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Worldwide Report

ARMS CONTROL

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10 February 1986

WORLDWIDE REPORT

ARMS CONTROL

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SDI AND SPACE ARMS

USSR ATTACKS GOALS OF SDI 'TRAVELING SALESMEN'

Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 2 Nov 85 p 3

[Article by Aleksandr Mozgovoy under the rubric "Events and Opinions": "'Star Wars' Traveling Salesmen"]

[Text] A child's drawing depicting people, houses and trees appears on the television screen... Suddenly there is alarm: these people, houses and trees are threatened by missiles--Soviet missiles. But the marvelous world drawn by a child's hand is successfully saved, saved with the help of a shield--President Reagan's "strategic defense initiative."

That is the simple plot of the film short concocted by advertising specialists on order from the American Coalition for the Strategic Defense Initiative. The calculation is clear: to cause concern in American papas and mamas for the future of their children, who allegedly can only be protected from a nuclear apocalypse by implementing the SDI. It is a very basic but rather effective technique. Who wouldn't be concerned with the destiny of beloved children?

The Coalition spent almost two million dollars for having television stations all over the United States show the advertising short. Just what are the lovers of children's drawings trying to gain? "The SDI is considerably more important for the United States than the decrepit ABM Treaty," explains General (Ret) D. Graham, head of the Coalition.

Strictly speaking, that same opinion is held by a number of highly placed American administration officials. And R. McFarlane, deputy assistant to the president for national security affairs, recently declared that the development and testing of ABM systems based on "new physical principles" allegedly not only are not banned by the Soviet-American ABM Treaty but, to the contrary, "are approved and sanctioned" by it.

McFarlane's statement, which indicates the intent of certain circles in the United States to torpedo the ABM Treaty, generated a political storm both within the United States itself and in Western Europe as well. Washington's NATO partners expressed their "lack of understanding" of the American position, which is aimed at a deliberate breach of the obligations assumed. Having encountered significant opposition at home and in the allied camp,

Washington is forced to maneuver as it discusses the "broad" and "narrow" interpretation of the ABM Treaty and the fact that the White House tends toward a "narrow" interpretation which provides for a treaty revision, but not such a radical one as with the "broad" interpretation.

Meanwhile, while some SDI apologists openly advertise the SDI over the national television network or engage in theoretical research intended to legitimize the "Star Wars" program, others are intensively trying to win over NATO allies in favor of the very same old SDI. Here is where new motives appeared. Here is what the WASHINGTON POST writes: "U.S. political, military and industrial circles have begun to encourage Western Europe on the sly to think about a variety of President Reagan's SDI for defense against medium range missiles."

Republican Congressman Duncan Hunter and another nine of his colleagues now are packing their bags for a trip to the Old World. The purpose of their trip is to propagandize American plans for "Star Wars" and for "a more modest European defense system." Hunter assures that this system "would be established by the Europeans themselves and with their money, and the United States would serve as a source of information and technology." Corresponding technology of the LTV corporation which is being used in the American ASAT antisatellite system also is offered.

By the way, it is not only LTV that is ready to share "star wars" secrets with sest Europeans. Raytheon also is imposing its services by offering to create an ABM based on its Patriot surface to air system for the NATO European countries. Another American corporation, Sperry Rand, has begun developing space attack weapons together with the West German firm of Dornier.

What nobility! Now Washington is not only taking care of its own defense, but that of the allies as well. "The idea that the Europeans should create their ABM system is a good one," says Kenneth Adelman, director of the U.S Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, enthusiastically. "Such a system is unquestionably permitted under the ABM Treaty."

At the very least it is strange to hear talk of the need to build up arms from the lips of a person responsible for questions of disarmament, but this is only half the trouble. The danger lies elsewhere. The fact is that in accordance with articles 9 and 10 of the ABM Treaty, the United States and USSR undertook not to transfer to other states, and not to deploy outside their national territory, ABM systems or their components, and not to assume any international obligations which would conflict with the Treaty. Meanwhile, Mr. Adelman is pushing through the idea of wrecking a very important agreement.

After encountering the allies' objections in connection with the "broad" interpretation of the ABM Treaty, the American administration set off on an outflanking maneuver in an attempt to make the junior partners in NATO accomplices in the process of undermining treaty provisions. The American "star wars" salesmen who now have rolled like a wave into West European capitals see this as their task.

SDI AND SPACE ARMS

SOVIET ARMY PAPER ATTACKS U.S. REASONING ON SDI

MOSCOW KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 12 Nov 85 p 3

[Article by Captain 2nd Rank Ye. Nikitin: "The Threat to All of Mankind: 'Star Wars' in the Imperialist Plans of Washington"]

[Text] The "Star Wars" program, which is masked as the so-called "Strategic Defense Initiative" (SDI), was brought into the world two and a half years ago. It is the peculiar result of the realization of political decisions of previous decades. A voluminous report called "The Preliminary Design for an Experimental Spacecraft for Circumnavigating the Globe" was prepared by the U.S. Air Force as early as March, 1946. It read in part "... The decision for a U.S. orbital satellite probably will evoke the same reaction as the explosion of the atomic bomb... The government which first achieves vital successes in space will be judged the world leader in military and scientific fields."

Washington is dreaming about a return to those very times when the United States possessed a monopoly on the atomic bomb. Quite recently the U.S. secretary of defense, C. Weinburger, spoke out quite frankly about this in Congress, before the Senate Armed Forces Committee. He said, "If we acquire a system which is effective and makes the Soviet Union's weapons useless, then we can return to the situation when we were the only country possessing nuclear weapons."

As we see, the very "Star Wars" program itself, is, in its essence, an expression of the imperialist conception of the United States to rule the world. It is namely in the realization of space plans that Washington sees the achievement of the goal of its global imperialist policy. Yet, in as much as that path is barred by a powerful shield in the person of the Soviet Union, Washington has high hopes for wrecking the existing Soviet-American strategic military parity. "We are tired of equality. The only means by which we can return the lever of political control to ourselves," noted the president of the (American Institute for Research on Space Problems and Safety), P. Bauman, "is by returning absolute military supremacy to ourselves."

In order to conceal the true goals of the "Star Wars" program, the White House attempts to demonstrate the disinterestedness and nobleness of its intentions and promises to share the secrets of

the defensive weapons with the Soviet Union. Such an unfounded promise has elicited nothing but sarcastic smiles. People have learned to judge a policy by deeds, rather than by words.

Washington demonstrated deeds which have taken a course toward world hegemony as early as 1945, when it used nuclear weapons two times, at Hiroshima and at Nagasaki. The plans of the United States at that time for atomic brigandage with regard to the Soviet Union are also well known. The fact that these plans were not realized is hardly the result of Washington's good will, but the result of the Soviet Union's unceasing efforts toward preserving peace and achieving strategic military equality with the United States. The period of the nuclear monopoly of the United States and later the period of its significant predominance in these weapons were characterized by continual calculations about when and how to take advantage of that situation.

Now President R. Reagan declares that a nuclear war cannot be won, and that it should not be started at all. Yet how, one asks, do these declarations tie in with the fact that the goal of victory in a nuclear war remains the official U.S. doctrine. Vice-

President G. Bush declared that, if the United States prepares well for a nuclear war, it is possible for them to gain victory in it. E. Rostow, a former director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, in turn said, "Even though up to 100 million Americans may die in a nuclear war, 'that is still not the entire U.S. population.' "In the "Guiding Principles" for nurturing the forces of aggression published by the Pentagon in 1982, it was emphasized that in the event of nuclear war, "the United States must possess superiority and be in a position to force the Soviet Union to seek a swift cessation of military operations in conditions favorable to the United States."

Thus, the facts demonstrate that Washington has not changed its hegemonic plans. Numerous variations of nuclear war are developed for their realization, and the military forces of the United States are formed accordingly. Strategic first strike weapons are being created at accelerated rates: the MX intercontinental ballistic missiles, "Midgetman," the "Trident-2" submarine-launched ballistic missiles, strategic bombers and long-range cruise missiles in various basing modes. New kinds of weapons of mass destruction are being developed, and plans for militarizing space are being hatched. When we throw away the beautiful, wordy husk in which the White House cloaks the "Star Wars" program, it appears before us in its true sinister form. The program is nothing other than a persistent attempt by American imperialism to ensure for itself world supremacy through military superiority over the Soviet Union.

The Arms Race has reached a fatal frontier. Realization of the "Star Wars" program would threaten the very existence of life on Earth, and the peoples of the world cannot help but see this. All over the world a mass movement has developed for a nuclear weapons freeze and for preventing the militarization of space. People of good will are waiting with great hope for positive results from the forthcoming meeting in Geneva between CPSU Central Committee General Secretary M. S. Gorbachev and President of the United States R. Reagan.

However, even influential circles in the West recognize the negative effect of American plans to militarize space on the outcome of this meeting. Former president of the United States J. Carter declared, "The main impediment on the road to success in the forthcoming Soviet-American summit meeting in Geneva is the proposed 'Star Wars' program of R. Reagan." THE PRESS TRUST OF INDIA emphasizes that, "The consequences of realization of the 'Star Wars' program are extremely serious, not only for the developed governments, but also for developing nations.

Doctor David Baker, a prominent English scientist specializing in the problems of space, warns about the pernicious consequences of the Pentagon's militarization of space. As the newspaper THE GUARDIAN reports, he branded "Star Wars" as a manifestation "bearing a threat to the very existence and sanity of our planet."

The Soviet Union is conducting an unceasing struggle in the interests of mankind, in the name of the welfare of present and future generations. As the draft of the new edition of the CPSU Program emphasizes, the Soviet Union will consistently strive for "limitations and reductions in the sphere of military preparations, especially those connected with weapons of mass destruction. First of all, we should entirely exclude outer space from this sphere in order that it not become an arena of military competition and a source of death and destruction. Research on space and its conquest must take place only in peaceful interests for the development of science and production, in accordance with the requirements of all peoples. The USSR is for collective efforts toward the solution of this problem and will actively participate in such international cooperation."

There lies the bright manifestation of the unceasing concern of the CPSU and the Soviet Government for the safety of all the peoples of our planet. All of mankind are vitally interested in the preservation of peace on Earth and the elimination of the "star" threat.

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SDI AND SPACE ARMS

USSR SENDS NOTE TO FRG ON U.S. SDI PROGRAM

Note Not Viewed as 'Protest'

LD291248 Hamburg DPA in German 1051 GMT 29 Dec 85

[Excerpt] Moscow/Bonn, 29 Dec (DPA)--The Foreign Ministry in Bonn does not regard a note, conveyed this weekend by Soviet Ambassador Vladimir Semenov, which expresses the wish for Bonn to examine its SDI decision, as a protest. A spokesman for the Foreign Ministry told DPA today that the action is seen as a formalization of the Soviet position, as already outlined in PRAVDA.

