


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Lizichev Speaks at Tajik Draft Conference

90UM4077B Dushanbe KOMMUNIST
TADZHIKISTANA in Russian 5 Apr 90 p 1

[Unattributed article: "What the Army Is to Be Tomorrow: A Conference of the Tajikistan Communist Party Central Committee"]

[Text] The Tajikistan Communist Party Central Committee held a conference on conscription of the young generation into the USSR Armed Forces. Military commissars of republic, oblast, city and rayon military commissariats, commanders and political workers of units of the Dushanbe garrison, secretaries of oblast, city and rayon party committees, VUZ rectors, executives of a number of ministries and departments and representatives of the mass media took part in the conference.

The conference opened with introductory remarks from Tajikistan Communist Party Central Committee Secretary K. M. Makhkamov.

Army General A. D. Lizichev, chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy, dwelled in detail in his speech on the tasks of the military commissariats and the party and soviet organs in this important campaign.

"We are living in a very complex period," he said. "Besides the motions that have been made in the direction of perestroyka, negative processes have also become widespread. A campaign to discredit the armed forces has been initiated. In this situation the military commissariats have taken the lead among healthy forces in the struggle. What our army is to be depends in many ways on their efforts. And in this situation," the general noted, "the republic's military commissariats prevailed: The spring and fall call-ups into the army were successful.

"The country's military commissariats are now seeking new methods of work, but there are also many unsolved problems as well, among which crime, drug addiction and the growing number of unemployed youth are especially troubling.

Here as well the military commissariats must display the best ever ability to win the minds and hearts of the young people, and work with foresight, rather than traveling in the baggage train of the ideological struggle.

We need to clearly explain that the military commissariats are the main binding link between the army and the people, and that this link must act faultlessly. Much depends here on the personality of the military commissar, and on his knowledge and competency.

Military-patriotic indoctrination should occupy a special place in this work. The activities of military commissariats should be tied in closely with local party, soviet and Komsomol organs.

The speakers at the conference included: I. Khalimov, first secretary of the Kurgan-Tyube Oblast Party Committee; Kh. I. Kasymov, first secretary of the Gissarskiy Rayon Party Committee; A. P. Vysochin, first secretary of Zheleznodorozhnyy Rayon Party Committee; V. V. Pripisnov, *rector of the Tajik Pedagogical Institute of Russian Language and Literature imeni A. S. Pushkin; R. Mamurov, director of the Dushanbestroy Trust; T. P. Karatygina, assistant editor of the newspaper KOMMUNIST TADZHIKISTANA; G. T. Tsyplukhin, second secretary of the Kulyab Oblast Party Committee; I. V. Fuzhenko, commander of the Turkestan Military District.

Then A. D. Lizichev answered numerous questions associated with conscription and service in the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union.

Members and candidate members of the Bureau of the Tajikistan Communist Party Central Committee G. G. Veselkov, G. V. Koshlakov, V. V. Petkel, Sh. D. Shabdolov and D. Kh. Karimov, and N. K. Dolgushkin, an official of the CPSU Central Committee apparatus, took part in the conference proceedings.

Impact of Nationalist Conflicts on Soviet Army Examined

90UM0423A Moscow KOMMUNIST
VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian
No 2, Jan 90 pp 42-49

[Article by Lt Col V. Gavrilov, KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL correspondent: "The Reason of the Sighted Against the Evil of the Blind..."]

[Text]

- * Salt does not heal the wounds...
- * Who benefits from driving a wedge
- * The "National Army" and its fighters
- * Reliance on informal leaders

Yerevan is a fairy tale city. Without the gift of poetry, it is difficult to describe its broad sunlit streets, where the bright green of dense edging rings every building, the fountains spill sprays of diamonds on polished granite slabs, and quaint bridges cross bottomless Razdanskiy Gorge. Quite recently the Armenians themselves were called the "sunny" people, for their inexhaustible friendliness, affability, and warm smiles. But, frankly speaking, in the few days that I was there I sensed that the troubles that befell the republic so suddenly greatly shook the traditional cheerfulness of the Armenians. I saw so many gloomy, alarmed faces in the half-kilometer long lines at gas stations, and at the empty shells of food stores and Soyuzpechat newsstands. But the most distressful impression remained from a meeting in the capital's Theater Square: fists furiously raised, glares, the threatening roar of the many-thousand strong crowd, which thirstily embraced the "preachings" of newly proclaimed

"prophets." As the political workers of a unit deployed in Yerevan explained to me, such meetings are being held on the square almost daily. The mass disturbances are ably heated up by nationalistic slogans, some of which are directed against the army.

As an aside, I note that today it is already obvious that the events in NKAO [Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast] erected a high wall of nationalist contradictions between the Armenians and the Azerbaijanis. Resorting to figurative language, they left bleeding wounds on the hearts of each of these peoples. The country's party and government, and all healthy-minded forces in our society, are making consistent efforts to localize the conflict and reconcile the quarreling sides, on the basis of a fair and objective resolution of contentious issues. A number of effective measures were outlined in connection with this in the USSR Supreme Soviet resolution, "On Measures to Normalize the Situation in Nagorno-Karabakh Oblast," approved at the end of November last year. Unfortunately, there are people both in Azerbaijan and Armenia who prefer to doctor these wounds in a very unique method, by pouring salt on them.

Even in the brief period of my trip to Armenia, I was able to see that calls for reason did not find a response in many of the leaders of the informal associations who were inclined toward extremism. Moreover, they shifted from loudly expressed wishes for all manner of calamities to befall neighboring Azerbaijan, to direct attempts to solve the problem of Nagorno-Karabakh "through the use of force." They are carrying out "brainwashing" of the population intensively and ably, in the most varied forms.

I recall a short talk with an elderly Armenian living on the outskirts of Yerevan. Having sat down in our vehicle and heard from her relative, a warrant officer, that I was from Moscow, she asked with sadness: "When will we have order?" I could only make a helpless gesture in response. But a second later she let fall with unconcealed ferocity: "Nagorny Karabakh is ours. You there in Moscow do not want to understand this. You are playing into the hands of Azerbaijan..."

Unfortunately, such conversations are being held everywhere in the republic today. Here is only one observation: Not one of the numerous Armenians with whom I spoke recalled the recent tragedy that befell their people—the earthquake. On all their lips was only the problem of NKAO. Such is the strength of the over-agitated national feelings, that they even "deafen" the pain from the loss of friends and relatives.

In the Caucasus there is an old, sinister-sounding saying: The friend of my enemies is my enemy. It is as though the representatives of the Karabakh committee, the organization "Armenian National Movement," and some others were "armed" with this, when they made up their minds to destroy the long benevolent attitude of the Armenians toward the army and military personnel. The most refined methods come into play: from hysterical

shouts at numerous assemblages that the military units in Nagorny-Karabakh are protecting Azerbaijani settlements, and throwing the Armenian ones to the will of fate, to open provocations.

A funeral meeting was held on Theater Square in Yerevan, the pretext for which was the death of Private A. Grigoryan, a military construction worker serving in one of the military districts. Representatives of the "Karabakh" committee, and relatives of the deceased spoke at the meeting.

Kh. Stamboltsyan, "Karabakh" committee (KK) member: "We send our children off to the army and receive coffins back. This is impermissible. If this is how it is, then we must not send our children to serve in the Soviet Army..."

S. Gevorkyan, KK member. "We will not send our children to serve in the army. I call upon all mothers whose children must be sent to serve in the army to send them to us to take part in a sitdown strike..."

Relative of the deceased. "He was killed because he was an Armenian. That was the only reason. He lay four days unconscious in the hospital, but no one paid attention to him. I appeal to mothers to let Amayak be the last victim, and not to send our children to serve in the Soviet Army..."

During the meeting a slogan was raised in the Armenian language: "One more murder in the Soviet Army."

But, as a matter of fact, the death of Private Grigoryan was related to a gross violation of safety measures at a construction site. The nationality of the deceased has nothing to do with the circumstances of his death. The persons involved in this tragic incident to one degree or another are under investigation at this time. Why did the leaders of the informal organizations have to exacerbate the already immeasurable grief of the relatives of the deceased soldier, and spread a deliberate lie? Their calculation was simple. It is enough merely to make a transparent allusion that the "age-old enemies of Armenia" were guilty in the death of the soldier, whom the unit command is "concealing," and rumors about the "deliberate" murder of an Armenian in the army will spread throughout the cities and the people, set emotions seething, and an avalanche of reproaches will rain down on the armed forces. If you look, these muddy waves are rolling even to the units located on the territory of the republic, and are planting turmoil in the soldiers' minds. And at the same time it also strengthens the authority of the "informals," as concerned about the honor and health of the nation. To nationalistic elements one of the more important tasks is to undermine confidence and respect toward the army, and drive a wedge between it and the Armenian people. They understand perfectly that, without having accomplished this, they will hardly be able to seriously destabilize the situation in the region. Instability, an orgy of passions and emotions, is the most nourishing environment for those who love "to fish in muddy water," and of political adventurers of various stripes.

However, it seems that I myself am beginning to display excessive emotion. The delicacy of the situation is such that far from all of the leaders of the informal groups are extremists or power-lovers. A considerable number of them are people who are painfully suffering for the fate of their homeland. This can be judged if only from the thoughts expressed by A. Manchuryan, Armenian SSR Supreme Soviet deputy, founder of the "Armenian National Movement" organization, during a meeting with correspondents of the Transcaucasus Military District newspaper. Here are excerpts from this discussion.

Correspondents' question. *Tell us what your movement is. What tasks do you pose for yourself, and by what means do you intend to reach what you have planned?*

A. M. *Our main tasks? Briefly a desire for rebirth of the Armenian people in the economic, political and cultural fields... I emphasize, so far, for today, we do not raise any question about leaving the USSR. But, to achieve common goals, common efforts are needed; i.e., the efforts of the ruling party, the official authorities in the center and the local areas, on the one hand, and of the people, the social and various informal organizations, on the other..."*

Correspondents' question. *"Tell us, what is your attitude toward military service, and toward the Soviet Army in general?"*

A. M. *"...The army has been placed in a position and forced to accomplish missions not inherent to it. In Tbilisi, for example. One must not interfere by force in solving political questions, even if the question concerns leaving the USSR. Every man is obligated to serve, to protect his people, his land, his country. This is his duty... In general, in principle, I believe that in an normal union or federation of equal republics, the idea of a national army is entirely acceptable..."*

It is hard to agree with the last conclusion. On the whole, I did not detect anything "seditious" in the thoughts of the AOD [Armenian National Movement] leader; they seemed sufficiently sensible. It is something else which disturbed me. Was it an accident that Ashot Manchuryan, in speaking with the correspondents, did not say a word about the methods and means of achieving his assigned goals? Is it perhaps because some of them are far from constitutional? Alas, in the arsenal of the informal associations (including the AOD), today predominate unsanctioned meetings, and dissemination of leaflets with texts that incite, rumors that agitate the population, etc. Concerning the army, extremistically inclined leaders of the informal associations have shifted from views held "in principle," to specific actions.

At the beginning of August 1989, in a building of the Yerevan School imeni Abovyan, a certain initiative group organized a list of those desiring to enter the "Armenian National Army" (ANA). On 2 and 3 August people gathered on Theater Square and actively discussed this question. On 4 August in the square, at the Sayat-Nova monument, approximately 40 young people gathered. Having lined up in a column, they moved toward the

center of the city, holding placards: "Armenians are Summoned to the Armenian National Army," and "We are Reviving the National Army." By the time the column reached Theater Square it had grown to 300 people. Here a meeting was held. The procedure for acceptance into the "army" turned out to be utterly simple. Some Zaven (he refused to tell his last name to representatives of the authorities) proclaimed the "birth of the national army." All those desiring to enter its ranks were on the spot handed the corresponding forms and the text of an oath.

A certain Seyranyan spoke on behalf of draft-age youth, telling about army "horrors," about instances that supposedly took place of infringing upon the rights of soldiers of Armenian nationality, about their "mass beatings and even killings."

As deplorable as it is, the facts indicate that today in the capital of Armenia, and in many other Armenian cities, representatives of a number of the informal groups are carrying out systematic and purposeful work calculated to evoke in the population a negative attitude toward military personnel, and in general toward the Armed Forces. They are ably playing on the national feelings of their people, and acting in an effective and highly refined manner. What do the local party and soviet organs do to counter them?

I spoke with V. Turyan, first secretary, CPSU rayon committee, Sovetskiy Rayon, Yerevan. I asked him to assess the current situation in the capital, to tell about how the attitudes of its residents are now taking shape toward the personnel of the subunits located on rayon territory, and how military-patriotic education is being organized.

V. Turyan *We have very good relationships with the personnel of the military collectives located in our rayon. We solve all problems that arise. After all, the army is part of the people, and it is inseparable from the people. And we must work based on this.*

The attitude of the population toward the army is most positive. Even the introduction of a curfew in Yerevan was received correctly by the people. Perhaps there were some isolated clashes, but conclusions and generalizations should not be drawn from this. One hears talks about a change in the attitude of the Armenian people toward the army for the worse. But this is incorrect. One can only speak about a certain cooling. Our people have always had a good attitude toward the army. Of course, considering the situation in the republic, we must intensify military-patriotic education. For example, our museum of the Great Patriotic War is working well in this plane. We watch how classes on initial military training are taking place in our schools. The lads study willingly.

Today talks are going on about forming national units. But, we have one army. It ensures the overall security of our state. It is simply necessary to take into account the national factor in the army.

"Our writer Zoriy Balayan has a book about the Karyaks. One of its main heroes says that it is necessary to say little about the bad. The bad has the ability to spread. I am not voting for not saying anything at all about our weak points. But, first show the good, so that peoples' hearts are filled with optimism..."

And I would be glad to be infected by the optimism of Vladimir Agvanovich, but there is too little basis for it. According to officers of the military collective located right on the territory of Sovetskiy Rayon, alienation of the local residents, especially the young people, and a hostile attitude toward military personnel are growing. Maj L. Semchenko, party organization secretary, stated, for example, that a total of 20 people came to see him on open door day. The majority of them were the military instructors at neighboring schools. Attempts to provoke officers and warrant officers toward open clashes are becoming more frequent. Lt Col N. Samusik twice had to withstand highly emotional attacks by Armenian women at the railroad station. Abusive shouts rang out from the crowd that surrounded them: "Get out of Armenia," "The Russians are in concert with the Azerbaijanis." Had it not been for the iron restraint of the officer, it is not known how all this would have ended. And what happened to Sr Lt S. Danelyan, who had previously fulfilled his international duty in Afghanistan, was even worse. On the street, in broad daylight, a drunken youth began to demand a weapon from him. Having been refused he began to fight the lieutenant. Only his knowledge of the Armenian language saved the senior lieutenant from reprisal from the crowd that gathered.

While some party and soviet leaders lull themselves by discourses about "the cooling of individual Armenians toward the army," extremists of all stripes, no longer satisfied with arousing the hostility of the local population toward the military, have established an activity around the units and subunits that is difficult even to name. Three or four people constantly circle around the checkpoints (I myself witnessed this). They enter into conversations with the guard detail, inquiring about how many Azerbaijanis serve there, and where the combat equipment and arms rooms are located. Officers are periodically asked questions such as: "If a crowd of 200 men rushed toward your unit, what would you do?" "When power is turned off in the camp, does the alarm system in the arms storerooms work or not?" I do not want to draw parallels, but the tragic events in the Fergana Valley were preceded by the same kind of "preparation" and "reconnaissance." And the local leaders there were also confident that everything would work out all by itself, and advised the militia and state security organs to display "more calmness and restraint." Wound up by their leaders, "inspired" by openly nationalistic slogans, groups of fighters, made up of Armenian youth, are switching from words to action. It was they who beat unmercifully Maj Gen A. Arutyunan, republic military commissar, who, during one of the breaks in a meeting of an emergency session of the Armenian SSR Supreme Soviet, attempted to enter into conversation with those gathered near the meeting hall.

Needless to say, there are numerous party and soviet workers in the republic who assess soberly and objectively enough the level of relationships that have taken place today between the population and the personnel of the units and subunits. They are not sitting with their arms folded, and consider it an important task to consolidate all the healthy forces in Armenia, and to strengthen contacts with the command of the military collectives, the political organs, and party organizations.

It is gratifying that the church in this case is serving as their ally. It is carrying out rather effective activity to hold back national passions, and is taking a completely loyal position toward the army. In their sermons, and in discussions with believers, Armenian clergymen tirelessly advocate patience, and emphasize that the armed forces made an invaluable contribution to eliminating the consequences of the earthquake. I understand that all this sounds somewhat out of the ordinary for us. But, let us remember that M. S. Gorbachev stated at the September 1989 CPSU Central Committee plenum: "We value the fact that the Orthodox, Muslim, and other churches are taking a position as peacemakers, and we hope that they will use their influence and will assist, to the best of their forces and capabilities, to prevent and overcome inter-ethnic conflicts."

We are living in an interesting time. Would one have ever thought that one would hear about friendly relations between a political officer and a major church figure? But, nevertheless, this is a fact. The deputy commander for political affairs of one of the military units, and the Supreme Patriarch of the Armenian Apostolic Church, Vazgen I, have long been acquainted. I recognize that it was namely due to this that I was able (apparently first among military journalists) to receive an audience with the head of the Armenian church. During our discussion he stated:

"The holy church has always preached friendship, love and mutual understanding; however, today the problem of Nagornyy Karabakh has become a stumbling block in the path of achieving mutual understanding between the Armenian and Azerbaijani peoples. Unfortunately, in the last decade the government of Azerbaijan has carried out a policy so that the fundamental rights of the Armenians living there were infringed upon. Let us say, for more than a thousand years Armenians have been living there and confessing their faith. And today there is not a single Armenian church in Nagornyy Karabakh. And, you see, in the past there were 15 monasteries and more than 160 churches. When I appealed to Baku, requesting permission to open just one church, I was refused.

"I was in Nagornyy Karabakh the last time in 1957—in Stepanakert. I cannot say that at that time the Armenians complained about oppression. Now the situation has changed. And everything that is taking place there in no way contributes to the development of the idea of internationalism.

"We hope that Moscow will do everything necessary to solve this problem. We also hope that the Leninist principle about the right of nations to self-determination will also be implemented. We believe that perestroika will help to bring up all peoples in the spirit of brotherhood and mutual understanding.

"As for the army, we are satisfied with it. It has done and is doing everything possible to prevent a bloody interethnic war. In the army we see a model of discipline and order. We support the most cordial relations with the command of the neighboring unit."

What came out of this meeting? First of all, the opinion that it is time for us to change our attitude toward the church. Our militant atheism, and continuous fears that faith interferes with a soldier performing his duty, is today not beneficial. Needless to say, when a youth arriving in his unit refuses to take the oath, or take weapon in hand, citing the prohibitions of his religion, then it is necessary to work with him and change his mind. However, why should we in Armenia not take the church as an ally in the struggle to strengthen ties with the local population, and against the enkindling of national discord? It should not be forgotten that its authority in the republic is uncommonly high.

Today the military collectives in Armenia can be compared with islands of relative calm in a tempestuous surrounding ocean of national passions. Judge for yourselves. Even at the height of events in Sumgait and NKAO, not a single clash based on nationalism between Armenian and Azerbaijani military personnel was reported. But, does this mean that the problem of uniting multinational military collectives, and strengthening the friendship between soldiers of different nationalities, is now on the back burner? I can say no with complete confidence. It remains at the center of attention of commanders, political workers, and party and Komsomol organizations. Moreover, the officers say frankly that the national composition of the unit or subunit must be taken into account not only when organizing political educational work, but also when organizing combat training, and internal and guard duty. The level of discipline and moral climate of the collective also depend on this.

We have already grown to understand that the time of unsubstantiated slogans and appeals has passed. In the army, as in the country in general, people now have a certain distrustful attitude toward them. Deeds and only deeds can convince and attract them. So, if we speak about modernizing the style of work of the political organ, and the party and Komsomol *aktiv*, and of uniting multinational military collectives, here there are still a mass of difficulties. The customary (and essentially stereotyped) ways of influencing the personnel are having less and less effect. The search for new ways is hampered by a lack of required knowledge and skills on the part of many officers, especially young officers, and by inadequate information on the part of command and political cadres on the processes taking place in various

regions of the country. This is true although the officers are perfectly well informed about what is taking place "beyond the gates" of their units. Obviously, this is also true concerning the Baltic region, Moldavia, and other "hot spots." The whole trouble is that, constantly sensing that the heightening of national contradictions and outbursts of national egoism among a certain part of the population of the republic has, frankly speaking, a marked influence on the moral and psychological climate in military collectives, they are often perplexed about how this should be countered. And there is also our elementary backwardness, awkwardness, and abundance of "guidance instructions," which, as before, come to the lower level political organs and party organizations.

Lt Col N. Khudenko, a worker in the political department of a large unit that I visited, did not conceal his concern:

"The most difficult thing in organizing the work of uniting the multinational military collectives is the constantly changing situation, both in the region, and right in our division. Let us take last year. Then up to 45 percent Azerbaijanis were serving in our subunits. You understand yourself what was taking place around us: meetings, demonstrations, and threats toward Azerbaijan. Although we worked fruitfully, and explained to the soldiers the true essence of the nationalistic slogans, which made it possible to avoid conflict situations. But, relations between the Armenian and Azerbaijani soldiers became rather cool. The problem? We had just started to think about how to solve it when the situation change: An anti-Armenian campaign developed in the republic, and up to 50 percent of the young replacements that came to us were from the republics of Central Asia. And a considerable number of them had passed through the school of the informal associations. It is no accident that representatives of AOD [Armenian National Movement] and "Karabakh" are now persistently seeking contact with the informal associations of the Central Asian Republics.

"Moreover, many of our commanders and political workers at the company and battalion level are still uninformed about the traditions and customs of, say, the Uzbeks, Tajiks, and Turkmen. It is namely among soldiers of these nationalities that we are confronted with such a phenomenon as the "khanate." This is, I believe, even somewhat more trenchant than the "dedovshchina" [harassment of junior conscripts by senior]. A soldier considers himself a head above his other countrymen, based on some familial and tribal traditions. It happens that a soldier, having served two months, forces a fellow soldier who is preparing to be discharged to work for him. The problems are most complex, and our weapons are stereotyped forms and methods, and slogans to set one's teeth on edge. We placed great hopes on the inter-ethnic relations groups. However, they are still operating much less effectively than one would hope."

Inter-ethnic relations groups currently exist in the party committees and party bureaus of each unit. When I became familiar with their composition, and looked into

the results of their activity, I could not help but think that their creation was received by many communist leaders as one more measure for a "check mark." Having included in this group sergeants and soldiers of different nationalities (as a rule, Komsomol activists), the commander and political worker began to wonder: What should we give them to do? Usually their instructions boiled down to one thing: to collect information about the moods of their fellow soldiers, and inform the command. Undoubtedly this is an important task. But, it was hardly worthwhile to create special groups just for this, and even to call them inter-ethnic relations groups. Some officers are already expressing doubt about the advisability of their existence, and are proposing alternate variants.

Political worker Maj V. Lyapin thinks that instead of these groups, soldiers' soviets could be created in the party committees in each company and battery. The accent should not be placed namely on "inter-ethnic." The soldiers themselves will choose the most authoritative fellow soldiers of various nationalities for these soviets, without additional instructions, and their influence will be immeasurably higher.

Let us not close our eyes to the fact that secret soldiers' "soviets" are operating in the subunits even today. Only frequently they express the interests only of soldiers in their last period of service, or some microgroup, which has come together on the basis of nationality. At times such soldiers' independent activity means just additional troubles for the officers. But, if the soldiers' soviets become fully official organs, elected, we emphasize democratically, commanders and political workers will be able to rely on him in their work of uniting the military collectives, combating non-regulation relationships, etc.

We are still giving too much importance to the "assortment" of political education measures. Let us try to make them "a bit more solid." What is there that is not set down in the plans: 10 day periods devoted to union republics, open door days, national cooking holidays, discussions in front of maps of the homeland. It would be incorrect to assert that they are not having any effect. All these measures carry a certain educational load. But, as one political worker expressed accurately, all of them are called upon more to divert the soldiers from national strife. They do not touch the deep processes taking place in the military collectives.

Today individual work with soldiers of various nationalities is taking on ever increasing importance. Officers, first of all, are striving to discover the informal leaders in the mass of soldiers, and establish close contact with them. Here is what political worker Lt Col O. Zapivakhin stated:

"It is no secret to any of us that the previous forms of international education of soldiers are hopelessly out of date. We will not solve this task by the quantity of measures, or even by their diversity.

"Today we are more and more striving to operate through the most authoritative and respected soldiers of various nationalities, the so called informal leaders. It is they who are capable of becoming the first assistants of the commanders. We had a Senior Sergeant V. Madaminov, Uzbek by nationality. He was an excellent specialist, and a CPSU candidate member. He enjoyed unqualified authority among his countrymen. Thanks to him we were always in the know about the moods of the Uzbek soldiers, and knew their needs and requests. And he gave us good help in crisis situations. One time a conflict arose between several Georgians and Uzbeks. Both are hot-blooded, emotional peoples, and they suddenly boiled over. We spoke with them, but feel that we merely suppressed the emotions. We consulted with Madaminov. He talked with his countrymen, and calmed them down. Thus it was possible to smooth over the conflict.

"Of course, there are various kinds of leaders. It is not easy to enter into contact with some of them. Private G. Sakhiashvili caused much bad blood in his day. He undoubtedly enjoyed authority among his Georgian countrymen, but the commanders became somber at the mere mention of his name. You see, the soldier was not without capabilities, but he was extremely undisciplined and unrestrained. For one misdeed he was even removed from the Komsomol. Evidently, in the end he would be the guest of the tribunal for his pranks. But, Maj Saguychenko, the battalion deputy commander for political affairs, was able to find the key to him. He learned that Georgians are especially proud of their military history. He talked at length with Sakhiashvili about Georgiy Saakadze and the Bagrationis. The soldier literally caught fire when talking about the Georgian national heroes. At the same time, Yuriy Viktorovich tried to plant in him the thought that for a man to serve poorly, especially a Georgian, is shameful. And what do you think? This had a stronger effect on Sakhiashvili than disciplinary punishments. He responded with trust to the trust of the political worker: He told about the frames of mind among his countrymen, and could have taken them in hand if necessary. At the end of his service he was again accepted into the Komsomol. Of course, this is a specific case. But, our work is made up of such specifics."

Reliance on positively inclined informal leaders has today become for unit and subunit communists an important form of work in international collectives. This is not my personal opinion. I repeat that this is what almost all of the political workers and party activists with whom I met believe. By the way, the members of the various "left" and "right" organizations active in the republic also understand well the role of soldier-leaders. There are instances when representatives of the informal associations have tried to establish who is the leader in the unit among the Georgians, the Balts, and the soldiers from the Central Asian republics, and to enter into contact with them.

I have not said anything about the ties of military collectives with the collectives of local plants, factories,

kolkhozes and sovkhoses. Such ties have been established. In Yerevan alone, more than 10 labor collectives are patrons of units and subunits. But, the overall situation in the region is little disposed today to the previous semi-official, semi-relaxed meetings. There are cases when officers and soldiers who have gone as guests to their patrons have to act in the role of justifying or explaining to the workers or kolkhoz peasants their attitude toward events in Sumgait and NKAO. This is very necessary, but the trouble is that they often turn out to be unprepared for such a mission. And frequently the "patrons" receive their words either with poorly concealed distrust, or frank hostility. Lt Col N. Khudenko told, for example, how workers initially attempted to interrupt his talk at the Zakavkazkabel Factory with whistling and shouts of protest. And only when he calmly began to explain to them that he had served in Armenia for many years, and considered it his second homeland, did they begin to listen. But, Khudenko is an experienced political worker, who has considerable experience in speaking before various audiences. And what happens to those who do not possess such experience?

Apparently, the time has come to conduct such meetings more decisively in the form of frank discussions, "round-table meetings," and debates, including on nationality problems. The large unit political organ is taking certain steps in this direction. Its workers conducted a "round table meeting" where a most important question was discussed: Is a national army in each union republic needed? Representatives of society and the local intelligentsia were present at the meeting. It was transmitted over television. The military personnel convincingly, in a well-argued manner, proved that there is simply no need to create such an army. However, the thought expressed there about forming an honor company or battalion in each republic, where the best representatives of the national youth would serve, received widespread approval.

Needless to say, there are no ready recipes for improving the international education of the soldiers, and strengthening ties of the units and subunits with the local population. As the saying goes, things can be seen more clearly on the ground. But one thing is clear. Here stagnation is especially intolerable. If we vacillate and wait until the situation becomes clear, they will seize the initiative from us. And it must not be given up!

Our unscheduled Yerevan - Moscow train stood for a long time at Spitak, which was wiped out almost to its foundation by the earthquake. With my neighbor in the compartment, an elderly Armenian officer, I walked among the ruins of the former streets, and almost immediately encountered a group of military construction workers, efficiently bustling about the ruins of some building. My neighbor observed them for some time, and then pronounced with sadness:

"Why do they not remember this when they throw dirt on the army? This wise man is truly correct: When reason sleeps, monsters are born."

And I had the thought: Nationalism today really is practically the most fearsome monster for us. But the sleep will end sooner or later. Let it not be a sad awakening.

NECESSARY POSTSCRIPT. On 10 January of this year the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium approved a resolution, "On the Non-Correspondence to the USSR Constitution of the Documents on Nagorny Karabakh Approved by the Armenian SSR Supreme Soviet on 1 December 1989 and 9 January 1990," and "On the Invalidity of a Number of Provisions of the Resolution by the Azerbaijan SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium of 4 December 1989, 'On Measures to Normalize the Situation in the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast, Azerbaijan SSR,'" and on 15 December, the edict, "On the Declaration of a State of Emergency in Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast and Certain Other Areas." Steps are being taken to resolve the national contradictions between Armenia and Azerbaijan, and to normalize the situation in these union republics. The voice of reason must turn out to be stronger than narrow nationalistic interests, and good sense must win out over emotions.

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Means of Improving Army-Society Relations Discussed

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[Round-table commentary by Col O. Belkov, doctor of philosophy, professor; Col A. Dremkov, candidate of philosophy, docent; Doctor of Philosophy F. Minyushev; Doctor of Philosophy B. Sapunov, professor; Lt Col A. Turchinov, candidate of philosophy: "The Army and the Society: If the Gilt is Removed"]

[Text] The slogan "The People And the Army Are One" has evoked no doubts in anyone for a long time. The soldiers come out of the people, the officers out of the people.... Extensive glasnost, however, has stripped the glitter of guilt off the slogan like a wind and revealed societal and army problems. We have learned about "dodgers," about desertion, about attacks on the prestige of the officer's profession, even about aggression toward the army and the men in uniform demonstrated by extremists in the Baltic area, the Transcaucasus and other areas of the nation.

Why is the army's prestige dropping? Is this advantageous to the society? How can the unity of the army and the people be strengthened? These are questions discussed at the latest meeting of the SOVETSKIY VOIN Round Table. Col O. Belkov, doctor of philosophy, professor; Col A. Dremkov, candidate of philosophy, docent; Doctor of Philosophy F. Minyushev; Doctor of Philosophy P. Sapunov, professor; and Lt Col A. Turchinov, candidate of philosophy, expressed their opinions.

[O. Belkov] One has to say, unfortunately, that there has recently been a certain exacerbation of relations between the society and the army. It did not exist previously, because it was not a subject of intense public debate. Anti-army statements have become almost the norm for many people. The Armed Forces are accused of all sorts of mortal sins, and the life of the troops is likened almost to the life of strict regimen corrective labor colonies.

Of what value, for example, are the slogans of picketers in Riga: "The Soviet Army is an army of criminals" and "Stalinism, militarism and dedovshchina are unvarying flaws of the Soviet Union." Or in Kishinev: "The Army—beyond the Dnestr! No one is threatening Moldavia." One is also deeply chagrined by the fact that many of the mass media have recently begun showering the reader, the viewer and the listener—with amazing persistence with purely negative material on the Armed Forces, which contains wholesale condemnation of the army and depicts the military in caricature. Certain youth publications are especially active in this.

Subjected to incompetent and offensive attacks, certain official representatives of the army have sometimes gone over to "stone-wall defense tactics," frequently losing their sense of moderation. In an attempt to defend the honor of the uniform no matter what, they embellish the reality of the military service and reject even warranted reproaches, as was done in the past. Unfortunately, the harmful practice of hushing up or evading the discussion of acute problems of military organizational development continues.

One has to state that the initiative in the revelation and the raising of vitally important problems of the army today and acute interest in its restructuring frequently come not from the military but from civilian people.

[A. Dremkov] Perhaps the Armed Forces should not be faulted for being in no hurry to engage in the turbulent and not always clear restructuring processes. Due to the army's specific organizational situation it is always the most conservative force in all nations of the world. Like essential ballast, however, healthy conservatism is required by every state ship, particularly in stormy weather, otherwise the ship will simply capsize.

Today we need not so much to fault the army—and doing this, believe me, is fairly easy—as to help it with a common effort to preserve its place in the society, one befitting the homeland's defenders.

If people, even those holding totally different viewpoints, demonstrate mutual patience and a preparedness for discussion, then public comparison or even the clashing of their views will be beneficial. It will help us to avoid one-sided assessment of the development of all events and help us correctly to choose the final solution to the most complex issues.

Unfortunately, we constantly encounter a disinclination to understand the person one is speaking with and a desire to impose exclusively one's own point of view,

encounter situations in which there is nothing behind the outwardly effective presentation of another, burning fact, as they say, but a desire to cause a scandal just for the sake of a scandal.

The need to retain the children's Zarnitsa games is being very noisily debated at the present time. It is stated in a hysterical tone that the Zarnitsa games cripple the young souls and even prepare potential killers. In the weekly SOBESEDNIK Mariya Lukina asks in perplexity: "Why do the children need semiautomatic weapons"? Script writer G. Oster answers her in great detail, naturally asserting that the semiautomatic weapons in the children's games are in conflict with the relaxation of tensions and harden the Pioneers. The discussion continues, now with the involvement of film director V. Fokin, who believes that the increase in the number of criminal offenses by teenagers is directly linked to the Zarnitsa games. A certain Dvoretzkiy literally screams: "I have experienced all of the charms of these military-patriotic activities on my own skin. In the first grade, in 1969, we were forced to walk in formation and howl the song of the 'young tankmen.' Even after 20 years, one still recalls with hatred the 'military-patriotic activities' in the first grade." In my opinion, the 42nd issue of SOBESEDNIK for 1989 simply redefined all permissible decency standards in its campaign against the Armed Forces. Komsomol journalists contrived to tar even Gen Gromov, who removed the Soviet units from Afghanistan. Sergey Romanovskiy tosses at Gromov the accusation that he promised his fightingmen early discharge into the reserve but in fact abandoned them to fate, while he himself rushed to Kiev to take over the military district. What follows from Romanovskiy's reasoning was that this "young general" was just about the main one to blame for the desertion of some fightingmen from the former 40th Army. As proof of the "terrible" situation of the former "Afghaners" on their native land, which is motivating them to desert, the journalist cites Pvt Lapitskiy: "There, in the mountains, we ate out of the same pot with the officers and did not salute them. And here we have this senseless regimentation...."

[B. Sapunov] The examples you cite are in fact depressing, but it is very difficult today to think of the Armed Forces unemotionally. The society has acknowledged the fallaciousness of the Stalinist model of barracks-and-camp socialism, and many critics of the army single out primarily its barracks aspect, seeing it as the visible embodiment of Stalinism.

The army has long since turned into a closed organism, and its social and spiritual ties with the society have grown weak or even been severed. It is absurd, of course, to demand "meeting-type glasnost" of the servicemen, but it is also inadmissible to ignore this social process today.

It seems to me that there are more than enough possibilities in the Armed Forces for participation in our civilian life. Take just the spiritual area, which does not require large material outlays but only a desire and organization.

We talk a lot about the continuity of the best combat traditions, but this talk is frequently abstract and does not develop into specific action.

Take just the military burials, for example. They are certainly not in proper order everywhere, after all. And who, if not the military, should assume responsibility for preserving them? The Great Patriotic War ended 45 years ago, but, to our great shame, the remains of thousands and thousands of Soviet fightingmen have still not been buried. Devotees search for and bury them, but the Armed Forces participates in this noble work only occasionally. I believe, however, that the Ministry of Defense should totally take over this work and immediately find and bury the remains of all heroes of the last war with military honors.

Right now there is a lot of discussion about the fate of the Preobrazhenskiy Monastery in Moscow and the old military cemetery located there, but once again the army community is not heard from.

Speaking of the continuity of the best traditions, one should not forget about the old Russian military etiquette whereby the general addressed the warrant officer by name and patronymic, when the officer was both the soul and the embellishment of any society, undeviatingly demonstrating a high level of culture and sharpness. For a long time we remembered only the "discipline of the rod" and the alleged ever present beatings, forgetting about all that was good. And today we see officers running around town carrying string shopping bags. And the sloppily dressed soldier performing some maintenance chore or sweeping a street has become almost a symbol of the modern army.

[A. Turchinov] It would be difficult not to agree with you, but it seems to me that the image of the soldier with the broom has been depicted out of proportion by the mass media, while the image of the fightingmen performing extremely difficult duty under the most extreme conditions has somehow inconspicuously moved into the background. It would be naive to think that our opponents in the world have begun seriously considering the man with the broom and not the man with the gun, figuratively speaking. And we have to attribute the fact that we have achieved certain agreements with the USA and NATO to the real fightingmen and not those who recall with hatred the song about tankmen.

Unfortunately, the extremely difficult work involved in military service for the homeland is practically not reflected in movies, in the literature or in stage productions. On the contrary, nonregulation relations and the so-called "dedovshchina" are greatly relished, and the image of the beast-like soldier with an entrenching tool continues to be puffed up. Without a tinge of embarrassment poet Yevtushenko lumps together SS troops and fightingmen in the internal troop units, and compares the people who died in the well-known Tbilisi events to those destroyed by the vengeful fascist forces. I refer to the poem "The Drobitskiye Apple Trees," which he

repeatedly read during his pre-election appearances. Finally, we have the cover of an OGONEK magazine which depicts an elderly man in the uniform of a colonel of the Soviet Army with the words "Stalin is with them!" written over his face.

It seems that while working hard to destroy the image of an external enemy, certain circles are creating the image of a perfectly specific internal enemy. Naturally, all of this is not enhancing the army's prestige.

[F. Minyushev] It is rather that such articles do not enhance the prestige of those who tolerate them. I am fairly familiar with the attitudes of the students and I can say with certainty that the military service itself does not turn off the young people. On the contrary, it continues to draw them. Many of my students would willingly take an intensive course of real military training, but no one wants to lose two years, and the years of service are perceived today as a loss. It is apparently not so much the image of the fightingmen with a broom as it is the reality of the broom which drives the young people away from the army.

The age of 18 or 20 years is a very passionate and romantic one. During those years the youth respond eagerly to any noble initiative. The peak of their intellectual understanding of the world occurs during that period. The military service must therefore evoke and stimulate intellectual, cognitive interest. And if we have cases of out-and-out evasion of the military service, is this not a result of negative attitudes and changing values brought about, among other things, by the endless removal of servicemen for all kinds of housekeeping tasks?

It sounds good to say that our army is always there where things are difficult, but is this its purpose? Do the departments not equate the army subunits to a universal fire fighting team prepared to cover all of their failures? When there is a natural disaster, the soldiers are put to work. If there is an accident on the railway, once again the soldiers are used. When the harvest needs to be gathered or rail cars unloaded, again the army's help seems to be the most natural thing. I think that we should not always be led by the departments and local authorities, covering up their inaction with the heroic labor of enlisted men and officers.

Of course, one could expect a change in the attitude of the mass media toward the army to one more benevolent, but we can also fight for our own prestige. The highest army leadership must itself do everything possible to make the youth eager to serve and not look for any kind of an excuse to avoid serving. Everything is important: well-conceived pre-draft training, a colorful ceremony for induction and discharge into the reserve. And military etiquette must be undeviatingly observed so that degrading human dignity is out of the question.

[A. Turchinov] It seems to me that incentives are needed not just for the enlisted men but for the officers as well. Their labor is evaluated fairly rigidly. They have the rank

and the position, but the position of company commander in various arms of the service, in various regions, in peacetime conditions and in a situation of constant combat readiness requires totally different skills and outlays of energy for achieving the same results. They are evaluated practically the same everywhere with respect to pay, however. The time spent on details and alert duty is not taken into account. We therefore have the situation in which members, let us say, of military administrative organizations or strictly rear-service units frequently receive more pay than officers who are constantly at a high level of nervous tension. And it is totally absurd that the commander of a nuclear-powered submarine capable of incinerating half the world is paid less than what is earned by a Sovtransavto driver, not to speak of a kebab vendor.

To return to the first-term servicemen, there are many reserves here. It seems to me that a suggestion expressed in a number of letters to the editors of SOVETSKIY VOIN about making the service directly dependent upon the zeal exhibited and the desire to master a military specialty deserves consideration. If one has mastered his occupation and passed the exams, discharge him into the reserve. If not, let him serve two or perhaps even three years.

We should also probably not reject out of hand the suggestion that they be permitted to choose their station and troop arm. One should not think that all of the youth will want to remain close to home. Many of them will probably want to test themselves under extreme conditions and not sit out the two years in a "hot house." Furthermore, where the soldier serves absolutely must be taken into account for calculating his length of service. A year of service in the Polar region, in the submarine fleet or the Strategic Missile Troops, for example, could perfectly well be counted as two or even three years of work and entered as such in the work record.

[A. Dremkov] The matter of providing incentives for military service is an important one and needs to be very seriously considered, taking into account the processes presently occurring in the society. In general, I support many of the suggestions for improving the material situation of our army. I cannot agree, however, with the idea of making the soldier's service term directly dependent upon his mastery of his occupation. In this case the Armed Forces will voluntarily discharge the most competent and conscientious soldiers, leaving those who are either lazy or simply have no wish to master the complex equipment or to serve honorably.

Look at the recent case of the simultaneous discharge into the reserve of all full-time students drafted into the army. At first glance it did not seem that the combat readiness had been undermined. There was no war breathing in our face, so that nothing terrible occurred or would occur. Was this the case?

The group of draftees today is very complex, although many of them continue to see the army through rose-colored glasses, regarding it as a universal school of life capable of rectifying all educational negligence. Naturally, the young people who had distinguished themselves with their overall culture and developed intellect and who have specific goals in life were good assistants to the commanders. The "educated" stratum of the soldiers, although a very thin one, substantially smoothed out many of the rough spots in army life. And then, in one fell swoop, this "stratum" was removed. Did it become easier for the commanders? No! Was it easier for the soldiers who remained in the service? All the more, no! Did the VUZs breathe a sigh of relief because of the sudden influx of students? Hardly....

Many conflicts immediately arose in the forces. There were even light-hearted calls for a return to the original name of our Armed Forces, the RKKA (Workers' and Peasants' Red Army). We could in fact end up with only workers and peasants left in the army.

[A. Turchinov] One recalls the subject of "Before and After Midnight." It was about the Israeli army. This perfectly idyllic subject has former Soviet citizens now serving in Palestinian territory occupied by Israel. Both the atmosphere in the army and the overall mood of the soldiers were presented with such love as though they were not a warring army but a fellowship of some sort of philanthropists. Particularly impressive was the image of the refined soldier-and-intellectual playing a sad melody on the violin. I must admit that I had not seen the image of the Soviet soldier depicted with such sympathy on the television screen in a very long time.

This is perhaps why the people's deputies got the students discharged as rapidly as possible. After all, they also read about more negative things and see more of them on television, while they are not shown the bright side.

[O. Belkov] We return once again to the mass media. This is probably only natural. They play an extremely important role today, after all. It is even felt that the world is dominated by him who possesses information and the means of delivering it, if I may put it that way.

The "inordinate appetites" of the military and the fact that defense outlays are a heavy burden on the national economy and should be limited have repeatedly been raised.

The outlays are indeed considerable, but we know that the standard of living of officers and their families is certainly not a high one. It is probably even below the national average. The officer's wife frequently has no possibility of working and has to live in private apartments. And one or two moves, as they used to say, are the equivalent of a fire and are not made up by any kind of incentive pay.

There is a lot of talk about economic independence. Once again we have a paradox. An individual military

unit is ordinarily called a housekeeping entity. This goes back to wartime. At the same time, the commander of this "housekeeping entity" is in no way its boss. He is unable to spend even a kopeck at his own discretion out of the meager regimental budget and is frequently forced to send soldiers to perform housekeeping chores in exchange for the materials necessary for keeping the barracks repaired or equipping the training classrooms.

The restructuring in the army should be started not with reductions alone, but also with the redistribution of items in the military budget and the allocation of more funds for the social and living area and for housing construction. Finally, we need to give considerably greater financial independence to the commanders of the military subunits, beginning at the company level. There might then be greater opportunity for taking part in those activities about which we spoke at the beginning of our discussion: restoring military monuments, supporting certain public military-patriotic movements and so forth.

[A. Turchinov] And this needs to be done immediately. The soldier's pay is too incommensurate with his work. This is why the young officers are eager to get into cooperatives. Around 200 requests for early discharge into the reserve have been submitted in the Leningrad Military District, and more than 600 officers in the Baltic Fleet are trying to get an early discharge.

[F. Minyushev] It seems to me that we are focusing too much on the economic aspect. We cannot ignore the fact that living conditions shape attitudes, of course, but we must also not take that philosophical premise too literally, reducing everything to the "sausage problem," as Yevtushenko did in the sadly well-known "Afghan Ant."

It has always been the case that the state official serves for money and career, while the officer serves for honor. We frequently forget about the officer's honor. We know the aphorism ascribed to Napoleon that "He who does not respect his own army will feed another." Once again, respect is foremost. It is precisely respect for the Armed Forces which should imbue the thoughts of all of the nation's people, regardless of their position or their ethnic origin. Only then will all the army's urgent problems be resolved in the most natural manner: those pertaining to material support, social protection and even the combat training.

[B. Sapunov] Respect for the homeland's defenders is perhaps the key issue in our discussion. This is where the demand that we begin the restructuring with ourselves is most applicable. If the military do not respect themselves, it is naive to expect respect from outside.

We must urgently revise the training programs at the military educational institutions for this purpose. We need to devote far greater attention to the general education subjects, which develop overall culture, and we need to accustom the future officers undeviatingly to observe military etiquette while they are still cadets. It is

time to establish a course on officer etiquette in the training programs for this purpose.

The army should stop blocking itself off from the society with a solid wall. We have the right to suggest that the soldiers' barracks and the seamen's quarters be open to representatives of the workers, that the officer or enlisted man should "feel at home" in the workers' shop, the classroom at school or in an unofficial organization, that the officers' club or regimental club should become the center of cultural life, particularly at small posts.

Finally, the subject of the harmful practice of enlisting fightingmen to perform national economic jobs is an urgent one. Furthermore, I believe that we should basically reject military construction detachments as a component of the Armed Forces. If the society needs such a work force, it should create the latter not by means of the army but as alternative service.

Most of the people regard the army with respect. We need simply to bolster this respect with real deeds and not limit ourselves to calls for respect for the army, which ordinarily come only from the one side.

[F. Minyushev] Indeed, the well-known writer Chingiz Aitmatov, addressing American youth studying at a military academy, wrote the following: "You are preparing yourselves for military service, for a military career. I wish you success in the training and in the service. I will honestly say, however, that I am not an enthusiast of military affairs. Despite this, however, I have paternal sympathy for you.... It is my understanding that you are preparing to become military personnel not in order to fight but in order to prevent war." If the American officer so needs the paternal sympathies of a Soviet writer and people's deputy, they are no less essential to the Soviet officer and enlisted man.

And our government should be primarily the one to demonstrate paternal concern. The Soviet Army can have no other "sponsors." Unfortunately, however, it appears that the people's deputies are concerned about all problems on earth except the problems of those who were quite recently proudly referred to as loyal sons of the people but almost have people spitting at them today....

[O. Belkov] We have been able to mention and discuss only part of the problems pertaining to relations between the army and the society. The restructuring has not touched many aspects of the Soviet society, including the army and navy. We would like to avoid those perverted forms which this complex process frequently takes, of course.

And no matter what organizational forms the restructuring of our Armed Forces takes, it must be creative and not destructive. It must contribute to the strengthening of the state's defense capability and not to its weakening.

As we conclude our discussion, I would like to underscore the fact that the Soviet Army is a part of the people, that it is inseparably linked with them, feels their troubles and joys and shares their concerns. Our children, brothers and fathers serve in it. Do we really have the right to treat them with contempt and mockery? Do we have the right to subject them to public insults? Do we actually have the right to ignore the army's needs?

Our army has always been prepared to protect the people. More than once it has demonstrated the heroism of its fightingmen also in peacetime and been there to help at the most difficult, sometimes fateful moments. It is itself in need of protection today, in need of our common help and concern.

We would like to hope that our discussion will help people to take a closer and calmer look at the army's problems and that it will be continued by the magazine's readers.

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First Deputy Chief, Cadres on Protectionism' in Officer Corps

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[Interview with Col Gen Vitaliy Fedorovich Arapov, first deputy chief of USSR Ministry of Defense Main Personnel Directorate, by *KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL* Chief Editor Maj Gen Nikolay Aleksandrovich Koshelev; date and place not specified: "Protectionism: 'Apparition' or Reality?"]

[Text] **Protectionism... This ugly social phenomenon struck deep roots in our state in the times of stagnation, and of course it could not help but penetrate into the Army and Navy environment, but to what extent? Some assert that protectionism in the Armed Forces has turned into a system. Is that so, and can a reliable barrier be placed in its path? Major General N. Koshelev, chief editor of the journal *KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL*, discusses this with First Deputy Chief of the USSR Ministry of Defense Main Personnel Directorate Colonel General Vitaliy Fedorovich Arapov.¹**

[Koshelev] Vitaliy Fedorovich, inasmuch as our conversation will be devoted to protectionism, I would like to begin it with a reminder that S. I. Ozhegov's "Tolkovyy slovar russkogo yazyka" [Defining Dictionary of the Russian Language] interprets this concept as selection of personnel for service based not on job criteria, but on acquaintanceship. Judging from the editorial mail, a considerable number of servicemen believe that there are many instances of protectionism in Armed Forces personnel policy. Moreover, the thought is expressed that protectionism has become established as a system. What is your opinion on this score?

