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POSITION OF PARLIAMENT AFTER EXPIRATION OF SPECIAL POWERS

Amsterdam DE VOLKSKRANT in Dutch 28 Mar 87 Supplement p 1

[Article by Oscar Garschagen: "Continuation: The Cowards Once Again Have a Say in Belgium"]

[Text] For 5 years Belgium has been governed without parliament entering into the matter. Some ministers have never even had any contact with the representatives. On Tuesday the government's special powers will come to an end. As a final action, king Martens rushed another 1.1 billion savings operation through. Oscar Garschagen probed the mood among politicians. Is Belgian democracy being resurrected from the dead?

A Dante-like warning has been posted in a back entrance of the Belgian parliament building.

"Abandon all hope, ye who enters here."

A silent protest, a realistic admonishment, or simply a joke? Probably the latter.

"But very applicable," commented the braided security official, while crossly filling out forms in scribbles. It remained unclear why he was convinced of that. Dozens of representatives and senators go by there every day, on their way to work. For them the words can no longer have any significance. After all, it should be excluded that they might still have illusions.

Five years ago, king Martens demanded and got a docile parliament. Even more, on 2 February 1982 the parliamentary democracy temporarily and conditionally eliminated itself. The government had to govern and needed very special powers. No dilatoriness or time consuming democratic whining in parliament. The Belgian variant of an iron government agreement became the "special powers." It cannot be denied that the majority of Belgian members of parliament are thorough. To a large extent they put themselves out of commission for years. A no-nonsense policy came into existence in Belgium in a rather very different manner.

The politics of scared democrats will come to an end on Tuesday, 31 March. The special powers of the sixth Martens administration will come to an end. The prime minister will not once again ask the majority in the rue de la Loi to vote themselves superfluous. Up until yesterday, the administration met almost permanently to make another series of decisions based on the special powers. Express messengers ran back and forth between the rue de la Loi and the Royal Palace to get the royal signature on dozens of resolutions, among which a 1.1 billion budget cut operation, and smaller resolutions. Will parliamentary democracy return in Belgium on 1 April?

Jean Defraigne, president of the Chamber of Representatives and member of the Walloon government party, the Liberal Reform Party (PRL), said: "Good, we are returning to a situation, to a parliamentary democracy, as prescribed in the Belgian Constitution. That is good news, because enough damage has already been done by those who think they have the power."

System of Tricks

Luc Van den Brande, parliamentary party president of the powerful Flemish government party, the Christian People's Party [CVP], said: "As a CVP parliamentary party we have had a very, very and very hard time with those special powers. Consequently, we are pleased that they have come to an end. Every right-minded democrat will rejoice about that next week."

After having sniffed grimly Louis Tobback, parliamentary party president of the Socialist Party [SP] in the House, commented: "Anyone who believes that should be quickly reclaimed from his error. Let me laugh a bit. The gentlemen of the administration have devised a mammoth law through which they could take action anyhow in certain clearly formulated circumstances. Under the guise of modernization of the Belgian economy we are faced with a whole new system of tricks through which parliament can be left out of the game. If the situation of Belgian enterprises worsens, then the government can take action again without consulting parliament. It has to be clearly understood that the special powers policy is a matter of mentality and nothing else. Members of parliament here are getting powers wrested from them. The special powers were used to keep parliament out of the game permanently in a number of areas."

The fifth and sixth Martens administrations have made and implemented a total of 500 decisions without previous dialogue with parliament, the House and the Senate. Pruning in the social security system, reorganizing that system, savings in the medical sector, savings in Flemish and French speaking education, tax reductions for business and industry. The House and Senate got to discuss these only when the measures had already been implemented.

The stationing of cruise missiles remained largely undiscussed. And to the extent that "the cobblestones of the rue de la Loi" felt it worth their while to put this rather important problem on the agenda, they declared themselves incompetent. The "cruise missiles" were already on the way when the discussion started.

The Sunday television program "Confrontation" became a substantially more important and more interesting forum than the House. For reasons of political survival Martens is a monument of openness on that program when compared to the information he provides parliament. For 5 years, the ministerial budgets were submitted only after the end of the year to which they referred. Dutch ministers, especially those of the first Lubbers administration, must sometimes have licked their chops while watching the actions of their Belgian colleagues. The street grumbled, but parliament remained silent. Ministers came and went, but it was regularly only weeks after a political change that parliament would get an explanation from the prime minister, and then only a scanty measure.

Improper

For example, in February French speaking Minister of Education Damseaux had to leave. Unlike the Flemish minister of education, he apparently had not lived up to the task of implementing serious budgetary cuts. A few Flemish newspapers attributed the real reason to Damseaux's habit of taking lengthy and unrestrained lunches, as a result of which he was usually not capable of governing in the afternoon.

Tobback: "We didn't even get an explanation. Vice Prime Minister Gol, the leader of the PRL, had said to Martens: you keep your mouth shut, otherwise there will be thunder. A small political crisis and parliament is put off."

Van den Brande, who has the reputation of combining strong statements with political obedience to the big boss, said: "That was indeed improper, eh, I mean incorrect."

Defraigne: "The prime minister was not obligated to do that. I remember that in 1976, as minister of public works, I had a major quarrel with Prime Minister Tindemans. As a matter of fact, that was neither the first nor the last time. I had to resign. No announcement of this was even made in parliament. It is also true that it was not a tragedy, it had no historical importance."

Until 1982, special powers for the government were an unknown phenomenon in Belgium. It is true that previous governments had made use of "plenary powers," far-reaching powers which were in effect for a short period of time and applied in times of serious, acute crises. Martens refined that questionable system and invented the special powers. Martens felt that he needed them to heal the "sick man of Europe." Following a series of political crises, Belgium was in a wretched state. You had to search far to find stability, and parliament worked slowly. The Roman catholic-liberal coalitions bogged down in quarrels about economic policy and defense. The key party in Belgian politics, the CVP was divided. The left wing of the CVP, which consisted of impulsive Christians and Christian workers, strongly opposed the liberal austerity policy.

At that time, Martens and a handful of confidants hatched the special powers strategy. He said that he needed those unknown powers to restore the competitive power of the enterprises, to cut government finances and to promote employment.

The only reaction was loud, verbal resistance by the opposition to the exclusion of parliament. Even an imaginable storm of social protest did not materialize. Democracy became seriously wounded and everyone looked another direction. It was only when the austerity measures became tangible that the streets became filled, and once in a while a cobblestone was pried loose. The 1985 parliamentary elections demonstrated that the majority of the Belgian voters had no objections to the special powers. Parliament apparently has barely any status at all.

Servility

Van den Brande noted: "Those elections were crucial. They indicated that Wilfried Martens was not seen as some kind of Attila the Hun." Tobback said: "What annoyed me most of all was the servility of the majority. Flemish and Walloon Christian democrats and liberals together. That damned submissiveness. Because it should be well understood: it was the parliamentary majority which decided this. As much as twice. First in 1982 and then in 1985, following the elections. The CVP was deeply divided about the financial and socio-economic policies. Martens simply wanted to eliminate the Christian resistance to his neo-liberal policy. I remember very well interviews by the CVP's Van den Brande in LE SOIR, in which he bravely stated that the special powers were unacceptable. That he would never allow them. All sheer puffing words, they meant nothing at all. He rounded the curve in 1982, and again in 1985. That mentality..." Tobback smirked contemptuously.

Van den Brande: "Yes, I know Tobback's argument about the CVP wing which had to be kept in check. That was not the main reason. But I do believe that there was a certain political risk involved that the very necessary policy would not be implemented. And it is true, I have resisted it a few times and I lost. Now, right, I don't want to weigh down the government with all the sins of Israel, but I hope that I will never have to experience that again. It was simply necessary."

That must be doubted. A strict austerity policy is being conducted all over Europe, from the conservative Thatcher administration to the socialist Papandreou administration, without parliamentary democracy being eliminated.

Running Away

Jean Defraigne, the very presidential president of the Chamber, noted: "The first time, in 1982, I too voted for the special powers. They were necessary to be able to take numerous measures quickly. The legislative procedures in the House and the Senate were too time consuming. A bill would sometimes take 6 months to pass. Later I voted against the special powers, because I felt that the members of parliament should themselves take responsibility for the socio-economic policy. In the final analysis, they were elected, the ministers were not."

"Special powers, plenary powers--that system may be suitable for a church, where the bishop has both legislative and executive powers. In a church you can run away if you don't like what the bishop invents. A citizen cannot flee a state; therefore, the freedoms laid down in the constitution must be guaranteed, including those of democracy. Look, those ministers are not tyrannical dictators, but they are going to get used to it. They no longer appear before parliament, leave questions unanswered, they get out of the habit of democracy and that is bad. The most dangerous aspect is that ministers with special powers have a tendency to exaggerate."

And did it help? Did Belgium pull through because of the special powers? Once again Defraigne: "I think so. Otherwise unemployment figures would have increased by a couple hundred thousand." Van den Brande commented: "Yes and no. When I look at the results booked by the enterprises and at the situation of the financing deficit, then I say yes. We have also slaughtered a number of holy cows, eliminated and modernized structures. But when I read the unemployment figures, then I have my doubts. We had hoped and expected that business and industry would use the new financial space to invest and to ensure new job opportunities. That response was not adequate."

Conjurers

Tobback: "Sometimes you would think you were among conjurers here. I find that hallucinatory reasoning. Unemployment is higher than in 1981; expressed in round figures, the financing deficit has barely gone down. The national debt has doubled. The workers' purchasing power has declined by 15 percent. Income from property has quintupled in 5 years. The Brussels stock exchange has never had it so good. I would express it this way: thanks to the special powers, we are living with a penniless state in a prosperous country. The banks, the holding companies, the large capital managers are drowning in money. They are crying about investment opportunities they find abroad."

Will the Belgian parliament become more alert starting next week? Will all those beautiful powers be put to use?

Defraigne: "It will be primarily the ministers who will have trouble with having to appear in parliament from then on with each bill. There are ministers who have never yet functioned in a parliamentary democracy. It is wrong to posit that parliament has forgotten manual labor. The special powers did not apply to all areas. Vice President Gol's bill on political refugees has essentially been adjusted."

Van den Brande: "I have introduced proposals to improve the working of parliament. Legislative procedures must be shortened and the accumulation of political functions must be eliminated. We are stuck here with the crazy system of a national parliament, a Flemish House of Representatives and a Walloon one. You can be a member of both. In the Belgian parliament, a modern score is being played by an ancient orchestra. We should also be able to question ministers more quickly, we must get a turn at the bat more quickly. And the members of the House should also get more assistance."

Defraigne: "It is an uneven fight between ministers and members of the House."

Tobback: "While cuts are being made in the House budget, the staffs of the ministers and secretaries of state are barely reducing their incomes. The reduction of the staffs is a farce. Jobs are being created for every subject, people are getting around in cars as big as battleships. In the parking lot you are run over by Mercedeses and BMWs."

"That reform of the state institutions Van den Brande was talking about, will take years. The actual problem is that the parliamentary majority no longer respects the democratic rules. All the members of the majority have an interest in the status quo. Of the 200 members of the House, 51 have a job as minister or secretary of state. The others keep quiet in order to earn a certificate of good party behavior, as a result of which the next time around they will get that car with the driver. They keep quiet because then they will be in a position to distribute small favors to their voters. I am afraid that very little will change. It happens to be a collection of cowards."

Van den Brande commented: "It is well known that Tobback often tries to shoot a mouse with a cannon."

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CSO: 3614/68

FLEMISH ASSOCIATIONS ENVISION FUTURE OF COMMUNITIES, BRUSSELS

Brussels DE STANDAARD in Dutch 25 Mar 87 p 3

[Unattributed article: "Flemish Associations Favor Belgian Union"--
Memorandum Handed to Party Presidents]

[Text] Brussels--The Belgian Union should consist of the territory of both federal states, Flanders and Wallonia. Brussels should be "common capital area," a common territory of both federal states. There can be no question of a third federal state or a separate area, nor even a separate district a la Washington, DC. This was included in the memorandum from the Consultation Center for Flemish Associations [OVV] handed to the four Flemish party presidents yesterday during talks which lasted about 1 and 1/2 hours and held in one of the rotunda halls of the Chamber of Representatives.

The OVV delegation consisted of Roland Laridon (Vermeyleen Fund), Lieven van Gerven (Davids Fund), Romain Pote (VTB-VAB), Jaak van Waeg (Flemish Popular Movement), Paul Daels (Yser Pilgrimage Committee), Ernest van Buynder (Willem Fund) and Robert van Haverbeke (Union of Flemish Academicians).

The twenty page memorandum contains a Master Plan and an Emergency Program. The master plan refers to the autonomy of Flanders and Wallonia as the ultimate goal of the state reform. To this effect Belgium must be transformed into a Union, consisting of two autonomous federal states (the VTB-VAB prefers the term Belgian Confederate Monarchy instead of Belgian Union).

All inhabitants with Belgian nationality who live in Flanders would be "Flemings," regardless of the language they speak. Each federal state would be sovereign in the exercise of all state powers over the totality of its territory, over all its inhabitants, and over all subordinate administrations.

Both federal states would be governed by a directly elected Flemish or Walloon Chamber of Representatives and a government. The powers of the Union would be exercised by a Senate, directly and proportionately elected by both Flemings and Walloons, and a government with equal representation from both sides which would be responsible to the Senate.

Today's rule that all authority not specifically allocated to Flanders and Wallonia is exercised by Belgium should be reversed. Maximum autonomy and cooperation should be achieved.

Brussels

Brussels would be a province common to both Flanders and Wallonia. According to the proposal it would get a council elected directly by the inhabitants. The election would take place on the basis of separate Dutch language and French language lists, with pool formation. Those elected from both language groups would form community fractions with guaranteed minimum representation for the smallest group. Each fraction would elect its own executive community body and an equal number of delegates, who together would form the executive body of the council of Brussels.

In matters relating to the individual the federal states would act separately. In territorial based matters and bi-community individual matters they would jointly. In case of deadlock the Senate would handle the matter.

The Brussels bodies would coordinate the municipal powers, replace the current institutions of the agglomeration, and carry out the provincial powers. In case of merger into a single municipality, then all the municipal powers would be taken over.

The federal states should be given very broad fiscal autonomy. The Belgian Ministry of Finance would only collect Brussels taxes and the non-localized taxes. Each federal state would finance all its powers, including its powers related to individual matters in Brussels, from its own tax revenues. Flanders and Wallonia would also finance, on a fifty-fifty basis, their joint powers in Brussels from their tax revenues.

Emergency Program

The emergency program will not wait for the constitutional review to achieve a number of urgent goals.

Recommendations for the appointment of mayors in all the Flemish municipalities and guardianship over all lower level administrations in Flanders should be submitted as soon as possible to the Flemish government. The division of the province of Brabant and of the Municipal and Provincial Fund should be prepared. The powers defined in the law of 1980 should be transferred to the municipalities and the regions.

A chapter on "certain individual matters in Flanders" states that the Cultural Pact is something that has been acquired. The basic principle of it cannot be altered. However, it is possible to refine it and make it more topical.

There is also a plea for a Flemish School Pact and for recognition of institutionalized progressiveness in Flanders.

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CP OLD GUARD DESCRIBED AS BITTER FOLLOWING CONGRESS SETBACK

Opposition Demanded Greater Openness

Copenhagen INFORMATION in Danish 15 Apr 87 p 12

[Article by Steen Valgreen-Voigt; first paragraph is INFORMATION introduction]

[Text] There have been demands for greater openness in the Danish Communist Party but it is doubtful that this will be expressed in concrete decisions at the party congress.

The final showdown with Stalinism has still not taken place in the Danish offshoot of the world communist movement.

When the Danish Communist Party opens its 28th congress in Brondby outside Copenhagen on Thursday the demand for greater openness will certainly be made with a forcefulness previously unknown, but it is extremely doubtful that this will be translated into concrete decisions.

The Danish CP, which has been characterized as the West European communist party most loyal to Moscow, has never had the showdown with the Stalin era that has left its mark on the policy of most of the other European communist parties in recent decades.

The Stalin legacy is seen not only in the compliance with Moscow on foreign policy issues but also in the party's entire organizational structure, with the central committee and especially the executive committee and the party secretariat ruling the party's internal debate with an iron hand.

The growing number of party members who want to break the monopoly of the leadership when it comes to debate are now hoping that Soviet party leader Gorbachev's reforms in the Soviet mother party will convince the dogmatists and bureaucrats at the Danish CP headquarters on Dronningens Tvaergade in Copenhagen that changes are necessary.

But so far there has been little to suggest receptiveness. In the current congressional period at least four members of the powerful central committee have resigned or been removed because they criticized the leadership.

Censorship

The leadership's power monopoly is exercised through such things as democratic centralism and censorship of the daily party newspaper, LAND OG FOLK.

Influence on party policy from below is channeled exclusively from local branches to the district leadership and on up. No debate occurs outside this structure so it is extremely easy for the leadership to isolate local groups or individuals with dissenting views. At the same time dissenters are barred from publishing articles in LAND OG FOLK, so it is hard for people with similar opinions to see that anyone else in the party shares their views.

The critics are not contesting the principle of democratic centralism but they do want the party debate to be more open and to cross over the lines of this vertical structure. Critics believe this will also make the party seem more "transparent" to the general public and that it will break down prejudices about the party.

But as long as the pressure comes solely from the bottom of the party there is no guarantee that it will have any impact in practice.

As one of the critics of the Danish CP's present structure told INFORMATION it is not a question of young or old but of attitude. If old bureaucrats are replaced by young ones the desired openness will not get anywhere.

There have already been examples of avowed supporters of greater openness being the first to try to muzzle people with different opinions as soon as they acquire some power. So it will not be known until the next congressional period if any real changes will take place.

The strength of those who want change will not be immediately expressed in the election of a new central committee because only around 15 of the committee's 50 members are up for re-election. And among those who are not running for another term are several supporters of the more open line.

New Chairman

The degree of openness will also depend on the party's next chairman to a large extent.

Both candidates, Jan Andersen, 46, chairman of Local 13 of the Metalworkers' Union, and Ole Sohn, 32, a member of the executive committee of the Semi-skilled Workers' Union [SiD], have announced that they will support a more open line and that they also favor setting up a party deputy chairmanship.

On Saturday the party's partially renewed central committee will both select the new chairman and take a stand on the question of a deputy chairman, something that is also viewed as a possibility for more external openness.

The most likely outcome is that Jan Andersen will succeed Jorgen Jensen as party chairman.

Partly because of his greater experience and partly because of his greater familiarity with the party apparatus.

But which of the two the party thinks it can best spare in the union movement will also be a factor. There are differing opinions on this point.

Both candidates have been selected by the central committee and apparently they agree on all important issues.

Jan Andersen is the typical working-class Danish CP man and a more popular speaker than Ole Sohn who is more representative of the quiet intellectual worker.

Both say they would be happy to serve as deputy chairman if such a post is created.

Difficult Period

The Danish CP is holding its congress in a difficult period in many ways.

Not only has the party just lost its chairman for 10 years, Jorgen Jensen, it has also lost the ability to "get back on course," as Jan Andersen put it.

He was referring to the party's long and tedious years with no Folketing representation since 1979 when the Danish CP dropped out of parliament. In 1977 it lost its dynamic and popular figurehead, Knud Jespersen.

In the elections of 1979, 1981 and 1984 the Danish CP nominated candidates but failed to get above the 2 percent cutoff barrier, although it came close in 1979. Opinion polls since then have not been encouraging.

In the 1984 Folketing election only 23,000 people voted for the party.

As the congress approaches Jan Andersen and Ole Sohn have both pointed to the necessity for a greater impact that would put the Danish CP back in Folketing.

For the leadership the question of openness is as much a matter of creating a credible profile in relation to the voters as a desire to make the party more democratic.

The degree of "glasnost" will therefore depend on the extent to which the leadership acknowledges that the closed Danish CP world and all its terminology and parochialism do not have much chance in a world where even the Soviet Union has realized the need to follow a different course.

Submission Out

One of the proposals made to the congress by the Roskilde district shows that the Danish CP is taking very small steps.

It is proposed that Chapter 3, Section 3 of the bylaws be changed to omit the words "submits to," replacing them with "invariably follows," so that the text goes like this:

"Anyone can be a member who is 18 years old and acknowledges the party's program and bylaws, works for the party, invariably follows the decisions that are made and pays his party dues regularly."

'Entirely New Language'

Copenhagen AKTUELT in Danish 21 Apr 87 p 10

[Editorial: "Danish CP's Reconciliation"]

[Text] Easter here in the 70th year of the Russian revolution gave portents of new times ahead for the Russian congregations in Denmark.

In Copenhagen's Alexander Nevsky Church on Bredgade a new priest is working diligently to create new life in the dwindling congregation. On Saturday night Pastor Dimitri Makaroff baked the altar bread himself for the stirring Easter mass but he also wants to travel new paths, in conflict with more orthodox circles, and among other things he would like to start using the Danish language in church services.

Similar tones were heard from the congressional hall in Brondby Strand where the Danish Communist Party was holding its 28th congress during this same period. The Danish CP has similar problems when it comes to maintaining the faith of its members.

A new leadership that includes Ole Sohn of SiD in Horsens and Jan Andersen of the Copenhagen Metalworkers' Union will try to correct that. On Sunday they celebrated their election with sparkling EC wine from West Germany and promises that some plans were already being hatched for the next election campaign. At the same time they heralded an entirely different language in the Danish CP where good Danish concepts like "glasnost" (openness) and "perestroyka" (reorganization) will be combined with good anti-Soviet slogans like "Get out of Afghanistan." This should produce quite a crowd at the demonstrations in front of the Soviet Embassy on Kristianiagade!

The Danish CP's desire for a reconciliation with its voters comes at a time that was well chosen by the small party. For one thing Gorbachev has opened the way by setting a tremendous pace for the rigid Soviet society and his opponents in the West. For another the political bench warmers from the Danish CP have sunk deeper into oblivion than ever before. The party lost half its voters in the 1979 election and today its attractiveness to the voters is at its lowest point since the war.

The Danish CP still has hard workers who are unsurpassed at acquiring chairmanship posts in the union movement and in peace work, but as a party it seems worn-out, lacking the confidence of the voters and lacking a convincing set of solutions for the urgent problems of the present day.

As the newly-elected chairman of the party, 32-year-old Ole Sohn sees his chance in tying himself in with the changes in the Soviet Union. The Danish CP must do a better job of selling itself, he says, and the sales agency on the Danish market is called Gorbachev & Sohn.

It is natural for a political newcomer to seek consolation in the large Russian embrace. There the party chairman can also obtain the most effective tools for a much-needed refurbishing of the Danish Communist Party.

