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## **West Europe**

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# West Europe

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## CONTENTS

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### POLITICAL

#### FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

|                                                          |   |
|----------------------------------------------------------|---|
| CDU Losing Support in Ruhr .....                         | 1 |
| CSU Seen Losing Grassroots Support .....                 | 1 |
| Strauss Favorites Tandler, Streibl Given New Tasks ..... | 2 |
| SPD Women Demand Quota Representation .....              | 3 |

#### FINLAND

|                                                                       |   |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------|---|
| Communist Parties Losing Influence, Suffering Economic Problems ..... | 4 |
| Budget Crunch Forces Dismissals .....                                 | 4 |
| Stalinists Renew Unity Appeal .....                                   | 4 |
| Loss of Political Influence .....                                     | 5 |
| Court: Expulsion Violated Rules .....                                 | 5 |
| Leaders View Court Decision .....                                     | 6 |
| Papers on Parties' Problems .....                                     | 6 |

#### FRANCE

|                                                         |   |
|---------------------------------------------------------|---|
| Poll Shows Disappointment About Failed 'Overture' ..... | 7 |
|---------------------------------------------------------|---|

#### NORWAY

|                                                                                                                |    |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----|
| Conservative Newspaper Assesses Labor Government Cabinet Changes .....                                         | 13 |
| Separate Polls Indicate Labor Party Failing To Attract Youth .....                                             | 13 |
| New Conservative Party Youth-Wing Chief Borge Brende Profiled .....                                            | 14 |
| Divided Nonsocialist Opposition Unable To Threaten Brundtland<br>[Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET 17 Jul 88] ..... | 16 |

#### PORTUGAL

|                                                               |    |
|---------------------------------------------------------------|----|
| Macao Issue Seen Affecting Soares' Reputation, Standing ..... | 18 |
|---------------------------------------------------------------|----|

#### SWEDEN

|                                                                   |    |
|-------------------------------------------------------------------|----|
| Poll Finds 63 Percent of Voters Expect SPD Election Victory ..... | 19 |
| 'Resignation' Felt by Nonsocialists .....                         | 19 |
| Carlsson's Election Strategy, Themes .....                        | 20 |
| Center Party Stressing Environment .....                          | 21 |
| SIFO Poll Sees Ebbe Carlsson Affair Benefiting VPK .....          | 22 |

### MILITARY

#### FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

|                                                                  |    |
|------------------------------------------------------------------|----|
| Terrain-, Mission-Oriented Infantry Doctrine Outlined .....      | 23 |
| Restructuring Assigns New Tasks, Organization to Infantry .....  | 28 |
| Combined Arms Doctrine Evolving for Air-Mechanized Units .....   | 33 |
| Naval Combat Systems' Successors, Upgrading Projected .....      | 35 |
| Changes in Legislation Governing Reserve Training Proposed ..... | 40 |

## FRANCE

Cooperation With Brazil Permits French Entry Into Latin American Market ..... 41

## NORWAY

Defense Minister on Soviet Submarine Threat, Budget Cuts ..... 42

Women Increasingly Applying to Officer Training Schools ..... 43

## PORTUGAL

Munitions Shipments to Iran Continue ..... 43

Spanish Rearmament Seen Threatening National Defense Status ..... 44

Funds Needed for 'Satisfactory' A-7P Aircraft Maintenance ..... 46

## SWITZERLAND

Formation of Full-Time Militia Readiness Unit Urged ..... 46

## ECONOMIC

### FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

Lafontaine Demands More Federal Funds for Saarland ..... 50

### PORTUGAL

Interest Expressed in Purchase of Nationalized Enterprises  
[Paris *LA TRIBUNE DE L'EXPANSION* 22 Jul 88] ..... 50

## FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

### CDU Losing Support in Ruhr

36200210b Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER  
ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG in German 4 Jul 88 p 3

[Article by Lothar Bewerunge: "Better a Howling Jackal Than a Camel"]

[Text] Bochum, 3 July—There is hardly any other place where the CDU lives in the diaspora as much as in the Ruhr. Only the real old-timers can remember the days when the CDU occupied the city halls of cities such as Duisburg or Bochum. And as for the sixties cry of "let's take the red city halls by storm," it is heard no more. In the Ruhr, the CDU is down to 25 or 30 percent of the vote. In the communal elections next year, the party will be trying to hold its own and not to gain any victories. Last weekend, the Ruhr district CDU organization under the chairmanship of Bundestag deputy Lammert tried to pick up some momentum for the upcoming Landtag election and the Bundestag election in 1990. But the mood among the roughly 130 delegates who met at Bochum's Parkhotel was quite depressed in view of the current poor public showing of the Kohl government.

"We are battling against the wind," the delegates were saying, as they noted that more than 1,000 CDU members had left the party throughout the Land during the preceding 10 days. "How can we wage an election campaign in the Ruhr in the face of the obstacles Bonn places in our path," the delegates said. Over the past several months, the airplane fuel issue has become the symbol of the anger and frustration over the Bonn leadership image. Many rank and file CDU members felt insulted by Kohl's statement at the Wiesbaden party convention that the caravan is moving on despite all the criticism. In Bochum, a Landtag deputy received almost derisive applause when he said: "we almost feel like howling jackals—because who wants to be a camel?" The delegates were especially critical of Lammert and other Bundestag deputies from the Ruhr area because they were "always clenching their fists in their pockets" instead of openly stating their case. The anger of the rank and file ultimately found expression in an almost unanimously adopted resolution by the Young Union, which expressly criticized that party leadership for providing tax exemptions for airplane fuel for private aircraft in opposition to a contrary resolution adopted by the party convention. In addition, a demand was made that future decisions by the Bonn government should "properly reflect impending measures," a pointed reference to incipient doubts in the chancellor's leadership qualities.

As the CDU's Land chairman for North Rhine-Westphalia, Labor Minister [Norbert] Bluem seemed loath to join the delegates to the Ruhr party convention in their critique of Kohl in public. But in private conversation it was noticeable that he, too, is giving thought to the limits of what is acceptable. "The airplane fuel issue is a bothersome matter. It will be taken care of. I know what

will be done but I am not going to talk about it just yet," Bluem said in referring to his loyalty obligation. But other members of the Bundestag who are not bound to silence were more forthcoming. The tax reform measures will be adopted without change later this week by the Bundesrat, they said, but with the proviso that the next reading of the mineral oil legislation this fall will reinstitute the tax on fuel for private aircraft.

But this hardly seemed to satisfy the CDU delegates. The party fears that continuing loss of faith in the CDU's credibility cannot be recouped. There was to be a debate on the subject of "new confidence" but not a single delegate rose to speak to it despite repeated calls. Bluem tried hard to motivate the assembled delegates. "[SPD Minister President] Johannes Rau must be called to account. We have to wrest power from the SPD. We need to start afresh; that is no deep secret. We have to work together once again, not at cross purposes," Bluem said. But the impression of paralysis could not be effaced in this manner. Following Bluem's speech, the party convention lapsed into silence. No one asked for the floor.

09478

### CSU Seen Losing Grassroots Support

36200211a Munich SUEDEDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG  
in German 1 Jul 88 p 2

[Article by Egon Scotland: "Rebellion Against the Isolated Leader; Test of Strength Between the CSU Landtag Parliament Group and Franz Josef Strauss Because of the Exemption of the Hobby Flyers From the Gasoline Tax"]

[Text] "My Kreis association has 2,395 members. Now it's perhaps only 2,390, active and nonactive members." Nikolaus Asenbeck, farmer from Zangberg in the Upper Bavarian rural kreis of Muehldorf, Land parliament deputy and for 21 years CSU kreis chairman, knows his strength very precisely. "They continue to elect me kreis chairman even if we have 10 percent less. But I don't permit the kreis association to be ruined. But we are not going to survive any more of such matters." Resignations and protests against the course of CSU Chairman Franz Josef Strauss regarding aviation gasoline has thrown the party into turmoil, isolated the minister president in a way not seen for many years and has permitted a dramatic situation to develop from which no one in Munich seems to know a way out.

"Giving in almost never happens," Asenbeck skeptically observed. The only thing he can imagine would be a prostration, something Strauss is not in the habit of doing as everybody knows. "If he says, folks, share the burden, I have goofed, I am not going to do it again, then everything is OK." Just as the self-confident Asenbeck, many in the CSU Landtag parliamentary group, who are also kreis chairmen, who have their ears more to the grassroots than the top people and who now—at any rate regarding the aviation gasoline matter—no longer want

to be forced into anything. The 3-hour debate behind closed doors of the parliamentary group had documented that on Wednesday. Almost 30 speakers furiously and in a warning tone did not pull any punches, saying the party no longer will go along, the people are leaving "like mad."

"Nobody is in favor of it, the Landtag parliamentary group is not in favor of it, the Land group is not in favor of it, Edmund Stoiber is not in favor of it, Gerold Tandler is not in favor of it, and Huber Erwin is not in favor of it either—and in spite of that it is going to happen. That is after all absurd!", Deputy Peter Widmann railed, who knows his Strauss particularly well, again and again interrupted by applause. "We must not permit the CSU to dismantle itself nor does the CSU Chairman Franz Josef Strauss either," he added adroitly. "I believe that is the most impassioned speech that I have ever delivered," the 57-year-old excitedly admitted afterwards before he went to the swimming pool to calm down. Only the State Chancellory chief, Stoiber, and the young deputy CSU General Secretary Erwin Huber dutifully continued to defend their chief's line, but were unable to convince anyone.

#### The Pressure Grows

Economics Minister Gerold Tandler, new in the office, but once again a loyal henchman of the boss, in vain tried to explain to his party colleagues that it was not Strauss who was behind the matter but Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl and Finance Minister Gerhard Stoltenberg had especially vehemently advocated that no tax be levied on aviation gasoline. "If the matter is the way Tandler says and it was not the chief, then the matter could be settled so much more easily," Erich Kiesel, Munich's former chief major, cunningly concluded.

The whole thing only a bagatelle? Scornful laughter. "The Army has started to retreat," hecklers responded to the exhortations of the wavering top people to hold out. Strauss himself was absent, was at the same time at Pontifical Mass on the occasion of the 20th bishop's anniversary of Cardinal Friedrich Wetter and then went to a reception. "If he had been present and had shouted at us again, it would not have helped anymore," members of the parliamentary group stated. "His negatives begin to outweigh his positives" and "There are better minister presidents in Bavaria," some murmur. Many were really thankful that Strauss was absent, that the new parliamentary group chief Alois Glueck let the discussion run its course, but was also smart enough to avoid a formal vote which would have completely compromised the minister president. Glueck raised the decision to the highest level: "We must continue to rack our brains."

The night before Strauss had delivered a spontaneous lecture exactly according to the feared model to a relatively small circle, the so-called "Wehrsportgruppe Weiss" (Military Sports Group White), a group of friends of national defense within the parliamentary

group. Without him, Strauss said, the CSU will soon sit on the opposition benches, the deputies would then be nothing but petitioners. That was peddled with relish and also the detail that at the decisive session of the parliamentary group even the frowned upon words "glasnost and perestroika in the CSU" were heard from the executive board's table.

As though freed from a nightmare, witnesses described the courage of the colleagues. Not even Strauss's closest friends had been able in the past to change his mind in time, the Land group and the entire Bundestag had failed parliamentarily under this control, only the CSU Landtag parliamentary group functions as a seismograph for the mood of the people.

Even crafty CSU managers are now at a loss. "Neither the coalition nor tax reform will collapse," the rebels optimistically insist. It is a "matter for the supreme command" to find the next opportunity to get out of the self-made dilemma. The pressure even grows since it has been settled that next Tuesday a special session of the Landtag plenum will take place, pushed through by the opposition. SPD and Greens would need about 30 votes to prevail. In the opinion of the old hands the consequences in Bonn would be incalculable if Bavaria actually had recourse to the mediation committee. Thus perhaps merely a resolution generally to tax aviation gasoline later on as part of the European coordination? Or right now, at least the real hobby flyers? Either the parliamentary group loses prestige or Strauss.

Alois Glueck, who will meet with the minister president in the state Chancellory Friday morning to continue his ordeal by fire in his new position before Strauss will fly to Bonn for the meeting of the party chairmen (topic: increases in the tax on oil for motorists), stoically fended off all questions: "At the moment I give no prognosis at all."

12356

#### Strauss Favorites Tandler, Streibl Given New Tasks

36200211c Munich SUEDEDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG  
in German 14 Jul 88 p 4

[Article by Michael Stiller: "Strauss Upgrades His Crown Princes"]

[Text] The new Bavarian Economics Minister Gerold Tandler returned quite impressed from a trip to the USSR a few days ago. It was his first sizable mission in his new office; he was accompanied by several representatives of Bavarian industry. "All of us were surprised by the atmosphere of change that was imparted," Tandler wrote thereafter in a long report published in the CSU organ BAYERNKURIER.

Hardly back home again, the status of the present favorite pupil of CSU Chairman Strauss was further enhanced. Tandler, who maintained in the past inconspicuously but effectively divers foreign contacts for the CSU, is to become "foreign policy plenipotentiary of the CSU." That is what Strauss announced at the latest closed meeting of the party executive board. Did the CSU thus establish a foreign minister of its own who is to cast his shadow on the unloved Bonn Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher (FDP)? That would probably be too daring an assumption which was dutifully contradicted by Tandler himself. "More is being interpreted into it than is really there," Tandler plays down the role assigned to him. Tandler knows only too well that Strauss values in his crown princes—to whom Tandler undoubtedly belongs in top position—above all modesty and selfless work. Strauss himself keeps in his own hands the threads of the self-willed foreign policy frequently deviating from the Bonn line.

Thus, behind the somewhat nebulous title of "foreign policy plenipotentiary of the CSU," there hides nothing much more than a continuation of part of the work performed by Tandler even as CSU general secretary. He will relinquish this office, which is hardly compatible with his new function as economics minister.

Even CDU general secretary Heiner Geissler, visiting Munich on Wednesday, sees no new potential for trouble for the Bonn government coalition in Tandler's new assignment. "They couldn't have found anyone better suited for that. Everybody who is competent is welcome in mountain climbing," Geissler said.

However, Tandler's anointing with foreign policy orders probably is being attentively noted in the CSU where the personnel movements in the team behind Strauss are being observed with growing attention. Since another crown prince, namely Finance Minister Max Streibl, was entrusted with the time-consuming representation of the minister president, which is indeed representative but is less attractive on account of the many welcoming ceremonies, the impression is gaining ground that Strauss in the meantime is interested above all in perfecting Tandler's political career with a view to a possible successor. If the question of succession had to be decided right now, Streibl would possibly be slightly ahead in the CSU Landtag parliamentary group. He meets the CSU image of a somewhat popular "father of the people" more than Tandler does, who at times seems to be somewhat untalkative and grim.

But since Strauss voluntarily will not quickly relinquish his power, time may possibly be against the 56-year-old Streibl; Tandler is almost 5 years younger. Bonn CSU representative Theo Weigel, who has also been regarded as a candidate for the succession time and again, recently has lost ground and probably also has no overly great ambitions to get out of Bonn politics.

In Erwin Huber one of the younger guard of the CSU will soon move up to Tandler's former function as general

secretary. At any rate Strauss has expressed his confidence to the 41-year-old Landtag parliamentary deputy.

12356

### **SPD Women Demand Quota Representation**

36200210c Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER  
ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG in German 5 Jul 88 p 4

[Article by Helmut Herles: "SPD Women Ought To Be Proud Roses"]

[Text] Bonn, 4 July—Women who have made their mark in political life even without quota representation met at SPD headquarters in Bonn today to call for incorporating the controversial quota proposal in the party's statutes. The group of women included Ms Wieczorek-Zeul; former FDP Bundestag deputy Ms Matthaeus-Maier and the Saarland's deputy minister president, Ms Peter, none of whom had previously endorsed the provision. But now the women sitting at a table decorated with flowers in the lobby of the Ollenhauer Building were saying that the quota representation provision must be adopted and that it will be. SPD executive secretary Fuchs said the women were sure of obtaining the necessary two-thirds majority at the upcoming party congress in Muenster in late August. Ms Fuchs chose her words carefully, calling on the others present to follow her example. She had herself raised the possibility of being named party executive secretary, she said, and had in fact been given the post.

Though the language used by some of the others was more radical and less tolerant, they would no doubt call it male chauvinism if men spoke about women in this manner in public. Bonn lyrical poet Karin Hempel-Soos, the spiritual leader of this group, resorted to black humor. The women were not meeting here, she said, to refute the saying that if God had wanted women to go into politics, he would not have given them such shrill voices. Saarland political leader Peter brushed the SPD's justifiable reservations against setting a 40-percent quota of women party officials and legislators aside by saying that "those who have reservations on legal grounds are guilty of intellectual witch burning." Katharina Focke, the SPD's last leading woman candidate in the European election, recalled the statement by top candidate Willy Brandt, the honorary chairman of the SPD, to the effect that he would only accept the top spot on the ticket, if 10 women were not included among the first 40 candidates. "Not even Brandt," she said, was able to get them to do it voluntarily. This is why the quota provision is needed.

Susi Moebbeck, the newly-elected chairman of the Young Socialists [Juso], used vintage political terminology in making her statement. The quota is now being "cast in concrete," she said. "We are looking for feminization on the inside as well as on the outside." The Jusos are asking that a woman be named deputy party chairman no matter whether Rau or Lafontaine give up their position or whether the number of deputies is

raised to four, as the Hesse South district SPD organization and their chairperson Wieczorek-Zeul and the ASF have proposed. Former Juso chairman Wieczorek-Zeul, wearing a proper two-piece suit, sat next to her successor who wore a T-shirt and spoke out in favor of "women-friendly perestroika." She was no longer opposed to the quota system, Wieczorek-Zeul said, because of the snail's pace at which the number of women legislators was increasing. Anke Brunn, another SPD district executive committee member, said that those assembled here were "individual examples," adding that "this is not the way we want it to be in the future." Eva Ruehmke, the former women's affairs official in Hamburg and present member of the Schleswig-Holstein regional government, said that the distinction being made between quotas and qualification amounted to "killer terminology." The quota system, she said, represents "the only opportunity for qualified women to earn their rightful position." Renate Schmidt, one of [Jochen] Vogel's deputies in the Bundestag, said she was looking forward to having 40 percent more women colleagues there. It is "not a matter" of creating "special preserves for women in tax policy matters" or "in economic policy," she said while failing to state how these "women's issues" would differ from other policies.

The final point was made by lawyers Herta Daeubler-Gmelin and Heide Pfarr. There is more than one legal opinion, they noted, which places such a high value on the equality principle contained in the Basic Law that it overcomes reservations such as those concerning voting rights. Nonetheless, Daeubler-Gmelin did speak of "reservations" although, in Peter's sense, it almost smacked of "witch burning."

At the start of the meeting, Anke Brunn, a member of the North Rhine Westphalian cabinet, had removed a particularly prickly, albeit symbolic cactus plant placed on the table by Hempel-Soos to make it easier for the press photographers to take pictures of the women politicians. Amid the applause of the assembled women, Anke Martiny did a takeoff on an old-fashioned verse about modest and pure violets in the green moss. "Let us be proud like roses, self-confident and free," she said, "and not like violets in the moss, anxious and faithful." What is it that Martiny does not like about modesty and faithfulness? But that was just one comment from a man. Another man said "just imagine the quota passes and nobody comes."

09478

## FINLAND

### Communist Parties Losing Influence, Suffering Economic Problems

#### Budget Crunch Forces Dismissals

36170090 Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish  
30 Jun 88 p 8

[Text] On 29 June, the Politburo of the Finnish Communist Party dismissed seven Central Committee workers, three of them officials and the rest office personnel.

Some five contracts that are up for renewal will not be renewed.

The dismissals were necessitated by the party's economic problems. Secretary General Helja Tammissalo estimated that the dismissals will reduce central office personnel expenses by one half for the next year.

The Politburo issued a statement assuring that efforts will be made to find the dismissed personnel new employment commensurate with their education and experience.

After the dismissals, the party headquarters will still be employing eight officials, five office secretaries, four office workers and two editors of the newspaper KOMMUNISTI.

#### Stalinists Renew Unity Appeal

36170090 Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish  
2 Jul 88 p 11

[Text] The Finnish Communist Party, on the eve of its 70th anniversary, received a renewed appeal for cooperation from the Taistoite faction, SKP-Unity, which was expelled from the party three years ago. The SKP-Unity proposed that the 22nd SKP representative assembly to be held in 1990 be viewed as a "reparatory assembly."

The offer was included in a draft for the SKP 70th anniversary resolution prepared by the SKP-Unity faction and scheduled for review at the Taistoite party conference in August. The conference will be held in conjunction with the SKP-Unity's gathering in Turku.

The resolution draft makes a strong point that the existence of a communist party is of the utmost importance and condemns the idea of merging the SKP into a leftist coalition. The idea of forming a leftist coalition was given strong support in the SKDL [Finnish People's Democratic League] convention in May.

In order to bring the communists back together, the SKP-Unity proposes a cooperative program, suggesting that the SKDL, DEVA [Democratic Alternative], and other "social change forces" form alliances for both the local elections this fall and the coming parliamentary elections as well as the labor union elections.

The SKP-Unity states as its opinion that plans should also be made this fall for cooperation on the most immediate political issues. Its suggested program would include establishing common local, district, and state committees, which would pave the way for the preparatory representative assembly.

In the past, the SKP-Unity has made several offers for cooperation without success. The current proposal, however, is the first one during Jarmo Wahlstrom's chairmanship of the SKP. Wahlstrom stated earlier that his attitude in this matter will be the same as that of the former party chief, Arvo Aalto.

In addition to the draft for the 70th anniversary resolution, the SKP-Unity party conference will also discuss proposed theses for developing the SKP-Unity main policies. During the conference, there will also be a Central Committee meeting, where a successor will be selected for the present party chief, Taisto Sinisalo.

SKP Unity chief secretary Jouko Kajanoja and parliamentary representative Esko-Juhani Tennila from the DEVA have been mentioned as likely candidates to succeed Sinisalo, who is resigning for health reasons. Neither of these men have so far revealed their intentions, and neither has Sinisalo himself made any public statement about the successor issue.

#### **Loss of Political Influence**

36170090 Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish  
2 Jul 88 p 8

[Editorial roundup]

[Excerpt] Tampere—The Conservative party organ AAMULEHTI in its comments on the SKP during the party's 70th anniversary celebrations in Tampere, reflects on what could be the SKP's very own version of perestroika.

"However, not even unity can save the SKP. The success enjoyed in the presidential elections by the Group 88, which was created to garner support for Kalevi Kivisto, was a source of some hope to the extreme left, but the SKP is in danger of dwindling into a marginal group that has nothing to offer but spoiled leftover porridge. While it is possible that the party in some alliance [or other] might be used to support others in the power struggle, it cannot expect [to establish] any meaningful position in Finnish politics unless there is an upheaval caused by outside forces. There are no indications that such upheaval—a straw for the drowning man—is likely," AAMULEHTI comments.

#### **Court: Expulsion Violated Rules**

36170090 Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish  
5 Jul 88 p 10

[Text] The Supreme Court gave on July 5 its final decision on the Finnish Communist Party controversy. On the whole, the court agreed with the lower courts that the SKP extraordinary representative assembly in 1985 was lawfully convened and that the participants constituted a quorum but that the amendments to the bylaws cannot be considered legal on the basis that the summons to the assembly was given out too late.

