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USSR Report

PROBLEMS OF THE FAR EAST

No. 1, Jan-Mar 1983

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13 September 1983

USSR REPORT

PROBLEMS OF THE FAR EAST

No. 1, Jan-Mar 1983

Except where indicated otherwise in the table of contents the following is a complete translation of the Russian-language journal PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA published quarterly in Moscow by the Far East Institute, USSR Academy of Sciences.

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PEACE POLICY IN ACTION

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The major processes in the development of human society have brought to the limelight the problem of preventing war and preserving peace. The fate of social progress on our planet as well as the further existence of human society hinge on the solution of this problem.

The Soviet Union has every right to take pride in its fidelity to the Leninist principles of peace foreign policy. In recent years the USSR has scored impressive gains in the scientific elaboration and practical resolution of the key problems of international relations. The creative Marxist-Leninist approach to the problems and phenomena of our day and age combined with its indefatigable energy, purposefulness and principled stance, is the main source of the foreign policy successes scored by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, its Central Committee.

The proposals put forward by the 26th Congress of the CPSU touch upon a broad range of world political issues, including questions concerning nuclear missiles and conventional types of weapons. The 26th Congress of the CPSU furnished a profound Marxist-Leninist analysis of the international situation and reflected the changes that had occurred in the world. It also clearly determined the current Soviet foreign policy strategy, and reaffirmed the unshakeability of the fundamental principles underlying Soviet foreign policy.

The Peace Programme for the 1980s, formulated by the Congress, attests to the tremendous expansion of the sphere of action of Soviet foreign policy, and to its vital importance for the destinies of all countries and peoples.

While implementing unswervingly the Leninist foreign policy, on 22 December 1982 the Soviet Union in connection with a dangerous aggravation of the international tension, issued an address, "To the Parliaments, Governments, Political Parties, and Peoples of the World", adopted at a joint ceremonial meeting of the CPSU Central Committee, USSR Supreme Soviet and RSFSR Supreme Soviet devoted to the 60th anniversary of the formation of the USSR. The Address appealed to all honest people of our planet to recognise that urgent and efficient measures must be taken to prevent a nuclear catastrophe.

In the present-day important period of world development, and in the complicated and dangerous international situation, the CPSU has once again displayed its collective wisdom, the ability to develop its activities with due account for long-term prospects, to single out the main problems of each historical stage and concentrate on them.

The Peace Programme for the 1980s, which became the principal factor of international affairs, has been exerting favourable influence on the prospects of international development. It has determined the major trends of Soviet policy with the aim of averting a world holocaust. First and foremost, it is imperative to extinguish the existing hotbeds of military conflicts and provide for reliable political guarantees against the emergence of fresh conflicts and crisis situations. The Soviet Union is firmly convinced that there exist real ways for settling disputes, be it in the Middle East, in South or Southeast Asia or in the Far East.

The USSR today is the largest socialist state, the focus of attention for the whole world. This imparts to Soviet foreign policy special meaning and significance. The comprehensive programme of struggle for peace elaborated by the 26th Congress of the CPSU is in accord with Lenin's behests. It has earned the universal recognition of the world public and political circles of foreign countries. Its analysis of the international situation, as well as its foreign, domestic and defence policy evaluations and provisions give ample food for thought about the urgent tasks in the struggle for peace and social progress.

The message sent by the USSR to the Second Special Session of the UN General Assembly on Disarmament was a new and graphic manifestation of the Soviet Union's desire for peace. The message reads in part that, being guided by the desire to do all within its power to remove from the peoples the threat of nuclear devastation and, in the final analysis, to exclude from the life of mankind its very possibility, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics undertakes the pledge not to be the first to use nuclear weapons.

While taking such a responsible decision, the Soviet Union proceeds from the fact that nuclear war would be tantamount to the destruction of human civilisation and perhaps to the end of life on earth. The peoples have the right to expect that the USSR's decision will be followed by similar steps on the part of the other nuclear powers. It is obvious, however, that the Soviet state will continue to shape its policy with due account of the behaviour of other nuclear powers, of whether they will follow its example or will push the world towards a nuclear holocaust.

The Soviet Union's confidence in common sense and in the possibility that mankind can avoid self-destruction and ensure peace and progress for present and future generations evoked broad response at the Session.

The concept of freezing nuclear arsenals as the first step toward their reduction, and finally, their complete elimination, and also the warning about the danger of such means of mass destruction as chemical weapons, evoked considerable interest. The new Soviet peace initiatives won active support among the broadest strata of world public. Even in the United States many prominent public and political figures have given high regard to Soviet proposals. The former US Defence Secretary R. McNamara stated that he approves of the Message. *Times of India* expressed the opinion of the Indian public when it wrote that the unilateral commitment undertaken by the Soviet Union not to be the first to use nuclear weapons has been welcomed by all people of good will. Millions of champions of peace from different countries, numerous national and international public and political organisations expressed their approval and support of the Soviet peace initiatives. During his visit to the Soviet Union Javier Pérez de Cuellar, Secretary-General of the UN, gave high regard to the Soviet foreign policy invariably aimed at consolidating peace and mutual understanding among nations. While underscoring the exclusive importance of the Soviet Union's pledge not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, he stressed that this step is graphic evidence of the USSR's adherence to the cause of peace, and a practical measure for reducing the nuclear threat. The highly humane goals of the foreign policy pursued by the CPSU and the Soviet State meet half-way the aspirations of all peaceloving peoples on the planet.

"Our stand on this issue is clear," Yuri Andropov, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, stated at the ceremonial meeting in the Kremlin Palace of Congresses, devoted to the 60th anniversary of the USSR. "A nuclear war must not be allowed, whether small or large,

limited or total. Today there is no task more important than halting the instigators of a new war. The vital interests of all peoples demand it. This is why when the Soviet Union unilaterally pledged not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, this was met with approval and hope throughout the world." The USSR's historical optimism inspires a search for solutions to the most intricate problems facing humanity today.

The decision of the Soviet Union not to be the first to use nuclear weapons is not empty verbiage. It spells concrete steps directed at strengthening the material foundations of international security. Some time ago, the USSR expressed its readiness not to use nuclear weapons against the states that refuse to manufacture or purchase such weapons and that do not deploy them on their territory. Now our pledge extends to all states of the world without exception. The Soviet Union, pledging unilaterally not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, takes into account that there are aggressive forces in the world which are ready, in the name of their narrow selfish interests, to put at stake the vital interests of mankind and resort to a nuclear adventure. The USA and other NATO countries must clearly realise that in refusing to be the first to use nuclear weapons, the Soviet Union straight-jackets all those who are nurturing plans of nuclear attack hoping to win victory in a nuclear war. In case of aggression, the USSR together with the fraternal socialist countries, will defend the gains of socialism without any hesitation, with entire resolve, using all its defensive and economic potentialities. The country which, committing a crime against humanity, would try to be the first to use nuclear weapons, would thereby be sentencing itself to death.

According to many delegations which took part in the Special Session of the UN General Assembly, the decision of the Soviet Union not to be the first to use nuclear weapons allows a fresh glance to be cast at the entire complex of problems relating to the limitation and reduction of weapons, particularly strategic ones, and creates more beneficial conditions for gains to be made on disarmament at large. There is no more essential task today than the aversion of the arms race and disarmament. The 26th CPSU Congress stressed: "A new round of the arms race will upset international stability, and greatly increase the danger of another war". Disarmament is a broad concept, inasmuch as it means halting the manufacture of arms of all types, reduction of arms stockpiles, destruction of weapons, reduction of armed forces, and the curtailment of military expenditures. Universal and complete disarmament would signify the complete elimination of weapons, armies, and military establishments of all states. The new proposals set forth by the USSR embrace a wide range of problems pertaining to disarmament. They touch on issues having to do with nuclear missiles, conventional weapons, land, naval and air forces, as well as the situation in Europe, in the Middle and Far East. They presuppose practical measures both of a political and a military nature. They pursue the sole purpose of doing the utmost to eliminate the threat of a new war and preserve peace on earth. The Soviet Union regards the concern for ensuring peace as a task of prime significance. It believes that no differences in social systems, way of life or ideology, no contradictions between states or groups of states, and no time-serving considerations must overshadow the vital need to preserve peace and avert a nuclear war.

Speaking before the November 1982 Plenary Meeting of the CPSU Central Committee, Yuri Andropov, General Secretary of the CPSU CC, stated: "Mankind cannot endlessly reconcile itself with the arms race and wars, unless it wants to put its future at stake. The CPSU is against

the conversion of the discussion of ideas into a confrontation among states and peoples, when weapons and readiness to resort to them becomes a yardstick of the potentialities of social systems... Everyone is equally interested in preserving peace and detente. Therefore, the statements in which the readiness for normalisation is linked with the demand that Soviet Union pay for that with some preliminary concessions in most different spheres sound lightmindedly, to say the least. We shall not agree to this. We favour equality, due account of the interests of both sides, honest agreement. For that we are ready."

The Soviet Union offers peace to each state, proposes to join efforts in the name of common security, and resolve most entangled problems on a sound basis acceptable to all parties, above all, the problem of curbing the arms race, both nuclear and conventional. The objective of the Soviet foreign policy is to place impassable barriers to war, while appealing to common sense, practicing goodneighbourliness and developing cooperation.

The consistent peaceloving policy of the Soviet Union and other Warsaw Treaty countries is in graphic contrast with the aggressive and adventuristic policy of the USA. This policy is aimed at intensifying the arms race and attaining military superiority. It is at loggerheads with the aspirations of the peoples for peace and security on earth, primarily for the elimination of the threat of a nuclear war. As is known, as a result of the titanic efforts of the Soviet Union and peoples of all countries, peace on earth has not only been preserved, but even consolidated. This is why the reckless attempts of ill-intentioned forces to destroy the edifice of peace, built as a result of such strenuous efforts, naturally evoke grave concern, indignation and counteraction.

While regarding military force as the principal means for achieving its global foreign policy goals, the Reagan Administration and the aggressive quarters of US imperialism backing it have set themselves the task of achieving military superiority over the Soviet Union at any price. These quarters would like to discard the legal and ethical standards of relations between states, and eliminate their independence and sovereignty. They are trying to replace normal relations between countries with "sanctions" and blockades, and use mounting threats of force, up to and including the use of nuclear weapons, instead of contacts and negotiations. Such course of the White House is with full justification described throughout the world, the USA included, as a course headed toward catastrophe.

There is nothing new about Washington's aggressive foreign policy ambitions. What is new is that after the cold war period most diehard representatives of the military-industrial complex who believe in the possibility and necessity of the US "superiority" over the whole world emerged in the political scene of the United States. It is precisely these quarters that gave the Reagan Administration a "mandate" to convert military force into the principal political instrument of the United States in its relations with the rest of the world.

Such intentions are being matched by practical steps and measures taken by the Reagan Administration. After it was decided in December 1982 to begin the full-scale manufacture of neutron weapons, a Senate Committee voted an appropriation of nearly \$1 billion for the production and deployment of the new MX intercontinental ballistic missiles—a nuclear weapon for launching a first strike. As well, such dangerous steps have been taken as the building of the Trident-2 missile, the deployment in Europe of medium-range Pershing-2 missiles and three types of cruise missiles, and also the improvement of a number of other systems. Wa-

shington's reckless designs are being supported by the elaboration of conceptual models for waging and even "winning" a nuclear war. These provisions are based, first and foremost, on the intention to shatter the existing approximate parity and achieve military superiority over the Soviet Union. These and other measures attest to the fact that the militaristic and aggressive policy of the United States is becoming ever more dangerous for the cause of peace and security of nations.

Holding forth over the TV on November 23, 1982, President Reagan did not stop at gross concoctions and distortions of facts in a bid to show that it is the Soviet Union, rather than the United States, that spurs on the arms race. He addressed unexperienced TV viewers showing them colour diagrams and graphs that contained everything but the truth. However, President Reagan could not and will never be able to refute the indisputable fact: the arms race is rooted in the American soil. It is common knowledge that the United States has initiated all its major rounds during the postwar years. President Reagan and his entourage cannot deny the fact that nuclear weapons were first created by the United States and that it was the only country to use the weapon in a war. Thus, the provision for using nuclear weapons continues to this very day to underlie US military policy. It is for this reason that Washington refuses to follow the lead of the Soviet Union and pledge not to be the first to use nuclear weapons under any conditions. Today, when tremendous amounts of nuclear weapons have been stockpiled, the White House is taking steps which make the risk of a nuclear war even more probable.

In his speech the US President talked groundlessly about Soviet military superiority over the USA. He stated that today practically in all categories of military might the Soviet Union enjoys obvious superiority. This statement is contrary to fact, it is designed to deceive public opinion and justify the United States' unprecedented military programmes and aggressive doctrines.

As is known, approximate balance in the field of strategic nuclear weapons between the USSR and the USA has been repeatedly and carefully verified by highly skilled experts on both sides during the SALT-2 talks. There is every reason to maintain that the US President's signing of the 1979 Treaty signified recognition of such balance.

There is parity both on the global and the European levels, existing not on paper, but in reality. Today, according to the Soviet Union, the preservation of military-strategic parity ensures, under the prevailing conditions, the implementation of the principle of equality and serves objectively the preservation of peace on Earth. Washington, however, is pursuing a diametrically opposite line. Its policy of "rearmament" under the pretext of attaining real parity means actually its urge for altering the alingment of forces in the world in its favour, and for military superiority. Furthermore, President Reagan stated bluntly that the purpose of manufacturing MX missiles and other types of armaments is to achieve indisputable military superiority of the USA over the USSR, and to create the prerequisites for a US victory in any conflict, nuclear one included. In his speech before the Kremlin session devoted to the 60th anniversary of the USSR Yuri Andropov, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, emphasised: "A policy based on the urge to obtain military superiority over the Soviet Union is without prospects and can only intensify the threat of war."

The new Soviet initiatives aimed at reducing the threat of war and returning relations between states to normal, as well as the revival of detente, have been treated with great interest throughout the world. This

is only natural because the people on our planet have become tired of the United States' "new" course, its attempts to foil the economic, scientific and cultural ties among peoples that have taken centuries and decades to build. They are tired of the threats to use military force against those who disagree with Washington's views, tired of the reckless buildup of the arms race and tension. The world needs stability and confidence in the morrow, and it is the Soviet Union that was and remains the foundation of this stability, self-restraint and unswerving concern for the future of mankind.

The alternative today is as follows: either an agreement or years of acute and dangerous nuclear confrontation. That is why the new Soviet proposals that call on Washington to come forth with its own constructive steps have been received with approval and hope throughout the world. People hope that the West will not lose the opportunity of coming to an agreement, and that, for the first time in the history of Europe, it will be possible to break the vicious circle of nuclear buildup and set about the task of reducing nuclear arsenals. Soviet proposals require a definite answer. The US "zero option", which presupposes unilateral disarmament of the USSR, is countered by a simple and understandable Soviet proposal—to reduce many hundreds of Soviet and US medium-range missiles in Europe, and achieve a balance of the armed forces of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation and NATO at the lowest possible level. It is common knowledge that the Soviet Union does not demand unilateral disarmament of any country. Neither does it aspire to military superiority. What the USSR is striving for is an honest and fair agreement.

The fate of war or peace largely depends on whether a Soviet-US agreement will be reached, an honest and fair agreement on the limitation and reduction of strategic armaments, one that does not impinge on anyone's interests. Meanwhile, all attempts at freezing or limiting the buildup of such armaments have been until now met with overt sabotage on the part of the White House, which has chosen precisely this sphere as the main arena of competition with the socialist world.

The public in the USA, Western Europe, Japan and other countries to whom the White House is addressing its widely advertised "peaceful offensive" has now enough common sense to tell a genuine peace offensive from an ostensible one.

The year 1983 is acquiring special significance in the struggle for averting a nuclear war, for in that year the aggressive quarters of the USA and NATO are planning to start deploying new US medium-range missiles in the FRG, Britain, Italy, the Netherlands and Belgium.

While accelerating and expanding the programme of deploying new medium-range missiles in Europe, the USA showed the true value of its rhetoric about the so-called "double option" of NATO, and revealed the hypocritical nature of the assertion that these missiles would allegedly be necessary only in case the Soviet-US negotiations in Geneva would not yield fruit by the end of 1983. Today, however, Washington chooses to keep silent about the fact that the consent of West Europeans to adopt the "double option" should have been followed by an immediate ratification of SALT-2. The key issue today, as never before, is to halt the buildup of nuclear arsenals and get down to their reduction. The peaceloving public is profoundly anxious about this issue. It is for this reason that the new Soviet initiatives advanced by Yuri Andropov, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, arouse universal and positive response throughout the world. These proposals are aimed at attaining fair and mutually acceptable agreements at the Soviet-US negotiations in Geneva.

Already now the Soviet Union proposes to stop the further buildup of strategic armaments by the two sides, i. e., to freeze them, and then reduce the existing arsenals by approximately 25 per cent on each side, bringing them to parity, and then to go on with further reductions.

Soviet proposals are directed at finding solutions to the problems at stake that would lead to a radical reduction of the armaments of the two sides, without inflicting any damage to their interests. If Washington were to display good will in response to such a fair and constructive position of the USSR, this would make the year 1983 a happy year for mankind. The Soviet Union has never wished the military-strategic balance to be maintained by means of the arms race. It has always favoured the lowering of the level of military confrontation, a qualitative and quantitative limitation of armaments, a halt in the arms race, and disarmament until it becomes universal and complete.

The Political Declaration of the Warsaw Treaty countries adopted at the Conference of the Political Consultative Committee, held in Prague early in January 1983, evoked broad response among the world public. The Declaration contains a number of major constructive proposals directed at overcoming the current dangerous aggravation of the international situation, including a proposal to sign a treaty on mutual non-use of force and maintenance of peaceful relations between the Warsaw Treaty states and NATO members. These proposals are paving the way for a radical improvement of the international situation.

The effort made by the Soviet Union and other countries of the socialist community for the elimination of the danger of a world thermonuclear catastrophe finds profound response in the hearts of millions of people and broadest support throughout the world. The preservation and consolidation of peace not only bear on the interests of millions of people living today, but also has now become an indispensable condition for the very existence of mankind.

The Soviet people and the peoples of other socialist countries look toward the future with optimism. They are confident that there exists a real possibility to preserve and strengthen peace, ensure normal and peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems, and avert the threat of a nuclear conflict.

Today, as never before, the peoples of the world are emerging on the historical scene. They have gained the right to voice their opinions which nobody will take from them. They are well aware that nuclear war must not be allowed and that, with the help of their purposeful activities, they are capable of removing the threat faced by the humanity, and preserving peace and life on earth.

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SOME ASPECTS OF NEW U.S. FAR EASTERN STRATEGY

Moscow FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS in English No 2, Apr-Jun 83 pp 10-23

[Article by V. I. Denisov, candidate of juridical sciences]

In recent years the intensive struggle between the two approaches in world politics stands out in bold relief. On the one hand, the Soviet Union and other countries of the socialist community, as well as all progressive forces, have been working toward curbing the arms race, strengthening detente, and safeguarding the freedom and independence of peoples. "Not war preparations that doom the peoples to a senseless squandering of their material and spiritual wealth, but consolidation of peace—that is the clue to the future."¹ This sentence is the quintessence of the peaceloving policy pursued by the CPSU and the Soviet government. On the other hand, most aggressive imperialist quarters, especially the United States of America, are seeking to exacerbate to the maximum international tension and whip up the arms race. This is an obvious attempt to secure military superiority over world socialism.

While making use of the myths of the "Soviet military threat" and "Soviet military superiority", the Reagan administration has set itself the goal of achieving "grandeur" of the United States and of enhancing Washington's prestige in international affairs. Under the present government, militarisation has become part and parcel of US foreign policy. It is self-evident that a "Soviet threat" was needed by imperialism not to overcome the alleged imbalance with the USSR in the military sphere but to destroy the military-strategic parity, whip up the arms race and lay the blame for the aggravation of international tension on the Soviet Union. This is what Lenin had in mind when he said that those who raise hue and cry about the "red militarism" are "political crooks who pretend that they believe this absurdity".²

The achievements of existing socialism and the upsurge of the national liberation struggle of the peoples arouse fury and hatred among imperialists, pushing them toward stepping up the arms race and preparing for a nuclear war.

The aggressive foreign policy pursued by the Reagan administration is of global character. It makes itself felt in US policy in Europe, Asia, Africa and Latin America. Different "theories", "doctrines", and "concepts" are formulated to substantiate it. Among these doctrines is Reagan's "new Asian strategy".

¹ *Twenty Sixth Congress of the CPSU*, Moscow, 1981, p. 40.

² V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 29, p. 66.

Ronald Reagan's coming to power marked a sharp turn in US foreign policy toward a tough confrontation with the Soviet Union in all aspects of relations, globally and regionally. Characterising this policy, American political scientist F. Greene notes that "the Reagan administration's efforts" are aimed "to recast US foreign policy, with emphasis on confronting the USSR".³

According to Greene, Washington's new approach includes: 1) a tough, even harsh, diplomatic and ideological stance against Moscow; 2) an extensive buildup of US military power; 3) delay of negotiations with the USSR until the armament programme is well under way; 4) a downgrading of the value of arms control agreements in enhancing US security; 5) emphasis on relations with the countries "threatened" by the Soviet Union; 6) provision with arms of the countries friendly to the USA to cement ties with them.⁴ Such a policy pursued by the US ruling quarters exerted most immediate influence on Washington's policy toward Asia. The task has been set to "restore America's strong role in Asia and the Pacific".⁵ All activities of the Reagan administration have been subordinated to the implementation of that strategic goal.

At the end of the 1970s, US political and academic quarters actively discussed the role played by the United States in Asia, the prospects for US policy in that region, and its possible alternatives. Early in 1979, the Rand Corporation, the "brain trust" of the US military-industrial complex, held a symposium on the problems confronting Asia in the 1980s and the elaboration of US policy in Asia for the current decade. The key issue at the symposium was to determine US policy in Asia in the conditions of the strengthening of the positions of progressive forces or, as R. Solomon, director of the research programme on international security of the Rand Corporation, put it, what was the US strategy in relation to the global Soviet challenge?⁶ Participants in the symposium called for a strengthening of relations with America's traditional allies in Asia, i. e., Japan and South Korea, and with ANZUS members but with due account taken of the Chinese factor.⁷ The American political scientist E. Lefever holds that, from the military strategic viewpoint, the USA has at least four alternatives as regards safeguarding of its interests in Asia: 1) increased US commitments in Asia; 2) considerably increased commitments; 3) the preservation of commitments at their present level; and 4) complete withdrawal. E. Lefever is inclined to believe that the best variant is the preservation of US commitments at the present-day level and a possibility of their decrease or increase in the foreseeable future.⁸

Professor R. Scalapino advocates the so-called "strategy of balance". In his opinion, the United States should continue to discharge its commitments to ensure the security of its Asian allies and preserve its military presence in the Pacific. He maintains such strategy would make it possible to avoid "super-Americanisation" of conflict situations in the

³ *Asian Survey*, January 1982, Vol. XXII, No. 1, p. 1.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 1.

⁵ *Pravda*, April 24, 1982.

⁶ See R. Solomon (ed.), *Asian Security in the 1980s. Problems and Policies for a Time of Transition*, (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1980, p. 2).

⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 63, 89, 127.

⁸ See E. W. Lefever, "United States, Japan and the Defence of the Pacific", *Policy Review* (Fall), No. 6, 1978, p. 99.

region and would ensure a more fair distribution of commitments between US allies in case of a conflict.⁹

On the whole American specialists in Asian problems and the concepts and formulas they set forth pursue one and the same goal, i. e., they make an attempt to substantiate "scientifically" the aggressive foreign policy of the United States that is directed at securing stronger US positions in Asia, preventing the consolidation of progressive trends in Asian continent, and undermining the influence of socialist countries on the changes in Asia.

The shaping of the Reagan administration's Asian policy was completed in the main early in 1982. It absorbed major postulates of US general aggressive line and was announced by the Secretary of Defence Caspar Weinberger during his visit to Japan in March 1982. US Asian strategy includes six points.

1) The USA confirms its intention to remain a Pacific power. The Reagan administration condemned the "Nixon Doctrine" as a cover for US withdrawal from Asia. The intention of the Carter administration to reduce US armed forces in South Korea was regarded as a way of the United States losing its role as an Asian power.

2) Relations with Japan. Washington insists that by the end of the 1980s Japan's "responsibility" in the sphere of defence should be put in conformity with its economic might, meaning an increase by Japan of its military expenditures, and the expansion of the spectrum of its armed forces' activities in the region.

3) Allround support for the South Korean regime, and the extending to it of new credits to modernise its armed forces.

4) "Strategic cooperation" with China. Development of relations with the PRC.

5) Countering the growing influence of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, of the forces of socialism in Southeast Asia. The United States is intent to encourage the development of bilateral and multilateral military cooperation with states of the region, develop their "potentialities" in filling the vacuum in case of a transfer of US troops from this region to other areas of the world.

6) Improvement of the rapid deployment forces and ensuring their fast redeployment to the Persian Gulf area as the most "vulnerable" point.¹⁰

It is clear that the new Asian policy "encompasses" the important region in Asia and demonstrates the intention of most aggressive US quarters to reinforce the American presence in the Far East. While describing Washington's new strategy in Asia, *US News & World Report* wrote: "The US is going on the offensive in Asia with the... 'Reagan Doctrine' to end a decade of retreat and vacillation".¹¹

The Reagan administration is pursuing an active Asian policy. During 1982 alone, the Secretary of Defence Weinberger twice toured the countries of the Far East and the Pacific. In the spring he visited Japan, South Korea and the Philippines, and in the autumn—several ASEAN countries, as well as Australia and New Zealand.

⁹ See R. Scalapino, "Approaches to Peace and Security in Asia: the Uncertainty Surrounding American Strategic Principles" in *Changing Patterns of Security and Stability in Asia*, New York, 1980, p. 5.

¹⁰ See *Far Eastern Economic Review*, June 18-24, 1982, pp. 10-11.

¹¹ *US News & World Report*, August 10, 1982, p. 36.

It is common knowledge that major US military bases are stationed in Japan, South Korea and the Philippines: In South Korea—40 bases, in Japan—32 bases.¹² The US Secretary of Defence inspected the combat readiness of the military installations and troops deployed on those bases.

For a long time Washington has been seeking to convince ASEAN countries of the need to make a more active contribution to the military preparations, though even now these states are spending huge sums for military purposes. In 1981 alone, military spending of ASEAN states amounted to \$7.6 billion, i. e., 170 per cent more than in 1975. Furthermore, Weinberger tried to convince ASEAN countries that Japan's rearmament in no way threatens them because the increased military potential of the Japanese armed forces is allegedly indispensable for safeguarding sea routes against the "Soviet threat". At a press-conference in Canberra Caspar Weinberger stressed the need to step up collective defence in the Asian-Pacific region. He noted the importance of ANZUS as a pillar of Asian security.

The heating up of militaristic ambitions in Asia is an important component of US policy toward Asia. Military budgets in Asian countries have grown considerably. The countries of Asia spend \$85 billion for military purposes annually.¹³ Had this tremendous sum been invested in the development of national economy, this would have considerably promoted the solution of the acute social problems faced by Asia.

The American military presence in the Far East and the Pacific is quite considerable. Suffice it to say that the numerical strength of US armed forces in the Far East alone has reached 147,000 officers and men. The US Pacific Command has at its disposal seven aircraft carriers, 140 other vessels, 44 nuclear and diesel submarines, and 1,125 planes.¹⁴ US military bases in Japan, South Korea and the Philippines are being expanded and modernised.

US aggressive intensions vis-à-vis the Korean Peninsula and South-east Asia, which have found confirmation in the Reagan administration's policy toward Asia, are still evident. The allround support of the Seoul regime, the commitment not to withdraw US troops from South Korea and the aggressive stance against the socialist countries of Indochina are spearheaded against the settlement of the situation in those regions.

The rapid deployment forces assigned to strengthen the positions of US imperialism in the Asian-Pacific region are a major component of the new Asian strategy.

It seems that Washington's new policy in Asia retains the inner continuity of the provisions of the "Guam Doctrine" and the "Ford Doctrine". It is steering toward a strengthening of the principal US positions in Asia with an emphasis on aggressiveness in attaining its goals. In other words, the US new strategy is sharply anti-Soviet and is directed at translating into reality its former tasks, i. e., the suppression of the Asian peoples' will for independent development and the undermining of positions of socialism in the region. The system of the existing military-political blocs and bilateral militaristic alliances of the USA with Japan, South Korea and other Asian countries serves as a means for attaining these goals.

¹² See *International Affairs*, No. 8, 1982.

¹³ See *Asia and Pacific*, No. 7, 1982, p. 77.

¹⁴ See *Krasnaya Zvezda*, June 12, 1982; *Izvestia*, Jan. 18, 1983.

The alliance with Japan is assigned a major role by the United States of America in achieving its regional and global objectives. US interest in Japan is predetermined primarily by the general growth of the latter's influence in the international and political relations. The defeat of the USA in Indochina brought its ruling quarters to the conclusion that Japan could serve as a major base for US policy in Asia. The Japanese-US "security treaty" is the foundation of their bilateral relations. In evaluating that treaty, Z. Brzezinski said that it "provides the anchor for our position in East Asia and extends the reach of our strategic and political influence in the Pacific".¹⁵ Both US and Japanese leaders demonstrate interest in maintaining closeknit friendly relations. R. Allen, former Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, noted that President Reagan highly evaluated the allied relations with Japan. The latter, he went on, plays an important role and is a support for the US policy in East Asia and the Pacific, being a major ally of the United States.

The US academic community is unanimous as far as the significance of the bilateral relations with Japan is concerned. Professor D. Hellman writes: "The Japanese-American alliance remains the cornerstone of our policy in Asia and one of the most notable achievements of the United States diplomacy since 1945."¹⁶

Large-scale military and political cooperation and interaction exist between the USA and Japan. They took on a new form after Prime Minister Z. Suzuki's visit to the United States in May 1981. The two sides elevated their bilateral relations to the level of an "alliance". President Reagan designated US-Japanese relations a "vital alliance" and called for "harmony" between the two Pacific countries.¹⁷ The Japanese Premier promised that Tokyo "will seek to make even greater efforts for improving its defence capabilities in Japanese territories and its surrounding sea and air space, and for further alleviating the financial burden of US forces in Japan."¹⁸ Tokyo spends annually around \$1.4 billion for the maintenance of US troops in Japan.¹⁹ The new government headed by Ya. Nakasone also declared that the United States is Japan's principal partner, and that it intended to develop multifarious ties with it.

Washington and Tokyo have set up a ramified political and military structure of cooperation relying on the "security treaty". There are over 100 military bases and other US installations in Japan, at which about 46,000 American servicemen are stationed.²⁰

A consultative committee on security matters is active between the two countries. At its annual sessions it discusses different aspects of the bilateral military cooperation. In 1978, the committee approved basic principles of cooperation between Japan and the USA in the field of defence. This document actually specifies basic propositions of the "security treaty" and provides for interaction between the armed forces of the two states as well as the distribution of combat missions between them. It notes in particular that Japanese "self-defence" forces will undertake the

¹⁵ See *Department of State Bulletin*, June 1978, p. 3.

¹⁶ D. C. Hellman, *China and Japan: a New Balance of Power*, Lexington-Toronto, 1976, p. 305.

¹⁷ See *Nihon keizai*, June 30, 1981.

¹⁸ *Asahi Evening News*, May 9, 1981.

¹⁹ See *Spiegel*, May 19, 1982, p. 23.

²⁰ See *US News & World Report*, November 16, 1981, p. 43.

repulsing of a "limited and small-scale aggression". In the course of naval operations they are supposed to safeguard sea routes, defend ports and bays, protect straits, fight submarines, and safeguard marine transportation.

As for the US troops, according to the abovementioned document, their function is reduced to the "maintenance of the containment nuclear force", the maintenance of mobile armed forces which can be "put forward to the advanced frontiers", assistance to the "self-defence force" and carrying out counteroffensive operations.²¹

It is highly indicative that at the end of the 1970s the Tokyo ruling quarters began revising certain aspects of their military-strategic doctrine whose basis is still the Japanese-US "security treaty". The concept of "national security" began to be interpreted on a much broader scale, and the question of delivering a strike on the enemy outside the Japanese boundaries was raised for the first time. It is precisely within this context that one should examine the expansion of the zone of operation by the Japanese "self-defence force".

At a regular meeting of the consultative committee in Honolulu in August 1982 the American side pressed for Japan to make greater military efforts. Having secured the extension of the range of operation of Japan's "self-defence force" up to one thousand miles away from the Japanese Isles, the USA continued to bring pressure to bear on Tokyo. In 1979, Japan's military spending was 1,200 per cent of its 1960 level.²² In fiscal year 1981, military expenditures were increased by 7.5 per cent, and in 1982, they topped \$10 billion. The figure is expected to reach \$11 billion this year.²³ According to P. Langer, the Rand Corporation's leading expert on Asian problems, "even if the Japanese should devote no more than one per cent of their GNP to a continuing defence buildup, they will possess a highly sophisticated military establishment by the end of the '80s, making Japan one of the world's larger military powers in terms of defensive capacity". Langer arrives at the following conclusion: "...the process of developing such enlarged defensive capabilities... will inevitably lead to some extension of the country's defence perimeter".²⁴

That was precisely what happened. The Suzuki government steered toward spreading the sphere of activity of the "self-defence force" beyond the boundaries of the Japanese Isles. Nonetheless, Washington is far from satisfied with the scope of Japan's growing military expenditures and the shifting of its armed forces' operations beyond its limits. US Ambassador to Japan M. Mansfield demands: "Japan has to do more... in the area of defence"²⁵ [in the Far East.—V. I. Denisov]. Indeed, Japan is bolstering its military potential. A five-year military programme (1983-1987) has been adopted recently, to cost Japan \$60 billion.²⁶ By the time this programme is completed, Japan will have 178 vessels and 185 aircraft in its naval forces, 138 F-15 planes, 58 F-1 planes and 35 planes of other types in its air force, while its ground forces will be equipped with 1,314 tanks, 418 aircraft and other weapons systems.²⁷ Even now, however, Japan's armed forces are quite impressive. Its army numbers 260,000

²¹ See *Asia and Africa Today*, 1982, No. 4, p. 14 (in Russian).

²² *Ibid.*, p. 12 (in Russian).

²³ See *Christian Science Monitor*, July 29, 1982.

²⁴ R. Solomon (ed.), *Op. cit.*, p. 88.

²⁵ *US News & World Report*, November 16, 1981, p. 43.

²⁶ *Izvestia*, June 12, 1982.

²⁷ See *Far Eastern Economic Review*, August 6-12, 1982, p. 35.

officers and men, and its navy consists of 60 destroyers and 50 submarines.

In the course of the August 1982 negotiations between Japan and the United States an agreement was reached on military matters in some other crucial spheres. In particular, the parties agreed that "in case of aggravation of the situation in the Far East, which may influence Japan's security" the latter will give support to the United States. They also decided to examine the problems of further cooperation in case of an "emergency". The Japanese side made concessions in another important area having agreed to discuss the transfer of its military technology to the United States.

According to the Japanese Professor I. Nagai, the United States is bringing pressure to bear on Japan for it to become a military threat to the Soviet Union.²⁸

One cannot but agree with I. Nagai's conclusion bearing in mind that the edge of the US military-political strategy in Asia, as well as other regions, is spearheaded against the Soviet Union. The statement made by the US Secretary of Defence Weinberger concerning the so-called "northern territories" should be viewed in the same context. He said that the USA supports Japan's demand about the return of these territories.²⁹ The alleged "Soviet threat" takes the lead in the entire set of measures of pressurising Japan.

The carrying out of joint military exercises became an essential component of Japanese-US military cooperation. Since 1978 the two countries have conducted military exercises more than 40 times as compared to 17 in 1972.³⁰

Another characteristic feature is Japan's being encouraged to participate in exercises conducted several thousand miles away from its shores. Since 1980, Tokyo has permanently taken part in the Rimpac (Pacific Ring) exercises carried out by the USA, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand near the Hawaii Islands. US military specialists attach much importance to these exercises, since they are conducted in order to solve the problems involving the interaction of NATO and ANZUS member countries' naval forces. Thus, an expansion of the functions of the "self-defence force" which is now facing the task of defending not only Japan is becoming a reality.

Washington has in principle approved Japan's plan to set up the so-called Pacific Community. Of course, the United States understands Tokyo's intentions but it has so far its own considerations. The main idea of the United States is to impart a military-political colouring to the community, and impose military commitments on it. In other words, the United States would like to consolidate and extend bilateral and multilateral ties between the USA and its allies in Europe, Asia and the Pacific, and build a bridge between NATO, on the one hand, and ANZUS and ASEAN, on the other, as well as Japan and South Korea.

It would be erroneous, however, to think that on all basic issues Tokyo is following in the wake of Washington's policy. There exist a number of grave differences between the two countries, on trade and economic issues in particular. The chronic US trade deficit with Japan creates an atmosphere of acute competitive struggle between them. In 1981, a record deficit of \$16 billion was registered in the balance of trade between

²⁸ See *Asahi shimbun*, Nov. 17, 1981.

²⁹ *Yomiuri*, March 21, 1982.

³⁰ *Krasnaya Zvezda*, Nov. 6 and 26, 1982.

the USA and Japan. It is expected that in 1983 the figure will double, while by 1990 it will reach \$50 billion.³¹

An analysis shows that at the current stage Japanese-American relations have attained a new level. It is no accident that Washington is striving to set up "allied" ties with Tokyo. It assigns the latter a leading role in its military-strategic scheme on a regional and global scale. The attempt, and a successful one, to place on Japan's shoulders a part of its military functions enables the United States to use its force thus released in other areas, which causes a growth in international tension. The course toward militarisation and support of Pentagon's military adventures runs counter to the national interests of the Japanese people and undermines the foundations of peace and goodneighbourly relations in Asia and in the Far East.

"MATURE PARTNERSHIP" WITH SOUTH KOREA

South Korea occupies a special place in the Asian policy of the United States. The situation on the Korean peninsula influences the entire system of international relations in East Asia and Western part of the Pacific mainly as a potential state of crisis. The Korean issue has not yet been resolved, and Washington's policy of the overall strengthening of the Seoul regime leads to an exacerbation of the situation in Korea.³²

All US administrations in the 1970s, as well as the Reagan administration, regarded and continue to regard the Korean peninsula as a "sphere of US vital interests". Donald Zagoria, a well-known US expert on Asian problems, noted that in spite of a changed tactical approach to Korea by different US administrations, "there is a basic continuity of American interest in the Korean peninsula",³³ which, in the final analysis, determines the exceptional importance of this region to Washington.

Henry Kissinger, former US Secretary of State, said that "the stability and security of South Korea were crucial to the security of the East Asian area". Commenting on this statement, William Barnds writes: "This view reflects South Korea importance in just right manner over the long term, it is not much of an overstatement for the immediate future".³⁴

US interest in South Korea is determined by a number of factors. First, military-strategic interests of US imperialism in Asia preconditioned the involvement of South Korea in Washington's plans in Asia. The southern part of the peninsula is a suitable strategic point ensuring the preservation of US positions in Asian and the Pacific region. R. Person notes that if Americans sacrifice Korea, this may lead to further erosion of US influence in Asia and, finally, to a withdrawal from that area. It is absolutely clear, R. Person goes on, that the frontline of defence in East Asia and the Western Pacific should be based on the resolute support of South Korea.³⁵

Second, in recent years the Japanese factor continues to remain and becomes more important in the US Korean policy. The "Nixon Doctrine", the "Pacific Doctrine" and the present-day Reagan's Far Eastern strategy closely tie in US relations with South Korea and Japan. Paul Langer of the Rand Corporation's "brain trust" notes in this connection: "American

³¹ *Far Eastern Economic Review*, July 16-22, 1982, p. 42; *US News & World Report*, September 23, 1982, p. 39.

³² See *USA and the Problems of the Pacific*, Moscow, 1979, p. 277 (in Russian).

³³ *Korea Newsreview*, January 2, 1982, p. 11.

³⁴ W. J. Barnds (ed.), *Two Koreas in East Asian Affairs*, New York, 1976, p. 181.

³⁵ See *Korea in the World Today*, Washington, 1976, p. 7.

support for Korean security thus remains a vital element in the stability of the Japanese-American defence relationship".³⁶ Thus, this implies the functioning of a single military-political structure consisting of the USA, Japan and South Korea in the Far East and in Asia. One should also bear in mind the geographic proximity of the Korean peninsula to the borders of the socialist community, the Soviet Union above all.

Third, the permanent instability of the Seoul regime causes anxiety among the US ruling quarters which are forced to keep an eye on the situation in the southern part of the Korean peninsula. Making use of the alleged "threat from the North", Washington retains its military presence in South Korea and helps the Seoul regime to build up its military and economical potential.

Finally, the US military and strategic interests are supplemented by highly important economic considerations. Direct US investments in South Korean economy today account for 25.8 per cent of total foreign investments.³⁷

In its new Asian strategy Washington assigns South Korea the role of a "regional force". According to D. Zagoria, South Korea ensures the balance of force in Asia, and if it is upset, this may entail grave consequences for the world. While strengthening South Korea as a "regional force", D. Zagoria goes on, the USA thus puts an end to its passive stand in East Asia that followed after the defeat in Vietnam.³⁸

Many US experts believe that "new partnership" between Washington and Seoul will take shape in the 1980s. It will be ensured by more active US participation in modernising South Korean armed forces, closely coordinating US-South Korean effort in the military sphere, totally supporting Seoul on the Korean issue, and developing closer political and economic ties with South Korea.³⁹

In the late 1970s, the US administration has expressed intention to reduce the level of its presence in South Korea and withdraw part of its ground forces from there. However, the Carter administration's turn from detente toward confrontation resulted in giving up initial promises. President Carter not only refused to withdraw US armed forces from the south, but decided to bolster the air force, and modernise the weaponry of the US forces there.

The present US administration proceeds from the fact that South Korea is a key factor in Washington's strategy in Asia. It is not by chance that Chun Doo Hwan, South Korea's dictator, was the first to make a visit to the United States after President Reagan came to the White House. This visit was regarded as the US "about face" to Asia. Indeed, the accent on the Asian continent by the new administration in its foreign policy is a response of sorts by the US ruling quarters to the progressive trends in that area.

As is seen from the joint statement adopted during the visit of Chun Doo Hwan to the USA, Washington and Seoul reaffirmed their commitments ensuing from the "mutual defence treaty" signed in 1954. It is indicative that in the joint communique the Seoul dictator acknowledged the US claims to "a tough guidance of the world politics". The US President reassured Chun that the United States had no intentions to withdraw its ground forces from South Korea.⁴⁰ This provision of the joint

³⁶ R. Solomon (ed.), *Op. cit.* ..., p. 88.

³⁷ See *Korea Herald*, Jan. 1, 1982.

³⁸ See *Korea Newsreview*, Jan. 23, pp. 10-11.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 11.

⁴⁰ See *Korea Herald*, Feb. 4, 1981.

statement, which is important from Seoul's standpoint, puts an end to the rumours about a reduction of the US military presence in South Korea that were spread under the Carter administration.

It should be emphasised that the amorphous plans of reducing the US presence in South Korea had no support in US political, to say nothing of the military, circles. R. Sneider, former US Ambassador to Seoul, holds that the withdrawal of US troops would upset the military balance in the peninsula and, what is most important, intensify the "process of erosion of Asian confidence in the US security commitment".⁴¹ The thesis concerning the loss of confidence in the United States can be often met in Western periodicals and studies of bourgeois scholars after the defeat of the United States in Vietnam. The partial reduction of the US military presence in South Korea, carried out by the Nixon administration, made the upper crust of South Korea wary about the destiny of the regime. Several theories were set forth as arguments in favour of preserving the US armed forces. It was claimed, first and foremost, that the US ground forces "play a vital role in maintaining peace in Northeast Asia", and the nationalistic sentiments within the US ruling quarters were whipped up. It was declared, for example, that, as a Pacific power, the United States should discharge its national mission, i. e., to ensure its own interests, and this is unthinkable without its military presence in South Korea.⁴²

The Korean factor has been directly tied in with the Japanese one in the entire system of the US military-political strategy in Asia and the Far East. While noting the importance of Japan for the Seoul regime, Sneider points out that US naval and air bases in the Japanese Isles ensure support to the US troops in South Korea. Another important element is that Japan can supply the South Korean armed forces with intelligence data. Sneider adds that Tokyo's economic aid should also be taken into account since it plays a positive role in South Korea's overall security positions.⁴³

Thus, the Japanese-US and US-South Korean military and political relations are the principal components of the general US strategy in the Asian-Pacific region.

The United States is expanding its deliveries of modern weaponry to Seoul. Ronald Reagan reassured Chun Doo Hwan that the United States would give South Korea weapons and technological systems for its defence industry.⁴⁴ Washington has for long bent every effort to help its satellite. From 1945 to 1974, it granted South Korea over \$11 billion, including \$5.7 billion in military aid.⁴⁵ In 1981, the US gave South Korea \$150 million and in 1982 about \$170 million for the modernisation of the South Korean army and the purchase of new US military hardware, including F-16 fighters, missiles, and radar installations. Within the next five years US military aid to the Seoul regime will amount to \$900 million.

The tension on the peninsula is aggravated by the presence of 40 thousand US troops equipped with nuclear weapons. The Pentagon has decided recently to increase the numerical strength of its armed forces in South Korea by one thousand officers and men. The US air force deploy-

⁴¹ R. Solomon (ed.), *Op. cit.*, p. 132.

⁴² See *Time Magazine*, June 30, 1975.

⁴³ See R. Solomon (ed.), *Op. cit.*, p. 132.

⁴⁴ See *Korea Herald*, Feb. 4, 1981.

⁴⁵ See R. Bartlett, *American Foreign Policy in Perspective. Is the US Security Being Threatened?*, 1978, p. 162.

ed in South Korea is to be reinforced by a squadron of A-10 aircraft. The US administration has also increased its allocations for the maintenance of its armed forces in South Korea and modernisation of their armaments. A sum of \$1 billion is planned to be spent for this purpose in 1982-1983.⁴⁶

The present-day US military concepts providing for the possibility of delivering the "first strike" and for conducting "limited" or "protracted" nuclear war are fully applicable to the South Korean situation as well. In reply to a reporter's question about the possible use of neutron weapons, Weinberger, US Secretary of Defence, stated bluntly: "It will be necessary on battlefield, and Korea, for example, may become such battleground".⁴⁷

The Japanese ruling quarters regard South Korea as a key element of Tokyo's regional policy. Japan cannot even think of its Korean policy without the presence of the US expedition corps in South Korea. In this connection Sneider, former US Ambassador to Seoul, writes: "US interests in Korea are derived from the treaty commitment to preserve the security of Japan. In fact, the security of the Republic of Korea [South Korea.—V. D.] and that of Japan are virtually inseparable. Indeed, the security interests of the two countries should be viewed from a broader regional... perspective."⁴⁸ Political figures in Tokyo have been permanently emphasising the vital necessity of Japan's relations with South Korea. Speaking before a session of the Japanese parliament, the former Prime Minister Z. Suzuki noted: "I deem it necessary to work for a more profound mutual understanding with South Korea". The importance of the Korean factor in the American and Japanese policies has also been reaffirmed in the US-Japanese communique on the results of the visit to Washington of the Japanese Premier in May 1981. Both sides noted that the presence of US troops in the south of the Korean peninsula is an important element of peace and stability in East Asia.⁴⁹

The new Japanese Prime Minister Nakasone confirmed Tokyo's intention to promote more solid relations with South Korea.

The military cooperation between Seoul and Tokyo is under way, and here American influence can be easily discerned. The USA has been persistently pushing Japan toward establishing contacts between defence ministries of the two countries, and the results of its efforts are evident. In 1981, General N. Namatame, Chief of Staff of the Japanese Air Force, visited Seoul and an agreement was reached to expand cooperation between the Japanese and South Korean armed forces. Japanese military representatives are present as observers at the annual US-South Korean military exercises. In the spring of 1982, the joint naval exercises of the USA, Japan and South Korea were conducted.

While encouraging Seoul's claims to Japan concerning the granting of \$10 billion⁵⁰ to stabilise South Korean economy, the United States is thus trying to make Japan increase its "contribution" to the consolidation of the Seoul regime and the reinforcement of the Seoul-Tokyo alliance under the guidance of Washington. Y. Nakasone's gift to the South Korean dictator in the form of a \$4 billion loan, made during his visit to Seoul last December, is ample evidence of Tokyo's urge to support, in every possible way, the anti-popular regime of Chun Doo Hwan.

⁴⁶ See *Izvestia*, April 24, 1981; *Financial Times*, June 5, 1981; *Izvestia*, July 7, 1981.

⁴⁷ *Welt am Sonntag*, April 13, 1982.

⁴⁸ R. Solomon (ed.). *Op. cit.*, p. 112.

⁴⁹ *Asahi Evening News*, May 9, 1981.

⁵⁰ See *Pravda*, July 12, 1982.

In turn, the South Korean regime spares no effort to become a "mature" partner of the United States in Asia. First and foremost, it steps up militarisation of the country, with its armed forces and police being bolstered. Today the South Korean army is a most numerous army in the world. The war industry is developing rapidly. Whereas early in the 1970s the United States gave the Seoul army all the necessary equipment, in 1977, 50 per cent of its military hardware was manufactured in South Korea. According to foreign military experts, the production of military equipment in South Korea—from helmets to howitzers—has doubled in recent years.⁵¹ According to American estimates, by the mid-1980s South Korea will be able to meet all its needs in armaments and military hardware, with the exception of electronic equipment. Today Seoul manufactures independently 155- and 105-mm howitzers, 81-mm medium mortars, anti-tank missiles and ammunition. An explosives-manufacturing plant has been built, and works producing tanks have been reconstructed. It was announced in 1978 that South Korea began manufacturing independently surface-to-surface and air-to-air missiles, helicopters and radar installations.⁵² Quite recently Chun Doo Hwan has stated that South Korea began producing aircraft.

The Seoul regime has spent tremendous amounts of money for military purposes. In 1974, the South Korean military budget was \$742 million, while in 1977—\$4.5 billion. In 1983, the military spending will make up 33 per cent of all budget allocations, or nearly six per cent of the GNP.⁵³

Seoul complements the consolidation of its relations with the USA and Japan on a bilateral basis with the quest for new ways for bolstering its positions both regionally and globally. It is maintained in Seoul that the economically "prospering" country (with a GNP of \$60 billion) should have a greater political weight at least in the Asian-Pacific region. In 1981, ASEAN countries, the USA, Japan, Canada, Australia and New Zealand accounted for 52 per cent of total South Korean exports (\$22 billion). South Korea imports from the abovementioned countries 60 per cent of its raw materials and fuel (in 1981, the cost of the South Korean imports was \$27 billion).⁵⁴ Economic and military factors (Seoul's army numbers over 600,000 officers and men) give rise to political ambitions of the South Korean ruling elite. Chun Doo Hwan has actively supported Japan's idea to establish a "Pacific Community" and proposed to convene a summit conference of the Pacific states in 1983 or 1984.

Announcing the "beginning of the great Pacific era", the South Korean ruler expounded the major objectives and principles of the future "community" as he sees it:

- creation of a consultative body within the framework of which the leaders of the Pacific countries will hold regular meetings to discuss problems of mutual cooperation;
- the doors to the consultative body will be open to all countries of the region;
- the chief tasks of the "community": the development of natural resources, expansion of trade ties, consolidation of economic and technological cooperation, expansion of cultural ties, and so on.⁵⁵

⁵¹ See *Far Eastern Economic Review*, June 10, 1977, p. 10.

⁵² See *Korea Herald*, Jan. 19, 1978.

⁵³ See *Asia Yearbook 1978*, p. 40; *Korea Newsreview*, Dec. 26, 1981, p. 9; *Pravda*, July 12, 1982.

⁵⁴ See *Far Eastern Economic Review*, June 25-July 1, 1982, pp. 20-22.

⁵⁵ See *Korea Newsreview*, August 7, 1982, p. 5.

Behind the declaration of the fundamental principles of international relations and general discourse concerning the need to promote cooperation in different spheres, the authors of the would-be "community" would like to hide the true meaning of a new neocolonial adventure undertaken by the imperialist forces. It is quite clear, however, that it is the United States of America and Japan that will dominate the organisation politically, economically and militarily. It is no secret that Washington would like to see the future community not so much as an economic grouping but primarily as a new militaristic alliance in Asia and the Pacific, spear-headed, above all, against the socialist countries, the national liberation movement, and aimed at strengthening the positions of imperialism in that region.

The vigorous efforts by the Seoul regime to find a place in the "community" planned by Japan and the United States is part and parcel of Chun Doo Hwan's line, who is seeking to tie up his regime even closer to the military-strategic structure of US imperialism in Asia.

It is clear that the "contribution" of the Seoul regime to the regional "balance of forces" is weighty and continues to grow. We witness the increasing military-political cooperation between the USA, Japan and South Korea within the framework of the "triangle". The growth of Seoul's aggressive ambitions, and its becoming a "mature partner" of Washington even more exacerbates the present-day situation in the Korean peninsula and the whole Asian-Pacific region.

* * *

The Soviet Union set forth a reasonable alternative to the imperialist designs in Asia. The 26th Congress of the CPSU has formulated the Peace Programme for the 1980s, which contains a set of constructive proposals having a direct bearing on the Asian region. They include negotiations on confidence-building in the Far East, limitation on the deployment of Ohio-class submarines and similar Soviet Typhoon-class submarines, and prevention of the emergence of new hotbeds of conflicts.

In pursuance of the basic propositions of the Peace Programme the USSR has advanced a number of new major initiatives aimed at curtailing the activities of the navies of the two opposing military-political blocs—the Warsaw Treaty and NATO. The Soviet Union is ready to negotiate that missile submarines of the two sides be withdrawn from the present vast areas of combat patrolling, and their navigation be limited by coordinated boundaries. The Soviet Union is also ready to discuss the spread of confidence-building measures to the seas and oceans, primarily the areas with most heavy sea routes.

In proceeding from the international legal principles of equality and equal security, the Soviet Union expressed its readiness for an exchange of opinion with Japan on the strengthening of guarantees of security for non-nuclear states, and non-use of nuclear weapons against the countries which refuse to manufacture and obtain such weapons and do not deploy them on their territories.

The Soviet Union's commitment not to be the first to use nuclear weapons is of paramount significance to peace and security in Asia and the whole world.

The proposal set forth by the Mongolian People's Republic on concluding a convention on mutual non-aggression and non-use of force in relations between the states of Asia and the Pacific has been exerting a positive influence on the situation in that region.

The initiative of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea on making Southeast Asia a zone of peace, stability and cooperation has made a weighty contribution to normalisation of the situation in Asia.

The Soviet Union is fully resolved to continue its persistent struggle for peace and the strengthening of international security. While addressing the November 1982 Plenary Meeting of the CPSU Central Committee, Yuri Andropov, General Secretary of the CC CPSU emphasised: "The ensuring of a lasting peace, the safeguarding of the right of peoples to independence and social progress are invariable objectives of our foreign policy. While working to attain these goals, the Party and state leadership will act purposefully, consistently, and consideredly".⁵⁶ The Soviet Union has been pursuing these goals in the Far East, too.

⁵⁶ *Pravda*, Nov. 23, 1982.

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RECENT FACTIONAL STRUGGLES WITHIN JAPANESE LDP DESCRIBED

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[Article by Yu. D. Kuznetsov: "The Political Situation in Japan"]

The election of Yasuhiro Nakasone as Chairman of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party and on the following day as Prime Minister put an end to Japan's month-and-a-half long political crisis. The crisis was triggered by former Prime Minister Z. Suzuki's announcement that he would not seek reelection to the highest post in the party. As such, this reshuffle of power opened the 6th act of a drama worthy of the Kabuki repertoire that has been playing out on the Japanese political scene for more than ten years.

This drama is commonly referred to within the country's mass media and political quarters as the "war of Kaku and Fuku", the title given to the power struggle between Kakuei Tanaka and Takeo Fukuda, the two major political figures in the country, former Prime Ministers and Liberal Democratic leaders.

Unlike other developed capitalist countries, for more than 25 years political power in Japan has belonged to a single political party, one echoing the interests of monopoly capital. In fact, this party—the Liberal Democratic Party—is a conglomeration of different factions engaged in a struggle for control over the party, which, given the present-day alignment of forces in the country, means the right to form the government. As no faction is capable of controlling the entire party on its own, they form a variety of combinations. Changes in the alignment and correlation of forces result in reshuffles in the Liberal Democratic leadership and, consequently, in the government. Yet, however intense the internecine warfare within the party, power constantly falls into Liberal Democrats' hands.

The internecine "war of Kaku and Fuku" got its start in hot July in 1972, when the question was being decided of who would succeed resigning Prime Minister Sato. Thanks largely to high economic growth rates that made Japan the capitalist world's second-ranking economic power, Prime Minister Sato's record of eight-year stewardship as head of a Liberal Democrat government ended on a stable note.

Before resigning, Sato named Foreign Minister Fukuda his successor. His choice, however, did not receive the unanimous approval of the party. In the fierce contention for the party chairmanship that ensued Fukuda's main rival was Kakuei Tanaka, Minister of Foreign Trade and Industry who had vast links with the representatives of big business and, as the long-time General Secretary of the Liberal Democrats, a firm party base. Apart from him, the post was coveted by Yasuhiro Nakasone, chairman of the guiding council of the Liberal Democrats and former Foreign Ministers Masayoshi Ohira and Takeo Miki.

All five leaders who had aspired to the post of head of the Liberal Democratic Party and thus of the government ten years ago have since achieved their goal. Z. Suzuki was the only "outsider" to have reached the desired goal, if only because he inherited the leadership of the corresponding faction after the sudden death of Prime Minister Ohira.

The present Prime Minister Nakasone was not a beginner in politics ten years ago. In 1959 he entered the N. Kishi government and went on to hold various cabinet posts in the Sato government in the late 1960s. He was an active participant in the "war of Kaku and Fuku", a fact which affected his political destiny.

Nakasone played a significant role in Tanaka's election as Chairman of the Liberal Democrats in 1972. Shortly before the party congress, that was to elect the chairman, Nakasone announced his withdrawal from contention for the post and his support for Tanaka. This move gave the latter a slight edge over the "official" candidate Fukuda in the first round of voting. In the second round two other contenders, Ohira and Miki, casted their support for Tanaka, assuring him victory.

The Japanese press reported that Tanaka spent 10 billion yen in 1972 to ensure himself a sufficient number of votes to be elected party chairman.¹ Nakasone was named Minister of International Trade and Industry in the Tanaka Cabinet, which enabled him to establish important contacts with big business.

Claiming 65 deputies, Fukuda's faction turned into a major force of opposition within the Liberal Democratic Party, posing a serious threat to the stability of the Tanaka government.

The Tanaka Cabinet got off to a rapid and effective start, launching with much fanfare a programme to "reconstruct the Japanese Archipelago". Tagged at upwards of 400 trillion yen, loud programme envisaged a decentralisation of industry, the development of backward regions, the building of hundreds of new towns, and other projects. As such, it was designed to satisfy the interests of the monopolies and give a boost to the less rapid pace of economic growth.

Tanaka made a trip to Peking, the result of which was the normalisation of relations between China and Japan. For some time this helped maintain the prestige of the government and the ruling party; yet was not enough to compensate for the Liberal Democrats' inability to cope with domestic economic problems and overcome growing inflation. The positions of the Liberal Democrats began to erode: in 1972 the ruling party lost governorships in the prefectures of Okinawa, Chitama and Okayama, and in December of the same year the party lost 17 seats in parliamentary elections.

Following the elections to the Diet, Tanaka reorganised his cabinet, offering his rival Fukuda a seat in the government as an outward display of unity.

A mass protest movement began to mount in the country against a Liberal Democrat policy that served monopoly interests. In April 1973 a general strike involving 3.6 million people broke out among public railway road, postal, telegraph and telephone employees. It was the largest single action by the Japanese working class in the entire history of the spring offensive campaign.

Even wider opposition was triggered by government attempts to revise the election system and introduce "smaller" electoral districts from which a single deputy would be elected, a change that would have benefited the Liberal Democrats (under the present system from 3 to 5 deputies are elected to the Parliament from each district, which gives opposition parties some chance of winning). The democratic forces formed a Central Liaison Council to frustrate the plans for introducing the new electoral system. The Council incorporated 233 organisations and united

¹ See *Japan Times*, Nov. 18, 1976.

a total of 14 million people. Meetings and protest demonstrations against the reactionary schemes were held throughout the country.

Some Liberal Democrats also opposed the introduction of smaller electoral districts, fearing the further growth of the mass protest movement and the possibility of losing political power. Pressured by democratic forces, the government was eventually forced to renounce attempts to revise the electoral system.

The Japanese economy suffered a strong blow in late 1973 when oil prices registered a sharp rise on the world market. Japan was as a result deprived of one of the key factors of its swift economic growth, namely, cheap raw materials and cheap power. The oil shock accelerated the advent of an economic crisis that had matured in the preceding period of high economic growth rates.

Tanaka was once again forced to reshuffle his cabinet. Though his main allies, including Nakasone, retained government posts, the Prime Minister was obliged to name Fukuda to the important post of Minister of Finance. Essentially, this amounted to the revision of the Tanaka government's economic policy aimed at promoting higher growth rates and the actual renunciation of his brainchild—the plan for “reconstruction of the Japanese Archipelago”.

Although the political crisis exacerbated many social and economic problems in Japan, it was inflation that had the most acute effect: retail prices shot upwards by more than 25 per cent in 1974, lowering the living standard of a wide section of the working people.

The mounting dissatisfaction of the people was felt on the results of July 1974 elections to the House of Councillors of Parliament. The Liberal Democrats lost seven seats, retaining a slight advantage over the opposition only with the help of “independent” deputies. Soon after the elections Deputy Prime Minister Miki resigned, followed by Fukuda. They announced their disagreement with the Tanaka policies and spoke in favour of a “modernisation” of the Liberal Democratic Party. This significantly weakened the position of the Tanaka government, setting it going on its actual downslide.

In late October the popular *Bungei shunju* monthly carried a major article headlined “A Profile of K. Tanaka, His Means of Existence and Contacts”. Relying on concrete facts, the article revealed that Tanaka had made a big fortune by speculating in land, forming fictitious joint-stock companies, screening income from tax inspectors and, finally, spending party funds and using his official position for personal ends. It was obvious that an experienced hand was played in that article by Tanaka's political opponents who decided to jump at the favourable opportunity to oust Tanaka from power.

Along with economic demands, mass calls for the resignation of the government were made at numerous meetings and demonstrations. Tanaka continued heading the government for a while only because his opponents could not agree on who was to succeed him as the party leader. Considerations of maintaining foreign policy prestige also had a certain role to play, particularly the desire to receive “befittingly” US President Ford who was making the first official visit to Japan.