But the problem with any sale is that it needs buyers and the products must be in order. The changes in the Soviet Union are still only scratches on the surface. A year after Chernobyl the Soviet state is a bogeyman for the rest of the world--in human terms, economically and in the area of environmental technology. Even the youngest and most dynamic Danish CP salesman cannot sell products like that to the Danish people.

The West is much more interested in Mikhail Gorbachev's peace policy overtures. His many offers to remove nuclear missiles from Europe call for a quick and favorable response from governments and parliaments. This is not a matter of narrow party tactical considerations but of vital peace interests in our part of the world.

In view of the widespread Danish skepticism when it comes to the Danish CP it can only harm the cause if the party, in its eagerness to market itself in Denmark, now rolls out its forces and presents them as Gorbachev's true legionnaires. The Danish CP can use its energy to much better effect in dealing with its friends in the East where there is still extensive distrust of the West. This is where the Danish CP's true historic task lies.

All things considered, no one is in a better position to influence the big ventriloquist than his own dummies.

New Profile, Same Policy

Copenhagen INFORMATION in Danish 22 Apr 87 p 12

[Editorial: "Ticket Sellers"]

[Text] The Danish Communist Party has acquired a new profile whose job is to sell tickets, as the profile himself put it. Not a new policy, on the contrary, everything here appears to be the same as always in the sense that what is new in the Soviet Union is naturally also new in the Danish CP. So Soviet party leader Gorbachev will probably be more responsible than the new chairman of the Danish CP, Ole Sohn, for the extra sales--if there are any.

It is thought-provoking that yet another party believes that its problem is due to a lack of profile.

Since the political congressional season began last September up to the Danish CP's 28th congress at Eastertime the profile of the parties seems to have been the biggest problem--how the party in question can best sell "tickets" to the voters.

One cannot mistake the condescending tone and the underestimation of the people who are supposed to cast their ballots for these parties.

But it can hardly be otherwise when the political system is borne along by opportunism and easy solutions. For example when the Social Democratic Party is seldom able after 5 years in the opposition to get more than 30 percent of the votes in opinion polls, a poorer showing than it had in the last election, it is clear that there must be something wrong with Anker Jorgensen. For it is surely impossible that it could be due to a vacillating and untrustworthy policy!

When on the other hand we never hear the Conservatives talk about profile problems it is presumably not because Poul Schluter as a profile is loved and esteemed by the quarter of the nation's eligible voters who apparently still intend to vote for his party but because the man actually seems to stand firmly behind some goals and to believe himself that they will succeed. Even though this is beginning to look extremely doubtful.

But when parties think they lack a profile it is also because they don't have one. And it is difficult for all of them at once to mount a campaign on the basis of pleasing as many groups of voters as possible, even though they do their best. It is hard to have a policy if it must not affect car owners, single-family homeowners, tenants, pension recipients, TV viewers, wage earners, taxpayers or whatever other interest groups one can think of. Then the solution must be to find the profile that is best able to sell tickets to the big event.

Now the Danish CP thinks it has found the right man. It would have been more interesting if the illness of former chairman Jorgen Jensen, now deceased, had not forced the Danish CP to find a new chairman.

Would we have seen Jorgen Jensen as the Danish advocate of Soviet "glasnost" or how would the party have tackled that situation without appearing even less credible?

Ole Sohn is young and he is not carrying any dead weight publicly. But his statements after the election are not new at all--it is true that he talks about a new openness that we have not yet seen in practice, but there was no hint of concrete criticism of the party's policy or the Soviet Union. He did say to the newspaper BT that the Danish CP will no longer defend things in the Soviet Union that the Russians themselves do not defend! That sounds like a promising beginning.

That no big changes are involved can also be seen from the election of the new 49-member central committee at the congress. Everyone was re-elected except for the 14 who for one reason or another decided not to run for another term. Of the 103 nominees only one managed to upset the list recommended by the leadership.

But actually it is quite legitimate to support the Soviet Union in good times and bad if one thinks it has the solution to Danish problems also and to be satisfied with the party's organization and policy. Regardless of the fact that the Danish CP's implementation of democratic centralism today is an anachronism from the 1930's, as one of the more critical members of the party, historian Kurt Jacobsen, put it.

But it would be a delusion to believe that it is not the party's policy the voters will be judging when they cast their ballots. No matter who one gets to sell the tickets. And the same thing is true of all the other parties too.

New Chairman Explains Views

Copenhagen INFORMATION in Danish 22 Apr 87 p 12

[Interview with Danish CP chairman Ole Sohn by 'PHM'; date and place not given: "New Chairman Would Force Capital to Invest"]

[Text] At its congress over the Easter weekend the Danish CP elected 32-year-old Ole Sohn as its new chairman. He became active in union work at a very early date and today he is chairman of the Horsens branch of SiD and a member of the SiD executive committee. The new chairman's election program called for a freer debate and a more outward party orientation, but what kind of policy will he now try to sell to the Danish voters?

[Ole Sohn] We felt at the congress that it is very important to tackle economic policy. The Social Democrats have said that they have their policy and that is the end of it and the Socialist People's Party, in its effort to become accepted, has embarked on a kind of ministerial socialism where cabinet seats are distributed in the hope of getting mandates for them. Neither party has seriously tried to make the necessary changes in economic policy that would end the economic chaos of many years with its huge foreign debts and enormous unemployment rates.

[Question] It sounds very reasonable, but isn't it quite difficult?

[Answer] It is not that easy because Denmark has gradually been swallowed up by the international financial system. Therefore it is essential to address the free flow of capital if a labor majority is to be able to pursue an independent policy.

[Question] Does that mean we should get out of EC?

[Answer] It does not. There has been control of capital flow during the time we have been EC members too.

[Question] Isn't the free flow of capital a cornerstone of EC?

[Answer] Yes, but it was not until 1985 that capital flow was fully liberalized. We would also like to get out of EC but we feel the first step is to deal with the form of capital mobility.

[Question] Does that mean state control of capital?

[Answer] We want social control of the economy. That is a prerequisite for the ability to force capital to invest in the production apparatus and thus create new jobs.

[Question] How will this policy improve the balance of payments?

[Answer] Today there is a lot of speculation in the Danish economy and we import an incredible amount of completely unnecessary products. For example Denmark has a trade deficit of 10 billion kroner today in relation to West Germany. It is reasonable to say that there should be a fair trade division so that we can export as much to West Germany as we import. That would improve the balance of payments.

Ole Sohn also saw a social aspect in this:

[Sohn] It is not reasonable to boast of being one of the best countries in the world when we provide such poor conditions for several hundred thousand jobless people and welfare clients. Therefore one of our ideas is that by gaining control over the economy we can create better social conditions and more jobs. We will put a lot of emphasis on that in connection with the debate on creating a basis for a labor majority.

Afghanistan

[Question] You have talked a lot about a freer discussion in the party. What will happen if a faction comes along that wants to print an article in your newspaper condemning the Soviet involvement in Afghanistan?

[Answer] It is my position that an open and critical debate is necessary if we are to improve the internal party debate. Naturally the goal is not to disagree. A critical debate ought to lead to making correct assessments and acting as a group on that basis. The prerequisite for making progress is to have an open and critical debate that includes foreign issues as well.

[Question] And is it conceivable that you would go as far as demanding that the Soviet Union get out of Afghanistan?

[Answer] If the Soviets do things we think are wrong, of course we will point that out.

[Question] But you haven't done so yet, have you?

[Answer] When you mention Afghanistan, it is our position that the problem can only be solved in a political way. All foreign troops and interests must be withdrawn. We should not ignore the fact that in reality the United States spends more millions of dollars in Afghanistan than it does in Nicaragua. Not many people call attention to this fact. They are not innocent angels in this area either.

Union Leader Attacks Secretary

Copenhagen INFORMATION in Danish 22 Apr 87 p 12

[Interview with Preben Moller Hansen, chairman of the Seamen's Union and leader of the Common Course Party, by 'HED'; date and place not given]

[Text] The Danish Communist Party can forget all about "glasnost" as long as party secretary Poul Emanuel and the circle around him have any influence, according to the head of the Seamen's Union and Common Course, Preben Moller Hansen. But the question of greater openness on the part of the communists is not very important because the party has lost the voters' confidence and will not get back into Folketing.

[Question] Does the election of Ole Sohn as chairman of the Danish CP make you regret that you are now an outsider?

[Answer] No, it doesn't. I am glad that Ole Sohn was elected chairman. I think he will make a good chairman of the Danish Communist Party.

[Question] Why do you think that?

[Answer] Because Ole is a decent person, but the Danish CP program has not changed at all. The Danish CP is still the Danish CP whether its chairman is Ole Sohn or Jorgen Jensen.

[Question] And what now? Ole Sohn says he will be glad to work with you in Folketing if it is necessary. Will you also be willing to cooperate with him?

[Answer] Well, I don't believe the Danish CP will get into Folketing. The Danish CP has lost the confidence of the people. And it will not be restored just because the party has a different chairman.

[Question] Do you feel that Ole Sohn is a good representative of the Danish working class?

[Answer] Yes, but there is no question that Jorgen Jensen was also an honest worker. No doubt about it.

[Question] There has been a lot of talk about "glasnost" in connection with the chairman's election. Is that the course the Danish CP is about to embark on?

[Answer] I can't say at this time. But one thing is certain, the Danish CP has been ruled with a hard and cynical hand by the group around Poul Emanuel and as long as he has influence in the Danish CP no changes will be made.

[Question] But you seem to think there should be changes?

[Answer] Yes, Common Course is a completely open party. In contrast to the Danish CP our policy is not centralized. We are much broader.

[Question] Are you as happy about Gorbachev as Ole Sohn is?

[Answer] Yes, I certainly am. Gorbachev himself is not that important, as far as that goes. He could die tomorrow. I am happy about the line but I would like to see some results.

Some Political Shift Noted

Copenhagen AKTUELDT in Danish 26 Apr 87 p 6

[Article by Erik Meier Carlsen: "Danish CP's Old Guard Cheated"; first paragraph is AKTUELDT introduction]

[Text] A prior agreement forced the majority of the central committee members to abandon their own candidate, Jan Andersen.

When the Danish CP's central committee meeting started at 8 pm on Easter Saturday a clear majority of the 49 members present favored Jan Andersen in the race for the party chairmanship, sources in the Danish CP informed AKTUELDT. But the old guard of the party, led by Ib Norlund and party secretary Poul Emanuel had miscalculated. Andersen's opponent for the post, Ole Sohn, had reached an agreement with his rival in advance to divide the power by setting up a deputy chairmanship. Therefore Jan Andersen told his disappointed supporters that he did not intend to run against Sohn. Sohn's opponents tried to wreck the new alliance in the 6 hours that followed by arguing vigorously against the establishment of a deputy chairmanship. In the course of this debate party secretary Poul Emanuel threatened to resign if a deputy chairmanship was established. But there was some attrition among the "old guard" during the discussion of the deputy chairmanship. Several of the older members, including Ingmar Wagner, admitted that Sohn's solution was the only realistic one. In the decisive vote at the meeting, the vote on establishing a deputy chairmanship, this change of mind led to majority approval of the new post, 24 to 22. That decided the matter. Sohn's model had won and when he was elected at 4 in the morning at the end of the marathon meeting, only three people voted against him.

The course of events emphasized that the political shift in the Danish CP is less powerful than assumed. The opposition branches of the party in central Jutland and Funen that backed Sohn and the demand for more openness had less of an impact on the congress than expected. What happened created a bad mood in the party leadership, according to AKTUELT's sources who noted in particular that the old guard feels somewhat bitter about Jan Andersen. Andersen's decision to conclude a truce with Sohn, they told us, was made on the good advice of people around him who thought it would be bad for him personally if he became chairman on the old guard's terms.

Chairman Ole Sohn Profiled

Copenhagen AKTUELT in Danish 26 Apr 87 pp 16-17

[Article by Erik Meier Carlsen: "Sohn of Horsens Goes to Norrebro"]

[Text] The old woman stopped halfway into the vestibule of the assembly building that looks like a temple and turned to her husband who had halted in the doorway. She could hear the rock rhythms resounding from behind the closed doors of the hall. "There's no bingo tonight," she said.

"Kilden" in Horsens is a monument to a working-class culture that is on the way out. There are Social Democratic strongholds here on the east coast of Jutland, but local SiD chairman Ole Sohn who just became chairman of the Danish CP a week ago at the age of 32 did not walk as a child among the town's picturesque old working-class houses or the cement blocks with which the labor movement's housing societies have filled the town.

He grew up in the village of Egebjerg, 4 kilometers out of town. His mother is a school teacher and his father was a sales representative.

His parents wanted Sohn to become a school teacher and he received his secondary school diploma before he became a construction worker and at the age of just 23 he became SiD chairman. He is a new age union man, buoyed by feelings of weariness and disgust with the Social Democratic union boss style into which the movement that has been the major dynamo in Horsens and other towns like it has partially hardened.

Sohn became a member of Danish Communist Youth [DKU] when no one else in his social studies class in school was willing to defend the communist viewpoint. So Sohn did and became convinced by his own presentation. That was in the early seventies and Sohn was concerned with Vietnam and the opposition to EC. He breathed new life into the town's moribund DKU division but the decisive factor in his involvement and effectiveness was probably his companionship with his soldier friend, Hans Sorensen, union secretary for the Horsens branch of SiD, former chairman of the town's Danish CP division and Sohn's probable successor as SiD chairman.

It was in Fredericia that Sohn and Sorensen and Henrik Saxgren, the nationally known photographer of the squatters' movement, went through

their compulsory military service together, sleeping in neighboring bunks. Sohn and Sorensen have since formed a partnership and they radiate self-assurance and a sense of fellowship that has obviously been a major factor in their success and breakthrough in the Semiskilled Workers' Union, the Horsens town council and the old labor party for which Sohn's Danish "glasnost" is clearly the last chance.

When Sohn and Sorensen became construction workers in 1975 a lot of construction was going on and it was possible to earn good money. They quickly won respect and trust with a union activity in which, as Sorensen says, the slogan was "keep the party books out of sight." The two young, talented and efficient workers were able to make their comrades proud of their trade. In SiD's streamlined new headquarters on Robert Holmsvej in a neighborhood of small houses on the outskirts of town, Sorensen sat behind his desk with his time schedule lying open before him and talked with conviction about the task--transforming the organizational effort that has been the backbone of his party--and the union movement--into a new openness that can attract new generations who find organization alien and repellent.

When he and Sohn got started in the seventies they were part of a wave that made the political left wing in this country stronger than it is in most neighboring countries. The educational explosion and the youth rebellion created a new political awareness among the surging "new middle class," the many first-generation college students, the large new groups of public employees, working women. The Danish CP was a presence in those years, it was strong in the student organizations, it dominated the new strong teachers' unions, it led the activity in the People's Movement Against EC. But in the late seventies the picture changed, the Danish CP suddenly ran out of steam and a downturn began that culminated in 1984 when the Danish CP was able to win the support of fewer than 1 percent of the voters, while the Socialist People's Party broke through the 10 percent barrier that had previously been the left wing's upper limit.

"The marketing of the party was too weak. But you cannot get me to say it was Jorgen Jensen's fault, for I didn't think it was," said Sohn. "We started too late to tackle the questions that were important to young people, the environmental issue and social issues." He expects that when the new executive committee meets for the first time next month the new priorities will be marked in the form of personnel changes.

Sohn is inclined to view the crisis of the Danish CP as paralleling the Social Democratic crisis; it is the well-organized segment of the labor movement that is in trouble.

The environmental movement has created attitudes and sympathies that have changed the political pattern, but now the task is to organize the environmental struggle around production, for the grassroots movement can point out problems, but not solve them, according to Sohn.

The ideal is an interaction between the party and the movement of the kind Sohn saw realized in the People's Movement and partially realized in the peace movement.

Sohn's Glasnost

The test of Ole Sohn's strength as chairman will be the appointment of the party executive committee and the implementation of an open and offensive debate in the party newspaper, LAND OG FOLK. "Openness" is the slogan, for it is mainly prejudices that have weakened the party, not its own mistakes, in the chairman's view.

"We are up against some prejudices in which the allegation of dependence on the Soviet Union plays a part. It is a prejudice--relations between the Danish CP and the Soviet Union are no different from relations between the Danish Social Democrats and their West German counterparts, for example."

We asked why Jorgen Jensen went to East Germany to die.

"He wanted to find out what was wrong with him. And the waiting period was too long in this country. It is not an expression of a special organizational link between the Danish CP and the German Democratic Republic."

Could any Dane be admitted to an East German hospital?

"I haven't the slightest idea."

But doesn't this help create the picture that he finds prejudiced?

"One of the things that is decisive for the party is becoming more open. And presenting the debate we have within the party which includes conditions in Eastern Europe."

We asked him to give an example of what he thinks should have been criticized more openly.

"We have criticized the way they are organized in the Soviet Union, the bureaucracy," Sohn said cautiously, but he gave no other concrete examples of neglect in this debate. It is more a question of style, the generation gap.

A new political editor, hired a year ago, and a clear and entirely new slogan for LAND OG FOLK's editorial activity will change the picture. "The only restrictions there should be in this debate are those imposed by the party bylaws and general editorial considerations."

We asked if things had been like that before.

"I don't know, but that is the way they should be. This is not just something I say, we decided to do this. If viewpoints are expressed in LAND OG

FOLK that the party disagrees with, they should be refuted openly," said Sohn with a very determined look.

The advocate of the new openness intends to make it his personal task to go on the offensive with an economic policy in which a key point will be tackling the dependence on EC and the free capital market.

"Our foreign trade must be regulated and compensation agreements must be negotiated with West Germany and other big trading partners. It is quite important for a labor majority to stand up against the internationalization that makes it very difficult to solve our economic problems."

Policy and the economy will be the chairman's main tasks while deputy chairman Jan Andersen will continue to be the key figure in union activity. There are hopes in the party that there will be a softening of what many regard as a very dogmatic union line, represented by union secretary Bo Rosschou and the party's old men, Ib Norlund and Poul Emanuel. Relations with one of the party's strongest bastions, the educators in BUPL, have been especially full of conflict because the party's union secretariat has unconditionally backed the teachers' aides in their border conflicts with the trained educators.

Sohn acknowledged the antagonisms but felt they resembled the antagonism between SiD and the Metalworkers' Union, a classic conflict between trained and untrained workers, and he found the Danish CP's support of the better-trained unskilled workers natural.

With regard to personal issues, Sohn said laconically that the tasks will not be assigned before the new central committee is constituted and that there are "no plans" to change Rosschou's position. Chairman Sohn will have a busy time this summer. He has to sell his big house in Horsens and move to a social housing development in Norrebro. He will wind up his affairs in the Horsens branch of SiD and would like to make sure that his friend becomes the new chairman of the union. He will be leaving the SiD executive committee where he has won great respect for his objective and constructive working style which lacked strong partisan overtones.

He will live a new life in Norrebro and on Dronningens Tvaergade. He will miss Horsens.

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SOCIAL DEMOCRATS' SUPPORT SHOWS DECLINE IN TWO POLLS

Drop in Vilstrup Poll

Copenhagen AKTUELT in Danish 27 Apr 87 p 3

[Text] In the poll of the Vilstrup Institute, published yesterday in POLITIKEN, the Social Democratic Party again experiences a setback to 28 percent of the vote. That is a decline from the most recent parliamentary elections in 1984, when the party obtained 31.6 percent of the vote.

The Vilstrup result, however, has been achieved on the basis of a very small number of persons interviewed. The Vilstrup Institute wanted to contact 1,149 voters on the Tuesday and Wednesday after the Easter holidays, but only 776 people answered their phones.

According to the poll, the Conservative Party, too, will experience a setback. From 23.4 percent to 21 percent.

The distribution in terms of percentages, with the results of the election in parentheses, is as follows:

Social Democratic Party	28	(31.6)
Radical Liberal Party	4	(5.5)
Conservative Party	21	(23.4)
Single-Tax Party	1	(1.5)
Socialist People's Party	18	(11.5)
The Greens	1	(0)
Communist Party	1	(0.7)
Center Democrats	5	(4.6)
Christian People's Party	2	(2.7)
Liberal Party	13	(12.1)
Left-Socialist Party	2	(2.6)
Progressive Party	3	(3.6)
Others	1	(0.1)

Among the government coalitions, if any, the Social Democratic Party, the Socialist People's Party and the Left-Socialist Party obtain a total of 48 percent of the vote. The Four-Leaf-Clover Government is able to muster 41

percent and obtains only 48 percent of the vote if the 4 percent of the Radical Liberal Party and the 3 percent of the Progressive Party are included.

The election campaign will start slowly tonight with a number of meetings between the Social Democratic Party and the Conservative Party.

In Silkeborg, Anker Jørgensen and Poul Schluter will meet at 7.30 p.m., while Svend Auken and Henning Dyremose will compete in Aalborg. Tomorrow Ritt Bjerregaard and Palle Simonsen will fight in Åbenrå.

Gallup Indicates Nonsocialist Majority

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 5 May 87 p 1

[Article by Thorkild Dahl]

[Text] The Social Democratic Party and the Socialist People's Party are unable to muster the majority needed to overturn the Four-Leaf-Clover Government in a parliamentary election, Gallup shows. The Poul Schluter government is strengthened by a major gain of Radical Liberal votes, which outweighs the drop of the Christian People's Party below the percentage of votes required for representation in the Folketing.

The Poul Schluter government is able to remain in power on the basis of its majority with the Radical Liberal Party, but the Christian People's Party, the small coalition party, will drop out of the picture. This appears from a Gallup poll of the opinions of voters if an election should take place at this point.

The voters were interviewed at the very time that the environmental debate was gathering momentum, and according to the Gallup poll, the Radical Liberal Party will have the largest support among the electorate since the election in January 1984. The Radical Liberal Party and the Socialist People's Party are thus the only parties to score gains in an election at this point.

The Gallup poll shows that the gains scored by the Socialist People's Party are insufficient to secure a majority of the Social Democratic Party and the Socialist People's Party. In view of the setback of the Social Democratic Party, the two parties can only muster 83 seats, while the Poul Schluter government will be able to obtain 86 seats with the Radical Liberal Party.

The Progressive Party is not involved, and the Social Democratic Party and the Socialist People's Party are its only alternative if the party should want to use its six seats against the nonsocialist government.

The Four-Leaf-Clover Government will lose one of its leaves, viz. Minister of Environment Chr. Christensen's Christian People's Party, which has dropped again below the percentage of support required for access to the Folketing.

Distribution of Seats:

Gallup Poll

Election 1984

The Social Democratic Party	53	56
The Radical Liberal Party	15	10
The Conservative Party	42	42
The Socialist People's Party	30	21
The Center Democrats	8	8
The Christian People's Party	0	5
The Liberal Party	21	22
The Left-Socialist Party	0	5
The Progressive Party	6	6

POLITICAL INDEX

Question: Which party would you vote for if elections to the Folketing were to take place tomorrow?

