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**THE IMPACT OF THE COLONIAL LEGACY ON
CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN AFRICA:
CHAD AND THE SUDAN AS COMPARATIVE CASE
STUDIES**

by

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December 1997

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The end of the Cold War has resulted in a general tendency towards democratization all over the world. The United States and other Western countries such as France and Britain are determined to help African countries establish democratic institutions and improve good governance. The reluctance and instability of many African societies and regimes to democratize inspired the research questions of this thesis: Why is Africa so vulnerable to military coups? Why is political and economic modernization so difficult in Africa? What is wrong with Africa? Can Africans ever get out of their conflicts and integrate into the world political and economic systems?

Scholars have suggested several explanations for Africa's political instability and military interventions including, political development theory, military centrality theory, ethnic antagonism theory, and world system/dependency theory.

Although I do not rule out that any of these causal mechanisms have contributed to some extent to Africa's political instability. However, in my opinion, these theories underestimate the significant role played by the colonial experience in shaping African political culture.

By using Chad and the Sudan as comparative case studies of former colonies of France and Britain, the thesis illustrates the relevance of my colonial-legacy theory. Chad and the Sudan are almost similar in every aspect except the former colonial power. Variations in the patterns of their civil-military relations are explained by variations in the nature of their colonial experiences.

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CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN AFRICA:
CHAD AND THE SUDAN AS COMPARATIVE CASE STUDIES**

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


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
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ABSTRACT

The end of the Cold War has resulted in a general tendency towards democratization all over the world. The United States and other Western countries such as France and Britain are determined to help African countries establish democratic institutions and improve good governance. The reluctance and instability of many African societies and regimes to democratize inspired the research questions of this thesis: Why is Africa so vulnerable to military coups? Why is political and economic modernization so difficult in Africa? What is wrong with Africa? Can Africans ever get out of their conflicts and integrate into the world political and economic systems?

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By using Chad and the Sudan as comparative case studies of former colonies of France and Britain, the thesis illustrates the relevance of my colonial-legacy theory. Chad and the Sudan are almost similar in every aspect except the former colonial power. Variations in the patterns of their civil-military relations are explained by variations in the nature of their colonial experiences.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS

AEF	Afrique Equatoriale Française (French Equatorial Africa)
AOF	Afrique Occidentale Française (French Eastern Africa)
CNS	Conference National Souverain (Sovereign National Conference)
FROLINAT	Front de Liberation Nationale du Tchad (National Liberation Front of Chad)
GUNT	Gouvernement d'Union Nationale du Tchad (Chadian National Unity Government)
IAF	Inter-African Force
IGAD	Inter-Governmental Authority on Development
MPS	Movement Patriotique du Salve (National Salvation Movement)
NDA	National Democratic Alliance
NUP	National Unity Party
OAU	Organization of African Unity
PDP	People's Democratic Party
PPT	Parti de la Progrès Tchadian (Chadian Progressive Party)
SACDNU	Sudan African Closed Districts National Unity
SCP	Sudan Communist Party
SPLA	Sudanese People's Liberation Army
SSU	Sudan Socialist Union
UDT	Union Democratique Tchadian (Chadian Democratic Union)

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This thesis examines the impact of colonial rule and its legacy on the patterns of civil-military relations and on the stability of elected civilian regimes in African countries after independence. I make a comparative analysis between Chad (a former French colony) and the Sudan (a former British colony) to show how the colonial legacy played and continues to play a major role in shaping civil-military relations in those countries.

This thesis argues that among other factors, the colonial legacy played a major role in shaping civil-military relations in post-colonial Africa. African countries have been outstandingly characterized by the instability of their elected civilian regimes. Why is that? Is it because of their economic backwardness? The lack of education? The multi-ethnicity and tribalism? Domestic traditions and civic culture? Or other reasons? In fact all these are important sources of political instability. However, the legacy of colonial rule, whether the colonial powers deliberately aimed to do so or not, played a significant role in irrigating the pre-existing seeds of instability and turning them into complex and chronic problems.

Africa has witnessed some of the worst examples of civil-military relations in the world. It is characterized by continuous military coups, weak unstable civilian regimes, and frequent reverses after attempts at democratization. Scholars have failed to find a common explanation to this pattern that would be applicable across all African countries. Most of the time they have ignored the effect of the colonial legacy as a possible cause for this pattern. Yet, Africa is an area that has been significantly affected by colonialism, and colonial rule was the last experience it had before attempts at democratization. Moreover, the influence of the former colonizer is still significant in "Francophone Africa" in an obvious manner.

Chad and the Sudan represent the French and the British colonial experiences (respectively), the two main former colonial powers in the Africa. Chad and the Sudan have many similarities and unique qualifications which render them representative in this comparative case study: they are both central African countries and their central geographic position enables them to represent all the other African countries; they are both exposed to the Arabic and Islamic culture in their northern part, and the African

and Christian culture in their southern part. The type of colonization is the major difference between the two countries. It is my argument that variation in the type of colonial experience is the most important factor in the varying make-up of civil-military relations in Chad and the Sudan.

In both Chad and the Sudan, the colonial experience was found to be a major cause for the instability of civilian regimes and the military interventions. However, the frequency of military interventions and the direct circumstances that stimulated military coups in Chad and the Sudan differed according to the differences in the policies of their former colonizers (France and Britain).

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I. INTRODUCTION

In this thesis, I will examine the impact of the colonial experience in Africa and its effect on the stability of civilian-led regimes and its role in military interventions in African politics after independence. I will provide a comparative case study between Chad (a former French colony) and the Sudan (a former British colony) to show how the colonial legacy has played a major role in shaping civil-military relations in the two countries.

This study is important, I think, because Africa has witnessed some of the worst examples of civil-military relations in the world.¹ Africa is characterized by frequent military coups, weak unstable civilian regimes, and continual setbacks after attempts at democratization. Previous Studies found that:

a coup or attempted coup occurred once every 4 months in Latin America (between 1945 and 1972), once every 7 months in Asia (1947-1972), once every 3 months in the Middle East (1949-1972), and once every 55 days in Africa (1960-1972).²

Scholars have failed to agree on an explanation of this pattern that would be generally applicable to all African countries. Although Africa is an area greatly affected by colonialism, and colonial rule was the last governing experience most of Africa had before attempts at democratization, scholars have tended to ignore the effect of the colonial legacy as a possible cause for African patterns of military interventions and political instability.

¹ Augustine J. Kposowa and J. Craig Jenkins reported in their study of "The Structural Sources of Military Coups in Post-colonial Africa, 1957-1984" that "[B]etween their independence and 1985, the 45 African states had had 60 successful military seizures, 71 attempts, and 126 reported plots. By the mid-1980s, 25 of these states were directly controlled by the military and over 90% had experienced at least one coup event." *American Journal of Sociology*, Volume 99, Number 1, July 1993, p. 126.

² "Global-level studies have consistently found Africa the region most prone to coups (Finer 1988; Janowitz 1977; Thompson 1973). Bertsch, Clark, and Wood (1978, p. 431)." *Ibid.* p. 127.

A. ARGUMENTS

This thesis will argue that the colonial legacy was one of the most significant elements that determined the factors or exacerbated the pre-existing factors that were to shape civil-military relations in Africa.

The political culture that developed during the colonial period has been one of the general causes for the instability of African civilian-led regimes.³ Unlike French direct rule, British colonial indirect rule made the distance between the upper class(civilian politicians) and the lower class (military and common people) of society even greater. However, in both the French and British cases, the colonial educational and missionary policy intensified the ethnic and cultural diversity. These ethnically, culturally, and religiously distinct people were put together in the same artificial states at independence. In this thesis I will argue that the instability of civilian regimes, the military coups, and the civil-wars in both Chad and the Sudan were likely to be products of these legacies of their colonial periods.

Unlike the British case, the French assimilation policy⁴ has led to an incomplete decolonization, and hence neocolonialism and post-colonial influence up to this day. Recently, France has been using this influence in democratization efforts in her former African colonies. That is because, most of these countries, if not all, depend heavily on France in their economic, military, and political affairs. Chadian democracy is highly influenced by French pressure. On the other hand, the British decolonization was comparatively complete. That is why Britain currently does not have much influence on her former colonies to force them towards the democratization process. Britain has a very small role, if any, to play in Sudan's current situation.

³ Stedman also argued that "[T]he roots of Africa's violence lie principally with the political and economic conditions that existed after independence." Stedman, Stephen John, "Conflict and Conciliation in Sub-Saharan Africa", in Brown, Michael, ed. International Dimensions of Internal Conflict, The MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1996, p. 238.

⁴ McNamara, Francis Terry. France in Black Africa, National Defense University, Washington, DC, 1989, p. 5.

B. PAST WORK AND REVIEW OF OTHER ARGUMENTS

There are four main theories offered by different scholars as possible explanations for Africa's patterns of civil-military relations.⁵

First is the political development theory (Huntington 1968; Barrows 1976; Kasfir 1976; Jackman 1978; Collier 1983).⁶ This theory suggests that the new African nations confronted participatory crises stemming from the tension between an increasing mobilized citizenry and weak political institutions. That is, high participation and level of demands but a lack of strong political institutions. Thus, ineffective rule which caused the military to meddle more and more in the political process and ultimately intervened.

Second is the military centrality theory (Andreski 1969; Wells 1974; Janowitz 1977; Nordlinger 1977; Finer 1988; Wells and Pollnac 1988).⁷ Its main idea is that resourceful and cohesive militaries are more likely to intervene, with a greater likelihood when the military is factionalized or when the budget and size of the military is larger.

Third is ethnic antagonism theory (Morrison and Stevenson 1972a, 1972b; McGowan 1975; Jackman 1978; Jenkins and Kposowa 1990).⁸ It suggests three main causes of coups: (1) ethnic plurality, where the instability of political conditions is positively related to the number of groups and their cultural heterogeneity; (2) ethnic dominance, where the existence of an hegemonic group provokes tensions and then coups; and (3) ethnic competition, where state building and economic development simultaneously increase the competition between groups and provides greater resources; the likelihood of coup is high when the two largest groups are roughly comparable in size.

Fourth is world system/dependency theory (O'Donnell 1979; O'Kane 1981, 1983; Thomas 1984; Johnson, Slater, and McGowan 1984; Jenkins and Kposowa 1990; Neuhouser 1992).⁹ It argues that the persistence of colonial trading patterns creates low

⁵ This review benefited from the article by Augustine J. Kposowa (Wayne State University) and J. Craig Jenkins (Ohio State University) "The Structural Sources of Military Coups."

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 127.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 127.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 127.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 127.

and unstable profits, economic stagnation, and poverty, and thereby political turmoil and military intervention.

I do not reject the possible influence of any of these arguments. However, there is a fundamental question which must be posed; are these theories exceptionally applicable for Africa and not applicable for the other regions that are undergoing military interventions? If yes, why?; and if no, then these theories do not yet answer the question (why Africa is outstanding in its frequency of military interventions?).

In this thesis I will raise these questions and suggest an alternative argument that may help us better understand Africa's awkward position of civil-military relations. Let us see what Africa has different from the rest of the world. Let us look at the development of Africa's political culture and in particular at the impact of the colonial experience and its legacy on the African attitudes. This is the subject of this thesis.

C. THEORETICAL APPROACH

This thesis will employ Robert Putnam's theory of the importance of political culture and civic society to make democratic institutions work. In his case study of Italy, Putnam traced the roots of civic community to explore how the Southern autocratic political arrangements were different from those in the Northern part of Italy. He found that political institutions worked effectively in northern Italy but did not work in the South for several reasons. First, in the North, feudal bonds of personal dependence were weakened; while in the South, they were strengthened.¹⁰ That is, in northern Italy people were citizens, while in the South they were subjects of feudalism. Likewise, in Africa, people were subjects of the kings, tribal chiefs, and colonial rulers, rather than citizens.

Second, legitimate authority in northern Italy was delegated only to public officials, who remained responsible to those whose affairs they were entrusted, while legitimate authority in the South was monopolized by the king, who was responsible only to God. The same was true in Africa: the kings before colonialism and the governors during colonial rule were not at all accountable to their population.

Third, in Northern Italy, Putnam found that the crucial social, political, and religious allegiances and alignments were horizontal. That is, in the hierarchy of orders and instructions that were to be executed without questioning. While those allegiances in the South were vertical or negotiated ones. Most of these relations in Africa were vertical during the colonial period, and subsequently remained vertical after independence. In fact, the absence of human capital (Putnam's key point) in Africa, which was severely exacerbated by slavery, colonial subjection, and the culture of patron-clientalism, provided the foundation for its economic and political backwardness.

D. JUSTIFICATION OF THE CASES AND METHODOLOGY

I have chosen France and Britain in my comparative case study because they were the main colonizers of Africa, and they had a more significant impact on African countries than other outside powers due to their colonial experience. Also I chose Chad and the Sudan as representative cases because there are several similarities between them: 1) they are both central African countries, which are exposed both to the Arabic and Islamic culture in their northern parts, and to the African and Christian culture in their southern parts; 2) they have the same geographical structures, in addition to sharing a very long border, through which people pass most of the time freely and without any control; and 3) a large number of the same tribes live in the two countries. I think the type of colonization is the only major difference. In fact, it is my argument that the type of colonial experience is the most important factor that has made a significant difference in the makeup of civil-military relations between the two countries.


In the first part of this thesis, I will deliver a general comparative analysis of the French and British colonial experiences in Africa in terms of the objectives, the nature of the respective colonial rule, the major legacies, the decolonization process, and the post-colonial influence. In the second part, I will show how these legacies are applicable to Chad and the Sudan throughout the colonial experience, the decolonization process, the

¹⁰Putnam, Robert. *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1994, pp. 121-136.

interchange among regimes after independence, the civil wars, and the post-colonial relations with their former colonial powers.

II. FRANCE AND BRITAIN IN AFRICA

Map 1: Africa in 1939, indicating areas controlled by European powers at that date.¹¹



¹¹ Wilson, Henry S. *The Imperial Experience in Sub-Saharan Africa Since 1870*, Volume III, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1977, p. 271.

At the beginning of the nineteenth century, European countries competed to conquer Africa to support the industrial development that was taking place everywhere in Europe.¹² The main goals in the colonization of Africa were: to provide European firms with cheaply produced raw materials and cheap labor; to find markets for the products of their factories; and to establish routes across Africa in order to shorten the route to their Asian colonies such as India.¹³ Additionally, they wanted to increase their self-sufficiency by occupying as much territory as possible in the colonies.¹⁴

For instance, France occupied 10 million square kilometers of territory that was home to 48 million inhabitants, including the territory that became most of the countries of West and Central Africa, such as, Senegal, Mauritania, Mali, Burkina Faso, Togo, Benin, Gabon, Niger, Chad, Central African Republic, Congo, Guinea, and Cote d'Ivoire.¹⁵ 'The un-set sun,' Great Britain occupied 30 million square kilometers, home to 400 million inhabitants. These territories included (in Africa) Sudan, Uganda, Tanzania, Kenya, Zambia, Malawi, Ghana, Nigeria, Botswana, South Africa, and Somalia.