But as soon as Gerald Ford left Japan, the Tanaka government resigned. It proved no easy matter to elect a new leader, as the leaders of three factions, Fukuda, Ohira and Miki, aspired to the post. The situation in the ruling party was such that the more probable candidates to chairmanship, Fukuda and the Tanaka-supported Ohira, as it were, blocked

each other. As a result of complicated innerparty manoeuvring, Miki became party Chairman and Prime Minister.

The Miki government was born of a compromise between factions within the Liberal Democratic Party that reflected a certain balance of forces between the two camps around Fukuda and Ohira, the main contenders for the ruling party chairmanship. Miki's influence among the Liberal Democrats was weak: in late 1974 the Tanaka faction had 92 deputies, the Fukuda faction—82, the Ohira faction—65, the Miki faction—45, and the Nakasone faction—43 deputies.²

Miki had a long-standing reputation of a liberal who repeatedly criticised the LDP government policy. His election to fill the post of ruling party leader and head of state was to foster the illusion of the possibility to reconcile the demands of the opposition parties advocating, albeit with various degrees of consistency, the renovation of the country's policy with the conservative line of the Liberal Democrats, who stubbornly upheld the political, economic and social status quo. The new premier's declaration of his government's intent to pursue a "clean" policy, to "modernise" the LDP and to "eliminate social injustice" also served the same purpose.

The priority task of the new government was to overcome as quickly as possible the acute crisis within the ruling party and to boost the Liberal Democrats' shattered prestige among broad sectors of the population. Nevertheless within the party Miki found himself under the strict control of his rivals. Key government posts went to members of the Fukuda and Ohira factions. Fukuda was named to the post of Deputy Prime Minister and head of the economic planning department, while Ohira took over at the finance ministry.

Miki's weak position within the LDP also predetermined the distribution of the leading posts in the party apparatus. Until then one of the closest supporters of the party chairman, that is to say, of the Prime Minister, was appointed secretary-general of the ruling party, as he is usually responsible for the daily guidance of the activities of the LDP central apparatus and local organisations. Miki was forced to relinquish that important post to other factions, which resulted in Nakasone's becoming the LDP secretary-general.

With the eroding of the party's positions in the country, the Miki government chose a tactic unusual for the ruling party, a "dialogue with the opposition" that envisioned consultations with the opposition parties in shaping the political course. It was a necessary measure, especially given the decreased LDP majority in the House of Councillors in the aftermath of the 1974 elections.

Miki's rivals in the ruling party, however, saw the tactic of a "dialogue with the opposition" as the Prime Minister's attempt to strengthen his positions and broaden his base outside the LDP. The conservatives fiercely resisted the tactic. For instance, an "anti-monopoly law" passed by the Lower House of the Japanese Diet, that envisaged certain restrictions of monopoly activities failed to gain the approval of the House of Councillors as a result of the LDP Deputies' refusal to consider it.

The "dialogue with the opposition" actually came to an end by the autumn of 1975 under pressure from the right wing of the Liberal Democrats. The new situation became manifest in the attitude adopted by the ruling party to the eight-day strike of 800,000 employees of government offices and communal services held in late November-early De-

² See *Japan Times*, Feb. 14, 1975.

cember 1975. This pronouncedly political strike demanded the restoration of government employees' right to strike.

The scale of the strike, its organisation and the sympathy shown to the strikers by broad sections of the population threw the ruling elite into confusion. According to Japanese press records, Miki, Fukuda, Minister of Labour T. Hasegawa and others at first contemplated some compromise. But the considerable part of the LDP leadership and some influential figures within it (the LDP Vice Chairman E. Shiina, the LDP Secretary-General Nakasone and also Ohira and Tanaka) urged the government to adopt a tough and irreconcilable stand with respect to the strikers. As a result the Prime Minister demanded that the strike be immediately stopped and promised to punish those responsible for organising it.

Trade unions were forced to call off the strike, and different form of punishment (including dismissals, temporary lay-offs, wage reduction and so on) were meted out to 5,500 of its participants. Nearly 80,000 were "cautioned".

Having demonstrated its ability to "cope" with a large strike, the Miki government seemed to have bolstered its position, although "victory" was gained at the cost of losing the repute of "liberalism": the tough stand adopted by the powers that be toward the strikers shattered the illusions about the possibility to "renovate" the LDP policy.

At the same time acute strife continued within the LDP. Fukuda tried to obtain Tanaka's support for his candidacy for LDP leadership to succeed Miki but was refused. Miki retained power thanks to the continued rivalry between the two camps in the ruling party. The infighting worsened after it was revealed in February 1976 that leading figures in the LDP and senior government officials had taken substantial bribes from the American Lockheed aircraft company in exchange for cooperation in distributing orders for that company's planes in Japan.

Former Prime Minister Tanaka happened to be implicated in the Lockheed affair. Exposures marred considerably the Liberal Democrats' prestige. Prime Minister Miki made persistent pronouncements on the need to "clean up" politics and to fight corruption. His main aim however was to exploit the situation to undermine the position of Tanaka, whose sway in the party had until then been growing steadily. Miki was supported by Fukuda who also hoped to weaken his long-time rival.

Miki yielded to the demands of the opposition and agreed to the complete investigation of the Lockheed affair. Up to twenty leading LDP figures were under investigation. In July Tanaka was arrested and released on bail, but was unable to evade the judicial process.

Most of the LDP leaders found this resolute activity of the Prime Minister "too dangerous", and a movement to remove Miki from power was launched in the party. On the other hand, the Lockheed affair sparked indignation about corruption in the ranks of the ruling party itself. In July 1976 six members of Parliament headed by E. Kono left the party, announcing their desire to "establish a new conservative policy" and to "put an end to corruption". They founded a new political party, called the New Liberal Club.

As the innerparty strife intensified, the crisis within the LDP also grew. In the autumn of 1976 the party was virtually split down the middle: along with the official leadership, there existed the Council for the Establishment of Party Unity, which comprised the Fukuda, Tanaka and Ohira factions and some smaller factions that officially announced that Fukuda was to succeed Miki.

In September the latter reorganised the cabinet and the LDP leadership in a bid to firm up his positions. Such changes, however, failed to settle the crisis.

When Fukuda left the government in November, the LDP was divided and remained in this state until the December elections to the House of Representatives.

As it could well be expected, the LDP suffered serious defeat at the elections. It won a mere 249 seats, losing at once 22 mandates. It was for the first time that the LDP failed to win a clear majority of seats in the House of Representatives, whose membership had been raised to 511. The ruling party gained an insignificant majority only when 12 "independent" deputies joined its faction.

The opposition parties, on the other hand, with the exception of the Communist Party of Japan, scored considerable success. The New Liberal Club, which captured 17 seats, became a tangible force, adding dimension to the LDP crisis.

The election results bred hopes of the possibility to soon put an end to the LDP's monopoly of political rule and to form a coalition government in the near future. However, the political manoeuvring launched by the centrist parties with this aim were meant rather to isolate the Communist party than to produce an effective alternative to the policy of the Liberal Democrats. These manoeuvres eventually brought discord into the opposition forces and played into the hands of the Liberal Democrats, helping them to maintain dominance in the far more complicated conditions.

After the elections Miki was forced to resign, having shouldered the responsibility for the unfavourable showing of the Liberal Democrats. Fukuda was elected chairman of the party and formed a new government. He, too, had to take into account the alignment of forces within the party and dish out four ministerial posts to the representatives of Tanaka's and Ohira's factions, who by no means were among his supporters.

The key task of the new government was to overcome the aftermaths of the economic crisis. The problem was tackled by stimulating state interference in the economy, increasing state appropriations on public works and the reconstructing of the branches most affected by the crisis (the textile, shipbuilding and other industries). The necessary means were produced by floating large state loans and increasing the state budget deficit. Though the economy was thereby revived to a certain extent, the disease was merely forced deeper within the Japanese economy: the gradually accumulating state debt created the potential danger of a crisis inside the entire state financial system.

To boost the ruling party's prestige, its leadership announced a party "reform" designed to "modernise" the LDP. The old procedure for electing the chairman of the ruling party was changed. According to the new system, all party members were to take part in the elections at the first stage, while at the second stage the general assembly of the Liberal Democratic deputies to parliament with the rights of a party congress, was to make the final choice from among the candidates who had received the greatest number of votes during primary elections.

The party leadership also announced the disbandment of party factions, and though they did continue existing in the form of different sorts of "societies", even this camouflage was discarded later on.

This facelift failed, however, to shore up the ruling party's position in the country. The Liberal Democrats barely retained their majority in

the elections to the Upper House of Parliament held in July 1977. As a matter of fact, they nailed down merely 124 seats (out of 252) at the elections and only after three "independent" deputies joined the Liberal Democratic faction, did the ruling party obtain a one-vote majority in the Upper House.

The election setback again triggered accusations of the leadership and demands that it should shoulder the responsibility for the unfavourable election results and resign. In an old move, Fukuda reorganised the cabinet and the party leadership to take better account of the alignment of forces within the party. As a result of the reorganisation, Nakasone was appointed chairman of the Guiding Council of the Liberal Democrats.

The LDP leadership paid much attention to increasing the numerical strength of the party, hoping thereby to "dissolve" factions in the mass of rank-and-file members. This task was only halfway accomplished; in 1978 the LDP membership was increased manifold to 1,500,000. In practice however, it was mainly factions themselves that expanded party ranks, seeking to attract as many rank-and-file party members to their side and to thereby consolidate their position within the party. As a result, factions, far from being eradicated, on the contrary, became even more deeply-rooted in the ruling party organisation and activity.

To strengthen the positions of the conservative forces, the reactionaries attempted to encroach upon the democratic gains of the working people. Bills were introduced before parliament envisioning the possibility of litigation without defence, thus paving the way for police arbitrariness. The progressive forces responded with resolute actions and mass protest demonstrations. The movement was headed by the People's Liaison Council in defence of independent and democratic legislation, with socialists, communists, trade unions, organisations in defence of the Constitution, the Japanese Association of Democratic Lawyers, women's and youth organisations, etc., having acted in close cooperation. As a result the government never brought the bills to a vote.

The reactionaries also sought to lift the Constitutional bans blocking the remilitarisation of Japan. The government gave instructions to work out bills on actions in case of "emergency circumstances", which would largely extend the powers of the "self-defence force". The democratic forces by right regarded this plan as an attempt to legalise preparations for combatting mass popular movements, and resolutely denounced it. The left-wing parties—the Communist Party of Japan and the Socialist Party of Japan—spoke in Parliament against the ruling party's attempts to push Japan toward militarism and fascism. Mass protest meetings were held throughout the country. The government had to confine itself to a general parliamentary discussion of "emergency laws".

This wrangling between the reactionary and the democratic forces lay bare the weakness of the government's position and lowered the Prime Minister's prestige. It also had an effect on the result of the election of the LDP chairman held for the first time according to a new system, that is, with the participation of all party members, in November 1978.

Four candidates announced themselves for the top party post—Prime Minister Fukuda, the LDP Secretary-General Ohira, chairman of the LDP Guiding Council Nakasone and Minister of International trade and Industry T. Komoto. Fukuda and Ohira were the main candidates for the post, with most of the forecasts predicting the Prime Minister's victory. However, Ohira scored the greater success in the election, receiving 44.3 per cent of the vote (36.7 per cent went to Fukuda).

Ohira's victory was largely ensured by support from the strongest faction within the Liberal Democratic Party, that of Tanaka, who did not miss the opportunity to engineer another defeat of his rival. Besides, Tanaka was worried over the outcome of the legal proceedings against him and wanted to see his supporter as Prime Minister.

Following the primary elections Fukuda resigned from further contention. At the specially convened LDP Congress Ohira was announced chairman without a vote being taken. The shortlived Fukuda government showed that the Liberal Democrats were still unable to overcome both an innerparty crisis and one within their policy. The party reforms failed to put an end to infighting. The LDP government was unable to find effective solutions to the complicated social and economic problems facing Japan. Attempts to encroach upon the democratic rights of the working people were just as fruitless.

In 1979 the Liberal Democrats continued the strengthening of their position in the local bodies of power, the process which had started somewhat earlier but failed to strengthen the ruling party's influence on a nationwide scale. Even though the Liberal Democrats increased their margin of votes for the first time since the late 1950s in the October 1979 elections to the Upper House (44.6 per cent in 1979 as compared with 41.8 per cent in 1976), the party failed to retain the former number of deputy seats and now had a mere 248. The LDP again secured a majority only thanks to the support of "independent" deputies.

The election results aggravated the position of the party and its cabinet. The opposition stepped up its preparations for creating a base necessary to form a coalition government. Nevertheless, the rightists and centrists in the opposition insisted, as before, on excluding the communists from the projected coalition, despite the communist party's major success at the 1979 elections, when it obtained 41 seats in the House of Representatives. The anti-communist manoeuvres of the centrists, which also involved the socialist party, seriously weakened the possibility for the opposition to influence the country's policy and eventually made it easier for the Liberal Democrats to overcome numerous obstacles.

Far from eliminating the instability of the Japanese political structure, the Upper House elections, on the contrary, added to it. Ohira's position was weakened both in relations with the opposition and within the ruling party itself, though as a direct result of the elections the Tanaka and Ohira factions were somewhat enlarged. The party's setback at the elections touched off an innerparty "mutiny" headed by Fukuda. To a certain extent, he was supported by Miki and Nakasone factions. As the case in the past, the Tanaka faction sided with Ohira.

Ohira's opponents demanded that he shoulder the responsibility for the party's failure at the elections and resign but he flatly refused to comply. The Japanese press reported that it was Tanaka who insisted on Ohira keeping his post because he feared that a change of government might have an adverse affect on the court proceedings involving the Lockheed affair.

Ohira's opponents then refused to support his candidature for premiership and founded the Society for Improving the LDP, which put up Fukuda as its candidate. Thus for the first time in its entire existence the Liberal Democratic Party proposed two candidates for premiership. The ruling party had actually split into two camps and again, as was the case in 1976, was on the point of disintegration.

It was with great effort that Ohira was reelected prime minister in the second round of voting. In no small measure his victory was promoted by the support of the New Liberal Club.

Ohira's difficulties within the party became evident upon formation of the cabinet and the party leadership. Though Ohira tried to change the system in operation since 1974 that commanded that the LDP secretary-general should be appointed from other than the Prime Minister's faction, the oppositional forces within the party prevented him from doing so. He was unable to appoint Suzuki Secretary-General, who was greatly responsible for Ohira's election to the party chairman in 1978, having to give the post to I. Sakurachi, a member of the rival Nakasone faction.

Ohira was also unable to thank the New Liberal Club for its support. His intention to appoint the Club's representative the Minister of Education met with a sharp rebuff from the ruling party, as many of its leaders saw in the step the undermining of the Liberal Democrats' monopoly political rule and an actual transition to the coalition government.

It took more than a month to form the leading party bodies, a fact that once again bespoke of a deep innerparty crisis. Its settlement had the character of a temporary respite before the next round of struggle for power, that was to start during the Upper House elections in the summer of 1980. The opposition saw the crisis within the ruling party as a real chance to put an end to the Liberal Democrats' undivided rule. For this reason both the ruling and opposition parties regarded the forthcoming elections to the Upper House as an important confrontation aimed at changing the balance of forces in their favour.

To widen its base, the Liberal Democratic Party launched another campaign to increase its membership, which doubled by January 1980 and reached 3,000,000. This time it became even more evident that the campaign had a factional character, because the more supporters a faction controlled, the greater were its chances during party chairman elections. The greatest increase was observed in the Komoto faction (the former Miki faction), which numbered 841,000, registering a ten-fold increase. The fact was immediately interpreted as Komoto's desire to seek the chairmanship at the nearest opportunity. The Nakasone faction also enlisted more supporters, whose number reached 419,700.³ Though the Tanaka and Ohira factions were ahead of the Nakasone faction in the overall number of supporters, they focused their attention above all on attracting as many MPs to their ranks as possible.

There was another outburst of infighting, after the socialist party introduced a vote of no-confidence before the Diet to the Ohira government. All the other opposition parties supported the vote, criticising the government for failing to take effective measures to halt economic stagnation, contain the growth of prices and unemployment and combat corruption.

A vote of no-confidence to the government was introduced repeatedly before the Japanese Parliament in the past only to be rejected owing to the majority enjoyed by the Liberal Democrats. This time, however, on May 16, 1980 the House of Representatives passed the vote of no-confidence. This became possible as a result of a boycott of the session by nearly 70 deputies from the Fukuda and Miki factions that thus enabled the opposition parties to obtain the majority vote.

The government responded by dissolving Parliament and calling pre-term elections to the House of Representatives on June 22, the same day

³ See *Asahi*, March 3, 1980.

that the next elections to the Upper House were to take place. This decision, unprecedented in the practice of political struggle in Japan, was taken to complicate the situation of the opposition parties, which were obviously not ready for two election campaigns in a row neither organizationally nor financially.

Keeping in mind the negative experience of the preceding elections, the Liberal Democrats healed over innerparty squabbling during the election campaign and consolidated their forces. The business circles also influenced the party in this respect by promising to finance its election campaign, provided internecine strife within it be put an end to. Monopoly capital gave the Liberal Democrats a vast sum of 15,000 million yen to conduct the election campaign.

During the peak of the election campaign Ohira suddenly died, and his death evoked certain sympathy with the ruling party among some sectors of the population. The opposition parties continued their bickering, which made the voters doubt their ability to offer a real alternative to the Liberal Democrats' rule.

Held in this unusual setup, the elections brought victory to the Liberal Democrats, who received much more votes and deputy seats in both houses, as compared with the previous elections. The LDP won 284 seats in the House of Representatives, that is to say, a "stable majority". The number of its deputies in the Upper House rose to 135, noticeably strengthening the party's position there as well.

Suzuki, who headed the Ohira faction after his death, was appointed party chairman after the elections. He was the compromise nominee that "suited" all the factions. Ya. Nakasone, T. Komoto and K. Miyazawa (from the Ohira faction), who also aspired to chairmanship, failed to receive any tangible support, so Suzuki was appointed without a vote being taken. While forming the government, he nevertheless gave all his rivals ministerial portfolios (Nakasone became chief of the administrative department, Komoto—chief of the economic planning department and Miyazawa—Secretary-General of the Cabinet of Ministers).

Suzuki greatly owed his election to the support rendered by the Tanaka faction, the largest within the party. They were awarded with several important posts in the cabinet and the party leadership. As a result Tanaka, who formally was no longer a member of the Liberal Democrats and was considered "independent", exercised even greater influence on the Suzuki government than he had on the Ohira government. I. Sakurachi, a member of the Nakasone faction, remained Secretary-General of the party. The Fukuda faction also preferred to support the Suzuki government for the sake of the "unity" of the Liberal Democrats.

The 1980 "double" elections to the two parliamentary chambers put the Liberal Democrats in a situation that was more favourable than they had witnessed for many years. The ruling party had a stable majority in Parliament and no longer needed the cooperation of at least part of the opposition in passing desired legislation. The internal strife in the LDP also subsided temporarily or at least was kept from the public eye.

As, a result of the stability attained by the ruling party, its political course noticeably shifted to the right. This was above all manifest in stronger militarist tendencies and stepped up activities aimed at discarding from the country's Constitution its anti-war principles and wiping out some of the democratic accomplishments of the working people. Japan was also largely affected by the American Administration's sharp turn from detente to confrontation, accelerated arms race and worsening of international tensions in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Pressured by

the USA, the Suzuki government pursued the policy of limiting contacts with the Soviet Union and introducing economic "sanctions" towards the USSR, a line it had inherited from the Ohira Cabinet.

At the same time it failed to cope with growing difficulties in the country's economy. The world economic crisis also spread to Japan. Unemployment grew noticeably. Attempts to overcome the economic recession by forcing exports sharply aggravated contradictions between Japan and not only the developing but also industrially developed capitalist countries, primarily the United States and the Common Market countries. On the other hand, Southeast Asian nations began showing growing concern over Japan's stepped up militarisation.

As a result of the floating of state loans by successive Liberal Democratic governments the state budget deficit accounted for 40 per cent of its overall figure in the early 1980s. The state debt totalled more than 90,000 billion yen in late 1982, sending the state finances into the troughs of a profound crisis.

The Suzuki government decided to cope with its economic problems by economising on state resources and announcing an administrative-financial reform. The reform was directed against the working people, as it primarily boiled down to the reduction of the number of employees at state enterprises and offices. Some of the state-run enterprises were to be turned over to private companies, above all the state railway lines and also the state telephone and telegraph corporation.

The administrative reform programme was devised under the direct supervision and with the direct participation of monopoly capital leaders (T. Doko, the honorary president of the Federation of the Economic Organisations, chaired the consultative committee which worked out recommendations to the government with respect to the content of the administrative reform) and fully echoed monopoly interests. The working people, on the contrary, responded to the programme with sharp protests. Trade unions launched a large-scale campaign against the administrative reform at the expense of the working people. They were supported by the left-wing parties, the communist and the socialist parties, which insisted on priority reductions of military spending and expanded social programmes.

The Suzuki Cabinet slid increasingly under the sway of the Tanaka faction, which exploited another reorganisation of the government and had its leading representative S. Nikaido appointed the LDP Secretary-General. The ruling party began showing as a result growing dissatisfaction with the Prime Minister's methods.

In September 1982 the exacerbated financial crisis forced the Suzuki government to announce an "emergency situation in finances". The "emergency" measures he put forth to extricate the country from the crisis again showed that the government was looking for a way out at the expense of the working people; wage freeze among the employees of state enterprises and offices was announced as an emergency measure. At the same time military spending remained intact and, what was more, the course toward its accelerated rise remained also unchanged.

These measures completely undermined the Suzuki government's prestige. Numerous public opinion polls showed that more than half the country's population did not support the government, while the share of its supporters dwindled to an all-time low of 16 per cent. The country's major national trade union centres stated their protest against the government's attempts to make the working people shoulder an additional burden as a result of its abortive policy. The General Trade Union Coun-

cil (Sohyo) called upon the Japanese workers to prepare for a nationwide campaign to make the government resign if it failed to take the appropriate measures under the circumstances. The parliamentary opposition was prepared to enter a vote of no-confidence to the government after the opening of the parliamentary session.

Under the circumstances a movement gathered momentum within the LDP to remove Suzuki from power so as to preserve the Liberal Democratic regime as a whole. Fukuda again spearheaded the movement. In early October Fukuda, Komoto and I. Nikagama, head of the scientific and technological department, agreed at a joint meeting of their factions not to support Suzuki's reelection to the party chairmanship. Their actions were supported by former Prime Minister Kishi, who was influential in the ruling party.

Another worsening of the infighting shattered Suzuki's hopes for reelection without primary elections at a general meeting of the Liberal Democratic deputies to Parliament. He would have had a stable majority at such a meeting, with his 244 votes out of 421. (The Tanaka faction controlled 107 deputies, the Suzuki faction—87 and the Nakasone faction—50), whereas his opponents could only have counted on 132 votes (the Fukuda faction—78, the Komoto faction—43 and the Nikagawa faction—11 votes).

Suzuki's opponents, however, wanted to hold primary elections in the hope of seeing the Prime Minister's advantages over other candidates shrink considerably when more than a million rank-and-file LDP members would take part in the voting. It was necessary to have four candidates to hold primary elections and, as there were just as many aspirants, primary elections became inevitable.

This drove Suzuki to announce his intention not to seek reelection as party chairman. His step had the preliminary approval by his supporters, first and foremost by Tanaka. His camp nominated Nakasone for party chairmanship. In exchange for his support, Tanaka hoped to secure important posts in the new cabinet and the party apparatus for members of his faction and thus maintain his influence over the activities of the Liberal Democrats and the country's political life. Among other things, Tanaka demanded that Nikaido should be kept as the LDP Secretary-General, hoping that this would allow him to influence effectively the Lockheed affair proceedings that were in their final stage in 1983.

The opposite camp put forward three candidates—T. Komoto, Minister of International Trade and Industry, S. Abe, who was the closest supporter of Fukuda, and Nikagawa. This scattered the forces of Suzuki's opponents.

Nevertheless, the Suzuki-Tanaka camp attempted to persuade its rivals to renounce the idea of primary elections under the pretext that they would require considerable time and major financial investment and could also lower the Liberal Democrats' prestige as a result of worsening infighting. The opposition proposed its own version—the appointment of Nakasone Prime Minister and Fukuda the LDP chairman. But, on talking the matter over with Tanaka, Nakasone resolutely rejected the idea of splitting the highest office in the party and the government.

No choice was left but to hold primary elections. From the outset it was thought that Komoto had the best chances at that stage, as compared to other aspirants, so Nakasone's supporters, especially the Tanaka faction, did their utmost to attract the rank-and-file party members to their side, employing for the purpose the mass media, which regularly announced public opinion poll results favourable to Nakasone.

Business figures spoke in favour of the administrative-financial reform, despite the change in the LDP leadership. As Nakasone announced his adherence to that reform (he took a direct part in working out that reform as chief of the administrative department in the Suzuki government), there were no doubts as to where the sympathies of big business lay.

All these factors determined Nakasone's victory at the primary elections. Of no small importance was the fact that for several years in a row his faction controlled the post of the LDP secretary-general and this strengthened Nakasone's relations with the local party apparatus, which has an important role to play in primary elections of the LDP chairman. Nakasone received 58 per cent of votes, while the runner-up candidate, Komoto, a mere 27 per cent. No second round was held, as all other aspirants withdrew their candidatures and Nakasone was appointed party chairman.

The important role played by the Tanaka faction in Nakasone's victory is attested by the composition of the present Japanese government. Six ministerial portfolios went to the Tanaka faction, that is, more than to any other. Tanaka's close associates hold the key posts of the LDP Secretary-General and the Secretary-General of the Cabinet. The Nakasone government was the first to break the tradition, according to which the Prime Minister's trusted man is appointed Secretary-General of the Cabinet. It is characteristic that the American weekly *Newsweek* claimed in that connection that representatives of the Tanaka faction were within the government to keep a close eye on Nakasone, who proved to be a not quite faithful partner.⁴ It is only natural that the Japanese mass media often refer to the present government as the "Tanakasone Cabinet".

Even this brief account of the inner strife among the Liberal Democrats forcefully shows the enormous role that the conflict between Tanaka and Fukuda played and continues to play. For all the colourfulness of the "war of Kaku and Fuku", it is merely an outward expression of deep-going processes within the ruling party and its desire to adjust itself in the best way possible to the crisis of Japan's present-day political structure.

Based on the undivided rule of the Liberal Democrats, this political structure took shape in the mid-1950s, when the Japanese economy was just getting on the track of high growth rates. The country has since seen major economic, social and political changes within its structure. The Japanese economy has not only built the capitalist world's number two potential but has also undergone one radical restructuring and has just launched another. Considerable changes also took place in the social and class structure of Japanese society, primarily with the working class's becoming the largest social group. The multiparty system finally took shape in the political field.

The undivided sway of the Liberal Democrats has long failed to reflect these profound shifts in the country. Though the ruling party has undertaken efforts to "modernise" itself, these attempts have remained largely unrealised. Needless to say, the LDP's crisis could have brought to it more dramatic consequences, had the opposition been ready to replace the Liberal Democratic government. The discord among the opposition parties helped the Liberal Democrats to preserve power to a large extent.

The past decade saw sophisticated ploys by the Liberal Democrats to preserve their political domination. The ruling party failed to overcome

⁴ *Newsweek*, November 28, 1982.

its political crisis, which is bred by its inability to settle the growing economic and social contradictions of Japanese capitalism. To stay in power, the Liberal Democrats have to change their leaders every couple of years, in order not to allow any dissatisfaction with the policy of individual governments to grow into the denunciation of the regime as a whole. This is the general meaning of the five political crises, which struck Japan in the past decade and which found their outward expression in the striking episodes of the "war of Kaku and Fuku".

During the greater part of the 1970s the instability of the Liberal Democratic governments could to a certain extent be explained by their steady loss of a majority in the Diet. However, this instability persisted in the entirely different situation of the 1980s, when the Liberal Democrats maintained a stable majority in the Diet. Apparently this instability has structural roots and is therefore of a chronic nature. It can be expected to persist in the future, though it is impossible to define beforehand the concrete forms of its manifestation. New rounds of the "war of Kaku and Fuku" must therefore not be excluded.

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PRC GAINED MORE FROM ECONOMIC TIES WITH USSR THAN WITH WEST

Moscow FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS in English No 2, Apr-Jun 83 pp 38-50

[Article by S. A. Manezhev and L. V. Novoselova, candidates of economic sciences: "The Role of External Factors in PRC National Economic Development"]

The growth of China's foreign economic activity in recent years is a characteristic feature of the economic policy followed by its leadership. Promotion of ties with other countries, including "import of modern equipment and encouragement of foreign investment", is now regarded as one of the basic trends in making the economic development of the People's Republic of China more effective.¹

The use of the external factors of economic growth is not an absolutely new phenomenon in China's economy. Acute shortage of material and financial means, technical know-how and organisational experience—all this generally predetermines the objective dependence of the accelerated economic development of China, like any other country in the former colonial and semi-colonial world, on diverse economic ties with economically more developed countries, on the activation of the factors which Marx called "*the civilising influence of foreign trade*".² At the same time, being indissolubly linked with the socio-class structure of the state, the nature and orientation of the system of foreign economic relations can either stimulate the socio-economic progress of the state or, on the contrary, retard and distort the processes of its internal development. China's history confirms that.

Prior to 1949 the links of the Chinese economy with the reproductive processes in the world economy were determined by the agrarian and raw-material specialisation imposed upon China and served to make it more dependent on the imperialist powers. In the economic sphere this profound dependence was determined by the lopsided structure of reproduction: in old China the extremely low level of development of the heavy industry, primarily engineering and metalworking, actually ruled out the possibility of its real, independent economic growth. This was the result of the deliberate imperialist policy of establishing full control over China.

The PRC, which embarked upon the path of radical socio-economic changes and creation of conditions for socialist development after the victory of the revolution in 1949, found itself in a completely different situation. As is known, in the conditions of socialisation of the basic means of production, the economic development of each socialist country objectively leads to its allround coöperation and rapprochement with the other socialist countries. Moreover, the economically more advanced countries help the economically lagging ones, for the development of each socialist country "promotes the general progress and consolidation of

¹ *Renmin ribao*, Dec. 2, 1981.

² K. Marx and F. Engels, *Works*, Vol. 46, Part 1, p. 204 (in Russian).

the world socialist system as a whole".³ From its very inception the PRC could fully feel the advantage of economic relations within the socialist community over economic exchanges within the international capitalist division of labour.

In the 1950s China was developing economically largely thanks to its active cooperation with the socialist countries which appropriated large sums for internationalist assistance to China. The support given by the world socialist system ensured the PRC's defence against the armed intervention and economic expansion of the imperialist states.

Most of the economic assistance to China came from the biggest socialist country, the Soviet Union. From the very first days of the people's government in China Soviet-Chinese economic cooperation was based on complete equality and mutual benefit. It aimed at turning a backward agrarian country into a mighty industrial socialist state. Because of the general backwardness China had inherited from the past and postwar dislocation, such a radical turn revealed that there was a whole number of serious problems on the way of the country's economic progress. Consequently, the economic assistance given China by socialist states acquired a multilateral, complex character.

First of all, bearing in mind that the acceleration of the PRC's economic development was complicated by the narrowness of the traditional base of accumulation, the granting of long-term credits to the amount of 1.8 billion rubles⁴ on easy terms was a major aspect of Soviet economic assistance to China. The aim of this assistance, rendered the PRC at a very difficult juncture, was to help its people to lay the foundation of modern industry by concentrating it on the key sectors of economic development. While in the period of the First Five-Year Plan (1953-1957) the Soviet Union's assistance accounted for 3 per cent of the total sum spent by China on its economic development, in industry this assistance paid for 15 per cent of the volume of capital construction.⁵ Economic rehabilitation, elimination of economic backwardness and laying the foundation for socialist industry in China required a vast amount of industrial equipment and other goods for production purposes. Taking into account the weakness of the material and technical base of the Chinese economy, as well as the economic blockade of the PRC by the imperialist powers, the socialist countries, and primarily the Soviet Union were practically China's only source of modern means of production. Mass deliveries of goods for production purposes in the conditions of balanced trade were a major factor of the socialist countries' assistance to China.

While in 1946-1948, in the years of the US monopolies' predominance in the foreign trade of Guomindang China, the country imported 2.3 times as much as it exported, in 1950-1959, when the socialist countries accounted for two-thirds of the PRC's foreign trade, exports and imports were about even.⁶ At the same time, the share of machinery and equipment in China's imports rose from 6 per cent in 1946-1948 to more

³ *Programme of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union*, Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow, 1961, p. 23.

⁴ M. A. Suslov, *On the CPSU's Struggle for the Unity of the International Communist Movement*, Moscow, 1964, p. 53.

⁵ Zeng Wenjing, *Socialist Industrialisation of China*, Moscow, 1959, p. 203 (in Russian).

⁶ M. I. Sladkovsky, *Essays on the Development of China's Foreign Economic Relations*, Moscow, 1953, p. 288. *Guidebook on Trading with the People's Republic of China*, UN, New York, 1982, p. 461.

than 40 per cent in 1957-1959⁷. As a result, China's foreign trade, which was a channel of outflow of scarce financial means, turned into an independent source of accumulation.

Socialist countries shared many kinds of modern machinery with China. In the 1950s, for instance, the Soviet Union exported 9 per cent of its heavy machine-building goods and 14 per cent of its instrument-making goods to China; Czechoslovakia—11 per cent and 9 per cent, respectively; Poland—7 per cent of the goods of its heavy machine-building.⁸ The socialist countries accounted for 77.9 per cent of the Chinese imports of metal-cutting lathes, 91.4 per cent of the diesel engines, 84.5 per cent of the drilling machines, 92.1 per cent of the automobiles, 99.5 per cent of the locomotives, and 74.7 per cent of the instruments.⁹ On the whole, Chinese purchases of complete plant in 1950-1960 reached 2.3 billion rubles. As a matter of fact, in these years the economic structure of the socialist countries was switched to serve the reproduction processes in the Chinese economy. In the Soviet Union alone, for instance, more than 1,000 industrial enterprises employing over one million people, were engaged in fulfilling the PRC orders.¹⁰ All this helped to overcome China's economic backwardness.

In accordance with the agreements on economic, scientific and technical assistance concluded with the socialist countries in the 1950s, the equipment supplied to China was mastered in proper time thanks to active assistance in design and survey work, installation and adjustment of equipment, and commissioning of a large number of big modern enterprises. Chinese data show that in the years of the First Five-Year Plan the projects built with Soviet assistance accounted for about 44 per cent of all state investments in the PRC industry.¹¹

The importance of Soviet support to China in economic development in 1953-1957 manifests itself in a peculiar way when one analyses the technological structure of state outlays of capital in China. It is well known that predominance of new construction while creating new branches in the economy of a backward country presupposes an enlarged passive component of investment (construction and erection work). At the initial stage of industrialisation construction and erection work is all the more important because it is necessary to keep large stocks of raw materials and fuel and build storehouses for them, have ample transport facilities, numerous repair workshops, housing, etc. All this calls for additional construction work that is not required in old industrial centres.

Nevertheless, the outlays for construction and erection work accounted for only 63 per cent of the volume of investment in China's economy in 1953-1957, while the share of machinery and equipment amounted to 31 per cent. It may be recalled that in the USSR, in the years of the 1928-1932 First Five-Year Plan, and in a similar economic situation, the figures were 83 per cent in the case of construction and erection work and only 12 per cent in the case of machinery and equipment.¹² And by its economic development at the beginning of the 1950s China was far below the level of the Soviet Union at the beginning of the 1930s.

⁷ *China: A Reassessment of the Economy*, Washington, 1975, p. 621.

⁸ See *Financial Times*, Jan. 15, 1963.

⁹ See *Druzhba*, 1959, No. 41, pp. 9-10.

¹⁰ Y. N. Kapelinsky and others, *Development of the Economy and Foreign Economic Ties of the People's Republic of China*, Moscow, 1959, p. 448.

¹¹ *China Today*, Moscow, 1969, p. 255.

¹² *The Soviet Union's Economy Over 60 Years. Jubilee Statistical Yearbook*, Moscow, 1977, p. 435.

All this shows that in the conditions prevailing in China in 1953-1957, the correlation of the passive and active components of investment was highly favourable and ensured the necessary guarantees of a rapid increase in the output and in the production of the national income per invested yuan. This was made possible largely thanks to the support given China by the USSR and other socialist countries, their allround economic assistance, and substantial deliveries of modern equipment with the help of which China was able to start large-scale industrial construction in the 1950s.

All in all, Soviet technical assistance enabled China to build 256 major industrial enterprises accounting in the early 1960s for 30 per cent of its cast iron, 40 per cent of the steel, 50 per cent of the rolled metal, 80 per cent of the automobiles, over 90 per cent of the tractors, 25 per cent of the electric energy, and 55 per cent of the hydraulic turbines.¹³ Another 85 enterprises were built with the help of other socialist countries.¹⁴ All this brought into being a whole number of new industries in China—aircraft, automobile, tractor, instrument-making, power, heavy engineering, precision machine-building, etc., and helped to lay the foundation for modern diversified industrial production.

China's scientific and technical cooperation with the socialist countries was of particular significance. From 1954 to 1963 the Soviet Union alone gave China free of charge about 24,000 sets of specifications containing no less than 30 per cent of all the scientific and technical innovations used in the Soviet economy in those years. By the end of 1959, Chinese specialists drew up over 400 complex plans for modern industrial enterprises—in the metallurgical, engineering, oil and coal industries, transport and communications and water conservancy—on the basis of these specifications.¹⁵

The extremely acute shortage of scientists, technicians and skilled workers was one of the biggest problems of China's economic growth. To help, the Soviet Union sent about 11,000 skilled specialists to work in different branches of the Chinese economy. At the same time, the Soviet Union assisted in organising large-scale training of Chinese engineers, technicians and workers. Over 8,000 Chinese workers and technicians underwent training at Soviet enterprises, and more than 11,000 students and post-graduates went to Soviet higher educational institutions from 1951 to 1962.¹⁶ Practically all the technical and managerial personnel at the enterprises built in China with Soviet assistance were trained in the USSR. No small role was also played by the training of Chinese specialists at home. For instance, Soviet specialists working on the Chinese-Changchun Railway trained more than 39,000 Chinese railwaymen in 1950-1952. The most important projects built in China with Soviet assistance were turned into major centres of vocational training.

Generally speaking, the history of PRC's cooperation with the socialist countries in the 1950s sets an example of effective use of such factors as foreign trade and economic, scientific and technical assistance with a view to accelerating the economic growth of a backward country. Foreign analysts have calculated that without imports from the CMEA countries China's economic growth would have been slower by 20-30 per cent. Other figures show that the average annual increase in the PRC

¹³ *The USSR's Leninist Policy Towards China*, Moscow, 1968, p. 203.

¹⁴ *PRC Economy: Possibilities and Reality*, Moscow, 1976, p. 212.

¹⁵ *Druzhba*, 1959, No. 42, p. 5.

¹⁶ *Voprosy Istorii*, 1969, No. 6, p. 49.

national income in 1953-1957 would have been only 6.8-4.2 per cent, and not 8.9 per cent.¹⁷

That cooperation with the socialist world was important for China was admitted by the Chinese leaders too. Speaking of the significance of the industrial projects built with the assistance of the Soviet Union, Premier of the State Council Zhou Enlai said: "These projects played an enormous role in the country's socialist industrialisation and development of agricultural production in the period of the First Five-Year Plan and will play a still bigger role in the future. In old China one could not even dream of such projects." Characterising the Soviet Union's contribution to the economic development of the PRC, Vice-Premier Li Fuchun stressed: "Our opinion, and it is a firm one, is that the enterprises designed and built in our country with the help of the Soviet Union are indeed the embodiment of all the modern and the best the Soviet Union has. These enterprises are the backbone of our industry, the backbone not only in volume but also in the level of up-to-date technology."¹⁸

In the 1960s the role of external factors in China's economic development was considerably reduced, and attempts were made to develop the economy largely with the help of internal economic resources. But it became clear already in the early 1970s that it was necessary to revise this economic policy and activate China's role in the international division of labour. The 1978 programme of modernisation of the Chinese economy finally led the Chinese leaders to reassess the external factors of economic growth. The *Sixiang Zhangxian* journal wrote: "If we do not encourage foreign investment and make use of foreign know-how and equipment, our economic and cultural development will crawl and creak, and we shall not be able to reach the world level."¹⁹

China's active recourse to external factors in recent years has found expression in the expansion of economic ties with capitalist countries. A number of steps have been taken to this end: interstate relations with Japan and the United States have been normalised and long-term trade and economic agreements concluded with practically all the leading capitalist countries. The absolute amount of China's trade with these countries in 1981 came to \$24 billion, which was more than ten times the level of ten years before. The capitalist countries now account for nearly 60 per cent of China's foreign trade, as against 45 per cent in the early 1970s.

What are the actual results of the development of China's economic ties with the West? According to the 1981 economic yearbook published in Peking, in 1970-1980 China imported \$16.2 billion worth of machinery and equipment, or six times as much as it did in the 1950s, while the credit agreements concluded by China with the banking houses of the industrial capitalist countries only in 1978-1980 were \$28.7 billion.²⁰ At first glance this testifies to the unprecedented scope of the operation of external factors in the process of PRC's economic development.

However, the comparison of the absolute volumes of machinery and equipment imports in the 1950s and 1970s requires a whole number of other important factors being taken into account. While the data on

¹⁷ See J. A. Cohen, R. F. Dernberger and J. R. Giarson, *China Trade Prospects and US Policy*, New York, 1971, p. 191; A. Eckstein, *Communist China's Economic Growth and Foreign Trade*, New York, 1966, p. 124.

¹⁸ O. B. Borisov and B. T. Koloskov, *Soviet-Chinese Relations in 1945-1980*, Moscow, 1980, p. 175.

¹⁹ *Sixiang Zhangxian*, 1981, No. 4.

²⁰ *Zhongguo jingji nianjian*, Peking, 1981, pp. IV-131-133.

China's imports in the years of its active cooperation with the socialist countries reflect the volume of machinery and equipment actually imported and put into operation, the data for 1970-1980 cover all the contracts for the delivery of machinery and equipment to China in this period, although a large part of them have not yet been fulfilled. Thus, the contracts concluded by China in 1970-1979 provided for the delivery of about \$11 billion worth of complete plant, but the actual deliveries, including those in 1980, did not exceed \$6.7 billion—about \$3 billion in 1970-1977 and \$3.7 billion in 1978-1980.²¹

Further, when comparing the data for the 1950s and 1970s, it is important to bear in mind the almost twofold increase in the prices of machinery and equipment in the world market: in comparable prices the cost of the complete plant acquired in the 1970s came to \$3.5 billion.²²

Lastly, it may be recalled, that prices of the industrial equipment supplied by the USSR in the 1950s were 20-30 per cent below those in the world market, while the design and technical specifications and the licences essential to organise production with the purchased equipment were given China by the Soviet Union practically free of charge.²³

Taking all these factors into account, one sees that the cost (in unchanged prices) of the complete plant received by China from the Western countries and Japan in 1970-1980 came to about \$3.1 billion. The analogical deliveries from the USSR and other socialist countries in 1950-1960 may be assessed at \$3 billion.²⁴ If one takes into account the increase of the Chinese engineering output, the share of the import component for the satisfaction of the country's overall requirements in machinery and equipment in the late 1970s came to only 7 per cent, as against 45 per cent in 1957.²⁵

Such is the quantitative aspect of the assessment of the West's material and technical aid. The qualitative aspect of the problem requires an analysis of the effect produced on the country's economic development by the economic resources from abroad. The organic inclusion of the equipment bought in the West in China's economic structure is meeting with many difficulties. This is due above all to the considerable lag of China's material and technical base behind the modern level. The average time of construction of large and medium-size projects in the late 1970s was 11 years as against six years in the period of the First Five-Year Plan. Moreover, about a third of the 1,000 industrial enterprises being built were under construction for 10-20 years and nearly 10 per cent for more than 20 years.²⁶ Only 2.6 per cent of the people employed

²¹ Calculated on the basis of the data in *Zhongguo jingji nianjian*, 1981, pp. IV-128, 131; *Zhongguo baike nianjian*, 1980, Peking-Shanghai, 1980, p. 303; *Renmin ribao*, April 30, 1981; *Selling Technology to China*, Washington, 1979, p. 9; *China Letter*, July 1981, p. 5.

²² The average index of export prices of complete plant supplied to China in 1970-1976 was 183 and in 1977-1980—201 as against 100 in the 1950s. Calculated on the basis of the data in C. Howe, *China's Economy*, New York, 1978, p. 153.

²³ Peng Ming, *History of Chinese-Soviet Friendship*, Moscow, 1959, p. 311; L. V. Filatov, *Economic Analysis of the Soviet Union's Scientific and Technical Assistance to China, 1949-1966*, Moscow, 1980, p. 111.

²⁴ Without the cost of technical documents. Imports in the 1950s calculated on the basis of *PRC Economy: Possibilities and Reality*, Moscow, 1976, p. 212.

²⁵ See *Peking Review*, 1965, No. 5, p. 18. The 1979 index calculated on the basis of the data in *Renmin ribao*, May 1, 1980, and *PRC Economy: Possibilities and Reality*, p. 106.

²⁶ *Jingji yanjiu*, 1980, No. 6, p. 26; *Renmin ribao*, March 17, 1980.

in China in the sphere of capital construction were engineers and technicians, and only 0.003 per cent were scientists.

The lag of China's building industry behind the present level vastly increases internal expenditure on the installation of Western equipment, this including outlays on building materials, additional local equipment, etc. In the first half of the 1970s such expenses came to 4 yuan per dollar of the imported plant or, taking into consideration the rate of exchange, were more than double the outlays on imported equipment.²⁷ The sharp increase in China's imports of sophisticated foreign equipment in the late 1970s and early 1980s led to a point where the additional financial outlays on the installation of the means of production bought abroad exceeded their cost seven-fold.²⁸ Such expenses, according to Finance Minister Wang Bingqian, are beyond the country's means. As a result, more than two-thirds of the industrial enterprises equipped with imported machinery cannot be built on schedule.²⁹

But even after it has been commissioned, the efficiency of the imported equipment is very limited. The undeveloped infrastructure, deficit of raw materials and energy, and acute shortage of specialists—all these complex problems in present-day China often cause expensive foreign machinery to be idle or to be used irrationally with heavy economic losses as a result. By way of example one may say that between 60 and 80 per cent of the Japanese and West German rolling mill equipment, bought for the Wuhan Iron and Steel Works at a cost of \$500 million, long remained idle. The Lanzhou Oil Refinery (cost of equipment: \$140 million) and the Nanking Chemical Plant are working under capacity, while nine man-made fibre factories equipped in the 1970s are standing idle.³⁰ One could cite many more examples of this kind. The reason, besides the weakness of China's material and technical base, is also the insufficient assistance given by capitalist countries in designing, prospecting, assembly and adjustment work. Foreign technical personnel per \$1 million worth of plant deliveries in the 1970s was less than 50 per cent that in 1950-1960.³¹

As a consequence, the introduction of some elements of Western industrial culture in China is not bringing the expected results in the resolution of the serious problems of its economic development. For instance, according to figures issued by the First Ministry of Engineering (renamed Ministry of Engineering in May 1982), the large and medium-size projects built in the years of the First Five-Year Plan became profitable within three and a half years on the average, while not one of the analogical projects built in the 1970s has done it so far. As a result, by the end of the 1970s the economic effect of capital investment had declined to half that in the period of the First Five-Year Plan.³²

The non-too-high returns from the resources coming to China through the channels of Western economic aid are due largely to the serious difference in the ultimate aims of the cooperating parties. In the 1950s, it may be recalled, the application of external factors to China's economic

²⁷ *Renmin ribao*, July 28, 1980.

²⁸ *Guangming ribao*, Jan. 10, 1981.

²⁹ See *China Letter*, July 1981, p. 5.

³⁰ *Renmin ribao*, Sept. 5 and 6, 1980; See *New York Times* Feb. 5, 1980; *China Business Review*, 1981, No. 1, p. 11.

³¹ Calculated in comparable prices on the basis of the data in *Selling Technology in China*, p. 9; See Cheng Cruyuan, *Economic Relations Between Peking and Moscow, 1949-1963*. New York, 1964, p. 31.

³² *Renmin ribao*, Jan. 21, 1980.

development was in many ways made effective by the active cooperation of Soviet and Chinese specialists in drawing up general plans of China's economic development, including well-weighed determination of the scale and proportions of its economic cooperation with the outer world. As for the capitalist countries, their idea of cooperation with the PRC is of a patently one-sided, consumer character.

After the proclamation of the "four modernisations" programme the Western business community hoped to use China as a new and capacious market: Chinese purchases of industrial equipment in the period ending in 1985 were estimated at \$60-85 billion.³³

The governments of the imperialist powers hoped that big Chinese orders would liven up their economy. In Japan, for instance, it was calculated that the sale to China of 100 million-yen-worth of complete plant would engender domestic demand worth 229 million yen and that the export of steel and steel structures of an analogous amount would stimulate a demand worth 311 million yen.³⁴ With a powerful, well-adjusted mechanism of publicity and sale at their disposal, the imperialist monopolies rushed to "develop" the Chinese market by building up their sales to China to the maximum, without taking into account its actual requirements.

As a consequence of all this, the West's economic aid is often of a chaotic, disorderly character. For instance, the complete plant supplied by the capitalist countries to China for the production of containers exceeded its actual requirements at the beginning of the 1980s almost four-fold, and a more or less similar situation has taken shape in the case of computers, some types of mining equipment, machinery for the metalworking industry, etc.³⁵ In 1978, alone, contracts for the delivery of complete plant to China that were not justified by its actual economic requirements came to \$2 billion, or almost a third of the overall cost of the contracts concluded during the year.³⁶

China's losses in its cooperation with the West are highly painful. Only a year after the proclamation of the "four modernisations" programme the unforeseen expenses on imports and the installation of foreign equipment were very much responsible for the budget deficit which amounted to 17,060 million yuan, or 15.5 per cent of the budget revenue.³⁷ Subsequently, despite urgent measures—from suspension of construction of many projects and closure of many unprofitable enterprises to the announced cancellation of many orders for equipment placed abroad—the budget deficit remained. The resolution of this problem has been made one of the main economic tasks in the period ending in 1985. What complicates balancing the budget is that, under pressure from its Western partners, China is forced to take the equipment it had ordered and the orders for which it had officially cancelled not so long ago. And since the possibilities for operating this equipment are very much limited, it is already planned to store it for a lengthy period. Foreign experts estimate that the cost of the equipment stored and the building of storehouses will come to 10 billion yuan.³⁸ The exclusion in the coming years

³³ See *Business America*, Jan. 29, 1979; H. G. Gelber, *Technology, Defence and External Relations in China, 1975-1978*, Balder, 1979, p. 121.

³⁴ See *Financial Times*, Aug. 23, 1978.

³⁵ *Renmin ribao*, Aug. 4 and Dec. 15, 1980; See *China Business Review*, 1981, No. 1, p. 10.

³⁶ *China Trade Report*, October 1981, p. 9; *China Letter*, July 1981, p. 5.

³⁷ *Renmin ribao*, Aug. 31, 1980.

³⁸ See *China Letter*, July 1981, p. 5.

of such a large sum from the economic turnover means a further growth of China's already big losses in its trade with the imperialist powers.

China's drawing in the system of international capitalist division of labour obviously leads to the growth of the instability factors in its foreign trade. While in the 1950s, when its foreign trade was balanced, China paid for nine-tenths of the machinery and equipment it imported on a clearing basis, that is, with deliveries of its traditional export goods to the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, now there is no such possibility.³⁹ The export of many important Chinese goods to industrial capitalist countries is subjected to stringent quantitative restrictions. The result is the imbalance of trade in recent years. The deficit in China's trade with the Western countries and Japan in 1978-1981, due largely to the rapid growth of its machinery imports, came to about \$20 billion, or more than 45 per cent of the cost of the Chinese imports from those countries.

Back in 1978, shortage of foreign currency forced China to turn for the first time to the resources of the international capitalist money market, to seek foreign bank credits. By the autumn of 1982 the PRC had concluded agreements with industrial capitalist countries to the amount of about \$31 billion, including approximately \$25 billion in the form of medium- and long-term credits. Among these creditors are Japan (37 per cent of the total sum of concluded agreements), France (25 per cent), Great Britain (18 per cent), Canada (7 per cent), and Italy, the FRG, Sweden, and the United States.

It would seem that the sums of loans granted by capitalist countries to China should in a way testify to their understanding of its foreign economic development problems. But the analysis of the terms of the agreements signed show it is rather the other way round. About 60 per cent of the sums earmarked for China are accounted for by "tied up" export credits granted on the state's guarantee. These credits are granted for five to ten years at 7.25-7.5 per cent of interest per annum. Nearly one-third of the credits offered by the West is accounted for by consortium market loans granted at a floating rate of interest (latterly 15-20 per cent per annum) for periods ranging from six months to five years. Lastly, slightly over 7 per cent of money loaned are low-interest and interest-free credits, including state loans and credits of international financial organisations.

On the whole, the average rate of interest on all credits offered to China is about 10 per cent annually, and the period of repayment only seven years. It will not be out of place to say that in the 1950s the Soviet Union granted China credits for 10-15 years at one per cent per annum. And today interest alone on every billion dollars China receives on the Western countries' terms exceeds \$400 million by the time the date of the repayment expires. Using loans on such terms, as is the case in the capitalist countries themselves, is economically expedient in case an enterprise can be built in three or four years. China, with its more than ten-year building cycle, is forced to repay the credit long before it gets any returns from the borrowed capital.

As a result, China's foreign debt at the end of 1981 was almost five times that in 1978 and came, according to the Minister of Finance, to \$4.7 billion. Further use of large foreign credits on Western terms may seriously overstrain China's balance of payments. All the more so, since

³⁹ *The Socio-Economic System and Economic Policy of the PRC, 1949-1975*, Moscow, 1978, p. 131.

of late the capitalist countries have been toughening credit terms. As agreed by the countries associated with the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), interest on guaranteed export credits was raised in November 1981 from 7.25-7.5 per cent to 10 per cent per annum; almost simultaneously interest on loans from the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) went up from 9.6 to 11.6 per cent per annum.⁴⁰ The situation is aggravated by China's limited export potentialities: according to the Chinese economists, the average growth of exports in the 1980s will be only 5 per cent annually, or almost half that of the preceding decade.⁴¹

This being the case, China was compelled, in the early 1980s, considerably to tone down its activity in the bank-credit market and seek loans on easier terms. It pinned its hopes mainly on its accession to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the IBRD in the spring of 1980. Particularly attractive were the loans of the International Development Association (IDA), an IBRD branch. As is known, these loans have a ten-year period of privileges, are repayable within 50 years and carry an almost symbolic rate of interest for services—0.75 per cent per annum. Robert McNamara, the then IBRD president, said China could reckon on receiving \$9 billion on such favourable terms in 1980-1985.

It was officially announced in 1981, however, that in the period ending in 1984 China could receive only \$800 million from the IBRD for the development of public education, agriculture, port facilities and the oil industry, and that this sum would include \$400 million from the credit fund of the IDA.⁴² Consequently, IBRD financial aid turned out to be considerably more modest than expected. What is more, the use of the money was made contingent from the very first on China's readiness to carry out a number of IBRD recommendations in the sphere of socio-economic development, aimed at decentralising economic management. In the sphere of foreign economic ties China is being pushed into making active use of foreign credits on market terms, increasing its foreign debt by the end of this decade to \$41-79 billion and even to \$214 billion by 1995. The debt may be paid, in the opinion of the IBRD, with the money obtained by the rapid increase in the export of finished goods, and to that end China is recommended to lay stress in its economic development on light industry and also to take a series of measures weakening the state monopoly on foreign trade.⁴³

It is obvious that the objective of such recommendations is to undermine the foundation of socialism in China, which is not concealed in the West. A report published at the beginning of 1982 by the US Treasury Department said bluntly that it would insist that the IMF and the IBRD make the granting of credits to China contingent on its readiness to activate in every way the market trends in the economy. At the same time, as developments in other countries show, the IBRD and the IMF are apt to institute extremely tough sanctions against the recipient countries and even completely stop helping them. In 1981, for instance, the IMF refused to grant Bangladesh the credits it had promised. This was a penalty against the Bangladesh government's failure to meet the IMF demand to axe government spending in the period set by the International Monetary Fund by scrapping the programme of food relief to the

⁴⁰ See *OECD Observer*, 1981, No. 113, p. 14; *Shijie jingji daobao*, Oct. 5, 1981.

⁴¹ Data in unchanged prices; *Guoji maoyi wenti*, 1981, No. 3, p. 13; No. 4, p. 12.

⁴² See *Far Eastern Economic Review*, Vol. 112, No. 23, 1981, p. 49.

⁴³ See *China Business Review*, 1981, No. 4, pp. 7-8.

poorest sections of the population. As a result, Bangladesh was forced to have recourse to extremely costly market loans and prohibit all purchases abroad with the exception of oil and oil products. The Hongkong *South China Morning Post* says this country suffered enormous damage as a result of the lesson taught it by the IMF. Such facts—and there are many of them—say that no terms, however “easy”, can change the nature of imperialist credits which are an instrument of exploitation and subordination.

Seeking to ease as much as possible the burden of the foreign debt, China is trying to diversify the ways of attracting the economic resources of the capitalist countries, resorting among other things to the use of direct private investments.

More than 30 normative acts regulating the activities of foreign capitalists in China have been adopted to this end. They include the Law on Mixed Enterprises with the Use of Chinese and Foreign Investments (1979), the Law on Income Tax from Mixed Enterprises (1980), the State Council decisions on the registration of mixed enterprises and on the regulation of questions relating to labour legislation at mixed enterprises (1980), the Decision on the Establishment of Special Economic Zones in Guangdong Province (1980), the Law on Income Tax from Foreign Enterprises (1981) and the Law on Trade Marks (1982). The elaboration of an integral legal foundation for foreign capitalists' activities in the PRC is still far from completion.

The total sum of foreign investments in China's economy today has reached \$2.9 billion.⁴⁴ As decided by the State Council, a number of so-called special economic zones, designed to grow in the near future into the main centres of foreign enterprise thanks to the privileges granted to foreign capital, have been set up in the south of the country. By mid-1982 the total sum of contracts for the construction of enterprises with foreign participation was in the vicinity of \$1.5 billion in the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone (Guangdong Province) alone.⁴⁵

Setting out to attract foreign capital, Peking hopes tangibly to increase the influx of modern machinery and technology into the Chinese economy and at the same time avoid spending much money on the import and mastery of expensive foreign equipment. All this would best be served by the establishment of companies with mixed capital, designed to operate for a relatively long period and envisaging close contacts and mutual responsibility of the partners at all the stages of construction and activity of the enterprises (including disposal of the produce). The law on mixed enterprises with the participation of foreign capital is directed precisely at establishing joint-stock companies and encouraging Western investors.

Actually, however the lion's share of foreign investments goes into the so-called “contractual” mixed enterprises operating chiefly on the basis of short-term agreements without legal registration of the investors' shares. Such enterprises often play the role of ordinary sub-contractors fulfilling orders from foreign monopolies which, preserving their ownership of the technical means and production technology temporarily put at China's disposal, retain the right to take industrial equipment out of the PRC on the expiry of the agreements. These are the terms on which McDonnell Douglas, Reynolds Tobacco, Baker Marine and other American companies have offered to cooperate with China.

⁴⁴ See *Beijing Review*, 1982, No. 14, p. 9.

⁴⁵ See *China Business Review*, 1982, No. 5, p. 21.

All in all, "contractual" enterprises account for about two-thirds of the foreign capital invested in the Chinese economy in 1979-1981. Incidentally, foreign investors are displaying less and less interest in establishing joint-stock companies: while in 1980 such enterprises accounted for about 5 per cent of the influx of foreign investments in China, in 1981 the figure was only 1.3 per cent, while the absolute amounts of new investments dropped to less than a third, totalling only \$20 million. This is due to the Western monopolies' refusal to bind themselves by long-term commitments and to their desire to get the maximum profit as quickly as possible by taking advantage of the changing situation in the international market and of cheap Chinese labour. The result is the short-term nature of cooperation, disruption of production cycles, and the dependence of production on the deliveries of raw materials, equipment and technology from abroad—all this hampers technical know-how being transferred to China and makes "contractual" enterprises technologically dependent upon foreign investors.

The possibilities of stimulating influence by foreign investments on the modernisation of the Chinese economy are also restricted by their largely unproductive character. Seeking to recoup as fast as possible their money, foreign investors put most of it into the development of international tourism, foreign trade enterprises, and real estate operations. In the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone these spheres of activity account for 75 per cent of the foreign capital invested, while industrial investments come to only 15 per cent of the total.⁴⁶ According to the Xinhua News Agency, tourism alone accounts for more than half the number of mixed enterprises that have opened current accounts in the Bank of China branches in different parts of the country.

As for the productive part of foreign investments, their actual content is at present determined chiefly by the Western entrepreneurs' interest in getting the maximum profit out of China by exploiting its cheap manpower. It has been estimated that remuneration of labour in China's industry, given about the same productivity, comes to about 60 per cent of that in Hong Kong, the leading Asian centre of foreign business.⁴⁷ It is not surprising that in such conditions the rate of profit from the foreign capital invested in China is at times as high as 20-25 per cent.⁴⁸ Orientation upon the use chiefly of the manual labour, of Chinese workers slows down the active introduction of modern machinery and technology in China through the establishment of mixed enterprises. As the data on the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone show, foreign investors spend \$145,000 for the establishment of a mixed enterprise, on the average 22 times as little as on a mixed foreign trade enterprise and 36 times as little as on the construction of mixed project in the sphere of tourism.⁴⁹ Most of such industrial enterprises are not large, are not very well equipped and, as a rule, confine production activity to assembly work or processing of raw materials.

A special role in the activity of foreign capital in China is played by the mixed projects in the exploitation of its natural resources, most of them on a compensation basis. By mid-1982 China had concluded contracts on joint exploration for and production of oil on the continental shelf with the Japan National Oil Corporation and the French com-

⁴⁶ *Shijie jingji daobao*, Sept. 28, 1981.

⁴⁷ See *Ekonomicheskaya Gazeta*, 1981, No. 3; See *China Business Review*, 1981, No. 5.

⁴⁸ See *Ta Kung Pao*, July 9, 1981, p. 1.