[Arapov] I believe that statement of the question is utterly incorrect. Let us think: Is it a legitimate statement that protectionism in the Armed Forces has taken shape and exists as a system and that the Army and Navy allegedly are "hopelessly wallowing in it"? Lately, I will note, some of the mass media have been repeating this with enviable determination. Well, now, if we are to believe that statement is legitimate, then it should also be admitted that there is no place to go, forward or backward, as they say, for a "simple" Soviet officer who does not have the "necessary" acquaintances and ties. But how does everything stand in fact? In reality the absolute majority of our officers receive the next positions, the next military ranks, and fully deserved awards of the Motherland for their difficult work in good time, although assignment errors also are known to happen.

By the way, I will speak about this a bit later, but now I would like to declare very expressly that we are fighting a tough, uncompromising struggle at all levels against instances of protectionism. It obviously could be no other way, for we are heading toward a rule-of-law state. And questions of social fairness are becoming the priority today, including in the official activities of our officer corps. Everything here must be placed on a firm legal foundation and be decided not on the basis of personal attachment, friendly likings and blood ties or out of selfish motives, but exclusively and solely on the basis of the interests of service.

If you are worthy, receive in full, as the saying goes—in the good meaning of the word, of course—so that honor also comes according to merits and fairness. We preach this principle in personnel entities and we strive to implement it more fully. And I think I will not exaggerate when I say that this approach corresponds to the spirit and tasks of perestroika in the Armed Forces and to taking them to new qualitative parameters.

[Koshelev] Probably one should take a look at the phenomenon of protectionism retrospectively, so to speak, for it has its historical roots. It is not by chance that examples often are encountered in memoirs, military-historical literature and works of fiction created even several centuries ago of how a particular officer advanced quickly up the career ladder thanks to blood or other ties and acquaintanceships until he received the longed-for position at the "court." And how are things today? For some reason we have become accustomed to believe that negative phenomena in our society and in the Army, including the Navy, are vestiges of the bourgeois past and that protectionism allegedly is the very same kind of vestige.

[Arapov] I believe that it is also not quite justified to draw any kind of analogies with the history of the Russian state, let alone with what occurred several centuries ago, and here is why. At that time protectionism actually existed in its classical form, as the saying goes, as a system. And I believe that everyone is quite familiar with this from our literature. Take for example the main character of Aleksandr Sergeyevich

Pushkin's story of Petr Grinev and other characters who had real prototypes. At that time there were more than enough such people, but we also must not forget something else: the situation at that time also corresponded.

Let us say that an offspring appeared in some noble family. If they desired, the parents could immediately "register" him in a particular regiment conforming to their position in society for "performance" of duty. The offspring thus grew up under papa and mama's wing, and his grades and ranks grew punctually together with him, often achieving fair magnitudes by the time of the "child's" immediate service. And, I will note, that state of affairs was not the exception, but the rule, although the look of the Russian Army was determined not by such parvenus at all, but by really gifted, talented officers.

I will refer to examples. General N. Rayevskiy, a hero of the Patriotic War of 1812, began his military career very early by present yardsticks. In 1786 Nikolay Nikolayevich already was a guards warrant officer at age 15. In just six years he was promoted to colonel, and two years later he became commander of the famed Nizhegorodskoy Dragoon Regiment, billeted in the Caucasus far from capital garrisons. The hero-general's sons Aleksandr and Nikolay served in the Army just as honorably and conscientiously.

In his time Adjutant General Prince G. Potemkin appraised the true worth of the uncommon qualities of Officer V. Dokhturov, then still a young man. Of course, the high protector gave all kinds of help to his protégé in career advancement, but the fact is that Dokhturov also justified with interest the hopes placed on him, as the saying goes.

And many such examples can be cited. Well, one asks, is this protectionism? If it is, then with a plus sign. So there was much that was positive even in the Russian Army, about which I believe we must speak at the top of our voices today. Well, with respect to vestiges of the bourgeois past, in my view this phrase is used to justify our shortcomings, writing them off to the account of past generations.

But let us return to today. Facts of protectionism or attempts at protectionism which are encountered chiefly involve omissions in personnel policy of commanders, officers in charge, political entities, party and Komsomol organizations, and personnel officials, for it is impossible not to see that even a higher position or the prospects of receiving a higher rank cannot lure a particular officer beyond the limits, let us say, of such cities as Moscow, Kiev and Leningrad. And on the other hand, is the desire of that group of officers who have been serving somewhere in the interior to get a job in more favorable places in time really not justified? There is nothing bad here, I believe. Therefore everything must be according to fairness. Strictly speaking, that is what we in the Main Personnel Directorate try to do. Our principle today is that if an officer has served somewhere

beyond the Ural Range he also should serve in the western part of our country and in groups of forces, and vice versa.

I also see nothing bad in the fact that commanders, political entities, party and Komsomol organizations, and personnel entities help good, promising officers advance in service. At this point I will permit myself a small digression. By the way, Nikolay Aleksandrovich, have you had occasion to read the sketch "Schastlivyye" [The Lucky Ones] by Anatoliy Agronovskiy?

[Koshelev] Isn't that the one about a certain talented aircraft designer?

[Arapov] Correct, about Aleksey Minayev. His abilities showed up back in his school years. People noticed the young boy and began to support him. Here is what the author of the sketch writes about this: "All these years powerful adults carefully kept an eye on him and on his life as if passing the baton, but the lad's life did not become easier for this. They got him permission to take exams as an external student, but he himself prepared for the exams. They helped him get a job, but he himself had to work simultaneously with studies. He did everything himself. The help, the main help, consisted of people heaping an enormous burden on his shoulders. This was very difficult, but now in looking back on the path covered by this person, you see that a better school could not have been conceived for him."

And again I ask the question: So is this protectionism? Or is it an example of a totally sensible, state approach to the development of an outstanding personality? Obviously it is again the latter. Strictly speaking, something similar also often occurs in life. Not long ago, for example, Captain 3rd Rank G. Frunza was appointed to the position of commander of the missile cruiser "Marshal Ustinov." What do you think? Did the officers in charge who recommended him to such a responsible position err in this young officer? No. The captain 3rd rank proved by his actions that they had not given him a promotion in position by chance. For example, during the visit of Soviet warships to the United States, the art of handling the combatant ship demonstrated by Frunza produced a great impression even on Americans who were not accustomed to be especially surprised.

Similar examples also are not isolated in our life today. Any officer as a rule is evaluated and advances in service only in accordance with the entire set of qualities—political, moral and job—needed for this. Well, every person needs help.

[Koshelev] And now, Vitaliy Fedorovich, I would like to touch on the question of dynasties; military, naturally. I believe it is no secret to anyone that they have existed since olden days. There are hundreds in our Armed Forces, but for some reason the opinion has become established that the appearance of a serviceman's son in his father's footsteps is the result of this same protectionism. And try to prove that often a particular father did not even lift a finger "for the sake of his own child."

Of course, if papa cleared the way for an offspring into military school or the academy or to a higher position by his ties and by hook or crook, this is immoral and illegal. But the fact is that there are many such sons who honestly make a career by dint of their own hard toil, as the saying goes. But it happens that they are included in the category of "sons with a 'paw'" ["paw" meaning "protector"] and "pozvonkovyye" [meaning people who get somewhere because of a telephone call ("po zvonku") from higher up]. What is to be done here? What position do personnel entities take now?

[Arapov] In my view, this is a very interesting and important question. Yes, military dynasties have very ancient roots. Such dynasties were highly esteemed in Russia, for example. Why? Well, because people saw in them the flower and pride of the nation, bearers of the spirit and best traditions of Russian officers. It was believed that the appearance of a son in his father's footsteps was the result above all of good upbringing in the family, upbringing in a spirit of patriotism and allegiance to one's homeland. It stands to reason that such a thing was encouraged in every way, although it had its reverse side—it threatened to turn the officer corps into a closed caste isolated from the people. But when armies became massive, such a threat disappeared of itself.

And what is seen in our country today? I will say frankly that one sees a certain skew in people's awareness and attitude both toward the Armed Forces as a whole as well as toward military dynasties in particular. Again I will emphasize, it has occurred not without the influence of a certain portion of the civilian mass media. For some reason people have begun to look suspiciously at the son of a general if the son followed in his father's footsteps: now, allegedly, he will advance undeservedly and "make a career with the help of a parent." Prejudice thus is apparent: clear and I would even say to some extent tendentious prejudice, for we do not find anything reprehensible in the fact that, for example, there are dynasties of workers and physicians, farmers and scientists, teachers and actors in the country. The important thing in the final account is not who you have become, but how you did it and what you have become.

[Koshelev] Excuse me for interrupting your answer, but I would like to quote an excerpt from a letter which came to the editors recently from Lieutenant Colonel V. Khyunpenen in the Turkestan Military District. Here is what this officer wrote in particular:

Today all of us are concerned with the drop in prestige and authority of service in the Armed Forces. I wish to note that this is not surprising with the attitude of our leadership cadres and press representatives to the profession of Soviet officer and to military dynasties. I am only afraid that by 1995-2000 such dynasties will disappear entirely—they simply will not exist. Here is why. Leaf through the pages of our periodicals. What isn't said when the talk turns to the Army?! Protectionism flourishes, nepotism has been bred, advancements are determined

exclusively by blood ties, and so on, and so on. And at the same time I have not once read, for example, negative statements concerning dynasties of scientists, designers, artists, writers and actors. For clarity I will cite names familiar to the entire country—Kapitsa, Paton, Tupolev, Liyepa, Mikhalkov, Raykin, Borovik. . . . And one thing more. Sons of regular officers begin to prepare for service long before entry into military schools. They are prepared for this by the military environment in which they grow up, by the life and routine of military people whom they see daily. That is how what the people call a "military bone" forms, although today I would hardly advise my son to follow the officer path.

[Arapov] Well, the letter was written with a painful heart. Everything in it is correct: the fact that our Army is being intentionally sullied by some, and the fact that the prestige of the officer profession is dropping sharply as a result often of unsubstantiated attacks on its representatives, and the fact that military dynasties are being abused without any substantiation. Only I do not believe very strongly that the author does not wish the path of a military man for his son in life. These rather were emotions speaking. One senses that a real officer wrote the letter, and one believes that his son also will follow his path. Our Army, I will note, is strong not only in arms, but also in its people's morale. Such an Army will not fall to pieces under pressure of those anti-perestroika forces which have pounced upon its foundations and its traditions today, including the tradition connected with military dynasties. And so to continue our conversation about them, it seems to me that here the following is especially important: a son must take pride in his father and the father in his son; take deserved pride, I will note. It is important that both perform their duty to the Motherland as conscience prompts them and as the chief law of a military man, the military regulation, orders. It is important that they never strike a bargain with their conscience under any circumstances.

Do we have such examples? In excess. Mikhail Vasilyevich Frunze's son Timur, who received the high HSU title, followed in his father's footsteps. The son of Vasily Ivanovich Chapayev also dedicated his life to Army service. The sons of marshals K. Meretskov and L. Govorov followed in their fathers' footsteps and also became well-known military leaders.

I wish to emphasize that the sons of many of today's military leaders also wear officer shoulderboards and serve the Motherland worthily. Many fought in Afghanistan, went up in the world, as they say, and were decorated with combat awards. So one might ask: Should this be commended or condemned? Obviously, it still is the former, because military dynasties even now remain the model in our Armed Forces officer corps. It turns out to be advantageous for someone to defame the Army and its traditions and implant a negative opinion about it and its people?! What happens? If you are the son of a general, that means you have been advanced and are a coddled officer? Here is what I cannot help but say. It is another matter if, in holding a high position, the father

attempts to take advantage of it to "move" his son to a "cushy" job by any means. Unfortunately, this sometimes also happens. I will refer in particular to an example so as not to make unsubstantiated statements. Lieutenant General Panchenko served in one of the central organizations of the Armed Forces up to 1987. Soon both his sons, officers, also ended up directly subordinate to him. I will say that severe and immediate steps were taken in this case. The father was discharged from the Armed Forces. The sons for their part were separated to different places. This is how attempts to give protection to friends and relatives usually end.

By the way, demands cannot help but be extremely harsh for such actions, for in the given instance we are concerned about the moral appearance of the Armed Forces and their purity. The Army and Navy must serve as a standard of decency for society, a standard for compliance with legality. This is why it is extremely important for us that military dynasties continue to exist and that these dynasties continue to be a subject of pride for the Armed Forces.

[Koshelev] Vitaliy Fedorovich, this question troubles many today, and the majority are inclined to believe that we unquestionably need military dynasties. Our journal's No 17 for last year, for example, published an article by Major I. Lymar entitled "'Unprestigious Marshal's Baton?'" In it the author wrote in particular: "I am for military dynasties and for sons continuing the fathers' cause, but with one mandatory condition—to make a career, in the good sense of this word, exclusively by one's own hands." The editors received responses to the article. Here is an excerpt from a letter by Captain-Lieutenant A. Butko. Referring to the words of this same Lymar about why not have our military sociologists study, let's say, the question of where and how the sons of generals, nephews of ministers, and grandsons of marshals serve, the officer writes the following:

Why not ask this question of commanding generals of branches of the Armed Forces and assign our personnel entities to analyze and publish its results? Only in this way is it possible to see this "apparition" of protectionism; then one could fight it enormously more productively. In particular, then personnel entities would enable a wide circle of readers to become familiar with the "capital" of our Armed Forces such as the Grishanov brothers, Gorshkov's grandson and so on. Only glasnost will be able to destroy protectionism and the "pozvonkovyye"; glasnost and substantial changes in the Statute on Performance of Service by Officers.

How would you comment on this excerpt?

[Arapov] Perhaps there is reason in Captain-Lieutenant Butko's suggestion, because, I repeat once more, the absolute majority of representatives of our military dynasties serve worthily and publication of such data would remove from many readers' minds questions such as those which Officer Butko asked in his letter to the journal editors. Here is what I will also say. Service for

Admiral Gorshkov's grandson actually had interruptions. Many complaints were made against him, but this is why he did not climb high on the career ladder. With respect to Admiral Grishanov's sons, they are serving well. Would that everyone served that way. The younger brother commands a formation of combatant ships in the Northern Fleet, which by the way was recognized as one of the best based on results of a recent inspection. The older brother recently was advanced to a higher position. So the sons did not let their father down.

Summing up everything said earlier, I would like to re-emphasize that we need military dynasties today as well. We must encourage them, keep an eye on their moral purity and decency, and be concerned with their upbringing. This is among the duties of personnel entities. I will not even fear the following words: military dynasties are our wealth under present-day conditions. Well, and as for the statement that only glasnost will be able to destroy protectionism and the "pozvonkovyye," as Officer Butko asserts, I wish to add only the following: it is not glasnost in itself, but by its help, by everyone together taking up arms, as they say, against the protectionism phenomena will we be able to really achieve success. Only in that way!

[Koshelev] Vitaliy Fedorovich, now and then the thought appears in readers' letters that if a person has served to the rank of general, that means he is someone's son or son-in-law. For example, how did you become a general?

[Arapov] I grew up without a father from age ten. He died in the war years. Besides me, there were also three sisters left in the family. And so I went to work in the kolkhoz at age 12 to help my mother. Later I was called into the Army and served four years as a private and NCO. When I finished military school in 1951 and became an officer, this was a genuine holiday not only for my relatives and my mother, a peasant woman who did not have a single grade of education, it was a holiday for the entire village. For at that time people did not regard the Army as they do now.

I will say without false modesty that I did not miss a single career level in service. First I held command and staff positions and later became a political officer. My path was as follows: battalion deputy political officer, party bureau secretary and deputy political officer of a regiment (six years), deputy chief and then chief of a division political department, deputy chief of an army political department, and military council member and chief of an army political department. The last seven years until I came into the Main Personnel Directorate I was military council member/chief of political directorate of a number of districts. And if we speak about duty locations, my officer path ran through the Turkestan and Central Asian military districts, the Arctic, and a number of other places which probably are not to be found on a "normal" map. Meanwhile, some probably believe that I too arrived at colonel general by protection.

I could name tens on tens of military leaders and generals with whom I am acquainted who also emerged from worker and peasant families, went through the entire war in attacking skirmish lines, and then served in the most remote areas of our country and achieved high posts. Take marshals of the Soviet Union Akhromeyev and Kulikov, army generals Sorokin and Sukhorukov, and many, many other military leaders. And before them Zhukov, Rokossovskiy, Konev. What kind of families are they from?

[Koshelev] Yes, that is really so. And what is in my view a reasonable question arises here, Vitaliy Fedorovich. Many are inclined to accuse exclusively the regular soldiers of protectionism phenomena, but what is to be done with party and Komsomol organizations? The fact is, as we know, not only official, but also party efficiency reports (Komsomol efficiency reports for Komsomol members) are required in advancements, appointments and reassignments. Their role in deciding personnel questions has grown considerably in recent years. The objectivity of these performance appraisals and the principle of party and Komsomol collectives in many cases stop protectionist impulses at the root. But as attested by the editorial mail, there still are frequent instances where, by order of some commanders (officers in charge), their political deputies, chiefs of personnel entities and personnel officials, positive party performance appraisals are compiled on officers being advanced under protection who from their political, moral and job qualities do not deserve this. What can counter this in your opinion?

[Arapov] What can counter it? Glasnost, openness, and broad democratism in deciding personnel questions, and also the principle and aggressive enthusiasm of party and Komsomol organizations. These are reliable protective barriers in the path of protectionist actions. In short, everything here depends on specific positions of a particular party or Komsomol organization, even the fact that up until now some performance appraisals being issued by them continue to give off the musty odor of formalism. Tell me, can one figure that all paths of advancement in service will be closed for unworthy people? No, it is impossible. Imagine a multilayered sieve: the first "screening elements" are commanders and officers in charge; the second are the political entities and party and Komsomol organizations; the third are personnel entities; and the fourth is the officer public. The fact is that not only good seeds, but also weeds filter through such a sieve. Why? Well, it is simply that holes formed in places. That is figurative. In life this usually happens where people did not wake up and come to their senses after a long "stagnant somnolence," where indifference and apathy still reign, where there is a formal approach to performance appraisals, and where perestroika is nothing more than a rending of the air.

But if we think about it, just what is a performance appraisal? It is a document giving a picture of human character, completely and thoroughly; that is to say, giving an objective impression of a person and his

abilities and shortcomings. Have you had frequent occasion to read such appraisals? No? That goes for me too, although I have been working in the Main Personnel Directorate for almost three years. Just what is the solution? It is simple. Everyone, each person in his own place, has to realize that all of us are responsible for seeing that worthy people are advanced. Then there will be no questions similar to this one, since, excuse me for saying so, some bawler who for now has appropriate authority can force, let's say, one or two spineless commanders or political workers to do what he wants, but in no way can he do that with the entire party or Komsomol organization or all the unit officers. So let us take a position of principle and seek shortcomings above all not just anywhere, but in ourselves, seek them in order to correct the situation for the better so that the sieve about which I spoke has no holes and people's performance appraisals correspond to reality!

[Koshelev] It is understandable Vitaliy Fedorovich, that special responsibility is placed specifically on the personnel of personnel entities for purity of personnel policy and strict compliance with its Leninist principles. Unfortunately, it still sometimes happens that it is the personnel people who act the part of active "creators" of protectionist actions. Have you personally had occasion to examine such people? And further: Is there a mechanism which would not give personnel officials an opportunity to exercise protectionist machinations?

[Arapov] In fact much depends on people in personnel entities in deciding a particular personnel question. There is even a popular saying on this account: Everything is decided "in personnel." That possibly is how it was at one time, but things are different now. The fact is that a personnel official does not act in isolation, he does not act alone. And in principle, even if he wished, it is very difficult for him to push "his own" person somewhere with the coordinated work of commanders, personnel entities, and party and Komsomol organizations. Why? Well, because any candidate for reassignment and advancement needs performance appraisals—official, party, Komsomol, and so on. As you know, all this is made out locally, and here again everything turns on the position of a specific commander, a specific political entity, and a specific party or Komsomol organization. If they have principle, if they have responsibility, if they have boldness and decency in defending their own opinion, they never will set "their own person" in motion. This is well known to any representative of personnel entities, as it is also known that he will be made strictly answerable for attempts to "pressure" anyone at all for selfish interests. We do not stroke the head for such actions, but stop them at the root right up to discharging from the Armed Forces an official who has compromised himself.

I of course can admit of a situation where a representative of a rather high personnel entity can petition for one of the officers whom he knows well. But here is where we Main Personnel Directorate officials must be vigilant and on the alert, as they say, to note each such case and

not to ignore it if an attempt has been made to exert pressure on the position, let's say, of a commander, political official, party or Komsomol organization. We demand this same thing also of personnel entities of branches of the Armed Forces, districts, groups of forces and fleets. In short, a dual control results here—both from below and from above. Such control permits erecting a sturdy barrier in the path of a subjectivist approach in deciding personnel questions, which essentially "de-energizes" the mechanism for carrying out protectionist machinations. But the important thing unquestionably is for every official of any personnel entity to thoroughly realize the full measure of responsibility placed on him, always be guided by the interests of service in everything, and work, as they say, not out of fear, but out of conscience. I will say more: even when we accept a new comrade for a job in the Main Personnel Directorate after a most thorough check, we caution him without fail about the following. Look, we say, a mass of "friends" immediately will appear for you. Show no weakness toward them!

And I would like to mention one other point. Personnel entities study, select and propose particular officers as nominees for reassignments, promotions in position and so on, but in no instance do they appoint them. Everyone must understand this well; then it will be clear to everyone that the popular saying which I quoted earlier has no real ground beneath it. Especially now, when the processes of democratization and glasnost are gathering force day in and day out, when people emerging from the state of "lethargic" sleep of the times of stagnation wish to have their opinion considered, and when appointments for many positions are being made according to the principle of alternative nominees.

[Koshelev] Life shows that protectionism usually mimics and skillfully "covers up" the traces. Let's take a typical situation. A company commander serves in the unit in a so-so, middling way. Suddenly there is an order to prepare documents for his advancement. Everything is quickly formalized and the person departs for his new duty station for a higher position. And try to discover who pressed which lever here. What is to be done here?

[Arapov] I will say this: mimicry and protectionism are interconnected in the closest manner. The fact is that protection, like any other dubious, illegal action, does not love the light, publicity or an outside look. For this reason it is difficult to fight its manifestations, for you cannot include a call or a word in a file. What is to be done, you ask? Well, I think I already partially answered this question, but I will repeat: one must indoctrinate principled champions of the truth and legality in oneself and stand up for them to the end. And if this is so, and not otherwise, then by their opinion and by their collective officers will be able to prove the truth to any appointed person in a particular matter.

[Koshelev] Unquestionably, personnel policy in the Army and Navy is undergoing serious changes today under the effect of glasnost. As you just noted, Vitaliy

Fedorovich, more glasnost, democratism and fairness is appearing in it. At the same time, it would be incorrect to assume that the old is surrendering its positions without a fight. Let's take a situation described in one of the letters which came to the journal editors. The position of deputy commander became vacant in Unit "X." Practically all officers were unanimous in the opinion that Major K had earned it by conscientious work, but suddenly another officer was sent "from above." This agitated the unit collective and irritated the people. The fact is, it is not that rare to encounter such facts. They undermine people's faith in social justice and in the genuine democratism of personnel policy, and they destabilize the moral climate in military collectives. How can we fight this?

[Arapov] You refer in this matter to a specific letter to the editors. I do not deny that such a case possibly did occur, but let's look into the situation: Is it not resentment that is speaking in the person who wrote about this fact? For how does it sometimes happen? Excuse me for the frankness, but some people are accustomed to be guided in their reasoning only by personal interests and considerations. Let's say such a person was recommended for a vacant position, but another more worthy person was appointed to it. Immediately a little rumor spread through the unit that he allegedly got the job "by pull." The further you go, the more there is, as they say—a letter to the editors was born: thus-and-thus, superiors are "suppressing" me, help me restore justice. People begin to look into the letter and it turns out that justice in fact had not been violated. It is simply that no one spoke with the person or explained to him promptly why an officer from outside (the very same kind of workhorse as he is who, if he does have a "paw," then it is his own working paw) was sent to fill the vacant position. You, they say, are both younger in age and still lack necessary experience; keep digging, you will manage to gain experience. But the next appointment certainly is yours, this is already precise, because we enlisted the support both of the division commander and the district. Would the person who considered himself unjustly offended or "passed over" really not heed these kind words and not understand them? I am sure that he would both heed and understand, and then a shout for assistance would not have appeared and resentment would not have originated. I myself frequently have occasion to deal with such complaints.

In this connection I also would like to direct attention to the following point. How can we avoid unsubstantiated, hasty, let alone rash appointments? By decision of the Minister of Defense, a reserve for advancement now is being established on the basis of officer efficiency report data. There must be such a reserve in each unit, division, district (group of forces) and so on. This will allow avoiding irregularities and hitches in personnel policy, and then everything will go more precisely, in the channel of social justice.

The fact is, before such lists are compiled any nomination must be coordinated by a specific commander with

the opinion of the political entity, the party or Komsomol organization, and the officer collective as a whole. We are for having local appointments occur basically from internal resources and capabilities, but this is of course the ideal. Life is life, and it introduces its own corrections. Even now our Armed Forces are being reduced. As already announced, two districts—Central Asian and Ural—have been disbanded and three tank divisions have been removed from groups of forces and reduced. Even earlier at the beginning of last year, our units left the territory of the Republic of Afghanistan. This means that thousands of young, strong, trained officers are without positions and have to be placed. But where, one asks, to which positions should they be assigned? Obviously, to vacant positions, those very ones where there already are claimants from among "local" personnel. And so it happens that they wished to assign one comrade to a particular position, but they assigned another, a person "advanced" from disbanded units. One cannot take offense at this. One has to regard such steps with understanding. But in this situation some consider themselves infringed upon, and they complain to the editors of newspapers and journals, to the Main Political Directorate, the General Staff, and the Main Personnel Directorate, not wishing to delve into all features of the moment. It seems to such people that they were unjustly passed over and that the specter of protectionism stands without fail behind the appointment to the position promised them. Instead of confirming their right to an advancement by their work, they give up, and it is necessary to patiently explain to each one who is in such a situation the erroneous nature of his position. One must explain that each promising officer will be promptly advanced in service. We also run across another variant causing offense. It is not precluded, let's say, that a regimental commander has his own candidate for a vacancy that has formed, and the division commander has his own. This means that the person best suited must be appointed to it, again, based on the interests of the cause, on the interests of combat readiness and discipline, on the interests of social justice.

[Koshelev] A "lightning rod system" often functions with respect to those who have "someone standing behind them." What I have in mind is that such a person as a rule is well "protected," since no one wishes to have anything do to with him in order not to complicate life for himself, fearing to cause the "anger of high protectors." And such a person lives easily and calmly and the "menacing" winds pass him by. In this connection I would like to ask: What in your opinion should and must be undertaken to activate the public to fight such people and their "protectors"?

[Arapov] Although it actually does not exist, such a "system" unfortunately does function at times. There is no contradiction in my words. It is not the system, but fear that functions, and often it is an imaginary fear because the threat itself also is imaginary. Again I invite you to think about the following with me. If someone really did manage to "force his way" to a particular

position by dubious means, will such an officer really be about to reveal himself and his ties? The answer is clearly no, because in this case a real danger exists for the officer himself: What "protector" will like the fact of his being exposed in unseemly acts? But let us assume that this did occur. Someone begins bragging: touch me and you'll see, you will pale when you know who is behind me. And what do you think? Two reactions are possible in this case. Either the colleagues of this intriguer really give in to the "hypnosis of his omnipotence" (if the collective is immature, not close-knit, or disunited), or they will begin to fight him (if the collective is close-knit, morally healthy, and principled).

I cite this because in the final account a morally unscrupulous person who has undeservedly forced his way into a position will not see a quiet and easy life, as you expressed it, since our officers more and more today are becoming principled and exacting toward themselves and others, perceive themselves as individuals and wish themselves and their opinions to be regarded. I would say this is a reassuring symptom. The fact is, protectionism not only sprouts from the officer environment, but also is directed against it. And who if not the officers themselves above all are to fight it?! And I assure you, we always will support such people. We will support them decisively and we will help justice to triumph. The roots of protectionism must be cut mercilessly, both at the everyday and the official level, but for this it is important to have civic courage and be able to fundamentally assess phenomena in a party manner, and not feel impotent before insolent persons, let alone intriguers. Their time has passed, never to return.

[Koshelev] As you know, protectionism not only is "assistance" in advancing in a "career," in entering the academy and so on, but also "help" in choosing a duty station. Our readers ask the following question: Why do the duty stations of some officers consist of the "capital-abroad" scheme while others manage to exchange 15-20 garrisons? When will rigid control finally be established in order to eliminate this crying injustice?

[Arapov] A fairer resolution of this problem, which affects the interests of all officers, now is provided for. What kind? All duty stations now have been "broken" into five conditional zones. Their remoteness from the "center" and climatic and other conditions have been considered here. "For what purpose was this done?" one asks. So that in the course of service every officer "covers" all five of these zones or the majority of them. Now it will not happen that one person "sits" hopelessly somewhere in Kiev, let's say, while another "wanders about" from place to place on the periphery. To this end last year we already tried to replace officers with consideration of these requirements, although of course we did not get by here without difficulties in connection with the removal of a number of units from groups of forces and from Afghanistan, which I already mentioned. So that the requirement of social justice thus is being filled with a fully realistic content today despite certain difficulties.

[Koshelev] Let us touch on one other aspect which in our view is closely connected with protectionism. This is the early promotion. What changes are occurring here? And further, Vitaliy Fedorovich, couldn't you give at least an approximate figure of how many officers, commanders, and political personnel received an early promotion in 1989?

[Arapov] The early promotion of an officer is one of the strongest motivations in his service. True, here too we did not get by without extremes. For example, I personally know of officers who received early promotions two or three or even four times each. It is understandable that this was far from always justified. Moreover, in some cases it appears to me such a frequent change of stars on the shoulderboards also was dictated to a certain extent by protectionist ties. It was necessary to revise this "policy" and rigidify the demands on those recommended for early promotion. But even this severity did not always "function": alas, not the most worthy of people sometimes continued to end up among the "lucky ones." To avoid this, a military rank—either a junior officer or senior level officer rank—now can be conferred on an officer early only once during service. It appears this will be correct and not offensive to others.

Now the specific figures. I will begin with 1988. At that time 740 persons (363 junior officers and 377 senior level officers) received early promotions. Last year these figures dropped greatly, but not because our officers began to serve more poorly. No, the reason lies elsewhere, in the fact that we sharply increased requirements on claimants for this kind of incentive and began to practice other measures of moral and financial incentive for the work of officer cadres more widely. Well then, in 1989 140 persons (62 junior officers and 78 senior level officers) received early promotions. I cannot help but mention here what is in my view one other very indicative figure. Last year 1,995 persons were promoted to military ranks one level higher than the position they held. This is a sufficiently high indicator, which indicates both the officers' attitude toward duty and the fact that constant concern is shown for them, concern that is within the framework of party demands about closeness to people. Yes, it is necessary not only to have a good knowledge of people, but also to steadily improve the conditions of their service, everyday life and leisure. We thereby also will show a real interest in raising the qualitative status of our officer corps to a new, higher level.

Soon a new statute on performance of duty by officers also will enter into force. It has many substantial changes compared with the one which previously existed. This statute in particular envisages enormously fewer grounds for delaying a promotion for a particular officer. It would appear that this step too will be only of benefit. The fact is that if a person serves normally, then he should receive the appropriate rank on time; then his mood will not be darkened and he will add to his zeal in service. I believe it will not be superfluous to note that the basic motive for a routine promotion previously was mastery of a new

position. As we see, the statute is very eroded and not precisely outlined. This point will not be in the document in question. Moreover, a proposal also is being prepared that an officer can count on promptly receiving a promotion even when he has punishments which, though, are not connected with his personal lack of discipline.

[Koshelev] Do you not regard it as necessary today to introduce a point to the Statute on the Officer Meeting to the effect that the question of early promotion of an officer would depend wholly on the decision of this meeting? Perhaps thereby we would succeed in placing one more barrier in the path of protectionism?

[Arapov] I have to say that the provisional Statute on the Officer Meeting is designed for two years. This would appear to be the optimum time period during which its strong and weak points will be revealed. With consideration of this, later it will be possible also to do a little more work on the statute. In short, life will show in what aspects it will have to be improved, "tightened," and corrected. For now, one thing is clear: the point according to which the officer meeting is directly charged with the struggle against protectionism must unquestionably play its role. In any case, we are very much counting on it. But of course it does not play the role by itself, but through people, by elevating their principle and responsibility.

Now about your specific proposal. Again, the future will show whether it is advisable or inadvisable to introduce a point to the statute that an officer's early promotion would be wholly within the competence of this meeting. And later I think that permanent efficiency report boards, made up as a rule of the best representatives of a particular collective, are sufficient for such decisions. It is another matter if such a board did not arrive at some positive or negative decision on a very specific nominee. Then perhaps it is also advisable for the officer meeting to act as an arbiter whose opinion would serve as a final option in the commander's decisionmaking.

[Koshelev] Journalists often have occasion to run across instances where, let's say, a particular general or officer is making serious miscalculations in work, is displaying moral unscrupulousness, and is rude, haughty, and inattentive to subordinates' needs. People do not cease complaining about him, and higher echelons seemingly are lodging serious complaints about such an "official." At the same time, everything remains unchanged. Moreover, they get rid of such a "specialist" by an advancement. This is why people justly question: How is this to be understood? Isn't it better simply to discharge a person who is not coping with his duties?

[Arapov] Strictly speaking, such a discharge is provided for in the present stage of reduction in the Armed Forces, and many of those who were obstructing matters despite all demands of recent times, who were indifferent and callous toward subordinates and deaf to their needs and wants, have parted with the Army. Not voluntarily, of

course. It stands to reason that this is good. We thereby purify ourselves. I will note that henceforth we do not intend to swerve from that path. But the fact is that in each specific case we should approach a person with maximum attentiveness and weigh all pros and cons, as they say, before making a decision. Otherwise, the fact is that it is possible to make a stupid blunder and cripple human destinies. Here one always should be guided by the rule: look before you leap.

In this place I will again permit myself a small digression. I often have occasion to be on TDY and chat with people, and officers turn to the Main Personnel Directorate rather often, so I believe I know about their needs and wants and about what troubles them not from hearsay, but from the horse's mouth, as they say. Well then, today many commanders complain that young people allegedly are fleeing the Army for an easy civilian life. Well, those things happen. And then the life of many officers and their families is not very established, it is not supported or protected socially. But I dare assure you that people basically are not fleeing from difficulties. The chief reason lies elsewhere—in the callousness and inattention toward them and in the spiritual deafness of some apologies for leaders, including, sorry as it may seem, also from among our party-political staff. The reason is that people have become sick of the rudeness and arrogance of such superiors. Recently, for example, I had occasion to chat with Shapovalov, one of the young officers who had been discharged; he had been serving in the Far East Military District. You know what this rather likeable young man told me? By the way, he is a young man who I am sure would have made a good specialist in time. He said literally the following: "Comrade Colonel General, the fact is that no one talked with me this way there where I served, simply, in a fatherly manner." I say this not for self-advertisement. No, I say it to more sharply set off the thought: we have to be closer to the people, know them, know each of our subordinates, not begrudge a kind word when a person has earned it, not wave the sword left and right, and not mangle human destinies.

After this digression, which although lying outside the framework of our conversation, nevertheless comes very close to it in places, I will cite some figures. Sometimes they are more eloquent than any words. In 1989 two formation commanders and 15 unit and ship commanders were removed from their positions and assigned lower because of gross failures and miscalculations in service and because of moral flaws. Of course, the first and foremost blame here is that of the Main Personnel Directorate. But where, one asks, were the corresponding superiors, officials of political entities, and party organizations who recommended those comrades for the appointments without a twinge of conscience? Didn't they know the true state of affairs? Or did they deliberately close their eyes? In any case, this does not remove the blame from them as well. This is why I wish to re-emphasize the thought that people must be studied carefully not from papers, but on the job.

Know what each one is capable of and what he is not capable of, and know his positive sides and shortcomings. Only in this case will we be able to avoid errors in personnel assignments and reassignments and avoid hasty, short-sighted decisions, just as we will be able to erect a more rigid barrier in the path of feeble protectionist impulses and actions.

[Koshelev] A few words about the forms of manifestation of protectionism. For this is a diverse phenomenon, is that not true? Protection can concern not only service, but also everyday matters. Here too, obviously the role of political entities, party and Komsomol organizations, and the Army and Navy public as a whole is difficult to overestimate.

[Arapov] Yes, the forms in which protectionism are manifested are quite varied, including in the everyday sphere: distributing goods for which there is increased demand, placing kids in kindergartens and nurseries, obtaining housing. But this merely strengthens the demands on political entities, party and Komsomol organizations and all our Army and Navy public for ensuring genuine legality in each sector. The person constantly must be the focus of their attention, but not some abstract person: a very specific person with his needs, wants, doubts and joys. It is important to do everything to facilitate this person's service, which even without this is not simple. One need have no doubt that he will repay this a hundredfold.

The ancients said: if you wish to destroy a person, give him everything he requests! The truth of this statement has been tested by time. I say this because any protection creates a sense of permissiveness, haughty self-confidence and scorn in some, and irritation, just anger, and the desire to fight each such attempt with all one's might in others. It is necessary to unite our efforts in this righteous struggle.

[Koshelev] We already said that when the talk turns to protectionism, attention for the most part is focused for some reason only on moral costs. But the fact is that not simply random people, but also harmful people sometimes end up in leadership posts on the wave of protectionism who clearly do not fit such assignments and who do not cope with assigned duties. As a result there are failures in combat readiness and discipline. Do those who recommended such people and formed protection for them bear responsibility for this?

[Arapov] Of course they do. How can it be otherwise? Here too you are correct: the greatest damage from unsubstantiated, erroneous appointments always is done to the job above all. The fact is that the psychology of a favorite already has been developed in those who have "wormed" themselves into the position through protection: I'll serve a year or two here and then they will "move" me further. Therefore such a "leader" doesn't care a fig for the job, pardon me for the frankness. It falls apart, creaks at all seams and that person doesn't care, although the end always is natural and leads to total

failure of the "career" for any story which began and developed not according to the law. It is much more complicated for the persons who have the protégés. Those people try to come out unscathed. There is always a convenient loophole for this: it was an oversight, they say, something was not sufficiently taken into account; the comrade did not turn out to be the person for whom he passed himself off; we are at fault, but we will take it into account in the future, and so on, and so on. And here I would like to clarify the position of the Main Personnel Directorate and its reaction to such "short-sightedness": if you recommend, you will bear responsibility, and not formal responsibility, but in fact the strictest responsibility. Only let's consult with the officer audience on how to secure this legislatively and where, in which document. Party Bylaws which clearly state black on white the responsibility of persons making the recommendation for those recommended for joining the CPSU can be taken as a model for deciding the question.

[Koshelev] And the last question, Vitaliy Fedorovich. In your view, nevertheless, how soon will an end be put even to individual manifestations of protectionism?

[Arapov] Once again I will remind you how our conversation began. What is protection? You referred to S. I. Ozhegov's "Tolkovy slovar russkogo yazyka." I will refer to the "Sovetskiy entsiklopedicheskiy slovar" [Soviet Encyclopedic Dictionary]. It states that protection is the influential support for someone in arranging his affairs. Well then, it seems to me this definition corresponds more to the context of today's discussion, for protectionism as a system is unnatural to the substance of the work of Armed Forces personnel entities. I will re-emphasize that one can talk only about instances of protection as applied to this work. But for some reason the word "protection" causes only negative emotions in people. It has become a bugaboo, as it were, behind which a not very good and far from inoffensive desire is hidden "to gratify a little relative."

During our talk we saw that this is not always so or is far from so. The support of a sensible official which is justified both from the standpoint of legality and from the standpoint of morality is one thing. "Pushing through" someone out of personal considerations, opinions "from above," telephone calls and dubious requests are quite another thing. It is plain as day: the best measures, the best motives, the most sensible orders do not "function" until they become part of the flesh and blood of their immediate executors and begin to determine their life credo. Strict, precise fulfillment of our Soviet laws and military regulations by each person in his place—this is the path which will permit eradicating everything negative from our life. Instilling respect for the laws and regulations and a need to act only in conformity with them is the means of solving the problem. No other is given.

With respect to prospects, I am an optimist. In the future there must be no place for negative phenomena, including feeble protectionist impulses. The fact is, this

is why we began perestroyka, to bring order to our house, exemplary order, worthy in all respects of our glorious Armed Forces and their no less glorious traditions.

[Koshelev] Vitaliy Fedorovich, we thank you for the conversation.

Footnotes

1. Arapov, Vitaliy Fedorovich; born 1927 in village of Argamakovo, Belinskiy Rayon, Penza Oblast. In military service since January 1945. Completed the Tashkent Tank School, Military-Political Academy imeni V. I. Lenin, and the USSR Armed Forces General Staff Military Academy. Held command and staff positions. Since 1957 has been in party-political work, having covered the path from deputy battalion commander for political affairs to military council member of a number of military districts. Since 1987 has been first deputy chief of the USSR Ministry of Defense Main Personnel Directorate.

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The Legal Right of an Officer

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[Letters to editor published under the heading "Repercussions": "One Thing in the Constitution, But Something Else in Life?"]

[Text] Last year our journal published an article by Col Just V. Bobrenev titled "The Legitimate of an Officer." This stated that all rights of Soviet citizens reinforced in the USSR Constitution, including the right to time off and a 41-hour workweek, are extended to the officer personnel. It was pointed out that any limitations here have no legitimate basis. Moreover, in 1972 the USSR minister of defense established for officers, warrant officers and reenlisted personnel precisely such a length of working hours for them in a week. The article has evoked numerous replies. Below we publish those which the editors have forwarded to the appropriate political bodies for verifying the facts set out and for taking specific measures. We also are publishing commentaries by a worker from the Main Military Procuracy.

Here Is the "Arithmetic"...

Possibly, somewhere the 41-hour workweek is observed in the troop units but this is not so on the ships of the Navy. In order not to be unsubstantiated, let me give some concrete figures.

For example, the Navy ship regulations provide a procedure for the officers and warrant officers to go on shore in such a manner that at least a third of the total number of the officer and warrant officer personnel is constantly "on board." And the shore leave is permitted only upon the completion of exercises, drills or other work. Return

to the ship is also strictly regulated and they must be back no later than 30 minutes before the hoisting of the flag, that is, at 0730 hours.

What happens as a result? An elementary calculation indicates that the workweek of an officer or warrant officer with such procedures for shore leave comprises a minimum of 87 hours. But when a ship is being readied for sea, this time increases to 117 hours. Not to say that in setting to sea the work schedule of an officer or warrant officer begins to run in entire days. But, one might ask, is such a "prolongation" reflected in their pay? No. As a comparison I will take myself and a land lieutenant holding the same captain's position as myself (this in no way is meant as a reproach). So the lieutenant receives 260 rubles a month. And I, with my additional pay "for nuclear service," receive 258 rubles (the letter was written before the announcement of increased pay for officers by the corresponding order of the USSR minister of defense.—Editors). Moreover, we have the same leaves: 30 days for those serving in the European portion of the nation and 45 for the personnel serving in distant regions.

And this is the "arithmetic." And this "arithmetic" pulls the rug from under all the assertions of the leadership on raising the role of the ship crews. Many officers at present do not want to serve on ships and submit requests for discharge. Incidentally, it is not so easy to be discharged as it may seem. Of course, it is possible to achieve this with sufficient desire. But only by setting out...to discredit the officer rank. One might ask who benefits from such a procedure: the officer, the Armed Forces or the nation? Clearly no one does. In this context I would like to submit the following proposals for general discussion.

It seems to me that on the basis of the already existing laws, it is time to draw up and introduce across-the-board a wage scale for hourly wages of the officers and warrant officers. Here it would be possible to dispense with the double time for the period exceeding the established standard of eight hours a day. What would such an approach provide? In the Ground Forces, it would be possible not to keep officers and warrant officers in service without any need. Certainly, the commanders and chiefs will not be patted on the back for the overexpenditure of money. And let me point out, for an illegal overexpenditure. They will be forced to strictly observe the established duration of the workweek. And in the Navy? Here clearly it will not be possible to reduce the working time of the officers and warrant officers due to the particular features of ship service. But increased wages would make it possible to actually raise the prestige of the crew as has long been under discussion.

I propose, in addition, that we revise the existing procedure for granting leaves to the officers and warrant officers. For instance, this might be done as in the civilian fleet. For example, when a ship goes to sea, all the holidays and days off not used by the various officers or warrant officers could be taken into account. And

then the obtained number of such days could be added to the regular leave. So that the families of the officers and warrant officers did not forget how their providers looked.

Finally, one last thing. I feel that each officer who wishes to change a military profession for a civilian one should be provided with an opportunity to do this on completely legal grounds, in accord with the USSR Constitution. Such officers, as a rule, are not actually serving but merely "serving time," although they meticulously receive money for this.

Lt V. Tkach,
Twice Red Banner Baltic Fleet

The political worker, Capt 1st Rank G. Atavin, has sent a reply to the editors to the letter from Lt V. Tkach:

...The pace of service for officer personnel on the Navy ships differs from the pace of service in the units of the Ground Forces or in the Navy shore units, where there is no such saturating with weapons and combat equipment, there is no danger of flooding, explosions, fires, injuries from electric current and so forth, and consequently, there is no need for around-the-clock presence of at least a third of the officers on the spot and these are officers who are capable and trained to assume independent decisions in any situation from preparations for combat and a voyage to preventing negative phenomena in the troop units; for this reason, there is the possibility of more or less systematizing the workday. Thus, the overload is determined by the specific features of organizing service on the ship and is provided for in the Ship Regulations which do not say a word about the length of an officer's workday but contain so many duties that a full 24 hours is not enough for performing them well. In addition to these regulations there are many other guiding documents in the forms of orders, directives, decrees, instructions, procedures and so forth. The flow of these is not drying up but rather increasing. And everything must be carried out in those same 24 hours!

And so the wages for decades of work are carried out in the fleet using the principle of wage leveling, regardless of the place of service, the attitude of one or another officer to service, the quantity and quality of invested labor and other evaluating provisions. So the standard of life of a ship officer differs little from the standard of life of a shore one. But such an officer endures many times more hardships and deprivations. Hence arguments in the press and at "high level" meetings concerning the prestige of the crew when not reinforced by material measures can cause nothing except bitter irony. Without reference to objective circumstances it must be honestly admitted that the material situation of the officers is poor and the salary rates are very low. For example, in Vladivostok, the drivers of regular buses receive 400-500 rubles a month and many who are dissatisfied with their earnings are working to raise them. But a Navy lieutenant for his service on a modern fighting ship receives a little more than 300 rubles a month. And this is a

person with a higher education, special training and an unique specialty. But the pay for such a specialist is half that of the wage of a bus driver.

It is possible to compare the standard of living of a ship officer with the standard of living of the ship. This comparison, alas, would be even more lamentable. But if one raises the question of housing, nurseries and creches, dairy kitchens, military exchanges, job placement for wives and not that of life in the capital, then the situation of naval officers generally, as they say, is rotten.... In addition, we must also consider that many officers cannot allow themselves an annual trip with their family on leave, for instance, from the regions of the Far East to the Western regions of the nation as it is too expensive! It is laughable and bitter to say this now but a goodly portion of the young officer families cannot get by without parental aid. It would be possible to give numerous other facts confirming that the so-called "extra support" and "extra benefits" of the officers which an ordinary Philistine likes to mention are nothing more than a myth. But many as before believe in this, for the press has not yet given convincing arguments to dispell it.

For instance, the nation's military budget has been made public. But what is its structure? How much money goes for the direct support of the "troops" and how much for other purposes? Is this a little or a lot? And what criteria exists here? And how ultimately do we "look" in this context among the armies of even the allied states?

It would be a good thing if these problems were spoken of openly. Personally I, for example, do not know how much a tank, aircraft, missile or ship costs us. Likewise, I do not know how much money a worker in the defense industry earns a month or how much the specialist earns who maintains the product. But the military journalists, being "informed" and "cleared" persons and being the repositories of notorious secrecy, by their silence contribute to the spread of unhealthy rumors and antiarmy attitudes among the people.

Understandably, patriotism cannot merely be decreed. The situation cannot be rectified by the next order or appeal "to strengthen patriotic education." Patriotism is high only as a manifestation of pride for one's strong, flourishing nation. And how much effort it takes to have a morally strong army under the conditions of the "unhealthy" reality surrounding us!

The officers who at present are seeking out and proposing things must be supported in every possible way. Their proposals must be listened to "on high" in the commissions and committees of the USSR Supreme Soviet. That is where the laws are formulated. Let the people's deputies of the nation study the most fantastic projects of the lieutenants and find the rational cores in them. Let the lieutenants publish their ideas on perestroika in the army, on perestroika in all our life and discuss these publically. For without this we cannot hope for changes for the better.

I feel that Lt V. Tkach understands everything: both the difficult economic situation of the nation, the existing financial difficulties and that such an attitude toward the army as it is now cannot be tolerated further. And if this officer with his comrades, losing hope for further changes, go into the reserves, then the discussions of the qualitative parameters of our defense will be simply absurd.

Order or Fiction?

In the article "A Legal Right of the Officer" it states just what our workweek should be. But, let us assume, even its author, a military judge advocate, perfectly understands that this provision is not met in any district. For example, the commander of our unit one time at an officer meeting announced that we would have a six day workweek. But certainly in the unit there is the corresponding order from the USSR minister of defense where it states that Saturday and Sunday are considered to be days off....

But even over the five days of the week, the length of an officer's work time for us is over 42 hours, not counting the details and duties. Hence, the order of the minister of defense for converting to a five day workweek with a total 41-hour length of service is not being carried out.

If one speaks about the so-called "responsible individuals," in the unit they are called "persons monitoring the order of the day." But how can there be any effective supervision over this, if the officers are designated responsible for entire days with the duty of inspecting the guard?!

In a word, if the magazine actually wishes to be in the front ranks of the participants of perestroika, then its actions should be concrete and provide precise answers to the questions raised. This should be done so that later on we do not have to scratch our heads wondering how to understand one or another explanation published in it. Each man should be able to defend his rights, using the publications of the journal.

In light of this, we would request that you provide a concrete answer as to where, in what units, after the publishing of the article "A Legal Right of the Officer" the state of affairs has changed and how long the given process will go on in the armed forces?...

