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INTRABLOC AFFAIRS

Budapest Events Prompt Socialist-Social Democratic Summit

90EC0110A Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP in Hungarian 3 Nov 89 p 3

[Text] Top leaders of the Western European socialist and social democratic parties convened yesterday for an extraordinary conference in Milan. The meeting was initiated by the Italian Socialist Party and was chaired by Willy Brandt. The purpose of the meeting was to discuss the new situation that is evolving in Eastern Europe, and to make decisions concerning the relationships these Western parties should have with the new Eastern European parties which acclaim democratic and socialist values. Participants at the conference made no secret of the fact that the establishment of the Hungarian Socialist Party [MSZP] catalyzed their thoughts in this regard.

The conference was held behind closed doors at the Technical and Scientific Museum building of Milan. Today Socialist International President Brandt and Italian Socialist Party Executive Secretary Bettino Craxi held a press conference. Altogether 23 West European party leaders participated in the Milan conference.

Craxi stressed that a new situation is evolving in Eastern Europe, and that the Socialist International and its leaders are facing a great responsibility in formulating an appropriate response.

The MSZP sought admission to the Socialist International, and the Polish Workers Party [LEMP], also in the process of change, expressed preparedness to place its relationship with the Socialist International on new foundations. The Socialist International recognizes the membership of Eastern European social democratic parties from 40 years ago as having legal continuity.

Slovak Greens Support Hungarian Position on Dam

90EC0110B Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP in Hungarian 3 Nov 89 p 3

[Text] The Hungarian Parliament's decision of last Tuesday concerning the Bos-Nagymaros barrage is contrary to the spirit that has characterized the longtime, lively, mutually beneficial, and diverse cooperation that has existed between Czechoslovakia and Hungary, according to a lead editorial in yesterday's RUDE PRAVO. The official paper of the Czechoslovak Communist Party stressed that in Czechoslovakia's view, the meaning of the Hungarian Parliament's decision is that from a practical standpoint Hungary has cancelled the 1977 intergovernmental agreement, and for this reason Prague expects to be indemnified.

Czechoslovakia has manifested sufficient patience and a maximum endeavor to find a mutually acceptable solution, but the rational Czechoslovak proposals "did not fall on fertile soil," according to the newspaper.

In UJ SZO, a newspaper published in Pozsony [Bratislava], Czechoslovak Government Commissioner Vladimir Lokvenc defended the idea of completing the project, and criticized the Hungarian stand. Only the Czechoslovak youth newspaper MLADA FRONTA published the view expressed by Slovak environmental protectionists. Although cautiously, the opinion expressed support of the Budapest position insofar as ecological issues were concerned.

Mikulas Huba, chairman of the Slovak Environmental and Natural Life Protection Association Pozsony City committee, openly stated that the views of Pozsony environmental protectionists is closer to the Hungarian viewpoint. Huba is also an associate at the Slovak Academy of Science. He reiterated the view expressed by Pozsony environmental protectionists, according to which independent experts should be invited to take part in debating the project, which from here on will be continued only in Czechoslovakia. "It is my view that we should concentrate on more than just what kind of decision the Hungarian Parliament has rendered, and in the meantime we should forget about the need to continue thinking in ecological terms in Czechoslovakia," according to Huba.

Complaints of Slovak Minority in Hungary

90EC0035A Bratislava LITERARNY TYZDENNIK in Slovak 7 Jul 89 pp 8-9

[Open letter by Gregor Papucek, member of the Presidium and chairman of the Mass Communications Committee of the DZSM [Democratic Association of Slovak Hungarians] organization; Stefan Kraslan, secretary of the literary section of the DZSM organization; Alexander Kormos, chairman of the literary section and editor in chief of the journal SME; Alexander Zderka, chairman of the natural sciences section of the DZSM organization; and Imrich Fuhl, editor of the weekly LUDOVE NOVINY and the journal SME, in Budapest on 24 May 1989 to A. Chrudinak, editor in chief of Hungarian Television; Gy. Bereczke, chairman of Hungarian Television; I. Pozsgay, minister of state and member of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the MSRS (Hungarian Socialist and Worker Party); M. Szuros, chairman of the National Assembly; and the editors in chief of the central dailies NEPSZABADSAG and MAGYAR NEMZET: "Response to the Hungarian Television Program 'Panorama'—The Suppressed Counterpole"]

[Text] Many of us followed the "Panorama" program transmitted over the No I program of Hungarian Television on 3 April 1989, which dealt with the fate of members of the Hungarian nationality in Slovakia. The weekly LUDOVE NOVINY, No 23, 1989, of the Democratic Union of Slovaks in Hungary published a response to this program which we are publishing in full below. The authors dispatched an open letter to A. Chrudinak, editor in chief of Hungarian Television; Gy. Bereczke, chairman of Hungarian Television; I. Pozsgay,

minister of state and member of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the MSRS; M. Szuros, chairman of the National Assembly, and the editors in chief of the central dailies NEPSZABADSAG and MAGYAR NEMZET.

Dear Mr Chrudinak!

We, Slovaks living in Hungary, followed your program, transmitted on 3 April 1989 in the "Panorama" series, with great interest. The program was entitled "Czechoslovakia—The Fate of the Hungarian Nationality." And it was very likely not only we who followed the program with interest. After all, the accelerated pace of events in eastern Europe is being followed by the entire world with ever-increasing interest. And particularly by us, the local Slovaks. And this is so because the Hungarian minority in Slovakia is a mirror image of us, whether they like it or not, from a certain standpoint: they live in Slovakia and are Hungarians; we live in Hungary and are Slovaks. They live in Slovakia because the state frontier runs south of their territory and we live in Hungary because the state frontier runs more to the north of us. From this standpoint, we are equal. And we also resemble each other by the fact that a Hungarian in Slovakia has feet which reach the ground just as is the case in Hungary with respect to a Slovak. Even though certain theories have developed here about the fact that we are not of equal nationality since "their country abandoned them by changing the frontier," they have found themselves living abroad just by remaining in their settlements, while we, of our own free will, moved into our current domiciles and thus subjecting ourselves to voluntary assimilation! There is only one thing we do not understand: Where did we move from and where did we move to, particularly since this occurred still within the framework of the same country? And not to mention the different types of privileges which, today, at the end of the 20th century, are caused by the fact that the Hungarian masses "by coming into the country" or even by fleeing from the Turks entered the region of Slovak ethnicity whereas we, Slovaks, remaining in our settlements or precisely as the result of overcrowding, resulting from the above-mentioned causes and the flight from hunger, arrived in the area where we live to this day!? One thing is certain, we do not recognize such theories, on the basis of which we could be assimilated "with more justification" as a Hungarian minority in Slovakia. Not a single minority can have a predetermined fate of assimilation.

Over the past 40 years, hardly anything happened in our country which would either accelerate or retard even a little the process of assimilation of the Slovak nationality. We have gone so far that we are afraid that it will no longer be possible to rectify this serious error. "However, our demise—in the opinion of politically connected vessels—will not contribute to the good feeling among Hungarians in Slovakia" (Laszlo Dobos, MAGYAR IFFUSAG, No 9, 1989).

We have the following reservations with respect to your program:

a) it objectively supports assimilation of both of the above-mentioned nationalities;

b) it is extremely naive when it speaks of polarization in a manner which totally disregards one of the poles (the Slovaks living in Hungary). But, after all, the North Pole cannot be defined without acknowledging the South Pole! In comparison with what is the North Pole the north pole and does not its counterpart exist—the South Pole?

c) it is harmful for both sides: for the Hungarian majority and the Hungarian minority in Slovakia, but also for us—Slovaks living in Hungary;

d) the program still further disinform that portion of the broad Hungarian public which recognizes the practices of Hungarian nationalities policy—be it ever so strange—also through the unsubstantiated proclamations by Otto von Habsburg.

We agree that "the time has come for us to learn from the mistakes of the past, from history—and for us to act!" But in this manner?!

In 1848, a short-sighted Hungarian nationalities policy first repulsed all potential allies (see materials of the Bratislava Congress of 1848), and when the Hungarians rose against Austria they remained almost completely isolated, they This is not bad in terms of a bravado action, but it is weak with respect to method. And even though, despite all of this, many members of the nationalities fought on the side of the Hungarians, the majority of the nationalities did not participate in the battle, some fought against it and the fight for freedom did not prosper.

Not even following the conciliation of 1867 did the Slovaks intend to break away from Hungary. They demanded autonomy, but did not receive it. Instead, the Hungarian authorities closed the grammar school and all three Slovak gymnasiums, which had been built with Slovak money, and consistently continued with Magyarization. Following all of this, it was no accident that, after the breakup of the monarchy, Slovaks elected to live in a joint state with the Czechs.

Tell us, which part of your program indicates that you had learned a lesson from past mistakes, from the errors of history. The nationalities problems cannot be solved with force, with agitation, but only with an open heart and with common sense. Oszkar Jaszi already spoke of this.

You say that it is "extremely important to balance critically." We agree, but here again the counterpole is missing: self-criticism. Criticism without self-criticism is only a one-sided, irresponsible manifestation of remorse!

You embarked "with popular diplomacy on a path to find out how your brethren live abroad—as people and

as Hungarians." But you forgot one very important matter! Before you even embarked on your journey, you forgot to look to see how the brethren of the Slovaks live in Hungary. Had you done so, you would have known immediately that, in comparison with us, your brethren fare generally well, incomparably better than we have it here.

We consider the segment on Transylvania to be a blow below the belt because you used a segment which had nothing in common with Slovaks to arouse anti-Slovak attitudes. And, furthermore, we do not agree with those who addressed anonymous letters to you. However, the fact that they accused you of unleashing nationalism is not even surprising to us anymore.

You say: "The Hungarian minority of virtually three-quarters of a million, which was previously intimidated, is awakening."

It can be said that way. But to whom does this apply? Because if you can make such statements, so can we. For how long was the small number of Hungarians living in Slovakia intimidated? For 2 years? And even though we disagree with such a short-term intimidation we must note, even if only for the sake of objectivity, that this intimidation did not threaten the existence of the entire Hungarian nation. The entire Slovak people were in such a threatened position for more than 100 years and its very existence was at stake! After Trianon [the Treaty of Trianon, 4 June 1920], those Slovaks who remained in Hungary found themselves again in a cruel demeaning position and not for just 2 years, but for 27 years! The 2 years were far too "light" (although they were difficult for those who suffered through them) in comparison with our approximately 150 years. It is not difficult to recognize that these two matters cannot be measured on the same scale. We note that it is precisely the substantial difference in the extent and duration of the threat that is the reason behind us Slovaks, living in Hungary, suffering an inadequacy of self-confidence, whereas a sizable portion of our comrades in fate who live in Slovakia suffer from a significant excess of self-confidence (for example, they are not willing to adopt the Slovak language). And so that we would speak not only of the past, the nationalities policy of Hungary abuses the lack of self-confidence in our national minority to an unprecedented extent. A Hungarian policy does not even value the fact that in 1968 the Czechoslovak state not only declared a great deal of importance to Hungarians living in Slovakia, but in actual fact gave them a lot.

They are awakening. And we are still sleeping here. They overdosed us a little with sleeping pills. It is only sad that here in Hungary many think that the physician who prescribes such overdoses can satisfactorily solve the fate of the patient. One thing is certain: We will never again have identity disorders.

Hungarians in Slovakia "are demanding their human and nationalities rights. More democracy and more freedom. If instruction in the mother tongue is placed in

doubt or is gradually discontinued, this will inevitably lead to shriveling of Hungarian linguistic culture and national identity."

It sounds as if you had analyzed and summarized the situation of Slovaks living in Hungary. Because with respect to Hungarians living in Slovakia, you could thus far not have been able to acquire such experiences because, there, you would find many such nationalities matters incorporated in the law such as is not the case here and never was. For example, the Komarno Hungarian Theater which is regional, travels about and, wonder of wonders, can also perform there because houses of culture exist, theaters in Hungarian-populated communities. We, too, had a theater (for sure, only an amateur one): at Cab, at Slovak Komlos, at Pitvaros, etc.—until 1947! And it was precisely at this time, when "things were already better," that this theater suddenly disappeared. To this day, it has not revived. Actors of Slovak origin (Juraj Melis, Zuzanka Durkovicova, Adam Svitek, etc.) prefer the glory of the Hungarian theater. Even though, believe us, even we would like to hear the Slovak word spoken in the theater.

You say that these "up-country" (!) Hungarians have a kind of "Sunday mother tongue." You say that "on Sundays, the family is together and they speak Hungarian. Even the priest in the church speaks Hungarian." You will have a reason to be astounded when, on Sunday, a Hungarian mother (or a father) addresses their child in Slovak and the child cannot understand what the mother or father is saying, and so they will converse in Hungarian! Unfortunately, we already know what it means to raise a child in a Slovak family, a child which does not know the Slovak language. And not even in our churches does the priest speak our mother tongue, not even on holidays. And what is more, as recently happened, during a mass, when believers were singing in Slovak, the priest was heard from saying: "We have Hungarian guests, sing in Hungarian!" And the believers, since they are unenlightened, obeyed. Or, "in our country, much attention and much patience was required before various nationalities succeeded in securing similar rights and opportunities and before appropriate guarantees were incorporated in the law. Actually, over the past 2 decades, those societies which utilize—or can utilize—the opportunities of providing instruction in the mother tongue, of promoting and preserving their national cultures, have become actual active organic and yet independent components of Hungarian public life. This process, which took place in our country recently, healed the wounds of the past, removed the ossified lack of confidence, suspicion, and rendered cooperation among the various nationalities living in one country more productive, increased the feeling of our responsibility for Hungarians outside of our borders, for their successes and development of their minority fates" (Tibor Thurzo, *MAGYAR NEMZET*, 14 February 1987).

So you see, Mr Chrudinak, what a nice dream Mr Thurzo had in 1987! And how good it is that he told the public

of the entire country that we, the nationalities, feel so well—instead of us telling them. He knows! It is a great pity that nothing is factual in his "dream." But it would be worthwhile to analyze what it really means once when someone in Hungary has such beautiful dreams regarding nationalities matters.

You express yourself very well when you say: "And then, with a magic wand of internationalism, they transformed the prince of their dreams into a frog." Very true. But you did not have to go to Slovakia for your example. Here, you would have found a better example.

We cannot know from whence you derive the daring which gives you the courage to issue the following challenge: "But let us look a bit into history!" And you begin with the year 1944.

Mister, history does not begin there. Not even the history of those contradictions between nation and nationality about which there is talk here. You should have begun with the year 1790! Or with the materials of the last congress of the famous Stavy and Rady, which was held in 1847 in Bratislava! You would do better to recognize that to operate against us with the injustices of the past is hopeless effort. We could list incomparably more and more serious wrongdoings. Therefore, it is better for you to accept our proposal: Even though we examine those past times, since we must recognize them, let us not use our one-time wrongdoings against each other, since this does not lead to healing our present wounds.

After you ask the question "But what faces our grandchildren?" you complain that in the past 3 decades in Slovakia some 233 Hungarian schools have disappeared. Do you know how many Slovak schools there are in Hungary? It was a total of five elementary schools. And that was from 1949 through 1960. At that time, those "competent" authorities judged (in our stead) that we do not need them. Since that time, there is not a single school.

You complain that of 18,000 Hungarian kindergarten students almost one-third attend Slovak primary schools. However, by using this example you simultaneously indicated that, in Slovakia, more than 12,000 Hungarian children attend Hungarian kindergartens! Do you how many Slovak children in Hungary attend Slovak kindergartens? You will be surprised: not a single one!

You complain that the ministerial directive which modifies the school law, which was issued more than 10 years ago, permits only one Hungarian gymnasium in individual okreses! Do you know how many Slovak gymnasiums there are in Hungary? Don't be surprised: not a single one. For 10 years we had one gymnasium and one normal school. It is true, we did not have one in each okres, but in the whole country! And this, too, was considered to be too much in our country and they were disestablished.

But we would be unjust with respect to local nationalities policy if we claimed that we have attained nothing in the

area of instruction. We have two institutions, the entrances of which bear shields with the following bilingual legend: "General school and gymnasium with instruction in the Slovak language." One is in Budapest and the second in Cab. However, in these schools, instruction in the Slovak language is offered only for three subjects! It would be a great insult if, according to the Hungarian example, Slovakia were to "assure" the Hungarian minority such schools. We hope that this will not occur. But even in this country more should be done than just this meager pseudosolution.

According to Laszlo Dobos, who, by the way, was also the nationalities minister in Slovakia (Mr Chrudinak, show us at least one person who was a nationalities minister in Hungary!), "in the last decade, the situation pictures covering the minorities are distorted in the direction of beautification." In this country, for the last 40 years, pictures of us were generally distorted and have remained so to this day. When nationalities in our country are referred to, the subject is, in the predominant majority of cases, Hungarians living abroad. There is silence with respect to us. We cannot omit your phrase according to which... "an honest person maintains silence only regarding his own shame."

So this is the reason for that great silence! Ah, well. Perhaps an honest person can yet be found who would admit to the reading public, even in place of others: ...we have something to be ashamed of (MAGYAR NEM-ZET). But then, how can your bitterness be understood? You live here in Hungary and are not familiar with the situation of the minorities living in our country? In order to give you at least some kind of insight, look at the comparison contained in the table below.

Item	Hungarians in Slovakia	Slovaks in Hungary
Population	559,490	110,000
Kindergartens	386	—
Elementary schools	131	—
Auxiliary middle schools	31	—
Specialized middle schools	22	—
Trade schools	25	—
Gymnasiums	18	—
Theaters	2	—
Independent nationalities publishing houses	1	—
Majority publishing houses also publishing nationalities literature	6	1
Newspapers, periodicals	24	1 since 1975 and 1 since November 1988

The majority of data on Slovakia were taken from the periodical HITEL, No 2, 1989.

The asymmetry at the expense of Slovaks living in Hungary is evident at first glance. Without regard to the

situation, the Hungarian press evaluates this situation as follows: "Hungary, primarily by practicing its internal nationalities policy, shows an example to its neighbors (MAGYAR NEMZET, 9 November 1988). May the good Lord protect the Hungarians in Slovakia against the leading representatives of Czechoslovakia taking these people at their word!

My dear Mr Chrudinak, perhaps you already understand that, in comparison with the "virtual nothing" which the Slovaks in Hungary have, the Hungarian leading representatives should thank Czechoslovakia for what the Hungarians have there. What is more, you must also already understand why General Secretary Karoly Grosz could not demand any more for the Hungarians over there than they already receive without his intercession.

We know that, in the interests of Hungarians living in Slovakia, you were not the only one to speak out. It was also done by Dr Zsolt Zetenyi in an open letter to Secretary General Karoly Grosz. He lists great complaints and, at the end, writes: "Therefore, we demand and expect the MSRS and its general secretary to proceed in questions dealing with the fate of the Hungarian minority in such a way that these procedures and positions do not violate the interests of the Hungarian nation, its national self-confidence, but, on the contrary, that they should reflect the firm determination to use all means at hand to ease the fate of the Hungarian minority." It can be anticipated that he writes this way because, thanks to the good information provided by this country, not even he recognizes (or does not wish to recognize) the true face of the nationalities policy of Hungary and, therefore, fails to see even the clearest connections.

"Teachers who feared for the fate of nationalities schools" also spoke. Like no one else, they know that "the key question in preserving the nationality is the education system." Naturally, we also know this. That is why for more than 20 years we have been begging and demanding that proper schools be built for us in Budapest. For more than 20 years—and in vain!

In Slovakia, instruction is provided in the Hungarian language. But Hungary is the only state in central eastern Europe which has schools which provide instruction in the language of the minorities only on paper; in actual fact, they do not exist. Under those circumstances, it is difficult to speak in the interest of the Hungarian minority!

"The essence lies in the fact as to whether or not it will be possible to convince the leadership of the local 'okres' school system that the future of Czechoslovakia depends not on the assimilation of nationalities"—write the teachers. In our opinion, such a fact should be recognized primarily in areas where the assimilation of nationalities has progressed the most, where not even a single school in which instruction is offered in a nationalities language exists, where there is not even a single nationalities publishing house, where even of those most

important items (school, press...) a maximum of only one exists for show so that it cannot be said that there is nothing there. Among the interested socialist countries, there is only one such country: Hungary.

According to B.I.: "...that which has happened to the Hungarians in Slovakia over the past 20 years was not overly visible or sensational. It was, simply, only tragic." However, he mentions not a single word to qualify that which has happened to Slovaks living in Hungary over the past 40 years! It is as though we did not exist. Or that which happened to us was even less visible! Empty talk and self-serving slogans (some of which we cite here) have covered things over so much that even in Hungary alone hardly anybody knows of it, unless they are the most conscientious members of the nationalities and their parent people. If the Hungarian minorities living around us had, over the past 40 years, only had as many rights and opportunities, only as many kindergartens, schools, theaters, publishing houses, journals, etc., as the nationalities minorities have in Hungary, then they, too, would already not be able to master their mother tongue as prettily. There are no clever or stupid nationalities. There is only a nationality. However, there are unhappy nationalities as, for example, Slovaks living in Hungary, who, for purposes of preserving their national being, have no assurance of even the most basic conditions; and there is a less unhappy nationality, as, for example, the Hungarians in Slovakia who even today have incomparably more material assurances than all the nationalities in Hungary combined.

We Slovaks, living in Hungary, do not wish that the Hungarian minority living in Slovakia would even once be impacted by our fate, we do not want Czechoslovakia to follow the practices of nationalities policies pursued by the Hungarian state. We do not wish our comrades in fate anything bad. We wish, all the more, for the Hungarian state to follow the practices of Czechoslovak nationalities policy or to simply practice what it preaches. The practice of "saying one thing and doing another" or the practice of poisoning the water and drinking the wine is cruelly unacceptable. Look about our Slovak villages. Where are their Slovak kindergartens or schools? If you find only one, show it to us, Mr Chrudinak!

