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JPRS-WER-87-044

19 MAY 1987



West Europe Report

19980616 149

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GOL GIVES VIEWS ON STATE REFORM, COMMUNITIES, TAXES

Brussels LE SOIR in French 10 Apr 87 pp 1-2

[Report on interview with Vice Prime Minister Jean Gol by Charles Bricman:
"In a Disturbed Climate, Gol Draws a Blue Line for the Martens VI... or VII
Administration"; date and place not given]

[Text] On the eve of Easter vacations and in the expectation of a decision--
finally--on the awarding of the RTT [Telegraph and Telephone Administration]
"sale of the century," the climate has had a tendency to become increasingly
heavy at the rue de la Loi, which is apparently insensitive to the first rays
of spring sunshine. While the government is concentrating its efforts on
telecommunications, the CVP parliamentary party in its majority seems intent,
as we shall see later on, on putting time bombs under Wilfried Martens' seat.

This is true in the case of abortion, where the Flemish social democrats are
multiplying their threats and delaying tactics. This is true for the question
of Fouron, where six CVP representatives submitted an explosive motion to the
Chamber. This is also true for the discussion on the militia bill, where the
same party has introduced amendments contrary to the majority pact which
specifies that this kind of initiative must be devised among group leaders.

This is also the moment chosen by Jean Gol, in an interview with our editorial
staff, to draw a broad overview of the government action as he sees it. From
special powers to AIDS, nothing or nearly nothing escapes the interest of the
vice prime minister who sketched out a kind of government program B. With PRL
sauce, that goes without saying...

Thus, Jean Gol wondered what the Martens VI administration will be like
without special powers. And he asked to see. Faithful to his ultra-
pragmatic approach, he stated that he looks at his files without ideological
taboos or prejudices. That is the reason why he does not believe in either
new "major" community negotiations or a vast program of privatization of the
public services.

That will not stop Gol from being inflexible on the fiscal reform which the
Martens VI administration has put on its program: all the room for maneuver
to be freed by the economy measures of Val-Duchesse will have to be used,
first of all to eliminate the abnormalities of the levying system and, next,
to reduce the rates.

Thus the vice prime minister put his stamp on the debate which will inevitably oppose the liberals and the social Christians, for whom this same margin will also have to serve to reduce labor costs within a framework favorable to employment and to ensure that today's profits, made evident by a CEPESS [Joint CVP and PSC Study Center] memorandum, will become tomorrow's jobs.

Another piece of information--one should say confirmation, but it is the first time that a high level official has explained it this clearly--there is something wrong in the community agreements which were concluded late last year: the regionalization of the Mol center, dreamed up to compensate for the advantages derived by Flanders from the division of some semi-public companies, is largely impractical and the financial resources freed on New Year's Eve to cover the operational losses of the mines in Campine are inadequate.

There is nothing surprising about that, but now the problem has been officially put before the government. Following are the most important passages of the long interview we had with Jean Gol.

Special Powers: "You have to be suspicious of the current reactions of those who express their relief about the fact that the special powers have come to an end. As far as I am concerned, I am wondering what people will say about this government a year from now. Will political power be more stable? Will we be able to once again form the same coalition after the next elections? When and how will the measures to implement the 1988 budget come into effect; what I mean is: what political convulsions will we have to go through to implement the budget?"

"The special powers became indispensable in late 1981 because of the confusion, the paralysis and the constant intervention of the parties which made up the regime."

"I continue to defend a system more closely related to the Vth Republic than the IVth. The French constitution survived three different political periods and it cannot be reasonably said that it ever endangered democracy."

"Thus I am afraid that parliament will return to the humdrum routine of before the special powers without having learned the lessons of the last few years, which could after some time cause a backlash, as it did in 1981."

"As far as I am concerned, and if one day I were to be in the opposition, I would never reject the special powers for the principle of the special powers. I am in favor of a new distribution of authority between the executive and the legislative powers, but I have noted that there is currently no majority to carry it out."

State Reform: "You never can tell, but at the present time I don't believe in the 'great institutional evening.' I even wonder whether future reforms might not be translated into profound changes in the constitution."

"The stage for state reform is the problem of financial resources and that of Brussels. There are no predetermined, rational or logical solutions in this regard. Hence, we will negotiate in fits and starts, step by step."

"The speeches of those who demand greater autonomy reveal contradictions. The weak point in Spitaels' argument is that greater autonomy for Wallonia and the French Community means less money. Thus, the French speakers must very carefully weigh the degree of autonomy they demand. And the weak point in the CVP argument which banks on the Europe of the regions is that the Europe of the regions does not exist. On the other hand, it seems to me that some people in Flanders realize that the Flemish would benefit more from seeing one of their own preside over the EEC in the name of Belgium than to have a seat on the Council of Ministers as representative of the Flemish Region."

The 1986 Community Agreements: "It will be necessary, over the next few weeks, to amend the agreements reached on Saint Catherine's Day and on New Year's Eve because there are problems related to their implementation. Thus, it appears that it is not possible to regionalize the Nuclear Energy Study Center [CEN] in Mol, as had been imagined, because the CEN fulfills a certain number of tasks of national interest. Under those circumstances it is normal for the 'bonus' freed to the benefit of Flanders through the mechanism of financing regionalized semi-public companies to be 'frozen' as was decided by the Council of Ministers."

"Similarly, it appears that the reality of the planned recycling to cover the operational losses of the mines of Campine is not perceived in the same manner in the northern part of the country as it is in the southern part. Thus it will be necessary to proceed with a fictitious anticipated recycling, to the benefit of Flanders. But that process will have to apply to everyone, thus also to Wallonia. Those are problems which we will have to tackle with a rested mind."

The RTT contract: "There are three dimensions to this file: the price, the industrial fallout, and the need for a balance among the regions. The price, which should be the lowest possible, but should not be so low that it deprives us of all industrial compensation, otherwise we will immediately go buy the equipment in Japan; if the national industry is to benefit from this sale, then it should not bring about such high investments that their cost would be prohibitive; and finally, if the investments are too limited or too concentrated in a single region, then there will simply be no consensus."

"In this regard, you have to take into account the types of production which are already located in Belgium. The relevant industry is largely located in the northern part of the country, with the exception of some not very specialized equipment, such as cables. On the other hand, in terms of research and development, the establishments are not very weighty and there is no pre-established localization."

Privatization: "The problem has never been studied as such by the government. As far as I am concerned, I have no prejudices, no fantasies in this regard. The state should be present at every crossroads, but not at every steering wheel. What is being done correctly by the private sector should not be nationalized and, conversely, I don't see any need to privatize public enterprises which produce profits and which carry out their role without distorting competition at the expense of the private sector. In any case, I feel that what has happened to our project to privatize the Professional Health Fund is a lesson for everyone."

Fiscal Reform: "The efforts the people have been asked to make must now bear fruit and this operation must be carried out on the occasion of the 1988 budget. The question is to know how to use the maneuvering margin released by the austerity measures: either we take the path of redistribution through the public services by increasing state congestion. Or we use those resources to reduce taxes."

"We chose the second option. We first have to eliminate the abnormalities of our fiscal system. The first one was done through indexing of the tax rates. What remains to be done is to eliminate cumulative taxation of the incomes of married individuals and to ensure that the average tax rate cannot exceed 50 percent. Afterwards, it will be necessary to fasten onto a progressive tax reduction in order to return to the level of the early seventies. But that will not be done without difficulty. When I read the PSC proposals on the matter, I cannot resist thinking about Canada Dry: it has the color of tax reform, the smell of tax reform, but it is not tax reform."

