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JPRS-WER-88-053
26 SEPTEMBER 1988



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DENMARK

Party System Seen Undergoing Change as Memberships Decline

Party Membership Rolls Dropping

36130087 Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 11 Aug 88 pp 1

[Article by Susanne Heglund]

[Summary] Danes no longer feel like joining political party organizations. The parties have in fact "no longer anything to offer," states the political science professor, Mogens N. Pedersen, of Odense University. He proposes that we adopt the American party system, where people are content with being active only during election campaigns.

Increasingly fewer Danes are joining a political party. In 1953, 23 percent of Danish voters were organized in a party. Currently the number is a little under 10 percent.

"This is a big problem for especially the old parties, which have based their organizations on democratic structures with a very great width. They no longer have this," asserted Pedersen. Since 1961, the four "old" parties—Social Democrats, Radical Liberals, Conservatives and Liberals—have lost well over half their members. Just in the last years, the Liberal and Conservative Parties have together lost around 17,000 members.

Pedersen states that it is the Social Democrats, Liberals and Conservatives which have been most affected. "These parties must adjust to a new form of party system," he states, pointing to the American model, which only requires work from party members up until the election.

That Danes are generally no longer eager to organize themselves politically is also seen in the fact that the new parties which have appeared since the 1970s have not, to any great extent, been able to recruit members leaving the old parties. "These new parties will never have a strong membership impact on the electorate, since their voters are too new and independent," explains Pedersen.

Christian Party Is Exception

An exception is the Christian People's Party which with its 11,000 members still occupies a very comfortable position in relation to its vote figure. In contrast, only quite a few Socialist People's Party voters join the party organization, which still nonetheless is one of the few having enjoyed a membership increase in recent years. In 1982, the Socialist People's Party had barely over 6,000 members, and today it has well over 9,000 organized [members].

There is some uncertainty surrounding party membership figures, because some parties "hide" the real numbers behind a long list of honorary members and former members who someone "forgot" to take off the rolls. Other parties simply do not register the members centrally at all.

"But the trend is clearly downward, and there is really nothing that has been proposed to hold onto the voters," thinks Pedersen. "They can indeed meet the politicians on television, and where they previously played bingo in the local voters' association meeting, they can now play bingo on television."

That a party now and then still can have a "boom" is explained by the fact that it may suddenly be "modern" to belong to a particular party. "This was seen, for example, with the Conservatives in the early years of this decade, when Poul Schluter attracted many into the party," says Pedersen.

"There is also a clear trend that members are becoming older and older." Therefore, the party organizations are about to ossify or simply die out. "For the younger voters, it is more natural to organize a petition drive or a demonstration than to talk with a party chapter president or a member of parliament."

That the Danes are slowly and calmly losing interest in organizing themselves politically may also be connected with the fact that it is difficult to advance within Danish politics.

"Politically ambitious voters do not get much out of being members, because there are so few patronage positions in this country," says the professor. "In the other Nordic countries, where far more voters are organized than in Denmark, there are proportionally twice as many political patronage jobs on local and national levels. There the voters can more easily obtain a career position in politics from being active as a member."

That the parties over the last couple of years have received government subsidies in Denmark is something which also bears a portion of the responsibility for members fleeing. "The party assistance system was in actuality the closest thing they were able to come up with to a national pension plan for party organization workers," says Pedersen.

The Professor finds it "very conceivable" that "the parties will be unable to stop the membership flight." He points out that there must be a minimum number for a party to remain a functioning apparatus.

"If the membership figures falls below a certain size, the decisions are no longer legitimate. Why should someone heed a Congress or executive council if it only represents quite a small portion of the voters," he asks.

The parties must instead adopt a new form of party system. "The American model, where the party organizations can mount a lot of activity on special occasions is not a bad idea, because it makes it possible for people to be active every other year or every 4th year, and then they can submerge themselves and wait again," says Pedersen.

In the United States, the voters register themselves as either Democrats or Republicans for a primary, and then can then have an influence as to who will be the party's candidate. In the opinion of Professor Pedersen, this is equally as democratic as the Danish system, "where 20 people decide who will be the candidate."

Leaders Dislike 'American Model'

36130087 Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 12 Aug 88 p 4

[Article by Susanne Heglund]

[Text] The political parties recognize that there is a problem with members fleeing. There is no definitive solution to the problem, they say, but they are in agreement that the American model, where the voters register themselves for each election, is unusable in Denmark.

Folketing President Svend Jakobsen (Social Democrat) ought to place himself at the head of a campaign which will inventory the achievements of the Danish democratic system. That would be a way to stop the flight of members from the parties, thinks Radical Liberal Party General Secretary Jens Clausager. "The parties must solve the problem of membership flight in common," says Clausager, who could conceive a joint PR campaign on television and newspapers.

Since 1961, well over half the voters have left their parties, and there is no sign of this trend changing. Today, only a bare 8 percent of the voters are organized in a party, contrasted with 30 years ago, when a little over 20 percent were tied to a party.

Today, the Liberal Party has the country's highest organization percent, 20 percent, and Group Chairman Ivar Hansen does not see the existing party system as "so wrong yet." In any case, he does not have any immediate solution as to how the voters can be enticed back into the fold.

"But the American system is a poor solution. Of course it is important to be included in selecting a candidate, which the registered voters have the possibility of doing, but it is at least as important that the one selected has a base he can use," says Hansen.

Nor does Folketing President Jakobsen trust in the American model. "There is nothing to find there. We must not forget that there is an incredibly great difference between Danish and American society," he says, pointing out that the Danish voters, despite everything, are more active than are the American voters.

In contrast, Jakobsen points to a stronger decentralizing of party organizations as one way to get more members. "But until now we have only placed emphasis on common solutions, and therefore change is not without difficulties," he admits.

Conservative Hans Engell thinks that the political parties themselves bear major responsibility for the flight. "They have not modernized political work, but instead operate according to the same model as in the 1940s, without taking into consideration that women today work outside the home, and that young families are entirely excluded from party work because they cannot find anyone to take care of the children."

He, therefore, proposes that the organizations devote more effort on social activities, in which members can be brought together. "But we can never return to when we had the large memberships of 100,000-200,000 again," he states.

Newspaper Views Parties' Future

36130087 Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 12 Aug 88 p 10

[Editorial: "Future of the Political Parties"]

[Text] It is naturally disturbing that in the political parties it is no longer the case everywhere that new forces appear where the old ones. Because this is nevertheless what is in reality happening in most parties; the members are not fleeing—the number of resignations is quite small (and the [recent] loan interest surcharge issue has not changed this)—but it is unbelievably hard to renew the membership pool.

It is disturbing because the parties—even though they are not mentioned at all in the Constitution—play such a significant role in political life. It is the party members who select the candidates for the Folketing, county councils and in municipal governments, that the elected representatives—to a greater or less extent—receive inspiration for new initiatives and get reactions to the legislation adopted at Christianborg and on the local level.

Explanations regarding the steadily dropping organization percent are many, and the massive voter migrations as another expression of loss of trust, perhaps not least among the nonsocialist voters. If there are really great problems in maintaining the membership figures than before, then one cannot avoid discussing unfulfilled expectations of the voters regarding a nonsocialist government and disappointment over the behavior of the

Social Democrats in opposition. In addition, there is the dissatisfaction felt that the parties have voted themselves government subsidies—and thereby themselves having undermined their role as fighting organizations, and contributed in establishing themselves as a sort of semi-official institutions without need of public backing.

There is good reason to holding a discussion on modernizing party work, so that the parties can attract more voters. The former general secretary of the Conservative Party, Torben Rechendorff, and Professor Mogens N. Pedersen of Odense University have both pointed to "the American model," where parties can swell up before an election and then include all those who allow themselves to be registered as party members, after which they can have an influence on the choice of candidates. It would clearly be a step in the right direction to provide more voters with an opportunity to influence candidate selection for the Folketing, county councils and municipal governments. But this is definitely not enough. The dialogue between the voters and their elected representatives must be intensified—and also among the voters. When the parties suffer a drop in membership, perhaps this can be attributed just to they have neglected that mission, that many now former members felt themselves to be without influence on the policies of their party (just as the elected representatives lack understanding among the members!), and that young voters do not consider such type of activity as attractive.

Various "grassroots movements" have—in contrast to the parties—been able to attract many new and active members. This is attributed not only to the objectives of these associations, but also to the form of their work.

The political parties have much to learn!

/12223

FINLAND

Parliamentary Foreign Affairs Panel Wants Greater Influence

36170104a Helsinki *HELSINGIN SANOMAT* in Finnish 13 Aug 88 1p 10

[Text] The chairman of the Parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee, Markus Aaltonen (Social Democrat), has called the Foreign Affairs Committee together next Wednesday in order to clarify Finnish readiness to participate in United Nations' peacekeeping activities, primarily in Namibia, but also in Iran and Iraq.

According to Aaltonen, the Foreign Affairs Committee has once during a parliamentary recess since 1968, when a meeting was arranged then because of the crisis in Czechoslovakia.

Now the Committee is attempting to strengthen its own role in foreign policy matters: "The position of the Committee is not weakly defined in the constitution. Nevertheless it has not up to now taken part in foreign affairs even to the extent mandated by law," says Aaltonen.

The Foreign affairs Committee has requested a briefing for Wednesday from Foreign Minister, Kalevi Sorsa (Social Democrat), and the Ministry of Defense, about those regional crises in which the peace process has begun to bear fruit.

"Matters might begin to unfold rather rapidly now. If we were to wait for the fall, we might be left in a lurch," Aaltonen defends his call for the meeting on short notice. Finland has announced its readiness to send two battalions of peace keeping forces to Namibia.

The dispatching of the monitoring forces is decided by the President of the Republic at a cabinet meeting. The Foreign Affairs Committee is expected to make its own statement about the matter.

Chile Not Considered

According to Markus Aaltonen, the Foreign Affairs Committee is not planning to consider Outokumpu's copper projects in Chile, nor the government's guarantee decision, at its Wednesday meeting in the festival suite of the Cabinet.

At least the chairman of the Deva's parliamentary group, Ensio Laine, has demanded that the Committee be called together because of the Chile dispute. Laine is an alternate member of the Committee.

Aaltonen says that "Apparently the demands are not too serious, since no one has contacted me." Aaltonen will not bring up the Chile dispute in the Committee without good reason.

12989

CP Stalinist District Supporting Tennilaa for Chairmanship

36170104b Helsinki *HELSINGIN SANOMAT* in Finnish 13 Aug 88 p 10

[Text] The Tampere district committee of SKP-Unity and representatives of the party conference chose Representative Esko-Juhani Tennilaa as the candidate for the party chairmanship. The decision was made at an election in which Tennilaa received 50 votes, Jouko Kajanoja 20, and Yrjo Hakanen 1 vote.

The party's central committee will choose a chairman during the party conference in Turku at the end of August. The party's present leader, Taisto Sinisalo, announced in June that he was resigning his position.

The Tampere delegation gave the most support to ex-Representatives Mikko Kuoppa, Marja-Liisa Loyttyjarvi and Yrjo Hakanen. Kajanoja was nominated to continue as secretary general. The Tampere committee also nominated Yrjo Hakanen and Hannu Nieminen for this position.

12989

Poll: Voter Satisfaction With Holkeri Government Shows Drop

36170089a *Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish* 27 Jun 88 p 21

[Text] Satisfaction with Prime Minister Harri Holkeri (Conservative Party) and the government he leads has clearly continued to drop since previous polls were taken.

According to the results of a poll published Friday by the Oulu newspaper KALEVA, in spite of the growing number of dissatisfied, those satisfied with the government still outnumber those dissatisfied.

According to the study, about one-third of the population is satisfied and less than a quarter dissatisfied with the government. The opinion poll was conducted by Suomen Gallup and consisted of 904 interviews.

In a poll conducted around the beginning of June, 4 percent of those responding were extremely satisfied with the Holkeri government; the comparable figure at the end of last year was 6 percent and a year ago 9 percent. The number of those quite satisfied had decreased from 36 percent in the previous polls to 29 percent.

Thirty-five percent of the respondents reported that they are currently "partly satisfied and partly dissatisfied;" in previous polls, the percentages were 29 and 20 percent. The number of those quite dissatisfied is now 17 percent, five percent more than at the end of last year and 12 percent more than a year ago.

The number of extremely dissatisfied also rose somewhat and is now at 6 percent in comparison to the earlier figures of 5 and 2 percent. The number of "don't know" respondents had declined clearly and is now 12 percent compared to 12 and 27 percent previously.

The members of the Finnish Social Democratic Party (SDP) and the Conservative Party continue to be the most satisfied with the government. Among the supporters of the SDP the number of satisfied has even increased 5 percent from last fall to the present 44 percent.

The supporters of the Conservative Party, on the other hand, are not nearly as satisfied with the Holkeri government as they were last fall. In general, the satisfaction figure fell 24 percent to stand now at 53 percent. Open dissatisfaction colors the Center Party and SKDL and as

well as the attitudes of the Greens who have turned quite sharply in a negative direction. Among the supporters of the Finnish Rural Party, both the satisfied and the dissatisfied have raised their profiles, but the number of the dissatisfied has clearly increased more. Among the different segments of the population, the Holkeri government continues to appeal mostly to the white-collar population.

Dissatisfaction with Prime Minister Holkeri's personal performance has also increased, according to the opinion poll. The number of those very satisfied decreased from last spring's 14 percent to four percent. Moderately satisfied among the respondents now number 29 percent, whereas the comparable figure last spring was 41 percent. The partly satisfied and partly dissatisfied opinions are now represented by 32 percent of the respondents. Last spring this figure was 20 percent.

Nineteen percent of the respondents are [now] quite dissatisfied, according to the opinion poll, when the comparable figure last spring was only 5 percent. The number of very dissatisfied has increased from 2 to 7 percent and the number of "don't know" respondents has decreased from 18 to 9 percent.

The opinion poll also follows the satisfaction ratings of the Center Party's chairman, Paavo Vayrynen. His ratings have hardly changed from last fall. There are now 22 percent of those who are satisfied and 43 percent dissatisfied, whereas the comparable figures last fall were 21 and 45 percent.

12989/7310

Poll Shows Steady Four-Year Decline in Support for Greens

36170089c *Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish* 1 Jul 88 p 11

[Text] Approval of the Greens has consistently decreased during the past four years among citizenry. In 1984, altogether 40 percent of the people had a favorable attitude toward the Greens; this year the figure is barely one fourth. At the same time the number of those with negative feelings has risen from 10 percent to 25.

This information was revealed through a study called "The Finns and Politics" conducted by Suomen Gallup, which is the fifth of its kind. Earlier studies were done in 1975 and after 1984 yearly. The questions and the interview techniques have been the same each year. The newest data are derived from the interviews conducted between the 4th and 25th of May with 932 citizens of voting age. The respondents were from all parts of Finland, excluding the Aland Islands.

The Greens got into Parliament for the first time in the 1983 general elections. According to the study, their approval has dropped considerably, especially among

the supporters of the SKDL [Finnish People's Democratic League]; on the other hand the attitudes of the Center Party supporters have become somewhat more favorable.

Finland Turning to Right

The placement of Finns on the left-right axis seems to have remained fairly stable according to the study. Compared to 1975, the population seems to have turned a little to the right. At least the supporters of SDP (Finnish Social Democratic Party) and SMP (Finnish Rural Party), and the supporters of the SKDL have moved to the right, which is explained partly by the fact that in 1975 SKDL supporters still included the Taisto minority faction of the communists.

However, compared to the 1975 situation, the supporters of the Conservative Party have moved somewhat to the left.

Also the Greens have moved left during the past year, even from the SDP. Earlier they were situated closer to the middle, which is due to the fact that disintegration has been the greatest among the Greens.

Concern Over Unemployment and Poverty Growing

Although the approval rating of the Greens has fallen, the people still consider a clean environment and the guarantee of an adequate income as the most important political goals. The value of both goals seems to have even increased from August of last year. Working for peace comes in third place. The respondent's first concern is maintaining the nation's international competitiveness and raising the standard of living.

The greatest tension in society is still caused by the conflict between environmental protection and economics.

Some old conflicts seem to be again raising their heads: the disparity between the rich and the poor is the second most important consideration, according to the respondents. Furthermore, the conflict between the employed and the unemployed is seen as a greater problem than in any other previous study. This conflict has moved into sixth place, surpassing such issues as the conflict between urban and rural dwellers.

A more favorable attitude toward nuclear power is on the rise after the base period of 1986. Most favorable toward nuclear power are the Conservatives and the supporters of the small parties, those most opposed include the supporters of SMP, SKDL and the Greens.

More Estranged From Politics Than Ever

The newest study confirms what has been noted before, that the interest of the young people in politics is decreasing.

This political estrangement seems to be more widespread now than in 1986 during the government led by Kalevi Sorsa. Sixty-two percent of the people think that individuals such as themselves have no say in what the government does.

More than an average level of powerlessness is felt by the SKDL (71 percent), SMP (73 percent), Center Party (67 percent) and SDP supporters. The feeling of powerlessness has increased especially among the supporters of SDP and SKDL.

Nearly three-fourths of the citizens consider politics to be so complex, that they simply can not understand what is happening.

Approval Fell When Line Was Found

The chairman of the Green's parliamentary group, Pekka Haavisto, estimated that the drop in the approval of the party was caused by clarifying the party line.

"In 1984 people had a very fuzzy picture of the Green movement, which was seen as synonymous with environmental protection. After the Greens took stands on many issues, for example social politics, urban planning and regional politics, these stands were not to everyone's liking."

[Question] How much have the arguments about the formation of the party influenced the decrease in approval?

[Answer] The conflicts were reflected in strong fluctuations in support as indicated by the Gallup poll last winter. The biggest drop in the approval rating was 2 percent, and the rating fluctuated between 4 and 7 percent. We managed to survive, however, to our surprise.

"Why are the Greens situating themselves even to the left of the SDP on the political axis, even though the earlier Greens were closer to the center?"

"At least from our politics you can not draw the conclusion that we are moving to the left."

"Are the Greens losing members to the right?"

"Perhaps we have lost voters to the Conservatives. the largest recent influx of people toward the Greens is from the direction of SDP. I suspect that those moving toward the Greens are the ones who felt that SDP was tending more to the right."

"Why have a large number of SKDL supporters, who have traditionally had a positive attitude toward the Greens, now, in less than a year, changed direction?"

"I truly cannot say. The SKDL promoted strongly a kind of red greenishness because it was losing members to the Greens."

"What do you think of the fact that the Center Party has begun to act more favorably toward the Greens?"

"The change in the attitude of the Center Party is most likely the result of opposition politics, which the Greens and the Center Party have exercised together. It is good if someone adopts stances that the Greens have favored for ten years already."

"Of course, I am bothered by the suspicion that the greening of the Center Party is only superficial and mere rhetoric by the leaders. But it is possible this greening has also awakened some genuine feelings."

"According to the study, attitudes toward nuclear power have become generally more positive. The most negative attitudes are being held by SKDL and Green party supporters, but the most negative is the SMP. How do you explain it?"

(Haavisto chokes with laughter) "It is impossible to explain. Perhaps it is a question of a statistical error."

"Are you worried about the drop in popularity?"

"No longer. According to the latest information our support is on the rise. Now it is a 5.2 percent, or at the level of RKP (Swedish Peoples Party)."

"The Greens have felt the lack of political opposition as problematic and for that reason the number of those who neglected to vote was always large. Perhaps we are at the point of discovering the political opposition."

"Who is it?"

"It is difficult to say. Often the SDP has been labeled as the arch-enemy. In the rural areas the main opponent is the center Party. Perhaps the Conservative Party will also become an enemy if it begins to use its power more than now."

12989/7310

Poll Traces Voter Movements Among Parties
36170099 Helsinki UUSI SUOMI in Finnish
24 Jul 88 pp 3, 17

[Article by Jyrki Vesikansa with graphics by Camilla Ekman-Suhonen: "Half a Million Finns Changed Party in a Year; Protest Groups Pull the Voters From Their Parties"]

[Text] A new study shows a dramatic change among Conservative voters. The Center Party pulled supporters from the right and from those who had previously abstained from voting. The SDP is losing support in every direction.

The traditional party loyalty of the Finnish voter is crumbling. According to a public opinion survey this spring, over half a million voters have changed parties during the year. In addition a quarter of a million who sat out the parliamentary elections have specified their party affiliation.

The net results of the opinion poll, which have aroused a commotion, have told only part of the story about the movement of voters, since the opinions are moving crosswise to a large extent according to the analysis by Taloustutkimus Oy.

The voters are especially attracted to the new protest movements, but how many of them actually will vote in the new municipal elections, for example, is another matter.

The biggest loser is the SDP [Social Democratic Party] with net losses of 45,000 voters since the last parliamentary elections. The party has lost votes in every direction, which makes patching it up difficult.

The Conservatives' net losses have remained at 45,000, but the flow through the party has been rapid—almost 200,000 persons. The changes have made the Conservative Party younger and concentrated it in Helsinki.

The winner has been above all the Center Party, which has received more than 50,000 new supporters from the Conservatives and the SMP [rural party], but primarily from those who previously abstained from voting. The party has at last obtained a foothold among the young people in the large cities.

The voters who are shifting party affiliation, according to the political scientist Hannu Ilkas, are primarily middle-aged, white collar workers with families in the large cities.

The SKDL [Finnish People's Democratic League] has again gained from the Democratic Alternative, but also from the SDP. The People's Democrats again lost members to the Greens.

Despite their squabbles the Greens have gained almost as much as the Center Party—both from the right and the left.

Finnish voters have begun to move in large groups—and in the most surprising directions. This is revealed when Hannu Ilkas ran Taloustutkimus Oy's recent public opinion findings in various ways through the computer.

Protest movements are now on the rise—70,000 citizens would be ready to vote for the new groups.

Half a million voters have changed their affiliation since the 1987 parliamentary election.

The biggest loser, the SDP, is losing voters in every direction. The Center Party is gaining from both the Conservatives and from Vennamo's SMP.

Of course there is some doubt how many will jump from the traditional fold in actual fact in the municipal elections next fall. In many municipalities the new groups are not even listed on the ballots. There would be a demand for them.

Still the traditional Finnish party loyalty—frequently lasting from one generation to another—seems to have crumbled. The parties are thus in a new situation.

The spring opinion poll results threw the parties into confusion—especially the biggest loser, the SDP. The net results, however, tell only part of the story—because the voters have been moving crosswise. Even between the Conservatives and Communists.

Hannu Ilkas ran the tapes of Taloustutkimus [economic research institute], which he heads, "crosswise" and constructed a political statement of profits and losses for the present moment. The views of 6,500 persons interviewed in spring and early summer were [extrapolated] to correspond to the attitudes of the whole voter population. Statistically the estimate is very reliable.

The starting point was the respondent's statement about how he voted in the parliamentary elections in 1987. The responses were compared with the actual election results, but few corrections were required. The second point of reference was the way he intended to vote in the coming municipal elections.

Half a Million Intend To Change

In all, 513,000 voters are changing parties—thus more than every fifth person. Of those who abstained from the parliamentary election 250,000 have now specified their parties. Of these the Center Party obtained 20 percent, the Conservatives 18 percent, the SDP 14 percent, the Greens 12 percent, and the SKDL 7 percent. Aside from the poor showing of the Democratic Alternative and the good showing of the Greens, the newly active voters were distributed more or less in line with the usual breakdown.

How many will actually vote is another matter.

The mean support estimates by Taloustutkimus, which were published in spring, were as follows (the result of the previous parliamentary election in parentheses): Conservatives 22.1 percent (23.2), SDP 21.9 percent (24.3), Center 19.0 percent (17.6), SKDL 9.6 percent (9.4), Greens 5.3 percent (4.0), Finnish Rural Party 5.1 percent (6.3), Swedish People's Party 5.0 percent (5.3), Democratic Alternative 3.1 percent (4.3), Christian League 2.4 percent (2.6), Pensioners' Party 2.1 percent (1.2), Liberals 1.6 percent (1.0), Constitutionals 0.2 percent (0.1), and others 2.6 percent (0.6).

For the large groups the directions of movement could be unraveled by parties as well as the net figures. For the small groups all the results are always more uncertain than for large groups for which there are many respondents in the survey.

White-Collar Workers Shifting

According to Ilkas, the most typical party changer is a "middle-aged head of a family with children who is considered to be a white collar worker and lives in a city with over 100,000 inhabitants." Thus a typical representative of the "new middle class." All of the parties are competing for them—but they succeed in holding them weakly in their grasp, although they do get hold of them.

Conversely, the farmers—who are bound to traditional society—factory workers and other people in the country and small towns have remained loyal. In these areas the trade union movement, Pellervo [grange] organizations, men's clubs and neighbor party chapters keep people in their traditional folds. (Many of them say of course that they remain in them not only willingly but out of conviction.)

Released from these ties to the big cities and to new office jobs well educated 30-year-olds on the other hand frisk about wildly. Things are speeded up by housing and education loans, taxes or day care problems.

The parties often seem, however, to be more interested in the loyalty of the faithful than in obtaining new groups. Perhaps middle-aged families with children do not have time to tell the parties about their concerns. But they may tell them with the ballot box.

SDP Losing Votes in Every Direction

The Social Democrats' situation is complicated by the fact that this true center party is losing support in every direction—to the Communists by a net 8,000 voters but also a net 4,000 voters to the Conservatives. The SDP is especially losing voters to "other parties"—whatever the non-aligned respondents might have meant by this.

In net terms the SDP has lost 45,000 voters in a year. The blue-red Government, however, is not necessarily the sole cause. For example, remaining in the opposition might have stanching the flow to the left, but would even more voters then have flowed to the Conservatives? And what will it profit in the long run if the key group is made up of white collar workers?

The march of over 100,000 voters through the SDP in any event has already increased the furor in the party on the issues of power-sharing and ideology. The central factor may be the fact that the SDP is at present a "normal party"; the machinery of our society has been built on the foundation of Social Democratic domestic ideology. Any dissatisfaction then, of course, is directed at Siltasaari.

As Eero Tuomainen has stated, it would probably be worthwhile for the SDP to recognize its position as the number one power broker and not pretend to be a revolutionary movement.

Center Party Is Winning, Conservatives Are Holding Their Own

The Center Party, which has engaged in tough opposition policy, has gained both from the conservatives and from the SMP. The Conservatives' net losses, however, were small. The turnover in the Conservative ranks on the other hand has been considerable—which always carries risks. Also both of the bourgeois parties lost considerably to various small groups.

The SKDL has received quite a few people from the SDP but also returnees from the taistoites. On the other hand the SKDL has lost voters to the Greens.

The Greens are in a central position like the SDP—with different characteristics. They have gained from both the right and the left. Only the Center Party has something like an even score with relation to the Greens and very little "cycling." The reason for this is probably the Greens' concentration in the large cities.

The small groups RKP [Swedish People's Party] and SMP that are in the Government are on the downhill slope. It is true that the RKP has made progress in Helsinki, but it may have lost in Ostrobothnia. Regional political factors probably also caused a net shift of 9,000 from the Center Party to the Social Democrats.

Is Liberalism Reviving?

Things are not going well for the Christian League. On the other hand the Liberal People's Party, which had long ago been pronounced dead, has gained a few new supporters—at least on the level of principles. Perhaps there would be a demand for liberalism if there were a strong supply.

The rise in protest groups has especially helped the Pension Party but also other "new" groups. On the other hand, the Constitutionalists, despite a small, statistically unreliable increase, are weak.

Is There a Lack of Content?

A statistical analysis like this can easily make politics seem like a game. Questions should be asked, however, about the basic currents behind the statistics. Materially Finland is better off now than ever; the boom is too hot and the consumer celebration continues. Still a strong pull towards the protest groups is felt. At least people want to change parties.

Since even generations that have grown up in passionately consensus-minded Finland are changing, the question may be raised as to whether the parties are too similar. If the main question in politics is whether Pertti Paasio will

go into the Government and in what position, it is no wonder that fresher alternatives are sought.

Party Support Groups 1987-88—Change in the party affiliation of respondents from the parliamentary elections to spring 1988. The 6,500 responses to the survey were converted to correspond to the whole voter population.

