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Worldwide Report

ARMS CONTROL

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31 January 1986

WORLDWIDE REPORT

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SDI AND SPACE ARMS

SOVIET JOURNAL WARNS EUROPE ON SDI 'TROJAN HORSE'

Moscow AGITATOR in Russian No 18, Sep 85 (signed to press 2 Sep 85) pp 35-37

[Article, published under the heading "For Discussion: International Affairs," by Maj Gen (Res) L. Korzun, candidate of military sciences: "'No!' to Star Wars"]

[Text] The expression "Greeks bearing gifts" has served from antiquity as a symbol of extreme treachery on the part of certain persons and a deadly threat to others due to their naive trustfulness. As we know, the Ancient Greek Danaoi tribe, unable to capture the city of Troy, lifted their siege and withdrew, leaving as a gift to the city's inhabitants a wooden horse, inside which were concealed armed warriors. And when the trusting Trojans hauled this sinister gift into the city, that night the enemy soldiers emerged from the horse and seized Troy. Since that time the expressions "Greeks bearing gifts" and "Trojan Horse" have signified gifts which bring the downfall of those who accept them.

Judging by all indications, the present Washington Administration is attempting to become contemporary Greeks bearing gifts, but on an immeasurably larger or, as it is generally put today, global scale. And Washington has decided to use its vaunted "Strategic Defense Initiative" (SDI) or, as it was quite accurately dubbed and is universally called, its "'Star Wars' plans," as a modern-day "Trojan Horse." And although the White House has recently taken great pains to disavow this sobriquet, the latter has firmly attached itself to Washington's "Greek-borne gift."

Proposing plans to militarize space, the U.S. Administration has made and is making a massive effort to palm these plans off as being beneficial to mankind. But present-day mankind, especially its progressive forces, is far from being trusting Trojans, for a great deal of historical experience has been amassed, and it has been necessary to pay dearly for this experience. Therefore Washington's offhand attempt to foist on others the allegedly peace-seeking "Strategic Defense Initiative" has failed. Even the majority of NATO allies have not officially declared support for it.

But the U.S. military-industrial complex (first and foremost the aerospace companies), which is the genuine initiator and author of the sinister plans to militarize space, and its loyal servants in the Washington Administration are

stubbornly continuing to push their line. SDI promises billions in profits for them.

Obviously herein lies one of the main reasons why the U.S. Administration sought an appropriation of 3.7 billion dollars for the coming fiscal year for "Star Wars" program research, and why the U.S. Congress authorized the expenditure of 2.75 billion dollars, which is twice the appropriation amount for similar purposes in the current fiscal year. A total of 32 billion dollars is to be spent over the next 5 years on the development of space weaponry. The entire program, however, is estimated at 1 trillion dollars. This is what the U.S. military-industrial complex (MIC) and the Washington Administration are working so hard to obtain. They are in great haste and, as we see, with far from selfish aims, to palm off their space "Trojan Horse" on mankind.

Quite recently U.S. General Abrahamson, in charge of implementing the "Star Wars" program, stated that initial experiments with components of a large-scale antimissile defense system containing elements of space-basing will begin in 1987. But in June of this year, during the orbital mission of the U.S. shuttlecraft "Discovery," he acknowledged that an experiment is in progress to test the possibility of utilizing laser weapons to destroy missiles in space. "This is one of the most important experiments aimed at determining the feasibility of using high-powered ground-based laser beams to destroy warheads or missiles in space with the aid of mirrors in earth orbit," he stated, completely straight-faced. This statement is convincing evidence of the fact that in the area of militarization of space the United States has already gone beyond the limits of purely scientific research and has commenced practical execution of a space venture. This put a lie to claims by the U.S. Administration about the allegedly research nature of the "Star Wars" plans.

These plans also contain an additional insidious element. Having encountered determined opposition to its undisguised attempts to scrap the SALT II Treaty and the ABM Treaty, the U.S. Administration is seeking to attain this objective by militarizing space, presenting the world with a fait accompli, as it were. And it wants very much for the other capitalist countries, and particularly its NATO allies and Japan, to become accomplices in this foul undertaking. Washington is engaged in intensive arm-twisting on its allies, is dispatching emissaries ranging from General Abrahamson to Vice-President Bush, and is applying all kinds of pressures. All these efforts, however, are falling somewhat short. Addressing journalists on the eve of his trip to Western Europe at the end of June of this year, George Bush commented that there is considerable suspicion among U.S. West European allies regarding Washington's plans to develop a large-scale antimissile defense system containing elements of space-basing. He also acknowledged that the main purpose of his trip was to "dispel" these suspicions.

One can judge the extent to which such completely warranted suspicions have grown by the fact that, although the question of position in regard to the U.S. "Star Wars" program was one of the main agenda items at the NATO Council meeting of foreign ministers held in Estoril (Portugal) on 6-7 June of this year, it was not even mentioned in the official statement released as the meeting adjourned. It was reported in the press that French Foreign Minister

Dumas had come to the meeting with firm instructions from his government not to sign any documents if they dealt with Washington's "Star Wars" project. The governments of France, Greece, Denmark, and Norway have already publicly declared their refusal to take part in this venture. Nor is the overwhelming majority of governments of other NATO countries particularly anxious to fall into line with marching orders from Washington. In an interview with the West German newspaper BILD ZEITUNG, U.S. Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger, who had issued the marching orders and had even stated a 2-month deadline for compliance, declared that the U.S. European allies were allegedly "unanimous on the whole" in the view that the "Star Wars" program "is important for the security of the NATO alliance." The only one who immediately responded favorably to Washington's appeal was West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl. Even the fact that by his blind compliance with the White House request he had introduced friction in relations with France and had ignored the opinion of a number of his own ministers did not stop him. On the other hand, CDU General Secretary H. Geisler voiced enthusiastic support. Their position was quite accurately described by the West German magazine DER SPIEGEL: "Kohl and Geisler are rushing headlong into a reckless venture...." It is by no means surprising that, according to a public opinion poll conducted by the Infas Institute, 88 percent of West Germans polled expressed displeasure with the federal chancellor's actions.

It would be erroneous to claim that in the FRG, as well as in other capitalist countries, there are no elements whatsoever willing to accept Washington's plan or to respond favorably to its so-called "initiative." These include first and foremost those who profit from the arms race. Another West German newspaper, DIE ZEIT, commented as follows: "It becomes clear from conversations with spokesmen of the companies serving the military that they are perfectly willing to take part in the development of space weapons, for the Americans are promising them fabulous profits. And they are little concerned over the fact that the 'Strategic Defense Initiative' will lead to an immense arms buildup for, as we know, profit is the bottom line."

But no matter how powerful these criminal forces may be, it is not their right to determine the fate of all mankind. And mankind as a whole rejects Washington's space ventures. An extremely broad and mass front is building up in the campaign against "Star Wars." Communists and worker parties are the firmest and staunchest fighters in this campaign.

A firm and consistent position is taken by the Soviet Union, which is doing everything possible to eliminate the danger of any war -- nuclear war or space warfare. A grateful mankind appraised as a major foreign-policy initiative the Soviet Union's unilateral moratorium on all nuclear testing effective 6 August and proposals presented by the Soviet Union in the United Nations pertaining to basic directions and principles of international cooperation in peaceful exploration of space in conditions of its nonmilitarization. These Soviet Government initiatives are diametrically opposed to Washington's "Star Wars" plans.

The ranks of those in vigorous opposition to the militarization of space include scientists of conscience in many countries, who by virtue of their knowledge have a better awareness than others of the degree of threat hanging

over our planet. Several hundred American scientists, including 54 Nobel Prize recipients and almost half of the members of the National Academy of Science, have launched a new offensive against this plan. Their attitude was expressed with extreme clarity by world-renowned scientist and twice Nobel Prize recipient Linus Pauling: "In my opinion all plans to militarize space are the sheerest folly.... This entire scheme seems to me to be the highest degree of madness."

A no less graphic assessment of these plans was given by famous American science-fiction writer and chemist Isaac Asimov: "This is a piece of cheap, lousy science fiction in the spirit of Hollywood 'star warriors.' It is precisely those politicians who are making preparations for a nuclear war which they intend to win who are expatiating about 'worldwide antinuclear protection'."

An appeal by scientists to prevent the deployment of any and all weapons in space, adopted in 1984 in Goettingen, West Germany, bore the signatures of 10,834 scientists from the FRG and 31 other countries. This document, drawn up by a group of scientists of initiative and disseminated in Bonn, states that SDI "constitutes a deception of mankind and a misuse of scientific resources." In Canada 700 scientists and technical specialists at 20 universities spoke out against the "Star Wars" program. We could cite other examples in the same vein.

The New Delhi Declaration by the heads of state and government of India, Mexico, Sweden, Tanzania, Argentina, and Greece, which forthrightly stated: "Space must be used for the benefit of mankind as a whole, not as a future battlefield...." evoked wide response throughout the world. India's faithfulness to this position has been affirmed time and again by that country's head of state, Rajiv Gandhi, including during a visit to the United States, which evoked considerable displeasure on the part of the White House.

The Bureau of the Socialist International, a meeting of which in Sweden held in June of this year included the participation of more than 30 delegations from Social Democratic and Socialist parties, stated unequivocally: "The Socialist International rejects the Strategic Defense Initiative and other such schemes and holds that no country should take part in their implementation." A great many different international meetings, sessions, and conferences were held this past summer, at which the U.S. "Star Wars" plan was examined from various points of view and rejected. At a meeting of the UN Committee on Peaceful Uses of Space, representatives of various countries issued an appeal that every effort be made to prevent the militarization of space. This demand also sounded as the leitmotiv at a meeting to prevent an arms race in space held in Geneva, at which former Portuguese president and prominent military expert Francisco Costa Gomes stated: "Washington's 'Strategic Defense Initiative', if subjected to serious scrutiny, can be seen as an attempt to deceive world public opinion." A. Baird, member of the executive committee of the U.S. National Campaign to Freeze Nuclear Arms, stressed: "Militarization of space is the line beyond which lies total annihilation of world civilization."

Even in the U.S. Congress they are beginning to realize that the "Star Wars" program is, as Congressman B. Boxer put it, "a financial, technological, and destabilizing nightmare."

The need to reject this program is now being stated even by such U.S. political and military leaders, who in the past have themselves made a solid contribution toward fanning the flames of anti-Sovietism, as former presidents Ford and Carter, former defense secretaries McNamara and James Schlesinger, former attorney general Clark, former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Jones, and others.

The U.S. military-industrial complex grasps with a death grip those whom it places at the helm of government. It is up to the Americans to handle their own domestic affairs. But the fate of all mankind should be determined by all mankind. And mankind emphatically rejects Washington's "Greek-borne gifts." It demands that space remain forever a domain of peace.

The Soviet Union's position on the "Star Wars" problem is quite clear. "If there is no ban on the militarization of space," stated Comrade M. S. Gorbachev in replies to the U.S. periodical TIME Magazine, "if an arms race in space is not prevented -- there will be nothing at all. This is our firm position. And it is grounded on our most sober and responsible assessment, which takes into consideration both our interests and those of the United States. We are willing to hold talks, but not on space weaponry, not on what kinds of space weaponry will be permitted to be deployed in space, but rather on the barring of an arms race in space."

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SDI AND SPACE ARMS

FRANCE'S QUILES ON SDI

PM091515 Paris DEFENSE NATIONALE in French Jan 86 pp 11-24

[Speech by Defense Minister Paul Quiles to Higher National Defense Studies Institute in Paris on 12 November 1985: "The Future of Our Concept of Defense in the Light of Technological Progress"]

[Excerpts] The Future of Nuclear Deterrence

Thinking about the future of nuclear deterrence implies thinking about the American SDI. In his speech on 23 March 1983, President Reagan, after condemning nuclear weapons outright as immoral, presented the American people with a new challenge: To remove once and for all the threat of nuclear apocalypse, to replace the doctrine of mutually assured destruction by that of mutually assured protection, in short, to render nuclear weapons powerless and obsolete.

This plan certainly fulfills the hope of a large section of American public opinion. It opens up the only way to deliver the American people from the threat of intercontinental missiles; it enjoys the unreserved support of all those who, for political or industrial reasons, are anxious to increase the defense effort; it is presented as a response to the wishes of the "new frontier" movements; thus, after the conquests of the West and of the moon, it presents a new challenge in keeping with American society's ambitions. I think that in a way this plan seems to have more to do with ideology than with the strategic concept.

The hopes aroused by President Reagan's speech were based on the promises of new technologies, like beam weapons, but also on the expected progress in many spheres like electronics, optronics, and computers. On 6 January 1984, President Reagan decided on a research program aimed at a better appreciation of the possibilities of building an effective strategic defense system. It is only in 1990, at the end of this program, that the current U.S. Administration's hopes will be justified or dashed.

Faced with such a doctrinal change, it is legitimate to question its realism: Is it a technological illusion or an irreversible break with the past, as the advent of the nuclear age was?

I do not want to judge in advance the results of studies and research carried out in the United States. There can be no question of underestimating the qualities of the research workers and the determination which is motivating them; I am sure that they will carry out remarkable experiments which, despite their incomplete character, will be political events. Remember: Last year a ballistic missile was intercepted and, this year, a missile fired from an F-15 plane destroyed a satellite and a laser beam pulverized one stage of a Titan missile.

So let us consider their studies likely to succeed, and look beyond 1990. To what extent and in what conditions can a strategic defense system be established? What problems will Europe and France have to face? What arms policy should we now implement?

The establishment of an impenetrable defense shield is now not very credible; the complexity of such a system is obvious to everybody; it will have to include several lines of defense, including the famous space component, responsible for destroying ballistic missiles from a great distance; it must be capable of detecting the launch of the missiles, eliminating false alarms, and pursuing and destroying its targets at a distance of several thousand kilometers; it will use many satellites of all types: warning, tracking, and identification, and communications satellites, and finally satellites carrying beam weapons. Only a whole chain of satellites will be capable of providing permanent cover of launch sites and the oceans; the most optimistic assessments make provision for several hundred, in other words around 10,000 metric tons in orbit and \$1 trillion in investment, or 20 percent of the annual U.S. defense budget for 15 years!

But it will not be enough to set up this system, it will also have to be maintained: One expert has calculated that one launch every 2 weeks would be necessary just to carry out this task.

What credibility could such a defense system have? It is impossible to test its efficiency in real operational conditions or to discover its vulnerability with certainty. However, there many means of penetrating it: nuclear attacks, antisatellite weapons, and destruction by the enemy strategic defense system. Will it ever be possible to guarantee that no single nuclear weapon will escape it and result in the destruction of a big metropolis?

Finally, I would like to point out, that such a system will only be able to fulfill its mission if its reaction times are compatible with the strategic missiles' flight times. The few minutes it will have imply a completely automatic operation and activation without human intervention, unlike the present situation in which leaders have around 30 minutes to take a decision. This is a logical result which has never been accepted by political leaders or public opinions: It amounts to withdrawing power from men and giving it to machines; it is reminiscent of hit movies like "Doctor Strangelove" or "War Games."

Moreover, uncertainties about the real efficacy of a strategic defense system are implicitly recognized by the Americans in charge of the SDI program. In their view the establishment of an impenetrable shield can only be a distant objective; between now and then a defense system is a vital complement to the offensive forces; its main advantage is therefore that it creates uncertainty for somebody planning a counterforce strike and maintains a reprisal capability. This therefore leaves us where we started, with mutual assured destruction!

So, is France worried about the future of nuclear deterrence?

France thinks that the SDI is likely to result in a revival of the arms race, even though its aim is to end it. If there is one point in the Americans' argument which deserves to be explained, it is the one which heralds a reduction in offensive forces rendered useless by the development of defensive weapons. Defense systems have always been much more costly than offensive systems. If technological progress makes a defensive strategy financially possible, why should the same progress not benefit offensive systems just as much? The sword is always stronger than the shield. For instance, I would like to point out that the development of surface-to-air systems has not made aircraft obsolete!

Another great French anxiety is the appearance of areas of unequal security within the alliance. The space system, as almost all the experts admit, will be ineffective against the intermediate-range or short-range ballistic missiles which threaten Europe, not to mention the Warsaw Pact divisions and air forces.

Finally, there is reason to fear that the idyllic picture painted of the SDI might mislead Western public opinions, although there are still many unknown factors. The SDI research program weakens the consensus on the concept of nuclear deterrence. The transitional period of developing and deploying Soviet and American strategic defense systems will be a particularly critical phase for world security; neither of the two sides will be able to accept being overtaken by the other. Moreover, there is a great confusion in this sphere because the U.S. President recently admitted the need to share defense technologies with the Soviet Union, and then denied this through his spokesman, before proposing the idea again in a more ambiguous form recently.

Thus we have ahead of us several decades in which we will have to reconcile the need for nuclear deterrence and the hopes which public opinions pin on a strategic defense system; this will certainly spark off a conceptual crisis whose development cannot be foreseen, and eventually war could come into its own again because people would think that they could avoid the nuclear threat.

So what are France's answers?

With regard to the technological challenge, France has proposed the civilian-based Eureka plan to Europe. This plan should enable European enterprises to

take up the technological challenge in a purely European framework. Nobody can reasonably believe in a balanced European participation in the SDI program; would such participation encourage the creation of European industry? Would it not instead aggravate natural competition? How could the difficult problems of industrial ownership be solved?

With regard to the political challenge, France has clearly expressed its concerns. The prime minister himself spoke to you about it; I will quote him: "Trying to base a strategic concept on remove technological possibilities is dubious. Above all it is dangerous to devalue what will form the very foundation of our security for a long time to come, namely nuclear deterrence."

In June 1984 France put forward practical proposals at the Geneva disarmament conference aimed at banning the deployment of weapons in space. It regularly warns the international community against the dangerous character of this new arms race, against opportunist interpretations of the 1972 ABM treaty, and against anything which might look like incitement to violate it.

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ITALY'S CRAXI ADDRESSES LOWER HOUSE ON SDI

Rome AVANTI! in Italian 7 Nov 85 pp 1-3

[Prime Minister Bettino Craxi 6 November Confidence Debate Speech to Lower House: "Building a Just Peace in the Middle East"]

[Excerpt] In talking with the Americans, we presented from the first an argument that in my judgment is the central one in this difference. That is, that one cannot envisage the United States being able, through its research (even if this research achieved the planned result, which is not certain), to achieve a result of military use that could lead to developing a defense system of such range and capability as to negate the nuclear potential of the opponent, while leaving intact its own nuclear potential. This would mean an upsetting of the general strategic balances and would signify aiming at a position of military supremacy that the other side could not accept. Thus, it would inevitably unleash a race for possible or imaginable countermeasures, which had in any case already been threatened by the Soviet Union.

The American reply has been given several times. However, I would like to cite only the conclusion I drew from the words of the President of the United States during the meeting in New York and which seems to me quite indicative. At the general meeting two simple arguments were presented: the United States maintains that if the research actually achieved results enabling construction of such an antinuclear space shield, this space shield would have to be available to all. One party could not have a monopoly of it.

Reagan gave me the example of the gas mask. He recalled that gas shells were invented during World War I, and the gas mask was invented. Everyone had a gas mask. In this era we invented the atomic bomb, the nuclear era: if a defense setup can be found that would negate the atomic bomb's destructive potential, then everyone should have it.

Reagan then presented another argument, even more convincing. He said that if someone thought he could have a monopoly of such a possible defense instrument, it would create a dangerous situation for peace in the world, because it would risk provoking a preemptive nuclear war. For example, he expressed the conviction that no one could passively stand by in face of a U.S. attempt to gain a position of supremacy in Italy.

My answer, on that occasion, was that I could end up being convinced of that line of argument, which appeared clear, however that the problem was to convince the Soviets and not us of the possibility that the issue in question could be negotiated with a system of guarantees such as to effectively achieve the desired result, that is, a complex of defensive systems that would radically change the relationship of offensive means to defensive means, in a general, guaranteed strategic balance.

