

JPRS-TAC-91-010
29 APRIL 1991



JPRS Report

Arms Control

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A

Approved for public release;
Distribution Unlimited

DTIC QUALITY INSPECTED 2

19980604 154

REPRODUCED BY
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
NATIONAL TECHNICAL INFORMATION SERVICE
SPRINGFIELD, VA. 22161

Arms Control

JPRS-TAC-91-010

CONTENTS

29 April 1991

AFRICA

ANGOLA

UNITA Reportedly Using 'Toxic Substances' [Luanda Radio 15 Apr]	1
MPLA Planes Reportedly Dropping Chemical Bombs [KUP 15 Apr]	1

CHINA

Gorbachev Asian Security Proposals on Visit to Japan Reported	2
Security Talks Proposed [XINHUA 17 Apr]	2
Reaction to Plan 'Cool' [XINHUA 17 Apr]	2
UN Delegate Supports Indian Ocean Peace Zone [XINHUA 17 Apr]	3
Sino-Soviet Talks on Border Disarmament Continue [XINHUA 18 Apr]	3

EAST ASIA

JAPAN

Gorbachev Proposes Asian Security System in Talks With Kaifu	4
2d Round of Talks Begin [Tokyo TV 17 Apr]	4
Gorbachev Calls for Security Framework [KYODO 17 Apr]	4
Gorbachev, Kaifu Diverge on Security [KYODO 17 Apr]	4
Further on Security Framework [KYODO 17 Apr]	5
Ignatenko Holds Briefing on Talks [Tokyo TV 17 Apr]	6
Gorbachev Addresses Japanese Diet During Tokyo Visit	7
Calls for Asian Security Framework [KYODO 17 Apr]	7
Further on Diet Speech [KYODO 17 Apr]	7
Reaction to Diet Speech [KYODO 17 Apr]	8

EAST EUROPE

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Dienstbier on Memorandum on European Security [CTK 9 Apr]	9
Defense Minister Views Nuclear Ammunition Storage [CTK 16 Apr]	9

HUNGARY

Soviet Debt Payment, Troop Pullout Link Examined [MTI 10 Apr]	10
Assembly Committee Told of Soviet Withdrawal [MTI 17 Apr]	10

POLAND

Government Aide Discusses Soviet Troop Withdrawal	
[Z. Ostrowski; DZIENNIK BALTYCKI 6-7 Apr]	10
Soviet Troop Withdrawal Begins 9 Apr [Warsaw Radio 9 Apr]	12
Soviet Commander Promises Soviet Withdrawal From Swidnica [PAP 10 Apr]	12
Soviet Troop Withdrawal Begins, Optimism on Talks	
[M. Wagrowska; RZECZPOSPOLITA 11 Apr]	12
Reports on Sixth Round of Soviet Troop Withdrawal Talks	13
'Will To Reach Agreement' Seen [Warsaw Radio 11 Apr]	13
Round Ends [W. Chodkiewicz; Warsaw Radio 12 Apr]	13
Transport To Facilitate USSR Troop Withdrawal [PAP 12 Apr]	13

NEAR EAST & SOUTH ASIA

PAKISTAN

Paper Criticizes U.S. Policy on Chemical Weapons	[THE MUSLIM 14 Apr]	14
--	---------------------	----

SOVIET UNION

GENERAL

Aleksey Arbatov Defends Arms Treaties	[NOVOYE VREMYA No 9, Mar]	15
Viktor Karpov Examines Conversion Problems	[Moscow International 8 Apr]	18

SDI, DEFENSE & SPACE ARMS

PRAVDA Report on Early-Warning Radar System	[A. Gorokhov; PRAVDA 15 Apr]	18
---	------------------------------	----

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

U.S. INF Inspection Team Arrives in Ulan-Ude	[S. Trofimov; TASS 16 Apr]	20
--	----------------------------	----

CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN EUROPE

Leadership at Odds Over Transferred Tank Forces		
[D. Yakushkin; MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI No 12, 24 Mar]		21
Radio Views Soviet Navy Divisions Issue	[V. Kozyakov; Moscow International 8 Apr]	21
Bogachev: Maintaining NATO Now Unacceptable	[V. Bogachev; TASS 9 Apr]	22
Yazov Denies Violating Conventional Arms Treaty	[O. Moskovskiy; TASS 9 Apr]	22
Further Reports on Talks With Poland, Troop Pullout		23
Deputy Chief of General Staff Comments	[A. Kleymentov; IZVESTIYA 9 Apr]	23
DER SPIEGEL Article Called 'Slandorous'	[V. Panarin; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 9 Apr]	23
General on Stages of Withdrawal	[V. Zhurbenko; TASS 10 Apr]	24
Further Report	[V. Zhurbenko; Beijing XINHUA 10 Apr]	24
Walesa: Speed Up Talks	[IZVESTIYA 11 Apr]	25
Talks Proceeding Slowly	[Yu. Ulyanov; Moscow TV 12 Apr]	25
Foreign Ministry Aide on Sixth Round of Talks	[V. Kopteltsev; IZVESTIYA 16 Apr]	25
Commentary Views Difficulties of Withdrawal	[Moscow International 16 Apr]	26
Documents on Troop Withdrawal From Hungary Signed		
[A. Borovkov; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 12 Apr]		26
Paris Forum on European Security Reported		27
Akhromeyev Urges NATO Dismantling	[Paris AFP 11 Apr]	27
'Common Denominator' Sought	[S. Sidorov; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 13 Apr]	27
'Cautious Optimism' on Third Round of CFE Talks	[V. Smelov; TASS 15 Apr]	28
Fitzwater Cited on CFE Treaty-Summit Linkage	[A. Fedyashin; TASS 16 Apr]	29
CSCE 'Conflict Prevention' Center Meets	[V. Smelov; TASS 16 Apr]	29
Delegation Proposes Working CFE Document	[V. Smelov; TASS 18 Apr]	29

SHORT-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

Commander on 'Secret Nuclear Garrisons' in Poland	[Warsaw PAP 15 Apr]	30
'Small Amount' of Nuclear Ammo Withdrawn From CSFR	[TASS 18 Apr]	30

NUCLEAR TESTING

Panel Cited on Novaya Zemlya Radiation Levels	[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 15 Apr]	30
Nuclear Program Transfer To Be Complete by '92	[V. Anufriyev; TASS 17 Apr]	31

CHEMICAL & BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

International CW Conference Opens in Moscow [M. Ivanov; TASS 9 Apr]	31
Moscow CW Conference To Discuss Conclusion, Implementation of Ban [M. Ivanov; TASS 9 Apr]	31
Moscow CW Conference Views Technology of Destruction [S. Kondratenko; TASS 12 Apr]	32

ASIAN SECURITY ISSUES

General Staff Deputy Chief on Far East Balance [V. Omelichev; IZVESTIYA 12 Apr]	32
Admiral Calls Pacific Fleet Defensive Force [G. Khvatov; TASS 15 Apr]	34
Admiral Tallies Pacific Fleet Force Reductions [G. Khvatov; TASS 16 Apr]	34
Soviet Ambassador on Withdrawal From Mongolia [Beijing XINHUA 17 Apr]	34

WEST EUROPE

GERMANY

Arms Conversion Problems in Ex-GDR Analyzed [E. Drechsel, et al; WEHERTECHNIK Mar] ...	35
U.S. To Withdraw More Troops Than Planned [WELT AM SONNTAG 7 Apr]	39
Defense Minister: U.S. Nuclear Presence Necessary [R. Moniac; DIE WELT 11 Apr]	40
CW Factory Plans for Libya Reach 'Third Party' [DPA 11 Apr]	40

SWITZERLAND

Inquiry Into Von Roll Company's Iraq Dealings [JOURNAL DE GENEVE 19 Mar]	41
--	----

ANGOLA

UNITA Reportedly Using 'Toxic Substances'

*MB1504200191 Luanda Domestic Service
in Portuguese 1910 GMT 15 Apr 91*

[Text] UNITA [National Union for the Total Independence of Angola] has intensified its attacks on Luena city, in Moxico Province. The attacks began at 1600 [1500 GMT] yesterday and have been growing in their intensity.

Now UNITA's most inhuman (?aspect) is the use of [word indistinct] with toxic substances because it seeks massive destruction [words indistinct] direct clashes with the FAPLA [People's Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola] forces.

The attacks have been increasing and causing deaths among civilians and military personnel alike. Homes have also been destroyed. The airport is one of UNITA's preferred targets. The enemy's aim is to render the airport inoperative.

Early this morning the enemy tried to capture the city yet again. It is believed that they used three battalions, including the 8th Regular Battalion.

Observing its duty to preserve our sovereignty and defend the people and Luena city, the FAPLA responded to this vain attempt by UNITA to take Luena through force. The enemy suffered considerable losses.

The enemy left 23 soldiers killed on the battlefield, including one lieutenant and one second lieutenant. Our forces also captured four PKM submachine guns, one 60-mm mortar, two RPG-7 rocket launchers, 26 AK weapons, two RPK submachine guns, three antitank missile launchers, one (?M-79) [word indistinct], 100 shells for RPG-7 rocket launchers, 20 shells for 60-mm mortars, four ammunition belts for PKM submachine guns, 18 hand grenades, eight grenades for (?M-79) [word indistinct], 25 AK clips, and large quantities of ammunition.

The FAPLA forces suffered two soldiers killed and five wounded.

It is also worth noting that people are currently experiencing difficult conditions because of sanitation problems and food shortages. This situation must immediately be dealt with. Hospitals in particular can no longer provide adequate

medical care. This affects the people in general and war-displaced people in particular.

Meanwhile, UNITA has continued moving war materiel and soldiers from Munhango, Cuemba, and Chicala to Luena.

At about 1015 today an unidentified light aircraft overflew Luena at a very high altitude. It flew in from Zaire above the railroad and followed the Lumeje River up to Luena to conduct reconnaissance missions and correct the enemy's artillery fire.

The Angolan rebels have also been active in other parts of the country.

On 13 April UNITA shelled the outskirts of Cuito city, in Bie Province, wounding ten civilians and extensively damaging one house.

On 14 April UNITA attacked the capital of Bie Province's Catabola District and wounded four civilians.

FAPLA responded to an enemy attack 30 km northwest of Cafunfo, in Lunda Norte Province, on [date indistinct]. Our forces killed seven UNITA soldiers and captured their weapons. Also on that day, our forces killed another two UNITA soldiers in a clash near Cazonda, in Lunda Norte Province.

MPLA Planes Reportedly Dropping Chemical Bombs

*MB1504203191 (Clandestine) KUP in English to
Southern and Central Africa 1920 GMT 15 Apr 91*

[Text] Jamba, Monday, April 15..... MPLA [Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola] military aircraft are reported to be indiscriminately shelling civilian settlements on the outskirts of the eastern Angolan town of Luena.

Reports say many civilians have died as a result of heavy air raids by MPLA MiG jetfighters using chemical and phosphorous bombs.

The reports quote military sources as saying at least 10 civilians have been killed and many more injured in the latest air bombardments by MPLA MiG's on civilian settlements in UNITA [National Union for the Total Independence of Angola]-controlled areas on the outskirts of Luena.

The bombing raids have been stepped up since last weekend.

Gorbachev Asian Security Proposals on Visit to Japan Reported**Security Talks Proposed**

OW1704112291 Beijing XINHUA in English
1044 GMT 17 Apr 91

["Gorbachev Proposes Trilateral Meeting for Security in Asia"—XINHUA headline]

[Text] Tokyo, April 17 (XINHUA)—Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev today called for a "new relationship" with Japan, and proposed trilateral consultations be held among Japan, the Soviet Union and the United States as a confidence-building measure.

The statement came in the Soviet leader's address at a plenary session of the House of Representatives of the Diet (Japanese parliament).

"It is not of our intentions to undermine the politico-military structures that exist in the region," Gorbachev said.

Stating that the Soviet Union expects the military aspect in international relations to become less important, the Soviet leader said in his 45-minute speech that the Soviet Union will reduce its military presence in Asia and the Pacific—a process that could develop at a faster pace if other naval powers follow suit.

Gorbachev also repeated his proposal that a five-nation regional conference grouping Japan, the Soviet Union, China, India and the United States be held as the first step toward establishing a multilateral framework for security in Asia.

"I think it is time we really came to grips with the idea of a security conference and a zone of cooperation to be established in Northeast Asia and the Sea of Japan," he said.

Gorbachev first put forward the proposal in 1986 in a speech in Vladivostok in the Soviet Far East, calling for the "five Asia-Pacific powers to meet in order to pave the way for the creation of an Asian security forum.

During his second round of talks with Japanese Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu earlier in the day, Gorbachev reiterated his five-nation Asia-Pacific security framework scenario.

But Kaifu reacted coolly to the idea, saying that Japan considers it more effective to tackle regional problems in a case-by-case approach.

Also in his speech to the Diet, Gorbachev expressed "understanding" of Japan's efforts to play an active role in seeking a settlement of the Cambodia conflict. Meanwhile, he also appreciated Japan's efforts in opening dialogue with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea for establishing diplomatic relations.

Gorbachev suggested that an Asian-Pacific foreign ministers meeting be convened in 1993.

Reaction to Plan 'Cool'

OW1704144291 Beijing XINHUA in English
1324 GMT 17 Apr 91

[Text] Tokyo, April 17 (XINHUA)—Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev today proposed an Asian-Pacific security framework only to a cool reception by Japanese legislators.

Speaking at a joint session of the Japanese Diet (parliament) today, Gorbachev proposed that a five-member security conference be held and that a zone of cooperation be established in Northeast Asia and the Sea of Japan.

The five members for the proposed security conference are the Soviet Union, the United States, China, India and Japan.

The Soviet president also called for a "new relationship" with Japan, and proposed trilateral consultations among Tokyo, Moscow and Washington should be initiated as a confidence-building measure.

Moreover, Gorbachev expressed his willingness to have a concrete dialogue with Japanese leaders on military issues, adding that the Soviet Union will reduce its military presence in the Asian-Pacific region.

Observers here noted that the Japanese legislators who listened to Gorbachev's 45-minute speech remained silent to the Soviet leader's plans on the Asian scene, despite sporadic applause for some other parts of his speech.

Japanese Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu said in his second round of talks with Gorbachev today that his country considered it more effective to tackle regional problems one by one than in a comprehensive way.

Kaifu stressed that the situation in Asia is not of the same nature as that in Europe. The best way to achieve peace and security, he noted, is to enhance the development of Asian and Pacific countries in a comprehensive manner.

Tokyo has long been cool to Soviet suggestions on regional security arrangements, contending that issues such as Japan's territorial dispute with Moscow, the Cambodian conflict, and tensions on the Korean peninsula should be given priority.

According to reports reaching here, Washington has also urged Tokyo to be cautious in talks with Moscow on issues like a multinational security pact.

The reports said the Bush administration's fear is that such a pact might upset the military balance between Washington and Moscow.

Yukihiko Ikeda, director general of the Japanese Defense Agency, said on April 12 that because of the limited political dialogue between the two countries, Japan would have difficulties in dealing with a Soviet-proposed security plan in the Asian-Pacific region.

UN Delegate Supports Indian Ocean Peace Zone

*OW1804000991 Beijing XINHUA in English
2350 GMT 17 Apr 91*

[Text] United Nations, April 17 (XINHUA)—China today reaffirmed its support for the establishment of a peace zone in the Indian Ocean region and called for the completion of preparations for the Indian Ocean conference.

Speaking at the U.N. ad hoc committee on the Indian Ocean, Chinese delegate Sha Zukang said, "China has always supported the efforts of the Indian Ocean countries for a zone of peace in the region."

He pointed out, however, that to establish such a zone, the international community "should demand that outside powers respect the sovereignty of countries of the region."

"Military occupation and presence in the Indian Ocean region must be eliminated, on land, sea, and air," he declared.

Meanwhile, he called on the Indian Ocean states to strictly abide by the U.N. Charter in their relations with each other and refrain from seeking armaments in excess of their defense needs.

Sha noted that a trend is emerging toward a multipolar world, yet the world is far from tranquil and the gap between the North and South, the rich and poor, continues to grow.

As a result, he said, the international situation has become more unstable. "The situation in the Gulf, which is an extension of the Indian Ocean, typifies that instability."

He thus urged the ad hoc committee to work hard so as to complete preparations for the Indian Ocean conference, which, after repeated postponement since 1981, is scheduled to be held in Colombo, Sri Lanka, in 1992.

The Chinese delegate also expressed regret at the withdrawal and non-participation of some countries in the work of the ad hoc committee, saying such actions created obstacles in the committee's work. He called for consultations with those countries with a view to persuading them to return to the committee at the earliest date.

Three permanent members of the Security Council—Britain, France and the United States—have withdrawn from the 49-member committee set up in 1971 while some other committee members announced non-participation in its work.

The current session of the committee, which began on April 15, will consider issues related to the Indian Ocean conference and address matters such as the political and security climate in the region and characteristics of the zone of peace, which was declared by the 26th General Assembly. It will conclude on April 19.

Sino-Soviet Talks on Border Disarmament Continue

*OW1804114091 Beijing XINHUA Domestic Service
in Chinese 1020 GMT 18 Apr 91*

[Text] Moscow, 18 April (XINHUA)—Chinese and Soviet delegations of foreign and military affairs experts held their third round of talks in Moscow 4-18 April to discuss the implementation of the two governments' agreement governing the guiding principles for the mutual reduction of military forces along the Sino-Soviet border areas and for promoting trust in the military sphere.

Some progress was achieved in the talks, which proceeded in a friendly, earnest, and truth-seeking atmosphere. Both sides agreed that negotiations would continue in connection with drawing up relevant documents on specific steps in implementing the guiding principles.

During the negotiations, Deputy Soviet Foreign Minister Rogachev met with members of the Chinese delegation. The Chinese delegation also paid a visit to the Belorussian Military Region.

JAPAN

Gorbachev Proposes Asian Security System in Talks With Kaifu**2d Round of Talks Begin**

OW1704045191 Tokyo NHK General Television Network in Japanese 0300 GMT 17 Apr 91

[Excerpt] Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev, who is now on a visit to Japan, began the second round of his summit talks with Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu this morning. The talks, centering on the international situation, are still underway. The third round of talks is scheduled for this evening; at this round, the number of conferees will be reduced to the minimum. Thus the talks on the northern territories issue, the focal point, are coming to a most important turning point.

[Reporter Kenzo Sano of the Political Department] I am reporting to you from the Foreign Ministry.

The second round of summit talks between Prime Minister Kaifu and President Gorbachev started at 0940 [0040 GMT] this morning at the State Guesthouse. It is still continuing at this moment.

According to information obtained so far, the subjects being taken up for discussion at the talks are international developments, including East-West relations, centering around U.S.-Soviet ties; the post-Gulf war Middle East security issue; and the Asian-Pacific situation, including the Korean peninsula and Cambodian questions.

President Gorbachev is particularly interested in the Asian-Pacific situation. He seems to be proposing the establishment of a new council for holding comprehensive consultations on the security of the Asian-Pacific region.

The basic position of the Japanese side on this question is that efforts should be made for the resolution of separate issues, such as Cambodia, the Korean peninsula and Japanese-Soviet relations, before establishing the Soviet-proposed comprehensive council in the Asian-Pacific region. It appears that Prime Minister Kaifu is explaining this Japanese viewpoint to President Gorbachev.

The northern territories issue, the focal point, is to be taken up at length at the third round of summit talks, which is scheduled for this evening. The third round is expected to be held with the participants limited to a very small number, including the two top leaders. [passage omitted]

Gorbachev Calls for Security Framework

OW1704051291 Tokyo KYODO in English 0450 GMT 17 Apr 91

[Text] Tokyo, April 17 (KYODO)—Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev on Wednesday proposed the establishment of a five-nation security framework in the Asia-Pacific region, Japanese officials said.

The officials said Gorbachev made the proposal in a meeting with Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu, saying the framework would consist of the United States, China, India in addition to the Soviet Union and Japan.

The meeting, which lasted nearly two and a half hours, focused primarily on international issues, including East-West ties, the situation in the Middle East, and security in the Asia-Pacific region, the officials said.

It was the second round of talks between the two leaders since Gorbachev arrived in Tokyo on Tuesday for a four-day state visit.

Japanese officials said Kaifu expressed "strong concern" in Wednesday's meeting over the transfer of Soviet forces east of the Ural mountains—the traditional geographical boundary between Europe and Asia.

The officials said Kaifu also underlined the importance of cooperation between the United States and the Soviet Union, saying cooperation between the superpowers "is important to the prosperity of mankind."

Turning to the Korean peninsula, Kaifu expressed concern about possible development of nuclear weapons by North Korea and said Pyongyang should allow international inspection of its nuclear facilities, Japanese officials said.

Gorbachev, who will be traveling to South Korea after his four-day trip to Japan, said he appreciates the efforts Japan is making to normalize ties with North Korea.

Gorbachev also called for international efforts to bridge the gap between the northern and southern hemispheres, Japanese officials said.

Gorbachev, Kaifu Diverge on Security

OW1704062391 Tokyo KYODO in English 0544 GMT 17 Apr 91

[Excerpt] Tokyo, April 17 (KYODO)—Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev and Japanese Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu on Wednesday differed in their assessments of the best way to achieve peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region, Foreign Ministry officials said.

