


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CONTENTS

5 FEBRUARY 1988

POLITICAL

INTRABLOC

- Soviet Economist Discusses Results, Prospects of Perestroika
[Abel Aganbegyan Interview; *DANAS*, 27 Oct 87] 1

ALBANIA

- Violations of Law by Clergy, Faithful Recalled [H. Meka; *RILINDJA*, 4 Dec 87] 5

HUNGARY

- Lawsuits Against State Institutions Increasing [OTLET, 16 Oct 87] 6
History of Autonomous Hungarian Region in Romania (1952-1968) Reviewed
[Ildiko Lipcsey; *KRITIKA* No 9, 1987] 7

POLAND

- Party Activities Calendars Published 15
14-27 September 1987 [ZYCIE WARSZAWY No 20, 7 Oct 87] 15
28 September-11 October 1987 [ZYCIE PARTII, 21 Oct 87] 19
Nuclear Ecological Threat Compared to Smoking, Using Coal
[Lucjan Pawlowski; *POLITYKA*, 3 Oct 87] 22

ROMANIA

- Popescu Removed From Deputy Minister Position [BULETINUL OFICIAL, 16 Oct 87] 24
Governmental Personnel Changes [BULETINUL OFICIAL, 19 Oct 87] 24
Personnel Changes in Mines, Petroleum, Geology [BULETINUL OFICIAL, 19 Oct 87] 24
Hunedoara, Constanta Peoples Councils Appointments [BULETINUL OFICIAL, 19 Oct 87] 25
Andrie Removed From Chairmanship of Worker Control Council
[BULETINUL OFICIAL, 24 Oct 87] 25
Deputy Ministers of Chemical, Petrochemical Industry Named
[BULETINUL OFICIAL, 30 Oct 87] 25
Personnel Changes Resulting From Ministerial Reorganization
[BULETINUL OFICIAL, 30 Oct 87] 25
New Deputy Minister of Technical Material Supply [BULETINUL OFICIAL, 28 Nov 87] 25
Stoian Appointed to Dolj Peoples Council Post [BULETINUL OFICIAL, 4 Dec 87] 25
Coordination of General, Individual Interests [Viorel Popescu; *ERA SOCIALISTA*, 25 Jul 87] 26
Journalists Visit Soviet Newsmen, Cultural Figures
[Cristina Dumitrescu; *PRESA NOASTRA*, Aug-Sep 87] 31
Lt Gen Ceausescu on Hungarian WWII 'Atrocities' in Transylvania
[Ilie Ceausescu; *MAGAZIN ISTORIC*, Oct 87] 34

YUGOSLAVIA

- Text of Suppressed Kljajic Speech at 22 October Session [MLADOST, 2 Nov 87] 36
Dedijer Criticized for Misrepresentations of Croatian History
[Nenad Ivankovic; *DANAS*, 17 Nov 87] 42
Deadlock Over Constitutional Change in Serbia Continues
[Steven Niksic; *NEDELJNE INFORMATIVNE NOVINE*, 15 Nov 87] 44
Vojvodina Presidency Chairman Discusses Status of Provinces
[Djordje Radosavljevic Interview; 17 Nov 87] 47

Kosovo Law on Real Estate Sale Ban Questioned [Marinko Culic; DANAS, 11 Nov 87]	51
Emigration Problems of Kosovo Albanians in Norway Discussed [Milos Antic; DANAS, 11 Nov 87]	54
Increasing Threat to Majority's Living Standard Weighed [Slobodanka Act; NEDELJNE INFORMATIVNE NOVINE, 29 Nov 87]	58

ECONOMIC

ROMANIA

Current Energy Situation, Outlook for Winter [Tiberiu Comanescu Interview; ROMANIA LIBERA, 12 Aug 87]	61
Brasov Tractor, Transport Vehicles Centrals Merged [BULETINUL OFICIAL, 21 Nov 87]	62
Popular Handicraft Products for Export Described [Ioan Gedorgescu; REVISTA ECONOMICA, 17 Dec 87]	65

SOCIAL

ROMANIA

Survey of Religious Beliefs, Practices in 4 Counties [Ana Balasa; VIITORUL SOCIAL, May-Jun 87]	68
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INTRABLOC

Soviet Economist Discusses Results, Prospects of Perestroika

28000027 Zagreb DANAS in Serbo-Croatian
27 Oct 87 pp 51-54

[Interview with Academician Abel Aganbegyan, head of USSR economic development commission, by Drago Buvac; date and place not specified: "Perestroika Two"]

[Text] A leading Soviet economist reveals the difficulties of the first stage of the reform, especially with inflation and unemployment, and the secrets of its development.

Academician Abel Aganbegyan, as a member of the government economic development commission and a person who in the Academy of Sciences of the USSR heads all economic institutes and is the leader in scientific economic thought, has no formal qualifications whatever to prepare him for such a position, but unofficially throughout the world and in the USSR he is regarded as the foremost figure in the Soviet economy, an initiator and inspirer, and probably the closest advisor on such matters to the general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, Mikhail Gorbachev, as they relate to the problems of perestroika. We took advantage of his recent visit to Yugoslavia, when we spoke with him for about 2 hours at the Esplanade Hotel in Zagreb, to broaden our knowledge of the Soviet economic and social reform. This was several days after Gorbachev spoke in Murmansk and announced deeper involvement in perestroika and a time when the Western press began to speculate about the difficulties facing him along this path. After comparing what Gorbachev said in Murmansk with what we were told by Aganbegyan, we were uncertain whether the latter was recounting the theses of that speech or whether his data had been used by the general secretary in making such an important public appearance following a long hiatus.

[Question] I have recently observed in talks with Soviet economists that they are talking less in terms of specific or public relations figures, statistical indicators and plan targets, and more about changes in thinking, about self-management or democracy. Even you, as an economist who leans toward econometrics and a person who is known for rigorous logical and statistical thinking, a borderline modern technocrat, recently stated that democracy is a prerequisite for perestroika. How do you explain the shift in focus of the interest of Soviet economic thought from planning figures to social relationships?

[Answer] This is not the first time that we have taken economic measures. Major changes took place in the economic mechanism of agriculture following Stalin's death in 1953. Then we had an economic reform in agriculture and industry in the mid-1960's. All these reforms provided significant impetus for development of

production forces and increased efficiency. Nevertheless, they failed. Why? Could this not happen again a third time? And so now in the process of perestroika we have made a serious analysis of earlier experience, and we have found that the main reasons for the failure of the first two reforms were, firstly, that they were partial in extent and depth, relating to changes in the economic mechanism but without change in policy, the superstructure, and ideology, and, secondly, something which appears to me to be more important and decisive, that the earlier economic reforms were carried out from the top, by the old administrative methods, and we failed to create conditions for involving the broad masses of workers in the process. For example, we did not develop self-management in the 1965 reform. On the basis of such analyses we came to the conclusion, as is often stressed by Gorbachev, that the main requirement for accomplishing perestroika is democratization.

[Question] What do you, as an economist, understand democratization to mean?

[Answer] Above all it is self-management, increase in the role of the worker collective to include broad rights, from approval of the plan and utilization of incentive funds to election of the workers council and all management personnel, including the director of the enterprise and association. Consequently, we regard democratization as the chief motivating force and prerequisite for perestroika. As a result, we are strengthening it constantly, from one plenum to the next, and we expect much in this direction from the forthcoming party conference in mid-1988.

[Question] The press, not just elsewhere in the world and in Yugoslavia, but in the USSR as well, I think, has the general impression that the democratization process has captured the imagination of the intelligentsia but not, of course, of the bureaucracy. But not even the workers, the working class, are enthusiastic about it. Is this impression correct, and how can this obstacle be overcome?

[Answer] Democratization in our country began with ideology, in the information media. It is linked to glasnost (openness), transition to respect for legal norms, detection of the diseases of society, to communist self-criticism, and holding of leadership positions by new people. All this has radically changed the aspect of our society and its activities. And all this is natural. Democratization has to start somewhere, and first of all in the information media. It is easier for intellectuals to write than it is for workers or farmers. To make room for economic democratization, however, it is necessary to carry out an economic reform. The essential link in transition to economic democratization is transition from administrative to economic methods of operation. Inasmuch as many administrative methods still remain, we are merely in the first stage of the economic reform. For 2 years now we have been elaborating the concept and the program of this reform. We have carried out

various experiments and have synthesized the experience of our own country and of other socialist countries. And on the basis of these 2 years of persistent work, the program of economic reform measures and the new Law on State Enterprises were adopted at the June plenum of the CPSU Central Committee. But the biggest transitional step into the new stage, transition to self-management, has just begun and lies before us. Consequently, the idea that democratization in the economy has lagged behind because of this process in ideology and to some extent in the political sphere is correct. Everything cannot be done all at once. But viewed as a whole, democratization has already strongly affected workers and peasants. You can sense it.

[Question] When I spoke with Soviet economists such as Tatyana Zaslavskaya or Gennadiy Lisichkin in Moscow 6 months ago, they commented on the problem of inertia of the working class in perestroika. Do you have any indication today that this situation is changing?

[Answer] First of all, I would not single out workers; I would rather talk about all employees and society in general. The thing is that perestroika cannot affect everyone simultaneously. Let us agree that people in the West are not aware of the complexity of our society. We have more than 100 nations and ethnic groups, and so the national characteristics of Uzbekistan have nothing in common with life in the North, the Caucasus, or the Baltic region. We have our West and our East, highly developed cities and backward villages, roadless areas that cannot be reached by motor vehicles. And in my opinion it simply is not possible to set such a mammoth society in motion all at once, in an instant. In addition, we have developed considerably over the last 15 years and negative tendencies have made themselves felt not just in the economy but in the life of society as a whole. We have had slowdowns, and there have been inertia, indifference, disbelief, and disparity between word and deed. All this has demoralized many people. And it is a very intricate matter to overcome all this inertia and this indifference. Naturally, it has not been possible to fill everyone with enthusiasm during the first stages of perestroika. Consequently, there are still villages, regions, and economic sectors which continue to operate as in the past regardless of what they say about perestroika. This is all changing gradually, step by step, and, despite the "dead spots," on the whole I agree with the official evaluation that our society has begun a process of movement and change. Only now are we approaching the real economic mechanism. So when we talk about self-management, we must realize that it simply does not exist in the majority of enterprises. Only now is the shift to self-management being made, but it will definitely come about. Hence it is difficult for us to say whether people are inert or not. Nor can we judge them by the individual public statements made at meetings. All this must be rated on the basis of economic indicators. For example, if labor productivity increases and nothing has changed in technology, something obviously has happened to overcome inertia.

[Question] As an economist who carefully monitors all these indicators, do you have any tangible results, any figures, to give in this connection?

[Answer] Consider industry. In the 1970s it grew at a rate of 2 to 3 percent a year, but in 1986 it increased 4.5 percent and will grow approximately 4 percent this year. Over the same periods productivity has increased by a factor of 2.5 in agriculture and by nearly 6 in railroad transportation. And all this is no mere accident.

[Question] Earlier the productivity of live labor in the Soviet economy increased at a fairly rapid pace, but at the expense of major investments, of a large share of retained earnings in the national income, and this at the same time reduced the so-called productivity of capital.

[Answer] This productivity of capital, which we term *fondootdacha* (what funds yield), has decreased 3 percent over each of the last 15 years. There have been no exceptions. In 1986 it was 1.3 percent for the first time. We expect the decrease to be only 1 percent this year. Production grew 5 percent with these funds last year in agriculture, where the decrease in investment efficiency had been especially rapid. This is a breakthrough. Consequently, this negative trend is decreasing sharply, and we have set ourselves the task of stabilizing the drop in so-called capital productivity.

[Question] Do you as yet have any favorable statistics on the effect of perestroika on the standard of living of workers, that is, on something which after all is of the greatest interest to the common man and which overcomes his inertia?

[Answer] Many people do not understand the meaning of perestroika and why it is being carried out. I often hear the question, "are you not afraid that people will abandon perestroika, because you are demanding discipline, more work, and you intend to raise prices and lower real incomes? If people do not see any results they cannot wait 5 or 10 years." These questions disregard the fact that perestroika is being carried out in our country for man and that he is its focal point. The main reason why we are really restructuring is precisely the fact that we must speed up social and economic development and that we must satisfy human needs to a greater extent.

[Question] Do the conditions actually exist for this in the USSR after so many years of economic stagnation?

[Answer] In many countries, to my knowledge including Yugoslavia, increase in the standard of living is outstripping production growth. These countries are living by borrowing or are reducing investments in development. The national income is eaten up, and then people come to their senses. Even though this is difficult to verify, the opposite is the case in our country. Our standard of living has lagged behind because of our industrial power; it lags behind the development of science and technology and behind the high level of education of our population.

The negative tendencies in our economy over the last 15 years have had an especially heavy impact on the social sphere. For example, in 1960, 23 percent of all gross investments was allocated for housing construction, but only 14 percent during the 11th 5-year plan. Funds for the social sphere were distributed on the basis of the so-called principle of residual income, that is, what is left from production. Hence perestroika is aimed above all at solving social problems, but in about 2 years and not in 10 or 15. Generally speaking, perestroika proceeds in 3 directions: Firstly, there is reinforcement of the social orientation, secondly, more intensive development and speeding up of the scientific and technical revolution, and thirdly, reform of management.

[Question] To judge by Mihail Gorbachev's recent speech in Murmansk, and in view of the mindset of the Soviet people, the primary danger to further progress of the economic reform lies especially in fear of price increases, inflation, and consequently the danger to the standard of living of the workers. How real is this danger?

[Answer] I want to say first that we have not yet made a decision to raise prices. It is true that we have decided to reform retail prices, but it is not as yet known what the reform will represent, that is, the products whose prices will be raised or lowered. Two important factors enter into play here. The first is that the retail price reform will be implemented in a general national, democratic way. The draft proposal for this reform will be published and subjected to public discussion. The second is that a plenum of the CPSU Central Committee has issued a directive to the effect that prices must not lower the standard of living of the population as a result of the reform, and in individual categories must even raise this standard.

[Question] How do you intend to accomplish this?

[Answer] Very simply, by paying compensation. We will raise the prices of meat and dairy products, for example, and will give the population compensation of approximately 25 rubles. Let us say that I have a family of three; my compensation would be 75 rubles. Low-income families, who otherwise consume less meat, will benefit, however paradoxical this may seem. The last time meat and dairy prices were changed in our country was in 1962. Costs have risen since that time, and so we pay a subsidy of 3 rubles for meat and 30 kopeks for a liter of milk. The subsidy paid out of the state budget for milk and meat amounts to 57 billion rubles out of a total budget of 430 billion. Hence because of the low prices a good assortment is not available, there is no selection, and the government has a trade deficit. And all this is socially unjust. A low price would seem to ensure social justice, but in reality a larger subsidy is received by the person who buys more meat, and he is the one who receives higher wages. All this will be brought out in the public discussion, and if the majority of the people are in favor of it, we will carry out the price reform.

[Question] Another problem which seems to worry the Soviet people is that of unemployment, because it does not appear to be possible from either the ideological or the practical viewpoint to reconcile it with their ideas of socialism.

[Answer] It would be unrealistic and dangerous to close our eyes to this problem. We will have a major freeing of manpower. We are building incentives into the economic mechanism to increase labor productivity, for example, by a factor of 2.3 to 2.5 by the year 2000.

First of all manual labor will be reduced. Currently one-half of our manual laborers and kolkhoz workers are employed in manual labor, and this figure should be reduced to 15 to 20 percent by 2000. About 30 million persons will be displaced from jobs involving manual labor. This process has already begun, especially in the sectors making the transition to the new operating conditions.

Take, for example, the Minsk railroads, which were the first in this sector to shift to the new working and wage payment conditions. A total of 12,000 workers have been released. Subsequently more than 10 railroad enterprises switched to the same conditions and 125,000 workers were released. Finally, all 30 railroad enterprises will switch to this system in 1987, and it is anticipated that 270,000 workers will be released.

[Question] How do you intend to solve this problem now or in the future?

[Answer] The process is currently being carried out on a large scale in the railroad system. When other areas need manpower, these people will be employed. But when the process assumes larger proportions in industry, we will have to deal with it in earnest, but we will not permit unemployment. This is our official policy and, unlike many of my colleagues, I actively support it.

[Question] What are your arguments?

[Answer] The manpower resource situation in the USSR differs from that in many other countries. We went through a period during which we suffered the demographic consequences of war, when population growth normally declined, and now the children of the persons born during wartime, who are few in number, are coming of working age. There is accordingly a smaller influx of able-bodied persons. At the same time, those who were not in the war are retiring, and there are many of them.

The number of able-bodied persons in the USSR usually increased by 5 million over a 5-year period, but during the 12th 5-year plan increased by only 3 million. We have a shortage of 8 million able-bodied persons. In the aggregate, over the 15 years up to the year 2000 our manpower resources will increase by 20 million persons fewer than during the previous 15 years. This alleviates

our unemployment problem. Consequently, we have a very undeveloped service sector and a major manpower shortage in health care, education, child day care centers, and housing construction.

[Question] But according to many economists a certain percentage of the unemployed could serve to exert pressure on the employed to do better work.

[Answer] This is an illusion. My comrades, such as Shmelev, who wrote an excellent article in *NOVIY MIR*, defends the thesis that moderate unemployment increases labor productivity. If we consider Yugoslavia, we do not find that unemployment has this result. There are measures for this purpose which can be applied to increase labor productivity; the person who does good work should be paid well, and the person who does not work well should be paid low wages. But the main thing is that even moderate unemployment disarms us. It would paralyze our agencies which would have to concern themselves with it to solve the unemployment problem and retrain the unemployed, inasmuch as the solution would be based on government payment for the unemployed. Lastly, the absence of unemployment is a major advantage of socialism. I was recently in the GDR. When I spoke to the trade unions about perestroika, the main question was, "are you really going to allow unemployment? Have you taken leave of your senses? Surely you know what this means."

[Question] But if you advocate the influence of economic measures and the marketplace in the economic reform, what role will be left for the previously sacrosanct central planning in socialism?

[Answer] We are broadening and intensifying the market and money commodity relationships. We do not regard this as any concession to capitalism or to the theory of convergence. Capitalism tries to acquire many things which do not belong to it. Nor does the marketplace, which was known long before capitalism, belong to it. After all, money-commodity relationships are not important in themselves; it is a question rather of what they reflect, what is their economic content, and who is the producer of a commodity, whether it be a capitalist or a socialist enterprise. Consequently, we want to extend our reformed market beyond consumer goods to wholesale trade as well. This is one of the most complicated processes of perestroika.

[Question] I must repeat the question: what role does the plan play in the process?

[Answer] The substance of our economic reform is shift from administrative to economic management methods, but it would be wrong to construe the plan as a system of tasks addressed. There are various management methods. One of them is rigorous planning, when a central authority issues directives which are to be carried out. Then we have flexible management, when there is a

self-regulating mechanism in addition to the administrative authority, when the majority of decisions in enterprises are made independently and the central authority merely corrects certain things. From the viewpoint of ideological orientation we want to shift from rigorous to flexible management by means of economic methods. Economic management, management by means of special interests and the market, is of course more complicated than administrative management. It requires more information and better qualified personnel, but it is more efficient and we want to follow this course. Implementing this form of management is based on special interests and utilization of the market, and so we see no conflict such that the plan opposed to the market. We want to manage flexibly, through economic norms.

[Question] Perestroika is something new and radical, not just for the USSR but for the world of socialism, no matter how we interpret this term. The Soviet model has always had an impact on other socialist countries from the political, ideological, and economic viewpoints. What effect do you expect perestroika to have in these areas on other socialist countries?

[Answer] Frankly speaking, I cannot answer this question. It should be posed to representatives of other countries. We do not consider our mode of operation to be the only one and proper for all times and situations. The socialist countries find themselves in different circumstances and have different problems. What may be good for us may be bad for others, or vice versa. Far be it from me to demand that other countries mechanically copy perestroika. However, the experience of one country is unquestionably of interest to another, and so it is with perestroika.

Nevertheless, whatever the GDR, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Yugoslavia, or China derive from it is the concern of these countries and not ours. It is clear, however, that perestroika in the USSR will have an effect on the development of economic scientific-technological and other relations with these countries, and this also applies to perestroika in the context of the SEV.

[Box, p 53]

The Invisible Fruits of Perestroika

In our talk with Abel Aganbegyan, and from listening to his address at the Economic Institute in Zagreb, we gained the impression that during his mission in Yugoslavia he wanted to demonstrate the first fruits of perestroika, which is the subject of so much discussion throughout the world, and he accordingly places them in the context of its further development. Although these results are not spectacular, the foremost Soviet economist has arguments and figures demonstrating positive developments. Following are several examples.

"Our most acute social problem is housing. Only 83 percent of families in the Soviet Union have housing, and the majority of housing units have neither plumbing nor central heating nor water supply. We have not increased the volume of housing construction over the last 20 years. Consequently, the first thing we did with perestroika in the area of speeding up development of the social sphere was to reassign funds for housing construction. Thus, in 1987 we will build about 2.4 million apartments, and 3 million in 1990. In the aggregate, by the year 2000 we will have built 40 million apartments so as to give every family an apartment of its own.

"Another direction of improvement in the social sphere is supply of basic food items such as milk, dairy products, vegetables, and fruit. We consume less meat per inhabitant than do other countries. All this is the result of the lagging behind of agriculture from one 5-year plan to another. We once exported food products, and now we import them. Accordingly, only under the 12th 5-year plan have major measures been taken in agricultural policy. We increased agricultural output by 5.1 percent in 1986, a year not characterized by particularly good weather conditions. There was an increase in the output of meat, wheat, and other farm products. We accomplished more than we had over the past 5 years. However, all this increase in output was not utilized to bring about appreciable improvement in the standard of living of the population. Why? We had to reduce imports of agricultural products, and we want to put an end to such imports by 1990. Consequently, the majority of families have not yet felt the impact of this increase in farm production. Under conditions of a huge shortage, an increase of 4 to 6 percent in the volume of these products has no effect. Many people failed to feel any difference.

"The third area is health care. Highly negative trends manifested themselves in our social development in the past. If we go back to the mid-1960s, we find that the statistics were good. We had almost the lowest death rate in the world (6.7 per 1,000 inhabitants), infant mortality was fairly low, and the average life expectancy was around 70 years, as it was in Japan, the leading country in the world in this respect. Things have been getting progressively worse since that time. Extensive economic development and budgetary needs led to increase in the production of alcoholic beverages. For example, over the last 15 years the production of vodka doubled, and that of wine quadrupled. Alcoholism became widespread. This was paralleled by sharp increase in the death rate among males of working age, the average life expectancy dropped 2 years, and infant mortality increased. This was horrible. Hence perestroika proceeded in the direction of improving health care. The fight against alcoholism began. We cut alcohol consumption in half in 2 years. This had its effect in decline of male mortality, poisoning, and work-related accidents (by 22 percent), while at the same time infant mortality declined and the life expectancy increased 2 years. We increased doctors'

earnings by 30 percent and permitted private medical practice. We are also introducing new equipment, acquiring drugs, and reducing the administrative staff in the Ministry of Health.

"A number of measures are also being taken in other areas affecting the standard of living. We intend to increase the service sector threefold. When we enacted the pension law in 1956, it was the best in the world, with the lowest retirement age and the best pensions, amounting to about 60 percent of average wages. Wages have increased sharply since that time, while pensions have stagnated and we are faced with a bad situation in the area of pension insurance. We are now devising a new pension system."

6115

ALBANIA

Violations of Law by Clergy, Faithful Recalled 21000004 Pristina RILINDJA in Albanian 4 Dec 87 p 8

[Article by H. Meka: "Religious Ceremonies for Political Purposes"]

[Excerpts] In the framework of the comprehensive actions and activities which are being carried out by progressive forces in Peje Commune for the purpose of stabilizing the political situation and security conditions, special attention is being given to the examination of matters related to religious activity because it has been determined that, in some situations, the religious communities are attempting to influence political affairs.

An examination of this matter in some executive organs of the socio-political organizations has revealed that the majority of the members and clergy of the three religious faiths support our socialist self-managing society and the coexistence of all nationalities. However, there are still cases where some religious preachers exceed the constitutional and legal limits of their activity and attempt to influence political life. These tendencies appeared most often after 1981 when a number of hodjas and Catholic or Orthodox priests began to use various religious ceremonies and gatherings for political purposes, seeking to influence the disruption or exacerbation of international relations. On numerous occasions the Catholic and Orthodox churches presented themselves as representatives of the country, identifying religion with the nation. A number of clergymen from the ranks of the Albanian nationality religious community also equated the Muslim nation with the religion.

Spreading hatred and religious intolerance, some clergymen promote their religion while attempting, by all means, to belittle the others. By equating religion and the nation they exert a negative influence on international relations and reject efforts for a just resolution of the nationality issue based on principles of equality, the affirmation of each person's nationality, etc. On more

than a few occasions the clergy have circulated propaganda against mixed marriages between people from different nations or nationalities or people from one nation but with different beliefs.

Also, it has been determined that some clergymen who are involved with the religious communities are also connected with nationalistic and hostile elements. By means of religious publications and verbal and other forms of propaganda they stress the so-called danger to their nationality from other nationalists and this results in the appearance of revanchist and chauvinist manifestations and international hatred. Such activities by clergy are present, in particular, in areas in which the activity of the socio-political organizations charged with exerting the main influence and initiating political-ideological and legal measures against such manifestations and against individuals who, while carrying out their activities, cause a deterioration of international relations, is not up to the required level.

There have been occasions when some religious ceremonies, especially funerals, have been utilized for manifestations of nationalistic feelings. These manifestations have occurred, in particular, at the time of the death of any individual who was an advocate of Albanian nationalism and separatism.

The escalation of Albanian nationalism and irredentism, such as the damaging of graves, etc, has contributed to a considerable extent, to the activity of the clerical-nationalistic forces in the Serbian Orthodox Church. This has resulted in the evacuation of Serbs and Montenegrins, and then, the alliances of conservative forces within the Serbian church with Serbian and Montenegrin nationalists and with Chetnik remnants abroad.

The activity of the Islamic religious community is oriented toward building new mosques and maintaining the existing ones, and it sometimes happens that the need arises to build mosques to spite the Serbs and Montenegrins and to leave for future generations religious institutions with a cultural and historic value. In order to achieve these aims they collect funds from the faithful, especially from our workers who work abroad.

It has been determined that the Catholic religious community is very active in disseminating an antisocialist and anticommunist ideology among all generations of believers. A number of clergy, oriented in this direction, achieve their goals by organizing the cultural and recreational activities of young athletes, organizing excursions and other activities for spending their free time.

Recently there have been cases in which some members of the League of Communists, intellectuals and even socio-political workers have participated in religious events and church gatherings, celebrations, etc, at which efforts were made to eliminate the socio-class and socialist definition of peoples. Furthermore, in some cases, there were signs of nationalism in these manifestations.

Some religious communities or individuals who are active in them are connected with various religious institutions abroad or with extremist political emigres from whom they seek material assistance.

In the light of all these things, the League of Communists and other progressive forces should exert more effort to ensure that religious activity is in accordance with the Constitution and the law, not permitting it to become involved with political issues and other matters which are harmful to international relations and to the advancement of all nations and nationalities in the commune.

/9738

HUNGARY

Lawsuits Against State Institutions Increasing
25000037a Budapest OTLET in Hungarian 16 Oct 87p 10

["I am Suing the State," article by A.S.]

[Text] "The legislator's intentions do not always correspond to the methods of the institutions"

A new type of man is being born, who is cleverly "fresh," because he does not respect office and institution, and fights for his right even against monopolies. Let's just remember: a whole country was keeping its fingers crossed for the lawyer who was suing the IBUSZ, the Merkur and other prestigious companies for a few forints. The citizen, becoming more and more assertive, sues not his mother-in-law or fellow inheritor, but the state itself, or its institutions.

In recent years, there has been a growing number of lawsuits won by citizens against judicial organizations. For example, someone kept in jail unlawfully can demand indemnification. According to a latest modification of the law, damages are to be paid for preliminary detention and temporary medical care if the suspect is not the perpetrator, or the act committed is not a criminal one. The new law, which is not yet in effect, has broadened the conditions for paying damages, and this not by accident. The institution [of paying damages] is peripheral, or rather it was handled as such. By all events, while the Ministry of Justice paid 255 thousand forints for damages in 1982, this number was more than 1.5 million forints in 1986. This seems to point to a tendency, since the number of claims is growing, too. Naturally, no one should imagine massive injustice, since there are only a couple of dozen such cases. What we have to be happy about is, of course, not that the rapist killer gets paid for damages for sitting five months longer, but that the institution exists and improves its operation. Nowadays, one question among others is, how satisfied the indemnified person can feel after a lawsuit for damages.

We do not have such big cases like the bourgeois countries. About fifteen years ago, a princess in West Germany received 50,000 marks in damages for having been reproached for an abortion that had never taken place. In our country, it is unthinkable that such an amount would be paid for non-material damages, as a similar case would be classified. Even though we do not have princesses, we do have bus drivers. We could read a lot about one of them recently. He was blamed for a traffic accident with a tragic outcome; he was formally charged and his driver's license was revoked for the whole period of the legal process. Consequently, he could work only in a position where his income was substantially lower than in his previous position. Although the court acquitted him of the charges, he was not entitled to get compensation for his loss of income... Despite the fact that in this case there was also an exactly determinable amount of money, in addition to the immeasurable damage that can be caused by a ruined family, or relationships destroyed by a stigmatized environment. The two latter are disadvantages for which no one is entitled to get damages or any kind of indemnification in today's Hungary. Although the law knows the concept of material indemnity (this corresponds to the old "smart-money"), someone's honor cannot be fully restored in practice.

When this problem was raised not so long ago, some lawyers said that such an institution degrades man to mere goods. The essence was pure theory, and let's add, a terribly wrong theory. If, mistakenly, the police take me away handcuffed, in broad daylight, under the eyes of the neighbors, who will pay me damages because the neighbors continue to point at me for years after my innocence is determined? In the best of cases, the Ministry of Justice will reimburse me for my loss of salary and, perhaps, my legal expenses. The Ministry is the final station for damages, which are paid from a separate fund. Perhaps, the cause of why there are no spectacular lawsuits for damages in our country should be looked for right here. The Ministry, or the court concerned, anticipates the lawsuits "against the state." The judicial main department investigates the case in question, makes a judgment about the legitimacy and extent of the damages, and the Ministry pays. The citizen does not even start a new lawsuit, and there is not even need for it, since these cases are about obvious matters the factuality of which is hardly disputable. For example, if a process drags on, a file gets lost, and therefore a sentence is given later, it may turn out that the accused should have been free already for two months. The professional jargon calls this "oversitting." This entitles the person in question to get damages, but he receives it only if he is aware of his rights. According to lawyers, the "prison news" operates more and more efficiently, and it is also a fact that the majority of those indemnified are not gentle citizens. However, it is worthwhile saying a few words about how well the lawyers' "news network," more exactly, informational work fares. The law knows the judge's obligation to inform, nevertheless, failure to comply with it has never resulted in any consequences, unless we regard as such the disadvantage of one of the

parties in the lawsuit. Judges say that recently professional circles have been dealing with this institution. Giving information and acquainting people with their rights, however, is not typical of police organizations at all. But then, why would investigators warn the suspect what his or her rights are? They would only make their own job more difficult. And it would really be too nice if, after having unlawfully kept someone in jail, the police themselves informed the victim that he is entitled to damages... Although it would be appropriate if the organization the citizen gets in contact with gave full information.

The legislator's intention do not always correspond to the methods of the institutions. That's why it is necessary to establish more exact and precise guarantees, and to enforce the obligation of judges to give information and to acquaint people with their rights. The latter should include the police, too, and every organization which is involved in a given phase of the process. It is necessary so that possible grievances would not be immaterial, unnameable, and the citizen can have more chance to fight the possible injustice of the institutions.

13212

History of Autonomous Hungarian Region in Romania (1952-1968) Reviewed

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[Article by Ildiko Lipcsey, academician at the Institute of History, Hungarian Academy of Sciences: "The Transylvanian Autonomous Region Was Created 35 Years Ago"]

[Text] Nationalities policy: 1945-1952

Two months after the four-power Paris conference of foreign ministers, Romanian Communist Party [RCP] Executive Secretary Gheorge Gheorghiu-Dej announced the Party's statement of principles concerning nationalities. "The Transylvanian Hungarian population is viewed as a democratic ally in the struggle against reactionaries... Fulfilling the civil rights of coexisting nationalities, and guaranteeing all their rights depends on Romania's democratization, and continues to remain our party's chief task. This statement was made at the RCP CC's 6 July 1947 expanded meeting. (Footnote 1) (Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej: "The RCP's Position Relative to Chauvinist and Revisionist Tendencies" RCP No 13, 1946) Stated differently: in the political struggle between the Romanian Left on the one hand, and its former partners in coalition on the other, the Left was assured of the Hungarian People's Federation's [MNSZ] support. The former coalition included Iuliu Maniu's National peasant party and I. C. Bratianu's National Liberal party. The MNSZ represented the interests of 500,000 Hungarians in Romania. The political struggle took place between September 1944 and June 1947, during which time the MNSZ was able to build and

reinforce its Hungarian language educational system from nursery schools to universities, as well as a network of cultural and scientific institutions, theaters, publishing houses, libraries, business organizations, and associations. Use of the Hungarian language was accepted in public life, including administrative and judicial processes. Hungarians took part in political and economic activities in proportion to their numbers.

In 1945 and 1946, the first two years of the Groza cabinet, Romania's nationality policies were influenced by yet another factor. This factor was defined by the Executive Secretary as follows: "Those Romanian comrades who fail to make clear that Transylvania had been annexed to a democratic Romania, are making a mistake." Expressed in clearer terms: from the nationalities' viewpoint, the Romanian nation had to be stabilized by all means prior to peace negotiations. It was then that promises were made to incorporate the nationalities law into the Romanian constitution. After such an encouraging beginning, it was hoped that the democratic nationalities policies would become permanent. Beyond that: the peace treaties were signed in February 1947, and accords concerning mutual friendship and cultural matters were reached. All necessary conditions for the establishment of international relationships appeared to exist. The observation of mutual interests and a conciliatory attitude were to be the hallmarks of international policies—just as in domestic policies where the construction of a people's democratic and socialist system of society, based on new social and economic conceptions free from exploitation was the aim.

Following its 10-11 June 1948 meeting the Romanian Workers Party [RWP] CC passed a resolution that affected every aspect of party policy. The resolution held that (1) with the beginning of collectivization and with the ratification of the Romanian constitution in April, the people's democratic revolution entered a new phase; (2) the resolution passed by the Information Office of Communist Parties condemning Yugoslavia was adopted; (3) the Marshall plan was rejected; (4) socialist construction takes place amid an increasing class struggle; (5) rejection of the idea of class struggle is tantamount to collaboration with the class enemy; and (6) the typical example for such conduct was manifested by Lucretiu Patrascanu.

Undoubtedly, nationality policies also entered a new phase. A similar phase was described by Stalin in 1913 and 1926 as one in which the problematics surrounding nations and nationalities are undoubtedly essential, but are not the most important issues of revolutionary transformation; and that revolutions can have phases in which some issues of detail (by virtue of tactical considerations) temporarily come to the (strategic) forefront. Stalin's two studies were published by the RCP in Kolozsvár. (Footnote 2) (I. V. Stalin: "Marxism and the National Issue" Kolozsvár, RCP 1946, and "The National Issue and Leninism" Kolozsvár, 1949) Responding to the RWP resolution, it was announced at

the 23-25 July 1948 MNSZ meeting in Csikszereda that insofar as coexisting nationalities were concerned, "all political, economic and cultural expressions must be made in the spirit of class struggle." (Footnote 3) (VILAGOSSAG [Light] 21 August 1948) Second, Vasile Luca wrote an article in October opposing the seclusion of nationalities. (Footnote 4) (Vasile Luca: "The Resolution of the Nationalities Issue—for a Lasting Peace and a People's Democracy" 1-2 October 1948) And third, the RWP established an official position concerning nationalities, in which all concerned received their share of condemnation: the Hungarians for their nationalism, the Germans for sympathizing with Hitler, the Serbians for their Titoism, the Ukrainians and the Bulgarians for collaborating with the kulaks, the Turks and Greeks for collaborating with the imperialists, and the Jews for Zionism. Among the charges levied against Patrascanu Romanian chauvinism was emphasized, and with that Gheorghiu-Dej ousted his potential enemy and the best educated leader within the RWP. Yet another significant obstacle was removed from the path toward the exercise of monopolistic power. (Footnote 5) (ROMANIAI MAGYAR SZO [Romanian Hungarian Word] 15 December 1948)

Insofar as Hungarians of Romania were concerned, they were suspected, accused or arrested on trumped-up charges linked to events in Hungary already in 1947. For example, the "anti-republic" conspiracy within the Hungarian Smallholders Party, and the Mindszenty and Rajk trials in Hungary also rendered Hungarians in Romania to be suspects of anti-state conspiracy, or as agents of Western intelligence services and the Gestapo. In 1949-1950 the entire MNSZ leadership fell victim to Romanian conceptual trials. The victims came from all walks of life, including writers, professors, the clergy, communists, social democrats, members of the intelligentsia and workers. Between 1949 and 1952 the work of the new MNSZ leadership was limited to conveying RWP resolutions, and to mobilizing Hungarians in the spirit of those resolutions Hungarians were supposed to stand fast jointly with all Romanians on the actual front lines of the ever-increasing class struggle, which (1) on the political and ideological level meant the politics of peace, fight against international imperialism and the revision of party membership; (2) in economic life meant the fulfillment of the two "one year plans," the construction of a canal linking the Danube and the Black Sea, and of the Scinteia House, the popularization of sowing, harvesting and collection plans, and of work contests and evening educational classes; and (3) in cultural and scientific life represented campaigns for socialist-realist literature, and against bourgeois ideologies, and nationalistic and cosmopolitan trends.

Accordingly, a new, well-prepared multi-step phase of nationalities policies had its beginnings. In the political sphere the new policy demanded a change in the policy of alliances with respect to both the partners in coalition, and the Allies. In the economic sphere the reckoning with the so called "class enemy" (i.e. in the countryside

the kulaks) was either complete or in progress. The cultural and ideological sphere was still to be dealt with. The review of Hungarian cultural and scientific life began in the spring of 1950. It covered the educational system, the publishers as well as literature. In May 1950 ELORE [Forward] had this to say about the Hungarian faculty of the Bolyai University: although the "conscious reactionary agents" have disappeared, but the extent to which marxist-leninist methods are applied, and to which the party's teachings prevail is not satisfactory. (Footnote 6) (ELORE 13 May 1950) In July the workings of the Department of History were dissected. According to UTUNK [Our Way], several faculty members were accused of having committed the crime of being idealists, objective, cosmopolitan or nationalistic. (Footnote 7) (UTUNK July 1950) Thereafter the focus shifted to the State Hungarian Theater at Kolozsvár and on Hungarian artistic institutions. At the 9-11 March 1951 meeting of the Kolozsvár chapter of the Writers Association "socialist realism" became the accepted standard. The highest praise one could receive was an announcement that "he wrote the most beautiful poem about Stalin," or that he chose "class struggle in the countryside," "the planned economy," or "life in a major industrial plant" as his topic. It was appropriate to critically judge literary works published between the two world wars, as well as to criticize the representatives of Hítel, Erdélyi Fiatalok and Transylvaniam, and even the marxist editor of KORUNK [Our Age], Gábor Gaál. Gaál, as well as others were forced to publicly exercise self-criticism, an event that hastened Gaál's early death. Toward the end of 1951 a public meeting focused on issues 4 and 5 of the IRODALMI ALMANACH [Literary Almanac] of Kolozsvár. The periodical was examined from the following viewpoints: (1) whether the published articles met literary criteria established by Lenin and Stalin; (2) whether they reflected the battle waged by the party and the working class in a given phase of socialism; and (3) whether the periodical accepted its share in the struggle waged by Romanian literature for the cause of peace and for socialist realism. The subsequent admonition stated that "not a single piece of original literary work presented in the combined issue [Issue 4-5] of IRODALMI ALMANACH dealt with 23 August or 7 November, nor did the articles deal with the other great holiday of the party and of the people: the anniversary of the party executive secretary's birthday." The fact that the universally respected Gaál was selected to make the keynote presentation—this, following his May 1950 denigration and expulsion from the party—was highly revealing of the spirit of that age.