Press Views Note

DW301113 Cologne Deutschlandfunk Network in German 0605 GMT 30 Dec 85

[From the press review]

[Text] The papers today comment on the Moscow note requesting a review of Bonn's SDI decision; a note which was handed over in the federal capital at week's end.

Commenting on the Moscow note, the Duesseldorf RHEINISCHE POST writes: Granted, it may be a coincidence that the news on a massive Soviet intrusion in the Federal Government's positive decision on SDI research broke nearly at the same time as the news on enticing Soviet orders to the German capital equipment industry. By the same token it is safe to assume some wirepulling in the background. Information and disorientation policies of the Kremlin are handled with equal dexterity. It had been discernible for weeks that the Soviets would make every attempt to sabotage German participation in President Reagan's orders for the Strategic Defense Initiative. Moscow's envoy on the Rhine, German specialist Semenov, used nearly every opportunity to warn German industrialists, above all, against SDI participation. Many a critical utterance made by these very industrial bosses indeed showed that this pressure was not totally without effect.

BRAUNSCHWEIGER ZEITUNG notes: There is no cease-fire on the psychological warfare front even at the turn of the year. The Soviet Union is bringing pressure to bear on Bonn for the latter's decision to negotiate with the United States on a potential SDI participation. It is amazing that the Kremlin is at such a loss for ideas for exploiting better for its own ends the chances which indeed do exist as a result of a disunited FRG opinion and the rather hesitant attitude of the Bonn coalition. The long-term goal of the Federal Government to at least keep a foot in the door to SDI

is only logical in view of the SS-20 nuclear intermediate-range missiles which are constantly targeted on us. When will the Kremlin come to realize at last what immense political effects it could have on the Western defense system if it dismantled the SS-20 missiles, if it took from the Europeans this anxiety and thus the strongest tie that holds NATO together?

AUGSBURGER ALLGEMEINE writes: Nearly in coincidence with the presentation of a Soviet protest note against Bonn's participation in the U.S. SDI project the news broke that the same USSR has promised a German company a project worth DM10 billion. Does Moscow intend to use this offer for exerting pressure on the Federal Government to review once more its position in the SDI question and thus to cold-shoulder the U.S. space plans totally with the promise of further transactions of such volume? Probably this development does not deserve such a high rating. After all, it was not the German companies alone which profited from the deals between the Soviet Union and the Federal Republic; the Soviets continue to be dependent on the cooperation with Western, including German, companies if they wish to implement the ambitious goals of the new Kremlin leadership.

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FRG'S STRAUSS ON BANGEMANN'S U.S. TALKS ON SDI

DPA Report

LD111758 Hamburg DPA in German 1039 GMT 11 Jan 86

[Excerpts] Bonn, 11 Jan (DPA)--CSU Chairman Franz Josef Strauss regards the negotiating brief with which Federal Economics Minister Martin Bangemann is traveling to the United States today for talks on a framework agreement for improved technology exchange--including an agreement on SDI--as wrong.

In a television interview on the sidelines of a closed meeting of the CSU regional group in Wildbad Kreuth, which was broadcast Friday evening, Strauss said he expressed his doubts to Federal Chancellor Kohl in a private talk on Thursday evening.

Strauss stressed that the SDI question cannot be restricted to purely economic negotiations. The issue in question is, first, to take part in technological developments with the United States, and second, questions concerning security policy. "And that is not Bangemann's concern." In the area of security the problem of eliminating short-range and medium-range missiles from the East arise.

Strauss said the CSU is especially astonished at the fact that the decision adopted by the cabinet on the 18 December looked totally different just beforehand. Apparently a change had taken place overnight, "probably as a result of pressure from certain circles in the FDP". The CSU chairman said he had made the "strongest criticism" of this "and the CSU minister's failure to state: 'We won't have any part of this'".

Strauss stressed that his criticism is not leveled against the decision to entrust Bangemann with the negotiations. It is not this that he regards as wrong. Bangemann will no doubt do the job quite well.

Bangemann's delegation also includes Horst Teltschik, head of the foreign and security policy department in the chancellor's office.

Further Comments

LD121741 Hamburg DPA in German 1011 GMT 12 Jan 86

[Excerpts] Bonn, 12 Jan (DPA) -- CSU Chairman Franz Josef Strauss has affirmed the CSU's desire to continue the coalition of the union parties with the FDP "to the end of the legislative period" despite attacks, some sharp, from the FDP ranks against CSU politicians. In an interview on Deutschlandfunk today, Strauss said the attacks were under the belt and indicated "stupidity."

Asked about a possible agreement with the United States on cooperation in the space missile defense system planned by the United States, Strauss said the Europeans also should participate fully in the scientific and technological process and in the research and development work needed. It is not enough to be satisfied with an agreement on the cooperation of firms, because this is only "a foot in the back door, the tradesman's entrance, and not a foot in the front door." What is necessary is a state framework agreement, whether in the form of an exchange of documents or an exchange of letters of a documentary character.

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FRG PRESS LOOKS AT BANGEMANN TALKS IN WASHINGTON

Bangemann on SDI

DW161133 Mainz ZDF Television Network in German 1800 GMT 15 Jan 86

["Excerpt" from interview with Federal Economics Minister Martin Bangemann by correspondent Peter Ellgaard in Washington on 15 January; from the "Heute" newscast -- recorded]

[Text] [Bangemann] We agreed that in continuing the talks, we would deal with two aspect: There is, of course, SDI -- an aspect of special importance for the U.S. administration, the Pentagon. And then, connected with it, we would deal with the general questions of technology transfer as formulated in the cabinet decision on which my mission is based.

[Ellgaard] A working group will now deal with the problems, and an expert group will meet subsequently. What do you say to your critics who say that all this is taking too long and will just delay an agreement on SDI?

[Bangemann] No, I do not think that such an argument is justified. The cabinet itself estimated that the talks would last for about 2 months, so that we will reach a result by late March or early April. And that is appropriate, because not only are the SDI problems complex and difficult, but particularly the problem of general technology transfer present quite a few difficulties.

Press Review

DW161200 Cologne Deutschlandfunk Network in German 0605 GMT 16 Jan 86

[From Press Review]

[Text] One of today's editorial issues is Economics Minister Bangemann's U.S. visit.

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE writes: The FRG will be discredited if its political leaders are unable to handle domestic political conflicts in their own parties and coalition policy problems in the cabinet. The foreign and security policy interests of the country must not be subordinated to domestic political power struggles. A responsible government must act responsibly.

Is Bonn actually negotiating not on the transfer of technology, but on the transfer of domestic policy to foreign countries? Is a foundling being deposited at the White House? The impression being made abroad is shameful.

The Duesseldorf RHEINISCHE POST notes: The Federal Government knows that it cannot stop SDI research work. It seems to have become self-perpetuating in the big U.S. electronic firms, with or without the participation of the allies, just because of the billion dollars from the U.S. defense budget. Why should West European industries not profit from the expected progress without final foreign and defense policy consequences being drawn immediately?

LUEBECKER NACHRICHTEN is of the following opinion: No doubt Bangemann was operating in a difficult atmosphere. When he wanted to speak up about the U.S. tendency to exaggerate in matters of secrecy, he found himself on the defensive and not just as a defender of Bonn's SDI policy. As to economic policy, he also heard again the repeated Washington demand for stronger German Government measures to get the economy going -- as a decisive contribution to heating up the international economy. However, it seems that Bangemann had an extremely hard time in the discussion of terrorism because of the Federal Government's reluctance to follow a policy of isolating Libya economically.

DIE WELT Editorial

DW170740 Bonn DIE WELT in German 16 Jan 86 p 2

[Editorial by Horst-Alexander Siebert: "The Path Will Become Clear for German SDI Participation"]

[Text] The protests from Munich following Martin Bangemann's Washington visit turned out to be superfluous. The economics minister has done a good job. In the talks he had with the top echelon of the Reagan administration, the impression was not created that the FDP disdains participation of German firms in SDI any more than the CDU and particularly the CSU. Bangemann kept strictly to the decisions of the Bonn government.

This time, too, the compromising FDP chairman managed to master critical situations and to create a friendly atmosphere. So for him it was not a difficult mission on the Potomac, despite the U.S. demands for more economic activity and the pressure for FRG participation in sanctions against Libya -- he declined both with arguments. In matters of technological transfer and SDI, which was Bangemann's main mission, many things are still unsettled in the United States. The administration has been informed about the basic German position. The FDP's attitude can be forgotten about up until the final form of the hoped for framework agreement or exchange of letters, because negotiations will be held by officials of the involved Bonn ministries. From a domestic German point of view the hot SDI issue will become nonpolitical, so to speak, and the chancellor will have more leverage. Basically, it is not advisable to separate the general improvement of technological exchange from research work or antimissile defense in space. The two are too closely linked.

The German side faces the problem that the export act adopted by Congress in the middle of 1985, with the help of which Washington controls exports, permits no conclusions regarding the U.S. attitude to technological transfer in the SDI framework. The bill has too wide an application range and most execution stipulations are missing. Now Bonn must first of all bring influence to bear on them. Naturally, it takes time, but it should be possible to do so up to the end of March or early April. So far the United States has not placed one single SDI order abroad.

It is wrong to adhere to the demand of following the example of London, whose SDI participation has already been contractually safeguarded. First, mainly state-owned firms in England will get contracts, so that the British Government's function as an agent is justified. Bonn, however, is subjected to the rules of the market according to which private German firms and institutes will decide on their own.

Second, the United States is trying to be as flexible as possible. Actually, the Reagan administration thinks little of an umbrella agreement applicable to all foreign firms. On the contrary, the Americans accept the national differences, as the chief of the Pentagon SDI bureau Lieutenant General James Abrahamson said repeatedly. However, certain principles are valid for all interested parties:

1. Without sufficient protection of secrets no one will get an order from the Americans.
2. The business potential remains open; the United States will not guarantee whether \$100 million is involved or \$1 billion; quotas are ruled out for certain countries.
3. Especially in the beginning, foreign firms must reckon with many small technical orders which in most cases will be subject to public invitation by tender.

It will be a cold shower only for those who had illusions. Basically, the United States is of the opinion that the technical know-how needed for SDI can be developed in its own country.

For that purpose a total of \$26 billion will be made available. One part will be separated for more progressive foreign competitors, such as in the field of micro-electronics, optics, material research, and sensors -- competitors who are also cheaper. In the United States higher wages are paid.

For many German firms cooperation will be attractive only on condition that there is an open exchange of technology, meaning that the United States will eliminate many barriers, at least with regard to them. This applies to data as well as to participation in scientific meetings. Therefore, the availability of research results will pay off even if the commercialization of SDI research spinoffs does not cover the costs, which is likely in most cases.

