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ANGOLA

MPLA Reportedly Using Chemical Weapons in Uige

MB0803210891 (Clandestine) KUP in English to Southern and Central Africa 1910 GMT 8 Mar 91

[Text] Jamba, Friday, March 8—The MPLA [Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola] government is reported to be using chemical weapons against the rural population in a move believed to be a retaliation against people suspected to be UNITA [National Union for the Total Independence of Angola] supporters.

Informed KUP sources said today that Qilemba village, situated 65 kms north of Uige was attacked by MPLA MiG jet fighters causing heavy casualties among the population and destroying homes and property early this week.

Explosions followed by a thick green smoke was seen by survivors who added that three days later, they discovered all [words indistinct] were found near the village, according to the sources. MPLA forces have been using chemical weapons against UNITA forces and the civilian people, including water poisoning.

region. In this context, appropriate approach and suitable measures related to regional confidence-building, security and disarmament issues have been explored.

In such wide areas as Asia and the Pacific, regional confidence-building, security and disarmament issues cannot exist alone; on the contrary, they are closely linked to and affected by what is happening globally or in other areas. As long as the strong and big nations continue to bully the small and weak, the sovereignty of states continues to be trampled on, and the arms race continues to escalate, peace and security in the Asia-Pacific region as well as elsewhere in the world will always be under threat; and as a result, confidence-building, security and disarmament arrangements for the Asia-Pacific area can hardly register real progress.

In recent years, there have occurred the most fundamental changes in the international arena since World War II. The old world order has broken up and the new order has not yet taken clear form. Today's overall international environment and atmosphere have improved to a certain degree, as shown by the reduction in East-West military confrontation as well as by the fact that certain regional conflicts are on the verge of reaching political solutions. This indeed provides a favourable background for discussions on the confidence-building, security and disarmament issues in the Asia-Pacific region.

On the other hand, however, it is also undeniable that the world today continues to suffer from a series of factors which menace peace and security. Hegemony and power politics have yet to be eliminated. In certain areas, political, economic or national disputes are tending to deepen and worsen, leading to new tension and turbulence. Several regional conflicts, including, *inter alia*, that of the Middle East, have a long way to go and have many difficulties to overcome before reaching their just and reasonable political solution. In the field of disarmament, although its momentum has been somewhat abated, the global arms race has not yet come to an end. Worse still, in some cases, weapons claimed to be reduced have in fact been transferred to other areas, thus causing new problems for peace and security. The progress of multilateral disarmament efforts remains unsatisfactory, partly because of attempts to shift the responsibility for disarmament. In the economic field, increase of world trade has slowed, while the economic situation in the developing countries is getting bleaker, the disparity between developing and developed countries deeper and the North-South gap wider.

These grave factors not only affect world peace and security, but also confine and curb the emergence and development of regional confidence-building, security and disarmament measures. In this regard, the Asia-Pacific region is no exception.

Differences

Solutions to issues in Asia and the Pacific can only be found in light of the specific situation and characteristics of the region. This also holds true for the arrangements for CBMs, security and disarmament.

An idea has surfaced recently that the CSCE (Conference on Security and Co-Operation in Europe) model for confidence and security-building measures and the CFE (conventional forces of Europe) model for disarmament are panaceas that other parts of the world should only copy to solve their own problems. This, however, is not feasible.

Positive as it may be, the progress in Europe has been achieved under the circumstances prevalent in Europe. Experience gained in Europe can hardly apply to other regions where situations and conditions differ from those of Europe. Differences exist at least in the following aspects: (1) For many years, Europe was dominated by two clearly-delineated blocs that confronted each other both politically and militarily. No such blocs exist among the dozens of countries in Asia and the Pacific. (2) The Asia-Pacific region also differs from Europe in that there exists a wide variety of contradictions and problems of different sources and nature in this region, and indeed, in every sub-region. (3) Countries in Europe may be at different levels of development, but on the whole, all of them are developed countries; while in Asia and the Pacific there are developed countries, developing countries and even the least developed countries. (4) The political, social and cultural diversity among Asia and Pacific countries is also much greater than that existing in Europe. These major differences preclude any possibility of mechanically copying the European experience and model in this region.

Different regions can only find and adopt appropriate measures to solve their problems in light of their own specific circumstances. This is a basic principle, a principle that must be followed in making arrangements for confidence-building, security and disarmament in Asia and the Pacific.

General Approach

Given the situation in our region, the following general approach appears to be reasonable and practicable in the search for confidence-building, security and disarmament arrangements:

- (1) In terms of geographical scope, bilateral arrangements should be given priority, followed by multilateral arrangements in small regions, which can then be gradually expanded to encompass larger areas if necessary.
- (2) In terms of the measures to be taken, CBMs should take precedence, to be developed into security arrangements and, at a later stage, appropriate arrangements for disarmament could be made.
- (3) In terms of the nature of the contacts and meetings between different countries, emphasis should first be laid on

disputes; strengthening economic co-operation. Countries concerned should first strengthen their dialogues and consultations, and take practical measures to enhance trust, reduce tensions, put an end to conflicts and strengthen security. On this basis, they can gradually establish and develop regional security mechanisms, first in small areas, and then step by step and if circumstances so require, extend them to larger regions. This will prove to be a suitable

approach for the Asia-Pacific region. Furthermore, issues concerning the common interest of all the countries in this region should be solved through consultation among all countries on an equal footing. If most countries tend to favour a certain form of consultation, this certainly deserves serious and positive consideration. Following these principles and approaches, the Asia-Pacific countries can surely find a suitable way to solve their problems.

The success story, however, has inspired few followers in the developing world, says Nobuo Maruyama of the Institute of Developing Economies, a semigovernmental think tank.

Many developing countries regard military expenditure as a first step toward economic development, says Maruyama, a senior research officer of the institute's economic cooperation division.

"As long as (foreign governments) request ODA, we have a right to ask them to harmonize with our basic principles," Maruyama says. "This is a good opportunity to change their mentality."

NORTH KOREA

Papers Mark Anniversary of Bikini H-Bomb Test

SK0103114791 *Pyongyang KCNA in English*
1032 GMT 1 Mar 91

["Lessons of Bikini"—KCNA headline]

[Text] Pyongyang, March 1 (KCNA)—Bikini Island where a hydrogen bomb explosion test took place on March 1, 1954 remains a voucher proving that the U.S. imperialists are the nuclear maniacs who try to exert nuclear holocaust on mankind, say papers here today.

Recalling that tens of Japanese fishermen were killed by the H-bomb explosion test of the U.S. imperialists, a signed article of NODONG SINMUN notes that disaster of Bikini exposed the crimes of the U.S. imperialists to the world and left lessons that the U.S. imperialists who attempt to bring back clouds of a nuclear war to hang over the heads of mankind should be condemned and vigilance be heightened.

The article goes on:

The U. S. imperialists are still stepping up the development and production of nuclear weapons, pursuing nuclear ambition.

It is on the Korean Peninsula that the U.S. imperialists are viciously activating nuclear war manoeuvres.

The U.S. imperialists are staging the "Team Spirit 91" joint military exercises, a test nuclear war and preliminary war against the northern half of our Republic, leading the situation of the Korean Peninsula to the brink of a nuclear war.

There is no guarantee that the adventurous "Team Spirit 91" war exercises will not turn into an actual war.

A world free from nuclear weapons and nuclear war, a peaceful world can be built only by the united efforts of the world's peace-loving people.

When they firmly unite to smash the war manoeuvres of the U.S. imperialists and conduct a vigorous movement for a nuclear-free, peace zone, mankind will be relieved of the danger of a nuclear war.

An article of MINJU CHOSON says that the reckless nuclear war manoeuvres of the U.S. imperialists must be thwarted and the disaster of Bikini never be repeated.

SOUTH KOREA

Ship Said To Carry DPRK-Made Scuds to Syria

SK0703014591 *Seoul KBS-1 Television Network*
in Korean 1200 GMT 6 Mar 91

[Text] CORRIERE DELLA SERA, an Italian newspaper, reported today that a Syrian-registered cargo ship loaded with North Korean-made Scud missiles is sailing to Syria after leaving North Korea.

The newspaper, quoting Lebanese sources, reported that these missiles, manufactured at Syrian request, have a range of 600 kilometers and can be loaded with biological and chemical weapons.

TAIWAN

Development of Chemical Weapons Denied

OW1103154191 *Taipei CNA in English* 1524 GMT
11 Mar 91

[Text] Taipei, March 11 (CNA)—The Republic of China has never developed or possessed any chemical weapons, a spokesman for the Ministry of National Defense said Monday.

The Republic of China has honored its obligations as a signatory to the Geneva Convention which bans the proliferation of chemical weapons, the spokesman said.

He made the statement when asked to comment on a NEW YORK TIMES report that the Republic of China was one of 14 developing nations believed to possess chemical weapons.

Citing a US Navy intelligence report, the TIMES gave the 14 as Burma, Communist China, India, North Korea, Syria, Vietnam, Israel, Egypt, South Korea, the Republic of China on Taiwan, Pakistan, Libya, Iran and Iraq.

Since communist China possesses a strong chemical warfare capability, the spokesman said, the Republic of China must strengthen its military preparedness against chemical attacks in order to secure its security.

He stressed, however, "We have never developed or possessed any chemical weapons."

[Parys] This will depend on the number of transports that pass through Poland. In the last round of negotiations held on 12-13 February 1991 in Warsaw, the Soviet team could not give us any figures because no rail freight agreement had yet been signed. Now that round is behind us, and it is known that approximately 85 percent of the transit will take place by rail. The Soviet generals should now be in a position to calculate their costs and their requirements. We know that the Soviet side will have difficulties with payment, and we anticipate that installments will be delayed. This could impact on the transit timetable. In turn, this could lead to political tension between the FRG and Poland. We would like to avoid this, and we have suggested that payment clauses from the agreement signed between Poland and the USSR should be removed and included in a collateral agreement signed by all three parties. We would like the German Government—which has committed itself to paying the transit costs up to the Polish-Soviet border—to nominate one of the German banks to service the costs of the operation. Poland could then present monthly bills for the number of actual transports for that month, and, after endorsement by the appropriate Soviet authorities, the bill could then be forwarded to the German bank handling the matter.

