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18 FEBRUARY 1987

WEST EUROPE REPORT

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PAPANDREOU SEEN ADOPTING SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC POSTURE

Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek 14-15 Dec 86 pp 1,3

[Article by Nikos Simou]

[Text] A. Papandreou's new political "identity" as a social democrat, which the prime minister is trying to "construct," has arrived in Greece "via Europe." This realization about the prime minister's intentions not only comes from information stating that his moderate cadres have recommended to him a gradual conforming of his policy to that of the European socialists; it also emerges from specific positions he has been taking recently which aim at distancing him from his relatively recent past, at least as regards foreign affairs. The crowning point of this tactic is the announcement of the prime minister's intention to include PASOK in the Socialist International, through which Papandreou believes he will obtain the necessary ideologic identity to authenticate his new physiognomy.

The prime minister's stance at the London Summit Conference, but also the things he said to his Parliamentary Group, are some of the reliable indications of his new moderate metamorphosis. Furthermore, something which was earnestly recommended to Papandreou, after being realized in the municipal elections, is that the arbitrary charting of "dividing lines" did not have a positive effect on the electoral body in PASOK's behalf.

At first, many were astonished at Papandreou's observation that the Europeans are justifiably uneasy about the fact that the Reykjavik talks referred to the decrease of nuclear, and not conventional, weapons. This is the first time this "European position" of the prime minister as a foreign policy philosophy is expressed.

Moreover, the stance and air of affected mildness to studious indifference which he maintained vis-a-vis the indications of the president of the European committee, Delors, that Greece has not only rights but also obligations, is an element to be used in evaluating the pursued change in the prime minister's "profile." If one considers Papandreou's related reactions in the past, he would justifiably have expected the president of the committee to get some "Greek lesson" about his effrontery. On the contrary, this time, Papandreou, in view of the second installment of the EEC loan, spoke highly to his party's Parliamentary Group about Delors, whose advice Papandreou characterized as "a masterpiece of economic reasoning...".

Papandreou was more revealing about his turns to social-democratic modes in his address at the luncheon he gave in honor of Spanish Prime Minister Gonzalez. Thus:

1. He hailed Spain's accession into the EEC as a step in achieving the idea of a United Europe.
2. He placed the Palestinians and Israelis on equal footing as concerns the right of both to live within secure borders.
3. He appeared more compliant vis-a-vis a dialogue with Turkey, a process which has been recommended to him by western, eastern and third-world parties.
4. He brought up the Greek role in improving and normalizing relations between the East and West, both in the frameworks of NATO and the EEC.
5. He unconditionally condemned terrorism and set himself in favor of international cooperation for its extermination (Community positions), even though, because of his known commitments vis-a-vis the Arab countries, he undertook some equilibratory proposals.

On the other hand, the economic policy of frugality is nothing more than a formula applied by European social-democrats and non-social-democrats long before Papandreou and the experimenting under the pretext of redistributing income.

Papandreou should attribute his new "persona" to two factors which are connected. The first has to do with domestic economic problems and our borrowing dependency which extended, as was natural, our defensive dependency, mainly from the United States.

The second reason, which is related to the first, is that PASOK officials now talk openly about restricted margins for drawing voters from the Left's reservoir. Therefore, the centrist area once more is considered exploitable, even though a great effort will be required to re-establish the credibility of PASOK and the prime minister.

The first reason in particular limits Papandreou's margins for a left-turning "profligacy" in the countries of the West, but also for anti-Americanism domestically in order to satisfy the Left or attract its moderate voters. Conversely, the social-democratic appearance, within and outside of Greece, helps, on the one hand, in relaxing those on the outside and, on the other hand, in recapturing the centrists. In the same sense, there is logic to the reserve with which the announcement of the establishment of Arsenis' party was accepted--just like every similar "initiative"--from the moment it is able to be shown that the creation of a new "vehicle" only aimed at containing any losses to the left in its boundaries which are controlled by PASOK.

Finally, the rebaptizing of Papandreou's disputed political physiognomy in the social-democratic font serves another objective--the cultivation of a more acceptable political style, which would be becoming to a political personality for its climb to the highest offices of the state.

Of course, it is noted, the persuasiveness of Papandreou's new political appearance depends not only on him but also on the official opposition, on which is falling the lot of demythicizing its primary adversary.

POLL RESULTS ON LEADERS', PARTIES' POPULARITY

Parties' Strengths Rise, Fall

Athens EMBISTEVTIKO GRAMMA in Greek 19 Nov 86 pp 6-7

[Text] The first new election polls were made public last week. The only named poll (EVRODIM, Athens-Piraeus) was published in two parts in APOGEVMATINI and its most significant elements were the following:

1. The ascent of the liberal conservative area observed in the municipal elections is confirmed. As appears in the related charts, the gains are on the order of two to four percent (analogous to the apportionment of the percentage of those undecided). At the same time, the decrement of DIANA [Democratic Renewal] is confirmed. Conversely, the "ascent" being propagandized by the "array" of the left is limited to the reclamation of a genuinely leftist 3.5 percent which had voted for PASOK under the special conditions of June 1985. Thus, the governing party presents a relatively high 35 percent.

2. There is significant deterioration in the image of PASOK's total government work, which fell to 38 percent. That is, 8 percent below the previously lowest point, and down 14 percent in comparison with April 1985.

3. There is a strengthening of Mitsotakis' intraparty position, which has improved very significantly, as is shown in the related chart, with a parallel drop in the leadership image of the historic officials (Averof, Rallis, Stefanopoulos, etc.). The only one who survives and rises is M. Evert, which is directly connected to his important victory in Athens.

Who is the most capable to be ND leader?

Leadership of:	Mitsotakis							Averof			Rallis			
Month	10	5	3	11	6	4	1	10	6	4	10	4	9	11
Year	86	86	86	85	85	85	85	84	84	84	83	83	82	81
Mitsotakis	41	36	36	25	29	30	27	28	11	18	24	10	8	4
Averof	6	10	10	8	9	10	16	9	18	15	12	13	18	25
Rallis	9	14	11	13	9	13	12	11	15	13	8	6	8	14
Boutos	4	3	5	5	10	8	12	13	16	6	9	8	4	4
Stefanopoulos	6	21	15	24	13	7	10	15	7	19	9	5	3	*
Evert	19	6	2	4	5	3	5	4	5	5	7	0	3	12
Varvitsiotis	1	1	2	3	*	1	3	2	2	3	3	3	3	6
Samaras	*	1	1	2	*	*	*	*	*	2	*	*	*	*
Others	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	1	*	*	*
New Person	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	29	31	*
No Answer	14	8	18	10	25	28	15	19	20	24	27	10	22	31

*Not included in corresponding survey

If elections for the Greek Parliament took place today, for which of these parties would you vote? (percentage)

Month Year	10 86	5 86	3 86	11 85	6 85	Jun 85 Elections
EPEN (1)	0.5	1.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5
New Democracy	38	32.5	34.5	32.5	37.5	38
DIANA (2)	1	4.5	3	5.5	-	-
KF (3)	*	*	*	*	*	*
PASOK	35	38.5	33	32	37.5	44
KKE(Int)	4.5	5.6	4.5	5.5	4	3.5
KKE	16	14	16	16.5	16	13.5
EKKE, EDE, KA, ASKE, LAE (4)	0.5	1	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5
Undecided	4.5	2.5	8	7	4	-

- (1) National Political Union
- (2) Democratic Renewal
- (3) Liberal Party
- (4) Revolutionary Communist Party of Greece, National Democratic Union, Leftists' Party, Combative Socialist Party of Greece, Popular Fighting Unity

4. The increasing pressure exercised on the population by the bad economic situation is confirmed. Fifty-five percent of the inhabitants of Athens and Piraeus think that the government's economic policy has harmed them personally; that is, 2 percent more than the previous highest point and up 19 percent in comparison with April 1985.

In evaluating these data, we must say that the special characteristics of EVRODIM polls (on the issue of those not answering and the percentages of those undecided, which are lower in comparison to other polls) do not influence the conclusions of its surveys when these are presented diachronically. Finally, these data were rendered in a relatively satisfactory way by the newspaper in its detailed report--not, however, in the titles (EVRODIM bears no responsibility here), such as: "Sixty-seven percent of Greeks ask for PASOK to leave," which, with all the good will in the world, is not concluded from the poll's data.

Papandreou Popularity Reportedly Down

Athens I VRADYNI in Greek 27 Nov 86 p 5

[Text] Recent political developments have caused noteworthy rearrangements in the popularity of political leaders and personalities. This realization is based on the results of a "Evrodin" poll, conducted from 30 October to 4 November in the capital area, and in which people who do not necessarily vote in Athens took part.

The former president of the republic, Konstandinos Karamanlis, continues to be the most popular Greek politician and, in fact, the percentage of those who have a "very or fairly good opinion" of him increased by 12 points (in comparison to June 1986), reaching 54 percent.

Significantly increased (in comparison with June 1986) is the percentage of the elected mayor of Athens, M. Evert, which is now 50 percent, versus 40 percent last June. Mitsotakis' popularity is up (43 percent, versus 39 percent), as is that of G. Rallis (40 percent versus 37 percent). It is exceptionally interesting that, for the first time, there are three ND personalities following the firmly and indisputably first-place former president of the republic on the list.

Prime Minister Papandreou, despite the fact that there is an increase of 3 percentage points in his popularity, has remained fifth on the list, with a total of 38 percent.

The decrease in the popularity of President of the Republic Khr. Sartzetakis continues and has now fallen to 35 percent, versus 38 percent last June and 41 percent last March.

Of particular interest are several other data in the poll which show that the popularity of both Karamanlis and ND Leader Mitsotakis, and two other ND officials, Rallis and Evert, has increased among voters from other parties. More specifically: Karamanlis' popularity rose from 8 to 26 percent among PASOK adherents, and from 0 to 8 percent among KKE voters.

Mitsotakis' popularity among PASOK adherents rose from 1 to 7 percent and, among KKE backers, from 0 to 1 percent. Evert's popularity, which certainly was favored by his triumphant battle for the Athens' mayoralty, increased among PASOK voters from 3 to 17 percent (the largest increase) and among KKE adherents from 0 to 4 percent. While Rallis' popularity among PASOK adherents increased from 6 to 10 percent, it was reduced to zero from the 3 percent it had had among KKE voters.

On another question in the poll, concerning "Who is the most capable to be ND leader," Mitsotakis continues to collect the highest percentage (36 percent), although this is lower than the percentage in September 1986. A significant increase is seen in the percentage of Evert (28 percent), who now surpasses the two former ND leaders, Rallis (7 percent) and Averof (5 percent).

9247

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ND REPORTEDLY BETS ON TIME FOR PASOK FALL

Athens ENA in Greek 18 Dec 86 p 15

[Article by Kostas Spyropoulos]

[Text] The ND chairman insists on saying that time is on the side of ND and works against PASOK.

In his political report to the recent session of the ND Central Committee and in a press conference, K. Mitsotakis gave his answer to those within and outside ND--K. Stefanopoulos--who recommend that he introduce a censure motion against the government. "I will fire when I think the time is right," he said to the members of the ND Central Committee.

Speaking to the press, Mitsotakis was even clearer: "I do not wish," he said, "to make things easier for the government by introducing a motion of censure. It is evident why such a motion would serve the government under the current alignment of forces in the Chamber of Deputies [Vouli]: On the one hand the PASOK parliamentary group will unanimously express their confidence in A. Papandreou, while on the other hand the leftist deputies will at best stay neutral.

"By contrast, the tactic of slow but continuous weakening of PASOK opens up possibilities for changing alignments within the PASOK Parliamentary Group, as it happened with the issue of student transfer from one university to another, but also with the joint attacks by all opposition parties in the case of the scandals."

On the other hand, even if one could be sure that some PASOK deputies would not support the government over a motion of censure, it is doubtful whether the ND chairman would opt for this form of confrontation since it would bring back the memories of 1965, with the possible effect of closing the ranks of PASOK supporters.

The Theory of ND. The theory of the "ripe fruits" prevails in the thinking of the ND leadership. This approach seems to be correct to a large extent since the strongest opposition to the PASOK government is...PASOK itself, as one wing tries to trip another.

The recent scandals did not come to light by action of the opposition (ND) which in its request for an Investigative Committee simply listed the dis-closures of government officials against their colleagues and the reports of the pro-government newspapers. The picture of PASOK, which acts in oppo-sition to PASOK, does not seem to bother Mitsotakis very much. He believes that now public opinion is not only against PASOK but in favor of ND.

Of course, beyond the official statements there are some "hidden thoughts." The austerity program and retention of the bases form a one-way street for Papandreou. If he moves on to the end, ND will profit in two ways: the economy's stabilization will be achieved with PASOK paying the political cost, and (in the case of the bases) a major issue will have been resolved.

A journalist who voiced these "cunning thoughts" received a reply from Mitsotakis that ND "does not expect to get anything from PASOK." "I expect," he said, "to be able to oust PASOK from office." With this in mind, K. Mitsotakis is now reorganizing the ND party organization, making changes which would have caused an earthquake within the party if it were not for the party's significant gains in the municipal elections.

Party officials are appointed, in-party elections are postponed, new members are being accepted with the instant right to vote and many other things happen in ND without dissent. "The pie in parliamentary seats has grown for ND," said an official of the Central Committee to ENA with some touch of unhappiness. "Those who are on the lists fight to stay on and those who are not fight to get on."

7520

CSO: 3521/54

ND RELUCTANT TO CONTINUE PARLIAMENTARY DEBATE ON SCANDALS

Athens ENA in Greek 18 Dec 86 pp 14-15

[Article by Andonis Korovilas]

[Excerpt]

The New Democracy and PASOK confrontation in the Chamber of Deputies [Vouli] over scandals ended in a tie. This happened because ND, which could make this into a major political issue, failed to do so, resolving that it was in its interest to "end the matter" politically at this point and let the newspapers go on dragging the issue through their papers.

In the end the press was charged with the biggest part of the responsibility-- by both PASOK and ND--during debate in the Vouli. ND washed its hands: "I did not say anything, the newspapers wrote about the scandals." PASOK not only agreed but even threatened to reveal the motives of some of the newspapers.

From this point on the debate in the Vouli became routine. The premier who, according to his friends, "does what Karamanlis used to do," did not go to the Vouli because he was busy with the visit of Felipe Gonzales (neither PASOK nor ND happened to recall when they agreed on the date for the debate it coincided with the visit of the Spanish premier). The deputies waited patiently until the wee hours "to vote," TV did not have a live broadcast because "this was not a major issue," while the communists left Vouli because they were not interested in disputes of the "bourgeois parties."

Even the voting was on a simple plurality just as it is with every ordinary issue before the Vouli. ND agreed--in a statement by Mitsotakis no less-- that "the matter was closed," while he added (for the sake of appearances) that ND maintains its views but he did not question the constitutional interpretation whether 120 or 151 votes are required.

Behind the scenes ND offered the excuse that it did not raise the issue since after withdrawal of the communists the proposal could not get 120 votes. But without the communists, the proposal received 119. (In other words, the culprits are KKE, L. Kyrkos, and ND Deputy Kh. Katsigiannis, who was absent.)

Now let us move to the "whereas" of the lengthy debate. The political responsibility which presumably the Investigative Committee would have placed, was defined by ND only at the level of party cadres.

ND said that fortunately "no ministers are directly involved." According to the ND leader, only the premier is responsible but merely "for the poor selection of individuals."

The same was said by government spokesman Menios Koutsogiorgas, except that he used different words. He said that "if Soulis Apostolopoulos is guilty in the case of corn, he should be sent to the prosecutor" and the same should be done to everyone who abused the position entrusted to him by the government.

The same was said by PASOK in its "self criticism," and by the Executive Bureau and the Parliamentary Group. The argument was that the blame fell "on some cliques" which "went the wrong way."

So the 11-hour debate was limited to a description of the scandals as revealed by the newspapers and a desire to even the score by threatening a broadening of the investigation with hints that "you, too, did the same."

For example, ND regarded as a scandal the granting of a 250-million drachma loan to provincial editor Ath. Popotas to publish two newspapers in Athens, and asked what was done about the bank president who approved the loan without collateral, the government (M. Koutsogiorgas) replied with a question: "Why such sensitivity now and not when ND was in office. Zolotas approved loans to newspapers to the tune of 2,700 million drachmas." And that was the end (of the debate) since the minister to the premier, who was given the floor by M. Koutsogiorgas, did not speak when his turn came, only saying that it was already too late.

The Newspapers. Generally (on the scandals), and more specifically (on the newspapers), M. Koutsogiorgas said: "Let us have a committee to check all government procurement since 1974." D. Tsovolas said that he will "soon disclose the motives of three newspapers" which made a front-page issue the allegation that he was "attorney for those who were seeking to buy the Bank of Central Greece."

KKE, which was first to propose an Investigative Committee, "cunningly pulled out of it" by withdrawing and thus not "voting again" with the ND deputies. But while leaving Vouli, KKE uttered a significant truth. It said the debate "was turned into a bipartisan petty political feud." (In 10 hours of debate--1 hour was used up by voting--for 9 nine hours ministers and ND deputies took the floor one after the other.)

Of course, KKE, which apparently is not yet ready to join ND in joint parliamentary action, but which does not have either access to the government to have its own data on the scandals, stayed out of the debate which after all

referred to--and hurt--the bourgeois parties. Besides, as the KKE deputies left they repeated the statement that they had initially proposed an Investigative Committee to look into ND's past as well.

The Role of ND. What was, then, left beyond the longest debate of the last few years and the patient presence of so many deputies (266)? The 9 December debate showed that the issue of the scandals, at least until the judicial process has run its course, will be considered closed in a political sense but that the "scandal mongering" can go on in and out of Vouli.

The result of a tie between ND and PASOK is a fact. It is also a fact that the public believes "they covered up everything." But what more could ND do when it knew the government's refusal? It could ask for a date for the debate when the premier would not have "international" or other commitments. It could have started discussions over the constitutional question to make the government appear as though it avoided discussion and resorted to a misinterpretation of the constitution.

It could have openly raised an issue of "political responsibility," asking for implementation of the law on ministerial responsibility, at least on the question of the refineries. But ND has an advantage in having the scandal mongering go on and "without being responsible for it."

7520

CSO: 3521/54

RISING ND OFFICIAL REJECTS LABELS, VIEWS ND POLICY

Athens ENA in Greek 18 Dec 86 pp 43-48

[Article by Nik. Khatzinikolaou]

[Excerpts] Andonis Samaras is regarded as the youngest "aspirant leader" in the ND party. No wonder his assignment as the main spokesman for the party in the parliamentary debate on the budget gave vent to whispers and "ulterior" criticisms. He, himself, declares that he hates the "sport" of "leader-mongering," considers "unnatural" not to support the leader of his party, and says the time has come for forming a "shadow cabinet" by ND.

Samaras says "he has nothing to do with this political sport." But next he admits "he is not satisfied by his progress within the party because he has a lot to offer to the people, but he cannot do it." To our insistent question whether he wants to become the leader of the party, his answer is not categorical. "The question is not timely," he said, "because today ND is at the threshold of getting into office."

Andonis Samaras, the young ND main spokesman on the budget, responds in these words to those who question his parliamentary experience for this "parliamentary battle." "As an old deputy I have experience," he replied to our "loaded" question.

[Question] Mr. Samaras, is it true that when Mitsotakis recently assigned to you the party report on the budget, a lot of talk came up around your name? Many say you have leadership ambitions. That you are the youngest aspirant leader in the ND party. Is this true? Do you have leadership ambitions?

[Answer] I want to say clearly that I have no part in this political sport which is being played lately for obvious reasons. First, because I don't like it and second because it offers some artificial help to the tottering power of Mr. Papandreou. My aims, which you call ambitions, are identical with those of ND. My course is to be always, as I did in Kalamata, with the people, because the people are the only genuine source of political inspiration and action.

[Question] But it is a fact that within a very short time you rose a great deal within your party. How do you explain this?

[Answer] It does not matter whether I rose fast or not. What matters is that I am not yet satisfied, because when you feel you have so much to offer to a nation that expects and deserves so much, and you cannot do so, how can you be satisfied?

[Question] I will insist. Don't you want to become the leader of ND?

[Answer] Shall I repeat the answer I already gave? [Note that he considers the question untimely]

[Question] No, I will move to another question. ND has accustomed us to the habit of assigning the report on the budget to one of its old and experienced former ministers. Don't you think that at the age of 35 you are too young and possibly too inexperienced for such an assignment?

[Answer] I am young, but I have experience as a deputy. This coming year I will complete 10 years as a Vouli member. During those years I always had some special role in the debate on the budget. Of course, this is the first time I shoulder the great responsibility of presenting the key report of our party. The battle in Vouli the day after tomorrow on the budget will show whether your question is justified.

[Question] Who in your opinion is the better leader? Averof or Mitsotakis?

[Answer] (He laughs.) In politics you don't give grades like in school. What matters each time is the specific political action within a specific political context. Averof was the leader who brought about the revitalization of the party and led the counter attack when PASOK, surrounded by its myth, was building its partisan state.

Mitsotakis is the leader who with very intelligent moves, put together the new image of the party as one destined to govern. Now if you want to give grades anyway, give an "A" to both!

[Question] After what you said I wonder if you are now a Mitsotakis man?

[Answer] (Pause, and then...) Well, what should I be? Would it not be unnatural if I were not supporting the leader of my party? Therefore, it is only natural that I dislike this sport of party anthropogeography. The sport, in other words, of those who presumably kill each other under the same roof.

[Question] There were two other ND leaders before. I would like to have your views on them. How do you see Karamanlis? What is your position toward G. Rallis?

[Answer] Mr. Karamanlis has repeatedly asked all of us to leave him out of political talks. I respect his wishes. Nevertheless, even though he may be of his own accord removed from active politics, he has influence on the country's political affairs. Second, he has left the stamp of his long contribution to the country's development. Our precious European identity bears his signature, does it not?

With regard to Mr. Rallis as premier and as party leader, I believe he was not favored by political circumstances, the political climate at the time. But he fought with honor and with democratic ethos. Of course, what he is doing today is a personal choice of a former premier. But I believe that he, too, works so that ND will come back to office.

[Question] There is a lot of talk about the 11 deputies of the Democratic Renewal Party. Do you think they should be accepted back into ND? Should ND try a rapprochement?

[Answer] When the 11 left the party, they did not ask the people. I believe that to let them come back we must first ask our people. Our party should find a reliable method to check with the rank and file whether they want them back. Such a decision is an absolute right for the ND people.

[Question] I see a picture of [President] Kennedy in a prominent place in your office. Automatically we recall what has been written from time to time about your well-advertised relations with the Americans. I recall the visit to your house by Mrs. Ridgeway, which indeed impressed me. Is it true that Mrs. Ridgeway is often a dinner guest at your house when she is in Athens?

[Answer] If your question hints that there is some American preference to my person, then you are wrong. It was a purely social visit. I think it is time to stop seeing an American "finger" even in a dinner. With the Kennedy's I have an old friendship, especially with the newly elected Joe Kennedy. In any event, I want to say that, by conviction, I believe in open communication. I even speak with the Chinese.

I detest isolationism and I don't think we can have a one-sided foreign policy, determined by taboos and preconceived notions. Both the country and the people are better off when foreign leaders know more about Greek reality.

[Question] Let us move on to current political developments. What was the message of the municipal elections, in your view?

[Answer] As I told you before, the municipal elections brought ND to the threshold of power. I do not believe in labels, but I think the center Right forces in our country have registered a truly great rise and have great support among the people. The electoral result shows clearly that the people, first of all, sent a message to Andreas [Papandreou] that arrogance and

economic bad times do not fit the Greek people and, second, a message to ND that it must quickly prepare for office. Third, it proved that national reconciliation and political renewal are the two new visions which move the Greek people, especially the young.

[Question] How do you view a "shadow cabinet" with the participation of young and uncorrupted cadres?

[Answer] A shadow cabinet, a beneficial practice found in the most advanced Western democracies, would be a natural development in a climate such as we are discussing. This advanced practice of the opposition does not need artificial confrontations because it deals with exhaustive study of each problem. It values the exchange of logical political arguments, not confrontational tactics. Therefore, I would like something like that.

[Question] I will probably put you on the spot. Which one among the ND cadres has the public not noticed as much as they deserve and who should be included in the nucleus of such a shadow cabinet? What new personalities could be promoted as a visible expression of ND's renewal?

[Answer] Quite a few persons. Many deputies and cadres, especially from the provinces. They are capable and worthy cadres who constitute, separately and together, a gigantic pool from which the ND leader will have a hard time selecting either a shadow cabinet or tomorrow the real government of ND. There are also the cadres who will prove within the governmental machinery the view that cadres from the party base, with meritorious criteria, are capable of assuming key posts in tomorrow's governmental machinery.

7520

CSO: 3521/54

LEADERSHIP ACCUSED OF SELECTING WRONG OFFICIALS

Athens TO VIMA in Greek 1 Jan 87 p 13

[Excerpts] The great mistake of 1986 (and that of 1985, 1984, 1983, etc. ad infinitum and ad nauseam) is the use of unqualified individuals in important positions.

This mistake will continue to be repeated in 1987 (and in 1988, 1989, 1990, etc.) because no one dares to do otherwise.

When I speak about unqualified individuals, I do not mean that they do not have the talents or the knowledge. They do not have the guts to say "No!" to premiers, ministers, secretaries general, branch directors, union leaders, suppliers, voters, etc. They merely hang their heads and we are all going to hell!

"Olympic" has become an elephant, LARKO a cancerous tumor, DEI a nest of drones and its plants a coffee shop!

No one dares appoint other types of individuals because the basic prescription for the proper "one of ours" is not to have the previously mentioned attributes.

"He is not one of ours." "He is not cooperative," which means that he may say "No" to hiring, to favoritism, to cronyism ...

Unqualified!

If, however, he is "obliging" and is "one of ours," it does not matter whether he is illiterate, a blockhead, an idiot, a numbskull, a thief ...

Worthy! Worthy!

Thus, our national wealth is sold out by individuals who neither know nor are able.

We are talking about bravery, responsibility, righteousness, sensitivity and--what the hell!--for elementary honesty.

The strange thing is that these virtues usually go hand-in-hand with ability and knowledge because the able person has what it takes to be brave and upright. The unqualified's only "talents" are servility and arrogance.

These men (and their supervising ministers) today handle 60 percent of our national income and they influence (banks, for instance) the remaining 40 percent. They create enormous deficits, they abolish productive systems, they multiply the dependence of the country!

They are the ones who have caused the public sector to turn into public enemy number one!

They are mostly responsible for our economic (and social) plight. They are the reason why, at a time of international prosperity, we are sinking.

The Greek public sector has not produced a single good manager. A Georges Besse or a John Egan. On the contrary, it has germinated some of the strangest flowers that have ever grown in the international business garden.

It is not the fault of individuals--someone selected them, someone who wanted obedient little men and unqualified sychophants around (perhaps to cover up their own ineptitudes). And, of course, individuals who were irreproachable by party standards, but reprehensible in everything else.

We are looking for able, responsible and brave men! Because now, in the state we are in, the foremost virtue we need is courage.

Find them, triple their salaries, give them plenty of power and let them do their job!

Can our leadership, however, stand such men? Or, will it repeat in 1987 (and in 1988, 1989, 1990) the big mistake of 1986 (1985, 1984 and 1983)?

9731
CSO: 3521/49

MAKNO SURVEY SHOWS GROWING PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR CRAXI

Rome AVANTI! in Italian 12-13 Oct 86 p 3

[Text] The most interesting finding to emerge from the 16th Mondo-Makno survey for the weekly OSSERVATORIO will be available tomorrow at the newsstands: it indicates measurable growth in the Socialist Party. Only 6 months ago, in the earlier editions of the little magazine, Italians exhibited strong support for the current government, the five-party coalition, and, above all, for the current Prime Minister Bettino Craxi. Most respondents (42.5 percent) thought him best suited to head the government, while Giulio Andreotti, who came in second, garnered only 21 percent. The Socialist Party, though, were elections to be held today, would get only 13.6 percent, right where it stood in the regional elections in 1985. This time, though, the personal popularity of Bettino Craxi, which prevailed despite a slight decline (now at 39.8 percent), seems to be certain to rub off on the party, which the survey rates at 15.7 percent.

Again according to the Makno survey, the DC stands to get 35.3 percent of the vote, thus holding its own again (it got 35 percent in the 1985 regional elections), while the PCI will continue to drop votes by a margin of 29.7 percent to 30.2 percent that voted for it in 1985. It predicts a slight decline for the Republicans to 3.7 percent (-0.3), while the Social Democrats (PSDI) would be seriously bloodied, fading from a 3.6-percent share of the vote in the 1985 regional vote to a mere 2 percent. The Liberals, though, are dropping, both with reference to the 85 percent and to the May predictions from Makno.

Among the governmental coalitions deemed likeliest to find sound solutions to the country's problems, the broadest consensus favors the present five-party coalition led by the Socialists (27.2 percent), while the same coalition with the Christian Democrats leading it finds favor with 11.5 percent. It is worth noting that the idea of a government made up of expert technicians which in earlier elections had garnered 13.2 percent, has risen to 15.4 percent in the public's favor, while a left-wing (PCI-PSI) coalition has dwindled from 16.1 percent to 13.9 percent.

Forty percent of Italian voters believe it unlikely, at least, if

not utterly impossible, for the relay race to Palazzo Chigi scheduled for March, in the hope of replacing Bettino Carxi with a Christian Democrat potentate, could be consummed without bloodshed. Only 32 percent of respondents would admit even a remote likelihood of such an outcome, while 27 percent expressed no opinion.

However, should relations among the governing parties begin to sour, 52 percent of voters feel that those in office should bend every effort to reach a compromise, thereby averting early elections, while some 27 percent favor them, and 27 percent either had no opinion or refused to disclose one. If, in the event, early national elections were to be held, the Socialist Party would stand to gain considerably at the polls—to the tune of 15 percent—at the expense of the Communists and Social Democrats.

Among political leaders, according to the MONDO/Makno survey, the man on the way up will be Foreign Minister Giulio Andreotti, whose standing with the electorate has risen from 20.9 percent to 26.5 percent of the people who want him to be top man in the government. Downward bound is Spadolini, counting 11.5 percent now as opposed to his earlier expectations of 14.4 percent. So is Alessandro Natta, with 11.3 percent as against his anticipated 11.9 percent, but still considerably better off than DC Secretary De Mita, who has plummeted from 14.3 percent to 12.9 percent of voters willing to express a preference.

6182

CS0: 3528/35

PSI'S MARTELLI OUTLINES THEMES OF FUTURE CONGRESS

Rome IL TEMPO in Italian 20 Oct 86 pp 1,2

[Interview of Claudio Martelli, deputy secretary of the PSI, by Giuseppe Crescimbeni, "One Lap Run More To Go"; date and place not specified]

[Text] Will there be a referendum on institutions as well?

We all know that Claudio Martelli is the driving force behind the partisan movement in the PSI, and it is believed that the Youthful PSI deputy secretary will be the interpreter and exegete of the party line at the forthcoming Socialist Party Congress. Is it true that Claudio dare not take a single step without Bettino's approval, or isn't it? Movement's the word, then; with aerobic exercise and even a short course in political muscle-building. Today a "front" opens here and tomorrow there will be another there: nuclear power, judges, schools, religion today and local governments tomorrow. What emerges is the impression of a PCI trying to capture an extra dash of imagination and aggressiveness, poised to pounce on issues that fire the public sentiment, with a lustful eye on the left, partly out of need for a dialogue and partly to do a little fishing in the PCI's territorial waters. And, of course, ever available to find and touch any sensitive nerve-ends in the "serene force," meaning the DC. And at the very start of this political interview, Martelli heaves another sizable brick into the political swamp: his suggestion of a national referendum on our republican institutions. Are there people who want an institutional referendum to reform our Republican institutions?

[Question] Are we to expect the opening of a new front, if not another "sound and light show"?

[Answer] There are a lot of fronts already and some of the goals we have already announced call for an all-out commitment. From the implementation of the government agreements, those on the justice package, to the environmentalist and ecological initiative, to the modernization of the Italian public school system, to relations so various and so intense that must be consolidated with other political forces, beginning with those closest to us and more congenial toward institutional reform, despite all the balking and rearing and all the pushing and shoving cannot shift either side a single inch from its stand.

[Question] And then there is the PSI congress to plan and to promote in a debate which, fortunately, will not be purely internal

and this will allow us to talk about issues with the whole spectrum of public opinion. We are not afraid to expose ourselves to opinion and criticism; we are a strong party, and we are used to that. When there is no prejudicial hostility, all this is a great help: it helps us identify and support good ideas, to correct doubtful ones, and to get rid of the out-dated ones.

[Question] The Turin congress was creative, while the one in Verona was more of a celebration than anything else. What will the next one be like? Some observers think it will focus mainly on the elections.

[Answer] It will be a fine congress, the kind we socialists know how to run: political and creative. It will be everything, except a congress that is over before it even begins. You'll see: there will be long lines at the doors and great things to see and hear inside.

[Question] Meanwhile, numerous symptoms would indicate that the long flight to election day has already begun. Is this an optical illusion, or are you taking a real risk in pushing for early elections? And in either case, what will the PSI's electoral strategy look like?

[Answer] I was once scolded for making too many plans at my desk. I am not doing that so much any more. Be that as it may, that desk plan for Craxi's return to the leadership of the PSI next March has become the common reference point for the governing alliance and for Italian politics. The political election campaign—not the organizational one—will, de facto, force it upon the March congress. I really don't think there were be anybody falling out of line. On the contrary, the solidarity of a decade of democratic struggle, of Socialist battles won and political victories on record will be the best foundation for a wide-open congress, strong and ready to renew hopes, and to welcome new programs, new people, and new ideas.

[Question] You said that in recent years there has been a real center-left. Also, you believe, as does the left wing of the PSI, that a 5-party coalition headed by the DC would be tantamount to a shift to the right, rather than a routine change of watch?

[Answer] I am not an expert in routine administration, because I don't think about it—much less think about it ahead of time. What interests me is Socialist politics and this extraordinary experience of governing. What comes afterwards is yet to be seen, and Craxi will be the one to manage a political transition that will be anything but an easy, foregone conclusion.

[Question] Word has it that all the Socialists' heavy guns will be joining Craxi's debarkation from government to devote himself to the party, and that either you or Formica will move into Palazzo Chigi to head a "national" PSI made up of entirely new faces, a kind of "under-forty" team.

[Answer] New faces are our passion, both for the government and for the Party. I say so even though I don't think that all the familiar faces still in circulation are tired old men who ought to be put out to pasture.

[Question] What is going to happen after the "first lap" given the fact that the changing of the guard at Palazzo Chigi is a foregone conclusion? A propos, there are jokes making the rounds in terms of the ides of March. And there are those who jest about the chances that this time it might be Brutus, and not Caesar, who gets stabbed.

[Answer] The comparison is invalid. I stand with Caesar and his party, which was the Roman democratic party. Brutus was a patriot like Caesar, and loyal to him, but he belonged to the senatorial party, to oligarchic Rome, opposed to Caesar's program of democratization and modernization, and to the personal power that program demanded. Therefore, if your Brutus—if there is one, you must seek outside the PSI—maybe among your fair-weather allies.

We Want to Change Whatever Needs to be Changed.

[Question] To tell the truth, there is some misunderstanding here. The Brutus in the jokes might not be you, or other members of the family, nor is it necessarily certain that the Caesar this March will be Craxi. You must have read an interview in which Andreotti pointed out that his name is Julius, and not Caesar, and that in any event he will be on his guard. But let's move on a little. You described a PCI as a party devoted to struggle and to government, and in fact that say that while Craxi governs, Martelli will do the struggling. In so doing, would he not risk losing his credibility? And might not it all be struggle all the way from March on?