⁴⁹ Calculated on the basis of the data in *Shijie jingji daobao*, Sept. 28, 1981.

panies Elf Aquitaine and Total. Foreign investments in these projects come to \$500 million. The foreign monopolies' heightened interest in the raw-material branches of the Chinese economy is easy to understand: according to the agreements, up to 50 per cent of the oil jointly produced during 15 years will go to the foreign partners to the deal. Moreover, supplying China with high-efficiency oil-producing equipment, the Western monopolies do not as a matter of fact conceal their plans practically to exhaust the oil potential of the concessions granted them.⁵⁰

It is clear that the development of foreign enterprise in the PRC is determined largely by the urge of international monopolies to squeeze out the maximum profit, enhance their technological supremacy and acquire new sources of highly valuable raw materials. As for China, its leaders say it is for promotion of relations with other countries in the spheres of economy and technology on the basis of equality and mutual benefit. As was pointed out at the Twelfth CPC Congress last September and at the Fifth Session of the National People's Congress in November-December, expansion of technical and economic exchanges with foreign countries is designed to make China more self-sufficient and must not be allowed to hamper the development of the national economy in any way.⁵¹

All this shows that the Chinese are trying to counter to some extent world imperialism's efforts to make their country play the role of "junior partner", forced by its backwardness to accept Western technical and economic aid on extremely tough terms. Time will show how fruitful in the present conditions are China's efforts to make truly effective use of external factors in its economic development.

⁵⁰ See *China Business Review*, 1980, No. 4, p. 55; No. 6, pp. 20-22.

⁵¹ *Renmin ribao*, Sept. 8, 1982; *Guangming ribao*, Dec. 1, 1982.

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U.S. MILITARY SUPPORT FOR TAIWAN ASSAILED

Moscow FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS in English No 2, Apr-Jun 83 pp 51-60

[Article by V. N. Baryshnikov, candidate of historical sciences: "American Policy of Arming Taiwan Regime"]

The Taiwan issue, which emerged as a result of the US imperialist interference in the Chinese civil conflict, is still a stumbling block in Sino-American relations. The Chinese government's just and insistent demands that a stop be put to Washington's interference in China's domestic affairs and its support for the Guomindang regime entrenched on the Chinese island of Taiwan are met by successive US administrations with nothing but vague promises cloaked in diplomatic wording that enables them to pursue invariably the expansionistic line towards Taiwan. Today this course is called the "two Chinas" policy, a policy that might, if the decrepit Guomindang regime on the island is replaced by a different regime that would discard the mythical doctrine of "liberating mainland China", become what some American analysts have called a policy of "one China and one Taiwan". Needless to say, this does not change the essence of the US course, one of hostility toward China and aimed at actually seizing part of its territory.

The question arises as to why the Americans are hesitant to settle the Taiwan issue even after having normalised relations with China, all the more so since Washington constantly stresses its hopes for the "strategic benefits" of such a step primarily in its confrontation with the Soviet Union.

The answer to this question can be found in a number of reasons that explain the American imperialists' unwillingness to part with Taiwan, even though such stubbornness is bound to complicate relations between the US and China. Featuring prominently among them are Washington's military-strategic plans for control over the island.

Back in December 1949 General Douglas MacArthur, commander of American troops in the Far East and a supporter of the policy of severing Taiwan from China, openly advocated retaining the island within the sphere of American influence. He argued that if China were to "seize" Taiwan, it would "pose a threat" to the Philippines and Japan and would also push the US defences to the Hawaii and Mariana Islands and the Pacific coast of the United States itself.¹

President Truman, who on June 27, 1950 ordered the Seventh Fleet "to prevent any attack on Formosa", said that the liberation of the island by the People's Liberation Army of China "would be a direct threat to the security of the Pacific area and to United States forces... in that area".² The same document signed by Truman officially revised the former position of the United States that recognised Taiwan as an inalienable part of Chinese territory.³ As outlined in the above presidential directive, the determination of the future status of Formosa had to await the restoration of security in the Pacific, a peace treaty with Japan, or consideration by the United Nations.⁴

¹ See *New York Times*, Dec. 30, 1949.

² See *Department of State Bulletin*, Vol. 23, No. 574, July 3, 1950, p. 5.

³ For details see *Far Eastern Affairs*, 1982, No. 4.

⁴ See *Department of State Bulletin*, Vol. 23, No. 574, p. 5.

More than 30 years have passed since that time. The situation in the world (including the Pacific area) has changed considerably. Both the US and China have long since normalised relations with Japan and the Taiwan issue has been more than once discussed at the United Nations. Since then an overwhelming majority of countries, as well as the UN, which at one time followed the US in recognising the political fiction of the "Republic of China" on Taiwan—for this is what it really is—have adopted a realistic approach and now honour the Chinese people's legitimate rights over Taiwan.

The United States also had to alter its former stand of non-recognition of the People's Republic of China and rejection of its admission to the United Nations, etc. Following the Sino-American talks in Peking in February 1972 the US Administration recognised the PRC government as the sole legitimate government of China and agreed that the future status of Taiwan should be determined by "the Chinese living on both sides of the Taiwan Strait". That is not to say, however, that the United States recognised the PRC's claims to Taiwan and discontinued support of the Guomindang regime.

No further action was taken until December 1978, when the Carter Administration announced that it was severing diplomatic relations with the Taiwanese regime for the sake of normalising relations with the PRC and that it was cancelling the 1954 US-Guomindang military agreement and would pull out American forces from Taiwan.

Yet practically simultaneously the US reiterated its policy of opposition to the reunification of the island with China, for President Carter merely "took into consideration", and came nowhere near recognising as legitimate the Chinese position that there is "but one China and Taiwan is part of China".⁵ On March 29, 1979 the US Congress passed the Taiwan Relations Act by an overwhelming majority (it was signed by President Carter on April 10, 1979). The Act guarantees the "security" of the island, that is to say, its separation from China. Part 2 (b) of this Act states, among other things, the following:

- the US policy is "to preserve and promote extensive, close, and friendly commercial, cultural, and other relations with Taiwan";

- "...the US decision to establish diplomatic relations with the PRC rests upon the expectation that the future of Taiwan will be determined by peaceful means";

- the US will consider any attempt to determine Taiwan's future "by other than peaceful means, including boycotts or embargoes, a threat to the peace and security of the Western Pacific area and a matter of grave concern to the United States".

The same act commits the US Administration to supply Taiwan with "defensive" weapons and "to maintain the capacity of the United States to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security or the social and economic system of the people on Taiwan".

Apart from the US military commitments with respect to Taiwan, the US Congress also sanctioned the honouring of all formerly concluded US-Taiwan treaties and agreements and also the setting up of "unofficial" missions which would have diplomatic immunity and perform the func-

⁵ Hungdah Chiu, "The Future of US-Taiwan Relations", *Asian Affairs. An American Review*, Vol. 9, No. 1, Sept.-Oct. 1981.

tions similar to those of the abolished embassies and consulates.⁶ To "build confidence among businessmen", the Congress envisioned further government guarantees with respect to American corporations' investments in the economy of the island and entrusted the corresponding commissions to observe that this act be strictly adhered to.

As can be seen, the establishment of diplomatic relations with the PRC did not essentially alter the long-standing relations between the US and the Guomindang regime on Taiwan and, what is more, in reality produced a most open form of the "two Chinas" policy. Washington has ignored all protests of the PRC's government.⁷

Washington's line of strengthening the Guomindang military machine, which from the outset has served as a key lever in the US imperialist policy in the Western Pacific, is an aspect of the US Taiwan policy directed against China.

The US military strategists' notion of Taiwan as an "unsinkable aircraft carrier", which poses a threat to any Asian port from Vladivostok to Singapore,⁸ accounts for the colossal appropriations allocated by the US Administration to strengthen and modernise the Guomindang armed forces. In 1950, a US military delegation headed by General A. Fox, Deputy Chief of Staff of the American forces in the Far East, visited Taiwan on an inspection tour and proposed measures to raise the Guomindang capability and also US help in achieving the goal. Since then the US has carried through several programmes to train and equip the Chiang Kaishek army. In 1950, the US allocated \$75 million for this purpose. In January 1951 the US endorsed a concrete programme of assistance to the Chiang Kaishek ground forces and in February to the navy and the air force. On January 30, 1951 the US Administration officially announced that Taiwan would be receiving assistance within the framework of the mutual defence programme. This programme included supplies of American weapons, ammunition, and other materiel to the Guomindang regime and also consultations.

This cooperation was sealed by an exchange of notes between the US Administration and the authorities of the "Republic of China" on rendering military aid to Taiwan.⁹ In March of that same year the US Administration adopted the recommendation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to set up the Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) on Taiwan to work directly in the Chiang Kaishek army units.

In May 1951, military advisers began working on the island. The Guomindang army was trained according to the programmes and service regulations of the American army. Numerous military schools, together with two military and two police academies to train officers, were opened on Taiwan. Training centres, airfields and testing grounds were established under MAAG guidance. In addition, many Guomindang officers were sent to the US to study the latest types of weaponry and tactics of modern warfare. Large batches of weapons and ammunition began arriving to Taiwan, and the Guomindang regime was granted priority ammunition supply rights along with the NATO countries. American military advisers began training the Guomindang troops for amphi-

⁶ The Taiwan Institute was set up in the US with nine departments in major American cities, and the Coordinating Council on the Affairs of North America began functioning in Taipei, with all the organisations staffed with professional diplomats.

⁷ See *Renmin ribao*, March 17, 1979.

⁸ The Statement by General D. MacArthur in August 1950. *US News and World Report*, Sept. 1, 1950.

⁹ See *UN Treaty Series*, Vol. 132, 1952, pp. 274-275.

bious landing operations and cooperation among services as part of regular military exercises. From 1950 to 1953, 24 Guomindang divisions were reorganised and rearmed, and modernised air and naval forces were rebuilt.

The Chiang Kaishek forces served as a reserve combat army in the American strategy in the Far East. Former US Senator Humphrey said in this connection: "Without such nationalist troops in that area there would be immediate need for hundreds of thousands of American men. So we should be grateful for the forces that are in that area, and we should do all in our power to support them."¹⁰ When the US followed a patently hostile course towards the People's Republic of China,¹¹ the Guomindang regime served as an instrument of pressure on the new system in that country. Despite Truman's order to make Taiwan "neutral", the Guomindang regime carried out interminable armed provocations against the PRC, participated in by nearly 30,000 Guomindang servicemen from 1950 to 1954 (the Chinese coast was attacked 41 times).¹² The Guomindang regime also tried to set up a military bridgehead for anti-Chinese activities at the Burmese-Chinese border, where General Li Mi's gangs were operating. Armed and equipped with the CIA help, Li Mi's military units raided the Chinese province of Yunnan and at the same time destabilised the situation in Burma. The Guomindang men also took part in the 1958 anti-government riots in Indonesia.

After the US Administration introduced an embargo on trade with China in December 1950, the Guomindang regime tried to organise a naval blockade of the Chinese coast by attacking Chinese merchant vessels and foreign ships headed toward Chinese ports. These acts were often carried out in cooperation with American aircraft, which supplied the necessary intelligence information. In the period from 1950 to 1954, such attacks were carried out against 470 Chinese vessels, as well as 40 British ships and merchant ships of the USSR, Poland, Greece, West Germany, Italy, Denmark, Norway and other countries. During the same period US aircraft made more than 7,000 violations of Chinese air space and US battleships entered Chinese territorial waters more than 300 times.¹³

After the signing of the American-Taiwan "mutual defence" treaty in December 1954 the Americans continued giving military aid to Taiwan. However, the commencement of Sino-American negotiations at an ambassadorial level in 1955 revealed Washington's obvious desire to curtail the military activities of the Guomindang clique in order to create a "two-Chinas" situation. The US sought to legitimise such a situation primarily by continuing the buildup of the Guomindang's military potential and by turning the island into a major American military stronghold in the Far East. In the 1950s and the 1960s the US built 50 new military bases, air fields and testing grounds on Taiwan and created a network of radar installations and radio stations. The Jilong, Gaoxiong, Zuoying and Tainan harbours were reconstructed and a naval base at Makun (Penghuledao) was built. American arms supplies to Taiwan were for the most part

¹⁰ *Congressional Record*, Vol. 101, p. 935.

¹¹ In his message to the 51st Annual National Encampment of Veterans of Foreign Wars (V. F. W.) in Chicago in August 1950 General D. MacArthur openly declared that the US should rout and eliminate the People's Republic of China. Other political figures in the US also made similar appeals.

¹² See *People's China*, 1954, No. 21, p. 12.

¹³ See *The Ninth Session of the UN General Assembly. Special Political Committee, Official Reports*, New York, 1955, p. 207.

made as part of US military aid to the Guomintang regime, which amounted to nearly \$2 billion by 1960.¹⁴ From 1950 to 1973 the US gave Taiwan a total of \$4.1 billion in military assistance.¹⁵ Beginning with 1973 the US started mainly selling its arms and materiel to Taiwan.

American military bases, however, which were under the jurisdiction of the command of the US armed forces on Taiwan, established in 1958, continued operating on the island. In 1957, the US deployed air units on the island equipped with atomic weapons. The US military units on Taiwan were highly instrumental in putting military pressure on China during an armed conflict in the Taiwan Strait in the autumn of 1958.

During the US invasion of Indochina Taiwan was used as a key communications and transportation centre and a rear base for US troops. In December 1972 the Guomintang regime, beyond doubt only after American consultation, transferred half of their fighter planes to the South Vietnamese air force to boost their military operations.¹⁶ The United States later on compensated the Guomintang regime for this "sacrifice".

Washington's consistent policy of building up the military potential of the Guomintang regime led to Taiwan's becoming the foremost military power in East Asia by the mid-1970s.

According to the London Institute for Strategic Studies, Taiwan with a population of 18,100,000, has at present armed forces totalling more than 450,000 men. A force of 80,000 men is stationed on the off-shore islands of Jinmen and Matsu, which have been turned into powerful strongholds in the immediate vicinity of the Chinese coast. At the same time the Guomintang ground force has 310,000 men and different types of automatic weapons, guided missiles, medium and heavy tanks, long-range artillery and so on. Thirty-five thousand serve in the Guomintang navy which has several submarines, 22 destroyers, 11 frigates and 40 other types of ships primarily of American make. Its marine corps comprises approximately 40,000 men. The Guomintang air forces consist of 400 warplanes and helicopters and a personnel of 67,000. The combat reserve of the Taiwanese army amounts to a force of 1,175,000 men.¹⁷

It should be pointed out that the Guomintang regime owes its stronger military potential entirely to its cooperation with the United States, which does not conceal its interests in maintaining Taiwan's military potential. In American military planning Taiwan remains an important link in the "defence" system in the Western Pacific. When approving the US-Guomintang military treaty in February 1955, the US Senate stated in its resolution that "...Taiwan formed an integral part of the defence of littoral extending from the Aleutians to the Philippines from which a decisive degree of control of military operations along the periphery of East Asia could be exercised. In unfriendly hands, Taiwan would pose a substantial danger to the other parts of the southern half of this littoral—the Ryukyus and the Philippines."¹⁸ Obviously there has been no drastic change in relations between the US and Taiwan. The island continues to

¹⁴ See J. D. Montgomery, *Foreign Aid in International Politics*, Prentice Hall, 1967, p. 282.

¹⁵ See *Newsweek*, Feb. 10, 1979.

¹⁶ See *The Christian Science Monitor*, Jan. 3, 1973.

¹⁷ See *Military Balance 1981-1982*, The Institute for Strategic Studies, London, 1981, p. 79.

¹⁸ *US Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Relations with the People's Republic of China, 92nd Congress, 1st Session, June 24, 25, 28 and 29, and July 20, 1971*, Washington, p. 378.

play an important role in the American strategy in the Western Pacific, for the Guomindang regime and its military machine serve to safeguard American interests in this region.

It is worth mentioning in this connection that the revising of Carter's promise to withdraw American troops from South Korea made public in March 1977 shows that the chain of US military strongholds along East Asia (including Taiwan) retains its paramount strategic importance. In 1979 this withdrawal was "postponed" indefinitely in view of military-strategic considerations dictated by the interests of American imperialism in that region.

The Reagan Administration follows the same course. M. Armacost, a spokesman of United States Defence Department, openly declared in March 1981 that stable strategic positions in East Asia and the Pacific were an essential element of US global might.¹⁹

One could hardly have expected that, after normalising relations with the PRC, American imperialism would radically alter its hostility toward the people who carried out a Communist Party-guided revolution, expelled the American invaders and their Chiang Kaishek puppets and began to build a new life. The US unrelenting hostility toward the People's Republic of China was graphically illustrated, for instance, by the secret part of President Carter's Directive No. 59 on the "new nuclear strategy" made public by the *Washington Post*, which envisions nuclear strikes at 100 targets on the Chinese mainland in the event of a so-called limited nuclear war.²⁰

In other words, Washington's present-day official policy of establishing "strategic partnership" with the PRC to fight the world revolutionary movement is also characterised by hostility toward that country rooted in American imperialism's class antagonism to the road chosen by the Chinese people after 1949. This is fully manifest in American manoeuvres around Taiwan.

The duplicity of American diplomacy on the Taiwan issue is also clearly seen from the fact that, though formally denying the Guomindang regime further diplomatic recognition and agreeing that the PRC government is the sole legitimate representative of China, the American Administration is *de facto* continuing interstate contacts with the Taiwanese authorities, obstructing the reunification of the island with the PRC and, as before, extending extensive support to Guomindang, particularly by arming the Taiwanese army. "These acts," Hu Yaobang told the 12th CPC Congress, "are an encroachment on China's sovereignty and interference in its internal affairs."²¹

At the present stage the US Administration is attempting to block the reunification of Taiwan with China, imposing on the latter commitments "not to use force." These "peace-making manoeuvres" by the US, which in its approach to the situation in the Middle East or some Latin American countries has nothing against using force when it is a matter of safeguarding the dominion of reactionary pro-American regimes, are explained by quite simple motives. As the Guomindang regime flatly rejects all the Chinese government's proposals on talks on the peaceful reunification of the two parts of the country, the PRC, once it agrees to the principle of the non-use of force, would, according to American stra-

¹⁹ *US Military Posture for FY 1981*, Washington, 1981, p. 3.

²⁰ See *Washington Post*, Oct. 2, 1980.

²¹ Hu Yaobang, *To Produce a New Situation at All the Fronts of Socialist Modernisation*, Peking, 1982, p. 40 (in Chinese).

registis, reconcile itself to the loss of Taiwan, thus leaving the island in the American sphere of influence.

Washington does not hide the fact that the reunification of Taiwan with the PRC runs counter to the US military-strategic interests. All the more so since in American calculations with respect to the Taiwan issue the PRC represents a potential enemy of the US rather than a friend. This stand is, for instance, reflected in an article published in *Current History* by Leo Yuen-yun Liu, associate professor of political science at Brandon University, entitled "Taiwan's Role in the Western Pacific". The reunification of Taiwan with the PRC, the author points out, would entail serious consequences. It would strengthen China, and Japan would seek closer ties with it, drifting away from the US to the detriment of the interests of American "security". The article is pervaded with the fear that Taiwan's dropping out of the American military system in the Far East would make it more difficult for the US to keep its present military and economic positions in the region. Leo Liu stresses the strategic importance of the island in controlling the Taiwan Strait and the major shipping lanes of the US, Japan, Korea and the Philippines. His conclusion is unequivocal: "...it would seem circumspect for the United States to continue to supply Taiwan with sufficient defensive weaponry. Today, Taiwan probably possesses the military capability to deter a conventional attack by the Communist Chinese."²²

Similar views are also characteristic of some other influential American political scholars, such as Ray Cline and Edward Littwark of the Centre for Strategic and International Studies at Georgetown University.²³

Today a powerful pro-Taiwan lobby exists in the US Senate, made up of Senators Barry Goldwater, Stromb Termond, S. I. Hayakawa and others, who reflect the attitude of the US military-monopolist forces striving to maintain Taiwan as a link in the American military system in the Far East and advocate continued armed support for the Guomintang regime.

Under the circumstances the US ruling elite has to resort to intricate manoeuvres to cash in on normalised relations with China, on the one hand, and to obstruct its reunification with Taiwan, its inalienable part, on the other.

Proceeding from this, the US ruling circles while normalising relations with the PRC and reducing direct American presence on Taiwan, pursue a policy that would give further armed support to Taiwan and that would ensure a balance of forces in the Taiwan Strait allowing the Guomintang regime to continue dominating the island. With this aim in view the Carter Administration committed itself to continue supplying "defensive" weapons to Taiwan after a year-long moratorium on weapons sales following the establishment of diplomatic relations with the PRC. In January 1980, the United States announced the resumption of arms sales to the Guomintang regime by extending it \$280 million in arms credits. Together with earlier contracts, American credits for arms supplies to Taiwan total approximately \$1 billion.²⁴ Furthermore, President Carter sanctioned the continuation of American-Guomintang military cooperation, including joint military manoeuvres, visits by American warships to Taiwanese ports, etc. Confidential directives worked out by Zbigniew Brzezinski envisioned that US warships would be able to make

²² *Current History*, April 1982, p. 177.

²³ See *Peking Informers*, 1981, Vol. 43, No. 10.

²⁴ See A. J. Pierre, *The Global Politics of Arms Sales*, Princeton, 1982, p. 216.

from seven to thirteen visits every four months. Also, Pentagon staff members would continue training the Guomindang personnel both on Taiwan and outside it (in the latter case the Guomindang servicemen were to pass themselves for civilians and come to the US in their private capacities).²⁵ American intelligence service went on using special projects on Taiwan to control military radio communications in China. One of these projects built in the mountains north of Taipei is regularly visited by agents of US secret services.²⁶

The Reagan Administration has continued the Carter Administration's policy toward Taiwan. During his election campaign, Ronald Reagan declared that he intended to carry out his Western Pacific policy in co-operation with Taiwan.²⁷ Reagan's totally loyal stand toward the Guomindang regime²⁸ was supported by the influential pro-Taiwan lobby in the US Congress, which insisted on "unrestricted" arms supplies to Taiwan for its maintaining "superiority at sea and in the air in the area of the Taiwan Strait". This strengthened Reagan's intention to go on arming Taiwan.

This stand evoked sharp protest from the Chinese government, which accused the US of disregarding its commitments made "in keeping with international norms and the joint communique on establishing diplomatic relations between the two countries". "China has always opposed arms sales to the Taiwanese authorities by other countries," *Renmin ribao* wrote on December 31, 1981. "The countries which have diplomatic relations with the PRC should not sell arms to the local authorities of the Chinese province of Taiwan if they recognise that there is but one China and that the government of the People's Republic of China is the sole legitimate government of China and Taiwan is part of China. Those who insist on arms sales to Taiwan encroach upon Chinese sovereignty and meddle in the PRC's domestic affairs. The United States is no exception in this respect."²⁹

In a bid not to lose the opportunity of playing the "Chinese card", Reagan had to make a tactical step and promise the Chinese government to stop arm supplies to Taiwan "some day" and in the meantime not to raise their level. That promise was recorded in the joint American-Chinese communique of August 17, 1982. This document, which contained statements from three letters by Ronald Reagan to the government of the PRC and the latter's statements on Taiwan, failed to resolve the problem of American arms supplies. Reagan's fairly vague promise is explained primarily by domestic policy considerations, namely, in view of the forthcoming presidential elections Reagan wanted to forestall accusations that relations between the US and China deteriorated during his presidency. In a telephone interview with a CBS commentator on the day of the signing of the joint communique, Reagan said, "There was no backing out of it on my part, absolutely nothing has changed. We shall continue arming Taiwan in the future. I am bound by commitments in keeping with the Taiwan Relations Act and will adhere to it."

²⁵ See *Washington Post*, April 10, 1979.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, June 18, 1981.

²⁷ See *Asian Affairs. An American Review*, Vol. 9, No. 1, Sept.-Oct. 1981, p. 24.

²⁸ In early August 1982 Reagan made a public statement with regard to the Guomindang regime on Taiwan: "We are not going to leave our old friends and allies to their fate." *The Christian Science Monitor* characterised that statement on August 6, 1982, as a careless wording, bearing in mind China's stand with respect to Taiwan.

²⁹ For more on the Chinese position on the issue also see *Renmin ribao*, July 4, 1981; *Peking Review*, Jan. 12, 1981.

Commenting on the gist of the American stand reflected in the joint communique of August 17, *The New York Times* wrote that the glib declaration of the American intent not to increase the number nor raise the quality of the arms supplied to Taiwan and "to reduce gradually its sales of arms to Taiwan, leading over a period of time to a final resolution", could mean anything any future American president might wish to say.³⁰

According to American press reports, Reagan had to reaffirm his stand to combat the influential circles within the State Department, the Defence Department and the CIA, which insisted on the greater importance of having good relations with the PRC as compared with the problem of Taiwan's fate.³¹ Incidentally, disagreement on this issue was one of the key reasons for Alexander Haig's resignation as the Secretary of State. G. Shultz, the new Secretary of State who formerly had business interests on Taiwan,³² announced while his approval was under debate in Congress that Taiwan would get everything necessary for its "defence".³³

It is symptomatic that, while conducting talks with the PRC on arms supplies to Taiwan, Washington also negotiated behind the scenes with Taipei. The statement of the Taiwanese "Foreign Ministry" published by *Zhuniang ribao* on August 18, 1982, said that, using "suitable channels", the US government informed Taipei of the following: "1) the American side does not agree to setting a time limit to selling us arms; 2) the American side has not yet agreed to meet the PRC's demand to inform the latter beforehand about arms sale to us; 3) the American side is not going to pose as any 'reconciler' between us and the PRC; 4) the American side will not agree to making changes in the Taiwan Relations Act; 5) the American side has not changed its consistent stand with respect to Taiwan's sovereignty; 6) the American side is not going to bring pressure to bear on us so that we should start talks with the PRC."

The United States again demanded that China should commit itself to use only peaceful means in tackling the Taiwan issue. This was a preliminary condition for a radical change of the American stand on arms supplies to Taiwan. As a senior official of the State Department admitted at a briefing for journalists, "The US Administration does not think that the PRC can change its course towards a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan issue. Should this happen, however, the United States will, naturally, also revise its stand."

In reply to these poorly concealed threats the Xinhua news agency issued a commentary on August 22, 1982 rejecting such an approach to the matter. The commentary remarked that "any attempt to interpret the communique as if the end to American arms supplies to Taiwan should presuppose a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan issue can attest to nothing but further deliberate American interference in Chinese domestic affairs".

Similar protests and Washington's desire not to aggravate relations with the PRC or to miss the opportunities arising from the normalisation of Sino-American relations caused the US Administration to introduce certain restrictions on American arms supplies to Taiwan (for instance, it delayed delivery to the Guomindang regime of the latest types of jet aircraft, such as the FX, F-16 and F-5G fighters). Nevertheless this in no way settled the problem as a whole.

³⁰ See *The New York Times*, Aug. 18, 1982.

³¹ See *Washington Post*, July 30, 1982.

³² G. Shultz has visited Taiwan several times. The Bechtel Company, his former employer, participates in a programme of developing nuclear power engineering on the island.

³³ *Washington Post*, Aug. 2, 1982.

First, the continued supplying of "defensive" weapons without a doubt further strengthens the Guomintang military potential. The Reagan Administration's go ahead for the building of several hundred F-5E aircraft on American licence on Taiwan (jointly with the Northrop Corporation), deliveries of spare parts and a large batch of armoured personnel carriers to the tune of \$97 million, etc., can hardly testify to the opposite.³⁴ In the period from 1977 to 1980 Taiwan's arms purchases (primarily from the US) were valued at \$737 million.³⁵

Second, US allies can sell arms, technology and ammunition to Taiwan—this practice is already in existence and is not obstructed by the US Administration. It is known, for instance, that the Guomintang armed forces possess Japanese cutters, Israeli surface-to-surface Gabriel missiles and Shafir air-to-air missiles, as well as South African-made Elephant tanks, field artillery and other armaments. In November 1980 the Dutch government granted licences on transferring to Taiwan two submarines, the orders for which were placed at Rotterdam shipyards.

Finally, one should not overlook American policy of developing the arms industry on Taiwan itself. Such a policy became especially manifest after the Sino-American Shanghai communique was made public on the eve of the normalisation of relations between the two countries, which put certain limits to the US military contacts with the Guomintang regime. This process was started by the joint American-Taiwanese production of F-5E fighters (139 planes had been made by 1979), Bell helicopters and Sidewinder air-to-air missiles at Taiwanese plants. American military experts also helped Taiwanese enterprises to produce guided missiles, anti-aircraft and vessel missiles, cutters, M-60 machine-guns, M-16 rifles, combat vehicles, tactical communication means, training planes, ammunition, fuel and so on. The military parade held in Taipei on October 10, 1981, displayed guided surface-to-surface missiles, anti-tank guns and also a new model of the M-14A2 tank built on the island.

The Guomintang responded to the US establishment of diplomatic relations with China by bringing their armed forces into a state of heightened combat readiness. Taiwan's "Premier" Sun Yunsuan announced that the military budget would be increased to a level that would ensure self-reliance in armaments and develop the necessary industrial base.³⁶ Military spending accounts for nearly half the entire Taiwanese budget. A "reform committee" was set up, which recommended greater emphasis on the building up of the arms industry and the organisation of a research centre for developing new military technology.

It should be also pointed out that, by creating their own military-production base, the Guomintang leaders hope to keep the US as the main and inexhaustible source of arms supplies. "President" Chiang Ching-kuo stated with confidence that "America will remain our principal weapons supplier".³⁷ This confidence rests on the American interest in precluding the reunification of Taiwan and the PRC and in using this territory of China for its imperialist purposes in East Asia, including against China itself, the interest all US administrations displayed in the past three decades.

³⁴ See *Izvestia*, Dec. 2, 1982.

³⁵ See A. J. Pierre, *Op. cit.*, p. 133.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 218.

³⁷ *Newsweek*, Nov. 1, 1982, p. 27.

TOKYO: POLICY LINE OF MILITARIZATION

Moscow FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS in English No 2, Apr-Jun 83 pp 61-71

[Article by V. N. Bunin]

Preparations for war carried out by US-led military and political blocs and alliances, directed against the socialist community and the national liberation movement throughout the world are just one of the forms of applying military force in postwar international relations. Reliance on military strength as the main means of foreign policy has always carried great weight in the imperialist powers' foreign policy concepts and political activities. The militarisation carried out by reactionary elements is accompanied by an unprecedented growth in military appropriations. Nearly doubling its military budget for fiscal year 1983 over that of fiscal year 1980, the US ruling elite has drawn its NATO and other aggressive block partners into the global arms race and is pushing imperialist Japan, its Asian ally, toward rearmament.

Egged on by Washington's demands and the activation of the nationalistic and militarist elements in the country, Japan has expressed mounting desire of late for beefing up its armed might. The military and political circles are increasingly bent on undertaking a comprehensive review of security problems and on working out a new all-round approach to them on a global scale, an approach which attaches great importance to foreign-policy and economic measures, side by side with preparations for war. Bypassing constitutional restrictions, ways are being sought for Japanese participation in joint strategic military actions with other imperialist countries, directed against the socialist community. Moreover, a great stake is being placed on the military factor as an important means for Japan to accomplish its aims on the world scene.

The rate and scale at which Japan's Washington-encouraged arms buildup is progressing is provoking growing international response. Addressing a rally in Alma Ata, Leonid Brezhnev noted that the imperialist forces were pushing Japan onto the "dangerous road of militarisation and hostility toward the Soviet Union".¹

The main principle of the Japanese military doctrine is to build up their own military potential by further promoting the Japanese-American military and political alliance.

According to government statements, "Japan is taking pains to strengthen its Self-Defence Forces quantitatively and qualitatively" primarily through modernisation of military hardware. Its leaders are fully intent to continue and work unswervingly for progress in this direction.²

MILITARY AND POLITICAL CONCEPTS OF JAPAN'S RULING ELITE

In the late 1960s and the early 1970s, when Japan was firmly ranked second in the capitalist world by its economic indices and was struck

¹ *Pravda*, Aug. 30, 1980.

² *Japan Times*, Sept. 3, 1981.

by the revival of nationalistic and revanchist tendencies, its military circles produced the so-called self-defence course, masterminded by the present Prime Minister Nakasone, who was at the time director of the National Defence Agency (NDA). The course is essentially a plan for defending the Japanese islands until help arrives from the US. The self-defence course with its emphasis on greater independence from the US in military policy substantiated a further buildup of the fighting strength of Japan's armed forces that would be capable to "repel any limited aggression".³ To attain greater independence from the US, the course envisioned stepping up military production and reducing to the minimum purchases of the American military hardware.

The "self-defence" course was further developed by the adoption in 1976 of the National Defence Programme Outline, which conveyed the gist of the Japanese military doctrine. The programme, which outlined the long-term plans for the military buildup, rests on the Standard Defence Force Concept, which envisages the development of armed forces sufficient in size to be able to produce a large army in war time. The programme set targets for the Standard Defence Force, which according to the schedule decided on by the Japanese National Defence Council in April 1981, are to be met by 1987.⁴

In keeping with the programme, the Japanese army must be prepared to conduct all types of combat operations involving the use of conventional and atomic tactical weapons. In the strategic sphere, the programme relies entirely on US military might including the use of its nuclear missile potential. The Japanese military concepts are based on the premise that the Soviet Union is Japan's major opponent and develop their armed forces accordingly.

As their expansionist ambitions grew, the Japanese leaders began increasingly calling for a shift in their foreign policy from that of passive contemplation to one of resolving major political, financial, economic and military problems on a global scale. It was in this setting that a new concept referred to as the Comprehensive National Security Concept took shape among Japan's military and political leaders in the late 1970s and early 1980s.

As its official name and government statements reveal, the concept is basically a balanced combination of political, economic and military measures in the country's domestic and above all foreign policy to ensure Japan's survival during various crises, that is to say, to ensure its national security on a large scale.

Having adopted this concept as the basis of state policy in its military buildup, the Japanese government formed on December 2, 1980 the Comprehensive National Security Council under the Prime Minister. It is made up of nearly all the ministers and part of the Liberal Democratic Party leadership, whose task is to formulate specific comprehensive measures in the economy, diplomacy and military buildup which will ensure "national security".

Displaying a new approach to its foreign policy problems from the global point of view and tackling them in close relation with the US world strategy, Japan has stepped up in the framework of the new concept political, trade, economic and military contacts with the states of western orientation, primarily the NATO countries, and also with regimes

³ *Japan's Contribution to Military Stability in Northeast Asia*, Washington, 1980, p. 39.

⁴ See *Japan Times*, April 22, 1981.

linked to the US by military treaties and agreements, for instance, South Korea.

MILITARY BUILDUP PLANS

The buildup of the Japanese armed forces was planned in the postwar period on the basis of consecutive five-year programmes, the fourth of which was completed in March 1977.

The powerful upsurge of the anti-militarist movement in the country was the main factor forcing the National Defence Agency to back away, beginning with 1977, from its five-year programmes, which were subjected to severe criticism by the opposition in the Diet. Some sources also point to the difficulties underwent by the Agency in obtaining large appropriations from the government for constructing the "self-defence force". In 1977 the Agency began making annual plans for strengthening and developing the armed forces in the hope of thereby facilitating the financing of the army. The new planning system for constructing the "self-defence force" evoked serious opposition of the defence production committee under the Federation of Economic Organisations (Keidanren), because the annual plans failed to provide for the distribution of the Agency's long-term orders in the arms industry. On the committee's insistence the Agency resumed in 1980 planning the military buildup on a five-year schedule.

At present Japan plans the buildup of its armed forces according to a special directive adopted by the Agency on April 17, 1977.⁵ As a result, the planning has become essentially different from the procedure used in the previous period. All military construction plans, including five-year and annual plans, are the Agency's internal documents and are endorsed by its chief without parliamentary debate, as was the previous procedure. The leading bourgeois newspaper *Asahi* wrote, "Plans for strengthening the military might are being carried out behind the back of the people".⁶ Whereas in the past each of the consecutive military buildup programmes was made public, the new programme became known only when the US demanded that it should be implemented ahead of schedule. Since the government recognises it *de facto* as the official armed forces buildup programme, it cannot be considered, according to the newspaper, merely as the Agency's internal plan but must be discussed at the National Defence Council and at the Special Commission for Security Problems in the House of Representatives of the Japanese Diet.

At present the fifth plan for construction of the "self-defence force" active for the 1980-1984 period is being brought to completion. In line with the demands of the United States Japan has committed itself to complete the plan one year earlier, i. e., by fiscal year 1983.

All the "defence plans" that consecutively incorporated the basic requirements of the developing military doctrine and the military concepts worked out within its framework aim at building armed forces that would be capable, on the one hand, of functioning efficiently within the Japanese-American security system and, on the other, of covering the assignment within the Self-Defence Concept and producing a large army in war time. These goals are accomplished by improving the "self-defence force" qualitatively, raising its combat readiness and equipping it with the latest types of arms and military hardware.

⁵ See *The 1980 White Book on Defence*, p. 301; *Wing Newsletter. Japan's Aerospace and Aviation Weekly*, Vol. 13, May 14, 1980, No. 20, p. 5.

⁶ *Asahi Shimbun*, May 9, 1980.

The current plan envisages no quantitative increase in the Self-Defence Forces but aims primarily at the qualitative improvement of all the armed forces, especially the Navy, and also the further development and improvement of the anti-submarine systems and the modernisation of the air defences by equipping them with latest radar stations and electronic jamming devices.

The ultimate aim of the plan is to bring all the armed forces up to the level specified by the Standard Defence Force Concept. However, the Agency believes that not all the target figures will be met in the current five-year period. The Standard Defence Force target figures are to be met in the sixth five-year plan for the "self-defence force" buildup for 1983-1987 (in view of fulfilling the fifth plan a year ahead of schedule).

Pentagon officers who took part in the annual working conference on problems of "ensuring security" held in Honolulu on June 13-14, 1981, voiced sharp dissatisfaction to their Japanese partners with the projected date of 1987 for fulfilling the Standard Defence Force target figures and also with the entire Japanese military buildup concept expounded in the 1976 National Defence Programme Outline and in the current five-year plan. According to their estimates, the Standard Defence Force targets are intended for peace time and do not take into account the military buildup outlook nor the complicated international situation. For this reason the entire programme should be radically revised.⁷ The US Secretary of Defence Caspar Weinberger told the same to the National Defence Agency chief D. Omura when they met in Washington on June 29-30, 1981. He remarked that it would "be too late" if Japan completed the programme only in 1987.⁸

At the Honolulu meeting US representatives suggested that Japan should make a new qualitative leap in building up the Self-Defence Forces combat potential, namely, that the number of combat fighters in the Japanese air force be brought up to 500, that all the anti-submarine warfare capabilities of the naval air force be replaced by the latest P-3C "Orion" bombers, 100 of which be purchased from the US, that the Japanese submarine fleet be doubled, with nuclear-powered submarines accounting for 50 per cent of that fleet. The Pentagon representatives declared that these measures would enable Japan to build armed forces capable of withstanding the "Soviet military threat".⁹

ESTIMATED COMBAT POTENTIAL AND PROSPECTS FOR SELF-DEFENCE FORCE BUILDUP

As projected in the sixth plan for the strengthening and buildup of the Self-Defence Forces for the 1983-1987 period, the ground forces are to comprise 13 divisions, including one armoured division created on March 25, 1981. By the time the plan is implemented their hardware will consist of 1,000 M-74 tanks, 900 armoured carriers, 91 self-propelled 203-mm guns capable of delivering tactical nuclear projectiles, anti-tank AHIS-56 helicopters, improved Hawk anti-aircraft missiles and anti-aircraft missile launchers of the 1981 type designed for hitting low-flying targets, etc.

The Navy will possess 200 combat ships with an aggregate displacement of 320,000 GRT, among them 60 anti-submarine destroyers, 16 sub-

⁷ See *Asahi Shimbun*, Aug. 12, 1981.

⁸ See *Japan Times*, June 17, 1981.

⁹ *Ibid.*, July 1, 1981.

marines and 40 mine sweepers. Naval aviation will include 220 combat planes, including 72 P-3C anti-submarine patrol aircraft and 91 antisubmarine helicopters.

Among other things, the plan envisions the designing of a missile-carrying destroyer of 6,000 tons displacement which will be the largest in the Japanese fleet. The ship is to be equipped with a comprehensive anti-aircraft, anti-vessel and anti-submarine defence system similar to that found on American cruisers. Estimated at a cost of 100,000 million yen, twice that of an ordinary missile destroyer, the new ship will be employed to expand the field of naval operations.¹⁰

The number of combat aircraft in the air force is to reach 400, including 138 F-15 fighter-bombers and 82 F-1 and FSX close support fighters. Apart from that the air capabilities will be beefed up with 6 groups of post-Nike generation anti-aircraft missiles and 30 missile launchers of 1981 type.¹¹

The new five-year plan is a clear sign that the Japanese army will be equipped with up-to-date combat hardware, for the most part offensive in character, that will significantly increase the combat potential of the Self-Defence Forces. Assessing the military buildup programme for the following five-year period, even the bourgeois Japanese press has to admit that its implementation will turn Japan into a "military power". Japanese analysts focus attention on the "haste" with which the "military potential buildup plan" proposed by the National Defence Agency was endorsed, concluding that the present administration has given top priority to the military buildup programmes.¹²

Despite the high degree of combat readiness of the "self-defence force" and its equipment with entirely up-to-date weaponry, the Japanese brass and some bourgeois political scientists are trying to prove that the present level is still insufficient and insist on the need to take radical measures to buildup and qualitatively strengthen the country's armed forces further.¹³

On February 13, 1981, the Liberal Democrats' council for security problems, consisting mostly of retired officers and generals of the Self-Defence Forces and headed by Shin Kanemaru, former chief of the National Defence Agency, submitted to the Prime Minister a report aimed primarily at demonstrating the weakness of the Japanese armed forces and drawing the Liberal Democrats' attention to the need to strengthen the army. The report lists eight major shortcomings of the "self-defence force", including the weakness of its air defences, its inability to protect shipping lanes and to block the La Pérouse, Tsugaru and Korean Straits. The report concludes by urging the development of an army capable of conducting independently prolonged combat operations, which would require budgetary appropriations to be raised to 2.5 per cent of the GNP.¹⁴

An article prepared by the Japanese strategic research centre which was published in *Gunji mondai kenkyu*, a military theoretical journal, seeks to prove that the "self-defence force" cannot adequately meet the

¹⁰ See *Akahata*, May 3, 1982.

¹¹ See the book *To Intensify Struggle for Peace, Against the War and Fake Administrative Reform*, Fukuoka, 1982, p. 9.

¹² *Asahi Evening News*, July 26, 1982.

¹³ See K. Matimura, "Towards the Military Potential That Would Not Bend in Front of a Military Threat", *Jiyu minshu*, 1980, No. 3, pp. 106-110.

¹⁴ *Japan Times*, February 15, 1981; S. Kanemaru, "Thinking About Defences", *Bungei shunju*, 1978, No. 12, pp. 402-409.

requirements of the present international situation. The authors calculate and substantiate the numbers they regard as adequate for the Japanese armed forces until the late 1980s. They believe it necessary to boost the reserve considerably to a strength of 510,000, to raise the number of infantry divisions to 15 and to establish an airborne division. The article urges the reinforcement of field armies, the development of surface-to-surface missile groups and special units to defend sea straits, a two-fold rise in the number of anti-aircraft missile battalions, and an increase in the number of anti-submarine destroyers to 90 and combat aircraft to 500.¹⁵

Most of bourgeois military experts in Japan make deliberately negative appraisals of the combat capability of the "self-defence force". Foreign experts show more restraint in their conclusions, citing the positive aspects of those forces along with their shortcomings. They believe, for instance, that the Japanese fleet is a "modern navy capable of efficiently performing anti-submarine and mine-sweeping operations in Japanese coastal waters",¹⁶ that Japanese destroyers equipped with missile launchers and torpedoes are comparable with US ships of that class and that the Japanese mine-sweeper fleet is "among the most modern in the world".¹⁷

Former US Defence Secretary Harold Brown in a report to Congress on the fiscal 1982 military budget also gave a favourable appraisal of the Japanese "self-defence force". "With new encouragement from the United States, Japan has slowly begun developing a more significant defence establishment. Today, Japan's maritime Self-Defence Force has more convoy escorts, naval aircraft and mine-sweepers than the US Seventh Fleet, and the Air Self-Defence Force has more tactical aircraft than the US Fifth Air Force".¹⁸

According to US expert on defence George Loria, the Japanese navy is among the most professional and, in certain respects, most proficient navies in the world, having the best equipment for mining operations.¹⁹

Many foreign sources point out that the "self-defence force" is a sufficiently strong army with modern weaponry, the sixth most powerful among major capitalist powers in terms of combat ability.

ESCALATION OF MILITARY SPENDING

Military spending, which keeps growing from one year to the next, as is characteristic of any capitalist state, constitutes the material basis of the military buildup in Japan. Japanese military appropriations have in fact doubled every five years since 1960.

In December 1976 the Cabinet, trying to reassure public opinion and the opposition, which responded keenly to major rises in military spending, undertook the decision to limit spending on defence to one per cent of the GNP. This limit was observed throughout the 1960s and 1970s, although the budget grew by roughly 6-8 per cent, or 100 billion yen annually, as a result of the corresponding growth of the GNP. The fiscal 1982 military budget, fixed at the level of 0.93 per cent of the GNP, amounted to 2,500 billion yen, making Japan seventh in the world in direct military spending.

¹⁵ See *Gunji mondai kenkyu*, 1981, No. 4, pp. 124-145.

¹⁶ See *Japan's Contribution to Military Stability in Northeast Asia*, p. 34.

¹⁷ See *Far Eastern Economic Review*, Vol. 107, 1980, No. 11, p. 23.

¹⁸ *Department of Defence Annual Report for FY 1982*, p. 86.

¹⁹ See *Far Eastern Economic Review*, Vol. 107, 1980, No. 11, p. 23.

Despite the relatively large sums in absolute terms appropriated by Japan as direct military spending, over the past two years the US Administration has stepped up allround pressure on Tokyo to force it to steeply elevate its military spending to three per cent of the GNP, the level of the NATO states. Pressured by the US, Japan again agreed to boost spending on the armed forces by 6.5 per cent in fiscal 1983, beginning in April.²⁰ The fiscal 1982 report by the US Defence Secretary stressed that Japan with its economy and "proven technological performance, simply must do more to meet defence needs at home to help compensate for the intensive and expensive US effort in Southwest Asia, on Japan's behalf as well as our own".²¹

The official amount of the military budget, however, does not reflect Japan's real outlays for military purposes. If the amount is calculated according to NATO's formula, i. e., including pensions to retired officers and generals and benefits for the dependents of deceased servicemen, it would rise to 1.5 per cent of the GNP, or \$17.4 billion, which is close to the amount spent by Britain and France for military purposes. Moreover, these figures do not include covert military spending, such as appropriations for space research and other research and development (R&D) work with military application financed by civilian agencies.

Japanese experts have estimated, however, that should outlays on armaments remain at the present-day level, Japan will spend on modernising its Self-Defence Forces roughly \$20 billion in 1977 prices (more than 4 trillion yen) within the next ten years, while the projected budget of the sixth defence plan for 1983-1987 will be 16.4 trillion yen.²² The National Defence Agency has estimated that under the sixth defence plan military spending will rise to 1.02 per cent of the GNP as early as 1984.

MILITARY R&D AS A FACTOR ENCOURAGING MILITARY PRODUCTION

The plans of the Japanese military buildup attach much importance to the growth of the military industry, and during the past few years the National Defence Agency has noticeably revised the role and importance of military research and development centres as a factor encouraging military production and the modernisation of the armed forces.

The Agency's R&D programmes are closely tied in with long-term programmes of military production, supervised by the Defence Production Committee under the Federation of Economic Organisations (Keidanren). In December 1978 the Committee adopted a decision to develop overall research and development on weaponry, including elevating the level of research on major weapons to bring it to that in West European countries and the United States and hike appropriations on military R&D to 5 per cent. At present the Agency spends on military-oriented research a little more than one per cent of its budget, whereas the figure for the US in 1979 was 10.6 per cent, for Britain 13.6 per cent, for France 12 per cent and for the FRG 5 per cent.²³

Today the National Defence Agency contracts out work to more than 2,200 companies producing war hardware. However, 10 major Japanese firms account for over 80 per cent of military orders, with the Mitsubishi Jukoguo corporation holding one third of them.²⁴

²⁰ See *Japan Times*, July 13, 1982.

²¹ *Department of Defence Annual Report for FY 1982*, pp. VI-VII.

²² See *Asahi Evening News*, July 26, 1982.

²³ See *1980 Yearbook of the Self-Defence Forces*, p. 481 (in Japanese).

²⁴ See *1981 Yearbook of the Self-Defence Forces*, p. 503.

Military R&D programmes lay special emphasis on the development of weapons and military hardware which will meet the technical standards of advanced capitalist countries. The Agency's five research centres are working on laser weapons, an armoured personnel carrier outfitted with a 30-mm machine gun and anti-tank missiles, and a new depth charge, KIX, intended for blocking major straits around Japan. A new tank is being developed which, for reasons of standardisation, is planned to be equipped with the same 120-mm smooth bore gun mounted on the American XM-1 tank. Plans are also being made to produce domestically equipment to counter radio-electronic jamming and surface-to-air missiles to fight low-flying targets.²⁵

A long-term plan includes measures to encourage scientific and technical cooperation and exchanges of know-how with the United States under a 1962 bilateral agreement. In particular, Japan will receive the blueprints and specifications from the US of a new supersonic aircraft with increased manoeuvrability in order to develop, on the basis of a Japanese training plane, the FX light fighter, which will have excellent manoeuvrability, a short takeoff and landing run and will be capable of reaching the M-2 speed. Altogether 3,415 billion yen has been appropriated for this project.²⁶

The stepping up of military R&D is an integral part of the overall military buildup course of the Japanese leaders. They view more efficient research and development work as a major way to expand the military industry and raise the share of military orders, currently at 0.4 per cent, in the total volume of industrial production, and to implement a programme of arming the "self-defence force" entirely with domestically produced technology.²⁷

JAPAN'S INTEGRATION INTO US GLOBAL MILITARY STRATEGY

The United States views the Japanese Islands as a forward base for a strike unit of its armed forces and attaches steadily growing importance in the Pentagon's strategy in Asia and the Pacific to Japan's increasing military potential. At present there are 119 bases in Japan, at which 46,000 officers and men are stationed. Japan spends more than \$1 billion a year to maintain US bases.²⁸

Having tied Japan to its Pacific policy, the US Administration tries to provide itself with effective means for influencing Japan's military buildup. The integration of the "self-defence force" into US military strategy and the involvement of Japan into joint planning of military operations constitute an effective control method.

A wide range of activities are being carried out under the Guidelines for Japan-US Defence Cooperation (1978) to involve the Self-Defence Force in US Pacific strategy on a larger scale:

- drawing up joint combat operations, including plans for blockading the La Pérouse, Tsugaru and Korean Straits;²⁹
- increasing the number of joint exercises and manoeuvres (altogether about 50 major naval exercises lasting from one day to a fortnight

²⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 481-483.

²⁶ See *1979 Yearbook of the Self-Defence Forces*, p. 453.

²⁷ See K. Tomiyama, "Condition of the Defence Industry of Japan", *Nihon keizai kenkyu sen ta kaiho*, Tokyo, 1980, No. 380, pp. 47-53.

²⁸ See *The 1980 White Book on Defence*, p. 299.

²⁹ See *Department of Defence Annual Report for FY 1982*, p. 87.

were conducted between 1970 and 1982);³⁰ eleven joint airforce exercises were held during fiscal 1979 alone;³¹ in 1980 and 1982 the naval wing of the Self-Defence Forces for the first time participated in the multi-lateral naval manoeuvres Rimpac-80 and Rimpac-82 thousands of miles away from the Japanese coast;

- collecting and exchanging intelligence on the activities of Soviet armed forces between Japan and the United States;³²

- using by Japanese naval vessels, including submarines, the US Loran-C system to accurately establish the coordinates of detected Soviet ships; Japanese military experts point out that the use of that system, intended to pinpoint targets for missiles of US strike atomic submarines, by the Japanese Self-Defence Force is indisputable proof of their close integration with the US armed forces;³³

- standardising weaponry;

- exchanging military technology; on the eve of Nakasone's visit to Washington the Japanese government violated the existing ban on exports of military technology and decided to make high technology available to the Pentagon, including microcomputers, high precision integral circuitry, microwave transmitters and other equipment which, according to Japanese specialists, can be used in the guidance systems of US ICBMs;

- establishing emergency coordination centres, which will actually function as joint command centres, and the joint use of military bases and facilities on Japanese territory.

The adoption by Japan of new military commitments in May 1981, under which the range of operations of the Self-Defence Forces will be extended to 1,000 miles off the Japanese coast, and also the agreement reached in the autumn of 1982 on the deployment of 48 US F-16 fighter-bombers and the so-called servicing personnel at the Japanese Misawa air base are viewed as another step toward extending military and political cooperation with the US, which makes Japan an active supporter of anti-communist imperialist strategy on the world scene.

MILITARIST BRAINWASHING OF THE JAPANESE

The Japanese leaders believe that public opinion should be bent ideologically to support government measures in military policy and security guarantees. Speaking at the National Press Club in Washington on May 8, 1981, the then Prime Minister D. Suzuki said that, to put the military buildup plans into effect, it was necessary for the Japanese people to understand and support their leaders. "Remembering this," he emphasised, "the government of Japan does its best to help our people to understand important aspects of defence problems."³⁴

The government is actively aided by numerous revanchist and militarist organisations whose ranks are more than 1.5 million strong. In their programmes the largest of them, such as the Japanese Federation of Former Servicemen, the All-Japanese Federation of the Societies of the Retired Military, the Japanese Society of War Invalids and so on, call

³⁰ See *Political and Economic Problems, 1980*, Tokyo, 1980, p. 157.

³¹ See *The 1980 White Book on Defence*, pp. 282-283.

³² See *For Disarmament and Neutrality Precisely Today*, Tokyo, 1980, p. 88.

³³ *Ibidem*.

³⁴ *Japan Times*, May 9, 1981.

for a revision of the Constitution, for a rearming of Japan and for a popularisation of the ideas of militarism.³⁵

Nationwide discussions and parliamentary debates on the country's military policy problems that at times have caused bitter clashes between the ruling Conservatives and the opposition dealt in the past few years primarily with furnishing the legal foundations for rearmament and the expediency of Japan's military option, under the pretext of a much exaggerated growing Soviet military presence in the Far East.

Despite the government measures, Japan's militarisation plans are vigorously rebuffed. A wave of popular protests was triggered in the spring of 1981 by the sinking of the Japanese *Nissho maru* dry-cargo ship by the US nuclear-powered *George Washington* submarine and former US ambassador to Tokyo Edwin Reischauer's admission that Japan and the US have an agreement allowing US warships carrying nuclear weapons to repeatedly enter Japanese ports. The ambassador's pronouncement was confirmed by the *Akahata* newspaper, which in a series of articles, informed its readers that nuclear weapon-carrying ships have entered Japanese ports 80 times in the period from 1974 to 1980.³⁶

A *Mainichi* newspaper public opinion poll conducted on June 18-20, 1981, showed that more than half of those polled supported the three nuclear-free principles, 37 per cent were in favour of forcing the United States to recognise that entry of US ships carrying nuclear missile systems into and their passage through Japanese territorial waters were in violation of US commitment not to bring strategic weaponry into the country; 56 per cent gave a definite "no" to the nuclear arming of Japan.³⁷

In the spring and autumn of 1982 Japan was swept by the most powerful wave of anti-war actions in the last 15 years. They started in Hiroshima on March 22 and developed on May 23 and August 5 into grandiose demonstrations for precluding the danger of the outbreak of a thermonuclear war and against the government's reactionary militarist course, aimed at abrogating Article 9 of the Constitution. The demonstrations were also directed against the Pentagon's intentions to deploy cruise missiles in the Far East and the government-approved plans to station two squadrons of F-16 "Falcon" fighter-bombers carrying nuclear weapons at the Misawa airbase in the northeastern section of the island of Honshu.

In the late 1970s and early 1980s war preparations were noticeably expanded in Japan due to US imperialism's aggressive global course and also the growing nationalistic and revanchist tendencies in the country.

The implementation of the current and long-term military buildup programmes is accompanied by a considerable growth of spending. The 1 per cent of the GNP limit on the military spending, established in 1976, is supposed to be exceeded in the next few years and may even reach 2 per cent of the GNP by the late 1980s. This will mean that Japan's military appropriations will amount to \$25-30 billion, thus

³⁵ See *Right-wing Organisations Reference Book. The Social Problems Research Society*, Tokyo, 1970, p. 275.

³⁶ See *Akahata*, May 31, June 5 and 8, 1981.

³⁷ See *Mainichi Shimbun*, June 20, 1981.

making it second after the US among the capitalist powers, outstripping West Germany and nuclear powers, such as Great Britain and France.

Exceeding the 1 per cent of the GNP limit in military spending will allow Japan, even without revising the existing Constitution, to emerge as a leading military power by the late 1980s, which will bring a tangible destabilising element in the alignment of the military and political forces in Asia and the Pacific.

Japan's stepped up war preparations which, according to local analysts, are likely to be further accelerated under the Nakasone government, cause anxiety not only among the Soviet people. Southeast Asian nations view them as directly jeopardising peace and the security of their countries; they resolutely oppose the rearmament of the Japanese army.

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RECENT PRC MEASURES TO DECENTRALIZE FARM MANAGEMENT DISCUSSED

Moscow FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS in English No 2, Apr-Jun 83 pp 72-81

[Article by L. A. Volkova, candidate of economic sciences: "Changing Trends in Organization of Economic Management in Rural China at the Beginning of the 1980's"]

Socio-economic transformations in the agrarian sector in countries with a predominantly rural population are fraught with considerable difficulties. In China, this process, complicated by a number of objective and subjective factors, did not always run along the path of progressive development.

The forms of organisation of production in the Chinese countryside since the proclamation of the people's republic have undergone a number of changes. The creation of the collective farming sector and its establishment on a countrywide scale in the mid-1950s marked a radical change in the socio-economic structure of the Chinese countryside. Economic units were sharply enlarged at the end of the 1950s, and this was accompanied by high-degree socialisation of the means of production and even household utensils, by the predominance of mass campaigns in the organisation of production and in equal distribution, although no economic, material or technical conditions had been created for that.

The process of the breakup of economic units at the beginning of the 1960s ended in most of the areas of the country in the setting up of production teams, uniting 30-40 peasant households, as "the main self-supporting units".

During the "cultural revolution" at the end of the 1960s, as in the years of the "big leap", new attempts were made to alter the structure of economic organisation in the countryside. But the scale and scope of enlargement of collective farms at that time were not so all-embracing as in 1958. The tendency to strengthen centralisation of economic management and the "big leap" methods of farming again picked up momentum in the mid-1970s.

Since the end of the 1970s, especially since the Third Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China in December 1978, the process of reducing the size of economic units and changing the form of organisation of production with the view to enhancing the economic role of individual peasant households began to gain strength.

Changes in the different aspects of rural policy were wrought as part of the present Chinese leadership's economic course of using "diverse forms of ownership and economic structures in the country".¹ Insofar as the rural areas were concerned, it was considered expedient, bearing in mind the big variety of their economic and natural conditions, not to adhere to one and only form of farming.²

¹ *Shijie jingji daobao*, Dec. 7, 1981.

² *Hongqi*, 1981, No. 19, p. 17.

In the initial phase after the Third CC CPC Plenary Meeting the organisational and economic changes were confined to decentralisation of management in the communes and teams: the size of the main self-supporting units, made up chiefly of production teams, was reduced and their number increased.³ They make up now nearly 99 per cent of the main self-supporting units. Their structure in 1979 was characterised by the following data:

Total number of self-supporting units	5,065,821	100%
Of which		
communes	54	0,01 %
big production teams	51,767	1,02 %
production teams	5,014,000	98,97 %

Measures were taken to invest production teams with elementary economic rights and a certain amount of economic independence. From 1979 to 1982 the number of the main self-supporting units increased by almost 20 per cent, from 5 to 6 million.⁴

At the same time wider use was made of the different forms of production responsibility, and in 1980-1982 it became the main element of the organisational and economic changes in the countryside.

The system of production responsibility represents a sum total of methods and forms of organisation of labour, production, and distribution of incomes within a collective farm.

Production responsibility may be used in different branches of the economy, for different kinds of jobs. It may be placed on one person, a group or a family, which frequently operates as a household. The methods of distribution and the forms of remuneration of the members of communes are also included in the system of production responsibility. The latter is thus a very wide concept uniting the scale, methods and forms of organisation of production, i. e., directly characterising the parameters of the economic structure in the countryside. Its content in 1980-1982 was not constant, since some forms of responsibility or other predominated. The decision on some questions of speeding up the development of agriculture, adopted by the CC CPC Fourth Plenary Meeting in October 1979, and the Project, adopted by the Third Plenary Meeting of the CC CPC recommended wider use of such forms of production responsibility as calculation of labour units on the basis of work quotas, assignment of tasks to groups, but on the condition that the farm is run as a single unit and the incomes are distributed in the team; remuneration of labour according to the volume of production, and payment of bonuses for the overfulfilment of production plans. At the same time it was forbidden to assign production tasks to households and to divide fields for individual cultivation.⁵ An exception was made for some districts specialising in the production of by-products, for remote mountain districts and the districts with poor communications. The CC CPC document on the further consolidation and perfection of the system of production responsibility in agriculture (dated September 1980 and also called *CC CPC Document No. 75*) recommended to assign tasks to households only in poor districts.⁶

³ *Zhongguo nongye nianjian*, Peking, 1980, p. 6.

⁴ *Nongye jingji wenti*, 1981, No. 12, p. 29; *Honqi*, 1982, No. 16, p. 47.

⁵ *Renmin ribao*, Oct. 6, 1979.

⁶ *Renmin ribao*, March 2, 1981.

Different Forms of Production Responsibility in Agriculture
(in per cent of total of main self-supporting units)

Forms of Production Responsibility	Jan. 1980	Dec. 1980	June 1981	Oct. 1981	Oct. 1982
1. Providing for collective farming	83.7	75.9	63.2	49.0	Over 16
Of which:					
Contracts for different kinds of work with remuneration on the basis of work quotas	55.7	39.0	27.2	16.5	—
Specialised contract	—	4.7	7.8	5.9	—
Assignment of tasks to groups	24.9	23.6	13.8	10.8	—
Assignment of tasks to individuals	3.1	8.6	14.4	15.8	—
2. Allowing individual farming	1.046	14.9	28.2	48.8	74
Of which:					
Partial assignment of tasks to households	0.026	0.5	—	3.7	—
Assignment of tasks to households	1.0	9.4	16.9	7.1	—
Households' full responsibility for production	0.02	5.0	11.3	38.0	—
Total	84.7	90.8	91.4	97.8	Over 90

Sources: Jingji xue zhoubao, Jan. 11, 1982; Renmin ribao, Oct. 5, 1982.