Employment: "The ministers of employment and of the middle classes as well as officials in the investment departments have been asked to submit proposals by 15 May. As a matter of fact, we do believe that some things can be done at the level of public investments: that is in fact what Pericles did in the 5th century BC! We only say that it is prohibited to create new constraints for the enterprises. There is an employment plan, and it must be implemented. As for the rest, if the social security administration produces profits, then I completely agree that a redistribution should be carried out and that labor costs should be reduced through a reduction in contributions."

Abortion: "I am positive: the government declaration planned for this problem to be settled by parliament. It is not right, as has been done by the CVP, to accuse the authors of the proposal belonging to the majority of not having conducted the negotiations within that majority."

"All the preconditions set by the social Christians have been met: the status of the natural child was improved, the descendants project was enacted, family planning was encouraged and a CVP secretary of state campaigned for this. The initiative taken in the Senate is completely legal from the point of view of majority loyalty, and, on the other hand, I find extremely encouraging the amendment proposals made by PSC Senator Pierre Falise, which seem totally acceptable to me."

Bio-ethical Problems: "As an appreciable part of the socio-economic program has been accomplished, I think that bio-ethical problems will be a significant concern of the government between now and the end of the legislative session. A colloquium for lawyers will be held on this subject on 4 May. In this area it is necessary to take time to think and not necessarily legislate, because there are enough laws in this country. The law should organize society by taking into account the new realities, while knowing that the prohibitive measures do not necessarily have a great deal of success."

AIDS and Drugs: "One should avoid the spread of the illness and, to that effect, act with enough progressiveness to avoid having to close our borders one day. As far as drugs are concerned, there must be ruthless repression for traffickers and a policy of prevention and education for the young, possibly planning to assign teachers especially to those tasks. I repeat, these are challenges which will definitely concern future governments, more than community problems, because they involve the future and the survival of society. And in that area, I feel that prevention is the most effective means yet."

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CSO: 3619/38

BJERREGAARD DEFECTION CREATES CHAOS IN CHRISTIAN PARTY

Several Jutland Members Follow

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 17 Mar 87 p 6

[Article by Per Lyngby: "Chaos in Christian People's Party"]

[Text] The Christian People's Party is short four Folketing candidates in North Jutland because Arne Bjerregaard has a following in leaving the party. Bjerregaard's district chairman has one foot out the door.

Arne Bjerregaard's goodbye without a thank you to the Christian People's Party has been followed by more resignations from the small government party. Several North Jutland Folketing candidates have resigned, and District Chairman Knud Verner Thomsen from Bjerregaard's district, Saeby, is also considering slamming the door.

"If we find a new candidate we like, that is, one of Arne Bjerregaard's kind, they certainly will not have him in the Folketing group if he should be elected. And if he is not of Bjerregaard's kind, we will not have him," says a disillusioned Knud Verner Thomsen.

The district chairman understands well the fact that Arne Bjerregaard chose to go, all things considered.

"If he had remained seated a half hour longer, he would certainly have been sacked by the party," Knud Verner Thomsen believes.

Arne Bjerregaard left the Christian People's Party because he is disappointed about the fact that the party did not become what he had hoped, i.e., the "distinct third alternative in Danish politics." He is not a supporter of the coalition government.

"I have tried to win sympathy for my views for many years. But when I see the conservative swing in the constituency and see the position I stand for shrivel up in our authorized gatherings, there is nothing more for me to do," Arne Bjerregaard reports to BERLINGSKE TIDENDE.

However, he is not completely finished with the party. He is willing to help the "Christians" in North Jutland and is thereby complying with a request from the party's county chairman in North Jutland, Borge Thomsen.

He presented a farewell gift from the party to Arne Bjerregaard at an executive committee meeting yesterday evening. Borge Thomsen did this in the hope that it will still be possible locally to draw on Bjerregaard's "fantastic working capacity and knowledge."

National Chairman Flemming Kofod-Svendsen was present at the meeting. He had to experience the truth of the fact that the situation in North Jutland is chaotic before the coming election. Four North Jutland districts are without Folketing candidates. Saeby has lost Arne Bjerregaard and Hjørring is losing Bjerregaard's substitute, Knud Glonborg, who announced his departure long ago.

In addition, the candidates in West Aalborg and Frederikshavn, Hans Pedersen and Inge Tranholm-Mikkelsen, respectively, slammed the door and followed Arne Bjerregaard out of the party. Hans Pedersen's wife, Ellen Pedersen, who is a member of the party's executive committee, has also stood down.

And County Chairman Borge Thomsen is prepared for still more resignations in the next few days. Yesterday the party's national office received only one of the sort.

Political Mavericks Seldom Successful

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 17 Mar 87 p 6

[Article by Carl Otto Brix: "Difficult to Stand on Own Feet in Danish Politics"]

[Text] It is only the fewest party defectors who have been successful in creating an independent party basis. Aksel Larsen and Erhard Jakobsen are exceptions.

Party discipline and the Constitution's admonitory words concerning the fact that Folketing members are bound only by their convictions (Section 56) are as a rule combined without major external dramatics, but Arne Bjerregaard (Independent) is neither the first nor the last to feel that an election is necessary.

At the time when parties were not yet fixed quantities, and members of Parliament were elected in individual wards more as the area's than the party line's representatives, the problem of conscience was not worth talking about. It became so first in this century, when candidates were nominated--and elected--on a party platform which placed fixed limits on what they could and could not do. And then the system of additional members totally removed nominees from affiliation with the district and instead bound him/her to the party, its program and its machine.

Resignation or Suffocation

From this election term alone there are several examples of the fact that the party leash became so tight that the individual had to free himself in order not to be suffocated.

Ole Maisted from the Progressive Party was the first, after the election on 10 January 1984, to take his good clothes and leave the six-man group the party had become reduced to. He was followed by John Arentoft.

Last summer Anne Grete Holmsgaard and Jorgen Lenger gave up getting the Socialist Left Party turned into what they thought was a realistic direction as compared with what is called with a catchword the labor majority. They left.

Party defectors have always had a hard time establishing their own basis, i.e., becoming party founders. Many feel called, but few are chosen.

In our time there have been only two Folketing members, elected by other parties, who have managed to enrich the democracy with new parties. The tour de force was successful for Aksel Larsen (1897-1972), elected to the Folketing by the Communist Party of Denmark in 1932, and the party's chairman from the same year to 1958, when he was expelled. The following year he formed the Socialist People's Party in anger and frustration over the fact that Khrushchev's exposure of Stalin's crimes did not touch off a party renewal. The fossilization continued.

It was obviously a bid at the right time and by the right man, and at the same time it became a party which proved that it can exist by virtue of itself and its own ideas.

Dependence on the Top Person

Some think or hope that another party is so dependent on its founder and leader that it will leave with him. In mind, of course, is the Democratic Center Party, founded by Erhard Jakobsen (1917-). He was elected for the first time by the Social Democratic Party in 1953, but he left the party in 1973 because he felt that it had been drawn toward the left and had forgotten completely to live up to the ideals created by men like Thorvald Stauning and Hans Hedtoft.

Since then he has tried to identify the CD [Democratic Center Party] as the honest party which does not make promises but is always ready to enter into the necessary compromises.

What succeeded for Aksel Larsen and Erhard Jakobsen did not succeed for many others. Ole Maisted, together with the ex-chairman of the Progressive Party, V.A. Jacobsen, tried to get the Free Democrats established, but they gave up after a couple of years, and Maisted was admitted to the Liberal Party's Folketing group last summer. John Arentoft went directly over to the Conservative Party's Folketing group, and Holmsgaard-Lenger was permitted, after a quarantine, to become a member of the SF [Socialist People's Party].