The decision of the highest court differed from those of the Municipal Court and the Court of Appeals only in the matter of replacing the party cards. According to the Supreme Court, the conditions set by the Central Committee for issuing new cards were against the party by-laws and consequently also against the law on organizations.

The legal squabbles within the SKP originated from the two-way split of the party. The majority wing decided in 1984 to settle the matter in an extraordinary representative assembly and, just before the assembly, established new district organizations in order to secure the majority positions in the March 1985 extraordinary assembly.

The intention was to amend the bylaws of the party in such a way that the minority factions could be expelled from the SKP by a Central Committee vote. Because of insufficient time, the members were not informed of the content of the amendments within the set time limits.

The SKP bylaws state that amendments to them can be made by a representative assembly, if the members have been informed on the amendment proposal three months prior to the assembly.

The Central Committee did announce in good time that amendments to the bylaws were going to be on the agenda, but the contents of the amendment proposals were revealed only two months prior to the assembly. Because of this procedural error, all courts decided that it was inappropriate to take up the revision of the bylaws in the assembly.

Nevertheless, the SKP bylaws were amended by the assembly in such a way that the following autumn the Central Committee was able to expel from the party eight minority districts, i.e. the districts of Turku, Tampere, Lahti, Kuopio, Joensuu, Uusimaa, Kymenlaakso and South Karelia.

After being expelled, the minority members took the matter to court. They demanded that the decisions made by the Central Committee in the autumn of 1984 and the amendments approved by the extraordinary representative assembly in 1985 be revoked.

According to the minority group, the Central Committee decision to establish new districts for the traditionally minority-controlled areas just before the representative assembly was illegal because it violated the old districts' rights.

In the fall of 1984 the SKP Central Committee had just accepted into the party the district organization of Uusimaa as well as those of Finland Proper, South Hame, South-East Finland, Pirkanmaa, North Karelia and North Savo.

Both the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court took the stand that the new member organizations were not in violation of the uniformity of the districts. According to the courts, the party by-laws cannot be interpreted to mean that one organization in a given district has the right over the others to choose the representatives for party meetings.

The Supreme Court held that the decrease of the minority vote did not violate any party member's individual rights nor equality based on voting rights.

The minority faction also brought into litigation the matter of the Central Committee decision in the autumn of 1984 on the reissuing of the party cards. The new procedure was intended as only a temporary measure and was to be discontinued once the recalcitrant Taistoites would have yielded to the command of the party leadership.

The Supreme Court interpreted this matter differently from the Court of Appeals. As the bylaws state that each member of a party division must have a party card issued by the Central Committee, the Supreme Court held that it is inappropriate to impose any further conditions [on acquiring it].

According to the Court of Appeals, the wording of the bylaws indicated that the Central Committee had the right to validate the party cards and that [additional] conditions could therefore not be considered illegitimate.

The SKP patched up the procedural error last summer in the 21st representative assembly. This time, information on the proposed amendments to the bylaws had been sent out in good time. The meeting ratified again the amendments made in 1985.

Afterwards, the minority members brought a new law suit on the majority. They maintained that also the 21st representative assembly was illegal, because the amendments to the bylaws and the expulsion had already been earlier declared by court to be illegal.

Despite the Supreme Court's ruling on the decisions made by the 21st representative assembly, the case is still before the Helsinki Municipal Court. It was heard for the first time early in the spring and will be taken up again in August.

#### Leaders View Court Decision

36170090 Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish  
5 Jul 88 p 10 txt

[Text] Both parties in the SKP controversy indicated that they found support for their own viewpoints in the July 5 Supreme Court decision on the legality of the expulsion of the minority districts.

SKP chief Jarmo Wahlstrom drew special attention to the Supreme Court's view that the party had given equal treatment to its members. Therefore, also the 21st representative assembly held last summer was legally convoked, said Wahlstrom.

He agreed with the Supreme Court decision that the amendments made to the by-laws in the 1985 representative assembly were invalid. "But this was corrected last year according to the party's old bylaws," Wahlstrom added.

According to him, the Supreme Court decision puts no obligations on the SKP. "Everything was done quite democratically and equitably, only unfortunately one procedural error was committed," said Wahlstrom.

Yrjo Hakanen, deputy chairman of the SKP-Unity, thinks otherwise. In his opinion, the Supreme Court decision implies that "even the 21st representative assembly did not comply with the party's bylaws."

Hakanen said he hopes the the SKP leadership will admit that the dissolution was illegal and take measures to reunify the party. "If the SKP sincerely wishes to break away from Stalinism, it could start by admitting that the breakup was achieved illegally," said Hakanen.

Wahlstrom had stated on Sunday, in the party's 70th anniversary celebration in Tampere, that the SKP must come to terms with its own Stalinist past. According to Hakanen, the minority districts were expelled by using Stalinist measures.

The SKP-Unity last week proposed that the upcoming SKP representative assembly would be regarded as a unifying assembly, i.e. the districts that were expelled three years ago would be invited to attend. The expelled districts would also like to establish shared committees in order "to create conditions for a unifying assembly."

Hakanen said he wishes that the SKP Central Committee would express its views on the new situation. "The party should admit to the illegality of the expulsion and grant all members equal rights." The Central Committee will convene in August.

Wahlstrom is not warming up to the SKP-Unity proposals. "I see no Stalinist past in this matter. All members have been treated equally." According to him, there is no reason for a unifying representative assembly, nor to establish shared committees.

#### Papers on Parties' Problems

36170090 Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish  
5 Jul 88 p 10

[Editorial roundup]

[Excerpts] The evening papers take a doubtful view of the revival efforts of the Finnish Communist Party and chairman Jarmo Wahlstrom's announcement that the SKP wants to remain a party of "unappeasable class struggle."

Independent evening paper ILTA-SANOMAT viewed the SKP 70th anniversary celebration as indicating minor signs of merriment but thinks that the post-celebration period will bring very little reason to be merry.

"The movement is split. Both the SKP and its umbrella organization SKDL elected new leaders, but the new leadership has had no chance to show its capabilities yet."

"It appears that nothing much has been done about reviving the confrontation-ridden Communist movement beyond the throwing about of slogans. Whereas the Soviet Communist Party is undergoing a spring cleaning of astonishing intensity, the Finnish communists are no further than having a veteran, Aarne Saarinen, admit cautiously that it was the Soviet Union that started the Winter War."

"During the financial foul-ups in the spring, Saarinen admitted that the SKP used to be financially dependent on the CPSU; but how long will the SKP linger with the rest of its laundry? When will it dare to evaluate honestly its own relationship with the Stalinist past?"

"As long as the party keeps covering up its shadier side, real class struggle is out of reach. If anything, it's the party's foes that now may revel in sadistic pleasure."

Another independent evening paper, ILTALEHTI, addresses Wahlstrom, claiming that the SKP fails to convince anyone at all and that it is imitating the CPSU.

"As soon as the Soviets began to investigate the Stalin era crimes, lo and behold: the SKP comes up with a proposal that our own Stalinists be subjected to investigation of their crimes. And as soon as the comrades in the Soviet Union admit to having started the Winter War, our home-bred communists, too, gather enough gumption to admit this fact. Why don't you take on the parrot as the party symbol?"

13421

## FRANCE

### Poll Shows Disappointment About Failed 'Overture'

35190086 Paris LE FIGARO-MAGAZINE in French  
2 Jul 88 pp 78-79

[Article by Charles Rebois]

[Text] The June thermometer took the temperature of public opinion after the presidential election, while that of July provided readings following the legislative contest. The results of the two surveys reveal a reversal of the trend between the two ballots.

In May, Francois Mitterrand's reelection by a large majority and the theme of unity developed during his campaign created a climate favorable to the socialists. The ratings of all leftist officials were up, along with those of officials on the right classified as moderates (Giscard, +15; Barre, +3).

The disappointment following the failed "overture"—a failure, at least, in the manner imagined by the French—and leading to the results of 5 and 12 June in turn brought about a near general decline in the ratings of socialist leaders, while Raymond Barre and Valery Giscard d'Estaing continue to rise in the polls.

The recentering therefore corresponds to an underlying aspiration of the French, but their hope of seeing it materialize has been thwarted.

And yet, they do not blame Mitterrand. In fact, the president's rating remains the highest ever. Some 63 percent of the French people have confidence in him, but that confidence is placed in a president who confines himself to his own domain: foreign policy and defense. The reformist image he assumed in 1981 is less well-received.

Michel Rocard has lost 5 points, for the failure of the "overture" is attributed to the prime minister. However, the poll was conducted before the surprise announcement of the agreement on New Caledonia, most of the credit for which goes to the head of the government. Many properly consider the agreement as the result of a consensual policy.

Rocard is a singular case in the polls. Whenever he has exercised little or no power, he has always been the star. As prime minister, will he preserve the advantage? His discreet method of approaching problems and his often hermetic rhetoric do not help him in the media. However, with 61 points, he has a reserve that allows him to neglect that contingency for a time.

The favor resulting from a brilliant election like that of Francois Mitterrand extends to the winner's party, but it is as precarious as it is quickly acquired. Elected officials on the left, carried along by the presidential wave in early June, are enduring the effects of a backlash. They are all going down in the ratings, with the exception of Laurent Fabius. Public opinion is always quick to take the side of the victims. It did not like the battle between the two former socialist prime ministers for the leadership of the Socialist Party and now hails the loser even before the presidency of the National Assembly has become his reward.

Jack Lang (-6), Pierre Beregovoy (-6), Lionel Jospin (-7), Pierre Mauroy (-6) and Jean-Pierre Chevenement (-7) have suffered a major drop in the ratings, for which there are several reasons. Charles Hernu has condemned the clan war in the Socialist Party. Such internal quarrels may have influenced the judgment of the French. Other

reasons more in keeping with human behavior may also be advanced, but the fact remains that one is witnessing a return of the pendulum after ephemeral infatuations.


A reclassification is occurring on the right. While the stars of Raymond Barre and Valery Giscard d'Estaing are shining again—they have gone up 6 and 17 points respectively in the past 2 months—those of Francois Leotard (-6), Charles Pasqua (-4) and Jacques Toubon (-5) are growing dim. These gains and losses correspond to a redistribution of roles on the political scene. The stability of Edouard Balladur's rating stands out in contrast.

Finally, there has been a reversal of trends on the two ends of the political scale. Jean-Marie Le Pen, who enjoyed 18 percent after the presidential election,

dropped down to 14 percent after the legislative contest. Inversely, Georges Marchais has gone back up to 16 percent (+2).

But this photograph of public opinion remains blurry. While things may have moved in politics, it still has not been demonstrated that they are frozen.

Technical data for the poll were provided by SOFRES [French Opinion Polling Company]. The poll was conducted for LE FIGARO-MAGAZINE from 18 to 23 June 1988. It is based on a national sampling of 1,000 persons, representing the entire French population 18 years of age and older, and incorporates quotas (sex, age, profession of PCS head of household) and stratification by region and category of urban area.



**Mitterrand: 63 Percent Have  
Confidence in Him.**

☐ **Question:** Are you completely confident, rather confident, not very confident or not at all confident that Francois Mitterrand will solve the problems now facing France?

|                      | July<br>1987   | Compared<br>with June<br>1988 |
|----------------------|----------------|-------------------------------|
| Completely confident | 20             | - 3                           |
| Rather confident     | 43 } <b>63</b> | + 3 } -                       |
| Not very confident   | 19             | -                             |
| Not at all confident | 14 } <b>33</b> | - 2 } - 2                     |
| No opinion           | 4              | + 2                           |
|                      | 100 %          | 100 %                         |



Rocard: 61 Percent Have

Confidence in Him.

☐ **Question** Are you completely confident, rather confident, not very confident or not at all confident that Francois Mitterrand will solve the problems now facing France?

|                      | July<br>1988 | Compared<br>with June<br>1988 |
|----------------------|--------------|-------------------------------|
| Completely confident | 18           | - 8                           |
| Rather confident     | 43           | + 3                           |
| Not very confident   | 14           | - 1                           |
| Not at all confident | 14           | + 3                           |
| No opinion           | 11           | + 3                           |
|                      | 100 %        | 100 %                         |

Political Personalities of the Right

Question: For each of the following personalities, would you indicate whether you wish to see him play an important role over the months and years ahead?

|                                                                                                           | July<br>1988 | Compared<br>with June<br>1988 |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------|-------------------------------|
| Simone<br>Veil                                                                                            | <b>54</b>    | —                             |
|  Raymond<br>Barre        | <b>53</b>    | + 3                           |
|  V. Giscard<br>d'Estaing | <b>46</b>    | + 2                           |
|  Jacques<br>Chirac       | <b>37</b>    | — 2                           |
|  François<br>Léotard    | <b>37</b>    | — 6                           |
|  J. Chaban-<br>Delmas  | <b>31</b>    | — 2                           |
| Edouard<br>Balladur                                                                                       | <b>30</b>    | —                             |
|  Charles<br>Pasqua     | <b>29</b>    | — 4                           |
|  Philippe<br>Séguin    | <b>29</b>    | — 3                           |
|  Jacques<br>Toubon     | <b>20</b>    | — 5                           |
|  Jean-Marie<br>Le Pen  | <b>14</b>    | — 4                           |

Political Personalities of the Left

Question: For each of the following personalities, would you indicate whether you wish to see him play an important role over the months and years ahead?

|                                                                                                             | November<br>1987 | Compared<br>with June<br>1988 |
|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------|-------------------------------|
|  Michel Rocard             | <b>65</b>        | - 5                           |
|  Jack Lang                 | <b>52</b>        | - 6                           |
|  Jacques Delors            | <b>46</b>        | - 10                          |
|  Laurent Fabius            | <b>46</b>        | + 1                           |
|  Pierre Bérégovoy        | <b>41</b>        | - 6                           |
|  Lionel Jospin           | <b>41</b>        | - 7                           |
|  Pierre Mauroy           | <b>38</b>        | - 6                           |
|  Jean-Pierre Chevènement | <b>29</b>        | - 7                           |
|  Georges Marchais        | <b>16</b>        | + 2                           |

Rating of Political Parties

|              | P.C. | P.S. | U.D.F. | R.P.R. | Fr. Nat. |
|--------------|------|------|--------|--------|----------|
| Good opinion | 24   | 62   | 44     | 37     | 12       |
| Bad opinion  | 62   | 28   | 41     | 50     | 79       |

79

## NORWAY

### Conservative Newspaper Assesses Labor Government Cabinet Changes

36390078 Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian  
14 Jun 88 p 2

[Editorial: "More of the Same"]

[Text] It sometimes happens that attempts to solve a problem reveal what the problem is. Gro Harlem Brundtland's cabinet shakeup appears to be such a case. Last week's catastrophe in the Storting had at least one good aspect: it gave her a chance to revitalize and strengthen her crew, to bring in more professionalism and greater political insight. As far as we can see, she has not seized the opportunity. Some of the changes that were made seem incomprehensible. And some that were *not* made seem even odder. Why not [Hallvard] Bakke, what about [Anne-Lise] Bakken?

The government was formed in 1986 on a peculiar foundation: there should be an equal number of men and women in it. Peculiar because that sort of restrictive rule for apportionment reduces the prime minister's opportunity to choose the best candidate for each post. Some of the changes occurring now bear testimony to how disadvantageous the rule was then. Still, it is being respected.

In recent days, the prime minister has talked a lot about the wear and tear on a cabinet minister in a minority government. As experience shows, however, such governments need cabinet ministers who have especially good contact with the Storting. Nevertheless, the government is now getting several new members who have less parliamentary experience than those they succeed. To put it more bluntly, the new arrivals have *no* parliamentary experience.

Other changes must reflect the misuse of resources. Jan Balsted of the Norwegian Labor Federation has a good head on his shoulders and plenty of common sense. But his experience is first and foremost domestic. Notwithstanding, he is named cabinet minister for foreign trade (succeeding Kurt Mosbakk, who had done an outstanding job).

Yet the most difficult to explain is the transfer of Kirsti Kolle Grondahl from the Ministry of Church and Education to the Ministry of Developmental Aid. Her experience in economics and foreign affairs is meager, to put it discreetly. And her contribution as cabinet minister up until now does not particularly explain why she should be given another ministry.

As expected, both Kjell Borgen and William Engseth will be kept in the government: both are excellent workers. But neither does *their* exchange of ministries bear witness to any sort of constructive rethinking on the prime

minister's part. She herself says the change would not have occurred if Borgen had not suffered a defeat in the airport affair. Here the government is being enfeebled, not strengthened.

For the time being, there is little to say about the new cabinet ministers in the Ministry of Church and Education and the Ministry of Consumer Affairs and Administration, respectively. Both will now try their hand at a political level above and beyond where they have operated so far. It may go well, all the same. But nothing in their background indicates that it is precisely they the government has been waiting for in order to be able to revitalize itself.

This is the crew that will guide the Labor government toward the elections of 1989. To what degree the government will succeed depends especially on how the prime minister exercises her political leadership. The impression that it can fail in crucial situations should not be allowed to take a firm hold in people's minds. The prime minister cannot tolerate any more "airport affairs" if she is going to stay in power.

12327/12232

### Separate Polls Indicate Labor Party Failing To Attract Youth

36390080a Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian  
18 Jul 88 p 3

[Commentary by Kjell Hanssen: "Yesterday's Party?"; first paragraph is AFTENPOSTEN introduction]

[Text] Norwegian Gallup's recent polls have shown that today the Labor Party can only count on support from 14-15 percent of the younger voters, i.e., those under 30 years of age. Another institute, MMI, has gauged the party's share of first-time voters as low as 12 percent. If this situation continues for any length of time, the Labor Party will cease to be a party of any magnitude.

Through two generations we have grown used to having a socialist and a nonsocialist bloc in some sort of balance. That will become history. The weight will lie definitively on the conservative side.

In politics there is nothing which says that a stream cannot reverse itself twice.

### Prolonged

But the Labor Party's loss among young voters is far more serious than the general drop in popularity which the party has had to endure the last 2 years. In the first place, it is serious because of its scope: the Labor Party now recruits only half the people it needs to even maintain its weak showing—which in itself is historically low—in the current polls. In the second place, it is serious because it is prolonged: the failure to attract young people began in the 1970s, and it encompasses

progressively more voters every year. And the entire time the changeover has been to the opposite side: to the Conservative Party or to conservatives in other ways. Separately, the Conservative Party and the Progress Party are now substantially bigger parties of youth than the Labor Party.

### Two Out of Three

When we know that environment and background influence political attitudes, the upheaval is even more dramatic. At least half of today's youth must have grown up in homes where people voted for the Labor Party. But more than two out of three of those young people have nevertheless chosen other parties for themselves. And nowadays practically no voters from other backgrounds and of their own persuasion are joining the Labor Party.

How has this happened? Why do 80-85 percent of today's youth feel that the Labor Party's policies, programs, and personalities have nothing to do with them? Has Norway changed and grown away from the Labor Party. Or could it be that the Labor Party has changed and grown away from Norway?

### Lost Its Way

The answer may, of course, be yes to both questions. Sooner or later, time runs out on every institution, and not necessarily because it lacks the ability to adjust. Its task may simply have been completed. The Labor Party was formed to be the political arm of the labor movement. If the working class crumbles, what happens to the party?

But it might also be that the party went astray and is losing support because it has lost the qualities which originally gave it appeal. Professor (and former state secretary) Gudmund Hernes thinks this is what has happened to the Labor Party. The party was a socialist party, but has become a social services party. Originally it fought so that society's underprivileged could stand on their own two feet. But now it tries to make welfare cases of us all.

### Everyone Shall Pay

What is clear is that the Labor Party once represented the individual against the Establishment. Today the party represents the Establishment, if anything, against the individual. A party takes an enormous leap when it switches from preventing the exploitation of disadvantaged people to denying strong people the right to work overtime. Or when it abandons the principle that everyone has the right to get an education in favor of the principle that everyone shall pay. Earlier the emphasis lay on developing a public health service, but today the emphasis lies on prohibiting private solutions—even when the public ones fail.

The Labor Party has become a party under siege. It is stuck in old solutions, but even more in the institutional apparatus which has been built around these old solutions.

### Offended

Now people have always said that the elderly complain about the young. But the Labor Party has actually made a practice of being offended by an entire generation. Young people have wanted a freer, more open, less regulated society, but they have been censured by the Labor Party, whether the topic was broadcasting, or what hours you keep your store open, or how many hours a day you work. Young people quite clearly benefit from schools where they encounter challenges. But such attitudes have been angrily condemned by the Labor Party. If a private college-preparatory school is now being planned for Oslo, it is in the face of excommunication from the Labor Party.

### Self-Contained

The Labor Party sees its solutions as an expression of solidarity and fellowship, others' solutions as an expression of egotism and cynicism. Here is where the problem itself lies. The party can hardly hope to conquer young voters until it realizes that it is faced with attitudes which must be taken seriously and with people who revolt not against solidarity but against guardianship, not against fellowship but against all the organized special interests which lay claim to representing fellowship. In order to understand this, the Labor Party must be able to look at itself objectively. That is a troublesome task for any party but especially for one like the Labor Party which has organized itself in such a self-contained way.

12327/08309

### New Conservative Party Youth-Wing Chief Borge Brende Profiled

36390080b Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian  
23 Jul 88 p 9

[Article by Bente Egjar Engesland: "Promises Tough Political Fight"; first paragraph is AFTENPOSTEN introduction]

[Text] So is he, Borge Brende, one of these young people who seize power? The 22-year-young chairman of the Young Conservatives has spoken frequently with reporters ever since he was named, with fanfare, to the leadership post. Does he just hover on a light-blue cloud of victory without seeing what is astir down there in the party establishment on Storting Street? Away with government taxes, said Borge Brende, and departed for Prague. This weekend he will study everyday life in an East European city where people are taxed differently.

Syse and the others get to clean up the "chaos" here at home.

Is he just one of these typical young-men-who-are-going-places? Before the meeting with the quick-witted guy from Trondheim, we wondered. But his dialect gains him instant credibility with this journalist: they are so pleasant, these people from Trondheim. With his background as a summer intern journalist for AFTENPOSTEN and ADRESSE, he also knows how to charm the press.

It has already been written and said about the newly-elected leader of the Young Conservatives that he is a weathervane who likes to have the same opinions others have. He himself thinks that this week's tax uproar and his proposal to eliminate government taxes demonstrates something else. And no one is one-dimensional. "I am a complex person. I am myself. I am Borge Brende—and not some political monster."

#### Audacious

But he is audacious, moaned many established figures in the party, after the front-page story in DAGENS NÆRINGSLIV where Borge Brende unscrupulously "advanced the program committee's conclusions on tax policy," as they say in Conservative Party circles.

"Young Conservatives have long believed that the tax system, with its overscrupulous sense of justice, stifles initiative. And under my leadership we won't have to clear propopsals with the party leaders."

So people in the Conservative Party can take notice that the Young Conservatives will not be the party leaders' wagging tail. Nor will they be the yelping watchdog. But there is no intraparty war over taxes, sighs Brende (resigned). He is pretty well convinced that the Conservative Party will rally round the proposal, but without the increase in value-added tax.