As Bonn itself is not directly involved, it must at least create the best conditions for German firms in this difficult situation. Bangemann has thrown the switches in Washington.

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CSO: 5200/2613

SDI AND SPACE ARMS

FRG'S RUEHE DISCUSSES SDI NEGOTIATIONS WITH U.S.

DW240815 Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German 23 Dec 85 pp 21-24

[Interview with CDU/CSU Group Chairman Deputy Volker Ruehe by unidentified SPIEGEL editor; date not given]

[Text] SPIEGEL: Mr Ruehe, how do you feel as a "Genscherist" in the ranks of the CDU/CSU Group?

Ruehe: You are using a label that applies neither to myself nor to any of my colleagues.

SPIEGEL: Regrettably, we have neither invented the "Genscherist" label nor that of the hardliners. The use of that label has been spread by your CSU colleague Hans Klein, the group's foreign policy spokesman.

Ruehe: Klein did not invent these terms, and discussion with the group has shown that such labels are sheer nonsense. I have always found it extremely important not to be the representative of a particular wing. I speak on behalf of the entire group.

SPIEGEL: On Wednesday, the cabinet decided to start negotiations with the United States on technological cooperation. That is the smallest common denominator.

Ruehe: The cabinet has not agreed on the smallest, but on the right denominator. I have always said that U.S. research, to the extent that it is done within the framework of the ABM Treaty, was supported politically in the April government statement. The Federal Government said in that statement that the U.S. SDI research is justified, that it is politically necessary, and that it is in the West's security interests.

SPIEGEL: Meanwhile, we have heard from many other voices in the coalition.

Ruehe: The question as to whether and in what way the German firms which are ready to cooperate are to be insured and protected is still open. I have pointed out for a long time that it is a technological agreement. The mistake of upgrading the agreement and raising it to the realm of East-West relations could have been avoided.

SPIEGEL: On 9 December the CSU Executive Board urged the federal chancellor to end the discussion on SDI and "conclude a government agreement with the United States on U.S.-German cooperation in this area as soon as possible." On the other hand, the FDP Executive Board last week advocated political restraint and stated that it did not want to give any political signals. Do you call that a coordinated foreign policy?

Ruehe: The political signal was given in April. The agreement that we seek adds nothing to the signal. However, the FDP has now agreed on principle to negotiations on a technological agreement.

SPIEGEL: Did Genscher say it like that, and did he mean it?

Ruehe: I would say yes to both questions since we now have a common basis.

SPIEGEL: Mr Stoiber who speaks for the CSU cannot be satisfied with that. The Bavarians wanted an agreement "as soon as possible," not just negotiations on an agreement.

Ruehe: Negotiations have not been conducted; there have only been sounding-out talks. We now have the proper order: negotiations and then very quickly an agreement.

SPIEGEL: And the form of the agreement depends on the outcome of the negotiations?

Ruehe: Yes, of course, and that is the point where we should be self-critical. The SDI discussion has sometimes reminded me of Christmas presents of my youth: We gave huge packages which only contained a toothbrush or something similar. In other words, we have only discussed the form of the agreement, even though it is obvious that first of all the contents should be negotiated--patent protection, price laws, technology transfer. Then the proper form must be found in accordance with the contents--no big Christmas present, no suit that is too small, but a suit that fits. I think that an official exchange of letters is probably the proper packaging.

SPIEGEL: Patent rights, technology transfer, security protection--if lawyers are in charge of these things, the negotiations will take many months.

Ruehe: Yes, but the negotiations will be conducted by the federal economics minister. As beautiful as it may be in the United States, I do not think that Mr Bangemann wants to stay there for weeks.

SPIEGEL: You are talking about an exchange of letters on SDI. But you are also talking about an agreement. Which do you mean?

Ruehe: An official exchange of letters is also an agreement. We could say generally that we seek to reach a government agreement.

SPIEGEL: There are indeed differences, politically as well as legally. According to a FDP Executive Board decision, the FDP wants a general agreement with the United States on scientific-technological cooperation. This agreement is only intended to improve the "legal position" of those firms and institutions which want to participate in SDI. It amounts to being a play on words.

Ruehe: I confirm that the FDP also wants a government agreement. I personally, and other people have said in the past, that it is one of the opportunities of such an agreement that we can quite generally get something out of it for the technology transfer.

SPIEGEL: Such agreements exist, for example, on the protection of secrets; the defense ministers agreed on something like that years ago. However, why should it suddenly work with SDI although it has not worked for many years?

Ruehe: Many things have remained unsatisfactory in the past also in civilian areas, if you recall the D-1 enterprise and the German spacelab. We ought to exploit the chances despite all justified skepticism.

SPIEGEL: Why do you think that the Americans could suddenly become more flexible and compromising on sensitive technological issues?

Ruehe: Out of their own interests. That is the most reliable thing that exists. In principle, the United States is in a position to implement the entire SDI research work on its own. However, there are fields where we are technologically more advanced. We could appeal to the Americans' self-interest, thus possibly achieving an improved technological transfer as a whole.

SPIEGEL: Foreign Minister Genscher says now that "NATO as a whole" must decide on the strategic and disarmament policy consequences of SDI research work. The federal security council's decision mentioned repeatedly just close consultations.

Ruehe: One must carefully differentiate in this matter. The Americans have committed themselves to consulting with allies and negotiating with the Soviets before the SDI project leaves the research phase. Many things are still open. One cannot buy ready-made SDI. It does not exist. Many people do not know, for example, that at the moment more means are spent on SDI research for ground-based defensive systems. For many people the SDI has to do only with space.

SPIEGEL: The Americans have returned to the ground because Congress has curtailed SDI funding.

Ruehe: No, General Abrahamson, the SDI head, has told us very early that priority is given to those fields where research work is most likely to be successful -- and these are the ground-based defensive systems. Cuts will remain within certain limits. However, it also means that the setup of SDI is still completely open. The strategy of the alliance will be affected by various developments. The strategy cannot be changed by one NATO member. The entire alliance must decide on it.

SPIEGEL: In the end we will have an additional new weapons system on the Western side, regardless of whether it will be ground-based or a space-based system. The Soviets will consider measures to cope with this defensive system. It is almost certain that nothing will remain of Reagan's original idea that SDI would offer 100 percent protection.

Ruehe: If it were really so that the Americans were going to develop a new weapons system to which the Soviets will respond, then the danger of a new arms race would exist. However, the Americans considered a possible countermeasure from the very beginning. They set up strict conditions for themselves with regard to costs and vulnerability. The whole thing will become futile if possible countermeasures could be so successful that the matter would become absurd.

SPIEGEL: What do you really believe?

Ruehe: To put it plainly: I consider SDI as more complicated than the landing on the moon. In connection with the moon landing, only one side had to become active. The moon could not defend itself against the landing, it could not take any countermeasures. Regarding SDI, the Americans know that they are not dealing with the moon but with the Soviets who can take countermeasures.

SPIEGEL: Do you know of a system in war or weapons history that was not overcome by another system?

Ruehe: No. Therefore, it does not make sense to take some independent action in this connection. Therefore, the Federal Government introduced the idea from the very beginning that this can be done only together with partners.

SPIEGEL: The Federal Government must reckon with it that participation in SDI could lead to a deterioration of relations with the Soviet Union. Hansjoerg Kastl, the German ambassador to Moscow, said that Bonn is "most unpopular" there [im "bierver-schiss"].

Ruehe: I do not know if he has said it in that way. However, one is only temporarily in such a fix. We should not be impressed by that. The FRG has a certain political, economic, and military weight. This does not change due to current political events. We have no reason to become nervous.

SPIEGEL: U.S. Ambassador Richard Burt has introduced another question, that the Europeans should complement SDI with a defense system against short- and intermediate-range missiles, with a European Defense Initiative called EVI [Europaeische Verieidigennss Initiative] a new slogan. What do you think of EVI?

Ruehe: I do not like slogans at all. If one defends oneself against aircraft, as we do, the question must be permissible whether one can defend oneself also against other weapons.

SPIEGEL: You mean antimissile defense for Europe?

Ruehe: The defense minister speaks of extended antiair defense. I consider it more realistic than EVI.

SPIEGEL: Extended antiair defense is a nice term, but involved is defense against missiles and cruise missiles. Burt wants separate tasks. The United States should make SDI, the Europeans EVI. Where should the billions come from?

Ruehe: The Europeans should get together and see what realistic, technical, and financial possibilities exist to extend antiair defense...

SPIEGEL: ...And set up antimissile defense?

Ruehe: Yes, that must be looked into. However, if it is legitimate to defend oneself against aircraft, it is also legitimate to look into whether one can defend oneself against short-range and cruise missiles.

SPIEGEL: With the knowledge of the German Defense Ministry, two big German firms have submitted studies about a European antimissile defense system to the SDI office headed by Gen Abrahamson.

Ruehe: I do not know anything about that, I cannot know about that. I know that German firms are interested in taking part in the SDI work. They expect to gain technological knowledge. But they do not expect great gains.

SPIEGEL: Is that true -- industry does not expect gains?

Ruehe: Yes, it is true. One can make money elsewhere, more money. German and European firms are interested in technological knowledge derived from SDI for extended anti-air defense here and also for civilian projects. One can make money with that knowledge later on.

SPIEGEL: Three German firms have so far concluded SDI orders for more than \$900,000. Will the three together produce great technological progress?

Ruehe: I repeat: Money will not be the decisive factor. Even if more orders should come in up to a total of \$100 million, it would still be rather limited. However, the chance for technology transfer exists and for gaining access to new technological development. That marks the significance of the planned framework agreement.

SPIEGEL: For almost 20 years there has been no CDU/CSU foreign minister. Is that the reason for the blurred foreign-political profile of the CDU/CSU?

Ruehe: I believe that great consensus exists in the party. However, others have also said that it is not a normal situation for the CDU/CSU that neither the foreign nor the economics minister comes from its ranks.

SPIEGEL: The FDP--You will probably depend on it in 1987--obviously is not prepared to compromise with regard to the Foreign and Economics Ministries.

Ruehe: You will not make me talk about ministries now. We must win the elections and then it will be the chancellor's task to conduct negotiations. I just speak in general about the mood in the CDU/CSU. If you look at the CDU/CSU history, you will find that the Foreign and Economics Ministries never were issues of secondary importance, to put it mildly.

SPIEGEL: In other words: you do not recognize the Foreign and Economic Ministries as an FDP heritage?

Ruehe: No, the heritage principle does not exist in politics. However, I believe that general agreement exists in this respect.

SPIEGEL: Not quite. Hans-Dietrich Genscher, who has held his position since 1974, already announced his claim for the Foreign Ministry in 1987.

Ruehe: Well, but he did not say that the Foreign Ministry is his heritage.

SPIEGEL: Genscher wants to become foreign minister again in 1987.