[Majle] What was the German and Soviet reaction to this proposal?

[Parys] We had already been talking informally on this point with the Germans, and their initial reaction was favorable. The Germans want no hitches, and on this point we have an identical position. The Soviet side does not know about the proposal yet. These are our latest moves. Our first suggestion was that the Soviet Union should deposit a down-payment guarantee of \$500 million with us to cover costs, but this proved to be unrealistic.

[Majle] Your second sphere of involvement is the negotiation of terms of the stationing and subsequent withdrawal of Soviet troops currently in Poland. The positions of the two sides on this issue seem to be very divergent.

[Parys] These are proving to be difficult negotiations. They are made more difficult by the deterioration of the political climate in the USSR. We are still not convinced that the Soviet side has the political will to want a quick resolution of this matter. The whole matter is complicated by conflicting interest groups and people. An example would be the aggressive comments of General Dubynin, Commander of the Soviet Army Northern Group. Various groups in Moscow see the issue of withdrawal as a political tool they can use in the political game. At present, the situation is as follows: We are negotiating on three levels; namely, there are the political, the economic, and the legal working groups. For the Soviet side, the most important at the moment is the economic group.

We are concentrating on the following matters: Polish property that has been used by the Soviet troops, that is to say, everything they rented from us. This comes to over 3,000 buildings and other facilities. These buildings are now old and in a poor state of repair. We have to calculate how much it will cost to repair them. The 1956 Polish-USSR agreement on the temporary stationing of Soviet troops in Poland stipulates that these buildings must be handed back to the Polish side in good condition. We have to estimate the extent of damage and the cost of repair. These costs have to be met by the Soviet Union. Another aspect concerns the buildings that were constructed by the Soviet side. According to the treaty, we only need to take these buildings over where we think they would be useful to us. In such cases we shall have to calculate their value and these sums will be included in the total equation. Those buildings that we decline to take over must be dismantled at Soviet expense and the surrounding area restored to its original state. Any salvage materials from this operation belong to the Soviet side. Another matter is to secure periodic payments due from the Soviet side for the period beginning 1 January 1991 for transport services rendered and their use of our forestry and agriculture. These are payments that have not been paid before. We must also negotiate the loss to Poland for the non-use of agricultural and forestry land that has been out of normal commercial circulation for the last 40 years. We intend to secure full compensation.

[Majle] Has there been any shift in the Soviet position recently?

[Parys] Initially, the Soviet Union showed no great desire to fix a date for the withdrawal of its forces. If this became inevitable, they first wanted to sell off all the buildings they had constructed. They were even thinking of selling to foreign companies. This was quite unacceptable to us. We tried to explain to the Soviet side that such agreements would be void under Polish law, because in Poland an object erected on land belongs to the landowner. Regarding securing periodic payments, the 1956 treaty stipulates that the Soviet Army is as liable to pay for facilities as the Polish Army. Nevertheless, units of the Soviet Army are not part of the Polish Army, and we have the right to charge higher payments from the Soviet Army. We have estimated our losses and the sums are substantial. The Polish Government is presenting bills on the basis of the agreement that followed the Mazowiecki-Ryzhkov talks last year.

Changes in the Soviet position take place very slowly. They have finally proposed a date for the withdrawal of troops. This date is not acceptable to us, but nonetheless, it is a date. I do not want to say anything on the complicated situation in Moscow, but it is a fact that the Soviet delegation's powers are very limited indeed. The smallest textual alterations have to be referred back to Moscow, and so another month passes before we can get around the negotiating table again. The next round of negotiations is scheduled to take place in Moscow on 14-15 March 1991.

pleasing, and I stress once again that this was not the main subject of our talks, that the Soviet side's stand has become flexible. Our Soviet guests indicated their great difficulties, great problems, beginning with housing, barracks [word indistinct] structures. We treat all this with full understanding, but we are stressing that we have our own problems, including housing.

Walesa, Gorbachev To Set Date for Troop Pullout

*LD1203143291 Warsaw PAP in English 1323 GMT
12 Mar 91*

[Text] Warsaw, March 12—In my opinion the date of final withdrawal of Soviet troops from Poland will be fixed at a meeting between Presidents Lech Walesa and Mikhail Gorbachev, Gen. Mikhail Moiseyev, chief of Soviet Army general staff, said after his talks at the Polish National Defence Ministry today.

As regards the transit of Soviet units from Germany via Poland, the Soviet side will not use the road transport but sea and rail one, Moiseyev added.

Soviet, Polish Officials Comment on Troop Withdrawal Talks

*LD1203184291 Warsaw PAP in English 1823 GMT
12 Mar 91*

[Text] Warsaw, March 12—"I think that the date for completing the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Poland will be fixed during a meeting between President Lech Walesa and Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev," the Soviet army chief of staff, General Mikhail Moiseyev

said after his talks at the Ministry of National Defence here and added that the task of diplomats and military experts was to set flexible dates which would fit both sides.

Moiseyev told reporters that USSR would not use road transport for the withdrawal of its troops from Germany and the Soviet units would make their exit by sea and to some extent by rail. Referring to the decision of the USSR to withdraw from Legnica, western Poland, within the next six months of the Soviet command of the so called "Western theater", comprising the units stationed in east Germany, Poland's Minister of National Defence Piotr Kolodziejczyk said it was a step of major political importance. Housing problems and the lack of social infrastructure for returning soldiers are the main obstacle in the prompt withdrawal of Soviet troops from Poland, Kolodziejczyk said.

Talks in Poland concerned also bilateral military cooperation, European security system that Poland is going to build through bilateral contacts.

General Moiseyev met also with Minister of State in the President's Office Jacek Merkel and with the head of the Council of Ministers, Minister Krzysztof Zabinski. "There are chances that some 10,000 Soviet soldiers could leave Poland between April and May," Zabinski said and added that final decisions will be made during the fifth round of talks to be held in Moscow on March 19.

The Soviet side said no chemical weapon was deployed on the territory of Poland and after the talks it seems that on-site inspections could be held which would confirm good intentions of the USSR in this field, Zabinski said.

INDIA

Government Denies Possessing Chemical Weapons

*BK1103144491 Delhi Domestic Service in English
1430 GMT 11 Mar 91*

[Text] India has denied a report appearing in a section of the press that it probably possessed chemical weapons. An External Affairs Ministry spokesman said in New Delhi today that the report is baseless.

ISRAEL

Soviet Role Said Important for Regional Arms Control

*TA0803141891 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew
8 Mar 91 p B1*

[Commentary by Ze'ev Schiff: "Holding on to Both Ends of the Rope"]

[Text] Secretary of State James Baker's starting point on Middle East arms control is problematic. The official proposal was raised after enormous quantities of weapons, equipment, and ammunition have been funneled into the Middle East because of the war. The contents of entire European ammunition depots that lay unused for years were transferred to Saudi Arabia. It makes no economic sense to return a large part of that equipment to the United States. The alternative is to leave part of the equipment and the weapons in Middle East depots, or to hand them over somehow to the regional countries. This may turn out to be the solution. Even before the war Washington reached a similar agreement with Jerusalem—that deal involved a modest sum (\$100 million)—about the stationing of U.S. equipment and ammunition in Israel.

Yet this forms only part of the overall picture. Immediately after the invasion of Kuwait, the administration in Washington struck a gigantic arms deal with Saudi Arabia to the tune of more than \$24 billion. As always, a myriad of explanations were found to justify the deal and to explain how it will not jeopardize Israel. To the chagrin of the administration, and contrary to its explicit request, Israel took action in Congress to foil that deal. Indeed, Congress at the time expressed its deep annoyance and the administration was forced to slash the deal to approximately a third of its original dimensions and defer, for a while, the lion's share. Several months later the Saudis, for their part, also announced their desire to put off the deal until after the war. They will raise the demand again soon, and some people have already expressed their opinion about the need to substantially enlarge the Saudi Army, despite the decisive victory over Saddam Husayn.

If this fantastic arms deal goes through, the problem will extend far beyond Israel's safety in the face of an Arab world in a state of war with it. This will be the death blow

to the idea of arms control in the Middle East. No explanation will be able to justify that gargantuan deal. It is inconceivable on the one hand to raise the notion of arms control in the Middle East and suggest a cutback in the size of the forces, and on the other hand to sign deals the scope of which has never been seen in all the world. If the United States had accompanied its proposal for a regional arms control conference with a joint communique with Riyadh on the cancellation of the huge weapons deal, it would have gained a tremendous psychological achievement, and Saudi Arabia, too, would have benefited.

There is also a Soviet angle to this picture. Even during the war it became known that a delegation from Damascus had concluded a new weapons deal in Moscow. But the Syrians did not stop at that. They have long been looking for weapons they cannot purchase in the USSR, such as surface-to-surface missiles more precise and longer in range than the Scuds, in the PRC and North Korea. The question is: Why does al-Asad need these weapons systems? Why should he increase his military when he knows that the IDF [Israel Defense Forces] has, over the past few years, decreased its manpower due to the economic situation? Clearly these deals will be financed by the money al-Asad will receive for joining the anti-Iraq coalition. Instead of directing all that aid money to the limping Syrian economy, a lot of money will be spent on weapons. This deal is also not good news insofar as the suggestion for regional arms control is concerned.

Those who think that it is possible to discuss arms control in the Middle East but to confine that discussion only to nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons while totally ignoring the broader question of the dangers enveloped in conventional weapons, are very much mistaken. The discussion must be all-encompassing. Israel cannot be expected to discuss disarmament while the Arab side equips itself with conventional and non-conventional weapons. Ironically, it was the authors of the latest UN report on regional nuclear disarmament who fathomed the sensitivity of the matter and pointed out Israel's unique security problems. Israel will not object to arms control but will probably declare that it is necessary to first discuss controlling and limiting conventional weapons, which will also include surface-to-surface missiles.

