the 24 hours that preceded the storm's arrival hundreds of sailors made immediate preparations and evacuated the base leaving only one Submarine Tender safely in a Dry Dock and a Submarine and crew that was unable to get underway due to mechanical problems. After the storm was over the base was a complete shambles. Sailors returning to port passed by huge container cranes that were twisted like pretzels. Whole buildings had disappeared. Civilian vessels that were left in port were found beached in the swamps, some almost 10 miles inland. The submarine left inport had broken loose from it's steel moorings during the storm and had to be submerged by the pier by her Crew to keep from being swept away by the 20 foot storm surge. Any naval vessel that had been pier-side without the ability to submerge would certainly had been destroyed had any been left. Because of the efforts of the hundreds of sailors to save their ships the entire base was re-manned within two days after the storm and the Navy was able to provide aid and recovery efforts to the community devastated by the storm.

Does your team of recruits have what it takes to get the MARLINESPIKE underway? Are you able to cooperate and organize as a team to accomplish this task? If you had been in Charleston in 1989 would your ship have been saved or lost to the storm?

TIME: 1 Hour.

EQUIPMENT: MARLINESPIKE Trainer and associated equipment

CASUALTIES: During each evolution casualties may be simulated by Staff to test the team ability to adapt and overcome.

TEAM COMPOSITION: Watch assignments as per WQSB (by RDC) for Sea & Anchor Detail.

SAFETY BRIEF: Standard pre-underway linehandling safety brief given to recruits just as in the fleet.

INCIDENT PLAN: In case of medical emergency contact Medical 1017 representative or Ambulance.

EVOLUTION 1: Board ship and make preparations for getting underway.

EVOLUTION 2: Getting underway.

EVOLUTION 3: Mooring.

EVOLUTION 4: Removal of injured personnel/depart ship.

DEBRIEF: Lead staff member shall provide critical feedback to the teams on their performance as a team in communicating with each other, their initiative to perform without prompting and their reaction to unplanned events i.e. snapback. Casualties induced will test the teams ability to take care of shipmates while not abandoning the task at hand (If a phone talker is injured, for example, he/she will have to be attended to and someone should take charge of the phones).

BATTLE STATIONS

SHIPBOARD FIRE FIGHTING SCENARIO

OBJECTIVE: (paraphrased and read to the recruit teams with the scenario) The recruit team will use provided WQSB assignments to control and extinguish fires as an organized fire party.

SCENARIO: (read to recruits) You are assigned as a Fire Party team member. Proper use of the damage control skills you have learned are essential to save your ship. Whenever a casualty strikes a ship it is an unplanned event and you must be prepared to use teamwork to overcome whatever situation is forced on you.

On 17 May 1987, while the United States Navy was providing security for Tankers in the Persian Gulf during the Iran-Iraq war, the USS STARK (FFG 31) was struck by two Exocet missiles launched by an Iraqi Mirage Fighter. The resulting explosion and fire killed 37 sailors and the ship came very close to sinking because of the large amount of damage. Because of the dedication of the crew the fires were eventually extinguished, the ship was able to be taken to port for repairs. Undoubtedly those on board the STARK that survived had gone to great lengths to save their ship. Existing DC party organization had to be adapted to cope with the loss of so many members of the crew. Each and every surviving crew member had to put their lives on the line to try and control the fires and keep the ship afloat while efforts were made to render assistance from other Navy ships in the area.

Even though you may have specific assignments in your Fire Party you must be prepared to take action when there is a casualty. It is probable that in a similar event many shipmates assigned specific duties will not survive and those who do survive must take up the slack. This is why understanding Basic Damage Control is so critical and also why being able to perform as a member of a team is just as critical. Sometimes there isn't enough time to think about it, sometime you just have to "Do It!" No one individual could have saved STARK, but the crew, working as a team did save it!

Does your team have what it takes to organize, adapt and overcome obstacles? Can you save your ship?

TIME: 1.5 Hours.

EQUIPMENT: DC Locker items

CASUALTIES: Induced by staff as appropriate to test the teams' ability to adapt and overcome.

TEAM COMPOSITION: As assigned by WQSB.

MEDICAL BRIEF: Performed by Facilitator(s) upon arrival at FFTU. The following will be covered and a determination made by FFTU Corpsman as to recruit physical suitability for the training:

- A. Open wounds and cuts.
- B. Pinkeye.

SAFETY BRIEF: Determined by FFTU.

INCIDENT PLAN: FFTU will utilize existing procedures for emergencies.

EVOLUTION 1: When the General Alarm sounds the following actions are taken by recruit teams:

- A. Lay to assigned compartment or repair locker.
- B. Dress out in protective gear.

EVOLUTION 2: Attack, Control, Extinguish and set reflash watch.

EVOLUTION 3: Restow damage control equipment and protective gear.

DEBRIEF: Staff will review strong points and weak points of team organization, their effectiveness in controlling the casualty and their ability to overcome complications induced by the staff and scenario as it unfolds.

NOTE: WQSB Assignments are made by the RDC prior to Battle Stations. The team will be directed to the location of the repair locker or compartment during the pre-brief. When the fire is called away it should be up to the recruits to man up the locker, don equipment or lay to the appropriate compartment as required. Restowing equipment in the DC Locker will also be part of the exercise and debriefed accordingly. Technical aspects of their approach are not being evaluated as much as the team effort involved, i.e. Exact spacing on the hose (as taught in Applications Lab) may not be a big issue unless it causes a safety problem that would "take out" team members, thereby hurting the effort of the team overall.

BATTLE STATIONS

SEARCH AND RESCUE SCENARIO

OBJECTIVE: (paraphrased and read to the recruit teams with the scenario) The recruit team will organize and conduct a search and rescue of missing shipmates in a smoke filled compartment.

SCENARIO: (read to recruits) Your team is assigned to conduct a search in a smoke filled compartment looking for, locating and removing victims to safety. You will have completed your mission when all of your team are accounted for, living or dead.