Ruehe: He has received already the respective answer from the chancellor who said that this is premature. We shall see after the elections.

SPIEGEL: You are considered a close confident of Chancellor Kohl. You did not want to become minister of state under Genscher. Do you strive for the position of chief of the Foreign Ministry after 1987?

Ruehe: I do not think in such categories.

SPIEGEL: That sounds very modest.

Ruehe: At the moment, I have the impression that I am needed in my current function. So far it has always happened that I like very much the job for which I am needed.

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CSO: 5200/2613

SDI AND SPACE ARMS

FRANCE'S GISCARD DISCUSSES SDI

LD162136 Paris International Service in French 1315 GMT 16 Jan 86

[Interview with former President Valery Giscard d'Estaing in his Paris office by Alain de Chalvron on "Carrefon" program--live]

Excerpts] [Question] Mr President, we don't have a lot of time left, and you just now criticized one point of the present policy of the French Government, that is its position on the strategic defense initiative of President Reagan. I would like you to say why you find this position worthy of criticism, and what is your position?

[Giscard] In general on the important questions of defense, in my view the present government has not made the choices which it should have made. I remind you that at the end of my term in office there were several questions which remained unanswered. The first question was would we manufacture the enhanced radiation bomb -- the neutron bomb -- when we were in a position to do so. I had made the arrangements to ensure that scientifically and technically we were in a position to do so, and it had to be decided whether to manufacture or not. Nothing was decided, either for or against. We foresaw that since other people were deploying Pershings and since our own missiles are old and obsolete, we, too, should have a type of French Pershing. The studies were completed, or were to have been completed at the end of 1983. It was to be decided whether to build them. Nothing was decided, which meant that we continued, I would say like a boat which sails on by, with the previous defense policy. One has the impression that the government does not have a real defense policy. At the beginning there was the break with the previous policy, then there was the adoption of the previous policy, but without the capability of building it from within. And it must be recognised that the strategic defense initiative is a big thing. Naturally, if it is a complete technical failure [words indistinct] tens of billions spent, then so be it, but if it gets somewhere, it means that in the international card game there will henceforth be one or several defensive cards which will somewhat change the psychology of populations, the psychology of negotiators, and certainly the contents of the negotiations. Negotiations will no longer be solely on launchers; there will be negotiations on launchers and on defense.

So France's position has been announced -- we are against it. For me it is always a drawback to say we are against something without its having any practical effect. The sole practical effect is that the U.S. leaders told me (?the only mistake we made) was to talk about it, for it would not do the French any good, since we are doing it without them anyway. I think that it is a scientific and technological mistake, because it is a huge program, and it is in our interest to follow this program, because there will be major technological and scientific spin-offs. In any case, the least was to assure ourselves that for our interests and independence, France could pick up certain of the technological developments of this project. And last, I think it lacks imagination, because if it is true that defense means development, France cannot avoid this. It is like the people who said at the start of the nuclear era, we're apart from all this, we won't make any. Finally successive governments of the Fourth Republic -- it began in the fourth, continued in the fifth -- have made French nuclear weapons. If there are technological defense systems in the world, French governments will end by making them; the population will insist on this. If one knows that it is possible to protect such a large zone as the Paris region against missiles, sooner or later political circles will take up and deploy a system of this sort. It is for that reason that, as you were saying just now, I am not at all in favor of saying we will not rally to the Reagan plan. Since the topic exists, let us make a European initiative, and the European initiative is to say that we are going to study the possibility of protecting our space with our neighbors, since our space is obviously too small, and in these studies we shall see what sort of cooperation we are interested in having with the U.S. strategic defense initiative. That is my formula.

[Question] Is the government's position natural? As soon as someone proposes a new strategy which makes our own obsolete and which after all involves considerable expense if we have to come into line, is it not normal to say no?

[Giscard] Yes, but to say no is useless and changes nothing. We have not said no, but have in fact said nothing. This does not make our deterrent obsolete. I think it is totally deceptive to think that the systems of the strategic defense initiative can be operational in less than a long decade, I would say probably closer to 15 years rather than 10. Over this period in any case, our system will remain valid, and our system will age, which means that during the period decisions must be made. For we must not content ourselves with reaching 1995 and 2000 without having made any decision on our system. This means that we cannot content ourselves with a passive attitude.

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CSO: 5200/2602

SDI AND SPACE ARMS

ITALIAN PAPERS ASSESS GORBACHEV ARMS PROPOSAL

PM211502 [Editorial Report] The dailies on 17 January carry extensive coverage of the new Soviet disarmament proposal announced by CPSU General Secretary Gorbachev on Soviet television 15 January. According to Alberto Jacoviello, in a 1,500-word commentary appearing on pages 1-2 of Rome's LA REPUBBLICA, the proposal demands that "the United States and the West as a whole take account of two fundamental political points." "The first," he goes on, "is that for too long Moscow is the only one to have have put forth proposals. It would be dangerous to prolong this situation," Jacoviello suggests, because "in the long run it could prompt feelings of impatience with the United States considered, rightly or wrongly, responsible for the tendency not to take the Soviet Union's out-stretched hand." "The second fundamental political point," Jacoviello continues, is that the plan presented in Moscow confirms that Moscow's concern is disarmament. Without disarmament there can be no economic growth and no reforms of the system." He argues that "this is the first time that the very future of Soviet society has been directly linked to disarmament requirements" and asks: "Can the United States and the West ignore this new fact, of historic significance?" Jacoviello also believes that since there must have been "resistance" in the USSR to the proposal, "if the political will" of the Gorbachev leadership "fails to produce results it is doubtful whether there will be sufficient strength to stand by the decision."

The PSI's Rome daily AVANTI! carries on pages 1 and 12 a 1,000-word article by Francesco Gozzano, who argues that while the Soviet proposal embodies "political and propaganda aspects" which are reflected "in a somewhat idyllic view of a world free from the nuclear nightmare," "it should be remembered that a similar tone is present in Reagan's arguments and political initiatives, such as SDI." According to Gozzano, while the proposal of considering strategic and medium-range weapons jointly to start with "should be pondered by the allies," "it would, if accepted, threaten to destroy NATO's flexible response strategy," "thus eliminating the intermediate stage between conventional response and strategic deterrence."

Gozzano concludes that "whatever their merits and vlaue," the proposals confront the U.S. President with a "difficult dilemma": "the choice between stubborn attachment to SDI, with the risk of undermining prospects of an accord, and a 'reduced' version of SDI that can avoid the USSR's predetermined opposition and keep the dialogue with Moscow open."

According to Moscow correspondent Sandro Scabello in a 900-word dispatch published on page 10 of Milan CORRIERE DELLA SERA, the aim of "the huge shock wave released in Moscow" is "to impart a sharp change of course to the current debate in the United States on the costly challenge in space, to exploit European reservations and the peace movements' capacity for mobilization, and in the final analysis to ensure that Gorbachev is in a position of advantage at his Washington meeting with Reagan in the fall."

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CSO: 5200/2616

SDI AND SPACE ARMS

BRIEFS

FRG OFFICIAL SEES INVESTMENT IN SDI--Bonn, 13 Jan (DPA)--In the view of Lothar Ruehl, secretary of state in the Ministry of Defense, the financial participation of the Federal Republic and the European NATO states in the U.S. SDI missile defense program is inevitable if a start is made in this program on research in short-range and medium-range missiles to defend Western Europe. In an interview with the defense policy magazine LOYAL, Ruehl said that such research in European missile defense is necessary. Expansion into defense against approaching short-range and medium-range missiles is a future military task for the air protection of Europe, and furthermore is independent of the feasibility of a nuclear protective shield in space. A European missile defense project is to be conducted and financed by all NATO states, including the United States. In the cabinet's decision of December last year to begin SDI negotiations with the United States of America, it was said that neither the Federal Republic's state participation nor the availability of state resources were being considered. [Text] [Hamburg DPA in German 1058 GMT 13 Jan 86] /9365

CSO: 5200/2613

U.S.-USSR GENEVA TALKS

LE MONDE PONDERES U.S.-USSR DISARMAMENT ISSUES

PM161449 Paris LE MONDE in French 16 Jan 86 p 1

[Editorial: "'Spirit of Geneva,' Are You There?"]

[Text] Logically the resumption of the Soviet-U.S. negotiations on nuclear and space weapons on Thursday, 16 January, should be illuminated by the "spirit of Geneva" which the optimists have reported in the two camps since the Reagan-Gorbachev meeting in November. However, similar experiences since the first East-West summit in Geneva more than 30 years ago -- there was already talk of the spirit of Geneva at the time -- prompt a degree of caution.

Since November, the only really new element has been a controversy between Washington and Moscow on nuclear tests. Mr Gorbachev called on his partner to resume negotiations on this subject and Mr Reagan refused until certain conditions had been fulfilled. But there was a feeling that the "essential role" played by nuclear deterrence here too is beginning to fade.

It is true that the Soviet leader still has not canceled the unilateral moratorium on nuclear tests which he had announced in August to last until the end of 1985. However, the United States carried out a test on 28 December. But this situation cannot last very long.

On 31 December another deadline passed with even less attention being paid to it: It was then that the SALT-II treaty signed in 1979 by President Carter and Leonid Brezhnev should have expired, if it had been ratified by the United States, which it was not. There is therefore nothing left of this document, except that the two powers say they are still determined to observe it in the absence of anything better. However, in this case, too, the situation cannot continue indefinitely. In regular reports (three in 1 year), Pentagon chief Weinberger constantly accuses the Soviets of violating these agreements and forcing the U.S. Government to denounce them in turn.

The ABM Treaty limiting the deployment of ABM's, which is the final barrier -- legally sound in this case -- to the arms race is also in danger of collapsing. This is the ultimate result of President Reagan's strategic defense initiative and the disagreement between the two superpowers on the problem of space defense is as complete as it was in November. However, some change is possible on the U.S. side since the combined pressure from Mr Gorbachev, scientists hostile to the SDI, and congressmen worried about the budget deficit could ultimately lead the White House to compromise.

Aside from this, the Geneva summit's achievements have not been called into question. The two partners say they are still prepared to negotiate a 50-percent reduction in their offensive weapons and a compromise on intermediate-range weapons in Europe, and leaving a number of U.S. missiles does not seem impossible. All this should take shape in some form or another during the year now beginning, on pain of losing if not the spirit of Geneva at least the impetus given to negotiations by the Geneva summit. Especially since the Soviets have already informed Mr Reagan that they would like to postpone the visit Mr Gorbachev is due to make to Washington from June until September.

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CSO: 5200/2600

U.S.-USSR GENEVA TALKS

FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTRY ON USSR DISARMAMENT PROPOSAL

AB221810 Paris Diplomatic Information Service in English 1332 GMT 22 Jan 86

["Disarmament--Soviet proposal of 15 January 1986, comments of the Ministry for External Relations (16 January 1986)"]--Diplomatic Information headline]

[Text] 1. France will carefully examine the proposals of which the main outlines were sketched by Mr Gorbachev on 15 January.

