


CBO PAPER

ANTIDUMPING ACTION IN THE
UNITED STATES AND AROUND
THE WORLD: AN ANALYSIS
OF INTERNATIONAL DATA

June 1998



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NOTE

Most of the figures and tables are based on a data set that the Congressional Budget Office constructed from the semiannual reports made by signatories to the Antidumping Code of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and, subsequently, of the World Trade Organization. That data set is referred to as the GATT/WTO data set.

PREFACE

Antidumping law and policy are recurring subjects of debate in the Congress and in international trade negotiations. At the request of the Subcommittee on Trade of the House Committee on Ways and Means, this Congressional Budget Office (CBO) paper examines international data on antidumping activity to determine trends, compare U.S. activity with that of other countries, and examine claims made by various participants in the debate over U.S. policy.

The paper was written by Bruce Arnold under the supervision of Jan Paul Acton and Elliot Schwartz. It benefits from helpful comments received on earlier drafts from Ellen Hays, Pam Greene, and Juann Hung within CBO, and from Michael Leidy of the International Monetary Fund. Timothy Lasocki prepared the figures. Carl Muehlmann provided helpful research assistance.

Sherry Snyder edited the manuscript, and Rae Wiseman helped with data entry and prepared the paper for publication. Laurie Brown prepared the electronic version for CBO's World Wide Web site.

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Director

June 1998

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SUMMARY

Dumping is the selling of an import at a price below its cost of production or below the price at which the manufacturer sells the good in its own domestic market. U.S. antidumping law views such imports as being sold at less than fair value. Under the law, duties are imposed on dumped imports that cause "material injury" to the competing U.S. industry. Almost any injury that is not negligible is considered to be material. The duties are set equal to the difference between the market price and the administratively determined fair value. Many other countries have similar laws.

The first U.S. antidumping law was very similar to a prohibition on predatory pricing of imports. Predatory pricing is the intentional selling of a good at a price below the cost of production with the intent of driving competitors out of business and increasing the market power of the predatory firm, allowing the firm to subsequently increase its prices above competitive market levels and thereby increase profits. The economic conditions under which predatory pricing can be successful and profitable are relatively rare, however. Consequently, the first antidumping law, which is still in effect, has never received much use.

Antidumping cases today are generally brought under another law with a more expansive definition of dumping. Under that law, no attempt is made to determine whether the pricing at issue is predatory or even whether successful predatory pricing is possible in the case at hand. All that is required to have duties imposed is a finding that the good has been sold below cost or below the price in the home market and that material injury has resulted. The vast majority of cases in which antidumping duties are imposed do not involve predatory pricing.

The change in the pricing behavior targeted by antidumping law is important. Predatory pricing is detrimental not only to the competing domestic industry but also to the economy as a whole. In cases for which predatory pricing is not an issue, however, imports priced below cost or their foreign price are generally beneficial to the economy. Thus, the original law was beneficial to both the competing domestic industry and the economy as a whole, whereas the most frequently used current law helps the competing domestic industry but hurts the economy as a whole. U.S. law places no restrictions on the pricing behavior of domestic firms in the U.S. market that are comparable with those placed on foreign firms by the antidumping law. For those and other reasons (not the least of which are charges of bias in U.S. administrative procedures and methodologies), antidumping law has been a continuing center of controversy and deliberations in multilateral trade negotiations and in the Congress.

In such deliberations, it is useful to know how U.S. antidumping practices compare with those of other countries and how the practices of other countries—especially those of the major U.S. trading partners—affect U.S. firms.

The usefulness of such knowledge is demonstrated by many of the claims of participants in the public debate. For example, critics say that the United States is the foremost user of antidumping laws, that other countries are following the U.S. lead and are beginning to make more use of such laws themselves, which is hurting U.S. exporters. Some further argue that countries are aiming their use of antidumping laws at U.S. firms in retaliation for U.S. use against the firms in their own country. Many critics say that the use of antidumping laws has been increasing around the world as other protectionist practices have been systematically and progressively prohibited to more and more countries over the years by the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and, subsequently, the World Trade Organization (WTO).

The claims are usually supported by at most a cursory reference to statistics to back them up, most likely because such statistics are difficult to come by. The best sources of the data needed for deriving such statistics are the semiannual reports made by signatories to the Antidumping Codes of the GATT and the WTO. Drawing summary statistics from those reports is difficult and time consuming for several reasons: they are not in a readily usable computer format, information about each antidumping case is scattered among several tables in several reports, various countries have failed at one time or another to file reports for given reporting periods, and the reports have many errors and omissions.

The Data Set and Its Limitations

To throw some light on some of the major claims and relevant factors in the debate over U.S. policy, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) has taken information from the GATT/WTO reports to construct a usable computer database of the antidumping cases, duties, and other measures of the United States and most of the countries with which the United States conducts a significant volume of international trade. To the extent feasible, errors and omissions in the reports have been corrected. The database extends from July 1979 through December 1995, with more countries covered in later portions of that interval than in earlier portions. Using the database, CBO has calculated and analyzed statistics relevant to the claims and issues surrounding antidumping practices.

Aggregate antidumping statistics are imperfect indicators of the economic significance of antidumping activity because no two cases are identical. Even if the same antidumping duty rate is imposed in two cases, the cases may involve different products, different quantities of imports, different source countries, and so on. Furthermore, one country might have a tendency to bring cases against more narrowly defined products than another country. In that case, a larger number of cases by the former could have a milder economic effect than a smaller number by

the latter. Despite those qualifications, however, the statistics provide useful information that can be used to draw a number of important conclusions.

The Prevalence and Significance of Antidumping Activity

Only a few countries make significant use of antidumping laws, and the United States is the most active user among them. Over three-quarters of U.S. exports from 1991 through 1995 went to countries that averaged fewer than half as many antidumping case initiations as did the United States. On December 31, 1995, it had 294 antidumping measures in effect; no other country had half that many. Under a reasonable set of assumptions about the import market, the large quantities of U.S. imports and the large U.S. gross domestic product do not explain why U.S. antidumping activity is so much greater than that of other countries. U.S. antidumping activity against other countries is much greater than their antidumping activity against the United States, both one on one and in the aggregate.

Antidumping duty rates are high enough to be significant impediments to trade, especially the duties imposed by the United States and a few small, mostly developing, countries. The average rate imposed by the United States from 1991 through 1995 was 56.8 percent. With the exception of Mexico, the most active users of antidumping laws impose substantially lower average rates of duty than does the United States, although their rates are still high enough to be significant impediments to trade. Among the most active users, Canada had the next highest average rate—36.1 percent. The United States progressively and substantially increased the initial duty rates it imposed over the years covered by the data set. The average initial rate imposed from 1993 through 1995 was almost triple the average from 1981 through 1983.

U.S. antidumping measures tend to last much longer than those imposed by any other country, and a large fraction of them last so long as to be effectively permanent—10.6 years on average. That difference in longevity at least in part reflects the fact that a number of other countries have had provisions for automatically reviewing and sunseting their antidumping measures whereas the United States has not. The new WTO agreement requires reviewing and sunseting. That requirement did not become effective immediately, however, and as of the end of 1995, it had not yet had any effect on the statistics for the duration of U.S. measures. CBO cannot say how much effect the requirement will have.

The United States tends to impose the most antidumping measures on the countries that export the largest quantities of goods to the United States. It also tends to impose measures on developing countries and countries that have (or recently had) nonmarket economies.

The Increasing Use of Antidumping Laws Around the World

Statistics from the data set are consistent with the claim that the United States has been a leader in the aggressive enforcement of antidumping laws, and they lend some credence to fears that U.S. policy may be starting to come back to haunt U.S. exporters as other countries follow its lead. The statistics also appear to be broadly consistent with the notion that most countries use antidumping enforcement as a substitute for other means of protecting their domestic industries from international competition and that antidumping enforcement is consequently rising as the GATT/WTO increasingly proscribes more countries from using those other forms of protection.

Almost alone among industrialized countries, the United States has increased its antidumping activity fairly consistently and substantially throughout the 16 years covered by the data set. In recent years, increased antidumping activity has been spreading among developing countries, in which such activity has historically been least prevalent. Most industrialized countries have not increased their activity (and some have decreased it), but many of them were already large users of antidumping laws at the beginning of the time period covered by the data set and remained so at the end.

The increasing activity by developing countries has boosted the number of active antidumping measures that they maintain against the United States, with most of the increases coming fairly recently. The increases for most of them were small, however. As of December 31, 1995, the total increase for all developing countries was less than the total decrease by some of the larger users in the industrialized world, primarily Australia and the European Community/Union. If trends among developing countries continue, however, that could change.

A stronger form of the claim of harm to U.S. exporters—that other countries are singling out U.S. firms for antidumping enforcement in retaliation for U.S. antidumping enforcement against their own firms—does not appear to be supported by the data. For 16 of the 18 countries for which data are available, the percentage of the countries' imports coming from the United States from 1991 through 1995 was larger than the percentage of all active antidumping measures at the end of 1995 that were against U.S. firms. Although retaliation may have occurred in certain individual cases, there is no widespread pattern of retaliation. Most countries seem to avoid imposing antidumping measures on the United States rather than single it out.

Consistent with the proposition that countries use antidumping enforcement as a substitute for other protection for their industries, the United States has been a leader in lowering other forms of protection and, correspondingly, a leader in

increasing antidumping enforcement. Developing countries as a group have more recently come under GATT/WTO restrictions on their use of a number of other protectionist practices and, correspondingly, only recently have started to become significant players in antidumping enforcement.

Bias in Procedures for Nonmarket Economies

Determining dumping margins (the amount by which the selling price is below cost or below the home-market price) on imports from nonmarket economies requires different procedures from those used for market economies. Although not conclusive, some evidence suggests that U.S. procedures may be biased toward finding dumping margins for nonmarket economies that are higher than the margins actually are. Since antidumping duty rates are set equal to the dumping margin, the bias would result in higher duty rates being imposed on goods from nonmarket economies. The statistics indicate that initial U.S. duty rates imposed on imports from nonmarket economies tend to be higher than the rates imposed on other countries, and the ratio of the former to the latter is higher than the same ratios for duties imposed by most other countries.

Injury to Downstream Industries

Antidumping measures against upstream goods (that is, goods that are in turn used as inputs in producing other, downstream goods) can in some cases put downstream users of those goods at a competitive disadvantage relative to their foreign competition. Some parties have therefore proposed a so-called short-supply provision for U.S. antidumping law to reduce or eliminate antidumping duties on individual goods in specified conditions of domestic shortages.

Most U.S. antidumping activity—approximately four-fifths of active measures and approximately two-thirds of the products covered by the active measures—is against upstream goods. The average duty imposed on upstream goods—over 52 percent on raw and processed materials and over 32 percent on intermediate goods—is high enough to create a significant disadvantage to downstream users if certain other conditions are in place, but the average market share of the dumped imports is probably not large enough for that to occur. A short-supply provision, however, would not be intended for the average case but for exceptional cases. The market shares for a number of individual goods covered by U.S. antidumping measures are indeed large enough that antidumping duties could disrupt markets, thus harming downstream users.

INTRODUCTION

Under U.S. law, an imported good is considered to be dumped if it is sold at less than fair value.¹ In most cases, fair value is defined as being approximately equal to the cost of producing the good or to the price of the good in the home market of the firm that exported it to the United States, whichever is greater. Since 1916, U.S. law has restricted dumping. Under the most frequently used U.S. antidumping law, duties equal to the dumping margin are imposed in cases in which the dumped import is causing "material injury" to the competing industry in the United States.² The material-injury standard is such that almost any harm that is not negligible suffices.

The law is administered by the Department of Commerce (DOC) and the International Trade Commission (ITC). Cases may be initiated in response to a petition from the competing domestic industry or on the DOC's own authority. The DOC determines whether the imports in question are being dumped and, if so, by how much. The ITC determines whether the imports are causing material injury to the competing domestic industry. If both determinations are affirmative, then the DOC issues an order directing the Customs Service to levy a duty equal to the amount by which the price of the import is less than the fair value as determined by the DOC. Antidumping duty orders are subject to periodic review by the DOC, which can result in changes in the duty rate.³

What Are the Economic Effects of Dumping and Antidumping Law?

At the outset, U.S. antidumping law was aimed at predatory pricing, the control of which is economically beneficial. Over time, however, antidumping law has become a form of general trade protection, which harms the overall U.S. economy.

The original 1916 law—the Antidumping Act of 1916—was very similar to a prohibition on predatory pricing of imports. Predatory pricing is the intentional selling of a product at a loss in order to drive competitors out of business, thereby establishing increased market power that allows the seller to raise prices above

1. U.S. antidumping law and procedures, as well as their history and economic effects, are discussed in detail in Congressional Budget Office, *How the GATT Affects U.S. Antidumping and Countervailing-Duty Policy* (September 1994). This paragraph and the following section on the economic effects of dumping and antidumping law briefly summarize some of the important points of that discussion.

2. The law in question is subtitle B of title VII (sections 731-739) of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended.

The dumping margin is the amount by which the price of the dumped good is below the fair value as defined under antidumping law and regulations. It is normally expressed as a percentage of the import price of the good (the actual price, not the fair value as determined under the antidumping law).

3. The administrative procedure, which is somewhat complicated, is covered in much greater detail in Appendix B of Congressional Budget Office, *How the GATT Affects U.S. Antidumping and Countervailing-Duty Policy*.

competitive market levels and increase profits. That practice is objectionable on economic grounds because the increased market power and higher prices are detrimental to the efficiency and productivity of the economy. Hence, prohibiting such behavior is beneficial to the economy. It also accords well with many people's notions of fairness. Predatory pricing is not very common because it is seldom possible and even more seldom profitable. Consequently, the 1916 law, which is still in effect, is almost never used and will not be discussed further in this paper.

To provide greater protection for U.S. industry, the Congress passed a law in 1921 that had a more expansive definition of dumping. Since then, changes in U.S. antidumping law and enforcement regulations and methodologies have made it easier for U.S. industries to receive protection from competing imports.⁴ Today, U.S. antidumping law does not act primarily against predatory pricing but against international price discrimination (sales at a lower price in the United States than in the home country of the exporter) and sales below cost, regardless of whether the sales are predatory or not.

That change is important. Whereas predatory pricing is economically detrimental but comparatively rare, nonpredatory price discrimination and sales below cost are generally beneficial and common.⁵ Hence, laws against the latter two pricing behaviors generally hurt the economy. Under U.S. law as it relates to domestic firms, therefore, such behavior is generally legal and unrestricted. The antidumping law treats foreign firms differently, however, in effect punishing them by applying duties to their goods whenever they engage in that behavior.

The antidumping law harms the economy because it raises the cost of acquiring the good in question. It not only hurts the purchasers of the good but also impairs the productivity and efficiency of the economy by causing the competing domestic industry to produce more than is economically optimal. To increase its production, the domestic industry must use labor, raw materials, and intermediate goods that otherwise would have been used elsewhere in the economy to produce other goods. The resulting decrease in production of those other goods has a greater value than the increase in production of the good on which the antidumping duty has been applied. Hence, the total value of the economy's production declines.

4. One of the changes, enacted in 1979, was to replace the Antidumping Act of 1921 with a new title VII to the Tariff Act of 1930, which was similar but contained changes mandated by the Tokyo Round agreement of the GATT.

5. Recessions, the introduction of new products, and the use of loss leaders in retail sales are only a few of the occasions when firms commonly sell products at prices below their full cost of production. Many firms lose money during recessions, which means by definition that they are selling at prices below cost. Many new products lose money for a period of time until demand reaches levels that can be produced efficiently and the producing firms learn through experience to produce those products efficiently. Loss leaders are products that a store puts on sale at very low prices in order to attract customers into the store, with the hope that the customer will see and purchase other, higher-priced products.

The foregoing discussion concerns how a country is harmed by its own antidumping law. Further harm occurs if other countries, either from following the lead of that country or in retaliation, start enforcing their own antidumping laws against that country's exporters.

The antidumping law has come to be used as a substitute for the section 201 escape clause in U.S. trade law.⁶ The escape clause allows temporary protection of domestic industries from sudden surges of imports that are causing serious injury, without regard for whether the imports are fairly priced or are in any other sense fair. The idea is to give the domestic industry time to adjust, after which competition will be allowed to resume.

The escape clause is seldom used, however. Industries generally find it easier to obtain protection under the antidumping law. At least partly because of a number of biases in its methodologies, the Department of Commerce seldom fails to find dumping in the cases that come before it. The main hurdle to obtaining protection under the antidumping law is demonstrating "material injury" to the domestic industry, and that injury standard is lower than the "serious-injury" standard required in the escape clause.

The recent Uruguay Round agreement required some changes in U.S. antidumping law and policy to make them slightly less protectionist. In total, however, the changes were not substantial and did not change the basic character of the policy.

How Do U.S. Policies Compare with Those of Other Countries?

Many other countries also have antidumping laws. Some had such laws before the United States did, but most have imposed them more recently. Disputes over those laws and their administration have been a regularly recurring feature of the various rounds of trade negotiations relating to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the World Trade Organization (WTO). To resolve those disputes, part of the Kennedy Round in the 1960s was devoted to negotiating an agreement that is known informally as the Antidumping Code. The Antidumping Code put constraints on the structure and operation of the antidumping policies of its signatories, which included some members of the GATT. Continuing disputes led to modifications of the code in subsequent GATT rounds.

6. Sections 201-204 of the Trade Act of 1974, as amended.

The most recent version of the constraints on antidumping policy, which was negotiated in the Uruguay Round, was incorporated into the new WTO agreement itself rather than being segregated in a separate Antidumping Code. Hence, all signatories to the WTO agreement are required to adhere to those constraints. Although the provisions are no longer a separate code, most people still refer to them as the Antidumping Code, and this paper therefore refers to them by that name.

The constraints of the code and the fact that many countries largely copied the existing laws and practices of the United States or other countries when they began their own policies have led to similarities among antidumping policies around the world, although significant differences remain. Of particular note are sizable differences in the aggressiveness of antidumping enforcement, in the methodologies for determining dumping margins (which lead to sizable differences in the duty rates imposed), and in the policies for terminating duties (which lead to sizable differences in how long duties remain in effect). Some countries often negotiate price undertakings rather than impose duties. A price undertaking is an agreement by the foreign exporter not to sell the product at a price below the fair value that has been determined by the antidumping administrative authority.⁷

The negative effects of antidumping laws have led some countries to agree not to use them against one another. Those countries have chosen instead to use competition (or antitrust) policy to regulate pricing behavior. Canada and Chile did that in the Canada-Chile Free Trade Agreement. Australia and New Zealand have similarly ceased antidumping enforcement between themselves, as have the members of the European Union and the members of the European Free Trade Area. Canada tried to get the United States to agree to do so in the North American Free Trade Agreement, but the United States refused.

Antidumping law and policy have been a recurring subject of debate in the U.S. Congress as well as in multilateral trade negotiations. Participants in those debates often compare or contrast U.S. policies with those of other countries to support their positions. For example, some critics say that the United States is the foremost user of antidumping laws and that it has been an international trailblazer for aggressive enforcement of those laws. They state further that other countries, following the U.S. lead, are beginning to make more use of such laws and that some of those countries are targeting U.S. firms in retaliation for antidumping actions the United States has taken against firms in their country. Claims of bias in U.S. procedures are common.

7. Duties and price undertakings have the same effect on trade. The only difference between them is who gets the additional revenue on each good sold that results from the higher price. With a duty, the revenue goes to the government of the importing country; with an undertaking, it goes to the foreign exporter.

Although many studies making such claims support their claims and conclusions with careful theoretical argument, analysis, and facts, they usually make at most a cursory reference to hard statistics to back them up. The reason is that such statistics are difficult to come by. The best source of international data on antidumping activity is the series of semiannual reports to the GATT, and subsequently to the WTO, made by signatories to the Antidumping Code. Until 1996, those reports were classified "restricted" by the GATT/WTO, which means that the raw reports were not to be distributed outside signatories' governments (although summary statistics calculated from them could be). Furthermore, drawing statistics from the reports is difficult and time consuming for several reasons: they are not in a readily usable computer format, information about each antidumping case is scattered among several tables in several reports, various countries have failed at one time or another to file reports for certain reporting periods, and the reports have many errors and omissions.

The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) has analyzed the GATT/WTO reports to provide a statistical overview of how U.S. antidumping activity compares and contrasts with that of almost all of the major U.S. trading partners. This paper presents the results of that analysis.

Limitations of the Data Set and Antidumping Statistics Generally

The statistics discussed in this paper are only rough indicators of various countries' antidumping policies and their economic effects. They provide important information that can be obtained in no other way and that helps to illuminate important issues in the debate over antidumping policy. A number of qualifications should be borne in mind, however, in any analysis of antidumping statistics.

Data Qualifications. Although the GATT/WTO reports that CBO analyzed are the best source available, they are not without problems. Appendix A describes in some detail the reports, the problems, and what CBO did to correct them. It also discusses the problems that remained in the final data set after those corrections had been made. A few brief points from that discussion are in order here.

First, although CBO devoted considerable effort to correcting the various errors, omissions, and inconsistencies in the reports, the sheer volume of those problems and the limited means at CBO's disposal for finding and correcting them virtually guarantee that a number of errors remain in the final data set used for analysis. As is discussed in Appendix A, however, the remaining errors are unlikely to be so serious or numerous that they significantly affect the results and conclusions presented in this paper.

Second, the final data set does not cover every country in the world. It covers only those countries that were signatories to the GATT/WTO Antidumping Code at each given date, and the number of signatories grew over time. The data set covers almost all of the major U.S. export markets, however. The largest missing markets for 1995 (measured in terms of U.S. export values) are Taiwan, the People's Republic of China, Saudi Arabia, and Russia. The changing number of countries covered over time complicates the analysis: one cannot validly conclude anything about worldwide trends from simple aggregate statistics for the world as a whole but must instead examine each country separately and then determine whether many countries have similar trends.

Third, before the July-December 1991 reporting period, the European Community/Union (EC/U) did not report case data for cases brought against countries that were not signatories to the code.⁸ (The term *case data* refers to data on antidumping cases, such as the product at issue, the country from which it is imported, the date the case was initiated, the date and result of any preliminary or final decisions, and so on.) Furthermore, the EC/U's first list of active antidumping measures (that is, duty orders and price undertakings) that included measures against nonsignatories was the one for September 1, 1989—the list included in the same report containing the January-June 1989 case data. That fact does not affect the statistics concerning EC/U cases against the United States, but it does affect statistics relating to total antidumping activity.

Arbitrariness of Case Divisions and Lack of Equivalence of Cases. When a country brings an antidumping case, the case is frequently against an array of closely related products (for example, various carbon steel products or various stainless steel products) from several different countries. The issue therefore arises of whether, for statistical purposes, the case should be counted as one case or as several, and if several, how it should be divided. When a case is brought against two or more countries for the same product, the data set treats each target country as a separate case. When a case is brought against several related products from the same country, the data set follows the lead of the reporting country: if that country reports it as one case, the data set treats it as one case; if that country reports it as two or more cases, the data set so treats it.

The process of dividing the antidumping activity into cases by product is somewhat arbitrary. For example, one country might bring a case against several carbon steel products and report it as one case with the product name "various carbon

8. In 1979, the members of the European Community were Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, West Germany, Denmark, Greece, Ireland, and the United Kingdom. Spain and Portugal joined January 1, 1986. The European Community became the European Union on November 1, 1993. Austria, Finland, and Sweden became members on January 1, 1995. East Germany became a member upon its reunification with West Germany.

steel products," whereas another country might bring a case against the same products and report it as three cases—one for carbon steel wire rod, one for carbon steel plate, and one for carbon steel sheet. If a particular country consistently uses a more detailed product breakdown than other countries do, that country will report more cases than the other countries (all else being equal) and therefore appear to be a larger user of antidumping laws.

Given the data contained in the GATT/WTO reports, the only way around this problem is to visually inspect the cases of each country and try to make a rough estimate of the extent to which various countries are more or less prone to detailed case divisions. Rigorously determining the extent of the problem and correcting for it would require going back to original sources (the published decisions of antidumping administrative authorities) to determine the Harmonized System product codes covered by the cases at issue.⁹ To do that for all of the cases in the data set would be a massive undertaking. Furthermore, it could be done only for cases occurring since 1989, when the Harmonized System was adopted.

Further arbitrariness and problems arise in the breakdown and comparison of cases by target country. First, a case brought by or against a major trading country such as the United States or Japan is likely to involve far more trade than is a case brought by or against a small country such as Trinidad and Tobago, and therefore the two cases are not equally significant. Second, occasionally a country will break up into two or more countries (such as the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia did), or two countries will merge (as East Germany and West Germany did), sometime during the period that an antidumping measure is in effect. If a country correspondingly breaks up or merges its measures against such countries (as is done in some cases in the data set but not in others), the total number of active measures that the country has changes even though the economic significance and effect of its measures have not changed at all.

Third, the EC/U brings cases at the community/union level rather than by individual member countries, and the cases are reported to the GATT/WTO accordingly. Many countries, however, including the United States, bring their cases against individual members of the EC/U rather than against the EC/U as a whole. Failure to correct for those facts would bias a comparison of the number of cases brought by the United States and the number brought by the EC/U. The comparison would indicate that U.S. antidumping activity is larger relative to that of the EC/U than is actually the case.

9. The Harmonized System is a common product classification code for trade negotiated by most of the large trading countries of the world.

Difficulties Fitting Data from Different Laws to One Form. Because the antidumping laws and procedures of signatories to the Antidumping Code have been required to be consistent with the code, there is some similarity among the laws and policies of various countries. Because those laws and policies are not identical, however, no one form for reporting data can easily accommodate all of them. Consequently, some countries may have difficulties determining the proper information to put in some blanks in the form.