#### Dream About Europe

Nor is it the economy and taxes which preoccupy Brende most. It is European politics he is genuinely and passionately devoted to. "I am a European," he says with great conviction and longing. Just a few minutes after breakfast with AFTENPOSTEN, he and his girlfriend Torild drove to Eastern Europe—to Prague, Budapest, Krakow. He has been to Poland once before. Everyday life and culture fascinate him. But the Iron Curtain is both unnatural and sad.

"A pan-European solidarity," says Borge Brende, "a whole and united Europe is what I dream about. And the first realistic step is for Norway to join the EEC. Because Norway is and remains outside Europe as long as we don't dare to do that. Norway has the duty to participate in bringing about European solidarity. The government says we'll adjust to the EEC's interior market. But why shouldn't we be involved in laying down the terms. It's through a policy of adjustment that self-determination is threatened."

#### Environmental Protection

Borge Brende is giving a speech to coffee-drinking tourists who are amused by the way he emphasizes his points and gesticulates, but he himself does not notice this. "Europe," says Borge Brende, "that's the main thing right now. But I also want to talk about environmental protection."

We will reveal a state secret about Borge: he deserves to be a national shrine, named as he is after the Borgerfjell nature reserve. And his sister Urda is named after Urdanostind. That is the way their parents, enthusiastic mountain climbers, wanted it. Even when he was a little kid, he climbed to the top, the Young Conservatives' chairman did. And how many summers has he not spent on an upland dairy farm? Borge Brende loves the great outdoors, he is a cinephile and voracious reader, and proclaims himself a nonmaterialist.

Faith can move mountains, but can the Young Conservatives acquire credibility as environmentalists when at the same time they serve as the businessman's mouthpiece, or as "industry's errand boy," as their foes on the political left say?

#### Binding

He vigorously denies that. "We certainly do have credibility. The Young Conservatives' environmental manifesto is comprehensive and binding. And we're not just going to talk, but act. If necessary, environmental protection must take precedence over jobs. New jobs can be created, but a mutilated environment can't be repaired. Of what value is conservatism if it doesn't conserve the environment?"

Why is it then that Bellona and other environmental activists lead the fight against pollution?

"All the political parties have been too standoffish. I myself admire Frederic Hauge and Bellona. And the Young Conservatives have supported them—to the annoyance of many in the Conservative Party," he says slyly. "In order for people to have more confidence in politicians, we have to become more active," he says. So don't be surprised if Borge Brende digs up barrels of toxic substances outside an industrial plant.

But despite all this, the chairman of the Young Conservatives has done the "right" things. He was chairman of the Sor-Trondelag Young Conservatives, group secretary in the Storting, personal secretary of Rolf Presthus, and committee member of Aid for Afghanistan. He has begun his studies at the Institute of Business Administration and will complete them sometime after his term in the Young Conservatives.

### **Tough as Nails Toward Progress Party**

Have the Young Conservatives also ingratiated themselves with the Progress Party through their tax proposal?

"No," he says, "the Young Conservatives will be tough as nails toward the Progress Party!"

"We can agree on individual issues, but Hagen-style liberalism is very alien to us. In the Progress Party, they are self-sufficient and have an ideology which can bring out the worst qualities in people. The Young Conservatives say no to governing with the Progress Party."

But, Borge Brende, isn't there a conflict between the Conservative Party's ideal of the individual person as centerpiece and the demand for solidarity?

### **Motivating Power**

"In order to achieve a better society, we have to begin with the individual person. Otherwise the great masses can't be moved. Your creativity and mine are the motivating power behind solidarity. Solidarity isn't something the socialists have a monopoly on. To focus on the individual person doesn't mean saying no to solidarity. I think it's great to take part in voluntary communal work. As leader of the Young Conservatives, I want to be a team player."

Many observers and critics within the Conservative Party believe that the party is undergoing an identity crisis and that the leaders don't dare to choose between middle-party collaboration and the Progress Party.

"The Conservative Party has great potential now. But the party hasn't managed to make a strong enough impression on the public. The Conservative Party has been too irresolute in relation to the Progress Party. We need to define our turf more clearly—that's more important than who we're going to collaborate with."

### **Decline of Schools**

Schools, says Borge Brende, changing the topic. In recent years, schools have become the cause of the country's economic problems, instead of the answer to them. He himself attended the Steiner school in Trondheim, and believes in a diversified curriculum. But the most important thing of all is to improve the prestige of the teaching profession. The Young Conservatives will fight against the decline of the schools, says Borge Brende. Behind the slogans and the posters stands a reflective fellow—and one who is ever so ambitious and enterprising.

### **Divided Nonsocialist Opposition Unable To Threaten Brundtland**

36500147 Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET  
in Swedish 17 Jul 88 p 5

[Commentary by Morten Fyhn: "Despite Conservative Gains, Difficult To Shift Brundtland"]

[Text] "Never has such a weak government been so secure!" This was written recently by a conservative commentator and his opinion is shared by many.

Prime Minister Gro Harlem Brundtland's minority government has serious problems and the Labor Party's figures in the opinion polls are catastrophically poor. At the same time, however, the nonsocialist parties are still strongly divided, and hardly anyone in Norway today believes in a government change before the parliamentary elections in 1989.

"Gro Harlem Brundtland is doomed to sit there with her minority government, and so far the Labor Party leader has adopted a political course which indicates that she is putting governing power above the party's policies," says another commentary.

If you are to believe the opinion polls—and now the politicians seem to do so since the trend is fairly clear-cut in the many different polls that will be published next week—Norwegian politics are in an almost revolutionary state of upheaval. If the last months' trend continues, the election in September of next year will lead to the most sweeping changes in the power relationship between the parties in over 50 years.

### **Ultra-Conservative Gain**

Most sensational is the fact that Carl I. Hagen's Progressive Party, which shocked the other parties in local elections last fall by getting 12.2 percent of the votes, is continuing to gain. In the latest poll by Norwegian Gallup, the Progressive Party became the second largest party in Norway with a support of 24.1 percent. The possibility that the party actually is the largest is contained in the statistical error margins.

In the same poll the Labor Party sank to an all-time low of only 27.4 percent, while the Conservative Party got 20.3 percent. During the parliamentary elections in 1985, the Progressive Party received only 3.7 percent, while the Labor Party got more than 40 and the Conservatives more than 30 percent.

These figures demonstrate in no uncertain terms that Norwegian voters are in a strong state of flux. Even if the Progressive Party were to get "only" 10-15 percent next year, the new parliament would have a fairly different configuration from today. The nonsocialist majority will be even greater than today, while at the same time it will

probably be impossible to achieve a nonsocialist majority government and perhaps equally impossible to achieve a nonsocialist minority government.

#### Danish Situation

It might happen that none of the parties will voluntarily accept the governing power and that the government that is finally formed will be weak and ineffective. A "Danish" situation may arise, but without the possibility of dissolving the parliament and calling for new elections, since this is not provided for in the constitution.

When Gro Harlem Brundtland formed her female-dominated government over 2 years ago after having defeated the nonsocialist three-party government under the leadership of Kare Willoch, she was optimistic. The Conservative Party, the Center Party and the Christian Liberal Party were bankrupt. Since then it has not been possible to rebuild a nonsocialist government alternative. On the contrary, the three former government partners have become more and more divided, not least because the parties in the middle, and especially the Center Party, have frequently cooperated with the government and contributed to giving its proposals a majority in the parliament.

It is no secret that strong forces within the Center Party want to move it further away from the Conservatives, at the same time as there is a feeling that greater power can be achieved by acting as a kind of unofficial support for the Labor Party. Gro Harlem Brundtland does not object to dividing the nonsocialists, and she has indicated fairly openly a closer government cooperation with both the Center Party and the Christian Liberal Party. The proposal has been rejected formally, but the government's problems remain. It needs the support of more than the Socialist Left Party in order to pass its resolutions, and a Labor government will need even more help from the nonsocialists after the next election.

#### Leftwing Criticism

The government's policy of compromise with the center has led to sharp criticism from the Federation of Trade Unions [LO] and the left wing in Norwegian politics. It is ironic that the Socialist Left Party has not managed to turn this to its own advantage. The party is fairly anonymous and will hardly be able to increase its voter support by more than a couple of percentage points over the 5.5 percent it received in 1985.

The Center Party's support of the government has led to sharp criticism from the Conservative Party and it has not strengthened their chances for cooperation. For its part, the Center Party maintains that the Conservative Party has pulled even more to the right in an effort to halt the success of the Progressive Party. None of the parties in the middle want to cooperate with the Progressive Party, while the Conservatives' attitude is that it is

not possible to isolate Carl I. Hagen. It was this that led to the fall of the Willoch government. In this aspect as well, Norwegian politics are similar to the Danish.

A noticeable feature of Norwegian politics, to which pollsters pay sharp attention, is the fact that the conservative trend is still very strong. It carried the Conservative Party to power in 1981 and is now continuing with the Progressive Party. At the same time, however, the Conservative Party is so strong that the two parties together get 45 percent of the votes in the opinion polls. There are those who believe that these two could achieve majority in the parliament after 1989. It is probable, however, that they will also need the votes of the Christian Liberal Party, which currently does not want to enter into such a government constellation.

Experts explain the decline of the Labor Party by referring to the prime minister's personal style of leadership and her very strong international commitment, especially to environmental questions. Her leadership is reminiscent of Olof Palme's: academic, strongly interested in international politics, respected and feared rather than revered within her own party.

Others explain the government's problems by saying that it carries the burden of a tight fiscal policy. On her part, Gro Harlem Brundtland seems to console herself with the thought that, as soon as the fiscal policy gives noticeable and positive results, the voters will return.

But the tight fiscal policy seems to be leading to increased unemployment and the increase in prices is currently at over 7 percent. This does not favor a Labor government in an election.

The government has also shown itself to contain several weak members. Several ministers were exchanged before the summer, but the changes were even criticized by LO for not being sweeping enough.

While the Labor government is in an uphill battle and the three nonsocialist, former government parties are fighting among themselves, the Progressive Party keeps gaining in the polls.

A broad debate has begun about how to explain the party's success, but nobody knows for sure. The Progressive Party has simple messages: it wants to help the old and infirm, strengthen police and defense; it wants to end unnecessary government support, privatize as much as possible in the belief that market solutions are the best solutions; the support for daycare is to be removed as well as agriculture support. In short, the party wants people to take care of themselves—only the really weak will receive help.

One of the party leaders in Oslo created a stir this summer by talking about his cultural views. In short they consist of the notion that if the market does not want it, it is worthless. If people really want to go to the theater,

they will be happy to pay 2,000 kroner for a ticket. Culture that does not sell does not have a right to live. Popularity means high quality, according to Peter N. Myhre, the vice chairman in Oslo. Myhre wants to sell the theaters, the movie houses and the concert halls to private interests.

More and more people feel that the Progressive Party is making use of many of the Norwegians' prejudices against immigrants, that it has casual solutions for complicated problems that satisfy the needs of many. The party is benefiting from the voters' weariness of the other parties' infighting. First and foremost, however, the Progressive Party has a vote-getter in its charismatic leader, Carl I. Hagen. He is perhaps the only Norwegian politician who is familiar with and knows how to make use of the advantages of television.

12339

## PORTUGAL

### **Macao Issue Seen Affecting Soares' Reputation, Standing**

35420112a Lisbon *TEMPO* in Portuguese  
2 Jul 88 p 3-R

[Article by Vicente Jorge Silva]

[Text]It is still early to predict the effect that the Macao issue will have on the Portuguese political scene, its corrosive impact on the image that Mario Soares has built up as president of the Republic—attaining an unprecedented popularity rating over the last 14 years of our democratic experience—or even the extent to which this issue is capable of altering institutional (and personal) relationships between the prime minister and the chief of state. The most obvious thing to expect—except in the event of some unpredictable and uncontrollable occurrence that might take place along the way—is that for now the going will continue to be quite smooth, with both men pretending to have a distant and conciliatory posture, and that the president of the Republic will not suffer a worrisome fall in his popularity and credibility in public opinion.

After all, Macao is very far away, its affairs do not have an impact on the everyday life of the Portuguese people—and, in the end, Mario Soares' inability to dominate real political life is not, in itself, anything new in this country, which has kept him at the head of the government. The Portuguese people have become accustomed to looking upon his weakness with familiar understanding, in exchange for the warm affection and contagious optimism with which the president performs his job—a role that, I'd say, has always been waiting for an actor so perfectly cast for it. Moreover, comparing this one with Eanes' tormented presidency has probably been one of the subconscious reasons for the success and widespread sympathy that his successor has gained.

It so happens, however, that things are not flowing along as calmly as appearances might indicate, and, beneath the smooth surface of the water, an undisguised malaise and silent tension are already forming the future blow-ups of aggressiveness. For the first time since he was elected president, Soares clearly appears to be ill at ease, and we are beginning to see—though still just the outlines—some of the typical reactions of an injured ego of the type we know so well from the past and that display the most oblique side of his personality. The oriental mess has shoved the president into a "race to the front," hounded by the habitual specters and the talk of conspiracy that Soares and some of his friends have found appropriate to explain the "unfortunate disclosures" in the press.

The problem is that, in this poisoned "dossier," the extraordinary blitheness and duplicity in their behavior—particularly that of the governor of Macao, Carlos Melancia—surpass everything that could be permitted under the rules for running a democratic state. It is impossible to accept this role confusion in the exercise of public functions and involvement in private affairs, especially when evidence are accumulating about the partiality and lack of transparency in the conduct of operations that should be placed above all suspicion. The use of political power to foster interests and to peddle influence is an untenable perversion that puts in question the state's impartiality. Now, the network of relationships established around the Emaudio company involves, directly and at various levels, the political responsibilities of the president of the Republic. But the fact that Mario Soares may eventually become a hostage of the consequences of this "affaire" is also of extreme gravity for the balance of powers and institutional relationships inside Portugal.

Cavaco Silva did not naively allow the PSD Congress to call for a parliamentary investigation on the Macao question, an initiative that he knew to be politically inconsequential (since the Assembly of the Republic has no jurisdiction in this area). But the prime minister was even less naive when he later let it be known that he gave instructions to freeze this process. As it was obvious that he could not run the risk of exposing himself to a new defeat on unconstitutionality, Cavaco attempted, essentially, to issue a warning to Soares—warning him that the president's "counterpower" was being watched by the executive branch and that, in some fashion, he had lost the attributes of "untouchability." More: By making a peace gesture after a sign of intimidation, Cavaco probably wanted to push Soares into an area of quicksand, where the president would feel exposed to a position of institutional vulnerability—as well as one of weakness in the face of the designs of his prime minister.

After the Constitutional Court, the unions, the professional associations and the parliamentary opposition, will the president of the Republic be able to make the government's stumbling blocks appear to be a plausible excuse or scapegoat? Certainly Soares has avoided taking

a confrontational or hostile stance toward the executive's initiatives, but, even so, the president dropped his questions about the constitutionality of some of the more controversial bills. Now, knowing Cavaco Silva's "modus operandi"—and his difficulty in recognizing certain rules for the operation of democratic institutions—the possibility of a more active intervention by the president could supply the pretext for a confrontation between the two branches. Here we must read the political significance of having frozen the proposal to carry out an investigation on the Macao question.

In the meanwhile, the paralysis of the institution of the president following the impact of the Oriental scandals, arises as the counterpoint of the increasing embarrassments, impotency, and lack of congruity in the government. As the tendency to play it by ear, and pure and simple improvisation, was being institutionalized—fiscal reform is an example of this—or when in certain areas we are able to observe total political inability—as occurs with the breakup of the Investigative Committee—the tentacles of party interest groups are being extended throughout a network of public enterprises, in an eloquent illustration of "Mexicanization" and the desire to privatize is becoming progressively more platonic. The minister of labor was left alone following the failure of the labor package; the agrarian strategy adds up to a return to the old order; the minister of health is a kind of psychiatrist's couch for Leonor Beleza's mental conditions (while the inquiry on the Costa Freire case seems to be finally buried); and Cadilhe encountered a providential reconciliation for the folly of the OPV's, proceeding to a virtuous burial of the Exchange; etc.

Is Soares Cavaco's prisoner? Is Cavaco the prisoner of a power that has surpassed him? Are both caught in a web being spun by the empire of interest groups? In the end, will Portugal be able to stop?

13331

## SWEDEN

### Poll Finds 63 Percent of Voters Expect SPD Election Victory

**'Resignation' Felt by Nonsocialists**  
36500144 Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET  
in Swedish 16 Jul 88 p 8

[Article by Margit Silberstein]

[Text] Arms deals and Ebbe Carlsson notwithstanding, a majority of voters believe that the Social Democrats will win the election. Even most nonsocialist voters think there will be a Social Democratic election victory.

"Do you believe that there will be a nonsocialist government or a socialist government following the election in September?" SIFO [Swedish Institute for Public Opinion Polls] asked that question of 944 voters by telephone

between 18 and 22 June. Of those polled, 63 percent answered that they believed the Social Democrats would still be in power after 18 September. When SIFO asked the same question before the 1985 election, not even half the respondents felt that the Social Democrats would be the winners in that election.

### Nonsocialist Resignation

Of those reached in SIFO's telephone poll, 24 percent expect a nonsocialist victory in 1988. In June 1985, there were 36 percent who thought that Sweden would be governed by the nonsocialists following that election. There are fewer undecided voters (13 percent) than there were in the poll conducted before the last election.

Among nonsocialist voters, a degree of resignation can be detected. Only 40 percent of nonsocialist voters—who of course want a nonsocialist government—have any hope that their parties will win over the Social Democrats. Before the 1985 election, 58 percent of nonsocialists believed that their political spokesmen would govern the country after that election. And only 26 percent believed that their political opponents would occupy the Government Office after that election. Now, 48 percent of those who vote nonsocialist think there will be a Social Democratic majority in 1988. Salaried workers (68 percent) believe more strongly than hourly workers (66 percent) that there will be a Social Democratic government. And 66 percent of private-sector employees expect a Social Democratic victory. About as many public-sector employees feel the same way. It is among the employers themselves that the nonsocialists find the greatest encouragement. In that group, 49 percent think there will be a nonsocialist election victory, while 39 percent believe the Social Democrats will form the government in the fall of 1988.

"Do you believe that there will be a nonsocialist government or a socialist government following the election in September?"

|                         | All Voters |           | Nonsocialists |           |
|-------------------------|------------|-----------|---------------|-----------|
|                         | June 1988  | June 1985 | June 1988     | June 1985 |
| Social Democratic       | 63%        | 46%       | 48%           | 26%       |
| Nonsocialist government | 24%        | 36%       | 40%           | 58%       |
| Unsure or don't know    | 13%        | 18%       | 12%           | 16%       |

Even among those with nonsocialist sympathies asked, there are more who believe in a social democratic victory than a nonsocialist one.

### Following Leijon's Departure

Among young people between the ages of 16 and 29, 63 percent believe that Sweden will have a Social Democratic government. Half as many young people foresee a nonsocialist government.

When SIFO conducted this poll, the Ebbe Carlsson affair had been steady fare on the front pages of the newspapers for about 3 weeks. Former Minister of Justice Anna-Greta Leijon had resigned. She had been filmed by TV and photographed by press photographers while tearfully receiving homage and sympathy from fellow party members at a meeting somewhere in the country. And Prime Minister Ingvar Carlsson had emphasized that his former minister of justice had used unconventional methods for noble reasons—that is, she wanted to apprehend Olof Palme's assassin.

Also during that time, the nonsocialist party leaders were in a furious rage over the fact that Prime Minister Ingvar Carlsson had intimated that nonsocialists were less eager than Social Democrats to clear up Olof Palme's assassination. The quarrel over a review of the government by the Standing Committee on the Constitution before or after the election was also underway.

### **Carlsson's Election Strategy, Themes**

36500144 Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish  
22 Jul 88 p 2

[Editorial: "Ingvar Carlsson's Campaign Thread"]

[Text] In his election year speeches in Visby, Olof Palme spun the thread that was to carry the party through the election campaign, recalled Ingvar Carlsson as he found himself in a similar situation for the first time. How strong is Carlsson's thread? What was it spun with?

The warp includes a little bit of Ebbe Carlsson. The skein proved to be too difficult and long for the Social Democrats to disentangle themselves from it before the election campaign. The party chairman has realized that, and he brought up the subject himself.

Ingvar Carlsson's main thesis is, however, that "Ebbe Carlsson's private investigations," as he described them, are purely a matter for judicial inquiry and not something that actually concerns politics. His thesis does not hold up.

What is special about Ebbe Carlsson is precisely the authorization and support he received from top echelons in the government—ranging from individual members of the Security Police [SAPO], the SAPO investigator, and ambassadors to the National Police commissioner and the minister of justice. The secret wiretapping equipment for illegal activity was smuggled in in an automobile leased by the National Police Board and driven by a bodyguard appointed by SAPO's top command. The minister of justice knew where Ebbe Carlsson was getting his money and became frenetically involved in his personal notions and ideas about conspiracy instead of referring them to the people in charge of the preliminary investigation for objective consideration, played a personal role in getting him assignments related to the preliminary investigation, and guaranteed his character

so strongly to foreign authorities that he even received her authorization—*carte blanche*—to answer all questions concerning the assassination investigation.

Added to that is the fact—sufficiently serious in itself in a democracy—that there were important stages where the minister of justice did not tell the truth about essential matters. When asked by the prosecutors, she disavowed the accreditation of Ebbe Carlsson which her letter of recommendation confirmed. In response to a question by the Liberal Party leader, she said she knew nothing about the financing, even though in fact she had known about it at a very early stage. Confidence that those in power are telling the truth (even though the whole truth cannot always be revealed immediately to everyone) is perhaps democracy's foremost and most fragile asset. This is true both in relations with the voters and in relations between the parties.

Despite everything, this probably could have been left out of the active debate if the minister of justice's resignation had been accompanied by a full acknowledgment of responsibility and wrongdoing by the prime minister. But that is not what has happened. On the contrary, Leijon has been described in the election campaign as the SDP's chief representative in legal matters and promised an important ministerial post in a Carlsson government following the election. The voters are thereby being asked to legitimize Anna-Greta Leijon's way of running her ministry in the Ebbe Carlsson affair. That makes her conduct a campaign issue.

Ingvar Carlsson's campaign thread contains one strong and well-proven element, and that is the opposition's disunity and its inability to govern in the unanimous and responsible manner required for dealing with the Swedish economy. When the SDP's chairman describes in detail how the "stage will be set for squabbling, lengthy discussions, and paralysis instead of action" if there is a nonsocialist government, his words are credible. The nonsocialists can refute his thesis only by coming back and giving tactical proof of their ability to govern successfully.

They can certainly point out that the Social Democrats themselves are divided over taxes and energy, for example, those being issues which Ingvar Carlsson mentioned in particular. But that is not a strong counterargument, because after debate, Social Democrats in Sweden have always managed to unite around one course of action. Ingvar Carlsson is right about that.

But he is facing another problem similar to that of the nonsocialists. The Social Democrats cannot govern alone. They must find support from and seek compromises with others. Where that will lead is something the voters cannot know. Will there be taxes on pensions and similar harmful encroachments with the cooperation of the VPK [Left Party-Communists]? Will money be taken away from the municipalities with the cooperation of the

Liberal Party and/or higher food prices with the cooperation of the Conservative Party? What will a Carlsson government do with a foundation as disunited as that formed by the SDP, the VPK, and the Environment Party?