After all of this, we do not know what to think when we hear Matyas Szuros say "At the end of the 20th century, a nation that does not assure the nationalities of their rights to which they are entitled cannot claim the respect of the nations of the world." Since even the leadership of Hungary is aware of this tooth which excludes all doubt, it must also know that the existing practices of its nationalities policy will have to be very rapidly and radically changed because, given the present practices, the nationalities in Hungary do not have a chance to preserve their identities.

If anything threatens the existence of the Hungarian minority in Slovakia, then it is the assimilation of

Slovaks in Hungary. One thing is certain: the development of the Hungarian minority outside of our borders under conditions of assimilation of our minorities is an illusion. It is true that Czechoslovakia still espouses the untenable principle, which is also proclaimed in this country, according to which "it must be accepted as a fact that the arrangement of conditions for nationalities minorities is an internal matter for each country" (Tibor Thurzo, *MAGYAR NEMZET*, 14 February 1987). But until when? Hungary (as was also neatly shown in your television program) no longer accepts this principle. We Slovaks in Hungary hope that, according to your example, our mother country will also awaken and will ask what you have done with its members, what has happened in Hungary to the substantial number of Slovaks listed in official statistics or even in your actually shameful estimate? What will you say? That they themselves selected the Hungarian language over the Slovak language? Or will you take from your desk drawer that "serious" argument which was heard in 1847 at the congress in Bratislava that "they themselves wanted to become Magyarized?" You will surely agree with us, Mr Chrudinak, that, at the end of the 20th century, this would sound a little peculiar.

So that our image in front of the Hungarian public is not deformed and unilateral, we request the leadership of Hungarian Television, following the countless numbers of your programs dealing with Hungarian minorities living outside of Hungary, to, finally, introduce us also, us Slovaks living in Hungary, and, of course, also introduce the other local nationalities! But not in such a one-sided manner as you did in your program shot in Slovakia.

We do not wish to introduce ourselves to the Hungarian public in extreme or gloomy colors, but rather in realistic colors, in accordance with the facts. We have a right to have the public finally be able to create a true image of us. And the Hungarian majority also has a right to this. In the final analysis, this is also demanded by honor and courage.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Writer on Division of Europe, Cultural Isolation

90EC0022A Bratislava *SLOVENSKE POHLADY* in *Slovak* No 8, 1989 pp 2-5

[Paper presented by Ladislav Ballek at the PEN Club conference in Vienna 12-14 April 1989: "Freedom of Speech Between Ideology and Business"]

[Text] The invitation by Austrian colleagues has permitted me to take part for the first time in a PEN Club meeting. This has offered me the opportunity to perceive the deliberations of this prestigious writers' association of whose operations I know only indirectly. The Czechoslovak PEN Club ceased being active in the years when my generation entered into Slovak literature.

This reference in chronometric records marks 2 decades in the people's and literary life of my generation that represents, however, a long-term specific situation. Let us even say that in Europe, in the meantime, another generation of writers grew up and matured and was forced by the laws of a divided continent to seek its merits in isolation. This generation actually does not know itself along the Danube road by which I mean the ancient European East-West trade route and is only now beginning to identify itself, that is, in the changed European atmosphere we record as the consciousness of the European House.

Yes, a classicist would agree that it is never too early to do good and never too late, but it is certain that the opportunity for closer and more frequent contacts is opening for this generation at a time when the inclination of youth toward friendship and comradeship is already behind it. A pity! What a pity! This sigh is not of fanciful birth. Let us consider that in fact it applies to the generation which still had direct contact with the generation brought up in the all-European spirit, that is, the generation that admitted no cultural separation in Europe.

I am not claiming, in fact, I cannot even claim, that no contacts were made between young people along the old Danube road. But they took place in various rivalries in a spirit of confrontation as befitted the character of the divided continent. Meetings of young people were most lively and frequent especially at sports events where physical prowess is put to the test. We considered sports the unique ability to bring nations together and strengthen peace, not literature, this principal and determining expression of every national culture; except that sports, to put it mildly, did not succeed very well in this mission. In a certain sense, if I may say so, in the world of Europe its prioritized popular and social activity was never such that it could more effectively prevent the incessant growth of that racket and din which made it impossible even for Franz Kafka to write, perhaps even to finish writing "Zamok" [The Castle] and which could subjectively shorten the ever widening distance between, for example, Bratislava and Vienna, really so much greater than was for Kafka the distance from Plana to Georgental in Thuringia. Somehow our constant fear of all kinds of unexpected happenings only increased, fears of changes which drained us by the fact that in reality they were bringing nothing new, of the crises which no one really resolved as they never really resolved anything. This was roughly how we felt.

Today, when we speak of the common European house in which from two separate entrances (each of which led elsewhere) we are building just one joint one, it may be worthwhile to ask where this idea was over the long years, who preserved it, and how and where it survived and bided its time until it again lived to see these days. It is certain—and I do not mean this only poetically—it survived in the crowns of trees with the birds, it was never absent in the waters, in the air, in the clouds, in the alteration of hours and seasons of the year, among

people; however among them and for them it was preserved by European culture itself, by its art and literature.

Literature does not compete, confrontation is alien to its field; every national literature blossoms thanks also to outside stimulus, especially though it revives again, now it is regenerated from the stimulus of others and thanks to other literatures and so it lives on in good relations with others and in the knowledge that it can last and endure only in relation with others. So literature does not know rivalry, rather it knows kinship, although kinship of the sort that does not prevent it from remaining distinct, individual and especially national. Literature cannot be separated just as it cannot be forcibly unified; therefore its true life and real nature had such a hard time squeezing itself into the conditions that arose in Europe after its division, in fact, they tried to separate it too; literature, exactly according to the old ecclesiastical key to a literature of the East and a literature of the West. So literature was supposed to change into a liturgy and the writer into a man of letters or, as the Latin interpretation of this word permits, into a church singer. It cost literature much strength and energy to free itself from this stipulation, but I believe that the partition of our world and its rivalry did nevertheless leave its mark on it. It does not sound flattering but let us admit that a considerable part of today's European literature reminds one a little of the fate of a domestic cat which, while retaining its familiar special characteristics and immutability, nevertheless, does not fully conceal that it lives only from that table at which it is fed. The voice of literature, its freedom of speech, more than once, to be sure, caught between the two worlds, between, if you like, that ideology and business, became weaker and quieter, like muses between crossed swords.

Behind us are the times of Voltaire, Goethe, Tolstoy, when Europe lived and died according to literature; the graying, modern classicists changed under the famous "beat generation" which electrified the broadest strata of people with its original and quite nonconforming attitude toward the world. By the way, what about its legacy? Exactly that for which it yearned the least. A part of the world, may I say, accepted it ideologically, the other part, meanwhile, completely bought out. That is how our world is now. It is practical, actually pragmatic, in other words, relentlessly material and relentlessly utilitarian and this can also be seen, if you like, in the translation of literature. Do we not mutually make translations especially for lucrative reasons? Does not the East translate chiefly book titles from the West that are simplified, helpfully called ideological by the world and that are of financial interest to publishers? And does not the West translate chiefly book titles from the East, helpfully simplified and known to the world of trade or markets, books which for it are chiefly political, propagandistic and generally ideologically useful? Profitable? Greedy for gain? Except that what can the East and West really know about themselves this way? And at the same time they are, I believe, two sides of the same coin, nay, perhaps in all ways.

The theme of this meeting, "Freedom of Speech Between Ideology and Business" eloquently indicates the kind of position literature holds in today's world and the problems that confront it. Why is literature losing its attraction and why is it losing its prestige? The prestige of writers is low. Why all this is so, I do not exactly know, but it seems to me that literature and its creator are losing their appeal and prestige perhaps when society is losing its appeal and prestige, the society in which we live, the world which they represent and for which they create. In the noisy world of advertising when actually everything has already become merchandise, the voice of literature (just like the voice of man and nature) is now reaching the very threshold of audibility, as the poet would say. Its voice cannot adapt itself completely to that noise and racket, therefore it is in no way privileged by them, rather the opposite. At the same time, however, this voice is losing credibility among those who always held it as the voice of the people or even the national conscience—and they are the ones, furthermore, who reproach it for allowing this state of the world.

If we say that freedom of speech lies between ideology and business we can imagine it as a small isle or a bridge between two shores. If we assign to ideology and business different views then our freedom of speech represents a third one. Those first two represent influence and power—they, in fact, form public opinion. Are they interested in the fate of man or only their own? Do they perhaps have the desire or ambition to give out strict, objective and complete testimony about themselves when their highest ideal is only success, preferably immediate and also permanent? And success, especially commercial, is seldom achieved without the help of concealing circumstances, possibly even with lies, and especially never is it produced without advertising. That has clear motives and even clearer rules about what to publish about itself or about rivals or the competition. We know from it so much negative information about opponents and competitors that then we cannot even judge ourselves more objectively. We inform ourselves mutually day in, day out, we do it all 24 hours, and even so we are more and more petty especially to ourselves. We only seem to know everything about ourselves. In reality, we know very little because we talk only positively about ourselves in particular, while only negatively especially about our opponents and rivals. So then how can we feel any kind of solidarity towards ourselves? Prejudice, myths, half-truths satisfy us, extremely negative opinions about political opponents and business rivals are most familiar to us and since we would rather not know the truth about the other, we easily persuade ourselves that this reality of ours is really the best, so that the other does not even have to exist. We communicate in the language of propaganda, goods, their packaging, the speech of advertising and that is precisely why we do not feel any solidarity towards ourselves. This applies both within our societies and mutually among them. Literature is unattainable and irreplaceable in one respect; no matter what the geographic distance it can change to psychological closeness.

If we want to know the real life of Europe we must know its literature, from Turkey to Iceland. All live and create in the colors of our continent. All the more we should know the literature of central Europe where that coloration is perhaps most vivid today and perhaps most densely represented, in the area where we still fully understand Faust as well as Raskolnikov—in fact, these figures and their stories stride through us from one end of the continent to the other.

If anything like the soul of Europe exists then let us admit that it is already filled to the brink with extremes which are the result of its division. Its spiritual life, literary not excepting, often developed in "pro" and "con" dimensions. This kind of living has quite exhausted us and even itself. Let us say that two kinds of life dominate or apply in Europe. Both begin and end on the shore of the Danube. And it is still always a distance from one shore to the other.

[Box, p 5]

From 12 to 14 April 1989 the Austrian PEN Club arranged a regional conference in Vienna on the theme Freedom of Speech Between Ideology and Business. Participating in the meeting were PEN Club representatives from the Federal Republic of Germany, Austria, Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Yugoslavia, Switzerland, Italy, authors living in exile as well as PEN Club Vice President Rene Tavernier (France) and its general secretary, Alexandre Blokh (England); Czechoslovak writers invited by Gyorgy Sebestyen, president of the Austrian PEN Club, were Ladislav Ballek, Lajos Grendel and Peter Zajac.

The theme of the meeting crystallized into three groups. The first was internal problems of individual PEN Clubs (especially Poland and Yugoslavia). The second was the declaration, repeated more than once, of the mutual interconnections between ideology and business in situations when ideology becomes business and business ideology. The third was the fundamental fact that freedom of speech is not an abstract category but is a concrete link to whom and from whom it takes a stand.

The Czechoslovak writers took advantage of the opportunity to participate in a regional PEN Club conference after a 20-year absence and to form the prospect of reintegrating Slovak and Czech literature into international literary life. The discourse published was presented by Ladislav Ballek as his contribution at this meeting.

Slovak Editor Calls for Recognition of Emigre Writers

90EC0067A Prague KMEN in Czech 5 Oct 89 pp 1, 3

[Interview with Rudolf Chmel, secretary of the Czechoslovak Writers Union, by Dagmar Sedlicka: "Search for Identity"; date and place not given]

[Text] "We cannot demand an eye for an eye, only a human memory," says Rudolf Chmel, secretary of the Czechoslovak Writers Union, in his talk with KMEN.

Literary critic and historian Rudolf Chmel has been secretary of the Czechoslovak Writers Union since 1982, and since 1988 chief editor of the monthly journal of the Slovak Writers Union SLOVENSKE POHLADY. He is the author of publications of literary criticism, history of literature, and comparative literature: "Literature v kontaktech" (1972), "Kritika a kontinuita" (1975), "Dejiny v dejinach" (1981), "Sondy" (1983), "Paralely a konfrontace" (1986), and others.

[KMEN] How would you characterize the situation in contemporary Slovak literature, is it different from the situation in Bohemia?

[Chmel] So many problems have accumulated in our literary life that we can no longer gloss over them or look at them with the forbearance of the previous years. This was, for that matter, acknowledged also at the recent large meeting of writers, arranged by the editors of SLOVENSKE POHLADY and the Slovak Writers Union in Budmerice, to contemplate the situation. Literary life, whether we wish it or not, is differentiated, which does not mean that it is breaking apart. It is differentiated in the sense that the principle of being able to discuss is defined as being productive, that reflecting on present and past problems is considered to be a self-evident precondition for projecting the future, that we understand the Slovak and Czech writers' community to be a group of unique authors joined together by a common idea. That we recognize the highest individual diversity and at the same time the awareness of common problems. Given such an approach, the need to change the current standards of evaluating must become obvious, inevitably and thus all the more urgently. To this change is linked also a reordering of the values and the authority not only of the works but also of attitudes and views... Lately, Slovak literary and journalistic life has developed relatively well in the direction of discussions and different positions (besides LITERARNI TYDENIK there are 3 monthlies—ROMBOID, SLOVENSKE POHLADY, and a new journal for young literature, DOTYKY); each of these journals had to stake out its own place within this new constellation, while all of them chose discussion and polemic as their main principle, a deeply developed dialogue about the basic questions of our literature within the context of all culture as it relates not only to today but also to the past.

[KMEN] Of course, people in the cultural field in this country have not been practicing debate and polemic very much these past years. They lost the habit, or to put it better, they got used to the fact that both still bring not only risks but often also personal unpleasantness. Moreover, polemic that deals with the very recent past is all the more contentious because those who participated in it are also participating in its "restructuring,"... which of course applies to both our nations as well as individuals, not excluding us personally.

[Chmel] We have to enter into a discussion about ourselves, about our situation, with all the risks that ensue from it. This debate, you see, must lead to changes, often even radical ones, to changes in thinking, feeling, and evaluating, as well as to changes of the values themselves. We are not talking, however, about some great rejection, as it may appear to some, but about a normal attitude of reevaluating the past, which could mean a dialectic negation and thus a disavowal of what is old, past, and outdated, but which in many ways still determines the current situation or even determines how it will evolve in the future. Of course, such reevaluation cannot have anything in common with "presentism" which is always only temporary. After all, how many times have we already denounced and reevaluated, and how often did it become apparent that it was a reevaluation only for the given moment which we thought we had just then under control. If only for that reason we cannot now demand an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth, but we can demand people's memory so that such events will not repeat themselves. Why, for instance, did we repeat in the seventies our experiences from the fifties, why did we erase names and works from textbooks, books.... Only, when history repeats itself, that is not a sign of progress. So that mistakes will not be repeated, so that we understand ourselves better, we need an atmosphere in which there is dialogue, where the philosophy and cultivation of dialogue are pursued as the only democratic way of studying and solving social and literary differences and controversies, the only things that can move history. In this sense the concept of a dialogue appears to me to be the sole productive concept not only for today but also for the future. The subject and the goal of this dialogue, this atmosphere of discussion, should be the search for the identity and integrity of our literature. This may sound too grandiose and general, but it has a very specific content. And that can be realized only by working day after day, every day and over a long period of time, because this is not a one-time action but a process.

[KMEN] What specifically has been done already in this search for the identity and integrity of our literature?

[Chmel] It is altogether clear that we are talking about a process that concerns the entire nation, that reaches across the entire society and to every thinking individual, a process that already existed before it was named restructuring. To put it simply, everyone who thinks is a participant in the process, even though there exist without a doubt institutional mechanisms and attitudes of individuals that can either accelerate or apply the brakes to this process. Since that moment when the small orchestra of our literary press expanded (we are still quite far from an ideal situation, particularly in Bohemia, but in Slovakia, too, we are still not talking about an ideal) much has certainly changed. But did the lack of literary journals and the inertia of the existing periodicals (among the exceptions to some extent was, for example, ROMBOID) have to last so intolerably long? The lack of literary journals has been and still is

one of the obvious factors that act as a brake, factors, which undoubtedly were the cause of their deformity as well as of the insufficient molding of the cultural sense of our society, and not just in the area of literature. The absence of journals also is to blame to some extent for the fact that today we still have not been able to recover completely—in Bohemia, for example, there still are no counterparts to ROMBOID and DOTYKY! When there are journals, and also other forums, there is undoubtedly more opportunity for discussion, for lifting the monopoly on opinions and attitudes. That is why personally I especially regret that even today there is not much willingness (and certainly not even money, although, if there were willingness it would be difficult not to find the money) to bring to life the idea expressed in the resolution of the 3d Congress of Czechoslovak Writers, the idea of a common, national literary journal. But let us go back to identity and integrity. If I wanted to be sarcastic, but in truth I am just being demonstrably correct, we are actually obligated to study identity and integrity by the resolution of the last congress, which says that it is necessary to reexamine and reevaluate the question of those writers who are still, for a great variety of reasons, outside the Union and without the possibility of being published. What I just said is, of course, only a part (sometimes more visible, sometimes less so) of the iceberg which I named the identity and integrity of the Slovak and Czech literature, albeit of the Hungarian and Ukrainian literatures as well. And I am not even talking about the identity and integrity in the Czechoslovak literary context, which is a subject for an independent discussion.

[KMEN] Let us then stay with the point which in the congress resolution is called somewhat charitably "writers outside the Union"...what is the emigre and the parallel, or, in other words, the unofficial literature? Lately there has been more and more talk about the fact that they exist side by side with the literature that is called official. How can it be defined, as precisely as possible, or at least qualified or summarized why they came to be, what is their mission and meaning?

[Chmel] You are asking me such questions that no matter how well I may answer them, I shall not please anybody. For some it will be less than too little, for others more than is necessary, not speaking about the fact that I can only give you my impressions in the guise of concepts because the topic would merit a deep analysis. But, as is usually the case here, we prefer not to deal with the topic, and we would be most pleased if it did not exist at all. But it exists, independently of our will. Nevertheless, I shall begin to approach it seemingly in an oblique manner. We have been "exporting" our sportsmen in various ways for a long time already, often we practically "offer" them for emigration, we legalize their activities and sojourns abroad, often in a manner which is undignified not only for them (who cares, that is their business!?) but above all for us. We are even willing to be proud of them when we see them on the screen; after all, do they not also represent our colors!?

Perhaps that is the way it should be. After all, we reclassified emigration as a misdemeanor and thus in fact we solved the problem. In legal terms, perhaps. Other than that, however, we are opportunists, especially when it comes to having our cake and eating it too. But the problem of exile remains unresolved. And not only in literature, the reputed conscience of the nation, although it is here in particular that the word exile still divides impenetrably.

Even though we generally clasp exiles to our bosoms (physicians, singers, automechanics, hairdressers...), a writer, in that he is no different from a politician, is still a traitor to his country. For a writer, however, exile is certainly much more traumatic than for a physician, although we "exported" incomparably many more of them. A writer wants to and should always be at home, in his country, and even abroad he wants to be part of a whole and the whole is, whether he wants it or not, at home. But for literature exile is not only a trauma, it is in fact a hard struggle for life, often indeed with death. "The feeling of belonging" as they talk about it in exile, in fact becomes all of a sudden stronger there than at home. It is sought also by the parallel literature or the literature of internal exile, which are only imprecise terms for the samizdat literature that is written here in this country but published in book form mostly abroad.

Today we are in the stage of "willingness" to more or less acknowledge these phenomena, that is, in a stage when we publicly admit that they exist. But in view of the fact that we really know only a small part of this literature, we can talk with difficulty only about suggestions of a comprehensive look at all the inconsistencies of the efforts to arrive at some overall picture of literature that would include every author existing in a truly nationwide circulation among the readership. The first requirement is to name and qualify the causes for the existence of the emigre and parallel literatures. A new understanding of these causes should also mean a new evaluation that should not be based on an immutable position from the past. A new situation places before us new questions and there can be no old answers to them. To loosen the cramp that has built up in this area over many years will not be simple. I am not a friend of surgical interventions, and therefore I speak in favor of evoking the spirit of debate about many problems which we are obviously facing. Generalized judgements, same as militant attitudes, hysteria, and passion will help the least. The restructuring and democratization of our society have made advances, however, and therefore our relationship to the emigre and parallel literatures cannot remain at a dead stop, which is unproductive for everyone.

[KMEN] Do you think, then, that the time has come for a definite end of the taboo on the problem called emigre and parallel literature?

[Chmel] There exists no definitive solution, there exist no final truths that could take care of societal differences once and for all. It is only possible to increase the

attempts to find the truth, or more precisely, attempts to get closer to the truth. That also applies to the search for the truth about our identity and integrity. These questions must be faced squarely, although not defensively. Not in a confrontational manner, but in a dialogue. The transmutation of confrontation into a dialogue is, of course, also the goal of the emigre and parallel literatures. In this sense, the vocabulary of confrontation ought to be changed into a vocabulary of dialogue on both sides. No, that does not mean that a dialogue cannot become a controversy. On the contrary. However, I do not consider, for instance, the approach of Antonin Brousek to be a dialogue (he composed a very educational anthology of the poetry of Czech Stalinism), who throws into one bag of "successful normalizers" Hanzlik, Honsa, Peterka, Skarlant, Zacek, Sys, Cernik, Cincibuch, and Navratil and says about them that today there is hardly anything they can offer that is worth talking about.

[KMEN] Do you think that there are differences in the existence and the evaluation of the emigre and parallel literatures in Bohemia and in Slovakia?