For example, the reporting form for case data has blanks for three different dates for each case: the date the case was initiated, the date any provisional measures were imposed pending further investigation of the case, and the date the final measure was imposed. Suppose a country's procedures allow the administrative authority the option of imposing preliminary duties on the date the case is initiated, then have a quick preliminary investigation to revise that duty decision, and finally have the full investigation followed by the imposing of the final definitive duty. Then it would not be clear whether the reported date of the provisional measure should be the initiation date or the revision date. If the person filling out the form for a given period is not familiar with which date was used in the report for the previous period, he or she might decide the issue differently, resulting in different dates for provisional measures being given for the same case in subsequent reports.

The pattern of dates given in Mexico's reports seems to suggest that such a problem exists. (Not being familiar with Mexico's procedures, CBO cannot say for sure.) Another example is that U.S. authorities have typically interpreted *definitive duty date* differently from other countries (see Appendix A).

Effects Beyond the Statistics. Antidumping laws have economic effects beyond those indicated by case statistics. For example, the U.S. steel industry filed a large number of antidumping cases in the 1980s that overwhelmed the U.S. antidumping administrative authorities (in particular, the Department of Commerce) and thereby pressured the Administration to negotiate quota agreements with the foreign countries in question. Upon negotiation of the quotas, the antidumping cases were withdrawn. Although that use of antidumping law ultimately led to protection for the industry, the protection did not show up anywhere in the U.S. reports. The case data indicated that the cases were withdrawn before a decision on protection was made, and nothing ever appeared on the lists of active measures in the reports. Many withdrawals of cases in other countries undoubtedly resulted from the negotiation of some kind of trade restraint not indicated in the GATT/WTO data, but such cases cannot be distinguished from those that were withdrawn for other reasons (for example, the complaining industry being told by the administrative authority that the case was weak and had little chance of success).

Furthermore, going through a U.S. antidumping investigation can be a costly and time-consuming ordeal for a foreign firm. Therefore, the mere existence of the antidumping policy and the knowledge that domestic industries are ready and willing to file cases if competition becomes too fierce can cause foreign firms to compete less aggressively in the U.S. market in order to avoid having cases filed against them. The same may be true in other countries.

No Two Cases Are Alike. Any two cases are likely to differ in terms of the quantity of imports, type of products, rate of duty applied, market share, the size of markets for the countries imposing the duties, and other significant characteristics. Consequently, no two cases have the same economic effect, and a given number of cases or active measures by one country does not necessarily have the same economic effect as the same number of cases or measures by another country.

Some Notes on Word Usage, Figures, and Tables

To avoid confusion, two notes on word usage are in order. First, because the EC/U brings and reports its cases at the community/union level, the word "countries" as used throughout the rest of this paper will include in its meaning the EC/U as one country.

Second, as discussed earlier, the GATT/WTO reports have information on two kinds of antidumping measures: duties and price undertakings. Different countries have different policies for those two kinds of measures. For example, the United States imposes duties almost exclusively. The EC/U uses sometimes one, sometimes the other, and sometimes both. More important, the EC/U sometimes starts with one imposed on a given good from a different country, changes to the other several years later for the same good from the same country, and may even change back several years later still. This analysis refers to either a duty or an undertaking as an antidumping measure. Even if both a duty and an undertaking are imposed on the same good, that is still considered one measure. If the measure changes back and forth between a duty and an undertaking, the measure is considered as lasting from the beginning of the first restriction to the end of the last restriction (assuming there are no long periods of time between them in which no restrictions are imposed). A change from a duty to an undertaking or vice versa is not considered to be the end of one measure and the beginning of another.

Since observing a trend or other pattern of the data is easier in a figure than in a table, most of the data presented in the main text of this paper are in the form of figures. However, since many readers will be interested in the precise numbers used to construct the figures, those numbers as well as other relevant numbers and

qualifying notes are presented in tables in Appendix B. Both the text and the figures refer to the relevant tables.

THE PREVALENCE OF ANTIDUMPING ACTION

To set the stage for discussing antidumping policy, it helps to examine the prevalence of antidumping activity around the world. The significance of antidumping policy as an issue increases in proportion to the prevalence of antidumping activity. Furthermore, notions of what constitutes proper policy for the United States can depend to some extent on what the rest of the world is doing. For example, if most of the world was vigorously pursuing antidumping policy and the United States began to pursue it less vigorously without first negotiating a multilateral agreement for all countries to do so, many observers would view the result as unfair to U.S. firms and oppose the new policy on those grounds. Opponents of U.S. antidumping policy claim that the opposite is true—that the United States has been more aggressive in its use of antidumping policy than most countries; that many countries have only recently begun to make significant use of antidumping policy, following the lead of the United States and a few other countries; and that a number of countries have been unhappy with aggressive antidumping enforcement and have wanted more severe constraints put on such policies in the WTO agreement.


Which Countries Make Use of Antidumping Laws?

Only a few countries make significant use of antidumping laws, and the United States is the most active user among those countries. By some measures it is by far the most active user, with no other country coming close. Under a reasonable set of assumptions about the import market, the large quantities of U.S. imports and the large U.S. gross domestic product (GDP) do not explain the high levels of U.S. activity relative to those of other countries.

The United States initiated an average of just over 49 antidumping cases per year from 1991 through 1995 (see Figure 1 and Table B-1). That number was 18 percent of the reported total world average of 278 initiations per year and was more than the number reported by any other country.¹⁰ Over three-quarters of U.S. exports during the five-year period went to countries that averaged fewer than half that many initiations per year. Only five other countries averaged as many as 20 initiations per

10. The number given here for the world average is what the world average would have been if all of the countries that filed reports for only part of the 1991-1995 period had filed reports for the entire period and if their average rate of case initiations was the same for the additional periods as it was for the periods for which they actually filed reports. Countries that filed reports for only part of the period are identified in Table 1.

FIGURE 1. RANKING OF COUNTRIES BY AVERAGE NUMBER OF CASE INITIATIONS PER YEAR, 1991-1995



SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office based on the GATT/WTO data set.

NOTE: All other reporting countries had no case initiations. Further details and notes are given in Table B-1.

a. EC/U = European Community/Union.

year, and only eight averaged as many as 10. Including the United States, 25 countries reported initiating cases during the five-year period. Three of them—Austria, Finland, and Sweden—joined the EC/U on January 1, 1995, and therefore now come under the EC/U antidumping policy and no longer initiate cases on their own.

The picture is more striking when one looks at the stock of active antidumping measures (see Figure 2 and Table B-2). The United States had 294 antidumping measures in effect on December 31, 1995—35 percent of the reported world total. No other country had as many as half that number. The next most active user of antidumping laws was the EC/U, which had 133 active measures, followed by Canada (98) and Mexico (81). Over three-quarters of U.S. exports from 1991 through 1995 went to countries that had fewer than one-third the number of active measures that the United States had at the end of the period.


The high numbers of U.S. cases and measures do not necessarily indicate that U.S. activity is particularly aggressive. The United States is a large country with large quantities of imports, and one would expect such a country to encounter dumping more frequently than a country with small quantities of imports.

In addition to increasing with the quantity of imports, however, the number of antidumping measures imposed should decrease with the size of gross domestic product. The reason is that the degree of injury resulting from a given quantity of dumped imports should be less for a country with a large GDP, making it less likely that any given case will pass the material-injury standard required for imposing antidumping measures. Analysis that takes the large quantity of U.S. imports into account must also take the large size of U.S. GDP into account.

The precise functional form according to which the number of cases would be expected to vary as import quantities and GDP change depends on what one assumes about the markets and the behavior of exporting firms. Under one reasonable set of assumptions, the number of cases and measures imposed should be roughly proportional to the ratio of imports to GDP. Those assumptions and the corresponding explanatory argument are as follows.

Assume that the quantity a foreign exporter will want to export to a country is roughly proportional to the size of the market, which in turn is roughly proportional to GDP. The number of foreign exporters would be equal to the total quantity of the country's imports divided by the average quantity imported from each firm. It follows that the number of foreign exporters is roughly proportional to a country's total imports divided by its GDP. If one assumes that the number of firms engaged in dumping is proportional to the number of firms exporting to the country,

FIGURE 2. RANKING OF COUNTRIES BY NUMBER OF ACTIVE ANTIDUMPING MEASURES ON DECEMBER 31, 1995



SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office based on the GATT/WTO data set.

NOTE: All other reporting countries had no active measures. Further details and notes are given in Table B-2.

a. EC/U = European Community/Union.

then the number of antidumping cases and measures should be roughly proportional to total imports of the country divided by its GDP.

One could undoubtedly alter the assumptions and come up with other reasonable functional forms. However, in all reasonable forms the number of cases and measures should be an increasing function of imports and a decreasing function of GDP.

To account for the effects of import quantities and the size of the economy, CBO has constructed a case initiation index and an active measure index in accordance with the assumptions just described. The former is equal to the average number of cases a country initiated per year from 1991 through 1995 divided by the country's average annual ratio of imports to GDP over the period. Similarly, the latter is equal to the number of active measures the country had on December 31, 1995, divided by the country's average annual ratio of imports to GDP from 1991 through 1995.


As measured by those indices, U.S. antidumping activity stands out even more than by the numbers already presented (see Figures 3 and 4 and Tables B-3 and B-4). The antidumping case initiation index for the United States is larger than that for any other country, and it is almost half again as large as that for the EC/U, which is the next most active user of antidumping law by this measure. Similarly, the active antidumping measure index for the United States is also larger than that for any other country, and it is over twice as large as that for the EC/U, which is the next most active user by this measure.

How Does U.S. Antidumping Activity Against Other Countries Compare with Their Activity Against the United States?

The foregoing statistics indicate that U.S. antidumping activity is much higher than that of other countries. What may be of more concern to policymakers, however, is how U.S. activity against other countries compares with the activity of those countries against the United States.

The United States has substantially more active measures against other countries than those countries have against it. (Though not surprising, that fact does not necessarily follow from the fact that the United States is the most active user, since other countries might aim their enforcement disproportionately at U.S. firms.) Overall, the United States had 294 active antidumping measures against other countries on December 31, 1995, compared with only 87 measures against it (see

FIGURE 3. RANKING OF COUNTRIES BY ANTIDUMPING CASE INITIATION INDEX, 1991-1995




SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office based on the GATT/WTO data set; trade data from International Monetary Fund, *Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook* (Washington, D.C.: IMF, 1996); and data on gross domestic product and exchange rates from International Monetary Fund *International Financial Statistics Yearbook* (Washington, D.C.: IMF, 1996).

NOTE: The case initiation index for the 1991-1995 period is the average number of cases a country initiated per year, divided by the average annual ratio of imports to gross domestic product. The value of the index for all reporting countries not shown in this figure was zero. Further details and notes are given in Table B-3.

a. EC/U = European Community/Union.

FIGURE 4. RANKING OF COUNTRIES BY ACTIVE ANTIDUMPING MEASURE INDEX
ON DECEMBER 31, 1995



SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office based on the GATT/WTO data set; trade data from International Monetary Fund, *Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook* (Washington, D.C.: IMF, 1996); and data on gross domestic product and exchange rates from International Monetary Fund *International Financial Statistics Yearbook* (Washington, D.C.: IMF, 1996).

NOTE: The active antidumping measure index is the number of active measures a country had on December 31, 1995, divided by the average annual ratio of imports to gross domestic product from 1991 through 1995. The value of the index for all reporting countries not shown in this figure was zero. Further details and notes are given in Table B-4.

a. EC/U = European Community/Union.

Table 1).¹¹ On a country-by-country basis, the United States has more active measures against each of 47 countries than those countries have against the United States (excluding the former East Germany, which is included with Germany for this tally).

Only 11 countries have more measures against the United States than the United States has against them. The 11 include neighbors Canada and Mexico, with whom the United States has large amounts of trade. However, they also include seven members of the EC/U (Austria, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Ireland, Luxembourg, and Portugal), which, like all EC/U members, do not have their own antidumping policies but instead are covered by the policy of the EC/U. The number of measures against the United States attributed to each EC/U member in Table 1 is the number maintained by the EC/U.

Counting the measures in that way, however, may not be the best indicator of the degree to which EC/U antidumping policy hinders U.S. exports to each of the members individually. The United States has 57 measures against various EC/U members, whereas the EC/U has only two against the United States. Even multiplying the two by 15 (the number of EC/U members) brings the EC/U up to only 30 measures against the United States, which is just over one-half as many as the United States has against the EC/U.

As before, one might be tempted to explain those numbers as being the result of underlying trade volumes. The United States runs a trade deficit with the rest of the world, importing more than it exports. Consequently, if one expects the number of antidumping measures that one country maintains against another to be roughly proportional to the amount that it imports from that country, the United States should have more antidumping measures against the rest of the world than the rest of the world maintains against the United States.

The U.S. trade deficit, however, is not enough to explain the differences in the numbers of active measures (see Table 2). On December 31, 1995, the United States maintained almost five active antidumping measures against other countries for every \$10 billion of U.S. imports, whereas other countries maintained fewer than two active measures against the United States for every \$10 billion of U.S. exports (equivalent to \$10 billion of imports by other countries from the United States).¹² On

11. To make for a fair comparison, the two measures that the EC/U maintains against the United States have been counted as two for each of the 15 members of the EC/U—for a total of 30—in tallying the 87 measures against the United States.

12. In theory, Country A's exports to Country B are the same as Country B's imports from Country A. In practice, many countries more carefully track and tabulate their imports than their exports (because of the revenues obtained from import tariffs), so export numbers are often slightly lower than the corresponding import numbers from the other country. That difference is small enough to be ignored here.

TABLE 1. NUMBER OF ACTIVE ANTIDUMPING MEASURES BY AND AGAINST THE UNITED STATES ON DECEMBER 31, 1995

	By the United States Against Other Country	By Other Country Against the United States ^a
Countries the United States Has More Active Measures Against Than They Have Against the United States		
Argentina	6	2
Armenia	1	*
Azerbaijan	1	*
Bangladesh	1	*
Belarus	1	*
Belgium	3	2 ^b
Brazil	15	6
Chile	1	0
Ecuador	1	*
Estonia	1	*
France	11	2 ^b
Georgia	1	*
Germany	15	2 ^b
Former East Germany	1	*
Hungary	2	0
India	5	1
Iran	1	*
Israel	2	*
Italy	13	2 ^b
Japan	47	0
Kazakhstan	4	*
Kenya	1	*
Kyrgyzstan	2	*
Latvia	1	*
Lithuania	1	*
Malaysia	1	*
Moldova	1	*
Netherlands	4	2 ^b
New Zealand	2	1
Norway	1	0
People's Republic of China	32	*
Poland	1	0
Romania	4	0
Russia	6	*
Singapore	4	0
South Korea	17	1
Spain	3	2 ^b
Sweden	5	2 ^b
Taiwan	16	*

(Continued)

TABLE 1. CONTINUED

	By the United States Against Other Country	By Other Country Against the United States ^a
Countries the United States Has More Active Measures Against Than They Have Against the United States (Continued)		
Tajikistan	1	*
Thailand	6	*
Turkey	2	0
Turkmenistan	1	*
Ukraine	6	*
United Kingdom	6	2 ^b
Uzbekistan	2	*
Venezuela	3	2
Yugoslavia	1	*
Countries That Have More Active Measures Against the United States Than the United States Has Against Them		
Australia	2	6
Austria	1	2 ^b
Canada	16	19
Colombia	1	4
Denmark	0	2 ^b
Finland	1	2 ^b
Greece	1	2 ^b
Ireland	0	2 ^b
Luxembourg	0	2 ^b
Mexico	7	15
Portugal	0	2 ^b
Country That Has the Same Number of Active Measures Against the United States as the United States Has Against It		
South Africa	2	2
All Countries		
Total	294	87

SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office based on the GATT/WTO data set.

- a. An entry of "0" means that the country reported no measures against the United States or that a value of zero can be fairly reliably inferred from the country's reports. An asterisk (*) means that the country did not report a list of active measures (and in many cases did not file any report at all) and that no value can be reliably inferred from the country's reports (if it filed any). In most cases, the true value is probably zero.
- b. The country is a member of the European Union, which takes antidumping actions at the union level rather than the country level. The number given is the number of measures imposed by the European Union against the United States.

TABLE 2. ACTIVE ANTIDUMPING MEASURES BY AND AGAINST THE UNITED STATES PER UNIT OF TRADE ON DECEMBER 31, 1995

	By the United States Against Other Country (Number per \$10 billion of U.S. imports)	By Other Country Against the United States ^a (Number per \$10 billion of U.S. exports)
Countries the United States Has More Active Measures Against Than They Have Against the United States		
Argentina	42.4	6.0
Armenia	2,150.4	*
Azerbaijan	23,337.3	*
Bangladesh	11.0	*
Belarus	255.8	*
Belgium	5.8	2.0 ^b
Brazil	18.8	8.5
Chile	6.5	0
Ecuador	6.5	*
Estonia	323.8	*
France	7.3	1.5
Georgia	954.1	*
Germany	5.0	1.0
Former East Germany	100.6	*
Greece	24.4	19.8
Hungary	46.9	0
India	11.1	4.2
Iran	275.6	*
Israel	4.4	*
Italy	9.6	2.6 ^b
Japan	4.4	0
Kazakhstan	702.8	*
Kenya	110.7	*
Kyrgyzstan	240.2	*
Latvia	238.4	*
Lithuania	631.5	*
Malaysia	0.9	*
Moldova	1,404.0	*
Netherlands	7.2	1.5 ^b
New Zealand	15.4	7.5
Norway	4.5	0
People's Republic of China	10.0	*
Poland	20.2	0
Romania	3,313.7	0
Russia	25.4	*
Singapore	3.0	0
South Africa	10.5	8.6
South Korea	9.0	0.6 ^b
Spain	9.4	0.1

Continued

TABLE 2. CONTINUED

	By the United States Against Other Country (Number per \$10 billion of U.S. imports)	By Other Country Against the United States (Number per \$10 billion of U.S. exports)
Countries the United States Has More Active Measures Against Than They Have Against the United States (Continued)		
Sweden	10.1	7.4 ^b
Taiwan	6.3	*
Tajikistan	334.3	*
Thailand	6.9	0
Turkey	14.5	0
Turkmenistan	6,655.9	*
Ukraine	242.3	*
United Kingdom	2.7	0.8 ^b
Uzbekistan	2,699.7	*
Yugoslavia	19.5	0
Countries That Have More Active Measures Against the United States Than the United States Has Against Them		
Australia	5.7	6.7 ^b
Austria	6.5	14.9
Canada	1.4	2.0
Colombia	3.2	12.2 ^b
Denmark	0	15.0 ^b
Finland	6.3	21.2 ^b
Ireland	0	6.8 ^b
Luxembourg	0	61.5 ^b
Mexico	1.6	3.7 ^b
Portugal	0	22.9 ^b
Venezuela	3.7	4.5
All Countries		
All Countries Combined	4.9	1.9

SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office based on the GATT/WTO data set.

- a. An entry of "0" means that the country reported no measures against the United States or that a value of zero can be fairly reliably inferred from the country's reports. An asterisk (*) means that the country did not report a list of active measures (and in many cases did not file any report at all) and that no value can be reliably inferred from the country's reports (if it filed any). In most cases, the true value is probably zero.
- b. The country is a member of the European Union, which takes antidumping actions at the union level rather than the country level. The number given is the number of measures imposed by the European Union against the United States.

a country-by-country basis, dividing U.S. measures against other countries by U.S. imports from those countries while at the same time dividing other countries' measures against the United States by U.S. exports to those countries (equivalent to imports by those countries from the United States) does almost nothing to change the statistics. The United States maintains more measures per unit of trade against each of 48 countries than those countries maintain against the United States. The reverse is true for only 11 countries.

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF ANTIDUMPING PROTECTION


The significance of antidumping activity as an economic and political issue rises not only in proportion to its prevalence but also in proportion to the degree of protection it provides. The protection provided under antidumping laws is significant both in terms of the rate and duration of the measures imposed. Furthermore, U.S. laws and procedures provide more stringent protection than do the laws and procedures of other countries.

How Large Are Antidumping Duties?

Antidumping duty rates—especially those imposed by the United States and a few small, mostly developing countries—are high enough to be significant impediments to trade (see Figure 5 and Table B-5). The countries with the highest average (mean) rates are Mexico (103.7 percent), Venezuela (greater than 100 percent), Colombia (62.1 percent), the United States (56.8 percent), and Peru (48.7 percent).

With the exception of Mexico, none of the countries with average rates higher than those of the United States are particularly big users of antidumping law. The big users have much lower averages, although their rates are still high enough to substantially impede trade. The mean rates for Canada, the EC/U, and Australia are 36.1 percent, 29.4 percent, and 25.6 percent, respectively. Looking at medians rather than means does not significantly change the picture (see Figure 6).

FIGURE 5. RANKING OF COUNTRIES BY MEAN INITIAL DUTY RATES IMPOSED, 1991-1995




SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office based on the GATT/WTO data set.

NOTE: Further details and notes are given in Table B-5.

a. The true value for Venezuela is the plotted percentage rate plus US \$1.46 per unit.

b. EC/U = European Community/Union.

FIGURE 6. RANKING OF COUNTRIES BY MEDIAN INITIAL DUTY RATES IMPOSED, 1991-1995



SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office based on the GATT/WTO data set.

NOTE: Further details and notes are given in Table B-5.

a. The true value for Venezuela is the plotted percentage rate plus US \$1.46 per unit.

b. EC/U = European Community/Union.

The rates imposed by the United States have increased dramatically, as shown by the following table:¹³

<u>Period</u>	<u>Mean Duty Rate (Percent)</u>
1981-1983	22.0
1984-1986	32.9
1987-1989	44.0
1990-1992	45.8
1993-1995	60.6

The mean duty rates given in this section are straight, unweighted averages, not trade-weighted averages. As such, they are better as indicators of the tendencies and propensities of the antidumping laws, procedures, and administrative authorities than as indicators of effects on the economy. Although trade-weighted averages would be better for the latter purpose, they have problems of their own, and the GATT/WTO reports do not give sufficient information to calculate them. (See the note to Table B-5 for more details.)


How Long Do Antidumping Measures Last?

Once a U.S. antidumping order is placed on an import, the foreign exporter generally finds it difficult to get the order removed, and the order usually stays in effect so long as to be effectively permanent. Statistics derived from the GATT/WTO data set show that the measures imposed by other countries are not particularly short-lived, that those imposed by the United States last much longer than those imposed by other countries, and that a large fraction of U.S. measures are indeed effectively permanent. Once again, the averages are unweighted, not trade weighted.

Active Measures on December 31, 1995. The mean duration to date of active U.S. antidumping measures on December 31, 1995, was 7.29 years; the median was 6.57 years (see Figure 7 and Table B-7). More than one in five U.S. measures had been in effect for 10 or more years. One in nine had been in effect for 15 or more years, and one measure had been in effect for more than 29 years.

13. Table B-6 presents statistics on the rates imposed by various countries in greater detail. That table also contains an average for 1978 through 1980 for the United States that is out of line with the trend for the other years, but the small sample size for that period (only seven cases) means that one or two cases with atypical duty rates could substantially affect the average, making it an unreliable indicator for the period.

FIGURE 7. MEAN DURATION TO DATE OF ACTIVE ANTIDUMPING MEASURES ON DECEMBER 31, 1995



SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office based on the GATT/WTO data set.

NOTE: Further details and notes are given in Table B-7.

a. EC/U = European Community/Union.

The numbers for other countries, though not as large as those for the United States, are not small. For Canada, the country with the next longest-lived measures, the mean duration to date was 5.61 years and the median was 3.85 years. One measure had been in effect for almost 21 years. An EC/U measure had been in effect for more than 11 years.


Those numbers indicate that many antidumping measures are long-lived, but they do not indicate how long measures normally last before being terminated (since, by definition, none of the measures active on December 31, 1995, had been terminated). They also do not give a valid comparison among countries; that is, one cannot validly conclude from the statistics that U.S. antidumping measures generally last longer than the measures of other countries. The reason one cannot is that the countries with shorter average mean and median durations to date might have enacted a large number of measures very recently (perhaps because they just recently began enforcing antidumping laws, or because a flood of imports had just come in as a result of exchange rate fluctuations). Those measures could end up lasting as long as U.S. measures, but in the meanwhile they would lower the average durations of active orders for the countries in question.

Measures Terminated During the Reporting Period. The statistics for measures terminated during the periods covered by the data set can be used to calculate how long measures typically last (see Figure 8 and Table B-8). Such calculations can be made for only 11 countries—eight fewer than was the case for measures in effect on December 31, 1995. Those 11, however, include most of the largest U.S. trading partners (one is the EC/U).

In examining such statistics, an issue arises concerning measures terminated early for reasons external to the normal operations of a country's antidumping laws and procedures. Australia and New Zealand terminated their antidumping enforcement and measures against one another during the period covered by the data set. Because of the early terminations, including the measures the two countries imposed against each other in the calculations would result in average durations for their measures that are lower than those faced by firms exporting to the two countries. Therefore, the average durations plotted in Figure 8 for Australia and New Zealand were calculated with the measures imposed by the two countries against each other excluded. Table B-8 contains the averages calculated both with and without the measures in question.

The same issue arises with regard to including measures against Spain, Portugal, and the members of the European Free Trade Area (EFTA) in calculating the average duration for the EC/U. Spain and Portugal joined the EC/U on January 1, 1986, at which time all antidumping enforcement and measures imposed by those two countries and the EC/U against each other were terminated. Similarly, the

FIGURE 8. MEAN DURATION OF ANTIDUMPING MEASURES TERMINATED DURING THE PERIODS COVERED BY THE REPORTS



SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office based on the GATT/WTO data set.

NOTE: Further details and notes are given in Table B-8.

a. EC/U = European Community/Union.

European Economic Area (EEA), comprising the EC/U and all of the members of EFTA except Switzerland, was created on January 1, 1994, at which time those countries terminated their enforcement and suspended their active measures against each other. The averages plotted for those countries in Figure 8 were calculated with those measures excluded. Table B-8 gives the averages both with and without the relevant measures.