Ingvar Carlsson attacked the Conservatives vigorously but said nothing about the Liberal and Center Parties. That was no accident. He does not think he can ignore the Liberal and Center Parties; the point is that the Conservatives are a more rewarding opponent in the election campaign. But Ingvar Carlsson also knows that he may need more open channels for cooperation following the election. The government issue is a difficult one even for the SDP.

Although effective in its description of the economic results achieved, Ingvar Carlsson's speech was vague on the subject of the future. In general, he was content to declare that his party would defend the state of law, combat destruction of the environment, take responsibility for the economy, and preserve today's welfare state. The lack of specifics and of analysis is to be offset by the party's influence as such and its half century of bearing responsibility in Sweden. But the question is whether that will carry as much weight and go as far in 1988 as it has in the past.

#### Center Party Stressing Environment

36500144 Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish  
22 Jul 88 p 2

[Commentary by Hans Bergstrom: "The Center Party in the Month of the Seals"]

[Text] Slite—A seal wearing an oxygen mask pops up out of the sea and startles a breathless bird. That masterly drawing by E.W.K. is exhibited on the Center Party's "environment boat," which is currently traveling around the Gotland coast and which received an encouraging visit by the party leader in the port of Slite on Thursday.

The environmental issue is a big one for the Center Party. Olof Johansson included a lengthy and emotional section on the environment in his speech in Almedal that evening. The other party leaders have done the same. The environment is therefore becoming a more vibrant issue in the election campaign than many people expected. Sick and dead seals—what they tell us about the condition of the sea and what they appeal to in people's hearts—have increased the campaign pressure on the parties to reveal completely their views on the environment.

At a press conference here in Slite, the Center Party leader, relaxed and obviously in good form for the election campaign, also made a strong connection between the environmental issue and the government

issue. Olof Johansson maintained that the opposition's credibility in claiming that it will pursue a more ambitious environmental policy than the Social Democrats is crucial to election victory.

He even said that the environmental issue has been the Center Party's primary reason for trying to achieve a new three-party government. His reasoning is that if the government negotiations result in a three-party coalition based on the more fervent environmental concern of the Center Party and probably the Liberal Party as well, that will break up a majority blockade which otherwise might easily be formed along the Social Democratic-Conservative axis in Parliament.

The Center Party leader appeared considerably better disposed toward the Environment Party than his colleagues heading the other nonsocialist parties. That party has done a lot outside Parliament to make the environment a bigger issue in Swedish politics, he says. He suspects that in Parliament, they would encounter the same kind of difficulties as the Center Party in combining pure doctrine with the necessary compromises.

Westerberg and Bildt have practically flat-out rejected the idea of governing with the Environment Party as the swing party. Olof Johansson declines to do that. He says that in a parliamentary democracy, it is wrong to lock oneself into a particular way of handling a hypothetical situation that may be created by the voters. Sweden will still need a government even after this election and even if the election results are not what one would prefer.

On the other hand, Olof Johansson is expressing his and the Center Party's objective, and as the election campaign begins, he is clearer on that point than he has been for a long time. He says he sees clear ideological boundaries between the blocs. They relate chiefly to views on property ownership and freedom of choice (Johansson mentions the fund issue, views on profit sharing, state ownership, nursing care benefits, and family policy). Moreover, he feels that it will be a good thing if the Swedish people react to what has happened in the legal area by changing their government.

The Center Party is seeking a nonsocialist majority in Parliament. If there is one, a three-party government should be formed. Among other things, it has the advantage of being the only majority government anyone seems able to offer. If it is to be capable of action, issues causing conflict must be resolved during the stage of government negotiations. "In today's society, controversial issues cannot be put on hold, as they were in the 1950's."

Olof Johansson also says he feels that it would be a good thing if the three parties reached agreement on the content of the 1989 tax revision even before the election, since there will be so little time after the change of government. Who is stopping them?

**SIFO Poll Sees Ebbe Carlsson Affair Benefiting VPK**

36500157 Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET  
in Swedish 5 Aug 88 pp 1, 8

[Article by Claes-Goran Kjellander: "VPK May Be Aided, Says SIFO"]

[Text] Four percent of the electorate is seriously considering a change of party as a result of the Ebbe Carlsson affair, and a further 10 percent are undecided if their choice of party will be affected.

If the Social Democrats lose voters because of the Ebbe Carlsson affair, these will mainly go to the VPK [Communist Left Party], the Environment Party and the Liberal Party.

This emerges from a SIFO [Swedish Institute for Public Opinion Polling] poll which was discussed in Thursday's [4 August] television news program.

All of 13 percent of those who consider the VPK now to be the best party believe that the affair may have influenced their party choice. The corresponding share

for the Environment Party is 9 percent, for the Social Democrats and the Liberal Party, 5 percent, and for the Center and Conservative Parties, 1 percent.

Also included in these figures are persons who actually have changed party and persons who may do so. A reasonable assumption is that the high proportions for the VPK and Conservatives is that many who consider these as the best parties have already made their party switch. The proportion of influenced voters is clearly greatest in the large cities.

A clear majority of the non-socialist voters reject the idea that Anna-Greta Leijon could return to government. Some 65 percent said no and 21 percent said yes. Among Social Democrats, there is an opposite view: 55 percent said yes, 22 percent said no. In the electorate overall, 35 percent said yes and 41 percent said no.

Compared with corresponding polls in June, this means a very strong drop in support. Then a majority of the electorate, and more than 80 percent of Social Democrats, that she should return as a member of parliament. [as printed] The poll was started last Monday [1 August] and was completed by evening of last Wednesday [3 August]. The poll is based on 727 telephone interviews.

/08309

## FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

### **Terrain-, Mission-Oriented Infantry Doctrine Outlined**

36200198 Bonn TRUPPENPRAXIS in German  
May 88 pp 364-368

[Article by Capt Herbert Seifert: "The Country Needs More Infantry"; first paragraph is TRUPPENPRAXIS introduction]

[Text] The following article whose author is currently attending the Bundeswehr Command School for training as a general staff officer is a plea for improving the structure of the field army with regard to both mission and terrain. Major segments of the article are part of Army Structure 2000 approved in late February which is soon to go into the test phase in some selected units. Though the article was written prior to the completion of planning work on Army Structure 2000, parts of it read like a detailed, knowledgable clarification of that plan. For this reason, we did not wish to keep it from our readers.

The strategic concepts of the Warsaw Pact call for the fastest possible seizure of as many objectives as possible—even at the expense of gaps and exposed flanks. To accomplish this, strong armored and motorized rifle units are concentrated in the main axis of effort in order rapidly to break through the NATO defenses and advance into the depth of the area. In such operations, the concentration of the main forces will take place as far as possible in armor-favorable terrain but populated and wooded areas need not be neglected in view of the capability of motorized infantry units to engage in dismounted combat.

Under these circumstances, the German Army must have the capability to meet a Warsaw Pact attack in all types of terrain. In this context, we need to remind ourselves of the fact that 29.6 percent of the FRG's territory is covered with woods, that 10.4 percent is populated and that 55.2 percent of the soil is given over to farming.<sup>1</sup> What is more, the structure of the terrain is characterized by a great variety of types and covers in a confined area.<sup>2</sup> The terrain of the forward combat zone is undulating and/or hilly for the most part. It is divided up by a large number of wooded areas and small forests and by numerous villages and towns. But there are also large contiguous forest areas, a section of the German Highlands, a number of cities with populations of up to 100,000 and even some major cities and densely populated metropolitan areas. To guarantee the continuity of forward defense, these terrain sectors must also be taken into consideration in the conduct of operations.

Under Army Structure 4, the field army is divided up into 17 armored and 15 armored infantry brigades (in addition to the three airborne brigades and the mountain infantry brigade) all of which are staffed and equipped in

the same manner. Because of their high rate of mechanization, these two types of brigades have great mobility and firepower. As against Army Model 3, however, these armored infantry and armored brigades have fewer infantrymen capable of engaging in dismounted combat.<sup>3</sup>

Given the present composition of divisions, the difference between the two types of divisions is reflected in just four companies. Otherwise, their structure is completely identical. The armored divisions have 20 armored and 16 armored infantry units while the armored infantry brigades consist of 16 armored companies and 20 armored infantry companies. Under the circumstances, the two types of divisions are best able to take advantage of the mobility and firepower of their mechanized units in open, slightly undulating terrain.

### **Impact of Terrain on Conduct of Operations**

The Warsaw Pact's basic operational plans for large areas of the forward combat zone call for full utilization of roads and other access routes because this is the only way in which an attack can be carried out at great speed. The use of these routes, however, presupposes the control of same. The attacker must therefore seize control of the villages through which the routes pass as well as of forest paths and must capture all of the defender's positions in the proximity of such access routes. This slows down the momentum of his attack but otherwise his attempts to bring up additional forces and maintain his logistics, if not the entire conduct of operations in this area would be in jeopardy. As a consequence, the attacker will be unable to avoid contesting both the wooded and the populated areas, if the defender chooses to take advantage of them.

Despite the fact that the Warsaw Pact prefers combat in open terrain its motorized rifle divisions are capable of fighting inside villages and in wooded areas. They have considerable strength of dismounted infantry personnel<sup>4</sup> and the support arms required for dismounted combat. They also have the necessary operational plans and have received the appropriate training.<sup>5</sup>

The intensive inclusion of wooded and populated areas in the conduct of operations presents a number of advantages to the defender. Villages and woods tend to favor camouflage, cover and dispersion. They help control the access routes leading through them or in their immediate proximity as well as the terrain which lies between them. This makes it easier to shift forces quickly and to surprise the attacker continuously. For another thing, wooded and built-up terrain makes it possible to combine and mutually complement mobile and static operational elements.

Larger villages and contiguous forest areas are particularly apt to slow down and even to hinder the advance of mechanized units. In view of the protection they offer, they enable the defender to mount a sustained defense

even if his forces are outnumbered. The use of wooded or built-up terrain by the defender forces the attacker into dismounted combat and substantially slows down the momentum of his attack.

#### **Possibilities and Limitations of Adapting Structure to Mission and Terrain**

*Deficiencies of the Present Structure.* In accordance with the Warsaw Pact's basic operational concepts, the command and mission guidelines as well as the structure of the field army<sup>6</sup> are predicated on the conduct of operations in open terrain. The most important features are great mobility based on a high level of mechanization and repellent firepower based on a large number of heavy, long-range, direct-fire weapons. In conjunction with small, easy-to-lead units, this results in the optimization of forces for a highly mobile conduct of combat operations.

Due to its substantial deficiency in infantry personnel an armored brigade organized in accordance with Army Structure 4 is unable to take anything like full advantage of the opportunities available to the defender in many sectors of terrain in the forward combat zone. Its highly mechanized forces will not be able to engage in combat in and around villages and forests but only in their proximity. In that case, however, positions on the edge of villages and forests will have to be abandoned whenever even a small-scale infiltration of attacking infantry units occurs. At the same time, the momentum of the enemy attack cannot effectively be slowed down by means of sustained defense of highway junctions and forest routes. What is more, because of the limits on observation, impact and mobility<sup>7</sup> even in relatively sparsely wooded or populated areas the brigade's great firepower and striking power cannot nearly be utilized to the full. In many instances the potential of the Leopard 2 battle tank cannot be sufficiently utilized. These deficiencies can neither be offset by committing more combat support units, nor by attaching a static divisional infantry battalion to the brigade.

Armored infantry brigades constituted in accordance with Army Structure 4 are better suited for operations in broken terrain. To be sure, they, too, lack the dismounted infantry units needed to engage in fighting for larger villages and forests. But they are capable of taking at least partial advantage of the obstacle effect of built-up and wooded areas, thus restricting the attacker's freedom of movement considerably and slowing down the momentum of his attack. Through the interaction of its static and mobile elements, armored brigades are also able to take advantage of the firepower and range of their heavy weapons.

Major formations suited for combat in villages and forests are not available to a division. Forty percent of the FRG's territory is favorable for infantry operations and for the most part indispensable for successful

defense. What is more, it is hardly possible not to take advantage of or to exclude populated and wooded areas in forward defense, if it is to be mounted in close proximity to the border.<sup>8</sup>

*Possible Ways of Paying Greater Heed to Mission and Terrain in Organizational Matters.* Since the highly mechanized armored and armored infantry brigades are unable to turn their great mobility and firepower into the desired combat effectiveness in built-up or wooded areas and since they are either unable or have but a limited capability of holding on to or recapturing such terrain due to their lack of infantry strength,<sup>9</sup> there is a need to adapt their structure to the varying requirements of the terrain. The lack of adaptation of the present division and brigade structures to their mission and terrain results in the use of highly mobile armored forces in movement-unfavorable terrain involving short-range observation and combat distances. In such situations, the potential of modern weapons and sophisticated equipment cannot be used to full advantage and the high level of combat effectiveness of these forces cannot be brought to bear to anything like the full extent. As a consequence of the "uniform organizational structure" of Army Structure 4, a part of the brigades assigned to forward defense is not in a position to achieve optimum combat effectiveness.

As a consequence of the great variety and smallness of the different types and covers of terrain in the FRG, the field army brigades must be able to engage in combat under a large variety of terrain conditions. Since the existing organizational structure is primarily oriented toward the conduct of mobile operations mostly in open terrain, a better adaptation to a variety of terrain conditions can be achieved by increasing the number of infantry units capable of engaging in mechanized, dismounted combat. In this way, the armored brigades can be adapted to combat in mixed terrain and the armored infantry brigades for the conduct of operations in more heavily wooded areas and larger villages. In other words, the potential for capitalizing on terrain advantages whatever they may be can be enhanced depending on the mission, be it to delay, to defend or to counterattack. For operations in large, contiguous wooded areas and in large cities and metropolitan areas, there is a need for appropriately structured and equipped mechanized infantry units capable of engaging in all types of combat.

There are two possible ways of achieving this: the number of infantry units at the brigade and/or division level can be augmented through the addition of non-mechanized infantry units or the capability of the existing units to engage in infantry combat can be enhanced by increasing the number of dismounted personnel. The first of these two choices presents the advantage of having units available which have been specifically trained for combat in villages and wooded areas but does nothing to offset the lack of infantry strength in the mechanized battalions and creates units that can only be used in preponderantly static operations. The second

choice enhances the brigades' capability to engage in dismounted combat without diminishing their capability for the conduct of mobile operations.

*Limitations on Paying Heed to Mission and Terrain in Organizational Matters.* Having stated the need for greater adaptation of the organizational structure to the various terrain types and covers based on the geographic checkerboard pattern of the FRG, let us now turn to the limitations on focusing on terrain requirements.

Even in comparatively small areas terrain conditions may change appreciably. Since the brigades and divisions cannot be restructured every time they move from one operational area to another, they must be in a position to engage in combat under differing terrain conditions. Individual types of brigades may well be optimized to specific conditions but must also be at least adequately suited to operations under different terrain conditions. They must be equally capable of conducting delaying, defensive and offensive operations—not simply because the brigade's mission may change in the course of combat operations but because specific missions, e.g., serving as the division reserve, call for the operations in all types of combat and every type of combat may include combat operations of the other types.

This fact rules out brigade structures exclusively adapted to one mission in one specific type of terrain. This applies even more to formations and units; which is another way of saying that the creation of different types of tank, armored infantry and motorized infantry battalions for use in one specific type of terrain is unacceptable.

Military and political considerations may impose additional limitations to structure, e.g., the use of large formations of non-mechanized infantry close to the border would call for setting up positions in peacetime because there would hardly be time carefully to prepare such defenses after the general mobilization order was given. This is why the use of mobilization-dependent infantry units at the forward edge of the battle area must also be ruled out.

In order to avoid limitations on freedom of action, some peculiarities need to be considered with which certain divisions and brigades may be confronted as a result of joint operations with neighboring allied units or of the supervision of the deployment of allied units.

*How a Structure More Oriented Toward Mission and Terrain Should Operate.* A structure more oriented toward terrain requirements than heretofore must pay greater attention to specific conditions obtaining in the operational areas of divisions than is possible under the "uniform organizational structure"<sup>10</sup> of Army Structure 4.

This calls for increasing the dismounted personnel strength of the armored and armored infantry brigades. In retaining the high level of mechanization, this will

greatly expand their operational spectrum and that of the divisions.

On the other hand, the conduct of operations in large, contiguous wooded areas and populated areas calls for the use of specially structured and equipped dismounted infantry units.<sup>11</sup> These can be combined in motorized infantry battalions or regiments at the division or corps level for combat in closed wooded areas or populated areas or may also serve to form motorized infantry brigades in conjunction with other armored infantry units. Equipped with the appropriate transport vehicles<sup>12</sup>, the latter would be particularly well suited for operations in preponderantly wooded areas or in terrain dotted with numerous small villages. In view of their great mobility and dismounted infantry strength, they would be able to capitalize on the advantages which present themselves in this situation to an even greater extent than the armored infantry brigades.

Through the creation of a third, fully mechanized type of brigade and the expansion of the operational potential of existing armored and armored infantry brigades, the divisions can be structured in such a way—even if the uniform, triadic structure is retained—that far greater consideration is given both to their mission and to the terrain.

Particularly those divisions which are employed in the more densely wooded and populated areas as well as in the highlands of the forward defense zone could thus be better structured than heretofore with regard to mission and terrain. The major formations committed to delay and defense missions in the forward area would thus be in a better position to take advantage of the multitude of sectors of terrain favorable to the defender than heretofore. And, if properly structured, the divisions assigned as corps or army group reserve units would then be far better equipped to recapture heavily wooded areas and, perhaps even more so, of larger-size villages without forfeiting their combat effectiveness in preponderantly open terrain.

For combat in large populated areas or wooded areas non-mechanized infantry units specially structured and equipped for combat in wooded and populated areas must supplement the existing armored infantry units. The decision of whether these units are available at the division level or perhaps as motorized infantry regiments at the corps level will depend on the size and number of such terrain sectors in the combat zones concerned and on the possible operational options for this static element in the conduct of operations.

#### **Suggestions for the Future Structure of the German Field Army**

There are a number of ways in which the structure of the German field army can be better adapted to the requirements of its mission and the terrain in which it operates:

—by increasing the dismounted personnel strength of its armored and armored infantry brigades so as to

improve their capability to conduct operations in wooded and populated areas;

- by enhancing the antitank capability of the armored infantry battalions through the creation of an armored antitank component;
- by creating fully mechanized motorized infantry brigades to make it possible to include forests and villages in the mobile conduct of operations;
- by combining the divisions of the three different brigade types in accordance with the requirements of the terrain and their mission;
- by assembling nonmechanized motorized infantry units as part of motorized infantry battalions or regiments at the division or corps level for combat in and for extended wooded areas as well as large cities and metropolitan centers;
- by fixing the number of nonmechanized infantry units at the division and corps level depending on terrain and operational options.

In line with these considerations, the brigades need only be upgraded on the basis of their present structure. But even though the four line battalion per brigade format may be retained, the "uniform organizational structure" pattern should be abandoned and a more differentiated structure of the individual brigades consisting of armored units, armored infantry and motorized infantry should be adopted depending on their mission and the terrain.

At the battalion level, the aim should be to add an antitank component to the armored infantry battalions<sup>13</sup> and an organic armored infantry company to the existing armored units. Like the armored infantry units, the motorized infantry battalions to be created should have an antitank and a high-angle weapon component.<sup>14</sup> The motorized infantry units should be equipped with fully mobile armored personnel carriers.<sup>15</sup> The number of units per battalion need not be increased, however. The structure of the companies should remain unchanged.

#### **Need for Organic Mix of Armor and Armored Infantry Units**

The Warsaw Pact armored and motorized rifle divisions both have a large number of battle tanks and armored personnel carriers and a large number of infantry units capable of dismounted combat.<sup>16</sup> In addition, the motorized rifle regiment's armored battalion is divided up among the motorized rifle battalions. This guarantees close interaction of battle tanks and infantry as well as the rapid shift from mounted to dismounted combat.

This not only calls for assigning infantry units to our own armored formations but also for an adequate antitank capability in our infantry battalions. This can be made available to the non-mechanized, statically employed motorized infantry units in the form of antitank missiles. The mechanized infantry units, engaged in mobile combat, on the other hand, need to be given antitank weapons which are both highly mobile and offer armor protection. These requirements will best be satisfied by battle tanks. Because of their great firepower, they will also substantially enhance the striking power of our armored infantry units against the Warsaw Pact's mixed structure formations.

The terrain, too, calls for a mix of armor and armored infantry units. Boosting the strength of the armored formations by means of infantry units is indispensable in all types of combat even in relatively thinly wooded or populated terrain sectors. By the same token, the armored infantry units need to be supported by battle tanks when engaged in mobile combat even in areas of preponderantly dense cover both to provide an antitank capability and to enhance their firepower and striking power.

In view of the special requirements of the terrain, the mission of armored and armored infantry units providing reciprocal support to one another frequently tends to diverge from their typical conduct of operations.<sup>17</sup> Thus, armored infantry units which provide support to armored units will have to protect the positions occupied by battle tanks at the edge of woods or villages against attacks by dismounted motorized rifle units and above all against their armor-piercing weapons or to overrun enemy infantry units in forest areas and villages so as to contribute to maintaining the momentum of the attacking armored formations. In essence, the above actions are typical infantry missions. The commitment of battle tanks in support of infantry battalions, however, may differ markedly from the principles of armored combat. In the conduct of mobile operations it will frequently be necessary not to employ armored units in closed formation but to divide them up for the purpose of providing additional antitank capability and of taking advantage of the few opportunities to attack long-range targets. In most cases, combat in villages and wooded areas calls for using individual battle tanks for the purpose of controlling barriers and of defending against enemy armored units advancing on highways or forest roads.

Reciprocal strengthening of armored units and armored infantry units in all types of combat and almost all kinds of terrain substantially enhances combat effectiveness. But at the same time, it requires modifications in their natural conduct of operations for which they can only be trained jointly. Under the circumstances, the basic structure of these units makes an organic mix at the battalion level indispensable. In this context, the considerable advantages of smooth interaction in combat situations more than offset potentially higher supply and maintenance costs in peacetime.

In view of present personnel and budget limitations and the likelihood of such limitations in the future, the future structure of the German field army must be more directly oriented toward its mission and terrain. By taking greater advantage of the terrain and optimizing the employment of modern weapon systems<sup>18</sup>, the combat effectiveness of the forward units can be further enhanced<sup>19</sup> while maintaining present material and personnel levels.

While maintaining the high level of mechanization, the brigades and divisions are to be put in a position to engage in sustained operations even in populated and built-up areas. Only in this manner can advantage be taken of a multitude of terrain sectors favorable to the defender which have to be excluded from the conduct of operations at the present time.

In closing, we would like to point out that the integration of motorized infantry brigades in divisions engaged in forward defense presents an opportunity for creating operational reserve units. If four of the present mechanized brigades were to be replaced by major motorized infantry formations, this would free armored and armored infantry brigades which would then be available for other purposes. They could either remain part of the field army or replace home defense brigades Nos 52-55. If structured and equipped like the other mechanized brigades, they would serve as an operational reserve and thereby provide a significant boost to forward defense in either case.

#### Footnotes

1. Cf. Statistisches Jahrbuch 1986 fuer die Bundesrepublik Deutschland [Statistical Yearbook 1986 for the FRG], Statistisches Bundesamt, Wiesbaden, 1987, p. 148.