The above-mentioned issue of IRODALMI ALMANACH included an article entitled "Active Patriotism" by Deputy Minister for Nationalities Affairs Lajos Takats. (Footnote 8) (IRODALMI ALMANACH No 4-5, 1951 pp 785-791) The article praised stalinist nationalities policies as a result of which 13,000 nationalities representatives were chosen in the December 1950 people's council elections, and 12,645 members of nationalities worked in 399 collective farms. The article also credited

stalinist nationalities policies for the existence of 17 daily nationalities newspapers (of which 7 were Hungarian), and 43 periodicals (of which 35 were Hungarian). Credit was due to stalinist policies also for the facts that between 1945 and 1950, 3200 books and brochures were published in 10 million copies (2500 books and brochures in 2.5 million copies in Hungarian), and that Hungarian theaters were functioning in Kolozsvár, Marosvásárhely, Nagyvárad, and Sepsiszentgyörgy, while Nagyszeben and Temesvár had German theaters, and in Bucharest and Iasi one could find Yiddish theaters. Takats provided education-related data also. Insofar as Hungarian education was concerned, a significant change took place as compared to data pertaining to the academic year 1948-1949. Takats' article explains why the Bolyai University faculty, and the music, performing arts, and creative arts faculties of the Kolozsvár Academy of the Arts were subject to an earlier review. The independence of these faculties had to be done away with, Takats explains, because in and of themselves they were easily swayed in the direction of bourgeois ideologies, cosmopolitanism, and nationalism. By uniting these institutions with Romanian institutions of similar scope the first step was taken toward the liquidation of Hungarian institutions of higher education. As a result of this move, the music and creative arts departments of the previously independent academy became departments of other Romanian academies, while the performing arts department was transferred to Marosvásárhely (!) (While during the academic year 1948-1949 there were 7 Hungarian language institutions of higher education in Romania, by the academic year 1950-1951 that number was reduced by two. The seven Hungarian language institutions of higher education in 1948-1949 were the Bolyai University, the Arts, Agriculture and Mechanical Engineering faculties of the Academy, the Medical and Pharmaceutical University, and two parochial academies.)

Improvements or deteriorations in nationalities policies were always the results of one or another, or a combination of both foreign or domestic political factors. The years 1950 and 1951 were filled with hardships in the people's democracies. Gheorghiu-Dej was methodically preparing for the transfer of power, and as far as he was concerned, the situation became ripe in 1952. At the May 1952 RWP CC session Finance Minister Vasile Luca, Interior Minister Teohari Georgescu and Foreign Minister Ana Pauker were criticized, then expelled from the party. (Footnote 9) (ROMANIAI MAGYAR SZO 22 January 1952 [See discrepancy between publication date and event, and the possible discrepancy in the name of the publication—i.e. ROMANIAI MAGYAR SZO versus UTUNK, in the context of the next paragraph, first sentence.]) The personal cult of the party executive secretary was reinforced. He was fully secure in his position—sufficiently secure to take the next step in nationalities policies. At this time a backward step.

The significance of the UTUNK June 1952 lead article rests not in the fact that a reason was provided for the

Population distribution within MAT was as follows: (Footnote 12) (Ibid)

County	Total Population	Hungarian Population	City	Hungarian Population
Udvarhely	127,330	123,959	Szekelyudvarhely	9,549
Csik	146,685	127,481	Csikszereda	5,280
Haromszek	138,441	121,491	Sepsiszentgyorgy	12,670
Maros	327,925	166,738	Marosvasarhely	34,943
TOTAL	740,381	539,669		62,442

[City population figures were not totaled in the original Hungarian.]

expulsion of Luca-Georgescu-Pauker trio. It was significant that the periodical once again continued to focus on Hungarian institutional activities, a focus that began in 1950. The article revealed that as of June 1952 nationalism and cosmopolitanism had not been eradicated from the Association of Hungarian Composers and Creative Artists, the Marosvasarhely Institute for the Performing Arts, and the Hungarian Academy of Legal and Economic Sciences of Kolozsvar: The liquidation of the Academy of Legal and Economic Sciences, in the form of a merger, was the next logical step.

24 September 1951: "The Constitution of Socialist Construction"

In his report conveying the draft constitution for debate, Gheorghiu-Dej stated that the constitution must not only reflect the fact that three economic formations were present in the transition from capitalism to socialism (i.e. the capitalist, the small merchandise producer and the socialist formations), and that civil rights were guaranteed for a decisive majority of the population, including city and country workers. Instead, the constitution must also reflect the fact that the nationalities policies of the Romanian communist party are founded on the appropriate and consistent application of stalinist teachings. In establishing political subdivisions within the People's Republic of Romania they considered the fact that (Section 19:) "the Autonomus Hungarian Territory [MAT] of the Romanian Peoples Republic is composed of the compact area inhabited by the Szekely people and that the MAT has an autonomous public management

elected by the population of the Autonomous Territory. MAT included the following districts: Csik, Erdoszentgyorgy, Gyergyoszentmiklos, Kezdivasarhely, Marosheviz, Marosvasarhely, Regen, Szepsiszentgyorgy and Szekelyudvarhely. Marosvasarhely will be the government center for MAT." (Section 20:) "The laws and decision made by the central authorities of the Romanian People's Republic are binding within MAT." (Section 21:) "Rules and regulations governing MAT shall be worked out by the People's Council of the Autonomous Territory, and the People's Council shall submit the same for approval to the Greater National Assembly of the Romanian People's Republic.(Footnote 10) ("The Constitution of the People's Republic of Romania" Bucharest, Romanian People's Republic official publication 1952 pp 16-17)

Sections 19-21 of the constitution make it apparent that the Szekely districts of Aranyosszek, Barcasag and Moldva were excluded from MAT, and that only the counties of Udvarhely, Csik, Haromszek and Maros were included. (According to the 1948 census there were 1,499,851 Hungarians in Romania, comprising 9.4 percent of the total population.) (Footnote 11) (ROMANIAI MAGYAR SZO 18 March 1952)

In addition to what the above chart shows, the following counties contained significant numbers of Hungarians (per the 1948 political subdivision):

Accordingly, MAT contained only one third of the Hungarian population of Romania. Section 21 promised the establishment of a separate Rules and Regulations

County	Total Population	Hungarian Population	City	Hungarian Population
Kolozs	366,193	118,823	Kolozsvar	167,977
Szilagy	373,220	141,369	Zilah	6,566
Temes	528,662	108,481	Temesvar	16,139
Binar	515,591	164,896	Nagyvarad	52,541
Szatmar	312,391	104,419	Szatmar	30,535

which would assure self-government, those Rules and Regulations, however, were not promulgated. MAT's pattern was that of the "socialist territorial autonomy" described in Stalin's 1936 constitution, which provided greater opportunities for minorities in using their native language. While in preparing the 1924 constitution Stalin's forceful centralizing intent was overshadowed by Lenin's influence, by 1936 nothing stood in the way of materializing Stalin's design, which was the opposite of the Swiss system of cantons, in which each canton had its own constitution and government. (Footnote 13) (The area of Switzerland is 41,288 square kilometers. Its inhabitants number 6,610,000. Two thirds of the population speaks German, 20 percent speaks French, 10 percent speaks Italian, and some 50,000 individuals speak the Rhaeto-Romanic language. L. Nagy: "World Atlas" Budapest 1986) In reality, MAT should have reflected the Swiss conception. All laws and action of the central authority were enforced within MAT, local councils, the militia, and the judicial organs were subordinate to the appropriate central organs. Issues of local, political or cultural character were within the jurisdiction of territorial institutions. Between the two world wars Transylvania was flooded with bureaucrats from Romania proper and virtually all state-supported school teachers in Szekely country were from the Regat. In contrast, it was reassuring that on this occasion the emphasis was on selecting individuals serving in councils, public management and in the administration of justice—including leadership positions—as well as teachers from among local specialist available in Szekely land.

Insofar as opportunities for the use of the Hungarian language were concerned, it was announced that territorial, district, city, and municipal authorities will use the Hungarian language. The announcement was made in conjunction with the presentation of the constitution. While obviously there would be no limitations on the use of the Romanian and other languages, the official state language to be used in contacts involving the central government and the higher levels of public management should be the Romanian. (Footnote 14) ("The Draft Constitution of the Romanian People's Republic—Questions and Answers Regarding the Establishment of MAT. To Be Used by Agitators" Bucharest 1952) MAT's rules and regulations as well as its documents were published in both the Hungarian and the Romanian languages. Accordingly, the essential difference between MAT and the rest of the Romanian territories was that within MAT an existing natural condition was sanctioned by law. A natural condition, because in MAT a substantial majority of the population was of the Hungarian nationality. At that time, however, one could not suspect that the unobstructed use of the Romanian, German and Hungarian languages, a condition that was heretofore a matter of fact throughout Transylvania's nationalities areas, will be henceforth restricted to MAT.

IGAZSAG (Truth), the communist party's Kolozsvár daily newspaper on 29 January 1953 published Gheorghiu-Dej's announcement to the effect that in Romania

the nationalities problem had been settled. According to Gheorghiu-Dej, such settlement took place because history taught the RWP that "socialism cannot be fully victorious without resolving the nationalities issue.... The assurance of territorial autonomy in government reinforces the confidence of Hungarian workers in Romanian workers, it brings the masses of Hungarian workers closer to the governmental machinery, it involves them in communal work, and it provides them with broader opportunities so that they can participate in the leadership of the country and in the construction of socialism." (Footnote 15) ("The Establishment of MAT—a Recent Success of the Party's Leninist-Stalinist National Policies" RWP official publication Bucharest 26 September 1952) Judging by the executive secretary's announcement—they "resolved the nationalities issue"—it logically followed that there no longer was a need for nationalities organizations, such as the Hungarian People's Federation, or even the Ministry of Nationalities Affairs. The reasoning: these organizations carried the potential of national seclusion and hindered cooperation between the Romanian and the Hungarian people (the two coexisting nationalities). (A similar text was publicized in 1959, at the time the Babes and the Bolyai universities were merged.)

MAT reflected all those processes which took place in the country's life. Accordingly, it was an authentic reflection of the 1950's and 1960's. Following Stalin's death in 1953, an opportunity emerged both in the Soviet Union and in the people's democracies to assume a healthy course of development. These changes had no effect on Romania: the personal cult of Gheorghiu-Dej did not change at all. The life of society continued to be determined by the "class struggle," and, according to a December 1955 statement made at the Second RWP Congress, the course of the economy continued to be determined by increased crude oil, mining, uranium, chemical industry, electrical and farm machinery production and by the continued growth of the socialist sector within agriculture. Briefly, all this amounted to the acceleration of establishing foundations for socialism. In part, this program had a salutary effect on MAT, because hopes were raised that by virtue of the program some local unemployment problems would be resolved. Nevertheless everything was pursued in a campaign fashion: the innovation movement as well as fulfillment of unrealistic, target setting goals pinned to sowing, collecting the harvest, and broadening the cooperative movement. The production of consumer goods, and the satisfaction of consumer needs continued to be neglected.

The situation was the same in political and cultural life. More than a year after Stalin's death they completed the protracted Patrascanu case by executing him and several of his associates. This took place in April 1954. The 23-27 March 1953 session of the Writers Association was still marked by Stalin's "ingenious" teaching about literature and the arts. On 30-31 March, the Kolozsvár chapter of the Writers Union reviewed one of the first

"socialist realist" books that appeared in Hungary: "At the Highest Temperature," authored by Istvan Nagy. In April MAT organized a creative arts exhibit. The only works of art recognized by state awards were in the category of "Work-Methodology Transfer" and "The Factory Obtained a Soviet Machine." And while writers were supposed to present images of "the fulfillment of tasks assigned to us by the magnificent era of Stalin," in June 1953 the Kolozsvar-based IRODALMI ALMANACH [Literary Almanach] was shut down. In retrospect one could understand why that periodical was the subject of so much criticism. (In its place came the monthly periodical IGAZ SZO [True Word] published in Marosvasarhely.) It happened thereafter that the Hungarian language Agricultural Academy in Kolozsvar, and the Hungarian department in the Engineering School were also shut down. In late 1955 the Hungarian editorial offices of the State Literary and Artistic Publishers were also transferred to Marosvasarhely. Except for the area that comprised MAT, bilingual signs slowly disappeared throughout Transylvania, and obstacles were placed in the way of bringing Hungarian newspapers and books to Transylvania. Orders for publications placed by libraries remained unfilled, and the preservation of Hungarian historic sites was assigned a low priority. Hungarians of Romania increasingly felt that MAT served as a "cultural ghetto" for those who reside within its limits. They voiced this feeling between December 1954 and March 1955 in governmental and party circles. Beyond MAT, use of the Hungarian language diminished when it came to official papers, petitions, proceedings and documentation. The equipment inventory of the Bolyai University was not renewed, teacher salaries at Bolyai were lower than those at Babes, several teachers of Jewish origin were dismissed, and the materials accumulated by the University Library of Kolozsvar became inaccessible. Initiatives to call the Hungarian literature of Romania "Hungarian language Romanian literature" were subjects of protests, and so were plans to close down schools established in the Moldva region in 1947, in the interest of integrating the Hungarian population of the Moldva region into the Romanian. The protesters recommended that Hungarian historians, natural scientists, physicians, and engineers be allowed to publish their works in Hungarian language publications, that in Transylvanian schools the study of the Romanian, the Hungarian and the German languages be mandatory, and that in Bucharest there be established an academic chair for Hungarian language and literature.

In terms of Romanian domestic policy, and thus also in terms of nationalities policies, the period between spring 1955 and June 1958 may be best characterized by the relaxation of tensions. The party stood up against Hungarian nationalism but also against Romanian chauvinisms, the clouds that obscured the future of the Csango schools passed, and a general amnesty was declared. A majority of the Hungarians imprisoned in 1949 and 1950 regained their freedom. Following the Second RWP Congress the chief focus of ELORE's lead article was on the accomplishments of the cultural revolution

and the economic policy. (Footnote 16) (ELORE 5 January 1956) In MAT's context that meant a new electrical power plant, and several cultural homes and libraries. A number of minor signs pointed in the direction of relaxation: Personal contacts between the two countries faced fewer obstacles; Karoly Kos' and Aron Tamasi's books were published in Romania; a Hungarian writers delegation traveled to Transylvania and within that, to Szekely country, and the Romanians withdrew the plan which called for the integration of the Romanian nation and the various nationalities.

In contrast, the Romanian party leadership's February 1956 reaction to the CPSU 20th Congress was surprising. In his 30 March report the executive secretary acknowledged that the cult of personality had its effects in Romania also, but that it had come to an end with the removal of the Luca-Georgescu-Pauker faction; that the thesis which "encouraged the artificial incitement of class struggle" was mistaken, but for that also the above-mentioned faction was responsible; and that certain state security organs had violated the precepts of legality, but such violations were quickly unveiled by the party. (Footnote 17) (ELORE 30 March 1956) On the other hand, at its party meeting the Writers Association rejected all criticism and all intents to make changes. Writer Alexander Jar, who demanded an accounting for a series of violations in party democracy, for autocratic actions, for bankrupting Romanian literature in the period of transition to socialist construction, and for the harassment of writers by the police, was condemned and expelled from the party. At the Writers Association June congress Istvan Nagy presented a report concerning the state of Hungarian literature in Romania. No substantial political issues were discussed. The writers were silent, only the Hungarian writers present were charged with the crime of pursuing Hungarian nationalistic endeavours. It is characteristic of the two-faced situation that at the meeting a resolution to establish a nationalities division within the Secretariat of the Writers Association carried, and so did others concerning the publication of a Hungarian children's newspaper, a Hungarian linguistic and literary periodical, and the reorganization of the publishing system serving nationalities.

The CPSU 20th Congress, and the October 1956 events in Hungary did break the trajectory of earlier Romanian politics. Nevertheless, following a temporary relaxation, everything continued toward the same negative direction. In the aftermath of the RWP's 27-29 December 1956 Plenary Session several actions benefited the overall Romanian population. These included the provision of a 15 percent increase in wages and in the standard of living, the discontinuation of the compulsory delivery of produce to the state, and profit sharing. (Footnote 18) (Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej: "Articles and Speeches—December 1955 through July 1959" Bucharest 1959) Prior to the RWP Plenary Session, at the December 16 MAT party conference the executive secretary not only analyzed the causes that lead to the outbreak of the tragic

situation, but also rejected the complaint that the RWP did not care sufficiently for MAT. In turn he complained that the people residing within MAT expected everything from the government, that they did not endeavour to better utilize local resources, and that they were not interested in public affairs. In January 1957 he extended the accusation of revisionism to apply to all Hungarians in Romania. Nothing can be predicted in advance, however. Once again the Hungarian cultural home opened its doors in Bucharest's Zalomit street, and a new high school was promised to be established in Kolozsvár. Two teacher training schools were formed, the Executive Directorate for Nationalities Affairs was established, and a decision was made that 5th grade education in the Hungarian language may be pursued if 15 students enrolled, and 6th and 7th grade education may be continued with 10 students. A 1957 party resolution provided green light for Hungarian language university admission exams. In Bucharest a Hungarian academic chair for linguistic and literary studies was established. But in June 1957 a new series of anti-Hungarian trials began, affecting mainly the Hungarian intelligentsia of Kolozsvár. Between 28 June and 3 July the RWP condemned Miron Constantinescu and Iosif Chisinevski for so called "distorted presentations of party and government leadership activities," i.e. for criticizing the party-line under Gheorghiu-Dej, and for negotiating with representatives of Hungarian nationalism during the summer and in November 1956. (Footnote 19) (ELORE 12 December 1961) (They did not admit that the above actions took place upon instructions received from the party.)

On the one side we see trials, convictions and party disciplinary actions. On the other, we find a year-end serialized article in UTUNK [Our Way]. In it, some writers who lived their adult lives between the two world wars, and who were unjustifiably silenced thereafter, were rehabilitated to their deserved place in Hungarian literature in Romania. In this article UTUNK ventured to say that the value of a literary product cannot be determined by awards bestowed by the state, and was critical of the 1948-1953 literary policy. Soviet troops were removed from Romania on 25 July 1958. A month later the UTUNK's 14 August issue presented an article by the talented Laszlo Foldes, entitled "For the Ideological Purity of Literary Critique." In it the author attacked the entire contemporary Hungarian literature in Romania. In 1959 they merged the Babes and the Bolyai universities of Kolozsvár. In the ensuing 10 year period the number of Hungarian language schools were reduced by half; specialized education took minimal proportions and as a result so did the number of specialized white collar and blue collar workers; the "romanization" of the more important government institutions resumed; a new decree authorized the state to designate workplaces for employees and the migration to the cities became more difficult; and, in certain places, including areas inhabited by Hungarians, the permissible number

of nationalities workers was reduced to 10 percent of the total workforce. All this took place in the name of "unification" mainly in Transylvania, and to a lesser extent within the MAT.

Modification of the National Territorial Division: Maros-Hungarian Autonomous Territory [MMAT].

Following the RWP CC's 19 December 1960 meeting, Nicolae Ceausescu presented a legislative proposal to the Greater National Assembly concerning "Improvements in the Territorial and Administrative Division of the People's Republic of Romania." They emphasized that during the one year preparatory period prime consideration was given to the wishes of, and recommendations made by workers, the essence of which was "to merge or to abolish certain districts; to transfer certain villages from one district to another; to proclaim certain centers as cities having jurisdictions identical to districts; to declare that certain cities within districts become subordinate to territorial jurisdiction; to change the names of certain districts and territories by returning certain well-known historic designations." (Footnote 20) (ELORE 24 December 1960) The changes affected all of the 18 territories, regardless of nationalities. Insofar as areas inhabited by Hungarians are concerned, the territories of Nagybanja, Hunyad, Nagyvarad, Temesvar, Kolozsvár, and Stalin, and the MAT were affected.

MAT's name was changed to "Maros-Hungarian Autonomous Territory." The area and population of the MMAT was increased by the full annexation of Sarmas and Ludas, and part of the Dicso district from the Temesvar territory. One village from the Stalin territory was also annexed to the MMAT, but from the former MAT they transferred the Hungarian-inhabited districts of Sepsi and Kezd to the Stalin territory. Thus, the area of the MMAT had increased from 759,000 square kilometers to 802,000 square kilometers, but the ratio of Hungarians decreased as a result of the addition of areas having a Romanian majority, and the subtraction of Hungarian districts. (Those commenting smiled when they said that "the Sepsi district is closer to Bucharest than it is to Marosvasarhely!")

Although on 20-25 June 1960 the Third RWP Congress decided to pursue industrialization consistently, to bring about a six-fold increase in production within 15 years, to increase the level of technology and to complete the collectivization movement, in Szekely country, within the MMAT they reduced the rate of industrialization in order to encourage emigration. On 27 April 1962 it was announced at the special session of the Greater National Assembly that collectivization had been completed ahead of of the original 1965 target date. (Footnote 21) (Gheorghiu-Dej: "Articles ... June 1961 to December 1962" 1963) At the MMAT party committee meetings an increasing number of remarks pertained to increasing

the per-acre production average of wheat, corn, sunflower, sugarbeet and potatoes. At the highest party levels they specifically emphasized that they expected MMAT to increase its animal stock and the area of arable land.

Neither the MMAT Territorial People's Council, nor the documentation of the territorial party conference sessions and the 1964-1965 publications of the party committee reveal anything about the slowdown in industrialization, even though this was the real concern for the territory. Not unlike in other parts of Romania, these documents also portrayed the magnificent achievements, and the increases in investment and production. (Footnote 22) (VOROS ZASZLO [Red Flag] 18 January 1964) These included the finished constructions of the woodworking combine in Galoca, the furniture factory at Marosvasarhely, the sugar mill, the brick and tile works, the thermal power plant of Radnot, the chemical combine of Dicso—so reads the 1965 summary of the territorial party committee. (Footnote 23) ("The Developing and Flourishing MMAT—Numbers and Facts" A publication of the Agitation Division of the Territorial Committee, Marosvasarhely 1965) According to the brochure it is indicative of increasing living standards that each 772 residents have one physician, that there are 550 cultural homes and libraries, 333 movie theaters and 2562 amateur groups within the territory. The Marosvasarhely State Theater has a Hungarian and a Romanian department, they present an annual average of 400-500 performances. The State Philharmonic Orchestra performed on 115 occasions, and the State Song and Dance Ensemble presented 164 performances in 1964.

These sources also dealt with the territory's educational situation. The following chart was presented for academic year 1964-1965:

823 elementary schools (of these 385 offer 8 grades) — 150,000 students

37 high schools — 10,000 students

24 specialized schools and 3 institutions of higher education — 2,400 students

Having returned from the CPSU's 22nd Congress, at a session between 30 November and 5 December 1961 the RWP once again rejected the idea of any change in Romania. Once again the mistakes were attributed to Luca and Pauker, and as of more recent date, Constantinescu and Chisinevski were also held responsible. But Romania's foreign policy had changed, henceforth it was characterized by friendship with China and by a path that was different from the one followed by other socialist nations. Insofar as nationalities were concerned, the idea of a "Romanian writer who speaks Hungarian" emerged, and an attempt was made to gain acceptance of the thesis that Romania is homogenous not only from a social, but also from an ethnic point-of-view.

The death of Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej in 1965, the selection of a new executive secretary, and the 9th party Congress slowly paved the way to relaxation. It was reassuring for nationalities that homogenization, i.e. the abolition of nationality existence, was dropped from the agenda already at the aforementioned 19-24 July 1965 9th Congress of the newly renamed Romanian Communist Party [RCP]. Moreover, they stated that under conditions of socialist construction neither nations nor nationalities would disappear, and that the fulfillment of the existence of the Romanian nation and of the coexisting nationalities had a long perspective.

At the RCP National Conference, 6-8 December 1967 it was suggested that as a result of the development and pattern of nationwide distribution of production forces, a new structure for Romania's political subdivisions will have to be drawn up. This will be accomplished in the interest of perfecting the national economy and the activities of society, with due consideration to the economic, societal and historical legacy. The goal of the reorganization was to create counties that are complex units which encompass cities, and commercial and cultural centers, to set the average size of counties at 6786 square kilometers, ranging from 3271 to 9380 square kilometers, and to set the average number of county's population at 509,000. (It then follows that the proposed political subdivision was not identical to the one in force prior to 1952.) The law went into effect on 18 February 1968. The new counties were as follows: Alba, Arad, Arges, Bako, Krisana, Beszterce-Naszod, Botosani, Brasso, Buzau, Krasso-Szoreny, Kovaszna, Kolozsvar, Dimbovita, Dorj, Galac, Gorj, Hargita, Hunyad, Jalimita, Iasi, Ilfov, Maramaros, Mehedinti, Maros, Neamt, Olt, Prahova, Szatmar, Szeben, Suceava, Teleorman, Temes, Tulcea, Vaslui, Vilcea, Vrancea. (Footnote 24) (VOROS ZASZLO 14 January 1968)

The former area of the MAT and of the MMAT was transformed so that the old, pre-1918 county division was observed only in part. The former Haromszek became Kovaszna with Sepsiszentgyorgy serving as the county seat; the greater part of Udvarhely was annexed to Csik, and Csik became Hargita. The smaller part of Udvarhely was merged into Maros and Kovaszna counties. Hargita's area became 7680 square kilometers with a population of 375,981, and Csikszereda as its county seat. Maros county's area became 7323 square kilometers, with 606,794 inhabitants. Its county seat remained Marosvasarhely.

The Gyulafehervar Resolutions of 1918, and the 1919 national minorities agreement guaranteed religious and cultural autonomy as well as self-governance in areas inhabited by Saxons and the Szekelys. It was on the basis of these documents that between 1928 and 1932 Transylvanian Hungarian minority lawyers worked out a plan for "Szekely communal autonomy." Needless to say, none of these plans became reality between the two world wars. Interested parties pinned both hopes and reservations to the 1952 action. Hope, because the action

might have represented progress in nationality policies; reservations, because it affected one third of the Hungarian population, because the action failed to produce self-governance, and because it was becoming increasingly clear that the real purpose of the 1952 action was to demote the traditional Hungarian cultural capital of Kolozsvár into a small town, to establish an adversarial, competitive area between Kolozsvár and Marosvásárhely, to bring an end to the bilingual practice in Transylvania, and to restrict bilingual practice to one territory. One should recognize that it was the Szentgyörgy Academy for the Performing Arts located in Marosvásárhely which produced the outstanding actors of Transylvania; that in IGÁZ SZÓ, János Kemény, the mentor of the ERDELYI HELIKON [Transylvanian Helicon], Ernő Salamon, who suffered a martyr's death, István Nagy, Andras Suto, Geza Paskandi, i.e. the first and the second "Forras" [Source] generation equally found space, that creative artists had their beginnings here and thereafter have reached national and international fame, and that within the Teleki Library—a subsidiary of the Academy of the Romanian People's Republic—and within the clinics some magnificent scientific achievements were produced. On the other hand, Kolozsvár had some famous parochial colleges, a university that was established in the 16th Century—one which in 1872 blossomed into an institution that had a faculty in the fields of philosophy, the natural sciences, law and medicine, an Agricultural Institute established in 1869, a Music Conservatory, a University Library, the Transylvania Museum, the Botanical Garden, the Ethnological and the Archeological Museum, the Institutes of Linguistics, of History, etc., publishers and periodicals. The effort to liquidate the economic backwardness of Székely country also failed. Press reports and sociographic studies reveal that shuttling back and forth, and emigration were as much of a concern at the time the territory was created, as it was at the time it came to an end.

Looking back at the 15 year history of MAT we can say that its fate was predetermined. This sense of predetermination is reinforced if we view nationalities policies in light of the brief period between 1968 and 1972, at which time it appeared that the golden age of Groza had returned!

The RCP CC's April 1968 plenary session represented a great step forward. (Footnote 25) (ELORE 28 April 1968) There the Romanian party had the courage to confront and to put an end to the experimentations of the 1950's, by publicizing the mistakes that were made in socialist construction, and by naming those responsible for the mistakes, including Gheorghiu-Dej. Nationalities representatives were once again able to discuss their problems and grievances. The first serious sign of relaxation appeared when the party leadership promised to provide greater room for the Hungarian language in schools and within cultural life. The August events in Czechoslovakia served to accelerate the process. Ceausescu, the party's executive secretary paid a visit to Székely land in August and promised to put an end to its

backwardness. "We have some accomplishments in this respect in the course of socialist construction, but we must admit sincerely that we have not done much. In the framework of the present 5-year plan ... the life of the Székely people will undergo a fundamental change." (Footnote 26) (Ceausescu: "Romania Constructing its Way To Fulfill Socialism, Vol 3 Reports, Speeches, Articles, January 1968 to March 1969" Bucharest, Political Publishers, 1969) The RCP CC's October 24-25 meeting reached a decision concerning the establishment of Hungarian and German Nationalities Councils. The Criterion Nationalities Publishing House was established (but other publishers also published Hungarian books), and so was the newspaper A HET (The Week). Within the Ministries of Education and Culture secretariats and directorates serving the nationalities were formed, and in some places bilingual announcements appeared. Hungarians of Romania were once again hopeful of the future—perhaps, at last, they have reached that stage of socialist construction in which democratic nationalities policies become permanent fixtures, and that they no longer will be the functions of cabinet and party politics as they were between the two world wars, or the tools of power struggles, as they were during the years of personal cult.

Illustrations

Page 6: Maros-Hungarian Autonomous Territory (Romanian Encyclopedic Dictionary, Vol 4, Bucharest 1966)

Page 7: The Establishment of the Hungarian Autonomous Territory — a New Success in the Party's Leninist-Stalinist National Policies. Published by the Romanian Workers Party, 1952.

Page 9 top: Resolution of the Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party Concerning the Rehabilitation of Certain Party Activists. From MAGYAR TUKOR April 1968

Page 9 bottom: Bukklak. The Maros-Hungarian Autonomous Territory During the Socialist Years.

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
Party Activities Calendars Published

14-27 September 1987

26000073a Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in Polish
No 20, 7 Oct 87 p 21

[Unattributed report: "Party Chronicle: 14-27 September 1987"]

[Text] Sessions of the Central Committee Politburo:



15 Sep

— The Politburo considered the working draft of the program for implementing the second stage of the economic reform as proposed by the Council of Ministers;

— The Politburo recommended a rapid adjustment of the program for implementing the second stage of the economic reform to a form in which it can be presented to the society. The government should submit a corresponding document for consideration to the Sejm this coming October.

Session of the CKKR [Central Control and Audit Commission] Presidium:

23 Sep

During its session the CKKR [Central Control and Audit Commission] Presidium:

— considered the activities of control and audit commissions at all levels during the first half of the year;

— evaluated regular and preventive verdicts announced during the second half of 1986;

— examined reports on the control activities of the CKKR and voivodship control and audit commissions;

— considered a report on the application of the new form of commission activities represented by control and audit talks;

— accepted the premises of the control drive which will be conducted this coming November in 10 voivodships.

The deliberations were chaired by Politburo Member and CKKR Chairman Włodzimierz Mokrzyszczak.

Conferences and Meetings:

16 Sep

— Central Committee Secretary Stanislaw Ciosek received representatives of the National Council of Legal Advisers, headed by Chairman Jozef Zych. Stanislaw Ciosek received a delegation of the Supreme Court of the Socialist Republic of Romania, headed by Chief Justice Joan Salajan, during its sojourn in Poland.

17 Sep

— Central Committee Secretary Andrzej Wasilewski met with the heads of the Union of Polish Composers.

— Director of the Culture Department of the PZPR Central Committee Tadeusz Sawic met with the heads of the Trade Union of Theatre Employees.

18 Sep

— Politburo Member and Central Committee Secretary Jan Glowczyk received a delegation of the Main Board for the Protection of State Secrets in Publications under the USSR Council of Ministers, headed by Main Board Director Vladimir A. Boldyrev, during its sojourn in Poland.

19 Sep

— At the Belvedere members of the highest political and state authorities met with leading farmers, employees of agriculture, and representatives of agricultural sciences and agriculture-servicing institutions. More than 100 farmers and employees of agriculture were awarded state decorations. The meeting was hosted by First Central Committee Secretary and Chairman of the Council of State Wojciech Jaruzelski.

21 Sep

— First Central Committee Secretary Wojciech Jaruzelski received Member of the Presidium of the Czechoslovak CP Central Committee and First Secretary of the Prague City Czechoslovak CP Committee Antonin Kapek during the latter's visit to Warsaw. The meeting was attended by Politburo Member and Central Committee Secretary Jozef Czyrek and Candidate Member of the Politburo and First Secretary of the Warsaw Voivodship PZPR Committee Janusz Kubasiewicz.

— Central Committee Secretary Andrzej Wasilewski received representatives of the Association of Polish Graphic Design Artists in connection with the coming congress of the Association.

22 Sep

— In Warsaw began the 3-day deliberations of the International Conference on Theory. The main topic was "For a Creative Development of Marxism-Leninism." This conference was organized by the editors of NOWE DROGI. The conference was inaugurated with an address delivered by Central Committee Secretary Henryk Bednarski.

23 Sep

— The International Commission of the Central Committee, deliberating under the chairmanship of Politburo Member and Central Committee Secretary Jozef Czyrek, discussed the draft theses for the Central Committee Plenum. The Commission also considered the directions, tasks, and course so far of the review of organizational structures and job certification in the Polish Foreign Service, presented by Director of the Foreign Department of the PZPR Central Committee Ernest Kucza.

— The first meeting of the Caucus of PZPR Parliamentary Deputies during the fall session of the Sejm was held. The deliberations were chaired by Politburo Member and Central Committee Secretary Tadeusz Porebski.

— Politburo Member and Central Committee Secretary Jozef Czyrek received a delegation of the People's-Democratic Party of Afghanistan, headed by Candidate Member of the Politburo and Secretary of the PDPA Central Committee N. Kawyani, during its sojourn in Poland. Participating in the conversation was Director of the Foreign Department of the PZPR Central Committee Ernest Kucza. The PDPA delegation was also received by Politburo Member and CKKR Chairman Wlodzimierz Mokrzyszczak.

21-23 Sep

— In Warsaw was held a meeting of experts from the central committees of the: Bulgarian Communist Party, Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, Communist Party of Cuba, Communist Party of Vietnam, Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Laos People's-Revolutionary Party, Mongolian People's-Revolutionary Party, German Socialist Unity Party, Hungarian Socialist Worker Party, and Polish United Worker Party. The meeting was devoted to problems of ideological confrontation in the modern world. The related activities and findings of the latest studies of this topic, conducted at the Center for Political and Propaganda Studies, PZPR Academy of Sciences, were reported on. The participants in the conference were received by Politburo Member and Central Committee Secretary Jan Glowczyk.

23 Sep

— The Chairman of the Caucus of PZPR Parliamentary Deputies Tadeusz Porebski received a delegation of the Secretariat of the Permanent Committee of the All-China Assembly of People's Representatives, headed by Deputy Secretary General You Lin.

24 Sep

— Książka i Wiedza Press has published a collection of last year's speeches by First Central Committee Secretary and Chairman of the Council of State Wojciech Jaruzelski.

— Politburo Member and Central Committee Secretary Jozef Czyrek received the Vice Chairman of the Christian-Democratic Union of the FRG and Prime Minister of the Upper Rhine-Palatinate Province Bernhard Vogel during the latter's visit to Poland.

— Politburo Member and Central Committee Secretary Tadeusz Porebski received members of the Delegation of the Secretariat of the Permanent Committee of the All-China Assembly of People's Representatives, headed by You Lin.

25 Sep

— First Central Committee Secretary Wojciech Jaruzelski received Candidate Member of the Politburo and Secretary of the Central Committee of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan N. Kawyani. Participating in the conversation were Politburo Member and Central Committee Secretary Jozef Czyrek and Director of the Foreign Department of the PZPR Central Committee Ernest Kucza.

— In Warsaw was held a journalism symposium on "Socialist Renewal — Experience, Dilemmas, Prospects." Wojciech Jaruzelski took part in the final part of the symposium. Jan Glowczyk was present.

26 Sep

— At the URSUS Factory was held the National Conference of the Worker Aktiv of the ZSMP [Union of Polish Socialist Youth]. The afternoon part of the discussion was attended by First Central Committee Secretary and Chairman of the Council of State Wojciech Jaruzelski. Also present were Politburo Member and Central Committee Secretary Marian Wozniak, Central Committee Secretary Kazimierz Cypryński, Deputy Prime Minister and Chairman of the Planning Commission Manfred Gorywoda, and directors of Central Committee departments as well as government ministers.

At Party Echelons and Organizations:

16 Sep

— In Wrocław was held a conference of the rectors of economics academies on the principal organizational, research, and instructional tasks of higher educational institutions in the new academic year 1987-1988. Present was Politburo Member and Central Committee Secretary Tadeusz Porebski.

17 Sep

— The Płock Voivodship PZPR Committee discussed the tasks and role of the POP's [basic party organizations] in party life and in the community. The deliberations were attended by Politburo Member and Central Committee Secretary Jozef Baryła.

— The Kielce Voivodship PZPR Committee, at a joint session with the ZSL [United Peasant Party] Supreme Committee, discussed problems of the promotion of civic initiative and projects. The deliberations were attended by Candidate Member of the Politburo and Secretary of the Central Committee Zbigniew Michalek and First Chairman of the Main Audit Commission under ZSL Supreme Committee Mieczysław Grabek.

18 Sep

— The Gorzów Wielkopolski Voivodship PZPR Committee discussed the role and tasks of the POP's in the light of the resolutions of the Fourth PZPR Central Committee Plenum.

— Candidate Member of the Politburo and Secretary of the Central Committee Zbigniew Michalek and Minister of Agriculture, Forestry, and Food Industry Stanisław Zieba met in Toruń Voivodship with a group of farmers, members of the Rural Youth Union from across the country.

— In Leszno deliberated the 26th General Meeting of Delegates of the Society of Polish Engineers and Technicians-Mechanics. Participating in the deliberations was Politburo Member and Central Committee Secretary Marian Wozniak.

20 Sep

— In Wałbrzezno, Toruń Voivodship, was celebrated the Central Harvest Holiday. The ceremony was attended by representatives of the highest political and state authorities: First Central Committee Secretary and Chairman of the Council of State Wojciech Jaruzelski, Prime Minister Zbigniew Messner, Chairman of ZSL [United Peasant Party] Supreme Committee and Speaker of the Sejm Roman Malinowski, Chairman of the Democratic Party's Supreme Committee Tadeusz Witold Młynczak, and OPZZ [National Trade Union Alliance] Chairman Alfred Miodowicz.

22 Sep

— The Sieradz Voivodship PZPR Committee discussed tasks of the POP's in implementing the basic sociopolitical objectives within their communities.

23 Sep

— Candidate Member of the Politburo and Secretary of the Central Committee Zbigniew Michalek met with the aktiv of the Agricultural Academy in Kraków. Zbigniew Michalek also took part in the International Scientific Conference on the Integration of Agriculture with the Agricultural and Food Industry.

24 Sep

— The Legnica Voivodship PZPR Committee discussed tasks ensuing from the resolutions of the Fourth PZPR Central Committee Plenum. The deliberations were attended by Politburo Member and Secretary of the Central Committee Jozef Baryła and CKKR [Central Control and Audit Commission] Vice Chairman Jerzy Wilk.

25 Sep

— In Walbrzych was held a joint session of the voivodship committees of the PZPR and ZSL [United Peasant Party]. It discussed tasks of the members of both parties in people's councils, trade unions, and rural self-governments, as well as the activation of the countryside. Participating in the deliberations were Candidate Member of the Politburo and Secretary of the Central Committee Zbigniew Michalek and Secretary of the ZSL [United Peasant Party] Supreme Committee Kazimierz Kozub.

— The Suwalki Voivodship PZPR Committee discussed tasks of the voivodship party organization in implementing the resolutions of the Fourth PZPR Central Committee Plenum.

— The Zamosc Voivodship PZPR Committee evaluated qualitative and effectiveness changes in the voivodship's economy in the light of implementing the resolution of the Third Central Committee Plenum.

Interparty Cooperation:

8-15 Sep

— China was visited by a delegation of the Foreign Department of the PZPR Central Committee, headed by Deputy Director Janusz Lewandowski. The delegation was received by Chinese CP Politburo Member and Central Committee Secretary Hu Qili.

16 Sep

— First Central Committee Secretary and Chairman of the Council of State Wojciech Jaruzelski paid a 1-day working visit to the GDR. He was accompanied by Politburo Member and Central Committee Secretary Jozef Czyrek, Deputy Prime Minister and Chairman of the Planning Commission Manfred Gorywoda, Director of the Chancellery of the Secretariat of the Central Committee Boguslaw Kolodziejczak, Director of the Foreign Department of the PZPR Central Committee Ernest Kucza, and a group of advisers and experts. Wojciech Jaruzelski held talks with Secretary General and Chairman of the GDR Council of State Erich Honecker. Following the talks a joint communique was published.