Many rush to mention in this context the East-West arms control and disarmament agreements in Europe. But there is a substantial difference between the two. Europe never experienced a situation in which one side does not recognize the other's right to exist. In the Middle East, however, not only are the Arab countries in a state of war with Israel, but some of them do not even recognize its right to exist. Additionally, their attitude toward the political setup and statehood is also very different (see, for example, Syria's attitude toward Lebanon as an independent country; or that of Iraq toward Kuwait).

GENERAL

Canadian Proposal to Restrict Arms Trade Viewed

91WC0066A Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 16 Feb 91
Second Edition p 5

[Article by Vsevolod Ovchinnikov: "The Committee for the Coordination of the Export of 'Strategic' Goods from NATO Countries Along the Vertical?"]

[Text] **The Prime Minister of Canada Mulroney recently came forward with an initiative which, in my view, is extremely interesting and urgent. He proposed to convene, within the framework of the United Nations, a worldwide summit meeting for the purpose of limiting the trade in military technology, and, above all, not allowing the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, as well as ballistic missiles.**

The seizure of Kuwait, which served to detonate the military conflict in the Persian Gulf, reminded mankind that the repudiation of the confrontation between East and West is capable of giving rise to a "threat from the South." The flow of weapons, which has become unnecessary in Europe, may gush into the developing countries, fanning old and igniting new regional conflicts. The bitter paradox consists in the fact that the multinational forces under the banner of the United Nations are fighting Iraq, which created its military potential with the participation of all five permanent members of the Security Council. It is only a pity that their so rare unanimity was manifested in the desire to arm Saddam Husayn, and not in the readiness to sacrifice these billions of dollars to fight hunger and disease.

On the other hand, at the time when the USSR and the United States are taking the first steps toward disarmament, and other industrial powers even if they only acknowledge the necessity to embark upon this path, the Third World continues to arm itself feverishly. The military budgets of the developing countries come to an average of six percent of their gross national product, which exceeds by a factor of six the expenditures for health, and by a factor of more than two the expenditures for education.

The detente between East and West is turning into a "pseudoconversion", that is the pumping over of masses of military equipment from North to South, from the developed to the developing countries. Thanks to the free access to the latest weaponry and the technology for its production, any aggressive regime can become a threat to its neighbors, to the entire world. How not to permit this?

I think the most urgent task is to fully prohibit chemical weapons, which thanks to their cheapness are sometimes called the "atomic bomb of beggars." The threats that are being heard from Baghdad concerning the use of poisonous substances reminds us of the necessity of completing more quickly the work on an appropriate international convention.

The treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, signed in 1968 on the initiative of the USSR, the United States, and England, played a considerable role in curbing the arms race in this very dangerous sector. It has been joined by more than 140 states that have received international access to the peaceful use of the atom in exchange for an obligation not to produce nuclear warheads.

Things are worse with rocket weaponry. Only in 1987, the members of the "Big Seven" (United States, Japan, FRG, England, France, Italy, and Canada) decided to introduce limitations on the sale of ballistic missiles, as well as the technology for their production. In my view, it would be desirable for the USSR and the PRC to join this agreement officially.

However, even conventional military technology may become a threat to international security. One can only regret that in 1978 the Soviet-American negotiations on arms trade were broken off. Perhaps now, after the end of the "Cold War", the time has come to create something similar to the notorious Committee for the Coordination of the Export of "Strategic" Goods from NATO Countries. But already not in order to conceal from the East the scientific-technical achievements of the West, but in order not to permit the transfer of the arms race from the North to the South. The world summit meeting proposed by the prime minister of Canada would lead to a single channel of negotiation in regard to the various aspects of the problem. For this reason, the initiative of Mulroney, in my view, deserves support.

Legislators Meet With WEU Assembly Members

LD2802231491 Moscow TASS in English 2134 GMT
28 Feb 91

[By correspondent Igor Kuleshov]

[Text] Paris, February 28 (TASS)—Aspects of cooperation between the Soviet Union and the West European Union (WEU) were discussed during the meeting between Soviet parliamentarians and representatives of this military alliance of Western countries in Paris on Thursday.

The Soviet delegation led by deputy chairman of the Soviet parliament Aleksandr Mokanu held a series of meetings with WEU Assembly members and representatives of its various committees.

During the meetings, the sides discussed problems of disarmament, the creation on the European continent of a system of mutual trust and cooperation and the further development of the CSCE process.

The burden of armaments weighs down on the Soviet economy with incredible force, the head of the Soviet delegation told TASS. This is why our talks with WEU representatives focused on disarmament problems, defence sufficiency and the conversion of military production.

on 10 March, in its regular "Vremya" newscast, broadcasts a 2-minute recorded video report by Igor Fesunenکو on his visit to an undisclosed strategic missile regiment command post. Reception is fair.

Fesunenکو says: "From here, from these control desks, by pushing the relevant buttons and turning the relevant keys, the most powerful and most terrible weapon ever invented by man—the intercontinental strategic missile, able to strike any goal at any point on earth—can be brought into action." The video shows Fesunenکو pointing to a desk with five visible red buttons, three of which read: Information not received; Main; Reserve; and three boxes with keyholes, two of which read: Command; Launch.

Also shown are officers on duty, and various unexplained pieces of equipment, a door with danger signs, plaques reading Combat Post 1 and Combat Post 2. Fesunenکو explains that officers are on duty permanently in order to ensure that the missiles are never launched, though naturally these officers are constantly changed, he points out. The video shows two officers, and then switches to a long low corridor.

Fesunenکو suggests that viewers will want to know whether or not the missiles could be mistakenly launched. Fesunenکو says: "You can learn the answer to that question and to many other questions, including any questions connected with our armed forces, in the next 'Who is Who' program, to be broadcast on 30 March—naturally on the first program—when the guest will be Marshal of the Soviet Union Yazov, USSR minister of defense. Please send in any questions which interest you, addressed to Marshal Yazov for this program, at 127000 Moscow, ul Akademika Koroleva 12."

Urgent Solution Needed for Faltering Arms Talks

*PM1203134191 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
11 Mar 91 Second Edition p 5*

[“Editorial Comments”: “Breakthrough Needed”]

[Text] It is known that in times of war the muses are silent. And diplomats too, evidently. In any case, their voices have not been heard much from Geneva, where the articles of the treaty on strategic offensive weapons [START] are being “polished.” While the war was blazing in the desert, and all attention was fixed on that, no one sounded the alarm. However, time is passing, and things are at a standstill in Geneva—in this case the treaty on strategic offensive weapons.

Meanwhile the treaty is being awaited in Moscow, where the Soviet-American summit that was postponed in February is to be held in the first half of this year. It is here that the two presidents are expected to sign this historic document.

There is no need to prove that it is historic. Even the slightest movement backwards of the hands on the “nuclear clock” makes it possible for mankind to breathe

more freely. And here we are talking about an unprecedented reduction of nuclear arsenals. Furthermore, the prospect of a nonnuclear world is opening up, and the whole international climate is changing for the better.

So what is the matter? Even a month ago, “negotiators” on both sides were reassuring the public that everything has been resolved and that only the “technicalities” remain, and now disjointed rumors are coming from Geneva about “unexpected” new complexities which threaten to postpone the signing of the treaty for an unspecified time. We are accusing “them” of inconsistency and of bringing out new complex approaches at the final stretch, and they accuse “us” of obduracy which they say reflects the “strengthened influence” of military circles on our foreign policy.

The truth is not always half-way between the two. Evidently the euphoria that overwhelmed the U.S. military department following the victory in the desert is having its effect here, in addition to the chorus of praises being sung there about the latest American weapons.

A solution needs to be sought urgently. It seems to us that the main thing is to see the aim behind the details of the talks. And it has stayed the same. It is not worth it for anyone, and that includes Washington, to disregard the fact that this is not just a question of weapons, but one of weapons of mass destruction, which do not leave anyone with a chance, and do not divide people into victors and vanquished.

And if these Geneva talks come to a standstill, if all these “levels” and “sub-levels” are not resolved, then we need to look at the experience of Reykjavik, for example. Even a “mini-summit” can rise above banal problems and make the necessary breakthrough in the talks. And in this case it is a question of a problem that is truly fateful for the whole world.

Everything that has been said also fully applies to what is going on in the Hofburg Palace in Vienna, where the “revision” of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe is also dragging on. There is an increasing amount of “unjustified linkages,” as the diplomats express themselves opaquely. A breakthrough—and a quick one at that—is also needed here.

Let us note that the problem is not just one of dates, but one of stopping a negative tendency which is highly dangerous. After all, if it is allowed to develop, it may freeze Soviet-American dialogue for a certain time, even if it does not completely stifle it, and return tension to Europe.

This must be prevented.

Concern Over ‘Technicalities’ Delaying Treaty

*LD1203185891 Moscow World Service
in English 1210 GMT 12 Mar 91*

[Yuriy Solton commentary]

this field, which is a priority for us. For in 1991 no funding has been allocated for work on a space-based thermal emission converter. One of the developers of the device that caused the sensation in the West is, within the framework of conversion, being switched to the production of packaging for dairy products. But you will not be seeing that in America...

Current Status of SDI Program Viewed

*PM0703152191 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 5 Mar 91 First Edition p 3*

[G. Khromov article: "The Main Affair of the 20th Century; How Things Are Proceeding With the Implementation of the American SDI Program"]

[Text] Eight years have passed since the announcement in the United States of the so-called strategic defense initiative (SDI) program, which the public immediately nicknamed the Star Wars program. In the words of the then President R. Reagan, SDI was to defend the entire United States territory from a missile strike. At the same time, world public opinion also held it to be a means of safeguarding a first nuclear strike, as a country possessing global ABM defenses could rely on remaining unpunished in the event of such a strike. Furthermore, it was considered that the SDI program's implementation would bring the United States immense technical advantages.

To date the SDI program has already gobbled up more than \$20 billion. This is considerably more than the cost of the atomic bomb project, and almost as much as the project to put a man on the moon. And what are the results?

The program's originally declared aim has already been officially recognized as overambitious even for such a rich and technologically advanced country as the United States, and its newly declared aim—to defend very important facilities—confirms the appraisal given earlier of the possible aggressive orientation of the program, whose implementation might undermine the foundations of the agreement on a 50 percent reduction in strategic offensive weapons, which is near to conclusion.