Party	Losses	Gains	Balance
SDP	111,000	66,000	-45,000
	-12,000 SKDL	+6,000 Conserv	
	-12,000 Green	+6,000 Greens	
	-11,000 Center	+4,000 SKDL	
	-10,000 Conserv	+2,000 Center	
	-31,000 Others		
	-35,000 EUP*		
Conservatives	102,000	87,000	-15,000
	-22,000 Center	+10,000 Center	
	-9,000 Greens	+10,000 SDP	
	-6,000 SDP	+5,000 Greens	
	-2,000 SKDL	+1,000 SKDL	
	-27,000 Others		
	-36,000 EUP*		
Center	56,000	110,000	+54,000
	-10,000 Conserv	+22,000 Conserv	
	-5,000 Greens	+11,000 SDP	
	-2,000 SDP	+4,000 Greens	
	-19,000 Others	+2,000 SKDL	
	-20,000 EUP*		
SKDL	38,000	52,000	+14,000
	-10,000 Greens	+20,000 Deva	
	-4,000 SDP	+15,000 SDP	
	-2,000 Center	+2,000 Greens	
	-1,000 Conserv	+2,000 Conserv	
	-11,000 Others		
	-10,000 EUP*		
Greens	39,000	80,000	+41,000
	-6,000 SDP	+12,000 SDP	
	-5,000 Conserv	+10,000 SKDL	
	-4,000 Center	+9,000 Conserv	
	-2,000 SKDL	+5,000 Center	
	-9,000 Others		
	-13,000 EUP*		
RKP	24,000	12,000	-12,000
SMP	60,000	29,000	-31,000
SKL	23,000	22,000	-1,000
Deva	42,000	11,000	-31,000
LKP	6,000	26,000	+20,000
SEP	6,000	34,000	+28,000
POP	2,000	4,000	+2,000
	4,000	72,000	+68,000

*EUP=no new party support

Politics is interesting in itself and people do follow it. This is borne out by the fact that a quarter of a million people who are abstaining from voting, responded to the public opinion survey.

12893/09599

Poll: Youth More Apathetic Toward Politics
36170089b Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in
Finnish 4 Jul 88 p 2

[Editorial: "People Distancing Themselves From Politics"]

[Text] According to an opinion poll, interest on the part of the young in politics is constantly declining. Moreover, political alienation is becoming more general. The Greens are in disfavor and the political atmosphere is somewhat more rightist than it was in 1975.

The continuing distancing of the youth from political life deserves the most serious attention. However, it is known from experience that, in particular, the interest of students in social issues comes in waves. It is precisely this segment of our youth which has been told to concentrate harder than ever on their studies and on entering a profession. There isn't even any excitement about international issues. Parties fine-tuning the welfare of the state do not offer any new inspiration.

Causes are becoming less common in our society, but it is causes that have served as the incentive to draw the young into politics. There are few ideal role models for the youth among our political leaders. Also, the watering down of day care promises, neglect of housing issues, and obfuscation in tax reform surely are pushing many young people into the ranks of the politically passive.

Finland is a secure, relatively affluent country and its inhabitants are quite self-satisfied. Materialism is in full bloom. Instead of challenging examples, our young are being offered conventional examples of provincialism and complacency. They are learning to shun political parties.

The seriousness of the situation over time, the estrangement even of adults from politics will also increase. The tendency to support bad political leaders and movements is growing, and the basic truths gained by hard experiences could be forgotten.

12989/7310

FRANCE

Paris Reportedly Approves Soviet Missile Transfer to Tehran

35190110 Paris LE CANARD ENCHAINE in French
17 Aug 88 p 3

[Excerpt] With the "sympathetic solicitude" of the French authorities—as those familiar with this kind of transaction say—a quantity of surface-to-surface SCUD-B missiles (an excellent product manufactured in the Soviet Union) will soon be purchased on behalf of the ayatollahs.

This is not the first favor the French Government is doing for the Iranians. Shells from Luchaire, explosives from the SNPE [National Powder and Explosives Company] and various electronic equipment have not been the only deliveries clandestinely made under the Fabius, and later, Chirac governments. From 1985 to 1987, French intermediaries have been authorized to respond to Iranian requests seeking U.S. Tow anti-tank missiles, 122-"Stalin organ" rockets, anti-personnel mines and other lethal devices on the international market.

This time, the Soviet missiles are of a less common type, and the method used is of a most circuitous kind. Several scores of these fat missiles will be sold by North Korea to French intermediaries in order to be "officially" sent to a third country. However, the name used in documents for this third country will be fictitious. In reality, these beauties fresh out of the Soviet arsenal will end their cruise in an Iranian port, most probably Bandar Abbas.

GREECE

Papandreou Cabinet Reportedly Divided on Election Date

35210137 Athens TO VIMA TIS KYRIAKIS in Greek
24 Jul 88 p 1

[Text] Five major cabinet ministers agreed recently with the view that the elections should be held in February or March 1989, namely 2 or 3 months before the end of the 4-year term of the government.

The five ministers who have made their views known in discussions or in meeting with colleagues are Pan. Roumeliotis (National Economy), G. Gennimatas (Labor), D. Tsovolas (Economics), I. Pottakis (Agriculture), and N. Akritidis (Commerce). They believe that parliamentary elections held immediately after the Greek presidency of the EEC expires, and at the start of the new fiscal year will lead to "a comfortable election victory" by PASOK.

The conviction of the "Five" that "the elections will be won very comfortably in February-March" is based on their conclusion that the government will retain the advantages of election surprise and of many favorable conjunctures (economic, social, income, international projection, etc.) without being strongly pressed by

demands and political juxtapositions which are believed to be intensifying and to be made more and more often if the elections were to be held in June 1989.

In any case, the views and suggestions of the "Five" have not led, for the time being at least, to any change or even simple review of the decision to hold the elections in June, as it had been announced by Mr Papandreu and to which adhere the vice president of the government and Minister of Justice Koutsogiorgas, the President of the Parliament Alevras, the Minister of Interior Tsokhatzopoulos and the Director General of the Political Office of the Prime Minister Livanis.

In any event, because of the special importance of the persons involved and their arguments, the proposal for parliamentary elections in the early months of 1989 is not expected to be rejected in debate.

This is even more true since the "strategy" of Roumeliots, Gennimatas, Tsovolas, Pottakis and Akritidis aims at increasing the variety of advantages PASOK will have during the long election period the country is expected to enter this coming fall and at satisfying certain party and syndicalist expediencies and demands which seriously occupy the government.

To be exact, it is estimated that at the beginning of the new year all the positive achievements of the Greek presidency will pile up, the new income policy, the new tax reliefs, the combination of large production and very satisfying prices in the agricultural sector, and the acceleration of government work in all sectors.

On the contrary, during the 2-month period of February and March it is believed that a public sector demands movement will not have developed (which would reach a peak during this 2-month period), and the party intervention and expediencies in the mass movement, the effect of the Automatic Cost of Living Adjustment [ATA] and other increases will not have faded out, and the liquidation notifications will not have gone out yet, etc. In addition, the government and PASOK will be able to face more effectively the pressures, expediencies, and practices, which would tend to abolish the income policy for 1989 and undermine the economic march for the "restoration of the health" of the Greek economy.

According to the "Five," conducting elections in June would conceal certain dangers and on one hand "have the economy play the game of election juxtaposition" while on the other hand somehow blunt the positive gains and deeds of the beginning of 1989.

Undecided Voters Seen 'Naive,' 'Idealistic'
35210133c Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek
22 Jul 88 p 16

[Article by Khar. Gortynios]

[Text] There must be some explanation for the high percentage of "undecideds" shown by all public opinion polls in the last 2 years. A large number of those polled replied they did not know or did not answer at all to appropriate questions scientifically prepared—perhaps some gave answers which were too crude to write, such as "leave me alone," "go jump" or simply "crack," the sound you hear when someone slams down the telephone, and other responses I can imagine but for reasons of decency do not dare repeat.

We are all concerned with reasons for the refusal to answer such simple questions such as "which party did you vote for in 1985?" and "which party would you vote for today?" For most people the answer is simple since it is anonymous and does not cost anything, unless you are a sorehead by nature and do not allow anyone to ask you orally or in writing about anything at any time.

But let us leave aside the neurotics. We are talking about a large group of people who appear to be in a dilemma and we should find out why because the poll analysts do not give us a clear explanation. So let us give the explanation since we have no ax to grind nor any interest in influencing parties or voters. The question is why the percentage of undecideds is so high. Everyone knows that for many years two camps have had a steady voting strength: The right and the left. Each of us can evaluate approximately the permanent strength of each camp. I would say that the Right has a larger percentage. What is left is a large segment of voters who do not consider their vote "spoken for." This segment of people vote as they see fit; sometimes they coalesce into a "Center" and other times the votes are divided, the Center breaks up, to strengthen the Right or Left or even some parties which at one time or another claim to be saviors.

This is because the voters of the Center are the purest, the best intentioned, the most gullible Greeks—those who believe somewhat nebulously in freedom, democracy and justice, without decorative adjectives.

Whoever is able to persuade them with his rhetoric and charisma that he, too, upholds these values, receives their support. Without thinking whether they are being deceived, whether they are being used, or whether they are being duped [they give their support]. They crave so strongly for the realization of their ideals that they do not question too carefully how the dreams of a lifetime will become reality.

Thus, those non-affiliated voters—but affiliated with their ideals—do not join any party. They vote with their trusting hearts and are the ones who feel let down when they see their vote go to waste because their wishes and hopes were not fulfilled.

We may say that the centrist ideology emerged during the occupation when the quest for freedom and justice moved great masses of people. In the end some joined the Right, others joined the Left, but a large segment remained uninfluenced by partisan slogans or enmities. This non-aligned segment of the people constitutes the so-called Center. Sometimes more to the Right, sometimes more the Left, it always dreams and continues to dream of a Greece without extremism, dogmatism, partisanship. Today's undecideds are their descendants.

The Moral of the Story

We don't know which way the centrists will go in the next general election. At the moment they seem to be in doubt because no one seems to be persuasive. But no one can win the next election without winning over the undecided centrists!

7520/12232

KKE's 'Dogmatics,' 'Renewalists,' 'Purists'
35210133b Athens ENA in Greek 14 Jul 88 p 13

[Article by Olga Tremis]

[Text] The KKE Political Office's meeting was critical. Those "in favor" reacted positively; those "opposed" simply did not react at all, since it was generally assumed that "it was a necessary move." So KKE's Kharilaos Florakis was formally given the green light to meet after 20 years with Leonidas Kyrkos, his "comrade" from the other side.

Of course he knew from the outset that the main problem in a possible "alignment" was the insistence of the Greek Left [EAR] to have PASOK included in the discussions—a view which was clearly stated in the first meeting. In effect, acceptance of this proposal would mean a shift in the policy KKE has followed for the past year and a half.

This initiative "to melt the ice" appears to have stopped, for the time being, the prevailing of the "successor group" which re-elected Florakis and which, a few months ago, appeared to accept a somewhat marginal role.

Now in the new scenario the situation within KKE appears as follows:

—The so-called "dogmatics" continue to hold to the view that the front against PASOK must be maintained but with a simultaneous speed up of the "convergence of the leftist forces."

—The so-called "renovators" (after their "historic compromise" with the diametrically opposed faction) show a tendency to "water their wine," abandoning, for the time being, the logic of "frontal assault" against PASOK and talking about "openings to the Left groups within PASOK."

—The "marginal" faction, which formed after the 12th Congress under the "flag" of preserving the ideological purity of the party, continues to insist that PASOK is a purely bourgeois party which makes "serious overtures toward the Establishment."

Relationships within the party appear more or less unchanged. Kh. Florakis is believed to continue to control the party's parliamentary group and the Press Office while he continues to have the right to give interviews whenever he wants. Grigoris Faracos is believed to continue to control all party organizations (except that of Thessalia which is headed by T. Mamatsis), the Ideological Committee (through M. Androulakis), the trade union sector (through M. Kostopoulos), the local administration (through Loula Logaras), and the Communist Youth [KNE] (through D. Gondikas), although KNE has been tied for years to a specific way of thinking—a fact which resulted in the exclusion, during its recent Congress, of three "renovating" members (Th. Kleitsas, T. Dravaliaris, and G. Papakonstandinou) from its Central Council.

By contrast, things are not so clear on the political level. On the eve of an electoral period, certain KKE cadres appear to be ready to restore some "bridges" with PASOK, thus reversing the climate which prevailed during the past year and a half. They argue that whenever PASOK gained KKE gained, too (1981), while when it lost ground KKE lost ground, too (1985).

This change of course (following the conclusions of the Central Committee 4 months ago, which decided that PASOK's self-sufficient majority in Vouli was equally dangerous as that of ND), must be attributed to the difficulties posed by cooperation with EAR which, from the outset, insisted that PASOK be included in the talks. Thus, after PASOK and ND were put on the same footing, one of the key KKE cadres, N. Kaloudis, only a few weeks ago gave a new dimension to the entire political question by saying that his party would be willing to take part in a coalition government!

7520/12232

NORWAY

Polling Organizations Found To Have Wide Variance in Results

36390089a Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian
13 Aug 88 p 3

[Article by Geir Salvesen: "Dispute Over Institutes' Measurement Methods"; first paragraph is AFTENPOSTEN introduction]

[Text] The opinion polls do not agree. In the last round of polling before the institutes took a summer vacation,

the figures for the Progressive Party varied by as much as 50 percent—in other words one institute showed 50 percent more Progressive [FRP] voters than another. People in the branch describe these differences as dramatic. There were also large variations for the Labor and Conservative parties. There are big differences in the polling methods used by the institutes, as indicated by a survey made by AFTENPOSTEN.

“None of the institutes can claim to tell the whole truth,” says Erik Dalen, who is in charge of political opinion polls for the Market and Media Institute (MMI). He and several spokesmen for the other institutes say that the general public can assume that an average of all the polls provides the most accurate picture of the balance of forces among the political parties.

There are currently five polling institutes in this country that publish political opinion polls every month. In alphabetical order they are MMI, Norwegian Market Data, Norsk Gallup, Opinion and Scan-Fact. With the exception of Opinion, all of them are based in Oslo.

In the June polls, support for the Progressive Party varied from 16 percent in the MMI poll to 24 percent in Norsk Gallup's. The Labor Party ranged from 27 percent in the Norsk Gallup poll to 34 percent in the MMI poll (figures are rounded off). The Conservatives received a rating of 20 percent from Norsk Gallup and 24 percent from MMI, according to a comparison of the four big Oslo institutes.

Weighted

What is the reason for this? The institutes themselves suggest methods of measurement and different “weight bases” as possible factors—to mention a few. The fact is that the institutes do not present raw data. When the MMI poll reports a 16 percent support level for the Progressive Party, it does not mean that 16 percent of the respondents said they support that party, the actual figure is different. But this different percentage was weighed against the results the Progressives achieved in the last Storting election. This method is also used by the other institutes, except that several of them “weight” the Progressive Party according to its results in the last county election.

The institutes disagree about which election should be used as a basis for comparison. The reason for this weighting, as it is called in the trade, is simply that many people “lie”—consciously or unconsciously—about which party they voted for in the last election. About half the people who switch parties have faulty memories, MMI's Dalen told AFTENPOSTEN. The institutes have made their own studies of why people remember things incorrectly. They have found that dissatisfaction with a

party one has voted for in the past makes it more “shameful” to admit having voted for it. On the other hand, choosing a successful party can lead to giving inaccurate information about which party one voted for last time. The institutes take this popular psychology into account.

“We weigh our data against the 1987 county council elections and feel this gives better voter representation than the Storting election of 1985,” Director Svein Lovas of Scan-Fact said. But he admitted that this is debatable, for voter turnout in the 1987 election was low.

“Another important factor that may be generally underestimated is the quality of the interview sample. The sample group must have the same composition as the general population with respect to such factors as age, geographical location, education and income. A certain percentage of the population belongs to the Federation of Trade Unions [LO] and this must also be reflected in the sample. If 25 percent of the population has received higher education while the percentage in the sample group is 35, the data will not be accurate. Weighting can compensate for some things, but not everything,” Lovas stressed.

Norsk Gallup also uses the last county elections as its only weighting factor. Group leader Johnny Pedersen says that was the most recent big election held in the period. In the next round the figures will be compared with the Storting election. It makes no sense to compare figures with the 1985 Storting election now because he feels those results are bound to be obsolete. Another factor that may explain the differences between one institute and another is that some do not include voters who did not vote in the last election but say they will do so this time.

Both Elections Used

Norwegian Market Data—NMD—gives equal weight to both county and Storting elections. Consultant Reidar Haugen told us that. But the institute is now considering presenting raw unweighted data. Haugen's mentioned the statistical margin of error and different polling dates as reasons for the poll variations. He admitted that the differences are large.

MMI is the only institute that now consistently weighs its data against the 1985 Storting election. And the institute also shows the highest support levels for the “established” parties. Erik Dalen defends this by saying that county election participation was 10 percent lower and that using this as a weighting factor magnifies political tendencies too much. But starting in January this institute will also

weigh its figures against both elections. Dalen says there is more voter fluctuation than most people think. "It goes by fits and starts" he said. The election campaigns and the final spurt play a big role. As many as 15-20 percent of the voters are unsure just before an election and 6-7 percent decide on election day.


Interviewing methods are important. Everyone says that. Whether people should be interviewed about their political views over the phone is a constant topic of discussion in the branch.

The Same Ones?

Svein Lovas of Scan-Fact says that it is an old myth that the same people are interviewed each month.

"There are many people who say they don't believe in opinion polls because they themselves have never been interviewed. Here one must bear in mind that from a statistical point of view it takes between 15 and 30 years before the entire population can be interviewed. "So be a little patient," said Lovas.

Poll Averages





The diagram shows voter support on the average since June 1987. The data was obtained from Norsk Gallup, Scan-Fact, Norges Markedsdata and MMI. Most polling organizations believe that averages give the most complete picture of political support.


KEY:

AP = Labor Party
H = Conservatives
Frp = Progressive Party
SV = Socialist Left Party

KrF = Christian Party
SP = Center Party
V = Liberal Party



(On this and the following page) are seen the variations in support figures for the three largest parties. Most dramatic is the divergency for the Progressive Party, which has 16 percentage points from MMI and 24 from Norsk Gallup, in other words, 50 percent more additional voters. The figures are from the latest polling in June, and have been rounded to the nearest whole number.



06578

Papers Differ on Potential for Nonsocialist Government

Conservatives Allying With Progressives

36390089b Oslo ARBEIDERBLADET in Norwegian
9 Aug 88 p 2

[Editorial: "Ready for New Nonsocialist Government?"]

[Text] In a lengthy article in AFTENPOSTEN, the Tromsø Conservative chairman and former national party vice chairman, Erlend Rian, made an urgent appeal to Conservative [H], Christian People's Party [KRF] and Center Party [SP] leaders to restore an alternative to the Labor government as quickly as possible. It is Erlend Rian's hope and desire that a new nonsocialist government will emerge as a clear goal before the 1989 election.

It is hard to find anything new in Erlend Rian's many deep sighs. That is why the middle parties have not paid much attention to them. Party leaders Johan J. Jakobsen and Kjell Magne Bondevik have practically shrugged off the article. As far as they are concerned, participation in a government coalition involves policy as well as determination. And here the Conservatives hold the key to cooperation.

Everyone who has watched developments in Norwegian politics since the government changed hands in 1986 has noted that the political center of gravity is now located in the Labor Party and the middle parties. The Conservatives have moved further and further away from this center of gravity. It was obvious as the Willoch government came to the end of the road that the three cooperating parties were having trouble working together. In the ensuing period the basis for a joint political platform

has deteriorated further. Aside from uttering obligatory phrases, the Conservatives have not shown any real interest in either responsibility or cooperation. The party's behavior in connection with this year's contract negotiations is the best illustration we have had of the new Conservative line. Last week's signals indicate that the main Conservative appeal going into the 1989 election will be a demand for sizable tax cuts. That is an old refrain and the middle parties are also pretty tired of it. And tax relief looks like a poor remedy in a period of decreasing oil revenues and national economic crisis.

The middle parties will flatly reject the Conservatives' association with the Progressive Party and the demand to include Carl I. Hagen & Co. as part of the basis for a nonsocialist government. Examples of Conservative-/Progressive [FRP] cooperation in cities like Oslo and Drammen will hardly appeal to KRF and SP. People in the middle parties are undoubtedly noting with interest that Stavanger Conservatives are now cooperating more closely with the Progressive Party. It is increasingly apparent that if KRF and SP want to be part of a government alternative, they must also go a long way toward swallowing Carl I. Hagen and his party.

We have a hard time seeing any realistic basis for the re-emergence of the three Willoch government parties as a government alternative. The basis is poorer now than it was when the coalition government broke up in the spring of 1986. If the three parties have a different view of the situation they should set to work and use their majority to bring about a change in government as soon as possible. These parties cannot in all decency go into the election campaign as a unified alternative in 1989 if they are not prepared to use the majority they (together with the Progressive Party) already have in 1988.

Conservatives Showing Revival Signs

36390089b Oslo *AFTENPOSTEN* in Norwegian
15 Aug 88 p 2

[Editorial: "Conservatives Get Started"]

[Text] It has taken some time, but at last it looks as if the Conservative Party is also starting to make a move. After several recent promising initiatives, we can note that the party is on course. The strategy seems clear and we await the more long-term effects with interest.

The most important thing that is happening now is the shaping of the draft that the Conservative program committee is currently giving the final polishing, a document that will form the basis for the final program for the 1989-93 Storting period. But it will also be a program for the country in the 1990's and for a Conservative Party moving toward the year 2000. This program could provide the basis for the policy of a new government.

The program committee under the leadership of Wenche Frogn Sellaeg is hammering out a policy for people's daily lives, one that can carry welfare developments further on the basis of new assumptions and needs. Due to the changes that have taken place in the national economy, this is such a staggering task that it will take all the brain power the party can muster and it will also require a great deal of boldness and imagination. We must ask ourselves first of all: What will we live on in the future? And carrying this a step further: How can we make daily life better and richer for all of us? Policy should always concern these things.

When politicians answer these questions they often tend to resort to well worn phrases. We are all too familiar with this from election campaigns and other occasions. But if all the phrases are stripped away, economic and social security can never be achieved unless we "keep the basic planks of the economy in good repair," to quote Wenche Frogn Sellaeg. Yes, we will never achieve anything significant as far as people's material welfare is concerned unless we take care of our fundamental economic problems. And let us not forget that there is an unbreakable link between economic security and the freedom and right of individuals to make their own decisions.

The Conservatives want to enhance the opportunities of ordinary people to make use of their talents and have some influence over their own daily lives through such things as a comprehensive educational policy program. Education may be the most important thing we can stress in the future and for this reason the effort to create better schools will be a banner issue. The health and social sectors will also continue to have a high priority.

But we cannot do anything without straightening out the economy. Resolving to pursue a consistent long-term economic policy will also determine our ability to deal

with the tasks and problems confronting us in the areas of social and health policy. This really concerns how much security the welfare state can give its individual citizens.

Here too policy must be adjusted to changed conditions and one of the things this forces us to do is to re-evaluate current systems and arrangements with an eye to utilizing the available apparatus more efficiently. More emphasis must be placed on the interaction between private and public sectors. But under any circumstances we need greater economic resources if we want to expand social care functions and meet the need for medical services and care. Consequently we must put the Norwegian economy back on its feet. We need new economic growth.

06578

TURKEY

SDPP States 'Kurdishism' Policy

Inonu Expresses Opposition

35540179b Istanbul *TERCUMAN* in Turkish 3 Jul 88
p 10

[Interview with SDPP General Chairman Erdal Inonu by Ceyhan Altinyelek in Inonu's office, "after the grand convention": "I Oppose Kurdishism"]

[Excerpt] [Question] It seemed at the SDPP [Social Democratic Populist Party] Convention that applause went to statements conveying messages beyond the left defined by the party program and to messages having to do with eastern and southeastern Anatolia...as if anyone who wanted to be applauded worked these topics. Perhaps it was for this reason that you occasionally brought up the language problem. Now my question is this: What is your final stance personally on this Kurdishism separatism problem?

[Answer] We have always said that we do not accept separatism. We say that we do not accept discrimination or Kurdishism. I am saying that the Republic of Turkey was defined within the National Pact boundaries and as a result of the War for Independence, that we are a nation living together within the borders accepted internationally by the Lausanne Treaty, and that I believe that every one of our citizens is still prepared to defend this outcome. We have different ancient cultures in our midst. Their existence enriches us; they do not infringe on our integrity. The problem is the structure of a unitary state, an integral state. This does not change. The more we develop democracy, the more freedom of opinion and freedom of thought will flourish and everything will be discussed freely. But this structure will not change. These articles of the Constitution will not change.

Policy will not be formulated on discrimination. Such a policy cannot be condoned because it conflicts with our basic view and is harmful. One cannot deny that discussions took place at our convention that expressed local aspirations, shall we say, in a atmosphere of excitement. To be suspicious of that person, saying he comes from a certain part of the country creates resentment, and the person who articulates this feeling is applauded. There is nothing in this to take offense at, in my opinion. The problem is within the unitary state structure.

[Question] That is, the SDPP is opposed to Kurdishism....

[Answer] It is. Of course it is. The SDPP is opposed to discrimination and Kurdish separatism. I think this is the finest message to come out of the convention. The convention made it clear that the party is opposed to all injustice and evinced a structure in which the people who have suffered injustices because of region, position or creed will eliminate those injustices and rectify them.

Deputies React to Inonu Statement

[Article by Hilmi Bengi: "We Oppose Separatism"]

[Text] Ankara (TERCUMAN)—SDPP administrators, whether national deputies or not, pointed out that they agree with General Chairman Erdal Inonu on "Kurdishism" and said that they are "opposed to Kurdishism."

Referring to General Chairman Inonu's view, "I am opposed to Kurdishism," published in TERCUMAN 2 days ago and Malatya national deputy Ibrahim Aksoy's remark, "I am Kurdishist," which appeared in a local newspaper, Deputy General Secretary Guler Tanyolac said, "I think the way our general chairman does. I accept Mr Inonu's views as correct in this matter."

What Aksoy Said

Central Executive Committee member Hakkari national deputy Cumhur Keskin pointed out that he talked with Ibrahim Aksoy himself and asked about the statement appearing in the local newspaper. "Mr Aksoy told me that he had made no such announcement," he said. Cumhur Keskin added:

"I do not believe that my colleague Ibrahim Aksoy made such a statement. We have no colleagues who are separatist or regionalist. All of us are opposed to discrimination. It is true that some of our country's citizens cannot take full advantage of their fundamental rights as envisaged in the Constitution. To oppose this is to oppose discrimination."

Official Party View

Party assembly member Kars national deputy Vedat Altin said also that General Chairman Inonu had expressed the party's official view. Altin pointed out that Erdal Inonu had expressed for the first time the view that "Everyone should be able to speak his mother tongue." "This matter has not been adequately debated in our party. It is a closed topic. I believe discussion would be beneficial," he said.

Gaziantep national deputy Abdulkadir Ates said, "I did not read either statement. But I believe the people elected by the delegates expressed their position and our party's view on this at the convention."

8349

Reportage on Trial of TCP, TWP Leaders

35540178 *Istanbul TERCUMAN in Turkish* 8-11 Jul 88

[Unattributed article: "Kutlu and Sargin Trial from the Indictment"]

[8 Jul 88 p 6]

[Text] Support for PKK Terrorism

The opening section of the Ankara State Security Court [SSC] Prosecutor's indictment "Illegal TCP AND TWP—Nabi Yagci, Nihat Sargin and Colleagues" states that the Turkish Communist Party was formed in Baku in 1920 and tried to gain legitimacy during the transition to a multiparty system, but failed, and continues as follows:

"It is understood that after Nabi Yagci (party name: Haydar Kutlu) was elected general secretary at the 5th Congress held in East Germany on 2 April 1983, he established relations with the European communist parties as well as the socialist countries and pursued his subversive and separatist activities against Turkey abroad with the support of the European communists, and that

"The Turkish Communist Party (TCP) joined with the outlawed Turkish Socialist Workers Party (TSWP), Turkish Workers Party (TWP), Turkish Communist Proletarian Party (TCPP), Turkish Kurdistan Socialist Party (TKSP) and Vanguard Workers Party of Kurdistan [as published] (PKK), which shared the same world view and recognized Moscow as their headquarters, to form the "Left Union" and formulate a Democratic Coalition Platform against Turkey."

DISK, TWP, TSWP Support

The State Security Court Prosecutor drew attention in the indictment to the announcement that Haydar Kutlu made in the 1 August 1986 issue of ATILIM magazine

that the TCP is Marxist-Leninist and a revolutionary-progressive party which recognizes proletarian internationalism. The indictment continues:

"Reportedly, TCP headquarters are in Leipzig-Maddeburg and East Berlin in East Germany, where the party operates under CPSU guidance, and its cover or screen is organizations such as DISK, its most important supporter, and 28 DISK-affiliated unions, and the TWP and the TSWP, parties which were banned on 12 September 1980.