[Answer] That's a strange idea. Other things have damaged our credibility. Struggles joined in a good cause and conducted by fair means beget credibility: they do not destroy it. And after March it will be just the same, or even more so.

[Question] How do you plan to deal with the problem of piling up public consensus on behalf of the first Socialist prime minister?

[Answer] We'll do it meanwhile by consolidating the consensus we already have with our performance over the next 20 months, explaining over and over again the things we have not been able to accomplish, and how that came about... expanding and enhancing initiatives and bright new ideas—there are so many of them—that have surfaced from the early days right up to the present. We shall build up Craxi's international standing. We'll do it by crafting a political platform and an area of understanding far broader than the PSI itself, by improving the action we take and the fruits of all such Party action. We'll do it by changing whatever needs to be changed.

[Question] There are those who maintain that the grandiose Midas plan has not come to pass. The PSI is locked into the 12 percent commitment, and now seems ready to abandon the goal of a split in the center to induce shifts and pendular swings, yielding, on the way, to the temptation to do a little fishing outside the PCI's waters.

[Answer] The grand Midas project was designed for survival. I am not joking. At first, it was seen as a way to revitalize the PSI after a decade of political crises, schisms, identity loss, and stagnation at the polls. And, at least until 1980, this effort was destined, first of all, to concentrate on dealing with strong internal resistance. The Socialist crisis is over now, though, we have a genuine center-stage role to play, and we are already building new bridges toward the future. That future, which will not depend solely upon us, is a major reform of our institutions and a vast socialist force or alignment, democratic, liberal, and libertarian. That is our project, and it is the Midas project, and as soon as we have it in place we can not merely survive: we can even "philosophize."

[Question] But in the meantime, you are going to have to amass consensus, Tell us: where do you plan to cast your nets?

[Answer] The votes will come from all quarters, but for the leading party of the Italian Left and its potential as teacher, modernizer, and governor: the votes will come from the young and from the Left, or there will not be many. And we shall seek those votes without promising a leftist alternative if there is none, but rather by underscoring what we have done for possible progress and for necessary changes, in short, for a major experience that was sound and effective, and for a project that is already a process of change and of evolution.

[Question] Intellectuals believed to be close to the PSI are beginning to live ammunition against you, and you respond by calling them reactionaries, authoritarians, and intolerant bigots. Is this a replay of the traditional battles with the "unlovables"?

[Answer] We are the up-to-date party, not the intellectual party. The intellectuals are no longer in the vanguard of the country. And in the ranks of the intellectuals, there will always be what Biagi calls "unlovable socialists." But, as you can see, they, too, are prone to change their views fairly often, and even to alter their cultural identities. These days, the intellectuals on the left are performing fewer exorcisms before Craxi and the Socialists. Will that last? I don't know. Others, though, who have vaguely supported the new Socialist direction, were among those looking down the gun-barrels at Sigonella, are veterans of the referendum on the courts, and of the anti-nuclear stand. Some of us did not like the proposals for liberalizing and modernizing the school system; and there will be others still, tomorrow, who

will be protesting against the plan to professionalize the Army, and the idea of the heavy lira or the proposal to reduce the number of communes. That is why there is no point in taking issue with them. As Arbasino once wrote, "Among intellectuals, as among the revellers at carnival, anything goes."

[Question] Well, then, let's play around a little. Have you ever had occasion to admit that...well, yes, maybe that old DC has given Craxi a helping hand?

[Answer: Yes, many times, at least as often as I have thought about the times we have given the DC a helping hand.

[Question] And yet it seems that on the matter of local governments the state has pulled back a bit. Are you by any chance (take the Province of Milan) getting ready to abolish some of them to thwart De Mita's triple-play (taking the Quirinale, Palazzo Chigi, and the local governments), or maybe to offer the PCI a carrot or two?

[Answer] It doesn't look that way to me. Others may be collecting new and dubious alliances in local government in the name of some unspecified national experiment. We react whenever the administrative situation and political balances become insupportable.

[Question] And that brings us to the referendum. People are wondering whether or not the referendum would be tantamount to abjuring politics and policy-making, and therefore a way of robbing every party of its legitimacy?

[Answer] Actually, the parties were frequently the ones to call for a referendum. And the referenda were a challenge to Parliament, rather than alternatives for citizens. I repeat, they are an irreplaceable reserve of direct democracy.

Nuclear Power Campaign was the Right One

[Question] You referred to the PSI as a "party of modernists." And accordingly you consider parliamentary democracy to be an archaic throwback?

[Answer] I did not say that it is an archaism per se. I said that there are too many outdated rules, procedures, and privileges (secret ballots, interminable speeches. Double and triple readings, and no orderly planning, no agenda for what Parliament must deal with). And I believe that we must guarantee stability and the possibility of democratic institutional renovation. Like Pertini, Craxi has done wonders; we need to make the exceptions into rules, into institutional possibilities. Since nobody wants to tamper with the constitution, either with time limits on speeches or with majority or one-party systems, if, in short, we truly cannot get

along without this kind of politico-parliamentary representation, let us at least make public consensus our guide for the republic and for the government. Let's vote with universal suffrage, in two distinct elections: one for Parliament and one for the President of the Republic or for the head of government.

[Question] And here we are at the burning question of nuclear power. You laughed when I mentioned the fact that people are talking about you as a naked savage dancing around the cauldron. But isn't there the chance of a return to tenderness toward the "gentle savage"? The question put to you now is this: Can you really opt out of a whole technological era?

Challenges, abuse, unsolicited instructions in occidentalism, a few strokes of the rod on the fingers from Solons and soloists, calls for heads to roll (mine among them)—none of this has even minimally interfered with the wide-ranging, no-holds-barred debate, on the very eve of the national conference on energy—on nuclear power: the issue if nuclear power in Italy is no longer a matter for secret discussion in the seats of power, but has spread and been enriched by the active involvement, thanks to the media, of millions of citizens. Thanks to television and the newspapers, everybody has learned more, and political parties, movements, and experts have spoken, clarified, documented, and offered orientation and, in the process, found it for themselves. And we have only just begun. The PSI can claim credit for this campaign of information and clarification, and will continue to conduct it responsibly and rationally. The PSI can claim credit for having motivated all concerned—citizens, parties, and public opinion in general—to awake again to the problem, to its real proportions, to the possible alternatives, to the energy, economic, and ecological aspects, and to its prevalent international dimension: Let them say what they will: one day that accuse us of mysticism, next day of cynicism, and another of utopianism. All the Socialists have done is simply to make policy, to mount a contemporary democratic action according to contemporary standards on an international issue of the utmost interest, and they have done it while maintaining close ties with the progressive political forces.

[Question] And now you are moving into education, which is under heavy fire from Socialist artillery.

[Answer] I spent more than 20 years of my life in the schools, in the Italian school system, public and private, and in schools abroad as teaching assistant, as student, and as teacher. I am no longer so concerned with our backwardness as I am with the relative deterioration of education from the standards of 20 and 30 years ago. I am concerned by the massive brain-drain—witness the hundreds of thousands of children of poor families, particularly in the south, that the schools abandon every year, and the brain-drain of thousands of skilled research people, including our best, who go abroad and, not infrequently, settle abroad for good. I am

concerned about the backwardness of the programs, by the fact that our schools start teaching children so late—later than any other country—at age 6, and that they let them go so early—at 14, which means that Italian children stay in school fewer weeks per year than those of any of their European counterparts. They are also given less individual attention and guidance. I am concerned by the fact that thousands of excellent Italian teachers in the public schools are frustrated and disillusioned by the beurocracy by the lack of collegiality, and, I hope, they are at least as disillusioned by the union leaders who have incorporated them, opting for the low-wage/low-responsibility trade-off rather than recognition for full-time assignments and adequate salaries. Most importantly, the one who is hurt worst, economically speaking, is the best teacher or the one who is totally dedicated to his profession.

[Question] And now we have a resurgence in the polemics over the hour of religious instruction.

[Answer] The dispute over the hour of religious instruction concerns me less than all the foregoing, not more. The only thing I would not like to see would be the spectacle of Craxi's fine record belittled by a management that would identify his sole significant reform as the extension of instruction in the Catholic catechism in the government-run nursery-schools. The education system, as well as the justice system and nuclear power, are all issues on which we must have the courage to turn over a new leaf.

[Question] Justice: there's another explosive issue. What possible solution is there?

[Answer] We have launched a public opinion campaign on reform of obsolete, unfair, and ineffectual legislation and implementation. It is based on two principles that are fundamental to justice, and it is on these that we have taken our stand: justice as equity, as fair justice, as justice in a free and modern country: the principle that says that the law applies equally to all, and the corollary that every power (especially the legal power to invoke the legal use of force must be balanced by an equal responsibility, and than any derogation be punished forthwith. We have mobilized and enobled the party in a referendum campaign, together with the Radicals, Liberals, and Social Democrats, and thousands and thousands of citizens behind a just cause and a battle that has yet to be won, even though Tortora and 114 innocent citizens wrongfully arrested have been freed. Riding the crest of the referendum, Justice has taken her seat at the top of the parliamentary and governmental agenda. The potential conflict over the referenda among the various majority parties can be resolved only by one of two means: either through general reforms such as those proposed by Craxi and set forth in the agreements that ended the July crisis, or via a referendum. If we prefer to follow the first route, I should suggest adopting choosing Cossiga's platform. On the authority of his undisputed independence and experience, the President has concentrated his message on the joint chambers, and spelled out in excellent synthesis an ideal basis for reform of the judicial system: protection of rights, equality before the

judges chosen for their impartiality and, accordingly, altogether independent. And then, speaking to journalists about the need for and opportunity for judicial reform, he urged them to pluck up the courage to turn the page and move on. The discussion, albeit still beset with ingrained mindsets and encrusted comfortable old habits, is now under way in all institutional quarters. Discussions have started among the magistrates as well. Here again, the credit belongs to the PSI, particularly the PSI, precisely because it is the party in government that dared challenge the movement in order to bring about reform.

[Question] It still looks fairly wide open to any number of outcomes...

[Answer] The crucial point, and the point that will determine whether or not there is a referendum, is only one aspect, admittedly a delicate one, of the three issues raised by the referendum. But general reforms in the direction Craxi pointed out in his statements to Parliament and in the same stipulations made after the meeting with the magistrates, are, as I see it, a sort of pocket guidebook to the justice reforms Cossiga developed.

[Question] Let's get back to pure politics. Relations with the PCI and abjuration. They say: Natta asked you to repudiate the five-party coalition, and you retorted with a reminder of Hungary. And the communists suspect that the PSI really wants to deny the PCI's readiness and maturity as a party to government so as to keep it, so to speak, as a minor ward.

[Answer] The fact of the matter is that socialist policy of recent years, Craxi's policies, and those of a party that claims only 12 percent of the vote, has given Italy the best and most long-lived government in the history of the Republic, with the help of allies, the voters, and a little bit of luck. Stalinism, though, shares with Nazism the 20th-century prize for political criminality, beginning with mass slaughters, committed by the state and the party. What is it that we want to confront? What would be the point? Unfortunately, the PCI lets slip the historic occasions offered it, refuses to practice simple courtesy, the easy appearance of openness, because its policy is not rooted in principle. A genuine Copernican revolution was expected here. It never materialized. I do not expect it either from Natta or from Pajetta, Can I expect it from Occhetto and Petruccioli? From Terzi, from Pizzinato? From the mayor of Bologna or from those we have just elected or from those we shall never again elect?

[Question] It would seem, though, that the long season of non-communication with the PRI is drawing to an end. Spadolini takes a brighter view of you, and as for Visentini (you once fingered him as the leader of the new right) there seems to be a budding sympathy on your part.

[ANSWER] Well, one is never alone in political clashes; when they occur, it is wise to reread what Visentini said about Craxi and the socialists. Our cohabitation has grown easier and the joint battles over fiscal equality have opened the way to more than one venture into dialogue. As for Spadolini, he has pluses and minuses in our view, not toward us, but toward a policy. Perhaps better understanding will emerge from identifying the compatibilities in our intentions, which are not at all few in number, and from circumscribing the differences that cannot be overlooked for historical reasons, for reasons of timeliness, and for reasons of character.

6182

CSO: 3528/35

OPINION POLL SHOWS CRAXI IN DECLINE, ANDREOTTI ON RISE

Rome L'ESPRESSO in Italian 16 Nov 86 pp 6-9

[Article by Guido Quaranta: "False Steps"]

[Text] POLL: Italians reject the relay-race government. The third reading "political barometer" devised by the GPF for L'ESPRESSO every 4 months shows these results: Craxi is liked less, Andreotti is liked better, and no one likes the changing of the guard decided on by the parties without consulting Parliament.

Bettino Craxi is less liked all at once. Italians still think that he is more likable than Spadolini, De Mita, Natta, Cossiga, and even Pertini, but for some months now they have considered him not to be not as energetic as he was at first. Long considered to be the most popular personage in recent years, the socialist president of the Council is beginning to lose the charisma he once had. Now the Christian Democrat minister of foreign affairs, the untarnishable Giulio Andreotti, is the one who is emerging, or rather re-emerging. He is the one, the man destined to replace Craxi next spring, on the basis of an agreement dubbed "relay race" which was decided on last summer and which Italians are rejecting without reservation.

These are the most significant of the latest readings of the barometer of Italian politics which L'ESPRESSO set up at the beginning of this year, when, as many will remember, it commissioned a polling organization in Milan (GPF and Associates, headed by Professor Giampaolo Fabris) to sound out the country's mood every 4 months. The first study, conducted in February with a representative sample of the electorate (1,030 persons 18 to 64 years of age residing in 126 communes), gave Craxi a high popularity index. The second, done in June according to the same criteria, confirmed him as being a leader whose star was rising. The third, carried out last month by interviewing 1,084 persons in 94 communes, showed a reversal of this trend.

However, the surprising drop in Bettino Craxi's personal popularity and the impending resurrection of Giulio Andreotti are not the only interesting items in this new statistical study, which is an especially significant one because it was conducted after the formation of the second Socialist-led government and with the changing of the guard at Chigi Palace in prospect.


The majority of those interviewed (citizens of varied social origins, educational levels, and political activities and leanings) view the situation with greater pessimism, all at once have less confidence in the government now in charge, and show increasing intolerance for party maneuvers, and particularly the last one known as the "relay race" with its vaguely athletic connotation.

But specifically what is the people's state of mind? How has the mood of the public changed between February and the present? What are its new worries, desires, and suggestions? Let's see.

Number of Pessimists Grows

The October barometer showed above all a clear-cut turnaround in assessment of the political situation. In February, 16 percent of those polled felt it to be better than last year. In June this figure jumped to 40 and now has dropped to 29 percent. While 9 months ago 38 percent considered the political situation to be worse, this figure subsequently dropped to 22 and is now at 31 percent.

This sudden wave of pessimism does not seem to stem from worsening of the Italian's economic situation. In fact, 79 percent of those polled say that their situation is just as good as, if not better than, it was a year ago. Only the elderly, women, the less well educated, residents of the South Central region, and especially supporters of the Social Movement maintain that things are worse now. What, then, can explain this pessimism?



CRAXI

(1)	Simpatico	15%
(2)	Affidabile	18%
(3)	Volenteroso	20%
(4)	Preparato	17%
(5)	MEDIA	17,5%
(6)	Giugno '86	17%
(7)	Febbraio '86	14%



A. DE OTT


Simpatico	15%
Affidabile	11%
Volenteroso	7%
Preparato	5%
MEDIA	14%
Giugno '86	12%
Febbraio '86	10%



SPAROLINI

Simpatico	8%
Affidabile	6%
Volenteroso	6%
Preparato	7%
MEDIA	7%
Giugno '86	6,5%
Febbraio '86	7%


Bettino Craxi resta il più popolare tra i "magnifici sette" della politica italiana, ma perde consensi rispetto al giugno scorso. Nei giudizi — che riguardano simpatia, affidabilità, volontà e preparazione — perde circa due punti percentuali, gli stessi che invece guadagna Andreotti. Migliora anche l'immagine di Spadolini, peggiora quella di Pertini e De Mita, restano stabili Cossiga e Natta.



Bettino Craxi remains the most popular of the "magnificent seven" of Italian politics, but his popularity has waned since June. He has lost about 2 percentage points, the same number gained by Andreotti in the rankings, which are determined on the basis of likability, trustworthiness, industriousness, and preparedness. Spadolini's image has also improved, while that of Pertini and De Mita has worsened and that of Cossiga and Natta remains stable.

Key:

- 1. Likable
- 2. Trustworthy
- 3. Energetic
- 4. Well prepared
- 5. AVERAGE
- 6. June
- 7. February



This is how Italians perceive the current situation relative to that a year ago. The "beautiful balance" of June has now been upset.

Key:

- | | |
|-------------------------------------|-------------|
| 1. Better or worse than a year ago? | 4. Worse |
| 2. Same | 5. February |
| 3. Better | 6. June |
| | 7. October |

As the survey makes clear, the fact is that the public seems to be increasingly dissatisfied with the political system dominated by the parties. In February, in those who wanted change through suitable reform amounted to 21 percent. In June this figure dropped to 19 but now has suddenly shot up to 28 percent. Another telling bit of evidence is that 57 percent of Italians think it "scandalous" for succession to chairmanship of the Council of Ministers to be decided by the secretaries of the parties among themselves without consulting Parliament, as happened during the last government crisis when the Christian Democratic Party left Craxi in Chigi Palace with the intention of replacing him next spring.

Less Efficient Government

The increasingly discredited reform of the political system is not the only problem which the public believes should be faced immediately and with resolution. While the percentage of those who deplore inflation or complain of the high cost of living has been dropping for several months, greater numbers of persons are in fact demanding housing, jobs, fairer pensions, a

more efficient medical service, and schools in step with the times. In short, the public feels that the second socialist-led government, formed in August, is doing very little to change things.

In February, 40 percent of Italians stated that the Craxi government was better than all those that had preceded it. By June, this figure had jumped to 57, and now has dropped to 49 percent. In January, 24 percent gave the activities of the executive branch a negative rating. By June, this percentage had dropped to 17 and now has gone back up to 21 percent. By this autumn, the idyllic relationship that had been established between the Italians and their government has thus cooled off.

Five-Party Coalition in Danger


The assessment of the current government formula is also becoming chillier. Many Italians this last summer spoke of the five-party arrangement as a suitable majority. Now a growing number of people would like to have a different set-up, and while the most dedicated supporters of the five-party coalition are those who declare their sympathy for the Christian Democrats, the most lukewarm supporters are those favoring the Socialists. This is an obvious sign that the coalition is creaking and is in danger of breaking up for good. The alternative which the discontented consider to be more attractive is nevertheless still uncertain. The only consistent signal, in comparison to the situation in June, is the increase in the number of citizens who long for return to a national unity coalition, that is, one made up of all the parties, with the exception of the Italian Social Movement.

PROMISES AND RESULTS

When he presented his government to the houses of parliament in August 1983, Bettino Craxi stressed four priority areas of action: the economy, social policies, institutions, crime, and justice. Now, 3 years and 3 months later, we see what has been accomplished and what has remained a dead letter.

The Economy

There were two stated objectives, reducing the deficit and defeating inflation. The deficit was to be reduced from 16 percent of the gross national product at that time to 10 percent. Inflation was to have been lowered progressively from 14.6 percent at the time to 5 percent in 1986. Reduction of the deficit and lowering of inflation were to lead ultimately to creation of new jobs, primarily for young people and in the South.



The five-party formula is holding up, but just as many of those polled feel that there should be another majority.

Key:

- | | |
|------------------------------------|----------------|
| 1. Confrontation of two majorities | 4. February 86 |
| 2. Should be another majority | 5. June 86 |
| 3. Current majority adequate | 6. October 86 |

The war with inflation has been won, thanks to lowering of the cost-of-living index and the decrease in petroleum prices. The deficit has leveled off at 12 percent of the gross national product, 2 points higher than anticipated. However, the new law on the south, the labor training contracts, and the business recovery process have not had a favorable impact on employment. Unemployment rose from 9.8 percent in 1983 to 11.4 percent in 1986.

Justice

The justice administration reform project was one of the most ambitious ones: war on organized crime, reform of the penal process, reduction of the number of prisoners by speeding up legal proceedings, and assignment of disciplinary responsibility to magistrates.

The penal procedure code was approved only by the Chamber of Deputies; preventive detention was first reduced and then extended; prison reform was instituted; and in the southern regions organized crime is an independent power.

Institutional Reforms

These reforms were pointed to as one of the central undertakings of the 9th Legislature. Reorganization of the chairmanship of the Council of Ministers, restrictions on secret balloting by the Chamber of Deputies, cautious use of decree laws, passage of the finance law before the end of the year,

and reform of local exercise of power in 1985 were to have paved the way for a higher degree of governability.

After more than 3 years, the law on chairmanship of the Council has been discharged only by the Chamber of Deputies. Parliamentary regulations remain as they were before, and the chambers are engaged primarily in discussion of decree laws. The legislative journey followed by reform of local exercise of power has not yet ended. Early approval of the finance law has been enacted.

Social Programs

Government commitments called for reform of the National Social Security Institute by raising the retirement age, separation of social security and welfare in the farm sector, and revision of disability pensions. The purpose was to reduce the growing public deficit. Approval of a national medical plan and provision of managerial bodies for the USL were to have guaranteed more efficient health protection. Fair rent reform was to have relaxed tensions in the rental situation.

The 1986-1988 medical plan has been approved, and new vouchers have been introduced, but the USL have remained as they were, and then there is the series of scandals that has rocked the southern regions. Every pension reform project worked out by labor minister Gianni De Michelis has been blocked, sometimes by opposition from the trade unions and at others by clashes among the government partners. The fair rent reform is in the draft stage, and it has been necessary in the meantime to resort to blocking evictions in the large cities.


Spadolini Rises and De Mita Declines

Now we come to rating of the politicians. A large number of those polled continue to consider Craxi to be "the best," keeping him in first place for the third time in a year. At the same time, the number of fans of Giulio Andreotti is increasing. He remains in second place, but the gap is narrowing. Many people believe that the foreign minister is as likable as the chairman of the Council, and a large number also consider him to be even better prepared.

There are not too many new persons giving a high rating to the holder of the defense portfolio, Giovanni Spadolini, who has thus come to occupy the third place that had been held by the socialist ex-president, Sandro Pertini, for 4 months in a row. This was a period of high popularity now constantly ebbing, putting Pertini in fourth place.

While the public is forgetting the virtues of father figure Sandro, there have not been many supporters of his successor in the Quirinale Palace. This is clear proof that the new president, Francesco Cossiga, is finding it difficult to capture the public's fancy. And indeed, he remains locked in the fifth place he had previously held.

So, too, the supporters of the communist secretary, Alessandro Natta, show no signs of increasing in number. In February they numbered 2 percent and so they have remained. The followers of the Christian Democratic leader, Ciriaco de Mita, on the other hand, are falling away; the 3.5 percent approval he received 5 months ago has dwindled to 2. One curious detail: a great many Italians show greater liking for another Christian Democrat, treasury minister Giovanni Gorla, who is considered to be a person "well prepared" and "congenial."




But what possible alternative formulas are there for the 5-party coalition? Preferences are for a national unity government.

Key:

- | | |
|----------------------------|------------------|
| 1. Why not national unity? | 5. Center-Left |
| 2. Left-wing government | 6. February 1986 |
| 3. National unity | 7. June 1986 |
| 4. Secular government | 8. October 1986 |

On the other hand, there is no very great variation in the returns on the other political figures involved. Only 3 percent of those polled still consider radical leader Marco Pannella to be "energetic." Barely 1 percent consider the Christian Democratic president of the senate, Amintore Fanfani, to be "trustworthy." And no one has expressed an opinion on the likability of the Christian Democratic deputy chairman of the Council, Arnaldo Forlani, already held in very low esteem (1 percent). In contrast, quite a large number, all of them with Social Democratic leanings, say that


they appreciate the "congeniality" of the Socialist deputy secretary, Claudio Martelli.



The question was couched in these terms: "There are sharp contrasts among the parties making up the government. Which party is the most to blame?"

Key:

1. Blame for the quarrels
2. All of them




The persons polled were shown a slate of possible candidates to succeed Craxi. Andreotti received the most votes.

Key:

1. When Bettino leaves.

Socialist Party Successful, Christian Democrats Rejected

What is the public's opinion of the parties? There are surprises here too. The majority of Italians believe that the Socialist Party has behaved better than all the others in recent months and that the Christian Democratic Party has shown itself to be worse. The Socialist Party is probably still



Who has behaved better in recent months? The Christian Democrats are sputtering, the Italian Socialist Party is improving, and the Communists have remained more or less the same.

- Key:
- 1. Report card for the last 4 months
 - 2. February 1986
 - 3. June 1986
 - 4. October 1986

enjoying the benefits of the "Craxi effect" now waning away and has been kindly absolved of the proverbial charge of wanting to have its cake and eat it too. The Christian Democrats are paying for their request for the

"relay race" that evoked the disapproval of Italians and are suffering from the endless bickering of its ministers.

Appreciation of the Italian Communist Party remains stable, a sign that in recent months it has appeared to be neither more attractive nor more disappointing than last summer. The signs of approval for the Republicans, the Italian Social Movement, and the Greens have remained just as stable. On the other hand, there is some greater liking for the Liberals and the Social Democrats, probably due to the new direction given to the former by new secretary Renato Altissimo and to the efforts which Franco Nicolazzi, leader of the Social Democratic Party, has been exerting to make people forget Pietro Longo, his controversial predecessor. And finally, while no one pays a bit of attention to the Proletarian Democratic Party, there is slightly more interest in the Radical Party, but this interest has almost certainly been aroused by the announcement of its holocaust bruited about a few months ago.

The Best Liked Premiers

One final indication provided by the survey is given by the names of the best liked non-socialist candidates to succeed Craxi. The majority is definitely in favor of Giulio Andreotti. Many long both for the return of Spadolini and the debut of a very young man, minister Gorla. Few give any thought to De Mita; the Communists flatly reject him. A considerable number of persons have expressed a preference for ex-president Forlani, the venerable Fanfani, Altissimo, and the Republican finance minister, Bruno Visentini. Only two out of every hundred Italians have named Nicolazzi.

In conclusion, the needle of the October "barometer" has dipped downward and points to "stormy weather" after the "fair weather" registered in June. It is difficult to say whether this indicates a passing squall or is the first hint of a true change of seasons. In any event, it promises that the winter will not be a peaceful one.

6115

CSO: 3528/42

PCI'S OCCHETTO SPEAKS ON NEED FOR NEW POLICY

Rome LA REPUBBLICA in Italian 17 Oct 86 p 8

[Text] On Via Botteghe Oscure they are making a fresh start. The tocsin has sounded out along the fringes of the party, summoning regional leaders to a more intensive phase of politics, fueled by the push for a "new phase in political mobilization." On the heels of an unheralded announcement two months ago by Achille Occhetto, the PCI's autumn offensive launched its offensive yesterday at a meeting of regional secretaries and top officials in the major cities, with Natta himself in attendance.

Underlying this unexpected switch are several motives: there was, first of all, the sneaky feeling (partly in response to the more aggressive postures of other parties, both on the fringes and in government) that the PCI's image was, on the whole, fairly "static"; the need to respond to critical stimuli coming from several directions; the urgent necessity to mount a broad-scale political action to project a better image of the party toward the electorate. (Perhaps with an eye on the latest opinion surveys which, albeit merely indicative, were showing a 1-point drop in the party's share of the votes).

For all these reasons, and others, the PCI has started work on a very sweeping initiative, designed to serve as a guideline for the Party during the next few perilous months.

The highlights of the program are peace and disarmament, with more sharp-edged suggestions about "Star Wars" (a topic raised anew at Reykjavik), on unemployment and on Parliament's second thoughts about budget bill, on the relationship between technologies as the model for development and energy options (the nuclear issue), and on justice (referendum) the schools, and computerization.

That was the agenda for talks that ran all through yesterday when the fringe leaders of the PCI met at the Botteghe Oscure. They were the targets (partly in order to respond to outside criticism) chosen by the Party's number-two man, Achille Occhetto, expatiating on the overall rationale for the move. The plans that keep cropping up, like the public's hopes pinned on the lay areas of government, were dismissed by Occhetto as "an insistent campaign" designed to paint the communists as "out of it" and as "spreaders

mistrust" in the chances of new political developments in Italy. "The tiredest old pretext seems to suffice to lend credit to the idea that the only issue worth bothering about is commitment to musical chairs in the five-party citadel," and never mind the "minimally edifying" outcome of the July crisis.

The communist leader, however, seemed to be redirecting his fire in connection with the expression "definitive" used last summer: "It may well be," he admitted, "that we may, upon occasion, have given the impression that we were talking about an already shattered coalition, one inevitably destined to fall, rather than of the twilight of a political cycle; of a crisis of the moderate assumptions of stabilization, of which there are many indications throughout Europe as well." And yet, these are still the PCI's basic convictions: the crisis affecting a political season, even though it does not yet signal the imminent end of a coalition.

Occhetto's remarks were the vehicle for two stinging rejoinders. Aimed at the socialists and, more remarkably, at the leftist independents, of all people, a parliamentary free-for-all drubbing of the PCI itself, among which critical voices have recently been raised. To those voices (which, first by Rodota and then by Napoleone) had criticized the PCI's "passivity" by comparison with the German social democrats, held up as a model for the European Left) in the pages of UNITA), Occhetto replied that the PCI is in no way laggard. The Italian communists had been talking of a "new equilibrium" between government and the marketplace at a time when the French socialists were nationalizing everything in sight; and again the PCI, which previously had welcomed the "new approach" that was taking hold in German social democracy, found itself pilloried for dragging its feet in drafting its election platforms, when even the PSD is about to unveil its platform for 1988.

As for the Italian socialists, who on these issues frequently go along with the PCI, objected that "there is an obvious contradiction between the things they do in government and the different things they say outside, a kind of two-way track"; "This is not what angers us. We want to move ahead and get the facts out," suggesting a platform "for the PSI and for all the democratic forces." Even though, with regard to the socialist polemics over Hungary, the communist leader talks of "political maneuvering to which we simply cannot turn a blind eye, and refers to "a clumsy attempt revive any pretext to draw the line against the PCI" at a time when all over the rest of Europe "factitious prejudices are toppling."

In the short run, the PCI's major commitment is to employment. "From now on," says Antonio Bassolino, "providing jobs will be the fulcrum to set the rest in motion. The budget will no longer be assessed on the basis of abstract criteria, but weighed against the standard of what will produce jobs—to find out what we need to win this battle. The current battle is the fight for full employment, bearing in mind the fact that the jobless today are, particularly in the south, young people, mainly women. Needed are new jobs, real jobs, not just any job, but jobs with meaning and purpose.

For the 1987 budget the PCI proposes additional spending in the amount of 10 trillion lire, to generate 20,000 new jobs. It is aimed at the vast public infrastructures (urban transit systems, energy conservation, agriculture, cultural assets), fully aware that every billion lire invested in these directions will yield 700 million more in other structures.

6182

CSO: 3528/35

IRANIAN CONSULATE 'FORCES' VISA APPLICANTS TO DON SCARVES

Istanbul HURRIYET in Turkish 22 Oct 86 p 7

[Text] Tourists wishing to visit Iran after their vacation in Turkey are being forced to cover their heads when they go into the Iranian consulate general to obtain visas.

The tourists who cover their heads scrupulously with scarves and whatever other clothing they may find when entering the Iranian consulate remove their head coverings as soon as they get their visas and leave the consulate.

Yesterday, a group of British tourists who had spent 15 days in Istanbul arrived at the Iranian consulate to obtain visas to visit Iran. Officials at the entrance of the consulate in Cagaloglu told the British tourists: "You will have to cover your heads when you enter the consulate if you want to obtain visas." At the insistence of the officials, the tourists covered their heads with shawls, scarves and wraps.

9588

CSO: 3554/92

GAZI UNIVERSITY DENIES ENTRY TO STUDENTS WEARING HEADCOVERS

Istanbul TERCUMAN in Turkish 9 Oct 86 p 7

[Text] Ankara--The "arbitrary interpretation" of the Dress and Attire Code has become a full-fledged "torment" for female students wearing headcovers. Female students wearing headcovers were "pushed and shoved" out when they tried to enter the School of Pharmacy of the Gazi University. Despite the decision of YOK [Higher Education Council] to "allow female students wearing turbans to enter the schools," the school's assistant dean, Ali Esat Karakaya said: "Students wearing turbans can also not enter this school."

Members of the press corps witnessed the treatment of female students wearing headcovers at the School of Pharmacy of the Gazi University. University employees tried to "push and shove" the students wishing to talk to the dean. When reporters began to film the incident, the employees stopped pushing the students and said: "We do not really want to do this. Our wives and daughters mostly cover their heads. But this is what we have been asked to do. We have to obey our orders."

Assistant Dean's Stance

The female students, who managed to go as far as the secretariat general of the school with the help of the reporters, had a meeting with the dean there and asked him about the required form of the turban that would allow them to enter the school. After the students waited for a while, Assistant Dean Ali Esat Karakaya came to the secretariat general and scolded the reporters by saying: "We are implementing the rules here; we are not making up rules. How dare you enter here without permission?"

Karakaya insisted that students wearing headcover constitute a "deviant group" in the school. When asked whether he "would not allow these students in with turbans despite the YOK decision," Karakaya refused to reply. However, after consulting with Dean Noyan Alpan, he said: "No one wearing headcovers can enter this school. They cannot enter even if they are wearing turbans."

9588

CSO: 3554/92

TWO BOXING CHAMPIONS TURN TO RELIGION

Istanbul MILLIYET in Turkish 22 Oct 86 pp 16,15

[Report by Ergun Emek]

[Text] Hands that were once swung as fists are now opened to God. Eyes that once looked upon opponents like a hawk's are now filled with mercy.

The lives of Pilgrim Celal and Pilgrim Kemal, once prominent boxers, are no longer dominated with punching and knocking. Celal and Kemal now help the fallen to get up and stand up for those who are faltering.

The gold medals of Celal Sandal and Kemal Sonunur now stand as symbols lighting the future, and their championships in Turkish, Balkan, Mediterranean and world tournaments remain mementos which adorn our boxing history.

Both Sandal and Sonunur insist that boxing was the primary reason they decided to go on pilgrimage.

Stating that boxing plays a major role in the building of the youths' individuality and character, Sandal says: "Boxers are the angels of the sports world." He continues:

"In the ring, the players move in accordance with the rules of the game. The two boxers' embrace after the game embodies one of the nice characteristics of this game. In effect, the game in the ring is a model of life. Those who have faith win in a good struggle."

Kemal Sonunur, our other boxer who became a pilgrim at a young age, says:

"Boxers are truly the angels of the sports world. They all have hearts of gold. Like the pilgrim, a boxer is also fulfilling certain requirements. In fact, both the boxer and the pilgrim are educating themselves."

9588

CSO: 3554/92

COLUMNIST SEES SCHOLARSHIP AS MEANS OF ISLAMIC SUPERIORITY

Istanbul TERCUMAN in Turkish 10 Oct 86 p 5

["Corner" column by Ergun Goze: "The 'Journal of Islamic Research'"]

[Text] When I received the first issue of the JOURNAL OF ISLAMIC RESEARCH in July 1986 several thoughts rushed to my mind. One of them was: Just as Turkey's leading problem is the issue of education, the most important problem of Islamic civilization is the attainment of "intellectual and scholarly" eminence.