Period During Which
Poll Was Taken:

4 April - 20 April 1987	10 Jan 1984 %	Nov 1986 %	Dec 1986 %	Jan 1987 %	Feb 1987 %	Mar 1987 %	Apr 1987 %
The Social Democratic Party	31.6	31.2	31.7	31.3	29.4	29.0	28.0
The Radical Liberal Party	5.5	5.6	6.1	5.1	5.1	4.7	8.0
The Conservative Party	23.4	23.8	23.0	23.3	23.9	22.5	22.5
The Single-Tax Party	1.5	-	-	-	-	-	-
The Socialist People's Party	11.5	14.2	12.9	15.2	15.3	17.3	16.0
The Greens	.	-	-	-	-	-	-
The Humanistic Party	.	-	-	-	-	-	-
The International Socialist Workers' Party	0.1	-	-	-	-	-	-
The Communist Party	0.7	-	-	-	-	-	-
The Marxist-Leninist Party	0.0	-	-	-	-	-	-
The Center Democrats	4.6	4.9	3.6	3.3	3.9	3.1	4.5
The Christian People's Party	2.7	-	2.2	2.7	3.0	2.5	-
The Liberal Party	12.1	11.9	11.9	11.8	11.2	12.0	10.9
The Left-Socialist Party	2.7	-	2.5	-	-	-	-
The Progressive Party	3.6	-	3.4	2.5	4.0	3.2	3.1
Other parties*)	.	8.4	2.7	4.8	4.2	5.7	7.0
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

*) Parties with less than 2.0 percent of the vote.

Reprinting subject to indication of Gallup and BERLINGSKE TIDENDE as sources.

Coalition Support Record Low

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 5 May 87 p 12

[Commentary by John Wagner: "Out of the Frying Pan Into the Fire"]

[Text] "Don't say that the parliamentary requirements have been easy."

The above statement was made by Poul Schluter at the meeting of the Executive Committee of the Conservative Party on Saturday, 25 April.

It has been difficult for the government obtaining the majority in the present Folketing, where the four coalition parties depend on the seats of the Radical Liberal Party, two independents from the Progressive Party and at times also a couple of North Atlantic seats.

But things will become much worse if after the next elections, the Folketing will have the composition indicated by the most recent opinion polls. The government will then get out of the frying pan into the fire.

The Gallup poll published today by BERLINGSKE TIDENDE is the second opinion poll carried through in April that shows the hitherto lowest support among the electorate for the four coalition parties since the elections to the Folketing in January 1984.

In the elections to the Folketing, the Conservative Party, the Liberal Party, the Center Democrats and the Christian People's Party scored a total of 42.8 percent of the vote.

Since then, 126 opinion polls have been carried through by Gallup/BERLINGSKE TIDENDE, Vilstrup/POLITIKEN, Observa/JYLLANDS POSTEN, morning edition, and the AIM Institute/BØRSEN.

The coalition parties have had prospects of gains in 40 of the 126 opinion polls, while in more than twice the number of polls, viz. 84, there have been prospects of setbacks. In two polls, it has been a question of unchanged voter support.

The lowest record was experienced when on 1 May 1987, BØRSEN published the April poll of the AIM Institute. The poll showed the coalition parties as having 36.7 percent of the votes, i.e., a setback of no less than 6.1 percent compared with the election less than 3.5 years ago.

And it is not a question of a single poll. On the contrary. Today the Gallup poll, which gives the coalition parties 37.9 percent of the votes, shows that the government is at present experiencing a major loss of voters.

The only consolation is that part of the setback is absorbed by the Radical Liberal Party, that the Social Democrats too are losing support among the electorate, and that both polls were carried through prior to the mini profit sharing agreement and the environmental agreement between the government and

the Radical Liberal Party. The nonsocialist parties may thus hope for the time being that the bottom record will also become a turning point.

In any circumstances, the most recent Gallup poll also confirms a clear trend in the opinion polls.

From the election until the intervention in the collective bargaining in the spring of 1985, the government experienced gains among the electorate in 28 of 40 polls. Since then it has experienced setbacks in relation to the election result in 73 of 86 polls. Following the Easter package in the spring of 1986, gains have been discernible in two polls only, most recently in a poll carried through by Observa in September 1986.

It is furthermore remarkable that since the adoption of the Potato Diet, all four coalition parties have been losing support among the electorate. Previously, the trend was for the Conservatives to gain what the Liberal Party, the Center Democrats and the Christian People's Party lost. At no point of time have all coalition parties experienced gains in the same poll, but in seventeen polls they have all experienced setbacks, for example, in the two most recent Gallup polls.

Before the Social Democratic Party starts pointing to the government, it may be appropriate to ascertain the state of affairs of the said party and the so-called labor majority.

Since the New Year, the four opinion polling institutes have carried through fifteen polls. In nine of these polls, the Social Democratic Party, the Socialist People's Party and the Left-Socialists (where the latter party scores support beyond the 2 percent limit barring access to the Folketing) obtain more support among the voters than the so-called national budget parties, i.e., the coalition parties plus the Radical Liberal Party.

The prime minister, however, has now announced that the government will continue on the basis of the seats of the Progressive Party as well if the national budget parties will not achieve the majority on their own in the upcoming election. And the fact is that there has only been a labor majority in three polls since the New Year.

And the Social Democratic Party?

That is the big surprise in all polls. But it ought no longer to be a surprise. It is a clear trend--as clear as the setback of the government.

From the election in January 1984 until the New Year 1985/86, the Social Democrats experienced gains in 38 of 69 polls. Since then, gains have been noticeable in another 10 polls but setbacks in no less than 47 polls.

In half the polls carried through since the New Year, the Social Democratic Party has scored less than 30 percent of the vote as against 31.6 percent in the most recent election.

It is thus not easy being the Social Democratic Party either.

PCI'S NATTA URGES MORE AUTONOMY, DEMOCRACY FOR UNIVERSITIES

Rome L'UNITA in Italian 29 Mar 87 p 7

[Article by Romeo Bassoli: 'Our Universities Aging Fast']

[Text] "How could it happen that, contemplating proposals that, to all intents and purposes, were compatible, we failed to come up with an approved bill?" That "childlike" question was raised at the PCI's national conference on the universities by the DC's education maven, Giancarlo Tesini. And indeed, while some key "buzz-words" in the discussion—autonomy, reform, new teaching arrangements, upgrading research work—there seemed to be complete agreement among the major political parties, should the clash in parliament reveal such deep underlying conflict? Again: why?

"Because, both in the country at large and in the universities we have for years had a conflict between the drive for renewal and adamant resistance from the conservatives," said Professor Giunio Luzzato, a docent at the Genoa University campus and director of "University Project" magazine. However, if that is so, how can you advocate greater autonomy for the campuses and still forestall such a process' degenerating into a mere shunting of such arguments onto the sidelines?

This was the prime issue during the final day of debate at the 3rd PCI conference on the universities which ended yesterday in Rome with Natta's remarks. It was a day when almost every speaker opened his remarks with words of welcome and best wishes for outgoing chairman Nilde Iotti.

Asked "How would power be shared amicably with autonomy?" A lot of delegates had answers ready. Roberto Antonelli, who heads the Communist university section in Rome (along with Prof Cazzaniga) made the point that university governance will have to change, too, away from its ancient juridical configuration: away, then, with the image of the rector as monarch elected by a limited portion of the university community.

[This is] an unfair and unjust electoral system which is compatible with that is both self-centered and unwilling to share responsibility. The very body (according to De Giovanangeli, head of the

FGCI-related League of University Students) , "reduces students to mere ciphers on their registration cards, leaving them to absentee instructors, even celebrated ones, and to the incompetence of the system." It is this "absence of oversight and the "pervasive permissiveness" that elicited comment again from Professor Giovan Battista Gerace of Pisa University to make the point that "we must lay down some hard and fast guidelines to make certain that autonomy means above all improving the standards of the public university system." It is a system, but it does not merely create new areas of inquiry, but that is at the same time a cultural playing-ground where the young scholar can find entry without necessarily having to take a degree."

Alessandro Natta returned to this same issue in his concluding remarks: "We," said the PCI secretary, "favor a kind of autonomy that would hark back to the great inspiration of autonomy that is the underpinning of the Constitution, that is designed to enhance capability and competence and to insure that public intervention is innovative, flexible, and efficacious..."

"The reform we propose is more than a shuffling of arrangements. It takes cognizance of the new importance, quantitative and qualitative, of the presence of women in the universities, and of the demand for the values of which they are the embodiment. And it looks to the students, to the young, as the prime concern and the essential force driving a process of reform."

6182

CSO: 3528/111

POLL FINDS TERRORISM, UNEMPLOYMENT MAIN PROBLEMS

Madrid MERCADO in Spanish 24 Apr 87 pp 18-19

[Article by Julian Gonzalez: "Everything Is Still the Same"]

[Text] In the opinion of Spaniards, unemployment and terrorism are the society's leading problems. Also very close to them are public health, citizens' security, the justice system, and taxes. Of the major issues, what least concerns the citizen is the matter of private television, the period of adjustment to EEC, the restructuring of the administration, and the negotiation of the American bases.

Based on sex, men are most concerned, while the lower class shows greater dissatisfaction.

As for the evolution of the problems, 45.2 percent of those polled think that everything is still the same; 21.5 percent think that we are worse off; and 16.9 percent believe things are better.

Andalucia is among the regions with the greatest awareness, and Madrid exceeds Barcelona in the assessment of the main issues cited.

The poll, taken by Emopublica for MERCADO, includes interviews of 2,000 persons between 15 and over 54 years of age. It has a margin of error of 2.2 percent, for a confidence level of 95 percent. The date of its preparation extended from the end of January to the beginning of March, a time when the country's labor situation began to erupt again.

Coal for the Government

With the exception of Felipe Gonzalez and the foreign minister, Francisco Fernandez Ordonez; the rest of the executive branch has had its management failed by the 2,000 Spaniards polled. Only the government's prime minister saves his head, with a 6.08 out of a score of 0 to 10, although he has declined from previous surveys.

All the ministers have lost "attraction." The one most penalized has been the education minister, Jose Maria Maravall, dropping from 5.40 to 4.30.

The student mobilization has unquestionably cost Maravall a loss of popularity. Now, he has the doctors and students from the medical field on the streets, demanding facilities opened so as to enable all those with degrees in medicine to have access to the 2 years of training required by the European Community. The university students have also resumed the strike against the study plans reform bill.

Based on age, it is the youth who appear most dissatisfied with Maravall's administration, which received a score of 3.71, a percentage repeated on the intermediate level.

Narcis Serra has also ranked under 5 points, and Alfonso Guerra has not recovered. The government's deputy prime minister has not managed to receive a passing grade in the three polls taken by this magazine. On the social level, the 5 given him by the lower class is surprising; a situation totally different from that occurring among well-to-do people, who disapprove of Guerra's actions with only 3.92 points.

Those with the lowest scores are the health minister, Julian Garcia Vargas, with 3.70, followed by the minister of industry and energy, Luis Carlos Croissier, and the agriculture minister, Manuel Romero. The latter has opposed all the Agrarian Chambers, and his policy has been described as injurious and anti-democratic. The dairy and grain surpluses are the sector's leading issues.

Luis Carlos Croissier is penalized by all fronts. In Cadiz, the Spanish Shipyards workers are still requesting fulfillment of the reconversion plans involving the contracts stipulated for the plant. In Reinosa, the mobilizations protesting the zone's industrial dismantling have not ceased; and in Asturias and Leon, mining is the bone of contention. At Hunosa, the signing of the viability plan has not been completed, and it is likely that the matter will not be concluded until after the municipal and autonomous elections.

Lesser Evil

A total of 45.7 percent of those polled consider the government's administration normal, although 32.5 percent describe it as unsuccessful, and 11.2 percent regard it as doing well.

On the social level, it is noteworthy that 43.1 percent of the well-to-do think that the Socialists are performing poorly, as opposed to 22.9 percent of the lower class, and 32 percent on the intermediate level.

Also notable is the fact that virtually half of the ministers received votes from only a third of those interviewed. This attests to the meager knowledge that they have of the members of the government. For example, the minister of congressional relations, Virgilio Zapatero, is unknown, with only 500 persons assessing his management. The minister of industry and energy, Luis Carlos Croissier, is also in the shadows, despite the fact that he heads a controversial office.

The ones most voted for were Felipe Gonzalez and Alfonso Guerra, with a larger percentage from men (51.8 percent) than from women (48.2 percent).

On government management, Barcelona is the city in which it is considered quite poor; although it is the northern area in which there is the highest index of unpopularity for the executive branch, with 38.8 percent, compared with 36 percent regarding it as normal.

Unemployment Rises

Unemployment is unquestionably the leading problem cited by Spanish society, as proven by the fact that it is the only one that has risen in scoring, compared with other polls. From 9.48, it has moved to 9.59 percent.

In this respect, it is women who mention it most, with 51.3 percent, compared with 48.7 percent of the men. Based on age, those over age 50 express the greatest concern, and the lower class shows greater fear of unemployment, because it suffers from it more.

Based on geographical areas, it is Andalucia where there occurs the highest rate of disturbance over unemployment. The northern area experiences this problem less, and there is considerable detachment elsewhere, except with regard to terrorism. This issue evokes great concern in all regions, but it is rather surprising that the northern section is not the one where people are most concerned. Specifically, it is the Levant where this social scourge is viewed with extreme interest (9.48 percent, as opposed to 8.87 in the northern region).

The other problems decline in their assessment. Public health, the justice system, taxes, and inflation concern Spaniards less, if we compare the results of the poll with that taken by this magazine last September. And this is noteworthy at a time when disenchantment is evident among all social classes, and when the level of labor conflict occurring far exceeds that of other years.

Nevertheless, it is the members of the lower class who speak out most constantly in all respects, although it is the major issues which receive the most backing. Hence, it is not surprising that the issue of private television does not reach a score of 6 points, and that individuals on a higher level show greater concern.

Without Particular Interest

But while the "coolness" is palpable regarding the most pressing issues, there are other matters which scarcely concern the citizens. The period of adjustment to the European Community is not making virtually any of the 1,400 persons who answered this question lose sleep.

Strange as it may seem, Spaniards detract importance from the question of whether or not inflation is reduced, a priority issue for the Solchaga office.

The negotiation of the American bases is also having few repercussions. Only 75 percent of those polled answered, and rate the problem far short of what was expected.

As for the evolution of the issues, the majority think that everything is still the same, although 25.5 percent think that we are becoming worse.

Those who think that we are better off do not amount to 17 percent, and 16.5 percent don't know or don't answer. Andalusia is the most critical, as proven by the fact that 26.5 percent of Andalusians claim to be living worse than they were months ago. Madrid also ranks above Barcelona, with 22 percent.

History is being repeated. Everything is still subject to the syndrome of skepticism and the population polled does not express any hope, in the real situation that it is experiencing. The government is questioned in its entire administration.

The Leading Problems

	%	Men	Women
Unemployment	9.59	9.52	9.65
Terrorism	9.23	8.99	9.45
Public health	8.90	8.73	9.07
Citizens' security	8.67	8.35	8.98
Justice system	8.32	8.15	8.50
Taxes	8.16	7.80	8.52
Inflation	7.62	7.37	7.88
Reduced state spending	7.31	7.16	7.49
Negotiation of bases	6.91	6.84	7.00
Administrative restructuring	6.55	6.42	6.71
Private TV	6.16	6.37	5.94
Adjustment to EEC	5.97	5.87	6.09

Scoring from 0 to 10

This is How the Future Will Be

	%	Men	Women
Better	16.9	18.9	15.0
The same	45.2	46.2	44.3
Worse	21.5	22.3	20.7
Don't know/no answer	16.5	12.6	20.1

The Ministers' Popularity

	1987	1986	1985
F. Gonzalez	6.08	6.20	6.35
A. Guerra	4.40	4.80	4.95
Fdez. Ordonez	5.15	-	-
Narcis Serra	4.80	5.00	5.15
Barrionuevo	4.60	4.70	5.00
J. Solana	4.50	5.15	5.10
J.M. Maravall	4.30	5.40	5.10
C. Solchaga	4.30	4.20	4.50
A. Caballero	4.20	-	-
F. Ledesma	4.20	4.60	4.70
J. Almunia	4.20	4.20	5.00
V. Zapatero	3.85	-	-
M. Chaves	3.90	-	-
G. Cosculluela	4.00	-	-
M. Romero	3.80	4.40	4.48
L.C. Corissier	3.75	-	-
J.G. Vargas	3.70	-	-

Scoring from 0 to 10

Opinion of the Government

	Total	Men	Women
Very successful	0.80	1.40	0.20
Successful	10.40	13.20	7.80
Normal	45.70	40.50	50.50
Unsuccessful	24.10	27.40	21.10
Very unsuccessful	8.40	8.80	7.90
Don't know/no answer	10.70	8.70	12.50

Data in %

Technical Record:

Date: 26-I to 9-III, 1987

Scope: Peninsula and Baleares

Size: 2,000 persons (962 men and 1,038 women)

Universe: Population from age 15 upwards

Margin of error: $\pm$ 2.2 percent for a confidence level of 95 percent

2909

CS0: 3548/76

LEADERSHIP CHALLENGE ERUPTS IN ADVANCE OF VPK CONVENTION

Six-Hour Day Campaign Theme

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 7 Apr 87 p 19

[Article by Hans O. Alfredsson]

[Text] The Left-Wing Communist Party (VPK) believes that the six-hour day may become a major campaign issue in 1988. It started its election campaign with 15 press conferences around the country last Monday.

To begin with there will be a spring campaign with the slogan "Get Going Now!"

The party leader, Lars Werner, is optimistic and feels that good things are happening in this area in a couple of county councils. If it means a first step towards shortening the workday while retaining the same wages, VPK is all for it.

"It is not important where the six-hour workday starts, the main thing is that it gets started," says Lars Werner.

In two county councils, Stockholm and Kopparberg, there are well-developed plans for trying a six-hour workday, the initial intention being to solve the personnel problems in the area of long-term care. The bargaining committee of the County Council Association wants to stop the plans. One reason being that the county councils' personnel costs, according to the committee, would increase by between 25 and 45 percent.

VPK does not believe that the costs constitute a problem.

"The employers have always said that reforms of this kind are too expensive," says Lars Werner. "The real issue is distribution between capital and labor. It may become a negotiating point and then the people with high incomes might have to give way."

VPK wants the workday to be shortened each day and rejects various kinds of separate solutions such as first concentrating on parents with small children, which is advocated by the Social Democrats, or collecting saved working-hours in a kind of working-hour bank, which is advocated by Metall.

1970's Question

A six-hour day for everyone would mean more jobs, increased equality between the sexes and increased fairness between various categories of people, according to VPK, which has been pushing this issue since the middle of the 1970's.

"Sweden has now fallen behind internationally," says Lars Werner. "Even Denmark which is supposed to have such a poor economy is ahead of us."

Contender's Ideological Differences Viewed

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 14 Apr 87 p 12

[Article by Kaa Eneberg:"Support From VPK-Districts. Werner Meets The Challenge"]

[Text] "I am prepared to continue as party leader simply because party-members in districts such as Stockholm, Goteborg and Skane have asked me to."

This was said by Lars Werner, leader of the Left-Wing Communist Party (VPK) since 1975, who has met with a challenger on the eve of the coming convention at the end of May. The challenger is Jorn Svensson, a VPK-member of the parliament, who is generally considered to have a more ideological outlook than Lars Werner.

The party's new election commission, which is going to nominate the party leader and the executive members of the party at the convention on May 23-27, will have its first meeting at the end of April. All the 23 district boards as well as the 300 local organizations have the right to nominate candidates, but it is unusual for the local units to avail themselves of that right. Even individual members have the right to nominate candidates.

This is the first time that a challenger has started off as strongly, with statements for instance, as Jorn Svensson has done. The current VPK-management does not feel, however, that his actions accurately reflect the mood of the party. When Lars Werner was elected for the first time, he was opposed by the minority-communist Rolf Hagel, but he won with two-thirds of the votes.

Skane-Consolation

Lars Werner is sitting in his room at the parliament, a large bouquet of carnations sent by party members from Molnlycke in Goteborg in front of him. He brightens visibly when he reads the accompanying note: "We're behind you!"

The flowers and the nominations from three large party districts obviously have brightened things up after the articles the last couple of weeks, describing alleged dissatisfaction with the current party management, due to the decreasing opinion figures, among other things.

The support he has received from Skane, which is Jorn Svensson's own district, is also a consolation for Werner.

Lars Werner refuses to comment on Jorn Svensson's challenge, but several times during the conversation he repeats that Svensson has only been a member of the party since 1966, while he has worked for VPK his entire adult life.

However, he does point out that there have always been voices in the party that have demanded greater reserve and a more dogmatic Marxist-Leninist line, with as he calls it "the entire liturgy." He does not want to admit that there are groups within the party that advocate a more rigid communism, "rather currents of dissatisfaction."

He points out that he himself, following in C.H. Hermansson's footsteps, has worked at realizing a broad left-wing party which could attract more than the communists, left-wing people in general.

"There have always been discussions within the party, and the strange thing is that these kinds of articles have appeared before every convention that I can remember," says Lars Werner.

"It is natural that the situation in the parliament creates frustration and tensions. We feel the same things in the party. We are not seeking an agreement with the Social Democrats for the sake of the agreement but to advance our interests.

"Things are no longer the same as during the 1970's, when we became committee-members after discussions with the Social Democrats. Today no Social Democrat dares to count our vote as an automatic "plus one," as far as the committees are concerned. At the time it was taken for granted that we would only vote with the Social Democrats, but that is not the case today."

Differences

On the subject of whether there are ideological differences between the current party leadership and Jorn Svensson, Lars Werner only comments by stating that even Jorn Donner supported the less doctrinary program that was finally adopted by the party leadership. The original program proposal asked for a stronger emphasis on the communist part of the party name, rather than the current stress on the "left-wing party."

275 delegates will finally choose the party leader at the convention in Stockholm.

"Well, until the new election, generally speaking, each post is vacant," says Lars Werner.

Kenneth Kvist, the party secretary, confirms to DAGENS NYHETER that there is worry in the party about the new opinion-figures. On the other hand there are figures that show a great personal trust in Lars Werner among party sympathisers and even among Social Democrats.

"In the discussion of whether they can be improved, there is naturally discussions about the political direction as well as the party leadership," says Kvist.

He adds that he does not want to comment on the party-leader fight, since he is a part of the current party leadership, which is being challenged.

Tough Leadership Fight Possible

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 16 Apr 87 p 12

[Dispatch from the Swedish Central News Agency (TT): "Six VPK-Districts Support Werner"]

[Text] The match between Lars Werner and Jorn Svensson at the Left-Wing Communist Party (VPK) convention in Stockholm May 23-27 should end in a home-court victory for Werner. But look out for Svensson. He is an outsider who might well turn Werner's apparently safe victory into an ignominious defeat for the old party leader.

