

**STRATEGY
RESEARCH
PROJECT**

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**UN REFORM – CAN IT BE THE ANSWER TO INTELLIGENCE
SUPPORT TO UN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS?**

BY

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ABSTRACT

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The increasing demand for the United Nations (UN) intervention in peacekeeping operation has caused the UN to reconsider the lifelong objection it has had against collecting intelligence information against any nation state. The United States (U.S.) historically provided the UN with critical national level intelligence. The last two United States administrations took a proactive stance trying to initiate reforms in a number of UN functions. Intelligence is one of the area's prime for change. The current leadership of the UN instituted reform measures in July 1997. These reforms will take the UN out of a Cold War mindset and into an era of active response to potential hot spots in the world. To transform UN intelligence operations, the U.S. will need to step up to the plate and assist the UN in this endeavor. The U.S. has the experience and a current structure that will meet the needs of the UN. Resources, personnel and funding are two matters that will need our national leaders resolve to assure the reform is successful.

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INTRODUCTION

"In United Nations operations the use of the word 'intelligence' is avoided and 'information' used instead. Intelligence implies undercover activities and the use of covert means for obtaining information about the parties in the dispute. The principle in peacekeeping is to be open and objective and therefore overt rather than covert methods of information gathering are practised[sic]."

Peacekeeper's Handbook, 1978

This quotation from a Peacekeeper's handbook reveals the United Nations (UN) overall attitude towards intelligence. However this attitude is changing as the UN recognizes that possessing an information gathering capability is vital to responding quickly and effectively when crises arrive. This paper provides a solution to the question put forth in the title. Namely with recommended modifications the UN can and should be able to rely on its own ability to gather and disseminate information vital to conflict resolution during peacekeeping operations. Two key documents, PDD-25 and the UN reform document provide the groundwork necessary to implement this information gathering organization.

From its roots and to this day the primary purpose of the UN is to maintain peace and security though out the world and to develop friendly relations among nations. The UN charter states

the collective determination to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war.¹ The United Nations determination is being tested as Peacekeeping Operations have increased dramatically since the end of the Cold War. Since 1988, 21 new peacekeeping operations have been undertaken, compared to 13 during the previous 40 years.² Likewise the nature of peacekeeping endeavors has evolved over this same period. The UN can not ignore the need for intelligence support and an information gathering capability in support of peacekeeping operations. Because of this increased demand for peacekeeping, since the end of the Cold War, the UN has set out to establish a viable information and assessment capability through a set of internal reforms. The current UN secretary-general, Mr. Kofi Annan, initiated the most recent movement.

The United States' (U.S.) commitment to assist the UN in the past is clear and continuation of that support remains a stated objective of the current administration. The genesis of the U.S. commitment to UN reforms is the United States Presidential Decision Directive, PDD-25. In May 1994, President Clinton signed the directive calling for the UN to actively pursue reform in their peace operations. In part President Clinton states".... the President believes United States support for the

participation in United Nations peace operations can only succeed over the long term with bipartisan support of Congress and the American people."³

Since the UN beginning, the U.S. has provided national intelligence to both UN mandated and supported operations. The National Intelligence Community does this with the full support of the National Command Authority. U.S. intelligence support is provided in different ways, directly to field commanders or through the higher headquarters responsible for the peacekeeping operations. What is missing? A coherent information center that processes and disseminates the data to the field commander is what's missing. While not a problem for United States run operations, the UN has experienced significant problems. A solution is possible, and the United States has the answer.

This paper will briefly trace the UN experience with intelligence support by using historical examples of past support or lack of support. This paper will also discuss the U.S. commitment to UN reforms through Presidential Decision Directive, PDD-25 and then outline UN reform efforts with an emphasis on intelligence support. It will also outline some of the changes the UN implemented to improve their information dissemination capability to deployed units of UN peacekeeping operations. This

author recommends an immediate solution to the UN information dissemination shortfall that will allow the UN to successfully accomplish the goals of the reforms. In conclusion this paper will identify actions the U.S. needs to implement to fulfill its commitment to this reformation.

INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO PEACE OPERATIONS

Intelligence support to peace operations is nothing new to the U.S. The U.S. has shown its commitment to support the UN and coalition partners alike. In the past we committed large numbers of the nations' sons and daughters, in military service, to the action. Our purpose in some cases was to balance the political power and respond to UN requests for our help. As the leader and only super-power in the "New World Order" we must continue to demonstrate our commitment to assisting the UN transformation. Without the United States, it is doubtful the UN can evolve into a viable peacekeeper/peacemaker. But the UN must follow through with proposed reforms in the area of intelligence gathering and processing capability.