In the opinion of many specialists there has also been no serious technical progress. P. Zimmerman writes in the Pentagon publication DEFENSE NEWS (21 January 1991): "In the course of research in the field of strategic defense there have not been any new scientific discoveries, and not one of the concepts talked about back in 1983 has been significantly developed at all." Work in such areas as the development of a nuclear-pumped laser, charged particle beam generators, electrodynamic mass accelerators, and exciter lasers, which were considered to be essential at the beginning of the program, have been practically completely halted due to their scientific untenability or practical infeasibility.

At present the SDI program's developers still have a version of the system ("Brilliant Pebbles"), based on

kinetic kill principles, "on the boil." But, many specialists consider that this, too, is leading nowhere. This version envisages using many thousands of satellites put into orbit around the earth, each of which is equipped with its own motors, sensory systems, guidance systems, and kill systems. The technical and economic viability of such a system has not been confirmed. Many specialists claim that it is impossible to imagine a system which can be tested in no other conditions than in combat. And where will they find these conditions?

The present SDI project's authors themselves are thinking up Star Wars scenarios which look consistent, if only in the eyes of a simpleton. In particular, they are trying in every way to play up the nonnuclear interception of missiles and nuclear warheads, as this is the only case in which the radar, optical, thermal, and other tracking system sensors do not become "blinded"; and without these it is impossible to engage the system's kill systems. And here the projects' authors hush up the fact that the other side is not going to act in accordance with this scenario.

In order to extract any funds at all from Congress, SDI's backers resort to speculative statements. For example, according to them the Soviet Union is creating its own ABM defense system at an intensified pace, and in a number of areas—laser technology for one—has already superseded the United States. It has been claimed in the American publication SOVIET MILITARY POWER over a number of years that the world's first laser complex (such facilities are part of the SDI program's projects) which is capable of taking out American satellites, has been built and is operational at the Soviet testing range in the area of Saryshagan. But the very first visit to this testing range by representatives of the American public and American specialists in 1990, ended in the confusion of the authors of the said publication. The lasers in Saryshagan turned out not only to be incapable of taking out satellites, but cannot even be seen as prototypes of such types of arms.

In this connection I would like to point out that the move toward openness in the military sphere, including in work connected with ABM defenses, should secure the strengthening of trust between the countries. This is why at the talks on nuclear and space weapons, our country speaks in favor of securing predictability in the sides' activities regarding ABM defenses. Overall our intentions are clear—we are for the preservation of the 1972 ABM Treaty.

However strange it may seem, the most responsible figures in the U.S. Administration are even using the events in the Persian Gulf to "push" the SDI program. See how effective the Patriot antimissile system is, they say, and how simple it is to destroy Iraqi Scud missiles with their help. You might ask: What has this got to do with the SDI program? Systems of the Patriot type relate to so-called tactical ABM defense, and include antimissile missiles with nonnuclear warheads and a real capability to effectively resolve the problem of defending

25-30 per cent in 1991, 30 per cent in 1992, 30 per cent in 1993, and 10-15 per cent in 1994, General Moiseyev said.

Supreme Soviet Committee Views Army FRG Withdrawal

LD0103152791 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 1102 GMT 1 Mar 91

[Andrey Zyuev report on USSR Supreme Soviet Committee for Defense and State Security session]

[Text] At a joint sitting of the Soviet of the Union and the Soviet of Nationalities today, deputies continued their discussion of the composition of the Cabinet of Ministers and then gave the draft law on foreign currency regulation its second reading.

But I had the good luck, for the first time, to gain admission—not far away, a couple of paces from here—to a sitting of the USSR Supreme Soviet's Committee for Defense and State Security, where the ratification of the treaties between the USSR and the FRG, signed in September-November 1990, is being discussed. They are not run-of-the-mill treaties either, for us, for Germany, or for Europe.

As is known, the troop withdrawal is already under way. It has been planned in detail for this year and up to the end of 1994 roughly. I'll quote just a few figures. Over 43,000 of the 337,000 servicemen have already been withdrawn. And six of the divisions being withdrawn will be totally disbanded, since there is no room to station them anywhere. This was noted by Army General Moiseyev, chief of the General Staff. Twenty-one cantonments have already been vacated, but the buildings and real estate that have been handed over are not being used by the German side and are deteriorating. But we have not yet received any compensation for them.

I personally had not suspected that the question of desertion in the area would give rise to such interest among those attending the sitting. In this connection, [Soyuz group leader] Deputy Alksnis recalled that the authorities in the FRG's eastern laender have received instructions not to return any deserter from the Soviet side, but to move all of them to the western part of Germany, to the town of Eisenberg in the Land of Baden-Wuerttemberg, where a special screening center, SASA, has been set up.

Speaking about the problem of desertion, Defense Ministry spokesman pointed out that the social aspect is one of the spurs to these acts. But Deputy Sharin, who was presiding over the committee meeting, disagreed with this, objecting that seasoned officers as well as conscripts are running off.

It has been calculated that 11,000 trains will be needed to withdraw the Western Group of Forces. At a rate of four trainloads a day, Deputy Alksnis made a simple mathematical calculation and pointed out that the chore

would take about 8 years. Army General Moiseyev then noted that, owing to disagreements on this matter with the Polish side, the troop withdrawal is now taking place via the Navy and military air transport. People's deputies wanted to know whether, following the troop withdrawal from Germany in 1994, our state would still be out of pocket or not. But it emerged that no one knows.

General on Troop Withdrawal From East Europe

LD0103111691 Moscow TASS in English 1101 GMT 1 Mar 91

[By TASS correspondent Oleg Moskovskiy]

[Text] Moscow, March 1 (TASS)—“The withdrawal of the central (Czechoslovakia) and southern (Hungary) groups of troops will be completed by June 30, 1991,” Colonel-General Gherman Burutin, first deputy head of a main department of the Soviet Armed Forces' general staff, told TASS today in view of the completion of a regular“ phase of the withdrawal of Soviet troops from East European countries and Mongolia.

Soviet troops are being withdrawn from the region “strictly in accordance with the Soviet Union's unilateral initiative, intergovernmental agreements and plans,” Burutin said.

In all, more than 223,000 servicemen, over 8,000 tanks, about 4,000 artillery systems, and more than 760 aircraft have been withdrawn from Eastern Europe and Mongolia in 1987-1991, the general said.

Yet to be withdrawn are as follows: 15 percent of the personnel and up to 10 percent of hardware from the central group of troops, 20 percent of the personnel and up to 15 percent of hardware from the southern group of troops.“ the small contingent of troops remaining in Mongolia will be finally withdrawn in 1992, Burutin said.

In accordance with the earlier concluded agreements between the Soviet Union and the Federal Republic of Germany, a withdrawal of the western group of troops from the territory of Germany has been started, he pointed out.

The withdrawal plan for the first two months of this year has been implemented in the whole. More than 16,000 servicemen, about 500 tanks and over 230 artillery systems have been withdrawn. At the same time, the general believes, the systematic character of the withdrawal of Soviet troops is being substantially influenced by the attitude of the leadership of a number of East European countries that raised transportation fare.

“The non-constructive stand, taken by “the Polish Government that hampers the transit of troop trains and motor convoys of the western group of troops across Polish territory, required the introduction of substantial changes to the transportation plans,” General Burutin emphasised.

[Badurkin] The treaty submitted for ratification is assessed differently by specialists and the public. That applies particularly to the schedule for our troops' withdrawal...

[Moiseyev] Yes, the schedule is indeed very tough. Incidentally, the General Staff counted on a minimum of about seven years. But life and the political realities of present-day Europe dictate their own terms. We were obliged to agree to the troops' withdrawal by the end of 1994. In all over the course of four years we will have to withdraw about 550,000 men, 114,000 units of equipment, and 1.5 million tonnes of material and technical stocks.

[Badurkin] And you believe you will be able to withdraw all that?

[Moiseyev] The General Staff has compiled a plan and schedule for the withdrawal of the Western Group of Forces. It has been coordinated and handed to the German side, as stipulated by the treaty, at the end of December 1990. With a consideration for the existing situation and the potential for the use of various types of transport, we have planned in each of the first three years to withdraw 30 percent of the troops and to withdraw the remaining 10 percent in the last year, 1994. Over 11,000 trains and 1,130 ship voyages will be needed for that.

[Badurkin] Recently the cost of rail shipments both in Germany and in Poland has increased substantially. In addition the stance taken by the Polish Government is impeding the transit of our troops' trains and motor vehicle convoys.

[Moiseyev] All this is giving us considerable additional worries. Some of the plan's provisions are having to be corrected on the move, so to speak. For instance, we have had to increase the volume of sea and air shipments. The main brunt has been borne by the forces of the Baltic Fleet and military transport aircraft and ships of the USSR Ministry of the Maritime Fleet.

Today these questions have already been resolved. In addition the German side has agreed to finance transport not to its own ports, as previously planned, but to Soviet ports. As far as the Poles are concerned I personally believe they will review their position. After all at present their railroads are not fully loaded. In any case we shall fulfill the withdrawal plan. That is borne out by the fact that despite all kinds of difficulties as of 1 March we had withdrawn about 44,000 servicemen, 3,849 tanks, 1,746 combat vehicles, and 988 guns and mortars from the Western Group of Forces.

[Badurkin] One of the most acute problems connected with the troops' withdrawal is the housing problem...

[Moiseyev] Yes, that is indeed the main problem. The troops from Hungary and Czechoslovakia went to virtually all the garrisons where there were free stocks or where the density could be increased. All possible measures are now being taken to provide normal facilities for

the units being withdrawn from the Western Group of Forces and to organize their planned combat training.

Matters are more complicated with regard to housing for officers and ensigns. We need about 54,000 apartments for family men and hostels for 13,000 bachelors. As you can see, the agreement with the German side to construct 36,000 apartments at its expense does not solve the problem. To this end a "Conversion-housing" consortium has been formed under the USSR Defense Ministry, including eight plants of the Western Group of Forces with the subsequent participation of the German firm "Bison Werke" in the matter. We are also hoping for assistance from the organs of power at the units' new places of deployment.