The forms of production responsibility prevailing in 1979-1980 were those employed within the framework of a single collective farm. They provided for closer interdependence of the results of peasants' labour and its remuneration: assignment of tasks to groups for the duration of this or that farm work and extension of the scale and improvement of the practice of establishing work quotas. By the end of 1980 these forms of production responsibility had covered more than 60 per cent of the production teams in the country (see Table).

A whole number of other forms of production responsibility were used in the Chinese countryside in 1980-1982, and they could be divided into three main categories: specialised contract, assignment of production tasks to individuals within the framework of collective farming in a production team, and assignment of production tasks to a peasant household with it being fully responsible for production. The first two forms—specialised contract and assignment of production tasks to individuals—are being carried out along with the preservation of collective farming within the framework of production teams. The third—assignment of production tasks to a peasant household with it being fully responsible for production—allows individual farming.

The Chinese press stresses the existence of a great many forms of production responsibility in the concrete conditions of the countryside. The same forms may be called differently in different districts, while different forms may be called the same.

The form of specialised responsibility for production, or specialised contract, is practised in the subsidiary branches of the farm, in combination with remuneration on the basis of work quotas in the main branch. The tasks of producing by-products are assigned to specialised groups which

are set up in the teams and communes engaged in multibranch farming. This form of responsibility is used where the collective farm is strongly established. About 8 per cent of the production teams used this form of responsibility in mid-1981, and roughly 6 per cent at the end of that year. In a number of provinces the percentage of teams using the specialised contract and receiving remuneration in accordance with the results of production was considerably higher: 45 in Heilongjiang, 41.4 in Jilin, 24.5 in Liaoning, 18 in Hunan, 17.4 in Shenxi, and 15 per cent in Shanxi and the Guangxi-Zhuang Autonomous District.⁷

In 1982 the form of specialised contract was extended also to the households specialising in the output of this or that farm produce, most often in animal production. Thus, according to incomplete data there were 560,000 households specialising in cattle fattening in Shandong, Liaoning, Heilongjiang, Shanxi, Gansu and some other provinces in mid-1982. Where the level of specialisation and the ratio of commodity output to the total output is relatively low, there is a form of transition to specialised households—households concentrating on the priority development of this or that branch. In mid-1982 their number exceeded 1,770,000.⁸

The number of specialised households is increasing fast. For instance, in the Dongnan District of the Shanxi Province there were slightly over 16,000 specialised households of both types at the beginning of 1982 and in August their number was already in excess of 130,000 (a more than eightfold increase), or over 14 per cent of the total number of households in the district.⁹ Specialised households become that either because they are contracted by the collective farm to take care of this or that branch of production, or because they have become better specialised in domestic by-work.

The second main form of production responsibility—assignment of production tasks to individuals within the framework of collective farming in a production team—was used for a number of years in the cultivation of industrial crops. In 1979-1981 the Chinese began to use it to grow cereal crops, too. Here is how it goes. The job of ploughing is done by a production team, while that of cultivating and harvesting the crops is entrusted to a member of the team. His remuneration depends on the volume of output: if the plan is overfulfilled he gets a bonus, if it is not fulfilled he is fined. The basic means of production are disposed of by the team.

According to the figures available in mid-1981, this form of responsibility was used by more than 15 per cent of the production teams. In the following provinces the figures were: 53 per cent in Henan, 47 in Hebei, 30 in Shandong, 25 in Shanxi, and 21 in Hubei.¹⁰

In assigning tasks to households, the production team entrusts them with all the field work and the output of a definite amount of produce. The volume of output secured in the team's contract with the peasant household depends on the area of the land put at the disposal of the household. The peasant family's work units are calculated on the basis of the established volume of production. The household is also given farm implements and other means of production that formally remain collective property. In a number of districts peasants have the right to buy them from the team. Farm output in the volume established by the contract must

⁷ *Nongye jingji wenti*, 1981, No. 9, p. 16.

⁸ *Jingji yanjiu*, 1982, No. 10, p. 16.

⁹ *Renmin ribao*, Aug. 21, 1982.

¹⁰ *Nongcun gongzuo tongxun*, 1981, No. 8, p. 11.

be turned over to the team and is subject to a definite form of distribution. Everything produced over and above the plan goes to the household. If the plan is not fulfilled, the family is fined.

The household's total responsibility for production envisages, as in the preceding instance, placing land and implements of production at its disposal. The arable land is given to the household for a certain period: in some districts it is three years, in others it is five. The peasant family organises production, promising to deliver a certain amount of produce to the state as tax and supplies and to contribute to the team's fund. The remaining part of output is kept by the household. This form of farming, it has been noted in the Chinese press, follows the principle: "Guarantee the delivery of output to the state, leave the due amount to the collective, and the rest belongs to you."¹¹

Assignment of production tasks to households is by no means a new form of organisation of production in the Chinese countryside. It was used in a number of districts in 1957, 1962 and 1964,¹² while in some places it was retained until the mid-1970s.

At the end of 1981 more than 45 per cent of the production teams¹³ used the form of assigning production tasks to households and making them fully responsible for production, and nearly 49 per cent of the teams got partially assigned tasks to households. There was a sharp increase in the use of these two forms of production responsibility in 1981-1982. In December 1980, for instance, 6 per cent of the production teams made use of the households' total responsibility for production, and at the end of 1981 it was already 38 per cent. In the first half of 1981 the assignment of tasks to households was the prerogative of nearly 17 per cent of the teams as against 9.4 per cent at the end of 1980; towards the end of the year the sphere of this form of responsibility decreased to less than half—to 7.1 per cent of the teams, i. e., the peasants preferred full responsibility for production.

In August-September 1982 these two forms of production responsibility were already practised in 74 per cent of the country's production teams,¹⁴ with the household's full responsibility for production still prevailing.

The percentage of production teams using these two forms of production responsibility topped 80 per cent in the provinces of Anhui, Guizhou and Gansu at the end of 1981, and 85 per cent in Guangdong Province in mid-1982.¹⁵

It was noted in official Chinese documents that it was above all in distressed areas, where the level of production and peasants' incomes are low and collective farming is on the verge of collapse, that peasant households should be assigned production tasks and be held fully responsible for production.

The state of affairs on these farms have been described in the press thus: "Food grain came from the state, production was made possible by credits, and life was kept going thanks to the state's assistance."¹⁶

But, as press reports show, these forms of production responsibility became widespread also in the districts where collective farming secures

¹¹ *Renmin ribao*, Sept. 1, 1981.

¹² *Lectures on the System of Production Responsibility in Agriculture*, Peking, 1981, p. 27 (in Chinese).

¹³ *Nongye jingji wenti*, 1981, No. 12, p. 29.

¹⁴ *Renmin ribao*, Aug. 22 and Oct. 5, 1982.

¹⁵ *Nongye jingji wenti*, 1981, No. 12, p. 29; *Jingji guanli*, 1982, No. 1, p. 64; *Renmin ribao*, May 28, 1982.

¹⁶ *Renmin ribao*, Sept. 1, 1981.

relatively high incomes for their members, and at the farms of the middle category which account for about half the production teams.¹⁷

In some districts different forms of production responsibility are used even within the framework of one farm. For instance, in growing grain responsibility is placed on the individual, in growing cotton the production task is given to a group, and in collective pig farming use is made of the specialised contract. In growing and harvesting medicinal herbs the production task is made the responsibility of the household, in collective fishery full responsibility is borne by the household.¹⁸ This undoubtedly helps to take fuller account of the concrete conditions, but at the same time complicates administrative work.

The wide use of forms of production responsibility allowing individual farming (74 per cent of all the production teams) shows that the positions of collective farming have definitely become weaker.

The process of the isolation of peasant households which have been made fully responsible for production, is gaining momentum. A substantial part of the means of production (excluding land) is becoming the property of peasant families because they have been bought from the collective farm or simply distributed among households. Sometimes they are bought by peasants themselves. In Anhui Province, for instance, individual peasants or clusters of households jointly bought more than 40,000 tractors in 1981 which now constitute a third of the province's tractor fleet. In Guangdong Province the peasants bought over 30,000 tractors which account for about 20 per cent of its tractor fleet.¹⁹

The peasant farms cultivating the land allotted to them with their own machinery maintain but formal ties with collective farming.

At the same time, official documents underscore the immutability of collective ownership of land and other basic means of production, as well as long-term application of different forms of production responsibility, including those envisaging individual use of the basic means of production.²⁰ The Chinese press adheres to the idea that "the single form of farming" exerted one of the biggest negative effects on the development of agriculture.²¹

The materials of the 12th CPC Congress, which took place in September 1982, urged encouragement of the development of individual farming, and its existence was no longer confined to mountain and poor districts.²²

What is the explanation for the rapid spread of the system of production responsibility in the countryside, above all of its individual forms? It is explained first and foremost by the possibility of increasing production and the peasants' incomes, the simplicity and clarity of the forms of organisation of labour and remuneration, and the diminution of the number and role of the groups mediating in production and distribution.

The Chinese press is unanimous in assessing the possibilities of increasing farm output by using different forms of production responsibility. It has been said, for instance, that in some places the assignment of production tasks to peasant households, or making them responsible for production, allows to increase output by 30 per cent and sometimes even by 100-200 per cent, and that labour productivity doubles and even increases

¹⁷ *Renmin ribao*, Nov. 5, 1980.

¹⁸ *Zhongguo nongmin bao*, April 25, 1982.

¹⁹ *Jingji guanli*, 1982, No. 1, p. 64.

²⁰ *Renmin ribao*, April 6, 1982.

²¹ *Honqi*, 1982, No. 10, p. 34.

²² *Renmin ribao*, Sept. 8, 1982.

six- and sevenfold.²³ This is achieved thanks to the peasant's heightened interest in the results of his labour, further intensification of labour and greater thoroughness, for in this particular case remuneration depends directly on a person's efforts and not on the state of affairs at the collective farm.

The Chinese press attributes certain improvement of the situation in agriculture in recent years to the use of different forms of production responsibility. It is pointed out that the rate of growth of production of certain crops in 1979-1981 topped the average annual rates of growth in 1952-1978: by 2.4 per cent in gross farm output, by nearly 9 per cent in cotton, and 10 per cent in sugar plants. The press also speaks of the growth of labour productivity: the cost of one farmer's produce increased in 1978-1981 by 10.3 per cent.²⁴ It should be borne in mind, however, that the increase of output and the growth of labour productivity in the conditions of individual forms of production responsibility are of temporary character, for they are based on the so far unused potentialities of small-scale production.

The use of diverse forms of production responsibility, and particularly the specialised contract, allows to increase the ratio of commodity output to the total output. The *Jingji yanjiu* journal said, for instance, that in some districts and in the case of specialised contracts it rose to 50-60 per cent and at times to 70-80 per cent in 1981. Figures for Hebei, Shandong, Liaoning and five other provinces showed that commodity produce of the households specialising in fattening pigs exceeded 70 per cent.²⁵

When a contract is given to households specialising in some particular production, it is possible to reduce to the minimum the expenditure of state funds and collective farm money on it. For instance, the cost of building a sty for 1,000 pigs in the suburbs of Shenyang is estimated at 300,000 yuan. In 1981, in one of the communes of the Sujiatun District, near Shenyang, 800 specialised households sold the state 5,000 pigs and built sties to fatten a similar number of pigs. The state and the collective farm spent practically nothing for that purpose.²⁶

The specialised contract, and it also extends to specialised households, is particularly widespread and ensures the best economic indices in suburban districts.

The different forms of production responsibility allow somewhat to increase peasants' incomes both from the collective farm and from household husbandry. Thus, in a number of districts where the households were assigned production tasks and made fully responsible for production, the incomes of 30 per cent of the members of the communes grew rather fast, 40-50 per cent showed signs of becoming well-to-do, and 15-20 per cent of the households continued to experience difficulties. The overall annual income of a member of the commune in 1980 was 191 yuan,²⁷ and only 45 per cent of it was accounted for by the collective farm.²⁸ According to sample surveys, his income in 1981 was 223 yuan, though it is difficult to compare the data on incomes in 1980 and 1981 on account of their difference (in 1981 the figures are those of sample surveys). Meanwhile, as an analysis of the data for different communes and teams shows, peasants'

²³ *Honqi*, 1981, No. 19, p. 23; No. 17, p. 15.

²⁴ *Renmin ribao*, Aug. 22, 1982.

²⁵ *Jingji yanjiu*, 1982, No. 10, p. 16.

²⁶ *Ibidem*.

²⁷ *Renmin ribao*, March 9, 1982; Dec. 1, 1982.

²⁸ Calculated on the basis of the figures in *Renmin ribao* of April 30, 1981, and Dec. 1, 1982.

incomes in 1981 grew not only because of the increase of output, but also on account of other factors, notably higher state purchase prices, lower deductions to public funds and, in a number of instances, their division.²⁹ In 1981, thanks to the increase of purchase prices and the volume of production, the peasants' incomes grew by 19.8 billion yuan. Compared with 1979, the income of each member of the commune grew by 24 yuan. In the future, the Chinese press stresses, the peasants' incomes will not grow as a result of the increase of purchase prices, but will rise thanks to the development of production, lower production costs and higher labour productivity.³⁰

The Chinese press writes of the decline in the number of the poor teams experiencing economic difficulties. In these production teams the per capita income from the collective farm is 50 yuan a year and less.³¹ In 1981 the number of such teams dropped by more than 250,000,³² compared to 1980. Nevertheless, their number is still very high.

Economic reorganisation in the Chinese countryside, linked with the introduction of different forms of production responsibility, has not yet been completed. Developments show that it is helping to resolve a number of problems and at the same time poses new problems and frequently aggravates the existing ones.

The individual forms of production responsibility—assignment of production tasks to the households and also their being fully responsible for production, etc.—that now predominate, also have negative aspects from the point of view of development of farm production. For instance, they complicate work that requires the efforts of several collectives, such as building irrigation and other facilities and combating natural calamities, and create problems in the use of machinery, upkeep of socialised cattle, etc. Further, they reduce the possibilities available directly to regulate farm production and economic processes in the countryside, and complicate planning. The state finds it more difficult to get farm produce from the countryside, though market trade becomes more lively.

As the journal *Honqi* has admitted, in some districts peasants ignore the state plan and arbitrarily increase the area sown with more expensive industrial crops at the expense of grain, and seek to sell farm produce and by-products on the rural markets at high prices, irrespective of whether or not they have fulfilled the plan of deliveries to the state. Some peasants do not contribute to the collective funds, do not want to take part in public works, and do not want to help the families of fallen servicemen, families living on "five allowances" and families experiencing difficulties.³³

There is a whole number of organisational issues that impair the positive aspects of production responsibility. In the conditions of the individual form of responsibility, and particularly in the case of specialised households, it becomes more difficult to sell produce and ensure supplies of means of production. The system of contracts regulating the relations of households, collective farms and the state organisations concerned has not yet been elaborated and the contracts are not always fulfilled by the sides, and this leads to unproductive expenses.

The widespread use in the rural areas of the system of assigning pro-

²⁹ *Gongshe caiwu*, No. 1, 1982.

³⁰ *Honqi*, 1982, No. 21, p. 47.

³¹ The subsistence minimum in the countryside is 70-90 yuan a year. See *Nongye jingji wenti*, 1980, No. 7, p. 43; No. 10, p. 13.

³² *Renmin ribao*, Aug. 21, 1982.

³³ *Honqi*, 1982, No. 8, p. 37.

duction responsibility to households is fraught with the danger of aggravating social problems, for the position of the families provided for by the collective or receiving any assistance from it grows worse, and the gap in the families' incomes becomes wider. While in the past the six- to ten-fold difference in the level of incomes was considered big, today it is tens of times greater. A distinctive feature in the distribution of incomes in 1981 was the wide gap between top and bottom incomes: "In the case of some, the average annual income was 500 and even 1,000 yuan", in some families the aggregate annual income reached 15,000 yuan, while in others it was only a few tens of yuan.³⁴

The system of responsibility engenders also new conflicts, linked with the struggle for better land plots, water, agricultural machinery, implements, etc.

The introduction of different forms of production responsibility sharply posed the question of redundant manpower in agriculture. In some districts it exceeds 30 per cent of all rural manpower and sometimes reaches 45 per cent.³⁵

A peasant family's greater economic independence as a result of the spread of individual forms of responsibility for production reduces the possibilities of birth control in the countryside.

Because of the weakness of the economic position of most collective farms and their managers, the spontaneous spread of this form of responsibility leads to a rapid growth of private-ownership tendencies in the countryside. In some districts the top echelons of production teams are "fully or half paralysed" and no one bears responsibility for many kinds of jobs.³⁶

There have been instances of growing profiteering on the rural markets, peasants frequently do not fulfil their contracts with production teams, they sell or rent land (in a number of places the peasants looked upon the allotment of land for their use as its return to the former owners with all the consequences ensuing therefrom), they sell or hire out some of the means of production that are collective property, etc. These processes have tended to gain momentum.

Especially widespread is profiteering in land plots. Land is sold by the leaders of teams and communes to enterprises and institutions, as a rule in suburban areas, it is sold to peasants, and by peasants to peasants.³⁷ Fairly often peasants use the plot they receive to build dwellings. In this connection, the State Council issued an instruction concerning wilful seizure of plots of land in the countryside to build housing. The new Constitution of the People's Republic of China stresses that land used for dwellings and household plots, and plots in the mountain areas in personal use, are collective property, and organisations or individuals are not allowed to appropriate, buy sell or rent land.³⁸

The Theses of the All-China Conference on Work in the Countryside, circulated throughout the country at the beginning of 1982, give collective farms the right to take land back from households if they violate the rules for using it. They stress the need of using all the stocks of land in the possession of collective farms as provided for by a single plan.

The Chinese press has said that the form of full household-by-household responsibility for production cannot be invariable. The ideas of col-

³⁴ *Renmin ribao*, May 18 and June 8, 1982.

³⁵ *Nongye jingji wenti*, 1981, No. 11, p. 9; No. 12, p. 11.

³⁶ *Renmin ribao*, April 6, 1982.

³⁷ *Renmin ribao*, May 13, 1982; *Zhongguo nongmin bao*, April 22, 1982.

³⁸ *Renmin ribao*, April 28, 1982.

GREATER MILITANCY IN JAPANESE TRADE UNIONS CALLED FOR

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[Article by I. I. Tamginskiy: "The Japanese Labor Movement"]

Japan's working class is the country's most progressive and best organised force. It is the prime motive force of social, scientific and technological progress. It leads the broad masses of the country in the struggle against imperialism and reaction, and has a profound influence on all aspects of Japan's material and cultural life.

Japanese society today is a product of social and economic changes which took place as a result of political struggles of Japan's working class against monopoly capital, against militarism old and new, for a democratic and peaceful Japan.

It is important to note that these changes took place against the background of a revolution in science and technology which left its imprint on the working-class movement, its forms and methods of struggle.

The rapid development of Japanese industry brought about major shifts in the working-class structure and a redistribution of the work force. An agrarian crisis drove enormous masses of peasants, mainly young men and women, to the cities, into industrial enterprises, construction sites and the services sector. Between 1961 and 1971 alone the total number of workers and other employees grew from 24.2 million, to 33.8 million, while their share in the non-agricultural work force went up from 51.3 per cent in 1960 to 66.1 per cent¹.

From 1955 to 1975 the total strength of the working class almost doubled, reaching a figure of 32.5 million or 70.2 per cent of the economically active population,² thereby becoming the largest social class in Japan today.

The growing share of hired labour has been brought about not only by an inflow of labour from the village but also by the fact that large numbers of urban dwellers and petty bourgeoisie joined this category. However, as before the industrial proletariat continues to be the backbone of Japan's working class, accounting for nearly one-half of its total strength (15.24 million or 39.6 per cent of all workers).³

A salient feature of the working-class structure is a considerable growth in the number of wage-earning women. During the 20 years between 1955 and 1975 their absolute number increased by 2.4 times, reaching almost 12 million.⁴ The cheap labour of women is broadly employed in all industries. Its share is particularly large in the services sector, commerce, finances and insurance business.

The scientific and technological revolution has sparked a heavy demand for young workers. Many large firms and enterprises readily employ young men and women with secondary education. For example,

¹ See *The Report on the Inspection of Trade Unions*, Tokyo, 1972, p. 14 (in Japanese).

² See H. Arabori, *A Study of Japanese Trade Unions*, Tokyo, 1981, p. 34 (in Japanese).

³ See *Japan's Labour Yearbook*, Tokyo, 1975, p. 83 (in Japanese).

⁴ See *Labour Statistics Review*, Tokyo, 1980, p. 26 (in Japanese).

workers above 50 years of age account for only a 7-10 per cent share of the total number of workers, while in 1970 young men and women between 15 and 30 years of age accounted for more than 53 per cent of all workers and other employees in the country.⁵

Large sections of Japan's working class are employed in the circulation sphere (upwards of 12 million) and the services sector (upwards of 4 million people).

The growth of the working class has both positive and negative consequences. On the one hand, it has broadened the horizons and extended the skills of the modern proletariat, consolidating its positions in the struggle against monopoly capital and the ruling class as a whole. According to H. Arabori, a prominent figure in the Communist Party of Japan, "the entry of proletarianised white-collar workers and technical specialists into the ranks of the working class will positively affect the development of the trade union movement. The movement itself in its turn will increasingly influence broad popular masses, forging new links with them and contributing to the creation of a broad united front of the people".⁶

At the same time it must be admitted that the dilution of the working class with intellectuals mostly hailing from petty-bourgeois strata is bound to create new problems for the working-class movement. Central among them is the struggle against the growing influence of petty-bourgeois ideology on the working class along with the need to work for stronger unity of its individual sections on the basis of common class interests, the need to raise ideological and political awareness and class solidarity in the struggle against trade unionism, and the need to put forward political slogans of struggle, etc.

A prominent feature of Japan's economy is its dual character, with modern industrial giants on one extreme and a vast number of medium-sized, small and very small enterprises on the other. In 1978 big industrial enterprises run by monopoly capital employed 4.57 million (16.8 per cent) workers, whereas small businesses and an assortment of manufacturing industries employed more than two-thirds of the country's hired workers accounting for one half of the total output in manufacturing.⁷

The great number of small-scale businesses not only slows down the introduction of scientific and technological advances but also hinders the development of organised working-class movement. Workers and other employees at small and medium-sized enterprises are the most exploited and the least remunerated part of the working class. As a rule, they are unorganised and unable to stand up to big monopolies.

Changes in the sphere of material production and the swelling of the ranks of Japan's proletariat have not however eased the degree of its exploitation. Japan's monopolies use scientific and technological advances to run a veritable sweat shop. They cleverly adapt the mechanism of capitalist exploitation to new conditions. Japan has adopted a broad range of measures designed to help state-monopoly capitalism to extract superprofits at the expense of the increasing exploitation of workers.

Streamlining production, Japan's monopolies have not forgotten about rationalisation of labour, which only means lay-offs, more compact work-

⁵ See *Japan's Labour Yearbook*, Tokyo, 1972, p. 64 (in Japanese).

⁶ H. Arabori, *Op. cit.*, p. 42.

⁷ See V. N. Khlynov, *The Working Class Under the Scientific and Technological Revolution*, Moscow, 1978, p. 25 (in Russian).

ing day and lower wages. Both the rationalisation of production and the rationalisation of labour were carried out in a manner designed to increase the rate of profit and the surplus value appropriated by the monopolies.

A typical feature of the capitalist rationalisation of production and labour in Japan is the combination of the most up-to-date forms of exploitation borrowed from US big business and old Japanese methods based on seniority, and life-long association with the same employer, along with the use of seasonal and part-time workers. Japan's peculiar dual system of industrial production with its cruel exploitation of the workers at medium, small and the smallest enterprises is also a typical feature of exploitation of labour in Japan.

Long hours of intensive work result in the growing number of industrial accidents which take as their toll one human life every three hours. The official unemployment figure of over a million has become a familiar item in the press.

It should be pointed out that official unemployment statistics include only those who have not put in a single hour of work during the period under review. Official unemployment figures do not include many categories of those who work a few days or even hours a week, sacked by the employers for various reasons and men above 55 or 60 who have gone on pension but are forced to look for work to maintain a decent standard of living. The plight of women is even less enviable. Many of them are unable to find a job after finishing school or college and have to be supported by their working parents. Only a fraction of them is counted as officially unemployed. Japanese statistics completely ignore approximately 36 per cent of married women who have expressed the desire to find permanent employment.

Officially the employment rate in Japan is cited at between 2 and 2.5 per cent, while private economic research institutions put the figure at 4 and more per cent and the trade unions consider that hidden unemployment reaches 8 per cent. This means that the actual number of unemployed Japanese is somewhere between 4 and 5 million.

A characteristic feature of economic management in Japan is the fact that the country's ruling quarters and monopolies are unconcerned about the reproduction of labour. The level of social security and public health services is rather low. The Japanese economist Tsujioka wrote that "the rationalisation of production under way in Japan is based on extremely cruel principles and the methods of its implementation are no less cruel".⁸

The rapid pace of industrial growth throughout the 1960s resulted in a concentration of enormous wealth in the hands of the monopolies on the one hand and widespread poverty among the people on the other. Between 1960 and 1970, the gross national product increased four-fold, while profits of large enterprises soared 4.5 times.⁹

Japan's monopolies make windfall profits, amassing enormous wealth. In 1979 835 companies posted profits 24.4 per cent higher than in the preceding year. This high rate of accumulation became possible as a result of mass lay-offs under the pretext of cutting management costs as well as of the streamlining of personnel, which actually means laying off middle-aged and old workers, the growing intensification of labour and

⁸ S. Tsujioka, *Modern Rationalisation*, Tokyo, 1969, p. 88 (in Japanese).

⁹ See H. Arabori, *Op. cit.*, p. 23.

other devices of shifting the burden of the economic crisis onto the working people. All this is accompanied by wage restraints.

With skyrocketing prices (64 per cent during the last decade) real wages lagged far behind consumer prices. According to the *Akahata* newspaper, in 1980 alone real wages fell by 1.3 per cent.¹⁰

Under the pretext of higher costs for oil and other raw materials, monopoly capital arbitrarily raised prices of manufactured goods, while the monopoly-controlled government did its utmost to adapt tax policies favourable to big corporations, boost arms spending, cut social spending, raise fares on state-owned railways, hike prices of communal services, rice and other staple foods. According to the estimates of Japanese economists, labour costs in Japan account for nearly 10 per cent of total sales whereas in Europe and the USA the figure is between 30 and 40 per cent. If we take into account that taxes per capita increased four-fold over the last 10 years we may conclude that Japan's working class hardly benefited from the scientific and technological revolution.

Japan's workers are clearly among the most underprivileged in the capitalist world. For example, in 1973 social security spending in Japan per capita was \$52.3 or 4.4 times less than in Great Britain, almost 5 times less than in the USA, 7 times less than in France, 6.4 times less than in West Germany and 8.3 times less than in Switzerland.¹¹

If we add here the environmental pollution which has attained catastrophic proportions in Japan, the mounting number of industrial accidents and occupational diseases, chronic fatigue of workers from overwork, poor housing, overcrowded municipal transport, poor water supply, outdated sewage and water treatment facilities, lack or poor quality of cultural amenities, then we can conclude that the claims of the Japanese press about the exclusively Japanese capitalist road of development and a welfare state with prosperous life for all are nothing but a pack of lies. Exposing the theory of the welfare state, the *Keizai* journal wrote that this policy has led to an unprecedented enrichment of monopoly capital, having fabulously increased its profits and greatly extended the scale of production. To the working class and people at large, in contrast, it has brought only insignificant improvement in the standard of living which was largely offset by poverty, exorbitant prices, deteriorating economic crisis and other social problems which pose a threat to the health and the very survival of the people".¹²

The conclusion is that the rapid pace of industrial growth which has brought about considerable changes in Japan's society has failed to resolve the central contradiction of capitalist society—that between the social character of production and the private character of appropriating its fruits. Only slightly improving the conditions for the reproduction of hired labour, the scientific and technological revolution has sharpened the antagonism between labour and capital.

Refusing to resign itself to its present plight Japan's working class is waging a resolute struggle against monopoly oppression. Japan's entire postwar history is full of vehement class struggles. The powerful postwar upsurge of the working class and democratic movement was a product of not only objective factors stemming from the difficulties which beset the country after its unconditional surrender but also of the fact that the

¹⁰ See *Akahata*, Sept. 24, 1982.

¹¹ See *The White Paper on Environmental Pollution*, Tokyo, 1972, p. 1 (in Japanese).

¹² *Keizai*, 1972, No. 11, p. 9.

working-class and trade union movement was led by the Communist Party of Japan which drew up a realistic programme of struggle for the political and economic rights of the working class against the onslaught of capital on workers' vital interests.

Together with the Socialist party the Communist party succeeded in rallying broad popular masses, involving other political forces in the struggle and organising joint actions with them against local and American reaction, for the country's democratisation and demilitarisation, for progress toward peace and social advancement.

Problems of the working-class movement have always figured prominently on the CPJ's agenda. The party's Seventh Congress (1958) made a major contribution to the elaboration of problems relating to the trade union movement. The congress carried out an indepth analysis of the state of the working-class movement and defined the tasks of the Communists at this decisive sector of party work. The Seventh Congress put forward concrete tasks in the struggle for raising the living standard of the working class and all working people. It called on all Communists to advance the cause of unity and cohesion of the entire working class, forging links between the working class and peasantry and creating a united national democratic front which will rally round it all working people and all progressives.¹³

The CPJ Programme adopted at its Eighth Congress stressed that in the process of struggle for a new, democratic Japan, the CPJ creates, broadens and consolidates mass organisations of various popular strata, first and foremost trade unions and peasant unions; jointly with them it creates a united national democratic front which under the leadership of the working class on the basis of an alliance between workers and peasants rallies around it all urban working people, intellectuals, women, youth, students, medium- and small-scale entrepreneurs and all those who love peace and the motherland and defend democracy.¹⁴

The CPJ's views on the trade union movement have been most exhaustively defined in the decisions of the Sixth Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee which took place in March 1966. The document entitled *For Continuing Development of the Trade Union Movement in the Name of a Class Unity of the Workers' Front*¹⁵ pointed out that the main factors slowing down its development are the pressure of capitalist monopolies and the government which had launched a broad ideological and economic attack on the working class. The plenary meeting set the following task: to repel the attacks of the ruling class, to disrupt its efforts to split and weaken the trade union movement and to gain control over it.

At the same time the plenary meeting pointed to a number of weaknesses inherent in the working-class movement. For example, it noted that a situation when certain trade unions and national centres coerce their members to support certain political parties economically, politically and organisationally was intolerable. The plenary meeting stressed that this only slows down the growth of trade union movement on a class footing and hampers the political awareness of the working class.

The plenary meeting also pointed out to another weakness of the trade union movement—the organisation of Japan's trade unions on an enter-

¹³ *The Seventh Congress of the CPJ*, Tokyo, July 23-August 1, 1958. Moscow, 1959, p. 37 (in Russian).

¹⁴ *The Eighth Congress of the CPJ*, Moscow, 1961, p. 239 (in Russian).

¹⁵ See *Akahata*, March 6, 1978.

prise and company basis which confines trade union activities to individual enterprises, hinders the education of workers in the spirit of proletarian solidarity, and hampers the establishment of branch unions.

The Sixth Plenary Meeting also underlined the importance of finding the right combination of economic and political action—a key problem of the proletariat's class struggle tactics. When workers and their unions put forward economic demands, they gain the support of the Communist Party since this struggle is aimed at securing the vital interests of the workers. The Communist Party does everything to make this fight for the satisfying of demand universal. Only then will the popular struggle for better living conditions grow into a political struggle against the ruling class.

Questions of trade union movement and its growing unity on a class foundation also featured prominently at subsequent congresses and plenary meetings of the party. As before the CPJ feels that it is absolutely essential for the trade union movement to renounce the patronage principle (support for a definite political party) since this kind of linkage is a violation of trade union democracy depriving the membership of the right to pursue freely political activities.

The CPJ maintains that political parties' organisations at the enterprise level should cooperate with the trade unions, refraining from imposing their own policy on them. The trade unions and political parties should build their cooperation on the basis of mutual respect. Every trade union member should be free to pursue political activities and to support political parties of his choice. This, the CPJ feels, should be the fundamental principle of trade union democracy. The renunciation of the patronage principle and freedom for trade union members to support any political party of their choice along with proper cooperation and alliance between the political parties and the trade unions, as the resolution of the Twelfth CPJ Congress (November 1973) stresses, are essential for ridding the trade union movement of sectarianism making the trade unions an appendage of social democratic parties; it is also a prerequisite for reinstating the trade unions as organisations of solidarity of the working class front.¹⁶

Guided by this important directive of the Twelfth Congress, Japan's Communists explain the errors of the country's social democracy in trade union movement matters to the masses showing the inadmissibility of support for centrist parties which are incapable of properly defending the workers' interests.

The Twelfth CPJ Congress set the task of creating party organisations in all Japanese enterprises which will be effectual in consolidating and extending the network of existing factory organisations and fitting the void left by enterprises which have no party members or *Akahata* readers. The congress also called for improving the political education work of factory staffs to raise the workers' class consciousness.

The powerful upsurge of the trade union movement, new social conditions and aggravation of social antagonisms force the ruling classes to look for new approaches to the working class and for vulnerable spots in its ranks which could be used to split it and thus to weaken the progressive forces seeking to undermine the foundations of capitalist society.

¹⁶ *Main Documents of the Twelfth Congress of the Communist Party of Japan*, Tokyo, 1973, p. 227.

The ruling classes use all available means for this purpose, first and foremost its powerful propaganda machinery. Japanese bourgeois propaganda typically employs sentimental appeals which fan old myth about the chosenness of the Japanese nation. Japanese workers are told that their conscientious work is indispensable for their company's success and that the company's prosperity means prosperity for the workers themselves. Much is made of the argument that the larger the company's profits the greater its capacity to raise wages and to give more benefits to workers. Japan's factories frequently display such appeals as "Raise labour productivity!", "Not a minute of idling!", "Make your firm's products the most competitive in the world!", "Make Japan a welfare society!"

In trying to clear the way for rapprochement with the working class and convince it of the need for collaboration between labour and capital, the ruling Liberal Democratic Party seeks to discredit Marxist-Leninist ideology and to reduce the influence of the Communist Party. Radio, television, the film industry and other media which are at the service of Japan's monopolies are systematically brainwashing the working people in the spirit of praise for the capitalist way of life, bourgeois freedoms and hostility toward the socialist countries. Intimidating the population at large with the so-called "Soviet threat", Japan's bourgeois propaganda machine distorts the peaceloving foreign policy of the USSR, spreading lies about the condition of the working people in the Soviet Union and trying to depict socialism as a totalitarian system depriving workers of elementary human rights.

At the same time the ruling classes use the power of the state with its institutions, including parliament, to stem the tide of the working-class movement and to rupture it with all sorts of legislative measures. In league with big business, the government tries to isolate industrial action by workers united in the militant trade unions. Back in 1948 a special government decree deprived workers and other employees of government-owned and municipal enterprises and offices (more than three million people) of the right to strike under the pretext that they are civil servants. When workers and other employees of government-owned railways, teachers, communications and postal workers, workers of tobacco and salt processing factories go on strike or join the "spring offensive" the authorities immediately react with threats of reprisal. Trade union activists are the hardest hit by reprisals: they are either dismissed, or fined, or deprived of fringe benefits and bonuses.

The ruling elite has plans to reorganise the workers' movement on a right-wing reformist basis, on a basis of collaboration between labour and capital. Every time the LDP government is plagued with troubles or is incapable of coping with mounting discontent by its own efforts, it is helped out by right-wing reformist parties and organisations which use social demagoguery and all sorts of hollow promises to keep the working class from taking mass action and to keep it on the trade unionist bandwagon.

When monopoly capital ran up against the particularly strong opposition of the workers' and revolutionary movement in Japan, there emerged a right-wing reformist Party of Democratic Socialism; it was set up in 1961 on the basis of the right wing of Japan's Socialist Party. The Komeito Party (Party of Pure Politics), which was founded in 1964, has been actively assisting the ruling quarters to keep "social order" in the country ever since. Posing as a champion of the most backward section of Japan's workers, petty bourgeoisie and certain urban strata, Komeito is actually an ally of the Liberal Democratic Party, diverting broad po-

pular masses from active struggle against capitalist oppression. Their anti-communist ideology has turned these parties into an instrument of US and Japanese reaction striving to split the workers' movement and weaken the democratic forces.

Sharpening class antagonisms and the activities of right-wing reformist forces in the workers' movement have resulted in a differentiation among trade union leaders of social-democratic orientation. In 1964 right-wing elements set up the Confederation of Japanese Trade Unions (Domei)—a trade union centre which espoused an ideology of class collaboration and anti-communism. Domei's membership totals 2 million workers and other employees of industries most advanced technologically which are mainly export oriented. This well-paid section of Japan's working class is in a privileged position in comparison with the rest of the workers. Their wages are two and sometimes three times those of workers of other enterprises. Domei's leaders support the Party of Democratic Socialism in its subversive activities within left-wing trade unions, trying to impose on them a right-wing reformist ideology.

The International Metalworkers Confederation—Japan Council, or simply JC,¹⁷ established in 1964 with the assistance of US trade union leaders and the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions, occupies a position even further to the right. JC has ambitious plans of creating a national trade union centre which would bring together all branches of the metal-working and engineering industries along AFL-CIO lines. JC would like to lead the Japanese unions away from political struggle in favour of purely economic industrial action. Like Domei, JC is active in disruptive activities in Sohyo, the country's largest national trade union centre, and the Council of Neutral Trade Unions (Churitsu roren), trying to make them abandon their class stand. The main target of the right-wing trade union leadership is the General Council of Japanese Trade Unions (Sohyo) whose militant anti-monopolist stance combines with economic and political struggle.

Created largely on the basis of Left-wing trade unions, which at one time were part of the Congress of Industrial Trade Unions, Sambetsu kaigi (influenced by the CPJ) the General Council of Japanese Trade Unions boasts a membership of 4,550,000. Over the last 30 years it has been very active in mobilising the working class in an anti-monopoly movement, for better living conditions, and has invariably played a part in a broad cross-section of political initiatives.

Sohyo played a particularly important role in the movement against the signing of the Japan-US "security treaty" and for the country's development along a road of peace and neutrality. It invariably takes part in campaigns against the country's militarisation, for the defence of the constitution and for peaceful development. Sohyo is one of the main organisers of yearly "spring offensives" of the country's working people which back up economic demands with political slogans.

Sohyo would be even stronger if it were not for the fact that its membership consists mainly of workers and employees of government and municipal organisations and enterprises and that it maintains weak links with workers in the key industries.

Of late the right-wing reformist leaders stepped up their schismatic activities under the cover of a slogan calling for a united workers' front allegedly designed to pool trade unions efforts in the struggle against monopoly capital. The drive to reorganise the trade unions' structure on a

¹⁷ International Metalworkers Federation—Japan Council, abbr. IMF-JC or JC.

reformist basis was launched in the summer of 1972 on the initiative of trade unions of private enterprises. At the time the leadership of the Japanese Federation of Trade Unions of Textile Industry Workers (Zensen domei), which was associated with Domei and the leadership of the National Federation of the Trade Unions of Metal Industry Workers (Tekko roren) associated with Sohyo, launched an appeal to create in the early 1980s a united workers' front headed by the trade unions of private capitalist enterprises. September 1980 saw the creation of a council for the acceleration of the front's creation which included representatives from six branch unions—automotive, electrical and electronic, iron and steel, textile, power stations and communications. With the firm support of Domei, these trade unions established a Society for the Promotion of a Workers' Front Unity (Rodo sensen roitsu sekushin-kai) which over the last two years has been busy organising a new national trade union centre on the basis of private enterprises' trade unions. Its organisers expect that the new trade union centre will be joined by workers of government and municipal organisations and ultimately by other trade unions presently associated with Sohyo and Churitsu roren.

On June 3, 1980 the Society published a document entitled "A Basic Theory for the Workers' Front Unity" which reflected the views of the right-wing reformist faction of the trade union movement in Japan. The document called for confining trade union activities purely to economic struggle. The document's authors lashed out against the trade unions which refused to abandon their class stand and association with the Communist Party. Attempts to push the workers' front to the right were accompanied by new waves of anti-communist propaganda and stirring up of right-wing trade union leaders' activities. For example, former Chairman of Domei who is now the General Secretary of the National Federation of the Metalworkers Union, Amaike Seiji, openly called for a break in relations between so-called democratic trade unions and those influenced by communists. Speaking at a congress of the electrotechnical industry union he said: "Trade unionism means the democratic workers' movement opposed to the communist movement". "We must", he went on to say, "actively reorganise political forces. As one of the components of this important task we must promote the cause of the united workers' front."¹⁸ Amaike also demanded that opposition to communism should be made the cornerstone of the planned trade union amalgamation. Later he added that the Basic Theory was not explicit enough on the need to oppose communism.

Under pressure from right-wing reformist leaders some of the unions associated with Sohyo began a gradual withdrawal from their anti-monopolist positions, sliding back to the opportunist line. Important evidence of this shift to the right is provided by repeated statements of Sohyo's leaders about the need to cooperate with the right-wing trade union centre Domei practically on its terms. Sohyo's 60th Extraordinary Congress (1980) noted the desirability of working "toward an agreement" on the conditions for working-class unity put forward by Domei and recognition of such demands as the reorganisation of unions on a trade unionist basis and association with the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions.

However Sohyo's right-wing leader's desire to organise the working-class movement on a reformist basis ran into serious opposition by the centre's rank and file. Sohyo's two extraordinary congresses which took place in 1981 and 1982 failed to define the final stance of the centre on the united front owing to sharp differences between its right and left wings.

¹⁸ *Zenei*, 1979, No. 8, p. 24.

The congresses showed that the branch unions associated with Sohyo had different views of the objectives to be pursued by the united trade union movement and ways of attaining them: some unconditionally supported the Basic Theory, others rejected it equally outright as an expression of right-wing deviationism, with still a third group demanding that the theory be amended.

The attempt of Sohyo's right-wing leadership to come up with a compromise which would enable the trade unions that agreed with the Basic Theory to take part in the proceedings of a committee preparing the establishment of a united workers' front also ran into opposition of left-wing elements of the centre.

Countering the plans of the right-wing reformist leaders, left-wing trade unions put forward the idea of creating a united national trade union centre on a class foundation. (Kaikuteki nashanaru senta). The idea was supported by the 15th Congress of the CPJ (1980). The congress resolution noted that the creation of a united front should by no means be reduced to the creation of a larger organisation by means of mechanical amalgamation of several trade unions centres. The real objective should be to make the trade union movement operating under conditions of state monopoly capitalism capable of taking on a strong and well organised enemy. Further, only an all-Japan trade union centre with a clear-cut class platform could give a rebuff to monopoly capital and its government. The CPJ felt that only such a trade union amalgamation could consistently protect the economic and political interests of the working class. The resolution of the 15th CPJ Congress underlined that, more specifically, the task was to create such a trade union centre, on the basis of correct class and democratic principles, which could lead the joint trade union struggle on a nationwide basis and to channel it into the desired direction.

Class-based Councils for the Promotion of United Workers' Front (Toitsu Rosokon) are viewed as the first step toward creating a national centre. The councils are called to organise a broad discussion of matters related to the establishment of a new centre. For this purpose circles (kon-dankai) including representatives of trade union, public and political organisations, scientists and other competent persons are to be created both centrally and locally. Such circles are already in existence not only in branch unions but also in local self-government organisations, among teachers and workers of other trades. The councils have been given the task of intensifying their activity first and foremost in the trade unions of large private companies and in the government workers and government-owned enterprises' trade unions (Korokyo), which are the main target of a mass propaganda campaign launched by right-wing elements. The councils are convened to give special attention to the need of involving unorganised workers in the trade union movement, for they are a major reserve of the movement's future growth.

Presently the membership of Rosokon and its regional trade union associates totals 1.5 million people. It incorporates 18 branch unions, including 4 associated with the Sohyo. The Council for the Promotion of the United Front made public its programme entitled "For Genuine Unity of the Workers' Front" which consists of the following five main objectives: struggle against exploitation and oppression, mass joint action in defence of workers' lives and rights; assertion of the principle of independence from capital and independence from political parties in the trade union movement, vigilant defence of class independence; struggle against admission to trade unions on the basis of anti-communism, and for open

unity; renunciation of a specific international policy line as a precondition and a fight for independent unity; recruitment of unorganised workers to trade unions.

The Council for the Promotion of the United Front is involved in a broad educational effort among the working masses; it exposes schismatic activities of the LDP and right-wing trade unions; it organises mass struggles for a higher standard of living, for a reorganisation of the country's economy on a democratic basis. It actively supports the working people's "spring offensive", opposes the country's militarisation and the Japanese-US "security treaty", it works for a lasting peace on Japanese soil. Numerous rallies adopted resolutions on mass action against growing monopoly rule for a better life for the people, for peace and democracy, for a class-oriented national trade union centre. The Council for the Promotion of the United Front and its member organisations are active in drawing unorganised workers into trade unions. For example, the Osaka branch of the Council conducted a poll of 150,000 unorganised workers which showed that the majority of them were in favour of a united national trade union centre organised on a class footing.

Domei and other right-wing forces view the Council for the Promotion of the United Front as a serious obstacle in the way of their plans. Speaking about the negotiations on the united workers' unity of the front, Domei's Chairman Usami said: "A condition for the creation of the united front is an unambiguous negative stand of the branch trade unions toward the Council for the Promotion of the United Front".¹⁹

Some of the Sohyo leaders followed the example of Domei in accusing the Council of factional and schismatic activities and made it clear that disciplinary measures would be taken against it. At the 1980 congress the right-wing Sohyo leaders got the congress to pass a resolution on the dissolution of Rosokon operating inside trade unions associated with the Sohyo or influenced by it. The leadership of the teachers union also censured its Tokyo branch for joining Rosokon.

The report to the 15th CPJ Congress stressed that the existing national trade union centres are engaged not in satisfying but in restraining workers' demands, not in implementing the great cause of progressive forces but in moving to right-wing positions in politics, not in consolidating the unity of the workers' front but in deepening the schism in its ranks. The report went on to say that the role played by these trade union centres and the functions which they perform are directly opposite to the original role and functions of national trade union centres. The natural right of workers and trade union organisations and the duty of all those who are not indifferent to the choice of a correct path for the trade unions to follow is the right to voice concern about the present state of affairs and to hold debates on the class and democratic nature of national centres. It is their right and duty to choose which national organisation to join and to pass resolutions on the creation of new national centres jointly with other trade unions.²⁰

As for the Sohyo's and Domei's criticism of Rosokon for its allegedly sectarian activities, the resolutions of the 15th CPJ Congress stressed that this sort of criticism is equivalent to a rejection of the workers' and trade unions' natural rights and to a coercion of workers and trade union organisations, who are critical of the anti-communist and anti-renovationist course of the existing national centres, to follow this course.²¹

¹⁹ H. Arabori, *Op. cit.*, p. 94.

²⁰ Akahata, March 9, 1980.

²¹ *Ibidem*.

In attempting to place themselves at the head of the entire trade union movement, social-democratic right-wing leaders decided to create urgently a new trade union amalgamation on the basis of private enterprises' unions which they hope will be soon joined by other trade unions presently adhering to a neutral stand. In December 1982 they announced the creation of the Japanese Council of Trade Unions of Private Enterprises (Zennihon minkan rodo kumiai kyogikai, abbreviated Zenminrokyo).

The amalgamation included 41 trade unions with a total membership of 4,230,000. The backbone of the new amalgamation is made up by 17 trade unions associated with the Confederation of Japanese Trade Unions (Domei), 8 associated with the Council of Neutral Trade Unions (Churitsu roren) and 5 associated with the General Council of Japanese Trade Unions (Sohyo) and 7 independent trade unions. Tateyama Toshifumi, former leader of Churitsu roren, was elected chairman of the new amalgamation and Yamada Seigo, deputy chairman of Textile Workers' Union associated with Domei, was elected its general secretary.

The organisers of the new amalgamation announced that they were planning to win over 12 more branch unions of private enterprises which would make them leaders in the country's trade union movement. It should be pointed out that the trade unions which decided to join Zemminrokyo did not announce their withdrawal from trade union centres to which they were associated earlier, which in effect makes the new trade union amalgamation a consultative organisation coordinating the economic activities of member unions, i. e., their struggle for "better living conditions on the basis of social peace in industry" and harmony between labour and capital.

The new trade union amalgamation announced its intention to form and maintain close relations with the US and West European reformist trade unions. Many observers predict that the new amalgamation will have many internal problems as a result of its incorporation of an assortment of unions with broadly divergent political orientations.

Many unions have already announced their refusal to cooperate with this right-wing reformist centre, accusing it of wanting to shift the country's trade union movement to the right, away from class struggles and towards a policy of opportunism. The Communist Party of Japan was sharply critical of the new organisation because Japanese Communists favour a reorganisation of the country's trade union movement on a class and democratic basis.

Today controversy on the future of the new national trade union centre has become a focal point of the struggle between the CPJ and right-wing social-democrats—the two flanks in the workers' movement. The 15th CPJ Congress resolution spotlights the way for creating a democratic national centre which would be a backbone of the united workers' front. The CPJ sees the creation of a centre as intimately linked with the following three principles. First, independence from capital, to be the cornerstone of trade union activities; second, the principle of freedom of choice in the support of political parties and guaranteeing this freedom to trade union members; and third, the principle of united action of the parties working for renovation. This unity should take the form of joint action on a nationwide and regional scale. The CPJ believes that the national centre should open its doors wide for all workers and all trade union organisations which accept the fundamental three principles. The 15th CPJ Congress noted that the united workers' front can only be created by such a national centre whose activities would be guided by these three principles. The CPJ called for a broad debate on the question of creating a class-oriented de-

mocratic national centre. The debate is to be accompanied by nationwide and local joint actions in support of the workers' economic and political demands. The CPJ feels that such tactics will help draw in a broad mass of workers into the creation of the united workers' front and provide a better understanding by the workers of the true essence of right-wing reformist machinations designed to create their own united workers' front on a trade unionist basis.

The clash of the two opposing trends in the country's development during the last few years has revealed the true essence of right-wing opportunist parties as a force contributing to the perpetuation of the existing system. For example, in such political issues as political campaign donations, the electoral system, "self-defence forces", the "security treaty" and construction of nuclear power stations, Komeito has cleared the road for creating a so-called complementary-supporting coalition, that is effectively sided with the LDP. The Party of Democratic Socialism declared the priority of creating a coalition government with the country's conservatives. Socialist Party of Japan is the target of massive pressure designed to push it towards collaboration with capital. Under the pretext of making the party's policy more "realistic" right-wing officials of the SPJ demand a review of the party policy on many questions of principle, and, allegedly wishing to come to terms with Komeito in the name of a future government coalition with it, work to isolate the Communist Party.

The shifts in the platforms of the parties of Democratic Socialism, Komeito, vacillations of the Socialist Party of Japan and Sohyo only create extra opportunities for the ruling class to lay siege to working people's democratic liberties and vital interests. Proof of this can be found in the attempts of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party to railroad through Parliament a number of reactionary laws on an emergency situation, on increasing military spending, and putting more teeth into the reactionary Japanese-US "security treaty".

The mounting reactionary offensive against the social, political and economic gains of Japan's working people, accompanied by rabid anti-communism and a mud-slinging campaign against the CPJ, aggravated by the schismatic activities of right-wing elements in the working-class movement, weaken the trade union movement and tend to defuse the intensity of the class struggle. This is attested to by the decline in the number of and duration of strikes. Responsibility for the declining militancy of the country's working-class movement lies not only with the Domei, which from its inception has trumpeted the cause of class collaboration, but also with many leaders of Sohyo and Churitsu roren who under the pressure of reactionaries and right-wing reformists are gradually retreating from their class positions and sliding back into the morass of opportunism.

Nevertheless, there is every reason to believe that the trade union movement's shift to the right is a temporary phenomenon. For the monopolies' new onslaught on the working people's living conditions will inevitably provoke new opposition to it, a process illustrated by West European developments. The slide to the right can be prevented by such factors as a continued decline in the standard of living, mounting unemployment, the sharpening of social and class antagonisms and the prolongation of the economic crisis which, if the ruling quarters have their way, will be headed off through increased exploitation of the working class and all working people of the country.

The 16th CPJ Congress held in July 1982 confirmed the willingness of the CPJ for joint action with all democratic parties and groups irrespective of their political affiliation and ideology providing they agree with the slogan of the struggle against the onslaught of reaction, against US imperialism's domination and the continuing rule of Japanese monopoly capital in the country. The Party has launched a broad debate on the character and organisational forms of the future united front, whose strength will be drawn from a powerful well-organised Japanese working class. Together with other progressive forces of the country Japan's Communists are resolved to make the 1980s a decade of progressive reforms, a decade of victories for the united progressive front.

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TRADITIONS IN CHINESE SOCIOPOLITICAL LIFE

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[Article by L. S. Perelomov, doctor of historical sciences, P. M. Kozhin, candidate of historical sciences, and G. F. Saltykov, candidate of historical sciences]

Of late, traditions have been attracting considerably more interest than before both on the academic plane and in purely practical terms. Recent events in many of the Asian and African countries show that the matter is not at all purely scientific and that it has gained great social and political relevance and urgency. As a result, a lively discussion has been touched off on cardinal approaches to the study of traditions in political, sociological, historical and socio-political literature abroad and in the USSR. A good example is the exchange of opinion among prominent Soviet scholars in the journals *Narody Azii i Afriki* and *Sovetskaya etnografiya* in 1980-1982.¹

Referring to the principles governing the relations between the socialist countries in his report, "The Sixtieth Anniversary of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics", delivered at the jubilee meeting of the CC CPSU, the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR on December 21, 1982, Yuri Andropov, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, said, among other things, that if they are to function properly there must be "full respect for the interests, distinctive features and traditions of each country".²

As we see it, this refers in a most immediate way also to the People's Republic of China, where, as we know, traditions play an enormous and highly peculiar role in society, the running of state affairs and in political life.

We might note that Soviet Sinologists have long shown an enduring interest in the Chinese historical heritage. The pioneers of Soviet Sinology, Academicians V. M. Alexeyev and N. I. Konrad, have examined China's cultural heritage in great detail in their many works. Suffice it to recall V. M. Alexeyev's *A Chinese Poem About a Poet. The Stanzas of Si-*

¹ See A. I. Pershitz, "Traditions and the Cultural-Historical Process", *Narody Azii i Afriki*, No. 4, 1981, pp. 69-84; Review of "Key Aspects of the Theory of Cultural Traditions", an article by E. S. Markarian, *Sovetskaya etnografiya*, No. 3, 1981, pp. 45-73; A. D. Litman and E. P. Chelyshev, "The Cultural Heritage of the Eastern Peoples and the Present-Day Ideological Struggle (Summary of a Discussion)", *Narody Azii i Afriki*, No. 5, 1982, pp. 23-32; A. P. Butenko, "A Few Theoretical Points Related to the Transition of Countries With an Undeveloped Economy to Socialism", *Narody Azii i Afriki*, No. 5, 1982, pp. 70-79, and others.

² Y. V. Andropov, *Sixtieth Anniversary of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics*, Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, Moscow, 1982, p. 18.

kong Tu (1916), *The Chinese Folk Picture* (1966). In *Old China* (1958), and *Pu Songling. The Stories of Liao Zhai* (1922, 1973), and N. I. Konrad's *Sun Zi. Treatise on the Art of War* (1950), *West and East. Articles* (1972), and others. Academician S. L. Tikhvinsky has contributed fruitfully to this leading trend in the study of China, producing such capital works as *The History of China and the Present* (1976), *The Reform Movement in China in the Late 19th Century* (1969, 1980), and others. A conspicuous contribution is being made by Academician N. T. Fedorenko. Among the many studies made by this connoisseur of the spiritual culture of the Chinese people, a special place belongs to *Problems Related to the Study of Chinese Literature* (1974) and *Ancient Specimens of Chinese Literature* (1978). "In recent years," wrote Maksim Tank, "N. Fedorenko has in his scholarly and literary works concentrated essentially on two basic and gigantic subjects: East and West, Antiquity and the Present."³ This only emphasises the relevance of the study of traditions at the present stage in Oriental research.

Much space is devoted to the topic of traditions in the many works of M. I. Sladkovsky, Corresponding Member of the USSR Academy of Sciences.⁴

Crowning a long period of Soviet research into Chinese classic literature, L. Z. Eidlin noted that "science is never divorced from its time". It focuses "specific circumstances that make research into past occurrences relevant and topical, those that compel us to devote ever greater attention to traditions, including the literary legacy of old China which can in no way be said to have dissipated itself in the past millennia, much less the past centuries. The swift course of Chinese developments today cannot be understood in isolation from the past, because, swift though they may be, they cannot detach themselves from the past, and close study of Chinese classic literature is essential more and more if we want to penetrate (as we are called upon to do) the essence of what is happening in that vast country peopled by a nation that has created a culture that is many centuries old."⁵

The study of traditions is being constantly discussed at various conferences of Soviet Orientalists, sociologists, historians, and ethnographers.⁶

Discussions related to the origin and functioning of traditions, to the methods of studying and the mechanisms of using them in politics are also under way in the capitalist press and in publications of the developing countries. Special interest is shown in the way traditions affect social and political processes in the developing countries.⁷

Unfailing interest in the role and place of traditions in China's history and culture is shown at countrywide conventions of Soviet Sinologists, at the annual "Society and the State in China" conferences, in monographs

³ *Literaturnaya gazeta*, November 10, 1982, p. 5.

⁴ M. I. Sladkovsky, *The Long Road: Sino-Russian Economic Contacts from Ancient Times to 1917 and China: The Main Problems of Her History, Economy and Ideology* which was published in Russian in Moscow in 1978, and other works by the same author.

⁵ L. Z. Eidlin, "Study of Chinese Classic Literature in the Soviet Union (1971-1981)" in *Narody Azii i Afriki*, No. 5, 1982, p. 169.

⁶ See Y. V. Bromlei, *Current Problems of Ethnography*, Moscow, 1981 (in Russian).

⁷ See the proceedings of the following conferences: Individualism and Wholism: The Confucian and Taoist Philosophical Perspective, York, 1981; Values and Communications in Chinese (Ming Ch'ing) Popular Culture Conference held at the East-West Centre, University of Hawaii, Honolulu, 1981; and the book by B. Holbrook, *Stone Monkey. An Alternative, Chinese-Scientific Reality*, New York, 1981.

and articles.⁸ As rightly noted by O. B. Borisov, "in connection with the tasks facing Soviet Sinology, two points must be made clear:

"First, research into Chinese traditions, China's specificity, which manifest themselves in many of the social, economic and political developments there and in ideological concepts, is certainly useful, even necessary. In its absence it would be impossible to produce any current, much less long-term, prognostication of China's policy;

"second, and this is more important, it is essential to adhere strictly to the Marxist-Leninist method and determine how the general social and economic laws governing the development of human civilisation operate in the specific Chinese environment."⁹

Still, in our view, Soviet theoretical studies of traditions have not gone deep enough into the experience of present-day China, which is of tremendous relevance for any general theory of the study of traditions. On the other hand, the role and importance of traditions in the PRC of the 1980s, which is contending with most intricate social, economic and political problems, have not been studied deeply enough either. What aspects of the methodology of studying traditions in present-day China should in our opinion be looked into first of all?

To begin with, priority should be given to the elaboration of a "general strategy of research into traditions", that is, of the set of theoretical propositions that perform a methodological function and act as principles.

In this contribution, we are above all interested in what we should consider traditions in present-day China. On the face of it, it may seem that the definition of the concept "tradition" would make the job of pinpointing traditional formations and structures in a society an easy one. But there are dozens of such definitions. This complicates the matter considerably. Furthermore, there is a wide abyss between the approach to the traditional heritage by scholars who study the country's present, on the one hand, for they fail to consider the effect of traditions on the country's life, and by those scholars who study Antiquity and the Middle Ages, on the other, for they do not always attach the due importance to the present-day practice and relevance of China's historical heritage.

If we want to work out a valid definition of the concept "tradition" and determine the traditions that function in present-day China, we must first of all refer to Lenin's definition of the concept "cultural heritage".

Lenin, in his works, devoted close attention to questions of tradition and historical heritage, and to their linkage with the present. It may be recalled that Bogdanov, Pletnev and other ideologists of the "theory of proletarian culture" had urged that Pushkin and Tolstoy should be "thrown off the ship of modernity". Coming to grips with them, among others, Lenin laid special stress on the continuity of the cultural tradition. He would not cut off the working class and the peasants from the cultural traditions of preceding eras. On the contrary, he always insisted that studying and using the spiritual culture of the past was an essential condition of success in building the new society. Here is how he put it: "...classes can be abolished only by the dictatorship of that oppressed class... of that class

⁸ See discussion of the proceedings of the 12th "Society and the State in China" conference in *Narody Azii i Afriki*, No. 4, 1981, pp. 170-172; the 2nd USSR Conference of Sinologists in *Far Eastern Affairs*, No. 2, 1982, pp. 183-189 (in Russian), and the following books: L. S. Vasiliev, *Cults, Religions and Traditions in China*, Moscow, 1970; P. M. Kozhin, *Study of Traditions in the PRC*, Moscow, 1982, and B. S. Erasov, *Socio-Cultural Traditions and the Public Consciousness in the Developing Countries of Asia and Africa*, Moscow, 1982 (all in Russian).

⁹ O. B. Borisov, "The Situation in the PRC and Some of the Tasks of Soviet Sinology", *Far Eastern Affairs*, No. 3, 1982, p. 10.

alone which has assimilated all the urban, industrial, big-capitalist culture and has the determination and ability to protect it and to preserve and further develop all its achievements...".¹⁰ And he amplified that to secure the successful development of all Soviet society "... literacy alone will not carry us very far. We must raise culture to a much higher level."¹¹

V. F. Asmus, who has studied Lenin's conception of cultural traditions, showed that Lenin did not confine them to merely the sphere of spiritual culture. "By the word 'tradition,'" Asmus wrote, "people usually and chiefly mean tradition in various fields of just the spiritual or intellectual culture. But for Lenin the concept of tradition was far broader. In that concept he also—even mainly—included the tradition of political action and struggle. For struggle involves methods and means that did not spring up overnight and that are derivatives of methods already found before—in the disparate conditions of a previous time—and that proved successful, suitable and victorious in the analogous struggle of preceding progressive classes and social groups."¹²

Yet Lenin also repeatedly stressed that traditions differ. In the political struggle, he pointed out, the working class of various nationalities should always first of all rely on its own revolutionary traditions. Addressing workers in the United States in 1918, he wrote: "The American people have a revolutionary tradition which has been adopted by the best representatives of the American proletariat, who have repeatedly expressed their complete solidarity with us Bolsheviks. That tradition is the war of liberation against the British in the eighteenth century and the Civil War in the nineteenth century."¹³ He ascribed especially great significance to the combative traditions of the Paris Commune. "A new socialist generation," he wrote, "... picked up the flag which had fallen from the hands of the fighters in the cause of the Commune and bore it boldly and confidently forward...".¹⁴ Referring to the revolutionary tradition of the December 1905 armed uprising, he observed: "Is it not the tradition of just *such* a struggle, the tradition of the December armed uprising, that is at times the only serious means of overcoming anarchist tendencies within the workers' party...".¹⁵

Lenin laid stress on the relevance of traditions in the political life of society, and noted that it was the duty of the progressive forces to thoroughly study revolution and to acquaint the mass of the people with the various forms of struggle and organisation, to implant revolutionary traditions among the people. Here is what he wrote: "... It is just because we cherish this concern for revolutionary traditions that we must vigorously protest against the view that by using one of the slogans of a particular historical period the essential conditions of that period can be restored. It is one thing to preserve the traditions of the revolution, to know how to use them for constant propaganda and agitation ... but quite another thing to repeat a slogan divorced from the sum total of the conditions which gave rise to it and which ensured its success and to apply it to essentially different conditions."¹⁶

This, in a nutshell, was how Lenin conceived the cultural heritage. At

¹⁰ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 29, p. 390.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, Vol. 33, p. 74.