For the United States, the mean duration of measures terminated during the periods covered by the data was 9.1 years and the median was 7.9 years. Four in 10 measures lasted 10 years or more. More than one in six lasted 15 years or more, and one lasted over 31 years. For Canada, the EC/U, and Australia, the means were 6.3, 5.6, and 4.2 years, respectively. The medians were 5.4, 5.2, and 3.6 years, and the longest-lived measures were 15.6, 12.4, and 9.6 years.¹⁴

Although these statistics give a better indication of how long measures typically last than do the statistics for active measures on December 31, 1995, some of the terminations on which they are based occurred five, 10, or even 15 years before December 31, 1995, and hence are less current. Furthermore, like the statistics on active measures, these statistics are skewed because the measures of a country that began substantial antidumping enforcement much later than the United States would be likely to have lower average durations even if they lasted as long or longer than U.S. measures. A country that began enforcing antidumping laws in 1975, for example, could not possibly terminate a measure that lasted 31.21 years (the duration of the longest-lived U.S. measure) until 2006.

An Unbiased Comparison Among Countries. Comparing the durations of different countries' measures requires a different methodology that, because of data limitations, can be applied to only five countries. Those countries, however, include the United States and several of its largest trading partners and major users of antidumping law (the EC/U, Canada, Mexico, and Australia).

One can determine the expected duration of a country's antidumping measures using the following procedure. First, identify all of the measures that a country imposed during the periods covered by its reports *and* that were imposed at least one year before the end of the last reporting period. Then, to estimate the probability that a measure will last at least one year, determine the percentage of those measures that

14. In some cases, Table B-8 gives ranges of numbers rather than the one number presented here. The same is true for Tables 3 and B-9, which are discussed on the next page. In each of those cases, the single number given is the midpoint between the two ends of the range. Because of incomplete reporting by the relevant countries, the precise duration of some measures is unknown. The low end of each range is calculated assuming that all measures lasted the minimum length of time consistent with the country's reports, and the high end is calculated assuming that all measures lasted the maximum length of time consistent with the country's reports.

lasted one or more years. A similar calculation can be done to determine the percentage of measures that will last two, three, or four years, and so on.

The percentages indicate that U.S. measures typically last much longer than the measures of other countries (see Table B-9). Over half of all U.S. measures can be expected to last at least 11 years. The comparable percentages for Australia, Canada, the EC/U, and Mexico are zero, 8.7 percent, 5.5 percent, and zero. (Once again, the measures imposed by Australia and New Zealand against each other and by members of the EEA against each other were excluded in calculating those numbers.)

Using those percentages, one can derive a summary number for comparing the typical durations of antidumping measures of different countries. That summary number is the expected median duration of antidumping measures—the number of years such that half of all measures first put into effect today can be expected to be shorter than the median and half can be expected to be longer. (The number assumes that future policy on terminating measures is the same as it was over the periods covered by the GATT/WTO data set.) As shown in Table 3, the expected median duration for U.S. antidumping measures is 10.6 years, which is considerably longer than the comparable number for the EC/U (6.3 years), Canada (6.5), Mexico (3.8), and Australia (3.4).

Effects of the Uruguay Round Agreement. At least part of the reason that U.S. measures have typically lasted longer than those of other countries is that a number of other countries (Canada, the EC/U, and Australia) have had provisions for automatically sunseting antidumping orders whereas the United States has not. That will soon change. As CBO reported in an earlier study:¹⁵

The new [WTO] Antidumping and Subsidies Codes require terminating antidumping and countervailing duties not later than five years from imposition, or five years from the date of the most recent review covering both dumping or subsidy (whichever is applicable) and injury. An exception is made if a review determines that such termination would be likely to lead to continuation or recurrence of the dumping or subsidy and consequent injury. The codes also set the same requirement for terminating price undertakings negotiated instead of antidumping and countervailing duties.

15. Congressional Budget Office, *How the GATT Affects U.S. Antidumping and Countervailing-Duty Policy*, pp. 72-73.

TABLE 3. RANKING OF COUNTRIES BY EXPECTED MEDIAN DURATION OF ANTIDUMPING MEASURES

Country	Median Duration (Years)
United States	10.6
Canada	6.4 - 6.5
European Community/Union ^a	5.6 - 7.0
Mexico	3.6 - 4.0
Australia ^b	3.1 - 3.6

SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office based on the GATT/WTO data set.

NOTE: The ranges indicated for countries other than the United States result from incomplete reporting by the countries, which in turn results in some of the measures having durations that can be determined only approximately. The lower value of the ranges is the value that holds if all measures of uncertain duration have the minimum duration that is consistent with the country's reports, and the higher value is the value that holds if all measures of uncertain duration have the maximum duration that is consistent with the country's reports. It is highly unlikely that either of those extremes is correct. The correct value is most likely somewhere in the middle.

- a. The numbers given are for the "Adjusted" case described in the text—that is, they are calculated from the cases remaining after excluding measures against countries that joined the EC/U or who, along with the EC/U, formed the European Economic Area during the range of reporting periods covered by the EC/U's reports. Since those measures were terminated early for reasons unrelated to the EC/U's normal policy on terminating antidumping measures, including them would result in a number that was lower than would normally apply to a country not expecting to join up with the EC/U or enter into a trade agreement with it that would eliminate antidumping enforcement.
- b. The numbers given are correct regardless of whether measures against New Zealand are excluded. The ~~give~~ numbers for the two cases differ only at a level of accuracy beyond that shown in the table (at the second digit after the decimal).

In relation to the sunset provision, the Antidumping Code states that ". . .existing anti-dumping measures shall be deemed to be imposed on a date not later than the date of entry into force for a Member of the Agreement Establishing the WTO. . . ."16

Since five years have not yet elapsed, the Antidumping Code has not yet required the sunseting of any U.S. antidumping measures. And, at least as of December 31, 1995, the United States had done little if any sunseting of measures ahead of time. That fact is reflected in the mean and median durations of U.S. antidumping measures for the 1987-1995 period (see Figure 9 and Table B-10). The mean duration to date of U.S. active measures—which was 7.29 years on December 31, 1995—has increased almost every year since 1987, when the mean was 6.04 years. The median duration follows the same pattern.


The upward trends in the mean and median do not necessarily imply that the United States has become more stringent about conditions for terminating orders. In some years before 1987, the mean and median were comparable with their values in 1995. However, a large number of new measures went into effect in the few years leading up to December 31, 1987, and that large batch reduced the mean and median durations to date of the stock of active measures. Since then, the durations to date of those measures have increased, bringing the mean and median back up to the prior levels. CBO has no way of forecasting what is likely to happen to the mean and median levels as the United States reviews all of its active measures as required by the Uruguay Round agreement. The result depends on the extent to which the United States makes use of the exception for cases in which a review determines that the dumping and consequent injury are likely to continue or recur.

THE INCREASING USE OF ANTIDUMPING LAWS AROUND THE WORLD

Opponents of U.S. antidumping policy argue that in addition to being harmful to U.S. consumers, such policy ultimately harms U.S. exporters because it leads foreign countries to use similar policies against U.S. firms. Some opponents make a strong claim—that other countries are singling out U.S. firms for antidumping enforcement in retaliation for U.S. antidumping enforcement against those countries' firms. A more moderate view is that other countries are beginning to follow the U.S. lead in using aggressive antidumping enforcement to protect their domestic industries and that as a result, more U.S. firms are being hit with antidumping measures abroad. Statistics from the GATT/WTO data set are consistent with the milder claim but not the stronger one.

16. Article 18, paragraph 3, subparagraph 2 of the Antidumping Code.

FIGURE 9. AVERAGE DURATION TO DATE OF ACTIVE U.S. ANTIDUMPING MEASURES AT THE END OF EACH YEAR, 1979-1995



SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office based on the GATT/WTO data set.

NOTE: Further details and notes are given in Table B-10.

The statistics also appear broadly consistent with another frequently stated proposition—that as more countries have joined the GATT/WTO and the GATT/WTO has increasingly circumscribed the ability of countries to use other trade restraints, an increasing number of countries are turning to antidumping enforcement as one of the few remaining GATT/WTO-legal options for protecting their domestic industries from international competition. That proposition is not inconsistent with the claim that other countries are following the U.S. lead (that is, both claims could be true).

Who Are the Major Targets of U.S. Antidumping Action?

Before examining the claims, it helps to determine which countries are the major targets of U.S. antidumping action, since they are the ones most likely to retaliate against U.S. firms or follow the U.S. lead. As one would expect, the countries against which the United States maintains the largest numbers of measures are all large suppliers of imports to the United States. When the numbers of measures are divided by the quantities of imports, however, it becomes evident that the United States tends to impose antidumping measures more on developing countries and countries with nonmarket economies (or which until recently had nonmarket economies) than on other countries.

The countries against which the United States maintained the largest numbers of active measures on December 31, 1995, were Japan (47), the People's Republic of China (32), South Korea (17), and Canada and Taiwan (16) (see Table 4). Three of those countries are among the five largest suppliers of U.S. imports, and all of them are among the eight largest suppliers (see Table 5). The relationship between active measures and import volumes holds farther down the rankings of the targets of antidumping measures and import suppliers as well.

The correlation between numbers of active measures and quantities of imports is so unsurprising as to be almost uninteresting. Of more interest is the question of which countries have the highest ratio of active measures against them to imports supplied by them. As shown in Table 6, which ranks countries by that ratio, the former republics of the Soviet Union dominate the top of the ranking. One might argue that their dominance is misleading, however, because the United States maintains only one or two active measures against many of those countries, and those measures all derive from the splitting up of one or two measures originally imposed against the Soviet Union. Many of those measures are still in effect only because no one has requested a review to get rid of them.

TABLE 4. NUMBER OF ACTIVE U.S. MEASURES AGAINST OTHER COUNTRIES ON
DECEMBER 31, 1995

	Number of Measures
Japan	47
People's Republic of China	32
South Korea	17
Canada	16
Taiwan	16
Brazil	15
Germany	15
Italy	13
France	11
Mexico	7
Argentina	6
Russia	6
Thailand	6
Ukraine	6
United Kingdom	6
India	5
Sweden	5
Kazakhstan	4
Netherlands	4
Romania	4
Singapore	4
Belgium	3
Spain	3
Venezuela	3
Australia	2
Hungary	2
Israel	2
Kyrgyzstan	2
New Zealand	2
South Africa	2
Turkey	2
Uzbekistan	2
Armenia	1
Austria	1
Azerbaijan	1
Bangladesh	1
Belarus	1
Chile	1
Colombia	1
Ecuador	1
Estonia	1
Finland	1
Georgia	1

Continued

TABLE 4. CONTINUED

	Number of Measures
Former East Germany	1
Greece	1
Iran	1
Kenya	1
Latvia	1
Lithuania	1
Malaysia	1
Moldova	1
Norway	1
Poland	1
Tajikistan	1
Turkmenistan	1
Yugoslavia	<u>1</u>
Total	294

SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office based on the GATT/WTO data set.

TABLE 5. LARGEST SUPPLIERS OF U.S. IMPORTS, 1991-1995

	Average Annual U.S. Imports (Billions of dollars)
Canada	114.66
Japan	106.57
Mexico	42.67
People's Republic of China	31.95
Germany	30.00
Taiwan	25.58
United Kingdom	22.04
South Korea	18.79
France	15.14
Italy	13.54
Singapore	13.53
Malaysia	11.20
Hong Kong	9.63
Saudi Arabia	9.00
Thailand	8.74
Venezuela	8.06
Brazil	7.99
Switzerland	6.13
Netherlands	5.56
Indonesia	5.40
Belgium	5.17
Philippines	5.06
Nigeria	5.05
Sweden	4.97
Israel	4.53
India	4.50
Australia	3.48
Spain	3.20
Colombia	3.11
Ireland	2.73

SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office based on annual data from the Bureau of the Census.

NOTE: Import numbers are customs values.

TABLE 6. ACTIVE U.S. MEASURES PER UNIT OF TRADE ON DECEMBER 31, 1995

	Number per \$10 Billion of U.S. Imports
Azerbaijan	23,337.3
Turkmenistan	6,655.9
Kyrgyzstan	4,240.2
Uzbekistan	2,699.7
Armenia	2,150.4
Moldova	1,404.0
Georgia	954.1
Kazakhstan	702.8
Lithuania	631.5
Tajikistan	334.3
Estonia	323.8
Romania	313.7
Iran	275.6
Belarus	255.8
Ukraine	242.3
Latvia	238.4
Kenya	110.7
Former East Germany	100.6
Hungary	46.9
Argentina	42.4
Russia	25.4
Greece	24.4
Poland	20.2
Yugoslavia	19.5
Brazil	18.8
New Zealand	15.4
Turkey	14.5
India	11.1
Bangladesh	11.0
South Africa	10.5
Sweden	10.1
People's Republic of China	10.0
Italy	9.6
Spain	9.4
South Korea	9.0
France	7.3
Netherlands	7.2
Thailand	6.9
Austria	6.5
Ecuador	6.5
Chile	6.5
Finland	6.3
----- Continued	

TABLE 6. CONTINUED

	Number per \$10 Billion of U.S. Imports
Taiwan	6.3
Belgium	5.8
Australia	5.7
Germany	5.0
Norway	4.5
Israel	4.4
Japan	4.4
Venezuela	3.7
Colombia	3.2
Singapore	3.0
United Kingdom	2.7
Mexico	1.6
Canada	1.4
Malaysia	<u>0.9</u>
Total	4.9

SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office based on the GATT/WTO data set and trade data from the Bureau of the Census.

Counting all orders as being against the Soviet Union—even those imposed after the breakup of the Soviet Union—rather than against each of the former republics eliminates the dominance of former Soviet Republics (see Tables 7 and 8). Nonmarket economies and developing countries still dominate the ranking, however. As shown in Table 8, of the 10 countries with the highest ratios of active U.S. measures against them to the quantities of U.S. imports they supply, six have or recently had nonmarket economies (Romania, East Germany, Hungary, the Soviet Union, Poland, and Yugoslavia). Three others are developing countries (Iran, Kenya, and Argentina). Only Greece is listed in International Monetary Fund publications as being an industrialized country. Progressing further down the ranking, the next highest ranked industrialized countries are New Zealand (12th), Sweden (17th), and Italy and Spain (19th and 20th). Japan, the country against which the United States had the most active measures on December 31, 1995, drops all the way to 35th when the number of active measures is divided by the quantity of U.S. imports supplied.

Are Other Countries Following the U.S. Lead in Increasing Antidumping Enforcement?

The GATT/WTO statistics support the contention that other countries are following the U.S. lead in using antidumping enforcement to protect their domestic industries. For example, the statistics show increasing antidumping activity by the United States over time, followed with a lag by increasing antidumping activity by other countries that do not already have significant activity. The data also show that the lagged increase in activity is more pronounced among developing countries, which might be expected if, in line with the conclusions from Table 4, those countries perceive that as a class they are especially hard hit by U.S. antidumping activity.

The overall picture is most evident in the numbers of active antidumping measures over time (see Figure 10 and Table B-11).¹⁷ In line with the contention that

17. Two notes are in order about the numbers in Figure 10 and Table B-11. First, the numbers for some countries for December 31, 1995, are different from the corresponding numbers in Figure 2 and Table B-2. The reason is that measures traceable to measures imposed against countries that later split into two or more countries are counted differently in the two sets of figures and tables. For example, the United States split the measures that it imposed when the Soviet Union was still one country into separate measures against the individual republics into which it broke up. Correspondingly, Figure 2 and Table B-2 count each of the new measures as a separate measure. Doing that in Figure 10 and Table B-11, however, would result in a spurious upward component to the trend in the numbers, suggesting a greater increase in the protection afforded by the stock of active measures than was actually the case.

To avoid that problem, each measure imposed against the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, or Yugoslavia by any country is counted in Figure 10 and Table B-11 as one measure in all subsequent time periods—even if the country imposing the measure at some point split it into several measures. The only measures counted separately against the new countries are those that met two criteria: they were imposed after the breakup, and the data appear to indicate that separate and distinct decisions about them were made for each of the new countries.

The second note is that the termination of enforcement between Australia and New Zealand and among the countries of the EEA that was mentioned earlier affects the analysis of trends in cases over time as well. When those terminations

TABLE 7. NUMBER OF ACTIVE U.S. ANTIDUMPING MEASURES AGAINST OTHER COUNTRIES ON DECEMBER 31, 1995, COUNTING MEASURES AGAINST THE FORMER SOVIET REPUBLICS AS BEING AGAINST THE SOVIET UNION

	Number
Japan	47
People's Republic of China	32
South Korea	17
Canada	16
Taiwan	16
Brazil	15
Germany	15
Italy	13
France	11
Mexico	7
Soviet Union	6
Argentina	6
Thailand	6
United Kingdom	6
India	5
Sweden	5
Netherlands	4
Romania	4
Singapore	4
Belgium	3
Spain	3
Venezuela	3
Australia	2
Hungary	2
Israel	2
New Zealand	2
South Africa	2
Turkey	2
Austria	1
Bangladesh	1
Belarus	1
Chile	1
Colombia	1
Ecuador	1
Finland	1
Former East Germany	1

Continued

TABLE 7. CONTINUED

	Number
Greece	1
Iran	1
Kenya	1
Malaysia	1
Norway	1
Poland	1
Yugoslavia	<u>1</u>
Total	294

SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office based on the GATT/WTO data set.

TABLE 8. NUMBER OF ACTIVE U.S. ANTIDUMPING MEASURES PER UNIT OF
TRADE ON DECEMBER 31, 1995, COUNTING MEASURES AGAINST THE
FORMER SOVIET REPUBLICS AS BEING AGAINST THE SOVIET UNION

	Number per \$10 Billion of U.S. Imports
Romania	313.7
Iran	275.6
Kenya	110.7
Former East Germany	100.6
Hungary	46.9
Argentina	42.4
Soviet Union	28.2
Greece	24.4
Poland	20.2
Yugoslavia	19.5
Brazil	18.8
New Zealand	15.4
Turkey	14.5
India	11.1
Bangladesh	11.0
South Africa	10.5
Sweden	10.1
People's Republic of China	10.0
Italy	9.6
Spain	9.4
South Korea	9.0
France	7.3
Netherlands	7.2
Thailand	6.9
Austria	6.5
Ecuador	6.5
Chile	6.5
Finland	6.3
Taiwan	6.3
Belgium	5.8
Australia	5.7
Germany	5.0
Norway	4.5
Israel	4.4
Japan	4.4
Venezuela	3.7
Colombia	3.2
Singapore	3.0
United Kingdom	2.7


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TABLE 8. CONTINUED

	Number per \$10 Billion of U.S. Imports
Mexico	1.6
Canada	1.4
Malaysia	<u>0.9</u>
Total	4.9

SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office based on the GATT/WTO data set and trade data from the Bureau of the Census.

FIGURE 10. ACTIVE ANTIDUMPING MEASURES AGAINST ALL OTHER COUNTRIES



SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office based on the GATT/WTO data set.

NOTES: The tick marks labeled with years represent data for December 31 of the years in question. The tick marks in between represent data for June 30.

Before September 1, 1989, the European Community/Union (EC/U) reported only measures against other signatories to the Antidumping Code. Spain and Sweden never had more than two measures and ceased reporting upon joining the EC/U. Norway and Switzerland had no active measures from June 30, 1980, through December 31, 1995. Brazil had no active measures from December 31, 1980, through December 31, 1988. Hong Kong, Pakistan, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Yugoslavia, and Egypt reported no active measures from December 31, 1982, or earlier through December 31, 1995. Cyprus reported none in 1995.

Further details and notes are given in Table B-11.

- a. The number plotted for this country excludes measures against trading partners against whom the country ceased antidumping enforcement at some time during the time span covered in the figure.
- b. The first date for which numbers are available for New Zealand is June 30, 1988.
- c. Japan had no active measures from June 30, 1980, through December 31, 1992.

the United States has been the leader in aggressive antidumping enforcement, the number of active U.S. measures followed a strong and consistent upward trend throughout the 16 years covered by the data set. From a level of 80 on June 30, 1979, the number increased in 28 of the subsequent 33 reporting periods, reaching 278 on December 31, 1995.

With the exception of New Zealand, however, none of the other industrialized countries show any pronounced, long-term, upward trend in active measures. Most of those countries were already significant users of antidumping policy. The number of Canadian measures fluctuated substantially—from 87 in 1980 to 163 in 1988 to 98 in 1995—with little if any trend for the whole period. Australia's measures also varied widely—from 107 in 1982, to 184 in 1985, to 19 in 1990, to 75 in 1995. Japan, although a huge player in international trade, has never made much use of antidumping law, having implemented only two measures—in 1993 and 1995—over the entire 16 years covered by the data.

The EC/U did not report active measures against nonsignatories to the GATT Antidumping Code before September 1, 1989, making it difficult to say much about trends before then. Since then, however, the number of measures has changed little. Furthermore, 34 previously unreported measures against those nonsignatories first appear on the list on that date. Assuming that a sizable fraction of those measures had been in effect for several years at that point, the number of active EC/U measures has probably been relatively flat since at least as far back as 1984. Other than the United States, only New Zealand shows a continuous increase in active measures over time, and its numbers are much lower than those of the other industrialized countries (except Japan) that have filed reports.

Among developing countries, use of antidumping law appears to be spreading significantly, and much of the spread is quite recent. As a group, those countries historically have made much less use of antidumping laws than have industrialized countries. Of the 22 developing countries for which lists of active measures can be derived from the data set, 10—Mexico, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Peru, India, Singapore, South Korea, and Turkey—had more active measures on the most recent date for which there are reliable numbers than on the earliest date, and no country had fewer. Mexico's active measures increased from 18 to 67 over the last four years of the data set; Argentina's, from 4 to 20 over the last year; Brazil's, from 17 to 23 over the last 2 ½ years; and Turkey's, from 27 to 37 over the last two years.

occurred, the numbers of active measures maintained by the countries in question declined for reasons having nothing to do with either the aggressiveness of the antidumping enforcement by those countries toward the rest of the world or the quantities of imports those countries received from the rest of the world. To avoid the resulting distortion of trends, the numbers plotted in Figure 10 exclude the measures that Australia and New Zealand imposed against each other and those that the members of the EEA imposed against each other. Table B-11 contains both sets of numbers.

To summarize, the United States and New Zealand are the only industrialized countries that show significant long-term upward trends in the number of active antidumping measures, but numerous developing countries do so. Those facts are consistent with the hypothesis that other countries have followed the U.S. lead in aggressive enforcement. Industrialized countries as a group were already large users of such laws whereas developing countries were not. Also, because they were not targeted by U.S. enforcement to the degree that developing countries have been, industrialized countries would not feel the same need to even the score for their firms.

Although not so readily apparent, the same trends appear in the numbers of case initiations over time except for the upward trend for the United States (see Tables B-12 and B-13). No trend is apparent for any other industrialized country except New Zealand. However, several developing countries—Mexico, Brazil, India, and South Korea—show an upward trend in the number of case initiations over time.

Antidumping Enforcement as a Substitute for Other Forms of Protection

Another explanation frequently put forth for the increasing use of antidumping laws is that countries use those laws as a substitute for other forms of protection, such as tariffs and quotas. As the various GATT/WTO agreements have progressively restricted the ability of a growing number of countries to use trade barriers to protect their domestic industries from international competition, those countries have increasingly turned to antidumping enforcement as one of the few remaining protectionist practices that the GATT/WTO still allows. That explanation and the idea that other countries are following the U.S. lead are not mutually exclusive. They could both be true.

Over the past several decades, the United States has been a leader in eliminating tariff protection. Therefore, if countries use antidumping enforcement as a substitute for other protection, it follows that the United States would be a leader in increasing such enforcement. Many developing countries have become subject to more GATT/WTO strictures in recent years, which would explain why antidumping activity is spreading in the developing world. Thus, with an obvious exception or two (such as Hong Kong, whose policies are strongly free trade but which has never made use of antidumping laws), the explanation would seem to be consistent with the facts. CBO cannot rigorously test that hypothesis because there is no good measure of overall protection for each country to correlate with the use of antidumping law. Nonetheless, the explanation is probably valid.

Is the Spread of Antidumping Activity Hurting U.S. Exporters?


As antidumping activity by developing countries has increased, so has the number of active measures they have maintained against the United States, and most of that increase has been fairly recent (see Figure 11 and Table B-14). For most developing countries (Mexico and Brazil being moderate exceptions), the increases have been small, and the total increase for all of those countries was more than offset by decreases in the number of active measures against the United States by other industrialized countries, primarily Australia and the EC/U. The declines among industrialized countries appear to have halted, however, whereas the increases for developing countries have not. Hence, the spread of antidumping activity may be starting to harm U.S. exporters.

Looking first at industrialized countries, the number of Canada's active measures against the United States fluctuated mostly within a very narrow band from 1981 through 1995, with almost no change from the beginning to the end of that interval. Japan never had any active measures against the United States. The only countries with increases over the period were New Zealand (from zero to one in 1992) and Spain (from zero to one in 1985 before it joined the EC/U and quit enforcing its own antidumping policy). Both of those increases are insignificant.

The numbers of active measures of Australia and the EC/U, however, fluctuated substantially. Starting at seven in 1982, Australia's measures increased to a high of 17 in 1985, declined to zero by the end 1990, rose back up to six by the end of 1994, and remained there through the end of 1995. Thus, the final number was just slightly below the initial number and substantially below the peak number in 1985. The earliest, completely reliable number for the EC/U is the peak of 20 in 1985; by the end of 1992, it had fallen to a low of two, and it stayed at that level through the end of 1995.

Among developing countries, the largest increase was for Mexico, which went from 10 active measures against the United States in 1991 to 15 by the end of 1995. The latter number makes Mexico second only to Canada in the number of active measures against the United States. Brazil's measures increased from two to six, and Colombia's from one to four. India and South Korea's measures increased from zero to one. No developing country showed a decrease.

FIGURE 11. ACTIVE ANTIDUMPING MEASURES AGAINST U.S. FIRMS.



SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office based on the GATT/WTO data set.