Calls made by TT to 20 of the 23 VPK-districts showed that Werner has decided support in six of them. They are the districts of Blekinge, Ostergotland, Skane, Goteborg, Stockholm and Kronoberg which already have nominated him for the party-leader post.

Two districts, Gavle and Alvsborg, are supporting Jorn Svensson.

Alvsborg's support should not be taken as an expression of the criticism against Werner that exists in the party.

"He has been the leader for twelve years and there is a limit. We feel that the time has come to change party leaders now that we find ourselves in the fortunate position of having an alternative candidate," says Kjell Eliasson at the Alvsborg district.

Until the 23rd of April the districts can nominate candidates in advance for the party-leader post.

Even after this date, the districts have the chance to make up their minds and act directly for their candidate at the convention.

The Bohus district is not going to nominate anyone in advance but hopes to decide on its position on the party-leader question by May 17.

"Ill-Advised To Change Now"

"It will probably be Werner. We feel that it would be ill-advised to change party leaders now," Birgitta Pettersson summarizes the discussions so far in the district.

Even in Jonkoping and Varmland they are leaning towards supporting the current party leader.

In seven of the districts, however, the question is still open about which candidate to support.

"We hope to be able to nominate a candidate before April 21," says Kenneth Johnsson in the Skaraborg district. He is in the midst of calling the local organizations to find out how the discussions are progressing.

"It's a toss-up between Werner and Svensson in this district," he says.

In Jamtland, which nowadays is a second home-province for Svensson, no candidate will be nominated beforehand.

"At a convention conference on May 9, we will decide on which candidate to support or whether we will simply support the candidate suggested by the election committee," says Kerstin Ellert. Both Werner and Svensson are in the running as candidates.

"In Uppsala, the party-leader question is being discussed internally and it cannot be determined at this time who has the strongest support," says Sylvia Masan. The same is true for the Malar district.

"There is no clear-cut picture as yet. Many people want to see someone other than Werner as party leader, but at the same time there are reservations against a change right now," says Mats Eriksson.

In the Malar district, two local organizations have nominated their own candidates. Hallstahammar is supporting Jorn Svensson and Vingaker has nominated Viola Claesson.

Two of the three Norrland districts have decided not to nominate any candidate. They are Vasterbotten and Norrbotten. The Vasternorrland district may make a similar decision.

The reason for a decision not being made is that there is support in those districts for both Werner and Svensson, and the district leadership has decided simply to let the local organizations nominate candidates.

Own Candidates

Vasterbotten raised the issue at a recent meeting where there was a lot of criticism of Werner. However, since there was no support for any obvious candidate, it was decided not to propose an alternative.

Two districts have nominated their own candidates. They are Orebro with Karl-Erik Persson and Dalarna which now supports Lars-Ove Hagberg.

12339
CSO:3650/117

COUNTRY'S ARMS INDUSTRY EXPORT ACTIVITY DESCRIBED

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 16 Apr 87 pp 11-13

[Article by Olli Hakkarainen, Martti Heikkila, Veikko I. Pajunen, and Riitta Vainio: "Finland Conducting Arms Trade Throughout World"]

[Text] Arms exports employ only 300-400 people, but plants are kept in operation in the event of a crisis. The government issues foreign trade permits after statements from the Foreign Ministry and the Defense Ministry.

Finland's annual exports of war materiel and explosives are worth 60-80 million markkas. In recent years munitions exports have made up a little less than one-thousandth of the country's export income.

The exports of arms producing countries were calculated to be a full 130 billion markkas in 1985. This figure does not include transactions conducted on the black markets.

The war materiel exported by Finland is not sufficient to arm any kind of army. Finnish arms plants primarily export explosives for civilian as well as military use and ammunition parts, such as percussion caps and cartridges. A few ready-made munitions and hunting weapons, which are, however, similar to military weapons, are also exported.

In the last few years Finland has also exported high-tech mine clearing equipment and surveillance systems for submarines. Modern means of communication have also been sold.

HELSINGIN SANOMAT has researched the official records of the Council of State for a period of 10 years. According to them, export permits for war materiel and explosives have been issued for a total of 47 countries and also for areas from which it can be assumed that weapons could be transported to countries involved in warfare.

These exports are justified by the need to maintain defense readiness and employment. It is, however, difficult to accurately calculate the employment

effect of these exports; it fluctuates between 250-850 people according to various estimates. According to the most frequent estimates, these exports in reality employ approximately 300-400 people.

Finland's arms exports are not talked about in public. In practice, the country's highest political leadership is responsible for it. The export permits of firms are given preliminary handling in the Defense Ministry, and after that, the government either approves or rejects the applications for export permits. The application also includes a statement from the Foreign Ministry on the foreign policy suitability of the export destination.

Finland's arms exports have been regulated by only one law, according to which war materiel can be exported abroad by the exclusive permission of the Council of State.

Arms May Be Exported, But They Cannot Be Used for Warfare

Enough war materiel is manufactured in Finland so that the arms industry can be kept alive and just barely alive. But in peacetime the Defense Forces do not need as many weapons as an industrially profitable series production would require. The difference is exported abroad.

Keeping alive the domestic production of war materiel guarantees crisis readiness; the plants that are presently operating at near zero capacity can increase their production overnight -- if needed.

The state-run Kemira and Valmet plants, the Lapua Cartridge Plant and the Vammaskoski Plant under the Defense Ministry as well as the privately owned firms Forcit and Hackman, among others, are manufacturing and exporting war materiel.

Exports from Finland to South Africa only are prohibited by an unambiguous statute. According to prevailing practice, however, Finnish munitions may not be exported to countries conducting warfare or to crisis areas.

Export Law Soon in Effect for 50 Years

The exporting of Finnish war materiel is regulated by a law dating back to 1938. It states in the law that exports of war materiel is permitted only with the approval of the Council of State.

All other activities connected with arms exports are guided by practice, and no democratically elected organ, for example, parliament has stated its opinion on it.

For example, no position has been taken on whether arms exports should be limited to international associations for the arms trade, whether there are opportunities to prevent the movement of Finnish weapons to illegal arms markets or whether arms exports should be prohibited to countries guilty of violating human rights.

Export permits are issued by the Council of State and the permit itself is issued as a so-called delivery document. The matter is prepared by the Defense Ministry, which requests a statement from the Foreign Ministry for all war materiel exports.

Forcit Was Involved in Bofors Scandal

The absence of more precise laws and statutes regulating arms exports in Finland has resulted in a unique court case, in which the Hanko-based Forcit Explosives Plant is being accused of smuggling. It has exported its products to Sweden, but has not declared to Finnish officials that the products are being reexported from Sweden to other countries.

The roots of the Forcit court case reach back to an illegal arms export scandal disclosed in Sweden. When an investigation was conducted in Sweden on the illegal exports of Bofors and Nobel Kemi, it was disclosed that Forcit delivered explosives to Bofors and the Nitro Nobel Company, which belongs to Bofors. Finnish Customs began an investigation of Forcit's exports at the request of the Swedes.

Nitro Nobel, which belongs to Bofors, owns 13.2 percent of Forcit's shares. The state-owned corporation Kemira owns 15.2 percent of Forcit's shares.

Committee Report To Be Completed This Year

War materiel exports and reform of the outdated law are presently being considered in an official work group, which is being directed by Lieutenant General Aimo Pajunen, chief secretary of the Defense Ministry. The committee's report will be completed this year.

According to preliminary information, the arms industry's so-called civilian products and explosives will also remain in the procedure for issuing permits. The industry has proposed the exclusion of civilian products from the procedure for issuing export permits.

Political Section Chief Matti Kahiluoto of the Foreign Ministry considers it expedient that the exports of civilian products remain subject to the issuance of permits. The delineation between civilian and war materiel is frequently difficult, even impossible. Kahiluoto is responsible for making the Foreign Ministry's statements on export permits.

In addition, the only thing that Kahiluoto will disclose of the committee's work is that "the intent is to make the presently cumbersome permit procedure more flexible".

Application of Criteria Is Difficult

Kahiluoto's evaluations as to whether it is suitable for Finland to export war materiel to any particular country are influenced by war and armed conflicts as well as the threat of war and crises. An export permit is not

issued for crisis areas. Violations of human rights are also defined as an obstacle to a permit.

In the work group's statement attention is given to the so-called end use certificates and to the fact that the buyer is the country's government or its subordinate official.

"In some instances there have been difficulties in the application of criteria. Sometimes it is difficult to determine what position should be taken on applications for export permits with respect to states situated on the fringe areas of crises. Likewise it is frequently difficult to determine the seriousness and probability of an internal conflict or its threat. The general rule in such instances has been restraint, and the issues have been resolved on a case by case basis," was the evaluation of the arms export work group in 1981.

The views of a Finnish arms exporter, the person making the foreign policy evaluation, and of the Council of State with respect to crises or the suitability of a country as an export country for war materiel may also be different.

The divided judgments of the Council of State indicate that the final outcome may be completely different depending on the evaluator. Several ministers in the Council of State may be of the opinion that a certain munitions consignment should not be exported to a certain country.

Kahiluoto does not see any conflict between the evaluation made by the Foreign Ministry and the divided judgment of the Council of State. "In certain instances the government may consider that it is better to refrain from exporting."

Even Trusted Parties Can Betray

Kahiluoto considers completely foolproof surveillance of exports to be impossible. "All boycotts can be circumvented. When a consignment has passed through the customs of the receiving country, it is impossible to determine where its future course will lead."

Recent information from abroad indicates that arms exporters have broken laws and contracts in export countries considered to be trustworthy, the large Bofors Company in Sweden being an example.

According to Kahiluoto, this information has influenced the decisions being made here also. In Finland, special attention is now being given to countries in which abuses have been observed. The requirement of a so-called end user certificate is one way. "If an official of a country issues an end user certificate, the matter is in order, but, perhaps, in certain cases even they can be misused," says Kahiluoto.

The Defense Ministry, the Foreign Ministry, or the Council of State may require an end user certificate, usually this is done by the Foreign Ministry.

We have become accustomed to trusting in the end user certificates issued by government officials. Corporations may also issue end user certificates. A bundle of blank end user certificates was found in connection with the investigation of Sweden's arms exports.

Ministry Trusted in Buyers' Assurances

Supreme Administrative Court Member Kauko Karkela, who has been responsible for preparation of export permits in the Defense Ministry for 10 years, categorically rejects suspicions that the end user certificates were misused.

"It is not at all a question of a certificate to soothe one's conscience. Indeed, we consider that if an official issues a certificate, it in principle is binding on the country in question," assures Karkela. According to him, in his 10-year term, there has not been one instance in which the end user obligation has been violated.

Karkela, who has handled the processing of permits in the Defense Ministry, characterizes himself as the first sieve. Requests subject to even the slightest interpretation have never progressed to the application stage, he assures.

Firms have generally known from before already those areas to which they cannot export. Generally speaking, before applying for a permit firms have made telephone contact, during which they received advance information on a probable negative decision.

Annual Permits Are Now Sought

Presently, firms seek export permits for their products to a certain country for a whole year at a time. The present officer who prepares export permits for the Defense Ministry, Government Secretary Eero Lavonen, considers that practice has not at all changed the obligations of the exporter compared with previous procedure. Previously, a separate permit had to be sought for each export consignment. The procedure was changed 4 years ago so that the number of permit applications and the work hours consumed by them could be reduced in the Defense Ministry.

If it is known that the export consignment for which an annual permit has been issued will be reexported to some other country, it is the obligation of the applicant to apply for a new export permit to the country of final destination according to Lavonen's understanding.

There are no laws or written instructions pertaining to the procedure for issuing permits. According to Lavonen's position, knowing the final export country is, however, the crux of the whole permit procedure since there is a desire in Finland to keep track of where munitions are exported.

Government Issued Most Recent Export Permits Without a Vote

The government has not unanimously approved the exporting of explosives as well as war materiel or without controversy. Often it has become necessary to take a vote on permits.

The most recent export permits, however, were approved unanimously on Wednesday when the caretaker government issued Kemira a permit to export gunpowder and detonators to Indonesia, percussion caps to Argentina, and grenade launcher cartridges to Ecuador as well as Thailand.

Kemira's permit applications were submitted for the first time last November and were resubmitted in February of this year. On both occasions, Second Social and Health Minister Matti Puhakka requested to review the documents for himself, and the handling of the permits was suspended.

Two other applications from Kemira, which concerned exports of war materiel to Peru and Singapore, were also brought up at both sessions. The applications were last tabled in February, and they were not discussed at Wednesday's session. According to Government Secretary Eero Lavonen, the officer preparing permits for the Defense Ministry, they were not now brought before the session of the Council of State since the Foreign Ministry has not yet declared its position regarding the export countries.

Previously opposing statements were included in the decisions of the Council of State on Kemira's exports to Brazil and Valmet's exports of assault rifles to Mexico, among other things.

Exports to Qatar, Singapore, and Indonesia, among other places, have aroused opposition. Some exports have been approved at the general session of the Council of State by a majority of only one vote.

The most recent export to Iran was approved in the Council of State in 1978 when Kemira received unanimous approval for a permit to export 52 tons of Hexagon.

In the following year, Kemira's permit application to export "gunpowder of an experimental nature, detonator caps, detonating fuses, shotgun cartridges, and sample blasting materials to many different countries in the world," no longer received unanimous approval.

Ministers Arvo Aalto, Veikko Saarto, and Kalevi Kivisto of the SKDL [Finnish People's Democratic League] submitted dissenting opinions on exports to Indonesia, Thailand, and Malaysia.

They also submitted a dissenting opinion on Kemira's gunpowder exports to Peru in 1980, and Minister Pirkko Tyolajarvi (Social Democrat) recorded a statement in the official records of the Council of State, in which she was joined by Sinikka Luja-Penttila (Social Democrat): "I approve the export permits since the Foreign Ministry has taken a stand on the issue as a policy solution. I do not approve the employment policy arguments and the fact that

other countries will possibly issue export permits or will not require them as a justification."

Tyolajavi attached the same kind of statement to the official records when Kemira received a permit to export cartridge detonator caps in the same year to Indonesia and Singapore.

In 1979, the Council of State took a stand on active sales promotions by stating that when samples are exported to Latin America, Africa, the Near East, or Asia, a permit application must be made for each sample separately.

The Foreign Ministry required the filing of case-by-case permit applications for exporting samples to Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Cyprus. In addition, the ministry stated that it does not, in principle, have any objections regarding the exporting of small samples to any country in the world. If, however, exports are directed toward Latin America, Africa, the Near East, or Asia, the exporter must file a case-by-case application. It was further noted that exports to the Republic of South Africa and South Rhodesia are completely prohibited.


In 1980, Aalto and Kivisto recorded dissenting opinions in the official records regarding the fact that Kemira was allowed to export gunpowder to Singapore: "The permit should not be issued since Singapore is known to be one of the international centers of the arms trade."

Minister Ulf Sundqvist (Social Democrat) entered his stand on the Council of State's decision on Valmet's exports of anti-aircraft gun ammunition to Argentina in 1980. According to it, Finland should refrain from exporting war materiel to Latin American countries in which violations of human rights have been confirmed.

Pirkko Tyolajarvi's dissenting statement was recorded in the Council of State's official records regarding the approval by a vote of Valmet's exports of assault rifles to Mexico and Kemira's exports of gunpowder to Brazil. In it she considered it regrettable that permits "are handled in the Council of State before the report on arms exports has been completed".

Kemira's extensive export permit application, which contained gunpowder for sports and hunting guns, detonator caps, mining explosives and gunpowder mass, nitrocellulose, detonating fuses, blank basic charge shells, blasting caps, and basic charges for grenade launchers for the years 1983-84 to various different countries, forced the Council of State to classify products intended for civilian and military use in its decision.

Minister Kaarina Suonio (Social Democrat) requested documents with respect to those sections in which exports concerned such weapons "which could be used for military purposes".



Värit on merkitty valit-
tiin Suomi on 1980-luvulla vie-
ny sotatarvikkeita ja räjähte-
itä. Innokkaimpia ostajia on
Ruotsissa, USA:ssa ja eräissä
kaikkialla maissa.

States to which Finland exported war materiel and explosives in the 1980s are shaded in on the above map. The most enthusiastic buyers are in Sweden, the USA, and various Far East countries.

Gunpowder, mining explosives, gunpowder mass, nitrocellulose, and detonating fuses, for which an export permit was issued in the first session, were defined as being used for non-military purposes.

In the second session a vote was taken on the final section of the permit application or on the exports of so-called war materiel. Voting for were the Center Party's Esko Ollila, Juhani Saukkonen, Mikko Jokela, Taisto Tahkamaa, Marjatta Vaananen, and Ahti Pekkala as well as Swedish People's Party members Christoffer Taxell and Par Stenback. Voting against were Social Democrats Vappu Taipale, Matti Ahde, and Kalevi Sorsa as well as SKDL members Jouko Kajanoja and Kalevi Kivisto.

In 1982, Valmet received a permit to export semiautomatic rifles and assault rifles to the United States by a majority of only one vote: voting for were the Center Party's Ollila, Saukkonen, Jokela, Tahkamaa, Vaananen, and Pekkala as well as Swedish People's Party members Taxell and Stenback. Voting against were the SDP's Suonio, Ahde, Mauno Forsman, and Jacob Soderman as well as the SKDL's Jarmo Wahlstrom, Kajanoja, and Kivisto.

A vote was also taken on Valmet's assault rifle exports to Qatar. The Foreign Ministry said in its statement that there were objections to these exports, but the stipulation was made that the weapons will not be reexported to third-party countries. Valmet filed an end user certificate, according to which the war materiel will be used on Qatar's territory.

The exports were approved by a vote of 8-6; voting for were the Center Party and the RKP [Swedish People's Party] or Ollila, Saukkonen, Jokela, Taxell, Stenback, Tahkamaa, Vaananen as well as Pekkala and voting against were the SDP and the SKDL or Suonio, Taipale, Ahde, Kajanoja, Kivisto, and Sorsa. Minister Jermu Laine, a member of Valmet's board of directors, disqualified himself from participating in the decision-making process.

A vote was also taken on the Lapua Cartridge Plant's exports of cartridges to Qatar. The exports were opposed by Suonio, Wahlstrom, Kajanoja, and Laine.

An export permit for samples of the Jatimatic automatic pistol from the Tampere Weapons Plant was issued in 1983 after a vote in the third session. Voting for were the Center Party and the RKP or Ollila, Saukkonen, Jokela, Taxell, Stenback, Tahkamaa, Vaananen, Pekkala as well as the SDP's Veikko Helle and Reino Breilin. Voting against were the other Social Democratic ministers Suonio, Arvo Salo, Taipale, Ahde, and Laine.

In the following year, the company received an export permit for 100 weapons to Belgium, 250 weapons to France, and 50 to England as well as sample consignments to seven other countries.

The 1985 permit application for exporting 500 Jatimatics to England was tabled. The company filed an end user certificate. Ahde requested the documents. After that, there are no notations regarding the Tampere Weapons Plant's export applications in the official records of the Council of State.

Last year the purchasing company as well as the reexport country were also noted in permit applications from various companies. Kemira received a permit to export military gunpowders and rolled gunpowder mass to the Nobel Industries Concern in Sweden, which will use the products in its own production for its deliveries to India according to the export notice.

The Vammaskoski Plant stated in its application in 1986 that the cocked cartridge shell blanks as well as the crushing turned and reduced cartridge shells delivered to Bofors in Sweden will be reexported as a partial delivery to India.

The purchasing company is mentioned almost without exception in the applications processed this year.

The following is a list of export permits issued by the Council of State in this decade for weapons and explosives. The list also includes firms which have exported explosives for their own use in foreign construction projects.

1980

Finn-Stroi

Electric detonator caps, 3,000 units, 15,000 kilograms of dynamite, 20,000 kilograms of anite to the Soviet Union.

Electric detonator caps, 40,000 units, 100 kilograms of forcite, 60,00 kilograms of ammonia, 8,000 meters of explosive fuse wire to the Soviet Union.

25,000 kilograms of dynamite, 200 kilograms of forcite to the Soviet Union.

Electric detonator caps, 25,000 units, 12,000 kilograms of dynamite, 7,000 kilograms of anite to the Soviet Union.

Forcit

1,000 tons of dynamite, 50 tons of forcite pipecharge, 100 tons of amatol, 50 tons of anite, 50 tons of trotyl to Sweden.

150 tons of trotyl to Norway.

1,000 tons of dynamite to Sweden.

Hackman

50,450 units of 57 mm m/50 gun shells to Sweden.

1,700 shells with 40L60 detonator caps to Holland and 1,700 40L70 barrels with detonator caps to Holland.

12,000 40L60 shells to Sweden.

60,000 40L60 shells to Thailand.

10,200 57 mm shells to Sweden.

Kemira

5 tons of gunpowder and 65 million detonator caps to Malaysia.

30 tons of gunpowder and 20 million detonator caps to Singapore.

30 million cartridge detonators to Indonesia.

56 tons of gunpowder to Singapore.

625,000 60 mm basic mortar charge to Denmark in the years 1980-81.

3 million cartridge detonators to Portugal.

20 million cartridge detonators to Spain.

20 million cartridge detonators to Italy.

10 tons of gunpowder to Italy.

Lapua Cartridge Plant

725,000 7.62x51 cartridges to Singapore. Lapua Cartridge Plant's justification: the Council of State issued an export permit for 1.2 million cartridges to Singapore in 1977. The client returned a portion of the delivery at that time and the new ones are a replacement.

A half million 7.62x39 caliber cartridges to Qatar.

100,000 9 caliber Browning Short cartridges to Qatar.

Valmet

6,000 40L70 HET anti-aircraft gun rounds to Indonesia.

10,000 JT P 02 detonators as well as 12,000 accompanying casings with detonator caps to Indonesia in 1981.

350 light Valmet LMG M78 machine guns as well as 2,000 kilograms of related equipment to Qatar.

60,000 40L60 cartridge detonators to Thailand. 60,000 40L60 gun shells to Thailand. 30,000 complete HET rounds to Thailand.

150 M76 caliber assault rifles as 222 REM semiautomatic weapons to Indonesia for that country's coast guard.

12,000 35 mm OeHEI and 3,00 OeTPT anti-aircraft gun rounds to Greece.

350 assault rifle cases (weapons parts) to Sweden.

1981

Finn-Stroi

To the Soviet Union: 3,000 kilograms of dynamite, 2,000 kilograms of ammonite, 200 kilograms of forcite, 10,000 kilograms of electric detonators, 5,000 meters of explosive fuse wire, 300,000 nail charges.

To the Soviet Union: 272,000 electric detonators, 151,000 kilograms of dynamite, and 80,000 kilograms of anite by the end of 1983.