¹² V. F. Asmus, "V. I. Lenin on Questions of Cultural Tradition", *Voprosy filosofii*, No. 4, 1970, pp. 149-150.

¹³ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 28, p. 68.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, Vol. 17, p. 143.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, Vol. 15, p. 61.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, Vol. 13, pp. 39-40.

the base of his view lay continuity, historicism, and the experience of revolutionary traditions.

Western bourgeois sociologists and political scientists are spurred to delve into Chinese traditions by the mounting interest in the relevance of the historical heritage for the contemporary world.

Ever since such studies, devoted to China, began in Europe, attention was focussed on "native traditions". And the initial judgements ultimately became the foundation of the present-day views on the subject, conditioned, as we have come to realise, on the traditional European approach to the study of Chinese society. This approach has had a certain salutary effect, because it acquainted the West with the rich cultural past of the Chinese nation (Confucianism, Buddhism, Taoism, and so on), which exercised a considerable influence on Western spiritual culture. A good example are the works of writer and humanist Hermann Hesse, winner of the 1946 Nobel prize for literature.¹⁷ But, at the same time, the study of traditions reflected the narrow practicality of the respective scholars, who worked in the political and economic interests of the ruling classes of the Western powers.

Applied studies of traditions, centred on specific political purposes in the general framework of political research, predominate as a basic trend in bourgeois Sinology. To be sure, the procedure is two-phased. To begin with, scholars delve into the tradition *per se*, with a stress on the practical realisation of its objectives and aims; also studied (where possible) is the significance of the tradition on the political scene. Then, in the second phase, they suggest the direct or indirect influence that could be exercised on the tradition in question, or the manner of using it for certain specific purposes. One example of this approach to the study of traditions is the research into the ways manual collective labour is organised in China, whose results are thereupon used to influence Chinese farm labourers and Chinese entrepreneurs in the agrarian sector of the economy in the United States and other countries. And, naturally, no small role in the study of these traditions is allotted to the conscientiousness of the Chinese labourer. Later, the study of the life of Chinese communities was centred on finding ways and means of increasing their isolation or self-isolation as ethnically alien immigrant groups. The several centuries of missionary work in China has led to changes in the original meaning of many of the conceptions of Chinese philosophy at the hands of Western missionary scholars in the light of Christian religious dogmas. This is vividly illustrated, among others, in the articles and other writings of Paul K. T. Sih.¹⁸ True, this pragmatic approach to traditions is not the only method.

Two basic trends have surfaced in the study of traditions that function in the People's Republic of China—to arrange traditions as a system, and to establish the principles for determining the periods in PRC state policy towards the functioning traditions.

Studying these approaches, one is bound to see the common methodological faults of the bourgeois historical political research. First of all, there is terminological confusion, the effect of the postulate that all scientific definitions are conditional and that their relation to the real facts is relatively arbitrary. This aspect of the case was examined at great length by Levenson, Cohen and other scholars. It is, indeed, true that the concept "tradition" is applied to determine the condition of the state and so-

¹⁷ See *East-West: Researches, Translations, Publications*, Moscow, 1982, pp. 174-245 (in Russian).

¹⁸ P. K. T. Sih, *Chinese Culture and Christianity*, Taipei, 1957.

ciety in China before the overthrow of the Qing dynasty (the so-called "traditional China"). But it is also often applied to any element of the "cultural" and "historical" heritage, irrespective of the influence and form of influence the element in question exercises on life in the People's Republic of China today. This treatment of the concept "tradition" is, however, far removed from the appropriate definition in ethnology owing to the longstanding estrangement that obtains between the historical and the ethnological branches of knowledge in bourgeois science.

Ethnological research links traditions with the aim-oriented influence on later generations of the sets of emotional, psychic, moral and aesthetic notions, and of habits, skills, production methods, forms of behaviour and communications, and of the views and perceptions of reality typical of an ethnic body of people passed down by education and training from generation to generation, in a specific environment that furthers the consolidation of the given ethno-psychological stereotype in its passive (receptive) and active (creative) forms. In bourgeois politology the components of this definition are associated with only the "lesser traditions", with the traditional forms of daily life, above all those of the village people. But this distinction between "lesser" and "big traditions", that is, socio-political traditions at the level of society as a whole, those of the ruling classes, the elite, the style of government, is, in fact, artificial. It prevents many bourgeois authors from seeing the integrity of the mechanisms that govern the influence, assimilation and spread of ethnic and national traditions, both "lesser" and "big", and thus prevents them from understanding the primordial sources and forms of the traditional Chinese "nationalism" and the specificity of the Chinese national character.

The attempts at arranging into a system the traditions registered and studied by bourgeois scholars show that nowadays only the surface layer of the "big traditions" is being scrutinised, while the "lesser traditions" are registered no more than casually—in the form of particular examples—and may be probed more deeply only through comparison with evidence obtained in massive studies in Taiwan or Hong Kong and through systematic interviewing of emigrants from the PRC.

We suggest that the traditions functioning in present-day China should be classified according to the time of their origin under several wide-ranging heads. And in so doing, the Chunqiu—end of Han (7th century B. C. to 3rd century A. D.) period may be taken as the time when the oldest of the present-day traditions had first come into being.

The typology of traditions, as outlined in literature,¹⁹ is roughly the following:

I. THE TRADITIONS OF ANCIENT CHINA

1) The philosophical and political teachings of Antiquity (Confucianism, Legalism, Taoism).

2) The labour and home traditions of the people. These include diligence, a high degree of manual and technical skill in the handicrafts, deriving from a large mass of production secrets, and the striving to assure the optimum employment of the country's surplus population.

3) Historical traditions. These are determined by the relevance of history as a specific branch of knowledge in the Chinese environment wholly different in role from that of Western historiography. To some extent, considering its moralising, instructive and educational character, and its

¹⁹ Inter alia see P. M. Kozhin, *Op. cit.*, pp. 174-192.

close association with the philosophical teachings, Chinese historiography may be compared to the Western "philosophy of history". But this comparison is not entirely valid either, because of the specific rationalism of Chinese historiography. In Chinese history the relevance of some fact, some concrete example, a specific situation, is usually far greater than that of sweeping abstract generalisations so common in Western philosophical thought. Only the logical and theoretical conclusions drawn from a definite and repetitive historical experience are characterised.

4) The traditions of rural and urban life. This topic is dealt with most assiduously in historico-political and purely political literature because most authors see its immediate link with, first, the development of the Chinese revolutionary movement, second, with the modernisation of the Chinese economy and the "socialisation" of living conditions, and, third, with some of the distinctive features of the structure of present-day Chinese society (organisation of neighbour collectives, the impact of rural traditions on the life of the modern city, and the like).

Three distinct points of view obtain these days on the part played by the Chinese city in the aforesaid processes during the early half of the 20th century. The first, which may be described as standard among Western scholars; has declared the city the centre of change in the socio-political life and structure of Asian countries, China included. The second ascribes the main role to the village, which is the object of the most far-reaching change and where the revolutionary movement was able to develop without much hindrance owing to its remoteness (due to poor communications) from the urban centres. The third point of view distinguishes between the various types of cities, those of the Chinese eastern seaboard, including the "treaty ports", and those of the remote interior, where life retained its traditional, unchanging forms. The more closely scholars study the cities of China, the more clearly the essentially traditional pattern of city life comes to light. The same is doubly true of the studies of rural areas.

5) Popular customs and rites. The question of familial, clan and various other private relationships has regained its former prominence in literature. Attempts are being made to classify and systematise particular informal ties in Chinese society. Authors even try to compare these ties as a system with the studies made along the same lines in Japan, where they are arranged in a rigid and intricate hierarchy, and with those in English-speaking countries, where special significance is attached to corporative ties and friendship.

The studies in China, including those of the 1920s and 1930s, tend to divide particular relationships (in the order of their importance) into those between father and son, between brothers, between teacher and pupil, benefactor and beneficiary, between members of a clan and relatives in a broader sense, between relatives-in-law, sworn brothers, between the chief and his immediate subordinates, natives of the same region or county, colleagues, natives of the same province, and between former schoolmates.²⁰

6) "Chinese nationalism". The topic of "Chinese nationalism" is being raised in various fields of scientific literature on an increasingly large scale. The variety of aspects that associate it with Chinese traditions is also extremely wide. Limits are being fixed that are able to reconcile Sun Yatsen's view that the "nationalist spirit" in China should be revived, maintained and promoted lest the lack of it destroys the nation, with the ele-

²⁰ J. B. Jacobs, *Local Politics in a Rural Chinese Cultural Setting. A Field Study of Mazu Township, Taiwan*, Canberra, 1980.

ments of Sinocentrism, hegemonism and national-chauvinist feeling that have their origins in late Qing policies.

7) China's "political culture". The topic of China's "political culture" is being studied mainly on the socio-psychological plane. Thereby bourgeois scholars sidestep any socio-class analysis of the prevailing processes, and discourse instead upon the effect on the mass consciousness of such notions as "the mandate of Heaven" (in government), the authority of the supreme ruler, and so on. At present, this topic is being studied anew. And we might note in this connection that the observations of Soviet scholars on the significance of rituals in Chinese history is of no small interest: "Chinese ritual had an exceedingly rigid internal structure. The experience of dealing with foreigners, who had other norms of interstate relations, did not affect it in the least. The 'battles over ritual' with foreigners in the course of two centuries led to no visible change in Chinese diplomatic rites. ... The Chinese side either did not see, or preferred not to see, that the 'ritualistic barrier' was doing untold harm to its relations with the rest of the world. Possibly, the Chinese did see and understand its pernicious effects, but could do nothing about it because ritual held too important a place in the then existing scale of values. In any case, it is quite safe to say that the significance ascribed to ritual in the Middle Kingdom appeared quite strange to Western eyes already in the 17th and 18th centuries, and is still looked upon as a curiosity today."²¹

8) The traditions implicit in the language and the hieroglyphic system of writing.

II. WESTERN TRADITIONS AS ASSIMILATED OR AS BEING ASSIMILATED IN CHINA

1) Technical progress, 2) European philosophical systems, 3) The shaping of the fundamentals of modern international relations in line with the standards and procedures of modern international law, which take into account pertinent juridical norms of Western capitalist states, notably those which may (and do) come into collision with conditions in the PRC or with the internal legal norms of China.

III. THE TRADITIONS OF MARXISM-LENINISM AND THE ADVANCED EXPERIENCE OF THE USSR

IV. THE TRADITIONS OF THE PRC, THE CPC, AND THE PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY OF CHINA

All these sub-divisions are dealt with extensively in political and historical literature. But we must not overlook works of a purely academic complexion, devoted to the study of the cultural legacy of past ages, of literary, ethical, artistic, political, social and economic achievements. To be sure, Western studies of no here-and-now political purpose, differ from each other considerably in their approach to the purpose of research and its forms (though in politological research, too, such differences of approach are increasingly common due to the large number of dilettante and journalistic works). The main explanation for this is that the terminology and methods of research are still in a confused state. It is, indeed, quite impossible to find a relatively widely accepted exhaustive definition of the term "tradition" in present-day bourgeois Sinology. The *International Encyclopedia of Social Sciences* (McMillan's, 1968) does not even have an item on traditions. Yet when it was being put out numerous studies already

²¹ *Narodny Azii i Afriki*, No. 5, 1982, p. 184.

existed related to the concept itself and to the interpretation of phenomena seen as specimens of the reproduction by succeeding generations of old-time social and economic processes and the life style in contemporary East and Southeast Asian countries. In most Western dictionaries and lexicological manuals the term "tradition" is still mainly defined as the passing down of literary and religious elements of culture and folklore by oral communication in any ethnic milieu. What makes matters worse, bourgeois research is a captive of each successive fashionable concept of social and political development, with each new approach to the study of traditions involving the use of new methods of research.

The strongest influence on the formulation of research topics in the field of Chinese traditions was exercised by the works of Max Weber, who opposed "rational" to "traditional" society, and by Karl Wittfogel's theory of "hydraulic civilisations". A considerable influence, too, was exercised by the works of Benjamin Schwartz, and especially by the studies of "political culture" launched on a general theoretical plane by Allmond, Verba, Powell and Pye, and carried on with direct reference to China by Richard Solomon. The quick change of attitude to Solomon's *Mao's Revolution and the Chinese Political Culture* (1971),²² and then the change of heart concerning the topic of "political culture" as a whole, is a vivid illustration of the instability of approach and method in bourgeois research.

Owing to this methodological diversity, it is impossible to compare the assessments of various traditions, and much less to arrange them in a single system. This is an obstacle to in-depth study of the historical and cultural processes that occur in the country under the impact of the political reconstruction of the present day. Hence the various attempts at resolving the problems of the present state of traditional phenomena—attempts which are essentially one-sided.

To reach down to the depths of the Chinese identity, which is so considerably determined by traditions, we must know the origins of the traditions and the scale on which they function in China. The main objective reasons for the tenaciousness of the traditional in China may be traced to the more than two-thousand-year history of its statehood and of the politico-philosophical doctrines that provided for the ideologically active functioning of traditions in the state machine, and also in society and the family, and all this on the basis of a stagnant feudal system. That is why traditional norms, notions and values have penetrated so deeply into Chinese culture and the national character of the Chinese, and why, too, in contrast to the political culture of other countries, that of China is so distinctly characterised by the active role in it of the "history-politics" institution.²³ Having grown into a living tradition, the "history-politics" institution is conceived as an organic element of the mechanism of social regulation and government. The most outstanding political figures enriched this institution with new cogent judgements, which were espoused by their associates, contemporaries and descendants. "If we learn to use the ancient authors correctly, if we learn to avoid letting them mislead us, if we manage to have them serve us rather than follow them blindly," wrote Sun Yatsen, "then the writings of the past will yield us much that is of value, and the most ancient ones can be made our secre-

²² See *Modern China in Research Abroad*, Moscow, 1979, (in Russian).

²³ See L. S. Perelomov, *Confucianism and Legalism in China's Political History*, Moscow, 1981, pp. 3-11 (in Russian).

taries; and the more writings we have and the more secretaries of this sort, the better."²⁴

This attitude to traditions and, among others, to the "history-politics" institution, has survived in the PRC. The most persuasive evidence thereof is the current concept of "using Antiquity to serve modernity". In the PRC it has become an important element of the mechanism of government and has undergone the whole range of modifications that have affected the country's political life.

At present, a change is in train in the attitude to traditions and to the use of the aforesaid concept. Prominent PRC historian Ding Weizhi, writes, among other things:

"In substance, there should be no question of whether to inherit or not to inherit the cultural legacy. The question should be, *how* to inherit it. With respect to the development of culture, continuity is indeed an objective and inescapable need. As for how to inherit, people can choose, taking some definite position, using some definite method. We are for national culture, but we are not against Western culture either. It is essential to take guidance in Marxism-Leninism, and to take account of the needs of the socialist period, making the most of the new achievements of modern science in studying our cultural heritage, its criticism and appreciation. Such continuity of the cultural heritage cannot be an obstacle to criticising various forms of bourgeois traditionalism. At the same time, such continuity cannot turn us into tight-fisted admirers of Antiquity who think of nothing but of preserving their heritage. The unquestionably most important thing about the continuity of the cultural heritage is in creating a magnificent future, a heretofore unknown new culture of the socialist era."²⁵ A similar evaluation of the relevance of traditions in contemporary China was set forth in *Guangming ribao*: "The Chinese nation is a great nation, possessing a splendid cultural heritage. If one really loves one's Motherland and people, if one believes in the flowering of the Chinese nation, then, learning the lessons of foreign experience, it is essential to study everything that is beneficial to China, that conforms with the political situation, and to reject everything that is rotten, backward, and harmful to the Chinese people."²⁶

Yet it is admitted in the PRC that negative traditions, too, dating from the feudal period, have survived in the life of Chinese society. An article by Jia Chunfeng, "Look at Socialism From the Angle of the Dialectics of History", says that feudal survivals will continue to exist for a long time and are inevitably influencing the views of people. In so doing, these views may have "a corrupting ideological effect, resulting in their possible penetration of the new system since that system is being built, and also being put into effect, by people."²⁷ Similar ideas are also expressed with regard to other cardinal aspects of community living where survivals of the old society and negative actions are still being registered (corruption, nepotism, bribery, improper attitudes to women, the family, childbirth, superstitions, and the like).

Traditions of all sorts are active in many areas of social and political life in the PRC. It appears that any further study of how they function calls for a more precise definition of the very object of research. We might suggest the following version of such a definition: tradition is an intrinsic

²⁴ Sun Yatsen, *Selected Works*, Moscow, 1964, p. 195 (in Russian).

²⁵ *Renmin ribao*, March 22, 1982.

²⁶ *Guangming ribao*, February 25, 1982.

²⁷ *Hongqi*, No. 21, 1980.

cally conditioned and long-functioning system of ideas, views and actions embracing and penetrating the entire sphere of social relationships which determine all the basic areas of public and private life in the given society by regulating behaviour, activity, and individual and group relationships. It will not be amiss to add that the content of traditions is continuously modified by the course of historical events.

When studying the various spheres of modern Chinese society—the economy, politics, social relations, culture, and ideology—it is first of all necessary to consider the degree to which traditions are active in each of these fields and, second, to take into account the regularities in the effect that traditions exercise on Chinese society as a whole, in order to obtain a more in-depth understanding of how they function. What is needed, in other words, is a comprehensive approach.

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JAPANESE CRITIQUES OF MODERN CAPITALIST SOCIETY CRITICIZED

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[Article by B. V. Pospelov, doctor of historical sciences: "Locked in Theoretical Contradictions; Some Modern Japanese Bourgeois Theories of Historical Development"]

The production slump of the mid-1970s marked the beginning of a new phase in the economic history of Japanese capitalism, having an effect far beyond the economic sphere. The overall phenomena, which had brought on an economic crisis, contributed to the appearance of new features and trends in the evolution of bourgeois social consciousness in Japan.

The character and direction of this process were determined in the 1960s when capitalist enterprise in the country was going through a period of vigorous upswing. It was a time when bourgeois ideologists believed their own prophecies of unlimited economic growth under the capitalist system. In the past, when the bourgeoisie was an ascending class, its ideologists put forward conceptions of historical development that reflected the world outlook of that class. The initial achievements of capitalist enterprise, the industrial revolution, scientific and technological progress had resulted in a bourgeois illusion of unlimited social development on the basis of capitalist production. Identifying its class interests with the interests of the whole of mankind, the bourgeoisie claimed to be the moving force of historical progress and the builder of civilisation.

These views were also shared by bourgeois ideologists in Japan. During periods of economic upsurge, bourgeois socio-political thought strove to prove the essentially unscientific thesis alleging that the capitalist system possesses immanent characteristics that help overcome its internal contradictions and turn it into a moving force of historical progress.

The economic decline of 1973-1974, followed by relative economic stagnation, dealt a blow at these illusions of bourgeois sociologists. Inevitable reality made them look anew at the political and economic institutions of the bourgeois system that revealed once again its hostile attitude to social progress. Japanese bourgeois science was confronted with the task of working out new conceptions of history. It sought interpretations of capitalist reality that would satisfy the class interests of the monopoly bourgeoisie and answer the intellectual quest of broad public opinion thrown into ideological disarray by the economic slump. Bourgeois sociological trends in Japan at the turn of the 1980s presented attempts at understanding the peculiarities of capitalist development and offered new cures for the ailments afflicting the capitalist system. But these attempts were doomed to failure. Relying on unscientific methodology and aiming at the preservation of capitalism, historical conceptions of Japanese bourgeois authors proved unable either to explain

the causes of the crises shaking capitalism or map out ways of historical development for society. This is borne out by analysis of new trends in bourgeois philosophic and historical thought in present-day Japan.

●

Professor Yasusuke Murakami of Tokyo University is forced to admit that "contemporary society is entering a sharp transitional period".¹ This conclusion is arrived at not only as a result of the economic crisis of the 1970s and the accompanying phenomena in the ideological and socio-political life of Japan, but also as a result of observations of the changing historical scene in the whole world; it is a conclusion drawn from the analysis of the very character of developments in the 20th century.

Admission of the crisis of bourgeois social relations and socio-political thought is not infrequent among bourgeois scholars. Unfortunately, such admissions are not followed up by a truly scientific study of the causes of crisis processes. The unscientific methodology adhered to by these authors prevents them from drawing the one correct conclusion that the cause of these processes dwells in the nature of the productive forces and the relations of production underlying the bourgeois social system.

Murakami marks several periods in the development of socio-political and philosophic thought in postwar Japan. Of much importance is the period embracing the end of the 1950s up to the 1970s. It was characterised by a swift economic growth and expansion in all spheres of capitalist activity. The ideology of the time was marked by the emergence of functionalism, different current economic theories, futurology, the ideas of the technological revolution and the omnipotence of science.

The 1970s occupy a special place in Japan's postwar history. This decade saw the end of modernisation whose aim was "to catch up with and surpass economically" the Western countries. According to Murakami, the slogan served as an organisational device in the sphere of bourgeois ideology that was out to justify unrelenting capitalist enterprise.

The author concludes that with the completion of modernisation "a loss of direction and purpose began to be felt" in the development of ideology. In contrast to previous decades, marked by one or several similar trends, many ideological currents and socio-political conceptions, claiming to represent the truth, made their appearance in this period. Competing with one another, disappearing and reappearing, they brought about a situation characterised by "ideological disarray" and confusion.

Let us accept this scheme of Japan's spiritual development as a working hypothesis which reflects the desire of a bourgeois scholar to systematise ideological trends in postwar Japan. Of course, the scheme is far from complete for it fails to show all the aspects of the ideological process occurring in the country. Thus even during the years, in which the economy was expanding and technicist views were spreading most rapidly, giving witness to the stability of bourgeois social relations, a formation of intellectual trends manifested itself, the trends which objectively rejected these relations. This refers, for instance, to contemporary Japanese existentialism as a philosophical trend, engendered by the in-

¹ Yasusuke Murakami, "Towards Critical Historicism", *Tyuo koron*, No. 9, 1979, p. 94 (in Japanese).

creasing alienation of man and deepening mood of anxiety and dissatisfaction among Japan's petty-bourgeois strata during the economic boom. Existentialism projected itself as a conformist and protective trend, yet its appearance was provoked by the complex intellectual structure of Japanese bourgeois society, in the depth of which, despite its achievements, or, rather, thanks to them, was to be encountered a general sensation of despondency and spiritual decline.

But with all that, Murakami's scheme deserves attention as an attempt by a bourgeois scholar to trace the general tendency of development of the ideological situation in the country. His descriptions of the situation are sufficiently apt and expressive: "a loss of direction", "ideological disarray", etc. All of this reflects, according to the Japanese sociologist, the end of the stage of "relative stability" of the highly developed capitalist countries and the beginning of a period of "gradual loss by the social system of the 20th century of its capacity for continued existence".²

The Japanese scholar's digressions into the history of major ideological trends and currents are tantamount to admission of the failure of bourgeois science to explain reality. With all the erroneousness of the initial methodological principles that deprived him of a reliable tool of scientific knowledge, with all the inadequacy of his assessment of the contribution to science of various representatives of bourgeois philosophic and historical thought, Murakami's account clearly shows a certain tendency of its advance—a growing subjective and idealistic attitude, a gradual loss of historicism even in its bourgeois interpretation. The present for Murakami is "the age of distrust for history". This distrust is connected with "the rift in the philosophic and historical thought of the West".

As has been mentioned, the direction in which the world is developing, unpredicted by bourgeois science, as well as concern for the destiny of bourgeois socio-political and economic institutions, force ever wider circles of bourgeois scholars and bourgeois public opinion to show interest in the historical process. This is also true of the analysis by the Japanese sociologist under discussion.

Stating the failure of bourgeois historicism, as a theoretical principle, to explain the direction of historical development, and rejecting Marxism, Murakami tries, nonetheless, to employ the very same bourgeois science, showing once again its inability to treat historical phenomena in a comprehensive way.

As an alternative to bourgeois philosophic and historical conceptions of idealistic hue, that have proven to be theoretically and ideologically untenable, Murakami advances the concept of "critical historicism", which, according to him, will make up for the deficiencies of the above conceptions. He attempts to formulate his "critical historicism" through countering so-called "syncretism" which, he argues, held sway in bourgeois philosophic and historical thought in the postwar years.

"Syncretism" implies a desire to combine diverse ideological trends, to remove the opposition of different ideological systems—conservative and liberal, to obliterate the difference of the "subjective" and "objective" approaches to history. Following Murakami's logic, "syncretism" presents a synthesis of existentialism and Marxism, Neo-Kantianism and doctrines of the classical school, liberalism and Marxism, etc.

² Yasusuke Murakami, *Op. cit.*, p. 97.

The emergence of "syncretism" was due to a number of factors of a socio-ideological nature and their influence on the spiritual life of the contemporary bourgeois society. But this influence, however, has not been elucidated by Murakami.

First, the emergence of syncretism as an eclectic mixture of idealistic trends and Marxism was a sign of the growing influence of Marxism in bourgeois society, of its entering public and spiritual life and driving back diverse conservative trends. On the other hand, syncretism was connected with the attempts of bourgeois and petty-bourgeois ideologists to halt the spread of Marxism-Leninism, to dilute its theoretical basis and thus deprive it of its revolutionary content.

Second, syncretism was a consequence of ideological pluralism that grew stronger in the postwar years as the social movement and revolutionary struggle spread to ever new segments of the population in the capitalist countries, in particular the petty bourgeoisie. The social status and practice of these segments determined the difference of their philosophic views which contributed to the appearance of new shades and nuances in bourgeois ideological trends.

Naturally, it was a foregone conclusion that all attempts at achieving a theoretical synthesis of idealism and Marxism, as well as creating a complete system of bourgeois views on a pluralistic basis, were doomed to failure. Marxism is a comprehensive teaching and it rejects any experiments to combine it with hostile ideological trends. And as for pluralism, it only promoted further reshuffling of traditional bourgeois categories and concepts, thus weakening even more their already shaky theoretical foundation.

The ideological inconsistency of petty-bourgeois ideologists, whom the Japanese author brackets within syncretism, was one of the main reasons for their criticism by other ideological trends, both right and left. In particular, this characteristic of syncretism invited attacks on its adherents in the mid-1960s from structuralism—an ideological and philosophical school that tried to overcome the "logical uncertainty" of syncretic trends and set up a universal structure for a theoretical substantiation of the bourgeois social system.

Murakami, too, is forced to admit the bankruptcy of ideological syncretism. Such a fate of syncretism fits in with his mention of abortive attempts by some petty-bourgeois theoreticians in Japan to lay an ideological foundation for the tactic of "political pragmatism" that envisaged temporary cooperation with the democratic forces. Incidentally, this is one of the reasons for the contradictory ideological and political positions of the theoreticians of this trend, who evolved from democratism towards conservative and reactionary ideas.

Thus, the ideological and philosophical trend, defined by the Japanese scholar as syncretic, came to a dead end. According to Murakami, syncretism's loss of position resulted in an "ideological vacuum". In Murakami's view, this calls for a "cardinal revolution" in the sphere of ideology. It is just by "critical historicism" that the vacuum has to be filled and a "revolution" of ideas performed.

Acquaintance with the "outline of critical historicism" shows that the task set by the Japanese scholar proved to be beyond his capabilities since his conception relies on the same methodological principles that have predestined to failure all the previous bourgeois views on history.

Murakami says that a "synthesis" as an antidote to the ideological division and eclecticism of syncretism should be the organising motive of "critical historicism". But it turns out that his "synthesis" implies

an ideological pluralism and tries to promote the same eclectic scheme of historical development.

Murakami rejects Marxism-Leninism as the only truly scientific theory of the historical process, saying that "the Marxist theory of the structural advantage of the basis is just one of the possibilities for creating a scheme of historical development". Given this attitude toward Marxism, the author of "critical historicism" had nothing to do but borrow structural elements for his conception among the categories of traditional bourgeois philosophic and historical thought. He proposes that the ideas existing in this sphere be divided into "several types", so that tendencies within each type can be traced and their causal relationships established. He argues that it is thus that the "general truth" can be arrived at and a "synthesis" of historical ideas achieved. In this respect the Japanese author is a disciple of the German bourgeois sociologist Max Weber. At the same time, trying to overcome the methodological weakness of Karl Mannheim's sociology, Murakami proposes that Mannheim's "methodological individualism", that insists on the subjective character of cognition of historical phenomena, be replaced by "methodological collectivism", whose presence he discovers in Oriental societies.

As a result of this and other methodological borrowings, Murakami's "critical historicism" acquires the form of a philosophic and historical theory aimed at safeguarding bourgeois historical consciousness from the crisis of ideas afflicting it and filling it with faith in the immutable nature of bourgeois social relations. The Japanese author proceeds from the recognition of two points of view on the historical process—an eternal one, standing outside historical time, and a temporary one, changing under the influence of historical events. Within the first he piles a number of religious, idealistic and metaphysical conceptions born in the West, as well as Hinduism, Buddhism and Confucianism. On the basis of synthesis of these points of view, proclaims Murakami's conception, "the great stable order, embracing both subject and object, will acquire eternal justification, while changes, taking place in the real world, will be regarded as a violation of order". Aiming his theory against the principle of historicism formulated by bourgeois, as well as Marxist, science, Murakami writes the following: "Given this way of thinking, we shall be obliged to reject the idea of development as it has been known since the 19th century—the idea of self-accumulating changes. Until the disappearance of the dominating old views on history, it is necessary for the success of such rejection to work out 'an anti-historical interpretation of history'. This will help to blot out decisively what has been viewed as development after the 19th century. When this kind of historicism, denying development, has at least partly taken root, and the economic, political and other vital activity is stabilised to some extent, then it will be possible for the first time to stand above historical time".³

No special effort is required to reveal the meaning of these pronouncements. With all his claims to originality in theory and to "criticism" in historical studies, the Japanese theoretician does not go beyond galvanising outdated metaphysical conceptions, stressing their "eternal" and "immutable" significance. And as for the second part of his conception—"critical historicism"—it all boils down to his trying to prove

³ Yasusuke Murakami. *Op. cit.*, p. 107.

the necessity of synthesising diverse modern bourgeois theories of historical development and social relations. Such a synthesis is viewed by the Japanese author as a guarantee of success in the struggle against the syncretic views of modern bourgeois sociologists, and as a condition of "survival" for theories interpreted by him as "anti-syncretic" and allegedly overcoming the deficiencies of bourgeois historicism.

Thus, Murakami's "critical historicism" fails to overcome the crisis of bourgeois historical consciousness in contemporary Japan. What's more, the theoretical position of the Japanese scholar shows new facets and shades of this crisis, one reason for which is the fallacy of methodological principles used by bourgeois theoreticians in their sociological studies.

* * *

If Murakami's conception of "critical historicism" emerged mainly as a product of affiliation of philosophic and historical ideas on the basis of eclectic combining their similar elements, then the historical views of another contemporary Japanese theoretician, Yoshio Nakatekawa, stem chiefly from the use of a socio-psychological method. These views are filled, even more so than those of the previous author, with concern for the fate of bourgeois society. However, they turn into an attempt to negate the objective nature and inevitability of progressive historical development and into a desire to deny the historical regularity of the decline of the capitalist mode of production. Nakatekawa endeavours to find solutions to problems raised by bourgeois society that would help direct the historical process along the path of partial changes of social relations so as to preserve the bourgeois order.

The Japanese theoretician is full of the oppressive awareness of the inevitability of social development and historical movement for he realises that they contain the initial cause of the deepening contradictions of the bourgeois system. Touching on the category of development, Nakatekawa comes up with a number of correct ideas and conclusions. He attaches universality to the category of development which embraces all spheres of human life. He also regards it as an immanent law of social life. He starts with the correct premise that historical movement proceeds along an ascending line and has no limit. He emphasises the purposefulness of the social process and the regularity of historical activity.

But these points regarding the essence of development, which are of a dialectical nature, remain in the work of the Japanese theoretician just an abstract logical construction devoid of objective substance and material basis. Nakatekawa endeavours to analyse the concept of development in its "pure form", abstracting from the productive forces and the relations of production and trying to prove that the purpose of historical movement is in itself "neutral".

Such a methodology lands the Japanese theoretician in the maze of idealism, making him shroud in a fog of mysticism the real source of historical development and the causes of crying contradictions of bourgeois society. As the impulse of historical movement he nominates the "universal will to development".⁴ This will is unknowable and mysterious. "Our life is pushed to development by some irresistible forces,"⁵

⁴ Yoshio Nakatekawa, "From Society of Development to Society of Values", *Tyuo koron*, No. 8, 1979, p. 124 (in Japanese).

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 127.

states the Japanese author. The categories of progress and development are treated in the same way. He sees in them a kind of "primordial striving permeating life to its very foundations".⁶

Such premises lead Nakatekawa to deny attempts to scientifically explain the essence of historical movement, to reject belief in progress and any optimistic view of the future of human society. "The future is difficult to foresee, we cannot shake off a deep doubt in this respect", such is the leitmotif of Nakatekawa's pronouncements.

His historical views are based on the criticism of "the developing society". Behind this term it is not hard to see modern bourgeois society in general and contemporary Japan in particular. Extending to them the features of the "developing society", he inadvertently assumes the role of a critic of certain essential aspects of the capitalist system. He points out the negative character of the ascending movement of the "developing society", since it endangers the very foundation of life and human civilisation as a whole.

Nakatekawa has no less negative things to say about the ideological situation of the bourgeois world at present. He draws attention to the adverse consequences for the "developing society" of the very comprehension of historical development as a process of unlimited ascent. He notes the end of the era of historical optimism, born in the 19th century, and illuminates the utopian character of the various social and technicist theories of the new and modern time. This, he argues, resulted in a peculiar ideological situation in the "developing society" which is fearful of the consequences of social movement. "Strong doubts have been born now as to whether progress of society can bring happiness. A fear of rapid development is growing inexorably, as well as concern over how long such development will last," writes Nakatekawa. "Along with the progressive consolidation of the idea of an unlimited process of ascent, an irresistible opposition is strengthening to the reality of this process."⁷

Nakatekawa's description of the "developing society" as a "limited society" takes on the form of a condemnation of bourgeois social institutions and capitalist enterprise. He sees the limited character of the society in the distorted forms and anti-humanistic nature of social movement under capitalism. He stresses that this movement has involved man in its orbit and made him a slave of an impersonal and self-contained process of development. Nakatekawa warns that such incentives of social activity as pursuit of wealth and glory are illusory and endanger the very existence of human spirit. "The movement of the developing society has completely deprived man of freedom."⁸ He cannot be himself in such a society and becomes nothing but a "functional element" of social life. This situation in the sphere of human activity in the "developing society" brings about a profound spiritual deformation of its members who only care about increasing the quantitative side of being. Such a society shows a "violation of proper relations between people, between man and nature, between man and things, between things themselves".

Such is Nakatekawa's conclusion regarding the ideological processes and moral-psychological climate in the "developing society".

As can be seen, the Japanese scholar subjects bourgeois social rela-

⁶ *Ibidem.*

⁷ Yoshio Nakatekawa, *Op. cit.*, p. 129.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 133.

tions to sufficiently serious criticism. Even though it is done in the form of an allegory and has no overt address, Nakatekawa's criticism of the capitalist mode of production, his condemnation of the anti-humanistic features of contemporary reality are beyond doubt.

How to set about the task of "getting rid of the fetters of the developing society", mentioned by the Japanese sociologist? His answer strikingly reveals the scientific, political and ideological inconsistency of his premises. The Japanese scholar's world outlook does not go beyond the limits of bourgeois idealistic schemes, while his criticism of capitalist society is subject to condemnation on certain points from the liberal-bourgeois positions. Nakatekawa holds that the essence of the process of contemporary development, which implies the development of bourgeois society, can be changed by restoring man's links with "primordial being", violated by the process of movement. This can be done, he argues, by rejecting the "developing society" and entering into a "society of values".

Because of the utopian nature of his social conception, the Japanese scholar is unable to define clearly the political and economic parameters of such a society. Its most clear-cut feature is a denial of any ideology because, according to Nakatekawa, "any ideological system pursues an interest". What is this—insistence on a so-called deideologisation or a manifestation of some peculiar philosophic and theoretical position? There can be no doubt that the first is true. It stems from the disappointment with the bourgeois conceptions of society. The Japanese scholar believes that existentialism, romanticism, nihilism, anarchism, critical skepticism, etc., have failed to help overcome the vices of the "developing society". These conceptions were divorced from life and gradually became "usual speculative constructions". Recognising Marxism-Leninism as an "influential moving force in the development of newly-free countries", he, nonetheless, also rejects it, since he fails to understand the nature of the communist formation as the goal of social movement and as a system that eliminates the vices of development of bourgeois society.

The "deideologisation" insisted upon by Nakatekawa when speaking of a "society of values" is unattainable because there can be no "ideological vacuum" under any social system. Despite his suppositions, a "society of values" is also bound to be dominated by bourgeois ideology.

A way out is seen by Nakatekawa in building a society based on the striving of individuals towards perfection, so that by "their own effort they break away from the current that sucks man into movement and development". His recommendations boil down to a list of various restrictions bordering on asceticism. As a final conclusion, Nakatekawa, being a proponent of reforming capitalist development, proclaims the necessity of "spiritual resistance" to the historical process.

All these plans of the Japanese sociologist are untenable because they leave intact the socio-economic basis of bourgeois society. He can't help admitting that "there are many problems to be solved in order to evolve from the developing society to a society of values". First of all, there is the problem of the economic system. He is obliged to note that without "a reform of the capitalist structure it is impossible to achieve anything in this sphere". In other words, Nakatekawa does not venture beyond posing the question of reforming capitalism, and the whole of his sociological conception of "society of values" turns out to be a conservative bourgeois utopia. Illusions, conjured up by Nakatekawa, only divert socio-political thought from the correct solution of social problems posed by bourgeois reality.

One of the schools of bourgeois sociology in contemporary Japan is philosophic anthropology. Claiming the interpretation of the essence of man's being, this school endeavours thereby to explain the essence of the world and human history.

Philosophic anthropology sees its main task in overcoming the pluralism resulting from diverse anthropological research in separate sciences. Studying different aspects of man's being, focusing attention on particular facets of human activity, some bourgeois theoreticians turn one or another aspect into an absolute. Thus a mosaic conception of man's essence has been devised in the form of biological, cultural, religious, historical and other anthropologies.

It is assumed that philosophic anthropology came directly into being as a reaction to the denial of reasonableness in human life, which is a feature of modern idealistic trends, and, at the same time, as a desire to overcome the one-sidedness of the rationalistic interpretation of man's nature, allegedly peculiar to the materialistic view, as well as of the various so-called scientific philosophic conceptions. But philosophic anthropology's attempt at fence-sitting in philosophy only confirms its idealistic nature.

During the 1960s and 1970s, some bourgeois scholars, in order to overcome a crisis of philosophic anthropology, made attempts to supplant it with new conceptions, borrowed from social and natural sciences, including psychology, medicine, etc. Naturally, these attempts were doomed to failure from their conceptions, for they relied on the same erroneous methodological principles that underlie the whole of this trend.

A search for "new anthropology" has been undertaken in Japan, too. The emergence of this trend of bourgeois philosophic and historical thought is explained by a crisis in the country's spiritual situation, the bankruptcy of bourgeois historical and philosophic views that stood in opposition to Marxism-Leninism. "Torment, especially spiritual torment, is one of the essentials of man's being", says historian Shigeki Tominaga,⁹ who shares the views of Western philosophers doing research in "new anthropology".

"We, human beings, have become empties," writes Satoshi Watanabe, echoing Tominaga. The communication explosion does not help restore interpersonal relations. "People lack initiative, wishes, aims. Alienation of man brings life after all to an end."¹⁰ Tominaga's pronouncements are echoed by Professor Ikuo Arakawa of the Tokyo Economics Institute, who laments insecurity of man's being. He draws attention to the "damage inflicted to man by science and technology" and finds that "the anxiety over the danger of mankind's annihilation" has now penetrated everyday life. "Ours is a time of revelation, of soul-searching that has never happened before," says he.¹¹ Central to Arakawa's theoretical inquiry is the problem of relationship between "humaneness opened up by industrial civilisation" and "humaneness destroyed by it". The Japanese scholar is in quest of "universal humaneness", alienated by scientific and technical progress.

⁹ Shigeki Tominaga, "Insight into Anxiety", *Tyuo koron*, No. 9, 1979, p. 178 (in Japanese).

¹⁰ Norio Fujisawa, Satoshi Watanabe, "Scientific Knowledge and Philosophic Knowledge", *Tyuo koron*, No. 9, 1979, p. 190.

¹¹ Ikuo Arakawa, "Civilisation, Savage State, Nature", *Tyuo koron*, No. 9, 1979, p. 121.

The chief distinguishing feature of Arakawa's "fundamental anthropology" is his insistence on the need for more bioanthropological research. To prop up this thesis he cites recent data obtained in anthropology, psychology and linguistics. His bioanthropological approach to man proclaims denial of "anthropocentrism" and insists on the relative character of difference between man and lower forms of life. The Japanese theoretician sets the task of creating an "ecological socio-cultural system" that would prove the existence of "cultural" phenomena in the animal kingdom and draw the line between man and nature outside the sphere of culture. In the same vein, Arakawa argues that, it is necessary to prove that the difference between man and the other primates consists not in the "characteristics stemming from man's high calling", but in the difference of purely quantitative dominants.

Advocating a militant bioanthropologism that betrays utter indifference towards the demands of true science of anthropology, Arakawa formulates the tenets of his "fundamental anthropology" in such a way that fully reveals its unscientific and anti-humanistic character. He denies analysis of the specifics that set man apart from animals, and insists on fixing such specifics "in really existing concreteness",¹² which allegedly overcomes the opposition of man and animal. He sees no point in finding the answer to the question what is primary and what is secondary—society or nature, and insists that both be regarded as self-containing entities. Lastly, Arakawa propounds the idea of a single genealogical line of these entities.

Arakawa argues that acceptance of these demands of "fundamental anthropology" will lead to a connection established between history and anthropology, which would do away in fact with history.

He ascribes to "fundamental anthropology" all-embracing explanatory functions, trying to substitute it for epistemology and philosophy as a world-view discipline. "If fundamental anthropology comes into its own as the foundation of all humanities," he declares, "then it is bound to become a real science of facts, including a new theory of epistemology. This conception will also demand a new philosophy, not based on the premise of the exclusive status of existing man."¹³

Arakawa sees the chief merit of the proponents of modern philosophic anthropology in the liquidation of "anthropocentrism". He writes that "man must look at himself as something non-existent in reality. The main premise of anthropology, that needs to be created, is renouncement of the interpretation of man as the centre of being".¹⁴

In other words, Arakawa sees man as an equal element of a certain general structure. He insists on man's complete merging with nature and on viewing nature through a man devoid of social functions. Productive forces, relations of production, basis and superstructure, the very concept of socio-economic formation do not exist for him, all of that is dissolved in an all-embracing structured system which is given a biological interpretation. The method of structuralism takes every substance element of a structure as an integral part of an aggregate and believes it to be stratified and functioning in accordance with the latter. Acceptable to a degree as a way of scientific analysis, structuralism must be decisively rejected when it begins to claim both philosophic functions alien to it and the role of a scientific theory.

Another Japanese scholar, Shigeki Tominaga, has thought out a

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 133.

¹³ Ikuo Arakawa, *Op. cit.*, p. 130.

¹⁴ *Ibidem.*

structuralist conception of "two histories"—history as a flow of time and changing events, and history as a static, unalterable state, which represents an individual life. In traditional structuralist conceptions these notions are expressed in such terms as a "diachronic section", which implies a historic approach, and a "synchronic section", which shows a fixed structure of existing relationships and ties. Dominated by the latter, the former plays only a subsidiary role. "The second state is a 'structure' given in advance and countering 'historical time'," declares Tominaga. A structure, or a "structural whole", thus finds itself in a vacuum, and is outside historical development. It is easy to see the similarity of the category of "structural whole" with various concepts of idealistic philosophy, which posits transcendental sources of being.

In anthropology the structural divorce of "structure" and history opens the door to reactionary conclusions and unscientific generalisations. Some proponents of this concept are trying to prove the existence of certain initial common features in the cultures of different peoples, features that are alleged to have emerged outside historical development. This thesis reveals a tendency to approach history in an irrational way.

Tominaga attempts to prove that modern anthropological conceptions overcome the difference between the diachronic and synchronic ways of analysing human history.¹⁵ However, this assertion does not hold water, for the authors' premises rely on an idealistic approach to reality.

An outstanding representative of contemporary Japanese structuralism is Yujiro Nakamura. He laments that at present "the sensual and the material have been ever more actively uniting" while "reason and intellect often shape the dominating social order, giving expression to its external and internal aspects". Nakamura advocates a stronger role for the sensual. In line with structuralist conceptions on the special role of primitive religions and forms of thought as elements of the given whole, he attaches much importance to shamanism and religious rites of primitive tribes in Asia and Africa. This theoretician tries to sell the idealistic idea that "material substance is just a vehicle for the spirit and is not of much importance".¹⁶ Nakamura's bioanthropological conception erases the difference between the states of life and death and dissolves man in a "structure". This conception denies the value of human life as it is by itself, and not as an "element and function of a structure". The Japanese author ignores man's historical activity; speaking of "dialectic", he views it not as a logic of historical development, but only as a logic of language, thus falling into anti-historicism. Consequently, Nakamura's structuralism claims not so much methodological functions of research as the role of a philosophic discipline of idealistic kind.

* * *

Analysis of bourgeois conceptions of historical development put forward by some Japanese philosophers and historians shows a deepening crisis of bourgeois historical consciousness, a theoretical dead end reached by Japanese bourgeois sociology. Progressive scientists in Japan see the solution in strengthening the positions of those social movements and forces to whom the future belongs, in mastering the method of dialectical and historical materialism which gives exhaustive answers to the questions of human history.

¹⁵ See Shigeki Tominaga, *Op. cit.*, p. 178.

¹⁶ See Akahata, April 29, 1981.

SOVIET HISTORIANS ON THE MAY 4TH MOVEMENT IN CHINA

Moscow FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS in English No 2, Apr-Jun 83 pp 118-129

[Article by V. N. Nikiforov, doctor of historical sciences]

The 1919 May 4th Movement holds a prominent place among the major revolutionary events in China studied by Soviet historians. On that day Peking students staged a stormy show of protest against the decision by the Paris Peace Conference confirming Japan's seizure of the Chinese province of Shandun. That anti-Japanese action was the beginning of a new wave of deliberate anti-imperialist, and at the same time anti-feudal, revolutionary actions. A history student dealing with the national liberation movement in China constantly comes across references to and evaluations of the May 4th Movement.

This historiographic review presents the main stages of Soviet research into the May 4th Movement and focuses attention on the significance of this movement in China's history and on the problem of the class hegemony.

First assessments of the events of May 4th, 1919, the news of which soon reached Moscow, are found in early works of Soviet Sinologists. The authors closest to the events felt that it signified a new stage of social development. Thus, A. Ivin reported from Peking that references to May 4th were "constantly cited in the columns of Chinese newspapers, heard at Chinese rallies, because the date, more so than October 10th, 1911, signifies a new era in the life of the Chinese public". The May 4th Movement, according to A. Ivin, for the first time showed "a single national face of China" and became "the point of departure for the contemporary social movement".¹

An observant eyewitness, A. Ivin noted the chief characteristics of the May 4th Movement: 1) the beginning of a new phase in the country's history (as we would say now, China's entry into the contemporary period of world history); 2) a milestone more important than October 10th, 1911; 3) the landmark in the formation of the modern Chinese nation.

Not all scholars immediately realised the significance of these events. Long after A. Ivin, the events of May 4th were mentioned in Soviet historiography but not as the beginning of a new chapter of history or revolutionary movement in China.² For 30 years the only exception was historian P. A. Mif who specially devoted a part of his essay to the May

¹ A. Ivin, "Contemporary China (Letter from Peking)", *New East*, 1922, No. 7, p. 186.

² See V. N. Kuchumov's article in the *Great Soviet Encyclopedia (GSE)* (1st ed., Vol. 32, 1936, p. 593) and G. V. Yefimov's article in the collection *China. History, Economy, Culture, Heroic Struggle for National Independence*, Moscow-Leningrad, 1940, pp. 184-185.

4th, 1919, demonstration.³ The date of May 4th enjoyed somewhat more luck with literary historians who wrote, as did, for example, N. A. Petrov, that the May 4th Movement was a watershed, separating the history of modern literature in China from the contemporary one".⁴

When after the Second World War historical works by Chinese communists published in China began to reach Moscow, it became evident that in fact the May 4th Movement was understood wholly as a watershed dividing the China of the modern period of world history from that of the contemporary.⁵ This understanding gave stimulus to Soviet scholars. And once again the first to focus attention on the event under discussion were philologists who were unable to pass over the historico-cultural and linguistic aspects of the movement.

In 1952 Academician N. I. Konrad even voiced the opinion that prior to May 4th, 1919, there was no point speaking of the Chinese (Han) nation as such and the Chinese national language accordingly: even the bourgeois revolution of 1911 gives no reason for this. He argued that "the decisive moment in the history of the Chinese national language, the moment of its ultimate consolidation, the moment when it acquired real national significance" is connected with the oft-mentioned 1919 May 4th Movement.⁶ During the "literary revolution" the bookish Wenyan language was replaced by the colloquial "simple language" of Baihua. "It was the stage of this simple language that completed the development of the Chinese vernacular into the national language," wrote N. I. Konrad, believing that such a victory was won thanks to the May 4th Movement.⁷ According to N. I. Konrad, the change of the written and literary language in China, especially in 1918-1919, meant the replacement of a vernacular by the national language.

Historian G. V. Yefimov, proceeding from the thesis that "the Chinese nation, with the specific features of a bourgeois nation in a semi-colonial country, was formed at the turn of the 20th century", held that the May 4th Movement exerted "a very beneficial influence on the development of the Chinese nation".⁸

The credit for publication of the first in the USSR special article on the May 4th Movement goes to young Soviet historian N. P. Vinogradov, participant in the Great Patriotic War.⁹ The author's main source of information was a book by Chinese historian Hua Gang, *History of the May 4th Movement*, published in Shanghai in 1951. The shortcomings of the historiographic period of the first postwar years resulted in the brevity of N. P. Vinogradov's article (only seven and a half pages), and also in some factual mistakes typical of historiography at the time: the communist intelligentsia was named the factual organiser and leader of the May 4th Movement; the ideologist of the Chinese national bourgeoisie, Hu Shi, was described as a man who served the interests

³ See P. A. Mif, *15 Years of Heroic Struggle. In Connection with the 15th Anniversary of the Communist Party of China* (July 1921--July 1936), Moscow, 1936, pp. 12-13.

⁴ *China*, Moscow-Leningrad, 1940, p. 304. Also see Emi Siao's article "Chinese literature" in the *GSE*, 1st ed., Vol. 32.

⁵ See, e. g., the first essay translated at the time in Moscow: *Modern and Contemporary History of China. Short Essay*, Moscow, 1950, p. 38.

⁶ See N. I. Konrad, "On Chinese Language", *Problems of Philology*, 1952, No. 3, p. 61.

⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 62, 63.

⁸ G. V. Yefimov, "On the Question of Formation of the Chinese Nation", *Problems of History*, 1953, No. 10, pp. 72, 76.

⁹ N. P. Vinogradov, "The Movement of May 4th, 1919, in China", *Soviet Oriental Studies*, 1955, No. 6, pp. 46-53.

of colonial powers, while militarist Duan Qirui was mistakenly called head of the Peking government.

Other articles in the early and mid-1950s on the May 4th Movement or the period close to it were devoted mainly to the reaction in China to the news of the Russian revolution. Much attention was focused from the start on the work of Lu Xin, an outstanding writer and public figure of the time.¹⁰

The regular (beginning from 1959) public marking in the USSR of each decade's anniversary of that event provided a stimulus for the study of the May 4th Movement. A list of bibliographical titles that appeared between the jubilee dates of 1959 and 1969 shows the general direction of Soviet Sinological studies. Many of the essays after 1959 were of a popular and popular-science nature, while works closer to 1969 were written for specialists. Typical of the former is a booklet by Yu. M. Garushyants and a part of the collection by the Institute of Sinology of the USSR Academy of Sciences, titled *Essays on the Contemporary History of China*.¹¹ Both works are of a descriptive nature, based, of course, (especially the booklet) on a lot of factual material, but mostly following a long-accepted conception. At the time they were the best works in Soviet literature devoted to the May 4th events and were valued accordingly by scholarly criticism.¹²

The later works are typified by a collection issued by the same Yu. M. Garushyants which contained sources of material and a critical article. The two periods in the work of one author substantially differ in the degree of criticism in his treatment of the sources, in the forms of work and in corresponding conceptions. The second, historiographically more mature stage also includes the works of other authors of the 1960s. Intensive studies of the May 4th events coincided with the monographic phase of Sinology dealing with China's history. The May 4th theme, ushering in the contemporary history of China and providing many insights into the later specifics of the Chinese revolutionary movement, naturally, found itself in the spotlight.

One of the earliest calls for a comprehensive research into the May 4th Movement came from professor G. V. Yefimov at the first historiographic conference at Leningrad University in 1961.¹³ Having mentioned the brochures published on the subject in the USSR and abroad at the end of the 1950s, he then dwelt on the analysis of the freshly published American Sinologist Zhou Cezong's works *May 4th Movement*, (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1960). G. V. Yefimov evaluated the book as a major scholarly work, based on abundant sources, and noted as

¹⁰ See V. F. Sorokin, *The Making of Lu Xin's World Outlook*, Moscow, 1958; V. V. Petrov, *Lu Xin, Essay on His Life and Work*, Moscow, 1960; L. D. Pozdneyeva, *Lu Xin, His Life and Work (1881-1936)*, Moscow, 1959.

¹¹ Yu. M. Garushyants, *The May 4th 1919 Movement in China*, Moscow, 1959; *The May 4th Movement. Essays on the Contemporary History of China*, Moscow, 1959; "Ideological Struggle Among Chinese Intellectuals at the End of 1918 and the Beginning of 1919", *Soviet Sinology*, 1958, No. 1; "On the Motive Forces of Anti-Imperialist Struggle in China in 1919 (In Connection with the 40th Anniversary of the May 4th Movement)", *Problems of Oriental Studies*, 1959, No. 3; R. M. Brodsky, *Anti-Imperialist Character of the May 4th Movement in China*, Lvov, 1959; V. P. Ilin, "People's Movement of May 4th, 1919—the Beginning of a New Democratic Revolution in China", *Problems of History*, 1958, No. 1; N. G. Senin, "The May 4th Movement and Ideological Struggle in China", *Problems of Philosophy*, 1959, No. 7.

¹² See V. N. Nikiforov, "The May 4th Movement in the Assessment of Scholars of Three Countries", *Problems of Oriental Studies*, 1960, No. 2.

¹³ See G. V. Yefimov, *On the Historiography of the May 4th Movement. Problems of History of National Liberation Movement in the Asian Countries*, Leningrad, 1963.

a positive feature the author's recognition of the historical necessity of the May 4th Movement. Even though Zhou Cezong tried to challenge in the final section of the book the Marxist views on the anti-imperialist character of the May 4th events, he himself, as pointed out by G. V. Yefimov, supplied enough material to substantiate those views.¹⁴

Zhou Cezong, in G. V. Yefimov's assessment, came out both against the liberal-bourgeois interpretation of the May 4th Movement, which limits it to the struggle for a "new culture", and against the Guomindang historians that diverged from the positive appraisal of that movement made earlier by Sun Yatsen.

Some of the points made by G. V. Yefimov in 1961 are now outdated. But the Soviet historiographer correctly noted Zhou Cezong's unjustified censure of revolutionary methods of struggle (Zhou said in his book that after May 4th the struggle in China acquired a "tragic character"), his tendency to belittle the influence of the Great October Socialist Revolution, underestimation of the Chinese participants in the movement (Li Dazhao, Lu Xin) and exaggeration of the influence of Western ideologists (Dewey, Russel).¹⁵

In November 1962, at the Institute of the Peoples of Asia of the USSR Academy of Sciences, A. G. Krymov defended his doctoral dissertation *Social Thought and Ideological Struggle in China. 1917-1927*.¹⁶ One third of its volume was devoted to the nearest roots and consequences (1918-1920) of the May 4th Movement. A. G. Krymov's work was remarkable first of all for its abundance of sources, partly collected by the author during business trips to the PRC (1957, 1958). His commentaries contained a long review (some 25 type-written pages) of the literature on the events of May 4th, which remains to date the only full historiographic review on the subject, thus making it still relevant despite certain inaccuracies and one-sided judgments. It should be borne in mind, however, that, in view of his general theme, A. G. Krymov in his historiographic review was interested not so much in the May 4th Movement as in the ideological struggle in China at the time in connection with the spread of Marxism.

Noting the indisputable usefulness of the works on the history of ideology published up to that time in the PRC (Hou Wailu and others), A. G. Krymov pointed out their descriptiveness, their lack of an extended theoretical analysis.

A. G. Krymov was the first rightly to call to "abandon the incorrect practice ... of passing over in silence" the part of Chen Duxiu in the May 4th Movement and in the early period of the Communist movement only because later he deviated from the party. "It is high time," wrote A. G. Krymov, "to pass ... an unbiased and critical judgment in accordance with the historical truth." Just as rightly the author criticised in his manuscript the other extreme encountered in bourgeois literature—that of painting Chen Duxiu as a "Chinese Lenin".

The author of the historiographic review noted the unscientific way of bourgeois historians of the 1950s (O. Brier, H. Creel, Gao Junyu) who opposed "eastern" and "western" teachings (Marxism is presented by these historians as one of "western" currents, while its successes in China are explained by subjective factors). "The concept of Western or Eastern origin of an ideology is rather conditional for China", wrote

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 71.

¹⁵ See *Ibid.*, pp. 70, 72, 74.

¹⁶ The dissertation was not published. The manuscript is kept by the author.

A. G. Krymov. "Heeding political requirements, bourgeois scholars changed their orientation. Such was the case with Yan Fu, Liang Qichao, Hu Shi, Liang Shuming, and many others. Most often the scholars offered a mixed bag, eclectically combining one and the other."

A. G. Krymov gave the following appraisal of Zhou Cezong's monograph: it "gives answers to a number of important questions, ... is distinguished by a wealth of materials" but belittles the importance of the Great October Socialist Revolution for China, the significance of the working-class movement, substitutes for them the allegedly beneficial influence of the bourgeois West and Japan. A. G. Krymov pointed out the lack of scientific foundation in Zhou Cezong's assertion about the growth of Japanese and French influence in China at that time just on the "premise" that many Chinese got to know Marxist literature through Japanese and French translations.

Direct description of the May-June, 1919, events occupied little space in A. G. Krymov's work, for the author was interested in the ideological roots of the movement and ideological demarcations of its participants. He distinguished the following milestones on this road: debates at the end of 1918 over the ways of China's postwar development; the May 4th Movement; Hu Shi's criticism of the so-called "isms" (i. e., of "broad theoretical generalisations") indicating the drift of the moderate wing from the movement, etc.

An entire group of studies were published in the USSR in connection with the 50th anniversary of the May 4th Movement: a collection of articles and speeches by Li Dazhao¹⁷ compiled by Yu. M. Garushyants and the abovementioned collection of materials on the May 4th Movement¹⁸ (among its historical articles three belong to A. G. Krymov; there is also a sizable chunk—9 articles—of philology and art-criticism). Also published were articles by historians V. P. Ilyushechkin, A. V. Meliksetov, S. L. Tikhvinsky,¹⁹ specialists on literature and art L. E. Cherkassky, M. E. Shneider.²⁰ The 55th anniversary of the May 4th Movement was marked by a scientific conference at the Institute of the Far East of the USSR Academy of Sciences.²¹

Several works by A. G. Krymov, Yu. M. Garushyants, B. V. Vetrov are wholly devoted to the history of the May 4th Movement.²² The central work at the end of the 1960s—a collection of materials on May 4th—appeared in the series of Sinological source studies. In an extensive historiographic foreword Yu. M. Garushyants focused attention on

¹⁷ Li Dazhao, *Selected Articles and Speeches*, Moscow, 1965; See also Yu. M. Garushyants, "Li Dazhao. The 80th Anniversary of the Birthday", *Peoples of Asia and Africa*, 1968, No. 5.

¹⁸ *The 1919 May 4th Movement in China. Collection of Articles*, Moscow, 1971.

¹⁹ V. P. Ilyushechkin, "May 4th Movement and Working Class in China", *Papers at the 20th International Sinological Congress in Prague*, Moscow, 1968; A. V. Meliksetov, "May 4th Movement and Sun Yatsen's Socio-Economic Programme", *Ibid.*; S. L. Tikhvinsky, "May 4th Movement and Sun Yatsen's Views on Foreign Policy", *Ibid.*

²⁰ L. E. Cherkassky, "Revolutionary Chinese Poetry of May 4th", *Foreign Literature*, 1964, No. 5; "On the Question of Humanism of the May 4th Poetry", *Ideas of Humanism in Literatures of the East*, Moscow, 1967; L. E. Cherkassky, M. E. Shneider, "October and New Chinese Literature", *Great October and World Literature*, Moscow, 1967; M. E. Shneider, *Qu Qiubo's Path of Creativity (1899-1935)*, Moscow, 1964.

²¹ See *Far Eastern Affairs*, 1974, No. 4 (opening speech by V. A. Krivtsov, report by R. A. Mirovitskaya, speeches by A. G. Krymov, T. N. Akatova, Ye. Yu. Staburova, G. S. Karetina, reports by V. F. Sorokin, S. D. Markova, speech by A. A. Antipovsky) (in English).

