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NEAR EAST & SOUTH ASIA

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PATRIARCH VISITS OZAL, PRESENTS ISSUES CONCERNING ARMENIANS

Athens DROSHAK in Armenian 4 Mar 87 p 26

[Text] The 525th anniversary of the establishment of the Armenian Patriarchate of Istanbul was celebrated at the beginning of this year. The commemoration of the anniversary of the establishment of this national institution which has played an important role in the history of the Armenian people is undoubtedly an occasion for every Armenian for contemplating its past and future--specially the latter--particularly because the difficulties faced by the Istanbul Patriarchate inspire only pessimism about the situation imposed on the Armenian community in Turkey.

What we are referring to is the policy implemented by the Turkish government to usurp the human and national rights of the minorities in Turkey--a policy that casts a dark shadow on the future not only of the Patriarchate of Istanbul but of the Armenian community of Turkey as well. These acts of depriving the Armenian community in Turkey of its rights were brought to the attention of Prime Minister Ozal when Archbishop Shnorhik Kalustyan called on Ozal on 11 January 1987, by appointment, accompanied by Dr Garabed Arman, a counsellor.

The issues that were brought to the attention of the Prime Minister were as follows, according to a correspondent of MARMARA.

"A - Citizens of Armenian origin are being deprived of the religious and moral satisfaction of donating their immovable properties to their communal institutions.

"B - Properties donated to communal institutions after 1938 are being taken back [by the Muslim Directorate General of Vakifs].

C - [The community] is deprived of the right to build new buildings on vacant land that it owns. Similarly, the community is not allowed to improve property during repairs and thus raise its potential for revenue.

"D - During the election of the boards of administration for churches, the authorities are demanding that both the electors and the elected be residents of that particular parish. In view of the fact that there may be cases where very few parishioners may be left in the immediate vicinity

of a particular church, and the fact that a member of the board of administration of a church may--as often happens--move away from the parish even after being elected, it is requested that each church be allowed to have its own registered members in common with practice in other countries and that these members elect their own parish councils from among the membership of their church, irrespective of their area of residence.

"E - Armenian communal establishments have been asked to pay a tax known as the 'balancing tax' since the 1970s, despite the fact that this tax was repealed by the Turkish Grand National Assembly and this decision was published in the 'Official Gazette' in 1980.

"F - The current rents obtained from properties owned by communal establishments are ludicrously low. It is requested that Armenian communal religious trusts should be allowed to raise the rents of their properties, in the same manner that all religious trusts managed by the state were allowed to do just for once, to realistic lawful levels.

"G - School inspectors sometimes raise doubts about the ethnic identity of Armenian students, on the grounds that their religion has been entered as 'Christian' in their identity cards without specifying their denomination as 'Armenian,' and prevent them from registering at Armenian schools. What is more, this is done despite the fact that currently the registration of religious denomination in identity cards has been discontinued by a government decision.

"H - The 'catchment area' rule for state schools is being imposed on Armenian schools as well, despite the fact that the number of students at some of the [Armenian] schools keeps increasing--at, for instance, Bakirkoy and Yesilkoy--and, at some others, decreasing. As Armenian schools are 'private' schools, the rule should not be applicable to our schools.

"I - Classes in Islamic religious instruction have been introduced in both state and foreign schools as of this year. Non-Muslim children are also being compelled to attend these classes. It has been requested that non-Muslim children be exempted from being compelled to attend.

"J - At present, the Armenian Christian community in Turkey lacks any educational institution devoted to training clergymen. It is also against the country's laws to invite clergymen from abroad to hold office here; it is therefore requested that either the former seminary of the Holy Cross be restored to its function of a religious school or the Patriarchate be granted permission to open a religious training course to train those with the desire and vocation to become clergymen to prepare for their calling. Dr Arman also raised the case of the Armenian church in Kirikhan [in Hatay Province], pointing out that this church, its properties, church records and funds had been taken over by the Vakif Administration without any reason and despite the fact that there are 18 Armenians living in the region."

It is not too difficult to guess how sincere is the goodwill shown by Ozal to find an amiable solution to the problems in question. The two-faced policy of the Turkish government, characterized by generous dispensation of false promises coupled with doing nothing concrete, are well known. The proof of this lies in the fact that Istanbul MARMARA [in Armenian], citing a report in the Turkish CUMHURIYET, gives the bad news on 14 January 1987 that the 150 year old Armenian Church in Kayseri has been turned into a Turkish sports club.

And who knows how many more churches may be blown up, or turned into stables or clubs, by the time the demands of the Istanbul Patriarchate are met--if they are met at all....

13184/9190

CSO: 4605/21

VARIOUS INTER-ARAB ORGANIZATIONS FACE BANKRUPTCY

London AL-MAJALLAH in Arabic 3-9 Jun 87 pp 26-28

[Article by Talhah Jabril: "The Problems of Joint Arab Action Are Escalating: Arab Organizations Have Gone Bankrupt and Await the Coup de Grace"]

[Text] From the time the Arabs thought up a league which would embrace them, during the forties of this century, and this league was born, the preoccupation has been "to give joint Arab action concrete form in order to cope with the nation's crucial issues," and so forth.

We do not want to pose an obnoxious question on what has been achieved during this period in the context of this "joint Arab action." We might become buried under a rubble of answers and justifications flowing in a single direction. But what if we took an overview of the mechanisms for such action? What are meant here are those Arab organizations stretching from the Atlantic to the Gulf, which were engendered by the Arab League or emerged from organizations that are subsidiary to it.

What is going on inside these organizations from within? Why were they established? How are their conditions? What have they offered? Why are they suffering at present? What, moreover, will be their fate in the future, in the face of the conditions of common Arab action toward which ailments from anemia to high blood pressure, passing through rheumatism and obesity, have hurriedly made their way?

AL-MAJALLAH visited four Arab organizations in Rabat, just as an example, not restrictively, cast a glance at some of their files, and conversed with the people in charge of them. These are the Arab Organization for Mineral Resources, the Arab Organization for Social Defense against Crime, the Secretariat of Arab Ministers of Justice and the Arab Aviation Council.

The situation inside these organizations is not one of ash -- it is on fire! The common denominator of their troubles is the problem of budgets and the reluctance of the members, that is, the Arab countries, not to make payments, for varying reasons.

At the beginning we raised the question: What have these organizations offered since their establishment?

Mohamed Alaoui Mohamedi, director general of the Arab Organization of Mineral Resources, considered that this organization, in past years, since its establishment, has managed to realize the goals for whose sake it was established. He added, "The programs in the mineral sphere are long-range, and the saying which holds 'there is no limit to perfection and no end to virtue' applies to them. We have performed many activities but the most important of these perhaps is the geological map, a project which is considered a basic foundation for every mining project in the Arab nation. We have at present embarked on the completion of the final portion of this map. A number of papers have been printed which will soon be distributed among the Arab countries and universities, institutes and organizations so that benefit may be derived from them. We are proud of this work, which the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has financed, because for a quarter century the matter of carrying out an Arab geological map has remained a dream which has been common among people working in this field. We have managed to carry out the map in 4 years rather than 7."

Mohamed Mikou, secretary general of the Council of Arab Ministers of Justice, answered the question by saying, "In 1970 the Arab ministers of justice held their first conference in Rabat. During this conference, the goals and objectives on which the activity of the Arab justice ministers was focussed were set forth; therefore they agreed on a charter which they titled 'the Rabat declaration.' The ministers then held a number of sessions, in Riyadh, Baghdad, Casablanca and recently Amman. What have they achieved in the course of this? First of all the cooperation agreement, which was titled the Riyadh agreement, was signed; this is an agreement bearing on the accreditation of judiciary personnel, the exchange of information and the submission of documents. It also includes the execution of judiciary verdicts and the surrender of criminals. I personally consider that this agreement is one of the most important things the Council of Arab Justice Ministers has achieved. In addition, the council has brought about the issuance of the Arab magazine of jurisprudence and the judiciary, which is concerned with the heritage of jurisprudence and the judiciary. In the legislative area, the Casablanca statute has been carried out; this has the goal of developing and unifying Arab statutes and laws."

Hocine Hayaoui Hamache, secretary general of the Arab Aviation Council, said: "I believe that the most important achievement the council, which was established in 1969, has realized is the establishment of an academy to graduate specialists in all areas of Arab civil aviation and unify laws. The site of this academy is Amman, it has a board of directors and it has started working and coordinating among Arab institutes. However, the failure of its achievements to stand out can be ascribed to the reflection of the Arab situation on its condition. In addition, the council has set out a plan to consider the Arab nation a single air region, which is a very important decision since it removes the area of civil aviation from all regional political conflicts, although some problems obstruct execution because of Arab conditions."

Driss Dahhak, director general of the Arab Organization for Social Defense against Crime, began his response with a basic observation in which he stated, "The Arab Organization for Social Defense works in the context of

the League of Arab States. It is a specialized government organization which has the aim of strengthening cooperation among Arab member countries with the goal of effecting protection against crime, struggling against it and remedying its effects. This means that the organization is only an executive bureau for what the member countries decide upon." He went on to state, "This explanation is considered necessary so that the organization will not be viewed as if it were an agency independent of the member countries and could carry out the projects it deemed suitable. As to the projects the organization has carried out, one can say in general that the organization has carried out all the tasks assigned to it by the general assembly which represents all the member countries. Space does not permit a review of all the organization's achievements since its establishment more than a quarter century ago; by referring to the general assembly's documents we can learn about a large number of achievements the organization has carried out in the area of meetings, scientific studies, training courses or the strengthening of cooperation among member countries in the area of the organization's fields of specialization. In this regard it is sufficient to point out that under the aegis of the organization the two Arab interior and justice ministers' councils were established, which are considered two edifices of which the Arab nation may be proud, and important stages have been covered under the organization's umbrella in preparing the draft unified Arab criminal law and the unified Arab personal status law."

Can one talk about achievements without talking about means of execution? Three or 4 years ago, some or perhaps most Arab organizations started to suffer from a weakness in their financial resources. Here the explanations proliferate. People working in these organizations attribute this to the reluctance by member countries to pay their commitments, because of the financial and economic retrenchment. Officials in some Arab countries believe that the mechanism of Arab action has made the choice and embodiment of bilateral or regional cooperation mandatory, in place of comprehensive cooperation, and consequently it is no longer feasible to gamble on what the Arab organizations can offer! Why then do they bear the burden of the financial commitments?

In spite of the danger of this approach and thinking, there is no way to avoid saying that it has started to declare itself clearly. Here is another of the tragedies of joint Arab action, since while the countries of the world are becoming oriented toward "the formation of blocs and common interests and concerns," the Arabs are once again retreating.

Others believe that the cause of these organizations' financial vexations is spending on pomp and excess in view of the weakness of means of oversight.

What, however, do the directors of these organizations say?

Hocine Hayaoui Hamache, secretary general of the Arab Aviation Council:

"The Aviation Council carries out its daily activity in the areas of the development of work in the Arab region and relations with international organizations. However, because of the contraction in our financial resources, some of our activities have been reduced, such as the organization of

scholarly symposia for example. Last year, we organized only one symposium because of the scanty financial allocations. However, if the situation continues as it is it will be necessary to cover these activities by making deductions from the salaries of people working in higher positions, because we consider that the work is the basic thing. We have indeed made deductions from some salaries and have transferred these deductions to the scholarly symposia budget."

Mohamed Alaoui Mohamedi, director general of the Arab Mineral Resources Organization:

"It is sad that the planning for the work programs is done with people responsible for the mineral resources sector in the Arab countries and a special budget is allocated to each program for execution. However, upon execution, we cannot find the means, that is, the financial allocations. Therefore the aspirations exist and the means for action are almost absent. If we are to continue to survive, that can be attributed first of all to tenacity and second to the reduction of expenditures in the face of this situation. We apply the proverb that says if you do not have the means for your policy, you must apply the policy of your means. Consequently, our means are what our policy imposes upon us."

Driss Dahhak, secretary general of the Arab Organization for Social Defense against Crime:

"With respect to the financial situation, I would like to point out that the League of Arab States and the organizations operating in its framework are going through a financial crisis; this is something known to all and the media deal with it analytically from time to time. The organization, like other Arab organizations, is going through a financial crisis because of the delay by a number of member countries in paying their shares of the organization's budgets, although these budgets were approved by the countries themselves and when they were set out the financial condition of the member countries was taken into consideration, to the point where the organization's budget now comes to about \$500,000 a year this year, whereas it had approached \$2 million in the past. I believe that a budget of this size does not constitute a big burden for the member countries, since some countries' share comes to less than \$10,000 a year."

Mohamed Mikou, secretary general of the Council of Arab Ministers of Justice:

"During each session of the Council of Arab Ministers of Justice, the secretariat general submits the budget for approval, and on the basis of that the budget for the execution of projects is set out. I can assure you that all projects, meetings and symposia have been carried out, and I can say that obstacles are almost nonexistent. Perhaps the reason for that is that the Arab justice ministers firmly embrace this council."

While officials in the Arab organizations loudly voice complaints about the shortage and lack of means for execution, study of these organizations' budgets may perhaps make it possible to learn about other sides of the picture.

Mr Mohamed Alaoui Mohamedi, director general of the Arab Mineral Resources Organization: "Our annual budget at present comes to about \$1 million, and this was not the figure of 3 years ago. The proportion of this budget which is paid out is no more than 30 percent, a sum which is not enough to cope even with the salaries of experts in the organization. We at present have contributions which have accumulated amounting to about \$5 million, and are now suffering from a financial deficit which comes to about \$750,000."

On the same subject, Mr Driss Dahhak, secretary general of the Arab Organization for Social Defense against Crime, said:

"The organization's budget is paid by the member countries in accordance with the scale applied at the League of Arab States, by virtue of which shares are distributed among the countries in accordance with criteria which the league has approved. Since the organization is a league institution, it applies these criteria to the letter. All countries have promised to pay, but the share of the 1986 budget that was paid out amounted to 11.8 percent. This situation has made the organization resort to spending from reserves and has driven it to such extreme austerity that it has decided to pay out half the employees' salaries while waiting for its financial crisis to be resolved."

Hocine Hayaoui Hamache said:

"The Arab Aviation Council budget comes to \$600,000 a year. In recent years, the proportion of this budget that was paid out ranged from 70 to 80 percent, but in the last year the rate of payment dropped and came to 43 percent. In the face of this, we were compelled to make a large deduction from allocations with respect to employees, including cost of living allocations. We exempted administrators and low-level employees from this. One should bear in mind that the total number of employees in the Civil Aviation Council does not exceed 22!"

Mr Mohamed Mikou, secretary general of the Council of Arab Ministers of Justice, requested that we excuse him from answering the question related to the financial conditions of the council's secretariat general.

These then are the circumstances some Arab organizations are passing through. What might one imagine the causes for the member countries' failure to pay their contributions to and participation in these organizations' budgets to be? There is a need to register a basic observation, which is that officials in Arab organizations frankly admit that the only country that has committed itself to paying its share in full is the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

In this regard, Mohamed Alaoui Mohamedi said:

"We judge on the basis of externals, but the knowledge of what lies within lies with God. The externals are what happen during the councils of ministers or even in the wings, and that is that everyone is committed to paying their contributions, but when we ask them for an explanation about delays, they justify them by the lengthiness of administrative measures between the minister concerned, who is the minister of energy and mines, the minister of

oil or the minister of industry and mining, and the ministry of finance or foreign minister. Sometimes they justify the delay by the lack of availability of hard currency or the complications which the transfer operations bring about. Of course we exempt Saudi Arabia, Morocco, Kuwait and the Emirates from that."

Mr Hocine Hayaoui Hamache believed that the reason for some countries' failure to pay their commitments vis-a-vis the organizations could be attributed to the economic conditions the Arab region is going through, pointing out that a number of countries have informed the Council of Civil Aviation that there will be a delay in the payment of their contributions until their financial conditions are improved.

We will clearly note that during the frantic search for structures and vessels of Arab unity in which joint Arab action might flow, Arab organizations were engendered and proliferated to the point where they covered all areas, but now that the years of economic prosperity have lapsed, some of these organizations are no longer even able to pay employees' salaries, not to speak of carrying out the goals for which they were established, and large numbers of employees working in these organizations started to drain away in flight before the ship sank. What then is to be done?

There are only two solutions, as some experts propose. Either merge these organizations and cut down on them, in order to carry out the goals for whose sake they were established;

Or have the Arab countries take the initiative of making decisions to eliminate these organizations, since the wherewithal for their survival is no longer available and their immunity has been undermined because of the usual characteristics of time and the ailments of the Arab situation.

In either case, the question reflects an unfortunate, painful reality.

11887

CSO: 4404/414

REGIONAL

NEAR EAST

DROP IN OIL PRICES CAUSES REDUCTION IN UAE EXPORTS, IMPORTS

Riyadh AL-RIYAD in Arabic 8 Jun 87 p 13

[Text] Abu Dhabi -- QNA --During the past 5 years the value of UAE exports dropped by 54 percent, its imports dropped by 29.2 percent, and its trade balance surplus dropped by 65.3 percent.

A recent study by the UAE Industrial Bank attributed this reduction in the UAE's foreign trade to the reduction of the value of oil exports as a result of the drop in its prices from \$22 to \$23 per barrel last year.

The study points out the fact that the value of the state's exports last year totalled 37.2 billion dirhams compared to 69.98 billion dirhams in 1982 while the value of imports in 1986 totaled 24.6 billion dirhams compared to 34.8 billion dirhams in 1982. During the same period the balance of trade surplus dropped from 35.2 billion dirhams to 12.8 billion dirhams. UAE trade with the GCC states has shown remarkable improvement in the past 2 years. For example, UAE exports to the GCC states has increased from 670 million dirhams to 808.6 million dirhams, an increase of 20.7 percent, while imports from those countries dropped from 1.653 billion dirhams to 1.376 billion dirhams, a decrease of 22.8 percent. UAE exports to other Arab countries during the past year totalled 99.8 million dirhams compared to 66.5 million dirhams during the year before last, showing a 50 percent growth.

The study indicates that the West European countries occupy first place as recipients of UAE exports followed by Japan and the United States.

13305/9190

CSO: 4404/407

GCC STATES' COOPERATION URGED IN MARKETING INDUSTRIAL GOODS

Riyadh AL-RIYAD in Arabic 9 Jun 87 p 13

[Article by 'Abd-al-'Aziz al-Khudayri: "Study on Industrial Cooperation Calls for Setting up Gulf Institution to Market Industrial Goods"]

[Text] A study on industrial and trade cooperation in the GCC states affirms that industry has made great progress and developed remarkably, adding that following the discovery of oil an industry based on the exploitation of natural resources has emerged thus leading to a cultural and economic change in society.

The study points to the fact that moves are underway to diversify sources of income and strengthen the petroleum industry in the post-petroleum stage with the aim of reducing dependence on a single source of income. Industrial efforts by the GCC states have focused on two kinds of industries: The basic industries, which depend on gas as a source of energy and oil as a raw material. These industries require large capital and advanced technical equipment which are difficult for the private sector to obtain and which require major markets for their products. In terms of production volume these industries are divided into two categories. These are the basic industries with large production volume whose products are mainly intended for export abroad, such as the petrochemical industry and the chemical fertilizer industry, and the basics industries with medium production volume whose products are mainly intended for the local and regional markets, such as the cement, aluminum, nad iron and steel industries.

Kingdom's Exports Increase

The study confirmed that the kingdom's exports to the GCC states increased between 1980 and the beginning of 1982. The state of Bahrain is regarded as the Gulf's largest market for the kingdom's products. Despite the drop in the value of export to Bahrain during the period between 1981 and 1984, Bahrain continues to occupy this position because of the short distance between it and the kingdom, the transport facilities, low costs, and the existence of a large number of joint projects. The study adds that during the period between 1980 and 1982 increased but then dropped due to the drop of the value of imported goods and of the

existence of Saudi products similar to those imported, thus leading to a reduction in the volume of imports.

Development of Industrial Cooperation

The study draws a number of conclusions in the field of industrial cooperation and makes recommendations that will contribute to strengthening trade and bolstering marketing activities. These recommendations include:

-- Strengthening integration among the GCC states in order to exploit available resources in order to achieve industrial development objectives, particularly since the limited scope of the Gulf market and the duplication of industrial projects limits the possibility of local industries succeeding in each state separately.

-- Concentrating on exporting and emphasizing its importance in overcoming the limited scope of the local market by entering larger markets through the establishment of an export bureau. This could be undertaken by the GCC General Secretariat and the Council of Saudi Chambers in collaboration with the Ministry of Trade and Industry. The bureau is to provide information about foreign markets and the opportunities available and help factories overcome problems they encounter in exporting.

-- Establishing a marketing institution in order to market industrial goods within the GCC framework and setting up a specialized authority to define specifications and measurements for GCC imports that would be compatible with the specifications of local products in order to curb unfair competition between the local industries and foreign imports.

-- Linking research centers with production centers while paying attention to coordination and integration between these centers and concentrating on the major role the media could play.

-- Establishing a Gulf common market after conducting studies to define its nature, objectives, and activities. The first stage would be to establish a free trade zone allowing the freedom of movement of industrial goods without restrictions. This would be preceded by coordination and cooperation in the field of production to be followed by the establishment of a customs federation that would protect these products from foreign competition.

-- Establishing specific principles and common policies among the GCC states regarding the support these states would provide their exported products in order to achieve equal handling of commodities and to establish fair competition.

-- Seeking trade coordination and cooperation among the GCC states and the other Arab countries in order to expand the market for Gulf products. A common marketing strategy among the Gulf states would be established in order to achieve a negotiating advantage in the face of other economic blocs. Gulf and Arab projects would be increased in order to achieve

economic coordination and integration. Coordination is necessary in the fields of industries and export activities. It is also necessary to make the basic preparations among the GCC states in order to increase trade between countries of the region. The private sector should allocate part of its budget for research and should utilize the national expertise and consultative institutions in this field and take advantage of the available production components in reducing production costs. It should also coordinate among the Gulf states in the establishment of new industries and avoiding duplication and redundancy in order to give the state the opportunity to establish its industry especially since it enjoys a relative advantage over the West in terms of raw material, etc.

13305/9190

CSO: 4404/407

YOUNG ARABS REPLY TO POLL ON DEVELOPMENTS OF LAST 2 DECADES

London AL-MAJALLAH in Arabic 3-9 Jun 87 pp 12-16

[Article: "AL-MAJALLAH Polls the Generation of the Setback"]

[Text] Twenty years separate 5 June 1967 from 5 June 1987: 20 years which as far as the Arab world is concerned have become the subject of memories where such expressions pass through the mind as "defeat," "setback," "war," "tents," "refugees," "the 1973 war," "the 1982 invasion," "Camp David," "the Zionist occupation forces," "the enemy," "the traitor," "the martyr," "the hero" and so forth.

As far as those who were born in it go, the year 1967 was a point of departure. Between 1967 and 1987 an Arab generation was formed which today is 20 years old, a generation which in some years will be the future of the Arab world with its ideas, aspirations, complexes, fears, fragmentation, unity and hopes.

How does this generation think?

How does it view the present and future of the Arab world?

What does June 1967 represent to it?

What does it read and what is it influenced by?

What are its political and cultural priorities?

How does it define the concept of Arab-Israeli struggle?

What is the solution, as far as it is concerned?

AL-MAJALLAH has prepared a file on the June 1967 generation. This consisted of a file it put out in most Arab countries, from the far east to the far west, concentrating on people who were born in 1967. The answers in the poll came from the occupied West Bank, Egypt, the Sudan, Saudi Arabia, Morocco, Kuwait, Lebanon and some Arabs residing in London.

AL-MAJALLAH also spoke to politicians, writers, intellectuals and artists who experienced the June war and its consequences.

In the file AL-MAJALLAH also addressed itself to a book recently issued in Washington by the writer Cheryl Reunberg which deals with American policy in the Middle East and its effect on the June war and its results and observes in detail the 10 days which preceded the Israeli invasion and the secret American-Israeli contacts which took place at that time.

In its poll, AL-MAJALLAH based itself on 180 forms which it received from Egypt, Morocco, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the Sudan, the occupied West Bank, Lebanon, Iraq, Kuwait, Jordan, London and Paris.

Some of the forms amounted to a total contradiction with one another, especially the forms from the occupied West Bank and Egypt.

While 98 percent of the young Egyptians replied that their political priorities were Arab unity, 100 percent of the young people from the occupied West Bank replied that their political priorities were the termination of the occupation and resolution of the Palestine cause. The strange thing is that just 6 percent of all the young people among whom the poll was taken considered the Iraqi-Iranian war part of their priorities. With respect to Lebanon, the response was just 4 percent. The strange indicator in the poll was that 95 percent of the young Egyptians in the sample denied that the June war had affected the course of their personal lives. Ninety-five percent of them also considered that the Arab situation, politically and militarily, was better than it had been in June 1967, while 100 percent of the young people from the occupied West Bank considered that the June war had affected their personal lives and 70 percent of them considered the Arab situation politically and militarily worse than it had been in June 1967. As regards Security Council Resolution 242, the answers also assumed contradictory form; 100 percent of the young people in the bank opposed Resolution 242 while 95 percent of the young people from Egypt supported it.

The most serious prominent point in the course of the poll was the answer to Question 21 related to the best solution to the Arab-Israeli struggle. The final result was favorable to a peaceful solution by a ratio of 71 percent. This result included 50 percent of the young people of the occupied West Bank and 85 percent of the young Egyptians, while the largest share in support of a military solution through a comprehensive Arab war came from the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, and 2 percent of the young people considered that the declaration of a true holy war was the best means for resolving the Arab-Israeli struggle.

The most important indicators the poll produced included the loss of trust by the June 1967 generation in Arab writers and literary figures. Eight-five percent of the former considered that the Arab literary figures had not succeeded in the treatment of the subject of the June war, and the basic reason in their view was the lack of availability of complete, accurate information on the war.

In addition, the June generation, by a ratio of 76 percent, considered that the Arab media had failed in the treatment of the causes and results of the June war. In spite of that, we observe that 92 percent of this generation reads daily papers, while just 63 percent of it reads magazines. It appears that priority in reading books and magazines goes to cultural magazines and books, after which come religious books, then political books. This indicator is of importance with respect to the formation of the future thinking of the whole society.

In another area, we observe that 55 percent of the answers considered that the Arab military and political situation was better than it had been in 1967, but 84 percent of the answers stressed that the Arab summit conferences had not succeeded in setting out suitable policies for coping with the results of the June war. In addition, 70 percent of the answers considered that the October war made up for the Arab loss in the June 1967 war.

Peripheral to the poll, AL-MAJALLAH noted that 100 percent of the generation of the occupied West Bank considered that its curricula did not treat the causes of the June war, which of course is because of the Israeli enemy's control of the curricula in Palestinian schools.

It is noteworthy that 50 percent of the answers we received from the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia considered that their lives and political orientations had been affected by the June war. It is also amazing that 100 percent of the Kuwaiti answers concerning the question of the media's success in treatment of the June war and its results were negative. One should bear in mind that Kuwait in some people's view is considered one of the Arab countries that respect freedom of the press the most and there is a large share of daily papers and weekly magazines there relative to other Arab countries.

In addition, the Kuwaiti answers on the curricula were uniform and all, that is, 100 percent, denied that the curricula had succeeded in their treatment of the June war and the Arab-Israeli struggle.

With respect to priorities, one of the Kuwaiti samples stated that as far as it was concerned the priority was the unity of Kuwait.

Camp David and the 1967 Generation

Although the result of the poll showed that 71 percent of the young people were in favor of a peaceful resolution, 43 percent of them considered that Camp David did not constitute a basis for the resolution of the Arab-Israeli struggle. It is worth mentioning that although 50 percent of the forms from the bank were in favor of a peaceful resolution, 100 percent of these forms refused to have Camp David a basis for the resolution of the struggle and the forms from Kuwait bore the same percentage.