2. Cf. HDv 100/100 VS-NfD [Army Service Regulation 100/100 FOUO] "Fuehrung im Gefecht" [Conduct of Operations], TF/G 1973, No 903.

3. Under Army Model 3, the armored and armored infantry brigades initially disposed of 320 and 640 and subsequently of 275 and 550 infantrymen for dismounted combat respectively. At the same time, the number of armored infantry and motorized infantry brigades was cut from 17 to 15.

4. Motorized rifle battalion (BTR): 280 dismounted infantrymen; motorized rifle battalion (BMP): 270 dismounted infantrymen; motorized rifle regiment (BTR): 810 dismounted infantrymen; motorized rifle regiment (BMP): 810 dismounted infantrymen; motorized rifle division: 2,500 dismounted infantrymen; armored division: 2,620 dismounted infantrymen.

5. Cf. Training Structure ROT, FOUO, February 1987. According to R. Franklin, the Red Army conducts 22 percent of its combat training in built-up and wooded

areas. (R. Franklin, "The Lessons of Vietnam" cited in Uhle-Wettler, "Gefechtsfeld Mitteleuropa: Gefahr der Uebertechnisierung von Streitkraeften" [Battleground Central Europe: The Danger of Excessive Technicalization of Armed Forces], Guetersloh, 1980, Note 88, p. 168.

6. Cf. HDv 100/100, ch. 4, particularly Nos 406, 407 and Anw FE [Instruction for Command and Operations] 700/108 FOUO, "Vorlaeufige Einsatzgrundsaeetze der Truppengattungen des Heeres" [Provisional Operational Principles for the Branches of Service of the Army], March 1984 (status of 10 May 1985), ch. 2, especially No. 202.

7. Relative to the total area of the FRG, short-range and shortest-range observation and target distances are by no means the exception. According to a survey conducted by the Bundeswehr map service the following line-of-sight distances apply: six percent of all line-of-sight distances extend for more than 2,500 meters; 10 percent for more than 2,000 meters; 17 percent for more than 1,500 meters; 45 percent for more than 500 meters and 55 percent for less than 500 meters. The survey excludes numerous areas with extremely short line-of-sight distances, e.g., the Harz Mountains, the Black Forest and the Ruhr area and only takes obstructions to vision resulting from ground cover, e.g., villages, industrial facilities and forests into consideration but not those resulting from topographical features such as mountains and hills, etc. (Uhle-Wettler, op. cit., p. 48; figures excerpted and rounded off).

8. Cf. Uhle-Wettler, p.24 ff and p. 75f.

9. Cf. HDv 100/100, chs. 29, 32, 34.

10. The principles contained herein are very similar to those of the 1959 Army Model 2. Compared to the 1972 Army Model 3, the available division and brigade types were cut by the major motorized infantry formations. At the same time, the ratio between infantry and major armored formations was reversed. Under Army Models 2 and 3, the four armored divisions and the six armored infantry or motorized infantry divisions were composed of 14 armored brigades and 17 armored infantry brigades. Now, however, the six armored divisions and the four armored infantry divisions are composed of 17 armored brigades and only 15 armored infantry brigades.

11. Cf. Uhle-Wettler, pp. 69, 83.

12. In contrast to Army Model 3, these vehicles must be capable of providing for interaction of armored and armored infantry units.

13. The armored infantry and motorized infantry brigades could be equipped with Leopard 1 tanks once all armored brigades have been equipped with Leopard 2

battle tanks. The question of whether the armored brigades are to be equipped with Leopard 2s or with combat vehicles carrying antitank missiles should be looked into in order to avoid additional supply and maintenance burdens.

14. By combining the antitank and the self-propelled mortar components, the need for additional command personnel can be kept to a minimum. Similar companies are presently part of the motorized infantry battalions of the No. 5 series home defense brigades.

15. This might involve the continued use of a modified version of the Marder armored personnel carrier following the introduction of a new APC for the armored infantry brigades.

16. Armored divisions: 315 main battletanks, 222 APCs, 1,620 men dismounted personnel strength; motorized infantry division: 266 main battletanks, 262 APCs, 2,500 men dismounted personnel strength. Figures based on ROT Training Structure minus battalion, regiment and division command vehicles.

17. Cf. Instruction 700/108, chs. 2-4.

18. This does not take the creation or employment of air assault or air cavalry brigades into consideration.

19. Personnel requirements are largely determined by the ratio of tank, armored infantry and motorized infantry brigades. Given the appropriate structure, the latter could be partially staffed without loss of combat effectiveness. The present staffing patterns of division and corps level motorized infantry units which are to be employed in the depth of the area can be retained. Partial staffing of brigades earmarked as corps or army group reserve units appears to be a possibility.

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### **Restructuring Assigns New Tasks, Organization to Infantry**

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[Article by Peter Kraska: "New Chances for the Infantry—From Wallflower to Centerpiece of 'Army Structure 2000'"; first paragraph is WEHRTECHNIK introduction]

[Text] Primarily for reasons of personnel and finances, the number of mechanized brigades will be reduced in the new "Army Structure 2000" while, at the same time, large units of the field army with a strong infantry component will be increased by barely 25 percent, for instance, by creating infantry and security brigades. The infantry's common characteristic is its ability to engage in deliberate combat; much more significant, however, are the remarkable features of the infantry's branches. General Staff Major Peter Kraska, of the combat-forces

section of the General Army Office which deals with light combat forces, in the following article makes pointed comments on the new mission of this branch of service, on its appropriate employment and on suitable equipment.

The detailed planning for the new Army structure provides a chance to improve the organization and equipment of the infantry which, especially in the new motorized infantry brigades, must lead to qualitative improvements and can also be expected to send a signal throughout the entire arena of the infantry. There is reason to hope that the infantry will emerge out of the shadow of the dominant armored arm and, in view of the central function it occupies in overall defense doctrine, that a door will open which leads to more modern and efficient armament.

These initial planning efforts must go hand in hand with a redistribution of tasks and with provisions for the specialization and optimization of units for specific primary missions. The need for a rational employment of forces and resources makes it mandatory to think, plan and fight in the context of a system which encompasses all forces. Even now, the branches of the infantry exhibit more differences than similarities and they are clearly overtaxed by their tasks. It will be necessary in the future to exploit and further develop existing strengths and to clarify and reduce the respective range of tasks to make their accomplishment feasible.

Armament and equipment must, purposefully and thoughtfully, consider the threat, mission and concept of employment as well as terrain conditions. This seems to require a redeployment and reduction of antitank missiles as well as a strengthening of the repelling and annihilating effect of infantry fire against unprotected area targets especially with new and effective indirect-fire weapon systems.

### **More Infantry in the New Army Structure**

The declining availability of personnel and consistently meager financial resources have made the restructuring of the Army—introduced by the telling name of "Army Structure 2000"—necessary.

One of the most obvious characteristics of the new structure is the reduction in the number of mechanized brigades and the creation of two new types of brigades: an infantry and a security brigade. If one includes the mountain infantry brigade and the two airborne brigades in addition to the five infantry brigades and the two security brigades, the share of infantry-oriented large units in the field army will be barely 25 percent. If one further considers the fact that in future all mechanized brigades—regardless of their designation as armored or armored infantry brigades—will contain two armored infantry battalions, therewith strengthening the infantry component of the entire unit, the growth in infantry becomes readily apparent.

A similar development will take place in the territorial army. Although the deactivation of the home defense brigades constitutes an overall loss of combat capability, the undiminished number of home defense regiments will be able to dispose already in peacetime over regular and semi-regular motorized infantry battalions. The number of active-duty personnel in the motorized infantry component has been notably increased thereby. One can also assume that in future the number of security squads intended for site protection and home defense companies will increase significantly in comparison to the current "Army Structure 4."

Does this mean that the infantry is experiencing a strong impetus and is once again blooming? Can we hope that the quantitative increase will also result in qualitative improvements?

#### **New Assignment of Roles for Forces**

The planned structure of the future brigades clarifies the differences in their strategic and operational mobility as well as in their firepower. The army brigades will thereby, in accordance with their respective structure, be especially well-equipped to defeat hostile forces decisively in mobile combat or to hold terrain when primarily deployed statically. The gradations in the brigades' combat effectiveness associated therewith are mandated by the scant financial resources. Presumably, as the budget crisis continues, the Army will no longer be able to meet the threat by the comprehensive mechanization of all major formations to enable them to wage the mobile battle of combined arms in all types of combat situations.

However, differences in combat capabilities and mobility should not cause major formations and units to suffer a serious loss of combat effectiveness. The new Army structure, therefore, calls for reapportionment of required capabilities within combat forces and possibly for a reduction of the range of tasks of individual units. Therefore, it seems reasonable and appropriate to continue developing units and major formations, more so than before, in such a way that their ability to accomplish certain major missions is optimized. This is particularly true for the infantry whose current diversity and range of tasks is probably unsurpassed within the Army and leads—from the nearly all-encompassing combat missions of previous "multi-purpose units"—to specialization for combat under specific conditions.

#### **Thinking, Planning, and Fighting With Forces Merged Into a System**

The limiting conditions (especially the factors of money and personnel), which are decisive for planning purposes, mandate that individual unit capabilities be reduced to enhance the total system's capability to fulfill its mission by the collaboration of all forces. In this way existing weaknesses are compensated for, as much as possible, while overall risks remain acceptable.

Combatting hostile forces by direct firefight will remain the primary mission of the combat forces. In the future they must be better able than heretofore to commit their primary and significant strength to the battle at critical points. This requires even closer cooperation between service branches and between combat and combat support units. Only by the concentrated association of all forces and by the coordinated combination of direct and indirect fire, blocking operations and maneuver will a "combat system" emerge which can decisively defeat hostile forces.

#### **Infantry—More Differences Than Similarities**

The combat forces of the Army are divided into armored, light combat units and airborne combat units. All categories include infantry units. While the light combat forces consist entirely of branches of the infantry (motorized, mountain and security forces), the armored infantry belongs to the armored forces. Finally, paratroopers, in conjunction with army aviation, constitute the airborne forces.

All infantry units share the ability to fight while dismounted. In this area differences also become apparent. Whereas motorized infantry can fight only when dismounted, armored infantry on the attack tries to utilize the mobility, protection and firepower of its armored personnel carriers [APC] to fight whenever possible while mounted. Paratroopers can be deployed rapidly by air over long distances and exhibit high operational mobility. Security forces, on the other hand, are always stationary when employed in site protection. While the mountain infantry can utilize its capabilities fully in mountainous terrain, its combat efficiency is likely to be lower in the Paderborn Basin [of North-Rhine Westphalia].

Aside from differences in mobility, firepower and suitability for combat in specific terrain, there is, moreover, an array of diverse threats confronting the branches of the infantry; the nature of this threat will also assume different forms as a function of the deployment within the combat area, of the mission, as well as of differences relating to intensity and effects. More simply stated, there is a trend for the threat posed by tanks and APC, by motorized infantry, artillery and attack helicopters to decrease as the distance from the forward edge of battle [FEBA] increases, while the threat from airborne forces, jet aircraft and forces fighting under cover tends to increase further to the rear.

In the current structure of the Army the opalescent heterogeneity of the infantry also shows itself in the large number of differently structured infantry battalions. There are no less than 32!

In view of these facts it is difficult to continue referring to "The" infantry for the differences are simply too pronounced. The generic term can, therefore, only be regarded as a traditional designation for the combined

branches of forces and units which differ in parts considerably from one another in their mobility, firepower, combat mode, equipment as well as their suitability for specific missions and whose sole common feature is the circumstance that they can or must (also) perform their mission on foot.

#### **Excessive Demands and Excess Weight**

Combat conditions for the infantry have significantly changed over the last decades and have led to increased complexity of combat. This trend was accompanied by an increase in tasks, with constantly rising requirements, which—without being critically examined—have been just as patiently accepted as the issue of antitank missiles at the squad and platoon level. Critics of this development, which points to possibly excessive demands on elements and their leaders, were told proudly that it was the very nature of the infantry to fight under any condition, with almost any weapon and against any enemy. This disastrous hubris, in my opinion, has led to fatal errors and it is high time to correct them.

Anybody who claims that an armored infantry platoon, for instance, is actually able—while attacking, defending, or involved in delaying actions—to fight by day or night under limited visibility, in woods and built-up areas as well as in plains, while rapidly (!) changing from a mounted to a dismounted posture, while using a multitude of weapons and combat resources properly and accurately at combat distances that range from 25 to 2,000 meters; [a platoon] which also understands how to exploit terrain safely and how to employ camouflage and deception skillfully; or which is as competent in pursuit operations as in general operational tasks; which displays the same courage in detecting chemical warfare substances as in defining the extent of hostile minefields and which, in addition, can handle rowboats and inflatable boats as expertly as a climbing rope and a kedge, or a bolt cutter and folding spade; [a platoon] whose soldiers can confidently distinguish and defend against approaching aircraft and helicopters, who—because of their close-combat and demanding physical fitness training—have full confidence in their physical stamina and who, with all that, can still maintain and care for their vehicles, weapons, night-vision and radio equipment with great technical skill. I cannot believe anyone who makes such claims; yet, there are those who act as if it were possible to fulfill all these (and some more) requirements equally well.

#### **Reduction of Tasks**

It therefore seems imperative to assign tasks to the infantry's officers and noncommissioned officers which they can really execute with their elements and units and which do not overwhelm them in their peacetime role as trainers and educators or in their wartime role as leaders.

Even if the overall range of tasks of the service branches remains broad and multifaceted, at least their units must nevertheless be assigned tasks which are clearly defined and manageable.

To accomplish this goal it is necessary to define tasks for the branches of the infantry in such a way that primarily those combat tasks are recognized which they, and only they, can handle best. Concentrating on essentials expedites training and leadership, strengthens combat capabilities and increases the combat effectiveness of committed units. What would such a distribution of tasks look like?

#### **Armored Infantry: Attack, Delaying Actions, and Shock Unit**

Armored infantry is particularly well-equipped to work hand-in-hand with tanks. Its APC provide firepower, protection and mobility. It therefore generates great striking power which it can, however, develop only in mounted combat. Dismounted, it fights basically like the motorized infantry and the fire support of its tanks has no decisive effect. Its mobility cannot be utilized in the defense of built-up and wooded areas where its combat effectiveness, because of reduced effectiveness when dismounted, is inferior to that of elements of the motorized infantry. Consequently, in comparison to other branches of the infantry, its strength lies in mounted combat and its "weakness" in dismounted combat.

Its primary mission should, therefore, be to engage in highly mobile combat in close collaboration with tank units, to expose the enemy to direct fire and to force him into maneuver. Only when [friendly] maneuver threatens to stall and its resumption can only be assured by an infantry attack, does the need for dismounted combat arise. Armored infantry is therefore particularly well-suited for attack and delaying actions in terrain that favors maneuver.

Its strength when dismounted has long been the subject of many discussions. The best-possible dismounted efficiency is obviously desirable and surely also appropriate. It must be borne in mind, however, that more soldiers also require more transport space. Since an APC must have the same complete armor protection as the tank with which it constantly works hand in hand, the requirement for more space leads to increased weight, a stronger engine, larger dimensions and higher costs. In the context of a rational commitment of forces and resources, the dismounted strength of one leader and three soldiers appears adequate to fulfill the tasks described above. Each platoon then constitutes an assault group and each company a shock unit which, while temporarily dismounted, can successfully carry out an attack with limited objectives to overcome barriers, open bottlenecks or similar obstacles.

### **Motorized and Mountain Infantry: Cornerstone of Defense**

The motorized infantry still corresponds most closely to the traditional concept of infantry. Its strength lies in dismounted combat in terrain that is unsuitable for maneuver. Its weakness lies in its limited operational mobility and in its vulnerability to fire, particularly enemy artillery fire.

Conditions for defense by the motorized artillery are favorable wherever the terrain forces the enemy to fight at close range, thus keeping him from developing his striking power and forcing him to fight dismounted. Such geographic conditions prevail in roughly 45 percent of the FRG. In built-up areas and in industrial installations in particular motorized infantry can find the cover and the positions which help reduce the still considerable time required for constructing field fortifications.

The motorized infantry brigades planned for "Army Structure 2000" correspond most closely to this mission. However, the ability of these so-called "infantry" units and of the mountain infantry brigade to hold fast must be strengthened for a commitment in forward defense. For this reason, in addition to resources for constructing modern field fortification, they urgently need lightly armored transport vehicles to increase their ability to survive under hostile fire, to guarantee a minimum of operational mobility, to offer collective protection when nuclear, biological, chemical [NBC] resources are employed and in which weapons, ammunition, ordnance and equipment can be safely transported and held in readiness.

An increase in the repelling effect of their firepower, especially against the area target of attacking motorized infantry, represents another urgent requirement. Rapid-fire weapons which are effective over large areas and infantry-related distances with a maximum of 500 meters are needed. Automatic grenade launchers and mortars appear to be particularly well-suited for this purpose.

Combatting enemy tanks is especially important. Small-arms antitank weapons must be able to destroy them reliably at distances up to 300 meters. These weapons need to be supplemented and reinforced at central points by self-propelled antitank guns and guided antitank missiles. Restricted vision in covered terrain as well as the limited frontage and depth of a company's deployment area make the integration of such weapons systems only reasonable and necessary at battalion level.

A prerequisite for a successful defense against tanks is the disruption of hostile maneuver and the negation of its striking power. Dismounted infantry on defense must, therefore, be able to rely on strong engineer support, with the capability to set up minefields quickly and to create extensive and lasting barriers. Employment

of modern, long-range barrage-fire ammunition directed by the artillery against the enemy, supplements and reinforces the effect to a considerable degree.

### **Area and Site Security—More Important Than Ever**

Motorized infantry contributes a large share of area and site security forces. The importance of this mission is often misunderstood and underestimated. The Warsaw Pact disposes over numerous forces for combat in our rear areas, forces which pose an extensive threat to these areas from the beginning—and in parts clearly even before the outbreak of hostilities—which will become part of combat operations. These forces receive special training for specific, sometimes covert, combat operations and are often assigned to elite units. The training and equipment as well as the motivation and mental stability of those of our forces, which will be committed against these experts in swift and unconventional commando operations is of great importance.

Motorized infantry battalions of the home defense regiments engaged in area security must, aside from high mobility, also have a minimum of limited striking power, which can be created with one heavy motorized infantry company equipped with self-propelled mortars, tanks and APC. If a new APC were to be introduced, an appropriate use for the Marder APC could be found here. This armored backbone of the territorial army's motorized infantry battalions also compensates to a degree for the presumably continued allocation of trucks which are no longer adequate for the threat. The security of extensive areas also requires a significant improvement of surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities. Special companies equipped with light, all-terrain bicycles and motor bicycles should be activated for this purpose.

The motorized infantry units planned for site security must be especially conversant with and able to defend successfully against expected patterns of covert operations and terrorist attacks. This clearly calls for better qualifications than those needed for mere [site] security and access control. Technical surveillance devices, sensors and reporting systems, are just as much needed as light and appropriate weapons to defend for a limited time even against superior forces until reinforcements arrive.

### **Paratroopers—The Swift Arrow From the Sky**

The reduced degree of mechanization of combat forces and the reduced flexibility of major formations increase the importance of operational reserves. Paratroopers, because of their high mobility and their ability to execute wide-range operations even across national borders are particularly well-suited for this purpose. Once on the ground, however, they had to be counted among combat units with the lowest operational mobility and perform time-consuming security tasks to prepare for a successful operation. Subjected to enemy fire, they could only be

disengaged with difficulty or not at all. This situation constitutes a considerable variance with the character of operational reserves and led to inconclusive employment options, the effectiveness of which had to be doubted and which never did justice to the great ability of this branch.

The introduction of the airborne vehicle, Wiesel [weasel], and the planned close cooperation with the army aviation's air-combat units, showed a way out of this dilemma.

Even if the Wiesel does not offer comprehensive protection, it does make mobile combat possible and considerably shortens the time required to achieve operational readiness. The extensive issue of this vehicle to all committed forces is imperative since a chain is only as strong as its weakest link. Consequently, a limited allocation must lead to different types of battalions and to different missions. The Wiesel-equipped airborne anti-tank battalion is particularly well-suited to oppose a mechanized enemy, to contain enemy forces which have achieved a breakthrough, to seal penetrations and to oppose hostile airborne forces. The light, infantry-oriented paratrooper battalion is particularly well-suited for combat in covered terrain, for surprise raids, for pursuit and commando operations. In certain situations these units could be mixed and constituted in accordance with the mission as, for instance, in probing attacks. Direct air support increases the paratroopers' effectiveness and sets the stage for their commitment.

#### **Appropriate Arms—Increased Firepower**

The arms of the elements, units and branches of the infantry must be adjusted to the threat as well as to the applicable command level and they must, in particular, take account of terrain conditions. An increase in weapons does not always mean an increase in capabilities and the terrain sets limits to the qualitative suitability and quantitative allocation of certain weapon systems. For instance, there are only very few opportunities to position antitank missiles in covered terrain and equipping the infantry with this weapon system is therefore appropriate only to a limited degree.

Arms must also be chosen in such a way that the required antitank capability is not provided at the expense of successfully opposing hostile motorized infantry; a proper balance of arms must exist. A mixture of tube and missile antitank weapons with different principles of effectiveness must be present to deny the enemy the chance to optimize his tank protection against a one-sided threat. Combat against motorized infantry in primarily covered and fractured terrain requires a preponderance of rapid-fire and highly accurate automatic small arms, as well as weapon systems which provide great fire density with highly lethal effects against unprotected area targets.

Since machineguns inflict significant losses on the enemy only when fired with the element of surprise and can (as principally all direct-fire weapons) only contain an enemy protected by cover, there is a requirement for weapon systems which provide indirect fire. Mortars and their ammunition, even if their combat effectiveness were increased, would not be able to provide the required effect to a sufficient degree, especially since their limited supply would only allow their commitment at central points. The same holds true for artillery.

Consequently, there appears to be an urgent need to equip forces, which are committed in forward defense, already at the platoon level with both direct-fire and indirect-fire weapon systems which provide great firepower and have great repelling effect. Of currently available weapon systems, automatic grenade launchers and grenade launchers appear to be most suitable for this purpose.

#### **Standard, Optional, and Specialized Armament**

The uniform standard issue of arms to all infantry personnel should consist of a combat knife, hand grenades, and a light automatic rifle.

To achieve, moreover, flexibility during operations and to cope effectively with any given threat or situation, issuance of optional weapons and combat equipment is required from squad level on, which the tactical commander can utilize as necessary. These operational resources will not be tied to specific soldiers or functions but can be allocated and utilized in any desired combinations as called for by tactical requirements. These resources include a flare and signal pistol [Very pistol], a grenade pistol, a light machine gun, a panzerfaust and a grenade launcher.

The designation "special issue" is chosen for weapon systems which are only required for certain types of threat situations—which can be expected to occur only to a limited degree and not generally or frequently—or in limited quantities. This equipment is not believed to be required below the platoon/company level. Required operators can be trained to become specialists for their tasks, which makes them most efficient while the multitude of tasks and training areas are diminished for the bulk of soldiers as well as for squad and platoon leaders. Each infantry platoon should, therefore, be equipped with an automatic grenade launcher for a combat range up to 1,000 meters. Only from this level on arises the possibility in principle to include sharpshooters.