On the other hand, as regards the problems that within a few days will be the subject of negotiations in Geneva, during the meetings between the President of the United States and Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev, I would like to give the Parliament some further information, recalling that the Italian Government had received with favor the latest Soviet initiatives and singled out the most significant aspect of the reduction proposals, certainly greater in degree than the past, in nuclear weapons. When on 10 October we met with Nitze, the special White House adviser, in Rome, it represented an opportunity for us to recognize the dynamic elements, at least on the side of the proposals by General Secretary Gorbachev, and we encouraged presentation of valid counterproposals. We repeated this position directly to President Reagan on 25 October in New York, and during that very meeting he himself gave advanced announcement of such counterproposals.

Cautious Predictions Regarding the Geneva Meeting

Without revealing the content and complete formulation of the proposals put forward by the United States at Geneva, of which President Reagan informed me by personal message (I believe that I cannot reveal them to you, lest we see them printed tomorrow morning in some American paper), and pending preliminary analysis of them, I think that I can nevertheless indicate some significant points.

Above all, it seems to me important to stress that these proposals have accommodated in their quantitative parameters the reduction proposals put forward by the Soviets in respect to strategic issues. This applies both for reduction of overall launch systems, amounting to 50 percent, and for limitation of nuclear warheads, which both countries propose to establish at a maximum level of 6,000 units, with "subceilings" for the various missile components on which there remain evaluation differences.

The American side, in response to the Soviet Union's call for reduction of the number and power of land-based ICBM's, has offered to redimension its own program for deployment of ALCM's (i.e. cruise missiles launched from planes), which is at a much more advanced stage than the Soviet program. The American willingness to carry out reductions in this area appears very significant to me. The United States has also offered as a matching step to limit the number of strategic bombers, to a greater degree than proposed in the START negotiating position.

On intermediate nuclear weapons, the latest American proposals clarify and define the position already previously announced, proposing an agreed

regional limitation for Europe, and leaving undefined the overall ceiling to be agreed on.

These are the prior measures so that Geneva meeting will not fail. I am making cautious predictions. I do not at all take for granted that there will be an agreement. I would regard a breakup as harmful, yes. I believe that the meeting will already have achieved a major result if it actually opens a period of dialogue, establishes a different atmosphere, of greater trust--greater mutual trust--and begins to influence in a beneficial way the development of international relations. And this even if the concrete results prove to be limited.

In short, I hope that the way will be found to put a hood on the "hawks" and the "hawklets," who are indeed scattered through the opposing structures, Atlantic and Soviet.

Our own position has to be very open, very alert, and one of decisively encouraging dialogue. When the Soviet Union, as has happened in the past, assumes an aggressive, closed, and hard position, which tends to divide the West and the Europeans and to create destabilizing effects, it is countered with a position of great firmness. If the Soviet Union is open to dialogue and shows itself interested in it, such dialogue must be encouraged. Perhaps it is worth making one observation: nothing in the world is unchanging. Within a closed system, historically regarded as monolithic and by its nature bureaucratic, such as the Soviet system, there is emerging in the leadership and in power a new generation, which probably has reforming intentions and the will for internal change (and even says so). In what direction and how is difficult to say; certainly it needs, and cannot but be strongly interested in, a long period of peace. If it is true that such interest exists, we also have this interest, as does the West: that of better organizing the peace, better guaranteeing it, and insuring it for an indefinite period.

In this direction, we hope that the occasion of Geneva will not be lightly wasted, nor that it will slip on some banana peel of a petty spy war.

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SDI AND SPACE ARMS

ITALY'S FIAT PRESIDENT IN BRUSSELS URGES SDI PARTICIPATION

Rome LA REPUBBLICA in Italian 22 Nov 85 p 5

[Text] Brussels - Gianni Agnelli is firmly convinced that the greatest technological and industrial challenge of the coming years lies with Ronald Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). "I believe," he said, "that within a short time the direct benefits of space research would fully justify European participation in this American program. If we fail to take part, we will be giving American firms a monopoly on every new technology emerging from Washington's endeavors." The president of Fiat was expressing his views yesterday, the first day of talks sponsored by the "Economist" on the theme of "Europe and the SDI."

The conclusions will be drawn today by General Abrahamson, director of the program, who has come to Brussels at the head of a large delegation, which includes Pentagon deputy Donald Hicks, in charge of research, and Frank Gaffney, arms control expert. The European delegates include such prestigious figures as Hubert Qurién, French minister of research and technology, Lynn Davis, director of the Institute of Strategic Studies in London, and British military aviation commander Sir Joseph Gilbert.

In his introductory report, Agnelli declared that "Numerous positive results will derive from space research." He is primarily concerned with the "relapse" of knowledge in the entire industrial base. "Even if the space shield should never be realized," he affirmed, "the research efforts mobilized by the SDI program will notably advance the technology of electronics, cybernetics, data processing, lasers and telecommunications." Meanwhile, space research requires new infrastructures for a sort of extraterrestrial industrialization. Among the numerous examples of potential achievements, Agnelli cited "the manufacture of microcrystals, which is possible only where gravity does not exist."

Europe, he pointed out, cannot refuse to share in this new productive dimension, and its government must evaluate attentively what forms of participation it will assume in the SDI program. He listed four possibilities: collaboration by single enterprises; the formation of European consortiums; bilateral agreements between the USA and the separate European nations; and negotiations within NATO's multilateral framework. Agnelli avers, however, that all firms should conduct negotiations within a general framework, which each European government must establish with the administration in Washington.

He wants Washington's guarantee that the Europeans will not be assigned a subordinate role in the development of SDI, either through prearranged quotas of public funds or assignments in specific sectors to Old World firms. For its part, Europe must "demonstrate that it has the vision, the creativity and flexibility to exploit the new world about to open up."

9653/13167

CSO: 5200/2577

SDI AND SPACE ARMS

ITALY'S NATTA ON SDI, FOREIGN POLICY

Milan L'UNITA in Italian 6 Nov 85 p 3

[Excerpts] Here is a broad summary of Alessandro Natta's remarks in the course of the debate on the governmental crisis. Our opposition: Ready to listen, tough to convince: "The Craxi report confirms our negative impressions of the circumstances and the substance of the accord." Issues in international policy--showdown must involve the overall line. Policy-related ties and the outlook for the nation.

The Star Wars Issue

We are also concerned with several vital aspects still present in the government's position vis-a-vis the issue of arms control and in particular on the matter of the United States' Strategic Defense Initiative. We discern in the prime minister's remarks a disturbing ambiguity. First of all, with regard to the defensive nature of the SDI, a nature that is challenged not only by its counterpart, but also by members of the Atlantic Alliance, and is even now a matter of controversy in the United States itself.

In the second place, because the hope of being able to "contain the results of research within effective bounds of control" seems extremely problematical in view of the fact that shows us that mere suspicion of possible supremacy of one side over the other can lead to the gravest imaginable consequences. Nor is a purely theoretical assertion of the principle of consensus adequate to prevent the onset of yet another arms race.

Italy has every reason to voice its views on this issue of the militarization of space with maximum clarity and simplicity, as so many states throughout the world have already done. Here again we are faced with a fundamental issue of our nation's sovereignty and autonomy.

Craxi has alleged that it would be premature now to try to assess the strategic implication of SDI, which "must be the subject of an ongoing consultation process within the Atlantic Alliance," and that, as for the impetus given the process of technological innovation "in the civilian as well as in the conventional military area, the government will be prepared in the weeks ahead to complete the investigative phase and to outline the necessary decisions to parliament."

We cannot accept this order of debate or the seats of power where all decisions are to be taken. Parliament must be vested with the power to make strategic policy decisions. In any case, we reiterate our belief that the "militarization of space" must be repelled, no matter where it rears its head, be it in the United States or in the USSR.

There has been talk of "nationalistic knee-jerks," of which even we have been found guilty by reason of our support for the government, as much exploited as unwitting dupes as traitors to our internationalist convictions.

The truth is exactly the opposite. The demand for autonomy is the direct opposite of any and all chauvinism. Chauvinism is the bastard child of an inferior response to patterns of frustration of the spirit and dignity of a national community. And it is therefore a stupid and persistent mind-set prevalent among the dominant classes toward the mighty of the world, an attitude that has historically brought with it the risk of nationalistic withdrawal.

This is why, in our history as communists, we have fought against the image of a branch of internationalism that would be seen as tantamount to surrender to any and all comers, or worse, as underminers of national identity and national autonomy. Let no one forget that it was in part due to the crucial contribution of the communists that the labor movement adopted as its own in the fight against fascism and in the resistance the need for national redemption. And it is for us today to remind a lot of impromptu polemicists that the idea of nationhood is more than a relic from the 1800's, and it does not conflict with, but blends with every proper approach to understanding the need for a broader supra-national community. Our Europeanism can be more deeply rooted as we grow more convinced that only in a Europe that turns itself into a truly political community will full appreciation of the original and unique contribution of each national tradition be possible.

The nationalist-chauvinist spirit emerges whenever there is a tendency to suppress and deny the rights of others, not when we demand our own. This is assuredly not the case in Italy. If anything, we should be blaming our governments for going too far in the opposite direction: the direction, that is, of such pervasive spinelessness as to culminate in surrender as policy, and in humiliating patterns of subjection. We are paying for the quest for legitimacy abroad on the part of every party entitled to participate in the government of Italy. The note of annoyance, as well as the accusations sent us by the office of the President of the United States, cannot be justified in any way whatever, but they also stem in part from surprise on the part of a man urged to establish boss-underling relations rather than relations between equals.

We are routinely accused of anti-Americanism. We should like to seize the occasion of this debate to make it clear that our criticism of the current American administration's actions and behavior or those of past administrations is different from and opposite to any form of preconceived hostility.

There has been, in this connection, a radical distortion of our positions. We have and do reject any Manichaeism sort of position. In a world like the one we live in, where the threat to all mankind is so awesome, so pervasive, crusader attitudes, from whatever quarter they may come, must be spurned, and we do reject them. At the same time, we have emphasized and will continue to emphasize the urgent, overriding need for stalwart defense of the principles of law that, however imperfectly, govern relations among nations.

Once again, it is for this reason that we took the positions known to you all between those policies and those acts on the part of the Soviet Union which we deemed wrong. There was nothing frivolous in the debate or in the polemical clash that ensued. We know now that some of the positions we espoused in good faith but which, in the event, proved to be mistaken, among them the line of good-will gestures based on unilateral moratoria and practical disarmament proposals, have today become a viable political fact. Permit me to remind you here how much all of us, not mely ourselves, owe to the unremitting quest for any and every possible step toward halting the arms race, a quest to which our beloved colleague and comrade, Enrico Berlinguer, devoted his entire life, right down to his dying breath.

We made it clear at the time that our sustained criticism of the policies and the economic and political models embraced by the USSR could in no way, shape, or form be construed as anti-Sovietism. For much the same reasons, these days we continued to draw a sharp distinction between our criticism of the current American administration, which, for that matter, is itself sharply divided politically, and any form of bigoted anti-Americanism. For example: we look upon it as a very grave error that, in the American President's enumeration of the points of conflict he omits the Middle East and South Africa, and glosses over his own responsibilities vis-a-vis Nicaragua, or vis-a-vis the pitiable condition of so many peoples of Central and South America, including Chile. But, as we see it, these criticisms derive in part from a recognition of the deep contradictions between certain political attitudes and actions and the great American democratic tradition: a contradiction that is replicated in a political line centered on the quest for supremacy.

Knuckling under and answering "yes" to every question or demand does not qualify as proof of truly friendly relations.

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CSO: 5200/2610

SDI AND SPACE ARMS

XINHUA HEADLINE: GORBACHEV INSISTS U.S. ABANDON SDI

OW021655 Beijing XINHUA in English 1645 GMT 2 Jan 86

["Gorbachev: Abandonment of Star Wars Key to Arms Control Progress"--XINHUA headline]

[Text] Moscow, January 2 (XINHUA) -- Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev today insisted that the U.S. must abandon its "star wars" program before progress can be made at the Geneva arms control talks, which are set to resume this month.

In a letter to a British politician, Gorbachev said "Progress at the Geneva talks is only possible if space strike armaments are completely prohibited," the Soviet news agency TASS reported. The soviet leader said Moscow will do its utmost "to close the door to space for weapons and to achieve radical reductions in nuclear armaments and their eventual complete elimination."

Gorbachev's letter was to Kenneth Livingstone, head of the Greater London Council, a municipal governing body, who wrote to the Soviet leader last month stressing that never has been there a stronger need than today for the progress of international disarmament talks. Saying that Moscow favors "the immediate freezing of nuclear armaments and the complete prohibition of their tests in perpetuity," Gorbachev again asked the United States to join Moscow's unilateral moratorium on nuclear tests, introduced on August 6 last year and which expired after five months on January 1. "It now depends on the U.S. Government to realize the prospect of it becoming a mutual agreement," Gorbachev said.

The Soviet leader also said his country was prepared to begin three-way talks with the United States and Britain on a comprehensive nuclear test ban, to seek a "mutually acceptable solution to this problem."

When touching upon the Soviet approach towards nuclear-free zones, Gorbachev called on countries to refuse to accept nuclear weapons. "For example," he said, "if Britain fully rejected nuclear weapons and dismantled foreign nuclear bases on its territory, the USSR would guarantee that the Soviet nuclear weapons will be neither trained on the British territory, nor used against it."

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CSO: 5200/4019

SDI AND SPACE ARMS

XINHUA ON USSR CONCERN OVER FRG SDI PARTICIPATION

OW211644 Beijing XINHUA in English 1605 GMT 21 Dec 85

[Text] Moscow, 21 December (XINHUA) -- Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze voiced concern on Friday to Federal German Ambassador Hans Joerg Kastl over Bonn's decision to negotiate a role for the country's firms in the U.S. star wars program, TASS reported.

Tass quoted Shevardnadze as telling the ambassador that, by taking this road, Federal Germany would become an accomplice in unleashing an arms race in space and would bear all the consequences thus incurred. The Soviet foreign minister said he hoped that Bonn would consider further "before ultimately committing itself to the participation in its implementation," TASS said.

The Federal German Government decided Wednesday to open talks with the United States on terms for its companies' participation in the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative [SDI], popularly known as "Star Wars."

During the meeting, Shevardnadze also underlined "the decisive importance of questions of security for the further development of bilateral relations" with Federal Germany, TASS said.

On Wednesday, TASS quickly reacted to Bonn's decision to negotiate involvement of its firms in the SDI plan, condemning the move as a dangerous choice and an effort to speed up the arms race and carry out space militarization.

The official newspaper PRAVDA in a commentary yesterday denounced the Federal German decision as "a most harmful step" which was incompatible with the call for fostering the foundation of dialogue laid by the Soviet-U.S. Geneva Summit. Bonn would itself be guilty of the violation of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, PRAVDA said, "for the ABM treaty forbids the United States and Soviet Union sharing technology in this field with other countries."

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CSO: 5200/4020

U.S.-USSR GENEVA TALKS

USSR'S ZAMYATIN DISCUSSES DISARMAMENT IN INTERVIEW

'Half-Hearted' U.S. Proposals

LD301238 Moscow World Service in English 1200 GMT 30 Dec 85

[Text] In a New Year interview with the newspaper MOSCOW NEWS a senior official at the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party, Leonid Zamyatin, has said that there are possibilities to start taking practical steps to cut down the nuclear arsenals of the Soviet Union and the United States. This was emphasized by the understanding reached at the recent summit meeting of the two countries in Geneva to do everything for stopping the arms race. At present, Leonid Zamyatin stresses, the Soviet and American plans differ greatly of course. American proposals are half-hearted and give away the desire of the United States and NATO to reach military superiority. Nevertheless compromises are possible.

'Points of Contact' Exist

LD311105 Moscow TASS in English 1012 GMT 31 Dec 85

[Text] Moscow, December 31 TASS -- Many people wonder today what course developments in Soviet-American relations and in world affairs in general will take after Geneva, Leonid Zamyatin says in an article entitled "After Geneva" and carried by the first issue of the weekly MOSCOW NEWS in 1986. One of the political results of the Soviet-American summit is that it has keyed up the interest of the world public in major international problems. The Soviet Union welcomes this heightened interest as an additional factor in favour of developments which are being sought by all the peace forces in the world. There also is evidence of a different process: The results of the Geneva meeting have also invigorated in the West the opponents of normalisation, the "superhawks," those who would like the U.S. Administration's policy towards the Soviet Union and the socialist community as a whole to remain as tough as it was or even to grow tougher.

There is a need today to concentrate efforts on the settlement of major questions which were not resolved at the Geneva summit, the author continues. It is necessary first and foremost for the two sides to refrain from actions which could hamper future agreements or erode the existing controls on the arms race. This presupposes, in particular, honest and precise compliance with the treaty limiting ABM systems and also further mutual respect for the relevant provisions of the SALT-2 treaty. What is most important, it is necessary to seek a real end to the arms race and practical steps to reduce the existing nuclear arms arsenals. There is a possibility to advance to these goals and there are points of contact between the positions of the USSR and the USA on the central question. At present Soviet and American proposals on nuclear arms reductions

differ a good deal. The American proposals are half-measures and still are pervaded with a desire for military superiority for the USA and NATO as a whole. The Soviet Union nevertheless believes that solutions are possible and is prepared to look for them. If developments follow this course, the questions of dependable verifications will be resolved as well.

But it is necessary to shut the door through which weapons could get into outer space -- otherwise radical reductions in nuclear armaments are impossible.

There is a realistic chance today drastically to reduce the threat of nuclear war and eventually to remove it altogether, the author says. It would be a fatal mistake to miss that chance. It is to be hoped that what the American side said on SDI in Geneva -- and it advertised that "initiative" there in every way -- was not the last word. It is at the same time clear that the very fact of continued talks should not be a justification and cover for the arms race.

The Soviet Union offers an all-embracing complex of measures blocking every avenue for the arms race, the article says. Concrete proposals to this effect, tabled by the USSR in Vienna, Geneva and Stockholm earlier, remain in force. The Soviet side regards with utmost seriousness the accords reached in Geneva and would be seeking to improve both the overall atmosphere and the contents of Soviet-American relations on the basis of mutual respect and full equality without any discrimination. The USSR is prepared to cooperate with the United States in good faith to seek the folding up of the arms race, its prevention in space and the improvement of the world situation. We are entitled to expect such an approach from the USA as well.

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CSO: 5200/1220

U.S.-USSR GENEVA TALKS

U.S. CLAIMS OF ARMS ACCORD VIOLATIONS SCORED BY USSR

'Unsubstantiated Attacks'

OW261142 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1500 GMT 24 Dec 85

[From the Novosti newscast; Boris Parkhomenko commentary]

[Text] USSR and U.S. representatives have sent a request to the UN secretary general to register the joint Soviet-U.S. Geneva statement as an official UN document. Here is our commentary:

[Parkhomenko] Hello comrades. In addition to arousing a positive reaction in the world community's headquarters, the request to register the joint Soviet-U.S. Geneva statement was also met with a feeling of deep satisfaction by the broad international community as further proof of the beneficial Geneva spirit for normalizing Soviet-U.S. relations. Consequently it was all the more surprising and disappointing when a government report was published in Washington -- if not simultaneously with, then at least immediately after the submission of the request for the statement's registration -- which accuses the Soviet Union of alleged violations of international agreements on limiting strategic arms and anti-missile defenses.

In this connection it is not superfluous to recall that it is precisely the United States which failed to ratify the SALT-II Treaty, that it is precisely U.S. Pershings that crossed the ocean upsetting the existing strategic balance in Europe, and that it is precisely the notorious SDI, the "star wars" program, that has led the world to the threshold of a new and even more dangerous round in the arms race. All these facts are widely known.

Yet it remains unclear why the White House had to come out with unsubstantiated attacks against the Soviet Union now when everyone is expecting from the U.S. side a specific response to the large-scale Soviet peaceful proposals concerning a moratorium on nuclear tests, freezing nuclear arsenals, and a 50 percent reduction in strategic weapons.

This question is answered by the U.S. military establishment memorandum entitled "Response to the Soviet Policy of Violations." It proposes to speed up the program for the production of Ohio-class nuclear submarines and new types of chemical weapons.

It is clear that the slanderous accusations against the USSR were needed by the United States in order to justify in the eyes of the world community its new moves to achieve military superiority, a routine step in the uncontrolled arms race it has started.