[Chmel] The situation in Czech and Slovak literature in this respect is considerably different. I am not competent to give a scientific, expert opinion, but evidently the difference is by and large not only qualitative, but above all manifestly quantitative—both in the emigre and in the parallel literature. Even in this case one could begin by analyzing the causes why it is so, but there is no reason not to consider these problems all together. This difference certainly has its historical-political roots and determinants. Slovak literature retained its integrity even at the price of a narrower legitimate differentiation. It achieved visible successes in creating its own autonomy, which is a positive element in its development. In the Czech situation there is a different constellation and a problem that is, I think, more urgent, which does not mean, however, that Slovak writers feel isolated from the Czech problems. On the contrary, we know that until the Czech problems are finally resolved, we cannot talk either about the integrity or the comprehensiveness of the Czechoslovak literary context. In this sense, the problems of Czech literature are also the problems of Slovak literature. I hope that it is like that, and vice versa.

[KMEN] Are the problems, about which we are talking, a part of the international policy of the Writers Union, or, in other words, the international position of both our literatures?

[Chmel] Even though we have not talked or written about it too much, that is the case. We are very painfully aware of the problem of international prestige and participation of Czech and Slovak literature in world events, as well as the question of the international prestige of Slovak and Czech art, literature, and culture. It is the reason for our efforts to join the international process of exchanging literary values. And so in practice we come willy-nilly face to face with the parallel and emigre

literatures and come to the conclusion that we can achieve full recognition only when the Slovak and Czech literatures are integrated and comprehensive. But we are not talking, as I already said, about a one-sided process. I realized this clearly, for example, 2 years ago at the international conference on contemporary Slovak fiction, arranged by a London university, as well as at some other international meetings. I think that we should be inspired (though not adopt in a dogmatic fashion) by what other socialist literatures that are coming to terms with similar problems have learned.

At the meeting of Soviet and emigre writers, which was hosted by Danish Slavists and writers in the spring of last year, the main topic was the question of the unity of Russian culture in the 20th century (an extensive account was published in VOPROSY LITERATURY in May of this year). These questions are being discussed in more parts of the European home and we can hardly insist, for example, that the publication of Solzenitsyn's "Gulag" (for the time being in the journal NOVYJ MIR) does not concern us. After all, we have already dealt with this question in our time. At the time when we integrated into Slovak literature the "emigre" J.C.Hronsky, and the home "dissident", or more precisely collaborant, M. Urban, to name at least some. I can only remember as tragic the reintegration of Laco Novomesky at the beginning of the sixties, but to tell the truth, that was another problem and another fate. It was not a simple process, particularly in the case of the emigre Hronsky, but in the end it had to be done. For goodness sake, after all the author and his work are not one and the same, and not just since the time when Engels made that point in analyzing the work of Balzac, and Lenin in analyzing the work of Tolstoy. We should look at these things dialectically and soberly, not even mentioning that history mostly goes on by itself no matter how much we may resist. The work after all remains, but the views and attitudes of writers perish in the tumult of history even on the day they are spoken. Nevertheless, we have a tendency to put too much emphasis on the second and not enough on the first.

[KMEN] The recently deceased writer Dominik Tatarka was, I think, a particularly extreme case that demonstrates in a tragic, concrete way many of the problems we are discussing. For 20 years nothing was written about him, and shortly before his death the decision was made to publish him. What does Tatarka's fate mean to you personally?

[Chmel] Tatarka is truly an appropriate example, although it was in fact a singular case. His name indeed has not been spoken in public for almost 20 years, although he it was difficult to erase from literary history during that time. When the news about him appeared in the obituary, which was published even in the Party press, the generation between 20 to 30 years of age (not even mentioning the younger one) actually did not even know who it was that died. Even that is a proof of our "consistency." This was one of the major representatives of Slovak socialist and modern literature, who, why keep

it a secret, steadfastly went also through its schematic period. Under normal circumstances he would have probably continued after 1968 with his individualistic essays on art, developing his deeply nationalistic and popular concept of culture. Truly, such losses in more such cases are unnecessary and unfortunately wilful. His fate is a warning to us. The absence of every talented person will sooner or later take its toll. And history will in the end return such a talented person to the place which belongs to him, naturally also with his mistakes and contradictions. That is why we accepted for SLOVENSKE POHLADY already during Tatarka's lifetime his "Navravacky" (they were published this year in No 7), with which this outstanding writer was definitely returned to a nationwide circulation of literature.

[KMEN] Do you think that the publication of works by emigre authors or authors of the parallel literature will be unequivocally beneficial to the current "official" literature? I have in mind the situation where many of today's authors complain about the impossibility of having books reprinted, about the insufficient number of copies..., in short, about many economic problems.

[Chmel] It would be intolerable, to say the least, but also ridiculous, if a shortage of paper were to be the greatest obstacle to publishing this literature. In the first place, we have to consider that when things are made public their value also changes from what it is now in the shadows of the current taboo. It will create, after all, a kind of real value system of our literatures, which today on both sides (but especially in the Czech literature) is not always complete or realistic. The situation demands, of course, serious literary criticism, a historical look and analysis. We all still have the tendency to place too much emphasis on some specific instances and that always leads to one-sidedness.

[KMEN] Europe lives by building a common European home, international comparisons of all the manifestations of human labor are becoming a matter of course, and there probably will also be an encounter between the literature published here at home and the literature published abroad in both our languages. On both shores that situation is often talked about as a possible calamity... What is your opinion?

[Chmel] The idea of a common European home, which we also support, is a calamity for extremists of all kinds. It is and will be a calamity for those who are still raising their hands (whether here or abroad) and want to divide, dispense, distribute... But in such an atmosphere it is impossible to live in a common barn or stable, let alone a house. That requires courteous treatment, dialogue, understanding. I do not think that confrontation is the right solution, even though such approaches will certainly be taken. The predominant approach should be a gradual dialogue that does not rule out competition. After all, competition is something that is entirely a matter of course even in literature. The better one will win, even if he lives in Honolulu.

The fact that our society at all levels is thinking about these questions, and not only in literature, is after all to its benefit, to the benefit of the restructuring. It is not actually so long ago that talking about these questions would have been impossible even in that above mentioned barn. The fact that we want to talk about things, about problems (the situation cannot be solved from the outside, only from the inside) also proves that although we want to study the past, most of all we want to plan the future, free of the traumas and spasms of the past. Such an approach, I hope, will also make it possible to increase the prestige of literature in the nation, to unify it according to the principle of differentiation, as well as to exorcise the lasting but false myth that writers are under a permanent curse or punishment. That perhaps will convince society and the world that writers have literature in their own hands, that is, competent hands. It will also contribute, to my way of thinking, to the inevitable change of the climate in the nation. To the development of literature and culture at home, where their legitimate place is and from which it should flow to the world. Perhaps this sounds unrealistic to some ears, but reality changes in spite of the fact that we are still thinking the same about it.

Author Writes to Pozsgay on Slovak Minority

90EC0032A Bratislava LITERARNY TYZDENNIK in Slovak 8 Sep 89 p 2

[Text]

An Open Letter to Imre Pozsgay, State Minister of the Hungarian People's Republic Dear Comrade Minister!

Representatives of the Democratic Association of Slovaks in Hungary, responding to a "Panorama" foreign affairs program of the Hungarian Television broadcast on 3 Apr 89 titled "Hungarian National Minority in Czechoslovakia," sent a letter to Hungarian Television chairman Matyas Szuros, to Alajos Chrudinak, to the editors of NEPSZABADSAG and MAGYAR NEMZET, as well as to you, Comrade Minister.

This letter was carried in full on 7 July by LITERARNY TYZDENNIK, the journal of the Association of Slovak Writers.

It is in fact the first extensive article in decades on the situation of the Slovak national minority in Hungary.

I too a member of a national minority. The experience of this situation is therefore close to me, and I am more sensitive to comparable situations, experiences and feelings. We Hungarians living in Czechoslovakia must be affected by these bitter words more than anyone else.

The open letter in question is a bitter, emotional accusation: it criticizes the neglect and practice of the Hungarian nationality policy over the recent decades. It points out the unsatisfactory situation of Slovaks in Hungary as well as their weakening national consciousness.

The authors of the letter compare the situation of the Slovak national minority in Hungary with that of the Hungarian national minority in Czechoslovakia. The result of the comparison is unequivocal: The Hungarians' situation in Czechoslovakia is good while that of Slovaks in Hungary is bad. Hence we have a bone to pick with the Hungarian nationality policy. I could start a debate about the method of this argumentation, I could cite evidence that such comparison is unreasonable and drawn up on the basis of false scenarios, I could point out that a mechanical comparison is unhistorical because both minorities have taken very different paths in their lives—if we consider where these paths began and to where they have led. But behind the indignation, behind the would-be objective interpretations and down-to-earth facts there still remains a bitter reality: assimilation (a notion holding special terror for me), very strong assimilation of Slovaks in Hungary.

But why are they raising this historical reproach just now?

The open letter was evidently provoked by the "Panorama" program and something else as well: the tremendous stirring of the Hungarian society over the past two years, the reform policy and its orientation toward human rights and democracy. And within the turmoil of these changes we see also a national awakening on the part of Slovak leadership.

In their view and that of the Slovak national minority the past appears as a bitter, depressing, lost time.

The situation of the Slovak national minority in Hungary and of the Hungarian national minority in Czechoslovakia is nowadays viewed almost instinctively in unspoken mutual connection. From this very fact follows the principle of mutuality. Nationalities living in central Europe, on a certain level of human rights and democracy, play the role of political joint vessels: they are the measure of the level of democracy in this or that society. I observe and register expressions of Slovak public life in its sensitive reactions to the situation and problems of Slovaks in Hungary. And so it is on the other side: the situation of a national minority in another state has nowadays come to influence the national feelings of the mother nation.

Mutuality in this case can be a principled foundation, rather than merely a copy, a replica or arithmetic. Mutuality can encompass appropriate differences in the specific situation and its handling; within the framework of mutuality one should provide for the preconditions and possibilities stemming from the given historical situation.

In my opinion there are matters which ought to be legalized: one of them is national feeling. I am convinced that national feeling has to be removed from the realm of criminal prosecution by the police—its marginal status must be changed; we must rehabilitate it. We must see it as a deep and natural human sentiment and equally respect the differences in its consciousness. Most

Basques are today relearning their mother tongue. For the weakened national consciousness of Slovaks in Hungary we must erect such stairs that allow only for walking upward, toward the warmth of the mother nation, to the mother tongue, to social autonomy, to a higher level of human, national consciousness.

It is the opinion of some people that the Slovaks in Hungary make no claims to national self-realization. This cannot be true. It is the given conditions which form the collective's life requirements. I believe that a grassroots self-organization of Slovak communities in Hungary can play the same role in awakening their national consciousness as the will of the state which assures the conditions for this process.

The many years of experience of the Hungarian minority's life in Czechoslovakia are a telling evidence of the success and unavoidability of self-uplifting by one's own forces.

Nationality rights are not given for free, they are also a result of struggle—this too is our experience.

We hear often the argument that the number of Slovaks in Hungary does not require applications of democracy on such a large scale. I am sure that the Hungarian reform policy has already gone beyond such petty and limited concepts of what democracy means. The bitter experience of our minority life shows that there is no majority or minority democracy, nor that democracy is a matter of numbers; rather, that it is a state of affairs, a system of relations between human beings in a society. The smaller the community the more it wants to construct with the building stones of democracy.

Esteemed comrade Minister!

I am convinced that the Hungarian reform policy basing itself on today's positive developments also in the area of nationalities, will establish new, favorable conditions and a different system of mutual relations.

I am convinced that in nationality policy the main focus will be not on declarations but rather on practical solutions to the situation of nationalities and their problems.

Esteemed comrade Minister!

Considering that the nationality question is within your portfolio I propose that the Government or its appropriate body (nationality board) give consideration, on the basis of materials referred to above, to the situation of the Slovak national minority in Hungary and adopt specific, long-term measures:

- in the matter of collective rights of nationalities;
- in the matter of social opportunities and ways of using respectively the national and mother tongue;

—in the matter of teaching in the mother tongue: an example could be the practice of Hungarian grade and secondary schools in Czechoslovakia;

—in the matter of establishing a nationality school system;

—in the matter of establishing a system of nationality institutions;

—in the matter of protecting nationality interests;

—in the matter of nationality self-government.

Further, it would be desirable to convene in Budapest an international conference on nationality questions.

In view of the special minority relations in Hungary and in the spirit of the principle that the culture of a national minority is also part of the culture of the mother country, may the Hungarian state make it possible for members of minority nationalities to study at Slovak (Yugoslav, Romanian and German) secondary schools and universities, in appropriate numbers and able to study primarily in fields important from the point of view of cultivating national culture and national consciousness which they cannot be taught in their own living environment by Hungarian schools. These include for instance language and literature, philology, pedagogics, history, archival science, journalism, library science, public enlightenment, philosophy. Further, may the Government make it possible to study in these fields with the assistance of the Hungarian state and foreign institutions in the form of scholarship grants. May the Hungarian state make possible systematic and permanent contacts between its national minorities and the cultural and scientific institutions of the mother nation. When historic symbols are reinstated, may the Hungarian state grant national minorities the right to use their own historic symbols and also to establish their national monuments.

As has already been recognized by Hungarian policy, an appropriate form of minority status is minority autonomy. But it must be considered what kind of autonomy would properly apply to such diasporas.

Esteemed comrade Minister!

We have here a sensitive common problem in the central European area. In my opinion a more thoughtful nationality policy of the Hungarian People's Republic's government would be useful all around; a proper resolution of nationality questions would serve as an example, would help to transcend historical wrongs, national conflicts, end once for all the mutual reproaches for old faults and grievances.

Respectfully,
Laszlo Dobos, writer

Bratislava
4 September 1989

HUNGARY

MSZMP Activists Reject Congress Decisions*90EC0066A Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian
17 Oct 89 p 4*

[Unattributed article: "According to a Meeting of 1,000 Party Activists, the Party Split Has Begun"]

[Text] (From our staff reporter) Yesterday afternoon [16 Oct 89], in the big hall of the Budapest XIII District Party Committee, over 1,000 MSZMP [Hungarian Socialist Workers Party] members met, claiming that the party has never ceased. As the "host," Adam Angyal, the party committee's first secretary, pointed out in his introduction that the party committee had merely provided the premises and had nothing to do with organizing the meeting. "That was done by Robert Ribanszki and his team." Then Adam Angyal was reminded from the podium that "it is not Robert Ribanszki and his team who are present here, but MSZMP activists."

Robert Ribanszki emphasized in his keynote address that everyone who holds the country dear, who belongs to the forces of the Left, sees and feels that the time has come for renewing and reforming socialism. In the speaker's opinion, renewal cannot take place without the MSZMP, and "socialism's renewal does not mean breaking up the party, either." Speaking about the congress, Ribanszki expressed the view that the delegates did not adopt the resolutions in the name of the party's members. Therefore, he said, the activists attending the meeting do not accept the 9 October standpoint and are challenging its very first sentence. The more-than-1,000 MSZMP members can attest to the fact that the MSZMP, the party of the Communists and revolutionary Social Democrats, has not ceased but still exists.

The packed audience responded with stormy applause, interspersed by occasional shouts of "Long live the party," to the speaker's words, which were not devoid of passion and effective elements.

Robert Ribanszki declared that the MSZMP membership regards the resolutions and decisions of this congress as unacceptable, rejects them, and is demanding that the 14th MSZMP Congress be convened this year.

The speaker announced that he wishes to run in the election, because he realizes that it is difficult for anyone to regain his seat in the National Assembly once that seat has been lost. In conjunction with the party's property, Robert Ribanszki pointed out that, in a divorce case, no court would award all the property to the deserting spouse. The MSZMP should not vacate its premises, nor surrender its seals to anyone, and should remain at the workplaces until the workers become the owners of the means of production, of the enterprises.

Speeches by three congress delegates—Karoly Szabo, Tamas Racz, and Janos Belicza—followed Robert Ribanszki's fiery keynote address. Meanwhile a draft appeal

was circulating in the corridors outside the hall. It read, "Comrades, preserve your identity, your party membership, and remain members of the MSZMP. Do not throw away your membership cards! The party split has begun! We are the upholders of continuity! Let us organize before the end of this year a provisional central governing body of the MSZMP and convene the 14th Party Congress. Let Karoly Grosz head the provisional central governing body. Keep the MSZMP's parliamentary section together!"

Robert Ribanszki revealed that he is holding talks with Karoly Grosz, and characterized the talks as fruitful. He said that the MSZMP's former general secretary "authorized me to say that he is not transferring to the MSZP." This announcement was received with stormy applause. Furthermore, Ribanszki said, the party's general secretary, Karoly Grosz, is of course a member of the MSZMP. He intends to continue his work where the party needs him the most.

The activists attending the meeting responded with hurrahs to the call that Karoly Grosz be asked to assume the duties of the party's general secretary. A proposal was adopted to form provisional governing bodies in the counties and in Budapest by 15 November. These provisional governing bodies should send their addresses to the provisional party leadership, at 71 Vaci Road, Budapest XIII.

As host, Adam Angyal, the first secretary of the present party committee, remained at the meeting to its very end. He welcomed with open arms the resolution that passed with stormy applause.

Calling itself an expanded active, the conference ended in the late evening hours.

Entrepreneurs Party Established*25000512D Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian
23 Oct 89 p 10*

[Unattributed article: "Political Interest Representation—The Most Important Task"]

[Text] The symbolic handshake—the picture on the wall that shows the two hands—became a reality a few minutes after noon on Sunday [22 Oct]. The Entrepreneurs Party was established as a result of a merger between the Debrecen Hungarian Democratic Club and the Budapest Private Entrepreneurs Union. The party regards political interest representation as its most important task, and will run independent candidates in National Assembly and local elections.

The Entrepreneurs Party was officially established at the Debrecen organizational meeting of delegates—a gathering that included small tradesmen, small merchants, and representatives of various entrepreneurs from all parts of the country. There were pronounced differences

of opinion as to where the party should be headquartered. Several persons recommended Debrecen for headquarters to symbolize concern for the Hungarian countryside. Others recommended Budapest, because that city is the traditional center for politics. In the end, a sweeping majority voted to designate Budapest as the place where the party should be headquartered.

The delegates elected an 11-member provisional presidium; this body will direct and organize the party until its congress on 20 January. Tibor Szabo was elected provisional chairman of the Entrepreneurs Party. Vice Chairmen Imre Olah, Janos Albert, and Alajos Bosze will be in charge of party organization West of the Danube, East of the Tisza, and in Southern Hungary, respectively. Istvan Milesz became the party's executive secretary.

It was announced at the meeting of delegates that the two organizations had 450 members prior to the merger. From among these members, those who elect to become party members will become the founding members of the Entrepreneurs Party. Membership dues were established at 56 forints per month.

The organizing meeting of the party adopted a five point economic policy program. In it the party demands that Western support be made available on the basis of competition, and under conditions of full openness. The party intends to take part in the distribution and control of funds designated for the support of private entrepreneurs.

The party urges a review of taxation practices which adversely affect entrepreneurs, as well as the enactment of a law on interest protection, and the submission to Parliament of the party's perceptions on reprivatization.

Mindszenty Rehabilitation by Nagy in 1956 Disclosed

*90EC0061A Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP (Supplement)
in Hungarian 7 Oct 89 p 7*

[Article by Mihaly Berki: "The Cross of Mindszenty"]

[Text] "A man does his duty without regard for his personal welfare and that is all; this is the foundation of man's morality." J. Kennedy

After a recent lecture of mine, a speaker from the audience elaborated on having experienced October 1956 which, to him, was, and continues to be, a "counter-revolution", and then asked me this direct question, "What do you think of Mindszenty's speech? Mindszenty spoke about reclaiming Church assets, land, and schools, and everything else that used to belong to the Church before 1945," he said angrily, and then added that I should take this as an almost word-for-word quote.

What could I say to these two summary statements? I acknowledged his right to decide about October 1956 using his own judgment, then suggested to him that he

read Mindszenty's speech more carefully and look into who this man was, about whom he speaks with such hatred.

Since those who know who Mindszenty was and what he did for the Hungarian people are in a minority in this small land, perhaps it is not useless to speak on his behalf in opposition to those who, because of their insufficient knowledge and as a result of the well run machinery of misinformation, still continue to heap curses on the late cardinal. I would like to begin by stating that I am an atheist and therefore what prompted me to write was not considerations of religious morality but my sense of justice.

Mindszenty gave two speeches in October 1956. Their scope makes it impossible to quote them word for word, therefore only the essential passages have been taken from them. In his first speech (1 November, 8:30 pm), he urged that the conditions for a solution be created. The second speech was broadcast on the radio at 8 pm on 3 November.

Perhaps it is worth noting that Imre Nagy instructed Zoltan Tildy and Geza Losonczy that Mindszenty's speech could only be recorded, that he could not be given a microphone for direct broadcast. The prime minister wanted to listen to the tape himself to determine whether its contents were suitable for broadcast. Tildy and Losonczy concluded that Mindszenty would make a favorable and loyal statement and thus authorized a live broadcast. In the following, I quote a few passages from his speech.

"Nowadays it is often emphasized that the speaker who breaks away from the practice of the past is speaking sincerely. I cannot say this; I need not break with my past.... Nor can I say that now I will speak more sincerely, for I have always spoken sincerely; in other words, I have said openly what I considered to be true and right....