Hans Jorgen Lembourn (1923-) also tried in vain to become a party founder when he was expelled by the Conservative Party in the middle of the 70's. He was a member of the Folketing from 1964 to 1976, but he came into a growing conflict with the party, which he felt was drifting to the right. It culminated with a tax program which he had developed in cooperation with his district, Fredensborg, a program which at that time was in harsh conflict with what the party wanted to stand for in its attempt to regain all too lost ground.

In the same year members of the Progressive Party trickled away who could not handle the culture shock the encounter with political life and Mogens Glistrup involved. They slid back to the backmost seat in the Hall of the Folketing, and then out of the running. Some of them tried as independents, nominated outside the parties, but with a pathetic amount of votes as a result.

It Went Hard with Holstein

Folketing members tried to buy a gun and begin on their own in the 30's too. This was true of an outstanding person like Count Bent Holstein of Holsteinsborg, who as early as 1920 was elected as a Conservative in Aarhus, but was expelled just a few years later. In later elections he was nominated "in support of" the party, as could be done at that time. He was very strong in his district, where the representatives were embittered about the attempts by Copenhageners to direct things. But it went hard with him. Holstein also came into conflict with his loyal Aarhus voters, went over to the Liberal Party, was nominated and elected in South Jutland, left the Liberal Party and became "independent" of everything and everyone.

Marott Did Not Come Away Well from the Social Democratic Party

While Holstein's complicated political career had to do with his personality, it was an issue, a major issue, which brought another colleague into conflict with the party. The party was the Social Democratic Party, at that, which was--and is--famous or notorious for its thorough party discipline, which normally prevents excesses. Emil Marott (1856-1940) had had a brilliant career in the party and became an editor and city council member and was elected to the Folketing in Odense (1903-1920). But when he was passionately devoted to South Jutland's reunification with Denmark and took part in causing the election that resulted in the resignation of the Radical Liberal Zahle government (the Easter Crisis), he was expelled by the party. He set up his own party, the Free Social Democratic Party, but ran in vain for three elections in 1920.

It is cold outside the protecting party walls.

Paper on Defection's Effects

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 17 Mar 87 p 10

[Editorial: "The Loner"]

[Text] Arne Bjerregaard's break with the Christian People's Party has been coming for a long time. He was against the four-party coalition government

from the start, and he gradually came into so many conflicts with his party that he isolated himself more and more.

He chose as the occasion for the open break the executive committee's decision that the party will be ready to continue in the four-party coalition after an election too. Bjerregaard ought to know that any other decision now could be disastrous for the already small party. He really owed his party an earlier decision rather than one awkwardly late and close to an election.

In spite of his sincerity, Bjerregaard's criticism of the government has most often been unfair. But now, when the break has occurred, he will have a single rose in his lapel. During the environment debate he criticized both the position on agriculture and even the validity of the decision's basis. It is precisely these problems which will ravage the work in the Environment Committee. Time limits must be adjusted, just as agriculture's survival and joie de vivre must be ensured, if the society is to at all be able to afford going through with the enormous investments in the environment.

Deep down, many politicians agree very much with Bjerregaard in the environment issue. But he himself has chosen to put himself outside any influence. The ways of the lone wolf are inscrutable.

8831

CSO: 3613/57

SOCIALIST LEFT PARTY SEEN CAUSING SDP PROBLEMS IN JOINT CABINET

Ideology Based on Opposition

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 23 Mar 87 p 10

[Commentary by "Monitor": "SF [Socialist Left Party] Between Ideology and Realism"; first paragraph is BERLINGSKE TIDENDE introduction]

[Text] If the SF joins the government, Anker Jorgensen will have a hard time. His coalition partners are cherishing ideas. They have appointed a little flock of members to watch over them, and at the same time they must pay regard to an uncertain constituency which is strongly attached to the public sector and its growth, Monitor writes.

The SF has wind in its sails. The party was supreme on the left wing in the 1960's. But the left wing did not mean very much until 1966. A leap forward came in 1966, and to begin with the SF was alone in reaping the gain. But then the split with the VS [Socialist Left Party] came, and the DKP [Communist Party of Denmark] came in from the cold a few years later, and the SF was reduced to a party the size of today's Progressive Party. But the picture changed in the 1980's. The left wing has advanced, and it is the SF alone which has scored the win. It is again supreme, as in the 1960's. But at a higher level. And the advance is continuing. The SF has been bouncing a bit from one poll to another. But it is always above the 1984 level, and more and more so as time goes by.

The SF would also like to be in the government. People's socialism is beginning to be a kind of Cabinet socialism. For this reason the party's politicians are quite naturally expressing themselves in responsible phrases. Margrete Auken is a NATO supporter, and Gert Petersen can come to terms with the membership. EC can be lived with, and, most important of all, the SF has professed economic realism. The American ambassador shrewdly invited Folketing Member Jes Lunde to the usual PR tour. There could be a future minister here.

The realism is sincerely meant. All the same, there are three impediments to a long affair. That is, ideology, the members and the voters.

The SF has an ideology. But it is first and foremost a program for a social democratic policy. There are no chances of realizing the ideas by oneself. No party, of course, can get all its wishes through. But most take it relaxed if they just get something once in a while. But the SF is a party of principles. The American John Logue, who was a professor at RUC [Roskilde University Center] until he got tired of the Danish university world, in his doctoral dissertation pointed out the dilemma the party was in. Either one should come out into the open--but then getting the Social Democratic Party into the conversation and getting anything accomplished would be improbable. Or the demands should be toned down so that the Social Democratic Party will go along. But then much of the justification for existence would be lost. The end of the "Red Cabinet" of 1966-68 illustrates the problem very well. Aksel Larsen emphasized a coalition with the Social Democratic Party. Later VS'ers emphasized an independent profile. And the Social Democratic Party misunderstood the whole thing by thinking that the SF was an ordinary party which wanted to get just as much as possible through. But there were limits to how far the SF could be pressured. Ideology had a value of its own besides practical political results. And in the 1970's a long conflict came between the old Larsenists, who wanted to conduct a "here and now" policy, and younger forces, who placed greater emphasis on the politics of ideas. The Larsenists slipped away in the swing.

The new political realism indicates that realization is more important today than professions of principles. The Larsenists lost. But their policy triumphed. But the triumph was not a complete one. There is grumbling in the ranks. Folketing members from the more dissatisfied ranks at times find their colleagues a little too pin striped.

The problem is intensified by the membership organization's role in the SF. The SF gives the organization great influence, although the party largely speaking has no members. In most parties the members do the organizing work, while the political work is left to the Folketing group. But it is the other way around in the SF. The organizational work is not much good. Part of this is probably due to a traditional opposition to a hard-nosed party machine. The party's founders got enough of this in the DKP. But this should not count for the younger ones. All the same the SF has never been able to get a membership which could be known to show. It is embarrassing in itself that a party can talk about popular participation in politics and about "activity at the base" when it itself is able to get only two or three percent of its own voters to join. There is really more "basic democracy" among political parties in the Liberal Party than the SF, for the Liberal Party in spite of everything still has a fairly good organization percentage.

Worse for outsiders are the consequences. A small membership has the same effect as a small number of interviews in polls. There does not have to be many random shifts to upset the results. And the SF has had difficulty in getting a stable-membership party. In the middle of the 1970's John Logue found that a majority of the participants in one of the party's congresses had been members for just a couple of years. And a very low percentage of members also makes it totally uncertain whether the members represent anything at all other than themselves.