Let us look at some examples where the U.S. provided national level intelligence support. As part of the Yom Kippur War's cease-fire agreement the United States offered sides, Arabs and Israelis, imagery from its U-2 overflights, as assurance against surprise attacks.⁴ After the Sinai II agreements in September 1975 this material was provided by sorties flown every seven to ten days routinely or upon Egyptian or Israeli request. The American package also included various technical observation

devices deployed in conjunction with the United Nations force. Reportedly subsequent American "overhead" photography (satellite imagery) provided similar support of the Egyptian-Israel Treaty of 1979. The United Nation Multinational Force and Observers established for verification received the analyzed results (not the original photographs) as a basis for discussion with both parties.⁵

In fact, U.S. intelligence has been used extensively in the verification process on numerous occasions. Other examples of intelligence support to peace operations include the Korean War in 1950, the Anglo-French-Israeli seizure of the Suez Canal in 1956 and more recently Cambodia, Somalia, and Bosnia. In each of the three recent operations United States intelligence assets provided information to UN headquarters and field locations to assist the decision making process for responsible leaders. Additional UN actions received support to a level that met the national interest of the U.S. or of the providing country. The U.S. has been the largest contributor of intelligence information to the UN. During the Cold War intervening action was often based on the national interest of competing countries. Even in recent actions in Iraq the U.S. provided the UN critical photographic information. We continue to provide this support to

both UN inspectors in Iraq and UN forces in Bosnia. These are just some examples of the support the U.S. has and continues to give UN missions. It demonstrates U.S. willingness to provide assistance in selected international situations. Understandably we must protect the classified nature of the process but in each case we have responded positively to UN requests. The U.S. is definitely a positive force in upholding the UN charter.

During Desert storm, perhaps the prototypical center for exchange of intelligence with coalition members was the Coalition Coordination, Communication, and Integration Center (C3IC). Created on August 13, 1990, early in the intervention, the C3IC mission was to "facilitate the combined planning process and improve the day-to-day integration of coalition operations."⁶ Situated adjacent to the CINCCENT War Room, the CENTCOM Joint Operation Center (JOC) and the CENTCOM Joint Intelligence Center (JIC), ARCENT and the Saudi Arabian Armed Forces operated the C3IC. It served as a conduit between the major command structures developed during the buildup to Desert Storm: American, British, Canadian, French, and Italian interest on the one hand, and the Arab/Islamic on the other. The C3IC became the focal point for sharing national, theater, and tactical level intelligence between forces for the duration of the conflict.

This concept was a major undertaking and became a forerunner of 'How To' doctrine.⁷

Subsequent to Desert Storm, the Central Command staff formalized the concept of an Intelligence Support Element (ISE) exportable for use as a model for future peace operations in support of the United Nations.⁸ In Somalia, U.S. officials initially staffed the CENTCOM Intelligence Support Element (CISE) with 43 persons. As seen in figure 1, the CISE managed collection, processing, reporting, and dissemination in all of the traditional intelligence disciplines, including the sensitive ones. The CISE bridged the intelligence flow from the CENTCOM regional Joint Intelligence Center (JIC) to the Joint Task Force (JTF) J-2 intelligence cell. It also provided sanitized intelligence to the United Nations information cell, U-2.⁹ During the high point of the mission, post October 3 incident, CISE numbers swelled to over 100 to give the United States force commander a 24 hour warning center capability necessary during increased hostilities. The CISE operated with only U.S. soldiers, sailors, marines and airmen for security reasons. CISE maintained a liaison team in the UN headquarters providing the UN force commander with sanitized national intelligence information pertinent to his operation and protection of the force. In

addition a number of national level reconnaissance assets remained available to CISE as well as in country assets responding to requests from both UN and U.S. commanders and intelligence centers operating in Somalia.¹⁰

Intelligence Support Element




Figure 1. CENTCOM ISE STRUCTURE

The significant work accomplished in Somalia regarding intelligence support to the UN multinational force assisted the intelligence community to improve intelligence support for succeeding peace operations. Operations in Haiti became a direct recipient of this Intelligence Support Element experience in Somalia. This allowed the intelligence community to provide outstanding support throughout the Haiti operation. Although operations in Bosnia are different, with NATO presence, an Intelligence Support Element is providing support to UN, NATO and U.S. commanders in the operations.