Sr Lt M. Dudchenko and others
(a total of 15 signatures),

Red Banner Transcaucasus Military District

Answering the letter of Sr Lt M. Dudchenko and his fellow servicemen is the Chief of the Propaganda and Agitation Department and Deputy Chief of the Political Directorate of the Transcaucasus Military District, Col Ye. Saushkin:

I should inform you that the fact set out in the letter from the group of officers from the command post (15 signatures) have been verified on the spot. Here the following was ascertained (in the course of the inspection, many

more questions were asked than in the letter itself; the answer was given as the questions were received.—Editors). In the opinion of the command, it is impossible to provide all the officers of the command post [KP] simultaneously with a five day workweek. A possible solution to the problem here could be: involve up to 25 percent of the officers in the Saturday maintenance days. But under the condition that the KP chief would draw up a flexible rotating schedule. As for the drill of the personnel, none of the KP officers would be involved in them on Saturdays.

Now on the question of benefits. The command feels that one must not compare the intensity of combat alert at the KP with the intensity of this duty in an air defense unit. Particularly as there are no guiding documents on this matter. A decision on the given question was taken a little more than three years ago upon the proposal of the officers themselves at the KP and was reflected in the corresponding instructions which are currently in effect. Moreover, the positions of operational duty officers in the air defense unit are regular ones and the personnel standing them are not involved with anything except alert duty. At the KP there are no such regular positions.

Furthermore, on the question related to construction work. In the unit all officers are involved with them. There was the instance on the transporting of brick. But clearly this cannot be considered characteristic for the workloads related to construction work here basically are spread evenly over the officer personnel.

On the question of patrolling. This was and remains our sacred duty as we are guarding our families and our compounds. In Baku in addition, they were also guarding the lives of other people.

On the question of official missions. Over the last three years, Capt Govorov went only once after "escapers." As for trips related to selecting young recruits, the following must be said: Who can select the needed specialists better than the officers of the KP?!

On the paying of travel expenses. The lack of money for paying these, as a rule, has occurred either due to the fault of the furnishing bank or due to the fault of the superior financial body. Generally, we would like to point out that for the given unit which has "points" spread over a large distance, the same amount of travel expenses is provided as for those compactly located.

As for the signing of responsible duty officers or persons exercising supervision over the carrying out of the order of the day. On the one hand, in the words of the deputy unit commander, this is local, "independent activity." But on the other, the unit commander, as the regulations require, is obliged to supervise the carrying out of the order of the day by the personnel, involving when necessary his deputies and other officers in this. There is the need for such supervision in the unit. Particularly in line with the reduced level of military discipline in certain subunits.

A few words on the daily details. Of the political workers, only the chief of the political department, his deputy and the unit propagandist do not go on detail. The remainder do, only they do not go on duty at the KP, as this is not provided for.

In the course of verifying the facts set out in the letter, it was also disclosed that among the KP officers there is the opinion it is better to be given a reprimand than to perform what is not required. All the questions raised by the declarants have been discussed in the district political directorate, calling in for this the leaders of the corresponding directorate which is directly in charge of the unit. Measures have been worked out for resolving the arising situation.

And They Merely Shrug Their Shoulders

I serve in Arkhangelsk Oblast. Service in these areas, as you can understand, is not easy. And not only because of the harsh natural and climatic conditions. It is also complicated for the following reason. In our unit, it is rather difficult to obtain even a legal day off. If you work a week, then there might be talk about it. Such a procedure was instituted by the commander of our troop unit. We serve from 0640 hours to 2015 hours each day. And when we are "responsible," then it is up to 2200 hours. In the evening, we conduct drill exercises with men who have already worked their eight hours in construction. I have repeatedly turned to the unit commander with a request to give us an opportunity to rest at that time. But he did not want to listen to me. I made an analogous request also of the unit political worker, Maj T. Khudozhilov, and the party buro secretary, Capt V. Kuropatko. However these comrades just shrug their shoulders. If you want it then you get it.

Warrant Officer I. Volokhatyuk,
Order of Lenin
Leningrad Military District

Col I. Korovkin has sent an answer to the editors to the letter by WO I. Volokhatyuk:

I can state that the information set out in the letter from Warrant Officer I. Volokhatyuk has been verified in the course of a trip to the site. It has been established that the commander of the designated troop unit did not completely carry out the demands of the minister of defense as well as the superior command on systematizing the working time of officers and warrant officers. According to these demands in the military construction units, a five day workweek has been established. The 6th day of the week, the Saturday, should be used for exercises in combat, political and special training and in conducting maintenance days (with the exception of the work Saturdays which are part of the annual schedule for the production activities of the given unit). The 7th day, as should be, is off.

At the same time, in considering that servicemen have all the socioeconomic, political and personal rights and

liberties of the USSR citizens as set out by the Constitution as well as in the aim of systematizing service hours for the officers and warrant officers, it has been recommended that the commanders of the military construction units provide them, if possible, with a second day off (according to the schedule). I would point out that this recommendation has been approved by the Ministry of Defense. In accord with this, Maj V. Medynich was instructed to put in order the working and off hours of the officers and warrant officers in the unit. A decision was also adopted to strengthen control by superior organizations over the carrying out of the given demand not only in this unit but also in other ones...."

It Remains...to Point Out

I serve in a support battalion for the training process in the Novosibirsk Higher Combined-Arms Military Political School. In our unit the appointing of "responsible" officers has also become a customary phenomenon. On those days when an officer is "not responsible," his presence in service is still at least 11 hours, even if he has done his all. This is due to the fact that many of our soldiers and sergeants are engaged not with their own job but rather work at dumps, at various subsidiary farms, at the garrison club, in the classrooms and so forth. Although according to the schedule they are counted as mechanics, gunners, loaders, and drivers.... As a result, they not only do not improve their technical level and do not better their practical skills, but often forget even what they learned in the training subunits. Should there be any surprise that the equipment which is assigned to the men is not always serviced as it should be. And when exercises and drills with it are conducted for the officer candidates, you can only expect accidents due to the lack of training of the main crews.

Furthermore, I want to say that the support battalion has been entrusted with all the school details. It is now considered ordinary, when in the morning, after mounting of the guard, in a company of 35 men just five remain or at best 10. And this is at a time when the work planned for the maintenance area and position could not be handled even in a day! For this reason, each time we must use nontraining time. This is done, certainly, by each officer and warrant officer to the detriment of his own leisure. No matter how many times we have raised the question at the party meetings or before the superior chiefs, there have been no changes observed in solving it. Moreover, with each passing year, the amount of work carried out by the battalion personnel steadily increases. And as before there are still not enough men. As a result, there are failings in political and combat training and omissions in the educating of the personnel. At the same time, a workday of 12-16 hours is considered normal for us. Certainly this runs contrary to the demands of the USSR Minister of Defense and, finally, to our legislation! So, having read the article "The Legitimate Right of an Officer," we can only smile bitterly and shrug our shoulders. And more than that, note how things should be in reality.

Sr Lt V. Antipov,
Red Banner Siberian Military District

The Chief of the Propaganda and Agitation Department and Deputy Chief of the Political Directorate of the Siberian Military District, Col V. Ivlikov, has answered the editors for the letter of Sr Lt V. Antipov:

I would inform you that the facts set out in the letter of Comrade V. Antipov did occur. As for the functions of the personnel in the support battalion of the training process [BOUP] and involving the standing of guard and internal services or performing jobs on combat equipment and school dumps, these functions were caused by the direct purpose of the BOUP and could not be eliminated. At present, for example, merely because of having the battalion perform a portion of the details instead of the officer candidates, this releases two (!) officer candidate companies which have greater opportunities than before to be involved in carrying out their immediate tasks according to the training plan. On Sundays all the personnel of the BOUP is completely free of details (with the exception, of course, of the actual interior services one).

In addition, at present the officer candidates of all the training subunits headed by the chair instructors are involved in carrying out planned measures during the maintenance days. This is a major help for the personnel of the BOUP. According to the order of the school chief, the officer candidates also are to repair and clean up the classroom buildings, the subsidiary quarters, barracks and maintain order on the territory. By another order, the workday has been systematized for the officers and warrant officers of the Novosibirsk School. The school command is understanding of this problem. At present, the officers and warrant officers each week are given their legal days off. In addition, at present for the BOUP personnel, a schedule of leaves has been worked out and according to this each soldier and sergeant in regular service with affirmative recommendations can visit home during service.

But No Changes for the Better...

I would like to continue the theme of the workweek of an officer in terms of the specific features in our aviation unit. At first let me give a small calculation. During flight days our workday is usually 12 hours long and during days of preflight preparation, eight hours. Considering the maintenance days, a workweek in the unit averages 51 hours. Here I do not include the daily details and the alert duties.

And how was service organized in the unit, for instance, 10 years ago? At that time, the officers had days off on Saturdays and Sundays. On Fridays work lasted only until lunch (if, of course, there were no flights). I am confident that at that time the level of the professional skills of the personnel and the combat readiness of the unit was no lower than now. This was because the men showed greater zeal for their job.

Let us turn now to the present. On Saturdays, we, as a rule, are employed in putting things in order. But these questions could be solved during the week. And with much better quality. And having thereby provided the officers with a five day workweek which is what all Soviet people have.

I want to be correctly understood. In order to convert to the five day week, there is certainly no need to change anything in the combat training system. The unit commander merely has to change his attitude toward economic activities, having provided a good incentive for the personnel.

I am convinced that if the Saturday off for an officer were to depend upon how he worked during the week, his attitude service would be better. This is also one of the basic tasks in perestroika, that is, how to work better and how to live better.

What am I proposing? That in order to at least come anywhere close to a 41-hour workweek, it is important to differentiate the working hours of an officer. On pre-flight preparation days and during the maintenance days, in my view, there is completely no need to organize (before the start and after the end of the work) general regimental formations. This could be done by subunits, without disturbing either the equipment or the quality of working out the posed tasks. And the men would not be kept unnecessarily at the airfield.

There is no doubt about it, exactingness is required. But recreation is also essential. In truth, not everything here depends solely upon the regimental commander. A great deal depends also upon the superior levels. As long as all levels of leaders do not direct their attention to subordinates and do not show proper attention and concern for them, I am afraid there will be no positive changes in our perestroika.

Sr Lt I. Patana,
Red Banner Baltic Military District

The political worker, Col N. Zaporoshchenko, has sent a reply to the editors to the letter of Sr Lt I. Patana:

In the course of an investigation it was established that the facts set out in the letter were partially confirmed. Thus, in the collective under discussion, the 41-hour week guaranteed for an officer by the USSR Constitution and by the demands of the minister of defense was partially not provided. The reasons for this are the complexity of the tasks being carried out, the intensity of the training process and at times the poor organizational activities of the unit leadership. It has been given the corresponding instructions and recommendations on this score.

It was explained to Sr Lt I. Patana that the length of an officer's working day is still not covered by our legislation. When necessary, the commander has the right to demand that one or another job be carried out in nonworking hours. This is dictated by the very purpose

of the air defense troops, that is, ensuring a dependable guard and defense for the USSR air frontiers. The specific work of executing the flights in the unit is actually such that it requires a colossal bending of all spiritual and physical forces of the personnel. The necessity of increasing the workweek of the officers and warrant officers to 46 hours is objectively related to the successful execution of the set tasks by the regiment. This is also reflected in the standard week worked out here and which provides an optimum combination of the interests of service with the interests of the men. I would also point out that considering alert duty and details, the week of the officers and warrant officers would be even further lengthened.

As a compensation for the unnormed workday, let me remind the readers that the government has established a number of benefits for aviators. This includes the rather high level of pay, uniform supply and food, the greater length of leaves, the free travel to the place of the leave and back, the low pension age and the substantial amount of pension.... However, the communist leaders in the unit do not consider the question related to the work time of the officers and warrant officers as finally settled. A search is underway for reserves to intensify the training process and raise combat readiness through the better organization of service and considering a shortening of the length of the workweek.

Where Is the Way Out?

An officer or a warrant officer has a legitimate right to a 41-hour workweek. Due to your journal, we finally know about this. But what has changed since the publishing of "The Legal Right of an Officer"? The only thing has been disturbances and completely unnecessary conversations revolving around the bitter insult from the fact that such a right as before remains on paper. Although your journal may be a very authoritative one, it, unfortunately, can change little.

Here is confirmation of this. We live some 70 km from the place of service. So we must get up in the morning at 0500 hours. And we must travel an hour by bus to duty. And we travel back at 2000 hours. We get home only at 2130 hours. In truth, on Saturday we arrive somewhat earlier, at 1930 hours. Often we must work on days off. And if someone timidly points out that this is not as it should be, then the answer comes back: Well, what about it, you rested last Sunday!

Furthermore, after the 24 hours spent on detail, in our collective no time is given at all for rest. Even if the going on detail coincides, for instance, with a day off, this does not change anything. My fellow servicemen do not know how to achieve their legitimate right to rest. This circumstance gives rise to a feeling of apathy in which our officers, and particularly the younger ones, remain. And as a consequence of this a mass of requests for discharge from the ranks of the Armed Forces. Unfortunately, such requests are not even reviewed. Moreover, the command has stated that dismissal from the army will be carried

out only under the provisions of...discrediting of officer rank! It seems to me that many officers want to get rid not of their rank but rather of the injustice and domestic chaos, the constant fatigue and the bad family situation engendered by the chaotic workweek.

As the secretary of the party organization, this matter is of particular concern for me, for among those who have submitted a request there are also communists. If one examines each specific instance of a reticence to serve, one sees that the reason for this is not only the order of the day which encroaches on the legitimate rights of an officer and removes him from his family. The reason is also in the unsatisfactory supply of food and industrial goods and the extremely poor organization of meals in the garrison mess. What is the way out of the created situation? What can I answer the communists and the other officers?...

Capt V. Kononovich,
Red Banner Baltic Military District

The acting chief of the political department, Col V. Tkach, replied to the editors to the letter from Capt V. Kononovich:

I would inform you that Comrade V. Kononovich has referred not completely accurately to the demand of the USSR Minister of Defense on switching the officer personnel to a five day workweek with two days off. Over a period of five days, the personnel of the directorate of engineer works, where this officer serves, carried out production tasks. On the 6th day, as the minister of defense demands, they are to participate in combat, political and special training. Naturally, in so doing virtually all the officer personnel is involved in conducting exercises with the troops. But Comrade V. Kononovich, as the chief bookkeeper of the UNR [office of work supervisor], does not.

In 1989, the directorate did not work on Sundays. The officers living in the garrison under discussion rested constantly on these days. The exception was the persons on detail. In truth, in June they organized two Sundays for collecting scrap metal and for putting all the construction projects in order. As for providing the officers a day off after serving in the daily detail, the given question is not decided in the current Internal Service Regulations of the USSR Armed Forces.

Now on the question of requests from the officer personnel for a discharge. The officers submitted 17 such requests. But this was caused not by a state of hopelessness in service but rather by the well-known decision to partially cut back on the Armed Forces. And the work carried out to explain to the officers that the military construction units would not fall under the given cutback played a positive role. A large portion of those who wrote out a request took them back.

Nor does the statement by Comrade V. Kononovich on the unsatisfactory supply of the garrison with food products and industrial goods correspond to actuality.

Proceeding from the military trade allocations, each officer is issued a card considering the size of the family for purchasing such products as meat, fish, sausage and commodities. Moreover, for the officers in the given unit, a separate day has been established when everything can be obtained. The statement by Comrade Kononovich on the poor organization of meals in the garrison mess is actually valid. At present, measures are being taken to eliminate the shortcomings in its operations.

The Law Should Be Observed

Commenting on the materials of the selection is the worker of the Main Military Procuracy, Col Just A. Rybchinskiy:

As an analysis of the editors' mail shows, a predominant majority of the letters is devoted to the questions of the legal and social safety provisions for the servicemen. It was for this reason clearly that the article by Col Just V. Bobrenev "The Legal Right of an Officer" evoked such a vital response.

What can be said on the question of these letters? Seemingly, the requirements of the law and the corresponding guiding documents concerning the scheduling of the working time of officers, warrant officers and reenlisted personnel have already been explained at present in sufficient detail and soundness. All the more as the official stance by the Main Military Procuracy on this question is unswerving: any legally established right of an officer should not only be declared but also actually ensured. What happens in actuality? There can be no doubt that the questions regulating the service hours of the officers and warrant officers are among the sphere of social rights. No matter how certain commanders would like to escape from these questions or treat them in their own manner, the objective situation forces us to return to their solution. Certainly this was the issue at the heart of the letters from Lt V. Tkach, Sr Lt M. Dudchenko and his fellow servicemen. I would like to inform the authors that the voice of the public has finally been heard and that the persons standing duty not only on holidays but also on days off should be given a day of rest by the command on the legitimate grounds.

Let me say that the view of the Main Military Procuracy is also firm on the question of the so-called responsible personnel. As is known, their presence in the subunit merely reduces the feeling of responsibility among the personnel on daily detail. And the puzzlement of Warrant Officer I. Volokhatyuk is completely understandable. The appointing of such individuals, of course, is illegal.

It must be admitted that for me personally I am ashamed for the unit political worker or the party leader who would stand on the sidelines with the violating of rights of fellow servicemen. And the question raised in this letter is not a rhetorical one, as laws are promulgated exclusively for their unswerving execution. And the fact

that certain commanders violate their requirements shows both their low sense of responsibility and their low level of legal knowledge.

It is difficult to provide a concrete answer to the questions raised by Sr Lt V. Antipov. But the information given by him reaffirms the truth that "each should have his own bread," that is, be concerned with his own job. Any violation of prescribed discipline automatically involves a violating of the order of the day. This usually happens where they lack organization and planning in the work of the command.

We would like to take up certain questions found in the letter from Capt V. Kononovich. Yes, actually, the journal *KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL* does not represent the interests of the legislative body, it is merely a tribune from which frequently one can hear, including from us, the judge advocates, explanations of the provisions of the law obligatory for execution by all servicemen and officials without exception. Here I am saying what seemingly are pat truths but the mail received by the editors shows that in a number of places these are unresolved problems. And they become bound into a "tight knot" where the officials who possess the powers do not see in the law their assistant or do not consider the social sphere to be of priority.

But the letter from V. Kononovich aroused questions in me. Who is to instill order in that house which the unit is for each serviceman? Or should all service be carried out awaiting the arrival of some "omnipotent fellow" capable of resolving painful questions in a single sweep? Finally, is it beyond the capacity of the party organization, the people's controllers, the women's council and the officer assembly to resolve them? I am hopeful that such bodies do exist in the unit. Clearly these questions could be eliminated if the social organizations enumerated by me were to work actively and show initiative and tenacity.

Here concern for subordinates, for ordering their working hours, as was described for example, by Sr Lt N. Patana, undoubtedly should remain one of the main stipulated duties of the commanders and superiors. Here the entire matter consists in their competence, their legal and moral levels and respect for the law. At the end of my commentary, I will endeavor to answer where the workers of the military procuracies look when the law is violated. In this context I would like to take up two aspects. The military procurators, in exercising superior supervision over legality in accord with the USSR Constitution, supervise the execution of the laws and are obliged to respond solely to their violation.

At the same time, I would point out that instances when such alerts do not become known to the military procurators are, alas, not isolated. At the same time, practice shows that only where there is close interaction between the command, the political bodies, the Army and Navy

community with the military procurators, are all questions resolved efficiently, on the grounds of the unswerving observance of the laws.

Of course, it is difficult to fit military service with its specific features in the Procrustean bed of a systematic work schedule. But if we wish to obtain from each serviceman a maximum return and disclose all his potential capabilities, it is important that the commanders endeavor to create for subordinates those conditions which would ensure their normal rest, cultural development and the possibility of raising their children. All the more as such measures are being taken on a legislative level with a number of appropriate supplements being incorporated in the drafts of the combined-arms regulations; there has been progress also in the legislative reenforcing of the granting of a weekly day off to servicemen; the corresponding standards have been incorporated in the regulation governing service by officers and warrant officers.

Beyond any doubt, military service is a type of specific state service. For this reason, all limitations on the rights of servicemen should be set out in the law. And if such limitations are not provided, then consequently they are inadmissible.

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Reactions To Ukrainian Interest In National Army

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[Unattributed Commentary: "Can One Remain Calm?"; Article by *LENINSKOYE ZNAMYA* correspondent Major V. Bilan: "National Army: Who Needs It And Why?"]

[Text] "I am a communist of many years' standing. I ventured to speak at a rally in an attempt to urge, in a frank and partylike way, its participants to come to their senses. But my voice was drowned out by whistling and vile abuse. There were shouts and calls from all quarters for the physical destruction of communists. I experienced a terror from which I have yet to recover. What is going on in our disintegrating state? Where are we headed? Isn't it high time that you, Mikhail Sergeevich, and the country's leadership as a whole give some serious thought—before it's too late—to the fate of our socialist state, to the fate of our honest working people, and take the most urgent, radical measures? God forbid that the opportunity be missed and that all the hard-won gains of socialism be lost. For that the people will never forgive you."

This letter from Comrade Ignatenko, a communist worker at Kiev's Artem Production Association, was read by A. I. Korniyenko, First Secretary of the Kiev City Party Committee of the Ukraine Communist Party,

at the February plenum of the CPSU Central Committee. As if to summarize what the worker says in his letter, Anatoliy Ivanovich emphasized: "Such views, suffused with sincere concern for the fate of socialism in our country, are being encountered increasingly often of late in appeals from ordinary people. Of course, in the majority of cases, these letters too are motivated specifically by errors and shortcomings in the work of local party and Soviet bodies."

One has to agree with Anatoliy Ivanovich. Indeed, many people—including soldiers and members of their families—have also written the editors of *LENINSKAYA ZNAMYA* of late with indignation, alarm, and pain: Why isn't a stop being put to open calls for slandering the name of Lenin, the October Revolution, communists, the socialist system, and the USSR Armed Forces? What is this—pluralism of views, or a call for destabilization and anarchy? The latter seems primarily the case.

Do Party and Soviet agencies understand the seriousness of the situation? Undoubtedly! The materials of the February plenum of the party Central Committee resoundingly confirm this. But at the same time, to use the words of the first secretary of the Kiev city party organization, it is becoming increasingly clear that the party lacks a comprehensive ideological platform, and that, as a result, the party and its Central Committee sometimes take a defensive posture and do not have, amid pluralism of views, a clear-cut viewpoint of their own.

That hits the nail on the head, as they say. And this is borne out by an unauthorized rally that was held in the Ukrainian capital on the first Sunday in February under the aegis of a certain Union of Independent Ukrainian Youth [SNUM]. The rally turned into a downright antiarmy orgy. The Soviet Army, which drove the fascist monsters off our soil and liberated half of Europe from the Hitlerite yoke was declared to be an occupation army, and defenders of the fatherland were called suppressors, killers, oppressors of freedom. Vladimir Ilyich Lenin also caught it, as did his comrades-in-arms and all who stood at the helm of the October Revolution.

Let us note that the rally was unauthorized, and for this reason a good many legitimate questions arise for city and republic party and Soviet agencies: Is it permissible to slander and disparage the name of Lenin, a name that honest people hold sacred, and to drive a wedge between the army and the people?

Is it really possible to explain this in terms of tolerance for other people's views and respect for a different, perhaps unusual, viewpoint, as an indispensable condition for the healthy development of society? It seems that, in this instance, the objective letter from communist worker Ignatenko is also addressed to the republic government, including the Kiev City Party Committee of the Ukraine Communist Party.

Can one remain calm in the face of such "performances" in the republic capital's squares, streets, and auditoriums? And what is one to think when even at authorized rallies, one reads handwritten signs saying: "Leninism + CPSU Central Committee = the butchers of my rights," "The GULAG and the party are one," and "We demand the withdrawal of occupation troops from the Ukraine." What is this? Pluralism of views and socialist renewal? Neither have anything to do with it.

To echo the materials of the Central Committee's February plenum, one can't help thinking the following: Why, despite the existence of enormous intellectual potential in the republic's party and Soviet agencies, do we feel theoretically disarmed? Why the persistent failure to notice attempts by our super-radicals to topple the leader of the world's first proletarian party from his allegedly undeserved pedestal, and to declare both Marxism-Leninism and the very idea of socialism unviable? Indeed, one gets the impression that in the protracted choice of forces on which one can confidently rely at present, the initiative is increasingly being lost to the extremists. That initiative was also lost on the first Sunday of February.

Let's be fair. For many commanding officers and political officers of all ranks in the Kiev garrison, it was no secret that an antiarmy rally would be held on February 4. And of all people, we shouldn't have sat the rally out in the trenches of temporizing. The intellectual potential of the capital's higher military schools is doubtless not inferior to that of the city. And if attempts were made to interrupt soldiers who tried to uphold the army's honor and appealed for reason, this is weak justification for our passivity. Given good organization and firm contact with local party and Soviet bodies, an alternative function could have been held successfully on that day. It could have involved Patriotic War and USSR Armed Forces veterans, internationalist soldiers, representatives of units, military educational institutions, and all healthy forces, which make up an absolute majority in the republic capital.

And how can we not repeat here the lines from Comrade Ignatenko's letter: "God forbid that the opportunity be missed and that all the hard-won gains of socialism be lost."

National Army: Who Needs It And Why? Rumors about an upcoming "important" rally outside the Ukraine Supreme Soviet building had been going around the city for about a week. And on the eve of the rally, leaflets appeared, immediately attracting groups of passers-by. The content of these opuses, which were pasted to many city fences [podvorotnya] by some unseen hand, did not so much attract as alarm.

To be honest, it was not unexpected that informal movements would turn their attention to army issues. One remembers many categorical statements at the Rukh founding congress about "Russia's occupation of the Ukraine" and calls for the creation of a Ukrainian

national army—for just what purpose we are well aware. And so again, following a short pause, we heard familiar words—granted, this time from different lips.

There was about an hour to go before the rally's start, but passions in front of the monument to N. F. Vatutin were already running high. When a short captain with a driver's insignia appeared in the center of the ever-growing crowd, many had a chance to vent their anger on an army representative and to give him his "most difficult" question. One has to give credit to that lone officer who probably found himself by accident amid the crowd that was gathering for the rally: His ability to listen to an opponent and to engage in polemics did not go unnoticed—for notes of reconciliation began to be heard in some people's statements. But a man in a blue jacket who broke into the circle like a whirlwind completely destroyed the incipient dialogue. His hysterical cries—"What are you doing listening to this marauding soldier?"—made it clear to all that the rally would hardly be a calm and constructive one.

Nor was it. After moving to October Revolution Square, the large stream of people carrying yellow and blue banners and homemade signs was inclined to listen only to "its own." The speakers, who represented various informal movements, often took turns, making it clear just what the thinking is on the subject under discussion in the Union of Independent Ukrainian Youth (SNUM), the Ukrainian People's Democratic League (UNDL), the Ukrainian Helsinki Union (UKhS), and the Ukrainian People's Movement for Perestroika (Rukh), and what certain people think on this issue in Kiev, Lvov, Lutsk, Baku...

There were many views and statements. They covered the widest range and were of the harshest character. A sober-minded person found them hard to grasp—from "explanations" of the need to create a Ukrainian national army to "practical recommendations" as to how to go about this. We will not retell them, but reproduce them in their original form, resorting, for understandable reasons, only to abridgments.

We have no doubt that readers will easily be able to sort out the historical truth of the "revelations" that were uttered, though we can hardly expect them to react calmly to what they read.

And so, why was the army on the agenda? Here is how several speakers "substantiated" this at the rally.

[Yurko Kalinichenkov (SNUM)] Dear ladies and gentlemen and comrades! The Moscow empire, in order to hold on to the territories it has seized, has done everything in its power to prevent the formation of national state entities in each republic. To this end, young men who are serving in the Soviet Army are sent as far away from home as possible.

Dear assembly! It is imperative that we Ukrainians have our own national army, not to mention the fact that forced service in the army is a flagrant violation of human rights.

[Igor Tkachuk (UKhS member)] And most importantly, the central government is virtually a mother country, while all the other republics are colonies. Under these circumstances, the "Soviet" army is, under international law, an occupation army. To conscript people from the colonies for service in an occupation army is a crime.

[A speaker who didn't give his name] Comrades, I am a candidate for Deputy to the Kiev City Soviet from Troyeshchinskiy Electoral District. I don't want to see you fellows fight against your own children, against your own parents. I demand that the Ukraine have its own army. Not the way it was for me—I served in Poland. I don't want my children to oppress other nations in the same way.

[Igor Zaporozhets] We have gathered at this place today, near this symbol of terror and betrayal, near this satanical symbol—Shame on Lenin!—in order to refuse to collaborate with the enemy in a specific area, namely its army, which historically has been hostile, anti-Ukrainian, and antipopular, an organization that has many crimes on its conscience, among them the occupation of sovereign states, such as the Ukraine, Belorussia, the Baltic states, the Caucasus...

And what can we do? There is the 1946 Geneva Convention, which states that the inhabitants of occupied lands do not have to submit to the laws of the occupying power, and a "collaborationist" government of the sort the present government is has no authority over us, and the path that the Bolsheviks offer us, the path of that Lenin—a German traitor, among other things—leads to nowhere. Long live a Ukrainian army!

[Yaroslav Baik (UKhS member)] If we are speaking here about creating a national army and about national rights, we must kill our first enemy—the brutal dictatorship of the Communist Party... Only by throwing off the Bolshevik yoke will we be able to create our own army. That army will march under our yellow and blue banners, and it will protect us.

[Yevgeniy Chernyshov (UNDL coordinator)] No independent democratic state can exist without its own armed forces. To all intents and purposes, the Ukraine republic has never had its own armed forces. And those forces that did exist during the time of the Central Soviet and Petlyura were insufficient.

In our time, a time when the empire has begun tottering and is going to collapse once and for all, each of the 15 union republics, in order to preserve and safeguard its economic and political sovereignty, must have the right to form its own national army. We must demand that our young people do military service only within the territory of their own republic.

Those whose sons will serve or are serving in the army now, above all in "hotspots," had their own opinions.

[V. A. Mirgorodskiy] My son, a paratrooper, is now in Baku. What we read in the press and see on television is all a fraud, disinformation.

I got a letter from my son today. Here is what he writes: "We are already in Baku. An outright war is being fought here. People fire on our posts with hunting rifles and assault rifles every day... We wear bullet-proof vests and carry our assault rifles around the clock."

I demand that the government bring our sons back from that place, in order to prevent that popular revolution from being suppressed.

[G. K. Ivanchenko] That major who spoke had it wrong. He does not understand and never will understand the grief of a mother and father. My son is currently serving in the GDR. What reason does he have to be there? What reason do our children have to be in Czechoslovakia and Poland? This cannot be tolerated.

We cannot continue to accept the fact that our children are fighting against the civilians of Azerbaijan and Armenia. They themselves will sort matters out, and if it proves necessary to impose order, they will request UN troops.

[Vladimir Naumenko] I am lodging a protest with the Ukraine SSR Supreme Soviet and the USSR Minister of Defense against the fact that my son, Sergey Naumenko, did his army service in a region where two peoples vented their hostility against each other. I am against my son's being a murderer or victim in that conflict. Our children must do their compulsory military service only where they live.

[Sergeant Sergey Naumenko] I do not refuse to continue my military service on the territory of the Ukraine SSR, which is not in conflict with existing law (?)... At first I served six months in the Ukraine. Then we were sent to Azerbaijan, where the blood of innocent people is being shed. There aren't very many of us there, but we are holding on as best we can. We are being oppressed there and given the most sordid work to do.

A number of soldiers, among them some doing compulsory service, were in the square where the rally took place. They reacted with indignation to such "gems," which clearly smacked of nationalism. We will present their reactions to our readers in upcoming issues. For now, we will only say that the soldiers are proud to serve in multinational collectives and are delighted to have the opportunity to constantly interact with representatives of different peoples and different national cultures. And one other thing. Readers will no doubt have some questions about Sgt Sergey Naumenko, who, along with his father, took such an active part in the rally. And we can answer some of them. It so happened that several days before the rally, completely unaware of his intention to participate in it, we spoke with the younger Naumenko. The result was

the article "Syndrome of a Dangerous Disease" (which appears on page four). Unfortunately, we were unable to ask additional questions of father and son—for after speaking they "melted into the crowd."

Armenia, Azerbaydzhan, and the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast were mentioned frequently on the square. It sometimes seemed the rally in the Ukrainian capital was devoted precisely to the tragic events occurring in those areas. But on paying closer attention to those passionate "speeches," one couldn't help noticing the organizing influence of a single hand that gathered emissaries from various regions with a single aim—to exploit people's keen sensitivities, to lead them astray, and, most importantly, to emotionally "enrich" the discussion about creating a Ukrainian national army.

[Alakhverdi Fasanov (Baku)] It happened in our republic that the entire people, the People's Front, wanted to remove from power the first secretary and chairman of the Council of Ministers. But they found out about it in advance, prepared themselves, and staged a pogrom in Baku. The KGB and the Ministry of Internal Affairs had a hand in it. When the troops were brought in, arrests began. Soldiers fired on innocent people.

The people are also trying to kill the soldiers. For this reason, the soldiers must be withdrawn from Baku as soon as possible.

[Izolya Gardiyev (Baku)] People's departure from Baku was provoked by the soldiers' families. They are fleeing not from the indigenous nationality but from the military and the soldiers. We have no choice but to join forces; otherwise, they will crush us all.

[Levko Levkovich (Chairman of "Smoloskipu," Lvov)] We have gathered here today to pose a question: How long will that Red Occupation Army continue to exist?

We have come here to say yes to the establishment of a national army of our own. We have every right to serve here in the Ukraine, and we do not want to be occupiers.

Our government fears the creation of a national army. Why? Right now they are putting down the uprising in Armenia and Azerbaijan. And tomorrow, or when the time comes, there will be an uprising here, in the Ukraine. And so they will send them. Such is the aim of this policy.

At rallies of this sort, it has now become fashionable to accuse Lenin, Marxism-Leninism, and Gorbachev of anything and everything. With ever-growing confidence and pride, people cite the names of "national heroes" whose hands are in fact stained with the blood of many innocent people. It is frightening to contemplate: The Bandera axe is raised over the holy of holies. Here is one such "discovery."

[Andrey Shkil (SNUM member, Lvov)] Dear ladies and gentlemen. At this rally, devoted to the formation (!) of an independent Ukrainian army and the adoption of a minimalist program that calls for service on Ukrainian

territory, I cannot help recalling the heroic deeds of our people and the glorious events that took place in the Western Ukraine from 1941 to 1949. I am referring to the glorious Ukrainian Insurrection Army.

It will be recalled that from 1941 to 1949, the Ukrainian Insurrection Army resisted the armed forces. And that army was no pack of bandits, as it is often called in the Soviet press.

We must remember that only a national army can lead the Ukraine to autonomy [samostiynost] and independence.

At such gatherings, one can apparently say anything one pleases, and the more far-fetched, the better, frequently. Part of the audience, as a rule, is already predisposed to such vitriolic and "cooked" facts. Nor were such facts dispensed with in those parts of the speeches that sought to "justify" the need to create a national army in light of the allegedly hellish reality confronting soldiers.

[Yurko Kalinichenkov] You know what the notorious school of life has now become. In addition to the so-called nonregulation conduct, ethnic segregation has appeared. We don't need ethnic clashes. Furthermore, you know that not all individuals were born to serve in the army.

[Vasiliy Korchinskiy] I would like to see our Ukrainian national army made of youths who are at least 20 years of age, because at the age of 18, a person is still politically unaware. Think about it: How can a person who is still politically untempered stand up to the army command's aggression for two years?

One got the impression that most if not all considered themselves specialists on the army. Conclusions and recommendations were offered by everyone, men and women alike, including on such subjects as how big an army we need and how it should be put together.

[Dmitriy Poyezd, candidate for Ukraine SSR People's Deputy] We need to clarify the following: Does the Ukraine need a professional sovereign army? It does. Why are our sons and brothers outside the Ukraine today? Because it's easier that way to maintain the federation. The federation can be maintained only if the army is not a volunteer army, only when its formation is based on the Law on Universal Military Service.

In my campaign program, I wrote the following point: that a law be enacted on contractual service in the army and navy—in other words, that a professional army be established. Such an army's combat readiness would be several times greater than that of our present army, and there would be no ethnic strife.

We need our own national army in order to defend our own sovereign territories. If we fail to achieve this, it will be the end.

[Natalya Stetsyk, candidate for Ukraine SSR People's Deputy (UKhS member, Lvov)] We can hold lots of rallies, but what we really need to do is take specific action.

One of the basic problems that the newly elected parliament must solve is the question of a volunteer national army. Ukrainian youths must serve on Ukrainian territory. And this is what we consider to be of the greatest importance today.

To serve, but only in the Ukraine. And that's that! And what if someone is taken outside the republic all the same? It turns out that the proponents of "autonomy" [samostiynel] have a simple solution.

[Natalya Stetsyk] As a representative of Lvov, I am happy to report that such actions as "solemn" burnings of Communist Youth League and military registration cards are becoming a tradition in our city.

[Igor Tkachuk] If one person tears up his military registration card and refuses to serve, they'll arrest him; but if thousands and millions do so, they won't do anything. We're not going to be cannon fodder for those fanatics!

Only two soldiers took the microphone. And while one, an instructor at a military school, was listened to attentively, the other's words were drowned out in cries of "shame!"

[Colonel A. E. Aslanyan, candidate for Ukrainian SSR People's Deputy] I think that a professional army is not only possible but also necessary at the present stage. However, the professionalization process must take place gradually. Initially, it could be a semiprofessional army, with part of the compulsory-duty soldiers replaced by professional soldiers and sailors.

[Soviet Army Major Aleksandr Ivanovich (the officer's last name was inaudible due to shouts of "Glory to the Ukraine")] I'm a Ukrainian. I heard a mother speak here. Naturally, she didn't want her son to serve far away, to die some place far away from his motherland. One has to understand her as a mother. But this is doubtless not the viewpoint from which one has to consider such important and critical issues as organizing army service on the basis of national apartments, including the Ukraine. Imagine national units in Azerbaijan and Armenia, equipped with tanks and missiles and moving against each other. Such a wave could never be stopped...

It's hard to somehow mentally "digest" simultaneously the passions that engulfed the square and to get over a sudden feeling of intense agitation. It turns out that we who cleared the Ukrainian land of the Wrangel, Denikin, Petlyura, and Makhno fascist scum; who are subduing the radiation of Chernobyl and rebuilding the destroyed cities of Armenia; and who daily work to improve our professional skills for the sake of just one thing—the dependable defense of the motherland, that we, in the words of many speakers, are occupiers and oppressors.

There's no overlooking the following theme that ran through most of the speeches: He who is not with us is against us. Obviously, the time has come to recall that the ostracism of the "man with the gun" on which certain informal organizations so thrive is fraught with far-reaching consequences: A people that does not respect its army, to use the words of a military authority of the past, is doomed to feed the army of the enemy. Apparently, someone deliberately wants to divide the Soviet Army among its national apartments, forgetting that the defense of the socialist fatherland is our common task, a task that brooks no regionalism, egoism, or self-interest.

Yes, perestroika is needed in the army as well. And it's no secret that much is already being done in this area. At any rate, he who does not take a distorted look at life will notice many changes. But not everyone, it seems. This is borne out by the "troubling revelations" at the unauthorized rally.

We soldiers are always ready for dialogue on the most diverse topics. Army unit checkpoints are open to all who have a sincere interest in gaining a deeper understanding of life in the army for members of their own ethnic group, kinsmen, and fellow countrymen in general. In such instances, we always say "come right in"; for the unity of the interests of army and people have always been the guarantee of our common strength.

Soldiers of the most diverse nationalities have always been proud to serve on the banks of the Dnepr and Slavutich, and all their life have had in their hearts the warmest memories of the Ukrainian people's hospitality. And suddenly we hear this talk of "occupiers" and "janizaries." Who benefits from driving a wedge between the army and the people?

Let us, dear readers, contemplate the answer to this question together.

Expanding Role of 'Democratic Institutions' Seen Advantageous

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[Article by Col N. Belyakov, candidate of philosophical sciences, under "Theory and Practice" rubric: "To Have the Right...: On the Legal Status of Army and Navy Democratic Institutions"]

[Text] Democratization in the army and navy.... Are we satisfied with the pace of the development of this process? The justification for putting the question in this way is the reality itself in the army and navy. On the one hand, one cannot deny the fact that democratization has taken its first steps in the armed forces. New democratic institutions have arisen: permanent certification boards, officers' assemblies, councils of Komsomol organizations and others. There has been an increase in the public political activity of many military personnel. On the

other hand, however, the process of democratization is proceeding sluggishly in a large number of units and combined units and in some place it is simply being impeded. A large number of the soldiers are showing passivity in public work and indifference to the affairs of their own collective. Glasnost in some units amounts at best merely to the uncovering of shortcomings. In other words, the accusatory side prevails over the constructive side. The regulations have just not become laws of life for many servicemen. The turning to the individual and his needs is just a declaration and a nice slogan for some officers. Some commanders and superiors continue to ignore the opinions of party organizations and other democratic institutions and are counting on the strength of the "authority" of the military rank and position held. Today there are frequent cases of haughtiness, arrogance and sometimes downright rudeness toward subordinates. One also encounters officers who knowingly do not accept the ideology of perestroika in the army and long for the times of stagnation.

This is how the wife of a serviceman quoted the chief of the political section of a combined unit on perestroika and democratization in the army in her letter to the editor's office: "Freedom is democracy, democracy is power and power is dictatorship. Perestroika leads to a dead end and here it did not and will not exist."

Unfortunately, such opinions are not unusual. One can hear many officers say that the army does not need democratization. There is the oath and regulations. Carry them out and you will have precisely what perestroika requires. Of course the oath and regulations concisely define the order of service as well as the rights and duties of persons in authority and all servicemen. But these documents do not act by themselves, automatically, but are put into effect by people and relate primarily to the individual. So it is not a matter of what the oath and regulations mean for the soldier but of how they are implemented in practice. In this connection, it is very important for the military supervisor to know how to combine the strengthening of the unity of command and military discipline with democratization in the army and navy. And there is an objective basis for this. For democratization does not contradict one-man command but is dialectically interrelated with it. This is dictated by the community of interests and objectives of all categories of servicemen. **Democratization presupposes a reasonable social order that is guaranteed through the establishment of a responsible attitude of each serviceman to his duties. And one-man command guarantees precisely the personal responsibility of supervisors as well as performers.**

One-man command in the armed forces is a basic organizational principle of military leadership. But as everyone knows, it presupposes the full controlling authority of the commander (superior). In this connection, one frequently hears that as long as the principle of one-man command prevails in the army the very idea of the inclusion of democratic institutions in the process of the functioning of authority is absurd. It is, they say, only

possible to increase their social and political activity! This idea is clearly seen in the regulations, order and directives now in effect and in all the positions regulating the action of the institutions of socialist democracy in the army, including those that came into being after April 1985. The common element characterizing them is the absence of a legal status or mechanism that would regulate the relationship between commanders (superiors) and the social-political and independent organizations of the armed forces. The democratic institutions do not have a right to make a final decision even in those matters for which they were established. They are only permitted to "petition" or "ask" the commander (superior), who at best will confirm or consider their decision in his own work and at the worst will simply not agree. The latter outcome is not so infrequent in troop practice. But the reader will say that this is blatant administration by injunction. And you will have to agree with him, for the one-man command presupposes not only rights but also obligations of the leader in relation to the collective, democratic institutions and all servicemen. This results from the methodological position of Marxism: "There are no rights without obligations and there are no obligations without rights" K. Marx and F. Engels, "Sochineniya" [Collected Works], Vol 16, p 13).

The unity of rights and obligations in the actions of the commander is dictated by the very essence of one-man command in the army. The latest issue of the Military Encyclopedic Dictionary states: one-man command is a "principle of military leadership under which commanders (superiors) are given full controlling power in relation to subordinates and have full responsibility for all aspects of the life and actions of troops. It is expressed in the right of the commander to make decisions by himself, to give orders and instructions and to see that they are carried out."

It is not difficult to note that this lengthy definition expresses two sides of authority: one is the right of commanders to "make decisions by themselves and to give orders..." and the other—not entirely clear—is their obligation to defend and realize in practice the interests of the collectives under their leadership "through the fullness of their controlling authority." This obligation is dictated by the very peculiarity of one-man command in the army, which today is realized on a party basis and will be on a democratic and law-governed basis with the establishment of a law-governed state.

Thus, theoretically rights cannot exist separately from duties and vice versa. In practice, however, in real life, we often observe a gap between them. This is one of the fruits of the administrative-command system. Precisely the gap between rights and obligations in the structure of authority led to distortions in the application of the principle of one-man command in practice.

The absolutization of rights and "forgetfulness," the conscious ignoring by commanders (superiors) of their obligations with respect to subordinates, mean that authority gets out of control and begins to function outside

the law. All of this gives rise to many negative phenomena: violations of discipline and misuse of the service position, deception and indifference, and sometimes a rude attitude toward subordinates and disregard for their needs and interests.

In 1989, according to the data of the Main Military Procuracy of the USSR Ministry of Defense, the violated rights of more than 8,500 people were restored through the intervention of military procurators, and they satisfied more than 5,000 complaints and requests with which servicemen and members of their families had previously turned to the command without results.

The question arises: Why does some officer or another who is obliged to rely...does not rely and who is obliged to be guided strictly by...is not guided? There are different reasons for this in every specific case. But there are also general reasons. For example, there are moral and ethical reasons. If, let us say, a leader himself has an unscrupulous attitude toward the performance of his obligations, is indifferent to the service, violates regulations, has separated himself from his subordinates and does not know their needs and interests, then what kind of a one-man command on a party and law-governed basis can this be? There are officers-leaders who think that once the party and state have given them full controlling authority they no longer have to take into account the party organization, public forces and the opinion of servicemen. They, it is said, are obligated to be concerned about the authority of the commander and to help him in all of his undertakings and actions.

Under conditions in which the operating regulations cannot yet serve as an effective means for the legal regulation of relations between commanders and subordinates, the party organization can and must warn the one-man commander against various kinds of violations and obligate him to take into account the decisions of democratic institutions and the opinion of the collective. For in the unit only it has the right to take the commander to account as a communist for service omissions, misuse of authority and immoral conduct. And as practice in the troops and navy shows, some individual leaders have had to answer for their offenses against communists and under their influence get rid of their shortcomings. The authority of officers did not decline because of this. On the contrary, it increased. And the principle of one-man command did not suffer but was enriched with new content. Lt Col V. Kutsenko, who was heard twice at the meeting of the party committee for violations of discipline and service failures, can serve as an example of this. And today V. Kutsenko, having drawn the correct conclusions from the party criticism, improved significantly in his work and raised his responsibility for the assigned work.

But there are frequent instances when for some reason party organizations are silent and prefer to keep to the side and when it is necessary to raise their voices in

defense of the party member and to be demanding and high-minded with respect to the communist leader who has exceeded his bounds.

The letters of servicemen to the editor's office with the request that they be protected against the arbitrariness of superiors are a confirmation of what has been said. Let us mention one letter from the officer F. Lozovskiy, who was arrested for 3 days just for appealing to the military procuracy (see KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL, " No 22, 1989, p 15). Lt Col V. Shiyon rightly wrote to the editor's office on the occasion of this publication: "I cannot fail to direct your attention to the fact of the flagrant inaction of the deputy commander of a regiment in a political unit and party committee secretary. After all, F. Lozovskiy is a member of the CPSU but his letter does not even mention the position of the political officer and party organization...."

The unprincipled position of individual party organizations sometimes leads to the fact that officers with low professional and moral qualities take over the leadership of units and combined units. Just in 1989, 2 commanders of combined units and 15 commanders of units and ships were removed from their duties or demoted for immoral conduct and gross mistakes and failures in their service in the armed forces. Eighteen political officers whose professional and moral conduct did not measure up to the position held were dismissed to the reserves.

Why does this happen? One of the reasons, in my view, is the complete dependence of the secretary of the party committee (bureau) and activists on the commander. Having taken the first step of extending the rights of primary party organizations, it is expedient to take the second of developing the legal mechanism of their interrelationships with commanders and superiors.

The fact that servicemen are restricted in a legal sense also contributed to the abuse of rights and the neglect of duties.

The serviceman does not have the right to change occupation or his place of service or to be discharged on his own wish; to be involved in cooperative and individual work for payment; to be compensated for a material loss sustained as a result of personal injury or trauma in the performance of the duties of his military service; to appeal to a court for incorrect actions of military officials; to annual leave (inducted personnel), etc.

The restricted rights of servicemen lead to their poor social protection. One out of every two letters to the editor's office from officers and members of their family talks about the fact that individual leaders are disregarding regulations and orders, thereby violating the principle of social justice.

Sociological studies give a more graphic picture of the violation of the principle of social justice by a number of commanders and superiors. The results indicate that abuse of authority and violations of laws and regulations

by those who are supposed to defend them are by no means infrequent in the troops and fleets.

According to the results of sociological studies, more than 60 percent of the respondents declared that there are instances of the violation of social justice in the army manifesting themselves in the interrelationships with the superior officer. Fifty percent of those questioned are not satisfied with the existing system of promotion. From 50 to 80 percent of the officers in different units are not satisfied with living conditions. More than 60 percent of the officers questioned link their lack of social protection with the receipt of orders and instructions from their immediate superiors that contradict the requirements of laws and statutory norms.

But it seems to me that the main reason for the distortion of the principle of one-man command and the gap between the rights and obligations of commanders and superiors is the fact that the **democratic institutions in the army essentially do not have any real rights that would obligate the leaders to take into account their decisions.** And if this is the case, how can that same unit commander rely on institutions without rights? After all, one can only lean on something that has substance. This, it appears, is why it is necessary to grant a legal status to all institutions of socialist democracy in the army. It is necessary to have a legal mechanism for the regulation of their relationships with commanders and superiors, those relations that today are primarily based (despite the existence of general military regulations) upon the personal qualities of the leader, that is, on the subjective factor. But they should be founded on a legal basis. It must not be otherwise in a law-governed socialist state.

Let us take, for example, the interim Statute on the Assembly of Officers that was intended for two years. According to this document, this institution can "examine" and "discuss" different questions in the service and everyday life of officers. Unit commanders (who are likewise chairmen of the assemblies) are "obliged to consider the decisions of the assemblies of officers." But they may also not agree with them. And then this matter is reviewed by the superior officer.

One asks where the democracy is here. For it is well known that democracy is a unity of rights and obligations, a harmonizing of the relationships between the leader and public-political and voluntary organizations, mutual responsibility one for another, and equality before the law and regulations. In my view, not one of these requirements is sufficiently well expressed in the interim Statute on the Assembly of Officers.