But while the few SF members are not of greater benefit organizationwise, on the other hand they have a lot to say about politics. The SF still uses the system of party ballots in which the members in broad outline decide the order in which the party's candidates are to be voted for. And more important still is the fact that the party organization's leadership is the supreme authority for laying down the party's policy. This has once before tripped up a Social Democratic Economic Democracy proposal. And the members are a problem in many parties. It is here that the sticklers for principles are found. The members are usually more ideological than both the practical politicians and voters. Why be a member of a party if it is not precisely because you set great store by the party's ideas? And the combination of a small membership and a tendency toward ideologizing easily becomes explosive.

Finally, the constituency provides a last uncertainty. The party does not have much of a core constituency. In recent years the influx has simply been too great for the old loyal voters to be able to constitute a very large part of the party's constituency.

Furthermore, voter polls indicate that many voters today do not identify with a single party but rather with a bloc of parties. Many of the SF's swings are really associated with internal shifts on the left wing. The left wing did not recede any further in the 1970's. But the SF was about to be outdistanced by the DKP. And part of the SF's first advance in the 1980's was really associated with weakening of the DKP especially. There was a more equal swap with the VS. And then they took nicely from the Social Democratic Party. Bloc loyalty makes it more difficult to make "unpopular decisions." For the party is in a situation of competition with others on the left wing.

A poll from the 1984 election shows quite clearly how insecure the SF's voter basis is. A good seven percent had no doubt at all that they would vote SF, another four percent doubted but ended with the SF, and, finally, another four percent had the SF in their thoughts but ended elsewhere. In the worst case, the party could have dropped to seven percent, and in the best, climbed to 15. And the swings from one poll to the next point in the same direction.

It is not becoming better with the voter profile the party has. In 1984 the SF was the party which to the greatest extent recruited its voters from the public sector, closely followed by the VS. Thirty-nine percent of SF'ers work in the public sector and only 31 percent in the private. The rest were not actively working. This was due first and foremost to a quite large number of students. A very large part of the SF's voters are therefore strongly dependent on growth in welfare expenditures. If they are reduced, their jobs are endangered, and if they are increased, there will be promotion positions. The SF can conduct a tight economic policy. But it will be with tax increases rather than through economizing.

If the SF gets into the government, Anker Jorgensen will have a hard time. His coalition partners cherish ideas. They have appointed a little flock of members to watch over them. And at the same time they must pay regard to an uncertain constituency which is strongly attached to the public sector and its growth. It will be hard to conduct a tight policy.

The SF's Strength

Election		Polls		
1960	6.1	1984	1st quarter	12
1964	5.8		2nd quarter	13
1966	10.9		3rd quarter	13
1968	6.1		4th quarter	13
1971	9.1	1985	1st quarter	13
1973	6.0		2nd quarter	14
1975	5.0		3rd quarter	13
1977	3.9		4th quarter	14
1979	5.9	1986	1st quarter	14
1981	11.3		2nd quarter	15
1984	11.5		3rd quarter	16
			4th quarter	15
		1987	1st quarter	16

The poll results are based on the average of results from Gallup. Observa, AIM and Vilstrup.

Socialist Left Business Platform

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 23 Mar 87 p 1

[Article by Per Lyngby: "SF: A Red Majority Will Put the Stick to Industry"]

[Text] The SF in a labor government will not pamper industry, but will give "both stick and carrot." Svend Auken's ideas regarding the pampering of industry are characterized in industry as "bait."

Industry must not count on being pampered under a social democratic government if the SF is part of the majority. Svend Auken offered this in the form of a three-year truce, but the SF thinks that industry must have "both stick and carrot."

"The present government is trying precisely to pamper industry, and this has not been coming off very well," says SF Industrial Policy Spokesman Kjeld Rahbaek Moller. "In principle I agree that we must rapidly chalk up the court so that industry knows the terms. But we must use both stick and carrot."

As reported in BERLINGSKE SONDRAG, Industry Council Chairman Otto Christensen wants political stability. And the government's color does not play the major role in this connection, because it is not a question of system changes in Danish politics, he believes.

His predecessor in the Industry Council, present Industry Minister Nils Wilhjelm (Conservative Party), does not understand this.

"It seems as though the Industry Council has not read the Social Democratic Party's industrial policy platform. For although Auken talks about pampering industry, his party is suggesting that the rules for the investment fund be

repealed, that the depreciation rules be changed in a negative direction, etc.," Nils Wilhjelm points out.

Danish Employers Association Chairman Benned Hansen will "surely talk about it if Auken wants to conduct the policy that the present government is conducting." But he and other industry leaders do not think that it makes no difference what color the government is. They talk about Social Democratic "bait" before the election.

8831

CSO: 3613/57

ISSUE OF EARLY ELECTIONS DISCUSSED

Firm Papandreou Denial

Athens TA NEA in Greek 6 Apr 87 p 3

[Excerpt] In a statement to this paper yesterday in Larisa where he had gone for the Kileler observance [anniversary of peasant uprising early this century], Premier A. Papandreou shattered all conjectures about early elections. Wanting to emphasize his statement that the elections will take place in the summer of 1989, he told us to "underline" this fact.

TA NEA submitted the question to the premier because there has been talk that we are headed toward early elections and this assessment was also reflected in newspaper reports. Such assessment was based on the fact that in Larisa Papandreou announced a number of measures favoring the farmers as well as developments concerning Greek-American relations and Greek-Turkish differences.

Certain circles are of the opinion that the government aims at exploiting the present political climate which it finds favorable to it and plans to hold elections.

Yesterday's statement by the premier clears up the political scenario about elections and defines the self purpose of the specific government measures and moves on foreign policy issues.

Election Talk

Scenarios about elections developed in various areas and with different backgrounds:

1. The government's adversaries attribute the talk about elections to certain government options. The character of the measures the premier announced in Larisa in favor of the farmers was overstressed as was the special importance attributed to them.
2. Government officials and PASOK party cadres have concluded that a pro-government climate has now developed as a result of the successful handling of the "Sismik" issue by the premier and sided with the view of holding early elections.

3. Neutral observers are contemplating possible elections. Some consider them as a "golden opportunity" for PASOK and others as "a solution of necessity for the government."

The newspapers also kept up with this continuous speculation by publishing reports expressing the view that we are headed for elections. But Papandreou's statement to this newspaper yesterday put an end to all scenarios.

Conclusive is the fact that even before the newspapers had begun speculating about elections, Papandreou had also assured the German magazine SPIEGEL that "we shall have elections in the summer of 1989," adding that "we shall win these elections too."

Early Elections Seen Unwise

Athens KYRIAKATIKI ELEVTHEROTYPIA in Greek 5 Apr 87 p 48

[Article by Panos Loukakos: "Only the Imprudent Can Talk About Elections"]

[Text] A curious tale about early elections is making the rounds lately in government party circles and already certain recommendations have been made to Premier Andreas papandreou. The rationale is as simple as it is naive:

--The government moves in the recent Greek-Turkish crisis and the fact that in the end the "Sismik" returned to its base created a positive impression on the public. By contrast, the policy the leader of the major opposition followed by charging the government with a national sell out at the very height of the crisis provoked reactions even within his own party.

--To the government moves in the Greek-Turkish crisis we should add distribution of the Church of Greece property, a measure which also had a favorable public reaction. On this issue too, Mitsotakis followed an oppositionist policy which harmed rather than benefited his party since even a large section of Church faithful, who were members of his party, agrees with the measure.

--To distribution of Church property we should add the fact that the recent inclement weather will cause a reduction in agricultural income and the view that 1989 will be a very hard economic year, perhaps much harder than 1987.