17 Sep

— Director of the Agriculture Department of the PZPR Central Committee Kazimierz Grzesiak ended a visit of several days to the capital of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic. He attended a conference of directors of agriculture departments of the central committees of the communist and worker parties of CEMA member countries.

20 Sep

— In Cologne were held anniversary celebrations of the daily newspaper of Italian communists L'UNITA. They were attended by a Polish delegation headed by First Secretary of the Biala Podlaska Voivodship PZPR Committee Jozef Oleksy.

25 Sep

— Politburo Member and Central Committee Secretary Jozef Baryla received a delegation of the Kirov Oblast CPSU Committee headed by its First Secretary Stanislav Osminin, during its visit to Poland at the invitation of the Siedlce Voivodship PZPR Committee. The meeting was attended by First Secretary of the Siedlce Voivodship PZPR Committee Andrzej Ornat. Present was USSR Ambassador Vladimir Brovikov.

28 September-11 October 1987

26000073a Warsaw ZYCIE PARTII in Polish
No 21, 21 Oct 87 p 21

[Unattributed report: "Party Chronicle: 28 Sep—11 Oct 87"]

[Text] Fifth PZPR Central Committee Plenum:

8 Oct

— The Fifth PZPR Central Committee Plenum deliberated in the presence of members of the Presidium of the Caucus of PZPR Parliamentary Deputies and members of the government; the topic was the party's tasks in implementing the second stage of the economic reform.

Sessions of the Politburo:

29 Sep

— The Politburo discussed the report of the Party-Government Commission for Reviewing and Modernizing the Organizational Structures of the Economy and the State. The Politburo listened to a report on the problems and results of the talks between Wojciech Jaruzelski, during his recent visit to the GDR, and Erich Honecker, as well to a report on the course and results of the visit of the Chancellor of Austria Franz Vranitzky to Poland.

6 Oct

— The Politburo continued discussing proposed solutions anticipated for the second stage of the economic reform. The Politburo evaluated the fulfillment of the targets of the socioeconomic plan during the first 8 months of this year and considered the course and results of the visits by the Vice President of the United States George Bush and the Chairman of the German Socialist Party Hans-Jochen Vogel.

Session of the Central Commission for Cooperation Among the PZPR, ZSL [United Peasant Party] and the Democratic Party:

5 Oct

—A joint session of the Central Commission for Cooperation Among the PZPR, ZSL, and the Democratic Party was held in the presence of signatories of the PRON [Patriotic Movement for National Rebirth] Declaration and the Presidium of the PRON National Council. The session was attended by members of the PZPR leadership headed by Wojciech Jaruzelski. Matters relating to changes in the functions and structure of the supreme and central agencies of state administration and the implementation of the second stage of the economic reform were discussed.

Conferences and Meetings:

28 Sep

— First Central Committee Secretary Wojciech Jaruzelski toured the exhibition "Achievements of Soviet Science and Technology" that opened in Warsaw.

— First Central Committee Secretary and Chairman of the Council of State Wojciech Jaruzelski received USSR Deputy Prime Minister Boris Tolstikh during the latter's visit to Poland on the occasion of "Days of Soviet Science and Technology."

— Under the chairmanship of Candidate Member of the Politburo and Secretary of the Central Committee Zbigniew Michalek, the Presidium of the Commission for Agriculture, Food Industry, and Forestry under the Central Committee held a session. It evaluated the underperforming dairy cooperatives, state farms, and agricultural producer cooperatives.

30 Sep

— Politburo Member and Central Committee Secretary Jozef Czyrek received activists of the Indian National Congress.

1 Oct

— First Central Committee Secretary and Chairman of the Council of State Wojciech Jaruzelski attended the inauguration of the academic year at the Warsaw Polytechnic.

— In Warsaw was held a conference of the agricultural secretaries of KK. The post-harvest tasks and the status of work on the second stage of the economic reform in the food industry were discussed, as were the assumptions of party work in the countryside for the coming period. Candidate Member of the Politburo and Secretary of the Central Committee Zbigniew Michalek was the chair.

2 Oct

— The Second Congress of the Association of Polish Journalists ended its 2-day deliberations. First Central Committee Secretary and Chairman of the Council of State Wojciech Jaruzelski attended the concluding part of the Congress and delivered an address. Guests at the Congress included the Politburo members Prime Minister Zbigniew Meissner, Jozef Czyrek, Jan Glowczyk, and Alfred Miodowicz.

— The Presidium of the Commission for Appeals under the 10th PZPR Congress discussed the current status of the Commission's activities. Its deliberations were chaired by Commission Chairman Kazimierz Barcikowski.

— Politburo Member and Central Committee Secretary Jan Glowczyk received a delegation from KOMUNIST, the newspaper of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, headed by Editor-in-Chief Viajko Krivokapicz. The Yugoslav delegation visited Poland at the invitation of Editor-in-Chief of TRYBUNA LUDU Jerzy Majko.

5 Oct

— On the occasion of the 30th anniversary of the GDR Cultural and Information Center, Politburo Member and Central Committee Secretary Jozef Czyrek received Member of the SEPD Central Committee and GDR Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Herbert Krolikowski. The meeting was attended by Director of the Foreign Department of the PZPR Central Committee Ernest Kucza. GDR Ambassador Horst Neubauer was present.

7 Oct

— Candidate Member of the Politburo of the Bulgarian CP Central Committee and Minister of Culture, Science, and Education of Bulgaria Georgi Jordanow, who headed a delegation which arrived on the occasion of Days of Bulgarian Culture in our country, ended his visit to Poland. G. Jordanow was received by Prime Minister Zbigniew Messner and Politburo Member and Central Committee Secretary Jozef Czyrek. He also met with Central Committee Secretary Andrzej Wasilewski.

9 Oct

— First Central Committee Secretary and Chairman of the Council of State Army General Wojciech Jaruzelski, on the occasion of the Polish Army Holiday, paid a visit to the garrisons of Gdansk and Gdynia where, among other things, he observed selected elements of the defense readiness of the Pomeranian Military District, the Air Force, the Anti-Aircraft Troops, and the Navy. The Supreme Commander of the PRL [Polish People's Republic] was accompanied by representatives of the leadership of the Ministry of National Defense headed by Politburo Member and Minister of National Defense Army General Florian Siwicki. Present were the heads of

the voivodship along with Candidate Member of the Politburo and First Secretary of the Gdansk Voivodship PZPR Committee Stanislaw Bejger.

— First Central Committee Secretary Wojciech Jaruzelski received Secretary of the Central Committee of the Korean Labor Party Hwan Dzan Jopa during the later's visit to Poland. Jozef Czyrek took part in the conversation.

— Politburo Member and Central Committee Secretary Jan Glowczyk received members of the Presidium of the Main Board of the Association of PRL Journalists, headed by Chairman Artur Howzan. The subject of the meeting was the program for implementing the resolutions adopted by the Second Congress of the Association.

At Party Echelons and Organizations:

28 Sep

— In Biala Podlaska was held a joint plenary session of the PZPR voivodship committee and the voivodship party control and audit commission which discussed the subjective causes of the impediments to the voivodship's economic and social development. Participating in the deliberations were Politburo Member and Central Committee Secretary Jozef Baryla, Vice Chairman of the Central Party Control and Audit Commission (CKKR) Jerzy Wilk, and Director of the Letters and Inspections Bureau of the Central Committee Marian Kot.

— A voivodship inauguration of party training for the Zielona Gora party organization was held in Zbaszynek in the presence of Central Committee Secretary Henryk Bednarski.

30 Sep

— The Poznan Voivodship PZPR Committee evaluated party work and defined the role and tasks of the POP's in the voivodship following the Fourth PZPR Central Committee Plenum. The deliberations were attended by Politburo Member and Central Committee Secretary Jozef Baryla and Candidate Member of the Politburo Gabriela Rembisz.

1 Oct

— The Opole Voivodship PZPR Committee discussed tasks of maximizing the fulfillment of housing construction plans in the voivodship.

2 Oct

— The Ciechanow Voivodship PZPR Committee evaluated, at a joint session with the ZSL [United Peasant Party] Voivodship Committee, the growth trends and implementation of targets in agriculture. The deliberations were attended by Director of the Agricultural

Department of the PZPR Central Committee Kazimierz Grzesiak and Member of the Presidium of the ZSL Supreme Committee Czeslaw Jaworski.

— The Lomza Voivodship PZPR Committee discussed, at a joint session with the Lomza Voivodship PZPR Control and Audit Commission, the political activity of farmers. Its deliberations were attended by Politburo Member and Central Committee Secretary Zbigniew Michalek and Director of the CKKR Control and Audit Bureau Leszek Grzybowski.

— The Nowy Sacz Voivodship PZPR Committee evaluated the implementation of the resolution of the Fourth PZPR Central Committee Plenum by the voivodship's POP's.

— The Torun Voivodship PZPR Committee evaluated the party's experience in ideological and organizational work following the Fourth PZPR Central Committee Plenum.

5 Oct

— The Lublin Voivodship PZPR Committee considered the manner in which problems presented in letters, complaints, and signals addressed to party echelons are resolved. Its deliberations were attended by Director of Letters and Inspections Bureau under the Central Committee Marian Kot.

7 Oct

— The Gdansk Voivodship PZPR Committee discussed the actual and desirable role of the POP's in the workplace and in urban and housing-project communities as related to the resolutions of the Fourth PZPR Central Committee Plenum. The session, attended by Politburo Member and Central Committee Secretary Jozef Baryla, was chaired by Candidate Member of the Politburo and First Secretary of the Gdansk Voivodship PZPR Committee Stanislaw Bejger.

— The Executive Board of the Lublin Voivodship PZPR Committee evaluated the performance of the voivodship party organization. Its deliberations were attended by Politburo Member and Central Committee Secretary Tadeusz Porebski.

9 Oct

— The Konin Voivodship PZPR Committee evaluated the implementation of the resolutions of the 10th PZPR Congress and the voivodship reports-elections conference concerning the intensification of the production of consumer and export goods.

— The Koszalin Voivodship PZPR Committee discussed the role of basic party organizations in the socio-political and economic life of the voivodship.

10 Oct

— The Chelm Voivodship PZPR Committee devoted its deliberations to the topic of the role and place of the POP's in the light of the resolution of the Fourth PZPR Central Committee Plenum.

— The Leszno Voivodship PZPR Committee considered the situation in housing construction within the voivodship.

Interparty Cooperation:

1 Oct

— The Chairman of the Social-Democratic Party of Germany Hans-Jochen Vogel ended his 3-day visit to Poland. The SEPD Chairman and the First Central Committee Secretary Wojciech Jaruzelski engaged in a broad exchange of views within the framework of the visit. A joint communique was published upon the ending of the visit.

2 Oct

— Slovenia was visited by a delegation of the Katowice Voivodship PZPR Committee. The head of the delegation, Candidate Member of the Politburo and First Secretary of the Katowice Voivodship PZPR Committee, was received by Member of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia Marko Arlandic.

5 Oct

— Poland was visited by a delegation of the Cultural Department of the CPSU Central Committee, headed by Department Director Voronov. The delegation was received by Secretary of the PZPR Central Committee Andrzej Wasilewski.

7 Oct

— Bulgaria was visited by a delegation of the PZPR Central Control and Audit Commission (CKKR), headed by Politburo Member and CKKR Chairman Włodzimierz Mokrzyński. W. Mokrzyński met with Politburo Member and Central Committee Secretary of the Bulgarian CP Chudomir Aleksandrov. The delegation held talks with Chairman of the Bulgarian CP CKKR Nacho Papazov.

Nuclear Ecological Threat Compared to Smoking, Using Coal

26000074b Warsaw *POLITYKA* in Polish
No 40, 3 Oct 87 p 8

[Article by Dr Lucjan Pawlowski, director, Institute of Water and Sewage Technology, Lublin Polytechnic: "Risk Accounting; Which is More Dangerous, Zarnowiec or Cigarettes?"]

[Excerpts] The risks to human health owing to environmental pollution in Poland are widely known and discussed. Public anxiety over these perils also has grown markedly; numerous official and unofficial environmental groups have arisen.

There is no doubt that environmental pollution in this country is disproportionately large in relation to our output and consumption of material goods. This means that the reasons for that pollution also are traceable to the institutional factor, to the acknowledged priorities and mentality of both rulers and the ruled. The by now practically nationwide awareness of the need for action to improve the quality of the environment is creating a climate, and even a material base, for first halting the continued degradation of the environment and thereupon eventually reducing it. But even the greatest optimists do not dare claim that pollution will be rapidly reduced. Rather, there is common consensus that until 1990 things will get worse in this respect in Poland.

It also is generally thought that things will get better only after 1990. This means that some time after 1990 the present situation will be restored, meaning that an improvement in the present situation is not to be expected in the near future—I stress, an improvement in the quality of the environment rather than merely halting the progress of environmental pollution. For the positive trends that have arisen do not mean, let me emphasize this, an improvement in the quality of the environment—they merely signify that at present measures have been prompted to curtail the further growth of environmental pollution.

I believe that the above facts should be borne in mind whenever discussing the environment, upon also bearing in mind the state of the economy or, speaking more generally, the condition of the entire society—i.e., the principal factors limiting any realistic possibility for improving the quality of the environment. As to who is to be blamed for the situation that has arisen, this is, despite everything, of secondary importance. For the fact is that there is a shortage of all kinds of resources. One cannot eat an egg and still hatch a chicken from it.

It should also be realized that creating a totally safe environment is not feasible. Besides, no environment ever has been safe.

Operating with the concept of the so-called nontoxic dose or concentration is based on a major misunderstanding. Most researchers support the view that, with respect to at least carcinogenic and mutagenic compounds, any dose affects the organism adversely. Thus, there is no safe dose. This also applies to radioactive contamination.

Is the Risk Worth It?

Decisions on the magnitude of so-called safe doses are political-economic decisions. It simply is assumed that, in a particular economic situation one case of cancer per, say, 1,000 or 10,000, etc., capita is admissible.

Reducing the risk below a certain limit is unusually costly, and attaining absolute safety is simply not feasible, because the cost increases in geometrical progression. For example reducing the risk to 1 per 10,000 from 1 per 1,000 capita in the Polish population means reducing the number of victims to 3,700 from 37,000, that is, by about 33,000. This costs much more than reducing the risk to 1 per 10,000,000 from 1 per 1,000,000 and thus reducing the number of victims to about 4 from 37, that is, by as few as 33 persons.

Ratios of this kind have to be borne in mind when planning countermeasures, and especially when the available funds are limited. The argument that every life is priceless, etc., is moot here. Since we cannot afford absolute safety (even in the United States when determining the permissible pollution doses the acceptable cancer risk is assumed at 1 per 100,000 to 1,000,000 capita), the limited funds available to us mean that measures minimizing the number of victims in absolute figures should be developed. This is a measurable criterion serving to compare the effectiveness of different applicable alternatives in environmental protection, whose paramount purpose is the protection of human health and life.

Public feeling (including even the feelings of active environmentalists) is not always rational. Often emotions and fear of the little known takes precedence. As a rule, people tend to focus on major incidents [such as Bhopal].

Another example, and one closer to us, could be a comparison of the perils caused by the Chernobyl Disaster and by cigarette smoking. The risk in environmental protection, and in the associated health protection, is construed as the expected frequency of occurrence of undesirable effects of pollution. Risk is a statistical concept. I am far from wanting to minimize the consequences of radioactive contamination, the more so considering that proper preventive measures could reduce them markedly. It can be disputed whether the resulting number of additional cancer cases amounts to 1 per 1,000 capita or 1 per 10,000 capita; for the Polish population this corresponds to 40,000 and 4,000 victims. If we compare these figures with the effects of the

smoking of tobacco, for which the corresponding risk ranges from 1 per 50 capita to 1 per 100 capita, the number of victims ranges correspondingly from 740,000 to 370,000, assuming that 40 percent of all Polish men and women smoke.

\$100.00 for a Cigarette

For while the effects of radioactive contamination are estimated on the basis of limited experimental data, because, aside from cases of accidental irradiation, the sole data available on a larger scale derive from the bomb explosions in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the effects of tobacco smoking are very well known. As for the prohibitions against smoking in Poland, the extent of their observance is quite evident to us when we look at the butt-strewn corridors in nonsmoking train coaches.

The disaster in Chernobyl spurred the antinuclear forces. Some countries, such as Sweden, intend to completely abandon nuclear energy. In this country, too, apprehensions have grown. I do not mean to say that nuclear energy is totally safe. But the scale of the real risk should be considered. Are coal-burning power plants indeed a lesser evil? For it should be borne in mind that every million tons of extracted coal means the death of one miner plus the disabling of quite a few other miners and their retirement at age 40-50. The burning of coal spews into the atmosphere many noxious compounds, starting with sulfur dioxide, which kills our forests, and ending with dust particles (that also contain radioactive elements). This atmospheric pollution also causes many diseases, including cancer. After all, there exist known instances of the construction of houses from flue dusts containing a radioactive concentration no lower than that coming from Chernobyl. On comparing these two ways of generating electricity, I incline to making the claim that, when there are no breakdowns, coal-based electricity generation is more dangerous.

Why am I writing this? I have become convinced that actions in behalf of environmental protection in Poland are too often based on emotional premises. There is a lack of an objective risk analysis that would assure an optimal utilization of the available funds. Moreover, isolating health protection [public health] from environmental protection is not rational, because these two domains are closely interrelated.

I believe that drafting plans for countermeasures should begin with the gradation of risks and elimination of mass perils.

Also important is the provision of adequate information to broad segments of the society. The claim of the existence of so-called safe doses is eyewash, because it prompts people to ignore the perils of lower risk even where these can be easily eliminated. Just as harmful is causing a general fear of perils that seem very menacing but have little probability of occurrence. Similarly, hasty

and impetuous comments should be avoided in emotional situations. The case of a female physician who, following the Chernobyl disaster, counseled washing one's head, combined with an impermissible ignorance of laws of physics concerning the sorbability of charged particles by proteins, laws that are taught in the secondary school, has indeed discredited the authority of the team of experts in the eyes of the man on the street.

Masked Effects

One more suggestion on the occasion. While writing this article I had a conversation with the director of the environmental protection department of a large industrial plant. He told me that he finds himself in a morally equivocal situation, because the management rates his performance in terms of his success in getting reductions in fines [for environmental pollution] and concealing the actual extent of polluting emissions. At the same time, avoiding these fines by actually reducing pollution is not feasible owing to lack of funds. He also told me that his is not an isolated case. In this connection, I conceived the following idea: I propose that environmental protection departments be removed from the jurisdiction of plant management and subordinated to the environmental protection divisions of people's councils. The cost of environmental protection measures should at the same time continue to be funded by industrial plants, but the staffing of these departments, personnel promotions, etc., should be totally within the jurisdiction of the people's councils. I believe that such a solution would radically improve the effectiveness of performance of industrial environmental protection services without requiring additional outlays.

1386

ROMANIA

Popescu Removed From Deputy Minister Position 27000042b Bucharest BULETINUL OFICIAL in Romanian Part I No 46, 16 Oct 87 p 2

[Text] The President of the Socialist Republic of Romania decrees:

Sole article—Comrade Ion Popescu is relieved of his position as deputy minister of electric power.

Nicolae Ceausescu President of the Socialist Republic of Romania Bucharest, 10 October 1987 No 178

/06662

Governmental Personnel Changes 27000042c Bucharest BULETINUL OFICIAL in Romanian Part I No 47, 19 Oct 87 p 2

[Text] The President of the Socialist Republic of Romania decrees:

Article 1—The following comrades are appointed deputy ministers of mines: Emil Huidu; Irimie Catargiu.

Article 2—The following comrades are appointed deputy ministers of petroleum: Victor Murea; Andrei Ene.

Article 3—Comrade Gheorghe Cazan is appointed deputy minister of light industry.

Article 4—Comrade Petru Cojan is appointed deputy chief of the central-department for geology, with the rank of deputy minister.

Article 5—Comrade Serban Petru Mihailescu is appointed secretary of the Council of Ministers, with the rank of state secretary.

Article 6—Comrade Gheorghe Chivulescu is appointed judge in the Supreme Tribunal.

Nicolae Ceausescu President of the Socialist Republic of Romania Bucharest, 17 October 1987 No 183

/06662

Personnel Changes in Mines, Petroleum, Geology 27000042d Bucharest BULETINUL OFICIAL in Romanian Part I No 47, 19 Oct 87 p 2

[Text] On the basis of Council of State Decree No 216/1987 on the reorganization of the Ministry of Mines, Petroleum, and Geology, the President of the Socialist Republic of Romania decrees:

Article 1—Comrade Iulian Costescu is relieved of his position as deputy minister of mines, petroleum and geology and director general of the central-department for coal.

Article 2—Comrade Irimie Catargiu is relieved of his position as deputy minister of mines, petroleum and geology and director general of the central-department for metallic and non-metallic ores.

Article 3—Comrade Petru Cojan is relieved of his position as deputy minister of mines, petroleum, and geology and director general of the central-department for geological prospecting and exploration.

Nicolae Ceausescu President of the Socialist Republic of Romania Bucharest, 17 October 1987 No 182

/06662

**Hunedoara, Constanta Peoples Councils
Appointments**

27000042e Bucharest BULETINUL OFICIAL
in Romanian Part I No 47, 19 Oct 87 p 1

[Text] On the basis of Article 97 of Law No 57/1968 on the organization and operation of the peoples councils, the President of the Socialist Republic of Romania decrees:

Article 1—Comrade George Homostean is appointed first deputy chairman of the executive committee of the Hunedoara County Peoples Council.

Article 2—Comrade Dimitrie Ancuta is appointed first deputy chairman of the executive committee of the Constanta County Peoples Council.

Nicolae Ceausescu President of the Socialist Republic of Romania Bucharest, 17 October 1987 No 181

/06662

**Andrie Removed From Chairmanship of Worker
Control Council**

27000042f Bucharest BULETINUL OFICIAL
in Romanian Part I No 48, 24 Oct 87 p 2

[Text] The President of the Socialist Republic of Romania decrees:

Article 1—Comrade Stefan Andrie is relieved of his position as chairman of the Central Council for Worker Control of Economic and Social Activity.

Article 2—Comrade Ion Radu is appointed chairman of the Central Council for Worker Control of Economic and Social Activity.

Nicolae Ceausescu President of the Socialist Republic of Romania Bucharest, 23 October 1987 No 185

/06662

**Deputy Ministers of Chemical, Petrochemical
Industry Named**

27000042g Bucharest BULETINUL OFICIAL
in Romanian Part I No 50, 30 Oct 87 p 6

[Text] The President of the Socialist Republic of Romania decrees:

Soles article—The following comrades are appointed deputy ministers of the chemical and petrochemical industry:

—Razvan-Andrei Grigorescu —Valeriu Momanu —
Dumitru Nicolaescu —Aristina Parota —Mihai Paraschiv

Nicolae Ceausescu President of the Socialist Republic of Romania Bucharest, 29 October 1987 No 192

/06662

**Personnel Changes Resulting From Ministerial
Reorganization**

27000042h Bucharest BULETINUL OFICIAL
in Romanian Part I No 50, 30 Oct 87 p 6

[Text] On the basis of Council of State Decree No 215/1987 on the reorganization of the Ministry of the chemical Industry and the Ministry of the Petrochemical Industry, the President of the Socialist Republic of Romania decrees:

Article 1—The following comrades are relieved of their positions as deputy ministers of the chemical industry: Nicolae Barbulescu; Aristina Parota; Petre Raiciu.

Article 2—The following comrades are relieved of their positions as deputy ministers of the petrochemical industry: Michai Paraschiv; Dumitru Nicolaescu; Valeriu Momanu.

Nicolae Ceausescu President of the Socialist Republic of Romania Bucharest, 29 October 1987 No 191

/06662

**New Deputy Minister of Technical Material
Supply**

27000042j Bucharest BULETINUL OFICIAL
in Romanian Part I No 55, 28 Nov 87 p 6

[Text] The President of the Socialist Republic of Romania decrees:

Article 1—Comrade Alexandru Heinrich is relieved of his position as deputy minister of technical-material supply and control of the management of fixed assets.

Article 2—Comrade Dumitru Breaban is relieved of his position as deputy minister of light industry and appointed deputy minister of technical-material supply and control of the management of fixed assets.

Nicolae Ceausescu President of the Socialist Republic of Romania Bucharest, 27 November 1987 No 200

/06662

Stoian Appointed to Dolj Peoples Council Post

27000042k Bucharest BULETINUL OFICIAL
in Romanian Part I No 56, 4 Dec 87 p 2

[Text] On the basis of Article 97 of Law No 57/1968 on the organization and operation of the peoples councils, the President of the Socialist Republic of Romania decrees:

Sole article — Comrade Stoian is delegated to fill the position of first deputy chairman of the executive committee of the Dolj County Peoples Council.

Nicolae Ceausescu President of the Socialist Republic of Romania Bucharest, 3 December 1987 No 202

/06662

Coordination of General, Individual Interests
27000003 Bucharest ERA SOCIALISTA in Romanian
No 14, 25 Jul 87 pp 9-12

[Article by Univ Reader Dr Viorel Popescu: "Dialectics of Interests in Romanian Socialist Society"]

[Text] The radical theoretical and practical innovations inaugurated by the Ninth Party Congress, implemented as a continuous revolutionary process under the party secretary general's creative and original thought, included the dialectics of interests as a constituent, inseparable part of the undertaking of building the new social order in Romania. The invaluable principles and guidelines concern continuing development and modernization of the economy on the basis of the new technical-scientific revolution and the new agrarian revolution; achievement of a new quality of life and work; definite transition to the intensive kind of socioeconomic development; promotion of an optimal ratio between the consumption and accumulation funds; the workers' threefold capacity as owners, producers and beneficiaries of the national wealth; socialist construction with the people and for the people; party leadership not in the name of but together with the working class and the people, and the implementation of revolutionary humanism. The new roles and functions of the state, the mass and public organizations and the new democratic bodies, the nature and manifestations of contradictions under socialism, etc., are basic components of a comprehensive and original conception of building the new order that also includes new views and conclusions about the dialectics of the various kinds of interests of the members of society, the social classes and categories, the various workers collectives and groups, the Romanian socialist nation.

In both theory and practice the RCP categorically rejects the non-Marxist views that ignore people or limit the role of the human factor to that of an elite in interpreting the aims and factors of socioeconomic and cultural development. By regarding the action of the human factor as that of the particular individual or of the workers in general (workers, peasants and intellectuals), the RCP elevates the individual to the rank of the supreme goal of its policy, while considering him the vital motive force of the whole undertaking of socialist and communist construction. As Nicolae Ceausescu says about this, "No automation or robotization can replace the individual! Both in the next period and always thereafter the individual will continue to be the decisive factor for progress, civilization and socioeconomic

development." Since individuals, groups and communities have certain interests objectively determined by their positions in the social structure and in the social division of labor, the role of the individual as a factor critical to socioeconomic development is inseparable from the role of interests, through which people assert themselves as builders of history and which are treated in the dialectical-materialist conception as basic motives for action.

Therefore, scientific study of the problems of building the fully developed society and of the dialectics of society in both its present and future stages must include investigation of interests and of the relationships among various categories of interests of social classes and groups and of people in general. The process of socialist revolution and construction, the interaction between its objective and subjective and material and cultural aspects, and the dialectics of its general and particular, national and international, and domestic and foreign features are in an objective correlation with the dialectics of the various kinds of interests, with the origin, interaction and evolution of the satisfaction of the interests of the creators of the new order, of the working class, peasantry, intelligentsia, the other social categories and the entire people, and with the need of creating and constantly improving the system of workers incentives. Experience tells us that the new order cannot be built without material and moral incentives for the people expected to build it and without considering their interests in close and constant correlation with those of society as a whole. While the problems of socialist construction cannot be understood nor its strategy determined without studying interests, it is no less true that in its turn scientific understanding of interests requires study of the material conditions, the social relations and structures, the superstructure and the entire socioeconomic and cultural activity of each developmental stage in their evolution.

Diversity and Unity of Interests Under Socialism

Construction of the new order and the process of social leveling do not in any way annul the plurality and diversity of human interests, and they certainly do not reduce them to general, common interests. Moreover, since social progress under socialism rules out standardizing people, it accentuates that diversity in certain respects against the background of the uniformity of all human interests.

The topologies and classifications of interests are based on many criteria and cover a wide range of interests, economic, political, ecological, those of social security and health protection, scientific, moral, cultural-artistic, individual, group, class and general social, national and international, fundamental and superficial, permanent or temporary, etc. They form a veritable system that essentially corresponds to the characteristics of the social system, its class, national and group structure, and the trends in its evolution and operation. Socialist society is

no exception to this. The differences from other societies, and they are essential, are primarily in the new content and nature of the various interests and in the particular relations among them.

Through the radical, purposeful changes made by construction of the new order under party leadership in the content of production relations, in the social and class structure, and in all social activities, radical changes were also made in the content of the interests and in the relations among them as well. The changes in content are due to the fact that all the kinds of interests in socialist society reflect in general the requirements of the individual's social development and the workers' needs, and they can be satisfied only through the labor of all and of each individual, because socialism is a society of labor generalized on the social scale and freed of any exploitation or oppression. Therefore the first time in history the vital interests of all the social classes and categories are identical or compatible and essentially coincide with the objective trends of social development. Those common interests form the objective basis of the alliance and collaboration of all the social classes and categories in Romanian society, of the entire people's inseparable unity around the party, of the constant rise of that unity to higher and higher levels, and of the accentuated social leveling that is evolving, as it says in the RCP Program, toward formation of the single working people of communist society.

Of course, economic interests are critically important to the existence and development of the individual and of society as a whole. They are also manifold, differing with the subjects to whom they pertain (society, social classes and categories, workers collectives, individuals) and with the needs they reflect. On the level of each subject, the economic interests are in production, labor and consumption and concern satisfaction of needs felt or acquired in the labor process, some directly and others via the material incentives (economic security, improvement and modernization of the production and labor processes, steady improvement of economic efficiency and product quality, etc.) and consumer needs (assurance of the necessities of life), all of which are constant concerns of the party and state. Satisfaction of people's economic interests accordingly requires various efforts on their part and on that of society and cannot be limited to acquisition and consumption of goods.

Combining the present generations' interests with those of future generations of the Romanian people and balancing those interests rationally and in the spirit of socialist humanism are vital problems emphasized by the RCP. Nicolae Ceausescu says, "In all our activity in all fields we must consider Romania's present and future.... We must realize that we bear the responsibility today for the future of tomorrow and for the future of Romania in the year 2050, and that we must work accordingly. That means being a revolutionary and being a communist!" Moreover, the principles of general human morality require every generation to concern

itself not only with its own interests but also with the needs of future development. That is the spirit that guided our ancestors, who lived under different and sometimes very cruel historical conditions. Concern for the future generations is all the more a basic requirement of the revolutionary principles of socialism and of socialist ethics and justice. The effort to meet this requirement and to combine the nation's present and future interests runs like a red thread through the party's and state's domestic and foreign policies, so that it is highly important to set a suitable ratio between the consumption fund and the fund for socioeconomic development. As we know, the state is allocating about 30 percent of the national income to the development fund in the current 5-year plan, since any reduction of that fund or unwarranted increase in consumption would seriously impair the present and future of the Romanian people. This policy has been fully borne out by experience.

The profoundly humanistic views of the RCP and Nicolae Ceausescu rule out any one-sided trend in their interpretation of the dialectics of the people's present and future interests, so that the effort on behalf of the nation's future and consideration of the coming generations' interests certainly does not mean any neglect or sacrifice of the interests of socialist Romania's present generations. As Nicolae Ceausescu said on this subject in outlining the major aims and directions of Romanian socialist society's current and long-range development at the 13th Party Congress, "The results of this magnificent revolutionary era will benefit all of socialist Romania's citizens today as well as their descendants, all those who will be born, will live and will work in the Romanian communist society."

In the light of this view, which allows for the nation's role as a major motive force for progress in the present period, the basic comprehensiveness of construction of the new social order and formation of the personality, and the requirements of revolutionary socialist humanism, the RCP makes a consistent effort to combine the Romanian people's national interests correctly with the international interests of socialism and to encourage and satisfy, in close correlation with the economic interests, social, political, cultural-artistic, ecological and other interests, as well as those in continuing improvement of professional and technical-scientific training (particularly important under the new conditions), which interests take various forms on the general, collective, and individual levels.

Moreover, from positions of thorough understanding of man's global problems, of the interdependences of the world of today, and of the extremely grave dangers threatening mankind, the RCP is working with a high sense of responsibility for disarmament and peace (Romania is the only country in the world that has instituted a 5 percent reduction in armaments and military expenditures and men on President Nicolae Ceausescu's proposal approved by the entire people in the national referendum of 23 November 1986), for elimination of

underdevelopment, for solution of the problem of the developing countries' foreign debts, for formation of a new international economic and political order, for resolution of the worldwide economic crisis etc., by appropriate measures, for settlement of all international disputes solely by peaceful means and negotiation, and for real democratization of international relations, because those are the vital interests of all peoples and of every inhabitant of the earth. Formulation of and emphasis upon the rights of man and peoples to peace, life, work and free development graphically reflect a proper understanding of those interests and of the ceaseless struggle to fulfill them.

Correlation of General, Group and Individual Interests

Classification of interests by the criterion of their "bearers" actually covers the whole range of people's interests. Whether it is economic, political, cultural, national or international, primary or secondary, or temporary or permanent, any interest always has some human "bearer," who is an individual, a group, a community or society as a whole. Of course, on the level of each "bearer" the interests are arranged in certain "strata," and each one has his priorities in implementing them. On the level of society the ratings are based on the RCP's scientifically determined political-strategic options. In the case of other "bearers," especially groups and individuals, the "ratings" may be vitiated at times by certain erroneous ideas and attitudes that are foreign to socialism and occasionally facilitated by incomplete or outmoded legal regulations. Study and knowledge of these "hierarchies" are necessary if society and the party and state administrations are to take the right measures to correct them, either by education or by improving the various social relations and political-legal regulations.

The fact that the interests, whatever they may be, always have certain "bearers" also explains their dual, objective-subjective nature, provided they are authentic (there are also false or artificial interests). Only if it were detached from man could an interest be considered entirely objective, and only if there could be an abstract man reduced to his subjective aspect and divorced from any objective social-historical context, could there be a purely subjective interest. And since neither of those conditions is real, an interest is still a unique combination of objective and subjective aspects.

In the light of the foregoing, it is clear that the dialectics of general, group and individual interests is central to the dialectics of interests in any given society and accordingly in Romanian socialist society as well, because knowledge and mastery of it make a decisive contribution to improvement of all relationships in which interests are involved and to determination of the entire process of building the new order and making socioeconomic progress.

In the dialectical-materialist view, the general interest reflects some historically determined necessities of the existence and development of communities. It is not something "indefinite" nor any "abstraction" or "ideological slogan," as some theorists conclude, nor the sum of the individual interests or those of social classes and groups, as others regard it. It is the common interest of the members of a given society, as Marx and Engels said. Whereas in the systems based on social antagonisms the general interests of society are most often interpreted differently by the hostile social classes, socialist society makes it possible for them to take the form of real common interests of all social classes and categories and of all workers of all nationalities.

In the present stage the general interests of Romanian society reflect the requirements for further consolidation and development of the new order, for construction of the fully developed socialist society and for Romania's advance toward communism. Essentially, as the documents of the 13th RCP Congress and the other party documents indicate they take the form of such vital requirements as modernization and intensive development of the production forces; consolidation of socialist ownership and improvement of social and production relations as a whole; achievement of the strategic objectives for Romania's transition to a medium developed country during the 1986-1990 Five-Year Plan and to a fully developed country by the year 2000; consistent promotion of intensive socioeconomic development and the start of a new quality of work and life; widespread promotion of the new technical-scientific revolution and the new agrarian revolution; development and improvement of education and occupational and political-ideological training; consolidation of national independence and sovereignty and of the people's social-political unity around the party and its secretary general; accentuated social leveling and intensive development of workers revolutionary democracy; consolidation of self-management, self-administration, and self-financing, etc.

Essentially all that serves the needs of socialist society's further development and of its conversion to an increasingly democratic and efficient society with the best possible results in all fields is being instituted in its general interest. So regarded, the general interests of Romanian society and its people and their consistent promotion by the party are vital to satisfaction of the other interests, which unquestionably exist, and to the full implementation of revolutionary humanism, and uniform management of socioeconomic development is indispensable to satisfaction of society's general interests.

In keeping with its social and class structure, Romanian socialist society still harbors some class and group interests too, which are basically common or compatible because all social classes and categories firmly adhere to the ideals of socialist and communism. But naturally there are also some interests peculiar to each of the social classes and categories that the party and state take into

account, in which case the exchange of activities among social classes and categories is based on the principles of social equality, equity and justice and mutual respect in satisfying those interests, in keeping with society's general requirements.

Under those circumstances it is not impossible for some differences in interests among social classes and categories to evolve into contradictions, necessitating a regular effort toward uniform coordination and awareness of them. It is the mission of the working class as the leading class in society and its revolutionary party to accomplish this through the workers' revolutionary democratic system, in which the party is the leading political force.

The party coordinates the different interests of the social classes and categories and resolves any contradictions that may arise among them by adopting and applying a uniform political policy that properly reflects and satisfies the general interests of society and the particular interests of the social classes and categories as well as the workers' individual interests. That policy both permits and secures further correlation of the objective living conditions and the subjective characteristics of the social classes and groups as well as correlation between city and village, between physical and intellectual work, and of people's living and working conditions. This reinforces collaboration and cooperation between the working class and the other social classes and categories and the entire Romanian people's unity around the party and its secretary general, and it combines their interests more and more effectively with the general interests of society and of socialist and communist construction in Romania.

Some of the group or collective interests occur on the levels of the socioeconomic units, workers' collectives and regional-administrative units. Application of principles of self-management, self-administration and self-financing accompanied by intensive socioeconomic and cultural development of all counties and localities in Romania has more clearly delineated those interests and strengthened their role in the activities on those levels, which suits the general interests of society and every worker. This has been aided by closer correlation of all workers' incomes with the work performed through generalization of the overall and direct contract systems and workers' contributions of social shares to the enterprises' development funds and profit-sharing.

The measures taken in recent years to strengthen enterprise self-administration and self-financing and to enhance the incentives of workers in agricultural units are in keeping with the greater importance of those interests in the general system of interests that is forming and operating in Romanian society and with the greater responsibility of the collective management organs in the socioeconomic units for management and development of the portion of the national wealth under their administration. Accordingly the workers' collectives in those units are more interested in obtaining better results in production both for the domestic market and for export,

covering their outlays out of their incomes, and in making the greatest possible profits in order to increase their possibilities of meeting their common needs and to provide the workers with higher incomes. For example, they know that according to the legal regulations, the quota of the above-plan profits an enterprise makes that remains at its disposal is higher than its share of the planned profits, just as the quota of the above-plan agricultural output obtained by a county that goes into the local self-supply reserve is higher than that for the same purpose out of the planned output. This interests both the socioeconomic and the regional-administrative units in obtaining better and better results, above-plan outputs, and the greatest possible profits. Promotion of group interests within the legal limits accordingly acquires a highly important role in accomplishing the general objectives of society, which are basic to better and better satisfaction of the workers' individual needs. These interests serve as mediators in the many relationships between the general and individual interests and accordingly contribute to their proper combination.

In Romania the principle of self-management and self-administration is applied to all socioeconomic development, under uniform management according to the Unified National Plan, and it provides for the correct combination of group interests with the general interests of society. The Unified National Plan is intended, among other things, to mobilize all socioeconomic and regional-administrative units to participate in accomplishing the objectives serving the general interests of society. The 13th Party Congress pointed out that without the principle of uniform management according to the Unified National Plan, a number of imbalances and contradictions and a general disorganization of activity would be inevitable, with serious effects upon construction of the new order, national development, and improvement of the people's living standard, and narrow group interests would gain priority to the detriment of the general interests of society. Therefore, as Nicolae Ceausescu said, the production units must always allow for the general needs, conform to the provisions of the Unified Plan for Socioeconomic Development, and take the initiative in exemplary fulfillment of the plan tasks, in technical and qualitative improvement of production, and in further improvement of economic activity.