USSR's Lomeyko Cited

LD292340 Moscow Television Service in Russian 2205 GMT 29 Dec 85

[From the "Novosti" newscast]

[Text] In Moscow a press conference has been held on issues connected with the problems of disarmament and in connection with the latest TASS statement. It was held by representatives of the USSR Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense. Opening the press conference, Comrade Lomeyko, chief of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs Press Department, said in particular:

[Begin Lomeyko recording] An attempt has again been made by the U.S. side to unleash a slanderous campaign with regard to, allegedly, violations of its international obligations being committed by the Soviet Union. For this purpose an additional administration report to Congress has been compiled repeating a collection of unsubstantiated and groundless claims which have been used for a number of years now. The Soviet Union's treaty policies and its practical actions have always been and will be honest and consistent. In the time that has passed since the day of the signing of the ABM Treaty, the 1972 provisional agreement, and then, the SALT II treaty in 1979, the Soviet Union has done nothing that might contradict the provisions of these agreements and has not tried to evade them. The same applies to the other Soviet juridical and political obligations mentioned in the U.S. report, supposedly the Helsinki Final Act, the treaty on underground tests of nuclear weapons of 1974, and on nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes of 1976. And the U.S. side cannot not know of this. Moreover, it is not the United States, but the Soviet Union which has every reason to pose the question: Is it possible to trust what the U.S. side is negotiating about; are they fulfilling their obligations? [end recording]

Answering journalists' questions, the participants in the press conference stressed the importance of precise adherence to accords already reached on problems of limiting the arms race.

Press Conference Held

LD292015 Moscow TASS in English 2010 GMT 29 Dec 85

[Text] Moscow, December 29 TASS -- The U.S. Administration's "Strategic Defence Initiative" violates the ABM Treaty, Vadim Chulitskiy, chief counsellor at the USSR Foreign Ministry's Office, has declared. He spoke at a press conference held at the USSR Foreign Ministry Press Centre today in connection with a TASS statement.

It is not concealed, he said, that the system of anti-ballistic missile defences, developed by the United States within the SDI framework, is to comprise space-based elements banned by the treaty. In fact, the "star wars" programme, to implement which the American Administration is allocating billions of dollars, will cross out major provisions of the ABM treaty.

Several more examples can be cited to see the United States' attitude to treaty commitments it undertakes. In violation of the ABM Treaty, the United States is deploying a new phased-array radar station in Thule, Greenland, although the treaty allows the deployment of radars of this type and designation only on national territory. A similar radar station is also planned for deployment in Fylingdales Moor region, England.

Had the United States ratified the SALT-2 Treaty, Vadim Chulitskiy pointed out, a major reduction in the strategic offensive armaments would now be carried out. The United States started the manufacture and mass deployment of long-range ground and submarine-launched cruise missiles, is positioning ballistic and cruise missiles in Western Europe, that is, in fact, directing its actions at undermining the SALT-2 treaty and, ultimately, strategic balance between the United States and the USSR.

In response to questions put by correspondents, deputy head of a department of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces Viktor Starodubov stressed that the U.S. Administration embarked on the course towards gaining military superiority over the USSR. The course has led the United States to a conflict with treaty pledges it had to honour. The nuclear explosion in Nevada, conducted by the United States within its "star wars" programme, has become yet another violation of the treaty limiting anti-ballistic missile defence systems, Viktor Starodubov pointed out.

Terminating any nuclear explosions is a matter of extreme importance, said Vladimir Lomeyko, head of the press Department of the USSR Foreign Ministry. The Soviet Union, he said, announced a unilateral moratorium on any nuclear blasts. We proposed that the United States join the moratorium, and offered a reliable verification system. So far, the United States has negatively responded to the Soviet proposal. The Soviet Union is prepared to contribute by concrete deeds to ensuring universal peace and peoples' security. It urges the United States to do likewise.

U.S. 'Smear Campaign'

PM291747 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 30 Dec 85 First Edition p 4

["TASS Statement"]

[Text] The U.S. side has again made an attempt to unleash a slanderous campaign about alleged "violations" of its international obligations by the Soviet Union. Yet another administration "report" to Congress has been compiled for this purpose. The "report" repeats the unfounded claims which they have been trying to put into circulation for a number of years with the assistance of those who seek at all costs to interfere with any constructive agreements between the United States and the USSR on curbing the arms race, improving the international situation and achieving a turn for the better in Soviet-U.S. relations.

In the past the Soviet side expressed, in utter clarity, its evaluation of both such a line itself, which is inadmissible in relations between states, and those unscrupulous devices which are being used in the process. This was the subject of memorandum handed to the U.S. Government in January 1984, the prepresentation made by the USSR Embassy in Washington to the U.S. Department of State in February 1985, and the TASS statement of June 12.

The treaty policy of the USSR and its practical actions have always been and will be honest and consistent. Since the signing of the ABM Treaty, the interim agreement of 1972, and then, the SALT-II Treaty in 1979, the Soviet Union has done nothing to contradict the provisions of the agreements and has not tried to circumvent them. The same also applies to the USSR's other legal and political obligations mentioned in the U.S. "report", be it the Final Act of the Helsinki conference, the 1974 treaty on underground tests of nuclear weapons, the 1976 treaty on nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, or other bilateral and multilateral documents. The U.S. side cannot fail to know this. The untenability of its assertions about "Soviet violations"

was exposed at sessions of the Soviet-U.S. Standing Consultative Commission -- the body which was officially instituted to verify the observance of agreements by the sides. The U.S. representative in the commission, as was recently reported, confirmed in the U.S. Congress that the USSR meets its commitments.

Whatever stratagems of military-technical and legal casuistry Washington invents again and again in an attempt to prove that the Soviet Union allegedly does not observe the concluded agreements, there are basic, indisputable facts which are widely known and which are clearly indicative of the real state of things and of the way the sides regard the observance of the treaties and respect for international law in general. It is the USSR, and not the United States which has every ground to ask whether it is possible to trust and what the U.S. side agrees on and whether it fulfills its obligations.

In order to see that, it is enough to look at some important examples.

The 1972 ABM Treaty which was signed by the U.S. President and ratified by the U.S. Congress is of unlimited duration. It requires that the USSR and the United States not deploy ABM systems to defend the territories of their countries and not provide a base for such a defense. It also makes it binding upon the sides not to develop, test, or deploy ABM systems or components which are sea-based, air-based, space-based, or mobile land-based.

What is the U.S. side's attitude to compliance with the treaty's fundamental provisions? In direct violation of them, the U.S. Administration has instituted a program to establish an anti ballistic missile defence system for the territory of the United States and its NATO allies.

The fact that the system is to comprise banned space-based elements is not concealed. Tens of billions of dollars have been set aside for work designed, in fact, to scrap the ABM Treaty. The intention to get rid of the treaty is being covered with formal pronouncements that it, allegedly, does not ban "research" on developing a large-scale ABM system. It was announced in advance that an "interpretation" of the treaty was devised that would make it possible to turn from so-called "research" to large-scale experiments on testing the banned systems. It is known that the United States, in violation of the ABM Treaty, is deploying a new phased-array radar station in Thule, Greenland, although the treaty allows the deployment of radars of this type and designation only on the periphery of national territory. A similar radar station is also planned for deployment in the region of Fylingdales Moor, England.

Under these conditions, there is no need for explanations as to why, in retrospect, two years after proclaiming the "star wars" program, they hastily cooked up fabrications about the Soviet Union being "on the threshold" of developing an ABM system for the country's territory. It is also clear why functions that it does not have, nor ever will have, are ascribed to our radar station in the Krasnoyarsk region, why juggling and concoctions of all sorts are being used. All of this is dictated by the desire to conceal actions incompatible with the ABM Treaty.

The U.S. Administration strives to portray itself as an advocate of sorts of the SALT-II treaty, a role that does not fit Washington. It is known that if the United States had ratified the treaty, a major reduction in strategic offensive armaments would now be carried out and the way would be paved for subsequent, even greater, and more comprehensive cuts in the field. But this is precisely what they in Washington did not want. Representatives of the administration bluntly declared that the United States has

"neither legal nor moral commitments to abide by the SALT II treaty." Recognizing and consolidating strategic parity hampered a policy that is oriented toward gaining military superiority and power pressure, disorganizing the process of curbing the arms race, and aggravating the world situation and relations with the Soviet Union.

Having failed to ratify the treaty, the U.S. Administration announced only in May 1982 its intention not to undertake actions that would undermine the SALT II treaty. Actual deeds are, however, quite different. Having failed to comply with the pledge on the solution of issues included in the protocol to the SALT II treaty, the United States started the manufacture of long-range ground and sea-based cruise missiles, and began their massive deployment. It also started the deployment of its new ballistic and cruise missiles in Western Europe, aiming at the very basis of the SALT II treaty -- the strategic balance between the USSR and the United States fixed by its provisions. This is an overt violation of Article 12 of the treaty banning any circumvention.

It is far from a fortuitous coincidence that the smear campaign accusing the Soviet Union of noncompliance with the SALT II treaty has been launched around the treaty provisions which most of all hamper the implementation of new U.S. strategic program. The Soviet Union is being accused, specifically, of developing a second, new type of ICBM, although it is known that the point at issue is not the development of a new missile, but only the modernization of the existing Soviet missile RS-12. Meanwhile, a second, new type of ICBM, the Midgetman missile, is being developed at full pace in addition to the new MX missile.

Talks are currently under way between the Soviet Union and the United States on nuclear and space armaments. Their aim is to work out effective agreements directed at preventing the arms race in outer space and terminating it on earth, strengthening strategic stability, and ultimately, eliminating all nuclear weapons everywhere. An agreement to this effect was reaffirmed during the Soviet-U.S. summit meeting in Geneva in November.

The Soviet Union tabled proposals at the Geneva talks for banning space strike armaments combined with a 50-percent reduction of the corresponding nuclear armaments which determine the strategic balance between the USSR and the United States. So far, the U.S. position has been reduced to the refusal to abide by the agreement on the subject and objectives of the talks.

The United States is opposed to any measures preventing an arms race in space. Instead, it suggests the elaboration of some "rules" for conducting it; insisting on its program of developing space strike weapons, which may only result in a sharp destabilization of the strategic situation and an arms race in all directions.

The U.S. side has so far not shown its desire to achieve a real reduction in nuclear armaments either: Its proposals, advanced at the very end of the final round of the negotiations, while outwardly looking like the Soviet proposals for deep cuts, in fact open channels for an unrestricted buildup of strategic delivery vehicles and the warheads on them, and are far from being conducive to stopping the nuclear arms race in Europe.

This approach is apparently incompatible with the task of accelerating the Geneva talks, elaborating concrete decisions at them on eliminating the nuclear war menace, and improving relations between the United States and the Soviet Union.

Terminating any nuclear explosions is a question of extreme acuity and importance. To achieve that is to set in motion the process of devitalizing nuclear armaments and to fulfill the pledge stemming from Article 6 of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. The Soviet Union announced unilateral suspension of all nuclear explosions. We propose that the United States join in so as to make the moratorium on nuclear blasts reciprocal. The Soviet Union also offers a reliable verification system.

The point at issue is the observance of top priority political, legal, and moral commitments which rest on the Soviet Union and the United States as the major nuclear powers. The negative U.S. position on the issue, unless it is altered, is evidence of Washington's real approach to a problem of central importance for securing the peaceful future of mankind. This cannot be camouflaged by any fabrications concerning the Soviet Union's alleged violations of the 1974-1976 treaties on underground nuclear explosions, the treaties which the United States stubbornly refuses to ratify and which it repeatedly violates.

The program for the creation of binary chemical weapons whose implementation is incompatible with the task of taking effective measures aimed at the general and complete banning of chemical weapons and the elimination of their stockpiles is also convincing evidence of the U.S. attitude to its legal and political commitments. However, it is these measures that are demanded by peoples of all the countries and continents.

TASS is authorized to state the following:

The Soviet Union firmly comes out for the preservation of all Soviet-U.S. agreements worked out on the basis of the principle of equality and equal security, for their strict observance and implementation.

The erosion of the Anti-ballistic Missile Treaty which is of fundamental importance for the prevention of the arms race in space and the progressive development of the process of the limitation and reduction of nuclear weapons, must not be permitted. Any actions running counter to the treaty and detrimental to it must be ruled out.

The Soviet side reaffirms its attitude to the SALT II Treaty. It proceeds from the fact that the observance of the provisions of this treaty that block the quantitative growth and qualitative improvement of the most powerful armaments of the sides, would continue to play an important part in maintaining the strategic balance and ensuring favorable conditions for working out possible new agreements on the limitation and reduction of nuclear weapons.

It is necessary to take practical measures for speeding up the Soviet-U.S. talks on nuclear and space weapons in Geneva in order to start at last the preparation of resolutions ensuring in deed the prevention of an arms race in space and its discontinuation on earth.

The attainment of these goals is the urgent call of the time. A nuclear war is impermissible. There can be no victors in it. Mutual understanding on this question has been recorded on the summit level. Practical conclusions should be drawn from it.

The Soviet Union is ready to make its contribution to bringing closer together the positions of the sides on the central issues of ensuring peace and international security. It urges the United States to act in a similar way, being guided by great responsibility before all the peoples.

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CSO: 5200/1220

U.S.-USSR GENEVA TALKS

IZVESTIYA'S MATVEYEV CONTRASTS U.S., SOVIET ARMS STANCES

PM261705 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 27 Dec 85 Morning Edition p 5

[IZVESTIYA political observer V. Matveyev article: "At a Turning Point"]

[Text] The problem of security in the broad sense was at the center of the work of the Soviet-U.S. summit meeting in Geneva. In the nuclear missile age the tenet that peace is indivisible and that security cannot be sought by trying to win something for one state at the expense of other states' vital interests has a special relevance. In the seventies the USSR and the United States were able to achieve accords which both strengthened their mutual security and promoted general stability in the world. And although these were partial, limited steps, they prepared the conditions for more radical measures.

We remember V.I. Lenin's precept on disarmament as the ideal of socialism. The traditions of the struggle for this ideal have their roots in the period when the foundations of the Soviet power's foreign policy were being formed. There has never been a year when the struggle for disarmament has taken place in easy international conditions, but the very fact that this objective has never been lost from view explains why disarmament has become the key goal of world policy, both for the broad masses of the public and for many governments.

And now, for the first time, a Soviet-U.S. document enshrines the ultimate objective of the talks which have begun in Geneva between the two countries -- "the elimination of nuclear weapons entirely, everywhere." This is said in the joint Soviet-U.S. statement published after the meeting between A.A. Gromyko and G. Shultz in Geneva 7-8 January this year.

Of course, speaking of this lofty, noble goal is not enough. It is necessary to act. In this regard very great significance is attached to the Soviet proposals put forward recently at the Geneva talks. It is a question of proposals which provide for a reduction by one-half in all the nuclear arms of the USSR and the United States capable of reaching the other side's territory -- on the essential condition of a total ban on space strike arms.

Prevent the arms race in space and end it on earth. That is the clear formulation.

Achieving this means seeking radical, large-scale solutions. That is the first thing. And not having your head in the clouds, but proceeding on the basis of the real situation. That is the second thing. The concrete approach and the far-reaching, bold nature of the new Soviet proposals are their distinguishing feature.

What causes each side -- the USSR and the United States -- the greatest concern from the viewpoint of safeguarding their own security? On the U.S. side, the existing arsenal of Soviet ICBM's is elevated to the rank of "special concerns." And although the Soviet side does not consider this "concern" justified, the USSR's new proposals provide for their reduction, simultaneously with the limitation of the proportion of ICBM warheads in the overall level of nuclear charges. Our country is prepared to take major steps in this sphere.

Of course, we expect Washington to take into account the legitimate security interests and needs of the Soviet Union too. And these interests are not such as to create any insupportable problems for the United States. On the contrary, what our country seeks accords with the vital interests both of the United States and of all other states in the world.

Governments and states which have their feet firmly on the ground cannot -- have no right to -- deliberately play with the idea of nuclear war, or indeed of any war using modern armaments. Peace and security are what scientists call the imperative, the insistent demand of our times.

But this imperative is not a pie which you can divide into shares, cutting the best portions for some people and doing others out of their share. Why does this have to be said? Because in the present U.S. Administration's way of thinking and acting one can clearly perceive the tendency, the desire to safeguard their own security at the other side's expense. Given this "approach," it is quite possible that adventurist circles across the ocean could develop the desire to make use of what they consider to be their superiority in the military sphere for direct aggressive actions.

The provision enshrined in the joint Soviet-U.S. statement of 21 November in Geneva, whereby the USSR and the United States will not seek to achieve military superiority, makes it incumbent on both states to do nothing which would lead to the disruption of the existing parity and equality between them in the military sphere.

But now the U.S. Government's actions raise a question which the Soviet Union cannot ignore -- and nor can other countries -- since it is a question of something capable of touching and encroaching on the vital interests of national and international security. Whatever types of strike arms were deployed in space, which is as yet free from such types of weapons, it would mean the spread of the arms race to a new -- and limitless -- sphere, the sphere which shrouds our "blue globe."

From the time of the very first steps in the peaceful exploration of space the Soviet Union has been advocating, and still advocates, that this environment remain tightly closed against weapons. Binding international agreements exist which prohibit the introduction of arms into space. Among them is the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, signed at Moscow, Washington, and London 27 January 1967. Other states have joined it. The 1972 USSR-U.S. Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems bans the creation [sozdaniye] of ABM systems or components which are sea-based, air-based, space-based, or mobile land-based.

On 23 March 1983 President Reagan announced his decision to embark on the implementation of the so-called "strategic defense initiative" program -- the development [razrabotka] of space-based weapons, whose main element is the creation [sozdaniye] of a large-scale ABM system with space-based components.

Any article can be wrapped in an externally attractive packaging. The contents do not change. This is how matters stand with the "initiative" in question. It is because of its contents that such broad circles of scientists, politicians, and public figures in the United States and in the world as a whole are most unambiguously condemning this program. It is fraught with serious dangers for all mankind.

Attempting to neutralize the criticism of this program, people in Washington have started accusing our country of having some kind of military plans and intentions for space. This was clearly answered during the Soviet-U.S. summit meeting in Geneva: The USSR is prepared to ban strike space weapons and is prepared to open its laboratories for the purpose of monitoring the ban on the creation [sozdaniye] of such weapons. The entire history of Soviet-U.S. strategic arms limitation talks demonstrates the unbreakable link between such defensive and offensive means.

This link was not invented by anyone. It reflects an objectively existing situation. The entire history of weapons development through the centuries testifies that no sooner have any defensive means been invented and developed, than work on offensive means had been intensified.

U.S. author John Newhouse cites the following fact in his book "The Cold Dawn," devoted to the history of SALT I, in other words the first Soviet-U.S. strategic arms limitation agreements. Early in 1967 the then U.S. President L. Johnson summoned all former and present White House advisers on science and technology. Seven illustrious scientists and specialists were present. They were asked: Should the United States embark on the creation [sozdaniye] of a ramified ABM defense? The answers were unanimously negative.

What has changed since that time? The scientific and technical revolution goes on. Does this mean, however, that the overall progress of science and technology must be accompanied by new and increasingly dangerous spirals of the arms race? By its expansion in width and in height? Mankind undoubtedly deserves a better fate!

The initiators of the "star wars" program would like to convince people that it is precisely because of the destructive power of modern arms, first and foremost nuclear missiles, that they intend to launch work on ABM systems with space-based elements. These, they say, would supposedly be capable of destroying missiles before they hit their target.... Is it, however, necessary to embark on the development of the arms race in this new environment, which would mean the expenditure of additional gigantic sums, when it is possible to ensure a situation in which the actual arsenals of offensive weapons will be considerably reduced, and under the strictest of monitoring, at that! This is what the Soviet Union proposes.

That is the choice. That is the turning point at which the world community stands. Advancement toward a secure future or a slide toward the point of "no return"? Life develops in such a way that both countries--the United States and our country--will have to get used to the strategic parity attained between them as a natural condition. Our country will not allow it to be broken. This parity ensures greater security for the two states and for the rest of the world. Our country has spoken its weighty word on the matter. Now it is up to the United States.