2. She notes in the first place that the suggested timetable would imply much faster progress in the current bilateral negotiations between the USSR and the United States than has been the case over the past fifteen years. She has already stressed the interest she attaches to concrete results being achieved within the bilateral negotiation in Geneva.

3. She recalls that the idea of a general and complete disarmament programme has long been under discussion at the international level. She notes that no agreement has proved possible so far as to the stages and conditions whereby a balance of both nuclear and conventional forces at the lowest possible level would be maintained.

4. France, for her part, set out in September 1983 and June 1984, through the voice of the president of the Republic, the terms on which she could make her contribution to an effective and verifiable nuclear disarmament process:

The margin between the nuclear arsenals of the two great powers on the one hand and of France on the other would have to have been substantially reduced.

The existing major imbalances in the area of conventional and chemical weapons would have to have been corrected.

No new system having the effect of destabilizing the present foundations of deterrence, and therefore of peace, should have been deployed.

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CSO: 5200/2600

U.S.-USSR GENEVA TALKS

SENIOR USSR OFFICIAL BRIEFS AUSTRALIA ON DISARMAMENT PROPOSALS

Hayden on Visit, Canberra Objective

HK170932 Hong Kong AFP in English 0914 GMT 17 Jan 86

/Text/ Canberra, 17 Jan (AFP)--A senior Soviet official is to visit Canberra next week to brief the Australian Government on the latest disarmament proposals put forward by Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev Foreign Minister Bil Hayden said today.

Mr Hayden said that Deputy Chief of the International Organizations Department of the Soviet Foreign Ministry Y. Nazarkin would arrive next week for talks with him and Australian officials.

Mr Nazarkin's discussions would focus on the recent announcement by the Soviet Union that it would extend its moratorium on nuclear testing for 3 months and on Mr Gorbachev's plan for total nuclear disarmament by the turn of the century.

The talks were at Soviet initiative and would coincide with the resumption of arms control talks between the United States and the Soviet Union in Geneva.

Mr Hayden said the discussions were a timely opportunity to exchange views with the Soviet Union on current prospects for arms control and disarmament as part of the Australian Government's efforts to achieve progress on these issues.

He said Australia supported any interruption in nuclear testing and welcomed the Soviet extension of its moratorium.

However the Australian objective remained a comprehensive test ban treaty involving formal treaty commitments banning all nuclear tests in all environments for all time, Mr Hayden said.

Other Australian Views

BK180801 Melbourne Overseas Service in English 0430 GMT 18 Jan 86

/Excerpts/ A Soviet arms control specialist is expected to arrive in Australia early next week to discuss Mr Gorbachev's latest disarmament proposals. The foreign affairs minister, Mr Hayden, says the visit by the Soviet Foreign Ministry official, Mr Nazarkin, is at the Soviet initiative.

He described the plan for total disarmament by the end of the century as of great interest to Australia and said it would be studied closely. He also said he hoped the Soviet Union would agree to an Australian proposal that the resumed talks in Geneva would undertake the necessary work on ways of verifying bans on nuclear testing.

Nuclear disarmament activists have welcomed news of the Soviet visit, but one group says the initiative from Moscow is not being treated seriously enough.

A spokeswoman for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament Action, Mrs Julian Fisher says the plan to extend the Soviet Union's moratorium on nuclear testing for 3 months and for total nuclear disarmament by the turn of the century is the first real opportunity for peace. Meanwhile, the federal opposition leader, Mr Howard, says he fears the visit by the Soviet diplomat is little more than a propaganda exercise. Mr Howard said he would want to see plenty of evidence from the Soviets that they were willing to adopt a genuine commitment to a comprehensive and enforceable disarmament ban.

Hayden Sees 'Positive Aspects' in USSR Plan

BK220912 Melbourne Overseas Service in English 0830 GMT 22 Jan 86

/Excerpts/ The minister for foreign affairs, Mr Hayden, says he sees many positive aspects in the Soviet Union's disarmament proposals. The special envoy from the Soviet Union, Mr Yuriy Nazarkin, is in Australia to brief the federal government on Moscow's latest plan for nuclear disarmament. After the first round of talks with Mr Nazarkin in Canberra, Mr Hayden said the complete elimination of nuclear weapons now proclaimed by both the United States and the Soviet Union was also the objective of the Australian Government.

But Mr Hayden said the proposals would have to be worked out carefully in stages and were dependent on agreement between the nuclear weapons states. He said other aspects of the Soviet Union stance needed clarification. Mr Hayden will hold further talks with the Soviet envoy tomorrow.

Disarmament Ambassador on Gorbachev Proposals

BK180852 Melbourne Overseas Service in English 0830 GMT 18 Jan 86

/Text/ Australia's ambassador for disarmament, Mr Richard Butler, says the newest Soviet proposals for ending the nuclear arms race offered concrete proposals which must be investigated.

Mr Butler told a Radio Australia reporter in Sydney on his return from Geneva that the Soviet proposals were a serious attempt at nuclear weapons reduction. He said despite elements of propaganda in the offer, Mr Gorbachev was a new style of Soviet leader who was concerned about the drastic state of the Soviet economy and knew he must reduce arms spending.

A Soviet arms control specialist is expected to arrive in Australia early next week to discuss Mr Gorbachev's disarmament proposals.

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CSO: 5200/4309

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

USSR HITS PENTAGON'S, NATO'S PLANS FOR DENMARK

Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 22 Nov 85 p 5

[Article by M. Kostikov, special PRAVDA correspondent, Copenhagen, 21 Nov: "The Bunker Boom"]

[Text] Hitlerite bunkers, the sinister attributes of a past war, have sunk into oblivion. Yet, today NATO generals are erecting other ones to replace them, including some on Danish soil. Six years were devoted to the construction of a "new project" bunker of the type erected in the small town of Ravenstrup (on the Jutland peninsula). Its mission is to direct nuclear missile operations on the northern flank of the Bloc. The four-story cellar for the NATO staff officers is protected from above by a meter-thick concrete roof.

Some days ago a pompous ceremony took place to commission this "installation," followed by its approbation during the course of week-long maneuvers for which several thousand officers were activated. According to the public affairs officer of the NATO command in Northern Europe, (E. Berdal), the maneuver region encompassed the entire Bloc command structure in Europe, as well as command centers for combat operations in the Atlantic and North America. As the Danish newspaper LAND OG FOLK reports, the main goal of this militaristic fuss is the development of the notorious American military doctrine of Flexible Response, which provides for the use of nuclear missiles.

The aspiration of the Pentagon and NATO is to even more firmly shackle Denmark to its global nuclear doctrine, as the new headquarters in Ravenstrup attests. This striving is causing growing alarm and concern in the democratic community of Denmark. The nation is speaking out against the U.S.-NATO presence on Danish soil and for a nuclear-free Denmark.

13109

CSO: 5200/1172

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

PARIS VIEWS GORBACHEV ARMS PROPOSAL

PM221401 Paris LE MONDE in French 22 Jan 86 pp 1, 5

[Article by Michel Tatu: "Mr Gorbachev's Disturbing Ideas"]

[Text] The Americans are now in the picture: The disarmament plan presented by Mikhail Gorbachev on 15 January is not only a surprise to them (the same day that the note from the Soviet leader arrived in Washington, a White House official explained to journalists that nothing new could be expected from Moscow before the CPSU Congress next month), it presents them and their allies with daunting problems.

Indeed, even though propaganda considerations play an essential role in the Soviet statements, as always, it must be admitted that this propaganda is more daunting when it is based on spectacular new gestures, and even more daunting when it seizes on the most forceful arguments put forward by the other side and turns them around. This is what Mr Gorbachev has just done by taking up two of Mr Reagan's slogans: freeing mankind from the nuclear threat and the "zero option" on nuclear weapons in Europe.

With regard to the first slogan, it is an effective move. When he launched his strategic defense initiative in March 1983, President Reagan was addressing all the American anti-nuclear movements, the authors of disaster books, and others who talk about the "nuclear winter," saying to them: "Let us build a strong defense and these weapons you fear so much will become obsolete to the extent that the Soviets themselves will abandon them." However, Moscow is now proposing to agree to abandon them, avoiding the costly and dubious solution of an impenetrable shield. This prompted Mr Shevardnadze to say in Tokyo: "If all these weapons are eliminated, what will be the point of the SDI?"

In addition, since the plan directly tackles most of the main areas of armaments discussed in recent years and is accompanied by much more stringent provisions for monitoring than in the past, it cannot just be dismissed, as Khrushchev's plans for "general and complete disarmament" were in the sixties. This is true to the extent that American officials cited by our colleague Leslie Gelb of THE NEW YORK TIMES admit in private that they are now faced with "difficult choices which we have hitherto not wanted to make." In particular it presents them with the question of what would become of the West's security if it was necessary to abandon the idea of balancing by nuclear deterrence the major and inevitable superiority the Red Army enjoys in the sphere of conventional forces and arms.

The second slogan, that of the "zero option" in Europe, seems even more daunting since it is modeled exactly on the proposals made by Mr Reagan in November 1981, aside from two differences. In the first phase Moscow is proposing the destruction of only the SS-20 missiles which are targeted on Europe, whereas Washington intended to eliminate the SS-20 missiles targeted on Asia, too. In addition France and Britain must respond to this gesture by a quantitative freeze on their arsenals. The qualitative freeze with, in particular, an end to tests is postponed until the second phase, but this nonetheless involves two painful decisions for these two countries; Paris would, as of now, have to stop the replacement of its M-20 missiles by M-4 missiles, since the latter have several warheads; Britain would have to cancel its order for Trident missiles from the United States since the latter would have to abandon any missile exports.

Despite these reservations, the concession made by Moscow is considerable. Throughout Brezhnev's reign, Soviet propaganda maintained that the SS-20 missiles were necessary to counter all the U.S. "forward-based systems," in other words the U.S. bombers deployed in Europe, the aircraft carriers, and tactical weapons. Simplifying the problem, Yuriy Andropov agreed to deal with aircraft separately and weigh his SS-20 missiles against nothing but the Western missiles, in this case the French and British forces. The situation has now been reversed again since Paris' and London's forces are no longer at stake, but only the U.S. Pershing and cruise missiles deployed in Europe since 1983. The least that can be said is that if Gorbachev's proposal had been made before this deployment the whole battle fought in Europe on this NATO decision would have taken a very different turn.