During a shipyard overhaul in 1992 the USS HOLLAND experienced a spill of hazardous material when a 5 gallon container of XYLENE (a thinner-like, toxic cleaning solution) was crushed in a cargo elevator spilling contents from the main deck to the 7th deck and into a storeroom. The entire forward third of the ship was contaminated by toxic fumes within minutes of the casualty. Most of the areas affected were berthing areas that berthed up to 500 personnel. The primary concern for the Fire Party was to locate and remove any crew-members who may have still been in the berthing areas and possibly overcome by the fumes. Electrical power had been isolated in that part of the ship making location of personnel difficult. Due to the methodical, effective and quick search of the areas several of the crew were located and moved to the fresh air of the weatherdeck where they could be attended to by the Corpsman.

This particular Fire Party was quick on their feet and even though fire extinguishment was not the mission of the party, they adapted their skills, teamwork and can-do spirit to ensure the safety of their shipmates.

The need for quick and effective action in this type of casualty can occur in port or at sea at any time of day or night. You must be able to adapt to the situation and use the people and training you have if you are going to save your ship and shipmate's lives.

TIME: 1 Hour.

EQUIPMENT: DC Locker equipment
OBA's

CASUALTIES: As required to enable maximum search and rescue participation.

TEAM COMPOSITION: Fire Party organized per WQSB but adhoc assignments will be made.

SAFETY BRIEF: Determined by FFTU.

INCIDENT PLAN: FFTU will utilize existing procedures for emergencies.

EVOLUTION 1: Casualty called away and team organizes at Repair Locker.

EVOLUTION 2: Search and rescue conducted.

EVOLUTION 3: Muster to determine if all members made it out of affected space.

DEBRIEF: Staff will discuss with the team the team's techniques for search and rescue, communication and organization in assigning personnel effectively.

NOTE: This event is run in conjunction with the Fire Fighting evolution. Each team will be broken into separate search parties at FFTU's direction.

BATTLE STATIONS

SHAFT ALLEY RESCUE SCENARIO

OBJECTIVE: (paraphrased and read to the recruit teams with the scenario) The recruit team will utilize provided Niel Robertson Stretcher to move a "Victim" through designated parts of the Confidence Course. This scenario will test what the recruit team has learned about transporting the wounded and challenge them to use both physical strength and combined ingenuity to overcome obstacles.

SCENARIO: (read to recruits) You and your team have been given the assignment of moving a critically injured shipmate from Shaft Alley to topside and then to the pier. Your ship has just entered port and because of recent battle damage there will be no brow available for several hours and your shipmate must be taken to the hospital ASAP! There are many obstacles you and your team must overcome as a group in order to get your shipmate to safety and proper medical care.

During peacetime and wartime sailors get injured, usually in the most inconvenient of locations. It almost always takes a lot of dedicated sailors to overcome the barriers that are the natural part of a ship's design. During the aftermath of the attack on Pearl Harbor in December of 1941, hundreds of wounded sailors had to be removed from what was left of their ships. The ability to do this made the difference between life and death for most. The greatest effort undertaken was most probably the rescue of trapped sailors in the USS OKLAHOMA. After taking torpedo hits she quickly capsized trapping many men below. An effort was immediately mounted to cut a hole through the hull to rescue trapped men. This effort saved the lives of 32 sailors trapped in shaft alley with no other way out.

It takes both physical strength and mental agility to overcome obstacles. Can your team meet the challenge and get your shipmate to safety while there is still time?

TIME: 1 Hour.

EQUIPMENT: Helmets
OBA's
Niel Robertson Stretcher with 150 lb. dummy

CASUALTIES: Not required.

TEAM COMPOSITION: No assigned watches, team will make Ad-Hoc assignments as required.

SAFETY BRIEF: Obstacles to be passed will be pointed out, remind team to use proper lifting techniques.

INCIDENT PLAN: In case of medical emergency contact Medical 1017 representative or Ambulance.

EVOLUTION 1: Transport patient to completion point.

DEBRIEF: Lead staff member shall provide critical feedback to the teams on their performance as a team in communicating with each other and their use of physical strength and mental ability to overcome obstacles.

NOTE: The Confidence Course will take two teams of twenty recruits each (with facilitator). The Facilitator will set up the scenario and each team will use a Neil Roberts stretcher (with dummy) starting the move from the beginning of the course while the other team will do the same from the opposite end of the course. Teams will work independently. Facilitators will direct only which obstacles come next and not particularly direct the team on how to overcome the obstacle. The team will only require a few

recruits to navigate some obstacles while all 19 remaining may be needed to overcome others. This is to be expected. Prompting of the team is permitted if required to keep the evolution on track. Safety will be a primary concern and the Facilitator is to stop the evolution to correct unsafe lifting techniques and any other "overly risky" situation. The Facilitator will debrief each team keying in on the use of teamwork to overcome obstacles and the confidence in the team work either experienced or not experienced by the recruit in the stretcher. The obstacle sequence may be abbreviated for time management purposes.

BATTLE STATIONS

REPEL BOARDERS SCENARIO

OBJECTIVE: (paraphrased and read to the recruit teams with the scenario) The recruit will demonstrate the ability to shoot the M-16 using the simulator with the added degree of complication of having to wear their gas mask.

SCENARIO: (read to recruits) Remember that as a sailor you may be called upon to perform extraordinary feats to accomplish any given mission. A good example of one sailor that rose to that challenge was BM1 James Williams. Being just eleven months from retirement in 1966 he believed he should do more and left his comfortable assignment on the East Coast and went to Viet Nam as a Boat Commander for River Squadron 5 in My Tho, south of Saigon. He earned a Bronze Star in July of 1966 for capturing enemy documents from a sampan his boat destroyed and just three weeks later earned a second Bronze Star for capturing another sampan with nine Viet Cong aboard. On August 22 of that year he was in charge of a two-boat patrol moving down the Mekong. Moving into what was an ambush they encountered over one hundred enemy gun emplacements from both sides of the river. At the height of the battle, after knocking out several emplacements he noticed a motorized sampan leaving the area. Suspecting that there might be high ranking VC aboard he ignored the enemy fire and pursued the fleeing vessel. Although wounded he managed to kill the boat's occupants and retrieve over one hundred important documents. He earned his first Purple Heart and the Silver Star.