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U.S.-USSR GENEVA TALKS

MOSCOW TV ON PROGRESS SINCE GENEVA SUMMIT MEETING

LD210057 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1545 GMT 20 Dec 85

[From "The World Today" program presented by Igor Kudrin]

[Text] It is 1 month since the completion of the summit meeting between Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, and U.S. President Ronald Reagan. A wind of hope blew from cold autumnal Geneva, and the normalization of Soviet-U.S. relations began. The preconditions were laid for an improvement in the international situation.

One month has gone by, and today one gains the impression at times that right-wing forces in the United States are trying to take a step back. It looks as if they are being placed on their guard by the possibility of trust building up and are frightened by the faith of peoples in the possibility of future agreements on disarmament. Maybe it is under pressure from these forces that the United States carried out its 15th nuclear test, although the Soviet Union, as you know, since August has no longer carried out such explosions. We are ready to go for an extension of the moratorium, if the United States joins it.

Alas, as President Reagan's representative has just stated, the U.S. Administration intends to carry on with its nuclear tests. By what are such statements motivated? By the fact that, ostensibly, only thus can the United States secure the preservation of the efficiency and reliability of its nuclear potential. At the same time the Pentagon is increasing its orders to contractors; new aircraft, submarines, and missiles are rolling off the conveyors. Battle tests of the Pershing II medium-range missile have just been carried out. Incidentally, at the end of this year, 108 missiles of this type will have been installed [ustanovleno] in West Europe out of an overall sited number [razmeshchennye] of 236, while all in all the Pentagon plans to site [rasmestit] 572 of them in Europe.

And what a tumultuous campaign in defense of the Strategic Defense Initiative has recently developed in the same United States, Britain, and the FRG. And besides, it is being asserted that allegedly the

Soviet Union is engaged in casting slurs on the ominous star wars program and is distorting its imaginary peace-loving meaning. This is being done, it is said, by the Soviet Union with the aim of deceiving and misleading the naive and innocent Western inhabitants. All of this does not conform to the spirit of Geneva, and this is what is interesting: the buildup of the arms race, the testing of nuclear weapons, the attraction of more and more allies to the star wars program is being served up under the guise of a striving for peace.

Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev replied well to this the day before yesterday; here are his words: A peace based on deterrence by means of nuclear weapons is precarious. [Video shows U.S. television video of test site, B-52 taking off, cruise missile being launched, map of Europe with cruise and Pershing missiles superimposed]

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U.S.-USSR GENEVA TALKS

USSR'S PONOMAREV VIEWS SUMMIT AT PARTY CONFERENCE IN VILNIUS

PM291830 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 29 Dec 85 First Edition p 2

[TASS report: "Duty Decrees"]

[Excerpt] Vilnius, 28 Dec--The questions of war and peace are of particularly great importance in our time, B.N. Ponomarev went on to say. The Soviet Union is conducting a gigantic battle for peace which is of world historic importance. The USSR is combining a firm rebuff to the course of wrecking military-strategic equilibrium with a balanced and constructive approach to the most acute problems of peace and security and the putting forward of a far-reaching and specific peace-loving program. The Soviet leadership came to the Geneva summit with that program. The summit was a major political event in international life and opens up an opportunity for moving away from the state of dangerous confrontation toward a constructive quest for ways of maintaining correct relations between our countries and for improving the international climate as a whole.

The mutual agreement reached at Geneva and expressed in the final document--that nuclear war must never be unleashed and that there can be no winners in one--is extremely important. It was put on record that the task of the Soviet-U.S. talks on nuclear and space arms includes the prevention of an arms race in space, a reduction in nuclear arms, and the strengthening of strategic stability.

In positively assessing the Geneva summit, it must not be forgotten that, by dint of the position assumed by the U.S. side, it did not answer the main question concerning all people on the planet: Will there be real movement along the road of reducing nuclear weapons, or will the prospects for ending the arms race be overturned by the militarization of space?

Taking all these facts into account, the Soviet Union and peace-loving forces abroad are launching a struggle to implement the key demands: for "star peace" and against "star wars" and the spreading of the arms race to space; for the prohibition of nuclear tests; for the removal of chemical weapons from military arsenals; for the reduction and removal

of U.S. medium-range missiles from West Europe. The authoritative demand of millions of people addressed to the U.S. Administration is ringing around the globe: Stop nuclear weapons tests! Since Geneva the USSR's readiness to extend the moratorium on nuclear explosions if the United States reciprocates has been reaffirmed. The Soviet Union is showing readiness in practice to travel its part of the way toward achieving reliable mutual security and peaceful coexistence.

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U.S.-USSR GENEVA TALKS

USSR WEEKLY WEIGHS GENEVA SUMMIT PLUSES, MINUSES

PM231708 Moscow NEW TIMES in English No 50, Dec 85 pp 3-5

[Article by Vladlen Kuznetsov: "After Geneva--What?"]

[Text] The year 1985 is nearing its end. It began, it will be remembered, with the understanding reached between the Soviet Union and the United States in January on the need to prevent an arms race in outer space and to terminate it on earth, which became the subject of the Geneva talks, and is ending with the confirmation of this understanding of fundamental importance as a result of the meeting between Mikhail Gorbachev and Ronald Reagan. It has been a year of momentous landmarks: the April plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, which launched a vigorous peace offensive all along the line; the comprehensive proposals advanced by the Soviet Union to bar the way to the arms buildup on earth and in outer space; the meetings of the top leaders of the socialist countries in Warsaw, Sofia and Prague which reflected their determination to work together with redoubled energy for a positive turn in European and world affairs; the visit of the CPSU General Secretary to Paris, and, lastly, the Soviet-American summit in Geneva. As a result, the world's political horizons cleared somewhat at the close of the year. It would seem that the further deterioration of the world situation, the escalation of international tension, has now been prevented, that new openings have appeared for transition to a new stage--that of constructive change in East-West relations in general and Soviet-American relations in particular. Hopes have arisen that detente, to which funeral dirges have so often been sung, will recover from its protracted malady and regain its vigour. But openings remain mere openings if they are not made use of, if they are not translated into the language of practical state policies, inter-state understandings and agreements. The more auspicious climate that has emerged in the world will soon be dispelled if it is not used to consolidate positive advances.

At the same time, the encouraging results of the year by no means justify any relaxation of effort. The progress that has been made towards a less dangerous and less confrontation-ridden world has literally been wrested from the opponents of detente and disarmament. Now too, when the Geneva meeting is barely over, a fierce political struggle over its outcome has developed both in the United States and in the international arena.

A struggle between those who realize the dangers with which the further growth of tension and acceleration of the arms race would be fraught and those who want no change for the better, those for whom the arms buildup is a source of lush profits. The peace-loving countries have every reason to remain on their guard, to display vigilance in the face of the intrigues of the enemies of peace. In his report to the recent session of the U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet, Mikhail Gorbachev stressed that the Warsaw Treaty states will under no circumstances sacrifice the security interests of their peoples and will do everything in their power to prevent the forces of militarism and aggression from gaining the upper hand.

What was the outcome of the Geneva meeting? What was its significance for the Soviet Union and the United States, for Europe, and for the whole world? The first answers to these questions have already been given, and further developments will provide more.

The results of the Geneva meeting have been summed up by its participants. Despite all the differences and nuances in their evaluations, they are seen on the whole as positive and promising, and holding out opportunities for further progress. The allies of the two powers whose top leaders spoke at the summit not only on behalf of their own countries have voiced their views in Prague and Brussels. The partners of the USSR and the United States agree that the meeting was necessary and useful from the standpoint of East-West relations today and tomorrow. Lastly, the pluses and minuses of the summit have been examined through the prism of public opinion in the Soviet Union, the United States and other countries, and commented on by the mass media. If the full range of assessments and opinions is weighed the common denominator will doubtless be seen to be satisfaction. Satisfaction with the fact that the Geneva meeting played a useful role in Soviet-American relations, on which the state of international affairs in general depends. Satisfaction with the fact that the outcome of the meeting was a service to world peace.

It would be wrong to take a maximalist approach to the evaluation of the Geneva meeting. The results are too multifaceted and complex to be measured by simplistic black-and-white yardsticks. They reflect the full complexity and contradictoriness of the period we live in. Its dialectics of cooperation and confrontation, of detente and anti-detente, of antagonism and good-neighbourship, the fluidity and dynamics of the world today. Only by these criteria can we duly, realistically assess the outcome of the Geneva meeting without minimizing what was achieved and at the same time without engaging in wishful thinking, without falling into euphoria.

The dialogue failed to produce solutions for the cardinal question relating to the termination of the arms race and the strengthening of peace. As hitherto, the USSR and the United States hold widely differing views on fundamental issues. There were no fewer missiles and armaments in general after the meeting than there had been before it. The President was unwilling to endorse the treaties on the limitation of strategic armaments and anti-missile defence.

This was of course an obvious minus. But there were also pluses. And significant ones. The USSR and the United States went on record that:

--a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought;

--preventing any war between them, whether nuclear or conventional, is of utmost importance;

--they will not seek to achieve military superiority.

The USSR, incidentally, has gone farther than that, undertaking in the United Nations the unilateral commitment to renounce first use of nuclear weapons. But even what the Reagan Administration agreed to in the joint Soviet-American statement was of no little importance, especially considering that it is precisely during its term of office that a number of strategic doctrines and concepts which by no stretch of the imagination can be called peaceable or defensive made their appearance.

As we know, it is a long and difficult road from initial premises to the final logical conclusions. And even more so to practical solutions. But the first steps were taken in Geneva, and it is to be hoped that Washington will not confine itself only to them.

Further, Moscow and Washington declared for speedy progress at the talks on nuclear and space weapons, proceeding from the points of contact that have been ascertained (the principle of a 50 percent reduction of nuclear weapons and the idea of an interim agreement on medium-range missiles in Europe). The experts are to study the question of centers to reduce nuclear risk. Commitment to the regime of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons was reaffirmed and it was agreed to tackle non-proliferation of chemical weapons in depth. All these are pluses which can be entered on the credit side of the balance sheet of the efforts of the international community to reduce the danger of war.

Thus, the solution of the main problem--that of preventing a nuclear war and checking the arms race--was hardly made easier. But the conditions for resolving that problem no doubt became to some extent more favourable as a result of the Geneva meeting.

The U.S. Administration, as was revealed at the Geneva meeting, was not prepared to conclude an arms reduction agreement. It was unprepared to do so morally, psychologically and politically.

Before his meeting with the Soviet leader, the U.S. President spoke of his readiness for a fresh start in relations with the USSR. It seemed as if, after several years of antagonism, he had really taken a position promising not only a good beginning but also a successful finish.

The President said that nuclear war must not be started and that in it there can be no victor.

Further he said that his country could not assume that the ideology and purpose of the Soviet Union will change.

A realistic, rational and hence successful policy could be built on these postulates. At any rate a policy that could count on understanding and reciprocity on the part of a state belonging to another socio-economic orientation. The trouble, however, is that Washington does not go beyond these statements. It lays down a premise but in no way wishes to make the logical inference. It admits that war is unnecessary, but it does not want to renounce all that leads to war--the arms buildup, aggressive concepts and doctrines, attempts to achieve military superiority. At the face of it, it does not question the right of a different system to exist, but it does not propose to disavow the ideology and practice of "crusades" (true, this odious term has latterly almost disappeared from official terminology). It charts a correct course, but insists on marking time or proceeding in the opposite direction.

The Soviet Union has learned in the course of association with representatives of the opposite social system how difficult it is for some Western leaders to accept political realism. True, the U.S. Administration does evince some elements of a sober view of the present situation and the nature of the relations of the two worlds. The Soviet Union welcomes this and hopes that what has been started will be carried forward.

This hope is not unfounded. For the present situation is objectively conducive not to militarist flights of fancy but to realization of the grim realities, to the conclusion that it is better to live together than to die together. The Soviet Union and its allies will not give way to positions-of-strength policies, will not alter their behavior to suit the votaries of such policies. They propose to the United States and its NATO partners that relations be built on positions of reason. World public opinion, including public opinion in countries allied with the United States, demands that Washington bring its policy in line with the imperatives of the nuclear and space age. And in America itself the situation is not such as would warrant a headling arms drive without any regard for the consequences involved. Inordinate military spending has led to a formidable budget deficit (the biggest in U.S. history), and this in turn leads to the growth of the already enormous federal debt. All this is fraught with financial, economic, and social strains.

Such are the objective factors of our time, which responsible politicians cannot ignore if they do not wish to be left behind the dynamically developing reality. But will the White House be able to correct its voluntarist, imperial, hegemonistic concept of the United States' role in the modern world and of how to deal with its socialist part?

The unwillingness of the U.S. leadership to renounce the "star wars" programme prevented concrete agreements on actual disarmament, and primarily on the key problem of nuclear and space armaments, from being achieved in Geneva. This has discredited SDI still more in the eyes of world opinion. The debates over this project by no means redound to the advantage of its architects. This is causing serious concern in Washington.

People everywhere in the world are weary of living in constant fear of the nuclear threat and wish to get rid of it. In view of this it has been decided to whitewash the militarist SDI and give it a peaceable facade by cultivating totally unfounded illusions.

Illusion 1. Only by means of SDI, it is claimed, can there be 100 percent security. However, serious-minded military experts and competent scientists hold, on the contrary, that an impenetrable umbrella or shield is a technological impossibility, a utopia. Just as it is impossible to create the absolute nuclear weapon, so can there be no absolute defence against it. And what kind of security would it be if innumerable missiles and anti-missiles were to fill outer space overhead in addition to the earth's surface being saturated with weaponry? Is it not clear that the world will be 100 percent safe only if there is general and complete disarmament?

Illusion 2. It is claimed that SDI alone can ensure the invulnerability of the Western world. That once Washington has covered them with its miracle shield, not a single hair will fall from a single head in the NATO countries. Without SDI the Western world will supposedly not be able to protect itself. But, it may be asked, has the present Pentagon "nuclear umbrella" made Western Europe any more secure? It appears that the present level of security in no way satisfies broad political and public quarters, which realize the deadly danger contained in the U.S. strategy of "limited" nuclear war in Europe under the present "nuclear umbrella" and with the use of the first-strike potential represented by the Pershing 2 and cruise missiles. What would the American anti-missile "umbrella" hold in store for them? Even Atlanticists and pro-Atlanticists in Western Europe make no secret of their fears that if SDI is realized, the Western part of the continent would become a zone of "lowered" security.

Illusion 3. The advocates of SDI argue that it would pave the way to total nuclear disarmament, make nuclear missiles "powerless and obsolete," and help to abolish them. But why choose such a roundabout method? Why must outer space be militarized in order to demilitarize the earth's surface? It is absurd to create new missiles in order supposedly to do away with the old ones. It is irrational to develop a new class of the most dangerous types of weapons--space strike weapons--for the sake of abolishing earth-based missiles. The way to rid the planet of the danger hanging over it is not to create new weapons, but to do away with the old ones.

Illusion 4. Realization of SDI, its advocates claim, would be an unprecedented step forward in technology which would lead humanity to the summits of progress and prosperity and be a universal blessing. Needless to say, non-military technology too might gain something from the development of military technology. But what price would humanity have to pay for this? And what need has it for a "blessing" that could be accompanied by war on earth and in outer space? Why this handout from a cosmic Mars when human genius is capable of ensuring abundance of the

good things of life for all without the militarization of science and the economy? The states have at their disposal a sufficient number of peaceful projects--take if only the harnessing of thermonuclear synthesis--by means of which a great many major problems can be resolved. The Soviet Union is against a contest in military technology in which a technological leap forward could be also a leap into the nuclear abyss. It stands for peaceful technological competition and cooperation.

The recent session of the USSR Supreme Soviet emphasized the absolute necessity of preventing weapons from spilling over into outer space. Unless this is done, radical reductions of nuclear armaments will be impossible. American and some West European quarters complain about the uncompromising rigidity of such a position.

There are different kinds of compromises. The Soviet Union is for reasonable compromises which benefit both sides and also the rest of the world. But there are also unreasonable, fallacious compromises that damage the interests of all. To agree to SDI would be to enter into the latter kind of compromise. There is no room for compromise when it is a matter of whether there are to be weapons in space or not.

This is all the more true since Geneva, as many in the West admit, confirmed that SDI is the main threat to peace and security, the main obstacle to agreement on nuclear and space weapons. Blind, obsessive adherence to the "star wars" programme threatens to perpetuate the arms race and bury all hope of its ever ending. In an article in the NEW YORK TIMES William Safire compared this obsession with the "inexplicable attachment" of the family hound to the smelly bone it keeps on dropping at its master's feet.

This piece of irony suffers from one inaccuracy. The attachment in this case is explicable. If the United States can develop an effective system that would make Soviet weaponry ineffective, Caspar Weinberger has said, it will be able to return to the situation when it was the only country possessing nuclear weapons. The whole purport of the sinister design is capsuled in these words spoken by the Pentagon chief. The idea is so obvious that it embarrasses even supporters of SDI. British Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Malcolm Rifkind, for instance, says that although the system is defensive, universal disquiet is caused by the fact that having ensured your invulnerability and believing that not a single missile will get through to your territory you might try to do something else.

Even the U.S. President has had to acknowledge that the much-vaunted space "shield," if the offensive potential is retained, could theoretically provide the basis for a first strike. This is exactly what the Soviet Union is tirelessly warning against. Let the word "theoretically" mislead no one. "Theoreticians" are fully capable of becoming practitioners if they think the moment is opportune.

Some people cannot understand why is it that the U.S. President from time to time offers to exchange SDI technology with even those whom he regards as "potential adversaries." Is this altruism? Nothing of the kind. It is simply a matter of camouflaging the aggressive essence of SDI and the possibility of dealing a first strike.

Does all this mean that the fundamental differences between the USSR and the United States in regard to the "star wars" programme are a virtually insuperable obstacle at the Geneva talks on nuclear and space armaments, as the London SUNDAY TELEGRAPH, for instance, believes? No. But the authors of this programme, if they wish to find a common language with Moscow, will have to resist the temptation to gain the upper hand over the USSR in the space race. It is not a matter of saving face, of prestige. Renunciation of an irrational project condemned the world over would only enhance U.S. prestige. It is hardly likely that anyone in the United States, with the exception perhaps of a few hawks, regrets the "withdrawal from Vietnam." And intervention in outer space is fraught with far more deplorable consequences.

The hotheads behind SDI would do well to soberly consider all the consequences of the undertaking. And not think that they have said the last word.

The post-Geneva pause for reflection has its limits. The time is coming when the answers will have to be given to the questions raised, the time to decide and act. The timetable for international talks is pressing.

The Soviet moratorium on all types of nuclear tests will be effective until 1 January 1986. It could of course be prolonged if Washington responds in kind. So far it is silent, just as it was in Geneva, where it evaded the direct question. The world will still have to wait a while to learn what the United States has opted for, whether it will respond to the Soviet Union's call and put an end to the development of new types of nuclear weapons and the modernization of existing ones, or whether it will turn down the opportunity offered and shoulder the responsibility for the continuation of nuclear explosions.

The Geneva talks will be resumed in January. At the summit meeting it was decided to speed them up. How will the U.S. delegation behave? So far it has tried to evade the understanding that questions relating to nuclear and space weapons will be examined as a single entity and to leave aside SDI. This understanding was confirmed at the summit and recorded in the joint statement.

It is at the Geneva talks that most of the work outlined by the Soviet and American leaders is to be carried out. The machinery of the talks should not be allowed to stall. But if one side oils this machinery and the other side spills sand into it there will be no progress. If one side seeks fair and mutually acceptable agreement and the other tries, as has already been the case, to turn the talks into a cover-up

for the continuation of militarist preparations on earth and in outer space, the expectations of the peoples will be disappointed.

The peoples want to see practical headway made along the lines charted in Geneva, be it a matter of observance of the non-proliferation regime, banning chemical weapons, the productive completion of the Stockholm conference without delay, or progress at the Vienna talks on the mutual reduction of armed forces and armaments in Central Europe.

The results of the Geneva summit are projected to the future. The future alone will fully reveal the place and the significance of the meeting of present-day international relations, and the extent of its influence on Soviet-American, European, and world affairs. The understandings reached as well as those projected will have to pass the test of time, of practice.

The Soviet leader, giving an optimistic appraisal of what was achieved in Geneva, voiced the hope that the important statements made by the American side would be confirmed by deeds. On his part, the U.S. President said that genuine trust in one another must be based not simply on words, but on deeds.