This provides two pieces of evidence. In the West the position adopted by the western powers since 1979, namely that the deployment of the SS-20 missiles was not based on any military justification and required a response, has been retrospectively proved correct. In the East there is confirmation that Mr Gorbachev does not feel bound, on this point at least, by the decisions of his predecessors and by the unquenchable thirst for weapons which his military officials showed during the seventies. As early as last year he had suspended then canceled the "countermeasures" they had taken after the U.S. deployments, especially the addition of now completely superfluous SS-20 missiles. He is now going much further, probably because this course of action has been made easier for him by the removal of major figures from the past: Mr Gromyko, of course, whose responsibility for the failure of negotiations on the Euromissile between 1981 and 1983 now seems obvious, and probably also Marshal Tolubko, commander of the Soviet strategic [missile] forces for almost 15 years.

Nonetheless it remains to be seen how the new instructions will be allied and in what conditions the Soviet proposal could be implemented. The fundamental question is this: Should the Gorbachev plan be regarded as a single "package," requiring simultaneous agreement on all its elements or are some of them valid separately from the others?

The Soviet leader's statement was clear on one point, which had already been clearly stressed in Geneva and elsewhere: The 50-percent reduction in "strategic" weapons (essentially intercontinental weapons) urgently requires the United States to abandon the SDI and -- but this is already a little less clear -- a ban on nuclear tests by the two superpowers. On the other hand this document remains unclear on the link to be established between the Euromissiles and the rest: The only preconditions set on the "Gorbachev-style" zero option are the ones mentioned above (nontransfer of U.S. missiles, freeze on French and British forces); the SDI was dealt with previously in a different context.

A reading of this document had prompted us to talk of a separate proposal, especially since the rationale of the Soviet position in recent months led to such an interpretation: During his visit to Paris in October Mr Gorbachev had already made an innovation by making it known that the European section of the Geneva negotiations was separate from the other two; an agreement on this subject could and should be concluded before a Soviet-U.S. agreement on the SDI. Moreover, it is in this spirit, and making this clear that the Soviet negotiations in Geneva presented an initial proposal for agreement some time later. In addition, if Moscow now accepts that the only counterpart to the SS-20 missiles are the U.S. Pershing and cruise missiles there is nothing to stop agreement being reached immediately on them with or without an SDI which only touches on them.

However, this is not what the usual exegetes of Soviet policy said in the press conference in Moscow last Saturday. According to TASS, First Deputy Foreign Minister Korniyenko was anxious to emphasize at length the fact that "the Soviet-U.S. agreement making provision for an interdependent solution to the problems of nuclear and space weapons remains in force," that this interdependence "is not arbitrary but objective and organic" and that it embraces "all the proposals and all the elements" of the Soviet plan. The agreement in question is the one reached in January 1985 between Mr Shultz and Mr Gromyko, the very one which Mr Gorbachev called into question in Paris when he proposed that the Euromissile issue no longer forms part of it. Should this be seen as another attempt at obstruction by the same Mr Korniyenko who for years was a "tool" of Mr Gromyko and whom Mr Shultz had already accused, during the Soviet-U.S. summit in November, of "sabotaging" his new boss' initiatives?

Until the future clears up this point, it is worth noting that it is probably preferable for the Western governments' and especially the European governments' peace of mind if Mr Korniyenko is right. Indeed one of two things is possible: Either a link is established once again between all aspects of disarmament, and the more attractive innovation made by Moscow on the Euromissiles problem will remain theoretical and everybody in the West will be able to hide behind the more general problem of the SDI and of the American "fixation" on this point to avoid asking too many questions.

If, on the other hand, the European problem is kept separate, an agreement eliminating all the Euromissiles at a stroke could seem within reach. It would probably not take more than that to revive in the FRG, the Netherlands and elsewhere the protest movement against the U.S. missiles. And this would also place the French Government in an extremely embarrassing position since by refusing to sacrifice the increase in its strategic naval force it would then be likely to look as if it were preventing disarmament.

The "Korniyenko interpretation" also has every chance of making people happy in Moscow, especially in military circles, since they will be able to keep the SS-20 missiles and other weapons longer. It may also suit Mr Gorbachev himself since he may think this is a means of exerting twofold pressure on Mr Reagan's SDI: pressure from U.S. antinuclear circles but also pressure from European pacifists for whom combating "star wars" will henceforth be the main way of combating the Euromissiles. But by dint of being diluted, this pressure is likely to be weaker, too.

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CSO: 5200/2601

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

USSR: DUTCH PUBLIC NOT DISCOURAGED BY CRUISE MISSILE VOTE

Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA in Russian 6 Nov 85 p 9

[Article by LITERATURNAYA GAZETA correspondent Anatoliy Frenkin under the rubric "After the Fact": "The Unyielding Netherlanders"]

[Text] The Hague-Bonn--The Netherlands probably has not known such enthusiasm of the public movement in all its history. There were 3,743,455 persons who signed a petition demanding the renunciation of a stationing of new American nuclear missiles on Dutch soil. This document-appeal was publicly handed to Prime Minister Lubbers and the chairmen of both houses of Parliament on the eve of 1 November, when the government had to decide about the "devil weapon," as the church here named the cruise missiles.

But still the government said "yes," casting a challenge to the antimissile movement and to its people. Why such haste right now, when the whole world is discussing radical Soviet arms reduction initiatives and is looking hopefully at the upcoming Geneva summit meeting?

An FRG television commentator said about the reasons for the haste that the Americans are hurrying in an attempt "to create difficulties for the USSR." But it is not just Washington pressuring the Netherlands: right-wingers on the Rhein are displaying superpersistence in attempts "to drive the Netherlanders into the common formation."

Despite the decision made by the Lubbers government, it cannot be said that the missile question has been removed from the agenda in the Netherlands. Remembering the parliamentary elections coming up in May of next year, the "missile coalition" of the center and conservative parties is trying to maneuver. Lubbers suggested a compromise version to the Americans: to build cruise missile silos in the Netherlands but keep the missiles themselves in the United States or the FRG "until the necessary moment." Washington refused, noting that the necessary moment had arrived.

Now The Hague is asking for something else: to remove old American missiles or some of the other nuclear weapons, of which there really are many.

Representatives of the antiwar movement intend to continue the campaign against the missiles. One of them, Peter Jansen, declared that if the

government doesn't heed the people's voice, "an even more strained situation" may take shape in the country. The first "storm" warnings already are apparent. While the Lubbers cabinet was debating how to formalize the surrender to the United States, rallies and demonstrations were being held throughout the Netherlands, people stopped trains, and young people didn't attend classes...

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CSO: 5200/1178

NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

SOVIET COMMENT ON AVARUA TREATY ON SOUTH PACIFIC NFZ

Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 21 Nov 85 p 3

[Article by S. Bulantsev under the rubric "Commentary": "For a Nuclear-Free Pacific Ocean"]

[Text] This poster, laconic but capacious in content, nailed to a coconut palm near the legal office of the city of Avarua (the administrative center of the Cook Islands), clearly reflects the attitude of countries of the Pacific basin toward nuclear weapons: "If they are dangerous, station them in Washington, store their wastes in Tokyo and test them in Paris."

Why do these three specific states figure on the poster? The United States is deploying its nuclear weapons in the Pacific zone, Japan recently tried to sink containers of radioactive wastes in the ocean, and France is conducting nuclear tests on Mururoa Atoll. The three states try with one voice to persuade the Pacific Ocean peoples that they allegedly are not doing any harm to the atmosphere, to the ocean and its inhabitants, or to the islands' population and nature. But despite their innate artlessness, the islanders just did not believe, for example, that a nuclear mushroom cloud over Mururoa is no more dangerous than the kites which boys so love to fly.

The concern over the imperialist powers' nuclear games and anxiousness over their future prompted the heads of 13 states members of the South Pacific Forum to gather in Avarua and draw up a treaty proclaiming the South Pacific to be a nuclear-free zone. The treaty forever prohibits the stationing, production and testing of nuclear weapons on their territory. A ban also was introduced on dumping radioactive waste in ocean waters.

Today, when over three months have gone by since the treaty was signed, the extent to which this is a timely and correct step along the path to relaxing military tension in the Pacific and contiguous regions is especially clearly visible. The Avarua Treaty was a specific embodiment of the antinuclear aspirations of millions of people residing on islands and atolls scattered over an area of 25.8 million square km. Signing of the treaty indicates that the realization of the real threat of a thermonuclear catastrophe for the fate of mankind is taking in ever broader circles of the international public, including regions of the globe relatively far removed from the centers of world politics and the planet's "hotspots."

Pentagon strategists greeted the Avarua Treaty without enthusiasm, to put it mildly. South Pacific countries are in the operations zone of the U.S. Seventh Fleet, which is equipped with Trident submarines and Tomahawk cruise missiles with nuclear warheads. Washington considers this region a component part of a far-flung network of military bases and one of the test areas for developing new kinds of nuclear weapons. The Pentagon also intends to use the South Pacific as a help in its planned "star wars."

In an attempt to justify the militarist course and stifle antinuclear sentiments, the American administration is intensively pushing through the thesis of a certain "direct dependence of the welfare and security" of Pacific Ocean countries on the U.S. military presence. Just what is the mechanism of interdependence? As Washington politicians assert, it is allegedly all a matter of American nuclear "peacemakers" defending the region against a mythical "Soviet military threat." But the calculation of the U.S. propaganda apparatus on the islanders' inherent credulity and artlessness also doesn't work here, since Washington's antisoviet stunting contradicts well-known facts.

Efforts by South Pacific states to establish a nuclear-free zone are approved in Comrade M. S. Gorbachev's response to an appeal of the Japanese council of organizations of atomic bombing victims. This position by our country received a high evaluation by parties to the Avarua Treaty. Pacific islands welcomed the USSR's decision to unilaterally stop all nuclear explosions and its readiness to extend the life of the moratorium if the United States would also refrain from nuclear tests. And further, Forum member countries are very familiar with the USSR's pledge not to use nuclear weapons against states on whose territory there are no such weapons. They also know that the United States refuses to make such a pledge, so that the real nuclear danger to the region stems from Washington, and not at all from Moscow.

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CSO: 5200/1178

RELATED ISSUES

FRG'S KOHL RECEIVES LETTER FROM GORBACHEV ON PROPOSALS

Analysis of Letter

LD171258 Hamburg DPA in German 1203 GMT 17 Jan 86

[Text] Bonn, 17 Jan (DPA) -- Federal Chancellor Kohl has received a letter from party leader Mikhail Gorbachev in connection with the new Soviet disarmament proposals. Government spokesman Friedhelm Ost did not reveal any details in Bonn on Friday. But he gave the assurance that the Federal Government will analyze the proposals carefully and added that they require additional clarification from Moscow.

In his cautiously worded statement, Ost spoke of "new elements" in Moscow's proposals and said he sees "constructive signals" both for the sphere of medium-range missiles and in the Soviet position on the verifiability of new agreements. But one cannot overlook the fact that Gorbachev's plans are tied in with previously known preconditions such as renunciation by the United States of the development of a space-based missile defense system. Ost said he thinks the proposals are largely geared toward Western public opinion since they were publicly released before even being introduced by the Soviets at the disarmament talks in Geneva.