On October 31 Petty Officer Williams was again in charge of a two boat patrol on the Mekong. Without warning enemy fire erupted from two sampans and he instantly returned fire killing the crew of one sampan and causing the other to flee. He gave chase and followed it into an inlet where the VC had laid a trap. Now he found his boats under fire from four enemy vessels. At this point he attempted to pull back and called in choppers to finish the enemy because he was overwhelmingly outnumbered. Along his route he stumbled onto an even larger concentration of vessels and plowed his way through the enemy boats, destroying seven junks and fifty sampans. Minutes later the choppers arrived and, not content to let the choppers finish the job he turned on his searchlights and went back in to the foray to completely route the enemy. He received the Medal of Honor on May 14, 1968. Petty Officer Williams would go on to earn many more medals, including the Navy and Marine Corps Medal for rescue of civilians from a vessel destroyed by a mine. He left Viet Nam in March, 1967 having earned two-dozen medals in an eight month tour. Clearly he was a "go-getter"! He also had undoubtedly good aim and a warrior spirit that allowed him and his crew to take deadly aim against the enemy even in overwhelming circumstances.

You and your shipmates have used the M-16 before but this time you are tasked to shoot 30 rounds at the target, using proper safety precautions. Your team is operating in low light and because a gas cloud has been detected you must wear your gas mask. Any time a sailor has to use an M-16 it will probably be in less than ideal conditions. How effectively can you concentrate? Are you as accurate as you were before when the rule of the game are changed? Will you become part of the Navy's history or a statistic in the enemy's body-count?

TIME: 1 Hour.

EQUIPMENT: Gas Mask
Helmet
M-16 Weapons Simulator

CASUALTIES: None required.

TEAM COMPOSITION: No specific watches assigned.

SAFETY BRIEF: Appropriate weapons brief related to Repel Boarders scenario.

INCIDENT PLAN: In case of a medical emergency contact Medical 1017 representative or Ambulance.

EVOLUTION 1: Don gas masks.

EVOLUTION 2: Shoot weapons.

DEBRIEF: Each recruit provided with their score and any applicable feedback. Any recruit who shoots less than the average score for the group will be considered a "casualty". Emphasis on the team aspect should be addressed. Each individual's accuracy is important to the team's effectiveness overall. A good technique is to ask how many of them listed as their #1 reason for joining the Navy "To die for my country".

NOTE: Facilitator will use lighting effects and sound effects as required for a degree of complication.

BATTLE STATIONS

ABANDON SHIP SCENARIO

OBJECTIVE: (paraphrased and read to the recruit teams with the scenario) The recruit team will utilize the pool and provided survival equipment to simulate abandoning ship, perform survival techniques, organize themselves to ensure the best chance of survival and rescue. This scenario will test the recruit team's ability to use what they have learned during initial swim/Survival skills training and will test their ability to organize and work together as a team.

SCENARIO: (read to recruits) Your ship is underway in the South China Sea. There has been a casualty that has caused irreparable damage and catastrophic failure of the hull and your ship is sinking. The Captain has ordered all non-damage control personnel to go to their abandon ship stations. The weather is clear and seas are relatively calm. Nearest land is 200 miles west and there is no discernible wind.

The annals of Naval history are full of stories of ships that, despite the best effort of the crew, have succumbed to the force of gravity and the unforgiving sea. Your survival skills will make the difference! Your determination to survive and ability to remain calm without the security of a ship to hold you are the ingredients you need to live. Take the case of Medal of Honor recipient EN2 Michael E. Thornton who, while conducting joint SEAL operations with Vietnamese forces, went back into an ambush to retrieve his Lieutenant when it became apparent that he hadn't escaped the ambush. While he was in the jungle looking for and saving the Lieutenant, the accompanying Vietnamese left by sea without Petty Officer Thornton or the Lieutenant. When the Petty Officer reached the shore he paused long enough to inflate the Lieutenant's life jacket then swam out to sea with the Lieutenant in tow. He supported the unconscious officer in the water for two hours before a Navy small craft located them and pulled them aboard. The lieutenant that Petty Officer Thornton rescued was himself a Medal of Honor recipient by the name of Tom Norris who had received his Medal for the rescue, five months earlier of two downed pilots. You must strive to be a team player especially when conditions are bad. Keep your team together and your chances of survival increase substantially.

TIME: 1 Hour.

EQUIPMENT: Lifejackets
Life raft

CASUALTIES: Added as required for realism/time management

TEAM COMPOSITION: Assigned as per WQSB for Abandon Ship Station.

SAFETY BRIEF: Pools staff will give brief reminding recruits about checking water clear and other pertinent safety items.

INCIDENT PLAN: Pool Staff will utilize existing procedures for emergencies.

EVOLUTION 1: Manning of Abandon Ship Station and muster.

EVOLUTION 2: Abandon Ship.

EVOLUTION 3: Boarding of Life raft/Organization.

EVOLUTION 4: Simulated Helo-Rescue.

DEBRIEF: Lead staff member shall provide critical feedback to the teams on their performance as a team in aiding shipmates, selection of who got the lifejackets, communicating and leadership among the group members.

NOTES:

The facility will take two teams of approximately twenty each. The teams will be briefed by the facilitator and directed to the location of the "abandon ship" locker. The facilitator will order all hands to "abandon-ship" stations at which point the recruits are expected to empty the contents of the locker, donning life preservers and mustering in preparation for the order to abandon ship.

The facilitator will order "abandon ship" at which point the recruits will proceed to the tower and abandon ship using either lifejackets or their dungarees or other available flotation device (facilitators may place debris in the water to be used for floatation). The recruits will jump at their own discretion just as they would in a real scenario. Once in the water they should swim free of the "ship" and rendezvous at the mid-point of the pool.

There will be liferafts at mid-pool that the recruits will board once they are told that the rafts are on the surface. Once in the raft the facilitator will evaluate their efforts to organize and enhance chances of survival. The end of the evolution is marked by the sound of a rescue helicopter at which point a rescue swimmer approaches the raft and gives direction for leaving the raft. On-site facilitators will then conduct the debrief.