Many participants in the All-Army Assembly of Officers that took place in December of last year in Moscow pointed out that the assembly of officers is without rights. Thus, Capt Yu. Sheyko said: "I cannot fail to mention three lines in the Statute on the Assembly of Officers that push it onto the path of formalism and conditional participation in the resolution of some question or other. It turns out that officers can 'discuss,'

'guarantee' and 'mobilize' but they cannot decide anything. Such 'rights' degrade the very essence of the assembly of officers and cast doubt on the competence of the certification boards and the high-mindedness of party bodies.... I propose that if the assembly of officers has made a decision on the dismissal of an officer (and it must be given such a right), then the matter should be resolved immediately and not rescinded. The collective must be trusted."

Marshal of the Soviet Union S.F. Akhromeyev also spoke out in favor of giving the assembly of officers specific rights. "I think," he noted, "that it is necessary to give greater opportunities to assemblies of officers of units. They must have rights to ensure social justice with respect to officers." Unfortunately, in the amended statute as well (see KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 14 February 1990), the assembly of officers can still only "examine" and "work out specific suggestions" but it does not have the right to make a final decision on any question involving the service career of officer personnel.

Nor are other democratic institutions—certification boards, officers' comrades' courts of honor, women's councils, sports committees, etc.—given the right of a "deciding voice." And it follows that their decisions are also not binding for the unit commander. But how can one obligate a commander with full authority to implement these decisions? It is clear that one ought to give rights to democratic institutions and secure them in new general military regulations. In short, as it was said above, they should be given a legal status and made to "work" fully for the social protection of servicemen and the preservation of the dignity of service. This will be a qualitative leap in the democratization of the armed forces. To implement it, however, it is necessary to make the corresponding changes in all the positions of the institutions of socialist democracy now in operation in the army.

The obligation of preserving the dignity of military service and the soldier's honor was first given to the community of officers by the founder of the Russian regular army Peter the First. His ukase on 25 July 1721 granted to the community of officers of each regiment the right to express their own opinion on the conduct of their comrades. The final deciding of the question thereby belonged to the Military Collegium. During the entire 18th century and the Alexander era, the rights of the communities of officers were expanded significantly. This is the subject of a whole series of legislative decrees. Ukases of the tsarist government introduced the balloting of officers for vacant ranks and the strict observance of this system was prescribed under the threat of punishment. Officer communities were granted the right not only to discuss the conduct of their comrades but also to discharge them from the regiments. All of the officer ranks of the regiment took part in the preliminary discussion of the action. If the officer acknowledged his guilt, the regiment commander immediately ordered him to request a discharge and resolved this matter within 24 hours.

The decrees introduced by Peter the First and supplemented after him were cancelled in 1829. Then, in 1863, the courts of the officer communities began to function once again. The greatest innovation was the decree on the procedure for the appeal of sentences (1879).

The logical question arises: Does not the giving of legal status to democratic institutions undermine the principle of one-man command in the army? No, of course not. On the contrary, under such an approach this principle is filled with a qualitatively new content and will "work" to raise the moral authority and power of the commander. For it is well known that discipline and legal order are the foundation and guarantor of democracy. But they are the basis of strong authority. Accordingly, the course of giving legal status to the democratic institutions of the armed forces does not undermine the principle of one-man command and does not lead to a weakening and liberalization of authority and legal order but to their strengthening.

And still another argument. Actual life practice has shown that the authority of the leader is in his support in the collective, in the ability to accumulate the advanced ideas of subordinates and to implement them, using the authority given him. Democratic institutions thereby appear as storehouses of collective thought, which they "offer" to the commander through their decisions. For this reason, the latter's ignoring of these decisions is a blow against his own authority and the principle of one-man command. There is no contradiction here either, for in such a case the thesis of the "commander's relying on the party organization and other institutions" is transformed from a declarative slogan to the real practice of their interrelationships. The commander actually becomes the spokesman and implementor of the interests of the collective, only now on a legal basis. And the fears of those who think that with the giving of legal status to all democratic institutions the commander (superior) will have to use his authority to implement the illegal decisions that he makes are in vain. On the contrary, under individual decision-making the probability of making mistakes is significantly greater. The practice in the troops and navy indicates that annually unit commanders issue from 6,000 to 7,000 illegal orders. It is no accident that a juridical service—assistants of the unit commanders for legal work—has been introduced in the army and navy.

The giving of legal status to public-political and voluntary organizations of units will not directly affect such areas of military life as combat and political training, alert duty, routine duty activities, flights and sea cruises. But even here there are democratic principles in the work of the commander. In working out and making decisions (for example, on the organization of the combat training of soldiers), he listens to the opinions and suggestions of the staff, deputies and chiefs of service and takes the most rational of them. The decision worked out in this way essentially accumulates in itself the reason and will of the entire collective. Expressed later in an order, it becomes the law for subordinates.

But at least two conditions are necessary for the unit commander to act in this way. The first relates to his professional and personal qualities. He must be competent, resolute and bold, accessible and fair. The second has to do with his work style, indispensable components of which are the unity of words and actions and consideration of the opinions and suggestions of subordinates.

Of course the idea of the legal status of democratic institutions and the expansion of the rights of servicemen is not undisputed and requires further scientific study. But practice indicates that the principle of one-man command in the form in which it is understood today is in conflict with the developing process of democratization in the army and navy. It is necessary to seek a way to resolve this conflict. It is seen in the establishment of a legal mechanism that defines the interrelationships between commanders (superiors) and the democratic institutions of the army and navy. This will help to organize relations in military collectives on a legal basis and to make them dependent only upon the subjective factor—the ethical-political, professional and moral qualities of leaders.

And it is important to talk about still another aspect of the problem under consideration. Essentially all institutions of socialist democracy in operation in the society are represented in the armed forces today. An analysis of their functional roles shows that some of these institutions may be eliminated without harm to the cause of democratization in the army. For example, the officers' comrades' courts of honor and their functions can be transferred to the assembly of officers, including with the right to demote officers and dismiss them from their current slot and even discharge them from the armed forces. This not only would raise the authority of the named institution but would also strike a powerful blow against protectionism and would help to increase the force of public opinion and to improve the moral climate in military collectives.

The dialectics of one-man command and democratization of military life requires not only a new view of the principle of one-man command and of the role of public-political and voluntary organizations but also an expansion and enrichment of their ties with all the institutions of the society. Qualitative shifts are also needed here. The permanent (and not just on holidays and anniversaries) participation of representatives of local party and soviet authorities, labor collectives, veterans of war and labor and internationalist soldiers in the work of army and navy political agencies, party organizations and other democratic institutions can serve in this. A step toward this was taken by the Komsomol of the army and navy, in the interim Statute on the Councils of Komsomol Organizations of which it is written: "...local Komsomol agencies work in the councils of Komsomol organizations of the armed forces."

The resolution of the set problems will contribute to the further strengthening of the unity of the army and the

nation, of that unity that presupposes mutual responsibility: the responsibility of the army for the security of the society and the preservation of the peaceful labor of the people and the responsibility of the society for the equipping of the armed forces with everything needed, for the high-quality moral and physical training of pre-induction youths and for the social and living conditions of officers and all servicemen.

Democratization is making a way for itself in the army and navy, although with difficulty. The full realization of the great potential of all democratic institutions will contribute to the acceleration of this process, which will doubtless have a favorable influence on the qualitative improvement of the armed forces.

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Marshal V. Mikhalkin on Election Appeal, Political Stance

*90UM0477A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
14 Apr 90 First Edition p 1*

[Interview with Marshal of Artillery V. M. Mikhalkin by Colonel V. Chernukhin: "The Temptation of 'Catchy' Appeals"]

[Text] Eleven deputy candidates are vying for the RSFSR people's deputy seat for the Northern National Territorial Electoral District No 12. One of them is Marshal of Artillery V. M. Mikhalkin, chief of missile forces and artillery of the ground forces, who is interviewed here today.

[Chernukhin] Vladimir Mikhaylovich, the results of the 4 March elections in the Northern National Territorial Electoral District No 12 were deemed invalid supposedly as a result of you contesting them. Could you explain what happened?

[Mikhalkin] I would like to make it clear right away that the complaint addressed to the Central Electoral Commission is signed by six out of nine people's deputy candidates, and not just by me, as might be understood from reports in some of the mass media.

The complaint turns attention to the astounding carelessness and even prejudiciousness displayed by the district electoral commission during preparation of the ballot. It was to blame for incorrectly indicating either the place of permanent residence and employment or the position of five of the people's deputy candidates. But the commission would not meet A. A. Vekshin half-way when he asked them to correct a disappointing error that affected his interests. It did not make the necessary corrections in the data of the other candidates either. At the same time despite our protest, on the day prior to the election my place of residence was corrected on the ballots by hand, with pen and ink, at the election precincts. Our suggestions for ways to resolve this delicate situation were rejected.

The reaction of voters to the corrections on the ballot confirmed our apprehensions. A number of Leningrad citizens thought that someone was trying to deceive them. Ballots "decorated" with the corrections elicited a clear sense of wariness among voters.

But that's not all. The complaint also contains information on cases of unlawful campaigning on election day not only near the election precincts but also in the voting booths. A document attesting to this was attached.

[Chernukhin] We heard young people at a certain election precinct skeptically declaring that you're not a radical. What do you think in this regard?

[Mikhalkin] If you define radicalism as recklessness at the people's expense, as simple rejection of everything, then I would have no objection to this. I would like you to turn your attention to a certain paradox. There is a particular faction of our society which refers to itself as radicals, and it often bases its activities on a criticism of the radicalism of prior years. I would like to recall for them what Hegel so aptly said: Experience and history teach us that the people and the government have never learned anything from history. I personally am in favor of radical, decisive actions, but only if they rest not upon loud campaign slogans but on an accurately verified forecast of the possible consequences of adopted decisions. In the final analysis, people are not guinea pigs on which to conduct experiments that ultimately affect the welfare of the authors of these projects the least of all.

[Chernukhin] At the threshold of the 45th anniversary of our victory in the Great Patriotic War, the question I have, Vladimir Mikhaylovich, is to you as a participant of this war, including the battle of Leningrad. It is no secret that "neo-ideologists" are currently attempting to represent the victorious Soviet people as the aggressor, and the sacrifices they suffered as something not deserving of remembrance and respect. What is your opinion on this account?

[Mikhalkin] True, it is not a rare thing today for the periodical press, television and radio to carry more and more reports assessing the events of 1941-1945 on the basis of not historically authenticated facts and reference materials but on emotions and fabrications. I would go even farther: A "version" according to which we had not prepared for the war, that we had not trained adequately to fight, and so on is being purposefully spread and savored. Such ideological attempts by certain authors at commercial sensationalism and a fear of being too late to make their contribution to "dispelling the myths" about our victory do not bring us any closer to restoring the historical truth, educating our youth and preparing them for defending the motherland. It is painful to the bottom of my soul, and it is embarrassing to me as a representative of the older generation that this has become possible under the conditions of socialist reality.

I am not opposed to glasnost and pluralism, but I am opposed to falsification of history. The historical truth of the war is widely known both in our country and abroad. I am certain that it will triumph.

Defensive Tactics: Actions in Forward Defensive Sector

90UM0419A Moscow VOYENNY VESTNIK
in Russian No 3, Mar 90 (Signed to press 16 Feb 90)
pp 13-16

[Article by Maj Gen Yu. Fotiyev, chief of the Tactics Department at the Military Academy imeni M.V. Frunze, and Col G. Ionin, candidate of military sciences, docent: "Conducting a Defense"]

[Text] We know that the theory of tactics studies the substance and the nature of modern combat, reveals its laws and principles and develops methods of preparing for and conducting combat operations. With respect to a defense, the magazine VOYENNY VESTNIK has already discussed certain tenets of the theory. (VOYENNY VESTNIK, issues 3 and 8, 1988) In order to round out the coverage, we shall discuss the functioning of a motorized rifle battalion defending in the forward defense area as the PO [forward detachment] in a regiment's 1st and 2nd echelons.

In the Forward Defense Area

The Great Patriotic War experience has taught us that the success of a defense in the forward defense area is ultimately achieved by skilful actions, great activity and maneuvering on the part of the forward detachments and by the steadfastness and determination of all the personnel. For example, on 22 June 1941 a reinforced battalion of the 41st's Rifle Division's 139th Regiment commanded by Sr Lt V. Vernikovskiy was assigned the mission at 04:00 of covering the state border on the left flank of the large formation as a forward detachment. Following a 30-kilometer march, part of the battalion's forces together with Lt. I. Sazonov's 13th Border Outpost halted the enemy's subunits at the Brusno Nove, Klezuvka line (8-10 kilometers from the state border), drove them back 3-4 kilometers and then went over to a defense. After setting up the fire system and digging in, the forward detachment also succeeded in repelling an attack by the main forces of an advancing fascist regiment during the second half of the day. The bold and vigorous actions of the forward detachments enabled the division's main forces (Maj Gen G. Mikushev, commander) to occupy a defense in good time and hold back an onslaught by four divisions of the enemy's 17th Field Army for almost a week.

In a modern situation the defensive battle begins for a battalion operating as the forward detachment in the forward defense area when it reaches the line of vulnerability for its weapons. In all cases alert weapons, including tanks, infantry combat vehicles (armored personnel carriers), machine guns and others are designated in the subunits during preparations for the defense. They are at alternate positions or temporary fire positions a constant state of readiness for destroying separate enemy groups attempting to reconnoiter and clear passages through obstacles, and also for firing at aerial targets.

The commander of the forward detachment reports through channels when the forward subunits begin moving out. When necessary he details the missions for attached and organic weapons and gives them the signal to open fire at maximum range. The superior commander provides constant support for the forward detachment's combat with his own assets. The bulk of the fire is concentrated on advancing enemy columns as they cross road junctions, bridges, fordings, mountain passes and other narrow spaces, as well as during deployment for the attack.

As we discuss combat in the forward defense area we want to stress the fact that the main method of fighting by the subunits defending it are restraining actions. They consist mainly in opposing the enemy's superiority in forces and weapons with well organized resistance at several successive lines. The basic difference between this and a positional defense is that the subunits are not tied down by the need to hold weapon and other positions no matter what.

Conducting a mobile defense, the battalion pins down and exhausts the enemy, inflicts losses upon the enemy with all weapons, halts the enemy and forces him to commit his main forces to the battle and to attack on a disadvantageous axis, drawing him into fire pockets and sectors of prepared obstacles. Ambushes with fire are extensively employed, combat security is posted and combat reconnaissance patrols are sent out for this purpose.

When conditions are favorable part of the forces may conduct brief, surprise counterattacks with limited objectives: halting the enemy, for example, frustrating individual enemy attempts to skirt the defense area and establishing a good situation for other subunits to break off combat and maneuver to strong points at the next line.

In one exercise, for example, a reinforced motorized rifle battalion was repelling an attack and having a difficult time holding the first position in the forward defense area. It was discovered that 10 "enemy" tanks and infantry combat vehicles were skirting the forward detachment's right flank, threatening to reach the rear area. It was clear that it was time to withdraw to the next line. In order to ensure a planned withdrawal Maj S. Kulikov, battalion commander, decided to halt the outflanking group with artillery and a brief counterattack and then execute the move to the second position covered by part of the forces on the front. This decision, approved by the superior commander, brought the battalion total success.

Ambushes with various types of fire play an important role in a defense in the forward defense area. They restrain the advance of enemy columns, secure intervals and lines between subunits, cover bridges and railroad junctions prepared to be blown up and prevent sabotage and reconnaissance groups from infiltrating into the defensive depth. Tank, motorized rifle and antitank

subunits of up to a platoon, individual tanks, infantry combat vehicles (armored personnel carriers) and anti-tank systems and specially trained and outfitted groups of scouts and motorized riflemen may be designated as part of these ambushes.

When the enemy approaches to within effective firing range the ambushes open direct, destructive fire on their own or at a command from the forward detachment's commander. Artillery fire is also summoned if necessary. After inflicting maximum damage upon the enemy, they rapidly leave their positions and take up their positions in the battalion's (company's) combat formation.

Air defense subunits and alert weapons of the motorized rifle subunits combat airborne landing forces and airmobile groups. In case enemy forces land, they are destroyed by the artillery and by subunits of the forward detachment located nearby but not engaged in battle. If the forces and weapons are inadequate, however, the landing forces are blockaded by the motorized rifle subunits and then destroyed by the artillery, with air strikes and the weapons of the commander which deployed the forward detachment.

The movement of subunits to the next position is carried out secretly, with the consent or at the order of the senior commander, in approach march formations or columns. Maximum use is made of natural concealing features, and aerosols are frequently used. It is supported by aircraft, artillery and a specially designated covering force—ordinarily up to a reinforced motorized rifle (tank) platoon from each company.

At the next position the subunits occupy the places assigned to them in the combat formation and prepare as rapidly as possible for repelling an enemy attack. The covering subunits are the last to leave. Combat engineers destroy roads, bridges, hydraulic engineering works and other important enemy facilities.

Following the battle at the next position in the forward defense area, the forward detachment withdraws through openings left on routes of movement through artificial obstacle set up in front of the forward edge of the main defense zone. The battalion arranges interaction in advance to secure their passage through.

At the First Position

If the enemy's forward subunits attempt to breach the first position of the main defense zone from the march or to reconnoiter it, battalions of the regiment's first echelon enter the battle. If their weapons and subunits give their positions away, they must move.

Passages made through our obstacles by the enemy are immediately closed off in order to enhance the defense. If this is impossible, artillery and other weapons are trained to fire upon them.

When the enemy opens softening-up fire (or immediately prior to that) the battalion personnel take shelter in slit

trenches and dugouts or on the bottoms of open trenches and foxholes, as well as in tanks, infantry combat vehicles and other sheltered sites in a state of readiness rapidly to occupy their positions for repelling the attack. Only observers and alert weapon crews remain at the positions.

Engaging in constant observation, the battalion commander follows the development of events and details the missions for artillery and other weapons for destroying detected high-precision weapon systems, artillery batteries, tanks and other armored vehicles and enemy infantry moving up or preparing for an attack. He simultaneously takes steps to fill in gaps made by enemy weapons in the battalion's combat formation, using armored groups formed in advance, as well as the 2nd echelon or combined-arms reserves.

When the enemy goes over to the attack the battalion's organic, attached and supporting artillery fire upon the enemy with all types of weapons, shell his battle orders and create a situation conducive to the destruction of the attacking armored combat vehicles with antitank weapons, tanks and infantry combat vehicles at maximum firing (launching) range.

The personnel rapidly occupy their positions for battle and open fire when the enemy switches fire into the depth and the attackers approach to within 300-400 kilometers of the forward defensive edge. The fire is increased to maximum intensity as the enemy approaches the battalion's forward defensive edge. The subunits battle the attacking tanks and other armored combat vehicles with all weapons, cut off and destroy their infantry with fire and destroy any which have reached the forward edge with point-blank fire, grenades and hand-to-hand combat. Knife rests, hedgehogs and other moveable obstacles are set up in communication and other trenches to prevent the enemy from spreading out through them.

In a defense the battle for the first position is conducted according to the principle "not a step back without an order". The personnel are therefore required to demonstrate steadfastness and courage in holding every meter of trenches and the strong point as a whole, as was done in the Great Patriotic War. Here is just one example. On the morning of 6 July 1943 around 120 fascist tanks, self-propelled guns and up to a regiment of infantry attacked the 214th Rifle Regiment's defense sector near the village of Krutoy Log, southeast of Belgorod. A determined battle ensued, lasting many hours. More than 30 tanks broke through to the positions of 3rd Rifle Battalion subunits, but the fightingmen did not flinch and did not abandon the trenches. Permitting the tanks to pass through, they cut off the infantry following them and "laid them low" in front of the forward edge. The enemy's attack foundered. Left without infantry support, the enemy tanks suffered losses and turned back.

If the enemy wedges into the defense, the battalion commander halts his advance into the depth and his

spread to the flanks with all weapons, reinforces our position on the breach sector and suppresses the enemy with fire.

In certain cases it is expedient to form part of the tanks and infantry combat vehicles (without landing troops) into battalion (sometimes company) armored groups. Taking up designated fire positions, they are capable of preventing tanks and infantry from breaking through on a threatened axis and covering breaches formed with concentrated strikes with high-precision ammunition. Such groups can also be used for securing flanks and sometimes, for destroying enemy landing troops with fire. After the mission is completed, all of the tanks and infantry combat vehicles take their places in the battalion combat formation.

If armored groups have not been formed, the battalion's second echelon (reserve) may be moved up to the threatened sector. An antitank platoon may also be deployed there.

If relatively small enemy forces have broken into the defense area and localized and his nearest reserves have been detained and if conditions are favorable the battalion commander personally organizes a counterattack by the 2nd echelon (reserve). It is ordinarily conducted jointly with the regiment's second echelon with a decisive objective, up to total destruction of the enemy which has wedged in. In certain cases a counterattack may also be conducted independently, but with a limited objective: the destruction of part of the enemy forces and capture of an advantageous line (elevation) to ensure the success of subsequent defensive operations.

If the enemy outflanks the defense area, the battalion commander sets up an all-round defense, primarily by shifting part of the weapons to the threatened sectors. The remaining subunits continue to hold the strong points occupied and the battalion's defense area as a whole. It is important for subunits which find themselves in the rear of the attacking forces to draw the enemy's attention and pin down his forces as long as possible.

At the Second Position

If the enemy breaks through into the defensive depth the regimental second echelons ordinarily pound him decisively with all weapons from their positions and halt his advance. If the enemy attempts to outflank them and develop the attack on the flanks, a tank battalion and a motorized rifle battalion in infantry combat vehicles move up to fire positions covering the threatened sector and inflict maximum losses upon him, preventing him from spreading out into the defensive depth.

In our opinion, this method of operation for a 2nd echelon battalion at the beginning of a war is preferable to a counterattack. In any case, counterattacks by second echelon regiments against powerful groupings of German fascist forces in the summer and fall of 1941 most frequently failed to achieve their objectives and entailed large losses. With a decisive superiority in

troops and weapons, the enemy forces repelled them relatively easily, particularly since they were conducted primarily without tanks.

We have to admit that second echelon motorized rifle and tank battalions today are perfectly capable of executing counterattacks. They have tanks, infantry combat vehicles and other effective weapons for this.

Upon receiving the order to repel an attack by enemy forces which have wedged into the defense from a line of fire positions or to counterattack, the commander sends out reconnaissance and details the missions for the subunits and weapons. Covered by artillery and air defense weapons, using camouflage and taking steps to protect against high-precision weapons, the battalion rapidly moves up to the designated sector, ordinarily in approach march formation, and deploys. If the situation permits, based on our experience in exercises, it can proceed to the line of fire positions or the line for going over to an attack in a column, assuming battle formation by simultaneously turning the tanks and infantry combat vehicles (armored personnel carriers) to face the enemy.

Following the artillery strike (softening-up fire) the battalion shells the enemy from the deployment line from tanks, infantry combat vehicles and other weapons, putting into disarray his battle formations and, interacting with adjacent forces and first echelon subunits, counterattacks decisively, primarily on a flank or the rear area. The motorized rifle subunits operate from infantry combat vehicles or dismounted behind the tanks. Subunits left in the enemy's rear area steadfastly hold their positions and shell the enemy. When conditions are favorable they may execute an attack toward the counterattacking companies.

We would like to mention in conclusion that although these tenets pertaining to defensive combat are basic ones, they should not be taken as absolute models. It is important to take the specific circumstances into account while following them.

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Problem of International Comparisons of Military Expenditures

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[Article by V. Dyadkin, candidate of economic sciences and USSR IMEMO [World Economics and International Relations Institute, Moscow] Academy of Sciences scientific associate: "The Problem of International Comparisons of Military Expenditures"]

[Text] The need to compare various states' military expenditures is first of all dictated by practical requirements for the systematic reduction of the opposing sides' military budgets (primarily the USSR and the U.S.A.) on a realistic and mutually acceptable basis.

Resolution of the problem of coordinated reduction of the sizes of military budgets could, without exaggeration, be vitally significant in the search for ways out of the deadlock of confrontation and for formation of a safe international peace. Really, the growth of military budgets in the world is directly related to intensification of military preparations and swollen military budgets in and of themselves are an important prerequisite that gives rise to an increasingly high quantitative and qualitative level of arms and military equipment. Therefore, the carefully considered application of measures for mutual reduction of military expenditures is a quite reliable method for curtailing the opposing sides' military preparations. It is also very important that it could effectively prevent the sides from implementing various measures to materially "compensate" for arms eliminated by treaties. Finally, a systematic reduction of military appropriations will not only result in the restriction of military activities—a reduction of the quantity of military equipment, troop strength, etc., but also really release resources for the needs of socio-economic development that will be an important factor in accelerating scientific and technical progress and establishing a new international economic order, etc.

While considering the international situation, the USSR has begun a significant unilateral reduction of its own military budget¹ and the conversion of resources released during the course of disarmament to satisfaction of socio-economic needs.

In its approach to the reduction of military expenditures, the Soviet Union has proceeded and is proceeding from its principled course for limiting the arms race using all available means in all directions wherever corresponding problems have matured for resolution. At the same time, the close link that exists between the reduction of military expenditures, disarmament and development has always been widely recognized and stressed. That is precisely why the USSR, while taking into account the situation in the world, has advanced and is already carrying out a specific proposal to unilaterally significantly reduce its military budget along with measures to transform the nuclear and conventional arms races by limiting their levels.¹

The massive unilateral reduction of military expenditures (and also the unilateral reduction of our troop strength) is being carried out in a spirit of good will to impart an exclusively defensive orientation to our armed forces. It is clear that further steps along the path of unilateral disarmament are limited by the bounds of reasonable sufficiency and the need to maintain reliable military-strategic parity with the U.S. and NATO countries. Thus we will also have to strive to achieve an international agreement on reduction of military budgets on a realistic and mutually acceptable basis.

The Soviet Union has expressed a desire to participate in preparatory work on this problem within the framework of the UN. A USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs letter to

the UN Secretary General on confidence building measures and increasing openness and glasnost in the military sphere emphasizes in this regard: "Recognizing the UN's important role in promoting the resolution of the military budget reduction issue, the USSR, within a time period announced by it and when conditions have been created for the realistic comparison of military expenditures, will begin to utilize the standardized accounting system that exists within the UN to present data about its military expenditures. At the present time, we are ready to become involved in UN work to systematically study military budget data information and comparison problems."²

A group of experts, under the aegis of the UN and within the framework of the so-called International Comparisons Project, has been engaged in military budget comparison issues since 1973. At the present time, UN experts have already developed in general terms a hard currency purchasing power parities accounting methodology as applied to military budgets and have obtained the first results of its use with reference to military expenditures of a number of developed capitalist countries. In this sense, a critical understanding of the acquired experience of comparing military expenditures appears to be useful.

As applied to military expenditures (or even to the sphere of military economics as a whole), hard currency purchasing power parities are a conversion factor (index) which is used in international comparisons instead of the currency exchange rate. In contrast to the latter, it fixes an average price ratio to primary military goods and services in the countries being compared. The primary advantage of using purchasing power parities consists of the fact that it permits assessment of one country's military expenditures in another country's monetary units while considering the price levels and the military consumption structures of the countries being compared.

The application of purchasing power parities instead of hard currency conversion rates in inter-country comparisons is undoubtedly worthwhile. However, the theoretical "attractiveness" of purchasing power parities and the merits of this comparison method are appropriately revealed only during the proper resolution of a number of methodological problems. We can single out at least two aspects: The first is associated with overcoming differences that exist in individual countries national military expenditure statistics and the second with development of a purchasing power parity accounting methodology for comparison of military expenditures in a single hard currency.

With regard to the first aspect, we can certify that an "international accounting system" has been developed through the efforts of UN experts. It is a detailed—nearly 600 different items—"military expenditure matrix" (See Table 1).

Table 1 - Typical International Accounting Chart Diagram proposed by UN Experts for Permanent Use by Countries for Presentation of National Data on Size and Structure of Military Expenditures

By Branch of the Armed Forces	Strategic Forces	General Purpose Forces				Support Forces and Central Command and Control Organs		Paramilitary Forces	Civil Defense	Military Aid	
		Ground	Naval	Air	Other Combat	Centralized Support: Supply, Maintenance, Training, Construction, Public Health Service, etc.	Central Command and Control Organs, Including Information and Communications Services			Expenses for Allied Powers and Their Infrastructure	Military Aid to Allies and Other Countries
By Functional Designation		2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11

I. Maintenance

1) Personnel

2) Military Equipment Operation:

- a) Day-to-day expenses (food, clothing, oil-petroleum-lubricants, etc.)
- b) Operations and maintenance
- c) Transportation, mail, and other
- d) Real Estate

II. Purchases and Construction

1) Purchases:

- a) Aircraft and aircraft engines
- b) Missiles, including nonnuclear warheads for them
- c) Electronic components and communications equipment
- d) Transport vehicles
- e) Other

2) Construction:

- a) Military air bases and airfields
- b) Missile launch pads
- c) Defensive fortifications
- d) Shelters (Bunkers)
- e) Other

III. Research and Development

1) Basic and applied work

2) Development, Testing, and Evaluation

Development of a standardized international military expenditure accounting system in the UN became a major step on the path to a uniform presentation of heterogeneous national statistical indicators. This tool substantially facilitates international comparison of military expenditures and military potentials of states. However, it is still early to consider the problem finally resolved if we bear in mind at least two circumstances. First, the countries that participate in the Project provide all statistical data on a

voluntary basis which furthermore does not exclude major direct military expenditures hidden in the bowels of the state budget. The Project does not provide for any verification or detection methods for such expenditures. Besides consciously hidden military expenditures in the developed capitalist countries, there are also official classified military funds—so-called “black” military budgets and even members of legislative organs know absolutely nothing about their structure.³

Second, the concept of military expenditures itself needs serious clarification. The UN experts accepted a quite narrow interpretation of the term "military expenditures" as a starting point. It does not include many types of expenditures that are directly or indirectly related with strengthening defense capability, supporting military activities, or with its financial and economic consequences. For example, construction of military infrastructure facilities, creation and storage of strategic reserves of energy resources and materials, construction of runways, and coastal defense support can be financed under the auspices of various national ministries and departments. Governmental institutions in the education sphere frequently finance professional work force retraining programs for the needs of military industrial companies and allocate special subsidies to organize courses to increase the skills of military enterprise workers and technicians. We can say the same thing about the budget of an environmental protection department or the ministries of transportation, energy, finance, credit, and so forth. Finally, at least a portion of the expenditures to repay state debts that have sharply increased in the 1980's in the industrially developed countries are primarily due to exorbitant military expenditures and should also be attributed to the military.⁴

Thus, a realistic comparison of the size of various countries military budgets requires the development of

reliable military expenditure data verification mechanisms and also clarification of this category's conceptual content.

Another important aspect of the international comparison of military expenditures issue is associated with collection, analysis, and processing of price information while calculating hard currency purchasing power parities as applied to military budgets.

The so-called representative method (it is a goods-representatives or models-analogies method) is utilized to compute hard currency purchasing power parities for military expenditures. Its essence consists of the following. Each category of military expenditures being compared is subdivided into a large quantity of military goods and services subcategories that have a minimum price variation (spread) when possible. One or several typical goods (services) are selected for each of the subcategories. Prices for the selected models of military goods (services) that have identical equivalents in both countries being compared serve as the point of departure for calculating the average price index for the subgroup being studied:

$$I_{A/B} = \left[\sum_i^n \frac{P_A}{P_B} \right]^{\frac{1}{n}}, \quad (1)$$

where $I_{A/B}$ -- Mean from the individual price indexes in the military commodities subgroup being studied in countries A and B which are being compared;

P_A, P_B -- Price of a military good in Country A (in Country B);

n -- Number of units (individual indexes) in the goods subgroup being studied.

After calculating the average group price index, individual hard currency purchasing power parities are calculated (using the aggregate cost index formula):

$$\Pi_{A/B} = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^n I_{A/B} Q_A}{\sum_{i=1}^n Q_A}, \quad (2)^s$$

where $I_{A/B}$ -- Average group price index (calculated using formula (1));

n -- Number of military goods (services) subgroups;

Q_A -- Quantity of military commodities in Country A;

$\Pi_{A/B}$ -- To be found: Parity of Country A's hard currency with respect to Country B's hard currency.

During the final stage, previously obtained hard currency subparities on the most important categories of military expenditures are reduced (also taking into account their ratios in the structures of the indicators being compared) into a single common purchasing power parity as applied to the entire military budget structure. This is the theoretical accounting model in its most general form.

In practice, far from all military financing projects (or their prices) can be directly compared throughout the countries. From the point of view of military goods (services) consumer properties which in this case are understood to be a series of their specific physical-technical, operational-economic, and military characteristics, we can single out those that can be sufficiently correctly compared and those whose comparison is extremely complicated.

Widely proliferated conventional, nonnuclear military goods—arms, ammunition, various equipment, vehicles, uniforms, etc. belong to the first group. Selection of military goods of approximately identical quality is required to obtain the most reliable result because, if this selection is not possible, the appropriate price adjustments must be conducted that would adequately consider differences in use costs of the goods being compared. Comparison of expenditures for military services (repair and operation of military equipment, operational command and control of troops, medical and everyday needs of servicemen, their training, and so forth) is more complicated. Usually the characteristics of services do not have the same obvious measurability as the characteristics of material and physical values. Therefore, we need to develop substantiated criteria for a list of military services, their quality, and scale.

Military research and also expensive unique military goods form the second vast group. The latter in particular include many types of strategic and operational-tactical nuclear missile weapons, certain types of conventional munitions, special equipment, and also to

reconnaissance and fire control systems. The latest technology and the latest achievements of science and technology are used during production of these goods and their prices frequently do not totally reflect the resources expended. International comparison is severely hampered in these cases.

We need to particularly discuss the comparison of expenditures for military scientific research and scientific research and experimental design work (NIOKR). Calculation of a purchasing power subparity for military NIOKR means to compare the monetary terms of the results of research in the given countries, that is, to compare monetary equivalents of among themselves of military economic effects of this type of activity with regard to the resources expended on it. One of the difficulties here consists of the fact many expenditures on basic scientific research work generally can also not have specific scientific results or can have them in the form of a new hypothesis or concept of the weapons system being developed or simply a new scientific fact and it is quite difficult to assess them in monetary terms. Furthermore, significant differences exist throughout the individual countries in the military NIOKR organization systems, their levels of intensity, time periods for achievement of scientific results, and the introduction of series production of new military equipment and so forth.

Considering what has been stated, we need to approach the assessment of the results of purchasing power parity calculations for military expenditures of a number of developed capitalistic countries that were obtained by the UN experts (see Table 2). The reduced purchasing power parities here express a quite approximate conditional assessment of price ratios to military goods and services in the U.S.A. and another country being compared with it. It can serve as a tool only for a selectively comparative analysis of certain military expenditure subcategories. In a statistical context, we must recognize the results of purchasing power parities calculations in

relation to personnel and military equipment operations expenditures as more reliable. Parities on other military budget categories are assessed quite roughly and only under the most superficial accounting of major adjustments of national data. Expenditures that are significant in

size have generally remained outside comparative analysis due to a lack of an acceptable method for their comparison. The experts were compelled to abandon complex military NIOKR subparity calculation and instead proposed only a fragment of the comparison of resources.

Table 2 - Hard Currency Purchasing Power Parities Calculated by a UN Group of Experts on Military Expenditures of Seven Capitalist Countries (for 1982)

Country (National Monetary Units)	Hard Currency Purchasing Parities for Military Expenditure Subcategories ^a			Comparison of Various Purchasing Power Parities and Currency Exchange Rates		
	Personnel and Military Equipment Operations	Purchases and Construction	Research and Development	Purchasing Power Parities for Military Expenditures as a Whole ^a	Purchasing Power Parities for GDP [Gross Domestic Product] as a Whole ^a	Currency Exchange Rate ^b
U.S.A. (American Dollars)	1.05	0.89	1.05	1.00	1.00	1.00
Great British (British Pound Sterling)	0.54	1.54	0.49	0.61	0.54	0.57
Italy (Italian Lira)	567	2,302	637	679	983	1,353
Australia (Australian Dollar)	1.37	2.60	1.14	1.45	1.03	0.98
Norway (Norwegian Krone)	6.34	13.36	6.51	7.14	7.30	6.45
Sweden (Swedish Krona)	6.24	11.63	5.37	7.10	5.97	6.28
Austria (Austrian Schilling)	11.77	51.44	—	13.56	16.10	17.06

a) The quantity of national monetary units equivalent to 1 U.S. dollar.

b) Average Annual National Monetary Unit Exchange Rates in relation to the U.S. dollar published by the International Monetary Fund.

Source: "Reduction of Military Budgets. Construction of Military prices indexes and purchasing-power parities for comparison of military expenditures." United Nations Publications, 1986, Sales No E, 86.IX.2, pp. 10, 12, 14.

Thus, the analytical value obtained in the UN data about military expenditures purchasing-power parities is still insignificant for the time being. Although, of course, we should also not excessively minimize it since the issues that affect reliability, completeness, and verification of military expenditures data presented by the countries as well as the conceptual content of this category essentially exceed the bounds of the tasks solved using statistics. Overcoming such difficulties is associated with the political choice of the interested parties. As the UN group of experts noted on reduction of military budgets, "political and technical aspects of international and inter-temporal (that is, between various periods of time—V.D.) comparisons of military expenditures are closely and permanently interrelated" since "the political aspects can even play a fundamental role."⁶

In other words, in a scientific context, the solution of the problem of correct comparison of military expenditures assumes trust and a certain degree of openness among the parties. But precisely secrecy, that shrouds the detailed structure of military expenditures and their true size, is one of the main driving forces of the arms race that must be stopped, including through reduction of the size of military expenditures.

The parties' good will and their sincere attempt to resort to numerous compromises for the sake of achieving the end goal—strengthening mutual security and real disarmament—are needed in order to break this vicious circle and resort to direct discussion of the issue of coordinated reduction of military budgets.

Footnotes

1. This proposal was submitted on December 7, 1986 in M.S. Gorbachev's speech to the UN General Assembly session in New York. According to precise data, Soviet military expenditures will be reduced by 14.2 percent altogether by the beginning of the 1990's and expenditures for arms and military equipment purchases will be reduced by 19.5 percent.

2. IZVESTIYA, June 10, 1988.

3. According to the Boston Globe, the U.S. "black budget" was increased to 21 billion dollars during fiscal year 1989 and it will total 28.7 billion dollars in 1991 or almost one fourth of all expenditures for Pentagon research work.

4. For example, the U.S. is annually compelled to seek enormous resources to pay "debt notes" [of resources] previously allocated for participation in the accelerated arms race: Budget expenditures associated with servicing the Federal debt will have reached the 220 billion dollar mark by fiscal year 1990 (The Pentagon budget totals nearly 300 billion dollars).

5. According to formula (2), which is the arithmetic mean of the weighted average group price indexes, UN experts also calculated hard currency purchasing-power parities as applied to various countries' entire GNP

[Gross National Product] (see Kravis, J.B., Heston, A.W., and Summers, R. International Comparisons of Real Product and Purchasing Power. The Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, Baltimore, 1975).

6. Reduction of Military Budgets. Construction of military price indexes and purchasing power parities for comparison of military expenditures. United Nations. New York, 1986, Sales No. E.86.IX.2, p. 3.

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**Katusev On Military Reform, Shevardnadze's
OGONEK Interview**

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[Interview by Col L. Nechayuk of Lt Gen Justice A. Katusev, chief military prosecutor, deputy general prosecutor of the USSR: "On Whose Side is the Prosecutor?"]

[Text] *Aleksandr Filippovich Katusev was named to the position relatively recently; a year has not yet passed. Before that he served as a military lawyer for more than a quarter century, as an investigator and prosecutor, in the Extreme North, the Transbaykal, and the Far East, and occupied the position of first deputy chief military prosecutor. Then he was deputy general prosecutor of the USSR. A. F. Katusev is a state legal council first class.*

[Nechayuk] For a long time the work of the military prosecutor's office was to the public at large essentially a closed zone. Probably for this reason many have a very hazy, as well as false impression about who military prosecutors are. As it happened, even among members of the government there are people who believe that by being a military prosecutor one cannot remain objective, and that "like it or not, they are forced to protect bureaucratic interests despite the facts." For example, that is the opinion of USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs E. A. Shevardnadze, recently expressed publicly on the pages of OGONEK. Please clarify: What is your relationship with the Ministry of Defense?

[Katusev] Having advanced against me serious accusations of non-objectivity, but accusations that were far from the truth, Eduard Abrosevich did not cite any facts in justification. There simply are none. And the supposition that a military prosecutor is forced, based on his position, to defend bureaucratic interests, and not the supremacy of law, in the mouth of a state figure of such a level, is bewildering. Who more than a member of the government must know that the chief military prosecutor is at the same time deputy general prosecutor of the USSR, and is only subordinate to him, and in no way to the USSR Minister of Defense. All of this is also relevant to the military prosecutor's office as a whole.

Of course, in their practical activity our workers coordinate closely with the Ministry of Defense and the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy, and with the command and political organs in the local areas. It happens that some commanders and supervisors, taking advantage of this, try to exert pressure. There is no reason to hide that amongst military prosecutors are some who, having lost their feeling of duty, forego their principles. We have never reconciled ourselves to this, and will not do so in the future. The prosecutor is obligated to be always on the side of the law, and only the law.

[Nechayuk] In short, theoretically the status of the military prosecutor's office, and its independence, are rather

high. How do things work in reality? How effective is the supervision over the observance of law, and the battle against criminality in the army and navy?

[Katusev] The Armed Forces are a part of our society. The problems, shortcomings, and flaws that arise in society have an effect also on those who wear the shoulder boards of military personnel. The level of criminality in the country is growing. Especially troubling is its increase among juveniles, the spread of drunkenness and drug addiction, the deforming of moral values and ideals. Thousands of youth from among those who grew up in unfavorable conditions, are on the rolls in various kinds of upbringing inspection offices and institutions, are serving out punishment under a court sentence, and tomorrow will be called up for military service. Commanders, political workers, and military lawyers are already feeling this wave rolling into the army. Alarming symptoms have appeared in the dynamics and structure of criminality, and the number of violations of law is growing.

Instances of evasion of military service, non-regulation relationships between military personnel, the so-called "dedovshchina" [harassment of junior inductees by senior], and damage of military equipment are causing especially great concern.

It would seem that it would be clear to everyone that the state of military discipline is inseparably linked with questions of the organization of service, everyday life, and material support, in other words, with maintaining regulatory order in its broad sense. However, it is very difficult for the simple truths to be realized, due to the fact that the command, staffs, and law enforcement organs far from always operate in coordination and consistently, in strict accordance with the law and regulations.

Now we have finally begun to speak openly and frankly about the unsatisfactory conditions of life of officers, warrant officers and their families, and about the frequent instances of infringement of the rights of military personnel. The soldier and sailor must engage in combat training, and not in special duty details in civilian enterprises, and he must be well trained and serve on high-quality combat equipment; this is not only the foundation of combat readiness, but is one of the guarantees protecting his rights and lawful interests.

The military prosecutor's office, by the way, has now changed the thrust of its activity. Previously we watched more to see that the soldier conscientiously fulfilled his obligations, and staunchly endured the burdens and deprivations of service. And we paid less attention to the fact that these burdens were frequently excessive, not caused by objective circumstances, but stipulated by the mismanagement, negligence or abuses by officials.

Now we are directing prosecutor's supervision to how the rights of military personnel and their family members are being observed. These are rights, guaranteed by the USSR Constitution. In recent months alone the main

military prosecutor's office has raised questions about the lawfulness of using military construction troops, military personnel, and reservists in collecting the harvest and eliminating the consequences of accidents and disasters. And I must tell you that, with respect to our materials, a number of documents have already been sent to the USSR Council of Ministers.

[Nechayuk] The new approaches require perestroika of the work and organs of the military prosecutor's office. How is the program of practical actions in this direction looking?

[Katusev] Our most primary duty is supervision over the universal and accurate understanding and application of Soviet laws. Here, restructuring our work under the present conditions, we have first of all precisely delineated the area of competence of the military prosecutors and the military leadership organs.

The center of effort of our work has shifted to exerting effective supervision over how the leaders of the central apparatus of the Armed Forces, the military district level, formations, large units, auditing organs, military units, enterprises and organizations are fulfilling their obligations of observing the law.

An independent problem for us is work with complaints, as well as measures to rehabilitate persons innocently repressed. The apparatus of the military prosecutor's office has virtually reached the limit of its capabilities. In short, the time has come for certain changes in the structure of our organs. These questions are being worked on currently, and some decisions have already been made.

On the organizational plane, a redistribution of tasks between the military prosecutors' offices at the primary and military district levels is also taking place. The former are receiving greater independence in executing the powers granted by law. The latter are paying their main attention to methodological and organizational assistance. The chief military prosecutor's office is emphasizing strategy, the selection and placement of cadres, and monitoring in all directions.

[Nechayuk] And from where does the military prosecutor's office draw its cadres?

[Katusev] This, I would say, is the most complex and painful question. In general, training of cadres for the military prosecutor's office is carried out in the legal faculty of the Military Institute. From there officers, military investigators, come to us. In addition, we select people from graduates of civilian VUZes. However, just the same we are not able to be fully manned. Briefly speaking, the existing system cannot provide for training of cadres in either a quantitative or qualitative respect. And at one time we had a military-legal academy. The question of its re-creation is now being decided. It should also become a scientific center for studying the reasons for crime in the army, and developing measures to combat it.

Of course, we also have the same problems as those found overall in the system of law enforcement organs. These include poor technical equipping with special resources, and a shortage of facilities, transport and communications. Army problems have also not passed us by. These include low pay, meager housing, wives unable to find work, and in general the whole range of social problems that confront the majority of officers.

[Nechayuk] In the period of stagnation there were enough words spoken about the further strengthening of lawfulness. Now the time has come to strengthen it in fact. Let us suppose that the prosecutors have been restructured and have gotten rid of old stereotypes. But, do they have sufficient authority? Can you shift to decisive measures, and what is called "power to use?" And not only when we are talking about embezzling officials, but when through their fault damage is done to the environment, memorials are destroyed, and people's rights are infringed upon. Or are you powerless here?

[Katusev] No, I would not say that. Last year, as a result of protests by the military prosecutor's office, more than 5,500 unlawful orders issued by commanders at various levels were repealed, approximately 55,000 persons were brought to disciplinary accountability for violation of laws, and about 1,000 military personnel were freed from under unlawful arrest. But it is not even a matter of these figures; I could continue them without difficulty. The organs of the prosecutor's office possess great power, and theoretically can by law bring persons to accountability, beginning with disciplinary, material, all the way up to criminal. It is another matter how the prosecutor uses his power. I will say frankly that it is still being done very timidly, or else is being misdirected. I believe that the effectiveness of prosecutorial power depends on the principles of the prosecutor; he has quite enough formal rights.

[Nechayuk] And are there violations of law in the work of military prosecutors and investigators themselves?

[Katusev] It happens, although rarely. Last year instances of falsification in investigations were uncovered in the Far Eastern, Transbaykal, Volga-Ural, and Turkestan military districts, and in the Central Group of Forces. In our work any, even the most insignificant, mistakes are very sensitive and dangerous. But, probably we will not ever be able to avoid and eliminate them completely. This is not in justification; such is the bitter truth of life. The whole matter is to correct mistakes quickly. And here glasnost is very important. Slurring over a mistake, no matter how small it may be, causes suspicion, and thus also distrust.

However, as we expand glasnost, involving millions of people in this process, it is necessary to remember that truth and law are above all. Then there will not remain a place for casting slurs, or making unjustified complaints about military prosecutors and investigators, such as those that appeared in the OGONEK article that you mentioned.

I am not speaking now about the attacks personally against myself contained in it, which discredited my worth as a lawyer, and honor as an officer and citizen. All of this I expressed in an open letter to Comrade Shevardnadze, published in the newspaper SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA on 25 March. I do not want to repeat myself, and it is not only a matter of me. The unfounded statement about inobjectivity, prejudice, and dishonesty supposedly manifested during the investigation of the tragic events in Tbilisi, places in doubt the law enforcement activity of the military prosecutor's office in general, and provokes an unhealthy attitude toward it in the local areas. This is hardly an accident—the appearance of such an article precisely on the eve of the anniversary of the Tbilisi tragedy. I cannot assess it otherwise than as an attempt to manipulate people's feelings, showing disdain both toward the truth and the law.

[Nechayuk] In the interview that Comrade E. A. Shevardnadze gave to OGONEK, I, for example, felt irritation that the facts established in the investigation by the military prosecutor's office of the circumstances of the Tbilisi tragedy do not correspond to existing opinion. You spoke about them at the Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR, but the majority of our readers are unfamiliar with them, since there was no television broadcast, and the central papers did not publish the text of your speech. Could you not speak at least briefly about the most important facts?

[Katusev] I will make a qualification at the outset. I spoke at the Congress not at my own initiative, but on the instructions of the USSR General Prosecutor. I believed, as did he, that the law permits and good sense demands that the deputies be informed about the facts established by the investigation, before they make a political decision. There have already been instances in our history when justice was made to fit desired political assessments. The sad results of such actions are known to all.

The public in the country and abroad awaited a clear answer to the question: How could the tragedy take place, that caused feelings of sorrow and sympathy in all honest-minded people on earth? There are three assessments, which in many respects do not coincide with one another: the commission of the Supreme Soviet of Georgia; the commission of the People's Deputies of the USSR; and the investigative group of the military prosecutor's office. The divergent conclusions are based on the different methods used to explain the circumstances of what took place. Commissions speak with people; an investigation interrogates. A commission consults with specialists; an investigation names commissions of experts from scientific institutions. And most importantly, an investigation does not accept a single piece of evidence without checking, and analyzing it along with the other evidence. In other words, a prosecutor is not allowed to guess; he must rely solely on reliably established facts. And they at the moment of my address were these.

Out of 21 persons who stated they had been traumatized by infantry boots, such injuries were determined by experts as seven. There were no serious bodily injuries, not to mention fatalities. Out of 427 people who received injuries on Rustaveli Prospekt and at the state television and radio building, 290 suffered from being crushed in the disorders, and 137 from the actions of military personnel. The reason for the death of the 18 people, including the women, was only from being crushed.

As for the 2,000 people who were initially counted as having been subjected to the effect of "Cheremukha" irritating agents, UN experts confirmed this only with respect to 54 people.