[Badurkin] You have outlined far from all the problems that have to be resolved during the withdrawal. It is primarily the Defense Ministry that will have to resolve them. During the discussion of the treaties many of your colleagues subjected them to serious criticism. Some suggested being in no hurry with the ratification. What is the position of the chief of General Staff?

[Moiseyev] Alongside the Foreign Ministry, Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations, and other interested departments, the Defense Ministry also took an active part in preparing the treaties and agreements. Of course not all, but many, of our proposals and wishes were taken into account. I would not say that all provisions of the documents that have been signed are irreproachable or suit us. But as a whole I want to stress that in the entire package of questions that were examined a big step has been taken in the full regulation of relations with Germany. Here are just a few specific examples. The treaties enshrine Germany's definitive borders. It has been emphasized that combat operations will never be launched in future from its territory. A "ceiling" has been set for the bundeswehr—370,000 men. The package of agreements develops and strengthens trust between our countries and maintains peace and stability in Europe.

Of course, this will seem too little for some of our citizens, especially the front line veterans. I have received proposals, even demands, to use the right of the victory state, right up to dictating our terms. From a purely human viewpoint I understand these people and share their pain and anxiety. But from the viewpoint of large-scale political and with a consideration for the realities of existing interstate relations, we could not travel that path. I believe the package of treaties must be ratified. Another question is the development and tuning of the mechanism for their implementation. That is what we must think about now above all.

[Badurkin] Considering the experience of withdrawing troops from Hungary and Czechoslovakia, it may be supposed that the property question will become a very vexed one.

[Moiseyev] That is precisely what I am saying. By agreement between the USSR and FRG governments,

the process of reforms in the military domain with positive processes in other areas of inter-state relations.

The following argument in favour of the seminar's speedy convocation was advanced: Much time is needed by the general staffs of CSCE states to make preparations for the discussion of concrete problems at the seminar, especially at a time when many parties to the negotiations are busy reassessing their doctrines. This is why it is necessary to reach agreement quickly on the terms of the seminar and to draw up its agenda.

The Soviet delegation has advanced several preliminary considerations, which boil down to the following: The problem of military doctrines has become particularly acute after the Warsaw Treaty military organisation was dissolved. The east European states are actively seeking new ways to ensure their national security, ranging from rapprochement with NATO to neutrality. In these conditions, the Soviet Union will also be guided by the national doctrine in shaping its defense policy. This doctrine will have to be amended correspondingly. It is planned, among other things, not only to perpetuate, but further increase its defensive orientation.

Furthermore, the changes that have now occurred suggest a basically new approach to the assessment of the only remaining European military alliance—NATO. This is why the Soviet side expects the bloc's leadership to grasp the new military-political situation on the continent and take measures to implement the concept of all-European security. The Soviet Union also believes it is high time to get down to the practical elaboration of defense sufficiency criteria. Further promotion of the European disarmament process is unthinkable without them.

Military Districts Create Disarmament Departments

*LD0603140491 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian
1200 GMT 6 Mar 91*

[Text] New departments dealing with disarmament issues are being set up in staffs of military districts. This has been done in accordance with the Paris Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe. Colonel Zorin, the head of the Transcaucasus Military District, said the following on the work of such a department in Transcaucasus Military District: We must ensure the implementation of the treaty and create all envisaged conditions for its fulfillment. We will monitor the movement of military equipment and weapons both in the district and outside it, take account of weapons which are to be destroyed, and provide for the work of foreign delegations on the territory of the district. We will establish by every means the necessary contacts with councils of ministers, foreign and interior ministries, and committees of state security of Transcaucasus republics.

General Views Troop Withdrawal from FRG

*AU0803144891 Berlin NEUES DEUTSCHLAND
in German 6 Mar 91 p 11*

[Interview with Lieutenant General Vladimir Grebenyuk, chief of the Political Administration of the Western Group of Soviet Forces, by Rainer Funke and Rene Heilig; place and date not given: "Plans for Troop Withdrawal Are Being Observed—Despite Many Obstacles"]

[Excerpt] [NEUES DEUTSCHLAND] The Western Group will withdraw 30 percent of its troops and staffs from Germany this year—will they all be withdrawn by sea?

[Grebenyuk] At the moment, we do not have any other choice because of the rigid Polish attitude. This could change, but so far there is also been a lack of diplomatic support from the FRG Government. They say that this is our problem. The plans for troop withdrawal will be fulfilled in line with the treaty, regardless of the obstacles that may arise. The personnel will be transported by plane anyway, the technical equipment will be transported by sea. Of course, this means additional costs—in financial, material, and organizational terms. Originally, we proceeded on the premise of transportation by land.

The sea route is much longer. Let us imagine: Our troops stationed in Neuruppin will be transferred to the Ukraine. Via Poland they would be practically close by. Now we are forced to transfer our troops to Mukran and Rostock, to load them on ships there, and then to take them to Leningrad by sea, and then take them from the north to the south. One can easily imagine how much more complicated that is. This is what I meant by referring to additional costs.

[NEUES DEUTSCHLAND] Thus, the tickets will be much more expensive. Would it not also be possible to go via the CSFR?

[Grebenyuk] Possible yes, but this presupposes corresponding negotiations and decisions. We are also withdrawing our troops from there.

[NEUES DEUTSCHLAND] Poland's Senate spokesman made the march through Poland dependent on the provision that before that all 50,000 Soviet soldiers have to be withdrawn from this country.

[Grebenyuk] Of course, one can pose conditions that are acceptable or unacceptable. The Polish side simply does not take some facts into account. The Soviet troops stationed in Poland must contribute their share to the withdrawal of the Western Group: material-technical supplies, medical care, and the regulation of the marching columns.

[NEUES DEUTSCHLAND] Soldiers and officers who have returned home from Hungary live in tents, their families in barracks. And now the Western Group is also on its way....

Warsaw Pact no longer exists. Are you really still a functioning part of the Soviet Army?

[Grebennyuk] Of course! We have to fulfill our tasks in line with the specific situation.

[NEUES DEUTSCHLAND] That is, withdrawal?

[Grebennyuk] We will withdraw one-third this year. Two-thirds are not just waiting for the date of embarkation. There is training, and we must guarantee a certain level of combat capability. The specific conditions are another question. [passage omitted]

[NEUES DEUTSCHLAND] The Western Group leaves ecological problems.

[Grebennyuk] You may tell your readers that we are doing the utmost to minimize the damage. However, if you transfer a Bundeswehr unit, you will also find ecological problems at its former location. Many locations were already barracks of the German kaiser and the Wehrmacht. It is hard to say who caused more damage. However, the problem concerns both sides. We have to repair the damage together. We understand that and we are doing whatever is possible. [passage omitted]

British Prime Minister Major Visits Moscow

Discusses Proliferation, CFE With Gorbachev

PM0703134791 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
7 Mar 91 Union Edition p 4

[M. Yusin report: "John Major: We Had An Intensive Dialogue; British Prime Minister's News Conference"]

[Excerpts] Having completed the program for his one-day working visit to Moscow, British Prime Minister John Major held a news conference for Soviet and foreign journalists on the evening of 5 March.

The head of the British Government expressed satisfaction with the results of the trip. During the conversations with President Gorbachev (which lasted more than four hours, including a working dinner) there was a "detailed, sometimes very intensive, amicable discussion that produced useful results." [passage omitted].

Major stated with satisfaction that Moscow agreed with London's view on the need to restrict exports of nuclear, bacteriological, and chemical weapons to the Near East and keep a check on supplies of conventional armaments. When asked whether the Soviet Union had given any guarantees during the talks that it would not supply Iraq with any weapons at all, however, Major replied in the negative. [passage omitted].

The prime minister touched on the differences that exist between the two countries on questions connected with the treaty on conventional arms Major told Gorbachev and Defense Minister D. Yazov of "Britain's concern about the transfer of Soviet Army troop formations to new commands," which, in his opinion, is a violation of

agreements that have been concluded. The Soviet interlocutors presented their arguments. Major called the exchange of opinions useful but, to all appearances, the differences were not eliminated. [passage omitted].

Meets With Yazov, Military Aides

PM0703113591 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 7 Mar 91 First Edition p 1

[Major M. Pogorelyy report: "Meeting in the Defense Ministry"]

[Excerpts] On 5 March British Prime Minister J. Major, who is on a brief working visit to Moscow, had a meeting with Soviet Defense Minister D.T. Yazov.

Describing the range of topics discussed, the USSR defense minister told journalists that attention focused on questions connected with the problems of implementing the treaty on conventional arms in Europe. The need for such a dialogue was dictated by the necessity to eliminate our sides' different understanding of questions of arms reduction. As Marshal of the Soviet Union, D.T. Yazov emphasized, the preparation of this treaty lasted more than three years. During this time the Soviet Union has withdrawn a large proportion of its troops from the territory of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic and Hungary and eliminated the "tank attack forces" previously concentrated there. The process of eliminating obsolete arms and commissioning new ones is taking place. All this was explained to the British side. [passage omitted]

Answering a question from KRASNAYA ZVEZDA's reporter, British Prime Minister J. Major called the conversation very useful and productive and said that it had made it possible to ascertain more exactly the USSR's position on the problems discussed. J. Major also reported that he had invited Marshal of the Soviet Union D.T. Yazov, USSR minister of defense, to pay an official visit to Britain.

Participating in the talks in the Defense Ministry were, on the Soviet side—Aviation Colonel General Ye.I. Shaposhnikov, commander in chief of the Air Force and USSR deputy defense minister; Admiral of the Fleet V.N. Chernavin, commander in chief of the Navy and USSR deputy defense minister; Col. Gen. V.G. Denisov, deputy chief of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff; and L.M. Zamyatin, USSR ambassador to Britain; on the British side—R. Braithwaite, British ambassador to the USSR.

Yazov Describes Meeting

LD0603231291 Moscow World Service in English
2000 GMT 6 Mar 91

[Excerpt] During his brief working visit to Moscow on 5 February [as heard], the British Prime Minister, John Major, had a meeting with the Soviet Defense Minister, Dmitriy Yazov, and some of the top military officials. At

decide, Vladimir Arkhipov, soviet deputy defence minister, logistics chief, told TASS today. He gave an interview in connection with the ratification of a package of treaties between the USSR and the FRG by Soviet parliament early this week.