Experience tells us that misunderstandings of self-management and self-administration may arise at times that cause certain contradictions between some group interests and the nation's general interests. The successive improvements made in the economic-financial mechanism, in the credits system, and in enterprise self-management, self-administration and self-financing are designed, among other things, to eliminate such misunderstandings and to permit coordination and rational combination of the two kinds of interests.

Meanwhile the existence of a varied and shifting range of individual interests is an incontestable fact of Romanian society. Society's effort to satisfy individual interests is

necessary in view of the requirements of revolutionary humanism, which rejects any standardizing trend and demands the economic, political and cultural-intellectual conditions for each individual's development in the context of the new social relations and the community. Actually it is part of the effort to meet the requirements of the fundamental economic law of socialism.

In correct combination with the general interests, individual interests acquire an important social value and a constructive function in Romanian society's development and in consolidating the people's social-political unity. Society's effort to satisfy those interests, as a requirement for the further rise of the workers' living standard and the development of each one's personality, while satisfying the general interests greatly encourages the workers' participation in implementing the social tasks and helps to reinforce their confidence in and dedication to the values of the new order. Accordingly the RCP considers it in the interest of society to allow for individual interests and to keep trying to satisfy them. The increasingly harmonious combination of general with individual interests is to be seen through the whole socialist construction effort and it figures accordingly in the content of workers revolutionary democracy and in the structure of Romanian citizens' rights, freedoms, and obligations.

The fact that the general interests have priority over the individual ones is to be understood in the sense that better and better satisfaction of the individual interests ultimately depends upon promotion of the general ones. Experience has proved that individual interests can be properly satisfied in each stage of building the new order only by satisfying the general interests, by developing the production forces, science, education, culture, and all activities, and by the efforts of the entire people and every member of society. That is why the RCP and its secretary general believe that being a revolutionary and a communist means putting the general interests first in all circumstances, and they cannot be divorced from the individual interests because they do not exist above or beyond people and the members of society but figure as their common interests, even if they are not perceived as such by all at a given point. The RCP's policy reflects its constant concern for better and better satisfaction of the workers' various economic, political, cultural, and other requirements and interests on the principles of socialist ethics and justice and as society develops. Meanwhile the workers' growing understanding of the general interests of society's their own interests is becoming a major motive force for progress in socialist and communism.

Of course, there are contradictions between the general and individual interests, even after the main sources of antagonism between the individual and society have been removed. The reasons for them are complex, combining both objective and subjective aspects. As we know, people have more difficulty with the general interests because the immediate, individual interests are

easier for them to understand. This is objectively determined by the fact that individual interests can be perceived directly, while the general ones are formulated on the theoretical and ideological levels and require an effort by every member of society to assimilate them. In this process the individual interests may be "overproportioned" in some situations, in that some people will demand more from society than they give it or more than society can give them at a given point. There are also people whose level of awareness prevents them from understanding that the general interests are also their interests. An individual whose perception of the system of interests is limited to the strictly individual interests, who entirely ignores the general ones, refuses to work, and tries to make illicit gains at the community's expense is attacking socialist ownership, violating the laws, and in a blatant contradiction with society. and conversely, the more general interests the perceived system of personal interests includes, the more completely are the general and individual interests coordinated and the more effectively is the individual integrated in society. This shows that in addition to socioeconomic development and use of coercive administrative measures, a critical part in overcoming the various contradictions between the individual interests of some members of society and the general interests is played by the political-educational effort to form socialist awareness, including a correct understanding of the structural combination of general with individual interests.

Active Role of Political Elements in Harmonizing Various Workers Interests

In its interpretation of the relationships among various categories of interests, the RCP rejects the "automatic" view that in socialism they invariably are and remain compatible or coinciding and that any effort to harmonize, coordinate and promote them is superfluous. Although they are not antagonistic and can be harmonized, thanks to the new content of ownership of the production means under the socialist system, the facts prove that not all interests are "born" or harmonized automatically and independently of the activity of the political elements, social management, and the efforts of the mass and public organizations and the workers of self-management bodies.

Accordingly the dialectics of interests, as a component part of the general dialectics of socialist construction, is not and cannot be confined to its regular-objective data but necessitates mechanisms and programs to make it purposeful, like the overall development of society. In that way if fully integrates the decisionmaking, organizational and educational activity of the political elements and of all components of the socialist democratic system, as well as the revolutionary communist militancy in harmonizing and promoting the various kinds of interests in practice. This is a basic aspect that determines in its turn a number of other characteristics of the actual practical application of the dialectics of interests in Romanian socialist society.

In the first place, because of the participative nature of the Romanian socialist democratic system involvement of the political elements in implementing the dialectics of interests requires the workers' direct participation not only in the practical application of decisions concerning their interests but also in approving them. It is to Nicolae Ceausescu's credit that he definitely eliminated, back at the Ninth Party Congress, the tendencies to distrust the ability of the working class and the people to know their own interests and to participate competently and responsibly in promoting them, thereby opening the way to formulation and application of such invaluable principles as exercise of party leadership together with the working class and the people and workers' participation in making political, economic and cultural decisions, in self-determination, and in promoting their own general, group and individual interests, all within a unique workers revolutionary democratic system. Of course, self-management is also becoming effective in workers' self-promotion of their interests through its organizational structures, some of which cover all workers in the socioeconomic units.

In the second place, thanks to better specification of the functions of each component of the Romanian political system and to repudiation of the theory that the mass and public organizations are mere "drive belts," the latter have been invested with important functions in promoting the interests of some social and occupational categories and groups, in close correlation with the general interests of society. Accordingly each of those organizations and bodies (trade unions, the Socialist Democracy and Unity Organization [sic], women's and youth organizations, professional associations, and the new democratic bodies), in close connection with the functions essential to promoting the legitimate interests of the categories of workers in certain fields, is also performing functions vital to involving its members who work in the respective sectors in fulfilling the plan tasks and other social obligations and in social management, to indoctrinating them in the socialist principles, and to developing the people's social-political unity, all of which graphically reflect society's general interests, the defense and advancement of which are the sure way to fulfillment of the collective and individual interests as well.

And in the third place, the factors that can temporarily interfere with satisfaction of collective or individual interests under socialism are no longer the interests of any particular social groups or classes or unfair social relations but the developmental levels of society and especially of the production forces and the appearance of contradictions, difficulties, shortcomings and instances of bureaucracy, which can be overcome by the workers' united efforts under party leadership. Therefore the effort by political-public organizations and bodies to promote the particular interests of the various social groups and categories is no longer peremptory in nature but characterized by close collaboration among those organizations and bodies under the RCP's constant

guidance, and it no longer involves a conflict of interests or subordination of the interests of some social classes or categories to those of other classes.

When the state of workers revolutionary democracy is directly engaged in fulfilling all the justified interests forming in society, general, class, collective and individual, and the workers as active participants in the exercise of power have a threefold capacity as owners, producers and beneficiaries of the social wealth, there can no longer be any question of promoting their interests by peremptory ways and means. Involvement of representatives of the chief mass and public organizations in the state organs' activity enables them to support the interests of the various social classes and categories directly through actual participation in approval of decisions concerning those interests in correlation with society's general ones. In coordinating the efforts to promote and harmonize the various interests and unity in diversity, it is vital for all mass and public organizations, all social classes and categories, and workers of all nationalities to cooperate under party leadership in the Socialist Democracy and Unity Front, the broadest and most representative political body in Romania.

The RCP, the vital center of Romanian socialist society, has a critical part to play in promoting and harmonizing the general interests, those of the various social classes and categories, and the group and individual interests and in guiding and leading the process of social leveling, which necessarily involves proper development of interests as well. In its more than 65 years of work and struggle the RCP has unquestionably proved that it faithfully represents the interests of the working class and workers of all nationalities, and the entire people, and that its policy "fully serves the vital interests of the entire nation," as Nicolae Ceausescu says.

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Journalists Visit Soviet Newsmen, Cultural Figures

27000020a Bucharest PRESA NOASTRA in Romanian Aug-Sep 87 pp 58-59

[Article by Cristina Dumitrescu]

[Text] There are trips, and not just trips, which promise to be successful from the start. This was the feeling we had—Rodica Simionescu, editor-in-chief of VREMURI NOI-Calarasi, and I, the writer of this article—as we arrived in Moscow for a visit to accumulate material on cultural matters, a visit included within the program of bilateral exchanges of the Council of Newsmen of Romania and the USSR Union of Newsmen.

And how could we think otherwise, seeing the assuredness with which Nina Borovskaya (who was to be our translator-guide for the 7 days) found us among the innumerable travelers at modern Sheremetyevo Airport, the smile with which she greeted us (a smile which did

not wear out in the 2 hours waiting for the plant), the beautiful and very rich Romanian in which she addressed us, the rapidity with which she got our luggage, tickets, forms to complete, pens to find in her bag, the glasses which could not be lost and so forth. Even from the airport we felt like old friends, and we were long-time friends in the car taking us to the Ukraina Hotel, chattering solidly about the program for the visit, the routes, Soviet and Romanian cultural life, common acquaintances and so forth. We agreed that we wanted to see as much as possible, learn about the activity of our newsmen colleagues, the problems confronting us and that we should meet Soviet artists and find what their concerns and achievements are.

Our proposals for the program—rather many, we admit—were greeted with great receptiveness by the leaders of the section of international relations of the Union of Newsmen, so that the 7 days of the visit gave us a wealth of documentary material, gathered not only in the reporter's notebook but more important in our "luggage" of impressions, opinions, memories. And just as the famous "white nights" not only belong to Leningrad, as we had remembered from geography and from Dostoevsky but also make their presence known over a much more extended area, including Moscow, we had the pleasant surprise of one week which was more comprehensive than we had expected, with many more "active" hours.

The first visit to an editorial office was in Vladimir, a city less than 200 km from Moscow, established at the beginning of the 12th Century and felt to be the cradle of Russian culture. The collective of the PRIZIV newspaper spoke to us on a broad level, with examples, specific arguments regarding the particularly rich traditions of the location, of the entire zone, regarding the current concerns of the workers here, about the contribution of the press to political, economic, social and cultural life. They were Victor V. Chernov, editor-in-chief, Natalya Ivanova, Larisa Aydinova, Larisa Vasilyeva, Svetlana Baranova and all the other newsmen present at the meeting. As one of the basic concerns of the editors, we discovered it to be the effort to be actively involved in the immediate present, to give an impetus to production activity and spiritual activity in the zone they are concerned with, popularizing and contributing to the generalization of positive experience, at the same time combatting trends of stagnation, lagging behind. The titles of some of the newspaper's columns are perfectly self-evident: "The Plan is Law," "Superior Quality is the Honorable Duty of Every Worker," "The Beneficiaries of Vladimir's Production," "The Economy Along the Line of Intensification," "Leading Experiments," "The Worker's Tribune," and so forth.

Enjoying special attention in the paper are social, civic and youth problems, Komsomol initiatives connected with work and life, studies, cadre training, the spending of free time. One of these initiatives, for example, recently adopted refers to building homes for young

families, construction entrusted to the future beneficiaries. PRIZIV gave a lot of space to discussion of the complex problems raised by this action and organized a comprehensive and extended exchange of experience between those concerned, and it appealed to the advice of specialists in the effort of participating actively in this worthy effort of the young workers with the specific methods of the newspapermen. Following the evolution of economic, social and cultural life of the region and the everyday concerns of its readers, our hosts told us that the paper is striving to broaden not only the subject angle but also to diversify the journalistic methods of treating reality and giving a priority place to the great problems of general interest without, however, neglecting the apparently, merely apparently, minor matters—the break-up of young families, relations among generations, aspects connected with the situation of single mothers and so forth.

The dialogue carried on with painter Valeriy Kokurin, working from his workshop as well as the modern V.I. Lenin House of Culture in Vladimir supplied a wealth of information on the cultural and artistic concerns of the present, concerns grafted onto existing tradition, but, of course, following new, original paths of evolution.

In an area of such importance for the history of culture, the problems connected with the preservation and restoration of monuments should be viewed with maximum attention and the visit we made to the Directorate for Restoration of Historical Monuments in Vladimir—a true school for specialists from all over the country—was telling in this regard, just as the many monuments, museums, exhibits, visited in Vladimir and Suzdal, a little nearby city with an impressive cultural and artistic wealth, with a rich folklore preserved and used with care and wisdom, were completely satisfying. The projects to preserve and restore the main historical objectives as well as some streets, civic buildings, traditional shopping areas also are a subject often treated in the local paper and the knowledge of the editors in this area are truly impressive, while the information they can furnish successfully rival that of the specialists. We could say that they have the merit of observation and bringing together of historical information with the eyes of the journalist so that the past called up is always in relationship to the present and the cultural is viewed in its natural connection with the political, economic and social.

Again in Moscow, we were guests of the editorial collective of a cultural magazine of true prestige, known by readers in many countries—SOVETSKAYA KULTURA. Intended to be a tribune for discussing the most important ideological problems, the publication and the newsmen producing it are striving to continually strengthen exactly this program-like nature—of broad discussion—involving various opinions and reflecting the political and definitive ideological climate at the current time. The magazine discusses the most important problems of professional and amateur artistic creation and social and political aspects of this activity and

various, sometimes even contradictory, viewpoints are expressed, with the reader being urged to also participate directly in the dialogue—by writing to the magazine—or merely clarifying certain ideas for himself. Mobility in thinking, a permanent opening toward dialogue and toward an open confrontation of opinions are permanent coordinates of action for the magazine's editors and for its leadership. "Sometimes it is difficult for us to accept," they confessed to us, "that a reader or a collaborator may be correct regarding a certain problem and not necessarily the magazine, the editor. Precisely in our honesty to not consider ourselves all-knowing and not to deliver decisions but rather to favor a real discussion, creating the opportunity for our readers to judge for themselves the solidity of the viewpoints expressed, precisely on this attitude we have adopted are based the continually growing popularity of the magazine and its prestige." The struggle with sluggishness, with red tape which inevitably appear in the practice of publishing magazines (as appears in many other professions), the wish and striving to continually be receptive to what is now—in the angle of approaching reality, of selecting subjects, of utilizing means of expressing it—the effort to make a paper interesting without, however, resorting to recipes for chief sensationalism and the newsman's responsibility in expressing and forming opinions—these are just some of the problems we dwelled on in the discussion at the editorial offices of SOVETSKAYA KULTURA, a discussion of colleagues, following with equal interest by hosts and guests alike, one in which, in time, we formulated questions and answered questions in a useful exchange of professional experience.

"Hello," "Welcome," "Have a seat." That is how, to our pleasant surprise, we were greeted in Romanian by the editor-in-chief of TEATR magazine, Mikhail Shvidkoy. True, that is where his knowledge of Romanian ended, but not his knowledge of Romanian theater. Before talking about drama and the art of the theater in the Soviet Union, we had the occasion to answer many of his questions, questions proving a good knowledge of the art of the Bucharest stage. So, proudly and rightly so, we found that actors, directors and playwrights from Romania are well known and valued in the Soviet Union and that their activity is followed with interest by audiences and also specialists from here. Perhaps this start to the discussion—but not just this—made the visit to TEATR like being home. The telephone was ringing constantly, collaborators and directors were coming in and out the door, which was more open than closed, and our lively host was telling us about Soviet theater and then running to his secretary, giving us tea and cakes, asking what Dan Micu, the Romanian director, was working on now, telling us about young Soviet actors and directors, about rethinking the scenes for some dramatic texts, recommending Moscow plays (some we succeeded in seeing), giving a tour of the office, competently analyzing the interpretive art of George Constantin, again serving us tea and cakes. Speaking sincerely, we waited minute to minute for a collaborator to look for us, too, on the phone or for the editorial secretary to scold us for not

handing in an article on time and to receive the galley proof for corrections. Our visit and the discussion with Mikhail Shvidkoy, however, did not have only an emotional value, reminding us of the regular atmosphere of the editorial office. At this time we find out a lot about Soviet artistic life, Moscow artistic life, about the current trends of development, pertinent, extremely interesting observations about the condition of the cultural press and the specialized magazine, about their role in the esthetic education of audiences.

Speaking about the young creators confirmed on Soviet stage in recent years, the speaker gave interesting observations about the definitive features of one zone or another, about the artistic characteristics of the current generation of people in the theater, about the productive, expressive combination of tradition and innovation. The evolution and maturization of theater critics and of specialized journalism are closely connected and directly determined by the evolution and maturization of the art they are observing and evaluating, about which they give value judgments, our speaker noted. "To speak about theater journalism means, at the same time, to speak about theater but also about its public, about its concerns, aspirations, problems and level of understanding."

At OGONYOK we hit the office of our host, responsible editorial secretary Demitriy Ivanov, also at a "hot" time (but, then, when is it not hot in the work of an editorial office?); he was covered with an impressive stack of manuscripts, galley proofs, pages which he had to get to the printer urgently to be printed the next day. Of course, we tried not to take too much of his time, but again we found a moment's peace for a concise, very interesting discussion on editing a large-circulation publication and one of great popularity, like OGONYOK. In our dialogue special emphasis was placed on the relationship with the reader, felt to be a relationship of interdependence, of mutual information, of sincerity and faith. As Dmitriy Ivanov told us, "The sign that a magazine is interesting and that its editors are working well—or, at least, one of the signs—is that the authors and professional collaborators or part-time collaborators do not have to be sought but rather they themselves notify the editors and propose subjects, ideas, articles. As long as we have more material than printable space, as long as articles we publish bring a lot of letters to the paper, we feel it is good and that the road we are following is not the wrong one."

There are trips which promise to be successful from the start. In the case of the documentary visit we have told about—inevitably, very short—the success consisted of the opportunity offered with a colleague's friendliness by the Soviet Union of Newsmen to use our time well, to have as many professional contacts as possible at the editorial offices of some various publications as an area of concerns, means of journalistic expression, category of reader and so forth. We shared experiences, had an

exchange of opinions, discovered similarities and specific differences. At each of the editorial offices visited we were received as friends, as colleagues, with a real hospitality lacking the coldness of protocol, with a politeness which does not raise barriers but, rather, eliminates them. And perhaps for that reason the rather loaded program (I have included just several of its points in this report) did not consume but rather provided energy so that, when the hosts often asked us, "Aren't you tired," we invariably answered, "Not at all. Where do we go now?"

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**Lt Gen Ceausescu on Hungarian WWII
'Atrocities' in Transylvania**
27000025 Bucharest *MAGAZIN ISTORIC* in
Romanian No 10, Oct 87 pp 4-6

[Article by Lieutenant General Dr Ilie Ceausescu: "The Will of the Entire Country"]

[Text] The ideal of liberating the northwestern part of the country, stolen by means of the fascist Vienna Diktat of 30 August 1940, continually inspired the entire Romanian populace; the elimination of foreign occupation from this ancient Romanian region, an inseparable part of the national ethnic and territorial heritage, illegally torn from the body of the Romanian homeland and annexed by Horthy's Hungary, was one of the main objectives of our nation's resistance movement during World War II. And the political and military program for the antifascist and anti-imperialist revolution for social and national liberation in August 1944, competently and meticulously prepared by the Romanian Communist Party, clearly established the combat missions for attaining this patriotic objective.

Thus, the political documents broadcast on the radio at the very moment of the outbreak of the Romanian revolution on 23 August 1944 stated unequivocally: "Alongside the Allied armies and with their help, mobilizing all the forces of the nation, we will cross the borders imposed by means of the unjust Vienna act in order to liberate the land of our Transylvania from foreign occupation." The statement of the chief of the Romanian state was complemented by that of the government instituted by means of the revolution, a government in which the Communist Party participated for the first time in history: "The recognition by the governments in Moscow, London, and Washington of the injustice done to Romania by means of the Vienna Diktat opens up the possibility for the Romanian Armies, alongside the Allied armies, to liberate northern Transylvania from foreign occupation."

From a military viewpoint, the strategic directive of the Romanian General Staff on the evening of 23 August 1944, which specified the missions of the national Armed Forces, concretely established the methods of attaining this national political objective. "The general

operational idea" of this plan of campaign was that the action of eliminating the German military presence from the national territory under the jurisdiction of the government in Bucharest would be allowed immediately by "the offensive action for regaining northern Transylvania," "against the German and Hungarian troops in Transylvania."

Through the heroic fighting of the entire Army, unanimously supported by the nation, the victorious course of the insurrectional military actions in the period of 23-31 August 1944 secured the liberation of two-thirds of the national territory (about 150,000 square km) and, at the same time, the creation of a strong base for launching the liberating offensive in Transylvania. Right at the end of August 1944, the Romanian troops, positioned in order of battle along the front in central Transylvania, launched the first actions for liberation the territory stolen by means of the fascist Vienna Diktat. On 30 August, the very day on which 4 years elapsed since the invasion of the villages and cities of northern Transylvania by the Horthyists, the commander of the Mountain Corps reported the liberation of the first localities within this ancestral region.

After concluding the insurrectional strategic operation with complete success on 31 August 1944, the Romanian military and civilian forces sought to complete the liberation of the national territory from foreign occupation. According to the operational directive of the Romanian General Staff on 30 August 1944, the mission of the Romanian 1st and 4th Armies, concentrated in southern Transylvania and in Banat, along a front of about 1,400 km, was to deny the enemy any penetration toward the Carpathian mountain chain and, later, to launch the offensive for liberating the entire territory of the homeland. Against the 19th Romanian divisions the enemy put 13 divisions from Horthy's Hungary and 8 compact German divisions as well as remnants of another 24 large units from the 6th Army and the 9th Army of the Wehrmacht.

In the first half of September 1944, Soviet large units rushed to the "bridgehead" in southern Transylvania and in Banat, held resolutely until then by the Romanian forces. The military actions for liberating the northwestern part of Romania took on a rapid pace, presenting the dynamic picture of the offensive's simultaneity, according to spatially remote plans, with the strategic defensive. On 7 September the Romanian troops, in collaboration with the Soviet forces, resumed the offensive against the enemy disposition in the southeastern part of Transylvania, while, in the center of the Transylvanian plateau, the Romanian 4th Army waged a fierce battle to check the counterattack of the enemy troops that were trying to occupy the peaks of the southern Carpathians. To the west of the western Carpathians, in Banat and Crisana, the Romanian and Soviet large units succeeded in repulsing the German-Hungarian offensive that sought to occupy the entire western Carpathian chain. In central Transylvania, the Romanian 4th Army, after

stopping the enemy advance, went on the counteroffensive on 9 September, together with the Soviet troops, in the directions of Tirnaveni-Ludus and Aiud-Turda, driving the occupying troops beyond the Mures and Aries Rivers. Fierce fighting occurred at this time at Singeorgiu Hill, Cimpia Turzii, Oarba de Mures, and the Aries valley.

Beginning on 21 September 1944, a new phase of Romania's military efforts to liberate the national territory was launched. To the east of the Apuseni Mountains, the Romanian 4th Army, in cooperation with Soviet forces, launched the offensive in the direction of Turda, Cluj, and Carei, engaging in fierce fighting in order to cross the middle Mures by force and gain the bridgeheads needed for advancing toward "the Gate of the Somes," to liberate the city of Tirgu Mures, break through the enemy front in the Turda area, liberate the city of Cluj, and pursue the enemy and drive him across the border.

The liberation of Cluj—an important economic, cultural, and administrative center in the northwestern part of the country—represented one of the chief events in the war waged by Romania against Nazi Germany and Horthy's Hungary. Stressing the moment's significance, the newspaper SCINTEIA, the press organ of the Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party, noted on 12 October 1944: "Now, through the gate of the Cluj, we will step with pride and dignity onto the land of emancipated Transylvania, where we will encounter the undying spirit of all the fighters for freedom beyond the mountains."

To the west of the western Carpathians, Romanian large units, in cooperation with Soviet large units, liberated the cities of Oradea and Salonta and cross the border with Hungary, then conducting military operations in the Debreczen-Nyiregyhaza area.

Between 14 and 25 October, continuing to advance, the troops of the Romanian 4th Army conducted a vigorous pursuit through "the Gate of the Somes," breaking in succession the enemy resistance in the Mezes and Faget Mountains and before the cities of Carei and Satu Mare. On the general plane of the offensive on the Second Ukrainian Front, this fighting was of particular significance, since the strong grip on the enemy in the northwestern part of Romania by the 4th Army did not allow the German commander to move part of the forces to the west of the western Carpathians, in the direction of the main attack on the front. On the evening of 25 October, Romanian large units rapidly approached the city of Carei, driving the invaders from this locality and signing with their sacrifice the act for the liberation of the last piece of ancestral land. By this means, the northern part of Transylvania, torn from the body of the country as a result of the Vienna Diktat, was reintegrated forever into the national territory. Noting the great event, General Gheorghe Avramescu, the commander of the Romanian 4th Army, addressed the military personnel as follows in an inspiring and moving order of the day: "At the

country's call for the emancipation of Transylvania, stolen by means of the Vienna Diktat, you responded with spirit and with faith in our people's triumph. Young and old, you went to the sacred borders of the homeland and made with your chests a fearless barrier to the enemy, who wanted to reach the Carpathians.... Overwhelmed by the furious artillery fire and by the continual attacks, the enemy was driven from dear Transylvania.... Following the example of those who put the homeland above life, we continue to fight."

Forced to retreat before the sweeping Romanian-Soviet offensive, the Nazi-Horthyist troops committed crimes of the most odious sort, murders and abusiveness toward the Romanian population, looting, arson, demolition of economic and cultural facilities. On 5 September 1944—it says in a report of the Alba Iulia Police Inspectorate—the enemy troops entered the localities of Ormenis and Sopter, where "they devoted themselves to atrocities, setting fire to many peasant houses and farms and killing women and children." On the night of 30 September 1944, another 7 Romanians were killed in the locality of Prundul Birgaului in the county of Bistrita-Nasaud. Among the mass murders committed by the Horthyists, the one at Moisei, in Maramures, where, on 14 October 1944, Hungarian soldiers killed more than 30 Romanian peasants, then setting fire to the locality, acquired a sad notoriety. Similar massacres occurred in Sarmasu, burnings of houses in Deleni, Iara, etc., and deportation of the population in Dej, Rediu, and so on. All these things were added to the thousands of atrocities committed against the majority Romanian population and the citizens of other nationalities, especially Jews, in the northwestern part of Romania during the 4 years of occupation by Horthy's Hungary.

Such crimes and terrorist actions rarely encountered in the history of mankind were the result of cultivating in Hungary's citizens of all social categories and all ages, from the children to the elderly, hatred and total contempt for the inhabitants of Transylvania and, in general, of Romania. To this end, falsification of the truth regarding the historical realities was used, with the Romanian people being presented hostilely as being without an origin, without ancestors, without a homeland, and without historical rights, driven away by some and tolerated by others. For centuries, distorted outlooks and ideas about the superiority of the Hungarians as a race and their right to ravage and destroy everything that was not Hungarian in Transylvania were constantly spread within the Hungarian population. With the simplest historical truth being distorted, the illusions that Transylvania, this ancient Romanian land, would supposedly be Hungarian and would belong to the Hungarian people was fostered in them. Consequently, everything that did not belong to the Hungarian people had to be destroyed. For centuries, but especially in the 19th century, such morbid promptings, systematically presented through every means of information and influence on the masses by the responsible Hungarian elements, from the people and institutions of the state to

those of culture, spread a sick hatred for the Romanian people and all citizens of other ethnic origins in Transylvania, releasing the impulses toward extermination, leading to bloody atrocities that surpassed any imagining. The pathological, inhuman result of such propaganda of hatred and revenge, of murder and torture of the Romanian population, was seen in 1940-1944, when part of Transylvania was occupied by Horthy's Hungary.* In that short period of 4 years, those who had been educated in the spirit of hatred and crime committed in the occupied Romanian zone atrocities that surpassed any human imagining. The Hungarian-Horthyist action of extermination in the occupied part of Transylvania—a real state policy—involved not just the Romanian population, but all the inhabitants, regardless of nationality: Jews, Saxons, Ukrainians, including Hungarians who lived in the localities in the occupied zone. This shows that not care and concern for the Hungarian population in Transylvania were the aims of the Hungarian fascists, but the unchecked craving for conquests and seizures for new territories, unpopulated if possible.

Such inhuman practices did not scare the population of all the ethnic groups in the occupied zones, but, on the contrary, increased their hatred for the fascists, their determination to fight without letup to liberate the last piece of ancestral land.

The actions performed by the Romanian Armies in cooperation with the Soviet military forces to defeat the troops of Hitler's Germany and Horthy's Hungary in the northwestern part of Transylvania had—like the epic of the insurrectional fighting—a pronounced popular character conferred by the unsparing support that the entire populace gave to the liberating struggle. Mobilized by the fervent appeals of the Communist Party, the soldiers without uniforms, from cities and villages, young and old, men and women, enthusiastically engaged in the battle to reestablish the Romanian people's historical rights, setting forever, through great sacrifices, the boundary stones in the proper place. The close unity between the people and the Army was seen to be concentrated expression of the will of the entire nation. "The war is the entire nation's, and the entire nation is at war," the newspaper SCINTEIA wrote on 21 September 1944. "Romania's inhabitants responded as one to the fervent call to battle and work launched by the Communist Party under the motto "All for the Front, All for Victory!"

The news of the complete liberation of the national territory under fascist occupation was received with immense joy and deep satisfaction by the entire Romanian populace. "Transylvania is now one and indivisible again, as it should be," the newspaper LIBERTATEA wrote on 27 October 1944. "No line of demarcation still arbitrarily divides the land for whose freedom Horea, Closca, and Crisan suffered and Avram Iancu, Simion Barnutiu, and the memorialists fought."

The balance sheet of the actions performed by the Romanian Army in the second phase of the fighting to liberate the country from Hitler and Horthy's occupation indicates the dimensions of the nation's complete attachment to the cause of its ideals of freedom and unity. Between 1 September and 25 October 1944, the Romanian Army used in the fighting to complete the liberation of the national territory 28 divisions, 1 air corps, and 2 antiaircraft artillery brigades, totaling an effective strength of about 275,000 military personnel. During the offensive, 872 localities, including 8 cities, were liberated, and losses that amounted to 11,434 prisoners and dead were caused to the enemy.

However, the complete liberation of the national territory from foreign occupation did not also mean the end of the Romanian people's struggle against fascism. The Romanian Army, with an effective strength of over 500,000 soldiers, continually supported by the entire nation, continued to fight, alongside the Soviet Army, on the territory of Hungary and Czechoslovakia and in the northeastern part of Austria, putting Romania, through the great human and material effort, in fourth place among the countries of the antifascist coalition. "Romania's participation, with all its might, in the war against Nazi Germany," the president of our country stresses, "the heavy battles fought by the Romanian soldiers, and the immense sacrifices made by the entire populace to obtain the final victory over fascism demonstrated strongly the Romanian people's determination to fight for the defeat of fascism and the elimination of the imperialist policy of domination and oppression, for the cause of the people's independence and freedom, of understanding and collaboration throughout the world."

*MAGAZIN ISTORIC No 7, 1987.

12105/9274

YUGOSLAVIA

Text of Suppressed Kljajic Speech at 22 October Session

28000031 Belgrade MLADOST in Serbo-Croatian
2 Nov 87 pp 18-20

[Speech by Radmilo Kljajic: "One's Own Head, Someone Else's Opinion"; first part of text is an introduction by MLADOST journalist "D. G."]

[Text] [Box by D. G.]

"Too Hard a Truth"

"It is necessary to go among the membership and ensure that the example of the Eighth Session of the Central Committee of the Serbian LC becomes the practice of every basic organization, every LC opstina committee, and other bodies and sociopolitical organizations in the city."

This imperative and direct position from the opening speech by Aleksandar Bakocevic was supported by all 64 participants in the discussion at the last session of the City Committee of the Belgrade LC. Not one of them missed the opportunity to praise the plenum of Serbian communists for its democratic spirit, by which they meant the right of every member of the Central Committee to express his opinion freely and publicly. For that reason, the plenum was a public discussion that left no misunderstandings (at least, regarding what was said). Otherwise, "if the session of the Central Committee of the Serbian LC had been closed, today people would perhaps be convinced that the truth had been concealed, and when it came to light, that it was too hard for some people to bear," said Nebojsa Maljkovic.

The plenum of Belgrade communists was held in a situation in which, as Milojica Pantelic said, "We in Belgrade are now especially faced with the question of what our attitude is in practice, what it should be, and what it will be, toward those who, in the process of the clash of opinions at the well-known meetings of the Presidium of the City Committee of the Belgrade LC organization, the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Serbian LC, and especially at the 8th session of the Central Committee of the Serbian LC, were left on the sidelines with their opinions." And he did not leave any doubt as to what that attitude should be: "In my opinion, not one iota more or less than the attitude that we have recorded in the LC Statute." This position was clarified even more by the President of the Central Committee of the Serbian LC, who said, "One must be clear and open—the differentiation that has occurred in the Central Committee of the Serbian LC and which should go further, to party and work organizations, is by no means a purge, nor any sort of settling of accounts with people, but rather a necessary means of achieving unity and conducting the necessary mobilization."

Unfortunately, these highly humane and profoundly moral utterances were shown to be a democratic facade concealing an authoritarian and undemocratic practice of hiding secrets from the public and not permitting certain members of the City Committee to state their opinions in public. Most of the speakers demanded determination of the ideological and political responsibility of the former executive secretary of the City Committee and the president of the Publishing Council of STUDENT, and at the proposal of the Presidium, the City Committee agreed that there would be no discussion of their responsibility, but that it would be discussed at a meeting that was to be held in another 20 days or so. As BORBA informs us, at this meeting Radmilo Kljajic and Spasa Andjelic were permitted to speak, and expressed their views and arguments against the proposed measures, but at the proposal of Bozidar Bogdanovic, the City Committee closed their speeches to the public. By the way, Bogdanovic is not even a member of the City Committee, nor was there a vote on his proposal, as required by the LCY Statute.

With this decision, the members of the City Committee identified themselves as being people who are afraid of public speech, who conceal their secrets (or perhaps even other people's) from the public, and in that way leave room for various sorts of speculation, just as if the publicly delivered speech were "too heavy for them to bear."

[Speech by Kljajic] I wanted to take the floor so that we could look each other in the eyes. I can, in spite of all the names that I have been called; I do not know whether you can look me in the eyes.

It is unfortunate that Slobodan Milosevic left the meeting just when this item came up on the agenda. I had intended to say something to him personally, in front of all of you...

I learned from the public news media that for two days the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Serbian LC discussed me in a closed meeting, and then, by a majority of votes, decided to inform me that "the City Committee was expelling me from the LC."

Thus sentence was publicly pronounced upon me in advance: as a member of the City Committee, the executive secretary of the Presidium, as a journalist, and as a person.

None of my party comrades, members of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Serbian LC, some of whom I have known for years, saw fit to talk with me before that. Even a month after that sentence, I have not been shown the minutes of that meeting.

Is such an act in accordance with the current statutory norms and the norms of socialist behavior?

If I am now being attributed with a failure to abide by those norms, why are they being violated by the body whose basic task is to act in accordance with those norms, to protect and respect them? Where would such a practice in the working methods of the Serbian LC and the LCY take us?

Furthermore, in raising this issue, I am strongly rejecting the characterization that has been expressed, that I "tarnished the moral image of an LCY member."

Neither as a man, nor as a communist, as a delegate to the 10th Congress of the Serbian LC, can I agree with an LC working method by which a sentence is first passed against someone, publicly, and then the bill of indictment is put together in closed meetings.

Such convictions before the trial, in my opinion, are a serious blow to the democracy of party life and work and to an essential component of democratic centralism. Without democracy in the preparation of a decision, democratic centralism turns into "bureaucratic Stalinism."

If I am denied in advance my statutory right to my own opinion, my right to a public, reasoned defense of that opinion, of my own personality and dignity, then I am being denied my right to freedom, my right to exist.

My point of departure in the ideological struggle is very clear. I have always stated it publicly. I have done nothing illegal or contrary to the Statute.

I felt, and I still feel today, that our actions can yield results only if our program is clear, if it implies gathering a broad front of creative individuals whose internal driving force would be the LCY, freed from forum work, bureaucratic and dogmatic restraints, and open to every progressive thought that leads us forward to a juster and more humane society.

I am an opponent of lightly writing people off and classifying them wholesale as enemies, if they really are not.

This is because when exclusivism and intolerance drive out reason, then the ideological struggle turns into ideological purges and internal party showdowns. In such an atmosphere people are judged, and not facts and arguments.

It was precisely such a working method in the ideological struggle that was announced last summer from the University Committee of the Belgrade LC, in the words of a member of its Presidium, Dr Vlado Petkovic, as follows:

"Everywhere, you know, there are those who are opposed to the system, and to the policy... In the Assembly, in the LC, in the Central Committee, and in the Presidium, they are everywhere... We know how many of them there are, and who they are."

Instead of the expected criticism of these positions, Vlado Petkovic was recently promoted to editor of MARKSISTICKA MISAO, the theoretical organ of the Central Committee of the Serbian LC!

In contrast to him and the supporters of similar positions, I have always felt, and I feel today, that criticism has a purpose only if it is reasoned, if it is comradesly and humane in the struggle for man, and not against man. This, probably, is Tito's line. I accept that line and not the other.

I felt and I still feel that forums cannot have any authority if it is not possessed by those who sit in them; that the party cannot build authority on failed students, bad workers, and would-be intellectuals; and that the party has to expel opportunism, sycophantism, and careerism from its ranks.

I am afraid of such people, because they respect only one opinion—the opinion of the one above them, the one on whom their promotion up the personnel ladder depends, because such individuals classify everyone who thinks differently, or who thinks differently, as an enemy.

Where only one opinion exists in advance, there is no democracy, or socialism, or freedom of creativity...

Concealed Facts

I do not want to say a great deal about my disputed morality. Let me just comment—morality is something that is not gained or lost by decree, or by a public announcement. I hope that my comrades in the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Serbian LC, those who are challenging my moral image as a communist, are likewise ready to expose their own moral image to the judgment of the party and the public.

I am not one of those people who nod obediently, those people who bow to the authority of a post, who grovel for a promotion in the service and for an armchair; I have never done this and I will not do so in the future.

I am not one of those people who wear their heads on their shoulders with someone else's opinions in them.

I see the meaning of our revolution as lying in its struggle for the liberation of the personality, and not in the creation of obedient and suitable people, or conciliatory ones. This revolution was not carried out by such people, but by ones who could not reconcile themselves.

I joined this committee standing upright, and I will leave it the same way, with the desire of establishing the real truth, no matter how hard it is for any one of us.

Simply put, I was and remain a communist, both in all of my work and in my convictions, because it is something that one carries within oneself, something that is not gained or lost exclusively with a party membership document.

I have never put my personal interests ahead of society's, and I have never viewed my political activism in terms of dinars, and material benefit. That is probably why I do not possess a great deal, aside from my personal honor and my spotless reputation, which has been tarnished by the serious public characterization of me that was signed by the members of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Serbian LC: Radmila Andjelkovic, Dobrica Cvetkovic, Svetislav Stojakov, and executive secretary Dragoljub Pajic. These are, then, people whom I have met two or three times in my life, except for Pajic.

As for their statements, which were naturally composed without my knowledge and participation, I am prepared to offer evidence, written evidence, since this working group did not do so, so that we can arrive at the real truth as soon as possible, and in a reasoned manner. Although

the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Serbian LC did not discuss these statements, or adopt them, Zoran Sokolovic, the secretary of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Serbian LC, signed them on behalf of the Presidium.

These statements say a great deal about STUDENT, just as in the report by the Presidium of the City Committee.

I think that it is not difficult at all to determine how this incident occurred and how it was produced. I do not know why this was not done by our working group in the report that we received, although the City Committee has documentation on it. This is because the problems did not appear just with the controversial title page, but much earlier, without the knowledge of the Presidium and the City Committee.

I think that it is very essential for us to determine why, from 9 February to 4 June 1987, there was a complete interruption of the flow of information between the Presidium of the University Committee and the Presidium of the LC City Committee? Who is concealing this and other important facts from this committee, and why?

During that period, not one official report on the current political situation, personnel changes, and activities of the LC organization at the university came through official channels to the City Committee, in accordance with the established statutory practice of internal party information, as followed by the LC opstina committees.

Where, When, How?

After all, three members of the Presidium of the City Committee and three executive secretaries are from university circles. Jagos Puric and Rados Smiljkovic participated in several closed meetings of the University Committee—and they did not report this and the positions they advocated there either to the Presidium or the City Committee?!

Executive Secretary for Culture Snezana Aleksic, a failed 30-year-old student of tourism at the Natural Science and Mathematics School, on several occasions, without the knowledge of our Presidium, was active and ?KADRIRALA in university youth circles, although that was not her operational responsibility. This has already been discussed once by this committee in the "Cicak case," but without results.