In Africa, France occupied mainly the vast desert, while Britain occupied selectively along the coasts and the area of the Nile and the Great Lakes. Given the barrenness of the desert, the French motives were probably more nationalistic than economic.¹⁶ That is, France was more concerned about the size of her colonies compared to the other European powers, and about filling the power vacuums among her occupied colonial territories. In contrast, the British were more concerned about economic assets, and that is why they had colonized areas that were rich in resources and commercially

¹² McNamara, France in Black Africa, p. 25. See "the Accident of Fashoda."

¹³ Cape Town in South Africa was used to be the shortest passage to Indian Ocean, before the conquest of Egypt and the construction of the Suez Canal.

¹⁴ The French Minister of Foreign Affairs (1883-1885), Jules Ferry, believed that colonialism was a way to reinforce France's international prestige; "Colonial policies are the international manifestation of the eternal laws of competitiveness." "Colonialism," in the Encyclopedia Universalis Vol. 4, Paris, 1980, p. 709.

¹⁵ Djibouti and Madagascar were the exceptions.


¹⁶ Porch, Douglas. The Conquest of the Sahara, The Trinity Press, Worcester and London, 1985, p. 11. Porch argues that economic motives for colonialism were less important than national honor. See his answer to: "Why did France, then, conquer the Sahara?" p. 10.

strategic. However, unlike the French colonies, the British colonies were geographically separated.

Although some scholars have argued that colonialism was a humanitarian and civilizing mission, these objectives suggest that the bottom line for colonial powers was their own interests. So depending on what was good for them, colonial powers could not be blamed for their legacies that I will discuss soon, because improvement of civil-military relations and good governance were not a part of their agenda. A close examination of the colonial rule can illustrate this argument.

A. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF PRE-COLONIAL AFRICA

Map 2: Culture areas of Africa.¹⁷



¹⁷ Wilson, Henry S. *The Imperial Experience in Sub-Saharan Africa Since 1870*, Volume III, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1977, p. 10.

Variations in geographical and environmental conditions dictated the emergence of distinct cultural regions in pre-colonial Africa. Henry Wilson argued that “[H]istory is grounded in geography and nowhere more so than in Africa.”¹⁸ Accordingly, before colonialism, the following African cultural regions existed (see Map 2.): North Africa, the desert, Egypt, Bilad al-Sudan, the gold coast (Guinea), tropical Africa (Congo), southern Africa, and eastern Africa.

1. African Pre-Colonial Empires and Civilizations

Despite the simplistic perception that some might have about Africa, which might be due to the history they only learned about the transatlantic slave trade, “[A]frican societies possessed an internal dynamic of change that persisted through and beyond the colonial period.”¹⁹ Pre-colonial African societies exhibited great diversity, comprising city-states and self-governing villages alongside sizable nations with distinctive political structures.²⁰

Although the modern African states have only existed after the colonial period, most of the African societies existed in pre-colonial Africa within organized empires, kingdoms, and small communities controlled by local tribal chiefs.²¹ However, there were few, if any, democratic values of ruling. All rulers tended to be authoritarian and of historically inherited, religious, or conquered legitimacy, rather than accountability towards the people they rule. The colonial military rule was experienced in the same ‘undemocratic’ manner. Many scholars have neglected the background of the African political culture, which is important in understanding the current African vulnerability to authoritarian and military rule.

Moreover, many African pre-colonial societies had contacts with the rest of the world and they possessed distinct civilizations and religious identities.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 3.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 12. Wilson also wrote that “historians and anthropologists that use the term ‘traditional Africa’ as synonymous with ‘pre-colonial Africa’ is distinctly misleading [and] tends to compress [the diversity of African societies] into conformity with the user’s simplistic perception of pre-colonial Africa.” p. 24.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 24.

For instance, some secrets of the Ancient Egyptians' civilization are not yet known despite today's technology and advanced science. How did the Ancient Egyptians build the pyramids? How could they lift the huge stones of the pyramids and put them together? How could they make the coffins of their kings so that the body is kept fresh over thousands of years? So far nobody knows.

2. The Effect of Religion on Pre-Colonial African Cultures

Many of the cultural traditions of African societies have been affected by other civilizations existing in the past long before any sailing ship from Europe reached the African coasts. Christianity and Islam were of significant effect. For instance, John Iliffe, Professor of African History at the University of Cambridge, reported that "North Africans adapted Christianity and Islam to their own cultures and transmitted both religions to black Africa, where centuries of internal development had prepared social environments for their reception and further adaptation."²²

Christianity was brought to Alexandria in AD 61. "By AD 400, perhaps 90 per cent of Egyptians were Christians."²³ The Kingdoms of Old Dongola, Meroe, Alwa, and Nobia (the recent northern Sudan) all became Christian kingdoms.²⁴ Christianity also covered the kingdom of Aksum in northern Ethiopia, which would even survive the Islamic and the European invasions afterward.

The Sudanic lands to the south of the Sahara were in touch with those of the Mediterranean. This contact resulted not only in the exchange of produce, but also in the sharing of skills and ideas. Roland Oliver and Anthony Atmore have a good summary of inter-religious and inter-cultural communication in North, West, and Central Africa:

While the Latin Christianity of the Roman provinces never crossed the Sahara, Greek-speaking missionaries, both Orthodox and Monophysite, converted the Nubian Kingdoms on the upper Nile and the kingdom of Aksum in northern Ethiopia. In the west Islam, from its first spread

²¹ Henry Wilson, in "African Empires" discussed, among others, the Zulu Kingdom and the Afrikaner Trekker Republics in South Africa, and the West African Jihads. *Ibid*, pp. 24-30.

²² Iliffe, John. *Africans: The History of a Continent*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1995, p. 37.

²³ *Ibid*, p. 39.

²⁴ *Ibid*, p. 39.

through the conquest of Egypt and North Africa in the seventh century, moved on across the desert with little delay.

By the ninth century the nomads of the central and western Sahara were converting to Islam. By the eleventh century at least, the new faith was beginning to penetrate the negro kingdoms of the desert, where it appealed first and foremost to those who traveled beyond their own communities and language areas as participants in an already active system of regional and inter-regional trade. To these Islam offered wider intellectual and spiritual horizons and membership of a universal brotherhood which looked after its members in very practical ways. Between the eleventh century and the eighteenth at least, the townsfolk of the Sudanic countries learned to be Muslims like the Arabs and the Berbers to the north. Their learned and pious men studied Arabic, the language of the Holy Koran, and a few made the pilgrimage to the holy cities of Mecca and Medina, passing through the great cities of Egypt and North Africa on the way. The rulers and the rich men on both sides of the desert worshipped the One God, read the same book, discussed the same things.²⁵

However, in tropical Africa, geographical conditions such as the forest, wild animals, and tropical diseases created a barrier against any further religious and cultural spread. Africans in these areas were more traditional when the European invasion occurred. In fact, even European invaders suffered from these geographical conditions in conquering tropical Africa.

This historical background of pre-colonial Africa recognizes the existence of authoritarian rule as well as the cultural, ethnic, and religious diversity of African societies before colonialism. However, the activities of colonial powers are more directly responsible for the pathologies that plagued post-colonial regimes. That is because they the colonizers exacerbated those pre-existing policies and misused them for their colonial rule.

B. THE FRENCH AND BRITISH COLONIAL RULE IN AFRICA

Although pre-colonial Africa was not governed by democratic institutions, I argue that colonial rule, generally and in most of its specific functions (administrative, legal, and educational), was the training ground for the future maintenance of the culture of

arbitrary rule. That is, those who became the first generation of African leaders were taught the methods of military and personal rule during the colonial period, while at the same time, African people became accustomed to military regimes.

I will take the French and British colonial administration, legal system, and education as examples to explain how the colonial rule disfavored democratic civil military relations.

1. Administration

In both the French and British colonies, the Governor General was also the commander-in-chief of the colonial military. He had the ultimate power to run the colonies, keep order, and achieve the colonial objectives. Although the British, in some ways, had run their administration differently, the legacies they left are similar to those of France in many aspects. However, the French post-colonial influence or the neocolonialism is a major difference from the British case.²⁶

In the French colonies, the "post-conquest period has been characterized as one of triumphant [barrack-room authoritarianism], as many of the first civil administrators came from the marines and military influence permeated the rest."²⁷ The notorious code of colonial administrative sanctions led to the application of French military code to the colonies, giving administrators precisely the same right to discipline their underlings as commissioned military officers had to exercise summary judgment on other ranks. Moreover, the French refusal to allow for local diversity led to the attempt to construct a strictly bureaucratic hierarchy from governor-general down to village chief based on the model of the army.²⁸

²⁵ Oliver, Roland and Anthony Atmore. Africa Since 1800, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1994, p. 3.

²⁶ The French philosophy of colonialism was evolved from Pacification, to Administration, to Assimilation and Association, and ended up with Cooperation; the post-colonial influence lies in this different philosophical approach (from that of the British). See McNamara, France in Black Africa, pp.26-32, and 95.

²⁷ Wilson, The Imperial Experience in Sub-Saharan Africa, p. 128.

²⁸ Pierre, Alexander. Chiefs, Commandants and Clerks, Africana Publishing Corporation, New York, 1970, pp. 2-13.

Similarly, in the British colonies, the governors of the different provinces were all military officers, who enjoyed wide powers in the internal administration of their provinces with little interference from the central government. There were fewer civilians than military officials to assist the Governor-General. This military rule was institutionalized by the government in the home country. That is, "[t]he British Colonial Office was attached to the War Office when it was created in 1801."²⁹

The French government had attempted to increase the initiative of local authorities and to convert the Colonial Office into an organ of control as it was in the British Empire. This attempt materialized through the grouping of the various colonies into two federations: 'Afrique Occidentale Française' (A.O.F.), and 'Afrique Equatoriale Française' (A.E.F.), with capitals at Dakar and Brazzaville respectively.³⁰ In contrast to the British separate enclaves, French West Africa (A.O.F.) was constructed as a solid bloc. French officials found themselves increasingly involved in conflict with the indigenous rulers once they intervened in the internal affairs of the chiefdoms. That is why they "abandoned the informal indirect rule they had adopted during the occupation of the interior through paper protectorates."³¹ Assimilation was the alternative policy pursued. Although they gave the local chiefs some status "the canton chiefs", the authority of the canton chiefs in the French new 'semi-indirect' rule was far less than that in the British indirect rule.

The British, in order to apply their policy of the 'indirect rule', sought to leave "... the native population free to manage their own affairs through their own rulers... under the guidance of the British staff, and subject to the laws and policy of the administration."³² However, the governor-general retained his ultimate power of making all the major decisions. Ultimately, this constituted not only a military rule, but also one-person rule.

²⁹ Fetter, Bruce. Colonial Rule in Africa, The University of Wisconsin Press, London, 1979, p. 9.

³⁰ Ibid, p. 102.

³¹ Wilson, The Imperial Experience, p. 128.

³² Fetter, Colonial Rule in Africa, p. 96.

In sum, both the French and British colonial administrations provided some ground for the current cycle of African authoritarian regimes and military interventions in politics.

2. The Legal System

In both the French and British colonies, the laws were made by the Governors-General, and there was an advisory group to help them. For instance, the governor-general of French Equatorial Africa (A.E.F.) was the 'reference' for colonial justice, which was itself often oppressive. That is, the governor-general did not only have executive and legislative powers, but also the final judicial authority. Moreover, most of the other officials, such as the district officers, were brutal and suppressive. Yet, the citizens could not question them. John Iliffe notes that "many early officials were brutal men, recruited because they were available."³³

Likewise, in the British colonies, the Governor had a council composed of the governor, 15 official members, and 14 unofficial members. The governors of the different provinces were left to rule their regions at their own discretion and with the guidance of circulars drawn up by the Governor General. The criminal law was framed in a simple way so that it could be understood by the military officers responsible for its application. Appeals were made to the Governor General. Similar to the French case, the Governor General in the British colonies had the legislative, executive, and judicial authority at the same time. Also the officials in the lower echelon, including the native chiefs who were given some responsibilities to assist the colonial authorities, had free hand over the citizens. Most of these officials misused the power they had, but nobody could ask them.

In fact, the concepts of human rights and rule of law were not there, in colonial Africa. I think, the unification of legislative and executive power, intervention of leaders in judicial process, and human rights abuses of today's Africa is a continuity of the same political culture that existed in the colonial Africa. That is, after such an experience, which had continued for about a century, we should not be surprised to see African

³³ Iliffe, Africans, p. 198.

officers, who in most cases originally trained and commissioned in colonial military, willing to test what they had seen before. Also, this seizure of power should not have been expected to, and actually did not, surprise the citizens who became accustomed to that type of rule over a long period of time.

3. Education, Religion, and Missionaries

In pre-colonial Africa, political instability and civil wars occurred largely due to ignorance and ethnic intolerance. The educational policy in both French and British colonial states aimed deliberately at qualifying only a few Africans for positions in the colonial administration. In fact, since it was not on the colonial agenda, education was left to the religious missions, and even the goal of the education provided by those missionaries was just to train Africans in basic skills (often clerical) so that they could serve in the administration of the colonies. That is, as Henry Wilson - the historian and Africa expert - has stated, "France required Africans to help her officials in the lower echelons of the new imperial apparatus".³⁴

Likewise, the education system in the British colonies depended on religious missions. Bruce Fetter notes that "[e]ducation in British Africa had been left largely in the hands of missions."³⁵ Although the missionaries did not want to give up their educational role, they did hope that the Colonial Office would take over certain administrative responsibilities.

This policy created a division between Arabic-speaking Muslims and the English-speaking Christians, so typical of many places in Africa. This is because the missionary education was applied in selected regions and within selected ethnic groups, while other regions and other ethnic groups were prohibited from such an education. They were left either without formal education or with only traditional Islamic and Arabic education. This experience, in turn, certainly contributed to the creation of distinct cultural,

³⁴ Wilson, The Imperial Experience in Sub-Saharan Africa, p.235

³⁵ Fetter, Colonial Rule in Africa, p.130.

religious, and linguistic differences within the same country, and later became one of the major sources of ethnic problems on the continent.³⁶

These ethnic conflicts were one of the major sources for military interventions and civil wars. Although some of the religious, linguistic, and economic differences already existed, the colonial education policy helped to exacerbate them.