Therefore, with such arguments, holding elections now in order to avoid also the obstacle of signing the new Greek-American agreement on the bases before the elections will surely reduce PASOK's electoral strength.

But all these arguments are naive as well as dangerous if they finally lead to the decision for early elections. They are naive because they are based on impressions recently created and not on facts of substance. It will soon be proved that all this ballyhoo about Church property and the relevant bill

[in the Chamber of Deputies] are pointless since the truly exploitable Church land today is very small.

And when the time comes--if it comes--to distribute it, those directly interested in it will discover that their share will be almost nil. On the other hand, the Church's reaction, which will surely escalate, will prove corrosive for PASOK. Shortly, today's victory in the area of impressions will be very costly politically.

During the recent Greek-Turkish crisis, the government, also helped by Mitsotakis' loquaciousness, won the battle of impressions. But what more did it do than its duty? What more did it do than any other responsible government would have done?

Of course, the Greek-Turkish adventure will be continued in the next few months. If some circles do indeed wish it, they have the facility to upset the climate which today is positive for the Greek government. For example, the Sismik can again re-enter the Aegean at any time, again forcing Greece to go on alert. It is obvious that, besides Athens and Ankara, Washington is also involved in this "game" and has the capacity to instigate or suspend the Turkish provocations.

For all these reasons, all arguments about early elections are naive because as easy as impressions can be created, they can also be easily foiled if not based on facts. Recommendations made to Papandreou are not only naive but nationally dangerous as well because if we finally do hold early elections, the political confrontation will focus on the big and critical issues of our foreign policy. Mitsotakis will accuse Papandreou of calling out national interests and Papandreou will charge that Mitsotakis is irresponsible and an American vassal.

At the same time, the present circumstances should compel PASOK to adopt a strong anti-American attitude during the campaign in order to halt any voter desertion from its left wing. But this pre-election anti-Americanism may encourage Ankara to proceed with the next phase of its plans concerning the Aegean.

Greece has lived through many national catastrophes whose beginnings can be traced to political mistakes and political disputes within the country itself. The clash between the Venizelos and King Konstandinos followers led to the Asia Minor catastrophe and the 1967 dictatorship to the Turkish invasion of Cyprus.

Holding elections at this time, with our national problems open and aggravated, could perhaps be the beginning of new and great sufferings. It would perhaps provide the opportunity for which Ankara is waiting.

It is indeed amazing that those who recommend early elections to Papandreou do not understand these elementary concepts. At the same time, the fact

is a truly curious political phenomenon that ND Chairman Mitsotakis agrees with them and almost on a daily basis asks for early elections. May be he acts so because in the student elections his party's percentage increased; or may be because a union joined his party; or may be there is no reason at all and he just talks about the issue.

This past week we lived through some deplorable events. Government and opposition insulted each other with strong characterizations about the handling of the Greek-Turkish crisis.

Only 2 days ago deputies came to blows about Church land and Minister Tritsis was blaming ND for the Asia Minor tragedy. And all this was happening while the Turkish threat was evident, the Sismik was ready to return to the Aegean, and Ankara was watching the petty exploitation of our enormous foreign policy problems which it could use for cheap internal consumption.

If things continue this way, if government and opposition are only thinking about holding elections instead of trying to chart a mutually acceptable policy toward Turkey and the threat to the Aegean, then we may be in greater danger in the coming months than we were in the weeks that passed.

Long 'Pro-Electoral' Avenon Foreseen

Athens I AVGI TIS KYRIAKIS in Greek 12 Apr 87 p 6

[Article by Vangelis Siafakas: "What Is Discussed in PASOK About Elections"]

[Text] Finally, "no elections will be held." Premier Papandreou seems to be definitely inclined toward holding elections in June 1989.

He said so officially and by all assessments and indications he meant it. Yet the fact remains that there were discussions and proposals for early elections--next June--which the premier rejected as "ill advised." Supporters of early elections were telling the premier that the de-escalation of tension in the Aegean has created a climate favorable to the government and were expressing doubts if a similar climate could again be created in the next 2 years until the end of the government's term. These views were supported and conveyed to the premier by Andonis Livanis and Chamber of Deputies Speaker Giannis Alevras.

The members of PASOK's Executive Office had directly opposite views. Among them were Gennimatas, M. Kovtsogiorgas and T. Tsokhatzopoulos who argued that the result of early elections cannot be guaranteed as favorable to PASOK and pointed out the negative impact on the premier's and the party's prestige "electoral utilization" if a national crisis could have.

They added that the government's trustworthiness would sustain a heavy blow if it attempted to renew its term before the 2 years were over. "It would be inconsistent," said an Executive Office cadre to the premier, "to ask

for a new 4-year term without having concrete indications that we shall be successful while our present term has 2 more years of governing."

Even though the premier's decision to hold elections in 1989 antedates the recent developments in the Aegean, one could surmise that the decision was strengthened or, if you prefer, confirmed by PASOK's poor showing in the electoral confrontations which followed the crisis in the Aegean (student elections, farm cooperative elections, etc.). The electoral "signs" did not "react" positively--at least to the extent PASOK expected--to the victorious shouts which followed the crisis.

The recent announcement about new increases to price lists of public enterprises put an "end" to the election talk. There was strong reaction about the timing of this decision which was considered inexpedient and created "exasperation" among the cadres who are occupied with the party's reorganization.

These cadres told the premier that before the party could advantageously exploit the favorable climate created by the bill on ecclesiastical property, developments on tension in the Aegean and promises made at Kileler, "there came Simitis and upset the climate."

Criticism against Simitis and other economic ministers was also expressed for their "inflexibility" about the Kileler announcements about which Simitis and the other ministers had expressed reservations even though the cost involved is not immediate.

The premier's decision that national and Euro-elections be held at the same time seems to be definite because it is believed that the simultaneous voting in Euro ballot boxes will affect the government favorably in the "critical ballot box" of national elections. The PASOK staffers believe they can "lead" the "displeasure" of the electoral body to the European Parliament ballot box and "divert" to the national elections ballot box the greatest possible number of votes.

Even though no positive indications exist about development of the economic situation--only 2 days ago I AVGI revealed the new rise in inflation--PASOK's leadership hopes there will be steady improvement which will allow not only for financial pre-election allowances but also for holding elections in a climate of economic recovery.

Another critical point in these long-term pre-electoral tactics is the agreement on the American bases. The government has not made its plans known on the subject but its decision to start negotiations is definite. The premier has decided--and his close associates confirm it--to renew the agreement on more favorable terms.

The new element is that the government places the time for signing such an agreement after the 1989 elections. The negotiations, that is, will last

many years provided the procedural discussions between the two parties start in the fall. However, the United States does not want a delay in negotiations beyond a time limit that could create problems in the step-by-step policy for improving Greek-American relations.

The government knows that the American side has every reason to want PASOK to sign the new agreement and believes during the long negotiations the Americans have no reason to create adverse impressions. The government thinks the United States will agree to a "dignified"--for the Greek government--agreement and will protract the premier's prestige during the negotiations.

In the meantime, other events to come are PASOK's Congress and the Greek presidency of the European Community during the second half of 1988. The PASOK Congress is scheduled to precede the EEC presidency but it may also be held early in 1989 during, that is, the election campaign.

These two events will lend, according to PASOK leading cadres, "prestige to both the government and the party" and will allow for a "sensational pre-election finale" with the return to their cabinet positions of strong Executive Office cadres.

Despite assurances to the contrary, there will be a change in the electoral system. Which system will be adopted is not yet known and the decision will depend on assessments and predictions at "the last moment." In any event, PASOK's leadership has in mind an electoral system which will not be the result of a PASOK-ND "consensual approach" as the case has been since 1974.