They said Gorbachev proposed the convening of a meeting among the Soviet Union, Japan, China, India, and the United States to discuss setting up of a multilateral forum on security and cooperation issues in the Asia-Pacific region.

He made the proposal in a two-and-a-half-hour meeting with Kaifu at the Akasaka State Guesthouse in central Tokyo, and was expected to expand on it in an address later in the day before the Japanese Diet.

But Kaifu, responding to the proposal, said Japan considers it more effective to tackle regional problems one by one, instead of in a comprehensive manner.

He said it would be difficult, for example, to find a solution to the problems of the Korean peninsula through an international gathering.

Rejecting the concept put forward by Gorbachev of an Asian version of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), Kaifu stressed that the situation in Asia is not of the same nature as that in Europe, where two giant military blocs had until recently confronted each other.

Japan's position, he said, is that raising the level of development of the countries of the Asia-Pacific region in a comprehensive manner is the best way to achieve peace and stability.

Offering an alternative mechanism to facilitate the Soviet Union's integration into the region, Kaifu said that Soviet participation in the Pacific Economic Cooperation Conference (PECC) would likely be considered by the present members of the forum, which is comprised of participants from both the public and private sectors.

Moscow has voiced a wish for full membership of PECC, which was formed in 1980. In 1989, it sent an observer delegation to the fifth PECC conference in Vancouver, Canada.

Gorbachev said his idea does not envisage a European blueprint for security being forced on Asia. He said it is intended as a logical step in the trend emerging in the region, where multilateral cooperation and dialogue is increasing.

Kaifu expressed concern over the Soviet Union's transfer of thousands of weapons and vehicles, including tanks and warplanes, to storage depots east of the Ural Mountains—the traditional geographical boundary between Europe and Asia—to escape destruction under the 21-nation Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) agreement signed in Paris last fall.

Japan is wary that the transfer is bringing about a qualitative upgrading of Soviet forces in the Far East which would be incompatible with the present period of relaxed tensions.

The Soviet leader for his part expressed concern over the gap between the North and South, saying the industrial countries of the northern hemisphere should not regard those countries in the southern hemisphere as mere suppliers of raw materials.

Kaifu said Japan is concerned over North Korea's refusal to allow international inspection of its nuclear facilities to ensure it is not developing a nuclear weapons capability.

Officials would not divulge Gorbachev's response.

Soviet presidential spokesman Vitaliy Ignatenko said Monday that Moscow has warned North Korea it will stop "all kinds of supplies and cooperation" if Pyongyang refuses to allow the inspections.

Moscow has supplied North Korea with nuclear fuel under a 1985 agreement. [passage omitted]

Further on Security Framework

OW1704084091 Tokyo KYODO in English 0750 GMT
17 Apr 91

[Excerpt] Tokyo, April 17 (KYODO)—Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev unveiled a plan for an Asia-Pacific security framework Wednesday, calling on the United States, Japan, China, and India to join the Soviet Union in exploring the concept of a new order in the region.

Gorbachev unveiled the Asian security proposal first in a meeting with Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu and expanded on the theme in an address to a joint session of the Diet, Japan's legislature.

In his first major policy speech on the Asia-Pacific in nearly three years, Gorbachev also called for a "new relationship" with Japan, and proposed initiating trilateral consultations between Tokyo, Moscow, and Washington as a confidence building measure.

The legislators who listened to the 45-minute speech applauded politely at times, but remained silent when the Soviet leader outlined his Asian version of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), mirroring the unenthusiastic response it received from Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu during their two and a half hours of talks held during the morning.

The meeting, which took place at the Akasaka Guesthouse, was the second of three scheduled sessions between the two leaders since Gorbachev arrived in Tokyo on Tuesday for four-day visit.

Japanese Foreign Ministry officials said Kaifu told Gorbachev Japan considers it more effective to tackle regional problems one by one, and that in any case the situation in Asia is not of the same nature as that in Europe.

Japan has in the past responded coolly to such suggestions, citing the need to first resolve outstanding issues such as the Cambodian conflict, tensions on the Korean peninsula, and Japan's own territorial dispute with the Soviet Union.

Gorbachev said the five Asia-Pacific powers should meet in order to pave the way for the creation of an Asian

security forum, which he first proposed in 1986 in a speech in Vladivostok in the Soviet Far East.

In his talks with Kaifu, Gorbachev said his idea does not envisage a European blueprint for security being forced on Asia. He said it is intended as a logical step in the trend emerging in the region, where multilateral cooperation and dialogue is increasing.

The Soviet leader expressed "understanding" of Japan's bid to play an active role in arriving at a settlement of the Cambodian conflict, and welcomed Japan's discussions with North Korea on establishing diplomatic relations.

He also proposed "a security conference and a zone of cooperation to be established in Northeast Asia and the Sea of Japan" and renewed a proposal to convene an Asia-Pacific foreign ministers' meeting in 1993.

He called for arms reduction in Asia and the Pacific, a process which he said "could develop at a faster pace if the other naval powers followed suit."

The United States, which has an advantage in terms of naval power in the Pacific, has not responded favorably to Soviet calls for naval arms reduction. The Soviet Union has more ground forces in the region.

Gorbachev described his summit talks with Kaifu as "the beginning of a breakthrough" in bilateral relations.

He referred obliquely to strains in bilateral ties, but made no direct reference to how the two nations might resolve a decades-old dispute over ownership of four islands off Hokkaido, seized by the Soviets at the close of World War II.

"Past mistakes should be corrected with prudence and due regard for the obvious fact that over the decades a new reality has emerged," he said.

Kaifu expressed concern in his Wednesday morning meeting with Gorbachev over the Soviet Union's transfer of thousands of tanks and warplanes east of the Ural Mountains—the traditional geographical boundary between Europe and Asia—allegedly to escape destruction under the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) agreement signed in Paris last fall.

Japan is wary that the transfer is bringing about a qualitative upgrading of Soviet forces in the Far East which it feels would be incompatible with the present period of relaxed tensions.

Kaifu said Japan is concerned over North Korea's refusal to allow international inspection of its nuclear facilities to ensure it is not developing a nuclear weapons capability.

Gorbachev agreed, and said the Soviet Union has urged North Korea to cooperate with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Soviet presidential spokesman Vitaliy Ignatenko told reporters in a separate briefing on Wednesday's summit meeting.

Prior to the talks with Kaifu, Gorbachev met Japanese opposition leader Takako Doi, chairwoman of the Social Democratic Party, over breakfast at the Akasaka State Guesthouse, where the Soviet president and his wife Raisa are staying.

In the first session of talks between Kaifu and Gorbachev on Tuesday they discussed bilateral ties, including Japan's demand for the return of the four islands.

Kaifu urged the Soviet president to acknowledge Japanese sovereignty over the four islands—Kunashiri, Etorofu, Shikotan, and the Habomai islets—but neither Japanese nor Soviet officials would divulge details of the talks.

Japan has refused to conclude a peace treaty with the Soviet Union and is withholding any significant economic help to Moscow pending a settlement of the dispute.

Kaifu and Gorbachev agreed Tuesday that the leaders of the two countries should meet more frequently, and Kaifu accepted Gorbachev's invitation to Kaifu to visit Moscow, officials said.

According to the Soviet sources traveling with Gorbachev, the Soviet leader intends to visit Tokyo again early next year to reciprocate Kaifu's visit to Moscow, which may take place in August.

The Soviet Government hopes to conclude a peace treaty to normalize ties at the summit talks in Moscow following Gorbachev's next visit to Japan, the Soviet sources said.

The sources said the Soviet side is ready to incorporate the words "territorial issue" in a joint statement to be released Thursday but is reluctant to include any concrete proposal on the subject. [passage omitted]

Ignatenko Holds Briefing on Talks

OW1704124591 Tokyo NHK General Television Network in Japanese 1000 GMT 17 Apr 91

[Text] Vitaliy Ignatenko, President Mikhail Gorbachev's spokesman, held a news conference today on the second round of the Japanese-Soviet summit talks. In the news conference, the spokesman said that President Gorbachev and Prime Minister Kaifu had exchanged views on the situations in five regions, including the Asia-Pacific region and the Korean peninsula, and disclosed that President Gorbachev had expressed his satisfaction with the results of the summit talks thus far.

According to the spokesman, during their exchange on the situation on the Korean peninsula, the Japanese and Soviet leaders expressed deep concern over North Korea's nuclear development and shared the view that any related research should be placed under the supervision of the International Atomic Energy Agency. On the Middle East issue, they also agreed that the issue

should be resolved comprehensively. President Gorbachev pointed out that Iraq should not be pushed into an impasse and that it should be allowed to participate in the process of resolving the Middle East issue. The Soviet president highly rated the relations of cooperation between the Soviet Union and the United States in the Gulf war and President Bush's political role, and predicted that such relations would be maintained in the future.

Gorbachev Addresses Japanese Diet During Tokyo Visit

Calls for Asian Security Framework

OW1704073691 Tokyo KYODO in English 0715 GMT 17 Apr 91

[Excerpt] Tokyo, April 17 (KYODO)—Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev proposed Wednesday holding a five-nation regional conference as a first step toward establishing a multilateral security framework in Asia.

Gorbachev, in his first major policy speech on the Asia-Pacific in nearly three years, also called for a "new relationship" with Japan, and proposed initiating trilateral consultations between Japan, the Soviet Union, and the United States as a confidence building measure.

"It is not part of our intentions to undermine the politico-military structures that exist in the region," he told a plenary session of the House of Representatives of the bicameral Diet, or parliament.

Rather, the Soviet Union expects the military aspect of international relations to become less important, he said.

Gorbachev named Japan, the Soviet Union, the United States, China and India as nations that would meet in order to pave the way for the security forum, which he first proposed in 1986 in a speech in Vladivostok in the Soviet Far East.

Japan has in the past responded coolly to such suggestions, citing the need to first resolve outstanding issues such as the Cambodian conflict, tensions on the Korean peninsula, and Japan's own territorial dispute with the Soviet Union.

Gorbachev in the speech expressed "understanding" of Japan's bid to play an active role in arriving at a settlement of the Cambodian conflict, and welcomed Japan's discussions with North Korea on establishing diplomatic relations.

"I think it is time we really came to grips with the idea of a security conference and a zone of cooperation to be established in Northeast Asia and the Sea of Japan," he said, reiterating a proposal to convene an Asian-Pacific foreign ministers meeting in 1993.

"We intend to reduce the military presence in Asia and the Pacific—a process that could develop at a faster pace if the other naval powers followed suit," he said.

The United States, which enjoys a naval advantage in the Pacific, has not responded favorably to Soviet calls for naval arms reduction. The Soviet Union has more ground forces in the region. [passage omitted]

Further on Diet Speech

OW1704080491 Tokyo KYODO in English 0738 GMT 17 Apr 91

[Excerpt] Tokyo, April 17 (KYODO)—The following are excerpts from Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev's speech to the Diet delivered at the House of Representatives as released by the Japanese Foreign Ministry.

(Talks With Japanese Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu)

Our talks with Kaifu and Japan's other political leaders proceeded in a positive atmosphere. I think they will pave the way for a new relationship between the Soviet Union and Japan. There were no "taboo" subjects, we did not eschew polemical topics or skate over differences and disputed assessments in an indication of candor and nascent trust between us.

(Regional Defense)

We still feel that trust is lacking despite the Soviet Union's statement that it will never launch an attack on Japan and the fact that Japan has seemingly begun to overcome its fear of the "Soviet military threat." Our new military doctrine, which logically extends to the East, is predicated exclusively on the principle of defense sufficiency.

We intend to reduce the Soviet military presence in Asia and the Pacific—a process that could develop at a faster pace if the other naval powers followed suit.

It is my hope that Tokyo will take all this under careful and thorough advisement.

I find it essential to underscore that the Soviet Union stands ready to begin a concrete dialogue with Japan on military issues, which might alleviate either side's concerns. Our proposals on the subject already have been conveyed to your government.

I also think it might be advisable to begin trilateral Soviet-Japanese-U.S. consultations in an effort, as we see it, to remove suspicions and build confidence through concrete agreements.

It is not part of our intentions to undermine the politico-military structures that exist in the region. But we are betting on the inevitability of some ultimate evolution of developments, in the course of which the military aspects of international relations will become less relevant.

Given the favorable fallout from the policy of new thinking, not only in our relations with the United States and Europe but also with Asian and Pacific countries, we see no reason for abandoning it. Otherwise, we would not have been able to strengthen effectively our security

as we understand it today, not to mention the fact that the policy of new thinking has enabled us to proceed with reductions in the onerous burden of military spending.

(On Asia-Pacific Regional Affairs)

We would find it natural and in line with the imperatives of this moment if Japan established diplomatic relations with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. We approach with understanding Japan's intention to play an active part in a Cambodian settlement.

We feel that the idea of a multilateral forum on security and cooperation problems remains as relevant as ever. Sooner or later, life will make us accept that idea.

As a first step in this direction we might consider holding a five-party conference with the Soviet Union, the United States, China, India, and Japan taking part. Also, we confirm our proposal to convene in 1993 a foreign ministers' meeting of the Asia-Pacific countries.

I think it is time we really came to grips with the idea of a security conference and a zone of cooperation to be established in Northeast Asia and the Sea of Japan. The Soviet Union stands to gain if the economy of Soviet Far East and Siberia were to be linked up with the emerging economic complex of Asia and the Pacific. [passage omitted]

Reaction to Diet Speech

OW1704121991 Tokyo KYODO in English 1200 GMT 17 Apr 91

[Text] Tokyo, April 17 (KYODO)—Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev's speech at the Diet on Wednesday was welcomed by political leaders, but some expressed regret that he failed to mention his position on the settlement of the territorial dispute with Japan.

Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu said of Gorbachev's speech, "I found something moving in it. I would rate the content highly."

Kaifu, however, refused to comment further to reporters, saying any remarks he might make could have some effect on his talks with Gorbachev.

Keizo Obuchi, secretary general of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party, said he valued the speech because Gorbachev spoke frankly of the difficulties the Soviet Union faces and that he restored his hope in the success of perestroika.

Obuchi said it would be better if Gorbachev had clarified his position on the settlement of the territorial dispute.

Takako Doi, chairwoman of the Social Democratic Party, said Gorbachev showed a humanitarian attitude in his desire to tackle peace issues, disarmament and the environment.

The leader of the largest opposition party said Gorbachev's visit would be a significant event in the search for a solution to the territorial dispute.

Koshiro Ishida, chairman of No. 2 opposition Komeito, said it was an excellent speech with insight and substance, but he regretted that Gorbachev failed to give any hint about a solution to the territorial issue.

Keigo Ouchi, chairman of the minor opposition Democratic Socialist Party, echoed Ishida's view.

Tetsuzo Fuwa, presidium chairman of the Japanese Communist Party, said Gorbachev virtually said the Soviet Union need not redress its "policy of favoring great powers and hegemonism."

A top Foreign Ministry official said there is a gap between Gorbachev's call for a multilateral regional conference for the establishment of a security framework in Asia and Japan's position.

Japan maintains that settlements of regional disputes and contributions to the development of regional economies should take priority, said the official, speaking on condition of anonymity.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Dienstbier on Memorandum on European Security

AU1204131191 Prague CTK in English 1858 GMT
9 Apr 91

[Text] Prague, April 9 (CTK)— Czechoslovak Foreign Minister Jiri Dienstbier said here today that a Federal Foreign Ministry memorandum comprises Czechoslovakia's initiatives aimed to initiate a debate between the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) participants contributing towards the institutionalization of the European process.

After handing over of the memorandum of the Czechoslovak Foreign Ministry on European Security to diplomats representing the CSCE signatories, he told newsmen that Czechoslovakia wants a Helsinki II summit, due in 1992, to highly contribute to the creation of a new mechanism of all-European security. Czechoslovakia also thinks that this summit should come to the conclusion that Europe needs a permanent political body to exist within the CSCE framework, which would be capable of reacting to the needs and urgent problems of the continent, Dienstbier said.

He briefed journalists about his visit to Washington next week during which he will have talks with U.S. Secretary of State James Baker. The talks will deal with Czechoslovakia's ideas on further moves of the Helsinki process, developments in Central Europe as well as with economic and trade relations between Czechoslovakia and the United States. Dienstbier stressed that it is the United States that supports the Czechoslovak concept of the institutionalization of the Helsinki Process. The CSCE is a platform linking the United States and Canada with the European countries. The interest in promoting these relations has increased also in connection with the new conditions in Central and Eastern Europe, Dienstbier said.

He spoke about a working visit by German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher to Prague, scheduled for April 11. He confirmed that preparations for a treaty to be signed between Czechoslovakia and the FRG, which is to be a basis of new relations in the future, will be on the agenda of their talks. He described as a provocation the questioning of the present property rights issues in the western and northern border areas in the Czech Republic in connection with the drafting of the new bilateral treaty. "The German officials demand no restitution. In no case is the Czechoslovak-German border questioned either by the FRG government or by the Sudeten German Landsmannschaft", Dienstbier said.

Defense Minister Views Nuclear Ammunition Storage

LD1604174691 Prague CTK in English 1642 GMT
16 Apr 91

[Text] Prague, April 16 (CTK)—Czechoslovak Defence Minister Lubos Dobrovsky told the Armed Forces and Security Committees of the Federal Assembly today that nuclear ammunition was most likely stored at three sites controlled by the Soviet Army in Czechoslovakia.

The minister was answering an interpellation which demanded an explanation of a December 1965 agreement between the Czechoslovak and Soviet Governments on raising the combat preparedness of rocket forces and another one from 1986 on bases with nuclear ammunition on Czechoslovak territory. The existence of the agreements remained secret until recently although they concerned the sovereignty and security of the state and the life of its population, the deputies who raised the question said.

Three sites were established on the basis of the 1965 agreement in west and northwest Bohemia, at Bilina, Bela Pod Bezdezem and Misov. The minister said there was no evidence that nuclear ammunition had been stored there, nor any radioactivity recordings to prove it, but with regard to the good operating condition of the sites it is more than certain that nuclear ammunition was there.

The minister confirmed that the agreements, which were valid for an indefinite period, were marked "classified". He said he would ask the Federal Government to contact the Soviet Government in an effort to make the agreements public.

The installations were built by Czechoslovakia, with an investment of more than 208 million crowns [korunas]. Although they were then under Soviet Government supervision and under the control of the Soviet Army command, Czechoslovakia financed their operation at a total cost of 226 million crowns over the whole period.

Dobrovsky said the installation has now been taken over by the Czechoslovak Army. A protocol of October 1990 provides for the termination of the agreement by a special accord to be signed when the last Soviet troops leave Czechoslovakia.

Soviet forces have been based in Czechoslovakia since the August 1968 Warsaw Pact invasion which crushed the country's reform movement. Under a February 1990 accord between Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union all Soviet troops are to leave by the end of next June. At the moment about 10,000 remain in Czechoslovakia to complete the pull-out and according to a Soviet commander all will leave already by the end of May.

Dobrovsky gave information on professional tests administered to the highest staff of the Czechoslovak Army to assess the degree of their loyalty to the state

leadership and their ability to handle the new tasks involved in state defence and to gain public confidence.

According to Dobrovsky, most of the generals proved to be good military experts who retained a high sense of responsibility for the country's defence. However, Dobrovsky acknowledged that their political thinking is one-sided as a result of the long influence of the past regime.

The minister said that reasons for dismissal from military service were not found in any of the cases but reshuffles will have to be made. In the next few weeks changes will be carried out in the Czechoslovak Army General Staff. They will not constitute a purge and their purpose will be to stabilize the Army command, Dobrovsky said.

He said the Army was poorly equipped, especially in the areas of command, communications, reconnaissance and radio technology, and said that the Air Force was outdated too.

Some 18,000 people have been released from the Army after they applied for civilian duty and this reduces the Army's ability to fight, he said. (Those who wish to perform civilian duty as an alternative to military service serve 27 months instead of 18.).

HUNGARY

Soviet Debt Payment, Troop Pullout Link Examined

LD1004111491 Budapest MTI in English 1005 GMT 10 Apr 91

[Text] Budapest, April 10 (MTI-ECONews)—The Hungarian position seems to be softening on the question of linking settlement of the USSR's debts to Hungary to the cost of Soviet troop withdrawals. Although Hungary insists that the two questions should be treated separately, it seems likely that after the financial implications of the troop withdrawal have been agreed, the two bills will be settled at the same time.

Hungary originally wanted the Soviet Union to pay the current account surplus of 2 billion roubles over 1-1.5 years, but it now seems that it is ready to accept a longer period of 3-3.5 years. At the same time the Hungarians were unwilling to shoulder any of the costs of the Soviet troop pullout, but recently Finance Minister Mihaly Kupa has hinted that Hungary would now be ready to pay something for vacated Soviet Army facilities in advance.

The Hungarian-Soviet current account featured an 800-million-rouble Hungarian surplus in both 1989 and 1990, while this year the figure had already reached 400 million roubles by March 31, the deadline for the ending of rouble accounting in bilateral trade.