"Our entire position is decided by what the Russian empire of 200 million intends to do with the military force standing within our frontiers.... We are neutral, we give the Russian empire no cause for bloodshed. But has the idea not occurred to the leaders of the Russian empire that we will respect the Russian people more if the empire does not oppress us?.... The fight for freedom was fought because the nation wanted to decide freely on how it should live. It wanted to be free to decide about its destiny, about the management of its state, and about the assessment of its labor.... This country is now in need of many things, but it needs as few parties and party leaders as possible. Today, politics themselves are a matter of secondary importance. The nation's existence and everyday bread is our worry.... However, I must stress the practical framework of things to be done. We live in a constitutional state; we want to be a society without classes, a nation which develops its democratic achievements, a nation based on private ownership rightly and justly limited by social interests, a nation and country of

a strictly cultural-national spirit. This is what the entire Hungarian nation wants to be. As the Head of the Roman Catholic Church I declare that ... we do not oppose the justified direction of historical progress, indeed we will promote healthy development in every field. The Hungarian people find it natural that we must care for our institutions which have a great past and great value.... We justly expect the immediate granting of freedom of Christian religious instruction and the restoration of the institutions and societies of the Catholic Church, among other things, her press...."

This is then the difference between the words "quote" referred to by the speaker from the audience and the words actually said. It is not his fault that for 33 years he, and others, were oriented and informed only through the book "Imre Nagy and His Accomplices...", and the lie-riddled writings of Hollos and Lajtai, published by the Information Office of the Council of Ministers. On page 89 of the former publication we read that Mindszenty's hostile "manifesto clearly demonstrated that the goal of the counterrevolution was not just a Western type of capitalist rule but the restoration of the pre-1945 fascist regime." Where are the sentences on which the author bases this claim? What the cardinal said was precisely that he did not oppose the justified direction of progress.

It is no accident that the publications of the Information Office have no writers, authors, or editors. They are guarded by the darkness of anonymity. Certainly, none of them would have the courage to assume responsibility for the truth of their writings. Those yellowed pages, laden with atrocious lies, tolerated everything and continue to guard the secret. According to Hollos and Lajtai ("Dramatic Days," page 388), Mindszenty's words caused great reverberations—those words that the cardinal never uttered or wanted (i.e., the restoration of land distribution and the pre-1945 regime). Average people condemned the misconstrued theses of the party and its speakers and the seminar leaders, not Mindszenty's theses.

Mindszenty did not commit any sin in October 1956 but enthusiastically cheered the revolution in his 3 November speech and expressed his hope that the Russian empire of 200 million people would not oppress us, but that instead the withdrawal of the Russian Armed Forces would begin as soon as possible. He emphasized that the post-1945 regime had been established by force and that it was swept away by all the Hungarian people. He laid open the prospect of holding the guilty accountable. (At the time of his own imprisonment, Janos Kadar was Minister of the Interior.) It is evident, then, that the cardinal's position was sealed by his "manifesto," and that the "sins" he committed between 1945 and 1949 did not sink into oblivion.

Mindszenty was hauled away from Esztergom by AVO [State Security Department] men at 8:30 pm on 26 December 1948 following a 5-hour house search, and then, after 39 days of torture and interrogation, was

sentenced to life imprisonment in February 1949. His greatest crime was being a Magyar and standing up for the Magyar people. By that time he was practically the only opponent of the countless violations of the law. He demanded the abolition of internment camps and protested against the expulsion of Swabians from Hungary and against the displacement and dispersion of Magyars living in Czechoslovakia. In 1948 the CPCZ [Communist Party of Czechoslovakia] and the MKP [Hungarian Communist Party] made an agreement regarding population displacements which was unfavorable to the Magyars. The Benes group wanted to eliminate the 650,000 Magyar minority. No one but the episcopate protested (27 August 1948). The leadership of that time did not speak up for Magyars living abroad, the Soviet leadership supported the Czechs and Romanians, and the Russians supported the Magyars of Sub-Carpathia [as published].

Mindszenty, disregarding his personal welfare, spoke up and fought for the interest of the Magyars. As early as 9 February 1919, he was arrested in Zalaegerszeg and then was expelled from the county. In 1944 he helped the Jews and spoke against turning Trans-Danubia into a battlefield. At the end of November 1944, he and 26 priests were arrested by arrow-cross men and transported to Sopronkohida in December. He was released on 2 April 1945. He became Archbishop of Esztergom on 7 October 1945 and was ordained cardinal in February 1946.

He placed his power and influence at the service of the Hungarian people, and for that the Rakosi group launched a campaign against him and against religion. They never forgave him for relentlessly bringing up the crimes committed by Soviet soldiers.

The cardinal also fought an unrelenting battle with Laszlo Rajk, the iron-handed Minister of the Interior. In 1947-48, the AVO and the police broke into parochial high schools and concealed revolvers, rifles, and ammunition at night which they "found" the next day in the presence of the principal. This was how they proved that parochial schools were nests of reactionary forces which had to be eliminated. A national scandal arose when the Baja action was badly coordinated with the press by the security police, and reports of a "student conspiracy" discovered in Baja appeared in the Budapest newspapers before the police had searched the Cistercian high school in Baja. The affair had to be taken off the agenda. Only Mindszenty dared to speak up and protest.

The cardinal voiced objection to the December 1946 arrest of Smallholders Party politicians and sympathizing army officers. Secretary General Bela Kovacs, who was transported to the Soviet Union on 25 February 1947, also fell victim to this campaign of arrests.

It was also Mindszenty who raised his voice against the 31 August 1947 election fraud which elicited a general public outcry. Nevertheless, the MKP accused the Hungarian Independent Party [MFP] of the fraud. Of course, the "investigation," conducted by the AVO, ended with

the defeat of the MFP. Because of the fraud, the election committee allowed the opposition to have only four seats in Parliament. The "Honorable House" became an obedient voting machine.

In April 1948, Gyula Ortutay, Minister of Culture, announced that the state would take over the parochial schools. Rakosi designated this as the most urgent task in his 1 May speech. The nationalization had no public support. On 7 June 1948, residents of 300 villages and towns, and on 13 June, residents of 350 villages and towns, requested in letters and telegrams that the campaign against the schools be stopped and the issue of nationalization be taken off the agenda. The MKP ordered the national committees to request nationalization. The resistance, labeled by the Rakosi group as fascist subversive activity, originated from Mindszenty. It was at this time that the Pocspetri murder was staged. The local population's protest was attributed to the provocative speech by the parish priest. One of the policemen's rifle accidentally went off and the policeman died. Twenty-eight persons were arrested. Miklos Kiralyfalvy, the town-clerk "admitted" that he had killed the policeman and parish priest Janos Asztalos "confessed" to having instigated Kiralyfalvy. Kiralyfalvy was executed. Asztalos was sentenced to life imprisonment. The village was sealed off for days, and the witnesses were "persuaded" to keep quiet. On 16 June 1948, Parliament passed the presented bill on the nationalization of schools. Of the 4,885 nationalized schools, 3,148 had been under the supervision of the Catholic Church. Priests and monks were not allowed to teach despite a shortage of teachers. The precipitous and ill-conceived affair was solved at the expense of the Hungarian people.

Mindszenty was sentenced on the basis of false charges. He was brought before court charged with spying, illicit foreign currency dealings, disloyalty, and the crime of attempting to overthrow the republic. They were not able to break him during the 39 days. Since it generally took 3 days in the AVO's prisons to break anyone, Kadar stated on 29 December that Mindszenty broke under the weight of the evidence and admitted his guilt. They tore off his cassock, put him in a striped clown outfit, kicked him, beat him, clubbed him, gave him drugs to break his will, deprived him of sleep, and falsified his statements. (This was reported in July 1950 by Laszlo Sulner in the NEW YORK HERALD TRIBUNE. The Gabor Peter group had forced Sulner to rewrite the cardinal's statements with the aid of a machine. This machine was able to break down any handwriting into individual letters and syllables and then, using that material assemble a new text, producing a manuscript with completely different contents. According to Sulner, they were able to forge anyone's handwriting. On 6 February 1949, Sulner and Hanna Fischhof fled from Hungary. The microfilm Sulner took along he presented abroad. Sulner did not live long, dying under suspicious circumstances.)

The display proceedings began on 3 February 1949 under the command of Vilmos Olti who, according to

Mindszenty, was a member of Mary's Congregation while a university student, and later joined the Cross-Arrow Party. Being afraid of his past, he joined the Hungarian Communist Party in 1945.

From December 1949 on, the cardinal went through 60 Andrassy Avenue, the Marko Street prison, the Concentration Prison, the Vac prison, and then on 17 July 1955 was interned to Puspokszentlaszlo, in the vicinity of Pecs. On 2 November of the same year he was transferred to Felsopeteny (in the vicinity of Retsag) where he was guarded by a 15-man AVO force.

On 27 October [1956] the party leadership (not Imre Nagy) decided that the cardinal had to be released and have his rights restored.

On 29 October Janos Horvath, Chairman of the State Office for Church Affairs, went to him and tried to persuade him to leave the mansion but the cardinal stayed. On 30 October, soldiers from Retsag went for him on orders from Zoltan Tildy and then, on 31 October, Major Antal Palinkas, Staff Commander of the Retsag Armored Regiment, transported him to Budapest. (He paid with his life for this: he was executed in 1958.)

Following measures by the party leadership, the Imre Nagy government rehabilitated Mindszenty. This is the text of the document:

"The Hungarian National Government verifies that the trial that began in 1949 against Jozsef Cardinal Mindszenty, Primate of Hungary, lacked all legal foundation and that the charges brought against him by the regime of that time were unfounded. Based on all this, the Hungarian National Government declares that the measures against Cardinal Mindszenty are void and, therefore, the cardinal may exercise all his civil and ecclesiastical rights without any limitations. Imre Nagy, Prime Minister."

At dawn on 4 November 1956, Zoltan Tildy had Mindszenty called to the Parliament. Imre Nagy had already departed, and Tildy had raised the white flag. The cardinal wanted to return to Buda but the Soviets had already closed the bridge. They went back to the Parliament building and Mindszenty was talking with his secretary Egon Thurchanyi when (no one has yet written about the following) Lieutenant Colonel Kalman Nagy, Deputy Chairman of the Department of Military History at Miklos Zrinyi Military Academy, and Major Tihamer Acs, who just arrived from the Soviet Union on 3 November, walked by the front of the Parliament building. When he spotted the perplexed Mindszenty, Nagy greeted them and told them that the Russians were at the Ministry of Defense. After covering a few hundred meters, the two officers turned around and Kalman Nagy suggested that the cardinal go to the United States Embassy. Mindszenty agreed and they rushed to the embassy (Mindszenty, Thurchanyi, three or four civilians, a few soldiers, and Nagy and Acs). For this deed, Kalman Nagy was sentenced in 1959 first to a 15-year

prison term which was later reduced to 8 years. Tihamer Acs received a 1-year prison sentence.

At 8:30 am, 28 September 1971, Mindszenty left the United States Embassy. In Rome, in front of the living quarters assigned to him, Pope Paul VI was waiting for him. The Pope removed the cross from his own chest and placed it around Mindszenty's neck, and put the synodical ring from his finger on the cardinal's finger. Mindszenty fulfilled his duty as an honest Magyar, without regard to his own personal welfare. This is the foundation of man's morality.

He was born on 29 March 1892 in Mindszent (Vas County) and died at 2:14 pm on 6 May 1975. He is buried in foreign soil. His father intended for him to wear a uniform but his mother, a cassock.

POLAND

Complexities of German Minority Issue Reviewed

90EP0091A Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER
ALLGEMEINE in German 12 Oct 89 p 8

[Article by Erik-Michael Bader: "Hopes of the Germans in Silesia: The Long-Missed Recognition of Cultural Rights of Ethnic Groups Is Coming Closer"]

[Text] There are Germans who are filled with envious astonishment when they hear how things are going for the Germans in the Soviet Union—an ethnic group in which very many are pessimistic about their future chances as an ethnic group and of whom about 200,000 have already drawn the conclusion that it is better to resettle. But how these Germans in Russia are organized among themselves and what rights and possibilities they have to maintain their ethnic identity was for Germans from Silesia, who have now been able to exchange experiences with them as guests of the "Association for Germanity Abroad" (VDA), cause enough for the expression of envy and wonder.

In comparison, it became even clearer to them how bad their own situation has been up to now. Because until quite recently even the existence of a German ethnic group was officially disputed in the area of Polish authority, with the result that it was not possible to cultivate the German language and culture, not to mention anything beyond that. To sing German folk songs occasionally in a private circle was for a time the only way that they could maintain their Germanity.

For a long time, for people east of the Odra and Nysa to admit that they belonged to the German folk was identical with the decision to leave the homeland and to apply for resettlement, which in many cases was denied many times, whereas the application brought with it disadvantages in one's career and elsewhere. To give each other consolation and encouragement in such cases was the first germ cell of the "German Friendship Circle" in Silesia, which lately has been changing more and more into an initiative for the right of Germans

remaining in their Silesian homeland to the organized cultivation of their own language and culture. The resettlement criterion "ethnic affiliation," although expressly agreed to between Poland and the FRG in addition to family reunification, did not appear in Polish public statements within the country; they spoke only of evacuation for the purpose of family reunification. The fact that so many wanted to and did resettle had not only and for a large share not even primarily economic reasons but to a considerable degree was because it has been made impossible for one to remain a German in his homeland.

The sad picture that one can be a German Silesian only if he has left Silesia but not in Silesia itself (in East Prussia and Pomerania, it has long since been impossible to speak of a German ethnic group with the same justification as in Middle and Upper Silesia, where above all in the district of Opele there are still reputed to be subregions with a German majority in the population and practically solidly German villages) could, as it now appears, soon belong to the past. A movement for mainly cultural ethnic rights for the Germans in Silesia is now under way among them, is hardly being bothered any more by state authority and has prospects of reaching its modest objectives. But the hopelessness of the past is still casting its shadows even on the vital spirit of the activists of this movement. A certain amount of bitterness, exacerbated by the fact that they continually had to deal with the charge from the Polish side that they were an offshoot of revanchism in the FRG, obviously prevails about the abandonment of German Silesians by Bonn, except for efforts on behalf of those wishing to emigrate. There has been only one federal minister in 44 years who has found his way to the Silesians, namely Bluem recently; "there was a Berlin Wall around us in Silesia," said one of the VDA guests from Silesia.

'Social and Cultural Society'

For the districts of Opele and Katowice, applications for the registration, that is, legal admission, of a "social and cultural society of the German minority" are pending. In Opele, such an application was rejected in the first instance but is now before the Supreme Court on an appeal. As a parallel demonstration that there really are Germans in Silesia, an action for signatures for inclusion in a "list of the population belonging to the German folk" was set into motion in the small town of Gogolin in Opele District. Meanwhile, more than a quarter million signatures have already been collected in the districts of Opele, Katowice and Czestochowa, the largest share of them in Opele District. It is asserted that the right to be registered is being checked on the basis of family papers. Obviously not everywhere, however, are only adults being counted. But that hardly affects the most significant thing—the dimension that an ethnic group whose existence was officially disputed now appears is six figures, and this not in connection with the intention to resettle, which could give reason for doubt about authenticity. In view of the imperfect possibilities for organization and the reluctance of many because of past reprisals

to admit belonging to an ethnic German group in the as yet unclear situation, one certainly could count on a substantial number of unknown cases; the VDA guests from Silesia gave the estimated number of 800,000 if all those were to register who are entitled to do so in accordance with their papers of origin.

The "social and cultural society" that does not yet exist legally is already active to a modest extent, especially with German language instruction when there is available space. But German instruction is very much needed, because the German language is threatening to be lost to the Germans in Silesia; because Polish is to be spoken at the place of work, in the schools and in public, this language is inevitably spread in the family as well, displacing German. Precisely in Opele and Katowice, the two districts with the highest percentage of Germans, it was not allowed until just a few months ago even to teach German in the schools as a foreign language, as is done elsewhere in Poland. This exclusion of German in the two Silesian administrative districts has now been suspended but for the present the region lacks trained German instructors.

The "social and cultural society of the German minority in the Opele region of Silesia" has set for itself four main objectives: first, cultivation and development of German learning, culture and art; second, submission of recommendations to agencies and institutions for the living conditions of the German population; third, strengthening of fraternal life together; and fourth, as a result of the realization of the first three objectives, curbing of the wave of emigration. The word "minority," carefully chosen in the name, is supposed to show that they recognize the Odra-Nysa border and view themselves as Germans in Poland; for logically there could not be a "German minority" in a German region.

Continuity of Settlement

Despite the expressed differentiation from territorial revisionism, recognition of a German minority is problematical from the Polish point of view if it, as the signature action has now made obvious, comprises such a substantial share of the population. For as long as the definitive nature of the Odra-Nysa border is not secured without reservation, an admittedly lasting continuity of settlement by hundreds of thousands of Germans to the east of this border appears as a potential additional argument for keeping open the border question, an argument that, in a manner of speaking, can give a human touch to the legal reservations and tends to weaken the Polish position in a final settlement. The Polish position, which has heretofore seemed spiteful, is understandable from the point of view of Polish reason of state.

Obviously the Opele District Court in its rejection of the registration application of the "social and cultural society of the German minority in the Opele region of Silesia" in July was influenced by this Polish reason of state not to allow anything to come up that could even be

utilized to put the Odra-Nysa border in question. As a justification, the court had argued that the application is really aimed at the formal recognition of the existence of a German national minority in the Opele region of Silesia. This question that belongs in the category of international law cannot be settled on the basis of the right to associate. The result of the laws and regulations of the postwar period is that only those persons in the areas taken over by Poland had received Polish citizenship and thus the right to stay whose undoubted Polish nationality had been determined in every individual case, whereas precisely the German population was completely evacuated. The appeal of the verdict avoids getting involved in an altercation about the "verification" of nationality at that time, in the critical assessment of which the interest of the Polish state in finding, if possible, a not insignificant number of long-established Poles in the so-called regained regions and the interest of the present inhabitants in avoiding expulsion from their homeland should be considered. The appeal argues, as it were, in another field besides that of the opinion and concludes from the spirit of the obligations from the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe and the reorganization of Poland as a constitutional state with equal rights and equal dignity for all citizens that "Polish citizens who want to acknowledge their German nationality" and establish a "social and cultural association of the German minority" must have the right to do so.

In the case of the German Silesians, however, there is considerable confidence that the negative Opele judgement will not hold up in the appeal and a belief from the previous behavior of the court there that it can be concluded that the application for the Katowice District will be approved even in the first instance. The hopes of soon being able to devote oneself to the legally recognized cultivation of the German language and culture are not primarily based on the negotiations between Bonn and Warsaw prior to the chancellor's visit to Poland, in which agreement was reached with the representative of the previous Polish Government on the right to establish cultural associations and on schoolbooks in their own language but are based especially on signs for a fundamental political change also in the policy on minorities and in the right to associate under the new government. As proof, one can cite the statements of Premier Mazowiecki and of Vice Premier and Interior Minister Kiszcak, who is a party member. In a conversation with representatives of the German Silesians, deputies of "Solidarity" recently held out the promise of inclusion in the elaboration of the planned minority law.

Meanwhile, two considerations suggest that one should not let the hopes run too wild. Experience shows that the declaration of a policy through the government headquarters in Warsaw does not at all mean that it is carried out in full in the provinces. And the subject of the German minority could be just what the party—which, to be sure, is participating in the new government but is actually in the role of the opposition—needs to agitate

against the government led by "Solidarity" by awakening nationalistic feelings. The attacks of "renunciation-politicians" against Pszon, Mazowiecki's negotiator with Bonn, and therefore against Mazowiecki himself a few days ago in TRYBUNA LUDU give a foretaste. That limits the latitude of the Mazowiecki government in cooperating with the German minority.

The Germans in Silesia are probably not just interested in culture and language. Understandably there is also the perception, since they are Germans, that their living standard really should not be so blatantly worse than that of their countrymen in the FRG. But they also clearly see the problem that a somewhat harmonious living together with the Poles in Silesia would be threatened if they were able to extract clear special material advantages from their Germanity. Thus, their expectations relative to Bonn are aimed primarily at help in education, advanced education and the cultivation of the language. In the case of further career training, where the problem of positive discrimination of the Germans could be avoided by allowing the offer to go to the Polish Poles as well as reconstruction assistance, ways could also be found to link a certain fulfillment of material hopes with the educational assistance.

Sejm, Foreign Ministry Focus on Policy Toward Polonia

90EP0115A Warsaw PRZEGLAD TYGODNIOWY in Polish No 42, 15 Oct 89 p 11

[Article by Włodzimierz Krzyżanowski: "Falski in a Computer: In Brazil 12 Schools Want To Teach the Polish Language"]

[Text] Marian Falski's primer had been withdrawn years ago from Polish schools but remains considered as a rarity and as the best textbook on the Polish language taught in Polonia ["Poles Abroad"] schools.

This opinion is also shared by persons teaching our language to foreigners. More even, Professor Michael Mikos of the University of Wisconsin, the author of the world's first computer program for teaching Polish, said that he also utilized Falski's concepts in his work to a large extent. This is not the first time that, as it turns out, we discarded the best things in favor of the second-best.

Poland is returning to Europe and interest in our country is again growing in the world. Also resurfaced are the problems, artificially glossed over in the past, of Polonia schooling, which was greatly harmed by the policy of the Polish authorities.

This subject was discussed last September by Polonia activists from the world over, gathered in Great Britain and Switzerland.

And in this country these problems will be studied in the next few days by the Sejm Commission for Poles Abroad.

These matters will also be discussed by the analogous commission of the Senate.

The political barriers that had arisen after World War II caused Polonia schooling in many countries to remain outside the scope of influence of institutions in Poland. In Australia, Canada, the United States, and Great Britain, i.e., in the countries where Polonia schools are the best developed, these schools are chiefly guided by the Polska Macierz Szkolna Zagranica [Polish Educational Alliance in Foreign Countries], the Association of Polish Teachers in Foreign Countries, and the Association of Polish War Veterans. Nowadays, however, once the abovementioned barriers and differences are eliminated, the offer of cooperation and specific proposals from our side should be much richer, said Sejm Deputy Ryszard Iwan of Solidarity, who himself is a member of the Commission on Poles Abroad.