Significantly, two successive U.S. administrations, of different political parties, have supported sharing U.S. intelligence with the UN. President Bush stated that the United States would "employ our considerable lift, logistic, communications, and intelligence capabilities to support peacekeeping operations".¹¹ President Clinton endorsed "the creation of a genuine United Nations peacekeeping headquarters with a planning staff with access to timely intelligence".¹²

Following Desert Storm, the U.S. proposed improvements to the UN Peacekeeping operations that included a "... Plans Division to conduct adequate advance planning and preparation for new and on-going operations, [and an] Information and Research

Division linked to field operations to obtain and provide current information, manage a 24-hour watch center, and monitor open source material and non-sensitive information submitted by governments."¹³

In November 1993 the deputy assistant secretary of defense for peacekeeping and peace enforcement, Ms. Sarah Sewall, said; "The United Nations also needs to devise ways to more efficiently utilize national intelligence that could be made available for peace operations".¹⁴ Besides enhancing intelligence capabilities, Sewall outlined a number of other requirements for strengthening UN peace operations. These included proposals to:

- Further increase the numbers and expertise of the United Nations military staff to improve the body's military planning ability.

- Create an information system to identify forces member nations might make available for peace operations.

- Develop a command, control and communications system linking New York and field operations.

- Create a headquarters team and logistics unit ready for immediate deployments to start a new operation and a logistics system to sustain operations once under way.

Intelligence, especially of a tactical nature, is key to ensuring the success of force deployments, a group of former and current commanders of United Nations forces have stressed in internal recommendations to the United Nations' peacekeeping department.¹⁵

The UN has not always performed up to the expectations of its field commanders. From the earliest experience of UN peacekeeping efforts, participants have complained about the lack of well-coordinated and professional intelligence support. Major-General Romero Dallaire, a Canadian who commanded United Nations forces, speaking at a symposium on the United Nations Rapid Deployment Brigade had this to say, "...I found that we took several casualties, and even many of those we were supposed to be helping, died, because we were literally blind and deaf in the field. One solution which could significantly reduce the number of casualties suffered by UN military personnel would be to have access to real time information on which to base correct and informed decisions. Yet, the UN is expected to operate in an information void."¹⁶ Brigadier General Finn Saermark-Thomsen, a Danish General Officer who commanded UN forces in Yugoslavia, commented at the same symposium, "Relevant intelligence information is essential for a new mission...."¹⁷

Based on the recommendation of the U.S. and input from its field commanders the UN made some organizational changes. To enhance information flow from New York to the field it established a 'situation room' staffed by military officers to maintain a continuous link with peacekeeping forces in the field. It was established during the Somalia mission and was supported by manpower from the United States UN military mission.¹⁸ Additional changes will be discussed later in United Nations reform chapter.

PRESIDENTIAL DECISION DIRECTIVE - PDD-25

In 1993 President Clinton told the General Assembly
"frequently, the Blue Helmets have worked wonders....[however]

The United Nations also must have the technical means to run a modern, world-class peacekeeping operation. We support the creation of a genuine UN peacekeeping headquarters with a planning staff; with access to timely intelligence; with a logistic unit that can deploy on a moment's notice; and with a modern operations center with global communications."¹⁹

In May of 1994, President Clinton signed his policy on reforming multilateral peace operation. Known as PDD-25 it states that peacekeeping can be a useful tool to help prevent and resolve conflicts before they pose direct threats to our national security. The policy addresses six major issues of reform and improvement:

1. Making disciplined and coherent choices about which peace operations to support.
2. Reducing United States costs for United Nations peace operations.
3. Defining clearly our policy regarding the command and control of American military forces.
4. Reforming and improving United Nations capability to manage peace operations.

5. Improving the way the United States government manages and funds peace operations.

6. Creating better forms of cooperation between the Executive, Congress and the American public.²⁰

While the document addresses the UN as a whole, important parts of the directive deal directly with intelligence and the need to improve its efficient handling in support of peace operations. Specifically it states that the United States is prepared to support: detailing appropriate numbers of civilian and military personnel to the Department of Peace Keeping Operations in New York in advisory or support roles and sharing information, as appropriate, while ensuring full protection of sources and methods.²¹ The decision also directs the Department of Defense to include appropriate peacekeeping/emergency humanitarian assistance in DoD training programs.

Our experience in recent peace operations and Presidential guidance prompted our senior military decision makers to include peacekeeping operations into Joint doctrine. We have imbedded the intelligence support into, Joint Pub 2-0, Joint Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Operations. Chapter VIII addresses policies and procedures and provides an operational framework. Peace Operations is also discussed in all applicable joint

publications including logistic, operation, and personnel publications. This is not just an intelligence commitment but a total asset commitment recognizing that peace operations will remain in the nation's military future.

However, it is not only the lack of intelligence support that is being questioned, but also the commitment to reforms necessary to advance the UN's ability to process and disseminate information to UN commanders in the field.