C. COLONIAL LEGACIES AND CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS

Although in some places the colonial powers brought beneficial changes,³⁷ they also provided an unfavorable environment for political stability and peace. Scholars have proposed some possible reasons for military interventions and explanations of civilian control of African militaries. However, as Harvard professor Jendayi Frazer contends, "...explanations of civilian control in Africa are far less developed. Rather, there is an implicit assumption in the literature that eliminating the perceived causes of military intervention will automatically lead to civilian control."³⁸

Arguments have been made that institutional weaknesses, economic backwardness, and multi-ethnicity, were the main causes for military coups in Africa.³⁹ In my opinion, however, the nature of Africa's state-society relations that were inherited from the colonial administration, the colonial educational system, the legal system, and the artificial nation-states at decolonization were the main causes for Africa's military interventions. Moreover, I think these factors also explain why African citizens accept, and at times, even support military coups.

³⁶ Henry L. Bretton made a comprehensive analysis for the Nigerian case, which is a typical example in many African countries. He explained how the British governed the northern (Islam) part of the country differently from the southern (Christianity) and the eastern (Animism) parts. Bretton found that "[I]n all three instances, the intention of British administrative policy apparently was to make the predominant power structure and underlying social systems compatible with the requirements of the colonial rule." Power and Stability in Nigeria: The Politics of Decolonization, Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., New York, 1962. p. 12.

³⁷ Before decolonization, for instance, most of the colonial powers stopped the slavery trade and provided some infrastructure such as railroads, bridges, disease control, and political institutions.

³⁸ Frazer, Jendayi Elizabeth. Sustaining Civilian Control: Armed Counterweight in Regime Stability in Africa, Stanford University, Ph.D. Dissertation, 1990, p. 5.

³⁹ Jendayi Elizabeth Frazer summarized in "Explanations for Coups D'Etat [in Sub-Saharan Africa]" the different arguments made by scholars. She mentioned institutional explanations, economic explanations, socio-political explanations, and political-institutional explanations. *Ibid*, pp. 6-19.

Rather than the common, critical, and determinant factors of continual coups in Africa, the causes that have been proposed by different scholars are more likely to be either: 1) auxiliary or co-factors, which better illustrate the variations in relative stability between the countries undergoing coups, or 2) factors that were themselves either caused or exacerbated by the colonial experience.

There are, at least, four major colonial legacies that illustrate the arguments I have made so far in this thesis: a political culture of authoritarian rule, a new shape of class structure, deepened ethnic tensions, and artificial nation-states.

1. Political Culture of Authoritarian Rule

Generally, most if not all of Africa was conquered militarily and ruled for several decades under colonial military rule. This rule was carried out by 'the general chiefs' of the colonial army who became governors. The culture of acceptance of arbitrary rule (in general) and of military rule (in particular) was either developed or confirmed under the colonial experience in both the French and British cases. At the same time that Europe was enjoying the fruits of democracy, European militaries were ruling colonies in Africa with an iron fist. The subsequent effects on the political culture that emerged through this experience of several decades cannot be ignored.

Although the colonial rulers finally at independence tried to leave behind institutions similar to their own in the independent states after decolonization, those institutions did not work as expected. In my opinion, it is important to acknowledge that these democratic institutions did well with respect to the time period in which they took place and the colonial legacy that accompanied them.⁴⁰ That is because democratic institutions are more likely to rest on a healthy civil society.⁴¹

Civil society was not there in Africa. In fact, the cultures in Africa were generally completely anti-democratic cultures that developed before and throughout the years of

⁴⁰ In both French and British colonies, democratic institutions were introduced gradually after World War II and they were never complete until independence. The whole process took less than one decade in most of the African countries.

⁴¹ Fukuyama, Francis. "The Primacy of Culture," *Journal of Democracy*, Volume 6, Number 1 January 1995, p.8.

colonial experience. Given this background, why should we have expected these European institutions to solve all such problems.

Post-colonial democratic institutions have competed with authoritarian systems and systematically alternated with them in many African countries. This took place in the environment of the Cold War, which also had a negative effect on democratization in Africa.

Overall, scholars and politicians seem to have set their expectations too high and failed to take into account the colonial experience in African history and the true circumstances of Africa's path toward democratization.

2. Class Structure

In addition to depending on the military, colonial rule depended upon traditional leaders - such as kings, tribal chiefs, and religious figures - to rule their colonies. Those chiefs and their sons had opportunities to occupy administrative posts, higher education (particularly overseas, such as Paris and London), better economic status, and consequently better chances for political participation as leaders. They formed the upper class of society, having the monopoly on political power, financial means, and higher social status. Eventually, the state became not only a symbol for political power, but also a center for economic resources. With the failure of Africa's post-colonial democratic institutions to provide fair distribution of political power and economic resources, military interventions became critical means for gaining political power and economic resources. In "Conflict and Conciliation in Sub-Saharan Africa", Stephen John Stedman argued that:

Africa's recent conflicts have arisen from long-term permissive conditions and more immediate proximate causes. Legacies from colonialism predisposed much of Africa to violent conflicts over the distribution of resources in societies, access to political power, and basic political identities. Such legacies helped to create a pattern of state and class formation.⁴²

⁴² Stedman, Stephen John, "Conflict and Conciliation in Sub-Saharan Africa," in, p. 236.

This stratification of the society was more evident in the British colonies than in the French colonies. That is probably because the British had applied indirect rule in their colonies more than the French had. Unlike the French, the presence of the 'loyal' group of people in the British society, who always had the right to rule might be an explanation for this difference in their legacies. That is, through the indirect rule, the British gave a lot of loyalty to certain families and groups in their African colonies- similar to that of the British Royal Family. This privilege has been reflected in the leaders and the politicians of post-colonial Africa, most of whom came from these 'loyal' families or groups. There were more communist and socialist movements in the former British colonies than the former French colonies in Africa. I think, the same explanation is valid for this phenomenon. That is because communism is more common in societies where the working class has no or less opportunities as the bourgeoisie. Of course, communist ideology encourages military coups (as a revolutionary means to seize power). These communist and socialist organizations have politicized and factionalized military officers in many African countries and led them to military plots, attempts or successful coups.

In Africa, as in many other places, the lower class was represented in the military and the poor masses of labor. There were very few people who constituted the African middle class. That is simply because there were very few Africans educated in the colonial states to be professionals. Stedman found that:

Colonial neglect of education posed nearly intractable problems for Africa's new states. There were, for example, no more than 1,200 university graduates in all of Sub-Saharan Africa in 1960. In Zaire, there were fewer than 20 college graduates at independence; in Zambia, only 108 Africans had received university education. In Tanzania, [there were only twelve African civil engineers, eight African telecommunication engineers, nine African veterinarians and five African chemists. No Africans had been trained as geologists or mechanical or electrical engineers.] When the Portuguese left Angola in 1974, there were no African civil servants. When Mozambique became independent, there were three African Doctors and one African lawyer; ninety percent of the population was illiterate.⁴³

⁴³ *Ibid.* pp. 241-242.

Of course, educated professionals are one of the main constituents of any middle class. Consequently, the military became a representative body of the 'majority' lower class, while the civilian politicians took the image of the 'privileged elite, who did not look after working class interests.

In the post-colonial era, whenever there have been political crises, security problems, or economic stagnation in the country, the majority of the population have welcomed military interventions to liberate them from the weak, corrupt civilian regimes. Even some intellectuals (particularly those who claimed ideologies asking for the protection of the working class) have coordinated with the military institution to overthrow civilian regimes. That is why most of the military coups have been supported by the citizens, because they think the military might protect their interests since they are from the same class.

3. Ethnic Tensions

Under colonial rule, structural and regional inequalities emerged from the colonial policy of favoring some tribes and ethnic groups over others: a characteristic of a divide-and-conquer policy. Those who were loyal to and cooperative with the colonial powers were treated better, and their regions received more resources, education, and representation in the armed forces. Consequently these people replaced the colonial rulers after independence.

This divide-and-conquer policy added economic and political factors to the cultural, religious, and linguistic differences which had already been either shaped or exacerbated by the colonial educational policy. The result was really a complex dualism.⁴⁴ This is true for both the French and British cases.

For instance, the French applied this policy in Chad and Bamako,⁴⁵ and so did the British in places such as Nigeria and the Sudan. This policy not only created regional dualism but also frustration and hatred among the Africans of the same African post-

⁴⁴ By "complex dualism" I mean an economic dualism that is associated with not only educational inequalities, but also with ethnic, religious, and cultural differences.

⁴⁵ McNamara, *France in Black Africa*, p. 14.

colonial states. Indeed, colonial rule was the main mechanism through which ethnic tensions were solidified and confirmed. Although ethnic diversity existed before colonization, inter-ethnic conflicts sharpened and became potential time-bombs for future problems as a result of the colonial policy.

Subsequent African leaders continued to apply the same colonial policy to citizens from the other ethnic groups by their suppression and unfair allocation of political power, and thereby economic resources. That is, because of the lack of domestic economic capital, African states became important sources of resources, and hence political power became an important mean for access to economic resources.⁴⁶ Eventually, at independence, Africa's new elites sought to harness the power of their states to be the lead instruments in their economies.⁴⁷ Keller and Rothchild argue that "[t]hese inequalities are clearly the basis for the civil conflicts in Liberia, Somalia, Ethiopia, and Sudan."⁴⁸

Moreover, the ethnic inequalities spawned many rebel movements that brought down many civilian governments. Some of these ethnic groups seized power in different ways, including military means. This also explains why some agitated ethnic groups supported ethnically focused military interventions, which in turn, opened the door for several civil wars and more general instability in Africa.⁴⁹ In such an environment, the logic of violence and military power is the major 'game in town.'

⁴⁶ Stedman argues that the first generation of African leaders compounded their political and economic underdevelopment by emphasizing the state as the leading engine for economic growth and insisting on national unity at the expense of sub-national ethnic and political identity. In fact, it is the same argument made by Basil Davidson in The Black Man's Burden, Times Books, New York, 1993. Stedman, "Conflict and Conciliation in Sub-Saharan Africa," in, p. 240.

⁴⁷ Also Larry Diamond observes that the state structures established by the colonial powers "dwarfed in wealth and power both existing social institutions and various new fragments of modern organization." Larry Diamond, "Class Formation in the Swollen African State," Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 25, No. 4., December 1987, p.570.

⁴⁸ Keller, J. and Rothchild Donald. Africa in the New International Order: Rethinking State Sovereignty and Regional Security, Lynne Rienner, Boulder, Colorado, London, 1996, p.5.

⁴⁹ Stephen John Stedman reported in his article "Conflict and Conciliation in Sub-Saharan Africa" (p. 237) that "[S]ince 1970s, Africa has been the site of many of the world's most deadly conflicts. Seven wars - in Angola, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Rwanda, Somalia, Sudan, and Uganda - took between 500,000 and 1,000,000 lives each, either directly through battlefield casualties or indirectly through war-induced famine and disease. Two other conflicts, in Burundi and Liberia, took over 100,000 lives each. In 1995, there were five ongoing wars (in Angola, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Somalia, and Sudan), several countries that were

4. Arbitrary Borders

The establishment of post-colonial, African national borders was not based on any rational standards. This process neither addressed the nationhood of the indigenous peoples, nor took into account any pre-colonial historical or geographical considerations. Some ethnic groups, tribes, and even families were divided into several states by mutual agreements of the colonial powers.⁵⁰ Keller notes that,

...most of Africa's fifty-three states are multiethnic, artificial creations, largely the product of the European scramble for Africa in the late 1800s. The colonial powers divided the peoples in the territories they claimed according to administrative convenience rather than pre-colonial social or political arrangements.⁵¹

Accordingly, African people were thrown together with other ethnic groups with which they had had few, if any, relationships. This separation has affected the stability of African regimes in a couple of ways. First, most of the dissatisfied groups found external support for their rebellions from their tribes and relatives in the neighboring countries, who acted as individuals or as governments. The problems of the Tutsi and Hutu in Rwanda, Burundi, and Zaire is an excellent example. This type of cross-border support encouraged the foundation of rebel movements and gave existing internal rebellions an external dimension.

Second, some post-colonial military regimes created problems with neighboring states, claiming certain territories by citing old stories to create legitimacy for their rule. In fact, they used the same method to quell internal problems and draw popular attention to an external threat. Territorial disputes between Somalia and Ethiopia, Eritrea and Ethiopia, and Cameroon and Nigeria fall into this category.

Although they were aware of the arbitrariness of these borders, African nationalist leaders accepted them during the struggle for independence as the quickest route to the

candidates for state collapse or civil war (Burundi, Cameroon, Kenya, Nigeria, Rwanda, Togo, and Zaire), and a host of other countries where low-level ethnic and political conflict remained contained, but unsolved (Chad, Congo, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Senegal, South Africa, and Uganda).

⁵⁰ See "Colonialism and Independence," in Perkins and Snodgrass, *Economics of Development*, 3d ed., W. W. Norton and Company, New York and London, 1992, pp. 20-21.

⁵¹ Keller and Rothchild, *Africa in the New International Order*, p. 4.

demise of colonial rule.⁵² In fact, “the charter of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) places great emphasis on the permanence of existing borders and the principle of territorial integrity.”⁵³ Moreover, most African societies have, for the sake of convenience, come to confer legitimacy upon these arbitrary state borders. In some instances, however, groups claiming the right to national self-determination have risen to challenge such arrangements.

The illustration of the arbitrariness of African post-colonial borders does not suggest reconsideration or redrawing of these orders, because that might open a door for other conflicts. However, understanding of the arbitrariness of African borders and the way Africans were put in the different post-colonial states would provide a better explanation of the nature and the origin of some of the African conflicts.

D. THE POST-COLONIAL INFLUENCE OF FORMER COLONIZERS

Economic and political dependency on former colonizers is one of the main differences between the former French and British colonies. That is, France still remained the main partner to her former African colonies, while Britain did not. However, in the context of the cold war, many of the post-colonial African states depended on either the United States or the Soviet Union.⁵⁴ In fact, Britain lost more of her former colonies to the Cold War than France did. This also illustrates France’s ability to maintain its influence in her former colonies.

⁵² The slogan in many places became, “we must die as tribes so that we can be born as a nation.” But practically it wasn’t that easy.

⁵³ Stedman, “Conflict and Conciliation in Sub-Saharan Africa,” in, p. 240. Although many analysts see that Africa does not suffer from inter-state wars, these unrealistic borders contributed to the internal instability. Michael Brown reported some examples to indicate the depth of the problem: “Nigeria’s territory included 3 major religions (Islam, Christianity, and Animis) and 250 ethnic groups, the largest three (Hausa Fulani, Yoruba, and Igbo) possessing vastly different political values and institutions. Zambia contained 72 ethno-linguistic groups, Tanzania 120. Some states contained historical enemies. In Sudan, Arabs in the north had enslaved Nuer and Dinka in the south; in Rwanda and Burundi, Hutu lived under near-feudal submission to Tutsi. The borders of Ethiopia, Kenya, and Somalia divided ethnic and clan groups, thus prompting periodic irredentist struggles.” *Ibid.*

⁵⁴ Stedman noticed that in post-colonial Africa, “[S]tate formation became based on ties to international financial institutions or external patrons, either the superpowers or former colonial masters.” *Ibid.* pp. 242-243.