"It is understood from statements made by Haydar Kutlu himself in ATILIM that the TCP's domestic publications are the magazines ALINTERI [TOIL], CAGDAS [CONTEMPORARY] and GORUS [VIEW]; its foreign publications are ATILIM [THRUST], SOL BIRLIK [LEFT UNION], TURKIYE POSTASI [TURKISH MAIL], YOL VE AMAC [WAYS AND MEANS], YENI CAG [NEW AGE], GERCEGIN SESI [VOICE OF FACT], PROLETER ISTANBUL [PROLETARIAN ISTANBUL] and ILERI [PROGRESS]; and its radio broadcasts are made over TKP'NIN SESI [VOICE OF THE TCP] and BIZIM RADYO [OUR RADIO]."

Support for PKK Terrorism

The prosecutor explains in the next section of the indictment the TCP bylaws and program, then gives information about the founding of the party. He points out that the party has constantly incited the people against the present administration and says:

"It is understood from organization documents on file that speeches have been made on the VOICE OF THE TCP to incite the people of the area to ensure the continuation of the armed aggression and raids being conducted by the PKK and that,

"The TCP has incited and arranged intensive propaganda efforts against the incumbent administration of the Turkish Republic by exploiting trials such as the DISK and Pacifists Association trials and organizing protest campaigns, rallies and demonstrations abroad to ensure that international organizations adopt resolutions against our country and that actions have been skillfully incited both at home and abroad on various pretexts by this party."

TCP's Relations Abroad

The indictment explains the TCP's relations abroad as follows:

"The TCP maintains relations with the communist parties of pro-Soviet Western and Eastern countries, the front organizations of communist organizations and other organizations and associations advocating like views and it is understood that the party benefits from these relations through material and moral support, solidarity rallies and mutual visits and that the TCP

receives material aid from the communist parties of Bulgaria, East Germany, West Germany, France and Denmark in addition to the CPSU.

"The TCP exploits every incident against the existing order in Turkey in its own behalf. For example, the TCP has been observed openly supporting the headcover protests by the European National View Organization, whose purpose is to establish an Islamic law order in Turkey, and has cooperated with FIDEF [Federation of West German Worker Associations], its organization abroad, and the European National View Organization.

"It is understood from evidence in the file that the TCP conveys organizational instructions and propaganda messages to party cadres and, through these cadres, to other bodies deemed suitable by means of organs such as the VOICE OF THE TCP, OUR RADIO AND ATILIM.

"In summary, the TCP is seen to be a revolutionary communist party that intends to establish a working class dictatorship based on Marxism- Leninism in Turkey."

[9 Jul 88 p 6]

[Text] The indictment reports that TCP Central Committee General Secretary Nabi Yagci (party name Haydar Kutlu) was a member of the TWP in 1962-1963 and published a magazine named PARTIZAN in Istanbul to promulgate Marxist thought and was tried by the Istanbul martial law court during the 12 March Memorandum period for conducting communist propaganda, but the case was dropped as a result of coming under the 1974 amnesty. The prosecutor describes TCP General Secretary Nabi Yagci's joining the TCP as follows:

"Nabi Yagci said in his statement that, unable to get along with TWP founder Behice Boran, he had asked Veysi Sarisozen, an acquaintance from the Federation of Idea Clubs, to set up contact with the TCP before he went to Belgium in 1974, that he had made contact with Aydin Meric after subsequently receiving a letter from abroad from Veysi Sarisozen, that Aydin Meric told him that he was a member of the TCP and that his party name would be Haydar Kutlu and this was how he joined the TCP, and that he had recruited Marxists from his circle such as Gulay Varli, Mustafa Hayrullahogu, Sitki Coskun, Ertan Ayar, Seref Yildiz and Guray Tekinoz to join the TCP also."

Professionals, DISK, 1 May

Nabi Yagci, who was on the TCP provincial committee in 1975, says in his statement which appears in the indictment that Sitki Coskun was on the Istanbul provincial committee responsible for the unions and directed the unions toward TCP policy and that Erdal Talu was the director for professionals and youth organizations.

Nabi Yagci said that the TCP participated extensively in the activities when DISK decided to observe 1 May 1977 and that Aydin Meric, TCP central committee and politburo member, also worked at DISK and was the party's "Turkey agent" until the end of 1978.

Yagci said that TCP Turkey agent Aydin Meric was removed from that position in 1978 and it was vacant for 2 years until late 1980 when it was assigned to Mehmet Aydan Bulutgil and himself. He explained developments within the TCP as follows, according to the indictment:

"He pointed out that TCP politburo member Aydan Bulutgil and he had shared the job, that he had been given responsibility for administering the Thrace and East Anatolia committees and Istanbul, that Mehmet Aydan Bulutgil took care of the other regions, that some of the leaders of the Progressive Womens Association [PWA] and the Progressive Youth Association [PYA] were TCP members, and that persons among these leaders such as Ahmet Muhtar Sokucu, Haluktan Ipekci, Gonul Dincer, Zulas Kilic, Seyda Talu and Ayse Coskun were members of top TCP organs and the central committee. Yagci said that when the 12 September operation occurred, they received instructions from the politburo abroad to convene and drew up a new alternative program at the conclusion of the congress."

Training in Moscow, Bulgaria

This section of the indictment was drawn up on the basis of Nabi Yagci's statement and says that the TCP had technical and political committees and that the technical committees made up identification documents such as false registration cards and false marriage certificates using the magazine printer's presses. It reads as follows on TCP members' training:

"The TCP took advantage of the educational units of communist parties in the FRG, France and Bulgaria to train TCP members, the TCP had a quota for this training, party members were chosen from among candidates nominated by the local and provincial committees to be sent to these party schools for training, and by June 1981 when he left the country, upper and middle level TCP members such as Erdal Talu, Gonul Dincer, Metin Ozturkoglu and Birol Basoren had undergone training at the Moscow and Bulgaria educational units..."

[10 Jul 88 p 7]

[Text] Provoking Hatred and Enmity

Nabi Yagci (Haydar Kutlu) stated that he had become general secretary prior to the fifth congress in April 1983 because of TCP General Secretary Ismail Bilen's advanced age, that this had been approved and became

effective at the congress and that Bilen was symbolic TCP general secretary. He described the TCP-TWP merger efforts as follows, according to the indictment:

"Efforts to merge the TCP, TWP and TSWP were in progress abroad by 1983. However, the TSWP took a negative stance. When Ismail Bilen died in October 1983, Veysi Sarisozen, Erdal Talu, Seref Yildiz and I attended merger talks representing the TCP, and Behice Boran, Nihat Sargin and Osman Sakalsiz attended for the TWP. It was decided at the conclusion of the talks that the TCP and the TWP would merge to form the Turkish United Communist Party [TUCP], and we announced this decision at a press conference in Brussels on 7 October 1987. The TUCP is a scientific socialist party that adheres to proletarian internationalism and will be able to solve Turkey's problems with a Marxist approach."

Leftist Unity

Nabi Yagci said in the indictment drawn up by the SSC Prosecutor that almost all of the leftist forces in Turkey formed organizations abroad after 12 September 1980 and that these organizations began thinking of unity and formed the "Left Union," consisting of six illegal parties. He described Turkey as a multinational country and said:

"...that the Turks and Kurds predominate, that there are minorities such as the Laz and Circassians in addition, that the Kurds living in Turkey will decide their own fate within Lenin's principle of the self determination of nations, that the Kurdish people must be granted their democratic rights, that the place within the borders of the Turkish Republic where the Kurds live is Kurdistan, that responsibility for the statements made in the name of the TCP is his...."

Evaluation

The Ankara SSC Prosecutor requests various prison sentences in connection with the statements made and actions performed by TCP General Secretary Nabi Yagci by the beginning of 1985 and summarizes this situation in the indictment as follows:

"A. The elected parliament, the government and the democratic, free, parliamentary, multiparty regime peopled by such leaders as the President are described as a fascist dictatorship in speech texts and, by indicating that the regime in Turkey tortures Turkish citizens and fills the prisons without cause, that the administration has allowed foreigners to trample the national honor and rights of sovereignty of the Turkish nation and brought the country to the point of economic collapse and that the regime does not grant Turkish citizens their democratic rights, and by showing the Turkish Republic in this light abroad, to spread exaggerated reports intended to detract from the respect and regard in which the state is held abroad and to engage in activities harmful to the national interests,

"B. To conduct propaganda to weaken and destroy patriotism by asserting that a Kurdish nation exists inside the Turkish Republic separate from the Turkish nation and by describing the area where they live as Kurdistan,

Inciting Hatred and Enmity

"C. That, in announcing that the state in Turkey is a bourgeois state and the form of government is bourgeois parliamentarianism, Nabi Yagci openly incited the working class to hatred and enmity against the existing order and administration in Turkey by fostering class distinctions,

"D. That, he insulted the distinguished elected President by name in the media and openly derided and vilified the government, in the person of Mr Ozal, and the armed forces by referring to a pseudo-parliament and generals who seized the Grand National Assembly through lies and demagoguery. He should be sentenced item by item for this reason..."

19 More Punishments for Same Crimes

The SSC Prosecutor cited in the indictment documents and examples proving that Nabi Yagci had been prosecuted 19 other times on various dates for the same crimes and asked that he be sentenced for each of these crimes individually. The incidents that the prosecutor listed in the indictment and for which the punishment of Nabi Yagci is sought are:

1. Leaflet published after holding talks with German Communist Party leaders.
2. Telegram sent on the TWP's anniversary.
3. Speech delivered at the Bulgarian Communist Party first congress.
4. Speech delivered on VOICE OF THE TCP on 1 May 1986.
5. Articles published in ATILIM magazine.
6. Message sent to the CPSU on the 69th anniversary of the October revolution.
7. Various speeches abroad.
8. Interview with the Greek Communist Party journal RIZOS PASTIS.
9. Speech delivered at the Greek Communist Party Congress.
10. Press conference in Athens.
11. Press conference held in Paris while the guest of the French Communist Party.
12. Speech on VOICE OF THE TCP on 1 May 1987.

13. Speech delivered at the Greek Communist Party 13th congress.

14. Speech delivered to mark the 67th anniversary of the TCP.

15. Leaflet published about the formation of the Left Union.

16. Leaflet published on Turkish Kurdistan for Left Union.

17. Democratic Coalition Platform leaflet.

18. Turkish Kurdistan leaflet published under Left Union name.

19. Leaflet published for Left Union summit conference.

[11 Jul 88 p 7]

[Excerpts] The second part of the Ankara SSC indictment gives information on the background, endeavors and legal status of the TWP, then discusses TWP General Secretary Nihat Sargin. The section is based on statements made by Sargin to the police, the Republic Prosecutor and the interrogation judge and on information from security units. It explains TWP General Secretary Sargin's background and his relations with the party and reads:

"He...revealed that he had left Yesilkoy and gone to Belgium using a 2- year passport upon receiving instructions to "get out of the country" from Behice Boran when party leaders and general chairmen were being taken into custody after the 12 September 1980 operation, that he had attended the CPSU's October revolution ceremonies in Moscow, that he had sat on the TCP-TWP merger and joint activities committees, that he had participated in the Left Union and Democratic Coalition platform efforts, that he had published declarations in connection with these efforts and that he was responsible for these documents."

27 Separate Crimes

The SSC Prosecutor requested separate sentences for 27 articles, bulletins and declarations that General Secretary Nihat Sargin, who revealed that the TWP is a scientific socialist party, published at various times in the magazine CARK BASAK, the party publication printed abroad and smuggled into Turkey. The SSC Prosecutor gave examples to clarify these articles, declarations and bulletins and repeated for TWP General Secretary Nihat Sargin the charges he had made against TCP General Secretary Nabi Yagci. He reported that the defendant had confessed to committing these crimes to the police, the Republic Prosecutor and the Interrogation Judge.

Other Defendants

Nabi Yagci and Nihat Sargin are being tried along with 14 other people in the trial, continuing at the Ankara SSC.

Of these, Ibrahim Cihan Senoguz, Naci Gursun, Adil Demirci, Mustafa Erdogan, Celal Ozdogan, Mehmet Salmanoglu, Musa Kasa, Ekrem Kandemir, Mehmet Atilla Coskun, Mehmet Alcinkaya, Ali Osman Sen, Ahmet Cevdet Uludag and Sefika Uludag are being tried for being TCP members and engaging in parallel activities as revealed in documents on file and statements by TCP General Secretary Nabi Yagci, according to the indictment. Attorney Rasim Oz, meanwhile, is being tried for inciting to hatred and enmity by encouraging class distinctions in praising the efforts made by Nabi Yagci and Nihat Sargin to establish a Marxist-Leninist order in Turkey.

TCP, TWP Goals

The conclusion and recommended sentence section of the indictment summarizes the goals and endeavors of the TCP and the TWP as:

"To change the constitutional order to a proletarian government based on the working class and, as a result, to institute the domination of one social class over other social classes and to annihilate other social classes in Turkey, and, therefore, to totally overthrow the established economic and fundamental order in the country and replace it with a Marxist-Leninist order."

[12 Jul 88 p 7]

[Text] "Our Constitution Has No Place for Communist State"

The final section of the Ankara SSC indictment lists the crimes committed by TCP and TWP general secretaries Nabi Yagci and Nihat Sargin and the articles of law under which these crimes fall. The statement reads as follows, verbatim:

"It was determined that the defendants Nabi Yagci and Nihat Sargin developed their endeavors within the program of these two outlawed parties, that they publicized in foreign countries unfounded and exaggerated reports and news based on and conforming to their own purposes about events within the country in such a way as to destroy the respect and influence abroad of the Turkish Republic, in the form of articles in the magazines ATILIM and CARK-BASAK, brochures and leaflets which they published abroad and introduced illegally into Turkey, and that they therefore committed acts harmful to the national interests."

Just as one sees from the publications mentioned that defendants Nabi Yagci and Nihat Sargin are administrators of these outlawed parties, it is understood from their documented statements that they admitted this to be true.

It is also seen that defendants Nabi Yagci and Nihat Sargin always spoke in print of the Turkish Republic and the government of the Turkish Republic in the persons of the distinguished president and prime minister in derogatory terms and engaged in the acts covered by the cited articles of the Turkish Penal Code [TPC].

Their Own Political Thought

Defendants Nabi Yagci and Nihat Sargin were able to say in their defense:

"We engaged in these actions to realize our own political thought we merged the two outlawed parties in an attempt to demonstrate these actions within the milieu of one outlawed party, the TUCP. When one speaks of democracy in the world today, it is axiomatic that these systems occur within a state system and act as a legal party.

"One must admit that thought outside of this framework would be outmoded."

It is clear that it would be unacceptable to place within democracy the proletarian dictatorship which would theoretically be realized within such a defense and impossible for the acceptance of such placement to be considered as conforming to the Constitution of the Turkish Republic and the legal order based on it.

Within State Order

The state of the Turkish Republic is a democratic, secular and social state of law as defined by the Constitution. An order that included the thought of the defendants would be contrary to our system of government as outlined by the Constitution. There is no basis for considering the system of government defended by Nabi Yagci and Nihat Sargin as being within the democratic system of government.

The democratic system of government and government based on Marxist-Leninist thought are two separate systems. They incorporate opposing systems of thought. There is no place in our Constitution for the communist system of government based on Marxist-Leninist thought.

In other words, just as there is no place within a communist system of government based on Marxist-Leninist thought for a democratic system of government, there is likewise no place within a democratic system of government for a communist system of government based on Marxist-Leninist thought.

Bearing in mind these facts and thoughts, the actions of defendants Nabi Yagci and Nihat Sargin require punishment as stressed item by item in the indictment.

It is necessary that the other defendants named in the indictment besides these two and excluding Rasim Oz be punished according to the articles of the TPC related to membership in the outlawed TCP and that Rasim Oz be punished according to TPC articles related to his actions as shown in the indictment.

Note: Jurists say that the sentences according to the law for TCP and TWP general secretaries Nabi Yagci and Nihat Sargin for the crimes in the indictment amount to 500 years each.

8349

Columnist Reacts to LE MONDE Ad, 'Preserve Kurdish Culture'

35540179a Istanbul *TERCUMAN* in Turkish
6 Jul 88 p 6

[Article by Yilmaz Oztuna in the column "Historian's View": "Kurdish Culture"]

[Text] A half-page advertisement in France's equivalent of the TIMES, LE MONDE (fortunately, a smaller sized newspaper than others): "Preserve Kurdish Culture." Beneath it, a list of signatures, genuine or not....

What ought the culture to be of these East Anatolian Turks, a segment of which are constantly being pressured in Turkey to be called Kurds? Let me say right away, it is heavy on folklore. And this lore must certainly be preserved. Do we not protect our popular cultures in Edirne, Mugla, Hatay and Kars? We ought to be equally careful to protect the folkloric values of the Turk who happens to speak Kurdish today as of the one who spoke Turkish during the Selcuk period in Tunceli. Are we not doing so?

Sir, let them speak Kurdish! Certainly! Do they not speak it? What next? Next let those who do not wish to do so omit learning Turkish! Look, distinguished international figures, this is impossible. Why is it impossible?

Lift the requirement for English in the United States, Britain and Canada, for French in France, for Arabic in Algeria and Morocco, for Russian in the Soviet Union and for German in Germany and allow the small mother tongues to exist officially beside these great languages, then the government of the Turkish Republic will certainly be willing to consider something!

I see among the endorsers the signature of the former head of state of our brother Algeria—rumored among the Algerians to be mentally ill. I am not saying they should lift French as the second official language but, if they have the nerve, proclaim Berber an official language beside Arabic! As many as 7 million of the 24 million Algerians speak Berber and a few million of them speak no Arabic at all. The same is true for Morocco.

Another signature belongs to the young Kennedy. The man got his college degree thanks to the wealth of his father and older brothers who were great men. He does not even have primary school knowledge of Turkey...

...the United States of America where 70- and 80-year-old immigrants have 5 years to become American citizens and are required to go to night school to learn English and American history or forgo citizenship. Minorities partially maintain their folklore and customs, but just let one of the 10 million Italian Americans speak Italian in a government office or submit an application in Italian to a government office and see what happens.

Yves Montand.... The French singer and actor whom I admire. A former heavy gun of the French Communist Party, he resigned after the Russian repression of the uprising in Hungary. But he is an Italian born in Italy. I would ask him to try speaking Italian in France. The entire population of Corsica is Italian, yet let me remind you of how the French treat the Corsicans and the Bretons.

The signature of former Iranian president Sadr is a laugh. Look man, first grant language freedom to the Kurdish minority and the 15 million Turks in Iran and then whatever you call Kurdish culture, try to preserve that!

There is even a Sudanese attorney among the signatures. It seems that he signed for his usual attorney's fee, otherwise he would have had to remember the treatment of the people in the three southern states of the Sudan who do not speak Arabic. The fellow must be a communist, because we recognize the Sudanese, they like the Turks and would not sign an anti-Turkish declaration and that sort of thing.

And there is an English writer.... He must be reminded of how those in Great Britain who speak the native local languages such as Irish, Welsh, Shetland, Orkney, Erse and Manx are required to learn English.

A handful of pseudointellectuals who consider the Turks naive, unable to face facts and uninformed about the world, in my opinion, are trying to bring trouble upon the East Anatolian Turks whom they call ethnic Kurds. In any case, they are very fond of them and would probably protect them better than Turkey does!

8349

AUSTRIA

Differentiated Infantry Doctrine Evolving for Militia Units

36200216 Vienna TRUPPENDIENST in German
Aug 88 pp 349-356

[Article by Brig Gen Guenter Hochauer: "The Infantry in the Nineties"]

[Text] [Boxed material] Brigadier General Guenter Hochauer, who was born in 1941, received his officer's training at the Theresianum Academy and graduated in 1963. He subsequently served as platoon commander and training officer with the 10th Training Regiment in Klagenfurt and as platoon and company commander of a 1-year volunteer company. From 1969 to 1972, Hochauer attended the sixth general staff training course. Thereafter, he was assigned to the formation staff of the readiness unit. In 1973, he was placed in charge of organization in the G-3 department at Army Headquarters and subsequently given the post of commander of a motorized infantry battalion. In 1979, he was appointed chief of operations and deputy chief of G-3 at Army Headquarters. Since 1987, Hochauer has been deputy chief of operations on the general staff.

Some Remarks on Fundamentals

The national defense plan and the doctrine of area defense form the backbone of our military national defense concept. Starting out with the actual situation, a phased plan has been worked out which is to attain the expansion stage via an interim stage. Efficiency levels at each stage have been clearly defined. But problems which have since arisen making it unlikely that the expansion stage will be attained anytime soon. The expansion stage calls for a military establishment composed of some 300,000 men which is to form the nucleus of an area defense posture based on the operational effectiveness of area-bound units.

The curtailed expansion plans of the Army and the temporary freeze on the quantitative development of area defense are reflected in the 1987 Army Organization Plan which lays down the guidelines for the development of the Army of the nineties.

Ever since the passage of the National Defense Act of 1971 the development of the Army has concentrated for the most part on organizational measures such as the creation of the readiness units, the formation of the area-bound units assigned to area defense duties and the establishment of the required command structure. But most of all it involved the transition to a militia-type structure through the formation of mobilization and training bases and regular territorial Army regiments. The organizational orientation of individual units toward the specific requirements of area defense was initiated in some instances but was not fully completed

in the sense of a balanced system involving all components. On the one hand, the tactics of area defense first had to be learned and the area-bound defense forces in particular had to be instructed in tactical matters. For another thing, one of the basic requirements for achieving this goal, i.e., an overall structure adapted to the required effectiveness of the various buildup stages, simply did not exist. The 1987 Army Organization Plan now enables us to consolidate the various formations and units. The operational capabilities prescribed by the size and structure of the Army are a major factor in setting up the various components in such a way that they will be able to fulfill their tactical missions.

The evaluation and orientation of the various formations and units toward their general and specific tactical mission in area defense based on overall plans for antitank and antiaircraft defense as well as high-angle and engineer support (to name the most important) thus represent a highly significant step in the implementation of the 1987 Army Organization Plan.

Terminology

The following are the designations of the units of the Austrian Army in accordance with their primary combat function: command units; combat units; support units; antitank and antiaircraft units; supply troops.

The combat units (which are the most important component of the entire system) are subdivided into infantry, i.e., non-armored, and mechanized, i.e., armored units. Organizationally, the infantry combat units are designated as motorized infantry brigades (Jaegerbrigaden) and territorial Army regiments (Landwehrregimenter) and the mechanized combat units as armored infantry brigades (Panzergrenadierbrigaden).

The specific combat technique and operational mission of the various elements as well as their major types of weapons and equipment determine the branches of service of the infantry and the mechanized combat units along with their organizational designation.

The infantry combat units are composed of motorized units in the form of motorized battalions and territorial Army battalions and, in addition, of blocking units in the form of blocking battalions, companies and independent platoons. The motorized brigades (mobile territorial Army units) are broken down into tank destroyer units in the form of tank destroyer companies as well as light infantry units in the form of light infantry battalions and companies. The territorial Army regiments (the area-bound territorial forces) are broken down into guard units in the form of guard battalions, guard companies and guard/blocking companies and into light infantry commando units made up of light infantry commando companies. The mechanized or armored combat units (armored infantry brigade) has its armored units broken

down into armored battalions; its armored infantry units broken down into armored infantry battalions and its tank destroyer units broken down into tank destroyer battalions and companies.

Relative Strength of Infantry and Mechanized Combat Units

The infantry combat units (which will henceforth simply be referred to as "infantry") called for in the 1987 Army Organization Plan make up the largest single component of the Army. The ratio of the total strength and the number of infantry units as against the mechanized combat units is 10:1.

As such, the infantry is the primary component of the area defense system and a determining factor in the operations and tactics of its combat management. The mechanized combat units, on the other hand, provide the means for massed concentration and for influencing the outcome of ongoing battles on the operational and tactical level and thus lend indispensable support to the infantry.

The Infantry Mission in Area Defense

These are some of the objectives to be achieved once the level of effectiveness envisaged by the 1987 Army Organization Plan is attained in the interim stage of development: to make an effective stand along the main operation lines of a potential aggressor by displaying credible resistance capability; to establish defense readiness status in the main key zones at the threat of an attack; to mount sustained defense in the main key zones in a national emergency in order to prevent the aggressor from quickly attaining his operational objectives or at least to retain control over a defense-favorable, contiguous area of Austrian territory; partially to satisfy the requirements of effective combat on the flanks and in the rear of the aggressor along the latter's main operation lines.

These are the primary missions of the infantry on which the organizational and training programs of its individual components are to be based.

Defense

Large-scale operations by a potential aggressor are carried out by mechanized combat units supported by high-angle weapons and aircraft. Tanks (as the prototype of all armored combat and support vehicles) dominate the battlefield and represent the greatest challenge to the defender.

Infantry units operating from fixed positions will have to be employed in order to mount an effective defense along the main operation lines of the potential aggressor—particularly in the key zones and key areas faced by the threat. Defense from fixed positions will thus be the

main mission assigned to the motorized infantry battalions, territorial Army battalions and tank destroyer companies (which are variable-use forces) and the blocking companies (which are area-bound units).

Although it is of course desirable to select defense-favorable terrain in line with the specific capabilities of the infantry, operational constraints (e.g., the actual location of key zones) and the tactical considerations resulting from the respective locations of two such zones may sometimes lead to the selection of less easily defensible terrain.

Under the circumstances, infantry units assigned to defense from fixed positions must be able to engage in combat against mechanized enemy forces in the kinds of terrain which these forces are apt to use for a rapid thrust through Austrian territory.

Motorized Infantry Battalion/Territorial Army Battalion

Motorized infantry battalions/territorial Army battalions, which are small infantry units employed for defense from fixed positions, must be capable of making the following contribution to overall defense operations:

In a combat sector roughly 3 kilometers wide, consisting for the most part of infantry terrain and armor terrain up to 1 kilometer wide, they must be capable of holding off a staggered attack by brigade strength and/or regiment strength mechanized forces of some 100-140 combat vehicles and up to 50 other armored vehicles.

The defenders will achieve a clear success if the motorized infantry battalion/territorial Army battalion manages to destroy some 50 enemy combat vehicles in the space of 2-3 hours by means of its own active and passive antitank capability and thus to wear down the attacking enemy formation to the point of its no longer possessing an attack capability.

To assist the motorized infantry battalion/territorial Army battalion in fulfilling the same mission in a combat sector of equal width but consisting of a greater percentage of armor terrain, the motorized infantry brigade or territorial Army regiment will have to provide for greater antitank capability by assigning some or all the elements of the tank destroyer company or locally available blocking companies to it.

Outside the point of main effort, in less important areas or areas with a preponderance of infantry terrain and specifically armor-inhibiting effectiveness, the combat sector may well be as much as 5 kilometers wide. Conversely, in broken infantry terrain (e.g., built-up or wooded areas), the combat sector will have to be reduced in size while the motorized infantry battalion/territorial Army battalion will have to be strengthened through the addition of infantry units.

Motorized infantry battalions/territorial Army battalions operating from fixed positions and all their combat units and elements must be capable of performing the following functions: combat reconnaissance; combat security (combat outpost lines); occupation of backup positions (mostly for occupation of all-round defense positions); sealing off penetration by enemy infantry units; counterthrusts; absorption of outside forces; breaking off combat operations, including fighting their way back to assembly areas.

The ability to perform these combat functions in key zones also includes defense operations from fixed positions according to different combat procedures.

The following are subsidiary functions to be performed by motorized infantry battalions/territorial Army battalions with particular emphasis on limited area defensive operations and security missions: breaking off combat operations; combat movements; protection of areas and installations; strike capability in security missions.

In this type of combat, the respective units and elements of the motorized infantry battalions/territorial Army battalions must also be capable of operating in terrain suitable for infantry combat and of launching attacks against a weaker enemy or one inferior in combat readiness while in movement or engaging said forces in a delaying action.

In view of their abovementioned primary and subsidiary mission, the majority of the motorized infantry battalions/territorial Army battalions are constituted along militia lines, undergo a short period of basic training and are commanded by militia cadres. This simplified system prescribed by the national defense plan and the predetermination of the operating areas (based on the operational guidelines contained in the area defense concept) as well as their preparation during peacetime constitute a solid basis for superior efficiency of these formations in the sense of containment and (if that fails) defense with a promise of success. Area defense, however, cannot do without infantry units capable of performing a variety of tactical missions. Although their primary mission is to conduct defensive operations from fixed positions, they must also be capable (both as small units, i.e., motorized infantry battalions and large formations, i.e., motorized infantry brigades) of launching attacks and engaging in delaying actions.