Other tasks require additional arms and combat equipment which, however, need only be available in limited quantities and not to all elements and will, therefore, be consolidated within special units. The allocation at respective command levels depends on quantitative

requirements and suitable adaption to operational concepts. It is particularly important to maintain the integrity of the responsible command level and to create operationally self-contained and easily commanded units and elements.

One antitank squad and one air defense squad, each equipped with defensive missiles, are conceivable for each company. Since the effectiveness of such weapon systems requires a range which exceeds the territorial expanse of an infantry company and since they can seldom be employed effectively at optimum combat distances in covered terrain, it seems principally more appropriate to issue such weapons only at the battalion level.

This approach simplifies command and training and only its application makes it possible to create points of concentrated effort with self-contained operations. Moreover, if required, the operational employment of squads and subordination to a motorized infantry company remains an additional option.

12628

#### **Combined Arms Doctrine Evolving for Air-Mechanized Units**

*36200199 Bonn EUROPAEISCHE WEHRKUNDE in German May 88 pp 278-280*

[Article by Ruediger Mueller: "Air-Mechanized Major Formations: The Flying Army on the Battlefield of the Future"]

[Text] Since the armies in East and West have started to arm helicopters and to integrate them directly in the combat of the ground force units, the use of the third dimension by the ground forces has steadily gained importance. Decisive progress was provided by the development of guided missiles whose technical characteristics meet the needs of flying weapons platforms. Since then two different trends have been discernible. On the one hand, the development of big, very efficient combat helicopters (KHS) with considerable weapons load and variable weapons mix, on the other hand, the attempt to design the KHS small, agile, and maneuverable.

However, both lines of development pursue the purpose to arm the helicopters so that they can effectively support the combat of the forces on the ground as standoff weapons platforms. This operational doctrine is achieved most markedly in the German concept of the antitank helicopter (PAH). Exclusively designed for optimum effect on the engagement of armored targets on the ground at great distance, the PAH can develop its effectiveness only in close coordination with combat forces. For independent action the PAH lacks stability and capability to carry through. According to the existing

operational procedures PAH in the German Army therefore are subordinated for employment to the divisions and brigades and integrated into combined arms combat by them.

Other nations that do provide the armed helicopter with a degree of stability and capability to carry through by appropriate weapons mix and additional equipment and thus make it into the KHS, nevertheless also see the helicopter's essential task in direct support of the forces on the ground. Thus the armies receive their own close air support, that is always available and thus can be planned, which, in contrast to the use of fixed-wing aircraft, has the additional advantage of a longer engagement time of the enemy.

A quite different form of using the third dimension for combat is—though indirect—the air transport of combat forces. To carry out such operations in the form of airborne operations, the German Army, in cooperation with army aviators and paratroopers, has developed flawless plans to take full advantage of the speed of air transport.

Both lines of development have now reached a stage in which no further increase in the effectiveness can be expected with available means. Merely continuing the air mobility of the Army is not enough to meet the demands of the nineties and to make preparations for the step into the next millennium.

For the weaknesses of the present concept cannot be ignored. The PAH requires support against the enemy combat helicopter but also protection from surprise appearance of the enemy on the ground. The escort helicopter for the PAH system is in the process of being designed. The problems of the airborne operation start especially after landing where the lack of protection as well as effective combat support impair the combat value of the airborne infantry.

In the future, too, the main threat will come from numerically superior, qualitatively excellently equipped mechanized forces which, as aggressors, have the initiative to start with. In all phases of the actions, these forces will receive intensive support from the air.

In the technological development progress emerges especially in reconnaissance in the depth of the enemy area and in increased performance regarding precision and effect of long-range fire. Linked by efficient command and control information systems, new reconnaissance and artillery systems make possible operational fire into the depth.

In continuing to develop the helicopter, complete night operations capability and night low altitude flight capability are to be expected as well as improved power-to-weight ratio, extended period of operation, and effective protective measures. Progress in electronics, optonics, and munitions technology will contribute to that just as

novel materials and improvements in the drive systems. Thus while technical developments in the case of reconnaissance and fire make movements on the ground more and more difficult and require expensive protection, flying systems, on the other hand, can make regaining of mobility possible.

If this quality of the helicopter can be utilized not only in the tactical field but also operationally, a new potential emerges. Operationally effective forces of the numerically inferior unit increase the latter's capability to hold its ground if it can employ these forces at any time quickly where its conduct of operations requires it. Operational mobility is a basic condition in this respect.

The idea of using airmobile forces as operational reserves is not new. Self-contained employment of the airborne brigade in an airborne operation as well as independent PAH operation tried in past army exercises are operationally conceived, but could not and cannot be adequate in the result. Measured by the cost the effect is not adequate. Obviously there are limits to the concept of transporting troops with their weapons by air so that they can then fight on the ground. The air transport capacity is insufficient to transport the necessary heavy weapons and equipment. The PAH, as a pure standoff weapons platform is only inadequately capable of doing so.

#### **Helicopters Tailored to Each Weapon System**

The solution is to create a system of mutually complementing and supporting weapons that make possible the classical combined arms combat. For this purpose, in the future it will be required not to provide a helicopter with a weapon and to then integrate it at great expense, but to build the main weapons system so-to-speak tailored around the helicopter so that the main weapons system is provided with the characteristic of flying. Only in this way will it be possible to fully exploit the effect of the weapon. If this idea is brought to its conclusion, then the escort helicopter as well as the combat support helicopter (KUH) will be developed in addition to the KHS.

KUH in various roles or versions will engage enemy aircraft, especially KHS, will lay mines, or fire indirectly aimed fire. Other helicopters have the purpose of command and control, carry sensors for long-range reconnaissance systems, as scout aircraft guide KHS to the enemy or serve as platforms for electronic warfare systems. Airborne infantry has the task of supporting the operations of the air-mechanized major formations by temporarily holding key terrain, by blocking defiles or by surprise raids from the air and similar combat tasks.

#### **Capability for Independent Combat**

Thus the air-mechanized major formation develops organized in units and forces and organizationally combined. Its characteristic is the capability for independently conducted combined arms combat from the air and in the air. In this formation, the helicopter is the core and primary actor in the battle.

A significant innovation in the concept of air mechanization is the disengaging of the helicopter from direct support of the ground forces. While the PAH flight subordinated to a brigade can use its superior speed and flexibility only within the limits of the brigade area, the air-mechanized major formation is capable of long-range action.

Air-mechanized forces are kept in readiness widely dispersed at a depth of 100-200 km back of one's own front lines. A maneuverable command and control supported by modern command and control systems makes it possible to bring up the flights, squadrons, and operations sections in a dispersed manner so that they do not offer any target and are combined in their action not until a decisive point is reached. Guided by reconnaissance helicopters, the air mechanized major formation attacks, disperses again, for renewed attack at another point or from another direction. At the same time, paratroopers introduced in an airborne operation have established reserve positions which keep the enemy from breaking through. A surprise raid from the air brings a crossing point into one's own hands and interrupts the enemy lines of communications. The employment of the mechanized reserves of the ground troops takes place in coordination with the operations of the air-mechanized major formation in terms of time and location. The operational linkage is the result of the intended effect in the target.

An additional advantage of the air-mechanized major formation is the fact that it retains the character of a reserve even when its helicopters are employed. For flying forces are able to break off combat at any time, to disengage themselves from the enemy and to quickly become effective again at another point. Efficient command and control and engagement support are a prerequisite.

#### **Development of the Army Aviators Into Actors in Combat**

In the air-mechanized major formation the army aviators and paratroopers form the airmobile combat forces. For the army aviator forces this means a further significant change in the history of this young branch of service. Originally planned as support of command and control and reconnaissance in the Bundeswehr and therefore assigned to the command forces, the army aviators, become combat support forces as a result of the concepts developed at the end of the sixties of the airborne operations carried out with helicopters and of the airmobile antitank defense.

The next step towards the combat force requires another change in the self-confidence of the branch of service. It, itself, becomes the bearer of the battle. This places new demands on capabilities and ability of commanders and forces. On a practical level there do remain support tasks for command, reconnaissance and combat for the army

aviator units organically assigned to the divisions. And transport helicopters of the corps must continue to support the divisions and brigades with logistical and field medical actions.

In the air-mechanized major formation, which is employed on an operational level, a multitude of new tasks arise. The battle in and from the air requires the capability for coordination in the area to a special degree. Targets on the ground and in the air must be engaged often simultaneously at different distance. If the employment exceeds the capability of one's own forces on the ground, their situation is to be taken into consideration; coordination with them must take place wherever possible. The close link of the combat and escort helicopters is complemented by helicopter-based command and control, reconnaissance, and combat support. In this connection a high rate of one's own combat actions leads to operating conditions and situations that constantly change rapidly.

The versatility of the demands on the helicopter crews is even surpassed by the complexity of the command and control tasks connected with combat in and from the air. Combat under these conditions cannot constantly be carried on with equally high intensity. Therefore it will be characteristic of the combat of the helicopters to form again and again new points of concentration, but to disperse in between times and also to supply. The types of combat of delay and attack present themselves for such a type of combat while the defense by itself appears to be imaginable only for a limited time. The conversion of the basic conceptional ideas into tactical principles and operational procedures requires research and tests in depth. A great deal of work remains to be done here in this respect.

For the paratrooper force the concept of air mechanization also signifies a further development of the branch of service. Surprise raids from the air and harassment on this side and beyond the most advanced line of our own troops are included even now among the duties of the paratroopers. But in the past the main effort in the self-contained action of the airborne brigade has been in defense. But in the future the combat of the paratroopers will be a direct component of the battle of the air-mechanized major formation. This requires holding for a limited time of an area as support for organization in the air as well as the employment of light combat reconnaissance on the ground. Employment as a commando force supplements the contribution of the paratroopers.

Better equipment with air-transportable vehicles, especially also with lightly armored weapons carriers, must be provided to fulfill the various tasks as well as improved equipment, weaponry and protection of the individual rifleman. Combat and action support is guaranteed by the air-mechanized major formation because of the fact that army aviators and paratroopers, who have been closely cooperating in the past, will now come together organizationally, too.

Air mechanization is a new, a bold concept. It requires that the airspace near the battlefield as third dimension be completely included in the conduct of operations. Along these lines an analogy to the development of the tank weapon may be permitted. Just as the tank was released from its ties to the infantry and its operational concept required the look into the depth of the area, the same way the helicopter must be released from its ties to the combat force on the ground to enable it to fully exhaust all its capabilities in its element.

If that can be achieved air-mechanized troops will decisively change the combat of the ground forces. The key to success on the battlefield of the future lies in the operational coordination of the air-mechanized forces with the armored major formations on the ground.

12356

#### **Naval Combat Systems' Successors, Upgrading Projected**

36200180 Bonn WEHRTECHNIK in German  
Jun 88 pp 26-35

[Article by Rolf Noeske: "Naval Arms Beyond the Turn of the Century"; first paragraph is WEHRTECHNIK introduction]

[Text] By virtue of its plans for the future, the Navy, like the Army and the Air Force, was forced to adjust to the basic conditions which have changed owing to the manpower available for conscription and the availability of funding. With respect to future armament with airborne material and material afloat this meant some revised planning. The following article by Capt Rolf Noeske, department head for Program Supervision and International Arms Cooperation, Naval Arms Staff Section VII of the naval command system, provides an overview of the most important naval arms projects. These affect not only ships and boats for the flotillas, but also important projects for naval aviators and efforts in the command systems sector. This article is based on a lecture the author gave on the occasion of the annual meeting of the DWT's Schleswig-Holstein section.

In view of the current basic conditions, which reflect in particular manpower and financial resources, statements concerning plans for the development and procurement of defense materials are never final, nor are they ever binding over the long term. Thus, additional comments represent a snapshot of the current status of planning. Nevertheless, every chief of staff of a military service who is responsible for establishing and maintaining the serviceability of his area is eager to move quickly to contain emerging risks and thus achieve a realistic planning start which will also endure on a long-term basis.

However, the standards in place make it impossible to avoid intervention in the planning process. This is painful for any military service. If in January of this year the last planning conference on the 1989 plan for the

Bundeswehr aroused the impression that only the Army and Air Force had to accept substantial intervention in their planing and that the Navy was left totally unaffected, this was true only because the chief of staff, Navy, in 1987, had ordered the necessary changes in planning in order to adjust to resource levels.

In spite of these changes, the following objectives and targets remain in effect for medium- and long-term naval arms planning:

The goal of the Navy's arms program is to maintain balance in its combat effectiveness in order to accomplish its mission. This balance relates not only to the mission-based structure of the respective components, but also to the balance between the Baltic Sea and North Sea components of our fleet, including naval aviators.

Drawing on basic conditions such as structure, manpower, training, logistics, technology and finances, the necessary measures are adjusted into a logical comprehensive plan.

These targets warrant mention:

- Relief in the area of maintenance costs and saving billets by replacing, at the earliest possible time, the units which are declining markedly in combat effectiveness while becoming increasingly more costly to support;
- Recourse—wherever possible—to material adopted and, given new standards, consideration of growth potential for subsequent upgrading of combat effectiveness as appropriate to the threat;
- Extensive standardization of defense material to reduce costs in training, logistics and maintenance.

Overall, to realize current and future naval forces the Navy is striving to utilize all technical findings and opportunities, to lower operating costs and to reduce manpower expenditure.

#### Capabilities of Future Naval Forces

Realizing arms projects always raises the question about which capabilities we must have in the future in order to be able to accomplish the operational missions set for us.

In combat the Navy must be able to do the following under the conditions of a multiple threat and the situation in the area of operations: scout the enemy, develop an up-to-date comprehensive status report and be able to employ the correct weapon against all possible targets by using its own electronic warfare.

Beyond that, the Navy must have available additional capabilities for collecting intelligence and information in peacetime. Only in that way will it be possible, among other things, to derive the requisite standards for further developing our naval forces.

Against this background, the Navy's medium- and long-term arms planning includes the following key issues to be realized:

- Improvements in the sectors of intelligence and information collection, command and electronic warfare.
- Increasing engagement distances and improved homing for missiles; along with this, increasing the electronic noise immunity of the sensors and means of communications.
- More efficient fighting against underwater targets using more efficient sonar equipment and torpedoes.
- Increasing antiaircraft capability, especially of units afloat, by arming them with more efficient antiaircraft installations for close and immediate ranges.

#### New Weapon Systems

##### Destroyer Flotilla

For the destroyer flotilla first the new construction program of Bremen-class frigates was completed in 1984 and the modernization program for the three Luetjens-class destroyers in December 1986.

Replacing today's oldest warships, namely the four Hamburg-class destroyers and the three Koeln-class frigates, which will reach the absolute end of their service life during the first half of the 1990's, is planned in two stages.

The original plan will resume by replacing two Koeln frigates with the seventh and eighth Bremen-class frigates in 1989 and 1990. In March 1986 the principal contract for this was signed, the two frigates have since been launched.

In line with the Navy's current planning four new F-123 class frigates are to be built in a second stage with delivery starting in 1994. This new planning development resulted from the need to be able to replace at the earliest possible moment the old units of the destroyer flotilla which are costly in terms of manpower and material. At the same time we realized that because of delays in the "NATO Frigate Replacement for the Nineties" (NFR 90) program the goal of "delivery of the first ship in 1995, beginning of 1996" could no longer be kept.

To the extent the components are still economically viable, the armament of these frigates will be modeled largely on that of Bremen class frigates because of the substantial time pressure to realize the F-123 class. Insofar as possible in the shipbuilding sector itself new directions in modular construction are to be followed. This is to be utilized wherever advantages result for cost savings, shortening construction time, increasing availability in utilization and facilitating later modernization.

Independent of this change in planning the German Navy is also involved in the NFR-90 program in order to be in a position to replace the Luetjens-class destroyers in the first years of the next century.

In January of this year France and Germany signed the modernization project for the "project definition" phase, thus all eight countries are now continuing their initial joint work on this project.

Closely linked with the NFR-90 is the program for future antiaircraft defense on ships. In two separate groups the countries involved in the NFR-90 program are endeavoring to resolve the question of a close-range air defense system because the eight countries in Project Group 33 in NATO's Naval Armaments Group were unable to arrive at a mutually agreeable solution in respect to a local area missile system (LAMS).

The role of the German Navy in the group is to develop an antiaircraft defense system for ships of frigate size and larger for self-defense and limited formation protection, the NATO Anti-air Warfare System (NAAWS). Currently the project is in the design phase; the results should be available by the beginning of 1989. After they have been analyzed and evaluated decisions will have to be made about further involvement in the next phases. NAAWS is characterized by the idea of integrating several different sensors, effectors and systems for electronic countermeasures via a so-called CORE system.

Of special interest for the German Navy is the opportunity during the design phase to pursue a second European path as an alternative to NAAWS. This should provide a sufficiently broad basis for deciding on the best possible solution for the most economical means of realizing a close-range antiaircraft system with limited formation protection capability which is suitable for the Navy.

The corresponding European alternative is the FAMS (Family of Anti-air Warfare Missile System) project which developed from the activities of Project Group 33.

The destroyer flotilla likewise includes the units afloat for intelligence and information collection. The construction phase of three new class 423 fleet service boats was begun in July 1985. Both manufacturing and operating costs are reduced by applying so-called "official standards" using commercial materials. Commissioning of two units is scheduled for this year, the third in 1989.

#### **Fast Patrol Boat Flotilla**

Starting this year 10 Albatros class (S-143) boats in the fast patrol boat flotilla will have their armament gradually raised to the level of the newer Gepard class (S-143A) by increasing the electronic noise immunity of the

onboard position finding and fire control systems, and at the beginning of the 1990's, by installing a new electronic warfare system and the RAM air defense guided missile system.

Retrofitting with the new electronic warfare system was completed for the Gepard class in May 1988. Installation of the RAM system is likewise scheduled for the beginning of the 1990's.

Modernization of the weapon delivery position finding equipment is also under way on the 20 Tiger-class (S-148) boats which were built in France and the FRG. The boats will also receive an electronic warfare system in order to provide better protection from missiles.

The RAM air defense guided missile system project, with installation also scheduled for Bremen frigates, Luetjens destroyers and future frigates, is now developing in a positive way. The final test and trial program was very successful, resulting in the issuance in the United States and also here of the approval to begin preparation for series production. Troop testing is scheduled for 1989 and 1990.

#### **Submarine Flotilla**

At present 12 class 206 submarines in the submarine flotilla are undergoing modernization. Basically this program includes the sonar system, the command and weapon delivery systems and improving navigational precision. The building contract was signed in November 1986. The modernized boats will be available to the fleet starting next year.

Plans call for building 12 class 212 submarines with an additional drive which is independent of outside air (hybrid drive) starting the middle of the next decade.

On the basis of a bilateral intergovernmental agreement, there is close cooperation with Norway in respect to the base command and weapon delivery systems, the main sensors and the torpedo armament for the new generation of submarines.

Parallel with submarine modernization and procurement, the existing heavyweight torpedoes are being improved in two stages.

#### **Minelaying and Sweeping Forces Flotilla**

The goal the minelaying and sweeping forces flotilla is to improve minesweeping and minehunting as well as minelaying capabilities.

When the contract to build 10 SM-343 high-speed mine warfare boats was concluded in July 1985 the foundation was laid for further modernization of the mine warfare units. The first boat was launched on March 15, 1988.

They are designed for mine warfare in general, that is, equally for minelaying and mine countermeasures, and will meet the exacting requirements for passive ship protection in respect to shock resistance, magnetic fields and acoustic radiation.

For the first time a mine warfare ship is being built with nonmagnetizable steel; our Navy had good results with this in the class 206 submarines.

At the same time the boat design of the SM-343 represents the standard for mine countermeasure units of the future.

Based on the standard of the SM-343, the 332 minehunter will be equipped, among other things, with a modern minehunting sonar system and a computer-assisted automated minehunting-tactical plotting and documentation system. In addition, there will be the newly developed efficient Penguin B3 minehunting drone to identify and destroy mines. The definition phase has been completed and the general contractor selected. Following parliamentary discussion, the contract to build 10 boats is to be concluded yet this year.

Parallel with the weapon systems mentioned for mine warfare, procurement of the Anti-Invasion Sea Mine and Ocean Bottom Mine 80 is proceeding in cooperation with Denmark.

#### Squadron Support

The support system group on the tenders which is equipped with workshops and replacement parts is of fundamental importance for high-level serviceability and a long period of service in the squadrons' area of operations. In addition, the tenders make possible immediate backup for the warships for fuel, fresh water, ammunition, provisions and waste removal. The advanced age of the existing tenders, maintenance of which is becoming more difficult, as well as the high manpower expenditure will force replacement of these units no later than the mid-1990's. Eight 404 class tenders with delivery in the mid-1990's are planned to replace the tenders of the fast patrol boat flotilla and the minelaying and sweeping forces flotilla. Since we are currently only at the beginning of the design phase, it is not possible today to make specific comments about this project. However, the tight fiscal situation might result in totally new solutions, among others, even coastal motor ships with containers.

#### Naval Aviator Division

Outfitting the naval aviator division with the Tornado fighter bomber is virtually complete.

By way of future armament this aircraft will receive the Kormoran II missile which is currently under development and which, in contrast to the Kormoran I, will have a longer range, freedom from interference and a greater impact on the target because of the larger warhead.

As an antiship missile of the next generation plans call for the Anti-Navire Supersonique (ANS) missile—a joint German-French project—to supplement the Tornado armament after phasing out the Kormoran I and to equip fast patrol boats and the new frigates. The definition phase for this project has been completed.

The HARM (High Speed Antiradiation Missile), which was acquired in the United States, is currently being delivered in order to decisively improve the Tornado's ability to prevail against enemy air defense.

Starting the end of this year and the beginning of next year, the level of operational readiness of the 22 Sea King Mk 41 helicopters will be upgraded; they will be rebuilt as combat helicopters. They are to function as external ship detectors for their own units as well as to be in a position to independently engage smaller surface targets. To do this they will receive special radar and a data transmission facility which will make possible automatic target data transmission and will permit efficient cooperation with the missile fast patrol boats; they will also receive the Sea Skua air-to-surface missile which is in use in the Royal Navy.

Beyond that, the Navy is involved in planning for a new standardized naval helicopter together with France, Italy and the Netherlands using the model of a base helicopter designated as the "NATO Helicopter for the Nineties" (NH-90). With various sets of equipment the helicopter is to be able to accommodate onboard-assisted submarine chasing, detection and transmission of target data, engage surface naval forces, and be used for distress at sea and for transport. The signing in September 1987 of the relevant modernization project for this undertaking initiated the definition phase which is to extend to the middle of this year. Development is to begin in 1989. With this planning the Navy is seeking to equip the new frigates with an efficient onboard helicopter and, on a long-term basis, to achieve type refinement by later replacing the kinds of helicopters currently in service.

In the North Sea/Sea of Norway area of operations the focus is on countering the steadily growing threat with a new submarine hunting and reconnaissance aircraft—MPA-90 as a successor to Breguet Atlantic. This project is in the definition phase.

Currently the French Atlantique 2 and the American P-3C Orion Update IV are being looked at as successor candidates. The new weapon system must be capable of being able to counter the submarine threat in 2000 and beyond. In order to do this it is mandatory that increasingly quieter submarines can be acquired and pursued with the sensors coming into use. Important selection

parameters include not only the quality of the subsystems, but also interoperability with other naval forces in NATO's northern flank area as well as the costs of acquisition and utilization.