Forcit

To Sweden: 1,500 tons of dynamite, 50 tons of forcite pipecharges, 100 tons of anite, 200 tons of amatol, 400 tons of trotyl.

To Norway 200 tons of trotyl.

To Norway 100 tons of trotyl.

Trotyl: 250,000 kilograms to Norway, 200,000 kilograms to Sweden, 50,000 kilograms to West Germany.

50,000 kilograms of anite and A-pipecharges to Sweden.

25,000 kilograms of amatol to Sweden.

25,000 kilograms of F- and K-pipecharges to Sweden.

1.5 million kilos of Dynamex to Sweden.

300,000 meters of black powder fuse wire and timed fuse wire to Switzerland.

Hackman

60,000 40L70 gun shells and 40,000 40L60 shells to Sweden.

32,000 57 mm M 50 shells and 2,0400 TAK 120 mm L/46 shells to Sweden.

120,400 40L60 shells to France.

20,000 40L60 shells and 40,000 40L70 shells to Sweden.

60,0040 40L60 gun shells to Thailand. The original permit was issued in 1980, now the term of the permit is being extended.

43,000 9 cm m/59 B gun shells to Sweden by the end of 1984

50,000 40L70 shells and 40,000 40L60 shells to Sweden.

Kemira

35,000 blank basic charge shells to Singapore in 1981.

35,000 base screws to Singapore in 1981.

Gunpowder (country/tons): Sweden 100, Norway 27, Denmark 4, West Germany 40, Austria 30, Portugal 15, Singapore 100, Malaysia 15, Columbia 30, Brazil 50, Thailand 10, United States 5, Yugoslavia 5, Greece 10, Switzerland 5, Belgium 1, Holland 1, Australia 5, New Zealand 5, total of 458 tons.

Base detonators for cartridges (country/millions of units): Sweden 35, Norway 10, West Germany 30, Austria 70, Portugal 25, England 8, Singapore 15, Malaysia 35, Indonesia 10, Venezuela 15, Peru 15, Thailand 15, Belgium 10, Holland 1, France 10, Greece 20, United States 5, Australia 5, New Zealand 5, total of 339 million units.

7,200 kilograms of trinitroresorsinol to England.

Samples of experimental gunpowder, base detonators, and base screws as well as other comparable products to all countries of the world.

Gunpowder for shotguns and small rifles (country/tons): England 60, Italy 25, France 30, Spain 30, Greece 15, Austria 10, Portugal 15, United States 5, Yugoslavia 5, total of 155 tons.

Detonating fuses: Norway 2 million units, Sweden 1 million units, Greece 2 million units, Switzerland 1 million units.

Nitrocellulose: Norway, Sweden, and West Germany, 50 tons each.

Samples of experimental gunpowder, base detonators, detonating fuses, shotgun cartridges, nitrocellulose, and comparable products to all countries of the world.

25 tons of gunpowder for shotguns and small rifles to Peru.

17,000 base screws and 20,000 blank basic charge shells to Singapore.

45 tons of gunpowder to Thailand.

20 tons of shotgun powder to Ecuador by the end of 1982.

Gunpowder to Brazil: 5 tons for rifles, approximately 25 tons for 20 mm caliber anti-aircraft rounds and approximately 30 tons for 30 mm caliber anti-aircraft rounds.

The buyer is the Companhia Brasileira de Cartuchos, which is controlled by the Brazilian Defense Forces, or the Brazilian Air Force.

100 tons of gunpowder for hunting rifle cartridges in 1982 to the United States.

Lapua Cartridge Plant

259,640 primed 20 mm shells to Sweden, 175,000 m/78 base detonators for cannon shells to Sweden.

One million primed 20 mm shells to Sweden in 1981-83.

Valmet

3,000 M76 semiautomatic 222 REM caliber assault rifles to Indonesia by the end of 1982.

2,000 M76 5.56 and 7.62x39 and 7.6x51 caliber semiautomatic rifles with gear as well as 2,000 kilograms of spare parts for the same weapons to the United States.

800 anti-aircraft gun 40L70 HEIT rounds to Argentina for test purposes.
30 mm HS 831 anti-aircraft gun rounds to Kenya by the end of 1982:
10,000 TPT types, 10,000 HEI, and 5,000 HEIT.

Semiautomatic rifles and their spare parts: Australia 50 weapons and 100 kilograms of spare parts, New Zealand 50 weapons/100 kilograms, Norway 50 weapons/100 kilograms, Luxemburg 50 weapons/100 kilograms, Holland 50 weapons/100 kilograms, Belgium 50 weapons/100 kilograms, England 100 weapons/250 kilograms.

A half million 9.00 PB pistol cartridges to Qatar.

200,000 uncharged cartridge parts to Sweden by the end of 1982.

50 M78 light machine guns to the United States by the end of 1982.

4,000 M76 and LMG M78 5.56x45, 7.62x39, and 7.62x51 mm caliber semiautomatic rifles with gear as well as 4,000 kilograms of spare parts for the same weapons to the United States by the end of 1982.

700 M76 assault rifles with gear to the Mexican Defense Ministry.

One million 7.62x39 blank cartridges to the United Arab Emirates.

300 semiautomatic assault rifles with gear to Australia and 200 kilograms of spare parts for the same weapons to Australia by the end of 1982.

Sica

3,000 R 3000 mining charges to Sweden and Norway by the end of 1982.

1982

Finn-Stroi

To the Soviet Union: 3,000 kilograms of dynamite, 20,000 kilograms of ammonite, 200 kilograms of phosphorus, 10,000 electric detonators, 5,000 meters of explosive fuse wire, and 300,000 nail charges.

Fiskars

Four excitation mine sweeping units to Sweden.

Forcit

One million meters of explosive fuse wire to Sweden.

50,000 tons of trotyl of Norway, 50,000 tons to Sweden, and 150,000 tons to West Germany.

20,000 kilograms of F- and K-pipecharges to Sweden.

100,000 kilograms of trotyl to Sweden.

50,000 kilograms of trotyl to Sweden.

Hackman

20,000 57 mm m/50 cannon shells to Sweden by the end of 1983.

16,500 57 mm cannon shells to Sweden by the end of 1983.

20,000 10.5 cm m/61 shells to Sweden by the end of 1985.

51,000 40 mm shells to Sweden by the end of 1983.

50,000 40L70 shells to Singapore by the end of 1983.

10,400 40L60 shells to Sweden by the end of 1983.

20,000 57 mm m/50 shells to Sweden by the end of 1983.

9,000 57 mm cannon shells to Singapore by the end of 1983.

6,000 40L60 cannon shells to Holland in 1983.

Kemira

100 tons of gunpowder to Portugal.

10 tons of gunpowder to Peru, 5 tons to Italy, 15 tons to Sweden.

55,000 detonators to Italy.

600 tons of dynamite and 100,000 blasting caps to Ethiopia.

15 tons of military gunpowder to Sweden.

40,000 base detonators for cartridges to Singapore.

30 tons of gunpowder to the Soviet Union by the end of March 1983. 25 tons of gunpowder to the Philippines by the end of March 1983.

20 million base detonators for cartridges to the Philippines by the end of March 1983.

45,000 blank basic charge shells to Singapore by the end of March 1983.

67,000 base screws to Singapore by the end of March 1983.

Gunpowder by the end of April 1983: 55 tons to Greece, 50 tons to France, and 7 tons to Yugoslavia.

Gunpowder for sports and hunting rifles in 1983-84 (country/tons): Spain 17, Portugal 6, Norway 15, Brazil 8, Austria 10, England 12, Italy 50, Sweden 15, Singapore 15, East Germany 15, Bulgaria 7, Yugoslavia 7, West Germany 10, United States 40, Soviet Union 30, Holland 1, Belgium 1, and Luxemburg 1 ton.

Military gunpowder 1983-84 (country/tons): West Germany 70, Portugal 85, Sweden 60, Greece 60, Singapore 120, Thailand 60, Norway 15, Brazil 30, Peru 10, Columbia 40, Philippines 20, Denmark 15, Turkey 80, France 40.

Base detonators for other shotgun cartridges (country/millions of units): Portugal 15, Sweden 20, West Germany 30, Malaysia 50, Peru 20, Austria 12, Singapore 30, England 6, Norway 4, Venezuela 5, Thailand 15, Philippines 20, Spain 5, Belgium 70, Holland 1, Luxemburg 1, Greece 10, United States 5, Australia 5, New Zealand 5. Total of 329 million units.

Mining explosives and gunpowder mass in 1983-84: Sweden 400 tons, West Germany 200 tons.

Nitrocellulose in 1983-84: Norway 50 tons, Sweden 50 tons, West Germany 50 tons.

Blasting caps in 1983-84: Norway 1 million, Sweden 2 million, Portugal 1.2 million.

260,000 blank basic charge shells to Singapore in 1983-84.

260,000 base screws to Singapore in 1983-84.

A half million detonating fuses to Indonesia in 1983-84 and a half million to Italy.

50,000 basic mortar charges to Ecuador in 1983-84 and 240,000 supplemental mortar charges to Ecuador.

Lapua Cartridge Plant

200,000 m/78 base detonators for cannon shells to Sweden.

One million 7.62x51 caliber Match/D 46 cartridges to the Singapore Defense Ministry.

One million 7.62x39 caliber cartridges and one million 7.62x39 blank cartridges to Qatar. One million 9 mm caliber Parabellum pistol cartridges to Kuwait.

Outokumpu

Mining charges by the end of 1983: Australia 2,000 units, India 500, England 1,000, Spain 1,000, Canada 1,000, Philippines 2,000.

Valmet

M76 and M78 semiautomatic rifles by the end of 1983: Netherlands 50, Belgium 50, England 50, Luxemburg 50, Norway 50, France 50, Sweden 50.

1,500 M82 semiautomatic rifles to the United States by the end of 1983 and 100 M82 assault rifles with gear to the United States by the end of 1983.

M76 and M78 semiautomatic rifles by the end of 1983: Austria 50, Sweden 50, New Zealand 50.

A half million practice cartridge casings for anti-aircraft guns to Sweden by the end of 1983.

200 M76 and M78 semiautomatic rifles to New Zealand by the end of 1983.

To Qatar by the end of 1983: 250 assault rifles with gear, 1,250 reserve clips, a half million 5.56x45 cartridges, and 250 clip sacks.

6,000 30 mm HS 831 TPT anti-aircraft gun rounds and 6,000 30 mm HS 831 TP rounds to Greece.

4,000 M76 and M78 semiautomatic rifles with gear as well as 4,000 kilograms of spare parts for the same weapons to the United States by the end of 1983.

Vammaskoski Plant

9,000 105 mm cannon cartridges to Sweden by the end of 1983.

Sica

10,000 (R 3000) mining charges to the United States and Canada by the end of 1983.

1983

Finn-Stroi

To the Soviet Union: 2,000 kilograms of dynamite, 10,000 kilograms of ammonite, 150 kilograms of forcite, 10,000 electric detonators, 5,000 meters of explosive fuse wire, nail charges.

55,000 electric detonators, 30,000 kilograms of dynamite and 16,000 kilograms of anite to the Soviet Union. The permit applies to the years 1984-85.

Forcitt

Dynamex: A half million kilos to Sweden.

Trotyl: Sweden 800,000 kilograms, Norway 350,000 kilograms, West Germany 500,000 kilograms, England 50,000 kilograms.

Five million meters of explosive fuse wire to Sweden.

E- and K-pipecharges: Sweden 80,000 kilograms, United States 30,000 kilograms.

Explosive fuse wire: United States a half million meters, Canada a half million meters.

50,000 kilograms of F-, K-, and KK-pipecharges to Canada.

F-, K-, and KK-pipecharges: United States 50,000 kilograms, West Germany 50,000 kilograms, Greece 50,000 kilograms.

500,000 explosive fuse wire to West Germany.

100,000 kilograms of amatol to Sweden.

500 tons of dynamex to Sweden, 100 tons of amatol to Sweden, 800 tons of trotyl to Sweden, 300 tons to Norway, 400 tons to West Germany, and 50 tons to England.

20 tons of F-, K-, KK-pipecharges to the United States, 20 tons to Canada, 50 tons to Sweden, 20 tons to West Germany, and 10 tons to Japan.

Five million explosive fuse wire to Sweden, 0.5 million meters to West Germany, 0.5 million meters to the United States, and 0.5 million meters to Canada.

100,000 kilos of trotyl to Sweden.

Hackman

10,000 40L60 cannon shells to Holland.

11,000 40L60 cannon shells and 11,000 40L70 cannon shells to Holland.

2,500 120 TAK cannon shells to Sweden.

60,000 40L60 shells to Sweden in 1984.

51,000 40L60 shells to Sweden by the end of March 1984.

12,000 40L60 shells to Belgium.

60,000 40L60 shells with base detonators to Thailand by the end of 1984.

50,000 130 mm shells designed by the General Staff to Sweden during the years 1984-1986.

Kemira

2.5 million base detonators for shotgun cartridges to Argentina.

85 tons of gunpowder to Greece by the end of 1984.

50 tons of gunpowder to England by the end of March 1984.

Six million base detonators (.223 REM) to Czechoslovakia by the end of March 1984.

20 tons of gunpowder to Czechoslovakia by the end of May 1984.

Gunpowder for sports and hunting rifles (country/tons): Spain 15, Portugal 7, Norway 15, Austria 20, West Germany 30, Italy 13, United States 8, Greece 15, Singapore 20, East Germany 15, Sweden 10, Belgium 10, Peru 10, Yugoslavia 6, Brazil 7, Bulgaria 7, Soviet Union 20, Luxemburg 1, and Holland 1 ton or a total of 280 tons. The export permit applies to the years 1983 and 1984.

200 tons of mining explosives and gunpowder mass to Sweden, 100 tons to West Germany, and 100 tons to Holland, a total of 400 tons.

50 tons of nitrocellulose to Norway, 50 tons to Sweden, and 150 tons to West Germany, a total of 150 tons.

One million blasting caps to Norway, 2 million to Sweden, 1 million to Columbia, and 0.5 million to Greece, a total of 4.5 million.

30,000 tracer capsules to Norway and 40,000 to Singapore, a total of 70,000.

5,000 kilos of shotgun powder to East Germany. Permit valid until end of 1984.

Lapua Cartridge Plant

900,000 7.62x51 caliber Match/D46 competition cartridges as well as 300,000 32 caliber SAW long Wadcutter cartridges to Nigeria.

170,000 refurbished 40mm m/48 brass shells to Sweden in 1983-84.

One million primed 20 mm shells. Permit extended until end of 1984. Previous decision to export shipment made in Council of State on 24 September 1981.

Outokumpu

500 mining charges to Chile.

General Staff Procurement Section

117,500 electric moment detonators to Austria.

Tampere Weapons Plant

Jatimatic 9 mm automatic pistols, samples: Belgium, England, Holland, Greece, Norway, France, Sweden, Switzerland, United States, United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Kuwait, Brunei, Malaysia, Thailand; 1-8 weapons/country.

50 sample Jatimatic 9 mm automatic pistols to Belgium, 50 to England, 20 to Holland, 150 to France, 50 to the United States, and 1 to the Philippines.

Valmet

30,500 (30 mm) anti-aircraft gun ammunition casings and 30,500 fuses for the same ammunition casings to France. Additional information from Valmet: Ammunition components will be used as parts for munitions to be shipped from France to Qatar.

2,000 M76 semiautomatic rifles with gear as well as 1,000 kilograms of spare parts for the same weapons to France by the end of 1984.

A half million 9 mm cartridges to the United Arab Emirates.

1,000 kilograms of spare parts for assault rifles to Qatar.

300,000 uncharged 20 mm anti-aircraft gun ammunition casings to Sweden.

Three million 7.62x30 cartridges to Indonesia in 1983 and 1,500 100 mm cartridges to Indonesia.

Five million 7.62x39 cartridges, 2 million 7.62x51 cartridges, and 10,000 76/42 projectiles to Indonesia. Export permit valid until end of 1985.

Vammaskoski Plant

50,000 130 mm grenade casings to Sweden by the end of 1984.

Sica

3,000 K 3000 mining charges to Sweden and Norway by the end of 1984.

1984

Finn Enterprise

Weapons discarded from use by Defense Forces to Canada: 5,000 m/91 military rifles and 5,000 m/1930 military rifles.

Forcit

200,000 kilograms of trotyl to Sweden.

500 tons of dynamex to Sweden.

100 tons of amatol to Sweden.

800 tons of trotyl to Sweden, 400 tons to Norway, 300 tons to West Germany, 100 tons to Denmark.

F-, K-, KK-, and GA-pipecharges: 100 tons to the United States, 50 tons to Canada, 100 tons to Sweden, 20 tons to West Germany, 20 tons to England, 20 tons to Italy.

Explosive fuse wire: 5 million meters to Sweden, a half million meters each to West Germany, the United States, and Canada.

Hackman

51,000 40L70 shells to Sweden.

100,000 brass 40L60 shells, export country: Sweden, France, or Holland.

50,000 40L70 brass shells, export country: Sweden or Spain.

13,000 mine parts to Sweden in 1985-86.

Kemira

100 million base detonators for rifle cartridges by the end of 1985.

12,000 charge series and 120 tons of artillery gunpowder by the end of 1986.

26 tons of military gunpowder to Singapore by March 1987.

Military gunpowder (country/tons): West Germany 50, Portugal 20, Sweden 70, Greece 190, Singapore 120, Malaysia 20, Thailand 50, Norway 20, Brazil 30 Peru 20, Columbia 30, Philippines 10, Denmark 5, Turkey 20, France 20, Czecholovakia 20, Ecuador 30, and England 170 tons by March 1985.

Base detonators for other than shotgun cartridges (country/millions of units): Portugal 15, Sweden 20, West Germany 30, Malaysia 20, Peru 20, Austria 13, Singapore 40, England 50, Norway 4, Venezuela 5, Thailand 15, Philippines 15, Spain 5, Belgium 6, Holland 1, Luxemburg 1, Greece 10, United States 5, Australia 5, New Zealand, and Ecuador 20, a total of 315 million.

260,000 blank basic charge shells to Singapore and 100,000 to Thailand.

260,000 base screws to Singapore and 100,000 to Thailand.

500,000 detonating fuses to Indonesia and 500,000 to Italy.

50,000 basic mortar charges to Ecuador and 50,000 to Thailand, a total of 100,000.

240,000 supplemental mortar charges to Ecuador and 300,000 to Thailand, a total of 540,000.

120,000 kilograms of gunpowder to Holland.

600,000 kilograms of gunpowder to Holland.

5 tons of shotgun powder to New Zealand.

160,000 120 mm basic mortar charges to Portugal and 40,000 supplemental charge series for them to Portugal by the end of 1985.

40,000 120 mm basic mortar charges to Portugal and 160,000 supplemental mortar charge series to Portugal.

Military gunpowder (country/tons): West Germany 50, Portugal 20, Sweden 80, Greece 70, Norway 20, Denmark 5, Czechoslovakia 20, England 80, Holland 560.

Base detonators for other than shotgun cartridges (country/millions of units): Portugal 15, Sweden 20, West Germany 50, Austria 90, England 30, Norway 4, Spain 5, Belgium 6, Holland 1, Luxemburg 1, Greece 10, United States 5, Australia 5, New Zealand 5, Czechoslovakia 15.

500,000 base screws to Italy. 500,000 detonating fuses to Italy.

Gunpowder for sports and hunting rifles (country/tons): Spain 10, Portugal 7, Norway 15, Austria 20, West Germany 37, Italy 15, England 13, United States 40, Greece 8, East Germany 20, Sweden 15, Belgium 10, Yugoslavia 7, Bulgaria 7, Soviet Union 20, Luxemburg 1, Holland 1, Czechoslovakia 10, New Zealand 5.

Mining explosives and gunpowder mass: Sweden 200 tons, West Germany 100, and Holland 100 tons.

Nitrocellulose: Norway 50 tons, Sweden 50 tons, West Germany 50 tons.

Blasting caps: Norway 1 million, Sweden 2 million, Greece .5 million.

30,000 tracer capsules to Norway.

40 tons of gunpowder to Holland by the end of March 1985.

11 million base detonators for cartridges to Peru by the end of 1985.

6.2 blank cartridges to Singapore by the end of 1985, 210,00 base screw detonators, 105,000 blank basic charge shells, 66 tons of ballistite gunpowder, 0.45 tons of black gunpowder, 111 tons of nitrocellulose gunpowder.

Lapua Cartridge Plant

500,000 primed 20 mm artillery shells to Sweden in 1984-85.

Nokia

600 electronic message units at the most to Holland in 1985.

Perusyhtyma

100,000 nail charges to the Soviet Union by the end of May 1985.

Sako-Tikka

Standard model 7.62 caliber assault rifles, 80 to Sweden by the end of 1985.

Suomen Museoase

40 m/37 and m/40 infantry cannons to England and 10 to Sweden as well as 40 76-mm K27 cannons to England and 10 to Sweden by March 1985.

Tampere Weapons Plant

100 Jatimatic 9 mm automatic pistols to Belgium, 50 to England, 2 to Spain, 5 to Norway, 2 to Portugal, 250 to France, 10 to Sweden, 20 to Switzerland, 10 to Denmark by March 1985.

Valmet

2,000 semiautomatic rifles with gear to the United States and 1,000 kilograms to parts, 200 semiautomatic rifles to Canada and 100 kg of parts by the end of 1985.

100 30 mm HS831TPT anti-aircraft gun rounds to Greece.

100 semiautomatic rifles to Australia and 50 kilograms of parts, 50 to Belgium and 25 kilograms of parts, 50 to England and 25 kilograms of parts, 50 Holland and 25 kilograms of parts, 50 to Italy and 25 kilograms of parts, 50 to Luxemburg and 25 kilograms of parts, 50 to Norway and 25 kilograms of parts, 1,500 to France and 500 kilograms of parts, 10 to Switzerland and 5 kilograms of parts, and 50 to New Zealand and 25 kilograms of parts.

An extension was granted to the permit issued in 1982 to export 6,000 30-mm HS831TPT and 6,000 30 mm HS831TPT anti-aircraft rounds to Greece.

500,000 38 Special pistol cartridges to Qatar as well as 7.62x51 rifle cartridges for the use of the United Arab Emirates and Qatar police.

Extension of export permit (Council of State decision of 27 April 1983) to the end of 1984: 1,500 100 mm cartridges to Indonesia.

3,000 40L60 ammunition casings for tank ammunition and 3,000 tracers for ammunition casings. Target country not mentioned.

500,000 7.62x39 cartridges to Indonesia.

For ammunition manufacture in Sweden by the end of 1985: 300,000 nuts, 300,000 transfer shanks, and 350,000 detonator casings.

80 fully automatic assault rifles with gear as well as necessary spare parts to Sweden by the end of 1985.

Vesi-Pekka

20,000 blasting caps (Kemira VA-SAE) with 25 m conductors to India.