²² This theme was central at the time for the latter two authors. Their dissertations on this theme alone earned them their degrees of Candidate of Historical Sciences, by B. V. Vetrov in 1964, by Yu. M. Garushyants in 1969.

the highlights of the movement, showing the inconsistency of the old scheme and counterposing to it his own conception, fully substantiated by the materials of the collection.

Before the 1960s the works of Soviet historians, including Yu. M. Garushyants, judged the May 4th Movement as anti-imperialist and anti-feudal. Emphasis was made on its mass character and consistent struggle against any sort (not only Japanese) of imperialism. The ever present thesis of the Chinese historical essays to the effect that the events of May 4th, 1919 marked the beginning of a "new democratic revolution" was understood in the sense that the revolutionary process in China at the time had objectively become part of the world proletarian revolution, even though the movement remained, by its social nature, bourgeois-democratic. Directly or indirectly, most Soviet authors proceeded from the understanding that there could be no talk of the hegemony of the proletariat in China in 1919. However, the idea was wholly borrowed from the Chinese works of a "united anti-imperialist front" in the period under discussion allegedly made up from the start of the bourgeois, petty-bourgeois and communist intellectuals (these three forces were personified by Hu Shi, Chen Duxiu and Li Dazhao). Yu. M. Garushyants, on the contrary, decisively came up with the following thesis: it is too early to speak of "communist intellectuals" in the China of the May 4th period; hence, it is incorrect to think that ideologically the movement had directly paved the way for the creation of a communist party. All the participants in the May 4th Movement, except Li Dazhao, were guided by a nationalist ideology, which is greatly distinct from Marxist-Leninist views.²³

Yu. M. Garushyants's analysis of the preceding conception of the May 4th Movement did not proceed without costs: carried away by his critical enthusiasm, the author put forward certain propositions which have not subsequently been accepted by Soviet historians. Thus, his foreword of 1969 suggested that the May 4th Movement could not actually be called anti-feudal. "True," wrote Garushyants, "under Chinese conditions any social movement, especially a major one, was objectively aimed against both feudal and imperialist oppression. But not every movement subjectively recognised the objective essence of this double-edged goal. Indeed, if the May 4th Movement's anti-imperialist aspect of the struggle (even though limited to protest against Japan alone) was spelt out in its programme quite clearly, then anti-feudal goals were not on the agenda".²⁴

In reality, however, if we take into account the fervent and deliberate struggle of the movement's participants against feudal ideology (Confucianism) and culture, we should accept as more correct the point made in the collection of articles by Soviet historians appearing three years after Yu. M. Garushyants's foreword: "the anti-feudal struggle of the May 4th Movement was in the main limited by the sphere of ideology".²⁵

Worthy of note are also the articles by B. V. Vetrov, who began to explore this subject in Kharkov at the end of the 1950s, i. e., simultaneously with Yu. M. Garushyants. In a series of articles in 1961-1969 B. V. Vetrov consecutively examined the working-class movement in

²³ See *May 4th Movement, 1919 in China. Documents and Materials*, Moscow, 1969, pp. 27, 28, etc.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 20.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 140.

Shanghai during and after the May 4th Movement, the student movement, the position of Shanghai bourgeoisie and the beginning of the spread of Marxism. B. V. Vetrov's works are based on Chinese sources published in 1958-1959; he also used the works of Chinese historians and some materials in English (especially on the general situation in Shanghai).²⁶

In distinction from Yu. M. Garushyants, who mainly shed light on the events in Peking, B. V. Vetrov gave a detailed picture of the Shanghai front of the struggle, and described the history of the three strikes during 1919 which constituted the most important integral part of the May 4th Movement. He marked the main stages of the 1919-1920 liberation struggle: 1) May-June, 1919,—upsurge of anti-imperialist movement; 2) July, 1919,—June, 1920,—“unsuccessful attempts of students and radical bourgeoisie to repeat the experiment of June 1919 general strike, and to do it without regrouping forces, without a clear political platform, just through further development of spontaneous movement of the united people's front”. The failure of the April 1920 student strike in Shanghai and the rolling back of the mass movement wave “marked a new important boundary in the history of the liberation struggle in those years”.²⁷

B. V. Vetrov stressed that the Chinese intellectuals, leading the May 4th Movement and comprising a considerable part of its participants, were not in the least Marxist. For example, movement participant Dai Jitao, alleging that Marxism undergoes a drastic transformation in every country into which it enters, called on China to seek her own ideology by “crossing” Russian Bolshevism with revisionism, *katheder*-socialism and anarcho-syndicalism. Zhou Yang, the would-be official head of the PRC's ideological front, admitted that as a participant in the May 4th Movement, he, along with others, may have been equally attracted at the time by Nietzsche, Kropotkin and Marx.²⁸

A notable progress in acceptance of Marxism by the progressive Shanghai intelligentsia is seen by B. V. Vetrov approximately in late April-early May, 1920 when Chen Duxiu, who had by then been strongly influenced by the ideas of the October Revolution and come into direct contact with G. N. Voitinsky, declared himself a Marxist (“even though prematurely”, as pointed out by B. V. Vetrov).²⁹ Chen Duxiu set up a Marxist circle which provided a “culture medium” for educating Marxist cadres and became the embryo of a communist party.³⁰ Of course, all of that happened far beyond the framework of the May 4th Movement.

Also of significance is B. V. Vetrov's observation that parallel with a tilt to the left by the petty-bourgeois revolutionary democracy after 1919 a similar tendency was spreading its roots in the Guomindang³¹ bourgeois-revolutionary party, within which a shift to the left was experienced by separate groups. “All of that,” concluded B. V. Vetrov, “paved the way for a drastic reexamination of Guomindang policy in 1923-

²⁶ On B. V. Vetrov's works in general, see V. N. Nikiforov, “On B. V. Vetrov's Works”, *The 6th Scientific Conference “Society and State in China”*, Issue III, Moscow, 1975.

²⁷ B. V. Vetrov, *Social Movement in Shanghai from 1917 to the First Half of 1920. Synopsis of Dissertation for the Degree of Candidate of Historical Sciences*, Kiev, 1964.

²⁸ See B. V. Vetrov, “May 4th, 1919, in Shanghai”, *Kharkov State University, “Scientific Papers”*, Vol. 117, *Works of Historical Faculty*, Vol. 8, Kharkov, 1961, pp. 49-50 (in Ukrainian).

²⁹ B. V. Vetrov, *Op. cit.*, p. 10.

³⁰ *Ibidem*.

³¹ See B. V. Vetrov, “Development of Sun Yatsen's Revolutionary World Outlook in 1917-1920”, *Scientific Papers of Kharkov State University*, Vol. 143, 1962, p. 24.

1924".³² What must perhaps be added to this undoubtedly correct conclusion is that the question of how much the "tilt to the left" by Sun Yatsen and Guomindang was due to the influence of the May 4th Movement and how much to the influence (apparently, much greater!) directly exerted on Sun Yatsen by the Great October Socialist Revolution still deserves thorough investigation.

Besides the abovementioned works by Yu. M. Garushyants and B. V. Vetrov,³³ other articles appeared which were directly devoted to the May 4th Movement. It can be said that the 1960s, and especially the turn of the 1970s, was a very fruitful period in the study of this subject.³⁴

The 1960s in the main resulted in the emergence of the contemporary Soviet conception of the May 4th Movement. Since then no special works on the theme have been published, with the exception of V. P. Ilyushechkin's article on the 60th anniversary of the event and a report by V. S. Lyubimova.³⁵ The latter showed how the Chinese bourgeoisie used the national movement to boycott foreign goods and promote their own. No complete unity existed, however, within the bourgeoisie: they stood firm in Peking and Shanghai, vacillated in Guangzhou, and in Manchuria the boycott flopped altogether.

A monograph by L. P. Delyusin³⁶ goes beyond the period under discussion but should be mentioned here because the author, examining the 1920 debate on socialism in China, plugs the gap between the history of the May 4th period and the history of the formation of the Chinese communist party.

Light is also shed on the May 4th Movement in a monograph by V. A. Krivtsov and V. A. Krasnova on Li Dazhao,³⁷ as well as in M. A. Aslanova's dissertation on the journal *Xin Qingnian* (New

³² B. V. Vetrov, *Social Movement in Shanghai...*, p. 16.

³³ See also B. V. Vetrov, "The Beginning of the Spread of Marxism in Shanghai (1917-1920)", *Scientific Papers of Kharkov State University*, Vol. 128. *Works of the Chair of the CPSU History*, Vol. 10, 1962.

³⁴ See also Yu. M. Garushyants, *The 1919 May 4th Movement in China (A Problem of Historiography)*, A Report on the Papers Published in 1957-1966 and Submitted for a Degree of Candidate of Historical Sciences, Moscow, 1969; A. I. Kartunova, "October Socialist Revolution and National Liberation Revolution in China (1917-1927); Modern and Contemporary History, 1967, No. 6; Yu. Kostin, "Imperialist Interference in the 'May 4th Events'", *Peoples of Asia and Africa*, 1963, No. 5.

³⁵ V. P. Ilyushechkin, "Anti-Imperialist May 4th Movement of 1919 in China", *Far Eastern Affairs*, 1979, No. 3; V. S. Lyubimova, "On the Economic and Political Positions of the Bourgeoisie in the May 4th Movement", *Fourth Scientific Conference "Society and State in China"*, Abstracts and Reports, Issue II, Moscow, 1973.

³⁶ L. P. Delyusin, *Debate on Socialism, From the History of Socio-Political Thought in China at the Beginning of the 20s*, Moscow, 1970. On the study of the period nearest to May 4th, 1919, see V. N. Nikiforov, "Working-Class Movement and the Formation of the Chinese Communist Party as Reflected by Soviet Historiography", *Problems of History of the CPSU*, 1982, No. 1.

³⁷ V. A. Krivtsov, V. A. Krasnova, *Li Dazhao. From Revolutionary Democracy to Marxism-Leninism*, Moscow, 1978; See review by F. F. Lappo, "A Book About Li Dazhao", *Far Eastern Affairs* 1978, No. 4. See also V. A. Krivtsov, V. A. Krasnova, "Li Dazhao—First Propagandist of Marxism-Leninism and Proletarian Internationalism in China", *Far Eastern Affairs*, 1977, No. 2; Li Dazhao, "My Marxist World Outlook", *Working Class and Contemporary World*, 1971, No. 2; K. V. Shevelev, "From the History of the Formation of Li Dazhao's Views on Classes and the Dictatorship of the Proletariat (1919-Beginning of 1920)", *Third Scientific Conference "Society and State in China"*, Abstracts and Reports, Issue II, Moscow, 1972; On the Issue of Li Dazhao's Article "My Idea of Marxism", *Fourth Scientific Conference "Society and State in China"*, Abstracts and Reports, Issue I, Moscow, 1973; Ting Sheng, "Li Dazhao—Thinker, Revolutionary, Internationalist", *Far Eastern Affairs*, 1974, No. 4.

Youth), which was the main mouthpiece of the May 4th Movement.³⁸ These are the major Soviet works in the 1970s that touched in one or another way on the history of the May 4th period.

The present review examines the contents of these works only in the part directly connected with the May 4th Movement", i. e., not going beyond 1919.

V. A. Krivtsov and V. A. Krasnova characterise Li Dazhao as the most prominent Chinese thinker of the May 4th period, as the first person in China to understand deeply and present in his works the meaning and significance of Marxism, and then Bolshevism and Leninism. The authors concur with the Chinese scholars that the ideological and political development of Li Dazhao passed through three main stages: 1) revolutionary-democratic (1907-1917); 2) transitional, when he gradually mastered the basics of scientific socialism (1917-1921); and 3) Marxist-Leninist (1921-1927). Of decisive importance in passing over from the first stage to the second was the Great October Socialist Revolution that had an immense impression on Li Dazhao. The second stage in the development of his views was in fact the preparation, emergence and nearest consequences of the May 4th Movement, Li Dazhao being one of its central figures. Chapter Three of V. A. Krivtsov's and V. A. Krasnova's book is devoted to this stage.³⁹

Having sided with the October Revolution, Li Dazhao slowly broke away from the influence of Social-Darwinism, popular at the time, even though during the May 4th period he still retained some adherence to P. Kropotkin's theory of "mutual assistance". After the May 4th Movement, struggle between the ideas of socialism and national capitalism became the main issue of China's intellectual life; since the summer of 1919 the Marxist trend was openly headed by Li Dazhao. In an article at the beginning of 1919 he connected the start of a new era with the emergence on the historical stage of the working class,⁴⁰ and at the end of 1920 and beginning of 1921 he accepted the Marxist formula of the dictatorship of the proletariat, which completed his transition to Marxism. V. A. Krivtsov and V. A. Krasnova take to task bourgeois authors, in particular M. Meisner, author of an American monograph on Li Dazhao, for attempts to ascribe to Li Dazhao a nationalistic, populist and voluntarist interpretation of Marxism. The Soviet authors prove that Li Dazhao was an internationalist who did not oppose the national specifics of China to the common elements in the development of China and other countries. Li Dazhao was not a peasant but a proletarian revolutionary. He was also a passionate partisan of humanism and international peace.⁴¹

Li Dazhao is remarkable for his critical attitude towards China's traditional ideology. Therefore, it is incorrect to reduce everything in China, including Li Dazhao's views, as is done by Western Sinologists, to tradition. V. A. Krivtsov and V. A. Krasnova view as completely erroneous the assertions of West German Sinologist V. Bauer (his mono-

³⁸ See M. A. Aslanova, *Journal Xin Qingnian and Its Part in the Development of Socio-Political Ideas in China (1915-1921)*, *Synopsis of Dissertation for the Degree of Candidate of Historical Sciences*, Moscow, 1974.

³⁹ See V. A. Krivtsov, V. A. Krasnova, *Ibid.*, pp. 72-110.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 80.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 152-155.

graph was published in Munich in 1967) that Li Dazhao's views constitute an "organic merging of Marxist and purely Chinese traditions".⁴²

The other major ideologist and organiser of the May 4th Movement, Chen Duxiu, has been studied less than Li Dazhao by our historiography. There is not a single monograph on him. Special articles about Chen Duxiu were written by M. A. Aslanova and S. L. Rykova.⁴³

The authors took as their theme two mouthpieces of the May 4th Movement: the journal *Xin Qingnian* (New Youth) and newspaper *Meizhuo pinglun* (Weekly Review).

M. A. Aslanova,⁴⁴ examining *Xin Qingnian* mainly from the standpoint of propaganda of Marxism in China, marks the chief milestones of the journal's activity in 1915-1921, i. e. in the period when the main event of international life was the October Revolution and in China's domestic life—the May 4th Movement. In the first years of its existence *Xin Qingnian* engaged mainly in criticism of Confucianism under the slogan of the liberation of the individual. In 1917-1918, as established by M. A. Aslanova, the journal's criticism of traditional Chinese conceptions became less strident and pointed. During that period *Xin Qingnian* zeroed in on the questions of culture and position of the woman. Apparently, the line of the publication was determined at the time by the moderate wing of the editorial board. It was not accidental that the journal did not react to the October Revolution (even though it welcomed the February revolution in Russia), and Li Dazhao, an editor of *Xin Qingnian*, was obliged to publish his articles on the October Revolution in other publications.

M. A. Aslanova holds that the issuance in November, 1918 of the fifth issue of the volume of *Xin Qingnian* devoted to the end of the First World War marked a turning point. It carried the ideas and proposals of China's top thinkers—Li Dazhao, Chen Duxiu, Hu Shi, Cai Yuanpei and others—concerning the country's prospects in the new epoch. Clash of ideas meant the beginning of a discussion. Li Dazhao, in his articles *Victory of the People* and *Victory of Bolshevism*, advocated a "Russian-type revolution, a revolution of the 20th century", radically diverging from ideologists of the national bourgeoisie. This opened up a new stage in the journal's activity, for it began publishing articles of Marxism. At the same time the publication continued to carry articles on language reform, science, literature, and the woman's positions.

The special issue of *Xin Qingnian*, devoted to Marxism (number 5, volume 6), appeared, apparently, after May 4th, 1919. In fact, it was a follow-up of the discussion, with the spotlight given to Li Dazhao's article *My Idea of Marxism*. Divergence in principles led to a rift in the editorial board. In December 1919, *Xin Qingnian* issued a Manifesto ad-

⁴² *Ibid.*, p. 110.

⁴³ M. A. Aslanova, "Chen Duxiu's Appeal to Youth and Its Socio-Political Significance", *Third Scientific Conference "Society and State in China". Abstracts and Reports*, Issue II, Moscow, 1972; "Journal *Xin Qingnian* and Struggle Against Confucian Ideology", *China: Traditions and Modernity*, Moscow, 1976; S. L. Rykova, Chen Duxiu's Views on the Problem of Unifying China, *Eighth Scientific Conference "Society and State in China". Abstracts and Reports*, Issue II, Moscow, 1977.

⁴⁴ Other publications by this author; "Female question on the pages of the journal *Xin Qingnian*", *Fifth Scientific Conference "Society and State in China". Abstracts and Reports*, Issue II, Moscow, 1974, *Xin Qingnian* in Post-October Period (1917-1918), *Sixth Scientific Conference "Society and State in China". Abstracts and Reports*, Issue II, Moscow, 1975; J. Dewey and B. Russel on the pages of the journal *Xin Qingnian*, *Seventh Scientific Conference "Society and State in China". Abstracts and Reports*, Issue II, Moscow, 1976; "Journal *Xin Qingnian* in 1917-1918", *China: Search for Ways of Socialist Development (From the History of Socio-Political Thought of the 20th Century)*, Moscow, 1979.

dressed to the readers and attempting to reconcile conflicting opinions on the common platform of struggle against feudal ideology and culture, with a tinge of anarchism and pragmatism. M. A. Aslanova presents a comparative analysis of this Manifesto and the appeal of *Xin Qingnian* in 1915.⁴⁵ M. A. Aslanova winds up her study with the journal's gradual turning towards Marxist positions. She refers completion of this process to a comparatively late date—the beginning of 1921.

S. L. Rykova examines the weekly *Meizhuo pinglun*, published by Li Dazhao and Chen Duxiu from December 1918 to August 1919, i. e., throughout the entire period under discussion. It carried the same debate on the ways of China as did *Xin Qingnian*. And here as well a vital part was played by Li Dazhao whose articles enlightened the readers with the truth about Soviet Russia, welcomed Bolshevism, called to follow the Russian example. In the last issues of *Meizhuo pinglun* the well-known discussion took place between Hu Shi and Li Dazhao about problems and “isms” that marked the split of the united anti-imperialist and anti-feudal front of intellectuals that existed during the May 4th Movement of 1919.⁴⁶

First results of the study of the May 4th period by Soviet historians can be summed up in the following way. Traditionally historians view the events of May 4th, 1919, as a mass political movement, which also had another side—that of ideological struggle in the sphere of culture. A more or less accepted chronological framework of the movement is May-June, 1919; a broader interpretation of the term May 4th Movement, covering the period 1919-1921 (or even 1917-1921), hasn't taken root.

Lately, Soviet historians unanimously define the May 4th Movement as one of national liberation; the stereotyped appellation of “anti-imperialist, anti-feudal” is applied more rarely. The point is that the anti-feudal side of the movement cannot be equalized with the anti-imperialist side. Still, the suggestion to abandon the epithet “anti-feudal” altogether did not meet with approval, nor did another radical proposal—to see the anti-imperialist orientation of the May 4th Movement as directed against Japan alone. Even though the chief thrust of the movement was really anti-Japanese, still it was also aimed at the united front of imperialist powers confronting China at Versailles.

The part played by workers in the movement was notable, though “the working masses were very little organised and still under the ideological influence of the bourgeoisie”.⁴⁷ The influence of the working-class movement on Chinese society in 1919 tended to be felt indirectly; thus, the most popular slogan of May 4th, that of “Work is sacred”, meant a shift in the thinking of intellectuals, an emerging consideration of and respect for the working people.

It follows from the work of Soviet scholars that the united anti-imperialist front that was formed during the events of May 4th appeared spontaneously, without a worked out general programme and organised leadership. In our opinion, it cannot even be considered fully “revolutionary”, since among its active participants were also proponents of

⁴⁵ M. A. Aslanova, “Two Appeals by Journal *Xin Qingnian*, *Topical Problems of Modern Oriental Studies, History, Economics*, Moscow, 1974.

⁴⁶ See S. L. Rykova, “*Meizhuo pinglun* on the Results of the First World War and on the October Revolution”, *China: Search for Ways of Social Development*, Moscow, 1979. On the period of May 4th, 1919, also see Ye. Yu. Staburova, “Proponents of Marxism and Anarchists in China (1919-1921)”, *Ibid.*

⁴⁷ See V. P. Ilyushechkin, *May 4th Movement and the Working Class of China*, pp. 37-39.

peaceful reforms (Hu Shi), and also because most participants, including Chen Duxiu, did not have at the time a clear-cut revolutionary programme. But objectively there is reason to endorse the following theses: "Though neither the leaders of the student action, nor its rank-and-file participants aimed at overthrowing the government or changing the existing social order, the May 4th Movement was in effect a revolutionary action".⁴⁸

The May 4th Movement, without doubt, can be regarded in a broad sense as an echo in China of the October 1917 events in Russia. Soviet scholars have ground for criticising bourgeois authors that deny a link between these two historic milestones. It has been proved that progressive Chinese intellectuals showed interest in neighbouring Russia and approved of the struggle waged there against imperialism, while Li Dazhao had chosen for himself and started to promulgate the Marxist way, and his pronouncements, of course, received great response.

But, as the recent Marxist studies show, neither should there be room for simplifications in the understanding of this phenomenon by historians. In the period of May 4th Li Dazhao was the only person in China who considered himself a Marxist and understood the full meaning of international events. The immense Chinese periphery in the days of the May 4th Movement just knew that "the countries of the Entente turned out to be ignoble, even America has double-crossed us, having let Shandong, the birthplace of Confucius, be gobbled up by the Japanese".⁴⁹

Attempts to find evidence of the influence of May 4th on Sun Yatsen have been fruitless so far. It seems that no author has succeeded in tracing the direct relationship between the May 4th Movement and the foreign policy and socio-economic stands of Sun Yatsen.

There are also other aspects of the history of the Chinese revolutionary movement that have no overt relation to the May 4th tradition. Thus, Yu. M. Garushyants, listing the endless turns of the "May 4th" theme in literature (e. g., "May 4th and Students", "May 4th and Pragmatism", "May 4th and the Formation of the CPC", etc.) noted that he had never come across two subjects: "May 4th and Peasants" and "May 4th and the Army".⁵⁰ Indeed, the latter two factors—peasants and the Army,—known to have played a major part in the Chinese revolution, are conspicuous by their total absence in the May 4th Movement, and only made their appearance in 1925-1927, i. e. on the subsequent stages of the revolutionary movement in China.

Still insufficiently dealt with, in our opinion, is the question of the May 4th Movement as a milestone in the formation of the modern Chinese nation (see articles by A. G. Shprintsin and V. M. Solntsev on the linguistic aspect of the movement).⁵¹ Related to this is another complex theme—"people of May 4th", which could invite cooperation of historians, literary and art historians, philosophers, specialists in social and ethnic psychology.

A review of historiography shows that Soviet science tackles the theme under discussion in a broad way, with due objectivity and unflagging respect for the revolutionary traditions of the Chinese people.

⁴⁸ See *The 1919 May 4th Movement in China. Collection of Articles*, p. 3.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 120.

⁵⁰ See *May 4th Movement of 1919 in China. Documents and Materials*, p. 8.

⁵¹ See *May 4th Movement of 1919 in China. Collection of Articles*, pp. 295-330.

LIN BOQU, OUTSTANDING CHINESE REVOLUTIONARY

Moscow FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS in English No 2, Apr-Jun 83 pp 130-138

[Article by Professor M. F. Yur'yev]

Lin Boqu, alias Lin Zuhan, was one of the founders of the Communist Party of China. He was a human link of sorts between the pre-October and the post-October periods of the Chinese people's liberation movement. Formerly a follower of Sun Yatsen and a member of an underground anti-monarchist organisation, he became a convinced adherent of Marxism-Leninism and Politburo member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China.¹

Lin Boqu was in the midst of the most important events that marked the history of the liberation struggle, beginning with the setting up in 1905 of Sun Yatsen's Chinese Revolutionary Union. He participated in the Xinhai revolution, in the activities of the Communist Party of China since its inception, in forming the united anti-imperialist and anti-militarist front, in running the peasant unions, in creating the National Revolutionary Army of China and in the Long March, in the Nanchang uprising, in the Soviet movement, in the Chinese Red Army's march northwestward, in developing the CPC-controlled border region of Shenxi-Gansu-Ningxia, in implementing the policy of the united anti-Japanese national front, in the struggle against US imperialism and Chiang Kaishek's reaction after World War Two, as well as in setting up the people's democratic regime and in strengthening the People's Republic of China in the 1950s. Lin Boqu actively supported the broader and stronger friendly relations between China and the USSR.

Lin Boqu was born on February 12, 1886, in Yongzhou county, Southern Hunan, and was given a classical education at a grammar school in Changde. In 1904 he went to Japan to continue his education and a few years later graduated from the Economics Department of Tokyo University. When in Japan he familiarised himself with various contemporary ideological and political trends, such as reformist views of Liang Qichao, with the appeals to follow the example of Japan, and with Western bourgeois thought. After meeting Sun Yatsen, the young student adopted his idea of overthrowing the Manchu-Qing rule and establishing a republic in China. In 1905, he joined Tongmenghui, which marked the beginning of

¹ In preparing the present article for publication, the author used some materials put at his disposal by Lin Boqu's daughter, Olga Mikhailovna Ling-Ling, Cand. Sc. (Philol.), an assistant professor at Moscow University Institute of Asian and African Countries.

his career as a revolutionary.² Following this organisation's instructions, he returned to China, and in 1907 was made head of the Education Department of Jilin Province. As such he went in for active underground activities, his aim being to establish secret ties with lower social strata and the detachments of "forest lads". In 1911, he was sent to his native province of Hunan for revolutionary work among the government troops stationed there. It was largely due to his efforts that, following the October 10, 1911 uprising in Wuchang, Hunan was the first to declare its support of the Xinhai revolution and to proclaim itself independent from the Peking monarchic government. He became one of the first members of the National Party (Guomindang) after Sun Yatsen had set it up by merging Tongmenghui with four other smaller groups. The revolutionary process in China was interrupted by the reactionary Yuan Shikai's seizure of power. After the defeat of the 1913 "second revolution", Lin Boqu was forced to flee to Japan to join Sun Yatsen, who had fled for the second time and set about forming a new organisation, the Chinese Revolutionary Party.

In Japan Lin Boqu met Li Dazhao who was later to become the first exponent of Marxism-Leninism in China. They kept up contacts by writing each other letters in which they shared their opinions on developments in China and discussed revolutionary work. Li Dazhao introduced Lin Boqu to Marxist-Leninist principles. In 1915, Lin Boqu and Cheng Qian (one of Sun Yatsen's associates who later became Minister of War in his Guangzhou cabinet) returned to China to work against Yuan Shikai's dictatorship.

In 1920, Lin Boqu and his relative Lin Xiumei, a military adviser to President Sun Yatsen's office, began publishing *Gexing pinglun* magazine (*Renovated Criticism*) which popularised communist ideas. In 1921, Lin Boqu, on instructions from Sun Yatsen, travelled between Shanghai and Guangzhou, and it was then that he became a member of one of the communist study circles in Shanghai. There he met Chen Duxiu, Deng Zhongxia, Shen Dingyi and others, and after its formation, in July 1921, joined the Communist Party of China, with Li Dazhao and Chen Duxiu as his sponsors.

Within a year after its foundation the CPC set to work to organise a united anti-imperialist and anti-militarist front. The united front policy had been formulated by the Communist International, which the CPC had joined in 1922 following the decision of its 2nd Congress, and was based on the ideas which Lenin had put forward at the 2nd Comintern Congress (1920) and which were further developed by the 4th Comintern Congress (1922). This congress adopted the theses entitled *Eastern Question* which contained a subsection "United Anti-Imperialist Front". At the time the CPC was in the grip of sectarian sentiments shared by a portion of its leadership. To neutralise these, Lin Boqu and Li Dazhao sought to implement the Comintern's recommendations on the united front. In 1922, Lin became Treasurer and Chief of the Economics Department of Guomindang's Central Committee, then headquartered in Shanghai. This position enabled him to promote contacts between Sun Yatsen and the leaders of the CPC. Thus, in August 1922, he took part in a meeting between Sun Yatsen and Li Dazhao, and somewhat later he helped to arrange a meeting between Sun Yatsen and the then CC CPC General Secretary Chen Duxiu, at which

² According to D. Klein and A. Clark, Lin Boqu joined Singzhonghui in 1904, and probably at that time became close with Liao Zhaogkai, with whom he was on friendly terms ever since.

general and concrete issues involved in setting up a united front and forms of cooperation between Guomindang and the CPC were discussed.

In the second half of 1922, Lin Boqu and Li Dazhao helped to prepare and conduct negotiations between Sun Yatsen and A. A. Joffe, the RSFSR's newly-arrived representative to China, and between Sun Yatsen and a representative of the Comintern. These negotiations resulted in A. A. Joffe and Sun Yatsen issuing the famous communique of January 27, 1923, which went a long way toward establishing equitable relations between the USSR and China. At the same time progress was achieved in forming a united national revolutionary front based on cooperation between the CPC and the Guomindang, as well as in removing obstacles to the communist affiliation with the Guomindang. Lin Boqu had a hand in the reorganisation of the Guomindang, which was stepped up vigorously following Sun Yatsen's return, in February 1923, to Guangzhou, where he assumed leadership of the government of Southern China, and the arrival in Guangzhou, in October 1923, of M. M. Borodin, a prominent member of the Bolshevik Party, whom Sun Yatsen had invited to be his adviser. Along with other communists, Lin Boqu played an outstanding role in the Guomindang's Hunan organisation.

Sun Yatsen's intention to cooperate with the communists came up against bitter opposition on the part of the right-wing Guomindangers. Lin Boqu recalled that Sun Yatsen had had to warn the "hard-liners" in the following manner: "If you refuse to cooperate with the communists," he said, "I'll dissolve the Guomindang and join the Communist Party myself."³

The 1st Congress of the Guomindang, held in January 1924, endorsed the formation of the united front. Having joined the Guomindang, the communists retained their ideological, political and organisational independence. A number of communists were elected to Guomindang's leading bodies. Lin Boqu, who was a delegate of the congress, was made an alternate member of the Guomindang Executive, and in 1925 became a full-fledged member. A peasant department was set up under the Guomindang Executive in February 1924, in keeping with Sun Yatsen's three popular principles and three policy-making fundamentals (union with the USSR, union with the CPC, reliance on workers' and peasants' support). Being appointed its first head, Lin Boqu, along with Peng Bai and other communists, did much to promote the peasant movement, to create peasant unions, and to train peasant organisers at special courses, at which he lectured. He also taught at the Guomindang's military school, set up with Soviet assistance on the island of Huangpu, which trained officers for the revolutionary army. His lectures dealt with the peasant question and the peasant movement in China.

In April 1924, he was sent to Hankou, where he and Xiang Ying set up an underground committee of the Guomindang. However, following a series of blows dealt to the committee by the militaristic secret services, he had to leave for Guangzhou.

In 1925 and early 1926, Lin Boqu pursued organisational activities in the Guomindang. At the 2nd Guomindang Congress he made a report on the preparations for the congress, was reelected to the Executive, and became head of the financial and revisional committee and member of the Executive Secretariat. At the 2nd Plenary Meeting of the Guomindang Executive in May 1926 he gave a report on organisational work. By that

³ Lin Boqu, "Speech at the Solemn Meeting Dedicated to the 90th Anniversary Since the Birth of Sun Yatsen", *Druzhba*, September 13, 1956. .

time he had been transferred to a military post, as military affairs had acquired priority in connection with the immediate preparations for the National Revolutionary Army's (NRA) impending campaign against the Northern militarists. Lin Boqu was appointed Guomindang representative (Commissar) and head of the political department at the 6th NRA Corps. In April 1926, he arrived at the town of Waizhou (northeast of Guangzhou), where the corps' headquarters was situated, held meetings at the political department and the Guomindang Party Committee, and established proper relations with Cheng Qian, the Corps Commander. As a result, the first few days of his work took him a long way toward achieving a political unity of the troops and isolating the right-wing elements. Thus, Cheng Qian banned the right-Guomindang society for studying Sunyatsenism and gave his approval for the setting up of groups of the communist-guided union of young soldiers. Of vast importance for the 6th Corps, both militarily and politically, was Lin Boqu's close cooperation with Soviet military adviser N. I. Konchits.

The 3rd Plenary Meeting of the Guomindang Executive, held in March 1927, elected Lin Boqu a permanent member of the nine-man Guomindang Political Council and General Secretary of the Guomindang Military Council which was designed to restrain the power of Chiang Kaishek.

The NRA's 1926 victory over the militarists in the provinces of Southern and Central China (Hunan, Hubei, Jiangxi, and Fujian) permitted an offensive to be launched in the spring of 1927 aimed at liberating the Shanghai-Nanking region in the lower reaches of the Yangtze River. The 2nd, 6th and 40th Corps led by Cheng Qian and Lin Boqu defeated the militaristic troops and on March 24 marched into Nanking, an important political, cultural, economic and transport centre in Eastern China. The day before Shanghai had been liberated by Shanghai workers and NRA units. It was an impressive victory for the revolutionary forces of China. The imperialist powers reacted to this by shelling Nanking from their ships anchored en masse in the Yangtze, and by sending the Guomindang authorities, on April 11, 1927, an impudent ultimatum. One of its points demanded that "punishment be extended to those guilty of inciting unrest in Nanking". Its authors pressed for Lin Boqu to be arrested and put on trial.

The imperialist interference precipitated the counterrevolutionary coup by Chiang Kaishek's fidels in the Guomindang and its Army, which was carried out on April 12, 1927 first in Shanghai and then in other cities and provinces of Eastern and Southern China. As one of the most authoritative associates of Sun Yatsen, Lin Boqu signed a telegramme denouncing Chiang Kaishek's actions, as did Sun Qingling (Sun Yatsen's widow) and other left-Guomindang and CPC figures. The right Guomindang government, cringing as it did before the imperialists, issued an order for the arrest of Lin Boqu and met their other demands. In July 1927, the military and political leaders of Wuhan Guomindang also came out against the CPC. And again Lin Boqu's signature was under the appeal that denounced the counterrevolutionaries.

The CPC's reaction to the counterrevolutionary coups was to deliver a number of counterstrikes, the first of these being a rebellion in Nanchang on August 1, 1927 by some pro-communist NRA units. Lin Boqu, one of the leaders of the rebellion, sat on the Revolutionary Committee and headed the Financial Committee. He took part in the revolutionary troops' march to the South. However, in late September the rebels were crushed in Eastern Guangdong. Their attempt to create a new revolutionary base in Guangdong failed.

Lin Boqu fought his way through to the Hailufeng Soviet region, and thence, with He Lung and Liu Bocheng he went to Hong Kong and later to Japan.

The CPC Central Committee issued an instruction for some participants in the rebellion, Lin Boqu included, to go to the USSR for study. He spent four years there as a student at the Communist University of the Working People of China (CUWPC). He acquired profound knowledge of revolutionary theory, familiarised himself with the experience of the Soviet communists and the Soviet people, and, according to some accounts, attended the 6th Congress of the CPC. He and Wu Yuzhang coauthored a piece on the agrarian question in China. During the same years, Lin Boqu, along with Qu Qiubo, Wu Yuzhang and Liu Changsheng worked on the reform of the Chinese alphabet, and in September 1931 and in 1932 took part in the first and second conferences on the Latinisation of the Chinese alphabet, held in Vladivostok, where he had moved following the dissolution of the CUWPC in the autumn of 1930. There he taught political economy to the Chinese students at a Lenin school.

In 1932, Lin Boqu and some other CPC figures returned to China. In Shanghai, while on the territory of the French Concession, he, Guan Xianying, Wu Yuzhang and Xie Xue'ai were arrested, but soon managed to bribe themselves out of custody and left for the Soviet regions.⁴

As soon as he arrived at the Central Soviet Region, he was made Commissar of the People's Economy and later Commissar of Finances in the Provisional Central Government of the Chinese Soviet Republic. In 1933-1934, the Central Soviet Region was plagued by grave difficulties. The Guomindang army launched frenzied attacks (Chiang Kaishek's 4th and 5th campaigns) to capture its territory and destroy the Chinese Red Army. The area was blockaded and its economy was in shambles. Nevertheless, the economic bodies, led by Lin Boqu, managed to overcome dislocation; agricultural production was set in motion, consumer goods began to be manufactured, and a certain amount of trade was carried out with some Guomindang regions. At the 2nd Congress of the Soviets held in January 1934, Lin Boqu delivered a report on the economic situation.

Material supplies played a major role in helping the armies at the front to hold out against the attacks of superior enemy forces. However, by mid-1934, the military situation worsened and the CPC Central Committee and the Red Army Command took the decision to withdraw from the Central Soviet Region. In October 1934, the Red Army troops broke through the enemy blockade, which signalled the beginning of a year-long operation of transferring the great part of the Red Army and most Party and administrative cadres from Jiangxi first to the west and then to the north. Lin Boqu was in charge of bringing supplies to the troops and the cadres. These he obtained through confiscation from the propertied groups.

After the abovesaid part of the Red Army reached Northern Shenxi in October 1935 and joined there with other Red Army troops, it merged with the two local Soviet governments, one of which ruled the territory at the junction of the Shenxi, Gansu and Ningxia provinces, and the other in Northern Shenxi, the result being the creation of the Northwestern Office of the Central Soviet Government. With the Japanese aggression on hand, the main task of the CPC was to strengthen the Soviet region and

⁴ See A. M. Grigoryev, *Revolutionary Movement in China in 1927-1931. (Problems of Strategy and Tactics)*, Moscow, 1980, p. 274 (in Russian). According to other sources, Lin Boqu, while making his way in early 1933 to the Central Soviet Region, was recognised by Guomindang soldiers and wounded.

to carry out the Comintern-inspired policy of a united anti-Japanese national front. It was only with the Civil War ended and a new united front involving the CPC and Guomindang created that there could be hope of a successful resistance to the Japanese aggression. Lin Boqu played an important part in accomplishing both tasks, again being the Commissar for Finances in the Soviet Government and, conjointly, the Director of the State Bank. He was in charge of the CPC's financial policy. Lin Boqu told Edgar Snow in 1936 that less than 10 per cent of the population—landowners, usurers and, to a somewhat lesser degree, the big traders—were liable to taxes, which accounted for 40 to 50 per cent of the budget revenues. Subsequently, he said, they might introduce minor progressive-proportional taxation on the peasants. As another source of Red Army revenues (15-20 per cent), he cited voluntary contributions of food, clothes and money by the population. Some revenues came from the state trade, from enterprises, cooperatives, loans, and from working the lands apportioned to the Red Army. At the same time a stringent economy was practiced. The total expenditures of the region, which was larger than Belgium and the Netherlands lumped together, added up to a mere \$320,000 in local currency. An example of moderation was set by the Commissar for Finances himself, whose monthly pay was \$5.

Lin Boqu made a great contribution to the establishment of the united front. A leading CPC figure and an associate of Sun Yatsen, he enjoyed considerable prestige within patriotic circles and did much to further an agreement with the Guomindang on common struggle against imperialist Japan. In 1937, Lin Boqu, who was at the time Chairman of the North-western Office of the Central Soviet Government, simultaneously headed the CPC Office in Xian which played an important part in contacts with the Guomindang. Along with Zhou Enlai and Qin Bangxian he had negotiations with Chiang Kaishek in Lushan (Kuling) in 1937. The Guomindang leader agreed to recognise the legal status of the CPC which, from its side, pledged to reorganise the Soviet Government in Northwestern China into a democratic government of the Shenxi-Gansu-Ningxia border region, to place the Red Army under the command of the National Revolutionary Army of China as its 8th Field Army, and to publish a declaration announcing its willingness to cooperate with the Guomindang in the name of national salvation.

That the CPC took the agreements with the Guomindang seriously, including the one providing for the reorganisation of the Soviet government into a democratic government of the Special Region of the Chinese Republic, is seen, in particular, from Lin Boqu's article, "From the Soviets to a System of Democratic Republic", published in the CPC weekly *Zefang* No. 5, 1937. It emphasised the necessity of making the political system democratic (general elections, guarantees of the people's democratic freedoms, the bringing of administrative bodies closer to the people), of ensuring high morale of the anti-Japanese armed forces, of eradicating the national traitors and defending the revolutionary gains.⁵

In keeping with the agreement, an assembly of the people's representatives of the Shenxi-Gansu-Ningxia border region was convened in June 1937, that is, prior to Japan's attack at Northern China (the Lugouqiao events of July 7, 1937), which elected the region's government. Lin Boqu, who emphasised that it was created on the democratic principles of Sun

⁵ See V. M. Gubaidulin, *Revolutionary Power in the Liberated Areas of China (1937-1945)*, Novosibirsk, 1981, pp. 13-14 (in Russian).

Yatsen and saw the policy of a united anti-Japanese front of all parties as its primary mission, became its head.

The cooperation between the Guomindang and the CPC took on definite forms in the first period of the anti-Japanese war (July 1937-autumn of 1938). The Red Army units were reorganised into the 8th and the New 4th armies, commanded by Zhu De, Peng Dehuai, Ye Ting and Xiang Ying, who were known as the supporters of the CPC policy of strengthening the united front. Zhu De became deputy commander of the 2nd military zone, comprising the Shanxi Province, which was the target of the Japanese attack in the autumn of 1937. Communist-commanded troops created anti-Japanese strongholds in the occupied regions of Northern and Central China. Zhou Enlai and Guo Moruo took up important posts at the Political Department of the National Military Council.

Lin Boqu played an active part in strengthening the united anti-Japanese front. The National Political Council (NPC) composed of representatives of political parties, public organisations, various social groups and army units was set up on July 1, 1938, its mission being to advise the National Government and discuss important political decisions and draft laws. It was presumed that it later might provide an organisational framework for the united front. It included seven CPC representatives: Bo Gu (Qin Bangxian), Wang Ming (Chen Shaoyu), Dong Biu, Deng Yingchao (Zhou Enlai's wife), Lin Boqu, Mao Zedong and Wu Yuzhang. This fact reflected the prestige Lin Boqu enjoyed within the Communist Party, the patriotic circles of the Guomindang, and other parties and public organisations, as well as the recognition of his activities aimed at carrying out the policy of the united front in the 1920s and also prior to and in the early stages of the war against the Japanese aggressors.

The 6th Plenary Meeting of the CC CPC held in October-November 1938, instead of the previously intended 7th Party Congress, was dominated by the internationalists and elected Lin Boqu a member of the Central Committee. This was done in appreciation of his outstanding services to the Party, and his extensive work as head of the Shenxi-Gansu-Ningxia border region government and his efforts to put into practice the Party's course for uniting all anti-Japanese forces.

As chairman of the border region government and member of the Standing Committee of CC CPC Northwestern Bureau, Lin Boqu did much to strengthen the region, to effect progressive democratic reforms in its territory, to raise the masses' activity, to carry out the policy of the united front, and to draw into the power bodies, along with communists who represented the interests of the working people, also non-party progressive figures representing petty-bourgeois groups, and the "intermediary elements" representing the bourgeoisie and the patriotic landowners.⁶ He paid great attention to solving financial and economic problems, developing culture, public health care and education, and overcoming obsolete views and prejudices.

At the first session of the First People's Political Council of the Shenxi-Gansu-Ningxia border region (January 1939), Lin Boqu read a report on the work of the region's government, which gave details of the situation in the region, explained its importance for the war against Japan, and dealt with issues pertaining to strengthening the rear bases and helping the front, to carrying out the policy of the united anti-Japanese front, the democratisation of the political and the legal systems, the

⁶ Li Weiham thinks that the "three-thirds system" began to be applied in the Shenxi-Gansu-Ningxia border region in November 1941. See *Renmin ribao*, May 30, 1980.

economy and finances, the cultural and educational work to be carried out in the spirit of defending the country from the aggressors, and the tasks facing the border region's government.⁷

Li Weiham, who was sent by the CPC Central Committee in 1942 to the border region as Lin Boqu's assistant in government work, noted with good reason that the successes in developing the Shenxi-Gansu-Ningxia region were "above all the result of the struggle of the broad masses of army-men and the people inhabiting the region, but were also inseparable from the correct leadership and the excellent style of work of the honourable Lin".⁸ According to Li Weiham and Li Jingfan, who worked in the government of the border region, Lin Boqu sought to obtain information on the state of affairs and the sentiments of the masses from the masses' representatives, members of the People's Political Council and delegates of the various congresses and conferences, which was of great significance in correctly solving the complicated problems of the region's life and struggle. He paid great attention to establishing good relations with the non-party figures (such as Li Dingming, Deputy Chairman of the government) and to enhancing their participation in various bodies of power, given a higher guiding role of the Party. With various patriotic-minded figures arriving to the region, Lin Boqu, relying on his rich experience, managed to have Party cadres cooperate with them as well as with the members of the old local intelligentsia to whom he explained the Party policies. He opposed the 1942 persecution campaign against the cadres of the Shenxi-Gansu-Ningxia border region and against the young patriots who had come to the region from the Guomindang territories. In carrying out his duties, Lin Boqu based himself on the principle of democratic centralism and took into account the experience and opinions, even if controversial, of other workers, particularly the veteran Shenxi cadres. But this did not imply concessions in the matters of principle.

Lin Boqu's ability firmly to stand by the CPC's line was particularly manifest during the negotiations with the Guomindang renewed in May 1944 first in Xian and then in Chongqing, with Lin Boqu leading the CPC delegation. The negotiations lasted till mid-August 1944, when they were broken owing to the Guomindang stand which not only refused to accept the CPC's proposals (to recognise the actual status of the anti-Japanese bases, to democratise regime in the Guomindang regions, to free political prisoners) but insisted on what amounted to its control of the CPC's territories.

At the 3rd session of the NPC in Chongqing held in September 1944, Lin Boqu, speaking on behalf of the CPC, demanded that the one-party dictatorship of the Guomindang be abolished with the subsequent convocation of a conference of various parties and organisations which would set up a coalition government and a united command of all armed forces, that is, the organs of the united anti-Japanese front. These demands met with broad support in different social groups, in particular among the patriots in the Guomindang, literary and cultural figures, and in the Democratic League.

The CPC's proposal on the coalition government was reiterated by the 7th Congress of the CPC (April-June 1945), which reelected Lin Boqu member of the CPC Central Committee. The 1st Plenum of the CC elected him a member of the Politburo.

⁷ The text of the report in Russian translation may be found in V. M. Gubaidulin, *Op. cit.*, pp. 98-153.

⁸ *Renmin ribao*, May 30, 1980.

The Soviet Union's rout of the Japanese Kwangtung army in August 1945 played a decisive role in liberating the main economic and political centres and regions of Northern, Eastern, Southern and Central China and created favourable conditions for the growth of democratic forces. As Chairman of the Shenxi-Gansu-Ningxia border region government, which post he retained until 1948, Lin Boqu took part in defending the region against the attacking Guomindang forces, after the Guomindang with US support unleashed a civil war in mid-1946, and subsequently helped organise counteroffensives by the People's Liberation Army of China.

During the final stage of the civil war, the CC CPC entrusted Lin Boqu with preparations for the formation of the People's Republic of China. In April 1949, following the decisive victories scored by the People's Liberation Army of China, CPC-Guomindang negotiations to end the civil war on the conditions put forward by the CPC took place in Peking. Lin Boqu was on the CPC delegation. After the Guomindang government refused to endorse the agreement reached, the PLA resumed its offensive, forced the Yangtze River, liberated Nanking, Shanghai, Wuhan and other cities and provinces. The defeat of the reactionary Guomindang clique in the war it had unleashed with the US support became an accomplished fact. The time was ripe for the convocation of a new Political Consultative Council⁹ which was supposed to create a people's government led by the CPC, with all the anti-Chiang Kaishek forces participating in it. Lin Boqu was one of the leaders of the Preparatory Committee, its secretary, and a member of the standing committee. He was on the CPC delegation sent to the session of the People's Political Consultative Council (PPCC) convened in September 1949, which elected the Central People's Government. Lin Boqu became General Secretary of the Central People's Government, a member of the Central People's Governmental Council (the supreme legislative body in 1949-1954), and a member of the Chinese National committee of the the PPCC.

The proclamation, on October 1, 1949, of the People's Republic of China was the result of the protracted liberation struggle of the Chinese people, in which Lin Boqu took an active part since the early 1900s. In the new period he did much to strengthen the people's democratic state. Following the adoption, in 1954, of the first PRC Constitution, Lin Boqu was elected deputy to and Deputy Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress and reelected to the post in 1959. The 8th CPC Congress held in September 1956, reelected Lin Boqu to the Central Committee and the Politburo.

Lin Boqu was loyal to the friendship between the peoples of the USSR and China. He was Deputy Chairman of the China-USSR Friendship Society, with Sun Qinling as its Chairman.

The outstanding veteran of the Chinese revolution died of a heart attack on May 29, 1960 at the age of 75. Lin Boqu's life is vivid proof of the fact that a true communist always upholds the vital interests of his own people and the cause of international solidarity of the working people, and always remains an internationalist.

⁹ In January 1946, the Political Consultative Council was in session in Peking, which was attended by Guomindang, the CPC and other parties as well as non-party figures. Its decisions aimed at the unification and democratisation of China were foiled by the Guomindang.

SUKHE-BATOR'S ROLE IN MONGOLIAN REVOLUTION RECALLED

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[Article by A. D. Sherstnev and B. Ye. Nizovtsev: "The Leader of the Mongolian Revolution"]

As an internationalist, patriot and soldier, Damdiny Sukhe-Bator is the most outstanding figure among the heroic fighters for the freedom and independence of people's Mongolia. A staunch champion of friendship with Soviet Russia, he devoted all his vigour and talent to the cause of liberating the Mongolian people from the colonial yoke and from exploitation, to the cause of a social reform in his country. Having been schooled by the adversity of struggle, Sukhe-Bator became the leader of the Mongolian revolution, the founder of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party and the people's state. A contemporary of his reminisced: "Be it battle or podium, Sukhe-Bator dominated the will of those who followed him or listened to him. He was a brilliant and almost sole orator in Mongolia. His speech was flowing most freely. His deep sincerity and strength of conviction gripped the hearts of his listeners. Even strangers to the language of his country happened to succumb to the charisma of this tribune, an ex-cattle-breeder, the son of poor Mongolia."¹

Damdiny Sukhe-Bator was born on February 2, 1893 in a suburb of Urga (now Ulan Bator) in the family of a poor cattle-breeder. He experienced all the hardships that were the lot of the oppressed toiling masses in pre-revolutionary Mongolia.

At the turn of the century Mongolia was gradually involved in the sphere of the world capitalist economy. Karl Marx's words that trade and usurious capital does not create a new but only brings "the existing mode of production to a more miserable state"² can be well applied to the socio-economic situation of Mongolia at the time.

The Mongolian people suffered oppression from three sides: by secular and clerical feudals, by the Manchurian colonialists and by foreign trade and usurious capital. Cattle-breeders went bankrupt. The country's main economic activity—nomadic cattle-breeding—was declining, the number of cattle was dropping every year. The firm Da Shenhua alone drove annually to China 600 thousand sheep and 70 thousand horses received as interest payments for credits in goods. The firm was credited with such wealth that it could, as they said in Mongolia, pave the road with silver nuggets all the way from Urga to Peking.³

Intolerable exploitation provoked the protest of the cattle-breeders. They exercised widespread passive resistance in the form of tax evasion, disobedience to the feudal authorities' orders, etc. Their movement climaxed in revolts and armed struggle.⁴

¹ *Urginskaya gazeta*, Feb. 20, 1924.

² K. Marx and F. Engels, *Works*, Vol. 25, part II, second edition, pp. 159-160 (in Russian).

³ See I. M. Maisky, *Mongolia on the Eve of Revolution*, Moscow, 1960, p. 32 (in Russian).

⁴ See A. D. Kalinnikov, *National Liberation Movement in Mongolia*, Moscow, 1926; Sh. Natsagdorzh, *From History of Peasant Movement in Outer Mongolia*, Moscow, 1958; same author, *History of Khalkha*, Ulan Bator, 1963 (in Mongolian); I. Ya. Zlatkin, *Outlines of Modern and Contemporary History of Mongolia*, Moscow, 1957.

The moulding of the character of Sukhe-Bator as an organiser and leader of the people's revolution was much influenced by the heroic struggle of the cattle-breeders against the feudals under the leadership of Ayush, Togtokh, and others.⁵

Revolutionary events in Russia and China had created favourable conditions for the liberation struggle of the Mongolian people. The echo of the Russian bourgeois-democratic revolution of 1905 reached the most distant corners of the world and, as V. I. Lenin stressed, "hundreds of millions of the downtrodden and benighted have awakened from medieval stagnation to a new life and are rising to fight for elementary human rights, and democracy".⁶ In Mongolia, the long smouldering resentment against the colonial regime culminated in 1911 with the overthrow of the rule of the Manchurian conquerors. An appeal in connection with Mongolia's declaration of autonomy ran as follows: "Our Mongolia from the very beginning of her existence has been a separate state, and therefore, in accordance with ancient law, Mongolia declares herself an independent state with a new government, with an authority independent of others to conduct its matters. In view of the said, it is announced that we Mongols henceforth do not obey Manchurian and Chinese officials whose power is fully terminated and consequently they must leave our country."⁷

However, the 1911 revolution did not bring real liberation to the Mongols. A real chance of winning freedom and independence only came with the victory of the Great October Socialist Revolution.

Because of his family's material plight, Sukhe-Bator began to seek a living at an early age. At 14 he became a herder of horses on the Urga-Kyakhta highway. Meeting people from all walks of life, he often came across unfair treatment of cattle-breeders by feudals, high-ranking lamas and Manchurian officials.

Sukhe-Bator spent the years 1907-1908 in Urga as a day-labourer. Every free minute saved from his hard work he used for self-education.

In 1912 Sukhe-Bator was called up to the army of Autonomous Mongolia. Successfully completing junior commanders' school, he became a squadron commander and fought for the independence of his country.

While in the army he learned of the Great October Socialist Revolution which became a turning point in the national liberation struggle of the peoples of the East. The Soviet government's annulment of all the unequal treaties forcibly concluded by the tzarist government, recognition of the Mongols' right to independence and sovereignty, which was a point of Lenin's foreign policy, met with the great approval of the toiling masses. Under the influence of the October Revolution Sukhe-Bator understood the liberating mission of the proletariat, the nature of Soviet power and of the first state of workers and peasants.

At the end of 1917 and the beginning of 1918 the working people of Russia's regions bordering on Mongolia—Russians, Tuvins, Buryats—were mounting a fight against foreign invaders, White Guards and local oppressors. Mongolian cattle-breeders, especially those in the border areas, became increasingly aware that the new power in Russia stood for the interests of the working people.

Soon afterward, the fear of the liberating ideas of the October Revolution prompted the feudal-theocratic government of the Bogdo-Gegen

⁵ See L. Bat-Ochir, D. Dashzhamts, *Biography of Damdiny Sukhe-Bator*, M., 1971, p. 21.

⁶ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 19, p. 86.

⁷ Sh. Natsagdorzh, *History of Khalkha*, p. 230 (in Mongolian).

(head of secular and clerical power) to enter an open collusion with Japanese imperialists and their Chinese agents from the militarist Anfu clique. Fearful of the fate of their power and feudal privileges, the Bogdo-Gegen government hoped with the help of imperialist Japan and reactionary Chinese generals to preserve feudal ways in the country and pacify the cattle-breeders. This treacherous policy had a dire consequence—the country was occupied by the troops of the Chinese militarists and on November 22, 1919 the autonomy of Outer Mongolia was annulled by a decree proclaimed by China's president.

Closely watching developments, Sukhe-Bator felt very strongly about the occupation of his country. That time marked the beginning of his active participation in revolutionary activity. By the end of 1918 he was demobilised and set off for Urga, where he found work as a type-setter at a printing office. It was also at that time that he first met Russian Bolsheviks living in exile in Mongolia, who became his political tutors.

In the summer of 1919 Sukhe-Bator had a hand in setting up two underground revolutionary circles in Urga, capital of Outer Mongolia. Members of the circles were spreading leaflets calling for a struggle to be staged against the Chinese militarists and their Mongolian henchmen—high-ranking clerics and princes, and for preparations to be made for an armed action against the feudals and invaders.

At the end of February 1920 the Red Army liberated Troitskosavsk and on March 2 Verkhneudinsk (now Ulan Ude). The hour was drawing close of the complete liberation of Siberia from the invaders and of victory over Russian bourgeois-landlord counterrevolution.

Members of the underground revolutionary circles understood that the Red Army's victories paved the way for the revolutionary struggle of the Mongolian people. But to succeed in this struggle, they had to join forces as soon as possible and to establish contacts with the international revolutionary movement, led by the Comintern, and with the government of Soviet Russia.

In June 1920, at a joint session of the underground circles the Mongolian People's Party was formed. The leadership of the party decided to establish contacts with the Comintern and the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) and to apply to the Soviet government for aid to the liberation struggle of the Mongolian people.⁸ The first group of party envoys, led by Kh. Choibalsan, set off to Soviet Russia in June 1920.

Sukhe-Bator, who had remained in Urga, went on directing the organisation under extremely difficult conditions. Meanwhile the situation had begun to get complicated. The Chinese militarists were applying even more terror, stopping at nothing. The feudals asked for the help of imperialist powers. The American consul in Kalgan was secretly handed a message from the Bogdo-Gegen to be delivered to the US government. A similar missive was sent to Tokyo through the Japanese consul in Khailar.

In July 1920, a second group of delegates, led by Sukhe-Bator, set out for Soviet Russia. On July 22 they reached Verkhneudinsk where they joined the Choibalsan group.

On August 15, the joint delegation, headed by Sukhe-Bator and Choibalsan, arrived in Irkutsk for talks with representatives of Soviet Russia. Sukhe-Bator and Choibalsan, in the name of the Mongolian people, handed an appeal to the RSFSR government asking for help and

⁸ See A. I. Kartunova, E. N. Shakhnazarova, "Comintern and Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party", *Far Eastern Affairs*, 1974, No. 3.

expressing the desire of the Mongolian revolutionaries to establish contacts with revolutionary organisations of Soviet Russia and China for a joint struggle against local feudals and foreign invaders.

Meanwhile the Japanese imperialists, having suffered a fiasco in 1919 with the plan of creating "Greater Mongolia" and having lost in 1920 their Anfu agents, decided to use for their aggressive purposes Russian White Guards who, after having been routed by the Red Army, broke up and fled to Mongolia and Northeast China. Execution of this plan was assigned to Baron Ungern. At the initial stage of the adventure Ungern managed to score certain successes. Having seized the most important centres of the country, he plunged them into terror, robbing and ruining the cattle-breeders without mercy.

On November 22 Sukhe-Bator arrived in Kyakhtha in order to guide the liberation struggle from there. Of much importance for mobilising the peasants to an armed struggle was the First Congress of the Mongolian People's Party, held on March 1, 1921. Speaking at the Congress, Sukhe-Bator said the following: "We have to fight on our own for the liberation of the Mongolian people because the Urga government is unable to do so. It humbly fulfills all the orders of Baron Ungern. Our only way is to establish close ties with Soviet Russia and with her help fight our worst enemy—Ungern and his allies, princes and lamas."⁹

The Congress outlined the character of the future revolution as anti-imperialist and anti-feudal, stressing the leading role of the party which expressed the interests of the exploited peasants, relied on the assistance of Soviet Russia and was able to lead the masses in the struggle for a complete national and social liberation.

The Congress decided to establish headquarters for the Mongolian People's Army, appointing Sukhe-Bator its commander.

The line adopted at the First MPP Congress directed the Mongolian people toward a revolution.¹⁰

On March 13, 1921 in Troitskosavsk a congress was held of representatives of the working people of border settlements, partisan detachments, and party organisations, which elected the country's first Provisional People's Government, with Sukhe-Bator as its member.

On March 16, 1921 the CC MPP and the Provisional People's Government resolved to liberate the border town of Maimachen from the Chinese militarists. Possession of this town would give the Provisional Government an important stronghold on Mongolian territory. March 18, 1921, the day of liberation of Maimachen, renamed afterward Altan Bulak, is observed as the birthday of the Mongolian People's Army.

On June 27, 1921 the Mongolian People's Army under the command of Sukhe-Bator and in cooperation with Soviet troops started its historic march to Urga which ended on July 6 with the city's liberation from the Ungern troops. On July 8 the Provisional People's Government arrived in the capital. On July 10 the CC MPP took a decision to hand over central power to a permanent people's government, in which D. Sukhe-Bator assumed the posts of the Defence Minister and Commander-in-Chief.

On July 11, 1921 a national rally was held in Urga, at which the establishment of people's power in Mongolia was declared. This day has become a national holiday—the day of victory of people's revolution.

⁹ Quoted from Kh. Choibalsan, *Short History of the Mongolian People's Revolution*, Ulan Bator, 1931, part II, p. 16.

¹⁰ See P. Demberel, *First Congress of the Mongolian People's Party*, 1931, p. 31.

On July 12, 1921 the people's government asked the RSFSR government not to withdraw Soviet troops from Mongolia until the White-Guard gangs were finally liquidated. The Soviet government complied with this request.

At the end of July 1921 the routing of the Ungern gangs was completed, and Ungern himself was taken prisoner and sentenced by a revolutionary tribunal to be shot by a firing squad.

Joint Soviet-Mongolian military operations in liquidating White-Guard gangs in Mongolian territory laid the foundation of fraternal friendship between the peoples of Mongolia and Soviet Russia.

With a view to further cooperation with its Soviet neighbour, the Mongolian People's Government sent to Moscow in October 1921 a delegation, which included Sukhe-Bator. On November 5 the delegation signed an agreement with the RSFSR Government on establishing friendly relations. For Mongolia it was the first equal international treaty and as such of immense importance for the consolidation of her international and domestic positions, and people's power, for further advance of the revolution and laying down the basis of people's democracy.

While in Moscow, the delegation was received by Lenin who shared the idea of a non-capitalist way of development for Mongolia.

Guided by Marxism-Leninism, the Mongolian People's Party and government have undeviatingly held the course of furthering revolution.