Kohl Comments

DW171037 Hamburg BILD in German 17 Jan 86 p 8

[Interview with Chancellor Kohl by BILD editors Wolfgang Kenntemich and Richard Voelkel in Bonn; date not given]

[Text] BILD: Gorbachev has made new disarmament proposals. What do you say to them?

Kohl: The U.S. President said they should be carefully examined. The Federal Government will also examine General Secretary Gorbachev's new disarmament proposals very carefully. I have always supported a policy of real and controlled disarmament. The Geneva summit meeting has created some action: Concrete steps toward disarmament in our world, which bristles with weapons, are in the offing.

Reagan and Gorbachev will meet again this year. That is reason enough for me to be somewhat optimistic about safeguarding peace.

BILD: What will the result be for the people in divided Germany?

Kohl: In the meantime, more people are permitted to come to us from the "GDR" for urgent family matters (weddings, anniversaries, deaths) than in earlier years. It is my heart's desire that not only pensioners but also younger people from the "GDR" should be permitted to come to the FRG.

In this respect I hope that the responsible people in East Berlin will show more understanding. The cultural agreement that has been under negotiation for so many years will be signed in the near future. Environmental protection agreements could follow. We have achieved progress in that respect.

BILD: U.S. Ambassador Burt criticized us publicly for not taking part in the economic sanctions against Libya. What has President Reagan written to you about it?

Kohl: The U.S. President knows that we are in a position of great conflict of interest and that we had a hard time making a decision. The Americans have their own oil, we do not. Our firms have been engaged in Libya for years with investment amounts running into billions, the Americans are less involved. As the responsible government chief, I must, naturally, also keep in mind the fate of the 1,500 Germans who are in Libya. I am most skeptical whether economic sanctions will achieve anything.

Parties Welcome Initiative

LD161341 Hamburg DPA in German 1255 GMT 16 Jan 86

[Excerpts] Hamburg, 16 Jan (DPA) -- The government and the opposition in Bonn today welcomed the most recent disarmament initiative by Soviet party leader Mikhail Gorbachev. Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl said that, with a view to the safeguarding of peace, he has "subdued optimism." The Federal Government will examine Gorbachev's proposals very carefully, Kohl said in the newspaper BILD (Friday's edition).

The CDU/CSU in the Bundestag received the initiative "with sympathy," in the words of its foreign policy spokesman Juergen Todenhoefer. Gorbachev has taken Western demands into account to a large extent. The proposals contain specific new elements that increase the chances of achieving a breakthrough in disarmament. The union is willing to examine all the elements in a constructive spirit. Defense Minister Manfred Woerner said in the Bundestag with reference to the new round of disarmament talks in Geneva that proposals now have to be turned into deeds. Above all, the seriousness of the Soviet intentions to remove medium-range missiles from Europe has to be sounded out.

SPD floor leader Hans-Jochem Vogel also advised "very careful examination." The careful examination promised by the U.S. President is also a positive thing, Vogel said on Saarland radio. "I believe it is one of those concrete utopias...which appear very unlikely in the first instance but which can be released by joint effort and joint commitment."

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RELATED ISSUES

ITALY'S CRAXI, FINLAND'S SORSA DISCUSS GORBACHEV PROPOSAL

AU230909 Rome ANSA in English 0845 GMT 23 Jan 86

[Excerpt]

(ANSA) Rome, January 23 -- The new set of nuclear arms proposals advanced by Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev and developments in the Middle East were among the issues discussed here Wednesday by Premier Bettino Craxi and his Finnish counterpart, Kalevi Sorsa in Rome for the annual session of the Governing Council of the International Fund on Agricultural Development.

A note issued by Craxi's office at the end of the encounter said that in the view of Italy and Finland, the proposals announced by Gorbachev contain elements which are encouraging and could open the door to new prospectives in disarmament negotiations.

The Italian head of government, the note said, affirmed that these factors will require thorough examination. The spirit of the proposals, however, must be approved of because it is evident that the only way to achieve total and general disarmament under effective international control is through negotiations and the gradual renunciation of forces in all armaments sectors, in a context of stability, balance and verification which consolidates confidence and peace, the note said.

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CSO: 5200/2620

RELATED ISSUES

PRC SPOKESMAN ON GORBACHEV DISARMAMENT PROPOSAL

HK180834 Hong Kong AFP in English 0832 GMT 18 Jan 86

[Excerpt] Beijing, Jan 18 (AFP)--China today gave a cautious response to Soviet proposals this week on nuclear disarmament, saying they contained new elements which Beijing was studying.

"The disarmament proposal has some new content. We still need to further study it," a Foreign Ministry spokesman said.

But he added that Afghanistan and Cambodia remained "hot spots" which should be eliminated.

Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev on Wednesday proposed that all nuclear weapons worldwide be withdrawn by the year 2000 provided the United States abandoned its strategic defense initiative, or star wars, programme.

Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze Thursday proposed in Tokyo that Moscow would reduce the number of its SS-20 missiles in Asia if Washington also agreed to cut its medium-range missiles.

"At present the Soviet Union and the U.S. positions on some important issues of disarmament are still far apart. We hope that the Soviet Union and the United States will negotiate in earnest so that progress can be made with regard to the question of Asia's security," the Chinese spokesman said.

"We believe that the key lies in the superpowers' cessation of their rivalry for hegemony in this region, reduction of their missiles and nuclear weapons and elimination of (the) hot spots of Kampuchea (Cambodia) and Afghanistan."

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CSO: 5200/4025

RELATED ISSUES

GORBACHEV 'STATEMENT' ON DISARMAMENT SENT TO FRG DPA

LD301152 Hamburg DPA in German 1051 GMT 30 Dec 85

[Text] Bonn, 30 Dec (DPA) -- Soviet party leader General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev has affirmed the Soviet Union's will to achieve disarmament. In a statement sent to DPA on 29 December by the Soviet Embassy in Bonn, Gorbachev said that the prevention of the arms race in space and a halt to the arms race on earth are "the most urgent current tasks." In this the Soviet party leader links the "radical reduction of nuclear armaments" with a ban on space offensive weapons.

The statement was termed a reply to the "numerous letters from citizens of the Federal Republic."

The short statement, formulated by the embassy in indirect speech, lists as a sign of good will the withdrawal of "additionally deployed SS-20 missiles in the European zone" and the moratorium on nuclear tests of all kinds. The Soviet willingness to set up controls and the monitoring of such a ban -- "some of them" on site -- is recalled. Concerning the duration of the moratorium, it is merely stated that: "It is valid until 1 January 1986. However, if the United States were to follow the example of the USSR, then a bilateral moratorium could be introduced."

The Geneva summit conference is referred to in the statement as "useful and necessary" -- in the hope that this process can be continued positively. In the Soviet view "the negotiation results open opportunities for improving the international situation."

A verbal complaint about FRG negotiations with the United States on SDI research participation was made on 27 December by Soviet Ambassador to Bonn Vladimir Semenov, to the Foreign Ministry Secretary of State Andreas Mayer-Landrut. Similarly the Soviet Union had already complained in London about Britain's SDI decision. While the (Bonn) Foreign Ministry spoke cautiously of an expression of opinion and not assessing the Soviet conduct as a protest, deputy SPD group chairman Horst Ehmke criticized the Soviet conduct. In a radio interview, Ehmke said yesterday that the Semenov statement vis-a-vis a democratic government was diplomatically impertinent and counterproductive.

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RELATED ISSUES

FRG'S KOHL ON EAST-WEST RELATIONS, OTHER ISSUES

Progress in Arms Limitations

LD091256 Hamburg DPA in German 1121 GMT 9 Jan 86

[Text] Bonn, 9 Jan (DPA) -- Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl sees a distinct possibility of progress in the field of arms limitation between East and West. Speaking at the federal press conference, the chancellor said in Bonn on Thursday that his hope is above all for an interim agreement on medium-range missiles and a superpower convergence on a ban on chemical weapons as well as on a ban on nuclear weapons testing. Kohl emphasized that the Federal Government would represent the expressly German interests in the talks between Washington and Moscow.

In a prepared statement at the start of his press conference, Kohl spoke positively about developments in the relations between the German states, which in this year too was a central concern of Bonn's policies. Kohl expects an expansion of holiday traffic and believes that the cultural agreement between the FRG and the GDR will be ready for signing in a few weeks. Intra-German trade, which reached a volume of DM16 billion in the past year, was also to be expanded. The statement by the chancellor devoted much space to relations between Bonn and Paris. In this connection Kohl spoke of a "very excellent state" and announced further development in the defense sector. The chancellor hoped that the East-West dialogue will be carried out on the broadest basis. It is important to speak with all concerned about all subjects and problems on the agenda. He hopes that the Soviet Union will not allow itself to be guided by its interests alone in a one-sided way in this.

On the forthcoming talks between Economics Minister Martin Bangemann (FDP) in the United States about German participation in SDI, the chancellor said he has no doubts that a conclusion will soon be reached on this question between Bonn and Washington. He is firmly convinced that what the United States is doing on this question is reasonable.

The chancellor described the continuing speculation about a date for the visit of GDR State Council Chairman Erich Honecker to the FRG as "absurd." He would not contribute to it. Kohl indicated, however, that he no longer expects Honecker before the Soviet CPSU Congress in spring in Moscow.

The chancellor predicted positive developments in the labor market this year. With reference to the latest unemployment figures, he said he thought the statistics include a large number of women who now want to get into the job market again.

Kohl was more cautious about the election campaign. "We cannot afford to give any votes away." After the Bundestag elections in January 1987, new and difficult tasks will have to be tackled, such as tax reform the long-term safeguarding of pensions, and the explosion of costs in the health service. These problems, said Kohl, could only be satisfactorily solved by the present government coalition.

Headway on Disarmament Possible

DW091349 Hamburg ARD Television Network in German 1200 GMT 9 Jan 86

[Text] According to Chancellor Kohl, 1986 will be a difficult year, and not just because of the land parliamentary elections. Speaking to newsmen in Bonn today, the chancellor listed as key points of foreign policy European integration and relations with states of the Warsaw Pact. The Federal Government will represent German interests to both world powers.

Further headway in disarmament negotiations are possible, Kohl said. Thus, an interim solution for intermediate-range weapons may constitute an important step and provide an impetus to reduce the number of short-range missiles.

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CSO: 5200/2614

RELATED ISSUES

FRG GOVERNMENT SPOKESMAN REJECTS SOVIET 'ACCUSATIONS'

LD071403 Hamburg DPA in German 1236 GMT 7 Jan 86

[Text] Bonn, 7 Jan (DPA) -- Government spokesman Friedhelm Ost rejected the accusations in the Soviet Army paper [KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] and said they are false assertions. In contrast to Moscow's claim the Federal Government's policy aims at overcoming confrontation in East-West relations. Bonn is interested in a balanced and verifiable reduction of the military potential. The Federal Government seeks cooperation between all states beyond the alliance borders.