In connection with the Orion Update IV program the Navy has initiated modernization project negotiations about the basic conditions for cooperation with the U.S. Navy and industry since we want to participate in this project for operational and financial advantages.

#### Naval Command System

Naval and naval aviation forces must be employable at all times in the Navy's entire area of operations. This requires high-level command ability with short reaction times as a condition for broad mobility and combined operations under extreme air threat and a complex electronic environment.

The naval command system as the totality of all self-sufficient command information, command and weapon delivery, and communications and reconnaissance systems makes this command capability possible. Its subsystems are linked together. At the same time it functions together with the systems of the other military services and the allies.

After initiating operation of the Navy's headquarters (MHQ) and the submarine command system, the next step in improving the command capability calls for the realization of the coastal radar organization (KRO) at the beginning of the 1990's.

The two position finding sites in the Baltic Sea sector (Staberhuk on Fehmarn and Alt-Buelk near Kiel) will work closely with the Danish KRO and transmit the reconnaissance results to the MHQ of the fleet's commander.

In the North Sea sector the Navy utilizes the radar system of the minister for transport. He has established an extensive transport control in the German Bay. The Navy utilizes the radar image and additional information, using them to supplement the status report for the commander of the North Sea naval forces in Wilhelmshaven.

Beyond the tactical level the systems of the operational level require closer cooperation within the NATO context. Thus, the MHQ is to be connected with the system of the Flag Officer Denmark (FOD) in Aarhus and the currently evolving ACBA CCIS of the Commander Allied Forces Baltic Approaches (COMBALTAP) in Denmark. Realization of the BALTAP system network is planned for the beginning of the 1990's. The focus here is to support the development of international standards, also with the goal of reducing development risks and costs in utilization.

#### Equipment Program

Equipment and weapons procurement are always somewhat overshadowed by the systems procurement which has been discussed thus far, although they do in fact have a substantial influence on the degree of operational readiness of the units and guarantee interoperability with the allied navies. The spectrum extends from modern communications equipment to sensors to weapons for surface and underwater warfare. Without them the large projects could not be realized. All of them together provide the balance in our arms projects and thus secure the balance among the naval forces even for the future.

#### International Cooperation

From the presentation above about arms projects it is clear that the Navy is planning and realizing a variety of its weapons systems and system parts in cooperation with its alliance partners, whether it be multi- or bilateral cooperation, or transatlantic or purely European. In this way the Navy is largely in conformity with the political objectives. Nonetheless, arms cooperation is not a simple matter. Various tactical requirements and objectives, as well as divergent time and cost targets are often obstacles which cannot be overcome. In addition, in view of the current economic situation in individual national labor markets, every nation is naturally interested in preserving as many of its own jobs as it can as well as remaining competitive in the world market in the area of high technology. Thus, viewed in the long term multinational projects will remain the exception and even the realization of bilateral projects will be possible only with appropriate industrial cooperation.

#### Navy and Shipyard Industry

The problem of preserving jobs for one's own industry in the context of international arms cooperation also applies to the question of maintaining an adequate national shipbuilding capacity—not only for reasons of security policy—in connection with the decline in merchant shipbuilding and the diminishing tonnage under German flag.

The Navy needs the innovative creative power of our shipyard industry with its high technical level. It needs these highly specialized capacities to build new ships and for economic maintenance of weapon systems afloat. In this connection, reserve capacities for increased demand in the event of tension and a crisis must also be considered. The impending loss of assets by the German shipyard industry also threatens the quality and survivability of the Navy.

Like all highly technical systems, warships are also exposed to a broad development dynamic. Serviceability, combat effectiveness and effective capability of modern naval forces can be guaranteed only by the use of the most modern technology and constant adaptation to development. These problems of adaptation take on

significance for two reasons. On the one hand, technological progress is becoming increasingly important, on the other hand the life of units afloat is increasing. Nonetheless, in addition to certain basic utilization the navy cannot be responsible for greater utilization of existing shipyard capacities, yet it will do everything in its power to contribute to maintaining an efficient and high-quality shipyard industry.

### Summary and Outlook

Marginal fiscal and personnel conditions have substantial impacts on the future management of our procurement projects. Modern systems pose increasingly higher requirements in crew member qualifications. Particularly serious is the demand for well-trained and experienced long-term servicemen who today can be recruited and retained only with difficulty. With the new weapon systems demographic developments force us to be more careful about economical personnel strength than we have been.

Reducing the manpower strength of warships below a certain level, however, is severely limited in respect to "effective capability," that is, the capability of being able to conduct combat under enemy action.

For us this results in intensified efforts to guarantee meeting the mission set for the German Navy within the framework of the alliance. Meaningful utilization of specified technologies and restricting ourselves to the essential are key projects in solving these problems. We must also take into consideration the fact that the German Navy can never consist of exclusively modern units. One part will be unavoidably "old" and even after costly modernization measures not always fully sufficient to meet the threat. It is a matter of establishing a good mix of modern and older naval forces and avoiding serious drops in combat effectiveness in individual sectors.

12124

### Changes in Legislation Governing Reserve Training Proposed

36200204 Bonn LOYAL in German Jul 88 p 16

[Article by Lt Col [Res] Bernd Wilz: "Security—Only With The Reserves"; first paragraph is LOYAL introduction]

[Text] What can the reserves and the economy in the 1990's expect from the FRG Armed Forces, if they must assume the inevitable added burden of training? CDU Representative Bernd Wilz, himself a Lt Col (Res) in the Artillery, comments here, among other things, on how the increased burden could be distributed more equitably.

The FRG will no longer be able to afford the luxury it has enjoyed during the past 30 years of not having to call up its million-strong reserve army.

The essentially unchanged threat of war on the one hand, years of low birth rate and a limited budget on the other, compel the Armed Forces to the most drastic structural reform since its existence. The concept of the reserve and the structure of the Armed Forces in the year 2000 are not the only, but the essential characteristics of future changes. Even with reduced forces in peace time, the mission remains unchanged: prevention of war, and the quickest possible ending of war in an auxiliary capacity to the allied first line of defense.

Structurally this is to be ensured by the fact that the FRG Armed Forces develop from a standing army to a more strongly cadre-oriented army in training, and that the Armed Forces, in particular with regard to regional characteristics, will have to accomplish their missions more efficiently and in a more action-oriented manner.

As far as personnel are concerned, the gap is to be closed by better-trained and more combat-ready reserves having a high degree of availability, and with the further goal of gradually increasing the number of permanent training sites from the present 6,600 to 9,800. Altogether, there remains the task of being able to grow in the shortest possible time to a defense force of 1.34 million soldiers.

For the state, for society, and for the economy that means, text in clear: our security will in the future depend even more on the combat readiness of willing and able reserves. All employers, both public and private, will have to adjust to the fact that in the future more workers will be called upon more frequently for training exercises. On the other hand, especially mid-sized enterprises, the self-employed, tradesmen and merchants, which together supply 67 percent of jobs in the FRG, can expect an equitable distribution of the burden, early notification of induction orders and training periods of shorter duration. As a result of this, new demands will be made on the FRG Armed Forces and its administration as far as its drafting practice is concerned:

—Reservists and employers must be given early advance notice of a planned training exercise—if possible, 12 months.

—There should be an interval of at least 2 years between exercises, and a minimum interval of 9 months (so-called waiting period) may not be undercut.

Only this type of structure, which leans heavily on the concept at present approved by parliament, makes the added burden on the economy appear reasonable. However, the action requires a high degree of flexibility and foresight on the part of district recruiting offices and of the troops themselves.

One important step towards the implementation of future plans will be introduced in the form of lengthening conscription from 15 to 18 months as of June 1, 1989. The reason is that it will be decisive in showing

whether the extended military service—originally planned more for reasons of increasing the effectiveness of the Armed Forces—will at the same time allow for the following objectives:

- more vocation-specific utilization of conscripts within the troops;
- if need be, training in an additional occupational specialty for future reserve deployment;
- more infantry, ABC, and medic training for all troops.

Military duty used in this manner will not only larger eliminate the sense of monotony and so-called “goof-off duty,” but will also arouse interest and lay a meaningful foundation for future activities in the reserves. After all, reservists must be given incentives which do justice to the significance of their mission and which can also give them personal motivation. Important here is the implementation of the following four points:

- equal rank of active soldiers and reservists;
- pride in unit, corps and arms;
- equal compensation for all reservists, private sector as well as government employees (full salary and housing allowance; an amendment to the appropriate law is being prepared);
- more attractive features ranging from better equipment and clothing to additional honors and improved chances for promotions, with fair credit given for training days served (the extensive demands of reserve corps such as, e.g., “Ehrensold,” or the introduction of official slots for officers who are military specialists must also be part of parliamentary discussions).

It should also be noted here that it is necessary to expand the possibilities for participation in military intelligence briefings or practical training for multipliers from the economy, divisions and public life. At any rate, the execution of a reserve training exercise, for example, must not turn into a failure for a businessman or an employer, who is, for the time being given the rank of first lieutenant (Res), because necessary funds had not been authorized in the budget. It is not, and never would be, understood by the public. It should be evident that an account of personal experiences by personalities from public life can have a strong ripple effect over an entire region. Moreover, it is incumbent upon the Armed Forces to gain the good will of ever wider circles by presenting a positive image. These points of view will in future be as significant as the impressions which a worker, returning from training, shares with his coworkers.

The reservist of tomorrow will, more than now, play the role of link between the Armed Forces and society in general. At the same time, the soldier in the reserve has a chance to be the liaison between the “world of work in the economy” and the “workplace in the Armed Forces.”

Adherence to the frame outlined above is the condition that in future reservists will fulfill their obligations, as opposed to now, when 38-40 percent “refuse”—for whatever reasons—too participate in training. The security of the FRG depends more than ever on them.

09328

## FRANCE

### Cooperation With Brazil Permits French Entry Into Latin American Market

35190087 Paris LE FIGARO in French  
16-17 Jul 88 p 16

[Text] Everything is going wrong these days in the Brazilian arms industry. Engesa, one of the largest enterprises in the country (eight plants, 2 000 employees), has just announced that it lost 6 million dollars during the first half of the year. The National Bank of Economic and Social Development had promised it a loan of 65 million dollars, which it has not yet deposited. In addition, Engesa is unable successfully to write off the repurchase—at a cost of 20 million dollars—of the Fabrica Nacional de Vagones, which is collaborating in the construction of a new tank, the Osorio, of which it hopes to sell Saudi Arabia 66.

This is not the only firm experiencing difficulties. Avibras Aeroespacial, the foremost exporter of arms from Brazil, will only with great effort manage to maintain this year the level of activity it achieved in 1987. And Embraer is not commercializing its AMS combat plane, manufactured in cooperation with Aeritalia, as it would have liked. The National Security Council and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs are becoming disturbed. The business figure for Brazilian arms is going to decrease.

Under such conditions, the contract for more than 240 million dollars signed last month with France, to supply 52 helicopters (16 Squirrels and 36 Dolphins), has the character of a real lifesaver, a last resort.

### Common Enterprises

These aircraft will in fact be assembled in a plant belonging to Helibras, a joint enterprise, whose members are the state of Minas Gerais, with 55 percent of the shares, and Aeroespaciale with 45 percent. Engesa should really come and join them by buying back a still undetermined part of the capital from the state of Minas Gerais, an operation more important than it seems, insofar as the Brazilian land forces will need approximately 200 helicopters during the years 1990-1995 in order to renew its fleet.

All the large manufacturers, Bell and Sikorsky in America, MBB in Germany and Augusta in Italy, were involved in the bidding. France, which financed this sale through the expedient of a bank pool with the BNP [Banque National de Paris] at its head, got the contract because it offered better proposals for the transfer of technology. It will be paid partly in cash and partly in Brazilian materiel, without doubt some fifty Tucano trainer aircraft assembled by Embraer. It should now be able to push its advantage. The Brazilian order is first of all tied in with a long-term agreement of cooperation consisting primarily of a training package. Next, the two countries are quite favorable to increasing the establishment of common enterprises. Contacts in this direction had been taken last March. In addition, the French engine builder, Turbomeca, has been in operation since last year near Rio de Janeiro.

Brazil is thus finding a means to give its industry a prod, whereas France is gaining a solid foothold in the large Latin American market.

08117

## NORWAY

### Defense Minister on Soviet Submarine Threat, Budget Cuts

36390076a Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian  
13 Jul 88 p 3

[Article by Liv Hegna: "Movement of Soviet Submarines Northward Worries Holst"]

[Text] The Soviet Union's withdrawal of Yankee submarines from the eastern coast of the United States and transfer to the Nordic territories increases the threat to Europe.

American fighter planes will replace Canadian flight squadrons in northern Norway.

Gardermoen must be rearmed for a billion kroner after the Hurum resolution.

Personnel in the Joint Chiefs of Staff will be reduced. Organizational changes are in the pipeline.

These are some of the main points from a press lunch given Tuesday by Defense Minister Johan Jorgen Holst in Oslo.

The cabinet minister pointed out, among other things, that when it comes to the navigational routes of its surface vessels, the Soviet Union is exhibiting a restraint that breaks with previous patterns. Holst was unable to say whether this is a trend based on strategic considerations. "In any case, fewer maneuvers and shorter voyages mean cutbacks in the Soviets' military working budget," he added.

### New Definition

In connection with negotiations on the conventional balance of power in Europe, Holst said that we need a new definition. "Europe isn't just from the Atlantic Ocean to the Ural Mountains, but also from the Barents Sea to the Mediterranean Sea."

The Soviet Union's transfer of Yankee submarines from the eastern coast of the United States to the Nordic territories means an increased threat to Europe. The Yankee class, which transports missiles having a range of 500-2,000 km, can only reach our territories and targets in Europe, the defense minister pointed out.

### Budget Tightening

The proposed long-term plan for the Armed Forces includes political signals of increased efficiency and more defense for each krone, according to Holst. To questions from AFTENPOSTEN about whether it is disloyal of the Armed Forces' supreme command to make a budget proposal which calls for reductions in refresher maneuvers, less recruit training, shutdown of the Troms military hospital, and elimination of the elite drill troop and the Armed Forces' special commando outfit, and cutbacks in ammunition use by the Home Guard, Holst replied that he would discuss such issues with military leaders on Wednesday.

"We'll have to navigate, fly, and practice maneuvers in new ways, so that we get more defense for every krone. A cheese slicer won't be used on all departments. Less efficient departments will be eliminated. The Joint Chiefs of Staff will be trimmed down, not the existing departments where we need forces," said the cabinet minister.

In addition, Holst said he had given the Armed Forces' chief the task of making concrete proposals for expansion of Gardermoen after the Storting resolution concerning Hurum as main airport. It will cost approximately 1 billion kroner to put the two squadron areas in usable condition, said the defense minister. Torp airport and the opportunity for allied squadrons to conduct maneuvers there will also be discussed.

### Distribution of Burden

Next Monday, cabinet minister Holst will hold talks with American Deputy Secretary of Defense William H. Taft IV in Oslo. In particular, the Norwegian will bring up the question of distributing the burden. To AFTENPOSTEN's question about whether the cabinet minister will also mention the United States' failure to make payments to the United Nations towards covering the expenses of peace-keeping forces, Holst replied: "It's an extra big burden for Norway when the United States doesn't pay its share, because the countries which provide troops bear a disproportionately large part of the burden of the UN assignment."

The defense minister added that Norway looks positively at establishment of a UN force in the Persian Gulf and is willing to participate in such a force.

#### Fighter Plane Replacements

American fighter plane squadrons are coming to northern Norway instead of the earmarked Canadian fighter plane squadrons in the CAST brigade, which is being pulled out. "It's a satisfactory replacement," stressed the defense minister.

Cabinet Minister Holst said that the Canadian battalion which will be included in the replacement force for the CAST brigade is identical to the one which is normally included in NATO's fire brigade. A Belgian battalion will relieve the Canadian one if the fire brigade is deployed in Denmark instead of northern Norway.

123276/12232

#### Women Increasingly Applying to Officer Training Schools

36390076b Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian  
7 Jul 88 p 4

[Article by Kjersti Moen: "More and More Women Apply to Officer Training Schools"]

[Text] More and more women want to attend to the Armed Forces' officer training schools. The Armed Forces' recruiting and information service thinks that this trend is the result of a successful recruiting campaign directed especially at women.

Preliminary figures show that 950 women, 16 percent of the applicants, want to attend officer training school in the autumn. This is a marked increase over last year, when women constituted 11 percent of the applicant pool.

"This is a positive trend that began when the Armed Forces opened up officer training schools to women in 1984," says Maj Gunnar Bruland, chief of the educational division. He thinks the Armed Forces' recruiting campaign can take a good deal of the credit for the trend.

In late March of this year, all Norwegian girls 18-21 years of age received a letter from the Armed Forces with some information about officer training schools and voluntary basic training. So far 6,500 girls have sent in the reply card for more information. Ten percent of them were especially interested in officer training.

At the same time as the letter campaign, the Armed Forces ran a series of advertisements in the weekly press that brought in 7,000 replies from young people, 40 percent of whom were girls.

"I believe that the letters and the simultaneous ad campaign are significant reasons why more and more women are now applying for officer training schools. But I also think that women in general have become interested in such training because it is free, embraces a wide spectrum, and can lead to a university-level education," says Maj Bruland. He also thinks that the Armed Forces' educational offer appeals to women who want nontraditional occupations.

Bruland says that the Armed Forces will continue to concentrate on similar campaigns in the future and will emphasize the portrayal of woman and men on an equal footing in informational films and other recruiting material.

But while many women would consider officer training, they seem to be less interested in basic training. During the first half of 1988, 150 women applied for basic training. That is less than half of the total figure for 1987, when 380 women applied.

Bruland does not find this development worrisome, because the Armed Forces do not face a lack of conscripts for the time being. On the other hand, the women's interest in the schools is welcome, especially because the Armed Forces are here competing with many other educational offers for the steadily smaller number of youths.

12327/12232

#### PORTUGAL

#### Munitions Shipments to Iran Continue

35420123a Lisbon DIARIO DE LISBOA  
in Portuguese 28 Jul 88 p 32

[Text] The Portuguese Explosives Company (PEC) is about to conclude preparations for yet another shipment of 155-mm artillery grenades to Iran as part of an important order signed in 1986 and scheduled for completion by the end of 1988. According to information gathered by DL through a source at the Defense Ministry, the contract, which amounts to several million contos, is far from being completed, and "will probably never be so, given that the war in the Gulf is in a state of cease-fire."

The total number of grenades already exported under the terms of the contract is no more than a third of the amount called for, added the same source, due to various difficulties relating to the procurement of imported raw materials and to payments from Tehran. The Luxair scandal in France, as well as the limitations placed on the sale of war materiel to Iran by other Western countries, are at the heart of the problems with which PEC has had to deal in acquiring the components necessary to the manufacture of the 155-mm grenades; the procurement of propulsive charges and detonators has been particularly difficult.

The responsibility for approving export contracts for war materiel from Portugal lies with the Ministry of Defense, which, on a case-by-case basis, studies the proposal and consults with the Ministry of Foreign Commerce with regard to the political advisability of the contract in question. At times, say our sources, the MFC creates obstacles, but if Defense feels that a given contract "is important, in technical terms, for national industry," discussions are held in order to overcome any objections.

In absolute terms, Portugal is involved with the embargo on the sale of arms to South Africa only through its membership in the EEC and the UN, while with regard to the rest of the world, "business opportunities are always analyzed on the basis of conscience." With regard to Iran and Iraq, and despite pressures from the US and the international consensus on limiting supplies to the countries at war in the Gulf, Portugal has continued to export to both battlefields. According to our sources, some contracts have been vetoed by the Ministry of Defense, "depending on quantities and the class of materiel," but "this has always been true, even before the U.S. intensification of the interruption of supplies to Iran." Curiously, the explanation given for this attitude was that "the Portuguese government has always been concerned that we might not sell everything that we can."

"Meanwhile, since the last trimester of last year, there has been an almost total stoppage of requests for authorization to sell to that country, but this could be as easily explained by the fact that they are no longer interested in our products as by the fact that the war is about to dissipate." The orders that still episodically come out of Setubal relate to contracts signed before the autumn of last year, and, despite the fact that the prospects for a cease-fire are far from concrete (see the news on the international pages), the current trend seems to be that the Gulf nations are becoming less and less important to the Portuguese armaments industry as compared with past years.

As regards the relative contribution to our exports made by such shipments, what we heard from the Ministry of Defense guaranteed that "the total that we have sold to Iran and Iraq since the beginning of the war would not amount to enough to sustain battle for more than 2 days."

Portugal's sales of war materiel to Iran amounted to 5,535,333 contos last year, and to Iraq, 1,091,938 contos.

12857

## **Spanish Rearmament Seen Threatening National Defense Status**

*35420124a Lisbon TEMPO in Portuguese  
4 Aug 88 p 25*

[Article by Jose Mateus]

[Text] Madrid continues to strengthen its command over NATO for the entire Luso-Iberian peninsula and neighboring areas, relegating Portugal to a subaltern position and Portuguese military forces to Madrid's authority. Despite having ceased public discussion of this policy and requested that Madrid's mass media do the same, the Felipe Gonzalez Government and the Spanish military hierarchy continue to press their combined efforts to make unified command appear as the only possible solution.

These efforts are being pressed on three distinct but unified fronts: the diplomatic front, the enormous strengthening of Madrid's military capabilities, and the offensive on Portuguese public opinion.

TEMPO has obtained the necessary information from reliable sources and has confirmed them with high political and intelligence authorities. In Portuguese circles involved in national defense and the military leadership, one notes today an enormous concern for what is silently occurring.

The Madrid government continues to drop hints about and insist upon, to allied leaders and NATO, the "inevitability" of the unified command under Spanish authority, and Madrid's capacity for exercising control in the Ibero-African Atlantic region, which encompasses Portugal, Morocco and Spain. That is the essence of the permanent diplomatic offensive.

## **Sophisticated Weapons**

Great efforts are being made in the military sphere. In addition to various reorganizations with a view to obtaining greater efficiency and better use of resources, the Madrid government has recently made important decisions on new and sophisticated ways of participating in agreements and projects with allied countries who possess the most advanced technology; the recruitment of women; and policy toward so-called conscientious objectors.

Most important among the decisions affecting weapons systems acquisitions have been the purchase of sophisticated systems for the Navy and the Army.

One hundred fifty billion pesetas have been invested in support systems and infrastructure for the navy's Naval Air Combat Group [GACM], whose total cost is budgeted at more than 300 billion pesetas. The GACM will

include the aircraft carrier Principe de Asturias, which entered service in May, and four antisubmarine combat frigates, constructed at Galicia's Ferrol shipyards under American license.

The Navy will also be provided with six more minesweepers and a 17-ton supply ship.

In the Army, in addition to acquiring a new armored system for the 150 AMX-30 personnel carriers, the modernization of which was initiated in 1986 with the installation of a new motor, modification of the chassis and installation of a new firing control with night vision, 18 Super Puma AS-332 helicopters have been ordered, of which 6 have already been delivered. The Air Force already possesses 12 of these helicopters. For low-altitude antiair defense, 18 Roland missile systems have been acquired, at a cost of 12 billion pesetas.

For coastal defense in the Gibraltar region, the Army will receive four mobile air-to-sea Harpoon missile systems. They had already earlier acquired Harpoon air-to-sea missiles for F-18 jets.