Non-Traditional Answers

In some places, the poll contained answers which were strange and at times non-traditional. One Saudi female university student replied to a question on the war's effect on her by saying that to her the war had had a bad effect on

her life in general and that she had gravitated toward rejection and violence and had taken a decision not to marry.

One of the forms contained a young person's answer on the possibility of a resolution to the Arab-Israeli struggle after 20 years as follows: "The struggle is on its way to resolution through capitulation."

One person in the sample said that his political priorities were "watching video movies."

After analyzing the options of the 1967 generation, interpreting its ideas and hopes and ascertaining its orientations, we can define some of its characteristics as follows:

1. The generation of the June war prefers political solutions to military ones.
2. It does not have confidence in the current Arab media.
3. It does not have confidence in modern Arab writers and literary figures.
4. It considers that its political culture is deficient.
5. It considers that the Arab summit conferences are failures.
6. We can describe it as supportive of Camp David.
7. Its most important political priorities are Arab unity, then the Palestine cause.
8. Its intensive reading is directed toward religion and literature, then politics.

A large part of it does not consider that the June 1967 war has affected its life.

We can describe it roughly as considering that the Arab-Israeli struggle is on the way toward a resolution.

This Is How the Moroccan Generation of the Setback Thinks

Morocco may be geographically remote from the land of the June 1967 war, but as part of the composition and makeup of the Arab world, the wind of the war and its interactions and consequences have reached it. There is a generation which we could call "the generation of the setback" in Morocco. AL-MAJALLAH's office in Rabat spoke to samplings of young Moroccans and polled them on their opinions and ideas. These are the results of the poll.

(Ratio of males, 43 percent, of females, 57 percent).

1. What does the June 1967 war represent as far as you are concerned?

- A. An Egyptian defeat: 13 percent.
- B. An Israeli aggression: 20 percent.
- C. A lesson from which benefit must be derived: 20 percent.
- D. An Arab defeat: 60 percent.
- E. Other: nil.

Observation: some considered it an Arab and an Egyptian defeat.

2. How do you view the state of the Arab world?

- A. Bad: 47 percent.
- B. Improving: 30 percent.
- C. United: nil.
- D. Fragmented: 37 percent.

Some of them considered it bad and fragmented at the same time.

3. Do you consider that the setback was a turning point as far as the Arabs go?

- A. Yes: 70 percent.
- B. No: 23 percent.
- C. Other: 7 percent.

If your answer was yes, was this a turn:

- A. For the better: 30 percent.
- B. For the worse, 40 percent.

4. Do the events taking place on the Arab stage concern you?

- A. Yes: 90 percent.
- B. No: 10 percent.

Moroccan Views

These are the views of some young Moroccans who took part in the poll of the 1967 generation:

Lahcen Oullal:

The year 1967 was the year in which the Arabs were defeated by the Israeli enemy.

The Arab world at present is very close to decline.

Akhraz Mohamed:

What is being observed on the Arab political stage is the absence of an important factor, which is concord and solidarity. Proof of the fragmentation is the Arab-Arab struggle the agitated areas are witnessing.

The events of various political, economic and social types in the Arab world interest me because these incidents have painful consequences for all of Arab society.

Latifa Boudouar:

Jamal 'Abd-al-Nasir was a figure who played a pioneering role in the Arab world and he held negative positions as well.

Khadija Nasser:

The setback was for a short period a turning point as far as the Arabs were concerned, and that is what is clearly apparent in the 1973 war.

Nadia Hafizi:

Arab artistic and cultural events concern me, but attention to political events is something that is not at issue as far as I go.

Abdel Rahim Malouki:

Who would imagine that he might challenge al-Sadat's visit, the Camp David agreements and the separate peace?

Economically, Arab consciousness has directed itself toward economic development, the attainment of development and the exploitation of resources, albeit under the umbrella of the Europeans.

Politically, there is political fragmentation and instability.

Allal Oukichen:

The 1967 war was a turning point because the Palestinian fighting figures came to prominence after it and also the Arabs for the first time managed to use the oil weapon in the 1973 war.

The events of the Arab world interest me as a young person because we are the ones who will bear the responsibility for this nation in the future.

Rachid Batour:

I am deliberately indifferent to events on the Arab stage.

Egypt: Some Events the 1967 Generation Lived through

The Arab summit in Khartoum, which resolved that there would be no peace, no recognition and no negotiation with Israel, August 1967.

The suicide of Marshal 'Abd-al-Hakim 'Amir, commander of the Egyptian army, September 1967.

The issuance of Security Council Resolution 242, 22 November 1967.

Demonstrations by students in Egypt in protest against the reduced sentences issued against the military leaders responsible for the defeat, February 1968.

The attempt to burn the al-Aqsa mosque, August 1969.

The first Islamic summit and establishment of the Islamic summit organization, September 1969.

The Rogers initiative and Egypt's acceptance of it, June 1970.

The clash between the Jordanian army and the Palestinian resistance and the signing of the Cairo agreement between the two parties, September 1970.

The death of Egyptian president Jamal 'Abd-al-Nasir, 28 September 1970.

Former Egyptian president Anwar al-Sadat's initiative to open the Suez Canal, February 1971.

Demonstrations by students in Egypt calling for war with Israel, January 1972 and January 1973.

The fourth Arab-Israeli war and the crossing of the Suez Canal, October 1973.

The agreement on the separation of Egyptian and Israeli forces, January 1974.

The agreement on the separation of forces on the Syrian front, June 1974.

The Arab summit in Rabat, which resolved that the Liberation Organization was the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, October 1974.

The decision to reopen the Suez Canal to shipping, June 1975.

The second agreement on the separation of forces on the Egyptian front, September 1975.

The six-party Riyadh summit to effect conciliation between Egypt and Syria and between the Liberation Organization and Syria, October 1976.

Al-Sadat's visit to occupied Jerusalem, November 1977.

The signing of the Camp David agreements, September 1978.

The Arab summit in Baghdad, which called for the severing of relations with Egypt in the event it insisted on making a separate peace with Israel, November 1978.

The signing of the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty, 26 March 1979.

The conference of Arab foreign and economy ministers in Baghdad, which resolved to sever diplomatic and economic relations with Egypt, 31 March 1979.

The exchange of diplomatic relations between Egypt and Israel and the commencement of normalization, February 1980.

The assassination of former Egyptian president Anwar al-Sadat, 6 October 1981.

The assumption of power in Egypt by President Mubarak, 14 October 1981.

The final Israeli withdrawal from Sinai, April 1982.

The Israeli invasion of Lebanon, June 1982.

Egypt withdraws its ambassador from Tel Aviv in protest against the massacres of Sabra and Shatila, September 1982.

The Fez Arab summit, which issued the Arab peace plan known as the Fez plan, September 1982.

The Palestine Liberation Organization's departure from Lebanon, September 1982.

Yasir 'Arafat visits Cairo for the first time since Camp David, December 1983.

Egypt's return to the Islamic summit organization during the Casablanca summit of Islamic countries, January 1984.

The restoration of diplomatic relations between Egypt and Jordan, September 1984.

The signing of the Jordanian-Palestinian agreement, February 1985.

Jordan freezes political coordination with the Liberation Organization, February 1986.

The Liberation Organization's decision to cancel the Amman agreement, April 1987.

The unification of the Liberation Organization at the Palestine national council in Algiers, April 1987.

Losses of the June 1967 War

From 5 to 10 June 1967, the Israeli enemy destroyed 400 Egyptian airplanes, 700 Egyptian tanks and three Egyptian submarines. It also destroyed 110 Jordanian tanks and occupied Sinai, the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, the Golan Heights and Jerusalem.

The number of killed, wounded and missing totalled the following:

Egypt, 20,000 killed and missing.

Jordan, 6,094 killed and missing.

Syria, 445 killed and 1,878 wounded.

The Israeli enemy, 1,872 killed.

Results of the Poll

Educational level: 100 university students.

Sex: 52 percent female, 48 percent male.

1. Do you believe that the year 1967 imparted a subsequent effect to your personal life?

A. Yes: 34 percent.

B. No: 66 percent.

2. If your answer was yes, how was the effect?

A. On your educational level: 6 percent.

B. On your political orientation: 18 percent.

C. Other: 3 percent.

D. On your family situation: 7 percent.

3. What are the priorities of your personal concerns?

- A. Political affairs: 18 percent.
- B. Cultural affairs: 9 percent.
- C. Academic education: 64 percent.
- D. Athletic activity: 9 percent.
- E. Other: nil.

4. Do you read the daily papers?

- A. Yes: 92 percent.
- B. No: 8 percent.

If your answer was no, what is the reason?

- A. Because they do not deal with the essential issues that interest me: 2 percent.
- B. Material reasons: 1 percent.
- C. Because time is not available: 2 percent.
- D. Other reasons: 3 percent.

5. Do you read weekly or monthly magazines?

- A. Yes: 63 percent.
- B. No: 37 percent.

6. If your answer was no, why?

- A. Because they do not deal with the essential issues that interest me: 6 percent.
- B. Material reasons: 2 percent.
- C. Because time is not available: 27 percent.
- D. Other reasons: 2 percent.

7. If your answer was yes, what are the preferred magazines, as far as you are concerned?

Political: 26 percent.

Scholarly: 14 percent.

Cultural: 16 percent.

Artistic: 7 percent.

Other: nil.

8. What are the books that you read?

A. Political: 21 percent.

B. Literary and Cultural: 38 percent.

C. Scientific: 14 percent.

D. Religious: 27 percent.

E. Artistic: nil.

F. Other: nil.

Political Questions

9. What are your political priorities?

A. The Palestine cause: 25 percent.

B. The Iraqi-Iranian war: 6 percent.

C. The Lebanese situation: 4 percent.

D. Arab unity: 64 percent.

E. Other: 1 percent.

10. What does 5 June 1967 mean to you?

A. An Arab defeat: 34 percent.

B. A setback: 25 percent.

C. A lesson from which benefit must be derived: 41 percent.

11. Do you believe that the results of the June war led to a positive transformation in the context of collective Arab action?

A. Yes: 69 percent.

B. No: 31 percent.

12. Do you believe that the June war achieved goals, as far as the Israeli party was concerned?

A. Yes: 65 percent.

B. No: 35 percent.

13. What in your opinion are the reasons for the June war?

A. Israel's desire to occupy more Arab territory: 45 percent.

B. The escalation of Arab power in a manner constituting a threat to Israel: 21 percent.

C. Israel's desire to realize political, military and economic goals: 33 percent.

D. Other: 1 percent.

14. How in your view is the Arab condition now that 20 years have elapsed since the war?

A. In a better military and political situation: 55 percent.

B. In a worse military and political situation: 31 percent.

C. In a situation similar to that which prevailed on the eve of the war: 14 percent.

15. What in your opinion were the reasons for the June defeat?

A. Israel's strength and military superiority: 4 percent.

B. The weakness and fragmentation of the Arabs: 53 percent.

C. The absence of a unified Arab strategy: 43 percent.

D. Other: nil.

16. What are among the most important results the June war yielded up?

A. The emergence of the Palestinian resistance as a basic factor in the Arab-Israeli struggle: 57 percent.

B. Assertion of the nationwide character of the struggle: 31 percent.

C. Arab self-examination and preparation to confront Israel: 9 percent.

D. Other: 3 percent.

17: Do you believe that the Arab summit conferences have succeeded in setting out appropriate plans for coping with the results of the June war?

A. Yes: 16 percent.

B. No: 84 percent.

18. What is your opinion regarding Resolution 242, which came in the wake of the June war?

A. In support: 42 percent.

B. In opposition: 58 percent.

19. If you are opposed to the resolution, what is the reason?

It does not provide a just solution to the Palestine cause and the Arab-Israeli struggle: 42 percent.

It requires amendments and additions: 5 percent.

It will lead to recognition of Israel: 11 percent.

Other: nil.

20. Now that 20 years have elapsed since the war, do you believe that the Arab-Israeli struggle is headed toward a solution?

A. Yes: 55 percent.

B. No: 45 percent.

21. What in your opinion is the best solution to the Arab-Israeli struggle?

A. Political solution: 71 percent.

B. Military solution through a comprehensive Arab war: 12 percent.

C. A comprehensive Arab war alongside the escalation of Palestine resistance operations: 11 percent.

D. Other: 2 percent.

22. Do you believe that the October 1973 war compensated for the Arab loss in the June war?

A. Yes: 70 percent.

B. No: 30 percent.

23. What is your assessment of the October 1973 war?

A. An Arab victory: 58 percent.

B. A partial Arab victory: 35 percent.

C. A further Arab defeat: 7 percent.

D. Other: nil.

24. Do you believe that Camp David constitutes a basis for resolving the Arab-Israeli struggle in a just manner?

A. Yes: 57 percent.

B. No: 43 percent.

Media, Culture, Education

25. Do you believe that the Arab media have succeeded in treating the June war and have treated its causes and results?

A. Yes: 24 percent.

B. No: 76 percent.

26. Do you believe that the curricula in your country have been successful in their treatment of the subject of the June war and the Arab-Israeli struggle in general?

A. Yes: 57 percent.

B. No: 43 percent.

27. The Arab motion picture industry has produced a number of movies on the June war. Have you seen any of these movies?

A. Yes: 51 percent.

B. No: 49 percent.

28. If your answer was yes, did these movies succeed in defining the causes and dimensions of the defeat?

A. Yes: 25 percent.

B. No: 26 percent.

29. Do you believe that Arab literary figures have been successful in treating the subject of the June war?

A. Yes: 15 percent.

B. No: 85 percent.

30. If your answer is no, why?

Because of their inability to express the dimensions of the defeat: 18 percent.

Because of the lack of freedom of expression in the Arab nation: 28 percent.

Because of the lack of complete, accurate information on the war: 39 percent.

Because of other reasons: nil.

31. If your answer is yes, who in your opinion is the favorite writer or poet dealing with the subject of the June war?

Nizar Qabbani: 3 percent.

Mahmud Darwish: 4 percent.

Muhammad Hasanayn Haykal: 4 percent.

Yusuf Idris: 1 percent.

No answer: 89 percent.

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UNRWA CHIEF DISCUSSES ACTUAL REFUGEE, CAMP CONDITIONS

Jerusalem AL-BAYADIR AL-SIYASI in Arabic 16 May 87 pp 36-38

[Interview with Bernard Mills, Director of UNRWA Gaza Operations, by Muhammad al-Mashukhi: "A Conversation with Bernard Mills, Director of the Agency's Operations in the Gaza Strip"]

[Text] The United Nations Refugee Aid and Employment Organization began its operations in the Middle East in May 1950 to provide emergency aid to the Palestinians who had been uprooted 2 years before that time. It came into being through a resolution issued by the United Nations General Assembly in December 1949 so that the agency could play its part until a solution was found to the Palestinian problem by providing basic aid services and health and education to the refugees.

As a result of the diaspora, the agency had its activity in five central areas of refugees, Lebanon, Syria and Jordan in addition to the occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip; these included 61 camps and more than 2 million Palestinians. Working in the agency are about 17,500 employees and it runs 643 primary and preparatory schools and vocational training and teacher's training centers comprising about 354,000 students. In the area of health it runs 98 health centers and 94 nutrition centers, and in the area of aid it offers social assistance to about 110,000 refugees.

The Gaza Strip occupies second place after Jordan in terms of the number of registered refugees; their number comes to close to 437,000 in the Strip, that is, 21 percent of all refugees. Fifty-five percent of them are apportioned among eight camps and the remainder are in the strip's towns and villages. About 77,000 pupils and students are studying in 145 primary and preparatory schools and vocational training centers and there are about 20 clinics and nutrition centers.

The Director of the Agency's Operations

The director of the agency's operations in the strip, Mr Bernard Herbert Mills, 54, British by nationality and unmarried, completed his service in the British army in 1964 then worked in Saudi Arabia before becoming director of the fund to save the children in Nigeria, then representative to the

international federation of children's aid in Nigeria, Pakistan and Bangladesh, then representative of a commercial bank in the Middle East.

Mills began working for the agency at the end of 1982, assisting the refugees as principal official in the greater Beirut area for a period of 4 months, during which he participated in rebuilding the camps of Shatila, Burj al-Barajinah and Mar Ilyas after the massacres and destruction to which they had been afflicted. After that, he worked as a director of aid services in Jordan, then volunteered to come back to Lebanon in 1983 to work as an assistant to the agency's general director in southern Lebanon and the person in charge of operations in the area Israel was occupying. He remained for about 16 months until the end of 1985, when he was compelled to leave Lebanon in accordance with his government's request following the kidnapping of the Britisher Alec Collick, who was an official in the agency. He went to Jordan to work as deputy director of operations, then in the beginning of November 1986 came to the strip to work as the aid agency's director of operations and UNRWA's representative in the republic of Egypt.

We met with Mills in his main office in Gaza, in a modest attempt to discuss some questions circulating in people's minds from time to time concerning the aid agency and its goals and services.

[Question] Your service to the Palestine refugees began in Lebanon and now it is in the Gaza Strip. What are the various features of the similarities and differences in the refugees' circumstances?

[Answer] When I was in Lebanon the southern region was under Israeli occupation and there was a similarity between what was going on there and what was going on in the occupied areas. However, the conditions which existed in Lebanon, in the south or in the Beirut area, were dangerous in terms of security for the Palestinian refugees though economically they were better. The Lebanese pound, for example; a dollar equalled 16 pounds. Now, however, the dollar comes to 116 pounds. However, the basic problem during my presence in Lebanon was the issue of security. The Palestinian refugees were trapped between the Israelis and the Shiites. In the rest of Lebanon, the refugees were besieged by struggles among the conflicting Lebanese entities and the security problem was paramount. Now, however, I might add the economic problem to this because of the deteriorating conditions there. Here the refugees and inhabitants are suffering from the presence of the occupation forces in addition to the difficult economic conditions. There is some similarity. The conditions of the refugees in Lebanon are worse, especially from the economic standpoint.

[Question] Studies have proved that the number of refugees actually requiring the agency's aid in the strip is several times greater than the number benefitting at present. What keeps them from being helped? What actual steps have you followed to achieve that?

[Answer] I know full well that there are a large number of needy persons in the strip because of conditions, and I have addressed this subject in my meeting with the village heads. However, because of the current severe standards in accordance with which the agency takes account of difficult

conditions meriting aid, we are trying to overcome this problem in a number of ways. For example, this year we have managed to increase the number of needy cases to which aid is being disbursed by 5,000, and this now totals 35,000. Next year we will add another 5,000 so that the cases will come to 40,000. We hope that they will rise this year and next to a large number.

As part of the steps that have been taken to this end, we have increased the number of social research workers so that we can perform the work in a better, more rapid fashion and continue with it in order to improve these difficult cases.

Mr Mills added, "Granting financing to families does not mean remedying the problem or raising its level. The director of aid services here is an energetic lady, speaks Arabic and knows the customs of the Arabs. She is Anj Tanir. The problem is not giving them food but real aid, studying the cases, studying the resources of the other organizations for helping the refugees and presenting these studies to the organizations. I am trying to help the needy cases whose conditions do not meet the criteria in effect with the agency and we are trying to increase the number of beneficiaries who can rely on themselves."

[Question] What are the results of the meeting which took place last month in Vienna? What is new with regard to the refugees?

[Answer] It was an ordinary meeting. We meet four times a year in Vienna with the heads of departments, the general commissioner and my colleagues the directors of the regions.

However, what is new is the construction of a new clinic to replace the old one in Gaza; it will be up to date, have better resources and cost \$450,000. A discussion took place on improving the schools. They were not part of our future plans and they have now been included and agreement has been made to them -- for instance, supplying the preparatory schools with libraries, laboratories and multi-purpose rooms. I have also managed to increase the number of beds in the national hospital from 20 to 30 and have been able to expand the agency's plans in the Gaza Strip over what those for the coming years had been.

[Question] The reasons for the policy of reducing the agency's services are often presented with the argument that the countries fail to pay the contributions they offer. How is this? Is there a relationship between the agency's support for refugees and the Jordanian development plans?

[Answer] This year the contributors provided us with the entire budget required for the two most important sections, which are employees' salaries and the repair of basic equipment, which we must have the money to cover. The share of this money must increase to be in keeping with the natural population increase, which ranges from 10 to 12 percent a year. However, if we obtain greater money than is required, that will facilitate our work. It happens sometimes that a contributing country commits \$5 million then does not carry through with payment of this sum.

Concerning the agency's relationship to the Jordanian development plans, there is no relationship between UNRWA and the Jordanian development plans. Do not believe that America's UNRWA budget is influenced by the Jordanian development plan.

[Question] Which of the Palestinian refugees' five areas holds first place in the agency's aid after Lebanon? Why?

[Answer] The Gaza Strip comes after Lebanon. Do not ask me why. The director in meeting with the general commissioner always emphasizes Gaza and the general commissioner gives Gaza priority after Lebanon.

[Question] What is the future of the plan to employ university graduates, especially since you give close to 350 university persons an opportunity to serve a period of 2 years in the agency's schools and they are certainly helping alleviate the burdens on the agency, all the more since news has circulated concerning the agency's placing of obstacles in the way of its continued execution?

[Answer] We are now involved in a study of that with specialists, and we have been asked to increase the number of university graduates to 400. This is out of the question, since our schools cannot absorb this number. It will lead to a contrary result for the students and will also lead to deterioration in the educational level. It will be possible to give them an opportunity to work in the preparatory schools. We have just 40 schools, for fifth and sixth primary only. I am prepared to absorb 200 university graduates, three graduates for each school, and the rest for fifth and sixth primary. I will absorb 200 graduates of agency institutes. These people have practical expertise in teaching. They have learned to be teachers in the agency's schools and it is possible to absorb them easily in the agency's schools.

We absorb university graduates so that they can acquire teaching expertise, and there are plans to develop the teaching system for children. When there were 360 university graduates in the past this system was not a success, especially in the education of primary level pupils. I am prepared, if a suitable plan is set forth to train graduates of the trade and business management faculties, to absorb another 50 to obtain practical expertise by distributing them to the offices to receive expertise for a period of a year. Of course this will be in the case a reasonable plan is set out. I know the graduates' problem well and I am prepared to offer them services so that these will be useful and will not inflict harm on the agency. I sympathize with them.

[Question] There have been numerous visits by delegations to the strip and the agency recently. What are their goals? Will they bring benefit to the refugees? How?

[Answer] I greatly encourage delegations and visitors to come to the strip. This was the first decision with respect to the policy I will follow here. I do not imagine that anyone can understand the Palestinian problem without being aware of the circumstances of life in the Gaza Strip. Visitors have come and left the strip sadder, more sympathetic and more aware of the problems of

the inhabitants and responsive to the agency's requests. When visitors and delegations come, we always try to introduce them to figures from the strip and representatives of the people to meet with them. The practical response to these visits normally occurs a few months after the visit. For example, the government of The Netherlands increased the value of its donations to the agency's general budget and contributed \$400,000 to facilities in Gaza. We expect that we will receive \$1 million from the Sida international development organization to rebuild and develop schools. The European economic group will contribute the sum of \$1.2 million over the period of the next 2 years for the vocational training program, and there are many other things which we anticipate following these visits.

[Question] Some refugee camps, for instance block five in Rafah, X and C in Jabaliya and the al-Nusayrat camp, and so forth, are subject to demolition by the authorities preparatory to the transfer of refugee inhabitants in them to new settlement projects. What steps will the agency take to help these refugees? Why doesn't the agency depart from the role of mere overseer, for instance accompanying visitors to inform them of the camps and refugee affairs?

[Answer] With every demolition operation we file suit with the competent Israeli bodies and so far as I know the dwellings have not been subjected to demolition for a long time. This is like a war of nerves. The agency is trying to do what it can to maintain the refugees' condition and rights, but ultimately the power is not in our hands. We always accompany the visitors to the camps and show them the sensitive areas in the camps. At every meeting that takes place with the head of the civilian administration or the contact officer, I try to raise this problem, but they tell me no demolition plan exists.

[Question] The salaries of the people working in the agency in the strip are low in comparison with the equivalents in the other areas, especially with their conversion to the shekel and the Israeli Bank, although the source of financing is the same. Does this lie within a special policy on the part of the agency?

[Answer] The problem of salaries is not a big one. The problem will be surveyed in a full manner here and on the West Bank. The problem of salaries was of importance in Lebanon because of the drop in the pound and economic conditions, and we took the necessary measures to solve it there. The same problem then arose in Syria, and we also took measures to solve that. The general commissioner has decided to make a survey of this problem in Jordan, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, and after that we will see how far the problem of salaries has been remedied.

[Question] Teachers at a school belonging to the agency in Rafah presented a complaint to you on an assault against them by occupation troops. What has been the fate of this complaint? What is your opinion about such assaults on people working in an organization belonging to the agency and under your management?

[Answer] We are very sorry about any attack against any employee belonging to the agency, by the occupation authorities or by any person, and in the event such a problem occurs with the authorities we file suit with the head of the civilian administration. Any other attack on any employee from the agency I treat with the same seriousness, whether it is by the occupation authorities or any other citizen. The agency's employees are exerting all their efforts to serve the refugees and they need help from all bodies, the authorities and the people. I sent a special letter, sent to Shayki Erez, the head of the civilian administration, in this regard, but they usually do not reply in writing to our letters!

[Question] Some people criticize the agency's position of choosing people other than refugees in some cases for positions, although the number of applicants among the refugees is large and the opportunity for selection is also greater. What is your answer to these people?

[Answer] When we make appointments we appoint refugees, and if we do not find competent persons we appoint people other than refugees. In the agency's policy here and in the other regions, priority is given to the refugees. We employ some people who are not refugees if we cannot obtain competent persons from among the refugees. I have the responsibility of providing the best service to the refugees, and therefore there are some instances that are not refugees, but ultimately they are Palestinians.

[Question] If we consider that the massacres of Palestinians have been a way of reducing the agency's burden of expenditures, what means are there in the event the peoples of the world reject such a method against a dispersed people, in your view?

[Answer] Let me excuse myself from answering because that is a political question.

[Question] What are the positive elements the agency offers the refugees, which they deny? What are the negative elements for which the agency is criticized, which you deny?

[Answer] We are often subjected to criticism because many of our services have been reduced. In the Gaza Strip specifically we have not reduced our services; indeed we are maintaining them. In fact, we are trying to improve them, especially in education and health. With respect to health, we offer hospital treatment service which is better than the past and service that is more appropriate as far as specialized doctors go, especially in the area of respiratory and eye diseases. We hope with the end of the coming year that we will have statistics regarding obstetric and gynecological diseases in order to provide a better opportunity for the treatment of diseases in the agency's clinics. At the present time we are offering nursing service to serve society in many of the refugee camps, and we will provide facilities for old people who visit the agency's clinics so that they can come at any time that is suitable for them for treatment in the clinic without delay or the imposition of burdens upon them.

[Question] What are your ambitions which you would like to realize to serve the refugees in the strip, especially during your period of work, which would be recorded as an accomplishment of yours?

[Answer] If I can offer services the way Hawkins, my predecessor, offered them, I will be happy, and if we can develop the services we offer I will be happier. If we offer social services for the refugees I will be very happy. If I see any peaceful solution for the Palestinians in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, I will be very, very, very happy.

11887

CSO: 4404/412

TABA ARBITRATION BOARD MEMBER DISCUSSES ISSUE

Cairo AL-AHRAM AL-DUWALI in Arabic 23 Jun 87 p 3

[Article: "Taba Represents a Challenge to Egypt. The Egyptian Team Was Not Surprised by Topics Mentioned in Israeli Memorandum"]

[Text] AL-AHRAM AL-DUWALI's conversation with Dr Nabil al-'Arabi, chairman of the legal department in the Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, concentrated on the legal developments in the Taba region, which Israel wants to claim, arguing before the Board of Arbitrations that Taba is not an Egyptian territory!