NOTES: The tick marks labeled with years represent data for December 31 of the years in question. The tick marks in between represent data for June 30.

Data for some countries cannot be seen in this figure because they coincide with the x-axis: Japan, Norway, and Switzerland had no active measures against U.S. firms from June 30, 1980, through December 31, 1995; New Zealand from June 30, 1988, through June 30, 1992; and India from June 30, 1992, through December 31, 1993.

Some countries are not shown in the figure. Austria, Finland, and Sweden reported no active measures against the United States, and Spain never more than one, from December 31, 1979 (June 30, 1980, for Austria) through their dates of entry into the European Community/Union. South Korea had no measures on June 30, 1994, and one at the end of each of the remaining subsequent reporting periods. South Africa reported two measures on June 30 and December 31 of 1995. Hong Kong, Pakistan, Singapore, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Yugoslavia, and Egypt had no active measures against U.S. firms for at least 10 years before December 31, 1995. The data set shows no active measures for Chile, Peru, Thailand, Cyprus, and Turkey for shorter periods before that date.

Further details and notes are given in Table B-14.

Are Other Countries Singling Out U.S. Firms in Their Antidumping Enforcement?


Periodically one hears anecdotal stories of other countries singling out U.S. firms for antidumping enforcement in retaliation for U.S. antidumping enforcement against those countries' firms. Those stories could be true (CBO has not tried to verify them), but statistics from the GATT/WTO data set indicate that there is no consistent or widespread pattern of such retaliation (see Figures 12 and 13 and Table B-15). In fact, just the opposite appears to be the case—a tendency not to enforce against the United States.

Assuming once again that the numbers of case initiations and active measures are proportional to the quantities of imports (divided by GDP, which remains constant in this example), if countries were singling out U.S. firms for enforcement, the ratio of case initiations against the United States to case initiations against all countries and the ratio of active measures against the United States to active measures against all countries would most likely be larger than the ratio of imports from the United States to imports from all countries. In fact, the opposite is true, both for all countries in aggregate and for most countries individually.

From 1991 through 1995, the rest of the world obtained 19.2 percent of its imports from the United States, but only 10.5 percent of its case initiations were against the United States. The same percentage of its active measures on December 31, 1995, were against the United States. On a country-by-country basis, for each of 22 of the 24 countries with one or more case initiations from 1991 through 1995, the percentage of the country's case initiations that were against the United States was less than the percentage of the country's imports that came from the United States during the same years. The only exceptions were India and Israel, neither of which is a large U.S. export market. For each of 16 of the 18 countries that had one or more active measures on December 31, 1995, the percentage of the country's active measures on that date was less than the percentage of its imports that came from the United States from 1991 through 1995. The only exceptions were Canada and Colombia.

Note that the countries that were exceptions with regard to case initiations were different from the two that were exceptions with regard to active measures. Thus, for no country were the percentages of both case initiations and active measures against the United States larger than the percentage of imports coming from the United States. For 14 countries, both antidumping percentages were lower than the percentage of imports coming from the United States. For eight countries, only one of the antidumping percentages could be calculated (because the country either had no case initiations or had no active measures); for seven of those eight countries,

FIGURE 12. ARE OTHER COUNTRIES SINGLING OUT U.S. FIRMS? AN ANSWER BASED ON CASE INITIATIONS




SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office based on the GATT/WTO data set.

NOTE: Countries with no dark bars initiated no cases against U.S. firms. Further details and notes are given in Table B-15.

a. EC/U = European Community/Union.

FIGURE 13. ARE OTHER COUNTRIES SINGLING OUT U.S. FIRMS?
AN ANSWER BASED ON ACTIVE ANTIDUMPING MEASURES



SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office based on the GATT/WTO data set.

NOTE: Countries with no dark bars had no active measures against U.S. firms. Further details and notes are given in Table B-15.

a. EC/U = European Community/Union.

the antidumping percentage against the United States was less than the percentage of imports coming from the United States.

SOME RECENT ISSUES

Two issues that have received attention in recent years concern the application of U.S. antidumping laws and procedures to countries with nonmarket economies and whether or not to adopt a short-supply provision for cases when antidumping duties applied to imports of upstream goods (inputs) make it difficult for downstream industries (whose production depends on the upstream goods) to obtain the goods at prices that allow them to compete.

Nonmarket Economies

Are the procedures that the United States uses to determine dumping margins on goods imported from countries with nonmarket economies biased toward finding margins that are too large? A previous CBO study surveyed problems in U.S. antidumping enforcement and discussed the problems inherent in determining dumping margins for goods from such countries as well as a charge of bias that had been leveled and the Department of Commerce's defense against that charge.¹⁸ Not having examined the DOC's procedures since then, CBO cannot comment on whether any particular biases remain or whether current complaints merely reflect the problems inherent in the task. Statistics from the GATT/WTO data set, however, can throw some light on the issue.

Of the active U.S. antidumping measures on December 31, 1995, 18 percent were against countries that had nonmarket economies (or had such economies until recently). Those countries supplied only 6 percent of U.S. imports from 1991 through 1995. The disproportion between active measures and trade is consistent with a bias against nonmarket economies but does not prove it. The United States also typically imposes higher antidumping duties on goods imported from nonmarket economies than on those from market economies. The mean and median initial duty rates it imposed on goods from nonmarket economies between July 1, 1979, and December 31, 1995, were 76 percent and 119 percent higher, respectively, than the rates for goods from market economies (see Table B-16).

Those higher duties, however, do not prove that U.S. procedures are biased against goods from nonmarket economies either. Unlike the case for prices in market

18. Congressional Budget Office, *How the GATT Affects U.S. Antidumping and Countervailing-Duty Policy*, pp. 39-40.

economies, prices in nonmarket economies have no meaning in terms of the actual cost of production. Consequently, countries with nonmarket economies have difficulty knowing the true economic cost of the goods they produce and, hence, have great difficulty determining the correct price at which to sell without being guilty of dumping. Therefore, goods imported from nonmarket economies may be more likely to be dumped than are goods imported from other countries, and the actual dumping margins may be typically larger.

Evidence for that conclusion is provided by the statistics displayed Figure 14 and Table B-16. For each of the 10 countries listed (all of the countries for which data could be obtained from the GATT/WTO data set), the ratio of the mean initial duty rate imposed on goods from nonmarket economies to the mean rate imposed on goods from market economies is greater than one. The same is also true for median duty rates.

One bit of evidence that U.S. procedures may be biased is that the U.S. ratios of means and medians are higher than those of most of the other large users of antidumping laws. The U.S. ratio of means is the fifth highest of the 10 ratios given, and its ratio of medians is the fourth highest. That would seem to imply that the U.S. ratios are average, but only one of the four countries with higher ratios—Mexico—is a significant user of antidumping laws. The other significant users—Australia, the EC/U, and Canada—have much lower ratios.


Furthermore, the three other countries besides Mexico that have higher ratios than the United States—New Zealand, Japan, and South Korea—have so few duties in place that one or two atypical duties could significantly distort the ratios. Hence, the ratios are not reliable indicators for those countries. New Zealand and Japan have only one duty against a nonmarket economy, and South Korea has only two. Japan has only one duty against a market economy, and South Korea has only five. An example of the significance of such small numbers: the only duty that New Zealand has against a nonmarket economy is 584 percent, which is several times as high as the next largest duty imposed by New Zealand, which in turn is several times as large as the third highest duty.¹⁹ If New Zealand imposed another duty against a nonmarket economy, it would probably not be anywhere near as high.

Downstream Users and Short Supply

Another issue that has stirred debate in recent years concerns how antidumping duties imposed on "upstream" goods affect "downstream" industries. The terms upstream

19. The rate of 584 percent is actually the average of several duties imposed in the case, presumably on different varieties of the product from the country in question (the People's Republic of China).

FIGURE 14. RATIO OF AVERAGE DUTY RATE AGAINST NONMARKET ECONOMIES
TO AVERAGE DUTY RATE AGAINST MARKET ECONOMIES



SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office based on the GATT/WTO data set.

NOTE: Further details and notes are given in Table B-16.

a. New Zealand's mean duty rate is at least four times as high as that of other countries.

b. EC/U = European Community/Union.

c. New Zealand's median duty rate is at least six times as high as that of other countries.

and downstream refer to stages of production. For example, automobiles are produced from steel, among other inputs. Thus, steel production is an upstream industry relative to automobile production, and automobile production is a downstream industry relative to steel production. Similarly, the mining of coal and iron ore is upstream relative to steel production, and steel production is downstream relative to the mining of coal and iron ore.

Antidumping duties have additional consequences when downstream industries are involved. When the United States imposes an antidumping duty on a final product that is sold to the consumer, the consumer pays a higher price, the foreign exporter receives a lower price, and U.S. domestic competitors of the foreign exporter receive a higher price for their goods, and that is the end of the analysis. When such a duty is imposed on an upstream product, however, the duty raises the costs of the product's downstream users. In some cases, the increased costs can be sufficient to place a downstream industry in the United States at a significant disadvantage relative to its foreign competition. In such cases, although the duty reduces imports of the dumped product and thereby protects the competing domestic industry, it results in increased imports of the downstream product and thereby damages the downstream domestic industry. One study has shown a consequent tendency in the United States for antidumping cases against upstream goods in some sectors to be followed by antidumping cases against downstream goods in those sectors.²⁰

In recent years, the issue of injury to downstream industries arose with particular prominence in an antidumping case brought against imports of flat-panel display screens used in laptop computers. The case prompted domestic computer manufacturers to threaten to move their production offshore, arguing that otherwise they would be unable to compete with imports of laptops produced by foreign manufacturers that did not have to contend with significant antidumping duties on display screens.

To ameliorate such problems, some observers have proposed inserting a "short-supply" provision into U.S. antidumping law. Such a provision would allow a reduction or suspension of antidumping duties in cases in which downstream producers would be unable to obtain the product domestically in sufficient quantities

20. Robert M. Feinberg and Seth Kaplan, "Fishing Downstream: The Political Economy of Effective Administered Protection," *Canadian Journal of Economics*, vol. 26, no. 1 (February 1993), pp. 150-158. Such a tendency would seem to imply that upstream firms pursue antidumping protection even when it harms their downstream customers, which would seem irrational. Another study has explained that apparent paradox by noting that the injury to the downstream industry increases the chances of its achieving its own antidumping protection, the extra profits from which would be shared between the upstream and downstream industries. In certain circumstances, the greater likelihood of protection is sufficient to give incentive to the downstream industry to support protection for the upstream industry, or at least not to oppose it. See Bernard M. Hockman and Michael P. Leidy, "Cascading Contingent Protection," *European Economic Review*, 36 (1992), pp. 883-892.

to fill their needs and thus would be forced (in the absence of the short-supply provision) to obtain the product by importing it and paying the normal price plus the antidumping duty.

To analyze the effects of U.S. antidumping policy on downstream industries, CBO took the active U.S. antidumping measures on December 31, 1995, and divided them into three groups: raw and processed materials, intermediate goods, and final- and near-final-demand products.²¹ The first two groups are upstream, with the first being further upstream than the second.

Deciding which group a product belongs in is to some extent subjective. One obvious problem is where to draw the line between a processed material and an intermediate good. In addition, some goods could be placed in more than one group. For example, sugar is sold to consumers for use at home and thus might be thought of as a final-demand good. However, it is also sold to producers of processed foods and thus might be thought of as an intermediate good. Quotas on imports of sugar into the United States have raised the price of sugar to the point that some processors, such as soft-drink producers, have replaced it with high-fructose corn syrup. That example illustrates how trade barriers on upstream goods can affect downstream industries. Another example of the subjectivity of the decision about which group a good belongs in relates to goods that are used as they are, rather than being incorporated into other goods, but that are not used by consumers. An example is self-propelled bituminous paving equipment.

Because of that subjectivity, some people might disagree with CBO's classification of particular products. However, the aggregate numbers that CBO has drawn from the classifications would probably not be significantly affected by reasonable differences in judgment about the classifications.

Most of the products on which the United States had active antidumping measures on December 31, 1995, belong in one of the two upstream classifications. By CBO's tally, 133 (or 47.7 percent) of the measures were against raw and processed materials and 92 (33.2 percent) were against intermediate goods (see Table 9). Only 53 (or 19.1 percent) were against final- and near-final-demand goods. Looking at numbers of products rather than numbers of measures, 55 (or 40.1 percent) of the products covered by antidumping measures were raw or processed materials and 40 (or 29.2 percent) were intermediate goods. Only 42 (or 30.7 percent) were final- or near-final-demand goods.

21. See Tables B-17 through B-19 for the list of measures in each group.

Thus, approximately four-fifths of the active measures and two-thirds of the products covered by the active measures were in one of the two upstream categories. Each of those measures could be expected to decrease the competitiveness of downstream industries in proportion to the following factors: (1) the size of the antidumping duty or the undertaking markup imposed, (2) the share of the market that the dumped imports had before the measure(s) was (were) put into effect, (3) the inability of the domestic industry that competes with the dumped import to increase its production of the good, (4) the lack of available substitutes that the downstream industry might use in place of the dumped good, (5) the significance of the product to the production of the downstream industry (as measured by the dumped import's share of the total production cost), and (6) the extent to which the product produced by the downstream industry is or can be readily imported.

Although CBO has no information on items (3) through (6), it is possible to calculate numbers relevant to items (1) and (2) from data contained in the GATT/WTO data set. For raw and processed materials, the mean initial duty rate for duty orders active on December 31, 1995, was 52.4 percent, and for intermediate goods the mean was 38.3 percent (see Table 9). If the price of an input that was important for a downstream industry increased by such large percentages, it could indeed cause competitive problems for that industry.

The mean market share of the dumped imports in the U.S. market was 13.6 percent for raw and processed materials and 17.9 percent for intermediate goods. Although CBO has no information on the ability of the relevant domestic industries to expand production if a shortage occurred, the domestic industry and perhaps other imports that are not subject to antidumping sanctions could probably make up for reductions in dumped imports of those magnitudes. For two reasons, however, one cannot conclude from this fact that there is no need for a short-supply provision.

First, these numbers may understate the actual market shares. The averages are calculated only for the products for which market-share numbers are reported in the GATT/WTO data. As indicated in Table 9, those products represent fewer than half the products on which measures were imposed. Many of the remaining products seem to be supplied by countries that might be expected to have rather large market shares, such as Japan and China. In addition, for some of the products used to calculate the averages, the GATT/WTO data set contains market-share numbers for some countries with measures imposed on them but not for others. Hence, the data understate the total market share of dumped imports.

Second, since a short-supply provision makes an exception to normal antidumping duties, it would presumably be for unusual rather than average cases. Hence, it is worth examining cases that have a higher-than-average market share. For

TABLE 9. U.S. ANTIDUMPING STATISTICS ON DECEMBER 31, 1995,
BY CLASS OF PRODUCT

	Upstream Goods		Final- and Near-Final- Demand Goods
	Raw and Processed Materials	Intermediate Goods	
Duty Rate			
Number of measures	133	92	53
Number with duty rates reported	112	82	38
Duty rate (Percent)			
Mean	52.35	38.28	60.20
Median	40.13	25.31	37.10
Highest	163.00	140.37	376.67
Lowest	0.97	0.65	0.98
Duration of Protection			
Number of measures	133	92	53
Number for which duration can be determined	133	92	53
Duration (Years)			
Mean	6.17	7.55	9.67
Median	4.26	6.63	8.79
Longest	27.34	23.55	29.30
Market Share of Dumped Imports			
Number of products	55	40	42
Number with market share reported	22	23	21
Market share (Percent)			
Mean	13.60	17.90	29.00
Median	13.40	13.20	25.00
Highest	36.50	53.00	65.00
Lowest	1.80	0.10	0.70
Percentage of products with a market share of 25 percent or more	13.60	26.10	52.40
Average number of countries (measures)/product	2.30	2.30	1.20

SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office based on the GATT/WTO data set.

one product in the intermediate-goods category, imports with antidumping measures against them had 53 percent of the U.S. market before the measures were imposed (see Table 9). For one good in the category of raw and processed materials, imports with 36.5 percent of the U.S. market have measures against them. Of the 22 raw and processed materials with market-share numbers reported in the GATT/WTO data set, three have market shares of 25 percent or greater. Of the 23 intermediate goods with market-share numbers reported, six had market shares of 25 percent or greater. One or more of those products might be candidates for a short-supply provision (depending on the other factors listed above that contribute to a competitive disadvantage for downstream industries). Including the cases for which no market shares are reported presumably would roughly double those numbers.

APPENDIX A: THE GATT/WTO REPORTS

From the beginning of 1980 through June 1994, the Antidumping Code of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) required its signatories to submit reports of their antidumping activity to the Committee on Antidumping Practices every six months. Beginning with the next reporting period—July-December 1994—the new World Trade Organization (WTO) Antidumping Code picked up and continued that requirement. Unlike the GATT Antidumping Code, however, the WTO Code is incorporated into the WTO agreement itself. All WTO members have therefore been required to file reports since the July-December 1994 reporting period. Each reporting period, the GATT/WTO has distributed copies of all reports to the other signatories.

What the Reports Contain

The reports consist primarily of case data tables and lists of active measures. The case data tables give data on all actions taken during the reporting period relating to current antidumping cases and reviews. (See Figure A-1 for a page from a case data table.) For each case on which action was taken, the tables give the product involved, the country from which it was imported, and any of the following that have occurred to date: the date the case was initiated, the date of imposition and percentage rate of protection for any provisional measures imposed while the case is being investigated and decided, the date and rate of any definitive duty imposed, the date and rate of any price undertaking imposed or agreed to, the date of a determination of no dumping, the date of a determination of no injury, and a general category of "other" for actions that do not fit into any of the aforementioned categories. The tables also give information about the amount of trade involved and the methodology the administrative authority used to determine the dumping margin.

The lists of active measures include all of the antidumping measures (that is, duty orders and price undertakings) resulting from past cases that were active on a given date during the reporting period—usually the last day of the period. (See Figure A-2 for a page from a list of active measures.) Sometimes the lists indicate whether a measure is a duty or an undertaking.

Many of the reports also contain data on terminations of active measures. Those data can be found in several places: in the case data tables, in the lists of active measures, or in separate tables altogether. In many cases, termination of a measure is never reported and must be inferred from the fact that the measure disappeared from the list of active measures from one report to the next.

FIGURE A-1. A PAGE FROM THE CASE DATA TABLE IN A SEMIANNUAL REPORT
SUBMITTED BY THE UNITED STATES TO THE GATT/WTO

G/ADP/N/9/USA
Page 2

Reporting Member: United States

Country or Customs Territory	Product	Initiation Date	Provisional Business	Final Measure		No. Final Measures				Trade Volume	Dumped Imports % of Domestic Consump- tion	% of Trade Import- ing Period (of Exporting Country)	Basis for Determi- nation
				Definitive Date	Date; Backward	No Dumping	No Injury	Can Withdraw	Other				
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14
Argentina	Silicon Metal (R)	13.10.94	09.08.95; 24.62%	15.12.95; 24.62%						n/a	n/a	1 Firm	BLA
Argentina	Silicon Metal (R)	12.10.95								n/a	n/a	1 Firm	BLA
Australia	Corrosion- Resistant Carbon Steel Flat Products (R)	19.09.94	16.08.95; 21.10%							n/a	n/a	1 Firm	BLA
Australia	Corrosion- Resistant Carbon Steel Flat Products (R)	08.09.95								n/a	n/a		
Bangladesh	Shop Towels (R)	06.05.93	28.12.94; 0.0% - 42.31%	21.09.95; 0.0% - 42.31%						n/a	n/a	6 Firms	CV
Bangladesh	Shop Towels (R)	14.04.95	21.09.95; 0.0% - 2.11%							NE for some firms	n/a	6 Firms	CV, BLA
Belgium	Technical Phosphoric Acid (R)	15.09.95	15.11.95; 0.0%							n/a	n/a	1 Firm	BLA
Brazil	Carbon-Steel Plate (R)	08.09.95								n/a	n/a		
Brazil	Carbon Malleable Cast Iron Pipe Fittings (R)	15.07.94	22.02.95; 5.64%	14.03.95; 34.64%						n/a	n/a	1 Firm	BLA
Brazil	Ferroalloy (R)	14.04.95								n/a	n/a	1 Firm	
Brazil	Frozen Concentrated Orange Juice (R)	24.08.93	14.08.95; 0.99% - 2.22%							n/a	n/a	2 Firms	TMA; Nation- alists and Germany

NOTE: GATT = General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade; WTO = World Trade Organization.

FIGURE A-2. A PAGE FROM THE LIST OF ACTIVE MEASURES IN A SEMIANNUAL REPORT SUBMITTED BY THE UNITED STATES TO THE GATT/WTO

G/ADP/N/9/USA

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Semi-Annual Report of Anti-Dumping Actions
For the period 1 July - 31 December 1995

Antidumping Orders Currently in Effect

Country	Product	Effective Date
Argentina	Barbed Wire	13.11.85
Argentina	Carbon Steel Wire Rods	23.11.84
Argentina	Oil Country Tubular Goods	11.08.95
Argentina	Rectangular Tubing	26.05.89
Argentina	Standard Line and Pressure Pipe	03.08.95
Argentina	Silicon Metal	26.09.91
Armenia	Solid Urea	14.07.87
Australia	Canned Bartlett Pears	23.03.73
Australia	Corrosion-Resistant Carbon Steel Flat Products	19.08.93
Austria	Railway Track Equipment	17.02.78
Azerbaijan	Solid Urea	14.07.87
Bangladesh	Shop Towels	20.03.92
Belarus	Solid Urea	14.07.87
Belgium	Cut-to-Length Carbon Steel Plate	19.08.93
Belgium	Phosphoric Acid	20.08.87
Belgium	Sugar	13.06.79
Brazil	Brass Sheet & Strip	12.01.87
Brazil	Butt-Weld Pipe Fittings	17.12.86
Brazil	Circular-Welded Non-Alloy Pipe	02.11.92
Brazil	Construction Castings	09.05.86
Brazil	Cut-to-Length Carbon Steel Plate	19.08.93
Brazil	Ferrosilicon	14.03.94
Brazil	Frozen Concentrated Orange Juice	05.05.87
Brazil	Lead & Bismuth Steel	22.03.93
Brazil	Nitrocellulose	10.07.90
Brazil	Pipe Fittings	21.05.86
Brazil	Silicomanganese	22.12.94
Brazil	Silicon Metal	31.07.91
Brazil	Stainless Steel Bar	21.02.95
Brazil	Stainless Steel Wire Rods	28.01.94
Brazil	Standard Line and Pressure Pipe	03.08.95
Canada	Brass Sheet & Strip	12.01.87
Canada	Construction Castings	05.03.86
Canada	Corrosion-Resistant Carbon Steel Flat Products	19.08.93
Canada	Cut-to-Length Carbon Steel Plate	19.08.93
Canada	Color Picture Tubes	07.01.88
Canada	Elemental Sulphur	17.12.73
Canada	Magnesium	31.08.92
Canada	Oil Country Tubular Goods	16.06.86
Canada	Racing Plates	27.02.74
Canada	Raspberries	24.06.85
Canada	Steel Rail	15.09.89
Canada	Steel Jacks	13.09.66
Canada	Sugar and Syrups	09.04.80
Chile	Standard Carnations	20.03.87

NOTE: GATT = General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade; WTO = World Trade Organization.

In principle, the lists of active measures are redundant. If one knows from the case data when measures are put into effect and from other indications in the reports when the measures are terminated, one can derive the list of active measures at any time. In practice, however, the case data, the termination data, and the lists of active measures contain many errors and omissions. Hence, it is valuable to be able to cross-check the lists with the case and termination data. In addition, reported lists of active measures are the only way to know of the existence of measures that went into effect before a country began reporting case data.

Problems with the Reports

The reports initially appear to be a gold mine for analyzing antidumping activity around the world. They are not available in a readily usable computer format, however, and the information for each case is scattered over several tables in several different reports. Furthermore, as mentioned above, the reports of all of the major reporting countries are riddled with errors of one kind or another, including:

- o Conflicts between reports for different reporting periods on the dates, duty rates, trade statistics, and so on, for a given case;¹
- o Conflicts between case data tables and lists of active measures relating to the dates that measures were imposed;
- o Cases for which there are no resolutions in the case data;
- o Cases that are completely missing from one or more of the sets of tables (case data tables, the lists of active measures, or the lists of terminations of measures);
- o Missing reports—that is, situations in which a country filed a string of reports over time but failed to file reports for some periods in the middle of that string;
- o Missing tables—especially missing lists of active measures and, even more so, missing lists of terminations of measures. When lists are missing, terminations can be determined only within a six-month, or sometimes larger, interval by comparing consecutive lists of active measures to determine

1. Most cases appear in the reports for more than one reporting period because the case initiation, provisional measures, and final disposition of the cases occur in different reporting periods. Also, if an antidumping measure is imposed, the case appears in subsequent periods on lists of active measures.

which orders on the list for one period were not on the list for the following period);

- o Reviews of active measures that are mislabeled as new cases, and to a lesser extent, new cases that are mislabeled as reviews; and
- o Cases in which countries fairly consistently reported the wrong information (or reported something conceptually different from what other countries reported). For the definitive duty date and rate, for example, in most cases the United States reported the date and rate of the Department of Commerce's dumping determination, even though the International Trade Commission (ITC) had not yet made its injury determination. Even if the injury determination was eventually positive, the definitive duty would not go into effect until after that determination. In some cases, the actual date on which the duty began was several months after the date reported as the definitive duty date. Even worse, in some cases the subsequent ITC injury determination was negative but was never reported, leaving the reader of the reports to conclude that a duty was imposed when in fact it was not.

These problems were compounded by the fact that in many cases, the name of the product at issue changed from table to table. Furthermore, in situations in which a country brought antidumping cases against several related groups of products (for example, various steel products), the breakdown by product sometimes varied from table to table. One table might list three cases and another list four. Taken together, the product coverage of the three would be the same as the coverage of the four, but none of the three would have exactly the same coverage as any of the four.