Both sides thus attach particular importance to the realization of the understandings, which were reached with no little difficulty. And this is what the rest of the world expects of the USSR and the United States. It expects that the spirit of Geneva will not be allowed to disappear, that it will be materialized. A good deal was done in Geneva. But this is only the beginning, the first step on a long and difficult road. And so the main work is still ahead.

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U.S.-USSR GENEVA TALKS

MOSCOW TV EXAMINES AMERICANS' VIEWS OF SUMMIT, STAR WARS

LD072037 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1530 GMT 7 Dec 85

[Video report by V. Dunayev from Washington; from the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] How do the Americans view the results of the summit-level meeting in Geneva? Our Washington correspondent reports: Statistical polls confirm that the overwhelming majority of Americans--seven in every eight--are in favor of an end to the arms race; only one in eight is in favor of the nuclear arsenal, so to speak, continuing to grow. But what attitude does the elite, in the business world, in the world of politics, the American elite, what attitude does it have toward Geneva? That has also become clear enough.

Realistically-minded people in the ruling circles, those who form policy, definitely have formed their view of Geneva: they feel that an about-face must begin, a new detente, so to speak, must begin in relations between the Soviet Union and the United States. But, as for the reactionary right-wing circles, a star complex, as it has been dubbed by American newspapers here, a branch of the military-industrial complex, has begun to speak at the top of its voice here now, before Geneva, during Geneva, and particularly now.

High-ranking people in the Pentagon are donning other hats as governors of various corporations. A thousand deals now have already been struck: 1,000 contracts have been signed between the Pentagon and various corporations, Boeing, Lockheed, General Dynamics, and others, for the manufacture of weapons for Star Wars, for the militarization of space. It has been calculated that in coming years alone, to start, the corporations will receive \$69 billion from the Pentagon for the militarization of space. This is the kind of star abcess [zvezdnyy flyus] that has formed on the face of the American capital.

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CSO: 5200/1220

U.S.-USSR GENEVA TALKS

TASS CRITICIZES DANISH DEFENSE MINISTER'S INTERVIEW

LD271717 Moscow TASS in English 1658 GMT 27 Dec 85

[" 'Christmas Message' by General Engell" -- TASS headline]

[Text] Moscow, December 27 TASS -- TASS news analyst Leonid Ponomarev writes:

The custom is that it is usual to speak of something pleasant during Christmas holidays, putting off everyday concerns for several days. Warring sides used to cease hostilities. However, the bellicose attitude of mind does not leave Hans Engell, Danish minister of defence, on these Christmas days either. As the future chairman of NATO's Eurogroup for 1986, he has stated in an interview with the newspaper BERLINGSKE TIDENDE that main attention under his leadership would be given to a "European contribution to NATO defence." The word "defence" in the vocabulary of the NATO generals means a speeded-up build-up of the military might of the North Atlantic block and the attainment of superiority over socialist countries.

It would seem, the Danish general did not say anything new in this respect. Yes, this is so. NATO mentality apparently remains at the same level, although the spirit of the times after the Geneva summit is changing. One could expect that hot heads would take into account the fact that the summit has been regarded around the world as a big political event in international life, creating opportunities for a transition from the state of dangerous confrontation to a constructive search for an improvement of the international situation as a whole. And what do we see? NATO leaders, while expressing compliments on the Geneva summit, practically continue the policy of confrontation and, besides, raise it to the so-called "space level", i.e. are launching preparations, with the Pentagon at the head, for "star wars".

The question of what kind of Europe should there be has been put very keenly: Either a peaceful one, as has been the case for forty years now, or it will turn into something that even scientists themselves have a vague idea now. Ignoring the unpredictable dangers of a nuclear conflict, the new chairman of NATO's Eurogroup is again advocating an endless arms race and is in favor of West European countries' coming down with money for space militarisation jointly with Washington within the framework of the "Strategic Defence Initiative" (SDI) program.

There is no doubt that these actions and statements do not square with the accords in Geneva while the stands of the Governments of Britain and the FRG on participation in the U.S. "star wars" program are in point of fact diametrically opposite to the mutual understanding reached in Geneva.

An overwhelming majority of West Europeans come out against U.S. nuclear weapons -- "Pershing-2" and cruise missiles -- on their soil, and against participation in "star wars". Last Thursday, for example, more than five thousand demonstrators gathered outside a U.S. base in Holland where nuclear weapons are stationed. The demonstrators demanded that the weapons be removed from their soil. That was this year's tenth vigorous demonstration in the Netherlands against U.S. nuclear plans.

Europe is not just a geographic notion but is our common home. And if some of its occupants strive to live in peace with one another in a goodneighbourly way, while others are preparing for "star wars", such a home resembles a powder keg rather than a home. This is what General Engell should turn over in his mind on these Christmas days.

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CSO: 5200/1220

U.S.-USSR GENEVA TALKS

NEGATIVE U.S. ATTITUDE ON ARMS CONTROL CRITICIZED BY BULGARIA

Soviet Goals Supported

Sofia NARODNA ARMIYA in Bulgarian 18 Oct 85 p 4

[Article by Col Georgi Atanasov: "The Sick Logic of Washington"]

[Text] One month remains until the meeting of M. Gorbachev and R. Reagan in Geneva. Undoubtedly the world community expects much from this meeting. But the closer the date comes, the more people are asking: what will this give the world?

The Soviet Union has again demonstrated that it has not limited itself to appeals for peace and declarations and that the foreign political initiatives made have a concrete, practical and tangible nature and are permeated by a sincere desire for a fundamental change in international development which would be aimed at peaceful coexistence and detente. Precisely this is how the Soviet initiatives were assessed when they were announced during the visit of M. Gorbachev to France. The Soviet leader turned to the U.S. government with a proposal to agree on the complete banning by the two sides of space assault weapons and a 50-percent reduction in the nuclear weapons capable of reaching the territories of the two countries.

In essence this proposal contained a practical solution to those tasks which at the outset of the year were agreed upon between the two countries on the question of the aims of the Geneva talks: not only to halt the arms race but also to sharply reduce their level and at the same time prevent the militarizing of space. Also highly regarded was the readiness voiced by the Soviet Union to sign a separate agreement concerning medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe as well as the decision of the USSR to unilaterally reduce the number of SS-20 missiles in the European zone.

Yet what are the "arguments" of Washington, if it can be so expressed. For the reader they are not new and the White House hurried to announce its own "counterproposals," in stating that, as one could see, the Soviet initiatives were of an "extremely general nature." Certainly, for any well-intended person this answer is of an unserious nature. American observers themselves have pointed out that the Washington administration at present has fallen into

its own propaganda trap as the U.S. president himself has posed the condition for a serious dialogue on the questions of limiting the arms race.

At present, when everyone has seen that a concrete step has been taken in this direction, the president is put in a difficult position as he is expected to make an adequate response to the Soviet initiative. But at the White House, this obviously is in no way required as such a response would not "fit" within the framework of the policy conducted by the present U.S. leaders. This has been the case previously: until things reach specific questions, the administration in the form of all its representatives, responds negatively.

As always, at present the position of Washington does not conform with public opinion. Again the White House has taken pains to fabricate all sorts of opinions. Its representatives have organized daily press conferences and interviews and have made speeches to "prove" that the Soviet proposals are "unbalanced" and that they do not provide a basis for future agreements and are essentially unusable. Even the American president himself has cynically stated that the U.S. space program is not a "barter chip." Calculations have been made to show that if the Soviet initiatives are accepted, the USSR will "maintain a substantial superiority" in nuclear weapons.

What are the figures in question? According to Washington, there are not 509 American heavy bombers but rather 263, while there are not 150 Soviet ones but rather 480. The same thing holds true for the intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) and the submarine-launched ballistic missiles. According to American estimates, they are, respectively, 1,893 for the United States and 2,832 for the Soviet Union, and not the actual 2,210 and 2,504. Also known is the number of nuclear warheads for the American arsenal. They surpass the Soviet arsenal by several thousand.

Virtually everything is clear. At present, the American political and military leaders are "taking trouble" to present unconscientious "estimates"; they are striving to play down their own weapons and to increase those of their partner. This lie also has another purpose, that is, they are endeavoring to create the impression, don't you see, that with a reduction under the Soviet plan the nations will be in a imbalanced situation and that the "blame" for this is that in the U.S. nuclear arsenal which is to be reduced they are to count the American forward-based weapons in Europe and Asia and the American medium-range missiles deployed in Western Europe. After the 50-percent reduction the United States would have "only" 1,680 carriers, the American leaders mourn, and if this is the case they subtract from the designated number the quantity of forward-based weapons and medium-range missiles, then the so-called strategic triad (ICBM, nuclear submarines and heavy bombers) will have only 531 units.

This means, according to American estimates, that they will be forced to cut back more than 50 percent more than the Soviet strategic forces. In this context the question arises: why does the United States need to "keep inviolate" its forward-based weapons and medium-range missiles and reduce only the elements of the "strategic triad"? Does the Soviet proposal oblige them to do this? No, it certainly does not. Only those weapons, according to the proposals, which can reach Soviet territory are to be cut back. Naturally,

this is within the competence of the U.S. administration. Hence, the "arguments" in favor of "major reductions" in the American strategic "triad" are clearly spurious.

But the proposal of the Soviet side is perfectly clear. The proposal is to include precisely those carriers of American nuclear weapons which reach Soviet territory as well as those of the Soviet side which reach American territory. Hence the American weapons such as the Pershing-2 missiles and cruise missiles deployed in immediate proximity to the USSR as well as the sea-based and the airborne nuclear weapons systems are directly related to the strategic equilibrium. At the same time it is perfectly clear that the Soviet SS-20 missiles do not reach U.S. territory and cannot be considered strategic vis-a-vis the United States.

Bewildered in a "maze" of figures, the American side has endeavored to proceed from the main point that Soviet territory is under a dual threat, from the strategic "triad" as well as from the American forward-based weapons and medium-range missiles. But in talks American leaders themselves have been forced to admit that if, as a result of the U.S. cut-backs, the United States will have 1,680 carriers which can reach Soviet territory and, as the USSR has stated, in this event it would be ready to keep 1,250 carriers, that is, the Soviet Union agrees to a certain "superiority" in the number of carriers in favor of the United States. However, the number of nuclear warheads on these carriers, according to the Soviet proposal, must be the same for the two sides, 600 units each, and that is the main point. Furthermore, the Soviet proposal envisages that none of the elements in the strategic "triad" should have more than 60 percent of the total number of nuclear warheads.

Naturally, Washington does not wish to reduce either the strategic "triad," the forward-based weapons or the medium-range missiles. And any talk that there has been a desire to reduce nuclear missiles goes over with a thud.

Similar is American logic on the full banning of space weapons. In the opinion of Washington, this ban "represents a serious obstacle preventing progress in Geneva and the Soviet Union should abandon it." Truly sick logic. According to the White House, the spread of the arms race into space "should help" to check the arms race?! Repeatedly the Soviet Union has stated on a most authoritative level that the shifting of the arms race into space will make a curtailment of the nuclear arsenals objectively impossible.

But while this is apparent to any person of common sense, in the leading circles of Washington they continue to reason in the usual manner. They would like and are working for the Soviet Union unilaterally and sharply to reduce its strategic nuclear weapons and cut back on medium-range weapons. Naturally, this is an absurd position which is aimed at achieving unilateral military superiority over the Soviet Union by the United States. But this is a pure illusion. The Soviet Union, whenever forced, has always found the ways and means to take the necessary measures to ensure its security and the security of its allies.

In our disturbing days, as never before, the need is felt for more active interaction among state, governmental and political leaders. The example of

the Soviet Union and France shows that such interactions are possible as long as the two sides, regardless of belonging to opposite military-political groupings, have a good deal in common in the approach to solving a number of acute problems and situations existing in the world. This example is also applicable to the forthcoming summit meeting between M. Gorbachev and R. Reagan. However, the question is whether the American president will view things realistically and will show a constructive approach?

Lack of New U.S. Ideas Decried

Sofia OTECHESTVEN FRONT in Bulgarian 18 Oct 85 p 5

[Article by Krasimir Drumev: "An Old Approach to New Ideas"]

[Text] The White House is feeling pressed to the wall by the new Soviet proposals. Everyone realizes when they were made, when the American rearming program was in full swing. Over the last 4 years, a trillion dollars have been spent on this and recently, even after the Moscow draft was already lying on the table of the Geneva talks, the American Secretary of Defense Weinberger announced that another thousand billion dollars would be spent. All of this has been accompanied by fine talk about the necessity of disarmament, but the United States has so far not done anything concrete. The only concrete thing has been the so-called "Strategic Defense Initiative" as the ambition to wage "star wars" has been "eloquently" called.

And then, precisely in such a situation, Mikhail Gorbachev announced the Soviet proposals. It was a question of radical measures and these were proposed by the Soviet leader in a speech before the French Assembly with additional light being shed at a press conference in Paris, so that the White House would be unable to throw up a vacuum of silence around them. The information quickly was flashed around the world and the public also quickly realized the global importance of the draft.

Washington saw difficulties in another area, it had to take care to call the initiatives "propaganda" as had been done with other Soviet proposals. Let us recall that in an interview with the magazine TIME (and this interview was republished in virtually all the major newspapers in the world), Comrade Gorbachev not without irony proposed that the White House act according to the principle of "an eye for an eye" [text unclear] and let the United States make similar "propaganda" through concrete, business-like disarmament proposals. Then the United States took up another approach calling the Soviet draft interesting and worthy of serious study and that it could be the start of a beneficial process. This was the first response and it could not be perceived by people other than with satisfaction and with the hope that things would now move toward the better.

However, after several days other notes began to sound louder. Max Kampelman, the leader of the American delegation to the talks in Geneva stated: "We will reach an agreement when it is in the interests of the United States to reach it." Just how should these words be interpreted, that up to now there was no interest? In the FRG there appeared a second person from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the State Secretary Staffenhausen. He complained that the

USSR was seeking to drive a wedge between the United States and its Western European allies. Leading English politicians added that the proposals were unacceptable in their present form, but without bothering to explain what bothered them. At a press conference at the White House, it was asserted that key elements from the Moscow draft were not subject to control although in the TIME interview Mikhail Gorbachev has said that with present modern equipment it was possible to photograph even motor vehicle license plates from outer space. The United States certainly knows this.

Still the basic argument from Washington can be formulated thus: the Soviet Union is seeking to obtain ultimately superiority. The toying with figures had already been taken up, that is, who possesses how many weapons. In this game the Americans have great experience as they have been playing it for more than 20 years at the Vienna talks for reducing troops and weapons in Central Europe and have stymied them. It is true that for the ICBM, the submarine-launched ballistic missiles and heavy bombers taken together, the USSR -- United States relationship is 2,504 to 2,210. However, the United States has several thousand more nuclear warheads. And now, when this is already known to the non-specialist, one missile, for example, can carry not one but several warheads each of which is independently targetable and the effect is precisely as if several missiles had been fired and not one...."

In the West there have also been arguments over what a strategic weapon essentially means, in other words, how can they be reduced by 50 percent? The arguments are for consumption by the broad public while it is quite clear for the specialists. Strategic weapons are those which can cause total destruction on enemy territory, wipe out its most important military installations and centers of leadership, and cause enormous casualties among the population. Several years ago the only strategic weapons were the ICBM, the submarine-fired nuclear missiles and heavy bombers carrying nuclear weapons. But then things changed with the 1979 NATO decision to deploy the Pershing-2 medium-range American nuclear missiles and cruise missiles in Western Europe. For the Soviet Union, these are strategic weapons for the simple fact that the effect from their use is the same as with the "strategic triad." Let us leave aside the fact that their time of flight is significantly shorter and hence the danger is increased.

In the West, they are presently rolling out the old "argument" which was repeatedly refuted by NATO specialists, that is, these were weapons to "offset" the Soviet SS-20 missiles. An equilibrium in Europe did exist, and this was repeatedly and convincingly evidenced, before the Pershing-2 and cruise missiles were deployed. In 1961, the young then military expert Helmut Schmidt who was later to become the FRG Federal Chancellor cautioned that the deploying of medium-range weapons in Western Europe would represent "an emphatically aggressive provocation against the Soviet leadership." In this instance, however, we are interested in something else, namely, should the Pershing-2 and cruise missiles be compared with the SS-20 in the strategic equation? These Soviet weapons cannot reach U.S. territory. Here the geographic factor has its say.

Thus, the White House does not want to consider the Pershing-2 and cruise missiles as strategic and at the same time complains that if they reduce only

the strategic "triad" of the ICBM, the submarine-launched nuclear missiles and heavy bombers, the Soviet Union will gain superiority. Against this lack of logic which is comprehensible even to a non-specialist, Moscow, according to information from TASS, has aimed its last draft, namely as a result of cut-backs the United States is to have 1,680 carriers which can reach Soviet territory while the USSR is ready to keep only 1,250 carriers. However, the number of nuclear warheads on these carriers must be the same, 6,000 for each side. Such an equilibrium, as has already been mentioned, is very important because precisely the number of warheads forms primarily the combat might of each state.

Scarcely anyone would deny that the problem of disarmament is extremely complex and things here cannot be settled in a day. There are different weapons systems which are part of the equation of equilibrium and one will have to work, to put it figuratively, with a calculator in order to reduce the level of the mountain of weapons without harming the security of either of the two sides. However, if this is not done at present the problem will become more and more complex. Because the arms race in the future will represent not only more systems but also the most diverse ones which are hard to compare in characteristics. A true jungle will be created and it will be very hard to escape from it.

The "jungle" certainly will be dense if the militarizing of near space is started. The United States continues to close its ears to the urgent Soviet appeals for both nuclear forces to fully ban space weapons. Recently President Reagan again announced that his "space shield" would not be a "bartering chip." Again the old demagoguery that the United States wishes to develop a "instrument of peace" and nothing more. Interestingly, why then did he not support the obligation assumed by the Soviet Union of not resorting to the first nuclear strike? Is it so hard to imagine that behind the space "shield" the United States will be able to launch missiles against the USSR with a certainty that the United States will be protected against a retaliatory strike? Secondly, when Reagan's plan was called a "star wars plan," specialists disclosed its essence which was to create an instrument but for aggression, for launching a first strike. For this reason there has been such a strong protest among all clear-headed persons in the world against the American ambition to militarize space.

In the interview with TIME magazine, Mikhail Gorbachev expressed definite reserve when he was asked what he expected from the meeting with Reagan in Geneva. Unfortunately, the American approach to the Soviet proposals does not weaken but, on the contrary, intensifies the skepticism that the White House will put something constructive in its diplomatic baggage. In this baggage for years now there have been the same old "things" the illusion of military supremacy.

Paul Warnke, the former director of the American Arms Control Agency, was right when he wrote in the NEW YORK TIMES: "A successful meeting now is probably the sole way to reducing the danger of nuclear war. The obstacles to reaching agreement can be eliminated only if political will on the highest level is shown."

31 January 1986

CHEMICAL/BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

SOVIET COMMENTARY ON BINARY ARMS DANGERS FOR EUROPE

Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 3 Oct 85 p 3

[Article by Lev Semeyko: "'Binary Gas Chamber' for Europe: The United States Escalates the Arms Race Into Another Round"]

[Text] Large-scale NATO war games are currently in progress on the territory of the FRG, code-named "Autumn Forge-85". The troops taking part in this exercise are rehearsing the employment of conventional, nuclear, and chemical weapons. The latter includes the latest chemical weaponry -- binary technology.

What kind of weapons are these? The essential concept is quite simple. Two nontoxic or little-toxic chemical components are housed separately in artillery projectiles, aircraft bombs, and missile warheads. They come together and mix only after firing or launch (bomb release) and form a highly-toxic chemical agent.

A measure recently passed by the U.S. Congress signaled the beginning of the "chemical rearmament" of the U.S. armed forces, a program which was announced by Reagan back in February 1982. This "rearmament" is warranted neither politically nor militarily, for the United States maintains in storage vast stockpiles of highly-toxic chemical agents -- 55,000 tons. About half of this total consists of neuromuscular-paralytic-effect gases, including VX nerve gas. To get an idea of their lethality, suffice it to note that less than 1 milligram of VX agent is enough to kill an adult.