Zoran Todorovic, as a "deserving" party official, was rewarded by performing his military service in Belgrade. I think that the Federal Secretariat for National Defense owes this committee and the youth of Belgrade a public explanation of that precedent (Todorovic is an executive secretary in this city and lives and works here).

We have witnessed how these comrades, in recent days, have been very vocal in seeking the party accountability of individuals in Belgrade and Serbia, as if someone had exempted them in advance from such accountability.

In connection with the controversial page of STUDENT, I made only one public statement, and that was at a time when no position had been taken on this by any party or other forum—on 12 May (it was published in VECERNJE NOVOSTI on 15 May). That issue of STUDENT came out at the end of April and up until the second half of May no one in the LC University Committee or the SSO [Socialist Youth League] University Committee reacted to that article, but now those same people are lecturing everyone about it.

At the 2 June meeting of the Presidium of the LC City Council, I spoke and supported the positions of the Central Committee of the Serbian LC and of our presidium. Then under which article of the LCY Statute am I being held accountable?

The working group of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Serbian LC claims that "on several occasions," I "took a completely opposite position." It does not state where, when, and how I did this, but demands to be taken on faith.

Next comes the observation that I was always "publicly supporting the replaced editor in chief of STUDENT." Here again I have to ask where, when, and how? If it is public, that should mean that it has been published somewhere.

At the end, it is added that my "damaging involvement has been conveyed to certain editorial boards and journalists, especially in POLITIKA, BORBA, and TV Belgrade. Was this really despite Zivorad Minovic, Ratomir Vica, Dusan Mitevic, Milan Rakas, and Stasa Marinkovic? The working group obviously has a condescending attitude toward the management and editorial abilities of the above-mentioned comrades.

I claim, and I can prove this, that not one of my public statements opposed the positions of this committee and higher party bodies, nor did I act in opposition to those positions.

That is, of course, unless opposition means my disagreement with some of the positions of Dusan Mitevic. On this occasion, I will cite just one example...

During the action of carrying out differentiation among the members of the so-called Solidarity Fund, the party line was clear: the line of demarcation was communiqué number 8 and the draft of that opposition program. The confusion in the LC basic organization and among journalists occurred only after Mitevic's speech at the ideological plenum of the Central Committee of the Serbian LC, when he, as a member of the Presidium of the City Committee, advanced the thesis that he was

bothered by such a formalistic logic, even though he himself had supported the action. I will quote Mitevic: "Many comrades who sit in these editorial offices think the same way, but they did not sign it for different reasons. The LC is not yet engaging in a discussion of such ideas, but is discussing only the signing. But I think that in the near future we will have to go into that."

The first to point out the illogical nature of this was STUDENT, to which Mitevic responded on 12 May, and only subsequently added his view of the title page and linked it with Tito's name.

Neither as an LC member nor as a man, nor as a journalist, can I agree with the logic that everyone is a suspect until proven otherwise, and that all those who do not think like Mitevic are suspect.

Later on Mitevic even distanced himself from himself. In a publication issued from the ideological plenum of the Central Committee of the Serbian LC, he deleted these and several other ill-considered views from his speech, as if they had not existed and had not been made public. The harm, it seems to me, had been done nevertheless.

In contrast to him, I cannot disassociate myself from any statement that I have made publicly, because I have made them.

Moral Image

Particularly insulting, I must admit, are the claims made by D. Mitevic at a recent closed meeting of the Presidium of this committee that I was a mere puppet of Dragisa Pavlovic (I do not know why the members of the LC City Committee did not receive the minutes of that meeting).

I have never sought to have someone else take the blame for my work, my failures and successes. In contrast to Mitevic, I have never linked myself with personalities and the balance of power in the forums.

I will answer for everything that I have done or not done. Insinuations like Mitevic's say more about his moral image than about mine. I have a great deal of esteem for Pavlovic, both as a communist and as a person, but I will not consent to having my alleged sins ascribed to him.

My statement about the already famous humor piece "Vojko and Savle" is well known: I did not write it, I did not contribute it, and I never influenced its publication. Zivorad Minovic has always changed his statement from one working group to another, in contrast to me, always trying everything he can to remove responsibility from himself and place the blame on someone else. At the party meetings at POLITIKA, I have always denied that I had any connection with this.

At the closed meeting of our Presidium (I do not know in what capacity he participated in its work, since I did not know that I would be discussed, but he did), he said that he was not accusing Kljajic of writing it, but that he did not know who the author of the sketch was. Perhaps this is true, but it sounds unlikely that the chief managing editor of POLITIKA, a member of the Central Committee of the Serbian LC and the chairman of its commission for information, would publish articles in his newspaper without knowing their authors. Although, I must admit, after the forgeries with the transfer of articles from ZERI I POPULIT to POLITIKA nothing that the chief managing editor does surprises me any more.

I do not know why the working group of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Serbian LC did not have any confidence that 100 communists at the POLITIKA editorial office would not pursue this matter to the end, or consider the findings arrived at in that LC basic organization, or the statements of those who had participated directly in that Rashomon-like incident.

Obviously, the truth in this case does not suit anyone. It suits me.

On the basis of Z. Minovic's statement that I had "put in" that humor sketch, the assessment was made that I had "tarnished the moral image of a communist." He, who approved it for publication, was promoted to acting director of the POLITIKA NO. Does this mean that I tarnished the party's image and he enhanced it?

Some measures of responsibility, party principles, and party morality are surprising. I wonder whether this is a sanctioning of practice: the higher the post, no responsibility, the lower the post, great responsibility.

The working group of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Serbian LC has expressed some very crude slanders at my expense, which go beyond internal party methods and are subject to criminal or judicial liability. One of them is the assertion that it had been "proven" that I had slipped in the author of the humor sketch.

I am even convinced that they, like me, know who in the POLITIKA editorial office put that signature under the sketch, and who later misused the maiden name of my late mother and the name of my relative. I will offer the evidence to the judicial authorities if the party does not consider it.

In connection with the other statements by that working group about my alleged unprincipled attitude in the ideological struggle, or at party meetings at POLITIKA, the minutes from those meetings indicate something quite different, but they are apparently not being taken into account.

I am also being accused, apparently, of "clique goals" aimed at destabilizing the situation at POLITIKA, and at editorial and party meetings. Since my election to this committee, I have never attended a single editorial meeting, and, as I have said, minutes of the party meetings exist. Nevertheless, it seems, people have more trust in those who have stepped into POLITIKA twice.

In contrast to certain comrades who have been criticizing me these last few days, at closed meetings, I have never participated, like Mitevic, in the work of "conspiratorial groups," as I have read of him in party archives and public media. Much more is known about how those groups work and operate by the participants in the meeting at "Carapic's Elm," who have been developing a strategy since last spring for eliminating me from the City Committee. We know who ordered this.

I have been at POLITIKA since 1973; I worked as a journalist and an editor. My professional and political involvement at that publishing house has never been disputed. On the contrary, I am a recipient of the highest journalistic recognition—the annual award for 1985. I was the chairman of the youth organization at the POLITIKA NO, the chairman of the trade union at the editorial office, a member and chairman of the Workers' Council, a member of the secretariat, and the secretary of the party organization.

How can "clique goals unacceptable to the LC" be attributed to such activity, as the working group of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Serbian LC claims?

I expect, I hope rightly, that an assessment will be made of my overall activity as executive secretary, member of the City Committee, journalist, and public worker, and that an opinion on me will be obtained from the LC basic organization at POLITIKA, as provided by the statutory norms.

I wondered for a long time why the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Serbian LC was devoting so much attention to me, in spite of its many important tasks in this crisis situation, and without the knowledge of the Presidium of the City Committee. What kind of person and communist am I that the Statute should be violated because of me? Was my work so damaging to the ideological and active unity of the Serbian LC that I had to be expelled from the LC in such a manner?

With the best of wills, I really cannot explain to myself by anything rational, or understand everything that is being attributed to me and because of which my expulsion from the LC is being sought. I say rational, acceptable, because I think that such a thirst for revenge is completely irrational, especially if the revenge is associated with truths that have been voiced.

Allusions and Sketches

I am convinced that this exists, because of the following examples. Milos Knezevic, the executive secretary for information of the Presidium of the LC University Committee, was replaced because he had distributed to members of the Presidium, as confidential material, an article from a Slovene newspaper that discussed a dogmatic group at Belgrade University headed by Mirjana Markovic.

The conflict with the editorial board of STUDENT began at the moment when it published an allusion to that dogmatic group headed by the close friends Mirjana Markovic and Milos Aleksic.

At one time, writing a sketch for EKSPRES POLITIKA on the revolutionary movement in Belgrade and Serbia, I published a document on Vera Miletic (with the underground nickname Mira), one of the greatest party traitors, a member of the District Committee of the Communist Party from Pozarevac, who in the fall of 1943, exposed the Belgrade party organization and confidential contacts of the Provincial Committee of the Communist Party for Serbia to agents of the special police. At that time, naturally, I did not know that she was the mother of Mirjana Markovic, a member of the Presidium of the LC University Committee and a member of the Ideological Commission of the City Committee. I must sincerely confess that if I had known this, I would not have concealed the truth.

I did not think then, and I do not think today, that that fact could in any way compromise Mirjana Markovic and her husband Slobodan Milosevic. Nevertheless, after this political witch hunt against me, which has been going on virtually since my election to the committee, I cannot find anything other than this fact to explain to myself just why I have been exposed to such moral and political attacks.

In the report that the City Committee received from the last meeting of the Presidium, in the drafting of which I naturally did not participate, it is claimed, on one hand, that Tito is frequently attacked in the public media, and on the other, that I did not oppose this. If that is true, and I claim that it is not, who prevented the ideological sector headed by D. Mitevic, as well as the above-mentioned officials from the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Serbian LC and the already well-known "fighters" from the Presidium of the Republic Conference of the Serbian Socialist Alliance of Working People from responding promptly, since all of the publications coming from Belgrade bear the imprints of their republic and federal founders?

Instead of doing so, these same comrades, in the meantime, in comfortable armchairs and offices, hidden from the public, wrote a bill of indictment against Kljajic.

After everything that I have said and that I can document, can one opportunistically keep silent and nod one's head? I have never consented to do that, nor will I, especially not now, when falsehoods are being said about me.

You, especially those of you from the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Serbian LC, can take away my party membership and job, but you cannot take away my reputation, honor, and pride!

9909

**Dedijer Criticized for Misrepresentations of
Croatian History**

28000041 Zagreb *DANAS* in Serbo-Croatian
17 Nov 87 p 4

[Article by Nenad Ivankovic: "Dedijer's Generalizations
From Below"]

[Text] Dedijer's latest book, "The Vatican and Jasenovac" (Rad, Belgrade 1987) is certainly one of those publications which one believes in advance could attract particular attention from the public and in the end be a good publishing deal. That is demonstrated by the "cleverly" chosen title of this rather large book (almost 800 pages, in large format, with a printing of 8,000 copies), whose cover is illustrated with a photograph that shows Pope Pius XII in the company of 110 "Croatian soldiers" during their visit to the Vatican in 1943, but also by the fact that heightened interest, one might say, has been aroused in this topic among part of the public. This is not just because in this Balkan sociopolitical milieu of ours something is repeated every day of what has already been done or said long before, but also, perhaps above all, because "historiography" (a certain kind of it, naturally) has to do more and more with everyday politics. For that reason, such a work becomes less documentary as it becomes more predetermined—like trials that are conducted solely in order to confirm sentences that have already been passed.

This book by Dedijer, unfortunately, is to a considerable extent a demonstration of such a method, primarily because it is not based on documents, although its full title is "The Vatican and Jasenovac: Documents," but also because Dedijer compiled a compendium of the opinions and views of different authors (on the subject in question), which are works that for the most part are well known to our reading public, and furthermore put them in the context of his own ideas without making any effort at all to judge them critically. This particularly applies to a considerable portion of Novak's "Magnum Crimena" and to the "Documents on the Anti-National Work and Crimes of Part of the Catholic Clergy" (from 1946), which in a way constitute the framework of this refresher course.

In addition to this, he is not publishing some important documents that throw a somewhat different light on the whole problem, and this makes the book one-sided and superficial. Thus, for example, under the title "Vatican Priests Committing Crimes in Jasenovac," he also talks about Tomislav Filipovic, a former monk and notorious Ustasa and the commandant of that camp (whose "conspiratorial" name was Miroslav Majstorovic, and afterwards Karlovic), without taking into account some important circumstances. First of all, in 1942, after his first campaign with the Ustasa, he was suspended by Marcone, the papal legate to the so-called NDH [Independent State of Croatia], and under pressure from the occupation authorities he was placed under judicial investigation, from which he was saved by Luburic, who brought him to Jasenovac under a false name. Much more important than these details, however, is a document from 1945 that is known as the "Statement by the Senior Officials of the Franciscan Province of Bosnia Srebrena," which, among other things, contains this important fact: "When," the document says, "the name of Tomislav Filipovic is already being mentioned so much in connection with the above, we must reiterate here, as is in any case well known to the public, that as soon as his presence at the commission of the crime in Banja Luka became known, and before it could have been determined that he had committed any crime, he was expelled from the Franciscan order by a summary canonical trial on 28 April 1942, and that since that day he has not belonged to our Franciscan community, and so we cannot bear responsibility for his subsequent actions. That was the most that we were able to do under those circumstances." At the end of the document, the Franciscans "express their loyalty to the NOP [National Liberation Movement] authorities, as well as their willingness to cooperate and assist in raising up and renewing our country and our long-suffering but never conquered peoples..."

Naturally, this by no means diminishes the tragedy of the Serbs, Croats, and other victims at that notorious Ustasa place of torture and execution, or a fact that should be repeated, namely, that the Catholic leadership has never publicly and openly condemned those Ustasa crimes, not just during the time of the NDH, but unfortunately not even today.

Unsupported Assertions

Another awkward aspect of this book is certainly that Dedijer did not manage to use the documents (and not even the testimony of the authors of other works) to support his main idea, that "Germany and the Vatican, with the support of Mussolini, were jointly responsible for the genocide in Croatia during World War II," and that accordingly "the Vatican told the Catholic Church in Croatia to help the Ustase," which in the final analysis boils down to the statement that "one of the tasks of priests was to encourage Ustasa units to engage in mass murders of Serbian peasants."

Since Dedijer does not say a single word about the considerable number of priests who cooperated with the NOB [National Liberation Struggle] or fought as partisans with rifles in their hands, he leaves a very painful impression with respect to his intentions, not because one would like to downplay the responsibility of Pope Pius XII for his reticence and acquiescence with respect to Hitler's Nazism, and his role in inciting a hysterical hatred of Communism, or even to downplay the consequences of the collaboration of part of the Catholic clergy in Croatia with the Ustasa regime, but rather because the method of taking a part for the whole leads to dangerous historical and political generalizations.

Furthermore, it is intolerable that a book that aspires to be a collection of documents, and thus a scholarly work, calmly talks about the "participation of the Vatican in the murder of hundreds of thousands of people," and that the only argument cited for that assertion is the concordat concluded between the Vatican and Hitler's Germany, which is then interpreted as a "blessing of Hitler's regime" and as the "basis for the association of Hitler and the Vatican in genocide against Serbs, Slovenes, and Jews" (with the antifascist Croats, Moslems, and Gypsies being "forgotten" in that context). The nature of Dedijer's "reasoning" was clearly expressed on page 465, which he "proves" this alliance between the Pope and the Ustasa regime as follows: "There can be no better proof of this than the fact that the Pope's first deputy, and thus the Pope himself as well, viewed with satisfaction the Ustasa mass conversion campaign, and that this was not only the affair of the Ustasa and the Croatian episcopate, but the Vatican's affair as well." Must we point out that Marcone, whom he has in mind here, was by no means the Pope's "first deputy," but rather an emissary (a legate) of the Vatican, and that, for instance, Rusinovic (the Ustasa emissary to the Vatican) often denounced to Lorkovic a much more significant Vatican figure, Cardinal Tisserant, of being anti-Ustasa? Or that the same Rusinovic, in a conversation with the above-mentioned prelate, said, "The Germans... are the greatest enemies of Catholicism as far as you are concerned!" Dedijer, however, does not take this complexity and controversial nature of the options and behavior into account in formulating his positions, and that is surely what is weakest in his book.

He acts in a similar manner in "arguing for" the general assertion that the Catholic Church was the "main spiritual leader in these mass crimes," and that "a striking large number of Catholic rectories and monasteries throughout the entire country played the role of the organizers of the Ustasa conspiracy and were a hotbed of fascist propaganda." Naturally, what is in dispute here is not his assessment of the leadership of the Catholic Church, because it undoubtedly bears a heavy historical responsibility, nor even his assessment of the behavior of groups or some of the priests, but rather his attempt to fix this blame upon the entire Catholic Church at that time, especially since the truth about this has meaning only if it is whole and complete. That is precisely what

Dedijer bypasses, however. Consequently, he does not cite all of the documents (the documents!) which clearly state that several hundred Catholic priests, for example, assisted the NOB or actively participated in it, or that (at least as an exception) Bishop Alojzije Misis of Mostar, during the very first year of the war, condemned the Ustasa crimes against the Serbs, and did so as a bishop in the so-called NDH. Instead, Dedijer prefers to act as follows: first of all he says, "Hundreds of priests were prominent in the criminal service of the Ustase and the occupiers, and received high Ustasa decorations for this," and then gives a list of 120 such names (!), naturally, without paying the slightest attention to the facts published, for instance, in Ciril Petesic's book "The Catholic Clergy in the NOB 1941-1945," which was published in cooperation with the VJESNIK Press Agency by the Commission of the Executive Council of the Croatian Assembly for Relations with the Religious Communities, not to mention other sources.

Intentions

Instead, Dedijer allegedly deduces the Ustase's origination in the Croatian Catholic Church (as a whole) from the fact that, according to one of the articles in "Ustase," "the first organized Ustase used to meet in the canonical residence at 4 Kaptol" (at the time of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia!). With such a superficial "proof," even if not voluntarily, he obscures the clear truth of the responsibility of one part of the church for the events in the NDH, either direct responsibility (the so-called conversions) or moral. At the same time, he does not just put the Vatican and the Catholic Church in Croatia on trial, but also a large part of the Croatian people by declaring the entire church to be an Ustasa standard-bearer (by dismissing the truth about the opposition to the Pavelic regime), since if all elements of the Catholic Church were infected with the Ustasa fever, as Dedijer makes it appear, then it is fairly logical to assume that most of these were believers in the same church! But these were the same Croats who perished along with Serbs, Jews, Gypsies, and Moslems in infamous Jasenovac and in the front ranks of the struggle under the flag of Tito's Yugoslavia.

The fact that Dedijer's historical and political prejudices have completely blinded that historian "from below" is also demonstrated by his regret that he cannot show the pro-Ustasa (and anti-Yugoslav and anti-Serbian) attitudes of the Vatican and the Catholic Church in our country as dating from the earliest times, which in his view means as early as the 6th and 7th centuries (!), "because even less recent history is full of reliable evidence, full of episodes that confirm our thesis." At this point he does not even refrain from insulting one Strossmayer, Krizanic, Pavlinovic, Dobrila, Milanovic, and who knows who else, by asserting the following: "If the bishops and priests in Croatia and Slovenia did act like 'patriots' (the quotation marks are Dedijer's!-author's comment), their policy was nevertheless a policy of loyalty and submission to Austro-Hungary."

These ideas, however, reveal the essence of the whole endeavor. His main point of departure is his conviction that the Catholic Church has a genocidal attitude with respect to the Orthodox (and this primarily means the Serbs), an attitude which has existed continuously for a thousand years, which surfaced in an exacerbated form during World War II, and which, in accordance with that deep-rooted tradition, lies dormant within contemporary Catholicism. Consequently, Dedijer does not devote a single word to some crucial events in postwar Catholicism (the Second Vatican Council and the church's ecumenical orientation as a direct result of it), petrifying it for all time in its pathological forms, and more in one historical form (which is a historical falsehood!); this dooms togetherness in our country to the togetherness of target and bullet.

Perhaps the only saving grace of this book, however, is that one can clearly see from a large number of details that it was written hastily (and thus many names and concepts are written incorrectly; Dedijer, for instance, did not even take the trouble to find out the surname of Banja Luka Bishop Pichler, and so signs the 1963 message to believers that he is publishing in a truly unusual manner: as a greeting from "Banja Luka Bishop Alfred"!), without any seriousness, internal logic, or systematic approach. Consequently, it does not even have any scholarly dignity; instead, it all serves the current naked interests of certain political forces, as is quite plainly shown by Dedijer's explanation of why he became involved in this "endeavor." He says, "A request came (to Russelov Sud [Bertrand Russell war-crimes tribunal]—author's comment) for a study of crimes of genocide, especially religious genocide, in Croatia during World War II. Another request also came for a study of the current living conditions of Serbs in Croatia." It is clear, since Dedijer has become his own Russelov Sud, that he does not have the slightest intention of mentioning who sent that request (although in several other cases, he names in his book those to whom it is addressed). But he therefore extends the request to the current situation as well! A word to the wise—really.

From a political standpoint, this book is far from being harmless, especially in a situation in which certain mentalities and groups have become sensitive to the point of readily taking things the wrong way, and in which people are increasingly adopting an "inquisitorial" attitude that in any situation necessarily has to have the wrong culprit for the sake of psycho-social catharsis, the task of which is also to act as a mass sedative.

9909

Deadlock Over Constitutional Change in Serbia Continues

28000033 *Belgrade NEDELJNE INFORMATIVNE NOVINE in Serbo-Croatian* 15 Nov 87 pp 18-19

[Article by Stevan Niksic: "Constitutional and Other Crises"]

[Text] As early as this summer, at the very beginning of the constitutional discussions in the Serbian Socialist Republic (on 28 July the Serbian Assembly approved the "Proposal to Begin Changing the Republic's Constitution"), one did not need to be a prophet to view with some caution the possibility that all three of the principal factors in this procedure—the assemblies of Serbia, Kosovo, and Vojvodina—would reach an agreement quickly and easily on the main (controversial) topics. After all, even in the first phase of the work on preparing the changes to the federal Constitution, which began somewhat earlier, difficulties were manifested and the old disagreements, based on well-known positions, were rekindled.

In the last few years, in spite of all the efforts to surmount the legacy of the past and the attempts to build new unity (the highest bodies of the Serbian LC and the LCY did all that they could in this regard), so much mutual distrust, suspicion, and stubbornness have accumulated in Serbia that only political dilettantes could believe that the same people who have argued and fought so much with each other could suddenly agree completely on everything.

If one also adds to this certain recent episodes, events in which really harsh words were uttered in high heat, the kind that cannot help but have consequences for mutual relations, it must be clear to everyone that this work will not be easy and simple. At the same time, however, after everything that has happened, after all of the rhetorical statements about determination to get many things moving forward again from a standstill, uttered at the 9th session of the LCY Central Committee and in connection with that session (on Kosovo), and the assurances at the 9th session of the Serbian LC Central Committee (also in connection with that session) about political unity in the republic, it was really hard to foresee that what did happen would happen, and that it would happen in the way that it did, just as if nothing had happened in the meantime.

Who Will Bear Responsibility

What happened, however, was that the "Proposal to Begin Changing the Serbian Republic's Constitution" was blocked virtually from the very beginning, before work began on formulating the first version, i.e., the draft amendments; mutual accusations and identification of the "culprits" began, and as of this moment no one has been spared, even the press, which has been accused once again (by Milivoj Vujadinovic, the chairman of Vojvodina's Constitutional Commission) of using its coverage to exert undue "pressure" and hinder the work of the republic's constitutional commissions, and so perhaps we should explain here how everything has turned out the way it has (so far).

Novi Sad's DNEVNIK, in its weekly commentary, after the meeting of the Vojvodina Assembly that established that province's position in the upcoming constitutional

changes in Serbia, noted that a "constitutional crisis" had begun in the Serbian SR; if this newspaper, which is usually well informed and as a rule expresses the views of official circles in Vojvodina, says so, then there is no reason not to believe it. Admittedly, the purpose of the commentary was somewhat more complex—to demonstrate that Vojvodina was not responsible at all for the above-mentioned "constitutional crisis," and that the Vojvodina Assembly's refusal to consent to the proposed changes was a legitimate act of self-defense against an alleged attempt to threaten the rights of working people in that part of the republic and to curtail the province's present rights and reduce it to the level of "administrative and cultural autonomy." Even if this represents the view of Novi Sad officials, resulting from their official deliberation and analysis, it is still somewhat difficult to accept, at least until valid reasons are offered for it.

Identical motives—alluding to responsibility for any political consequences—took different forms last week in the two provincial assemblies. Djordje Radosavljevic, the President of the Presidency of Vojvodina, noted first of all that "incorrect solutions would make Vojvodina unstable," and immediately afterward rejected (in advance) any possible criticism that Vojvodina's positions in this regard could be interpreted as a cause of constitutional and political crisis.

"One who acts in accordance with the constitution cannot cause a constitutional crisis," Radosavljevic said. (The fresh discovery, which significantly enriched the history of Yugoslav constitutional law, that "Vojvodina was firmly part of AVNOJ [Antifascist Council for the National Liberation of Yugoslavia] Yugoslavia even before it joined federal Serbia," was not repeated on this occasion.)

At the same time, Miroslav Francuski used a similar method of "preventive polemics," claiming that the position of the Vojvodina assembly did not mean that it was blocking changes in the Serbian constitution, but on the contrary provided a "platform for getting out of the situation we are in."

Bajram Seljani, the President of the Presidency of Kosovo, speaking at a meeting of the Kosovo Assembly, expressed an essentially identical assessment: "Kosovo has consistently adhered to the agreement not to politicize the issues of constitutional changes, something that could not be said of certain other areas." And, he added, "We in Kosovo are not blocking the constitutional changes, but we do not accept bias."

Thus, through an interesting and quite unusual logical operation, the one who is proposing the changes is designated as being responsible for blocking them, and the one who does not accept the proposed changes refuses in advance to bear any consequences whatsoever for such an action; responsibility, it has been said, can be sought exclusively "on the other side," on the side of the one proposing the changes.

It is interesting to observe, furthermore, that no one wants to take responsibility for "blocking" the changes, because there is a clear awareness that changes are desired and expected, and that one would have to take responsibility for "blocking" changes; it is even indisputable that responsibility can be associated only with "blocking" the changes, although apparently it would have to be open to question whether the announced process of changes has been blocked by the proposal to carry out the changes or by the refusal to accept this and do it.

What Happened

Accordingly, one could perhaps get the impression at first glance that the only surprise and the only new thing, after the first round of constitutional discussions in the Serbian SR, is that it appears that there is nothing new and that the discussions are going around in circles, and that the ritual seen so many times is being repeated, following the well-known scenario. This is only partially correct, however, since—to tell the truth—during the last few months the work on the constitutional problem in the Serbian SR has not been completely monotonous. At certain points it appeared that an agreement was not only possible, but even very close. But several other things happened, which would have been hard to imagine earlier.

At one time, the official representatives of Kosovo advocated views that were substantially different from those advocated by the representatives of Vojvodina. Consequently, they agreed on virtually everything with the representatives of republic bodies on the republic's Constitutional Commission. Somewhat later, i.e., more recently, their views apparently "evolved," and they even came closer to the position that the Vojvodina representatives had advocated virtually from the very beginning of the work on the constitution.

If one compares the final and officially approved positions of the Kosovo and Vojvodina Assemblies on the "Proposal for Beginning to Change the Constitution of the Serbian SR," which were adopted at the end of last week, it is not difficult to see that the differences between them can now be reduced to quite negligible nuances. Essentially, both provinces do not agree with having a range of issues (national defense, state security, international cooperation, legal protection, etc.), which are part of the arsenal of the classical privileges of the state (and thus of the republic as a state), resolved at the republic level, in a uniform manner for the entire territory of the republic. In their opinion, without these privileges, the current extent of the provinces' rights would be fundamentally and intolerably encroached upon.

The discussion of this followed tracks that were often chosen completely arbitrarily. Specifically, it consisted, on one hand, in demonstrating that without these privileges the rights of the provinces would be reduced, and on the other hand, in giving futile assurances that they

would not be reduced. But it was necessary to cite and clarify completely, once and for all, what are the state's classical privileges and what are not. The state's privileges cannot be the privileges of the province, or of anyone else, unless possibly the state concedes them to them by its own decision. And if the bodies of the republic, as a state, do not exercise certain classical state functions in part of the republic's own territory, and someone else does, someone who is not a state, and accordingly it is neither logical nor constitutional for it to exercise these functions without appropriate authority, then perhaps the specification of the jurisdiction of the republic and the jurisdiction of the provinces, which should have been the first (although naturally not the sole) goal of the current constitutional changes in the Serbian SR, could not have been blocked by arguing over "who gains and who loses."

To put it simply, everything depends (although this is being stubbornly denied) on clarifying a preliminary question: is Kosovo a republic? And is Vojvodina a republic?

If the answer is clearly negative, then there is hardly a basis for disagreements of the present kind. If Kosovo and Vojvodina are not republics, and the SFRY Constitution defines republics (and not provinces) as states, then nothing can be either gained or lost in the process of determining what belongs to whom. Everyone should "gain" and "have" what belongs to him. But since the disagreements over distinguishing "what is whose" and who should "gain" and "lose" something are still a reality, the only logical conclusion that follows is that there is still no clear agreement on the answer to the question of whether Kosovo and Vojvodina are republics, and whether they should be.

Dissenting Voices

As one could have expected, very different opinions were expressed at the meeting of the Kosovo Assembly. Some delegates demanded that the proposal of the Serbian Presidency and the Serbian Assembly be adopted in its entirety, without any reservations. They were in the minority, since the majority voted for the proposal of the Kosovo Constitutional Commission, i.e., for reservations to the proposal.

A novelty, and for some perhaps a somewhat unexpected event, was the fact that for the first time dissenting voices were publicly heard in Vojvodina on such a matter. Clearly, and of course quite naturally, not everyone in that province thought the same way previously about everything. For a long time, however, it was inconceivable for the differences to be expressed in public. Now it has happened. In some opstinas, voices were heard demanding that the Serbian Assembly's proposal be adopted in its entirety (without reservations), and the delegate from the Odzaci opstina argued for such

a position at the meeting of the Vojvodina Assembly. He was in the minority, of course, since the majority voted for the reservations of the Vojvodina Constitutional Commission.

In view of the dissenting voices in both provinces, it is evident and understandable that the list of criticisms and of those who find a great deal to criticize in connection with the current constitutional changes is growing drastically.

The provincial leaderships are expressing their criticisms of the republic bodies and of individuals in them who are unnamed for the time being; some opstinas as a whole, and many people in both provinces, as individuals, are also criticizing the provincial bodies. But what about the republic bodies and their responsibility?

At the end of this month (on 24 November), a meeting of the Serbian Assembly will discuss both provinces' agreement to the proposal for changing the republic's constitution, and also their reservations. It is not difficult to predict that on that occasion there will be harsh words once again, and that responsibility will be mentioned again, along with the unwillingness of the provinces to agree with what was proposed. It should not be any surprise, however, if remarks were also made on that occasion to the effect that it is not only the "other side" that can be blamed for the "dead end" of constitutional changes in the republic. At last week's meeting of the Serbian Council in Belgrade, it was clearly stated that the republic leadership had not always acted as it should have acted, and as the public had a right to expect from it.

The list of stated (or only possible) criticisms is not a small one in this case either, although some of them mutually cancel out or exclude each other. Thus, on different occasions the republic bodies have been criticized for insufficient decisiveness, and even excessive concessions in cases in which they were not justified. In the name of some sort of vague "higher" goals and an abstract concept of unity, Serbia allegedly entered the current round of constitutional changes with intolerably modest ambitions, and thus risked having even these minimal expectations fulfilled only halfway, which would prolong the life of one of potentially the most dangerous, and even principal, sources of the crisis. Several criticisms have also been expressed, however, pointing out that certain individuals in the republic have occasionally behaved in a way that visibly made cooperation and agreement more difficult.

Finally, the serious disruption of the republic's unity, which was discussed at the 8th meeting of the Central Committee of the Serbian LC, could not help but affect the work to date, and even Serbia's position, in the constitutional discussions so far.

The blame for the current difficulties has been sought and placed not only among the participants in the procedure that is under way, but also in the norms of the existing Constitution, which is acting as a fact, that is to say, on the side of those who are no longer participating directly in this procedure today, nor are able to do so. In the final analysis, this may perform the function of providing some sort of "alibi" for the current participants.

Academician Jovan Djordjevic said in a statement for BORBA a few days ago that "Serbia itself is to blame for allowing such a procedure for reaching significant decisions in its constitution." Recalling that on the basis of the current constitutional provisions it is sufficient that one provincial assembly not give its consent in order for a change in the Serbian Constitution to be postponed, Pavle Nikolic, a professor at the Belgrade Law Faculty, says, "That is a serious mistake in the Serbian Constitution, because it is virtually a constitutional right to a veto. That sort of blockade, in cases in which decisions are being made on vital issues of interest to the entire republic, has already brought us a great deal of trouble and disagreement."

"The blow was especially severe," says Najdan Pasic, "because the reports from the constitutional commissions of the two provinces, in which it is stated that they do not agree to fundamental parts of the proposed changes, arrived on the same day (or a day later) as the meeting of the Presidency of the Republic Conference of the Socialist Alliance of Working People of Serbia, which pointed out the urgency of starting to change the Serbian constitution and the Yugoslav constitution in order to surmount the economic and political crisis."

What can the Serbian Assembly do in this situation? As it appears at present, little or almost nothing. The worse solution would apparently be a decision to proceed with incomplete and partial changes to the republic constitution because of the disagreement (veto) of the provinces. The most logical decision, although one that certainly would not be easy to make, would be simply to postpone the changes for some other time, until it becomes possible to obtain the necessary agreement, because partial changes that would actually leave everything the way it was would not only be absurd and irrational at this time, but would also be an unnecessary waste of nerves, time, and money. Why are we fooling ourselves once again? Haven't we already done this many times and learned that no good will come of it?

9909

Vojvodina Presidency Chairman Discusses Status of Provinces

28000040 Zagreb DANAS in Serbo-Croatian
17 Nov 87 pp 16-18

[Interview with Djordje Radosavljevic, chairman of the SAP Vojvodina State Presidency, by Marinko Culic and Jovo Paripovic: "We Do Not Suffer From a Complex About Statehood"; date and place not given]

[Text] DANAS: Opinions differ markedly on what has been done so far in formulating the constitutional amendments. As representative of a sociopolitical community which is particularly affected by this, what do you think about the objections, which seem to be increasingly outspoken, that in their present form the amendments have opened the door to centralistic and unitaristic options in the country's development?

Radosavljevic: If everything that is being talked about in public were adopted, that would really be the case. But I do not think that will happen, nor would it be good if it did.

DANAS: Does a real basis exist today for a renewal of centralism in Yugoslavia?

Radosavljevic: I believe there is no real basis, but there is a real pretext. The great economic difficulties the country faces, especially the difficulties faced by the underdeveloped parts of Yugoslavia, bring onto the stage throughout Yugoslavia solutions which are objectively unacceptable, since they are not in the long-range interest of the country as a whole. I fully understand that this occurs out of necessity and that no one is doing this just because that is the way he would like it. But we have to seek solutions in the other direction; we need a powerful stimulus of all the work potential and productive potential in the country, and that means that there have to be standards which will reward good work and a good result of business operation. That is why we must cultivate an awareness of the need to utilize and reproduce our capabilities to the maximum, especially our personnel and our people. No one who fails to understand this will get out of this difficult situation, and there will be increasingly serious political problems. Most important, that would open up the doors to polarization and confrontation with far-reaching consequences within the country. That is bad for both the advanced and the underdeveloped.

DANAS: There have been demands to grant the status of an underdeveloped region to "Serbia proper" or at least to certain parts of it. If this were accepted, Vojvodina would remain the only advanced component of SR Serbia. How is Vojvodina "getting along with" its level of development, does it even cause certain problems?

Radosavljevic: You put it well when you said "get along with," since as matters now stand Vojvodina could also be requesting the status of an underdeveloped part of the country in 2 or 3 years. That might sound like an exaggeration, but today a great deal of income is being drained uneconomically out of Vojvodina, and this province is therefore stagnating more and more.

DANAS: But where are we headed if everyone wants to be underdeveloped, including even Vojvodina, which is one of the most highly advanced parts of the country?

Radosavljevic: No one is saying that Vojvodina wants that; we are fighting to prevent that, but that is the objective state of affairs.

DANAS: Fine, but this is obviously becoming the "fashion"; where are we headed if it is more advantageous to be underdeveloped than advanced?

Radosavljevic: Well, it does not lead us anywhere good, that is quite clear. But I think that we have not yet learned to talk about these problems—when I say "we," I am also referring to us from the so-called advanced parts of the country, but a calm and tolerant conversation would remove, I am deeply convinced, many problems which now seem to us irresolvable.

DANAS: But today there is obviously a lack of conversations of that kind. Does this mean that the dialogue on the basic issues of the country's future development is confined to the highest bodies of leaders in a crisis?

Radosavljevic: I am not certain that matters can be explained exclusively in terms of shortcomings in leadership and in what is said in bodies of leaders, since many solutions have not even been within their jurisdiction, nor is it always a good thing to be concerned only with them. The problem is broader, and although it can be looked at in the way you are doing, and then also in terms of the relation between the advanced and the underdeveloped, in terms of the constitutional amendments in the economic system we are now concerned with, and so on, I would call attention to something else. For years we have had an immense human and scientific potential, so great, if I might put it this way, that it exceeds all the difficulties we encounter at the moment. We have a situation today where that knowledge is not being used or where the people in the fields of knowledge are fighting one another.

The period of synthesis came to an end with Tito and Kardelj both in the sense of action and in the sense of theory and politics. That is not effective enough today. The conception, as is well known, was that the social councils would bring about this synthesis: however, they are involved in reconciling views instead of synthesizing knowledge. Yet we already have assemblies for reconciling views, and we have no need for yet another institution engaged in that, and the executive councils exist for proposing and carrying out decisions.

DANAS: But how is one to synthesize views that differ so widely as those, say, of the Slovenes and the Montenegrins or of the Slovenes and the Macedonians?

Radosavljevic: I am talking about a synthesis of knowledge and about reconciling views. Neither of them is easy, but it can and must be done. Otherwise we will go on adopting certain solutions which are satisfactory only to some people. The foreign exchange law is an example of this; you in Croatia are well aware of that problem: the law was passed under pressure, it does not meet the

needs and it has not been yielding the anticipated results, and now it turns out that it inevitably will be amended. Even if no one is going to be responsible for the damage which has been caused thereby, it should serve as a lesson for the future for everybody.

DANAS: How are we to get out of the closed circle in which decisions, as you have mentioned, are made under pressure; who is going to make the synthesis you speak of, are conflicts to be overcome in the classic party way, or differently?

Radosavljevic: Let us get straight at once, a conflict of opinions is not bad in and of itself, as a matter of fact, we need such conflicts.

If there were no conflict of opinions, there would be no thinking, and that presumably is not what we want. The solutions we need must be arrived at through dialogue. I think the best way is for the proposals generated by a dialogue to be tested first in practice, to be passed through the experimental sieve, and to see how much they are worth.

As for the role of the party in the synthesis we are talking about, I think we need a League of Communists which will operate in the spheres of both thought and action, and that means a party that will rise above the horizon of momentary circumstances and get a better and further view.

DANAS: Let us go back for a bit to the constitutional questions. What is your comment on the diametrically opposite view of the role of the 1974 Constitution in the present crisis situation, from the view that sees the Constitution as the principal generator of the crisis to the view which "holds its hand in the fire" in asserting that that is not the case?

Radosavljevic: This is what I would say: the latter opinion is the only correct one, but it is sometimes poorly defended. That is, it is true that the 1974 Constitution was on the line of the continuity of the revolution, and if it had not been enacted, I would dare to say that we would have had a greater crisis than we have now. But to defend things in the 1974 constitutional solution that are not functioning or cannot function or when time has brought something new, that is absolutely wrong in my view. After all, we are not dealing here just with an orientation, just with ideas, we are talking about the implementation of those ideas. If you analyze things carefully, you will see that Yugoslavia's reputation of the world and Tito's reputation as well did not come about primarily because of our ideas; they came about because those ideas were realized to a large degree.

DANAS: Nevertheless, a while back you yourself said that we have brains, but we are not using them. If that is true, and the challenges before us are of fateful importance, how are we to make use of them, how in general are we to arrive at a Yugoslav model of socialism which will be successful in economic terms?