This tactical versatility makes it possible to employ certain small formations in mountainous terrain away from roads and on airmobile missions. Infantry elements employed in this manner must be at least partially active formations, similar to the present motorized infantry battalions, which include a large number of regular cadres and whose training program calls for continuous training in formations. This might be achieved by adding similar mobilization units to the motorized infantry battalions of the readiness forces.

As a rule, the main antitank defense mission will be accomplished by the capabilities integrated into these small formations; but as for additional high-angle weapon and engineer support for the motorized infantry battalion/territorial Army battalion that will have to be provided by the next higher command level.

At a minimum, the motorized infantry battalions/territorial Army battalions must be capable (in addition to delivering blinding fire and firing flares) of one-time engagement of dismounted attacking infantry units before they reach the forward edge of the battle area. In order to provide engineer support, e.g., passive antitank defense, the motorized infantry battalions/territorial Army battalions, given 48 hours advance notice to establish defense readiness and relying on their own forces and means, must also have the capability to block sectors of terrain at least 1,200 meters wide and to activate 10 barriers and other territorially prepared obstacles along the movement axis.

Tank Destroyer Company

The tank destroyer company of the motorized infantry brigade or territorial Army regiment is designed as a variable-use component for strengthening static antitank defenses in predominantly armor-favorable terrain and in wider combat sectors. In terms of overall capability, its mission is to ward off battalion-strength mechanized forces with some 30 vehicles. This calls for the destruction of at least 15 combat vehicles no matter whether the company is employed separately or as a unit.

Blocking Company

The blocking company is the tactical formation of the blocking units. In specific instances, its function may also be performed by the blocking platoon operating independently. The command level of the small blocking formation, i.e., the blocking battalion, does not have any major tactical missions to fulfill. It represents an organizational framework and is operationally responsible for the coordination of engineer, high-angle weapon and logistic support.

The primary mission of the blocking company is to provide defense from fixed positions by blocking major axes of movement. Serving as a previously assembled component, trained for its task during peacetime, they have an important defense mission to fulfill in area defense by holding off the enemy at the points of main effort in almost all key zones and at gateways to the base area.

Blocking companies and battalions assigned the job of protecting densely populated areas and thereby serving as the backbone of a potential limited-area defensive battle perform a mission of operational significance.

This also applies to blocking units employed in subsidiary threat areas or areas not initially threatened. Their job in such instances is to prevent surprise attacks from unexpected quarters, thus contributing to the maintenance of the freedom of action of the forces located in the main threat area.

While the tank destroyer company is employed as an independent unit only in exceptional cases, the blocking company must be capable of acting on its own at times for the abovementioned conceptual reasons. With regard to antitank defense, its capability is equal to that of the tank destroyer company. But in contrast to that of the tank destroyer company, its capability is always directed toward actual defense against battalion-strength mechanized forces in a tactically contiguous area characterized by variable terrain, generally along an axis of movement. For this reason, the individual blocking companies tend to differ in size and structure (i.e., they will be structured in accordance with their specific mission) while the tank destroyer companies are organized along uniform lines.

In essence, blocking companies are independent components of the antitank defense forces. The sole mission of the blocking company's infantry component and its integrated weapon support (e.g., mortars and antiaircraft weapons) is to provide for the immediate protection of the antitank defense weapons. Organically integrated engineer units and/or the blocking battalion's engineer company constitute the passive antitank defense element.

By preparing fixed installations and barriers to protect the infrastructure, the blocking companies provide strong support to the motorized infantry battalions/territorial Army battalions engaged in defending the same operational area to which they have been assigned. This also substantially enhances the manpower options of the motorized infantry battalions/territorial Army battalions.

As one of the components in the fixed position defense system, the blocking company and its elements must also be able to perform the following additional functions in its own combat sector: combat reconnaissance; combat security; occupation of backup positions (for occupation of an all-round defense position); counterthrust; absorption of outside units; breaking off combat, including fighting its way back to assembly areas.

Blocking companies will only be required to perform secondary missions within the context of security operations. Blocking companies employed in proximity of the border will be given the job of protecting border crossing points and, specifically, of guarding the border area. Inside Austrian territory, they will also be employed to protect areas and installations.

Light Infantry Warfare

The national defense plan calls for effective action on the flanks and in the rear of an aggressor's main lines of operation and this, in turn, calls for employing infantry units in light infantry actions. In area defense terms, this specific type of combat calls for the exclusive employment of light infantry companies. In essence, these are the tactical formations of the light infantry units. The light infantry battalion does not have any mission to perform in terms of combined weapons combat and is not called upon to employ small formations in light infantry actions. In the main, it is the responsibility of the command level of the small formations to provide organizational and logistic support and to coordinate individual engagements in terms of identifying uniform tactical objectives and sustaining the actions of the light infantry units over extended periods of time.

There are no plans for light infantry actions by other infantry units (except light infantry commando units); they are solely viewed as an emergency solution based on constraints arising from actual combat situations. It is not possible for units charged with a defensive mission directly to switch over to light infantry warfare. It seems that this could only be done by falling back to intermediate terrain and trying for a piecemeal linkup with existing light infantry warfare units and their reinforcements. Following an extended reorganization phase and a gradual switch to light infantry warfare, newly established formations might ultimately resume this type of warfare.

Next to the blocking units, the light infantry warfare units represent the second important area-bound component of the area defense system. The envisaged goal is for the light infantry warfare units to provide variable depth cover for all of Austria's territory outside the central area depending on threat assessment and terrain. Depending on operational and tactical requirements and regional options, the light infantry warfare units' dual mission is directly to interdict the advancing aggressor through attrition and delaying actions and to wear him down in the penetrated area by employing "1,000 hit-and-run" tactics against his rear units and occupation forces. Areas not subjected to direct attack are to be held and favorable conditions are to be created for the recapture of areas which have been lost. This is the essential operational dimension of light infantry warfare. To make it a success, a minimum number of light infantry warfare units are required; but that is a condition which will not be met in the 1987 Army Organization Plan.

To attain the projected interim stage level of effectiveness, it will be necessary to employ the light infantry warfare units for containment and initially to drop the idea of inflicting heavy losses on a potential aggressor once he is inside Austrian territory.

As part of their light infantry warfare mission, the light infantry warfare platoons and companies must have the following capabilities: combat reconnaissance; ambush; surprise attack; combat actions over barriers; harassment; tank destroyer actions; occupying and securing depots; combat security; area surveillance; breaking off combat operations and evasion.

The light infantry warfare units' contribution to warding off a potential enemy attack will include the destruction of as large a number of enemy armored vehicles or certain special vehicles as possible as they advance on key zones and delaying the enemy advance in areas outside the key zones to be defended in conjunction with an operational blocking concept.

Summary

In defining the mission of the infantry, we have outlined the parameters for its development in the nineties. They call for gradually adapting our present infantry units to the requirements of area defense within the limitations of our financial, manpower and peacetime organizational capabilities.

We might point out in this connection that the present motorized infantry battalions/territorial Army battalions were conceived in an era prior to the elaboration of the area defense and militia concepts and that they have undergone little change in equipment or organization other than slight manpower and organizational modifications.

This applies in equal measure to the tank destroyer companies.

The light infantry warfare unit may represent a new development based on the area defense concept, but after a brief "learning stage" it would make sense to reevaluate its overall structure in terms of organization and equipment and above all with regard to the above-mentioned operational requirements.

The blocking units are the most advanced component in terms of area defense. They already meet area defense requirements in terms of their mission, organization and tactical concept. This will be reflected among other things in the establishment of a special blocking unit training center in 1988.

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Current Structure of Militia, Mobilization Mechanisms Detailed

36200217 Vienna OESTERREICHISCHE
MILITAERISCHE ZEITSCHRIFT in German
Jul/Aug 88 pp 297-306

[Article by Maj Gen Ernest Koenig: "The Austrian Armed Forces. Ongoing Development and Impending Crisis"]

[Text] Generally speaking, questions involving the [Austrian] Armed Forces, military defense, even Austrian security policy are discussed on the basis of daily events.

This article attempts to take a broader view and to trace the development of the Austrian Armed Forces as one might present it in as objective and critical a manner as possible to an outsider for example.

Starting with the militia concept, the article tries to explain its underlying political, physical and manpower principles and parameters; the threat and the concept as well as the organization, the personnel, the training program and the experiences with this particular system. This exchange of views might have part of a conversation with members of the armed forces of another neutral country.

The second part of the article deals with the impending crisis occasioned by changes in budgetary parameters and the organizational steps taken to confront that crisis.

The final section attempts to place this development in a broader context by drawing historic comparisons, pointing out the consequences of the impending crisis as well as ways and means of overcoming it.

The Development of the Armed Forces Until 1986

The Militia Concept

The militia concept goes back as far as the 16th century. By the 18th century, it was in full bloom. That is a well known fact as is the different interpretation of the concept, e.g., by the Warsaw Pact as well as in Lebanon or Iran for example.

In Austria, the militia concept became law in the form of the 1988 Military Service Act although it had been in use prior to that time primarily in the field of public information. A strong militia component in the Armed Forces is favored by 87 percent of the population. The historical reference to the militia concept is contained in the Moscow Memorandum, the last step prior to conclusion of the 1955 State Treaty. That memorandum establishes a logical connection to the militia concept by mentioning "Austrian neutrality patterned after the model of Switzerland."

Article 9-a, section 1 of the Austrian State Treaty reads as follows: "Austria affirms the concept of comprehensive national defense the objective of which is to protect the inviolability and unity of its national territory, particularly for the purpose of maintaining and defending its everlasting neutrality. This includes the protecting and defending its constitutional institutions and their operation as well as the democratic freedoms of its inhabitants against outside aggression."

Section 2 of the same article reads as follows: "Comprehensive national defense includes military, spiritual, civil and economic national defense."

Underlying Principles and Parameters

As far as the political area is concerned, the 1955 State Treaty clearly states that Austria will prepare for its own defense. This is reflected in particular in the relevant provisos of the treaty.

By drawing up the neutrality law in 1955, Austria's political leaders succeeded in averting a threatened guarantee of Austria's neutrality along with the consequences of possible "unwanted [military] assistance." Under this constitutional law, Austria assumes the obligation "of defending its everlasting neutrality with all the means at its command."

Austria's Armed Forces were welcomed at the time of their establishment in 1955 and were used 1 year later. As prosperity became more widespread, less importance was assigned to them. After a number of years of playing a secondary role, the very existence of the Armed Forces was put into question (resulting in a plebiscite on dissolving them) and turned into a political issue, i.e., 6 months of military service are enough.

In the aftermath, a national reform commission was set up to deal with the problems of the Armed Forces. Adoption of its report in full would have resulted in an optimally functioning national defense establishment.

Nevertheless, positive developments have taken place since 1974 which have been scarcely noticed both inside Austria and abroad.

The concept of comprehensive national defense was incorporated into the constitution in 1975. This concept calls for the protection and defense of constitutional institutions and their operation as well as the democratic freedoms of the population against outside aggression.

All three political parties also agreed on a defense doctrine in 1975 which called for the preparation of a national defense plan. "Already" by 1983 this national defense plan as well as the area defense plan was adopted by the cabinet. When the plan was made public in 1985, it was clearly stated that more was needed for national defense than was done at that time.


Materiel and Personnel: From the mid-seventies to 1986, the national defense budget climbed 3 percent per annum in real terms. The organizational structure of the Armed Forces has been significantly enlarged and the material inventories were increased. In 1970, compulsory military service was cut from 9 to the current 8-17 months. The latter applies to reserve officer candidates, a group to which we will return later. The number of individuals performing alternative service has been declining.

This enables us to make better use than heretofore of the roughly 45,000 annual conscripts. The personnel inventories of the mobilization organization are clearly on the rise as is the number of reservists called up for maneuvers, i.e., about 80,000 per annum.

Threat and Concept: The potential threat to Austria is attributable to its geopolitical location. As in all European countries, it includes a nuclear, a conventional and a sub-conventional component. The INF Treaty may be a boon for the big powers but can hardly be viewed as one by a small country situated at the interface between the two blocs. Thus, rather than try to meet the nuclear threat by issuing declarations or by adopting passive protective measures, such a small country is better off concentrating on preparations on the conventional level. In addition, organizational preparations at least have been made on the subconventional level.

If all nations were to adopt a primarily defensive posture like Austria's, the world would be a far more peaceful place. The plan calls for not leaving any part of Austrian

Table 1. Schematic Diagram of Key and Area Security Zones



Key:

1. Key zones.
2. Area security zones.

territory undefended in an emergency, i.e., combat will commence at the border and crucial areas (key zones and key areas) will be defended tenaciously.

Holding on to the base area, i.e., as large a contiguous area of Austrian territory as possible, in accordance with the "key zone combat" doctrine assures Austria's continued existence as a functioning nation state under international law. (Cf. National Defense Plan, No. 4.2, p. 66)

The plan also calls for committing Austria's Armed Forces in a manner commensurate to the threat, i.e., security mission; defensive operations in a limited area; operations within the zones and for thereby aiming [the aggressor] off from target.

Organization

Since the formation of forces a continuous buildup has been under way. In 1955, the Austrian Armed Forces numbered some 7,000 men. Their number had grown to 50,000, 10 years later, and 10 years after that to 150,000 men. At the present time, up to about 250,000 men are called up in a mobilization, if required. It should be pointed out in this context that it is characteristic of militia organizations that lead times and date changes must be firmly scheduled far in advance. When organizational changes occur too often or without sufficient lead time, this leads to major problems in training and/or to confusion.

The incorporation of the comprehensive national defense plan into the constitution in 1975 has been largely responsible for the significant expansion of the mobilization staffing pattern. Present plans based on Army Structure '87 call for increasing the strength of the Armed Forces to 260,000 men by the mid-nineties, starting from the 1986 "interim level" figure of 242,000. The actual "interim level" total is 186,000 men. In addition, there are 9,300 guard unit members and 27,900 replacement troops plus a 10-percent manpower reserve for a grand total of 242,000 men. Plans still exist which call for an even more significant expansion, i.e., to 385,000 men.

In addition to the customary command levels ranging from the Army level down to regiment, the organizational structure includes nine military commands which correspond to the nine provinces of Austria and 57 battalion headquarters which are expanded to 145 following mobilization.

There are just under 400 companies in peacetime and just under 1,100 following mobilization. Some of the 400 companies are directly incorporated into the mobilization staffing pattern. This includes the readiness units. The remaining units are dissolved and their personnel is used to build up the skeleton of the units to be mobilized.


Peacetime strength is about one-quarter of mobilization strength, i.e., 60,000 men, including draftees who are to undergo training. High availability peacetime units should make up about one-eighth of the mobilization organization, i.e., some 30,000 men. About 10 percent of the regular Army personnel are included in the mobilization staffing pattern.

For a small country the development of material inventories is quite remarkable as well. The number of antiaircraft guns, for example, has increased twofold over the past 12 years. The number of highly efficient mortars has increased by 400 to 900. Also, almost 500 medium and heavy antitank weapons have been added. The number of tank destroyers has more than doubled. Command support communications equipment and systems have been significantly improved and expanded. Air surveillance capability which became obsolete in 1970 will be restored in 1988, thus providing an efficient system to safeguard Austria's neutrality in the third dimension.

As for actual numbers and types of weapons, in 1975, the Austrian Armed Forces had 120 M-60 battle tanks, 152 M-47s and 42 M-41s; in 1988, they had 170 M-60s. There were 122 K-type Kuerassier tanks in 1975; there are 284 Kuerassier tanks of the same type in 1988. The number of mortars increased from 490 to 914 during the same time span; the number of medium and heavy antitank weapons increased from 2,191 to 2,643 and the number of antiaircraft guns increased from 369 to 610.

In addition to the command and support units at the army and corps level, the armored infantry division, the air division, the supply units and the territorial services, we should also mention the territorial reserve with its mobile component, i.e., the eight fully motorized infantry brigades, the mobile territorial reserve battalions and their fixed area component. The latter includes the "tailor-made" blocking units and uniformly structured motorized infantry combat units in the form of motorized territorial reserve battalions.

Table 2. Structure of Territorial Army



Key:

1. Territorial army
2. Mobile units
3. Area-bound units
4. 8 fully motorized infantry brigades, variable-use; can be concentrated throughout Austria
5. Territorial army battalions
6. 26 territorial army regiments; blocking units, light infantry warfare forces; used at all times to cover area

Manpower

For a clearer understanding of the militia principle which was developed onward primarily and most particularly in the territorial reserve, it is important to differentiate between the basic peacetime unit, i.e., regular territorial reserve regiments numbering some 150 men and the mobilization staffing pattern with its territorial reserve regiment, made up in the main of infantry units and the replacement regiment. The 150 men guarantee an regular cadre component of at least 3 percent in the mobilization organization.

Following mobilization, the regular territorial reserve regiment is dissolved, giving way to the mobilization staffing pattern consisting of up to six small units.

Now which positions in this militia organization are held by career servicemen? At the battalion level, these include some of the battalion commanders, an average of two staff officers and 50 percent of the battalion headquarters personnel; one company commander per battalion; two or three non-commissioned officers per company, more in the heavy company; approximately 10 non-commissioned officers in the headquarters company.


For the sake of completeness, let me also mention how the high-availability units operate in peacetime. The various small units have been assigned both peacetime and mobilization staffing patterns. The peacetime structure calls for high levels of strength and operational readiness for as much of the year as possible.

The peacetime strength of the armored infantry division, for instance, is about 9,000 men and 15,000 men after mobilization. In other words, we are talking of an optimization of immediate operational readiness and a corresponding permanent staff structure.

Like all Western democracies, Austria is faced with the problem of declining age classes. The parameters we are dealing with are the size of the standing Army and the utilization level of the number of draftees in a mobilization situation. As far as Austria's Armed Forces are concerned, seven-eighths of the organization is dependent on mobilization. The draftees can be used in the mobilization structure between 18 and 33 years.

In addition, just under one-quarter of the draftees presently being called up for service each year are performing jobs which serve no useful purpose to the operational

Table 3. Area-Bound and Mobile Units of Permanent Territorial Army Regiment



Key:

1. 10th Permanent Territorial Army Regiment
2. Headquarters company
3. Training companies
4. Material maintenance
5. Mobilization/Personnel
6. Following mobilization

readiness units or the mobilization organization. Objectively speaking, we therefore have enough reserves to provide the manpower for the 260,000-man Army as called for in the 1987 Army Organization Plan, the next planning cycle. But this is possible only because of the fairly prudent plans we have been following for the past 7 years.

For the most part, the concrete steps to be undertaken apply to intra-service areas, i.e., a cut in the number of functional soldiers, which means that many officers and non-commissioned officers will lose their assistants; a reduction in the number of draft exemptions in the public interest, which gives little pleasure to some authorities; an

increase in the number of long-term servicemen, which has raised concern in some quarters; the rationalization of the mobilization organization, which no commanding officer really likes and finally, motivation as such. The latter would most effectively originate with the political leadership.

These are just some examples representative of a much wider selection. More thought might be given to other possibilities.

We are also quite pleased about the increasing number of volunteers for the reserves. The manpower problem is getting less worrisome with every passing year. We have been able to fill more than 80 percent of the officer slots in the mobilization organization after proper training.

The number of reserve officers and non-commissioned officers has almost been increasing by leaps and bounds during the past few years. Over the past 10 years, the Army as a whole has been getting distinctly closer to the manpower levels envisaged by the national defense plan.

But in spite of the virtually progressive trend curves it will take several years longer before this particular problem is resolved.

Training and Exercises

The minimum term of service which lasts 8 months includes the following: general basic training; basic weapon training, weapon training and 60 days of field training.

Command training calls for training in the actual command function for both regular Army commanders and militia commanders. A large variety of measures contributes to the enhancement of the training level of the


militia cadres. This includes the targeted distribution of regulations and professional journals; correspondence courses for reserve officers; command seminars for both civilian and military staffs; preparatory cadre exercises and ongoing improvement of cadre training programs.

Let me cite the career of a militia or regular Army officer as an example of the interaction between training and exercises.

To start with, militia and regular Army officers undergo joint training for 1 year. Regular Army officer candidates then attend the military academy for an additional 3 years while militia officer candidates take part in cadre and field exercises. At the end of 4 years, they are jointly commissioned as lieutenants and then meet again at the unit commander training course between their seventh and ninth year of service.

For obvious reasons, less time is spent on training militia officers (as assigned reserve officers are called in military parlance) than on regular Army officers. But both must be enabled to perform the duties assigned to them on their own.

Table 4. Reserve Cadre Personnel Trends



Key:

1. Number of men
2. Reserve NCOs
3. Reserve officers
4. Reserve officer candidates

The operational command functions of both are the same; in peacetime, regular Army officers are required to attend to training and administrative matters in addition.

In conclusion, let me explain the connection between regular cadre and draftees once more. The cadre is made up of career servicemen, either regular Army or extended term, and the reserve cadre or militia cadre, as it is called in the military.

The term of service is composed of basic training and field exercises. Basic training either takes 8 months at the end of which no further exercises are required or 6 months plus field exercises. 1-year volunteers, on the other hand, take 12 months of basic training at the conclusion of which they take part in exercises dictated by specific needs.

The exercises include both field exercises and cadre exercises. All field and voluntary exercises last 2 months.

The cadre exercises which must be performed in addition to the field exercises last 1, 2 or 3 months depending on the particular assignment. As in all militia-type armies, the term of service thus is not the same for everyone.

We have now gone full circle with respect to the reserve or militia cadres.

Problems and Experiences

We will now cite some examples of problems and experiences relevant to the further development of the Armed Forces. They will address the subject areas of structure, operating sequence, motivation and shortfalls. There are reciprocal relationships between all of these, of course. We will also include findings obtained by the Armed Forces of other countries.

Structure

The duty hours of draftees in basic training taking part in field exercises, voluntary weapon training, etc., are continuous and open-ended. There is no pay for overtime. Active cadre personnel, on the other hand, enjoy union benefits. Work (public service) performed above and beyond regular hours is considered overtime and must be compensated in money or leave time.

Since funds are limited, such overtime is not paid for. The active cadres go home instead or else keep accumulating huge amounts of compensatory time which merely puts off the solution of the problem. Solutions are being sought but they are not easy to find. If the number of required working hours is cut, the problem becomes even worse.

Industry is not too fond of training exercises. Under the circumstances, the 8-month draftees (the so-called all-the-way draftees) who do not have to take part in additional exercises have a better chance of finding jobs than the 6-month servicemen who are of such importance for the militia units.

The political leadership at least has recognized this problem and is looking for ways to resolve it as well. It is to be hoped that the issue will not be resolved by means of a compromise which might play well vis-a-vis the public but would be of little benefit to the militia.

At times, legal defects also make the optimal fulfillment of assigned tasks more difficult. The call for complete physical fitness for every conceivable military assignment, for example, would drastically reduce the number of draftees able to pass the examination. The amended military service act will resolve this problem in a sensible manner.

In the past, servicemen who did not take part in training exercises by reason of illness were given credit for them just the same. This problem has been resolved in line with the wishes of the Army.

The Army does not always successfully or tenaciously resist efforts at interference in the conduct of its affairs, e.g., in the case of requests for exemptions from military service.

Other problems caused by a lack of commitment to security on the part of many politicians include the following: rigid pay scales, a brake on motivation and continuous cuts in the length of service of cadres. It is easy to see that a grammar school in which the students spend 30 hours per week as against only 22 hours for the teacher will not operate too well. In the Army, on the other hand, this simple concept is expressed in such a complicated way that the origin of the problem can no longer be detected and that possible attempts at a solution tend to miss the heart of the matter. In this instance, no solution has as yet been found.

There are six different fitness categories for draftees, ranging from fit for "territorial defense forces cadre" to "physically fit but not suitable for military service." This system works well. Plans exist for closer coordination between training and subsequent assignments.

The regional manpower resources available for conscription are assigned to motorized territorial Army battalions and blocking units, i.e., the area-bound territorial Army units, on a priority basis. The rest are assigned to jobs more or less far from home. That is an unavoidable necessity.

Operational Sequence: The decentralized DERGIS replacement information system is used for data collection purposes; but its quality is dependent on the input of actual data. We would wish the system were more flexible.

Mobilization headquarters submits the draftee requirement order to Army Headquarters 2 years in advance, coordinates the various requests and is responsible for the allotment of draftees. The actual call-up is handled by the [defense] ministry replacement office via the

territorial replacement departments of the different military headquarters. This procedure has proven efficient and in keeping with militia requirements.

Problems in the execution of this process are handled between the regiments and the military headquarters for the most part, since they need to be resolved where they occur.

Motor vehicle requisition detachments which take over civilian vehicles in case of mobilization are sent to the small units from military headquarters. This seems to be the best way of handling it from the end user point of view.

The problem of specialized training for future mobilization seems to have been resolved at least in principle. Following basic training, the individual serviceman is immediately transferred to a mobilization unit. At times, we run into problems because there are not enough trainees for a territorial Army regiment. Generally speaking, military headquarters is in a position to resolve this problem.

The establishment of combat teams during the period of basic training represents a problem which has not yet been resolved. The appropriate tests are being conducted at this time. The primary objective will be to resolve the question of the allocation of reserve cadres. The Swedish Army has resolved this issue with the help of preliminary training programs; the Swiss Army uses the "earning" system.

Motivation: It is important to overcome mistrust between the professional and reserve cadres. The following system has proven effective, particularly in the case of cadre personnel.

Joint preparation, e.g., of battalion orders, of the next training exercise; assumption of leadership role in the exercise by the reserve cadres while the professional cadres lend assistance, if necessary; raising requirements and awareness of joint responsibility as more training exercises are conducted.

More attention is being paid to the information programs prior to induction and during training exercises. This costs money but it achieves results. The programs should focus on the period between the exercises and should be the responsibility of the respective (professional cadre and reserve cadre) commanders. The militia commanders are expected to participate.

The military service act spells out the legal status of "called-up" reservists. But in practice these servicemen are at a disadvantage vis-a-vis the 8-month soldiers and the so-called "all-the-way" servicemen and, above all, vis-a-vis those performing alternative service who are erroneously referred to as civilian servicemen.

Shortfalls: Without a doubt, a shortage of reserve cadres is one of the most serious problems. But as we mentioned above, things have improved, at least in terms of numbers.

The shortage in the number of participants in training exercises is offset by the 10-percent manpower reserve. This guarantees operational readiness. But an analysis of ways to increase this manpower reserve cannot be ruled out.

The shortfall in called up draftees over a period of 10 years amounts to between 30 and 50 percent per unit. This is offset by means of the so-called replenishment ratio, i.e., the subsequent training of small numbers of men who are assigned to the unit in question. That is one possibility. The other might be to assign an excess of 40 percent to a given platoon, company, etc. There are pros and cons with regard to both options.

Summary Remarks

There were many reasons why Austria opted for a militia-type system. They concerned questions of international law, security policy, foreign and domestic policy as well as demographic, cultural and financial considerations.

This is why an attempt was made to delimit the militia concept and to outline the principles of international law; the basic requirements of materiel and manpower; the threat perception; the concept; the organization and the personnel structure and, using the above as a point of reference, to correlate the training and exercise methods and the experiences to some extent with those of foreign armed forces.

The weaknesses of the system are reflected in the brief duration of compulsory military service and the possible lack of timely availability of a sufficient number of units and formations.

On the other hand, there are benefits as well, e.g., the application of experiences from civilian life to service in an increasingly technology-oriented army such as human relations and technical aptitudes and, last but not least perhaps, the fact that the members of militia units tend to know each other.

It may be assumed that the key to success will lie in the buildup of militia cadres. The basis, however, is provided by the political leadership; by the unqualified commitment to the twin political tasks of security policy and national defense; by the creation of the necessary financial and legal framework (in particular regarding compulsory military service); by the timely availability of forces in sufficient numbers and the utilization of the areas and resources necessary for defense and the preparation of defense.

Following the Army crisis which lasted from 1968 to 1974, a positive trend continued until 1986 which helped Austria approach the international standard of nations with defensive military postures such as Switzerland, Sweden and Finland.

The military leadership even began to believe in the possible implementation of the guidelines set down in the military segment of the national defense plan by the national defense council and the cabinet. It may in fact be implemented in the foreseeable future, if not exactly on schedule.

But then came the severe budget cuts in 1987 and 1988. The Army's financial structure went out of control. The investment budget declined to one-half of the funds earmarked for that purpose in the national defense plan and personnel costs rose even as the defense budget continued to shrink.

1987 Army Organization Plan

In this situation, every minister of defense, no matter what his party affiliation, would have had to adopt measures which could not have led to a very different outcome unless it would have been even more dramatic than it already is.

The draft proposal submitted to the cabinet in the fall of 1987 was based, after all, on the strictures imposed by the barely possible. Even this particular concept will help continue the buildup of the Army, albeit at a more modest pace.