It was a historic accomplishment of the Mongolian People's Party and its leader Sukhe-Bator that they linked the liberation struggle of the Mongolian people with the international working-class movement and its vanguard—the party of Lenin and the first state of dictatorship of the proletariat. Wrote Yu. Tsedenbal on the great significance of Lenin's ideas for the victory of the Mongolian revolution: "It is fair to say that it was Leninism and the Great October Revolution that delivered the Mongolian people from the reign of destitution and darkness, lawlessness and slavery, from the fetters of poverty, hardships and backwardness endemic to feudalism and colonialism. Leninism not only delivered the Mongolian people from the reign of colonialists and feudals, but also opened up a clear, scientifically substantiated perspective of development of our country, it showed up the purpose of the struggle, the way and means of achieving it."¹¹

D. Sukhe-Bator was a true and fervent champion of Mongolia's development along the Leninist road and of consolidating friendship with Soviet Russia.

In March 1922 the Soviet Government decorated Sukhe-Bator with the Order of the Red Banner for his outstanding achievements in the struggle against the common enemy. The Mongolian People's Government marked his services by giving him the title of "Zorigt Bator" (fearless hero).

On February 22, 1923 death snatched from the ranks of the party its tried leader, people's hero D. Sukhe-Bator when he was only 30. Here is what he said in his testament: "I instruct you, friends, to sacredly preserve the freedom won by the people, always to subordinate the policy of the party and the actions of the government to the interests of the working people, to consolidate the liberation of the cattle-breeders from the yoke of the internal and external enemies."¹²

¹¹ Yu. Tsedenbal, *Selected Articles and Speeches*, Moscow, 1974, p. 335.

¹² *Collection of Materials on the Life and Activity of D. Sukhe-Bator*, Ulan Bator, 1963, p. 160 (in Mongolian).

Sukhe-Bator's dream was to see his country delivered from the detrimental vestiges of colonialism and feudalism, with a developed economy and culture. Since then his dream has come true. In a historically short time, the Mongolian people, guided by the People's Revolutionary Party, have come all the way from feudalism to socialism, having thus proved the correctness of Lenin's theory of non-capitalist development. The MPR has become a developed socialist agrarian-industrial state with a high level of culture and people's well-being.

The Mongolian working people highly value and carefully preserve their friendship with the peoples of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries bequeathed by Sukhe-Bator and Lenin, regarding it as a guarantee of their freedom and independence, of successful development along the road of socialism and communism.

The General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Yuri Andropov, in his speech during the celebration of the 60th anniversary of the USSR, noting the global importance of strengthening friendship and co-operation of the fraternal countries of socialism as a major stabilising factor in international affairs, as a guarantee of each country's advance along the road of socialism and communism, said the following: "...Appraising the present-day situation of our countries, we can say with satisfaction: we have learned a lot, the community of socialist states is a strong and healthy organism which plays a great and beneficial role in the contemporary world... By joint efforts we find ever more successful ways of combining the general interests of the community with the interests of each member-country."¹³

The Mongolian People's Republic is a trustworthy member of the socialist community. Following D. Sukhe-Bator's behests, the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party makes a worthy contribution to the strengthening of unity and solidarity of the communist ranks, of the whole revolutionary movement, to the noble cause of the struggle for peace and security in the Far East and the whole world.

¹³ *Pravda*, Dec. 22, 1982.

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INDOCHINESE COUNTRIES' STRUGGLE FOR ZONE OF PEACE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

Moscow FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS in English No 2, Apr-Jun 83 pp 145-156

[Article by M. P. Yelin]

The 26th Congress of the CPSU has once again announced the solidarity of Soviet communists and the whole of the Soviet people with Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea, and has declared itself in favour of the development of goodneighbourly relations with ASEAN countries. The Congress welcomed the idea of conversion of Southeast Asia into a zone of peace.

The peoples of Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea secured the triumph of their just cause through immense hardships. The victory they won, as a result of a protracted struggle against imperialist aggression, enabled the peoples of the three countries to choose the road of development that best corresponds to their historical and socio-economic conditions, the road of a direct transition from the national people's-democratic revolution to the socialist revolution. The tasks of building a material and technical basis of socialism in Vietnam, of laying down foundations for a socialist society in Laos and Kampuchea, and the solving of the economic and social problems connected with this are being carried out under difficult conditions, since these tasks are being resolved in countries whose economies have been devastated by a long war and the destructive influence of neocolonialism, primarily in the south of Vietnam. In Kampuchea the people's power has yet to stamp out the terrible aftermath of the three-year rule of the criminal Pol Pot regime. The countries of Indochina are also facing the serious problem of ensuring their security. The peoples of Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea need a lasting peace to improve the situation in their respective countries.

It is only natural that the countries of Indochina have been consolidating, in every possible way, their time-tested special relations of friendship and solidarity. The peoples of Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea associate their achievements in building a new life and upholding their independence and sovereignty with the disinterested assistance and all-encompassing support of their reliable friends—the Soviet Union and other countries of the socialist community.

The struggle for converting Southeast Asia into a zone of peace and stability looms large among the primary foreign policy tasks solved together by Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea. The three countries link the solution of this task with plans of their economic, social and cultural development. This was convincingly stated at the Fifth Congress of the Communist Party of Vietnam, the Third Congress of the People's Revolu-

tionary Party of Laos and the Fourth Congress of the People's Revolutionary Party of Kampuchea, which were held in 1981-1982.

* * *

As a result of the victory won by the peoples of Indochina in Southeast Asia in the mid-1970s, the necessary prerequisites have taken shape for the development of peaceful cooperation and creation of an atmosphere of mutual confidence. During that time Vietnam and Laos began acting in Southeast Asia as an influential peace-loving factor, something that gave a tangible impetus to the implementation of this region's peoples' desire to live in peace.

In the mid-1970s, under the favourable influence of international détente, ASEAN countries (Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines and Singapore) began displaying independence in politics and economics and safeguarding their right to their own path of development. The Southeast Asian countries urge for cohesion on a regional basis to give a rebuff to imperialism was quite justified. There was growing awareness in those countries that the policy of imperialism presents a grave threat to freedom and to the independence of their peoples and that a united Vietnam pursuing an independent peaceable policy together with its allies—the peoples of Laos and Kampuchea—would act as an important barrier hampering the realisation of the schemes by the enemies of peace and stability in that region.

Socialist Vietnam, which by that time had already been a target of a rabid propaganda campaign launched by the forces of imperialism and world reaction who sought to counterpose Vietnam to ASEAN countries, was the first to stretch the hand of friendship to its neighbours.

As early as July 1976, right after the proclamation of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, its government, guided by the desire to develop fruitful political, economic and other relations with the countries of Southeast Asia, set forth a programme embodying the following four principles which underlie its policy in the region:

- 1) mutual respect for independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity; noninterference in each others' internal affairs, equality, mutual benefit, peaceful coexistence;

- 2) denial of a request by any foreign state for use of the territory of a state of the region as a base for launching aggression and direct or indirect interference in the affairs of countries of the region;

- 3) establishment of relations of friendship and goodneighbourliness, economic cooperation and cultural exchanges on the basis of equality and mutual respect; settlement of all disputes between countries of the region in the spirit of equality, mutual understanding and mutual respect;

- 4) development of cooperation among countries of the region to create prospering states with due account of the specific conditions in each country in the interest of independence, peace and genuine neutrality of Southeast Asia, thereby contributing to the strengthening of universal peace.¹

The Lao People's Democratic Republic made its contribution to the normalisation of the situation when it declared that the establishment of goodneighbourly relations with the countries of Southeast Asia was a major prerequisite for creating an atmosphere of peace and cooperation in the region.

¹ See *Nhan Dan*, July 6, 1976.

The efforts by Vietnam and Laos aimed at finding together with ASEAN countries an acceptable plan of regional political and economic cooperation that would exclude wars and military conflicts from the life of peoples of Southeast Asia were met with the understanding and support of the peoples, as well as the political and public quarters of the countries in that region.

As a result of the aforementioned diplomatic action of Vietnam in August 1976 diplomatic relations between the Socialist Republic of Vietnam and all ASEAN countries were established; Vietnam's relations with Malaysia, the Philippines, Indonesia and Singapore improved, and the path toward normalising Vietnamese-Thai relations was charted. Mutual contacts were developing, the result of which was that Vietnam's partners gave their approval to the four principles outlined by Vietnam in that area. ASEAN countries (some of them were accomplices to the US imperialist aggression) declared their readiness to take part, as much as they could, in healing the wounds of war and in the economic construction in Vietnam. By the beginning of 1978 the contractual principles of the relations, in particular economic, were laid down between Vietnam and a number of countries of the region.

After the people of Kampuchea had won victory in January 1979 and formed People's Republic of Kampuchea that stood for peace, friendship and nonalignment and would promote peace, stability and prosperity in Southeast Asia, the possibilities for positive changes in the region became even greater. Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea represented a new political centre of progressive forces which began immediately to exert tangible influence on the development of positive changes in Southeast Asia, and on the restructuring of international relations in the interests of peace and security of nations.

The visit of the Prime Minister of Thailand to the Lao People's Democratic Republic in January 1979 confirmed this trend. The resulting Lao-Thai communique reaffirmed such principles of interstate relations as respect for independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity, noninterference in each other's internal affairs, and the settlement of all disputes by peaceful means. The parties noted their mutual desire for strengthening goodneighbourly relations in that region.²

The visit of the government delegation of Laos headed by the Prime Minister Phomvihane to Thailand in April 1979 was also a success. In the course of the negotiations the parties concentrated on the problems of peaceful and mutually beneficial cooperation. The negotiations confirmed the desire of the two sides to turn the Mekong River into a zone of peace and friendship. The Lao paper **Siang Pasason** in its commentary on the outcome of the visit of the Lao delegation to Thailand wrote: "Laos and Thailand are not merely neighbouring states with a common border of 1,600 km. They are also united by the community of the traditions of solidarity and mutual assistance, and kindred cultures."³

Such development of events was not to the liking of the opponents of detente in Southeast Asia. Unprecedented pressure was brought to bear on ASEAN countries with the aim of making them abandon the policy of establishing goodneighbourly relations with the independent countries of Indochina. It should be pointed out that in Southeast Asian countries, alongside the growing awareness of the danger emanating from the forces of imperialism and reaction, some other sentiments were spread.

² See *Siang Pasason*, Jan. 14, 1979.

³ *Ibid.*, April 6, 1979.

Their essence was to try to "keep aside", to "adapt themselves" and, in any case, to avoid openly qualifying the actions of the enemies of the three independent Indochinese countries.

While succumbing to the pressure by Washington and by those in agreement with it on this issue, ASEAN countries took a negative stance as regards the People's Republic of Kampuchea. Moreover, they declared their urge to preserve ties with the so-called Democratic Kampuchea which fell into oblivion, i. e., with the remnants of the Pol Pot gangs which had been driven out of Kampuchea and which entrenched themselves in Thailand. During the sittings of the 34th and 35th sessions of the General Assembly a proposal was put forward, not without the consent of ASEAN, to convene a so-called international conference on Kampuchea. Till now ASEAN members refuse to recognise the People's Republic of Kampuchea as the sole legitimate representative of the Kampuchean people.

Despite all the obstacles placed by the enemies of detente in that region on the road toward normalisation of the situation in Southeast Asia, Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea have expressed their desire for an improvement of relations in the area. They display patience and political flexibility while continuing to look for ways to normalise relations with ASEAN countries, and working for the turning of Southeast Asia into a zone of peace, stability and cooperation.

Of special political significance for the normalisation of the situation in Southeast Asia is the active peace offensive of the three Indochinese states launched during the past three years. It was initiated in January 1980 at the First Conference of the Foreign Ministers of Kampuchea, Laos and Vietnam in Pnompenh. The communique of the conference pointed out that the governments of Kampuchea, Laos and Vietnam are ready to start negotiations with the governments of Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines, Singapore and Burma so that they together can convert Southeast Asia into a peaceful, independent, free, neutral, stable, and prosperous region.

In May 1980 Vietnam launched fresh efforts for normalising the situation in Southeast Asia and improving relations with the states of the region. The Foreign Minister of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam Nguyen Co Thach paid official visits to Malaysia and Thailand with the aim of resuming a dialogue with Southeast Asian countries and explaining the peaceful initiatives of the Indochinese states.

However, a stable situation in Southeast Asia was in no way to the liking of imperialism and reactionaries, whose interference in the internal affairs of the region became even more dangerous, resulting, among other things, in an aggravation of the situation near the Thai-Kampuchean border. While using the territory of Thailand as a shelter for the Pol Pot gangs that were described as Kampuchean "refugees", the reactionaries armed remnants of Pol Pot troops and incited them to carry out subversive activities against the People's Republic of Kampuchea. With the same aim in view the so-called campaign of voluntary repatriation of Kampuchean refugees was launched in June 1980, when Thailand with the support of its armed forces made an attempt to send a large unit of the Pol Pot cutthroats across the Thai-Kampuchean border, using as cover the multithousand flow of refugees. The provocateurs were given a fitting rebuff, by the armed forces of the People's Republic of Kampuchea.

During the Soviet-Vietnamese summit meeting in the Kremlin on July 3, 1980, its participants stated that the complications on the Thai-

Kampuchean border stem directly from the policies of those forces hostile to the cause of peace, which encourage the provocative inroads by the Pol Pot gangs against Kampuchea. The Soviet and the Vietnamese leaders stated that the establishment of an atmosphere of peace and stability in that region would meet the vital interests of the Southeast Asian countries. The USSR treated with understanding and approval the actions and initiatives by Vietnam, Laos, Kampuchea and also other states, aimed at achieving this goal.⁴

The diplomatic offensive of the states of Indochina with the purpose of improving the situation in Southeast Asia was continued at the Second Conference of the Foreign Ministers of Laos, Vietnam and Kampuchea held in Vientiane on July 17-18, 1980. Having reaffirmed the fundamental proposals advanced at the Pnompenh Conference of January 5, 1980, the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, the Lao People's Democratic Republic and the People's Republic of Kampuchea made a proposal to sign bilateral or multilateral treaties between Laos, Kampuchea, Vietnam and Thailand on nonaggression, noninterference in each other's affairs, and the denial of a request by any other country to use the territory of any of these states as a base against another country or countries. The states of the Indochinese peninsula declared their readiness to discuss with the other countries of that region the creation in Southeast Asia of a zone of peace and stability.

The four-point proposal on the turning of the Kampuchean-Thai border into a zone of peace and friendship put forward by the People's Republic of Kampuchea at the Vientiane Conference, was of considerable political significance. The proposal envisaged, among other things, that Kampuchea and Thailand undertake to create a demilitarised zone along the border between them. It was noted that the negotiations to settle the problems existing between Kampuchea and Thailand can be conducted directly between the governments of the two countries or through some other country. It was meant that the agreement reached between the parties can be confirmed and its realisation ensured at an international conference or by means of international guarantees on the basis of mutual consent.

The constructive character of the proposals set forth by the Vientiane Conference of Foreign Ministers of Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea attracted the attention of the whole world, including the United Nations. Early in August 1980 the UN Secretary-General K. Waldheim arrived in Hanoi and conducted talks with the leaders of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. In the course of the negotiations the Vietnamese side reiterated its loyalty to the policy of strengthening peace and stability in Southeast Asia and of settling all disputes through negotiation. The UN Secretary-General handed to the Thai leaders a message from the Vietnam leaders in which the proposals of the Indochinese countries were developed and specified. Soon after his visit to the PRC, however, the Thai Foreign Minister hastily rejected the new initiatives of Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea without any convincing arguments.

As the Foreign Minister of Kampuchea Hun Sen has stated, facts show that Thailand intends to continue acting in accordance with outside instructions. There is no doubt, Hun Sen added, that it was as a result of outside pressure that Bangkok turned down the peaceable proposals of

⁴ See *Pravda*, July 4, 1980.

the People's Revolutionary Council of Kampuchea (PRCK) directed at settling the Thai-Kampuchean relations.⁵

On September 24, 1980, the Foreign Ministry of the People's Republic of Kampuchea issued a statement in connection with the opening of the 35th Session of the UN General Assembly, which stressed that only the People's Revolutionary Council of Kampuchea is the genuine and legitimate representative of the Kampuchean people and that any discussion pertaining to Kampuchea in the UN without the participation of the PRCK representatives would be a gross interference in the internal affairs of People's Kampuchea.⁶

The unseemly attempts by Washington and the forces holding identical views with it to revive the political corpse—the criminal Pol Pot regime—were given a decisive rebuff in the speeches of the representatives of many countries that took part in the 35th Session of the UN General Assembly. In his speech Member of the Political Bureau of the CPSU Central Committee, the USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs Andrei Gromyko noted that the “USA promotes the destabilisation of the situation in Indochina and the whole of Southeast Asia”.⁷

The speeches by the representatives of Vietnam, Laos and a number of other countries before the UN General Assembly contained an appeal to turn Southeast Asia into a zone of peace, stability and cooperation. Representatives of Hungary, Vietnam, the GDR, Bulgaria, India, Angola, Afghanistan and many other countries underscored the need to expel the Pol Pot followers from the UN. They pointed out that the continuation of the powers of the Pol Pot representatives in the UN inflicts damage on the prestige of this international organisation and impedes its functioning.

While relying on broad support from the progressive public throughout the world, the Socialist Republic of Vietnam and other countries of Indochina, exhibiting patience and restraint, continued to work firmly and consistently for a normalisation of relations in Southeast Asia. A new constructive initiative was set forth by the Foreign Minister of Vietnam who, during his conversation with the Foreign Minister of Thailand in New York on October 1, 1980, stated that Vietnam would withdraw certain contingents of its troops from Kampuchea after a demilitarised zone along the Kampuchean-Thai border had been created. He pointed to the need to discontinue extending help to the remnants of the Pol Pot regime and to other reactionary Khmer forces in Thailand.⁸

The efforts of Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea for converting Southeast Asia into a zone of peace and stability meet the interests of all states of the region. The Soviet Union and other countries of the socialist community, displaying concern for the improvement of the political climate in Asia, in Southeast Asia in particular, gave vigorous support to the efforts of Vietnam and other countries of Indochina. The joint Soviet-Indian Declaration signed in Delhi on December 10, 1980, emphasised that the Soviet Union and India support the desire of states of Southeast Asia for improving the situation there and turning Southeast Asia into a region of durable peace and stability. The two sides also support the efforts of Southeast Asian countries aimed at developing relations of goodneigh-

⁵ See *Pravda*, Sept. 3, 1980.

⁶ See *Kampuchea*, Sept. 25, 1980.

⁷ *Pravda*, Sept. 24, 1980.

⁸ See *Nhan Dan*, Oct. 3, 1980.

bourliness and cooperation. The Soviet Union and India oppose outside interference in the internal affairs of these countries.

The peaceful constructive initiatives of the Indochinese states advanced at the Third Conference of the Foreign Ministers of Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea, held in January 1981 in Hochiminh City, were a fresh blow at the schemes of the imperialist and reactionary forces. Representatives of the three countries reiterated their readiness to discuss with ASEAN states the conversion of Southeast Asia into a zone of peace and stability and to sign bilateral and multilateral non-aggression agreements. They proposed to convene a regional conference of the countries of Indochina and ASEAN members to discuss problems of mutual interest. At the same time Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea declared their readiness to sign bilateral treaties on peaceful coexistence with the PRC on the basis of the principles applied in international relations. On February 22, 1981, on the instruction of the Soviet leadership, Soviet Ambassadors in Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, the Philippines and a number of other Asian states handed a message to the respective governments which stated that the Soviet Union fully shared the evaluation of the situation in Southeast Asia made by Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea, and declared its support for their constructive initiatives. The dialogue between the three Indochinese states and ASEAN members which was proposed by participants in the Conference in Hochiminh City, the Soviet message said, can promote the removal of difficulties in relations between them. The USSR, the Soviet leadership stated, welcomed the creation of a zone of peace in Southeast Asia and declared its readiness, provided such readiness is displayed by the other permanent members of the UN Security Council—the USA, Great Britain, France and the PRC—to take part in an international conference which, as was noted in the Declaration issued by Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea, can be convened after the countries of the two groups conclude a treaty of peace and stability in Southeast Asia, for the purpose of recognising and providing guarantees for such treaty.⁹

The Soviet initiative won the approval of all peaceloving states of the world. Its addressees, however, unfortunately failed to respond to it properly. On May 19, 1981, the Foreign Ministers of Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea sent a message to the UN Secretary-General K. Waldheim in which they noted that while recognising the regime of the so-called Democratic Kampuchea that had been overthrown by the Kampuchean people, the UN continues to oppose the inalienable right of the people of Kampuchea to self-determination. At the same time it was noted that the presence of Vietnamese armed forces in the People's Republic of Kampuchea is in accord with an agreement between the two countries for protecting Kampuchea against the still-existing threat to its security. According to the agreement, as soon as the threat ceases to exist, Vietnam will withdraw its troops from Kampuchea.

The message underscored that the demands by some countries for convening an "international conference on Kampuchea" are nothing but an attempt to impose the desire of one group of Southeast Asian countries on the other, and to prepare ground for outside interference in the internal affairs of that region. All this could only thwart the efforts by the countries of Indochina and ASEAN at the regional consultations among them held in May 1981, which were conducted in the name of

⁹ See *Pravda*, Feb. 22, 1981.

the Indochinese countries, with Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines, by the Foreign Minister of Laos.

Representatives of the three countries of Indochina noted perseveringly that the right way for settling the problem consists in a dialogue between the countries of ASEAN and Indochina. This stance of Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea, permeated with goodwill, was winning growing international understanding and support.

The decisions of the Fourth Conference of the Foreign Ministers of Vietnam, Kampuchea and Laos (June 1981, Pnompenh), which confirmed these countries' desire for a dialogue with their neighbours in the region, evoked strong response. Participants in the conference set forth a proposal to convene a regional conference of the two groups of countries (Indochina and ASEAN) in mid-July 1981, to discuss the problems of Southeast Asia of interest for both sides, with the participation, as observers, of the UN Secretary-General and of some other countries, as agreed on by both sides. The Ministers proposed to convene an international conference on a broad basis to record legally and reaffirm by documents the agreements reached by both sides first at a regional conference or in the course of regional consultations. The three countries of Indochina reiterated their willingness to sign bilateral treaties of non-aggression and peaceful coexistence with the PRC.

In the course of the negotiations between Andrei Gromyko and Nguyen Co Thach (Moscow, June 26, 1981) the Ministers stated that it is the policies of the outside forces pushing the ASEAN countries towards a confrontation with the states of Indochina that constitute the main cause of tension in Southeast Asia. This was evidenced by the manoeuvring toward forming a "united front" of Kampuchean emigre groups, and convening the so-called international conference on Kampuchea. A dialogue between the states of Indochina and ASEAN countries, rather than the piling up of new difficulties, will lead toward normalisation of the situation and creation of a zone of peace in Southeast Asia. Andrei Gromyko emphasised that the USSR regards the proposals advanced by the June 1981 conference of the Foreign Ministers of the three Indochinese states in Pnompenh as a fresh confirmation of goodwill and constructive approach of these countries to the improvement of the situation in Southeast Asia.

Nevertheless, the so-called international conference on Kampuchea was held in New York in mid-July 1981. The world public justly assessed it as an obvious attempt to erect another obstacle on the road toward normalising relations between the countries of Indochina and ASEAN and to aggravate the already tense situation in Southeast Asia. Washington was most zealous in organising and convening the "conference", and sought to use the latter for slanderous attacks against Kampuchea, Vietnam and the Soviet Union.

It should be pointed out that ASEAN members displayed different attitudes toward the "conference".

For example, the Indonesian press noted that at the international conference on Kampuchea attempts were made to bring pressure to bear on ASEAN countries and secure the restoration of the Pol Pot regime in Kampuchea, something contradicting the vital interests of ASEAN countries.¹⁰ According to Jakarta-based *Kompas* newspaper, sober-minded ASEAN leaders had no doubt that the absence of the representatives

¹⁰ See *Merdeka*, July 18, 1981.

of the Soviet Union, Vietnam, and People's Kampuchea at the "international conference" on Kampuchea doomed it to failure.¹¹

Characteristically, the Thai *Bangkok Post* warned as early as November 1980 that there was no reason to pin too big hopes on the success of the "international conference on Kampuchea". Like the preceding meetings, the paper went on, the conference faces the danger of being turned into a forum for propaganda attacks.¹² That was precisely the case, since it is self-evident that no decisions on Kampuchea adopted in contravention to the will of the Kampuchean people and in the absence of the representatives of the People's Republic of Kampuchea can and will be valid.

While commenting on the course of the "international conference", the Vietnamese *Quan Doi Nhan Dan* noted that "no force can make Vietnam give up its commitment to support the fraternal Kampuchean people".¹³ The Soviet Union stated that it considers the decisions of the "international conference on Kampuchea" invalid since they are nothing but an attempt to interfere in the internal affairs of a sovereign state.¹⁴

Despite the encroachments of the forces hostile to the cause of peace in Southeast Asia, there was growing awareness in ASEAN countries of the importance of a constructive dialogue with Vietnam and other states of Indochina. The Indonesian public admitted that "all attempts to settle the 'Kampuchean issue' without the participation of Vietnam are doomed to fiasco. ASEAN should put forth an initiative acceptable to Vietnam. As to Kampuchea itself, it does not encounter the problem of war but is busy reconstructing and restoring its economy. To all appearances, the criminal activities of the remnants of the Pol Pot gangs are not an insurmountable obstacle on the road toward peaceful construction."¹⁵ The concerted position of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, the Lao People's Democratic Republic and the People's Republic of Kampuchea was formulated in a document advanced by the Lao delegation during the 36th Session of the UN General Assembly entitled the "Basic Principles of Peaceful Coexistence of Countries of Indochina and ASEAN". The condemnation is growing in Asian countries of the interference in the internal affairs of Southeast Asian countries under the false pretext of "opposing the Soviet and Vietnamese threat". It is common knowledge that the USSR is the only great power which has never conducted hostilities in Southeast Asia and, of course, presents no threat to anyone. It is also well known that Vietnam, which recently was a victim of aggression, has never fought against ASEAN countries and has no such intention.

Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea have constantly coordinated their efforts in the international scene with the Soviet Union and other countries of the socialist community in the interests of strengthening peace and security in Asia and turning Southeast Asia into a zone of peace. The results of a consultative working meeting of Deputy Foreign Ministers of Laos, Vietnam, Kampuchea, Bulgaria, Hungary, GDR, Mongolia, Cuba, Poland, USSR and Czechoslovakia, held in Vientiane in December 1981, confirmed the close interaction of the fraternal countries in the international scene. The participants in the meeting welcomed the conso-

¹¹ See *Kompas*, May 17, 1981.

¹² See *Bangkok post*, Nov. 5, 1980.

¹³ *Quan Doi Nhan Dan*, July 13, 1981.

¹⁴ See *Pravda*, Sept. 10, 1981.

¹⁵ See *Merdeka*, June 19, 1981.

olidation of unity and cooperation between Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea, as well as their fraternal cohesion with the Soviet Union and other countries of the socialist community. It was pointed out at the meeting that the foreign policies of the three states of Indochina are a factor contributing to peace and stability in Southeast Asia. The fraternal socialist countries have unanimously backed the positions of Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea with respect to peace and stability in Southeast Asia, and to a regional conference of the countries of Indochinese and ASEAN states.

The participants in the meeting welcomed any steps by governments and peoples of Asian countries aimed at the construction of interstate relations in Asia on the basis of the principles of peaceful coexistence. They stated that they would spare no effort to implement these principles, as soon as possible, among Asian states.

It was pointed out at the meeting that the proposals made by the 26th Congress of the CPSU concerning concrete negotiations on confidence-building measures in the Far East among all the countries concerned, the readiness to discuss problems around Afghanistan on the basis of the programme advanced by its government, Mongolia's initiative to elaborate and sign a convention on mutual nonaggression and nonuse of force in relations between states of Asia and the Pacific, as well as the constructive proposals of Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea meant for ASEAN countries and the PRC serve precisely this purpose.¹⁶

On February 16-17, 1982, Vientiane played host to the Fifth Conference of Foreign Ministers of the Indochinese countries. Its participants expressed satisfaction with the steadfast consolidation of allround cooperation between the three countries of Indochina and the Soviet Union and the world socialist community. They highly praised the results of the working consultative meeting of Deputy Foreign Ministers of socialist countries, held in Vientiane in December 1981, and regarded it as a major contribution by the world socialist community to the struggle for peace and stability in Southeast Asia, which would bring about a relaxation of tension in the whole world. It was pointed out with satisfaction that mankind can be ever more effective in safeguarding peace and avoiding the danger of a new world war, thanks to the harmonious development, foreign policy and peaceloving nature of the USSR and other countries of the socialist community, as well as the efforts of non-aligned countries.

The participants in the conference called on the ASEAN countries to join efforts to normalise the situation and ensure the security and stability of Indochina and Southeast Asia. They reaffirmed the desire of the peoples of Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea to establish goodneighbourly relations with Thailand, and expressed their readiness to discuss with the latter all problems of mutual interest through direct or indirect contacts. If such contacts should produce positive results, the Socialist Republic of Vietnam and the People's Republic of Kampuchea would agree to a partial withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Kampuchea.

This time, too, ASEAN countries failed to exhibit a constructive approach. For example, the Foreign Ministers of Thailand and Singapore, after conducting negotiations in Bangkok on February 20, 1982, deemed it possible to claim that there was allegedly "nothing new" about Vietnam's proposals for a partial withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Kampuchea.

¹⁶ See *Nhan Dan*, Dec. 22, 1981.

The partial withdrawal of the Vietnamese troops from the People's Republic of Kampuchea in July 1982 evoked a positive response in the world. It was assessed by the progressive public as an important demonstration of the goodwill of Vietnam and Kampuchea, as evidence of the sincere desire of the three countries of Indochina to improve relations with their neighbours, and as an indicator of the further stabilisation of the situation in the People's Republic of Kampuchea.

Despite the tireless efforts of the three countries of Indochina, the situation in Southeast Asia is still strained. The policy of the imperialist forces and world reaction and the incessant attempts to turn ASEAN into a military-political pact and a pliant instrument of their policy is the principal factor preventing the majority of countries in that region from consolidating security and establishing peaceful and mutually beneficial contacts with each other.

The United States continues to render broad moral and hidden military support (via Thailand) to the Khmer anti-government organisations. US military aid to Bangkok is also on the rise. In 1981 alone Washington increased its credit to Thailand for purchasing armaments by \$30 million to reach \$80 million. Earlier the US Administration earmarked \$1 billion to carry out a modernisation of Thailand's armed forces that was completed by the end of 1982.¹⁷

As before, Washington displays special interest in the so-called Kampuchean problem. The provocative activities of the Pol Pot gangs acting from the territory of Thailand are openly used to whip up tension in relations between the countries of Indochina and ASEAN members. The USA was among the first to support the plans for creating the notorious "coalition government" of the nonexistent Democratic Kampuchea, and Pol Pot's followers were supposed to fill the leading posts in it. This "coalition" which includes "president" Sihanouk, "vice-president" Khieu Samphan who was one of the ringleaders of the Pol Pot regime, and who was sentenced to death by the people's revolutionary tribunal in Pnompenh in 1979, and "prime minister" Son Sann from among the Khmer emigres was put together in July 1982, not without US help.

It is self-evident that the goal of setting up this "government" which represents no one is to intensify interference in the internal affairs of the sovereign People's Republic of Kampuchea, to continue vain efforts to describe negatively the policy of Socialist Vietnam in Southeast Asia and, at the same time, by any method to preserve Kampuchea's place in the UN for the Pol Pot regime that the Kampuchean people had relegated to the dustbin of history.

The new initiatives of the Indochinese countries, formulated at the Sixth Conference of the Foreign Ministers of Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea (July 6-7, 1982, Hochiminh City) produced a positive response in the world. The participants in the Conference proposed some major initiatives directed at relaxing tension in Southeast Asia. Among other things, the countries of Indochina proposed to convene an international conference with the participation of Vietnam, Laos, Kampuchea, the ASEAN countries, Burma, the five powers which took part in the previous conferences on Indochina—USSR, PRC, USA, France, and Great Britain, and also India to discuss the situation in Southeast Asia. It was proposed to invite the UN Secretary-General to attend the conference. The states of Indochina expressed their readiness to meet with repre-

¹⁷ See *Far Eastern Economic Review*, August 7-13, 1981.

representatives of ASEAN states to agree on the date, venue, composition and agenda of the Conference and on other problems.

The three countries of Indochina reiterated their principled and consistent stands as regards the PRC, their readiness to restore normal relations with China, and sign with it bilateral and multilateral agreements on peaceful coexistence, thereby contributing to the cause of peace and stability in Southeast Asia.

The socialist community and many nonaligned states evaluated these initiatives as a weighty contribution to peace and stability in Southeast Asia. There is growing awareness in ASEAN countries that the time has come to abandon rhetoric in approaching the future of Southeast Asia and take a stand of political realism.

The visits to ASEAN states in 1982 by Foreign Minister of Vietnam Nguyen Co Thach confirmed Vietnam's sincere desire to normalise relations with Southeast Asian countries. The negotiations brought to light the proximity of views concerning the danger threatening the countries of Southeast Asia, and promoted the development of a dialogue between the two groups of countries—those of Indochina and ASEAN.

At the 37th Session of the UN General Assembly, representatives of many countries voiced their support of the constructive position of the Indochinese states. The Soviet-Vietnamese summit talks during the visit to the Soviet Union in October 1982 of a party-and-government delegation of Vietnam, headed by Member of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Vietnam, Chairman of the State Council of Vietnam Truong Chinh, confirmed that the views of the USSR and the Indochinese countries are identical as regards the ways of struggling for peace and security in Southeast Asia.

An exchange of opinion on some international issues, including the situation in Southeast Asia and the conversion of this region into a zone of peace and stability, occurred during the meeting between Yuri Andropov, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, and Le Duan, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Vietnam, on December 23, 1982.

The countries of Indochina highly appreciate the USSR's consistent policy of support for the efforts of the states of Indochina to turn Southeast Asia into a zone of peace. Recent developments, as was pointed out in the documents issued by the Foreign Ministry of Vietnam, eloquently attest to the fact that the USSR has always been and continues to be a friend of the peoples of Southeast Asia, and that it gives great support to their just struggle in the name of peace, independence and prosperity of the peoples of Indochina and other peoples of that region.¹⁸

It is of paramount significance that there exists a good foundation for improving and stabilising the situation in Southeast Asia, i. e., the constructive proposals by Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea, permeated with the spirit of goodwill, the proposals which are being fully supported by the Soviet Union which is sincerely interested in establishing peace and detente in Southeast Asia.

¹⁸ *Nhan Dan*, Aug. 26, 1980.

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ROLE OF 'PROGRESSIVE' CHINESE WRITERS', ARTISTS' GROUP IN WW II DESCRIBED

Moscow FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS in English No 2, Apr-Jun 83 pp 157-169

[Article by O. P. Bolotina, candidate of philological sciences: "From the History of Resistance Literature"]

The date of March 27, 1938 is one of the milestones in the history of 20th-century Chinese literature. On that day over 500 writers, artists, actors and other figures from literature and the arts came to Han Hou to constitute China's first mass patriotic organisation of creative workers—the National Association of Workers of Literature and the Arts to Rebuff the Enemy. This union of China's intellectuals was influential in consolidating the national anti-Japanese front and played a big part in the victory of the Chinese people's national liberation struggle against Japanese aggression (1937-1945).

The association's *Manifesto* stressed that during the first few months of the war the country's writers were divided and that literature and the arts failed to become a rallying factor for the propaganda effort against the aggressor. "Big cities have fallen, publishing work has become more difficult, workers in literature and the arts are scattered all over the country. Although numerous press reports, features and other publicistic materials have appeared, literature and the arts as a whole are still slumbering," noted the constituent congress' participants.¹ They added indignantly that the country's book market was inundated with Japanese militaristic literature which combined apologies for the war with attempts to conceal its aggressive character.

Another document—the resolution on the association's tasks and objectives—gave the following description of the organisation's main thrust: "We are aware of the importance of literature and the arts in these times of war against Japan. Workers of literature and the arts, scattered throughout the country, must unite and contribute jointly to the great cause of national liberation." The constituent congress launched an emotional appeal to China's intellectuals: "Let us unite and, like front-line soldiers using their arms, use our pens to inspire the masses to valiantly defend the motherland, to destroy the hated enemy and attain victory."

The congress named as priorities for the association: the publication of its own periodicals and of special propaganda materials for the army, the creation of writers' and actors' teams to work directly with the troops and the population, the setting up of association's branches throughout the whole of China, the creation of a department for popular mass literature, and the holding of regular conferences on creative aspects of literature and the arts. These objectives meant that the association resolutely casted its lot with the people struggling against Japan's aggression, with the people's destiny, as the congress participants declared, becoming the destiny of literature and the arts.²

¹ *Reference Materials on the History of Modern Chinese Literature*, Peking, 1959, Vol. 1, part 2, p. 621 (in Chinese).

² *Ibid.*, pp. 621-622.

The congress worked out an organisational structure for the new creative union. Its supreme governing body—the congress—was to elect a 45-member board. The board, in turn, elected a 15-member general council consisting of a general, organisational, publications and research departments. The first meeting of the association's board, which took place on April 4, 1938, elected a general council whose membership barely changed afterwards. It included such prominent writers as Lao She, Yu Dafu, Wu Luxiang, Feng Naichao, Mu Mutian, Hu Feng and Lou Shiyl, and others.

The association constituted itself under the aegis of the united national anti-Japanese front. It brought together intellectuals of different political views: Communists, democratically-minded writers who were not Communists, and pro-Guomindang authors. It is natural that with such political diversity in the organisation's membership, the figure of its chairman acquired particular significance. From the outset, the Guomindang government tried to place its functionaries at the head. During the Wuhan period the chairmanship was claimed by Shao Liji, department head of the Guomindang Central Executive. In Chongqing, where the association moved in October, 1938, the post was sought by Zhung Dao-fan, Minister of Information in the Guomindang cabinet. It was then that the left wing suggested that the association do without a chairman and carry out its work at the departmental level.

The general department was headed by Lao She, a highly talented author whose works advocated lofty civic ideals. He became the *de facto* universally recognised head of the organisation. There is ample testimony to Lao She's contribution to the association's public image and war-time China's literary life. "We all deeply respected him for his independence and impartiality, sympathising with his indefatigable efforts to keep up the association's morale," wrote Lo Changpei, a prominent literary figure, about Lao She.³

Speaking at the 1944 meeting marking the 20th anniversary of Lao She's literary activities attended by over 400 admirers of his talent, Mao Dun said, "Were it not for the hard work and patience of Mr. Lao She, I fear that our great cause—the uniting of all patriotic workers in the field of culture—could not have been established so quickly and so smoothly, nor would it have survived up to the present in the troubles and difficulties around us."⁴

And difficulties were many: internal political strife, mounting Guomindang encroachment on democratic liberties and progressive literature, increasingly dangerous sectarian trends in the association itself and in its branches (in May 1938 branches in Chengdu, Guangzhou, and Changsha were established, followed by the setting up of the Kunming branch in February 1939, the Hongkong one in March 1939, the Yanang one in May 1939 and the Guiyang and Qujian branches in 1940). In addition to political problems, the organisation was constantly beset by financial ones. Taking stock of the association's first five years of existence, Lao She wrote in 1943, "During the Wuhan period [March-October 1938.—O. B.], the association's monthly budget varied between 200 and 300 yuan. Presently it is not in excess of one thousand. The money is supposed to pay for the rent, the cost of putting out the journal, all sorts

³ Lo Changpei, *The Chinese People and Chinese Literature*, Peking, 1947, p. 107 (in Chinese).

⁴ Quoted from Z. Slupski, *Evolution of a Modern Chinese Writer*, Prague, 1966, pp. 90-91.

of other activities and letters abroad. Impossible as it seemed, we nearly always managed to make both ends meet. We had no other source of financing except the usual government subsidy. We were in need, but we could not beg." Although Lao She does not mention the exact amount of the government subsidy, its miserliness and irregularity can be divined from his sad observation that if the association's leadership had waited for the arrival of the subsidy, they would not have been able to see through even one activity, more or less important. In spite of this, the association saw it as its duty to contribute to the Army Fund. "Although we had no money," Lao She recalled, "we could still sell our works and contribute the royalties to good causes."⁵

Despite all adversities, the association acted, built up its influence and translated into practice the objectives formalised in the documents of the constituent congress. This would have been impossible without its own periodicals. On May 4, 1938, the anniversary of the historic "May 4 (1919) Movement", the first issue of the association's official organ *Kangzhan wenyi* (Literature and the Arts of the War of Resistance) made its first appearance. Initially appearing every fourth day, after its fifth issue the publication became a weekly and after January 1940 a monthly. Lao She, one of its editors, had already by that time had some experience of that type of work: since January 1938 he had been editing such propagandist literary journals as *Kang Daodi* (Resistance to the End) and *Renren Kan* (Reading for All). Other editors included Ye Shengtao, Ge Bao Cuan, Ge Yihung, Lao Xiang and Xie Bingying.

The journal carried both propaganda material and various genres of fiction reflecting war-time problems; it promptly reacted to latest developments. *Kangzhan wenyi* put out a supplement—"Leaflet for the Soldier". Special issues also became a regular feature with four of them appearing in Wuhan in September-October 1938. Many association members, including Feng Naichao, Hu Feng, Kong Luocan, Ye Yiqun, An E and Shu Qun, made visits to front-line troops engaged in battle. Issues published immediately following such visits, full of facts and descriptions of combat episodes still palpitating with life, became a sort of chronicle of Wuhan's heroic defence. Two special issues were devoted to the memory of the great Chinese writer Lu Xin and the great Soviet writer Maxim Gorky, a great friend of the Chinese people. *Kangzhan wenyi* was also published in English; these issues were edited by Xixio Mar, a prominent Chinese literary critic and chairman of the association's foreign relations commission at the time.

In addition to *Kangzhan wenyi*, there was a considerable number of other journals both in the centre and the provincial branches of the association. A month after the outbreak of war Mao Dun and Ba jin launched a small literary journal in Shanghai under the title of *Fenhuo* (The Lighthouse). In the first few months after the outbreak of fighting Hu Feng began printing the journal *Qiyue* (July) in Han Hou, with Ding Ling and Shu Qun publishing their own journal—*Zhandi* (The Battlefield). All these journals were subsequently incorporated in the association. In 1938 *Kangzhan* (War of Resistance) began to appear in Han Hou, with Lu Baiyu, Cao Ming, Xiao Hong, Ye Yiqun and Xi Jin among its authors. In 1939 the association published several journals at the same time: *Wenhua gangwei* (An Outpost of Culture) in Kunming, *Bizhen* (Literary Front) in Chengdu, *Kangzhan wenxue* (Literature of the War of Resistance) in Xiangfan and *Wenyi zhanxian* (Literary Front), edited

⁵ *Kangzhan wenyi*, March 27, 1943, pp. 3-4.

by Zhou Yong, in the Yanang branch. In 1940 Guo Moruo and Feng Naichao founded *Wenyi gongzuo* (Literary Work), a journal of literary criticism. In April 1940 still another journal of the association, *Dazhong wenyi* (Literature and Art for the Masses), began appearing in Yanang. *Yecao* (Weeds) appeared from 1940 to 1942 in Guiling. Its editor-in-chief was Qin Si and its coeditors were Xia Yan, Ne Gannu and Song Yanbin. In 1940 Guiling received a new quarterly, *Kangzhan wenyi* (Literature and the Arts of the War of Resistance). One of the most interesting wartime journals *Wenxue Yuebao* (Literature Monthly) began appearing in Chongqing in January 1940. Its editor-in-chief was Kung Luosum and its contributors included Lao She, Feng Naichao, Ouyang Shen, Cao Ming, Yang Sao, Luo Feng, Ge Baoqian, Ge Yihong and Shen Qiyu.

Some of the journals had only a short and un auspicious life, others subsequently changed their name or place of publication, and changes among the editorial staffs were frequent. A good example of this is provided by *Wenyi zhendi* (Literary Positions). As its editor-in-chief, Mao Dun later recalled: "The publication was born at the time of our victory at Taier shuang"⁶ [1 April 1938.—O. B.]. Soon after Mao Dun went in hiding from Guomindang security police and until August 1940 the journal was edited by Lou Shiyi. Then the journal temporarily ceased to appear, resuming publication only in January 1941, this time in Chongqing. The new editorial board included Mao Dun, as well as Ai Qing, Sha Ting, Song Shidi, Cao Jinghua, Ouang Shan, Ye Yijiong, Zhan Min and others.

Toward the end of the war fewer new journals made their appearance. Some of the latest included *Zhongguan* (Native Land) edited by Guo Moruo which appeared in Chongqing in 1943-1945 and *Wenshao* (On the Literary Post) edited by Ye Yijiong whose first issue appeared in Chongqing on May 4, 1945. It is symbolic that the first *Kangzhan wenyi* and the last *Wenshao* of the association journals timed their first issues to coincide with the May 4th Movement anniversary. This symbolism is explained by Lao She in a *Wenshao* editorial as the direct continuity between the association and the progressive trends of the literary revolution and revolutionary literature of the preceding decades.⁷ Following in the footsteps of the May 4th Movement's periodicals, publications of progressive literary societies of the 1920s and those of the Left-Wing Writers' League, the association's journals rallied supporters, polemicised with the enemies, fought evil and championed good.

Many of the association's features make it similar to progressive creative organisations of the 1920s and 1930s, particularly the Left-Wing Writers' League. The association took over where the League had left off in the task of bringing literature closer to the masses though with one difference. Whereas for the Left-Wing Writers' League the creation of mass popular literature was the key for solving the tasks of the proletarian literary movement, for the National Association it was the main instrument for bringing across the ideas of national resistance to broad popular masses. According to Lin Danqiu, a member of the association, "the political expediencies of the anti-Japanese war literature and of purely artistic tasks blended into a movement to create literature for broad popular masses".⁸ The slogans "Let Us Bring Literature to the

⁶ *Wenyi zhendi*, 1941, Vol. 2, No. 4, p. 191.

⁷ See *Wenshao*, 1945, Vol. 1, No. 2, pp. 1-5.

⁸ *Collected Materials on Literature and the Arts of the War Against Japan*, Shanghai, 1939, p. 767 (in Chinese).

Army" and "Let Us Bring Literature to the Village" launched by the association's constituent congress were in keeping with the times, and their realisation could bring China's writers closer to their objective of bringing literature closer to the masses.

The association's members felt that in times of war their main task was to carry out propaganda work using the medium of culture. The congress' resolutions called for the creation of special teams of writers to work among the troops and in the rear. The team movement became widespread in wartime China, particularly in 1938-1940, a phenomenon characteristic of the liberation war. At its initial stage of the war the team movement was highly beneficial both for the soldiers and the writers. Writers who came to the front were given a chance to gain first-hand experience of soldiers' life, which made good material for their future works. Many features, propaganda plays, songs and poems were based on this factual material still palpitating with life. This was the stuff of which numerous digests and leaflets for soldiers were made. The propaganda material was widely distributed by writers' teams among troops and peasants. By 1940 the number of such propaganda works became so large that it was decided to publish them in a special series. During six months in 1940 Yang Sao, Song Zhidi, Li Huiying, Lo Feng, Ge Yihong, Bai Lang prepared twenty collections under the common title *Literature on Combat Positions*. A separate book in the series was a collective diary of the writers who had worked among the troops. Another book of the series included poetry by Shelly Wang,⁹ an active participant in the team movement. The poet's name at that time became the symbol of self-denying service to national liberation: already seriously ill, he made repeated visits to the front, dying among the troops of the Northern Front in 1939.

Work among troops and peasants was difficult and dangerous, being within the range of but the strong and the courageous. Feng Naichao describes the hardships involved in this sort of work: "In September 1938 Wuhan's writers sent several teams to the front-line: one to the 4th front in Hubei's South and another to the 5th front in Hubei's East. I accompanied Shen Cheng, Qian Junduan and several others to the 5th front, where we distributed books, newspapers and medicines to the troops. At that time Zang Cejia's team returned to Xishui. The 4th and 6th teams of political theatre had not yet returned. Jinshang was served by a theatre team headed by Wan Shi. During the Japanese attack on Sunfu on September 24 Shen Cheng, a member of our team, was wounded. The 4th team lost one member. We left for the front on September 17 and returned on the 26th. All ten days were spent at front-line positions."¹⁰

Chinese writers were very conscientious about their patronage of the troops and the peasants, feeling that "anti-Japan literature scored its most brilliant successes precisely at the time when writers and theatre companies went to the front and to the country".¹¹ The association's slogans "Let Us Bring Literature to the Army!" and "Let Us Bring Literature to the Village!" thus became a guide to action for many writers. Mao Dun wrote, "As a result, a great number of short, popular works were written which suited the broad masses of the people and which propagated patriotism and resistance to aggression. It was during this pe-

⁹ Wang Lisi's pen name. Wang Lisi was a prominent scholar, poet and publicist of the 1930s. He headed the association's international propaganda department.

¹⁰ *Kangzhan wenji*, March 27, 1943, p. 19.

¹¹ *A Collection of Criticism on the Mass Literature Series*, Peking, 1949, p. 7 (in Chinese).

riod that the principle that literature should work for the people's revolution was advanced a step further."¹²

Whatever the value of the team movement and of the propaganda works, as an answer to the expediencies of the time, genuine literature understandable to and loved by the people, the sort of literature about which Lu Xin and Qu Qiubo had dreamed was still a long way off. Moreover during the first few years of the war the main stream of Chinese literature moved away from the realistic gains of the 1920s and 1930s. The country was utterly flooded with daily propaganda material of poor artistic standard. China's writers faced the challenge: how to produce "great works worthy of the great epoch" that would contain a message for the masses and be of real artistic value, be traditional and modern? What was needed was new esthetics which, as Lao She put it, could "reflect noble sentiments and strong characters. These noble sentiments and strong characters depicted by the writer were expected to strike a sympathetic chord in society."¹³

The association was persistently looking for answers to the questions posed by life itself. It set up a committee for popular literature, held seminars on theory and practice of literature for popular audiences, and held writers' discussions. The first of them, devoted to the theme "How to write books accessible to soldiers?" was held in May 1938. The participants in the discussion debated the following key problems: Is it necessary to produce universally accessible books? Do soldiers and other popular strata need them? To what extent, if at all, can traditional forms be used in the creation of new works? The discussion drew a representative cross-section of authors, including Lao She, Tian Han, Feng Naichao, Mu Mutian, Wang Yaping, Xu Bingchang, An E, Xi Jin, Lao Xiang and others. The issue that provoked the greatest controversy was whether "it was necessary to pour new wine into old vessels", in other words, whether the genres of traditional literature and folklore could still be used, or whether "the old vessels should be smashed and new wine poured into new jugs", i. e., whether old forms should be completely abandoned. The extremes of the argument were represented by Tan Han, who recommended the broadest possible use of traditional forms in the creation of new works, and Lu Qian, who favoured only minimal use of traditional genres. The position of Lao She who moderated the discussion was more simple. He upheld the author's right to choose the form which most suited his purpose. Many participants were alarmed by the idea voiced during the discussion that political expediency or mechanical choice of form could make up for the low artistic value of mass literature. "I am afraid that our method means a choice of either the mass reader or artistic worth," said Mu Mutian, rightly adding that "on the matter of the use of old forms everybody is in the dark."¹⁴

The use of traditional forms was the subject of repeated controversies, one of the longest ones taking place in 1940. By that time the literary community had already amassed a wealth of experience in the adaptation of traditional folklore genres to modern subject-matter. When authors addressed their works to those who could at least read newspapers in Baihua, they could use a variety of genre forms, including "Europeanised" ones. On the other hand, if they had progressive ideas to be conveyed to completely illiterate masses, the message had to be put in a carefully

¹² *Chinese Literature*, 1957, No. 2, p. 209.

¹³ *Yuzhou feng*, 1937, No. 53, p. 163.

¹⁴ *Kangzhan wenyi*, 1938, Vol. 1, No. 5, p. 36.

chosen form. It was in this latter form that folklore came to the aid of writers, poets and playwrights. "If we have no time to teach the masses how to read," observed Lao She, "we must have their ears by singing, have their eyes by acting, encourage local creative work and translations into local dialects, and to extend the sphere of our influence." Lao She had particular praise for songs, story-telling to the drum-beat and plays in local dialects, for he was aware that "the idiom of poetry to be declaimed and stories to be told accompanied by the drum which have been written in the official language Guoyu is not universally understandable; therefore even the usual sing-song out-loud reading will not produce the desired effect".¹⁵

Mao Dun who held similar views deplored that 80 per cent of the country's population were fully illiterate and that only one half of the 20 per cent who knew hieroglyphs could read newspapers or books. Supporting the most important ones of Lao She's proposals, Mao Dun put forward his own programme of action: "It is the business of writers to write, of folklore specialists to work out standards and methods of employing traditional forms, of performers of drum-accompanied songs, Peking opera, stories, Hunan music plays, Hunan and Hubei colloquial plays, Guangdong plays and other oral genres to make use of the ancient forms. All should cooperate. Only then can we be confident of success in our work against Japan!"¹⁶

Abandoning extreme views of popular mass literature, most authors and other literary workers adopted a more reasonable stand permitting a combination of a variety of forms and genres. In later evaluations of the literary process during the anti-Japanese war, China's workers in literature and the arts unanimously noted that considerable progress had been made in bringing literature closer to the masses. The reality of the national liberation war could not but affect the subject-matter of contemporary Chinese literature, presenting it with new ideas, subject-matters and means of artistic expression. Lao She's work of the period is particularly indicative of this. A well-known prose writer, master of the short story and the novel before the war, during the war he extended his creative activities to songs, declamations, several traditional music plays and patriotic poetry of which he put out a collection. During the period Lao She gave a particularly fine account of himself as a playwright, producing about ten oral drama plays, and as a publicist. Promptly abandoning the traditional and folklore genres in pure form, Lao She continued making frequent use of chosen elements of folklore and devices of traditional literature. He included several music scenes into the oral drama "The Duel between the Dragon and the Serpent in the Great Land" (1941). "From the point of view of form," Lao She recalled, "one might say that when I bravely introduced certain devices of the music drama and song-and-talk genres to the oral drama, I acquired new eyes and ears, so to speak".¹⁷ His collection of poetry *To the North of the Tiangmenguan Outpost* (1940-1942), his fairy tale *The Little Wooden Man* (1943) and novel *Fiery Burial* (1943) are highly reminiscent of folklore. Lao She was opposed only to the absolutisation of old forms and unjustified contrasting of centuries-old national traditions to the new features of Chinese literature of the 1920s and 1930s. The task of creating genuine literature for the masses of China was viewed by Lao She with an enthusiasm and re-

¹⁵ *Reference Materials on the History of Modern Chinese Literature*, Peking, 1959, Vol. 1, part 2, p. 778 (in Chinese).

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 764.

¹⁷ Lao She, *Selected Plays*, Peking, 1959, p. 2 (in Chinese).

sponsibility of a patriot and a writer who espoused both the national classical and folklore traditions and the innovative ideas of the May 4 Movement's revolution in literature.

The National Association took over from progressive societies of the pre-war period, particularly the Left-Wing Writers' League, in other spheres, too. Whereas the initial period of the war (up until October, 1938) was marked by general patriotic enthusiasm and unity, later on the situation subsequently changed for the worse. Toward the end of 1938, when the Chiang Kaishek administration toughened its domestic policies, the situation in the country became conducive to the flare up of a hitherto dormant ideological struggle in the letters and the arts, and to the spread of all sorts of reactionary theories. Again, as in the 1930s, advocates of art for art's sake and champions of nationalism put up their heads. The struggle was especially fierce between the association and right-wing bourgeois literary figures preaching apolitical art. The latter were headed by Liang Shiqiu who had already tried to place art above classes in the 1920s and 1930s but was rebuffed by Lu Xin, Qu Qiubo, and other revolutionary authors. This time Liang Shiqiu took advantage of the worsened political situation in the country to attack the basic principles of the National Association, namely the political and propaganda thrust in literature, patriotism and search for optimal forms of bringing the message of the anti-Japanese national liberation war to the masses.

On December 1, 1938 Liang Shiqiu published "A Letter from the Editor" in his supplement to *Zhongguang ribao* newspaper, followed on December 6 by an article in the newspaper itself, entitled, "On Non-Interference in the War of Resistance". In them he called on writers to keep away from the issues of the anti-Japanese war and from politics in general. The association's members promptly responded with criticism of the idea of apolitical art. The December issue of *Kangzhan wenyi* carried a series of materials in which Song Zhidi, Wei Mengke and other writers led a comprehensive critique of Liang Shiqiu's provisions. The progressive writers were in unanimous agreement that the latter's call to refrain from tapping the war theme was tantamount to shutting one's eyes to the very fact of the war against Japan. They stressed that as there was no place in China untouched by the war, there could be no subject-matter unrelated to the war for the patriotic-minded writers; and that the position of the advocates of art for art's sake was in effect a defeatist one. The danger of such behaviour, the progressive writers went on to say, could be illustrated by Zhou Zuoren, whose advocacy of art for art's sake culminated in an act of political treachery and service to the puppet government of North China.

Kung Luosun, a prominent literary critic, wrote two articles exposing Liang Shiqiu's theories, published in the supplement to the *Dagongbao* and *Xiju Shijie*. Lao She was adamantly opposed to the non-interference policy. He prepared an open letter on behalf of the association to the editor of *Zhongguang ribao* newspaper, which qualified Liang Shiqiu's actions as an attempt to "break the unity of writers which emerged at the beginning of the war, and to block the development of resistance literature and art". Lao She stressed that "nowadays everything is connected to the war of resistance".¹⁸ At Zhong Daofan's insistence the letter was not published, but its ideas were repeatedly aired by Lao She in his speeches, publications and works. Acknowledging congratulations on the success of his play, *State Above All* (1939-1940) Lao She wrote, "I

¹⁸ *Mingbao yuekan*, 1974, Vol. 9, No. 10, p. 78.

am pleased, but not only because my play has gained recognition. That resistance literature and the arts are so popular can shut the mouths of those who contend that literature cannot be useful in a war of resistance."¹⁹

As it became increasingly clear that the war would be a protracted one, the political and economic situation in the Guomindang-controlled territory became graver. Writers who persisted in their advocacy of active resistance to Japanese aggression found themselves in an increasingly difficult position. Between the summer of 1940 and the autumn of 1942 the association was forced to launch several campaigns in defence of the writers' rights. However, the Guomindang's encroachment on democratic liberties intensified. In those difficult times some writers gave up active work in the resistance movement, while others joined the ranks of the advocates of non-interference. In 1940, Zhang Tiani cracked down on Liang Shiqiu, Shen Congwen and other right-wing writers in the pages of *Wenxue yuebao* journal. Lao She summed up this polemicising in a foreword to his novel, *The Fiery Burial*: "Some people say that in times of war there is nothing to write about, because war is an abhorrent and destructive phenomenon", said Lao She in beginning his argument with the advocates of non-interference. "But if it is believed that everything in society can be used as raw material for literature, it is not clear why war, all the more a war of liberation, should be viewed as an exception. If the goal of fiction is to encourage good and to punish evil," continued Lao She, using his own weapon against Liang Shiqiu, "why can't a war of resistance, which is nothing but a battle between good and evil, be reflected in a work of fiction?... To keep silent only because war is repellent means to wait for others to win the peace for us at the cost of their own suffering."²⁰ Thus China's patriotic-minded writers threw in their lot with the forces of good who were fighting for a wonderful, peaceful future.

Naturally, advocates of apolitical literature had to be beaten by books, not by rhetoric. Liang Shiqiu's supporters failed to produce works of even minimal significance during the war. Even Shen Congwen, the most talented of them, had lost his prestige as a writer, having defected to the ranks of the advocates of "non-interference". In contrast, members of the National Association created rich and diverse literature during the war. An important feature of it was that psychological works in the tradition of critical realism written by Lao She, Mao Dun, Ba Jin, and the brilliant satire of Zhang Tiani were accompanied by the emergence of a quickly growing trend which was new for the China of the 20th century. Examples of it are Ba Jin's novel, *Fire*, depicting heroic students—the country's future, Mao Dun's, *Story of the First Stage*, which confronted its readers with the choice of the road to take in the national liberation struggle, Lao She's *Fiery Burial* and the *Four Generations of a Family* trilogy, whose heroes valiantly fight for justice and peace, novels and short stories by Sha Ting, Ai Wu, Wu Zuxian, which narrate of the people's everyday life in wartime and their growing national consciousness, as well as numerous novels, short stories, plays and poetry by other authors, devoted to other burning issues of the day. All of them drew a broad canvas of wartime China, paying tribute to the heroism and courage of its people.

The National Association was also active in forging links with progressive creative organisations and intellectuals abroad. In 1940 it set up

¹⁹ *Kangzhan wenji*, 1942, Vol. 8, Nos. 1-2, p. 27.

²⁰ Lao She, *Fiery Burial*, Shanghai, 1948, p. 3 (in Chinese).

a foreign relations commission headed by Xixio Mar. One of the commission's main tasks was to develop cultural links with the Soviet Union, an activity diligently pursued through the intermediary of the Society for Sino-Soviet Cultural Relations. November 23, 1938 marked the inauguration of the society's literature section. Association activists performed various functions devoted to the USSR and Soviet literature, and frequently contributed to *Zhong Su wenhua* (*Cultures of China and the USSR*) journal. In a letter to the Soviet readers, published in the journal, the association members said, "The Great Soviet Union is the true friend of the Great Chinese people in its struggle for happiness and freedom. Great Soviet literature is also a true friend of our new literature in its resolute struggle for freedom and happiness. We are proud to be able to tell you this."²¹

The association strove to keep the Soviet readers in touch with the latest developments in China's literary scene, the problems facing the country's literary community; it made its best for the Soviet public to read and like the works of the resistance war. The Soviet magazine *Internatsionalnaya Literatura* (International Literature) played the most prominent role in establishing contacts between China and the Soviet intelligentsia. The magazine frequently carried works by Chinese authors as well as literary criticism on the wartime literary process. In December 1939 the association sent a letter to *Internatsionalnaya Literatura* which said, "Your magazine is distributed the world over, and it has won broad recognition long ago. It frequently gives its pages to Chinese authors writing on the war of liberation. China's writers and the whole of the Chinese people are deeply grateful to you for this."²²

China's writers were eager for more expansive friendly exchanges. "We'll be pleased," they wrote, "to play host to any of you who would wish to visit our fighting country and, like Ilya Ehrenbourg during the Spanish Civil War, live and work among a heroic people courageously struggling against heavy odds." They also expressed a desire to visit the Soviet Union. "It is our ardent wish to visit your happy country and to breathe the heady and healthy air of your literature, to share in the resolve and optimism of the great Soviet people. We hope that this dream of ours could come true in the near future."²³ The dream did become true for many association members after the victory of the Chinese people over Japan and the formation of the People's Republic of China.