10,000 Nitro Nobel Nogel GT blasting caps with 27 m conductors to India.

4,000 gang contacts for the above.

1985

Finn Enterprise

To West Germany 1,500 military rifles rejected and discarded from use by the Finnish Defense Forces, 15,000 to the United States by the end of 1986.

A total of approximately 57,940 military rifles as well as 82 sniperscope rifles discarded from use to Canada in 1986-1990. The General Staff's procurement section sold them through a company.

Finn-Stroi

To the Soviet Union: 5,000 kilograms of dynamite, 5,000 electric detonators, 200,000 nail charges.

To the Soviet Union: 2,000 kilograms of dynamite, 15,000 kilograms of ammonite, 140 kilograms of forcite, 5,000 electric detonators, 3,000 meters of explosive fuse wire, and 5,000 nail charges.

Fiskars

Hydroacoustic components at a value of 35 million markkas at the most to Sweden in 1985-86. Contents: communications cables, voice-frequency amplifiers, microphones, micro computers, power sources.

Sweeping equipment for sea mines worth 5 million markkas at the most to Indonesia by the end of 1987. Contents: clearing cables, rectifiers, guidance systems for rectifiers, sound sweepers.

Sweeping equipment for sea mines worth 4 million markkas at the most to Nigeria by the end of 1987. Contents: clearing cables and electrodes, rectifiers, guidance systems for rectifiers.

Forcit

150 tons of trotyl to Belgium.

600 tons of nabite to Sweden.

500 tons of dynamite (Dynamex, Mastermix) to Sweden.

100 tons of amatol to Sweden.

Trotyl in 1986: Sweden 800 tons, Norway 400, Denmark 200, Belgium 100, West Germany 300, and Austria 100 in 1986.

400 tons of nabite to Sweden in 1986.

F-, K-, KK-, and GA-pipecharges in 1986: United States 100 tons, Canada 50, Sweden 100, Poland 50, England 50, Portugal 30, West Germany 50, and Japan 30 tons.

Five million meters of explosive fuse wire to Sweden and half million meters each to the United States, Canada, West Germany, Poland, and Portugal.

Hackman

300 100-mm shells to Belgium.

32,000 40L70 brass shells to Denmark and 10,000 to Belgium by the end of 1986.

11,000 122 mm brass shells to Greece by the end of 1986.

Kemira

120-mm mortar-components to Thailand: 3,100 base screws, 6,200 detonating fuses, 3,100 basic charges, and 3,100 supplemental charges.

7,84 million blank cartridge detonators to Singapore.

900 60 mm base screws to Thailand. Order was sent as replacement for corresponding amount rejected by client.

400,000 electric blasting caps for use in mining to Turkey by the end of June 1986.

64,422 Brandt 81 mm basic mortar charges to Malaysia.

To Greece: 14,000 30 mm shells, 14,000 30 mm HSS-base detonators, 7,000 30 mm HSS-tracer capsules.

42,000 Brandt 81 mm basic mortar charges to Ecuador.

12,000 series of charge series and 120 tons of artillery gunpowder to Thailand by the end of 1986.

Military gunpowder 1 January 1986--31 March 1987: West Germany 50 tons, Portugal 50, Sweden 100, Norway 20, Denmark 5, France 20, Czechoslovakia 30, Holland 450, England 125, Austria 25, and Greece 60 tons.

Base detonators for other than shotgun cartridges (country/millions of units): Portugal 5, Sweden 20, West Germany 50, Austria 80, England 30, Norway 3, Spain 5, Belgium 1, Luxemburg 1, Greece 10, United States 10, Australia 10, New Zealand 5, and Czechoslovakia 10 million.

Base screws: Italy 500,000, Portugal 300,000.

Detonating fuses: Italy 500,000, West Germany 200,000.

Basic mortar charges: 200,000 to Portugal.

Supplemental mortar charges: Portugal 200,000 and Austria 80,000.

Lapua Cartridge Plant

944,000 9 mm caliber Parabellum pistol cartridges to Kuwait. As background information for the Council of State it was noted that the cartridges are being sent as replacements for previously delivered defective cartridges, which the client will return.

400,000 primed 20 mm shells to Sweden by the end of 1987.

Raikka

50 illumination capsules for illumination grenades to Sweden, 300 (model 21) alarm mines, 100 (model 85 Raikka) tear gas launchers, 100 (model 85 Raikka) colored smoke launchers.

Sica

3,000 mining charges to Sweden and Norway by the end of 1986.

Tampere Weapons Plant

500 Jatimatic 9 mm Para-series automatic weapons to England. Permit was tabled, and there is no subsequent note of it in the official records of the Council of State.

Urheilupyora

2,000 kilograms of gunpowder to Sweden.

Valmet

30 military pistols to the United States and 2 to West Germany.

1,000 100 mm cartridges to Indonesia by the end of 1986.

Semiautomatic rifles with gear by the end of 1985 (country/number of weapons/spare parts): Australia 100, 50 kilograms of spare parts, Belgium 50/25 kilograms, England 50/30 kilograms, Holland 100/30 kilograms, Italy 300/100 kilograms, Luxemburg 50/30 kilograms, Norway 50/30 kilograms, France 1,500/500 kilograms, Switzerland 10/20 kilograms, New Zealand 150/50 kilograms, Indonesia 10/10 kilograms.

500 40L70 anti-aircraft gun rounds to Malaysia.

25,000 20 mm practice anti-aircraft gun cartridges to Sweden.

Anti-aircraft gun round to Ireland: 6,000 model 40L60 HET and 2,000 40L60 TPT by the end of 1986.

100 40L70 ammunition bands to Malaysia.

12,600 defective deflecting rings returned to France.

300,000 transfer shanks for the manufacture of munitions in Sweden by the end of 1986.

2,000 122 mm m/38 howitzer rounds to Indonesia by the end of 1986.

1,500 JTP-02 bomb fuses to Indonesia by the end of 1986.

Semiautomatic rifles with gear and their parts: United States 2,000, 100 kilograms of parts, Canada 500/200 kilograms, Australia 200/70 kilograms, Belgium 50/30 kilograms, England 100/50 kilograms, Holland 50/30 kilograms, Italy 300/100 kilograms, Luxemburg 50/30 kilograms, Norway 25/20 kilograms, Sweden 10/10 kilograms, France 1,000/500 kilograms, New Zealand 150/50 kilograms.

Vammaskoski Plant

Terrain vehicle parts to Sweden until the end of 1987: 1,000 towing clamps, 5,000 roller holders, 1,500 blower blades.

17,000 cocked ammunition casing blanks to Sweden by the end of 1987.

1986

Finn Enterprise

4,357 rejected and discard military pistols to the Canadian Century International Arms Ltd. firm at a price of 1,090,947 markkas in 1986-88. The combat weapons section of the General Staff first sold the weapons to Finn Enterprise.

Finn-Stroi

To the Soviet Union: 10,000 kilograms of dynamite, 10,000 electric detonators as well as 800,000 nail charges used in construction work.

Fiskars

Hydroacoustic components to Sweden by the end of 1987: Contents: communications cables, voice-frequency amplifiers, microphones, micro computers, power sources.

Sea mine sweeping equipment: clearing cables and electrodes, rectifiers, guidance systems for rectifiers, and sound sweepers worth 12 million markkas to Thailand by the end of 1990.

Magnetic protection devices for ships at a value of 8 million markkas at the most to Thailand: guided power sources, guidance equipment for power sources, and magnetometers by the end of 1990.

Sea mine sweeping equipment to India at a value of 20 million markkas at the most in 1987-1989.

Forcit

10,000 kilograms of amatol to the United States by the end of 1987.

Five tones of pentyl to Sweden.

Hackman

40L60 brass shells: 80,000 to Sweden, Holland, and Belgium.

40L70 brass shells: 40,000 to Sweden and Belgium.

40,000 57 mm brass shells to Sweden.

25,00 brass shells for 152 mm weapons m/1937 to Yugoslavia by the end of 1987. 8,700 100 mm brass shells, 200 130 mm brass shells, and 122 mm brass shells to Belgium by the end of 1987.

Air Force General Staff

Fouga Magister CM 170 aircraft to the United States at a price of 731,747 markkas.

Kemira

Gunpowder for sports and hunting guns by the end of 1987 (country/tons): Spain 20, Portugal 7, Norway 20, Austria 25, West Germany 40, Italy 20, England 20, United States 150, Greece 10, East Germany 20, Sweden 50, Belgium 10, Yugoslavia 10, Bulgaria 10, Soviet Union 20, Luxemburg 2, Holland 2, Czechoslovakia 60, and New Zealand 10 tons.

Mining explosives and gunpowder mass: Sweden 200 tons, West Germany 100 tons, Holland 100 tons.

Nitrocellulose: Norway 50 tons, Sweden 50 tons, West Germany 50 tons.

Blasting caps: Norway 1 million, Sweden 2 million, Greece .5 million.

Tracer capsules: Norway 30,000, Greece 30,000.

280 tons of military gunpowder to Sweden by the end of 1988 and 40 tons of rolled gunpowder mass to Sweden by the end of 1988. Client: Nobel Industries, which uses the products in its own production for shipments to India.

Gunpowder intended for military use by the end of March 1988
(country/tons): West Germany 100, Portugal 50, Sweden 50, Norway 20,
Denmark 5, France 20, Czechoslovakia 50, Switzerland 20, Italy 10, Canada
40, Bulgaria 40, Holland 540, England 80, Austria 40, Greece 300, Belgium
20, Spain 20, and the United States 20 tons.

Base detonators for other than shotgun cartridges (country/millions of
units): Portugal 5, Sweden 30, West Germany 20, Austria 30, England 20,
Norway 5, New Zealand 5, Spain 1, Belgium 1, Luxemburg 1, Greece 10,
United States 5, Australia 20, and Czechoslovakia 10 million.

Base mortar screw detonators: Italy 200,000, Portugal 200,000.

Basic mortar charges: Portugal 200,000, France 100,000, Austria 100,000,
United States 50,000.

Supplementary mortar charge series: Portugal 200,000, Austria 100,000,
United States 50,000.

Detonating fuses: West Germany 200,000, Belgium 200,000, Italy 100,000,
Austria 50,000, Sweden 400,000.

Detonators: Portugal 50,000, Austria 10,000, West Germany 20,000.

Gunpowder for sports and hunting guns by the end of March 1988
(country/tons): Spain 20, Portugal 7, Norway 5, Austria 15, West Germany
40, Italy 20, England 20, United States 50, Greece 10, East Germany 20,
Sweden 25, Belgium 10, Denmark 40, Yugoslavia 10, Bulgaria 20, Soviet
Union 20, Luxemburg 2, Holland 15, Czechoslovakia 100, New Zealand 15,
Australia 10, and Canada 10 tons.

Mining explosives and gunpowder mass: Sweden 50 tons, Holland 50 tons,
Denmark 50 tons, and Turkey 100 tons.

Mining blasting caps: Norway 1 million, Sweden 1 million, Turkey 1 mil-
lion, and Greece 400,000.

Tracer capsules: Norway 100,000, Greece 50,000, England 50,000.

20 tons of military gunpowder to Malaysia, 10 million base detonators for
weapons other than shotgun cartridges, 200 anti-aircraft rounds to
Malaysia by the end of March 1987.

50,000 detonating fuses to Indonesia by the end of March 1987.

To Peru by the end of March 1987: 10 tons of military gunpowder and 10
million base detonators for other than shotgun cartridges.

To Ecuador by the end of March 1987: 10 tons of military gunpowder, 10
million base detonators for other than shotgun cartridges, 120,000 basic
mortar charges, 100,000 supplemental mortar charge series.

120 tons of M1-gunpowder with a type mark of 27 N 49, 1,750 kilograms of CBI-gunpowder, and 330 kilograms calcium sulphate to Singapore.

132 tons of military gunpowder to Greece by March 1987.

Lapua Cartridge Plant

6,000 detonator caps to Sweden by the end of 1987.

Nokia

A total of 600 electronic message units to Holland and Sweden in 1986 and 800 in 1987.

Perusyhtymä

200,000 nail charges to the Soviet Union by the end of 1987.

Raikka

110 tons of nitrocellulose to Belgium.

Suomen Museoase

The procurement section of the General Staff sold through a company approximately 26,800 military rifles as well as 103 sniper scope rifles discarded from service to the United States in 1986-1990.

4,000 scope-type laser-range finders to Malaysia, West Germany, and England by the end of 1987.

Turku Air

Four Fouga Magister aircraft discarded from use by the Finnish Air Force to the United States.

Valmet

2,000 practice 35 mm anti-aircraft gun rounds to Switzerland.

Semiautomatic rifles (semiautomatic sports and hunting guns) and their parts by the end of 1987: United States 2,000 weapons, 1,500 kilograms of parts, Canada 500 units/200 kilograms, Australia 200/70 kilograms, Belgium 50/30 kilograms, England 100/50 kilograms, Holland 50/100 kilograms, Luxemburg 50/30 kilograms, Norway 25/20 kilograms, Sweden 10/10 kilograms, France 1,000/500 kilograms, Switzerland 10/10 kilograms, New Zealand 150/50 kilograms.

300 OE 35 mm anti-aircraft rounds to Greece.

300,000 practice 20 mm anti-aircraft gun cartridges to Sweden.

500 OE 35 mm anti-aircraft rounds to Austria.

2,000 122 mm m/38 howitzer rounds to Indonesia. Extension until the end of June 1986. Previous decision made in January 1986.

Radio and navigation system antennas worth 2.5 million markkas to Sweden by June 1988. This equipment will be installed in Draken aircraft to be delivered to the Austrian Air Force.

Vammkoski Plant

A total of 20,000 cocked 155 mm cartridge casing blanks and 15 155-mm crushing turned and reduced cartridge casings to Bofors in Sweden, which stated that the casings will be reexported as partial deliveries to India. Procurements from Sweden by the Finnish Defense Forces are compensated by these exports.

35,000 Adapter 105 mm artillery cartridge parts to Sweden by the end of 1987.

1987

Fiskars

Underwater listening system worth 30 million markkas to Saudi Arabia in 1988-89. Client is the Sager International Company. Contents: hydrophones and cables, data processing units, display terminals.

Forcit

200 tons of trotyl to Sweden, 300 tons to Norway, 100 tons to Denmark, 100 tons to Belgium.

Mining explosives: 300 tons of dynamex to Sweden, 50 tons of amatol to Sweden, 150 tons of nabite to Sweden.

100 tons of F-, K-, KK-, and GA-pipecharges to the United States, 50 tons to Canada and 30 tons to Sweden, of which 1.4 tons of K-pipecharge will be reexported to England as well as 30 tons to Italy.

One million meters of explosive fuse wire to Sweden.

0.5 million timed fuse wire to Switzerland.

300,000 40L60 brass shells to Singapore by the end of 1987.

50 kilograms of amatol to Sweden.

To Austria 100 kilograms of Formex, 100 kilograms of F-pipecharge, a portion of which will be reexported to Yugoslavia.

Hackman

22,000 flank mines with detonator systems and packing without explosives to Sweden by the end of 1988. The client is Forsvarets materialverk or the the materiel administration of the Swedish Defense Forces, Stockholm.

32,000 40L70 brass shells to Denmark's Harens Materialkommand, 10,000 to Belgium's Fabrique Nationale, 20,000 to Holland's Eurometal, 31,000 to Sweden's Bofors, 50,000 to France's Matra-Manurhin, 5,000 to Italy's Snia BPD.

40,000 40L60 brass shells to Liabi in Sweden, 20,000 to Venezeula's Aerotec.

25,000 122 mm brass shells to Kintex in Bulgaria, 10,000 to Portugal's Barcaren.

152 mm brass shells: 35,000 to Yugoslavia's UNIS, 10,000 to Bulgaria's Kintex.

130 mm brass shells: 3,000 to Belgium's PRB/Hecar, 3,000 to Austria's SMI/Hirtenberg, and 3,000 to Yugoslavia's UNIS.

Air Force General Staff

Four Fouga Magister CM 170 aircraft to the United States at a price of 731,747 markkas.

Kemira

10,000 kilograms of small rifle gunpowder intended for sports and hunting use (1.22 caliber) to France by the end of 1988. The client is Nouvelle Cartoucherie de Surveilliers.

25,000 mining blasting caps to Columbia.

200,000 detonating fuses and 20 tons of military gunpowder to Indonesia. The client is Departemen Pertahanan Klamam R. I. (Pindad).

10 million base detonators for shotgun cartridges to Argentina by the end of 1988. Client is Orbea Argentina S.A.I.C., which manufactures shotgun cartridges.

100,000 mortar charge series, 10 tons of rifle gunpowder, and 10 million rifle detonators to Ecuador by the end of March 1988. The client is Direction Industrial del Ejercito, Fabrica Santa Barbara.

30,000 81 mm mortar charge series, 10,000 120 mm mortar charge series, and 20 tons of military gunpowder by the end of March 1988 to Thailand. Client is Royal Thai Army.

Lemminkainen

To Norway: 35,000 kilograms of dynamite, 100,000 kilograms of anite, 50,000 pipecharges, 210,000 kilograms of ammonite, 40,000 detonators, 20,000 meters of explosive fuse wire.

Nokia

Electronic message units and calculators to England by the end of 1988: 800 electronic message units, 800 electronic message unit printers, 50 electronic message unit exchanges, 100 remote terminals, field calculators. Client is A Division of Philips Electronic and Associated Industries Ltd.

T:mi Nordarms Pertti Ketola

Rapid-fire and automatic rifles, anti-tank rifles, rotating telescopes, and field cannons with gear and without ammunition no longer used by the Finnish Defense Forces to England by the end of 1987.

Sako-Valmet

5,000 type TPT 30 mm HS-831 rounds and 5,000 type HEIT to Kenya by the end of 1987. Client is Kenyan Defense Forces.

Vammaskoski Plant

10,000 crushing turned and reduced 155 mm cartridge casings to Sweden. The buyer is Bofors, which will export the products to India.

Applications Still Being Considered

Kemira's application of 27 November 1986 to export 10 million base detonators for shotgun cartridges by the end of March 1988, 15 million base detonators for rifles, and 20 tons of gunpowder to the Indimil Firm, which is a subsidiary of the Peruvian Defense Ministry. The Finnish Defense Ministry required an obligation to prevent reexport. There was a motion to table the matter on 5 February 1987. The government has not considered the application since then.

Kemira's application of 27 November 1986 to export 120 tons of military gunpowder to Singapore by the end of 1988, 30 tons of mortar gunpowder, 15 million base detonators for blank cartridges, 100,000 base detonators for mortars, 100,000 blank basic charge shells for mortars as well as blank flame pipes. An agreement precluding reexport was required. The matter was considered again on 5 February 1987 when it was tabled. The application has not been considered since then.

Export Permits Were Issued "Flexibly"

Finnish arms and different types of war materiel have been exported over the years to areas and countries which as procurers do not meet the conditions

established by the Finnish Government. Officials directives have been interpreted rather loosely or they have not been considered at all.

According to the conditions stipulated by the Foreign Ministry, weapons may not be sold to areas in which either open warfare is being conducted or a threat of war prevails. Several such areas are to be found in the world and frequently Finnish arms exporters are also operating in these markets.

The conditions attached to the exporting of arms "are applied flexibly, this is policy", says Assistant Section Chief Jukka Valtasaari of the Foreign Ministry. "The policy is that we do not have a permanent black list with respect to any country." The only exception is South Africa, to which nothing is exported from Finland.

A flexible application has been the rule, for example, with respect to the Persian Gulf. A fierce war between Iran and Iraq has been going on in the area since 1980. Nevertheless, last year a shipment of pistol cartridges was sent from Finland to Kuwait, Iraq's neighbor.

Qatar, another wealthy small state located in a war zone area of the Persian Gulf, is a client of Finnish arms plants. Automatic rifles, assault rifles, and cartridges have been sold to Qatar during wartime. Qatar's assurance that it will use these weapons on its own territory only was a sufficient guarantee for the transaction.

The United Arab Emirates in the area of the Persian Gulf is also a client of the Finnish arms industry. Sweden does not export weapons to countries in this crisis area.

The condition that weapons are not to be exported to countries in which an internal crisis prevails is also applied flexibly in Finland. This restraining qualifier does not even come close to being sufficient to cover the situation which prevails in several of the client countries of the Finnish arms industry.

Warfare between the governments armed forces and the extreme left wing's New People's Army has been going on for years in the Philippines. Muslim guerillas are also rebelling against the central government in Manila. The situation has not changed even though President Corazon Aquino is now guiding the country on the path of democracy after many years of dictatorship.

The military government in Indonesia, which continuously buys Finnish war materiel, is carrying out a nearly permanent bloodbath in East Timor. There have been skirmishes with guerilla movements over the years in Thailand, another good client country.

In Latin America client countries of Finnish arms exporters include Peru and Columbia. The armies of both countries are conducting a continuous armed struggle against extreme left-wing guerilla movements, especially in rural areas. From time to time there are skirmishes in the cities also.

Even though military rule was at its bloodiest in Argentina in 1979, Kemira received a permit to export 40 tons of rifle and pistol gunpowder to that country. It was only 2 years later that the Finnish Government took note that the client country has a bad reputation.

Ulf Sundqvist, the trade and industry minister at that time, in a session of the Council of State stated his opinion that "considering Argentina's continuing violations of human rights", arms should not be exported to that country until the situation changes. Nevertheless, the Council of State decided to permit the export of anti-aircraft gun cartridges "for test purposes".

Transit countries present their own special problem in the international arms markets. They themselves are experiencing peaceful times, but they sell and reexport weapons purchased from other countries to crisis areas. Such transactions are difficult to control in spite of guarantees.

Singapore has become the best known market place in recent years. Its name came up again in connection with the Swedish Bofors Company's arms export scandal. Malaysia, Singapore's neighbor, also operates in this area. Both countries are clients of Finnish arms exporters.

One does not even have to travel outside of Europe to find intermediaries in the arms trade. Portugal has acted as a transit country in shady arms deals, in which the buyers have been Iranians and the Unita guerilla organization. It is conducting a civil war against the left-wing government with the support of South Africa and the United States, among others, in Angola, a former colony of Portugal.

Gunpowder for rifles, base detonators, and grenade launcher charges have been exported from Finland to Portugal over the years. This year, Hackman received a permit to export 122 mm brass shells to Portugal. In question is the artillery caliber of the Warsaw Pact countries, which cannot be used in the Portugal's Western-made artillery.

Finland's Arms Export Trade Is Small Time

It is not possible to equip even the smallest army with weapons exported from Finland; exports are primarily comprised of explosives and semi-finished products, such as detonator caps, shell casings, and base screws. Gunpowder and explosives represent substances which can be used by civilians, the military, and terrorists. When a ductile explosive substance explodes, it can tear apart an automobile as well as ore from a mine.