Going back to original sources to find the correct numbers or other data whenever an error was discovered would have been a task so vast as to be totally impractical. Instead, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) used its best judgment to correct the data using the information available. For example, if one table gave one date for a given event and two or three other tables gave another date for the same event, CBO normally assumed that the one odd table was in error rather than the two or three, unless there was evidence to the contrary. Similarly, if several consecutive reports gave one date for an event (for example, a date on a list of active orders) and then the next several consecutive reports gave another date for the same event, CBO normally chose the earlier value as correct. The assumption was that for reasons of copying errors, faulty memories, lost records, or the like, the latter number was more likely to be in error. Such methods have their limits, however. In cases that seemed to have no reliable basis for determining even an approximately correct value for a number in question, CBO simply left it blank.

For the U.S. reports, CBO was able to cross-check the final results with a separate case listing obtained from the Internet Web site of the DOC's International Trade Administration. That listing appeared to have errors of its own, necessitating further use of the sorts of methods mentioned in the previous paragraph. It proved invaluable, however, in straightening out the problems resulting from the U.S. practice (discussed above) of reporting the Commerce Department's decision date in place of the definitive duty date and of frequently failing to report subsequent determinations of no injury.

Some Qualifications of the Final Data Set

The final data set (hereafter referred to as the GATT/WTO data set) resulting from CBO's work on the GATT/WTO semiannual reports is very useful for comparing and contrasting the use of antidumping laws by countries around the world and for assessing the prevalence of their use and how it is changing. Several qualifications must be kept in mind, however.

Errors in the Data. CBO believes that the judgments it made in correcting the data were reasonable and that the resulting numbers used in the questionable cases are mostly correct, or are at least close to the correct values. The resulting data set is undoubtedly more accurate than the original GATT/WTO reports before CBO worked out the inconsistencies and other problems. CBO cannot guarantee, however, that all of the errors were found or that all of the errors and inconsistencies that were found were resolved correctly. In fact, the errors in the original data and the resulting judgment calls they required were so numerous that the final data set undoubtedly contains some incorrect numbers.

The remaining errors should not significantly affect the summary statistics given in this paper. For such statistics, the law of large numbers should come into play: numbers that are larger than their correct values average in with numbers that are smaller than their correct values, and the individual errors tend to cancel each other out. Someone interested in looking at the data set for numbers relating to a specific case, however, cannot be completely confident that the numbers are correct. For such use, one should verify the numbers by going back to original sources, which would be the published decisions of the administrative authority of the country bringing the antidumping case.

Incomplete Reporting by Countries That Filed Reports. The problem of isolated missing reports by countries that filed reports in most periods is not particularly serious. In principle, it means that a few cases may be missing from the data set, but it seems unlikely that there are many such cases, for two reasons. First, in most such instances, the country in question reported few if any cases in the periods for which

their reports were available, and it seems likely that the country failed to file a report simply because it took no actions during the period (even though countries were supposed to report that no actions had been taken).

Second, most cases take longer than six months to complete, so most cases on which actions were taken during the missing reporting periods had actions taken in other periods as well and thus were included in the reports for those other periods. Even cases that were initiated and completed within the missing periods would be indicated on subsequent lists of active measures if they resulted in measures being taken. Consequently, although information specific to the missing period may have been lost for some cases, few if any cases are likely to have been completely missed, and the few that may have been missed would be cases that resulted in no antidumping measures being taken.

Completeness of World Coverage. The data set covers cases brought by countries that were signatories to the GATT/WTO Antidumping Code at the time of each semiannual report and adhered to the reporting requirement of the code. (See Table A-1 for a list of countries covered for each reporting period.) Starting with the July-December 1994 reporting period, those countries have included almost all countries whose antidumping policies are of economic interest to the United States. That is the first reporting period under the new WTO regime, which requires all WTO members to file reports of their antidumping activity.

Despite the new requirement, many countries have not submitted reports. Some of the nonreporting countries are not members of the WTO and therefore are not required to file reports. Most of the nonreporting countries have probably not had significant antidumping activity. Whether they have or not, however, few of them are important U.S. export markets, so their antidumping activity is of little economic interest to the United States. (See Table A-2, which lists the U.S. export markets that have never filed a GATT/WTO report and gives the share of U.S. exports going to those markets.)

The largest U.S. export markets not covered by the data set for 1995 are Taiwan, the People's Republic of China, Saudi Arabia, and Russia, which received 3.3 percent, 2.1 percent, 1.1 percent, and 0.5 percent, respectively, of U.S. exports that year. All other noncovered countries combined received less than 4 percent of U.S. exports. Over 89 percent of U.S. exports went to countries for which the data set has case data for the year, and just over 82 percent went to countries for which the set has lists of active measures or for which such lists can be derived. (See Figure A-3 and Tables A-3 and A-4 for the corresponding shares of U.S. exports covered by GATT/WTO reports for each year going back to 1983.) Hence, statistics drawn from the final years of the data set should give a fairly accurate indication of antidumping activity around the world that is of economic interest to the United States.

TABLE A-1. COUNTRIES FILING SEMIANNUAL REPORTS FOR VARIOUS REPORTING PERIODS

[illegible]

SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office based on the semiannual reports to the GATT/WTO.

NOTES: Reports are filed twice a year. The first report (I) covers January 1 through June 30; the second report (II) covers July 1 through December 31.

The symbol x indicates that the country filed a report or reported that it took no antidumping actions during the period. The symbol o indicates that the country joined the European Community/Union (EC/U) and was covered for that period by the EC/U report. In addition to the four countries with that designation (Austria, Finland, Spain, and Sweden), the members of the EC/U are Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, and the United Kingdom. Greece joined the EC/U on January 1, 1981. Portugal and Spain joined on January 1, 1986. The former East Germany became a member when it merged with West Germany (already a member) in 1990. Austria, Finland, and Sweden joined on January 1, 1995. All other members joined before July 1, 1979 (or were founding members).

TABLE A-2. COUNTRIES THAT HAD NEVER FILED A SEMIANNUAL REPORT
AS OF DECEMBER 31, 1995

Country	Share of U.S Exports in 1995 (Percent)
Taiwan	3.306
People's Republic of China	2.128
Saudi Arabia	1.096
Russia	0.505
Ecuador	0.266
Panama	0.239
Algeria	0.137
Bahamas	0.118
Nigeria	0.108
Lebanon	0.106
Haiti	0.099
Netherlands Antilles	0.086
French Guiana	0.081
Jordan	0.061
Bangladesh	0.059
Bermuda	0.054
Iran	0.050
Angola	0.047
Vietnam	0.046
Bahrain	0.045
Aruba	0.044
Syria	0.041
Ukraine	0.040
Qatar	0.039
Oman	0.038
Suriname	0.034
Yemen (Sana)	0.033
Ivory Coast	0.032
Cayman Islands	0.027
Ethiopia	0.027
Estonia	0.025
Guyana	0.025
Croatia	0.025
Bulgaria	0.024
Kenya	0.021
Belize	0.018
Georgia	0.017
Antigua	0.017
Latvia	0.016
Zaire	0.014
Kazakhstan	0.014
French Polynesia	0.014
Armenia	0.013
Guadeloupe	0.012
Guinea	0.012
Uzbekistan	0.012
Congo	0.010
Gabon	0.010
Papua New Guinea	0.009
Lithuania	0.009
Mozambique	0.009
Byelorussia	0.009
British Virgin Islands	0.008
Cameroon	0.008

(Continued)

TABLE A-2. CONTINUED

Country	Share of U.S Exports in 1995 (Percent)
Mauritania	0.008
Sudan	0.008
Saint Christopher-Nevis	0.008
Saint Vincent and Grenadines	0.008
Liberia	0.008
Rwanda	0.007
Martinique	0.007
Botswana	0.007
Azerbaijan	0.007
Turkmenistan	0.006
Benin	0.006
Turks and Caicos Islands	0.006
Niue	0.005
Fiji	0.006
Macao	0.005
Bosnia-Herzegovina	0.005
Grenada	0.005
Dominica	0.005
Cambodia (Kampuchea)	0.005
Kyrgyzstan	0.005
Mali	0.004
Federated States of Micronesia	0.004
New Caledonia	0.004
Uganda	0.004
Macedonia (Skopje)	0.004
Togo	0.003
Sierra Leone	0.003
Malawi	0.003
Tajikistan	0.003
Niger	0.003
Gibraltar	0.003
Eritrea	0.003
Andorra	0.003
Burkina (Upper Volta)	0.003
Anguilla	0.003
Albania	0.002
Mongolia	0.002
Chad	0.002
Moldova	0.002
Madagascar	0.002
Nepal	0.002
Monaco	0.002
Djibouti	0.002
Palau Islands	0.002
Somalia	0.001
Western Samoa	0.001
Tonga	0.001
Seychelles	0.001
Cape Verde	0.001
Central African Republic	0.001
Gambia	0.001
San Marino	a
Equatorial Guinea	a

(Continued)

TABLE A-2. CONTINUED


Country	Share of U.S Exports in 1995 (Percent)
North Korea	a
Christmas Island	a
Montserrat	a
Afghanistan	a
Reunion	a
Burundi	a
Solomon Islands	a
Pitcairn Island	a
Kiribati (Gilbert Islands)	a
Yugoslavia (Serbia/Montenegro)	a
Lesotho	a
Sao Tome and Principe	a
British Indian Ocean Territory	a
Laos	a
Svalbard, Jan Mayen Island	a
Vanuatu (New Hebrides)	a
Norfolk Island	a
Maldives Islands	a
Cook Islands	a
Guinea-Bissau	a
Comoros	a
Yemen (Aden)	a
Nauru	a
Faroe Islands	a
Bhutan	a
Cocos (Keeling) Islands	a
Saint Pierre and Miquelon	a
Saint Helena	a
Falkland Islands	a
Vatican City	a
Iraq	a
Tuvalu	a
West Bank	a
Tokelau Islands	a
Gaza Strip	a
Wallis and Futuna	a
Heard Islands & McDonald Islands	a
Western Sahara	a
French S. Antarctic Territory	a
Total	9.668

SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office based on trade data from the Bureau of the Census.

NOTE: This table includes all countries, other political or geographical jurisdictions, and categories that U.S. Customs reported as being the destination of nonzero quantities of U.S. exports in 1995 and that are not listed in Table A-1. The table does not include all countries that had never filed any semiannual reports as of December 31, 1995, because some of those countries, such as Libya and Cuba, received no U.S. exports in 1995.

a. Less than 0.001 percent.

FIGURE A-3. PERCENTAGE OF U.S. EXPORTS GOING TO COUNTRIES REPORTING CASE DATA AND A LIST OF ACTIVE MEASURES



SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office based on the semiannual reports to the GATT/WTO and trade data from the Bureau of the Census.

NOTES: In the panel relating to case data, the tick marks labeled with years are for July through December of the years in question. The unlabeled tick marks in between are for January through June. In the panel relating to lists of active measures, the tick marks labeled with years are for December 31 of the years in question. The unlabeled tick marks in between are for June 30. Further details and notes are given in Tables A-3 and A-4. Before the July-December 1991 reporting period, reports filed by the European Community/Union (EC/U) did not include data for cases against countries that were not signatories to the Antidumping Code. Similarly, before September 1, 1989, the EC/U's lists of active measures did not include measures against nonsignatories.

TABLE A-3. PERCENTAGE OF U.S. EXPORTS GOING TO COUNTRIES REPORTING CASE DATA

Reporting Period	Including EC/U Before July-December 1991 ^a	Excluding EC/U Before July-December 1991 ^a
1983		
January-June	63.7	42.5
July-December	63.7	42.5
1984		
January-June	64.6	44.0
July-December	66.3	45.7
1985		
January-June	67.5	47.0
July-December	67.5	47.0
1986		
January-June	72.8	50.7
July-December	72.8	50.7
1987		
January-June	72.2	50.0
July-December	72.2	50.0
1988		
January-June	78.3	56.6
July-December	78.3	56.6
1989		
January-June	80.6	58.3
July-December	80.6	58.3
1990		
January-June	81.3	57.8
July-December	81.3	57.8
1991		
January-June	79.6	56.5
July-December	79.6	79.6
1992		
January-June	78.4	78.4
July-December	78.4	78.4
1993		
January-June	77.6	77.6
July-December	77.6	77.6
1994		
January-June	79.5	79.5
July-December	89.5	89.5
1995		
January-June	89.8	89.8
July-December ^b	89.3	89.3

SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office based on semiannual reports to the GATT/WTO and trade data from the Bureau of the Census.

NOTES: The numbers given are the percentage of U.S. exports for the year in question.

A country that did not submit a report for a given period is still counted in this table as having filed a report if CBO is confident that all of the actions taken in that period were included in reports the country submitted for other periods.

a. Before the July-December 1991 reporting period, reports filed by the European Community/Union (EC/U) did not include data for cases against countries that were not signatories to the Antidumping Code.

b. The largest U.S. export markets not reporting case data for July-December 1995 were Taiwan, the People's Republic of China, Saudi Arabia, Indonesia, and Russia, which received 3.3, 2.1, 1.1, 0.6, and 0.5 percent of U.S. exports, respectively, in that year. For the January-June 1995 periods, Indonesia reported but the United Arab Emirates, which received 4 percent of U.S. exports in 1995, did not.

TABLE A-4. PERCENTAGE OF U.S. EXPORTS GOING TO COUNTRIES REPORTING LISTS OF ACTIVE MEASURES

Reporting Period	Including EC/U Before September 1, 1989 ^a	Excluding EC/U Before September 1, 1989 ^a
1983		
June 30	63.5	42.0
December 31	63.5	42.0
1984		
June 30	64.5	43.7
December 31	66.2	45.3
1985		
June 30	67.3	46.5
December 31	67.3	46.5
1986		
June 30	70.0	46.4
December 31	70.0	46.4
1987		
June 30	69.0	45.3
December 31	69.0	45.3
1988		
June 30	68.1	44.9
December 31	68.1	44.9
1989		
June 30	69.7	45.9
December 31	69.7	69.7
1990		
June 30	70.1	70.1
December 31	70.1	70.1
1991		
June 30	67.6	67.6
December 31	75.7	75.7
1992		
June 30	74.2	74.2
December 31	74.2	74.2
1993		
June 30	73.5	73.5
December 31	75.0	75.0
1994		
June 30	79.4	79.4
December 31	81.8	81.8
1995		
June 30	82.3	82.3
December 31 ^b	83.1	83.1

SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office based on semiannual reports to the GATT/WTO and trade data from the Bureau of the Census.

NOTES: The numbers given are the percentage of U.S. exports for the year in question.

A country that did not report a list of active measures for a given date is still counted in this table as having reported such a list if a reasonably reliable list can be derived from lists for other dates, lists of terminations, and case data that the country reported. In addition, the long strings of periods with zeros accompanied by asterisks in Table B-11 are counted as having lists reported.

- a. Before the list for September 1, 1989, the lists of active measures filed by the European Community/Union (EC/U) did not include measures against countries that were not signatories to the Antidumping Code.
- b. The largest U.S. export markets not reporting lists of active measures were Taiwan, the People's Republic of China, Malaysia, Saudi Arabia, the Philippines, and Israel, which received 3.3, 2.1, 1.5, 1.1, 0.9, and 0.9 percent, respectively, of U.S. exports in 1995. Those countries, as well as Venezuela (which received 0.8 percent of U.S. exports in that year) reported no list for June 30, 1995, either.

Before the July-December 1994 reporting period, not all members were signatories to the Antidumping Code, so the coverage of the data set is less complete. Countries covered by the set for 1985 received roughly two-thirds of U.S. exports that year. That coverage is substantial enough so that statistics drawn from the set are strongly indicative of worldwide activity, but they may miss some of that activity. The fact that one-third of U.S. exports went to countries not covered by the data set does not necessarily mean that the data set excludes one-third of the antidumping activity of interest to the United States. Rather, it means that the countries in question did not file reports on their activity, which in many cases may have been negligible or nonexistent. (Several of the countries that have filed reports for many years have had no antidumping activity for the entire time they have filed reports.)

The number of countries that were signatories to the GATT/WTO Antidumping Code grew sizably over the periods covered by the data set, and consequently so did the number of countries covered by the set. Hence, one must be careful not to draw erroneous conclusions from trends in the data. For example, the fact that the total number of active measures in the set has increased over time is not proof that antidumping activity around the world is increasing. Even if all countries' activity had remained the same, the fact that more countries have begun reporting over time means that the set would contain an increasing worldwide total of active orders over time.

Finally, before the July-December 1991 reporting period, the European Community/Union (EC/U) did not report case data for cases brought against countries that were not signatories to the Antidumping Code. Furthermore, its first list of active measures to include measures against noncode signatories was that for September 1, 1989—the list included in the same report containing the January-June 1989 case data. Figure A-3 and Tables A-3 and A-4 therefore show two sets of numbers: one including and one excluding the EC/U before those times. That reporting practice does not affect the statistics for EC/U cases against the United States, but it does affect statistics relating to total antidumping activity.

APPENDIX B: STATISTICAL TABLES

The following tables provide more detailed data relating to the discussion in the main text.

TABLE B-1. RANKING OF COUNTRIES BY AVERAGE NUMBER OF ANTIDUMPING CASE INITIATIONS PER YEAR, 1991-1995

Country	Case Initiations		Country's Share of U.S. Exports to All Countries
	Average Number per Year	Country Average as a Percentage of World Average ^a	
United States	49.4	17.8	n.a.
Australia	42.8	15.4	1.9
European Community/Union	32.4	11.6	22.6
Argentina	22.7 ^b	8.1	0.7
Mexico	22.6	8.1	9.0
South Africa	20.0 ^b	7.2	0.5
Canada	16.4	5.9	20.5
Brazil	13.8	5.0	1.5
Turkey	10.5 ^c	3.8	0.6
New Zealand	8.0	2.9	0.3
Poland	4.8	1.7	0.1
India	4.2	1.5	0.5
Israel	4.0 ^b	1.4	0.9
Philippines	4.0 ^b	1.4	0.7
South Korea	3.8	1.4	3.7
Colombia	3.8	1.3	0.7
Chile	3.3 ^b	1.2	0.6
Peru	3.3	1.2	0.3
Venezuela	2.4 ^d	0.9	1.0
Austria	2.3 ^e	0.8	f
Malaysia	2.0 ^b	0.7	1.2
Japan	0.8	0.3	10.9
Singapore	0.4	0.1	2.3
Finland	0.3 ^e	0.1	f
Sweden	0.3 ^e	0.1	f
All Other Countries	0	0	19.3
All Countries	278.1 ^a	100.0	100.0

SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office based on the GATT/WTO data set and trade data from the Bureau of the Census.

NOTE: n.a. = not applicable.

- a. The world average in this table is what the world average would have been if the countries that filed reports for only part of the period had instead filed reports for the entire period and if their average rate of case initiations for the additional periods was the same as it was for the periods for which they filed reports.
- b. This country's first report was for the July-December 1994 reporting period, so the average number of initiations per year is for the period July 1, 1994, to December 31, 1995.
- c. This country's first report was for the January-June 1994 reporting period, so the average number of initiations per year is for the period January 1, 1994, to December 31, 1995.
- d. This country's first report was for the July-December 1993 reporting period, so the average number of initiations per year is for the period July 1, 1993, to December 31, 1995.
- e. Austria, Finland, and Sweden joined the European Union on January 1, 1995, and quit filing reports at that point, so the average numbers of initiations per year for them are for the period January 1, 1991, to December 31, 1994.
- f. U.S. exports to Austria, Finland, and Sweden are included with those to the European Community/Union.

TABLE B-2. RANKING OF COUNTRIES BY NUMBER OF ACTIVE ANTIDUMPING MEASURES ON
DECEMBER 31, 1995

Country	Active Measures		Country's Share of U.S. Exports to All Countries, 1991-1995 (Percent)
	Number	As a Percentage of World Total	
United States	294	35.1	n.a.
European Community/Union	133 ^a	15.9	22.6
Canada	98 ^b	11.7	20.5
Mexico	81	9.7	9.0
Australia	75	8.9	1.9
Turkey	37	4.4	0.6
New Zealand	25	3.0	0.3
Brazil	23	2.7	1.5
Argentina	20 ^c	2.4	0.7
South Africa	15	1.8	0.5
India	12	1.4	0.5
Colombia	6	0.7	0.7
South Korea	6	0.7	3.7
Venezuela	4	0.5	1.0
Chile	2	0.2	0.6
Japan	2	0.2	10.9
Peru	2	0.2	0.3
Singapore	2	0.2	2.3
Thailand	1	0.1	^d
All Other Countries	0	0	22.3
All Countries	838	100.0	100.0

SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office based on the GATT/WTO data set and trade data from the Bureau of the Census.

NOTES: For December 31, 1995, most countries reported measures against the former Soviet republics rather than the Soviet Union, the former Yugoslavia rather than the countries into which it broke up, and Czechoslovakia rather than the Czech and Slovak Republics. Instances in which various countries reported measures differently (and, for the European Union, what CBO did to offset the effect on the number of cases) are indicated in the alphabetic notes. The different reporting of those cases does not significantly affect the conclusions drawn from the table.

n.a. = not applicable.

- a. Contains a number of active measures against the various countries into which Yugoslavia broke up that originated in three cases against the former Yugoslavia as one nation. Thus, what began as one measure against iron and steel sheet and plate from Yugoslavia became three measures against Macedonia, Serbia/Montenegro, and Slovenia. What began as one measure against synthetic textile fibers from Yugoslavia became two measures against Macedonia and Serbia/Montenegro. A case brought against seamless pipes and tubes of iron and steel from Yugoslavia resulted in a measure against Croatia only. To permit a fair comparison with countries that list only measures against all of Yugoslavia, the number given in this table counts all of those measures as three against Yugoslavia rather than six against the countries into which it broke up.
- b. Contains one order against Czechoslovakia, two against the Czech Republic, one against Yugoslavia, and one against Macedonia (for which the case was initiated all of Yugoslavia but the order was placed only on Macedonia).
- c. Contains one order against the Czech Republic.
- d. Less than 0.1 percent.

TABLE B-3. RANKING OF COUNTRIES BY ANTIDUMPING CASE INITIATION INDEX, 1991-1995

Country	Antidumping Case Initiation Index a	Country's Share of U.S. Exports to All Countries (Percent)
United States	523.5	n.a.
European Community/Union	350.7	22.6
Argentina	353.6 b	0.7
Australia	289.5	1.9
Brazil	225.6	1.5
Mexico	122.3	9.0
South Africa	119.4 b	0.5
Canada	66.5	20.5
Turkey	64.1 c	0.6
India	49.5	0.5
New Zealand	35.8	0.3
Peru	34.4	0.3
Colombia	22.9	0.7
Poland	21.8	0.1
Chile	14.6 b	0.6
South Korea	14.1	3.7
Venezuela	13.8 d	1.0
Japan	12.8	10.9
Philippines	12.4 b	0.7
Israel	12.1 b	0.9
Austria	7.9 e	f
Malaysia	2.5 b	1.2
Finland	1.2 e	f
Sweden	1.1 e	f
Singapore	0.3	2.3
All other countries	0	19.3

SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office based on the GATT/WTO data set; trade data from International Monetary Fund, *Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook* (Washington, D.C.: IMF, 1996), and data on gross domestic product and exchange rates from International Monetary Fund, *International Financial Statistics Yearbook* (Washington, D.C.: IMF, 1996).

NOTE: n.a. = not applicable.

- a. The antidumping case initiation index is equal to the number of case initiations from 1991 through 1995, divided by the country's average annual ratio of imports to gross domestic product over the same years.
- b. This country's first report was for the July-December 1994 reporting period, so the average number of initiations per year is for the period July 1, 1994, to December 31, 1995.
- c. This country's first report was for the January-June 1994 reporting period, so the average number of initiations per year is for the period January 1, 1994, to December 31, 1995.
- d. This country's first report was for the July-December 1993 reporting period, so the average number of initiations per year is for the period July 1, 1993, to December 31, 1995.
- e. Austria, Finland, and Sweden joined the European Union on January 1, 1995, and quit filing reports at that point, so the average numbers of initiations per year for them are for the period January 1, 1991, to December 31, 1994.
- f. U.S. exports to Austria, Finland, and Sweden are included with those to the European Community/Union.

TABLE B-4. RANKING OF COUNTRIES BY ACTIVE ANTIDUMPING MEASURE INDEX ON
DECEMBER 31, 1995

Country	Active Antidumping Measure Index a	Country's Share of U.S. Exports to All Countries (Percent)
United States	3,115.7	n.a.
European Community/Union	1,439.6 b	22.6
Australia	507.2	1.9
Mexico	438.4	9.0
Canada	397.6 c	20.5
Brazil	376.0	1.5
Argentina	312.0 d	0.7
Turkey	226.0	0.6
India	141.4	0.5
New Zealand	111.8	0.3
South Africa	89.5	0.5
Colombia	36.7	0.7
Japan	32.0	10.9
Venezuela	23.0	1.0
South Korea	22.3	3.7
Peru	20.7	0.3
Chile	8.8	0.6
Thailand	2.6	e
Singapore	1.4	2.3
All Other Countries	0	22.3

SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office based on the GATT/WTO data set; trade data from International Monetary Fund, *Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook* (Washington, D.C.: IMF, 1996); and data on gross domestic product and exchange rates from International Monetary Fund, *International Financial Statistics* (Washington, D.C.: IMF, 1996).

NOTES: For December 31, 1995, most countries reported measures against the former Soviet republics rather than the Soviet Union, the former Yugoslavia rather than the countries into which it broke up, and Czechoslovakia rather than the Czech and Slovak Republics. Instances in which various countries reported measures differently (and, for the European Community/Union, what CBO did to offset the effect on the number of cases) are indicated in the alphabetic notes. The different reporting of those cases does not significantly affect the conclusions drawn from the table.

n.a. = not applicable.