Language Is a Passport to Democracy

Many parliamentarians believe that priority should be given to helping the Polish ethnic groups living in the countries of East Europe, primarily in the Soviet Union. The more than 2 million strong Polish community in the USSR has been for the last 40 years subjected to extremely intensive Russification processes. In many Soviet republics the only genuine pillar of Polishness is the Catholic Church.

In some of these republics the social status of Poles is disastrously low. This concerns particularly our compatriots in Belorussia. "The situation is very bad also in the Ukraine and in Kazakhstan," said Jan Sienkiewicz, chairman of the Association of Poles in Lithuania. "In Lithuania, graduates of the Polish Department at the Vilno Teacher Training Institute cannot find employment. Likewise, the enrollment of Poles at clerical seminaries is being artificially limited and so calculated that within a score or two of years there would be no Polish priests left at all. It is only since last year that youth from the USSR has been able to study in Poland and major in self-selected fields. There still persists a shortage of Polish-language textbooks and books on Polish fairy tales and legends, in a word, of everything that serves to preserve roots. In our republic the rapid shrinkage of the Polish school system is highly dangerous. Thus, for example, as late as in the 1976-77 school year there were in Lithuania 140 Polish-language schools with an aggregate enrollment of 16,382, but by 1987 their number dwindled to 96 schools with an enrollment of 10,280. This year it shrank still further to 92, of which 47 are mixed schools at which instruction is also in Lithuanian or Russian. The decline in the number of Polish-language preschools has also been steep, and yet it is they that determine the future scope of the Polish school system. Poles in Lithuania are crying out for help, but, aside from the Polonia Society, no one seems to hear them."

"Members of our commission will in the immediate future visit several socialist countries in order to familiarize themselves on the spot with the problems of Polonia schooling there and work out a realistic and effective program for improving it," said Deputy Jerzy Zurawiecki (Solidarity) of the Commission on Poles Abroad. In Lithuania we also will try to enter into talks aimed at obtaining approval of Polish-language textbooks for Polonia schools, because so far such [printed-in-Poland] textbooks have not been permitted and the textbooks used there are Polish-language mutations of commonly binding Soviet textbooks. An exception is the specially prepared scripts for the teaching of the Polish language and Polish literature. The level of all these printed aids is, however, much lower than that of their printed-in-Poland counterparts, thus causing Poles from the Soviet Union to have considerable problems when they first begin to study in Poland. Similar problems also are encountered by the Polonia in Romania, chiefly inhabiting the Bukovina. In three Polish villages there, Solonet Nou, Poiana Micului, and Plesa, schools exist in which, to be sure, instruction is in Polish but on the basis of a specially prepared poor Romanian textbook. Moreover, the school in Plesa is facing the threat of conversion to Romanian-language teaching as part of the so-called systematization drive.

The situation in Czechoslovakia is much better. There, teaching the Polish language is based on an agreement for cultural cooperation between the governments of the Polish People's Republic and the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, concluded on 22 January 1966, as well as on a Czechoslovak constitutional provision of 27 September 1968 guaranteeing to Czechoslovak citizens of Polish nationality the right to education in their national language. This right is being utilized by the Polish community of about 30,000 inhabiting Cieszyn Silesia and associated in the Polish Cultural and Educational Association. There exist 48 Polish-language preschools and six Polish-language departments in Czech preschools, along with 28 elementary schools at which instruction is in Polish, three schools for exceptional children, and one high school. At five Czech elementary schools classes with instruction in Polish are maintained.

In the German Democratic Republic live about 40,000 Poles, of whom 2,500 to 3,000 children and youth are of school age. How many Polish-language schools are there? Only one, attached to the embassy in Berlin, with a 12-year curriculum.

In 1982, during the visit by General Wojciech Jaruzelski, the GDR decided to open 15 schools with instruction in Polish as an additional language, in cities with substantial Polish populations. The possibility of giving examinations for secondary-school certificates in the Polish language also was discussed. Unfortunately, all these decisions have not, however, been implemented.

The Name of the Game

The problem of the more than a million Poles in the German Federal Republic continues to be a sensitive and difficult topic. Certain high ministry officials believe that, in deciding to be "Germans," these people do not merit the interest of Polish cultural and educational institutions.

"This position is mistaken. More even, in my opinion, the German Federal Republic is among the major Polonia centers to which special attention should be paid," said Dr Pawel Laczkowski (Solidarity), a sociologist and vice chairman of the Commission on Poles Abroad. That community is highly differentiated depending on the status of its residence in the FRG, the degree of assimilation, and the period of emigration. The largest group, about 500,000 people, are the emigres of the 1980's. These people, raised in Polish culture, retain strong bonds with that culture, and Polish will remain their language at home for many years still. The geographical proximity of both countries and the contacts with family members and friends remaining in Poland promote retaining Polishness, on the one hand, but cause Polish-language schooling in the FRG to be disproportionately limited compared with the size of the Polish community there, on the other. There are many signals indicating that the work of Polish consuls in the FRG also leaves much to be desired, since they are clearly reluctant to promote Polishness; soon, they will discuss this topic with the heads of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Polish schools in France still cannot be rebuilt after the "earthquake" experienced 26 years ago. That earthquake was sabotage, organized by the then heads of our government and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs who shut down, for allegedly money-saving reasons, the well-developed system of Polish-language consular schools in that country. This affair was hushed up for many years.

"Although the consular school system had been disbanded 26 years ago, the question of pensions for former teachers still has to be settled," said Zdzislaw Domanski, a Sejm deputy (United Peasant Party). Polish is one of the 12 foreign languages taught in French schools and may be a high-school subject. Besides, each year in France some 40 to 50 persons take examinations for high-school certificates in Polish. Under French law, a foreign-language teacher is paid by the parents or the government of the country of that language. Polish-language teachers, unfortunately, receive much lower salaries than teachers of other subjects. If sufficient prestige is to be conferred on our language, this problem has to be settled.

"The policy of the government of the country of settlement is increasingly becoming a factor in the operation of Polish-language schools. This particularly concerns the countries following a pluricultural policy: Sweden, Denmark, Great Britain, and also West Berlin, and, outside Europe, chiefly Canada," said Deputy Director

of the Consular Department at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Dr. Witold Rybczynski. "Essentially this policy consists in supporting the ethnic culture of minority groups and treating it as a major contribution to the culture of the country of settlement. In an extreme positive case, that of Sweden, the practical implementation of this policy manifests itself in the possibility of learning one's ethnic language free of charge, that is, in the government's sponsorship of the cost of teachers, textbooks, and premises. In the other countries named above, material assistance is granted but all organizational initiative is left to the ethnic groups themselves."

In the last dozen or so months several Polish-language schools were established in Europe. With tremendous support from the Polish consul in the Hague, Dr. Zbigniew Tomkowski, after a hiatus of 20 years one such school was established in Eindhoven.

The Polish Consul General in Brussels Tadeusz Kalinowski is the spirit behind the growth of Polish-language schools in Belgium.

For the first time Polish can be learned in Lahti; the organizer is the Circle of Polonia Families. The school receives support from the local authorities in the form of space in a preschool building, and from the Polish Embassy in Helsinki it receives funds and textbooks. Schools in Helsinki and Tampere operate on similar principles.

Recently also four small Polish-language schools were opened in Italy: in Rome, Milan, Aquila, and Reggio Emilia.

The flexible Polish-language school system in Great Britain is beginning to catch its second breath.

To the Rhythm of the Samba and the Computer

"You studied English and French. Now it is time for Polish." Recently I saw posters with this slogan, promoting the study of our language. They were originated by the Society of the Lovers of Chopin, a society which, to put any doubts to rest, consists entirely of Italian citizens.

The interest in Polish culture, in the history of our nation and state, is considerable. As a result, interest in the Polish language also exists. And though of a certainty Polish will never be a major language, the institutions designed to popularize our culture should pay much more attention than previously to promoting the language. This applies in particular to Polish institutions for culture and information.

Our language is being taught at many universities throughout the world. Their exact number is known neither at the Ministry of National Education nor at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Polish can be studied at the renowned Parisian Sorbonne and the British Cambridge, and at nearly every major university in the United States, Canada, Australia, Italy,

and the FRG. And not only there but also in Ankara, Havana, Hanoi, Delhi, Beijing, Seoul, Brasil, Curitiba, and Porto Alegre.

Most Polish-language students are not ethnically related to our country. They are chiefly future businessmen, diplomats, and culture personnel.

A recent poll taken in Brazil, in the state of Rio Grande del Sul alone, revealed that 12 secondary schools desired to introduce teaching the Polish language in their curriculums. An obstacle is the lack of teachers and, until quite recently, the shortage of suitable, modern teaching aids.

Until quite recently—because the aforementioned Prof Michael Mikos, who developed a modern computer program for teaching Polish, has nothing against its export to all continents.

Mikos's computer program has already attracted the interest of the Consul General in Chicago Tadeusz Czerwinski and members of the Polish Educational Alliance.

"Portugal is not among Europe's richest countries; on the contrary, but we have never begrudged money for the promotion of our language. Aside from emotional reasons, this is always a good investment which more than repays the expenses," a Portuguese minister of state said recently.

"That man is right, but it is a pity that no Polish decisionmaker has been thinking similarly for many years," said Czeslaw Milosz.

"Why is it that in the United States there is no center for Polish culture? Such a center would of a certainty earn hundreds of thousands of dollars for Poland and initiate, even if indirectly, many advantageous and needed investment projects," Jerzy Kosinski asked, declaring that he himself would take an active part in organizing that center.

The Sejm deputies working in the Commission on Poles Abroad and on Foreign Affairs believe that this situation will change radically in the next few months. They count on support from the Catholic Church and Lech Walesa.

YUGOSLAVIA

Possibility of EC Membership for Yugoslavia Viewed

*90EB0018A Zagreb VJESNIK in Serbo-Croatian
24 Sep 89 p 6*

[Interview with Aldo Cricchio, deputy chief of the EC delegation in Yugoslavia, by Ljubomir Cucic: "Aldo Cricchio Says There Is Room for Yugoslavia in the EC"; date and place not given]

[Text] The European community has participated the in Zagreb fairs for several years in a row now. A journalist reporting on the meeting of European emissaries at their

information booth or at roundtables this year notices two things. The first is the relatively modest EC presentation at the booth, and the second is the increasing interest of businessmen and specialists in participating in discussion of the future of the current Yugoslav approach to Europe. Fresh inferences may be drawn from this, including the one that the Europeans are gradually cooling off and are refraining from displaying cordiality or encouraging overly great expectations. That is, it is a question of speculation, and just how (un)founded it is is best demonstrated by the thoughts of Aldo Cricchio, deputy chief of the EC delegation to Yugoslavia, whom I interviewed recently at the Zagreb fair. Mr Cricchio is also an engineer and in the past he has engaged in research in the field of nuclear physics, later going to work for the EC Commission. He is an Italian citizen and has been in Yugoslavia since the beginning of this year.

[VJESNIK] Mr Cricchio, you have been in Yugoslavia only a short time, but long enough, I think, to have noticed the growing interest in the process of European association. How does the main office in Brussels interpret the pro-European attitude in Yugoslavia and what instructions are you receiving in this connection?

[Cricchio] My basic mission is to forward to my superiors news on events relevant to cooperation between the community and Yugoslavia and to do what is expected of me. I would not say that there is declining or growing interest in the EC in increasing cooperation with your country. It is simply that we live in the real world and we must operate within the confines of these realities. I know, for example, that we in the delegation and the Commission would sometimes like to do much more, but things often come to a standstill because of lack of money. What is the Commission's position on Yugoslavia? First of all, Yugoslavia is a European country. Secondly, it is a country which has extremely strong ties to two member countries, Italy and the Federal Republic of Germany. Thirdly, for a long time the fundamental factor impeding greater cooperation between the two countries has been the high Yugoslav foreign trade deficit in trade with the EC. Today the Commission is really satisfied that this deficit has been virtually eliminated. The Commission's position is clear in this situation. It intends to seek and find new ways of cooperating with Yugoslavia, increase trade, and extend it to other member countries, because the two countries referred to account for 70 percent of Yugoslav foreign trade with the EC.

As to integration, I can give you my opinion. All of us who work in the EC see that the Yugoslav press to a greater or lesser extent regularly follows what happens in the EC and urges closer ties to Europe. Nevertheless, Yugoslavia still does not meet the requirements for joining the EC, because it first must set up a free trade zone with the EC, that is, it must eliminate all customs duties and accept the legal system of the Community, its standards, etc.

'EFTA Will Disappear'

[VJESNIK] Unlike some of your colleagues, then, you do not exclude the possibility of Yugoslav membership in the Community?

[Cricchio] Of course I do not exclude it, because to me it is a natural step, something almost inevitable after the progress in economic cooperation made in the last few years. The matter is very simple. EFTA [European Free Trade Association] will disappear, and signing an agreement with it is not a long-term policy. An increasing number of former EFTA member countries have now joined the EC. Austria too is doing so. Finland, Sweden, and Switzerland will one day be EC members. Unlike the EC, then, EFTA is disintegrating. In my opinion, Yugoslavia does not have much choice. The goal ahead of it is clear, even though it is still rather far off.

[VJESNIK] When you refer to requirements, you limit yourself mostly to economic preconditions. However, there are also certain political requirements. The Rome agreement is quite clear in this respect.

[Cricchio] Naturally, Yugoslavia must sign the Human Rights Declaration accepted by all the members of the European council. In addition, political pluralism, that is, a multiparty system, is regarded as a fundamental democratic benefit of West European integration and it would be inconceivable for any country to consider joining the EC without meeting this crucial requirement.

[VJESNIK] How do you view the current political situation in Yugoslavia in this context?

[Cricchio] We see that some processes are rather disparate, because on the one hand you have democratic openness, especially in the northern part of the country, and on the other the one-party system is growing stronger in other parts of the country. From the historical and geographic viewpoints I am not at all surprised that the processes of democratization in Yugoslavia are beginning in the northwestern part of the country. Slovenia and Croatia are more progressive in this respect, and Serbia is more conservative. It is up to you in Yugoslavia to decide what is more important to you.

Common Aim

[VJESNIK] It obviously is not a question of what is more important but of who will win the political battle.

[Cricchio] We have 12 members in the EC, and you would not believe how difficult it is sometimes to find a common language, to agree on a budget and subsidies, to reconcile the different regulations which must be unified in an integrated market, and so forth. But we all have one common goal. Whether or not the Yugoslavs want to reach it depends on them.

[VJESNIK] I recently talked to a high Brussels official, who surprised me with his viewpoint that Yugoslavia, as he put it, can be integrated into a unified market but

probably cannot expect full-fledged membership in the EC. What do you think about this reserved invitation?

[Cricchio] I cannot comment on statements made by another person when I do not know if they are his own words or reflect the position of a particular institution. But I do know that the problem can be viewed in two ways, from a short-term and a long-term perspective. The fact is that at the moment the Community has problems of its own. It has to achieve full coordination of a unified market, and reconcile a wide variety of standards and regulations in 12 member countries, and until this process is completed by the end of 1992, no other members can be accepted. I believe that, no matter whom you may talk to, the person does not express the official thinking of a single EC institution, and probably not of a single member country government. The Community is expanding, and it is merely a matter of time until Yugoslavia becomes a member of it, if it satisfies the preconditions.

[VJESNIK] Do you believe it to be possible for any of the Eastern European countries to outstrip Yugoslavia in this process?

[Cricchio] I do not think so. The EC has formal and institutional links with Yugoslavia that are at a much higher level than those with any other Eastern European country. I think it highly unlikely that Poland and Hungary, for example, could join the Community ahead of Yugoslavia, because they are only now opening their doors. Not until last year did they appoint ambassadors to the EC, and only in the last few months have they expressed sympathy with the West. Nor should we forget that these countries still belong to the Warsaw Pact and CEMA and that from the geopolitical viewpoint they still belong to the East, not the West. Yugoslavia does not belong to either side.

[VJESNIK] A Hungarian politician recently stated that his country could become neutral while honoring its ties to the USSR.

[Cricchio] This does not yet mean anything, because he may only be saying what it pleases him to say. On the other hand, even Austria, which has applied for membership in the EC, insists on maintaining its internationally recognized neutrality and ties to Moscow.

[VJESNIK] The Community represents political as well economic integration, above all from the foreign policy viewpoint, and to some extent from that of defense. Do you believe that Yugoslavia with its foreign policy positions could join such an alliance?

[Cricchio] That is a problem of almost all countries outside the Community which want to join it. The Austrian application will be the most controversial one precisely because of Austrian neutrality. This application has not yet been considered officially, but it is

absolutely certain that there will be different interpretations within the EC. This will be precisely the case of Yugoslavia when the question of joining becomes topical one day.

Yugoslav Nonalignment

[VJESNIK] Does this mean that Yugoslav nonalignment and a European orientation cannot coexist?

[Cricchio] The point is that one day Yugoslavia will decide just what it wants. To be leader of the nonaligned movement and to desire membership in the EC are two different things. This matter is discussed as if Yugoslavia as an unaligned country could be an intermediary of closer ties between the EC and the Third World. I am not convinced that the EC would be unable to do this without Yugoslavia, something which for that matter experience is already confirming. Individual developing countries have different ties to the EC, especially ones which have traditional ties to France, Great Britain, etc. Consequently, Yugoslavia must know exactly what it wants, because, to return to your question, nonalignment is incompatible with active participation in the EC.

[VJESNIK] How do you view the immediate future of cooperation between Yugoslavia and the EC; how does it seem possible to achieve the mutual desire for membership?

[Cricchio] A short time ago I said that Yugoslavia must first establish a free trade zone with the EC. You must encourage your industry to put in an appearance in competitive markets, to confront the competition of the EC and other countries. At this moment Yugoslavia cannot do this overnight, because a large part of the economy would have to lock its doors. Gradual adjustment is necessary. The economic policy of prime minister Markovic is one which will yield medium-term results. These are the reforms which Yugoslavia is introducing into a market economy, and much change and work is still needed in this direction. The creation of a market economy is the chief economic precondition for membership in the EC, and I think that the present Yugoslav government is on the right track. It is clear to me that inflation is a major problem and danger. It is an illusion to expect that it will be reduced by certain special measures. All of your previous governments have tried them, without success. On the other hand, I think that the policy of the government headed by Markovic can yield results only after a period of 4 to 5 years. In the meantime, foreign capital must be attracted, the door must be opened to industrial integration of your enterprises and the enterprises in the EC, scientific and technological exchange must be encouraged, the standards of the unified market must be adhered to, and customs duties on imports must be progressively lowered.

[VJESNIK] And so this government is faced with direct pressure to abandon its current policy?

[Cricchio] Of course, I know that attempts are made here and there in Yugoslavia to dispute that the current government is reformist and stabilization oriented. Regardless of what happens to it, this will not have a direct effect by impairing the ties between the EC and Yugoslavia, but Yugoslavia could move away from everything I have talked about and postpone its adjustment to the integration processes in Europe.

Current Position, Role of Army Viewed

Reaction to Slovene Amendments

90EB0040A Belgrade NIN in Serbo-Croatian
8 Oct 89 pp 12-15

[Article by Milorad Vucelic: "Neither More nor Less Than the Constitution"]

[Text] "Yugoslavia can exist only as a true federation, or, in our opinion, it will not exist!"

This view was delivered on behalf of the Yugoslav People's Army at the 17th Session of the LCY [League of Communists of Yugoslavia] Central Committee (October 1988) by Colonel General Veljko Kadijevic, secretary for national defense. A similar position has been reiterated by the highest officers of the YPA [Yugoslav People's Army] on several occasions, and at the celebration of the 75th Anniversary of the Battle of Cer Mountain in Tekeris. It was also advocated by Colonel General Antun Lukezic, at that time commander of the 1st Military District, who said: "Yugoslavia can survive and develop only as a federal governmental community and a socialist social community. The decisions of the Second Session of AVNOJ [Anti-Fascist Council of Peoples Liberation of Yugoslavia], then, and in particular the decision on the federal system, are a social compact with lasting historic importance, and therefore this is something that we cannot and must not haggle over every day. The reason for this is that the sovereignty of the SFRY is the sovereignty of the whole, not the simple sum of the sovereignties of the various nationalities."

After positions as unshakable as these, it was easy to foresee that the reaction of the Yugoslav Army to the proposed anti-AVNOJ amendments to the Slovenian Constitution would be awaited and followed with great attention and even anxiety. Especially since it has been stressed for a rather long time from the highest places that "the Army is the main factor in our society's stability" (Janez Drnovsek) and a key cohesive force and organization at the level of Yugoslavia. The drama and suspense were heightened by the well-known positions of the top officers of the YPA concerning the depth of our social crisis and the inability of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia to find a way out of it, which were uttered most pregnantly by Vice Admiral Petar Simic, chairman of the Committee of the Organization of the LCY in the YPA, at the 20th Meeting of the LCY Central Committee this January:

"First, the situation in Yugoslavia has been rapidly approaching a culmination of the crisis. The League of Communists, as never before in its history, is losing battle after battle and has been unable to escape the vicious circle of a schematized and essentially powerless mode of thought and action. The sociopolitical system is in a kind of paralysis, especially with respect to the functions of the Federation, and is actually cracking at many seams. The opposition has appeared everywhere on the political scene and has been quite legally imposing political-ideological conceptions about Yugoslavia's system and strategies for its future development which were rejected long ago.... Never in postwar development have we confronted such great dangers to the integrity of the country and the destiny of our revolution."

MLADINA and the YPA

After the 20th Meeting of the LCY Central Committee, General Milos Bajcetic declared without any circumlocution that "the present party leadership has lost all confidence and legitimacy."

Finally, the YPA is constantly saying that it is Tito's Army, which is marching on Tito's road, and that it is the staunch defender of Tito's work. The YPA resolutely rejects all attacks on Tito's image and his place in history. That place was earned most of all by Josip Broz's role in Yugoslavia's renewal as a state and in the creation of the second Yugoslavia, so that any recomposition of Yugoslavia can thus be considered a most serious attack on Tito and even a destruction of Tito's work.