Dr Nabil al-'Arabi, the Egyptian representative to the board of arbitration which was formed to issue a judgment on Taba, touched on the historic, geographic, and legal aspects of the case which Dr Wahid Ra'fat, God rest his soul, prepared while preparing and guiding the Egyptian defense committee.

The director of the legal department of the foreign ministry also clarified the Egyptian position on two other questions, namely the "international peace conference" and disarmament issues.

About the Taba issue and related developments, Dr Nabil al-'Arabi said that Taba represented a kind of challenge to the Egyptian foreign ministry. The ministry did not limit its treatment of the problem to the confines of international law or to Egyptian-Israeli relations or UN resolutions, but dealt with the problem in its historic framework as well.

Dr al-'Arabi added: "We went back to the past to study Egyptian government files during all the various time periods, be it the time of Egypt's official submission to the Ottoman state or subsequent eras during the mandate, post-World War II, the 1956 and 1957 Israeli withdrawal, or the peace treaty."

Dr al-'Arabi went on to say: "There was an urgent need to conduct an in-depth survey of Egypt's modern history. We went back to various matters, from the time of Muhammad 'Ali and the Khedive. This required a great effort by the Egyptian team that contributed to these topics, be they prominent legal specialists led by the late honorable Wahid Ra'fat, or professors of geography and history or defense ministry representatives, especially those from the Military Survey Agency."

"Moreover," said the director of the legal department, "the foreign ministry team that cooperated with me did everything it could to explain that right is on our side."

[Question] Deputy prime minister and foreign minister Dr Ahmad 'Isamat 'Abd-al-Majid affirmed that the Israeli memo Egypt received last May 13 did not contain any surprises. Is this due to articles "Kimhi" wrote in British and Israeli newspapers during the negotiations, and his subsequent participation in preparing the Israeli memo?

[Answer] Without exaggeration, I say that all the topics discussed in the Israeli memo were known to us for various reasons, including the fact that the Israeli delegation had gone into these topics during the negotiations. Furthermore, John Kimhi, the Jewish British journalist who made a positive contribution to the preparation of the Israeli memo, had submitted the topics of articles he had written in the British and Israeli press to the British Journalist Union Board. He was compelled to defend his opinions and submitted a pro forma memorandum on all topics, and we obtained a copy of it.

[Question] As a representative of the Egyptian government to the board of arbitration in Geneva (in addition to your duties as Egypt's ambassador to the UN in the Swiss capital), what were the delicate stages of developments in the Taba issue before the board of arbitration, up to the point when the final decision on the matter was issued?

[Answer] The stipulation signed last September 11 said that "should the two parties fail to agree on a date for implementation within 21 days from the issuance of this judgment, they must go to court to obtain a judgment on this matter."

If we assume that Egypt was in disagreement with Israel over the date of implementation--for example, if Egypt demanded Israel's withdrawal within 3 months, while Israeli demanded withdrawal within a year or more--then the only thing we can do is go back to the court and the court would decide.

[Question] I would like to ask you about your expectations as to when the decision might be issued.

[Answer] The issuance of the decision is linked to many things, among them the submission date of the second memorandum. We expect this to occur next October 12, but nonetheless, there is still a likelihood that one of the two sides may ask for a postponement.

If neither side asks for a postponement, then, following the submission of the second memorandum, we will begin to form a chamber to try to find a solution acceptable to both parties. The chamber will be in session for 2 weeks.

Should any of the two sides reject all solutions, oral arguments will begin and will last for 2 months, during which time visits will be made to the "border" markers. At the end of the oral arguments, the case will be postponed until judgment within 3 months, in which case I expect the decision

to be handed down next spring because the court may take more or less than 3 months to reach a decision.

We always set a date for submitting memoranda, for so long as the two sides are addressing the court, it would be improper to expect the court to hand down its decision within 3 months because the court could shorten or prolong this period.

Therefore, there is no fixed date for handing down a decision. Consequently, my expectation is that the decision will be issued next spring.

[Question] Can you acquaint us with the efforts Egypt has made to obtain documents and records that serve the Egyptian cause? Have Egyptian archives been lax in this regard?

[Answer] We have surveyed all the historic documents and records in several countries. This momentous job was supervised by Dr Yunan Labib Rizq, an 'Ayn Shams University professor, in cooperation with the Egyptian team. We turned to British archives and Ottoman archives. Turkey cooperated with us fully, and we obtained maps and several documents from the Library of Congress in Washington, and historical documents from other countries.

I would like to commend a number of Egyptian citizens who brought forth to the Egyptian foreign ministry historical documents and maps their families had in their possession.

I give special mention here to the families of the late Major General Fu'ad Sadiq and the late Major Gen Kamil Gabriel, who offered documents of great value. I also make mention of Dr Wahid Ra'fat's archives that contained files of great significance.

On another matter, that of the international peace conference, the director of the legal department of the foreign ministry said that there has to be an agreement on the rules of the game. There has to be congruity in the international will of the concerned parties, including a kind of congruity among the superpowers.

He said that agreement on these matters is non-existent and endeavors are still being made; the Egyptian government and Ministry of Foreign Affairs are in constant contact with a number of countries and all concerned parties.

He went on to say that "efforts to explore the points of agreement are ongoing, but I do not imagine that we have reached a point where we can say that the convening of an international conference is imminent or that it will happen in the near future." He added: "I think that the matter is too weak to warrant such a belief."

About another matter concerning Egypt's policy toward the question of disarmament, Dr al-'Arabi said that the center of disarmament activity is in Geneva, since the UN in New York takes up negotiations and agreements concluded in Geneva.

He said that all attempts by the third world, including Egypt, are aimed at the entire international community, and the superpowers specifically, to arrive at agreements defining and regulating disarmament.

At the beginning of the interview, Dr al-'Arabi paused in fond memory of the father of Arab constitutions, the late Dr Wahid Ra'fat, who the director of the legal department said played a super role in preparing the Taba case during the negotiations to arrive at the "arbitration stipulation" up until his death last May 12, when he was at the head of the Egyptian defense committee in Taba.

Dr al-'Arabi said in a voice filled with emotion: "We all miss Dr Wahid Ra'fat and cannot imagine that we will fill the void left by him.

"Dr Wahid Ra'fat used to say about the Taba issue: 'It is a subject of special concern to me because I was born in 1906, the same year in which the Taba crisis came into being.'

"He also used to say: 'Taba is more of a historical and geographical issue than a legal one.'"

12502

CSO: 4504/271

ISLAMIC THINKER CALLS FOR TRUE DEMOCRACY, NEW CONSTITUTION

Cairo AL-WAFD in Arabic 11 Jun 87 p 16

[Article by Khalid Muhammad Khalid: "For God...and Freedom. Enjoy the Bad, for the Worst is On its Way!"]

[Text] Toward the end of World War II, a clever joke was making the rounds among the military in the battlefields and the civilians around the cities of the world.

This "wisecrack" or joke said: "Enjoy the war, for peace is on its way." The cleverness of this good-natured funny joke stemmed from peering into the political and economic problems of peace awaiting the world the moment the war ended.

These tough problems which the warriors and the people envisaged were more dangerous and enervating than the war itself, so they began calling out to each other: "Enjoy the war, for peace is on its way!".

In these days of ours, with the clamor and commotion of crazy violence, this expression, so caustic in its derision and irony as it is in its wit and rendition, was jarred from my memory, and I told myself, or it told me: "Today seems so much like yesterday." Then I found myself telling my people: "Enjoy the bad, for the worst is on its way." Wretched be they who put out the fire with flame throwers--assuming that there is a fire to put out other than the one they ignite to fill this peaceful country with smoke and conflagration.

The matter, dear sirs, is that some people have contravened legitimacy in shameless disdain, donning the judicial robe and usurping the rights of the judicial and executive powers. In the dark of night or in the darkness of their souls, they handed down judgments in absentia without questioning or notifying the defendants, notwithstanding that these misguided sentences are the closest criminal penalties to a death sentence which is carried out by the "judges of darkness" themselves.

And whereas Hasan Abu Pasha was sentenced to death by those judges of heedlessness and darkness on the pretext that he practiced or ordered the practice of torture, this charge has not gone beyond the realm of rumors and has been rejected by a prosecutor whose reliability, integrity, and courage in

fulfilling his responsibilities has been vouched for by most if not all of the people!

This prosecutor is the one who ordered the lifting of parliamentary immunity from Hasan Abu Pasha, the one who questioned him personally or ordered a hearing under his supervision, and the one who returned indictments against 44 officers of various ranks, [all this] while refusing, being trustworthy, honest and valiant, to indict the person the "judges of darkness" were determined to assassinate with their blessed bullets that did not lodge in one place of the target's body but strew their abundance all over it with noble generosity. I say: if the motive behind the attempt on the life of Major General Abu Pasha is the alleged punishment, what was the motive behind the attempt on Makram Muhammad Ahmad? Did he commit the crime of torture as well? I doubt that Makram Muhammad Ahmad has scared a cat in his entire life.

The only explanation for taking away his life from its Creator is to stop him forever from expressing his opinion and proclaiming his convictions, and to make him an example for all writers to heed!

It is a damn shame and an impending evil. Nonetheless, we would do well to call out to one another: "enjoy this evil, for worse is on its way!" Some of you might say: "God forbid."

And I ask you: "How do you know it is not the will of God, the Arbiter, the Justice, the Watcher, and the Reckoner?"

Pray tell if you are truthful:

-- Who will bring about better and more ideal conditions? With what gentle breeze will the winds of tranquility, safety, and compassion blow?

-- Will it be the "luxury novelists?"

-- Or the "whining press?"

-- Or the self-perpetuating rulers?

-- Or the parties that are suffering from a chronic cold that has robbed them of their sense of smell?

-- Or the people who are "above the law"?

-- Or the people who are "under the law"?

-- Or those who undermine the judicial system by delaying its pronounced judgments and make light of its position?

How strange it is that all are disciples, as they see themselves. Who then is "Judas?"

How strange it is that all are crying. "Who then stole the Qur'an?", as al-Hasan al-Basari said when he looked at the people gathered around him during

his sermon with tears of joy in their eyes and looked for his favorite Qur'an but could not find it: "It is strange that you are all crying. Who then stole the Qur'an?"

I do not want to dwell on this.

God Almighty knows what writers go through by swallowing this burning mixture of pressure and pity while following the miserable events in these miserable days.

But it would be foolish, stupid and useless to end this discourse before it comes to its proper conclusion.

I will sum up this conclusion in a few fleeting words:

Gentlemen: All those who are concerned about Egypt and all those who fear God in heaven and on earth.

O, you passengers of one ship, and the target of those who are conspiring against your present and your future, abroad more so than at home, and those who are lying in wait for Egypt and the Egyptians: men, women, youth, children, and even fetuses!

This is the way it is:

1. So that society may be safe and stable, its people must be free.
2. So that the people may be free, they must be governed by authority and not domination.
3. The difference between authority and domination is that the former is the fruit of legitimacy and the latter is the product of insurgency and subversion.
4. The authority's legitimacy is drawn from a constitution dictated by "altruism" rather than "egoism" and "right" rather than "whim", and by laws that render the nation and state equal in rights and responsibilities.
5. This can only be achieved under true consummate democracy.
6. This requires the entire nation, and the state with all its agencies, to rally around a "holy pact" that determines the fundamentals and particulars of a system of rule patterned after the western democracy, which is exactly what the Shura in Islam represents.
7. After such a pact or historic document is formulated, a referendum would be held provided that all the guarantees of sovereignty, power, and continuity are incorporated in it whereby any contravention, at present or in the future, becomes an act of treason.
8. Using all the powers of persuasion and guidance, we will mobilize the people's manliness and loyalty so that they will not languish before any coup

or violence the pact rejects and so that their pact may be their "political religion" commanding no less loyalty than their "revealed religion."

Such a pact would then be placed on all the leadership rostrums in Egypt: the legislative, the judicial, and the executive, and would be a basic course at all levels of education.

9. When we agree to change or amend the existing constitution, the document in its entirety must be in the forefront and, indeed, must be an inspiration to the constitution in the event of change or amendment, and all our laws must derive their identity, existence and legality from it.

What will happen if we do this?

We will become one united nation safeguarded by governmental as well as societal democracy. We will have created a "cause" that captivates us with its loftiness and draws us away from our desires and whims, a cause and that grows on its beautiful towering stalks the flowers of our lives and the joys of our struggle.

We will then block every foolhardy coup, for it will be, regardless of its identity, in flagrant and criminal defiance of the entire people, a people who entrusted their hopes, rights, destiny, and fate to this pact that reaffirmed their stability and guaranteed them all the aspirations of a free, magnanimous, noble people.

A consensus by the political forces on a pact such as this will underscore their real affiliation with freedom and democracy. But the people's approval through a free referendum will accord all of us, including the pact, total unanimity which will make it very difficult for any renegade to renounce it or for any robber to rob the nation of its freedom.

This is if we act.

What if we do not act?

The answer lies in the title of this article.

When will we act, you might ask?

I say right now, before now is no more!

12502

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RESTRUCTURING OF LEGISLATIVE SYSTEM ADVOCATED

Cairo AL-I'TISAM in Arabic Jun 87 pp 37-38

[Article by Kamal Khalid al-Muhami: "Open Letter to Judges' Club: Constitutional Flaw Marring People's Assembly, Shura Council and Local Councils"]

[Text] Article 29 of the Supreme Constitutional Court Law No 48 of 1979 stipulates the following:

The court (the Supreme Constitutional Court) shall assume judicial oversight regarding the constitutionality of laws and bylaws as follows:

A. Should a court or a competent judiciary panel, in the course of a hearing, deem a provision of a law or a bylaw intrinsic to the settlement of the conflict unconstitutional, the hearing shall be brought to an end and the records referred, without fee, to the Supreme Constitutional Court for a ruling in the constitutional case.

B. Should a litigant in the course of a hearing before a court or a judicially competent panel challenge the constitutionality of a provision of a law or bylaw, the hearing shall be adjourned and the petitioner shall, within three months, be given the opportunity to file a lawsuit with the Supreme Constitutional Court. Should such a lawsuit not be filed within the prescribed period of time, the challenge shall be deemed invalid.

This provision is a clear indication that Egyptian lawmakers have entrusted the judges of the various courts and judicially competent panels and no one else with constitutional oversight, and appointed them all, without exception, the sole judges of the substantiality or unsubstantiality of any challenge to the constitutionality of any law or bylaw!

This responsibility obligates the judges to oversee the enforcement of all Supreme Constitutional Court principles and decisions on the unconstitutionality of any laws or bylaws, not to mention binding all of them to the provisions of Article 49.1 of the Supreme Constitutional Court law stipulating the following:

A. The court's rulings and expository decisions in constitutional cases shall be binding upon all state authorities and all others without exception.

I say, however, in honor of the oath and in fulfillment of the pledge the people took upon themselves in the Declaration of the Constitution that said:

"We the people of Egypt, in our determination and our belief in and realization of our national, pan-Arab and international responsibilities, and in recognition of God's right and messages, and by the right of the country, the nation, and the right of principles and human responsibility, and in the name of and with the help of God, we declare that we accept, proclaim and give ourselves this constitution, reaffirming our firm determination to defend, protect, and uphold it."

There is no doubt that the judges are most intent on living up to the pledge in compliance with God's commandment: "...and keep the covenant. Lo! of the covenant it will be asked." [Qur'anic quotation, Surah 17:34]

The Supreme Constitutional Court, during the 16 May session, handed down its decision in case No 131/6 which ruled unconstitutional Article 5A, Article 6, Para 1 and Article 17, Para 1 of the People's Assembly Law No 38 of 1972, as amended by Law No 114 of 1983, prohibiting independents from running for elections.

The court reaffirmed that the contested articles represented a grave contravention and a gross violation of the principle of "equality and equal opportunity" prescribed by the Egyptian constitution, and that the articles precluded broad segments of the citizenry from exercising their right and indeed their national duty to run for the People's Assembly elections.

The court said in its opinion: "...And Article 62 of the permanent constitution stipulates that a citizen has a right to vote, to run for election, to express an opinion in a referendum in accordance with the law, and to participate in public life as a national duty. Accordingly, lawmakers must not seize or impair said constitutional rights, and restrictions regulating the use of such rights must not prejudice the principle of 'equality and equal opportunity' among the citizenry." By stipulating that People's Assembly elections shall be conducted via party slates and that a certified copy of the party slate should be attached to the the candidacy papers, lawmakers restricted the right of candidacy to the registered members of political parties and consequently deprived the citizens of the right to run for People's Assembly elections, thus undermining public rules and violating the constitutional principles contained in Articles 8, 40 and 62 pertaining to equality and equal opportunity among the citizenry.

If this is the case, then the text of section 10 of the explanatory note of the Supreme Constitutional Court law clearly manifests the lawmakers' animus that a decision regarding the unconstitutionality of any part of a law and bylaw signified the non-application of the law, not only in the future but with regard to facts and relations preceding the decision as well, provided that rights and positions established upon the enactment of this retroactive

provision by an irrevocable decision or under the statute of limitations are excluded. Naturally, these two exceptions do not apply in our case.

And whereas it has been established that the constitutional flaw disclosed by the Supreme Constitutional Court in its decision, namely the violation of constitutional rules contained in Articles 8, 40 and 62 pertaining to equality and equal opportunity among the citizenry by denying the independents the rights to run for elections, this constitutional flaw is also found in the provisions of articles 4/71, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 of Law No 120 of 1980 pertaining to the Shura as well as similar articles of the local government law that limits candidacy for local councils to party slates.

And whereas it has been established that the state is countering the Supreme Constitutional Court decision with enviable "disregard", and I have the definite feeling that it is useless to address officials of various ranks, status, and positions, my experience with them underscores the fact that they do not listen to advice and are not open to any guidance.

And whereas peoples' greatness is measured by their ability to uphold the law and defend and protect it..., and whereas the most important principles guaranteed by the constitution are the sovereignty of the law (Article 64) and the obligation to enforce judicial decisions and make their obstruction a criminal offense (Article 72).

In the face of the strange policy of "disregard" which the government is pursuing, and in the face of my unwillingness to give in to despair, resignation, vacillation, or fatigue in defending the constitution as a sacred and national right and duty, and in my belief that Egypt's judges will not break their oath and will not abandon their duty to protect, defend, and uphold the constitution, I call upon them to direct an appeal through the Judges' club, "the bastion of justice," to the president, asking the following:

First, to enact a law calling for the dissolution of the current People's Assembly and the holding of new elections under a system of direct, free, and individual elections; and the revocation of the unconstitutional amendments introduced to Law No 38 of 1972 via Law No 114 of 1983 and Law No 288 of 1986.

Second, to enact a law calling for the dissolution of the Shura and the local councils, and the holding of elections that would realize the principles of equal opportunity and equality among citizens guaranteed by the constitution.

Third, to spare the citizenry an impending grave constitutional predicament should the current People's Assembly initiate the process of renewing the president's term next October, for the president will lose the advantage he now enjoys of depriving the legitimacy of his position from that of the People's Assembly that undertook the process of nominating him and installing him in the presidency in 1981, the same assembly that was elected in 1979 and whose constitutionality has not been challenged by anyone.

And it is God who bestows success.

12502

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AID TO CAMEROON TO INCREASE

Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST in English 18 Jun 87 pp 1, 7

[Article by Benny Morris]

[Text]

YAOUDE. - Israel and Cameroon yesterday agreed on a substantial expansion of Israeli technical aid to this central African state and Cameroon President Paul Biya assured visiting Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir that his country would "soon" send an ambassador to Israel.

Cameroon, the second country on Shamir's African tour, renewed diplomatic relations with Israel nine months ago but has procrastinated thus far regarding the posting of its ambassador.

Shamir, at a press conference here after an afternoon of talks with Biya and senior Cameroon officials, said that Biya himself raised the subject and said that no ambassador had been sent because he, Biya, "had not found a suitable candidate." But Biya, said Shamir, had assured him that one would be sent soon.

At the press conference Shamir noted that 50 Cameroon agronomists had been to Israel during the past nine months and that Israel and Cameroon had agreed to substantially expand Israel's help in developing Cameroon's arid zones. Shamir said that a Cameroon delegation would soon come to Israel.

Shamir also said that the two countries agreed to "draw up a project to develop fisheries" in Cameroon, and to set up a regional centre in Cameroon for the "training of cadres in agriculture and health care which would serve the other countries in the area."

While it is understood that Israel is bent on increasing its economic and technical aid to Cameroon and,

proportionately, to reduce its defence and security aid, Israel instructors will continue to train the Cameroon Presidential Guard who wear violet berets, like the Givati brigade and other military units.

Shamir at the press conference denied that Israel's military and "security" aid help prop up African regimes and rulers, and said that this aid was geared to "protecting state rather than regimes." He added that Israel was also cooperating with African regimes in combating "international terrorism."

Shamir said that Zionist and Israeli help to Africa was rooted in the writings of the Zionist founding fathers at the turn of the century. "The Jews should help solve the problems of the Africans, who are suffering too much, and to free them from their distress." There is "a feeling of moral duty (among Israelis) in helping black Africa," said Shamir.

Shamir declared at the press conference that "we know that there are other (African states) thinking about renewing ties with Israel and will do so in the nearest future" - but he declined to name any names.

Shamir's 24-hour visit to Cameroon, which began yesterday morning and ends this morning, when the prime minister and his entourage fly to Liberia, was greeted by widespread and friendly press coverage and by a lukewarm popular reception at the airport and along the presidential motorcade's route to the presidential palace.

EXPORTS TO AUSTRALIA DISCUSSED

Jerusalem THE ISRAEL ECONOMIST in English No 43, Jun 87 p 31

[Article by Joel H. Bainerman]

[Text]

Although Israeli-Australian bilateral trade reached only \$100 million last year, George Wertheim, director of the Australian Overseas Marketing Authority, predicts that figure will triple within the next few years.

Currently, Israel exports \$5 million-\$10 million more to Australia than vice-versa. Exports to Australia include chemicals and diamonds; Australia exports coal, wool, rice, skin and hides, beef, and mutton to Israel.

Cooperation need not be limited to two-way trading but could be extended to mutual involvement in industrial technology ventures.

"Australia has not been export-minded as the local market consumes almost all it produces and because of the country's abundance of natural resources," says Wertheim. "That's all changed, with the world becoming a global marketplace and the depressed prices for almost all commodities and metals. The reason why Israel could be a natural trading and development partner for Australia is that each country's technology complements

rather than competes with each other. For instance, Israel is strong in drip irrigation but not in planting technology. The opposite is true for Australia. The same holds true for avionics and some electronics technology. Joint ventures in marketing is also a possibility, as Australia can serve as the gateway to the Far East for Israeli companies and Israel can be the bridge for Australian firms entering the European and American markets."

In another, recent interview Wertheim asserted that surprisingly, most of Australia's trade with Israel was carried out by non-Jewish businesspeople.

"They judge the products and do their selling on a strictly business basis. There is a need for the Jewish business community to look at Israel as a proper business market and not as a place which has to be supported because of the dictates of the heart. They should not look at doing business with Israel as an obligation."

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CSO: 4400/225

FREE EXPORT PROCESSING ZONES UNDER KNESSET CONSIDERATION

Jerusalem THE ISRAEL ECONOMIST in English No 43, Jun 87 pp 28-29

[Article by Ben Molloy]

[Text]

It is widely acknowledged that Israel, as a small country, depends on increased export — particularly from manufacturing and R&D sources — for growth, which needs to be financed by private, foreign investment. The frustrating question remains: why, given this evident necessity, has there been such limited success in drawing foreign investment? Stories of willing and enthusiastic potential foreign investors who simply give up in the wake of bureaucratic obstacles painfully abound.

Recently, Meir Eldar, a development economist, has formulated a proposal — now in the initial stages of Knesset consideration — calling for the establishment of several free export processing zones (FEPZs) in Israel. According to this concept, these zones would essentially be economic enclaves, providing one-stop administrative services, and be specifically suited to facilitating export production, cutting through the maze of red tape and bureaucracy, freeing potential staff and zone tenants to devote their efforts to economic activity. The essential feature of a FEPZ is the creation of an area in which domestic economic constraints and bureaucratic procedures do not apply and in which economies of scale are created to ensure competitive ability for its enterprises.

Removing obstacles to foreign investment

According to Eldar, foreign investors seek three critical elements in choosing an investment site: conditions for free economic activity, access to a skilled and experienced labor force, and competitive ability in the international market. Israel has the latent potential to offer these benefits. However, the bureaucratic maze that prospective foreign investors must negotiate, coupled with the lack of free economic activity, discourages many and prevents them from drawing upon Israel's comparative technological and industrial advantages. In 1985, less than \$45 million from private sources were invested in Israeli manufacturing industry, against a total of \$1.2 billion in general investment — much of it from government sources. He believes that if the obstacles for foreign investors were removed, Israel could expect to benefit from an additional \$150 million-\$200 million annually from private investment.

Hong Kong, Taiwan, South Korea, and Singapore have been extremely successful in attracting foreign investment — despite their high labor costs and real estate prices — due to their streamlined procedures and free economic activity. Hong Kong's free economic activity helped generate virtual economic miracles: Per capita income increased from \$250 in the 1950s to over \$6,500 in the mid-

1980s, largely due to the impact of foreign investment. Eldar points out that actual costs in Israel are lower than those of Hong Kong, but its latent capabilities as an export center are stifled by the regulation entanglement.

The economist's detailed proposal for the FEPZ calls for establishing export parks in several locations throughout the country, with Jerusalem and the development town of Sderot projected for the initial stage. Once set up, the parks or enclaves would provide centralized services, offering economies of scale to their industrial parks and "one-stop" service, eliminating the need to deal with numerous services and authorities to secure financial, technical, and communications support for industry. Likewise, the zone's management would be responsible for providing post office branches, exhibition halls, and other services.

Jerusalem is especially viewed as an important site for the FEPZ, given its ideal characteristics for high-tech industry. Government authorities conceived that the city's expansion would be based upon public and government institutions and services, not paying sufficient attention to developing Jerusalem's scientific and industrial potential. Despite the city's Zone A development incentive status and its experienced manpower, scientific institutions and the service infrastructure have not realized their potential.

Treasury cool to idea

While some 400 Free Export Processing Zones exist in 72 countries — including the US, Britain, and Australia — the Israeli Finance Ministry is reluctant to see such an idea implemented in Israel. Its officials contend that establishing many enclaves would require setting up a parallel bureaucratic structure and

more intense customs and tax scrutiny to prevent tax fraud and smuggling from the site into Israel. In response, Eldar suggests that the Finance Ministry is inaccurately projecting its current Eilat Free Trade Zone experience — really a free-tax zone — onto his proposal. He also claims that the FEPZ would eliminate tax-fraud incentives; since imported raw materials destined for the zone would not be taxed, there would be no need to inflate their value. Furthermore, all imported supplies would be shipped directly to the zone while under customs supervision, making it infeasible to smuggle goods out of the zone into Israel without detection.

Eldar explains that bureaucracy in the zone would be eliminated by several elements, including abolishing the lengthy process currently connected to obtaining "approved enterprise" status; all enterprises accepted into the zone would, by definition, be directed to export. Also, problems like land allocation and permits would be handled within the zone, and approved enterprises would no longer have to contend with foreign-currency controls.