- a. The active antidumping index is equal to the number of active measures on December 31, 1995, divided by the country's average annual ratio of imports to gross domestic product from 1991 through 1995.
- b. Contains a number of active measures against the various countries into which Yugoslavia broke up that originated in three cases against the former Yugoslavia as one nation. Thus, what began as one measure against iron and steel sheet and plate from Yugoslavia became three measures against Macedonia, Serbia/Montenegro, and Slovenia. What began as one measure against synthetic textile fibers from Yugoslavia became two measures against Macedonia and Serbia/Montenegro. A case brought against seamless pipes and tubes of iron and steel from Yugoslavia resulted in a measure against Croatia only. To permit a fair comparison with countries that list only measures against all of Yugoslavia, the number given in this table counts all of those measures as three against Yugoslavia rather than six against the countries into which it broke up.
- c. Contains one measure against Czechoslovakia, two against the Czech Republic, one against Yugoslavia, and one against Macedonia (for which the case was initiated against all of Yugoslavia but the measure was placed only on Macedonia).
- d. Contains one order against the Czech Republic.
- e. Less than 0.1 percent.

TABLE B-5. RANKING OF COUNTRIES BY INITIAL DUTY RATES IMPOSED, 1991-1995

Country	Duty Rate (Percent)		Number of Cases	
	Mean Duty Rate	Median Duty Rate	With Duties Imposed	With Duty Rates Reported
Mexico	103.7	48.0	70	43
Venezuela	100.0 ^a	100.0 ^a	4	2
Colombia	62.1	66.7	6	6
United States	56.8	42.7	117	116
Peru	48.7	48.7	2	2
South Korea	36.9	35.9	9	7
Canada	36.1	33.0	60	60
Brazil	34.2	27.2	17	16
New Zealand	31.8	17.0	19	10
Thailand	30.0	30.0	1	1
European Community/Union	29.4	21.8	96	63
India	27.6	23.2	12	5
Australia	25.6	20.0	80	65
Turkey	19.4	19.4	40	2
Israel	18.0	18.0	1	1
Japan	10.9	10.9	2	2
Chile	8.0	7.0	3	3

SOURCE: Congressional Budget based on the GATT/WTO data set.

NOTE: In cases for which more than one duty rate was reported, CBO took a simple unweighted average of the rates as the duty imposed for the case. The resulting rates were then averaged together with the rates for cases in which only one duty rate was reported, also using a simple unweighted average. In principle, it would have been better to take an import-weighted average, but the import numbers needed to calculate such an average (that is, the quantities of imports covered by the duty orders denominated in the same units for all orders) were not available.

a. The duties in question were on blue jeans and were specified as 100 percent plus US \$1.46 per unit.

TABLE B-6. DETAILED STATISTICS ON INITIAL DEFINITIVE DUTY RATES

	United States	Canada	Australia	New Zealand	Japan	European Community/Union
Reporting Period	7/1/79-12/31/95	1/1/80-12/31/95	7/1/82-12/31/95	5/6/88-12/31/95	1/1/80-12/31/95	1/1/80-12/31/95
Number of Cases	291	238	216	27	2	233
Number with Duty Rate Reported	283	95	138	11	2	121
Mean Duty Rates (Percent)	45.3	35.8	24.5	82.0	10.9	28.0
Entire reporting period	47.1 (7 cases)	(no cases)	23.0 (14 cases)	(no cases)	(no cases)	26.4 (12 cases)
Three-year increments	22.0 (20 cases)	(no cases)	22.4 (55 cases)	(no cases)	(no cases)	29.4 (13 cases)
1978-1980	32.9 (56 cases)	22.3 (6 cases)	40.1 (4 cases)	584.0 (1 case)	(no cases)	25.0 (23 cases)
1981-1983	44.0 (70 cases)	32.8 (25 cases)	25.7 (45 cases)	15.4 (6 cases)	(no cases)	27.8 (43 cases)
1984-1986	45.8 (50 cases)	37.2 (42 cases)	25.3 (20 cases)	56.4 (4 cases)	10.9 (2 cases)	30.8 (30 cases)
1987-1989	60.6 (80 cases)	(no cases)	22.5 (67 cases)	(no cases)	(no cases)	29.5 (23 cases)
1990-1992	27.5 (50 cases)	35.3 (35 cases)	34.1 (6 cases)	584.0 (1 case)	(no cases)	24.7 (35 cases)
1993-1995	41.3 (110 cases)	36.1 (60 cases)	25.6 (65 cases)	31.8 (10 cases)	10.9 (2 cases)	29.4 (63 cases)
Five-year increments	56.8 (116 cases)	(no cases)	(no cases)	(no cases)	(no cases)	(no cases)
1981-1985	31.9	32.9	20.5	20.0	20.5	20.5
Entire reporting period	48.1 (7 cases)	(no cases)	15.8 (14 cases)	(no cases)	(no cases)	22.0 (12 cases)
Three-year increments	12.2 (20 cases)	(no cases)	21.2 (55 cases)	(no cases)	(no cases)	23.0 (13 cases)
1978-1980	16.8 (56 cases)	22.5 (6 cases)	36.8 (4 cases)	584.0 (1 case)	(no cases)	16.5 (23 cases)
1981-1983	33.3 (70 cases)	41.0 (22 cases)	22.5 (45 cases)	13.3 (6 cases)	(no cases)	17.7 (43 cases)
1984-1986	25.6 (50 cases)	29.8 (25 cases)	13.8 (20 cases)	24.5 (4 cases)	10.9 (2 cases)	22.7 (30 cases)
1987-1989	47.5 (80 cases)	36.4 (42 cases)	20.0 (67 cases)	(no cases)	(no cases)	23.0 (23 cases)
1990-1992	13.0 (50 cases)	(no cases)	31.3 (6 cases)	584.0 (1 case)	(no cases)	15.8 (35 cases)
1993-1995	25.7 (110 cases)	33.0 (60 cases)	20.0 (65 cases)	17.0 (10 cases)	10.9 (2 cases)	21.8 (63 cases)
Five-year increments	42.7 (116 cases)	(no cases)	(no cases)	(no cases)	(no cases)	(no cases)
1981-1985	376.7	78.0	101.0	584.0	15.9	122.1
Entire reporting period	0 *	4.0	0.2	4.5	6.0	2.9
Three-year increments	76.3 (216 cases)	95.8 (91 cases)	81.2 (112 cases)	81.8 (9 cases)	50.0 (1 case)	81.0 (98 cases)
10 percent or more	55.1 (156 cases)	72.6 (69 cases)	40.6 (56 cases)	36.4 (4 cases)	0 (no cases)	36.4 (44 cases)
25 percent or more	34.6 (98 cases)	20.0 (19 cases)	8.7 (12 cases)	18.2 (2 cases)	0 (no cases)	13.2 (16 cases)
50 percent or more	12.7 (36 cases)	0 (no cases)	0.7 (1 case)	18.2 (2 cases)	0 (no cases)	2.5 (3 cases)
100 percent or more	1.1 (3 cases)	0 (no cases)	0 (no cases)	9.1 (1 case)	0 (no cases)	0 (no cases)
200 percent or more	0.4 (1 case)	0 (no cases)	0 (no cases)	9.1 (1 case)	0 (no cases)	0 (no cases)
300 percent or more						

(Continued)

TABLE B-6. CONTINUED

	Mexico	Brazil	Chile	Colombia	Peru	Venezuela
Reporting Period	7/1/87-12/31/95	7/1/80-12/31/95	7/1/94-12/31/95	1/1/92-12/31/95	7/1/94-12/31/95	7/1/94-12/31/95
Number of Cases	79	25	3	6	2	4
Number with Duty Rate Reported	43	18	3	6	2	2
Mean Duty Rates (Percent)						
Entire reporting period	103.7	31.3	8.0	62.1	48.7	b
Three-year increments						
1978-1980		(no cases)				
1981-1983		(no cases)				
1984-1986		(no cases)				
1987-1989		7.9 (2 cases)				
1990-1992	24.9 (5 cases)	37.0 (9 cases)		56.3 (1 case)		
1993-1995	114.1 (38 cases)	30.6 (7 cases)	8.0 (3 cases)	63.3 (5 cases)	48.7 (2 cases)	b (2 cases)
Five-year increments						
1981-1985		(no cases)				
1986-1990	0.0 (no cases)	7.9 (2 cases)				
1991-1995	103.7 (43 cases)	34.2 (16 cases)	8.0 (3 cases)	62.1 (6 cases)	48.7 (2 cases)	b (2 cases)
Median Duty Rates (Percent)						
Entire reporting period	48.0	27.2	7.0	66.7		
Three-year increments						
1978-1980		(no cases)				
1981-1983		(no cases)				
1984-1986		(no cases)				
1987-1989		7.9 (2 cases)				
1990-1992	24.5 (5 cases)	32.0 (9 cases)		56.3 (1 case)		
1993-1995	52.5 (38 cases)	27.2 (7 cases)	7.0 (3 cases)	77.1 (5 cases)	48.7 (2 cases)	b (2 cases)
Five-year increments						
1981-1985		(no cases)				
1986-1990		7.9 (2 cases)				
1991-1995	48.0 (43 cases)	27.2 (16 cases)	7.0 (3 cases)	66.7 (6 cases)	48.7 (2 cases)	b (2 cases)
Highest Duty Rate (Percent)	456.0	92.0	10.0	116.3	64.1	b
Lowest Duty Rate (Percent)	7.5	4.7	7.0	15.9	33.2	b
Percentage of Cases with Duty of:						
10 percent or more	97.7 (42 cases)	88.9 (16 cases)	33.3 (1 case)	100.0 (6 cases)	100.0 (2 cases)	100.0 (2 cases)
25 percent or more	79.1 (34 cases)	55.6 (10 cases)	0 (no cases)	83.3 (5 cases)	100.0 (2 cases)	100.0 (2 cases)
50 percent or more	46.5 (20 cases)	11.1 (2 cases)	0 (no cases)	66.7 (4 cases)	50.0 (1 case)	100.0 (2 cases)
100 percent or more	30.2 (13 cases)	0 (no cases)	0 (no cases)	16.7 (1 case)	0 (no cases)	100.0 (2 cases)
200 percent or more	18.6 (8 cases)	0 (no cases)	0 (no cases)	0 (no cases)	0 (no cases)	b
300 percent or more	9.3 (4 cases)	0 (no cases)	0 (no cases)	0 (no cases)	0 (no cases)	b

(Continued)

TABLE B-6. CONTINUED

	India	Israel	South Korea	Thailand	Turkey
Reporting Period	7/1/80-12/31/95	7/1/94-12/31/95	1/1/86-12/31/95	7/1/94-12/31/95	1/1/94-12/31/95
Number of Cases	12	1	9	1	40
Number with Duty Rate Reported	5	1	7	1	2
Mean Duty Rates (Percent)					
Entire reporting period	27.6	18.0	36.9	30.0	19.4
Three-year increments					
1978-1980	(no cases)				
1981-1983	(no cases)				
1984-1986	(no cases)		(no cases)		
1987-1989	(no cases)		(no cases)		
1990-1992	(no cases)		(no cases)		
1993-1995	27.6 (5 cases)	18.0 (1 case)	36.9 (7 cases)	30.0 (1 case)	19.4 (2 cases)
Five-year increments					
1981-1985	(no cases)				
1986-1990	(no cases)		(no cases)		
1991-1995	27.6 (5 cases)	18.0 (1 case)	36.9 (7 cases)	30.0 (1 case)	19.4 (2 cases)
Median Duty Rates (Percent)					
Entire reporting period	23.2		35.9		
Three-year increments					
1978-1980	(no cases)				
1981-1983	(no cases)				
1984-1986	(no cases)		(no cases)		
1987-1989	(no cases)		(no cases)		
1990-1992	(no cases)		(no cases)		
1993-1995	23.2 (5 cases)	18.0 (1 case)	35.9 (7 cases)	30.0 (1 case)	19.4 (2 cases)
Five-year increments					
1981-1985	(no cases)				
1986-1990	(no cases)		(no cases)		
1991-1995	23.2 (5 cases)	18.0 (1 case)	35.9 (7 cases)	30.0 (1 case)	19.4 (2 cases)
Highest Duty Rate (Percent)	56.8	18.0	66.1	30.0	19.4
Lowest Duty Rate (Percent)	2.7	18.0	6.3	30.0	19.4
Percentage of Cases with Duty of:					
10 percent or more	80.0 (4 cases)	100.0 (1 case)	85.7 (6 cases)	100.0 (1 case)	100.0 (2 cases)
25 percent or more	40.0 (2 cases)	0 (no cases)	71.4 (5 cases)	100.0 (1 case)	0 (no cases)
50 percent or more	20.0 (1 case)	0 (no cases)	14.3 (1 case)	0 (no cases)	0 (no cases)
100 percent or more	0 (no cases)	0 (no cases)	0 (no cases)	0 (no cases)	0 (no cases)
200 percent or more	0 (no cases)	0 (no cases)	0 (no cases)	0 (no cases)	0 (no cases)
300 percent or more	0 (no cases)	0 (no cases)	0 (no cases)	0 (no cases)	0 (no cases)

(Continued)

TABLE B-6. CONTINUED

SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office based on the GATT/WTO data set.

NOTE: In cases for which more than one duty rate was reported, CBO took a simple unweighted average of the rates as the duty imposed for the case. The resulting rates were then averaged together with the rates for cases in which only one duty rate was reported, also using a simple unweighted average, to obtain the mean given above. In principle, it would have been better to take an import-weighted average in both cases, but the import numbers needed to calculate such an average (that is, the quantities of imports covered by the duty orders denominated in the same units for all orders) were not available.

- a. According to the U.S. semiannual report, this duty was adjusted to zero in accordance with GATT article VI:5 to reflect the margin attributable to export subsidies, as determined in a concurrent countervailing-duty investigation. Thus, it does not reflect the actual lowest dumping margin found. The next lowest duty for the period is 0.65 percent.
- b. The duty rates in question are 100 percent plus US \$1.46 per unit. Not knowing the value of a unit, CBO cannot calculate the precise duty rate.

TABLE B-7. DURATION TO DATE OF ACTIVE ANTIDUMPING MEASURES ON DECEMBER 31, 1995

Measures Imposed by	Number of Measures Of Known		Duration to Date (Years)		Percentage with a Duration to Date of							
	Total	Duration	Mean	Median	Longest	5 Years or More	10 Years or More	15 Years or More	20 Years or More	25 Years or More	30 Years or More	
Industrialized Countries												
North America	98	98	5.61	3.85	20.93	41.8	19.4	5.1	1.0	0	0	
Canada	278	278	7.29	6.57	29.30	56.8	20.9	11.2	5.8	0.7	0	
United States												
Asia and South Pacific	75	75	3.17	3.19	7.28	1.3	0	0	0	0	0	
Australia	2	2	1.67	1.67	2.92	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Japan	25	25	4.10	4.06	7.58	32.0	0	0	0	0	0	
New Zealand												
Europe	129	123	3.82	3.50	11.44	26.8	1.6	0	0	0	0	
EC/U												
Developing Countries												
North America	67	67	1.85	1.20	6.22	4.5	0	0	0	0	0	
Mexico												
South America	20	20	0.76	0.66	2.98	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Argentina	23	23	2.61	2.86	4.55	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Brazil	2	2	0.59	0.59	0.66	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Chile	6	6	2.17	1.94	3.63	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Colombia	2	2	0.26	0.26	0.41	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Peru	4	4	1.31	1.31	1.81	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Venezuela												
Asia and South Pacific	12	12	0.90	0.33	1.95	0	0	0	0	0	0	
India	2	2	0.25	0.25	0.42	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Singapore	6	6	1.87	1.79	2.86	0	0	0	0	0	0	
South Korea	1	1	1.14	1.14	1.14	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Thailand												
Europe	37	37	3.01	3.33	5.09	13.5	0	0	0	0	0	
Turkey												
Africa	15	15	2.65	2.13	6.71	6.7	0	0	0	0	0	
South Africa												

SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office based on the GATT/WTO data set.

NOTE: EC/U = European Community/Union.

TABLE B-8. DURATIONS OF ANTIDUMPING MEASURES TERMINATED DURING THE PERIODS COVERED BY THE REPORTS

Measures Imposed by	Number of Measures		Duration (Years)					Percentage with a Duration of:				
	Total	Of Known Duration	Mean			Shortest	5 Years or More	10 Years or More	15 Years or More	20 Years or More	25 Years or More	30 Years or More
			Median	Longest	Shortest							
Industrialized Countries												
North America	240	194	6.23-6.28	5.33-5.47	15.61	0.84	57.7-59.8	12.9	1.0	0	0	0
Canada	112	111	9.07-9.08	7.88	31.21	0.18	61.3	42.3	18.0	7.2	2.7	0.9
United States												
Asia and South Pacific	293	255	3.94-4.41	3.30-3.79	9.34-9.84	0.003-0.28	32.5-38.0	0	0	0	0	0
Australia	279	242	4.00-4.47	3.35-3.84	9.34-9.84	0.003-0.28	33.9-39.3	0	0	0	0	0
Australia-Adj. a	8	7	2.29	2.33	3.10	1.14	0	0	0	0	0	0
New Zealand	3	3	1.77	2.09	2.09	1.14	0	0	0	0	0	0
New Zealand-Adj. a												
Europe	248	182	4.89-6.09	4.69-5.72	12.30-12.55	0.00-0.24	32.4-77.5	4.9-6.0	0	0	0	0
EC/U	210	155	4.89-6.25	4.69-5.78	12.30-12.55	0.00-1.26	30.3-81.9	4.5-5.8	0	0	0	0
EC/U-Adj. b	1	1	0.93	0.93	0.93	0.93	0	0	0	0	0	0
Spain	0	0	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Spain-Adj. b	3	3	2.74	3.27	3.27	1.69	0	0	0	0	0	0
Sweden and Sweden-Adj. b												
Developing Countries												
North America	17	17	1.51-2.57	0.90-2.51	5.51-5.01	0.00-0.56	0-5.9	0	0	0	0	0
Mexico												
South America	4	4	4.70-5.20	4.70-5.20	4.70-5.20	4.70-5.20	0-100.0	0	0	0	0	0
Brazil	1	1	0.43	0.43	0.43	0.43	0	0	0	0	0	0
Chile												
Asia and South Pacific	6	6	0.32-5.13	0.003-5.14	1.92-7.83	0.003-2.75	0-50.0	0	0	0	0	0
South Korea												
Europe	3	3	0.40-0.89	0.12-0.61	0.96-1.46	0.12-0.61	0	0	0	0	0	0
Turkey												

SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office based on the GATT/WTO data set.

NOTES: The ranges indicated for some values for some countries stem from incomplete reporting by the country that in turn results in some of the antidumping measures having durations that can be determined only approximately. The lower value of the ranges is the value that holds if all measures of uncertain duration have the minimum duration that is consistent with the country's reports, and the higher value is the value that holds if all measures of uncertain duration have the maximum duration that is consistent with the country's reports. It highly unlikely that either of those extremes is correct. The correct value is most likely somewhere in the middle.

EC/U = European Community/Union; n.a. = not applicable.

- a. During the period covered by the reports, Australia and New Zealand replaced antidumping policy on trade between them with a competition policy and terminated the active measures against each other. Because those measures were terminated early as a result of external events unrelated to the countries' normal antidumping policies, including them in the calculations of average durations biases the averages downward. To eliminate that bias, the figures in the rows titled "Australia-Adj." and "New Zealand-Adj." are calculated with Australia's measures against New Zealand and New Zealand's measures against Australia excluded.
- b. On January 1, 1994, the European Economic Area (EEA) was established. The EEA was composed of the European Union (EU) and the members of the European Free Trade Area (EFTA) excluding Switzerland. (The members of EFTA are Austria, Finland, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland.) Four days later, all active EU antidumping measures against the EFTA members (excluding Switzerland) were suspended. Similarly, on January 1, 1986, Spain and Portugal joined the European Community (EC), at which point all active EC measures against them were terminated. Because all of those measures were terminated as a result of external events unrelated to the EC/U's normal antidumping policy, including them in the computation of the average duration of EC/U measures biases the average downward. To eliminate that bias, the numbers in the row titled "EC/U-Adj." are calculated with all measures against those countries excluded. Similarly, "Spain-Adj." excludes a measure against EC/U-member Italy, which is Spain's only measure. Sweden had no measures against EC/U members during any of the periods covered by its reports, so the statistics are the same for "Sweden" and "Sweden-Adj."

TABLE B-9. DURATIONS OF ANTIDUMPING MEASURES

Duration Greater Than	Number of Measures with Given Duration		Actual as Percentage of Possible
	Actual	Possible	
United States			
1 year	279	284	98.2
2 years	250	266	94.0
3 years	206	225	91.6
4 years	174-175	202	86.1-86.6
5 years	150	182	82.4
6 years	136	168	81.0
7 years	110	145	75.9
8 years	96	132	72.7
9 years	59	95	62.1
10 years	36	67	53.7
11 years	28	55	50.9
12 years	15	33	45.5
13 years	10	20	50.0
14 years	6	13	46.2
15 years	2	9	22.2
16 years	0	4	0
Australia			
1 year	222-249	256	86.7-97.3
2 years	186-199	242	76.9-82.2
3 years	120-161	230	52.2-70.0
4 years	54-68	195	27.7-34.9
5 years	18-29	174	10.3-16.7
6 years	2-7	169	1.2-4.1
7 years	1	159	0.6
8 years	0	147	0
9 years	0	143	0
10 years	0	134	0
11 years	0	109	0
12 years	0	74	0
13 years	0	22	0
Australia-Adjusted*			
1 year	214-239	245	87.3-97.6
2 years	179-192	231	77.5-83.1
3 years	117-157	219	53.4-71.7
4 years	51-65	184	27.7-35.3
5 years	18-28	163	11.0-17.2
6 years	2-7	158	1.3-4.4
7 years	1	148	0.7
8 years	0	137	0
9 years	0	133	0
10 years	0	125	0
11 years	0	102	0
12 years	0	68	0
13 years	0	21	0

(Continued)

TABLE B-9. CONTINUED

Duration Greater Than	Number of Measures with Given Duration		Actual as Percentage of Possible
	Actual	Possible	
Canada			
1 year	246	247	99.6
2 years	224-225	226	99.1-99.6
3 years	198-200	210	94.3-95.2
4 years	171-173	202	84.7-85.6
5 years	112-116	190	58.9-61.1
6 years	83	183	45.4
7 years	57	178	32.0
8 years	37	166	22.3
9 years	24	152	15.8
10 years	18	132	13.6
11 years	9	104	8.7
12 years	7	84	8.3
13 years	5	44	11.4
14 years	0	24	0
15 years	0	10	0
European Community/Union			
1 year	277-282	286	96.9-98.6
2 years	253-260	267	94.8-97.4
3 years	219-239	248	88.3-96.4
4 years	174-200	230	75.7-87.0
5 years	88-170	207	42.5-82.1
6 years	55-98	178	30.9-55.1
7 years	45-71	161	28.0-44.1
8 years	30-43	145	20.7-29.7
9 years	22-30	136	16.2-22.1
10 years	11	117	9.4
11 years	4-6	107	3.7-5.6
12 years	2-3	86	2.3-3.5
13 years	0	57	0
14 years	0	28	0
15 years	0	17	0
European Community/Union-- Adjusted ^b			
1 year	256-261	261	98.1-100.0
2 years	235-242	242	97.1-100.0
3 years	198-221	223	88.8-99.1
4 years	161-187	205	78.5-91.2
5 years	78-158	182	42.9-86.8
6 years	47-90	156	30.1-57.7
7 years	38-63	140	27.1-45.0
8 years	25-36	124	20.2-29.0
9 years	18-24	115	15.7-20.9
10 years	9	98	9.2
11 years	4-6	91	4.4-6.6
12 years	2	75	2.7
13 years	0	49	0
14 years	0	22	0
15 years	0	11	0

(Continued)

TABLE B-9. CONTINUED

Duration Greater Than	Number of Measures with Given Duration		Actual as Percentage of Possible
	Actual	Possible	
Mexico			
1 year	54-60	63	85.7-95.2
2 years	32-38	42	76.2-90.5
3 years	23-24	35	65.7-68.6
4 years	14-15	25	56.0-60.0
5 years	3-4	14	21.4-28.6
6 years	1	11	9.1
7 years	0	5	0
8 years	0	1	0
New Zealand			
1 year	24	24	100.0
2 years	23	24	95.8
3 years	21	24	87.5
4 years	13	13	100.0
5 years	8	8	100.0
6 years	8	8	100.0
7 years	4	4	100.0
Brazil			
1 year	24	24	100.0
2 years	21	21	100.0
3 years	15	15	100.0
4 years	6	6	100.0
5 years	0	4	0
6 years	0	4	0
South Korea			
1 year	7-12	12	58.3-100.0
2 years	3-9	9	33.3-100.0
3 years	0-3	5	0-60.0
4 years	0-3	5	0-60.0
5 years	0-3	3	0-100.0
6 years	0-3	3	0-100.0
7 years	0-3	3	0-100.0
8 years	0	3	0
9 years	0	3	0

(Continued)

TABLE B-9. CONTINUED

SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office based on the GATT/WTO data set.

NOTE: For each country and duration, the percentage given is the number of measures lasting at least as long as the duration in question expressed as a percentage of the number of measures beginning during the range of reporting periods covered by the country's semiannual reports but early enough in that range to make it possible for the measures to have lasted for the duration. Thus, the United States had 284 orders that began between July 1, 1979, and December 31, 1994--at least one year before December 31, 1995, which marked the end of the range of reporting periods covered by the U.S. reports. Of those 284 orders, 279 lasted at least one year (279 is 98.2 percent of 284).