The objective is to achieve and/or maintain combat effectiveness in relation to the surrounding area (the "others" have gotten stronger, too, after all), i.e., the effectiveness of the interim posture in accordance with the provisions of the national defense plan.

In dealing with the developments during the past 2 years, we will concentrate on the financial situation at the outset; the policy decision; the planning changes and the projected structure of the 1987 Army Organization Plan.


Financial Situation

Since 1978, [Austria's] national defense budget has developed in the following manner:

The upper or nominal curve represents the schilling amounts allocated to the Army. It is the real value of these funds, going back to the base year of 1978, however, which provides a clearer picture of relative purchasing power over the years.

All told, the defense budget has reverted to the status of 1982/83, i.e., the period following the funding crisis of 1981. One should not forget in this connection that the Armed Forces increased in size by some 70,000 men, i.e., 40 percent, between 1978 and 1988 and that the operation of a larger Army costs more money.

Table 5. Austrian Defense Ministry Budget



Key:

1. Billions of schillings
2. Nominal percentage
3. Real percentage

For the time being and/or seemingly, investment is the only area in which savings can be made. For 1988, the investment budget is about the same in real terms as it was in 1977. Today this amounts to loss of substance, obsolescence of equipment and thus loss of combat effectiveness and higher maintenance costs which, in turn, place a further burden on investment. It is a vicious circle which keeps rotating faster.

The same applies, perhaps even more so, to construction. In view of the precarious situation in this regard, approval was given to dip into upcoming budgets, which shifts the problem to the future when costs will inevitably be higher.

The decision was reached based on the assumption that the 1987 and 1988 budget decline might be arrested in the years to come and that the targets set by the political leadership (both in section M of the national defense plan and the 1987 Army Organization Plan) were realistic after all. In that sense, it was the right decision. But there is probably no way in which this process could be duplicated in the future. The alternative would be structural adjustment or to put it more succinctly, a reduction in the peacetime as well as the mobilization organization.

The Policy Decision

In the summer of 1986 at the latest it had become apparent that the Armed Forces were faced with a budget cut and that rationalization measures could not be avoided. It was impossible to freeze the mobilization organization at the summer 1986 level because it was in the midst of a dynamic buildup. A freeze would have turned a disharmonious, momentary situation into a permanent one.

Under the circumstances, the military leaders called for upgrading the antiaircraft component, particularly the battlefield missiles; for a modest buildup of the territorial defense forces, with special emphasis on the area-bound units and the integration of the existing organization in efficient command structures.

They also called for upgrading the supply component and, if possible, high-angle weapon support which had been purposely neglected during the 10 years of the buildup. These items were more than the finance minister was prepared to approve but certainly a great deal less than the national defense plan called for.

It is therefore highly unlikely that the desired efficiency of the buildup stage will be achieved by the end of this century. In view of the urgent fiscal limitations, the 1987

Army Organization Plan was not submitted to the national defense council until the summer of 1987. Following recommendation of the plan by the council, it was adopted by the cabinet in the fall of 1987.

Unfortunately, the 1988 budget has affirmed the decision to adapt future Armed Forces expenditures to projected financial resources which are still seen in an optimistic light.

Planning Changes

The proposal by the military leaders thus called for rapid implementation of the following measures as part of the 1987 Army Organization Plan:

1. Reductions in already costed and planned programs oriented toward 1994 buildup levels, i.e., the projected doubling of the size of the area-bound territorial units by 1994 by some 30 percent more companies was cut to 15 percent; the 35 percent and 15 percent increase in the number of motorized infantry companies was cut to 6 percent; projects involving the relatively few mechanized units were cut by 25 percent.


2. The concomitant consolidation of existing regiments and battalions called for, e.g., integrating units and partial units of incomplete battalions into other battalions or directly integrating them into regimental units; postponing the establishment of battalions for the foreseeable future, i.e., not listing them in the 1987 Army Organization Plan; earmarking units for the replenishment of battalions and regiments only in operationally important cases.

What follows is an outline of the relevant organizational measures as they apply to a hypothetical territorial Army regiment—in a maximized manner, to be sure.

The 1987 Army Organization Plan, too, calls for giving priority to the (albeit modest) buildup of the infantry component, which is the heart and soul of the territorial defense force concept. The objective of the territorial forces is to implement the established operational guidelines within the framework of the area defense concept in such a way that they correspond to the efficiency criteria prescribed by the guidelines for the interim stage of the national defense plan.

The units are distributed among the various branches of service in the following manner: 58 percent motorized infantry brigades and territorial forces; 8 percent mechanized combat troops; 5 percent Air Force and antiaircraft units; 9 percent supply units; 6 percent territorial units; 8 percent support units, and 6 percent command units.

Table 6. Planning Changes



Key:

1. Permanent battalion
2. Directly subordinate to regiment
3. Replenish
4. Activate

The following schematic diagram differs only slightly from the known organizational pattern.


The detailed replenishment and consolidation plans under the 1987 Army Organization Plan call for clearing up a number of weak spots, e.g., with respect to missiles, medical supplies and supplies generally and with respect to blocking and reconnaissance units and the modernization of the high-angle fire support system.

Summary Remarks

Since the adoption of the area defense plan, we have been much more successful in raising public awareness of the military security measures we have undertaken.

This plan is not intended as a model for other countries but is designed to make an optimal contribution to the protection of Austria's security interests within the European context.

Table 7. Structure of Austrian Army



Key:

1. Defense ministry (executive secretariat)
2. Bureaus and other departments
3. Ministry commands
4. Academies and schools.

It is hard to believe what has been achieved in terms of building up Austria's Armed Forces, given the limited funds made available for this purpose. The present organizational weaknesses are well known. Up to 1986, there was still reason to hope that a long-range program might largely remedy these weaknesses.

The austerity program introduced by the Austrian government in 1987 did not spare the Austrian Army whose budget had already been stretched to the limit. The impending cabinet changes in the summer of 1986 led to a period of indecision so that the government did not issue the long overdue organizational directives expeditiously enough. When the decision-making process was hastily resumed in the summer of 1987, heated debates ensued.

There was a lack of preparation time and the summer months did not favor the information and coordination process. As a result, suppositions and conjectures began to surface about matters which had in fact already been settled within the context of the recommendation of the 1987 Army Organization Plan by the national defense council.

Under the circumstances, the impact on Army morale was inevitable. Preparations for organizational dispositions had to be cancelled; procurement of long-promised, upgraded equipment had to be postponed yet once more but this time for an extended period of time; restrictions in training programs and operations had to be imposed, ranging from limits on training ammunition to a shortage of funds to pay for cadre overtime. The sum of these economy measures impacts on the enthusiasm of the cadres and that, in turn, impacts on the draftees. Not surprisingly, surveys have borne this out.

No doubt, there are other reasons to be found within the Army context itself. But in the end they go back to the abovementioned points and to questions relating to the situation of the cadres themselves, in terms of their duties, their pay and their social status.

If the rapid reduction in material expenditures continues in 1989, the impact on materiel and operations as well on those serving in the Armed Forces for brief or extended periods may turn out to be irreparable.

In terms of damage control, the former problem might be met by painful cuts in the existing organization at the expense of our already impaired defense strength, i.e.,

the organization as a whole would have to be reduced in size. On the other hand, it will scarcely be possible to control the impact on attitudes and motivation.

But we also have, for the first time ever, a 4-year financial guideline starting in 1989 prepared by the defense minister which would satisfy the material requirements spelled out in the Armed Forces structure. The fight to obtain the first annual installment is likely to continue until the fall of 1988.

Parameters for Armed Forces Development

A potential conflict situation or an actual conflict develops because one nation feels that it is capable of projecting its power onto another nation or group of nations. This may but does not necessarily have to include military power. There are usually a number of aspects to conflict situations of this kind. Who is projecting his power? We hear of such situations every day. Surely the big powers do so, e.g., in the Persian Gulf or vis-a-vis their allies. But France projects its power, too, in North Africa; Vietnam does in Kampuchea; South Africa does in the frontline states and Namibia; and so do Nicaragua, Israel, Syria, Iran, and other nations.

It is scarcely possible to accuse countries like Sweden, Finland, Switzerland, Austria or, for that matter, Yugoslavia of such behavior, much less of military actions. They all have one thing in common, i.e., a defensive defense posture—unless one subscribes to the cynical theory that an aggressor's intentions are always peaceful; that he does not really want war but merely to attain a specific objective. In which case it would be perfectly proper to pin the blame for war or conflict on the defender.

The behavior of the nation affected by the projection of power may be of crucial importance for future developments. In such a situation there are only two possibilities.

Based on all the steps taken or not taken and the declarations made or not made, the nation in question will either protect and defend itself or it will not. There are several variations to the negative response but in the final analysis the crux of the matter will be whether that nation affirms or does not affirm its present system and its basic values. Austria is not free of indications of the latter (cf. the events at Hainburg and in Styria). There is one common denominator in all this: the likelihood that one may be drawn into the orbit of another power is increased.

The alternative response is that one stands by one's country. This, too raises the possibility that the leadership elites in particular, basing their response on a kind of "functional hubris" and on intellectual acrobatics,

will view a threat as nonexistent, as too large or self-caused and will reason that it needs to be met "in a different manner." The ideas as to how are somewhat skimpy. The outcome is the same as above.

Only a realistic assessment of the situation and the common will to resist any type of interference or aggression increases the likelihood of not being drawn into that orbit. There are no guarantees, of course. In a democracy, after all, the evolutionary process of public opinion will always be a multi-faceted one.

But in Austria this process seems not to be well-developed at all. In fact, it seems difficult to get beyond the posture adopted in 1938.

Where did Austria stand in 1938? Following the short-sighted and harsh terms of the Peace Treaty of St. Germain, the nation's fate was sealed by the course adopted in 1931. Racked by internal dissension and economic misery (no advantage was taken of the victory over the National Socialists in 1934 either internally or externally), Austria was softened up by means of broad-based indirect warfare over a period of 5 years.

Austria had lost faith in its own survival. It had tried approaches to France, Great Britain and Czechoslovakia among others but was ultimately deserted by the democratic nations as well as Italy. Its national defense establishment was weak. Those who might have provided the nucleus of possible resistance were pensioned off. Still, present estimates are that 60 to 70 percent would have voted against the Anschluss in the plebiscite scheduled for but never held on 13 March 1938. In the end, the leadership was no longer able to assemble its forces in time. It was a case of too late, too little, too indecisive. Misjudged and jubilantly welcomed by some, catastrophe struck Austria down as well as a great many other nations in the years that followed.

But it did not strike down Yugoslavia, for example. Despite internal dissension, that nation was able to identify a rallying point and in fighting on stood the test. Not so Switzerland and Sweden, who were spared the worst. Perhaps their defense posture made the difference.

Now that would be the lesson. Between 1945 and 1955 and for some years thereafter there were promising signs for our finding ourselves, for putting aside the issues that separated us. The state and the society seemed to be one. In the space of just a few years, Austria was able to achieve things it had only dreamed of in the years between the wars. Perhaps building up is easier than maintaining and developing onward.

Today, Austria's defense establishment is roughly comparable to that of the countries mentioned above in terms of organization, technology and preparatory measures for defense.

But in the end and in all likelihood there is still a lot to be done in terms of will, of standing by this country. Looking back at the "golden years," it is easy to see that public opinion in this regard is characterized by a relatively high measure of irrationality and a surprising lack of awareness of reality.

This is why the crisis primarily resulting from the reduction in defense expenditures needs to be taken seriously. The reason why it needs to be taken seriously is that between about 1975 and 1986 there seemed to be a glimmer of hope—relief about the fact that the great social group which had originally distanced itself from the government responsibility for national defense was now prepared to accept this responsibility as its very own. The trauma of the era between the wars would thus have been disposed of. Austria would have met its next challenge as a unified nation. Things had not quite progressed that far; but the general direction could be made out.

There is very little more money our Armed Forces can save. A one-billion cut in the Army budget may provide the finance minister with an extra 500 million but the remaining 500 million will be forfeited through the loss of direct taxes and payroll taxes as well as unemployment insurance payments.

There are five major items in the Austrian budget which raise the debt to the tune of some 140 billion schillings. If that debt were cut in half, we could practically balance the budget. Is the comprehensive national defense buildup undertaken over the past several years really going to be jeopardized yet once again because of a real savings of just 500 million schillings?

Whether people are willing to admit it or not, our defense efforts are not measured according to domestic standards but those which other countries apply to matters of national defense. Our defense posture stands and falls in line with the assessment of professional observers.

Even if people sometimes dismiss the fact, our security policy, our defense policy and our military national defense, along with other factors, has a distinct bearing on the credibility or the lack thereof of our country in the international community. The more our country does on behalf of its own security, the more likely it is that it will not be drawn into conflict situations and the longer it will be able to act independently—and vice versa.

Our Army buildup faces a crisis. That will happen again and again. But there is a positive side to crisis, too, i.e., things may also turn out well. If we can link up in 1989 to where we stopped in 1986 and if we manage to combine that with the lessons of 1938, then we would have missed a few years perhaps but would have made distinct progress in the area of security policy awareness.

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09478

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

Air-Mechanized Doctrine Imposes Heavy Command, Control Burdens

Impact Upon Ground Combat

36200214 Bonn WEHRTECHNIK in German
Aug 88 pp 50-51

[Article by Maj Gen Georg Bernhardt: "Ground Combat of the Future and the Role of Air Mobility"]

[Text] In the opinion of the commander of the 1st Airborne Division, Maj Gen Georg Bernhardt, the defense needs a broad operational means for depriving the attacker of the initiative. A rapid and superior reaction capability is therefore an absolute necessity for the ground forces. The consolidation of army aviation and airborne troops of the German Army into air-mobile

major formations [brigade and up] is therefore planned. The traditional perception of the battlefield thus changes from the two-dimensional field of combat to the three-dimensional combat zone. The command and control of ground forces will not become simpler as a result. A land battle during a conflict in Central Europe will not be conducted by the same rules as during World War II. Nor can the examples set by conflicts in other parts of the world be simply transferred to Europe. Worth noting, however, is the fact that air-mobile forces played a role in almost all conflicts. The history of these conflicts, such as the 6-Day War, the Falklands War, etc., illustrates the immense versatility and flexibility of air-mobile forces.

Since the existence of a credible deterrent must also be assured in the future, the mission of the German Army within the framework of the NATO ground forces will not change fundamentally.

The superior military potential of the Warsaw Pact, particularly in conventional combat strength, continues to exist, despite glasnost and perestroika. In addition to a quantitative superiority, the Warsaw Pact is now also catching up in a technological-qualitative sense. The invasion capability of Warsaw Pact ground forces continues to exist, and the invasion potential is being further expanded in a goal-oriented manner toward a highly mobile operational control. In order to guarantee a forward defense against enemy forces attacking in echelons, supported by operational maneuver groups, air drops, etc., the defensive strength must be concentrated at the point at which the attacker is seeking the decisive battle, so as to permit counterpoints of main effort to be quickly established. A static defense concept will be less realistic in the future than it is today. A sufficiently mobile defensive force thus becomes the critical dimension of the defense. Defense thus requires a broad operational means. This includes: mobile, adequately armored combat troops with sufficient firepower, so as to wrest the initiative from the attacker, flexibly employable and quick-reacting barrier systems, preventing the forward movement of enemy reserves through fire in depth, and the means to react more quickly than the adversary.

Gen Bernhardt then addressed the subject of faster reaction. The air-mobile forces of the Army are definitely not flying armored reserves, and a helicopter is no flying battle tank. The close interaction of the attack helicopter with ground-based combat troops offers the prerequisite for effective operational employment. It is for that reason that the consolidation of army aviation and airborne troops of the German Army is planned. It will be more easily possible in the future to augment the antitank capability of the airborne infantry on the ground with night combat-capable antitank helicopters, while their equipment with the airborne weapons platform [air-portable armored vehicle] Wiesel increases their ground reconnaissance capability and thus indirectly contributes to the survivability of the helicopter. It will be necessary in the future to give cover to antitank

helicopters during their employment by means of escort helicopters. For the long term, the Army is aiming for the continued development of air mobility to air-mechanized forces, which can control combined arms combat both from the air and in the air.

The battlefield will thus develop into a three-dimensional combat zone. The employment of air-mobile forces within the framework of conduct of operations and tactical combined arms combat must be coordinated. The current system of airspace allocation during combat is no longer adequate for this purpose.

The utilization of night vision technology largely obliterates the distinction between day and night combat, which in turn has consequences for the employment of air-mobile forces. Modern data transmission and data processing systems, and munitions technology, make it possible also to engage enemy targets far to the rear quickly, precisely and effectively. Ground combat will thus undergo a development toward greater depth. The rapid concentration and dispersion of forces will be the rule. Ill-defined front lines, insular and crisis situations will be the norm. Air-mobile forces can react to these situations with superior mobility. Their specific strengths become effective only when they are not detached during their employment from the other operational elements but are employed in close concert with these. Also avoided in this way is that air-mobile combat troops are employed for missions with which because of their specific weaknesses they are unable to cope. The control of land warfare thus becomes ever more a system of complementing elements characterized by mutual dependence. In the future, the art of troop command will consist even more of putting this ever more complex combination of forces into effect in ever more rapid action sequences and even shorter reaction times.

New Roles for Helicopters

*36200214 Bonn WEHRTECHNIK in German
Aug 88 pp 51-54*

[Article by Brig Gen Istvan Csoboth: "Army Aviation Forces and Their Continued Development in the Army Structure 2000"]

[Text] General of Army Aviation Brig Gen Istvan Csoboth first gave an overview of the German army aviation forces and then addressed himself to the continued development of army aviation forces in the Army Structure 2000, their organization and their airborne resources.

Army aviation forces comprise circa 10,500 men, including 1300 helicopter pilots, 170 air traffic control personnel, and 3000 technicians. The army aviation fleet consists of 750 helicopters. Army aviation forces serve in three army aviation commands with the three corps of the German Army, are stationed at 14 airfields and are organized into 10 regiments, 20 independent squadrons,

and 12 army airfield garrison headquarters. The 750 aircraft constitute the largest European helicopter fleet. This fleet consists of the following five types:

- Alouette 2 and
- Bo-105M as liaison and observation helicopters,
- Bo-105P as the antitank helicopter 1 (PAH-1),
- Bell UH-1D as light transport helicopters, and
- Sikorsky CH-53G as medium transport helicopters.

One-fifth of the helicopter fleet are of French, two-fifths of American, and two-fifths of German origin.

An important element of the army aviation forces is the army aviation weapons school, which trains 4000 students annually in 57 different types of courses conducted in 239 classrooms. School personnel include 200 officers, 270 senior [staff sergeant and above] and lower-ranking NCOs, as well as 90 other enlisted and 340 civilian employees.

German army aviators fly under unusually difficult environmental conditions such as frequent precipitation, often combined with poor visibility, over terrain dotted with populated areas and having very heavy wiring in the tactical flight altitude sector, making VFR sorties difficult. German army aviators were the first in the world to conduct night flights using image intensifier glasses and develop them to a high level. Instrument flights, too, are greatly handicapped by the icing vulnerability of the helicopter and the increasing density of air traffic. And yet there were only 0.066 accidents per 10,000 hours of flying time in 1987.

Continued Development of Army Aviation in the Army Structure 2000

In order to create the capability at the command level of quickly gaining the initiative through mobility and combat in and from the air, and of reacting effectively to the enemy's formation of main points of effort in combat, it is necessary to combine and continue developing the current elements of army aviation and air-borne forces in such a way that they embody, as a unified whole, a mission-adapted tactical grouping, a high degree of flexibility, and the capability to operate independently.

Above and beyond the antitank defense and air transport capabilities offered to date, army aviation forces are to provide:

- airborne command and control,
- reconnaissance from the air,
- direct and indirect air-mobile fire,
- engineer, air defense, and ABC defense support, as well as electronic warfare, and
- logistic support through the air for the entire duration of the engagement.

With support from helicopters, airborne forces are to

- take and hold for a limited time key terrain for operations of the air-mobile major formation,

- seal off enemy penetrations,
- contain the enemy,
- be employed in commando or surprise raid operations, as well as
- for harassment operations.

Under the unified command of the air-mechanized major formations, their combined arms combat yields more than just the sum of the individual elements named above. It becomes a rapidly unfolding battle of ground forces in the airspace close to the ground. The armament and equipment of army aviation forces, their speed and mobility in independent operations without being tied down by ground forces create a new element for striking the enemy a surprise blow at an unexpected point. This makes it possible for the troop commander to gain operational freedom of action through tactical means.

Being considered is the consolidation of available forces and resources into

- two air-mechanized divisions at the I and II Corps, and
- one air-mechanized mixed brigade at the III Corps.

Aside from divisional troops, the air-mechanized division is to consist of

- one antitank helicopter brigade,
- one light transport helicopter regiment,
- one medium transport helicopter regiment, and
- one airborne brigade with two airborne infantry and two airborne tank battalions.

The mixed air-mechanized brigade will have at its disposal

- one mixed antitank helicopter regiment,
- one mixed transport regiment, as well as
- one airborne infantry battalion and
- one airborne antitank battalion.

The mechanized divisions of the Army will each receive one army aviation squadron; the 6th Armored Infantry Division in Schleswig-Holstein will be supported by one mixed army aviation regiment, as in the past.

With the equipment currently assigned, army aviation forces have thus far had the capability to deliver airborne forces to their destination in airborne operations, as well as to give limited command and logistic support. Since the introduction of the PAH-1 [antitank helicopter 1], the daytime antitank capability has been substantially improved. These requirements have today been solved technologically or are viewed as being solvable. The problem is much more one of funding. One must therefore look for ways to adapt the currently assigned equipment and the ongoing equipment planning step-by-step

to the expanded requirements. This is to be carried out in small steps. One possible entry into this process will be described below on the basis of mission:

For the combat mission:

- the PAH-1 has been available thus far. This is a small, maneuverable helicopter, which was procured as a stopgap measure, to be sure, but which has performed well in 8 years of utilization. Through combat effectiveness upgrading measures in the early 1990's, the Bo-105P is to be made more stable and given a limited night combat capability. It will therefore be available for direct antitank support of ground combat troops until far into the next century, first at corps level and later at the divisions. From 1998 on,
- the PAH-2 [antitank helicopter 2], a joint German-French product, will assume the main burden of air-mobile antitank defense. It will be consolidated into independently operating brigades in the air-mechanized major formations and will be capable of far-ranging missions at night as well. The PAH-2 will be equipped for self-protection with air-to-air missiles. Defense against the enemy in the air diverts it from its primary role of tank-killing, however. For that reason, both antitank helicopter generations need to be escorted to preserve their operational freedom.
- Escort helicopters will assume this role, initially a helicopter deemed suitable based on an examination of what is available, whose performance reserves permit it to be fitted with air-to-air missiles and night vision technology. Later on a weapons system adapted to the performance of the PAH-2 will have to be developed. Depending on the mission and the threat, the antitank and escort helicopters will then be employed in concert. Also, possible, however, is the independent employment of escort helicopters for pursuit of enemy helicopters or to provide security for airborne operations and air transports.
- Other air-mobile weapons such as combat drones can supplement the arsenal in the long term.

A whole range of measures are necessary for combat support. To date there is no equipment at all for this role. Consideration is being given to:

- Fire support with unguided rockets, fixed aircraft guns, standoff weapons, and target-seeking guided missiles,
- Barrier support from helicopters, as tested years ago already with the mine launching system,
- Air defense support with special mission equipment, as planned for the escort helicopter or beyond.
- ABC defense support by means of fittable radiation and chemical agent detection equipment,
- Electronic reconnaissance, protective, counter and support measures with appropriate mission equipment.

The combat support helicopter will constitute the weapons and equipment platform for the tasks listed above. The plan here is not a new weapons system but the step-by step development of a variation of modular mission equipment that can be adapted to existing helicopters. The weight of such equipment packages makes it likely that most of it will have to be fitted to transport helicopters. A start will have to be risked with the weapons and helicopters currently available. Only an adequate combat support helicopter fleet will give airborne forces the effective supplement for combined arms combat. A key role is played here by artillery support fire or its substitute. Operational support through the air transport of troops, wounded personnel, medical personnel, and repair teams, of material, especially critical supply items, specialized tools, testing equipment, etc., is an absolute necessity. For these missions the army aviation forces have at their disposal the:

- light transport helicopter fleet of UH-1D, which in the long term may be replaced by the NATO helicopter 90, and the
- medium transport helicopter fleet of CH-53G, which until far into the next century will be used primarily to transport the Wiesel weapons platform for airborne forces.

A night low-altitude flight capability and autonomous flight control will have to be systematically expanded. Thought should also be given to active and passive protection equipment for transport helicopters within the framework of the combat effectiveness maintenance measures which will perforce become more necessary. The direct protection of closed air transports by escort and combat support helicopters will prove to be indispensable.

Reconnaissance with helicopters as part of the reconnaissance network of the Army, operating jointly with escort and combat support helicopters, but also with reconnaissance assets on the ground, especially air observation teams, will be an indispensable prerequisite for air-mobile operational control of all types. Available to serve as the sensor platform are the liaison and observation helicopter Alouette 2 until the end of the millennium, and the Bo-105M. Both thus far lack any type of optronic and electronic sensors. The night operations capability can be established only to a limited extent. Also non-existent is a flight-terrain and situation data storage and transmission capability. Efficient solutions are available. Their procurement and integration into the liaison and observation helicopters, if need be also the combat support helicopters, must be strived for.

The control of air-mechanized major formations requires air-mobile command centers, just as it does fast helicopters, with which commanders can proceed directly to the scene of the action and can influence the outcome of the battle. For this mission, as well, the

liaison and observation helicopters Alouette 2 and Bo-105M are available. Their number, stability, and capability to assert themselves in combat will not satisfy requirements, however. Combat support helicopters as mobile command centers and escort helicopters in the role of command and reconnaissance helicopters can bring relief.

For the control of air-mobile operations, it is imperative that a manageable air-space allocation system be established. This includes a secure IFF system, as is being sought by the NIS. As seen by the German Army, the airspace allocation system and thus the coordination of fire and movement in the airspace near the ground must be consolidated in one hand, so as to minimize mutual obstruction and endangerment of the systems, but also so as to optimally combine the rapid pace of the air-mobile combat carried out by the ground forces with all participating weapons systems. For this purpose, the command level of the corps appears best suited. Still required in order to achieve this is intensive persuasion and coordination work with the sister service Air Force as well as with the allies.

In summary, Gen Csoboth noted that the planning of the Army for the next millennium requires a qualitative improvement in air mobility. This is a central task, he stated. And yet the process which is to be introduced in the coming years through organizational and armament planning measures will be achievable primarily by means of small steps and an evolutionary growth of the new systems.

12689/7310

Armored Vehicle Production, Modernization Schedules Reviewed

*36200212 Bonn WEHRTECHNIK in German
Aug 88 pp 30-38*

[Article by Wolfgang Flume: "The Armored Vehicles of the Army"; first paragraph is WEHRTECHNIK introduction]

[Text] At the moment, the Bundeswehr is awaiting delivery only of the Leopard 2 battle tank. Next year, 140 of the modernized combat engineer vehicles 2 will be delivered and as of 1991/92, a number of tank recovery vehicles 3 on Leopard 2 undercarriages as well as 353 Wiesel airborne armored vehicles as equipment for the five projected air mobile brigades. The combat effectiveness of the Leopard 1 and Leopard 2 battle tanks and the Marder armored personnel carriers is to be upgraded. While work on the Marders may be contracted out later this year, the battle tanks are not likely to be upgraded until the early nineties. The operational requirements for upgrading the combat effectiveness of the Leopard 2's is slated for approval sometime later this year.

Yet to be developed vehicles will not be coming off the assembly lines until 1993. The first will be the Panther tank destroyer on a Leopard 1 chassis. Then, as of about 1997, the new Marder 2 armored personnel carrier and even later, if possible before the end of the century, the armored combat vehicle 2000. The definition stage for the Panther and the Marder 2 is due to commence early next year. The operational requirements for the armored combat vehicle 2000 have been written up but "are lost somewhere in the defense ministry maze," as one ministry official put it who is upset with the slowness of the decisionmaking process in arms matters.