It will be an electoral system whose efficiency will "be tested" in new election districts corresponding to the 13 administrative regions in which the country has been recently divided. For this system there are two alternative probabilities: one to maximize the efficiency (in parliament seats) of a low electoral percentage and the other to minimize the efficiency of a high percentage.

Which one of the two systems will be chosen will depend on the predictions of "the last moment" as to which party will come first. In any case, no one should ignore the fact that in less than a year after June 1989 and specifically in March 1990 when the photographers will take pictures of Khr. Sartzetakis at the presidential mansion, 180 "uniform" parliamentary votes will be sought. So many, that is, that the country will be turned into a "pre-electoral arena" of unknown duration.

7520

CSO: 3521/114

ND STATUS, FAILINGS ANALYZED; RECOMMENDATIONS MADE

Better Communications Urged

Athens EMBISTEVTIKO GRAMMA in Greek 18 Feb 87 p 10

[Commentary under the "Analysis" rubric: "Organization and Communication--the Key Words for ND"; passages within slantlines emphasized in original]

[Excerpts] When after the recent shake-up the official opposition party began to intensify its political activity, that in the nature of things brought to the fore the /continuing problems of communication/ ND faces.

The position of the opposition as we know it in Greece since the dictatorship is in /the nature of things disadvantageous/ from the standpoint of communications. Television and radio are controlled by the government of the day, which compels the opposition to rely on inferior media, such as the press friendly to it, its party apparatus, and its presence in public areas (posters, slogans, etc.).

The same is true today for ND, which /faces no/ substantive problems as regards ideological positions, political slogans, or program. Its primary problem is that it cannot /effectively carry these positions to the grassroots voter of the governing party./

Ideologically, A. Papandreou's shift over to ND's positions is hardly likely to impress voters who already did not vote for him in 1985, preferring the "liberal New Democracy" at that time. Those who had already been freed from the prime minister's charm then can list political happenings over the last 2 years which fully /confirm/ their decision. Scandals, the admission of economic failure, maladministration, authoritarian behavior, austerity, all these things make the possibility of such shifts [back to Papandreou] /political fantasy,/ and in any case there is no sign of them in available polls.

The "game" /is being played out exclusively among the PASOK voters/ of 1985, where --after A. Papandreou's latest ideological concessions-- the two parties' political positions are closer together and their differences are primarily differences of will (as regards public-sector expenditure), /ability to govern,/ and /credibility./

With the proof available on these three points from the years of PASOK government, the official opposition has more than enough arguments. What it /does not have/ is the ability to communicate /directly/ and /adequately/ with those who do not read the opposition press.

That is why its /real/ electoral effort will never get started unless its party apparatus becomes extroverted (e.g. from local party committees to door-to-door contacts) and unless it starts to use the mass media available to it (such as posters).

Thus ND's current moves merely prepare the atmosphere for a long electoral struggle. /It still is not the start of the struggle./ And the official opposition's weaknesses mainly involve its organization and its use of modern methods of communication, rather than its political position.

Disorganization, Lack of Unity Lamented

Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek 7 Apr 87 p 8

[Commentary by E. under the "Current Events" rubric: "Electoral Prognostications"; ellipses as in original]

[Excerpts] This announcement by our mendacious television that elections will not take place before 1989 threw oil on the electoral fire. All those involved in forecasting the electoral weather had the same reaction: this is an effort to refute talk about early elections. In any case, how can Andreas not be thinking about holding elections here and now? He must start up in bed at night, seeing the word "elections" suddenly glowing in bright letters in the darkness. Elections, of course, quickly, now while the impression remains that I scored a great diplomatic victory... Now, when the Greek people has once again trusted me --how naive people are! I'll give something to the farmers, something with the "green drachma," something with proud anti-Americanism, the kids like that! And we'll win...

I do not imagine there is anybody wondering how, after the impressive declaration that he will not call elections before 1989, he will announce them for this summer or fall, is there?

The excuse presents itself so easily, temptingly: "As we approach the great national issue of a dialogue with Turkey, my democratic conscience, my faith in the Greek people, compel me to ask the people, yet another time and on a specific issue, for an expression of their confidence in my person..."

He will be humble, moving, the complete patriot; he will note with satisfaction the years of "peace" "PASOK" has given Greece; he will ask for an extension of his mandate in order to secure more such years; he will say; he will promise; he will command...

Will he once again trick the weary, disappointed Greek people?

The question is, are we doing anything to deal with elections in an organized manner? Regardless of when they come?

This "New Democracy" of ours, what kind of party is it? Does it have modern, accessible offices that its supporters can go to to ask for information, that a foreign journalist passing through can visit and leave with a few well-printed foreign-language publications giving the history of New Democracy, biographical data on its present and past leadership, and the party's thoughts and plans for the future?

Does it have members, like all the organized democratic parties in Europe? Can it tell us how many? And when they joined and how many are joining today? And what kind of ties bind them to the party? Do they pay even a nominal membership fee? Do they ever meet? Do they take on any duties, any work? Do they do something, anything, to enlighten the people they come into contact with?

Our own people quarrel. They disagree. They have serious objections on insignificant issues and insignificant objections on serious issues. They are full of criticism, often correct and almost always useless.

As "PASOK" sinks into a sea polluted by scandals, we travel in a "dead calm" and wait for those elections which will mark its final shipwreck.

We will not bet on when and how fast elections will be called, only that we will not have to wait until 1989.

We do not know what Andreas has in mind and for that at any rate we are not at fault.

Whereas in other regards we do know and we are at fault.

We know, almost with certainty, that if early elections are called we will be taken by surprise and unprepared.

To be fair, K. Mitsotakis himself may not be but those around him will be, those who do not seem to be doing anything constructive and above all do not seem to show any inclination to aid, to strengthen the party leader whom --how often must we remind them?-- they elected themselves, not just once, but twice.

The "officials" go around, discontent, faded, creating an atmosphere of bankruptcy, although they do not adduce any serious political argument to justify it. How shall we persuade them to postpone this childish obstinacy, to accept their own decisions, and to start getting ready to take advantage of the opponent's failures? And to deprive Andreas of the sole ray of light he sees on the horizon, the discord within the ranks of "New Democracy"?

How much worse off do our own people want "PASOK" to be before they smile? Before they go into the elections, whenever they come, with the leader they have chosen --who is, simply and definitively, K. Mitsotakis-- and in the expectation of victory?

12593

CSO: 3521/103

NO ADVANTAGES SEEN FROM KARMANLIS' DISMISSAL

Athens KYRIAKATIKI ELEVTHEROTYPIA in Greek 8 Mar 87 p 48

[Article by Panos Loukanos: "Was Papandreou's 'Historic Choice' a Good One?"]

[Text] Tomorrow is the second anniversary of Kon. Karamanlis' dismissal from the presidency of the Republic; the second anniversary since the decision of Premier Andreas Papandreou to go ahead with what he himself called "the historic rift of the 9th of March." It is also the second anniversary of starting the proceeding to revise the constitution and of the elevation of Khristos Sartzetakis to the presidency.

Karamanlis' removal from the presidency continues to be loaded with political significance--not because PASOK did not have the right to propose for president the person it wanted, but because until the 8th of March it continued to assure Karamanlis that it would vote for him.

Much has been written about the methods used during those days in March--methods condemned even by some of those who agreed with the removal of Karamanlis from the presidency. For this reason our subject today is not how it was done, but what the consequences were.

It is evident that Papandreou's move on March 9, 1985 had as its sole aim the transfer to himself the part of power he had to share with the then president. For this reason, Papandreou placed in the presidency Khristos Sartzetakis who was then not an active politician. At the same time Papandreou moved on to revision of the constitution, eliminating the political powers of the presidency.