The Soviet Union is demanding that 1.7 billion of the total 2 billion transferable roubles be written off as payment for facilities vacated by its troops. Both these figures, under an earlier agreement to convert the debts into US dollars at a rate of 0.92 roubles to the dollar, now work out to 1.56 billion and 1.8 billion USD [U.S. dollars] respectively. However while the 1.8 billion USD Hungarian claim is fixed and agreed, the Soviet claim is still subject to negotiations.

Under an agreement signed by Hungarian and Soviet authorities on Monday, a detailed list will be drawn up of all damage caused by Soviet troops both to buildings and the environment, which will be handed in by June 30, 1991, the deadline for the last troops to leave. A Finance Ministry official has confirmed that the final sum will most likely be set against the Soviet debt while the remaining Hungarian surplus will be used as credit to boost Hungarian exports to the Soviet Union.

Assembly Committee Told of Soviet Withdrawal

LD1704194891 Budapest MTI in English 1824 GMT 17 Apr 91

[Text] Budapest, April 17 (MTI)—In its closed session on Wednesday, the Defence Committee of parliament reaffirmed the proposal put forward by the Ministry of Defence and the Hungarian Army on the defence principles of the Republic of Hungary.

Lieutenant General Antal Annus, state secretary of defence, gave updates on the Soviet troops pull-out and the negotiations on accounting methods. He said the Soviet troops were being withdrawn as scheduled in the inter-governmental agreement. Up to now, 85 per cent of the troops have left Hungarian territory. The military equipment is being moved out more quickly than planned, Annus said.

POLAND

Government Aide Discusses Soviet Troop Withdrawal

PM1104151891 Gdansk DZIENNIK BALTYCKI in Polish 6-7 Apr 91 pp 1, 3

[Kazimierz Netka report on news conference by General Zdzislaw Ostrowski, government plenipotentiary for the stationing of Soviet Armed Forces in Poland with unidentified reporters; place and date not given: "The Great Retreat: On Schedule or Not, It's Good News"]

[Text] "Our Armed Forces will return to the great Soviet superpower according to our own plans and along the routes chosen by them alone. We will be responsible solely for the life and safety of Soviet citizens involved." These words, spoken some time ago by General Dubinin, the USSR government plenipotentiary for the stationing of the Soviet Armed Forces in Poland, have lost none of their importance. As they make their way home from Poland, our eastern neighbor's armed forces wish to

move in the land that lies on the Vistula like the proverbial cat: along their chosen routes and exactly when they think fit.

"The Soviets do not want to enter negotiations with the Polish side on the timetable for the withdrawal of their Armed Forces from our country," General Zdzislaw Ostrowski said. "The Soviet side has already begun to exercise its variants of withdrawing units of the Northern Group of the Soviet Armed Forces from Poland. This was announced on 11 March by the chief of staff of the USSR Armed Forces, General Moiseyev, and confirmed during the fifth round of talks between representatives of the Polish Republic and the USSR.

"This year the Soviets intend to withdraw some 30 different units, including missile, engineering, and Air Force units. The number of troops stationing in Poland will be reduced by almost one-fourth. During the year 1992, 35-40 percent of the Armed Forces will be removed from Polish territories, and the remainder will leave by the end of 1993.

"I want to strongly stress," Gen. Ostrowski said, "that this is not according to any agreed timetable of withdrawal of the Armed Forces. The withdrawal operations were started without the sides' having signed an inter-governmental agreement or worked out a detailed plan of action. Combat units should be the first ones to be removed, because they are socially and ecologically the most burdensome. Despite the lack of progress in the negotiations, we regard the removal of the Northern Group of the Soviet Armed Forces to the USSR as a positive development. According to an agreed schedule or not, it is very good news to us.

Between July 1989 and the present time, the following eight units left Poland: a training tank regiment from Zielona Gora voivodship; a training antiaircraft missile regiment from Legnica; a part of the headquarters of the Western theater of war operations based in Legnica; an air force squadron from Brzeg; a landing assault brigade from Bialogard; an independent motor transport battalion from Swidnica; a motorized chemical battalion from Wroclaw; and some of the stores of the air-army based in Torun. We now have several garrisons in Poland where the consequences of World War II only ended a few weeks or even a few days ago."

"What is the progress of the talks on transit of the USSR troops from the territory of the former GDR?"

"On the basis of earlier agreements, the Soviet Union was entitled to lawful transit, which was in practical terms not restricted in any way," Gen. Ostrowski replied. "However, we recently introduced certain clearly defined restrictions there. We allow no more than three or four convoys every 24 hours. In exceptional cases we will allow transit to trains that could be regarded as part of the convoys about which we currently conduct negotiations. We make these concessions for

humanitarian reasons. Minister Skubiszewski has suggested that it would be advisable to make our position more flexible."

[Reporter] Is it a regular and normal situation when the Polish defense minister is unable to ascertain what kinds of weapons the Soviets had here on our territory? After certain of their bases here were vacated, a number of bunkers were found that we had known nothing about; nor can anyone tell what they contained.

[Ostrowski] Such installations as, for example, the bunkers at Sypniewo, were not included in the records kept by the office of the government plenipotentiary for the stationing of the Soviet armed forces in Poland. We do not know what they contained, and we can only make tentative guesses. [Ostrowski ends]

"What is the size of the missile unit scheduled to be withdrawn next week? Can we really accept that the planned withdrawal of the Soviet forces has already begun in earnest?" a Western reporter asked.

"The unit in question is an operational tactical unit, capable of deploying both conventional and nuclear weapons," Gen. Ostrowski replied. "We will see it on 9 April. It has 1,000-1,200 servicemen. I can assure you that there are no nuclear weapons on Polish soil."

[Reporter] How can you be so sure?

[Ostrowski] I can trust my Soviet partner—that is, my opposite number in the Northern Group of Soviet Armed Forces, General Dubinin. The contents of the statements he has been making is another thing altogether. I simply must believe him—though I would not give my right arm for it... Besides, the National Defense Ministry has confirmed that there are no nuclear weapons in Poland.

[Reporter] What is the numerical strength of the Soviet forces in Poland?

[Ostrowski] At present there are about 50,000-52,000 Soviet servicemen in Poland. To this number you must add civilian employees and servicemen's families. Altogether, there are some 90,000 persons to be evacuated. In addition, there are 590 tanks, 800 transporters, 300 artillery pieces of the 100-mm-plus range, 40 helicopters, 201 combat airplanes, and 13 airfields (eight operational and five reserve airfields).

[Reporter] Does the register of all these different units include the resident representative of the GRU [State Intelligence Directorate], an organization considered no less than criminal in the West? Where will the units you mentioned be withdrawn to? It is certainly not a matter of indifference to us whether they are moved beyond the Ural, to Vladivostok, or to Brest, Lvov, or Kaliningrad. After all, Kaliningrad is closer to Warsaw than Legnica....

[Ostrowski] We must not interfere in the USSR's internal affairs. We do know that they are having enormous difficulties with relocating the units returning to the USSR under the withdrawal scheme. They are short of 200,000 housing units for the servicemen. Army families are accommodated in tents, which is the major reason for the delays. I would not seek some underlying political reasons here. Soviet representatives have repeatedly stressed that they saw no need to leave their military units in Poland.

We are doing all we can to get an agreement on Soviet troop withdrawal completed and signed. The Soviets want to negotiate with us only on the subject of financial evaluation of the facilities and installations they have erected here. We even plan to appeal to international institutions to help us ensure that the Soviets comply with Polish legislation in this matter—including the laws and regulations passed in recent years. Individual sectors have been collecting data and evidence on the extent of losses sustained by the Polish side as a result of the damage to property and the environment arising from the Soviet armed forces' stay in our country.

Soviet Troop Withdrawal Begins 9 Apr

*LD0904161791 Warsaw Domestic Service in Polish
1200 GMT 9 Apr 91*

[Text] At 1100 today the first part of a Soviet missile brigade left the Soviet garrison in Borne Sunilowo in the Koszalin voivodship for the Soviet Union by railroad. The Soviet side has thus commenced the withdrawal of its forces from our country. Around 10,000 troops from 30 different types of military units are planned to be withdrawn by year end. The brigade of operational tactical missiles will be entirely withdrawn from the Soviet garrison by the end of next month. It will be disbanded on Soviet territory in June.

The withdrawal of Soviet forces from our country has commenced before the signing of an intergovernmental agreement on the withdrawal.

Soviet Commander Promises Soviet Withdrawal From Swidnica

*LD1004200591 Warsaw PAP in English 1704 GMT
10B Apr 91*

[Text] Walbrzych, April 10—Commander of the Soviet troops in Poland General Victor Dubynin pledged to finally withdraw the Soviet garrison stationing in Swidnica, south-western Poland, by the end of August in a letter sent to the Walbrzych provincial governor.

Some of the objects used by the Soviet soldiers have already been taken over by the local authorities and assigned for housing purposes, cultural institutions and medical units.

Soviet Troop Withdrawal Begins, Optimism on Talks

*AU1504153991 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish
11 Apr 91 p 1*

[Maria Wagrowska commentary: "Symbols and Facts"]

[Text] The ceremonies that accompanied the departure of the first Soviet Army unit from Poland—the unit left Borne-Sulejowo Army camp on 9 April—were mainly symbolic in character. Nevertheless, it was a very important symbol, perhaps the most important symbol in the whole sphere of present-day Polish-Soviet relations. Both countries are currently seeking political solutions that will—in the light of the changed European realities—best serve them in resolving the issues of good neighborliness and mutual cooperation. The principles underpinning the new relationship will be included in the new bilateral treaty between the two countries.

One does not have to dwell on the significance of the decision to begin pulling out Soviet troops from Poland. For the Poles, this is just one more step along the road to achieving full sovereign rights, and this was the reason the Polish Government approached the Soviet Government in 1990 with a request to pull out all Soviet troops from Polish territory. For the USSR, this is made necessary—as emphasized by many Soviet politicians referring to the many statements made on this subject by their government, including those made in 1990—by new doctrinal concepts that do not require the maintenance of Soviet military presence in various countries.

Even though both sides are motivated by different considerations, the five rounds of intergovernmental negotiations at the political level—and mainly as a result of the talks that Prime Minister Bielecki had with President Gorbachev and Premier Pavlov—have finally secured the agreement to begin the withdrawal of Soviet troops, which are still seen by the Poles as an army of occupation. The date 9 April has been accepted by both sides as the official starting date for the whole operation. Let us hope that from this date on there will be better cooperation between the Polish and Soviet authorities in this matter.

The departure of the first Soviet Army unit from Poland after an uninterrupted stay of almost 46 years, should make upcoming pull out negotiations easier and make easier the solution of issues that arise as a result of the transit of Soviet troops being pulled out of Germany.

In a note sent to the Walbrzych voivode on 10 April, General Dubynin has bound himself to pull out the Soviet garrison in Swidnica by the end of August 1991. If the Soviet side continues to pull out its troops at a significant rate this fact will undoubtedly become an important element enabling both sides to agree the final date for the completion of the whole operation. At present, both sides seem ready to make concessions. It does not seem likely that the end of 1993—a date that is still officially quoted by the Soviet side—will be the

USSR's final word on this subject, and conversely, the end of 1991, a date originally insisted on by Poland, is now probably accepted by the Poles as an unrealistic deadline. Without trying to preempt the future, one can safely assume that the final date for completion of the Soviet troop pull out will probably be agreed at the upcoming Walesa-Gorbachev meeting and will be set for 1992. Every month counts.

Reports on Sixth Round of Soviet Troop Withdrawal Talks

'Will To Reach Agreement' Seen

*LD1104213991 Warsaw Domestic Service in Polish
1800 GMT 11 Apr 91*

[Text] The sixth round of negotiations on the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Poland, and the transit of Soviet troops from Germany, has begun in Warsaw. During a meeting of the leaders of both delegations with Jerzy Makarczyk, secretary of state for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, matters relating to the date of withdrawal of Soviet troops from Poland and the timetable for removing specific kinds of armaments were discussed. There was a clearly evident will on both sides to reach an agreement on this issue.

Round Ends

*LD1204191191 Warsaw Domestic Service in Polish
1700 GMT 12 Apr 91*

[Excerpt] Another round of talks on transit and withdrawal of the Soviet Armed Forces from Poland has ended. There is still no agreement on how property and financial assets will be settled. Likewise the Soviet side did not present any deadlines for the withdrawal of its units from our territory. The most work has been done on the agreement on transit. Witold Chodakiewicz,

undersecretary in the Ministry of Transport and Maritime Economy, reports the following:

[Begin Chodakiewicz recording] So far, two elements have not been agreed to, and they concern the mutual penalties and how to pay them. It was clear that the Soviets wanted to consult these matters in Moscow. Other issues are as follows: Everyone will travel by rail, there will definitely be no road transit, air transport has been agreed to in full, and sea transport has been taken out of the agreement—the Soviet Union will make an appropriate statement that their sea transit will not constitute any danger for navigation and that it will be outside Polish territorial waters. We are ready to carry the transit along these four routes. [end recording] [passage omitted]

Transport To Facilitate USSR Troop Withdrawal

*LD1204174491 Warsaw PAP in English 1601 GMT
12 Apr 91*

[Text] Warsaw, April 12—Undersecretary of State in the Ministry of Transportation and Maritime Economy Witold Chodakiewicz said here today that Polish state railways PKP were able to provide necessary facilities to transport Soviet troops out of Poland by the end of 1991 and for transit of Soviet troops from Germany to the USSR.

The undersecretary made the statement during the sixth round of Polish-Soviet talks on the withdrawal of troops being held here.

According to Chodakiewicz, the PKP could secure eight 40-wagon trains daily for the withdrawing troops and could handle 16 transit trains. Fees for the rail transportation were settled earlier this month in an agreement between the PKP and Soviet Ministry of Railways.

PAKISTAN

Paper Criticizes U.S. Policy on Chemical Weapons*BK1404154091 Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English
14 Apr 91 p 6*

[Editorial: "The Chemical Weapons Octopus"]

[Text] Although reports of the use of chemical weapons by the occupation forces in Indian-held Kashmir await confirmation it is bad enough that various media sources have alleged that this is being done. It were these reports to which Science and Technology Minister Hamid Nasir Chatha was referring Thursday in the National Assembly. India, if the reports are true, will be the third country to have entered what can safely be termed the chemical weapons club. Iraq, of course, became the second when it used them against its own Kurdish population and the first and foremost was the great mentor of the two, the almighty United States of America, when it initiated the barbaric practice in Vietnam.

Having reduced the lush green landscape of Vietnam to a desolate wasteland by the use of defluents which reduced the opulent forests of that country to a desert land, the US then proceeded to supply these diabolical weapons to its one-time protege Iraq, to enable it to 'crush' the Islamic Revolution of Iran, something nauseatingly repugnant to the Americans. While the Iranian

forces and the dissident Kurds were being mercilessly subjected to the use of chemical weapons by Saddam Hussayn, the US was content, to borrow a term, [to] 'fiddle' while the Iraqi dictator had his will. It would be useless to say that nobody condemned the use of chemical weapons by the US itself in Vietnam because, to all intents and purposes, this 'giant' among nations has always arbitrarily arrogated to itself the position of sole judge and executioner in international affairs. Introspection and soul-searching have always been weak points with US administrations.

Now, because it suits the United States eminently to do so, its voice is most strident in condemning the use of Saddam Husayn's use of chemical weapons against his own dissident population. When it suited the US, it was all right that Saddam should use chemical weapons against the Kurds. Now, when he is giving a repeat performance, it is highly condemnable! Whatever the logic behind the whole thing, to all but the US, it is nothing but perverse. One can imagine with what glee the US must be hearing reports of the use of chemical weapons against the freedom fighters by the Indians in the part of Kashmir occupied by them. No doubt an American condemnation will ultimately be forthcoming but, knowing the US as we do, it will most undoubtedly be more for form's sake than anything else. It is equally clear that the US will never admit that other 'humanists' are only playing 'follow my leader' when they subject dissident populations to the use of chemical weapons. Since it was the US which set the example, it is only right that it now take definite steps to see that this odious form of warfare is internationally outlawed.

GENERAL

Aleksey Arbatov Defends Arms Treaties

91WC0089A Moscow *NOVOYE VREMYA* in Russian
No 9, Mar 91 pp 25-27

[Article by Aleksey Arbatov, doctor of historical sciences: "Polemics: DOMOSTROY and Security"]

[Text] "Fifteen Questions to a Retiring Minister" were addressed to Eduard Shevardnadze by three USSR people's deputies in the newspaper DOMOSTROY. The article was published in late January, after a new minister of foreign affairs had already been appointed. Yet the "witch hunt" goes on.

Those behind the campaign currently underway are attempting to prove that the agreements reached between East and West in recently years on disarmament and other problems have allegedly undermined our country's security.

Do We Have Too Few Tanks?

The main target of critical attacks by deputies V. Alksnis, Ye. Kogan and N. Petrushenko is the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe, signed in Paris in November 1990.

The first question concerns the method of calculating the correlation of NATO and Warsaw Pact forces. Since the Warsaw Pact has virtually ceased to exist and Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary are more "inclined to redeploy their troops along their eastern borders than their western ones and make no secret of their desire to join NATO," in the opinion of the three deputies "in the present situation it is more advantageous for the United States and NATO to recognize and preserve the former structures, in order to force the Soviet Union as one component of total Warsaw Pact forces to lower its level of defensive capability." They rhetorically ask: "But what will be the correlation of forces if the weapons of the aforementioned Eastern European countries are added to those of NATO?"

The disintegration of the Warsaw Pact definitely is not something about which to be elated. But that is a political problem, not a military one, and it would be at the very least unfounded to blame the West for it. We are reaping the effects of the "alliance" policy which has been conducted with regard to the GDR since 1953, Hungary since 1956, Czechoslovakia since 1968 and Poland since 1981. The stance taken by our former comrades-in-arms in the future will depend primarily on the USSR's policy. If we place those states in the enemy camp right from the start and develop forces to counter them, something which the authors of the article in DOMOSTROY do in fact urge, then that would be the surest means of prodding them into taking undesirable steps.

But the Paris Accord is not to blame. Furthermore, it provides certain guarantees for the USSR's security from unforeseen turns of events in the future, setting acceptable levels of forces and arms not only in Europe, but also in its individual regions. Specifically, the treaty provides for deployment of NATO troops at distances of 1,000 kilometers or more from our western borders. In Central Europe (excluding the territory of the former GDR) NATO cannot have more than 7,500 tanks, 5,000 artillery pieces and 11,250 armored vehicles, while the Soviet quota allows us to keep over 13,300 tanks, 13,700 artillery pieces and 20,000 armored vehicles in the European portion of our territory.

If contrary to expectations NATO should decide to increase its forces in Central Europe or move them closer to our borders, or if any of the Eastern European countries should join NATO, that would constitute a violation of both the letter and the spirit of the treaty and would give the USSR legal grounds to take reciprocal measures, including expansion of its armed forces or redeployment of troops from beyond the Urals. This fact serves as a strong constraint against any such actions. But all this will be true only after the treaty takes effect; in order for that to happen we must remove the disputes which have arisen as a result of several measures taken by the Soviet side.

Another aspect of the treaty which concerns the three deputies pertains to the fact that it "provides for essentially unilateral destruction of armored equipment by the Soviet Union... Destruction of tanks will cost the Soviet people a handsome sum." They propose to save money by mothballing armaments and storing them in regions far removed from Europe.

In fact, only a small portion of the total number of Soviet tanks comprising the difference between their actual number (41,500) and the final level agreed upon in the treaty (13,300) is actually subject to conversion. Over the past two years 16,100 tanks have been redeployed beyond the Urals, and 4,000 of the oldest models have been scrapped. In view of these figures only 8,100 of the Soviet Union's tanks will now have to be physically destroyed. At the same time NATO will undergo a reduction of over 5,000 tanks. Where is the unilateral disarmament, if at the start of the negotiations the East exceeded the West by almost 30,000 tanks?

In political terms the massive redeployment of Soviet military equipment beyond the Urals (as well as the reassignment of a portion of it to the Soviet Navy) for the purpose of avoiding large-scale reductions is a source of great dissatisfaction in the West. By their logic, whoever has the greatest number of weapons should be the one to make the greatest reductions until equal and lower arms levels are attained (and the USSR had more weapons in all categories except combat helicopters). We should not criticize the treaty, but rather those who in past decades accumulated mountains of arms while at the same time claiming that there existed "approximate parity"

between the two alliances on the European continent, taking advantage of the complete absence of oversight by the public or a parliament.

But now that tens of thousands of pieces of military equipment have been redeployed beyond the Urals (without notification, incidentally, either of our treaty partners or the members of our own parliament), they should not be brought back so that they can be destroyed. In this respect the three deputies' suggestion seems to be a reasonable solution to the problem: we could mothball the redeployed equipment in remote storage depots under the supervision of the other side, with the equipment to be destroyed in the future under less strict deadlines.

The deputies point out that the treaty "extends to the USSR and to the NATO countries in Europe; but to what extent does it affect the United States' armed forces?" Again, they pose a rhetorical question: "Does this mean that we are disarming unilaterally in the face of the United States?" (Incidentally, in a recent interview in PRAVDA even Dmitriy Yazov, minister of defense, stated that he was "very concerned about the unilateral concessions.")