Great attention is being paid to competition in the combat effectiveness upgrading and new development programs. It used to be a more or less foregone conclusion that the heavy vehicles would be built by Krauss-Maffei in Munich or Krupp MaK in Kiel and the light vehicles by Thyssen Henschel in Kassel; but today the field is wide open. When the Panther vehicle was in the development stage, Wegmann, a rank outsider, joined the bidding and ultimately won out. Krauss-Maffei, in turn, came up with the winning bid for the Marder 2. This does not mean, however, that the two firms will be responsible for the definition stage as well. Competitive bids will also be submitted for this stage as well as the development and construction phase. In the case of the Panther, the latter two phases may be combined, since no work is needed on the undercarriage. This raises the question of whether it might not have been better to use the so-called self-propelled howitzer model for the Panther and the Marder 2 so as to provide for two demonstration models from which one could have chosen for further development on the basis of tests and not on the basis of designs on paper, as is now the case. Although this might have cost the government more money, the results would surely have been more risk-free.

Speaking of competition, one more word about the concept phase of the Panther, the Marder 2 and the antitank combat vehicle. During the concept phase for these three vehicles which ran from the summer of 1986 through the summer and fall of 1987, Krupp MaK, Thyssen-Henschel, Daimler-Benz and Krauss-Maffei were all allowed to submit more than one design per vehicle in some cases although there was only enough money for working out a single proposal. In the interim, plans for the new development of an antitank combat vehicle were dropped. The Leopard 1 was thought to be and probably is well suited for this purpose for the foreseeable future, i.e., as a tank destroyer operating from partially covered positions. The plans for the new armored combat vehicle 2000 went on concurrently, the operational requirements for which are expected to be drawn up this summer.

Although the firms did not always receive official word immediately, similar changes as in the case of the antitank combat vehicle were made on other vehicles during the concept phase. In the case of the Panther, the ministry opted for a tracked vehicle, an unmanned

platform and a two-man crew; also for a modified version of the Hot missile, since there were constant delays in the advanced production program of Pars 3. For another thing, the entire construction program was advanced by about 3-5 years. Under the circumstances, the evaluation process took only those proposals into consideration which met the above specifications. In the end, Wegmann won the bid although it had not entered the competition as a systems company. Changes were also introduced in the course of the Marder competition involving the upgrading of the combat effectiveness of Marder 1 and the new development of Marder 2. Several ideas were dropped, i.e., providing new weapons for Marder 1; adapting the Pars 3 MR for use on Marder 2 and preselecting the 35/50 mm weapon built by Rheinmetall. The industry (perhaps excluding the eventual winners) did complain about all these new conditions "while the race was already being run." But it did not lodge an official protest because it was afraid that the programs might otherwise be delayed even further. Nor was the industry made aware of all the evaluation criteria. Which leaves one with the unpleasant impression that this competition was not conducted quite fairly; and that is something definitely to be avoided in the future—especially if industry is forced to dig into its own pockets because of insufficient government funds, as it was in this case.

Leopard 2

Following a 6-month break in production, delivery of the sixth lot of 150 vehicles recommenced in January 1988. Nine vehicles are being built per month; five by Krauss-Maffei and four by Krupp-MaK. Since the seventh lot (of 100 vehicles) has already been placed on order, the Leopard 2 deliveries will continue until April 1990. But this also means that a possible eighth lot should be ordered now, if another delay in the production schedule is to be avoided. Ordering additional lots would be good both for our armored units and for industry. The advantage for industry would of course lie in making use of its productive capacity to the full and also in the export field where a model in current production sells better than one that is being phased out.

Canada in particular has shown interest in the Leopard 2 and also in the M-1A1. A preliminary inquiry is expected for this fall; the official bid solicitation for next spring or summer. The actual contracts might be signed 1 year later provided the present government which faces an election later this year stays in power. About 250 vehicles are involved, with Canadian industry playing a major role in their production. Sweden, another potential customer, expects to decide in principle by 1992 whether it will build a tank of its own or turn to a foreign supplier. An order for some 300 vehicles could not be expected prior to 1994/95.

The stiffest competition on the world market comes from the American M-1A1 whose promoters are particularly proud of its constantly improved armor. To counteract this argument (but perhaps most of all to turn the

threat aside), there are plans to upgrade the combat effectiveness of the Leopard 2. The corresponding operational requirements are to be approved later this year. If everything moves quickly and not according to rigid bureaucratic rules and regulations, the work on upgrading combat effectiveness could start in connection with the first overhaul procedure in 1992/93. The Netherlands and Switzerland (where the Leopard 2 is currently being built) will no doubt join in the upgrading process. The primary aim is to provide greater survival capability and control. The improved protection built into the sixth lot will thus have to be improved yet again; the 120-mm ammunition will have to be upgraded and an integrated control and information system may have to be installed which will enable all vehicles within a given battle zone to act in concert and will allow for better and faster target identification and engagement.

Leopard 1

For the past 2 years, Wegmann has acted as general contractor in the construction of 1,300 Leopard 1 battle tanks, upgraded to 1A5 standards. This work will continue until about 1992. In the main, it involves the installation of a new fire control system (largely taken over from the Leopard 2) complete with laser range-finder and thermal imager. At one time, plans were to equip 1,845 vehicles in this manner; but budget limitations are likely to keep the number down to 1,300. Although the upgraded vehicles are capable of carrying 120-mm cannons, it is not expected that they will. An improvement in the protection of the turret area is more likely to be undertaken. But this would add several tons of weight and result in alterations in the turret drive and the undercarriage which would cost more than DM500,000 per vehicle.

Armor which is not quite threat adequate in Central Europe, where NATO is confronted with the most sophisticated Soviet battle tanks, may well be acceptable for other countries. Under the circumstances, the Leopard 1 remains a desirable vehicle—perhaps also because of the lack of funds for a battle tank of the Leopard 2 variety. The Leopard 1A4's to be replaced by the 250 Leopard 2's of the sixth and seventh lot will therefore go to various NATO partners. Turkey will get 150 of them and Greece 75—following modernization to conform with the standard of the Leopard 1s which have been in service in both countries for a number of years. Denmark has expressed interest in 110 Leopard 1's, i.e., 25 Leopard 1A4's and 85 1A3's, which would have to be upgraded to the standard of the 1A5's along with the 120 1A3's already in service in the Danish Armed Forces. Greece also needs an additional 100-150 Leopard 1's. If all these transactions actually come off, the work involved would definitely have an impact on the utilization of the German tank production capability.

Armored Combat Vehicle 2000

While the Panther and Marder 2 layouts are fairly far advanced, the armored combat vehicle 2000 (previously known as Leopard 3) is still in the conceptual stage. Its

operational requirements have been defined but have not yet been approved by the defense ministry. There is a need for more than 1,000 such vehicles.

It is hoped that this battle tank will not only match the most sophisticated Soviet tank developments but will also achieve something of an advantage, if possible—because a vehicle of this kind will surely have to remain in service for 30 or 40 years. Such a vehicle must be highly combat effective, particularly with regard to firepower and protection. In both respects, the goal is to achieve a genuine great leap forward as against the Leopard 2.

This means that at least one 120-mm powder cannon will be used or perhaps missiles which might be fired by the tube artillery or a specially designed launch unit. The missiles should be equipped with armor-piercing warheads with high-level penetration capability because of their higher flying speed as compared to a cannon (post-accelerated projectile).

The high-quality, all-round armor will inevitably result in a vehicle mass exceeding MLC 60 unless entirely new methods are used. One possibility would be to cut the number of crew members down to three. This could be accomplished by replacing the loader with an automatic loading device which is a must under any circumstances because of the weight and size of the ammunition used in large caliber cannons. This is the only way of minimizing the volume to be protected. To be sure, the consequences of such a crew concept would have to be investigated in field tests beforehand. A two-man crew means that each man must be able to do all the required jobs, i.e., that of commander, gunner and driver. It also means that alternate crews would be needed, if the battle tanks were committed to combat around the clock.

Cutting the crew down to two men might alter the appearance of the tank completely, e.g., it might carry an externally mounted weapon. Under these circumstances, it might be helpful to equip the vehicle with an integrated control and information system.

Since this Leopard 3 will be in service for 3 or 4 decades, its combat effectiveness is likely to be upgraded several times along the way. In other words, it would only be a design with promise for the future if a combat effectiveness potential were built into it from the start. But that will not be all that easy to do in the case of new, upgraded components such as liquid propellant cannons, electromagnetic cannons or electric drive.

Another question that needs to be answered is whether this battle tank should again be built as an exclusively national project. The conceptual phase will no doubt be national but may also include the Dutch who received assurances on this score at the time they bought the Leopard 2s. Other countries have expressed an interest; among them Great Britain which has done so repeatedly. But multinational development of the armored combat

vehicle 2000 will no doubt prevent the vehicle from being placed into service prior to the year 2000. At any rate, we hope it will not suffer the fate of the self-propelled howitzer 70.

The idea of developing a greatly modified version of the Leopard 2 instead of the armored combat vehicle 2000 is not as bizarre as it might seem, e.g., by developing a new turret. Though this might cut costs, decisive systems advantages would be lost in the process such as only result from the development of an entirely new vehicle.

Marder 1

The plan is to upgrade the combat effectiveness of all Marder 1 APC's used by armored infantry units to the status of the 1A3's. Work on this project is to start as early as next year. The original plan to integrate a 25-mm weapon has been abandoned as has the plan to equip the vehicles with a new turret and an even more powerful weapon at a later date. The funds saved as a result are to be applied to the Marder 2 APC.

The present combat effectiveness upgrading program is designed to improve ballistic protection up front and to protect the vehicle against the 30-mm cannon of the BMP-2. The entire vehicle also is to be protected against artillery shell fragments. The armor required for this purpose will alter the appearance of the vehicle appreciably. For another thing, the space problems inside the APC will be alleviated, since the new tail ramp as well as stowage compartments above the tracks can be used for storing personal belongings. The stowage compartments will replace the bell mounts on the sides of the vehicle. The mounting of the new extra armor has been designed in such a way that it can be upgraded at a later date through the use of even stronger armor currently under development.

Although work has already started on the development of a new armored personnel carrier, there are still some who would rather see a more continuous combat effectiveness upgrading of the Marder 1. They call for more sophisticated protection, a new turret and a 35-mm weapon because the 20-mm cannon which will continue to be used on the Marder really is no longer threat adequate. The same, in fact, applies to 25-mm cannon, as tests have shown.

Marder 2

The conceptual phase for the future armored personnel carrier Marder 2 started in July 1986. In September 1987, the various manufacturers submitted their proposals and it was the Krauss-Maffei proposal which carried the day. Currently, Krauss-Maffei is working on a so-called harmonization phase in the course of which rough edges are to be smoothed, additional requests are to be considered and certain questions to be answered. As far as Krauss-Maffei's competitors are concerned this means that "the good points of our design are going to be

incorporated." In the fall, bids for the definition phase will be solicited; it could then start early in 1989. Some industry spokesmen are saying that there is no need for this particular solicitation and are calling for the invitation to bid on development, which is part of the regular process in any event. In the course of the definition phase, one experimental vehicle or another may already be built. Plans are to place the Marder 2 in service by 1997 although complete replacement of the old vehicles is hardly likely by that time.

The vehicle projected by Kraus-Maffei is quite similar in appearance to the U.S. M-2 Bradley armored personnel carrier. As a consequence of the demands for all-round protection, the combat weight of the vehicle is more than 40 tons. The conventional design two-man turret built by Rheinmetall is equipped with an RH 503 35/50-mm cannon and thermal imagers for both the commandant and the gunner. The vehicle has a MTU Diesel 883 motor. Both the motor and the gear box are, of course, front-mounted. The infrared-camouflaged exhaust is on the front left and there are two doors for the crew in back. The vehicle includes many parts identical to the Leopard 2, which had a great bearing on its winning out in the competitive bidding.

Panther

The Panther tank destroyer is an entirely new combat vehicle without equal anywhere in the world. It is designed to fight tanks and helicopters and is equipped with a platform which can be raised to a height of 12 meters. To the astonishment of the four firms participating in the official bidding, i.e., Krupp MaK, Thyssen Henschel, Daimler-Benz and Krauss-Maffei, the Wegmann Co., an outside competitor, ultimately came out on top. Wegmann which had previously specialized in the construction of turrets focused on the special feature of the Panther, i.e., its extendable platform. The platform was placed on top of a "turret" which fits all armored vehicles with a turret ring diameter of a battle tank. By combining this arrangement with the Leopard 1 chassis, Wegmann won the competition. As in the case of Marder 2, Wegmann is currently carrying out a harmonization program. There will be a further competitive bidding process on definition and development which may run concurrently in order to be able to place the Panther in service as of 1993, i.e., 3-5 years earlier than originally planned. This seems quite feasible, since there is no need to develop a new vehicle.

The Wegmann design calls for a two-man turret with an unmanned, extendable platform mounted on a collapsible mast. The platform is equipped with sights for operation and Hot and Stinger antitank missiles. Both the gunner and the commander can fire the weapons. The design, conceived as a turret structure for battle tank undercarriages, is extremely flexible and as such usable on other tracked vehicle undercarriages and thus well suited for cooperations.

Because of the decision to introduce the vehicle at an earlier date, a number of design changes were made. The original plan was to equip it with Pars 3 antitank and antihelicopter missiles; but since the development of that missile kept running into delays, the Panther had to be refitted to accommodate Hot and Stinger missiles. When the Pars 3's become available (probably not before the end of the century), that missile will be integrated into the vehicle since it would go a long way toward optimizing Panther's effectiveness.

A lot of people were surprised that Panther will not run on wheels. Several designs, including that submitted by Daimler-Benz, had proposed that it should be. It turned out to be "just" another tracked vehicle because the Leopard 1 undercarriage is readily available and therefore cheaper and because only a tracked vehicle is thought to be fully mobile on a battlefield pockmarked with artillery shell craters. For another thing, a new, to be developed wheeled vehicle would hardly have been ready for series production by 1993.

Combat Engineer Vehicle

The first three models of Engineer Combat Vehicle 2 have already come off the assembly line at Krupp MaK, the developer and prime contractor of the vehicle. Series production for the full order of 140 vehicles is to start later this year. These are not new vehicles but 36 Engineer Combat Vehicle 1's and 104 Armored Recovery Vehicle 2's of the Leopard 1 family which are to be overhauled and refitted as Engineer Combat Vehicle 2's. The vehicle has a three-man crew. Its equipment includes a telescope arm backhoe (similar to the one used on the test rig of an armored engineer vehicle some years ago); a sweeper blade with collapsible grippers, an improved main winch and sophisticated cutting and welding equipment.

Canada has ordered nine of these vehicles, i.e., new models, which are scheduled for delivery in the early nineties.

Armored Recovery Vehicle 3

Armored Recovery Vehicle 3, the first Leopard 2 family vehicle, is currently being developed at the Krupp MaK plant. The Netherlands has taken part in its development ever since the definition phase. The prototypes are now undergoing technical trials in both tactical and logistic operational tests. Series delivery is expected to start in about 1991/92.

In terms of effectiveness, the vehicle is adapted to the requirements of the Leopard 2, e.g., it will be able to lift the Leopard 2 turret out of the hull with the help of its crane.

Keiler Mine-Clearing Tank

Development of the Keiler, also known as the Land Mine Fast Clearing Vehicle, is taking a lot of time. Originally, it was conceived as a joint project with France. The Keiler is currently in the development phase. Krupp MaK is hoping to obtain a contract for the remaining work on it. Keiler is based on a modified M-48 hull and engine. The vehicle is powered by an MTU 871 diesel engine which also drives the about 4.7 meter wide, divided shaft plus striker in front of the vehicle. The power requirement is more than 400 kW [kilowatts]. This is to enable Keiler to breach an extremely deep minefield lane. The shaft can be lowered as well as tilted automatically by means of ground sensors to determine whether the lane really is free of mines even on rough terrain.

Wiesel

As of the end of 1989, the Bundeswehr's airborne units will at long last have an (at least lightly) armored vehicle, i.e., the airdroppable Wiesel, equipped with Tow missiles or a 20-mm automatic cannon. 353 of these Wiesels are to replace the obsolete Krakas. The CH-53G helicopter is capable of carrying two of the Wiesel vehicles.

The Wiesel vehicle was originally developed by Porsche in the seventies; but for lack of funds, development was interrupted for about 5 years. Then, new operational requirements were drawn up, additional prototypes were built and in early 1988, after winning the bid for series production of the vehicle, Krupp MaK was designated as prime contractor. Since the Bundestag did not pass on the matter before the summer recess, the actual contract has not yet been signed but the industry is already hard at work to meet the deadline for delivery of the first vehicle in September 1989.

The Bundeswehr order, of course, has greatly enhanced Wiesel's export chances. Several countries have expressed interest in the vehicle. The United States wants to buy about 10 of the Wiesels, some of them for the purpose of conducting trials in conjunction with robots on the battlefield. Though the Wiesel is normally equipped with an Audi 100 engine, other engines may be used, e.g., to provide more power (for air conditioning among other things) in hot climates.

Self-Propelled Howitzer 2000

The combat effectiveness of the 586 M-109G self-propelled howitzers in use in the artillery is currently being upgraded to M-109A3G status at army ordnance facility 860. They are being equipped with a longer tube (of 39 instead of the previous 23 caliber lengths) from Rheinmetall in order to achieve greater range. But since these guns do not meet the requirements of a modern howitzer for the nineties, the defense ministry has called for the national development of the self-propelled howitzer 2000 in the aftermath of the failed attempt to build such

a gun under an international arrangement. Two teams of firms are competing for the contract, i.e., Wegmann and Krupp MaK and Krauss-Maffei, KUKA, Porsche and Rheinmetall.

In November 1987, the two teams were given an approximately DM90 million contract each to pay for the conceptual and definition phases and to build a test rig to be delivered in 2 years (i.e., in November 1989) for 1 year of comparative testing. Following an evaluation of the two test rigs, four prototypes of the design selected are to be manufactured so that the self-propelled howitzer could be placed in service by about the mid-nineties. The initial order is expected to call for construction of some 600 of these systems. But the total number is likely to exceed 1,000, since there are plans to replace the M-109s over the long term.

Both designs include a 155-mm weapon—most likely of 52 caliber lengths—with an automatic ammunition feeder, and an MTU 881 diesel engine. The Wegmann team is using time-tested Leopard 1 running gear components while Krauss-Maffei is relying on the Leopard 2 running gear.

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Advanced Mine Warfare Systems Shaping Ground Denial Doctrine

36200215 Bonn WEHRTECHNIK in German
Aug 88 pp 74-79

[Article by Lt Col Georg Stammel, retired: "Barriers Supplement Fire and Maneuver;" first paragraph is WEHRTECHNIK introduction]

[Text] WEHRTECHNIK has repeatedly pointed out that—also in view of personnel shortages—the creation of terrain barriers through natural and technical means is becoming increasingly significant and assuming a place equal in importance to the traditional major combat elements of "fire" and "maneuver." The fact that land mines will receive greater attention in the future is, however, also due to the availability of new technologies which could lead to smart robot mines. Lieutenant Colonel Georg Stammel, retired, of the marketing and distribution section in the munitions branch of the Diehl company and responsible for operational studies has collaborated as chairman of the "Operational Assessment Group" in NATO's Industrial Advisory Group [NIAG] prefeasibility study "On an Area Defense Weapon." In the following article he explains how the German Army, with a "Ground Denial System 2000," and NATO, with the development of an area defense weapon [ADW], is preparing for the future.

Mines, if their existence is acknowledged at all, are usually underestimated in peacetime. They hold little "appeal" and are, therefore, hardly suited for demonstrations, exhibitions and parades. Nevertheless, the outstanding combat effectiveness of mines has been

explicitly proven. Thus, in World War II losses of combat vehicles due to antitank mines in all amounted to about 20 percent. In Korea and Vietnam, with 59 and 69 percent respectively, they were considerably higher still. These statistics are all the more impressive since the mines were only equipped with simple pressure fuses over which the chains or wheels of combat vehicles had to pass.

In contrast to many other weapons and weapon systems, these ordinary mines function very reliably:

- almost regardless of weather,
- even under extreme climatic conditions,
- under "dirty battlefield" conditions (smoke, dust, etc),
- during artillery fire and with enemy air superiority, and
- over prolonged periods of time.

Moreover, mines are unequivocally defensive and no argument, no matter how ingenious, can label a mine system as being aggressive.

Mine combat has become an important part of the Army's concept of operation particularly in the context of "Army Structure 2000" (See WEHRTECHNIK, April 1988, p. 49 ff). This fact was vividly expressed by the former chief of staff of the Army, Lieutenant General Hans-Henning von Sandrart, in a lecture on "Forward Defense—Operational and Technical Aspects:"

"In the hands of a unit commander the future land mine, as a smart and even a homing weapon, should enable him to make the mine—by flexible adaptation to the developing situation—the pivotal point of a battle around which the traditional elements of fire and maneuver can then be reorchestrated in accordance with the situation."

To the previous major combat elements of "fire" and "maneuver," the concept of "ground denial" has now been added... This fact has in the meantime also received binding recognition in Army Regulation 100/100 on the "Command of Troops."

The demand to make "the mine the pivotal point of the battle" constitutes a special challenge to the engineers, who want to incorporate their existing mine systems, as well as those under development or in the planning stage, into a working concept of the "Ground Denial System 2000."

Mine Generations

Antitank mines are subdivided in the literature in different ways into mine generations. Using effective width as the point of departure, the following definitions should apply:

- First generation mines function as pressure mines from below against the armored vehicle chains. The

maximum effective width is defined by the width of the two chains.

- Second generation mines are effective from below against the entire width of an armored vehicle. Consequently, the effective width is equal to the entire width of an armored vehicle.
- Third generation mines are triggered by sensors away from the track of the armored vehicle and attack its front, side and rear or from above. The effective width corresponds to the range of the system. Third generation mines include the soon to be introduced directional antitank mine-1 [ATM-1]; the ATM-2 (ACE or "Aimed Controlled Effect" ATM) which is being developed multinationally; and the so-called "area defense weapon [ADW]," the most advanced mine system with the capability to search for and engage targets unaided.

Ground Denial System 2000

Within a "Ground Denial System 2000" all armed (mines) and blocking (e.g., tree trunks) resources should gradually be merged into one "system" with the objective:

- to provide reliable protection to defending forces engaged in area combat
- to keep armored forces available or unencumbered in the contest for the initiative; and
- to support operational units.

Thus, "Ground Denial System 2000," should consolidate all current and future elements into one dynamic, flexible, and largely autonomous "ground denial system" as a comprehensive technical solution to a multitude of possible operational situations.

If we confine our consideration to combat resources, "Ground Denial System 2000," as an additive system, consists of mines which:

- have already been introduced
- are in the process of being introduced;
- are under development; and
- are in the planning stage as, for instance, the ADW.

The diversity of resources in "Ground Denial System 2000" is quite deliberate and designed to afford an optimum response to any blocking requirement and to reduce the effectiveness of countermeasures.

In its final configuration "Ground Denial System 2000" is intended to counter hostile sweeping maneuvers with a mix of sensors, payloads and assault charges against which there are no effective countermeasures:

Sensor mix may consist of:

- IR;
- mmW [millimeter (or dwarf) waves];
- acoustics;

- seismic; and
- magnetic [sensors].

Payload mix may consist of:

- shaped-charge;
- tandem shaped-charge;
- projectile forming charge; and
- KE penetrator [kinetic energy] [mines].

Assault mix against tanks [for]:

- front attack;
- side attack;
- rear attack;
- top attack;
- belly or full width attack.

Flexibility and dynamic range are two expressions which are inseparably related to the "Ground Denial System 2000" concept. In this context, engineers must basically satisfy two competing requirements: On the one hand, they must effectively and lastingly impede enemy movements and, on the other hand, maintain freedom of maneuver for their own armored forces.

The possibilities for solving this problem are both tactical and technical:

Tactical:

- permanent assignment of engineers at appropriate command levels;
- careful coordination of ground-denial plans and barrier plans with friendly maneuver and artillery support plans;
- joint training with combat forces.

Technical:

- programmable time in place and remote control.

In the future the many technical command requirements of the flexible and dynamic "Ground Denial System 2000," with all its components and employment options, can no longer be handled with pencil, map, and message pad. A computer-assisted ground denial planning and information system for the engineer commander at division and brigade level seems indispensable in order—as expressed by the chief of staff in the above-cited quote—to make "the mine the pivotal point of the battle."

In the context of "Ground Denial System 2000," the important present and future contribution of the artillery must also be discussed. While engineer units construct terrain-oriented—but in the course of battle primarily situation-oriented—minefields, artillery alone is able to create target-oriented minefields. It can do this in

great width and in depth without having to maneuver on the battlefield. Suited for this purpose is primarily the medium-range artillery rocket system, MARS/MLRS.

The advantages are obvious:

- an extremely short response time to the actual developing situation;
- coverage of an entire division frontage with few weapon systems;
- "subsequent reinforcement" of existing minefields to enhance or preserve their effectiveness;
- creating minefields even in enemy-controlled terrain.

The combination of remotely laid minefields and ADWs constitutes a qualitative jump with regard to flexibility, effectiveness and autonomous monitoring. The tactical utility is obvious. See WEHRTECHNIK, April 1988, p 96 ff, for attributes of "Mines That Can Be Laid From Afar."

Area Defense Weapon—A Project for the Future

Definition and Integration With "Ground Denial System 2000"

The area defense weapon (ADW), as a third-generation mine, should independently:

- recognize armored targets;
- identify them;
- destroy the target with a high kill ratio;
- over an effective radius of 360 degrees and
- at a range defined by the system.

ADWs with an autonomous target recognition and destruction capability are feasible:

- with a variable mix of sensors;
- with variable detonating devices;
- with variable means of intelligently approaching and destroying targets;
- for variable placement systems;
- for variable angles of attack with regard to the hostile armored vehicle;
- with variable control devices; and
- for a multitude of conceivable scenarios.

In the last analysis the user will have to decide which one of these feasible designs—within financial constraints—best satisfies tactical requirements as well as the standards of "Ground Denial System 2000."

Finally, ADWs—in conjunction with existing mines or those under development—must have an extremely high blocking capability in the setting of combined-arms combat. While ADWs constitute only one component of the additive "Ground Denial System 2000," they are surely a component which, because of its particular importance and effectiveness, can decide the battle.

Key Performance Specifications

Performance specifications, which determine the design concept, for an ADW are:

- kill effectiveness beyond the tracks of a tank;
- an effective radius of 360 degrees;
- autonomous target recognition and day-and-night effectiveness under all conditions of visibility;
- recognition and destruction of moving vehicles;
- accurate differentiation between armored and other combat vehicles;
- a capability to count targets;
- accommodation of as many placement systems as possible;
- high resistance to mine-sweeping efforts;
- remotely controlled and repeatable activation/deactivation (controllable "switch on/switch off") with positive display;
- variably adjustable self-destruction capability;
- replaceable sources of energy;
- end of effective-life display with positive signal.

A look at possible technical solutions reveals the significant differences between "ordinary" mines and autonomous ADWs as well as the wide variety of design concepts.

Sensory Analysis

Noticeable, though hardly surprising, is the extensive sensory analysis which an autonomous mine requires to execute the following functional chain:

- wake up
- recognition
- identification
- measuring (e.g., direction, distance, speed)
- firing
- guiding
- igniting.

Of course, not all conceivable design concepts require all elements of the functional chain.

A "wake-up sensor" is indispensable for all ADW operational concepts. The mine, in order to conserve energy, remains in a "sleeping" state from which it is only aroused when it registers one or more targets. The optimal solution for the alarm function utilizes acoustic or seismic sensors because they require very little energy and the target does not need to be within the line of sight (LOS).

Dual-mode acoustic and seismic sensors can reliably detect and identify an armored target, and "awaken" the mine.

The measuring function (e.g., distance, speed, direction) subsequently needed to aim or detonate the explosive charge can only be executed by acoustic and seismic

sensors with the required degree of accuracy when at least three microphones or geophones provide a sufficiently wide base for measurements. This presents no problem if the charge is launched from a large container but becomes difficult if the operational concept calls for a single compact mine. In the latter instance, the target parameters can be established by an infrared or radar sensor. Both, of course, require the target to be within the line of sight. Their effective range depends, therefore, on the terrain.

After the required target parameters—obviously dependent on the design concept—have been established, the signal to fire the warhead or submunition is given.

In the "attack-from-above" design, submunition sensors search for targets with an active mmW sensor and a passive IR sensor (dual mode) within the height-dependent footprint (search-fuse munitions).

In conceptual designs in which the armored vehicle is attacked from the front, side, or rear, the target is sighted directly and the missile is guided to the target by wire or glass fiber or—assuming an appropriate airspeed or a short distance—guidance is entirely omitted.

Magnetic fuses are used if ignition is not initiated by the sensor head (as, for instance, in the search-fuse system).

Detonating Devices

Depending on the attack mode, tanks can be attacked successfully with the following detonating devices:

- charges which become projectiles;
- KE penetrators;
- shaped-charges with different liners;
- dual-mode shaped charges.