Despite occasional clashes between Papandreou and Sartzetakis, it is a fact that Papandreou succeeded in his aim. Today Papandreou is the sole power holder in the political arena. Of course, this concentration of power has its negative aspects as well. This has become increasingly evident lately.

In attempting a real opening to the Right both in policy and contacts with personalities, PASOK is obviously seeking support to deal with the current crisis. Such openings, of course, cannot be made in the direction of K. Mitsotakis' New Democracy party. Thus, Papandreou one day talks with G. Rallis and another with Giannis Boutos. But these talks cannot lead to

a wider political consensus for a way out of the present crisis; and PASOK today needs such a consensus.

If Kon. Karamanlis had remained president there might have been a common point of reference for the two major parties. This could have affected PASOK's policy on certain points. And it might have affected the tactics of ND as the opposition party.

Currently, ND uses the tactic of unyielding opposition to the government even when such attacks have heavy national cost. The present president, Sartzetakis, cannot play such a role because his election was not the result of a wider consensus and because even the procedure for his election is being questioned.

All sides now admit that in the 5 years Karamanlis was in the presidency, he had a positive record. No one questions the fact that Karamanlis exercised his duties in a non-partisan manner and that he helped the PASOK government at certain critical moments, especially during the early years. However, those who approve Karamanlis' removal argue that he would have been different during a second 5-year term. Why?

PASOK attempted some "confrontation" which, in fact, it was never able to bring to a visible conclusion, except during the yearly years of its rise to power. Gradually, in the following years, PASOK made an impressive conservative turn. Today, in its sixth year in power, PASOK follows policies which resemble in many ways those of the ND policies when Karamanlis was the premier.

The only difference is that the economic measures, which were then called "austerity measures," are now called "stabilization measures." To the extent that the Karamanlis-Papandreou co-existence was possible during PASOK's "revolutionary stage," by what logic can one argue today that it would not also have been today when PASOK has become more "conservative" in its policies?

On the 9th of March 1985, the removal of Karamanlis was presented as a "rift with conservatism," as a revolutionary step so that PASOK could implement all those promises that presumably the then president was blocking. But things did not follow that course in the ensuing 2 years. The past 2 years have shown that if Karamanlis could co-exist in harmony with Papandreou during the first term, he would have co-existed even more harmoniously during a second term--not because Karamanlis would have changed but because PASOK has changed.

The events of the last 2 years show that the reasons which led to the removal of Karamanlis were not political. They were personal. Andreas Papandreou wanted for himself all the power, and he took it. Now the question is, what can he do with it?

From the moment Papandreou became the sole power holder, he also assumed full responsibility for everything. The objective facts in the political and economic sector are not particularly pleasant to permit optimistic predictions.

Papandreou could have moved at some point to the presidency succeeding Karamanlis, and playing the role of the "arbiter" as it was done by the former president. But by revising the constitution Papandreou has turned the office of the president into almost a purely ceremonial one. And by placing Sartzetakis in the presidency, he now faces the prospect that Sartzetakis will stay in office until 1990. But prior to 1990, Papandreou will have to face a parliamentary election, with much uncertainty as to the outcome.

Papandreou has indeed gathered all power in his hands since 9 March 1985. But this concentration of power may boomerang in the near future. It may turn out that in addition to having no political effect the removal of Karamanlis did not help Papandreou's personal designs either.

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CSO: 3521/105

PAPANDREOU'S YOUNGER SON SEEN ENTERING POLITICAL ARENA

First Appearance at Women's Organization

Athens ELEVTHEROTYPIA in Greek 17 Mar 87 p 15

[Article by Khr. Papastathopoulou]

[Excerpts] "Development has influenced women's position in society as well as in the family. Fundamental characteristics of this development are: the women's association with the capitalistic method of production and international distribution of work."

Thus spoke the premier's son Nikos Papandreu yesterday during an event organized by the Union of Greek Women [EGE] on the occasion of Women's World Day whose theme was "Equality and Development." Nikos Papandreu, who is presently serving as a soldier, spoke for the first time at a woman's event in his capacity as an economist.

It should be mentioned that Nikos is the fourth person in the Papandreu family appearing in the limelight. In his speech he said, in part:

"As all studies show, women work more than they worked before their country's development and much more than men. This is so because a woman today continues to work at home and be responsible for her children's care. At the same time, together with men she is responsible for the production of marketable products. It seems more than certain that the South will not reach the North's development level.

"But is this by any chance the criterion of success? Has the North achieved so much, especially in the area of equality, that it is worthy of imitation? In the North, too, women are in second place; they are not on a footing of equality. Their salaries are 70 percent of those earned by men. In the factories of the South the salary difference--between the two sexes--is the same."

In conclusion he pointed out: "In both the North and South government positions, companies, everything, is in the hands of men. What, anyway, is the model the West is proposing to the South? It seems that the reproduction of the North's economic systems in underdeveloped countries also brings with it reproduction of the inequalities among the West's two sexes."

'Naive' Third World Views

Athens EMBISTEVTIKO GRAMMA in Greek 18 Mar 87 p 7

[Text] It is said that the appearance of Nikos Papandreou, the second son of the A. Papandreou family, at the EGE meeting on feminist issues was disappointing. His views were charitably characterized as "third-worldly naive," given that the young speaker (who is getting prepared for the general secretariat of the Greek Productivity Center) claimed that women's limited position is due to the West (hurling, moreover, strong criticism against the social democratic countries of the West) and not to those of the East.

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CSO: 3521/105

FORMER MINISTER INTERVIEWED ON PASOK DYNAMISM, WEAKNESSES

Athens ENA in Greek 16 Apr 87 pp 41-44

[Article by Olga Tremi: "When There is Lack of Political Courage the Imprudence of Mediocrity Flourishes"]

[Excerpts] Vaso Papandreou, a former [deputy] minister [of Industry, Energy and Technology] and presently a member of PASOK's Executive Office, is a much talked-about person yet unknown to many. In this interview with ENA she talked about government, political parties, the economy, society, and even about equality of the sexes and her own "Sundays of Loneliness..."

[Question] To what extent do you think PASOK has lost its dynamism in the past 6 years? To what do you attribute such a loss and how can it be coped with?

[Answer] Indeed, PASOK does not have the dynamism it had in 1981 nor before or even during the first years it governed the country. The causes are many. First, the fact that several PASOK cadres participated in the government.

Second, there has been some synonymousness between PASOK and the government. The organization, that is, did not have the political autonomy it should have vis-a-vis the government.

A third reason is that the organization came into existence and operated in a climate of parliamentary opposition--as an opposition party. And its change from an organization of opposition to a governing organization created certain problems--the organization was not able to recognize in time its new role.

[Question] Do you believe, that is, that it identified itself more than it should with the government and that this fact had negative consequence?

[Answer] Yes, to a large degree it was absorbed by the government and to a large degree it was operating as an intermediary organization between the people and the government. When one party assumes power new conditions are naturally created and at some point the distribution of authority has a negative impact.

In a multi-party regime, moreover, the character of the party in power is defined by the government whose operations have direct influence on the party itself. There were certain issues on which the party should have disagreed or expressed a different point of view, but did not do so at least to the degree it should.

The party's choice to support the government--especially in certain cases where the government's operation was not what it should be--had a negative impact on the party's operation and on its relations with the people. The necessary consistency between promises and deeds did not exist.

And the way individuals or agencies operated was not always in accord with PASOK's ideological and political principles and this caused some credibility crisis.