It is true that American territory is not included in the reduction zone, though the United States' conventional forces in Europe (from where they can really threaten us the most) are being limited and reduced by roughly 2,400 pieces of military equipment. It is equally important to note that the treaty forbids the deployment of a large contingent of U.S. reinforcements from the United States to Europe. Yet that is not all. Soviet territory beyond the Urals is also outside the scope of the treaty. In addition to Central Asia, in Siberia and the Far East alone the USSR originally had 12,600 tanks, 14,600 armored vehicles, 16,400 artillery pieces and approximately 2,000 warplanes. Now, following redeployment of equipment from Europe, these figures have risen to over 16,000 tanks and an overall total of 60,000 pieces of military equipment. Outside of Europe the United States, including its home territory, has approximately 10,000 tanks and 3,000 warplanes (including naval aircraft).

True, not all Soviet forces beyond the Urals are being used to counter the United States; there are also other potential opponents there. But American units are also intended for use in other theaters of operations besides the USSR, such as in the Persian Gulf and other regional conflicts. Thus there are not any grounds for speaking of unilateral disarmament in this regard, either.

Concessions on Missiles, Too?

In the article the claim is made that under the INF Treaty the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs agreed to destroy OTR-23 operational-tactical missiles (systems in the Oka or R-400 class) with a range of approximately 400 kilometers, whereas the topic of negotiation was destruction by both sides of missiles with a range of 500 kilometers or more. Furthermore, it is stated that "great

economic and military harm was done to our country. The Americans and NATO are deploying similar systems."

In fact, the inclusion of 200 missiles of the Oka class in the treaty made it possible to eliminate the American Pershing-1A missiles (170 units), ban the production and deployment of the new Pershing-1B, and get the FRG to pledge not to modernize and to remove from their arsenal 72 Pershing-1A missiles.

It is also incorrect to state that NATO is presently deploying systems of this type. If was precisely in view of the INF Treaty and under the influence of other Soviet steps in the area of disarmament that the United States and NATO dropped their plans to deploy the extended-range Lance-2 missile. They retained only 120 old Lance-1 missiles with a range of under 150 kilometers, and France has 30 similar Pluton missiles. In Europe alone the Soviet Union has a 12:1 superiority in this class of weapons. At issue is the development of an American air-to-ground missile system of the TASM type, with a range of up to 500 kilometers. In this connection it would be appropriate to recall that Soviet medium-range bombers have long carried hundreds of dual-purpose air-to-ground missiles with ranges of from 180 to 500 kilometers. These issues must be resolved at tactical nuclear arms talks.

It is also claimed that at the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks we made "a clear concession to the United States by agreeing to their demand that we allow them to break the ABM Treaty."

It should be borne in mind that the ABM Treaty itself, like any other international accord, stipulates the right of each party to abrogate the treaty with six months' advance notice, if exceptional circumstances connected with the content of the treaty present a threat to either side's "highest interests." In order to exercise their right to abrogate the treaty the Americans do not need any permission from us at all; therefore there is no cause to speak of a Soviet concession. But if they do decide to take that step, then we will have an equal right to abrogate not only the ABM Treaty, but also the Strategic Offensive Arms Limitation Treaty, which will contain a similar article with analogous wording. Therefore the most rapid conclusion and implementation of a treaty reducing offensive arms by half will be a real political guarantee against abrogation of the ABM Treaty.

The deputies complain that at the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks "the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs made a concession to the United States by agreeing not to count sea-based cruise missiles, approximately 4,000 of which could be deployed within the near future." They also object to reductions in our heavy missiles, "which serve as a deterrent factor against the Americans."

In actuality we are talking about limiting cruise missiles with nuclear warheads at a separate level of 800 units, with the USSR's rights on a par with those of the United

States. Cruise missiles with conventional warheads, which the authors included in that figure of 4,000, could also be deployed by the USSR in unlimited number. These matters should be discussed at future naval talks, the path to which passes through implementation of a conventional forces treaty in Europe.

As for heavy ICBMs, a reduction in them by 50 percent combined with an overall arms reduction by one-half is not only logical, it is actually essential to our security. If there were no proportional reduction in heavy ICBMs, then there would arise a serious imbalance in the Soviet triad: 3,000 warheads, i.e. over one-half of the total permitted number (6,000) would be concentrated on just 300 large missiles comprising fewer than 20 percent of all launchers (1,600 total). In that case instead of being a "deterrent factor" they would be a target for the Americans, especially considering the fact that ICBMs in their launch silos are now vulnerable to modern precise and powerful warheads with independently targetable projectiles. Under these conditions, by concentrating such a large proportion of warheads on heavy missiles, we would not be able to adequately disperse our forces onto more viable land-mobile launchers, submarines or bombers.

Where To Save Money

The authors produce a table indicating that the expense of eliminating arms and monitoring the treaty on a 50-percent reduction in strategic offensive arms will cost R830 million [rubles], that the Conventional Forces Treaty in Europe will cost R1.65 billion, and that overall (including the INF Treaty plus nuclear testing and chemical weapons treaties) the total cost of disarmament in 1991-95 is estimated at R3.16 billion. The methodology followed in arriving at these figures is unclear; one can only assume that they were obtained by the authors from competent military sources.

This is in fact quite a large sum of money. However, the deputies' conclusion that the treaties are unfeasible "at a time of perestroika and economic crisis" seems false. What is really absurd in our severely difficult economic situation is to keep on forging such a large quantity of arms that we are subsequently forced to reduce them on a large scale in order to establish parity with the other side and prevent reciprocal expansion (which would then require countermeasures by our side, and so on endlessly).

Incidentally, if the three deputies are so concerned about saving the people's money, then they should ask why the 1991 military budget increased from R71 million to R97 million. This increase was once again the result of arms purchases, not concern for improvement in the army's living conditions, specifically construction of housing for officers who have no apartments.

In their reasoning as published in DOMOSTROY the deputies complain that "our military cutbacks are being carried out immediately, while the Americans and NATO countries are still by and large merely planning

theirs." The authors sarcastically propose unilateral disarmament of the USSR by the year 2000 in order to convince everyone of our "long-range love for peace."

Yet is there any cause for sarcasm here? Yes, in recent years we have made unilateral cuts in a number of categories of conventional arms. Yet in all those categories we previously had substantial superiority over the United States (and in a majority of them over NATO as a whole). And even after those reductions we were not below the other side's level in a single category. As for the United States, in the past it, too, has repeatedly made unilateral cuts in its armed forces and defense budget. Just one of numerous examples: the withdrawal of 2,500 tactical nuclear weapons from Europe in the 1980's. In the very recent past the United States has eliminated more than 20 major new weapons systems, while a number of programs have been cut back (this was the fate of the Stealth bomber and the Trident submarine).

We also must not forget that as we reduce we are also modernizing the majority of our types and classes of weapons, and on a larger scale than cost-conscious America. It is just that the Soviet public and the Supreme Soviet do not yet deem it necessary to make that known.

It is clear that no one is proposing that we disarm unilaterally. We are talking about ensuring a realistic and publicly justified sufficiency of defense. Treaties on arms limitation and reduction do not contradict efforts to ensure sufficiency; on the contrary, they aid in those efforts. They increase military stability and the predictability of mutually lowered levels in the strategic balance on both a global and a regional scale. Agreements also make it possible to decrease the wastefulness of competition and focus our efforts on the qualitative aspects of defense (including the quality of life for military personnel), technical reliability and our army's combat readiness.

One cannot help but be alarmed by the whole philosophy reflected in the three deputies' critical comments. It is this: the Union's security can be ensured only if its armed forces are in no way inferior to the combined armed forces of all probable opponents together, opponents which include the United States, the European NATO member countries, China, Japan and other countries. If we attempt to oppose all the largest powers in the world simultaneously as "potential adversaries," then they will inevitably become our real enemies and will in response close ranks and expand their military efforts. It is true not just of the USSR, which finds itself in a state of the deepest domestic crisis, but of any other power: no one country could bear up under that kind of confrontation. We have already taken that route in the 1960's, 1970's and 1980's, and it has cost our state colossal expenditures which have transformed it, to use the words of Colonel Alksnis himself, into "an Upper Volta with missiles."

The new political thinking proclaimed in the mid-1980's set a goal of breaking out of this vicious circle and using political means to break the endless spiral of increasing military confrontation. Soviet policy has achieved considerable success in that direction in just five years. Thanks to major political decisions, treaties and unilateral steps toward partial arms reductions the USSR's national security has not been weakened, but instead has grown substantially stronger in military and strategic terms. The principal threat today is not the military threat from without, especially since in the majority of weapons categories we are still ahead of any world power. The real threat stems from the disintegration of our economy, still overloaded by a huge military burden, and from our acute ethnic and sociopolitical problems, i.e. from those areas in which perestroika has unfortunately not been adequately developed. If we, as the authors put it, "are begging for alms" from other countries, then it is precisely because of this approach to ensuring our security reflected in DOMOSTROY, not because we now have fewer missiles.

Only continuity in our political course, along with long-overdue radical internal transformations, can guarantee an end to our country's crisis and restoration of its status as a great power on a fundamentally new basis.

Viktor Karpov Examines Conversion Problems

*LD0904160191 Moscow World Service in English
2300 GMT 8 Apr 91*

[Text] Conversion of part of a vast military industrial complex to civilian use is one of the major economic problems in this country. Soviet citizens have so far seen no tangible results of conversion. Deputy Foreign Minister Viktor Karpov explains in the Soviet journal *BUSINESSMAN*:

The process of conversion in the USSR is aggravated by many factors. One of these is that up till now it has not been clear to what extent the economy has been militarized. This country has long criticised the U.S. military industrial complex amounting to 20 percent and more of the American economy. Yet there have been no official statistics of this score in the USSR. However, in Karpov's view defense industry in the USSR may account for two times more of that in the United States.

Viktor Karpov believes it's now impossible to foresee the results of disarmament in terms of profitability. Economic militarization by plan and command has led to the distortion of prices, expenditures, and production efficiency. The prices of Soviet military hardware have been classified as well as its production costs. Nonetheless, most analysts in the USSR believe that conversion is feasible. Its implementation requires not only the government's political will and participation in its organization; it's also necessary to take the munitions plants subject to conversion out of state control and involve them in market relations.

Viktor Karpov feels conversion will be highly lucrative since hi-tech facilities and skilled workforce will be applied for civilian production. In Karpov's view, conversion in the USSR has in fact a wider scope as compared with the USA. It's common knowledge that in the Soviet Union there is a dire shortage of consumer goods, whereas in the United States the commodities market is full. The USSR, just as the USA, will have to (?retrain) the discharged labor force and provide social safeguards. Viktor Karpov says peace dividends depend on how quickly and successfully the problems will be solved.

That was the view of the Deputy Foreign Minister Viktor Karpov in the Soviet magazine *Businessman*.

SDI, DEFENSE & SPACE ARMS

PRAVDA Report on Early-Warning Radar System

*PM1704124191 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
15 Apr 91 Second Edition p 8*

[Special correspondent A. Gorokhov report: "Front Line: Report From the Missile Attack Early Warning System Command Center"]

[Text] Air Defense Forces—...I am on the front line. A special kind of front line, without trenches, foxholes, or positions, but crammed with electronics and flashing screens, and full of the gentle whirr of air conditioners and a kind of inexplicable, tense, and rather pressurized silence. There is only the click of the keyboards as a command is selected.

It is from here, from these workstations, that a combat crew controls the orbiting group of Soviet satellites constantly monitoring all possible launch points for U.S. ICBM's, including U.S. territory. Hanging from the ceiling of the large room is a map of the United States divided into 10 zones, including the eastern and western missile and space test ranges.

This is the first, space-based line of defense—the Soviet Missile Attack Early Warning System [BMEWS], whose existence, not just as part of the Air Defense Forces structure but as an entity at all, we managed to conceal for many years with enviable stubbornness (not so much from a likely enemy as from our own taxpayers and, most regrettably of all, from the legislators who were drawing up the defense budget).

The officer of the watch, who was at his workstation and could not help overhearing my conversation with Colonel N. Lukinov, suddenly said: "The people do not know what we do here. Everyone thinks that we are just twiddling our thumbs..."

That is true. This place is, without exaggeration, the "president's eyes." From here, the president—wherever he may be—should be able, if necessary, to obtain an accurate assessment of a missile launch. The General

Staff and command centers of branches of the Armed Forces obtain information from here as well.

Access to such installations was strictly denied to journalists until recently, although, in my view, at least some parliamentarians or members of the Cabinet of Ministers should be shown around here from time to time.

I want to reiterate the degree of responsibility borne by these officers and warrant officers, who receive no privileges compared with their colleagues in other branches and categories of troops, apart from continuous duty. Whether it be a holiday, like last Sunday, or an "ordinary" day, there is no special note in their diaries.

...On the highway, the numerous "no entry" signs tell you that there is something top secret ahead. Then domes suddenly loom up like so many Easter cakes—the so-called outstations [vynosnyye punkty]. Each dome covers a huge, 25-meter antenna. The multistory base of the "Easter cake" contains a computer center, a command post, and mess facilities. This is where the officers serve. Without any external sign of their activity, but continuously—year in year out—as if waiting for something.

Information from the outstations is fed to the central command post for the space-based element of the BMEWS. I find myself making a comparison with the Central Spaceflight Administration near Moscow, which is known to all our readers from television reports. Hundreds, if not thousands, of specialists participate in controlling a manned orbiter, for example (this shows yet again that spaceflights are not just simple outings with medals and titles waiting at the end—as they have recently been presented to public opinion).

"Managing orbiting groups, extracting the necessary information from satellites, processing that information, and passing it on to other command posts is something that only the Armed Forces do," Col. Lukinov noted.

I did not detect even a hint of any "obscurity" when talking to my companion or in conversation with his fellow officers. Admittedly, the new face of the Air Defense Forces came about some time ago, when computerized controls to monitor near-earth space were organically added to the traditional surface-to-air missile units, fighter aircraft, and radar operators.

I imagined their transatlantic space-based early warning system colleagues. I imagined a map of our country, divided in precisely the same way into standard zones depicting the test ranges at Tyuratam (Baykonur), Plesetsk, and Kapustin Yar. What are they thinking about "over there"? Clearly, about the same things: detecting launches, informing the country's leadership, warning of a threatened missile attack, and providing time for retaliation...

For a long time this was called confrontation. Nowadays a different term is used: deterrence. I think it is not too farfetched to envisage a possible Soviet-U.S. exchange of

data, methods, and specialists in the missile attack early warning sphere. What if, by the end of the century, the number of countries with a nuclear missile potential increases, as expected, to two dozen? What further restraints will have to be devised?

Colonel General of Aviation V. Kraskovskiy gave me the following information:

"Around 40 U.S. intelligence satellites with functioning on-board equipment 'work' on the Soviet Union. They conduct a radar, imaging, radio, and electronic effort against our territory and possible maritime and ocean military theaters. Satellites in low-earth orbits make 42 passes a day over Soviet territory..."

Readers are free to imagine the numerical strength of our orbiting group, which is needed at least to ensure parity.

To explain to some extent just how such systems operate, I shall turn to recent events in the Gulf region.

How did the U.S. political leadership and the U.S. military command gain a complete and steady picture of the development of events in the military theater? By making extensive use of space-based intelligence-gathering systems deployed before the outbreak of hostilities in a so-called orbiting group. They were "targeted" on Iraqi territory, which was effectively used by the U.S. military as a kind of testbed. Yes, it was possible to "hoodwink" the satellites by setting up all kinds of dummy targets and, for example, painstakingly concealing mobile operational and tactical missile launchers. The satellites' ability to see did deteriorate in bad weather conditions or when areas were smoke-covered.

These are just details, however. In the opinion of Soviet military specialists, the satellites made it possible above all to identify the most important installations with great accuracy, to reveal the armed forces' order of battle, to monitor all changes in the armed forces, to increase the targeting accuracy of airborne strikes, to correct the flight paths of air-launched and cruise missiles, to ensure precision low-level bombing, and to improve the effectiveness of Patriot surface-to-air missile complexes in their battle against the Scuds...

Orbiting group intelligence satellites such as the KH-11, Lacrosse, Ferret D, and Magnum (imaging, radar, radio, and electronic intelligence) were able to monitor the conflict zone virtually around the clock. Intelligence information processed on the ground reached multinational forces' units and subunits between 90 minutes and three hours later. Communications, relay, and navigation satellites operated at the upper levels of the orbiting group. Military helicopters and tanks were urgently fitted with Navstar navigation system equipment.

As far as this report is concerned, I would particularly spotlight the use (for the first time in combat) of third-generation space-based IMEWS, [Integrated Missile Early Warning Satellites] early warning satellites to

detect ballistic missile launches. The satellites operated in conjunction with AWACS [Airborne Warning And Control System] long-range radar detection aircraft.

We must assume that these satellites are based on the same physical principles as our own. Scud launches were detected from the engine plumes at altitudes of 10-15 km 30 seconds after launch (during this period the missile is "breaking through" the denser layers of the atmosphere). Information on the fact of the launch and its coordinates were immediately fed to the command center at the joint (U.S. and Canadian) North American Air Defense Command (NORAD) and to the command center at the multinational forces' joint central command on Saudi territory.

At this point, of course, we can conjecture about the effectiveness of using space-based systems in such a rapidly developing process as monitoring operational and tactical missile launches. As the saying goes, you hardly have time to blink and the missile has hit. I think, however, that it was no accident that the Americans used their space system in order, first, to acquire unique experience—albeit in a localized theater and not involving such powerful missiles as ICBM's. Second—or perhaps, on the contrary, first—to convince their paymasters under no account to reduce funding for research and development into improving their own national missile attack early warning system.

Colonels V. Lyukh and A. Tsapliyenko showed me a recording of test launches of the Trident 2 ICBM. An unusual light appeared on the crowded screen—the background was the earth during the daytime. Of course, I could not distinguish it from the other points on the screen without outside assistance. The operators here know these screens forward and backward, however.

"The first stage is firing, it is very powerful," Tsapliyenko explained. "The operator can get a fix on it about 20 seconds after launch. Satellites track the target during the boost phase, then the second echelon of the BMEWS comes into action—ground-based, over-the-horizon radar stations..."

Incidentally, when a Titan 4 rocket launched the first satellite in the IMEWS series into geostationary orbit from the eastern missile and space range (Cape Canaveral, Florida) almost two years ago, my companions were monitoring all the electronic details of the launch.

I realize that this recording was a kind of teaching aid. And yet, and yet... It will probably be easier to reach agreement on comprehensive verification if all national systems work like clockwork. Without having organized matters, however, we are already cutting off our nose to spite our face—I am thinking of last year's government decision to mothball the Mukachevskiy Radar Station.

Having plunged into cuts and reorganizations, it is as if we are clouding the "president's eyes" of our own accord...

I realize that this report is not much cause for celebration, but I must reiterate the fact that the Air Defense Troops "celebrate" their day, as always, at their posts. These ideas, I would add, were invariably present when I talked with officers and later with the developers of the systems entrusted to them.

The BMEWS is a system at state, or even supranational, level. We must say that there are things to criticize in the Soviet military-industrial complex. What if the defense industry is broken up and regional thinking prevails? What would we gain and what would we lose? Destroying is not the same as building.

...When during our conversation we broached the touchy subject of the people's money being "swallowed up," Colonel V. Ivanov used what struck me as a convincing argument.

"Suppose," the officer said, "nuclear missiles disappeared altogether. Even in that fantastic situation our service would still be needed. You want examples? A global environmental catastrophe, for example, fires, and so forth. That is just one of the possible avenues of conversion for our work..."

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

U.S. INF Inspection Team Arrives in Ulan-Ude
LD1604182591 Moscow TASS International Service
in Russian 1708 GMT 16 Apr 91

[By correspondent Sergey Trofimov]

[Text] Ulan-Ude, 16 April (TASS)—A U.S. Air Force Starlifter-141 transport aircraft landed today at the airport of the capital of Buryatia (a Soviet republic within Russia in Tranbaykalia). It brought to Ulan-Ude ten U.S. inspectors working within the framework of the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles [INF].

"We have come to Buryatia to carry out an inspection within the framework of the INF Treaty signed in Washington in December 1987," U.S. Air Force Lieutenant-Colonel Robert Jablonski, the leader of the group, told a TASS correspondent. "Today's visit to Ulan-Ude is the hundredth since the start of mutual inspections. We have always met with mutual understanding here, and there have been no problems. We start work tomorrow."

The U.S. inspectors were met at the airport by representatives of the USSR National Nuclear Risk Reduction Center.

CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN EUROPE

Leadership at Odds Over Transferred Tank Forces

PM1004140391 Moscow MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI
in Russian No 12, 24 Mar 91 p 13

[Dmitriy Yakushkin article: "What Is the Value of Trust?"]

[Text] The affair of the Soviet tanks transferred beyond the Urals in contravention of the spirit of the agreement to reduce conventional arms signed in Paris last fall continues to develop according to an unfavorable scenario. Now that the war in the Near East has ended, this problem again has come to occupy center stage in Soviet-American relations.