- a. Excludes cases against New Zealand because Australia and New Zealand terminated antidumping enforcement between themselves during the range of periods covered.
 - b. Excludes cases against Spain, Portugal, and all members of the European Free Trade Association except Switzerland because the European Community/Union and those countries terminated antidumping enforcement among themselves during the range of reporting periods covered.
-

TABLE B-10. AVERAGE DURATION OF ACTIVE U.S. ANTIDUMPING
MEASURES AT THE END OF EACH YEAR, 1979-1995

End of Year	Number of Active Measures	Duration (Years)		
		Mean	Median	Longest
1979	84	5.87	6.35	18.45
1980	85	6.55	7.34	19.45
1981	81	6.88	7.95	18.66
1982	87	7.24	6.34	19.66
1983	98	7.12	6.02	20.66
1984	112	6.59	5.64	21.66
1985	108	7.10	6.55	22.66
1986	129	6.58	4.73	23.66
1987	157	6.04	3.27	24.66
1988	170	6.55	3.92	25.66
1989	188	6.72	3.73	26.66
1990	192	6.64	4.43	27.66
1991	204	6.77	4.92	28.66
1992	226	7.02	5.69	29.66
1993	262	6.92	6.03	30.66
1994	263	7.08	6.34	28.30
1995	278	7.29	6.58	29.30

SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office based on the GATT/WTO data set.

TABLE B-11. ACTIVE ANTIDUMPING MEASURES BY VARIOUS COUNTRIES AGAINST ALL OTHER COUNTRIES

Industrialized Countries											
North America		Asia and Pacific				Europe					

TABLE B-11. CONTINUED

Developing Countries																				
Latin America						Asia						Europe				Africa				
Argentina	Brazil	Chile	Colombia	Peru	Venezuela	Hong Kong	India	Pakistan	Singapore	South Korea	Thailand	Cyprus	Czechoslovakia ^b	Hungary	Poland	Romania	Turkey	Yugoslavia	Egypt	South Africa
12/31/78						0 **	0 **	0 **					0 **	0 **	0 *	0 **				0 **
6/30/79						0 *	0 *	0 *					0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *			0 *	
12/31/79						0 *	0 *	0 *					0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *			0 *	
6/30/80	0 *					0 *	0 *	0 *					0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *			0 *	
12/31/80	0 *					0 *	0 *	0 *					0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *			0 *	
6/30/81	0 *					0 *	0 *	0 *					0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *			0 *	
12/31/81	0 *					0 *	0 *	0 *					0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *			0 *	
6/30/82	0 *					0 *	0 *	0 *					0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *			0 *	
12/31/82	0 *					0 *	0 *	0 *					0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *			0 *	
6/30/83	0 *					0 *	0 *	0 *					0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *			0 *	
12/31/83	0 *					0 *	0 *	0 *					0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *			0 *	
6/30/84	0 *					0 *	0 *	0 *	0 **				0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *			0 *	
12/31/84	0 *					0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *				0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *			0 *	
6/30/85	0 *					0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *				0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *			0 *	
12/31/85	0 *					0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	0 **			0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *			0 *	
6/30/86	0 *					0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *			0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *			0 *	
12/31/86	0 *					0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	2 *			0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *			0 *	
6/30/87	0 *					0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	2 *			0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *			0 *	
12/31/87	0 *					0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	2 *			0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *			0 *	
6/30/88	0 *					0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	2 *			0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *			0 *	
12/31/88	3 *					0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	2 *			0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *			0 *	
6/30/89	4 *					0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	1 *			0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *			0 *	
12/31/89	4 *					0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	1 *			0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	0 **		0 *	
6/30/90	4 *					0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	1 *			0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	5 *		0 *	
12/31/90	4 *					0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	1 *			0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	11 *		0 *	
6/30/91	6 *					0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	1 *			0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	15 *		0 *	
12/31/91	18 *					0 **	0 *	0 *	0 *	2 *			0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	18 *		0 *	
6/30/92	23 *					1 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	2 *			0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	19 *		0 *	
12/31/92	23 *					2 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	2 *			0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	22 *		0 *	
6/30/93	17 *					2 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	2 *			0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	27 *		0 *	
12/31/93	3 **					3 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	4 *			0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	27 *		0 *	
6/30/94	28 *					0 **	5 *	0 *	0 *	5 *			0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	26 *		0 *	
12/31/94	28 *					0 *	5 *	0 *	0 *	7 *			0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	26 *		0 *	
6/30/95	47 *					0 *	5 *	0 *	0 *	6 *			0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	37 *		0 *	
12/31/95	49 *					0 *	12 *	0 *	2 *	6 *			0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	37 *		0 *	
12/31/95 e	67 *					0 *	12 *	0 *	2 *	6 *			0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	37 *		0 *	

(Continued)

TABLE B-11. CONTINUED

SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office based on the GATT/WTO data set.

NOTE: See notes a and b to Table B-8 for an explanation of "Adjusted" data for Australia, New Zealand, and the European Community/Union (EC/U).

- * The country in question filed no lists of either active measures (orders and undertakings) or terminations for this date or any earlier date, but it did file case data reports. The number given here is derived from the case data and the earliest available list of active measures (if there is one). The number assumes that no active measures were in effect before the first number with one asterisk given for this country or, if there were active measures, that they were terminated before this date. That assumption is probably correct for countries that have a long string of numbers with one asterisk for which the first few numbers are zero (Japan, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Brazil, Hong Kong, India, Pakistan, Singapore, South Korea, Czechoslovakia/Czech and Slovak Republics, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Yugoslavia, and Egypt). It may or may not be correct for other countries (New Zealand, Mexico, Colombia, Peru, Venezuela, and South Africa).

- ** The country in question filed no reports of any kind (case data, lists of active measures or terminations) for this date or any earlier date. The number given here is the number of measures that the country reported on its earliest list of active measures (or on the earliest list that can be derived from the country's reports) for which the starting date of the measure is on or before this date. The actual number of active measures for this date cannot be less than the number given here, but it might be more--possibly substantially more. The likelihood that the actual number is substantially more increases with the length of time between the date in question and the first date for which the number given has one or no asterisks.

- a. Before September 1, 1989, the lists of active measures reported by the EC/U included only measures against other signatories to the Antidumping Code. Hence, the actual numbers of active measures are are likely to be larger than the numbers given here. The following numbers of measures with unknown beginning dates appear on the list of active measures that CBO constructed from the EC/U reports on the dates indicated: 22 on December 31, 1979 (12 in the case of the EC/U-Adjusted list); 4 on June 30, 1980; 1 on December 31, 1980; 2 on October 6, 1982; 7 on June 30, 1985 (6 in the case of the EC/U-Adjusted list); 1 on September 1, 1986; 1 on May 4, 1988; and 34 on September 1, 1989. All that can be said for certain about the beginning dates of those measures is that they are on or before the dates on which the measures first appear on the list of active measures.

- One can determine from the EC/U reports that it terminated 67 measures over the 30-month period from March 1, 1987 (the date of one of the reported lists of active measures) to September 1, 1989 (the date of the next reported list of active measures), but the actual dates of termination cannot be determined any more accurately. This tabulation assumes that those measures were terminated at an even rate of 2.23 per month (67/30) over the period (as close as can be approximated within the constraint that the number of terminations at any given time must be an integer). The adjusted EC/U data included 62 such terminations, which were assumed to have occurred at an even rate of 2.07 terminations per month (62/30).

- b. Includes the Czech and Slovak Republics after Czechoslovakia split up.

- c. On January 1, 1986, Spain joined the EC/U, became covered by the EC/U's antidumping law, and ceased filing its own reports. Sweden did the same on January 1, 1995.

- d. Yugoslavia ceased filing reports when it broke up into several countries. One of its former constituent republics, Slovenia, began filing reports with the 1994 July-December reporting period, but it has not reported any lists of active measures. None of the other former constituent republics have filed any reports.

- e. The numbers for December 31, 1995, in this table do not agree with the corresponding numbers in Table B-2 in all cases. This table counts measures against the Soviet Union at the time they began as being against the Soviet Union throughout the rest of the table rather than counting them as several measures against the countries into which the Soviet Union split. That treatment avoids introducing spurious upward trends in the number of measures over time, which would suggest that the countries in question were becoming more stringent in their antidumping enforcement than was actually the case.

TABLE B-12. CASES INITIATED BY VARIOUS COUNTRIES AGAINST ALL OTHER COUNTRIES

Industrialized Countries																										Developing Countries									
North America		Asia and Pacific				Europe										North America and West Indies																			
United States		Canada	Australia	New Zealand	Japan	EC/U ^a	Austria	Finland	Iceland	Norway	Spain	Sweden	Switzerland	Barbados	Costa Rica	Cuba	Dominican Republic	El Salvador	Guatemala	Honduras	Jamaica	Mexico	Nicaragua	Saint Lucia											
1979 Jul-Dec	6				0	4	0	1		0	0	0	0																						
1980 Jan-Jun	11	11			0	12	0	2		0	0	0	0	0																					
1980 Jul-Dec	10	16			0	11	0	0		0	0	0	0	0																					
1981 Jan-Jun	5	11			0	23	0	0		0	0	2	0	0																					
1981 Jul-Dec	9	13			0	16	0	0		0	0	0	0	0																					
1982 Jan-Jun	16	50			0	17	0	0		0	0	0	0	0																					
1982 Jul-Dec	19	26	49		0	8	0	0		0	0	0	0	0																					
1983 Jan-Jun	21	13	41		0	19	1	0		0	0	0	0	0																					
1983 Jul-Dec	28	17	41		0	13	0	1		0	1	0	0	0																					
1984 Jan-Jun	19	6	28		0	24	0	0		0	0	0	0	0																					
1984 Jul-Dec	20	17	24		0	17	0	0		0	0	0	0	0																					
1985 Jan-Jun	43	17	39		0	2	0	0		0	0	2	0	0																					
1985 Jul-Dec	34	19	22		0	4	0	0		0	0	0	0	0																					
1986 Jan-Jun	33	9	33		0	7	0	0		0	0	0	0	0																					
1986 Jul-Dec	34	8	29		0	8	0	0		0	0	0	0	0																					
1987 Jan-Jun	7	15	11		0	25	0	0		0	0	0	0	0																					
1987 Jul-Dec	9	17	11		0	12	0	5		0	0	0	0	0																					
1988 Jan-Jun	22	2	10		0	21	0	0		0	0	0	0	0																					
1988 Jul-Dec	19	12	6	5	0	14	0	0		0	0	0	0	0																					
1989 Jan-Jun	10	2	14	0	0	5	0	3		0	0	2	0	0																					
1989 Jul-Dec	14	11	7	1	0	31	0	0		0	0	6	0	0																					
1990 Jan-Jun	10	4	15	1	0	16	0	0		0	0	0	0	0																					
1990 Jul-Dec	25	11	31	0	0	6	0	1		0	0	0	0	0																					
1991 Jan-Jun	35	1	30	6	0	18	0	0		0	0	1	0	0																					
1991 Jul-Dec	30	10	38	3	3	12	5	0		0	0	0	0	0																					
1992 Jan-Jun	29	6	34	10	0	28	0	0		0	0	0	0	0																					
1992 Jul-Dec	54	28	35	4	0	6	4	0		0	0	0	0	0																					
1993 Jan-Jun	15	2	24	0	0	15	0	0		0	0	0	0	0																					
1993 Jul-Dec	22	22	34	0	0	34	0	0		0	0	0	0	0																					
1994 Jan-Jun	29	0	11	2	1	8	0	0		0	0	0	0	0																					
1994 Jul-Dec	19	2	3	4	0	26	0	0		0	0	0	0	0																					
1995 Jan-Jun	10	7	3	5	0	9	0	0		0	0	0	0	0																					
1995 Jul-Dec	4	4	2	6	0	9	0	0		0	0	0	0	0																					

(Continued)

TABLE B-12. CONTINUED

Developing Countries (Continued)																									
South America													Asia and Pacific												
	Argentina	Bolivia	Brazil	Chile	Colombia	Paraguay	Peru	Trinidad & Tobago	Uruguay	Venezuela	Brunei Darussalam	Hong Kong	India	Indonesia	Israel	Kuwait	Malaysia	Myanmar	Pakistan	Philippines	Singapore	South Korea	Sri Lanka	Thailand	
1979 Jul-Dec																									
1980 Jan-Jun																									
1980 Jul-Dec																									
1981 Jan-Jun			0									0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
1981 Jul-Dec			0									0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
1982 Jan-Jun			0									0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
1982 Jul-Dec			0									0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
1983 Jan-Jun			0									0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
1983 Jul-Dec			0									0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
1984 Jan-Jun			0									0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
1984 Jul-Dec			0									0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
1985 Jan-Jun			0									0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
1985 Jul-Dec			0									0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
1986 Jan-Jun			0									0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
1986 Jul-Dec			0									0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
1987 Jan-Jun			0									0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
1987 Jul-Dec			0									0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
1988 Jan-Jun			1									0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
1988 Jul-Dec			0									0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
1989 Jan-Jun			3									0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
1989 Jul-Dec			0									0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
1990 Jan-Jun			0									0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
1990 Jul-Dec			2									0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
1991 Jan-Jun			0									0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
1991 Jul-Dec			7									0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
1992 Jan-Jun			5		0							0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
1992 Jul-Dec			9		3							0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
1993 Jan-Jun			5		3							0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
1993 Jul-Dec			29		3							0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
1994 Jan-Jun			2		1							0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
1994 Jul-Dec	7		7	1	1	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
1994 Jul-Dec	0	0	5	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
1995 Jan-Jun																									
1995 Jul-Dec	27	0	0	3	4	0	1	0	0	2	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	

(Continued)

(Continued)

TABLE B-12. CONTINUED

SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office based on the GATT/WTO data set.

NOTE: See notes a and b to Table B-8 for an explanation of "Adjusted" data for Australia, New Zealand, and the European Community/Union (EC/U).

- a. Before the July-December 1991 reporting period, the EC/U reported only the actions it took against other signatories to the GATT Antidumping Code. Therefore, the numbers for those dates understate the actual numbers of case initiations. The missing initiations, all of which were against nonsignatories, fall into three groups: (1) those for which no antidumping measures were imposed; (2) those for which antidumping measures were imposed but were terminated before the country became a signatory or before the EC/U began reporting measures against nonsignatories; and (3) those for which antidumping measures were imposed and remained in effect after the country became a signatory or after the EC/U began reporting measures against nonsignatories. The GATT/WTO reports yield no information about the first two groups, but one can determine that the following 72 initiations from the third group are missing: 10 in the Jul-Dec 1990 reporting period or earlier; 2 in the Jan-Jun 1990 period or earlier; an 34 in the Jul-Dec 1989 period or earlier; 4 in the Jan-Jun 1989 period or earlier; 1 the Jul-Dec 1988 period or earlier; 2 in the Jan-Jun 1988 period or earlier; 3 in the Jul-Dec 1987 period or earlier; 4 in the Jul-Dec 1986 period or earlier; 7 in the Jan-Jun 1985 period or earlier; 1 in the Jul-Dec 1980 period or earlier; and 4 in the Jan-Jun 1980 period or earlier. Few if any initiations are likely to be missing in the Jan-Jun 1991 reporting period, which was the last reporting period before the EC/U began reporting cases against nonsignatories, because almost all cases take longer than six months from initiation to final decision. All or almost all cases initiated during that period would be decided and therefore reported in the following period (when the EC/U began reporting cases against nonsignatories) as well as in the period in question. In addition to the missing cases, the GATT/WTO reports list one case as terminated on July 16, 1992, but give no initiation date.
- b. On January 1, 1995, Austria, Finland, and Sweden joined the EC/U, became covered by the EC/U's antidumping law, and ceased filing their own reports. Similarly, on January 1, 1986, Spain joined the EC/U, became covered by the EC/U's antidumping law, and ceased filing its own reports.
- c. Yugoslavia ceased filing reports when it broke up into several countries. One of its former constituent republics, Slovenia, began filing reports with the 1994 July-December reporting period. None of the other former constituent republics have filed any reports.
- d. Includes the Czech and Slovak Republics after Czechoslovakia split up.

TABLE B-13. AVERAGE NUMBER OF CASES INITIATED PER YEAR IN THREE- AND FIVE-YEAR INCREMENTS

	Three-Year Increments			Five-Year Increments		
	1978-1980	1981-1983	1984-1986	1987-1989	1990-1992	1993-1995
Industrialized Countries						
North America						
Canada	27.0	43.3	25.3	19.7	20.0	12.3
United States	18.0	32.7	61.0	27.0	61.0	33.0
Asia and Pacific						
Australia	0	87.3	58.3	19.7	61.0	25.7
Japan	0	0	0	0	1.0	0.3
New Zealand	0	0	0	4.0	8.0	5.7
Europe						
EC/U ^a	16.0	31.3	22.3	28.3	37.0	32.7
Austria	0	0.3	0	0	1.7	2.0
Finland	2.0	0	0.3	4.0	0.3	0
Norway	0	0	0	0	0	0
Spain	0	0	0.5	b	b	b
Sweden	0	0.7	0.7	2.7	1.0	0
Switzerland	0	0	0	0	0	0
Developing Countries						
North America						
Mexico	0	0	0	16.8	14.7	26.3
South America						
Brazil	0	0	0	1.3	7.7	16.0
Colombia	0	0	0	0	3.0	4.0
Asia and Pacific						
Hong Kong	0	0	0	0	0	0
India	0	0	0	0	2.7	4.3
Pakistan	0	0	0	0	0	0
Singapore	0	0	0	0	0	0.7
South Korea	0	0	3.0	0.7	3.3	4.7
Europe						
Czechoslovakia ^c	0	0	0	0	0	0
Hungary	0	0	0	0	0	0
Poland	0	0	0	0	8.0	0
Romania	0	0	0	0	0	0
Yugoslavia	0	0	0	0	0	0
Egypt	0	0	0	0	0	0

SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office based on the GATT/WTO data set.

a. Before the July-December 1991 reporting period, the European Community/Union (EC/U) reported only the actions it took against other signatories to the GATT Antidumping Code. Therefore, the numbers for those dates understate the actual numbers of case initiations. The notes in Table B-12 explain what can be determined about the numbers of missing initiations. Few if any initiations in the January-June 1991 reporting period are likely to be missing, as is explained in those notes, so the numbers for the 1991-1995 five-year increment reported above should be accurate.

b. On January 1, 1986, Spain joined the EC/U, became covered by the EC/U's antidumping law, and ceased filing its own reports.

c. Includes the Czech and Slovak Republics after Czechoslovakia split up.

TABLE B-14. ACTIVE ANTIDUMPING MEASURES BY VARIOUS COUNTRIES AGAINST THE UNITED STATES

Industrialized Countries										Developing Countries				
Asia and Pacific					Europe					Latin America				
Canada	Australia	New Zealand	Japan	EC/U ^a	Austria	Finland	Norway	Spain	Sweden	Switzerland	Mexico	Argentina	Brazil	Chile
12/31/78	1 **			1 **	0 **	0 **	0 **	0 **	0 **	0 **				
06/30/79	2 **			1 **	0 **	0 **	0 **	0 **	0 **	0 **				
12/31/79	5 **		0 **	1 **	0 **	0 **	0 **	0 **	0 **	0 **			0 **	
06/30/80	5 **		0 **	3 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *			0 *	
12/31/80	14		0 *	5 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *			0 *	
06/30/81	18		0 *	8 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *			0 *	
12/31/81	5 **		0 *	11 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *			0 *	
06/30/82	19		0 *	13 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *			0 *	
12/31/82	7		0 *	17 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *			0 *	
06/30/83	11		0 *	18 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *			0 *	
12/31/83	14		0 *	19 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *			0 *	
06/30/84	15		0 *	20 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *			0 *	
12/31/84	22		0 *	20 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *			0 *	
06/30/85	21		0 *	20 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *			0 *	
12/31/85	24		0 *	20 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *			0 *	
06/30/86	19		0 *	18	0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *			0 *	
12/31/86	13		0 *	18	0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *			0 *	
06/30/87	12		0 *	16	0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	0 **		0 *	
12/31/87	9	0 **	0 *	14	0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	1 **		0 *	
06/30/88	18		0 *	10	0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	3 *		0 *	
12/31/88	7		0 *	8	0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	5 *		0 *	
06/30/89	16	1	0 *	7	0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	5 *		0 *	
12/31/89	1	0	0 *	6	0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	5 *		0 *	
06/30/90	19	2	0	4	0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	4 *		0 *	
12/31/90	18	1	0	2	0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	5 *		0 *	
06/30/91	15	0	0 *	3	0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	7 *		0 *	
12/31/91	14	0	0 *	3	0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	10	0 **	0 *	
06/30/92	17	3	0	2	0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	12	0 *	0 *	
12/31/92	4	1	0	2	0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	9	0 **	1 *	
06/30/93	18	5	1	2	0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	11	0 **	2 *	
12/31/93	20	5	1	0	0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	12	1 **	6	0 **
06/30/94	18	5	1	0	0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	11	1 **	6	0 **
12/31/94	18	6	1	0	0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	11	1	6	0 *
06/30/95	19	6	1	0	0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	14	2	6	0
12/31/95	19	6	1	0	0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	15	2	6	0

(Continued)

TABLE B-14. CONTINUED

Developing Countries (Continued)														
Asia					Europe					Africa				
Hong Kong	India	Pakistan	Singapore	South Korea	Thailand	Cyprus	Czechoslovakia ^b	Hungary	Poland	Romania	Turkey	Yugoslavia	Egypt	South Africa
12/31/78							0 **	0 **					0 *	
06/30/79	0 *						0 *	0 *					0 *	
12/31/79	0 *						0 *	0 *					0 *	
06/30/80	0 *						0 *	0 *					0 *	
12/31/80	0 *	0 **					0 *	0 *	0 **				0 *	
06/30/81	0 *	0 *					0 *	0 *	0 *				0 *	
12/31/81	0 *	0 *					0 *	0 *	0 *				0 *	
06/30/82	0 *	0 *					0 *	0 *	0 *				0 *	
12/31/82	0 *	0 *					0 *	0 *	0 *				0 *	
06/30/83	0 *	0 *					0 *	0 *	0 *				0 *	
12/31/83	0 *	0 *					0 *	0 *	0 *				0 *	
06/30/84	0 *	0 *	0 **				0 *	0 *	0 *				0 *	
12/31/84	0 *	0 *	0 *				0 *	0 *	0 *				0 *	
06/30/85	0 *	0 *	0 *				0 *	0 *	0 *				0 *	
12/31/85	0 *	0 *	0 *				0 *	0 *	0 *				0 *	
06/30/86	0 *	0 *	0 *	0 **			0 *	0 *	0 *				0 *	
12/31/86	0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *			0 *	0 *	0 *				0 *	
06/30/87	0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *			0 *	0 *	0 *				0 *	
12/31/87	0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *			0 *	0 *	0 *				0 *	
06/30/88	0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *			0 *	0 *	0 *				0 *	
12/31/88	0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *			0 *	0 *	0 *				0 *	
06/30/89	0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *			0 *	0 *	0 *				0 *	
12/31/89	0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *			0 *	0 *	0 *				0 *	
06/30/90	0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *			0 *	0 *	0 *				0 *	
12/31/90	0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *			0 *	0 *	0 *				0 *	
06/30/91	0 *	0 *	0 *	1 *			0 *	0 *	0 *				0 *	
12/31/91	0 *	0 *	0 *	1 *			0 *	0 *	0 *				0 *	
06/30/92	0 *	0 *	0 *	1 *			0 *	0 *	0 *				0 *	
12/31/92	0 *	0 *	0 *	1 *			0 *	0 *	0 *		0 **		0 *	
06/30/93	0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *			0 *	0 *	0 *		0 *	p	0 *	1 **
12/31/93	0 *	0 *	0 *	0 *	0 **		0 *	0 *	0 *		0 *	p	0 *	1 **
06/30/94	0 *	1	0 *	0	0	0 **	0 *	0 *	0 *		0	p	0 *	2 *
12/31/94	0 *	1	0	1	0	0	0 *	0 *	0 *		0	p	0 *	2
06/30/95	0 *	0 *	0	1	0	0	0 *	0 *	0 *		0	p	0 *	2
12/31/95	0 *	1	0	1	0	0	0 *	0 *	0 *		0	p	0 *	

(Continued)

TABLE B-14. CONTINUED

SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office based on the GATT/WTO data set.

- * The country in question filed no lists of either active measures (orders and undertakings) or terminations for this date or any earlier date, but it did file case data reports. The number given here is derived from the case data and the earliest available list of active measures (if there is one). The number assumes that there were no active measures before the first number with one asterisk given for this country or that, if there were active measures, they were terminated before this date. That assumption is probably correct for countries that have a long string of numbers with one asterisk for which the first few numbers are zero and for those that have a long period of time with no cases or measures reported (New Zealand, Japan, Austria, Finland, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Brazil, Hong Kong, India, Pakistan, Singapore, South Korea, Czechoslovakia/Czech and Slovak Republics, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Yugoslavia, and Egypt). It may or may not be correct for other countries (Mexico, Colombia, Peru, Venezuela, and South Africa).
- ** The country in question filed no reports of any kind (case data, lists of active measures or terminations) for this date or any earlier date. The number given here is the number of measures that the country reported on its earliest list of active measures (or on the earliest list that can be derived from the country's reports) for which the starting date of the measure reported by the country is on or before this date. The actual number of active measures for this date cannot be less than the number given here, but it might be more--possibly substantially more. The likelihood that the actual number is substantially more increases with the length of time between the date in question and the first date for which the number given has one or no asterisks.
- a. The European Community/Union (EC/U) data set has lists of active measures for June 30, 1980, and June 30, 1985, but not for any date in between. However, one can determine from the data set that one measure began after the first of those dates (on December 9, 1980) and ended before the latter, but the precise date is unclear. This tabulation assumes that the measure was terminated on March 21, 1983--the midpoint between December 9, 1980, and June 30, 1985.
- The EC/U data set has lists of active measures for March 1, 1987, and September 1, 1989, but not for any date in between. One can determine from the lists that 12 measures ended between those two dates, but the precise date for each is unclear. This tabulation assumes that all of those measures were terminated on June 1, 1988--the midpoint between the two dates.
- b. Includes the Czech and Slovak Republics after Czechoslovakia split up.
- c. On January 1, 1995, Austria, Finland, and Sweden joined the EC/U, became covered by the EC/U's antidumping law, and ceased filing their own reports. Similarly, on January 1, 1986, Spain joined the EC/U, became covered by the EC/U's antidumping law, and ceased filing its own reports.
- d. Yugoslavia ceased filing reports when it broke up into several countries. One of its former constituent republics, Slovenia, began filing reports with the 1994 July-December reporting period, but it has not reported any lists of active measures. None of the other former constituent republics have filed any reports.