The development of the complexity of a social movement depends on the period and geographical area of its growth. Islam has a rich chronology spanning more than 14 centuries over five continents. Consequently, in order to understand Islam, we must take a "scholarly inventory" which will provide us with sufficient data to enable us to eliminate discrepancies and temporal and geographical differences.

The West has taken this "inventory" on Islam, out of feelings of hostility and with the purpose of understanding Islam in order to dominate and exploit it. Today, Westerners know about many Islamic issues better and more "methodically" than Muslims. In fact, in recent years they have abandoned their hostile attitude and have begun developing a new approach of understanding toward Islam. An important issue that needs to be strongly emphasized on this matter is: Our foremost task is to equip ourselves with knowledge and to raise this knowledge to a level which will surpass the scientific and methodical superiority of the West.

The only way to do that is to promote and to encourage scientific work and thought. This will also protect Islamic civilization from intellectualization, politicization and, therefore, degradation. Today, there are those who claim that they have brought a brand new outlook to the Islamic world and those who insist that they are continuing with the old ways. Which of these two groups do truly know the old and the new? For that reason, Islamic thought should have first gone through an "encyclopedic" phase and should have developed sound and rational elements of thinking and a scientific framework.

Yes, I greeted this journal edited by Professor Mehmet S. Hatipoglu with joy and enthusiasm. The journal's editorial board includes Professor Mehmet

Aydin, Professor Mustafa Fayda, Professor Ethem Ruhi Figlali, Professor Sabahattin Zaim and other eminent scholars. I wish them success and continuity and I pray that the promise, "God has promised knowledge to everyone who wants to have it" will be fulfilled in their endeavor.

Here, I feel obligated by my conscience to mention one point. Science is performed through language. This is particularly true in the fields of philosophy, history and the social sciences. The pathetic state of our Turkish is well known. Most of the journals published in the name of Islam are linguistic disasters. They are devoid of meaning, grammar, concept, reason and fluency. However, the journal that we are reading now is far ahead of these. Even so, let us look at the following sentence to make our point: "While I am not the first one who has broached the problem mentioned in the introduction, and although several others have spoken and written about the subject..." Now, if we drop the term "while," the meaning conveyed by the sentence will be much clearer and the sentence will become much more Turkish. Alternately, the sentence could be rephrased as: "Although I am not the first one who has broached the problem mentioned in the introduction and several others have spoken..." This issue is as important as science and scientific achievement. We congratulate them and wish them success. Their address is: JOURNAL OF ISLAMIC RESEARCH, P. O. Box 60 (06242) Ankara.

9588
CSO: 3554/92

DEGRADATION OF ISLAM REPORTED

Istanbul TERCUMAN in Turkish 11 Oct 86 pp 5,12

["Corner" column by Ergun Goze: "Slandering Islam"]

[Text] The young people came all the way to my office; I received phone calls and letters. Colleagues from our paper expressed their repugnance. All of them were referring to remarks--on 5 October--about Islam by the editor of a "weekly" which has chosen to increase its circulation and profits by publishing pornography. With apologies to our readers, I quote some these remarks below:

"The Ottoman society promoted a system of homosexuality. Islam is tolerant toward homosexuality. The Koran promises slave boys (that is homosexuals) in paradise. We asked the meaning of this Koranic verse to the Religious Affairs Charmsmanship. We were told that 'God's grace has no limit.'"

One cannot imagine a Muslim Turk who would not be annoyed and disgusted by these remarks. Even among the unfortunate we call "homosexuals," those who have not lost themselves completely and who have not lost their hope of repenting and returning to normalcy were probably disgusted by these remarks.

How can a person not know about the Koran's strikingly eloquent account of how Lot's tribe drew God's wrath because of its sexual excesses and perversion and how Sodom and Gomorrah were obliterated by "divine anger" for this kind of perversion? How can one not know that the Koran admonishes and prescribes punishment for this psychological disease? How can a person who knows these put forward such absurd propositions about Islam and the Koran? And on whose behalf? On behalf of the "homosexuals." The motive behind this illicit sponsorship of homosexuals is to increase circulation by promoting sexual anarchy.

How can a person venture into such sacred and intimate issues with the most blatant ignorance and the utmost insensitivity? This is not an isolated attitude. We are not commenting on something isolated or individual, but a mentality which some people want to institutionalize. We are commenting on the degeneration of rationality and morality to a point where non-homosexuals are about to be declared abnormal.

I spoke with the Chairman of Religious Affairs. He told me that he was not consulted as reported, that the response quoted is true for many other issues, but that such a response has not been given with regard to that issue.

Here, let me recount one of my memories to show that this matter is not so old. Similar allusions, though much more subtly and half jokingly, were also made in the past. I had heard about the hoja from Malatya. He was an eloquent and witty man. A young man who wanted to embarrass him and put Islam in a difficult position once asked him:

"Hoja for whom are beautiful virgins in the Koran?"

The hoja replied: "For you and me, son. For you and me."

Thus the hoja had the good grace to keep up the good humor and to respond to the young man as a young man would.

But the young man was determined to take his insolence to its ultimate end. He persisted:

"What about the slave boys? Whom are they for?"

Staring at the insolent face of the young man, the hoja replied calmly:

"That is very easy, son. They are for your mother and sister."

As you can see, my esteemed readers, talking and writing to those who wish to sophisticate issues is the world's hardest and most ungratifying task. Because there is always the danger that you might sink to their level. That is why people would like even their enemies, rivals and opponents to be intelligent and respectable.

They would like that, but it is hard to find them. The era that we call "the age of reason" has become an age of crisis. We have a sexual crisis, an economic crisis, a political crisis, a diplomatic crisis--we have nothing but crises.

A mentality so ignorant and ill-intentioned about Islam--which is the most recent and most perfect religion God has bestowed upon mankind--and the Koran--which is the only authentic book of religion--will naturally assail the Ottoman civilization which was based on the fusion of Islamic morality with the Turkish character. It will naturally try to debase it. This is what happens once denial begins.

It is true that Islam is tolerant. For Islam, the worst sin is the denial of realities--such as the denial of God's existence and the denial of the rules which prove the existence of God. What we must be careful about is the following: It is a sin to violate rules out of human weakness. But the biggest and most unforgivable sin is to reject and to destroy those rules and thus to cause others to go astray. Sexual immorality is of course bad. But inciting sexual immorality is even worse. It is a sin to commit any sins like that. But to claim that they are not sins is an immeasurably worse sin.

Because that goes beyond putting the carnal man to the test and means that the soul is rejecting its owner.

In other words that amounts to the denial of reality--the denial of the only eternal and permanent reality.

It is true that Islam is tolerant. It is more tolerant toward homosexuals than those who deny the only eternal and permanent reality.

9588

CSO: 3554/92

POOR ECONOMIC PROSPECTS CAUSE WITHDRAWAL OF U.S. BANKS

Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek 14-15 Dec 86 p 3

[Article by Kostas Dedes]

[Text] The withdrawal or, in the best case, restriction of the activities of U.S. banks is indicative of the conception prevailing among foreign investors about the course of our economy. In reality, there has been an increase lately in the number of U.S. banks wishing to abandon their activity in the domestic banking market.

In particular, after the "First National Westminster" (British bank) bought out the U.S. "Continental" Bank several months ago--this purchase took place because the British bank thought it would be good to extend its activities--other banks have restricted, or are restricting, their transactions drastically. One of these is the "Bank of America" which now maintains a small office, composed of 35 employees, to settle certain pending business. Apparently, the "Bank of America" is being followed by the "Chicago Bank" which is negotiating its purchase by a Greek bank, a subsidiary of the National Bank.

"Chase Manhattan," which is also facing problems in the Greek market, is--according to information--"thinking of" decreasing its activities.

It has also become known that in 1987 the "First National" will decrease its personnel by 100 people in order to deal with its increasing operational costs.

Aside from the problems being faced in the international area by certain U.S. banks (that is, problems of debts, loans to problematic Latin American countries, etc.), the shrinking of the U.S. bank subsidiaries' activities in Greece is owing to the poor prospects assessed for the Greek economy. It is dictated, moreover, by the institutional framework for operation of foreign banks, which apparently does not serve the foreign banks' objectives and ambitions.

"No Good Sign on the Horizon"

Naturally, one of the repercussions "towed" by the withdrawal of U.S. banks is that these banks expose to the international banking forum and banking market "their experience" resulting from their operation in our country, and concerning its economy--experience which is not so flattering, and which plays a certain role (small or large) in decisions about a consortium of foreign banks granting loans to our country.

Banking circles, referring to the "intentions" of the U.S. banks in Greece, maintain that the banks "do not see any good sign on the horizon as concerns developments in shipping and in investments by foreign multinational enterprises, which are now interested in investing in Turkey and Spain."

The question is created, however: Why are the European banks not expressing an inclination to withdraw or shrink their activities when the economic prospects are unfavorable?

The same banking factors maintain that the increase in our country's commercial exchanges with the EEC partners makes it in the European banks' interest to maintain their establishments for reasons of exchange clearly.

Also, European bank experts estimate that the establishment of leasing (that is, the banks hiring out mechanical equipment to businesses) eventually may strengthen entrepreneurial interest and thus increase their loans to small or large enterprises of Greek industry and handicraft. They hope, finally, that interest may be expressed in the purchase of 22 viable problematic enterprises by Greeks abroad, and they can improve their activities.

9247

CSO: 3521/43

FOREIGN EXCHANGE TRADE DEREGULATED

Istanbul HURRIYET in Turkish 22 Oct 86 p 4

[Text] Ankara--The "liberalization of the foreign exchange regime" begun when Ozal first took office has assumed new proportions with the introduction of a new foreign currency trade system. Henceforth, authorized private firms will be able to engage in foreign currency trade which was until now conducted only by banks. This system will eventually be expanded, as has been done in West European countries with free foreign currency trading rules, and "foreign currency booths" will be opened. Central Bank Foreign Exchange Director General Dogan Sevim said in a statement to HURRIYET that this program will eventually be expanded to touristic areas.

A new decision has been taken amending the aging "Decision No. 30" on the Protection of the Value of Turkish Currency. This decision by the Council of Ministers, which went into effect after it was published in the Official Gazette yesterday, "came like a breeze" and was not noticed by anyone except those concerned. According to the decision, private companies which will be certified by the Undersecretariat of the Treasury and Foreign Trade and which will be called "authorized agencies" will be able to buy and sell foreign currency. Initially, the system will be implemented at border crossing points and will be open only to foreign residents (such as tourists, businessmen and foreigners coming to Turkey to work) entering or leaving Turkey.

Central Bank Foreign Exchange Director General Dogan Sevim said:

"Under the present system, hotels can already buy foreign currency. Now agencies to be authorized by the Undersecretariat of the Treasury and Foreign Trade will also be able to buy foreign currency. They will also be able to sell foreign currency up to the limits specified by the decision. These offices will generally be set up at border crossing points. Touristic establishments and certain other companies are eligible to open such agencies."

According to the Council of Ministers decision, after the "authorized agencies" are set up foreign residents will be able to exchange their foreign currency at the foreign currency trading booths.

STATE ENTERPRISES LEAD TOP 500 INDUSTRIAL FIRMS

ISO President Comments on Survey Results

Istanbul DUNYA in Turkish 6 Oct 86 pp 1,11

[Excerpts] The Istanbul Chamber of Industry [ISO] has published its list of Turkey's 500 largest industrial corporations in 1985. TUPRAS, the Turkish Petroleum Refineries Corporation, tops the list as it has for the last 3 years. The largest private corporation is ranked 11th on the list.

In a statement about the work done to prepare the list, ISO Administrative Council President Nurullah Gezgin said that more than 4,000 firms and several new types of data were included in this survey and that this makes the results of the 1985 survey more valuable. Noting that it would be hard to draw accurate conclusions about annual developments by a general evaluation of the survey results, Gezgin said that the inclusion of the Turkish Electric Power Enterprise Directorate General [TEK] in the survey for the first time and the first-ever disclosure of full information about the assets and liabilities of the State Monopolies Directorate General makes year-to-year comparisons difficult and that the results for private and state-owned companies must be evaluated separately.

Of the largest industrial corporations in 1985, 94 are state-owned and 406 are private companies. Among the 500 largest corporations, 244 are members of the ISO. Of these, 6 are state-owned and 238 are private companies. Exporting firms had a 48.5 percent share in the total volume of industrial production in 1985. The top 500 industrial corporations paid 311 billion Turkish lira in value added tax.

Stating that the 1985 survey results exhibit notable differences between the private and public sectors, Gezgin said that an evaluation of the general results without taking into account these differences would be misleading. Gezgin pointed out that while the private sector experienced a period of stagnation and stability in 1985 in comparison to 1984, the public sector enjoyed remarkable growth.

The survey results show that in 1985 the top 500 firms increased their total sales revenue by 11.6 percent over 1984. Over the same period, their total net operating profits rose by 43.2 percent, gross added value increased by 12.2 percent and net added value jumped by 20.8 percent. The private sector's

sales revenues rose by 11.4 percent while that of the public sector increased by 11.9 percent during the said period of comparison. The private sector's net operating profits declined by 3.5 percent during the said period, while the public sector's net operating profits rose by 86.7 percent. Total gross added value in the private sector increased by 3.3 percent while that of the public sector rose by 23.5 percent. In net added value, the private sector suffered a decline of 2.4 percent compared to a 52.1-percent gain in the public sector. The share of wages and salaries in the total net added value for all 500 top companies dropped from 46.4 percent in 1984 to 40.4 percent in 1985, while the share of profits in net added value rose from 31 percent in 1984 to 34.5 percent in 1985. However, these figures are also substantially different for the private and public sectors. The share of wages and salaries in net added value rose from 38.2 percent in 1984 to 39.4 percent in 1985 in the private sector and dropped from 57.4 percent in 1984 to 41.3 percent in 1985 in the public sector. Meanwhile, the share of profits in net added value declined from 28 percent in 1984 to 23.7 percent in 1985 in the private sector while it rose from 35.1 percent in 1984 to 43.9 percent in 1985 in the public sector.

Gezgin stated that the differences observed between the real sales, added value and profit figures for the private and public sectors stem from the fact that the prices of input materials increased more than the prices of output materials in the private sector, while in the public sector output material prices rose faster than input material prices. He added that in contrast to the private sector, profits and the share of profits in added value increased in the public sector. Gezgin said that this result indicates that there has been a net transfer of resources from the private sector to the public sector. Stating that the survey results contrast with the guidelines in current government's program designed to steer the development of the private sector, Gezgin said that the data that has been collected indicates that the private sector's prioritized position in the economy is shifting toward the public sector and that the public sector has a dominant position in industry.

Firms that were not on the 1984 list but were included in the 1985 list:

Meric Textile, Sivas Cement, Nigde Cement, Ege Metal, Istanbul Piston Ring Casings, Denizli Printed Textiles, Abfar Pharmaceutical Industry, Abes, Bayraktarlar, Beytas Karacabey Foodstuffs, Izmir Wool, Sabirlar, Dentas, Titiz Apparel, Sezginler, Turkmen Corduroy, Serel Ceramic, Teknik Glass, Er-Os, Cimsatas, Turk Ytong, Aydin Lignite, Detel Iron Industry, Elaks, Trakya Flour, Yeni Tekstil Textile, Gimsan, Teknik Rubber, Ipsan Textile, Turk Cement, Bozuyuk Ceramic, Kampana Leather and Shoesoles Industry, Vestel, Turkish Shipbuilding Industry, Turkish Agricultural Equipment Corporation, Sanko Textile, BP Petroleum, Pako, Sametoglu, Ethem Ozsoy, Turkish Milk Industry Corporation, Osman Akca, STFA Energy, Pilsa, Yazici Iron and Steel, Tutunteks, Gaziantep Cement, Kromsan, Kayseri Sugar Factories, Akpinar, Dosan, Sandoz, Trakya Cement, Kirlangic, Botas [Pipelines and Petroleum Transport Corporation], TK1 [Turkish Coal Works] Marmara Lignite Works, Cidelsan, Bursa Car Batteries, Orta Anadolu Ceramic, Trabzon Cement, Betoya, Obus, Demircioglu, Adiyaman Cement, Turbes, BASF, Anadolu Beers, Esas, Yucel Electronic, Tusan, Atabay Pharmaceuticals, Ladik Cement, Derimod, Akkardan, Ozgur Atermit, Ova Flour, Turkish Iskenderun Cement Factories, Ileri Yarns.

Firms that were on the 1984 list but were not included in the 1985 list:

Zonguldak Coal Works, Uniroyal, Akdeniz Fertilizer Industry, Cukurova Industrial Enterprises, Yu-Pi Poultry, Turk Cables, TKI Southern Aegean Lignite Works, Turkish Maritime Service Enterprises Dry Dock Services, Eska Construction, Umranspiral-Welded Pipe Industry, Eti Food Industry, Seka Aksu Establishment, Izmir Olive Oil Agricultural Sales Cooperative Union, Kayseri Sugar Factories [appears in previous list; as published], Polylen Synthetic Yarn Industry, Topkim [Topkapi Drug Premix Industry], Celsentas Steel Products Industry, Burtrak, Plastel Plastics, Meko Metallurgy and Foundry Industry, Turkish Coal Corporation Armutcuk Coal Works Establishment, Cumra Paper Industry, Anadolu Automotive Industry, Oerlikon Welding Electrodes, Birlik Tobacco Cotton Foodstuffs, Kutahya Sugar Factories, PIMAS [Plastic Construction Materials Corporation], Zeytip [Zeytinburnu Integrated Textile Factory], Tek Agricultural Machines, Akdag Leather Industry, Ozdoyuran Flour and Semolina Industry, Yildiz Textile Industry, Sungurlar Heating Industry, Seka Afyon Paper Establishment, Bornova Canning and Packaging Industry, Surtel Cable Industry, Erkboru Profile Bar Industry, ORUS [Forest Products Directorate General], Odoksan [Osmaneli Foundry Industry], Ugur Poultry, Vatan Plastics, Istikbal Pendik Pipe Industry, Untas Ismet Flour Industry, Balikesir Cement Industry, Filiz Foodstuffs, Dentas Corrugated Cardboard, Elaks Electronics, Bergama Cotton, TKI Bursa Lignite Works, Turkish Cement Soil Industry, Yarimca Ceramic Establishment, Mavi Steel, Ozlem Agricultural Products, Gonen Foodstuffs, Sedef Shipbuilding, Karsiyaka Trade and Industry, Cumhuriyet Printing, Grasso Refrigeration Installations, Desa Iron Industry, Ente Industry, Temel Construction and Public Works Industry, Ankara Flour, Kartal Pasta, Omtas Atom, Taris Figs, Epengle Upholstery, Ari Sugar Refinery, Bebimod Belde Bicycles, Ozkoseoglu Heating, Emek Electric, Sunel Trade, Sumerbank Nevsehir Cotton Fabric Industry, Necip Ersoy, Halefi Ilknur Basegmez, Mitas Metal Construction, Coskunoz Metal Forming Machines, Istanbul Metallurgy, Sen Celikoglu Marketing.

Top 10 Private Firms

Name	Production sales (million Turkish lira)
1. Cukurova Electric	95,617
2. Arcelik	93,066
3. Unilever-Is	92,860
4. Aksa	89,458
5. Oyak-Renault	79,744
6. Bekoteknik	75,282
7. TOFAS	74,090
8. SASA	73,476
9. Uzel Machinery	71,268
10. Otosan	70,061

Top 10 State-owned Firms

Name	Production sales (million Turkish lira)
1. TUPRAS	2,056,124
2. TEK	913,864
3. State Monopolies	619,424
4. Eregli Iron Works	272,458
5. Turkish Sugar Factorics	180,762
6. CAYKUR	155,691
7. PETKIM	144,423
8. ISDEMIR	142,721
9. (Prefers to remain anonymous)	—
10. TPAO	111,000

Cukurova Electric Executive Comments

Istanbul DUNYA in Turkish 6 Oct 86 pp 1,11

[Text] Cukurova Electric Corporation which ranked first among the private companies in the top 500 industrial corporations listed in ISO's survey, increased its sales 1985 revenues by 140 percent over the previous year despite a 5.3 percent decline in its production.

Cukurova Electric Corporation, whose capital is 25.46 percent owned by TEK and the rest by private individuals and corporations, is currently operating four hydroelectric power plants with a total generating capacity of 192,000 kilowatts and one thermal power plant with a generating capacity of 106,000 kilowatts. These power plants are:

--The 60-megawatt Seyhan Hydroelectric Power Plant on the Seyhan River. The first two units of the plant went into service in 1956, and a third unit was added in 1964. The plant generated 311,354,000 kilowatt-hours of electricity in 1985.

--The 70-megawatt Kadincik I Hydroelectric Power Plant, consisting of two units, was built on the Kadincik tributary of the Tarsus stream in 1970. The plant generated 315,944,000 kilowatt-hours of electricity in 1985.

--The 56-megawatt Kadincik II Hydroelectric Power Plant has only one unit. The plant, which went into service in 1974, gets its water through a 6,100-meter tunnel from a concrete dam built at the outlet of the Kadincik I power plant. This plant generated 247,026,000 kilowatt-hours of electricity in 1985.

--The 6-megawatt Yuregir hydroelectric power plant was built on the left irrigation canal of the Seyhan River in 1972. It generated 9,109,800 kilowatt-hours of electricity in 1985.

--The 106-megawatt Mersin thermal power plant, consisting of four units, is powered by fuel oil. Its first two units went into service in 1966 and the

other two were phased in in 1969. The plant generated 551,250,000 kilowatt-hours of electricity in 1985.

Stating that water supplies were relatively low in 1985 and that, as a result, production at the hydroelectric plants was lower than what was planned, Cukurova Electric Corporation Executive Council President Munir Tanyeloglu said that the Mersin power plant generated more than the targeted amount. He continued:

"On the other hand, our energy sales increased in real terms in 1985; more electricity was bought through the TBEK grid. Thanks to new opportunities in electricity rate schedules, we were able to procure the resources needed for our firm's investments. As in previous years, our operations in 1985 yielded sufficient profit to offer our partners satisfactory dividends."

Arcelik Executive Comments

Istanbul DUNYA in Turkish 6 Oct 86 pp 1,11

[Text] Arcelik Corporation Director General Hasan Subasi said that the growth in his firm's sales volume in 1985 was primarily due to the vigorous state of the housing sector, higher productivity and sales and production increases in new products. Subasi added that this growth will continue through investments in 1987.

Stating that Arcelik increased its sales revenues by 66 percent from 52,502 million Turkish lira in 1984 to 86,946 million Turkish lira in 1985 and that its after-tax profits rose by 100 percent to 6,295 million Turkish lira, Subasi said that the expansion of sales and production because of new products accounted for a major share of this growth. Noting that in 1985 Arcelik introduced several new products to the market--such as a new vacuum cleaner, a thermostat-controlled water heater, a heat pump, a laundry dryer, a dishwashing machine, a compact laundry machine with rollers and a deep freezer--Subasi said that wide consumer acceptance of these products resulted in substantial sales growth. He continued:

"Another reason for the growth was higher productivity in our company. The more productive use of capital, machinery and labor has increased our profitability. In 1985, the inflation rate was around 38 percent. The average price increase on our products was 23 percent. Even so, sales increased by 66 percent. Meanwhile, the return on turnover increased from 5.9 percent in 1984 to 7.2 percent in 1985."

Stating that Turkish manufacturers of white appliances are strong enough to compete with foreign manufacturers in technology, materials, cost and quality and to maintain their share of the growing domestic market, Subasi said the following with regard to Arcelik's share of the white appliance market in Turkey:

"In the domestic white appliance market, as of the end of 1985 Arcelik had a share of 52 percent in refrigerators, 75 percent in washing machines and 32 percent in stoves. The relatively low saturation of the white appliance

market (as of the end of 1985 85 percent of households had refrigerators, 40 percent had washing machines and 24 percent had stoves) indicates that annual sales can increase to higher levels in a market like Turkey which has a population of 50 million and 10 million households. Rising household incomes will turn this potential market into real demand."

Unilever Executive Comments

Istanbul DUNYA in Turkish 6 Oct 86 pp 1,11

[Text] Atilla Midillili, the deputy director general of Unilever-Is, which was ranked as the third largest private industrial corporation, said that his firm owes its success to the spreading of fixed costs over increased production and the productivity gains achieved through investments in high technology. Midillili disclosed that Unilever's Bakirkoy factory will be moved to Corlu in 1988 and will operate with more advanced technology.

Midillili stated that the firm's sales recorded only minor gains between 1981 and 1984 because of inadequacies in the company's production capacity and that during the said period domestic sales ran at between 105,000 metric tons and 120,000 metric tons per year. Stating that the growth in the domestic demand for margarine could not be met for several years because of insufficient production capacity, he said: "Our Adana factory, which was bought in 1984 and which began production in September 1984, and our Corlu plant, which began production in mid-1985, are now in a position to meet our people's demand for Sana, Vita and Rama brand margarines and shortenings in the near term. Thanks to these developments, our sales grew by 13 percent from 145,000 metric tons in 1984 to 163,000 metric tons in 1985." Midilli said the following with regard to Unilever's 1985 operations:

"Our company's 1985 profit was higher than its profits in 1984 not so much because 1985 was such a good year, but primarily because our 1984 profit was 35 percent less than the profit for the previous year. Our firm's pretax profits in 1984 totaled 1,442,904,643 Turkish lira and constituted only 2.6 percent of our sales revenues for that year. That low margin of profit was partly the result of the inclusion of the first-year amortization costs of the Adana factory which was bought that year and the Corlu factory which we began building in 1984 as well as interest costs associated with these investments in the profit-loss account. After these costs--which are considered normal in the first year of large investments--were paid for, profitability rose to a healthy level in 1985 and the ratio of pretax profits to sales revenues rose to 10 percent. To explain this in different terms, while the ratio of profits to sales was 18.2 percent in 1984, without including the cost of amortization and interest, that figure rose to 19.7 percent in 1985, recording an increase of 1.5 percentage points. The improvement of this ratio, which can be described as real profitability excluding the effect of inflation and investment costs, resulted primarily from the spreading of fixed costs over increased production--which resulted from expanded capacity--and productivity gains achieved through investments in modern technology."

9588

CSO: 3554/61

STATE ENTERPRISES SHOW RISING PROFITS, HIGHER PRICES

Istanbul CUMHURİYET in Turkish 22 Oct 86 p 11

[Text] Ankara--The state economic enterprises [SEEs], most of which are "monopolies" in their areas of specialization, have been implementing a price hike policy which can be described as "raise your prices, and solve your financing problems." At the root of this policy is the government's failure to end tax evasion. When sufficient funds are not earmarked for SEE investments from the budget, the SEEs, which have to expand the production of goods and services they provide by investing trillions of Turkish lira each year, try to compensate their financing shortfall by raising their prices.

Because of successive hikes in the prices of goods and services, the share of profits in the SEEs' total revenues (resources) has steadily increased over the years. The share of profits in the SEEs' total revenues rose from 14 percent in 1984 to 21 percent in 1985. It is estimated that this figure will increase to 25 percent in 1986 and it is envisaged to raise it to 33 percent in 1987.

According to the targets that have been set, the SEEs' 1987 revenues will total 6,016 billion Turkish lira, of which 1,985 billion Turkish lira will be profits. In that year, the SEEs will spend 4,645 billion Turkish lira, so that the difference between revenues and spending will increase to 1,371 billion Turkish lira. When the 2,531 billion Turkish lira needed for investments is taken into account, the SEEs will suffer a deficit of 1,160 billion Turkish lira despite the sharp price hikes and a profit of nearly 2 trillion Turkish lira.

According to ANKA [Ankara News Agency], of the said deficit of 1,160 billion Turkish lira, 400 billion Turkish lira will be paid from the government budget--220 billion Turkish lira will be for expansion of capital and 180 billion Turkish lira will be for service losses--and 666 billion Turkish lira will come from foreign project loans. In addition, 80 billion Turkish lira will be transferred from the State Investment Bank, and 14 billion Turkish lira will be contributed from the Price Stability Fund.

--In the case of the State Monopolies Directorate General, which was the focus of attention this month because of the sharp price hikes it announced, the share of profits in revenues will be 76 percent [in 1987]. The ratio of

profits to revenues for State Monopolies jumped from 18 percent in 1984 to 82 percent in 1985. This figure is expected to drop to 78 percent this year and to 76 percent in 1987.

--The profit-revenue ratio has been steadily rising at the PTT [Post, Telephone and Telegraph Administration]. The said figure for the PTT was 39 percent in 1984 and 42 percent in 1985. PTT's profit-revenue ratio is expected to rise to 57 percent in 1986 and is targeted for 67 percent in 1987.

--Another SEE where the share of profits in revenues has steadily increased is TEK [Turkish Electric Power Enterprise Directorate General]. TEK's profit-revenue ratio rose from 17 percent in 1984 to 20 percent in 1985 and is expected to increase to around 33 percent this year. The said figure has been targeted to rise to 48 percent in 1987.

--The Meat and Fish Association Directorate General [EBK], which has been turning a profit after suffering losses in 1984, has the largest ratio of profit to revenue. The EBK's profit-revenue ratio is expected to rise from 28 percent in 1985 to 69 percent this year and to 84 percent in 1987.

9588

CSO: 3554/85

PRIVATE BUSINESS CRITICIZED FOR AVOIDING RISK

Istanbul DUNYA in Turkish 7 Oct 86 p 1

[Editorial: "500 Firms and Some Realities"]

[Text] The annual surveys conducted by the Istanbul Chamber of Industry [ISO] to determine "the 500 largest companies" have become valuable studies which facilitate the sectoral analysis of the economy. The 1985 survey presents a clearer picture than previous ones because of an increase in the number of firms surveyed and the inclusion of new data.

The principal conclusion that can be drawn from these surveys, including the last one, is that the state-owned firms continue to preserve their "locomotive" status in the overall economy. In the rankings of the top 500 firms, State Economic Enterprises [SEEs] and their affiliated organizations have taken the top 10 places virtually every year. This ordering did not change in 1985. Moreover, this year, the SEEs have 25 representatives in the top 100 firms. In other words, 25 of Turkey's 100 largest companies are state-owned.

The public sector, which has taken the top 10 places in the ranking of 500 top firms and which now has 25 representatives in the top 100 firms, continues to play the role of "the economy's driving engine" by producing primarily "heavy industry" goods. A major portion of the private companies which were included in the rankings are manufacturers of consumer and durable goods while another portion are manufacturers of "semi-finished goods" or light industry products. This situation is an important indication that the SEEs have consolidated their status of "indispensability" in the "industrialization" policy which is the primary motivation of the economy.

A second conclusion that has been reaffirmed by the "500 top firms" survey is: The "mixed economic system" which was blamed for all the problems of the economy until the 1980's has still not reached the "restructuralization" stage, despite the "liberal" economic policies that have been implemented since 1980 with the aim of giving the private sector a leading role in the economy.

The public and the private sectors have no general disagreement over the premise that economic development must be realized through "industrialization." However, one might say that the private sector in fact

prefers to live under the "public sector's umbrella" and that it is "actually" not too unhappy with this structural division of labor. In a nutshell, while the public sector operates in the most risky areas of the economy in its position as "the leader of industry," the private sector finds it "more profitable" to operate in relatively low-risk areas and thus contributes to the perpetuation of the "structural division of labor."

From a private-sector perspective, several individually-applicable causes may be found for the growth of the public sector. For example, the "monopolistic" positions taken by the SEEs in some essential sectors may be claimed to have created "indisputable dominance" over the private sector. One might argue that this situation has increased the SEEs' profits and raised the private sector's costs. These are true when taken separately.

However, all these facts must not obscure the low "performance" of the private sector in the "transformation" the Turkish economy has been going through since 1980. The private sector must begin to think with an open mind why it has been avoiding taking on real responsibilities in the transformation of the economy, taking the risks mandated by this transformation and implementing the mental and structural "internal reforms" that are needed to comply with the transformation despite all the economic and political easements that have been offered to it. Leadership cannot be won in any field without risking a fight.

9588

CSO: 3554/61

EFFECT OF PRICE HIKE ON ALUMINUM INDUSTRY

Istanbul DUNYA in Turkish 30 Oct 86 pp 1,9

[Report by Metin Soysal]

[Text] With the price hikes announced by the Seydisehir Aluminum Factories on 22 October, the increase in the price of aluminum so far this year has reached 42.45 to 46 percent. Market specialists stated that these increases far exceed the 25-percent inflation rate the government expects for this year, that price increases in world markets have been far less and that the price hikes in Turkey are caused by the policy of the state economic enterprises [SEEs] to "increase prices rather than productivity." On the other hand, a senior official of the Seydisehir Aluminum Factories noted that the prices of aluminum products have been increased six times since the beginning of this year and that the increases were correct. The official added: "However, it is not true that we are not working productively. We have attained 100 percent capacity utilization, and our productivity is higher than what was targeted. The price increases that have been announced are in line with developments in world markets."

While government officials have frequently stated that they expect the inflation rate for 1986 to be 25 percent, successive price hikes on SEE products indicates that the price of many products will increase by more than that amount and that in the case of some products that figure has already been exceeded. The price hike announced by the Seydisehir Aluminum Factories on 22 October was the sixth for this year and followed price hikes of up to 55 percent on State Monopolies products. The latest hikes increased the cash price of aluminum ingot (excluding VAT) by 4.6 percent to 990 Turkish lira per kilogram.

This means that since the beginning of the year, the price of aluminum ingot has increased by 42.45 percent from 695 Turkish lira to 990 Turkish lira per kilogram. During the same period, the price of aluminum bars rose by 46.15 percent from 780 Turkish lira to 1,140 Turkish lira per kilogram. The price of various other aluminum products also increased by up to 46 percent during the said period. In comparison to these domestic price increases, the price of aluminum ingot rose from 761.5 pounds sterling per ton on 1 January 1986 to 818 pounds sterling on 22 October 1986 on the London commodity exchange. This

increase amounts to 7.42 percent. During the same period, the British pound rose against the Turkish lira by 23 percent while the U.S. dollar gained by 25.5 percent.

Market specialists with whom we consulted stated that the price hike Seydisehir Aluminum Factories has announced on its aluminum products are "too high" and that this situation is the result of the general policy of the SEEs. One specialist said: "Since the SEEs were asked to set their own destiny, they have chosen to increase prices, which is a short-term and easy solution, rather than improve their productivity which is a long-term process. The absence of domestic competitors in many products and services has made the implementation of this policy easier. While aluminum prices rose by only 7 to 8 percent on world markets, they jumped by as much as 46 percent in Turkey. Aluminum is a material that is used in many areas ranging from pharmaceuticals to packaging and from machinery to construction materials. Consequently, any increase in the price of aluminum indirectly raises the prices of these products. This, in turn, has an adverse effect on inflation." The specialist added that because Seydisehir Aluminum Factories did not disclose its price hikes to the press there is a general impression that the price hike originated from the wholesalers. The specialist said:

"In addition, even if you pay this firm in advance for your next month's purchases, your order is delivered to you at the price effective 1 month later. Because of that situation, the industrialist cannot deliver to his clients the goods he has contracted at the price he had agreed to, and this leads to difficulties. In the end, the industrialist is forced to increase the price he had originally agreed to. This increase is eventually transmitted to the end user. This situation eventually shakes the market's confidence in the manufacturer and the seller."