And, as expected, the Army did react. At the last plenum of the LCY Central Committee, Petar Simic "acknowledged" that "at the beginning of this month (September) the Federal Secretariat for National Defense informed the SFRY State Presidency" of its positions concerning the Slovenian amendments, "and in the Presidium of the LCY Central Committee it supported the initiative to hold a debate of possible political consequences of adoption of those amendments."

A few days later, a "confidential" document containing the positions of the Federal Secretariat for National Defense sent to the SFRY State Presidency on 21 September of this year was published in MLADINA of Ljubljana. MLADINA remarked that the positions of all federal bodies concerning Slovenia's constitutional amendments completely agree with the positions of the Ministry of Armed Forces, in which, "as is generally known, the personnel are mainly Shoguns instead of civilians." In the document itself, the position of the federal secretariat is extremely ambiguous: "Legalization of the right of constitutional establishment of republics contrary to the SFRY Constitution prevents the Armed Forces from performing their basic function of protecting the social system established by the SFRY Constitution. Such a situation must not be allowed, and the SFRY Presidency, as the supreme body for direction and command of the Armed Forces of the SFRY, has the

decisive role and responsibility in this respect. We therefore propose that it take every step and undertake every activity so that that situation does not occur, to anticipate it and prevent it."

It goes on to propose that the SFRY Presidency request and assemble the views and assessments of all the competent bodies of the Federation, in particular the FEC [Federal Executive Council] and the Constitutional Court of Yugoslavia. And it found the following to be necessary on the basis of the opinions and assessments gathered:

- To schedule and hold, on an urgent basis, a meeting of the Council for Protection of Constitutional Order in which the council would set forth and propose measures which the SFRY Presidency should take;
- Under the constitutional power contained in Article 318 of the SFRY Constitution, to inform the SFRY Assembly of the situation that has come about, of the problems of domestic and foreign policy caused in this manner, and to propose that it urgently convene in order to debate this issue, take its position ... and adopt an appropriate decision."

It also proposed that all the activities be performed "before adoption of the constitutional amendments in the Assembly of the Socialist Republic [SR] of Slovenia." And, as we know, all those activities (except the decision of the SFRY Constitutional Court) were in fact performed before adoption of the amendments, but with no success whatsoever—the Assembly of SR Slovenia passed the amendments, and the Slovenian Communists refused to act in keeping with the decision of the LCY Central Committee and to oppose adoption of the amendments.

False Fear of the YPA

Only Colonel Franc Carel of the YPA voted against the amendments in the Slovenian Assembly. Carel justified his vote in a very characteristic and symptomatic way: "I am not free to speak to you on my own personal behalf and to say what I personally feel. I inform you that the position of the delegation of the YPA in the Slovenian Assembly is against adoption of the amendments to the Slovenian Constitution. I have a duty to advise you of the possible far-reaching consequences if this chamber and this Assembly adopt the constitutional amendments today. Thank you."

The "pressure" and positions of federal bodies and the armed forces seem after all to have borne some "fruit," and the Slovenian constitutional amendments were somewhat altered "at the last hour." The armed forces are no longer explicitly mentioned in them, "but this altered text does say that no one can carry out any measure related to a state of emergency without the consent of the republic Assembly, which is still worse (emphasis supplied by M.V.), the restriction on the SFRY Presidency is still greater than in the first text of the amendments" (P. Simic in a conversation with veterans in Zagreb).

Faced with the end of AVNOJ Yugoslavia and perhaps with the beginning of the end of Yugoslavia as a state in general, we must remember that all the supposed fear of the Army and its "emergency measures" and "putsches," which has been kept alive in Slovenia for years, and recently ever more frequently in Croatia as well, has actually been a cover and alibi for governmental secessionism and separation. It is difficult to understand why anyone who is so afraid of the Army would persistently and almost recklessly challenge and provoke the Armed Forces and the generals by calling them "Shoguns." This appears to have been an elaborate scenario for portraying the Army as a kind of "wicked witch." This kind of propaganda has mobilized and indoctrinated even those who were not in favor of governmental separatism, but who concur in it precisely out of a fear of "socialism imposed by tanks" and because of the danger, as it was put in the party plenum by Janez Kocijancic, that "Tienanmen Square would spread all the way to the suburbs of Trieste"!

Similar propaganda tricks are also being used in somewhat closer northwestern parts of the country, where the heads, helmets, and bayonets of our soldiers (!) are shown with captions like "The Defense or Last Days of Yugoslavia," and questions are emphasized along the lines of "Whose Army Is It?" There has hardly been a single session during the past year in which Milan Kucan or someone else close to him has not said that a "quiet overthrow" is taking place in our country and that we are supposedly "already living in a state of emergency." These tactics of constantly emphasizing and referring to the state of emergency, in addition to spreading fear of the YPA, has turned out to be more than effective in paralyzing all those who do not consent to the separatist policy, and at the same time it has served the pursuit of secessionist interests.

The Party and the Army

The Committee of the Organization of the LCY in the YPA, in the meeting in which it scheduled the conference of the LCY in the YPA, also emphasized in no uncertain terms that there is no alternative to "democratic centralism in the LC [League of Communists]." At the same time, Ciril Ribicic said on behalf of Slovenia in the International Press Center in Belgrade: "At the Extraordinary Congress of the LCY, Slovenian Communists will fight to do away with the principle of democratic centralism, since under it Slovenes can end up in a position of having something imposed upon them that they do not want and do not desire because they have been outvoted. Which is also why they did not respect the decision of the LCY Central Committee to fight for postponement of the decision on the amendments in the Slovenian Assembly."

Ribicic also pointed out the possibility and hope that "the Slovenian LC will remain in power after the elections in March 1990, on its own or in a coalition with other democratic forces."

It is becoming more and more obvious, then, that democratic centralism at the level of the Federation will still be operative only in the Organization of the LCY in the Yugoslav Army, which raises a number of very complicated problems. This is in fact indicated by the words of Petar Simic at the 20th Meeting of the LCY Central Committee, when he mentioned the "increasingly frequent applications of numerous retired military officers and members of the League of Communists to return to the Organization of the League of Communists in the Yugoslav People's Army, so that they can exercise their rights and discharge their obligations in it. After all, under present circumstances they do not want to carry out their activity, since they are under pressure of the divisions in the League of Communists."

Only the possibility that has been hinted of this kind of organization of the League of Communists would then jeopardize even the functioning of democratic centralism within the republic organizations of the LCY. The problem would also be raised of the political organization and party organization of the reserve and territorial defense segments of our nationwide defense.

The complexity of the situation and the extent to which everything suggests the question of whether it is about the Yugoslav People's Army at all or of the people's army of the "remnant of Yugoslavia" is indicated by the statement of Dusan Sinigoj, chairman of the Slovenian Executive Council, made a few days ago, in which he says that "Slovenia is unable to meet its obligations to the federal treasury," and the commentators recall that the new constitutional amendments allow for "closing the financial faucet" on the basis of "Slovenia's economic sovereignty" with respect to fulfilling obligations to the Federation and to its budget, and that fulfillment of obligations to finance the armed forces will accordingly be limited.

The Illiquidity of the YPA

As is well known, the YPA had major problems with financing during the period before the amendment. Vice Admiral Stane Brovet, deputy federal secretary for national defense, pointed out in the 18th Meeting of the LCY Central Committee that "it was noted on several occasions even earlier that the present constitutional arrangements do not guarantee the necessary length of term and stability in financing the YPA in keeping with the character of its tasks."

Brovet pointed out the illiquidity of the YPA—that the share of the national income in financing the YPA has dropped from the planned 5.2 percent to 4.94 percent: "One consequence of that is the increased outflow, especially of highly trained personnel, to the economically advanced regions. It is reducing the response to the military calling and is making it difficult to man units and institutions with young and competent personnel.... The datum that this year 48 students and cadets of military schools dropped out, most of them immediately before promotion, is another indication that the personal

incomes of active military personnel are not excessively high. They included 32 from SR Slovenia. This is also confirmed by the datum that in the communities from which the demands are coming for the Army to share the destiny of the population they are offering social welfare to certain members of the YPA."

In the conclusion of his speech, Brovet dramatically warned that the constitutional arrangements of that time could make it impossible for the Army to perform its tasks as set forth in the Constitution, and he insisted on a constitutional amendment making it possible for the Army to carry on its normal life. This dramatic situation has deteriorated still more since the adoption of the Slovenian constitutional amendments.

Following the plenum of the LCY Central Committee and adoption of the Slovenian amendments, Petar Simic spoke at the Ninth Election Conference of the Basic Organization of the LCY in the Air Force and Air Defense in Split and said that "frequently there is exaggeration in assessments to the effect that the Army is the only factor in Yugoslavia's stability. However much this may impress us, it must be emphasized that it is primarily the working class, rhetoric aside, that figures as that factor. There has also been speculation with the inclination of the Army toward this or that program which is relevant at the moment in the country. It therefore needs to be stated clearly that the YPA is capable of evaluating all the events in society on its own and is inclined only to a Yugoslav program, not to partial programs."

Simic and Ljubicic

While Simic's reaction at the plenum to the speeches made by Druzic and Kocijancic left no opportunity whatsoever for subsequent reinterpretation and substitution of subjects and objects, his words uttered in Split were used by many to conclude that Simic was actually criticizing Army General Nikola Ljubicic, former federal secretary for national defense, whose remarks during a visit to Kosjeric included this:

"All those who would like to change the national boundaries and secede from Yugoslavia have to be prevented. The favorable sociopolitical situation that has been achieved in Serbia and the unity of the LC in the YPA, as two important factors for cohesion to preserve Yugoslavia the way it is, are especially important to all our endeavors."

The commentators in the propaganda centers in Northwest Yugoslavia also insisted that Simic was indirectly criticizing the speech by Momir Bulatovic, chairman of the Presidium of the Montenegrin LC Central Committee, delivered at a rally in Titograd. Those interpretations seemed both unfounded and stretched until Petar Simic spoke to the veterans in Zagreb, when these interpretations, at least as far as Bulatovic is concerned, turned out to be true.

It is worth recalling that at the 20th Meeting of the LCY Central Committee Vice Admiral Petar Simic "expressed a desire" in the name of communists in the YPA "that the divisions extend [as published] even to an organization like the Federation of Associations of Veterans of the National Liberation War," and he called upon the veterans "not to give in to the current republic-provincial confrontations." "Also," Simic continued, "communists in the YPA distance themselves from the statements of certain retired generals and admirals who on various recent occasions have been contributing to the divisions of this country and of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia. Their criteria are not ours."

In spite of these highly critical positions, Simic did in a way accommodate those he criticized. Without confirming the assessment of himself "as too experienced a soldier and politician to run into the trap of a debate" (DANAS), in the conversation with Zagreb veterans he did respond to a question critical of the speech by Momir Bulatovic at the Titograd unity rally, when Bulatovic reportedly spoke about "armed intervention against those who think differently" (Since when are those directly engaged in destroying Yugoslavia's integrity as a state only "those who think differently," and all those who criticize only verbally "enemies"?), in strict terms to the effect that "the Army and weapons are too serious a matter for certain of our politicians. It would be good if they made a thorough study of our Constitution and of the jurisdiction of the YPA." Petar Simic was obviously granting license to all those who saw Bulatovic as the target of his speech in Split. Only one more question remains: What about the positions of Nikola Ljubicic?

Well, what was it that Bulatovic said, where did he say it, and what was it that Simic felt such a marked need to react to on several occasions?

Before 50,000 Montenegrins, at least 40,000 of whom are military registrants and members of the Armed Forces reserves, in addition to being members of the working class, who precisely as a sign of support for the initiatives of the YPA kept shouting when confronted with the threat to Yugoslavia: "We want weapons!"—Bulatovic, referring to all the earlier abuses of such shouts, said: "Let them not reproach us even though we are demanding weapons, we have those weapons, as you know. They are in the hands of the YPA, since we are all its soldiers. If under the laws of this country and if in keeping with the SFRY Constitution the need arises for us to defend the territorial integrity and inviolability of our Yugoslavia even in that way, they can count on us to a man, every one of us who is here."

What Did Bulatovic Say?

Bulatovic, then, said almost word for word what was being said by Simic and other members of the YPA Officer Corps and all those who respect Yugoslavia and constitutionality and legality, and there really is no basis for setting the chairman of the Montenegrin party in opposition to Petar Simic as is done by Tintor and his ilk

or those who "compare" Petar Simic "to the American actor Robert Mitchum because of his inherent elegance and appearance."

As for Montenegro, some observers and analysts recall the speech made by Branko Mamula at the 17th Meeting of the LCY Central Committee. Supporting the October intervention of law enforcement agencies in Montenegro, Mamula said at that time: "The recent events in Montenegro have shown, in the midst of all the other constructive and adverse experiences, how much the people esteem the national identity of the state. The forces which had jeopardized it quickly stepped back in the face of the people, and forces came together in its defense. The leadership of Montenegro was given broad support in the country for its resoluteness on these issues, but combined, of course, with a readiness to take collective and individual responsibility for the situation that has been created."

And certain other generals have from time to time been expressing very biased judgments, and thus General Ferdinand Toplak recently warned "that Knin is only the tactical variant behind which the strategy is concealed," referring, as one commentary wrote, "to the simple military rule that mobilizing all forces along someone's tactical alternatives results in a guaranteed defeat."

Substitution of Objects

In short, we must ask: What characterizes the present political situation and the attitude of the YPA toward it?

First of all, the YPA itself initiated the debate in the highest federal governmental bodies concerning the Slovenian constitutional amendments. All the federal bodies have without exception adopted an unambiguous negative position toward the package of proposed Slovenian amendments. The Slovenian Assembly turned a deaf ear to all the positions and recommendations of the federal bodies of government, and now the most distinguished leaders of Slovenia and Croatia, in full combined operation with their propaganda centers and periodicals, are avoiding a polemical confrontation with the YPA and federal governmental bodies, and in their now characteristic manner are attempting to dump all the responsibility on the "Serbian professional public," the specialized services of the SFRY State Presidency, which are supposedly "in Serbian hands," on the Serbian leadership, on the member of the SFRY Presidency from Serbia, and finally on the Serbian people themselves.

All the responsibility for disputing the Slovenian separatist amendments is being placed on Serbia instead of on the federal bodies and the Army. Serbia has been accused without any basis whatsoever of "integral Yugoslavism with a single nationality as its patron and of failure to recognize the equality of all the nationalities and ethnic minorities which live in Yugoslavia," as well as of "saber-rattling." Aside from all that, Serbia has been accused without any basis whatsoever of "taking over the Army."

The military officers, obviously not grasping the essence of this entire maneuver or perhaps refusing to grasp it, have been obstinately saying that "our armed forces are equally Croatian and Serbian, equally Slovenian and Montenegrin, equally Macedonian and Muslim—they belong to all our nationalities. They are, then, Yugoslav" (P. Simic in Split). No normal person in his right mind disputes this, of course, but it obviously bypasses the essence of the problem.

Of course, no one is calling upon the Armed Forces, nor can they call upon them, to take a position in advance in favor of some particular ethnic side and to stand by some partial and selfish interest. But if the Armed Forces advocate absolutely unambiguously a federation that is AVNOJ-oriented, modern, and efficient, and it has been persistently doing so, it cannot, precisely on the basis of that principle it has adopted, join in the same manner either social or ethnic political forces which advocate Yugoslavia as an "asymmetrical federation" or again as a loose confederation [...] those who favor Yugoslavia's federal system. The policy of enforced symmetries and leveling, of putting in the same basket things which are extremely incommensurable, here as in all else, cannot be of any help or benefit at all. It is accordingly not a question of any sort of ethnic favoritism or of ethnic allegiance, but of consenting or not consenting to a Yugoslav federalistic program which is consistent with the positions of AVNOJ and the YPA.

'Taking Over' the Armed Forces?

The conclusion as to some Serbian takeover of the Armed Forces cannot be drawn from the clear programmatic commitment of SR Serbia that Yugoslavia "should be a modern democratic and efficient federation, which includes ethnic equality on matters essential to the joint existence of the nationalities, representation of the interests of man as citizen and producer in the federation, the broad right to self-organization of the republics as federal units, and the necessary set of functions of the federation and effective means of performing them." Serbia certainly cannot be at fault when it says "for the federation to be able to meet these requirements, it must be recognized as a legal state with its own original powers and sovereignty, which applies among other things powers, measures, and instruments which could not be a remnant nor a part of rights transferred and delegated by the federal units, but an expression of its original authority. This set of functions of the federation and the manner in which they are performed do not constitute centralism nor unitarism, but the elementary prerequisite for the functioning of society and the economy and for development of the country as a whole."

Presentation of the program of the Commission for Reform of the Political System of the Presidency of SR Serbia was only a contribution to establishing Serbia's equality in Yugoslavia. That proposal was publicly and officially sent to all the republics, and, as can be seen on the basis of the practice of some of them, it was not

accepted as such, and was not even found worthy of a reasoned response. Slovenia's separate and one-sided constitutional establishment and the similar and visible intentions in SR Croatia make it evident that this is not any kind of design of the federation that represents conquest and hegemony. It is likewise evident that the YPA takes the same position toward this program as toward all others. It is precisely this position of the YPA which seems to us worthy of reassessment, since by emphasizing some kind of variant of mechanical Yugoslavism it attempts to give equal treatment to extremely incompatible projects of an "asymmetrical federation" and confederation on the one hand, and of a modern and effective federation on the other.

It is not a question here of advocating ethnic bias, but of respecting a principle. Here, it really is not helpful at all to have Simic's position that "there are new very essential differences in commitments in the programs adopted in Serbia, Slovenia, and now also in Croatia." Simic added to these words that in the YPA "they are convinced that most of our people favor achieving consensus in favor of reform," although judging by everything we have been able to read and on the basis of public statements by the political leaders of Croatia and Slovenia, and indeed even of Bosnia-Herzegovina, it is easy to understand why the vision of reform programmatically presented by Col Gen Veljko Kadijevec in the conference concerning the LCY in the YPA was explicitly rejected, to put it mildly.

The Inequality of the Republics and the YPA

Be that as it may, whether you want to admit it or not, a situation of actual and legal inequality of the republics has been created in Yugoslavia. So, it is not just a question of nonacceptance of the proposal for reform of the Federation submitted by SR Serbia, but also of the fact that adoption of the Slovenian constitutional amendments has made it and certain other republics unequal. What will happen if this state of inequality begins to be corrected (and it is impossible to maintain the status quo) by all the republics incorporating in their respective constitutions those same principles of self-determination of the nationality all the way to secession and deciding to finance or not finance certain of the federal organizations and functions in accordance with the respective and arbitrarily determined capabilities, and on the basis of economic sovereignty? What consequences would that have for Yugoslavia and ultimately for the Yugoslav People's Army itself? In the situation when Croatia and Serbia, Macedonia, and so on, incorporate in their constitutions the right to self-determination all the way to secession; will the YPA behave in the same way as in the Slovenian example and attempt to react to the new situation that has come about with declarations of artificial equilibrium?

Can there be a unified Yugoslav People's Army committed to federalism and AVNOJ in a Yugoslavia that is disunited and confederal? Is there any possibility of the YPA existing on ideological and political foundations

which obviously have not been universally accepted throughout Yugoslavia? It is well known that the YPA is against party pluralism, so the question arises of what will happen when not only Yugoslavia's governmental system, but also its social system begin to change because of possible ruling party coalitions (which have already been indicated in Slovenia)? Dr Dimitrij Baucal pointed to the complexity of this problem area at the 22d Meeting of the LCY Central Committee when he said that "separation of the function of the party from the state in our case implies simultaneous, if not even prior, construction of a federal legal state that is modern, very effective, and efficient, with precisely stated powers in areas of vital importance to the stability of our community, powers that would be exercised in a unified way and in the interest of all our nationalities and ethnic minorities. We know well what kind of situation we have now."

Much of that supports the proposal to hold a general referendum or other similar forms of direct democratic declaration of citizens and the people concerning Yugoslavia's future governmental and social system. As far as the Armed Forces are concerned, its popular character, which it is always emphasizing, and its class approach to all outstanding problems, whereby our national bureaucracies are preaching and representing interests opposed to the true will of the people, would seem to favor that idea. Aside from all members of the YPA taking an active part in that kind of democratic job, which seems more and more necessary, the activity of the YPA would undoubtedly have to be directed toward protecting the existential interests of individuals and nationalities, toward preventing possible interethnic retributions, toward preventing barbarism, and toward respect for all human rights in the processes of change or indeed in the processes of integration and reintegration.

In that way, the Armed Forces would become and would remain a factor in the civilized resolution of key problems and in obtaining answers to the fateful questions faced by the Yugoslav governmental community. The Armed Forces, then, and this only seems to be paradoxical, would actually continue to figure, as in fact they have up to now, as a guarantee of civilian and democratic solutions. Processes of that kind must, of course, slowly change the YPA itself and force it to update more and more the performance of its functions and update its conception of defense of the country.

Demographic, Strategic Problems

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[Article by Aleksandar Tijanic: "Martial Music as a Factor"]

[Text] To some people in this country, General Veljko Kadijevic, minister of the Armed Forces, and Petar Simic, his "commissar," are like members of an amateur cultural society, since, dressed up in traditional "costume," they preserve the old customs, traditions, and

memories associated with Yugoslavia. Is the number of members of this "society" truly so small, and is their job really only a matter of "folklore"? The answer depends above all on the relation at the moment between the two theories of how Yugoslavia should look. According to one, it must be like a peach (soft on the outside and hard on the inside), while the other theory prefers the model of the egg (firmness on the outside and flexibility within). Many analysts have been trying to guess which of these two models is the Army favorite. This is being done very carefully, so carefully that to an outside observer, the "federalists," "republicans," "dogmatists," "liberals," "communists," and "noncommunists," are trying to be "with the Armed Forces." The Armed Forces, however, are not with them all! It is that trifle, that missing piece of knowledge, that makes the topic of which way the Armed Forces will swing so attractive. However, all the mystery has been taken out of the thing, at least from the Army's point of view.