The distinction between hunting and military weapons is also blurred. In this decade, Valmet has exported more than 30,000 semiautomatic rifles, of which approximately 17,500 have been exported to the United States. A semiautomatic rifle is very similar to an assault rifle and is almost like it. The only difference is that a semiautomatic cannot be used for series fire. The trigger must be pulled for each bullet, but for a quick-fingered guerilla

it is an excellent military weapon, especially if one knows how to aim accurately. The weapon itself is accurate, and a hunter can attach a bayonet to the end of the barrel.

The American hunting markets consume an enormous amount of weapons. Valmet's rifles are swallowed up almost unnoticed. Just as unnoticed they could travel from there to the guerilla armies of small states. Various models of Valmet's semiautomatic rifles, some of which can accommodate cartridges used in NATO forces and others cartridges used by the Warsaw Pact, have been exported.

Valmet has also sold abroad a few heavy semiautomatic rifles, which have been equipped with front support brackets. Weapons similar to rapid-fire rifles are well suited for shooting mountain ibices, but mountain guerillas can lie in wait for something else also.

One Finnish product suitable for double use is the mining charge or flank mine. For several years the Sica Company has exported mining charges to Sweden and Canada, and this year Hackman has a permit to export 22,000 flank mines for the Swedish Defense Forces. In principle and to a great degree even in practice it is a question of the same type of equipment which shoots a molten copper mass either into the vault of a mine or the side of an armored tank. A vault will collapse just as easily as the side of an armored tank.

In addition to the detonator cap trade, plants producing materiel for the Finnish Defense Forces have been able to export several high-tech products in recent years. Nokia has exported binocular-model laser-rangefinders to Malaysia, West Germany, and England, and a new type of communications equipment, electronic message devices, to Sweden, England, and Holland.

The electronic message device is a new type of communications processing, concealment, transmitting, and receiving device. It sends messages in short bursts, which are difficult for the enemy to quickly decipher.

Know-how has also required the development of submarine surveillance systems. Fiskars has a permit to deliver hydroacoustic components or communications cables, sound-frequency amplifiers, microphones, micro computers, and power sources to Sweden. The company has also delivered excitation mine sweeping equipment to Sweden, and it will export approximately 30 million markkas' worth of underwater listening systems to Saudi Arabia in 1988-89.

For years already the Swedes have been interested in Finland's coastal defense systems, and the result is becoming apparent in the export trade.

An interesting detail is Hackman's export permit from the year 1983. According to it, the company may export "50,000 130-mm shells designed by the General Staff in the years 1984-86" to Sweden. The caliber in question would match Tampella's new turret gun, which has just been adopted for use by the Finnish coastal artillery. Has Tampella sold the manufacturing license for this cannon abroad?

For this year Fiskars has received a permit to export mine sweeping equipment, which will be delivered to Indonesia at a price of 5 million markkas and to Nigeria at a price of 4 million markkas. The company intends to export 20 million markkas' worth of mine sweeping equipment to India and 12 million markkas' worth to Thailand. In addition, Thailand is purchasing magnetic shielding equipment for ships from Fiskars worth 8 million markkas.

An example of Finnish arms inventions is the Tampere Weapons Plant's Jatimatic automatic pistol. Because of its slide system, one can fire it with one hand and the weapon will not climb. The Jatimatic is suitable for special forces and police use, but it has also been described as a dream weapon for bank robbers.

In 1983-85, the Tampere Weapons Plant applied for a permit to export a total of 1,300 Jatimatic rifles. A permit was issued for 800 weapons. It is suspected that a couple dozen Jatimatics have been smuggled abroad. When the plant's break-in and smuggling incidents were investigated in the Tampere Municipal Court, the discussion was only of the legal export of 200 Jatimatics.

In addition to shells and detonator caps, Finland's arms plants have sold a certain amount of completed artillery and rifle cartridges abroad. Their amount may at times seem large, but they are consumed very quickly in practice use already. A well trained Finnish infantryman will shoot about a thousand live cartridges during his military service. Thus a thousand men will use up a million cartridges in a year. A few million cartridges does not even begin to supply any kind of an army.

Small consignments of cartridges and munitions, which show up from time to time on the export permit list, are clearly samples of Finnish production, and with their help foreign armies can compare and test their own country's production.

Indeed, a terrorist group can cause a lot of damage with even a small amount of munitions. In the bloodbath at the Rome airport two men killed tens of people with two automatic weapon clips or 50-60 cartridges.

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CARABINIERI UPGRADE IMAGE THROUGH PUBLICITY CAMPAIGN

Rome L'ESPRESSO in Italian 22 Mar 87 p 26

[Article by Cristina Meriotti]

[Text] The Carabinieri are out to polish up their image. To help in that effort, they have picked the paratrooper son of FIAT's vice president, young Giovanni, Umberto's son and nephew of the founder.

In this year's public relations campaign, one of whose chosen as models for recruiting posters in full Paratroop regalia is yet another Agnelli, Giovanni, son of Umberto and nephew of the founder. It would appear that the invitation reached him through his aunt, Susanna, a Republican and a personal friend of Defense Minister Spadolini.

The recruiting poster for the Cc's campaign has already appeared in several magazines and the Army's publicity office (as well as the P.R. agency that did most of the work on it) is expected to produce "great returns."

"Join the Carabinieri, the professionals who protect society," says the invitation to all would-be recruits. Posing for the cameras are nine athletic-looking youngsters, handsome, sure of themselves, one for each of the Corp's special divisions. There is a frog-man, a parachutist (that one is Giovanni Agnelli); there is a CC helicopter pilot, and so forth and so on. What we have here is a manifesto in high Stefanel or Bennetton style, replacing the historic calendars portraying heroic Carabinieri on horseback, checking to see that all is well at lonely farmhouses in the Langhe, or the Adua Carabinieri quasi-icons by Salvo d'Aquisto, who is regularly cited as the "Enrico Toti" of the 40s. Giovanni Agnelli served in the Carabiniere for his regular year's service, was mustered out on 3 February of last year, and returned to Turin to take up his place in the soundest and most respected company in Italy, but with his picture on CC posters he will go on volunteering a priceless service to his Corps: the persuasive message to thousands of kids that to serve in the Carabinieri is something worth doing, is—not by chance—a Piedmontese idea, like FIAT.

At Carabinieri public relations offices they swear that the choice of the poster Carabinieri, like the choice of Giovanni, nephew of the counsellor, was the result of pure chance. "We had asked for a few paratroopers from our Leghorn barracks, some helicopter pilots from Pratica di Mare, and some skiers from Val Gardena. From Leghorn, they sent us carabinieri Agnelli as well. In any case, he volunteered for the job. And it worked out splendidly. That's all there is to it."

At Publipoool, the agency that for 3 years has been polishing the new image of the Carabinieri, everybody is delighted. They are hoping that their "promotions" will strengthen the trend toward 50,000 enlistments per year (as opposed to the old average of a scant 10,000). This time the sampling process will be something altogether different. The fishing, they have found, is better in the north, even though the prime reservoir for recruits is still the south. This year's recruits are much better. From 65 percent of candidates with a junior high-school diploma, we are on our way to 63 percent of new recruits with a high-school diploma. As of now, Publipoool's most ambitious target to date is to consign the whole pack of stupid jokes about the laziness of the Corps to the dustbin of history. The first poster in the new campaign, showing the opportunities for good jobs and careers, says: "And this is what it is to be a Carabinieri. It's no joke."

Maybe we needed a "journalist minister,"—that's what Spadolini is called in military circles all over Italy—to change the image of the citizen soldier and that of soldiering as a career. Even the call for cadet enlistments in aviation this year will speak a different language, vaunting "the sophisticated, high-technology system the nation makes available to the citizen serving in the defense of his country." As for the Navy, entombed once and for all time in the ministry's archives are the old public relations efforts that, in form and in substance, seemed enticing ("Join the Navy! Learn a trade! See the World!") when we knew full well that only 2 percent of recruits had even a theoretical chance at sea duty). Today, the models posing for our new recruiting posters will be real people, not hired actors. We asked Pierluigi Sambo, an officer of Engineers, who is physically the archetype of the ready, willing, and able Venetian, who commanded the Italia contingent of the multinational expedition in Lebanon, to record the enlistment campaign for his "Corps."

6182

CS0: 3528/111

MARKED INCREASE IN SOVIET FLIGHT ACTIVITY NEAR BORDERS

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 23 Apr 87 p 5

[Article by Ola Trygge Storvik: "In Airspace Around Norway: Increasing Soviet Flight Activity"]

[Text] A marked increase has taken place in Soviet military flight activity in areas around Norway compared with the level in the 70's. A peak for the present was reached in 1984, when the air force identified 550 Soviet planes.

This is according to the "Armed Forces Annual Review for 1986." The annual review is a completely new publication from the Armed Forces High Command and is part of a number of information measures Armed Forces Commander Fredrik Bull-Hansen has taken the initiative for.

It reads in a press release from FO [the Armed Forces High Command] that the annual review is meant to be an annual collection of statistics and facts concerning the armed forces' activities. The object is to construct a base of information which is comparable as much as possible from year to year, so that the picture of the armed forces' activities will be the best possible.

The marked increase in Soviet military flight activity around Norway in the 80's, compared with the level in the 70's, is associated in part with an increase in Soviet naval exercise activity in the Norwegian Sea. The peaks in 1984-85 are due to major Soviet exercises during these years. The increase in the number of planes that are being identified per expedition is also associated with the fact that Soviet planes are appearing in larger formations during these exercises. A regimental attack by 16 to 30, and now and then more, naval assault planes against convoys is not unusual, it reads. But the increase in the statistics for the 1980's is explained also by the fact that the F-16 planes have given Norway greater capacity for such identifications.

Submarines

The annual review also contains interesting statistics on the number of submarine reports since 1975. It appears that the number of "probable/possible" submarines is largely speaking below 20 per year, with a peak of 22 in 1983. For example, last year there were 101 so-called

"submarine events." Of these, eight are characterized as "probable/possible" foreign submarines, 44 were our own or allied submarines, while 42 are characterized as "not submarines." But it is necessary to be aware of the fact that all of seven "submarine events" for this year have not yet been completely evaluated.

Subsidies

The annual review makes no secret of the fact that considerable sums appropriated for the defense budget go to quite different purposes than to constructing the best possible defense system. Yes, in individual instances the money is used to subsidize bankrupt industrial concerns like Horten Shipyard, for example. It appears that the armed forces had to give 56.1 million to the firm for a 175-decare open storage area. It is known from before that this order came from the Defense Ministry's political leadership. The same storage area was given to the firm free of charge in the 60's. "By order" of the Defense Ministry, a panel has now been appointed to find out how the open storage area can be utilized.

8831

CSO: 3639/50

SNOWMOBILES GAINING WIDER ROLE IN ARMED FORCES

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 22 Apr 87 p 72

[Article by Ola Solvang: "Snowmobiles---New 'Field Weapon'"]

[Text] The armed forces have gotten a new "secret" weapon. The use of snowmobiles can be of great importance in the future for the armed forces' ability to wage winter warfare. The Porsanger Garrison has been testing snowmobiles for a good month now. The experiences from this will form the basis of an assessment of to what extent the armed forces will place greater stakes on this vehicle.

With speeds of a good 100 kilometers an hour, the snowmobile will signify a revolution for the ability for quick transfers in a winter landscape. One thing which will be evaluated now is the establishment of separate special units outfitted with snowmobiles. Such units can change location quickly and carry out surprise "pinprick operations."

New Weapon Carriers

It is assumed that mechanized forces with tanks and armored vehicles will be used to a considerable degree in an attack on Finnmark. The armed forces' most effective armored weapons, the American TOW system, are very heavy and are difficult to transfer. The problem is solved if they are mounted on a snowmobile sleigh. This is one of the things that has been studied during the test period. In addition, experiments have been conducted with recoilless guns and rocket launchers. The armed forces have also tested a separate sleigh for transporting the ill and wounded.

Good Experiences

It is the Finnmark Land Defense Force which has taken the initiative. FLF [Finnmark Land Defense Force] Commander, Colonel Ole Ronning tells FINNMARK DAGBLAD that they have gained very useful experience.

"We are waiting for a detailed report from the Porsanger Garrison, but as I understand it the experience has been so good that we will come to support recommendations for the purchase of 10 to 15 snowmobiles."

Easy to Conceal

"It is especially the ability for rapid transfer which has evoked interest. This will give us an increased possibility for rapid transfers and surprise attacks. In addition, the snowmobile is quite a bit easier to conceal than the other vehicles we operate with."

"There is no doubt in Finnmark whether this vehicle will be of great importance to the armed forces. We will be able to requisition the large number of private snowmobiles in a mobilization situation. In peace time we will have to have a sufficient number to be able to train personnel," Ronning says.

Ivan Drives a Snowmobile

Snowmobiles are not a new phenomenon in the armed forces. They have been used for a number of years in individual units, including in the Porsanger Garrison. They have been used especially for border patrolling there. Trying them out for tactical use is the new thing now. Norwegian border guards have observed the fact that Russian patrols have used snowmobiles along the Norwegian border. However, little is known about how the vehicle is used in other units in the Soviet army.

"The snowmobile cannot replace any of the vehicles we already have. However, we can utilize its mobility and speed for operations that are difficult to carry out with caterpillar vehicles and the like," says the commander of the Porsanger Garrison, Lieutenant Colonel Eldar C. Kjelling.

8831

CSO: 3639/50

FOREIGN FLAGGING OF MERCHANT MARINE SEEN THREAT TO NATIONAL DEFENSE

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 23 Apr 87 p 4

[Article by Olav Trygge Storvik]

[Text] The foreign flagging of Norwegian ships almost exploded last year with an average of three ships a week. By the turn of the year 417 ships, representing a total of 13.5 million dwt., had been registered abroad. For the time being, 550 ships, representing 10.6 million dwt., are left under the Norwegian flag.

"This is very serious for the armed forces and it entails two problems: a shortage of suitable tonnage, and a shortage of Norwegian seamen," said Rear Admiral Sivert Farstad when the subject was discussed at the Naval Forum yesterday evening. Farstad, who is the Armed Forces High Command Operations Staff chief, thought that the foreign flagging can create a shortage of ships for carrying out the missions which must be accomplished in a crisis or war. This applies both to the transport of allied reinforcements with their supplies to Europe, and the ordinary supply service which all nations need.

He estimated the military need for replenishment supplies coming across the Atlantic in a crisis at 40 to 50 million tons a month. In addition there is the civilian requirement on the order of magnitude of 100 million tons. This transport demand requires a total of about 2300 shiploads a month.

The bases for defense planning, which are based on the Ship Requisitioning Law, will function poorly with the foreign flagging, Farstad emphasized. The requisitioning of ships registered outside is possible only if agreements are entered into with the flag countries giving the right to command the vessels in a readiness situation. But this presumes that the countries of registration display good will and that they will remain friendly or neutral.

Next there is the problem that the crews of foreign-registered ships will consist mainly of foreigners, and it cannot be counted on that they will as a matter of course remain on board Norwegian-owned ships if they should be drawn into international conflicts or a war. There were 1700 Norwegians and 9300 foreigners on foreign-flagged ships at the turn of year in 1986-87, Farstad reported.

NIS [Norwegian International Ship Register] Will Solve in Part

He believed that the proposal concerning a Norwegian International Ship Register (NIS) can reduce and possibly solve the problems of the command and control of vessels. But this assumes that the register will be established and will gain the support of the shipowners with, among other things, resolutions concerning reflagging.

"But the NIS will not solve the crew problem," Farstad said. "We expect that the law which limits foreigners to one third of the crew on a ship registered in the NIS will be repealed, and that foreign seamen will constitute the majority in crews."

Farstad said that the preparedness authorities here have a duty to work out arrangements which guarantee crews on merchant ships under Norwegian command in a crisis or war.

The chairman of the Storting Shipping and Fishing Committee, Hans Svendsgard, thought that there will always be a core of seamen in Norway which will solve the crew problems far down the road. Besides, he thought that the vessels of the future would require smaller crews than today.

Asbjorn Eikeland, the trade minister's personal secretary, could set the gathering's minds at rest by stating that the Trade Ministry was keeping a watchful eye on the preparedness problems. The ministry will return to the preparedness questions after the Storting has discussed the plans for the NIS. But it had to be completely clear that the Ministry prefers an NIS to agreements with flag countries, he thought.

Captain Jacob Borresen of the Defense Ministry thought it was unrealistic to believe that Norway can maintain a group of seamen who can man a NATO fleet in a war. Nor will the time ever return when Norway will be able to behave as the world's carrier. All the same, this does not mean that the West's combined tonnage is declining, and Borresen doubted that NATO would have transport problems even if Norwegian ships carry foreign flags.

8831

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ASSOCIATION ESTABLISHED TO PROTEST ORGANIZATIONAL REFORMS

Madrid TIEMPO in Spanish 20 Apr 87 pp 30-33

[Article by Enrique Montanez: "1,000 Colonels Stand Firm Against Narcis Serra's Military Reform"]

[Text] While a court-martial has acquitted Col Carlos de Meer of a crime of abandonment of residence, the upset among the army chiefs has become known. The latter has materialized in a movement of 1,000 colonels and lieutenant colonels who have created an association to protest the professional effects of the military reform undertaken by the head of the Defense Ministry, Narcis Serra.

Nearly 1,000 Army colonels and lieutenant colonels intend to convey their dissatisfaction with the system created by the defense minister, Narcis Serra, for promotions to general, through an Association of Temporary Reserve Inductees which will soon come into existence.

This is the first time in 50 years that high-ranking commanders of the Spanish Armed Forces have united to defend professional interests, while still subject to military discipline; owing to the unusual legal context established by the temporary reserve, as a step preceding final retirement.

This military status preceding final retirement, called the "temporary reserve," was created through a royal decree of the government in June 1985, to reduce the number of military on active duty. A total of 6,000 commanders, including generals, chiefs, officers and petty officers would have to leave the military service within a 6-year period.

At the same time, and as part of the modernization plans stipulated for the army, Narcis Serra put a new classification system into effect among army commanders to take the general's course, in January 1983.

Sources close to the minister claim that, up until that time, and since the end of the Civil War, "the normal end of a military career was the general's status"; so, the Spanish Army was the one with the largest number of generals of all the European Armed Forces.

Serra's new orientation specified that the conclusion of the military career would be the position of colonel, as is the case in most modern armies. Only the percentage strictly necessary to provide for the armed forces' new organic structure will attain the rank of general for the army and air force, and that of admiral for the navy.

Upset

Serra's new orientation, limiting access to this course, has caused upsets and nervousness among the colonels. The defense minister ordered from the then army chief of staff, Lt Gen Ramon Ascanio y Togores, a new system for classifying the members of the military classes summoned annually to the "general's course," as it is commonly known in the army.

The provisions of Law 48/1981, on classification of commanders and regulation of promotions, prepared during the period of the Democratic Center Union [UCD], were put into effect. No other system occurred to the legislators for setting quotas or percentages for attendance at the course for each of the four branches of service (infantry, cavalry, artillery, and engineers), in each graduating class.

Narcis Serra gave approval for the implementation of the law in January 1983, with the eighth graduating class, which was subjected to a quota of 60 percent not classified. The taking of this course does not presuppose promotion to general, but rather is one of the requirements, among others, that the candidate must meet, such as that of having commanded a regiment.

One of the colonels affected remarked: "This measure caused a great upset, because there had never been a precedent for creating a 'numerus clausus' [closed number] in the army. It is an improvement course, to update knowledge during the final period of the military career. This course lends prestige in the army, because it is very difficult. Many were even satisfied to have taken it and, a few years later, to go home without being promoted to general."

Commanders affected score the "arbitrary nature" of the system, "because it was later learned that, for making the quotas, the judgment of Lt Gen Juan Cano Hevia, director of the Army Superior School, had carried weight. The school's director decided that, because of the lack of classrooms at that center, the course should be held with one group of 80 students, instead of two groups with 130 students. Instead of looking for larger premises in any of the under-utilized military departments in Madrid, they opted for what was easiest: to have fewer students attend," concluded a colonel who is now in the temporary reserve.

In 1984, the ninth graduating class suffered the same fate, and the colonels' dissatisfaction became worse with the tenth class in 1984, which was cut to 75 percent of its 299 members.

The reports appearing in the news media regarding the military uneasiness forced the army's intelligence division, through its counter-intelligence section, to issue informative memos classified with a "confidential" stamp.

Throughout 1984, the discontent of the colonels and lieutenant colonels not classified for the generals' course was followed with special attention. This was revealed in an informative memo dated 20 November, with "D" level dissemination, up to the rank of commander, in which mention was made of news media "making a series of comments that are to a large extent not geared to reality."

Improvable System

At that time, the press had noted that the classification board for the controversial tenth graduating class had given priority to those awarded staff certificates. The informative memo stated, verbatim: "Even acknowledging the obvious weight carried by the staff certificate, those holding staff certificates have never had their classification assured, as proven by the fact that some certificate holders from the eighth and ninth graduating classes have not been classified." In military circles, this argument was considered "rather flimsy," and an "absurd outlet."

Concurrently, at that time, rumors were spreading that the members of the classification boards, with a different composition every year, were not acting independently and stringently.

In addition to the "numerus clausus," the system contained serious fundamental errors, in the view of the military who had to pass through the "screening" of the board. Every year, the army's general personnel directorate selects the 19 commanders from among generals and colonels who decide who is to be called for the generals' course, or not.

The records of the course candidates are anonymous, because they do not contain the names of those concerned, and they are given a number, using a method similar to that followed for correcting competitive examinations. But experience has shown that the members of the board, in many instances, knew the name of the person behind the anonymous service record; because he could be identified by the assignments that the candidate had received during his military career. At meetings held with reporters in 1985, Gen Jose Maria Saenz de Tejada himself, the army chief of staff, admitted that the system was "improvable."

Sparks flew when several colonels from the eighth and ninth graduating classes who had not been called, as well as over 50 from the tenth class, submitted an appeal to the minister. Narcis Serra responded that they could have recourse to the National Court of Justice, taking action under administrative law.

The high court of justice has taken over 2 years to hand down the first verdict. On 21 January, it found in favor of one of the appellants, the juridical colonel, Francisco Muro Jimenez. The decision nullifies the order of the Army

Superior Council of 26 May 1983, whereby Muro had been excluded from the aptitude course for higher commanders, "the defendant administration being required to include him in the first notice that it issues for attending the pertinent course."

The verdict from the National Court of Justice fell on Minister Narcis Serra like a bomb, because it represented a precedent, with over 800 colonels and lieutenant colonels in the same situation. This was the first time that a court had declared a royal decree of the Defense Ministry contrary to the legal code.

Sources close to the defense minister told this weekly publication that the verdict is "individualized," and does not establish jurisprudence. After hearing about the "Muro decision," the military commanders who at the time had not filed an appeal have been procuring the right to petition, protected by the finding of the National Court of Justice. The ministry has filed an appeal with the Supreme Court to have the high echelon of justice clearly establish the juridical doctrine applicable in similar hypothetical cases.