'We Are Following World Markets'

Meanwhile, in a statement on this issue, a senior official of the Seydisehir Aluminum Factories insisted that the price hikes his firm has announced are the result of price increases on world markets. He said: "I do not agree that the SEEs have chosen to increase prices rather than improve their productivity. We are currently operating at 100 percent of capacity. Moreover, our productivity is higher than what was targeted." Insisting that his firm reported its price hikes to the concerned companies and the Association of Aluminum Industrialists regularly, the official said:

"Previously, our prices were below world prices. With the recent price hikes we have achieved parity with world prices. We had to do that, because we were losing money. However, at no time did our prices exceed world prices. Because we import some of our input materials, price increases in world markets directly affect our operating costs. The pound sterling has risen by 23 percent against the Turkish lira since the beginning of the year, however it is more important to look at the increase of the value of the dollar. In addition, Turkey's electrical energy costs are among the highest in the world. While the share of energy costs [in the production of aluminum] averages

between 16 and 20 percent worldwide, it exceeds 50 percent in Turkey. A price hike of 1 Turkish lira per kilowatt-hour of electricity raises the manufacturing cost of aluminum by 20 Turkish lira per kilogram.

"Moreover, aluminum products can now be imported without any customs duty. If we sell our products below the prices of the imports, we lose money; if we exceed their prices, demand for our products declines. For this reason, we set our prices in accordance with developments in world markets and do not surpass world market prices."

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CSO: 3554/76

DECLINE OF REAL WAGES CONTINUES

Istanbul DUNYA in Turkish 30 Oct 86 p 9

[Text] Ankara--The State Planning Organization [SPO], which is headed by Prime Minister Turgut Ozal's brother Yusuf Ozal, has disclosed that the real wages of public sector workers have been declining since 1984 and that this decline is expected to continue in 1986.

According to SPO data included in the government's 1987 program, the real wages (purchasing power) of public sector workers declined by 5.9 percent in 1985. The SPO estimates that the rate of decline will be 8.3 percent in 1986. In 1984, the public sector workers' real wages had risen by 3 percent.

According to figures calculated on the basis of SPO data, the real wages of workers in the private sector have been rising since 1981. After staying level in 1983 and 1984, private sector workers' real wages rose by 15 percent in 1985. It is estimated that private sector workers' real wages will rise by about 1 percent in 1986.

Meanwhile, civil servants' salaries declined by 9 percent in real terms in 1985. It is estimated that the civil servants' pay will increase by 2 percent in 1986.

The SPO data also shows that the real income of salaried employees, other than workers, in the private sector is currently less than what it was in 1979. The index of public sector workers' real wages rose from a reference of 100 in 1979 to 113 in 1981 [as published] and stood at 102 in 1984. The said index remained below 100 in all the other years between 1980 and 1986. Private sector workers' wage index rose above 100 for the first time in 1985. The index for civil servants' salaries has remained below 100 since 1979.

The SPO figures for net incomes in 1984, 1985 and 1986 include tax rebates.

Inflation for 1986 Estimated at 27 Percent

It is to be noted that the SPO has estimated the inflation rate for 1986 at 27 percent and has based its wage computations on that figure. This indicates that the SPO also has no faith in the government's inflation estimate of 25 percent.

Changes in net real wages (computed by the SPO) on the basis of increases in the Istanbul cost of living index which the SPO has used as a measure of inflation

Year	Worker wages			Overall salaries	Civil servant salaries
	Public sector	Private sector	Overall Turkey		
1979	100	100	100	100	100
1980	87	85	85	31	--
1981	83	96	99	93	73
1982	98	78	82	80	75
1983	99	88	89	87	78
1984	102	88	90	90	89
1985	96	101	98	95	81
1986	88	102	98	95	83

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UNIONS CALL FOR INFLATION-INDEXED MINIMUM WAGE

Istanbul TERCUMAN in Turkish 22 Oct 86 p 3

[Text] Concerned that the minimum wage will not be set in accordance with current conditions, labor unions have declared that "because of unfavorable economic conditions" they would accept a wage increase which would only equal the real inflation rate.

The labor unions expressed their views about the "minimum wage" issue which is again on the political agenda following statements by leaders of Turk-Is [Turkish Confederation of Labor] and TISK [Turkish Confederation of Employer Unions] and a statement by Prime Minister Turgut Ozal that "the minimum wage will not be taxed."

Insisting that the "minimum wage must stop being a wage of poverty," labor union leaders said that this wage must be set such that it can support a family of three and "the real inflation rate is taken into account."

The following views have been expressed by labor union leaders:

Cevdet Selvi, leader of Turkish Petroleum, Chemical, Nitrogen and Atomic Workers Union: "In view of the latest price hikes, today the minimum wage must be 100,000 Turkish lira [per month], exempted from taxes and tied to a moving scale system."

Zeki Gedik, leader of Turkish Tobacco, Intoxicants, Food and Ancillary Workers Union: "According to scientific calculations we have carried out, a worker's family with three children needs a net monthly income of 158,000 Turkish lira in order to live decently. However, because of unfavorable economic conditions at present, the minimum wage must be raised without delay from its present level of 41,400 Turkish lira a month to at least 68,000 Turkish lira net on the basis of the inflation rate that is forecast at 35 to 40 percent."

Metin Tiryakioglu, leader of Basisen [expansion unknown]: "Does the government really believe that it is possible to live on the present minimum wage at a time when a kilogram of meat costs 2,500 Turkish lira and a one-room shanty rents for at least 30,000 Turkish lira a month? If it does it should appoint to the Ministry of Finance someone who will work for the minimum wage. Then in 2 years, our country will have no debt left. If the minimum wage is to comply with its definition, today it should at least surpass 100,000 Turkish lira."

Huseyin Palan, leader of Municipal Workers' Union: "The minimum wage must be seen as income sufficient to support a family of three and not one person. Nobody lives on his own. Moreover, in Turkey's current conditions we cannot say: 'Let everyone work.' Even the head of the family cannot find a job, much less the other members of the family. The minimum wage which must be enough to support a family of three must be exempt from taxes and paid as net salary."

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CSO: 3554/85

SHEET IRON SOLD ON BLACK MARKET

Istanbul TERCUMAN in Turkish 22 Oct 86 p 6

[Report by Emin Pazarci and Kasim Senol]

[Text] Ankara, Karabuk--Sheet iron has followed iron and cement into the black market. The black market for sheet iron has been revived as a result of the failure of the Eregli Iron and Steel Factories to meet the industrialists' needs for sheet iron. Selcuk Irgit, chairman of the Iron-Steel Professional Committee of the Ankara Chamber of Commerce, said that "sheet iron has been on the black market since August." Meanwhile, Nazim Capraz, the president of the Karabuk Association of Private Rolling Mill Operators, disclosed that the Iron and Steel Works has not supplied pig iron for the last 2 months. Stating that the mill operators have been buying their pig iron from smelting plants for the last 2 months, Capraz said that the prevailing price on the market is not a black-market price and that the price has risen only because of increased transportation costs.

It has been learned that the Eregli Iron and Steel Factories have been unable to meet the rising market demand for sheet iron in the last few months. The said firm sent a memorandum to its customers stating that it cannot not fill their orders even though advance sums have been paid for the orders. The memorandum says that the firm's production is inadequate to meet the demand on the market and that sheet iron shipments contracted for January, February and March 1987 will not be delivered even though advance payments have been made and advises the customers to fill their needs with imports.

Black-market Prices

Hot-rolled products which are sold for 191,000 Turkish lira per metric ton by the factory are selling for 250,000 Turkish lira per metric ton on the black market, while cold-rolled and drawn products that sell for 255,000 and 265,000 Turkish lira per metric ton at the factory are priced at 325,000 Turkish lira on the black market.

Meanwhile, the shortage has been slightly more exacerbated by the new Highways Traffic Law which bans loads of more than 10 metric tons on intercity highways. Before this law went into effect, double-axle trucks could load 13 to 14 metric tons of goods from the Eregli Iron and Steel Factories. After their load limit was reduced, the truck operators increased their freight charges from 5.75 Turkish lira to 9.50 Turkish lira per kilogram.

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COTTON, YARN PROTECTION MEASURES ADOPTED

Istanbul CUMHURIYET in Turkish 30 Oct 86 p 10

[Text] Ankara--The Council of Minister has increased the fund surcharges on imports of cotton and cotton yarn whose prices have declined in international commodity markets. The new rates will be \$100 per metric ton for cotton and \$130 per metric ton for cotton yarn.

In a statement after the Council of Ministers meeting yesterday, Minister of State and government spokesman Hasan Celal Guzel said that the fund surcharges on cotton and cotton yarn were raised from zero to the present levels because of a decline in the prices of these commodities. Guzel stated that the goal of the increased surcharges is to make the importation of cotton and cotton yarn "less attractive." Guzel noted that in the first 7 months of this year 10,000 metric tons of cotton were imported. Stating that cotton imports during the corresponding period of last year totaled only 500 metric tons, Guzel said that the explosive growth in cotton imports was accompanied by a decline in cotton exports this year. Explaining that 1 kilogram of cotton yarn can be manufactured from 1.3 kilograms of cotton, Guzel said that the \$100 and \$130 fund assessments on cotton and cotton yarn were determined on the basis of this ratio.

Meanwhile, the crisis experienced in the textile market in recent months is attributed largely to the high price of [domestic] cotton. The crisis in the textile sector has led to growing inventories of cotton yarn. It is believed that the government's decision to impose duties on cotton imports is designed to protect the manufacturing sector and to reduce cotton yarn inventories.

The decline in world cotton prices before the recent by-elections affected the government's cotton purchases, and cotton growers complained about low prices to Ozal during his campaign trips to Izmir and Manisa. In response, Ozal put into effect a system designed to raise cotton prices before the by-elections. The system reduced fund surcharges on cotton exports and introduced export premiums. However, after the elections the export premiums were found to be too high and were reduced in two stages. The new decision which makes the importation of cotton harder is reportedly designed to raise domestic cotton prices independently from world prices. However, since that has the potential to make raw materials for the textile sector more expensive, it is expected that a proposal "to give subsidized cotton to the export-oriented textile industry" will soon be considered.

EASTERN BUSINESSMEN UNHAPPY WITH DEVELOPMENT PACE

Istanbul CUMHURİYET in Turkish 22 Oct 86 p 11

[Report by Meral Tamer]

[Text] Erzurum--At the Eastern Anatolia regional meeting of the Turkish Union of Chambers [TUC] in Erzurum, the hopes of the representatives of eastern chambers to tell Prime Minister Ozal about the problems of their region were dashed because the Prime Minister chose to "speak" rather than "listen" during the meeting; he spoke virtually uninterrupted for nearly 2 hours. The only persons who had the chance to speak before the Prime Minister were TUC President Ali Coskun and Erzurum Chamber of Commerce and Industry President Ali Sirri Kuskay who made opening remarks as the hosts of the meeting.

At the TUC's Eastern Anatolia regional meeting, it was not hard to see that the participants crowded into the large conference hall of Ataturk University in Erzurum were opposed to Ozal and the Motherland Party [MP]. The eastern chamber and stock exchange leaders, industrialists and businessmen--most of whom were reportedly sympathizers of the Correct Way Party [CWP]--listened frigidly to the issues Ozal raised with an eye to winning applause. As a result, the responsibility to applaud the Prime Minister and to start applauses fell on MP deputy leader Mehmet Kececiler, MP ministers and MP's eastern parliamentary deputies.

Although eastern businessmen could not make themselves heard to the Prime Minister at the TUC's regional meeting, TUC President Ali Coskun said that the meeting was "useful from a viewpoint of starting a dialog between businessmen from eastern regions and the Prime Minister and his ministers." In our opinion, the meeting was dominated by a monolog and rather than a dialog. The monolog was recited by the Prime Minister who did not allow a dialog to start because he left the meeting as soon as he finished his speech.

At yesterday's session of the meeting, Sahamettin Egriçayir, the assembly president of the Erzurum Trade Exchange, said with regard to the frustration of the wish of the region's businessmen to talk with the Prime Minister: "Why should I speak here? We talk about our problems and listen to them among ourselves every day. At a large meeting like this we would have liked to convey our complaints to more senior authorities. However, it was the Prime Minister who talked; he left without listening to us. Apparently, he did not deign to talk to us."

The TUC's regional meetings were begun in 1980 when Mehmet Yazar headed the union. The regional meetings have been held four times a year for the last 6 years. The participation of a prime minister in a regional meeting for the first time made this last meeting particularly significant.

According to a member of the TUC Administrative Council, the first regional meeting was also held in Erzurum about 1 week before 12 September, and by coincidence Turgut Ozal attended that meeting as well. However, at that time Ozal was Undersecretary of the Prime Ministry and Deputy Undersecretary of the State Planning Organization. The TUC official added that at that meeting Ozal praised the 24 January decisions, insisted that shortages were eliminated and said: "Things are improving, but whenever things begin to improve in Turkey there is always someone who will throw a monkey wrench in the wheels." One week after that speech, the 12 September period began. That era greased the wheels of the 24 January decisions rather than throwing a monkey wrench in them.

Ozal attended the TUC regional meeting in Erzurum in 1986, this time as prime minister. At one point during his 2-hour monolog, Ozal said: "There is not much difference between what I said at the TUC regional meeting on 6 September 1980 as undersecretary and what I am saying today." However, he did not use any terms like "wheels" or "monkey wrench."

During his speech, Ozal also made references to [industrialists] Koc and Sabanci. Stating that the names of Koc and Sabanci always come to mind whenever the term "entrepreneurship" is mentioned, Ozal said: "But we have millions of entrepreneurs in our country. Take, for example, the farmers; they are all entrepreneurs. The same applies to small and medium businessmen and industrialists. I know that exports are realized by the small companies and not the large ones. The large ones are only the organizers."

According to Ozal, Turkey's most important problem today is exports. Only a little while prior to Ozal's remarks, TUC President Coskun had declared inflation to be Turkey's No. 1 problem. Another issue over which the TUC President and the Prime Minister differed was the importation of consumer goods. While Coskun said that the growth in consumer good imports must be closely watched, Ozal insisted that consumer good imports are insignificant in terms of their monetary value and are beneficial for the country. Ozal explained these benefits as follows:

"A doll named Barbie is manufactured overseas. It is very well known abroad. When we permitted the importation of toys, I noticed that Fatos Toys has begun manufacturing a Barbie doll. I was very pleased. Our people are very skilled. Nowhere else in the world has anyone managed to make a Barbie clone. The same situation is true in sports shoes. When imports began to come in, domestic ones began to be manufactured and they were of good quality."

Ozal said that "nowhere else in the world has anyone managed to make a Barbie clone," but even in Turkish stores selling imported toys, several Barbie clones--mainly Syndy--are competing with each other, with cheap ones coming from Hong Kong and expensive ones coming from Germany.

According to the Prime Minister, despite the recent increases observed in imports, total imports for this year will be lower than last year's. But the same will apply to exports. Thus the current account deficit will be a little more than last year's.

Ozal said at the meeting that Turkey's reputation abroad has been improving, that \$11 billion have been secured in foreign loans in the last 3 years and that Turkey's ranking in creditworthiness rose from No. 103 in 1980 to No. 51 today. Just as he was saying these the audience began applauding unexpectedly.

There was a strong smell of opposition in the wave of applause that arose when Ozal said: "Whether you like us or not, we are in the same boat. But please do not tarnish our political reputation, because if we lose that it would be very difficult to reinstate it. Turkey's reputation is more important than our prospects of getting elected."

On the other hand, Ozal did not receive the applause he expected when he insisted that he had given the east preferential treatment by keeping floor prices for wheat and sugarbeet high, that he was planning a new credit system for small businessmen and farmers and that the real exporters are the small businesses.

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LIST OF TOP 500 COMPANIES

Istanbul DUNYA in Turkish 6 Oct 86 pp 6,7

[Turkey's 500 largest industrial corporations ranked by the Istanbul Chamber of Industry in accordance with the companies' production sales]

[Text] Notes: 1) The companies listed in the table below are members of chambers of industry and chambers of industry and trade and/or affiliated with state economic enterprises [SEEs].

2) The companies listed in the table below are ranked by their production sales.

3) "Sales revenues" reflect the firms' production sales plus other sales not shown in the table below.

4) Abbreviations used in the table: "KT" indicates SEEs, "V.O." indicates pretax, "SB" indicates Sumerbank and "ETB" indicates Etibank.

5) Some firms have been included in the table by their rank according to their production sales, but their names and/or other data do not appear. In these cases, indicated by "--", the companies in question did not wish to be identified and/or have their data published.

6) Some companies which are members of the Istanbul Chamber of Industry are also members of other chambers.

7) Three of the 500 top firms listed declined to provide information about their capital, and one declined to disclose its net assets.

LIST OF TOP 500 COMPANIES

(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)	(i)
No :	Firma ve Mülkesseler	Beğli bulunduđu Ode/KT	Üretimden Sattıklar (1.000 TL.)	Satış Hasılatı Sıra Tutarı (1.000 TL.)	Brüt Katma Değer Sıra Tutarı (1.000 TL.)	Net Aktif Toplamı Sıra Tutarı (1.000 TL.)	Bilanço Kârı (V.O.) Sıra Tutarı (1.000 TL.)	Sıra No : (1.000 TL.)
1	Tupraş - Türkiye Petrol Rafinerileri A.Ş.	Kamu	2.056.124.616	2.296.098.839	84.310.063	863.907.740	58.580.511	1
2	Türkiye Elektrik Kurumu	Kamu	918.864.770	939.239.342	405.558.493	3.029.097.993	277.964.523	2
3	Tekele İşletmeleri Genel Müdürlüğü	Kamu	619.424.738	844.106.298	239.689.845	396.917.320	120.198.798	3
4	Eregli Demir ve Çelik Fabrikaları T.A.Ş.	Kamu	272.458.386	279.816.172	64.872.601	272.235.527	26.531.016	4
5	Türkiye Şeker Fab. A.Ş.	Kamu	180.762.217	216.046.992	59.235.032	513.543.600	27.975.068	5
6	Çay İşletmeleri Genel Müdürlüğü	Kamu	155.891.680	155.691.680	66.934.042	114.036.429	27.412.567	6
7	Petkim Petrol Kimya A.Ş.	Kamu	144.423.609	159.660.182	39.200.573	598.205.472	3.170.338	7
8	İskenderun Demir Çelik Mües.	Kamu	142.721.627	146.361.550	39.831.576	419.317.597	66.943	8
9	TPAO Türkiye Petrolleri A.O.	Kamu	111.000.400	111.000.400	76.535.900	517.263.100	169.673.400	9
10	Çukurova Elektrik A.Ş.	Adana	95.617.593	95.617.593	38.570.523	60.919.494	31.102.061	10
11	T. Gübre San. A.Ş.	Kamu	93.896.209	93.896.209	24.306.418	114.876.921	923.978	11
12	T.D.C. İsl. Gnl. Müdürl. Karabük D.C. Fab. Mües.	Kamu	93.509.254	93.757.484	26.338.252	127.271.950	1.260.327	12
13	Arçelik A.Ş.	İstanbul	93.066.527	95.641.528	20.902.172	41.693.217	9.466.541	13
14	Unilever-İs. Ticaret ve San. Türk Ltd. Sti.	İstanbul	92.860.161	96.232.220	24.885.747	28.370.025	9.231.201	14
15	Alsa Akrilik Kimya San. A.Ş.	İstanbul	89.458.912	94.625.315	18.405.157	59.010.376	5.274.959	15
16	Oyak-Renault Otomobil Fab. A.Ş.	İstanbul	79.744.200	81.653.300	8.378.000	41.252.941	2.292.700	16
17	Bekoteknik San. A.Ş.	İstanbul	75.282.832	76.060.706	16.008.529	54.995.552	7.113.793	17
18	TOFAS Türk Otomobil Fabrikası A.Ş.	İstanbul	74.090.960	77.131.664	18.820.872	28.292.825	11.077.876	18
19	Sasa Suni ve Sentetik Elyaf San. A.Ş.	Adana	73.476.900	73.855.580	16.646.725	75.202.142	—	19

1. TUPRAS, Turkish Petroleum Refineries Corporation
2. Turkish Electric Power Enterprise
3. State Monopolies Directorate General
4. Eregli Iron and Steel Factories Corporation
5. Turkish Sugar Factories Corporation
6. Tea Industries Directorate General
7. PETKİM, Petrochemical Corporation
8. İSDEMİR, Iskenderun Iron and Steel Works Establishment
9. --
10. TPAO, Turkish Petroleum Corporation
11. Çukurova Electric Corporation
12. Turkish Fertilizer Industry Corporation
13. TDCİ [Turkish Iron and Steel Works Directorate General] Karabük Iron and Steel Factory Establishment
14. Arcelik Corporation
15. Unilever-Is Trade and Industry Corporation
16. Akso Acrylic Chemical Industry Corporation
17. Oyak-Renault Automobile Factory Corporation
18. Bekoteknik Industry Corporation
19. TOFAS, Turkish Automobile Factory Corporation
20. Sasa Artificial and Synthetic Fiber Industry Corporation

21	Uzel Makina San. A.Ş.	İstanbul	71.268.543	28	71.579.807	36	14.223.597	90	23.853.719	16	11.312.163	12	21.788.358	40.286
22	Olinus Otomobil San. A.Ş.	İstanbul	70.061.059	29	71.157.502	37	14.207.640	28	52.616.946	—	1.206.640	336	84.893	159
23	Bağlus Rendirne Gubre Fabrikaları A.Ş.	İstanbul	68.384.427	27	72.421.613	78	8.319.479	59	32.887.793	35	5.587.236	37	10.810.730	19.700
24	TKI Garp Linyitleri İşletmesi Müessesesi	Kamu	66.198.561	31	66.501.143	13	27.789.339	12	116.095.219	40	5.250.000	—	—	—
25	Lassa Lastik San. ve Tic. A.Ş.	İstanbul	63.657.123	32	63.786.869	35	14.945.760	32	46.087.189	26	7.354.873	22	14.428.984	26.526
26	Ei ve Balık Kurumu Genel Müdürlüğü	Kamu	63.100.807	30	68.255.506	22	18.437.131	38	42.272.514	37	5.454.412	138	2.715.788	5.376
27	Rabak Elektronik Bakır ve Mamulleri A.Ş.	İstanbul	62.211.481	34	62.211.481	51	11.529.729	43	40.309.372	105	1.632.973	16	16.667.677	33.586
28	Kordsa Kırdı Bezi Sanayi ve Ticaret A.Ş.	İstanbul	60.275.474	36	60.322.875	27	16.291.952	36	42.778.575	29	6.972.859	11	22.199.438	37.770
29	Çukurova Çelik Endüstrisi A.Ş.	İstanbul	57.794.306	37	58.839.853	58	10.513.505	18	74.389.099	222	624.040	40	10.530.340	22.031
30	Metaş İzmir Metalurji Fab. T.A.Ş.	Ege-İzmir	57.715.203	38	58.210.123	72	8.427.344	116	18.919.207	—	2.644.457	28	12.238.040	24.105
31	Colakçılıo Metalurji A.Ş.	İstanbul	53.408.268	41	55.204.953	427	927.004	112	19.506.768	—	411.928	3	30.437.602	48.345
32	Telra Elektronik San. ve Tic. A.Ş.	İstanbul	53.398.220	39	57.923.877	64	9.622.196	33	44.709.333	94	1.886.267	234	811.026	1.557
33	Fiskobirlik Fındık Tarım Satış Koop. Birli.	Giresun	53.220.491	42	53.334.351	50	11.599.886	31	47.298.762	—	19.067.553	6	26.718.019	53.922
34	Etibank Seydisehir Alüminyum İşl. Müessesesi	Kamu	53.213.950	43	53.213.950	18	21.591.070	16	75.694.974	302	357.905	148	2.244.133	3.871
35	Gubre Fab. T.A.Ş.	İstanbul	52.327.207	44	52.375.892	67	8.948.550	61	31.489.073	100	1.719.885	53	8.004.544	14.636
36	Alarko Sanayi ve Ticaret A.Ş.	İstanbul	52.203.872	35	60.654.727	57	10.646.882	37	42.752.281	55	3.314.926	274	470.164	845
37	Türk Traktor ve Ziraat Makineleri A.Ş.	Ankara	49.619.167	45	49.619.167	86	7.698.501	122	18.217.532	429	45.595	364	12.017	20
38	BMC Sanayi ve Ticaret A.Ş.	Ege-İzmir	48.464.196	47	48.745.734	39	13.663.389	41	41.481.331	—	604.415	208	1.088.080	2.336
39	Chrysler Kamyon İmalatçıları A.Ş.	İstanbul	47.443.876	46	48.838.469	166	4.071.889	83	25.119.427	114	1.545.971	358	18.661	41
40	Puş Petrol Olanı A.Ş. Genel Müdürlüğü	Kamu	46.318.022	2	1.312.122.457	12	30.990.864	—	—	5	35.416.219	—	—	—

21. Uzel Machine Industry Corporation
22. OTOSAN, Automobile Industry Corporation
23. BAGFAS, Bandirma Fertilizer Factories Corporation
24. TKI [Turkish Coal Works] Garp Lignite Works Establishment
25. Lassa Tire Industry and Trade Corporation
26. Meat and Fish Association Directorate General
27. Rabak Electrolytic Copper and Products Corporation
28. Kordsa Corduroy Fabric Industry and Trade Corporation
29. Cukurova Steel Industry Corporation
30. METAS, Izmir Metallurgy Factory Corporation
31. Colakoglu Metallurgy Corporation
32. Telra Electronic Industry and Trade Corporation
33. Fiskobirlik Hazelnut Agricultural Sales Cooperative Union
34. Etibank Seydisehir Aluminum Works Establishment
35. Fertilizer Factory Corporation
36. Alarko Industry and Trade Corporation
37. Turkish Tractor and Agricultural Machinery Corporation
38. BMC Industry and Trade Corporation
39. Chrysler Truck Manufacturers Corporation
40. POAS, Petroleum Office Corporation Directorate General

Sıra No	(a) Firma ve Müesseseler	(b)	(c) Bağlı bulunduğu Oda/KT	(d) Üretimden Satışlar		(e) Satış Hasılatı		(f) Brüt Kelime Değer		(g) Net Aktif Toplamı		(h) Bilanço Kârı (V.Ö.)		(i) İhracat	
				Sıra No	Tutarı (1.000 TL.)	Sıra No	Tutarı (1.000 TL.)	Sıra No	Tutarı (1.000 TL.)	Sıra No	Tutarı (1.000 TL.)	Sıra No	Tutarı (1.000 TL.)		Sıra No
41	Aygaz A.Ş.		İstanbul	46.014.446	33	62.523.976	108	6.284.255	107	20.316.471	97	1.855.416	277	450.897	868
42	İgssas İstanbul Gübreyi A.Ş.		İstanbul	41.652.028	55	41.652.028	151	4.543.908	50	36.866.612	77	5.921.860	—	—	—
43	Türk Pirelli Lastikleri A.Ş.		Kamu	41.505.472	54	41.734.679	47	11.784.502	104	20.781.812	25	7.480.327	73	5.801.190	11.334
44	Bossa Ticaret ve San. İşletmeleri T.A.Ş.		Adana	41.369.843	51	44.189.840	24	16.842.921	80	25.714.823	36	5.534.500	14	17.630.357	31.183
45	Me-Ta Elektronik End. ve Tic. A.Ş.		İstanbul	40.608.226	53	42.285.213	138	4.788.374	141	16.090.038	56	3.281.181	357	19.386	33
46	Günay Sanayi ve Ticaret İşletmeleri A.Ş.		Adana	39.867.076	56	41.210.534	41	12.953.219	84	30.030.716	247	511.970	13	19.233.654	38.865
47	Temsa Temizlik Maddeleri San. ve Tic. A.Ş.		İstanbul	39.812.824	57	39.914.101	80	8.135.921	181	11.905.234	185	813.058	321	128.306	245
48	Otopar San. ve Tic. A.Ş.		İstanbul	38.849.706	52	43.065.490	373	1.363.516	289	5.977.857	434	34.970	—	—	—
49	Marsa Margarin San. A.Ş.		Adana	38.800.463	60	38.848.741	70	8.590.780	97	21.584.485	38	5.362.485	86	5.240.457	11.660
50	Oto Yol San. A.Ş.		İstanbul	38.221.702	61	38.832.640	89	7.394.206	105	20.728.460	—	830.348	264	535.314	967
51	Akdeniz Gübreyi A.Ş.		Merain	38.064.589	59	39.149.215	79	8.207.153	82	25.459.857	52	3.760.619	—	—	—
52	Oronarsan Otobüs ve Mot. Araç San. A.Ş.		İstanbul	37.482.000	48	45.756.100	56	10.680.173	73	—	45	4.838.000	29	11.864.000	23.389
53	Mobil Oil T.A.Ş.		İstanbul	37.326.735	8	247.139.982	135	4.880.866	62	30.948.329	34	5.883.221	—	—	—
54	Ak-Al Tekstil San. A.Ş.		İstanbul	36.960.867	64	37.049.089	46	12.081.368	96	21.983.151	48	1.110.431	45	9.659.201	18.837
55	M.A.N. Kamyon ve Otobüs San. A.Ş.		İstanbul	36.460.698	62	38.251.135	49	11.721.238	24	55.637.174	418	66.453	247	686.045	1.325
56	Izmir Pamuk Tarım Satış Koop. Birliği - Tarıf		Ege-Izmir	36.295.734	65	38.295.734	45	12.467.265	46	39.373.726	33	6.040.184	66	6.301.373	12.867
57	Peg Profilo Elektrikli Gereçler San. A.Ş.		İstanbul	36.212.305	63	37.667.991	60	10.491.030	45	39.827.427	280	412.538	346	48.031	50
58	TKİ S.S. Ege Linyitleri İşletmeleri Müessesesi		Kamu	36.183.295	66	36.218.492	11	31.280.743	34	44.489.735	30	6.725.687	—	—	—
59			İstanbul	—	49	—	109	—	119	—	51	—	58	—	—
60															

41. Aygaz Corporation
42. ---
43. IGSAS, İstanbul Fertilizer Industry Corporation
44. Turk Pirelli Tires Corporation
45. Bossa Trade and Industry Corporation
46. Me-Ta Electronic Industry and Trade Corporation
47. Gunev Industry and Trade Corporation
48. Temsa Cleaning Materials Industry and Trade Corporation
49. Otopar Industry and Trade Corporation
50. Marsa Margarine Industry Corporation
51. Oto Yol Industry Corporation
52. Akdeniz Fertilizer Industry Corporation
53. OTOMARSAN, Bus and Motor Vehicle Industry Corporation
54. Mobil Oil Corporation
55. Ak-Al Textile Industry Corporation
56. M.A.N. Truck and Bus Industry Corporation
57. Izmir Cotton Agricultural Sales Cooperative Union-TARIS [Agricultural Workers Union]
58. Peg Profilo Electrical Gadgets Industry Corporation
59. TKI Aegean Lignite Works Establishment
60.