Corroborating Eldar's proposal

Eldar is not the only one who identifies administrative problems as the critical inhibitor to greater foreign investment. *Ha'aretz* recently reported that the Task Force for Economic Independence has published a report, citing the bureaucratic obstacles foreign investors must face. According to the article, while government ministers deny the extent of such difficulties, the task force proposes that special stations for foreign investors be established, enabling these businesspeople to obtain immediate solutions to taxation, real estate allocation, manpower, and telephone extension problems. Eldar's solution would also encompass these elements. ■

The Art of Promoting Israeli Companies

"Many Israeli companies display a lack of awareness as to how to project themselves to the American market", says Ilana Gerard, an American immigrant who heads the Gerard Associates consulting firm which assists Israeli companies in their corporate promotion needs, and helps American investors find suitable Israeli ventures. She adds that companies seeking to break into the American market must make their presentations in a style and on the professional level US firms are accustomed to. Furthermore, Gerard emphasizes the importance of speaking to someone in their "own language"; that is, utilizing concepts and reference points familiar and meaningful to the person one is attempting to communicate with.

Concerning the problem of matching up American investors with suitable Israeli enterprises, Gerard indicates that she has seen potential partnerships fall through in the preliminary contact

stages simply because of the culture gap between Americans and Israelis. To surmount this difficulty, she undertakes the role of interfacier, or go-between, for the American investor and the Israeli firm. Often she will not directly match up the investor with the firm itself until negotiations are well underway.

Gerard asserts that while the field of corporate promotion is basically new in Israel, Israeli companies are gradually getting the message that they must pay more attention to image building and marketing strategy. She accentuates the importance of planning and believes it to be essential, particularly in a country like Israel, where there is the possibility of so much rapid and unexpected change.

Gerard's efforts, which are now expanding to include Europe and the Far East, have the support of many interested Americans, including New York Congressman Joseph DioGuardi.

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CSO: 4400/225

NEW IDF POLICY AGAINST SETTLER VIOLENCE DISCUSSED

Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 9 Jun 87 pp 1,2

[Article by Yosef Walter and Ilan Behar: "The IDF Has Formulated A New Policy Against Law-Breaking Settlers"]

[Text] The IDF is implementing a new policy toward law-breaking settlers. Already in the past few days, the IDF reacted speedily and energetically against rioting settlers in al-Duhayshah.

During recent general staff discussions, it was decided that every case will be dealt with swiftly, a complaint will immediately be filed with the police, and all the necessary steps will be taken, such as confiscating weapons and issuing administrative orders.

Defense Minister Yitzhaq Rabin yesterday sharply attacked the al-Duhayshah riots and unequivocally upheld the statements made by Amram Mitzna', the commander of the Central Command. At a reception given to welcome the new NAHAL commander, Brig Gen Ben-Zion Weiner, and to take leave of the former NAHAL commander, Brig Gen Yoram Gilbo'a, Rabin described the riots as a first class scandal.

The defense minister said: "I support everything that Gen Mitzna' said about the irresponsible behavior of the settlers, who came with IDF weapons which had been given to them by the IDF for self-defense and not for the purpose of threatening and injuring people, and needless to say, not for threatening IDF soldiers in the exercise of their duties."

Rabin stressed that the police was following the law in dealing with the suspects arrested in the riots, and that he was convinced that the report he received from the Central Command about the al-Duhayshah events was absolutely true.

"This is an unbelievable scandal," Rabin said, emphasizing that the rioting in the refugee camp only reinforces the view and demonstrates beyond doubt that the settlers must not be allowed to establish a civil guard.

The defense minister also came out against political figures "of a particular color" who attacked Gen Mitzna' for his statements. "This is an

unprecedentedly serious position. The political organizations must be requested to immediately cease criticizing IDF commanding officers who are implementing government policies. They would do better to turn their anger against the defense minister, since he is the one who sets the policy in the area according to the government policy," said Rabin.

The detention of the 13 suspects in the case of the rioting in the al-Duhayshah refugee camp was yesterday extended by 4 days. The chairman of the Jerusalem Peace Court, Aharon Simha, said in his decision that he did not understand why the settlers had decided to demonstrate against the authorities precisely in front of al-Duhayshah, at a late hour of the night, and most of them armed.

"One cannot escape the conclusion that it was not a demonstration for its own sake, and at least for that reason each one of them is guilty of unlawful gathering," the judge determined.

The police investigators, who had requested that the suspects' detention be extended by 15 days, were not happy at the end of the 9 hour debate. The suspects, who had expected to be immediately released, were stunned by the judge's decision.

Daliah Peleg reports:

Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Shim'on Peres toured Ramat Hasharon yesterday and was asked whether the security policy in the territories should be revised in wake of the violence and the radicalization occurring there among Jews and Arabs.

His answer: "We must not condone shots fired over the fence on civilians' homes. No policy can completely uproot terrorism which assumes a new form each time. First it was knives and stones, now it is Molotov cocktails. It is believed that there is such a team in Qalqiliyah; the right thing to do is to get on its tracks."

Rapha'el Mann reports:

Prime Minister Yitzhaq Shamir said yesterday: "I am totally opposed to actions such as those recorded at al-Duhayshah, and to having civilians take the law into their own hands. For that we have the IDF and the security services. We must leave them the care for the security of Judaea and Samaria."

Re'uven Ben-Tzvi reports:

"Some 2-3 days ago several settlers transgressed by taking the law into their hands and rioting. I want to condemn such phenomena. We are a democracy resting on the law, and no man has the right to supplant the state, even if he thinks that the state is not working properly." This was stated yesterday by Finance Minister Moshe Nissim, who was the guest of honor at the annual reception of the B'nei Akiva Pirhei Aharon Yeshiva in Qiryat Shemu'el.

The finance minister then added: "Immediately after the incident we committed, as we sometimes do, the sin of dangerous generalization, and we began to sound as if every settler were a rioter."

RETURN OF INHABITANTS OF IQRIT, BAR'AM DISCUSSED

Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 12 Jun 87 p 3b

[Article by Ze'ev Shiff: "The Dispute About Iqrit and Bar'am"]

[Text] Despite media items concerning the imminent return of Iqrit and Bar'am inhabitants to their villages in an effort to correct the moral and legal injustice done to them, it is still doubtful whether Prime Minister Yitzhaq Shamir will approve the proposal of his colleague, Minister Moshe Arens. Shamir cannot consider this issue without looking over his shoulder in the direction of Tehiya and the extremists in his own party, poised to pounce on any help to Arabs or any compromise with them. I would advise the people of Iqrit and Bar'am not to announce the festivities in honor of their return to their villages just yet. What is more certain is that Arens, who was raised at the knee of American liberalism, and his advisor for Arab affairs, Brigadier General (Reserves) 'Amos Gilbo'a, are likely to discover firsthand the magnitude of the hypocrisy concerning the Arabs, and the hatred toward the Arabs among the right-wing parties, but not exclusively among the right-wing parties.

In the meantime storms are also raging among the inhabitants of the villages close to Iqrit and Bar'am, who at the time received the lands of the two villages. It would appear that they do not realize that the talk about the "return" of the villagers does not include restitution of their lands. The first and foremost condition to their return is their agreement and obligation to accept monetary compensation (not land for land) for their land; this condition was reinforced by the emphasis that the two new villages will be in any event established on rocky grounds or pasture land.

The Bet Neqofa Incident

The topic has also become a subject of competition between the Alignment and the Likud for Arab votes. During the period that Shim'on Peres was prime minister, the office of the adviser for Arab affairs worked out a proposal to allow the inhabitants of Iqrit and Bar'am to return to their villages.

Whatever the results of the debate, it is important that the public should know that today there no longer exist any security reasons against the return of the inhabitants of Iqrit and Bar'am. The changes that have occurred along

the northern border and beyond it are so great that it is ridiculous to claim that the return of several hundred Christian families, half of whom are Maronites, can jeopardize the security of the state. A Christian militia, the Southern Lebanon Army, whose members are Lebanese citizens armed with Israeli weapons, participates in defending Israel's northern border. Former chief-of-staff Moshe Levy had said that the IDF has no security objections to allowing the return of the villagers. Today this is also the position of the IDF Planning Branch. The position of the General Security Service was that from its viewpoint there was no objection to the villagers' return. They did ask to check whether that would not create a legal precedent, but the jurists said there was no reason to worry about that.

In point of fact there exists an inverse precedent known to very few. In the War of Independence, the inhabitants of Bet Neqofa, near Jerusalem, fled to Abu Ghaush upon the advice of the IDF. Later, the IDF razed their village and an Israeli settlement was established in its stead. Years later an arrangement was found, and some of the Arab inhabitants of Bet Neqofa received permission to establish a new village close to their original one. This means that if the proposal to restore the people of Iqrit and Bar'am to their villages is once again vetoed, they stand a good chance, according to jurists, of winning in the High Court. And it is doubtful that the ruling authorities will let themselves do today what they did at the beginning of the 1950's, when they violated orders of the High Court of Justice.

Circumventing Decisions of the High Court of Justice

The story of the Iqrit and Bar'am affair is like the story of the state, and in it one can find pages that do not add honor to Israel. It contains much arbitrariness, disregard for orders of the High Court of Justice, invocation of the name of security in vain, and cynical stratagems designed to deprive the two villages of their property.

Let us consider the main facts. On 8 November 1948, about one week after the two villages were occupied by the IDF, the inhabitants were requested to vacate them "for a short period of time." The villagers say that it was a matter of leaving for two weeks, and the IDF never denied that a limited and short evacuation had been intended. At the time, Ben-Gurion wrote in his diary that the Christians who were evacuated would be willingly returned as soon as the border was secured. Months passed and the villagers were not returned; in September 1949 the area was decreed a security area. This meant that whoever did not live there permanently at the time the disposition was issued could not return without permission. Moreover, an expulsion order could also be issued against a permanent resident.

In May 1951, after all their requests had been rejected, several of the inhabitants of Iqrit applied to the High Court of Justice to instruct the minister of defense to return them to their village. On 31 July 1951 the High court rejected the state's claim that the inhabitants of Iqrit and Bar'am were not permanent residents because they had not been there (having been requested to leave) at the time when the area was decreed a security area. "Consequently, as soon as the fighting ceased, the inhabitants were entitled to return to their village. There were no legal grounds for denying the

applicants their right to return. In view of the fact that the unjustified opposition of the respondents was responsible for the fact that the inhabitants did not return to the village, we believe that the respondents cannot now deny that the applicants are permanent residents."

The permission to return as permanent residents was clear. At first the authorities did not carry out the High Court's instructions; later, on 10 September 1951, the IDF dispatched departure orders to the inhabitants. That is to say, they treated them as if they had been living in the village, thereby expelling them a second time, this time formally and legally. In this way the legality of the situation was ensured and the High Court could do nothing about it, and even had to turn down the inhabitants' appeal to repeal the departure orders. The IDF did not stop there: on 25 December 1951 all the houses in the two villages were blown up, except for churches and other holy places.

Some 28,226 Dunam

Now came the stage of taking possession of the lands of the two villages, and this in fact became the central issue. The area was first decreed a closed area, which means that access to it required a special permission from the military commander. The legal situation was such that the inhabitants of Iqrit and Bar'am could not enter the area (except for visits to the cemetery or church during the daytime), although legally they still owned the land.

In order to overcome the last "obstacle," the Knesset on 20 March 1953 adopted the land acquisition bill, which allowed the authorities to take possession of land and assets if it was decided that it was for purposes of "vital development, settlement, or security." The owner was, of course, entitled to compensation from the state. Only a few people in Iqrit and Bar'am took advantage of the right to receive compensation: six inhabitants of Bar'am and 68 of Iqrit. The lands of the two villages were divided among new Israeli settlements, 28,226 dunam altogether, of which 16,120 dunam belonged to Iqrit. Of that area, 6,422 dunam were made into a natural reservation. The rest were awarded to six Israeli settlements, including the kibbutzim Bar'am and Sasa. In the order of the number of dunam awarded, the other recipients were Shomera, Dovev, Even Menahem, Goren, and Sasa.

At its meeting of 23 July 1972, the government once again discussed the Iqrit and Bar'am affair. The lengthy debates ended with a decision to allow the status quo to continue. Chief of Staff Dado supported the decision. When the emergency regulations for security areas expired at the end of the same year, they were replaced by new orders based on the defense regulations. Bar'am and Iqrit were decreed closed areas, and that situation is still in force today. Consequently, if the villagers are allowed to return, Defense Minister Yitzhaq Rabin will have to issue an order to open up the area.

A \$5 Million Investment

The inhabitants of Iqrit and Bar'am have been periodically trying to revive the question of their return. Almost every government has been confronted with this problem in one way or another, but the request was always rejected. The

same thing happened under Begin. The inhabitants established various committees, and to this day each village has two committees, which indicates disagreement among them. Over the years, the inhabitants were dispersed throughout the north. Out of the 1,800 inhabitants of Bar'am, most of whom are Maronites, some 800 live in Haifa, some 600 in Jish, and the rest in Nazareth and Akko. The people of Iqrit, the majority of whom belong to the Greek Catholic community, were only about 1,000; most of them live in various villages in the Galilee, with some 65 families in Haifa.

Only if Shamir agrees to bring up Arens' and Gilbo'a's proposal for the government's approval can practical discussions begin in a committee which would determine the rules of the agreement. Such a committee would decide the exact location of the two new villages. It is almost certain that they would not be built on their old site or very close to it, but on rocky ground. The committee would also have to decide the criteria for compensation, both for the expropriated land and for the houses destroyed by the IDF.

Members of Arens' office say that the two new villages would be incorporated in the territorial defense. It is to be hoped that the negotiations will not be used to pressure the villagers into joining the IDF--that is not the way to mobilize volunteers for service in the IDF. In addition, the committee will have to deal with the problem of who is entitled to live in the new villages and on what conditions. Apparently the intention is that only people who want to live permanently in the new Iqrit and Bar'am, or people who obligate themselves to live there continuously for a few years, should move there.

The assumption is that most of the inhabitants will take advantage of the compensation right, and that only some 100-150 families will settle in each village. This is only an assumption, and it is possible that the committee will encounter surprises in this respect. Experts estimate that 100 housing units with auxiliary land (some 300-400 dunam altogether for 100 units), including a public area, and allowances for access roads will require a \$5 million investment. But the problem does not stem from economic difficulties, but primarily from a basic opposition and from the psychological fear that such a move, however moral and just it may be, is bound to pull out a brick from the solid wall separating the state from the problem of the Palestinian displaced persons and refugees.

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BRIEFS

DRAFT DODGERS TO U.S.--Israeli circles in New York have recently discovered a new phenomenon: Israeli parents are sending their sons overseas in order to evade military service. Several groups of Israeli boys of high school age have been identified in the area of greater New York, sent there by their parents; they go to school and live independently on money transferred to them from Israel. The subjects involved are families who, for various reasons, cannot or do not want to leave Israel, who do not have relatives abroad, but who want to free their sons from military service. The boys were sent abroad before their 16th birthday; they rent apartments, usually in groups, and enroll in schools. After graduation they do not return to Israel to enroll in the IDF, but because they had left before receiving military summons they are not considered deserters. The phenomenon was noticed after such a group of Israeli youths, living in Queens without parents or relatives, became involved in a brawl and was arrested by local police. The policemen were surprised to find out that all the boys had Israeli citizenship, went to high school, lived together in a rented apartment, and had no family relations in the United States. [Text] [Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT in Hebrew 9 Jun 87 p 1] 12782

COMMUNIST PARTY DELEGATION TO CHINA--A delegation of the Israeli Communist Party [RAKAH] is scheduled to leave soon on a visit to China as a guest of the Chinese sister party. The initiative for the visit--the last such visit took place 26 years ago--came from the CPC. The Chinese asked to host a delegation of the RAKAH Central Committee for high-level talks between the two countries. RAKAH decided to content itself with a 2-member delegation: MK Me'ir Wilner, RAKAH secretary general, who had already visited China in 1956 with an Israeli communist delegation, and Central Committee Secretary George Tubi, the brother of MK Tawfiq Tubi. The discussions will also touch upon political subjects concerning the two countries, despite the fact that the Israeli delegation, being a party delegation, does not have the backing of the Israeli Foreign Ministry. Officially it has been explained that the discussions will deal with strengthening the relations between the two parties, and the situation in the Middle East and in the world. The delegation is expected to stay in China 8-10 days. On the previous occasion, the Israeli communists were represented in China by MK Tawfiq Tubi in 1961. [Text] [Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 17 Jun 87 p 1] 12782

CSO:4423/39

PARLIAMENT MEMBER ADVANCES RIGHT-WING RESOLUTIONS

Kuwait AL-MUJTAMA' in Arabic 9 Jun 87 pp 26-27

[Interview with parliamentary deputy Yusuf al-'Azm: "We Reject the Policy of Secularism and the Left Wherever It Is"]

[Text] Mr Yusuf al-'Azm recently visited Kuwait, and AL-MUJTAMA' had this meeting with him to shed some light on some newly created conditions on the Arab and Islamic stages:

[Question] In the recent period, the talk about holding an international conference to solve what is known as the Middle East problem has become more heated. What is your conception of the nature of this conference and the extent of what it can realize for the Palestine cause?

[Answer] In my conception the international conference will not be held, and if it is held it will be a pro forma conference in which America will stand with all its weight alongside Israel and use its influence among some Security Council member countries to thwart everything that will have the effect of condemning Israeli aggression or condemning its practices. The Jews are determined to be the masters themselves and lecture us from on high, and as long as we are a dispersed nation, how can we aspire to have the Jews give us anything of our land or be so gracious as to give us part of the promised land, as they call it, when the conditions we are in will bring everyone back half empty-handed?

[Question] What is the magnitude of the adherents of Islam in the Jordanian chamber of deputies and what is their role vis-a-vis what are called the efforts toward peace with the Jewish entity?

[Answer] There are 60 deputies in the chamber of deputies, 10 of whom are Christian and the rest Moslems. As for the people following Islamic policy who embrace the constructive opposition, they are six to seven in number. Four of them are from the Society of Moslem Brothers and the others are gracious brothers who support the constructive positions we take and bestow advice and counsel on us on many occasions. Other deputies who have conviction in what we consider right and demand what we demand might support us. In our conception, there will not be a peaceful solution and Israel will not relinquish a single sliver of the land of Palestine without fighting, which always prompts us to

call for the need to prepare and ready ourselves so that all the people of the nation will long for the arenas of holy war and martyrdom.

[Question] The Islamic movement is criticized for the weakness of its military presence in confronting the Zionist enemy, contrary to the other movements. How do you explain that?

[Answer] The Islamic movement, when it breathed some freedom to some extent in 1948, helped send holy war battalions to Palestine. When it was repressed after that, its people were thrown into prisons and it continued to move from one ordeal to another and one vortex of repression to another, the 1967 war occurred and the Islamic movement and its symbols and troops were behind bars and in the dungeons of domineering Arab dictatorship, which gave all left-wing and nationalist movements scope to act and prevented the Islamic movement from assembling military forces, at a time when these countries opened their land to all forces to train on them and supplied them with arms so that they would be partial to one regime or another, bearing its banner and raising its slogans in addition to Soviet arms, which were given to some forces of the movement, and training camps in China, and the people of the Islamic movement stood as orphans, imprisoned and repressed. Nonetheless, they made attempts in 1968-69 in their own camps in Jordan until the 1970 strife occurred and the rifles fell from the hands of all fighting forces without exception.

[Question] We have learned that a parliamentary delegation from the Supreme Soviet Council under the chairmanship of the vice chairman of the Supreme Soviet Council, with the membership of the deputy director general of the Soviet agency TASS and a number of Soviet deputies, recently visited Jordan and met with the members of the foreign affairs committee in the Jordanian chamber of deputies. In your capacity as a member of this committee, we would like you to give us an idea about what went on in this meeting.

[Answer] Generally in such meetings statements of protocol and greetings to the guest delegation are made and that was done, but some fellow deputies and I raised the subject of the emigration the Soviet Union had permitted the Soviet Jews, to emigrate to the occupied territories, which constitutes a threat to the Arabs in Palestine and threatens Arab-Soviet friendship, which the Russians cherish. The delegation's answer was that they view the issue from a broader angle and consider the discussion of this issue an internal matter of the Soviet government, which no one had decided for them.

I also addressed myself to the Afghan issue, from our Islamic understanding of the Islamic revolution in Afghanistan, when Moscow's vice chairman and the deputy director general of the TASS agency referred to it as a counterrevolution. I said, "You must distinguish between some agents and hirelings whom America is trying to win over." I also mentioned to them that I had made a visit to the Mojahedin in their positions and did not find hirelings or American arms among them or a luxurious living. Rather, I found Mojahedin from the Afghan people themselves and arms from people who take them as spoils in their combat with the Russians, and live a life of sufficiency. I asserted that the Moslem Afghan people rejected a foreign presence on the land, be that a Soviet presence or an American one, and they had to live free in their country, devoted to their faith.

The meeting ended with statements of protocol between the members of the delegation and those who had met with them.

[Question] Many readers ask about the nature of the relationship between the Islamic movement and the Liberation Organization, particularly FATAH. We would like you to give us an idea about this relationship.

[Answer] I am not delegated to speak in the name of the Islamic movement in this regard, but what I do know personally is that we reject the policy of secularism and the left wherever it exists, because it threatens our belief and what remains of our land. One should bear in mind that the left is demanding not liberation but peaceful solutions in a revolutionary guise. We are not in favor of the fragmentation of decisionmaking, the shattering of views and groping with individual interpretations. When FATAH declares unity of ranks, unity of decisionmaking and unity of conception and action, as it declares the adoption of the ideology of the nation and its honorable historic course, we are on its side, against its enemy and our common enemy, which is occupying the territory and destroying sacred possessions. I must state here that we are against the murderers who are besieging the Palestinian camps, annihilating old men and children and sealing them off until death, which constitutes the vilest human tragedy man has known. May God greet every arm that throws a missile against the Jews or casts a stone at an Israeli patrol.

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CSO: 4404/415

FOREIGN MINISTRY'S AL-TURK ON CRISIS, PALESTINIANS

London AL-HAWADITH in Arabic 29 May 87 pp 14-17

[Interview with Fu'ad al-Turk by William Dahir "Lebanon Does Not Have Capacity for Settling Palestinians"; in Amman, date not specified]

[Excerpts] The Jordanian minister of occupied territory raised the question of the Palestinians staying in Lebanon, emphasizing that Palestinian presence in Lebanon was unavoidable. This statement implied that Palestinians would be settled in Lebanon to which al-Turk replied that settlement was unacceptable both from a Lebanese and a Palestinian point of view.

AL-HAWADITH had a long interview with Ambassador al-Turk, getting an exclusive look into his thoughts on developments in the Arab region and how they relate to the Lebanese crisis. The interview dealt with the future of Lebanese-Palestinian relations, Lebanese-Syrian relations and Arab-Arab relations. It also dealt with preparations for bilateral or expanded Arab summits and for an international conference. Ambassador al-Turk framed an objective and realistic picture manifested in this interview.

[Question] The Jordanian authorities placed much weight on your visit to Amman, as evidenced by the fact that four cabinet members attended your lecture and participated in the ensuing discussions and the warm reception you received during your visit and the high-level meetings that culminated in a meeting with King Husayn. How do you assess this visit?

[Answer] Actually, I returned from Amman happy and satisfied with the visit and its outcome. I was fortunate enough to meet with His Majesty King Husayn and had a chance to meet with the crown prince, His Royal Highness Prince Hasan, and with a number of ministers, the minister of foreign affairs, Mr Tahir al-Masri, in particular. I sensed the extent to which the king is concerned about Lebanon and felt that he is always ready to do everything within his power to help. Of course, President Amin al-Jumayyil's visit to Jordan gave impetus to relations between the two countries. Naturally, this has to be pursued in order to develop and further these essentially fraternal relations. However, any initiative at the present time affords a special dimension, particularly since the matter of an international conference has been put on the back burner. The meeting with King Husayn was two-sided: a discussion about Lebanon and an exchange of views between Jordan and Lebanon

regarding the international peace conference. With the other ministers, discussions revolved around bilateral diplomatic, economic and trade relations between the kingdom and Lebanon and around transit and personal travel issues. The upshot of it all is that the visit, in my opinion, was very positive in view of its being my first visit to Jordan and my first chance to get to know the country and the people and to have the honor of meeting senior officials headed by King Husayn.

[Question] Did you get the feeling that King Husayn approves of Lebanon's presence and participation in the "international conference" for which he is preparing?

[Answer] Of course I did, especially since Lebanon is one of the concerned countries by virtue of the presence of half a million Palestinians on its soil. An international peace conference will study the future of these people. Therefore, Lebanon, their host, ought to be present so as to take part in it. The Lebanese position on this issue has been explained more than once. Lebanon supports convening such a conference with the participation of all parties. However, our support of and participation in the conference must not in any way be construed as linking the Lebanese question to the Middle East one. It is widely known that the international conference will deal with resolutions 242 and 338 while the situation in the South has always been dealt with in resolution 452, and there is a stark difference between these resolutions.

[Question] Do you think the time is right for holding an international peace conference this year or early next year?

[Answer] Of course it is difficult to predict the timing of the conference, but I would like to think that we have other stages to cross before we get to that. We face a certain American attitude and an Israeli attitude on this issue. The permanent members of the UN Security Council have approved the convocation of such a conference and so has the European Community. The Arab countries have given their approval as well. Only the United States and Israel are left. It is known that that Israel has many disparate positions: one party supports the principle and another rejects it. This is what is delaying the Israeli decision on the conference. As for the United States, it has, if you will, a demand or reservation in form and substance. It had stated that the Soviet Union had to adopt certain measures before Washington accepted the principle of holding a conference, among them the restoration of diplomatic relations between the Soviet Union and Israel, before deciding to take part in the conference. As for substance, certain steps have to be taken as well, particularly as they relate to Palestinian representation in the conference. It is also known that the Soviet Union had presented to President Mitterand on his visit to Moscow the idea of holding a preliminary conference of the five permanent members of the Security Council to prepare for an international peace conference. This idea, however, was not well received in Washington at that time because the United States was against such a conference, hence its rejection of a preliminary meeting for a conference it had not approved in the first place.

[Question] In the context of international contacts you have made concerning the international conference, your visit to Amman was preceded by successive visits by American, British and Soviet envoys to Beirut and the American ambassador paid you a surprise visit last week to inform you of his country's position on the international conference. Based on these contacts and on what you have heard from numerous international contacts, are we safe to assume that this conference will be held?

[Answer] My perception is that we are still far from holding such a conference.

[Question] During the lecture you delivered in Amman on the Lebanese question, one Jordanian minister participating in the discussions raised the question of the Palestinians staying in Lebanon. This kind of talk is serious and telling and means that the idea of settling the Palestinians is still alive and is being promoted behind the scenes. What is your answer to that?

[Answer] Allowing the Palestinians to stay in Lebanon means final settlement which is unacceptable, not only from the national perspective but from the Palestinian one as well because. If Palestinians are to remain in exile, we can say good-bye to the Palestinian cause. Basically, the Palestinian cause is the cause of the Palestinian people and not an intangible one. If the Palestinian people decide not to return to their country, it means that they have decided to bury their cause. This is from a Palestinian point of view. From a Lebanese point of view, we too have our reasons, not to mention our belief that the Palestinian people must return to their homeland.

Lebanon, of course, does not have the capacity to settle the Palestinians, be it from a political, economic or purely demographic standpoint. Hence the idea of settlement is totally unacceptable to us. This is what I made clear in the debate that followed the lecture in Amman.

[Question] Did you raise this subject with King Husayn during your meeting with him?

[Answer] We did not go into such details.

[Question] What about the matter of Palestinian representation in an international conference? Did you raise it with his majesty?

[Answer] We discussed the conference in its broad outlines which are under discussion at present in preparation for the conference. It seems to me that certain fundamental issues have been agreed upon by the concerned parties.

[Question] King Husayn had undertaken an initiative with Syria in Lebanon's behalf right after President al-Jumayyil's visit to Jordan. Where does this initiative stand and does he plan to resume these endeavors?