In a situation where this state is actually not being run by the Presidency, but by fears—of unitarianism, separatism, the past, the future; where mutual intolerances of the nationalities are becoming stronger, there was nothing else for the leader of Army communists, Simic, to do but to preserve "his flock" from the call of the "ethnic sirens," informally leading a ninth League of Communists, in addition to the eight that formally exist. In practice, this is the only Yugoslav Communist Party of the "international" type, which is not accused of having melted down into a party along nationality lines. All of a sudden, to his horror, Simic found himself in the position of "reconciling" communists at odds with one another, of closing his eyes to appeals for "fraternal assistance," of rapping on the knuckles people to whom in the former scheme he should only have been "logistical support," the formal vote of professional soldiers who are members of the party.

Defense Against Civilians

Kadijevic experienced approximately the same thing. That is, in normal countries the "civilians" look upon the Army with suspicion, evaluating its political ambitions. In this Federation, which no one would dare to call normal, the military system, as defined by the well informed, is forced to defend itself strenuously against civilian "specialties of the house," all the way from nationalism to people ready to shoot anyone who does not speak their language. It was precisely that social matrix that thrust Kadijevic to the top leadership in the military. That is, this wise, but firm man from Imok, in the opinion of his fellow generals who nominated him to that position, was the most suitable individual to head the military at a time when the YPA faced a dual challenge. First Admiral Branko Mamula left in the middle of his second term, in accordance with regular procedure and at his own request, it was emphasized. However, there were sotto voce comments to the effect that he was actually leaving because of a conflict with the top "civilian" leadership over "exceeding authority" in connection with evaluation of the political situation in

Slovenia. At his inauguration, Kadijevic took the first opportunity to express indirectly his opinion about those comments, emphasizing that Mamula "could be proud of the job he had done." But Mamula's departure revived the old stories about having a civilian minister of the Armed Forces. There was even talk in the hallways that mentioned the names of candidates (Vidoje Zarkovic was frequently mentioned), so that the republics have already undertaken a kind of promotional campaign. Sensing the danger of republicanization—and incidentally demonstrating that professional soldiers do not care to have amateurs among them—the "collegium of generals" nominated Kadijevic as the most suitable person for the position of "a general ensuring continuity amid the changes" that began when Mamula took office.

As the last veteran of the war, the last Partizan to hold this position, by virtue of his prestige with the new generation of politicians who have seen the Germans only as tourists, Kadijevic is to some extent preparing the ground for the next generation of military leaders, who will be pure theoreticians and incidentally will not have help from a wartime pedigree. He inherited all of Mamula's problems, and time has simply added several of this year's specialties. To wit, the battles in the top political leadership of the Federation are being waged "without rules and without prisoners"; Kadijevic and (this week) Simic do not have the time, as they once did, to slowly prepare and read written addresses for the ceremonies in celebration of Armed Forces Day. Now, the repartee and debate in meetings carried by television are such that everything depends on the mental rating of individuals: In this game, you win or you lose for always! So, "preparation of the terrain" will not be possible; every future minister of the Armed Forces (we have already mentioned that the possibility of this being Admiral Stane Brovet is being announced) will tend to be more and more a politician and less and less a soldier. Those are the reasons why the Army has broken the unwritten rule since the time of Josip Broz Tito of keeping a low profile, at least for the general public, in the numerous political skirmishes. Drawn out step by step, often against its will, the military, even back during Mamula's term, demonstrated that it had an opinion on everything, but did not always express it. Under Kadijevic, that barrier has also been lowered: The Armed Forces are always speaking out when they consider that this is in the interest of those goals and values for which they stand.

Passing the Buck

This more active domestic role on the part of the YPA is derived, a majority of analysts are convinced, from the assessment of the military that things in the country are so bad that the military might even be used as a domestic superpoliceman, a Pretorian guard for the system, or as "United Nations" forces at odds with one another. In both cases, the civilian inability would pass on to the military full responsibility for getting out of that situation. This is why the generals have been speaking against the conventional theory of "the Army in garrisons," but

also against the excessive assessments to the effect that the YPA is the only cohesive force of the Federation! Their problem here is that most of the iconographic symbols upon which the Army's self-consciousness is based have been weakened—from the revolution to Tito, from communists to self-management. Accustomed to obedient loyalty to the commander in chief, the soldiers today are looking on as members of the SFRY Presidency, which is the "collective commander in chief," and get their "ears pulled" in public. After the first period of confusion and disorientation in the "post-Tito" period, the soldiers have begun to "militate" on the political battlefield according to the rules which it respects. But, continuing to avoid the trap of deciding between the warring republic leaders and options, the generals have been speaking in general terms, committing themselves to principles, not to specific individuals, speaking in the metaphors of certain theories concerning the causes of the crisis and the possibilities of getting out of it.

At the same time, as has already been written about Mamula, Kadijevic found himself in the position of a trade union leader who must explain to his rank and file that the "good times" have passed, that there is no longer any money, and that there has to be saving even on housing, vacation resorts, weapons, salaries, pensions, and imports of modern equipment. The troubles have been one of the reasons why for the first time in socialist Yugoslavia we can talk about a kind of public opinion of the Armed Forces, whose attitudes the generals must take into account. That is, the soldiers are dissatisfied not only with their earnings, but also with the vacillation of the "civilians" over restoring order in Kosovo and putting an end to the interethnic disputes. Retired military people talk about the increasing number of their unemployed descendants. There is also less money to feed the soldiers, so that wherever possible they are raising "everything from vegetables to hogs" in the units. The men in uniform are encountering phenomena previously unknown—attacks, insults, physical assaults, deprecation, public accusations that "we are selling weapons left and right." The military calling is becoming more and more unpopular; there are fewer and fewer applicants for military schools, especially from the northwestern parts. In Kosovo alone, over the last 7 years the conscientious soldiers have suffered 203 assaults, 311 insults and threats, 80 cases when entire units were disrupted, and 254 incidents related to military facilities.

Oversights and Problems

What is more, the question has been raised in public as to the quality of the expensive imported systems (mainly Soviet-made), which in the Arab-Israeli conflicts proved to be inferior to those from the West. The reference is above all to the T-55 and T-72 tanks, and then the MiG-21 airplanes and the SAM batteries. An article containing an analysis of the shortcomings of these systems appeared some years ago in the journal NASE

TEME. Relations with the public have become increasingly complicated. The loyal military journalists on civilian newspapers have wholeheartedly supported the "revolutionary" plan for establishing required military service for women. It soon turned out that there were holes in that plan. The system of the draft has been touched up several times. Now that 18-year-olds are being taken, the Army is left without skilled manpower, without technicians, engineers, and physicians, and it has faced numerous problems in the adaptation of the new urban generations to conditions in the garrisons. It is because of these boys that units now have a psychologist for the first time. There have been demands originating in Slovenia to respect "conscientious objection," which does not allow the bearing of arms, and for establishment of the possibility of civilian service to satisfy the military requirement. Following several years when it held firm to its position, the military has loosened its regulations. Much the same action was taken with opening up certain areas of the Adriatic which had been an exclusive military zone which foreigners could not enter or stay in. The military budget no longer went through Parliament without debate. On the contrary! Because of the lack of money, the project of a Yugoslav-made supersonic aircraft has been "shot down" for now since it would cost between \$3 and \$5 billion just to prepare the blueprints and build a prototype.

Exports of military equipment, now that wars have been dying down, have been falling off and have been bringing in less than \$2 billion. There is talk about a possible large sale of T-84 tanks to Kuwait, but we have not earned anything by selling the much-praised airplanes—which are as much as 10 years behind similar types in the rest of the world. Thanks to the trade surplus with the Russians, our pilots recently received the up-to-date MiG-29 airplane and thus have stayed in contact with top flight technology, since in this field every interruption in development is disastrous from the military standpoint. The "civilians" are still fighting over which of the helicopter models offered (the "Belgrade" model or the "ZINVOJ Mostar" model) will be purchased to meet the needs of the YPA. Unofficially, the "Soko" from Mostar is thought to have the advantage, since "quite a bit of military money has been invested" in the equipment there.

Young Generals

Aside from these problems, the military has also faced the consequences of the demographic explosion; as far as we are aware, young Albanians comprise the second largest group of draftees, and in another 10 years or so they could be the largest. Taken by themselves, these figures need not signify anything good or bad. But, instructed by the experience of this decade, the soldiers will not sleep peacefully until many things are set right in Kosovo.

A year ago, the Army came to have generals under the age of 50 for the first time (mainly pilots); under the new regulations they must be doctors of science in their field.

The public image has changed, from the uniforms, which are becoming more and more modern, to the advertising posters announcing enrollment in military schools.

The garrisons are being opened on every occasion and all the weapons systems are being demonstrated to the citizens gathered: from airplanes to tanks (3 years ago, 1 million people visited the military "fair" at Usce in Belgrade). Unnecessary skirmishes with "civilians," which occurred a few years ago and are remembered for their mutual exclusiveness, are avoided. However, the well-known trial of "the four" in Ljubljana, and then stories about the existence of a scenario for a "military administration" in Slovenia, the trial of several Slovenian soldiers for hostile activity, the reorganization of military districts, which resulted in a merger of the Ljubljana and Zagreb military commands, and the constant revival of stories about the YPA as the "bastion of dogmatism and unitarianism," and as the "Yugoslav melting pot," emphasis on the need to strengthen the role of territorial defense at the expense of the operational Armed Forces, the demands that recruits be sent to garrisons in their own respective republics, and conflicts with the Slovenian delegates because of the way in which the YPA is financed—it takes about 60 percent of the federal budget—have ultimately resulted in a cooling of relations between numerous strata and centers of public opinion in Slovenia and the top military leadership.

A few days ago, the conflict culminated in the adoption of the amendments, which, in the opinion of the generals and the LCY Central Committee, restrict the constitutional powers of the SFRY Presidency and the general staff, dividing up unified defense "space" by introducing so-called pockets. Kadijevic and Simic, as the spokesmen of the military, believe that the country's defense cannot be based on a "collection of republic forces," but must be based on the "collective strength of the unified military machine." Everything that is happening in the country meanwhile is going in the opposite direction.

That is the reason why with the rotting of many joint mechanisms within the system and society, and then the economic collapse, the document on Prospects and Development of Defense up to the Year 2000 is in jeopardy from the position of the top military leadership. At the same time, the spirit of the times has already extended to the uniform system: There are fewer and fewer "military secrets of small nations," documents marked "Strictly Confidential" are appearing in the media, the generals are speaking openly about problems in the military—from the shortage of money for the expensive training of pilots, sailors, and tankmen to the fact that only one out of every five or who knows how many members of missile units have an occasion to fire an authentic missile rather than the beep-beep electronic signal on a training simulator; what is more, they mention the "strange" habits of the new generations—grouping together by nationality in their free time, the increasingly politicized young men who have already

been ideologically "brainwashed" in their own respective republics before they come to the military.

Kadijevic is thus solving problems on an everyday basis of how to maintain the constitutional "neutrality" of the Armed Forces between the fierce attacks and fierce appropriations, how to shatter the conviction concerning the "excessively Serbian character" of the military structure of society and its alleged anti-Slovenianism, what position to take toward fellow generals who become involved in politics after retirement and in so doing become involved in mutual duals and scandals, how to control the dissatisfaction of the middle level of the military and "let steam off" through new "safety valves," what position to take concerning homogenization in all the republics, how to resist the pressure from the top leadership groups of our states on the system for command of the Armed Forces, how to protect personnel against "mobilization" around "republic and provincial concepts even when those concepts are not Yugoslavia-oriented," how to interpret and how to protect the internal system of defense when it has been made public that in recent years more than 200 hostile groups have been discovered within the YPA.

Changes in Strategy

The collegium of generals has faced many difficulties. It is now evident from the statements made by the highest party and government leaders that defense of the country in the sixties was not what it should have been (Bakaric's statement that "we would not have fired three bullets, and the Russians would have entered Zagreb," and the assertion of General Gosnjak to the effect that it takes the Army 3 days to remove the grease from its weapons"). This is why the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968 brought an end to cordial relations with the Russians, and although the generals do not speak about it publicly, the sharp edge of our defense, just as in the fifties, was turned eastward again. At the strategic level, the Brezhnev Doctrine about "fraternal assistance" resolved the internal dilemmas of the top military and political leadership, and the conception of nationwide defense was established as the only realistic option if effective resistance was to be offered to a possible aggressor.

The emergence of Gorbachev and the relaxation of tensions between the Russians and the Americans have revived the domestic "doves" so that in some quarters it is even being asked whether there is a need to have a standing Army, which, according to foreign sources, is assumed to have about 200,000 men.

Our military analysts countered with a question: Imagine the fall of Gorbachev, who really has serious problems in the Soviet Union, and in a trice we will find ourselves, as we were before, between the two alliances, between the two armed forces, but this time "with our pants down." By economizing and reducing the expenditure per soldier from \$116 in 1987 to \$85 in 1988, the YPA has reduced the number of men by 12 percent

under the pressure of penury, since its "allowance" has fallen from the 6.17 percent of the national income which it once was, to 3.85 last year, by sheer force of circumstances.

Less but Better

Internal reform is leading the military toward a smaller but better equipped and more capable armed force led by a well-educated command. This is that process of "continuity in changes," of a sense that the times are different and concessions have to be made to the new relations within the federal scheme. At the same time, assessments are not rare in which the corps of generals is represented as a closed system of "keepers of the will," who supposedly do not feel the need for comprehensive changes and are holding back modernization of the country on behalf of an ideology which has lost its original use value. And then one hears assessments that more and more generals are becoming members of the central committees instead of "civilians" going into the ministry of the Armed Forces, that the military products industry enjoys "special benefits," that the Armed Forces are becoming exclusive instead of defense affairs going up openly for debate in Parliament, that the domestic political importance of the military system is growing, that the "military band" is playing marches....

It is that kind of matrix that compelled the generals to come out in the open with a kind of platform of their own in which they appeal to the mechanism: no more than the Constitution, but no less either! That is, in an analysis of their public statements one can find several support points which cannot be given up without, in their opinion, damaging definitively the character of the Armed Forces created in recent decades. Obviously, in a situation when there has been a certain breakup of the main goals of national security policy as seen by YPA leaders, and when political consensus among the republics has been lacking concerning this topic, there was no other choice but for the military men to come out in favor of reaffirmation of the Federation and the state, for preservation of the constitutional system, for a market economy and a more modern economy, for preservation of territorial integrity, for moderation of the ethnic disputes, and against the multiparty system and against destruction of the personality cult of Josip Broz Tito, against use of the Army as an arbiter—which does not imply avoiding participation in adoption of strategic political documents of the party and the state.

There are two ways in which possible models of Army behavior can work themselves out. One is the "Mediterranean model," already tested in Italy, Spain, and France, where there was a reaffirmation of the role of the state and at the same time the isolation of the political public from defense policy was broken (Petar Strpic: NASE TEME, No 5) and in which redefinition of the role of the Army was one of the essential prerequisites of domestic democratic development. This model presupposes "the Army in garrisons," whose task is to achieve

an appropriate force to deter and protect national interests against an external threat. The question is whether that formula would function under our conditions? The second model is a still more active role for the military under pressure of external factors and because of the need for the existence of "federal forces" within the political elite of Yugoslavia. Or, again, some third possibility!

Kadijevic knows for certain that the use of force is the Achilles heel of Marxist systems and—as writers have already said of him—he knows that the daily need of the human organism for iron is better satisfied with spinach than a tank. That is only theory. In practice, the military minister gets up every morning knowing that 200,000 soldiers are expecting to be fed both meals!

HUNGARY

SZOT, Hungarian People's Party Negotiate

Party Interest in SZOT Clarified

25000502B Budapest NEPSZAVA in Hungarian
13 Oct 89 pp 1, 5

[Article by Irene Szabo: "The Multiple Disadvantages of the Countryside May Be Reduced Only Through Joint Effort"]

[Text] Yesterday [12 Oct] the National Federation of Trade Unions [SZOT] Hotel at Benczur Street was the scene of yet another meeting. This time SZOT leaders met the president and representatives of the Hungarian People's Party, a small organization which, nevertheless, places emphasis on quality. As we learned at the press conference that followed the negotiations, this qualitative feature is tied to the names of Istvan Bibó, Laszlo Nemeth, Aron Tamasi, and Gyula Illyes—it represents their thought. The party's task is none other than to implement the "intellectual testament" of these persons.

Janos Marton conveyed the Hungarian People's Party's view when he said that the country's political situation is fluid, and no sober minded organization should have as its goal to sustain this situation for long. For this reason it is necessary to find allies in every possible field. They consider the problems of the Hungarian economy to be one such field. In their view, the economic issues are of no smaller caliber than the need to clarify the political situation. The rather popular philosophy which advocates that "the worse it gets, the better off we are" is regarded by the party as genocidal. The economic round-table negotiations must be continued and accelerated, and since SZOT leaders approach the issue of improving the economic conditions from this vantage point, the joint expert committee of the People's Party and of SZOT will soon begin its work.

SZOT Executive Secretary Sandor Nagy raised the question of whether the Hungarian People's Party would welcome a trade union movement linked to parties, or alternatively, one that is independent. The response was unequivocal. Only sovereign, independent trade unions will be able to win the members' confidence, because only in this way is it possible to protect interests.

As perceived by the People's Party, its relations with trade unions will materialize in committee discussions of specific issues. They regard the lifting of food price controls in January as one such issue, and the matter of animal breeding as another. And the irresponsible upward price spiraling policies of the government constitute a similar topic, which is unacceptable also because under these circumstances the high premium paid to business leaders based on the amount of revenues has no merit. These high premiums irritate the public as well as conceptions of morality.

They decided that in addition to specialized economic committees they will also establish a special committee on culture. This was recommended by SZOT Secretary Mrs Kosa, Magda Kovacs, because the party intends to organize its people's academies, but does not have the institutions needed for that purpose. On the other hand, trade unions have 200 cultural homes throughout the country. They would readily make those cultural homes available for the People's Party to realize its cultural objectives. They said that the multiple disadvantage of the countryside is not caused solely by voids in the protection of peasant interests, but also by blank spots in education and culture. The silent bells in village schools and the disintegration of families in villages have become a major national issue, even though today this matter is understated by many, according to Szilveszter Forgeteg.

At the press conference chaired by SZOT Spokesman Attila Balint, the Hungarian People's Party president was first to praise the meeting. He said that since party dictatorship had destroyed the agricultural stratum and robbed the Hungarian villages, the interests of peasants must be protected.

Responding to a question by a Hungarian Television reporter about whether the People's Party would throw a veil on the past and whether it already regards the trade union as an ally, Janos Marton replied by saying that no veil should be thrown on anything, in fact all veils should be lifted. The People's Party is looking forward to seeing the results of a self-examination conducted by trade unions, but the present tasks are very urgent, as for example the issue of lifting food price controls, and the major issue of a dramatic "meeting" of Hungarian families. How will the consumers relate to these matters? These are trade union concerns.

The NEPSZAVA reporter asked what a small party could do with a large trade union when each is operating in a different sphere of action. Janos Marton responded by saying that the evolution of village autonomy, and the formation of a national alliance of autonomous governmental bodies guided solely by the principle of independence from political parties, will obviously be tied with many strings to interest protection that is independent from political parties.

Joint Statement

25000502B Budapest NEPSZAVA in Hungarian
13 Oct 89 p 5

["Statement Concerning Negotiations Between the National Federation of Trade Unions and the Hungarian People's Party"]

[Text] On 12 October political negotiations between leaders of the National Federation of Trade Unions [SZOT] and the Hungarian People's Party began. Sandor Nagy, Mrs Kosa, Magda Kovacs, Laszlo Sandor, Tibor Czirmai, and Sandor Csintalan appeared on behalf of SZOT, while the MNP [Hungarian People's Party] was

represented by Janos Marton, Gyula Fabian, Szilveszter Forgeteg, and Laszlo Konya.

Considering the situation in which Hungarian society finds itself today, the SZOT and the MNP find it necessary for all responsible political and social forces to cooperate in the establishment of a modern Hungary. The two negotiating parties are fundamentally interested in seeing to it that the establishment of a new Hungary takes place under peaceful circumstances.

The MNP welcomes the fact that the trade union movement also condemns the decisionmaking mechanism and political practice which lead to the suppression of the populist movement's political endeavors in 1949 and in 1956.

The joint appearance of the two movements is represented by the values of a communal society which rests on national features. These features are: democracy, social solidarity, self-regulation, self-governance, and a joint interest in establishing local communities. Both parties attribute great significance to an agricultural and food economy, to the resolution of concerns in the countryside, and to the improvement of the situation of millions of people involved in these.

Trade union representatives stated that the trade union movement is interested not only in economic interest representation at the workplace. It is paying increasing attention to the resolution of everyday concerns.

The MNP and the SZOT believe that turning workplaces into places where political battles are waged should be avoided. Both negotiating parties agree that political and ideological control over productive work should cease. They established the fact that the time of trade unions being tied to a single party has expired, and that both negotiating parties feel that it is necessary to avoid a situation in which political parties divide the trade union movement.

The negotiating parties agreed that the changing of proprietary relations is one of the key issues of economic uplift. A joint special committee is established to further correlate the conceptions.

The negotiating parties regard an educational system capable of conveying the values of national culture as a fundamental condition for the establishment of a modern Hungary. The negotiating parties agree that human and moral values that have thus far been neglected shall fully prevail in formulating the future.

It was agreed that on several issues the views held by the trade unions and by the MNP are close to each other, and they agreed to regularly conduct expert consultations, and occasional leadership consultations in the future.