Why is it that another round is being added to the numerous rounds of the arms race which the United States is escalating -- a "chemical" round? Is it that the White House has nowhere else to spend the 10 or even 20 billion dollars which will be required for "chemical" escalation?

The reason is the same one which underlies other -- nuclear and space -- programs: the desire to gain military superiority over the USSR. Binary chemical munitions are to be extensively employed simultaneously with nuclear and conventional weapons in so-called "integrated operations," carried out in conformity with the latest "Airland Battle" concept. Cruise missiles would carry these munitions even into the strategic heartland of the Soviet Union and its allies.

The timetable is very tight. A directive issued by U.S. Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger for fiscal years 1985-1989 states that the U.S. armed forces shall be prepared for "rapid employment of chemical weapons" in 1985, while the Air Force and Navy shall "complete development of new systems for delivering binary chemical munitions to the target" in 1990.

It is primarily densely-populated Europe which would be drowned in waves of binary chemical agents. We are dealing here with a uniform policy of destroying the Old World under the pretext of saving it, for according to calculations by foreign experts, the ratio of civilians to military personnel stricken by chemical weapons will be 20 to 1, or even as high as 30 to 1. People would die, but property would remain intact. We see here not only the general "concept" involved in utilization of neutron weapons, the manufacture of which Reagan also approved (on 6 August 1981, we might recall, that is, on the anniversary of the Hiroshima tragedy). We also have here another confirmation of the aggressive essence of contemporary U.S. military doctrine. As was noted at a recent press conference at the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, if the United States deploys binary chemical weapons in the FRG and other countries of the Old World, Europe will be turned into a "binary gas chamber."

U.S. manufacture of binary chemical weapons will lead to the most serious negative political consequences. They include first and foremost a considerable complication to one of the most important tasks of disarmament -- banning chemical weapons and destroying chemical weapons stockpiles.

If production of binary chemical munitions commences, it will be easier to conceal preparations for chemical warfare. It is therefore obvious why the United States refuses to accept Soviet proposals calling for a total ban on the commercial manufacture of certain chemical (so-called methyl-phosphorus) compounds, which form the basis for neuromuscular-paralytic-effect toxic chemical agents.

Another danger lies in the fact that binary chemical weapons are comparatively cheap, and this might encourage some countries to produce these toxic chemical agents. Accelerated spread of chemical weapons (approximately 15 nations currently possess chemical munitions) could become reality, which would present a qualitatively new threat to international security.

The U.S. Congress's approval to go ahead with binary chemical weapons evoked a storm of protest throughout the world community, especially in Europe. The Soviet Union is a committed advocate of total and universal banning of chemical weapons and the elimination of all existing stockpiles of these weapons. Since 1972 the Committee on Disarmament (presently called the Conference on Disarmament) in Geneva has been examining a draft convention on this problem proposed by the USSR and the other socialist countries. Ten years later the USSR introduced a new draft proposal before the UN -- draft "Basic Provisions" for such a convention. It reflects the results of Soviet-U.S. talks and the suggestions of other nations, including on the most highly complex issue -- that of verification, which once again attests to the flexibility of the Soviet approach. This document is playing a fundamental

role in hammering out a solution to the most important points dealing with the banning of chemical weapons.

The United States is continuing in its attempts to impede this process, however. Washington and its leading allies are blocking the resolution of key issues and are hardening their position. For example, they are insisting on the freedom to manufacture extremely dangerous ultratoxic chemicals wherever they deem fit and in whatever quantities they desire. They are also insisting on the employment of herbicides for military purposes (what this signifies was convincingly demonstrated by the "experience" of U.S. aggression against the peoples of Indochina).

What we have here is an obvious attempt to bring the multilateral Geneva talks on chemical weapons to an impasse, in spite of the fact that the parties to the talks have reached agreement on many points. The United States is showing a disinclination to resume Soviet-U.S. talks on banning chemical weapons, which were suspended through the fault of the United States after the 12th round. All this and a great deal else indicates that Washington much prefers to increase its chemical arsenal from 3 to 5 million units of munitions than to ban chemical weapons.

The problem of freeing Europe of chemical weapons -- a continent in which chemical weapons stockpiles are enormous and where the Pentagon intends to employ chemical weapons first -- is today taking on a special urgency. As we know, the USSR came forth with a suitable initiative at the Stockholm Conference. But the West failed to support this initiative, although the Soviet proposal is in line with the aspirations of the European peoples. A political initiative by the Socialist Unity Party of Germany and the SPD -- West Germany's largest opposition party -- as well as a proposal by the GDR and Czechoslovak Socialist Republic to the government of the FRG calling for the establishment of a chemical weapons-free zone in Europe constituted a reflection of these hopes and aspirations. The Soviet Union supported this intelligent proposal. If a chemical weapons-free zone is established in Central Europe, the USSR, following its fundamental foreign-policy principles, would be willing to guarantee and respect the status of this zone. Such a guarantee would go into force if the United States proceeded in like manner.

It is in the interest both of the European peoples and of all mankind to become free of the threat of death-dealing chemical weapons. It is impossible to put an end to this threat by developing and manufacturing new chemical weapons -- binary chemical munitions -- just as it is impossible to bring an end to the nuclear threat by developing offensive space weaponry. To acknowledge this fact means to ensure a most important condition for strengthening international security.

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NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

UK READY TO DISCUSS N-TEST BAN PROPOSALS WITH SOVIETS

London DAILY TELEGRAPH in English 24 Dec 85 p 22

[Article by David Adamson]

[Text] Britain is prepared to discuss Soviet proposals for a ban on underground nuclear tests when arms control experts from the two countries resume their annual meetings, a Foreign Office spokesman said yesterday.

The Soviet Union expressed its readiness last week to resume talks with Britain and the United States on a comprehensive test ban.

It is prepared, too, to extend the current Soviet moratorium on testing beyond Jan. 1 if the United States agrees to a similar move.

The Government sees talks on nuclear issues being conducted through the dialogue proposed by Mr Gorbachev, the Soviet leader, and accepted by Mrs Thatcher.

In the British view, the most suitable vehicle for this would be the annual meetings of arms control experts. None has taken place since March 1984 as this year's meeting in April was cancelled because of the expulsion of Soviet officials for spying.

Neither Britain nor the United States is prepared to

join a moratorium on testing at the moment. The Soviet offer of on-site verification of the to change that position as both countries are testing new ranges of weapons.

OWEN'S ADVICE

Positive reaction urged

OUR POLITICAL STAFF writes: The Prime Minister was urged yesterday by Dr Owen, S D P leader, to decide over Christmas on a "positive response" to Mr Gorbachev's offer to hasten a nuclear test-ban treaty by allowing Western inspection of test sites behind the Iron Curtain.

Dr Owen said in a letter to Mrs Thatcher that such a response would be particularly important as "the Comprehensive Test Ban negotiations are the only ones in which Britain is directly involved with the Soviet Union and the United States."

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31 January 1986

NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

ICELAND DECIDES TO REMAIN NEUTRAL ON NUCLEAR FREEZE ISSUE

Reykjavik MORGUNBLADID in Icelandic 6 Dec 85 p 36

[Article: "Not in Conformity with the Althing Resolution, says Foreign Minister"]

[Text] The proposal of Sweden and Mexico for a "freeze" of nuclear weapons is at variance with three main articles of the Althing Resolution On Icelandic Disarmament Policy, agreed to last 23 May. For this reason, and in accordance with the previous position of Iceland, Iceland's representatives abstained from the voting on the proposal of Sweden and Mexico. This is the gist of what Icelandic Minister of Foreign Affairs Geir Hallgrimsson said in an extraordinary speech to both houses of the Althing yesterday.

Unified Nordic Position

Hjorleifur Guttormsson (People's Alliance) asked for special rights to speak in the Althing yesterday. He asserted that Iceland's abstention in the voting on the proposal of Sweden and Mexico on a freeze of nuclear weapons was contrary to the Althing resolution on disarmament of last spring. Iceland and 6 other countries abstained and was the only Nordic country to take such a position. He asked the minister of foreign affairs whether any change in Iceland's position was to be expected in the final United Nations vote and the prime minister if he and the Progressive Party were in agreement with the minister of foreign affairs on Iceland's abstention.

Article Three

The gist of what Foreign Minister Geir Hallgrimsson said was that the proposal of Sweden and Mexico was at variance with three important articles of the Althing resolution. For this reason and in accordance with its former position, Iceland has abstained from voting on the resolution. The three articles mentioned by the Icelandic minister of foreign affairs were:

The Althing resolution spoke of a general ban, of a "freeze" under secure international supervision of the parties. This condition has not been met.

The Althing resolution made provision for "an annual reduction in stocks of nuclear weapons." This provision has not been met in particular.

At the end, the Althing resolution makes provision for such a ban being pursued in reciprocal manner in cooperation with agencies of international supervision. The proposal of Sweden and Mexico does not meet this provision.

The minister said that the Nordic countries voting for the proposal have nonetheless made clear that they are opposed to individual parts of the proposal, among others, those concerned with criticism of NATO defense policy.

The Althing Makes Short Work of the Matter

Olafur Ragnar Grimsson (People's Alliance) expressed the view that the Icelandic Althing should make a statement on how Iceland should vote on the proposal of Mexico and Sweden which will come up for a final vote in the United Nations General Assembly in two weeks. "I am in agreement with this view."

Prime Minister Steingrímur Hermannsson regarded the Althing resolution on disarmament as important. It has become known to other countries. The discussions of the leaders of the nuclear powers bear witness to this. Only agreement of the great powers can guarantee the outcome of disarmament. It would not be beneficial to take part in agreements which end in disequilibrium. The prime minister said that the Icelandic foreign minister had made clear his decision that the position of Iceland is unchanged in this issue. "I was and am in agreement with him," the prime minister said.

Short Notice

Gudrun Agnarsdóttir (Women's List) criticized the fact that members of the Althing received too short a notice of the extraordinary discussions. She encouraged support for the proposal of Sweden and Mexico.

Thorvaldur Gardar Kristjánsson, chairman, stated that Agnarsdóttir's criticism of the arrangements for the extraordinary discussions was based upon a misunderstanding. According to parliamentary procedures, members of the Althing can call for discussions of this sort not less than 2 hours before a meeting. The chairman must inform the members at the beginning of the session when such a discussion will take place.

Opponent of the Minister of Foreign Affairs

Páll Petursson (Progressive Party) said that the position and justifications of the minister of foreign affairs were amazing. We could have nonetheless voted for the proposal just like the rightist government in Norway did.

Proposal of the People's Alliance

Hjorleifur Guttormsson (People's Alliance) said that Petursson's words encouraged the members of the Althing to look into the issue. The People's Alliance would like to offer a draft of an Althing resolution to the effect that Iceland should vote for the proposal of Sweden and Mexico.

An Independent Icelandic Position

Minister of Foreign Affairs Geir Hallgrimsson said that Nordic cooperation is good. But no effort should be made, on the other hand, to rob Iceland of its rights to an independent point of view and to independent policy formulation in foreign affairs. It would be strange to follow Hjorleifur Guttormsson and the many points of the Nordic statement with our vote since they are directly contrary to the expressed views of the members of this Althing. Naturally the members of the Althing should have the text of the proposal of Sweden and Mexico, both in English, the language it was presented in, and in Icelandic.

Seventy-four Disarmament Proposals

Eyjolfur Konrad Jonsson (Independence Party) stated that 74 proposals on disarmament issues are presently before the United Nations General Assembly. The proposal by Sweden and Mexico is nothing special compared to many others, which accord fairly well with the Althing resolution of last spring. The Althing should support such proposals.

Many other members spoke, yet little else of importance was said.

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CSO:5200/2594

NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

NORDIC NUCLEAR-FREE ZONE DISCUSSED

Origin, Seriousness of Zone Issue

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 24 Nov 85 p 24

[Article by Erkki Pennanen, including interview with Foreign Minister Paavo Vayrynen]

[Text] A Nordic nuclear-free zone has long been a central part of Finland's foreign policy liturgy. Parliamentary parties from the extreme Left to the Conservative Party have adopted it. Our parliamentary representatives scarcely know any more than that about matters relating to the establishment of such a zone. While the zone has been discussed in the other Nordic countries for years, here in Finland we have been content with a liturgy.

A week ago, under the leadership of Prime Minister Kalevi Sorsa, Finland's party leaders made an appeal to the governments of the Nordic countries to set in motion discussions on a zone. Only the leaders of the Constitutional People's Party did not participate in the joint appeal.

In Sweden, Norway and Denmark they have on many occasions engaged in heated, but many-sided debate on the advantages and problems of a zone. Ministers, members of parliament, civic organizations, scholars and the press have participated in it. Different kinds of expositions, reports and pamphlets on the zone have been published as a basis for discussion.

In Norway last week the foreign minister found on his desk another report, even more detailed than the previous one, on the possibilities of realizing a zone. The country's most competent experts and officials composed the report. The Swedish and Danish governments have also had the same kinds of reports made up.

It is otherwise here in Finland. Outside of a limited circle of investigators, the different aspects of the zone plan have not been discussed much or been written about. The Foreign Ministry has not ordered reports to be composed for the enlightenment of members of Parliament or the general public. Nor has Parliament overly requested explanations or discussed the zone on its own initiative. The press too has usually contented itself with repeating the official liturgy without critically examining the zone plan.

It was not until last week that a condensed collection of Nordic zone discussions was published in Finland. It is the cooperative product of Nordic civic organizations. This summary appeared at the eleventh hour.

The fact of the matter is that Finnish parliamentarians' debating skill will be put to the Nordic test as soon as next weekend. Parliamentarians from all the Nordic countries will be meeting then at the Danish Folketing for the first joint discussion of a Nordic nuclear-free zone.

The event may be described as a milestone in the Nordic security policy discussion -- security policy is after all excluded from the Nordic Council's annual sessions.

Finnish parliamentary representatives will have to leave for Copenhagen more poorly prepared for a detailed exchange of opinions than their Nordic colleagues. While an attempt has been made, on the threshold of the conference, to give them a rapid briefing, the Finns' speeches will probably be just circumspect reiterations of the official attitude -- since they will be discussing a Finnish initiative.

Kekkonen's Two Initiatives

President Kekkonen is recognized as the real father of the current plan in all the Nordic countries.

In May 1963 at the Paasikivi Society Kekkonen proposed that Finland, Sweden, Norway and Denmark declare themselves to be a nuclear-free zone. Behind the proposal was concern over the spreading of nuclear weapons into Northern Europe and concern over the note crisis in the early 1960's and NATO plans to create a multilateral nuclear navy had grown.

According to Kekkonen, the zone would leave the Nordic countries outside of speculations relating to the development of a nuclear strategy. He stressed the fact that a zone declaration would only strengthen the prevailing situation and that it would not weaken Nordic security at all.

The idea itself was not, however, originated by Kekkonen. As early as 6 years before then, Soviet Premier Mikhail Bulganin had proposed the same thing in his correspondence with the Norwegian and Danish prime ministers. The Soviet Union was concerned over the possibility that in a crisis situation Norway and Denmark would allow NATO to station nuclear weapons in their territories.

In the other Nordic countries Kekkonen was regarded as being an agent for the Kremlin. The initiative got a cold reception in Sweden too.

Kekkonen updated his proposal 15 years later in Stockholm. Behind the updated proposal was a deeper concern than before over the superpowers' continued development of nuclear weapons and especially over possible cruise missile flights over Nordic territories.

In Kekkonen's opinion, time had flown past all the objections and prejudices that had until then prevented objective discussion of the establishment of nuclear-free status for Northern Europe. The initiative was not ruled out in the other Nordic countries as mercilessly as it had been the previous time. Nevertheless, the round of feelers sent out by the Finnish Government did not lead to any sort of followup action.

For example, then Danish Prime Minister Anker Jorgensen saw no reason in Kekkonen's proposal for entering into discussions. According to him, negotiating on zones was a matter for the superpowers. Jorgensen was still of the same opinion in the fall of 1981, but he later changed his mind to promote the plan.

Then Finland just did not develop Kekkonen's last proposal nor did it adjust its position on the zone. In the other Nordic countries, on the other hand, a lively debate on the zone was set in motion in the beginning of the 1980's.

It developed into the most heated and many-sided debate of all -- surprisingly perhaps -- in Norway where Kekkonen's proposal had originally been most vehemently ruled out. At the same time an even broader debate on the country's security policy was initiated in Norway.

The Norwegian Labor Party government's decision to approve the introduction of Euromissiles in West Europe, the advance stockpiling of NATO heavy weaponry on Norwegian soil and discussion of the doctrine of a limited nuclear war set in motion in NATO served as a tinder box.

The Labor Party's left wing reared up on its hind legs, got the peace movement, which opposed nuclear weapons, and an incredibly broad and active Finnish-style public opinion to go along with it. The plan was energetically debated in the Storting and many town councils declared their towns to be nuclear-free zones.

The debate at times threatened to get out of the hands of the Norwegian Government and caused it diplomatic embarrassments in NATO. Finally, in the fall of 1981 just before the elections, Prime Minister Gro Harlem Brundtland had to put the debate on the zone into its proper perspective: "A zone would not mean that Norway could not defend itself with nuclear weapons from the territories of other NATO countries if Norway were to become the object of a massive attack."

The debate was silenced when the Labor Party lost the elections and Conservative Prime Minister Kare Willoch, who was particularly opposed to a zone, took its place.

The Norwegian debate also had reverberations in Denmark and Sweden when the zone proposal was raised at a joint meeting of Nordic social democrats. In the spring of 1981 Sweden's Social Democrats demanded that the then non-socialist government enter into communication with the other Nordic governments on the matter of a zone.

At the conference of Nordic prime ministers they had to admit that there was no basis for a detailed discussion. At the conference of foreign ministers in the fall of 1981 the zone was, however, officially raised for the first time. Since then, the zone proposal has always been mentioned in meetings of foreign ministers communiques, even though there actually has been no discussion of the zone at meetings.

Several initiatives were launched in the Swedish Riksdag to promote the zone proposal. Despite the differing views of the parties, the Foreign Affairs Committee enjoined the government to maintain contact with the governments of the Nordic countries.

When the Social Democrats returned to power in the fall of 1982, the government's hitherto lukewarm attitude changed. According to the Olof Palme government, keeping the zone proposal warm was in itself a positive action. It was not prepared to go much farther than that either, but it wanted to avoid a situation in which the Nordic countries would be openly divided into two different groups.

In Denmark the zone debate became more lively when the Social Democrats moved from a position of government responsibility into the opposition in the fall of 1982 and Anker Jorgensen changed sides. In the Folketing the Social Democrats pushed through several statements in which they demanded that the government work actively to establish a Nordic nuclear-free zone. It was, however, felt that this was only possible "in a broader European context."

Jorgensen is also the father of the parliamentarians' conference that is to meet next weekend. Finns think the idea is more President Mauno Koivisto's, who, when he was prime minister, presented the idea of a separate security policy debate in the Nordic Council.

Where Is the Hangup in Establishing It?

Northern Europe has actually always been nuclear-free. Its confirmation by an official agreement will, however, encounter countless problems. Getting to the negotiating stage has not been facilitated at all by the fact that former Norwegian Minister of Maritime Law Jens Evensen in his own name years ago presented a 23-article draft agreement for a Nordic nuclear-free zone.

The differences of opinion start with the need for a zone. Urho Kekkonen operated on the assumption that a zone would strengthen the security of all the Nordic countries. In Norway and Denmark they do not consider that to be at all obvious.

The defense strategy of the Western military alliance, NATO, is chiefly based on the scare tactic that, in the event of a war or crisis, they can also prepare to defend themselves against an enemy superior in power and numbers with nuclear weapons.

The establishment of a nuclear-free zone would in advance force Norway and Denmark to refuse to accept the protection offered by NATO's nuclear-weapon

umbrella. This would be regarded as shaking the credibility of NATO's entire defense strategy and leaving Norway and Denmark at the mercy of the Soviet Union.

In Sweden too, they have occasionally been of the opinion that Norway and Denmark's nuclear-weapon reserves are part of a so-called Nordic balance, a well-established security policy arrangement. Establishing a zone would change this to the advantage of the Soviet Union unless it were to agree to essential counterconcessions.