TABLE B-15. ARE OTHER COUNTRIES SINGLING OUT THE UNITED STATES IN THEIR ANTIDUMPING ENFORCEMENT?

Country	Number of Antidumping Case Initiations, 1991-1995		Number of Active Antidumping Measures on December 31, 1995		Imports, 1991-1995 (Billions of dollars)		Initiations Against the United States, 1991-1995 (As a percentage of initiations against all countries)	Active Measures Against the United States, Dec. 31, 1995 (As a percentage of measures against all countries)	Imports from the United States, 1991-1995 (As a percentage of imports from all countries)
	All Countries	Against the United States	All Countries	Against the United States	All Countries	From the United States			
Argentina	34	3	20	2	81.2	17.7	8.8	10.0	21.8
Australia	214	13	75	6	229.6	51.5	6.1	8.0	22.4
Austria	9	0	a	a	208.4	8.7	0	a	4.2
Brazil	69	14	23	6	154.5	34.3	20.3	26.1	22.2
Canada	82	23	98	19	695.0	450.7	28.0	19.4	64.8
Chile	5	0	2	0	55.3	12.5	0	0	22.6
Colombia	15	3	6	4	47.8	17.8	20.0	66.7	37.3
EC/U	162	3	133	2	3,242.9	592.6	1.9	1.5	18.3
Finland	1	0	a	a	86.0	5.9	0	a	6.8
India	21	3	12	1	124.4	12.1	14.3	8.3	9.7
Israel	6	2	0	0	116.6	19.6	33.3	*	16.8
Japan	4	0	2	0	1,321.0	301.2	0	0	22.8
South Korea	19	2	6	1	480.6	107.1	10.5	16.7	22.3
Malaysia	3	0	0	0	259.5	42.3	0	*	16.3
Mexico	113	22	81	15	318.7	226.5	19.5	18.5	71.1
New Zealand	40	1	25	1	53.0	9.8	2.5	4.0	18.5
Peru	5	0	2	0	23.3	6.4	0	0	27.5
Philippines	6	0	0	0	96.1	18.2	0	*	18.9
Poland	24	0	0	0	101.7	3.9	0	*	3.8
Singapore	2	0	2	0	450.5	70.7	0	0	15.7
South Africa	30	3	15	0	101.8	13.2	10.0	0	13.0
Sweden	1	0	a	a	192.4	16.7	0	a	8.7
Thailand	0	0	1	0	253.4	29.1	*	0	11.5
Turkey	21	0	37	0	133.9	14.4	0	0	10.7
Venezuela	6	2	4	0	53.2	24.7	33.3	0	46.4
All Countries	892	94	544	57	16,261.4 b	3122.2	10.5	10.5	19.2

SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office based on the GATT/WTO data set and trade data from International Monetary Fund, *Direction of Trade Statistics* (Washington, D.C.: IMF, 1996).

NOTES: For each country, the number of active measures is the same as that in Table B-2, which was calculated to make a fair comparison with other countries.

EC/U = European Community/Union; * = not applicable.

a. Austria, Finland, and Sweden joined the European Union on January 1, 1995, so they are covered by the active measures of the European Union and do not maintain any of their own.

b. Because the European Community/Union administers antidumping policy at the union level rather than the country level, it was treated as one country in tabulating the total imports of all countries; that is, trade among its member countries was excluded from the total.

TABLE B-16. INITIAL ANTIDUMPING DUTY RATES IMPOSED ON NONMARKET ECONOMIES

Country Imposing Duties	Mean Duty Rates			Median Duty Rates			Numbers of Cases	
	Against Nonmarket Economies	Against Market Economies	Ratio of Nonmarket to Market	Against Nonmarket Economies	Against Market Economies	Ratio of Nonmarket to Market	Against Nonmarket Economies	Against Market Economies
New Zealand	584.0	31.8	18.36	584.0	17.0	34.35	1	10
Mexico	196.3	43.2	4.55	181.0	31.5	5.74	17	26
Japan	15.9	6.0	2.64	15.9	6.0	2.64	1	1
South Korea	56.7	29.0	1.96	56.7	31.3	1.81	2	5
United States	70.2	39.9	1.76	55.9	25.5	2.19	51	232
Chile	10.0	7.0	1.43	10.0	7.0	1.43	1	2
Australia	31.5	23.8	1.32	25.0	20.0	1.25	11	127
EC/U	32.9	25.7	1.28	24.6	16.5	1.49	38	83
Brazil	35.7	28.4	1.26	27.2	24.8	1.10	7	11
Canada	38.7	35.3	1.10	38.7	32.6	1.19	13	83

SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office based on the GATT/WTO data set.

NOTE: This table includes all countries that reported at least one duty rate for a nonmarket economy and one duty rate for a market economy, so that comparison could be made between duty rates for the two cases. Three other countries--Peru, Turkey, and Venezuela--each reported duty rates for two cases against nonmarket economies but did not report any duty rates for cases against market economies; hence, no comparison could be made.

EC/U = European Community/Union.

TABLE B-17. U.S. ANTIDUMPING MEASURES AGAINST FINAL- AND NEAR-FINAL-DEMAND GOODS ON DECEMBER 31, 1995

Product	Country ^a	Initial Average Duty (Percent)	Duration to Date (Years)	Initial Market Share of Dumped Imports (Percent)
3.5-inch microdisks and media	Japan	39.37	6.74	*
Aspheric ophthalmoscopy lenses	Japan	158.00	3.71	*
Aspirin	Turkey	32.98	8.35	4.7
Barbed wire and barbless fencing wire	Argentina	69.02	10.13	4.8
Bicycle speedometers	Japan	*	23.10	*
Canned Bartlett pears	Australia	*	22.77	*
Canned pineapple fruit	Thailand	29.07	0.45	48.
Cased pencils	PRC	22.33	1.01	*
Cellular mobile telephones and subassemblies	Japan	53.30	10.03	*
Certain fresh cut flowers	Colombia	41.86	8.79	54.5
Certain fresh cut flowers	Ecuador	10.78	8.79	0.8
Certain fresh cut flowers	Kenya	2.34	8.69	0.1
Certain fresh cut flowers	Mexico	14.70	8.69	1.2
Color negative photographic paper and chemical components thereof	Japan	*	1.39	*
Color negative photographic paper and chemical components thereof	Netherlands	*	1.39	*
Color television receivers	Taiwan	*	11.67	6.9
Color television receivers	South Korea	8.70	11.67	10.3
Cotton shop towels	PRC	36.20	12.24	34.6
Drafting machines	Japan	90.87	6.00	*
Fishnetting of manmade fiber	Japan	*	23.56	*
Fresh and chilled Atlantic salmon	Norway	23.73	4.72	65.
Fresh garlic	PRC	376.67	1.12	8.8
Fresh kiwifruit	New Zealand	98.60	3.58	*
Frozen concentrated orange juice	Brazil	0.98	8.66	*
Heavy forged hand tools	PRC	30.22	4.86	*
Honey	PRC	*	0.41	8.28
Industrial forklift trucks	Japan	37.05	7.56	48.5
Paint brushes and brush heads	PRC	127.07	9.88	22.8
Paper clips	PRC	86.48	1.10	*
Petroleum wax candles	PRC	55.17	9.34	18.3
Photo albums and photo album filler pages	South Korea	64.81	10.04	*
Pistachios	Iran	241.14	9.46	42.3
Porcelain-on-steel cooking ware	PRC	66.65	9.08	*
Porcelain-on-steel cooking ware	Taiwan	12.56	9.08	*
Porcelain-on-steel cooking ware	Mexico	37.15	9.08	*
Pressure-sensitive plastic tape	Italy	*	18.19	*
Professional electric power tools	Japan	50.59	2.47	*
Racing plates (aluminum horseshoes)	Canada	*	21.84	*
Red raspberries	Canada	11.38	10.52	25.
Shop towels	Bangladesh	22.52	3.78	7.2
Small business telephone systems	Taiwan	64.87	6.05	1.4
Small business telephone systems	Japan	157.85	6.05	14.5
Small business telephone systems	South Korea	14.08	5.89	15.2
Sparklers	PRC	47.59	4.54	57.3
Stainless steel cooking ware	Taiwan	20.59	8.94	13.1
Stainless steel cooking ware	South Korea	15.99	8.94	41.5
Standard carnations	Chile	14.39	8.78	0.7
Steel jacks	Canada	*	29.30	*
Sugar	Belgium	*	16.55	*
Sugar	France	*	16.55	*
Sugar	West Germany	*	16.55	*
Sugar and syrups	Canada	*	15.73	0.89
Television receivers	Japan	*	24.81	*

SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office based on GATT/WTO data set.

NOTE: (*) indicates the GATT/WTO data set does not have the number in question.

PRC = People's Republic of China

a. Measures in this table are assigned to the country against which the measure was initially imposed, even if the country and the corresponding measure were later broken up.

TABLE B-18. U.S. ANTIDUMPING MEASURES AGAINST INTERMEDIATE GOODS ON DECEMBER 31, 1995

Product	Country ^a	Initial Average Duty (Percent)	Duration to Date (Years)	Initial Market Share of Dumped Imports (Percent)
Antifriction bearings	France	38.73	6.63	1.1
Antifriction bearings	West Germany	81.77	6.63	5.2
Antifriction bearings	Italy	140.37	6.63	1.1
Antifriction bearings	Japan	55.31	6.63	9.6
Antifriction bearings	Romania	39.61	6.63	0.6
Antifriction bearings	Singapore	25.08	6.63	1.3
Antifriction bearings	Sweden	96.85	6.63	0.9
Antifriction bearings	Thailand	0	6.63	0.7
Antifriction bearings	United Kingdom	52.25	6.63	1.3
Brass fire protection products	Italy	3.47	10.83	52.
Carbon steel butt-weld pipe fittings	PRC	108.98	3.49	19.7
Carbon steel butt-weld pipe fittings	Thailand	25.53	3.49	10.7
Carbon steel butt-weld pipe fittings (finished and unfinished)	Brazil	52.25	9.04	*
Carbon steel butt-weld pipe fittings (finished and unfinished)	Taiwan	47.07	9.04	*
Carbon steel butt-weld pipe fittings (finished and unfinished)	Japan	48.32	8.89	*
Carbon steel pipes and tubes	Taiwan	26.70	11.65	*
Chrome-plated lug nuts	PRC	4.24	4.28	*
Chrome-plated lug nuts	Taiwan	8.57	4.28	41.5
Circular welded carbon steel pipes and tubes (standard and line pipe)	Thailand	15.65	9.81	0.7
Circular welded carbon steel pipes and tubes (standard and line pipe)	Turkey	16.15	9.63	0.85
Circular welded nonalloy steel pipe	Brazil	103.38	3.16	2.6
Circular welded nonalloy steel pipe	Taiwan	23.56	3.16	1.8
Circular welded nonalloy steel pipe	South Korea	8.27	3.16	15.4
Circular welded nonalloy steel pipe	Mexico	32.62	3.16	2.3
Circular welded nonalloy steel pipe	Venezuela	52.51	3.16	0.8
Color picture tubes	Canada	0.65	7.98	1.7
Color picture tubes	Japan	17.42	7.98	5.1
Color picture tubes	South Korea	1.91	7.98	6.
Color picture tubes	Singapore	5.33	7.98	2.1
Compact ductile iron waterworks fittings	PRC	127.38	2.31	5.75
Defrost timers	Japan	83.67	1.83	*
DRAM semiconductors	South Korea	5.99	2.64	26.1
EPROM microchips	Japan	*	9.37	*
Forged stainless steel flanges	Taiwan	48.00	1.89	13.19
Forged steel crankshafts	West Germany	1.17	8.27	*
Forged steel crankshafts	United Kingdom	14.67	8.28	*
Greige polyester printcloths	PRC	22.40	12.29	12.4
Helical spring lock washers	PRC	77.47	2.20	*
Helical spring lock washers	Taiwan	31.93	2.51	*
High-powered microwave amplifiers and components	Japan	33.40	13.45	*
Impression fabric	Japan	*	17.60	*
Industrial belts	West Germany	100.60	6.55	*
Industrial belts	Italy	74.90	6.55	*
Industrial belts	Japan	93.16	6.55	*
Industrial belts	Singapore	31.73	6.55	*
Industrial electric motors	Japan	6.70	15.15	4.4
Iron construction castings	Brazil	32.35	9.65	3.2
Iron construction castings	Canada	7.10	9.82	5.5
Iron construction castings	PRC	11.66	9.65	3.2
Large power transformers	France	*	23.55	*
Large power transformers	Italy	*	23.55	*
Large power transformers	Japan	*	23.55	*
Light scattering instruments	Japan	129.71	5.11	*
Light-walled rectangular welded carbon steel pipe and tube	Taiwan	23.24	6.76	5.1
Light-walled rectangular welded carbon steel pipe and tube	Argentina	56.26	6.60	4.5
Malleable cast iron pipe fittings	Brazil	5.64	9.61	0.7
Malleable cast iron pipe fittings	Taiwan	43.97	9.61	7.6
Malleable cast iron pipe fittings	Japan	56.39	8.49	10.4
Malleable cast iron pipe fittings	Thailand	1.70	8.36	3.7
Malleable iron pipe fittings	South Korea	12.48	9.61	6.8
Mechanical transfer presses	Japan	11.33	5.87	*
Musical instrument pads	Italy	1.09	11.27	*
New steel rail	Canada	38.79	6.29	4.3
Oil country tubular goods	Canada	18.63	9.54	4.3
Oil country tubular goods	Taiwan	26.32	9.54	0.5
Oil country tubular goods	Israel	11.96	8.82	0.9
Oil country tubular goods	Japan	44.20	0.39	7.

(Continued)

TABLE B-18. CONTINUED

Product	Country ^a	Initial Average Duty (Percent)	Duration to Date (Years)	Initial Market Share of Dumped Imports (Percent)
Oil country tubular goods	South Korea	6.09	0.39	*
Oil country tubular goods	Mexico	23.79	0.39	*
Oil country tubular goods	Argentina	1.36	0.39	*
Oil country tubular goods	Italy	49.78	0.39	*
Pads of woodwind instrument keys	Italy	1.82	11.27	*
Railway track maintenance equipment	Austria	*	17.87	*
Roller chain other than bicycle	Japan	*	22.72	*
Self-propelled bituminous paving machines	Canada	*	18.31	*
Small diameter and light-walled rectangular welded carbon steel pipes and tubes	Singapore	12.03	9.13	12.5
Small diameter circular seamless carbon and alloy steel standard, line, and pressure pipe	Argentina	108.13	0.41	*
Small diameter circular seamless carbon and alloy steel standard, line, and pressure pipe	Brazil	124.94	0.41	*
Small diameter circular seamless carbon and alloy steel standard, line, and pressure pipe	Germany	58.23	0.41	*
Small diameter circular seamless carbon and alloy steel standard, line, and pressure pipe	Italy	1.84	0.41	*
Stainless steel butt-weld pipe fittings	Taiwan	0.70	2.54	21.4
Stainless steel butt-weld pipe fittings	Japan	32.58	7.77	29.
Stainless steel butt-weld pipe fittings	South Korea	21.20	2.85	2.6
Stainless steel flanges	India	114.87	1.89	13.19
Stainless steel hollow products	Sweden	20.47	8.08	*
Steel wire rope	Japan	*	22.21	*
Steel wire rope	South Korea	0.81	2.77	5.1
Steel wire rope	Mexico	111.68	2.77	1.7
Truck and trailer axles and brake assemblies	Hungary	*	13.99	*
Welded carbon steel standard pipes and tubes	India	7.08	9.64	0.1
Welded stainless steel pipe	Taiwan	17.59	3.00	8.7
Welded stainless steel pipe	South Korea	5.15	3.00	4.7

SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office based on the GATT/WTO data set.

NOTE: (*) indicates that the GATT/WTO data set does not have the number in question.

PRC = People's Republic of China; DRAM = dynamic random access memory; EPROM = erasable programmable read only memory.

a. Measures in this table are assigned to the country against which the measure was initially imposed, even if the country and the corresponding measure were later broken up.

TABLE B-19. U.S. ANTIDUMPING MEASURES AGAINST RAW AND PROCESSED MATERIALS ON DECEMBER 31, 1995

Product	Country ^a	Initial Average Duty (Percent)	Duration to Date (Years)	Initial Market Share of Dumped Imports (Percent)
Acrylic sheet	Japan	*	19.33	*
Anhydrous sodium metasilicate	France	60.00	14.98	4.1
Animal glue and inedible gelatin	West Germany	*	18.02	*
Aramid fibre of PPD-T	Netherlands	66.92	1.52	*
Barium chloride	PRC	14.50	11.20	*
Benzyl paraben	Japan	126.00	4.88	*
Brass sheet and strip	Brazil	40.62	8.97	1.4
Brass sheet and strip	Canada	7.03	8.97	1.4
Brass sheet and strip	France	42.24	8.82	2.2
Brass sheet and strip	West Germany	10.00	8.82	9.2
Brass sheet and strip	Italy	12.08	8.82	2.
Brass sheet and strip	Japan	35.64	7.38	4.4
Brass sheet and strip	South Korea	7.17	8.97	1.5
Brass sheet and strip	Netherlands	16.99	7.38	2.8
Brass sheet and strip	Sweden	*	8.82	1.
Calcium aluminate cement and flux	France	28.42	1.55	*
Calcium hypochlorite	Japan	*	10.70	*
Carbon steel plate	Taiwan	*	16.55	*
Carbon steel wire rod	Argentina	119.11	11.10	1.9
Cement and cement clinker	Mexico	31.04	5.34	25.
Cement and cement clinker	Venezuela	*	3.84	*
Certain sulfur chemicals (eventually becomes "sodium thiosulfate" only)	United Kingdom	50.13	4.86	3.5
Certain sulfur chemicals (eventually becomes "sodium thiosulfate" only)	PRC	25.57	4.86	1.
Certain sulfur chemicals (eventually becomes "sodium thiosulfate" only)	West Germany	100.40	4.86	6.
Chloropicrin	PRC	58.00	11.78	*
Cold-rolled flat steel products	Germany	20.05	2.37	2.4
Cold-rolled flat steel products	South Korea	14.44	2.37	1.2
Cold-rolled flat steel products	Netherlands	20.19	2.37	1.2
Corrosion-resistant flat steel products	Australia	24.96	2.37	1.4
Corrosion-resistant flat steel products	Canada	19.58	2.37	3.4
Corrosion-resistant flat steel products	France	39.40	2.37	0.7
Corrosion-resistant flat steel products	Germany	4.18	2.37	1.4
Corrosion-resistant flat steel products	Japan	36.41	2.37	6.2
Corrosion-resistant flat steel products	South Korea	17.70	2.37	1.5
Coumarin	PRC	87.92	0.89	*
Cut-to-length carbon steel place	Spain	105.61	2.37	1.2
Cut-to-length carbon steel plate	Belgium	10.05	2.37	1.
Cut-to-length carbon steel plate	Brazil	75.54	2.37	0.9
Cut-to-length carbon steel plate	Canada	35.09	2.37	3.8
Cut-to-length carbon steel plate	Finland	32.80	2.37	1.
Cut-to-length carbon steel plate	Germany	36.00	2.37	0.4
Cut-to-length carbon steel plate	Mexico	49.25	2.37	1.2
Cut-to-length carbon steel plate	Poland	61.98	2.37	0.5
Cut-to-length carbon steel plate	Romania	75.04	2.37	0.4
Cut-to-length carbon steel plate	Sweden	24.23	2.37	1.3
Cut-to-length carbon steel plate	United Kingdom	109.22	2.37	0.4
Electrolytic manganese dioxide	Greece	36.72	6.70	*
Electrolytic manganese dioxide	Japan	74.67	6.70	*
Elemental sulphur	Canada	*	22.04	*
Extruded rubber thread	Malaysia	15.53	3.23	35.
Ferrosilicon	Brazil	44.43	1.80	*
Ferrosilicon	PRC	137.73	2.81	1.8
Ferrosilicon	Kazakhstan	104.18	2.73	*
Ferrosilicon	Russia	104.18	2.52	*
Ferrosilicon	Ukraine	104.18	2.73	*
Ferrosilicon	Venezuela	9.55	2.52	*
Ferrovanadium and nitrided vanadium	Russia	55.88	0.48	21.1
Furfuryl alcohol	PRC	46.99	0.53	*
Furfuryl alcohol	South Africa	11.55	0.53	*
Furfuryl alcohol	Thailand	5.94	0.44	*
Glycine	PRC	155.89	0.76	*
Grain-oriented electrical steel	Italy	60.79	1.39	*
Grain-oriented electrical steel	Japan	31.08	1.56	*
Granular PTFE (polytetrafluoroethylene) resin	Italy	46.46	7.33	*
Granular PTFE (polytetrafluoroethylene) resin	Japan	77.23	7.35	*
Gray portland cement and clinker	Japan	66.25	4.64	2.4
High-tenacity rayon filament yarn	Germany	24.58	3.50	*
Hot-rolled flat steel products	Canada		0.26	1.9
Industrial nitrocellulose	Brazil	61.25	5.48	*
Industrial nitrocellulose	PRC	78.40	5.48	*

(Continued)

TABLE B-19. CONTINUED

Product	Country ^a	Initial Average Duty (Percent)	Duration to Date (Years)	Initial Market Share of Dumped Imports (Percent)
Industrial nitrocellulose	France	1.38	12.39	*
Industrial nitrocellulose	West Germany	3.84	5.48	*
Industrial nitrocellulose	Japan	66.00	5.48	*
Industrial nitrocellulose	South Korea	66.30	5.48	*
Industrial nitrocellulose	United Kingdom	11.13	5.48	*
Industrial nitrocellulose	Yugoslavia	10.81	5.21	*
Lead and bismuth carbon steel	France	75.08	2.78	0.08
Lead and bismuth carbon steel	Germany	85.05	2.78	1.7
Lead and bismuth carbon steel products	United Kingdom	25.82	2.78	0.26
Lead and bismuth carbon steel products	Brazil	148.12	2.78	0.04
Low-fuming brazing copper wire and rod	New Zealand	26.93	10.07	*
Low-fuming brazing copper wire and rod	South Africa	3.30	9.92	*
Melamine	Japan	*	18.91	*
Nitrile rubber	Japan	146.50	7.54	*
Phosphoric acid	Belgium	14.67	8.36	1.5
Phosphoric acid	Israel	6.82	8.37	0.7
Polychloroprene rubber	Japan	*	22.07	*
Polyethylene terephthalate (PET) Film	South Korea	4.55	4.57	*
Potassium chloride (potash)	Canada	*	7.95	*
Potassium permanganate	PRC	39.63	11.92	*
Potassium permanganate	Spain	5.49	11.95	*
Precipitated barium carbonate	West Germany	9.90	14.52	20.3
Pure and alloy magnesium	Canada	15.67	3.33	16.9
Pure and alloy magnesium	Russia	50.13	0.64	*
Pure and alloy magnesium (eventually listed as "pure magnesium" only)	Ukraine	92.07	0.64	3.
Sebacic acid	PRC	93.82	0.64	1.7
Silicomanganese	PRC	143.56	1.46	*
Silicomanganese	Brazil	41.27	1.02	*
Silicomanganese	PRC	150.00	1.02	*
Silicomanganese	Ukraine	163.00	11.09	*
Silicon metal	Argentina	8.65	4.26	3.8
Silicon metal	Brazil	90.50	4.42	8.4
Silicon metal	PRC	139.49	4.56	5.6
Sorbitol	France	4.20	13.73	*
Stainless steel bar	Brazil	19.43	0.86	2.
Stainless steel bar	India	12.45	0.86	2.
Stainless steel bar	Japan	61.47	0.86	8.
Stainless steel bar	Spain	35.29	0.83	4.
Stainless steel plate	Sweden	*	22.56	*
Stainless steel wire rod	Brazil	25.57	1.92	10.3
Stainless steel wire rod	France	24.39	1.92	10.3
Stainless steel wire rod	India	48.80	2.08	1.4
Steel wire strand	Japan	*	17.06	*
Sulfanilic acid	PRC	52.17	3.36	36.5
Sulfanilic acid	India	114.80	2.83	*
Synthetic methionine	Japan	*	22.48	*
Tapered roller bearings	PRC	0.97	8.54	0.1
Tapered roller bearings	Hungary	7.42	8.53	0.2
Tapered roller bearings	Italy	124.75	8.38	0.1
Tapered roller bearings	Romania	8.70	8.53	0.9
Tapered roller bearings and parts, 4 inches and under	Japan	*	19.37	*
Tapered roller bearings and parts (finished and unfinished) over 4 inches	Japan	36.37	8.24	13.2
Titanium sponge	Japan	56.30	11.08	24.4
Titanium sponge	Soviet Union	*	27.34	*
Tungsten ore concentrates	PRC	151.00	4.11	*
Uranium	Kazakhstan	*	3.17	*
Uranium	Kyrgyzstan	*	3.17	*
Uranium	Russia	*	3.17	*
Uranium	Ukraine	129.29	3.17	*
Uranium	Uzbekistan	*	3.17	*
Urea	East Germany	44.80	8.47	0.8
Urea	Romania	*	8.47	4.4
Urea	Soviet Union	60.75	8.47	6.

SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office based on the GATT/WTO data set.

NOTES: (*) indicates that the GATT/WTO data set does not have the numbers in question.

PRC = People's Republic of China.

a. Measures in this table are assigned to the country against which the measure was initially imposed, even if the country and the corresponding measure were later broken up.