61	Mintax Deterjan San. A.Ş.	Istanbul	35.563.764	68	35.565.002	121	5.262.277	118	18.444.489	67	2.874.744	187	1.409.992	2.179
62	Nasaç Alüminyum San. ve Tic. A.Ş.	Istanbul	35.063.053	69	35.067.368	150	4.565.817	47	36.114.824	139	1.131.709	25	13.243.202	25.362
63	Eczacıbaşı İlaç Sanayi ve Ticaret A.Ş.	Istanbul	34.534.313	70	34.567.131	55	10.882.600	76	26.752.790	121	1.313.656	194	1.281.687	2.285
64	Goodyear Lastikler T.A.Ş.	Istanbul	34.252.145	72	34.252.145	54	10.892.989	144	15.639.976	28	7.011.294	313	185.819	276
65	Toros Gübre ve Kimya Endüstrisi A.Ş.	Istanbul	33.912.863	67	36.192.259	66	9.167.031	49	36.950.775	111	1.578.115	278	442.260	771
66	Yem San. T.A.Ş.	Kamu	33.098.019	71	34.367.545	169	3.981.142	187	11.490.963	148	1.084.512	—	—	—
67	Seke İzmit Selüloz ve Kağıt Müessesesi	Kamu	32.783.894	58	39.841.134	31	15.928.645	71	28.598.940	72	2.563.578	—	—	—
68	Cihan Elektronik San. A.Ş.	Istanbul	32.556.501	73	33.175.029	91	7.216.985	147	15.411.665	53	3.721.013	355	21.985	40
69	Cer Metal San. ve Tic. A.Ş.	İzmit	32.228.116	40	56.358.185	81	8.095.689	133	18.378.433	44	4.956.486	10	22.210.375	41.958
70	Türkiye Yağ ve Mamulleri A.Ş. Turyağ	Ege-İzmir	31.483.888	75	31.820.213	112	5.822.812	162	13.376.518	—	676.161	143	2.413.249	4.507
71	Mannesmann-Sümerbank Boru Endü. T.A.Ş.	İzmit	30.863.255	78	30.863.255	117	5.577.080	187	12.860.692	66	3.009.748	69	6.138.511	12.007
72	Sönmez Filament Sentetik İplik ve Elyaf San. A.Ş.	Bursa	30.792.693	79	30.792.693	82	8.060.524	89	24.079.797	79	2.311.653	49	8.534.642	16.265
73	Etibank Emek Kolmanit İpl. Müessesesi	Kamu	30.604.844	80	30.604.844	15	25.776.678	55	33.365.379	11	26.841.395	7	25.488.322	47.025
74	Seke-Dalaman Müessesesi Müdürlüğü	Kamu	30.259.203	81	30.259.203	52	11.158.388	52	36.071.023	261	452.823	265	531.731	1.014
75	Teletaş Telekomünikasyon End. Tic. A.Ş.	Istanbul	30.080.898	82	30.097.309	32	15.910.538	75	27.070.553	24	7.893.718	—	—	—
76	Soda San. A.Ş.	Meralin.	29.943.794	83	30.042.265	68	8.736.422	44	40.300.997	153	1.045.315	52	8.048.353	15.547
77	Borusan Gemlik Boru Testileri	Istanbul	29.901.836	84	30.004.413	137	4.792.615	142	16.023.056	108	1.588.220	36	10.999.994	21.766
78	Karadeniz Bakır İpl. A.Ş.	Kamu	28.900.501	85	28.900.501	20	19.624.683	29	51.278.159	—	4.166.300	—	—	—
79	Trakya Cam San. A.Ş.	Istanbul	28.601.200	86	28.627.175	34	14.965.332	39	42.046.289	180	833.716	71	6.056.576	11.661
80	Asil Çelik San. ve Tic. A.Ş.	Kamu	27.676.879	88	27.690.111	120	5.353.232	21	60.193.751	—	3.968.1.5	160	1.917.248	3.434

61. Mintax Detergent Industry Corporation
62. Nasas Aluminum Industry Trade Corporation
63. Eczacıbaşı Pharmaceuticals Industry and Trade Corporation
64. Goodyear Tires Corporation
65. Toros Fertilizer and Chemical Industry Corporation
66. Animal Feed Industry Corporation
67. SEKA [Turkish Cellulose and Paper Factories] İzmit Cellulose and Paper Establishment
68. Cihan Electronic Industry Corporation
69. Cer Metal Industry and Trade Corporation
70. Turyag Turkish Edible Oil Products Industry Corporation
71. Mannesman-Sümerbank Pipe Industry Corporation
72. Sonmez Filament, Synthetic Yarn and Fiber Industry Corporation
73. Etibank Emek Colemanite Works Establishment
74. SEKA Dalaman Establishment Directorate General
75. TELETAS, Telecommunication Industry and Trade Corporation
76. Soda Industry Corporation
77. BORUSAN Gemlik Pipe Factories Corporation
78. Black Sea Copper Works Corporation
79. Trakya Glass Industry Corporation
80. Asil Steel Industry and Trade Corporation

(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)	(i)
No :	Firma ve Müesseseler	Bağlı Bulundduğu Oda/KT	Üretimden Satışlar (1.000 TL.)	Satış Hasılatı (1.000 TL.)	Brüt Katma Değer Sıra Tutarı (1.000 TL.)	Net AKRif Toplamı Sıra Tutarı (1.000 TL.)	Bilanço Kârı (V.D.) Sıra Tutarı (1.000 TL.)	Sıra No : (1.000 TL.)
81	Çanakkale Seramik Fab. A.Ş.	İstanbul	27.397.505	27.397.505	13.912.820	20.215.238	3.142.678	165
82	Anadolü Cam San. A.Ş.	İstanbul	27.383.816	27.879.299	12.716.648	19.762.701	1.243.243	27
83	Bozkurt Mensucat San. A.Ş.	İstanbul	26.205.872	26.485.147	6.905.699	19.773.046	2.143.619	39
84	NETAS Northern Electric Telekomünikasyon A.Ş.	İstanbul	26.076.917	26.076.917	16.029.517	25.727.690	4.261.176	281
85	---	İstanbul	---	---	---	---	---	76
86	Izmir Demir Çelik San. A.Ş.	Ege-Izmir	25.812.334	25.912.856	3.918.477	33.231.336	2.247.158	24
87	The Shell Company Oil Turkey Ltd.	İstanbul	25.776.082	320.578.318	13.553.024	33.332.633	12.388.851	---
88	Mensucat Santral T.A.Ş.	İstanbul	25.685.232	26.844.825	7.110.263	26.571.376	1.001.090	20
89	Ege Göbre San. A.Ş.	Ege-Izmir	25.606.516	25.606.516	3.001.194	15.235.689	2.113.031	---
90	Vestel Elektronik San. ve Tic. A.Ş.	Manisa	25.206.160	25.206.160	2.908.038	16.178.116	1.109.874	310
91	Çayırova Cam San. A.Ş.	İstanbul	25.039.032	25.039.032	6.003.211	17.943.721	492.948	59
92	Türk Demir Doküm Fabr. A.Ş.	İstanbul	25.002.695	31.121.703	10.511.581	21.491.290	4.085.511	220
93	Silâh Sanetik İplik Fabrikaları A.Ş.	Bursa	24.862.915	25.008.481	7.230.948	16.202.781	1.608.985	53
94	Ak Çimento Tic. A.Ş.	İstanbul	24.922.040	24.938.653	8.374.840	15.981.619	2.590.235	146
95	Aksu İplik Dokuma ve Boya Apre Fab. T.A.Ş.	İstanbul	24.430.834	24.463.252	7.701.351	24.675.933	1.109.663	47
96	Pasabahçe Cam Sanayii A.Ş.	İstanbul	24.339.961	24.373.978	10.049.808	24.803.893	56.281	41
97	Hürriyet Gazetecilik ve Matbaacılık A.Ş.	İstanbul	24.008.878	24.404.112	6.990.530	9.482.339	1.695.711	103
98	DYO ve Sadolin Sent. Selül. Boya ve Ver. Fab. A.Ş.	Ege-Izmir	23.718.073	23.718.070	---	---	---	303
99	SEKA Balikesir Mües.	Karşı	23.651.415	23.651.415	6.718.567	61.338.076	5.140.838	359
100	Topkapı Şişe Sanayii A.Ş.	İstanbul	23.331.753	23.331.753	7.599.183	18.989.225	38.999	111

81. Canakkale Ceramic Factory Corporation
82. Anadolu Glass Industry Corporation
83. Bozkurt Textile Industry Corporation
84. NETAS, Northern Electric Telecommunication Industry Corporation
85. ---
86. Izmir Iron and Steel Industry Corporation
87. The Shell Company of Turkey Corporation
88. Mensucat [textile] Santral Corporation
89. Ege Fertilizer Industry Corporation
90. Vestel Electronic Industry and Trade Corporation
91. Çayırova Glass Industry Corporation
92. Turkish Iron Foundry Factory Corporation
93. SIFAS, Synthetic Yarn Factories Corporation
94. Ak Cement Trade Corporation
95. Aksu Yarn Weaving, Dyeing and Dressing Factory Corporation
96. Pasabahçe Glass Industry Corporation
97. Hürriyet Publishing and Printing Corporation
98. DYO [Durmus Yasar and Sons] and Sadolin Synthetic Cellulose and Paint Factories Corporation
99. SEKA Balikesir Establishment Corporation
100. Topkapı Bottle Industry Corporation

101	Sümerbank Pamuk Sat ve Çiçir Fab. Mües.	Kamu	23.024.344	110	224.281	404	1.447.875	441	8.833	—	—
102	TCDD Etiliştir Tokomotif ve Motor San. Mües.	Kamu	22.204.917	113	7.027.819	69	28.818.256	299	361.745	—	—
103	Türkiye Ziral Donatım Kurumu	Kamu	22.095.011	5	—	62.884.923	7	409.653.454	8	29.043.999	—
104	Bısaş Bursa İplik Sanayii A Ş	İstanbul	22.042.562	112	22.426.921	83	8.034.640	26	55.163.581	70	6.082.899
105	Türkiye Gemt San. A Ş	Kamu	21.897.490	115	21.897.490	44	12.701.185	48	37.479.968	289	337.970
106	Çukurova Çimento San. T.A.Ş.	Adana	21.740.538	117	21.740.538	125	5.120.632	228	8.981.342	61	8.733.982
107	Ateİsan Akeri Elektronik San. ve Tic. A.Ş.	Kamu	21.710.737	118	21.710.737	62	10.424.821	63	30.194.386	32	8.879.105
108	Sönmez A.S.F. İplik Dokuma ve Boya San. A.Ş.	Bursa	21.362.208	114	22.279.150	213	3.176.284	137	18.219.903	239	7.068.665
109	Marshall Boya ve Vernik San. A.Ş.	İstanbul	21.135.900	92	26.558.544	172	3.920.744	232	8.593.044	131	3.359.308
110	TZDK Fabrikaları Müessesesi	Kamu	20.861.765	119	21.825.920	292	2.188.429	132	16.458.040	—	—
111	Dinarsu İmalat ve Tic. T.A.Ş.	İstanbul	20.581.362	122	20.665.338	99	8.835.981	117	18.453.802	210	693.406
112	Sanko Tekstil Sanayi ve Ticaret A.Ş.	Gaziantep	20.412.211	109	23.237.744	84	7.730.188	157	13.777.564	84	4.230.339
113	Mente Mensucat San. ve Tic. A.Ş.	Adana	20.375.126	123	20.494.741	98	6.868.444	60	31.802.548	345	1.427.247
114	Roche Mustahzarları San. A.Ş.	İstanbul	20.201.101	125	20.201.101	179	3.746.090	148	15.243.393	212	81.096
115	Orpaş Metal San. ve Tic. A.Ş.	İstanbul	19.908.075	111	22.989.893	382	1.240.773	318	5.393.181	—	—
116	Antbirlık (Antalya Pa. Ta. Sa. Koop. Birliđi)	Antalya	19.638.114	121	20.868.421	61	10.458.935	91	23.692.744	43	1.487.438
117	Ekinciler Demir Çelik San. A.Ş.	İstanbul	19.623.241	126	19.623.241	364	1.427.395	287	5.989.090	236	557.288
118	Etibank Kirka Boraks İřit. Müessesesi	Kamu	19.317.174	129	19.317.174	28	16.060.924	74	28.048.559	13	15.092.918
119	Nuh Çimento Sanayii A.Ş.	Ankara	19.187.445	130	19.187.445	—	—	207	10.312.982	6	—
120	Seİa Akdeniz Müessesesi Müdürlüğü	Kamu	19.153.675	131	19.153.675	157	4.412.217	15	85.159.317	—	7.911.048

101. Sumerbank Cotton Sales and Processing Factories Establishment
102. TCDD [Turkish State Railways] Eskisehir Locomotive and Engine Industry Establishment
103. TZDK, Turkish Agricultural Equipment Corporation
104. BISAS, Bursa Yarn Industry Corporation
105. Turkish Shipbuilding Industry Corporation
106. Cukurova Cement Industry Corporation
107. ASELSAN, Military Electronic Industry and Trade Corporation
108. Sonmez A.S.F. Yarn Weaving and Dyeing Industry Corporation
109. Marshall Paint and Varnish Industry Corporation
110. TZDK Factories Establishment
111. Dinarsu Manufacturing and Trade Corporation
112. Sanko Textile Industry and Trade Corporation
113. Mensa Textile Industry and Trade Corporation
114. Roche Compounds Industry Corporation
115. Orpas Metal Industry and Trade Corporation
116. Antbirlık (Antalya Cotton Agricultural Sales Cooperative Union)
117. Ekinciler Iron and Steel Industry Corporation
118. Etibank Kirka Borax Works Establishment
119. Nuh Cement Industry Corporation
120. SEKA Mediterranean Establishment Directorate General

(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)	(i)	
Sıra No	Firma ve Müesseseler	Birli Bulundugu Ode/i	Üretimden Satilar	Satış Hasılahı Sıra Tutari	Buik Katma Değır Sıra Tutari	Net Akıf Toplamı Sıra Tutari	Bilanço Kıvı (V.O.) Sıra Tutari	Sıra No	
No			(1.000 TL.)	(1.000 TL.)	(1.000 TL.)	(1.000 TL.)	(1.000 TL.)	(1.000 TL.)	
121	Etibank Ban. Bor. ve Asit Fab. İhl. Mües.	Kamu	19.106.383	19.106.383	12.766.861	42.787.108	8.064.666	46	
122	Etibank Şark Krom. Fer. İhtisemi Mües.	Kamu	18.667.439	18.669.439	11.738.916	33.448.386	8.315.868	21	
123	Pemko Pro. Elek. Mot. ve Komp. San. A.Ş.	İstanbul	18.560.414	19.090.142	6.485.525	14.280.592	208.338	191	
124	Komili Yağ Sabun Gli. San. ve Tic. A.Ş.	İstanbul	18.411.692	19.031.231	—	—	414.970	51	
125	Üstün Çelik Malz. İmalat ve Mon. San. A.Ş.	Ankara	18.319.357	19.343.783	1.639.055	3.328.681	278.137	30	
126	Çimsa Çimento Sanayi ve Ticaret A.Ş.	Merzin	18.318.230	18.440.593	5.013.003	12.859.516	3.076.852	83	
127	BP Petrolleri A.Ş.	İstanbul	18.221.895	11.108.083	2.884.683	16.536.062	2.040.868	304	
128	Çimento İzmir Çimento Fab. T.A.Ş.	Ege-İzmir	17.678.540	17.678.540	6.949.075	12.727.179	5.185.698	227	
129	Fako İlaçları A.Ş.	İstanbul	17.559.319	17.559.319	5.055.675	19.550.614	608.140	126	
130	Hema Diğli Sanayi ve Ticaret A.Ş.	Ankara	17.504.042	20.316.363	1.583.682	29.359.678	—	341	
131	Samedoğlu Orm. Ürün. Değ. San. ve Tic. A.Ş.	Taurus	17.176.941	17.489.324	328.667	3.003.797	82.039	—	
132	Konya Şeker Fab.	Ankara	17.061.160	21.787.659	4.620.439	36.494.772	2.144.747	78	
133	Etem Özsoy Tarım Tic. ve San. A.Ş.	Ege-İzmir	17.042.965	—	—	5.277.857	—	15	
134	Etibank Bigadiç Mad. İhtisemi Müessesesi	Kamu	16.895.039	16.895.039	15.206.480	17.097.740	12.553.903	17	
135	Mektaş Madeni Ev Ger. San. ve Tic. A.Ş.	Denizli	16.833.550	16.833.550	6.835.464	14.593.170	4.313.971	—	
136	—	İstanbul	—	357	—	—	—	33	
137	ÇBS Bıye-Kimya San. ve Tic. A.Ş.	İstanbul	16.504.210	16.504.210	1.854.180	7.226.999	431.344	169	
138	Kilim Gurubu Kartaltepe Men. Fab. T.A.Ş.	İstanbul	16.313.992	16.313.992	2.724.777	12.330.024	226.077	50	
139	Aslan Çimento A.Ş.	İstanbul	16.122.569	16.278.672	3.538.032	14.015.875	132.720	177	
140	Koruma Tarım İlaçları A.Ş.	İstanbul	16.109.347	16.218.079	5.452.733	—	—	292	
121.	Etibank Bandirma Borax and Acid Factories Establishment	127. BP Petroleum Corporation	127. BP Petroleum Corporation	127. BP Petroleum Corporation	127. BP Petroleum Corporation	127. BP Petroleum Corporation	127. BP Petroleum Corporation	127. BP Petroleum Corporation	127. BP Petroleum Corporation
122.	Etibank Eastern Chromium and Ferrite Works Establishment	128. CIMENTAS, Izmir Cement Factory Corporation	128. CIMENTAS, Izmir Cement Factory Corporation	128. CIMENTAS, Izmir Cement Factory Corporation	128. CIMENTAS, Izmir Cement Factory Corporation	128. CIMENTAS, Izmir Cement Factory Corporation	128. CIMENTAS, Izmir Cement Factory Corporation	128. CIMENTAS, Izmir Cement Factory Corporation	128. CIMENTAS, Izmir Cement Factory Corporation
123.	Pemko Electrical Motor and Compressor Industry Corporation	129. Fako Pharmaceuticals Corporation	129. Fako Pharmaceuticals Corporation	129. Fako Pharmaceuticals Corporation	129. Fako Pharmaceuticals Corporation	129. Fako Pharmaceuticals Corporation	129. Fako Pharmaceuticals Corporation	129. Fako Pharmaceuticals Corporation	129. Fako Pharmaceuticals Corporation
124.	Komili Oils, Soap and Glycerine Industry and Trade Corporation	130. Hema Gear Industry and Trade Corporation	130. Hema Gear Industry and Trade Corporation	130. Hema Gear Industry and Trade Corporation	130. Hema Gear Industry and Trade Corporation	130. Hema Gear Industry and Trade Corporation	130. Hema Gear Industry and Trade Corporation	130. Hema Gear Industry and Trade Corporation	130. Hema Gear Industry and Trade Corporation
125.	Ustun Steel Products Manufacturing and Assembly Industry Corporation	131. Samedoğlu Forest Product Processing Industry and Trade Corporation	131. Samedoğlu Forest Product Processing Industry and Trade Corporation	131. Samedoğlu Forest Product Processing Industry and Trade Corporation	131. Samedoğlu Forest Product Processing Industry and Trade Corporation	131. Samedoğlu Forest Product Processing Industry and Trade Corporation	131. Samedoğlu Forest Product Processing Industry and Trade Corporation	131. Samedoğlu Forest Product Processing Industry and Trade Corporation	131. Samedoğlu Forest Product Processing Industry and Trade Corporation
126.	Çimsa Cement Industry and Trade Corporation	132. Konya Sugar Factories Trade and Industry Corporation	132. Konya Sugar Factories Trade and Industry Corporation	132. Konya Sugar Factories Trade and Industry Corporation	132. Konya Sugar Factories Trade and Industry Corporation	132. Konya Sugar Factories Trade and Industry Corporation	132. Konya Sugar Factories Trade and Industry Corporation	132. Konya Sugar Factories Trade and Industry Corporation	132. Konya Sugar Factories Trade and Industry Corporation
		133. Etem Özsoy Agricultural Corporation	133. Etem Özsoy Agricultural Corporation	133. Etem Özsoy Agricultural Corporation	133. Etem Özsoy Agricultural Corporation	133. Etem Özsoy Agricultural Corporation	133. Etem Özsoy Agricultural Corporation	133. Etem Özsoy Agricultural Corporation	133. Etem Özsoy Agricultural Corporation
		134. Etibank Bigadic Mines Establishment	134. Etibank Bigadic Mines Establishment	134. Etibank Bigadic Mines Establishment	134. Etibank Bigadic Mines Establishment	134. Etibank Bigadic Mines Establishment	134. Etibank Bigadic Mines Establishment	134. Etibank Bigadic Mines Establishment	134. Etibank Bigadic Mines Establishment
		135. MEKTAS, Metal Household Gadgets Industry and Trade Corporation	135. MEKTAS, Metal Household Gadgets Industry and Trade Corporation	135. MEKTAS, Metal Household Gadgets Industry and Trade Corporation	135. MEKTAS, Metal Household Gadgets Industry and Trade Corporation	135. MEKTAS, Metal Household Gadgets Industry and Trade Corporation	135. MEKTAS, Metal Household Gadgets Industry and Trade Corporation	135. MEKTAS, Metal Household Gadgets Industry and Trade Corporation	135. MEKTAS, Metal Household Gadgets Industry and Trade Corporation
		136. —	136. —	136. —	136. —	136. —	136. —	136. —	136. —
		137. CBS Paint and Chemical Industry Corporation	137. CBS Paint and Chemical Industry Corporation	137. CBS Paint and Chemical Industry Corporation	137. CBS Paint and Chemical Industry Corporation	137. CBS Paint and Chemical Industry Corporation	137. CBS Paint and Chemical Industry Corporation	137. CBS Paint and Chemical Industry Corporation	137. CBS Paint and Chemical Industry Corporation
		138. Kartaltepe Textile Factory Corporation--Rugs Division	138. Kartaltepe Textile Factory Corporation--Rugs Division	138. Kartaltepe Textile Factory Corporation--Rugs Division	138. Kartaltepe Textile Factory Corporation--Rugs Division	138. Kartaltepe Textile Factory Corporation--Rugs Division	138. Kartaltepe Textile Factory Corporation--Rugs Division	138. Kartaltepe Textile Factory Corporation--Rugs Division	138. Kartaltepe Textile Factory Corporation--Rugs Division
		139. Aslan Cement Corporation	139. Aslan Cement Corporation	139. Aslan Cement Corporation	139. Aslan Cement Corporation	139. Aslan Cement Corporation	139. Aslan Cement Corporation	139. Aslan Cement Corporation	139. Aslan Cement Corporation
		140. Koruma Agricultural Chemicals Corporation	140. Koruma Agricultural Chemicals Corporation	140. Koruma Agricultural Chemicals Corporation	140. Koruma Agricultural Chemicals Corporation	140. Koruma Agricultural Chemicals Corporation	140. Koruma Agricultural Chemicals Corporation	140. Koruma Agricultural Chemicals Corporation	140. Koruma Agricultural Chemicals Corporation

141	Bati Anadolu Cimento San. A.Ş.	Ege-Izmir	15.995.481	155	15.995.481	73	8.410.753	208	10.308.931	42	5.094.070	218	923.119	1.845
141	Teksa Tekstil Ticaret ve Sanayi A.Ş.	Adana	15.599.608	150	16.304.746	88	7.397.810	173	12.696.377	127	1.255.136	64	6.467.997	12.368
143	Kalebodur Seramik Sanayi A.Ş.	Istanbul	15.339.678	158	15.699.384	148	4.598.245	238	8.115.654	92	1.951.144	237	787.686	1.481
144	Çinko-Kurşun Metal Sanayi A.Ş.	Kayseri	15.325.366	157	15.731.374	417	1.001.735	93	23.052.907	—	3.908.039	311	184.984	374
145	Berdan Tekstil San. ve Tic. A.Ş.	Tarsus	15.280.842	94	26.317.254	85	9.330.438	88	24.081.240	354	223.656	26	13.112.924	25.682
146	İsto Tekstil San. ve Tic. A.Ş.	Gaziantep	15.216.146	181	15.592.490	101	6.809.751	197	11.060.450	82	2.189.532	63	8.659.549	12.263
147	Seke Çaycuma Müessesesi	Kamu	15.201.188	156	15.852.874	106	6.429.652	200	10.765.379	59	3.210.715	72	5.904.667	—
148	Altinyıldız Men. ve Konf. Fabr. A.Ş.	Istanbul	15.085.272	159	15.646.500	69	8.683.241	77	26.599.875	311	332.626	96	4.413.525	8.232
149	Bakırsan Bakır San. Mamulleri ve Tic. A.Ş.	Istanbul	15.069.287	164	15.069.289	167	4.013.976	109	19.815.405	361	205.043	145	2.307.489	4.330
150	Alemdar Kimyas. End. A.Ş.	Istanbul	14.922.248	163	15.215.440	203	3.323.020	311	5.481.674	322	310.652	48	9.245.946	17.622
151	Sarkıysan Elek. Bakır San. ve Tic. A.Ş.	Izmit	14.834.558	144	17.181.271	392	1.206.196	124	17.731.833	85	2.133.847	42	10.178.679	19.239
152	T.S.E.K. Genel Müdürlüğü	Kamu	14.720.823	168	14.720.823	204	3.297.484	134	16.315.143	161	982.132	—	—	—
153	EtiBank Antalya Elec. Trom. San. İhl. Mües.	Kamu	14.575.751	189	14.575.751	110	6.006.959	145	15.598.704	50	3.993.211	54	7.734.037	14.168
154	—	Ankara	—	136	—	178	—	241	—	116	—	—	—	—
155	Pınarsüt Mamulleri San. A.Ş.	Ege-Izmir	14.234.510	171	14.234.510	185	4.119.908	186	11.502.154	283	405.202	240	740.000	1.275
156	İes İzmir Elektronik San. ve Tic. A.Ş.	Ege-Izmir	14.097.266	172	14.182.903	229	2.903.089	188	11.429.903	241	521.750	—	—	—
157	Adapazarı Şeker Fab.	Ankara	14.064.010	143	17.189.759	383	1.233.938	94	22.419.777	—	1.855.683	352	32.953	66
158	Maktaş Makarnacılık ve Tic. T.A.Ş.	Ege-Izmir	14.057.587	173	14.159.446	247	2.608.426	265	6.937.625	334	268.079	198	1.248.418	2.418
159	Narin Mensucat Fabrikaları A.Ş.	Istanbul	13.983.507	170	14.526.323	140	4.759.063	101	21.237.892	193	768.498	74	5.848.600	10.344
160	Yalova Elyaf ve İplik San. ve Tic. A.Ş.	Istanbul	13.874.489	175	13.874.489	156	4.441.093	159	13.623.582	318	317.967	119	3.356.440	6.514

141. Bati Anadolu Cement Industry Corporation
142. Teksa Textile Trade and Industry Corporation
143. Kalebodur Ceramic Industry Corporation
144. Zinc and Lead Metal Industry Corporation
145. Berdan Textile Industry and Trade Corporation
146. Isko Textile Industry and Trade Corporation
147. SEKA Çaycuma Establishment
148. Altinyıldız Textile and Apparel Factory Corporation
149. BAKIRSAN, Copper Industry Manufacturing and Trade Corporation
150. Alemdar Chemical Industry Corporation
151. Sarkıysan Electrical Copper Industry and Trade Corporation
152. TSEK [Turkish Milk Industry Organization] Directorate General
153. EtiBank Antalya Elec. Trom. [expansion unknown] Industry Establishment
154. Pınarsut Products
155. Industry Corporation
156. IES Izmir Electronic Industry and Trade Corporation
157. Adapazarı Sugar Factory
158. MAKİTAS, Macaroni Products Trade Corporation
159. Narin Textile Factories Corporation
160. Yalova Fiber and Yarn Industry and Trade Corporation

Sıra No	(a) Firma ve Müesseseler	(b)	(c) Bağlı bulunduğu Ode/KT	(d) Üretimden Satışlar (1.000 TL) No:	(e) Satış Hasılatı Tutarı Sıra No:	(f) Brüt Katma Değer Tutarı Sıra No:	Net Aktif Toplamı Tutarı Sıra No:	Bilanço Kari (V.D.) Tutarı Sıra No:	(i) İhtisat Sıra No:					
										(1.000 TL) No:	(1.000 TL) No:	(1.000 TL) No:	(1.000 TL) No:	(1.000 TL) No:
161	Paksoy Tic. ve San. A.Ş.	Adana	13.836.333	174	13.882.571	301	2.070.785	323	5.262.075	238	556.216	75	5.821.786	13.140
162	Osman Akça Tarım Ürün. İth. İhr. San. Tic. A.Ş.	Ege-İzmir	13.747.541	145	17.101.803	412	1.043.767	231	8.679.839	420	62.896	31	11.591.119	21.540
163	Birlik Mensucat Tic. ve San. İht. A.Ş.	Kayseri	13.698.970	165	14.579.825	113	5.811.180	250	7.597.555	99	1.781.371	79	5.816.730	10.032
164	Akın Tekstil A.Ş.	İstanbul	13.304.264	182	13.379.636	154	4.478.487	206	10.475.817	216	664.066	178	1.524.803	3.023
165	Sidemase Müessesesi	Kamu	13.283.117	184	13.283.117	152	4.510.144	209	10.268.056	—	125.457	—	—	—
166	Sümerbank Merinos Yünü San. Mües.	Kamu	13.236.925	183	13.313.493	74	8.404.012	126	17.247.111	227	604.998	286	391.517	691
167	Karagöçlü Tütün San. ve Tic. A.Ş.	Ege-İzmir	13.171.350	186	14.913.598	161	4.333.048	174	12.550.571	408	86.340	23	13.668.638	26.335
168	Derby Lastik Fabrikası A.Ş.	İstanbul	13.024.831	186	13.074.133	159	4.362.771	293	5.911.663	168	943.823	257	604.699	1.156
169	—	İstanbul	—	187	—	145	—	244	—	179	—	370	—	—
170	AEG Eti Elektrik End. A.Ş.	İstanbul	12.961.283	180	13.486.460	202	3.343.365	113	19.315.546	—	4.868.009	212	1.039.102	2.831
171	Tormak Toros Makina ve Tic. A.Ş.	Adana	12.842.428	188	12.842.428	408	1.070.395	329	5.068.647	281	410.867	—	—	—
172	İzmir Pamuk Mensucatı T.A.Ş.	Ege-İzmir	12.742.284	190	12.778.785	168	3.987.176	334	4.937.389	190	781.416	90	5.013.803	8.972
173	Erciyas Bıracılık ve Malt San. A.Ş.	İstanbul	12.730.183	178	13.528.329	103	6.575.252	95	22.255.882	310	334.569	255	608.400	1.018
174	İcdaş İstanbul Çelik ve Demir İşleme San. A.Ş.	İstanbul	12.669.032	191	12.669.032	365	1.426.604	460	3.538.358	226	606.033	—	—	—
175	Etibank Kestelek Bor Maden. İht. Mües.	Kamu	12.578.389	193	12.578.389	55	11.089.187	163	13.352.328	19	11.004.052	34	11.313.448	21.106
176	Ege Bıracılık ve Malt San. A.Ş.	Ege-İzmir	12.543.243	177	13.552.952	107	6.380.278	87	24.179.537	349	227.557	140	2.575.407	4.710
177	Olmuksa Mukaveve San. ve Tic. A.Ş.	İstanbul	12.537.331	194	12.554.857	122	5.186.649	211	10.182.591	75	2.499.869	207	1.116.216	2.132
178	Ardem Püsküncü ve Isıtıcı Cihazlar San. A.Ş.	İstanbul	12.520.699	189	12.812.650	195	3.406.124	214	9.877.103	107	1.604.380	269	502.017	1.076
179	Aymar Yağ San. A.Ş.	İstanbul	12.511.361	192	12.613.391	288	2.205.503	327	5.169.178	154	1.041.912	350	38.705	70
180	Türkiye Şişe Cam Fabrikaları A.Ş.	İstanbul	12.426.850	196	12.490.805	71	8.550.626	25	55.538.841	93	1.902.000	197	1.253.059	2.152

161. Paksoy Trade and Industry Corporation
162. Osman Akca Agricultural Products Import Export Industry and Trade Corporation
163. Birlik Textile Trade and Industry Corporation
164. Akin Textile Corporation
165. SIDEMAS [Sivas Railway Machinery Industry] Establishment Directorate
166. Sumerbank Merino Wool Products Industry Establishment
167. Karagozlu Tobacco Industry and Trade Corporation
168. Derby Tire Factory Corporation
169. ---
170. AEG Eti Electrical Industry Corporation
171. Tormak Toros Machinery and Trade Corporation
172. Izmir Cotton Textiles Corporation
173. Erciyas Beer and Malt Brewing Industry Corporation
174. ICDAS, Istanbul Steel and Iron Smelting Industry Corporation
175. Etibank Kestelek Boron Mining Establishment
176. Ege Beer and Malt Brewing Industry Corporation
177. Olmuksa Cardboard Industry and Trade Corporation
178. Ardem Cooking and Heating Devices Industry Corporation
179. Aymar Edible Oil Industry Corporation
180. Turkish Bottle and Glass Factories Corporation

181	Cukobirlik Iplik Dokuma Fab	Adana	12.149.211	195	12.500.044	131	5.005.557	—	313	324.403	319	144.286	283
182	Mullu Akr ve Malzemeleri San A S	Istanbul	12.107.289	176	13.795.744	93	7.096.041	296	140	1.128.745	124	3.222.878	6.185
183	Alpaslan Besikcioglu Dis Tic A S	Ege-Izmir	12.099.768	159	12.099.768	452	584.822	202	402	100.307	35	11.143.877	22.001
184	Turk Telekom Endustrisi A S	Istanbul	12.066.956	198	12.244.106	270	2.414.466	210	251	506.093	363	14.669	26
185	Ipek Kagit San ve Tic A S	Istanbul	12.041.365	197	12.374.307	153	4.504.041	184	386	158.482	368	9.711	14
186	Turk Hoechst San ve Tic A S	Istanbul	11.962.738	167	14.760.295	170	3.948.630	222	147	1.088.882	260	548.161	1.374
187	Paisan Makine Parcalari Sanayi A S	Istanbul	11.937.543	185	13.101.570	116	5.616.873	178	323	308.389	186	1.410.721	2.826
188	Yunsa Yunlu Sanayi ve Ticaret A S	Istanbul	11.920.080	200	11.996.295	237	2.777.557	164	228	596.961	115	3.475.925	5.932
189	Sezal Turkes - Fevzi Akkaya Enerji San Tic A S	Ankara	11.902.548	201	11.902.548	221	3.008.636	92	389	144.553	95	4.499.319	8.720
190	Goltas A S	Isperja	11.890.152	202	11.890.152	127	5.052.306	262	64	3.041.168	291	327.293	630
191	Edirne Yağ San ve Tic A S	Edirne	11.873.090	203	11.873.093	318	1.965.075	379	198	750.098	—	—	—
192	Sumerbank Manisa Pamuklu Mensucat A S	Kamu	11.858.611	205	11.858.611	104	6.501.046	219	60	3.173.695	—	—	—
193	Santral Dikis Sanayi A S	Istanbul	11.805.714	217	11.805.714	119	5.387.219	290	78	2.361.214	298	262.691	483
194	Polylen Sentetik Iplik San A S	Bursa	11.745.391	204	11.866.010	144	4.644.212	170	245	516.501	213	1.037.630	1.835
195	Durmuş Yasar ve Oğul Boya Ver Rec Fab A S	Ege-Izmir	11.741.172	210	11.741.172	—	—	—	155	1.037.514	226	871.126	1.516
196	Birko Bir Koyun Mensucat Tic San A S	Ankara	11.741.043	209	11.770.318	227	2.962.770	196	145	1.099.557	87	5.239.097	10.280
197	Asahi Demir ve Sac Sanayii A S	Istanbul	11.739.163	90	27.366.119	188	3.614.402	267	90	2.003.034	103	4.232.921	7.975
198	Trakya Yağ Sanayi A S	Istanbul	11.435.553	215	11.435.553	363	1.427.837	425	213	670.168	—	—	—
199	Amasya Şeker Fab	Ankara	11.413.864	162	15.449.714	192	3.671.709	56	173	873.827	84	5.312.405	10.524
200	Pilsa Plastik San A S	Ankara	11.335.347	208	11.842.716	303	2.065.012	226	254	491.304	202	1.207.905	2.343

181. Cukobirlik [Cukurova Cotton and Citrus Agricultural Sales Cooperative Union] Yarn and weaving Factory
182. Mullu Car Battery and Materials Industry Corporation
183. Alpaslan Besikcioglu Foreign Trade Corporation
184. Turkish Telecommunication Industry Corporation
185. Ipek Paper Industry and Trade Corporation
186. Turkish Hoechst Industry and Trade Corporation
187. PARSAN, Machine Parts Industry Corporation
188. Yunsa Woolens Industry and Trade Corporation
189. Sezai Turkes-Fevzi Akkaya Energy Industry Corporation
190. Goltas Corporation
191. Edirne Edible Oil Industry and Trade Corporation
192. Sumerbank Manisa Cotton Textile Industry Corporation
193. Santral Tailoring Industry Corporation
194. Polylen Synthetic Yarn Industry Corporation
195. DY0 Paint, Varnish and Resin Factory Corporation
196. BIRKO United Sheep Raisers Textile Trade and Industry Corporation
197. Assan Iron and Steel Plate Industry Corporation
198. Trakya Edible Oil Industry Corporation
199. Amasya Sugar Factory
200. Pilsa Plastic Industry Corporation

Sıra No	(a) Firma ve Müesseseler	(b)	(c) Bağlı bulunduğu Oda/KT	(d) Üretim Satışları (1.000 TL)	(e) Satış Hasılatı (1.000 TL)	(f) Brüt Kazıma Değer Tutarı (1.000 TL)	(g) Net Aktif Toplamı Tutarı (1.000 TL)	(h) Bilanço Kârı (V.Ö.)		(i) İhracat							
								Sıra No	Sıra No								
201	Ceylan Ceyhan Tekstil San. A.Ş.		Adana	11.274.890	218	11.294.128	182	3.661.902	272	6.545.554	112	1.562.917	60	6.836.922	13.233		
202	Soktaş Pamuk ve İyem Ür. Değ. Tic. ve San. A.Ş.		Ege-İzmir	11.259.996	213	11.535.080	174	3.904.538	191	11.251.800	134	1.205.095	65	6.371.780	11.756		
203	Austro Türk Tütün A.Ş.		Ege-İzmir	11.108.257	212	11.828.524	147	4.598.588	183	11.797.675	266	439.961	32	11.581.766	22.405		
204	Yazıcı Demir Çelik San. ve Tic. A.Ş.		İstanbul	10.974.358	160	15.627.827	---	-414.897	455	2.293.747	320	312.712	---	---	---		
205	Aydın Tekstil A.Ş.		Aydın	10.853.594	220	10.853.594	162	4.265.731	295	5.889.992	400	101.755	147	2.252.012	4.484		
206	---		İstanbul	---	221	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	154	---	---		
207	Tat Kanser'e San. A.Ş.		İstanbul	10.811.806	217	11.203.941	180	3.722.391	171	12.746.179	117	1.410.289	96	6.406.845	8.487		
208	Tümösan Türk Motor San. ve Tic. A.Ş.		Kamu	10.808.155	222	10.808.155	421	956.601	22	59.834.239	---	728.044	---	---	---		
209	Sümerbank İzmir Basma San. Mües.		Kamu	10.798.792	223	10.798.792	139	4.774.729	151	14.920.437	272	424.240	130	3.003.950	5.544		
210	Tütüntex Ticaret A.Ş.		Ege-İzmir	10.692.695	228	10.692.695	199	3.392.737	282	6.185.117	382	162.522	43	9.974.808	19.509		
211	Çelik Halat ve Tel Sanayi A.Ş.		İstanbul	10.657.003	224	10.794.077	158	4.396.263	233	8.557.547	65	3.023.216	166	1.806.069	3.415		
212	Türk Henkel Kimyevi Maddeleri Sanayi ve Tic. A.Ş.		İstanbul	10.637.444	229	10.643.881	211	3.209.917	277	6.366.265	203	723.043	360	17.028	29		
213	Baştaş Beykent Çimento San. ve Tic. A.Ş.		Ankara	10.614.928	231	10.614.928	193	3.462.996	312	5.457.829	164	961.841	---	---	---		
214	Mako Elektrik San. ve Tic. A.Ş.		İstanbul	10.569.977	233	10.608.121	128	5.046.121	203	6.960.851	74	2.535.625	330	97.279	194		
215	Karsan Otomotiv San. ve Tic. A.Ş.		Bursa	10.557.526	225	10.757.392	256	2.531.179	374	4.133.707	271	424.789	---	---	---		
216	Borusan Boru San. A.Ş.		İstanbul	10.529.407	227	10.735.797	368	1.389.873	345	4.661.471	315	321.484	308	190.321	373		
217	Döğtaş Dokümcülük Tic. ve San. A.Ş.		İstanbul	10.427.563	219	10.916.221	124	5.158.093	194	11.183.132	248	511.090	248	577.834	1.318		
218	Nevron Elektronik Sanayi A.Ş.		İstanbul	10.409.292	234	10.576.909	201	3.344.466	243	7.883.770	229	593.925	---	---	---		
219	Beslen Makarna Gıda San. ve Tic. A.Ş.		Gaziantep	10.373.909	236	10.373.909	343	1.618.114	175	12.472.279	285	402.346	128	3.062.997	5.750		
220	Auer İnşaat A.Ş.		İstanbul	10.314.771	230	10.643.466	185	3.638.893	310	5.483.703	325	298.750	353	28.166	53		
201.	Ceytas Ceyhan Textile Industry Corporation		İstanbul	208.	TUMOSAN, Turkish Motor Industry and Trade Corporation		İstanbul	214.	Mako Electric Industry and Trade Corporation		İstanbul	216.	BORUSAN, Pipe Industry Corporation		İstanbul	218.	Nevron Electronic Industry Corporation
202.	Soktas Cotton and Agricultural Products Processing Trade and Industry Corporation		İstanbul	209.	Sümerbank İzmir Printed Fabric Industry Establishment		İstanbul	210.	Tütüntex Trade Corporation		İstanbul	217.	DOKTAS, Foundry Trade and Industry Corporation		İstanbul	219.	Beslen Pasta and Food Industry and Trade Corporation
203.	Austro Turkish Tobacco Corporation		İstanbul	210.	Tütüntex Trade Corporation		İstanbul	211.	Steel Cable and Wire Industry Corporation		İstanbul	220.	Auer Manufacturing Corporation		İstanbul	---	---
204.	Yazıcı Iron and Steel Industry and Trade Corporation		İstanbul	212.	Türk Henkel Chemical Substances Industry and Trade Corporation		İstanbul	213.	BASTAS, Basket Cement Industry and Trade Corporation		İstanbul	---	---		---	---	
205.	Aydın Textile Corporation		İstanbul	---	---		---	---	---		---	---	---		---	---	
206.	---		---	---	---		---	---	---		---	---	---		---	---	
207.	Tat Canned Foods Industry Corporation		İstanbul	---	---		---	---	---		---	---	---		---	---	