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CSO: 5200/2614

RELATED ISSUES

EC INITIATIVE ON ARMS REDUCTION URGED BY ITALY'S PCI LEADER

PM241107 Milan L'UNITA in Italian 17 Jan 86 pp 1, 18

[Paolo Soldini dispatch: "Natta Proposes EC Initiative" in Strasbourg]

[Text] Strasbourg -- The PCI proposes an EC initiative with Moscow and Washington, a demarche by the Europe of the Twelve vis-a-vis the leaders of the two superpowers for arms reduction. This request was submitted to the Netherlands, the current EC chairman, by PCI Secretary General Alessandro Natta, who took part in the European Parliament debate yesterday. The speech was delivered on the very day that direct U.S.-USSR negotiations resumed in Geneva and immediately following Gorbachev's proposal for the total elimination of nuclear weapons over the next 15 years. In other words, at a moment when the Moscow-Washington dialogue on disarmament seems to be moving and when there is a more pressing need than ever for a European involvement and initiative.

What form could the EC demarche with Washington and Moscow take? Perhaps the sending of a delegation of representatives of the various institutions (the Council of Ministers, the Commission, the Parliament). Or a delegation of foreign ministers of the Twelve led by current chairman Van den Broek, whose country, Natta acknowledged yesterday, is "particularly sensitive to the major problems of peace." This will probably be discussed in the next few days.

Yesterday Natta explained the political significance of the initiative. "The Geneva summit created new hopes," he said. "It is Europe's duty and in Europe's interests to ensure that these hopes materialize in deeds. There must be no delay." This is why, on a matter "which transcends all others," the PCI had decided to "attract the attention" of EC institutions. "We are asking," Natta said, addressing Van den Broek, "that you promote a specific EC initiative with Moscow and Washington for arms reduction."

The PCI secretary general placed his proposal within the context of an anxious analysis and indictment of the difficult situation affecting the European integration process, which has run aground on the disappointing "mini-reform" that emerged from the inter-governmental conference, with whose results, Natta said, "we express our most profound dissatisfaction."

The Community, Natta said, must be active. Especially "in the various crisis areas, to support just and correct political solutions," first and foremost in the Mediterranean, now criss-crossed and threatened by dangerous tensions. "There must be strict inflexibility and absolute commitment against terrorism," Natta argued. It is necessary to demand from states and institutions "absolute clarity" toward this phenomenon, "which has nothing in common with the ideals, methods, and experiences of the liberation

struggles." "But," he added, "it is of prime and essential importance to resolve the Palestinian issue." International negotiations involving the Palestinian people's representation legitimized by the UN vote is the only way to resolve the Middle East crisis and to bring peace and security to all the peoples and states of the region." This is why the time has come to "resume, update, and support" the stance which the EC adopted in the 1980 Venice Declaration and then allowed to lapse, to the serious detriment of the cause of peace, "without any concessions to the rationale of reprisals and sanctions."

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CSO: 5200/2620

RELATED ISSUES

CANADIAN JETS TO TAKE PART IN CRUISE TEST

Toronto THE SUNDAY STAR in English 22 Dec 85 p A19

[Text] Edmonton (CP) -- Canadian CF-18 jet fighters will be used in a training exercise during the first of four planned cruise missile tests, a Canadian Forces spokesman has confirmed.

The exercise will involve two to four CF-18s, Maj Luigi Rossetto of Canadian Forces Base Edmonton said.

The free-flight cruise tests will be held sometime between next month and March.

The CF-18s "will fly in a defensive posture to try to detect and intercept the cruise missile," he said. United States fighter aircraft may take a similar role in succeeding tests.

Transport Canada announced the missile trials earlier this month, and peace groups say they are gearing up for another season of protests against the cruise.

Greenpeace Canada directors will be around the test corridor, said Jim Bohlen, a Vancouver-based Greenpeace director.

But "we're not going to do what we did last year," he added. "That would be a tough act to follow." He was referring to an effort to send a balloon-laden, cruise-catching net aloft at Grand Centre, Alta.

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CSO: 5220/24

RELATED ISSUES

FIRST CRUISE MISSILES ARRIVE AT U.S. HAHN AIR BASE IN FRG

DW090745 Hamburg ARD Television Network in German 1900 GMT 8 Jan 86

[Text] The first cruise missiles slated for deployment in the Federal Republic in accordance with the NATO two-track decision have arrived at Hahn U.S. Air Force Base in Rhineland-Palatinate. According to information gathered by the Baden-Baden Suedwestfunk Network, the cruise missiles will be kept at the base only temporarily. Before the end of the year they are supposed to be deployed at the U.S. depot in Hasselbach near the U.S. air base. Opponents of NATO counterarmament demonstrated against deployment of the weapons at Hahn. [Hamburg DPA in German at 1008 GMT on 9 January carries the following Bonn-dated report: "The stationing of U.S. cruise missiles has begun in the FRG. DPA has learned from military circles in Bonn on Thursday that the first of the planned 96 cruise missiles have arrived in the Hunsrueck 'according to plan.' No other details were made available. The planned stationing on German soil of 108 Pershing-2 missiles in accordance with the NATO two-track decision of 1979 was completed in December."]

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CSO: 5200/2614

RELATED ISSUES

CANADIAN DEFENSE OFFICIAL ON STREAMLINING RESPONSIBILITIES

Ottawa THE WEEKEND CITIZEN in English 11 Jan 86 p A3

[Article by Jim Robb: "Canadian Force Spread too Thin: Defense Minister"]

[Text] The government wants to streamline Canada's defence obligations but the armed forces will get the resources to do their work effectively, Associate Defence Minister Harvie Andre said Friday.

Andre told the Conference of Defence Associations the military is spread too thin and has had too many responsibilities assigned to it.

He told his audience, mostly former armed forces officers and reservists, Canada has been in close consultation with its NATO allies on possible changes to its responsibilities in Europe, which include a mobile brigade group and an air group, to get more effectiveness from the resources available.

But later, he would not disclose any details of the possible changes, which are going to cabinet for final approval before they are presented in the long-awaited defence white paper to be made public in the near future.

Andre said options under consideration in government could also include a realignment of defence responsibilities in North America. That means they might affect Canadian participation in NORAD, the North American Aerospace Defence Command, as well as maritime and Arctic surveillance.

The minister said Canada's reserve forces are going to have a clearly defined role in new plans

and they will be equipped to carry out that role.

"The reserves in this country have been allowed to deteriorate to a shameful extent and that situation cries out for immediate remedy," Andre said.

"In the past Canada's greatest positive influence on international affairs occurred when her armed forces were strong," he said.

In a companion speech Gen. Gérard Thériault, chief of the defence staff, told the conference the central assumption in the review of defence policy leading up to publication of the forthcoming white paper has been Canada's membership in NATO and the consequent implications for "co-operation and interoperability" with allies.

Thériault warned the military capability of the Warsaw Pact countries is growing faster than NATO's.

He also warned Canada's military faces a cost-squeeze because of the many tasks assigned to it and escalating costs for major weapons systems.

He said the problem was common to western countries and "it is resulting in much reduced inventories of key defence equipment."

Thériault said when he looks at the size of the country and the many assignments handed the armed forces, "I cannot help but feel that we are spread awfully thin."

RELATED ISSUES

USSR: AUSTRALIAN CATHOLIC COMMISSION RECOMMENDS DISARMAMENT

Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 26 Nov 85, p 5

[Article by O. Skalkin: "Stung to the Quick"]

[Text] In Australia anti-war sentiment is acquiring ever greater scope among the masses. This confirms, in particular, the report published here by the Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace. The Commission's thorough work in the field of the Arms Race and its conclusions about its possible consequences both for the entire world and for Australia itself are outlined in 38 pages. The document has become widely known and is debated in social and political circles. The discussions were furthered to no small degree by the reaction to the Commission's report by the U.S. embassy in Canberra, which sent the Commission a series of angry and moralizing letters.

The American representatives were stung to the quick by the warning contained in the conclusions of the Catholic Commission about the danger of the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative. Nor did the Americans like the recommendation to Australia to review its obligations in regard to American military bases on its soil, "if effective steps are not undertaken toward disarmament."

In the opinion of the Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace, Australia's participation with the United States under the aegis of ANZUS is leading to Australia's progressively worse involvement in the strategic plans of Washington. ANZUS was accompanied by the creation of major installations of a military nature in Australia. It also led to Australia's involvement in the Vietnam War and to opening the nation's ports and airports to nuclear vessels and B-52 bombers capable of delivering missiles of a new kind. In the "spirit of ANZUS," Australia has become integrated in the American system of nuclear strategy.

Whether such a view of the world reality is a "tendentious and distorted characterization of American policy," as the official American representatives maintain, is for the Australians themselves to judge. Yet, the very appearance of the report by the Commission for Justice and Peace and the wide discussion aroused by it attest to the growing popularity among the Australian people of the ideas of peace and disarmament.

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CSO: 5200/1172

RELATED ISSUES

CANADA, JAPAN TO HOLD REGULAR ARMS CONTROL TALKS

OWL30403 Tokyo KYODO in English 0250 GMT 13 Jan 86

[Text] Toronto, Jan 12 KYODO -- Japan and Canada agreed Sunday to hold regular consultations on disarmament and arms control, indicating that Japan wants to discuss establishment of a verification system as a first step toward a halt to underground nuclear experiments. The agreement calling for the holding of regular consultations at the level of director generals of the Foreign Ministries of the two countries came at a meeting between Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone and Canadian Prime Minister Brian Mulroney. It marked the first time that Japan agreed to have regular consultations with another nation confined to disarmament and arms control.

The agreement is one of the measures Nakasone is contemplating in preparation for hosting the Tokyo summit of industrially advanced nations in May. Japanese officials accompanying the prime minister on his four-day official visit to Canada said the first consultation will be held in Tokyo before the summit.

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RELATED ISSUES

BRIEFS

ITALIAN FOREIGN MINISTRY SEES BID 'FAVORABLY'--The Foreign Ministry has commented favorably on the disarmament proposals of CPSU Secretary General Gorbachev. A note reads that they seem to contain interestingly new elements compared to the ideas and the starting point previously expressed by Moscow, particularly in the delicate field of verifications and the reduction of medium-range missiles. The Foreign Ministry recalls that the Italian Government has always spoken out, and still does, in favor of general and total disarmament in a context of equilibrium and stability which guarantees peace and encourages trust. [Excerpt] [Rome Domestic Service in Italian 2130 GMT 17 Jan 86 LD] /9274

CSO: 5200/2620

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