I did not merely recount these and other facts from the rostrum of the Congress. On 9 April of last year I was in Tbilisi as deputy general prosecutor of the country, myself investigated on site, and experienced everything personally. I bear full responsibility, both professional and human, for the objectivity and reliability of the facts.

It is impossible, even if one wants to do so very much, to find in my address accusations against the Georgian people, or a desire to save the "honor of the greatcoat" at any cost.

[Nechayuk] And the final question. Aleksandr Filippovich, what is your attitude toward the process of democratization in the army? Won't it weaken sole command?

[Katusev] I am sure that it will not weaken it. Sole command, based on law, will be still further strengthened, and will receive support in the army and navy community. The goal of democratization in essence coincides fully with the goals of sole-commanders. We unconditionally support intensifying the role of the military collectives in strengthening discipline and law and order, whether it be the Officers' Meeting, or corresponding social forms for warrant officers. We are for legal recognition of the comrades' courts of compulsory service personnel. These are democratic levers in the hands of the commander for strengthening discipline, and this means also combat readiness.

Student Commentary on Value of Reserve Officer Training

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in Russian 26 Jan 90 p 3*

[Article by V. Trusov: "Third Problem. Where Will a Ballistic Missile End Up If Its Launch Is Entrusted to a Student Lieutenant?"]

[Text] The author of this article does not hold a specific military rank. You can't actually call me a draftee, since I have completed the course of training in my institute's department of military science, and I have even passed the "lieutenant's" final examination, nor am I a commissioned officer, because I have not yet defended my senior thesis. If my thesis defense is successful, they will give me

four little stars—two for each shoulder. But if I fail, all my “military accomplishments” (three years study in the department of military science and a 30-day active-duty training stint in a line unit) will be stricken from the books, and I shall enter the military as a private and serve one year.

I believe that I shall be able successfully to defend my senior thesis. I am not so sure, however, that I will be able to launch a ballistic missile, although I received such training. Nor am I so sure about my fellow students. Judge for yourselves why.

What Is “War”?

This is a frightening word in its true meaning. But it has a different meaning here, and for that reason is enclosed in quotation marks. “War” [voyna] is the universally-used word in the college students’ jargon (which angers the officer-instructors) when referring to the department of military science [voyennaya kafedra (VK)].

We studied a missile. A ballistic missile. We studied every nut and bolt. Hundreds of numbers to memorize, hundreds of illustrations, diagrams, drawings.... But one’s mind was shut tight against all this information by a gnawing, persisting question: “What for?”

Why should one study the optical prisms of an aiming device if you will never be called upon to perform this critical operation? Why fill your head with the sequence of valve operations during engine ignition if you will never be igniting a missile motor? But the most important question is: why on earth study a missile which was retired from service 30 years ago?!

Here is a first rule for you: learn it, even if there is no rhyme or reason. Can one get interested in studying the finer points of using a slide rule when the outside world is in the middle of the computer age? Our instructors explained to us in this regard that some design elements and operating principles employed in the retired missile have been preserved in current models. But they would not say specifically which ones and in which missiles. Perhaps they were afraid to reveal some great military secret. After all, one does not know what will be the fate next semester of a student armed with classified information. He might even flunk out or be kicked out of school for something. Is this not why they were so strict about making us sign out for those string-secured and serial-numbered notebooks which are kept in those special sealed boxes in the classified area? Is that not why every month they performed a “sheet-by-sheet check” (one of the interesting terms used in the department of military science), in order to determine whether any pages had been torn out or if anything additional had been penned in? And, finally, is that not why they made us sign a formal statement (and we are not even talking about travel abroad!) agreeing to stay clear of foreign

embassies, consulates, missions, and foreign nationals? And God forbid that you should have any contact with them whatsoever!

Here is a second rule: even though you have no knowledge of even a single classified figure, conduct yourself as if you are Shtirlits [fictional name of famous derring-do Soviet intelligence officer in World War II].

Here is rule number three: “Pretend!”

Remember that in any children’s game we always would pretend to be someone: a doctor, a cook, an Indian, or a scout. In the “Voyna” you have to pretend merely that you are a soldier. You have to pretend, since nobody has yet defined that status of a student in the department of military science. It is your guess whether you are a college student, a military cadet, or a buck private. “Captain, sir, student Pupkin reporting as ordered!” But there is no military title “student” to be found in the drill manual! In addition, one can order student Pupkin to do anything one likes in the way of punishment: sweep puddles dry on the parade ground, wax floors, shovel snow, etc. But is an officer in the military science department empowered to issue such orders? Must a student obey them? Nobody knows the answers to these questions. We only know the traditions which are passed on from one generation to the next, that is, the rules of the game. “Yes sir!” replies the unlucky student to the angry officer and, brandishing an ice chipping bar or broom, he gets off “easy,” for if he were to get into a real hassle, dismissal from the military science department “for unwillingness to study military affairs” means automatic expulsion from the institute....

Perhaps just these three rules are sufficient to draw a parallel between children playing “war” and the training of reserve officers—definitely a serious matter. But every game is essentially a set of rules and attributes. As for the matter of attributes, the most important element is a standard uniform mandatorily to be worn to training instruction classes. Stated more accurately, not an actual uniform, since the latter presumes a common standard cut and color, but following a “dress code” established by the head of the institute’s department of military science. You can imagine how a person feels wearing dark-blue or black trousers, a white shirt, a green “construction detachment” jacket, and a violet-colored machinist’s beret with a little tab on top and attached cap badge. I felt like a scarecrow in a vegetable patch. What’s more, if even one clothing item fails to meet “regs” (gray rather than black trousers, for example), the offending student is either made to leave the classroom or is put on report.

The second attribute element is the haircut. An ROTC student is easy to spot: he has a close-cropped haircut. Or, as they say in the “departmental” language, a neat hair style. A trivial matter, it would seem, but a short haircut does not look good on me—my ears stick out. For this reason every time I returned to school from summer vacation, during which my hair would take on

the required configuration, I would recall with helpless anger the unavoidable ROTC requirement to clip it back down.

Burdens and Privations of the "Camps"

Most likely a far from trivial role in the clever geography of student summer training is played by the need to acquaint the student with the burdens and privations of military service when transporting personnel. A single common car, packed to the gills, right up to the third-tier bunk racks; not a hint of food or tea, although you will be 24 hours en route; no drinking water, and even no mattresses. Although later one of the officers told me that, as it turns out, one could have obtained bed linen for a ruble....

Contrary to my expectations, the "lagerya" [camps] (as *studencheskiye sbory* [summer training camp for college ROTC students] is sometimes called) were not situated deep in the forest primeval. They housed us in a real barracks at a real training facility, cheek by jowl with real conscripts. Forgive me for the tautology, but this was perhaps the only real thing here, since in the eyes of the new conscripts, who were constantly heading off somewhere at a run, of the dignified "dembelya" [soldiers under general discharge waiting for separation papers], and in the eyes of the officers, we were not real or genuine, brought here for God knows what. Now we ourselves became for a month's time attributes of the game.

Our uselessness and alien presence permeated the very air. This determined the attitude of others toward us, and it determined our own training effort and performance.

And what was required of us? Only to accomplish the goal of the training camp session: to reinforce in a practical manner the knowledge we had acquired over the course of three years and to become fully-qualified reserve officers. Let's see to what extent this goal was achieved.

Every officer, regardless of his military occupational specialty, should be a competent marksman. Otherwise, what kind of an officer is he? For this reason they marched us off to the rifle range literally the second day after our arrival.

"There are 'machinegunners' down there," the battalion commander shouted, pointing down into the mist-shrouded valley with his index finger. "But you would do better not to fire at them. You wouldn't hit them anyway. Don't waste your ammunition; fire at the close-in targets."

We indeed had to be sparing with our ammunition, for they issued only 22 rounds for three firing practice drills. Incidentally, I lost all desire to shoot, about which I had been dreaming so long, as soon as I flopped down into the puddle designated as "attack position." My score was five out of a possible 30, resulting in a mark of two

[second from the bottom of a five-point system]. I did pretty much the same on the other drills (it is not surprising that the officers were unanimous in their assessment of our marksmanship: "We have never seen a worse bunch of 'combat infantrymen'").

So we "learned" to shoot, and from this moment on the assault rifle became for us nothing but an implement to be used during drill instruction.

In addition to marksmanship, an officer must have knowledge of tactics and have the ability to command his unit on the battlefield. A special course, Tactics, was devoted to this.

They taught us to crawl on all fours, "semi on all fours", to slither on our sides, to crawl "po-plastunski" [crawling on one's belly and keeping pressed to the ground], and to negotiate a "live-fire assault obstacle course".... But it was different from what they show you on the TV program "Sluzhu Sovetskomu Soyuzu!" ["I serve the Soviet Union!"]—stock-phrase reply by Soviet soldier to superior when praised for a job well done—with a whole bunch of cleverly-devised structures, with everything in flames, where you have to leap and clamber over everything, while firing your weapon and jabbing a dummy with your bayonet. This was a "student" obstacle course: we had to run across a plank, jump over a 1.5-meter obstacle, jump up on two steps, crawl under a third, and run down a tunnel fashioned of welded-together lengths of pipe, on one of which a burning tractor tire was emitting copious amounts of smoke. They taught us to negotiate a "tactical swamp" in a line of platoons in column, in a line of squads, and in a squad line; they taught us how to dig a skirmisher's trench, a foxhole with kneeling firing position, and a foxhole with standing firing position.... That's about it.

A whole week was devoted to specialized training. We were sent out to a special site which contained everything needed to provide practical reinforcement of our meager knowledge: there were launch silos (minus missiles, to be sure), there were fueling trucks, loaders, and prime movers—in short, what more could you want? Strangely enough, however, there was a definite dearth of hands-on training.

I never learned how a missile is fueled. Although I heard that fueling officer is my MOS. I am now quite well acquainted, however, as are my buddies, with the cooking kettle, large, and with the "baltika" dishwashing gear.

All of us passed the final examination, even those who were excused from training for the entire camp session (20 of our guys worked on setting up the Lenin Room in the barracks, worked on roofing a building under construction, worked on tiling a barracks latrine, etc).

Two days after the final examination there was a little ceremony, at which they congratulated us, presented us with certificates, the band played a flourish, we said our good-byes, and headed home.

Too High A Price

I would be defending my senior thesis in just a few months. Soon I would be a lieutenant in the reserve. And this means that if the need arises I am supposed to defend the homeland, taking my place in the fighting forces. And engaging in my assigned military occupational specialty.

Question: can I do this when all I know about my MOS is the fact that it is indicated by a six-digit number from some list somewhere, a number which I heard once or twice from officers in the department of military science? If I am neither able to fuel, nor aim, nor operational-check the systems of even that missile I "mastered," which was retired from service 30 years ago, let alone current models? The answer is unequivocal: no. Then can they perhaps use me not in my MOS but as a line-unit commander? Can they hand over a platoon, brief me on the mission, and then we march off into battle? Theoretically of course it would be possible. But is it necessary? I don't know how to shoot, I don't know a single hand-to-hand combat move, I don't know how to disarm a landmine, give first aid to wounded, prepare or read maps.... I don't know how to do anything an officer is supposed to know how to do. I therefore ask to be stripped down to private. And not only me—all my classmates, those who received training before us, and those who are receiving training now....

Who are we kidding? What good is an "officer factory" which produces nothing but defective goods? We are spending a lot of money, taking study time away from students, which could be spent on their main subjects, we are maintaining an enormous staff of instructors, administrators, and training methods specialists, and all for what? For a check mark in Ministry of Defense records to the effect that several thousand or perhaps several hundred thousand more reserve lieutenants have been trained? Is that not too great a price for these check marks? After all, in the final analysis we are talking about our country's defense capability! For a military reservist should constitute a reliable reserve for the fighting forces. But those thousands of current student-lieutenants constitute a fiction, "dead souls" [reference to Gogol's novel]. They are on the reserve rolls, but they cannot be counted on; they are unfit for combat. We are just fooling ourselves. For what reason? For the sake of peace of mind? Out of fear of striking out from the beaten track? Or do we perhaps fear the "external foe," who will suddenly learn the truth about the level of proficiency of our military reserve? Answers to these questions are beyond my area of competence. But I know one thing for sure: the "officer factory" is in need of a thorough overhaul.

In my opinion there is plenty of food for thought here. We are paying too high a price for what we are getting. Even if we ignore the wasted money, the detriment to the quality of training young specialist personnel, and the sufferings of the students themselves, in anguish over the senselessness of current military training, this playing

"war" is directly proportional to the detriment done to the combat readiness of the military. And God forbid that the cost of this game someday become even greater!

Commander, Baltic MD on Low Quality of Draftees, Problems of Service

90UM0435C Riga SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA
in Russian 23 Feb 90 pp 1-2

[Interview with Col Gen F. Kuzmin, Commander, Baltic Military District, by SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA reporter V. Varlamov: "About Military Service...."]

[Text] Col Gen F. Kuzmin, commander of the Red-Banner Baltic Military District, replies to questions by a SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA reporter.

* * *

[Varlamov] Up until recently, on the occasion of the 23 February holiday we would usually recall for the most part the historic journey traveled by the Soviet Armed Forces. But we have been well acquainted with these historical facts since childhood. For that reason, Fedor Mikhaylovich, let us depart from tradition and discuss current problems facing our Army and Navy.

The parents of military personnel frequently turn to you, as a commanding general and USSR people's deputy. As I understand it, their inquiries for the most part involve instances of mistreatment of personnel [neustavnyye otnosheniya—actions at variance with or contrary to regulations]. There are those who are inclined to see as a cure-all to this type of problem the revival of national-territorial combined units and the introduction of alternative service for a certain category of draftees, draft legislation on which has been approved in an initial reading by the Latvian SSR Supreme Soviet.

What is your opinion regarding such solutions to the problem? How are military draft calls proceeding in this situation, with the induction process being subjected to increasing pressure on the part of the unofficial organizations [neformaly]?

[Kuzmin] First of all I would like to emphasize that we are waging an implacable campaign against so-called mutual relations at variance with or contrary to regulations [neustavnyye vzaimootnosheniya—mistreatment of personnel by superiors or fellow soldiers], a phenomenon which is alien to the very nature of our armed forces. This problem is a focus of particular attention on the part of command and political personnel of the combined units and units and the district military council. An aggregate of measures of an indoctrinational nature is being implemented, and they are producing positive results.

But final solution to the problem will depend not only on the military but also on the efforts of society as a whole. In my opinion it is not enough nowadays merely to talk and write in a critical manner about shortcomings in the

military. What is needed is a campaign to be waged against the causes of "dedovshchina" [hazing of conscripts by those with greater seniority]. But in my view the causes lie in substantial problems in the civic and moral upbringing of our young people. Immoral and unethical phenomena will occur in all segments of society until such time as society itself becomes more ethically, morally, and spiritually pure.

Young men enter the military with already-formed, sometimes distorted attitudes. In many instances we must engage not in indoctrinating but rather in reeducating them. The fact is that many parents are counting precisely on this. During their brief time in the military the majority of young men become morally and ethically purer and stronger physically. Officers expend enormous effort toward this purpose. Judge for yourself. What kind of ethical, moral, and spiritual potential can be brought into military units by young people who had come into conflict with the law prior to military service, who had consumed alcohol and taken drugs, and who were frequently morally degraded?

Here are some statistics on draftees from Latvia. Every year up to 10 percent of young men drafted into the military had been arrested at least once. Presently a total of 1,212 draft-age youth with a prior criminal conviction, as well as drug addicts and alcoholics, are registered with the republic's military commissariats. The situation is no better in other regions of the country. It would be naive to assume that the very fact of putting on a military uniform will immediately alter an individual's cultural and spiritual outlook. I want to reemphasize the point that the root of the problem lies in flaws in the moral upbringing of our youth.

I should like to say a few words about alternative service. I believe that this has indeed become a valid issue. But one can hardly consider it correct to resolve the issue at the republic level, since it affects the interests of defense of the USSR and the foundations of Soviet military organizational development, and is contrary to the provisions of the USSR Constitution and present laws pertaining to defense matters. In my opinion a state governed by rule of law cannot be built on a foundation of ignoring existing laws. It is highly doubtful that such an approach would foster a reduction of tensions regarding the military draft.

[Varlamov] One of the most critical tasks brought to the forefront by perestroyka is the task of resolving the very difficult state of affairs in the area of interethnic relations. There are indications that ethnic aloofness [nationalnaya obosoblenost—exclusivity of ethnic association] and mutual distrust by persons of different ethnic affiliation have been entering the military to an ever increasing degree. To what extent does this correspond to the actual state of affairs in Baltic Military District units and subunits?

[Kuzmin] I would not overly dramatize the situation. On the whole interpersonal relations in our military units

can be characterized as healthy. There have been no conflict situations on this basis within the troops of this district. However, problems which are typical of the present state of ethnic relations in this country will likely affect the military as well. Association based on ethnic or regional affiliation [obshcheniye v "krugu zemlyakov"] has been noted some places, nor is there anything bad about this. That is the way life is. But when such association is followed by ethnic selfishness, arrogance, and certain exclusivity, this cannot help but be cause for concern by us.

The task of instilling a high level of decency of interethnic relations is a matter of special concern on the part of commanders and political workers. District officials have increased demands on knowledge by officers and warrant officers of the ethnic-psychological features, history, culture, and customs of the peoples which their men represent. We endeavor to ensure that they treat primary-rank enlisted personnel and NCOs of the various nationalities and ethnic groups in a sensitive, equal, and evenhanded manner.

Instilling a respectful attitude toward the history, traditions, culture, and languages of the peoples of the Baltic occupies the focus of heightened attention. We devote special time to this in the course of training activities. We have a single goal: not to disunite but to unite people. To ensure that, on leaving the military, each individual will have lifelong friends. But our success in this endeavor will be greater if the Baltic mass media help us in our efforts. Unfortunately there has been little understanding in this regard up to the present time.

I am firmly convinced that in the present circumstances the only correct way to achieve radical improvement in interethnic relations is contained in CPSU documents on the nationalities question. Patience and mutual respect are needed. Otherwise, having failed to resolve old problems, we shall be faced with new and more acute problems.

[Varlamov] What is your overall assessment of the state of affairs as regards interethnic relations in the Baltic in light of the points of the CPSU platform on the nationalities question as adopted by the September (1989) CPSU Central Committee Plenum, in which you took part?

[Kuzmin] One cannot help but see that interethnic relations in the Baltic have appreciably worsened lately. A split of the population on the basis of ethnic affiliation has become reality. Certain elements are using the problem of ethnic relations as a card in their political game. They are seeking to fan the flames of nationalism. Separatist ideas are being propagated. I must state that this road leads to an impasse. Is there a way out of this situation? I believe there is. The answer lies in taking into consideration the interests of all nationalities and ethnic groups residing in this republic and their harmonization. A good basis for this is provided by the

proceedings of the September (1989) and February (1990) CPSU Central Committee plenums.

[Varlamov] What is your attitude toward the movements in Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia which are of a pacifistic bent and are highly negative toward the military?

[Kuzmin] I shall begin by saying that these movements were engendered by the very course of perestroyka. They have become a reality of political life in the Baltic republics. One can only welcome those which pursue the goal of socialist renewal of society. One cannot fail to see another thing, however. The political platform points and political actions on the part of the popular fronts of Latvia and Estonia and of Lithuanian Sayudis today differ substantially from those which were originally proclaimed. This also applies to military issues. In my opinion they cannot be considered outside the overall structure of the political tasks of the above-mentioned sociopolitical movements, which in turn are subordinated to a quite definite strategic objective. Pacifist slogans and demands to reestablish local national military units, as well as other points seem to me to be devices and ploys in this great political game.

As for the campaigns unleashed by a number of unofficial organizations and mass media alleging an "occupation force" status of Soviet troops in the Baltic, this is a subject for a separate, extensive discussion. I would merely like to draw the attention of the holders of such views to documents of international law as well as to the encyclopedia, from which one can learn exactly what the term military occupation means.

[Varlamov] Perestroyka in the military. The military and the new thinking. Does the latter always win out? Let us take the following example. Impressive military parades are held on the 7th of November each year on Moscow's Red Square, in the capitals of the union republics, and in a number of other cities. Are such elaborate, very expensive spectacles really necessary in our quite frankly difficult times?

[Kuzmin] Whether or not military parades should be held is not an easy question. For some they are merely a visual spectacle. I cannot agree with this view. First of all, parades are held in most countries throughout the world. Secondly, in my view they will always exist, as long as armed forces continue to exist. A parade is a review of the troops. The people should see the countenance of the army which is protecting them. During the period of glasnost perhaps at parades as well more should be opened up to the people than is being done at the present time. Evidently there will also be a military parade in Moscow on 9 May of this year—on the 45th anniversary of the Great Victory Over Fascism.

To call military parades a "show of militarism," as unofficial organizations and representatives of some of the mass media do, is an insult to the men of the Soviet Armed Forces. As for cost, I can assure you that expenditures on fuel and the cost of engine operating hours do not exceed the costs of transporting from various parts of

the republic the participants in the mass meeting held on 18 November of last year, or fuel consumption in the course of "Operation Baltic," plus other events.

[Varlamov] Today you regularly offer an open communication channel. Tell us, how did this form of communication with military personnel develop, and how often during such open-line sessions are you asked questions about problems connected with social provisions protecting officers and enlisted personnel? In connection with the latter, we would like to hear your opinion on Shchit [Shield], the unofficial alliance of social protection for military personnel and their families, which was established at the end of October of last year.

[Kuzmin] The development of such a form of communication with military personnel as the open communication channel is directly connected with processes of democratization of military affairs. This enables me as military district commander to learn right from the horse's mouth, so to speak, about problems of concern to the men, and to take measures promptly in order to resolve such problems. And a great many problems have accumulated. There is an acute housing problem, as well as other problems of a social and services nature. Suffice it to say that there are more than 10,000 officers and warrant officers in this district without allocated quarters.

The open communication channel operates on Saturdays, for two hours and thirty minutes. Since it has been in operation it has provided an opportunity for direct contact with citizens not only in the Baltic but also in other parts of the country, and has enabled us to resolve hundreds of matters. I feel that people appreciate this form of communication, for the fact that they do not have travel anywhere, make an appointment, or experience a host of inconveniences. This communication channel is also used by the mass media and reporters from various print media, radio and television. This attests once again to our openness and willingness to engage in dialogue on any matter of concern to people.

As for the Shchit unofficial organization, in my opinion it was formed not to solve the social problems of military personnel but for the purpose of attaining the selfish aims and satisfying the personal ambitions of its organizers, who are leeching off the aspiration by military personnel and their families to improve their degree of social protection. One is particularly concerned by those procedural forms and techniques on which the leaders of Shchit are focusing their members. Ploys include sabotaging the orders of one's superiors, strikes, etc. The law should crack down on such actions.

[Varlamov] It has been more than a year now since you became district commander. Considering today's swift-paced events, that is a considerable time. You came to us as a lieutenant general, and now you are a colonel general. In addition, you have become a USSR people's deputy. Congratulations. But tell us: is it that an additional star is appropriate to the office or is it a result of

particularly distinguished service? And since we are talking about general officer ranks with a general officer, we would like to hear what you think about the view that we sometimes cheapen the value of general officer ranks by handing them out fairly readily in peacetime (of course I am by no means casting doubt on your personal merits or accomplishments). The present number of general officers in this country, even with the recent reductions, is twice the number of general officers in active service with the U.S. military. We still have more than 2,500 general officers in active service. And this is with military forces numbering almost 4 million men—the world's largest (the armed forces of the PRC are smaller by approximately 1 million men, while the U.S. armed forces are smaller by 2 million).

In addition, the military in all countries consists of three branches of service: army, air force, and navy. But we have five branches of service. And each service contains a full complement of general officers and other high-ranking officers. How justified is this state of affairs? Is this swollen establishment not a carryover from the period of stagnation?

[Kuzmin] The structure of our Armed Forces formed on the basis of historical factors, proceeding from the requirements of a reliable national defense. And the point is not that somebody wanted or wants to swell the higher echelons of the officer corps. One cannot simply mechanically compare the strength levels or tables of organization of armed forces in a quantitative manner, nor should one simply adopt somebody else's command and control system. For example, the Strategic Missile Forces [or: Strategic Rocket Forces] comprise the foundation stone of Soviet nuclear missile forces. In the United States from the very outset emphasis was placed on development of the Strategic Air Command as the basic means of delivering nuclear weapons. In the U.S. nuclear triad, missile forces are organizationally part of the Air Force. In the Soviet Union we have Air Defense Forces as a separate branch of service, while in the United States counterpart functions are performed by the North American Air Defense Command (NORAD).

It is therefore erroneous to claim that since things are different here than there, this means that it is bad. This does not mean that the organizational structure of forces is permanent and unchangeable. But any change should pursue a single objective—to increase the combat effectiveness of our army and navy. On the whole, however, the reduction of forces taking place in this country has also affected command and control agencies at the various echelons. This military district's strength level was reduced by 15 percent last year.

As for the manner and procedure of awarding general-officer ranks, that is the prerogative of our state's supreme authorities. It is no simple matter to earn general-officer ranks.

[Varlamov] Since we are talking about what many see as an excessive number of senior-officer and general-officer

billets, what is your position regarding proposals to cut back on such military institutions as lower-echelon political agencies, construction battalions, special services battalions for athletes, and military sovkhoses? Such proposals are based on the opinion that each person should do the job for which he is trained. One can certainly question the validity of using a soldier as a bricklayer or cow milker, for example. Not to mention athletes and athletic coaches in the military who have virtually nothing to do with military activities, and in addition around which are cozily clustered literally battalion-strength officer-rank bureaucrat establishments. Would it not be wiser to channel all resources allocated for defense into establishing a military force which is half the size but is mobile in the broadest sense of the word, is highly trained and highly proficient, that is, professional?

[Kuzmin] I am in favor of military service involving activities appropriate to military service. For well-known reasons, however, nowadays the Armed Forces could scarcely get along without construction units and military sovkhoses. Today their existence helps resolve social and services problems in the military. Without them the situation will become more difficult. At the present time local authorities are not providing the army with what is specified in the law.

As for sports in the military, I would like to note that we have indeed amassed many problems in this area. In my opinion what we need is a radical refocusing toward military personnel physical training needs.

As for political agencies, at the present time they are indispensable. They are doing a great deal from the standpoint of democratization of the military, glasnost, perestroika in party organizations and ideology, and the campaign against routinism, resistance to change, and abuses. They play an enormous role in raising the level of troop combat readiness.

As for the matter of a professional military, in my opinion its advocates fail to consider a number of factors, first and foremost of an economic nature. Think about it. Would society be able to maintain an all-volunteer military? Even with the deepest cuts in military forces, taking into consideration the military confrontation which still exists in the world, the military will not total merely tens of thousands and even not hundreds of thousands of men. And the cost of feeding, housing, and clothing personnel, plus providing them with the various needed services, will increase many times over, according to estimates by experts. We simply cannot afford it at the present time.

Or take the problem of preparing a trained body of reservists in case it is necessary to mobilize a mass wartime army. Today we are talking about 5,000 military specialist personnel. Who is going to train them and how?

[Varlamov] Our Armed Forces are currently being reduced by half a million men. To what extent has this process affected the troops of the Baltic Military District?

[Kuzmin] The process of force reduction is in progress in the Baltic Military District, just as it is throughout the Armed Forces. The overall strength level in troops and armaments has been reduced by 3.4 percent this year. One motorized rifle division has been disbanded. A large portion of freed-up equipment and supplies is being disposed of on the civilian market. Revenues from such disposal activities total 4,082,000 rubles. Sale of motor vehicles alone has generated 920,000 rubles, while sale of communications gear and equipment has realized 300,000 rubles. In 1988 the district billeting and maintenance directorate transferred over free of charge to local authorities in Latvia, for example, a total of 2,163 square meters of barracks and housing inventory, and two military installations were transferred over to civil authorities in 1989. Conversion of military enterprises in this district has become reality. Last year they produced many thousands of rubles worth of consumer goods.

We are taking all necessary measures to maintain the combat readiness of our troops at a level ensuring reliable defense of our country's northwestern borders.

[Varlamov] Thank you for the interview.

Leningrad MD Experiment With Leave for Soldiers

90UM0435B Leningrad LENINGRADSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 7 Mar 90 p 4

[Article by Yu. Trefilov published under the rubric "Reporter on Duty".]

[Excerpt] At a get-together with personnel, Col Gen V. F. Yermakov, commander of the Leningrad Military District, stated that there will be new provisions pertaining to leave for compulsory-service military personnel.

Details are provided by Lt Col Justice V. F. Ruzheynikov, chief of the legal group at Leningrad Military District Headquarters: "That is correct. As an experiment our military district commander has decided that all compulsory-service military personnel shall be mandatorily offered short-term leave—once in a 24-month period of service. The commanding general is seeking to arrange for annual furloughs for married soldiers, and particularly for those with children. The military community is determining the manner and procedure of granting furloughs as well as length of furloughs."

Deputy Chief of Finance Directorate on Servicemen's Pensions

90UM0435D Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 9 Mar 90 p 4

[Interview, published under the rubric "From Authoritative Sources," with Maj Gen Nikolay Maksimovich Bay, deputy chief, USSR Ministry of Defense Central Finance Directorate, by IZVESTIYA reporter V. Litovkin: "Pensions for Military Personnel"]

[Text] **The Presidium of the USSR Council of Ministers has examined and approved a draft USSR Law on Pension Benefits for Military Personnel. Maj Gen N. Bay, deputy chief of the USSR Ministry of Defense Central Finance Directorate, tells our reporter about the content and features of this law.**

* * *

[Litovkin] Nikolay Maksimovich, as we know, the draft law on pensions for military personnel was not taken up at the Second Congress of USSR People's Deputies. What was the reason for this? Does it really involve classified matters?

[Bay] No, of course there are no secrets involved, although certain figures, not involving the draft law but pertaining to pension benefits for military personnel, are of a classified nature. They pertain to persons performing special duty assignments in extreme conditions. The draft law, however, is absolutely unclassified. It was not discussed because it was not sufficiently worked up at that moment, and it contains many features which require specific discussion.

I do not believe it is necessary to explain in detail that military service involves many difficulties and privations, the strict demands of the military oath of allegiance and orders by superiors, and sometimes involves risk to one's life. It presupposes full expenditure of physical and emotional energy. The workday of the officer and warrant officer at the line-unit level is not suited to standard designation of so many working hours, but is as long as is necessary to accomplish the assigned task. The work and stress loads are such that the unit-level line officer can take such stresses only to the age of 40-45.

In addition, one must consider the fact that the requirements on combat and mobilization readiness of this country's armed forces presume that persons discharged from active military service into the reserves for reason of age (maximum term of service has been set at 40 years for junior officers [junior lieutenant to captain], 45 years for majors and lieutenant colonels, 50 years for colonels, and 55 years for general officers) subsequently comprise a mobilization reserve. As a rule such reserve personnel do not possess a usable civilian occupational specialty.

There is another factor which in our view is important. Pension provisions for military personnel prescribe certain differences in pension benefits for disabled veterans

who sustained wounds, disabling injuries, or concussive injuries in the performance of their duties, as well as pension benefits for the families of military personnel killed in the course of defending the state interests of the USSR. Incidentally, in most foreign countries matters pertaining to pension benefits for military personnel are also separated from the general pension system and are governed by separate laws.

[Litovkin] What are the main provisions of the draft law?

[Bay] There are several. In many respects they parallel those principles embodied in the draft Law on Pension Benefits for Citizens in the USSR. Pension benefits for military personnel with 25 years of active service are specified in the amount of 55 percent of pay and allowances (60 percent for personnel retired by reason of age or health) and have an upper limit of 75 percent, that is, the same as civilian pension benefit limits established for all citizens. The law also provides for increase in pension payments on the basis of increase in cost of living and determined by place of residence, taking regional factors into account. But there are also differences.

We have already mentioned age eligibility requirements. In connection with the fact that in some instances (and this has become more commonplace due to the military manpower cuts) military personnel are discharged into the reserves without having completed the required length of service (only 17 percent of those discharged have reached the full required length of service), the draft law provides for pension benefits in the amount of 40 percent of pay to officer personnel who have completed 20 years of service (45 percent for personnel retired from active military service by reason of age or for medical reasons). An additional 3 percent is tacked on for each subsequent year of service.

[Litovkin] As we know, however, Article 76 of the draft Law on Pension Benefits for Citizens in the USSR stipulates that all types of labor remuneration shall be included in the earnings on the basis of which pension benefits are figured. Does this provision not extend to military personnel?

[Bay] No. At the present time pension benefits are computed from pay based on military rank paygrade and pay based on billet or position paygrade, which runs approximately 30-50 percent less than the total amount received by military personnel. For example, a battalion commander with the rank of lieutenant colonel, with 28 years of military service, following the basic pay increase currently receives about 500 rubles.

His pension (pay based on military rank paygrade plus pay based on position paygrade totals 370 rubles, or 69 percent of pay and allowances) will be 237 rubles. The draft law specifies that the categories and amounts of pay and allowances considered in figuring pension benefits, as well as the manner and procedure of their computation, shall be determined by the USSR Council of Ministers.

In order to increase pension benefits for line-unit level [voyskovoye zveno] military personnel (up to the battalion and equivalent subunits), the draft law provides that a service pension [awarded for specified length of service] which figures to an amount of less than 200 rubles per month shall be increased by 20 rubles, but shall not exceed 200 rubles. At the present time service pensions of less than 120 rubles are increased in this manner. For example, a pension amount of 143 rubles awarded to an aircraft technician [ground crew chief], a senior lieutenant, with 22 years in the service, discharged in connection with the reduction of military forces, will be raised to 163 rubles.

Higher pension amounts have been specified for disabled war veterans and other military personnel whose disability is connected with performance of military service, as well as for the families of personnel killed in the performance of duty in a case of loss of breadwinner. I do not think there is any need to quote specific figures. They will soon be made public, but right now they would merely complicate our discussion. I would like to emphasize the main point, however: as a result of implementation of the military personnel pension benefits reform, if it is ratified by the USSR Supreme Soviet, pension benefits for military personnel will increase by approximately 15-20 percent, while pensions for disabled veterans and the members of the families of personnel killed in the performance of duty will increase by 30-40 percent. This will amount to a total of one and a half billion rubles each year. This figure is included in the 29 billion allocated for carrying out the pension reform in the USSR. One billion of this 1.5 billion rubles is being spent on increasing pension benefits for war veterans and disabled war veterans—there are more than a million persons of this category in the USSR—as well as internationalist fighting men [e.g. Afghan veterans], disabled compulsory-service personnel, and the families of military personnel killed in the performance of duty.

[Litovkin] When is the new Law on Pension Benefits for Military Personnel to go into effect?

[Bay] On 1 January 1991.

[Litovkin] To whom does it apply?

[Bay] To 3 million recipients of pension benefits within the classification of military personnel of the USSR Armed Forces, troops and agencies of the USSR Committee for State Security, Internal Troops, Railway Troops, and other military force organizations, including compulsory-service personnel, command and supervisor personnel and rank- and-file personnel of internal affairs agencies and their families.

[Litovkin] Have earnings limits been established for military personnel pension recipients?

[Bay] No.

[Litovkin] Will pension benefits be refigured for military pensioners discharged to reserve status or retired prior to the time this new law goes into effect?

[Bay] Absolutely.

Military Procuracy on Criminal Offenses in Armed Forces

90UM0435A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
31 Mar 90 p 1

[Article by Col L. Nechayuk: "The Army and the Law: Press Conference at the Main Military Procuracy"]

[Text] A press conference was held on 29 March at the Main Military Procuracy, at which Lt Gen Justice A. Katusev, chief military prosecutor and deputy prosecutor general of the USSR, spoke. He discussed the state of military discipline and the state of law and order in the Army and Navy. He noted that the crime rate has risen by 14.5 percent in the last year.

The military procuracy and criminal investigators have solved the majority of crimes, have tracked down and confiscated more than 1,000 firearms; investigation of approximately 80 percent of criminal matters was completed within the time prescribed by law. The state has been indemnified for financial loss in the amount of more than 20 million rubles.

Lt Gen Justice A. Katusev noted that there is taking place in the activities of the military procuracies a shift toward resolute defense of the rights and legitimate interests of military personnel and other citizens. The infringed rights of more than 7,000 persons were restored in 1989 at the demand of military prosecutors, and instances of approximately 5,500 unlawful orders were revealed.

Responding to reporters' questions, Lt Gen Justice A. Katusev stated in particular that the growing number of instances of military desertion is cause for concern: there have been 850 such cases in Lithuania and 700 in the Transcaucasus. Criminal charges have been brought in each case. All deserters must be returned to their unit and face charges: this is required by the law. Of course punishment can vary, depending on the specific conditions and circumstances involved. Voluntary surrender to a military commissariat, for example, opens up the possibility of avoiding a court-martial action.

Last year 6,500 persons evaded conscription into the military. In the past such cases were isolated, and draft evaders attempted to hide, while today criminal acts of this type are performed openly. Joint efforts on the part of the military and society are needed in order to change people's attitude toward military service and to make it more respected.

Analysis of Effects of Reorganization of Volga, Ural MDs

90UM0493A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
14 Apr 90 First Edition p 2

[Article by Lt Col O. Bedula: "Does the Headquarters Have Enough Forces?"]

[Text] I believe that the abolition and combining of a number of military districts may be counted among the large scale measures carried out recently in our Armed Forces within the framework of implementing the requirements of the new military doctrine. The remarks by our correspondent from the Volga-Ural Military District concern certain aspects of the reorganization, and problems that have arisen in connection with it.

The combining of the Volga and Ural military districts was completed, as is known, by September 1989. The headquarters of the new Volga-Ural district was based in Kuybyshev, at the location of the former military district headquarters. Here one did not see any especially noticeable changes in the external attributes in connection with this. Except, perhaps, for the fact that there became more automobiles at the motor vehicle stand.

However, there have been many more, so to speak, internal administrative changes. Projecting their impact on myself, I can say, for example, that I have not been able to see for many weeks already some officers of the combat training directorate, and specialists from the engineer and chemical troops and the motor vehicle service. They are on trips.

Or there is this trait. To a request about a meeting, headquarters workers most often answer: "After 1900 hours on Sunday." Otherwise it simply does not happen. For example, I was able to "force my way through" to see Lt Gen A. Dvornichenko, district chief of staff, only at 0745 hours on Saturday.

Again we discussed the problems of troop control. It turned out that Aleksandr Grigoryevich had numerous interesting thoughts. And characteristically, he associated combat readiness of the troops, its state today and tomorrow, not only with improving, say, the organization of administrative structures. In his opinion the effectiveness of our military organizational development will depend decisively on the course of perestroika in the party, and the country as a whole.

But there also arose during our conversations with officers of the directorates a more down to earth question: "Does the new leadership have enough forces to maintain combat readiness from the Volga to the Urals?"

"All our requests about filling up the manning tables remain unanswered," Col S. Safonov, chief of the district cadres directorate, told me. "By the way, there is still one answer. They tell us: How can you request this when a reduction of the army is going on?"

Well, in general this is logical. But really, who is against a sensible reduction? Can there really be anyone who does not understand that combining the districts was thought up for that reason? It is difficult to understand one other thing: Why is this being done at times without taking into account as we should the interests of the job, not to mention the interests of people? By the way, Col Safonov is still to some extent in a better position than the chiefs of the other directorates. He was given six additional people.

"And they reduced us by two more men," says Col V. Melikov, deputy chief of the combat training directorate. "The amount of work, considering the size of the new districts, has significantly increased. The situation, to be frank, is irregular."

The same problems are faced by signal corps officers, the editors of the district newspaper ZA RODINU, and the rear services directorate. The VOSO [Military Communications Service] find itself in a really critical situation. In connection with the reorganization, an additional 11,000 kilometers of railroads were transferred to its management, so to speak. Postal correspondence amounts to a million (!) envelopes per year for dispatch alone. And the strength of the military communications service remained practically as before.

People address their complaints in this regard mainly to the central apparatus. But, of course, Col N. Chernyshev, chief of the corresponding district directorate, who, by the way, himself is clearly shorthanded, also receives enough of them. I asked him how the new organizational structure of the district was working out.

"We received firm figures from the General Staff," stated Nikolay Alekseyevich. "At the same time, there came a model diagram of the headquarters structure of the districts, on which we were instructed to orient ourselves. But, you see, the headquarters structures of these districts do not meet our tasks and scale in many ways.

"Another question, which is still very topical in 'intra-headquarters' discussions, is the time allotted for the reorganization. And with good reason. The initial date for its completion was stated to be 1 December 1989. Then the times were compressed to 1 September. What was the purpose for the adjustment? Here in the district people simply don't know anything in this regard. However, it is unlikely that any exalted considerations—political, military, or economic—can explain what took place with them, say, last summer. At the height of training, the combat training directorate, for example, was forced to conduct an inventory of the material resources of units in the Ural Military District, which was being reduced in size. Into the cadres directorate, where they were barely managing to solve the tasks of the reduction and dissolution of units, there entered a stream of graduates of military schools, as well as officers and warrant officers who had been replaced from the groups of forces. Moreover, they went to two

addresses—some to Kuybyshev, and others to Sverdlovsk. I remember how for nights on end the windows burned brightly in the offices of the rear services directorate, the motor vehicle service, VOSO, and the political directorate."

Here it is appropriate to note that approximately the same problems had to be solved by our military department a little earlier, during the reorganization of the Turkestan and Central Asian military districts. Why was that experience, both positive and negative, not taken into account?

"Once I phoned to Tashkent," Col V. Konoplev, deputy chief of the district cadres directorate, told me. "I asked colleagues how things were going there. 'It is dreadful,' they answered. Now I understand them well. Given a more intelligent approach, including toward determining the optimal time periods for the reorganization, we could have avoided many of the things that we are 'stumbling over' today."

Along with the purely military problems, the headquarters of the new district was faced with acute problems of everyday life. The fact is that both the Kuybyshev garrison, and the local authorities, turned out to be practically unprepared to receive new people. Housing is catastrophically inadequate. Officers transferred here from the headquarters of the former Ural Military District form the end of the line of those without apartments, a line that according to forecasts is three or four years long. Naturally, the officers' families are not hurrying to move from the Urals to the Volga. The stream of requests and complaints up the chain of command is increasing: "Give us an opportunity to live together!" And how can we do this? Today, for example, the question of returning to Sverdlovsk a senior officer of one of the directorates, Lt Col A. Karpov, the father of four children, is being decided. But he is not the only one in such a difficult position.

When one gets involved in all of these troubles, one cannot help but ask the question: Was it really not possible for, say, military construction personnel to build in good time some houses for the families of officers who were to be transferred to Kuybyshev? Or perhaps the city ispolkom could not find a place for building? No, it is apparently not a matter of finding a place. In solving large scale tasks, we are simply not accustomed to thinking about people. Is this not why many of those who were hit by the reduction, or arrived at a new city station with a unit withdrawn from a group of forces, are today wandering about in search of housing? And ahead are still larger scale measures associated with the reduction in forces and their reorganization. And it is simply terrible to think about how our military reform may turn out for many, many people, given such an organization.

People want perestroika in the army, and ardently support the party policy of ensuring qualitative parameters of military organizational development. But, they

also have a right to count on the fact that this policy will be implemented taking into account all of the problems associated with perestroyka. For example, for many years various centrally subordinate units have been stationed on the territory of the district. They are supported by the district rear services with all types of allowances. Why is this rather considerable additional burden still not reflected in any way in the table of organization of the appropriate headquarters elements?

They also told me this story. Lidiya Nikolayevna Karpova works in the apparatus of the directorate of rocket troops and artillery, as a clerk typist. Before the reorganization her pay was 100 rubles. Now, when she has twice as much work, it has become 90 rubles. Naturally, Karpova was planning to leave. But the officers, having convinced her that a "misunderstanding" had taken place, passed the hat around. They did not want to lose a most experienced specialist. And to this day, each month they make up the difference in the woman's pay, not ceasing to be amazed at the "efficiency expert" who decided to economize in such an original way.

Just the same, it would be incorrect to say that the managerial apparatus of the new district is only "rehashing" the pluses and minuses of the reorganization. An active search is underway for ways of improving the organizational structure of its subunits, and the methods of their work. For example, the senior officer of one of the directorates, Lt Col A. Kovalchuk, expressed what in my view is an interesting idea. The sense of it amounts to combining several directorates that have specific tasks that are similar. This, first of all, would simplify the procedure for providing related services, which today is complicated due to the need for all manner of agreements between their managerial apparatuses. Say that all the weapons of chemical, signal, and combat engineer troops are mounted, as is known, on wheeled or tracked equipment. This means, Lt Col Kovalchuk believes, that these specialists, as well as those of the motor transport and armored services, could work under the supervision of one man. Second, some specialists would be freed, with whom it would be possible to reinforce, for example, that same combat training directorate. Apropos of this, the already mentioned deputy chief of this directorate, Col Melikov, is behind Kovalchuk's suggestion with both hands, as the saying goes.

"We are treating only motorized riflemen and tankers," he stated. "I consider this situation abnormal. If we want to raise the quality of training of the large units and units, it is necessary for our directorate to encompass the training of specialists of all branches of arms. Of course, for this the directorate will require additional forces. Lt Col Kovalchuk is showing where to get them, without going outside of the framework of the established table of organization. It is true that our requests in this regard to the Main Directorate of combat training of the ground forces so far have not produced results."

According to the conclusion of all the inspections, including the VAI (Military Motor Vehicle Inspection),

through operating times have been from the services and subordinated to the chief of staff. I also heard about a suggestion to create a bank of innovative ideas. These would be compared in terms of place and time, in order to work out an alternative concept of the organizational position structure of the district headquarters.

Of course, not all the officer's suggestions can be approved immediately. They require serious thought and practical testing. But, here it is important not to suffocate the spirit of creativity and initiative, which is appearing in people in the process of uniting the new formation.

And this, I believe, is a most promising path. It is the path of not asking the center for that which they are most likely unable to give, but to seek it locally, and to solve the task through maneuver and regrouping of already existing forces.

Critique of Secrecy in Defense Spending

90UM0547B Moscow OGONEK in Russian
No 15, Apr 90 pp 19-20

[Article by Yuriy Kornilov: "The Secrets of Parity: What General Babyev Said, and What He Didn't Say"]

[Text] Colonel General V. N. Babyev, chief of the Central Financial Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Defense, spoke at the International Seminar on Military Doctrines held in Vienna in late January, and what he said immediately caught the attention of many foreign military experts and journalists. This is not surprising: The "chief financial expert" of the Soviet Armed Forces gave the most complete run-down of our defense expenditures ever publicized. The numbers V. N. Babyev revealed are important and interesting in and of themselves. But they are doubly interesting if we consider that in those same days and from that same podium, U.S. Assistant Defense Secretary D. Chu [transliteration] reported on the American military budget, and observers were given an opportunity to compare the military expenditures of the two militarily most powerful countries of the world. Let's compare.

In the USSR, defense appropriations for 1990 are 70.9 billion rubles, while in the USA they are \$305 billion. What are the main directions of these appropriations? There are three of them. The first is maintenance itself of the armed forces; this year a little more than R9 billion were appropriated in our country for the maintenance of personnel (including pensions), and \$78.5 billion were appropriated in the USA. The second important and major expense item is expenditures for the purchase of armaments and military equipment; this year they will be expressed in the USSR and the USA by the respective sums of R31 billion and \$83.8 billion. Finally, large sums are spent in both countries on scientific research and experimental design work, called upon to keep armament and military equipment up to date and its quality high. These expenditures are to be R13.2 billion for the year in our country, and \$37.1 billion in the USA.

It stands to reason that the structure of the armed forces of the two countries may differ. Also obvious is the fact that it is hard to compare the ruble to the dollar. Nonetheless if we believe the figures cited above, it turns out that the main expense items of the American military budget are "more substantial" than the corresponding items of our budget. How can we explain this?

If we analyze the first of the items of the military budgets of the two states presented above (maintenance of the armed forces), the answer is clearly evident. Although the numerical strength of the armed forces of our country (around 4 million persons) significantly exceeds that of the U.S. Armed Forces (2.1 million persons), it costs significantly more to maintain the American army, navy and air force than the Soviet Army. The reasons are obvious: The U.S. Army is a mercenary army, a volunteer army, and the pay of officers and generals in the American Armed Forces is six to eight times greater than the pay of corresponding categories of our servicemen. A Soviet private receives, if I'm not mistaken, R7 a month. But what about an American one? The monthly pay of a recruit in the USA is \$671, that of a private is \$753, that of a corporal is \$876, and that of a sergeant is \$1,060. That is, dozens of times greater.

But while differences in the expenses of maintaining the armed forces of the two states can be explained, it is much more difficult to find a persuasive explanation for why the same differences appear in the outlays of the two countries for their purchase of armaments and for scientific research. In order to obtain a persuasive answer to this question we need to be able to compare the structure, level and quality of the armaments of the two countries' armies—not simply compare the corresponding items of the two military budgets, but "interpret" these items, so as to know precisely what the multibillion appropriations allocated by the state are spent on—on specifically what programs, and for the purchase (or creation) of precisely which systems and types of armament.

Information on armament in the U.S. Army is published, and the American military budget contains thorough explanations of the specifications of military programs and of different types of weapons, together with a precise indication of their quantity, delivery dates and, of course, cost. The draft budget, which fills hundreds of pages, is brought up for open discussion at Congress each year. We are aware from the newspapers of the savage battles that have occurred in recent years between American legislators in regard to how many billions should be spent, for example, on the latest "invisible" Stealth bombers, MX missiles or other components of space weaponry. The Defense Department has changed the volume of its military programs on several occasions at the demand of Congress: For example while the Pentagon initially insisted on producing 200 MX missiles, later on it was compelled to reduce this program by a factor of four. Congress has also made significant corrections in the Pentagon's plans for scientific research.

And how are things handled in our country? For the sake of fairness it must be said that although the Defense Ministry was late in doing so—not until the fifth year of perestroika, it did finally make data on the armament levels of our army, navy and air force public in December 1989. We learned from these data that our armed forces possess approximately 10,000 warheads on strategic vehicles, over 8,200 combat zone warplanes, almost 64,000 tanks, 260 submarines and 157 large surface ships. Publication of these data allowed Academician G. A. Arbatov to declare on the podium of the Second Congress of USSR People's Deputies that "we produce and possess more of almost all forms of weapons than any other country of the world, except perhaps for large surface warships and strategic bombers."