221	Mustafa Nevzat İlaç San. A.Ş.	Istanbul	10.249.518	235	10.544.332	323	1.933.810	316	5.415.087	209	699.747	309	188.316	380
222	T.C.D.D. Adapazarı Vagon San.	Kamu	10.242.211	237	10.242.211	302	2.068.532	292	5.919.406	303	350.908	—	—	—
223	Hema Traktör San. ve Tic. A.Ş.	Ankara	10.233.685	139	18.168.241	—	-2.194.194	130	16.603.913	—	—	121	3.328.791	6.280
224	Ankara Çimento San. T.A.Ş.	Kamu	10.203.050	232	10.611.374	223	2.395.160	352	4.559.895	171	894.398	—	—	—
225	Sümerbank Deri ve Kundura San. Müessesesi	Kamu	10.099.642	238	10.198.805	129	5.016.939	140	16.129.128	319	315.407	369	8.745	19
226	Altron Alarko Elektronik San. ve Tic. A.Ş.	Istanbul	10.034.061	218	11.055.754	299	2.096.088	253	7.554.802	396	117.447	—	—	—
227	Kartonasan Karton San. ve Tic. A.Ş.	İzmit	9.938.397	241	9.964.302	143	4.682.906	81	25.652.433	70	2.620.603	300	245.379	500
228	Gaziantep Çimento San. T.A.Ş.	Kamu	9.879.552	242	9.886.585	260	2.479.405	393	3.666.451	143	1.106.439	—	—	—
229	Sinmak Dikilit Makinaları San. A.Ş.	Istanbul	9.831.670	239	10.123.190	141	4.723.778	319	5.344.325	68	2.790.296	273	479.357	788
230	Meteksan Matbaacılık ve Tek. San. Tic. Ltd. Şti.	Ankara	9.728.983	240	10.058.547	136	4.803.046	102	21.219.469	387	154.099	—	—	—
231	Sümerbank Melayte Pamuklu San. Mües.	Kamu	8.720.807	246	9.720.807	123	5.175.730	160	13.517.952	182	827.479	348	39.516	69
232	Orta Anadolu Tic. ve San. İşletmesi T.A.Ş.	Kayseri	9.694.110	245	9.761.397	219	3.038.377	242	7.978.570	187	795.175	117	3.412.249	6.690
233	Pfizer İlaçları A.Ş.	Istanbul	9.541.647	250	9.541.647	224	2.988.824	355	4.511.956	136	1.174.270	294	296.320	635
234	Vakko Tekstil ve Hazır Giy. San. İşl. A.Ş.	Istanbul	9.500.901	249	9.547.724	207	3.237.045	337	4.870.690	91	1.959.501	—	—	—
235	Türk Tuborg Bira ve Malt San. A.Ş.	Ege-İzmir	9.468.160	248	9.585.046	175	3.828.768	30	47.697.919	—	891.258	242	730.453	1.297
236	Çimtaş Çelik İmalat Montaj ve Teslimat A.Ş.	Istanbul	9.414.509	181	13.392.724	259	2.480.722	128	16.818.376	327	292.305	107	3.937.940	8.764
237	Abaloğlu Yem Sanayi A.Ş.	Denizli	—	256	—	163	—	413	—	110	—	293	—	—
238	Milan Gaz Tic. ve San. A.Ş.	Istanbul	9.360.198	247	9.685.670	428	873.986	441	2.515.363	218	661.152	263	538.497	1.235
239	Kent Gıda Maddeleri San. ve Tic. A.Ş.	Istanbul	9.355.025	252	9.503.243	459	504.218	457	2.248.684	432	39.943	—	—	—
240	—	Istanbul	9.329.413	257	9.370.902	246	2.639.896	269	6.660.088	219	660.495	251	636.935	1.089

221. Mustafa Nevzat Pharmaceutical Industry Corporation
222. TCDD Adapazarı Railcar Industry
223. Hema Tractor Industry and Trade Corporation
224. Ankara Cement Industry Corporation
225. Sümerbank Leather and Shoe Industry Establishment
226. Altron Alarko Electronic Industry and Trade Corporation
227. KARTONSAN, Cardboard and Trade Corporation
228. Gaziantep Cement Industry Corporation
229. Sinmak Sewing Machines Industry Corporation
230. Meteksan Printing Industry and Trade Corporation
231. Sümerbank Malatya Cotton Fabric Industry Establishment
232. Central Anatolia Trade and Industry Corporation
233. Pfizer Pharmaceuticals Corporation
234. Vakko Textile and Apparel Industry Corporation
235. Turkish Tuborg Beer and Malt Brewing Industry Corporation
236. CİMTAS-Steel Manufacturing, Assembly and Installation Corporation
237. Abaloğlu Animal Feed Industry Corporation
238. Milan [propane] Gas Trade and Industry Corporation
239. Kent Foodstuffs Industry and Trade Corporation

Sıra No	(a) Firma ve Müesseseler	(b)	(c) Bağı bulundığı Oda/KT	(d) Üretimden		(e) Satış Hasılatı		(f) Br-Ül Kelema Değer		(g) Net Arzı Toplamı		(h) Bilanço Kârı (V.Ö.)		(i) İhracat (1,000 \$)	
				Satışlar (1,000 TL.)	Sıra No	Tutarı (1,000 TL.)	Sıra No	Tutarı (1,000 TL.)	Sıra No	Tutarı (1,000 TL.)	Sıra No	Tutarı (1,000 TL.)	Sıra No		Tutarı (1,000 TL.)
241	Gümüşsuyu Heli San. ve Tic. A.Ş.		İstanbul	9.327.890	255	9.402.095	327	1.877.830	284	6.110.328	347	232.000	137	2.724.643	5.156
242	Nuh Tic. ve San. A.Ş.		Ankara	9.298.755	258	9.364.580	216	3.070.890	325	5.228.300	69	2.738.750	—	—	—
243	Sümerbank Nazilli Basma San. Mües.		Kamu	9.297.524	259	9.297.524	155	4.476.578	185	11.535.647	256	480.493	268	342.700	652
244	Izocem Tic. ve San. A.Ş.		İstanbul	9.252.673	261	9.271.769	187	3.620.077	204	10.580.290	76	2.425.228	252	628.762	1.165
245	Sümerbank Eskişehir Basma San. Mües.		Kamu	9.228.188	263	9.228.188	198	3.392.954	229	8.929.338	371	184.103	68	6.209.508	6.108
246	Hektaş Ticaret T.A.Ş.		İstanbul	9.216.731	268	11.783.115	214	3.152.102	216	9.790.103	205	719.658	329	99.476	182
247	Emboyl-Yüntaş Bır. Kam. Stray. İplik İmal A.Ş.		İstanbul	9.164.813	262	9.247.910	346	1.592.941	398	3.620.394	328	290.968	127	3.068.186	6.020
248	İnsa İstanbul Naylon San. A.Ş.		İstanbul	9.137.890	265	9.137.890	232	2.841.898	326	5.193.948	115	1.470.397	205	1.145.872	2.048
249	Bursa Çimento Fabrikası A.Ş.		Bursa	9.130.992	264	9.150.967	164	4.194.544	286	6.072.080	73	2.547.798	316	149.911	260
250	Adel Kalemcilik Tic. ve San. A.Ş.		İstanbul	9.087.912	254	9.412.764	191	3.486.227	121	18.287.100	427	50.622	163	1.820.706	3.500
251	Polisan Kimya San. A.Ş.		İstanbul	9.082.743	214	11.516.916	337	1.676.699	227	8.983.060	287	399.742	151	2.141.868	3.246
252	Yasaş Yağar Boya ve Kimya San. ve Tic. A.Ş.		İzmit	9.002.242	74	39.069.126	160	4.350.632	161	—	119	1.336.383	—	—	—
253	Sümerbank Karaman Pamuklu San. Mües.		Kamu	8.987.088	266	8.987.088	225	2.981.030	297	5.833.849	186	797.179	155	1.978.523	3.827
254	İzmir Zeytinyağı Tar. Sat. Koop. Bir. Tarıf. Z. Yağı		Ege-İzmir	8.912.085	269	8.912.085	369	1.389.481	266	6.928.588	314	323.998	351	33.395	74
255	Otokar Otobüs Karoseri Sanayii A.Ş.		İstanbul	8.874.226	270	8.888.294	277	2.380.307	335	4.919.346	282	408.067	354	27.623	57
256	Doğu İlaç Fab. A.Ş.		İstanbul	8.838.079	268	8.935.808	354	1.552.990	362	4.314.662	277	413.951	—	—	—
257	Anadolu Otomotiv San. ve Tic. A.Ş.		İstanbul	8.792.576	192	16.273.062	291	2.191.986	154	14.312.622	426	50.784	—	—	—
258	Elida Kosmetik San. ve Tic. A.Ş.		İstanbul	8.728.444	272	8.728.444	289	2.203.714	438	2.648.083	138	1.141.759	326	110.581	177
259	Çumra Kağıt San. A.Ş.		İstanbul	8.616.978	267	8.978.593	415	1.018.770	359	4.366.636	428	49.387	56	7.070.231	13.689
260	Sümerbank Kayseri Pamuklu San. Mües.		Kamu	8.590.165	275	8.590.165	181	3.675.222	239	8.092.098	393	124.896	268	502.096	945

241. Gumusuyu Rug Industry and Trade Corporation
242. Nuh Trade and Industry Corporation

243. Sumerbank Nazilli Printed Fabric Industry Establishment
244. Izocam [glass] Trade and Industry Corporation
245. Sumerbank Eskişehir Printed Fabric Industry Establishment
246. Hektas Trade Corporation
247. Emboyl-Yuntas United Yarn Manufacturing Corporation

248. INSA, Istanbul Nylon Industry Corporation
249. Bursa Cement Factory Corporation

250. Adel Pencil Trade and Industry Corporation
251. Polisan Chemical Industry Corporation
252. YASAS, Yasar Paint and Chemical Industry and Trade Corporation
253. Sumerbank Karaman Cotton Fabric Industry Establishment

254. Izmir Olive Oil Agricultural Sales Cooperative Union-TARIS
255. Otokar Bus Bodies Industry Corporation

256. Dogu Pharmaceutical Factory Corporation
257. Anadolu Automotive Industry and Trade Corporation
258. Elida Cosmetic Industry and Trade Corporation
259. Cumra Paper Industry Corporation
260. Sumerbank Kayseri Cotton Fabric Industry Establishment

281	Tekstilplik San. ve Tic. A.Ş.	Istanbul	8.548.115	276	8.562.362	209	3.229.828	377	4.059.485	109	1.581.076	156	1.962.280	3.772
282	Kromsan Krom Bileşik. San. ve Tic. A.Ş.	Istanbul	8.542.878	277	8.542.878	475	266.348	70	28.788.821	—	5.766.536	95	4.329.931	8.175
283	Ticaret ve Sanayi Kontuvarı A.Ş.	Ege-Izmir	8.540.731	278	8.540.731	416	1.006.886	434	2.711.734	206	713.023	328	104.579	189
284	Soke Döğirmencilik ve Tic. A.Ş.	Ege-Izmir	8.485.644	279	8.522.803	407	1.071.329	454	2.360.164	201	735.000	349	37.162	56
285	Sümerbank K. Meraş Pam. San. Mües.	Kamu	8.484.109	280	8.484.109	287	2.207.210	205	10.511.717	390	140.303	152	2.119.121	4.074
286	Edip İplik San. ve Tic. A.Ş.	Istanbul	8.431.319	274	8.623.719	265	2.439.235	189	11.390.505	224	613.803	82	5.395.478	10.424
287	Deva Holding A.Ş.	Istanbul	8.411.736	282	8.411.736	314	2.006.320	275	6.416.826	275	420.819	—	—	—
288	Kayseri Şeker Fabrikası	Ankara	8.352.432	226	10.741.746	210	3.215.196	65	29.578.589	—	130.209	106	3.959.048	7.483
289	Başer Kimya San. ve Tic. A.Ş.	Adana	8.224.956	273	8.665.689	482	121.907	288	5.979.511	332	275.622	110	3.667.584	6.700
290	—	Istanbul	—	271	—	279	—	342	—	305	—	—	—	—
291	Ege Kimya San. ve Tic. A.Ş.	Istanbul	8.183.151	281	8.445.532	244	2.685.875	305	5.632.016	188	786.925	199	1.238.324	2.361
292	Orbucak San. ve Tic. A.Ş.	Adana	8.158.347	285	8.278.190	132	4.988.575	270	6.605.113	268	431.932	314	181.196	307
293	Beldesan Motorlu Vasıtalar San. A.Ş.	Istanbul	8.126.521	289	8.126.521	243	2.692.260	347	4.644.452	163	971.914	345	58.224	104
294	Erbosan Erişyas Boru San. ve Tic. A.Ş.	Kayseri	8.110.759	291	8.110.759	342	1.621.274	388	3.843.900	130	1.232.419	141	2.490.681	4.875
295	Türk Elektrik Endüstrisi A.Ş.	Istanbul	8.078.266	286	8.197.154	208	3.233.179	358	4.404.068	221	642.201	320	141.332	265
296	Anadolu Çimentoları T.A.Ş.	Istanbul	8.017.574	295	8.017.574	274	2.393.059	405	3.473.078	217	661.696	237	82.331	168
297	Orma Yün İplik San. ve Tic. A.Ş.	Istanbul	7.999.433	292	8.061.157	278	2.360.993	353	4.549.083	102	1.698.203	108	3.911.355	6.474
298	Bayer-Tarım İlaçları San. Limited Şirketi	Istanbul	7.970.563	297	7.970.563	255	2.551.798	294	5.892.891	419	64.355	312	173.657	338
299	Taftaks Heli San. ve Tic. A.Ş.	Ankara	7.937.884	298	8.016.861	358	1.489.952	291	5.947.512	122	1.312.323	113	3.500.965	6.761
300	Fenil Alüminyum San. ve Tic. A.Ş.	Istanbul	7.960.265	260	9.278.422	375	1.338.719	273	6.466.658	339	256.407	109	3.892.676	7.556

261. Tekstilplik Industry and Trade Corporation
262. KROMSAN, Chromium Alloys Industry and Trade Corporation
263. Trade and Industry Counter Corporation
264. Soke Milling and Trade Corporation
265. Sumerbank Kahramanmaraş Cotton Fabric Industry Establishment
266. Edip Yarn Industry and Trade Corporation
267. Deva Holding Corporation
268. Kayseri Sugar Factory
269. Baser Chemical Industry and Trade Corporation
270. —
271. Ege Chemical Industry and Trade Corporation
272. Orbucak Industry and Trade Corporation
273. Beldesan Motor Vehicles Industry Corporation
274. ERBOSAN, Erciyas Pipe Industry and Trade Corporation
275. Turkish Electric Industry Corporation
276. Anadolu Cement Corporation
277. Orma Woolen Yarn Industry and Trade Corporation
278. Bayer Agricultural Chemicals Industry Limited Company
279. Taftaks Carpet Industry and Trade Corporation
280. Fenis Aluminum Industry and Trade Corporation

(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)	(i)
Sıra No	Firma ve Müesseseler	Beğli Bulduğdu Oda/KT	Üretimden Satışlar (1.000 TL.)	Satış Hasılatı (1.000 TL.)	Birikt. Kısm. Deger (1.000 TL.)	Net Aktül Toplamı (1.000 TL.)	Bilanço Kârı (V.O.) (1.000 TL.)	İhazatı (1.000 TL.)
			Sıra No	Sıra No	Sıra No	Sıra No	Sıra No	Sıra No
281	Aksan Metal San. ve Tic. A.Ş.	İstanbul	7.951.045	8.046.537	1.104.942	3.436.019	512.120	2.198.662
282	Çelik Montaj Tic. ve San. A.Ş.	İstanbul	7.942.371	7.954.377	2.556.329	20.506.471	337.775	539.294
283	Akpınar İmtiyazlı Linyit İşletmesi Ltd. Şti.	İstanbul	7.931.066	7.945.100	2.227.873	2.012.345	1.823.937	—
284	Gaz Aletleri A.Ş.	İstanbul	7.924.006	7.924.006	1.941.066	3.413.406	481.320	1.878.354
285	Dosan Konserveler San. ve Tic. A.Ş.	İstanbul	7.923.591	8.330.184	2.462.553	12.036.882	667.452	2.203.264
286	Sandoz İlaç San. Ltd.	İstanbul	7.893.587	8.054.477	1.546.764	4.139.129	105.300	20.481
287	Tac San. ve Tic. A.Ş.	Ege-İzmir	7.827.905	8.125.689	4.721.928	8.122.218	370.100	1.778.927
288	Canakkale Çimento Sanayii A.Ş.	İstanbul	7.816.695	7.816.695	1.661.421	17.409.134	1.810.748	3.978.911
289	Dewilux Boya Ver. San. Reçine ve Pol. Fab. A.Ş.	Ege-İzmir	7.777.582	7.875.131	2.111.313	3.859.352	614.154	122.397
290	Altinyag Kombinaları A.Ş.	Ege-İzmir	7.766.275	7.768.275	1.471.697	2.794.110	474.316	496.029
291	Erik Boru Profil Sanayi ve Tic. A.Ş.	İstanbul	7.755.895	13.503.505	230.418	7.575.539	145.419	6.252.725
292	—	İstanbul	—	—	—	—	—	—
293	Egeplast Ege Plastik Tic. San. A.Ş.	Ege-İzmir	7.643.769	11.656.119	2.241.668	6.087.419	773.881	1.93
294	Antalya Yağ Sanayi A.Ş.	Antalya	7.623.476	7.660.551	1.609.832	2.039.023	945.996	2.289
295	Ayeka Yağ San. ve Tic. A.Ş.	İstanbul	7.569.223	7.582.720	1.199.846	1.411.708	134.313	555.603
296	Cam Elyaf San. A.Ş.	İstanbul	7.567.586	7.592.885	2.435.501	4.946.785	517.963	1.648.985
297	Mardin Çimento San. ve Tic. A.Ş.	Kamu	7.530.347	7.530.347	2.275.460	9.353.463	1.084.389	44.604
298	Eternit San. A.Ş.	İstanbul	7.503.462	7.765.319	3.925.151	9.435.050	955.050	75.637
299	Konya Çimento San. A.Ş.	Konya	7.478.742	7.478.742	3.634.373	4.960.511	2.279.373	—
300	Bolu Çimento San. A.Ş.	Bolu	7.434.953	7.434.953	3.070.551	5.244.463	2.121.158	—

281. Aksan Metal Industry and Trade Corporation
282. Celik [steel] Assembly Trade and Industry Corporation
283. Akpinar Concessionary Lignite Works Limited Company
284. Gas Devices Corporation
285. Dosan Canning Industry and Trade Corporation
286. Sandoz Pharmaceutical Industry Limited
287. Tac Industry and Trade Corporation
288. Canakkale Cement Industry Corporation
289. Dewilux Paint, Varnish, Synthetic Resin and Polymer Factory Corporation
290. Altinyag Combines Corporation
291. Erk Pipe and Profile Bar Industry and Trade Corporation
292. —
293. EGEPLAST, Ege Plastic Trade and Industry Corporation
294. Antalya Edible Oil Industry Corporation
295. Ayeks Edible Oil Industry Corporation
296. Glass Fiber Industry Corporation
297. Mardin Cement Industry and Trade Corporation
298. Eternit Industry Corporation
299. Konya Cement Industry Corporation
300. Bolu Cement Industry Corporation

301	Sümerbank Adana Pamuklu San. Mües.	Kamu	7.428.583	315	7.428.593	215	3.100.604	182	11.884.772	297	362.400	306	193.045	369
302	Viking Kağıt ve Selüloz A.Ş.	Ege-İzmir	7.373.219	317	7.398.300	245	2.657.205	340	4.857.012	242	521.610	301	240.865	391
303		İstanbul	—	321	—	208	—	236	—	104	—	318	—	—
304	Trakya Çimento San. T.A.Ş. Genel Müdürlüğü	Kamu	7.271.170	323	7.271.170	268	2.423.769	384	3.894.739	124	1.301.198	—	—	—
305	Tarasan Takım Tezgahları San. ve Tic. A.Ş.	İstanbul	7.250.596	318	7.383.976	236	2.779.612	235	8.244.473	306	341.951	157	1.958.910	3.724
306	Keyseri Tekstil Fab. A.Ş.	Keyseri	7.210.581	328	7.210.581	405	1.085.742	343	4.759.815	—	356.470	228	862.250	1.549
307	Tire Kutsan Oluklu Mukavve ve Kutu San. A.Ş.	Ege-İzmir	7.199.085	324	7.250.755	403	1.095.948	370	4.183.729	374	179.011	172	1.630.323	3.092
308	Elektrofer Çelik San. A.Ş.	İstanbul	7.115.404	253	9.421.283	418	983.389	278	8.377.775	424	54.768	—	—	—
309	Ciba Geigy İlaç ve Kim. Ürün. San. ve Tic. A.Ş.	İstanbul	7.108.155	244	9.862.518	241	2.726.942	301	5.751.114	197	751.108	371	5.785	11
310	Bağ Yağları San. ve Tic. A.Ş.	Ege-İzmir	7.062.188	287	8.176.818	402	1.102.679	423	3.051.080	372	183.066	267	516.340	1.049
311	Saray Hali A.Ş.	Keyseri	7.057.071	331	7.076.219	281	2.341.202	336	4.887.101	200	738.261	214	1.024.022	1.945
312	Sümerbank Adıyaman Pamuklu San. Mües.	Kamu	7.044.880	334	7.044.880	200	3.356.140	280	6.218.113	177	847.710	335	85.479	143
313	Demirsaç Galvaniz Tic. ve San. A.Ş.	İstanbul	7.043.018	329	7.144.509	468	379.402	470	1.915.135	296	363.965	89	5.045.175	9.520
314	Kırlangıç A.Ş.	Ayvalık	7.008.155	328	7.167.295	438	744.796	410	3.390.419	288	402.035	219	912.687	2.262
315	Trakya İplik San. A.Ş.	İstanbul	6.985.214	333	7.046.587	233	2.833.743	302	5.710.547	158	1.016.065	134	2.838.901	5.587
316	Botaş Bornova Tenise ve Ambalaj San. A.Ş.	Ege-İzmir	6.931.125	330	7.087.296	257	2.520.373	317	5.412.680	316	321.190	253	628.747	1.191
317	T.K.I. Marmara Lint. İşletmesi Mües. Müdürlüğü	Kamu	6.905.342	338	6.972.419	324	1.928.867	195	11.157.575	—	779.919	—	—	—
318	Simtel Tic. ve San. A.Ş.	İstanbul	6.892.632	288	8.187.770	313	2.016.973	373	4.137.872	125	1.298.512	—	—	—
319	Tür Çim. Top. San. T.A.Ş. Kon. K. Meğ. San Mües.	Kamu	6.883.988	339	6.883.988	258	2.508.478	321	5.283.803	157	1.028.767	—	—	—
320	Demir-Export A.Ş.	Ankara	6.866.919	341	6.866.919	289	2.423.244	356	—	292	—	325	—	—

301. Sümerbank Adana Cotton
Fabric Industry Establishment
302. Viking Paper and Cellulose
Corporation
303. --
304. Trakya Cement Industry
Corporation Directorate
General
305. TEZSAN, Machine Tools Industry
and Trade Corporation
306. Kayseri Textile Factory
Corporation
307. Tire Kutsan Corrugated
Cardboard and Box Industry
Corporation
308. Elektrofer Steel Industry
Corporation
309. Ciba Geigy Pharmaceutical
and Chemical Industry and
Trade Corporation
310. Bag Edible Oils Industry
and Trade Corporation
311. Saray Carpet Corporation
312. Sümerbank Adıyaman Cotton
Fabric Industry Establishment
313. Demirsac Galvanizing Trade
and Industry Corporation
314. Kırlangic Corporation
315. Trakya Yarn Industry
Corporation
316. BOTAS, Bornova Tin Container
and Packaging Industry
Corporation
317. TKI Marmara Lignite Works
Establishment Directorate
318. Simtel Trade and Industry
Corporation
319. TCİTS [Turkish Cement and
Earthenware Industry
Corporation] Konya K. Mag.
[expansion unknown]
Establishment
320. Demir Export Corporation

(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)		(f)		(g)		(h)		(i)	
				Sıra	Tutarı	Sıra	Tutarı	Sıra	Tutarı	Sıra	Tutarı		Sıra
No :	Firma ve Müesseseler	İşletme Yeri	Üretimden	Satış	Brüt Katma Değer	Net	ATIR	Bilanço	Yatırımlar	Sıra	Tutarı	No :	
		Oda/KT	(1.000 TL)	(1.000 TL)	(1.000 TL)	(1.000 TL)	(1.000 TL)	(1.000 TL)	(1.000 TL)	(1.000 TL)	(1.000 TL)	(1.000 TL)	(1.000 \$)
321	Mobil Gaz - Mobil Petrol Gazları A.Ş.	İstanbul	6.857.272	336	7.036.396	419	979.218	465	2.034.254	265	442.603	—	—
322	Kütahya Şeker Fab.	Ankara	6.844.704	302	7.817.087	240	2.752.342	152	14.669.726	232	576.451	367	10.575
323	Sümerbank Bakırköy Pamuklu San. Mües.	Kamu	6.835.519	342	6.835.519	205	3.281.312	224	9.139.689	231	563.636	—	—
324	Yer Menden Sanayi ve Ticaret Ltd. Şti.	İstanbul	6.806.719	340	6.877.383	440	730.586	442	2.511.342	252	493.468	—	—
325	Mudurnu Tavukçuluk A.Ş.	Ankara	6.788.449	335	7.042.148	454	565.264	436	2.697.274	357	217.196	181	1.507.896
326	Cidresan Cider Yağ ve Yam San. Tic. A.Ş.	Ege-İzmir	6.703.467	316	7.405.298	443	721.483	449	2.411.914	290	381.725	190	1.360.429
327	Bursa Akü Sanayi A.Ş.	İstanbul	6.673.327	332	7.059.367	295	2.113.620	451	2.404.525	208	700.113	222	896.552
328	Orta Anadolu Seramik San. ve Tic. A.Ş.	İstanbul	6.672.518	344	6.672.518	197	3.397.049	300	5.751.442	195	755.025	156	1.948.210
329	İzmir Özüm Tar. Sat. Koop. Birliği Tarıf Üstüm	Ege-İzmir	6.671.708	345	6.671.708	231	2.859.400	445	2.489.766	—	385.600	100	4.263.348
330	Trabzon Çimento Sanayii Müessesesi	Kamu	6.634.813	347	6.634.813	398	1.157.247	448	2.436.628	394	120.463	—	—
331	Öksektepe Bulbon Gıda Sanayi A.Ş.	Ankara	6.632.262	343	6.758.880	448	634.110	458	2.232.580	273	423.486	173	1.588.348
332	Cebitas Demir Çelik Endüstrisi A.Ş.	İstanbul	6.623.402	127	19.492.273	—	-1.349.374	215	9.828.136	802	734.569	19	15.230.862
333	Betoya - Beton Top. Yapı San. ve Tic. A.Ş.	Ege-İzmir	6.608.711	322	7.334.973	238	2.765.351	306	5.554.522	264	448.058	—	—
334	Uyarlar Demir Çelik San. ve Tic. A.Ş.	İstanbul	6.595.721	308	7.727.292	460	502.753	478	1.630.236	258	468.551	—	—
335	Atlas Halıcılık İşletmesi A. Ş.	Kayseri	6.584.286	350	6.590.459	254	2.144.717	246	7.742.504	378	175.602	198	1.261.234
336	Okdu Kurumu Müessesesi Mədərlüğü	Kamu	6.530.891	352	6.576.145	133	4.970.032	190	11.314.789	54	3.584.994	285	398.271
337	Pekyağ Sanayi ve Tic. Aret A.Ş.	Adana	6.529.605	353	6.529.605	441	730.415	258	7.208.855	291	375.317	282	434.693
338	Afyon Çimento Sanayi T.A.Ş.	Kamu	6.528.438	348	6.831.317	273	2.397.810	472	1.967.496	194	757.910	—	—
339	Kümeş Menayit İşletmeleri A.Ş.	Kamu	6.520.032	355	6.520.032	176	3.823.857	220	8.398.269	156	1.038.198	104	4.039.953
340	Anarsa Taşkömürü İşletme Müessesesi	Kamu	6.507.645	358	6.507.645	114	5.732.579	120	18.327.128	172	879.800	—	—
321.	Mobil Gaz, Mobil Petroleum Gases Corporation	328.	Orta Anadolu Ceramic Industry and Trade Corporation	334.	Uyarlar Iron and Steel Industry and Trade Corporation								
322.	Kutahya Sugar Factory	329.	Izmir Grape Agricultural Sales Cooperative Union-TARIS	335.	Atlas Carpet Manufacturing Corporation								
323.	Sumerbank Bakirkoy Cotton Fabric Industry Establishment	330.	Trabzon Cement Industry Establishment	336.	OBUS [expansion unknown] Establishment Directorate								
324.	Yer Mining Industry and Trade Corporation	331.	Ozkasikci Bulkon Food Industry Corporation	337.	Pakyag Industry and Trade Corporation								
325.	Mudurnu Poultry Corporation	332.	Cebitas Iron and Steel Industry Corporation	338.	Afyon Cement Industry Corporation								
326.	CIDERSAN, Cider Edible Oil Animal Feed Industry and Trade Corporation	333.	BETOYA, Concrete Construction Industry and Trade Corporation	339.	KUMAS [Kutahya Magnesite Works Corporation]								
327.	Bursa Car Battery Industry Corporation	340.	Amarsa Coal Works Establishment	340.	Amarsa Coal Works Establishment								

341	Elyafli Çimento Sanayi ve Ticaret A.Ş.	İstanbul	6.474.196	337	8.974.162	183	3.847.661	221	9.366.104	324	304.127	266	519.915	904
342	Demircioğlu Gıda ve Et Sanayi A.Ş.	Adepaşarı	6.413.979	359	6.413.979	439	739.627	357	4.424.471	407	87.228	136	2.730.355	5.324
343	Sümerbank Ereğli Pamuklu San. Müd.Ş.	Kamu	6.400.168	360	6.400.168	177	3.819.063	180	11.987.594	278	413.037	—	—	—
344	Foks Moda Sanayi ve Ticaret A.Ş.	Adana	6.274.850	325	7.211.275	331	1.769.392	309	5.468.233	129	1.243.991	85	3.301.402	9.013
345	Birlik Galvaniz Saç San. ve Tic. A.Ş.	İstanbul	6.274.113	362	6.277.314	481	147.412	475	1.710.539	404	90.736	201	1.214.589	2.581
346	Çorum Çimento Sanayi T.A.Ş. Genel Müdürlüğü	Kamu	6.270.212	383	6.270.212	253	2.575.668	398	3.624.789	120	1.323.260	—	—	—
347	Karadeniz Orma Sanayi Anonim Şti.	İstanbul	6.255.444	365	6.255.444	326	1.909.825	328	5.148.200	95	1.870.981	102	4.246.911	8.332
348	Kerevizler Gıda San. ve Tic. A.Ş.	İstanbul	6.170.632	381	6.304.788	444	694.461	420	3.139.203	199	747.775	80	5.609.665	10.450
349	Makina Takım Endüstrisi A.Ş.	İstanbul	6.164.063	370	6.164.066	252	2.378.145	234	8.234.127	401	100.431	278	439.234	854
350	Kelebek Mobilya ve Kontrplak San. A.Ş.	İstanbul	6.162.377	368	6.251.246	272	2.413.192	399	3.516.154	362	201.537	327	106.323	207
351	Kaynak Tehniği San. ve Tic. A.Ş.	İstanbul	6.153.774	354	6.523.696	353	1.864.118	380	3.993.876	412	80.164	184	1.474.392	2.551
352	Yıldız - Yavuzlar İplik ve Dokuması A.Ş.	Mersin	6.124.813	372	6.124.813	391	1.217.903	331	5.037.923	365	197.503	189	1.368.637	2.727
353	Eskişehir Çimento Fabr. T.A.Ş.	Eskişehir	6.106.395	371	6.133.072	298	2.069.328	349	4.574.781	235	561.711	—	—	—
354	Adıyaman Çimento San. Müd.Ş.	Kamu	6.075.790	375	6.077.344	—	-545.047	193	11.183.476	—	1.214.297	—	—	—
355	Tarbass Tar. Ür. ve Besicilik San. ve Tic. A.Ş.	İstanbul	6.033.507	377	6.037.455	473	287.763	485	1.437.769	431	41.618	—	—	—
356	Başf Sümerbank Türk Kimya San. A.Ş.	İstanbul	6.033.265	376	6.078.360	309	2.031.367	341	4.852.638	383	160.304	305	197.805	372
357	Göktepe Plastik San. ve Tic. A.Ş.	Ege-İzmir	6.006.566	346	6.049.641	371	1.373.970	385	3.971.030	380	166.684	322	126.210	231
358	Anadolu Bireçlik Malt ve Gıda San. A.Ş.	Ankara	5.998.013	368	6.252.072	—	-89.815	114	19.244.500	—	—	125	3.127.118	6.332
359	Tam Gıda San. ve Tic. A.Ş.	Eskişehir	5.975.335	367	6.251.923	325	1.916.324	383	3.905.831	259	460.531	258	572.079	1.092
360	Ergür Kablo ve Bakır San. A.Ş.	Denizli	5.972.847	366	6.220.827	474	268.997	129	16.692.408	438	24.307	249	667.926	1.253