In any event the American side links the progress of work on subsequent disarmament agreements with it. It is making it plain that its agreement to come to a summit meeting—which objectively speaking is now more necessary to Moscow than to Washington—depends on this.

MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI has already written that this whole secret operation to transfer equipment, the point of which has not been convincingly explained by the Defense Ministry, and particularly other actions—the handing over of three ground forces divisions' heavy weapons to Navy jurisdiction—places the Paris treaty's ratification in Western parliaments at risk. This naturally could signal a breakdown in the whole European process.

Even the monitoring [kontrolnaya] group specially set up under the treaty, meeting in Vienna, could not eliminate the sense of concern over both the actions. But in the course of a Soviet-American meeting held at the foreign minister level the Soviet side made new proposals which were nevertheless not adopted neither. From the Americans' point of view it contained only quantitative concessions, which do not alter the fundamentals of the matter because they fail to shut off the channel for circumventing the treaty.

According to information received by MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI, not long before J. Baker arrived in Moscow the two approaches to the whole vexed question collided head-on. Our diplomatic department proposed eliminating the contradictions which had arisen (there is the particular issue of counting all combat hardware within the ceilings agreed at the talks) and prepared its own ideas for the country's leadership. However, as a result of the discussion which took place it seems most likely that the view of the military, who were defending the expediency of their actions, gained the upper hand.

Thus the question remains open. It is clear that the country's president must make the decision in the end. In essence the choice comes down to the following: either to preserve the excess [izlishki] combat hardware, or to preserve the West's trust in the country's political course.

Radio Views Soviet Navy Divisions Issue

LD0904160691 Moscow World Service in English
2300 GMT 8 Apr 91

[Vladislav Kozyakov report]

[Text] The interpretation of an article in the Paris treaty on the conventional weapons in Europe has put Soviet-U.S. relations to yet another test. Vladislav Kozyakov has contributed this report:

The United States insists three coastguard divisions of the Soviet Navy be subject to the provisions of the Paris document and treated as redundant. The fate of the three divisions deployed on the Baltic and on the Black Sea coast could be decided in separate negotiations on the fate of warships, marine, and coastguard units but unfortunately the United States has so far been reluctant to (?meet) the Soviet initiative and hold separate (?naval) negotiations.

Apart from that the Paris treaty was signed last November the three divisions entered the Soviet Navy back in 1989 when the treaty was still in the making (?and) Washington remembered to raise the issue when it was time to ratify it [sentence as heard]. Ratification has stumbled on the difference in interpretation. The coming into force of the Paris treaty, resumption of the Paris talks in Vienna with a view to cut more conventional forces in Europe, conclusion of a treaty on the reduction of strategic offensive weapons and finally a new Soviet-American summit have all found themselves hostage to the solution of that problem. Moscow (?is) working hard to find a compromise. (?It) is ready to cut the [words indistinct] by half.

The Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Viktor Karpov has said a mutually acceptable formula must be found. He added that the Soviet Union is waiting for (?a rational) response to its proposals. The United States' European allies are reported to question the wisdom of the all or nothing (?plan). THE WASHINGTON POST correspondent in Paris has reported some European governments are trying to [word indistinct] a way out [word indistinct] they assume the treaty's ratification takes precedence over the [word indistinct] issue. Czechoslovakia's parliament has already ratified the Paris treaty and Czechoslovakia's Foreign Minister Dienstbier has said it will help substantially reduce the conventional forces in Europe.

Bogachev: Maintaining NATO Now Unacceptable*LD0904221191 Moscow TASS in English 2154 GMT
9 Apr 91*

[By TASS military analyst Vladimir Bogachev]

[Text] Moscow, April 10 (TASS)—U.S. Senator Clairborne Pell, who heads the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee, has spoken in favour of preserving the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation even after the abrupt reduction of international tension in Europe because NATO, he said, is a guarantor in case something unforeseen happens.

Pell was speaking at a conference in Amsterdam devoted to political and economic problems in Europe. He said that it would be risky to dismantle the security mechanism which had maintained peace for forty years. His message is that the preservation of the North Atlantic military organisation will not exercise a negative influence on the situation in Europe, while its dismantling is fraught with destabilising consequences.

Pell's conclusions cannot be accepted for a number of reasons. First of all, the abolition of the Warsaw Pact has changed the balance of forces between NATO and the Soviet Union in Europe. The Soviet Union will now have to rely on its own forces to ensure security. The levels of armed forces established under the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) treaty, were based on the existence of two military alliances. The preservation of one of them, the Western military alliance, will certainly destroy the earlier-existing equilibrium and hence stability.

After NATO and the Soviet Union make cuts in their land forces in keeping with the treaty, their relation will be about 1 - 1.5 in favour of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Moreover, Soviet troops are now leaving East European countries. The withdrawal is expected to complete by 1994, leaving no buffer zone between NATO and the Soviet Union. The politicisation of the Western military alliance announced by the NATO leadership has yet to be seen.

There is no doubt at all that the level of conventional arms established under the CFE treaty and the Soviet Union's nuclear shield are fully capable of protecting the Soviet Union under any conditions. However, NATO plans to switch to the arms race in the field of latest high technologies do little to strengthen confidence and trust among European countries. The appearance of ever new arms systems calls for continuous comparison of the forces on both sides both as concerns their numbers and their efficiency. The continuation of the arms race may cause further complications in carrying out the provisions of the CFE treaty and even disrupt the arms control process.

It is clear that the transformation of the North Atlantic military alliance into a truly political organisation, as envisaged in the London declaration, is the necessary next step on the road towards the normalization of the military-political situation in Europe. In any circumstances, further arms reduction in Europe must proceed on an equal footing, taking into account the liquidation of the Warsaw Pact and not infringing on the interests of the Soviet Union.

Yazov Denies Violating Conventional Arms Treaty*LD0904135891 Moscow TASS International Service
in Russian 1145 GMT 9 Apr 91*

[By TASS correspondent Oleg Moskovskiy]

[Text] Moscow, 9 April (TASS)—“Following the conclusion of the Paris treaty on conventional weapons in Europe, the Soviet Union has not violated a single one of its pledges,” Marshal of the Soviet Union Dmitriy Yazov, USSR minister of defense, stated. He granted an interview to your TASS correspondent today after completing his talk with Alfred Dregger, chairman of the CDU/CSU [Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union] group of the FRG Bundestag, who is visiting the Soviet Union.

Marshal Yazov said that in fact “everything is perfectly clear” concerning the problem, touched on during the talk, of the relocation of some Soviet tanks beyond the Urals, something being inflated persistently in the West. “This relocation was carried out long before the mandate was worked out at the Vienna talks,” the minister stressed.

According to Marshal Yazov, the allegation that “the Soviet Union concealed three of its tank divisions” was also touched on at the meeting. The defense minister said “that evidently the matter concerns not tank divisions, but motor-rifle divisions.” One each was included in the composition three fleets as coastal defense units, Dmitriy Yazov asserts. He added that this step is purely the internal affair of the USSR. “All the equipment at the disposal of these divisions has been counted and included in the total amount of weapons which we still have according to the treaty,” Dmitriy Yazov stressed.

The problem of reducing strategic offensive arms was also examined during the conversation, he said.

The USSR defense minister said: “The matter concerning the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the FRG was also examined.” Certain parts of the mass media are working up an unhealthy atmosphere around Soviet military camps and calling on soldiers to desert from the Army. “The unfriendly nature of such actions is contrary to the spirit and letter of the treaties concluded between the USSR and the FRG,” the marshal said in conclusion.

Further Reports on Talks With Poland, Troop Pullout

Deputy Chief of General Staff Comments

PM1104135191 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
9 Apr 91 Union Edition p 2

[Interview with Colonel General A. Kleymenov, deputy chief of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff, by correspondent N. Burbyga; no place or date specified: "Troop Trains Heading East From Poland"]

[Text] The first subunits of Soviet troops stationed in Poland will leave for home 9 April. On the eve of this event our correspondent met with Colonel General A. Kleymenov, deputy chief of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff.

[Burbyga] Anatoliy Nikolayevich, what kind of grouping of forces do we have in Poland?

[Kleymenov] The grouping numbers around 50,000 servicemen. It comprises several formations and combined units and also a large number of separate units. Armaments include more than 1,000 heavy tracked vehicles, more than 10,000 wheeled vehicles, combat aircraft, and helicopters. But it must be borne in mind that not only will servicemen and military hardware be leaving, but hospitals, schools, public and consumer institutions, and officers' and warrant officers' families will also be going. The grouping is considerably smaller than the one in the FRG. And this, of course, makes our task easier.

[Burbyga] Who and what is going to leave in the immediate future?

[Kleymenov] Despite the fact that the withdrawal agreement had not yet been signed between our country and Poland, we will nonetheless be withdrawing several subunits in the first half of April. Maintenance and support units will be the first to go, and we will also be taking away ammunition, fuel, clothing, and other gear and supplies.

[Burbyga] What is the deadline for the withdrawal of forces?

[Kleymenov] The Polish leadership has ordered us to complete all the work by the end of the year.

[Burbyga] Is it a realistic deadline?

[Kleymenov] No. January, February, and March have already gone. Only nine months remain. Moreover, the withdrawal of forces from Hungary and Czechoslovakia has not yet been completed and the withdrawal from Germany has only just started...

[Burbyga] What awaits those returning home? Have barracks been prepared for the soldiers and temporary accommodation for servicemen's families?

[Kleymenov] Of course, there will be problems. One should have no illusions. We are physically unable to

provide housing for everyone: We do not have it. But every effort is being made to ease the resettlement problems. Not for nothing are we withdrawing the forces nearer the summer. And the first to leave, as I said, will be those who will organize housing for their comrades.

[Burbyga] It is known that many servicemen will be discharged as a result of the cuts. Is there a coordinating organ that could help them find work and accommodation?

[Kleymenov] Some of the first to leave Poland are those least affected by the cuts. As for a coordinating organ to help servicemen find work and accommodation, it does not exist in the Army, alas. The law says that local soviets are supposed to deal with all these matters.

DER SPIEGEL Article Called 'Slandorous'

PM0904115991 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 9 Apr 91 First Edition p 3

[Lieutenant Colonel V. Panarin report: "DER SPIEGEL Misinforms..."]

[Text] In a recent issue the magazine DER SPIEGEL published a slanderous article which is essentially a distortion of the facts. It was devoted to the recent talks between Army General M.A. Moiseyev, chief of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff, and Polish Foreign Minister K. Skubiszewski on the terms for the presence and withdrawal of Soviet troops from the Republic of Poland and also on the transit across Polish territory of the Western Group of Forces, which is being pulled out of Germany.

This was an official meeting held in a businesslike and friendly atmosphere, in the course of which the sides sought a mutually acceptable solution to these questions. And, as the latest round of talks showed, it helped to advance some of them substantially, particularly regarding the troop withdrawal procedure. The necessary accords were thereby reached during Army General M.A. Moiseyev's two-day visit to Warsaw, and ground-work was laid for a profitable meeting at the head of government level.

The chief of General Staff unequivocally declared that the withdrawal of our troops from Polish territory will begin in the very near future. The convincing arguments cited in favor of that decision left the Polish side no grounds for doubts. However, DER SPIEGEL "started to have doubts" and even tried at all costs to uncover intrigue in the sides' official relations. The article emphasizes, in particular, that the great power's representative found himself in an unusual role when he was forced to act as a suppliant, appealing "to the conscience of the fraternal Polish nation and for understanding of the Soviet Union's problems."

The atmosphere at the official talks, the questions raised there, and the foundation of long-standing Soviet-Polish

traditions thoroughly sweep aside, so to speak, the "factual aspect" presented by the magazine. This was also confirmed by the Polish foreign minister himself in an interview, when he noted the positive and constructive nature of the dialogue which had taken place. And then the author of the article contradicts himself: Do "occupiers," as he calls the Soviet servicemen, really ask?! The older generation, which lived through World War II, knows that occupiers usually take without asking.

We have no need to touch our forelock to the Polish side. Our temporary presence on Polish territory is linked, above all, with the Soviet Army's liberation mission during the years of World War II, thanks to which the Polish people not only secured freedom and independence, but also hundreds of villages and cities were saved from destruction. And in the postwar period our presence was dictated by the complex military-political situation on the European Continent and was undertaken at the request of the Polish Government. As regards the real occupation, our people laid down 640,000 human lives for the expulsion of those occupiers and Poland's liberation. This ought to be remembered, particularly by a magazine published in Germany.

General on Stages of Withdrawal

*LD1004122891 Moscow TASS International Service
in Russian 0940 GMT 10 Apr 91*

[By TASS correspondent Oleg Moskovskiy]

[Text] Moscow, 10 April (TASS)—"The Soviet Union plans to fully eliminate its Northern Group of Forces in Poland by the end of 1993," Major General Vladimir Zhurbenko, deputy head of the Main Directorate of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff [zamestitel nachalnika glavnogo upravleniya generalnogo shtaba vooruzhennykh], declared today. He gave an interview to the TASS correspondent in connection with the dispatch from Poland of an echelon of personnel and rocket brigade weaponry. "The dispatch of this echelon to the Soviet Union marks the start of the final stage in the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Poland," the General Staff representative noted.

The general said that the withdrawal of the rocket brigade now under way was planned in accordance with the defensive doctrine adopted in the USSR. According to this concept, "by 1995 Soviet troops will not be stationed on the territory of other countries," he pointed out.

Vladimir Zhurbenko recalled that in accordance with the USSR's plans to cut troops in Europe, the withdrawal of units and subunits from Poland began as long as two years ago. He mentioned among the troops withdrawn at that time "a training tank regiment, an assault brigade, all construction units, and some rear support units." But the withdrawal of Soviet troops was then halted. "Until autumn 1990, Poland did not insist on their withdrawal from its territory," the General Staff representative pointed out. Nevertheless, he added, hardly had united

Germany given assurance that it would not lay claim to a review of Poland's borders, than "the Polish Government returned to the issue."

In 1991, according to the general, about 10,000 Soviet servicemen will leave Poland, and the area of seven military settlements will be completely freed. The withdrawing troops will include some units and subunits of aviation, communications, and engineering troops.

Further Report

*OW1004232791 Beijing XINHUA in English
1521 GMT 10 Apr 91*

[Text] Moscow, April 10 (XINHUA)—A Soviet general said today that the USSR has planned to complete the withdrawal of troops from Poland by the end of 1993.

Major General Vladimir Zhurbenko said that the train leaving Poland carrying a Soviet missile brigade home has signaled the beginning of the last stage of Soviet withdrawal.

The ranking officer from the General Staff of the Soviet Armed Forces was quoted by TASS as saying that the pullout of Soviet troops from Poland commenced two years ago when a tank training regiment and a paratroop commando brigade, as well as the whole construction force, left the Polish territory.

He claimed that "Poland did not insist on Soviet troop withdrawal until fall 1990." The request was put forward after unified Germany pledged no change to the German-Polish border, Zhurbenko added.

A total of 10,000 Soviet servicemen will return home from Poland this year, and there will be no more Soviet troops abroad by 1995, the general said.

The Polish and Soviet authorities have been disputing over the deadline for the complete Soviet pullout and the use of Polish territory as Soviet soldiers in eastern Germany are heading home.

While the Soviet Union is prepared to complete the troop withdrawal by the end of 1993, the Poles set a deadline at the end of 1991.

The timetable is expected to be finalized when Polish President Lech Walesa visits USSR, but Walesa's visit has been postponed several times.

According to reports from Poland, some 1,200 Soviet servicemen left Poland's Borne-Sulinowo Tuesday afternoon for home.

The Warsaw TV station said this is the first batch of more than 50,000 Soviet troops in Poland to be withdrawn.

Soviet Commander-in-Chief in Poland Viktor Dubynin, however, said on Monday that the pullout can not be achieved before the end of 1993.

Walesa: Speed Up Talks

*LD1504092391 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
11 Apr 91 Union Edition p 1*

[Item from roundup of IZVESTIYA, TASS, REUTER, UPI reports: "Interview with Lech Walesa"]

[Excerpt] While on a visit to France, Polish President L. Walesa made the following statement in an interview with the newspaper LA CROIX L'EVENEMENT on the subject of Soviet troops stationed in Poland: Apart from a statement on the need for Soviet troops to be present in our land, Mazowiecki's government has done nothing about this question. I reproach the government for this, maintaining that there is a need to bring the date for troop withdrawals forward. Right now we are trying to speed up this process, but we do not want to expel or humiliate them. We are attempting to show that keeping the troops does not bode well from either a political or an economic viewpoint. Once we have done this, it will simply remain to find solutions to the technical questions of withdrawal. [passage omitted]

Talks Proceeding Slowly

*LD1204214291 Moscow Central Television First
Program Network in Russian 1800 GMT 12 Apr 91*

[Report by correspondent Yuriy Ulyanov in Warsaw including recorded remarks by V.A. Kopteltsev, head of the Soviet delegation at the talks with Poland on troop withdrawal; from the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] [Ulyanov] The talks are proceeding slowly and with difficulties. First, there is the issue of timing. The Polish side from the outset, that is last November, declared that the withdrawal of Soviet troops should be concluded in 1991. We proposed late 1994. Then we agreed to the middle of 1994, and then—late 1993. This year it is simply unrealistic to implement a complete withdrawal because of the large volume of material and technical resources. Furthermore, our military command considers it wrong to cut off the Soviet troops from our country that are being withdrawn from Germany. [Video shows negotiations; military vehicles; servicemen]

Second, the property, finance, and legal problems have not yet been solved. After all, over 46 years entire military towns, with airfields, bases, storage facilities, housing, schools, and municipal services enterprises have been built in Poland using our resources.

But we cannot simply sit and wait for the conclusion of the negotiations. As agreed between the Governments of Poland and the Soviet Union, the withdrawal of troops has to all intents and purposes begun. Some subunits of airmen, air assault troops, anti aircraft troops, and tankmen have left the Polish Republic. A missile brigade is leaving. In the immediate future the Polish side will have seven military garrisons at its disposal. [Video shows Soviet and Polish officers saluting; troops march

past; servicemen waving with flowers from a train wagon; waving crowd of people]

But what's happening at the talks?

[Kopteltsev] The present—sixth—round of negotiations took place in a favorable atmosphere, thanks to Prime Minister Bielecki's recent visit to Moscow and the coming visit by President Walesa. It has shown that we, albeit slowly, are progressing along the road of mutual understanding. Of course, the more details of the issues you go into, the greater is their variety, but I am convinced that we will reach a mutual understanding with the Polish side.

Foreign Ministry Aide on Sixth Round of Talks

*PM1804155391 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
16 Apr 91 Union Edition p 3*

["From Authoritative Sources" interview with V. Kopteltsev, deputy chief of a USSR Foreign Ministry administration, by correspondent N. Burbyga: "When Are We Leaving Poland?"]

[Text] Round six of the talks between the USSR and the Polish Republic on the transit of Soviet troops from Germany and the withdrawal of the Northern Group of Forces from Poland has ended in Warsaw. Our correspondent talked about the results of the talks with Soviet delegation head V. Kopteltsev, deputy chief of a USSR Foreign Ministry administration.

No final results were achieved at the talks. Therefore the next round will take place in Moscow in early May.

[Burbyga] Has the timetable for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Poland been set?

[Kopteltsev] We have a difference of opinion on this question. The Polish side insists that the forces should be withdrawn in 1991. Of course, we cannot accept this. We said it should be by the end of 1994. However, in the course of the talks, in view of the Polish side's request, we agreed to withdraw the forces before the end of 1993.

[Burbyga] Is that realistic?

[Kopteltsev] We know it will be difficult. But the General Staff thinks we will cope.

[Burbyga] But rushing things like that will affect first and foremost the families of servicemen who do not have apartments in the Union...

[Kopteltsev] I have heard criticism of this kind before. But the diplomats are not guilty, since we do not tackle any question without the military. If you are going to take someone to task it has to be both ministries. It is time to stop pitting the Foreign Ministry against the military.

There are events that are difficult to predict. For example, many thought that the unification of Germany would take at least three years. The Germans themselves

thought so. It is not the diplomats' fault that events developed so swiftly. Moreover, our "haste" is also due to the fact that lately we have been having to pay our forces abroad with hard currency, which, as you yourself will appreciate, is to our disadvantage.

[Burbyga] What will happen to the military camps that were constructed with Defense Ministry funds?

[Kopteltsev] That is the most difficult question. They are our buildings, but it is Polish land. By their laws, everything built on that land belongs to Poland.

The question is difficult also because there is no mechanism yet for the transfer of military camps and the various facilities and structures. So property disputes arise between us and the countries where Soviet forces are stationed.

[Burbyga] According to my information, the Soviet delegation at the talks had to get to Warsaw by relay, because the aircraft was not allowed to land at a Polish airfield...

[Kopteltsev] Yes, we flew from Moscow to Brest and then we got to Warsaw by bus. There were financial reasons for it. But I would not pay too much attention to that.

[Burbyga] Polish journalists commenting on the first withdrawal of a missile brigade claimed that it was merely a propaganda stunt by the Soviets.

[Kopteltsev] Few of the journalists would say that... The planned withdrawal of forces has begun.