[Answer] King Husayn is ready to do anything that might resolve the Lebanese question. During the recent summit meeting between him and President al-Asad in Damascus, the Lebanese problem took up a good part of the discussions between them.

[Question] A Lebanese consensus manifested in the parliament's unanimity to abrogate the Cairo Agreement was noted during the parliamentary session last Thursday. What do you think?

[Answer] There is a kind of Lebanese consensus that the Cairo Agreement has been rendered virtually invalid. We had notified the Security Council a few years ago that any resolution issued by the council on the South would take precedence over any other. To realize this objective, we had to be officially dedicated to the de facto abrogation of the Cairo Agreement. Of course this matter belongs to the executive power in Lebanon and to the legislative power that actually abrogated it.

[Question] Mr secretary, what about the Arab summit conference? Do you think that the Arab climate is propitious for holding such a conference and what were you able to perceive in this regard during your visit to Amman and Damascus?

[Answer] The Arab summit conference should have been held in Saudi Arabia over 3 years ago in accordance with the resolution adopted at the end of the last summit. However, this summit has been delayed by Arab differences and divisions. Everyone was almost certain that any summit conference not well planned and carefully considered would lead to failure. Therefore, the summit conference had to be given a chance to succeed. To this end, three or four committees emanating from the Arab League Council were formed through the good offices of certain parties. Some committees have made active progress, but not all problems have been resolved. To put it more plainly, the Arab air must be cleared prior to the conference, from the standpoint of Syrian-Palestinian relations, Syrian-Iraqi relations and relations with certain North African countries in particular. If progress can be made in this area, an Arab summit will be more likely.

[Question] King Husayn was working on more than one level to clear the Arab air and bring differing points of view closer together. To this end, he visited certain concerned capitals, including Damascus, Baghdad and Cairo. In your discussions with him, were you able to form a clear picture of the Arab climate through such contacts?

[Answer] We certainly perceived some improvement, but not enough to expect the conference to be held in the immediate or very near future.

[Question] Did you also perceive a likelihood of a bilateral summit between the Syrian and the Iraqi presidents via the said Jordanian endeavors?

[Answer] To be honest with you, I am not in a position to answer this question.

[Question] Can you describe for us your meeting with the Syrian minister of foreign affairs, Mr Faruq al-Shar', and other officials in Damascus?

[Answer] Minister Faruq al-Shar' and I are bound by mutual affection, respect and friendship. My visit with him was not the first in this regard. It is

commonly known that minister al-Shar' affords daily attention to the Lebanese question and my visit dealt with current developments in the Lebanese arena and with other matters of common concern. He reaffirmed to me Syria's intention, under the leadership of President al-Asad, to offer all possible aid to Lebanon and to make every effort necessary to render the national conciliation process a success. He also made it clear to me that by shunning conciliation, the Lebanese people have brought more suffering on themselves. He also expressed his conviction that the success of contacts in progress will help push the national accord process forward. We are now waiting for the results of the consultations Brigadier General Ghazi Kan'an is now holding in Beirut, in light of which subsequent steps, the next meeting of the Lebanese delegation in Damascus in particular, will be decided. I also had a chance to meet with my counterpart, the recently-appointed assistant foreign minister, Major General Yusuf Shakkur, to convey to him my sentiments and wishes for success. We both examined cooperation between the two ministries in Lebanon and Damascus and I extended to him an invitation to visit Beirut. I hope he will be able to respond to this invitation in the near future so that we may resume our discussions about cooperation and coordination between our two countries.

[Question] We have heard reports that the level of representation among Lebanese and Syrian negotiators may be lowered?

[Answer] I know nothing about that.

[Question] Based on information at your disposal and on your talks with Minister al-Shar', is it possible that a summit meeting between Presidents al-Jumayyil and al-Asad could be held and can such a summit, if held, frame a basis for a solution?

[Answer] The expected summit meeting between presidents al-Jumayyil and al-Asad will certainly be the culmination of discussions now under way between Beirut and Damascus. But the importance of such a meeting lies in meticulous preparation. In my view, a draft agreement must be completed to be confirmed by the summit meeting so that such a meeting will not be another number on the list of previous summits.

[Question] In your opinion, will the solution in Lebanon come from within or from without the country?

[Answer] I have said many times that the solution to any problem must be effected in light of the causes that created the problem. So long as we are certain that the causes of the Lebanese problem are both domestic and international, the solution, in our opinion, must be domestic, regional and international. Had the Lebanese problem been purely domestic, it would have been settled a long time ago, as evidenced by the fact that we have reached many agreements in the past but none of them have been put into effect. In 1976, the constitutional document was approved, then came the parliamentary documents, the 14-point document of self-evident principles drawn up by the late president Ilyas Sarkis, and signed by all Lebanese leaders, the Islamic firm principles approved by all and the Geneva and Lausanne meetings that produced the present national unity government and its cabinet communique

which received unanimous parliamentary approval. Nevertheless, the problem has not yet been settled. This means that the problem is not only domestic but is complicated by regional, Arab and international intricacies that must be taken into consideration in order to arrive at a radical solution to the Lebanese problem. Hence, the solution must come partly from within and partly from without. We are now in the process of resolving the domestic part of the problem in anticipation of regional, Arab and international conditions conducive to a radical solution.

[Question] What is your opinion of the sectarian solutions that have been put forward as a settlement to the Lebanese crisis? Will they help the Lebanese people attain the rights that they have been seeking or will their benefit be limited to the drafters and certain other individuals?

[Answer] I am not an advocate of sectarian solutions because I believe in human rights which in effect contribute to the rights of the Lebanese people as a whole. Of course, any solution must take into account Lebanon's sectarian and social makeup, balance and participation. All these things must be considered in drafting any solution. We must not forget, however, that the issue to be considered in Lebanon is not the rights of certain individuals within some sects, but rather the rights of the Lebanese people as human beings, namely their rights to medical care, education, housing, work and old age security, all, of course, within the framework of individual and societal rights. By according every human being in Lebanon his basic social rights, the entire Lebanese people can attain their rights as well. But allowing an individual within a sect to benefit from a certain position will not lead to the desired result, underscoring once again the need to bear in mind the Lebanese reality. Take me as an example. As the secretary general of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, what has my sect reaped from my appointment to this position? I find no link between my job as the secretary general and between my sectarian affiliation.

[Question] Tension in the South has increased recently due to Israeli aggressions against southern villages. Do you anticipate a new Israeli invasion to follow, and if so, what has Lebanese diplomacy done to spare the South this bitter experience?

[Answer] The greatest part of the Lebanese diplomatic initiative revolves around the South. The South has been a matter of concern to us, not only today but for many years. Of course, the recent escalation of Israeli aggression has compelled us to make efforts in the UN Security Council or with countries and forces that have influence with Israel to put a stop to such aggression. I am certain that tension in the South has eased due to these efforts and we hope that developments will not add to our concerns because the situation of the international forces must be reassuring. The international forces in the South are, in our opinion, an element of peace, security and stability and we must enable them to do their job the best way they can.

[Question] What kind of progress has been made in the highly publicized diplomatic assignments and is your ambassadorial appointment still valid in addition to the motion that you keep your position as secretary general?

[Answer] Diplomatic assignments and transfers occur routinely once a year and usually include those employees whose overseas tours have ended, those who have been retired or those whose term at the main office has expired. Some transfer plans have been approved in principle by the prime minister, by the foreign minister and by the president, and I expect them to see the light in the very near future. Transfers for this year have been limited in scope, however, and the more sweeping reassignments will occur next year because, under the law, non-career ambassadors have to submit their reassignments at the end of the term of the president who appointed them which means that their future will be decided in light of next year's developments.

As for my own status, I appreciate the kindness, confidence and support I have received from the president, prime minister and all leaders. This to me is a great asset of which I hope I am worthy. As for details, I hope you will forgive me for not going into the particulars.

[Question] Of all the ministries, the foreign ministry has been the only one that has maintained its unity and cohesion despite the war. To what do you attribute this cohesion which we hope will serve as a model for all Lebanese institutions?

[Answer] I am very proud of this and am happy to see it in the foreign ministry. Our work at the foreign ministry is based on fundamental constants which are Lebanon's sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity. Every initiative we undertake, every position we adopt and every statement we make revolves around these constants. On the other hand, we at the ministry distinguish between the national concern and political concern. Our efforts are concentrated on the former within the framework of the constants I have mentioned. As for the political one in the Lebanese, or the partisan or the sectarian or the logical sense, we do not interfere in it. The foreign ministry reflects--and should continue to reflect--the conscience of Lebanon, all of Lebanon. Diplomatic and administrative personnel, be they at the main office or at diplomatic missions and consulates, do their job as professionals and not as a group meddling in politics. Diplomacy is one thing and political action, in the parochial sense of the word, is something else. The motto we raised when I assumed my position at the foreign ministry is "I am an employee of Lebanon."

12502

CSO: 4404/392

KARAMI'S BROTHER DISCUSSES PRIME MINISTER'S ASSASSINATION

Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic 20 Jun 87 pp 24-25

[Text] Observers have long paused over what 'Umar Karami, brother of late Prime Minister Rashid Karami, said about the conversation that took place between the two brothers just 2 days before Prime Minister Karami's assassination. Leading political leaders considered 'Umar Karami's revelations as probably the key and the beginning of the clue that could lead to identifying the party behind the assassination and revealing all the circumstances surrounding the decision to assassinate the late Lebanese prime minister.

What did 'Umar Karami say?

He said: "I saw my brother the last time on the Saturday that preceded the assassination. We asked him: Where are you going and why don't you stay with us today? You have resigned from the government; why are you going to Beirut?"

Continuing, 'Umar Karami said:

"On that day I found my brother unusually optimistic. He told me that secret negotiations that have been underway for some time have achieved an agreement in principle. He said that he was going to Beirut in order to reap the fruits of this agreement which was to be finalized during the following week."

'Umar Karami said: "My brother, the martyr, had assured us that he would take over the legitimate utility services and ports would be closed down, adding that this would be a good approach to taking new steps to resolve certain problems that are still preventing understanding on a plan for a political solution."

When 'Umar Karami related this incident before the military and judicial committees investigating the crime of Prime Minister Karami's assassination when they visited Tripoli, he expressed his belief that this information could be among the principal reasons for his brother's assassination. Prominent government leaders have not expressed doubts about this possibility nor about the views Mr Karami expressed. These leaders have two fundamental concerns which are based on established information and facts:

First, certain forces in the Lebanese arena would suffer grave harm from any solutions that would block their sources of revenue from their control of

these legitimate and illegal utility services and ports. These revenues add up to millions if not billions and constitute the number one and most important source for financing the militias.

By reviewing the reactions and the political pressures that were applied following a cabinet meeting in the Chamber of Deputies during which agreement was reached to implement a number of decisions, one can see how the forces that stood to lose the most were prepared to sabotage the agreement and to prevent the implementation of its decisions, even at the cost of assassinating someone of Prime Minister Karami's stature, considering that he was leading an open battle for this purpose and insisted on it as a prelude to solving the government's crisis.

Second, these leaders possess information confirming that Israel perceives any political solution to the Lebanese crisis, whether partial or total, as a red line and that any attempt to cross this line would be countered by an Israeli response. This information can be substantiated by certain international diplomatic sources which revealed that the Israelis consider that any solution to the Lebanese crisis which excludes Israel or is reached as a result of Syrian unilateral efforts is not subject to implementation and rejected by Israel. Israel believes that the only way is for Israel to participate in reaching a solution whose price would be granting Israel security arrangements in the South and particularly within what is known as the border strip which it now controls directly and through Antoine Lahd's forces. In this context well-informed official Lebanese circles revealed that all the American envoys who visited Lebanon and held talks with senior state officials carried with them one single proposal that never changed, that is the need for Lebanon to agree to give Israel security arrangements in the South because such measure, according to the United States, is almost the only way to solve the problem of the South, to bring about the withdrawal of the Israeli forces, and to abolish the military and security role which Lahd's forces are playing there. The U.S. envoys had recommended solving this problem in order to satisfy Israel and secure its northern borders against the dangers of armed attacks by Lebanese or Palestinian fedayeen. Such a step--again according to the United States--would facilitate finding a solution to the Lebanese domestic problem since Israel will not allow Syria to reach a solution separately, using its own security and political methods because on one hand this would cause an imbalance in the strategic situation and, on the other, it would be a sweeping victory for Syria in the battle for influence in the Lebanese arena.

In light of these Lebanese and regional realities there is no reason to be surprised, or astonished over the assassination of Prime Minister Karami who firmly rejected giving Israel any security arrangements. He was a moderate and accepted politician, an effective negotiator, and Syria's ally in this bitter battle. Israel saw him as the obstacle that should be removed in order to create further confusion in the Lebanese arena and plunge it into new rounds of political and sectarian conflicts that would ensure destroying what is left of the mainstays of the Lebanese regime and state. Most importantly, this would again strain the official relations between Beirut and Damascus, as President al-Jumayyil said. This would also take things back to square one in the search for a solution and would freeze the contacts that were taking place between the

two countries and made great progress during the days that preceded Prime Minister Karami's assassination, according to 'Umar Karami, whom the Tripoli crowds proclaimed successor to his late brother. 'Umar Karami has now begun dealing with events on this basis despite the fact that he and his family are still deeply grieving his elder brother's assassination. The present political climate, whether in the Lebanese arena or in the context of Syrian-Lebanese relations, is not very reassuring particularly since the situation is dominated by continuous political reactions to Prime Minister Karami's assassination. Accusations and counter-accusations have from the beginning cast suspicions on the president of the republic and the military command, putting in question the latter's sincerity in investigating the assassination crime, the perpetrators, and the planners. Meanwhile the president of the republic still insists that judicial and military investigations should be allowed to run their course and refuses to get ahead of this process through individual measures. This atmosphere which augurs great dangers has created a fertile ground for parties that are interested in continuing to fuel the internal struggle and charge the domestic atmosphere with every kind of explosive element. Even the moderate political and spiritual leaders have expressed the fear that the situation will deteriorate to the point that such random political and personal attacks aimed at the left and the right might turn into indiscriminate attacks resulting once again in a military conflict instead of the political conflict that has prevailed for a long time. Despite the signs of military preparations on the ground and the concentration of mechanized units and launching pads on both sides, there are great hopes that the situation will not deteriorate to such an extent thanks to the Syrian military presence in the Lebanese capital and in West Beirut in particular whose area is three quarters that of the capital's area.

Meanwhile ambassadors of the major powers who are permanent members of the Security Council have warned President Amin al-Jumayyil and acting prime minister Dr Salim al-Huss of the dangers of maintaining the status quo and continuing to pursue a policy that could lead to intensifying disagreement among the local forces as well as between the government and some of the opposition forces. President al-Jumayyil had earlier received ambassadors of the major powers and briefed them on the political and security developments that followed Prime Minister Karami's assassination as well as the progress made in investigating Prime Minister Karami's assassination. He reassured them that these investigations are proceeding in accordance with the law and with the determination to uncover the crime and severely punish the perpetrators regardless of who they are. On his part acting prime minister Dr al-Huss cut short his visit to Damascus in order to receive ambassadors of the major five powers and brief them on the situation, explaining the reactions of the Islamic and nationalist leaders and groups to Prime Minister Karami's assassination and the manner in which investigation into this crime is being conducted.

Although the president of the republic and the acting prime minister briefed the ambassadors of the major powers the situation as a whole, each from his own perspective, ambassadors of the five powers, in their talks with President al-Jumayyil and acting prime minister al-Huss, seemed to agree on a single approach: giving advice, urging the need for returning to dialogue and seeking, despite the difficult circumstances, to reform the constitutional institutions.

They pointed out that written and unwritten constitutional provisions cannot continue to be implemented by proxy and the Chamber of Deputies cannot operate by proxy since its speaker has resigned. Furthermore alienation between the president, the speaker, and the government should not continue because this state of affair could lead to an extremely dangerous situation and will have serious consequences leading to further fragmentation and total collapse.

The recent contacts in which the Syrian capital was a principal party have shown the Syrian leadership's desire to put an end to the current Lebanese situation even though Damascus is presently seeking to reorganize the ranks of its Lebanese allies in order to fill the political vacuum created by Prime Minister Karami's departure.

13305/12859

CSO: 4404/406

OFFICIAL COMMENTS ON CAMPS SIEGE, RELOCATING PALESTINIANS

London AL-MAJALLAH in Arabic 27 May 87 p 29

[Interview with 'Ali Faysal, DFLP official in Burj al-Barajinah camp: "The Camps Represent a Political Presence. We Have Overcome the Relocation Phase"; date and place not given]

[Text] 'Ali Faysal, DFLP official in Burj al-Barajinah camp, spoke to AL-MAJALLAH about the siege and what the camp is experiencing today.

[Question] Since the beginning of the Lebanese war it has been said that there is a plan to relocate the Palestinian camps to al-Biqa' region. What has happened to the inhabitants of Sabra and Shatila in the past years, such as being prevented from rebuilding their camps, is regarded as one of the pointers in this direction. Do you believe that relocation of the camps has been overtaken by time or do such fears still exist?

[Answer] We believe that we have practically overcome the fear of the camps being relocated to al-Biaq'. We are against the relocation of any Palestinian citizen from his home whether in a camp or a town because such relocation is political and not geographical. The camps represent a political presence and not demographic expression. We have overcome these fears thanks to our steadfastness. The recent war has achieved several gains, foremost of which is that it has established our presence as Palestinians in our camps beginning with al-Rashidiyah and ending with the camps in Beirut.

[Question] Do you believe that the siege of Burj al-Barajinah camp has indeed been broken?

[Answer] Breaking of the siege did not come about as a favor by anybody. Rather it was the result of the blood that has been shed. There are still some blood stains on the camp's ground. Nevertheless, from a military standpoint the siege has not been broken. The blockade of supplies has been lifted while the problem of east of Sidon is resolved. This could be a justification to ignite the situation at any moment. The military siege should not continue for a long time. We call upon the forces responsible for security in Beirut to intervene in order to lift the siege. The aim of continuing the siege is to keep the Palestinians in Lebanon in a state of alarm over their security and destiny and to drive them toward emigrating and leaving the arena for those who wish to achieve the sectarian plan in Lebanon.

[Question] A question that has been asked by many of those who have been closely watching the camps war was this: How come the food supplies in the camps have run out while the arms have not?

[Answer] First I would like to make it clear that the war of starvation that lasted 2 months was not a fake war as some have alleged. The camps' inhabitants have starved and have eaten rats, dogs, and mules. More than 50 children have died of starvation. Some 25 pregnant women have had abortions because of hunger, eight elderly men have died, and 25 women, including a 7-month pregnant woman, were killed in the "death crossing" trying to secure bread. Also, some 72 women were wounded in the same crossing. Frankly, we used to prefer to bring in arms and ammunition rather than food supplies.

[Question] In case the problem of east Sidon is not resolved do you expect the camps siege to be resumed?

[Answer] I do not expect a new supply blockade against the Beirut camps because the Syrians should not change what has been established on the ground; in fact they should try to improve the situation. I believe that the political goals of the camps war have been eliminated because it has failed. The camps have emerged stronger and in general the PLO has regained its unity.

13305/12859
CSO: 4404/406

LIBYA

NEAR EAST

BRIEFS

ARAB LEAGUE APPOINTMENT--Former Libyan Foreign Minister 'Abd-al-'Ati al-'Ubaydi will be appointed as Libya's permanent representative to the Arab League. Al-'Ubaydi's nomination will be forwarded "unofficially to the appropriate authorities in Tunis." Official Tunisian circles welcome this selection because it indicates "the profound improvement in Libyan-Tunisian relations" following financial compensation of Tunisian workers expelled from Libya, and because of the discretion typical of Al-'Ubaydi's political dealings.
[Text] [Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic 27 Jun 87 p 7] /6091

CSO: 4504/282

COMMUNIST LEADER HARMEL DENOUNCES ALLEGED KHOMEYNIST GROUPS

Tunis AL-ANWAR AL-TUNISIYAH in Arabic 14 Jun 87 p 1

[Article : "The Communists' Congress: Harmel Shoots At Khomeyni"]

[Text] This time "comrade" Mohamed Harmel, secretary general of the Tunisian Communist Party, expressed his adoration for Gorbachev and fired at the Khomeynists!

These were two of the main points of the address with which Mohamed Harmel opened the Communist Party's Ninth Congress, which was the first such congress to be held openly in 25 years. There were two other important points: Harmel's self-criticism of his young party and his position towards the General Federation of Workers, which caused the withdrawal of some of the old leadership, thus opening the way only for Taieb Baccouche alone (as usual)!

Moreover, there has been gossip over the withdrawal of hundreds of conventioners, dismayed by the party's new positions, on the day before the congress.

Mr Harmel said at the beginning of his speech that it seemed strange that the party was holding its congress under these conditions, but he justified holding the conference because "it was, at any rate, an opportunity of 'democracy and the left'." He discussed the situation at length then declared with astonishing frankness that "we are dissatisfied with ourselves. We admit to mistakes in the past and even at present!" He focused on this final point for a long time.

Perhaps the most important segment of the speech, long-awaited by guests, newsmen, and representatives of parties and associations, was the part dealing with the Communist Party's position towards the Khomeynist movement in Tunisia. Mr Harmel said: "When we talk of the Islamic Tendency Movement, we do not talk of Islam. Although the movement is a fact of life, we must not ignore the dangers such religious movements pose in Iran, for instance, or in Lebanon (Hizballah)." He continued: "We are aware of the danger of their single-mindedness. There are no guarantees that religion will not be used in politics, which would lead to stagnation and oppression. At any rate, the fight in Tunisia is not a religious one. We reject any attempt to establish a religious state."

This historic congress of the Communist Party, according to all attending observers, adopted new slogans, new positions, and even new personal and patriotic expressions. This could complicate its relations with some organizations and parties, especially since the address was quiet in tone and its other points were merely a restatement of its previous positions and those of all other Communist Parties throughout the world.

The gossip continues!

12945/12859

CSO: 4504/272

BRIEFS

DEPORTED WORKERS ISSUE SETTLED--Geneva (KUNA)--Francois Blanchard, secretary general of the International Labor Organization [ILO], said yesterday that Tunisia and Libya have reached an agreement to settle their dispute over Tripoli's dismissal of many Tunisian workers. Blanchard told reporters that the ILO has successfully concluded intensive consultations with both sides. The International Labor Conference held in Geneva last year had suggested that Tunisian and Libyan officials meet to resolve the conflict over the deportation of a large number of Tunisian workers from Tripoli. Blanchard added that the agreement calls for full or partial compensation for the losses suffered by those workers as a result of being deported. [Text] [Kuwait AL-SIYASAH in Arabic 2 Jun 87 p 20] 12945/12859

NEW CHARGES AGAINST FORMER PREMIER--AL-ANWAR reported exclusively some time ago on the formation of a committee to investigate wrongdoing by former Premier Mohamed Mzali, and said that the committee had already begun its work. AL-ANWAR has also learned that this committee may have uncovered serious political and moral violations that occurred during the administration. Needless to say, these violations will have an impact not only on the country, but also on Mr Mohamed Mzali, who may stand trial again as a result of the committee's work. The committee may have uncovered such Mzali political violations as the peddling of influence, dependence on incompetent [employees] and the creation of parallel channels to run the government and handle the affairs of state. The committee may have also uncovered moral wrongdoing by Mr Mzali and his entourage within the prime ministry itself, in the [al-Qasabah?] hall to be exact. AL-ANWAR also learned that the committee, after concluding its investigation, will submit detailed reports to several authorities, including the ministry of justice, the house of deputies, and the president's office. [Text] [Tunis AL-ANWAR AL-TUNISIYAH in Arabic 31 May 87 p 5] 12945/12859

CSO: 4505/272

GOVERNMENT TROOPS SUFFER HEAVY CASUALTIES

Tehran KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL in English 3 Jun 87 pp 1-2

[Text]

ISLAMABAD, Pakistan (Dispatches) — Afghan troops suffered as many as 1,000 casualties in fierce fighting with Mujahideen that began late last month in Kandahar, Afghanistan's second largest city, diplomatic sources said Tuesday.

Military and civilian wounded from daily Mujahideen rocket attacks and retaliatory air and ground bombardments have flooded hospitals there and in Kabul, sources in Islamabad said. The diplomatic sources spoke on condition they not be identified further.

Facilities in Kandahar were reported so full of military wounded that no room was left for civilians. The provincial capital, about 60 miles (96 kms) from the Pakistani border, had a population of 750,000 before the civil war began in 1978.

One Afghan report said up to 20,000 Soviet and Afghan troops were involved in the fighting, which started when combined forces began clearing Muslim guerrilla-controlled suburbs.

Diplomats said Tuesday the Mujahideen shot down 14 to 16 Soviet and Afghan aircraft in the past 10 days.

Foreign reporters are rarely allowed to visit Afghan battle areas and confirmation of accounts of fighting there can rarely be verified.

The anti-Marxist Muslim guerrillas are fighting to overthrow the communist government in Kabul, which is supported by about 115,000 Soviet troops.

Heavy Fighting Persists

Mujahideen sources on Monday reported persistent heavy fighting over guerrilla supply routes through the mountains of Paktia and Logar provinces just west of the Pakistani border in north-eastern Afghanistan.

Witnesses reported heavy Soviet and Afghan troop movements to the area.

The Muslim insurgents said their commanders fear the fighting will cut off supplies to comrades fighting in northern and eastern Afghanistan.

Official Radio Kabul has reported raids on guerrilla supply depots about 30 miles east of Kabul and the seizure of three U.S.-made Stinger anti-aircraft missiles.

Use of Stingers and other sophisticated weaponry has boosted the guerrillas' effectiveness and led to increased

fighting over the last six months, observers say.

The Afghan government in January instituted a national reconciliation policy aimed at ending nine years of civil war and finding a political solution that would allow the Soviet Union to withdraw its troops.

The English-language Kabul New Times reported May 27 that 56,000 refugees returned under the policy. It said 24,300 insurgents surrendered and 5,600 prisoners were freed from Afghan jails.

The main Muslim guerrilla groups, based in Pakistan, challenge the figures. They say hundreds of Afghan troops continue to defect.

Afghans report the regime and Soviets have deployed many thousands of troops and that there are daily, very intense bombing and strafing attacks against Kandahar's suburbs, the diplomat said.

He said Mujahideen rocketing of Soviet and Afghan troop positions in and outside the city continued nightly.

The resumption of forced conscription in the Afghan Army has been reported by the diplomats for the past month.

One diplomat said parents of the young men and boys rounded up in Kabul bazaars were particularly anxious to ensure — through bribes — that their sons are not sent to Kandahar.

/13046

CSO: 4600/273

REPORTEDLY 800 SOLDIERS DEFECT TO MUJAHIDIN SIDE

Tehran KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL in English 6 Jun 87 p 5

[Text] Afghanistan

Soviet and Afghan air strikes and artillery bombardments left the Afghanistan city of Baghlan in virtual ruins after 800 soldiers posted there defected and it fell under the control of Muslim Mujahideen, reliable sources said recently.

The defection by Afghan Army troops was the biggest one reported since March 1986 when nearly 900 troops of the Soviet-backed government switched sides during a battle in the city of Khost.

The 800 troops stationed at Baghlan, led by a commander identified only as Basheer, were reported to have defected to the Muslim Afghan resistance forces on May 11. The diplomats said Basheer had been a former guerrilla commander before joining the Afghan Army.

Baghlan, 125 miles (200 km) north of Kabul and 80 miles (130 km) south of the Soviet border, had been the scene of heavy fighting since early May, the sources said who added that much of the city had been under guerrilla control.

Subsequent fighting, together with intensive Soviet bombing, has left Baghlan in virtual ruins. Another source said the city had experienced heavy artillery shelling and bombing raids by Soviet and Afghan warplanes.