341. Fiber Cement Industry and Trade Corporation
342. Demircioğlu Food and Meat Industry Corporation
343. Sümerbank Ereğli Cotton Fabric Industry Establishment and Trade Corporation
344. Foks Fashion Industry and Trade Corporation
345. Birlük Galvanized Steel Plate Industry and Trade Corporation
346. Çorum Cement Industry Corporation Directorate General
354. Adıyaman Cement Industry Establishment
355. TARBES, Agricultural Products and Animal Feed Industry and Trade Corporation
356. BASF-Sümerbank Turkish Chemical Industry Corporation
357. Göktepe Plastic Industry and Trade Corporation
358. Anadolu Beer, Malt and Food Industry Corporation
359. Tam Food Industry and Trade Corporation
360. Ergür Cable and Copper Industry Corporation
347. Karadeniz Knitting Industry Corporation
348. Kerevitas Food Industry and Trade Corporation
349. Machine Tool Industry Corporation
350. Kelebek Furniture and Plywood Industry Corporation
351. Welding Technology Industry and Trade Corporation
352. YIDAS, Yavuzlar Yarn and Weaving Industry Corporation
353. Eskişehir Cement Factory Corporation

(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)	(i)
Sıra No	Firma ve Müesseseler	Bağlı bulunduğu Oda/KT	Üretimde Satışlar (1.000 TL) Sıra No	Satış Hattları Sıra Tutarı (1.000 TL) Sıra No	Bdkt. Keimsa Değer Sıra Tutarı (1.000 TL) Sıra No	Net Aktif Toplamı Sıra Tutarı (1.000 TL) Sıra No	Bilanço Kârı (V.Ö.) Sıra Tutarı (1.000 TL) Sıra No	İhracat (1.000 \$) Sıra No
361	---	Kamu	---	76	---	53	---	---
362	Eşy Elektrik Sanayi ve Ticaret A.Ş.	İstanbul	5.897.521	378	6.028.839	264	2.448.179	225
363	Kaval Kablo ve Elektrik Malzemeleri A.Ş.	İstanbul	5.877.080	384	2.033.008	320	5.334.478	234
364	Kerim Çelik Mamulleri İmalat ve Ticaret A.Ş.	İstanbul	5.841.429	283	8.363.577	413	1.024.589	443
365	Sümerbank Bergama Pam. İpl. ve Dok. San. T.A.Ş.	Kamu	5.812.595	386	5.812.595	184	3.644.803	198
366	Deştek Ev Cihazları San. ve Tic. A.Ş.	İstanbul	5.809.693	387	5.809.693	409	1.066.985	474
367	Kilim' Menaucat San. ve Tic. A.Ş.	İstanbul	5.787.938	388	5.787.939	411	1.047.390	395
368	Yücel Elektronik San. ve Tic. A.Ş.	İstanbul	5.782.737	319	7.371.992	423	937.057	390
369	Güney Bırcılık ve Malt Sanayii A.Ş.	Adana	5.759.857	381	5.931.187	266	2.437.321	177
370	Tepe Ağaç Metal v eMakina San. Ltd. Şti.	Ankara	5.759.397	154	16.024.966	328	1.872.752	245
371	Bizimgaz Ticaret ve Sanayi A.Ş.	İzmit	5.749.694	390	5.778.306	456	545.668	466
372	Bisiklet Sanayi A.Ş.	Ege-İzmir	5.743.858	349	6.620.117	394	1.169.150	433
373	Plastifay Kimya Endüstri A.Ş.	İstanbul	5.742.487	383	5.890.381	426	927.156	432
374	Türsan Koll. Şti. (Oba Makarna Fab.)	Gaziantep	5.710.918	394	5.710.918	464	450.469	368
375	Sümerbank Antalya Pam. Dok. San. T.A.Ş.	Kamu	5.693.185	395	5.693.185	235	2.786.680	240
376	İ.E. Kimya Evl T.A.Ş.	İstanbul	5.693.080	384	6.264.415	312	2.019.849	450
377	Hema Hidrolik Makina San. ve Tic. A.Ş.	Ankara	5.685.101	373	6.117.961	226	2.975.355	230
378	T. Çimento ve Top. San. T.A.Ş. Yer. Por. San. Mües.	Kamu	5.668.158	397	5.668.158	194	3.436.763	401
379	Hes Hacilar Elektrik San. ve Tic. A.Ş.	Kayseri	5.652.311	396	5.673.665	433	795.705	259
380	Untaş İmet Un Sanayi ve Ticaret A.Ş.	Manisa	5.651.715	351	6.577.932	---	---	480
361.	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
362.	ESAS, Electrical Industry and Trade Corporation	İstanbul	---	---	---	---	---	---
363.	KAVEL, Cable and Electrical Materials Corporation	İstanbul	---	---	---	---	---	---
364.	Kerim Steel Products Manufacturing and Trade Corporation	İstanbul	---	---	---	---	---	---
365.	Sümerbank Bergama Cotton Yarn and Weaving Industry Corporation	İstanbul	---	---	---	---	---	---
366.	Destek Household Gadgets Industry and Trade Corporation	İstanbul	---	---	---	---	---	---
367.	Rug Textiles Industry and Trade Corporation	İstanbul	---	---	---	---	---	---
368.	Yücel Electronic Industry and Trade Corporation	İstanbul	---	---	---	---	---	---
369.	Güney Beer and Malt Brewing Industry Corporation	İstanbul	---	---	---	---	---	---
370.	Tepe Ağaç Metal and Machine Industry Limited Company	İstanbul	---	---	---	---	---	---
371.	Bizimgaz Trade and Industry Corporation	İstanbul	---	---	---	---	---	---
372.	Bicycle Industry Corporation	İstanbul	---	---	---	---	---	---
373.	Plastifay Chemical Industry Corporation	İstanbul	---	---	---	---	---	---
374.	Türsan Collective Company (Oba Pasta Factory)	İstanbul	---	---	---	---	---	---
375.	Sümerbank Antalya Cotton Weaving Industrial Corporation	İstanbul	---	---	---	---	---	---
376.	I.E. Chemical Establishment Corporation	İstanbul	---	---	---	---	---	---
377.	Hema Hydraulic Machines Industry and Trade Corporation	İstanbul	---	---	---	---	---	---
378.	TCTS Yar. [expansion unknown] Porcelain Industry Establishment	İstanbul	---	---	---	---	---	---
379.	HES, Hacilar Electric Industry and Trade Corporation	İstanbul	---	---	---	---	---	---
380.	UNTAŞ, Ismet Flour Industry and Trade Corporation	İstanbul	---	---	---	---	---	---

381	Dokusan İstanbul Dokuma San. ve Tic. A.Ş.	İstanbul	5.645.515	358	6.446.187	115	5.727.226	67	29.461.413	—	238	764.338	—
382	Vatan Plastik ve Sünger Sanayi A.Ş.	İstanbul	5.628.059	401	5.628.059	—	—	—	3.753.525	437	25.597	2.076.731	3.742
383	Atabay İlec. Fab. Ltd. Şti.	İstanbul	5.620.284	398	5.664.118	434	791.876	298	5.831.794	335	261.947	11.138	—
384	Sümerbank Defterdar Yünü San. Müessesesi	Kamu	5.600.027	402	5.600.027	248	2.603.317	307	5.534.808	355	223.012	—	—
385	Ladik Çimento Sanayi Müessesesi	Kamu	5.586.153	411	5.490.608	480	168.862	166	12.960.836	—	1.375.720	—	—
386	—	Kamu	—	403	—	—	—	192	—	—	—	—	—
387	Cicisan Gıda Sanayi ve Ticaret A.Ş.	Eskişehir	5.570.298	405	5.570.299	351	1.571.150	304	5.655.854	373	181.163	827.156	1.574
388	Ferro Çelik San. ve Tic. A.Ş.	İstanbul	5.556.751	393	5.735.442	451	586.938	492	990.041	415	75.655	460.515	900
389	Bogaziçi İplik ve Dokuma San. A.Ş.	İstanbul	5.532.721	392	5.753.530	436	771.730	419	3.173.371	284	403.102	3.430.718	6.588
390	Erka Balata ve Otomotiv San. A.Ş.	İstanbul	5.503.523	406	5.534.447	234	2.813.922	397	3.621.603	211	685.762	1.168.045	2.189
391	Atabay Kimya San. ve Tic. A.Ş.	İstanbul	5.501.572	409	5.501.572	469	350.101	387	3.849.449	381	162.757	1.514.494	2.687
392	Erkunt Sanayi A.Ş.	Ankara	5.499.231	410	5.499.231	212	3.203.202	354	4.527.085	230	592.141	96.620	219
393	Entes Endüstri Tezai. İmalat ve Montaj Tash. A.Ş.	İstanbul	5.480.258	374	6.081.137	404	1.093.970	135	16.247.940	358	211.735	—	—
394	Pancar Motor San. ve Tic. A.Ş.	İstanbul	5.448.770	407	5.446.737	220	3.025.421	299	5.815.259	—	30.661	700.799	1.190
395	Çemtaş Çelik Makina Sanayi ve Ticaret A.Ş.	Bursa	5.434.728	320	7.354.561	447	670.736	315	5.428.888	—	291.680	483.481	946
396	Boynar San. Mensucat Fab. A.Ş.	İstanbul	5.427.918	404	5.572.803	366	1.423.019	412	3.342.177	220	659.275	3.489.697	6.861
397	Emsan Madeni Erye Emaye San. ve Tic. A.Ş.	Denizli	5.427.578	389	5.780.581	322	1.936.392	283	6.180.270	181	830.648	—	—
398	Trakya Sanayi ve Tic. A.Ş.	İstanbul	5.414.216	413	5.457.814	420	978.689	468	2.000.938	192	771.807	—	—
399	Sörmez Söğüt Refrakter Matremeleri A.Ş.	Eskişehir	5.396.601	420	5.406.001	330	1.814.288	169	12.795.471	403	96.289	1.073.600	2.057
400	Derimod Kontek. Haykabrı Deri San. ve Tic. A.Ş.	İstanbul	5.383.678	400	5.661.003	463	453.656	417	3.218.369	250	506.605	3.008.007	5.752

381. DOKUSAN, İstanbul Weaving Industry and Trade Corporation
382. Vatan Plastik and Sponge Industry Corporation
383. Atabay Pharmaceutical Factory Limited Company
384. Sumerbank Defterdar Woolen Industry Establishment
385. Ladik Cement Industry Establishment
386. —
387. Cicisan Food Industry and Trade Corporation
388. Ferro Steel Industry and Trade Corporation
389. Bogazici Yarn and Weaving Industry Corporation
390. Erka Brake Lining and Automotive Industry Corporation
391. Atabay Chemical Industry and Trade Corporation
392. Erkunt Industry Corporation
393. ENTES, Industrial Installations, Manufacturing and Assembly Contracting Corporation
394. Pancar Motor Industry and Trade Corporation
395. CEMTAS, Steel Machine Industry and Trade Corporation
396. Boynar Textile Factory Corporation
397. EMSAN, Metal Product Enamel Industry and Trade Corporation
398. Trakya Industry and Trade Corporation
399. SORMAS, Sogut Refractor Materials Corporation
400. Derimod Apparel, Shoe and Leather Industry Corporation

Sıra No	(a) Firma ve Müesseseler	(b)	(c) Bağlı bulunduğu Oda/KT	(d) Üretimden Satışlar (1.000 TL.)		(e) Satış Hasılatı (1.000 TL.)		(f) Brüt Kazıma Döğeri (1.000 TL.)		(g) Net Aktif Toplamı (1.000 TL.)		(h) Bilanço Matri (V.D.) (1.000 TL.)		(i) İhracat (1.000 \$)	
				Sıra No	Tutarı	Sıra No	Tutarı	Sıra No	Tutarı	Sıra No	Tutarı	Sıra No	Tutarı	Sıra No	Tutarı
401			Kamu	412	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
402	Göveçlik İplik San. ve Tic. A.Ş.		Denizli	414	5.363.766	356	1.542.192	367	4.223.970	243	520.497	123	3.231.291	6.211	—
403	Penyelüks Hasan Gürel Kombine Tekstil İht. A.Ş.		İstanbul	385	5.352.311	311	2.020.191	350	4.570.888	184	816.128	132	2.963.334	5.941	—
404	AK-Kardan San. ve Tic. A.Ş.		İstanbul	417	5.333.113	340	1.646.694	274	6.434.537	118	1.365.484	254	612.477	1.000	—
405	Özgür Atermit San. ve Tic. A.Ş.		Adana	421	5.303.170	387	1.226.832	428	2.909.225	351	226.244	239	761.190	1.367	—
406	Türk Ambalaj San. A.Ş.		İstanbul	416	5.302.617	457	526.741	371	4.146.221	336	259.110	142	2.438.353	4.751	—
407	Ova Un Fab. A.Ş.		Konya	423	5.287.949	462	482.827	489	1.291.280	397	108.319	—	—	—	—
408	T. Ç. ve T. San. T.A.Ş. İskenderun Ç. San. Mües.		Kamu	424	5.285.601	300	2.090.590	407	3.440.533	137	1.163.084	—	—	—	—
409	İleri İplik San. ve Tic. A.Ş.		İstanbul	311	5.262.913	315	7.581.783	281	6.211.140	233	—	361	—	—	—
410	İstanbul Mahle Piston San. A.Ş.		İstanbul	399	5.240.640	251	5.662.450	203	10.657.999	174	873.704	284	406.447	795	—
411	I. Ç. ve T. San. T.A.Ş. Aşkale Çimento San. Mües.		Kamu	425	5.210.105	350	5.225.382	416	1.571.399	330	286.603	—	—	—	—
412	Nace Makina San. Ltd. Şti.		Ankara	418	5.206.605	276	5.408.262	411	3.355.354	133	1.216.273	324	116.931	251	—
413	Ödemiş Tekstil Tic. ve San. A.Ş.		Ege-İzmir	422	5.105.816	335	5.339.385	363	4.311.773	435	34.806	232	837.093	1.542	—
414	Teknik Boya T.A.Ş.		İstanbul	428	5.086.898	280	5.194.245	429	2.348.318	169	931.342	256	606.602	1.220	—
415	Devlet Malzeme Ofisi İmalat Müessesesi		Kamu	430	5.081.955	437	5.081.955	487	749.614	377	176.142	—	—	—	—
416	Meriç Tekstil San. ve Tic. Anonim Şti.		İstanbul	431	5.080.278	410	5.080.721	338	1.052.351	425	52.465	159	1.918.565	3.583	—
417	Sivas Çimento San. Mües.		Kamu	432	5.070.348	380	1.289.399	415	3.290.668	350	227.289	—	—	—	—
418	Elazığ-Altınova Çim. San. T.A.Ş. Genel Müdürlüğü		Kamu	433	5.057.925	425	5.060.938	469	927.691	423	55.136	—	—	—	—
419	General Elektrik T.A.Ş.		İstanbul	434	5.057.425	293	2.171.127	444	2.499.052	156	754.555	339	79.370	149	—
420	Nigde Çimento San. T.A.Ş. Genel Müdürlüğü		Kamu	382	5.038.035	307	5.919.890	404	2.036.539	162	973.587	—	—	—	—
401.	---														
402.	Göveçlik Yarn Industry and Trade Corporation														
403.	Penyelüks-Hasan Gorel Integrated Textile Works Corporation														
404.	AK-Kardan Industry and Trade Corporation														
405.	Özgür Atermit Industry and Trade Corporation														
406.	Turkish Packaging Industry Corporation														
407.	Ova Flour Factory Corporation														
408.	TCTS İskenderun Cement Industry Establishment														
409.	İleri Yarn Industry and Trade Corporation														
410.	İstanbul Mahle Piston Industry Corporation														
411.	TCTS Askale Cement Industry Establishment														
412.	Nace Machine Industry Limited Company														
413.	Ödemiş Textile Trade and Industry Corporation														
414.	Teknik Paint Corporation														
415.	State Equipment Office														
416.	Meriç Textile Industry and Trade Corporation														
417.	Sivas Cement Industry Establishment														
418.	Elazığ-Altınova Cement Industry Corporation Directorate														
419.	General Electric Corporation														
420.	Nigde Cement Industry Corporation Directorate														

401. ---

402. Göveçlik Yarn Industry and Trade Corporation

403. Penyelüks-Hasan Gorel Integrated Textile Works Corporation

404. AK-Kardan Industry and Trade Corporation

405. Özgür Atermit Industry and Trade Corporation

406. Turkish Packaging Industry Corporation

407. Ova Flour Factory Corporation

408. TCTS İskenderun Cement Industry Establishment

409. İleri Yarn Industry and Trade Corporation

410. İstanbul Mahle Piston Industry Corporation

411. TCTS Askale Cement Industry Establishment

412. Nace Machine Industry Limited Company

413. Ödemiş Textile Trade and Industry Corporation

414. Teknik Paint Corporation

415. State Equipment Office

416. Meriç Textile Industry and Trade Corporation

417. Sivas Cement Industry Establishment

418. Elazığ-Altınova Cement Industry Corporation Directorate

419. General Electric Corporation

420. Nigde Cement Industry Corporation Directorate

421	İbdir Sentetik Dokuma San. A.Ş.	Balıkesir	5.026.996	426	5.213.019	352	1.564.130	279	6.330.096	363	201.222	175	1.586.150	3.126
422	Hateks-Hatay Tekstil İşletmeleri A.Ş.	İzmir	5.000.906	379	5.000.943	442	725.391	268	6.706.175	439	24.324	94	4.592.684	8.703
423	Ege Metal Madencilik A.Ş.	İstanbul	4.981.518	380	5.999.729	384	1.232.775	271	6.597.323	274	421.292	88	5.132.841	10.502
424	Tuğay Turğutlu Konsarvecilik A.Ş.	Ege-İzmir	4.967.530	357	6.453.418	345	1.605.847	281	7.064.213	399	104.321	182	1.493.260	2.771
425	İstanbul Porcelan San. A.Ş.	İstanbul	4.951.575	435	5.032.495	431	818.764	418	3.215.123	—	—	244	697.736	1.179
426	Mis Süt Sanayii A.Ş.	İstanbul	4.936.738	415	5.435.242	390	1.223.628	365	4.497.759	—	125.410	365	11.829	22
427	İstanbul Segmen ve Gömlek San. Tic. A.Ş.	İstanbul	4.927.993	427	5.195.065	283	2.450.515	84	25.021.116	—	830.162	302	208.373	462
428	Akip Tekstil Sanayi ve Tic. A.Ş.	İstanbul	4.906.308	439	4.922.858	374	1.342.278	378	4.046.997	289	383.463	131	2.991.581	5.597
429	Denizli Başı ve Boya San. A.Ş.	Denizli	4.902.425	251	9.528.921	282	2.289.807	339	4.858.787	189	784.733	120	3.330.444	8.245
430	Etibank Ergani Bakır İşletmesi Müessesesi	Kamu	4.875.721	442	4.875.721	218	3.045.833	248	7.820.312	—	1.691.623	—	—	—
431	Abfar İlaç Sanayi ve Tic. A.Ş.	İstanbul	4.863.357	443	4.863.357	458	520.746	481	2.139.665	295	366.646	—	—	—
432	Abeş İplik ve Mensucat San. A.Ş.	İstanbul	4.850.816	406	5.558.129	381	1.272.373	392	3.718.497	151	1.064.191	101	4.263.459	8.123
433	Bartın Çimento San. T.A.Ş. Genel Müdürlüğü	Kamu	4.825.831	444	4.825.831	303	2.051.692	460	2.201.561	144	1.103.278	—	—	—
434	Bilim İlaç Sanayi ve Tic. A.Ş.	İstanbul	4.787.577	445	4.814.587	385	1.230.398	366	4.277.571	395	119.019	—	—	—
435	Bayraktarlar Motorlu Vasıtalar Tic. ve San. A.Ş.	İstanbul	4.786.669	441	4.875.792	250	2.593.049	361	4.329.032	113	1.553.489	139	2.608.869	4.309
436	Sümerbank Denizli Pamuklu San. Mües.	Kamu	4.699.195	447	4.699.198	262	2.456.130	260	7.098.421	353	223.693	261	543.311	937
437	Etibank Keçiözümlü Kükürtlü İşletmesi Mües.	Kamu	4.631.150	451	4.631.150	196	3.405.328	364	4.306.712	132	1.219.422	—	—	—
438	Boyluş Karacabey Gıda San. ve Tic. A.Ş.	İstanbul	4.628.123	440	4.692.750	379	1.296.700	351	4.565.526	—	278.633	195	1.269.564	2.095
439	İzmir Yün Mensucatı T.A.Ş.	Ege-İzmir	4.618.813	446	4.718.563	453	583.792	257	7.220.617	398	108.229	298	272.268	461
440	Karsu Tekstil San. ve Tic. A.Ş.	Kayseri	4.583.437	450	4.635.568	367	1.392.483	422	3.068.724	270	430.157	133	2.904.019	5.878

421. Isbir Synthetic Weaving Industry Corporation
422. HATEKS, Hatay Textile Works Corporation
423. Ege Metal and Mining Corporation
424. TÜKAS, Turğutlu Canning Corporation
425. İstanbul Porcelain Industry Corporation
426. Mis Milk Industry Corporation
427. İstanbul Piston Ring Casing Industry and Trade Corporation
428. Akip Textile Industry and Trade Corporation
429. Denizli Fabric Printing and Dyeing Industry Corporation
430. Etibank Ergani Copper Works Establishment
431. Abfar Pharmaceutical Industry and Trade Corporation
432. Abes Yarn and Textile Industry Corporation
433. Bartın Cement Industry Corporation Directorate General
434. Bilim Pharmaceutical Industry and Trade Corporation
435. Bayraktarlar Motor Vehicle Trade and Industry Corporation
436. Sümerbank Denizli Cotton Fabric Industry Establishment
437. Etibank Keçiözümlü Sulfur Works Establishment
438. BEYTAS Karacabey Food Industry and Trade Corporation
439. İzmir Woolen Textiles Corporation
440. Karsu Textile Industry and Trade Corporation

(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)	(i)			
Sıra No	Firma ve Müesseseler	Bağlı bulundugu Oda/KT	Üretimden Satışlar (1.000 TL.)	Satış Hasılatı Sıra Tutarı (1.000 TL.)	Büht Kalma Değer Sıra Tutarı (1.000 TL.)	Net Aktif Toplamı Sıra Tutarı (1.000 TL.)	Bilanço Kârı (V.O.) Sıra Tutarı (1.000 TL.)	İhtical Sıra No : (1.000 TL.) (1.000 S)			
441	Sabirler Koll. Şti. S. Sabir - I. Sabir	Trebzon	4.539.180	5.774.754	631.111	435	375	177.454	91	4.931.843	10.962
442	Söke Çimento San. T.A.Ş. Genel Müdürlüğü	Karşı	4.537.572	4.537.572	1.978.258	471	170	900.080	—	—	—
443	Çukurova Makina İmalat ve Tic. A.Ş.	Ağrı	4.528.091	4.528.091	—	255	—	6.328.725	—	—	—
444	Denizli Dentaş Oluklu Mukaveve San. ve Tic. A.Ş.	Denizli	4.521.207	4.637.089	1.712.821	453	150	1.078.438	225	873.963	1.893
445	Alevgaz Lihit Petrol Gazları San. ve Tic. A.Ş.	İstanbul	4.469.497	4.478.106	308.715	493	413	76.802	—	—	—
446	Halifığa San. ve Tic. A.Ş.	Bursa	4.452.507	4.971.823	777.882	330	337	258.546	334	88.133	187
447	Karamanmıner Yağ San. ve Tic. A.Ş.	Tarsus	4.439.587	5.088.338	1.227.748	477	237	1.632.792	245	696.182	1.360
448	Eczacıbaşı Seramik San. ve Tic.	İstanbul	4.436.300	4.463.470	2.763.927	254	364	7.491.250	215	960.225	1.835
449	Sümerbank Erzincan Pamuklu San. Mües.	Karşı	4.435.923	4.435.923	2.382.369	394	307	3.644.277	—	—	—
450	Türk Petrol ve Madeni Yağlar T.A.Ş.	İstanbul	4.430.634	76.866.777	1.322.608	251	175	866.578	—	—	—
451	Salihli Tekstil San. A.Ş.	Ege-İzmir	4.431.552	5.407.793	1.107.307	223	430	41.940	217	941.826	1.826
452	İtiliz Giyim San. ve Tic. A.Ş.	İstanbul	4.413.245	4.599.753	1.370.809	382	340	—	216	—	—
453	Bezpınar Gıda Sanayi ve Tic. A.Ş.	İstanbul	4.403.713	9.868.887	502.143	462	263	448.411	206	1.121.895	2.128
454	Sümerbank Gemlik Suni İpek ve Viskoze Mam. San.	Karşı	4.402.507	4.531.900	1.022.495	150	—	710.439	—	—	—
455	Balıkesir Yem San. ve Tic. A.Ş.	Balıkesir	4.390.383	4.553.464	587.215	483	279	1.496.195	—	—	—
456	Orma-Orman Mahsul. İntegre San. ve Tic. A.Ş.	İsparta	4.373.489	4.373.489	843.257	421	—	3.124.544	—	—	—
457	Profil Boru San. A.Ş.	İstanbul	4.368.441	4.938.601	401.667	473	326	1.823.172	295	275.325	612
458	Kastamonu Entegre Ağaç San. ve Tic. A.Ş.	İstanbul	4.355.767	4.381.720	1.146.014	314	301	5.432.261	317	148.653	280
459	Giriş Makina ve Montaj San. A.Ş.	Ağrı	4.351.972	4.448.617	2.198.840	158	178	13.719.768	—	—	—
460	Türkmen Kadife Türkmenli Tekstil Şen. ve Tic. A.Ş.	İstanbul	4.343.904	4.343.904	—	199	—	10.831.364	209	1.087.406	3.285

441. Sabirlar Collective Partnership, S. Sabir-A. Sabir-I. Sabir Corporation and Trade Corporation
442. Soke Cement Industry Corporation Directorate General
443. Çukurova Machine Manufacturing and Trade Corporation
444. Dentas Corrugated Cardboard Industry and Trade Corporation
445. Alevgaz Liquefied Petroleum Gas Industry and Trade Corporation
446. Halifleks Industry and Trade Corporation
447. Karamemmetler Edible Oil Industry and Trade Corporation
448. Eczacıbaşı Ceramic Industry and Trade Corporation
449. Sümerbank Erzincan Cotton Fabric Industry Establishment
450. Turkish Petroleum and Mineral Oils Corporation
451. Salihli Textile Industry Corporation
452. Titiz Apparel Industry and Trade Corporation
453. Sezginler Food Industry and Trade Corporation
454. Sümerbank Gemlik Synthetic Silk and Viscose Products Industry
455. Balıkesir Animal Feed Industry and Trade Corporation
456. ORMA, Forest Products Integrated Industry and Trade Corporation
457. Profil Pipe Industry Corporation
458. Kastamonu Integrated Wood Industry and Trade Corporation
459. Guris Machine and Assembly Industry Corporation
460. Türkmen Velvet-Türkmenli Textile Industry and Trade Corporation

461	Narinler Kadife San. ve Tic. A.Ş.	Istanbul	4,323,739	437	4,941,045	347	1,590,628	369	4,181,520	360	207,743	176	1,583,699	3,255
462	I.G.S. Istanbul Giyim San. ve Tic. A.Ş.	Istanbul	4,309,240	327	7,169,343	189	3,549,569	212	10,179,645	348	230,740	200	1,218,723	2,500
463	Abalioglu Terim Ürünleri ve Araçları A.Ş.	Denizli	4,285,343	467	4,309,910	432	800,998	437	2,687,256	333	268,892	—	—	—
464	Kaleporselen Elektro Teknik San. A.Ş.	Istanbul	4,259,783	468	4,371,388	349	1,571,887	403	3,505,404	260	457,593	241	730,802	1,344
465	Wyeth Laboratuvarları A.Ş.	Istanbul	4,259,650	489	4,259,650	362	1,448,855	447	2,469,229	267	434,129	343	66,733	129
466	Transtürk Fren Debriyaj Endüst. San. ve Tic. A.Ş.	Istanbul	4,228,793	448	4,675,599	334	1,710,945	376	4,079,660	376	177,425	270	498,696	943
467	Ser-el Seramik Şihhi Tes. Gereçl. San. ve Tic. A.Ş.	Istanbul	4,202,392	472	4,212,454	310	2,022,584	247	7,715,823	262	450,154	307	192,883	394
468	Söğüt Seramik San. A.Ş.	Balıkesir	4,194,425	473	4,194,425	306	2,046,274	375	4,081,572	183	823,320	287	369,172	559
469	Ertaş Elektrik Teçhizatı İmal. Teşisatı A.Ş.	Ege-Izmir	4,162,506	468	4,262,412	378	1,320,866	344	4,707,210	356	222,726	—	—	—
470	Haliser Hali ve Yer Döşemeleri San. ve Tic. A.Ş.	Istanbul	4,148,271	471	4,237,587	389	1,225,720	213	9,980,262	405	89,932	171	1,634,229	2,924
471	Diktaş Diktaş İplik San. ve Tic.	Istanbul	4,145,041	476	4,145,041	332	1,716,746	414	3,307,412	240	543,322	280	438,469	832
472	Teknik Cam Sanayi Anonim Şti.	Istanbul	4,138,874	477	4,138,874	320	1,946,840	303	5,702,448	—	80,657	230	845,035	1,704
473	Bandırma Yem Fabrikası Ltd. Şti.	Balıkesir	4,097,512	478	4,097,512	465	448,353	494	564,791	321	311,287	—	—	—
474	Er-Os Çamaşlıları A.Ş.	Istanbul	4,090,620	480	4,090,620	395	1,158,467	456	2,253,022	123	1,309,658	144	2,308,950	4,337
475	Betontaş Beton San. Tic. A.Ş.	Ege-Izmir	4,068,978	470	4,238,985	361	1,457,212	431	2,764,581	343	242,400	—	—	—
476	Ortel Orme San. A.Ş.	Istanbul	4,059,828	465	4,341,399	316	1,979,007	264	6,957,878	300	360,503	283	409,421	825
477	Dora Plastik Fab. A.Ş.	Istanbul	4,046,451	482	4,048,451	376	1,324,261	439	2,559,340	298	7,662	221	902,662	1,749
478	Cimsatay-Cukurova İnc. Mak. San. ve Tic. A.Ş.	Mersin	—	481	—	286	—	381	—	—	—	313	—	—
479	Er-Os Çamaşlıları A.Ş.	Istanbul	4,030,333	478	4,108,372	388	1,235,880	136	18,243,373	—	5,247,773	340	77,881	118
480	Türk Ytong San. A.Ş.	Istanbul	4,024,384	483	4,024,384	297	2,109,621	427	2,973,219	152	1,051,448	382	13,311	78

461. Narinler Velvet Industry
and Trade Corporation
462. IGS, Istanbul Apparel Industry
and Trade Corporation
463. Abalioglu Agricultural
Products and Equipment
Corporation
464. Kaleporselen Electrotechnical
Industry Corporation
465. Wyeth Laboratories Corporation
466. Transtürk Brake and Clutch
Industry and Trade Corporation
467. Sel-el Ceramic Hygienic
Equipment Industry
and Trade Corporation
468. Sogut Ceramic Industry
Corporation
469. ETITAS, Electrical Equipment
Manufacturing and
Installation Corporation
470. Haliser, Carpeting and Floor
Covering Industry and
Trade Corporation
471. DIKTAS, Sewing Yarn Industry
Corporation
472. Teknik Glass Industry
Corporation
473. Bandirma Animal Feed Factory
Limited Company
474. Er-Os Underwear Corporation
475. Betontas, Concrete Industry
and Trade kc
476. Ortel Knitting Industry
Corporation
477. Bora Plastic Factory
Corporation
478. —
479. CIMSATAS, Cukurova Construction
Machinery Industry and
Trade Corporation
480. Turkish Ytong Industry
Corporation

(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)	(i)					
Sıra No	Firma ve Müesseseler	Beğli bulunduğu Oda/KT	Özellikler (1.000 TL.)	Satış Sıra Tutarı (1.000 TL.)	Brüt Katma Değer Sıra Tutarı (1.000 TL.)	Net Aktif Toplamı Sıra Tutarı (1.000 TL.)	Bilanço Kari (V.Ö.) Sıra Tutarı (1.000 TL.)	İhracat (1.000 \$)					
481	Aydın Linyit Ltd. Şti.	Ege-İzmir	3.998.555	484	3.999.555	271	2.414.464	479	1.606.462	168	946.540	—	—
482	T. C. ve T. San. T.A.Ş. Bozüyük Ser. San. Mües.	Kamu	3.953.514	485	3.953.514	310	1.954.455	408	2.457.845	410	82.539	372	2.940
483	Mutfak Gaz. Tic. ve San. A.Ş.	İstanbul	3.921.454	489	3.921.454	471	323.087	459	3.215.774	442	8.438	—	—
484	Kampana Deri ve Kösele San. ve Tic. A.Ş.	İstanbul	3.901.827	491	3.901.827	476	244.858	478	1.668.973	329	287.591	224	882.642
485	Detel Demir Sanayi A.Ş.	İstanbul	3.883.120	486	3.951.371	468	425.813	488	1.359.757	436	25.827	—	—
486	Makap Ayakkabı Endüstri ve Tic. A.Ş.	İstanbul	3.881.594	475	4.156.049	424	928.256	463	2.081.834	366	192.485	297	269.692
487	Elektrik Elektronik Aksam San. A.Ş.	İstanbul	3.874.433	453	4.579.819	398	1.663.533	481	1.582.743	385	158.984	—	—
488	Disaş Dijonktör ve Elek. Mlz. İm. San. ve Tic. A.Ş.	Ege-İzmir	3.862.846	487	3.932.926	399	1.135.439	440	2.521.779	249	506.659	246	689.284
489	Trakya Un San. ve Tic. A.Ş.	Edirne	3.856.043	488	3.931.755	455	550.092	490	1.176.774	369	188.633	—	—
490	Yeni Tekstil Mensucat Fabrikası A.Ş.	İstanbul	3.852.168	493	3.852.394	422	941.593	389	3.842.900	408	89.089	223	893.197
491	Sekse Bolu Lamine ve Lif Levha San. Mües.	Kamu	3.831.515	494	3.831.515	370	1.381.241	346	4.657.320	414	75.783	—	—
492	Gimsan Gediz İplik ve Mensucat San. A.Ş.	Kütahya	3.804.841	495	3.804.841	406	1.078.403	380	4.334.800	135	1.178.373	135	2.785.647
493	Çelik San. A.Ş.	İstanbul	3.803.085	490	3.912.584	359	1.473.044	446	2.462.092	215	665.382	338	81.155
494	Pinar Konserveliklik A.Ş.	İstanbul	3.790.067	492	3.878.665	336	1.687.696	249	7.601.695	444	5.960	122	3.311.609
495	Teknik Kaçuk Sanayi A.Ş.	İstanbul	3.786.634	497	3.787.708	446	681.977	482	1.525.237	338	258.338	276	454.358
496	Ipsan Tekstil San. A.Ş.	Bursa	3.765.905	498	3.760.311	397	1.149.529	424	3.047.633	294	368.393	—	—
497	Kale Kilit ve Kalıp San. A.Ş.	İstanbul	3.760.339	474	4.162.172	430	825.963	452	2.400.735	304	345.075	180	1.393.128
498	Kula Yağ San. ve Tic. A.Ş.	Balıkesir	3.750.730	496	3.789.990	477	243.065	491	1.124.355	409	82.906	—	—
499	Balıkesir Çimento San. T.A.Ş.	Kamu	3.741.285	499	3.741.285	249	2.602.936	348	4.614.374	101	1.701.239	235	809.978
500	Demtaş Demir Mamulleri San. A.Ş.	Ege-İzmir	3.738.991	500	3.738.991	304	2.061.124	313	5.435.599	—	143.460	—	—
GENEL TOPLAM (j)			12.189.397.843	15.490.267.256	2.991.030.866	13.828.986.520	1.330.805.058	1.603.854.840	2.985.843				

481. Aydın Lignite Limited Company
482. TCTS Bozüyük Ceramic Industry Corporation
483. Mutfak Gas Trade and Industry Corporation
484. Kampana Leather and Shoesole Industry and Trade Corporation
485. Detel Iron Industry Corporation
486. Makap Shoe Industry and Trade Corporation
487. ELAKS, Electronic Parts Industry Corporation
488. DISAS, Circuit Breaker and Electrical Equipment Manufacturing and Trade Corporation
489. Trakya Flour Industry and Trade Corporation
490. Yeni Tekstil Textile Factory Corporation
491. SEKA Bolu Laminated and Foil Plate Industry Establishment
492. GIMSAN, Gediz Yarn and Textile Industry Corporation
493. Celik [steel] Industry Corporation
494. Pinar Canning Corporation
495. Teknik Rubber Industry Corporation
496. Ipsan Textile Industry Corporation
497. Kale Lock and Mold Industry Corporation
498. Kula Edible Oil Industry and Trade Corporation
499. Balıkesir Cement Industry Corporation
500. Demas Iron Products Industry Corporation

Key:

- a) Rank by production sales
- b) Name of company or establishment
- c) Chamber or SEE affiliation ["Kamu" indicates state-owned]
- d) Production sales (in 1,000 Turkish lira)
- e) Sales revenue:
 - [Column 1] Rank by sales revenue
 - [Column 2] Amount (in 1,000 Turkish lira)
- f) Gross added value:
 - [Column 1] Rank by gross added value
 - [Column 2] Amount (in 1,000 Turkish lira)
- g) Total net assets:
 - [Column 1] Rank by total net assets
 - [Column 2] Amount (in 1,000 Turkish lira)
- h) Pretax operating profit:
 - [Column 1] Rank by pretax operating profit
 - [Column 2] Amount (in 1,000 Turkish lira)
- i) Exports:
 - [Column 1] Rank by exports
 - [Column 2] Amount (in 1,000 Turkish lira)
 - [Column 3] Amount (in \$1,000)
- j) Grand total

9588

CSO: 3554/61

ADVANTAGES, HAZARDS OF DOMESTIC ARMS INDUSTRY ANALYZED

Vienna TRUPPENDIENST in German Oct 86 pp 468-474

[Article by Brig Gen Alfred Plienegger: "The Austrian Armament Industry-- A Burden or a Promise for the Future?"]