Radosavljevic: We must certainly look for solutions, but some proposals which would resolve everything by administrative means are unacceptable to me. Take the example of the changes being proposed in labor legislation. I am not against devising a more effective set of instruments to combat idlers, and indeed even to make it possible for work organizations to discharge those who are not working. But if efficiency is sought solely through that, if everything comes down to "driving" workers to work, and methods are not explored for giving workers incentives to do good and responsible work and to manage well and responsibly, then nothing will be achieved. Even under capitalism they no longer go about it that way.

DANAS: Doesn't it seem to you that all these questions concerning the efficiency of economic activity, and from the standpoint of getting out of the crisis they are undoubtedly the central ones, have been on the fringes of the constitutional debate, while the main preoccupation has been with how to distribute (redistribute) power in society?

Radosavljevic: That is true, the question of man, of his ability to work and his creativity, his responsibility and incentives, have been pushed to the fringes of the public debate. When a parallel is drawn between the solutions which the Constitution presently contains in this regard and the solutions which we now have occasion to hear about, it is evident that they include some which would signify a step backward if they were adopted.

DANAS: How do you evaluate those amendments which have to do with regulating relations in the Federation; are those people right who say that it is in the interest of resolving the country's burning problems that we go back to a strong, or at least stronger, Federation?

Radosavljevic: I would say that we need democratization in the republics and provinces, but not a "strong" Federation. Certain functions probably should be "restored" to the Federation. Federal bodies and agencies should have instruments for more successful and responsible performance of their functions than now. The level of responsibility of the republics and provinces for their own development and joint development that has been achieved is not some passing attainment which can be abandoned, but rather the statist tendencies have grown up to such an extent within them in the meantime that they need to be democratized. As for the present proposals, it is difficult to say anything more definite, since the amendments are only in the phase of approval of the draft, and judgments can be made only on the basis of opinions which we have so far heard concerning that process. And we from Vojvodina have said what we thought, and according to us the main task is now to state in specific terms what has been set forth in the proposal of the SFRY State Presidency, not to raise new issues.

That proposal was not the result of any kind of negotiation; it contains a synthesis of the opinions and views of all our communities; it is the result then, if I might put it this way, of this country's collective intelligence.

If certain new issues are nevertheless raised, which, of course, no one can preclude in advance, we are in favor of resolving them by reconciliation. We will continue to resolutely oppose the method of pressures and "back-door" solutions, as in fact we have up to now.

DANAS: What does the status of autonomy mean to Vojvodina? We ask because there are those who think that it is not deeply rooted in the feelings of ordinary people and the nationalities and ethnic minorities in this area, but that the provincial political structures push this only in order to hold on to power.

Radosavljevic: I would answer that with a question: Aren't those who talk that way defending some power of their own? After all, if someone tries with all his might to take something away from someone else in order to broaden his power, how can we blame the other one for fighting for power, but not the first one?

Autonomy has essential importance to Vojvodina. That is the case today, it will certainly be the case in the near future as well, but whether that will remain the case in the more distant future I do not know and I will not go into that. But at this moment there is no alternative. Vojvodina's autonomy should be seen as an expression of its specific identity—economic, ethnic, cultural, and historical; this is much more important than the guessing that goes on about the distribution of functions in the republic. No one can question the status of people in such a complicated and specific community as Vojvodina and wish SR Serbia and Yugoslavia well. Those things simply do not go together. Perhaps that would not be so important in certain other parts of the country, but we have bad historical experience with the ties the various nationalities have to their so-called parent countries, and this has led to confrontations, conflicts, and enmity among members of the various nationalities. It took a long time for people to become aware that we should put an end to this, that we must live together, and that this can be done only in relations of equality with one another. It is with that outlook that we undertook the revolution, and it has remained firmly rooted to this very day. I would call this the "Vojvodina" outlook, but it is not something above the nationalities, nor is it anti-Serb, anti-Croat, anti-Hungarian; this outlook essentially represents the commitment of belonging to the Yugoslav community of nationalities and ethnic minorities.

DANAS: Pledges are coming in from Kosovo that no sort of ambitious demands for statehood will be made in the upcoming constitutional debate. Is Vojvodina also willing to offer such guarantees?

Radosavljevic: We do not suffer from a complex about statehood. To be sure, certain functions of a state are performed in Vojvodina, but there are also functions of the state that are performed in the opstina. The idea of Vojvodina as a state does not exist either in the minds of the people or those of the Vojvodina leadership. This is not in the Vojvodina tradition. But at the same time, people here feel that the province must perform the functions which correspond to the status and nature of autonomy in SR Serbia and the SFRY, and that does not undermine the unity of SR Serbia at all. We do not accept the line of thought which puts an equal sign between unity and unified functions of bodies at the republic level; thinking of that kind does exist in the public arena, and pressure is being exerted from these positions on the Serbian leadership and on Yugoslavia to guarantee that kind of unity. This is unacceptable, since it would be a mistake to believe that that kind of unity can exist.

DANAS: There are six remaining points in the amendments to the Republic Constitution of SR Serbia on which there is disagreement between the republic leadership and the Vojvodina leadership.

What is the reason for such a difference in opinion—does the republic leadership regard the changes being sought in those six points as being in line with the Constitution, and does the Vojvodina leadership think them to be even contrary to the LCY Program?

Radosavljevic: I must correct you. There is no disagreement about those points as a whole, and that is the result of reconciliation, which both sides acknowledge has not been altogether without results. It is true, however, that we consider those things which have not been reconciled very important and we cannot overlook this.

DANAS: Why is this so important?

Radosavljevic: Here is why. We agree that some of the functions must be performed in the republic, and they are in fact today, since the provinces cannot in fact perform them, since they are not states, but the work on them in SR Serbia must be done in concert. But some functions must be performed in the provinces, that follows from the composite nature of the constitutional status of SR Serbia and is not a product of any desires of ours for federalization of SR Serbia, as we have been accused of by some. We are talking here about exercising the contemporary rights of nationalities and ethnic minorities in the province, and for us that is the key reason and actually the only reason why we cannot consent to the increasingly loud assertions being made to the effect that SR Serbia will become "more of a republic" only if the largest possible number of functions are centralized.

DANAS: Relations in SR Serbia have been passing through a sensitive period, which is illustrated, and indeed even more than that, by the last meeting of the

Serbian LC Central Committee at which the decisions were made by outvoting, which is a certain precedent, although it is also in line with the party bylaws of this republic. We have recently been witnesses of a kind of threat of a constitutional crisis, to be sure not only from this community, but also from certain others as well. Are you afraid of such a crisis?

Radosavljevic: I think that this cannot happen if everyone abides by the Constitution. It is not our intention to block the amendments, but I wonder how someone can block something by exercising his constitutional right to express himself on his status in society? We are being told that we must grant consent to certain solutions.

I do not know what kind of consent that is which must be given. If you have the right to grant consent, then logically you also have the right to withhold that consent. We will get into a constitutional crisis only if we betray the Constitution.

DANAS: Yet even at the last meeting of the Presidium of the Serbian LC Central Committee that position of yours was interpreted as resistance to the amendments, and Slobodan Milosevic said that there can be no compromise.

Radosavljevic: I think that what we are doing is not a compromise; this is simply both a responsibility and a need which we have. We are not for compromises either. If someone wants to solve things in spite of the rights which Vojvodina has under the Constitution, that is his own subjective affair.

DANAS: There are those who think that greater unity in SR Serbia concerning constitutional matters should be arrived at through the party. How do you look on the possibility of Vojvodina being "compelled" by democratic centralism to grant consent to those amendments?

Radosavljevic: Anyone who talks about unity and then mentions democratic centralism must be aware that they are not the same thing. We, of course, need unity, and we are convinced, as probably others are as well, that we are working toward the greatest possible unity with the best intentions. But it is a question here of amendments to the Constitution. And democratic centralism cannot be above the Constitution. After all, the LC is not above the system and above the Constitution, it realizes its ideas, its views, its positions, and so on within the system. Its decisionmaking must be consistent with its role in society.

DANAS: And what do you think about the idea of putting up the constitutional amendments to a referendum?

Radosavljevic: A referendum is a good thing for many questions, but not for all. The foundations of the Constitution were laid down by the revolution; if at this point someone proposes a referendum, he must explain why he wants to change those foundations.

DANAS: You recently said that the situation in Kosovo could not be a reason for changing the constitutional status of Vojvodina. To what extent is the situation in Kosovo actually having an impact on constitutional debates in SR Serbia?

Radosavljevic: It is having quite a bit of impact, and that impact is negative. What is going on is politicization, and it is said that our alleged opposition to the amendments favors the present situation in Kosovo. Our answer is that for the situation in Kosovo to be a reason for changes in the constitutional status of Vojvodina, the situation in Vojvodina would have to be the same as in Kosovo. And we all know that that is not true.

DANAS: To what extent will the new "balance of power" in SR Serbia that occurred after the last plenum of the Serbian LC Central Committee influence the further course of the debate concerning relations in this republic?

Radosavljevic: There is more and more talk in our country about that "balance of power," but I could never really accept and think in terms of those categories. I would therefore prefer to skip that question. After all, the term assumes a political struggle within our ranks, and I believe that we cannot allow anything like that to happen. A contest of opinions is necessary within the LC, but not a political struggle. Those are two different things. Everything that happened at the meeting you refer to was public, and I believe that our people are able to render a sound judgment of this.

DANAS: What do you say to the opinions that there would have been fewer polarizations of this kind in the political elites if the constitutional debate had been conducted in public?

Radosavljevic: The debate is probably not secret even now, but I am not certain that opening it up completely in this phase, in the phase of formulating the proposed version of the amendments, would be useful. I do not know where that would take us.

DANAS: There is a great deal of talk about the Blue Book which some 10 years ago raised the issue of relations in SR Serbia. What would it mean to publish that document, which is banned even now?

Radosavljevic: It would not mean anything; today all the issues raised at that time are being debated much more broadly, and the publicity being given to it only amounts to an unnecessary politicization of this topic.

DANAS: Is it true that Kardelj agreed with the last version of the Blue Book?

Radosavljevic: In the phase of debates there were differing opinions on the various issues by the people who took part in that. However, what Kardelj agreed, and this also applies to the others, including some people who are spokesmen today, is that this document should not be adopted. But the decision was made by the Presidium of the Serbian LC Central Committee.

DANAS: How true is the opinion, which one hears in public, that a "harder" line began to be followed when S. Milosevic came to the head of the Serbian party and that the recent meeting of representatives of Serbia with representatives of Vojvodina on the eve of the meeting of the Vojvodina Assembly was the first step toward "softening" the people from Vojvodina?

Radosavljevic: My expectations are in line with the responsibility which we have. As for the question of "softening up," the rumors are mistaken. And as for the "harder" line, I would say that I believe only in a strong line—the line of the LCY. Should it be different, it would be wrong.

DANAS: Recently there have been several stresses in interethnic relations in Vojvodina. How would you comment upon the events in the Subotica Theater?

Radosavljevic: The Subotica Theater, like other theaters, is important to us as a cultural institution, and we will make clear distinctions as to what is good and what is bad that happens in it, just as in the others. We will not tolerate any evils related either to business operation or to interethnic relations.

DANAS: One other event, the disturbance directed against the schoolchildren from Osijek in Novi Sad, encountered a very harsh reaction here.

Radosavljevic: That is understandable, since nationalism has more destructive consequences here than in communities which are ethnically more homogeneous.

07045

Kosovo Law on Real Estate Sale Ban Questioned
28000036b Zagreb DANAS in Serbo-Croatian
11 Nov 87 pp 10-11

[Article by Marinko Culic: "Purchases Under Surveillance"]

[Text] Slightly more than a month ago dawn fell in the village of Prekale, near Istok, on a roadside sign with the depressing offer collectively made by the entire village: "The farms of all Serbs are for sale." Aside from the reasons for departure that have already become standard—attempted rapes, physical threats from Albanian fellow villagers, lack of understanding and arrogance on

the part of the local and higher levels of leadership—the local people presented to newsmen a less ordinary, in fact bizarre, reason. Since 1981 a group of Albanians has been coming here from the vicinity of Decane claiming to be the descendants of the former agas who were once owners of these farms, and that is why they are not allowing anyone to purchase the Serbian houses and land from the people of Prekale except them. The people of Prekale are, of course, irritated even by the very appearance of these “self-styled agas and begs,” but there is a particular reason for frustration in something else—the fact that the tyrants from the Decane area have been purchasing their property at “their own” lower prices.

The real meaning of the indignation of the people of Prekale can be understood only in the context of the relatively new phenomenon of the way things are in Kosovo, and that is the purchase of Serbian and Montenegrin farms at what are usually markedly high prices. According to a report published this spring by the Provincial Secretariat for Internal Affairs of Kosovo, the price of land per hectare ranges from 50 to a fabulous 100 million dinars, but the newspapers have already carried reports on higher amounts and even amounts which are quite difficult to believe (\$400,000 per hectare). But that truly big money is involved one way or another is beyond any doubt: solely on the basis of recorded sales (and they represent a very small group) *Delo* calculated that since 1981 the purchase of Serb and Montenegrin farms “has brought” more than \$1 billion. The estimate was probably made in dollars so that the figure would remain “fresh” for a somewhat longer time, but it also has significance in explaining the sources from which so much money originated. That is, it is calculated that about 40,000 people from Kosovo (most of them Albanians) are working abroad, and according to official Kosovo explanations that is the principal source of funds to purchase Serbian and Montenegrin houses and other property. According to the same explanation—which thereby departs from the customary stereotypes about the cloudy origin of the purchase of real estate in Kosovo—Albanians are not making purchases solely from Serbs and Montenegrins (that really would not be very sensible in view of the size of both groups), and what is more the provincial SUP says in its report, which has been examined and adopted by the federal SUP as well, that Albanians usually do this between themselves, and that the prices agreed to are even higher than those mentioned here.

Does this take the ground out from under the thesis of the purchase of land and houses in Kosovo as one of the principal instruments for exerting pressure on the Serbs and Montenegrins to move out and the thesis that the undetected core of the irredenta is organizing this and providing it with financial support? The Kosovo Provincial SUP, which compiled its report (the very first analysis of any seriousness) under orders from the SFRY State Presidency and the LCY Central Committee, came out in April with the decided assertion that “nothing that has been learned in the field up to now indicates that the

material resources for purchase of farms from Serbs and Montenegrins has been provided by the irredenta, by emigre organizations, or by anyone else from abroad.” Instead the excellent market for land and houses is explained by the high birth rate, the disintegration of large patriarchal families, migration, and so on. To be sure, it is acknowledged that the purchases have become more newsworthy since 1968 and especially 1981, and that ought to demonstrate if not the direct participation of the irredenta, then at least that there is some connection between the purchase of Serbian and Montenegrin farms and the increased emigration. But what connection?

In principle a choice can be made between two conclusions: that the first is the cause of the second, but also the other way around, that it is the consequence, that the number of sales is increasing because of the continued emigration, for which the causes then need to be sought on the other side or at least on the other side among other things.

There is probably no need to prove that it is just a question of putting things to rights with respect to logic. Since practically the very adoption of the Kosovo provincial law on the 5-year ban of sale of real estate which encourages emigration (in the summer of last year)—adopted several months after the well-known resolutions of the SFRY State Presidency and the Presidium of the LCY Central Committee—there has been doubt in the air of whether such a law should have been adopted at all. We have already touched upon one reason for this—if the sale of houses in Kosovo has not been organized by the irredenta, which means that it is not the principal driving force behind the emigration under pressure either, then elementary legal pragmatism would argue that there was no reason to adopt the law. The second reason is one of principle: Is this law consistent with the Constitution? The Constitutional Court of Yugoslavia recognized the soundness of this issue a few months ago; that is, it accepted the initiative of a citizen (Miroslav Zaric of Belgrade) to reexamine its constitutionality and to see whether it conforms to Article 193 of the SFRY Constitution, which guarantees citizens the freedom of movement and residence, envisaging restrictions only in cases of criminal proceedings, the needs of national defense, prevention of the spread of infectious diseases, etc. As Dr Vasil Grivcev, justice of the Constitutional Court, explained on that occasion, the law is defective in two respects—it restricts the right of free disposition of real estate owned by private individuals and it indirectly forces citizens to live where their real estate is located.

There are probably quite a few people who would pass this off as some kind of lawyer's tourism which puts its ears to the law books instead of real life. But certain decisions which the Constitutional Court of Serbia has rendered even before the Constitutional Court of Yugoslavia hardly provide the grounds for accusing the constitutional justices of exhibiting the limitations of lawyers. A few months ago the constitutional court from this

republic vacated the decisions of three opstinas—Bujanovci, Presevo, and Medvedje—forbidding the sale of real estate between Albanians and Serbs, and for the present that is the only and therefore all the more relevant interpretation of the constitutionality of these enactments. In rendering that decision the court did not at all have in mind that the sale of real estate could not be used as a means of pressure. It merely said that all three opstinas are in Serbia proper, that accordingly the provincial law of Kosovo does not extend to them, and that in itself was enough for rejecting those decisions. A second and more important reason why this kind of decision was rendered is certainly that the decisions of the three opstinas did in practice prevent sales which were not the consequence of emigration (but rather perhaps a move from a southern to a more northern part of Serbia proper), that is, of “ethnically mixed” sale as such. And that is obviously a precedent which the constitutional courts did not want to show understanding for, perhaps not merely on strictly legal grounds, but also on broader political and indeed even human grounds.

But in the confused merry-go-round of relations and situations in this part of the country, the opinion of the lawyers is only one of those involved, and in this republic an initiative was taken late last year to extend the validity of the law on sale of real estate to the entire republic. In responding to objections that this was an unconstitutional law, which, as we have seen, regularly accompany any such initiative, Veljko Markovic, member of the State Presidency of SR Serbia, said that this was a temporary measure regulating subject matter in the exclusive jurisdiction of the republics. He recalled that this is not the first temporary law in Serbia—at one time a law on temporary prohibition of the building of weekend cottages was enacted—and he added that it was resorted to as a “necessary evil” in order to finally halt the exodus of Serbs and Montenegrins. Markovic is not the only one to mention the phrase “necessary evil,” it is also underlined in the explanations given in the Bujanovci, Presevo, and Medvedje Opstinas, where they say that they are aware that their decisions are unlawful. They add, however, that they saw no other way out, that it was only this that had helped them finally to halt the “exodus” to some extent, and that now one sees signs on Serbian houses more and more frequently: For Sale. But is the power of the law really that great? In Pristina for a long time after the law’s passage no more than a few sales contracts were overturned, and only this fall were charges filed against a somewhat larger number of violators (11 Albanians and the same number of Serbs and Montenegrins who had engaged in purchase and sale). Of course, opstina departments are responsible for enforcing the law, and probably it does not take a lot of guessing to know where they have been most zealous in this case. But by all appearances the main part of the explanation still lies in the sellers and purchasers themselves, who take pains not to encounter those departments, but conduct the sale on the basis of a “private contract,” that is, secretly. In this way they avoid paying

taxes, but they also avoid the hassles and checks as to the motives behind the sale and the purchase (the verification is rigorous, and permits are issued only to certain categories, for example, to retired military officers who want to go to Belgrade or elsewhere after finishing their service, to the owners of two apartments or houses, etc.). Brokerage flourishes in this kind of situation, and this is brokerage on both sides (reporters from Kosovo write about groups of Albanians who visit Serbian and Montenegrin villages in an organized way, but they also mention Serbs and Montenegrins who are nimble and engage in buying and reselling). One can only guess as to what is still more important about the motives behind sales and purchases, and it seems that the Albanians making the purchase and the Serbs and Montenegrins making the sale are under equally rigorous surveillance of their fellow villagers.

In this entangled and murky situation the basic concepts of what the sale of Serbian and Montenegrin real estate to Albanians objectively means often seem to grow pale: Is this in fact one of the fundamental generators of the exodus under pressure or has there been a simultaneous occurrence of events which are only feeling the more pronounced and delicate impact than in other places of the raging prices, the evasion of regulations and taxes, etc. Certainly, this should explain the considerable differences in opinions of those directly involved. On the one hand it is pointed out that many of the houses purchased have been standing vacant, which means that the purpose of the purchase was for the purchaser to move into the house rather than for the seller to move out, and certain older cases are being looked at carefully in which the purchases were made with the support of the opstina leadership or even higher leadership in the province (the Decane case of some 15 years ago, which only now has become public, and this has been the occasion for the only trial so far on charges of unlawful purchase of Serbian or Montenegrin property). It is under the impression of the Decane case that perhaps the most serious assessment of the purchase of Serbian and Montenegrin real estate was recently made in a debate in a committee of the SFRY Assembly (Mato Krstovic: this is a “policy which goes right on up to the highest official levels”). On the other hand one also hears more moderate assessments, as in the case of Gojko Eftovski, secretary of the Tetovo Opstina Committee of the SAWP, who feels that the large investments of Albanians in real estate should be explained first of all by the fact that there are a great number of them abroad (although proportionally fewer than certain others) and that they possess a large number of private shops, mostly confectionery shops, within the country.

As we have said, it is difficult to evaluate where the whole truth lies. It is a fact that the Kosovo Provincial SUP, which this past spring submitted a report on this, committed itself to continuing to monitor and analyze the purchases and sale of real estate of Serbs and Montenegrins, and suggests that the final knowledge about this will be obtained only after a bit more waiting.

But by all appearances there is not much time. After all, if people already accept the argument that certain laws can be enacted as a "necessary evil," they still ought not to go on generating legal uncertainty. There is already more than enough of that in Kosovo.

[Box, p 11]

Iso Rusi: Acting Against Albanization With a Law

In a number of places of western Macedonia and in Skopje there have been long meetings of party and other forums in recent days whose common agenda could briefly be stated as the campaign against Albanian nationalism, with emphasis, as it is put, on the new forms it is taking. According to what has been said in recent days at meetings in Kumanovo, Struga, Ohrid, and Skopje..., those new forms include the particularly sensitive trade in real estate, on which figures are given which are supposed to show the proportions of the offensive aggression of Albanian nationalism, but usually show nothing more than that "something is happening."

In Ohrid the figure is given that in 1981 Albanians were purchasers in 112 cases of 129 certified sales contracts, and this is true of 13 of the 24 sales contracts since 1986. Usually orchards, houses, apartments, and shops are being bought.

The figure was also presented that the purchasers are usually Albanians from the neighboring opstina of Struga, and then from Gostivar and Kicevo. According to the 1981 Census, somewhere around 3,500 Albanians were living in Ohrid, which is roughly about 5 percent of the total population. The figure that in the old marketplace they now own more than half of the shops is seen by the people of Ohrid as a part of the aggressive capturing of "new" areas and the creation of a new ethnically pure Albanian community. Similar things are also happening in the old marketplace of Skopje, where once again Albanian purchasers have the principal role. Therefore in the part of Skopje known as Centar Opstina they are demanding expropriation of all private shops, and a first step has already been made in that direction: the Executive Council of the Assembly of SR Macedonia adopted on 11 June the proposal of the Executive Council of Centar Opstina and issued a decision setting forth the general interest in the complex of the old marketplace. Acquisition of this status is a legal precondition for expropriation through the community for business space. However, this resulted in a rebellion of shop owners, since what they received as compensation would not be even one hundredth of the real value of each square meter in the old marketplace. It is an open secret that a square meter in the most dilapidated parts of the old market costs 1 billion old dinars. Figures were also presented in the debate in the Skopje forums about the constant and large mechanical migration of Albanians from SAP Kosovo and the Sandjak over the last 10 years or so and their grouping in certain settlements,

which has a direct impact on the price of land, houses, and apartments. Houses in Katlanovo are selling at a price of 250,000 marks, while in Cair, a Skopje neighborhood, the price per square meter of apartments and houses is between two- and threefold higher than that which is obtained on the other bank of the Vardar for the same quality. Often the purchasers are Albanians, and skeptics call the left and right bank of the Vardar "Lebanonization" of Skopje. One of the "perpetual" questions is the origin of the money of the purchasers of Albanian nationality. Assertions are made from the rostrums of forums that the money comes from abroad and that this is a method of economic pressure aimed at creating pure Albanian settlements. It is a fact, however, that that connection has not so far been proven, although it is also true that investigation of the origin of money comes down merely to a formal statement on the part of the purchaser (usually the reference is to employment abroad or the income of entrepreneurs and confectioners working all over Yugoslavia). To this we should add that the way in which a majority of Albanian families live in a community is certainly not without an influence here. These communities sometimes number as many as 30 members, and it is not uncommon for a dozen of them to be gostarbiters. Money in these families is always concentrated in the hands of the head of the family, who usually invests precisely in houses and land, for which Albanians cultivate a particular inclination.

07045

Emigration Problems of Kosovo Albanians in Norway Discussed

*28000036a Zagreb DANAS in Serbo-Croatian
11 Nov 87 pp 7-9*

[Article by Milos Antic: "To Paradise and Back"]

[Text] Thanks above all to Franc Setinc, who it seems happened to be in Oslo, the Yugoslav public learned something more about the fate of about 1,000 Yugoslavs who had gone to Norway mainly looking for jobs, and when they realized nothing would come of that, they tried to obtain political asylum. Political grounds thus all of a sudden took the place of economic reasons, but as matters now stand the Norwegian authorities were not taken in and they simply requested that all those who did not have work permits leave this Scandinavian country (a euphemism for deportation).

What gives this entire story particular importance is the datum that Albanians from Kosovo were seeking asylum, and it is exactly that way and almost in no other way that they have been referred to and treated by our media, not as citizens of Yugoslavia. This massive pilgrimage to Norway is another piece in the complicated mosaic of the Kosovo situation, but we can still not fail to put a question that is perhaps blasphemous for some people: Would our public, indeed even our authorities, behave in this rather nonchalant way if 1,000 Serbs, Croats, or Slovenes were involved? Even though the

Norwegian authorities behaved with perfect correctness this time and were not taken in by stories about the lack of freedom and persecution, since they know that they all arrived with passports in order and by their own choice, that in their own country they have guaranteed political, ethnic, and religious freedoms, it still turns out that we ourselves were able to internationalize the problem of Kosovo when others were unable to do it.

It is difficult at this point to reconstruct the entire story about the departure from Kosovo of Albanians for Norway, but it is obvious that this episode will not help in straightening out the situation in the province, and we know that that situation is such that special units of the Federal Secretariat for Internal Affairs have had to intervene. As the hot topic of the day in Kosovo the special police have had to yield to the emigration of a not exactly small number of Albanians, both individuals and entire families, mainly from Pec Opstina.

The problem in Pec has been kept quiet for a long time. There were "rumors" about it this summer, but the departure of nearly 1,000 members of the Albanian nationality seems to have been of no concern at all to the opstina leadership, which has looked upon all this as a routine matter, they were not disturbed by repeated warnings from local communities that people had practically overnight assembled entire families and left for parts unknown, nor were they disturbed by all kinds of rumors on the street about who was persuading all those people to leave for those parts, still less by where those fellow citizens of theirs were going and what and who were waiting for them there.

Pec and the vicinity of that well-known communist revolutionary nucleus were the focus of attention of the Yugoslav public this summer on many counts. There were several very serious interethnic outbursts there which upset the traditionally good interethnic relations between Albanians on the one hand and Serbs and Montenegrins on the other. At the same time the economy of this area has been facing difficulties offering no easy solution, and some collectives have found themselves on the thin edge. An additional problem has been the undiminished process of Serbs and Montenegrins moving out, a process that threatens to make this area completely homogeneous from the ethnic standpoint.

The problem of the emigration of Albanians to Norway was added to all that. The opstina leadership, lulled to sleep in its cushy position, treated this exactly the same as it has the countless other problems. The story going around Pec now is that their purpose was to let time pass and to get some other cushy positions for themselves, and what happened with the people would have nothing to do with them. They had "confirmed" their helplessness on several occasions during the summer and especially during the fall, when they should have shown full

readiness, ability, and political skill in turning the conclusions of the Ninth Meeting of the LCY Central Committee concerning Kosovo into specific action that would change the situation for the better.

This leadership simply could not or did not want to do all that. The response to their political weakness and apathy arrived a few days ago. The Presidency of the Kosovo LC Provincial Committee and the State Presidency of SAP Kosovo resolved to change the leadership in three opstinas, one of them Pec Opstina, and to replace them with able people who are willing and able to tackle the vital problems of the working people and citizens in this area.

The problem of the emigration of Albanians to Norway broke through to the surface only when Norway decided to return a number of Albanians who had been unsuccessful in obtaining work permits there. Only, that is, when the chain of emigration reversed direction. Delegates in the Pec Opstina Assembly tried to give this problem relevance in several sessions back during the summer. Certain party organizations issued warnings—the opstina authorities were regularly informed about the daily departures of people for Norway; at one point they were warned that the emigration threatened to become a mass movement. However, none of this disturbed the competent people in the opstina.

To make matters still more absurd, even the opstina secretariat for internal affairs did not draw up even a single report on all of this, since no one had requested such a report of it. Nor did that agency react to all those skillfully launched stories that "led" those people to Norway, and it was not tickled even by professional curiosity to ascertain who was hidden behind all of that.

In recent days there has been stubborn silence about all this in Pec. The opstina leaders do not want to talk, since they do not know exactly who will be "affected" by the resolution of the two presidential bodies to remove certain officials in this opstina. In the local communities where most of the people came from, aside from a few activists, the rest of the people do not want to talk about this. They simply respond to every question by withdrawing into their courtyards surrounded by high walls.

In the Kapasnica Local Community, from which 18 entire families departed, it is also difficult to find anyone to talk to. Only Riza Luku, delegate in the Chamber of Associated Labor of the Kosovo Assembly, who also talked about the problem in the Pec Opstina Assembly, agreed to say something for our readers:

"Last summer there was virtually a massive departure of people to Norway from our local community. A rumor went around about a promised land where everything was waiting for you on a platter. A bit later the story went around that you could get a job only if you requested political asylum. Unfortunately, even those stories did not stop people. The reason they didn't was that at the

same time there was a rumor that they could expect to get houses there, jobs, good salaries, and free instruction in the Norwegian language. In the opstina assembly I requested an answer to many queries in this connection, but it was all passed over in silence.

"Since the official authorities did not react, the hostile forces did. 'Protectors' of Albanian interests immediately emerged and loudly advanced the thesis 'that here were Albanians moving away and fleeing Kosovo under pressure.' Various other theses were also planted, all of this aimed at instilling additional confusion, whose purpose was to maintain a general muddled atmosphere in which only they could profit.

"Most of those who left were young people. They were told that there in the 'promised land' they would get not only a job, good pay, a house, and other features of a 'better life,' but also their choice of young women.

"A rumor arrived that because the Norwegians faced a drop in population, that is, depopulation, they would be welcomed with open arms, since they wanted in this way to increase the birth rate.

"So far there has been no official assessment in Kosovo of the problem of the emigration of a number of Albanians. This problem is now being used in the manipulations of all those who think they can gain something from it. Thus, an additional climate of distrust is being created, since everyone relates this to whatever suits him.

"We asked the local people in Kapasnica and certain other villages what drove those people to leave their country and go off into the unknown? Mainly we heard apathetic and brief responses 'They went off to find something better,' 'Everything was waiting for them there,' 'They had nothing to live on here,' 'No one is going to wait for a job for decades,' and 'It was poverty that drove them away.'"

And what were they fleeing from?

"I do not know any example of someone having to flee from here for any reason. I do not know exactly what happened there in Norway. Under what condition people go there and what they have to do and what they have to consent to to obtain a work permit. I only know that those who left Kapasnica were not in trouble with the law here, and none of them was involved in hostile activity. Nor had any of them been convicted, nor do we know of any of them having participated in demonstrations," said Hajri Belegu, official in the Kapasnica Local Community.

No one either in Pec or the local communities will comment on what is being said to the effect that these people have been making all kinds of statements in order to obtain political asylum in Norway. They say that they simply do not believe that until it is proven.

As for the return, that is, the organized mass return from Norway, no one here knows anything about that, since the people simply have not come back. The only thing they know is that Nusert Dreshaj and Ibrahim Rustemi came back on their own initiative; we were unable to find them, since they were never where we were told they should be.

Remzi Kolgeci, member of the Presidium of the Kosovo LC Provincial Committee, spoke to newsmen a few days ago about the problem of the large-scale exodus of Albanians to Norway. On that occasion he said that the Presidium of the Kosovo LC Provincial Committee would be coming out very soon with a complete assessment both because of the problem itself and also because it had become the subject of various manipulations.

"The exact number of emigres, that is, of those who left for Norway, is not known at this moment," Kolgeci said. "After all, we face the fact that some people are still leaving and also the fact that certain individuals are returning. As for the information published by the news media to the effect that groups of our citizens are returning in an organized fashion from Norway because of several problems that have arisen, we know nothing about that. So far not a single group of that size has return."

In response to the question of whether the provincial committee of the LC or any other body in Kosovo knew what the principal reason was for the emigration of about 1,000 Albanians to Norway, Kolgeci replied:

"Everything we have learned so far indicates that this was emigration in search of work; that is, these people left exclusively to find jobs."

And what about political asylum? we asked Kolgeci.

"It is well-known that if someone wants to obtain a work permit or a job, he is ready to seek even political asylum. Those who left probably agreed to all that. Now, especially in recent days, when everything has come out in public, all of this is being manipulated. Especially by those forces which want to disrupt good intergovernmental relations between Norway and Yugoslavia. It is especially being manipulated by the extremist Albanian emigre community in the West, especially since certain individuals seem not to have been choosy about their means in obtaining work permits and jobs."

Another inevitable question is what the attitude of the province is toward those who have to return?

"There is nothing new to be said on that," Azem Vllasi said recently. "Opposition is well-known to everyone. All of our citizens, regardless of where they are, can freely return to their country. Those who have not gotten into trouble with our statutes have nothing to fear."

Those others can also return, since in our country everything can be cleared up somehow. And thus while there is a lot of talk about those whom Norway is returning in a body, they are not there in Kosovo. It remains to be seen what will come of all this. The Presidium of the Kosovo LC Provincial Committee will in any case soon present its view of this entire problem, since up to now this has not been done by those whom it concerns the most—the competent agencies and socio-political organizations in Pec Opstina.

[Box, p 8]

Kreso Speletic: A Machination That Failed

The manipulation with about 900 Yugoslav citizens, most of them of Albanian nationality, and that is no accident, ended in Norway as it obviously had to end: the great majority will be deported to Yugoslavia.

This is not the result and expression, as in some places in this country has uncritically been alleged, of a particular goodwill and respect of Norway toward Yugoslavia, but the result of the fact that under the current and generally accepted standards of international law and behavior there did not exist even the most basic elements suggesting the conclusion that there were grounds for granting political asylum. After all, as is well-known, even the General Declaration on Human Rights recognized everyone's right to seek and enjoy in other countries refuge from persecution (political, religious, racial, and ethnic), and subsequent provisions of international conventions and other documents made the offering of asylum to such persons an obligation of the state. If, then, the request for political asylum had some measure of evidence that asylum was being sought because of persecution of any kind Norway, regardless of its excellent relations with our country, unless it wanted to discredit itself with the international public, would have been forced to meet those demands.

However, we are dealing here with something altogether different. Driven by unemployment, which for a long time now has not bypassed the countries of western Europe, and, of course, has affected the gostarbeiter most of all, some Yugoslav citizens have been taken in by the assurances of members of our extremist emigre community that with the help of political asylum it would be easy for them to obtain new employment in Norway. And that accounts for the pilgrimage of Yugoslavs over many years to that country, and this year that came to a head and ultimately resulted in deportation. It is quite understandable that people of Albanian nationality should have been a majority among them, since there had to be some kind of pretext for the political monkey business prepared about the political asylum that would open the door to Norway, and it was believed that this could be found most easily by saying that the Yugoslavs were being persecuted in Kosovo.

When 150 of the applications were withdrawn, since the applicants, according to the statement made by Kjell Solen, spokesman of the Norwegian Ministry of Justice, decided to "voluntarily return" to their country, the machinations with our gostarbeiter simply failed. Another fact (that Norway, as reported by the Norwegian wire service NTB, granted 10 requests for political asylum) confirms that the Norwegian authorities did not decide on deportation in haste, and least of all (or exclusively) because of exceptionally good relations with Yugoslavia.

Norway did not do that because it simply did not find justification for it. Three hundred Yugoslavs were therefore deported, and by all appearances another 600 or so of them still waiting for their applications to be decided on will experience the same fate.

Thus, the machinations of the extremist emigre community have failed after having come down on the heads of the naive people who themselves seem to have realized that they were taken in, as is indicated by those 150 withdrawn applications. These citizens of ours have lost on two counts. If they had presented themselves in Norway as simple gostarbeiter, precisely thanks to excellent Norwegian-Yugoslav relations in general, they probably would have received work (there are about 8,000 foreigners there now seeking jobs). At the same time, they would have avoided the notoriety which whether you like it or not accompanies you when you turn your back on your country even when you have been led astray and have been naive. Obviously, no one in the country intends to make a "case" of the latter, since Raif Dizdarevic and Azem Vllasi and Franc Setinc have declared in various occasions and in various connections that those who come back have nothing to fear unless they have violated Yugoslav laws before they left the country.

Thus, the view stated publicly is yet another confirmation that matters with human rights and human freedoms in Yugoslavia are precisely the opposite of what the affair of the Yugoslav Albanians in Norway was supposed to demonstrate the world public. If matters had been at all different, Norway would not have been able to avoid its international obligation, nor would the international public, especially the public in the West that is not favorably disposed toward Yugoslavia, have remained aloof. After all, in the political games 900 people, who are moreover in the heart of Europe, are more than just 1 dissident from East Germany. We are after all talking about three battalions.

[Box, p 9]

Draga Bozinovic: Report From Oslo

Is there some kind of Norwegian fever in Yugoslavia? In recent months Norwegians have been putting this question not on any medical grounds, but because of emigration. Since last summer, that is, a small invasion of

Yugoslavs to the borders of Norway has begun, and in recent days this has exploded with the datum that more than 1,000 Yugoslav nationals, most of them Albanians, are waiting for political asylum in Norway. It has been reported that only a few of those 900 applications have been granted, and the emphasis then was that residence permits were being issued on humanitarian rather than political grounds. When the applications for asylum were rejected, 150 Yugoslavs were sent home, and the same number withdrew their applications on their own initiative and set out for their homeland. Now about 600 applications are being processed, but the outcome, in view of the position of the Norwegian authorities, will most probably be unfavorable.

The Norwegian government, that is, recently adopted a decision whereby Yugoslavs could not in principle obtain asylum in Norway since there was simply no justification for that; they had not been oppressed. In taking that position the Norwegian government, according to the comment of Milorad Djurovic, charge d'affaires in the Yugoslav Embassy in Oslo, had acted on the basis of a good familiarity of conditions in Yugoslavia and of its democratic system based on traditional friendship between the two countries. The Norwegian government did not allow the situation in Kosovo to be politicized in Norway as well, nor did it allow economic troubles in Yugoslavia to be used for political intrigues.

But who is behind the intrigue, who sent Yugoslavs to Norway with their most essential luggage and one-way ticket, and why were they sent to precisely that country?

In Norwegian circles they do not enter into this kind of clarification, since Norwegian authorities decide only whether someone fulfills the conditions for political asylum. However, from everything we have been able to learn there were two "lines" of people—one group simply taken in by false information and another who had deliberately arrived in Oslo in an organized way in order to spread their well-known "truth" about Kosovo.

In various parts of the country or in the circles of Yugoslav workers in other European countries stories had begun to circulate that Norway was an Eldorado for people seeking jobs. According to those rumors, one only had to pack his bags, buy a one-way ticket, and the Norwegian job market, especially the offshore oil-drilling market with its good salaries, would be waiting with open arms. When they arrived in the Norwegian capital, they encountered a tremendous surprise and disappointment: for a long time Norway has not been accepting new manpower, and it is possible to remain in that country only in exceptional cases and on the basis of political asylum. Political asylum, however, cannot be obtained simply on the basis of statements, especially when it comes to "refugees" from a country which is well-known to the host country.

Back in 1972, when the number of unemployed began to increase, Norway closed its borders to new manpower. Since that time it has been possible to obtain a residence permit only in exceptional cases—usually in the case of specialists which that country needs or in cases of what is called bringing families back together again. At the same time, Norway has remained one of the most liberalized countries for political refugees, and many foreigners have sought a refuge in that country. Since the number of refugees has increased sharply in the recent past (from the previous 2,000 to 3,000 to an estimated 10,000 or so this year), this has aroused political debates, but there has also been a disturbing increase in tolerance of the host country toward foreigners. One reason for this was certainly the estimate that of the total number of "refugees seeking asylum" only 25 percent are real refugees, while the rest come on economic grounds, and the Norwegian government has announced a tighter policy toward refugees. Recently, the Norwegian premier Gro Harlem Brundtland declared in a meeting of leaders of parties represented in Parliament that those from Yugoslavia seeking asylum would be sent back.