Heavy fighting was also reported south of the capital of Kabul. The Soviets are also said to be concerned of stepped up attacks by the Muslim insurgents and speculation is rife over a possible change in the Afghan government.

Meanwhile Afghan gunners again fired artillery into Pakistani border areas May 26. Refugees from the 7-year-old war in Afghanistan and official sources said at least six people, including five refugees in the Chaman camp, have been killed and 24 wounded in the past 24 hours.

Baghlan, a center of textile manufacturing, had a population of 100,000 before the Soviet Union sent troops to Afghanistan to prop up a Communist government besieged by Islamic resistance.

Guerrilla sources based in the Pakistani border town of Peshawar said that heavy fighting had erupted between resistance forces and combined Soviet and Afghan troops 13 miles (10 km) inside Afghanistan in the Jaji region of Paktia Province.

The sources said Soviet reinforcements were moving from the provincial capital of Gardez, to aid in the fighting. Eighteen guerrillas were seriously wounded in the week-long battle, the sources said.

Although details on the fighting are not available, reports say a convoy of 320 vehicles, including T-62 tanks, 152 mm self-propelled guns and armored personnel carriers, were seen leaving Kabul last May 20 and may have been moving toward the Jaji region.

Their apparent mission is to block the movement of the freedom fighters (Mujahideen) through the area toward Kabul, 50 miles (80 km) to the north.

/13046

CSO: 4600/273

KHAMENE'I INTERVIEWED BY ASAHI ON REGIONAL PROBLEMS

Tehran JOMHURI-YE ESLAMI in Persian 10 Jun 87 P 11

[Interview with Ali Khamene'i by ASAHI correspondent; date and place not specified]

[Text] Hojjat ol-Eslam val-Moslemin Seyyed Ali Khamene'i, the president, in a comprehensive interview with the correspondent of ASAHI newspaper answered his questions regarding the summit conference of the heads of the seven industrial nations, the war of the oil tankers, the presence of the USSR and the United States fleets in the Persian Gulf, the probable dispute between Iran and the United States, the possibility of closing the Strait of Hormuz by Iran, the future of the imposed war, Irano-Japanese relations, the relations between Iran and other countries of the region, the U.S. efforts for the renewal of political relations with Iran, an imminent trip to Japan by the president, the role of Japan in the Security Council, the reason for closing down the Islamic Republic Party, the relationship of imam and other responsible officials of the country.

The president in this interview which was printed on the front page of the Japan's foremost newspaper, emphasized that in case the commercial shipping traffic in the region becomes insecure, the Strait of Hormuz will likewise become insecure for the whole region and in that case the possibility of its closing cannot be denied.

In view of the significance of the aforementioned interview, complete text of the questions together with Mr Khamene'i's answers will appear below.

Question: The summit meeting of the heads of the seven industrial nations in Vienna is getting underway and the most important issue of this meeting pertains to the security of shipping lines in the Persian Gulf. Japan as a country which depends on this region for 60 percent of its oil needs, has been severely under pressure to play a role in the security of the region. What is your opinion with regard to this issue and the summit as a whole?

Answer: Of course this summit meeting can be effective. In our view the main cause of insecurity in the Persian Gulf must be recognized and duly announced. The main cause for the insecurity is Iraq which started the attack on shipping lines and oil tankers. I think if the big nations of the world are going to play a role in the issue of the Persian Gulf, they should focus their pressure on the Iraqi regime to stop it from attacking the oil tankers in the Persian Gulf, and in this effort Japan can play an effective role too.

Question: War on oil tankers has intensified. Around the beginning of May of the current year a Japanese giant oil tanker which was flying Japanese flag

came under attack. It is said that this vessel was attacked by the Iranian gunboats. Why Japanese vessels and other similar ships which belong to neutral countries are being attacked?

Answer: We do not accept the responsibility for attacking any vessels at all.

Question: As a result of an increased presence of the United States in the Persian Gulf, there is a fear of a conflict between Iran and the United States. What is your opinion?

Answer: Of course a military presence of the United States in the Persian Gulf will have its inherent difficulties, and it is for this reason that we have always insisted that the military presence of the superpowers--particularly in the Persian Gulf region--should be decreased or completely stopped.

The Persian Gulf is a commercial region which is intertwined with the economy of many countries such as Japan. And the main reason for our opposition to a military presence by the United States in the Persian Gulf is that wherever and whenever the superpowers establish a military presence, a sense of insecurity and a fear of military conflict in the region in question will arise. Of course we will not take any action so far as we are not forced to, however will will never accept any imposition either.

Question: The Soviet Union intends to increase its influence in the Persian Gulf. What is your reaction to this matter?

Answer: We have clearly announced our views with regard to the presence of the superpowers in the Persian Gulf and firmly believe that a military presence by the Soviet Union, like that of the United States and other superpowers will cause insecurity in the Persian Gulf. Of course during the past couple of weeks the presence of the Soviet's fleet and others have diminished in the Persian Gulf.

Question: Don't you think that the instigations by the United States and the Soviet Union will eventually isolate Iran?

Answer: If we look through the eyes of the superpowers, certainly we will notice that they carry on such instigations in order to exert pressure on the Islamic republic and perhaps one of their intentions may be to isolate Iran. However, our reaction toward various difficulties is an active and remedy-seeking one and we believe that other governments, particularly other nations can understand our situation quite well.

In fact in the Persian Gulf we defend the general interests of the nations of the region and on a wider level we do so to protect their universal interests, and this role in itself causes other nations which look at the issues of the Persian Gulf realistically, to recognize our role as a beneficial and dignified role.

Question: Do you think there is a possibility for closing off the Strait of Hormuz?

Answer: One cannot disregard this possibility. However, it is not an easy issue to deal with. Of course the day when our commercial route is completely blocked off and a comprehensive decision against our petroleum and commercial traffic seems to be brooding then the Strait of Hormuz will become insecure for the whole region.

Question: In the opinion of many political observers with due consideration to the unlimited support of the superpowers for the Iraqi regime, the possibility of a military victory for Iran seems quite remote and as a result the war will go on for a long time to come. In your opinion what is the most practical way to end the war in the shortest possible time?

Answer: I confirm the fact that the superpowers have, in the imposed war, extended extensive assistance to the Iraqi regime and if it were not for such assistance the issue of Iraq's aggression toward Iran would have been resolved by now. However, despite all the direct and indirect assistance of the superpowers, in our belief it is the human possibilities and the will-power of a nation which will go beyond the effects of military possibilities.

Our revolution has made many impossibilities into possibilities. There is no reason why this impossibility could likewise become a possibility by dint of the belief and the will-power of our people. At any rate, we intend to defend our national right and punish the aggressor for the sake of maintaining the security of the Persian Gulf region.

Question: In your opinion, will there be an end to the war through political or military means?

Answer: I've already answered your question clearly.

Question: Activities of the peace committees have once more become intensified. It seems as though the Islamic Republic of Iran, more than any other plan, is inclined toward the peace plan of the U.N. secretary general. At the present time what has been the result of this plan and whether Iran is ready to accept it or not?

Answer: I don't know what you mean by the plan of the secretary general. We had indicated that we would accept the plan of the secretary general with regard to a cease-fire in the Persian Gulf. This is a plan which was also suggested by the UN secretary general and we had accepted it. The reason for this is that the Iran-Iraq war is a war merely between the two countries which is going on at our immediate borders, and other countries can avoid becoming involved in this conflict and thus prevent incurring damages. Expansion of the war to the Persian Gulf threatens the interests of other countries. From the

very beginning we've welcomed any and all the initiatives which would insure the peace and security of the region. We think that the most interesting plan which was ever presented with regard to maintaining or preserving peace and security in the Persian Gulf, was the plan of the secretary general and on the first day after the end of the fasting month I also announced that we had accepted this plan.

Question: If it is possible describe to the people of Japan the conditions for ending the war.

Answer: Our main emphasis at this juncture is the punishment of the aggressor. This is a very important issue since if the aggressor is going to be encouraged, in reality the act of 'aggression' itself is encouraged, which means that we would better forget about peace and security of this region for ever.

All the assistance which have been extended towards the Iraqi regime amounts to encouraging of the aggressor and if the war comes to an end under the prevailing conditions the aggressor will feel that he has not lost anything at all. It is for this reason that we put particular emphasis on punishing of the aggressor. Without punishing the aggressor, it would be nothing but a day-dream or an impossible wish to think of peace and security along the borders of our two countries or the entire region as a whole. Our principal condition is the punishment of the aggressor.

Question: In your opinion who is the aggressor: Saddam or the Ba'thist Party of Iraq?

Answer: Undoubtedly Saddam and his clique are all part of the group of the aggressors.

Question: I've visited the battlefield on many occasions and always have noticed the high morale of the combatants for attaining a final victory; however, despite all the enthusiasm this war has brought about many problems in its wake. As the highest executive official of the country, what is your policy for resolving these difficulties?

Answer: We make a great effort. Of course if we were the ones who started the war and would welcome such difficulties, we would certainly not go through what we are going through now--but you should remember that this war and its ensuing problems have been imposed on us. We've made an all-out effort to mobilize the country in order to resolve these difficulties, on the other hand we are quite certain that many of these obstacles will persist until the end of the war and it is only after the end of the war when we will have a chance to resolve some of these difficulties.

Question: Do you still receive U.S. weapons even after the incident of Irangate?

Answer: No. Even no appreciable quantity of weapons from that incident alone was ever shipped to Iran from the United States. The United States has never been a major source or supplier of our weapons.

Question: What is the situation for securing your weapons needs? Do you receive enough? What would you do if an arms boycott against Iran were put into effect?

Answer: It is a few years now that an arms boycott against our country has been put into effect practically, yet despite all the boycotts we have managed to acquire our weapons' needs. Since from the very beginning we did not have enough trust in foreign sources, we put emphasis on our domestic sources and thus made an all-out effort to meet our goals. Today in our country we are able to make many equipment which cannot be manufactured in many other countries which are technologically on the same footing with us. We secure many of the war munitions domestically and our revolutionary forces constitute a good force for this purpose.

Question: Iran has announced that this year is a year for reaping the benefits of the setbacks of last year. Does this mean that this year the war will come to an end?

Answer: Because of your age I don't think you can remember the wars of your country. For a person who has felt the impact of the war, it is a very complex and unforeseeable issue. This means that one cannot foresee the end of any war at all. The reason being that various other factors will affect the outcome of the war--factors which are very difficult to take into account. Therefore, we don't have any definite prediction. Of course we will try to bring an end to the war as soon as possible.

Question: In my view a victory for Iran is drawing close and there is a very high possibility of a coup d'etat in Iraq!

Answer: I thank you very much for your feeling. God willing, be it so!

Question: Japan is one of your greatest commercial partners. How do you assess Japan's policy?

Answer: As you indicated Japan has friendly relations with us. Both in the political arena and particularly in the economic areas our relations with Japan seems quite warm. Of course we expect to see the effects of these political and economic relations on a correct and proper stance with regard to the war. For example, we expect to see a decisive and firm stance by the Japanese government with regard to the use of chemical weapons or other instances of conflagration in the Persian Gulf by the Iraqi regime. Undoubtedly, such position-taking, particularly by Japan, will have a favorable effect on the outcome or ending of the war and it will at the same time prevent the Iraqi regime from following such inhumanitarian approaches.

Question: At a meeting with you, you had told the Japanese ambassador that Japan can cooperate with Iran for reconstructing the country after the war is over. Could you please elaborate on the areas for this cooperation?

Answer: There are various areas for cooperation. After the war comes to an end we've a great deal of work to do in such areas as the technical, industrial, agricultural, cultural or reconstructing of the country and Japan with all its superb technical and industrial possibilities can be a very good technical partner for us. With due consideration to the fact that we enjoy good economic relations with Japan today, these relations can be the harbinger of a wide variety of cooperations in the future.

Question: The Japanese foreign minister will visit Tehran next week. Do you welcome this visit?

Answer: By all means.

Question: Would you like to visit Japan as your first trip to any western country?

Answer: I don't mind travelling to Japan at all. We've to see how the things evolve and in case the situation permits I will be eager to do so.

Question: At present, Japan is a member of the UN Security Council. What are your expectations from Japan?

Answer: Japan can play a very good role in the UN Security Council. Unfortunately, during the past several years of the war, the Security Council has left a bad impression on our nation. At the beginning of the aggression of Iraq on our country and at a time when all were expecting that the UN Security Council should condemn such flagrant transgression, no appreciable reaction was seen by the Security Council. All that was seen during the first two or three years of the war was a few communiques which were issued by the UN Security Council and none of these truly expressed the right and proper position of that council. It is for this reason that our people are disappointed by the Security Council and they don't have good memories of that forum. Japan which is now a member of the UN Security Council must exert proper influence on this council by taking proper, realistic and rightful positions in order to make amends for the past shortcomings.

I think this kind of service by Japan more than helping Iran and the outcome of the war can provide a service to the United Nations and the Security Council and thus demonstrate that Japan can have an effective role as well.

Question: Japan has strongly protested the use of chemical weapons by the Iraqi regime and expressed its objections likewise. If Japan is inclined to play a more important role in the war between Iran and Iraq, what measures should it take?

Answer: I think the best role that Japan can play would be to make the western countries, which extend assistance to the Iraqi regime under various forms, aware of the ensuing dangers of such measures. This means that today there are some western countries which practically cause the continuation of this war, thereby through provision of supplies to the Iraqi regime they've helped to prolong the war. It is here that Japan can make them aware of the dangerous consequences of such a role and make those countries to apply some pressure on the Iraqi regime. This in itself would be the most significant service to the two nations of Iran and Iraq and those of the region and most certainly it will help to bring an end to the war.

Question: Prompted by humanitarian motives the Japanese government tried to act as an intermediary between Iran and the United States in order to secure the release of the American hostages in Lebanon. Of course this action never materialized. Do you think that Japan should not interfere in such an affair?

Answer: No, I don't think so. Humanitarian feelings are fine and acceptable things and Japan has been motivated by such sentiments. We also always experience similar feelings ourselves and would not feel comfortable to see other individuals under pressure anywhere.

Question: It is said that the United States is still trying secretly to establish diplomatic relations with Iran. Is this a correct assumption?

Answer: It is possible that such assumption is right, however I do not have any information to that effect. You mentioned that this is something secret, and besides in the past the United States was not successful at all in a similar case which was assigned to McFarlane and other officials for establishing contact with our government. Therefore, it is quite a natural assumption to think that the United States have similar intentions without our knowledge.

Question: One of the reasons which prompted me to ask this question is the payment of 451 million dollars of the frozen Iranian assets by the United States. Can this not be construed as the first step toward re-establishing of the relations between the two countries?

Answer: Naturally I don't know the motives of the U.S. government in this regard; however, this is an issue which pertains to the courts and it was the tribunal court which decreed that the United States should pay its debt. Obviously if the U.S. government had not acted according to the decision of the court it would have to face other legal and political consequences.

Question: What is your view about the world terrorism and the issue of hostage-taking in Lebanon? Do you have any intentions for helping/securing the release of the hostages?

Answer: With regard to world terrorism we've to say that we clearly condemn it, however we believe that the main causes of world terrorism are the superpowers

which exert pressure on other nations so much so that some elements of these nations have no other recourse except resorting to acts of heroism which are in turn dubbed as terrorism.

If unnecessary pressure is removed from other nations and these nations are left alone to pursue their normal life, undoubtedly we will not have the phenomenon of terrorism any more. On the other hand, we must not limit the act of terrorism with the instance of hostage-taking or the murder of a person in a certain region. Today many of the operations which are carried out by the United States in Central America or Africa can also be called acts of terrorism.

Terrorism, whether on a large or small scale has to be condemned. Unfortunately, in our world of today all the small scale terrorism will be severely condemned while the large scale terrorism which is committed by the superpowers go unnoticed. In our view the government of the United States is a terrorist and every and all acts of terrorism is condemned by us.

With regard to the hostages in Lebanon, undoubtedly if we were able to find a way to help the release of those hostages we would certainly like to do so--as in some instances where we've had the opportunity to extend such help. However, it should be noted that as a result of the prevailing conditions brought about for the Lebanese Muslims, the problem has become more complicated for all of us.

To a certain extent the captors might accept our recommendations, but at a time when the pressure of the zionists and the phalangists over a group of Muslims has been intensified, then neither our recommendations nor our words will have any effect.

Question: In the past recent days Iran has been in contact with the countries of the region more than ever before and certain messages from you have been dispatched for the heads of the states. What are the nature of such contacts and what have been the reactions?

Answer: In general the reactions have been positive and harmonious. Naturally, the main point is a diplomatic revival of the regional issues. We've always put our views and solutions for the existing problems at the disposal of these countries and on many occasions our messages have been welcomed and accepted by the recipients.

Question: Now more than eight years have passed from the advent of the Islamic revolution. How do you assess the revolution and its effect on the world politics. Is the eminent imam satisfied with the existing situation and the past eight years altogether?

Answer: The kind of work which has taken place during the last eight years is something similar to a miracle and the reason for that was the pile of problems which were present in the path of our reconstruction of the country. Most certainly if such difficulties were non-existent, through the revolutionary power

and movement of our people we would have achieved further accomplishments. Although we are quite satisfied with the kind of efforts and the many progresses that we've achieved, yet we do not consider them sufficient at all and that is also the view of the imam.

We always consider each goal as an additional step toward the final objective of the revolution--which is the complete victory of the Iranian nation and a true and comprehensive reconstruction, whereby each and every individual reaches the pinnacle of moral and material accomplishments.

With regard to the effect of the revolution on the world politics, it is evident that it has had a tremendous effect. Perhaps in this age no comparable phenomenon has had such prodigious effect on the universal way of thinking. If I want to describe the greatest effect and the product of the revolution to other nations, perhaps it would be enough to emphasize the point that this revolution has revived the self-reliance of the nations. In other words, other nations have come to realize that they can live without relying on the superpowers and that they can go on and continue their work and efforts with no dependency at all. Whereas in the jargon of colonialism the people had been given to understand that they had to be definitely subservient to somewhere, while our revolution demonstrated that without dependency on the East or the West or any other superpower for that matter, it is possible to stand on one's own feet and reconstruct one's life. This was a significant accomplishment for other nations.

Question: Is Iran considering the policy of the 'export of the revolution'?

Answer: What do you infer from the export of the revolution? If you mean to export the revolution to other countries by means of arms and aggression, then the answer is no--this is a policy which has never been existent at all. However, if the export of the revolution is construed as a beneficial lesson for other countries, in that case it would be an inexhaustible asset.

Every country puts its experiences at the disposal of other nations. For instance, Japan after World War II was not disinterested to put its comprehensive experiences in the industrial and technical areas at the disposal of other countries. This is the message of any nation or any country which has something to say-- And our revolution has a lot to say. It is but natural that these words will reach the ears of other nations and it cannot be stopped.

Naturally, if the export of revolution means something like this it is going to be continued as it has been doing so. Unfortunately, in the universal portrait of the export of revolution a mischievous act has been committed. Namely, it has been given to understand as if we want to export explosive materials to other countries and create chaos and confusion among their people. It is nothing of that sort at all.

Question: The Islamic Republic Party has stopped all its activities. One of the reasons for this inactivity has been given as the possibility of some differences. What are these differences?

Answer: Naturally the existence of a party in which some are members and others are not, can be divisive. This means that under the present circumstances for a nation which needs unity and solidarity more than anything else, the existence of any kind of barrier or separating medium could be dangerous. Our reasons were exactly the same as were reflected in the letter which we [I and Mr Hashemi Rafsanjani] wrote to the imam.

One day, this party which could act as a fortress in defending the revolution and its accomplishments seemed to be quite necessary; however, today there is no need for it. For this reason we brought its activities to a halt and if we feel there is a need for it we will reactivate it again.

Question: Will you please give us some explanation about the health status of the imam and also how often do you pay him a visit?

Answer: On the day of Id-e Fetr [the first day after the fasting month] everyone saw for himself how the imam looked health-wise. The imam feels very good, healthy and jovial. I think there are not many 85 year old men with such mental acuity in the world. The strong morale of our dear leader most certainly plays a factor in his health. As regards our visits: whenever I need to see him I pay him a visit, other than that once every few days or every one or two weeks I pay him a visit.

Question: How does the imam give you and the other responsible officials guidance?

Answer: Imam is the true and moral leader for us. He is the resolver of any difficulty which might arise for us. Whether we are faced with a political problem or another important issue he can truly resolve it for us when we pay him a visit. In addition to imparting us with strength, our leader's spiritual integrity is the greatest guiding element which gives us the necessary morale to carry on such heavy burdens.

ASAHI: Mr president, we are very grateful to you for this interview. If you have any special message, please go ahead.

President: Thank you.

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HEAVY INDUSTRY MINISTER QUESTIONED ON TRADE DIFFICULTIES

Foreign Trade: Non-Oil Exports

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 11 Jun 87 pp 6, 19

[Interview with Behzad Nabavi, minister of heavy industries; date and place not specified]

[Text] Early this year following a trip by a high-ranking political-economic delegation to Turkey a new economic protocol was signed between the Islamic Republic of Iran and Turkey.

The new protocol gave us an opportunity to interview Engineer Behzad Nabavi, minister of heavy industries and supervisor of the Iran's political-economic delegation during talks with Turkish economic officials concerning Iran's foreign trade problems, with in-depth treatment of economic relations with Turkey, government policy-making for foreign trade, and the gains made in the industrial sector by non-petroleum exports.

During the interview Engineer Behzad Nabavi also gave his views concerning domestic trade, the principal ways to fight hoarding and overpricing, and the right methods for controlling the distribution of society's basic and vital goods.

The first part of this interview was devoted to trade and economic-political exchanges with Turkey, which we transcribe below:

KEYHAN: What is the extent of the qualitative and quantitative differences in Iran and Turkey's new economic protocol? And what guarantees insure the fulfillment of the new commitments? What is the reason for the sharp drop in the export of non-petroleum goods from 500 to 70 million dollars?

Answer: In general, protocols signed between various countries do not have the force of international treaties. Rather, they are statements of mutual understanding between two parties establishing a framework for their relations in the coming year. The failure to implement a protocol merely leads to stagnation and disagreement. Neither party can complain to any authority if some article in the protocol is not implemented.

A protocol clarifies frameworks and what must be done. Within the framework of this protocol, treaties are signed between negotiators, industrialists, tradesmen, the commercial and service sectors, and if the framework is cultural, between the cultural sectors, or the political sectors if it is political.

A protocol thus sets a framework, and treaties, which are more detailed, are concluded by the various groups on both sides, and in our country the signatories could be in the public, private, or cooperative sectors.

Therefore, the guarantees to which we can have recourse are the things that have been foreseen by the two governments, and both governments think that this year's statement of mutual understanding may be more realistic than last year's.

With regard to the quantitative and qualitative differences between this year's and last year's protocols, one must first realize what characteristics last year's protocol had. In that protocol the expected volume of trade was to be about three billion dollars. When the Turkish prime minister came to Iran and the protocol was signed between the two prime ministers, the expected volume of trade was three billion dollars, or 1.5 billion dollars from Iran and 1.5 billion dollars from Turkey. This protocol was drawn up in view of the Islamic Republic of Iran's normal economic situation, at a time when oil revenues were high. The world price of oil was high, the level of oil exports was greater, and Iran's sources of revenue were different than they are now.

It was on that basis that the protocol was drawn up and signed, and the types and quantities of purchases were determined during contacts between Turkish merchants and Iranian industrialists, factories and merchants—both public and private. These were then collected, and they made a total volume of 1.5 billion dollars in Iranian purchases from Turkey or 1.5 billion in Iranian sales to Turkey. First we establish a procedure that says what goods we will buy from Turkey and what goods we will export to them, then all government and private companies and institutions begin talking, and the total of the understandings reached forms a protocol.

Reduction in Oil Prices

This is the way the protocol for 1365 [21 March 1986 – 20 March 1987] was signed, but in less than 20 days the world price of oil dropped, and one of the provisions of the protocol was that if there were severe fluctuations in the price of oil the prime ministers of the two countries would talk and set a new price within 15 days. This provision was included in the protocol at the insistence of the Turkish side, and since they insisted on a large reduction in the price of oil and we said we were not willing to agree to such a reduction, it was agreed that if major fluctuations occurred in the price of oil, the prime ministers of the two countries would talk and solve the problem. Apparently they (the Turks) had knowledge of the impending drop in oil prices at that time, but we were uninformed!

Then the price of oil dropped and the prime minister of Turkey notified the prime minister of Iran, but there has been a disagreement over the new price and the method of pricing which has caused a great deal of time to be lost since this matter was announced, so that in 1986 the total value of the oil taken out of Iran by Turkey did not exceed 250 million dollars.

This figure, compared to previous years when it was one and 1.3 billion dollars, shows a striking decrease and an important change. On the other hand, the volume of our purchases from Turkey also dropped significantly. Of course the volume of purchases in 1986 reached about 470 million dollars, most of which was exported oil, but because we have special credit between the two countries up to 400 million dollars, either side can purchase up to 400 million dollars more in goods than that purchased by the other side which can be taken out of that special credit account. Therefore, last year when oil revenues decreased, neither we nor the Turkish side had firm and

specific policies for dealing with this new situation, even though immediately after the drop in oil prices in the month of Khordad of that year [22 May - 21 June 1986] we took a relatively large delegation of 50 to 60 people to Turkey and inserted an amendment in the protocol.

We prepared the amendment with the idea first of all that Turkey has a large market in Iran and with the reduction in our foreign exchange income it would lose this market, or if it did not lose it, it would buy non-petroleum goods from us as a substitute for petroleum. We therefore said that now was the best opportunity for us to go immediately and take this action. For this purpose we went to Turkey, and the three-billion-dollar protocol became a 2.2-billion-dollar protocol, of which 1.2 billion dollars were allocated for petroleum exchanges.

This means 600 million dollars in oil sales and 600 million dollars in goods purchased (totaling 1.2 billion dollars), and another billion dollars in the protocol is allocated for non-petroleum trading, meaning we are to export 500 million dollars in non-petroleum goods, and they will export 500 million dollars of the same.

The Race for Exports

As expected, the measures we took were welcomed by Turkey, and they in turn hastened to buy, but they did not know our market, nor did we know it ourselves. We had previously estimated our maximum export capability at 300 million dollars. We went to Turkey and they made a proposal to that effect, and we saw that such an amount could be exported, and it is possible.

They made proposals rapidly, and we accepted just as rapidly, for we had brought all of our own exporters with us. Therefore the figures given in the minutes of the talks they brought to us and those of the export agreement reached a ceiling of 600 million dollars. On the last day we decided that this 600 million dollars was too high, and that it would not be likely that of the nation's total non-petroleum exports of 800 to 900 million dollars we would be sending 600 million to Turkey alone. We said the talks should be revised and 100 million dollars were taken off that figure, bringing the total down to 500 million dollars. Both parties eagerly agreed to the revision of the protocol in this form.

We ran into problems, however, in the practical implementation. The problems turned up with regard to oil, and instead of 600 million dollars, they took no more than 250 million dollars, and our purchases were 470 million dollars, fulfilling a high percentage of the terms of the protocol.

In the area of non-petroleum goods, unfortunately we must say that in all of 1986 we only exchanged four million out of 500 million dollars.

Of course, even when we returned from Turkey and this 500 million dollar figure had been given, I told the media in every interview to write that this is what is on paper, meaning that the Turkish side had shown its inclination and the Iranian side had indicated its interest, but there was still a lot of work to be done. I even said in a television interview that we would be very happy if one-fifth of this amount were reached, but unfortunately since you people in the media write only what is good and do not write what is bad, you didn't print everything I said, you only wrote about that 500 million dollars.

In any case, in this way a three-million-dollar revision was made to the protocol, but the same revised protocol has not been implemented, for various reasons that I will explain.