APPENDIX B
BATTLE STATIONS

FACILITATOR QUALIFICATION

301 FINAL QUALIFICATION AS RTC BATTLE STATIONS FACILITATOR

NAME _____

This page serves as a record of satisfactory completion of the specified Job Qualification Requirement (JQR). The Battle Stations LCPO/ALCPO shall certify completion of applicable sections after an oral examination and observation of performance. Ensure that your knowledge and performance meets appropriate standards.

Maintain this qualification section in the member's Training Record.

QUALIFICATION RECORD

Member was indoctrinated in this JQR and given a target completion date of: _____

Signature _____
Battle Stations LCPO/ALCPO

Date _____

The above staff member has completed all requirements for this qualification. Recommend assignment as a qualified Battle Stations Facilitator.

RECOMMENDED _____
Battle Stations ALCPO

DATE _____

RECOMMENDED _____
Battle Stations LCPO

DATE _____

RECOMMENDED _____
Battle Stations Division Officer

DATE _____

QUALIFIED _____
Afloat Training Group Commander

DATE _____

BATTLE STATIONS FACILITATOR

1. **Basic Function.** The Battle Stations Facilitator is directly responsible to the Battle Stations ALCPO/LCPO for the execution of their duties. The Battle Stations ALCPO shall be responsible for training and qualification of all Facilitators assigned to the Afloat Training Group as Battle Stations staff members. All Facilitators will be familiar with command policy and applicable RTC notices and instructions pertinent to their duties.

2. Duties, responsibilities and authority.

a. The Battle Stations Facilitator shall be responsible for the following:

(1) Be fully capable of acting as the key link in achieving the objective of Battle Stations in terms of appearance, qualification and attitude.

(2) Act as the primary Safety Monitor throughout Battle Stations, paying particular attention to hydration and control of acceptable risk in each event.

(3) Ensure every effort is made to keep all recruits motivated and on-track, using available RDC's when appropriate if problems arise.

(4) Call for Medical assistance if a recruit is seriously injured during Battle Stations.

(5) Report any incidents to the ALCPO/LCPO involving:

- (a) Injury (staff or recruit)
- (b) Refusal to Train
- (c) Any other unusual circumstance.

(6) Maintain physical fitness to RTC/RDC standards or better.

3. Action.

a. All Battle Stations Facilitators shall ensure that the objective of Battle Stations is met and that their method of facilitation is in line with provided guidance and within RTC/Battle Stations policy.

101 BATTLE STATIONS FACILITATOR-FUNDAMENTALS

References:

- a. SORM
- b. RTCINST (R-FEP Instruction)
- c. Battle Stations Facilitator Guide
- d. Battle Stations RDC Package

101.1 Discuss the duties, responsibilities and authority of the Battle Stations Facilitator.

.2 Define the difference between various heat, chill and weather conditions and be able to take action on the following:

- a. Extreme heat and chill conditions.
- b. Weather emergencies such as Lightning Storm, Tornado, Blizzard.

.3 Define the difference between minor and major injuries and be able to take action on the following:

- a. Major medical emergency/injury.
- b. Minor injury.

- .4 Define the requirements for hydration of trainees in general and specifically the implications for the following:
 - a. G6PD and Sickle Cell trait trainees.
- .5 Define the objectives of Battle Stations.
- .6 Discuss the operation, sequence, safety concerns and historical backdrop for the following R-FEP scenarios:
 - a. General Quarters
 - b. Abandon Ship
 - c. Emergency Sortie
 - d. Mass Casualty
 - e. Magazine Flooding
 - f. Shaft Alley Rescue
 - g. Forrestal Escape Scuttle
 - h. Fire Fighting
 - i. Search and Rescue
 - j. Rescue and Assistance
 - k. M-16 Simulator
 - l. Boarding Party
 - m. Stores On-Load
- .7 Discuss the operation of the Master Battle Stations Schedule with specific emphasis on:
 - a. Time critical events.
 - b. Methods to manage time during non-time critical events.
- .8 Discuss methods for prebriefing and debriefing each Battle Stations scenario with specific emphasis on:
 - a. Teamwork/Team-Building.
 - b. Positive Motivation.
 - c. Core Values.
- .9 Discuss the criteria for Battle Stations failure and procedures for dealing with specifically:
 - a. Refusal to Train.
 - b. Major Injury.
- .10 Discuss the role of the RDC during each event.
- .11 Discuss procedures for transit between events specifically:
 - a. Weather/road conditions.
 - b. Transit routes.
 - c. Time management implications.
 - d. Street Songs/Cadence

201 **WATCH STATION - BATTLE STATIONS FACILITATOR**
Estimated completion time 2 weeks

201.1 **PREREQUISITES**

Fundamentals 101 of this JOR
101.1 thru 101.11

Fundamentals completed _____ Date _____
Battle Stations ALCPO

Battle Stations Water Survival
Instructor/2nd Class Swimmer Qualified _____ Date _____
Pool Staff LCPO

Medium Risk Screening Completed _____ Date _____
RTC Medium Risk Screening Officer

301 **TASKS**

301.1 Explain the duties, responsibility and authority of the Battle Stations Facilitator.

(Signature) (Date)

.2 Describe the difference between various heat, chill and weather conditions and actions taken on the following:

- a. Extreme heat condition.
- b. Extreme chill condition.
- c. Weather emergencies.

(Signature) (Date)

.3 Describe the difference between minor and major injuries and be able to take action on the following:

- a. Major medical emergency/injury.

(Signature) (Date)

.4 Describe the requirements for hydration of trainees in general and specifically the implications for the following:

- a. G6PD and Sickle Cell trait trainees.

(Signature) (Date)

.5 Describe the objective of Battle Stations.