Economic Chamber Reorganization Principles Described

25000510 Budapest FIGYELO in Hungarian
19 Oct 89 p 10

[Article by Andras Gabor, chairman of the Hungarian Economic Chamber: "The Chamber's Organizational Renewal: A Multilevel Protection of Interests"]

[Text] Various professional groups, branches, and local chambers must enjoy substantially more independence than before. Only this kind of renewal will be able to protect the chamber's clout in the midst of today's economic and political changes, according to the chairman of the Hungarian Economic Chamber.

The changes taking place in the structure and political relations of the Hungarian economy, the evolution of a multiparty system, the renewal of the trade union movement, and the evolution of organizations that protect interests must not leave the organization and functioning of the Hungarian Economic Chamber untouched. Last February we made a decision to accomplish an organizational change, and we would like our membership to discuss and to accept our final perceptions at the general meeting next spring.

What is it that warrants change, and in what direction would it be appropriate to move? A market economy characterized by mixed forms of ownership—and by now, no one argues that we are building an economy like that—will obviously increase the size of our membership and will change its composition. At our initiative the Council of Ministers recently amended the law which specifies who may become a member of the chamber. Along with state enterprises, our membership now may include private entrepreneurs and mixed nationality enterprises, as well as foreign firms. In its present form, the chamber would not be able to effectively represent the interests of these groups.

The issue of whether all this demands an organizational change, or if a change in form would suffice, sparked lively debate at our board meeting in mid-September. Oddly enough, we were almost left to ourselves in the minority. We advocated that the chamber's structure be modernized as long as the realities of life gently point the chamber in the direction of change, but do not yet force it to change. After all, the establishment of the physicians' chamber is an accomplished fact, and it is well known that the agronomists are also planning to establish their own, independent chamber. At the same time, it is equally true that the Hungarian Economic Chamber commands great respect, and that it has its own international relations and appropriate information. Accordingly, these elements must be preserved.

The chamber's organizational renewal may be perceived by way of establishing a multilevel system for the protection of interests. The various professional groups, branches, and chambers which exist in theory must be assured of greater independence than before, so that they

may begin negotiations with the appropriate trade unions. And further, we must transfer certain functions previously exercised by the Budapest headquarters to local branches of the chamber and to local groups, because in the framework of the chamber's new form, these functions would clearly serve to slow down substantive work. I have in mind both political and administrative functions (such as the resolution of certain customs issues, the enforcement of media of exchange in the marketplace, etc.). In our perception then, in the future, the Hungarian Economic Chamber must function in the framework of a federated system. By this I mean that the chamber should be responsible, and should serve as an umbrella organization for professional groups, associations, and regional chambers. It should hold them together, but it should not inhibit them.

Quite naturally, decentralization of this kind raises a number of practical issues. One of the questions is whether as a result of such change our expenses will increase. They probably will, but at the same time we hope that our revenues will also increase. Will it not take a protracted time period before we manage to formulate unified chamber positions? In this regard, at present our organization is being attacked from two sides. According to the membership, by reason of haste we are sometimes forced to prepare staff comments in response to some governmental papers without opening up issues for debate before the board and the various branches. On the other hand, on occasion the government which seeks our comment accuses us of dragging our feet. We may effectively represent our members' interests if we are able to convey their views quickly and in a synthesized manner to our negotiating partner.

And this raises yet another question: Will the presently more than 200-member staff of the chamber be suitable to perform this streamlining task? For the time being it seems that the new tasks will demand a smaller, professionally better prepared, and more firm staff at headquarters, and the professional core of local chambers must be reinforced by all means. Unfortunately, it is a fact that the salaries of those who work for the chamber are not competitive with salaries that can be attained at enterprises. Even as compared to the government, the salaries paid by the chamber are at the levels paid to those who are not well off.

The new and old members of the chamber may rightfully assert the need that the chamber's board should also be activated. What in my view is a growing indifference within the board may be explained on the one hand by the fact that its members are quite busy with the production and management concerns of their own firms. At the same time it is also true that, generally speaking, in Hungary today the value of social work has decreased. Unfortunately, despite the chamber's clout, the fact of serving as a member of the board is not as high an honor as it was before. At least some do not feel that it is. And yet, complacency, the phenomenon of tiring out, cannot be explained by these factors only. It is also a fact that our board has many retired members. We are renewing

and reforming the chamber and, as part of that process, the board. We are doing so not because it is a fashionable thing to do. In order for the chamber to be legitimate (so that we may consistently pursue what we have committed ourselves to pursue: the formulation of a market mechanism) we must establish the basic principle that the members of the board must be active leaders. Along with these we may, of course, have honorary and sponsoring members, on whose advice we count.

In relation to the renewal of the organization and the bylaws, the question occurs whether membership in the chamber should remain voluntary, or if we should introduce mandatory membership along the patterns established by the West German and Austrian chambers. Although the momentary political and economic situation provides a clearly negative answer to the latter part of the question, it would be worth our while to give long-term consideration to the idea of obligatory membership. What supports this idea? In case of obligatory membership, laws would prescribe how many per mill of an enterprise's income should be paid to the chamber. Consequently, the chamber would be independent from its members in the sense that in the event that the chamber organization condemns a firm for some reason, that firm could not respond by leaving the chamber. On the other hand, it is also in the chamber's financial interest to support the development of its members. We must recognize, however, that in countries where membership in the chamber is mandatory, these organizations perform a number of functions which in Hungary are financed by the state and by the state budget. The Austrians, for instance, perform foreign representation through the chambers, and ministries do not have offices and representation abroad. The chambers of developed countries regularly train midlevel and upper-level management, and provide various publications and up-to-date information to their members.

It may be expected that paralleling an increasingly vigorous market economy, open competition among individual professional groups will increase and become more spectacular. Perhaps we will have to take positions with regard to an increasing number of ethical issues. Experience thus far clearly shows that business conduct cannot be influenced by laws and legal provisions only. The chamber may play an important role in establishing general standards of conduct, in terms of the positions it takes with regard to various disputed issues. In contrast to the practice pursued in the past, when individual and group interests were derived from collective interests, the future, uniform principles of the chamber will have to be moulded by starting out from the interests held by various professional groups.

The forgoing should make it apparent that the organizational changes we are aiming for will lead to fundamental changes in roles played. We need a chamber which adjusts itself better to the economic and political situation that may be seen in the country, a chamber that provides true interest representation, a chamber which enforces entrepreneurial interests. Built on professional,

branch, and local groups which are far more independent than they are today, we need a chamber which has a modern center and a modern board, and the character of a service provider.

Banking Profits Examined

25000513 Budapest FIGYELO in Hungarian
26 Oct 89 p 7

[Article by Denes Csongor: "Are Bank Profits Too High?"]

[Text] There is a growing, widespread view which holds that banks enjoy an unusually rosy financial situation. Business organizations say that banking profit levels substantially exceed those in the productive sphere. For this reason, business organizations believe that a reduction in the budget deficit could be offset—at least in part—by tapping funds held by financial institutions.

Quite naturally, those who voice these views judge banking profits from their respective points of view. But in this instance they fail to recognize that banking profits also play their own, indispensable role, meaning that banking profits also have their own functions, and perform certain tasks. The decisive issue is not whether banking profits are higher than the profits accrued by other actors in the economy. Instead, the question is whether the function of profits earned in other sectors of the economy are comparable to the needs satisfied by banking profits. Each branch of the economy has its own peculiar capital and capital accumulation needs.

If we start out from the idea that banks are enterprises which happen to perform functions which qualify as financial institutional tasks, we will surely find that the same economic rules apply to banks as to all other enterprises. They must make profits, and enough profits to recover their justified, necessary expenses from sales, and beyond recovering such expenses, to cover tax payments and the payment of dividends. And further, profits must be sufficiently high to increase assets by at least as much as is required by the increased demand for capital. One could accuse banks of being excessively profitable only if banking profits were to exceed levels justified by the above considerations in excessive proportions, or if their profits were to be derived through dishonorable means. (In this writing we will disregard the fact that, aside from a few exceptions, the state budget and enterprises which receive their share from the same banking profits they complain about are the stockholders of financial institutions.)

Risks

In examining one by one the components that make up justifiable banking profits we will find certain peculiar items, particularly in the area of "societally necessary expenses." That is, if we disregard the generally familiar material and wage expenses which must be managed sparingly, one cannot disregard expenses which appear

in individual financial institutions in a more concentrated form than in other enterprises. Of these the most significant are:

- risks involved in credit practices, and losses related to loans;
- exchange rate fluctuation risks; and, finally,
- the depreciation of money.

Lending risks may occur at any enterprise which delivers its merchandise or services to buyers in lieu of payment in any form other than cash. Every entrepreneur of this kind may establish risk reducing conditions for his customers, of course. An entrepreneur may reduce his risks by demanding advance payment, by obtaining information about the client's ability to pay, by requiring cosigners, or by using the cash against documents or letter of credit methods of payment. He also may establish a greater probability for the quick collection of accounts receivable by demanding that a note be signed. Several of these methods of payments transfer the risk inherent in productive capital to banking capital (bank guarantee). Banks accept such risks in lieu of fees and commissions on the one hand, and perform functions in the possession of appropriate information, on the other. Finally, banks themselves endeavor to minimize their risks and losses as a result of such transfers of risks by requiring "secondary obligations which secure contracts."

Despite these measures, however, financial institutions may incur losses on loans. Quite obviously, such losses made it necessary in certain places to legally mandate banks to accumulate risk funds, despite the fact that banks could account for such losses by charging losses directly against their balances, their reserve capital, or their capital stock. The obligation to accumulate a risk fund not only increases the security of those who lend money to the bank (depositors). Risk funds also serve as constant reminders that outstanding loans require attention, even if this seems natural to any entrepreneur engaged in the lending business, regardless of the obligation to accumulate risk funds.

Whether the existing risk funds held by banks are more or less at levels warranted, or if they exceed the volume of questionable, or perhaps already uncollectable loans, constitutes a practical issue. Responding to this question at this time is made more difficult by the fact that criteria for qualifying outstanding loans as questionable have not yet evolved, and because such criteria have seldom been described. Thus it would also be impossible to establish a percentage or per mill of the total volume outstanding loans that may be realistically charged as banking expenses, without inviting criticism. Doubtless, however, sooner or later Hungarian economic structural transformation will begin, and banks will be forced to write off an increasing number of notes received from bankrupt enterprises doomed to be liquidated. Supposedly, as a result of such write-offs, banks will have to suffer greater credit losses than other creditor enterprises. As a result of the credit monopoly in effect not too long ago, enterprises made fewer loans to their customers than banks. (The huge amount of accounts

receivable that evolved recently as a result of knowingly delivering goods to customers of whom it was known that they would not pay, will be judged differently.)

Fluctuating exchange rates present risks in both the productive sector and at financial institutions. Insofar as such losses are concerned, enterprises are able to protect themselves by entering into offsetting transactions, by taking out insurance, by establishing specific deadlines in sales agreements, etc. Once again in all likelihood financial institutions are at a greater risk as a result of exchange rate fluctuations than the productive sector. This is because a larger proportion of banking transactions are affected by the effects of changes in the foreign exchange rate, even though the banks' involvement in foreign exchange transactions has not fully evolved.

Money Losing Its Worth

A reduction in the value of any prevailing legal currency almost always constitutes an "expense" for financial institutions. Since money itself is also merchandise, its loss of value cannot be interpreted otherwise than money's relative loss of value compared to other goods. Accordingly, the exchange rate between money and goods deteriorates. But the recorded assets held by financial institutions exist almost exclusively in the form of receivables, while in the productive sector such assets exist overwhelmingly in the form of goods. When the value of money decreases, the monetary value of goods increases.

To offset this peculiar "expense" incurred by financial institutions which results in a depreciation of their assets, financial institutions may incorporate a "constant value"

clause in their loan contracts, or they may raise the fees charged for their services to the extent that an opportunity exists to balance the depreciation of their assets.

The latter method has become the accepted practice. Interest and other fees charged by financial institutions must be increased to such a degree that the income realized in the form of interest payments and fees offset the depreciation of their own assets, in addition to the increased cost of money financial institutions must pay to their financial sources. One should stress here that financial institutions cannot be satisfied with charging the same interest and fee increment they paid to their financial sources. They must increase the interest rate differential, because only by doing so can they increase their profits, which permits them at least to build a reserve fund which offsets the depreciation of their own assets. The constraint of charging an increased interest rate also appears to be a result of the fact that from their profits, the bulk of which (80 percent) is based on interest rate differentials, financial institutions must also pay taxes and dividends. Accordingly, if the value of money and bank assets declines by 10 percent, the difference between the interest rate paid and the interest rate charged must increase by more than 10 percent, considering the fact that this is the most important factor that increases income. This is because almost half of the incremental income is paid out in the form of profit taxes, and only the remainder may be used for dividend payments or for the accumulation of a reserve fund.

No analysis of banking profits may disregard this fact. Nevertheless, it appears that this matter did not occur to the banks either when in 1988 they distributed their profits. The following table proves this assumption:

Name of Bank	Reserve Accumulation From 1988 Profits in Millions of Forints	Capital Stock and Reserve Capital as of 31 December 1988 in Forints	Reserve Fund Accumulation as a Percentage of the Financial Institution's Own Capital
Hungarian Credit Bank, Inc.	1,675	16,403	10.2
National Central Credit Bank, Inc. [OKHB]	253	11,570	2.2
Budapest Bank, Inc.	504	7,556	6.5
Foreign Trade Bank, Inc.	172	9,673	1.77
Industry Bank, Inc.	22	1,054	2.1

The above table shows that the real value of capital owned by financial institutions decreased last year, because in terms of absolute amounts they increased their reserve assets to a smaller extent than they increased their capital stock, and by less than the value reduction suffered by reserve funds carried over from the previous year, a reduction which resulted from money having lost some of its value. This statement also holds true if we consider the depreciation of money in terms of producer prices (7 percent in 1988, and between 14 and 15 percent in 1989), and not in consumer prices (16 percent in 1988 and about 17 percent in 1989). (In 1988 producer prices were also affected by a price reduction mandated in early 1988.) Even though risk funds may also be regarded as assets owned by the banks, they must

be disregarded in the above analysis because only that portion of the risk fund may be regarded as the bank's own capital, which exceeds the amount of the bank's questionable receivables.

Even if both the banks and their shareholders disregarded the factors described above in the course of distributing their 1988 profits, the market did not. Despite relatively high dividends paid by banks, today's incomplete Hungarian "Exchange" quotes newly issued bank stock only at nominal value, even though the return on such stock is above average, while their real internal worth has decreased because the loss of value suffered by the bank's own stock was not offset by the accumulation of reserve funds.

Considering the above, the financial situation of banks is not that enviable. As far as the reserve capital of financial institutions is concerned, one should clearly see that such assets play a dual role in times of inflation. On the one hand, the loss of value suffered by the bank's own capital must be offset by an appropriate proportion of reserve capital and from risk funds that accumulated in excess of expected credit loss. On the other hand, reserve capital must be used to cover the expanding demand for capital faced by banks. Accordingly, one may not object to the profitability of banks, because reserve funds cannot be disregarded. This must also be kept in mind by the stockholders of banks when they distribute profits....

POLAND

Senator Paszynski Presents Economic Solution in Six Steps

90EP0077A Warsaw GAZETA BANKOWA in Polish
No 37, 11-17 Sep 89 pp 1, 8

[Interview with Senator Aleksander Paszynski, Minister, Land Use Management and Construction, by Dariusz Fikus: "Shock Therapy"; date and place not given]

[Text] [GAZETA BANKOWA] In your opinion, what does the government have to do to save its reputation? How much time does it need to demonstrate that it can cope with the situation?

[Paszynski] I feel that the situation requires the creation of a program of radical, resolved steps whereas the coalition government, by its very nature, will not be able to draw up such a program and that is why I have been in favor of a government of experts made up of professionals. What sort of program do I have in mind? In its first phase, I would like for this to be a short-term program of 3 to 4 months and in practical terms—until the end of the year. I call this program a rescue program preventing the caving in of the economy because that is how the current situation ought to be described. Therefore, this should be a program that would not introduce any new positive elements of overcoming the crisis but simply one that would save us from collapse. What sort of decisions must such a government make?

The first and foremost decision to be made is radical: to sever by means of a single administrative act the entire program of production investments with the exception perhaps of classic promarket or proexport ones. It is not only a question here of so-called central investments but also of enterprise investments financed from government preferential credit.

[GAZETA BANKOWA] Why do you place emphasis on these particular enterprise investments?

[Paszynski] Because, as we all know, several years ago, simply for reasons of defrauding, the government reclassified so-called central investments and called them enterprise investments, even though, they are not financed from enterprise funds but through bank credit.

The second decision to be made is the emphatic announcement (without implied meanings) that in this state of the economy, the country is in no condition to support the military program. What is of essence is to repeat, only on a broader scale, Gomulka's maneuver of 1956 and, therefore, the maximum use of the armaments industry's potential.

The third decision should be that of the immediate taking up of talks with creditors not on the basis of credit repayment deferral but of a moratorium.

[GAZETA BANKOWA] Thus, Poland would be the 21st country to simply stop repaying its debts?

[Paszynski] Yes. This would be a moratorium of 3 to 4 years.

The fourth decision concerns the issue of debts incurred in the Soviet Union which requires the renegotiation of economic agreements. I am thinking primarily of investments conducted in the USSR and not only there. Since 1989, these investments have been conducted on relatively reasonable terms. However, we are continuing a vast program of investments that clearly brings losses. These are investments based on Soviet cost calculations.

[GAZETA BANKOWA] I remember the famous building of pipelines in the USSR during the 1970's which made it necessary for us to purchase Western construction machinery.

[Paszynski] This move should take care of the issue of our more than 6 billion debt in the USSR. And here again we are dealing with repeating the operation of 1956, i. e. the coal agreement owing to which our debts for the building of Nowa Huta were amortized.

The fifth decision, which requires no preparation of any kind, is the program of selling that portion of the national wealth which is easy to sell and which does not require great legislative efforts. What I have in mind are building lots, the government farmland fund, living quarters, houses, stores, small enterprises and restaurants. This must give a boost to the budget.

The sixth decision is related to the integration of the administration to the maximum possible extent under these conditions. This is a set of direct decisions that should, first of all, check inflation; secondly, eliminate the budget deficit; and thirdly, create freedom of action for further maneuvers. I feel that the government, that will conduct such a program, should receive special powers from the parliament. This means that the parliament should control only the conformability of government activity with an outlined program. At the same time, and this is where I am stepping outside of the strictly economic sphere but today there are no strictly economic decisions since they are all related to politics, the parliament should officially recognize that it fulfills the role of a Constituent Assembly. Thus, this authorization given to the government to act within the economic sphere would enable the parliament to involve

itself in preparing the principles of the new economic, social and political order along with the new elections law, constitution and the entire package of legislation that make up this new order. I had presented such an overall proposal at the OKP [Citizens' Parliamentary Club] meeting. In my opinion, it is possible to obtain ratification by the parliament of the principles of the new order of the government system in a matter of 3 to 4 months with the aid of special work methodology. These two operations would be convergent in time, i.e. the initial effects of the rescue plan along with the outlining by the parliament of the principles of the new order. And it is on this basis that this same government, if it continues or perhaps a new one, should start developing a 2-year positive program of coming out of the crisis and of systems changes, that would already take into account general, strategic decisions accepted in the package of system reforms.

A schedule of putting into effects these decisions should also be worked out and by the middle of next year, the parliament could by means of a single act ratify the new constitution and elections law—the entire indispensable legislative package. What is of importance is to create such a critical mass of changes with a single act that would prevent a reversal and would, at the same time, release social support that would in turn accelerate the operation. This requires the renegotiation of the decisions made at the roundtable with regard to the most important stipulation: to shorten the period of achieving democracy from 4 to 2 years. At the same time, this should mean that after these 2 years, the president would resign and the parliament would be dissolved and new elections would be announced. All of this has to be enveloped in activity that would relieve public impatience and despite the fact that such a program mobilizes everyone to action, several spectacular decisions have yet to be made emphasizing that we are entering a new phase of development.

[GAZETA BANKOWA] Therefore, in your opinion, shock treatment is the most appropriate?

[Paszynski] Yes. What I have in mind primarily are such dramatic moves as the restructuring of the Radio and TV Committee. It should be subordinate to the parliament and not the government. Changes in the Radio Committee should entail the appearance of completely new

faces on television. Such an operation would constitute the validation of our efforts.

In summing up: the 3-month program should be traditionally one that restrains whereas the 2-year program—a radical one.

[GAZETA BANKOWA] Inasmuch as this restraining program is plain and clear so the 2-year program concentrates more on political and not economic activity.

[Paszynski] No. I have not mentioned everything yet. Generally speaking, this should be a program that would take into account adjustment recommendations made by the World Bank and the Monetary Fund. First of all, the process of the privatization of the economy must occur; secondly, the process of demonopolization; third, the process of genuine restructuring.

[GAZETA BANKOWA] And what do you foresee in terms of the protection of the zloty and currency?

[Paszynski] I am the least prepared in this field. I believe that by the end of the 2-year period, monetary reform should take place, i.e. the replacement of currency resulting from improvement of the economic situation.

[GAZETA BANKOWA] In the paper presented by Prof Jeffrey Sachs from Harvard, whom we heard in the Senate Committee for the National Economy, the issue of currency was treated rather oddly in the reform.

[Paszynski] Prof Sachs feels that in reality this currency is partly exchangeable already today and that it is enough to only expand this process. The weakness of this reasoning is in that the high rate of exchange of the dollar results from the game of supply and demand. There is not enough of these dollars and, therefore, they attract a high rate on the black market. However, there are none [black markets] left. Thus, I do not quite understand how it is possible to bring about a realistic rate.

I believe that in our 2-year program, we should also begin to solve two important problems in the functioning of the country: the issue of food supplies and either housing construction or communications systems. What matters here is to uphold a certain belief in that the program of self-sacrifices is promising so that the public would be willing to accept it. However, stopping regression is the fundamental issue.