Without going into the essence of this assessment, we can note that the fact that the information presented above was published is doubtlessly a step forward in the matter of openness and glasnost in the military sphere. But what is interesting is this: Having made this step, having told us what had been done to arm our army in years past, the Defense Ministry stubbornly continues to maintain a curtain of secrecy over our present and future defense programs. This curtain also hides the corresponding subdivisions of the military budget well: No matter how you reread General Babyev's Vienna statement, and no matter how closely you scrutinize this statement, you won't find any information there on the cost of our arms programs, on weapon purchases or on appropriations for specific military research.

And yet we are not talking about something minor—we are talking about a sum of R44-45 billion! If not the public at large, then shouldn't at least members of the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee for Defense and State Security have the right to know the specific purposes on which this enormous sum will be spent? But these data are unavailable even to the committee. "Members of the committee reasonably suggest that they should be in an equal position with foreign parliaments that approve allocations not only in general—for military purchases for example, but also in relation to every armament program taken separately," noted a reviewer of this journal, accredited with the USSR Supreme Soviet, at the beginning of the year in the Academy journal *MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZH DUNAROD-NYYE OTNOSHENIYA*.

The discrepancy that results from attempts of any seriousness to explain how we might have military parity with the USA when such parity is absent from the defense expenditures of the two countries is so obvious that it cannot be ignored in the West.

And they make use of this discrepancy, declaring that although Soviet glasnost has made it possible to take some impressive steps forward in eliminating the secrets about Soviet military might that cause the world so much anxiety, even today Moscow fails to communicate the true volume and level of its military expenditures. It is asserted for example in a report of a special NATO

expert group published in January in Brussels that in 1988 the USSR spent from R130 to 160 billion for military purposes—twice more than declared. CIA experts assert that in terms of real value, our country's military expenditures increased by approximately one percent in recent years. The same thesis was also suggested by Pentagon representatives during meetings and talks with a delegation of the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee for Defense and State Security that visited the USA in February.

The reader should not presume that I am urging him to blindly accept, on faith, the data on our military might gathered through covert intelligence! Of course, things are not as they seem: Figures and accompanying commentary published in the West are often dictated by political and sometimes even purely propagandistic considerations, and just for this reason alone they are often biased; it is no wonder that E. Kordesmen [transliteration], a prominent American military expert working for the U.S. Congress, describes the Pentagon's well known work "Soviet Military Might" as "a mixture of facts and fantasy." But doubts as to the accuracy of information published recently on the country's defense expenditures arise even among our own highly respected and authoritative specialists. As an example let me cite a recent IZVESTIYA interview with Academician V. Avduyevskiy, chairman of the Soviet National Commission for Assistance to Conversion, who asserts that his commission still possesses no information sufficient to clarify precisely what the Soviet military-industrial complex is. "Even today, officially published data do not inspire trust," he continues. "Let's think about what the Defense Ministry's 70 billion ruble annual budget represents. We say that we have parity with the USA. But its annual military budget is \$300 billion. Even if we assume that we have a cheap work force, and that they army's maintenance and materials are cheaper, the difference is still too large, and we still have to consider that our labor productivity is lower."

Soviet perestroika, our new thinking in international affairs and transition of Soviet-American relations from the sphere of confrontation to the rails of interaction are all making it possible to create a more-open world, to dismantle many of the secret bastions which have concealed the bureaucratic military establishment from the public eye and from public control so long and so meticulously. Who, for example, might have said seriously just two or three years ago that members of the opposing military-political blocs should freely observe each other's military activities from the air in the name of stronger trust? And recently, in mid-February, the ministers of the 23 states of both the Warsaw Pact and NATO, who met at an international conference in Ottawa, Canada, supported in principle an "open skies" regime. Even a list of the locations of Soviet medium and lesser-range missiles was published recently in the VESTNIK MID—simultaneously, of course, with publication of a similar list of the locations of American

missile bases. But when it comes to the country's military expenditures, neither USSR people's deputies nor economists nor journalists are able to cross all of the tees.

But, you might ask, aren't there any secret items in the U.S. military budget which are not made public? There are. But in monetary terms they make up not more than 7-8 percent of total appropriations. And even in regard to these secret expenditures, referred to as "black programs" by the American press, the government and the Pentagon are obligated to inform representatives of the corresponding Congressional committees, and they in turn are entitled to discuss these programs behind closed doors—without the participation of observers and the press.

What is the conclusion from this? It is obvious, and it can be worded as follows: Wouldn't it be suitable to analyze the military budget with all scrupulousness and meticulousness once more, publicly and openly—perhaps with the assistance of the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee for Defense and State Security?

Confirming the necessary level of our defensive might is not the only goal of doing so, though this objective is also exceptionally important; it would be pertinent to recall in this connection that many OGONEK readers ask in their letters if we aren't being a little too hasty in disarmament, if we aren't putting the country's security in jeopardy. But I think that the other side of the matter is no less important—determining if the appetites of our military-industrial complex always correspond to the demands imposed on the armed forces by the doctrine of sufficient defense. Since after all, can anyone really guarantee that a careful, comprehensive inspection of defense outlays by the USSR people's deputies would not suddenly reveal a few "underhanded" figures, that it would not reveal a few billion "surplus" rubles, which the USSR Supreme Soviet could rightfully reroute, without detriment to defense, into our civilian economy, which is in such grave crisis today, and utilize this money to solve highly acute social problems?

A rhetorical question, you might say. Let it be so. But only until such time that members of our parliamentary Defense Committee begin to take their work seriously.

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Quality of Spring 1990 Draftee Contingent

90UM0547A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
2 May 90 First Edition p 2

[Article by Col V. Sirenko: "And Yet We Do Trust Them With Weapons..."]

[Text] This is my first letter to the editor. What compelled me to take a pen in hand? I am concerned that in my opinion, today's young draftees fail to meet many of the requirements that should be imposed on compulsory-service servicemen.

We train young aviation specialists. The latest group of replacements has just joined us. What for example are personnel of the fall call-up of last year like? Less than 40 percent of the soldiers among the young replacements finished 10 years, there are some who have not even managed to complete eight, and one of them has but a primary education. How can we train specialists to service modern aviation equipment if conscripts have such a level of education?

But education is not the only problem. The army is presently being criticized (and correctly so in some instances) for still being unable to surmount so-called improper mutual relationships. And the arrows of criticism fly chiefly in the direction of officers. I have served in the army over 25 years, and I have never met, nor do I know, a single officer who might be a proponent of "dedovshchina," who would not fight against it. But to be honest, I must say that fighting it is difficult. Why? Judge for yourself.

Consider that same fall call-up. Over 60 persons out of the new recruits that joined us had been in trouble with the police prior to service, while one of them had been in trouble 14 times. Private Chernigovtsev was up before the police three times for thievery, Private Luzik was up twice for stealing motorcycles, Private Shakhov was convicted to three years for robbery, and Private Mirzabiyev from Fergana Oblast was the object of a manhunt by organs of the Uzbek SSR procuracy for participating in pogroms.... What will such new recruits contribute to the military collectives?

I remember a time when people with a record were not allowed to bear arms. But what about today? We can't, after all, transform the army into a corrective labor colony.

The problems of the military reform are presently being discussed in the press. The issue that is being hotly debated is whether or not the army should go professional. I myself am not against universal compulsory military service in principle. And I feel that every young person is obligated to fulfill military duty, just like it says in the USSR Constitution. But should we entrust weapons to every one of them? I think that new recruits who have a record, who have been in trouble with the police, who are prone to violations of social order and so on should not be allowed into so-called line units, where people go on patrol, learn to fight, and master combat equipment.

But this brings up a question: What are we to do with them, where are they to serve? I think that even here a solution can be found. Labor armies did, after all, exist in their time. Who was it that built half of the Baikal-Amur Rail Mainline? Military railroaders. And who is now building roads in the Nonchernozem? Soldiers of road construction subunits. Today we seem to be reluctant to talk about alternative service. It is unacceptable to us, some say. But why specifically? Is service in construction units, for example, in which soldiers often

pick up an assault rifle only once in their life—when taking the oath—not itself reminiscent of alternative service? These soldiers, after all, are sooner laborers than the country's defenders, in the direct sense of this term. Let conscientious labor for the good of the motherland become alternative service for those who are inappropriate for combat missions. But what actually happens? Subunit commanders are forced to draw up special lists indicating who can serve as a sentry at a post, and who cannot. Incidentally, this approach to the problem might also help us solve another one: I am certain that cases of stealing of weapons and their unsanctioned use would decrease significantly in the army.

New recruits suffering various health deficiencies are still allowed to serve in many instances (even in training subunits!). For example, around 40 percent of the soldiers in our unit from that same fall call-up have poor vision, and one is barely able to hear out of his left ear. Many came to us with other illnesses.... Why transform a training subunit into an infirmary?

There are unfortunately drug addicts and alcoholics among the conscripts. The largest percentage are from Khabarovsk Krai, Kazakh SSR and Yakut ASSR. Every third recruit from Khabarovsk and Ulan-Ude used drugs prior to service.

I am writing this not with the purpose of shocking someone with such facts. Such things are no longer a surprise to anyone, since owing to glasnost many things have now become open knowledge. I simply want to ask a question: Do we really need such soldiers? I think that the military reform should consider this aspect of the problem as well.

Readers' Opinions: Professional Vs. Cadre/Draft Army

Editorial Commentary

90UM0610A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
17 May 90 First Edition p 2

[Editorial commentary under rubric "Military Reform: Problems, Suggestions": "About 'Every Third' in True Colors"]

[Text] The question of the urgent need for the Army's professionalization is being discussed today both in society and in the press. On 3 April KRASNAYA ZVEZDA published materials of a roundtable discussion entitled "I Request To Be Registered as a Private..." Its participants expressed various opinions about principles of manpower acquisition of tomorrow's Army. Speaking about today, Navy Personnel Directorate Deputy Chief Rear Admiral S. Kokotkin, for example, said that every third person in the Armed Forces is a professional: an officer, warrant officer, or extended-term serviceman. The figure is impressive, but it does not speak about the key factor—the criteria and level of professionalism. The indicator turns out to be a gross indicator, although the

priority of qualitative parameters of Armed Forces organizational development is unequivocally proclaimed. This means it will also be more objective to judge professionals based not only on the military education they receive, but on real achievements in the matter of training personnel. We offer items from two of our readers who, in pondering this problem, share their observations and conclusions.

Officer Professionalism Questioned

90UM0610B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 17 May 90 First Edition p 2

[Letter by Major V. Matyash, student at Military-Political Academy imeni V. I. Lenin: "Those Kinds of Professionals..."]

[Text] Senior Lieutenant I. Markhotko was briefing foreign military observers, who had arrived at the command-observation post during a field training exercise, on missions of the subunit and adjacent units and on the tactical situation at hand.

"How about these self-propelled antiaircraft guns in the disposition of your company strongpoint? To whom are they subordinate?" These questions from Lieutenant Colonel A. Heinemann, an FRG observer, perplexed the senior lieutenant. He also did not know how to answer U.S. Army Brigadier General J. Harding's question about who would control their crews' actions during combat.

Could these questions be commonplace, so to speak, for a company commander? Unquestionably, if he were really a professional and had occasion to deal with them during day-to-day activities, but...

The American general lingered near a tank camouflaged in an emplacement. As it was learned, he began service as a tanker and so he conversed knowledgeably, as the saying goes, with tank company commander Captain M. Maryanchenko.

"When did you calibrate and register the tank armament? At what range do you set up the sighting target? Can you conduct effective fire from the move at a range of 2,000 m?"

Let Captain Maryanchenko's responses remain on my tape recorder, since it was not his fault, but his misfortune that he was unable to speak with the foreign observer as professional with professional even with an interpreter's help. And he was not the only one in such a position. But why?

The cornerstones of professionalism are laid down in military educational institutions, but their faces never will gleam without being polished in the training routine. And how do things stand with us at times with this same routine? Here is just one example.

The tank battalion commanded by Lieutenant Colonel S. Kurdin received new equipment. It is even difficult to

imagine what efforts it cost the officers, NCO's and privates to master the combat vehicles, service them and prepare them for an exercise, considering the fact that just one company in the battalion was up to T/O&E strength. Others had 4-5 persons each, including officers.

"Missions are assigned to us as full-fledged subunits," says Senior Lieutenant S. Denisov, deputy battalion commander for political affairs.

The officer did not begin speaking about this to tell about a difficult life. He was troubled that with such a T/O&E structure the task of providing quality parameters of combat readiness places commanders and their subordinates before the dilemma of what should be done first. If you precisely fulfill maintenance requirements, the combat training program will go unfulfilled, and so it is necessary to gyrate. But can one speak about attaining cohesiveness in crew actions, for example, if they have to be made up from NCO's and privates from different companies for classes? Specialists know how complicated it is to achieve complete mutual understanding in crews. Without this, by the way, quality performance of operational training missions is inconceivable.

And what are the conditions for improving the training of officers whom roundtable participants consider professionals? The fact is that these people can be said to be generals without an army. Their knowledge of methodology and tactics obtained at one time in schools and, if one was fortunate, during service in full-fledged units, now remains unclaimed. But to say that gaps in professional training can be filled by independent training under these conditions means generating an ironic smile on the reader's face. It turns out that officers who serve in reduced-strength units are professionals more in form. But in substance?

"It is necessary to engage exclusively in your own professional affairs in order to call oneself a professional with a clear conscience," said mortar battery commander Lieutenant V. Chelovenko, expressing his opinion. "But do you know the essence of my activities? Working with documents. I have two full suitcases of them. I am constantly updating, reconciling, or rewriting something. Is there time for classes here? There is little purpose in the work done. Not one of those called in for active-duty training now has any idea about the mortar of our system except Reserve Sergeant Krasnoperov, so that it is necessary to begin perfecting military expertise in an exercise essentially from zero, as you write in the newspapers."

I recalled that when Brigadier General Harding was asked how much time is taken up by work on the terrain and in the field in their troop training programs, he answered with a smile: "I never made exact calculations, but I can say with assurance that it is no less than required to remain professionals." It would appear that there is something to ponder here. By the way, I once had occasion (for training purposes, so to speak) to engage in mathematical calculations of the time spent in the field

by one of the Moscow Military District subunits. At that time it was learned that tankers of the company commanded by Senior Lieutenant S. Skorokhod did not even spend half of the program's allotted training time in the field for weapon training. The rest of the time was "eaten up" by repair, construction and so on. With that apportionment you will not become a professional even in a combat unit—it is no wonder that existing skills are lost.

Unfortunately it is not always that even those exercises in which some of our cadres have occasion to take part become a school of professionalism for them. For example, chatting back before the beginning of active operations with participants of an operational-tactical exercise recently held in the Kiev Military District, I realized that the officers had been rather well informed in advance about how events would unfold in upcoming defensive combat. And Major O. Varlakov, appointed to direct operations of a repair and recovery team, even knew in advance specifically which tank would be "knocked out." The superior has nothing to worry about! And it was no secret for the crew of this "doomed" tank headed by Sergeant V. Aleshin. Is it necessary to speak about the value of such "prevision"?

I realize that an exercise is an exercise. One cannot get by here without conditionalities. But how often do the crudest of errors, which in actual combat would cost many human lives, lie concealed behind these very conditionalities?

...A tactical airborne assault force is landing. It is an impressive spectacle, but... Helicopters with the assault force fly at low altitude over the full depth of "enemy" combat formations, which by the way have a sufficient number of air defense weapons.

Later I asked the aviators about their fly-by over the heads of the opposing side. They just shrugged their shoulders as if to say that was the shortest route. Meanwhile, many officers who had gone through Afghanistan and were decorated with combat orders were operating in the helicopter crews. In short, they were professionals, but none of them expressed even a shadow of embarrassment over such obvious oversimplification.

I once saw in a television film how effectively sensors which denote an "enemy" hit are triggered on the helmets of soldiers and on combat equipment. I have not yet had the good fortune to see the same in life or in exercises, but as a matter of fact, how can the age-old question of who got whom be answered in an opposed-forces exercise? The winner will be determined by the senior commander as always? It is hardly possible to call such an approach to evaluating the difficult and costly labor of thousands of people professional. Or is this not the meaning of an exercise?

Isn't the reason why we close our eyes today to many shortcomings in our training because we realize that one cannot count on a high standard of professionalism with the existing troop T/O&E structure and with troops constantly being diverted for tasks not connected with

combat training? And isn't this why expert mastery of equipment and weapons gets along with incompetence, and selfless labor gets along with simulation of work in our Army's real life?

New Training Approaches Necessary

90UM0610C Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 17 May 90 First Edition p 2

[Letter by Captain 2nd Rank (Reserve) Yu. Pirogov:
"There is No Other Way"]

[Text] Of course the Army and Navy need professionals, and they exist even today, but our approach to their selection is far from always rational. I know from personal observations that approximately only one out of five warrant officer school graduates becomes firmly entrenched among personnel afloat; the others are released ashore or discharged to the reserve. There are many reasons for this, not all of which can be resolved at a single stroke, but there also are those which can and must be resolved already today. Above all it is the selection of candidates for training. We need wide adoption of testing and sociological research, which will require expenses today, but will be repaid in the near future.

The system of training fleet cadre specialists also requires revision. Specialists of a "broad" profile who have no experience in operating that equipment which they will have to man come to the fleet from military schools and warrant officer schools. Instead of normal service, an agonizing retraining process begins which naturally does not provide the detailed knowledge necessary for a true professional. It would be enormously more effective to prepare a specialist for specific equipment according to a fleet's order. That is just what the U.S. Navy does, by the way. But the trouble is that the technical outfitting of training institutions has fallen far behind today's fleet requirements, and as a rule the school instructors have been separated from ships and submarines for a long time. Brief TDY stints aboard ships do not give a complete idea of the demands which modern equipment places on a fleet specialist. The fact is that later you will not be able to explain on your fingers even what you managed to learn during the TDY. Consequently, along with a change in the training program it is also necessary to change the technical facility of military educational institutions and schools and make provisions for specialists from the fleets to participate in the training process.

It is also time to think about physical training of professional military people. I do not have statistics of submariners' illnesses, but even from external appearance one can judge how much full-fledged service they can perform. Excess weight, sluggishness, and in some cases even an inability to swim—can that really be a professional military man in the prime of his life? It is time to take another look at the U.S. Army, where an annual

physical training test makes no exceptions for anyone no matter what high position he holds.

It is clear that the problem cannot be solved by orders and new physical training manuals alone. It is necessary to put funds into building athletic facilities (of which there are especially few in the Arctic, where there are so many submariners). The objection can be raised that there are not enough funds even for housing, let alone for gymnasiums and pools. But without physical training there can be no thought about establishing a professional Army. With the approach that now exists, the effectiveness of a highly paid professional's service will be nullified in a few years with no concern shown for maintaining his physical form. Athletic facilities will pay for themselves not only by extending servicemen's service, but also by providing reasonable time for garrison residents for an appropriate fee. And the construction itself can begin on a joint basis with local authorities, with conditions for future operation stipulated.

Submarine commanders deserve special attention. How irrationally their strength and nerves are used ashore! I know about this from more than hearsay—I myself served on submarines 11 years and served 15 years in a ground support maintenance crew. Instead of a submarine commander holding practices with combat information center teams and watch officers, resting, and gaining physical strength before a new cruise, we literally tear him to pieces in base. We place demands on him for clearing snow from the external installation, for barracks repair, and for a subordinate's misdeed. Moreover there is an inexhaustible flow of documents with markings of "Urgent," "By the following date..." and "Immediately." Sometimes there is no time here for combat training, let alone for rest.

Along with this it will be necessary to revise the organization of rear entities. All this will take both time and money, but without this there is no reason even to think about establishing new structures in an Armed Forces mechanism struck by many ailments.

Central Finance Directorate Response

90UM0610D Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 17 May 90 First Edition p 2

[Response to KRASNAYA ZVEZDA by Lieutenant General S. Korennoy, chief of a directorate of the USSR Ministry of Defense Central Finance Directorate: "From the Column's Mailbag"]

[Text] We are providing the following information after looking over Major I. Sergeev's article entitled "Enthusiasm and Regimental Money" published on 27 February 1990.

In accordance with USSR government decisions, differences in performance of duty by servicemen, in their ratings and in attitude toward performance of official duties are regulated in the pay and allowances system by establishing pay rates for military ranks and various

supplementary forms of pay (monetary reward for a rating, a percentage increment for years served in officer positions and so on). Payment of a one-time monetary reward has been established to motivate conscientious work of servicemen and to increase their personal contribution toward maintaining military discipline. By decision of the USSR government, commanders of separate battalions, regiments and formations and equivalent and higher commanders or officers in charge are granted the right to reduce the amount of such reward for servicemen or deprive them of it completely for omissions in service, infractions of military discipline, and amoral acts. Beginning in 1991 servicemen who have achieved the highest indicators in combat and political training can be paid a supplementary reward amounting to up to 50 percent of established norms within limits of a general annual one-time monetary reward fund.

To further improve the economic incentive of servicemen for qualitative, conscientious performance of official duties, a USSR Council of Ministers Decree dated 23 November 1989 provides that as of 1 January 1990 pay rates for officer positions at the tactical echelon are set from a minimum to a maximum (bracketed) amount. Unit commanders are granted the right to establish or change these pay rates (raise or lower them) within bracketed limits depending on the difficulty and scope of duties in the position occupied, work experience, and attitude toward service. Payment of monetary reward for a class rating or rating category is introduced as of 1 July 1990 for officers who have achieved high professional expertise in a specialty (according to a list approved by the USSR Minister of Defense). To provide incentives for servicemen, an award fund is placed at the disposal of military unit commanders. There also are other forms both of moral and economic incentive for servicemen's conscientious work (recommendation for early promotion, for appointment to higher positions and so on).

In light of what has been said, it is impossible to agree with the assertion of the article's author that "an officer receives money not so much for quality of work as for going to work." One also can hardly agree with the suggestion of introducing payment of a reward for performing various public duties. Servicemen can be encouraged with money from the award fund for active public work. At the same time, the existing system of servicemen's pay and allowances is constantly being improved, including in the direction of greater incentives for conscientious performance of official duties. Some questions are planned to be resolved in the draft Statute on Pay and Allowances for Servicemen presently being drawn up.

With respect to giving bonuses for saving resources, in accordance with Minister of Defense orders based on corresponding government decisions, servicemen can be given bonuses for saving various fuels and oils in operating naval support vessels, motor vehicles and tractors (except unit operational vehicles) and for collecting and turning in ferrous, nonferrous and valuable metals.

Maintenance, Aircraft Shortages Plague Squadron

*Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 5 Apr 90
First Edition p 2*

[Discussion led by Col A. Vasilets, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent: "Combat Readiness: Parameters of Quality—The Problems Have Not Lessened"]

[Text] On 12 August 1989 a discussion was published in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA entitled "What Concerns the Squadron Commander?" More than a half year passed and the journalist again visited this unit. Two of the participants in that discussion are still serving in the regiment. And how are things going with the problems raised at that time? The discussion, in which the squadron commanders of the military unit participated, began with that question.

[Lt Col Yu. Tsyrlunichenko.] It is as though our past discussion remained the voice of one crying in the wilderness. None of the leaders on whom solving the problems we raised depends responded or expressed his opinion. One even doubts whether it is worthwhile to cross swords about it. No one will hear us anyway, it is as though no one is interested in our difficulties.

[A. Vasilets.] Yuriy Ivanovich, I understand your frame of mind, but I do not share your pessimism, since the paper is returning to the topic.

[Tsyrlunichenko.] But, the paper does not solve problems, and I would like to hear the voice of competent and responsible comrades, all the more so in that the problems not only remain, but new ones have been added to them.

[Vasilets.] I suggest that first we briefly recall what we talked about in the previous discussion, and then state what concerns have arisen in addition.

[Lt Col S. Volnukhin.] I stated at that time that the existing inspection system does not reflect the true state of combat readiness of units, since the personnel prepare especially for each inspection; i.e., legal deception exists. I also raised the question about the squadron commander's lack of any means of communication to control his subordinates on the ground, and about the fact that we very much need portable radio stations such as those of the militia.

[Tsyrlunichenko.] We were troubled and continue to be troubled by the squadron commander's lack of transport resources; we are forced to drive many-ton prime movers all over the airfield for every little thing. And, while previously we at least had UAZ automobiles authorized on paper, now even the theoretical possibility of having an automobile has disappeared. I also spoke about the cadre problem, and about unjustified limitations on the operation of aircraft. These limitations, under the appearance of concern about flight safety, in fact are elementary overcautiousness.

[Vasilets.] Just the same, let us turn to the new problems. Last time Lt Col Ye. Yegorov, who is absent today, complained about the drawn out experiment with the shift to the new organizational structure. Now, as I understand it, isn't this question already solved?

[Maj D. Konoplev.] Truly, we waited a long time for this innovation, but it did not bring us the expected satisfaction. Here technical detachments, reserved directly for the squadron commanders, have been created in the squadrons. The flight commanders have been freed from working with technical personnel. However, this increased the burden on us. Now are forced to take away even more time from pilot training. And the ATO [air technical detachment] commander has been placed under conditions of dual subordination: to the squadron commander, on the one hand, and to the regiment engineer on the other. In my view it would be better to keep only the second variant, as training the pilots is a more important task for the squadron commander. He is less competent in engineering problems.

[Maj A. Nikodimov.] I must note that this is truly the ideal variant. I am judging from my own experience, since there is no ATO in my squadron, and I have the opportunity to engage solely in the training and education of pilots. But the main problem is that we fly little.

[Vasilets.] Why?

[Nikodimov.] There are few places in the planning table, and a lack of aircraft.

[Volnukhin.] The lack of aircraft is associated with a shortage of spare parts. The guaranteed time periods for operating air equipment go by, and a new problem arises, the roots of which are beyond the limits of our unit.

[Tsyrlunichenko.] Last time we seemed to shy away from the problems of the life and living conditions of people. Perhaps then they seemed not so acute to us, but today, in connection with the reduction of the army, and in connection with the unclear future, social tension is increasing. The majority of our officers in the USSR do not have apartments, and this means that there is no guarantee that their families will not find themselves in a difficult position.

[Konoplev.] Today there are also numerous "trivial" problems with living conditions, which poison people's lives. For example, in the garrison there are constantly interruptions in the water in apartments located above the third floor. Every family has a television set, but there is no television and radio repair shop. There is no tailor for sewing civilian clothing, the women stand for weeks in lines for the hairdresser, and there is no place to get shoes repaired.

[Nikodimov.] There are shortages in the supply of flight gear.

[Tsyrlunichenko.] And here is what is interesting. We can solve many of our everyday living problems ourselves. Among the officers' wives could be found both

hairdressers and dressmakers. If the commander could officially authorize them to get to work, do you really think they would sit on their hands? There would be profit to the state, and things would be easier for the people. But, alas.

[Volnukhin.] The unsettled state today, and the lack of confidence in the future, are engendering in officers the desire, under certain conditions, to take advantage of the situation and leave army service. Let us say that an officer has an apartment in some area of the country, and they are planning to send him to another area. Or, a unit is moved out to another place in connection with the troop reduction. A man must protect himself against unfavorable circumstances for his family. For this reason, at times we lose highly skilled aviators ahead of time.

[Vasilets.] For myself, for example, as an officer, the drop in the prestige of army service in general, and as a former aviator, the drop in the authority of the flying profession in particular, is painful. But, I wonder whether, so to speak, external forces are always to blame for this? I wonder whether we always act respectfully and sensibly toward ourselves?

[Konoplev.] It is precisely from bad traditions that have taken shape in the army itself that officers at times suffer considerable indignities. And they are undeserved and unjustified. For example, take the system for punishing pilots. If something is not just so they are removed from flight work. And what could be worse for us? Such an approach forces pilots to become overcautious, to operate looking over their shoulders, and to be concerned not so much about the quality of fulfillment of the flying task, as, God forbid, as it is said, not to make a mistake. And, in general, in the army commanders are punished not for shortcomings in the organization of service and combat training, but for so-called incidents. And most often without an examination of how much the officer himself was at fault for what happened. Everything depends on the gravity of the incident.

[Maj Gen Avn V. Maldov, military soviet member and chief of the Air Forces Political Department, Western Group of Forces, comments on the discussion:]

"It is too bad that the first sharp discussion seemed to remain unnoticed, since the appropriate conclusions were not made. Without removing the responsibility from Western Group of Forces Air Forces officials, I would like to emphasize that a number of the problems noted by the squadron commanders can be solved only at a higher level. Let us take, in particular, the question of transport resources and portable radio stations for commanders. Even the group Air Forces commander cannot solve this problem, since he does not possess either the resources, or the capabilities. It seems to me that it is necessary to seek an answer in a more radical re-examination of approaches to the organization of combat training in general. Say, one of the variants could be this. The state allocates a certain sum to the regiment

commander for the organization of combat training, and let the commander himself decide how to dispose of these funds, what auxiliary equipment to acquire, and what to build. I think that if there is a well set-up, progressive system for monitoring and responsibility, such an approach is preferable to the existing system of ultra-centralization and petty regulation of the supply of units with everything necessary. The conservatism of the obsolete structure, created once upon a time, at times greatly interferes with progress. For example, the personnel establishment of airfield security subunits has not changed for decades, and today it is the same as it was when air unit basing was linear; i.e., the aircraft were disposed at one park, set out in one line.

"Many years have already passed since conditions have changed; each squadron has its own zone, and the security subunits are literally suffocating in the old organizational framework. It is especially difficult in the period of the scheduled discharge of compulsory service aviators into the reserves.

"We will never succeed in optimizing the organizational structure of technical flight personnel. The variant that Maj Konoplev spoke about is also far from ideal. You see, today's squadron commanders are tomorrow's regiment commanders, and here will have to have all services under their subordination. And if they do not have experience in working with various categories of personnel at the subunit level, it will be simply impossible for them to handle this duty immediately.

"The problem of insufficient flying time is one of the most acute today. Flying time equates to the training level and skill level of the pilot. But, every hour of flying a combat aircraft is costly, and if this time is not used in a proprietary way, is not used efficiently, then this is simply wasteful. In many countries old types of aircraft are used to maintain flying equipment at a sufficient level and husband combat vehicle resources. Let us recall that in the not too distant past we had a situation in which, in one shop in the aviation factories assembly of aircraft was going on, while in a neighboring shop the equipment, which had hardly gotten off of the conveyer, was destroyed, cut up by the welder. Now this does not occur, but considerable funds are spent for storage of obsolete models. So, why not make old aircraft still serve the cause of enhancing the combat readiness of air units?

"In general, I consider ideal the variant when each pilot is assigned an aircraft and the corresponding ground crew. I remember that it was that way when I was young. We pilots lived as one family with the technicians and mechanics. We had common interests, and we understood each other excellently. Today depersonalization has gotten to the point that the technical personnel are alienated from the flight personnel. What is this leading to? While the pilot has some incentive for improving his skill, and increasing his flying time, the mechanic and technician have virtually none, for he is given practically no incentive for flying time, or for high-quality preparation of the aircraft. I think that the unit commander

must have his own material incentive fund for officers; this would help engender a spirit of competitiveness among all categories of personnel.

"I would also like to say a few words in defense of inspector pilots. In the August discussion people made digs at them, saying that supposedly the inspectors are concerned more with affirming their own class qualifications, and that they produce instructions and directives. The topic of the work of an inspector pilot deserves a separate discussion, and I will note only that they are frequently used not according to their direct purpose, and fulfill the role of instructor, especially during re-training on new equipment. They must be, first of all, methodologists, collectors and disseminators of leading experience, and unique barometers who catch unfavorable tendencies in pilot training. A considerable burden is placed on the inspectors. They spend most of their time on trips. Their responsibility is great. Therefore, the selection of inspector positions must also be very careful, high demands must be placed on them, and corresponding concern shown to them.

"And finally, the questions of the social protection of officers and warrant officers are becoming more and more acute every year. A law on defense is needed.

Air Defense Officer on Moscow ABM System, Peaceful Uses

90WC0077A Moscow TRUD in Russian 26 May 90 p 1

[Interview with Colonel General Volter Makarovich Kraskovskiy by TRUD Correspondent V. Badurkin: "Just What Is ABM?"]

[Text] The Anti-Ballistic Missile System (ABM) is considered to be one of the most "restricted areas" in the country's Armed Forces. A paradoxical situation has developed when the entire world knows that the Soviet Union deployed an anti-ballistic missile defense force around its capital in accordance with the Treaty on the Limitation of ABM Systems [1972] but there has not been a word about it in our own press! But, glasnost has also finally penetrated into the Army's activities. TRUD Correspondent V. Badurkin met with Colonel General Volter Makarovich Kraskovskiy, one of the PVO [Air Defense] leaders, and asked him to answer some questions for TRUD's readers.

[Badurkin] Volter Makarovich, considering the total absence of any information at all about anti-ballistic missile defense, first of all tell us about its place in the Armed Forces system.

[Kraskovskiy] Organizationally, Moscow's anti-ballistic missile defense is part of the Air Defense Troops. It consists of command and control facilities based on the most modern computers with software containing one million commands, acquisition and guidance radar sites, and firing complexes with anti-ballistic missiles deployed dozens of kilometers from each other. All of this has been developed and functions based on the very

latest achievements of command and control theory, mathematics, electronics, radar, and other sciences.

[Badurkin] You emphasized the word "Moscow" in your answer....

[Kraskovskiy] I did that intentionally. I think a small historical digression is necessary to clarify it.

In the 1960's, when the Cold War was at its height, the need arose to reliably defend the country from an American ballistic missile (ICBM) surprise attack. However, it soon became clear that creation of an anti-ballistic missile defense system, not even for the entire country but only for primary strategic areas, would be a very expensive and futile venture. The fact is that if we covered, say, 10 targets with anti-ballistic missiles, the Americans would accordingly soon increase the number of their missiles in order to penetrate this shield. We, in turn, would once again strengthen our ABM System to protect ourselves from them.... And so on and so forth ad infinitum. A classic pattern of the arms race.

Fortunately, both sides had enough common sense to think it over in a timely manner and to begin negotiations to limit strategic weapons and anti-ballistic missile defense systems. As a result, as we all know, the 1972 Treaty was concluded between the USSR and U.S.A. which permitted each side to have only one area protected by ABM's on its territory. Furthermore, the radius of the ABM weapons system deployment areas must not exceed 150 kilometers. The Americans decided to cover their Grand Forks strategic missile base in the northern portion of their country and the Soviet leadership decided to cover the capital of the USSR.

[Badurkin] What played the determining role during selection of the region? We really have regions that are much more important in a strategic sense....

[Kraskovskiy] The Soviet side proceeded from the fact that Moscow is the most important political, administrative, and industrial center of the State. All organs and all threads of command and control, including with the country's defense, are concentrated here. If we did not cover it, then it could occur in such a way that there would be no one to make a decision on a retaliatory strike or that the decision would not reach the executors.

[Badurkin] I think the time has come to tell our readers about the ABM System in greater detail: How does it function and what missions does it accomplish during peacetime?

[Kraskovskiy] During peacetime, the system is in a state of permanent combat readiness and it "monitors" outer space. Its eyes and ears are early warning radar sites. They are capable of ascertaining the fact of an attack against the Soviet Union in seconds and transferring to automatic tracking of ballistic targets, having discriminated nuclear warheads from false targets and decoys.

Anti-ballistic missiles are simultaneously brought to their readiness condition automatically, they are distributed among the targets, predicted target destruction points are calculated, and anti-ballistic missiles are automatically launched at the designated time. At first, the exo-atmospheric anti-ballistic missile interception echelon is employed and undestroyed ballistic missile warheads will be shot down in the atmosphere by short range interceptors. Anti-ballistic missile command and control is carried out by ground-based and on-board computers according to a calculated and confirmed point that is reflected by combat algorithms and programs and implemented on domestically produced supercomputers using target tracking radars and anti-ballistic missiles. This is a brief outline of our operations.

[Badurkin] I am afraid that, putting it mildly, not all of our readers will know how to sort this out....

[Kraskovskiy] I will attempt to explain it in more understandable terms. Imagine a man who is being steadily fired at from practically all directions but he manages to react to each shot. At the same time, he selects only those bullets for destruction that are flying directly at him. If he sees that he cannot hit all of the bullets, he selects those bullets that are aimed at vitally important organs.

[Badurkin] We all know that the Americans have already mothballed their ABM System that protected their ballistic missile base in the 1970's. Why did the Soviet leadership not resort to that same step?

[Kraskovskiy] Let us begin with the Americans. The Americans have actually mothballed their Safeguard [ABM] System but they have left its primary element, the PAR [Perimeter Acquisition Radar] site, to serve as a nuclear missile attack early warning system. Furthermore, they are constantly improving ABM technology and conducting scientific research and experimental design work for this purpose. And considering the U.S.'s high scientific and technical potential, I can state with certainty that they are planning and are capable of deploying their own combat [ABM] complexes in a very short period of time if the need arises.

In addition, we should also not forget that, for seven years now on that side of the ocean, they have been intensively developing the SDI Program that envisions deployment of an ABM system, including space-based elements, along with the total build up of strategic offensive force capabilities.

As for our system, we think: It is not economical to "freeze" the enormous sums spent on its development. Therefore, it not only defends the capital of the USSR from ballistic missiles but also accomplishes other missions.

[Badurkin] That is, you want to say that the Soviet ABM System also performs peaceful operations?

[Kraskovskiy] Of course. It is needed by many sectors. ABM radar systems are utilized for monitoring outer space

where thousands of artificial Earth satellites [AES] are permanently located. They monitor AES's while they enter into their calculated orbits, search for space vehicles that have changed the position of their orbit as a result of an accident or due to other causes, determine state affiliation of AES's and monitor their activities. We frequently have occasion to participate in supporting space vehicle docking, elimination of accident situations on them, conduct various maneuvers and carry out their landings. For example, I can remind your readers about the test flights of Buran-Energiya, the new Soviet space system, and the docking of the Mir Orbital Station with the Kvant-2 Astrophysical Module.

The responsible portion of our work is surveillance of Shuttle reusable space vehicle flights. (For example, from 1 through 4 March 1990, we observed Atlantis in outer space for the Pentagon). We also participate in determining times and possible reentry areas of space vehicle fragments, especially those that have nuclear power plants on board. Using ABM systems, we can determine space vehicle movement parameters with a very high degree of accuracy and check the characteristics and adjustment of new radar sites located in remote areas of the earth's surface.

I can list many more missions accomplished by the ABM system in peacetime but nevertheless our primary mission is maintenance of all systems at constant combat readiness to repel an enemy nuclear missile attack and to intercept ballistic missiles launched as a result of erroneous or arbitrary actions of individual subunits (for example, a submarine) or, finally, during disruption of stability in a country that has ballistic missiles with nuclear or chemical warheads.

[Badurkin] And the last question, Volter Makarovich. Everything that we have talked about until now concerns armed confrontation. But if we pose the problem in a different and maybe unusual plane for a military commander: How do you assess the possibility for cooperation between the USSR and U.S.A. in the area of security, including monitoring air space and outer space?

[Kraskovskiy] By the way you posed the question, I see the reflection of an attitude that has developed that military people are somehow only engaged in those things that prepare them to fight and that they do not at all want to think about detente for some reason. I personally think it is not such a fantastic idea to establish an all air and space monitoring system data correlation facility somewhere in the center of Europe where information would flow in from radar, optical, and other systems not only of the USSR and U.S., but of other countries and joint combat crews would perform alert duty there. Although in this case, obviously it would be more appropriate to call these alert forces not "combat" but peace crews.

It seems to me that during implementation of this idea, the world community would at least be guaranteed that nuclear war would not begin due to a ridiculous error in a combat program or due to a meteorite or a falling satellite that is perceived to be a ballistic missile.

Flt Adm Sergeyev Recalls Gorshkov's Career

90UM0454A Moscow VOYENNYE ZNANIYA in Russian No 3, Mar 1990 (Signed to press 02 Feb 90) pp6-7

[Interview with Admiral of the Fleet Nikolay Dmitriyevich Sergeyev by A. Utkin: "S.G. Gorshkov—Naval Leader and Man"]

[Text] An entire era in the development of our Navy is associated with his name because he led this branch of the Armed Forces for almost 30 years. However, a similar period of service surprised hardly anyone during the years of stagnation: How many highly placed state figures can you name whom death has removed from their positions. Unfortunately, the majority of them turned out not to be doing what they should have been.

But he, Commander-in-Chief of the Navy from 1956 through 1985? From that same "brilliant assemblage"? Or was he an exception?

[Utkin] Comrade Admiral of the Fleet, you had the opportunity to work with Sergey Georgiyevich for many years....

[Sergeyev] More than 20 years, from 1956 through 1977. Of them, 13 were as Chief of the Main Staff of the Navy and as first deputy Commander-in-Chief.

[Utkin] However, if we judge by the biographical information in the Sovetskaya voyennaya entsiklopediya [Soviet Military Encyclopedia], you became acquainted with Gorshkov much earlier.

[Sergeyev] Yes, our fates had crossed twice even prior to the 1950's: At one time I studied with him at the Higher Naval School imeni Frunze and at the Naval Academy. But we were not close friends at that time.

[Utkin] Nikolay Dmitriyevich, if you had honestly thought that Gorshkov, having become the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, would decide to have a former fellow student beside him....

[Sergeyev] You are mistaken. one event that occurred just prior to this served as the reason for the transfer. The first tests were being conducted of a naval weapons model with nuclear warheads. I was assigned the mission to deliver it to the test range. But how do we accomplish it? How do we transport these "items" in total secrecy without delay from the special military train to the flotilla that will carry them to the designated point afterward? We do not have suitable anchorages to support these same approach routes. I decided to do the following. I called the director of a major plant (I had developed a very good working relationship with him): I said, help us out, let us use your "port" next Sunday, on the enterprise's day off. Naturally, I did not say a word about what was going to be transferred.... Having obtained his consent, I immediately told Moscow the day and time to schedule the train. In general, both the "operation" and subsequent tests were successful.

[Utkin] We need to assume that Gorshkov liked your initiative and that fact that you managed to find a solution to this difficult situation.

[Sergeyev] Yes, Sergey Georgiyevich highly valued this quality in his subordinates because he himself was a man who was capable of an independent decisive step when the situation demanded it.

For example, Sergey Georgiyevich's famous assault landing near Odessa in September 1941. When Gorshkov and a detachment of cruisers and destroyers arrived at the rendezvous point where the ships that would land the naval infantry on shore were supposed to arrive, he discovered that they were not there. A little later, the radio operator reported that he had received a message: The Destroyer Frunze, which had been sailing to Odessa with Rear Admiral Vladimirskiy the leader of this operation, had been sunk by the Fascist Luftwaffe.

What should he do? Gorshkov decided to conduct the assault landing using the ships' assets since at any rate he had ordered additional boats and motor launches to be taken on board. The surprise attack inflicted on the enemy was completely successful.

Gorshkov did not even retreat from duties as an army commander. During the Autumn of 1942, he (true, for a short period of time) commanded the troops of the 47th Army in the Northern Caucasus. He handled his duties quite well which he often recalled with pride thereafter.

[Utkin] Of course, it is very important that a naval leader not be afraid to accept responsibility during a war. But sometimes a man who is brave in combat shrinks from difficult situations during peacetime.

[Sergeyev] This certainly does not apply to Sergey Georgiyevich. Just take the difficult period for the Navy when totally unjustified reductions of a large number of major surface combatants were undertaken at Khrushchev's initiative. They were cut into scrap metal right at the shipbuilding plants. They say the shipbuilders cried while watching the newborn steel giants being destroyed.

But that was Minsudprom's [Ministry of the Shipbuilding Industry] diocese. Gorshkov attempted to impede the execution of the voluntarist decision in every possible way and under any pretext: The ships are on a cruise, we need to assign them to accomplish some mission, the Navy does not now have the necessary equipment to cut up the hulls and superstructures, or we are experiencing difficulties with transporting the metal. He of all people knew very well that the missile submarine fleet was not a sort of "absolute weapon" that would permit us to completely neutralize the enormous superiority of the NATO Navies. Therefore, he also acted in this way even though he undoubtedly remembered the sad fate of Kuznetsov, his predecessor.

Here, incidentally, I need to say that the press is now linking Nikolay Gerasimov's removal from the position of Commander-in-Chief and demotion with the loss of

the Battleship Novorossiysk. Actually, everything happened differently. At one of the meetings when Khrushchev ordered these "coffins" to be cut up, Kuznetsov began arguing with him and in the end directly told Nikita Sergeyevich that Kuznetsov and everyone else present were better suited than Nikita Sergeyevich to determine what type of Navy the country needed. He was also punished for this "audacity."

[Utkin] Nikolay Gerasimov's life abounds in dramatic turning points. In my opinion, Gorshkov's service career occurred very smoothly: A task force commander at 30 years of age and already Commander-in-Chief 16 years later...

[Sergeyev] Everything looks that way from the outside. But for example, did you know that he was almost shot just prior to the war? In 1938, Gorshkov (he was serving in the Pacific Ocean Fleet) was tasked to bring a newly built destroyer to Vladivostok. He accepted the ship at the plant, took it through the Tatar Strait—an area that is difficult to navigate even during calm weather, and found himself in a very severe storm despite the fact that the meteorologists had not forecast any sort of danger. The destroyer was thrown onto the rocks. Gorshkov did not lose his presence of mind and did his utmost to save the crew. As a result, everyone survived. But the appropriate organs immediately took after the commander. Furthermore, no one understands why Frinovskiy, the sadly infamous deputy of "iron narkom [People's Commissar]" Yezhov, was named to head the Navy. It appears he was better at searching for "enemies of the people" than at managing Navy issues. Therefore, at the meeting in Stalin's office, he demanded that the "saboteur" be punished. Kuznetsov, commander of the Pacific Ocean Fleet from 1937 through 1939, saved Sergey Georgiyevich from reprisals. He was not afraid to speak for Gorshkov and he managed to convince Stalin of Gorshkov's complete innocence in this extraordinary event.

[Utkin] Sergey Georgiyevich was at the helm of our Navy for three decades. In your opinion, was he equal to the task?

[Sergeyev] Unquestionably! Military people have a final entry in their service records: "The position occupied is appropriate." If I was suddenly tasked to prepare such a document for Gorshkov, I would provide this conclusion without hesitation. He had more than enough boldness, initiative, and decisiveness. I hope I have convinced you of this by what I said earlier. He had a marvelous understanding of all of the subtleties of shipbuilding and attentively tracked its prospects. It is no wonder that he became intimately familiar with and only after that approved all new ship designs and their construction programs.

He knew the ocean and sea theaters well. More than once while approving plans for exercises presented to him, he made corrections while at the same time convincingly substantiating why, in his opinion, we needed to transfer

development of some mission to a different area. And he did this through memory without referring to any notes whatsoever. He keenly perceived the smallest changes in the situation in the theaters. He, in particular, immediately directed the attention of the country's leadership to the serious threat to strategic stability base created by the U.S. in the Indian Ocean on the Island of Diego Garcia.

He confidently led large Naval task forces and strategic formations, for example, during the Okean maneuvers in which forces of all of the USSR's Fleets took part.

Finally, unfortunately, you rarely meet a man who is so totally dedicated to his duty as Sergey Georgiyevich. He did not forget about his duties even during his infrequent days of rest. I remember more than once: You come to work after a day off and there is a telephone call from the Commander-in-Chief right away: "Come here." In his office, he begins to share some concept or idea. He does not give you anything in the "raw," everything has already been seriously thought out and substantiated. I was unconsciously surprised: How does he have enough strength, I myself attempted to distract myself and rest somehow after the latest difficult week, but he....

[Utkin] But did all of this really guarantee that he would not be removed? It is sufficient to again recall Kuznetsov.

[Sergeyev] In contrast to Nikolay Gerasimov, Gorshkov inherently had, I would say, a definite diplomatic talent. It is a puzzle for me even now: How he managed to escape from severe conflicts and at the same time without, as far as it was possible, giving up the interests of the matter over which he agonized so much.

And he had the opportunity to clash with many varied people. With Khrushchev who, to put it mildly, was cool toward the Navy. I remember one of the obkom first secretaries participated in an exercise where missiles were being tested and he (as a member of the military council) and the fleet commander signed the document on the results. The document arrived at Nikita Sergeyevich's office and he immediately called the first secretary on the telephone: "Since when have you been involved in Naval affairs? Do you not have other worries?"

Brezhnev. I had several opportunities to personally closely meet with him. This was a strikingly limited and dull-witted man. Once I accompanied him on a trip to the Northern Fleet. You know I died from shame when Leonid Ilyich began telling vulgar and indecent anecdotes in front of the sailors in the cruiser's wheelhouse.

But Gorshkov constantly succeeded in resolving very important issues with him! Of course, it was simple to convince him to do something. Due to his incompetence, he would easily approve the proposal being presented. However, another comrade could just as easily change his mind about something for the same reason.

On the contrary, Aleksey Nikolayevich Kosygin had real statesmanship and rapidly grasped the essence of problems and difficulties that arose in the Navy. He meticulously delved into them, always helped to resolve them, and provided precise and specific assignments to ministers whose enterprises supplied the Navy with everything it needed.

[Utkin] However, diplomats are specialists at compromise. A compromise signifies some sort of concession.

[Sergeyev] I am not hiding the fact that Sergey Georgiyevich sometimes had to resort to compromises, although with difficulty. "Superior forces" painfully battered the Commander-in-Chief. For example, Dmitriy Fedorovich Ustinov, while CPSU Central Committee secretary and being the defender of the defense industry, at the end of the year openly undertook "massive attacks" to force Gorshkov to accept ships even if they were not completed in some way. And sometimes he managed to break the commander-in-chief.

But, be that as it may, Sergey Georgiyevich's service to his Native land and the Navy was colossal. Under him, our Navy underwent enormous qualitative changes, came out onto the World Ocean, and put a stop to the absolute predominance that the Navies of the imperialist states had on it. Under his leadership, a whole generation of seamen have been educated who have distinguished themselves on long cruises and while rendering international assistance to the peoples of various countries and contingents. Because Sergey Georgiyevich Gorshkov himself belonged to that group of people that we are accustomed to call—real seamen.

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Weapons, Specifications of OSO Class Missile Cutter

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[Article by Captain 1st Rank A. Tsybulko and Retired Captain 1st Rank V. Krasnov, candidate of naval sciences: "Missile Cutters Are Attacking"]

[Text] The sea was resting after the storm. Only the monotonous noise of the individual rolling waves violated the total silence. An early seagull flashed in the semi-gloom. Dawn was approaching....