This position of the Norwegian government was not, of course, favorable to those who came to Norway in what was probably an organized effort and had altogether definite goals. This observation is supported by recent demonstrations of about 150 Albanians in front of the Norwegian Ministry of Justice, where they carried Albanian flags and banners with the slogans "Kosovo a Republic," "Special Units Out of Kosovo," and "Grant Us Asylum" in protest against the refusal of the Norwegian government to classify them as political refugees and grant them residence in Norway. Unfortunately, they did manage to get space in a small portion of the press here for nonsensical and false statements to the effect that I get 5 years in prison because I wear this cap (the white skullcap worn by Albanians).

However, a large portion of the Norwegian public has been objectively evaluating the situation with the Yugoslav "refugees," explaining present conditions in Yugoslavia and emphasizing that Yugoslavia needs help in the present economic crisis. One local newspaper published an article on Yugoslavia under a headline reading in our language "Let Our Love Be Your Guide," while another, probably provoked by the space given to statements of those pretending to be "political" asked: Have we Norwegians already forgotten the meaning of Yugoslavia and its democratic commitment?

07045

Increasing Threat to Majority's Living Standard Weighed

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NOVINE in Serbo-Croatian 29 Nov 87 pp 23-24*

[Article by Slobodanka Act: "Limit of Endurance"]

[Text] Social disaster is knocking on the door of half of workers' families: 3-figure inflation, astronomical prices for groceries (Yugoslavs pay 65 percent of their family

earnings for food; in Western Europe this percentage is 19 percent, and in the United States it is 13 percent), municipal services, increasingly more expensive free education, and increasingly smaller personal incomes are threatening to put most worker families on welfare. An almost paradoxical situation has been created in which the class that is in power in a self-managing society of "those on top" is seeking public assistance. Obviously, the class differentiation of society has led to the essential impoverishment of worker families.

These are only a few of the main points expressed by Prof Marko Mladenovic at a scholarly meeting on "The Family and the Social Crisis," which brought together about 300 participants from all parts of Yugoslavia last week in Pristina.

The Least Protected

Dr Berislav Sefer warned of several very important trends in connection with the impoverishment of worker families:

"The decline in the family's real buying power has also been accompanied by restrictions on public expenditures, and thus a significant part of the outlays for education, health care, and the protection and development of children... has become a burden on the family budget. On top of this, however, comes supporting young unemployed people, without apartments, and supporting the aged. It is beginning to be spontaneously but fairly frequently concluded and generalized from this that this is the way things are supposed to be, which is a return to a conservative view of the family, and is in conflict with our socialist commitments."

Last month's study of the living conditions of Yugoslav households (ZIT/CEMA) indicates that in response to the question about where the limit of endurance was in connection with the continuing decline in the standard of living, 70 percent of the respondents answered that they had already reached that limit or that they had passed it.

The Italians have a saying that "The rain falls on those who are wet." Thus our multidimensional crisis is most seriously affecting the least protected parts of society: children and young people, women and the aged.

Today, the education of two schoolchildren for an average Yugoslav family, with an average personal income ranging from 270,000 dinars in Slovenia to 120,000 in Macedonia, is almost a heroic feat. Specifically, one average month's salary must be paid to equip one child starting school.

For many families, day care is too expensive, and social workers warn that more and more school-age children are going hungry.

Young people are also in a vulnerable position: education is increasingly more expensive and increasingly more uncertain, employment is completely uncertain, and a house is further and further away.

The crisis is also undoubtedly slowing the social and professional advancement of women: they are withdrawing more and more into the family, trying to save the family's last internal reserves in order to continue "surviving," or, as some lucid cynics say, to "prolong the dying."

The need for "survival," however, also turns the man into a "beast of burden," who tries by holding down a regular job and an additional one to ensure the family's subsistence, Dr Braco Kovacevic emphasizes.

The employment of one family member, and sometimes even two, is usually not enough for bare subsistence. In many families, bare subsistence is ensured through additional work—the gray economy, the black market, or moonlighting.

Some of those at the Pristina meeting justifiably warned that the aged, both in rural areas and in the cities, would bear the brunt of the catastrophe, and spend the rest of their lives in extreme poverty, almost forgotten by society. Really, who are our parents?

Are we giving due attention to the statistical data and the renewed urgency of the discussions of the frequency of tuberculosis? Social attention and energy have apparently been turned in another direction, and so some dramatic details of the features of the crisis are obviously escaping us.

Morbid Symptoms

If it is true that one manifestation of the crisis is that "the old is dying" but "the new cannot be born," and so an interregnum is occurring with a large number of morbid symptoms, then we can state that in a way the crisis is intensifying the sick condition of the family, Dr Kovacevic says. Actually, the family is already showing many such symptoms, which affect not only interpersonal relations, emotive and ethical values, but also the very advisability of the family's existence.

Dr Kovacevic calls attention to another gloomy aspect of the crisis: an increase in repressive teaching methods in the family. Repression in the family is an integral part of repression in society. Weakness in society forces the "pater familias" to establish or try to establish absolute power in the family. Subordination, submission, obedience, authoritarianism, and "learning to get along" are values common to both levels. And thus, in its own way, the family makes the crisis in society possible, and vice versa.

After all, as Fromm says, every society has the kind of family that it deserves.

A sort of parameter of the consequences of the social crisis, but also of the crisis of the family, can be seen in the dramatic decline of the birth rate; in Serbia proper the birth rate has fallen during the last 6 years by 9 percent, and in the last 2 years by as much as 11.2 percent. In Croatia, parts of Slovenia, Serbia, and Vojvodina the birth rate is no longer even high enough to maintain the population.

Experts are already talking about the "aging of the population," the "white plague," and an epidemic of abortions, because the number of interrupted pregnancies is three times higher than the number of children born. At the other extreme is the demographic expansion in Kosovo, where the birth rate is the highest in Europe, and even among the highest in the world: the average family has almost 5 children. In the opinion of most of the experts at the meeting on "The Family and the Social Crisis," society has to take responsibility for demographic disruptions.

The statistics show that fewer and fewer marriages are taking place, but also that the number of divorced couples is growing (13.34 percent); the highest divorce rate is in Vojvodina and Slovenia, and the lowest in Kosovo; the number of marriages without children is increasing (20 percent), but also the number of bachelor households. There are more and more broken families: divorced, abandoned, extramarital, migrant...

We should note that there have been no long-term, continuing multidisciplinary studies of the family. Has man as the goal of development been lost?

Under the Linden Tree

As far back as ancient times, on Egyptian papyruses, predictions have been made about the collapse of the family, and in more recent times neither utopians, nor anarchists, nor some Marxists have favored it... but it appears that the family is "eternal," changeable, but irreplaceable. And while the winds of the crisis are dealing it heavy blows, the family members are clutching at this old battered vessel as if at a last straw.

Dr Miloslav Milosavljevic sees two tendencies in the social crisis that have opposite effects, but identical causes: there is an increasingly more pronounced tendency toward the reduction or even breakup of the family, but also a renewal of expanded two-generation families. This is primarily a question of family solidarity, and less so of sociocultural and sociopsychological ties. This is the well-known syndrome of "30-year-old children": prolonged education, long waits for a job, the slow solution of housing problems, the unemployment of the young, the education of women (this group represents 56 percent of the unemployed), and difficulties with daily care for children, all of which leads to a forced expansion of the family. What is critical is obviously the financial dependence of many married couples on their parents, which has extremely negative effects. In any case, this parental family is a significant "cushion" for numerous social problems, tensions, and insecurities... And thus, as someone once wittily remarked, 2-3 generations often live under one roof, in a cramped area of about 50 square meters, like the Old Slavs under the linden tree. What is happening under this tree, however, is the scarcely idyllic everyday reality of the "crisis generation."

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ROMANIA

Current Energy Situation, Outlook for Winter

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12 Aug 87 p 2

[Interview of Tiberiu Comanescu, deputy director of the Technical Directorate in the Ministry of Electric Power, by Ion Marcovici; date and place not given]

[Text] The scorching days of this season were anticipated, yet they are posing special problems for the workers in the energy sectors, concerned with keeping the electric power units in a normal operating state, with beginning and completing the repairs planned, with placing into operation new energy projects that are due, with providing reserves for winter. Why should this season as well as the cold season raise difficulties when at least the thermoelectric power plants operating on coal, whose fuel is now as dry "as hay" (it even catches on fire), should operate under optimum conditions? In order to explain some dilemma-causing questions we asked the leadership of the Ministry of Electric Power Comanescu, deputy director of the technical directorate, appointed spokesman, answered a number of our questions. Faced with the given situation the answers did not cover the entire state of affairs, although they are well-founded, so to the editor returns at the end of a short commentary which we are bringing to the attention of the specialized services of some of the central organs, that is, the State Planning Committee and the Ministry of Material-Technical Supply and Control of Management of Fixed Assets. This is because power is a vital problem of the national economy and a problem of ours and of everyone.

[Question] So, comrade director, summer not just winter poses problems for us.

[Answer] Back in 1982 we had a long period of drought, with much lower-than-average precipitation, a fact which did not allow water to accumulate in the lakes in the summer in order to be utilized with greater efficiency in the winter. As in years past, measures also were established this year and we sought to increase the water level in the lakes, with some increases being recorded in May-June as a result of melting snow and precipitation during that period, reaching 50-95 percent full in the main lakes. This percentage, however, could not be maintained and the lack of energy continues to grow, both as a result of what has been pointed out above as well as the improper operation of the coal-based plants.

[Question] From an "optimist's" viewpoint one could say the main lakes are half full. What must be done to keep this valuable energy reserve for the cold season? Summer is summer, but what about the peak hours of winter?

[Answer] Under these conditions it would be necessary to provide the centrals with additional liquid fuel in order to preserve the hydroelectric energy potential and compensate for the reduction in power during the periods when there is lower natural gas pressure. Due to this, a number of the big thermoelectric power plants have not been operating properly, including the Bucharest South, Bucharest West, Grozavesti, Brazi, Borzesti, Braila and Galati plants. They recorded very low gas pressure so that in July the average amount of pressure at the entrance to the Bucharest South gas station was just 15.8 percent of the rated pressure.

[Question] Household consumption no longer is creating difficulties since "priority gas lines" were created for industrial consumption. There has to be a considerable reduction in natural gas consumption in industry. Most of the enterprises burn these resources uncontrolled, without measuring. Whatever amount they receive, that is what they burn and then they request additional amounts at the end of the month or quarter, much more than the amount given. It is surprising that they are given what they ask for, so that the empirical "pipeline" burns continuously, while the energy-consuming technological processes go on operating, without being redesigned. Yet, as I was saying and as we all hoped, the drought-dried coal, at least in the summer, should have taken over the energy tasks on a massive scale. But I see you request liquid fuel. That means that you are not based on coal.

[Answer] In recent years the thermoelectric power plants of the Ministry of Electric Power have been faced with the situation of continuing worsening of the quality of coal delivered by the mining enterprises. We have found a reduction in heat power of the coal, a high content of waste, failure to respect the prescribed granulation and large quantities of metal and foreign bodies in the coal, particularly in the lignite from the Oltenia field. So during 1986 the heat value of coal delivered by the mining enterprises was around 1,500 kilocalories/kg for the Isalnita Thermoelectric Power Plant compared with the 1,750 planned, it was 1,640 kilocalories/kg at the Diocesti Thermoelectric Power Plant, compared with 2,150 planned, it was 1,790 at the Oradea I Thermoelectric Power Plant, compared with the 2,100 planned and it was 2,930 at the Mintia Thermoelectric Power Plant, compared with 3,700. These situations during 1986 led to the reduction in heat value, and to failure to produce 6.5 billion kWh of electric power and an immense rise in production costs.

The delivery of coal of inadequate quality by the mining enterprises is due to their failure to respect the extraction technologies, meaning that there is not separate excavation of the layers of waste with a depth of more than 30 cm and their failure to assemble installations for crushing and separating the metals and foreign bodies at all the coal-delivery points as well as installations for weighing the cars and having mechanized sampling of the coal samples.

[Question] Actually, "quality of the coal" is a subject frequently discussed by our paper and the entire press. But there are also other difficulties which do not originate totally with the miners. If the coal-based plants did not operate under optimum conditions at their total capacity and gas pressure at the thermoelectric power plants operating on natural gases is reduced, it is easy to understand why you used hydroelectric power resources during the summer.

[Answer] All this led to large consumption of electric power for irrigation. Whereas in April the energy consumption for irrigation was 21 million kWh, in July this consumption rose more than 21 times. They were forced to resort to using water, although we know that during the winter the natural increase in water in the reservoirs is very low so that in the case that we go into winter without water in the lakes and hydroelectric power plants are forced to increase operation. Without their contribution to covering the daily peak load, a difficult situation is created precisely during the hours when there is the greatest need for electric power.

Because not all the answers were complete, this reporter is obliged to take over as relay of answers and to complete them with a number of figures since the national energy system present is being again confronted with difficulties.

Installed power in the hydroelectric power plants is around 4,500 MW, while the energy capacity of the entire volume of water which can be accumulated in lakes (outside of the natural tributary deliveries) is around 3 billion kWh. But we cannot count on a production capability based on the volume of water originating in the spring rains of just 2.5 billion kWh. So, if water in the lakes were kept at the level created by the flood level and were turbinized just from the natural floodwater, then in the November-March period, that is, 150 days, an average of 16.5-20 million kWh could be produced daily with the help of the water stored, which in the 6-7 peak hours would mean a power of 2,500-3,000 MW. More than enough. But, for the reasons presented by the speaker, the hydroelectric power installations have operated and do operate at full power during the summer so that during the most critical period of winter the contribution of the hydroelectric power plants remains very low, actually depending on the natural tributary deliveries from bodies of water. According to a study done by the Institute for Power Studies and Design, in order to keep water accumulations we would need an additional amount of hydrocarbons equal to up to 800,000 tons of conventional fuel. This figure was calculated scientifically by specialists but we cannot agree with this position. It is easy to ask: "Give us 100,000 cars of crude oil," but it's harder to answer these questions: How do the thermoelectric power plants operating on coal appear to be? What actions are the energy specialists taking in order to put things right in these thermoelectric power plants? Here, due to some chronic shortcomings (among which are lack of discipline and the fact that service

personnel are not thoroughly trained), a large amount of "unavailable power" is being recorded. That is, they have it installed but cannot use it and on the average this means around 800-1,000 MW, which equals 7-8 billion kWh per year. In order to reduce this amount there must be complete adherence to the operating standards and the obligatory system of repairs. Also contributing to the reduction in power at the thermoelectric power plants, as we have seen, by an additional amount of around 750 MW, is the inadequate quality of coal. The reduction in power for the reasons mentioned above is 324 MW at Mintia. The installed power of the electrogenerating groups in the national electrical power system was 19,287 MW on 1 December 1986, of which 7,567 MW were in the thermoelectric power plants operating on coal. Due to a number of factors, objective and subjective, the average monthly producing powers in the thermoelectric power plants operating on coal are much below expectations. To remind you, below we repeat some of the figures published during the first quarter of 1987 on the average monthly power in January-March:

	Installed Power (MW)	Average Productible Power (MW)
Rovinari	1,720	420
Isalnita	1,035	750
Doicești	520	270
Mintia	1,260	850
Paroseni	300	100

Again let us admit that this is much too little compared to the existing potential! And we cannot help but mention that the poor operation of the groups in Turceni and Rovinari bears the most responsibility for the unavailable power of the coal-based thermoelectric power plants.

Under these circumstances what role and what tasks belong to energy workers as well as to each economic sector, each unit in the national economy, beneficiary of electric power and each one of us? At the present time what is the balance sheet of the effort to get the thermoelectric power plants straight?

In the next issue, in Part II of the conversation with Engineer Tiberiu Comanescu, we shall try to find (not to give) an answer to these new questions.

8071/9274

Brasov Tractor, Transport Vehicles Centrals Merged

27000027 Bucharest BULETINUL OFICIAL
in Romanian Part I No 54, 21 Nov 87 pp 1-5

[Decree of the State Council on Some Measures for Improving the Production Activity in the Field of the Manufacture of Tractors, Motor Vehicles, and Agricultural Machines]

[Text] The State Council of the Socialist Republic of Romania decrees: Article 1. On the date of the present decree, the Brasov Industrial Central for Tractors, Motor Vehicles, and Agricultural Machines, with headquarters in Brasov Municipality, Brasov County, under the guidance and control of the Ministry of the Machine Building Industry, is founded through the merger of the Brasov Industrial Central for Tractors and Agricultural Machines and the Brasov Industrial Central for Motor Vehicles for Transportation, which cease their activity.

The central has as an object of activity research, technological engineering, and production involving tractors, trucks, dump trucks, buses, trolley buses, utility vehicles and special machines, machine sets, agricultural machines and equipment, automotive trailers, engines, subassemblies, spare parts for the products manufactured, technical assistance and service, the organization of exportation and cooperation, and the providing of technical assistance for the products provided for exportation.

The industrial central performs the function of foreign general supplier for the complex exports in its line of manufacture.

Article 2. The Brasov Industrial Central for Tractors, Motor Vehicles, and Agricultural Machines, the Brasov "Tractorul" Enterprise, and the Brasov Truck Enterprise operate on the basis of worker self-management and economic and financial self-administration, with a juridical personality, and are organized in accordance with the legal norms on the organization and management of the state socialist units.

The Brasov Industrial Central for Tractors, Motor Vehicles, and Agricultural Machines has the organizational structure given in Appendix 11* and a maximum number of 130 positions in its own apparatus and belongs to the special grade of organization and group III of branches.

Article 3. The Brasov Industrial Central for Tractors, Motor Vehicles, and Agricultural Machines has subordinate to it the units given in Appendix 2.

Article 4. The maximum number of positions of principal engineer, economist, chemist, and physicist I and II in the apparatus of the Brasov Industrial Central for Tractors, Motor Vehicles and Agricultural Machines is that given in Appendix 3.*

Article 5. The Bucharest Group of Enterprises for the Production of Agricultural Machines, grafted onto the Bucharest "Semanatoarea" Enterprise for Agricultural Machines, operates in the organizational structure of the Brasov Industrial Central for Tractors, Motor Vehicles and Agricultural Machines.

The Bucharest Group of Enterprises for the Production of Agricultural Machines will utilize the organizational structure given in Appendix 2a to State Council Decrees No 58/1985.

Article 6. The Brasov "Universal-Autotractor" Foreign Trade Enterprise, with headquarters in Brasov Municipality, Brasov County, under the direct subordination of the Ministry of Foreign Trade and International Economic cooperation and under the subordination of the Ministry of the Machine Building Industry, is founded on the date of the present decree, it having the object of activity given in Appendix 4.

The Brasov "Universal-Autotractor" Foreign Trade Enterprise is founded through the merger of the Brasov "autoexport-Import" Foreign Trade Enterprise and the Brasov "Universal-Tractor" Foreign Trade Enterprise, which cease their activity.

Article 7. The Brasov "Universal-Autotractor" Foreign Trade Enterprise is organized on the basis of worker self-management and economic, financial, and valuta self-administration, with a juridical personality, and operates in accordance with the legal provisions on the organization and management of the state socialist units and with the structural standards for foreign trade activity approved by means of State council Decree No 162/1973.

Article 8. The Brasov "Universal-Autotractor" Foreign Trade Enterprise is organized on the basis of the model organizational structures approved by means of State council Decree No 136/1984, belongs to the special grade of organization, has the maximum number of 220 positions for specialized administrative, and general-service personnel, and will utilize the value quota per position-year in accordance with Appendix 5.*

Article 9. The Brasov Institute for Scientific Research and Technological Engineering for Tractors and Motor Vehicles, with headquarters in Brasov Municipality, under the subordination of the Bucharest Central Institute for Machine Building and the Brasov Industrial Central for Tractors, Motor Vehicles and Agricultural Machines, is founded on the date of the present decree, it having the object of activity given in Appendix 6.

The Brasov Institute for Scientific Research and Technological Engineering for Tractors and Motor Vehicles is founded through the merger of the Brasov Institute for Scientific Research and Technological Engineering for Tractors and the Brasov Institute for Scientific Research and Technological Engineering for Motor Vehicles, which cease their activity.

Article 10. The Brasov Institute for Scientific Research and Technological Engineering for Tractors and Motor Vehicles operates on the basis of worker self-management and economic and financial self-administration

and is organized in accordance with the provisions of State Council Decree No 297/1973 on the Establishment of the Uniform Structural Standards for the Research and Design Units.

Article 11. The Brasov Institute for Scientific Research and Technological Engineering for Tractors and Motor Vehicles goes in the pay level, the group of branches, size, systems and levels of pay for workers and has the maximum number of administrative personnel given in Appendix 7.*

Article 12. The assets and liabilities established on the basis of the balance sheets concluded, together with the economic, financial, and valuta plan indicators and with the contracts concluded, pass from the units that cease their activity to the units founded in accordance with the provisions of the present decree, on the basis of a protocol.

The personnel who move from the units that cease their activity to the newly founded units are considered transferred in the interest of service.

Article 13. The personnel transferred in the interest of service or moved to positions with lower pay levels and the worker personnel becoming available as a result of the application of the provisions of the present decree have the rights of the application of the provisions of the present decree have the rights given in Article 21 of State Council Decree No 162/1973 on the Establishment of the Uniform Structural Standards for the Economic Units.

Article 14. The Brasov Industrial Central for Tractors, Motor Vehicles and Agricultural Machines is equipped with one motor vehicle for transportation of persons on official business.

Article 15. The provisions of State council Decree No 367/1980 on Some measures for the Rational Utilization of the Personnel in the Socialist Units, whose applicability was extended by means of State Council Decree No 426/1986, do not apply in 1987 to the positions in the units to and from which personnel are transferred as a result of the application of the provisions of the present decree.

Article 16. The provisions of the present decree are applied within the framework of the economic and financial indicators approved for the Ministry of the Machine Building Industry and the Ministry of Foreign Trade and International Economic Cooperation for 1987.

On the basis of the proposals of the ministries involved, the State Planning Committee and the Ministry of Finance will submit for approval the changes that result from the application of the present decree in the sole national plan for economic and social development and in the volume and structure of the state budget for 1987.

Article 17. Appendices 2a, 2b, 3, 3a, 3b, and 4 to State Council Decree No 224/1985, Appendices 1 and 14 to State council Decree No 165/1987, and Appendices 1-5 to State Council Decree No 346/1985 are amended accordingly in conformity with the provisions of the present decree.

Article 18. Appendices 1-7 are an integral part of the present decree.

Nicolae Ceausescu, President of the Socialist Republic of Romania Bucharest, 19 November 1987 No 276.

*The appendix is communicated to the institutions involved.

Appendix 2

Units Subordinate to Brasov Industrial Central for Tractors, Motor Vehicles, and Agricultural Machines:

Brasov "Tractorul" Enterprise; Miercurea-Ciuc Tractor Enterprise; Craiova Enterprise for Tractors and Agricultural Machines; Sinaia Precision Machinery Enterprise; Oradea Machine Enterprise; Buzau "Metalurgica" Enterprise; Codlea Machine Enterprise; Brasov Machine Enterprise; Galati Machine Enterprise for Hydraulic Equipment; Gheorgheni Machine Enterprise; Rimnicu Sarat Enterprise for Gaskets and Brake Linings; Intorsura Buzaului Enterprise for Tractor Parts; Brasov Truck Enterprise; Sfintu Gheorghe Enterprise for Machine Sets and Automotive Subassemblies; Sibiu Enterprise for Automotive Parts; Mirsa Machine Enterprise; Bucharest "Autobuzul" Enterprise; Medias "Automecanica" Enterprise; Moreni "Automecanica" Enterprise; Brasov Radiator Enterprise; Oradea Machine and Spare-parts Enterprise; Reghin "Republica" Metallurgical Enterprise; Iasi Enterprise for Automotive Parts; Satu Mare Enterprise for Automotive Parts; Cluj-Napoca "Sinterom" Enterprise; Sibiu Metallurgical Enterprise*; Brasov Automotive Transportation Enterprise; Brasov Enterprise for Technical Assistance and Service for Automotive Means of Transportation; Brasov "Hidromecanica" Enterprise.

Bucharest Group of Enterprises for Production of Agricultural Machines

Bucharest "Semanatoarea" Enterprise for Agricultural Machines; Medgidia Machine Enterprise for Equipment; Piatra-Neamt "Ceahlau" Machine Enterprise; Alexandria "Islaz" Machine Enterprise; Bailesti Machine Enterprise; Toplet Machine Enterprise.

*A unit without a juridical personality.

Appendix 4 Ministry of Foreign Trade and International Economic Cooperation

Name and Headquarters: Brasov "Universal-Autotractor" Subordination to: Ministry of Foreign Trade and International Economic Cooperation; Ministry of the Machine Building Industry.

Object of Activity According to Main Groups of Products—Exportation

Agricultural and industrial tractors, tractors equipped with bulldozer-type blades, scarifiers, loaders, and other specific equipment; Trucks, dump trucks, automotive trailers, and other trailers; Buses, trolley buses, utility vehicles; Special vehicles and others derived from trucks, utility vehicles, and buses; Motor vehicles for fire extinguishing; Agricultural machines, equipment, and tools, agricultural trailers; CKD [completely knocked-down components], SDK [partly knocked-down components], engines, assemblies, subassemblies; Machine tools in its sector of activity, machine sets, processing lines, assembly lines, shops and factories, spare parts, organization of service and technical assistance, schooling, and other work and services proper to its object of activity; Asbestos-rubber material and metal asbestos; Licenses, patents for Romanian inventions, trademarks, studies, designs, know-how, engineering, technology, assembly; Foreign general supplier in its field of activity.

Importation

Agricultural and industrial tractors, tractors equipped with bulldozer-type blades, scarifiers, loaders, and other specific equipment; Trucks, dump trucks, automotive trailers, and other trailers; Buses, trolley buses, utility vehicles; Special vehicles and others derived from trucks, utility vehicles, and buses; Motor vehicles for fire extinguishing; Agricultural machines, equipment, and tools, agricultural trailers; Subassemblies, CKD, SKD, engines, assemblies, subassemblies, and parts for making specific products; Refrigerating and automotive air-conditioning equipment and firefighting equipment for outfitting special vehicles; Asbestos-rubber material and metal asbestos; Licenses, studies, designs, know-how, engineering, technology, assembly, service, technical assistance, schooling, and other work and services proper to its field of activity.

Appendix 6

List of Scientific-Research, Technological-Engineering, Design, and Higher-Educational Units in the composition of the Bucharest Central Institute for Machine Building:

Unit: Brasov Institute for Scientific Research and Technological Engineering for Tractors and Motor Vehicles Headquarters: Brasov Municipality, Brasov County Subordinate to: Bucharest Central Institute for Machine Building; Brasov Industrial Central for Tractors, Motor Vehicles, and Agricultural Machines.

Object of Activity: Agricultural and industrial wheeled and caterpillar tractors, trucks, tank trucks, dump trucks, buses and special automotive chassis, utility vehicles, trailer trucks, trailers, subassemblies and equipment specific to them. Equipment specific to tractor production.

12105/06662

Popular Handicraft Products for Export Described 27000028 Bucharest REVISTA ECONOMICA in Romanian 17 Dec 87 pp 11, 18

[Article by Ioan Georgescu: "Romanian Handicraft Products Highly Valued on World Market"]

[Text] Handicrafts, in the general sense of unique or limited production articles, have earned a solid reputation on the world market, as has the entire range of exports of Romanian consumer goods. Over half of the handicraft production is exported, currently to tens of countries. These assertions concerning the popularity of Romanian handicrafts abroad apply fully to the exports of artisan cooperatives from Sibiu county, an area of rich traditions in developing handicrafts and folk art.

Centuries ago, the fame of Sibiu guilds of furriers, tailors, weavers, and potters had spread far and wide. By 1868, the wool spinning mill in Dumbrava Sibului had grown to factory size. Hides and leather manufacturing expanded very rapidly after 1880. At the Chamber of Commerce Exhibition in Cluj in August 1886, 17 industrial firms from Sibiu put on displays.

The descendants of these old traditions, Sibiu artisans, are now grouped into 16 strong cooperatives with over 200 kinds of products. They are heavily engaged in exporting—meeting and surpassing the export goals they themselves proposed.

Artistic handicrafts such as pottery, woodcarving, hand-making of rugs and tapestries as well as clothing and textiles for daily use, the weaving of straw and willow branches etc. are considered by specialists (Footnote 1) (O. Horsia, P. Petrescu, "Artistic Handicraft in Romania," the Central Union of Handicraft Cooperatives.) as "a special and specialized occupation, equally technique and art, which has its origins, both the technique and art, in the very stages of the construction of human society." Thus the archaeological remains of the first Dacian cities (oppidum) attest to the development of handicrafts in the ceramic and metallurgical ovens, the woodworking shops, and the workshops for minting coins. A prime example of the timelessness of folk traditions is in rustic furniture, particularly the low table, round and essentially unchanged even today, where it is found in many homes in Romania. Furthermore, the Latin origins of the names of the basic hand craftsmen—the blacksmith, the stone mason, the potter and the wheelwright, speaks eloquently of the origin and the continuity of these professions over the ages.

The first guilds—in the modern sense of the word—of hand craftsmen in Romania were documented in Transylvania in 14th century papers which listed 19 guilds in Sibiu, Sighisoara, and Orastie. That these crafts reached high levels of artistic development is demonstrated in the popular architecture, rustic furniture, textiles, ceramics, glass etc., of numerous Transylvanian centers. For example, craftsmen specializing in home construction with wood in northern Transylvania, using skills gained in their day-to-day work, erected a wooden building 60 meters high without the use of iron nails (the famous wooden Romanian cathedral, the pinnacle of European wood architecture). Another example is their "by-the-numbers" first prefabricated homes, built of wood, which were erected on special grounds outside of towns and built on well-established ethnographic principles. Buyers from around the country would select their desired model, and the carpenters would then transport the home and rebuild it on the lot indicated by the client.

Romanian peasant furniture also demonstrates a high degree of artistry, both the furniture made of wood without the use of nails and decorated with notches and cuts and the furniture assembled by joiners and decorated with pictures. The characteristic handicraft of Transylvania (Sighisoara, Hendorf, Brasov and Rime-tea) is of the latter variety. Chests, cupboards, beds, benches and chairs are decorated in many colors with scenes that often have plant motifs.

There is practically no county that does not have its pottery centers, that handicraft being one of the most durable over the ages. The Transylvanian centers at Vama, Vadul Crisului, Danesti, Madaras, Lelesti, Criscior, Lapus and Birsa work in both black ceramics (Dacian in origin) and red (Roman origin).

The development of handicrafts in textiles had a strong foundation in our country because of the abundance of raw materials. The variety and relative richness of textiles in peasant homes are unique in European textiles, both in Western Europe and in our own southeastern Europe region. Rugs, a primary form of our people's creativity, currently are produced in many cooperatives throughout the country, in over 30 specialized sections. Romanian rugs—the wall rugs are made manually on looms with vertical or horizontal weaves—can be of different types, according to the quality of the wool strands being used and the density of strands per square centimeter, as well as to the different ethnographical regions which are represented. The decorative composition, the form, the decorations and the colors are specific to various ethnographical regions, these characteristics being retained even in today's mass-produced rugs. Included among these rugs are numerous small wall hangings and wall coverings (following the pattern of a central field with multiple borders) that are among the prize holdings of many famous collections throughout the world. The woven rugs of Maramures are the most

remarkable of this kind in Transylvania, and are used as sources of inspiration in the creation of new panels and decorative weavings for interior use (tapestries).

Another large group is the knotted rugs (Oriental carpets). In the art history of Oriental rugs, there is a distinct category known as the Transylvanian carpet, which is noted in all the specialized studies on Oriental rugs. Those carpets in the collections of the Romanian Museum of Art and of the Bruckenthal Museum in Sibiu, as well as those held by certain historical church monuments in Brasov, Sighisoara and Bistritsa date to the 16th, 17th and 18th centuries.

These carpets have a specific chromatic and ornamental composition in the European style that were produced for these countries first in Anatolia (and sold in the West by Transylvanian businessmen) and then locally by the guilds of weavers noted in the 16th century. They predominantly are of geometric patterns. The tradition of these carpets was taken over by Oriental rug manufacturing sites in Bucharest, Braila, Gherla, Fagaras, Galati and Iasi by the turn of the century, and more recently by factories in Harman, Craiova, Sibiu, Oradea, Tulcea, Tirgu Mures, Satu Mare and Focsani. In the past few decades, this production has undergone dramatic development with a continuous rise in quality. Based on the quality of the wool or cotton strands used (the warp) and the wool knots per square meter, the rugs are classified as types between 40,000 and 300,000 knots per square meter. The workshops for the creation and execution of designs that are co-located with the large production cooperatives, use both Oriental and Transylvanian models for inspiration.

The hand-knotted Oriental carpets made in Romania are known worldwide for their superior quality, varied ornamental design and harmonious colors.

Textiles for clothing and home interior decorating have a splendid tradition in our country. Thousands of creative weavers and artisans work in centers with rich traditions such as the Tismana-Gorj region, and the regions of Marginimea Sibiului and Tara Oltului-Sibiu, Bran and Tara Birsei-Brasov, and Lugoj and Faget-Timisoara.

In these centers, a variety of authentic works of folk art are created including: peasant costumes; decorative bags and towels with rich ornamental compositions such as those from Avrig-Sibiu; tablecloths and towels from Tara Oltului and the Bran region which are impressive for their intricate designs and colors; Banat textiles with their rich designs in red on a white background; scarfs from Bucovina; silk kerchiefs from the Muscel and Arges regions which are remarkable for their lacework, and hand embroidery from Breaza-Prahova.

A basic principle followed in the production of folk art is that the products of a cooperative in one region cannot be reproduced by cooperatives in other regions or countries. This would diminish the authenticity and intrinsic value of the respective works.

The attention which handicrafts enjoy today in Romania is reflected in the fact that they are the object of a special national program for the training of skilled craftsmen. Among the Sibiu exporters of products from handicraft cooperatives we must mention first the cooperative, "Arta Sibiului," with centers in Sibiu, Saliste, Rasinari, Copsa Mica and Dumbraveni. These produce and export 100 percent wool, handmade Oriental carpets of various types with 100,000, 160,000 and 200,000 knots to the square meter. These are produced from their own designs or from models supplied by the purchaser. They export to a number of foreign countries; traditional recipients being firms in the U.S., Italy, France, The Federal Republic of Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands and so on. Also in these workshops, they produce 100 percent wool, woven rugs, bedspreads, tablecloths and towels with folk motifs from the region (using red, white, blue and green colors). Also they produce specifically for Romanian peasant dwellings a rich collection of wall coverings, towels, and bedspreads with designs that are uplifting, vivacious, optimistic and inviting.

Furniture exporters include the cooperatives, "Dumbrava" from Dumbraveni, "Inainte" from Agnita, "Mestesugarul" from Medias, and "Munca timplarilor" from Sibiu, all of which have numerous workshops in their respective regions. These firms make furniture and small furniture kits which are functional and even multi-use in design such as, for example, a child's desk that is also a toy box or storage place for nightwear. Among the recipients of these products are firms in the USSR, the U.S. the UK and France.

In addition to the peasant costumes exported by "Arta Sibiului," the cooperatives "Imbracamintea" and "Textila" in Sibiu export clothes and knitwear of very high quality and taste to prestige markets such as the FRG, the Netherlands, Czechoslovakia and the USSR.

Giving wider distribution to the traditions in leather goods and footwear of local craftsmen, the cooperative, "Gheata," exports high-quality leather goods and stylish, comfortable footwear to the USSR, Czechoslovakia and Poland.

The "Technica Noua" cooperative, specializing in artistic works in glass, exports decorative articles of etched and ornamental glass (for example Christmas Tree ornaments to the U.S.).

It is noteworthy that the cooperatives have met and surpassed the export plan targets for the first three quarters of the year and currently have more orders for export than they can possibly fill with the materials that are provided them. Unfortunately certain producers (excluding PAL), prefer to export their goods directly, unprocessed, and do not meet their orders for indirect export by PAL for furniture. The situation is similar for veneer, varnish, and other raw materials and supplies which could have much greater value added by the skilled artisans of these cooperatives.

12280

ROMANIA

Survey of Religious Beliefs, Practices in 4 Counties

27000022 Bucharest VIITORUL SOCIAL in Romanian May-Jun 87 pp 221-240

[Article by Ana Balasa: "Particular Features of the Secularization process in Socialist Society"]

[Excerpts] The process of secularization has become a major dimension of today's world, in which the basic structures and the material and cultural areas of life are basically removed from the influence and authority of religion as an institution and spirituality. In socialism secularization as a progressive and complete liberation of society and the human personality from the influence of religion is caused not only by objective factors, by conditions of material, economic-social and cultural life but also by the rise in the role of the entire system of political-ideological, cultural, philosophical, scientific and moral education.

The process of secularization is still an open, unfinished process at the level of certain forms of people's culture, of certain human communities and at the level of the personality, where for some people religiousness exists as a daily form of life and spiritual existence. On the other hand, like any social phenomenon of these proportions, the secularization process does not unfold continuously without winding, but rather breaks in continuity and even revivals of religious interest. So scientific concerns with the dimensions, changes and effects of religion in socialist society and with the rise in the relationship of religiosity/non-religiosity and atheism are fully justified.

The legitimacy of socialist research into religious phenomenon and of analysis of the relationship between religion and society at a specific level and of a given social reality, along with theoretical and ideological considerations, is granted by the demands of practical and social-political action. The knowledge furnished by sociological research contributes to substantiating activities of scientific-materialist and revolutionary-humanist education and to different ways of conceiving of them, in which the methods and forms of education would be varied and complementary. The priority tasks of educational work which aim at the constructive effort of forming a new personality with a socialist awareness also may be established, an effort which is included in the general process of the revolutionary transformation of society.

Of course, it is difficult to find all the complexity of the religious phenomenon, syncretism and its multiple interrelations with other processes, acts and social phenomena in specific research. In a first phase, extensive research, undertaken in a number of counties, subordinate the goals of the task to achieving a diagnosis of the status of religiosity/non-religiosity and atheism in Romania, which means identifying the dimensions of

the phenomenon (its scope) and the intensity which the system of religious values and standards profess and identifying some of the factors favoring the reproduction of religiousness as well as its effects at the individual and social level.

Of course, any diagnosis implies a system of reference. At the present, we can relate to prior research carried out in large or small areas but, generally, by fragments of population (youth, student, neo-Protestants and so forth). (Footnote 1) (In this regard refer to the research reports and studies done by the Center for Sociological Research, the Research Center for Youth Problems at the UTC CC, the sociology Chair of the Academy of Social-Political Studies at the RCP CC and other research institutes and centers). In the analysis made, at the same time we shall compare counties among each other, taking into account their cultural context, different historical traditions, social-structural differences which play an important role in the rise of the religious phenomenon. We shall continually relate the results to the socially desirable model and we also shall resort to comparisons with the results of sociological research from other countries as often as is necessary in order to discover either if they fit within certain general trends or in order to bring out particular aspects.

A standardized questionnaire was mainly used as a diagnostic tool (the methods and means of research were worked out by a collective formed of Univ Prof Dr Ion Dragan, Dr Septimiu Chelcea, Dr I.M. Popescu, Dr Petre Datculescu and Ana Balasa, university lecturer), applied to certain representative samplings, seeking that the variables by which the religious phenomenon was measured (opinions, attitudes, behaviors) be as appropriate as possible for any of the religions existing in Romania (the majority being Christian). One set of variables measured the ideological and doctrinary dimension present in any religion and as we know worked out surrounding three central themes: divinity, the world (natural and social) and man as a creation of divinity. Ideological theses mainly view nature and the competencies of divinity and its relationships with the world and man, justification of these relations, the destiny of the world and of man. In specific research, the knowledge/lack of knowledge of doctrinary theses by the subjects investigated and adherence/non-adherence to them represent a relevant indicator of religiosity/non-religiosity. However, what also is of interest is the extent to which basic doctrinary assertion, the *asic credo*, still is a stable, coherent system capable of determining attitudes and guiding behaviors. The interest is all the more well founded today, as all religions are making efforts to adapt and modernize the doctrinary body and to have an ideological reconstruction.