Commentary Views Difficulties of Withdrawal

LD1604223591 *Moscow International Service*
in Polish 1600 GMT 16 Apr 91

[(Vasiliy Lisovik) commentary]

[Text] The sixth round of talks between the Soviet Union and the Polish Republic on the transit of Soviet troops evacuated from Germany and the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Poland has taken place in Warsaw. Radio Moscow commentary (Vasiliy Lisovik) writes in this regard: Above all, it is worth stressing that the Warsaw round of talks was preceded by an important event, namely, the withdrawal ceremony on 9 April of a Soviet missile brigade at the Borne-Sulinowo garrison in Koszalin province, in an atmosphere of great pomp. In the presence of representatives of the Polish authorities and military leadership, part of the weaponry and some of the personnel left for home. The official planned withdrawal of Soviet troops from Poland, on the basis of an initiative from the Land of the Soviets and in agreement with the Polish side, began in this way.

In two days, the sixth round of talks on the timetable for troop withdrawal and the settlement of accounts is taking place in Warsaw. It transpires from the results that the forementioned sixth round will not be the last.

This in itself is testimony to the two sides' divergent approaches to this problem, and so, quite simply, divergence in relation to a number of important points. The most important are the deadline for withdrawal and the mutual settling of accounts as regards transporting troops to the Soviet Union, as well as the purchase by the Polish side of various Soviet assets, mainly buildings occupied by the Army and by officers' families.

The Polish side demands that the last Soviet soldier leave Poland before the end of 1991. The Soviet side believes that this is an unrealistic date, and has put forward its own timetable, ending withdrawal before the end of 1994. This relates to previous rounds of talks. A similar situation also arose during the sixth round, although, on the basis of my own observations as well as on the basis of interviews with the plenipotentiary representatives of the Soviet and Polish Governments on the subject of these talks, I can state that some progress has emerged toward achieving compromise, writes (Vasiliy Lesovik). I think that the most realistic date for the final, agreed deadline should be the end of 1993. This does not mean, however, that this deadline has been agreed. As the Radio Moscow commentator stresses, this date concerns a possible compromise.

The mechanism for the transfer of housing estates and buildings remains a complex problem. According to the Radio Moscow commentator, neither side has, up to now, proposed realistic means for cutting this Gordian knot. Therefore, another round of talks is indispensable, this time in Moscow. Will it be the last? Will all the i's finally be dotted regarding the timetable for withdrawing Soviet troops from Poland during the announced official meeting between the presidents of both countries? In reply to this question, my Polish journalist colleagues often refer to a view which, they maintain, was expressed by Lech Walesa when he stated that two Nobel prize-winners were capable of finding a common language in respect of all problems, writes (Vasiliy Lesovik), ending his reflections on the sixth round of talks on the transit and withdrawal of Soviet troops from Central and East European states.

Documents on Troop Withdrawal From Hungary Signed

PM1504152991 *Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA*
in Russian 12 Apr 91 First Edition p 3

[Correspondent Lieutenant Colonel A. Borovkov report: "Signing of Documents"]

[Text] Soviet and Hungarian representatives signed documents relating to questions of the Soviet troops' withdrawal from Hungarian territory. These documents lay down the procedure for the reception and transfer of installations and the means of assessing environmental damage. Lieutenant General V. Shilov and Lieutenant General A. Annus, the two governments' plenipotentiary representatives on questions of the troops' withdrawal, took part in signing the documents.

Paris Forum on European Security Reported

Akhromeyev Urges NATO Dismantling

AU1104181491 Paris AFP in English 1754 GMT
11 Apr 91

[Text] Paris, April 11 (AFP)—Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev's personal military adviser Thursday called for the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation to dismantle its military structure, saying that the Red Army no longer represented a threat to the West. In a satellite link-up during a Paris symposium on European security on the eve of the 21st century, Marshal Sergey Akhromeyev said NATO should follow the Warsaw Pact's example by abolishing its military structure.

The Soviet Union has repeatedly called for the simultaneous dismantling of the two rival military alliances, and Marshal Akhromeyev said Soviet citizens failed to understand why NATO continued to exist. The six Warsaw Pact countries dissolved their military structures in Budapest in February, while retaining a political consultative committee.

Marshal Akhromeyev strongly denied charges from former West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt that the instability in the Soviet Union could lead to dictatorship, civil war and consequently a renewed threat to the West. Speaking as one of the six marshals in the Soviet Union, he said that "all of us are devoted to the ideals of perestroika, and we are walking hand in hand with President Gorbachev". "The leadership of the Armed Forces is devoted to the whole process of democratisation and perestroika (restructuring)," he said. The military were even "active participants" in perestroika, he added.

Marshal Akhromeyev declared he was "unconvinced" by NATO Secretary-General Manfred Woerner's statement during the discussion that NATO should remain although adjust to the political changes of the last two years in which communist regimes throughout eastern Europe were toppled.

Moscow had a military potential "for our own security, but we represent no danger to the rest of Europe whatsoever," he said.

NATO's decision to keep its military structures because of the danger of Soviet instability "concerns us greatly," he said. "Are they going to help us ensure stability? This (NATO) is a military organisation." But Mr. Woerner brushed aside Marshal Akhromeyev's concerns, pointing out that NATO was "purely defensive".

Mr. Gorbachev's personal adviser on European affairs, Vadim Zagladin, told the Paris audience of military and defence specialists that the threats to stability now came from "domestic policies", and pointed notably to the situation in central Europe.

The two-day symposium, which was closed by French President Francois Mitterrand, was organised by the French Ecole Superieure de Guerre, an army officers' think tank.

'Common Denominator' Sought

PM1604105591 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 13 Apr 91 First Edition p 2

[Captain S. Sidorov report: "Paris, Moscow, Washington: Security Is Impossible Without Cooperation"]

[Text] "European Security. What Form Should It Take at the Turn of the Century?" An international forum, which was held in the French capital and brought together some 2,000 security experts beneath the domes of the Higher School of French Land Forces [Ecole Superieure de Guerre], was devoted to this extremely topical issue. It was also attended by students from the higher military education establishments of 17 countries, including representatives of the USSR. KRASNAYA ZVEZDA's international observer followed the course of the meeting. We publish his notes.

The conference participants exchanged opinions on a broad range of questions, from the prospects for setting up an all-European collective security system to the problems of disarmament and military industry conversion. Moreover, the discussion was not limited to an examination of the purely military aspects of security, as is evidenced by the profound understanding both by the public and by the future military leaders of the countries represented of the importance of the economic, cultural, diplomatic, scientific research, and other elements of security. In my view, this understanding was expressed clearly enough by V. Zagladin, head of the Soviet delegation in Paris and chairman of the Soviet Committee for European Security and Cooperation, who stressed that the starting point for any security system should be the security of each individual person.

The concluding session of the conference took place with the aid of a satellite linkup that joined the audience in Paris with students from the National Defense University in Washington and the USSR Armed Forces General Staff Military Academy in Moscow. A brief exposition of their vision of a future European security system was given by authoritative figures like Marshal of the Soviet Union S. Akhromeyev, adviser to the USSR president; NATO Secretary General M. Woerner; and B. Scowcroft, assistant to the U.S. President for national security affairs.

On the whole the nature of the speeches and the ensuing brief but intense debate reflected the current state of the European process. Whereas the sides were unanimous in their positive assessment of the major military-political changes that have taken place in the world and especially in Europe in recent years, there was no unanimity in their assessment of ways to deepen these processes.

B. Scowcroft, for example, saw the way forward in a strengthening of the "leading role of America" which, in the opinion of the administration he represents, has emerged from the Persian Gulf conflict as something totally new—the only superpower in the world. Needless to say, as participants in bilateral and multilateral dialogue with the Americans, we cannot avoid facing the complex question posed by attitudes of this sort: How do we conduct business with them from now on?

M. Woerner put forward a quite contradictory position as well. On the one hand, he confirmed NATO's intention to develop relations with the Soviet Union in a spirit of mutual understanding and friendship, but on the other hand he spoke in favor of maintaining the alliance's military organization, albeit with a lower level of arms and a changed strategy. Meanwhile, Woerner is well aware that the Soviet Union, whose understanding is being relied on, is reasonably interpreting the alliance's future in a different way: If the Warsaw Pact's military organization no longer exists, neither, consequently, should NATO's. In trying to substantiate his viewpoint, Woerner unconvincingly referred to the instability of the internal political situation in the Soviet Union, and then reinforced the thesis of NATO's "strictly defensive" character by stating that the alliance lacks an "offensive potential," which came as a big surprise to the fairly well informed students from the General Staff Academy.

There was also a speech from an East European representative—Polish politician B. Geremek—who expressed his concern at the "Soviet side's dragging its feet over the schedule for withdrawing its troops from Poland." In this context he expressed the fear that this was being done "deliberately," and could therefore be seen, in his opinion, as a sign of the Soviet leadership's recoil back to the pre-perestroika period. I shall not set forth the counterarguments adduced by the Soviet participants in the television link. These are obvious for all who are familiar with the problems of the withdrawal. I will merely note that this is not the first time that hints of "a growing conservative influence on the Kremlin's policy" and even of "a military conspiracy against Gorbachev" have been heard. They have been put with particular eloquence by former FRG Chancellor H. Schmidt, who for some reason attributed conspiratorial aims specifically to the "marshals," almost all of whom, incidentally, retired long ago, just like the former chancellor.

The marshal had to give an answer. As far as was possible in the space of one or two minutes, Presidential Adviser S. Akhromeyev stated fully and cogently that the military leadership and the "marshals" are not only committed to changes, but are also taking an active part in them. Moreover, the Armed Forces are the guarantor of the peaceful progress of the transformations that are taking place in our country. In fact, would it really have been possible to start implementing a major program of troop and arms reduction without the participation of the military?

However, the entirely explicable contradictions that came out in the speeches by participants in the television linkup—it would have been strange if there had not been any—were just a minor detail. But the recurrent theme was still a desire to arrive at a common denominator. Ultimately everybody had one aim—the creation of a regional security system that would guarantee reliable peace and security for all peoples and states. It remains only to agree with the main idea in French President F. Mitterand's statement, who delivered the closing speech to the forum participants: The political prerequisite for such a system already exists, namely the Paris Charter for a new Europe. It is up to the Europeans to realize the potential contained therein through cooperation and collaboration.

'Cautious Optimism' on Third Round of CFE Talks

*LD1504151291 Moscow TASS in English 1323 GMT
15 Apr 91*

[By TASS correspondent Vladimir Smelov]

[Text] Vienna, April 15 (TASS)—The new, third round of the talks on conventional armed forces in Europe [CFE] that opened here today will try to overcome difficulties that have arisen at the talks.

The first stage of the talks was concluded by the Paris summit where the treaty on conventional armed forces in Europe was signed. The present forum is to discuss questions connected with limiting the numerical strength of the armed forces of the 22 participating countries on an area stretching from the Atlantic to the Urals. Effective and verifiable measures for stabilisation should be worked out and a procedure for aerial inspections coordinated.

The second round of negotiations was futile. Debates on the procedure for counting those armaments and equipment to which reductions apply hit a wall. There were heated debates over the fact that three motorised rifle divisions in the USSR were attached to the coastal defense, although this took place back in 1989, long before the treaty was signed.

Local observers speak about prospects for the present round with cautious optimism, based on reports from Washington that the U.S. is prepared to propose a compromise. This will possibly help get the negotiations off the ground.

If this happens, the participants in the forum will be able to begin drafting agreements to limit conventional armed forces. These limitations may be on the basis of separate countries, not the basis of blocs. A consensus is being reached about this approach. The military organization of the Warsaw Treaty no longer exists. While NATO continues to operate as a military-political alliance, it has stated its intention to change its strategy and tactics because there are no longer military adversaries in Europe.

They will search for a mutually acceptable way to limit the scope of military exercises, contributing to stabilisation measures aimed at averting the threat of a surprise attack and covert preparations for large scale offensives. Participants will also seek to coordinate a regime of aerial inspections.

Fitzwater Cited on CFE Treaty-Summit Linkage

*LD1604031691 Moscow TASS in English 0302 GMT
16 Apr 91*

[By TASS correspondent Andrey Fedyashin]

[Text] Washington, April 16 (TASS)—The United States served a clear notice on Monday that it does not insist that work on the Strategic Arms Reductions Treaty (START) should be completed before any Soviet-American summit could take place.

However, it said that completion of the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE) is a precondition for a summit between Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev and U.S. President George Bush.

The sides postponed the Moscow summit scheduled for February because of the Gulf crisis and differences on the START treaty.

White House Spokesman Marlin Fitzwater told a news briefing that both President Bush and Gorbachev were interested in the meeting.

"We are very concerned about the CFE," Fitzwater told reporters. "I think it's fair to say we have to resolve major questions about that before we'd be ready to have a summit."

He hinted that differences on the START treaty could be resolved during the Moscow summit, which could also bring progress in nuclear disarmament.

"In terms of the START agreement, we also want to make progress on that and so we wouldn't tie specific conditions to a summit," Fitzwater said.

CSCE 'Conflict Prevention' Center Meets

*LD1604183191 Moscow TASS in English 1521 GMT
16 Apr 91*

[By TASS correspondent Vladimir Smelov]

[Text] Vienna, 16 April (TASS)—The search for and testing of new principles for relations between states and the development of new approaches to security that will meet the criteria of the new epoch are the core of the European process, according to speeches by representatives from various states at a meeting of the consultative committee of the Conflict Prevention Centre, held here today.

The new institution of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), an important mechanism in Europe's future structures from the Atlantic to

the Urals, was established in compliance with decisions taken by the Paris summit and opened in Vienna in mid-March.

The Centre is now oriented only on confidence-building measures and security. However, the Centre also plans to help prevent conflicts. But the programme for these activities has yet to be drafted.

Head of the Soviet delegation at the Vienna talks Oleg Grinevskiy told TASS that the Centre's activities will be discussed in the future.

At the same time it is logical to suppose that the Centre will strive to be efficient and flexible, enabling its members to use all the levers and experience of the CSCE, including experience accumulated during the Vienna talks, to prevent developments that could threaten peace, security and stability of CSCE states, Grinevskiy noted.

The present consultative committee meeting discussed the establishment of the Centre's data bank, which will accumulate various military information from all the 34 CSCE member-states.

The session of the Joint Consultative Group of Experts (JCGE) continued to specify initial data on military arsenals covered by the Conventional Forces in Europe treaty. The session held its regular plenary meeting in the Austrian capital today.

The group was set up to monitor the observance of the above document, signed at the Paris summit.

JCGE experts believe that the analysis of information, supplied by member-countries, shows that additional discussions at various levels are needed to remove possible questions concerning data on military forces.

During the session, the Soviet side intends to give specifications concerning initial data on the Soviet Armed Forces covered by the CFE Treaty. In turn, it has some questions concerning initial data supplied by other states.

Delegation Proposes Working CFE Document

*LD1804180191 Moscow TASS in English 1322 GMT
18 Apr 91*

[By TASS correspondent Vladimir Smelov]

[Text] Vienna, April 18 (TASS)—Progress reached during contacts between leaders of countries taking part in talks on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) offers a chance to overcome remaining differences, according to participants in the first plenary meeting of the third round of the Vienna talks, which will discuss troop numbers, aerial inspections and stabilisation measures.

A compromise acceptable for everyone would be welcome, participants said.

The past few months saw sharp fluctuations in the climate at the talks. After a euphoria following the successful completion of the treaty last November, several participants panicked after confronting the first difficulties in its implementation, Soviet chief negotiator Oleg Grinevskiy told TASS.

Expectations of the collapse of the European disarmament process froze all work. Meanwhile, the tasks put by state and government leaders at the Paris summit remain in force and very little time remains for their implementation, Grinevskiy said.

It is extremely important to begin work immediately, he added.

Today, the Soviet delegation presented a working document on stabilisation measures, which, experts believe, would make negotiations much more concrete.

The Soviet side proposed that all military activity involving more than 40,000 troops, or 800 combat tanks, or 1,500 armoured vehicles, or 800 artillery systems or 400 combat aircraft or 150 assault helicopters at one time in areas covered by the treaty be banned.

The signatories will be limited to no more than six military activities a year, involving a lesser number of forces but more than 13,000 troops.

The document also envisages mutual information about military activities and other measures.

SHORT-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

Commander on 'Secret Nuclear Garrisons' in Poland

LD1504225191 Warsaw PAP in English 2208 GMT
15 Apr 91

[By PAP correspondent Zdzislaw Raczyński]

[Text] Moscow, April 15—Speaking to the MOSKOVSKIE NOVOSTI weekly commander of the Soviet troops stationed in Poland General Viktor Dubynin said it would be best for the interest of Poland not to raise at all the question of Soviet secret nuclear garrisons in Poland. Dubynin said the Polish press made a sensation of the issue while all the installations had been known to the Polish Defence Ministry, were built by Polish construction workers according to Polish blueprints, and then leased to the Soviet Army in Poland for storing, as he puts it, "products" for the Polish Army.

'Small Amount' of Nuclear Ammo Withdrawn From CSFR

LD1804170791 Moscow TASS in English 1602 GMT
18 Apr 91

[By TASS diplomatic correspondents Sergey Postanogov, Sergey Nikishov, and Sergey Ryabikin]

[Text] Moscow, April 18 (TASS)—A small amount of Soviet nuclear ammunition was deployed on that part of

Czechoslovak territory where the units of the Central Group of troops was located in accordance with the Soviet-Czechoslovak intergovernmental agreement.

However, the last round of nuclear ammunition was withdrawn from Czechoslovakia in March 1990, Soviet Foreign Ministry Spokesman Yuriy Gremitskikh told a briefing here today.

He was commenting on Czechoslovak Defence Minister Lubos Dobrovsky's statement, published by Czechoslovak newspapers on April 17, in which the minister confirmed that there had been Soviet nuclear bases on Czechoslovak territory in the past.

NUCLEAR TESTING

Panel Cited on Novaya Zemlya Radiation Levels

PM1804122791 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 15 Apr 91 First Edition p 1

[Unattributed "Our Digest" report: "What Is Being Said, What Is Being Written..."]

[Text] The following is an extract from information given to USSR Supreme Soviet Chairman A. Lukyanov by the State Military-Industrial Commission:

"...In light of the safety measures being taken the holding of underground nuclear tests at the northern test site is not affecting the radiation situation in the territory of the test site or, moreover, in the areas adjacent to it. This is confirmed by the results of systematic observations in this region by the USSR State Committee for Hydrometeorology. Even in the period of atmospheric nuclear tests carried out in 1955-1962 the content of radioactive substances in the air, ground, and water in the regions of the Far North did not exceed the permitted norms. By now the concentration of these substances has decreased and is tending to decrease further. Measurements of the test site's radiation status carried out with the participation of people's deputies from the Komi Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic and Arkhangelsk Oblast Soviet following the 24 October 1990 underground nuclear explosion did not establish a change in the natural environment.

"...The USSR Government draft resolution 'On Measures Associated With Holding Underground Nuclear Tests' provides for the allocation to the USSR Ministry of Defense in 1991-1992 of appropriate quotas of state centralized capital investments for the preparation and holding of nuclear tests, the construction of housing and social amenities, and other essential work at the northern test site."

(This information was circulated at the USSR Supreme Soviet.)

Nuclear Program Transfer To Be Complete by '92

*LD1704124891 Moscow TASS International Service
in Russian 1200 GMT 17 Apr 91*

[By TASS correspondent Vladimir Anufriyev]

[Text] Arkhangelsk, 17 April (TASS)—It is planned that work on transferring to Novaya Zemlya (in the Soviet Arctic) the test program from the Semipalatinsk nuclear proving ground in Kazakhstan, which is subject to closure, will be completed by 1992. This was stated at a meeting with journalists by Colonel Gennadiy Neverov, head of the USSR KGB directorate for the Arkhangelsk Oblast (in northern Russia). He was quoting information he had at his disposal.

The Arkhangelsk Oblast Soviet of People's Deputies is opposed to any buildup in the numbers of nuclear weapons tests in the Arctic, said Viktor Shiryayev, deputy chairman of the Soviet, who was present at the meeting. "The resolution of this question is within the competence of the country's Defense Council and president, he observed. We will insist that the military pay compensation for taking the territory of the testing ground and for the possible ecological damage."

CHEMICAL & BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

International CW Conference Opens in Moscow

*LD0904104191 Moscow TASS in English 0933 GMT
9 Apr 91*

[By TASS correspondent Mikhail Ivanov]

[Text] Moscow, April 9 (TASS)—A three-day international conference on chemical arms [CW] opens in Moscow today.

The meeting, organized by the Commission on International Security and Disarmament of the Soviet Peace Committee, is attended by Soviet Foreign and Defence Ministries experts, lawmakers, prominent Soviet scholars and specialists from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.

The conference will discuss prospects for an international convention banning chemical arms, the role of the public and lawmakers in expediting its signing, problems of eliminating chemical arms and environmental safety during the destruction of chemical weapons.

Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Viktor Karpov is expected to speak at the opening ceremony.

Other speakers include Matthew Medelson, U.S. Government delegation consultant at chemical arms talks, Nikita Smidovich, chief of the Soviet Foreign Ministry Department on Arms Limitation and Disarmament [as received], and Martin Kaplan, former secretary-general of the International Pugwash Movement.