(Signature) (Date)

.6 Describe the operation, sequence, safety concerns and historical backdrop for the following Battle Stations scenarios:

- a. General Quarters
- b. Abandon Ship
- c. Emergency Sortie
- d. Mass Casualty
- e. Magazine Flooding
- f. Shaft Alley Rescue

- g. Forrestal Escape Scuttle
- h. Fire Fighting
- i. Search and Rescue
- j. Rescue and Assistance
- k. M-16 Simulator
- l. Boarding Party

m. Stores On-Load

(Signature)

(Date)

.7 Describe the operation of the Battle Stations Schedule with specific emphasis on:

- a. Time critical events.
- b. Time management techniques for non-time critical events.

(Signature)

(Date)

.8 Describe methods for prebriefing and debriefing each Battle Stations scenario with specific emphasis on:

- a. Teamwork/Team-Building.
- b. Positive Motivation.
- c. Core Values.

(Signature)

(Date)

.9 Describe the criteria for Battle Stations failure and procedures for dealing with specifically:

- a. Refusal to Train.
- b. Major Injury.

(Signature)

(Date)

.10 Describe the role of the RDC during each event.

(Signature)

(Date)

.11 Describe procedures for transit between events specifically:

- a. Weather/road conditions.
- b. Transit routes.
- c. Time management implications.
- d. Street Songs/Cadence

(Signature)

(Date)

.12 Be able to facilitate the following events:

APPENDIX C

<u>EVENT</u>	<u>OBSERVE/DATE</u>	<u>PERFORM/DATE</u>
a. General Quarters	_____	_____
b. Abandon Ship	_____	_____
c. Emergency Sortie	_____	_____
d. Mass Casualty	_____	_____
e. Magazine Flooding	_____	_____
f. Shaft Alley Rescue	_____	_____
g. Forrestal Escape Scuttle	_____	_____
h. Fire Fighting	_____	_____
i. Search and Rescue	_____	_____
j. Rescue and Assistance	_____	_____
k. M-16 Simulator	_____	_____
l. Boarding Party	_____	_____
m. Stores On-Load	_____	_____

BATTLE STATIONS

RDC PACKAGE

OBJECTIVE: "Battle Stations" is designed to challenge your recruits physically and build their ability to work as a team. Each scenario is built around some technical skills acquired throughout their training at RTC and is prefaced with an example of our Naval Heritage meant to "inspire". Recruits should be encouraged to look upon this as the culmination of their Boot Camp experience and their actual transition from "Recruit" to "Sailor".

1. RDC ROLE & SCENARIOS:

- A. The RDC's (2) are required to accompany their groups throughout the "Battle Stations".
- B. **NON-INTEGRATED:** Each division is divided into four (4) groups of approximately twenty recruits and the groups will move to each site in pairs. This will allow one RDC to be present to observe your recruits and assist the Facilitators as required.
- C. **INTEGRATED:** Each division is divided into eight (8) groups and combined with recruits of the opposite sex. RDC's will have to collaborate on WQSB assignments.
- D. The Facilitator will have primary responsibility for your recruits during the "Battle Stations" exercise and will need your assistance in some instances. If a recruit is injured, has difficulty working as a team-player or decides to quit the Facilitator will require you to assist in assessing or motivating the recruit.
- E. Direct participation in the scenario with the recruit team is generally not desired, but there are some instances where your assistance as a safety observer and "cheer-leader" are useful. Decisions and actions made by recruits during "Battle Stations" are largely up to the recruit team by design. Even though you may see obvious approaches to each scenario, the recruits are expected to perform with minimal guidance from staff.

- F. The following is a list of scenario's and specific functions the RDC should expect to perform.

EMERGENCY SORTIE

Using the MARLINESPIKE and Sea & Anchor assignments, the recruits make preparations to get underway due to an approaching hurricane and moor upon return to port. RDC should observe for safety and work with the Facilitator to determine if prompting at some points is desirable to allow sequence flow.

SHAFT ALLEY RESCUE

Given one injured 150 lb. recruit and a Neil Robertson Stretcher, the team must negotiate the Confidence Course obstacles while wearing OBA's to get the "patient" to medical care. RDC observes for safety. The recruit teams are split for this evolution and the Facilitator will require assistance in monitoring the separate groups. decisions are made totally by the recruits. Facilitators will provide basic ground rules.

M-16 SIMULATOR

Recruits will shoot the M-16 in a "Repel Boarders" scenario in low light while wearing their Gas Masks and Helmets. RDC's observe only.

FIRE FIGHTING

A fire is called away and recruits must man the Repair locker and attack the fire using WQSB Fire Party assignments. RDC's monitor safety and assist in motivation for realistic effect.

SEARCH AND RESCUE

Using their Fire Party assignments, recruits must locate and remove victims from the Egress Chamber in a dark and smoky environment. RDC's observe and may participate as the "victim" if desired.

ABANDON SHIP

Recruits are ordered to their "Abandon Ship" station and discover that there aren't enough Life Jackets to go around. They will then "Abandon Ship", get organized in the water and make their way to the raft once it is on the surface. RDC's desiring to be in the water must clear it with the Chief on Deck at the pool.

FORRESTAL ESCAPE SCUTTLE

Each recruit in the team must pass through the scuttle without touching the sides or they become "burned". Only a total team effort makes this possible. RDC's may encourage but the decision making is all up to the recruits.

2. PREREQUISITES:

- A. Recruits must be **FIT FOR FULL DUTY** for "Battle Stations". Please have it entered on the Hard Card to make screening easier
- B. 3rd Class swimmer qualified.
- C. Academic Test 4 complete.
- D. Final PT complete and within bodyfat standards.
- E. Firefighting Applications stamp.

3. HARD-CARD DELIVERY:

A. HARD CARDS MUST BE DELIVERED TO THE BATTLE STATIONS OFFICE ON THE 7-3 MORNING PRIOR TO 1200. Earlier is better. Please ensure they are separated in four stacks coinciding with the appropriate WQSB. If arranged ahead of time the Facilitator may spot check the Hard Card that is missing at General Quarters.

NOTE: Integrated divisions must also integrate their Hard Cards to correspond to the applicable WQSB.