The existence of the British commonwealth prior to the post-war decolonization movements facilitated Britain's ability to cope with demands for independence. However, France's *Communaute* did not succeed even though she tried to establish it along different and even more associative lines. By 1960, France was left with a network of bilateral relationships with its former colonies.⁵⁵ An equivalent to membership in the British Commonwealth, of which the former colonies recognized the Crown as head, is something France was unable or unwilling to match in the early years after decolonization.

The association of France and Francophone African states through summits and bilateral defense arrangements has preserved more of a residue of imperial power than the soft association of British Commonwealth states. While the lack of a pre-existing framework permitted France to take a case-by-case approach to establish strong bilateral ties, Britain's more systematic method of dealing with former possessions meant that the newly decolonized nations had the same status as older and larger members of the Commonwealth.

France was unhindered by precedents in negotiating strong political, economic, and military links with each of its former colonies. In contrast, Britain was under strong moral and political pressure to grant African countries the same privileges as other Commonwealth members. As a result of this policy of equal distribution of autonomy, Britain was able to maintain some solidarity among its former colonies, while France proceeded more selectively.

However, Britain failed to create an association with a strong center while France remains the undisputed hub of Francophone countries, especially those in Sub-Saharan Africa. That is, despite the solidarity of the members of the British Commonwealth, Britain was unable to influence the political, economic, and military events in these countries as France did in her Francophone community.

⁵⁵ "In the early 1960s, France intervened to prop up regimes in Congo, Cameroon, Gabon, Mauritania, Niger, and Chad. However, the French military presence on the continent had dropped from 60,000 in 1960 to 5,000 in the late 1960s." Keller and Rothchild, *Africa in the New International Order*, p. 10.

Another distinction between the French and British management of their former colonies lies in the use of common language. For France, the extent to which the world makes use of French and thereby takes the opportunity of assimilating French modes of thought is considered a measure of France's own standing in the world. This has given France a stronger influence over her former colonies than Britain. This does not mean that the British were not concerned with the use of English as a common language in their former colonies. However, the French were more serious, and they have committed to realize that concern. For instance, today, all the French former colonies in sub-Saharan Africa use French as their official national language. While English is not the official national language in all former British colonies of sub-Saharan Africa.

There is an inverse incentive for the common use of a language within each these post-colonial relationships: in the Commonwealth, the main motive is the mutual advantage of all members to use English as a common language, while in the Francophonie, it is mainly to France's benefit that the language be perpetuated among members.⁵⁶ Moreover, the burden of securing adhesion to a common language is carried by the individual members in the case of the Commonwealth, and by France itself in the case of the French-speaking countries. In other words; the French had more commitment than the British in maintaining their language, and were ready to pay the 'bill' for that. This was not a new policy for the French; it was a continuation of the association and assimilation policy during the colonial period. All these differences gave France a unique influence in her former colonies.⁵⁷ That is why, unlike Britain, France not only has legacies in her former African colonies, but also a strong hand and some control over how these legacies play out as well.

Dependency on former colonizers and the super powers of the Cold War created an environment in which military and authoritarian regimes relied on external support to reward internal allies and ignored the needs of their citizens. Stedman found that "[B]y the early 1980s, the survival of many African regimes depended on external, not internal,

⁵⁶ Schraeder, Peter. US Foreign Policy Toward Africa, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1996, pp. 217-219.

⁵⁷ *Ibid*, p. 217.

legitimacy.”⁵⁸ That is why “...the end of the Cold War undermined the external sources of support for Africa’s patrimonial regimes and left some with no legs to stand on.”⁵⁹ In the late 1980s, a new democratization wave in Africa coincidentally occurred with the end of the Cold War and the pressure of France on her former colonies towards democratic institutions. This wave suggests the importance of the post-colonial influence in Africa’s civil-military relations.

⁵⁸ Stedman, “Conflict and Conciliation in Sub-Saharan Africa,” in, p. 236. See also Robert H. Jackson and Carl G. Rosberg, “Why Africa’s Weak States Persist: The Empirical and the Juridical in Statehood,” in Atul Kohli, ed., The State and Development in the Third World, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 1986, pp. 259-282.

⁵⁹ Ibid.

III. CHAD AND THE SUDAN

A. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

This historical background acknowledges some of the structural and cultural problems that were rooted far beyond the colonial experience. It also explains, however, that colonial policy exacerbated these problems, as we will see in the comparative case studies of Chad and the Sudan.


1. Chad

Chad is a former French colony in Central Africa. It links the Islamic and Arabic-cultured Northern part of Africa, with its Christian African-cultured Southern part. French and Arabic are considered the official languages of the country, besides the more than 100 other languages and dialects that are spoken. The population of Chad, about six million, is comprised of 50 percent Muslims, 25 percent Christians, and 25 percent animists or atheists.

In the prehistoric period, Chad was much wetter than it is today, as evidenced by large game animals depicted in rock paintings in the Tebesti and Borkou regions. Recent linguistic research suggests that "all of Africa's languages south of the Sahara Desert [except Khoisan] originated in prehistoric times in a narrow band between Lake Chad and the Nile Valley."⁶⁰ Formation of states began across central Chad in the "Sahelian" zone in about 1,000 A. D. All states were militaristic, but none was able to expand far into southern Chad, where forests and the 'tsetse' fly, which causes sleeping sickness, complicated the use of cavalry. This is why southern Chad has less interaction with the rest of the world and was comparatively less developed than the North until the arrival of the French. Although many kingdoms rose and fell, the most important and durable of the empires were Kanem-Borno, Bagirmi, and Ouadai.

⁶⁰ Ibid., p.4.

Map 3: Administrative Divisions of Chad, 1988.⁶¹



⁶¹ Collelo, Thomas. *Chad: A Country Study*, US Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, 1990, p. xxiii.

The Kanem Empire originated in northeast Chad in about 800 A.D. Sef ibn Dhi, who was "believed to have broken off from the Zaghawa,"⁶² is the founder of Kanem Kingdom. It lasted until 1812, when it was sacked by the Fulani. The Baguirmi Sultanate began in 1522 over the remains of the Bilala. Located between the powerful Kanem and Ouaddai empires, the Baguirmi were forced to pay tribute to these two neighbors. In 1897, the Baguirmi were "forced to seek protectorate status from the French" in order to face the danger of the invading Sudanese forces under the leadership of Rabah Zubayr.⁶³ Thus, the Baguirmi Sultanate survived (as a canton) during French occupation.

The Kingdom of Ouaddai was established by the non-Muslim Tounjours, a tribe from Darfur (recently the major region of western Sudan) in the sixteenth century. Between 1630 and 1640 some of their subjects (such as the Maba) supported Abd al-Karim IV, an Arab invader from the Sudan, and revolted and established the new (Islamic) Ouaddai. Ouaddai gained greater control of trans-Saharan trade routes, and became dominant over both the Kanem and the Baguirmi by the year 1800. Ouaddai became a member of the Libyan Islamic 'Sannousiya' Brotherhood, and fought against French colonization.⁶⁴

This background shows that the people of northern part of Chad were more enlightened than the southerners because of their relatively developed kingdoms. All these kingdoms had administrative systems, organized armies, religious identities, and external relations (particularly with the Islamic world - which was at its peak of glory at that time).

On the other hand, the Southern part was less developed, and still in a more traditional age. Geographical differences, I think, was the major factor that made these differences in modernization distinct. This was the situation that the colonial power had to deal with. This helps us understand why many things went in the way they did during the colonial experience. This also explains why France faced strong resistance in the

⁶²Nelson, et. al. Area Handbook for Chad, US Government Printing Office, Washington DC, 1972, p.25.


⁶³Ibid, p. 29.

⁶⁴Ibid, p. 30.

North, where people had already established civilizations, while it easily conquered the South, where the people were less organized.

2. The Sudan

Map 4: Administrative Divisions of Sudan, 1991.⁶⁵



⁶⁵ Metz, Helen Chapin. *Sudan: A Country Study*, US Government Printing Office, Washington, DC 1990, p. xxii.

The Sudan is a former British colony in Central Africa. Like Chad, it is a very diverse country. Like Chad, it links the Islamic and Arabic northern parts of Africa with the Christian and English-speaking southern parts. Unlike Chad, Sudan's only official language is Arabic, while English is the second language. However, similar to Chad, more than 100 other local languages and dialects are spoken. The population of the Sudan, about 29 million, is comprised of more than 50 percent Muslims and about 16 percent Christians. At least one-third still practice the indigenous religions of their ancestors.⁶⁶

The Sudan has experienced throughout history different types of long-lasting, authoritarian kingdoms along the Nile river, such as: (1) the kingdom of Napta (750-300 B.C.), a royal family of Ethiopian origins that lasted for 300 years; (2) the kingdom of Meroe (350 B.C.-350 A.D.) which was divided into small kingdoms after 700 years; (3) the Christian kingdoms of Nuba (580-1504) through which Christianity entered the Sudan from Egypt and formed three kingdoms (Nubia, Makuria, Alawa); (4) the Fung Kingdom (1505-1775), an Islamic kingdom which replaced the Nuba after the immigration of the Arabs to the Sudan; (5) the Abdullab Sheikhdoms (1778-1820), who rebelled against the Fung and established their own kingdom; and (6) the Fur sultanate (in Darfur- the western Sudan), which replaced the Fung and was overthrown by the Turco-Egyptian condominium. All these kingdoms, excluding the first, were characterized by their religious orientation.⁶⁷

Similar to Chad, all these kingdoms were in the northern part of the country. Also the southern part of the Sudan was less developed and more traditional. The same geographical conditions (such as the forest and tropical diseases) in the south probably represented the main barrier against inter-cultural communication between the North and South. Indeed, the distinct cultural differences between the two parts (in both Chad and the Sudan), dictated colonial policy, the legacy of which afterward shaped post-colonial politics.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 100.

⁶⁷ Voll, John Obert and Sarah Votts. The Sudan: Unity and Diversity in a Multi-Cultural State, Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado, 1985, pp. 25-49.

Unlike Chad, the Sudan had been exposed to Turco-Egyptian colonial rule (1820-1885) before British colonization. Mohammed Ali Basha-the governor of Egypt on behalf of the British and Turkish Empires- invaded the Sudan, mainly for economic interests, and established a colonial military rule until the death of General Gordon, the general-governor, and the fall of Khartoum in 1885 to Al-Mahdia rebels.⁶⁸

In 1881, Mohammed Ahmad Al-Mahdi, the leader of the Mahdist Movement began his 'jihad' or the holy war against colonial rule to establish the Islamic state.⁶⁹ Within only four years, he won the war and spread his authority all over the territories of the Sudan at that time. His "Khalifa"⁷⁰ al-Taashi, continued governing the Sudan under Islamic law until they were crushed by the British in the "Karari" battle of 1898.

In distinction with the French colonial experience in Chad, British authorities had the incident of the horrible death of Gordon (and cutting off his head for Al-Mahdi) by the 'Drawish'⁷¹ in mind, forcing their compromise with religious groups. They did not want to repeat that experience. Thus, they won religious groups over such as the Ansar and the Khatmiyya and persuaded them to form political organizations: the Umma Party and the Democratic Union Party, respectively. In fact, this was the beginning of the use of religion for political purposes in the Sudan, a development the French did not allow to occur in Chad. These two political parties have alternated (or jointly) governed the Sudan during all its democratic periods. 'Modern Forces' or the intellectuals called them the "traditional" parties, the "automatic majority" parties, and the "sign" parties.⁷²

B. CHAD AND THE SUDAN UNDER COLONIAL RULE

Four aspects of the French and British colonial experiences have had a negative impact on post-colonial civil-military relations in Chad and the Sudan. These are the

⁶⁸Holt, P. M. A Modern History of the Sudan, from the Funj Sultanate to the Present Day, Grove Press, New York, 1961, p. 86.

⁶⁹Ibid, pp. 77-78.

⁷⁰"Khalifa" is an Arabic word means predecessor. For instance, the rulers of the Islamic State who came after the Prophet Mohammed were called his Khalifa of Khalifs.

⁷¹"Drawish" in term given to the "Ansar" or the religious followers of Mohammed Ahmad Al-Mahdi.

colonial administration, legal system, education and missionary policies, and ethnicity policies.

1. The Colonial Administration

a. Chad

The colonial administration in Chad had two main characteristics that impacted post-colonial civil-military relations: 1) it was mainly military rule; and 2) it created and exacerbated economic, cultural, and political differences between the two parts of the country.

First, the Chadian political culture until today assumes that military officers are more capable than civilians in governing the country.⁷³ I think, this political culture is highly influenced by the colonial administration. Chad was administered as a part of French Equatorial Africa (which also included Ubangi-Chari, Moyen-Congo, and Gabon).⁷⁴ The governor-general stationed in Brazzaville was the commander-in-chief of the French colonial military in this part of Africa. Each of the four colonies was presided over by a Lieutenant governor (who was also a military officer). District officers were appointed as prefects of the intra-colony regions to help the lieutenant governor.

An illustration of the legacy of these administrative arrangements can be seen in the fact that until the late 1960s, the Chadian civilian prefects dressed in military uniforms like the former colonial district officers in official ceremonies. Although local traditional chiefs (Sultans and Canton Chiefs) assisted the district officers in some administrative aspects, their authority was very limited. That is, civilians were always subordinate to military officers; a civil-military relation problem we are facing until today.

⁷² "Sign" is an indication that the supporters of these two parties just move or vote by a sign from their religious leaders, without even referring to the electoral program of the party. This is a kind of blind obedience.

⁷³ For instance, in the first democratic presidential multi-party elections of Chad in March 1996, only two of the fifteen candidates were former military officers, General Idriss Deby and General Wadal Camoque. Yet, they were ranked the first and the second in the results.

⁷⁴ 'Ubangi-Chari' is the present central African Republic and 'Moyen-Congo' in the present Congo Brazzaville.

Second, in Chad, France managed to govern effectively only in the South, but failed in the North. The southern blacks, having been freed by the French from the "chronic depletion of their human and material resources by Arab and Toubou raiders from the north,"⁷⁵ accepted French rule and welcomed the economic, political, and educational innovations introduced by the colonial authorities.

Thus, in the South, France instituted a regime similar to that in other parts of French black-Africa: a centralized hierarchy of district officers presiding over canton and village chiefs, all of whom were ultimately responsible to the Paris government by way of the territorial governor and his superior (the governor-general of French Equatorial Africa). Soon the pagan Sara tribesmen (the biggest ethnic group in southern Chad) used the schooling provided first by the state and then by the Christian missionaries to enter the lowest levels of administration, then the political arena, and finally the national government.

In the North, the Muslim Toubou and Arab nomads successfully resisted French attempts to impose secular institutions, a centralized administration, and a culture alien to them. As a result, France was forced to institute a military regime as the most effective and economical form of administration for the North.