Arkhipov said that by now the Soviet troops have turned over to the German side 844 facilities, 431 of them built at Soviet expense. Still the utilisation of property should be more effective, Arkhipov said. He believes that the buildings and structures transferred remain unused and gradually decay.

Arkhipov said that a joint Soviet-German commission decides on the composition, value and uses of real estate owned by the USSR. The commission has run up against some difficulties. "The German side has not yet worked out the procedure for the utilisation of this property", he said.

Arkhipov said the FRG raises the question about the compensation of its expenditures for the restoration and overhaul of structures and buildings used by the Western Group of troops, as well as for environmental improvement. There were also difficulties about settling questions of property of land on which these facilities are built.

The difference of approaches was manifested and it has not yet been possible to reach understanding, the general said.

In view of the need to settle all property and financial matters involved in the utilisation of Soviet real estate in the FRG, Arkhipov expressed the wish that the text of supplement to the treaty about troops, that would settle property questions, be drafted by the German side within a brief period of time.

Pact-NATO Consultative Group Discusses CFE Implementation

*LD0703205491 Moscow TASS in English 1718 GMT
7 Mar 91*

[By TASS correspondent Vladimir Smelov]

[Text] Vienna, March 7 (TASS)—By ratifying the treaty on the final settlement of the German issue, the Soviet Union has greatly contributed to developing cooperation in Europe to the future, head of the German delegation at conventional arms in Europe [CFE] talks Ruediger Hartmann told a news conference here today.

The news conference was held after a plenary meeting of the joint consultative group of Warsaw Treaty and NATO experts, discussing the implementation of the conventional arms in Europe treaty.

Hartmann said the document is the main pier for the architecture of a new Europe aimed for cooperation.

Hartmann said the exchange of specified military data on the armed forces of the 22 member-states of the two

blocs within the consultative group was useful. He said there remained certain differences, but partners were trying to reach a consensus.

There are problems with placing three Soviet motorised infantry divisions under the command of the coast guard. Some delegations believe that by doing so, Moscow has violated its obligations on the treaty.

The Soviet side said this was done in 1989, i.e. a year before the treaty was signed, and it did not aim to violate the treaty. At the time, the issue of taking marines into account or exchanging such information had not been raised.

In addition, placing the divisions under the other command was a forced measure. After the Soviet Union considerably reduced its land forces' potential, NATO gained superiority in strike and mobile naval means. The Soviet Union was forced to protect coastal areas.

The Soviet Union said the coastal guard, like marines, is included in the navy, which is not being discussed at the Vienna talks.

Moiseyev in Poland To Discuss Troop Withdrawal, Transit

Churkin on Visit's Purpose

*LD1103174291 Moscow TASS in English 1730 GMT
11 Mar 91*

[By TASS correspondents Aleksandr Kanishchev and Igor Peskov]

[Excerpt] Moscow, March 11 (TASS)—[passage omitted] Asked about the purposes of the trip to Poland by Mikhail Moiseyev, chief of the Soviet Armed Forces' General Staff, Churkin said that the trip is being made "within the context of a regular round of Soviet-Polish talks on the transit of Soviet troops being withdrawn from Germany and on the discussion of matters connected with the stay of Soviet troops that remain on Polish territory for the time being". A regular round of Soviet-Polish talks on these issues will be held in Moscow on March 19-20, Churkin announced. [passage omitted]

Meets With Foreign Minister

*LD1103224891 Moscow TASS International Service
in Russian 1808 GMT 11 Mar 91*

[By TASS correspondent Vladas Burbulis]

[Text] Warsaw, 11 March (TASS)—Army General M.A. Moiseyev, Chief of General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces, first deputy USSR minister of defense, arrived in the capital of Poland today on a two-day working visit. The Soviet military leader was received by Kszysztof Skubiszewski, minister of foreign affairs of the Republic of Poland. During the talks, the two sides discussed the issues of Soviet troops staying on the territory of Poland,

One more argument in favor of such a solution which is ignored in many cases: The future of thousands of career servicemen and their families who would be directly affected by the reduction and the withdrawal of troops. It is clear that their interests cannot be neglected. Probably it is worse letting them serve their term once they have connected their lives with the Army.

Joint FRG Agreements on Troop Provisions Reported

LD120311589 Moscow TASS in English 1057 MT
12 Mar 91

[By TASS correspondent Oleg Moskovskiy]

[Text] Moscow, March 12 (TASS)—“A number of new agreements with German private and state firms followed the signing of a package of Soviet-German treaties. They will be needed to provide Soviet troops with everything necessary.” Soviet Deputy Defense Minister Vladimir Arkhipov, who also heads the Soviet Armed Forces rear [services], told TASS.

According to Arkhipov, after the German reunification, Soviet troops provision with various goods, services and transport facilities has considerably changed. This is connected with the fact that such issues have been resolved not at the governmental level,” he said.

In accordance with the agreements, German authorities “guarantee reliable provision of the Western group with everything necessary”. Since the signing of the treaties, “there is no interruption with provisions on the part of Germany,” Arkhipov said.

Arkhipov said that in order to settle the disputed issues and differences connected with conditions of Soviet troops' stay and withdrawal from German territory, a joint Soviet-German commission and a working group have been set up to ensure legal assistance and administrative cooperation.

Arkhipov recalled that the joint commission at its recent meeting discussed a range of issues. He said he was satisfied with the German side's agreement to pay for transporting Soviet troops to the Soviet Union by sea in German main.

The German side has agreed to help sell 300,000 tonnes of scrap metal and 300 tonnes of military and technical equipment, Arkhipov noted. Germany has agreed to “study proposals by the Western group to set up a number of joint ventures using military.” He said the agreements are “useful and convenient.”

“Soviet-German relations are developing on a basis of goodwill between the two countries. The signing of the treaties and Soviet troops' withdrawal from German territory are aspects,” Arkhipov said.

120,000 Troops to Leave FRG in 1991

LD1203171491 Hamburg DPA in German 1624 GMT
12 Mar 91

[Text] Rostock (DPA)—A total of 120,000 Soviet soldiers and 30,000 civilians are to leave Germany and return to their homeland this year. According to the Rostock Senate today, 48,000 soldiers from Saxony-Anhalt and 35,000 from Brandenburg are to start their homeward journey via the Baltic ports of Rostock and Mukran during the next few weeks. The withdrawal of the approximately 400,000 Soviet Army personnel from former GDR territory is to be concluded by the end of 1994.

The senate spokesman further stated that the Soviet Army's property in the former GDR, valued at 10.3 billion marks, is to be put up for sale. The proceeds are to be used to meet the costs of refuse disposal and clearing up damage to the environment in the garrisons. Because the money will probably not be sufficient, the federal minister of finance has stated his readiness to make interim resources available until 30 June. Afterwards the local authorities will probably be “asked to pay up.”

NUCLEAR-FREE ZONES & PEACE ZONES

Far East Expert Calls Korean NFZ 'Basic Policy'

SK2302091391 Seoul YONHAP in English 0831 GMT
23 Feb 91

[Text] Seoul, February 23 (OANA-YONHAP)—Making the Korean Peninsula a nuclear-free zone [NFZ] is one of the Soviet Union's basic policies, and negotiations are actively under way with experts from the United States, Japan and China, a leading Soviet scholar said Saturday.

Mikhail Titarenko, director of the Institute of Far Eastern Affairs at the Soviet Academy of Sciences, told a press conference here that South Korea's economic experience will be helpful to Moscow. [passage omitted]

When asked whether the Korean Peninsula can be made into a non-nuclear region, Titarenko said it is one of the basic policies of the Soviet Union and is highly possible.

“There has not yet been inter-governmental talks on the issue, but the matter will naturally come up during discussions for establishing an Asia-Pacific cooperation conference,” he said. He also mentioned Mikhail Gorbachev's proposal to create a “zone of peace” in the Far East. Titarenko said the proposal is “very important.”

Yazov discussed Soviet-Chinese relations in detail. Our station's special correspondent Plevakho said: There is much speculation about your upcoming visit to China. I would like to ask about this. What role will the military play in the development of Soviet-Chinese relations? From your perspective, has the stabilization of Soviet-Chinese relations been felt throughout the entire Asia-Pacific region's military and political spectrum?

Marshal Yazov said: I think that our relations with China, military relations included, influence the stability of all Southeast Asia. We must bear in mind that the Soviet Union and China are two big nations and play a decisive role in many issues. We must mention that China is currently making several fundamental decisions in order to substantially reduce the strength of its own armed forces. For our part, we have also done a lot to let the Chinese people see that we have no intention of invading their territory. We have replaced infantry units on camels with permanent machine gun and artillery divisions; these are not able to make moves on the Soviet-Chinese border. We see that the Chinese side is taking similar measures. The Soviet defense minister said: We believe that our relations are normal. [passage omitted]

Moscow Radio Interviews Yazov on Upcoming Visit

*OW0103125891 Moscow International Service
in Mandarin 0700 GMT 1 Mar 91*

[Announcer-read report on interview with USSR Minister of Defense Dmitriy Yazov by special correspondent Plevakho; place, date not given; from the "Asian Affairs" program]

[Text] Dear listeners, one of the issues discussed during an interview with Marshal Yazov, USSR minister of defense, by Radio Moscow's special correspondent Plevakho, was the development of Soviet-Chinese relations and its influence over the situation in the region.

Plevakho said: A great deal already has been discussed about your forthcoming visit to China. With regard to

this fact, people still raise such questions as the following: What kind of contribution can a soldier make to developing Soviet-Chinese relations? In your opinion, does the stability of Soviet-Chinese relations have any influence over the military and political situation in the Asia-Pacific region?

Yazov said: We think that our relations with China include the military sphere and that they do play a role in stabilizing the whole situation in eastern Asia because the USSR and China are two superpowers, and as such, many things depend on their stands. It should be pointed out that recently China decided on some important policies concerning reducing their armed forces. In order to show the Chinese that we will not start an offensive, we also have done a great many things in this regard. We have withdrawn our motorized infantry divisions from the border areas, where now only machine gun artillery divisions fixed at the firing point are deployed. It is hard for troops so deployed to push ahead in an assault. We noticed the Chinese side also took similar actions.