Moscow CW Conference To Discuss Conclusion, Implementation of Ban

*LD0904222191 Moscow TASS in English 2204 GMT
9 Apr 91*

[By TASS diplomatic correspondent Mikhail Ivanov]

[Text] Moscow, April 9 (TASS)—An international conference on chemical weapons [CW] opened in Moscow today.

Its participants will discuss the conclusion of an international convention banning chemical weapons, the role of the public and parliamentarians in speeding up its signing, the elimination of chemical weapons and ecological safety of facilities for destroying chemical agents.

The conference was organized by the Commission for International Security and Disarmament under the Soviet Peace Protection Committee.

The conference is being attended by experts from the Soviet Defence Ministry, Soviet and Russian parliamentarians, leading Soviet scientists and specialists from the Stockholm International Institute for Peace Research.

The commission's head Viktor Israelyan stressed that the conference did not replace official Soviet-U.S. or multilateral talks and aimed to work out mutually acceptable recommendations at experts level, speeding up the signing of a multilateral convention banning chemical weapons.

Nikita Smidovich, a departmental head of the Soviet Foreign Ministry Administration for Arms Limitation and Disarmament, said that participants managed to reach agreement on some major provisions of the future document, including obligations to ban the production of chemical weapons.

The sides practically settled issues pertaining to the gradual destroying of chemical agents and worked out general ecological requirements to facilities for destroying chemical agents.

The document envisages an international control over the implementation of the convention.

Smidovich said the sides had not yet found ways to ensure an effective control over the implementation of the convention without a detriment to the national security of each country.

The conference will also consider some technical problems relating to the compiling of a list of to-be-banned chemical weapons and facilities.

Current talks focus mostly on political issues, including a mechanism for imposing sanctions against violations of the convention, aid to people affected by chemical weapons, the promotion of a universal character of the convention and measures against countries refusing to join the convention for a long time.

Moscow CW Conference Views Technology of Destruction*LD1204165991 Moscow TASS in English 1235 GMT
12 Apr 91*

[By TASS diplomatic correspondent Sergey Kondratenko]

[Text] Moscow, April 12 (TASS)—The importance of concluding an international convention on the destruction of chemical weapons [CW] after the 1990 Soviet-U.S. agreement came into force was discussed by an international conference on the prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons, which ended in Moscow on Thursday.

The conference also examined the technology and methods for the destruction of chemical agents and other issues. The forum was attended by scholars and experts from the United States, the USSR, Sweden, Switzerland and Poland, as well as Soviet and foreign legislators.

Conference participants noted that the method of destroying chemical weapons with energy released by an underground nuclear explosion, suggested by the international Cetek joint stock company, deserves the most serious attention as the least expensive means.

The forum supported the idea of holding a demonstration experiment to improve the technology of large-scale destruction of chemical weapons and highly toxic industrial waste.

A proposal was made to set up an international committee to appraise the results of this experiment from the viewpoint of ecological security.

The conference pointed to the importance of utilizing chemical weapons and using the products of their processing in the economy.

ASIAN SECURITY ISSUES**General Staff Deputy Chief on Far East Balance***LD1504115191 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
12 Apr 91 Union Edition p 6*

[Interview with Colonel General V. Omelichev, first deputy chief of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff, by V. Litovkin under the rubric "From Competent Sources"; place and date not given: "Do We Threaten Japan?" —first two paragraphs are IZVESTIYA introduction]

[Text] The USSR president will make the first official visit to Japan in the history of relations between our countries in the next few days. Among the acute problems he will discuss with the country's leadership there will evidently be military ones too. What kind of problems are they, how does the USSR Ministry of Defense perceive them, and how is it proposed to resolve them?

Colonel General V. Omelichev, first deputy chief of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff, answers our reporter's questions.

[Litovkin] As you know, Bronislav Aleksandrovich, one of the conditions for strengthening confidence between our countries is the Japanese side's proposal that we publish data on the Soviet military grouping in the Far East. What is included in this grouping?

[Omelichev] To be brief, the Soviet troops in the Far East incorporate two historically evolved groupings: One counters the U.S. and Japanese armed forces in the Pacific zone, as well as the U.S. troops in Alaska and on the U.S. West Coast. A considerable proportion of our troops is deployed on islands and peninsulas facing the Pacific. The other was set up in the past to cover the land borders east of the country and is located in the narrow, populated strip along the Soviet-Chinese border and close to industrial and administrative centers.

Now, specific figures. Until recently, the two groupings included 597,600 men. Their arsenal included 1,690 combat aircraft, approximately 12,600 tanks, 14,300 infantry fighting vehicles and armored personnel carriers, and approximately 16,400 artillery systems. The Pacific Fleet incorporated 55 large surface ships, including two aircraft carriers, and 48 nuclear-powered submarines, which tackle the region's defensive tasks. This does not include submarines with strategic ballistic missiles.

[Litovkin] Why do you speak of the groupings' composition in the past tense?

[Omelichev] Because, in the course of the unilateral reduction of the Soviet Armed Forces, the grouping of our troops in the Far East has been reduced by 120,000 men. Twelve divisions have been cut back in the Ground Forces, 11 air regiments have been disbanded, and 16 warships, including three large surface ships and seven submarines, have been removed from the fleet's combat composition. We now have fewer troops than South Korea, let us say, left in that region as a result of these reductions.

[Litovkin] Our grouping is earmarked for defense against the Japanese and U.S. forces deployed in the region. What kind of forces are they? How do are our defensive structures measure up against them?

[Omelichev] A small elaboration. I did not say that we "defend" ourselves against these forces. As military people, however, we cannot disregard their composition, structure... In short, their combat potential. This is as follows.

The United States has deployed within the region a powerful grouping which includes more than 530,000 men. It includes U.S. bases in Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, the Mariana and Hawaii Islands, Alaska, and the U.S. West Coast. These forces have in their arsenal approximately 250 nuclear artillery pieces, as

well as more than 1,200 combat aircraft, including almost 550 capable of carrying nuclear weapons. The warships include up to seven multirole aircraft carriers, 39 multirole nuclear-powered submarines, and 30 ships equipped with long-range cruise missiles.

I wish to emphasize one very important, in my view, detail. A powerful grouping of U.S. troops, which includes more than 175,000 men, is deployed in the immediate vicinity of the Soviet coasts, on the Japanese islands of Okinawa, Kyushu, and Honshu and in South Korea. It incorporates two divisions—one, a land division, the other a marines division, up to 130 tanks, and more than 600 combat aircraft, approximately one-half of which can carry nuclear weapons, plus up to 70 warships of the U.S. 7th Fleet, including one or two multirole aircraft carriers. It can be quickly reinforced thanks to the high strategic mobility of the U.S. Armed Forces. They graphically demonstrated this mobility in the Persian Gulf.

Directly regarding Japan, its "self-defense forces" are modern, well armed, and equipped with the latest combat hardware. Their overall strength exceeds 270,000 men. More than 40 percent of the total potential of their ground forces is located on Hokkaido, the closest island to us. This means approximately 50,000 personnel, almost 600 tanks, up to 800 field artillery pieces and mortars, 90 aircraft, and 128 antiaircraft guided missile launchers. Three infantry divisions and one tank division are stationed on the island.

If you compare the U.S. and Japanese Armed Forces in that region with ours, you can notice that they have superiority over our grouping: More than twice as many personnel, almost four times as many large surface ships, absolute superiority in surface ships with cruise missiles with a range of more than 600 km on board—the Soviet Navy does not have such arms at all—and more than twice as many tactical and naval strike aircraft.

We only have superiority in the Ground Forces earmarked for defense—twice as many tanks, and 50 percent more infantry fighting vehicles, armored personnel carriers, and artillery systems. So you can see for yourself that we cannot threaten Japan and its allies in any way and do not intend to do so.

[Litovkin] What role do the four islands of the South Kuril Chain play in the defense of the Soviet Far East coast? What forces are located on those islands? What, in general, is the military significance of these islands for the country?

[Omelychev] The islands of Iturup, Kunashir, Shikotan, and Khabomai constitute a natural border on the Pacific side on the approaches to the Sea of Okhotsk and the Soviet Maritime Kray. As you understand, on the one

hand they substantially extend the sphere of our continental defense and, on the other hand, they ensure the security of communications lines linking the Soviet Maritime Kray and Kamchatka. Furthermore, it must not be forgotten that sea routes of importance to us pass through the straits that separate these islands.

We have machine gun and artillery units of the Far East Military District stationed on these islands. In terms of their composition—there are approximately 4,000 men there—and structure they are capable of fulfilling only exclusively defensive tasks within the island territories. They have neither nuclear missile weapons nor subunits of airborne troops in their arsenal. Nor is there a single ferry or pontoon that could be used to cross from island to island. Nor do they have landing aircraft or helicopters.

So, as you see, the strength and armament of the forces stationed on the islands are minimal. They are earmarked only for defense.

[Litovkin] The position of our country's leadership and of the Ministry of Defense on the problem of the islands is well known today, but life does not stand still and neither does our state's international policy. With the strengthening of confidence and mutual understanding, various options for resolving disputed questions, including with regard to these islands, can arise. For example, the sides will agree to create a free economic zone on them or a decision will be adopted to grant the Japanese side an opportunity to utilize the islands' shelf, to create joint ventures on them.... What is the General Staff's attitude to such prospects?

[Omelychev] We will not guess which option will prove most acceptable. We at the General Staff are accustomed to dealing with real facts. I have spoken of the military aspect of the question, but, in addition, there are other aspects too. Time will show how they are tackled.

[Litovkin] Is Soviet-Japanese military cooperation possible in the long term? If it is, what specifically is meant by this?

[Omelychev] It could be a question, primarily, of developing confidence-building measures in the military sphere. What we mean by this is notifying exercises to be held, inviting military observers to them, limiting the scale and regions for holding exercises, and also exchanging military delegations. There could be other forms of cooperation too. For example, the Soviet Union has suggested to the Japanese side drawing up and concluding an agreement to prevent incidents at sea and to prevent dangerous military activity, similar to those that we have with other countries. The chief thing is that our president's visit to this country should end successfully, and then it will be possible to speak of many real steps toward each other.

Admiral Calls Pacific Fleet Defensive Force*LD1504160391 Moscow TASS in English 1443 GMT
15 Apr 91*

[By TASS correspondent Vladimir Popov]

[Text] Vladivostok, April 15 (TASS)—The Soviet Pacific Fleet abides by the defensive military doctrine, Admiral Gennadiy Khvatov, commander of the fleet, told TASS today.

He spoke in connection with recent remarks made by Professor Masashi Nishihara of the National Defence Academy of Japan in Vladivostok recently. Nishihara voiced "concern" over an increase in Soviet naval potential in the Far East.

"Much depends on the accuracy of information available," Khvatov said. "As for a naval build-up or increased activity of the fleet, the state of affairs should have been estimated on the strength of real facts.

"Facts point to the contrary: the number of exercises and participants in them has been reduced, the area of the stay of Soviet nuclear-powered submarines has been limited to coastal zones", and warships' cruises in the Indian Ocean have been reduced to a minimum which is necessary to ensure Soviet merchant shipping in the area.

"And, finally, all exercises of the Pacific fleet are of a pronounced defensive character which accords with our new military doctrine. The better the Japanese public is informed about the practical steps of our country, the more realistically the situation in the region is judged," Khvatov said.

"We are interested in exchanges of impartial military information," the Soviet admiral emphasised. "This would be a big step to enhance confidence-building measures between the countries of the Asia-Pacific region".

Admiral Tallies Pacific Fleet Force Reductions*LD1704041991 Moscow TASS International Service
in Russian 1840 GMT 16 Apr 91*

[Text] Vladivostok, 16 April (TASS)—A meeting of political scientists from the USSR, the United States, China and Japan on Asian security problems has been held in Vladivostok. Some participants expressed concern over allegations that the potential of the Pacific Fleet is increasing, its actions off the shores of Japan are being stepped up, and there are incidents of Soviet

planes violating this [Japan] country's air space. A TASS correspondent asked Admiral G. Khvatov, commander of the Pacific Fleet, to clarify the situation.

"It is true," the admiral said, "that two years ago a note from the Foreign Ministry of Japan alleged that its air space was violated by a plane of our fleet. However, the above episode is highly disputed. As for increasing the potential of the fleet and stepping up its actions, facts prove the opposite, Judge for yourselves. In recent years the number of exercises and the strength of the personnel taking part in them have been reduced, the area where Soviet nuclear submarines operate has been restricted to coastal zones, and the sailing of warships in the Indian Ocean has been cut down to the minimum necessary for ensuring the safety of our shipping in that region. All exercises of the Pacific Fleet are held in accordance with the provisions of the Soviet defense doctrine".

The Soviet military chief noted that the armament of the USSR Navy is being reduced unilaterally. As recently as 1989-1990, 16 nuclear-powered and 24 diesel-powered submarines, 41 surface ships and 25 combatant craft were taken out of its force composition. A total of 16 units from this list are from the Pacific Fleet. These figures do not require any further comment.

"We are interested in an exchange of objective military information. I am convinced that this process should be placed on a firm basis of a treaty. We are ready for this," the admiral stressed.

Soviet Ambassador on Withdrawal From Mongolia*OW1704221191 Beijing XINHUA in English
1518 GMT 17 Apr 91*

[Text] Ulaanbataar, April 17 (XINHUA)—The Soviet Union will complete its troops withdrawal from Mongolia by mid-1992, Soviet Ambassador Vasilii Sitnikov said here today.

Only 15 percent of the 67,000 troops once there have failed to return to the Soviet Union due to limited transport capacity in Mongolia, the ambassador said, adding "the pull-out might otherwise have ended earlier."

The Soviet Union began to send its troops to Mongolia in 1963. It announced that between 1989 and 1990, it withdrew 50,000, accounting for 75 percent of a total that had never been made public before.

The ambassador also said \$300 million worth of military installations will be left gratis with Mongolia.

GERMANY

Arms Conversion Problems in Ex-GDR Analyzed

91WC0082A Bonn WEHRTECHNIK in German
Mar 91 pp 39-43

[Article by Eberhard Drechsel and Michael Ruck: "Arms Conversion in the New Laender: Lessons, Problems and Conclusions"—first paragraph is WEHRTECHNIK introduction]

[Text] Dr. of Science Prof. Eberhard Drechsel and his coauthor from the Institute for Peace Research, Security and Disarmament Economics in the School of Economics, are professional economists. Their school, the former School for Planned Economy and, therefore, the training ground for the cadre of the planned economy, was renamed the "Bruno Leuschner School" before receiving its current name. With the cancellation of its orders the armament industry in the former GDR lost its basis for existence from one day to the next. It became almost impossible for individual enterprises to find a niche in the civilian economy, especially since the existing market for consumer and industrial goods had evolved in the free economy for over 30 years and had not been created under the aegis of a planned economy. Given these basic conditions this article assumes even greater importance.

[Box, p 39]

Arms Conversion: Selective conversion of personnel, materiel and financial resources from military to civilian use.

- Conversion of R&D
- Conversion of arms production (employees, basic assets, circulating assets...)
- Conversion of tangible services (information, transportation, repairs...)
- Conversion of intangible services (education, culture, health system...)
- Verification of conversion
- Conversion of arms budgets
- Conversion of military infrastructure
- Conversion of immovable assets (bases, sites, training areas...)
- Conversion of demobilized military and civilian personnel
- Conversion of military assets (military machinery, equipment...)
- Developing capabilities for destroying/scraping military assets (weapons...)
- Conversion of military garrisons (regional and local structures...)

The agreements on conventional disarmament, sealed in Paris by the 22 member states of NATO and the Warsaw Pact on 19 November 1990, give added impetus to arms conversion in Europe and beyond. However, the basis for its realization differs greatly in the East and the West and in the reunited Germany these differences currently

cause noteworthy confrontations. Consequently, the conversion process proceeds here in a highly unbalanced manner. While in the old laender of the Federal Republic—with the awareness of pending disarmament measures—the transformation of armament industry resources to civilian use can be planned for the long term and is under the control of industry itself, the enterprises in the new German laender already engaged in the process of conversion operate under quite different conditions; conditions which reflect the difficult transition from an administratively planned economy to a social market economy.

Basically, the armament industry in the new German laender faces a dual challenge. It must accomplish the already complicated process of arms conversion by means of the simultaneous transition to a new economic order and with the latter's tools. Unfortunately, until now this process—which is probably unique in the history of conversion and also characteristic for the East European countries—is not adequately reflected by Germany's extensive discussions on conversion.¹ Naturally, it raises a number of new questions which need to be thoroughly and objectively discussed and considered in the economic policy decisions that support conversion. The answers are also of great interest to the East European countries.

Arms Conversion Progress To Date

An analysis of the conversion process in the new German laender up to now reveals the following: The process is proceeding in a contradictory and disorderly (not to say chaotic) fashion. Basically it came to a halt half way and was accompanied by many failures and dead ends in the economic life of affected enterprises. The basic reasons for this state of affairs are, in our opinion, primarily the following:

—On the basis of the new military doctrine adopted by the Warsaw Pact in 1987, an arms conversion decree was issued. Conversion began abruptly early in 1989, without prior conceptual deliberations by either the cognizant political authorities or the enterprises. The scientific institutions concerned with industrial military research were also unable to provide urgently needed preliminary conceptual guidance for decisions that had to be made. Moreover, growing information about conversion problems was also not utilized.

—Arms conversion was made considerably more difficult and slowed down by repeated changes in goals and in the conditions which followed the extraordinary dynamics of political developments. It should be noted here that within barely two years arms production was not only subjected to substantive changes in the security concepts of different governments—following fundamentally disparate policies—but also, simultaneously, to radically changing economic conditions. The conversion began under conditions of an administratively planned economy. It passed through the phase of the latter's collapse coupled with the

failure of promulgated goals. Then came the liquidation of the remnants of the planned economy and the adoption of market economy. This happened in conjunction with the abolition of regulations, which had given the enterprises some relief when arms production was halted, without developing new ground rules to do justice to the specific needs of the conversion process in a market economy environment. The final goal for 1990 was to incorporate arms conversion into an all-German framework.

Summing up this development one needs to note: The dynamic development with its constantly changing goals and conditions hardly allowed the time or occasion to evolve well-founded concepts for required structural changes, nor did it permit formulation of an effective transition policy by the enterprises of the new German laender. In this context it needs be emphasized that—in contrast to the conversion of the armament industry in the old laender of the Federal Republic—what is happening here is not merely a reduction of government orders for arms but the total cessation of arms production. That aspect of conversion has in fact been accomplished, but the problem of completing the conversion process remains and involves the transition of the affected enterprises to a promising civilian line of production.

—The fact that arms conversion occurred simultaneously with the transition to a market economy had two negative effects on the conversion process. On the one hand, it created complicated problems for the arms manufacturers concerning the manner of converting arms production to civilian production; the problem, for instance, of totally different markets or that of a marketing organization for the prevailing market. On the other hand, the historic significance of the transition of the entire economy to a market economy environment also led to a situation in which conversion—in view of the scope of all the structural changes required for the national economy—represented only one aspect; one need only consider, for example, the changes required in the areas of energy, transportation, industry, and agriculture. To that extent the low political priority assigned to conversion-related activities by the former GDR administration and the former People's Chamber is understandable, even though the enterprises impacted by conversion were decidedly in need of government help.

Arms production, in fact, accounted only for roughly 1 percent of total industrial production in the former GDR; in 1989 this amounted to about 5.5 billion marks. The share of arms production in the different industrial branches varied roughly from 0.4 to 2 percent and was slightly higher in the area of electrical engineering and electronics. This situation is also reflected by the fact that the 76 affected enterprises with a significant share of arms production also constitute only about 1 percent of the roughly 8,000 companies to be denationalized—

possibly after being reorganized or, if need be, liquidated—by the Trust Agency.

Special Characteristics of Arms Production—Source of Impediments to Conversion and Competitive Disadvantages

[Box, p 40]

Specific Characteristics of Arms Conversion

- Goals politically determined—capabilities designed to accommodate most extreme requirements
- Disproportionate use of science and technology—oversupply of high qualifications
- Disproportionate corporate division of labor—adaptability of the cooperative network
- Limited market—marketing organization poorly developed
- Technological groups—degree of specialization
- Type of organization—dependence on the state

Intensity of Effect Determines Convertibility

The key to understanding conversion problems is the recognition of the universally valid, general characteristics of arms production.² These characteristics usually demonstrate considerable differences between military and civilian production. Military requirements relate to a technology and to arms which have specific scientific/technical features and which assure an unusually high degree of quality and reliability under extreme conditions. Typical of military requirements for arms production are modifications of production factors—compared to civilian production—which can be characterized as being peculiar to arms production. They express themselves in engineering/technological and organizational factors. As a result arms production is:

- Personnel-intensive, clearly requiring a higher percentage of university-trained cadres—who must often possess special qualifications—than the civilian sector;
- Equipment-intensive and, consequently, capital-intensive, with a high percentage of specialized equipment and structures which, for technical or financial reasons, are not suitable for civilian use;
- Cost-intensive with regard to materials because the materials used are specialized, rare, and, therefore, very expensive.