Reduction in Volume of Turkish Exports

With regard to purchases, since Iranian oil exports to Turkey have been reduced, our purchases have also dropped. The amount of foreign exchange allotted to organizations has dropped and their purchases have also declined. Turkey has shown a gradual tendency to seek other markets, because in that country the private sector's mechanism is such that it will not wait to see what we are going to do. It is looking for its own markets. Therefore the volume of Turkish exports dropped nine billion dollars, and this level of decline was also related to Iran, Iraq and the oil-producing nations. Of course Turkey made great efforts to find new markets to replace its lost markets, and to a degree it may have been successful. In any case, due to the failure to implement the part of the protocol pertaining to oil, first of all because of differences on the price and the failure to receive oil, and second because of the reduced amount of foreign exchange available to our own organizations, we were not able to buy from Turkey in accordance with the protocol.

There were many more problems in the area of non-petroleum goods. When we say that 500 million dollars in exports is possible in principle, it seems very simple, but in practice it is extremely difficult to do.

I myself have written a number of letters and held a number of meetings with Turkish officials in connection with the sale of one export item produced by one of the units under the Ministry of Heavy Industries, a deal involving 400 combines for Turkey valued at only 16 million dollars, which will give us only an additional one million dollars in foreign exchange, and we still haven't succeeded in solving the problem.

Non-petroleum exports are not like petroleum exports, where we connect a pipeline nozzle to a supertanker, press a button, fill it in one day and get a hundred million dollars or so.

Great effort must be expended for every dollar earned in non-petroleum exports. We wanted to make use of our buying mechanism and apply pressure for exports; we have indeed made progress, but unfortunately subsequent problems have prevented things from getting done.

Obstacles to Non-Petroleum Exports

As for the subsequent problems, some of them were on the Turkish side. The Turks agreed to buy an item from us, then when they went to import this item, they saw that the tariffs on this item were so great in Turkey, where it is produced domestically, that our goods could not compete.

After that we tried to make some changes in the commercial tariffs between the two countries so that we would be able to export there, but since Turkey is a member of GAT (the general international tariff and trade agreement), it cannot unilaterally enter into such an agreement with us.

We were therefore obliged to pursue this matter within the framework of ECO (the organization for regional cooperation between Iran, Turkey and Pakistan), because under GAT regulations, if there is a regional economic-commercial union, its members can establish special conditions among themselves. However, to pursue such a thing under ECO would take a year or two and time would be lost.

Problems with Non-Petroleum Exports

The second thing is that so far we have done no exporting and do not understand it. None of those things we see as exportable traditional goods, such as carpets, cumin and so forth, were part of the 500 million dollars in the agreement. These things were not needed in Turkey. Of course they have no objections, they would take them themselves and export them to Europe themselves, but we ourselves did not like this.

What we wanted to export were agricultural-industrial goods, and finding and exploiting markets for these is very difficult. One of the same Turkish importers, who has a large company, told me 'I came to buy tiles from you at a time when tiles had become expensive in Turkey. I'm a businessman and at that very moment I want to buy tiles from you and ship them and sell them for a profit. However, you took so long to give a proform that the element of time was lost, and as a result of the high prices tile imports had begun in the country, and the Turkish government imposed a tariff on tiles. Therefore when you (Iran) took measures to deliver the goods, my tariffs had doubled and I was left holding the tiles and I couldn't sell them. Even worse, when I came to receive the tiles, you said you had tiles but no crates...'

Or there is the fact that a Turkish government official told one of my colleagues, 'You want to export non-petroleum goods? Go right now to your country (Iran). There are four Turkish merchants sitting in every one of your offices. Go help them get their work done'.

The truth is that we have been spoiled for a long time. We just put the hose in the oil tanker and just sell oil. Of course they come and insert the hose themselves, since the consortium, the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company and others have done this themselves for some time. Then the only thing the National Iranian Oil Company did was to throw the nozzle aboard the supertanker.

This is very easy to do, and everyone comes to Khark Island to take the oil. However, when we want to go after non-petroleum exports it becomes very difficult. Although we have made good progress (with Turkey), in practice we have not been able to advance. In this regard, Turkey, not wanting to lose its market, has made many proposals, but they did not know the domestic situation, whether they would be able to get an exemption on tariffs and so forth. However, when they looked into the situation they realized that they would not be able to buy all these goods from us.

The Iranian side, which only wanted to increase its exports, said yes to everything they said, but met with difficulties later in the practical implementation.

In any case, both sides were unrealistic about seeking non-petroleum exports.

Two-Billion-Dollar Protocol

The change that was made in this year's protocol was in the volume of exchanges. It dropped to around two billion dollars, about 500 million dollars of which is for what has already transpired in the first four months of the current Christian year, during which each side has bought 250 million dollars in goods. Therefore what we have agreed to in practice totals 1.3 billion dollars for both sides, and I believe this figure is somewhat more realistic than the figure that was set last year.

The total figure given in this protocol for non-petroleum exports is around 70 million dollars, which is much more realistic. When we had four million dollars in non-petroleum exports last year, this figure is quite high.

We actually have a series of problems in this area. For example, in the matter of transporting export goods, we do not allow Turkish trucks to come to Iran because of a law the Majlis enacted, and we ourselves either cannot send our own trucks, or if we do send them the price is so high that they cannot be used to export goods.

In any case, difficulties of this kind exist and must be eliminated if we are to reach a volume of 70 million dollars.

Participation in Third Country Projects

KEYHAN: In the area of cooperation with Turkey in third countries, what understandings have been reached so far?

Engineer Nabavi: We are trying to retain this project and implement it, but the reality is that with regard to the above project we are being very slow. They have control of the regional market and we want to enter this market and participate with them.

Turkey alone has markets in Libya, Algeria, all the Arab nations, in the region and even in Japan and Western Europe. We want to say let's go into Third World countries and find markets.

There is no Third World country where Turkey has no access and we do. For example, suppose we have good relations with Libya and Algeria, Turkey has better relations with them than we do. Therefore these proposals of ours are not very attractive to Turkey; at the same time they do not reject it and are moving ahead.

For example, we say let's build this product together and export it. They spend a year or two making preparations, but we do not. They act and move ahead themselves!

For this reason, such collaborative efforts have not been very productive so far; there has been talk in many areas, but action has not been taken.

Natural Gas Pipeline Project

KEYHAN: The technical exchanges of the two countries are still being directed to projects to build the Iran-Turkey natural gas and oil pipeline. What progress has been made in this area?

Engineer Nabavi: The oil and natural gas pipeline has a separate protocol signed by the prime ministers of the two countries.

To date only the government of Iran has announced measures to provide Turkey with natural gas, and we have said that we are willing to deliver natural gas to Turkey at the border.

In this regard Turkey has not yet given an answer, but technical-economic petroleum studies show that the project is evidently not economical, and that the project is not acceptable.

The proposal for a natural gas pipeline was made during the last five or six months, and the proposal is for a pipeline to Europe which also delivers natural gas to Turkey. This project is an independent proposal of ours, on the assumption that even if it doesn't go to Europe Turkey itself would be able to make use of the natural gas. Turkey has not yet given a final answer and is now studying the project.

Policy of Foreign Relations

KEYHAN: In view of Turkey's political, economic and military relations with America and Iraq, and in view of Iran's economic policy of giving trade priority to Islamic countries and its opposition to America and Iraq, how do you explain Iran's existing economic relations with Turkey? And how is it that even as Iran's political differences with Turkey are increasing, economic relations between the two countries are also increasing at the same rate?

Engineer Nabavi: The first point is that a great many nations of the world with whom we have relations have good relations with America and Iraq or the Soviet Union and Iraq.

A great many nations have the common attribute of good relations with Iraq.

Moreover, we have stated our concerns elsewhere. In our foreign relations and in our economic and technical relations, the criterion is whether they serve the interest of our nation, not whether the other country is imperialist or not, because if we were to make this the basis of our foreign relations, we would not be able to establish relations with many nations.

The second point is the fact that we said we would trade with Islamic nations, and we have not stipulated, as you say, that they should be in opposition to America and Iraq.

How many Islamic nations do we have that are opposed to America and Iraq?

Only Syria fits this description, then there is South Yemen, which is opposed to America but not Iraq. We must thus look only to Syria for trade possibilities, and no matter what we do we could obtain 150 million dollars in purchasing power from Syria.

Therefore, the number of Islamic nations who are opposed to America and Iraq is very small, and these have no economic power, while we are importing raw materials for our factories from Turkey, we import steel, basic goods such as wheat, chemical fertilizer, sugar, wood, paper and other things. Which of these Islamic nations has these things for us to import?

We import none of these things to our own detriment; none of our purchases has made us imperialistic or led to Turkish influence in Iran, and none will.

Within this framework, we must expand our relations as far as we can with Third World nations, and especially Islamic and neighbor nations, in technical, economic and industrial areas and in border affairs as long as they are in the interest of the nation, and these expanded relations should give us more secure borders and more normal relations with these nations.

On this basis, Turkish policy meets all three requirements: it is a third world nation, an Islamic nation, and it is our neighbor.

Actually, if we weren't at war with Iraq we would be expanding the same relationship with them, and we would do the same thing with Afghanistan if we were not entangled in a struggle with them. We are establishing an economic exchange delegation with the Soviet Union; even though the Soviet Union is a great power and if it had extensive economic relations there would be a greater possibility for its economic influence and domination than there would be for a Third World

nation, we are establishing relations with the Soviet Union. We have established extensive relations with Pakistan, we have established relations with the Persian Gulf sheikhdoms to the extent that they can, and of course there is still room for progress.

However, because of the Iran-Iraq war, the Persian Gulf sheikhdoms will not come very close to Iran. Naturally we have tried to establish economic relations with all our neighbors, with all Third World nations, and with all Islamic nations, with the exception of those who are hostile to us such as Iraq, Afghanistan, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco and others, with whom we have severed relations, naturally in order to create a secure climate at the borders and in our political relations.

Political Differences

Concerning the last part of your question where you said that economic relations between Iran and Turkey are expanding just as fast as their political differences, I must say first of all that the political differences between Turkey and Iran have not reached a very high level. There are points of difference, such as the bombing of northern Iraq.

During my last trip to Turkey I clearly told the prime minister of Turkey that our nation cannot tolerate them warring with our enemy's enemy, for warring with our enemy's enemy means supporting our enemy, and we protested this.

Of course they almost promised us that if the Kurds do not attack Turkey, they will not under any circumstances venture into northern Iraq. They said the reason for their attack was that the Kurds attacked them, and if they do not attack the Turks will not under any circumstances undertake aggression.

Then there is the matter of the woman's veil. Of course we cannot deal with that issue in Turkey as a government, but at the same time we do express the public's objections. In my meetings with the prime minister of Turkey, I clearly expressed the unhappiness of the public in our country with the veil episode. He told me clearly that there are differences of opinion on that issue within the Turkish government itself, and that he himself was not in agreement with the policy. This decision was taken in Turkey by the Supreme Council of Higher Education, which is apparently managed under the president's direct supervision. Therefore, contrary to what you say, there are no major political differences between Iran and Turkey, and an indication of this is our prime minister's trip to Turkey.

We have tried to preserve neighborly relations. The primary political problem, as I have said, is the bombing of northern Iraq, and the Turkish side has taken a positive position on this issue. The matter of the veil, as I said, was not a problem with the Turkish government. It became clear to us that the Turkish government itself was not so much in agreement with such a policy, not, of course, in the sense that it is itself in favor of veiling as we are, but it is not in favor of such measures that are being taken with regard to veiling.

At the same time, economic relations have not increased, and we can see that they are less than what was written in the protocol, or even in last year's revision. Of course this reduction is not to be seen as a deterioration in relations, but rather as an indication of more realistic economic relations.

Anti-Islamic Movements in Turkey

KEYHAN: The anti-Islamic movements in Turkey, especially last year, persuaded Turkish government and military officials to adopt new policies (of an oppressive, anti-Islamic, and propagandistic nature). How do you view this development and its consequences in the context of ongoing economic relations between the two nations?

Engineer Nabavi: I explained in my answer to the previous question, first of all that the prime minister of Turkey told me clearly that he is not in agreement with this, but that there are internal differences of opinion there regarding the veiling of women.

Secondly, you can see that in a lot of other countries right here in our own region, such as India, there is hostile treatment of Muslims. We protest to the limit of the government's responsibility. Our public objects, and they may stage demonstrations and even hunger strikes against them, but we cannot cut off all our relations on the basis of such issues as this. If we did this, we would have to cut off our relations with many countries, because in any case the economic and political tendencies in the countries of the world are such that we cannot approve of them, and if we were to have confrontations with all of them, there would be no room left for conducting trade and economic, industrial, technical and commercial relations.

Therefore, in the above matters, again I say that although as an Iranian citizen I object to anti-Islamic activities such as those being carried out in Turkey, at the same time we go there and participate as a delegation as guests of the Turkish government.

There is a distinction between my government persona and my Islamic and Iranian persona. As an Iranian, I object, but as a government we have preserved our relations.

Dependence in Economic Difficulties

KEYHAN: Won't confining our foreign relations to countries like Turkey and Germany lead to economic problems and dependence for us?

Engineer Nabavi: I don't know why you are especially sensitive on this, I don't know. Why Turkey and Germany?

KEYHAN: On Iran's imports curve, Japan, Germany and Turkey appear at the top of the graph.

Engineer Nabavi: Are you drawing this conclusion from the fact that I have gone to these two countries during the past six or seven months? In any case, we have not, as you say, confined our relations to Turkey and Germany, with God as my witness. We have welcomed and continue to welcome expanded economic, technical and industrial relations, with any country, with those stipulations I have mentioned, with the exception of America, South Africa, Israel, Egypt, Morocco, Jordan, Iraq, Afghanistan, the Philippines, and several others.

If you noticed, our minister of commerce recently went to Indonesia and signed a protocol. We even went to this country and established relations, a country we had had nothing to do with before the revolution because of its size and because it is not really an exporting country.

We have established relations with Nicaragua, Cuba and with many South American and African countries, so you see that we are trying to establish relations with everyone. Moreover, it is not our fault that Tanzania lacks the ability and capacity of Germany to interact with us economically.

You say that our economic relations are extensive with Germany, and yes, I confirm this and do not refute it, but I want to explain something. Germany is the largest and best producer of industrial machinery in the world. If you go into a Japanese factory, you will see that many of their important machines, such as line testers, measurement devices, and quality and quantity control devices are German. Or we buy from Turkey those things that serve the interest of the nation.

If we want to buy wheat for our own western provinces, is it better to obtain it at the Turkish border, or to buy it in Australia, then bring it by ship to port and then transfer it 3,000 kilometers by truck to our western silos?

We now obtain it at Erzerum, avoiding the problems of it piling up at port, shipping, and trucking. For example, it has been useful for us to bring iron implements for many factories and their raw materials through Turkey. It is much better and it is economical for both sides.

The reduced distance means that we pay slightly higher prices than international rates, but at the same time the total cost is less to us than that of goods from other markets. Therefore, we are not going to confine relations to Turkey and Germany in any way. If you are talking about my trip to Turkey, that is in no way an indication that our relations are confined to Turkey. I have also gone to Bulgaria, why didn't you look at that, I also went to Czechoslovakia, why didn't you notice that, why didn't you notice the protocol I signed several days ago with the Bulgarians? I signed a 500-million-dollar protocol with the Bulgarians, whose export and import capability is much less than that of Turkey, and a protocol was signed with Czechoslovakia in Tehran.

All of these things show that we do not look only in one place. Recently the general economic director of our ministry even signed economic protocols with Libya and Algeria.

However, the conditions in some countries are such that, for example we have been trying for two or three years to expand industrial, commercial and economic exchanges with Libya and Algeria.

For many years imperialism has attracted both countries to itself, but we have bought a series of goods from the West that we may have been able to buy from Algeria, and Algeria in turn has bought a series of goods from the West that it might have been able to buy from us.

When I met with the Indonesian ambassador, I said 'We buy your tin from the London commodities exchange, and you buy our products from another country. Who should it be this way, who don't we exchange our goods directly ourselves?'

Turkey happens to be an example of successful exchanges of this type, and the Turks themselves happen to have the same view. Two Third World nations were able to solve their own problems.

Contrary to what might be envisioned, none of these goods we buy from Turkey are produced in America. The steel we buy is not brought from America, and the petrochemical raw materials are not brought from America. They take our oil, process it in a refinery and give the results back to us. For goods of this type, it is not the case that we are a market for Western capitalist monopolies.

Hoarding, Overpricing Problems

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 14 Jun 87 p 18

[Text] Economic Service—The first portion of the views of Engineer Behzad Nabavi, minister of heavy industries, concerning foreign trade and export problems was printed in the previous issue. The second and concluding portion deals with non-petroleum export policies, problems and solutions to the matter of expediting exports, solutions to the problem of overpricing and hoarding, insuring the procurement of society's basic needs, and other matters.

In his interview with KEYHAN, the minister of heavy industries discussed the supply and demand situation for goods in the country and gave his views concerning the alleviation of distribution problems in society while the country is at war. The concluding portion of the interview follows below:

KEYHAN: What is your view of the status of the country's exports, and what organization must do whatever it can to open up the bottlenecks in the country's exports and activate them so that they can grow?

Engineer Nabavi: Exports are not subject to the control of organizations, the entire nation is responsible for exports. The first responsible party is that producer who must produce quality goods at a low price in a short time, and in our country this practice is almost non-existent.

Neither the government nor the private sector produces quality goods at a low price in a short time. Our producers are used to having the domestic customers stand in lines for hours, praising them to the skies and buying low-quality goods at high prices without complaining. This is the situation with the producers.

Mobilization of Organizations and Units

The producer must be mobilized in a form that accommodates export and import regulations, shipping regulations and port regulations in order to support exports. In my view much work has been done in the last year or two in the above areas, but the instability of export policies is still a stumbling block.

If export policies are unstable, especially in the first years, and if we say to export goods this way today and another way tomorrow, it will completely bankrupt people. I depend on export policies. If the exporter is to be allowed to sell export contracts and to buy and import goods, this must remain as a policy for three or four years so that the exporter can count on it.

If an exporter can export an item with exemption from currency licensing, this must be a long-term policy. Although I myself am opposed to exporting watermelons in a Boeing 747 without one dollar going into the nation's accounts, I am more opposed to having you grant an exemption today, tomorrow demand a written settlement, the day after tomorrow say no, we don't have the right to export at all, and then the next day you write up regulations on it. We must be consistent for two or three years, because non-petroleum exports are very difficult and can succeed only in the shadow of stability. The government must adopt stabilized policies and give great support to the exporter, even if a few people get rich, because a lot of people put huge amounts of money in their pockets in these dealings.

Solution to Export Problems

Behzad Nabavi also said: When we have found a market then we can gradually begin to work out these problems. I am really becoming very unhappy. For example we see watermelons being exported with a Boeing 747, which expends a lot of foreign exchange for takeoff and landing, flies with fuel that all requires foreign exchange, the watermelons are grown with chemical fertilizers that take foreign exchange using tractors and agricultural supplies that have all been bought with foreign exchange, all of which was paid by the government so that the watermelons could be produced. Then the watermelons are exported and not one dollar of the proceeds is controlled or supervised by the country, or used in the country's service in a way that is accountable.

Of course they sell a lot of these and bring in goods, but there no accountability and this is very bad. In any case, it is better that a policy that is adopted in this area be stable.

KEYHAN: A new plan has recently been adopted for fighting overpricing. Do you think such plans will be successful, and what is your view concerning the hoarding of products, overpricing and their solution?

Engineer Nabavi: God, the fight against overpricing has never succeeded. In my view, the fight against high costs is more important than the fight against overpricing, and after that the fight against overpricing will make sense.

The simplest way to fight high costs, which is stated in classical economics, is to increase supply to the point that it exceeds demand, and prices come down.

Very well, this was the policy that we were under pressure to implement in 1362 [21 March 1983 – 20 March 1984] and 1363 [21 March 1984 – 20 March 1985]. If we were to implement that policy, we would have to pour so many Springtime of Freedom coins into the street that anyone wanting coins would be able to obtain goods immediately at the 3,500-toman price set by the Central Bank, and thus break black market prices.

Or for example we could put so many Peykan automobiles on the streets that the 400,000-toman black market price would be broken and the government price would go into effect.

This policy is very simple and everyone knows it and we know how to implement it, but some think that we are inefficient and cannot implement this policy.

Policy of Fighting High Prices

This policy requires very great financial resources, and we do not have such resources. If we were able to first attain a sufficient level of production for the most important items by building enough road building equipment, our own refineries and power stations and then go on to increase our domestic resources that we could build enough Peykans domestically that every Iranian could have an automobile, not only would we be able to sell oil, but there would be no problem implementing the policy of creating an abundance of supply.

Now is not that time, however, therefore in my view instead of fighting overpricing we must fight high prices, but the way to do it is not by increasing supply. The nation now has many problems with foreign exchange and there is absolutely no possibility that we can make supply and demand prevail in the market.

This is why I started that movement in the National Economic Mobilization Staff in 1359 [21 March 1980 – 20 March 1981] that met with so much disparagement. I couldn't even mention ration coupons, and if I did they said 'couponism means communism' and accused me of heresy. I even remember wanting to introduce a bill with sanctions for coupon forgery in the Majlis and my friends telling me that the mood in the Majlis was such that this bill could not be passed.

Fortunately, we now see that the mood is no longer like that. Now everyone at least realizes that you cannot fight economic problems and high prices with a policy of increasing supply.

Procurement of Basic Needs

With all the things I have said, I must say that I believe that the fight against high prices is the way to obtain society's basic needs, which is exactly what I said in 1359 [21 March 1980 – 20 March 1981] on the Economic Mobilization Staff. If we had been firm then and followed that policy without giving in to pressure here and there, we would be more prepared than we are now.

Of course it is not too late now, and we should be able at least to make the people's basic needs available to them at acceptable and appropriate stabilized prices, in accordance with the people's purchasing power.

The government should not involve itself with other items, and it certainly cannot take responsibility for them. These items have been identified; the Economic Mobilization Staff is working on them now, and I think they will do a good job.

There is a series of items that should be made available to the people at fixed prices and under controlled conditions. There is no point in stopping someone who is overpricing goods. We must establish a system of control so that goods really reach the people.

You know that the problems in the ration coupon system were such that until a few years ago it was a very strange system, so that those implementing it were opposed to it and wanted to destroy it. For example they would give coupons to the people but did not give goods in return for them, and the coupons remained unredeemed until their expiration. Of course the system has not yet been entirely reformed and these things must be reformed.

If we are to give the people coupons with value and if goods are to be truly available so that we do not have to go to 100 stores to find a kilogram of meat or a chicken, this is the best method, and all of that fight against overpricing is useless, just a lot of commotion and noise that arises one day and disappears the next.

Combatting the Roots of Overpricing

Behzad Nabavi said: In the 44–45 years of my life I have seen many campaigns against overpricing, both in the regime of the idolaters and in the government of the Islamic republic, and they have produced no determinant results.

The important thing is for us to fight the roots of high prices, and the solution to the root of high prices is both in increasing domestic production and in increasing the gross national product. God willing, this will be a long-term task, and one for self-sufficient production, not dependent production.

The only final solution to high prices is to increase supply in society and return conditions to normal, and in view of the Islamic republic's priorities, and with the war and very high priorities, we will not be able to meet society's needs with our domestic production, and one must not think of this.

In the meantime, however, it is necessary, in view of the war, the shortage of foreign exchange, the reduction in domestic production and other things, that we at least make guaranteed provision of the needs of the people at fixed prices in accordance with their buying power, in order to minimize pressure, especially on the lower classes, and stabilize prices for wage earners. Then if we want to implement this procedure properly, we must impose severe penalties on those who commit violations in the distribution of rationed goods or those who forge ration coupons.

I read the penalties used during the shah's time and saw that after Shahrivar 1320 [23 August - 22 September 1941] the penalty for hoarding was death, but under the Islamic republic, which is at war and where hoarding could be the downfall of the government, and where in many cases hoarders could also be convicted of warring against the government, we have set penalties that have absolutely no value or effect.

For example, we close the doors of a shop for ten days and put a sign that says what? The shopkeeper charged prices for 100 days in one day of business. Then he goes and spends that ten days relaxing and vacationing.

The penalty thus has no effect, while only the people in that neighborhood are deprived of a series of goods during the time that the shop is closed.

Therefore, if we want to fight overpricing, we must bring very decisive and revolutionary laws taken from the principles of theology and religious law. The principles of theology and religious law will authorize us and I am certain that Islamic theology will not allow the country to fall while it is at war and in conflict, and while its foreign exchange suddenly drops to 1/4, 1/5, or sometimes perhaps even 1/20 of what it was while it allows a group of people under these conditions to plunder, rob, hoard and sell at excessive prices, and we all respond to what they do merely by protesting, or for example by posting a placard above the shop and closing it for five days.

These penalties are therefore without merit, and in my view they are ill-advised. If we want to fight overpricing, hoarding and other things, we must appoint disciplinarians. If someone then hoards goods, if someone sells at excessive prices, we would then be able to call the disciplinarians, and under Islamic law the sentence for hoarding is clear. I realize this, but the reason theologians and religious magistrates exist in society is to move conditions and see which sentence they should put into effect at the time to prevent an act of corruption, a crisis, or a problem that could endanger the basis of the government of the Islamic republic.

Here I will quote a sentence from His Holiness the Imam, who said: The preservation of the basis of Islam is higher than the preservation of the edicts of Islam. This does not mean that in the preservation of Islam the edicts of Islam are not observed, but that if the atmosphere that the edicts of Islam seek to create is lost, it will no longer be possible to implement an Islamic edict.

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GENERAL CHARGES WAR LEADERSHIP INCOMPETENT

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 31 May 87 p 5

[Article by Bobo Scheutz: "Disappointed General In War-Time Iran: The War Leadership Is Incompetent"]

[Text] Teheran (SVENSKA DAGBLADET)--"The Iranian war leadership is incompetent and tactics at the front most resemble the Indians' war against the whites."

The grey-haired general, who must remain anonymous, does not mince words when he describes his country's and his army's efforts in the war against Iraq which will soon have been going on for seven years. Even though he is one of the revolution's generals who has stood by Khomeini's side since before the 1979 revolution, he is scathing in his criticism of the way the Islamic regime is waging war. He is a professional and, as such, outraged by the victories which did not happen, victories he thinks the Iranian army should have been able to win had it had the knowledgeable leadership it once had.

Purge

"More than 8,000 high-ranking officers were forced to leave the armed services after the revolution because of poorly founded suspicions that they would lack loyalty to the new regime. Many of them have invaluable skills, but despite an obvious need for their contribution, the government refuses to summon them for active duty. Instead, vacancies in the upper echelon of the officer corps have been filled with hastily called up captains and majors, but they lack training and the qualifications to lead the entire armed forces at a general's level."

"Furthermore, the recruitment of newly qualified officers at lower levels has been made difficult owing to the fact that so many of our young, well trained men are trying to get out of Iran. Today more than two million young Iranian men are abroad, most of them students, and among those who are still in Iran, there is a clearly observable unwillingness to take part in the war. It is an unwillingness which unfortunately has its roots in a lack of solidarity for the revolution as it has developed. Its promise has not been redeemed."

The War As A Gift

The general is not alone in this latter assessment. Among other critics of the regime in Teheran, there is support for the view that, despite everything, the war came as a gift from on high for the ruling ayatollahs. It came at a time when the opposition of the middle class and the intelligentsia had begun to be much more clearly formulated and splits within the regime had become more marked. But with the Iraqi attack, the regime could rapidly and with simple means rally the nation around it and thereby legitimize its own exercise of power even without the conflict. The war gave the regime opportunities to purge the last open political opposition and thereby provided many, students and intellectuals not the least, with a motive to flee the country.