China's literary community was profoundly saddened by the news of Hitler Germany's treacherous attack on the Soviet Union. In its first issue after the invasion, the *Zhong Su wenhua* journal published a collection of articles about the USSR and its literature. On the occasion of the first anniversary of the Great Patriotic War the association addressed a message to the Soviet people which said, "The whole world is in a state of war with the fascist beast. The whole of humanity is eager to get free from the blood-stained paws of the fascist devils. All our thoughts and hopes are with the Soviet people fighting for victory." On behalf of the association the letter was signed by Lao She, Mao Dun, Guo Moruo and others. Every new day strengthened the Chinese people's gratitude and respect for the country which carried the burden of the struggle against fascism. China's writers expressed these sentiments of their people in letters to the Soviet Union. "My heart, like the hearts of thousands of

²¹ *Zhong Su wenhua*, 1941, Vol. 8, No. 2, p. 2.

²² *Internatsionalnaya Literatura*, 1940, Nos. 7-8, p. 117.

²³ *Zhong Su wenhua*, 1941, Vol. 8, No. 2, p. 2.

others, is beating for you. We understand that progress and survival of mankind depend on the outcome of this titanic battle," wrote Xia Yan.²⁴ Soviet successes in the struggle against fascist invaders were enthusiastically hailed in China. "With bated breath and joy we follow the news of the struggle of the Red Army and the Soviet people to defend the country of Tolstoy, Dostoyevsky, Gorky, Mendeleyev, and Pavlov; the country which is a new guiding star for us," wrote the editors of the *Ye cao* journal. "We are confident that the foreign bandits will be routed by the heroic Soviet people, and we wish you every success."²⁵

The historic victory of the Soviet people was hailed by the association as an epoch-making event. Its foreign relations commission sent a message of greetings to the Soviet Writers' Union which said among other things, "We, Chinese writers, are glad and proud that you, Soviet writers, have shown the world an unparalleled example of courage and loyalty to the Motherland in waging a Patriotic War. Not only were you unstinting in your service to art, some of you gave your lives in defence of the Motherland. You have created excellent literature, and it is not for nothing that Soviet works devoted to the war theme are so popular in our country."²⁶

Continuing the progressive tradition of China's literary and public organisations of the 1920s and 1930s, the association took note of the most important events in the USSR. During the war it organised extensive activities marking anniversaries of the Great October Socialist Revolution: it held meetings and other functions, published special issues of journals and materials in the press. "We mark the anniversary of the October Revolution as our own national holiday,"²⁷ wrote association members about the celebration of the 25th anniversary of the October Revolution. The Lenin theme featured prominently in the association journals. The wealth of material devoted to the life and work of the leader of the world revolution was a tribute of respect to his memory. The editors made a point of choosing facts and documents most consonant with current events in China. During the last few months of the war China was directly confronted by the need to choose a future road of social development. This prompted democratically-minded members of the association to publish materials expounding Lenin's views on democracy. "Lenin and Democracy", "Lenin on the Great Democrat Sun Yatsen"—these and other articles on the subject in *Zhong Su wenhua*, *Wenxue yuebao*, and other journals were meant as a help in making this difficult political choice.

Chinese writers were greatly interested in extending cultural links between the two countries. No less important for China, in their view, was introducing China's public at large to Russian and Soviet literature. "These are the most pressing tasks for our workers of literature today," observed association members in 1940.²⁸ Popularisation of foreign literature was one of the Association's tasks put forward in its early documents. "Our translation effort is a means of arousing enthusiasm and stepping up propaganda," it was said at the constituent congress. "We must acquaint ourselves with foreign literature."²⁹ It was Russian, and especially Soviet, literature that enjoyed the greatest popularity in wartime China. Explaining why translations of Russian and Soviet literature were given preference in China Guo Moruo wrote, "Russian literature directly teaches

²⁴ *Internationalnaya Literatura*, 1942, No. 11, pp. 151-152.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, 1942, Nos. 1-2, p. 241.

²⁶ *Literaturnaya Gazeta*, July 7, 1945.

²⁷ *Internatsionalnaya Literatura*, 1943, No. 1, p. 141.

²⁸ *Wenxue yuebao*, 1940, Vol. 2, No. 5, p. 212.

²⁹ *Reference Materials on the History...*, Vol. 1, part 2, p. 624 (in Chinese).

us many things and, first of all, how to reflect the invaluable experience of the revolution."³⁰ Another writer, Ge Yihong, comparing Soviet and Western literatures, concluded that the Chinese reader was more attracted to the main hero of Soviet literature—the new Man, valiantly struggling for the happiness and liberation of the oppressed. He went on to describe the hero of Western literature as “an individualist interested only in his own prosperity”.³¹ During the war years, the hero of Soviet literature was closer, more attractive and easier to understand for the Chinese reader than any other.

During the national liberation war in China the reading public particularly favoured works about the Civil War and foreign intervention in Russia: A. Fadeyev's *Rout*, M. Sholokhov's *And Quiet Flows the Don*, Y. Libedinsky's *Week* and V. Ivanov's *Armoured Train No. 1469*. Feng Naichao wrote that “these works taught China's writers how to write about war”.³² What made Soviet literature particularly dear to readers in China was its revolutionary optimism and portrayal of the self-abnegation of the popular masses who rose up in arms to defend the gains of the revolution. In Soviet literature the Chinese reading public found answers to many questions posed by the reality of the national liberation war in their own country.

Maxim Gorky, Vladimir Mayakovsky and Alexei Tolstoy were especially popular. Their works were repeatedly reprinted during the war and their names became symbolic of the glory of Soviet literature. Soirées of Mayakovsky's poetry, special Gorky readings and even Gorky days were held. Tolstoy had many personal friends among China's writers. The association met the sad news of the writer's death with a special issue of *Zhong Su wenhua* journal which referred to Tolstoy as the pride of Soviet and world literature.

Soviet works of the Great Patriotic War and those published on the eve of the war proved a veritable sensation. M. Sholokhov's *They Fought for Their Motherland*, I. Ehrenbourg's *The Fall of Paris*, P. Pavlenko's *A Russian Story*, *The People Are Immortal* by V. Grossman, and other books showed the strength of the Soviet people's spirit and the feats of courage of which the October generation was capable in defence of their country. The Chinese translators had to work quickly. A year after the outbreak of the Great Patriotic War, Cao Jinghua published in Chongqing a collection entitled, *Literature About the Patriotic War in the USSR*. Cao Jinghua and Ge Baoqian were the most active translators of Russian and Soviet literature in those years. The collection included short stories and essays by V. Katayev, V. Sayanov, V. Vasilevskaya and other authors. Almost immediately after the appearance of such outstanding plays as A. Korneichuk's *Front*, K. Simonov's *The Russian People* and L. Leonov's *The Invasion*, a paean to the invincibility of the Soviet people, they were translated and presented to Chinese audiences.

A new feature of the effort to popularise Soviet literature (compared to the war-time works) was the translation of works of authors from the USSR's national republics. Thus the association pioneered in the introduction of multinational Soviet literature in China. V. Vasilevskaya's *The Rainbow*, V. Latsis's *Fisherman's Son*, P. Tsvirka's *Frontier*, Jamboul's poem *To the People of China*, along with numerous other works of Lithuanian, Latvian and West Ukrainian authors were highly popular, for

³⁰ *Zhong Su wenhua*, 1940, Vol. 6, No. 5, p. 2.

³¹ *Internatsionalnaya Literatura*, 1941, No. 5, pp. 224-225.

³² *Wenxue yuebao*, 1940, Vol. 2, No. 5, p. 210.

they showed vividly the gains of the USSR's nationalities policy and provided convincing proof of the equality of all peoples and nations under socialism. As China was soon to choose a path for development, this example of the solution of the nationalities problem was exceedingly important.

The broad range of translated works was indicative of the depth of the progressive Chinese public's interest in Russian and Soviet literature in which it saw a means of understanding the logic and pattern of historical development of a country which had opted for socialism and defended its independence against heavy odds. It should be stressed that the publishers translated and reprinted primarily the most brilliant examples of classical Russian and Soviet literature. Works by A. Pushkin, M. Lermontov, L. Tolstoy, M. Gorky, V. Mayakovsky, M. Sholokhov and A. Tolstoy were thus called on to imbue the people of China with a sentiment of national consciousness and belief in their own strength. N. Ostrovsky's *How the Steel was Tempered* enjoyed the unparalleled love of Chinese readers. Its hero Pavel Korchagin became a model for the Chinese youth, his story was well known. According to Chinese men of letters, during the war Soviet literature became a textbook for revolutionaries, offering guidance for everyday life and work.

The National Association of Literature stood at the head of wartime China's intellectuals, it gave depth and variety to progressive literature and the arts in the country, ensuring continuity with the 1920s and 1930s. Describing the historical importance of the association, Mao Dun told the first congress of China's workers of literature and the arts in 1949, "This organisation united writers and other art workers from all social strata who struggled against Japan's aggression, and mobilised them to important tasks. It was very active in the field of anti-Japanese propaganda at the early stages of the national liberation war and subsequently, in the democratic struggle against Guomintang reaction."³³ After Japan's defeat China and Chinese literature were confronted with the new problems of struggle for democratic transformations in the country against the Guomintang regime and for a people's China. In December 1945 the National Association of Workers of Literature and the Arts to Rebuff the Enemy was reorganised into the National Association of Workers of Literature and the Arts with a headquarters in Shanghai. Subsequently the First National Congress of Workers of Literature and the Arts which took place in 1949 reorganised the association into the present union of literary and artistic intellectuals of the People's Republic of China.

³³ Mao Dun, *Collected Works in Three Volumes*, Moscow, 1956, pp. 286-287.

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FROM THE HISTORY OF SOVIET-CHINESE LITERARY CONTACTS

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[Article by R. S. Belousov]

Several centuries have passed since caravans of early Russian trailblazers reached the walls of ancient Peking. Contacts between the Russians and the Chinese, the two neighbouring nations, developed and expanded with every passing year. Our two nations got to know each other largely thanks to books which, among other things, told the Chinese about the struggle waged by Russian workers and peasants and about the building of a new life.

In the 1920s and the 1930s Qu Qiubo, Jiang Guangci, Zou Taofen, Ge Gongzhen and other men-of-letters presented a truthful picture in their reports and feature stories of Soviet Russia, which they visited and eyewitnessed the building of a new life. Their works paved the way to truth. The first contacts between Soviet and Chinese writers and the beginning of their creative relations date to that now remote period.

We today recall with gratitude those Chinese men-of-letters who, though restricted by the censorship, repressions and persecution of the Guomindang, courageously worked to publish and popularise in China books by Soviet writers. The great Lu Xin, who believed that the dissemination of Russian and Soviet literature in China was a revolutionary task of paramount importance comparable to the secret delivery of arms to rebellious slaves, was the first Chinese writer to have made a great contribution to the development of Soviet-Chinese literary contacts. According to Lu Xin Gorky was the first influential Soviet author to produce a tremendous revolutionising effect on different aspects of social life in China and above all on the development of progressive Chinese literature.¹ Chinese writers viewed him as their comrade-in-arms: his books and articles armed them ideologically and sharpened their art of writing, their main weapon. Gorky's books were a lodestar for many in China. This is especially true of his novel *Mother*, which, according to writer Ouyang Shan, helped many people in China to come to understand that the meaning of life could be realised only through struggle. Zhang Tanyi said that Chinese authors learnt from Gorky inexhaustible enthusiasm of a fighter. They learnt from him not only how and what to write but also how to live and fight. Lu Xin especially valued Gorky for this and wrote that his books played a great role in the destinies of several generations of Chinese readers. This, incidentally, refers to other Soviet writers, whose books dealt with the emancipation struggle and were, according to Lu Xin, of paramount importance for his homeland at that time. Among them were works by Ale-

¹ See M. Ye. Shneider, *Russian Classical Literature in China*, Translation, Evaluation, Creative Assimilation, Moscow, 1977, p. 177.

xander Serafimovich, Alexander Fadeyev, Boris Lavrenev and Mikhail Sholokhov.

Anyone reading Lu Xin's diaries will be impressed by the number of Soviet books, periodicals, albums, engravings and posters he received. Apart from the books by Soviet writers that he managed to buy in China (for the most part these were Japanese, German and English translations), he received a good deal of Soviet literature from his friend Cao Jing-hua, who lived at the time in Leningrad and who later was to become a well-known literary man and translator of many Soviet books. Cao Jing-hua was asked by Lu Xin to keep him informed about literary life in the USSR, sending him newly released books, issues of the *Literaturnaya Gazeta* and the *Internatsionalnaya Literatura* journal, as well as portraits of Russian and Soviet writers. Little by little Lu Xin collected a vast assortment of Soviet books and writings about Soviet authors.

If for some reason Lu Xin could not make use of a book he received from the Soviet Union he would hand it over for translation. He himself would become a guardian of sorts of the book thenceforth, watching over its translation, writing a foreword or a postscript and often both, finding a publisher and, finally, often editing the Chinese translation.

His diary, despite the brevity of entries, gives an idea of the amount of work he did in preparing the publication of Serafimovich's *The Iron Flood*, Fadeyev's *The Rout* and Sholokhov's *And Quiet Flows the Don*.

Leafing through the diary, I pondered on the role many Soviet books happened to play in the revolutionary struggle of the Chinese people and on the complicated and at times arduous road these books traversed in the kit bags of Chinese revolutionary fighters.

In the summer of 1931, Lu Xin received from Cao Jing-hua another parcel from Leningrad containing the long awaited manuscript of a translation of *The Iron Flood*. Lu Xin had decided at that time to publish a series of books by Soviet authors, and Serafimovich's novel was to be one of the first to appear: Lu Xin thought it had to be published at all costs.

He set out to work without delay. Day in day out he repeated the brief diary entry: "Edited *The Iron Flood*". Meanwhile indefatigable Cao Jing-hua sent from faraway in the Soviet Union the material to be included in the future book. We can piece together from Lu Xin's diary how the publication of *The Iron Flood* was prepared. On August 15, he wrote in his usual brief manner: "Received *The Iron Flood* from Jing-hua." The Russian text of the novel was vital for collation of the translation. One night he made the following entry: "Received a letter from Jing-hua and notes to *The Iron Flood*". Three days later, on the 24th he added: "Received a letter and commentaries to the future book." Finally, on September 2 the text of the foreword to the first Chinese edition of *The Iron Flood* arrived.² (Later on, in 1933, Serafimovich, the author, wrote a short preface specially for a Chinese edition.)

When he received the foreword to the first edition of *The Iron Flood* Lu Xin gave it to Qu Qiubo, asking him to translate it into Chinese. In this way Qu Qiubo became the third party to the publication of that book.

After a map of the Taman Army march was received in early December, the work was completed. The speed with which the book was published in Chinese was truly remarkable. In all a thousand copies were ran off. To quote Cao Jing-hua, the book "filtered through to the readers little by little".³ Small wonder that almost all the copies of the two successive edi-

² See Lu Xin, *Diary*, Vol. 2, Peking, 1959, pp. 835, 836 (in Chinese).

³ See *Recollections about 1 S. Serafimovich*, Stalingrad, 1959, p. 181.

tions of the novel were confiscated. It took *The Iron Flood* several more years to carve its way through the Guomindang censorship; it "was, as it were, icebound" for a long time. It was not until the late 1930s that, according to Cao Jing-hua, *The Iron Flood* gradually "surfaced from the undercurrent".⁴

Qu Qiubo, a prominent Marxist literary critic who, as it was already mentioned, directly took part in the publication of the book, responded to the issuance of *The Iron Flood* with an article, in which he cited an interesting fact. When the book was published in the French newspaper *L'Humanité*, readers flooded the editors with letters, asking if there were any prototypes in real life, where they were and what they were now doing. In one of the old issues of *L'Humanité* Qu Qiubo found by chance a letter written by a French worker from the Renault factory who had read Serafimovich's novel in French and was asking: "Did Kozhukh really exist? Could there really be a man like that?" Epifan Kovtyukh, the living prototype of the main character of the novel, answered the letter of the French worker. Moved by this correspondence between a French worker and a hero of the Civil War in Russia, Qu Qiubo wrote about the enormous revolutionising role of *The Iron Flood*. His article is replete with reflections on the destiny of China and the course of the Chinese revolution. He was sure that the day was not far off when the iron flood of the revolution in China would turn into an ocean swell and that a worldwide "iron flood" lay around the corner.⁵

The Iron Flood indeed became for the soldiers of the Chinese revolution, to quote Cao Jing-hua, "a torch, those who are trampled upon and despised, hold in their hands, lighting their road to emancipation".⁶

On more than one occasion Lu Xin spoke about translators, mentioning how important the difficult, selfless and painstaking work of those people was in paving the way to enlightenment.

He himself was one of them and did much to propagandise and publish Soviet books. His study was a laboratory of sorts, in which China came into contact with advanced revolutionary culture of new Russia and in which he thought about translating many a work by Soviet authors. It was a centre of propagandising Soviet literature, from which Soviet books embarked on a journey throughout China.

One of the books conceived in that laboratory was Alexander Fadeyev's *The Rout*, which Lu Xin translated and published at his own expense. He began translating the novel in January 1930 and completed the work in February 1931. Simultaneously, some chapters of the novel were published by the *Mengya* journal. Lu's diary reveals that he worked on the editing of that translation until the end of that year. Finally, after many days of exhausting work, Lu Xin wrote in his diary on November 26 that he had finished work on *The Rout*. Several days later, in early December, his friends were already receiving the first copies of the Chinese edition of Fadeyev's novel, fresh from the press.⁷

It would be of interest to look into Lu Xin's laboratory and get an idea of how he worked on the translations of Soviet books and how he painstakingly amassed additional reference material to be contained in the book. This was something he was very particular about. Every Soviet book which he had himself translated or helped to prepare contained vast sup-

⁴ *Ibidem*.

⁵ Qu Qiubo, *Collected Works*, Vol. 1, Peking, 1957, pp. 329-334.

⁶ *Recollections about A. S. Serafimovich*, p. 183.

⁷ See Lu Xin, *Diary*, Vol. 2, pp. 845, 847.

plementary material. The publication of *The Rout* is very characteristic in this respect. The book opened with the author's autobiography and had an article written by Kurahara Korehito, a well-known literary critic and author of a Japanese translation of *The Rout*, and also a foreword by Soviet critic Friche. Lu Xin himself wrote an afterword entitled "Impressions of *The Rout*". As is evident, he did not confine himself to the translation alone but sought to create a better idea of the author of the published work through his biography, critical reviews and a literary analysis of his work.

In his concluding article Lu Xin stressed the author's mastery in creating graphic images of revolutionary fighters. He believed that Fadeyev's novel was a success primarily because the author knew well his subject and had himself taken part in the struggle he described. Lu Xin said that this truthful and moving account could be written only on the basis of a personal experience rather than relying on imagination.⁸

Lu Xin began translating *The Rout* from a Japanese edition but then he came across a German and an English translation of the book, using both to collate the exactness of the thought.

He had to do this because his command of Russian was poor for him to be able to translate from the original—a fact which he greatly regretted. He used the Russian to check the subtitles that were absent in the Japanese edition and to more strictly divide chapters, yet he was unable to collate the whole text with it. He wrote that a translation from three foreign editions at one and the same time merely filled the gap "between the complete absence of any translation and something more consummate". He wholeheartedly wished to see as many translations of Soviet books from the original as possible. To this end he recommended that young translators should study primarily Russian and, in his profound modesty, never doubted that there would appear translations of a better quality than his. He showed extraordinary responsibility towards his translations, which he gave a thorough treatment, saying that "one should get one's teeth into a translation and not gulp it, as if it were tea or porridge".

It is therefore only natural that Qu Qiubo, who was fluent in Russian, praised Lu Xin's translation of *The Rout*. "Your translation is very precise," he wrote Lu Xin in early December 1931, "and it won't be an exaggeration to say that it in no way takes the reader far from the original. One can picture from your translation an honest man with an ardent heart, who fights for the bright future and is persevering and aware of his responsibility for what he does."

In reply to his friend's letter Lu Xin confessed that he, too, was fond of his work "like his own son".

Qu Qiubo declared the publication of *The Rout* "a landmark event in China's literary life". He wrote that "every militant revolutionary writer and every revolutionary reader should mark this victory, however small, as a holiday".

What feelings were evoked from the Chinese readers of this novel born of a passionate heart, this story of "new people"?⁹ According to Qu Qiubo, Fadeyev's book demonstrated why poorly-armed and hungry Russian workers and peasants defeated the White Guards and the Japanese invaders. He wrote that "this happened primarily because there were the Soviets and because people of a new type were moulded in the course of strenuous and heroic struggle... Who headed that struggle? Miners, farm

⁸ See Lu Xin, *Collected Translations*, Vol. 7, Peking, 1959, pp. 189-207.

⁹ Qu Qiubo, *Essays and Articles*, Moscow, 1959, p. 158.

hands and above all industrial workers. It was exactly such. The mass of the working people headed by the proletariat came out to remake the world, to destroy their enemies and to reeducate themselves in the course of this great struggle."

In his article devoted to the publication of Fadeyev's novel in Chinese Qu Qiubo advocated using the arms captured by the revolutionary troops against the enemy—the imperialists and the Japanese invaders who at that time occupied northeastern China.

On more than one occasion Fadeyev said with gratitude that he would never forget Lu Xin for translating his book. Perhaps, driven by the desire to show his gratitude toward his Chinese friend, he eagerly accepted an invitation in the 1930s to edit one of Lu Xin's publications in Russian. When he visited China many years later, he admitted that that had been his modest acknowledgement of the great Chinese writer, who had spent part of his time translating Fadeyev's novel. That was how a book brought together the two writers.

Writers Boris Lavrenev and Cao Jing-hua became friends in a similar way. After Lavrenev's story *The Forty First* was published in the *Zvezda* (Star) journal in 1924, Cao Jing-hua translated it into Chinese in 1927. At approximately the same time the enthusiastic young Chinese translator and the well-known Soviet writer met for the first time.

Lavrenev's story happened to be one of the first Soviet literary pieces to be translated into Chinese. In April 1927, Lu Xin wrote in a letter: "It is necessary to hasten the publication of *The Forty First*". He had to make haste because at the time there was only talk of revolutionary literature in China but no revolutionary writing to speak of. "If things go on like that," Lu Xin wrote, "literature will perish". That was why it was most important, in his opinion, to introduce to readers immediately the best writings from other countries, first and foremost works from the Soviet Union.

After Chinese readers read *The Forty First*, Lavrenev received numerous touching letters from Chinese fighters for the liberation of their homeland. In them, he recalled, they thanked the author for that short story. They wrote that *The Forty First* had helped them in their struggle, describing to him how they read his story in the unbearably hard conditions of guerrilla warfare in the remote areas of revolutionary strongholds. A printing house at one of such bases printed the story in the form of a small booklet. This occurred at the point in the war when units of revolutionary troops were encircled in the Taihangshan mountains area. The story was published in a crude form: for lack of paper it was set in small type, to say nothing of the quality of that paper.

This, however, was unimportant at the time. In those days of struggle, Lavrenev's story was not merely a work of art but also a guide to action. The fighters who had broken away from the encirclement, Cao Jing-hua recounted, presented him with several copies of *The Forty First* printed in their guerrilla detachment. They said that during trying moments, when it was a matter of life or death, fighters would leave behind all their most precious belongings, except, for gun and books. Even while bleeding and within an inch of death, while breaking through the enemy encirclement, soldiers would bear them along or die, not part with them until their last breath.¹⁰

Lavrenev's story amassed such popularity that it was staged and reprinted in newspapers as pictures with captions. Lavrenev would be

¹⁰ See B. Lavrenev, *The Forty First*, Peking, 1958, pp. 97-100.

proud and glad of the fact that his book became a companion and friend of so many readers in faraway China. In one of his letters he proudly wrote to Cao Jing-hua that his *Forty First* was triumphantly travelling both the West and the East.

In his last letter (which he wrote when was already gravely ill) Lavrenev confessed: "...I have great desire to visit your country, but apparently this disabled man is bound to leave this world without tasting water from Chinese rivers.

"I sincerely wish you, my dear friend who did so much for me by introducing my works to your readers, best of luck, sound health, success in all your undertakings and a long life.

"I heartily shake your hand..."¹¹

Other books by Soviet writers also served as guides for action. Soldiers of the Chinese revolution knew and appreciated this passionate literature and derived inspiration from it. Soviet literature was for them a source of courage and at times a manual for guerrilla action.

It is a widely known fact that the soldiers of the people's war in China were given pages from Konstantin Simonov's *Days and Nights* instead of instructions in street fighting. Soldiers of the People's Liberation Army were well familiar with the Chinese translation of Alexander Bek's *Vologolamsk Highway* called *Fear and Fearlessness*. Its profound ideas conveyed in an easily understandable and poignant manner evoked great interest among Chinese readers. It was required reading for everyone from the chief of staff to uncommissioned officers, for it was considered not only a wonderful piece of writing but also an invaluable warfare manual. Frontline newspapers, such as *The People's Soldier*, *Soldiers Are the People's Children*, *Comrade-in-Arms* and so on, specially published articles advising careful study of Bek's book.

It was no easy task to bring newspapers, journals and magazines, to say nothing of books, to the liberated areas. "These were rare guests of the soldiers of the Chinese revolution. And still they were there", said Lu Xin's friend Zhou Shi, a communist writer who was shot dead by the Guomindang men in 1931. They were issued by field printing houses in Yanan caves and the Taihangshan mountains and distributed in handwritten copies, with every hieroglyphic and line carefully copied out. The books continued their existence in the form of manuscripts, passing from hand to hand: the wounded would pass books on to those who remained in the ranks so that they would become the property of all the soldiers.

Poet Yan Yi, former soldier and builder, described the role Soviet books played in his life.¹² In the winter of 1945, during battles in the Shandong Province he got hold of a book of verse. Large hieroglyphics on the cover read *For Truth!* It was a handwritten copy of a collection of verse by Soviet poet Yanka Kupala.

This was how the Chinese soldier and would-be poet Yan Yi first came into contact with Soviet poetry.

"Upon leafing through the pages, I involuntarily thought about the former owner of the book," Yan Yi wrote. "We held the positions of the 58th regiment. The person having read these poems could have died in

¹¹ A letter dated April 25, 1958. Cited by a photocopy kindly sent to the present author by Cao Jing-hua in his time. For the full text of the letter see R. Byelousov, *In a Thousand of Hieroglyphics. On Books and Men*, Moscow, 1963, pp. 122-123 (in Russian).

¹² See *I Thank Soviet Literature for Help*, Peking, 1958, pp. 85-91. The collection consists of reminiscences by 49 people of different occupation, coming from different parts of China.

action: after all the cover was stained with blood! I leafed through the pages again and again but failed to find the owner's signature. I talked to fellow soldiers but to no avail. Ever since that time I've kept this gift from an unknown friend. Yanka Kupala's poetry has become firmly imprinted in my mind". In the moments of repose he would pick up the book and read it to himself or aloud to his fellow soldiers. Kupala's poetry was very much to their liking because it awakened class feelings and dreams about a better future. "I remember that we were especially fond of *A Peasant, There's a Place for You to Live In...* and *Be Courageous*. We got into the custom of reading these poems." They were read during political education classes and before battles and, to quote Yan Yi, they will forever live on in his heart and the hearts of those who heard them at that time.

Lu Xin predicted in his time that writers in many countries would be influenced by Sholokhov's works. In 1931, when the Chinese translation of the first volume of *And Quiet Flows the Don* appeared, Lu Xin, who edited the publication, said in his concluding article that the book would bring to light new writers in China. He was quite right.

Zhou Libo became one of those writers. His major literary work, which had a noticeable influence on everything he did afterwards, was the translation of Sholokhov's *Virgin Soil Upturned* in 1946. He said that it was Soviet literature that Chinese writers had chosen as their teacher and in which they found "the most progressive creative method which instills profound ideological integrity, close unity with the people and truthful portrayal of life and struggle".

Virgin Soil Upturned was one of the first Soviet books to be printed in Yanan. However, I'd like to mention here another publication of that book and the role it had to play in China later on when the agrarian reform was carried through and the Chinese people were given the chance to advance towards socialism.

I mean here the popular abridged edition of the novel put out by the Guanghai Shudian Publishers in Harbin in April 1948.¹³ This small-size booklet was printed in 3,000 copies. This did not matter much, however. The important thing was that the book was published specially for political agitators sent by the party to the countryside to carry out the agrarian reform in the liberated areas. The book appeared in an abridged form so that as many people as possible could read it, including semi-literate people. Meng Fan, who produced the abridged version, specially pointed it out in his postface. There were as yet few Chinese books on the subject and he was sure that a book written by such master as Sholokhov would indisputably be very useful. The Harbin edition opened with an article, "Why We Recommend This Book", which said that the agrarian reform was carried out in the liberated areas of northeastern China, ruining the centuries-old foundations of feudalism, and that the movement involved the ever growing mass of peasants. The author pointed out that the Soviet experience in collectivisation, irrespective of its stage, merited serious attention and analysis. As if to show graphically the success scored by the Soviet people since the period described by Sholokhov in his book, that is, the period of collectivisation, the Harbin edition of *Virgin Soil Upturned* ended with an article, "The Growth of the Collective-Farm Movement in the USSR".

The author of the introductory article dealt in detail with the character of Davydov, calling to learn from this communist in his position of prin-

¹³ M. Sholokhov, *Virgin Soil Upturned*, Retold by Meng Fan, Harbin, 1948.

ciple and democratic attitude combined with exactingness and the ability to set an example for others.

In this way Sholokhov's novel helped agitators and rural activists and made it possible to study the diverse and vast experience of those who were the first to bring new life into the countryside. Writer Xian San and many others, including reader Feng Jiangnan, described the service rendered by Sholokhov's book during the agrarian reform. The latter, a party worker sent, like Sholokhov's communist Davydov, to build a new life in the countryside, took along a copy of *Virgin Soil Upturned*.

"I was sure," he wrote to the author, "that your book will help me in my practical work." In his letter Feng Jiangnan specially mentioned the enormous support he derived from Davydov: "He seemed to be close to me all the time." "I think, Comrade Sholokhov," he went on to say, "that a lot of what Davydov said was addressed not only to the peasants from the village of Gremyachi Log but directly to us Chinese peasants and rural communists." He thanked the Soviet writer for a wonderful book and confirmed how important the characters he created were to the working people in different countries. He closed his letter, saying proudly that "we in China have already produced our own true production leaders both in town and country".¹⁴

One of them, Wu Shichun, wrote in connection with the educational importance of *Virgin Soil Upturned* that the truthful portrayal of typical representatives of different classes enabled him to master the method of class analysis in dealing with people and problems. "This book," he said, "was not only a guide but also a valuable source of experience".¹⁵

Before 1959 the Chinese press carried hundreds of articles about *Virgin Soil Upturned* and, for that matter, about other works by Sholokhov.¹⁶

¹⁴ See *I Thank Soviet Literature for Help*, pp. 92-99.

¹⁵ Quoted from N. T. Fedorenko, *Essays on Modern Chinese Literature*, Moscow, 1953, pp. 245-246.

¹⁶ See K. Priima, "And Quiet Flows the Don" in *Battle*, Moscow, 1975, p. 356.

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JAPAN AND THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

Moscow FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS in English No 2, Apr-Jun 83 pp 178-181

[Review by Yu. Ye. Yevgen'yev of book "Yaponiya i razvivayushchiyesya strany. Problemy tekhniko-ekonomicheskogo sotrudnichestvo" [Japan and the Developing Countries. Problems in Technical and Economic Cooperation] by A. I. Kravtsevich, Moscow, Nauka, 1981, 184 pages]

The experience of economic development of Asian, African and Latin American countries shows that the existence of national personnel of engineers, technicians, managers and skilled workers is a major prerequisite for creating and strengthening the base for accelerated industrialisation within these countries and for eliminating their neocolonial dependence on the world capitalist economy.

As is known, the training of a large-scale contingent of national personnel in the developing countries is carried out on the basis of national systems of education and technical and cultural cooperation with the states that are more economically developed.

The author of the book under review is quite right in saying that "technical cooperation is not confined to the transfer of knowhow, but it also involves such a specific aspect as the formation of the world outlook of the personnel under training. Thus, it exerts certain influence on the national concepts of progress in the developing countries" (pp. 5-6). It is precisely this specific feature of technical cooperation that, given the existence of two world systems, converts the cooperation into an arena of ideological confrontation, reflecting fundamentally opposite approaches to relations with newly-free states.

Technical cooperation among socialist countries is based on equality and mutual benefit, while for the developed capitalist states it presents, first of all, a means of infiltrating the economies of the developing states, and tying them up to the world capitalist economy. The Programme of the CPSU notes: "The imperialists are using new methods and new forms to maintain colonial exploitation of the peoples... Under the guise of 'aid', they are trying to retain their old positions in those countries and capture new ones, to extend their social basis, lure the national bourgeoisie to their side."

This is why an analysis of the basic forms, methods, scale, geographic and structural directions of technical cooperation is of great theoretical importance. It is rather urgent, and presents obvious scientific and practical interest in solving the vital tasks of development faced by the newly-free states of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, while studying the problems of technical cooperation between developed capitalist and developing countries.

In his monograph A. Kravtsevich made an attempt, and a successful one, to analyse the main theoretical aspects of technical and economic cooperation of capitalist states with the developing countries and also to characterise history, the present state, specifics of, and prospects for, technical cooperation of Japan with this group of countries, and this is the chief merit of his book.

In the first chapter the author defines the place of technical cooperation within the system of economic cooperation between developed and developing countries, brings to light the causes predetermining mutual interests of the two groups of countries in such cooperation, and traces the evolution of Western concepts of technical aid, as well as of forms, methods, financial sources and channels of technical cooperation, from the viewpoint of their influence on the character of a given form of economic ties.

Of interest is the author's definition of the concept of "technical cooperation". In Soviet and foreign economic literature it is often confused with the concepts "technical aid" and "technical assistance", which are close in meaning but different in content. For example, "technical aid" usually implies practically all forms of economic cooperation, promoting the technological development of the partner-country, including the deliveries of machinery and equipment. As for the concepts of "technical cooperation"

and "technical assistance", there is no clear-cut differentiation. Meanwhile, according to the author, "the fundamental differences between these terms consist in that, first, technical cooperation embraces a broader range of services than technical assistance; second, it can be carried on on both a commercial and free of charge basis. Technical assistance, on the other hand, can be carried on only on a free of charge basis" (p. 17). Let us note that technical cooperation may encompass mutual ties between countries which have attained different levels of development, while technical aid presupposes one-way flow of technical knowledge from a developed to a developing country and the assimilation of this knowhow by the latter.

Having examined a number of definitions of technical assistance (*White Papers of Great Britain on Technical Assistance*, the Service of Technical Cooperation of the Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development, the works by the British economist P. Williams and others), the author arrives at the definition of "technical cooperation" or, to be more precise, of the set of ties which he calls "technical and economic cooperation". In his well-grounded opinion "technical and economic cooperation implies such forms of foreign economic relations as bilateral or multilateral activities on the exchange of knowledge and experience (each country receives elements of development which it lacks or finds difficult to obtain them independently), promoting their more efficient socio-economic and cultural progress" (pp. 21-22). Therefore, the author considers it most correct to regard the "technical assistance" given by the developed capitalist states to the developing ones as a manifestation of technical cooperation that is either free of charge or is granted on favourable terms.

The first of Japanese assistance programmes to the developing countries were launched immediately after the end to US occupation of Japan in 1952. By this Japan's ruling quarters had in mind a number of tasks: stimulation of the restoration and reconstruction of the Japanese economy, restoration of diplomatic relations with the neighbouring Asian countries, the promotion of political and economic consolidation of the regimes which took a pro-Western course and were developing along capitalist lines, and

restoration of Japan's influence and leadership role first regionally and then globally.

While analysing the policy and practice of the Japanese government aid, the author singled out the four main stages in its evolution in the postwar period, in accordance with the change of the role of assistance within the system of foreign economic and foreign political steps of the Japanese government, and its goals and aims.

First stage: 1952-1956. After the occupational regime ceased to exist, Japan endeavoured to restore its international status as a sovereign and equitable state. Its governments declared their willingness to extend economic and technical assistance to the developing countries, despite the internal strained conditions of their own economy. As one of the biggest recipients of American and international aid, Japan also acted as a donor-country, having become member of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and of the International Monetary Fund, the UN Extended Programme of Technical Assistance, and so on. At the same time, a number of reparations agreements with the countries that had suffered from the Japanese aggression were concluded.

"If the first stage can be regarded as a preparation stage for the implementation of the Japanese foreign economic expansion", A. Kravtsevich rightly notes, "then at the second stage [1957-1964. — Y. E.] called 'economic diplomacy', Japan's ruling quarters launched an active policy of infiltration in the economies of the Asian developing countries, primarily of Southeast Asia" (p. 57). The expansion of export markets and the maintenance of political and economic stability in recipient countries became the principal goals of the Japanese assistance.

The author exposes the false nature of the constant statements of the Japanese government about the "selfless nature" of Japanese "assistance" which, alongside reparations, was allegedly assigned to play an important part in the development of the economies of the newly-free countries. Here, the author cites statements made by the Japanese leaders themselves. A statement by Prime Minister Ikeda, the principal initiator and champion of the policy of "economic diplomacy", is highly indicative: "The govern-

¹ *Programme of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union*, Moscow, 1961, p. 44.

ment actively extends economic cooperation since it contributes to Japan's prosperity. The implementation of economic cooperation develops Japan's economy... and the more of it is carried out, the better. It is necessary to proceed from the fact that economic cooperation is conducted not in the interests of other countries but in the interests of Japan" (p. 58). This is quite a frank utterance, leaving no doubt as to the genuine aims of the Japanese "assistance".

During the second period the conclusion of agreements on the reparations was completed and Japan began to make payment.

Having agreed to pay out reparations and having secured favourable terms for their payment, the Japanese monopolies first ensured for themselves stable markets for selling comparatively expensive products of heavy industry (a greater part of the deliveries were made within the framework of the reparations), ensured large-scale and free of charge advertising of the Japanese industrial products, which were little-known in the countries of Southeast Asia, and also of the technology and knowhow by means of making available Japanese experts and training probationers and students. The Japanese monopolies, by delivering capital equipment, ensured a stable demand of spare parts and subsequent technical equipment, which, in turn, contributed to the development of commercial exports and the expansion of the Japanese private capital to those countries. During the same period Japan extended its participation in international cooperation, having become a member of the committee promoting the development of the OECD and increased its donations to a number of international organisations of economic cooperation.

To improve the mechanism for implementing Japanese programmes of "assistance" the Foundation of Foreign Economic Cooperation was set up in 1961 and in 1962 the Agency for Foreign Technical Cooperation. These two agencies, together with Export-Import Bank of Japan, were entrusted with the task of translating into reality specific measures in this field.

The author links the coming to power of the Sato Cabinet late in 1964 with the beginning of the third stage in the implementation of the programmes of Japanese "assistance". By that time Japan, which ranked

third in the world in GNP, had a positive trade balance due to its rapid foreign economic expansion. This fact caused discontent among its trade partners who demanded its evening out. The import of raw materials and energy resources from a relatively small number of countries resulted in the Japanese economy becoming greatly dependent on deliveries from those countries. Besides, the bolstering of economic potential on the basis of a "high-rate economy" produced serious pollution of the environment on the Japanese Isles. Japanese monopolies saw the answer in transferring "especially dirty" production to the third countries, and also in the development of new deposits of mineral resources in the developing countries for subsequent export to Japan.

A new strategic plan called "development through imports" (p. 62) was Japan's way to solve these tasks; the plan was devised on the initiative of the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Industry. In accordance with the plan, the Japanese government granted finances and technical aid for the development of natural resources, mining industry and agriculture in recipient countries with an eye to increasing their exports to Japan and other developed capitalist countries. Tokyo also agreed to adopt the 1964 UNCTAD and the 1965 DAC recommendations that one per cent of Japan's national income should be allocated for promoting the development of young states, though the concrete date was not fixed.

A. Kravtsevich points out not without reason that "an analysis of the extent of Japan's dependence on the import of raw-material, fuel-and-energy and food resources in order to provide for the uninterrupted functioning of its economy, and one of the highest levels of pollution of the environment gives ground to speak of the more or less forced character of the new concept of the Japanese policy of 'assistance'" (p. 63).

The fourth stage in the implementation of the programmes of foreign "assistance" by Japan began in 1970. It is characterised by the intention of the Japanese government to "increase substantially the granting of assistance to the developing countries, whose socio-economic progress is a *sine qua non* for the progress of Japan itself" (p. 65). Japan undertook, among other things, to ensure by 1975 a total flow of financial re-

sources to the developing countries to the amount of one per cent of its GNP, to bring the volume of the "official aid for development" to 0.7 per cent of its GNP, to improve, in accordance with the DAC recommendations of 1969, the terms of granting "assistance", and increase the volume and scale of technical cooperation and the size of donations to international organisations.

In spite of all such commitments, the problems of economic development and improvement of the living standard of the peoples in the developing countries — and this is convincingly revealed in the monograph under review—were viewed by the Japanese ruling quarters as only the secondary task of their "assistance". Moreover, Japan was giving increasing attention to the so-called "self-assistance". According to M. Ohira, Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Tanaka cabinet, "the expansion of the Japanese assistance, as a major aspect of Japan's foreign policy, is a means for assisting the developing countries in their aid to themselves" (p. 66).

"Thus," A. Kravtsevich writes, "the examination of the evolution of the Japanese policy of 'assistance' to the developing countries during the postwar period warrants the conclusion that there is considerable inconsistency between the declarations and the true policy of Japan in this field" (p. 66).

The author also points to the predomination of economic considerations in giving economic and technical "assistance" by Japan, though he does not ignore completely the political and ideological aspects of the Japanese cooperation with the developing countries. The latter, among other things, makes itself felt in the preferential development

of relations with ASEAN countries inside the region, the support to the reactionary regimes in South Korea, Taiwan and Thailand, the refusal to give assistance to the countries of Indochina that have opted for a socialist orientation, and so on. A statistics-filled analysis of technological and economic cooperation of the leading imperialist powers with the developing countries, and the place Japan occupies in this cooperation, show that, although in 1979 Japan ranked second after the United States among the developed capitalist countries in the total resources channelled to Asian, African and Latin American countries, as far as "absolute expenditures on technological cooperation are concerned, Japan is only sixth in the world after France, the FRG, the United States, Great Britain and the Netherlands" (p. 77). In spite of the fact that since the beginning of the 1970s the Japanese government has been steering toward a sharp expansion of technological cooperation with the developing countries and by 1978 it increased the volume of government allocations for this cooperation more than ten-fold (as compared with the level of 1970), this kind of activities still takes a rather modest place among the other foreign economic measures of Japan.

In the third chapter A. Kravtsevich examines the organisational structure and the system of financing technological and economic cooperation of Japan with the developing countries. An acquaintance with this chapter, as well as with the whole book, enables one to get a better understanding of the mechanism of foreign economic expansion of Japan, in which the technological and economic cooperation with the developing countries is an important part.

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AGROINDUSTRIAL INTEGRATION IN JAPAN

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[Review by V. B. Ramzes of book "Problemy agropromyshlennoy integratsii v Yaponii" [Problems of Agroindustrial Integration in Japan] by S. B. Markar'yan, Moscow, Nauka, 1982, 287 pages]

"The production of means of subsistence", Marx noted, "is the very first condition of the direct producers' existence and of all production in general..."¹ Citing this precept, the author of the book under review writes that it does not require proof (p. 96). Such is reality. On the other hand, the methods of greatly boosting the efficiency of the production require a most serious substantiation. And the formation of an agro-industrial complex (AIC) is the most reliable way to attain this goal.

S. Markaryan's book conducts an analysis of this formation, both technically and through the prism of complex socio-economic processes that are variegated and bring about various properties and consequences. The existing scholarship on the subject contains both narrow and broader interpretations of the AIC and contradictory views on the motive forces forming it and on the specific types of connections between its links.

I think, for example, that the conclusion by Soviet scholar G. Faktor (with whom S. Markaryan agrees) gives great opportunities for scientific investigation. Faktor argues that the AIC should be considered a "vertically integrated and coordinated sum-total of branches and enterprises participating, in one way or another, in the production and distribution of finished farm goods" (p. 6). It seems that stability of business ties between the interbranch bodies and the sphere of AIC should be the main criterion of their relationship.

It is noteworthy that Markaryan's explanations are sometimes too lapidary, her position vague and her terminology somewhat lacking in preciseness. For example, she should have more accurately compared the

notions of "agro-industrial unification" and "agro-industrial integration and the AIC" (p. 148). She establishes integrational connections at times according to the long-term agreements specifying the basic technological standards (p. 113), at other times according to ordinary contract relations between trade-industrial companies and farm producers (p. 144). For some reason, she does not consider "production on commission", a more perfect type of contract, envisaging control over production technology by the trade-industrial firms as a method of inclusion agriculture into the integration process (pp. 131-132). The definition of interbranch and intereconomy amalgamations crowned by combined enterprises (p. 149) should have been more clearcut too.

All this, however, did not prevent Markaryan from presenting a broad panorama of the interconnection between various economic branches in Japan (agriculture, fertilizer industry, farm engineering, mixed feeds and food industries, trade and servicing branches) and the AIC.

The most abrupt changes which, by the way, are not always quickly felt, are occurring in agriculture, i. e., in the most important and most backward link of the future AIC. Outward inertia, typical of this branch, conceals the concentration of arable land (which is done by purchases, leases, virgin land being upturned, cancellation of lease contracts, etc.), concentration of growing portions of produce in big estates (by cooperation of production, among other things), and territorial and economic specialisation.

Mechanisation of production in farming has also been accelerated. This major factor of raising labour productivity has become more important during the 1970s, mainly owing to the mechanisation of rice-growing and other agricultural sub-industries.

¹ K. Marx, *Capital*, Vol. III, p. 635.

Very similar changes are taking place in the branches adjoining agriculture (with their specific features preserved), servicing it at the initial and final stages, the former being production of fertilizers, chemicals, mixed feed, farm engineering, maintenance supplies, etc., and the latter including food industry and trade.

The intensified processes of concentration and, notably, of centralisation; more sophisticated technology, constant increase in the assortment of goods and range of services, a greater ability to meet the ever-changing demand, learning how to create the demand for the goods produced—all these factors, vividly shown in the book, daily increase the latent compatibility of the above-said industries and bring about a certain standard of quality that helps to sweep away all obstacles from the path of the ongoing integration.

Organisationally, research in agriculture holds a somewhat isolated position, as it is carried out primarily by the state or municipal bodies. As far as effectiveness is concerned, this research is connected with the formation of the AIC in the closest fashion. An ordinary list of what has been done and is still being done is eloquent proof of this.

"The effort Japanese research centres in the postwar time," writes Markaryan, "resulted in new productive varieties of crops that were more resistant to diseases and pests, bad weather and overdoses of fertilizers. New kinds of fertilizers and chemicals have been created, and ways of using them have been improved. The techniques of growing rice sprouts in a shorter time and of raising crops in covered soil have been mastered, new machines have been designed for work in Japanese conditions. Many of these trends in research have remained urgent issues for the present. At the same time, new trends have emerged concerning, for example, the environmental protection and energy conservation" (pp. 78-79).

The material presented in the book shows that the Japanese government's agrarian policy covers a much larger sphere than regulating prices of farm produce, which is usually understood (not very correctly) to protect small landowners in general and rice-growers in particular.

The main objective of the government policy in agriculture (the price policy being no exception) is "first of all the alteration of the structure of this industry, with a view to raise it to the level of other industries of the agro-industrial complex" (p. 96).

For this reason, it is not to the rice-growers that the main flow of state subsidies and low-interest credits go. They primarily go to cattle-breeding, vegetable and fruit-growing farms of medium or big size.

In addition, the state helps promote spe-

cialisation in agriculture, participating in designation of the so-called basic districts for providing the country with certain kinds of produce. During this process, the local administrative bodies act as mediators between the trade-industrial firms and the farmers.

The author managed to complete a very informative and interesting study of the prevailing forms by which agriculture integrates into other branches of economy.

While reading the book, one becomes aware that a nationwide experiment is being conducted in Japan to find an optimal balance of business relations between agricultural production, industrial production and the market. Indeed, we can see simultaneous, parallel, and sometimes even intertwined functioning of a fairly large number of such connections and participants, some of which assume the responsibilities of leaders, with others being led most of the time.

The contract system seems to remain the most widespread one at the present moment. It comprises ordinary contracts that are very often no more than one-time market deals. The above-mentioned contracts-on-commission, for example, signify that relations between the farm-producer and his contractor in town are being put on a more or less permanent basis, given the former fulfills definite tasks set before him and the latter assists him financially and technically.

The contract system is being used side by side with the establishment (which happens increasingly often) by the trade-industrial companies of their own farm enterprises, or establishment by universal trade firms of longer integrational chains, sometimes forming an exclusive circle, from the market selling means of production and up to the market selling manufactured goods. Finally, combined forms are also used.

The wealth of combinations for setting up the AIC in Japan becomes clear if one remembers that, besides trade-industrial companies, both farming and town consumer cooperatives may become its participants, that there are many mediators acting among the basic enterprises in the system of multi-branch firms, etc.

The author has managed to find, select and systematise dozens of examples of tremendous growth of economic and social

efficiency of social production. This growth stems from "two-way traffic bridges" being constantly built between agriculture and the adjoining industries.

Given this material, the author's remark that "the role of agro-industrial complex in the economic life of the country is slowly decreasing" (p. 89) seems to be somewhat controversial. In support of my view, I would like to draw the reader's attention to the following three points:

first: the statistical data referring to certain spheres of the AIC (substantiating this conclusion) either turn out to be wrong (p. 88), or can do only for very approximate calculations (pp. 91-92);

second: the changes within definite parts of the AIC as regards the number of workers, the gross output and the complete added value testify to their radical and progressive restructuring (rather than to their degradation), consisting in replacing labour-intensive processes by labour-saving ones, cutting off a number of functions from some industries to benefit the others, in creating new, highly-productive industries which are too small, however, in absolute terms to replace the traditional, low-productive industries, and to dismantle them;

third: the AIC, as the book indicates quite correctly, is not a simple arithmetic sum-total of certain parts; in reality, the AIC is still in the making while the role of integrational processes leading to it is strengthening. This fact reveals itself partially in the social changes that the AIC brings about in agriculture.

In my opinion, the economic role—not of the AIC, of course, as it is still in the making, but of the integration processes leading to it—is enhanced. This process is revealed, in part—, in the social changes they bring to agriculture.

The consequences of industrialisation of agricultural production, influenced by integrational processes, are not confined to rationalisation, modernisation, perfection of equipment, technological novelties, all of which lead to lower costs. Among these consequences one can name the speeded up

stratification of the population in the countryside, the greater dependency by farmers on trade-industrial capital, and the mounting number of hired labour in the countryside. As a result, agriculture is being increasingly drawn toward the system of capitalist relations of production.

A selective approach, used by the trade-industrial companies vis-à-vis their village contractors, plays quite a definite part: the most competent, well-to-do and promising homesteads are chosen for business relations; their owners are given financial and technical assistance, which naturally implies total control over them. On the other hand, it implies that these owners will rise above the mass of peasants who remain outside these amalgamations.

The farmers included into the system of integrational relations get seeds, young cattle, fertilizers, money loans—all this without interruption; they are given advice on farming and cattlebreeding, as well as opportunities to sell their produce at reasonable prices and replace their implements.

Of course, these privileges have to be paid for. The farmers pay the dear price of losing their independence and initiative, to say nothing of part of their revenues. In addition, the "patrons" may revise the conditions of cooperation or discontinue it under the pressure of economic situation, doing so of their own free will and quite unexpectedly for the farmers.

What are the prospects for the integration processes in Japan? Will they lead to the establishment of the AIC? Here is what the author writes: "In the future, the setting up of the AIC will take the form of high and low tides, depending on the objective conditions of interaction between the sectors [agrarian and industrial.—V.R.], different at every given moment" (p. 250).

S. Markaryan has long been known in Soviet scholarship for her profound works on agrarian problems. Her latest book is a successful analysis of another important socio-economic problem facing Japan.

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BOOK ON JAPANESE-SOUTH KOREAN ECONOMIC TIES REVIEWED

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 1, Jan-Mar 83 (signed to press 22 Feb 83) pp 202-203

[Review by P. Yu. Maslov of book "Yaponiya i Yuzhnaya Koreya ('pomoshch' razvitiyu' i yeye posledstviya)" [Japan and South Korea ("Development Aid" and Its Implications)] by V. I. Shipayev, Moscow, 1981, 286 pages: "Contradictory Partnership"]

[Text] The presence of two conflicting sociopolitical systems on the Korean peninsula has led to the widespread use of various myths in bourgeois scientific literature about the nature of South Korean economic development, which is usually described in apologetic terms. In general, this approach is also characteristic of bourgeois researchers of Japanese-South Korean economic relations, who tend to embroider or "varnish" the truth about the motives, methods and means of Japanese activity. This is due to the official political goals of bourgeois political science, but the actual economic development of South Korea and Japanese-South Korean economic relations provide absolutely no basis for their depiction in idyllic terms. In this connection, V. I. Shipayev's study of Japanese-South Korean economic relations is pertinent.

The author stresses that both South Korea and Japan had an interest in well-organized economic cooperation, but to varying degrees. For South Korea, this kind of cooperation made the rise of its national economy possible through modernization, which was supposed to promote successful economic competition with the North. For Japan, it provided an additional outlet for surplus capital and was supposed to heighten the economic potential of South Korea, which is regarded in Tokyo as a "forward line of defense," and to simultaneously strengthen the capitalist order in the south of the Korean peninsula. An important role was also played by pressure from the United States, which hoped to lay a basis, with Japan's help, for a trilateral coalition aimed against the DPRK and other socialist countries in the Far East.

The author's list of objective prerequisites for organized Japanese-South Korean cooperation includes, firstly, the pitiful state of the South Korean economy throughout the 1950's; secondly, the dynamic development of the Japanese economy during this period; thirdly, the Japanese machinery set up by the end of the 1950's for "development aid" to newly liberated countries and for the transfer of huge sums of Japanese surplus capital to these countries (p 26). The strategic purpose of the "development aid" program consisted in

the maximum facilitation of the widespread expansion of Japanese monopoly capital. It was made up of the following elements: financial aid (reparation payments and government loans), private export credit and private investments as well as technical aid and trade.

It must be said that the Seoul regime had created a favorable investment climate for foreign capital in the country by the middle of the 1960's in order to effect the rapid rise of the South Korean economy and compete successfully with the socialist economy of the DPRK. It was at that time, during the years when the first South Korean five-year plan was being carried out (1962-1966), that some of the negative implications of Japanese "development aid" became apparent. The author singles out the following: Firstly, the Japanese loans and credit increased South Korea's foreign debt and thereby augmented its national economic difficulties; secondly, the South Korean economy became more dependent on Japanese monopoly capital because the South Korean partners who accepted loans or credit had to promise to use Japanese equipment and industrial raw materials; thirdly, the financial aid from Japan gave rise to disparities in the development of various economic subdivisions.

There was a constant rise in the absolute figures of Japanese "development aid" to South Korea between the end of the 1960's and the end of the 1970's. It was important for Seoul to acquire the maximum quantity of Japanese capital in the form of loans, credit and direct investments in order to finance its program of industrialization and to lead the country out of its state of chronic underdevelopment. The economy of South Korea turned out to be a capacious reservoir, absorbing part of Japan's surplus capital. At the same time, the Japanese "development aid" heightened South Korea's economic potential and strengthened its position in the competition between the two systems on the Korean peninsula.

South Korea's economic successes gave rise to certain worries, however, in Japanese ruling circles. South Korean wages were much lower than wages in Japan, and this secured the superior competitive potential of South Korean goods. As a result, Japanese monopolies began the gradual restriction of "development aid" to South Korea. The Seoul regime responded with efforts to reduce the South Korean economy's dependence on the policy of Japanese ruling circles. By the end of the 1970's this had led to a situation in which "South Korea is trying to reduce its dependence on Japan, and its efforts have grown more persistent as its economy has grown more sound. Japan, on the other hand, is doing everything within its power to secure this dependence and, if possible, to postpone the transformation of South Korea into a dangerous competitor. These conflicting aims and the competition that has already begun between the two countries," the author concludes, "will inevitably give rise to contradictions that will most certainly increase in scope and intensity" (p 135).

One of the most serious sociopolitical implications of the development of Japanese-South Korean economic ties was the growth of conflicts between the middle and petty bourgeoisie, which had not received access to "development aid," and the increasingly strong segment of big South Korean capital. This does not mean, however, that there are no conflicts between big South Korean capital and the Japanese monopolies, although the desire for cooperation is

now the prevailing factor in their interrelations (at least on the surface). In the future, however, there is no question that as soon as big South Korean capital becomes strong enough, V. I. Shipayev writes, "it will feel oppressed by its now unavoidably dependent status, and all of the disputes which are now being resolved on some kind of class basis will sooner or later, but within the foreseeable future, grow into an international problem" (p 171).

Now that the South Korean bourgeoisie has gained strength with the aid of the Japanese monopolies, it is making more persistent and purposeful efforts to strengthen its security on the foreign and domestic political levels. The notorious "threat from the North"--the bugbear of anticommunism--was the basis for Seoul's convergence with Japanese ruling circles. There is no question that the United States is constantly urging close cooperation by its Far Eastern allies, including politico-military cooperation. Tokyo has also displayed this desire because, as mentioned above, it views South Korea as Japan's bridgehead or "forward line of defense" against the notorious "communist threat." It was no coincidence that the Japanese monopolies began to strengthen Seoul's military potential even before the official normalization of Japanese-South Korean relations and later continued these efforts.

The contradictory nature of Japanese-South Korean relations was also reflected in the approach of the two sides to this issue. Tendencies toward some restraint in Tokyo's position on military cooperation with Seoul came into being and grew strong at the end of the 1970's. The main reason was that there are forces in Japan, including some members of ruling circles, who advocate the normal development of relations with the USSR and DPRK, and this would unavoidably complicate a politico-military alliance with South Korea. Secondly, there was the real danger of the direct involvement of Japan in any military conflict provoked by Seoul, which has often acted as a dangerous destabilizing element in international relations in the Far East. Another important reason for Japan's relatively reserved position on military cooperation with South Korea was the increase in economic conflicts between the two countries. These facts gave Seoul an opportunity to accuse Tokyo of "not contributing enough" to the defense of the capitalist system in the south of the Korean peninsula.

In general, the author says in summation, Japanese-South Korean relations, which are strongly influenced by the United States, have two bases--the common class interests of Seoul and Tokyo and their economic partnership. During the first stage of their economic cooperation (1966-1970), Japanese "development aid" promoted the growth of South Korean economic potential. At the same time, Japanese capital's predilection for the most "prestigious," or most profitable, industries created disparities in the development of various subdivisions of the South Korean economy. During the second stage, which has lasted up to the present time, the economic relations between Japan and South Korea have displayed friction caused by the gradual reinforcement of the South Korean economy. Japanese monopoly capital views it as a new serious competitor, capable of crowding it out of foreign markets. As a result, around the middle of the 1970's Japanese ruling circles used various methods to slow down the development of the South Korean economy, including smaller doses of "development aid."

At the present time Seoul and Tokyo, connected by their relationship of a debtor and creditor with common class interests, are striving to minimize existing and new differences (including economic conflicts). The author concludes, however, that the partnership between Japan and South Korea, both in the past and particularly in the future, can only be described as a contradictory partnership with intimations of conflict.

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OBITUARY OF ORIENTALIST, ECONOMIST K. M. POPOV

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 1, Jan-Mar 83 (signed to press 22 Feb 83) p 208

[Text] Soviet Orientology has suffered a severe loss: The renowned scholar and one of the founders of Soviet Japanese area studies, Honored Scientist of the RSFSR Konstantin Mikhaylovich Popov, a talented educator, public spokesman, doctor of economic sciences and professor, died at the age of 83 on 27 September 1982.

K. M. Popov's entire life was an example of selfless service to Soviet science and to his socialist homeland. After graduating from two VUZ's (the Institute of Foreign Relations and the Institute of the National Economy in Kiev), he worked in Moscow, in USSR Gosplan, from 1925 through 1933, participating in the compilation of the First Five-Year Plan for National Economic Development in the USSR. His long and fruitful career as an educator began in 1930, when he began teaching at the Moscow Institute of Oriental Studies. His original and thorough lecture courses served as the basis for several VUZ textbooks. In 1933 K. M. Popov transferred to the Institute of World Economics and World Politics of the USSR Academy of Sciences and successfully combined research with teaching.

Major works by K. M. Popov, which immediately put him in the forefront of Soviet Oriental studies, were published in the 1930's: A book entitled "Ocherki geografii i ekonomiki Yaponii" [Essays on Japanese Geography and Economics] was published in 1931; a second, revised edition, entitled "Ekonomika Yaponii" [The Japanese Economy], was published in 1936; a new comprehensive study, "Tekhnoekonomicheskaya baza Yaponii" [The Technical Basis of the Japanese Economy], was published in 1934 and became the basis of the doctoral dissertation he defended in 1943. K. M. Popov was made a professor in 1945. New studies by the scholar were published later: "Tikhookeanskiy teatr voyennykh deystviy" [The Pacific Theater of Military Operations] (1942), "Voyennaya ekonomika Yaponii" [Japan's Military Economy] (1946), "Mineral'nyye resursy Yaponii" [Japan's Mineral Resources] (1949), "Ocherki natsional'noy kul'tury i geograficheskoy mysli Yaponii" [Essays on Japanese National Culture and Geographic Theory] (1964), "Problemy EKADV i Yaponiya" [Problems of ECAFE and Japan] (1969) and others. His works are widely known in our country and abroad and have been translated in several editions in Japan.

K. M. Popov made a tremendous contribution to science, to Soviet studies of Japan. He won the distinguished title of honored scientist of the RSFSR for his great services in the development of science and the training of Orientalists.

For several years, K. M. Popov participated officially in the planning and conduct of the foreign economic policy of the Soviet State. At the end of 1944 he was invited to serve in the Ministry of Foreign Trade, where he worked as an expert on Oriental affairs until 1952. During these years, he attended sessions of the UN Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East in India, Ceylon, Burma, Singapore, Thailand, Australia and Japan, participating in the commission's work as a member of the Soviet delegation.

For many years, K. M. Popov worked productively in the "USSR-Japan" Society, and he was one of the founders of this society. As deputy chairman of the society board and the head of its science commission, he spared no effort to strengthen friendship and mutual understanding between the people of our country and Japan and to develop productive cultural and scientific contacts between the two countries.

Until the end of his days, Konstantin Mikhaylovich Popov worked tirelessly to train Orientalists for the Far East Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences. Konstantin Mikhaylovich was a member of the institute's specialized council and a member of the editorial board of PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA, taking the most active and enthusiastic part in their work.

Fond memories of Konstantin Mikhaylovich Popov, a renowned Orientalist, excellent educator, prominent public figure and a most charming man, will live forever in our hearts.

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