For the Air Force, five P-3B Orion airplanes will be acquired from Norway to replace the obsolete P-3A Orions that will be returned to the USA.

In addition, the Felipe Gonzalez Government has decreed full access to the Army and National Guard for women, as professionals with full rights of participation in the military academies of 24 technical schools and institutions. Women will even be able to advance to the rank of general. With this measure, the Gonzalez Government hopes to obtain the participation of a component of the population that is valued especially highly in new military technologies and the characteristics of modern combat.

#### Conscientious Objectors

The Gonzalez Government has decided that objectors must provide service, and has defined areas in which this service may be performed. As a result, objectors must complete a period of service in nonprofit enterprises and in publicly administrated centers involved in civil protection, environmental conservation, rural development, natural resource protection, and health. They can even be assigned social service tasks in areas involving community, family, elderly and ethnic minority activities. Here they might provide services supporting the prevention of delinquency and the reintegration of former prisoners, alcoholics and drug addicts.

#### Acquisition of High Technology

Rearmament and the optimization of material and human resources has yet another very important component: participation in programs and projects with allied countries possessing more advanced technologies. Thus

they obtain not only immediate results but also the transfer of technology with a medium-term impact on the entire industrial apparatus.

Madrid is already participating in the Naval Antiair Combat System in which Canada, Holland, West Germany, England and the United States are also collaborators. This program aims at equipping frigates and ships of the highest classifications for antiair combat.

Madrid has established with France a bilateral agreement for naval air cooperation in the Mediterranean, and for Spanish participation in the French military observation satellite Helios. This agreement anticipates the construction of a data reception center in the Canaries, as well as the joint use of AWACS airplanes.

Madrid is also attempting to place a representative on the Defense and Security Council, created last November by Germany and France, as well as to incorporate Spanish troops into the Joint Franco-German Brigade.

#### A Destabilizing Opinion

A third front in this offensive is Portuguese public opinion. Sources involved in these matters have pointed out to us that "they are trying to permanently destabilize Portuguese public opinion from Castela, at times with the unwitting collaboration of Portuguese authorities, in order to misrepresent the Portuguese military apparatus and isolate it in Portuguese public opinion." In these efforts the Portuguese media, confirming their ingenuousness or perhaps something else, have been a vehicle of privileged influence and penetration... This "influence," which relegates the national interest and permanent national objectives to distant priority, is served by sophisticated techniques and cannot be confused with criticisms accurately aimed at the functioning of certain governmental institutions or to their isolation from the realities facing Portugal and within which it attempts to guarantee its future as a sovereign nation.

These same sources assure us that the objective is obvious to those who wish to "read it." Madrid hopes to achieve the internal and external, military and political conditions to be able to present itself as the only state with the necessary capacity and coherence in the Ibero-African Atlantic region, definitively subjugating the other two states in the region, Portugal and Morocco.

It is in this sense that certain sectors of Madrid life and some of the media do not hesitate to affirm that Portugal "is a country whose existence no longer makes sense." In American, that is translated as "has been."

### **Funds Needed for 'Satisfactory' A-7P Aircraft Maintenance**

*35420123b Lisbon O DIA in Portuguese  
20 Jul 88 pp 14-15*

[Article by Manuel Catarino]

[Text] We flew in an A-7P Corsair, one of the 50 pursuit bombers bought by the Portuguese Air Force from the US Navy. Aboard a plane piloted by Maj Donato, we took part in a mission involving this aircraft and another in a ground attack. The target was a railroad bridge between Baleizao and Serpa. It was more than an hour's flight at an altitude of 150 meters. And, incredible as it seems, we flew as low as 50 feet, about 15 meters, and at a speed of 900 km/hr.

This A-7P model is a descendant of the American A-7A. The Portuguese version has a remodeled body as compared with the first models, and is equipped with modern electronic systems. In the opinion of Maj Pinheiro, the pilot of the other plane that participated in the training mission, "Our Corsair maneuvers and accelerates better than those piloted by the Americans and Greeks, is even lighter, and, from the electronics standpoint, is more advanced than those others." On the other hand, "we are at a relative disadvantage regarding armament," he says.

In 1979, our Air Force bought 20 of these aircraft. The other 30 arrived in 1982. All of them were bought from the U.S. Navy, who had contracted them from Voight Corporation in Dallas in order to make the modifications in the planes for Portugal. The purchase was broadened to include 18 A-7A's that could be used for engines, accessories and backup equipment.

It is clear that the A-7P fleet, stationed at the Monte Real Air Base, has had a low rate of operability. According to sources we contacted, this is due exclusively to the financial resources available for purchasing: "In fact, with the initial order, engines, accessories and backup equipment were purchased, as well as spare parts, but all of them in small quantities because there was no money for more." The budgets for subsequent years did not allow for offsetting the shortages. As a result, the reserve equipment needed to support the fleet is today manifestly insufficient.

This is the major problem for the Portuguese Corsairs: lack of money. But this does not explain the nine accidents suffered by the fleet.

"It is a good aircraft for a certain kind of mission—ground attack—which it carries out very well, without question," Maj Donato, the commander of Squad 304, "The Magnificents," told us. The plane "is perfect for the Portuguese Air Force. It is clear, however, that the plane suffers from some restrictions that have nothing to do with the aircraft itself."

It is also clear that no other PAF fleet ever suffered as many accidents as the Corsairs. "Because no others were ever flown so much, and no other planes were pushed so far as the A-7P; we fly them a lot, we fly under more varied weather conditions, and, as a result, the risk factor is higher," says Maj Pinheiro.

The Air Force has resorted to cannibalization of the Corsairs, taking parts from some planes to put others in the air. This is not because of a shortage of material in the marketplace, but because the TF-30 engines with which the planes are equipped are no longer being manufactured. The A-7P's are "being fed by their mates, because finances do not allow the purchase of the spare parts needed. And if this is not a serious problem now, a few years from now the Air Force will find itself in a real mess."

The discontinuation of the manufacture of the engines creates a real problem if new engines are needed. The manufacturer still makes spare parts for the TF-30. If only there were money with which to buy them...but there isn't. And the shortage of backup equipment is being felt in other fleets of the Air Force, as well.

In the United States, the TF-30 engines in the A-7 planes were replaced by the more powerful TF-41. And new motors in ours would be welcomed by the pilots. But the high command of the Air Force doesn't even want to hear about this because such an operation would be so expensive.

"The planes are just about like they were when they arrived," a pilot from Squad 304 at the Monte Real Air Base told us. "As we see it, the plane could be improved, especially with a new motor. With the new TF-41, we would have a better plane." It's all a question of money.

12857

## **SWITZERLAND**

### **Formation of Full-Time Militia Readiness Unit Urged**

*36200205 Frauenfeld SCHWEIZER SOLDAT + MFD  
in German Jul 88 pp 8-9*

[Article by Prof Dr Rudolf Kurz: "A Readiness Unit—Overcoming a Weakness of the Militia"]

[Text] With a certainty that leaves no room for doubt, we increasingly have to admit that modern military developments do not favor the militia idea. The Swiss defense system, which arose under fundamentally different circumstances than prevail today, is meeting increasing difficulties. While these do not raise doubts about the principle as a whole, they do here and there require corrective measures which begin to affect the system. We must, however, be aware of the danger in undermining the militia principle. The militia is the form of defense appropriate to our special circumstances, and we must

preserve it in as pure a form as possible, because any large-scale abandonment of this principle—or even significant deviation from it—would lead to a weakening of our inward defensive strength. Concern for the militia must be a priority in everything we do; only when unavoidable reasons make it urgently necessary to do so, can we fail to be governed by that concern.

The development of modern, highly-technical warfare creates various difficulties for the militia:

1. The short training periods characteristic of the militia make it more and more difficult to provide the training necessary to handle increasingly complicated military technology. Of course the considerable technical knowledge and ability of the Swiss militia soldier help a great deal, and the most serious difficulties can be eased through efforts to secure maximum "militia-usability" of equipment. Nonetheless, we face growing demands that increasingly call for new solutions, such as greater specialization in training and service, even more thorough exploitation by the Army of civilian resources, and the use of civilian professional personnel who can be militarized at mobilization.

2. By its entire structure—the callup of the male population in particular—the militia system is made for war once mobilization comes. Long periods of active service reveal the weaknesses of the militia compared to a standing Army; the militia is badly suited for long service at full strength. The need soon arises for rotation, leave, and exemptions, which are among the unavoidable evils of the militia.

3. The current military situation makes it necessary that certain elements of military defense be fully ready even in peacetime, rather than go into action only at a time of increased tension, much less danger. Besides the intelligence service, whose most important work is actually done in peacetime, this particularly includes the various warning and security elements, in particular those responsible for operating the technical installations required to guard our airspace. To a considerable extent, the requirement that the safeguards against surprise attacks operate permanently is met in peacetime by the use of soldiers who are employed as civil servants and can be militarized at short notice in case of mobilization in order to carry out the same tasks as before, but as military personnel. The military administration has increasingly become a supplementary "personnel reservoir" for the militia.

4. In an age when there is a constant possibility of being attacked with very little notice, the most dangerous disadvantage of the pure militia is the lack of an immediately available, powerful military presence. As a matter of principle, the militia Army is not "present" in peacetime; apart from those that happen to be in training, it lacks immediately ready combat units. The Army comes into being only upon full or partial war mobilization,

when units which are only potentially available in peacetime are "activated" (whence the term "active service"). Since the militia is normally only mobilized in case of danger, there is no small risk that it will achieve combat-readiness too late, permitting the aggressor to attain initial successes that can not be reversed.

#### Immediate Security Measures

Military authorities have taken various measures of a technical and organizational nature in recent years to overcome the dangerous "early weakness" characteristic of the militia. These include the expansion of the intelligence service; the refinement of the mobilization apparatus in all its ramifications; the intent to mobilize as early as possible; and the practice of having combat units in being throughout the year on a refresher course basis, to be ready immediately as the first units into battle. The final step in this series of security measures was to create special airfield formations, an airfield regiment for Kloten and an airfield battalion for Cointin; their mission is to provide military protection for the major airports. In order to make mobilization possible in the shortest possible time, these formations consist as far as possible of soldiers residing in the vicinity. A first gap-bridging measure of this type—one still of significance today—was taken back at the beginning of World War II with the creation of the Pilot-Guard Squadron, which, as a permanent, professional flying unit, is ready for immediate service in the air.

#### Permanently Ready Units

The Army command is aware that the corrections already undertaken have done much to ease existing difficulties but that from a military point of view, the militia's greatest weakness—the lack of strong, permanently ready combat units—has not been corrected. Consequently, the two army models of 1980 and 1984-87 pointed out this dangerous gap in our defense readiness and noted that it will be necessary in the immediate future to take measures to permit us to meet a strategic attack on our country with the fastest-possible, strongest-possible defense, one such as the neutral states of Sweden and Austria have also prepared.

#### Creation of a Readiness Unit

Whereas the two army models merely formulated in very general terms the necessity of increasing our immediate readiness, the idea took more concrete form in early 1986 in statements which the chief of the General Staff, Corps Commander Luethy, made on the issue of increasing the Army's readiness in case of mobilization. In these personal comments, Luethy called for the creation of a small, well-trained readiness corps equipped with the most effective weapons and equipment available. This new organization would be part of the militia system and would not constitute a professional unit. At present soldiers must serve a total of about 1 year's service in peacetime; this is divided up into numerous military

courses: recruits school and refresher, supplementary, and Landsturm courses. One possible arrangement for the new system would be to have a certain group of soldiers serve the whole of their peacetime service obligation all at once in a single year. These soldiers would form a new unit which would be combat ready throughout the year. This year's service would fulfill their entire military obligation at once and they would be exempt from any further service in peacetime. Since this service would correspond roughly to current requirements, these soldiers could not be considered professionals. As stated above, this suggestion by the General Staff chief is a personal idea which still needs thorough study. In addition, the responsible authorities still have not made any decisions on it or issued any guidelines. Nonetheless, the then head of the Federal Department of the Military, Federal Councillor Delamuraz, told the press that the suggestion was "more than just a trial balloon from the Department of the Military," and that such plans were being seriously studied.

#### Not a Professional Unit

The establishment of a permanent readiness unit would be a fundamental innovation in our Army, one which would have significant consequences in certain respects. Consequently, we must come to grips with the plan and its effects early on and thoroughly think through the entire complex of problems associated with this innovation. Let us take a somewhat closer look at the individual elements of the proposed solution. 1. Would the Readiness Unit Constitute a Professional Unit?

The General Staff chief's plan assumes that the readiness unit would not constitute a truly professional unit, because its personnel would only be fulfilling the 1 year total service that is required of the entire Army, the sole difference being that this service would be served all at once rather than be divided into a large number of shorter periods. On the other hand, it is not intended to call up the members of the readiness unit for longer service. This fact is important primarily in political terms, because to a considerable extent it takes into account our people's deeply-rooted dislike of anything professional in the Army, and particularly of the fear that the government might create an instrument of power to strengthen itself and suppress the free opinion of the people.

Nor would the readiness unit as now planned violate the provisions of Article 13 of the Federal Constitution, which states that the federal government is not permitted to maintain standing units. Of course, from a military point of view the readiness unit would be a "standing unit." But it is not the intent of Article 13 to ban a unit serving the purposes of foreign defense; rather, history and the spirit of the article prove that its intent is to guarantee the nation's freedoms against attempts by the cantons and federal government to suppress those freedoms using standing government units. Article 13 of the Federal Constitution does not constitutionally require

the militia *tout court*; this provision is of purely historic significance and is intended only to prevent the creation of professional units that could be misused to impose the will of the government on the people. For these reasons, a whole series of military organizations, the professional nature of which was obvious, have been created without arousing significant objections:

- the militarily-organized Gotthard and St Maurice Fort Watches, which were created in the last century;
- the 14 volunteer border guard companies that were set up between 1936 and 1938, mainly from the unemployed, and attained a total strength of 3,000 men;
- the Fortress Watch Corps set up in 1941 by combining the old fort watches and the voluntary border guard companies;
- the Guard Squadron, which was created in 1941 on the basis of a 1939 Federal Council decision. 2. What Would Be the Relationship Between the Readiness Unit and the Militia System?

Because the militia system is not bindingly required by any provision in the Constitution, the question as to the relationship of the readiness unit to the militia principle is not an issue from a purely legal point of view. Because, moreover, there is no unambiguous, legally-established definition of the militia principle, experience shows that the question of what constitutes militia can easily turn into a fight over words. In view of the great significance of the militia for our Army, however, we must attempt to clarify these concepts. According to the definition of the militia which is generally accepted in Switzerland, the militia is characterized by two elements: on the one hand, the lack of professional cadres and professional units, and on the other hand, the Swiss Army's unique system of military training, i.e., the division of this training into basic military training (recruits school) and a system of numerous shorter refresher courses distributed throughout the soldier's entire "military life." This means that the soldier is a soldier all his life. We cannot ignore the fact that these fundamental principles could not be retained in all respects by the planned readiness unit. Even though in quantitative terms, the personnel of the readiness troop would only be doing the service already demanded today, the concentration of this service into 1 year would constitute an element of "professionalism" that scarcely accords with the true nature of the militia. This would probably be true above all of the cadres of the readiness unit, where it would scarcely be possible to exclude the professional element entirely. An even clearer deviation from the militia system would come in the readiness unit's training; here, it would hardly be possible to retain the distribution of the various training periods throughout the entire military career that is fundamental to the militia, since the entire training would be concentrated into the single year. Thus, the new unit would inevitably constitute a certain deviation from the militia principle.

This fact certainly does not constitute a compelling objection to the creation of a readiness unit, if one

proves technically possible. The decisive point is that its creation would not violate any law. Whether we are willing to accept a partial deviation from the militia system in the case of a single unit of limited size is a question of military policy. Surely, however, in light of

the imperative demands of the current world situation, the effort to attain maximum military security must take precedence over the more theoretical misgivings.

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## FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

### Lafontaine Demands More Federal Funds for Saarland

36200207c Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER  
ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG in German 5 Jul 88 p 11

[Unattributed article: "Lafontaine Demands DM2 Billion From Bonn"]

[Text] Bonn, 4 July—Difficult consultations on the economic advancement of the Saarland lie ahead today, Tuesday, in the Federal Chancellor's Office. Federal Chancellor Kohl has called for a Saarland Conference after the manner of last February's Ruhr Conference. Some 10 members of the federal cabinet will participate in the big session involving politicians of all parties, economists, union officials and scientists. For the conference, Saarland Minister President Oskar Lafontaine has presented a catalog of demands which, in effect, call for the Federal Government to put more than DM2 billion in additional funds at Saarland's disposal over the next 5 years. Right after the Ruhr Conference Lafontaine had said that he would not be able to rest content with the assistance which had been negotiated from the Federal Government by North Rhine-Westphalia. The paper issued by the Saarland Land government (FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG of 9 June) bears the title: "For a Modern Saarland Region."

Federal Chancellor Kohl wishes to emphasize his willingness to further advance the cause of the Saarland region. In the past 5 years the Federal Government has paid DM7.6 billion for the most important measures to promote regional and investment development, as well as for labor market policy in the Saarland. In addition, extensive assistance has either been approved or is planned for 1988 and 1989. The largest sum is forthcoming from the newly-arranged fiscal adjustment of federal supplementary payments to the Saarland amounting to an estimated DM640 million by the end of 1989. Approximately DM300 million will be paid in 1988 as assistance to the coal sector. As a co-proprietor will be paid in 1988 as assistance to the coal sector. As a co-proprietor of Saarland mining, the Federal Government is jointly assuming losses of DM118 million this year. In case of a union of Saar Steel Voelklingen and Dillinger Steelworks, the Federal Government has pledged to disencumber the enterprise within the framework of guaranteed credits. At the beginning of this year these credits, with a term extending to 1997, already amounted to DM770 million, inclusive of interest.

Nonetheless, Kohl does not want the Saarland Conference to be understood as a meeting at which more money is to be demanded unilaterally from the Federal Government. From all accounts, Kohl wishes to press for stronger commitment on the part of all those who, amid the difficult processes of adaptation for the Saarland's mining and foundry areas, and with the Saarland's strained budgetary situation, bear responsibility for the

region. As is stated in a treatise by the Federal Ministry for Economics, greater individual initiative for the Saarland's restructuring must be mobilized—whether in the form of increased renovation of enterprises, or greater mobility and flexibility on the part of workers. For that, non-uniformly structured wage settlements are also required.

Lafontaine's call for renewal and modernization is welcomed by the Federal Government. His presentation of approximately 40 pages in length is criticized as an inadequate and non-self-consistent plan. The Federal Government has long been making considerable contributions to "socially cushion" the necessary restructuring of the Saarland, to create new jobs and to promote the fiscal and economic strength of the region as a whole. The Saarland catalog demands additional help from Bonn—above all for regional development, for the development of research and technology, for special programs for renovation and the establishment of new institutions for the strengthening of the Saarland region.

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## PORTUGAL

### Interest Expressed in Purchase of Nationalized Enterprises

35190096a Paris LA TRIBUNE DE L'EXPANSION  
in French 22 Jul 88 p 3

[Article by Carlos de Veiga Pereira in Lisbon and Daniele Gervais in Paris]

[Text] The "French-style" process is already arousing the criticism of those who fear the "hard core" and the reactions of the stock market. For their part, the French bankers, while criticizing the archaism of the local market, see in it a profitable "no bank's land."

The government of Anibal Cavaco Silva, the Portuguese prime minister, now wants to carry out the privatization process as quickly as possible. Since the passage in February of a law authorizing conversion of public enterprises into limited private companies—in which the state, however, is to retain a majority—nothing has yet been done, other than the pending sale of a daily paper and a newspaper printing plant.

A revision of the Constitution is required for exceeding the limit of 49 percent: it would very probably be voted, since the PSD (the prime minister's party) is in favor, and the Socialist Party (of President Mario Soares) now hardly has any objections. However, the discussions stumble over the choice of the enterprises to privatize, with the Socialist Party wanting prior and binding agreement of two-thirds of Parliament.

It was in order to put pressure on Parliament that Cavaco Silva decided to immediately initiate the process for two enterprises, one industrial and the other financial; and this despite the criticisms of the Portuguese Industry Confederation, which would have liked him to await the possibility of a 100-percent privatization.

The first enterprise is a group established in 1975, UNICER, which at that time had taken over some bankrupt breweries. UNICER achieved quite a remarkable restoration, since, with its own production, its production under license and the distribution of various beverages, it today occupies almost 52 percent of the Portuguese market, with a net profit of 587 million escudos in 1987, or some 23.5 million francs.

#### Picture of Economic Recovery

(Percent change in volume, 1977 prices)

|                     | 1985 | 1986 | 1987 | 1988 | 1989 |
|---------------------|------|------|------|------|------|
| Domestic demand     | 1.0  | 7.9  | 9.9  | 6.0  | 5.0  |
| Investment (FBCF)   | 3.0  | 9.5  | 19.0 | 10.0 | 8.0  |
| GDP (market prices) | 3.3  | 4.3  | 5.0  | 4.25 | 3.5  |
| Consumer prices     | 18.9 | 12.0 | 9.5  | 6.5  | 5.75 |
| Unemployment        | 9.2  | 9.1  | 7.8  | 7.5  | 7.25 |

Source: Perspectives Economiques de l'OCDE, 10 Jun 88

Simultaneously, the fourth largest Portuguese bank, Banco Totta e Acores, will be put on the market. Formerly the bank of the CUF—an industrial and financial conglomerate of the Mello family—this institution had a large deficit in 1975 when many enterprises were nationalized. It was beginning in 1986 and particularly in 1987 that recovery of bad debts enabled it to regain equilibrium. Last year it had a cash flow of 8.5 billion escudos (340 million francs).

This week, Cavaco Silva is appointing a commission composed of representatives of the concerned ministries.

It is to examine not the enterprises to be privatized, but the international staffs of accounting experts to be selected on 16 August, following a call for applications to be published in the major European and American papers. Finance Minister Miguel Cadilhe will be able to intervene to change the selection.

The auditing enterprises thus selected will then have the task of evaluating UNICER and Totta e Acores, whose sale will take place in March-April 1989. Of the 49 percent of the capital privatized, 20 percent will be reserved for employees of the enterprises concerned and private investors (individuals), with the share price to be established in advance. Since it is unlikely that employees will be able to buy a large number of shares, many fear one will see the old owners reappearing at lower cost in the enterprise capital.

The remaining 29 percent will be placed on the stock market. Portuguese and foreign enterprises will be able to buy them, however, in order to leave room for individual holders, quotas are set for them out of the overall 49 percent: a maximum 10 percent for Portuguese and 5 percent for foreigners. It remains to be seen whether the control facilities of the stock market authorities will be able to impose respect for these quotas.

It is certain that debate involving the "hard core" will develop in Portugal between now and the end of the year. The enterprises to be privatized are of interest to investors. A group of capitalists of Porto and Lisbon is forming in anticipation of the UNICER sale, but foreign interest has also been shown. The same is true for Totta e Acores.

Finally, certain economists are concerned about the ability to absorb new share issues, since the Portuguese capital market is very limited and the Lisbon stock market has not recovered well from October's crash. This concern has also contributed to restraining the prime minister's privatizing enthusiasm.

10

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