Iraq Initiated

Inasmuch as it was Iraq which without any question attacked Iran on 22 September 1980, the villain's role in this war drama, which to date has claimed hundreds of thousands of lives, was easy to assign to Baghdad, at least in widespread Iranian opinion.

"And to be sure, you can do nothing but condemn the Iraqi attack, but to be honest, you have to add something which most people seem to have forgotten," says a one-time Iranian diplomat who served at the Iranian embassy in Baghdad before the war broke out.

"Beginning with the revolution in February 1979, the Iraqi government adopted a fairly positive attitude towards the Khomeini regime, giving, for example, no indications that it wanted to modify the 1975 Algiers agreement (at which the shah and Saddam Hussein patched up their differences, among them the disputed border issue). Even Mehdi Bazargan, who was Iran's prime minister at that time, was invited to visit Baghdad, but the offers were refused. Instead, after several months, the Teheran regime began a savage anti-Iraq propaganda campaign, among other things challenging the people of Iraq to overthrow the regime of Saddam Hussein."

"Had the revolutionary regime had a less dogmatic policy, the war could have been avoided," the former diplomat maintains.

Early Peace Offer

He and most of the other critics both in Teheran and elsewhere are also convinced that the war could have been ended a long time ago with a settlement acceptable to both parties. The first Iraqi peace offer came just one week after the start of the war but was naturally unacceptable from the Iranian point of view. Iraqi troops were far inside Iran on all fronts and an Iranian readiness to negotiate was what was thought in Baghdad to be a natural consequence of the quick victories. But they made a very mistaken assessment of the Iranian regime's willingness to resist and in place of the limited, short-term war they had imagined, they got a far larger conflict with economic, military and political costs they had not reckoned with.

Iraqi war aims have long since been forgotten and have now in practice been totally replaced by a powerful effort to bring the war to an end. Since Iranian forces began a series of counteroffensives in the spring of 1981, Iraq has largely been in retreat the whole time and there are scarcely any military critics outside Iraq who still believe that the Iraqi armed forces have any other goal save preventing further Iranian advances on Iraqi territory. The desire for peace in Baghdad has been very palpable the last five years and became almost embarrassingly marked in the summer of 1982, when Iranian troops stormed across the border with Iraq. That was the seventh major Iranian offensive, which has since been followed by about 20 more, at a cost of massive losses of both men and materiel on both sides.

Split At The Top

It is no secret in Teheran that ever since Iraq pulled back from Iranian territory the Islamic regime has been split over the issue of whether it is beneficial to continue the war. But as long as the Iranian troops continue to make advances, even small ones, and, above all, as long as Khomeini supports continued war operations, the peace-loving wing will have a hard time getting a hearing.

It is of little help that both the critical general in Teheran and outside military experts of differing backgrounds assert that a decisive Iranian military victory is unlikely given the unproductive division of the Iranian war apparatus into competing units which have existed ever since the outbreak of war and which of course seriously hamper operations.

The rivalry between the regular armed forces and the Islamic regime's own armed guard, the revolutionary guards, has not been diminished by the fact that during certain offensives they really worked together and made some progress. Rather, the conflicts have increased together with the considerable development of tactics and a supreme command by the revolutionary guard, which in the beginning had been enthusiastic but rather unprofessional. Today the guard is a body which is beginning to take the form of a traditional armed force and which is gradually organizing itself into different branches.

Its Own Navy

As we know, the Swedish patrol boats from Lidingo which were supposed to serve the customs department and the coast guard have instead become the embryo of the revolutionary guards' own navy, even if this navy is far from being able to take on anything other than an unarmed tank ship.

Greater progress has occurred in the area of an air force for the revolutionary guard. According to highly reliable sources in Teheran, there are at present 55 Iranian revolutionary guards in China being trained to pilot Mig 21 planes. Their training will conclude this September and at that point they will return to Iran with an unknown number of Mig 21's furnished by the Chinese to set up the revolutionary guard's first air base, in the city of Dezful, according to sources.

It is unclear how the purchase of the planes is being financed, but sources in Teheran tell SVENSKA DAGBLADET that some of the revolutionary guards' arms purchasing goes on alongside the national budget using funds obtained from a second route. Among other things, genuine Persian rugs are being exported via Dubai for sale on the world market and these sales are beyond the control of the government.

12789

CSO: 3650/167

BUILDING RESTRICTIONS LIFTED TO ALLEVIATE HOME SHORTAGES

Tehran ETTELA'AT in Persian 3 Jun 87 P 2

[Text] Social Service--This morning Mohammad Nabi Habibi, mayor of Tehran in a telephone conversation with the ETTELA'AT correspondent announced the latest details for the elimination of restrictions on building permit and other pertinent decisions in this regard.

The mayor of Tehran further noted: The issuing of building permit in the past had not completely stopped and Tehran municipality continued issuing permits for construction on the plots of land which were included in the investigation of the Urban Land Law which was ratified in 1360 [21 March 1981 - 20 March 1982]. Of course after the 28 April of the current year when the statute of limitation of the Urban Land Law of 1360 had expired, the new applications which were naturally to be investigated under the new laws, were waiting for the official announcement of the law and other appropriate regulations.

He emphasized: Following the announcement of the circular issued by the prime minister's office to the municipalities, the aforementioned law was put into execution.

In answer to the question from our correspondent with regard to expediting the issuance of building permits--as to where or which centers should the applicants go to? Mohammad Nabi Habibi said: In the prime minister's circular four cases have been specified for the issuance of building permit. The second section of the said circular reads: All the urban land owners--whether barren, arable or waste lands-- who according to the testimony of the Urban Land Organization have agreed not to avail themselves of the benefits of articles 6 and 8 of the Urban Land Law, and provided that they can adduce convincing evidence to the municipality as to their lack of a proper dwelling place, can receive a building permit for a maximum of 1,000 square meters.

Therefore, in order to expedite the work of these applicants, the aforementioned parties should secure the required testimony from the Urban Land Organization and present the same to one of the 20-district Tehran municipality offices so as after completing the necessary form regarding lack of a proper dwelling-place and presentation of other pertinent documents such as the title deed, new building remittance form and the property tax settlement for unutilized lands, their applications can be duly processed.

He went on to add: With due consideration to the problem of home shortages in Tehran, the issuing of building permit, particularly its residential dimension, can alleviate part of this problem. However, it should be pointed out that with due regard to the increase of volume of construction in the urban areas, the municipality will only issue the building permit within the approved limit. Similarly, within this limit the construction of various structures such as residential, educational, health-related or others have been taken into consideration. Notwithstanding the fact that as a result of building many unauthorized structures in the past, somehow a lack of proportion exist, however for those plots of land within the specified limit, due preventive measures have been considered as to the mix of building type.

In conclusion the mayor of Tehran noted: Based on the Urban Land Law as ratified in 1360, the issue of revitalization and development of other proper structures and determining the kind of utilizable lands and distinguishing the barren from the waste land have been assigned to a commission composed of representatives from the Ministries of Justice and that of Housing and Urban Development together with the pertinent district's municipality representative. As regards other dossiers which deemed necessary in other situations of the articles of the law and its relevant regulations, in the past the view of the commission of the 12th article was sought and thereafter the dossier in question was referred to the secretariat of the said commission whereby after due deliberation proper vote would be announced. There was a 10-day grace period for expressing objection to this vote. However, in the present law the aforesaid commission has been duly foreseen, which will be formed with its duties properly specified after the official announcement of the law.

12719

CSO: 4640/139

SERUM MANUFACTURING PLANT BECOMES OPERATIONAL

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 10 Jun 87 P 17

[Text] Daru-pakhsh Company's largest serum manufacturing plant in the Middle East, which will be able to produce more than seven million serums on a one-shift basis annually, was inaugurated in the west of Tehran in the presence of engineer Mir Hossein Musavi, the prime minister.

At these ceremonies where the minister of health, treatment and medical training, Dr. Nik Nezhad and some other deputies and responsible officials of the said ministry were present, the prime minister together with the accompanying party visited the research center, laboratories and various other parts of the serum manufacturing plant and talked with the personnel and specialists of the aforesaid plant. Thereafter, the prime minister took part in a gathering of the workers and other employees of Daru-pakhsh Company and made a speech about an overall effort toward self-sufficiency, the success of the generic plan, the issues pertaining to the region, the war and the historical background of the Islamic medicine in our country.

At these ceremonies, Dr Azarnush, managing director of Daru-pakhsh Company, in a report made a comparison between the output of the said company before and after the advent of the Islamic revolution and in part of his speech stated: According to the projected plans, this production unit will be able, on a one-shift basis, to produce injection solutions at a high volume, in four various size plastic vials and one vitreous type, at over seven million units of serum annually. It seems quite feasible that through proper planning by our specialist brethren we will be able to increase this figure to 12 million units of serum in one shift annually. Until now, in addition to the production of the plants under the cover of the Organization of National Industries, on the average about 15 million units of serum were imported each year.

It should be noted that the various establishments of this serum manufacturing plant went into operation within the compounds of Daru-pakhsh Company on a 9,000 square meters plot of land as of 1361 [21 March 1982 - 20 March 1983]. The initial credit allocations for the aforesaid establishments were 1.5 billion rials and about seven million dollars various other cost overruns.

12719

CSO: 4640/139

DANGER TO NATIONAL INTEREST FROM ANTI-U.S. SLOGANS EXAMINED

Lahore NAWA-I-WAQT in Urdu 29 May 87 p 10

[Article by Ibnul Hasan]

[Text] An Anglo-Saxon proverb warns against cutting off one's nose to spite one's face. In Pakistani politics, people are cutting their own nose while the enemy's face is becoming more and more beautiful. This is happening in both domestic politics and in external politics. The process of linking domestic politics to foreign countries that started a few years ago is still in progress. Having politics of the Right and the Left in national life is understandable. It is not possible to avoid a hostile struggle between the two ideologies in national life. But when this becomes the instrument of a foreign power or interest, then it clashes with the national interest. In these circumstances it can create internal chaos and external danger, as is the case at present. If the supporters of the two ideologies in national political life work to attain national leadership without getting involved with foreign powers then it is of no significance, but this is not what is happening.

Tactics have been adopted by the Left for making the aims and objectives of the Soviet Union and its allies successful on Pakistani soil. In contrast, the sense of perception and the moral condition of the Right have become so weak that it is unable to meet the challenge facing the nation today. Thus, there is no way to prevent Pakistani public opinion from being misled by the deadly propaganda to which the ordinary Pakistani citizen is being subjected. Furthermore, it is not possible to say with certainty whether it is necessary to take measures to protect the Pakistani people from the cultural predicament in which they find themselves at present. It is possible that this in itself may be a historic event and that Pakistan's culture is destined to meet the same as that which befall many other cultures that had become the victim of chaotic conditions, which have been described in various ways by people according to their sense of perception. Some call it revolution, some anarchy and others a curse of God.

For example, when the U.S. naval aircraft carrier Kitty Hawk entered Pakistan's territorial waters, of its own accord, thus putting Pakistan in grave danger lest the crew of the Kitty Hawk occupy our country and Pakistan be dominated by the United States. The inference was that in order to maintain the unique and rare position Pakistan occupies in international politics, U.S. naval ships

should not be allowed to come near its coast or enter its territorial waters. It was as though Pakistan were in a state of war with the United States and the arrival of a U.S. naval ship in the vicinity of Pakistan could create serious problems for this country's freedom; or perhaps that restrictions had been placed on Pakistan's waterways and the arrival of a U.S. naval ship would be considered a violation of these restrictions.

Attempts were made to create the impression that all of should hate the Kitty Hawk as a symbol of U.S. imperialism and exploitation of the people; that because the Pakistani rulers were sycophants of the United States, then reproaching the United States and denouncing the Pakistani rulers was necessary to express our national freedom and independence. With this purpose in mind, there were street demonstrations and some papers gave elaborate details of these incidents.

Under normal conditions no one can raise objection to such peaceful demonstrations. In democratic countries, expressing one's political thinking is nothing unusual. Such demonstrations are commonplace on streets, in parks and at universities in the United States. During such demonstrations, the United States is described as an imperialist power and a leader of forces of violence and suppression. Such demonstrations also are commonplace in countries like Britain, Germany, France, Italy and Japan, all of which are friends and allies of the United States. Such demonstrations are held in order to pave the way for gaining public support for the international policy of the Left by denouncing U.S. influence in the international field. There is no reason why we too cannot pursue such a policy. However, there is a lot that is at stake here and under the present conditions such actions may not prove to be suitable for our national life.

Those who are knowledgeable about the aims and objectives of the presence of American ships at the Karachi port are also aware of the commercial importance of the port. There are facilities here for ships to procure daily life requirements, to provide for their maintenance and repair, and for ships on a long journey there are facilities for anchorage. This is an independent business and involves tens of millions of rupees in trade. The ships that may anchor at the Karachi port include warships from any country without discrimination. These ships, on their way home after war maneuvers, avail themselves of the facilities at Karachi. The ships of our navy also anchor in other parts of the world for the same purpose. In peacetime there is no restriction for any ship to enter any port. These are subject to international laws. Any country, however self-respecting and whatever the demands of self-respect, does not repudiate these international laws. International terrorism or sea blockades is a different matter. Pakistan is not involved in such activities, nor does it have any psychological problems under pressure of which it would restrict the entry of the ships of any country in its ports. The idea of citing the Kitty Hawk as an example was to explain the international interest. We do not have any way of ascertaining the percentage of people in this country who have been influenced by this explanation.

A campaign similar to the one started against the Kitty Hawk is currently underway against AWACS. Like the Soviet Union and India, which have started a campaign against AWACS, some observers and politicians are also opposing

attempts to procure these sophisticated planes equipped with an early warning advanced radar system. In this connection some hypotheses have been put forward which are aimed at misleading the public, and through ignorance some people instead of investigating the facts are engaged in discussions on the basis of hearsay and are being influenced by these hypotheses. For example, the people are led to believe that the AWACS is an intelligence aircraft, which is of course ridiculous and baseless. AWACS is a sophisticated aerial radar. Incidentally, I have had the opportunity of seeing an AWACS aircraft. Some years ago I took part in a tour of the United States with a group of journalists, and we visited the Boeing factory at Seattle. Here 707 AWACS destined for Saudi Arabia were going through the final stages. We saw these aircraft. We were given a detailed lecture on their working system, and later during a film on Boeing aircraft the performance of the AWACS was exhibited. They are not as mysterious as has been indicated because of the discussions on supplying them to Pakistan. The aircraft are equipped with an early warning advanced radar system that is activated automatically and they acquire the ability to see far ahead. As the United States has the most advanced computer technology in the world, no other country possesses such aircraft equipped with early warning advanced radar systems as the AWACS supplied by the United States to NATO and Saudi Arabia. The day is not far off when the Soviet Union too will have advanced planes of its own.

Some circles in Pakistan are saying that this is an intelligence aircraft with the help of which Pakistan will supply the United States with information on the Soviet Union. Such baseless and misleading statements and press reports are being used to imply that Pakistan should not acquire the modern technology it is seeking in order to strengthen its general defense capability, including air defense, and make it more reliable. The case should have been just the reverse. Taking into consideration the defensive requirements of Pakistan, the region in which it is located and its limited financial resources, people should have been clamoring for the United States to provide Pakistan with AWACS at a reasonable price. The nature of the relationship between Pakistan and the United States, as well as the assistance provided to Pakistan by the United States, demands that for preserving the independence and freedom of Pakistan, it is not only necessary to strengthen Pakistan's defenses but also that its financial resources should not be unduly overburdened. Pakistan does not fall in the category of an oil-rich nation whereby the United States has the maximum to gain from Pakistan. Since cooperation with Pakistan is of a political nature, the financial elements involved should be minimal. Any campaign undertaken from this standpoint would have been in Pakistan's national interest. The Soviet air attacks on Pakistan from Kabul in the past few months have taken the lives of some 250-300 people, caused wide-scale damage to property and have resulted in Pakistan losing a very costly F-16 aircraft. Such statements and published reports, besides being based on erroneous assumptions and ignorance, are supportive only of the stand taken by the Soviet Union and India, and they illustrate the English proverb I mentioned in the beginning. In other words, in trying to disfigure the enemy we are cutting off our own nose. Who the enemy is needs no clarification; I explained this right at the outset.

What deserves consideration is why the Soviet Union and India in their campaign against Pakistan seize upon this country under any circumstances and at any cost. The idea put forward is that Pakistan does not have the right to defend

itself against them, it should not acquire modern technology to improve and strengthen its defense system, nor are its defense requirements and regional status compatible with international custom. When Pakistan was a member of SEATO (Southeast Asia Treaty Organization) and CENTO (Central Treaty Organization), it was the target of accusations, and now that Pakistan has left these organizations and joined the group of nonaligned nations, it is still singled out and censured. The Soviet Union and India did not like Pakistan's alliance with other countries and they do not approve of its membership in the group of nonaligned nations now. The concept of progress and development is very strange indeed. India, despite being a very backward, poor and sectarian country, financially helpless and plagued with a class system, because of its relations with the Soviet Union is considered a progressive country, whereas Japan, Singapore, South Korea and Malaysia are considered backward and reactionary because instead of being Soviet allies they have an alliance with the United States. Similarly, Syria and Libya are progressive countries and Egypt and Saudi Arabia are backward countries.

The matter does not end here. The stand also applies to all equipment, goods and treaties related to the USSR and the United States. The huge amounts of military equipment India has been receiving do not in any way affect that country's honor and virtue. But Pakistan's acquisitions, made with great difficulty and after spending huge sums of money, are somehow disgraceful. This happened when F-16 aircraft were being procured, and the same thing is happening now that efforts are underway to obtain AWACS. India enters into a 20-year agreement with the Soviet Union, carries out military action against Pakistan and divides it in two. But the agreement is considered an indication of prosperity, love and freedom. When the Soviet Union sends its army into Afghanistan, the argument is presented that the action is intended to bring about radical changes in the backward economy and system and make it a prosperous and happy country and as such is praiseworthy. Opposing such an action is labelled backward and colonialist. Whenever Pakistan tries to buy modern weapons and military equipment for its defensive requirements from the United States, it is accused of being a minion and sycophant of the United States. It is said that the aircraft and weapons purchased from the United States are useless and defective. If U.S. AWACS arrive in Pakistan, then, God forbid, Pakistan will be destroyed.

It is the express desire of the Left, that vis-a-vis India, the people of Pakistan should be the victims of an inferiority complex so that they will be overwhelmed by Indian foreign policy and will become distrustful of their own foreign policy, and thus they will be discouraged and become the victims of a serious lack of self-confidence. The perpetration of a delusion on the part of the Right increases the sense of a lack of self-confidence and mistrust. Besides being ignorant and careless, the Right keeps repeating what the Left has been instilling in the people. In other words, the incompetence of the Right and the conspiracy of the Left both serve the same purpose--that is, the way is being paved for the domination of the region by India and the Soviet Union. They are determined to achieve their goal at any cost and to follow a course of action even if it causes disruption and bloodshed, harms the national self-confidence, endangers the safety and security of Pakistan, brings disgrace and dishonor to Pakistan in the comity of nations, shatters national unity and integrity, and shakes Pakistan's moral, ideological and religious foundations. At present Pakistan is facing a deceitful and deadly conspiracy, and the common citizen is not aware of anything.

SOVIET STAND ON NEWSPRINT FOR PAKISTAN NEWSPAPERS CRITICIZED

Lahore NAWA-I-WAQT in Urdu 29 May 87 p 10

[Editorial]

[Text] According to a newspaper report, the Soviet Union has declined to provide newsprint for Pakistani newspapers. The Soviet leadership has complained that it provides cheap newsprint to newspapers which use it to print anti-Soviet news and articles. The Soviet leaders have perhaps forgotten that the restrictions on the Pakistani press are also the result of their cheap newsprint. When the late Mian Iftikhar Aldin, founder of the PPL, imported cheap newsprint from the Soviet Union and began spreading propaganda about socialism in his newspapers, the government and the public became rightly concerned that the import of such newsprint had become a political problem, and that by this means, the Soviet Union was increasing its influence in Pakistan. The line taken by these newspapers confirmed this. Therefore these newspapers were taken under government control, and later the National Press Trust was formed which included the EASTERN AND MORNING NEWS. Thus the Pakistani press had to face the dark day when more than half of the newspapers were taken under government control, and so began the restrictions on the press. All this was the result of Soviet newsprint, which gave the government an excuse. Now the Soviets complain that their newsprint is being used for propaganda against them, and anti-Soviet material is being printed on their cheap newsprint, although it is they who began using the newsprint for their political purposes. Moreover it is also a fact that the Soviets are not providing this newsprint free of charge. If because of commercial considerations they charge lower prices, there must be a reason for this. It is possible that the quality is inferior. The Soviet Union may or may not provide newsprint to Pakistani newspapers, but no newspaper of any free and independent country of the world, including Pakistan, can support its unrealistic and, in the light of the UN resolutions, aggressive stand on the Afghanistan issue. This is also confirmed by the fact that 122 nations who are members of the General Assembly have openly opposed the Soviet Union's Afghanistan policy. When in the light of the principled stand of the world brotherhood, Pakistani newspapers criticize the Soviet Union, the Soviet leaders' complaint about this is baseless. They should not have false expectations from any free and independent Muslim country, including Pakistan. These are not Soviet colonies where only Soviet policies will be followed and, by closing one's mind and senses, attention will be paid only to the pleasure and displeasure of one superpower. The complaint would have looked better coming from the Soviet Union if its stand and policy had been based on the defense of human rights.

STRICT ACTION URGED AGAINST CORRUPT OFFICIALS

Lahore NAWA-I-WAQT in Urdu 29 May 87 p 10

[Editorial]

[Text] Presiding over a top-level meeting recently, Punjab Chief Minister Mian Mohammad Nawaz Sharif warned that the administration will be called strictly to account at every level and that tough legal proceedings will be instituted against incompetent officials those who are involved in misconduct and those who have become a hindrance in the way of providing quick justice to the public. At the national level, reference has been made to the evils that have crept into the civil bureaucracy as a result of the long history of martial law and authoritarianism in the country; at every level one can see dishonesty, bribery, and incidents of corruption in national affairs, and embezzlement of national treasury funds has spread like a social epidemic. Unfortunately, during the past decade and a half these trends have been routinely encouraged; to promote their own political interests, previous rulers adopted the practice of turning a blind eye to the illegal, self-serving and selfish activities of administration officials. This encouraged them to act without fear or restraint, and to use national resources and treasury funds for their personal gain. Because of the absence of elected bodies and unfair restrictions on the judiciary and the press, they had no fear of being called to account or redistribution. So they continued to play their games, and gradually instead of using law and order for the betterment of the masses, it began to be used for creating obstacles in the way of political and social justice. The present civil administration is trying to end corruption and dishonesty and to improve the working of government employees. But the rot that set in as a result of years of looking the other way cannot be corrected merely by ordinary laws and toothless cautions. The situation has not improved as a result of the steps taken to date, and this has been acknowledged by the federal accountant general, by the chairman of the federal committee for prevention of dishonesty and also by the leaders of the elected government. Therefore, even though the Punjab chief minister's warning that the administration will be called to account is welcome, this will prove fruitful only if extraordinary steps and effective action are ensured toward this goal. If instead of merely warning the corrupt elements or dismissing the employees, they are first called to accounts for their past actions and if arrangements are first made to recover from them the ill-gotten gains from the national treasury and from the people and then they are punished as an example, this would attention to this.

ADMINISTRATION URGED TO KEEP PARTY, GOVERNMENT AFFAIRS APART

Karachi JASARAT in Urdu 23 May 87 p 3

[Editorial]

[Text] Recently the startling disclosure was made that under the 7-Marla Scheme, land will be allotted only to those who become members of the Muslim League. This method is neither just nor moral. The present Muslim League administration claims to be the heir to Qaide Azam, but its methods in no way resemble those of Qaide Azam's Muslim League. The deputy chairman of the Jamaat-i-Islami, Prof Ghafoor Ahmad, has rightly said that the present government is acting in a manner that could very well pave the way for martial law. Prof Ghafoor Ahmad remarked that the prime minister said that Pakistan was not created for martial law, but he pointed out that previous administrations also said these things but nevertheless martial law was imposed.

It is up to the government to adopt means that will make the country prosper. People should be encouraged to perform their duties honestly, and the government itself should strictly follow these principles. But this is not what is happening in the country. The government is being run on the basis of fear, intimidation and greed. Qaide Azam's Muslim League, which created Pakistan, did not adopt such policies; otherwise, the Muslim minority of India would never have united under its flag. Today, people are being enlisted in the Muslim league by the use of fear and intimidation. The nation's resources are openly being used on behalf of party politics. The official attitude is to some extent reflected by this development. According to confirmed reports, when a federal minister embezzled millions of rupees, the prime minister, far from prosecuting him, took his side and supported him. Such actions cannot bring good, nor will people tolerate them for long.

The nation should be well aware what are the daily expenditures of the prime minister, the chief minister, the governor and the other ministers. At a time when the country is deeply in debt, when this country has been mortgaged to foreign countries, when expenditures of billions of rupees are inescapable, the wastefulness and extravagance of our rulers are increasing every day. Today the true situation in the country is that except for the rulers, everyone is upset and unhappy. Families are being ruined, people are being

abducted, murder and robbery are common, dacoity is a daily affair, people's honor is not respected, the nations's youth are being misled and they are being enticed into activities that show a lack of concern for the future. Immorality is rife. By different means and by various pretexts, every effort is being made to create conflict among those who want to bring about a change in the situation, those who want to improve the situation, and those who want to bring about the supremacy of Islamic Sharia in the country. The simple and straightforward question of enforcing Sharia has been made the subject of discord and hypocrisy.

In the holy month of Ramadan, games and sports are evident right at the time of evening prayers; cinemas are open. Restrictions have been placed on student organizations. Well-wishers and supporters of Islam and Pakistan are languishing in jail. Their families are anguished and deeply upset, but nobody cares. There is no help against oppression and injustice. This is the country's internal condition. External conditions are not happy either. The Indian prime minister keeps threatening Pakistan, and our prime minister keeps studying his statements. In Delhi, Meerut, Gujerat and other Indian cities, Muslims are being massacred, they are being burned alive, their houses are being plundered, they are being dishonored, they are made sacrificial victims for the crime of creating Pakistan, but our government does not have the courage even to lodge a protest with the Indian government. The present government can easily crush Sharia-loving, peaceful citizens; it can punish them for no crime of theirs, but it cannot punish enemies, murderers, traitors to the country, dacoits and robbers.

It is the duty of the nation's political and religious parties to unite and endeavor to rid the country of these problems. The situation has deteriorated gravely, and it continues to grow worse. A feeling of violence and lawlessness is arising among the people. If the present situation continues unabated, the integrity and independence of the country may well be in jeopardy. What is most important at this time is that in order to nip the lawlessness in the bud, Islamic Shariat should be imposed without delay. Then these forces will die their own death, and the oppression of the rulers will end on its own. It will be possible to deal with every person, and nobody will remain above law. At the same time, we will ask the prime minister to keep a watchful eye over his party, the Muslim League, and over the government; he should be aware how excesses are being committed under the cover of his personality. All kind of rumors about him are current among the people. It is imperative for the prime minister to keep in touch with the people; he should personally take steps to remove their difficulties and distress; he should not merely put blind trust in others who tell him that all is well. The prime minister is well aware that the country rid itself of the curse of martial law with great difficulty. God forbid that this country should once again be shackled with this problem. Martial law can only be imposed by taking advantage of real or imaginary unrest and discontent among the masses. We are confident that the prime minister will use his good sense and that he will not do anything to promote conditions whereby the country would again become bogged down in the mire of martial law and the tender plant of democracy would wither away.