- B. Fill out Equipment Custody sheets (PG. 10) with names from updated Alpha roster.
- C. Hard Cards will be ready for pick-up the morning of the 7-4 DOT.
- D. Any recruit from your Division unable to participate in Battle Stations on the night scheduled, must report to 1312 between 1200 and 1400 on the day of their make-up with hard card.
- E. PT2 and Battle Stations failures must wait 24 hours before participating in Battle Stations. First time failures must have pg. 13 signed by Ship's Officer. Second Time failures must have pg. 13 signed by Ship's Officer and must have Hard Card documented by parent Squadron Commander and Afloat Training Group Commander authorizing third attempt.

4. BATTLE DRESS EQUIPMENT:

THERE WILL BE NO MARKINGS PLACED ON HELMETS!

HELMETS WILL ALWAYS BE STOWED ON THE DECK!

A. Call ahead to our office to give us the number of small, medium and large Gas Masks you will need. We will pre-stage the equipment and you may pick it up, Division Strength, at BLDG 1312. Recommend pick up equipment directly after photo pick up. The back-up time is after evening chow.

B. Turn-in of equipment will take place between 0800 and 1000 on the 7-4 DOT.

5. COMPLETION CEREMONY:

A. RDC's shall obtain "NAVY" Ball Caps by taking an updated Alpha roster (verifying the number of eligible recruits) to Supply (1212).

B. The "NAVY" caps are to be held until the Completion Ceremony at the end of "Battle Stations" and will be passed out in the Ship after the last Battle Stations event or Breakfast. Sequence for the ceremony is as follows:

1. Combine both Divisions in one compartment (if applicable).
2. Video tape is shown.
3. Ship Officer will make congratulatory speech.
5. RDC's swap covers out one at a time, exchange salutes with each recruit.
6. Recommend "Proud to be an American" be played.
7. Ship/RDC may add to ceremony as appropriate.

6. POOL LOGISTICS:

A. Each team will be required to change into dungarees already pre-staged at the pool.

B. Each recruit will be required to have a change of skivvies, PT shorts (swimsuits for females), and towel for use at the pool.

C. Each team will carry **AT LEAST two (2)** seabags with the change of undergarments rolled inside the towel, name facing outward for ease of identification (for integrated divisions one seabag should be for females and one for males). **Females must bring swimsuits.** The team will carry the seabags throughout the "Battle Stations". Switching off who carries the sea-bag is up to the recruit team.

D. Hair care products will be **COMPLETELY WASHED OUT** prior to commencement of "Battle Stations". Any remaining conditioner has the potential to cloud the pool rendering it unsafe.

E. Female recruits who are menstruating will require use of a tampon.

7. GENERAL QUARTERS SCENARIO: Recruits will start "Battle Stations" with a General Quarters wake up at a time designated IAW the "Battle Stations" schedule. Facilitators will meet with the RDC's in the RDC Lounge prior to GQ. Sea-bags should be already packed, canteens full, all outergarments stowed in locker, raincoat liner on hanger. Uniform of the day will be set by facilitator at GQ. Recruits should be asleep in their racks for this evolution. Recruits will be required to fall in at full Battle Dress. **THIS SHOULD TAKE NO LONGER THAN 7 MINUTES! RECRUITS SHOULD KNOW THEIR WQSB ASSIGNMENTS PRIOR TO GQ.** The compartment will be left off-spot until the completion of "Battle Stations".

8. WATCH, QUARTER AND STATION BILL:

A. WQSB's are to be filled out for each of your recruit teams. Leadership positions are completely up to the RDC. Groupings may be divided as you wish. Integrated divisions will have as even a split as possible between male and female recruits.

B. The following Fire Party assignments must be made for each of the four (groups):

- | | |
|--------------------------|--------------------------------|
| *1) Repair Locker Leader | 11) #2 Nozzleman |
| 2) On Scene Leader | 12) #2 Hoseman |
| 3) Attack Team Leader | 13) #2 Hoseman |
| 4) #1 Nozzleman | 14) #2 Hoseman |
| 5) #1 Hoseman | 15) #2 Hoseman |
| 6) #1 Hoseman | 16) #2 Plugman |
| 7) #1 Hoseman | *17) #2 Messenger |
| 8) #1 Hoseman | *18) Locker Messenger |
| 9) #1 Plugman | *19) Repair Locker Phonetalker |
| *10) #1 Messenger | *20) On Scene Phonetalker |

* Note: Indicated positions are optional for teams with less than twenty.

C. The following Sea and Anchor assignments must be made for each of the four groups:

NOTE: USS MARLINESPIKE will be manned by two groups at a time, A&B, C&D, E&F, etc. The WQSB for each team provides 50% of the fully manned Sea and Anchor detail. Two of your four teams comprise one full detail for this event.

WQSB A, C, E, G, I, K, M, O

- | | |
|-------------------------|-------------------------|
| 1) BMOW (Pilothouse) | 11) Line 2 Captain |
| 2) Focsle Captain | 12) Line 2 Linehandler |
| 3) Colors Fwd. | 13) Line 2 Linehandler |
| 4) Focsle Phonetalker | *14) Line 2 Linehandler |
| 5) Aft Phonetalker | 15) Line 3 Captain |
| 6) Midship Phonetalker | 16) Line 3 Linehandler |
| 7) Line 1 Captain | 17) Line 3 Linehandler |
| 8) Line 1 Linehandler | *18) Line 3 Linehandler |
| 9) Line 1 Linehandler | 19) Shore Detail |
| *10) Line 1 Linehandler | *20) Shore Detail |

WQSB B, D, F, H, J, L, N, P

- | | |
|------------------------|-------------------------|
| 1) Fantail Captain | 11) Line 5 Linehandler |
| 2) Midship Captain | 12) Line 5 Linehandler |
| 3) Bridge Phonetalker | *13) Line 5 Linehandler |
| 4) Underway Colors | 14) Line 6 Captain |
| 5) Colors Aft | 15) Line 6 Linehandler |
| 6) Line 4 Captain | 16) Line 6 Linehandler |
| 7) Line 4 Linehandler | *17) Line 6 Linehandler |
| 8) Line 4 Linehandler | 18) Shore Detail |
| *9) Line 4 Linehandler | 19) Shore Detail |
| 10) Line 5 Captain | *20) Shore Detail |

*Note: Indicated positions are optional for teams with less than twenty..