Consequently, the southerners benefited from colonial education, political experience, and economic investments, whereas the northerners remained resistant to all modernization attempts.

After independence, the political leaders, the armed-forces, and the post-colonial administration that replaced the colonial state were mainly composed of southerners. This, in fact, was the main cause for the civil war and general instability of the Chadian political system. However, one of the positive effects of this dual administrative policy is that it provided a reasonable balance between the northern part of the country, which had already been relatively developed previous to colonial rule, and its southern part, which was developed only under colonial rule.

⁷⁵Thompson, Virginia and Richard Adloff. Conflict in Chad, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1981, p. 6.

b. The Sudan

Similar to the French experience in Chad, the British administration in the Sudan was militaristic and divisive. However, the policy of indirect rule added a distinctive element to the British legacies particularly in terms of class structure and its consequences.

Lord Kitchener became the first governor-general after he had conquered the Sudan in 1889. He was responsible for the two condominiums until 1910.⁷⁶ The governor-general was not the only military official, but the whole colonial rule was completely controlled by the military. Mandour El Mahdi, a history professor in the University of Khartoum, wrote:

Kitchener appointed a senior British officer in the Egyptian army as governor of each province. The governor enjoyed wide powers in the internal administration of his province with as little interference as possible from the central government. He was assisted by two officers, each holding the post of Inspector, later called district commissioner, to supervise the districts of the province which were administered by Mamurs and sub Mamurs recruited from the officers of the Egyptian army.⁷⁷

In fact, similar to the case of Chad, British colonial rule in the Sudan was not only authoritarian, but also militaristic. This particular administration, which lasted for five decades shaped the entire political culture of the Sudanese people. In the post-colonial era, democracy was not only a new model for them, but also a strange one. This argument will be better illustrated through the performance of civilian regimes and their fates by military interventions(as will be demonstrated in this thesis).

In direct contrast to the French in Chad, the British in the Sudan developed only the North and ignored the South. However, the result was the same: a severe cultural, religious, intellectual, and economic dualism in the two sections of the colony. Under the 'secret' treaty of the closed districts (1930),⁷⁸ southern Sudan was completely isolated from the rest of the Sudan. Christian missions were restricted to the south and

⁷⁶ Mandour El Mahdi. *A Short History of the Sudan*, Oxford University Press, London, 1965, p.122.

⁷⁷ *Ibid*, p. 124.

used only as educational centers, while being outlawed in the north, which enjoyed a modern educational system, in addition to Islamic religious schools 'Khalwa.'⁷⁹ This created enormous cultural, educational, and social differences between the two parts of the country. Consequently, this policy contributed to the civil war that is going on to this day.

The Sudanese traditional tribal chiefs in the North (called Sheikhs) assisted local authorities. Of course, as I have mentioned before, the South was almost completely ignored. That is, the British district commissioners allocated some of their powers to the chiefs, such as tax collection, law and order, and minor administrative services to local inhabitants. This policy was called 'indirect rule.' In fact, the British offered more power and respect to the chiefs than they had before. For instance, the Mahdi and the Mirganni families added a political dimension to their religious sphere of influence after the colonial authorities made these two religious groups the main political parties. The parties of the two families have alternated or jointly governed the Sudan in its entire democratic period since its independence. The majority of the Sudanese, and even some intellectuals, were often sympathetic to military coups as a solution to the tyranny of these two traditional parties.

2. The Legal System

Although the British legal system in the Sudan was relatively more developed than the French system in Chad, both systems gave judicial power to the governor-general and his agents in addition to his executive power. In the same manner, top African leaders after independence have influenced the judicial systems by their continual interventions. Although the leaders of Chad and the Sudan themselves are the ones to be blamed for these unfavorable interventions, we have to acknowledge that the colonial rule has provided them with this political culture. These interventions negatively affected the distribution of justice and increased corruption in post-colonial Chad and the Sudan.

⁷⁸ Wood, Peter. Sudan 1898-1989: The Unstable State, Loster Crook Academic Publishing, London, 1990, p. ix.

a. Chad

The legal system evolved in a slow and halting manner. When the federation of French Africa was created in 1910, two categories of justice were established. The Africans were to be subject to customary courts or would be judged by district courts according to local custom. The Europeans, for the most part, were to be tried before French magistrates under the codes of France. The French authorities served as a backstop, providing order and mitigating the severity of certain customary sections. That is, the role of the French authorities concerning judicial problems of the Chadian citizens was only to supervise the traditional customary legal process of the local chiefs. There were, however, "no guarantees of personal rights."⁸⁰ Moreover, "assured separation of judicial and executive powers often existed in name only."⁸¹ The reliance on local customs, which varied widely throughout the region, blocked the development of national legal codes.

b. The Sudan

In the Sudan, before the formulation of civil and criminal law in 1910, the governors and the 'Mamurs' were left to rule the country at their own discretion and with the guidance of circulars drawn up by Kitchener. Even when criminal laws were promulgated on the basis of Indian law, it was framed in a simple way so that it could be understood by the military officers responsible for its application.⁸² Appeals were to be made to the governor-general (who was also the commander-in-chief of the army). In other words, the governor-general had the legislative, the executive, and the judicial authority at the same time. Moreover, he was the chief of the army. This was the political culture to which the Sudanese were subjected for six decades (1898-1956). A knowledge

⁷⁹ "Khalwa" is an Arabic term given for a small Islamic school, where a specific responsible 'Sheikh' teaches children the 'Holy Koran' and the basics of Arabic writing.

⁸⁰ Nelson, *Area Handbook for Chad*, p. 34.

⁸¹ *Ibid.*

⁸² Mandour El Mahdi, *A Short History of the Sudan*, p. 125. Because India was also a British colony, the British colonial authorities in the Sudan applied the same Indian law in Sudan.

of this culture will help us better understand the struggle between democratization and reversion towards traditional, military, and religious authoritarianism.

3. Education and Religion

Both the French and British used Christian missions as means for education and civilization, particularly in the southern parts of Chad and the Sudan. Spreading religions is not necessarily bad, but for educational purposes, a secular system throughout the entire country could have provided a common ground for national unity. Religious missions concentrated in places where the beliefs were more primitive and natural, or traditional (the South). Their activity in this regard was normal. However, the entire involvement of the missionaries in the South and their complete neglect of the North, gave a new dimension for the "clash of civilizations" which had already begun to develop.

a. Chad

As in many other African countries, the nature of colonial education in Chad produced two clear outcomes in the post-colonial period: first, the number of educated Chadians was too small to shoulder the responsibility of running the country after independence. In addition to that, there is no doubt that uneducated people are more likely to use violence as a tool to solve their problems than are the educated.

For instance, between World Wars I and II, fewer than twelve Chadian students were able to take advantage of secondary education, which was only in the South.⁸³ On the other hand, among the northern Muslim peoples, Koranic schools offered limited training in written Arabic and the reading of the Koran. Indeed, immediately after the World War II, the total enrollment of students between six and eight years of age was only 1.4 percent of the population. By the year 1971, Harold Nelson, an area specialist, found that "[a]bout 88 percent of all males and 99 percent of all females over fifteen years of age could not read, write, or speak French - the official national language. Of the literate men, about 4.3 percent could read and write French, and about 7.8 percent could

⁸³ Nelson, Area Handbook for Chad, p. 87.

read and write Arabic.”⁸⁴ These facts contradict the argument that Europeans have colonized the third world in order to fight ignorance and spread civilization.

Moreover, the type of education provided was culturally and religiously oriented. The establishment in 1920 of a Protestant mission school in the south marked the beginning of Western forms of education in Chad. Except for religious instruction in which local languages could be used, all schools were required to provide instruction in French. Mission schools were permitted to offer secondary education only to students planning to enter the clergy. Nelson notes that “...until after World War II, the majority of students were enrolled in schools operated by the various religious missions.”⁸⁵

I will not discuss whether the French educational policy was good or bad, because it depends on one's values. But it certainly did provide a favorable environment for the later civil war. It is quite normal that any colonizer tries to spread his culture, religion, and values. But the problem here was that this policy was applied in one part of the country and with a certain ethnic group, in a way that it threatened another already existing culture, religion, and ethnicity, in another part of the country.

This was coupled with a dualistic type of intellectual administrative and economic development, which created a sense of inequality and unfairness. The French had the chance to consider these differences in forming the borders of Chad, but they did not. The post-colonial administration was not capable of handling this potentially dangerous situation wisely. The unsurprising result was a 30-year civil war after independence, which has paved the way for military interventions and shaped all of Chad's political dynamics.

b. The Sudan

In the Sudan, although it was comparatively better than in Chad, British educational policy was responsible for the same two major problems as the French policy in Chad: inadequacy and divisiveness. That is, as in Chad, “the education system was designed more to provide civil servants and professionals to serve the colonial

⁸⁴ *Ibid*, p. 86.

administration than to educate the Sudanese.” As a result, the adult literacy rate at independence in 1956 was only 22.9 percent.⁸⁶

During the colonial period, the North suffered from shortages of teachers and buildings, but education in the South was even more inadequate. That is because, as Helen Metz has noted, education in the South was left largely to the mission schools, which were proven to be so poor that “as early as the mid-1930s the government imposed provincial education supervisors upon missionaries in return for the government subsidies that they sorely needed.”⁸⁷

The Christian missions were restricted to the South and prohibited from the North, where some modern educational institutions coexisted with the Khalwa - traditional Islamic schools. Secular education could have been used as a tool to dissolve or lessen the cultural differences that existed between the different ethnic groups. But, under colonial rule, it was the opposite: education was tied to religion and became an even more divisive instrument.

Missions remained the means to education after independence. The ejection of all foreign missionaries in February 1964, because of the civil war, further diminished educational opportunities for southern Sudanese. Ignorance and backwardness in the South became even worse, and hence, the disparity between the relative advantages of different minorities and the relative equality between the two regions of the country became greater. This fueled the ongoing civil war.

C. THE DECOLONIZATION PROCESS OF CHAD AND THE SUDAN

In Chad, by developing the severely backward South, the French left a developmentally equal but culturally, ethnically, and spiritually distinct North and South. The southerners, whom the northerners historically considered as inferior to them, were given political power and complete dominance over the North. This situation shaped most of the political developments after independence. The civil war between the southern

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*

⁸⁶ Metz, *Sudan: A Country Study*, p. 110.

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*

government and the northern opposition became the foundation of Chad's political field and the main cause for military interventions.

In the Sudan, by developing the north and ignoring the already backward south, the British created a culturally, ethnically, and spiritually distinct minority south and an intellectually and economically more developed north. The result was the civil war between the northern government and the southern minority. More importantly, and distinct from Chad, the colonial authorities have divided the north into two main competitive parties (the Umma Party was sympathetic to the British, and the Khatmiya Party was sympathetic to the Egyptians). Elite competition of the politically divided and externally influenced northern parties was the main cause for Sudan's military coups.

1. Chad

In 1940 Chad became internationally prominent when its lieutenant governor, Felix Eboué, led the rest of the AEF (Afrique Equatoriale Française) federation in support of free France under Charles de Gaulle. In 1946, the French constitution granted Chad and other African colonies the right to elect a territorial assembly with limited powers. The Assembly, in turn, elected delegates to the French General Council of the AEF. The position of the governor general was renamed high commissioner, and each territory gained the right to elect representatives to French parliamentary bodies, including the National Assembly, the Council of the Republic, and the Assembly of the French Union.⁸⁸ The African peoples became French citizens, and the colonies were designated overseas territories of France. But the real focus of authority remained in Paris, and French personnel continued to dominate the AEF's administration. Indeed, no formal attempt was made to train Chadian Africans for civil service positions before 1955.⁸⁹

Two major parties were founded: The Chadian Democratic Union (UDT), which was associated with a political party in France (the Assembly of French People) and the Chadian Progressive Party (PPT), which represented the Chadian intellectuals. The UDT

⁸⁸ Collelo, *Chad: A Country Study*, p. 14

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*

leaders were composed primarily of Muslim and Ouadaian nobility, while the PPT leaders were comprised mainly of southerners and African civil servants.

In the elections of 1952 the UDT won 33 of a total of 45 assembly seats, and formed the first national government. In the territorial elections of March 1957 the PPT won the majority, while the UDT, which had been renamed the 'Chadian Social Action' party, won only nine seats. Accordingly, the first territorial government was headed by Gabriel Lisette, a former West Indian with considerable administrative experience and one of the leaders of the PPT.

By the year 1959, which was characterized by political instability, Lisette's government had fallen. A new government was formed under Sahoulba Gonchome (from the same party), but it fell in less than one month. Another government formed in mid-March 1959 under Ahmed Koulamalla, leader of the UDT party, but lasted less than two weeks. On March 25, 1959, the fourth provisional government was installed. François Tombalbye, a labor union leader and strong supporter of the PPT, was named premier, under whom independence took place.⁹⁰

Chad's political structure at independence was clearly divided into two main poles: South and North. That is because parties were formed along the same geographical, cultural, and ethnic lines. The co-existence of this division with the other legacies I have mentioned, such as the incompetence and divisiveness of educational policy, resulted in the civil war which led to continual military interventions and general instability.

2. The Sudan

In the Sudan, after World War II, two political parties were created. The Umma Party was headed by al-Sayyed 'sir' Abedlrhman al-Mahdi, Mahamed Ahmed al-Mahdi and the religious leader of the Ansar. The National Unity Party (NUP) was headed by al-Sayyed Ali al-Mirgani, the spiritual leader of the Khatmiyya, the second biggest religious

⁹⁰ Nelson, Area Handbook of Chad, p. 40.

group after the Ansar. The British sponsored the Umma Party, while the Egyptians sponsored the NUP. National Unity meant unity of the Sudan with Egypt.

After the agreement on self-determination was finalized on February 12, 1953, the general elections for the transitional period took place at the end of 1953. The results were as follows: the National Union Party (NUP) received 51 seats out of 90 in the House and 20 out of 30 in the Senate; the Umma Party received 22 seats out of 90 in the House, and two out of 30 in the Senate; the National Party (Southern) received nine seats out of 90 in the House of Representatives; the Social Republican Party received three seats out of 90 in the House of Representatives; and the non-party candidates won the rest.⁹¹

The parliament held its first meeting on January 7, 1954, and Al-Azhari, whose party, NUP, commanded the majority, was elected Prime Minister. He formed the cabinet purely from his party. His decision not to share power with the other forces, which had won a considerable number of seats in the elections, resulted in serious consequences.

First came the riots of the 'Ansar' on March 13, 1954, against Egyptian activism. 34 people were killed, the ceremonial opening of the parliament was abandoned, and General Naguib, the Egyptian official who was supposed to preside over the ceremony, flew back to Egypt early next day. The Ansar thought that the Egyptians - who historically had strong ties to the Khatmiyya - were responsible for their being left out of the government. While the British, their friends, were leaving, the Egyptians were involved to support their rivals.⁹²

Second a military rebellion of the southerners occurred on August 18, 1955, protesting discrimination against their region and the continuation of preferences for the North.