The advantage of projectile forming charges—to be found in search-fuse munitions—is that their projectiles can penetrate reactive armor. Shaped charges, on the other hand, are sensitive to reactive armor. If they are applied to thus-protected parts of the armored vehicle, the reactive armor must first be penetrated by an advance charge (dual-mode or tandem shaped charges). Applicable to both cases is the fact that, in the last analysis, penetration capability depends on caliber.

The direction of attack on the armored vehicle depends, of course, on the design. Generally, the armored vehicle should be attacked at a "weak point." This is possible with an attack from above—especially against the top of the turret and the engine area—or with an attack from the rear, which a smart ADW is even able to accomplish.

Placement Systems

The user would want to have an ADW which can be placed by as many different systems as possible, thus affording him a wide range of employment options and thereby the desired flexibility.

It is, in other words, desirable and ultimately cost effective to be able to lay an ADW depending on the tactical situation either:

- by hand;
- by mine-laying systems;
- by ballistic missiles; and
- by helicopters.

This provides the opportunity to use such a mine in terrain-oriented, situation-oriented, and target-oriented ways.

What Could the "Ideal" Area Defense Weapon Look Like?

It is undoubtedly risky to pick one of the many possible design concepts as being "ideal." It is nevertheless desirable to list the important parameters to guide a conceptual design.

The external form of a compact ADW should resemble the AT-2 mine with an erector device. This adaptation could reduce the cost of realizing the four previously mentioned placement options.

An ADW should attack a tank from above ("top attack") and have the capability to hit the engine area where even future tanks will have relatively little protection.

As payload the sensor-ignited submunition with projectile-forming charges, which is now being developed, should then be chosen to minimize technical risks.

The dual-mode sensor is thereby submunition supported, which avoids line-of-sight requirements and assures optimal target detection within the footprint area.

As explained earlier, there is no reasonable alternative to the dual-mode acoustic and seismic sensory analysis for the "wake-up" function.

Radar and IR are available to define the target parameters, a necessary function to effect the timely release of the submunition.

Finally, these or similar solutions fit in well with the current mine-combat doctrine of the engineer and artillery forces and expedite the mix of mines desired for the "Ground Denial System 2000."

"Ground Denial System 2000" Within "Army Structure 2000"

The recently revealed basic outline of "Army Structure 2000" raises the question of the special significance a "Ground Denial System 2000"—as an additive system which includes ADWs—could have for the new—dictated by financial and personnel constraints—Army structure.

It is apparent that:

- only 16 armored brigades can be employed without restrictions in all three categories of combat: attack, defense, and delaying actions;
- 12 armored infantry brigades can fight in the two combat categories of defense and, with some restrictions, delaying actions;
- 5 motorized infantry brigades and 1 mountain infantry brigade remain restricted to defensive combat;
- 5 airborne brigades can handle subtasks in offensive and defensive operations.

This rigid task and employment-oriented structure opens a three-dimensional battlefield to the Army because of the activation of the airborne brigade—significant progress to be sure—but it diminishes effectiveness in all situations because of the high percentage of brigades which can no longer fight in all types of combat.

By the same token, the importance of "Ground Denial System 2000," is naturally proportionally greater in combined-arms combat. Only highly hardened mine barriers will create the conditions for a successful defensive engagement of brigades whose armored component is weak.

Status of Current Efforts

National efforts concentrated on the goal to draft a comprehensive technical solution to an autonomous "ground denial system" with diverse employment options and to include area defense weapons as the most demanding development involving mines. Important steps to this end are:

- Army Staff studies on "Operational Mine Systems" and "Directional Mine Technology and Ground Denial Systems" and
- formulation of a "Tactical Requirement" for "Ground Denial System 2000."

International efforts aim at the joint development of an autonomous area defense weapon. A prefeasibility study "On an Area Defence Weapon," in which nine countries participated, was carried out by the NATO Industrial Advisory Group (NIAG) between March 1987 and April 1988. A detailed examination of design concepts for short, intermediate, and long-range effectiveness was carried out and the following general conclusions deserve to be emphasized:

- Autonomous ADWs are feasible.
- ADWs are cost effective.

- Development risks are predictable.
- ADWs have significant tactical and logistic advantages and create a new dimension for mine warfare.

In the meantime efforts toward international development were reinforced:

- A project group was formed;
- revised drafts of two NSTs (NATO Staff Targets) for "mines" below and above an effective 400-meter range are available;
- Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Norway and the United States have already decided to continue the project with a feasibility study;
- a so-called "kick-off meeting" in Paris is still supposed to take place in the fall of this year.

We can only hope and wish that efforts relating to the "Ground Denial System 2000," to include smart mine systems, will be successful and in future lead to even more effective support of combat forces.

12628

FINLAND

Shortcomings In Civil Emergency Preparedness Outlined

36170093 Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish
10 Jul 88 p 2

[Editorial]

[Text] The frequently occurring false fire alarms indicate to everyone that our preparation for emergencies has great technological shortcomings. We do not even seem to have enough money to see to it that the equipment which is supposed to warn us of danger is in good repair.

The attitude of the state toward activities required by serious emergencies and toward civil defense has been marked by an incomprehensible lack of concern. This is shown most clearly by the pace at which relevant matters are handled.

The law concerning fire and rescue operations came into effect at the beginning of 1976, but the payment of the funds allocated therein has been postponed time and time again; these will be paid in full by the beginning of 1989. A parliamentary committee headed by governor Kauko Sipponen prepared a memorandum on the new civil defense law already in the spring of 1983, but the Ministry of Internal Affairs has not to date been able to get the legislation in question before the Parliament.

When the Chernobyl nuclear power plant accident occurred more than 2 years ago it was thought that the officials would finally understand that civil defense

involves much more than being prepared for war or preventing possible accidents in the area of weapons technology. For example, the rapid growth of chemical industries could bring along with it situations in which large numbers of the civilian population must be moved to shelters very quickly.

But what is the reason for the delay in the civil defense legislation? The Finance Ministry says that the Ministry of Internal Affairs has underestimated the true economic impact of the law and that the renewal of the defense operations could increase state expenditures. These assertions may be true, but don't go far enough. If civil defense is to become operational, it will take additional state funds.

It is, of course, the job of the Finance Ministry to see that state expenses do not get out of hand, but this cannot mean the freezing of all development and improvement. It is hard to imagine that this superministry has more expertise in the civil defense area than Sipponen's committee which, in addition, presented an unanimous statement

The slowness noted in the renewal of the antiquated civil defense law is one indication that the Ministry of Internal Affairs has not been in active hands over the past years and might very well be overwhelmed by the Finance Ministry. It is also strange that peacetime civil defense is being equated with normal fire and rescue operations. The Ministry of Internal Affairs has no evidence to show that it has visibly fought for its own development. A civil defense organization must influence attitudes at all levels on its own behalf.

There is quite a strong consensus that civil defense is a matter about which the society has to care. Opinions differ only on how urgent development in this area is. When time is spent in merely waiting, the populace has reason to become concerned about its own safety.

12989

GREECE

Government Reports Continuing Arms Sales To Iraq

35210141b Athens MESIMVRINI in Greek
22 Jul 88 p 5

[Text] By way of an official announcement of the Ministry of Defense distributed by the General Press Secretariat, the Greek Government admits for the first time, that it is selling war materiel to Iraq. It is certainly contending that "within the framework of conformation with international rules and international practice, Greek arms industries export war materiel to third countries including Iraq, in execution of contractual obligations."

The announcement maintains the following:

—Exports to Iraq, as in the case of exports to other countries, are not made by our country "in secret," but are made in accordance with the provisions of Greek law and the rules of International Law, particularly in the case of loading of explosives. The national representatives and the public have been informed many times on the matter.

—In the case of explosives loading in particular, according to provisions of the Code of Public Naval Law and of Port Regulations, it is mandatory that the ship be at a safe distance from the shores, as it happened with the Ship "Alzawraa."

—We have repeatedly expressed the wish that the annihilating war between Iran and Iraq be terminated, a war that has been costly to the economy of the warring parties.

—The Greek Government has publicly declared, in Parliament and to the press, that it respects international agreements and international practice and is in absolute adherence with legal procedures. The efforts and activities of our country in support of the peaceful settlement of local disputes are internationally known.

8193/9274

Disposition of U.S. Bases Scheduled To Be Closed
35210136 Athens ETHNOS TIS KYRIAKIS in Greek
17 Jul 88 p 13

[Text] For strategic reasons the United States has decided to abolish some of its bases in Greece, since they have stopped serving the purpose for which they had been established.

The joint Committee on Overseas Bases of the Pentagon is expected to announce shortly to the Greek Government the names of the bases located on Greek territory that will be put out of action.

Procedures have already started for turning over to the Greek Army the Elefsina Base 588 where nuclear artillery shells are stored.

Also to be abolished is the Yannitsa Base, where the nuclear cones used by "Honest John" missiles are stored. The base will be turned over to command 193 M.B.M.

The Larisa U.S. Base has been earmarked for deactivation because of the involvement of the 7th Allied Command and the demand by Ankara that it extend the responsibility for operational control to the middle of the Aegean.

The Tanagra U.S. Base has also been earmarked for deactivation since in the same area is stationed one of the most critical Battle Wings of the Greek Military Air Force.

For the Americans, this base was to be used as support base in case of nuclear war in Southern Europe.

Transport

Near Porto Lago at Alexandroupoli, there are U.S. depots for the naval administrative logistics which will be transferred to Kriti.

Stationed at Kasimidi are the Squadrons of anti-aircraft hawk missiles, which have been definitely under the jurisdiction of the Greek Army.

The Langada Base which is a substitute for the 588 Elefsina Base, will be turned over to the Army.

For the American side the negotiations battle is focusing on the Ellinikon, Nea Makri, Gournes of Kriti, Souda, and the "Voice of America" on Rodos, which is linked with the Kavala Radiocommunication Unit.

The Ellinikon Base is manned by 1,600 officers, warrant officers and enlisted men as well as American civilians of various specialties.

Besides serving aircraft for transporting material, in 1981 the base also served electronic surveillance and spy airplanes against the Warsaw Pact countries.

These planes including the "G-135" and "Pa-Pa III" and the eavesdroppers of Sigmund have been transferred to the Akrotiri Base on Cyprus.

Nea Makri includes the "Cyclon" system which can divert the flight of all airplanes and can disorganize the wireless and wire communications in the Aegean up to Eastern Mediterranean.

The Gournes Base is an information index for the Northern, Central and Eastern Aegean region and is connected with the Turkish stations "Loran" for overseeing the Soviet fleet in the Mediterranean.

The Americans insist on continuing to use the Souda Base because of its immense natural port, the anchorages, and the installations that constitute vital facilities for the whole Mediterranean Fleet, and for supplying other allied naval units.

8193/12232

Special Forces Division To Be Disbanded
35210141a Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek
29 Jul 88 pp 1, 4

[Text] The Ministry of National Defense decided to disband the Third Division of the Special Forces [MED], well informed sources said yesterday; they also said the decision to disband the special forces goes into effect today.

The Third Division encompasses the commando force, the paratroopers and the marines. Appropriate sources clarified that the above forces will not be disbanded but will stop being under unified command, as they were until now.

The strongest argument by those who supporting the disbandment of the 3rd MED is that today the armies of even much bigger countries do not have a division of Special Forces. The weak point of this argument, however, is that the armies of the countries those in favor of disbanding the forces refer to, are professional armies and their record is much higher than that of a conscript army, as in the case of Greece where the concept of Special Forces is not identified so much with the meaning of special operations as it is identified with the need for a higher degree of training and readiness.

Highest sources of the Army General Staff [GES], said the decision to disband the 3rd MED is part of the more general "effort to reorganize the Armed Forces" and clarified that "the only thing disbanded is the luxurious command, since the forces themselves will not be disbanded but will be placed under a different command and specifically, the Land Forces."

The weak point of the above argument is that since there will be no prior selection of the conscripts who will serve in one of the three forces which were part of the 3rd MED, the only difference would be "a more aggressive spirit," the "idea of a more special mission" which was inspired by the disbanded 3rd Division.

It is clarified that the 3rd MED was the elite reserve of the commander in chief in case of war. The forces of the Division were not on the plain but were stationed in areas of "greater danger" and for that reason they were dispersed. Under the new order the elite reserve of the commander in chief will be a Brigade of Marines, but the disbandment of the 3rd MED, note well informed sources, is hurting the spirit and the effort to reach higher records of achievement.

The answer of the Armed Forces leadership to the question why the 3rd Division was disbanded is that "it does not have any reason to exist." It is obvious, however, well informed sources point out, that this view cannot be easily accepted unless it is supported by arguments proving that the reasons which led to the establishment of the 3rd Division have ceased to exist.

The disbandment of the Special Forces Division will certainly create problems in the planning of national maneuvers, note well informed circles. Nevertheless, a highest source at GES told KATHIMERINI in answer to a question, that "there were problems during the time the 3rd Division existed because they were doing what they wanted to do in planning." Under the best circumstances this evaluation, in conjunction with the view by Army officers that the special forces remain cut-off,"

constituted the reason that led finally to the disbandment of the Division. Seen in this light, the decision by GES is a simple confirmation of a chronic disenchantment of the Army Land Forces towards their colleague members of Special Forces.

/9274

NORWAY

Arguments for Reducing Defense Budget Increase Viewed

36390086 Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian
4 Aug 88 p 2

[Commentary by Olav Trygve Storvik: "Change of Course for Armed Forces"]

[Text] Several persons have pointed out the profound and—to some degree—dramatic consequences for the country's defense if the government's economic proposal in Storting report No 54, "Chief Guidelines for Armed Forces' Operations in Period 1989-93," is accepted. So far, the section of the report concerning security policy has not received the same attention. This section is also based on certain arguments which should not be automatically accepted without further discussion.

The report shows that the country's biggest political party, the Labor Party, has renounced the goal of fixed percentage growth for the Armed Forces which has been in effect since the end of the 1970s. Even though this growth was theoretical and really reduced and eroded in various ways, the result of it has also been that Norway earned the trust of the international community and "cover" rights from the allied superpowers. This is indicated by the protection which Norwegian vessels enjoy in the Persian Gulf today and by the major military maneuver, "Teamwork'88," off northern Norway this autumn. The maneuver is intended to show the Soviet Union that Norway is able to control territorial waters far to the north, one of the best guarantees of security Norway can receive.

Phasedown

Now, however, the government warns of a distinctly lower level of ambition for the Norwegian Armed Forces, and does not want to commit itself to any increase at all in the military budget. The signal is thereby given for a permanent change of course which can scarcely be understood as anything other than a phasedown of the Armed Forces. It is not unreasonable to expect this to have an eventual effect on security policy.

One of the arguments for the change of course is that several countries are now reducing their defense efforts, and the report names some Western (but not Eastern) ones: the United States, Great Britain, Sweden. The argument is hardly well-thought-out. Norway's position

does not improve if other countries reduce their defense. The Chinese have a saying which goes: "Why complain about the snow on your neighbor's roof when your own doorstep is dirty." The countries the report refers to are not front-line states with growing strategic significance such as Norway. They are, in part, major powers with armed forces at an entirely different level and with tasks and needs entirely different from Norway's. Nor do the countries named have a small population spread over an area which corresponds to large sections of Western Europe.

Wishful Thinking

Indeed, the argument has little to do with defense and security policy. It is rather a form of wishful and misleading thinking, and only the future can show whether it is a dangerous form of wishful thinking. The paradox is that if the superpower to the east should decide to reduce some of its Armed Forces, there will still be a need to increase Norwegian defense efforts.

The Storting report's warning of a change of course for the Armed Forces gives the wrong security-policy signal at the wrong time. This holds true both domestically (in Norwegian society) and abroad (the Soviet Union and NATO allies).

Unrealistic

With respect to Norwegian opinion, the report serves to create unrealistic attitudes and expectations which, in the short run, may prove difficult to manage politically without resulting in further damage to the Armed Forces. Nevertheless, the most important thing is that the augured change of course can contribute to Soviet conceptions of Norwegian indecisiveness. It can also delude Soviet political and military leaders into believing that the Norwegian Armed Forces are weaker than anticipated in a period which has not been particularly propitious from the Norwegian viewpoint.

To be sure, the immediate prospects are often presented in an optimistic, almost carefree light. Thanks to the Western media's presentation of General Secretary Gorbachev's friendly but vague and nonbinding proposal, the world seems assured of a long, happy period of detente. The picture is dangerously superficial. Seen through Norwegian eyes, too, the quality of the general secretary's topics does not matter much. The significant thing is that the superpower is now entering a period (of still unknown duration) with internal reforms which may evidently be comprehensive enough to throw the Russian empire out of balance.

Old Conflicts

The possibility is present to a great extent. Almost daily reports come which reveal profound, centuries-old conflicts in the form of ethnic and national antagonisms. This holds true both in Eastern Europe and in the Soviet

Union itself. In this perspective, there are clearly many unknown factors, but we know from experience that powerful internal conflicts in a society can easily get out of control during a reform period. The possibility that domestic tumult will spill over into foreign affairs is relatively great. If this happens, countries which border the Russian empire could quickly note unpleasant consequences, especially if their defense has been neglected.

These are circumstances which the Defense Ministry's Storting report does not bring up for discussion. The reasons can be many, but the approach to the problem is central and should be included when the scope of the Armed Forces is discussed. With this in mind, it hardly seems like the correctly chosen moment to drop your shield and phase down the Armed Forces, as the government favors.

12327/7310

Government Accused of Sending 'Wrong Signals' on Defense Cuts

36390088b Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian
5 Aug 88 p 2

[Commentary by Olav Trygve Storvik; first paragraph is AFTENPOSTEN introduction]

[Text] A wrong signal at the wrong time. This is what the government's proposal for reduced defense spending contained in Parliamentary [Storting] Report Nr. 54 seems to be, in regard both to the Soviet Union and to the allies in NATO.

The Soviet Union has initiated experiments with domestic reforms which can easily lead to an unstable situation that spills over into its relationships with smaller neighboring countries. Also, up until now, the more open and liberal tone in domestic political affairs has not been specifically reflected within the military area. The Soviet arms program has continued with undiminished energy, also with regard to typical offensive weapons systems.

In the area near Norway, Moscow has recently obtained and deployed weapons systems which suggest a continuing intention to exercise control over the Norwegian Sea as far to the southwest as possible. As an example of this, the marine forces on the Kola Peninsula, which can only be intended for use against Norway, have been increased in numbers and qualitatively enhanced in many areas. Attack helicopters have been supplied in significant numbers to the Army forces. New offensive aircraft types with greater operating ranges than previously have been brought in, and, at the same time, the apparatus for command and control of advanced operations has been qualitatively improved. New vessels have been assigned to the North Fleet and the strategic significance of the Norwegian Sea is a growing one, especially after the INF Treaty removes the land-based medium range missiles in

Europe. As a consequence, the Soviet Union is now beginning to deploy long range cruise missiles at sea, calculated for targets in Western Europe.

A False Reading

In the parliamentary report, this is described as "low tension in the North." A peculiar use of the language, many will say, while others will point out that the expression belongs to a particularly Norwegian kind of security policy liturgy. This is true, but it nonetheless is also an expression of a false, almost absurd, reading of reality, and is therefore dangerous because it misleads opinion. More than anything else, the characterization "low tension in the North" is an expression of a beautiful dream that ought not to be entertained by a responsible security policy leadership. But, in view of the fact that the expression is used entirely deliberately both in the parliamentary report and in other connections, another explanation is obvious: that we are confronted here by a political tool that is being used in order to hold defense appropriations down, even if reality dictates something different. Would it be possible for the government to recommend less for defense if it acknowledged that tension in the North is not low?

The signal about reduced Norwegian defense contributions is also a wrong signal at the wrong point in time in relationship to our great power allies and NATO, particularly the United States. The proposal is being launched at approximately the same time as American opinion is once again taken up by the great difference that exists in defense contributions between the United States and well-off Europe.

The debate is not a new one, and many arguments can be made in many directions. In this connection, it is irrelevant whether there is an objective measure for defense contributions among unequal countries. The point is the atmosphere which seems to be taking hold in the United States and which very well may produce a political reaction—irrespective of who wins the presidential election—with a demand for reductions in the American defense contributions in Europe.

Under Pressure

The American defense budget is under pressure on economic grounds, a pressure that probably will continue in the years to come. For the time-being, the powers that call the tune in Washington want to maintain a high level of activity in the Norwegian Sea. But it cannot be excluded that this may quickly change. It was not many years ago that the American Navy received orders to reduce operations in European waters on grounds of the poor economic situation. The same can happen again.

At the same time that the government favors reducing Norwegian defense spending, the report states that the defense of Norway is becoming more dependent upon allied reinforcements. To a large degree, this means American reinforcements.

For many, it will seem that the government aims to replace Norwegian defense contributions with American ones. It will be interesting to see how Washington reacts to such signals. Indeed, it is also not long ago that Norway came to be in a less favorable light in connection with the Kongsberg Vaapenfabrik's sale of advanced technology to the Soviet Union, thereby helping to make Soviet submarines more effective and American ones, correspondingly, more vulnerable. It is doubtful that the affair has been forgotten. In any case, the latest signals concerning Norwegian defense contributions hardly contribute to improving Norway's standing in Washington.

The Norwegian Sea

All the same, Parliamentary Report No. 54 has many good aspects as well. This applies to the description of the European dimension in Norwegian security policy, even if this is incomplete. The most part of the report which is thought through most thoroughly relates to the analysis of the naval situation in the Norwegian Sea and the consequences which this has for Norway. The line that was defended last year in the Defense Ministry's budget proposal has now been further expanded upon and extended. It is of absolutely central importance that the government asserts that the strategy of the alliance is fully applicable to Norway and, at the same time, emphasizes the vital significance of forward naval operations involving control of the Norwegian Sea.

If this line is followed up by practical actions in the time to come, this will remove the uncertainty that have resulted from the rash initiatives during the governments first term and which suggest that they seriously considering other plans.

13032

Paper Defends Role of Civilian Resistance Groups
36390088a Oslo *AFTENPOSTEN* in Norwegian
16 Aug 88 p 2

[Editorial: "To Be On The Safe Side"]

[Text] These days, discussions concerning secret services evidently ought to begin with a linguistic clarification that previously has been superfluous. Secret is *not* another word for illegal. An open society, also, must have certain closed services, simply because they are necessary for its existence. They need to be secret because they only work as intended so long as the country's potential enemies do not know who, what, and how.

Such services are a proper part of a free, democratic society; they are not a morbid outgrowth. Nevertheless, certain politicians, parties and organs of the press make great efforts in order to confuse these circumstances. Now, they have recently been trying to cook up a plot by the civil resistance groups. They are a subject of dismayed exposure about every other year.

These groups were established after the liberation in 1945. They were meant to be cells in a new resistance movement if Norway should be occupied again. We had, after all, made two basic discoveries in 1940: The first was that an unallied and militarily weak country was vulnerable to attack. The other was that the capability to resist an occupation force must be prepared *before* the occupation has become a fact.

The resistance movement's slow birth during the war, and the whole series of elementary—and fatal—mistakes that were made, bear witness to the fact that we simply do not have the right to be so unprepared again. Nor was the lack of effective intelligence in the initial period solely a Norwegian problem. It affected—and weakened—the entire allied war effort.

It is perceptible that, over the years, the resistance groups have gotten different tasks and have been systematically incorporated into defense planning, without thereby being integrated into the rest of the military apparatus. The whole idea is, specifically, that they should be intact and make a contribution *after* ordinary defense may have collapsed.

So, we know now that such groups continue to be found, but not how many of them, or where or how. This is how it must be. If we demand to know more, we make their task impossible. And our own and the country's security is diminished as a result.

In an imprecise debate, some people are taking delight in mixing up completely dissimilar elements. The resistance groups neither have had nor do have anything to do with surveillance of political opponents. Or, to set a name to it, with the Labor Party's surveillance of communists during the first postwar years. Also, this activity must be correctly understood in the context of the cold war days, when the threat from the East appeared extremely real and never became a reality precisely because it was taken so seriously.

But, whereas the surveillance took place outside the control of the authorities, the resistance groups have been subjected to military command and political supervision. As long as we know this, we know enough. And can feel more secure because the groups exist.

SWEDEN

Upper Norrland Forces Commander Cites Strength, Readiness

36170106 Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish
13 Aug 88 p 27

[Article by Jukka Luoma: "Northern Sweden's Defense Not Compromised: Swedish General Does Not Believe Lack of Money Will Eliminate Northern Military Units Because Preservation of Neutrality in North Is More Important Than Ever"]

[Text] Boden—Military officers in northernmost Sweden do not believe that the armed forces in their corner of the country will be compromised, even if units elsewhere in the country are eliminated due to lack of money.

"The Army and Air Force troops here will be kept at their current level," said Major General Ake Sagren to HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Boden. "Army cutbacks will occur mostly in the south," predicted Sagren, referring to the controversial plan to economize which Sweden's top military officers will submit to the government in late September. The Navy and the Air Force must assume greater responsibility for the defense of southern Sweden, said Sagren.

The superpowers' potential pressure on northern Sweden is substantial, and defending a remote corner of the country is difficult, thinks Sagren, who is the chief of staff responsible for the military district of Upper Norrland.

The position of northernmost Sweden is complicated by the fact that the Boden fortification was built early in the century as a lock against Russia. There exists the danger—more than that of a bilateral war—that Sweden will be drawn into a conflict between the superpowers.

The airspace of Upper Norrland is in the greatest danger. The soldiers are also prepared to repel land-based operations which might be militarily advantageous to the Soviet Union.

"The direct threat of war against the Nordic countries has not grown, as the Swedish Defense Committee stated in 1984," said Sagren to the staff officers of the military district. "But if a war erupts, we could become involved in it at a very early stage. This was a new viewpoint, one that has never before been stated so clearly."

Population Sparse, Connections to South Long and Vulnerable

Upper Norrland is more vulnerable to surprises than the rest of Sweden, said Sagren, even though the wooded and marshy terrain, criss-crossed by rivers, favors the

defender. "The biggest problem is that too few people live here." The military district covers 37 percent of Sweden, but only 6 percent of the population lives there.

Sagren estimated that two thirds of the men in mobilized units must be brought north from other parts of the country. "So maintaining a state of readiness is very difficult." The plan is to use men from this region to slow down the attacker.

This year, more people have moved into the northern district than out of it, but the trend may be temporary. People in the armed forces move south when they start a family. It is hard for spouses to get work, because the government does not grant people in the armed forces a special status.

Upper Norrland's connections to the southern centers are long and militarily vulnerable. The Defense Committee requires that the food supply and ambulance service be ready for an armed conflict. The committee was also worried about the structure of industry and commerce. It was assumed in Boden that the problems were similar in northern Norway and Finland.

Superpowers Active in North

The Defense Committee declared that the superpowers' interest in the north had grown. The Soviet Union has concentrated significant air and naval forces on the Kola Peninsula, said Sagren. "NATO's operations partly involve Norway's northern section, but mostly U.S. aircraft carriers."

The Soviet Union is prepared to sever NATO's connections in the Atlantic and wants to protect its nuclear weapons in the northern seas. According to Sagren, it demands the extension of air and naval support at least to the level of Iceland-Greenland.

"NATO is trying to reduce the missile threat, which primarily means American naval strategy. Last year a group of aircraft carriers was spotted outside Narvik. Maybe it won't happen during a war, but it's interesting nevertheless."

The range and strike capacity of the Air Force have increased. Battles can also be efficiently directed by radar and command machinery. The Nordic countries are on routes which airplanes and cruise missiles may use between East and West.

"It would also be naturally advantageous to the Soviet Union to be able to advance on land," Sagren pointed out. A land attack via Norway is conceivable, but the Defense Committee thinks that the Soviet Union, because of its geography and fighting forces, has a much better chance to attack via a land front than NATO does. "On this basis, the guidelines are to give priority to the eastern direction. So the statement is not political but rests on other facts."

Arduous To Keep Sweden Out of Conflict

Keeping Sweden out of a superpower war in the north would be a very arduous task, said Sagren. Neither side should think it would gain an advantage by using Swedish territory. The general considered this important for the entire Nordic balance.

The Defense Committee presumed that there would be a political forewarning of war, which would be difficult to evaluate in a chaotic situation. Sagren hoped for a 2-3 month political and 2-3 day military warning.

From Boden's viewpoint, Finland's position is important. "We can and do discuss what chance you Finns have to fulfill the defense assignments you agreed upon. We also discuss how long it will take before Swedish territory becomes the site of war."