D. A team leader/POIC shall be designated for each event per team on the WQSB.

9. **COMPLETION CRITERIA:** Each recruit must pass "Battle Stations" to complete Boot Camp. Failure to complete "Battle Stations" will constitute a "Refusal to Train".

10. **INJURIES:** Medical will be called in case of major injury to determine if the recruit will be able to continue with "Battle Stations" or must be pulled. RDC's are asked to monitor recruits with "minor" injuries to assist the Facilitator in risk assessment.

11. **SAFETY:** The Facilitator bears the most responsibility for the overall safety of recruits during "Battle Stations". You may be asked to assist at some sites as a safety observer. Training Time Out is in effect throughout Battle Stations.

12. **UNIFORM FOR "BATTLE STATIONS":**

- A. Dungarees.
- B. Guard Belts with FULL Canteen.
- C. Outer Garments (See pg. 3 para 7)
- D. Safety Shoes.
- E. Dog Tags.
- F. I D Cards. (left shirt pocket)
- G. RECRUIT Ball Caps in Gas Mask Case.
- H. Helmets
- I. Gas Mask in Carrier
- H. S-cell/G6PD recruits will wear their "belts". (Available at DH1000)

DO NOT WEAR: Notebooks, watches, jewelry, contact lenses and collar devices

14. **MIND-SET:** "Battle Stations" is meant to be the "final hurdle" for recruits completing Boot Camp. Feel free to tailor your training in terms of "attitude development" RDC Time to that end goal. Your recruits' successful completion of "Battle Stations" will hinge on their ability to perform as a team without prompting. They will be given the latitude to improvise to achieve their mission with minimal staff intervention.

15. **HYDRATION:** Recruits should maximize their hydration prior to commencing "Battle Stations". This is particularly important for Sickle Cell and G6PD recruits. Make sure the recruits start out with full canteens. There will be no time to fill them during General Quarters.

16. **QUESTIONS:** Please be sure and contact the "Battle Stations" office at ext. 2298 if you have any questions.

BATTLE STATIONS RECRUIT INSTRUCTIONS

OBJECTIVE: To galvanize the basic warrior attributes of SACRIFICE, DEDICATION, TEAMWORK and ENDURANCE in each recruit through the practical application of basic Navy Skills and Core Values learned during Recruit Training as the apex of the training program

INTRODUCTION: The "Battle Stations" exercise is designed to give Recruits an opportunity to use the limited technical skills and teamwork ability learned during basic training to accomplish fleet-oriented tasks. You will be challenged individually and as a team to accomplish each assigned mission. Each event your team participates in is based on actual events in Naval History that have produced both heroes and casualties. The difference between success and failure will be your ability to work with your shipmates as a team. There will be a Facilitator with your group at all times to guide your team to each event and discuss each event both before and after, to assist you in seeing the value of your accomplishments. In many cases during your training you have been told exactly what to do and how to do it. In this case many decisions will be up to you and your shipmates with minimal intervention from the RTC staff. Just as in the Fleet, you will have to be motivated and a self-starter to stay on track and accomplish each given mission.

CRITERIA FOR COMPLETION: Each team will have a specific schedule and WQSB assignments (made by your RDC). You must be sure you are aware of your individual assignments as part of the team prior to commencement of "Battle Stations". The Facilitator accompanying your team will be giving your team feedback as to their performance as you proceed through the events. The only thing you have to do to pass "Battle Stations" is to finish as part of your team. If you quit, get severely injured or are pulled out by the Facilitator because you are pulling down the team then you will fail and will be set back in training for remediation. "Battle Stations" must be completed by each recruit in order to graduate from Basic Training.

PREREQUISITES: You must be FIT FOR FULL DUTY and all items on your Hard Card that are required for completion of Basic Training must be documented prior to being allowed to participate in "Battle Stations".

ELEMENT OF RISK: Almost every "Battle Stations" event contains some element of risk. If you become injured then medical attention will be provided. A decision will be made immediately whether you can continue or not. If the injury is serious enough you will be pulled out and will not pass "Battle Stations". The best way to avoid injury is to be as active as possible as part of your team and look out for the welfare of your shipmates.

UNIFORM: You will wear dungarees, appropriate outer-garments, guard-belts (with canteen), helmet and gas mask (at the carry). A change of undergarments shall be rolled in your towel and each team will carry their own change of clothing in two sea-bags. Collar devices and jewelry are not to be worn. I.D. Cards are required and are used at some events.

TRANSIT: You may be required to double-time between event sites. This will be done in "columns of three" and road-guards will not be required.

TECHNICAL KNOWLEDGE: Ensure you review the following areas. Performance of the technical skills you have learned will be essential to completing the scenarios:

Linehandling
First Aid

Firefighting
M-16 Firing Procedures

Abandon Ship Procedures
Gas Mask Donning Procedures

BATTLE STATIONS WQDD (REV 7-20)
TEAM ALPHA

SCHEDULE SEQUENCE										5	2	6	4	1	3			
NAME	GENDER (M/F)	SSN	BLOOD TYPE	GEPDS-CELL	SHIP FIGHTING	EMERGENCY SORTIE	ABANDON SHIP	SHAFT ALLEY RESCUE	ESCAPE SCUTTLE	M-16 SIMULATION	FACILITATOR USE ONLY	DATE:	DIVISION:	# STARTED: Male Female	# COMPLETED: Male Female	FACILITATOR:	NOTES:	List failures/reason
1 ADAMS, M.S.	M	230498322	A+		RL P/T	LINE 3 L/H												
2 BRADSHAW, I.T.	F	751538923	O+		OSL	MIDSHIP P/T												
3 BRAUER, B.K.	M	551337314	A+		#2 FLUG	SHORE DETAIL												
4 CONAHAN, J.F.	F	391456712	A-		#1 HOSEMAN	FWD POIC												
5 DAHL, G.S.	M	632141153	B+		ATL	LINE 1 CAPT	POIC											
6 DUNCAN, R.C.	F	547823492	A-		#1 HOSEMAN	LINE 1 L/H												
7 GRIFFIN, P.N.	M	272622950	B-	66R	#1 MSGR	LINE 2 L/H												
8 HOLCOMB, T.D.	F	309841269	O-		RL	BMOW												
9 JENSEN, E.L.	M	480304671	O+		#1 NOZZLE	LINE 1 L/H												
10 LENZ, J.F.	F	689045369	A+		#2 HOSEMAN	LINE 1 L/H												
11 LEVY, B.C.	M	55314302	AB-		#1 HOSEMAN	LINE 3 L/H												
12 MARLER, A.O.	F	301932021	AB+		#2 HOSEMAN	LINE 2 L/H												
13 MEISTER, R.I.	M	135632904	O+		#2 HOSEMAN	SHORE DETAIL												
14 MORGAN, M.L.	F	641693285	A+	5-CELL	#1 FLUG	LINE 1 L/H												
15 NELSON, K.D.	M	745628310	B-		O/S P/T	LINE 2 L/H		POIC										
16 RANDALL, S.R.	F	292054081	B+		#2 HOSEMAN	COLORS FWD												
17 REFFELL, A.O.	M	797324338	A-		#2 NOZZLE	AFT P/T												
18 RIVERA, N.S.	F	451673422	O+		#2 MSGR	LINE 3 L/H												
19 ROEKER, V.J.	M	630384419	O-		#1 HOSEMAN	LINE 2 CAPT												
20 SHEKLES, Z.N.	F	261708439	O-		L. MSGR	FOCUS P/T												
21																		
22																		
23																		
24																		
25																		
26																		
27																		

FACILITATOR USE ONLY
DATE:
DIVISION:
STARTED: Male Female
COMPLETED: Male Female
FACILITATOR:
NOTES:
List failures/reason

BATTLE STATIONS

RDC FEEDBACK

The Battle Stations staff is interested in any ideas or constructive criticism you may have. This feedback is optional. If you do return this form please sign it and give us a number where we can reach you for clarification if required. Thank you.

EQUIPMENT CUSTODY

	NAME	MASK #	HELMET #	JACKET #	TROUSER #	HOOD #
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APPENDIX D

12 November, 1997

From: STSCS (SS/SW) D. A. Dahl
To: LT Bradshaw

Subj: "THREE STRIKES" PROPOSAL

1. The following is proposed in order to increase the challenge of Battle Stations for the recruit. A recruit was recently asked what she heard about Battle Stations she said that "If you just keep running you pass". This isn't the first time we've heard this.

2. If adopted as policy, each recruit would be subject to a "strike" given by the Facilitator during the conduct of events. An accumulation of three (3) strikes would result in a Battle Stations failure. This will be briefed to the recruits ahead of time.

3. Strikes can be removed by the Facilitator for an extra effort on the recruit's part displaying exceptional teamwork, operational use of or understanding of the Core Values.

4. Strikes are assessed for the following:

FFTU - Improper seal on OBA facepiece (bad seal, not worn at appropriate time, breathing tubes not connected, hood worn under head harness, wearing glasses with facepiece).

- Failing to activate OBA's (or OSL failing to order activation)
- Plugman charging unmanned fire hose or ATL ordering unmanned hose charged.
- Grounding charged hose.

SORTIE - Recurring safety violation (more than one occurrence).
~~UNABLE TO TIE BOWLINE~~

WEPS - Rapid fire of the weapon.

- Improper donning/excessive time to don gas mask.

SAR - ~~USING LABOR (STUDY) TO SIGHT~~
~~SAFETY VIOLATION~~
- Designation as casualty as the result of a safety violation.

POOL - Being removed from the water by staff member.

- Major safety violation (entering or exiting raft head first).

~~SINKING SONS IN RAFT OR POOL~~

GQ - Longer than 7 minutes to dress out.

- Not familiar with WQSB assignment.

General - Intermittent stop and starts for double time.

- Excessive arguing.
- Lack of participation.
- foul language.

5. Automatic failure would occur for individuals who fight, quit or show extremely poor effort on double time. A failure would also occur if a safety violation occurs that results in injury to another recruit or staff member (primarily a concern at FFTU and the Pool).

6. Facilitators will tally strikes on the WQSB per event and will inform recruits when they earn a strike.

7. This method is meant to create a perception that Battle Stations is more than just showing up and hanging with the crowd.

8. An increase in the number of failures is anticipated which will be a problem in terms of rescheduling and could ultimately affect Ship 9 population.

D. A. Dahl

APPENDIX E

From: BUC(SCW/AW) Conahan

To: LT Bradshaw

Via: STSCS(SS/SW) Dahl

Subj: FY 98 BATTLE STATIONS BUDGET

1. The following is a breakdown for the Battle Stations budget:

Building 1312	\$ 8,500	*\$ 8,500
Gear Issue	\$10,000	*\$10,000
Abandon Ship	\$18,856	*\$ 8,856
Forrestal Escape	\$ 800	*\$ 800
Emergency Sortie	\$ 3,300	*\$ 2,200
M-16 Simulator	COST NOT YET DETERMINED	
Shaft Alley	\$ 4,500	*\$ 3,500
Fire Fighting	\$ 4,688	*\$ 3,500
Egress Chamber	\$ 4,500	*\$ 4,000
Mass Casualty	\$ 3,500	*\$ 3,000
Magazine Flooding	\$ 6,500	*\$ 6,500
Stores on Load	\$ 2,500	*\$ 2,500
Rope Bridges	\$ 6,600	*\$ 6,600
Total	\$72,244	*\$59,956

* To reflect the current FY 98 budget that ATG has received.

V/R

J. A. CONAHAN

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- Personal interview with FCC (SW) Keth, Battle Stations staff, RTC Great Lakes, November 20, 1997.
- Personal interview with GMCS Werley, Battle Stations Assistant Leading Chief Petty Officer, RTC Great Lakes, November 20, 1997.
- Personal interview with HTC Tilton, Battle Stations staff, RTC Great Lakes, November 20, 1997.
- Personal interview with LT Bradshaw, Battle Stations Division Officer, RTC Great Lakes, November 20, 1997.
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