UNITED NATION REFORM

On 16 July 1997, Secretary-General, Mr. Kofi Annan set the United Nation on a course of sweeping reform. The fundamental objective of this reform effort is to narrow the gap between aspiration and accomplishment. It seeks to establish a new leadership culture and management structure within the United Nations that will lead to greater unity of purpose, coherence of efforts and agility in the pressing needs of the international community.

Once the Cold War ended, the UN rushed and in some cases pushed, to respond to a vast increase in demand for its services. The UN peacekeeping mechanism for a time became the international community's emergency services, fire brigade, policeman and military deterrent, even in instances where there was no peace to be kept. The fundamental challenge remained to fashion a leadership and management structure that would result in a better focused, more coherent, more responsive and more cost-effective UN. The leadership of the organization has recognized the need to provide critical information so it can assist in necessary political decision. Although the UN mandated or sponsored previous peacekeeping actions, for all practical purposes, these

actions were led by the U.S. and supported by a host of coalition partners.

The problem was that the UN had no infrastructure to process or analysis information provided by any country. They were just not resourced to handle the responsibility. Additionally as previously noted the UN was not in the business to gather information on any sovereign state.

The U.S. recognized this shortcoming and has tried to carefully encourage the UN to acknowledge their deficiency. The U.S. helped identify organizational features most demanded by the UN field commanders. In some respect they remain in short supply: strategic deployment of resources, unity of purpose, coherence of effort, agility and flexibility. The current reform effort aims at redressing this imbalance and setting the United Nations on a course of revitalization for the twenty-first century.²²

The Secretary-General laid out fifteen major reforms on the 16th of July. Improving the Organization's ability to deploy peacekeeping and other field operations more rapidly, including enhancing the United Nations Rapid Reaction capability is the one we will look at.

Although the words intelligence, information, or early warning do not appear in any of the reforms, progress has been made. First, recognition of the need to provide information to the field has been expanded in the United Nations' Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO).

The DPKO was established in 1994, at the UN headquarters in New York with a small staff. That staff, one of PDD-25's recommendations, has been increased to over 350 military and civilian personnel. The department is divided into sections: Planning and Support (which includes civil police matters, demining and training, finance, logistics, communications and personnel) and Operations (which includes a regional division for peacekeeping and the Situation Center).²³

A UN Crisis Center was set up to support all UN operations, including peacekeeping. Electronic equipment, staff planning, and intelligence data are being upgraded, providing accurate and more timely data for humanitarian and military operations alike.²⁴ The key section of the DPKO, the Crisis Center is responsible for gathering information, analysis and dissemination to field operating locations. (All of these steps were instituted after President Clinton's release of PDD-25. Many feel the actions taken in the UN were a direct reaction to the directive.)

A Lessons Learned Unit, part of the DPKO, has undertaken studies of four multidisciplined peacekeeping operations: the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM); the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR); the United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH); and the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM III). The study published six lessons learned in Intelligence and Information Analysis:

1. An effective political and humanitarian early-warning system is needed for potential conflict zones. Given the necessary political resolve, the key to a successful early-warning system would be effective targeting of warnings to relevant political bodies and individuals. However, they may not act on such warnings.

2. A well-managed intelligence and information analysis program can also greatly assist peacekeeping operations. Despite the Organizations traditional reluctance in this area, this need should be taken into account in future operations.

3. A detailed intelligence management plan should be completed before deployments. The plan should cover in as much detail as possible the mission area, collection effort, analysis and fusion of information, dissemination and sharing procedures, operational security and acquisition and maintenance of intelligence products, including maps.

4. Standard procedures must be in place to assure the timely sharing of intelligence information, both among contingents in the field and between mission headquarters and New York.

5. A combined civilian-military information analysis cell is needed in the Office of the Senior Representative to the Secretary-General (SRSG) for political and military analysis.

6. Ensuring security of information gathered and protecting the confidentiality of sources is essential. Missions must develop standard operating procedures for these.²⁵

Another factor that bears on the ability of the UN to respond to crisis situation in the world is a viable military force to rapidly deploy to the conflict area. A standby agreement with member states to contribute military units is currently ongoing. The agreement already includes commitments from 65 member states as of 26 February 1998. This is important to the process of conflict resolution. The military force card can persuade a belligerent state to reconsider and allow peaceful resolution to take its course.

The Mission Planning Service (MPS), another unit within the DPKO, is responsible for developing those plans that address lesson learned. The MPS goal is to anticipate a crisis and

initiate the planning process at an early stage, before the United Nations Security Council has given final authorization for a peacekeeping operation.²⁶ Having a military force commitment in a ready state makes this planning more realistic. The one negative factor is the limit of funds. Lacking funds prevents purchasing the military equipment needed to outfit the force.