The silhouettes of two missile cutters maneuvering at a low rate of speed were barely distinguishable on the dark part of the horizon. Precise maintenance of the assigned order, coordinated turns, and the muffled operation of the diesels at low rpm's were evidence that the cutters were accomplishing a combat training mission and were conducting a reconnaissance search before launching a missile attack.

The commander and navigator leaned over the navigational map while observing the shining cross-hairs automatic position plotter that constantly indicates the ship's position. The warrant officer who controls the main engines is to the right in a cramped chair. A radar position is visible through the hatch on the conning tower deck. The radar operator is attentively watching the radar screen on which the green scanning line moves at a measured pace. A weak, hardly visible blip has appeared on the very edge. One more turn of the antenna and there it is once again....

"Target! Azimuth... Range....!" "Training alarm! Missile attack! Course....! Full speed ahead!"

The ship's hull shuddered from the increasing rpm's of the three diesels. The bronze propellers shoved the missile cutter toward the target with enormous force.

"Initiate pre-launch preparations!"

The crew prepares the weapons and technical systems for immediate employment, battens down the ventilation portholes, and all ship compartments are sealed. The range to the target is becoming shorter. It is visible on radar. Finally, the signal flashes "gun crews ready."

"Connect the emergency circuit!"

"Prepare to launch!"

The canisters' forward covers shuddered and moved up. The missiles' paths are clear.


"Launch!"

A dull jolt and a flash. The first missile has launched. A glow lit up the pre-dawn sea for an instant. The missile lunges into the sky. Having gained altitude, it sets off on a westerly course. The second missile launches after the first...

The rocket cutter's architecture is dictated by the need to provide such qualities to these ships as speed, maneuverability, and undetectability. As a rule, they are low-sided and fast hulls and underdeveloped and low superstructures that promote the least resistance. Seaworthiness is most frequently limited to swells of five balls. The speed of ordinary rocket cutters normally reaches 45 knots (80 kph), air cushion hovercraft—more than 50 knots, and hydrofoils—up to 60 knots. This permits the rocket cutter to approach enemy ships in a very short time, to inflict surprise attacks, and to rapidly leave the engagement area.

One type of Soviet rocket cutter has a total water displacement of 220 tons, is 39.6 meters in length, and has a beam of 7.6 meters and a 2.93 meter draft. The three diesel engine power plant permits speeds of up to 45 knots. The cutter's main weaponry is four anti-ship cruise missiles. Furthermore, it has two twin-mounted 30-mm automatic guns.

Longitudinal view of a [missile] cutter.



Key:

- 1. and 8. 30mm twin-mounted antiaircraft guns.
- 2. Conning tower.
- 3. navigating bridge.
- 4. Mast and antennas.
- 5. Missile in hangar.
- 6. Hangar.
- 7. Airborne target detection and gun command and control radar.
- 9. Missile pre-launching check station.
- 10. Officers' wardroom.
- 11. Engine control station.
- 12. Fore and aft engine rooms.
- 13. Officers' cabins.
- 14. Radar systems station.
- 15. Crew quarters (petty officers' quarters).

The missile launch systems, artillery, the conning tower with signal bridge, two radar antennas (one for target detection and target designation and the other for directing artillery fire) are located on the upper deck.

Anchor gear, crew quarters, officers' cabins, engine room, mess hall, petty officers' mess, artillery magazine, and artillery radar room are located in the cutter's compartments.


Missile launchers are made in the form of hangars or cylindrical canisters (in this case, the missiles have collapsible fins) with forward and aft covers. There are two rails in each canister on which the missile moves while managing to gain sufficient speed by the moment of release, a device for securing missiles, a combat connector, and a fire suppression system. Loading is conducted using a loading device through the forward

covers of the missile launchers that automatically open and close just at the moment of launch. Emergency release of a malfunctioning missile is provided for.

An anti-ship cruise missile manufactured from light alloys based on an aircraft design is the main element of the missile system. Its fuselage consists of several stages and it has wings, a tail, and stabilizers with ailerons. A solid fuel launch engine is attached to the rear and below the fuselage that imparts the missile's initial velocity during launch until the sustainer engine is turned on. There is a radar homing head capable of conducting target search and lock-on in the nose section under a radio-transparent ogival-shaped nose section. From the moment of lock-on, the anti-ship cruise missile carries out its commands.

A warhead that has an explosive charge and blasting devices (either contact or remote) is located in the next

Longitudinal view of a missile.

**Key:**

1. Missile homing device.
2. Warhead (high explosive charge).
3. Oxidizing agent tank.
4. Fuel tank.
5. Compressed air tank.
6. Fuel pump.
7. Solid fuel launch engine.
8. Sustainer jet engine.

section and, behind the warhead, is a tank of compressed air to support command and control element operations. The engine that supports the missile's movement during the sustainer phase is located in the rear section. Furthermore, it is equipped with an autopilot and altimeter. Control surfaces are located in its wings, tail, and stabilizers. Solid fuel, liquid fuel, or turbo-jet engines are used in anti-ship cruise missiles. After completing their operations, the solid fueled launch engines are separated from the missile using special shear bolts or an explosive charge.

The shipborne missile command and control system includes a target detection and tracking radar, a gyroscopic stabilization system, pre-launch preparation instruments, and electronic computer units that process launch initial data. The radar conducts target search and, when targets are detected, begins tracking them by order of the cutter commander. Azimuth and range to target are entered into the computer unit for processing initial data—attack course, target course and speed, and range to turn on the radar-homing head—that are entered into the missile's autopilot. Since firing is conducted under

various sea wave conditions, the missile must be stabilized with regard to the horizontal plane when it leaves the launcher. Gyroscopes carry out these tasks and the pitch and roll angles that they process are also entered into the autopilot which, along with the altimeter, supports the missile's autonomous flight toward the target at a definite altitude. The flight can be carried out on a constant course and altitude and also on a changed trajectory. The missile homing system is turned on at the assigned range and conducts search and automatic target lock-on. When the missile makes contact with the target, the warhead is actuated and... an explosion occurs.

When the range to the target is great, the radar cannot detect the target and in this case azimuth and range to the target are entered from other target designation sources—a ship, an aircraft, a helicopter, etc. If the radar malfunctions, or if there is a great deal of enemy jamming, the missile launch can be conducted by an alternate technique using data provided by an optical sight within line-of-sight range.

Soviet rocket cutters have proved to be highly efficient and reliable combat equipment.

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Conversion vs. Sufficiency of Defense Spending

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in Russian No 12, Dec 89 pp 118-128

[Article by Ye. Adamov, general designer, director of the Research and Design Institute for Power Technology and doctor of technical sciences, under "Problems. Continents" rubric: "Economic Reform and Conversion"]

[Text] Several months ago, I gave an English colleague at an international conference an explanation of the contradictory processes in our economic life. By profession we are both economists but even terminologically the conversation on this subject was difficult for us. But the persistent curiosity of the professor, who is also a justice of the peace in public life, overcame the barriers. In trying to find an analogy for his concept of the strange combination of administrative and self-regulating principles in the structure of the management of our economy, the Englishman reminded me that his island country is the only one in Europe where people drive on the left side of the road. From time to time voices are heard in favor of a harmonization of the rules with most of the rest of the world. At the same time, the most careful reformers are proposing that they limit themselves to an experiment for a start: let only buses on the right side. We were not talking about conversion but I certainly would not want it to be assigned the role of these buses.

Probably my assertion that the health problem cannot be resolved merely by shifting expenditures from the production of nuclear warheads to medical services, for example, will seem if not absurd then certainly not obvious not only to a foreign reader but also to many of my countrymen. Many of the candidates on the ballot for the congress considered the key part of their program to be the proposal on the reduction of defense expenditures as the most realistic source for covering social requirements. It is obvious that such programs were especially popular both as peacemaking programs lowering the level of armed confrontation and as indicators of the way for the most rapid resolution of acute social problems. It is too bad that despite all their attractiveness these proposals were not, to put it mildly, the fruit of sound thinking.

The state of the economy in general and of its consumer sector in particular makes it absolutely impossible to continue to substitute empty ideological words for a real saturation of the market. It is obviously here where it is necessary to look for the roots of the particularly administrative decisions from which conversion is still growing. I can see the look of surprise on the face of the reader: administrative decisions? Many associate conversion with perestroika itself, almost with its economic foundation. If is a fact of life, however, that conversion and economic restructuring are certainly in the same family, whereas conversion and the mechanisms for the self-regulation of the economy are not even distant relatives.

When the administrative system—the depths of which gave rise to conversion—began its real implementation, it was at least possible to assume that in these depths they also performed an analysis of associated problems and that the decision itself, although made in the old traditions of secret politics, was balanced and thought out in detail. The problem arises, to be sure, of choosing between two not very similar points of view on the approximate parity of two opposing blocs: either it was realized with a surplus of some kinds of arms on our side or, in the event of true parity, we essentially disarm unilaterally.

What besides momentary political dividends guided the candidates for people's representatives who made the proposals on the reduction of defense expenditures? A reduction of what? That which was unknown by the people except for those who in our hereditary credulity believed that defense expenditures amount to 20 billion rubles. I will risk expressing the heretical thought that not even the present government knows these expenditures precisely. This was hindered not only by the infamous secrecy that frequently guarded not the true interests of the state but individual and group interests. In addition to the means of hiding expenditures invented by the state, there are probably also departmental "tricks." Mixed in here are the grimaces of statistics (double counting) and our absolute inability to consider the effects of technological innovations.

With their roots in the careful concern of the bureaucracy that according to the rules no inventor should earn much (that is, more than the bureaucracy itself), these prejudices not only deprived our most inventive people of material incentives for inventiveness but also deprived our economic life itself of precise knowledge of how much profit, for example, the thermonuclear armament, still fruitless in the sense of its final realization, gave us as a result of the introduction of technologies that arose because of this still unrealized supercreation from the technical progress of the 20th century. Vacuum technology and cryogenics, plasma technologies, ion alloying and superconductivity—although in its low-temperature version—are things that we utilize enough of, even in our lack of resourcefulness, to justify thermonuclear expenditures many times over. For the European Center for Nuclear Research (CERN), an order in industry of the most complex and technologically unique experimental devices is no problem. And CERN pays at production cost. Industry receives profit later, when the unique nature of the individual order from scientists results in real market gains. Try to show up at a serious plant here with such a task! We wasted our undisputed lead in these same "Tokamaks" in the "fight" with our designers and industry.

Let us return, however, to defense expenditures. Let us suppose that I am in error and our government knows the price of the defense potential in all its forms. True, I think that in this case, despite all the resolve in breaking down dogmatic determinations, there would be no need

to hide behind the arguments about the nonconvertibility of the ruble. The incomparability of wages and the cost of an automobile in our country, for example, do not hinder the publication of their ruble values and equivalents in the currencies of the countries acquiring these automobiles. At the First Congress of People's Deputies, they officially named for the first time the very modest—in comparison with the estimates—sum of military expenditures: 77.3 billion rubles. If this figure is not subjected to doubts, as has already happened with the deficit in the state budget announced by the former minister of finances, and if it does not rise significantly, one should not see military expenditures as a basic source for the resolution of social tasks.

Moreover, the acting parliament should have demanded from I.S. Belousov, deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers with responsibility for the defense industry, a basis for the idea that these expenditures are adequate to ensure the defense capability of the state. With such a surprising difference between them and the analogous American budget, the thesis of adequacy is hardly demonstrable merely by referring to the difference in the payment of military personnel and the services of the personnel of the defense branches. The willingness of the deputy premier to involve the defense potential actively in the treatment, as he put it, of 10 sore points was certainly pleasing to the ears of the deputies. At the same time, the complete lack of information, even in the accustomed imperative manner, on the level of our defense capability is at least surprising, as is, by the way, the lack of interest in this problem on the part of the body of deputies. What is this, the reverse side of the hypertrophied attention to defense over many years, as is now supposed?

The conveyance of freight by means of the transport aviation of the air forces instead of training flights without an economic benefit certainly makes it possible to combine the training of flight cadres and the maintenance of equipment in the proper operating condition with the real effect of the reduction of strain in freight flows. Even the construction battalions are socially useful, despite the inefficiency of utilization of manpower resources (the labor productivity of construction battalions is one-sixth of what it is with Zlobin, for example). Without finding a way of obtain a greater effect with less manpower under the same conditions in which the labor of construction battalions is utilized, it is impossible from the general considerations of primitive conversion to reduce this work of engineer troops of our army and the number of personnel employed there. Such an abrupt change will not do anything but harm. Although it is possible and necessary in the shortest possible time to put together and implement a program for the gradual rejection of the performance of construction work as a military duty and, as a result, to obtain all possible social and economic advantages.

Especially since the reduction of the quantitative indicators of armament cannot maintain the potential unchanged without changing them qualitatively. And the

quantitative balance is useful only for natural production indicators and for a direct comparison of the volumes of arms of the opposing blocs. In the development of new technology, general percentage reductions cannot fail to be accompanied by a specific examination of the programs and projects as is done, for example, by the corresponding committees of the U.S. Congress. And since the Americans have not yet abandoned further developments of SDI, it would not be bad for our people to know whether our so-called "asymmetric response," as they like to call it, will survive.

The clear lack of attention to the structure of defense expenditures by the highest state body in combination with the long-standing practice of the system of taking all innovations to the absurd (corn from pole to pole!) as well as with the existing tradition of presenting above all domestic science as a "scapegoat" cause one to fear with good reason that the storms of budget changes will essentially sweep away not the excess production of series arms but new developments. For this purpose it is enough to distribute the announced percent reduction equally between production and research and development work.

Thus, the question of the adequacy of the defense budget and of the possibility of extracting resources from it for other social needs remained open. The members of the Supreme Soviet did not hear and, as strange as it may seem, did not even demand the proper explanations of the possibility of movement along this path or a substantiation of the admissibility of the announced further reduction of defense expenditures.

Nevertheless, it is difficult to name the industrial output whose production would not be planned for the defense branches. For the electronics industry, the Ministry of Communications and the radio industry, conversion means only an increase in the scope of their existing participation with many billions in the market for household electronics with, of course, the achievement of new levels of consumer qualities for this output. The former Ministry of Medium Machine Building, now the Ministry of Atomic Energy and Industry, essentially has yet to appear in the market for consumer goods. It is gratifying that this benefit promises to resolve such problems as the issue of up-to-date personal computers, cameras of the Polaroid type and electric batteries, whose shortage is inversely proportional to their quality, and complete equipment for the processing of milk provided by service firms. The remaining enterprises of the so-called "nine" are being included in conversion.

Why are we turning our eyes to defense enterprises when we are looking for a way out of our economic difficulties, if it is already obvious that there will not be a lot of "broth" in purely budgetary terms? Apparently the hopes are linked with the utilization of the potential that was gained in the defense branches over many years and which boils down not only and perhaps not so much to the material aspects of its provision as to the intellectual wealth that is concentrated in this sphere. Certainly the

real necessity that existed over many years and the practice subsequently cultivated by inertia for the priority provision of defense enterprises helped, as a rule, in their better technical and technological development and resulted in social benefits for the collectives. But the priority of production over the social sphere, as an element of many years of state policy, also had an effect here and the leveling tendencies practically evened out the advantages of the social provision of the personnel of defense enterprises in the 1980's. Up until a certain time, participation in the strengthening of the "defense capability of the Motherland," as we said for many years, contributed to the formation of such moral priorities as service in the army and work to create and improve military technology. We will note that this stimulus, being strong enough in the 1950's, for example, was essentially transformed in the 1980's to the point of reversing it, which could not fail to have an effect on the current state and especially on the prospects for the preservation of the leading positions of defense enterprises in comparison with other enterprises in the national economy.

The accident at Chernobyl, the earthquake in Armenia, the gas explosion in the Bashkir ASSR and the major catastrophic events in other countries were accompanied, as a rule, by the use of army subunits as the most mobile and well-trained force for actions in extreme situations to alleviate and eliminate the consequences of tragic events. By the way, such a form of action is also economically the most acceptable for the society, for it substantially reduces expenditures for the elimination of the consequences of the accident in comparison with any other versions of state decisions. And the more rigorously the state acts in extreme situations, the better will be the results. The accidents in the Urals and at Chernobyl that were comparable in scope led to much more severe results for the country in 1986. As the people directly involved in the events after the accidents know very well, the scope of the resources brought in and the level of the organization of the work, especially in the initial period, were far from exemplary. The state expenditures after the earthquake in Armenia also turned out to be many times greater than the minimum necessary expenditures. The conversion of administration begun in 1985 has not yet led to perceptible results in the standard of living of the population but, as the mentioned accidents showed in particular, it very rapidly weakened the state itself.

Under the conditions of the coming reductions of army expenditures and evaluating the consequences of the process of democratization unfortunately accompanied by an abrupt decline in labor discipline, I will risk making the unpopular proposal that the corresponding army specialists be utilized in the operation of dangerous production systems, above all nuclear power facilities. And not through a reduction in the size of the army but through the conversion of its responsibilities. Indeed, we could be calmer during these uneasy years in reducing

the number of nuclear submarines and in transferring personnel to the shops of nuclear power stations that determine safety.

It may be that the impatient reader who has already perceived my ambiguous attitude toward conversion (more accurately, toward how it is realized) will see the analogy. Specialists often assess the state of the economy in the foreseeable future and the current management of the economy as catastrophic. It would seem that from these positions the logical scenario of conversion is precisely the one that is being implemented: the assignment of national economic tasks to defense enterprises. The management personnel of branches subject of conversion underwent such minor changes that one of the brilliant representatives of the older generation of administrators, speaking to managers of enterprises carrying out conversion, declared—obviously through force of habit—that "the tasks set by the party will be fulfilled at any price."

It is precisely about the price that we need to talk seriously. And not only and perhaps not so much about the production cost and price of new output in new markets. We are already bearing the first expenditures or, more accurately, the first losses in connection with the erosion of the potential that was accumulated in the defense branches and that is assigned the role of a rescuing wand. The tendencies observed in this connection were already mentioned above and among the most serious of them should be included the problems of personnel reproduction dictated by the decline in the prestige of working in defense spheres and by the change of direction of the vectors of public interests. The spontaneity of the processes leading to the situation today has nothing to do with the realized social necessity. A person would hardly take responsibility for the purposefulness of such a policy out of common sense. One cannot imagine a state consciously regulating the economy in such a way that the material prosperity of a worker not needing high skills will in any quantity and quality of his labor exceed the wage of a specialist with a good education who works conscientiously in accordance with his knowledge.

It is no wonder that every year in an economic Chernobyl we bring in workers from the cities, military personnel and students to do farm work during the intense harvest time. The administrative system established criminal liability for the dismantling of new equipment rather than repair equipment that had not served its useful life, which was frequently the practice in the countryside because of hopelessness and sometimes negligence. But are not the decisions that disrupt the normal rhythm of industrial operations, the educational process in the VUZ's and the creative atmosphere in science (in those institutes, of course, where it exists) not from this series?

It is obvious to all that you cannot make the ruble convertible through a ukase; the only dispute is about the stages preceding the partial and full convertibility of our

REAR SERVICES, DEFENSE INDUSTRIES

monetary unit. But is not the still profound difference between the wage ruble and the ruble in the sphere of the economic relations of socialist enterprises created by many decades of development of our economy through administrative-volitional ways just as clear? And without changing this system, was it really reasonable to establish cooperatives, whose status still differs fundamentally from state enterprises, in areas of work where they received the possibility of repainting various types of monetary units and that are the basis for their rapid enrichment and apparent violation of social justice in the society?

It is evident that the academician and now Deputy Premier L.I. Abalkin was right when he asserted that the influence of the cooperatives on the economy could not yet be decisive. But what measures the indirect damage that is statistically linked only with the action of state enterprises, whose managers have tried and are trying to find ways not to lose in competition with cooperative members for manpower resources? Is not this the root of the sickness that led to an exponential increase in money payments, which they are now trying to treat through tax regulation, with the clear danger of doing even more to increase the inequality of enterprises with different forms of ownership and organization of labor? The country's top newspaper can take delight in the fact that a truck driver in a cooperative earns 1,300 rubles. But if this is taken as the point of reference, then a specialist with a university education and high labor efficiency in a research institute must receive no less than 2,000 rubles. The same PRAVDA presented examples in which wages in some institutes reached such a level but this was reported as cases of grabbing and made a reproach rather than an example.

The question of the prices of the products of conversion has still not been fully uncovered and will not appear to its full extent until the end of 1990 or 1991. Neither the practice of price-setting nor the substantial differences in the structure of expenditures of enterprises belonging to different departments allow one to hope for prices for the output of the plants of defense departments that are acceptable for the national economic consumer. Examples of this from our past experience are the "Kirovets" tractor and the "Don" combine (although it is issued not at a defense enterprise but is quite appropriate as an example in the context of the conversation on prices). No matter how we curse the administrative-command period, however, there was balance in the decisions of those times. And the state paid in full not only for planned unprofitable meat (which, by the way, did not become unprofitable until the 1960's) but also, for example, for fuel and energy resources and those same combines and tractors. We remind those who think that such decisions were a special national feature of ours that in the FRG, for example, the coal industry is also unprofitable and the difference between the cost of organic fuel mined in West Germany and that obtained in the world markets is covered out of the state budget.

Scarcely anyone has any doubts that equipment for the processing of milk or meat, light and other kinds of industry manufactured by the "nine" will be of a much higher quality than that from traditional suppliers. But the price will certainly also be different. Whereas the problem of the German miners is resolved at the expense of taxpayers as a social problem whose roots are naturally in the past, we are creating the pending problems of imbalance in the prices of the output of the "nine" and of the possibilities for national economic consumers to pay for it only because, having declared the transition to a state managed by economic laws, we are continuing to resolve problems administratively. The humor of my English colleague becomes gloomy reality.

After the tragic events in the submarine fleet, many publicistic arrows were fired against the really existing problems of working conditions and even of ensuring the safety of military specialists at particular facilities of military technology. They thereby forgot the simple circumstance that authoritarian states can concentrate resources on solving narrow specific tasks such as the building of an atomic bomb and delivery systems for it but are not able to achieve in all areas of the life of their people a level higher than that which corresponds to the level of the culture and organization of the society as a whole. To build that atomic bomb, it was necessary to concentrate everything in a single branch: from the mined material and the processing of the ore to theoretical physics. In the well-known lagging of our domestic computer technology, our "Buran" landed automatically, whereas all the flights of the "Shuttle" in the United States with its advanced automation required pilot participation. It is therefore a very great mistake of politicians in the Western world to suppose that limiting deliveries of computer technology to the USSR can effect the level of defense capability. It will have an effect and it actually is already having an effect only on progress in those areas that determine the standard of living of our people and the speed of the resolution of ecological problems, indirectly influencing, by the way, not only the health of our population but also the environment of those states whose leaders are continuing such an archaic policy.

A no less serious mistake, however, is the supposition that the general level of education and attitude toward labor and the imperfection of economic mechanisms can be compensated by extending the blanket of the intellectual and physical resources of the defense complex to the entire national economy. Reasonable voices are already calling upon us to remember that our well-being will not change by replacing the mechanisms for the distribution, for example, of the existing stocks of food products. But almost everyone sees conversion as a panacea for practically all of our misfortunes.

The press today is providing our reader much food for critical thought. Today it is natural to be interested not so much in negation and even in very nice explanations for why something is bad in some area or other as in

pragmatic programs and realistic proposals. In this connection, it is possible to give the author of the preceding part of the article if not a reproach for his critical disposition then at least the question: "Are you for conversion or against it? If you are for it, then how must it be realized?" An equally direct answer is possible only for the first of the two direct questions: "Unequivocally for it." But an honest doctor will not set out to treat a patient without knowing the diagnosis precisely. In any case, however, following the ancient medical principle of "do no harm," he will not undertake any actions unless he is convinced that these actions will not worsen the patient's condition. In the critical preamble to the present article, the author tried to present to the reader the idea of the inadmissibility and even, unfortunately, actual harm from actions that, continuing the medical analogy, are not so much the treatment of an unhealthy part of the organism as the destruction of a normally functioning part.

It appears that everyone understands very well the large portion of slyness in the assertions on the problems having to do with the 18 million administrators in the country: I think that it was not out of a misunderstanding and not without intention that this figure included not only heads of ministries but also the personnel of enterprises, right down to foreman of production sections. But a different feature of our time is being perceived much less clearly: the more than 12 million workers and employees in agriculture. It was precisely to this army that the state order was oriented, as a result of which we are producing one and half times as many tractors as Japan, the United States, FRG and France together. And as you know, the picture is no different for combines. And here our statistics can be believed, in contrast to the data on the volume of agricultural production: we cannot see on our store counters 86 percent of the abundance of products of the United States, for example. Will not the state order for equipment for all spheres of the national economic complex turn out to be just as unfounded as before?

Judging by American and West European roads, the producers of our trucks also face conversion: no vehicles analogous to our gaziks and zils travel the autobahns and city streets. The tractor and combine plants obviously also face the task of conversion in the renewal of output, although these enterprises (or their corresponding production systems) were not defense enterprises. Payment for conversion expenditures is dictated by the inadequacy of the mechanisms for the management of the preceding period. But have these mechanisms changed to the extent that they guarantee the defense industry that there will be no repetition of the situation that developed for tractor and combine builders? It is not the producers of milk and meat or their processing enterprises that are ordering equipment for themselves but the same structure for the formation of the state plan is in operation. The famous Volkswagen "beetle" broke all Western records for longevity on the assembly lines of motor vehicle plants. But the market kept it on the

assembly line. But this phenomenon itself did not prevent the building of an advanced Mercedes. The Volga is apparently also a record holder. It owes its "achievement," however, to shortages and the so-called "planned economy." But judging by everything, no domestic Mercedes is foreseen in the near future.

Having indicated the striving to take part in the international division of labor, are we not making a new mistake when we try to develop all kinds of output here to a world level, including those products where we are hopelessly behind? For even the resources of the "nine" are inadequate to produce this same Mercedes according to market requirements within 3 years. Is it not better to concentrate only on those directions in which we are either at the same level as the West or even ahead of it: yes, ahead; as unaccustomed as we may have been to hearing this in the recent years of a critical attitude, we really have such directions. In the areas requiring a high technological level, it is space and nuclear technology. There are quite a number of directions in science whose fruits are much more effectively used by Western industry than here as a result of the unnatural process of "introduction."

It is not conversion itself as a strategy for reorientation to the vital needs of people for public resources but the tactics of its realization that evokes serious concern. Having pronounced a transition to economic forms of management, it is inadmissible to realize conversion by administrative means. It is also inadmissible to exclude defense from the sphere of the vital needs of the members of the society. Concentration on such clearly unsuccessful branches of the national economy as the production of food products, construction and transport with their huge internal manpower reserves is the obvious and priority concern of all levels of state administration. The corresponding measures realized through the economic path naturally also utilize the potential of the defense complex: the intellect of the specialists working here and the established industrial might. Just as it is natural in the so-called "countries of capital" for the leading corporations in the defense complex also to be the lawgivers in the market for science-intensive consumer goods, the enterprises of the "nine" will reach for well-considered orders under the conditions of economic relations.

It is time here to note a substantial difference not only between the majority of the enterprises of the "nine" but in general between the enterprises of our national economy and the firms of the countries of the market economy. For many years, the planned economy presupposed the closing of economic balances only at the level of the country, region and, in part, of branches. An individual enterprise, as a rule, was neither an independent economic unit nor a final producer of commodity output. Practically everywhere today they have opened the cycle "research-development-production of output-operational service." Under these conditions, the

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erecting of economic barriers between enterprises did even more to aggravate the situation in the sense of the consumption effect.

The separating out of extrabranh concerns is nothing other than an attempt to resolve the problem of linking the entire chain in the creation of consumer product. But if we do not withdraw from the realities of the present day (with its shortages, lack of an economy based on a firm monetary unit and a strange combination of the administrative structure and factors of self-regulation), three concerns separating themselves from a department form nothing other than new microdepartments from the point of view of the organization of state management: with separate lines for planning, supply and financing. Is it not simpler to see a direct analogy between most of our branches and foreign concerns?

Being concerned about antimonopoly barriers, it is possible to establish several large concerns from such ministries as, for example, the Ministry of the Aviation Industry. Their founding, by the way, will absorb a significant part of the administrative system. Having a different specific function, today's administrators, economists and other departmental specialists subjected to undeserved social ostracism are the core of managers of socialist firms and concerns. In the sense of the social optimization of the use of manpower resources and the professional potential, this is much more efficient than the early pensioning of the reducible administrative system and its haphazard employment at enterprises where there is no need for it under the conditions of the existing structure. And all of this takes place simultaneously with tremendous efforts to retrain as managers enterprise specialists without managerial experience.

In the person of the remaining part of the Ministry of the Aviation Industry, the concern established on the basis of the Tupolev or Ilyushin design bureau will receive a body acting as a customer on behalf of the state and in no way interfering in the problem of the management of the concern. During the time necessary to overcome the shortages in the economy, the ministry will perform the functions of a manager not only of credit but also of ceilings, funds and job authorizations—all the rudiments of administrative state management. These functions must die off not by decree but naturally: the appearance of free construction capacities in the market immediately eliminates the function of distributing the contractual work ceilings, etc.

The states with a free economy never emphasized an antimonopoly policy. This problem comes to the agenda only in a sufficiently developed economy and it is not always resolved in the same way. Whereas in the United States, for example, there are several firms such as Westinghouse and General Electric participating in the market as developers and suppliers of equipment for nuclear power stations, there is just one giant concern in France—Fromatom. In this same country, there is a monopoly in the operation of nuclear power stations united under the firm Electricite de France. The results

differ surprisingly: whereas in France, where more than 70 percent of the electric power is produced at nuclear power stations, the cost of these nuclear power stations increased by a factor of about 1.7 in the last 15 years, in the same period in the United States the cost rose by a factor of more than 6 under the full demonopolization of both the building and the operation of nuclear power stations. Having begun with the acquisition of an American license under the conditions of internal monopolism, it is generally recognized that Fromatom has surpassed its American rival in the latest developments.

The monopolistic Fromatom within the country is simultaneously involved in a harsh competitive fight in international markets with such analogous firms as that same Westinghouse and Mitsubishi. Being concerned about the achievement of a world level for our output, we could initially convert entire branches—nuclear machine building, for example—into concerns. There is no need to worry about a lack of competition in the world. Only the uniting of the scientific, design and industrial potential can guarantee the gaining of a place in the international market and only by going out into this market will we raise the level of our domestic output. The reorganization of branches into a number of concerns or the conversion of some branches into concerns—these seem to me to be the urgent stages in the structural reforms as a decisive factor in the introduction of truly economic relations, naturally under the new conditions of ownership.

Wait a minute, the meticulous reader of a number of official statements will again object. After all, economic relations are already being realized and all enterprises have been working under full cost accounting since 1989. Contractual relations have been pronounced the main form of horizontal ties throughout the national economy.... Many other things have been proclaimed and announced. But just as the dining room of our institute has for months been receiving steadily fewer and fewer basic products despite the nondecreasing indicators in statistical reports, the principle of exchange in kind is prevailing more and more in the interrelationships of enterprises. We are observing the picture of the disintegration of the perhaps bad but capable system of the socialist market (with all of its outlays for job authorizations, funds and ceilings), which is being replaced by an extrastate system of extra-economic relations. It is precisely under these conditions that the logic of economic incentives can be violated, exactly reversing social priorities. Under the conditions of shortages, the market for goods and services inevitably becomes a "black market." It is not difficult to extrapolate the observed tendencies and one can only be astonished at those who are surprised at the inefficiency of the state in the fight against crime or cases of transport sabotage that leave the entire republic without the means to delivery everything that is necessary for its vital activities.

Having begun perestroika with the fundamental problems of our state and having determined the main reasons for the poor functioning of the economy—the

basis for any social formation—we suddenly rushed in a completely different direction. It is possible that I am too bound by dogmas but today I seriously believe in the secondary nature of the superstructure over the basis. Besides that, having been in various countries that belong among those that our press just yesterday called “free” only in quotation marks, I received many confirmations of this. In none of them did I see such surprising differences in the level of the economy from the level of culture and degree of democracy. And it is difficult in our reality to separate the real advocate of social progress from the skillful demagogue resolving the problems of his political prominence not only through the difficulties of being but sometimes also through the blood of his compatriots. The establishment of political institutions that prevent the taking of power by a dictator or junta is just as necessary as the regeneration of an opposition as a stimulating factor for social development in all its spheres. But why must this be done to the detriment of priority economic interests? Indeed, it seems to me that the presence of a modest abundance on the shelves of the stores is a much greater social success than the possibility of freely discussing the personal life of Gorbachev or of tasting the obvious dislike of Yeltsin and Ligachev (it seems to me that it would be much more useful to have a public dialogue by these two politicians in the press or on television. It may be that we could then understand the differences in the positions of these obkom secretaries who were so similar just yesterday.

Much of what takes place before our eyes, including mistakes, happens not because of evil intentions. As a rule, the primary source of haste is the desire to correct and improve everything as quickly as possible. But just as the road to hell is paved by good intentions, as they say, haste in crucial decisions is always fraught with the loss of the stability of the ship of state. Having recognized the erroneous nature of a course, it is necessary to plot the further course quite accurately so as not to waste energy in the chaos of haphazard Brownian movements. It is possible, of course, to argue about where to spend borrowed foreign exchange: for the purchase of cars and video recorders or in the construction of plants for their production. But one cannot fail to see that both means have already been tested (the GAZ before the war, the VAZ in the time after that and purchases of consumer goods during all the years of the oil Klondike). And none of them resolved the fundamental problem of the establishment of incentives for the highly productive labor of the overwhelming majority of the society.

It is possible to first reject the proposal on the reduction of capital investments in the country and then implement it in a hyperbolic volume. But one cannot fail to understand that it is not the volume of capital investments that is the matter with our construction but the lowest labor productivity after agriculture accompanied, by the way, by the highest level of average wages for state enterprises. In any reduction of the volume of capital investments, our excessive practice of wasting resources will not free any resources for the market. It does not

matter so much whether they are stolen, become the victim of mismanagement or backward technology or are lost in some other way. It is important only that the pace of the resolution of all national economic as well as social tasks will doubtless be slowed. Once again, we are trying to treat not the illness but the pain, to act not on the underlying processes but on their external manifestation.

The tired reader will finally ask: What relationship does this have with conversion? The most direct, if the problem of conversion is not perceived as replacing the building of tanks with tractors, although one cannot fail to see that heretofore they have tried to see it that way. We have wonderful examples of conversion and there are people who carried out conversion from the level of general indifference to the level of burning themselves up, achieving good social results even in the years of stagnation. We need a true conversion of the public consciousness, a conversion of politics and, of course, a conversion of the economy from its traditional and largely fossilized forms to the freedom to develop on the basis of economic laws. But having understood these laws, there is no need to hurry to take action. Only in one application of resources will the society not be wasting them, no matter how many it allocates, and that is education and culture.

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Reduction in Warship Construction at Baltic Plant
90UM0434B Leningrad LENINGRADSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 11 Jan 90 p 1

[Interview with Baltiyskiy Zavod [Baltic Plant] Deputy General Director V.I. Polukeyev and Baltic Plant Chief Economist Yu.K. Atamanenko by A. Agrafenin: “Conversion at the Baltic [Plant]”

[Text] Recently, the new icebreaker “Sovetskiy Soyuz” traveled from the mouth of the Neva to its Arctic watch [area]. This is the fourth vessel in a series of nuclear giants constructed by the shipbuilders of the Baltiyskiy Zavod [Baltic Plant] Association for the sailors of the Murmansk Steamship Line. They successfully concluded the 1989 program with the Baltic State Commission turned over the icebreaker in December.

But what next? What are the shipbuilders’ plans for the future? Our correspondent asked [Baltic Plant] Association Deputy General Director V.I. Polukeyev and Baltic Plant Chief Economist Yu.K. Atamanenko for answers to these and other questions.

[Agrafenin] There is the impression that Leningrad residents were poorly informed about what was really happening at the Baltic Plant shipbuilding slips in previous years.

[Polukeyev] Yes, obviously so. A significant portion of our output was, as they say, not publicized very much. Thousands of top-notch specialists did their work,

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received awards, and won the All-Union Socialist Competition but the fact that they manufacture ships which personify the might of the USSR's Navy was passed over in silence.

[Atamanenko] However, last year was a turning point in the enterprise's fate. Conversion abruptly altered our plans. Over the course of several months, several military ship building programs were shutdown. This was a very difficult period for the Baltic Plant.

However, I can now say with confidence that the most complicated period is behind us. We succeeded in restructuring production to purely peaceful output. We have found reserves. We have fulfilled the plan in accordance with all indicators.

[Agrafenin] Tell me about the scale of the conversion at the plant.

[Polukeyev] Last year, we refurbished a quarter of our entire production facilities. This year we anticipate restructuring about an additional 40 percent of the shops.

The Baltic Plant has mastered production of so-called "Rolkers" dry cargo ships. These vessels are almost 200 meters long. The first of the "Rolkers" was laid in September of last year. We are presently beginning construction of two more. Unique technology allows construction of two dry cargo ships in one boat slip at the same time.

In addition, we have begun producing equipment for an agroindustrial complex. They will be sausage automated production lines and quick freezers to produce meat dumplings.

[Atamanenko] I would especially like to stress that our primary task today is to keep our personnel and not lose the highly skilled specialists for which the enterprise has always been so famous. In many respects this dictates the direction in which we search for new types of products. These same "Rolkers" are vessels which demand no less skill, experience, and knowledge than cruisers. Incidentally, as soon as Western companies heard about our intention to produce dry cargo ships, we were literally deluged with demands to sell them these ships. This is evidence that, in spite of the plant's reorientation, the reputation of Baltic Plant products remains high.

Conversion, Economic Value of Foreign Weapons Sales

M.P. Simonov; 90UM0431A Moscow SOYUZ in Russian No 7, 12-18 Feb 90 p 14

[Interview with M.P. Simonov, general designer of the machine building plant imeni P.O. Sukhoy, people's deputy of the USSR, by Dmitriy Khrapovitskiy; date and place not specified]

[Text]

The word "conversion," which was so mysterious and promising just yesterday, no longer enchants us today. The reduction of the country's expenditures for arms and the reorientation of part of military production to peaceful tasks have not yet led to a saturation of the Soviet market with consumer goods. How can one make the huge potential of the defense industry that was created by several generations of Soviet people work for perestroika and how can one make it yield its maximum peaceful effect? This was the subject of the conversation of our correspondent with M.P. Simonov, general designer of the machine building plant imeni P.O. Sukhoy and people's deputy of the USSR.

[Khrapovitskiy] After the recent demonstrations in Paris, specialists acknowledged the fighter Su-27 to be a masterpiece of world aircraft building. But it was built more than 13 years ago! Mikhail Petrovich, are not our expectations reasonable that the defense industry of the USSR is already capable of supplying the market with consumer goods whose quality is up to world standards?

[Simonov] This question reflects a very widespread view of conversion: the defense industry must manufacture consumer goods. It must be understood that 100 percent of defense production is not subject to conversion. I hope, of course, that this will be possible when we create a world full of trust. But today there is no reason for us or anyone else to get ahead of ourselves. Conflicts between countries are possible and their concern about their own security is quite understandable. On the other hand, remember how for many years our press workers reported on the sale of arms by the United States of America and other capitalist countries with a great deal of pathos. Information has now been published on the sale of arms by the Soviet Union. And the many years of pathos somehow evaporated. But do we need to determine whether or not it is good to sell arms?

[Khrapovitskiy] And what is your opinion?

[Simonov] If we want politics to continue to govern the economy and not to be a concentrated expression of it, then the answer will be: arms must not be sold. There appear to be many good arguments for this. But common sense suggests that if there is a demand for arms, then sooner or later ways will be found to satisfy it. And we, a power with several generations of people who have invested their resources in the defense industry, must not stop fighting for rubles in the arms market. In my view, there is just one "but." The arms that we sell must be defensive in nature.

[Khrapovitskiy] That is, you want to say that the people in the defense industry can help the country at this time only by involving themselves directly in their own work—creating arms, including for sale...?

[Simonov] No, this is just one of the possibilities for the defense complex. But to continue, you probably do not know that in the sale, for example, of the aircraft of our firm, there is something like a "reverse" exchange rate for the now extremely weakened ruble: we obtain several

rubles for one dollar. So it is necessary to continue. A large part of the foreign-exchange profit will go to the state budget and will help to resolve urgent problems in providing people with goods through imports.

[Khrapovitskiy] It is interesting: Despite the huge base of raw materials and army of engineers, technicians and highly skilled workers, it is proposed that consumer goods be purchased rather than produced here. But the arms market also has its saturation point. So are we to wait for this moment when we can finally undertake true conversion?

[Simonov] By no means are we to wait! I said that the sale of arms is just one of the possibilities for helping the country and immediately. Of course it is also necessary to give thought to having the enterprises of the defense complex produce consumer goods. But what is happening? Here, with our habit of campaigns (what can you do, that is how we were all brought up), a conversion campaign got under way but not conversion itself. Neither pots nor spoons nor other goods manufactured for the huge sums that formerly went for the production of arms will save the situation. But many military plants that have been deprived of their former complex and expensive orders are now working precisely in a hopeless race for such "gross output."

We also have such orders. A washing machine with a fully automatic cycle that we developed will go into series production in 1991. Never mind the fact that our designers here have the possibility of applying experience in the utilization of up-to-date materials and computer technology, that is, of remaining to some extent at the level of their former specialization. But here is another example. Under the pressure of the former Ministry of Machine Building for Light and Food Industry, Gosplan is giving us the task of developing packing machines for bulk products. That is, to master a production system that is completely new for us. Precisely this approach is the main hindrance to conversion. Why?

You yourself noted that our Su-27 was acknowledged to be a masterpiece of world aircraft building, despite the fact that it is already 13 years old. But we achieved this exclusively through the strictest specialization, having made plenty of mistakes along the way and gained rigorous experience. I think that the readers of SOYUZ will be interested in learning how this was. The decision on the beginning of the project planning and construction of the Su-27 was made in 1976. The aircraft made its first flight within 13 months. But there was no rejoicing in our souls. In our estimation, this was a rather ordinary aircraft whose combat qualities were inferior to those of the American fighter F-15. Numerous conclusions of expert organizations convinced us of the contrary: apparently our aircraft outperforms the American planes. "Boys," one of our colleagues said to us with a good deal of justification, "put the Su-27 in series production. There will be no war!"

But we went to the Ministry of the Aviation Industry with a request that the production of the aircraft be postponed. You probably have no idea what it means to go to the customer and propose that an aircraft that is almost in series production be modified. We were fortunate. With the help of Deputy Minister I. Silayev, we got another year. And in this time we "gave wings" to a completely new aircraft that now, after 13 years, is considered the best in the world.

A similar mistake happened to us professional aircraft builders when we built the first sports aircraft in our practice, the Su-26. In the first attempt, it also turned out to be quite "average." Again, after a year we came out with the next aircraft under that same number. And now, after numerous victories of Soviet sportsmen pilots in international competition, our country was criticized for not selling the Su-26 abroad so as to maintain a technological lead, thereby establishing exceptional conditions for its team in world and European competition.

I said all of this to make it clear that in today's world market any commodity must be at the level of a masterpiece. And if we specialists in building aircraft are not able to achieve success in the production of our own output on the first attempt with a 100-percent guarantee, then it is incomprehensible what they were intending to do in the former Ministry of Machine Building for Light and Food Industry when they sought to have Gosplan include a packing machine in our state order....

[Khrapovitskiy] So your slogan is conversion by specialty?

[Simonov] Exactly.

[Khrapovitskiy] Well, with the triumphant Su-27 you have a very powerful argument in favor of your position. But the world military aviation industry is not standing still. The Americans put into the air the F-117A, the B-1B and B-2, are preparing the fighters ATF-UF-22 and ATF-UF-23 and are developing the strike aircraft ATA. I suspect that you are not standing still either.... One cannot see any end to the competition in this race. But as you yourself said, there is no guarantee of success. What awaits us—huge national investments in the military-industrial complex?

[Simonov] No, we are not standing still. But not by taxing the population. As early as last year, we met all of our needs through finances and did not take a kopeck from the budget. We do 80 percent of the work under direct contracts with customers. Our needs are met 100 percent through contracts and credit provided by the banks of the USSR. But just the year before last we received 97 percent of our funds from the budget. This is also a manifestation of conversion, just as is the fact that despite the serious prospects for competition with American aircraft builders, we also have good prospects for very close cooperation with them.

[Khrapovitskiy] An aircraft for business people?

[Simonov] Not only. We are also pursuing other work with the United States, although it was precisely the prospects of the building of the S-86 that allowed us to count on serious cooperation. This aircraft is being built not only for business people but is also called upon to replace the aircraft Yak-12, An-2 and Il-14 in our "aircraft backwoods." The S-86 is intended for six to eight passengers, its speed will be about 600 kilometers an hour and its range will be over 2,000 kilometers. Its engine of 1,000 horsepower will be "commercial," as we say today, that is, economical.

When we began to sell the Su-26, the Americans immediately pointed out to us the rather wretched level of the design work of this aircraft. It turned out that conversion, besides replacing the production of military with civilian aircraft, is forcing a perceptible catching up in production standards. It is for this reason that at our firm we call the work on the S-86 the second stage of conversion. It is turning out to be more attractive. The American firm Piper Aircraft Corporation, which is headed by Mr Stuart Miller, signed an agreement with us on the development of this aircraft. We are responsible for the project, construction and testing and they are responsible for certification, servicing and navigation electronics and, in the case of sales for export, for the finishing of the cabin, design and comfort.

[Khrapovitskiy] This, if I am not mistaken, is our first cooperative experience with the Americans in the area of aircraft building?

[Simonov] Yes, this is the first time. It seems that the level of partnership is rather high. We and they both understand that in recent years, when a new thinking has started to prevail in world politics, the priority has been shifted to common human values and people have begun to believe in life. The industrial boom and the development of international tourism led to a more than doubling of the demand for international air transportation. Taking into account the coming increase in transport flows, we began to develop two other aircraft. One is the S-80, which is twice the size of the S-86 and intended for 20 passengers. It is equal to the Il-14 in speed and performance and its weight is a little greater than the An-2.

We also began development of the supersonic passenger aircraft S-51. This is a relatively small aircraft intended for 50-60 passengers. It will also be issued in a salon version for 15-20 passengers for large corporations that have to exercise trusteeship over a great number of branches in many countries. Its speed is 2,500 kilometers an hour.

[Khrapovitskiy] As I understood it, the firm "Su," counting on its now well-known experience, is trying to find that unfilled niche in the world market through which it can obtain maximum dividends?

[Simonov] And believe me, this is much more promising than the development of packing lines! Our rapid agreement with Stuart Miller is an indication of the mutual desire to be the first to occupy one of those "niches."

[Khrapovitskiy] Mikhail Petrovich, you spoke extremely calmly about one of the "stellar periods" of the firm: thanks, they gave us another year to work and the result was a masterpiece of an aircraft. One might think that any specialists could do this.

[Simonov] Oh no! I was simply already accustomed to the collective after some 20 years there. But its foundation was laid by Pavl Osipovich Sukhoy. The foundation was very much up-to-date. Most of the design bureau was set up in an authoritarian manner: general, deputy and chief designers and so on. Formally that is the way it is here too. But Sukhoy understood that in a difficult situation the firm can develop and survive only if there are extrasubordinate ties as well. That is how the collective was "concocted." And it is too bad that here in the country they clipped the wings of many scientific-technical collectives and schools as well when they set limits to the increase in wages. It became clear that many in our country do not understand the importance of scientific-technical progress.

It is very important to curb the devaluation of money in the next 15 months. But what happens after the end of the period of effect of the limiting measures that, I will note, are rather traditional in our country? Can all this be called a "radical restructuring" of the national economy? Throughout the world favorable conditions are established for the stimulation of particular production systems.

There is another problem—the fact that we lack independence. If the defense enterprises had independence, they would find the right version of conversion. Why. Economic independence would make it possible to combine their interests with the interests of the entire society.

But what we have today is simply inadmissible. We have passed, for example, the Bases of Legislation on Leasing but their effect does not extend to the most potent production systems, where the most qualified engineers and workers are concentrated and where the country has invested colossal sums. And all because the list of enterprises that cannot go over to leasing is determined by the USSR Council of Ministers. Thus, perestroika is blocked in the most highly developed production systems.

[Khrapovitskiy] Let us sum things up, Mikhail Petrovich. We have had a long conversation and I fear that for some the impressive details about the work of your firms have masked the main subject of the conversation....

[Simonov] Conversion still does not have a plan for the entire union. It is forming spontaneously. This is inadmissible for branches in which hundreds of millions of rubles have been invested. In the United States, for

example, laws on conversion have been presented for consideration by Congress for three decades now. If the questions of conversion continue to be resolved here as they are now, I cannot guarantee that the economic crisis will not spread to the defense industry. Then what kind of conversion will we be talking about?

Difficulties In Conversion At Uralsk's Omega, Metallist Plants

*90UM0408A Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 28 Mar 90
Second Edition p 4*

[Article by Pravda Correspondent D. Gutenev: "Without A Reverse Gear"]

[Text] Conversion

The government's report presented to the second Congress of USSR People's Deputies talks about the necessity of increasing the contribution of the defense complex in the process of normalizing the country's economic situation. With its help, plans call for a technical reequipping of the national economy, first of all, of the light and medical industries, the agroindustrial complex as well as commerce and public catering. Also planned is an expansion of the production of high-quality consumer goods.

There is an enormous amount of work to be done. Are the collectives of the defense complex ready for this?

The mood of Yu. Kornev, foreman at the "Metallist" plant, echoed the unstable weather. The assignments for 1989 were fulfilled and they had a head start on the future. But how could it be otherwise! Professionals of the highest qualifications were chosen for the work brigade. They worked without a technologist, according to blueprints. Each is able to handle a variety of machine tools which were gathered in a small area of the plant for the manufacture of grenade launchers.

But the shift began with a vague sense of alarm. At first the rumor spread that the section would be closed. Then A. Malakeyev, the director, came into the shop and announced that the ministry had not included their product in the state order for 1990.

There was reason for the brigade to be outraged. This happened right before the new year. The work rhythm which had been developed was broken, earnings fell and the "head start" evaporated.

Conversion has affected two more Uralsk enterprises. Dark clouds gathered over the "Omega" plant but lightning did not strike. The expected reduction in the production of specialty goods did not take place. However, the Voroshilov plant lost 17 percent of its program. During the past year this led to a loss of 2.5 million rubles of profit.