Kekkonen limited the zone to the territories of Finland, Sweden, Norway and Denmark. In principle the Nordic countries could decide on such a zone among themselves. In the opinion of the other Nordic countries, this sort of zone would, however, not be sufficient. Sweden and Denmark are demanding that nuclear weapons in the Baltic absolutely be included in a zone arrangement.

This requirement is problematic. The Soviet Union has concentrated a considerable portion of its navy's repair docks in the Baltic, docks it can scarcely abandon. And above all: The Baltic is a sea that is open to all. An agreement restricting nuclear weapons in it is by no means a matter to be handled [only] among the Nordic countries, the Soviet Union and the other coastal nations.

Counterbalancing its nuclear weapons in the Baltic, the Soviet Union may regard as a source of irritation the NATO fleet nuclear weapons, from cruise missiles to aircraft, that are moving about the Norwegian Sea. Kekkonen was already worried about them when he revised his 1978 zone proposal.

Norway, Denmark and Sweden are concerned over the Soviet nuclear weapons located in areas adjacent to Northern Europe, weapons on the basis of whose range seem to be intended for or are expressly adapted to be used against targets that are in the Nordic countries. Therefore, as an extension of the nuclear-free zone, a "thinning-out zone" would unquestionably be needed, one from which the Soviet Union would pledge to remove such missiles.

Can such pledges be expected of the Soviet Union in connection with a Nordic zone or do they belong to negotiations between the superpowers? The Soviet Union will not agree to discuss detailed issues before the Nordic countries are first able to agree among themselves to initiate negotiations.

Because of their membership in NATO, Norway and Denmark are linked with a "broader European connection" of the zone plan through NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organization. A separate Nordic zone plan would seem to be as utopian as it was 20 years ago.

As early as 1978, Kekkonen acknowledged that the plan was impossible without the cooperation of the superpowers right from the start of negotiations. He required guarantees from the superpowers that they would under no circumstances use nuclear weapons against the zone countries, nor would they threaten the latter with them.

In the other Nordic countries they fear that binding the Soviet Union to guarantees might by opening the back door to it give it the right to speak on issues relating to their security policies. This is why a guarantee too is problematic.



Norway's former Maritime Minister Jens Evensen has drawn up his own draft agreement.

Foreign Minister Paavo Vayrynen

In an interview with HELSINGIN SANOMAT Foreign Minister Paavo Vayrynen said that mere discussion of a Nordic nuclear-free zone has strengthened the nuclear-free status of the area. Finland proposes a joint Nordic report on the zone as the next step in this eternal matter.

HELSINGIN SANOMAT [HS]: Finland is not in the habit of contributing to proposals which we know both superpowers will firmly oppose. How does the proposal for a Nordic nuclear-free zone jive with this?

Paavo Vayrynen [PV]: The Nordic nuclear-free zone is Finland's own security and is therefore an important proposal, thinking in terms of our important national interests. It is of primary importance to us. In considering the attitude we will assume toward the negotiating process and the content of a zone agreement we take into account the interests and views of the superpowers.

We have indeed stressed the fact that the zone arrangement should be realized such that each Nordic country retains its current basic decision as concerns its security policy. We have likewise proposed that the leading superpowers be present at the negotiations right from the start.

HS: Is promoting the plan merely self-importance? What will we gain by this?

PV: Mere discussion of the Nordic nuclear-free zone has been and is useful. Thanks to it the peoples of Northern Europe are aware of the importance of nuclear-free status for this area, that it is important to preserve and strengthen our nuclear-free status. It has already in fact strengthened Northern Europe's nuclear-free status.

On the other hand, a preliminary agreement to strengthen our nuclear-free status may become surprisingly possible if only we work for it. It may be influenced by, for example, the development of military technology and the general improvement of relations between the superpowers.

HS: Hasn't the development of arms technology made the introduction of nuclear weapons into Northern Europe militarily unnecessary and thus Kekkonen's proposals obsolete?

PV: That's a good question, but it can also be turned around: Isn't precisely technological development a factor that would in part facilitate the establishment of a zone? A zone will after all in any case be an important factor in increasing confidence and security, one which will combat speculations about nuclear weapons directed toward Northern Europe.

HS: Finland has not assumed a position on nuclear weapons in areas adjacent to [those parts of] the Baltic and the Soviet Union in Northern Europe. Isn't forgetting them unrealistic?

PV: It is expedient not to assume positions on many details until we are involved in the negotiations. Finland's premise is, however, that the zone itself would be composed of the national territories of the Nordic countries. We, of course, support measures aimed at the areas adjacent to the zone and which will add to its importance.

We have expressed our satisfaction with the Soviet Union's announcements that, as for it, it is ready to discuss both the nuclear-free status of the Baltic and measures aimed at the Soviet Union's own territory.

HS: What about the plan's general European connection, on which emphasis is laid in the other Nordic countries?

PV: Naturally, the nuclear-free zone will have a direct connection with other European arms limitation arrangements. This need not, however, in our opinion be an obstacle to the advancement of the zone plan. More far-reaching European decisions might also be set in motion through the Nordic zone arrangements.

When the NATO countries of Northern Europe also proposed that the zone be discussed among the leading superpowers, we pointed out that, before that happens, the Nordic countries should have a common idea of what sort of zone we ourselves want.

HS: How might the plan be advanced?

PV: As the next step, we have proposed that a joint Nordic report be composed. If an intergovernmental study group composed of officials cannot be formed, we might appoint a team partially composed of independent experts. At the present time there are both a UN report and national reports. A joint Nordic study would be a logical sequel to them.

HS: Can we assume that a Nordic nuclear-free zone will also fit in with our chief foreign policy objectives in the 1990's?

PV: Yes, it will fit in -- if we have been unable to establish the zone by then. Its timeliness will keep.

Norwegian Stand in Copenhagen

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 26 Nov 85 p 19

[Article by Pal T. Jorgensen: "Unfavorable Report from Norway: 'Nordic Nuclear-Free Zone Is Not at This Time Attainable'"]

[Text] Oslo--Norway continues to react very reservedly to the idea of creating a Nordic nuclear-free zone. This becomes evident from the Norwegian Foreign Ministry's special report which was submitted to the Storting's Foreign Affairs Committee on Monday.

The Zone Committee report was prepared under the direction of Norwegian Conservative Prime Minister Kare Willoch's former advisor, Kjell Colding. Colding is at present serving as Norway's ambassador in Helsinki.

The report states that a Nordic nuclear-free zone can only be discussed when a broader European arms limitation arrangement is effected as concerns both nuclear weapons and conventional forces.

"The report demonstrates that a Nordic zone is not attainable in the short run, which is also the Norwegian Government's view of the matter," the nonsocialist government's Foreign Minister Sven Stray stated on Monday.

Copenhagen Does Not Interest Them

The Conservative-led, nonsocialist Norwegian Government has also refused to participate in the conference of Nordic parliamentarians to discuss the zone question, which will be organized in Copenhagen this weekend.

The government was asked to send a delegate, who would be granted the right to speak, to the conference. The Norwegian Government declined, appealing

to the fact that this will be a parliamentary-level conference. The Oslo prime minister's office specified on Monday that the Norwegian Embassy in Copenhagen would arrange for an observer at the zone conference.

According to the report made public on Monday, the possibility that Norway might go along with a Nordic zone would not in itself be in conflict with Norway's membership in NATO. However, its joining the zone could be at odds with the defense strategy of the Western defense alliance, NATO.

This is why the working out of the zone will have to take place by mutual understanding with Norway's NATO allies. If this does not happen, Norway's relations with NATO may encounter difficulties. According to the report, serious consequences would be incurred if Norway were to abandon the possibility of defending itself with nuclear weapons or if Norway were to extend its support base policy, its current peacetime nuclear-free status, to apply to a state of war or times of crisis as well.

Neutrality Is Frightening

Such a decision might give rise to fears or hopes that Norway had taken a step in the direction of neutrality. The report states that, if this happened, Norway would certainly feel the need to intensify political and military cooperation with our (current) allies.

For the above-mentioned reasons, in the Norwegian Foreign Ministry report they extremely clearly state that a Nordic zone should not be established before -- not even simultaneously -- a broader European arrangement is created.

However, Norway may at some time in the future participate at the level of officials in the work of a joint Nordic report relating to a zone. Provided that the report is made taking into account arms limitation talks then in progress and NATO's internal consultations.

Guarantees a Source of Irritation

The key point in the zone report made public by Norway on Monday is whether the potential zone nations will have faith in any guarantees that nuclear weapons will not be used against them. The credibility problem with these so-called negative security guarantees especially applies to a situation in which they have already been driven into a war.

It is the viewpoint of the report that arrangements involving nuclear weapons in the areas adjacent to Northern Europe, as concerns the Kola Peninsula and the Baltic among others, should be combined with a Nordic zone arrangement -- the aim of which is therefore to strengthen the security of the zone nations.

Nor will the zone arrangement involve only the Soviet Union's nuclear weapons. The Norwegian report also demands that conventional weapons be included because the Soviet Union has superiority in that branch of weaponry.

Supervision Difficulties

Another key problem area dealt with in the report is the question of supervision. According to the report, the Nordic countries' expertise and resources are insufficient to effectively supervise compliance. As an indispensable condition to the implementation of a zone, they stipulate that the Soviet Union must submit to inspections inside the zone itself.

According to the report, the Soviet Union must also admit inspectors into those areas of the Soviet Union that are included in a possible Nordic zone, the so-called thinning-out zones.

"Appealing to negative security guarantees, those nations possessing nuclear weapons may possibly demand a more far-reaching right of inspection. This may mean unwarranted interference in the internal affairs of a zone nation. Supervision arrangements must therefore be so designed that abuses do not occur," the report states.

Finland Is Not Yet Taking a Stand

On Monday the Finnish Foreign Ministry did not wish to say anything about the Norwegian zone report and Norwegian statements relating to it. Foreign Minister Paavo Vayrynen said that he had just gotten his hands on the report towards evening. Vayrynen and ministry officials will first familiarize themselves with the contents of the report and comments will not be issued before Tuesday.

Vayrynen on Norwegian Stand

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 27 Nov 85 p 8

[Article: "Vayrynen Sees Something Positive Too in the Norwegian Zone Report"]

[Text] Foreign Minister Paavo Vayrynen sees positive factors too in Norway's recent report on a Nordic nuclear-free zone. The Norwegians have decided that the zone plan cannot be realized at this time, but Vayrynen draws attention to the fact that in the report they discuss in detail and in a positive spirit the development of Nordic communication in the matter of the zone.

"According to the report, it is useful for the Nordic foreign ministers to continue holding regular discussions on the zone and to complement them with communication at the secretary-of-state level. Furthermore, they feel that it will be possible at some later point for them to be able to on a joint Nordic basis start to shed more light on the zone issue at the level of officials. This outline offers opportunities for making progress, ones there is good reason to seize," Vayrynen said in his Tuesday statement.

The Finnish foreign minister, however, noted that in the Norwegian report they particularly closely link the establishment of a nuclear-free zone with a broader European arms limitation arrangement.

31 January 1986

"The report makes it clear that, due to the conditions that have been described, the establishment of a zone would turn out to be very complicated and time-consuming," Vayrynen said.

Prime Minister Kalevi Sorsa did not want to comment in detail on the Norwegian report on Tuesday because he had not yet had time to familiarize himself with it. Sorsa, however, said that he had gotten the impression that the report was not quite as negative as the first comments sounded because, among other things, Norway said that it was ready to participate in a joint Nordic preliminary discussion of the matter.

The Nordic zone will be discussed at the conference of Nordic parliamentarians to be held this weekend in Copenhagen. There, speaker Erkki Pystynen will present the Finnish parliamentary parties' appeal on behalf of a nuclear-free zone.

In their appeal they propose that the governments of the Nordic countries decide to launch a joint Nordic preliminary effort relating to the zone.

The chairmen of all the other parliamentary parties except the Constitutional People's Party have signed the appeal. The chairmen will meet to consider possible followup actions after the Copenhagen conference.

They will not be aiming for a joint declaration or other position paper at the parliamentarians conference to be held Friday and Saturday in Copenhagen.

Foreign Ministry Group to Study Zone

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 28 Nov 85 pp 3,9

[Article: "Ministry Appoints Study Group: Report on Nuclear-Free Zone"]

[Text] The Foreign Ministry has appointed a group of officials to study viewpoints relating to a Nordic nuclear-free zone.

According to Foreign Minister Paavo Vayrynen, the group intends to draft a proposal to be published by next midsummer on Finland's position with regard to the [zone] plan. It will also bring together and update the ministry's own earlier reports on the matter. The purpose is to in this way prepare for a joint Nordic report and for discussions with the other countries.

According to Vayrynen, the creation of the study group came at an opportune moment since the Norwegians published their own sternly worded report on the plan early this week.

In Vayrynen's opinion, there was a lot of new material in the report. He feels that the readiness expressed by the Norwegians to participate in a study of the plan together with the other Nordic countries, among other things, is positive.

Norwegian Report Led to Creation of Study Group in Finland

According to Foreign Minister Paavo Vayrynen (Center Party), the report of the group that studied a Nordic nuclear-free zone and which was made public in Norway early this week has also made the formation of a study group opportune in Finland.

"There was new material in the Norwegian report, even if it did also reveal new problems," Vayrynen said on Wednesday in Helsinki.

The task of the group of officials to be formed is to study the viewpoints relating to the establishment of a Nordic nuclear-free zone. They will have until next midsummer to draft a report to be published on Finland's position on the establishment of the zone.

The group will also familiarize itself with reports and materials involving the Nordic nuclear-free zone that have been produced in the other Nordic countries. On the basis of these it will update the Foreign Ministry's own zone studies, keeping in mind a joint Nordic report on the plan that is to be made and discussions to be entered into with the other countries.

The study group will be headed by Political Undersecretary of State Klaus Tornudd and Political Section chief Seppo Pietinen will serve as its vice chairman.

In Vayrynen's opinion, there is an in principle positive readiness in the Norwegians' report to participate in a joint Nordic effort to study the plan.

"Norway has not specifically expressed its position on the plan before. Now that position has been formulated and it is a tough one," Vayrynen said and stated that the study group had also imposed strict conditions for joint Nordic negotiations.

In the Norwegian report the development of a Nordic nuclear-free zone is linked with developments in common European plans for limiting nuclear and also conventional weapons. In Vayrynen's opinion, Norway also imposes very far-reaching demands for the extension of the zone to Soviet territory.

"It's hard to say whether the Norwegian report will make it harder or easier to carry out the plan. It contains both elements," Vayrynen deliberated.

Parliamentary Representatives to Go to Copenhagen

In the Nordic countries they are right now getting ready for the conference starting on Friday in Copenhagen of parliamentarians who are to discuss a nuclear-free zone. Among others, Prime Minister Kalevi Sorsa (Social Democrat), Foreign Minister Vayrynen and a group of parliamentary representatives will be leaving for the 2-day conference from Finland. Representatives of the government from Norway will not participate in the conference.

According to Vayrynen, the Finns will not propose anything new with regard to the plan at the conference. "We have for a long time now hoped for a joint Nordic report on the zone," he said.

Categorized as the eternal plan, in Vayrynen's opinion the nuclear-free zone will probably not be implemented quickly, although the Finns' goal would be to achieve it without delay.

In his opinion, Norway, Denmark and Iceland's membership in NATO can be reconciled with the zone plan.

"Of course, in practice the zone plan will also depend on the positions assumed by the superpowers and their relations with one another. The leading superpowers would have to participate in the discussions right from the start. We must also assume that they would offer their own security guarantees," Vayrynen said.

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NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

POLISH PAPERS HAIL USSR MORATORIUM OFFER

LD201245 Warsaw PAP in English 1105 GMT 20 Dec 85

["Papers Hail Soviet Test Ban Offer"--PAP headline]

[Text] Warsaw, Dec 20--ZYCIE WARSZAWY today said Poland would welcome a nuclear test ban as a "concrete and practical step in the spirit of Geneva." In a commentary following PRAVDA's editorial published yesterday, the paper recalled that the Soviet Union had given up such tests, declaring a unilateral moratorium in this regard and calling on the United States to follow suit, which the latter has failed to do.

Referring to the nuclear tests now being carried on in the U.S. with a view to working out space arms components, the daily stressed that continuation of such tests brings about increased international tension, and commented further:

"This is why the Soviet Union has proposed an extension of the moratorium which is due to expire January 1, 1986, provided that the United States also joins in (...) [TANJUG punctuation] political preparations conducive to maintaining a complete ban on nuclear explosions might be helped with a resumption of tripartite talks on the subject, involving the Soviet Union, the United States and Great Britain. The ban would be effective, since it is fully checkable, also through on-the-spot inspections."

Other national dailies also bring related commentaries. TRYBUNA LUDU said: "The PRAVDA editorial elaborates upon and substantiates the Soviet concept of banning all nuclear testing and stresses that such a move would in a natural manner halt the arms race and the improvement of deadly tools.

"Joining the Soviet unilateral decision by the United States would also open a real prospect for a turn for the better in the international situation and confirm the stability of the results of the Soviet-U.S. summit meeting in Geneva.

"The world is awaiting a positive response from Washington. It will be a genuineness test for many White House declarations on (its) endeavours to make 'a new start' in the relations with the Soviet Union," the paper said.

The government daily RZECZPOSPOLITA wrote the following:

"PRAVDA's editorial article should be read as an expression of the official Soviet stand on the issue of nuclear explosions, hence on nuclear armaments in general.

"The unilateral abstention from conducting nuclear tests meant no less than a delay of Soviet experiments, and hence desistence from Soviet participation in the nuclear arms race.

"Today the Soviet Union has put forward a proposition of extending the moratorium and it calls on its American partner in the recent Geneva summit to join. The Soviet Union is therefore proposing a concrete programme of action for the sake of world security."

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CSO: 5200/3018

RELATED ISSUES

USSR: 'INTERNATIONAL SITUATION: QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS', 3 JAN

LD040549 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1030 GMT 3 Jan 86

["International Situation: Questions and Answers" presented by Vyacheslav Lavrentyev, All-Union Radio commentator with Nikolay Vladimirovich Shishlin, political observer; Boris Savodyan, correspondent in Kabul; Yuriy Baranov, correspondent in Managua; and Vladimir Pasko, international affairs writer]

Soviet-U.S. Relations

[Excerpts] [Lavrentyev] As always, many listeners are interested in the development of Soviet-U.S. relations. Their letters express approval for the Soviet Union's foreign policy and our government's persistent search for paths toward detente and towards curbing the arms race. I summarized the questions on this topic contained in listeners' letters and asked political observer Nikolay Vladimirovich Shishlin to answer them. Nikolay Vladimirovich, is it now possible to say that there was a change for the better in 1985 in Soviet-U.S. relations?

[Shishlin] Let's look first of all at the makeup of Soviet-U.S. relations and at the result of their development in the past year. It goes without saying that the central event in Soviet-U.S. relations was the Geneva summit meeting. And you know, basically, what the results of Geneva were. A sufficiently binding Soviet-U.S. statement was adopted there, in which a very fine thing is set forth: that nuclear war is inadmissible and that neither side will strive for military superiority. An understanding of the need to speed up the negotiations between the Soviet Union and the United States on space and nuclear weapons was reached. And the aims and subject of these negotiations were confirmed, that is, to halt the arms race on Earth and to prevent its transfer to space.

All this is certainly on the credit side, on the plus side; it all makes for a good start to 1986. But one must not close one's eyes to the fact that at Geneva there was no success in reaching agreement on the cardinal problems concerned with stopping the arms race on Earth and preventing its spread into space. And it seems to me that when we now speak and consider whether there was progress or no progress toward an improvement in Soviet-U.S. relations, then I think we ought to take our cue from the true assessment of what took place which was given in the latest official Soviet statements.

There was a certain rapprochement in positions, or rather the potential for a coming together of positions. And I think, if we are speaking accurately, in accordance with the realities, we must say that 1985 created opportunities for a turn to the better in Soviet-U.S. relations, opportunities. The year 1985 created the prerequisites for a turning point in Soviet-U.S. relations and for the easing of international relations as such. To make something of these opportunities, to make something of these prerequisites, is the task for 1986.