Like the Ansar, the southerners expressed their dissatisfaction at Azhari's slight of the region in the first national government. This slight confirmed what the southerners had suspected. Consociation, or the sharing of power, which had proven its effectiveness in culturally and ethnically diverse societies such as India, would have brought better results.

⁹¹ Mandour El Mahdi. A Short History of the Sudan, pp. 147-148.

Similar to the case of Chad, the events of the Ansar and the South illustrate the potentially dangerous situation the colonial rule left upon decolonization.

⁹² Ibid. p. 148.

IV. POST-COLONIAL POLITICS

In this chapter, I will show how and why the civilian regimes were so weak in Chad and the Sudan; the direct causes for the military interventions; the impact of the colonial experience on the civil wars; and the nature of the post-colonial influence and its impact on civil-military relations in both countries.

Since its independence on August 11, 1960, Chad was governed by a democratic parliamentary system for two years, a one-party system for 13 years, and several military regimes (1975-1996). During its various civilian and military regimes, moreover, Chad witnessed not only a severe civil war for three decades, but also an external war against Libya and external military interventions (France, Libya, and the OAU). Now, Chad is a democratic country with a constitution adopted by the Chadian people, democratically elected executive and legislative officials, and an independent judicial system.

The Sudan, on the other hand, has systematically alternated between civilian and military regimes since its independence on January 1, 1956. It was governed by a civilian democratic regime from 1956 to 1958, a military regime from 1958 to 1964, another civilian democratic regime from 1964 to 1969, another military regime from 1969 to 1985, a civil-military transitional government for one year, yet another civilian democratic regime from 1986 to 1989, and finally, still another military regime from 1989 up to today. Unlike Chad, Sudan's civil war began during the transition period (before independence), and has not yet ended.

A. CIVILIAN (DEMOCRATIC) REGIMES OF CHAD AND THE SUDAN

While the political struggle in Chad began between North and South, in the Sudan it began among the northerners themselves. The Umma party sympathized with the British, and the NUP sympathized with the Egyptians.

Even though the regional conflict between northern and southern Sudan existed since its independence, it was not the main cause of military interventions. Rather, competition among the elites of the two northern parties was the most significant factor in this respect. In Chad on the other hand, the opposite was true. There was reasonable

consensus among the southern elites, who replaced the French authorities. The main factor for civilian regime instability in Chad was the regional problem between the North and the South.

1. Chad

Chad's civilian periods were more durable than in the Sudan. The French presence after independence acted as a stabilizing factor, as far as the Chadian regimes cooperated with the French and protected their interests.

a. *The First Civilian Period (1960-1975)*

Chad's independence came on August 11, 1960, under the presidency of Francois Tombalbaye, a promising young teacher and a union leader from the south, who wrestled the leadership of the PPT Party away from Lisette.⁹³ Tombalbaye purged Lisette and declared that Lisette was a non-citizen while the latter was abroad on an official visit and barred him from returning to Chad.⁹⁴

Tombalbaye continued his policy of eliminating his political opponents by banning all political parties except his ruling party (the PPT) in January 1962, and in April he established a presidential form of government. In 1963, serious rioting occurred in N'Djamena and Am Timan. Tombalbaye used that as an excuse to declare a state of emergency and dissolve the National Assembly.⁹⁵ Moreover, Tombalbaye created a special criminal court. By June 1964, Tombalbaye was in full command of the country, and made a general increase in tax rates. This increased popular discontent. However, the critical point was reached when some government officials allegedly forced "citizens in rural areas to make payments at three times the official taxation rates."⁹⁶

During this time, the northerners were politically and economically suppressed by the southern authorities, leading to the civil war which legitimized military

⁹³ Gabriel Lisette was the first leader of Tombalbaye's Party, the PPT, and "a black colonial administrator born in Panama and posted to Chad in 1946." Collelo, *Chad: A Country Study*, p. 15.

⁹⁴ *Ibid*, p.18.

⁹⁵ *Ibid*, p.18.

⁹⁶ *Ibid*, p. 18.

interventions as the only available means for seizing or maintaining political power and economic resources.

Although the personal character of Tombalbaye played an important role in the failure of Chad's first post-colonial regime, some of the potential causes of this failure were already planted by the French colonial experience. That is, by their double-standard administration and their emphasizing cultural differences between the north and south, the French made Chad's post-colonial struggle for political power and economic resources inevitable.

b. The Second Civilian Period (1996 - ?)

Multi-party democracy was only introduced after the victory of the "Movement Patriotique du Salut" (MPS) in December 1990. Despite widespread criticisms,⁹⁷ MPS, under the leadership of General Idriss Deby, was able to arrange a Sovereign National Conference (CNS) in N'Djamena from January to April 1993.⁹⁸ In that conference, representatives of the different regional, intellectual, and political groups met to debate about the way the country should be ruled. They elected a prime minister and a legislative body of transition. The latter would then write a new constitution, which was adopted in a national referendum in June 1995. Accordingly, presidential and legislative elections were held in 1996. Even though General Deby has declared democracy in his first speech on December 4, 1990, the strong stand of France that any French aid would be tied onward to the efforts made toward democracy put a lot of pressure to realize Chad's democracy. The same policy and the same transitional steps were taken in almost all the other French former colonies in sub-Saharan Africa.

⁹⁷ The criticisms were based on several reports of human right abuses by the military, particularly in some southern and eastern prefectures of Chad, the brutality of some security agents (political police), and the fact that the transitional period was too long. This information is based on the author's personal observation of events in Chad, his own country.

⁹⁸ The "Conference Nationale Souverain" in Chad was one of several typical conferences in many former French colonies such as, Mali, Niger, Benin, Togo, Central African Republic, and the Congo. Amor Abdelfattay, "L'urgence democratique dans les pays du tiers-monde: le cas des Etats Africains" in Gerard Conac (Dir.), L'Afrique en Transition vers le Pluralisme Politique, Economica, Paris, 1993, pp.60-68.

In fact, French post-colonial influence and neocolonialism acted in favor of civil-military relations, at least at this point.

2. The Sudan

In contrast with Chad, Sudan's civilian periods were very short and less stable than its military periods. Elite competition for political power through the political and ideological parties was the main cause for civilian regime instability. The British did not act as a stabilizing factor, because they did not have any more influence in the post-colonial Sudan as in the case of the French in Chad. Moreover, Sudan's new partner, the United States favored support to military regimes, rather than civilian opposition. I think, among other reasons, the effect of the Cold War could be a legitimate excuse for that policy. For instance, the United States did not support the last military regime which took place after the end of the Cold War.

a. The First Civilian Period (1956-1958)

Sudanese independence took place under the leadership of al-Azhari, who won the elections of the transitional period. Taking into account the negative consequences of his first transitional government, and in keeping with the demands of the two Seyyeds, Ismaeil al-Azhari reorganized his government, recalling the Khatmiyya ministers he had earlier dismissed, and including leading Umma figures (Abdalla Khalil and Ibrahim Ahmed). In July 1956, the People's Democratic Party (PDP) split from the main Khatmiyya party and defeated Al-Azhari on a vote of no confidence, and formed a coalition government with the Umma party headed by Abdalla Khalil.

When the parliamentary term was complete, the coalition of the two parties made some changes in the electoral law to limit the power of Azhari before the elections of 1958. According to Peter Woodward:

These changes included: abolishing the five graduates' constituencies⁹⁹ where the NUP had held 3 seats, changing the residential rules which

⁹⁹ There were a certain number of the constituencies specified for the graduate voters only, in a presumption that it was not fair to give the same one-vote power to the intellectuals and university

permitted the enfranchisement of more people of West African origin, many of whom were Ansar. They also established mobile electoral units to increase the nomad vote, which was overwhelmingly linked to the sectarian parties, and altered a number of constituency boundaries to the extent of gerrymandering in favor of those same parties.¹⁰⁰

In the first elections after independence, the coalition received a majority of seats (Umma, 63 seats and PDP, 26 seats), while the NUP received 70 seats. The Sudan Communist Party (SCP) and the Muslim Brothers finished at the bottom of the list. Consequently, the old coalition managed to continue a government under Abdalla Khalil as Prime Minister.

Both Abd al-Rahman al-Mahdi (the leader of the Umma) and Ali al-Mirgani (the leader of the Khatmiyya) wanted the post of the presidency in the coming constitutional assembly. The Umma party leaders were thinking about accepting a major US aid package, the new partner that was replacing Great Britain. Meanwhile, the Khatmiyya leaders were suspicious of that aid.¹⁰¹ That is, they thought that the aid threatened their partnership with Egypt, which at that time had a close relationship with the Soviet Union.

On the other hand, Azhari, who was isolated from the government, flew to Cairo where he met the two Sayyeds, who were already there holding discussions with the Egyptians. While the three leaders were there trying to make some deals, the possibility of a military coup began to gather steam. The Prime Minister, Abdullah Khalil, who was once the highest-ranking officer in the Sudanese Defense forces, had good connections with the officers, particularly with Major General Abd al-Wahhab, the deputy commander of the army and the Umma party member.

In the first civilian period in Sudan, we can see that the main problem was a lack of national consensus, which led to unstable governments. This was, I think, a result of the colonial policy of "divide and conquer" and a continuation of the rivalry

graduates as the illiterates. By the same logic, the National Electoral Committee specified 28 seats (called the graduate constituencies) for university graduates in the 1986 elections.

¹⁰⁰ Woodward, Peter. *Sudan 1898-1989: The Unstable State*, Loster Crook Academic Publishing, London, 1990, p. 98.

¹⁰¹ *Ibid*, p.99.

between the two condominiums. In fact, the extreme rivalry between the two externally oriented parties, which were themselves inherited from the colonial state, ended up causing Khalil, the Umma Prime Minister, to hand over the power as a gift to the military by inviting them to stage a military coup.

b. The Second Civilian Period (1964-1969)

The transitional government after the October Revolution¹⁰² was headed by Sirr al-Khatham Khalifa, a head of the Khartoum Technical Institute and ex-deputy secretary for education with responsibility for the South. Because Khalifa had worked close to the south, people hoped that his experience would enable him to deal with the question of the South. His cabinet was formed from 15 members: seven from the National Front of Professionals (a representative body for workers, peasants, engineers, lawyers, academics, teachers, and students); two from the South; and a representative from each party (the Umma, NUP, PDP, SCP, and the Muslim Brothers).

The government of Sirr al-Khatham began to diverge. On one hand, the Professionals' Front and the 'Modern Forces'¹⁰³ wanted 50% of the seats in the coming parliament to be allocated on an occupational basis to produce a more progressive body than the old pre-Abboud system. They also sought to delay the elections until a settlement was reached with the South.

On the other hand, the old parties (Umma, NUP, and PDP) wanted the elections earlier and parliamentary representation to be based on the same geographical bases. Finally the old parties won: they began to put pressure on the inexperienced Prime Minister, until he capitulated and opened the door for old-style elections in the Spring of

¹⁰² In October 1964, the Student Union of the University of Khartoum organized a seminar about the problems of Southern Sudan. Representatives of political parties, labor unions, students, and professionals were invited. From that seminar, a National Front of Professionals (NFP) was formed to call for a general strike asking for the return of military to their barracks. The demonstrations continued and the strike spread, especially after the shooting of a university student to death. The military government was forced to hand over power to the (NFP). On the other hand, it was protected from the public call to account for the regime's period in office.

¹⁰³ "The Modern Forces" is a Sudanese political term, used for the newly emerged political organizations; such as the Sudan Communist Party (SCP), the Muslim Brothers (their party was called the Islamic Charter Front), and the student movement.

1965, which resulted in the victory of the old parties (Umma, 75 seats; NUP, 44; and PDP, 8), with a moderate presence of the SCP (eleven) and the Muslim Brothers (Islamic Charter Front), who won five out of the eleven seats specified for the graduates constituencies.¹⁰⁴ Mohammed Ahmad Mahjoub of the Umma became Prime Minister, while Azhari (NUP) became head of the five-member presidency council.

In July, 1967, Sadiq al-Mahdi became Prime Minister, after entering the parliament through what was called 'by-election.'¹⁰⁵ He split from the group of Mahjoub and his uncle the 'Imam' al-Hadi al-Mahdi, who had replaced his father. He formed another wing of the Umma party. His status as an Oxford-educated young liberal helped him to modernize the Umma party. However, the way Sadiq entered the parliament (through a by-election) demonstrates the monopoly of politics within certain families, which is also a continuation of the British colonial legacy. That is, the British offered a lot of loyalty and respect to the family of al-Mahdi since the colonial period. In fact the members of al-Mahdi's family in Khartoum were perceived as the members of the British royal family in London.¹⁰⁶

In the elections of 1968, Azhari united the two parties of the Khatmiyya (NUP and PDP) and won 101 seats to return to the old alliance with the Imam's wing of the Umma, while Sadiq sat on the seats of the opposition. The problem of a permanent constitution was on the parliament's agenda, and debates around Islamic law were very intense at the time, especially between the SCP and the Islamic Charter Front. Within this environment, the 'Revolution' of May 1969 took place, which brought Numayri into power. The Communist Party was the master mind of the coup.

In addition to their ideological stand for military coups as legitimate means for revolution, the communists had two main concerns that urged the May coup. First, they wanted to stop Islamic law which was being discussed in the parliament within

¹⁰⁴ Woodward, *Sudan: The Unstable State*, p.111.

¹⁰⁵ When the elections took place, Sadiq was not yet 30 years old, the minimum age for a candidate. As soon as he was 30, a member of his party resigned for him to enter the parliament in a "by-election."

¹⁰⁶ The status of the two families (al-Mahdi and al-Mirgani), was one of the major points of disappointment and frustration for the Sudanese intellectuals. This status was also a subject of an acute criticism from the Communist Party and some military officers.

the project of Sudan's permanent constitution. Second, the two main parties and the Islamic Charter Front were plotting to outlaw and dissolve the communist party at that time.¹⁰⁷

The second civilian regime reflected the intra-elite competition among politicians of the two main parties. This competition was the main cause for the weakness of their political system. Unlike Chad, there was a continuous growth of ideological groups, such as the Muslim Brothers and the SCP.

While the French policy of acting as a cultural and political mentor protected Chad from ideological diversity, the complete British withdrawal from the Sudan paved the way for new ideological parties. These ideological groups, in turn, became the key actors in Sudanese politics enhancing the intensity of political competition.

c. The Third Civilian Period (1985-1989)

After the April Revolution that ended the second period of military rule, political parties were formed again and the general elections took place in spring of 1985. The Umma party of the Ansar won a total of 99 seats. The NUP of the Khatmiyya won a total of 63 seats; the Islamic Front of the Muslim brothers won 37 seats; the alliance of the Southern parties won fewer than that, and the independents, even fewer. The communist party (SCP) won only three seats.