The defense minister said: I believe our relations are normal. Incidentally, I would also like to talk about my upcoming China visit. At present, we have a very tight work schedule because we are withdrawing our troops from Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Germany, and Poland. In spite of our present heavy workload, we have reached an agreement with the Chinese side, through consultation, on my coming visit to China in March. By the way, I have never visited China before and so would like very much to see the living conditions of the People's Liberation Army of China and how they study. There is another fact that gives me reason for wanting to visit China, namely, we were once good friends in the past. For instance, I studied together with some Chinese in the (Voronezh) Military Academy. Guo Moruo, Zhu De, and other famous Chinese figures attended our academy. We were at odds with each other later on. We have been having fairly good contacts with each other since Gorbachev's visit to China.

Soviet Defense Minister stressed that, taking Gorbachev's forthcoming visit to Japan into consideration, we definitely will be able to achieve important political successes in the Asia-Pacific region.

against a newly expansionist Russia would be cruise missiles and Pershing II's with a range of 500 km.

It is tempting, in face of the rapid democratization of Central Europe, to nourish illusions about the uselessness of an American nuclear force in Europe, particularly now that the Soviet Union is in the process of reducing its conventional forces in accordance with the November 1990 agreement. But the USSR still has 13,000 nuclear warheads based on European soil. Even if the START accord on American and Soviet strategic weaponry (scheduled for conclusion at the February 1991 summit) were finally signed, Russia would still have more than 6,000 nuclear warheads. Unless we are content to rely solely on sea-based strategic deterrence (submarines and surface ships), is it not essential to consider the deployment in Europe of an air force equipped with a nuclear air-to-ground missile capable of reaching Russian territory? But is such a deployment politically possible? And are we not here facing the problem of a fourth zero option, the only one which is still conceivable—one, moreover, which indirectly would restore the balance of intermediate nuclear forces (INF)? As one can see, the stakes are high and should not be underestimated. One need only consider the potential for destabilization posed by a country like Iraq to get some idea of the threat that a nondemocratic Russia, with all its modern weaponry, could pose for Europe. Without a significant American presence, Europe would be doomed to powerlessness. And in event of politico-military confrontation, the United States—lacking an adequate panoply of military options—might perhaps have to resort to strategic weapons, which could lead to global war.

Once again, it is not that we hold doubtful the survival of much of the democratic gains Gorbachevism has brought. It is just that a coherent and cautious security policy still seems indispensable. Indeed, even Germany's defense minister has recently concluded that NATO needs to be strengthened.

Alliance Revision

A rather lengthy transition period will be required before we can expect a purely European defense. Even if British and French nuclear forces are not threatened by the Soviet-American disarmament process, they are not at present integrated into a conventional force adequate to cope with any conceivable crisis. The American presence, therefore, is necessary. The question that has been left hanging since the Reykjavik summit—whether or not that presence should include a nuclear component on European soil—is still unanswered. It is a difficult question, one that demands much reflection. Assuming anti-missile systems need to be developed, who gets the contract? How can the evident concern of the new Central European democracies for their own protection be integrated into defense policy? And how will Germany respond to these problems?

Many questions remain unanswered at present. Given the new realities of the security situation in Europe and

around the world, a return to square one—and consequently a rethinking of the whole concept of the Atlantic alliance—seems unavoidable. And, apart from European territory, we must reconsider the question of the alliance's geographic extension. We have just seen in the Gulf crisis that independent, autonomous action by a limited force is not viable in a military situation where one power clearly dominates all the others by virtue of its commitment in material and human assets.

It would thus appear, if this reasoning is valid, that of all the countries in the alliance, the one that should have the honor of taking the first steps to promote a general review of European and Western security problems is none other than France.

GERMANY

Daimler-Benz CEO Defends Sales to Iraq

91GE0146B Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German
28 Jan 91 p 17

[Interview with Edzard Reuter, Daimler-Benz CEO, by DER SPIEGEL editors Wolfgang Kaden and Dietmar Hawranek; place and date not given: "The Policymakers Must Decide"]

[Excerpt] [DER SPIEGEL] Now that the Gulf War is on, Mr. Reuter, all those in Europe who for years delivered weapons to countries such as Iraq are being criticized. Do you feel you are a target of the criticism?

[Reuter] No, in no way whatever. We exported with the full knowledge of the responsible political figures and within the framework of legal regulations—and nothing else.

[DER SPIEGEL] Iraq for example took delivery of 4,564 Milan missiles and 1,050 Roland anti-aircraft missiles via France's Euromissile company, 50 percent of which is owned by MBB [Messerschmitt-Boelkow-Blohm], a Daimler subsidiary. Everything in order?

[Reuter] Do you recall when that was? It occurred at a time when it was considered politically—I stress: politically—desirable to assist Iraq militarily in its war against Iran.

[DER SPIEGEL] The avenue via French partners is a favorite of German arms manufacturers such as MBB in order to circumvent the German ban on arms exports to areas of tension.

[Reuter] This constitutes a real problem which worries us ourselves. We have no European guidelines on the export of defense materials. But there is no major European defense technology project that does not involve European cooperation. That is why we have been fighting for some time now for the formulation of a uniform export policy in this field. Hopefully the conflict with Iraq will once again demonstrate to those responsible that one is urgently needed.

[Reuter] I am not that pessimistic in this regard. The jobs are less of an obstacle than the unwillingness to transfer sovereignty to supranational agencies.

[DER SPIEGEL] You once said that there ought to be "strict moral limits" on export deals. What are they?

[Reuter] Clearly exports should not go to countries about which there is the least doubt regarding their political reliability. We cannot clandestinely deliver weapons to some petty princes who are preparing for wars somewhere. In my view that is immoral.

[DER SPIEGEL] That seems too general to us. Iraq is a good case in point of how fast political opportunities change. Must one not draw the conclusion from this experience that arms should no longer be exported to all these countries?

[Reuter] Although most people have since repressed the fact, Iraq was deliberately supplied with military material on the basis of government decisions until a very short time ago...

[DER SPIEGEL] ...the political decision need not have been the correct one.

[Reuter] Let me go down the list: the USSR did it; the French government did it. All of this was done with the knowledge of the United States. It was paid for with, among other things, Saudi Arabian money...

[DER SPIEGEL] ...and with Kuwaiti money.

[Reuter] That is so. So do not know make it out now as though the military conflict in the Gulf was principally brought about by German arms sales.

[DER SPIEGEL] We did not say that.

[Reuter] But it is being done to a very large extent in German public opinion.

[DER SPIEGEL] The most terrible weapons, to be sure, do come from Germany.

[Reuter] What are they?

[DER SPIEGEL] The chemical weapons.

[Reuter] You are probably just as little aware of how those plants there came into being.

[DER SPIEGEL] We know a great deal about them. And we have written a lot about this.

[Reuter] That may be. But Daimler-Benz was not a part of it.

[DER SPIEGEL] An unequivocal decision might state that military equipment may only be sold to NATO countries.

[Reuter] That might be a possibility. But let me repeat: The main thing is that a Europe-wide decision is reached. But there also is a need to debate the issue of

what responsibilities the Western community is actually willing to assume to maintain world peace in the future. Do we really intend to burden our American friends with the role of world policeman? Or must we not conduct a fundamental debate on the question of how peace-keeping policies can be distributed among several nations? Let us not make believe that someone will not appear in some corner of the world and disturb the peace and commit acts of violence.

[DER SPIEGEL] Must the united Germany make a stronger commitment?

[Reuter] I am firmly convinced that there is no other way. But the Germans must act within the bounds of a community, of NATO or the United Nations.

[DER SPIEGEL] In the United States above all people are saying that the Germans are exporting military equipment without any scruples. How do you assess the harm done by the illegal exports to Libya or Iraq?

[Reuter] It is obvious that the transgressions of individuals have caused great harm. [passage omitted]

Economics Minister on Arms Exports Controls

*91GE0157A Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German
11 Feb 91 pp 104-105, 107*

[Interview with Economics Minister Juergen Moellemann, by Paul Lersch and Heiko Martens; place and date not given: "The Erosion Is Continuing"]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] [SPIEGEL] Before you can implement your great strategies, you of all people must deal with the subject of arms exports.

[Moellemann] Why me of all people?

[SPIEGEL] Have you not promoted all the business deals with the Arab states?

[Moellemann] I have advocated security cooperation with and weapons exports to Saudi Arabia, just as Helmut Schmidt did. And I was not wrong in doing so, as shown by the threat to Saudi Arabia from Iraq.

[SPIEGEL] You are known as a person who, in his time as minister of state in the Foreign Ministry, for example, urged diplomats to promote export deals of all kinds....

[Moellemann] Yes, the diplomatic service must also take seriously the interests of the German economy in legal exports to the entire world; that has now been understood in the Foreign Ministry as well.

[SPIEGEL] And now you want to curb exports?

[Moellemann] The firms must adhere to the decisions of the export permit authorities where it is a matter of goods that require a permit. I will abide by this.

[SPIEGEL] Permits are given by government officials and they must have some idea of what their chief is

six additional motorized infantry regiments will be established. The defense kreis commands will be incorporated into the defense bezirk commands, which means that they will no longer be independent authorities. The Luftwaffe airborne combat units will be reduced by one-third. The land-based air defense will largely be reduced to cadre personnel. The Navy will be reduced by 50 percent to 90 ships by the end of the decade.

Stoltenberg announced that there are also plans to reduce the Defense Ministry. In that connection, tasks that have so far been fulfilled by the ministry will be transferred to high-level command authorities, to offices and authorities of the Bundeswehr administration. That applies both to the military services and the sphere of armament. The Bundeswehr administration, where civilians are employed, will also be reduced. Of the existing 170,000 jobs, 26,000 will be eliminated by the end of the decade. Layoffs are not planned, but there will certainly be transfers.