This happened despite the plant's rich traditions of producing civilian goods. Metal dishes with a double layer of white enamel are snatched up here as fast as they make them. The meat grinders produced here in the past

were famous but their manufacture now has been transferred to another enterprise. The plant also has had much experience in the manufacture of tools for the branches of industry which make goods. In the 1960's Uralsk workers elaborated and began production of automated machines which dyed and moulded nylon stockings. The country's entire light industry was reequipped with these machines and they were eagerly purchased abroad. Now there are plans for similar automated machines to make tights. Last year the first shipments of dough mixers and equipment for sausage factories were produced. There are plans for the manufacture of presses for determining moisture levels in wool, of universal appliances, furniture rollers and filtration presses for vegetables and fruits...

Other enterprises have also made plans for new types of products. "Omega" will make home vacuum cleaners; "Metallist" will produce sewing machines and parts for home refrigerators with the prospect of making the refrigerators themselves in the future.

But still...

According to assignments in the oblast, this year the Uralsk plants of the defense complex are supposed to increase the production of consumer goods by almost 1.6 times in comparison with last year. Their share of overall production essentially will not increase. A more significant increase is to be expected much later, toward the end of the five year plan.

"You're mistaken if you think you can make weapons and sewing machines on the same machine tools," reasons A. Malakeyev, director of "Metallist." The precision casting section is working right now at half capacity. The head of the shop is looking on the side for additional work. There are also problems with our aluminum welders. This equipment also will not be in great demand for our future civilian production. It is possible to list more examples. We will still be able to manufacture certain individual details and parts on existing production lines, like we produce pistons, small cables, rear sprockets for motorcycles or springs for motor scooters...But to manufacture finished, complex products we need additional factory space and new production lines.

In December 1989 it became clear that "Metallist" would not be producing the specialized products for which two new factory wings had been constructed. They rushed out to find orders. They decided on sewing machines and compressors for refrigerators but not without a lot of trouble and help from the ministry and the republic government. These ideas do not belong to Aralsk; they belong to the Tula arms factory but it does not have the necessary factory space. The plants formed an association, in which, however, with the exception of these two products, they are completely independent.

The situation regarding the equipment has cleared up. It will be of foreign manufacture; the ministry has allocated approximately 20 million rubles in hard currency for its acquisition. But as soon as it became known that the

premises under construction were to be used for the production of civilian and not military goods, the work pace at the sites fell sharply. Last year builders from the "Uralskpromstroy" trust did not assimilate 1.2 million rubles. Efforts were transferred to the reconstruction of a meat processing enterprise group and the construction of a slaughterhouse in one of the remote desert regions. These were also sites of paramount importance. Nonetheless, there is still some unutilized capacity in Minmontazhspestsroy [Ministry of Installation and Special Construction Work] but two central agencies cannot agree on joint actions.

A similar situation is emerging at the Voroshilov plant as well. True, here by unifying specialized goods they were able to free factory space for use by shops manufacturing dough mixers and sausage production lines. Things are tight with the enamel dishes, though. One of four ovens is under reconstruction. By reducing the distance between the dryer and the kiln, several dozen square meters were saved but it will be difficult this year to reach the growth figure of 1.6 times the previous level. Meanwhile, two bays, the development of which was frozen in the past because of a reallocation of resources and materials to housing needs, stand idle. It turns out that the numbers have been calculated, but there is no base of support yet.

There is also a specialized shop at "Omega" which sits cozily in a small enclosed area. For the most part complex toys are produced in it, which by the way, provide the plant a level of profits which is no laughing matter. Together with the head of the consumer goods department, L. Ryskin, they calculate that this shop represents the most efficient utilization of space. A special group in the design bureau (KB) is finishing work on the "Arman" home vacuum cleaner. With time "Omega" will ship 190 thousand of these devices to merchants each year at a value of 6.5 million rubles.

Time is also required for a psychological perestroika. The customary products, an efficient work rhythm and reliable deliveries are being replaced by additional concerns involved in mastering new innovations. Bureaucratic obstacles in price formation and a lack of balance in resource planning also get in the way. L. Ryskin went through a whole list of obstacles hindering the accelerated delivery of products for the people. The problems here include an excessively long coordination period and the procedure which requires ordering materials and parts two (!) years before manufacture.

The poorly functioning system of resource provision is of most concern. Like at "Omega" only 60 to 80 percent of the resources necessary for the production of some items is available at other plants. Throughout the oblast there is a shortage of 17.2 million rubles worth of resources below the level required to fulfill the plan of consumer goods production. But receiving even that which has been earmarked is often problematic. The behavior of suppliers is often unpredictable; they have their own problems. Some of them actually use extortion. In

exchange for meat grinders for sausage production lines the Voroshilov plant sends castings and other supplies to Baranovichi. In exchange for trawl cables from the Belorechenskiy metallurgical enterprise group, the plant provides spare parts for rolling mills. We have to say that they are no slouches either. In Orsk they traded dough mixers for gasoline.

B. Muldashev, former "Omega" director who was recently elected chairman of the Uralsk gorsoviet [city soviet] of people's deputies, sees a partial solution to this problem in organizing a cooperative to pool the efforts of the oblast's enterprises regardless of their subordination. The other plants have agreed to the creation of such an association. Each can produce something good for the rest. One can produce plastics, another castings, a third electronics.

At the very beginning of conversion the Uralsk enterprises encountered other problems as well. Take, for example, the tax on increases of the salary fund. The Voroshilov plant this year will manufacture almost five million rubles worth of sausage production lines, dough mixers, fishing trawls and fish locating equipment. They don't have any relationship to consumer goods but without them there would be less sausage made, fewer pirozhki baked and fewer fish caught. But increasing their production is equivalent to punishing yourself.

As we can see, shelves won't become fuller from setting a course towards conversion. It is not an easy path to follow from mouthing slogans to producing goods. But it is possible to judge even from three plants what kind of contribution to the marketplace can be made by the defense industry. The economy does not have a reverse gear.

Changed Responsibilities of Military Factory Representatives After ANT Scandal

90UM0434A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
1 Apr 90 First Edition p 2

[Article by Colonel L. Nechayuk: "ANT: The Chronicle of a Scandal"]

[Text] A lot is being written and spoken about the cooperative movement now. Well, the time has come to learn to understand where there is honest work that the people need and where there are opportunists and self-seekers under the guise of cooperators who are amassing fortunes on our misfortunes and shortages. Those people in pursuit of profit are even trying to carry things out the door to the foreign market that we do not have enough of at home right now. All of this compelled the government to issue a special resolution in March of last year.

By way of illustration, this document states that industrial cooperatives and their unions (associations) do not have the right to buy up goods to resell them at export, to engage in importing goods for subsequent resale on the USSR's domestic market, or to act as middlemen in foreign economic operations as a form of activity.

How clear and unambiguous. But what is surprising and hard to explain is that the government ordered the establishment of ANT State-Cooperative Interbranch Concern at practically the same time and allowed it to do things categorically prohibited for others.

Deputy Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers V.K. Gusev's memorandum states: "...It seems to be advisable to authorize central and republic subordinated enterprises and organizations, including USSR Ministry of Defense, defense industrial sector, and local Soviet enterprises and organizations to sell output that is over and above State orders, control figures, and contract obligations using wholesale and contracted costs for manufacturing expenditures, illiquid assets, secondary raw materials, production subject to being written off, and above-plan production for the needs of the ANT Concern and subordinate organizations.

"Request your instructions, Yu. Pekshev 14 September 1989"

And he did not have to wait for instructions. Not long ago, the quite ordinary ANT Cooperative in Noginsk, a Moscow suburb, was converted into a concern under the same name but immeasurably more powerful. So powerful that, even without being registered anywhere, it essentially obtained the right and the capability to go abroad for anything it wanted on any scale.

You agree that this could not have happened accidentally or through an oversight. Of all people, USSR State Foreign Economic Commission Deputy Chairman Yu. Peshkev, his deputy V. Grinev, and USSR Council of Ministers Administration of Affairs Senior Official V. Babayev all thoughtfully provided special conditions for the cooperators and they understood that they had let the genie out of the bottle. Nevertheless, they accepted increasingly "daring" ventures under the concern's guardianship with astonishing good humor and at times delight.

In sum, ANT, headed by a certain V. Ryashentsev, a comparatively young man, not too educated, and not quite 40 years old who has not managed to master one profession and even once was a KGB agent, developed unrestrained activity. In only a few months, products totaling 564 million rubles have been purchased. There were large lots of very valuable nonferrous metals, steel plates and stainless steel, aluminum pipes, plastics and many other items that are in extremely short supply in the country. Meanwhile, state retail trade received only 119,000 rubles worth of ANT's imported goods.

From a TASS report:

"The USSR Council of Ministers Presidium acknowledged that ANT Concern's illegal activities which grossly violated the country's established procurement system for selling military equipment and shortage raw materials abroad were made possible because a number of USSR Minaviaprom [Ministry of Aviation Industry] and USSR Minoboronprom [Ministry of Defense Industry]

functionaries had an irresponsible attitude toward their immediate official duties and several of them allowed misuse of their rights."

A large group of people who participate in government and Committee of Party Control under the CPSU Central Committee decisions have been punished for quite obvious specific guilt in what transpired. Nevertheless, the press says that the general intent, general decisions, and legal authorizations granted to ANT are legitimate and it is only illegal to try to sell tanks. And they say that this deal was nothing more than some sort of insidious provocation and, as Minister of the USSR Aviation Industry A.S. Sytsov declared in the press, "that it resulted in an enormous scandal and discredited a good thing." How can that be? And who provoked whom?

An unguarded military transport train consisting of fifteen rail cars loaded with tanks and weapons stood idle on Novorossiysk-Port's railroad lines for almost two weeks. And during that entire time the station administration tried to find out who they belonged to and what else to do with them...

First of all, quite naturally, the railroad men, having produced the number assigned to the train at its point of departure, asked the Military Transportation Service Commandant's Office. However, they refused to acknowledge it but simply crossed it out as if it did not exist.

From the Central Directorate of Military Transportation Commander's report to the USSR Armed Force's General Staff:

"On December 22, 1989, Military Transportation organs, suspicious of an illegal transport movement, detained a group of cars that arrived under military transport numbers at Novorossiysk-Port Railroad Station. There were twelve T-72 tanks loaded on flat cars.

"The military transport number had been crossed out, not for the purpose of concealing it, but to stop further movement of the cargo...

"The investigation showed that it was not a military transport movement and that it was carried out in accordance with Ministry of Defense Industry's Ural-vagonzavod [Ural Rail Car Plant] Enterprise plan. The Sverdlovsk Railroad Central Military Transportation Directorate (VOSO) Commander passed off as his own a transportation movement number for issue by the Volga-Ural District Military Guard. Senior Lieutenant A.V. Karpukhin, an officer from the VOSO Commandant's Office, checked the train at the Sverdlovsk Railroad Smychka Station and, due to the absence of a military guard, it was removed from the railroad network transport and movement control plan.

"Lieutenant General Yu. Vorontsov 11 January 1990"

What this means is that Military Transportation Service workers displayed unpardonable carelessness by closing their eyes to very gross violations of military weapons

rail transport regulations. However, just how did a situation arise when tanks, for the first time ever in our defense industry's existence, were found outside the factory gates and were shipped no one knows where without government knowledge or Ministry of Defense approval?

We all know that our government sells guns and military equipment. But this is special merchandise and the government never puts it onto the market without strict controls. The consequences of such a step are unpredictable and are fraught with moral-political damage to the country. Who needs this equipment and for what purpose? Was this really an attempt to secretly sell tanks or a chain of chance occurrences and misunderstandings as the functionaries who answered to the CPSU Central Committee KPK [Party Control Committee] for their actions have tried to convince us?

I had the opportunity to attend that KPK meeting. It lasted about six hours. The scandalous deal's circumstances were comprehensively and thoroughly examined. There were many unexpected and surprising things to see and hear but most startling of all was how it turned out that people who occupied important positions were so amenable to dubious proposals and how easily supposedly highly experienced leaders and specialists allowed themselves to be deceived.

From a speech by USSR Deputy Minister of Defense General of the Army V.M. Shabanov:

"This incident really stands out even by present standards and the obviously lowered level of discipline. This certainly was a very carefully thought out venture. Our military shipping and receiving system for tanks was developed over the decades and it prevents irregularities. But it is a bit different with regard to the practice of exporting goods; these tanks are not really ours, not the Ministry of Defense's, because [plant quality control] military representatives do not accept them. The Uralvagonzavod leadership took advantage of this, outwitted the military receiving [system], and resorted to direct deception. Here we need to honestly admit that we 'slipped up' and that we were not adequately vigilant or responsible."

The Main Tank Directorate or GBTU is assigned direct responsibility for everything connected with the production, delivery, and maintenance of armored vehicles. Its representatives at the plants are responsible for monitoring vehicle manufacture, their quality, and for monitoring established system for shipping tanks to the troops.

From information provided by the Main Tank Directorate Commander to the CPSU Central Committee KPK:

"Twelve T-72 tanks shipped from Uralvagonzavod Production Association to Vzlet NPO [Scientific Production Association] do not appear to be USSR Ministry of Defense equipment.

"In 1989, all T-72 tanks designated for export were not presented to the military representative due to the absence of appropriate instructions on this issue.

"The lack of information about the decision-making process and about the final decision on the issue of shipping tanks to Vzlet NPO deprived the Main Tank Directorate of the opportunity to stop the conclusion of an illegal deal and delivery of the listed items...

"Colonel General A. Galkin 17 April 1990"

As you can see, the Uralvagonzavod NPO leadership itself, its General Director V. Seryakov who was personally involved in the illegal deal with General V. Dovgai, General Director of Vzlet NPO acted despite existing regulations. I will not attempt to judge if this was done consciously or unwittingly. It is true that they did not make a big secret of their plans. In any case, Military Representation Commander Colonel V. Domnin, his immediate supervisor Colonel V. Zhitkov, and Colonel A. Kadantsev from GBTU already knew about the deal in November of last year. Neither astonishment nor watchfulness arose among either of them with regard to these, putting it mildly, unusual plans.

Comrade Kadantsev also did not become concerned a month later when he received a telegram from GBTU Deputy Director Major General N. Zhuravlev concerning shipment of the tanks from Uralvagonzavod and that ordered him to look into the issue. Note that he told NPO General Director Seryakov, but not the military representatives, about the military vehicle shipment. The telegram arrived on 22 December when the tank train was already in Novorossiysk.

And just what conclusion did the GBTU draw from this, let us speak honestly, embarrassment?

From information provided by the Main Armored Vehicle Directorate Department Chief to the CPSU Central Committee KPK:

"Based on what has been set forth, it appears to be advisable to make documents and normative acts more precise...through an unambiguous order: "Military representatives shall monitor the manufacture and receipt of arms, military vehicles, and equipment regardless of where or to whom they are to be delivered..."

"Colonel A. Belov"

However, we think that this matter is not about instructions or normative acts although we think that they are in need of improvement. Incidentally, it is hardly worth waiting for an extraordinary event. Too great a responsibility has been entrusted to us, the military, that we should allow laxity and indifference when the question is about arms and military vehicles. And now, you cannot avoid the fact that officers from the GBTU presented themselves in a very poor light. Alas, the protective mechanisms were not set in motion as they were supposed to be but nevertheless the shady transaction did not succeed.

The investigation which the USSR Procurator is conducting in conjunction with the KGB will determine the ANT wheeler dealers' and their sponsors' motives. But right now it is necessary to draw lessons and to

provide accurate assessments of the activities or inactivity of those who were involved in the ill-fated deal. Even if they do not fall under articles of the Criminal Code.

DOSAAF CC, Presidium Statements to Lithuania

90UM0513A Moscow SOVETSKIY PATRIOT
in Russian No 13, 26 Mar-1 Apr 90 p 2

[Statements by DOSAAF Central Committee Chairman and USSR People's Deputy Colonel General N. Kotlovtssev and DOSAAF Presidium to Lithuania: "Lithuania: To the Detriment of Democracy"]

[Text] Today, tensions are high in Lithuania. And although its leaders are having their say from the television screens the newspaper pages about the system that prevails in the republic, we certainly cannot talk either about the tranquility in the minds of citizens or about legal order here.

The lengthy speeches of extreme radicals about achieving independence as a prolonged process of restoring the political and economic structures of the sovereign state have been long forgotten. Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet Deputies crossed out a half century of joint residence in the Union with all of the developed ties and structures with ease. Constitutional acts that strengthened our country's legal foundations have been crossed out. The Republic Parliament is aggressively annulling Laws of the USSR and is hastily resolving personnel problems. The issue of Lithuania's borders is being debated...

Negation of laws must cause anarchy in all of its manifestations. The aggressiveness of all anti-Soviet elements has intensified in the Republic. The matter has reached the point that Major General G. Taurinskis, chairman of the Lithuanian SSR DOSAAF Central Committee, was subjected to threats and insults at a session of the Republic Supreme Soviet because he carried out the order about placing arms under guard that are under the organization's jurisdiction. And immediately thereafter, a decision followed about transferring all organizations of this Society to the jurisdiction of the Republic Government.

In connection with this illegal act, the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee Presidium requested that USSR President M.S. Gorbachev protect the rights of citizens who are members of Lithuanian DOSAAF and the interests of the all-union defense organization.

On 23 March, USSR People's Deputy and USSR DOSAAF Central Committee Chairman Colonel General N. Kotlovtssev presented a protest to Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet Chairman V. Landsbergis as a result of the Republic Parliament's decision about subordinating Lithuanian SSR DOSAAF exclusively to the Lithuanian Council of Ministers.

We are publishing USSR DOSAAF Central Committee's protest to the Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet and the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee Presidium's appeal to the Lithuanian SSR defense organization Central Committee and to all members.

To the Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet

The All-Union Voluntary Society for Assistance to the Army, Air Force, and Navy Central Committee considers the Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet's decision about the subordination of the DOSAAF organization exclusively to the Republic Government to be illegal and anti-democratic and expresses a protest to the Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet.

The All-Union Voluntary Society for Assistance to the Army, Air Force, and Navy is an independent social organization that operates in accordance with laws consolidated in the USSR DOSAAF Charter and in accordance with the Constitution of the USSR. It is called upon to promote the strengthening of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic's defense capability and to aggressively participate in satisfying the population's requirements for the development of technical types of sport and mastery of specialities in the interests both of the citizens themselves and of the country's national economy, including all of its republics.

The Lithuanian SSR defense organization has significant training facilities at its disposal that were established using DOSAAF assets and with the participation of all union republics.

The Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet's decision is equivalent to stopping the activities of the republic defense organization and essentially runs counter to the provisions of the Constitution of the USSR and the Laws of the Lithuanian SSR on the right of citizens to association in social organizations. It violates the unity of the All-Union Voluntary Society for Assistance to the Army, Air Force, and Navy and damages the consolidation of the USSR's defense capability.

The question about the status, content, and forms of activities of the Lithuanian SSR defense organization as a social organization is exclusively the prerogative of its elected organs and the All-Union Voluntary Society for Assistance to the Army, Air Force, and Navy of the USSR Central Committee.

Based on what has been stated above, the All-Union Voluntary Society for Assistance to the Army, Air Force, and Navy Central Committee Presidium insists on the review of this illegal decision.

We are informing you that the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee Presidium has recommended that the republic defense organization be strictly guided in its activities by the country's defense society charter and to firmly insist on maintaining its integrity.

By direction of the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee Presidium

USSR People's Deputy and USSR DOSAAF Central Committee Chairman N. Kotlovtssev

March 23, 1990.

**To the Central Committee and All Members of the
Lithuanian SSR Defense Organization**

Dear Comrades!

We have learned with a sense of profound concern that the Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet has unilaterally decided to withdraw your defense organization from the all-union organization and to subordinate it exclusively to the Republic Council of Ministers.

We are convinced that this decision is anti-democratic. It essentially contradicts the provisions of the Constitution of the USSR and the Lithuanian SSR on the right of citizens to association in social organizations. It violates the integrity of the All-Union Voluntary Society for Assistance to the Army, Air Force, and Navy and damages the consolidation of the USSR's defense capability.

Adopted without the approval of the central elected organ of Republic DOSAAF and the All-Union Voluntary Society for Assistance to the Army, Air Force, and Navy of the USSR Central Committee, it is in the very least incorrect and violates the rights of the Republic defense organization and the country's defense society as a whole.

The question of the status, content, and forms of activities of the Lithuanian SSR defense organization as a social organization is exclusively the prerogative of its representative organs.

Your Republic defense organization is one of those actively operating in the country. It has skilled personnel and good training and sports facilities at its disposal. During the years of its existence, a large number of specialists and high-class sportsmen who are famous far beyond the Republic's borders have been trained for the Armed Forces and for the national economy. All of this has gained it deserved prestige among the workers of Soviet Lithuania and the USSR.

We believe that the activists and leading, training and sports collectives—everyone to whom these traditions are dear, while acting in accordance with the USSR DOSAAF Charter will unite their efforts to preserve the unity of the country's all-union defense organization which, in our opinion, is a necessary condition to realize the interests of the Republic's defense organization.

We appeal to you to aggressively support the decision of the March 15, 1990 special [session of the] 3rd Congress of USSR People's Deputies and to firmly stand their ground as patriots and internationalists.

All-Union Voluntary Society for Assistance to the Army, Air Force, and Navy of the USSR Central Committee Presidium

March 23, 1990.

Long-Range Aviation School's Program Outlined

*Moscow KRYLYA RODINY in Russian No 1, Jan 1990
(Signed to press 12 Dec 89) pp 4-7*

[Article by Ye. Podolny under the "Initial Phase" rubric: "The Long-Range Wings of Tambov"; first four paragraphs are KRYLYA RODINY introduction]

[Text] This is the first in a series of articles on aviation schools to appear in this publication. It deals with a specialized military school, which trains students to be pilots of long-range strategic aircraft, the most powerful variety.

Background information: The Tambov Higher Military Aviation Red Banner School for Pilots imeni M. M. Raskova has its roots in the Engels Military Aviation School (aviashkola) for Pilots (1931). The first class was graduated in 1933. In 1945 it became a military aviation school (aviauchilishche) for pilots. In 1954 it was moved to Tambov; five years later the term "higher" was added to the name.

The early years of the Great Patriotic War saw the formation of women's regiments at the school. The aircraft employed were Po-2s and Pe-2s. Unit Commander Hero of the Soviet Union Marina Mikhaylovna Raskova led a group of dive bombers to the front; she was killed in action on this mission. The school was named after her in 1943. Two hundred graduates of the Tambov Aviation School became Heroes of the Soviet Union. Twenty-eight of them were women. Pilots M. Gareyev, M. Odintsov, and V. Golubyev were twice awarded this honor.

The school's address is 392004, gorod Tambov-4. Visitors arriving at the railroad station can board bus No 5 and ride to the stop marked "Aviation School."

As we were flying toward Tambov aboard a military transport, I recalled two contrasting opinions relative to the Air Forces. One of them was expressed by ninth-grader Dima Nyandin of the DOSAAF sports flying club. He said emphatically, "I will be admitted to the military aviation school even if it takes me five years to do so!" But this is what Cadet Nikolay Dolgov had to say: "I found out that I will receive little pay, live without any conveniences, and wander from post to post. No, I gave up all my dreams." I shared thoughts and doubts I had in this regard with another traveller, Colonel Igor Valeryanovich Torikov, who, incidentally, is a 1969 graduate of the Tambov School. This is how he explained the situation:

"The situation in military aviation, the same as in the Armed Forces in general, is not a simple one. Nonetheless, I do not understand Nikolay Dolgov's 'superpracticality': He has much to say for a person who has not seen any real service. Of course there must be improvement in the standard of living and living conditions of the military. Still, during my years as a cadet such arrogance

was simply unthinkable. We were not afraid of deprivations and burdens of the service. Dismissal from the school—that would have been a real disaster! We were very conscientious in our studying and selfless in our flying. None of us cadets of that time would under any circumstances be concerned with the post on which we would be serving, let alone how much money we would be paid."

"That kind of thinking is still almost the norm among cadets," contributed political worker Colonel Aleksandr Grigoryevich Pomolev. "The military profession has lost some prestige. There are fewer applicants taking the tests for admission to military aviation schools (two applicants per vacancy, down from six, on the average). Measures, including those of a material nature, are being taken. The USSR Ministry of Defense plans to allot one billion rubles from its annual 1990 budget to raising the pay and improving the material and living conditions of servicemen and their families. Incidentally, about a third of our cadets are married."

It is clear that the major problem facing the Air Forces in this time of reduction consists of improving the quality of combat aviation and realignment toward a higher level of professionalism. This also means that the quality of living of people who put their lives at risk and exert much more effort than any other kind of citizen should be higher.

What approach can be taken to satisfy the quality factors?

The school's lecture halls and laboratories are spacious, well-organized, and equipped with simulators and other working apparatus. There is instruction going on everywhere. The head of the school, young-looking and energetic General Vasily Yegorovich Aleksandrov, had this to say:

"We are experimenting, trying new approaches to teaching.

The general's statement was amplified by Colonel Nemtsov, chief of the school's Education Section (Eduard Aleksandrovich coordinates the work of the entire scientific teaching staff and is responsible for theoretical instruction of the cadets):

"Ours is a four year course of study. The first year is taken up by pure theory of general subjects and aviation disciplines. In the second year we apply theory to flying the L-29 jet aircraft. We do the same in the third year. In the fourth year the students study the more complicated Tu-134 jet airplane. That is when they learn to fly a standard pattern, pilot the craft cross-country, and take the piloting test. Since 1932—the year of inception of the school—our cadets have flown many aircraft models: the Po-2, SB, Il-2, Pe-2, Yak-18, and Il-28."

In addition, the graduates study a new bomber model they will fly in their combat unit and they also examine the combat employment and all features of NATO's

primary aircraft. The cadets log a total of more than 200 hours of flying time during their stay at the school, with additional work in flight simulators. The instructors have started to compile qualification characteristics. Research work is being carried out in collaboration with the Kirovograd Higher Civil Aviation Pilot School. The purpose is to ascertain the relationship between flight activity functions and the human factor, and to study the problem of length of the flying career. The reason for this is its short duration in our country compared to, for example, the Americans. The first phase of the reorganization consists of a 25-percent change in the curricula. Being implemented is a system of reference signals that will make it possible for the cadets to assimilate a greater amount of knowledge.

Another new approach is the application of segregated instruction. The cadets are divided into three categories according to ability. This is to provide weaker students with more individual attention.

Large amounts of electronic equipment have recently been introduced into the school. Alas! Our domestic Elektronika-501 set, supplied by the Voronezh Radio Plant, is a far cry from a Sony: All seven displays required repair while still under warranty.

Every year 600 to 700 young men age 17 to 21 from all parts of the country arrive at the school to try their luck. Fifty to 60 men are eliminated straightway in the selection process. Some of the others are unable to pass the medical examination. Still others fail due to poor written test scores.

I believe that the cause of the large number of rejects is the extremely poor and slipshod manner in which applicants are solicited.

Before the oath is administered, the young men undergo general military training, qualify for the GTO [Prepared for Labor and Defense], swim, fire weapons, and even perform parachute jumps. Finally, in August they take the oath committing themselves to cadet status.

I was naturally interested in how flying clubs, the sports flying clubs of the DOSAAF, and military commissariats cooperate with the military school. I learned to my dismay that this tie is very poorly organized, that the matter has gone adrift. The school is highly displeased with the secondary school system for the poor grounding in general subjects and physical training it provides youth. Some applicants for pilot training (!) are unable to state Archimedes' principle properly, solve a simple equation, or perform a single chinup on the horizontal bar.

The school entertains heightened expectations as a result of a new system of three-phase instruction. The first phase consists of specialized Air Force schools offering general subjects, aviation disciplines, and elementary flight instruction; the second, the aviation school proper, three years of theory of all aviation disciplines, and

flying various aircraft types; the third, a training center, in which the cadets undergo final training to qualify for their assignments.

Classrooms, classrooms. Each one makes you as curious as a cadet; you envy people involved in this interesting work. Colonel Anatoliy Nikiforovich Deynega, head of the Marxism-Leninism Section, told me about IKS, which stands for individual control conversation. The purpose of this technique is to teach cadets to think logically and independently. What about problem-oriented discussion type lectures, debates, and practical exercises in finding solutions to complex economic and political situations?! The approaches themselves generate innovation and offer opportunities to ponder various opinions.

What is new in the Higher Mathematics Section? Section Head Aleksandr Andreyevich Ashcheulov showed me a model of reference signals patterned after Shatalov, the famous educator. It effects a several-fold improvement in assimilation of facts and quality of learning. There are the devices: Press the buttons, do what is required, and master the process. Then again, how poorly equipped we are with electronic computers; the situation is pitiful.

The Aerodynamics Section also employs reference models featuring formulas in a logical presentation. I conducted a test by slowly leafing through several pages, then trying to recall what I had seen: computations of piloting maneuvers consisting of a roll, spin, and a loop. It is true: I assimilated the information easily.

I could hardly wait to see what goes on in "that laboratory"—the one where the selection process is performed. Judging by the letters written to this publication, many potential flying careers are "dashed" here. On this score, Lieutenant Colonel Nikolay Gerasimovich Gunchak had a different opinion:

"That is not so. On the contrary, we help the applicants by determining scientifically their psychological and physical fitness for the pilot's profession. In our testing we have the students do written tests, questionnaires, timed problem solution, and logical reasoning."

Testing also involves the use of apparatus that simulates a cockpit, complete with levers and readouts. The youths should not be afraid of any of these things. If you do not do well, do not hold it against the laboratory. You should realize that flying is a special kind of activity. If a person is incapable of instant reaction, this can be the cause of a flight disaster.

Do you know what the KTS-Tu-134 A-11 is? No? Let me tell you. It is a simulator used to teach cadets the principles of piloting a heavy jet aircraft. The person in charge of this impressive electronic complex, which occupies several rooms, is Colonel Vladimir Stepanovich Garin. He is assisted by Captain Beskaravaynyy and Warrant Officer Mikhaylov. Off by itself is a full-scale cockpit of the Tu-134A. You turn on the power and energize all the units. Next, you try to take off. Your feet

are on the foot controls. You push the control yoke forward a little bit. You accelerate smoothly while watching the runway, which is represented on a television screen located in front of the window. The runway is coming at me first slowly, then faster. I experience a realistic feeling of flying. I can simulate any situation I would encounter in the air.

Nonetheless, in the training you cannot replace entirely a real aircraft. The commander of the training regiment, Lieutenant Colonel Nikolay Nikolayevich Labukin, is a man of medium height with excellent bearing. He apparently is also a strict officer. He familiarizes the students with the school's combat training equipment. That means the Tu-134A. And what kind of people serve in the regiment! He told me that the pilots and engineers collected 3,000 rubles and donated the money to a children's home they have taken under their wing. The chief mentor for the kids is Uncle Gena—Senior Flight Instructor Gennadiy Basharinov, who is the son of frontline pilot and Hero of the Soviet Union Ivan Vasilyevich Basharinov.

There is no need to say anything about the special qualities possessed by the flight instructors. Ask any cadet who he thinks is the best teacher he has ever known and he will tell you the name of his flight instructor or flight or squadron commander. What enormously difficult work this is—flying and flying—much more so than in line units. There is no doubt that flying and teaching at the same time is the most difficult kind of work. However, that does not seem to make any difference to the personnel. There are 100 families of regimental personnel that are in need of apartments and better living conditions. The instructors do not enjoy any of the privileges granted "line pilots."

In a lecture hall of the classroom building I met cadets that had just graduated, immediately before they were to receive their commission. They spoke openly and in a comradely manner.

Cadet Yevgeniy Losev complained that "we are being taught that with which we will have little to do in practical service, such as the Tu-16."

"Did the DOSAAF sports flying club help me?", asked Losev, repeating the question he had been asked. "Judge for yourself. In our training regiment I was the first to fly on my own. Many thanks for this to my Arkhangelsk sports flying club!"

The graduation exercise was held. The graduates headed for points located all over the country. The long-range

wings of Tambov are facing difficult service and flights of many hours over taiga, oceans, deserts, fields, and mountains.

From the editors: As this issue was going to press, the editorial office received notice of passage of a new regulation dealing with higher military educational institutions, which brings a solution to many problems cited in the above report. The text of an interview on this subject with Colonel General Vladimir Andreyevich Vostrov, chief of the Main Directorate for Military Educational Institutions of the USSR Ministry of Defense, will be published in issue No 3 of this publication.

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Use of Krasnodar School to Train Foreign Pilots Noted

Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 17 Mar 90 Morning Edition p 11

[Article by Aleksandr Dergachev: "Secrecy Label Removed"; first paragraph is IZVESTIYA introduction]

[Text] The press has been given access to the Krasnodar Military Aviation Technical School, which for 30 years has been training foreign military pilots and aviation engineers.

The school has trained pilots from more than 40 countries, including Angola, Algeria, the GDR, Cuba, and Mozambique. Future cosmonauts Ahad Momand (Afghanistan), Bertelan Farkas (Hungary), and Pham Tuan (Vietnam) earned their wings here. Our pilot-cosmonauts V. Gorbato, V. Komarov, Ye. Khrunov, and G. Shonin also graduated from the Krasnodar school (not the Yeysk school—the name until very recently suggested for use in the open press). Someone else who walked the school's corridors was Aleksey Meresyev and another person that also had an amazing future awaiting him: Colonel General G. Dolnikov, who shot down 15 fascist aircraft. It was he, while under interrogation as a prisoner in a concentration camp, who downed three glasses of vodka "without taking something to eat to counter the effects." That event was used by Sholokhov in his story "A Man's Fate." (In 1978 Dolnikov was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.)

It seems that School Commandant Major General M. Kosarenko was right when he said that the existence of the institution was kept secret for too long a time. On the contrary, it needs publicity, for the more foreigners we have studying there, the larger the amount of currency the country will receive.

Improvements To Whitman AFB For B-2 Noted

90UM0416A Moscow KRYLYA RODINY in Russian
No 1, Jan 1990

[Report on improvements to Whitman AFB in anticipation of the arrival of the first B-2 bombers: "B-2's Destination—Whitman AFB"]

[Text] The first B-2 bomber will arrive at Whitman AFB in 1991. Airplane crews and technical service teams will undergo training there. In time two or three other bases will accept the newest bombers. Plans call for their deployment in the central part of the USA.

Currently at Whitman AFB, which is located 45 miles southeast of Kansas City, 100 Minutemen-II missiles are deployed. Now the base will be thoroughly modernized. In the 1988 fiscal year the USA Congress appropriated 84.8 million dollars for military construction associated with the preparation of the air base for the arrival of the B-2 aircraft. This sum was increased by an additional 59.5 million dollars in 1989.

At the present time construction of more than 20 new buildings is underway. Primary attention is being given to the creation of hangars for the bombers and training areas for the crews. In the opinion of air force specialists, one closed area in addition to existing combat fortifications will be required for the technical servicing of each aircraft which is not in a state of combat readiness. This is connected with the decreased visibility of the B-2 which requires frequent technical servicing of the body and engine. In all 34 enclosed structures are needed for the aircraft.

In addition, a new technical exploitation control complex and a flight control center will be built. Resources for controlling landing approaches by radar and a building for the aircraft's auxiliary equipment and spare parts storage have been constructed. Other improvements include the application of a new runway surface, the expansion of the base's overall mission and the installation of a system of hydrants for fuel distribution.

The Center of Air Logistics in Oklahoma City at Tinker AFB will become the main storage facility for technical servicing of the B-2 bomber.

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Modernization of F-15E Noted

90UM0146B Moscow KRYLYA RODINY in Russian
No 1, Jan 1990 (Signed to press 12 Dec 89) p 33

[Report on modernization of F-15E: "System Modification"]

[Text] The deployment of the McDonnell Douglas F-15E aircraft will begin at the end of 1990. It will be deployed with the ALQ-135 modernized active electronic suppression system. It will have the new "Band-3" transmitter

for countering target detection by radar during final trajectory. This did not exist in the middle 70's in the electronic warfare system.

An expansion of the working zone of the frequency range of band K was required for the ALQ-161 electronic warfare system on the B-1B aircraft. As in the case of the ALQ-135, the ALQ-161 system is a scientifically improved version of the mid 1970's model.

It was necessary to rework the design in order to install the additional equipment in the two-seater F-15E and for its inclusion in the design construction. The goal of the redesign consisted of unifying two pieces of equipment emitting active, deliberate, low-frequency radio interference and the elaboration of various methods of active electronic suppression. From the very beginning specialists encountered certain problems associated with the unification of the two "Band-1 and Band-2" interference-emitting transmitters into a new "Band-1.5" transmitter and also with the introduction of receiver processors necessary for the creation of active, imitative radio interference.

The systems program staff of the F-15 estimates that tests of "Band-3" will be completed by the end of 1990 before the new "Band-1.5" subsystem is completely tested. The new piece of equipment will also be installed on the F-15C aircraft in the place of the "Band-2" system of active, deliberate radio interference. For operational and evaluation tests experimental versions of the "Band-3" were installed on five F-15C/D aircraft.

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U.S. ASW Aircraft Development Program

90UM0416C Moscow KRYLYA RODINY in Russian
No 1, Jan 1990 p 34

[Report on U.S. ASW Aircraft Development Program: "ASW Aircraft of the 21st Century"]

[Text] The U.S. Navy has chosen the Lockheed firm for the development of its new long-range antisubmarine aircraft, LRAACA [Long-range air antisubmarine warfare capable aircraft]. The overall cost of the program will be 4.9 billion dollars. According to navy specifications the LRAACA will be equipped with the RS-3 "Update-4" electronic suite.

According to requirements the LRAACA is responsible for the following missions: to provide underwater defense and patrolling of the ocean surface, to act as an antiship and mine-laying aircraft.

The LRAACA is capable of four hours of uninterrupted operation. Its range is 1600 nautical miles. Its minimal cruising speed corresponds to $M = 0.55$. The aircraft can carry a payload of 23,661 pounds. Its complement includes ten crew members, the "Update-4" electronic equipment system, two "Harpoon" missiles with

increased range, four Mk.50 torpedoes, 150 size A submerged radio-ranging buoys and a food supply for two additional crews.

It is expected that this Lockheed aircraft equipped with turboprop engines will have special advantages in comparison with the turbofan Boeing 757 in holding patterns at low altitudes since in these conditions turboprop engines are more effective. The General Electric GE 38 engine with Hamilton Standard five-blade propellers made from composite materials will consume almost 25 percent less fuel than Allison T56-A-14 engines in the P-3 "Orion" aircraft.

The main construction of the LRAACA will be prepared from new alloys, stronger with increased resistance to corrosion. The weight, however, will not change significantly. Because of the greater loads, the thickness of construction materials will increase. At the present time Lockheed is studying the possibility of utilizing composition materials for the preparation of secondary designs such as control surfaces and landing gear hatches.

The firm plans to deliver two experimental aircraft in 1992, six in 1994, eight in 1995 and 18 per year during 1996-2000 and 19 in 2001.

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Foreign Experience With Military Reform

Reform in Chinese People's Army

90UM0499A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
18 Apr 90 First Edition p 3

[Article by Maj V. Klavov: "The Way It's Going in China"]

[Text] **Wide discussion of what the USSR Armed Forces should become as a result of the military reform is developing in our country. Experience accumulated in foreign countries is of considerable interest in this regard. The articles below describe the course of military reform in the Chinese People's Republic and some results of the reform in the USA.**

In the mid-1980s China concluded on the basis of an analysis of the international situation that nuclear parity between the "two superpowers" limited the possibility of a direct large-scale war between them. And this meant that besides the appearance of other poles of power in the international arena, a world nuclear war could be avoided.

This assessment of the military strategic situation and the conclusion that there was no direct threat to China's safety resulted in a major evolution of China's military policy and military doctrine. The "strategic turn" in military development, which entailed reorientation of China's PLA [People's Liberation Army] toward a lengthy period of peacetime reform and which was announced by Deng Xiaoping in June 1985, made it possible to begin creation of an army corresponding to modern requirements in equipment, organization and personnel.

Manpower reduction, structural reorganization and introduction of professional elements into the PLA became significant components of the new course in military development. It was decided in this case to conduct the army's modernization in concert with China's economic development, and not at the expense of this development.

It should be noted that the reduction of the PLA by one million servicemen in 1986-1987 did not decrease China's military expenditures. On the contrary according to official data China's military expenditures grew from almost 20 billion yuan in 1986 to 20.376 billion yuan in 1987 and almost 22 billion yuan in 1988. But this reduction made it possible to channel assets into priority development of nuclear missile and naval forces, into the army's reequipment and into increasing the professional training of the troops.

Reorganization of the PLA's personnel system is said to be the key element of China's military reform. Reinstatement of officer ranks in the PLA as of 1 October 1988 and adoption of the statutes "On Military Service of PLA Personnel," "On Military Service of PLA Privates and NCOs" and the "Interim Statute on Civilian Workers of the PLA" made it possible to begin professionalizing the army, to hasten restructuring of the armed forces organization, to establish "reasonable proportions of privates, NCOs and officers" and to establish a standard pattern of career advancement.

Besides reorganizing the system of officer training and career advancement, a course toward gradual professionalization of army and navy privates and sergeants was adopted. The practice of voluntary retention of servicemen in the army and navy on a contract following completion of their term of active duty was expanded. According to the law the term of a serviceman's active duty could be lengthened by one to two years. And after this, a contract is signed with him for voluntary service lasting from eight to 12 years. Today the majority of junior commanders and practically all technical specialists of the PLA have been made professionals.

Regular junior commanders and technical specialists receive much more pay than soldiers serving their compulsory term. The amount of pay depends on the number of years served and technical qualifications. In addition volunteers are granted an annual 20-day leave. They are entitled free round-trip train travel to the place of their leave.

A material interest made it possible to raise the responsibility of these categories of servicemen for the state of affairs in the subunits and for the quality of combat equipment maintenance. New problems arose as well, of course. Volunteer servicemen must live a minimum of 13 years in the barracks. It is naturally difficult for them to raise a family. And it is even more difficult for discharged personnel over 30 years of age to get married.

Significant changes are occurring in troop combat training. While in former times the army was oriented on a readiness to react immediately to a "great nuclear war," the

course adopted now is one of making the PLA capable of conducting effective combat operations in a limited local military conflict. Priority in troop operational and combat training is placed on practicing the modern methods of troop command and control and interaction of the armed forces and branches of troops in modern combined-arms combat, on mastery of modern types of combat equipment and on practicing the tactics of combat activities.

All of these changes occurred on the background of conversion. In the words of Tang Zhongwen, assistant chairman of the PRC State Committee for Machine Building Affairs, around two-thirds of all defense industry enterprises manufacture civilian products. Working in the civilian sector, in this way military industry ensures additional financial income for itself, which is used to modernize the PLA.

Participation of the Chinese army itself in economic activities is also increasing. Fifty-six military airfields, 300 railroad lines and 90 military communication lines, 20 ports and so on are presently allocated for the needs of the national economy. Defense scientific research institutes and design offices have completed more than 6,000 scientific and technical developments and 2,546 defense technologies were unclassified and transferred to the national economy in the interests of the economy's civilian sectors. However, in distinction from previous years, when the Chinese army participates in production, construction and other economic activity, it now does so on a cost accounting, contract basis. According to Chi Haotian, PLA chief of general staff, "Given the reduction of military expenditures, the army must seek ways of self-development and self-reinforcement."

The contract system has also been extended to scientific research and experimental design work in the military sphere. Placement of orders with enterprises on a competitive basis to develop and introduce modern combat equipment and armament made it possible to sharply reduce the time and increase the quality of developments, and lower the cost of projects and correspondingly the outlays on acquiring new models of armament. As an example introduction of the contract system made it possible to reduce by 10 million yuan the outlays on a program to design an unmanned airplane, and by 1.3 million yuan the outlays on creation of a new high-explosive projectile. As the Chinese press noted, over 80 percent of the PLA's military programs were completed on the basis of contracts in 1988.

The military reform, upon which the leadership of the PRC places so much hope, should change the countenance of the Chinese armed forces by the end of the present century. This countenance will correspond to a greater degree to the situation in the world arena, including in the Asia-Pacific region, which will be typified by a tendency toward reduction of military confrontation and of the danger of a major nuclear war. "Under these conditions," notes the journal LIAOWANG, "an increasingly larger number of countries are recognizing that the security of a country and its position in the world will depend in the

21st century on the integrated might of the country," of which economic, scientific and technical potential is the main factor.

In the opinion of Senior Colonel Huang Shuofeng, a prominent Chinese specialist in strategic analysis and an associate of the strategic research center of the PLA's military academy, the world is currently shifting from arms race to competition in the area of a country's integrated might. The struggle for strategic superiority in the next century, Huang Shuofeng emphasizes in an interview in RENMIN RIBAO, will require China to develop a new state strategy oriented on rapid growth of the state's integrated might. This new state strategy, the scientist feels, should be based on priority development of the economy, science and technology, and on use of political and diplomatic means as guarantees of peaceful development.

From a military point of view, in his opinion, reinforcement of the state's integrated might is required in the nuclear missile era not so much as a means of achieving victory in war as of preventing it. The overall might of the state should play the role of a deterrent factor, one which would ensure attainment of strategic security. And this in return requires reinforcement of defensive might.

Results of U.S. Reform

90UM0499B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in
Russian 18 Apr 90 First Edition p 3

[Article by Lt Col S. Lavrenov, candidate of philosophical sciences: "...And What Its Results Are in the USA"]

[Text] "A Straw Giant?" This is the controversial title given to a book by the American scholar A. Hadley devoted to an analysis of what in his opinion are the vulnerable aspects of the professional model of the armed forces. A number of works by other military sociologists are also devoted to this topic.

The transition to a professional army, which was the essence of the military reform in the USA, was far from easy. Here is just one fact. In 1983, 10 years following the decision to adopt the voluntary principle of manning the army, a special conference of American top military leaders was convened in order to discuss the advantages and shortcomings of the professional model of the armed forces. And during the conference at least a third of the participants expressed support for the return of conscription within the next 10 years. As several American specialists admitted then, had the conference been held 2-3 years earlier, a minimum of half of the participants would have voted in favor of this. Summarizing the mood reigning at that time, the journal NEWSWEEK noted that "a return to the draft is unavoidable."

The day was saved by a "boom" in the American professional army, which occurred in approximately the mid-1980s and which was a surprise to many. What happened primarily was that the educational level of new recruits increased. Today, nine out of 10 new recruits have a

secondary education. While in former times advertising expenses were around \$4,000 per year per recruit and they did not always justify themselves, now the recruiting stations receive a constant flood of applicants for service. The professional qualities of American servicemen have risen dramatically, military discipline has increased, and the drug and alcohol consumption curve is slipping downward. Service in the army has become a desirable area for the use of one's strengths for very many young Americans.

What is behind this "renaissance" of the American professional army? First of all, the enormous material subsidies. Today, over half of the USA's military budget is spent on maintaining the personnel. While in 1973, the year of the American army's transition to the professional model, the expenses of maintaining servicemen totaled \$41 billion, by the end of the 1980s this figure went over the 100 billion mark! This made it possible to implement an extensive social program in the American army, to place a system of various benefits into motion (continuing education, including civilian, free medical care, free housing and so on). The American serviceman has guaranteed protection against inflation "fever."

Material interest is a powerful lever of professional growth. The system of categories of privates and NCOs, for example, makes it possible to flexibly account for the contribution of each serviceman to duty. Material interest is a powerful means of instilling discipline and thrift in servicemen. Substantial monetary fines keep the negligent, the undisciplined and the loafers in line.

But at the same time in the opinion of scholars such as E. Kellett and J. Anderson, the rigid dependence of a serviceman's behavior only on material interest inevitably narrows the limits of his manifestation of moral and fighting qualities. The effect of this is insignificant in peacetime. But in a combat situation, when one's own life may become the cost of risk—and the readiness to take a risk is perhaps the most important quality of the military profession—material considerations may be far from effective.

Despite the growing level of "patriotism" among recruits documented by questionnaires, 90 percent of American servicemen still cite material considerations as the principal motive of entering military service, just as they did decades ago. This situation is in many ways the product of the limited social "representativeness" of the professional army. People who join the army are primarily those who for one reason or another are unable to compete equally with their peers in the civilian sphere. And as a rule these are representatives of the poorer strata of the population.

This problem acquired greater acuity in American society in connection with the last presidential campaign. The army past of Dan Quayle, the current vice-president, was to blame for this. During the Vietnam War he served in the National Guard, which guaranteed that he would not be

sent to the combat zone. According to research by the sociological service of the Ganneti organization, which studied the "military" biographies of all members of Congress who were of draft age during the Vietnam War (1964-1972), 129 Congressmen who were eligible for the draft in that period did not serve in the army at all for unconvincing reasons, while 30 served their time in the National Guard and in the reserves. At that time the American army was formed on the basis of a combined principle (volunteer and selective service), which made transfer to the combat zone at least hypothetically possible.

Well known American sociologists such as Ch. Moskov, A. Gabriel, D. Segal, M. Binkin and Dzh. Lyuis [transliterations] have other serious complaints in regard to a purely professional army as well. They include the perpetual problems with finding specialists for "hazardous" military specialties—submariners, ICBM service personnel, dosimetric chemists and pilots. The problems with military discipline are far from fully resolved, thousands of servicemen are discharged from the armed forces each year for drug use, and hundreds die and receive injuries as a result of accidents involving alcoholic intoxication.

The problem of surmounting social, national and racial separateness in the army remains acute. Criticism is still being heard in regard to cases of red tape, protectionism and ineffective leadership in the officer milieu. According to some research a careerist orientation, for example, is typical of 40-50 percent of officers, and improper relations with subordinates are typical of 15-20 percent.

These shortcomings of the USA's professional army are responsible for a continuing debate on its future prospects. The latest research conducted by Congressional experts reveals that a return to the draft would significantly reduce the financial expenses of maintaining the army, without detriment to its quality. Recently a group of Congressional experts proposed a far-reaching plan for reforming the armed forces in the USA. According to this plan the army would remain voluntary, but in this case all youngsters would be given a right to choose between service in the regular army, in the reserves, or social service in local communities. As with many others, this plan is currently "wandering" through the corridors of the American Congress.

Professionalization of the army, which is presently one of the dominant worldwide trends in development of armed forces, is traveling a hard road. The experience of the American army, for which the professional model is traditional by the way, shows that a one-act transition to such a model is not always successful. Apparently the professional model needs to become the result of a sort of organic "self-development"; it must make its way through a number of intermediate, sufficiently lengthy stages.

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