The issue of Islamic law was the main focus of the electoral program. For instance, in looking at the most successful parties in the elections: the Umma's program was called "al-Sahwa al-Islamia" which means "the modern Islam"; the NUP's program was "al-geomhouria al-Islamia" which means "the Islamic republic"; and the Islamic Front had "al-Sharia Islamia" which means "the Islamic law".

Sadiq al-Mahdi became the Prime Minister, and Ahmed al-Mirgani, the head of the state. Sadiq formed his cabinet from Umma, NUP, and the Southerners.

¹⁰⁷ That was because in a party rally, one of the communist leaders made some comments about the personality of the Prophet Mohammed that were perceived as disrespectful comments and a lot of Muslims were offended. Public demonstrations took place and the problem was raised in the parliament.

Sadiq's government was characterized by inconsistency in the cabinet, and highly influenced by the strong opposition of the Islamic Front.

In late 1988, disagreements in the cabinet caused the coalition to collapse. This opened the door for the Islamic Front to share power with the Umma party. In the new government, Hassan al-Turabi, the leader of the Islamic Front, became the minister of foreign affairs. During this period, the discussion of Islamic law found its way to the parliament and the first draft was approved. The NUP led the opposition.

The NUP, from the seat of political opposition, could make connections with the rebellions of the Sudanese People's Liberation Army (SPLA), the main military opposition group in the south. The leader of the NUP, Seyyed Mohammed Osman al-Mirgani, signed a peace agreement with Colonel John Garang, the leader of the SPLA, in the city of Kocadam, Ethiopia. Small parties, some scholars, and some professionals were invited to witness the event, where suspension of Islamic law was on top of the agenda.

All the secular parties, led by the communist party, put pressure on Sadiq al-Mahdi, the Prime Minister, to accept the peace agreement of Kocadam. Finally, Sadiq adopted the agreement as a project of the government. Consequently, the final draft of the proposal of Islamic law was rejected by the same parliament which passed the first draft, and the Islamic front was excluded from the government.¹⁰⁸ As a result, I think, the impetus behind the third military coup by the Islamic Front was to secure Islamic law from rejection.

In the second civilian period there are three points to note. First, the weakness and instability of the civilian governments continued. Second, the role of civilians in Sudan's military intervention was significant; indeed, as we have seen, all the civilian periods of the Sudan were ended first by conspiracies between civilians and the ideologically oriented elite before they were ended by the military institutions. And third, unlike Chad, the question of Islamic law was a fundamental issue for the majority of the

¹⁰⁸ The author witnessed all the events of the second civilian period, while studying pharmacy at the University of Khartoum.

Sudanese (for a party to win an election it had to express this as a top priority issue as mentioned before).

I think this latter issue certainly had a lot to do with history of the Sudan, and the way the British colonial rule had compromised with the religious groups. The French never allowed the politicization of religion in Chad, while the British formed the main political parties of the Sudan on religious bases.

B. MILITARY INTERVENTIONS IN CHAD AND THE SUDAN

The nature and type of military intervention in Chad and the Sudan differed according to the type and the significance of colonial legacy that each of the two countries had. In Chad, military interventions were caused by the civil war between the north and south, rather than civilian elites' political and ideological competition. In contrast, the Sudanese military coups were products of political parties and ideological competitions among the northern civilians themselves. Although Sudan had a civil war between the north and the south, it did not influence military interventions directly.

1. Chad

All Chad's internal and external military interventions were highly influenced by its civil war.

a. Malloum's Coup

In 1975, President Tombalbaye was killed in a military coup by certain southern military officers who thought that he had given too much to the northerners during his political reform. Afterward, the civil war became even more severe. In 1978, General Filix Malloum, the president of the new military council, struck an agreement with some factions and appointed their leader - Habre - as Prime Minister. Hostilities continued, however, and the Prime Minister kept his revolutionary army separate from the national army. Also, Libya backed another faction, led by Goukouni, in order to pursue her own interests.

b. *Habré's Coup*

In 1979, Habre staged a coup, using his position as prime minister and his separate army. Malloum was sent into retirement (under French protection), and the remains of his military regrouped in the south under Colonel Kamougué and proceeded to massacre more than 10,000 northerners living in the south.¹⁰⁹

Ten days after the coup, Goukouni entered the capital, N'Djamena, with Libyan assistance, and started fighting against the forces of Habré. Between March 10 and August 21, four conferences took place in Nigeria in the hope of finding a framework acceptable to the warring factions.¹¹⁰ Habré was forced to flee N'Djamena to eastern Sudan, rearrange his forces, and re-enter N'Djamena in 1982. Then he continued governing Chad by military rule until December 1990.

c. *Idriss and Djamous Movement*

In April 1988, Colonel Idriss Deby (the military advisor to President Habre and a former general chief of staff) and Hassan Djamous (the general chief of staff at that time) fled to the Sudan after being accused of plotting a coup. Djamous was killed in combat with government troops. However, Idriss survived, and he was able to form an alliance of different opposition groups, and defeated Habre by December 1990.¹¹¹ Idriss Deby declared that his objective was to bring about democracy and freedom, and he fulfilled his promise after a transitional period of five years.

d. *External Interventions (France, Libya, and the OAU)*

In addition to the ongoing civil war during the 1980's, Chad witnessed French and Libyan intervention and an OAU peacekeeping operation.

¹⁰⁹ Collelo, *Chad: A Country Study*, p. 28.

¹¹⁰ *Ibid*, p. 28.

¹¹¹ In his first speech to the Chadians on December 4, 1990, Idriss Deby said: "Chadian people, what do you think I have brought to you as a gift? I brought you neither gold nor silver; I brought you even a more valuable thing; freedom and democracy." "Ni or ni argent, liberte et democracie," means neither gold nor silver, liberty and democracy.

The Chado-Libyan war around the Aozou Strip and the Libyan intervention which began in 1973 was a direct product of the French colonial legacy of territorial disputes. Thomas Collelo, in his book about Chad noted:

An event occurred in 1935 that was to have far-reaching consequences throughout the 1970s and 1980s. In that year, the French colonial administration negotiated a border adjustment with Italy, Libya's colonial master. The adjustment would have relocated the Libyan-Chad boundary about 100 kilometers south across the Aozou Strip. Although the French legislature never ratified the agreement, the negotiations formed part of the base of Libya's claim to the area decades later.¹¹²

However, France intervened in Chad in 1979 to help the Chadian government to face the Libyan threat.¹¹³

The OAU intervened in Chad by the Lagos Accord of August 21, 1979, in which a national unity government(GUNT) was formed from eleven different Chadian factions at war with each other under the presidency of Goukouni, vice president of Kamouqué, and Habre, the defense minister. One result of this was that the Inter-African Peacekeeping Force (IAF) was formed from 600 Congolese troops.

Accordingly, the Libyan troops were asked to withdraw by October 1981, and an additional 4,800 IAF troops were formed from Nigeria, Senegal, and Zaire and deployed in Chad in December 1981. GUNT (Gouvernement d'Union Nationale de Tchad) failed, and the troops of Habre entered the capital N'Djamena on June 7, 1982 with the assistance of the United States and her allies at that time, such as Sudan and Egypt, while the OAU troops showed no resistance.¹¹⁴

Unlike in the case of Sudan, as we will see, all the military interventions in Chad were directed against either a military or authoritarian regime or, more often, both.

¹¹² Collelo, Chad: A Country Study, pp. 13-14.

¹¹³ Thompson and Adloff reported that there was "a secret deal allegedly made early in 1987 by France and Libya, whereby Chad was to be divided into two zones of influence. The northern zone would in effect become a part of Libya, whereas France would be given a free hand in Chad's five southern prefectures." Virginia Thompson and Richard Adoff. Conflict in Chad, p. 140. Also Sennen Andriamirado reported in the journal of Jeune Afrique, December 24, 1980 that Khadafi said to Giscard d'Estaing: "Leave me my Muslims and I will leave you your blacks." *Ibid.*

¹¹⁴ Collelo, Chad: A Country Study, pp. 27-30.

Also, all these interventions were products of the civil war, in which French colonial policy played a major role, and the consequences of that war.

2. The Sudan

The Sudan had a military coup bringing an end to each civilian period. The three main military coups that occurred in the Sudan were direct results of political and ideological parties, as we will see one after another.

a. *Aboud's Coup*

Only a few hours before the constituent assembly was due to reconvene on November 17, 1958, General Abboud, the army commander, and his fellow officers took power. "...with at least the connivance if not the encouragement of the old soldier [the prime minister] from whom they took over".¹¹⁵ Nobody complained because it was a voluntary hand-over of power as Muddathir Abd al-Rahim and Peter Woodward reported:

It was essentially a hand-over to the military by the civilian Prime minister, Abdallah Khalil (himself a former senior army officer) in circumstances in which the leaders of his party, the Umma Party, and senior military personnel were convinced that the divisions amongst the political parties, within the context of the international politics were too heavy to bear.¹¹⁶

Abboud announced that they would shortly hand the power back to civilians, but after they had enjoyed the taste of power, and seen economic progress, they decided to hold on to power. A new presidential system was established with emergency powers vested in Abboud and the supreme council composed of twelve, which was later reduced to six.

Two of them (Brigadiers Abd al-Rahim Shannan and Muhy al-din Abdallah) were barred from the council because of alleged pro-Umma character. The two Brigadiers made two unsuccessful attempts at taking over the power from Aboud and

¹¹⁵ Muddathir Abd Al-Rahim, Raphael Badal, Adnan Hardallo, and Peter Woodward. Sudan Since Independence, Grower Publishing Company, England and USA, 1986. p. 100.

¹¹⁶ Ibid, p. 66.

ended up in jail. Another coup attempt was made by Colonel Ali Hammed, who was tried and hanged with four of his fellow plotters.

Only four figures from the military supreme council remained in control of the country. There were no significant efforts to militarize the regime or to politicize the army. However, the regime introduced some administrative rearrangements, which, along with a mixture of elected and nominated memberships, was composed of a hierarchy of councils, starting from local and regional, all the way up to central government. All the provincial governors were military officers.

The opponents of the Umma party in particular, and even some members of the Umma party, called for the return of the military to their barracks when they felt that the military had settled in the government. Some of the active political leaders were jailed for several months by the military government. The 'Modern Forces' lead by the Sudan Communist Party, student unions, and labor forces (particularly the Sudan railway union) all began to turn against the military regime. All these forces participated in the October Revolution that ended the first military regime in 1964.

Unlike military interventions in Chad, the occurrence and the end of the first Sudanese military regime was not directly related to the civil war. Rather, it was a product of competition among elites, and ideological group activism.

b. Numayri's Coup

On May 25, 1969, the 'Free Officers',¹¹⁷ led by Jaafar Mohammed Numayri, overthrew the weak civilian government, and claimed that their revolution was in the tradition of the October Revolution of 1964. They claimed that they had played a significant part in ensuring the success of the October uprising. Feeling that the old traditional parties had begun to lose the flavor of October revolution, the masses and 'the Modern Forces' supported the new regime. The communist party (SCP) possessed among its ranks three of the seven members of the Revolution Command Council.

¹¹⁷ The 'Free Officers' was a political organization within the officer corps, thought to be initiated by the Communist Party.

Although the SCP was behind the May coup and Numayri was very sympathetic towards the communists, the Nasserist dimension of Numayri and the prospects of the newly proposed union with Egypt and Libya made the SCP suspicious of Numayri. Moreover, Numayri removed the three communist officers from the Revolution Command Council. The best solution that the SCP saw at that point was to depose the leader. Subsequently, SCP attempted a coup, led by Majors Hashim al-Atta, Faroug Hamadallah, and Babiker al-Nour, the former members of the Revolution Command Council who Numayri removed. The coup survived for three days. During this time they managed to gain control of the capital Khartoum and put Numayri and other officers in prison. Shortly afterwards, however, Numayri escaped and led a successful counter-coup, with the aid of Egypt and Libya. Numayri executed the coup leaders and outlawed the communist party.

Numayri applied a one-party system (copied from the Egyptian experience of Nasser) under the Sudan Socialist Union (SSU), which based Sudanese political life around the "alliance of the working forces of the people as represented by farmers, workers, intellectuals, national capitalists, and soldiers."¹¹⁸ The new political system also included 'functional organizations' in various professional fields including the army, women's unions, youth unions, students, etc. Moreover, Numayri created the People's Assembly (whose candidates were nominated by the SSU), and he institutionalized all this in a permanent constitution, adopted by the aid of the People's Assembly in 1973.

Pressed by the Muslim Brothers, led by Hassan al-Turabi, with whom Numayri shared power after reconciliation, Numayri declared the Sharia (Islamic) laws in September 1983.¹¹⁹ This was strongly opposed by secular forces, Southerners, and his partners in the West, especially the United States, upon whom Numayri depended heavily.

¹¹⁸ Muddathir Abd Al-Rahim, et. al. Sudan Since Independence, p. 68.

¹¹⁹ Ibid. p. 4.

c. Sowar al-Dahab's Coup

Similar to Aboud's regime, Numayri's regime was ended by a popular revolution (the April Revolution) on April 6, 1985. Prior to his visit to the West (including the United States) to find a solution to his economic and political problems, Numayri declared increases in the price of bread and other essential goods. The public, including all segments of the society, immediately protested on the streets, leading to a general strike and riots. The situation was so severe that the security forces were overwhelmed and could do nothing. Finally, the general chief-of-staff of the military (General Abd al-Rahman Sowar al-Dahab) announced a change of regime on behalf of the civilians. He promised to give the power back to civilians within a limited period of time.

Sowar al-Dahab appointed a military council of 15 members responsible for constitutional matters and a civilian government, headed by Dr. Algazouly, responsible for all executive concerns. The agenda of this government was to start preparations for the elections, peace talks with the rebellions, and routine matters of the government. Although peace negotiations failed, they did prepare for the elections and held them on schedule (after exactly one year). On April 26, 1986, Sowar al-Dahab gave power to the elected parliament and stepped out.

d. Al-Bashir's Coup

Only a few days before the date on which the Sadiq-Garang meeting was scheduled, General Omar al-Beshier staged a third military coup on June 30, 1989. The coup leaders hid their identity at first. They declared that they were following the way of Nasser, and that they did not belong to any political group or party. Accordingly, the Egyptian government acknowledged them officially and many other countries followed. After a while, it became clear that they were the secret military wing of the Muslim Brothers and their sympathizers. Eighteen months later, the regime declared the Islamic law as a way of life and began the application of general reforms in all domains of life in order to be consistent with Islamic law.

In October 1990, all the other parties, including the old - Umma and NUP - and the new secular parties, united to form a political opposition named the National Democratic Alliance(NDA). The SPLA joined NDA.