All this is connected with very high costs, especially for R&D that has no relevance for the civilian market. In the final analysis, conversion opportunities are a function of these specific characteristics, which are related to specific managerial problems. The difficulties thus arising for conversion tie in with additional constraints. Such are the conclusions of arms manufacturers in the vanguard of the conversion process and the constraints under which conversion must be carried out. For the enterprises in the new German laender affected by conversion, the arms production trends created by the planned economy in the former GDR prior to 1988 have

caused the negative effects on arms production conversion and on the ability of affected enterprises to carry out conversions under the conditions prevailing during the transition to a market economy. These conditions in particular include the following:

Armament Enterprises Lack Reserve Funds

As all enterprises in the formerly "nationalized" economy, arms producers had to be largely satisfied with credits when they asked the state to finance production. Fixed and liquid assets as well as profits were subject to heavy duties.

Despite the fact that costs were on the average objectively higher than in civilian production, the state exerted enormous pressures on prices. The prices of the granter of a license were often used as the standard. Because different economic principles were applied (in the GDR: An economic accounting system; in the Soviet Union: extensive financing of costs by the state) and because considerably fewer units were produced in the GDR, import prices for products of the granter of the license in the Soviet Union were frequently distinctly below GDR costs. Arms producers, consequently, had to fight extensive battles over prices which would reflect their costs (e.g., the AK 74 assault rifle: Soviet price 948 marks; GDR price finally 1,825 marks). As a result the cost of arms production in the former combines had to be redistributed, partially at the expense of profits from civilian production.

All told, under such conditions reserves could hardly be created and, therefore, the investment capital needed to convert to civilian production exceeds a priori the conversion resources of affected enterprises.

Conversion Hit Arms Producers in an Expansion Phase

Before the sudden shift to disarmament, arms production in the former GDR was in the process of expanding its capacity both quantitatively and qualitatively. This expansion applied, for instance, to onboard computers for cruise missiles, to antitank rockets, to 5.45-mm assault rifles and corresponding ammunition, to weapon control systems for modernizing tanks, and to other products. The former Kombinat Spezialtechnik, for instance, received investments exceeding half a billion marks for the 1986 to 1990 period.

Originally, it had been planned to increase GDR arms exports by 1990 by 440 percent over the volume of the 1976 to 1980 Five-Year Plan. Subsequently, this goal had to be somewhat reduced because of economic problems. The forced interruption of this development in 1988 prevented the initiation of production or, in some cases, the completion of the projected number of units at numerous prepared facilities which, in addition to those that had already been producing, are now subject to conversion. In 1989 the hastily prepared plan reductions intended to accomplish rapid partial conversion had to fail because, as pointed out previously, no provisions had been made for conversion. The political changes led

to a ban on exports and, finally, to the complete cancellation of already greatly reduced government orders. Thus ended any chance to profit from the sale of finished products or capital goods. For instance, roughly 14,000 assault rifles could no longer be marketed by today's special tool and hydraulic units company, the Wiesa GmbH. As of 1 July 1990, arms manufacturers' claims against the state for rejected finished products amounted to 90.9 German marks [DM] million. The armament companies were, nevertheless, obligated to accept and fully pay for still-arriving deliveries (e.g., a DM0.5 million shipment of nitrocellulose powder that arrived in August 1990). The upshot of this development is, moreover, a conversion debit of 2.14 billion marks against fixed assets.³ To this must be added unfinished investments totalling about 0.2 billion marks, as, for instance, for the Gnaschwitz smokeless-gunpowder plant. These expenditures produced no significant returns. Aside from the depreciation of large parts of fixed and liquid assets this development also led to an excessive indebtedness of the arms enterprises which created competitive disadvantages in the search for financially sound partners or granters of credit. As of 20 August 1990 (after the currency conversion) a DM0.3 billion mountain of unredeemed credits has accumulated and the enterprises are experiencing a liquidity crisis. Also considered must the enormous sums needed to cover social insurance and retraining costs for employees.

Concentration of Arms Production Complicates Conversion

Arms production in the GDR was concentrated. Most of the important armament enterprises—representing roughly a 98-percent share of arms production—had been consolidated in the former Kombinat Spezialtechnik in Dresden. In addition there were, in association with other former kombinats, specialized enterprises and plants that produced primarily military items and, consequently, lacked strong support from the civilian sector, which makes conversion much more difficult. In extreme cases—e.g., in the ammunition industry—explicitly single-product organizations evolved whose resources are largely useless in the civilian sector. Such enterprises were excluded from redistribution opportunities when the combines were dissolved. The arms reduction measures instituted in 1989 were linked to the withdrawal of subcontracts from the armament industry, thus hurting the already very low production of civilian goods and further exacerbating the negative effects of centralization on conversion.

Old Dependencies Complicate Conversion

Military equipment in the GDR was manufactured and repaired primarily on the basis of Soviet licenses. This fact created a number of dependencies which could not be transferred to civilian production. The plants had adjusted to the technical level and standards of the licensor. Cooperative relationships have to be severed and new ones arduously established. No longer usable stock must be scrapped at the expense of the enterprises.

Long-term arrangements for import shipment could sometimes be cancelled, but that subjected the enterprises to claims by foreign suppliers for reimbursement of expenses and contractual penalties. Moreover, the capacity and organizational structure of the GDR's former arms production was designed to accommodate crisis situations. A plant exists, for instance, that can produce roughly 210 million rounds of infantry ammunition annually. Even though the opportunity to utilize this capacity never arose, one should not underestimate the effect of tying down capital and personnel which can not be fully productive but has a significant effect on costs and which today increases the conversion mass. All these conditions make conversion much more difficult during the transition to a market economy.

Arms Conversion By Reorganization and Privatization

With the transition to a market economy the privatization of arms enterprises proves itself to be a tool for shaping the conversion process.

When in the course of privatization a shift to an alternative line of production has preserved the enterprise and, therefore, jobs in arms factories, the interests of the work force coincide with those of the state, which still owns the arms enterprise. The interests of the state are upheld by the Trust Agency. The Trust Agency targets enterprises which can be reorganized within a short time and which can then—while jobs are being maintained—be sold to interested investors and yield a return.

The demands of the Trust Agency for speedy reorganization are currently critical. Two interrelated tendencies are apparent here: On the one hand, reorganization is the decisive factor which also applies to arms enterprises. If speedy reorganization and, consequently, privatization of the entire enterprise should prove to be impossible, conversion of the business activity—formerly related to the arms industry—is also precluded. Bankruptcy of the enterprise will almost certainly destroy suitable production capabilities. On the other hand, conversion itself is also a process which can expedite reorganization and, consequently, privatization. For instance, the former Reparaturwerk Neubrandenburg—which was also involved in the Warsaw Pact's tank production program—has founded 11 companies in conjunction with partners from the east and west German economy and has sold no longer needed branches with a guaranty for jobs. One of these companies was founded together with the well-known Diehl GmbH, which is also active in the armament industry, with the intention of submitting bids for scrapping and repairing military equipment.

An impediment in the search for financially sound partners with requisite know-how is the enterprises' great burden of debts and material conversion encumbrances which deter potential investors.

Conclusions

The progress of arms conversion in the new German laender so far suggests a number of conclusions. They include, in our opinion, especially the following:

- With the reunification of Germany, using the new national security concept as a point of departure, the further conversion of existing armament resources should be reassessed from an economic and military point of view. Such reassessment should, for instance, include decisions concerning the continued use of the military technology of the former National People's Army with its corresponding requirement for support and maintenance for which, from an economic point of view, the technical military capabilities residing in the new German laender are appropriate. In the long run, it also seems advisable not to rely exclusively on the capabilities of the old Federal Republic when NATO military equipment is used. Furthermore, decisions concerning the destruction of the former National People's Army military equipment, as required by the Vienna agreements, should also favor suitable production facilities in the east. Making such decisions would further the reorganization of the enterprises in the new German laender affected by conversion.
- Government support, granting an appropriate period of time, would seem to be a suitable means of facilitating self-help. Such support, however, would only make sense if affected enterprises exhibited independent initiative and formulated feasible conversion concepts. It should be noted here that the development of alternative products usually takes more time than enterprises have before entering the market economy; especially, if they have to cope with high conversion encumbrances. This problem could be alleviated, for instance, by forgiving related old credits and thus removing the problem of their use to offset government obligations arising out of cancelled arms orders. Such basic conditions could expedite the involvement of private investors with arms enterprises to be converted or at least facilitate their reorganization while maintaining as many jobs as possible. But here, too, it is necessary not to link reorganization worthiness with too short a period of time and not to make one-sided judgements by relying only on market economy criteria. Such a differentiation is called for, for example, by national defense considerations, which make the previously-cited resources of the new German laender appear to be useful; however, in view of the disastrous condition of the labor market, the creation of alternative jobs should also be given high priority. This consideration applies particularly to structurally weak areas.
- Combining short-term with medium-term objectives when launching a marketable alternative product line can assure the survival of the enterprise.

First of all, the enterprises affected by conversion must develop a strategy for quickly realizing profits and thereby assure their survival since, on their own initiative, they cannot usually start the production of alternative products very quickly. The experiences in eastern Germany suggest use of the following possibilities instead:

- Setting up joint distribution networks, to include customer service, for the partner's products;
- Setting up ancillary industry chains (extended workbenches) for the partner's products;
- Setting up installation and distribution programs for partner's products;
- Marketing of buildings and sites (especially disposal of structural units that are part of the infrastructure and of auxiliary and secondary operations) with guaranteed jobs in the small businesses sector.

The abruptness of the conversion process can be eased by a profit-oriented utilization of conversion assets, which—aside from the above possibilities—may include the utilization of capabilities for the destruction of military equipment and for materiel maintenance as well as the sale of already manufactured military products or primary materials and special facilities. Medium-term goals relating to the start of production of the enterprise's own civilian goods can be tied to such measures. Promising to be successful along such lines is, for instance, the expansion of strong auxiliary processes—as, for instance, the tool manufacturing capabilities of the former arms and ammunition industry—or of already existing civilian production lines.

—Making use of the proven tools of structural policies, arms conversion should become part of general measures for structural adjustments.

Since joining the Federal Republic, the new German Länder also have at their disposal the tools of structural policies on the basis of which all required steps for structural adjustments can be implemented; but they do not have the necessary financial resources. Consequently, it is particularly important to treat the conversion processes as an all-German problem. This includes the equitable distribution of both burdens and incentives and heeding the special conditions prevailing in parts of the Federal Republic.

All in all, it is important today to prevent the thoughtless dismissal or destruction of highly qualified personnel and the high-grade means of production of the former GDR which would preclude the desirable utilization of these valuable assets. Moreover, in view of the generally prevailing technological backwardness, such utilization would be particularly important. The former employees of the armament industry should therewith be given a chance to keep their jobs through alternative production.

—The difficulties of assuring a harmonious arms conversion process are illustrated by the deficiencies and call for a more thorough scientific analysis of disarmament and conversion-related problems. Special reference is made here to the interrelationship of national

defense, military, and economic issues. The following aspects are particularly important:

- The relationship between disarmament and conversion, paying particular attention to the related armament reequipment process;
- The relationship between conversion processes in the Armed Forces and the conversion within arms enterprises and in the different regions, as well as
- The generalization of positive arms conversion experiences within individual enterprises, which may be useful to all the enterprises affected by conversion in both the new and the old Länder of the Federal Republic.

Footnotes

1. See, for instance, Koellner, L. and Huck, B.J. *Abrüstung und Konversion* [Disarmament and Conversion], Campus Verlag, Munich 1990.

2. See Schubert, H. "Keine Illusionen" [No Illusions] in *WEHRTECHNIK* Nov 90, p 45.

3. DM figures will only be complete after all DM opening balances become available. In accordance with the State Treaty, receivables and liabilities can be converted at a 1:2 ratio.

U.S. To Withdraw More Troops Than Planned

AU0904151391 Hamburg *WELT AM SONNTAG*
in German 7 Apr 91 p 4

["ws" report: "United States Will Withdraw 176,000 Soldiers"]

[Text] Hamburg—According to information received by *WELT AM SONNTAG*, the United States wants to withdraw a considerably larger number of troops than originally believed: Instead of the originally planned 56,000, about 176,000 will be removed.

According to this information, the U.S. Army wants to reduce its 204,000 soldiers in Germany to 70,000 by 1995. The Air Force will probably be reduced from 47,000 to about 5,000 (three air wings).

Officially, the United States has so far only announced a reduction of its troops to 195,000.

The remaining ground troops will be united to form a corps, a "forward presence." Its troop units will be distributed over the whole deployment area in Germany. The task of the new corps will be to cover the deployment of more U.S. forces in the event of a war. Parts of the corps might be used for large multinational units.

The corps will consist of two divisions: A tank division and an armored infantry division (as well as of several corps troop units).

The corps will be equipped with a larger number of multiple rocket launchers, but it will have fewer mobile

artillery battalions. The antiaircraft forces—so far subject to the control of the U.S. commander for Europe—will now be controlled by the corps. The number of Patriot anti-missile missiles, which have become known because of their successful use against the Iraqi Scud missiles in the Gulf war will be reduced.

The troop parts of the new corps will be formed out of all major formations stationed in Germany. Only in exceptional cases will the existing major formations be preserved.

The timetable for the withdrawal of the U.S. troops is as follows:

The U.S. Defense Department will withdraw about 80 to 90 percent of its soldiers from the Gulf region by the end of June 1991. They will return to their original locations in Germany and the United States. The remaining soldiers will stay in the Gulf region for the time being.

The Patriot units that were transferred from Germany to Israel will presumably not return to Germany.

According to recent estimates, 12,700 soldiers will be removed from Germany and discharged from the Army in the United States in fiscal year 1991 (ending in September).

The following German locations will be affected by the withdrawal: Neu-Ulm, Bamberg, Augsburg, Boeblingern, Mainz, Wildflecken, Hanau, Baumholder, Giessen, Spangdahlen, Bitburg, Hahn, Karlsruhe, Zweibruecken, Kaiserslautern, Wuerzburg, Goepingen, Pfullendorf, as well as the brigade in Berlin.

In fiscal year 1992, the troop withdrawal is to be carried out faster than originally planned. The remaining combat forces and artillery forces that are not used in the new corps will be removed. The accelerated withdrawal is designed to prevent those troops returning from the Gulf from having to stay in Germany for a longer period.

Defense Minister: U.S. Nuclear Presence Necessary

*AU1104122191 Hamburg DIE WELT in German
11 Apr 91 p 10*

[Ruediger Moniac report: "U.S. Nuclear Presence in Europe Required"]

[Text] Bonn—On the eve of his trip to Washington, Defense Minister Gerhard Stoltenberg gave a speech in which he tried to dispel U.S. concerns that, as a result of the process of its political unification, Europe might underestimate the future role of the United States on our continent. With his speech, Stoltenberg, who is currently chairman of the European defense ministers within NATO, responded to a U.S. demarche addressed to the group of European NATO nations and made it clear that Europe, which is developing a new security policy, will only remain able to balance the future military-strategic capabilities of the USSR in cooperation with North

America. Thus, the "substantive conventional and nuclear presence of the United States in Europe will continue to be necessary."

Stoltenberg, who will meet with his counterpart Cheney and probably also with President Bush in Washington, stated in Bonn that security in Europe "must never be defined exclusively in European terms." NATO has to fulfill stability-related tasks that go beyond its area. It is in the interest of the European partners "to fully involve the United States in European affairs on an institutional basis." However, he also said that it would be "desirable" if the United States "would open itself up to a greater extent to Europe."

According to Stoltenberg, the internal developments in the Soviet Union are the biggest problem for European stability. While the process of democratization is slowing down, "conservative forces awaken again that are prepared to use military means previously thought to be no longer possible to solve domestic problems." The minister warned that the Soviet Union, despite the fact that it experienced its worst economic crisis since World War II in 1990, spent an "disproportionately high share" of its financial and productive strength on its Armed Forces. He called on Moscow to unconditionally respect the Treaty on Conventional Stability in Europe signed in November 1990, because only "full loyalty to the agreement and mutual confidence" allow the continuation of disarmament in Europe.

CW Factory Plans for Libya Reach 'Third Party'

*LD1104145291 Hamburg DPA in German 1304 GMT
11 Apr 91*

[Text] Stuttgart (DPA)—Plans for the poison gas factory that the Imhausen-Chemie firm in Lahr supplied to Libya have apparently reached a third party. This was reported by Southwest German radio in its program "Politics Southwest" yesterday evening and by Berlin's TAGESZEITUNG in today's edition. They state that Western security circles have specific information indicating that the poison gas blueprints were passed on to an unnamed third country. It is apparently a developing country that had placed orders and received deliveries on the basis of the blueprints. It was unclear whether the blueprints originated from Libya or from Imhausen-Chemie circles, the media sources report.

According to research by Western intelligence services, Libya still intends to produce chemical warfare agents. Apart from the "Pharma 150" poison gas plant delivered to al-Rabitah by Imhausen, which was—it is assumed—badly damaged by a fire in March 1990, the Libyans are planning a second chemical weapons plant west of the provincial capital of Sabha. In a letter to the federal chancellor's office about a year ago, the Federal Intelligence Service reported that it "is very similar to the Pharma 150 plant near al-Rabitah." Documents acquired by Southwest German Radio showed that the

second factory probably also comes from Imhausen-Chemie. Work on a project entitled Pharma 200 had been under way there since 1987.

The state prosecutor's office in Mannheim has been investigating senior employees of the Imhausen firm, partly because of Pharma 200, since August 1990. In June 1990 Imhausen boss Juergen Hippensteil was sentenced to five years' imprisonment due to the delivery of the first poison gas factory to al-Rabitah.

SWITZERLAND

Inquiry Into Von Roll Company's Iraq Dealings

91WC0087A Geneva JOURNAL DE GENEVE
in French 19 Mar 91 p 15

[Unattributed article: "Parts Delivered to Iraq: Von Roll To Be Prosecuted"]

[Text] Bern, 18 March (ATS)—Judicial investigation has established that the equipment seized in Bern and Frankfurt was intended for the manufacture of an Iraqi "supercannon."

The parts sent to Iraq by the Bern-based Von Roll SA company were definitely war materiel, rather than parts for a forging press, since they could be used in the construction of a "supercannon." The Federal Council on Monday authorized the filing of criminal charges against officials of Von Roll and a "Vaudois firm" that served as an intermediary, on grounds they violated the War Materiel Act (LMG).

The Confederation Public Prosecutor's Office, which opened a judicial police investigation on 15 May 1990, has established that the Von Roll shipments seized in early May in Frankfurt and Bern were war materiel. The impounded parts did not conform to use specifications indicated on the customs declaration.

20 Deliveries

"On the contrary, it consisted of elements destined for the Iraqi 'supercannon,'" said a communique from the Federal Department of Justice and Police. The Armaments Group (GPA) of the Federal Military Department also established from shipping documents that Von Roll had already sent to Iraq, between 17 February 1989 and 20 April 1990, 18 shipments similar to the two that were seized.

The judicial police investigation was broadened on 28 June 1990 to include officials of a Vaudois enterprise that served as an intermediary. The company played a crucial part in finalization of the November 1988 contract in Baghdad, implementation, and negotiations on

future contracts. The public prosecutor cannot disclose the name of the Vaudois firm, which unlike Von Roll has not appeared in the press.

Juridical Aspects

The public prosecutor received judicial assistance in its investigation from other European states that have impounded equipment suspected of being war materiel destined for Iraq. The illegal export of weapons to foreign governments or political organizations is considered a political offense under the federal code on penal procedures, because it can have serious political repercussions.

Since violations of the LMG fall under federal jurisdiction, the Federal Council authorized criminal proceedings. It ordered the federal magistrate to conduct a pretrial investigation owing to "intense public interest" in the affair.

An initial delivery of 16 tons of "spare parts for stamping and forging presses" that bore the notation "PC 2" was seized in Frankfurt on 7 May 1990. That Von Roll shipment, destined for Iraq, was worth 782,000 francs. The second confiscation took place three days later at the Bern freight terminal: 115 tons of "spare parts for forging presses," it also bore the mark "PC 2" and was valued at more than 4 million francs.

Mysterious Supercannon

It has never been proven—not even during the Gulf war—that an Iraqi "supercannon" exists. Talk about it first surfaced in April 1990, when British authorities at the port of Middlebrough seized some steel cylinders destined for Iraq. Although the consignee maintained the parts were to be used in construction of an oil pipeline, experts hypothesized they could be used to build a giant cannon 40 meters long. Scientists then began arguing about the practical feasibility of building and using such a weapon.

Von Roll "Duped"

Gerlafingen (SO)—If the spare parts Von Roll shipped to Iraq were for military purposes, the company was "duped" and deeply regrets it, according to a communique published on Monday. After a thorough investigation, Von Roll remains persuaded none of its agents knowingly and deliberately participated in delivering restricted equipment to Iraq.

Between 1988 and 1990, Von Roll took a number of orders from the Iraqi Ministry of Industry for machine parts, including hydraulic forging presses, according to the communique. It was not apparent from those orders that the parts might ultimately be used to build weapons systems, the company asserts.