Referring to the future structure of the Bundeswehr, the minister pointed out that only a few mobile units that can be used at short notice will exist after the middle of the decade. The remaining units will be reduced to cadres. Units that are destined for deployment outside Germany will include, besides professional soldiers and long-term servicemen, only conscripts who "volunteer to join the units and thus decide to participate in operations outside Germany," the minister stressed. However, he did not elaborate what will happen if the number of conscripts volunteering to join such units is insufficient.

The so-called core of the old Bundeswehr of 89,600 professional soldiers and officers who have signed up for military service for a specific period of time is to be reduced to 78,500. The number of soldiers who sign up for between four and 15 years of service will be slightly reduced. It will drop from 145,800 to 115,500. However, the number of volunteers who serve only two years will decline from 16,800 to 5,000. The number of those doing compulsory military service will be reduced from 208,000 to 145,000. It was striking that in his statements Stoltenberg referred to the old Bundeswehr in the former FRG. In his plans the minister generally made a distinction between Bundeswehr West and Bundeswehr East, thus making it clear that a merger of the old Bundeswehr and the units resulting from the former GDR National People's Army is not planned in the foreseeable future.

[Text]

Continuing Disarmament

Mentioning difficulties that have arisen in connection with the Vienna arms control talks since the fall of last year, the defense minister stressed that the Federal Government is willing to continue the arms control process, to open a second round of talks in Vienna, and to negotiate over the reduction of the chemical weapons that still exist in Europe in the near future. Referring to the two-plus-four treaty on German sovereignty, which also includes the agreement on the deployment and

withdrawal of Soviet troops, the minister stated that there are indications that the treaty will be ratified by the competent Soviet bodies, and that the troops will be withdrawn according to schedule.

Stoltenberg described the fact that the Soviet Union simply transferred 57,000 weapons systems covered by the Vienna disarmament treaty behind the Urals as "not really compatible" with the spirit of the agreement. A clarification of that issue is being sought in Vienna. Bonn and its allies view the fact that three divisions with weapons systems covered by the Vienna agreement, which were so far part of the ground forces, have been incorporated into the naval forces in Leningrad—which means that they no longer fall under the Vienna agreement—as an obstacle to the ratification of the Vienna treaty.

Talks on confidence-building measures should be continued swiftly and concluded before the end of this year, Stoltenberg emphasized. Talks on nonstrategic weapons in Europe should also be opened this year. In that connection, a reduction, not the elimination, of such weapons should be discussed, the minister pointed out.

Further Reduction of Bundeswehr in East

*AU1203102391 Berlin BERLINER ZEITUNG
in German 8 Mar 91 p 4*

[ADN/"eb" report: "Bundeswehr in East Is Further Reduced"]

[Text] Dresden—The reduction of Bundeswehr strength in eastern Germany and the development of new structures has clearly made progress. Yesterday Defense Minister Gerhard Stoltenberg expressed this view in front of journalists in Dresden. At the conclusion of a three-day visit to Saxony, he said that the objective is a socially acceptable troop reduction from about 90,000 to 50,000 men, 37,000 of whom will perform basic military service. According to the minister, the application of 23,000 officers and noncommissioned officers for permanent employment by the government is encouraging.

Inspector General on Bundeswehr Reform, NATO's Future

*AU1203101991 Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER
ALLGEMEINE in German 12 Mar 91 p 6*

["fy" report: "Bundeswehr Reform Is Almost a New Start"]

[Text] Bonn, 11 March—The Bundeswehr will continue to be necessary for Germany's security in the future. This was pointed out by Inspector General Admiral Wellerhoff at the opening of the 32d Commander's Meeting in Bonn on Monday [11 March]. The positive development that led to German unity and to the end of the division of Europe does not change that. "No sensible person would remove the dam in front of his door as long as he

[Text] The Hague, 8 February—The Second Chamber yesterday once again called for stricter European legislation to prevent the export of technologically high-quality weaponry. The Netherlands Government should strongly support such a move within the EC context. Current legislation on the European and national level is inadequate.

The Gulf war shows where this situation can lead. It is "sad" that the allied troops there must "fight against weapons that they themselves exported," said PVDA [Labor Party] member of parliament Valk. CDA [Christian Democratic Appeal] speaker Koffeman spoke in this regard of a "less than distinguished role by the Federal Republic [of Germany]." The CDA and PVDA wondered whether there should not be a nonproliferation treaty in order to counter the proliferation of missile technology.

All these points were brought up during a verbal consultation between Minister van den Broek and the Chamber Foreign Affairs Committee concerning the Fourth Review Conference on the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPV) Against the Spread of Nuclear Weapons, held in Geneva in August and September.

The Chamber seemed pessimistic about the results of this conference, which is held every five years. At the conference, the United States and Great Britain refused to explicitly link further agreements on preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons to agreements on halting nuclear testing.

The attitude of the two major powers was criticized by all speakers. According to Koffeman (CDA), an extension of the NPV has been jeopardized. Valk (PVDA) said that the credibility of the West among Third World countries has decreased. Tommel (Democrats 66) criticized van den Broek, saying that the Netherlands is perhaps too understanding of the U.S. and British position.

"You can tell friends the truth, and the truth is that they are too sluggish," said Tommel. Van den Broek promised to urge both major powers "to consider this linkage seriously."

Country To Cut 40,000 Troops From Forces

LD0803141991 *Hilversum International Service*
in English 1130 GMT 8 Mar 91

[Text] The Dutch Armed Forces will be cut by 40,000 troops in the coming ten years. Dutch Defense Minister Relus Ter Beek, presenting his new defense plans, said that, due to a completely changed perception on world security, it has become necessary to remodel the Armed Forces. In future, he said, all military units must be able to perform a wide range of tasks in various divergent situations and under different circumstances; especially, the land forces will have to become more flexible in their operation. A new initiative within the Armed Forces has been the introduction of a flying mobile brigade. The

Armed Forces trade unions have rejected the proposals, saying they are deeply concerned about the planned personnel cuts. The trade unions have also indicated that, on crucial points, the defense plans are too vague.

SWITZERLAND

BLICK Reports Firms Exported CW Precursors to Iraq

91WC0069B *Geneva JOURNAL DE GENEVE*
in French 31 Jan 91 p 2

[Unattributed ATS article: "Switzerland Exported Poison Gas Ingredients"]

[Text] Bern, 30 January (ATS)—Swiss chemical firms sold Iraq substances that go into mustard gas and neurotoxins. Between 1981 and 1985 (if not for even longer), phosphorus oxychloride and thiodiglycol were among the products Switzerland exported to Iraq. Since 1987, these substances have come under the purview of the War Materiel Exports Act, but federal authorities refuse to say whether they authorized any deliveries.

According to the daily newspaper BLICK's Wednesday edition, 452 tons of phosphorus oxychloride were exported to Iraq between 1981 and 1985. This substance, used primarily for water chlorination and as an insecticide in industry, can also enter into the composition of neurotoxins, BLICK was told by Bernhard Brunner, an expert with the DMF [Federal Military Department]. During those same years, 14 tons of thioglycol [as printed], a product used in the manufacture of mustard gas, was also shipped to Iraq.

The General Directorate of Customs confirmed to ATS that these materials were in fact exported to Iraq during the period cited by the newspaper. The customs statistical division even indicates that other substances were at one time delivered to Iraq, but demurs regarding the quantities alleged in the newspaper—though without advancing its own figures.

The customs directorate refuses to comment on possible deliveries after 1987, when the two products came under the purview of the War Materiel Exports Act. The DMF also has no comment, pleading confidentiality of procedures.

Exports Increased

Switzerland's overall chemical exports to Iraq grew steadily through the 1980's. In 1987, some 1,300 tons of chemical products valued at 31 million francs [SF] were delivered to Iraq, whereas in 1989 the volume of those exports was 4,800 tons (SF95 million), according to the customs directorate.

By way of comparison, total Swiss exports of goods and services to Iraq came to SF311 million in 1989; machinery exports, amounting to SF189 million, made up the lion's share of the sales. Since imposition of the

Rabta

[Bessard] Is this initiative a result of the Gulf war and in particular the problems arising over chemical exports to Iraq?

[Godet] The DMF and the Federal Council did not wait until the Gulf war to begin tackling the job. Work was already under way in 1989. What started us thinking and convinced us of the need for a new law was the Rabta affair. (Editor's note: It was suspected that the manufacturing facility in Rabta, Libya, was capable of producing nonconventional weapons.) German firms were implicated in that affair and we knew the same thing could happen to industries in Switzerland. We therefore searched for some way to establish controls that could prevent countries trying to acquire biological or chemical weapons from purchasing equipment and technologies which were meant for civilian applications but which could also be used in the production of such weapons.

[Bessard] Is it really possible to establish and regularly update a list of products and suspected countries? Especially when the list would have to be accepted internationally?

[Godet] No international convention exists, at the moment. But efforts are being made, and concertation is taking place in several multinational fora. There is the "Australia Group," for example, which consists of about twenty industrialized countries; it issues directives to avoid sales to suspect countries of materials or technology that would help them build biological or chemical weapons.

[Bessard] Swiss chemical exports to Iraq have been growing since 1980. In 1989 the volume of those exports was 4,800 tons (95 million [Swiss] francs). They declined 59 percent in 1990, for obvious reasons. Is there a danger here?

[Godet] Since the embargo started, there have been no more exports, at least no legal exports. Nothing delivered before 7 August 1990 involved substances the exportation of which required a permit under the war materiel exports act.

[Bessard] But could some of those substances have been diverted from civilian use for military purposes?

[Godet] Normally not. Substances that are easily diverted require export permits. There are presently 17 substances that cannot be exported without a permit. The principle is this: Authorization must be requested for key precursors, in other words substances from which derivatives for military ends can be produced. Obviously, it is possible, using even more rudimentary substances, to manufacture the key precursors, which can then be used to make chemical weapons. But if we carry that argument to extremes, we would have to require permits even for the export of such simple substances as hydrogen, oxygen, and nitrogen. That is why the line has been drawn at key precursors.

[Bessard] When could the new law go into effect?

[Godet] Drafting is well under way. In fact, a rough draft has already been submitted to nongovernmental experts in the chemical and machine industry for review. If all goes well, we think the Federal Council should be able to send a bill to parliament toward the end of the year.