There are different opinions on the issue, admitted Sagren. "We play a cautious game, and we don't want to paint too optimistic a picture of how quickly advancement through Finnish territory would be in a bad situation." People in Boden are pleased to note that Finland has strengthened its defense in the north.

12327/9604

Swedish Navy Said Well Informed on Intruding Submarine's Location

Improved ASW Resources

36500159 Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 2 Aug 88 p 2

[Editorial: "Becoming Accustomed to Submarines"]

[Text] On Saturday, 30 July 1988, Lars Navarro and Mats Rytter were out wind-surfing between Liso and Toro in Stockholm's southern archipelago. Navarro is a professional wind-surfing teacher. Rytter has sailed in those areas of the archipelago since he was a child.

But that trip was no routine exercise for the two wind-surfers. All of a sudden, Lars Navarro spotted a large object coming directly toward him. At first he thought that it looked like a big barge. But Lars Navarro and Mats Rytter immediately saw that what they were seeing was a submarine.

If they had contacted the Armed Forces National Defense Staff 10 years ago to report what they had observed, their report would probably have been brushed aside. But now the probabilities undeniably indicate that they described what they had observed in a lucid manner.

And actually the story is not sensational by any means.

SVENSKA DAGBLADET was able to report in its news section yesterday on the submarine intrusion at the Gustaf Dahlen lighthouse and the intrusion in the vicinity of Nynashamn. There is no doubt at all that at least one foreign submarine was there. The Armed Forces also have extremely good "sound pictures" of the submarine.

Only a few years ago there were frequent attempts, especially in the press, to explain away the intrusions as being something else. It was said that they were seals, shoals of fish or unusual wave formations that gave the public cause to believe they were seeing submarines.

The Armed Forces' resources, especially those for spotting foreign submarines, have been improved appreciably during recent years. Their resources for hunting submarines have not really kept pace, although they have also been improved. That means that many more of the observations that are reported do not come from the public, but from Armed Forces personnel with the help of the improved technical equipment they now have.

Consequently, the reliability of the observations has also increased. The general expressions of doubt that submarine intrusions are actually intrusions also do not occur very much any more.

Thus, to all intents and purposes, no one questions that Swedish waters are violated, to a great extent, by foreign submarines.

Nevertheless, no political reaction is forthcoming. The Armed Forces decisions that are made are influenced to a very slight extent by the intrusions. The Armed Forces got a slight addition in the spring; something different had been inevitable after the Commander-in-Chief of the Swedish Armed Forces' extremely sharp report a few days before Christmas. But for the Armed Forces as a whole that addition was only something scribbled casually in the margin.

Sweden's reaction to the submarine intrusions is to cut down the Armed Forces!

Only yesterday, Commander-in-Chief of the Swedish Armed Forces Bengt Gustafsson described the situation in the Armed Forces. Among other things, he said that the actual situation is making a "fundamental reappraisal of our entire defense policy" necessary. And that does not mean that the situation that is the result of the submarine threat is moving us in the direction of raising our sights. Instead, he hints that the Armed Forces' inadequate resources are making it necessary for the politicians to acknowledge very soon, in their concrete decisions, that we will try to accomplish less instead of more where defense is concerned.

What everybody said after the anti-submarine commission did not come into being has happened. Sweden is engaged in accustoming itself to the intrusions.

Navy Getting Advance Intelligence

36500159 Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in
Swedish 8 Aug 88 p 5

[Guest commentary by Lt Commander Hans von Hofsten: "The Navy Has Advance Warning on Submarines!"]

[Text] Anything big that happens happens quietly. The barrage in the mass media on the Ebbe Carlsson scandal has covered up a positive event of very great interest. After all the serious alarm signals I have given in this spot, it therefore is a refreshing feeling to be able to say something pleasant.

What refer to, primarily, is the result of the submarine hunt during the two submarine operations at the beginning of June.

In the first place, one can see from the reports that the Navy was in the right place at the right time—beforehand.

In the second place, it was possible to bring weapons into action against an object definitely identified as a submarine.

In the third place, it was possible, after the attack, to document with photographs the fact that depth charges were detonated in the immediate vicinity of the submarine.

The fact that the Navy was at the right place at the right time beforehand may seem to be a trivial accident, but that cannot be so. The coast is 2,700 km long and an antisubmarine force can, by a rough estimate, guard only approximately 30 km at a given time. Thus the coverage is only 1 percent. Add to that the fact that intrusions can take place on any one of approximately 270 days during the year and the idea of accidents as the cause of success can be rejected.

Then how could the Navy know when and where an intrusion was going to come? For easily understandable reasons, the Armed Forces National Defense Staff is silent about that. But that does not prevent us others from thinking for ourselves.

Being conscious of the vital importance of the earliest possible advance warning on threats that call for mobilization, our politicians earmarked money for an improved intelligence service in one defense resolution after another. It can be said that they strengthened the intelligence service at the same rate of speed as they allowed the Armed Forces to degenerate in other respects. The result in that regard has now become apparent and is welcome after 8 miserable years.

Furthermore, the slow but gradual improvement of the materiel at last brought it about that a contact that is obtained could be identified positively, on the one hand, and could be retained long enough that an attack could be put into action with good precision, on the other.

For the intelligence that is obtained and new materiel to yield such results, knowledge and skill are required. Obviously the personnel have succeeded in improving their capabilities, so that a well-deserved success could be recorded. However, that success is certainly not decisive to such an extent that the intruders will admit that they have been worsted. Far from it. With a term borrowed from tennis, it can be claimed that the Swedes have broken their opponents' serve.

A success from a weak position must be followed by many more before the match can be won. Continuous replenishment of resources, energy and perseverance are therefore what are constantly needed to finally put a stop to the intrusions that are so dangerous and humiliating for Sweden.

In that connection, it is worthwhile to consider another remarkable event—specifically, AFTONBLADET's conversation with a Soviet government official in which he stated that Soviet submarines' encroachment in Swedish waters may very well have taken place before 1985. The peace and war research worker, Wilhelm Agrell, has speculated on the possibility that Gorbachev wants to put the blame on his predecessor by leaking that out.

The only thing that can be said with certainty about Soviet social life is that such a leak is guided from the highest level. That leads one on to think that Gorbachev must have seen how close to a sinking the attack at the Gustaf Dalen lighthouse on 2 June 1988 came and what a catastrophe that would have been for his "glasnost" policy.

We do not know how strong a grip Gorbachev has on his military apparatus, but it is generally thought that he is not omnipotent. Perhaps he wants to prepare the ground with the leak, so that, in case a sinking should perhaps take place, he can throw the blame onto his adversaries in the military apparatus and, on that pretext, repeat the purging maneuver he carried out after Matthias Rust's landing in Red Square.

However that may be, the fact remains that we seem to have been completely free of submarines in our archipelagoes for nearly 2 months this summer. Either the operations were broken off temporarily or they chose a

substantially more prudent way of behaving. However, some wind-surfers' observations recently remind us that apparently no definite breaking off has taken place.

The moral of the history of the submarine intrusions up to the present should be easy to relate:

Destroying an entire defense program function tempts interested powers to exploit it.

Not being willing to believe the facts because they are disagreeable brings devastating consequences.

Building what one has destroyed back up again takes a very long time.

Nevertheless, the government is in danger of repeating the fatal mistake of 1972 regarding the need for anti-submarine protection, and this time on a monumental scale, for they are planning to destroy half of the Army.

In 1972, they did not listen to the warnings of the commanding officer of the Navy. In 1987 and 1988, they are not listening to the commanding officer of the Army or the supreme commander of the Armed Forces. They did not even listen to the unanimous parliamentary Defense Committee in 1984, which recommended a strengthening of the Armed Forces as late as the spring of 1987.

On the other hand, they intend to cash in in advance on the profits from an international relaxation of tension of whose durability we know nothing. What we do know, on the other hand, is that the relaxation of tension that indubitably does prevail may depend upon the success of a single man—Gorbachev. If the opponents of his "glasnost"- "perestroyka" policy should throw him out of the saddle, or if something happens to him, the relaxation of tension can be changed into its antithesis overnight.


Should one not also consider that the Soviet Union is withdrawing from Afghanistan, reducing its commitments in Africa, discontinuing the building of two aircraft carriers that is going on and reducing its naval exercises in the North Atlantic, but—is continuing its submarine operations against Sweden? What is more natural than that the Soviet Union would make up for an abandonment of the struggle for the North Atlantic with a strengthening of its capabilities in Scandinavia?

09258

'Unidentified Object'

36500259 Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in
Swedish 4 Aug 88 p 2

Unidentified Object



[Political Cartoon by Jansson]

FINLAND

Finns, Soviets Dispute Blame for Problems in Balancing Trade

Pugin: Finns Too 'Passive'

36170097 Helsinki *HELSINGIN SANOMAT* in Finnish
20 Jul 88 p 23

[Text] In a KANSAN UUTiset interview, Soviet trade representative Vladimir Pugin places full blame for the management of trade with the Soviet Union on Finnish officials and firms.

Receiving their share of the blame were, among others, the metal industry and the construction trade, as well as the Export and Import License Office. Pugin accuses the firms of being slow to make connections and reluctant to participate in Kola Peninsula megaprojects.

Pugin finds fault with the metal industry, only 3-4 percent of whose imports stem from the Soviet Union. In Pugin's opinion, that does not nearly correspond to Finland's needs or to the Soviet Union's capacity to supply.

Pugin says that often Finnish firms do not even invite bids from the Soviet Union, but afterwards it is claimed that the Soviet Union is incapable of delivering the goods. This claim holds true in fewer and fewer cases, according to Pugin.

Pugin is also surprised by the Finns' lukewarm interest in projects on the Kola Peninsula. Negotiations have been conducted for some time, but not one concrete project has [been developed as a result], while other Western countries have progressed much further, Pugin says.

In the general development of trade, Pugin compares Finland with Sweden. He points out that the exchange of goods between Sweden and the Soviet Union grew 20 percent last year, and Soviet exports to Sweden have increased 43 percent. "Perestroika is in full force there," Pugin contends.

Pugin says the construction industry's trade relations are like a lopsided hockey game between Finland and the Soviet Union. "The number of construction sites in the Soviet Union is extremely high, but there isn't a single joint construction site on Finnish soil."

He sees opportunities for collaboration mostly in the construction of electric power plants.

Few Finnish Firms Active

According to Pugin, perestroika affects trade relations in that firms which have received the right to import and export cannot be forced by anyone to do business. They

conduct business with Finns only if it is advantageous to them. Some Finnish firms have been active in making contacts, but there are very few of them, Pugin estimates.

Pugin says that the trade mission on Tehtaankatu works daily in cooperation with Finland's Export and Import License Office. "We understand the Finnish side's difficulties, and sometimes the Finns understand our difficulties," he admits.

Because of licensing problems, trade has gone elsewhere. The Soviet Ministry of Wood-Processing Industry intended to buy paper from Finland and sell cellulose in exchange, but for lack of a license the deal was made with other countries.

There are no plans to cancel the trade protocol because of these problems, Pugin asserts, but the present situation will affect future agreements. Pugin hopes to have this year's payment and credit questions resolved by the beginning of September. The meeting of Economic Commission Chairmen Kalevi Sorsa and Vladimir Kamentsev is tentatively scheduled for the seventh day of September.

Newspaper: Soviet Initiatives Awaited

36170097 Helsinki *HELSINGIN SANOMAT* in Finnish
24 Jul 88 p 2

[Editorial: "Ball Is in Soviet Court"]

[Text] The debate on the present status of trade with the Soviet Union is heating up. Jermu Laine, former minister of foreign trade and current director of the National Customs Board, considers the muddled management of the Soviet economy the reason negotiations have not progressed. Soviet trade representative Vladimir Pugin threw the ball back and criticized the Finns who ordinarily trade with the Soviet Union for their lackadaisicalness.

Pugin's criticism is in large part familiar. Because of his position, he must respond to reproaches. Nevertheless, Pugin should have remembered what this alleged lack of enterprise is due to. There is a virtual freeze on export licenses, and a balance of trade is being fashioned by an iron hand. The reason is Finland's clearing account of several billion markkas: the goal is to reduce it to zero by the end of next year.

Pugin reproached large-scale Finnish firms for being reluctant to participate in joint enterprises. According to him, Finns are falling out of the race for projects on the Kola Peninsula. Finnish entrepreneurs in the metal and construction industries are not sufficiently interested in Soviet products, Pugin jokes. Finnish firms are silent in the face of these accusations. A constructive dialogue on how to get trade onto a realistic track is, however,

important to both sides, but especially to Finland. It is clear that Finns must be more active in promoting trade. It is worthwhile to ponder this if we are accused repeatedly of listlessness.

Finland's former minister of foreign trade has shed some light on the impasse in trade with the Soviet Union. He has stated publicly what all the trade negotiators know, namely, that the Soviet Union's economic reform has practically brought the transaction of business to a halt, while the ranks of the opposite party are in disarray. For all practical purposes, the situation is stagnant. Finland has made its proposal—maybe several of them, unofficially—on how to handle the clearing account of several billion markkas without balancing trade by the current harsh measures. An alternative is clearing-account interest and long-term credit protected from possible devaluation of the ruble. A response from the Soviet Union has not been received, though one is expected. This is disappointing, of course, and the Finns have reason to demand a more vigorous trade arrangement. Hopes now focus on the beginning of September when Kalevi Sorsa meets with Vladimir Kamentsev, the other chairman of the Economic Commission.

The talks will not affect the problem itself, the clearing account of several billion markkas. What it really boils

down to, after all, is verbal shadowboxing. The clearing account is a headache for Finland, whose money is at stake. On the other hand, the Soviet Union has gained an interest-free period in which to pay for the goods it imports. Why would it hurry to promise interest on a debt until the very last moment? The situation becomes worrisome only if it does not receive the merchandise agreed upon.

Yet the present situation is substantially different from earlier periods of imbalance. Time will not put trade relations into proper working order. Finns cannot wait for a possible rise in oil prices, new and suddenly concocted imports, or the felicitous impact of joint enterprises. It is not possible to raise imports from the Soviet Union to the former level of expensive oil [imports].

What remains is a reduction of exports to the level of imports, because both countries are of one mind about continuing to trade mostly on a bilateral basis. Transactions would increase somewhat if shipping trade were removed from the bilateral system and conducted on a credit-granting basis.

12327/9604

GREECE

Large-Scale Survey on Secondary, Higher Education, Employment

35210139 Athens TO VIMA in Greek
24 Jul 88 pp 28-31

[Article by Khr. Korfiatis: "New Graduates and The Unemployed"]

[Text] Professional orientation of young people through the educational system is at this time based on past studies! The period to which these studies refer has already ended and new ones for trends in labor supply demand for the next five years and even more for the ten-year period before the year 2000 do not exist. And so, substantially, young people needing help in deciding on their studies and occupation are entirely without assistance.

A revealing research survey gives a categorically positive answer to this question about the insufficient relation of the educational system to the labor market and more generally to the private sector. The survey is the result of collaboration of Mrs Niki Tzavella, official of the Professional Orientation Service for young people, Mr Evsth of the OAED [Labor Force Employment Organization], professor Dimitropoulos of SELETE [School for Teachers in Trades and Technical Education], and Mr Vas. Katrivesis, economist.

It includes an analysis "of the flow of the educational force" and many modern interesting proposals for the substantial handling of the "drama" of unemployment for young people.

Even though young people between 14 and 29 years of age make up a very significant percentage of the OEP [Economically Active Population] of the country, their participation, however, in the SED [Total Labor Force] is disproportionately small.

Breaking it down in years, it is observed that of the entire labor force, young people of the above age bracket amounted to 42.5 percent in 1981 and only 42.6 percent in 1982. This percentage increased to 48.2 in 1983, fell back to 47.8 in 1984, was 47.9 in 1985, and again fell to 46.6 in 1986.

In comparison to 1981, participation of young people in the labor force increased, of course, but again the percentage of their participation remains small.

Among other things, this observation relates to the educational changes of the last decade and includes the determination that the number of persons who remain in the educational system and seek higher posts in education is continuously increasing.

Later for Work

A glance at education from the primary level on upwards and in every direction produces interesting observations.

First of all, it appears that in comparison with the past, students now delay going out to find work. Despite the fact that everyone does not finish the first cycle of Secondary Education (compulsory education remains to a certain degree optional), only a few look for work before the time they formally finish their Secondary Education.

This fact is reflected in the total make-up. Specifically, the number of those who have not graduated from middle education show a drop. Correspondingly, the number of those who have a middle education diploma or even a third-level education certificate show an increase.

As for the participation of persons of the various educational levels in the total labor force, the survey made revealing determinations.

The largest participation proportionately in comparison to all years is maintained by graduates of third-level education, something that throws doubt on the predominating view which sees additional difficulties confronting the graduates of the highest and higher educational levels in joining the labor force. Nevertheless, showing a larger participation of persons at this level of education in the general labor force does not prove a satisfactory representation of what the educational system is doing at the higher level of the occupational scene because workers from this level of education, even though there are no statistical facts, are known to have extensively tried the phenomenon of employment outside their field of training or underemployment.

The smallest proportionate participation in the labor force is held by those who studied (but did not graduate) or are studying in the third levels of education.

They get into the labor market with great difficulty.

Immediately following them, the smallest participation is held by those who did not go to school at all. The demand for workers in this category is evidently very small for understandable reasons.

The educational reforms that took place after the change in government in 1974 improved, it is understood, the educational level of workers. The changes, however, that came about in the status of the existing force, according to the facts of the survey, are still very far from securing a modern OEP [Economically Active Population].

The existing levels of studies noted in the survey, also explain up to a point many of the weaknesses of the human productive mechanism of the country. Most

important, indeed, is that they demonstrate how difficult it is for the technological revolution that is "knocking" persistently on the doors of our country to be absorbed.

The majority of the OEP is made up in all of the years studied by those who have only a grammar school certificate, while second is a multitude of those who went to grammar school but did not finish.

Also, the number of illiterates is discouragingly large. The consolation is that the above categories have been getting smaller in number during the last years.

In this way, an increase is seen in participation in the OEP by those in the other levels of studies. Specifically:

Graduates of the third level of education increase from 5.1 percent of the OEP in 1981 to 6.1 percent in 1986. As an indication, it can be reported that the corresponding percentage in France was 6.1 in 1975, about 7.5 in Germany in 1976 and 6.0 in Britain in 1981.

Those who attended or are attending a third level education school show variations with an increasing trend.

The same trend is shown for the graduates of middle education, as well as the graduates of the first (gymnasio) cycle of the second level of education.

The lessened, although improved in comparison to the past, response of the educational system to the demands for the establishment of a modern productive labor force is quite obvious.

The Nine-Year Education

Despite the fact, however, that at least theoretically the attainment of an education below the university level means relatively easy entry into the labor market, there is a real interest in the university. The "aura" of the university as a means of securing good employment does not appear to be thwarted by the difficulties of the unemployed graduates, or by the occasional "notifications" of the authorities that it is not possible to amass hundreds of thousands in the universities. The number of people that are seeking this level of education is continuously increasing. There is a great waste of time despite the fact that the number of people who remain in the educational system at this level seeking their degree is increasing.

A problem of lack of interest exists from there on down, even when it concerns higher education.

As the survey shows, regarding technology schools, while new entrants are increasing, the number graduating remains the same. It is significantly lower, about half the number of entrants! On the basis of these facts, one could then speak of the failure of the famous TEI [Technical and Vocational Foundations]. And understandably the

question arises immediately, how much do Technological Foundations relate to the manufacturing sector of the country, to its trends, and to its needs? And even to what extent do these schools also contribute, as they currently operate, to the distortion of the needs and finally to the "dramatization" and inflation of youth unemployment?

Even though, mainly because of the educational reforms that made the nine-year education compulsory, the number of graduates from middle education shows an increase, the truth is that a low degree of interest is seen in all the lower educational levels. Regardless of financial, family or other difficulties, doubt about the effectiveness of the educational system in regard to future occupations, seems to play an important role in the "flow of interest" in the various levels of education.

The circumvention of the law on compulsory nine-year education is proof.

A conclusion clearly deriving from the survey, is that circumvention of the law applies to even the first level of education.

A large percentage of students do not even finish grammar school or do not finish it in the normal fashion.

Similar conclusions are arrived at also for the two levels of the second level of education, the first cycle, the gymnasio [high school], and the second, lykeion [specialized high school].

In the gymnasios, there is a steady reduction in graduates in relation to the number registering in the first grade of the gymnasio. A large number of students do not finish the first cycle of the second level of education.

A situation similar to the one in the gymnasios appears in the lykeion. A large percentage of the students who enter the first grade of the lykeion do not graduate.

Regarding the flow of the labor force from the lykeion to the third level of education, it is worthwhile at this point to make note of a fact. What real role is played by the MPK [Post Lykeion Preparatory Centers]? The number of students that attended the MPK, a number that showed an increase from the period 1985-86, dropped significantly during the period 1986-87, despite the fact that the number of MPKs increased. Indications of the failure of this institution, of the MPKs, and the accompanying waste of resources, already are apparent.

Besides, in an extensive empirical survey that was done in northern Greece (and that is being used in the present survey), it was determined that the students take seriously into consideration what they believe is the prospect for employment when they are choosing the school and the occupation. While, to the contrary, they are least influenced by the occupational orientation conducted in school!

Justly or not, it does not make any sense to discuss it now since, by this time, the existing professional orientation that the school provides is based, according to the survey, on past studies.

But, we add, how can education not be going through a crisis and a deep one at that, and how can the students not react intensely, when there is a crisis in the sector of professional orientation that education should worthily be serving?

And in consequence, how can one miss serious distortions in the relation of the educational system to the labor market?

And even yet, how can one miss distortions in manufacturing sector of the country itself?

The survey in these columns provides valuable conclusions.

After all this, it would be natural to a certain extent, one might say, to one way or another increase unemployment affecting to a greater degree the young people between 14 and 29 years of age.

In comparison with other countries, youth unemployment between 15 and 24 years of age, for which there is a great deal of facts, appears to be especially large. While the percentage for France is 25.6 percent, it is 9.5 percent for W. Germany, 21.7 percent for the United Kingdom, 13 percent for the United States, and 16.5 percent for Canada, for Greece it is 30.6 percent, only in Italy is it higher at 33.7 percent, from the total of these seven countries.

This estimate (36.6 percent) of unemployment for young people comes from, let it be noted, the ESYE [National Statistical Service of Greece] and was taken only in urban areas. Furthermore, we should not ignore the delay of entry into the market of many young people because of induction into the military (soldiers are not considered unemployed), delay in studies, and the extension of support by their families until they are much older.

New entrants in the market, as it is proven, are more prone to unemployment than the older workers and being less experienced and specialized, apparently face larger problems of unemployment than the others do.

All in all, the 14 to 29 age group, in relation to older groups, has shown every year from 1981 through 86 the smallest percentage of occupation and, correspondingly, the largest percentage of unemployment.

Specifically, in 1987 unemployment for the group between 14 and 29 years of age was estimated to be 2.67 times larger than the total!

Unemployment, measured in terms of the economically active and the total labor force, has increased a great deal during the current decade. While in 1981 the unemployed of the 14 to 29 age group represented 4.6 percent of the OEP and 10.7 percent of the SED, corresponding percentages in 1986 increased to 8.4 percent and 18 percent!

By levels of studies, paradoxically, and despite what is said to the contrary, the largest unemployment does not occur among graduates of the third level of education. It happens more, according to the survey, among graduates of middle education and after gymnasio graduates.

Regarding occupations by the branch of economic activity, the survey also reveals interesting facts, unknown until now such as the following: graduates of higher education mainly are occupied in the tertiary sector, with a tendency that indeed increases with the years. Their occupation in the service sector from 88.7 percent in 1981 rose to 90.1 percent in 1985, while their occupation in the secondary sector went from 10.4 percent in 1981 to 9.1 percent in 1985 and fell at a higher rate in the primary sector.

In other words, the relation of the higher schools with the absolutely real manufacturing system of the country is from very little to imperceptible.

Degree Work

The subject, however, of "overqualification", compared with other categories of the graduates of the third level of education, is worth looking at more analytically, since it relates to the differences in views for what for some is real and what for some is mythical unemployment of the graduates.

The survey reveals that the persons who have a degree from the third level of education are overrepresented, that is, they participate in greater percentages in the total labor force. Specifically, 80 percent of these graduates in 1986 participated in the SED. On the other hand, the other categories are underrepresented by participating in smaller percentages.

According to survey results the possible hypotheses are two:

First that unemployment of the graduates is less and an inaccurate exploitation of the matter is occurring.

And second (and rather, even though the researchers do not take a position, the more predominant one) that what is shown as occupation for the graduates is nothing but concealed unemployment, in the form of underemployment or another kind of occupation, either with their being occupied in sectors irrelevant to their specialty, or with their occupying positions for graduates of lower educational degrees.

From the Classroom to Unemployment

The fact that the employer is subsidized by the OAED with 1,500 drachmae daily for every position it gives to an AEI [Supreme Educational Institutions] graduate most probably contributes to this.

That is, one way or the other, the "myth of the degree" is not a myth. In one way or another, to a certain extent or another, it helps secure (even in some form) an occupation.

However, no matter how long it remains a polite pursuit to have a university education for everyone, it remains equally realistic that a university education and a scientific occupation for everyone is not desirable. The survey reminds us of this conclusion, adding that, to the degree that it is desired to lessen this tendency (and strengthen other tendencies), there are three possible ways to do this:

The number of entrants be restricted by the government.

To lessen the number of those interested in higher studies through proper enlightenment.

The combination of the above.

The greatest need, however, as is emphasized, is to attain a realistic "correspondence" between education and industry, at least for a 10-year period. The existing disharmony is a significant factor contributing to the creation of unpleasant repercussions regarding youth employment. Proper correspondence between the supply (of the labor force that is offered for occupation) and the demand (the needs of the market for the labor force) is more than necessary.

The need for modernizing job orientation is, because of the way things are, an urgent priority.

Because, unfortunately, the answer to the question: what does the school have to say to the student of the first grade of the gymnasium about the trends in the labor market 10 years from now is, absolutely nothing! No matter how many serious problems there may still be in describing the picture of the labor market and especially the demand, at least the phenomenon to "educate in sectors that are needed" should be dealt with.

Organizational weaknesses make it almost impossible, at this time, to attain a realistic realization of job orientation, as noted in the survey. By now, the requirements for effective operation of education in relation to the labor market are:

- 1) Flexibility.
- 2) Sensitivity.
- 3) Adjustability.

4) The speed of adaptability and reaction.

Education, it is stressed in the survey, must build an orientation system for students that would be up to date at all times, realistic, flexible, and knowledgeable in order to institute a mechanism for readjustment of the programs at least once a year.

Confronting the problem of the mass effort to promote all graduates to the highest educational level (only a few end up in the TEI) should, according to the group of researchers, be combined with the following measures. Among other things the program should:

- Provide ways that are secured at the middle education level, together with securing jobs and fortifying professional roles.
- Establish flexible programs for quick preparation and modernize all professional education programs. Do it in such a way that students will attain "basic talents" that they can prepare quickly and be flexible, ready for every movement in the job market.

This same education must be open to greater initiatives for educating the labor force, especially in the "special" and "local" markets. The survey underlines that education should concentrate with the equal intensity on study of the national market as well as on special and local markets, according to basic investment law. Especially at the home level, adjustment of supply to demand is considered easy with proper planning.

However, feasible estimates must be made by someone! And since the occupation/unemployment problem cannot be solved by the market itself or by education (just as each one of them is not solely responsible for the bad situation), "it is necessary", as pointed out, "to establish a unique, responsible service that will undertake this coordinating function."

The special purpose of this service is proposed to be on a permanent basis and to conduct in an effective manner:

- 1) The study of the labor market;
- 2) The study of education;
- 3) The interconnecting and coordinating of the two sides.

For this reason, it should have, understandably, the necessary mechanism to facilitate the effective linking of education programs with predicted market needs. And the service should process necessary materials for the full and prompt (projecting for 5 years, 10 years, and 15 years) educational and professional enlightenment of students, both the young and anyone interested, within the framework of the orientation institution.

This unique service, according to the opinion of the committee, cannot possibly function as a bureaucratic public service, but must be a self-controlled, self-administered private unit, an idea supported earlier in the Blanchard report (1977).

In other words, it should function as an independent, free, private, scientific organization from which all other services will be getting facts, studies, analyses, information, advice etc.

If it is possible finally for such bases and conditions of operating to exist for the Labor Institute, the establishment of which was recently declared by the minister of Labor, perhaps this could contribute to dealing with the "problematic" interconnection between the educational and productive aspects of the country.

Besides, unemployment is not always the result of an overabundant labor supply!

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