[Lavrentyev] What prevented the achievement of greater progress?

[Shishlin] Well, of course, the most serious and important obstacle to the development of Soviet-U.S. relations, to the improvement of these relations, remains the absence of agreement on the key problem of our times -- the problem of stopping the arms race. And just look at the picture that emerges. The Soviet Union, as you know, has supported and still supports the discontinuance of nuclear tests in all environments. And the Soviet example of good will in this respect is in everyone's memory. But how did the United States act? Just before the new year they carried out another test of a nuclear weapon, one with a power of 150 kilotons, 10 times the power of the charge that destroyed the Japanese city of Hiroshima. And the United States says quite plainly that it will go on testing nuclear weapons. And not for the sake of testing, of course, but in order to create new types of nuclear weapons.

All these tests are for the purpose of equipping those strategic missiles which are to appear in the U.S. arsenal in coming years. They carry out these tests in order to create a nuclear pump for the laser which they hope to use in the notorious "star wars" program, to which they cling with all their might.

I believe a great deal is at stake in 1986. One can utter fine words, one can declare one's desire for peace -- the U.S. politicians do that. But if they do not have the political will to seek compromises with the Soviet Union on the basis of the principle of equality and equal security of both sides, as far as a reduction in the level of military confrontation is concerned, then of course Soviet-U.S. relations will mark time, or even progress.

However, the prerequisites, I repeat, for a turn for the better in Soviet-U.S. relations, do exist. But much will depend of course, on the political climate. I have in mind, of course, the positive things that exist, (?such as) the exchange of New Year's greetings by the leaders of both countries. And it seems to me that Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev is quite right when he says that it is essential to introduce trust into Soviet-U.S. relations, that it is essential to overcome the deficit of trust. But how can this be done most effectively? Of course it is probably possible to speak, as I have already mentioned, about certain practical areas of mutual relations. One can utter new words to the effect that it is essential to establish better working relations with the Soviet Union. But the decisive test lies in one area only -- in the military sphere. Trust will emerge when the Soviet Union and the United States manage to move away from the arms race to the curbing of the arms race. And the arena for this -- the political arena -- has been cleared by the Soviet Union. In January the Soviet-U.S. negotiations on nuclear and space weapons restart, and I think that they ought to show a great deal.

[Lavrentyev] Nikolay Vladimirovich, what can be hoped for in 1986?

1986 Tasks

[Shishlin] Making forecasts is of course a thankless task, but as far as international politics and international relations are concerned the interest in how the world will develop, in how the fate of the world will shape up, is so great that one must contemplate what we can expect in the new year. As far as the task for 1986 is concerned, that is perfectly clear: the task is to materialize those good intentions and good statements that accompanied the end of 1985 and the very first day of 1986. This is the main thing, the key matter. And I want to stress again and again that much will depend on how the negotiations in Geneva on nuclear and space weapons progress. In essence, the basis for agreement exists there, and although naturally the Soviet proposals and the U.S. counterproposals are far from symmetrical, and differ substantially, nonetheless if there is a common understanding of the inadmissibility of the deployment of the "star wars" program, then a coming together of the sides' positions on strategic offensive arms and on medium-range nuclear arms is within the bounds of the attainable, is possible.

Further, in 1986, it seems to me, it would be quite realistic to come to some sort of positive result at the Stockholm Conference which is discussing confidence-building measures and security in Europe. There the contours of a possible agreement are already being sketched out, and of course success at Stockholm would be a success for international relations.

At the beginning of 1986 we may also speak of some modest steps forward at the Vienna talks on the reduction of arms and armed forces in Central Europe. I am intentionally speaking about talks concerning the problem of curbing the arms race since these issues remain the main ones in 1986. And I think that progress at the negotiations I have mentioned would of course create the appropriate political climate for solid results from the expected Soviet-U.S. summit meeting which is to be held in 1986 in the United States.

In other words, the foreign policy calendar for 1986 looks busier than ever. But it would be splendid if that tense calendar led to a reduction in international tension. And the prerequisites for this, I repeat, exist. And as for the Soviet Union, its desire for peace, its readiness to seek sensible compromises, to find these compromises, guided by the principle of equality and equal security of both sides, on that account there can of course be no doubts at all.

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RELATED ISSUES

5 JANUARY WEEKLY USSR 'INTERNATIONAL OBSERVERS ROUNDTABLE'

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["International Observers Roundtable" program with Rudolf Georgiyevich Kolchanov, deputy editor-in-chief of TRUD; Aleksandr Aleksandrovich Lebedev, deputy editor-in-chief of the magazine WORLD ECONOMY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS; and Aleksandr Vladimirovich Zholkver, political observer for central television and All-Union Radio.]

U.S.-Soviet Summit

[Excerpt] [Zholkver] Hello, Comrades! In the first few days of the new year it is customary to sum up the results of the past year and outline the prospects for the future. In this connection, the new year addresses by Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev and President Reagan have received the very widest response throughout the world. They were viewed first and foremost as a good omen for a year which has been declared International Peace Year. Here, for example, is the opinion of a man who is accustomed, through his job, to looking into the future, the well-known U.S. science fiction writer Isaac Asimov. He considers the Soviet-U.S. summit in Geneva to have been the most portentous event of the old year, and expresses the hope that in the new year the United States and the USSR will be able to achieve a mutually acceptable agreement aimed at curbing the arms race on earth and preventing it from spreading into space. What is your opinion, Rudolf Georgiyevich?

[Kolchanov] I think that both we journalists and people who are perhaps not involved via their daily work in foreign policy problems should agree with that science fiction writer that the Geneva meeting really was the most important event of the past year in the foreign policy sphere, and I am very happy that I had occasion to be present there and write about that historic event. On the eve of the meeting, the question arose in the minds not only of politicians and journalists, but also of millions of other people, as to what would be the result of the meeting. We in the press center, where there were about 4,000 journalists, also made our own forecasts, of course, but we were closer to the event, so that on the very first day after the meeting between Comrade Gorbachev and President Reagan ended we were able to say immediately that this event, without doubt, had positive results. These were announced in concrete terms when the joint statement was read out in the press center. The sides assumed very important pledges: the pledge not to start nuclear or any other wars between each other; the pledge not to strive for military superiority; the pledge to promote the Geneva talks and to further the Stockholm conference; the pledge to further the process of chemical disarmament; and so forth. In a word, pledges that are extremely important and extremely substantial, and if you consider that they were assumed on behalf of two great powers, then the weighty nature of those pledges comes across all the greater. But any pledges on paper alone remain paper pledges, so the most important thing, as Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev stressed more than once in his subsequent statements, is how those pledges will be carried out in concrete practice.

[Zholkver] Aleksandr Aleksandrovich, you weren't in Geneva, but I know that your magazine has been making a profound analysis both of what happened in Geneva and how things developed after that. What would you say about this?

SDI Program

[Lebedev] Of course the old year did contain a great many things to its credit on the international politics side, for example.

But nonetheless those positive things should not conceal from us the host of alarming phenomena which unfortunately have become confirmed even since the Geneva meeting, and the pledges and fine words that Rudolf Georgiyevich was talking about must be backed up by action so that the credit side, that capital which has begun to build up as a result of the Geneva summit, really is developed in genuine relaxation of international tension and the development of the broadest possible cooperation. But what do we see in practice? As far as our country is concerned, and our listeners are quite well informed about this, it has kept strictly to its word about unilaterally introducing a moratorium on all nuclear explosions. And what do we see on the part of our U.S. partners? Just recently another underground nuclear explosion was carried out in Nevada, the purpose of which is quite evident -- namely to test a nuclear device necessary for an X-ray laser installation; and that installation in turn is necessary for the deployment [razvertyvaniye] in space of combat strike systems.

[Kolchanov] Well, I'll interrupt you here, Aleksandr Aleksandrovich. On 13 September the United States destroyed an artificial earth satellite by means of combat facilities for the first time, and within the framework of development [razrabotka] of the SDI program contracts have been signed with 800 firms of the most varied kind. In the main these are military firms, so it is obvious what it is about.

[Lebedev] So when I was listening, for example, to the new year greeting from President Ronald Reagan, for all one's desire somehow to wholeheartedly accept the sincerity of the words addressed to our people, a host of doubts arose, you know, over a whole number of statements in that greeting, in particular the very long tirade, as I could call it, about the President's dream to move toward the elimination of nuclear weapons by means of the development of so-called defensive systems. Well, what defensive systems these could be I don't know, apart from the name of course -- and SDI is the so-called Strategic Defense Initiative -- when it is clearly a matter of combining the "star wars" plans with the development of offensive nuclear weapons, both strategic weapons and medium-range missiles which are being intensively deployed near our borders.

[Zholkver] You have raised a very important aspect of this problem, because when they proclaim about SDI and the "star wars" program, they try to stress that it is different from everything that has come before and that it is not, they say, a nuclear program. But in fact the underground test in Nevada, and the planned allocations for the further expansion of nuclear weapons production in the budget for the new year, 1986, and in the U.S. budget for 1987 that is already being drawn up disprove this. And for me this stood out when I compared both new year addresses. One one hand there is the genuinely concrete peaceableness of the Soviet Union which is backed up by action -- the moratorium on nuclear tests that you have already mentioned, Aleksandr Aleksandrovich, the pledge by the Soviet Union not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, our coming out in favor of an immediate freeze on nuclear weapons and a

complete ban without time limit on nuclear tests together with the most effective system of monitoring them, our readiness to sit down again at the table for trilateral talks with representatives of the United States and Great Britain in order to find a mutually acceptable solution to this problem, and last, but not least, our proposal that the nuclear systems of the Soviet Union and the United States be reduced by a half. From the U.S. President I have not seen such concrete action, but on the other hand one cannot but note that literally on the eve of the new year the world community, by which I mean the UN General Assembly, spoke out on one hand in favor of preventing the arms race in space, and on the other hand against the continuation of nuclear weapons tests.

[Kolchanov] One hundred and fifty-one states voted for the prevention of an arms race in space including, naturally, the Soviet Union, while the United States abstained.

[Zholkver] Yes, and on the question of nuclear tests only three states voted against -- the United States, Britain, and France.

[Kolchanov] And, finally, the freezing of nuclear weapons: the United States and the NATO countries voted against, and 120 countries, including of course the Soviet Union, voted in favor.

[Lebedev] And continuing that idea of comparing the words and deeds of each side, I should like to add a few facts to what you have already said. I started to speak about the intensive deployment of U.S. medium-range missiles. According to the figures as of 31 December, the number of U.S. medium-range missiles, in other words Pershing and cruise missiles, deployed in Western Europe, was 236, including all 108 Pershing-2 missiles. And that is at the same time that the Soviet Union is going in for the dismantling of its missile installations. And what I would like to stress is that although the chief responsibility for these developments is borne by the United States, their closest allies bear some of the blame, too, because with regard to the notorious SDI, Great Britain and the Federal Republic of Germany have been led by the nose and have taken a step which far from leads to detente.

[Zholkver] You know, I would like to add to this, if you like, the quite important moral aspect, both in regard to the United States and to its allies. Let's start with its allies, perhaps. Well, that nuclear explosion at the proving ground in the state of Nevada which you, Aleksandr Aleksandrovich, spoke about, caused universal indignation. What was the position of the FRG Government? It was asked about Bonn's attitude to this explosion. In reply, an official government spokesman stated that insofar as, he said, the FRG is a country which does not possess its own nuclear weapon -- almost with regret, it sounded -- it neither condemns nor welcomes the fact that the United States has carried out another nuclear explosion. The FRG Government, its spokesman stated, has no position on this question.

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RELATED ISSUES

PRAVDA 5 JANUARY REVIEW OF WEEK'S INTERNATIONAL EVENTS

PM071401 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 5 Jan 86 First Edition p 4

[Vitaliy Korionov "International Review"]

[Excerpts] The year 1986 has been declared Peace Year by the United Nations. The United Nations defined three main areas when making the decision: peace and disarmament, peace and development, and preparation for life in conditions of peace. The WPC, for its part, has called for 1986 to be turned into a year of real progress toward disarmament. Time does not stand still, the WPC has stated. World public opinion expects the spirit of the Soviet-U.S. summit meeting to find expression in specific, far-reaching agreements which will halt and reverse the arms race.

Our country's working people are fully resolved to do their utmost to ensure that Peace Year becomes a peace decade enabling mankind to enter the next millenium without wars and in an atmosphere of trust and cooperation. On 1 January M.S. Gorbachev's New Year message to the people of the United States and R. Reagan's New Year message to the people of the Soviet Union were broadcast on television. The world public notes the USSR's desire to continue dialogue with the United States and highlights the Soviet leader's remark that the Soviet people are committed to peace as the supreme asset, an asset equal to the gift of life.

"The peace-loving foreign policy course elaborated by the party and consistently pursued by the state in combination with the strengthening of the country's defense capability," the draft new edition of the CPSU Program says, "has secured for the Soviet people and the bulk of the planet's population a peaceful life for the longest period in the 20th century."

On the basis of our achievements, it is possible this year to make still further progress toward consolidating peace, preventing an arms race in space, and stopping it on earth.

A certain general thaw in the international political climate has been the meeting's most tangible result. The exchange of signals between East and West offers a ray of hope that there will be progress toward mutually acceptable solutions. However, the hope is as yet embryonic. Geneva merely provided the opportunity to stop the dangerous development of world events. That opportunity still has to be skillfully exploited. The main thing is to implement the Geneva accords and give them material expression. And every move here must be energetically fought for.

Obstructions Again?

At the turn of the century H.G. Wells sought to see into its future and attempted a prediction: "...Long before the year 2000 -- possibly in 1950 -- an aeroplane capable of taking off and returning safely to the same spot will be invented." How much richer has reality proved to be than the great science fiction writer could imagine! Science and technology have scaled gigantic heights. It is mankind's misfortune, however, that through class egotism and for the sake of enriching the ruling elite in the capitalist world the creations of man's intellect and handiwork are turned against him.

The stockpiles of lethal weapons in the United States and other NATO countries are getting bigger and bigger. "Security interests" are cited as a justification for this. Influential circles in these countries do not seem able to grasp that the nuclear age makes it imperative to discard the former, completely outdated ways of thinking and acting. They prefer living in a world of illusory notions which have been disproved by life itself, notions that it is allegedly possible to ensure security through competition in the race to produce the most advanced arms.

Not surprisingly, voices pointing out the outdatedness of this view are ringing out with increasing insistence in the United States. R. Bowman, ex-director of the United States Air Force's Advanced Space Program, for instance, notes quite sensibly: "The truth lies in the fact that everything that makes nuclear war less likely strengthens the security of both the United States and the Soviet Union; and conversely, everything that intensifies the threat of war jeopardizes both side's security. The terrible destructive force of nuclear weapons has made our interests in the security sphere virtually identical. We are both interested in survival -- an aim which can be achieved only if we succeed in preventing war."

However, the realistic approach is being frenziedly opposed by the "star wars complex" spawned by the U.S. military-industrial elite and its political allies who regard the accords achieved at the Soviet-U.S summit in Geneva as the main obstacle to the implementation of their egoistical adventurist schemes. "Shoot down the Geneva accords!" -- that is their slogan today. These forces are not just hampering the dismantling of existing obstacles in Soviet-U.S. relations but are strenuously trying to pile up new ones.

A graphic example of this is the administration's recent report to Congress, concocted in the depths of the Pentagon, about so-called Soviet "violations" of agreements in the arms control sphere. Its content indicates that the "forgery" was produced by professional disinformation experts. For this reason it would be futile to try to find any kind of proof in it. This has been replaced by slander against the USSR, which scrupulously abides by its international obligations.

But this provocative venture did not last long. Its true purpose was set out recently by THE WASHINGTON TIMES -- one of the most right-wing newspapers in the United States. The solution is simple. Next fall the midterm congressional elections are being held in the United States and many legislators are seeking reelection. And for that reason it is necessary to pay some heed to the mood of an electorate which is dissatisfied with the gigantic increase in appropriations for the Pentagon -- which not only hits the working people's living standards but also hinders the attempts to balance the country's budget, which is enormously inflated as a result of the continually increasing military appropriations.

So the Pentagon, according to THE WASHINGTON TIMES, is harboring a plan, after the ratification of the present military budget, which already stands at nearly \$300 billion, of putting forward, perhaps in February or March, another "separate request for budget appropriations for military programs so as to counter the Soviet Union's violation of nuclear arms control agreements." In specific terms, the newspaper states, this is a question of additional finance for the Pentagon's plans to deploy even more cruise missiles on U.S. warships, submarines, and bombers. There you have the whole "mechanics" of it!

At the very end of last year the militarists gave the U.S. people yet another "Christmas present" when an underground nuclear explosion code-named "Goldstone" was conducted at the test range in Nevada. Its yield, according to official figures, was 150 kilotons, or 10 times greater than the bomb which destroyed Hiroshima. Why does Washington throw down such a blatant challenge to the world's peoples, who persistently demand the cessation of nuclear explosions?

This question may be answered to a certain extent by materials which appeared in AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE TECHNOLOGY recently, describing the Pentagon's intensified work with X-ray lasers aimed at using the latter to transform the energy of a thermonuclear explosion in space into a ray capable of destroying missiles and nuclear warheads. The laser is termed the "heart" of the "star wars" program. The proposal is to base the laser in space, which means putting into orbit the nuclear bombs which will feed the lasers. Thus the truth is revealed about what is really behind the claims that the notorious "Strategic Defense Initiative" is aimed at "eliminating nuclear weapons." Thus they would like to sweep aside in one fell swoop several Soviet-U.S. and international agreements concluded in the sixties and seventies which represent a definite obstacle to an unrestricted arms race.

One of the basic results of the meeting of the USSR and U.S. leaders in Geneva was that they succeeded in taking the first steps toward overcoming distrust. The vital interests of the United States and the USSR demand that what has been achieved in this direction be carefully protected, that the trust factor become more effectual.

One can imagine that Washington's support for the Somozists and the other "contras" whom the White House continues to designate the "democratic resistance" accords with the "spirit of Geneva." A strange understanding of the "spirit of Geneva"!

Mankind's Conscience

Hundreds of millions of people began the new year with the determination to make 1986 a year of real action to strengthen peace. This determination reflects a characteristic feature of the contemporary political situation on the planet -- the growing sense of responsibility on the part of the peoples for the fate of world peace.

Attempts are also being made to mislead those who want peace by means of ideological subversion. Even the Geneva accords are exploited, the provocative question being put: but why wage a peace struggle now if there are such accords?

But the attempts are futile. Everywhere the peoples are appreciating more and more clearly that the danger of nuclear catastrophe threatening the world imperatively demands the most resolute action on their part.

The movement opposed to the plans to turn outer space into an arena for war has involved particularly extensively the strata of the intelligentsia who are aware through their professions of the infinite misfortune with which these plans threaten mankind. The movement by scientists to boycott the "star wars" program is expanding. Some 1,700 U.S. scientists, including 15 holders of the Nobel Prize, as well as more than 1,000 engineers and other staffers of scientific research establishments and higher educational institutions in the country have signed documents stating that they refuse to take part in research aimed at creating space weapons. In the FRG 3,500 scientists and in Japan more than 1,200 scientists from 104 of the country's universities have signed protests against "star wars."

Some 2 million Frenchmen and Frenchwomen have signed an antiwar appeal; 1.5 million Americans have signed a petition demanding an end to nuclear explosions; almost 75 percent of British people, according to a poll, are in favor of a general freeze on nuclear arsenals and more than 80 percent favor the halting of nuclear weapons tests in the United States and Britain. In Japan 5 prefectures and more than 640 cities, villages, and city districts have already declared themselves nuclear free zones. By the beginning of December more than 100 U.S. cities and more than 60 Canadian cities; including major ones such as Toronto and Vancouver, had declared themselves nuclear free zones. More than 90 percent of Finns, 86 percent of Icelanders, and 80 percent of Swedes are demanding that nuclear weapons be denied access to their region.

. . . Envoys of antiwar organizations from a number of U.S. states mounted a New Year "vigil" near a nuclear test range in Nevada. Campfires lit by the courageous women of Greenham Common, England, burn outside a U.S. "arsenal of winged death." It is scarcely possible to count all the places where people of good will are mounting a peace vigil!

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