This is the third time, out of the three coups in the Sudan, in which the military intervention was catalyzed by civilian conspiracy or with strong civilian support, especially of the ideological groups.

C. CIVIL WARS OF CHAD AND THE SUDAN

The Chadian civil war was, principally, the major source of Chad's political instability and military interventions. That is, the war was so severe because of the relative balance in the power of the two warring sides. In contrast, Sudan's civil war has been an imbalanced war between the northern majority, which monopolizes almost all political power and economic resources, and the southern minority, which has been marginalized. That is why, unlike Chad, Sudan's civil war did not have a significant effect on political stability. As stated before of course, both civil wars were seeded by the French and the British colonial legacies. That is why despite similarities in the nature and the causes of the two wars, their outcomes differed according to the colonial policies, the independent variable.

1. Chad's Civil War

The first and the most significant armed opposition group in Chad after its independence in 1960, was the Front for the National Liberation of Chad (Front de Liberation Nationale du Tchad - FROLINAT). It was initially formed in exile in 1962. On November 1, 1965, frustration with what was perceived as government mismanagement and tax-collection abuse erupted in riots in the town of Mangalmé in Guera Prefecture. Five hundred people died, including the local deputy to the National Assembly and nine other government officials.

In June 1966, FROLINAT was reinvigorated in Nyala in southwestern Sudan under the leadership of Ibrahim Abatcha. From Mangalmé and nearby Batha Prefecture, the rebellion spread to Ouaddai and Salamat Prefectures, where in February 1967 the

prefect and deputy prefect were killed.¹²⁰ Abatcha died in combat in February 1968 and Abba Siddick became FROLINAT's new secretary general after a couple of years.

FROLINAT was principally a northern and Muslim movement, directed against the French-supported southern non-Muslim regime of Tombalbaye. Arab countries such as the Sudan, Algeria, and Libya had supported FROLINAT for that reason. Moreover, some of the same ethnic groups lived in Chad, Sudan, and Libya.

On the other hand, the government in N'Djamena, which was led by the Christian-dominated southerners, depended highly on its traditional partner - France. Indeed, the historical background of the colonial administration, as I have already mentioned, influenced much of Chad's post-independence politics. Thus France had little chance to gain the confidence of the northerners. This also explains the reliance of President Goukouni on Libya; President Habre¹²¹ on the United States; and President Tombalbaye and Malloum, who were from the south, on France. In fact, after the formation of the (FROLINAT), all the northern factions had either relied on Libya or the United States and its African allies (i.e., Sudan, Egypt, and Zaire). Meanwhile, France remained somewhere between backing the weakened Southerners' government and dealing with the Northerners' effective opposition.

Between 1969 and late 1971, President Tombalbaye had taken a variety of steps to alter the relations that had existed between the central government and the North since independence. Following Tombalbaye's presidential elections of 1969, important northern opposition leaders were allowed to enter high government positions, and some 600 political prisoners were released.¹²²

In April 1971, Tombalbaye, addressing the Seventh Congress of the PPT, "...admitted for the first time that he had made mistakes and that there were some shortcomings associated with his policies."¹²³ Moreover, in June 1971, Tombalbaye freed another 1,500 political prisoners and toured rebel regions in the north, where he

¹²⁰ Collelo, *Chad: A Country Study*, p. 20.

¹²¹ Presidents Goukouni and Habré were from Northern Chad.

¹²² Nelson, *Area Handbook for Chad*, p. 127.

¹²³ Collelo, *Chad: A Country Study*, p. 21.

promised, among other things, government-subsidized sugar and salt for the nomads of Zouar and Bardai.¹²⁴ These nomads "...had never recognized any form of authority; even their chiefs had only religious significance."¹²⁵ Despite these major changes, the war continued. The huge cultural, ethnic, and religious gap between the two regions coupled with a lack of confidence in each other remained as difficult barriers to the achievement of national unity.

As we saw in the section on military interventions, the civil war became the cause of all military interventions and political unrest of Chad throughout the regimes of Malloum, Goukouni, and Habre. In fact, the Chadian civil war continued until 1993, when a sovereign national conference accepted democracy as the only solution to Chad's problems.

2. Sudan's Civil War

In the Sudan, the colonial legacy of the "closed district policy"¹²⁶ was the time bomb that exploded even before the complete departure of the colonizer. That is, on August 18, 1955, units of the Equatorial Corps from the South mutinied at Torit, ransacking the military stores. The Equatorial province and parts of Bahr-el-ghazal were subjected to massacres and lawlessness by both soldiers and civilians. Hundreds of northern civilians living in that area were killed.

In fact, the stage for the trouble was being set during the years of the colonial rule. "The policy of segregation exercised under the condominium created an image which pictured the northerner in the south as a slave-dealer and a swindler."¹²⁷ This was coupled with a feeling of unfair economic, political, and intellectual treatment from the northern politicians.

¹²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 21.

¹²⁵ Nelson, *Area Handbook for Chad*, p. 127.

¹²⁶ "The Closed Districts' Treaty" was a secret treaty made in 1930. It mandated the isolation of the southern Sudan from the rest of the country. Accordingly no entry of northern Sudanese to the north (or the vice versa) was allowed. Christian missions were allowed to work only in the south and restricted from the north. Woodward, *Sudan 1898-1989: The Unstable State*, p. ix.

¹²⁷ Abd Al-Rahim, *Sudan Since Independence*, p. 69.

During President Aboud's regime (1958-1964), the southerners formed what was called the Sudan African Closed Districts National Union (SACDNU) in 1962. They began seeking support in Europe and North America, especially among Christian organizations. Also, guerrilla groups in the region became active, especially after the nationalization of the mission schools, the Arabization program, and the moving of the Sabbath from Sunday to Friday.

During the second military period (1969-1985), President Numayri had the opportunity to put an end (at least temporarily) to the civil war in the South through the peace agreement between the Sudanese government and the rebels of the "Ananya" in Addis Ababa in 1972. This peace agreement, however, was reversed in 1983.

In May 1983, President Numayri decided to divide the south into three administrative regions, reviving a decades-old conflict. John Garang, a dissident Colonel, led a mutiny in garrisons of the south and founded the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA). Numayri's declaration of strict Islamic Sharia law across Africa's largest country in September 1983, worsened the situation.

After the end of Numyari's regime, the transitional government invited Garang to participate in the multi-party elections, but he refused. The civilian government of Sadiq al-Mahdi (1986-1989) put a lot of effort into ending the war. But the lack of confidence in the northern politicians and the deep cultural, religious, and economic differences between the two parts of the country forced them to abandon these efforts.

After the military coup by the Islamic fundamentalists on June 30, 1989, the situation became even more complex. That is because one of the main demands of the SPLA is to separate between religion and state, while the leaders of the new regime claim that their primary goal is to implement Islamic principles in all aspects of life.

In 1994, peace talks in Nairobi chaired by Kenyan President Daniel Arap Moi, head of the mediation committee of the regional Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), led to a Declaration of Principles providing for a secular state. Khartoum denounced the Declaration and launched its largest offensive of the war. However, after opening a new front in the eastern Sudan by the NDA in 1997, the

government and SPLA agreed to meet face-to-face in Nairobi on October 29, 1997. After 10 days of negotiations, the IGAD-sponsored talks were adjourned without agreement.

Unlike Chad, the Sudanese civil war is still going on. While the French policy in Chad brought about a reasonable regional balance (despite the cultural diversity), the British policy in the Sudan widened the gap even further between the two parts of the country. Indeed, Chad's civil war was a struggle for political power and economic resources, while Sudan's civil war was both a struggle of the southern minorities for their identity and a struggle for self-actualization as well. Despite some similarities between the conditions and causes of the two civil wars, differences between the two colonial experiences and their policies have produced clearly distinct outcomes. This illustrates the relevance of the impact of colonial legacy on political instability.

D. POST-COLONIAL RELATIONS WITH FRANCE AND BRITAIN

One of the major differences between the French and the British colonial legacies in Chad and the Sudan is neocolonialism, or the post-colonial influence. That is, France has sustained her special bilateral economic, cultural, and political ties with Chad after independence, while Britain has not sustained such relations with the Sudan after its independence.

1. Chad

As in most of her other former African colonies, France remained the primary economic, political, and military partner of Chad. For instance, total Chadian imports from France from 1979 to 1985 were 35.1 percent, 12.6 percent, 19.1 percent, 24.6 percent, 25.8 percent, 43.4 percent, and 48.5 percent, respectively. In 1994, France supplied 39.16 percent of Chad's imports.

Moreover, France still has advisors at all levels of administration in the country. There are also two French military bases in the capital N'Djamena. Any major political or economic changes in France will be directly reflected in Chad. The devaluation of the Franc (CFA) was an example of this phenomenon, and the expected unification of the European currencies is likely to be a turning point for Francophone African states. The

young Chadian democracy, which has effected economic liberalization by opening markets, privatizing state-owned institutions, and encouraging national and foreign investment, is highly influenced by French pressure.

2. The Sudan

Meanwhile, British decolonization is almost complete. The level of Sudan's economic and political relations with Britain remains lower than normal for post-colonial states. Instead of Britain, Sudan has found other Western and Eastern partners in addition to the Arab states. For instance, the percentage of Sudanese trade with Britain in the years 1987, 1988, and 1989, was 10.0, 9.3, and 8.3, respectively.¹²⁸ Moreover, after the military coup of 1989, which was led by the Islamic Fundamentalists, Sudan decided to apply Islamic principles in all her economic institutions and policies.

Thus, Sudan is not only distancing itself from Britain, her former master, but also from all Western political and economic philosophies. I think this phenomenon has been inadvertently promoted by the British policy of politicizing the religious groups, a policy completely opposite to that of the French in Chad. In contrast to the current French influence in Chad, Britain has very little, if any ability to affect current Sudanese economic and political policies.

¹²⁸ Metz, Sudan: A Country Study, p. 284.

V. CONCLUSION

In this thesis, I have discussed the impact of the colonial legacy on civil-military relations in Africa after independence. In part one, I made a general comparative analysis of the British and the French legacies. Then, I discussed how these legacies have had a hand in shaping the current civil-military relations, political stability, and democratic situations of Chad and the Sudan.

This study has made some explanations why African political and economic conditions are so bad. We have seen that colonial rule has shaped a particular African authoritarian culture for several decades, which cannot be changed within just a few years. Although Africans themselves are responsible for most of Africa's economic and political problems, the burden of the colonial legacy and its effect on political economic and security options inherited by African leaders is unique and it deserves recognition.

A. SUMMARY OF THE FINDINGS

Colonial administration, educational policy, ethnic tensions, and territorial disputes are the important elements of the colonial legacies that contributed to make arbitrary rule and military interventions inevitable in post-colonial Africa. Political instability in general and the civil wars in particular provided unfavorable environments for good governance and economic development in Africa. The Chadian and the Sudanese civil wars and military coups were found likely to be products of those colonial legacies.

The colonial administration and educational policy in both Chad and the Sudan increased cultural, linguistic, religious, and economic diversity and inequality between the northern and southern parts of the two countries. These colonial legacies created differences combined with the historical ethnic and geographical differences to contribute to the civil wars of the two countries.

While Chad's civil war became the direct and major cause for military intervention, the externally and ideologically oriented competition among elites in the Sudan became the direct and major cause for its military interventions. I have related both

cases to the French and British legacies, respectively. This variation in the outcomes, despite the similarities of the two cases, illustrates the role of a particular colonial experience in shaping civil-military relations.

Unlike Chad, the effect of class structure on military interventions was significant in the Sudan. That is, most of the military coups in Sudan, if not all, were justified and enjoyed significant support among different segments of the population, who in turn saw the military as a part of their class and as an institution that might protect their interests. Laborers, students, and professionals (the second class) were often sympathetic to military coups as a way to overcome the tyranny of the two old traditional parties, the Umma and the Khatmiyya, who had gained the majority in all elections. The Numayri coup was a typical example. As mentioned before, it was supported by most segments of the society.

The French had a policy of excluding religion from politics in Chad. The British, on the other hand, compromised with religious groups and helped them to turn into political parties in the Sudan. These two distinct policies have produced different outcomes: a secular system in Chad and a religious state in the Sudan. In my opinion, this explains why the Chadians were able to overcome their civil war, while the Sudanese were not. This distinction also illustrates that some colonial legacies brought beneficial results. However, the scope of my thesis is not to answer the good or bad question. Rather, it is to show the causal linkage that explains some patterns of the military coups and political instability.

One of the major differences between the French and British legacies we have seen in this thesis is the strong French post-colonial influence in Chad and the special bilateral ties between Chad and France. Unlike British post-colonial relations with the Sudan, French political, military and economic relations still have a direct impact on civil military relations in Chad.

B. IMPLICATIONS

A deep understanding of the impact of colonial legacy and African political culture has important academic and political implications for future research and policy options.

1. Academic and Theoretical Implications

In my review of the literature on Africa's political and economic problems (in general), and its civil military relations (in particular), I found very little, if any, consideration of the effect of historical background, colonial experience, and political culture by the different scholars that have tried to find explanations for these problems. This study can add to the previous efforts done in the area of comparative politics focusing on Africa, and it can draw attention the consideration of these concepts in future studies.

Moreover, I think my arguments (regarding the impact of colonial legacy on civil-military relations in Africa) could be applicable in other areas. Regions such as Latin America and Southeast Asia, which were highly affected by colonialism, and yet have had problems in their civil-military relations, are potential areas for research. Thus I would recommend that experts in these areas look at the possibility of these claims of the effect of colonial legacies.

2. Political and National implications

The post cold-war environment has generated a general tendency toward democratization. The United States, which maintains the spread of democracy as one of her national security goals,¹²⁹ and other Western powers, such as France, have allocated resources for democratization efforts and have tied other economic and military assistance to this central process. I think it is critically important to identify the structural obstacles to democracy accurately and tackle them properly.

¹²⁹ The White House. A National Security Strategy for a New Century, May 1997, p. 28.

Another implication at the national level is for the African leaders. That is, my study does not suggest that it is the responsibility of the former colonial powers to correct the impact of the legacy they left behind. On the contrary, it is important for our leaders to know that only Africans themselves can and should overcome these problems. However, this study is important for the new generation of African leaders, because it may help them further understand some of the major causes behind the failure of their predecessors. Moreover, other developed countries (in general) and the former colonial powers (in particular) may better understand their moral responsibility to help African nations solve these problems (which they have contributed to cause by one way or another) and integrate with the rest of the global society and economy.

C. RECOMMENDATIONS

Based on the findings and the implications of this study, I would recommend that scholars who are concerned with African studies consider the possible effect of African culture and colonial background (which is also a significant part of the African culture). These considerations are important because, without knowing the real cause of a problem, one can never prescribe a proper treatment. Any approach to understand the problem or suggest a solution without taking these factors into account leads simply to "barking up the wrong tree," or is destined to fail.

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