The Pulse of the Colonels

The total number of military chiefs excluded from the courses is distributed thusly: 103 from the eighth graduating class, 130 from the ninth, 234 from the tenth, 194 from the eleventh, and 174 from the twelfth. Most of the commanders affected are in the temporary reserve, and from it they are promoting an Association of Temporary Reserve Inductees to convey this grievance.

One lieutenant colonel claims: "A professional association can be legally created without the passage of the 3 years stipulated by the temporary reserve for the military inducted into it to be able to retrieve their citizen's rights." In its Article 3, the royal decree states that the retrieval of citizen's rights will be effective 3 years after they have left the army.

Hence, Serra is faced with the pulse of the colonels, compounded by pressure from some of the generals to retain the classification system.

In the view of professional military personnel defending the democratic system, the existing uneasiness does not at all benefit political stability. They note that the key as to whether or not the current classification system is to be continued will come this very year, with the classification of the 14th graduating class, which is the one to which King Juan Carlos, commander in chief of the armed forces, belongs.

2909

CSO: 3548/76

NAVY TO USE NEW ASW TACTICS WITH START OF SPRING SUB SEASON

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 13 Apr 87 p 7

[Article by Anders Ohman]

[Text] Berga Naval Base--The Navy is ready to start this year's antisubmarine season just as Parliament is deciding on total defense for the coming 5-year period. As soon as the ice is gone from the sea and the archipelago's bays, the ASW units will take to the sea.

In the 7 years since the 1981 incident in Huvudskar Bay, ASW activity has grown into the Swedish military's most extensive military operation. About 20 vessels, along with aircraft, helicopters, and sonar groups, make up the ASW force that will be deployed against foreign underwater activity this year. Besides the mobile force, about 1,000 specially trained reconnaissance groups will record movements in archipelago waters around the clock. Among other things, the commandos making up those groups are equipped with image intensifiers and cameras.

Hunting in Packs

The Navy's ASW tactics have evolved over the past 7 years. Helicopters or ships are no longer sent out as soon as something suspicious is reported.

If more than half an hour is required to respond to a suspected submarine, nothing is done. The Navy's ASW tactics are based on the idea of sneaking up on a foreign submarine. Under that procedure, the entire ASW force searches an area along Sweden's east coast. At the last minute, OB [supreme commander of the Armed Forces] Bengt Gustafsson decides in great secrecy where search efforts are to be concentrated along the 1,620 miles of Swedish coast. Sweden is the Baltic Sea's largest riparian owner.

Periscope Mania

Is it not true that the Swedish people are afflicted with "periscope mania" every spring, summer, and fall? Civilians and soldiers see strange things in the water that are then reported as being suspected submarines.

"No, there are no instances of that. Suspected foreign underwater activity occurs very regularly during certain periods, but it is not related to the fact that a large number of people are out in the archipelago. Reports are scarce in July, which is when the most people are out there," says Commodore Peter Nordbeck, chief of the Coastal Fleet's surface attack flotilla.

Navy officers emphasize that since Swedish waters are violated in several widely separated places simultaneously, the ASW force can have only a deterrent effect in those places where it does not happen to be at the moment.

Optimistic Chief

Commodore Peter Nordbeck is one of the Navy officers with operational responsibility for ASW activity. DAGENS NYHETER met with him at the Berga Naval Base in the Stockholm's southern archipelago. The ice out in Hars Bay was half a meter thick.

Peter Nordbeck is pleased and optimistic concerning the coming antisubmarine season. Officers and conscripts are no longer wearing sour looks because of Minister of Defense Roine Carlsson's disparagement of coastal corvettes as "sheets of tin" and "Navy officers glittering on the bridge."

"We don't talk about that anymore. Now we must concentrate on the future; ASW operations have high priority in the coming exercises," says Peter Nordbeck.

He fully understands why the public smiles when it learns that a submarine has slipped into--and out of--the archipelago. He emphasizes that hunting submarines is difficult. Underwater searches are guided by natural laws.

Vidinge Incident

Last year's antisubmarine season began with a submarine incident in Vidinge Bay in Stockholm's northern archipelago during the first two weeks of June. When the antisubmarine defense force crept into the area, several search groups working independently of each other made contact with a foreign submarine. Two armed actions using ASW grenades and depth charges were undertaken after the area was closed off. Those actions were fruitless.

Analysis following the Vidinge incident showed that both passive and active sonars had made contact with the submarine. Parts of the submarine had been seen. The coastal corvette Stockholm had picked up a foreign submarine within territorial waters on its sonar. But despite that, the Navy was unable to get a grip on the situation. Why?

"Vidinge Bay is rocky and full of shoals. The topography on the bottom gave the submarine a tactical advantage," says Peter Nordbeck.

Acoustics Important

The success or failure of a submarine chase depends on underwater sound propagation conditions.

Using radio or radar waves, it is almost impossible to discover what is hiding under the surface of the water. Antisubmarine operations are therefore based almost entirely on the ability to record various kinds of acoustical effects--the effects of underwater sound. This can be done passively or actively. Passive listening involves the use of sensors and signal processing equipment to pick up the sounds made by submarines. In active listening, a pulse is transmitted from a sonar and bounces back when it encounters a submarine.

Passive reconnaissance used to be directed at cavitation noise: the sound from a rapidly rotating submarine propeller. Modern submarines in all countries now have such smooth propellers that cavitation noise does not occur until speeds exceeding about 10 knots are reached, according to Peter Nordbeck.

There are other noises besides acoustical vibrations. Acoustical vibrations resulting from rotation of the propeller are one example. They can be detected using advanced signal processing--and sometimes identified as coming from a particular submarine.

Losing Contact

According to Peter Nordbeck, a quiet submarine moving at a slow speed of about 5 knots in the Baltic Sea can be detected by passive systems at a distance of no more than about 5,000 meters.

Other vessels, which are not built to operate quietly, can be picked up at a much greater distance of about 100 kilometers.

Passive systems make it possible to determine the foreign submarine's location. Not until then is armed action possible. In Swedish inland waters, action is taken without warning. In territorial waters--to a distance of 12 nautical miles from shore--peacetime rules require that warning shots be fired. Those shots are heard by the foreign submarine, which then takes quick tactical action to protect itself.

"The result many times is that our passive system loses contact," says Peter Nordbeck. "That is why active reconnaissance is also needed, since that is the only way in which very quiet submarines can be detected."

Active underwater reconnaissance works well in deep open water. Under favorable conditions, reconnaissance range can reach almost 60 kilometers with no interference from false echoes from the sea bottom. Local water conditions vary greatly depending on the time of year, salinity, water temperature, and so on. Walls can appear in the water and make it impossible for sonar sound waves to pass.

Sometimes high-frequency sonars must be used to distinguish a submarine from very similar sounds coming from the sea bottom. This results in short ranges of a few hundred meters.

Damage Rather Than Sink Submarines

The difficulty in catching a foreign submarine is also due to the armed action that is possible, according to Peter Nordbeck. All of today's underwater weapons are slow. It takes time for sinking weapons, depth charges, and antisubmarine grenades to drop down to their targets.

"So there is no special weapon today that can handle every attack situation," says Peter Nordbeck, who would like to see a combination of several weapons.

In peacetime, the attack phase is complicated by the fact that an effort is made to damage--not sink--the submarine. Explosive charges are therefore made smaller, while the need for accuracy is greater.

First Mobile Force in 1990

In its final report, the Defense Committee says that the quality of antisubmarine defense should be improved during the 5 years ending in 1992. Systems that have great value in invasion defense must be given priority.

Antisubmarine defense will receive 400 million kronor under the terms of the 1987-1992 defense agreement reached between the Social Democrats and the Liberal Party, while 150 million kronor will be used for Navy training, 450 million kronor for submarines, 50 million kronor for the planning and design of a new warship (the "Navy JAS"), 200 million kronor for a heavy shore missile (Missile 15), and 50 million kronor for archipelago defense.

The Navy says that not until 1990 will the first mobile ASW force be completely ready, along with the fixed installations for guarding our most important base areas.

An ASW force consists of one or two ASW aircraft, three submarines, five or six coastal corvettes, six ASW helicopters, five or six patrol boats, three mine clearance ships, and antisubmarine defense units from the Coast Artillery for fixed and mobile underwater surveillance.

In ASW operations, submarines, sonobuoy units, and ASW aircraft are used mainly for passive reconnaissance and surveillance.

Active reconnaissance, attack, and armed action are handled by coastal corvettes, patrol boats, mine clearance ships, and helicopters.

Submarines, coastal corvettes, and aircraft operate mainly outside the archipelago area, while patrol boats, sonobuoy units, and mine clearance ships hunt chiefly in narrow channels and archipelagoes.

Helicopters are best when speed and a mustering of strength are required. They come into their own in large bays and outside the archipelagoes.

11798

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IMPLIED CRITICISM OF ARMY LEADERSHIP IN ORDERING OF STUDY

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 14 Mar 87 p 13

[Article by Sven Svensson]

[Text] Major General Ake Sagren of the Ministry of Defense has been appointed by the OB [supreme commander of the Armed Forces] to carry out the study of the Army's future organization and training system that was ordered by the Defense Committee. That arrangement implies criticism of the Army leadership for being unable to present a timely solution to the training problem.

Ake Sagren was previously chief of the Ministry of Defense's Office of Planning and Budget, but he has just been appointed chief of staff of the Upper Norrland Military Command.

The recommendation concerning a new organization of the Army is to be submitted to the government by 1 October 1988.

The arrangement with Sagren as head of the investigation work has not been formally confirmed at the Ministry of Defense, but it is taking place with the consent of the new OB, Bengt Gustafsson. What it also implies is a belief that the Army leadership is incapable of carrying out the study concerning its own future.

Irritation

The members of the Defense Committee were very irritated by the fact that no information was available for reaching a decision on the future organization of the Army when they were deciding on Armed Forces policy for the coming 5-year period. That is why the minister of defense has now acted quickly to correct the Army's shortcomings as regards both overspending and its future organization.

A special reference group in the Government Office will keep tabs on the investigation work, and the question of parliamentary control of the Army investigation will be decided later.

Sagren's investigation will start from the premise that the balance between NCO training, basic training, and refresher training must be reached within the current training times. That will mean shorter training periods for some conscripts and longer training periods for others.

FORCES' COMMANDER'S CRITICISM OF DEFENSE PROGRAM VIEWED

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 30 Mar 87 p 2

[Commentary by Johan Schuck: "OB's Fear About Skane a Pawn in the Defense Game"]

[Text] Imagine what would happen if Roine Carlsson had said that southern Skane's flat landscape could not be defended if an attacker had already landed! There would have been a storm of public opinion going far beyond the one that followed his "tinplate" remark.

But it so happens that it was the OB [supreme commander of the Armed Forces], Bengt Gustafsson, who threw that incendiary torch, and the reaction has been almost absentminded. Nor was any great interest aroused when the OB said that the debate over the defense agreement between the Social Democrats and the Liberal Party was concerned with the wrong things--that a few more coastal corvettes and Viggen aircraft are not the most important thing for the Armed Forces. A few more exaggerated remarks will no doubt be necessary before the OB gets the defense debate he wants underway.

There are several explanations for the silence to date. At least among politicians, several of whom must feel that they are being singled out, the prevailing opinion is that the defense debate has had its day and that other matters now seem more important. Few people are prepared to enter into a controversy with a fairly new OB, and that includes some military who may feel that their toes are being trampled on. In the Army particularly, there are still many who are clenching their fists behind their backs but remaining silent for fear that something worse might happen.

As the new OB, Bengt Gustafsson has in practice dissociated himself from a great deal of what his predecessor Lennart Ljung stood for. This applies to the decision data provided to the politicians, which was unsatisfactory because the connection between the perceived threat to security and the operational proposals was too vague. It also applies to the tolerance shown toward the inability of the armed services--especially the Army--to set priorities. The reason why the OB is now assigning Major General Ake Sagren of the Ministry of Defense to investigate the Army's organization and training is that the Army leadership was unwilling to do so in preparation for this

year's defense decision. It is with good reason that Sagren is being tipped as the next Army commander in chief.

What the OB wants is a quite radical restructuring of the Army. It can be expected that the number of units will be reduced--it can be expected that at least the low-quality infantry brigades (Type 66) will disappear from the wartime organization. It can also be expected that some peacetime units in southern and central Sweden will be shut down. The funds made available in that way can then be used for improved training and the procurement of modern equipment.

The fact is that both the Air Force and the Navy have procured a great deal of modern materiel in recent years, but the Army has not been able to keep pace. The big procurement issue for the next few years has to do with tanks: what are the Armed Forces going to do when the current armored units can no longer rely on Centurion tanks from the 1950's and Tank-103's (S tanks) from the 1960's?

That is the context in which the OB has questioned whether being able to engage in armored combat on the Skane plain is the correct priority. Actually, his argument is not as irresponsible as it sounds. A great many military observers now view the risk of a coastal invasion in Skane as relatively small. There is also the question of whether NATO might not be compelled to take preventive action against a Soviet naval landing force which could just as easily, for all anyone knows, be on its way to Sjaelland in Denmark.

Naturally, it would be preferable to fend off an invasion in the Baltic Sea itself--using attack aircraft, shore missiles, and so on. What the OB is saying is that the Armed Forces should not really concentrate their attention on a situation in which the attacker has already succeeded in establishing a bridgehead on the open Skane plain. Repelling the enemy at that point would require considerably more modern tanks than he thinks the Armed Forces can afford. For the moment, the plans seem to be centered on procuring the West German Leopard tanks, perhaps about 100 or slightly more, and renovating the old Tank-103's, about 300 of which currently exist. There is scarcely any talk of a new Swedish-built tank.

Most of today's armored brigades would then be converted into mechanized brigades with fewer and older tanks. On the other hand, they would be equipped with more light armored vehicles. Such units can be used to repel attempted airborne and seaborne landings, but are not really suitable for combat in open terrain. The OB seems to be intent on bringing the matter to a conclusion even before 1992, when it will be time for the next 5-year defense decision. But will there be enough money?

New tank procurement was not included in the budget requests submitted by the OB as a basis for the agreement by the Social Democrats and the Liberal Party on appropriations for the next 5 years. Bengt Gustafsson is evidently in a bigger hurry than his predecessor. One reason may be that a good many other materiel matters are in line for the 1990's. For one thing, a large part of

the coastal fleet will be ready for the scrap heap then. But it is also conceivable that the OB wants to limit participation by the politicians in a decision on tanks by bringing it up during the current appropriation period.

It is clear, of course, that we now have an OB who is trying to recover lost ground. This will mean some shaping up in the Armed Forces, where the heads of the armed services in particular will have to move a little. With respect to the politicians, what the OB's plan means is that for the next 5 years, he will accept the financial conditions as they stand--the idea being that he will be in a considerably stronger position when the time comes for the 1992 defense decision.

The idea, probably, is that the defense politicians who were debating the need for individual corvette submarines or aircraft before this year's defense decision will get back to more general discussions concerning goals and the trend in appropriations.

The procurement of tanks may become a test issue. If the politicians want to delay the decision until 1992, it is quite likely that they are also prepared to postpone funds for a higher aspiration level that would increase our ability to offer resistance in Skane. It should be easy for the OB to accept that very gratefully if less decisionmaking power means more money in return.

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BANK FORECASTS STRONG GROWTH FOR ECONOMY THROUGH 1989

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 9 Apr 87 p 14

[Article by Jan Magnus Fahlstrom]

[Text] The Swedish economy is about to enter an upswing: 1988 will be a year of strong growth, and we will reach our next economic crest in 1989. So say the Cooperative Bank's economists, thereby flatly contradicting economic observers at other banks.

On the other hand, the report, entitled "The Cooperative Bank's Economic Forecast for the Spring of 1987" and published by the Economic Department of the Federation of Swedish Cooperative Banks, is in fairly close agreement with the assessment presented by the Federation of Swedish Industries in January.

The forecast by the Cooperative Bank (FB) notes that the Swedish economic pattern has proven to be remarkably stable.

The last economic crest, measured by the rate of growth in GNP (economic growth), occurred in 1984, and its effects lasted into the first half of 1985. But on the whole, 1985 and 1986 both showed a weakening trend.

Low Point

In that respect, the FB's economists can chalk up a point for themselves, since they were more accurate in their prediction for 1986 than most other forecasters, who had overestimated the effect of the drop in oil prices, the dollar, and interest rates on demand and economic growth.

The authors of the report note contentedly: "At the Cooperative Bank, we anticipated a traditional year of slowing economic activity, and the outcome shows that we were correct in our assessment of that difficult year."

Their assessment of economic trends therefore stands fast: the low point will come this year--that is, in 1987--and the usual upswing will follow.

As a logical consequence of that approach, most of the FB's key figures for Sweden's economy in 1987 differ only marginally from those in other forecasts. For 1988, in the great majority of cases, the differences are much more striking between the FB's figures and those in the reports by the four other

banks--the Trade Bank, the Scandinavian Private Bank, the Banking Company of Swedish Savings Banks, and the Joint Post Office and Commercial Credit Bank--which have so far ventured to make numerical predictions for next year.

Higher Prices

In the examples below, the FB's figures for 1988 are shown first, followed in parentheses by the lowest and highest figures in the other forecasts (representing a change in volume as a percentage unless otherwise indicated).

GNP: 2.1 (1.1, 1.5).

Private consumption: 2.6 (1.2, 2.0).

Industrial investment: 10.0 (-5.0, +3.0).

Exports: 3.8 (-0.5, +2.5).

Imports: 7.7 (1.0, 3.0).

Industrial production: 2.0 (1.0, 1.5).

Current account balance in billions of kronor: deficit of 7.6 (deficit of 5.0, surplus of 5.0).

Unemployment as a percentage of labor force: 2.7 (2.9, 3.0).

Rise in prices from December to December as a percentage: 5.0 (5.0, 5.5).

The fact that prices are rising faster in 1987 than in 1986 is not due to the trend in prices or interest rates, according to the FB's economists. Instead, the cause is a number of administrative rates, fees, and taxes.

Election Year

On the other hand, the rise in the inflation rate from 4.1 percent in 1987 to 5.0 percent in 1988 is due to an upswing in international prices, combined with a 7.5-percent increase in labor costs.

The report warns that the economic upswing will be hampered by a shortage of capacity in the economy, the conclusion being that the investment funds should be made available throughout the country even for investments in machinery.

There will be little room for an increase in private consumption in 1987. But private consumption will speed up again in 1988.

The FB's chief economist, Anita Lignell Du Rietz, comments: "That always happens in an election year."

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LAPPS WEIGH EMIGRATION FOLLOWING CHERNOBYL DEVASTATION

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 28 Apr 87 p 6

[Article by Soren Lovenhaft: "Vasterbotten After Chernobyl--Lapps Considering Emigration"; first paragraph is DAGENS NYHETER introduction]

[Text] One year after Chernobyl the hardest hit Lapp towns in Vasterbotten are forced to consider very radical measures to survive.

Slaughtering of the reindeer herds and starting again on a small scale in a cesium-free area in Varmland, Dalarna or Dalsland is one alternative. Emigration to Canada is another. Contact has been established with a member of the Canadian government.

"It is completely feasible to transport entire reindeer herds to Canada via Hercules aircraft," said consultant Sture Nilsson of the National Association of Swedish Lapps (SSR).

In other Lapp towns where radioactive fallout was less during the last days of April last year, there is a certain optimism.

Support feeding has been successful. Also investment in winter feeding in Alvdalen for a couple of Jamtland Lapp towns.

New Guideline

On 8 May the National Food Administration decided on a new national value for cesium in food. The recommendation of the National Institute of Radiation Protection for a new giant step from today's 300 becquerel per kilo to 10,000 becquerel/kilo for reindeer meat has been ordered as the alternative, according to what DAGENS NYHETER has learned.

The Lapps have reacted strongly against all thoughts of special handling for reindeer meat, and have also had hearings for their arguments.

Now it is probable that there will be a national value at about the level applied by the EC (600 becquerel per kilo daily, but an increase is expected in the fall). That would mean that over half of the country's 260,000 reindeer can be free for party consumption this year.

"The most important thing for us is a national value which is based on medicinal and health reasons so that the customers know that they are getting a healthy quality product," said Sture Nilsson of the SSR.

But for the Lapps in the north and south Lapp villages of Vilhelmina, a total of 40 families, the future is dark regardless of where the national value is put.

Their reindeer herds over the weekend reached the calving grounds in the mountains. According to a new Norwegian scientific study the mountain grass is expected to be as radioactive this summer as it was last year.

"And down in our winter pasture land it was still up to 64,000 becquerel in the lichen," said herdsman Leif Larsson of Klimpfjall.

This past season 75 percent of the 90,000 reindeer which were slaughtered in Sweden were rejected. Leif Larsson does not believe that there will be any relief for the Vilhelmina Lapps this year. Or for many years.

"The proposal for a national value of 10,000 becquerel/kilo would leave us without economic replacement for the meat, at the same time as we would have a very difficult time selling it," maintained Leif.

Normally the best time in the herdsman's year--the calving period when the spring comes to the mountains--is filled with concern this year.

"I cannot entirely escape the thought that we will get malformed calves, even though the experts say differently," said Leif.

The mountain fish are still paralyzed. Under the spring ice, where there used to be lots of small fish it is now almost empty. "Even the illegal fish are gone."

The shadow of Chernobyl remains over the mountains and it is not just the Lapps who have had their world almost destroyed. The situation is the same for all those living in sparsely populated areas who live by fishing, hunting and a little farming.

"We Lapps can either continue as we have this year by slaughtering and burying, and hoping for continued state grants which we have been promised. Or we can begin again where we can find radiation-free soil," said Leif Larsson of Klimpfjall.

In the Lapp village of Vilhelmina South, to which he belongs, they have discussed slaughtering most of the village's 10,000 animals and beginning again from the beginning in areas farther to the south, outside the traditional reindeer herding areas.

Emigration

"With small herds we would be able to survive as forest Lapps for 10-15 years until the radiation up here has subsided. But then we also need an agreement with the state about spreading our income and taxes over the years."

Many Lapps are not foreign to the idea of emigration to Canada. SSR has had contact with landowners there, and with a government representative.

"Canada is a possibility. There is land and interest there, but so far the contacts are entirely without prospects. But it is not impossible that a small group of Lapps and their herds could emigrate in Hercules aircraft to survive Chernobyl," said Lapp consultant Sture Nilsson. Herdsman Leif Larsson commented:

"Preferably Canada, if it is the only possibility to get away from the radiation. A Lapp village cannot be competitive, or set aside like an unprofitable business. It is a matter of a culture and a pattern of life. Better to have a long move than to have to leave the reindeer herdsman's life."

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