[Text] Preliminary Remarks

The problems surrounding the export of VOEST cannons to Libya and the difficulties that another large Austrian arms concern--Steyr-Daimler-Puch AG-- is also encountering, have once again led to violent and sometimes emotional discussions concerning the arms industry and export sectors. Among the arguments advanced, statements on neutrality and economic-political as well as moral issues predominated. But strangely enough, the interests of the Austrian military were addressed hardly at all. The author therefore deems it appropriate--following the ebbing of the most violent emotions and thus at a time when conditions for an objective discussion are more propitious-- to describe the problem areas faced by the arms industry and exports as seen by an informed member of the army, namely the chief of the Armament Planning Department of the Ministry for National Defense. The author's official capacity notwithstanding, it must be emphasized that the thoughts expressed below reflect the personal views of the author and not the official opinion of the Ministry for National Defense.

Objectives of a Neutral State

It is the political objective of every neutral state to avoid involvement in an actual armed conflict, whether it be nearby or far from its own territory. The task of a state that has assumed the responsibility of permanent neutrality also includes taking the necessary precautions to enable it to stay out of all conflicts. This means that the state in question must be able, in all conceivable situations, to conduct itself in accordance with the norms of the neutrality law. With respect to military armaments, the following should be given primary consideration:

--the obligation to prevent the use of one's national territory by one of the warring parties (the prevention obligation); and

--the obligation to treat the warring parties equally (the equal treatment obligation).

Here it should be noted that it may be necessary to uphold these obligations for an extended time period, perhaps as long as several years, depending on the duration of the conflict.

The following requirements are derived from the prevention obligation: The military forces of a neutral state are to be sufficiently armed so that potential aggressors will not view the systematic use of its territory or airspace as profitable. Potential aggressors (more precisely, powers that intend to violate the sovereignty, and thus the neutrality, of this state) are to arrive at the conclusion that the "price of admission" is too high. For this purpose, at least part of the Austrian armed forces would have to be mobilized and kept in a state of operational readiness in what would probably be the most critical "neutrality case" for Austria--a war between NATO and the Warsaw Pact--in order to counter a surprise attack.

The neutral state must also be able to prevent the unintentional use of its national territory, for example, by troops who have lost their bearings. The above statement regarding the need for a partial mobilization in the most critical case for Austrian neutrality applies here *mutatis mutandi*.

Therefore, precautions must be taken to enable the Austrian Army to run in "high gear," as it were, over an extended period. Here it must be noted that, perhaps even in advance of the neutrality case *per se*, economic bottlenecks for the entire country may arise and thus for armed forces as well.

To meet the equal treatment obligation, it helps if the neutral state is as independent as possible from--or at least dependent to approximately the same degree on--the belligerents. Derived from this is a requirement to ensure that the goods needed for the orderly functioning of the entire state (and thus the army as well) can be obtained either not at all or on as balanced a basis as possible from the belligerents. When compared, for example, to what is necessary to provide the entire country with energy and raw materials, the supply of military arms to the armed forces represents a lesser problem, as long as the neutral status can be preserved. This is because weapons already stockpiled have a long life and because, thanks to the Austrian Army's system for stockpiling spare parts, the requirement for these items would not be as immediate and would take on incomparably smaller dimensions than would be the case for energy and raw materials.

The impact of a neutral state's dependence on belligerents, and thus the problem of obtaining goods from the belligerents on as balanced a basis as possible, increases with the number of the neutral nation's trading partners involved in the war. Here the ability of the neutral nation to perform this difficult balancing act successfully will vary inversely with the degree to which it is dependent on individual countries, in other words, is able to disperse the procurement of important goods, and directly with the degree to which it is itself capable of offering scarce commodities.

From the standpoint of the equal treatment obligation, one can thus conclude that completely indigenous production of all required arms-related products would lead to maximum independence and that the purchase of arms from other countries can lead to the creation of dependence relationships if the supplying countries become involved in a war.

The indigenous production of arms-related products, from a neutrality-political standpoint, can thus be characterized as very beneficial.

The neutrality-political ideal of producing all arms-related products domestically is not attainable, however. Even extremely potent arms producers--such as the United States, the FRG and France--procure part of the weapons-related products they need from abroad. The primary reason for this is surely does not spring from a desire to do their partners a favor, but because other factors, including cost-benefit considerations, make a multinational division of labor advisable.

If, therefore, at least a partial purchase of arms-related products abroad is necessary, the question arises as to the limits to be applied, from a neutrality-political standpoint, to such purchases. Since it is possible in peacetime to stockpile armaments and also the operational resources and spare parts required for their utilization to a sufficient degree to assure a systematic functioning of the army over an extended time period even under conditions of isolation, a compelling need to exercise restraint does not appear to be automatically inescapable.

The purchase of arms-related products abroad, also from the viewpoint of a permanently neutral state, can thus be viewed as a feasible alternative to domestic production, but only to the extent that there is sufficient stockpiling. It must be noted, however, that if arms are to be produced domestically, it will be necessary to stockpile not only raw materials, but also components that cannot be manufactured domestically, particularly if the effects of extended periods of isolation are to be overcome.

On no account can it be inferred from these findings that a small neutral nation needs no arms industry. What can very definitely be inferred, however, is that there is extensive freedom of action in organizing the arms industry complex. Future decisions should, therefore, be made on the basis of usefulness and feasibility considerations. Usefulness includes cost-benefit considerations in the broadest sense, that is, factors not limited to corporate profitability. Here above all it is essential to determine not only if the operational-tactical needs of the Austrian Army can be better served through domestic production than would be possible through purchases abroad, but also if domestic production can provide impulses for the creation of lasting jobs. Feasibility considerations, finally, should be used to determine to what extent the production and export of specific products will be supported by the majority of Austrians.

The Austrian Arms Industry

Before questions are asked about possible criteria for the future organization of the arms industry, it is advisable to take a short look at the current situation. This is appropriate since otherwise there is a danger that the flight of ideas will distance itself too lightheartedly from reality, which from the planning standpoint is always a nuisance.

Figure 1: Arms Producers in Austria (as of 1985)

Weapons and accessories	9
Munitions and explosives	11
Communications equipment	17
Vehicles and related products	47
Engineering equipment and shipbuilding	23
Optical equipment	5
Housekeeping and personal equipment	75
Medical equipment	15
Other	<u>40</u>
Total	242

The breakdown of the arms industry by product areas is shown in Figure 1. In all, some 240 Austrian firms are related to the arms industry, although it should be kept in mind that most of their products are "civilian" in nature. It is worth noting that the number of arms-related firms continues to grow. It increased by about 10 firms from 1983 to 1985. All in all, considerably more than 60 percent of the requirements of the Austrian Army are covered by domestic production (also see Figure 2).




Figure 2: Percentile Share of Austrian Products in Arms and Operating Expenditures from 1973 to 1985. The graphic analysis reflects all requirements of the Austrian Ministry for National Defense, with the exception of buildings, rations, land purchases, and parts of operating costs such as expenditures for electricity, the cleaning of clothes, purchases by troops at the expense of annual credit transfers. The dip in 1978, 1979 and 1985 can be explained by several major projects which were awarded to foreign countries in those years.

Only a relatively small number of firms are active in the particularly spectacular and sensitive sector of weapons and munitions production, where in turn the two greatest problem areas at the present time--namely cannon production in VOEST-Alpine AG and the arms sector of Steyr-Daimler-Puch, because of the ownership circumstances prevailing there--are subject to special influence by the government. Particularly notable is the large number of companies involved in the production of vehicles, housekeeping equipment, and other equipment--areas where there is a steady demand both for new equipment for the steadily growing Austrian Army and for the replacement of old equipment. Also worthy of note is the limited involvement of Austrian firms in those sectors currently characterized by a downright tempestuous international environment--electronics, optics, and the development of "intelligent" munitions.

It is thus evident that there are also organizational problems in the defense industry, which, because of the considerable number of persons affected, (Footnote 1) requires a careful solution. All further observations must start from the fact that the manufacture of arms-related products, and particularly those in the spectacular weapons and munitions sector, makes exports necessary if unit costs are to be kept reasonable. Thus the following considerations regarding a suitable organization of the arms industry appear to be particularly worth noting:

- developments international in the defense industry sector;
- the requirements of the Austrian Army;
- profitability considerations; and
- the legal regulations for arms exports.

International Developments

The development of the arms industry in Austria in the 1970's and early 1980's was especially tempestuous. At that time the global situation in this sector was characterized by two circumstances. First, there was a large number of countries that, as a result of rapidly rising prices for raw materials, especially oil, achieved financial leverage and purchased large quantities of weapons with this money. These countries range from the rich oil states in the Near East to the very poor states of the Third World. Second, there were, in addition, a number of countries that, by accepting a growing indebtedness, procured weapons in order to achieve a set of national objectives. It was in fact possible to sell to these interested parties at truly respectable prices and thus realize substantial profits. (Footnote 2)

Since then, the situation has changed completely. Money has become exceedingly scarce. Declining oil prices, ambitious industrialization and social programs, as well as mismanagement and subsequent ruination of state finances are the cause.

In addition, the number of arms-exporting countries is on the rise. A striking example here is Chile, which because of a past arms embargo built up an efficient defense industry. Other newly added suppliers in the arms sector include Egypt, Argentina, Brazil, Israel, and the Republic of South Africa. It can be taken for granted that the number of arms exporters in the Far East will also increase. It can further be assumed that the number of countries that export arms only to realize a profit or to safeguard their political influence will probably increase. What is more, these countries export without any moral or other constraints.

It should be kept in mind, therefore, that a strong and further increasing trade rivalry will prevail in the arms market for the foreseeable future, and that, except for sales to countries at war, the time of easily realizable profits will definitely not return very soon.

As far as can be ascertained, competition will increase above all in the sectors of small arms and handguns, classical ("non-intelligence") munitions, and light tanks and armored personnel carriers--in other words, in precisely those sectors in which the Austrian defense industry was and is involved to a special degree.

The Requirement Situation in the Austrian Army

The Austrian Army is an exclusively defense-oriented instrument of the national government, designed to assure peace for Austria. Its defensive concept of area defense demands a numerically strong army, however, for under this concept the ability to shift friendly troops to appropriate "focal points" is replaced by the principle of occupying as many of these "focal points" as possible from the outset. The Austrian Army will therefore have to continue to grow.

In order to be able to carry out the politically important task of holding off potential aggressors, the armed forces' capability and will to fight against battle tanks and aircraft will be put to the test. Arms production measures must therefore be geared to these objectives.

Increasing size and financial constraints are compelling the Austrian Army to look for inexpensive solutions through a clearcut prioritization. This also means that swimming along on the wave of the technologically feasible is impossible in many sectors. The consequence of the search for inexpensive solutions is reflected in the following fundamental idea for the armament of the Austrian military:

As long as the continued utilization of old weapons systems is still acceptable operationally and tactically, efforts are to be directed more toward extending the service life of existing systems than toward large-scale replacement. This attitude, originally designated the philosophy of the poor man, is finding increasing acceptance throughout the world as a result of the growing scarcity of financial resources and also because of the enormous costs of modern weapons systems. (Footnote 3) With this attitude, Austria increasingly finds itself in good company, for even in the United States the effort can be discerned more and more to continue to utilize, through modification, even such old weapons systems as the M-48 battle tank and the self-propelled anti-aircraft weapon M-42 (the latter in a different role, however, namely that of a ground combat support vehicle.)

Expensive and high-risk developments should be avoided. Rather, provided that Austrian requirements do not necessitate domestic development, there is a tendency to fall back on systems that have already proved their worth in similar configurations in other armies or which exist as prototypes. All in all, this means that in Austria not many initiatives in the direction of the latest technologies will come from the arms sector.

With respect to the procurement program firmly planned up to the year 1994, it can be determined that:

--relatively straightforward major systems such as battle tanks and guns are to be procured;

--a steady flow of procured equipment of limited complexity, ranging from personal equipment to vehicles and mortars, can be expected;

--high expenditures are planned for munitions, with the goal of introducing "intelligent" munitions set for the end of the 1980's at the latest; and

--high expenditures in the optics and electronics sector--including those portions of this technology required by the plans for tank modification and for the procurement of simulators and air defense weapons systems--in excess of 8 billion Austrian shillings are planned.

As to what the more distant future may hold, the media have spread the story that the Austrian Army is occupying itself with directed-energy weapons. In this connection, it should be noted that currently only a feasibility study is being prepared, which is intended to show when such weapons systems can presumably become operational and what possibilities Austria has for contributing to their development.

The likelihood that Austria, alone and on its own, will develop such systems is remote, and a broad-based breakthrough--especially in Austria--would almost have to be classified as a miracle. What does appear to be attainable in this connection, however, is that several Austrian firms could establish themselves as potent developers and subsequently as suppliers of a number of components of these systems.

Summing up, it can be stated that the requirements of the Austrian Army do not represent a very spectacular field of activity for a defense industry directed toward highly technical major equipment items. However, with its search for low-cost, technologically not too complex solutions, and with its efforts to extend the service life of existing systems, the Austrian Army is in the same boat with many other armies, thus offering the Austrian defense industry a field of activity that holds promise for the future.

The manufacture of such products, developed on the basis of specifically Austrian requirements, also constitutes a valid justification for the existence of an Austrian defense industry. Otherwise different products would have to be bought that do not conform, either in price or performance, to these requirements. In this connection, the horizontal antipersonnel mine, arrow munitions, the Glock pistol, the 81mm mortar and the 120mm mortar, already in the procurement stage, may be cited as examples of successful developments in recent years.

Considerations

Notwithstanding all other reflections to be made in connection with the armament industry, appropriate significance must also be attached to the cost-benefit equation. This must be considered by both the producers as well as all potential buyers, and thus also by the Ministry for National Defense.

The arms industry, meanwhile, is guided by the (sensible) rediscovered objective of realizing a reasonable profit. For all potential buyers, the objective is to assure the desired combat capability at the lowest possible cost. In addition, the Austrian Ministry for National Defense must take the legal situation into account.

Both the "General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade" (GATT) (Footnote 4), which enjoys the status of law, and the authoritative "Guidelines for the Awarding of Contracts" (RVL) and the "Guidelines for Procurement" (RFB), require that contracts be awarded on the basis of the best bidder principle, whereby the best bidder is determined on the basis of valuation catalogs compiled prior

to the opening of bids or in accordance with other previously established criteria (e.g., delivery deadlines). It should be self-evident that the determination of the best bidder, when dealing with goods not subject to the GATT, can take the extent of the Austrian net product into account, and that a certain homefield advantage thus exists.

These legal norms are not only binding, but must also be observed in order to ensure that the activities of governmental organs are both calculable and visible at a glance. Permit me to mention at this point that the visibility and calculability of the actions of governmental organs must be viewed as an essential prerequisite for the acceptance of the decisions of these same organs by the citizens of the state. It is the lack of transparency and appraisability of different measures that has led to what is so often referred to in the media as disillusionment with politics or politicians.

The question thus arises as to whether or not the existing regulations should, if possible, be changed. In my opinion this is not advisable. For if one takes into account the fact that the Austrian Army cannot absorb a sufficient quantity of products--except for clothing and simple equipment materiel--to make a production at an acceptable price-to-performance ratio possible, the necessity for exports must--as previously mentioned--be recognized from the outset. Exports are only possible, however, if products can be offered at a price-to-performance ratio that is also competitive internationally. It thus appears very appropriate to exclude those firms, in the course of awarding contracts on the basis of the best bidder principle, that are unable to make competitive products. Otherwise, there is a danger that, at least in part at the expense of the already tight credit funds of one's own department, a production line will be established or perpetuated that is not capable of competing. Since it is also true that noncompetitive products usually cannot be sold outside of Austria, additional pressure could conceivably be applied, using the economic-political argument of jobs, to force the purchase of less suitable goods. This would be a highly undesirable consequence of producing goods that are not capable of competing.

Acceptance of the best bidder principle, and thus the fact that under certain conditions defense contracts are also awarded to foreign countries, can definitely have positive results for the Austrian economy. Basically, this is attempted by reaching agreement on a barter transaction basis. These barter transactions have also undergone a certain evolution. While initially barter transactions were only agreed to on the basis of value--which in an extreme case could have led to an exchange of aircraft for lumber or chocolate-covered marzipan--efforts are now being made to open the door to modern technologies through such agreements. The most promising model, and one that we should strive to apply, is the procedure whereby firms are permitted to enter into the production of components for larger series or pieces of equipment other than what is delivered to the Austrian Army. This would create an opportunity to ascend to the ranks of the world's best suppliers in one specialized sector, and subsequently to gain access to transactions with other manufacturers as well. It would be conceivable, for

opinion, to limit the area of uncertainty created by the inclusion of an "other reason" category and in any case does not entail consequences as serious as is sometimes portrayed in public discussion. (Footnote 8) In passing, let me refer to the problem involved in classifying a state as a "warring" nation. Since declared wars are the exception nowadays, there would be continual uncertainty, even with a seemingly clearcut regulation calling for bans on arms exports to warring nations.

For the reasons cited, I consider a limitation of the law on the import, export, and transit of war materials to permit the state to restrict only those exports sent to warring countries to be neither appropriate nor practicable.

What is very much necessary, however, is that firms be given a visible and calculable framework for their activity through a consistent application of the law. In essence, this means that, whenever necessary, even when unrelated to a concrete business transaction--for example, for planning purposes--it should be possible for a firm to inquire whether or not exports are permitted to specific countries, and for the inquirer to be notified in the event this policy changes. Once taken, a position should be upheld subsequently to enable firms to discreetly conduct business transactions in a manner appropriate to these specific products. It can no doubt be accepted as fact that this attitude, which incidentally must first grow in at least a portion of the populace and the media, cannot, under the conditions prevailing in a free democracy, include a ban on the open discussion of (presumably) illegal activities. On the other hand, the possibility and willingness should also exist to impose severe penalties in the event of false reports. The granting of reasonable compensation of a firm also appears appropriate, such as is provided for in the FRG, for example, when a properly obtained export license is revoked. (Footnote 9)

Summary and Conclusions

The question of whether or not the Austrian arms industry is a burden or a promise for the future must be considered primarily from the viewpoint of two groups of people--the soldiers of the army who actually use the arms and those persons working on the manufacture of these products. In the process, a very high degree of congruence of interests can be determined.

Both groups must demand products that are qualitatively satisfactory, available on time, and competitive. The soldiers of the Austrian Army must demand this because only such arms permit the best possible utilization of very scarce available resources. Only in that way is the maximum combat capability of the army--and derived therefrom the greatest possible deterrent effect--assured. The persons working on the manufacture of these products must demand it because only products such these can provide a lasting basis for their livelihood. The best means for assuring the production of such goods still appears to be the principle of awarding contracts to the best (not the lowest) bidder. It would be shortsighted, therefore, to change the procurement guidelines which require the application of principle.

instance, if, instead of producing modification kits for battle tanks under license in Austria (for which in turn a number of components would have to be supplied by others) the contract were awarded to a foreign country, and in return for this an agreement could be reached on the production and delivery by an Austrian firm of, say, certain optical components for a much larger series than the Austrian Army requires.

Legal Provisions

Above and beyond the considerations mentioned thus far, there doubtlessly are, in a matter as serious as arms exports, ethical and moral questions as well as domestic and foreign policy issues that must be addressed.

The result of deliberations on these complex problems has been consolidated by the legislative branch into the law on the import, export, and transit of war materials. The core provisions of this law were jointly adopted by all parties represented in parliament. (Footnote 5) Now, in connection with the discussion surrounding the export of VOEST cannons to Libya, the media have occasionally suggested that this law should be changed to prohibit exports only to countries at war. In assessing this problem, the following aspects should be considered:

--The core provisions of the Austrian law (Footnote 6) on the import, export, and transit of war materials are similar to those--though not always having the status of law--provisions of comparable laws in other states such as Switzerland and Sweden, for instance, and even to those of the FRG, which is tied to an alliance.

--A change in this law not supported by the vast majority of the populace would almost certainly be ineffectual, for the reason that the undesirable publicizing of individual transactions would increase. In this way, as proved in the past, individual business transactions can literally be written to death. The major damage caused by such occurrences usually goes far beyond the individual business transaction, since potential arms buyers, who as a rule do not like to be in the limelight, naturally follow such events. The result of a public discussion of individual business transactions is that the country in which these events took place will, at least initially, be left out of consideration for future procurements.

--A national self-restraint so extensive that a governmental veto is only possible for arms exports to warring nations is hard to imagine. In this connection, thought should be given, for example, to the foreign policy aspects of endangering friendly nations, or to the military aspects of endangering one's own troops, through arms exports. In addition, the legislative branch, on political grounds, will probably also have to devise "other reasons" (Footnote 7) for a ban, simply because a designation in advance of all important reasons that could militate against a specific business transaction is not possible. Nevertheless it is necessary to enumerate individual reasons that can lead to a ban on exports, because this also serves, in my

All in all, one can say that the Austrian defense industry has had, has, and will continue to have a high capability to make products available under the conditions cited. Since production of this type is neutrality-politically useful and is at the same time economically and politically expedient, it would be foolish to eliminate these sectors.

It must also be noted, however, that when goal-oriented production is not economically possible, Austria's neutrality status should not be used as a crutch for the continuation of noncompetitive production branches, and the Austrian Army must not serve as the recipient of such products. On the other hand, it should also be taken into account that, whenever a production effort is eliminated, "know-how" is lost that cannot be made available on short notice if needed later on.

In my opinion, therefore, many sectors of the Austrian defense industry represent a promise for the future. It must also be noted, however, that because of the requirement situation in the Austrian Army, like those in other armed forces, and as a consequence of increasing pressure from competition, organizational changes will be necessary in several traditional sectors of the Austrian defense industry.

In the process, more attention than in the past should be given to the following areas: optics, electronics, and "intelligent" munitions, but above all the problem of extending the service life of existing weapons systems as well as the production of components for major systems.

FOOTNOTES

1. According to the study "Arms Conversion in Austria" by Alexander van der Bellen, about 15,700 persons are employed in the production of arms. According to a statement by Dr Androsch, quoted in the "ARBEITERZEITUNG" of 28 Apr 1982, some 40,000 jobs would be affected by a cessation of arms production. The difference between the figures can probably be attributed primarily to diverging interpretations of the concept "arms production."
2. Thus during discussions in the early 1980's regarding the continuation of armament production by Steyr-Daimler-Puch, the former general manager, Dipl-Ing Malzacher, voiced the opinion that the firm could not exist without the profits realized through arms production ("WOCHENPRESSE," No 24/1981, and "PROFIL," No 28/1981).
3. As examples of the cost of complex arms systems, the following can be cited: medium battle tank--30 to 50 million Austrian shillings; self-propelled anti-aircraft gun with radar guidance--50 to 140 million Austrian shillings; attack helicopter--minimum of 200 million Austrian shillings; combat aircraft--minimum of 200 million Austrian shillings.
4. Announced in the OFFICIAL BULLETIN 175/1981. Article II of this law stipulates, among other things, that the foreign goods falling under these

provisions are to be given the same treatment as domestic goods, in other words, in accordance with the RVL and RFB.

5. The federal law on the import, export, and transit of war materials was unanimously adopted by the parties represented in Parliament on 18 October 1977; the change in the law was adopted on 1 July 1982 with the votes of the Austrian People's Party and the Socialist Party of Austria.
6. In accordance with the currently valid version of the federal law on the import, export, and transit of war materials, "...consideration is to be given to the fact" that:
 - a) the import, export, and transit does not run counter to obligations under international law or the foreign policy interests of the Republic of Austria, keeping in mind the special aspect of its permanent neutrality;
 - b) exports and transits are not destined for a territory in which an armed conflict is taking place, threatens to take place, or other tensions exist;
 - c) exports and transits are not destined for a country in which, because of serious and repeated human rights violations, the danger exists that the delivered war materials will be used for the suppression of human rights;
 - d) embargo resolutions of the UN Security Council are appropriately considered, keeping in mind Austria's permanent neutrality;
 - e) there are no security-political or military objections to the import, export, or transit; and
 - f) there are no other significant misgivings.

The supplementary bill for 1982, in addition to certain changes in the information and administrative area, contains the implementation of points b, c and d.

7. See footnote 6.f). Accordingly, point f) was already a component of the law adopted in 1977.
8. Thus the export of "Cuirassier" tank destroyers to Chile was prevented at a time when there was not yet a "human rights paragraph" in the cited law.
9. See the OFFICIAL BULLETIN of the FRG, Part I, of 20 April 1961 (implementing law for the law on the control of military weapons), Paragraph 9.

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CHANGES IN MILITARY ACADEMIES' CURRICULUM DETAILED

Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek 1 Jan 87 pp 1, 3

[Text] A stack of identifiable accusations, single, but also coming from interested employee associations, has been piling up lately covering a bill that has been drafted at the National Defense ministry and was published by a pro-government newspaper.

It is the bill on the "structure and operation of the Armed Forces Academies: the Army Cadets Academy, the Naval Midshipmen Academy and the Air Force Cadets Academy" with which, according to the charges, the control and final take-over of the military schools by the party machinery is artfully attempted. For this final objective, the bill, basically, provides the division of the entire curriculum into two "branches," in other words, the "Branch of Military Education" (A.S.E.) and the "Branch of University Education" (P.P.E.), which will be divorced from the Defense Ministry and transferred to the Ministry of Education by which it will be controlled. To control it, mechanisms similar to those of the law on the A.E.I. [Institutes of Higher Learning], which has created so many problems for higher education, are provided. In essence, it is sought to control the military academies in view of the fact that the control of the university training branch will involve the greatest part of the curriculum, the granting of degrees, the control of evaluations and placement of faculty, etc. As a matter of fact, during the first phase, in order to ensure immediate control, it is provided that the tenured faculty now serving in the academies be evaluated by agents, who are unknown and undefined by the law and who have absolutely no relation to the present service agents of the academies. With this evaluation there is a possibility for downgrading, if not for separation, of the tenured teaching staff against all constitutional guarantees.

The entire purpose of the law has been disguised by the purported democratization (women students, student participation in the administration, transfer of courses, etc.), and provides, as an enticement, for the granting of a special, non-military degree by the university education branch, without, however, defining either these degrees or even the duration of the studies to obtain them.

It should be noted that in order to obtain this degree and, hence, for the graduates of the military academies to obtain two degrees, it will be necessary, according to university and international data, that the duration of studies in the military academies be increased by at least 2 years, a matter that is overlooked by the law.

On the other hand, the law actually lowers the level of training and professional preparation of officers in view of the fact that it provides for the university students to graduate as officers merely on the strength of their training in the military education branch, even if they have not successfully completed the first year in the university education branch.

In addition to the civilian employees and others who are directly interested, strong objections to this bill have already been raised by the commands and the agencies having jurisdiction of the three branches of the Armed Forces concerning the unrealistic and contradictory directives of the bill. As a matter of fact, many of the bill's articles (there is a total of 53) are in complete conflict with other bills that have been drafted during the relatively recent past and had been acceptable to most of the responsible agencies of all three branches of the Armed Forces. Actually, one of these had been signed by the premier and the minister of National Defense, Mr. A. Papandreou.

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NEW COMPUTER AT CASACCIA TO PROTECT AGAINST NUCLEAR ACCIDENTS

Rome LA REPUBBLICA in Italian 18 Dec 86 p 17

[Article by Antonio Cianciullo: "Italian Technicians Take a Lesson from Chernobyl: the Computer Will Tell Them What to Do"]

[Text] A simulator costing 3 billion lire was dedicated at Casaccia yesterday by the ENEA [National Committee for Research and Development of Nuclear Energy and Alternative Energy Sources].

Rome--Physics, chemistry, electronics and now "nuclear incidents." The technicians at our nuclear plants have a new subject to study in 1987: Chernobyl. The professor is ready and yesterday opened a course in the presence of ENEA chairman Umberto Colombo and 20 reporters. The computer handles 40,000 variables. It cost 3 billion lire and was custom made for the new Trino power plant project.

It made its debut at the ENEA center in Casaccia at 1100 hours yesterday. Its console reproduces the operations board of a nuclear reactor control room. The monitors reenacted the dramatic sequence of events that led to the serious accident in the Ukraine on 26 April. As in an electronic war game, the little yellow cylinders representing the control rods were withdrawn; as they emerged, the reactor's power increased with a crescendo of red lights that could be seen everywhere.

Nothing happened. Even the alarm bells remained silent. The whole sequence of mistakes that caused the Chernobyl accident was repeated. But after a few minutes, the red line that showed the increase in reactor power stopped rising. It steadied for a moment and then began to drop. The emergency was avoided.

Is this really what would happen in the case of a serious nuclear accident in an Italian reactor? The ENEA technicians answered unhesitatingly that the simulation reproduced with absolute fidelity the functioning mechanism of a nuclear power plant and that the experiment performed was among the severest imaginable, with high temperature increases and inactivated control mechanisms.

"I want to make it clear immediately that such an accident could not happen in Italy, because our safety conditions are quite different from the Soviets'," said Columbo. "But in any case, assuming the same situation, we have proved that the pressurized-water reactor, which is to be installed at Trino and in other plants scheduled under the national energy plan, would shut down under those conditions rather than go critical."

At Chernobyl, the power jumped in 40 seconds to 100 times maximum, 340,000 megawatts. At the Italian plant, ENEA technicians assured, there is no way to bypass the automatic shut-down systems, and the structure would emerge completely intact from an experience such as the Soviets had.

Why, then, is the United States studying a new type of power plant that is smaller than previous ones and considered much safer? "There are commercial reasons why some people in the United States are trying to inject the virus of distrust in Europeans," Columbo answered. "But we can safely say that Italy has reached a level of nuclear technology that is equal if not superior to that of the United States. It would be folly to abandon this technological asset and adopt a new means of power production."

More will be said about this at the national energy conference, to which parliament gave a green light yesterday by appropriating 1.2 billion lire. But the debate over atomic power, which seemed to have largely subsided, is picking up again. IL MONDO is publishing the results of two research projects. The first is a study conducted by Jay M. Gould on behalf of the Council on Economic Priorities. This study indicates that the states in the United States in which nuclear reactors are located have 9,000 deaths a year due to radiation. The second study, by the General Accounting Office, reflects concern about continuation around nuclear plants producing plutonium for military purposes. In some cases, aquifers have been found to contain radioactivity 400 times greater than that allowable in drinking water.

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BRIEFS

ANTINUCLEAR VIOLENCE AT MONTALTO--Montalto di Castro--A guerrilla war took place at dawn in front of the nuclear power plant under construction at Montalto di Castro. The hundreds of municipal and national police who were protecting the work site in a veritable state of siege confronted participants in an antinuclear demonstration promoted by autonomy groups. The police repeatedly mounted charges against the demonstrators in a 2-hour battle that raged back and forth between the plant and the Via Aurelia. There were dozens of arrests and wounded, one of whom was struck in the chest by a tear-gas grenade. [By Alberto Stabile] [Text] [Rome LA REPUBBLICA in Italian 10 Dec 86 p 1] 8782

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DISAGREEMENT WITH IRAN PREVENTS OIL IMPORTS

Istanbul DUNYA in Turkish 30 Oct 86 p 1

[Report by Erdal Saglam]

[Text] Ankara--Because of an unresolved dispute over prices, Turkey is unable to import oil from Iran. Crude oil purchases from Iran were cut in October 1986 following Iran's bid to change the existing "netback plus \$1" agreement to "netback plus \$3" and have not been resumed since then because the dispute over price has not been settled.

Turkish-Iranian talks on crude oil, which have been cut and resumed several times since the beginning of this year, will be resumed again at the beginning of November. In a statement to DUNYA, TUPRAS [Turkish Petroleum Refinery Corporation] officials noted that negotiations with Iran were cut at Iran's request because of the latest OPEC conference and said that an Iranian delegation will come to Ankara at the beginning of November to resume the negotiations.

Because of the failure of the two sides to resolve the dispute over prices, Turkey has not included Iran in its crude oil import program for November 1986. Iran was not included in the October oil import program as well. Noting that trade between Turkey and Iran declined substantially this year in conjunction with Turkey's oil imports from Iran, officials said that if an accord is not reached soon trade with Iran--which forms a substantial portion of Turkey's foreign trade--will decline even further and that that would aggravate setbacks in Turkey's foreign trade.

Commenting on how decisions taken at the latest OPEC meeting may affect Turkey, TUPRAS officials noted that the participants at the latest meeting decided to continue with oil production cutbacks and said that this may raise world oil prices by several dollars per barrel by the end of the year. The officials added that paralleling increases in world oil prices, the increases seen in Turkey's crude oil import bill in the last few months will accelerate in the last 2 months of the year.

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