The support of member states with a national information gathering capability is necessary for the MPS to complete its mission. The U.S. has committed to working with the UN to develop this capability. The U.S. has also shown the political will to provide essential information in the past. Remaining Security Council members must demonstrate similar commitments to do the same.

Mr. Annan is a highly regarded politician. He is the right person at the right time. His insight to reform of the United Nations is refreshing.

RECOMMENDATION

There is a critical need in UN peacekeeping operations for qualified people and a organization to run its information gathering and dissemination section. This paper argues the solution to this need is an organization that mirrors the Intelligence Support Element. The primary source of information could be from open sources such as media and media services. The Associated Press, Reuters, and CNN can keep the current situation updated. Another source must be the NGO/PVO's in the field working within potential hot spots. Additionally alliances like NATO could provide Intelligence summaries and estimates. This approach is out of the box, but UN member states and especially the Security Council must address current and future requirements. The U.S. can continue to lead the world in innovative thinking and support UN reform measures in the Security Council.

Training will also be a factor. The U.S. can offer training through the International Military Education and Training program (IMET). For example, a Unified Command could be assigned the support mission of standing up a UN Intelligence Support Element once established it could be supported by a National Intelligence Support Team (NIST) from the Intelligence agencies.

All UN assistance must have a start date and an end date so that we do not get caught in a can't live without it situation at the UN. These reforms must also have a commitment from the Secretary-General and the Security Council. Many of the member states have intelligence organization within their countries, especially the western countries. Let's look to the future and not get tied up with intelligence gathering of the past. The intelligence elements of many of the Security Council countries are excellent. These countries can assist in resources for the UN ISE. A combined effort for the good of peace is called for and needed.

History proves that nations can work together in times of crisis. Why don't we work together to avert crisis from occurring.

CONCLUSION

The UN, without compromising its general charter, can provide the needed information gathering capability. The current reforms being instituted give them the structure and guidance needed to finish constructing the Information Support Element started in 1994.

The U.S. can assist the process by doing three basic tasks. One, provide a training team to guide the UN in operating an effective ISE. Two, assign twenty U.S. intelligence professionals to the UN for duty in the DPKO. Three, pay the outstanding dues and continue to make payment on time to assure operations are funded in the out years. The first two tasks can be accomplished easily. The third tasks will require the Congress to show its commitment by passing legislation to authorize payment of owed moneys.

To assure the UN can meet peacekeeping operations in the future the U.S. must show support for the reform process and approve all three suggested tasks. If the U.S. will not support the UN, the U.S. should then consider getting out of the UN in total.

Strengthening UN and regional peace operations can reduce the burden of being the world's remaining superpower and enhance

U.S. national interests. Preventing conflicts from escalating to war eliminates the need to respond to those wars at a later time. An improved UN can help reduce the proliferation of nuclear technology and conventional arms, encourage the development of democratic states, constrain a reemergence of the former Soviet Union, and provide a stronger economic system open to U.S. trade. All of these are clear goals of the U.S.

The time to act is now. Since 1994, the UN has struggled to provide an information gathering capability. The U.S. Congress should fulfill our obligation and pass legislation to pay our outstanding debt. This must be done now while the opportunity is here.

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² Basic Facts About the United Nations. New York: United Nations., 1995, 27

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⁴ Herman Michael. "Intelligence after the Cold War: Contributions to International Security?", Conflict Studies Research Center M12 (November 1995), 2

⁵ Ibid., 3

⁶ Douglas H. Dearth and R. Thomas Goodden, eds., Strategic Intelligence: Theory and Application (Carlisle Barracks, PA: 1995) 424

⁷ Ibid.

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⁹ This is what the 'intelligence cell on the multinational UN force was called, personal knowledge off the author who served as the director of the ISE for 7 months from September 1993 till March 1994 when the US forces pulled out of the Somalia mission.

¹⁰ The author was the director of the ISE and relates the structure from personal knowledge.

¹¹ Dearth, 419

¹² Ibid.

¹³ DoS Publication 10161, p.7.

¹⁴ Defense News November 15-21, 1993

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Major-general Dallaire was the UN commander for UNAMIR

¹⁷ Brigadier General Saermark-Thomsen command in Macedonian

¹⁸ Dearth, 422

¹⁹ Victoria K. Holt, Briefing Book on Peacekeeping: The U.S. Role in United Nations Peace Operations (Council for a Livable World Education Fund 1995), 18.

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²¹ Ibid., 9

²² Secretary- General Annans' remarks to the General assembly in July 1997.

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