Another set of variables measures the way the subjects place a value on religion. In this regard I have used several indicators which, in my opinion, express overall people's attitude toward religion. These indicators refer to religion as an interpretation of the world and of life, to

the divine origin of the Bible, the church and to religion as the foundation of morality. In the end, through a number of other indicators I have sought to determine religious behavior, which represents exteriorization of faith and of religious ideology in observable acts. Religious behavior generally is a rather relevant indicator in measuring religiosity, specifying that in the case of different cults the recipes for religious practice are not the same. For that reason I have used just the indicators of the common cults in Romania in the research.

The level of religious practice has both religious as well as social significance: it expresses a certain degree of adherence (conforming) to religious doctrine, but also the extent to which a cult or group operates or not as an integrating community capable of also influencing types of behavior other than religious ones.

The Status of Religiosity: Quantitative and Qualitative Determinations

In order to determine the status of religiosity I used at the same time many methods of measurement, asking the subjects to do the following:

- State their affiliation or non-affiliation with one of the religious cults existing in Romania;
- Give a self-appraisal of religiosity/non-religiosity, choosing one of the five choices of answer on a scale (very religious, religious, indifferent, atheist, active atheist);
- State their opinion (attitude) on a number of declarations on basic doctrinary elements of any religion;
- Estimate the extent to which they conform to certain practices (individual and collective) prescribed by the religious institution or community;
- Choose one of the formulations by which the questionnaire places an overall value on religion.

I used these methods for determining the state of religiosity both from theoretical considerations but also because we are aware that there is a risk in the practice of field investigations, particularly in the case of certain research subjects, that the subjects will give answers which they feel the researcher expects from them. Bearing in mind that, on one hand, the problems of religion are felt to be more delicate, having to do with spiritual intimacy, and, on the other, that in the case of Romania the dominant and desirable social-cultural model excludes religious values or makes them secondary, I was particularly concerned with the authenticity of the answers and their agreement with actual attitudes.

Without analyzing the significance of failure to answer in the sociological research, I still can state that despite some suppositions, the fewest failures to answer were recorded precisely for the questions which viewed the religious universe, with their value not exceeding 4 percent. (The European average of failures to answer was

8 percent on a similar subject.) (Footnote 2) (Jean Stoetzel, "Les Valeurs du Temps Present: Une Enquete Europeenne," Paris, PUF 1983, p 87).

1. Scope of Religiosity

a. Religious Self-identification

A religion first represents a group of affiliation. Affiliation to a cult, like to any other social group, theoretically means that the individual is aware of his adherence to the goals of the groups and of the rights and duties he assumes as a member of it, that he accepts its standards and values and is guided by them in practical behavior. What is the real religious and social significance of belonging to a cult, as is seen from our sociological research? (Footnote 3) (We are referring to Arad, Brasov and Dimbovita counties, where the field research was coordinated by the author of this study and to Satu Mare, where the research was coordinated by Univ Prof Ion Dragan, and these are the counties from which we received primary information for writing this analysis). See below for answers to the two question of religions self-identification: adherence to a cult and a self-appraisal of religiosity (See Table 1).

Comparing the percentage of people stating their adherence to a cult with the percentage of those who identify themselves as being religious, we find very great differences (more than 47 percent), which justifies the assertion that identity of a faith to the greatest extent is a formal one and represents a less relevant indicator of religiosity. most of those declaring themselves Orthodox, Catholic and so forth do not state that they are religious and do not demonstrate their adherence to the dogmatic theses of the religion to which they claim they belong and do not positively utilize religion or demonstrate religious behavior. The situation is not the same in the neo-Protestant cults, where the two percentages tend to be superposed.

Without being a relevant indicator of discrimination between religiosity and non-religiosity, adherence to a cult represents an indicator of classification, particularly in the analysis of the other indicators of religiosity.

The phenomenon of mobility between the religious is weak (with the greatest percentage—7 percent—being recorded in Arad County), with the motivation for the change in cult being distributed throughout the choices of answers.

As I have mentioned already, I used a direct question requiring the subjects to characterize themselves as an indicator for identifying the status of religiosity or non-religiosity and atheism. Since the categories of "very religious" and "active atheist" are poorly represented (the greatest percentages were 2.7 percent for very religious and 5.3 percent for active atheists) and we see from correlations with other indicators that they do not have definitive notes for the categories of "religious" and

$$D.m = \sqrt{\frac{P_1(100-P_1)}{N_1} + \frac{P_2(100-P_2)}{N_2}}$$

"atheist," we can say that actually, conforming with the self-appraisal, there are three main categories of subjects: religious indifferent and atheist. (See Table 2).

As one may see, the "indifferents" are the greatest percentage for all counties, while the percentage of atheists is small compared to the socially desirable model. One may say also that the percentage of "religious" is low, particularly if we relate it to similar research in other countries. For example, European research has found that at the level of the countries studied, "63 percent feel they are religious, 24 percent feel they are not and 15 percent state that they are convinced atheists." (Footnote 4) (Jean Stoetzel, op. cit., p 87).

Following the differences by counties we may state that there are not significant differences between Arad, Brasov and Satu mare counties in the category of "religious"; however, a significant difference exists between each of the counties mentioned and Dimbovita County; there is a significant difference between Arad and Dimbovita in the "indifferent" category; significant differences in the "atheist" category are found between Arad, Dimbovita and Satu Mare on one hand and Brasov on the other. (Footnote 5) (the significant difference between percents was calculated according to the formula as follows: . In order to make the diagnosis more thorough, the self-defining is to be correlated with the answers to other questions.

b. Adherence to Doctrine

In order to know who is a believer, we must take into consideration the dogmatic content of religion and at least the adherence to a minimal "orthodoxy." This is because, as we know, doctrine in Christianity is of major significance, with implications and even prescriptions for rituals and individual and collective religious practices. Below we will show just the percentages of answers conforming to an ideal model (Footnote 6) (The scale of answers regarding agreement with doctrine was as follows: 1. False; 2. True; 3. Probably true; 4. I don't know. To conform with an ideal model just the "true" answers were shown in the following table) of a truly religious person (who expresses full adherence to the doctrine).

One sees the lower percentage of subjects who express their complete agreement with doctrinary theses and a significant gap between the percentage of religious people in conformity with their self-appraisal and conformity with attachment to doctrine, with the latter being much lower. How may we interpret the above information and how can we explain the appreciable differences between stated religiosity and the lower agreement with doctrine? Even if, generally, there is somewhat of a

distancing between dogmatic and normative content and the way it is accepted, the distance recorded by research is too great to be considered natural and, if it is not natural, what significance does it have? The theses formulated are still basic in Christianity and, logically, one cannot say he does not know them, even the believer. The distance cannot be influenced by an eventual contextualization of dogma, worked out in another historical space and time, which, supporting syncretism with native beliefs, popular beliefs, would not any longer have been "recognized" in the presented form in the questionnaire. Also the questions were not formulated in a theological language with which the believers would not have been familiar but rather in the language of general culture. The difference cannot be due to any excessive conceptualization of the questions and their lack of accessibility related to the subjects' cultural level. So we may assert that the difference expresses a real situation: estrangement of believers from the standardized, institutionalized ideological model, a relativization of it, which represents signs of a clear decline in religious ideology.

One may also observe in this table that the agreement with the elements of the doctrine vary, with some being accepted less than others, although all are part of the same doctrinary body. The lowest value is recorded in the declaration on "existence of eternal life after death," which expresses serious circumspection even from those who say they are believers. Selective evaluation of doctrinary assertions and the way in which believers relate to dogmatics mean a process of disorganization and destabilization of religion at this level.

In this context we mention that much sociological research done in the western countries (Footnote 7) (In this regard please see "Problemes Politiques et Sociaux," No 345, 1978, "L'Evolution des Atitudes Religieuses en Occident," the Gallup Opinion Index [1977-1978]) also show the disinterest and lack of more and more emphatic adherence of believers to the ideological aspect of religions, lack of homogeneity of expressions of religious doctrines, the gap between beliefs and doctrines, making the latter indigenous, which risk making them so relative that "their universal value" no longer would have any coverage.

Of course, Christian ideologies are up to date with the changes in religious doctrine, a fact which requires them to make basic concessions and attempts to get into agreement with the scientific, rationalist spirit of modern man or to adopt a strategy of "discretion" with regard to certain doctrinary theses in too evident contradiction with this spirit.

c. The Level of Religious Behaviors

Religious behaviors are considered means of exteriorizing belief, but also means of cultivating it. In the research we used as indicators religious behaviors common to the cults in Romania and which have to a greater extent the

significance of adherence to a religious "credo," avoiding taking into consideration certain practices or rituals which were drained of their original religious content (examples: rest on Sundays, year-end holidays and so forth) or which have a relatively low religious significance (baptism, religious marriage and so forth).

Below we show a table of religious behaviors, recording just the answers which on a principled basis conformed to an unequivocal religious attitude. (We included the answers "often" and "very often" for the frequency of the particular behaviors).

The information below brings out a process of decline in cult practices in all four counties. (See Table 4).

Recognizing the priest as a person who can guide human behavior comprises the poorest following. The very low percentage (as we shall see, even among believers, not only in the sampling) of those who ask advice from the cult official means that his social role is becoming marginal. The sociological research to which I have referred, carried out in western countries, also records the role of the priest and of the religious institution in general becoming marginal in the system of social control of the human communities. Of course, the clergy, including in Romania, have understood this process which they are trying to counteract by intensifying their pastoral activities (particularly in the Roman Catholic and neo-Protestant cults) by initiatives at modernization, among which is also practicing a more emphatic "social activism."

Again we note the similarity between Satu Mare, Arad and Brasov in part and the very low level of religious practice in Dimbovita County. There are significant differences statistically between the types of behaviors considered as relevant indicators of religiosity. In all counties the greatest percentage is recorded by prayers, followed by attending church, which is interesting because one represents a private religious behavior (praying) while the other is a public religious behavior, having different significance in bringing out true religiosity. Prayer, being an intimate religious behavior caused by an interior motivation, is more relevant for proving belief than attending church, which represents an obvious behavior which does not necessarily have the significance of adherence to a belief. Attending church may signify a simply conformity with standardized duties or an occasion to make social contacts, to satisfy one's needs to communicate, without always preserving a religious meaning.

This, however, is also interesting from another viewpoint both theoretically and in practice: the religious institution to only a small extent still fulfills its specific job of transmitting and preserving belief, which is equal to a symptom of its decline. At the same time, however, assuming its social and psycho-social roles and making sacred general human needs (to communicate, compassion, mutual understanding, ethic and aesthetic needs

and so forth) which find satisfaction in the religious area, the church is able to maintain its prestige to the extent to which these social roles and general human needs are not filled, that is, satisfied, by the lay organizations which have the particular competencies. The motivation for religious behavior, most often outside religion, also leads to the conclusion of the need to carry out the competencies of certain organizations and institutions at a higher level, particularly cultural ones. Preventing the effects of the "compensating" function of religion, however, can be obtained through joint action of educational work and social intervention, specific and timely, of the factors invested with responsibility from all decision-making levels so that resorting to religion no longer appears as a solution or alternative.

In this context we must state that the repressing of religious practices is a general characteristic of the evolution of traditional religions in the modern world. For example, the results of sociological surveys in the FRG show the process of decline in religious practice, a decline found in the Catholic religion as well as Protestant. In 1953, 60 percent of Catholics regularly attended church, while in 1979, it was 36 percent. Some 19 percent of those below 30 and 14 percent in 1979 went to church frequently. That same trend also was seen among Protestants: 18 percent of Protestants regularly went to church in 1953, while it was just 9 percent in 1979; in 1953, 13 percent of those below 30 went to church and this went down to 2 percent in 1979 (Footnote 8) ("Problemes Politiques et Sociaux," No 452/1982, La Documentation Francaise).

For the European countries studied overall (France, Great Britain, Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Spain, Netherlands, Belgium, Ireland and Denmark) the percentages of those attending church in 1981 were as follows (Footnote 9) (Jean Stoetzel, op. cit., p 120) (see Table 5):

d. Placing a Value on Religion

Theoretically, an estimation of beliefs and of religious behaviors may be suggested by the way in which the subjects place a value on religion. Below we give the percentages of answers which evaluate religion positively, in conformity with the attitude of a believer. (See Table 6).

We find a low level of placing positive value on religion for all indicators in all counties, especially the one on considering religion the foundation of morality. In all the counties, more than 86 percent of the subjects investigated (among which, as we have seen, some stated they were religious and expressed their adherence to doctrinary elements and have religious behaviors) stated that people can be moral, honest, correct, and so forth, even without being religious. Again, a similar valuation for the first three indicators is given in Arad, Brasov and Satu Mare counties, somewhat higher than in the case of Dimbovita County, while the other countries give a

similar valuation for the fourth indicator, except for Brasov. In all counties, more than 75 percent of the subjects felt that the significance and placing of a value on religion do not express a religious attitude, which at this level also express materialization of the process of people's detachment from religion. Also adding the fact that there are significant differences statistically for all the counties between one's appraisal of being religious and placing a value on religion (this is much lower), at first glance the figures would seem to be contradictory. But religious people do not live isolated in a world of religious values is not boosted up. That is why we feel we can explain the clear process of erosion of axiological and normative systems centered on religion and the believers' acceptance of other moral codes and alternative systems of values, including when it is a matter of the concept of the world (not more than 18 percent feel religion is the only true interpretation of the world and of life). So, indisputably we are faced with an emphatic process of secularization at the level of awareness and of individual and collective behaviors.

2. Intensity of Religiosity

Evaluation of the intensity of religiosity offers a more varied diagnosis of it and at the same time, by constructing overall indicators, the opportunity for a more adequate comparison of the figures. The procedure I used to determine intensity was comprised of calculating the weighted arithmetical averages for each indicator in each of the categories of 'religious,' 'indifferent,' 'atheist' and calculating a score for each dimension and a general average.

What was found? Naturally, in all counties the highest score, that is, the greatest intensity of religious behavior, was recorded in the category of "religious," but in the lower half of the interval of possible values (0-24); in descending order they were 10.04 (Satu Mare), 9.92 (Brasov), 9.30 (Arad) and 8.66 (Dimbovita). The general averages naturally follow the same order.

The lowest scores and averages, again naturally, were recorded in the category of "atheist." Of course, the values indicate a minimum intensity but also some inconsistencies regarding the behavior of those stating they are atheists.

In the category of "indifferent," one may see that the values of scores and averages do not indicate an intermediary position but rather one much closer to the position of atheists than to that of religious, thus, a low intensity of religious behavior.

However, we shall compare the averages and scores with the values of the scale and of the score in order to show the intensity of religious behavior more graphically.

The general averages—1.67 (Satu Mare), 1.65 (Brasov), 1.55 (Arad) and 1.44 (Dimbovita), all within the interval of 1.00-1.99—express the fact that in the "religious"

category the intensity of religious behavior is average. The values of the scores within the 6.00-11.99-interval express the same thing: an average intensity of the believers' religious intensity.

The average values of the scores in the category of "atheist" in all counties show a very low intensity of religious behavior, nearly zero (absent).

Among those calling themselves "indifferent" to religion, the values fall within the interval corresponding to low intensity of religious behavior and it is nearly similar to the intensity of religious behavior of the atheists (coming closest in Brasov and Dimbovita counties).

Following the same methods and in order to measure the intensity of adherence to doctrinary ideas, we find that the values recorded in the category of "religious," except for Satu Mare County, fall within the interval corresponding to average intensity, but very close to the limit separating this interval of low intensity; in Satu Mare County the value recorded coincides with the value of demarcation between average and powerful religiosity. So in the case of the ideological dimension the intensity of religiosity of those calling themselves "religious" is between the average and low values and below the intensity of religious behavior.

For those calling themselves atheists, we actually find the absence of religiosity, since the intensity of adherence to doctrine has the value of zero or very close to zero.

In the "indifferent" category the intensity of agreement with doctrine is low, close to the intensity of those who call themselves atheists.

In conclusion, there is less religiosity than claimed, indifference is nearly identical to non-religiosity, while atheism sometimes, to a small extent, it is true, is associated with certain inconsistencies and concessions.

At least two problems result from what has been shown above: one views the contradiction between calling oneself indifferent and actually associating the corresponding behaviors and concepts which define an atheist and the second views the consistency of religiosity of those who call themselves religious. Continuing, we shall analyze each one separately.

As far as contradiction is concerned, it also could be the effect of an aspect of the research methods: asking subjects to place themselves on a scale of attitudes ranging from "very religious" to "active atheist" means that they should have a real ability to know themselves and evaluate themselves as well as the aptitude to operationalize the variations in "atheist" and "active atheist," which are less used in common language and which sometimes have negative connotations. The same problems do not rise for the variations in "religious": "The great majority of those interviewed do not need any explanation in order to answer the question of

whether or not they consider themselves religious." (Footnote 10) (Jean Stoetzel, *op. cit.*, p 87). Yet, if the subjects say they are indifferent and basically have concepts and behaviors associated with the definition of an atheist, one also may presume that the cultural model for an atheist is not being disseminated and understood satisfactorily. In the specialty literature, particularly what is being advertised, there has not been enough emphasis on the fact that not only denial of religious concepts is associated with the definition of an atheist and that atheism does not mean a lack of values, but rather a reconstruction of the system of values, proceeding from man and society. Associated with the concept of an atheist is a system of values in which "man is the measure of all things"; freedom, responsibility, good, evil, justice, honor, basically all values, not just those from the area of ethics, relations among people, ideals for life are not judged and evaluated in relationship to transcendent beings but in relationship to one's neighbors, to society.

3. The Consistency of Religiosity

The figures analyzed on the scope and intensity of religiosity give us a picture of the agreement with religious ideology, another picture of the dimension of the behavior and a third picture of religious attitudes. But, as we have seen, these pictures are only partially superposed, with significant differences existing between the three dimensions. Second, within each dimension we still do not know if the answers for various indicators are from the same people and, in the end, third, if the same subjects are answering and are answering in the same way for all the indicators of the dimensions considered, in conformity with what we have defined as a religious person.

Following the table below (see Table 7), drawn up on the example of Dimbovita and Satu Mare counties, we can see that just a portion of the believers are expressing their adherence to the basic doctrinary theses of the religion they are claiming to take part in and, also, just a portion of them are conforming to the prescriptions for behavior.

One can see that in Dimbovita County only between 33-53 percent of the subjects stating they are religious answer categorically in the affirmative for elements of doctrine and only between 14-39 percent declare frequent religious behavior. For Satu Mare County the proportions are 34-54 and 8-53 percent, respectively. Naturally we ask on what the declarations of religiosity are based and by what they are supported. It seems we are facing not just an inconsistency of religiosity but also a subjectivization of the method of faith, establishing of "one's own style" of religiosity, closer or further from institutional religion. One further can see the consistency of the answers of those calling themselves "atheists" and

the inconsistency in the category of "indifferent" with regard to their type of answer coming closer to that of the atheists, with several exceptions in the case of Satu Mare County.

In all the counties the "indifferents" have the largest percentage, but this indifference expresses generally a positive process of moving toward attitudes and behaviors motivated by essentially lay, non-religious system of values and standards. The figures in the research confirm that this transition to a great extent is a fait accompli. Along another line, religious indifference is not equal to an axiological and standardized vacuum as is sometimes claimed, but rather and most often is equal to a reconstruction, a resignifying of axiological and standard systems, a process which must be supported by all methods of educational work, but, in turn, they must find as full a correspondence as possible in the existential sphere, that is, at the level of life of collectivities and communities in the process of practical activity (the essence of social existence) by satisfying the needs, interests and social goals and solving social problems (Footnote 11) (Ion Iordachel, "Sociologie Generala," a manual, Party Academy for Social-Political Instruction, 1986, pp 8, 102-107).

In order to reach even greater accuracy of the diagnostics on the consistency of religiosity I constructed a cumulative scale for the ideological dimension and the behavioral one and a scale comprised of religiosity. The construction of these scales assumes that certain preliminary conditions are filled: the unidimensionality of the universe studied (in our case, each dimension separately and then both should form a unidimensional continuum) and a hierarchical structure of the indicators used (Footnote 12) (See Ion, Marginean, "Measuring in Sociology," Bucharest, Scientific and Encyclopedic Publishers, 1982, pp 168-181. We do state that the three scales we are referring to in the text were constructed with the assistance of the author of the book cited).

The goal of the analysis of the scale consists of placing the subjects in order all through the dimension identified from all the observations. The findings until now justify our accepting the idea that the indicators by which the religious universe was measured comprise a hierarchical structure (Footnote 13) (As an example please see A. Martins' scale in "Classe, Religion, Comportement Politique" by G. Michelet, M. Simon, Paris, Editions Sociales, 1977, pp 289-290).

A prime indicator of the existence of a hierarchical series (cumulative) of indicators lies in the fact that they are placed in order depending on the frequency of affirmative answers (acceptance) and negative (rejection) so that the indicator with the most affirmative answers in a certain collectivity would be placed at the top of the scale, while the indicator with the most rejections would be placed at the other end. For example, if we refer to the

$$(CR = 1 - \frac{\text{number of errors}}{x \cdot \text{number of subjects}})$$

set of indicators on religious doctrine from the research done in Arad County (510 subjects), we find the following order (which also is found in the case of the other counties): (See Table 8).

Truly, we see from the analysis of the set of indicators referring to religious ideology that this areas has a powerful hierarchical structure (cumulative): if a subject answers affirmatively to one indicator at "n" on the scale, he will answer affirmatively to all the indicators below it. For example, those who believe in the existence of life after death also believe in the power of the divinity and in creation of the world and man by that divinity.

However, in social research "we cannot identify perfect scales but just approximations of them. The threshold for accepting one type of scale is given by the value of a coefficient of reproducibility (Footnote 14) (Ion Marginean, op. cit., p 169).

In the perfect model $CR = 1$; the threshold of acceptability of a scale is established conventionally at the value of $CR = 0.90$ (Footnote 15) (L. Guttman, "The Basis for Scalogram Analysis" in S.A. Stouffer, "Measurement and Prediction," New York Science Edition, 1966, pp 60-90). For the research in Arad County a scale of religious ideology was established, one which satisfies all the criteria of acceptability shown in the specialty literature for reproducibility ($CR = 0.99$) and the percentage for each indicator and incongruities in order fitting within the prescribed limits.

Continuing, we show the synthetical form of the scale (without visualizing the incongruent models of answer) (See Table 9).

Of all the subjects investigated, 93.5 percent had consistent models of answer, corresponding to the five values on the scale, recording a low number of errors in order (one for each incongruent model). One may find that most of the subjects investigated do not adhere to religious ideology:

Some 358 people (70.2 percent of the sampling) reject all doctrinary elements; adding the 18 models of relatively incongruent answer (in which three of the four indicators are rejected) we reach 377 people (73.9 percent) who reject religious ideology;

Some 10.7 percent of the subjects show they adhere to all four structural elements of the religious ideology; as in the preceding case, adding the relatively incongruent models (adhering to three of the four indicators, but among which is always the indicator with the highest rank on the scale, that is, belief in eternal life) we reach 12.7 percent of the subjects who adhere to overall religious ideology;

Some 13.4 percent (the difference up to 100 percent) have models of answer with acceptance either of the first indicator on the scale or the first two or the first three; here the incongruity is extremely low (just four subjects have models of answer with errors in order).

And as far as the set of indicators referring to religious behavior is concerned, we find they are set up in an hierarchical series depending on the frequency of affirmative or negative answers given by the subjects investigated (See Table 10).

The cumulative scale of religious behavior in turn satisfies all criteria of acceptability ($CR = 0.96$) best, while the errors fit within the prescribed limits. The synthetic form for the scale has the following structure, where church attendance is at the bottom of the scale and consulting the priest is at the top (with the lowest affirmative frequency) (See Table 11).

Although lower than in the case of the scale of religious ideology, consistency is still good: 386 subjects (75.7 percent of the sampling) have consistent (perfect) models of answer, with the others recording certain incongruities in their answers in relationship to the hierarchy of the scale (however, most have one single error in order, making 36 errors for 124 subjects). Analyzing the scale of religious behavior through the prism of the models of answer corresponding to various values of the scale we find that 9.8 percent of the subjects in the sampling have affirmative answers for all indicators, but together with the incongruent models of answer which correspond to this value of the scale (totaling is justified because the indicator with the highest rank is always accepted), we reach 13.5 percent of the sampling which conforms to the prescriptions of religious practice;

Some 16.1 percent of the subjects do not give any favorable answer for the indicators which express different religious practices; together with the models also containing incongruities (an affirmative answer to one of the last five indicators on the scale), this category represents 18.6 percent of the sampling. If we also add the subjects who indicate they attend church occasionally without having answers favorable to religiosity and to the other indicators, the people who do not have behavior with religious significance constitute 43.1 percent of the total sampling;

Some 43.4 percent of the subjects comprise an intermediate category of the population which with a certain regularity conform to the various religious prescriptions, a category for which the frequency of incongruent models of answer is great, designating in this case an irregular nature of specific religious behaviors.

On the basis of the above analysis we can support the fact that the two scales (of ideological dimension and behavior dimension) have special relevance in relationship to the other procedures for analyzing the figures. So, recapitulating these results, we can characterize the population investigated as follows:

	Conforming to scale of ideology	Conforming to scale of behavior
Absence of religiosity	73.9	43.1
Regular, consistent religiosity	12.7	13.5
Not regular, inconsistent religiosity	13.4	43.4

To a much greater degree we can confirm that religiosity motivated by a coherent ideological system is lower, that in general it is practiced more than is believed, that to a large extent prescriptions for behavior are carried out selectively.

For a unified detection for the complex structure of the phenomenon we are studying and for greater preciseness of the results, we should attempt to place the subjects in order depending on all indicators which describe the religious universe (corresponding to two dimensions).

Truly, a correct evaluation of the state of religiosity implies bringing out the measure to which such cognitive, affective and behavioral methods comprise a cumulative structure integrated to the same individual or group of individuals (Footnote 16) (Petre Datculescu, "The Scientific Materialist Education of Youth. Psycho-Social Research," Bucharest, Political Publishers, 1980, p 74).

So we have tried to determine whether the entire set of indicators used in our research to measure religiosity comprises a single hierarchical structure (cumulative). In order to do this we introduced into the analysis the 10 indicators used in the previous scales (six referring to behavior and four to ideology) as well as the indicator of belonging to a religious indicator, an indicator which became the start of the scale composed of religiosity (due to the many affirmative occurrences—82.7 percent of the sampling).

The resulting scale (in which the two dimensions intersect) satisfies the criteria of acceptability with regard to reproducibility of the individual values from the total score ($CR = 0.94$ and to the limit satisfies in the requirements for the number and structure of incongruities (of errors in order).

Analyzing the configuration of this scale we deduce that 54.3 percent of the subjects have consistent models of response (without incongruities), that just 4 percent of the subjects answer affirmatively to the 11 indicators of religiosity; that together with the incongruent models they reach 12 percent of the sampling, that 6 percent of

the subjects do not even indicate an affirmative answer, together with the incongruent models arriving at 11.6 percent, that if we also group in the latter the subjects who indicate just that they belong to a cult (while the other indicators are rejected) we reach 24.5 percent of the sampling, comprising the real category of atheists.

Following this procedure, we believe it is justifiable to group in the category of atheists also the subjects who indicate in addition to belonging to a cult that they attend church just occasionally. In this way we identify a category of the population with in reality does not support religious influences and which represents 43.1 percent of the sampling.

An intermediary category of the population also is identified (44.9 percent of the sampling), one which accepts some of the religious ideas and which conforms to some of the prescriptions for religious practice. So the subjects are placed in the following order in conformity with the scale drawn up:

Consistently religious	12 percent	
Inconsistently religious	44.9 percent	
Atheists with behavior inconsistencies (occasionally attend church)	18.6 percent	43.1 percent
Consistently atheist	24.5 percent	
Total	100 percent	

In social practice, of course, we are primarily interested in the percentage of religious people and, in particular, where they are in the various social subsystems or segments of the population but to the same extent we are interested in the category of inconsistent believers, on one hand, because they are the largest percentage and, on the other, there exists the probability that they vacillate either toward a consistent religiosity or toward a detachment from religion.

From a concise presentation of the scales we find that they comprise an adequate model for studying religiosity and, in addition, they permit a determination of the hierarchical structure of the phenomenon researched, an identification of the consistent models of answer, designating religiosity or total lack of religiosity (within the particular hierarchy of indicators), a determination of the level to which certain people adhere to religious doctrine and/or conform to certain religious prescriptions, a determination of the incongruity (inconsistency) toward the consistent models shown by the hierarchical structure of the area investigated.

We mention that in using the scales one reaches a different hierarchization of the indicators of the universe studied, caused by the particular features of the population or the period of the investigation, which does not refute their importance in the study of the religious phenomenon which, as we have seen, represents a cumulative area (hierarchical).

Analyzing the relationship between self-identification as religious and the scales of religiosity we find the existence of a powerful association (See Table 12).

As we see, 96 percent of those stating they are religious are placed at values of the scale which designate significant religiosity. The 170 subjects who identify themselves as religious, however, represent only 59 percent of the 290 people classified as religious through analysis of the scale. Compared with the 35 percent of the subjects who state they are religious, the cumulative scale places 57 percent of the subjects (290) in the significant zone of religiosity. By comparing the two series of frequencies we see that the phenomenon of religiosity brought out by scaling has a greater scope than could have been established by taking into consideration just the subjective indicator of self-identification, since a portion of those identifying themselves as indifferent to religion and a smaller portion of those who identify themselves as atheists are still in agreement with religious doctrine or with some elements of doctrine and/or have specifically religious behaviors. (Associating the two dimensions of the religious phenomenon with self-identification is presented differently: it is more powerful in the case of the relation with the behavioral dimension than in the case of the relationship with the ideological dimension).

Statistical discordances between those who stated they are religious and those who actually are religious lead us to the conclusion that the self-appraisal of religiosity does not represent an overall indicator which satisfies

the requirements for the definition of a "religious person" and, as such, cannot be used alone in mapping out the religious phenomenon, with its being necessary to take into consideration the entire set of the relevant indicators of religiosity. From the social and psychological perspective this gap, however, represents a particularly interesting subject for research.

It is understood that the process of the secularization of Romanian society unequally affects sociogeographic and cultural zones of the country, social and residential surroundings, human communities, generations and various social-structural components. On the other hand, determining the way religiosity is distributed in various social-geographic areas, in various social environments, areas of activity and other structural categories gives more nuances to the diagnosis by establishing zones of concentration of religiosity and identifying some of its trends.

Like any other social phenomenon, religiosity cannot be explained outside these social, social-geographic, historic and cultural frameworks. The spatial variations in religiosity at the country level, however, will be able to be explained only when field investigations are concluded in all counties or, at least, in representative counties for the relatively homogenous zones from the viewpoint of historical and cultural traditions, religious contexts as well as other elements which view social-demographic, social-professional and community characteristics.

Table 1:

	Arad (N = 510)	Brasov (N = 854)	Dlmbovita (N = 529)	Satu Mare (N = 801)
1 Declaratia de apartenență la un cult	81.7	86.0	72.4	80.6
2 Autoidentifi- carea ca reli- giosi	34.6	32.2	20.2	36.4
Diferența	47.1	53.8	52.2	54.2

Key:

1. Stated that he/she belongs to a cult
2. Identifies himself as religious

8071/9738

Table 2:

	(1) Religious	(2) Indifferent	(3) Athe	(4) Non-raspuns	
Arad	34.6	44.7	19.4	1.3	100
Brasov	32.2	53.8	12.8	2.2	100
Dimbovita	20.2	58.6	20.8	0.4	100
Satu Mare	36.2	48.3	15.3	0.2	100

Key:

1. Religious
2. Indifferent
3. Atheist
4. No answer

Table 3:

	Arad (N = 510)	Brasov (N = 854)	Dimbo- vita (N = 529)	Satu Mare (N = 801)
(1) Originea divină a lumii	20.0	12.9	8.7	16.5
(2) Tot ce se petrece este urmarea voinței divine	17.2	11.8	8.9	15.1
(3) Existența vieții de după moarte	14.1	9.0	7.4	13.0
(4) Omul, creație divină	24.5	17.8	12.3	22.0
(5) Se autoconsideră reli- gios	34.6	32.2	20.2	36.2

Key:

1. Divine origin of the world
2. Everything that occurs is the result of divine will
3. The existence of life after death
4. Man, a divine creation
5. Considers himself religious

Table 4:

	Arad (N = 510)	Brasov (N = 854)	Dimbo- vița (N = 529)	Satu Mare (N = 801)
(1) Frecventarea bisericii	14.1	10.6	7.2	16.5
(2) Respectarea posturilor religioase	8.0	8.4	3.6	11.7
(3) Frecvența rugăciunilor	19.2	17.8	8.9	22.7
(4) Lectura religioasă	9.9	9.4	3.4	8.3
(5) Consultarea preotului	4.8	4.9	3.6	3.2
(6) Difuzarea ideilor reli- gioase	4.7	8.3	3.8	6.1
(7) Se consideră credin- dincioși	34.6	32.2	20.2	36.2

Key:

1. Attends church
2. Respects religious lents
3. Frequently prays
4. Religious lessons
5. Consults priest
6. Spreads religious ideas
7. Considers himself a believer

Table 5:

(1) Frecvență	(2) Catolici %	(3) Protestanți %	(4) Fără religie %
(5) mai puțin de o dată pe săptămână	37	9	1
(6) o dată pe lună	14	12	1
(7) o dată pe an	20	28	5
(8) mai puțin de o dată pe an	7	17	4
(9) niciodată	22	34	88
	100	100	100

Key:

1. Frequency
2. Catholics (%)
3. Protestants (%)
4. No religion (%)
5. Less than once a week
6. Once a month
7. Once a year
8. Less than once a year
9. Never

Table 6:

	Arad	Brasov	Dumbo- vila	Satu Mare
(1) 1 Religia, interpretare adevărată despre lume și viață	18.2	16.6	7.2	17.1
(2) 2 Originea divină a bibliei	22.4	20.2	13.1	21.5
(3) 3 Caracterul divin al instituției religioase	21.5	20.3	12.8	23.1
(4) 4 Religia ca funda- ment al moralei	10.0	14.2	7.1	9.1
(5) Se consideră credin- cioși	34.6	32.2	20.2	36.2

Key:

1. Religion, a true interpretation of life and the world
2. The divine origin of the Bible
3. The divine nature of the religious institution
4. Religion as the foundation of morality
5. Consider themselves believers

Table 7:

	Dimbovita			Satu Mare		
	(1) Religiosi (N = 107) %	(2) Indife- renti (N = 310) %	(3) Atei (N = 110) %	(1) Religiosi (N = 364) %	(2) Indife- renti (N = 365) %	(3) Atei (N = 122) %
(4) Dimensiunea ideologica						
(5) Origena divină a lumii*	38.4	1.0	1.8	42.4	1.8	0
(6) Puterea divinității	40.2	1.3	0	38.2	1.6	1.6
(7) Existența vieții după moarte	32.7	1.3	0	34.4	0.8	0
(8) Omul, creație divină	32.3	2.3	1.8	33.6	5.0	0
(9) Dimensiunea comport.						
(10) Frecvențarea bisericii**	28.0	2.2	1.0	40.0	37.7	0.8
(11) Respectarea posturilor religioase	16.8	0.3	0	29.3	2.1	0
(12) Frecvențarea rugăciunilor	39.1	2.0	0	52.9	6.3	0
(13) Lectura religioasă	15.9	0.3	0	24.8	8.5	0
(14) Consultarea preotului	14.0	1.3	0	8.2	0.3	0
(15) Difuzarea ideilor religioase	15.9	0.7	0	14.5	1.2	0
(16)	* sînt consemnate răspunsurile de la codul 2 = „adevărât”					
(17)	** sînt însumate răspunsurile de la codul 4 și 5, respectiv „des” plus „foarte des”.					

Key:

- | | |
|----------------------------------|---|
| 1. Religious | 11. Respect for religious lents |
| 2. Indifferent | 12. Attends prayers |
| 3. Atheist | 13. Religious lessons |
| 4. Ideological dimension | 14. Consults a priest |
| 5. Divine origin of world | 15. Spreads religious ideas |
| 6. Power of the divinity | 16. *Answers from code 2= "true" have been recorded |
| 7. Existence of life after death | 17. **Answers from codes 4 and 5, that is, "often" plus "very often" have been totalled |
| 8. Man, a divine creation | |
| 9. Behavioral dimension | |
| 10. Church attendance | |

Table 8:

(1) Rang	(2) Denumirea indicatorilor	(3) Frecvența răspunsurilor		Total (6)
		(4) Affirmative (+)	(5) Negative (-)	
(7) 1	Crearea omului de către divinitate	24 %	76 %	100 %
(8) 2	Crearea lumii de către divinitate	20 %	80 %	100 %
(9) 3	Puterea divinității	17 %	83 %	100 %
(10) 4	Existența vieții de după moarte	14 %	86 %	100 %

Key:

1. Rank
2. Name of indicators
3. Frequency of answers
4. Affirmative
5. Negative
6. Total
7. Creation of man by divinity
8. Creation of the world by divinity
9. Power of divinity
10. Existence of life after death

Table 9:

(1) Scala ideologiei religioase (Arad)								
(2) val. de scală	(1)				(7) Modele de răspuns		Total	
	(3) Credința în viața vesnică	(4) Credința în puterea divină	(5) Credința în crearea lunii	(6) Credința în crearea omului	(8) Perfecte	(9) Incongruente		
4	-	-	-	-	55	10	65	
3	-	-	-	-	20	2	22	
2	-	-	-	-	14	0	14	
1	-	-	-	-	30	2	32	
0	-	-	-	-	358	19	377	
					477	33	510	

$$CR = 1 - \frac{33}{510.4} = 0.99$$

Key:

1. Scale of religious ideology (Arad)
2. Value of scale
3. Faith in eternal life
4. Faith in divine power
5. Faith in creation of world
6. Faith in creation of man
7. Models of answer
8. Perfect
9. Incongruent

Table 10:

(1) Rang	(2) Denumirea indicatorilor	(3) Frecvența răspunsurilor		Total
		(4) afirmative* (+)	(5) negative (-)	
(6) 1	freventează biserică	81%	19%	100%
(7) 2	face rugăciuni	54%	46%	100%
(8) 3	lectură religioasă	42%	58%	100%
(9) 4	ține posturi	37%	63%	100%
(10) 5	difuzează idei religioase	22%	78%	100%
(11) 6	consultă preotul	20%	80%	100%
(12)				

* Răspunsul afirmativ echivalează cu însumarea răspunsurilor de la variantele: foarte rar, rar, des, foarte des.

Key:

1. Rank
2. Name of indicators
3. Frequency of answers
4. Affirmative
5. negative
6. Attends church
7. Says prayers
8. Religious lessons
9. Observes fasts
10. Spreads religious ideas
11. Consults priest
12. *Affirmative answer equals total responses from the varieties of very rarely, rarely, often and very often

Table 11:

(1) Scala comportamentului religios (Arad)										
(2)	Val. de scală	(3) Consultă preotul	(4) Difuzază idei religioase	(5) Postește	(6) Lectură religioasă	(7) Face rugăciuni	(8) Merge la biserică	(9) Modele de răspuns		
								(10) Perfecte	(11) Incongruente	Total
	6	+	+	+	+	+	-	50	19	69
	5	-	+	-	+	+	-	27	16	43
	4	-	-	+	+	+	-	40	29	69
	3	-	-	-	-	+	-	28	26	54
	2	-	-	-	-	+	-	50	5	55
	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	109	16	125
	0	-	-	-	-	-	-	82	13	95
								386	124	510

$$CR = 1 - \frac{136}{510 \cdot 6} = 0,96$$

Key:

1. Scale of religious behavior (Arad)
2. Value of scale
3. Consults priest
4. Spreads religious ideas
5. Fasts
6. Religious lessons
7. Says prayers
8. Goes to church
9. Models of answer
10. Perfect
11. Incongruent

Table 12:

(1) Clasificat religios pe scala compusa (valorile 3-11)		(3) Da	(4) Nu	(5) Total
(2) Autoidentificare religioasa				
(6) Da		170(96%)	7(4%)	177(100%)
(7) Nu		120(36%)	213(64%)	333(100%)
(8) Total		290(57%)	220(43%)	510(100%)

Key:

1. Classified religious on a scale composed of values 3-11
2. Identifies himself as religious
3. Yes
4. No
5. Total
6. Yes
7. No
8. Total

8071