When the main objective is "change" and not the system's management, it is necessary to have new institutions, new forms of authority and new ways of operation. At the same time those who undertake to develop and implement a policy should have the necessary background and ability and I do not think the best-qualified individuals were always chosen.

[Question] It is said that within PASOK there exist organizational and mismanagement problems, a phenomenon of complacency and, in some cases, of dissipation--the result, it is claimed, was the recent party-government separation.

[Answer] My opinion is that the separation was not an issue of individuals but of policy. Some persons may have a dual identity but this does not necessarily mean that the party was absorbed by the government. And vice versa, it is possible to have divergence among individuals but not the necessary political divergence.

Undoubtedly the party faces problems today. It is in a phase--also organizationally--not particularly satisfactory. The main problem, however, is not organizational but political and concerns PASOK and the political life in general. Today there is a devitalization, an indifference and disappointment in a section of the people--phenomena which are of course also reflected among organized persons.

The reasons are many in this case also but, as concerns PASOK, they are to a large extent related to the way it was structured, to the fact that it had to be a broadly attractive party. Thus, for some members and followers the concept of socialism had in many cases a subjective content.

Vaso Papandreou considers "the policy of independence from the government" as a prerequisite for PASOK's improvement. She adds that PASOK must demand "its own political stand," which means that "on many points it will agree with the government but there will be issues on which it can express a different opinion about specific actions or specific changes which must

be made." This should be so because "the government is occupied with the ordinary daily affairs and has greater restrictions while the party should formulate a more advanced position on certain issues."

[Question] The premier himself has said that some degenerative phenomena have been observed within PASOK. He even spoke about "cliques in the party." What does this mean and to what degree have the causes of such phenomena been investigated?

[Answer] I think I referred indirectly to the causes earlier: the party's absorption by the government; its change to a large extent to an intermediary organization; the effort to distribute authority--all these led to a weakening and disfunctioning of the party. I do not think that "cliques" with the meaning of group alignments exist.

Cliques with the meaning that some persons are supporting or are trying to promote other persons not on purely political criteria but because of personal relations or influences exist within PASOK. But within PASOK and within the Movement in general there exist different political views and conflicts. Many times these political views are expressed with personal clashes or contradictions and not with political confrontations as it should be.

[Question] The press reported--ad nauseum--about a "Gennimatas-Vaso Papandreou-Laliotis" clique...

[Answer] Yes, it is true that such scenarios were reported. Each person's manner of action, his political standing and attitude are known and it is obvious that such scenarios are products of the imagination for the purpose of serving some expedencies. The imprudence of mediocrity flourishes where there is lack of political courage.

"Such a clique of course does not exist," says Vaso Papandreou. "I don't even have to deny it," she adds. At the same time, however, she points out that the existence of such scenarios is a sample of how certain centers or paracenters operate.

"It is discouraging," she continues, "that today the methods of party and society politics so effectively used in the past have not changed, even though the people themselves consider them antiquated. Unfortunately, there is plenty of mudslinging. Various officials and obscure politicians are trying to survive and get advanced through cloudy methods. This is sad and disturbing."

[Question] PASOK recognized the need for a "revival". What would be the salient points of such a revival?

[Answer] Look, our Movement is 14 years old. Therefore, we have enough experience not only as an opposition party but as a government as well. I think certain positions of ours should be based on this experience and,

of course, on the prospect of a Greece of the year 2000. Some things should be reexamined...

[Question] Such as...

[Answer] Not our objectives--they are givens--but how to achieve them.

[Question] In other words, we don't speak about changes of a strategic character which could possibly affect PASOK's make up...

[Answer] No, we don't speak about changing PASOK's profile nor about changing our ideological principles. But we have in mind the modernization of our political practice. How to achieve our objectives, the socialist transformation, which is a long-term affair. Today there is need for more democracy in the way the institutions work and believe, for changes in the organization and operation of our society, for modernizing the economic and social life.

The problem is how PASOK, as a political party, will guide or influence these developments which constitute the socialist change in our country. At the same time PASOK must launch a system of values which will persuade, inspire and attract. Change assumes an internal change in all of us. And there lies the difficulty.

[Question] What prospects of cooperation exist--and to what extent--with the traditional Left?

[Answer] I think we can have and there must be cooperation in specific areas--in unions, cooperatives, etc. Also, cooperation on issues of institution and generally on all those issues to which the parties of the traditional Left should not be opposed because the changes made correspond to the people's demands and our society's transformation. I believe the parties of the traditional Left begin to become aware of this fact because the oppositional attitude they have shown until now toward PASOK may have given them some short-term party benefits but on a long-term basis will lead them to an impasse.

[Question] Is not the condition KKE puts on the simple proportional [electoral system] an obstacle?

[Answer] I think that KKE is beginning to understand that regardless of the electoral system, cooperation among the liberal forces in specific areas is necessary in order to cope with certain problems.

[Question] Despite the fact that it is believed that you belong to PASOK's "leftist wing," there are many who believe that in the end you were able to get along with the industrialists and to deal with them realistically.

[Answer] I don't think that a leftist policy means a non-realistic policy. I would say that the contrary is true. The problem is how you should

develop in each case the method to achieve your objectives. It is true that there were rumors about certain PASOK cadres that we are somewhat...singular persons, far from the Greek reality. Well, people saw that we can have vision, inspiration and that at the same time we can cope with issues realistically.

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CSO: 3521/116

FEW CHANGES SEEN IN NEW LEFTIST PARTY IDEOLOGY

Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek 26-27 Apr 87 pp 1, 10

[Article by And. Karkagiannis: "New Party of the Left on the Road...to the Past"]

[Text] What changes did the founding Congress of the new party bring about to the Left and what changes will the new party itself bring about? This question is preoccupying these days press representatives, observers, invited guests, as well as the Congress delegates themselves. With regard to the party's leaders, central ideas and anticipated, one could observe the following:

1. Compared to KKE-Int. the leaders are about the same and clearly fewer with small changes in the influence each one exerts in their inter-relations. For the area of the Left this is of some importance.

About 19 years ago, these same persons who fought with such determination and religious fanaticism for KKE-Int., for the traditions and slogans of the communist Left, will now find it difficult to gain some political credibility with their tragically delayed discovery of the new party.

The true new party indeed resulted from the activities of the pre-dictatorship United Democratic Left and of the KKE split. At that time they had fought with fanaticism for the new KKE-Int. How will they now bring the people to believe the reverse?

2. The central ideas (not a word was said about ideology) are the same as those of KKE Int. The strategic orientation continues to be the society's socialist transformation (the same as that of KKE, except that in this case it is stated more clearly) with "freedom and democracy" (presumably the same as PASOK's).

This orientation is being embellished with reference to the new problems and the "new movements" (which are accepted only as natural or as satellite allies), with the usual criticism of the extant (Soviet-style) socialism (Gorbachev is considered to have been nourished in the KKE-Int. principles) and, finally, with general references to the revolution of the "new technology," etc.

Beyond these general and useless declarations the society's socialist transformation remains obscure and uncertain and nowhere is it made clear how it differs (in certain aspects) from the known social-democratic models and (in other aspects) from the better-known models of extant socialism.

Devoted to the antiquated verbalisms (rift with the system, leadership role of the "revolutionary party," etc.), the Congress spent most of its time theorizing about a new political promise of the Left. Explaining the "crisis of the Left" with oratorical references to errors and distortions in relation to a "vague" but fanatical model of socialism, the Congress did not pose these critical questions: is the epicenter to be found in some chronic crisis of the Left and socialism--when many and various solutions are proposed, one of them being the new party--or in the fact that capitalism has the capacity to survive its crises, to renew itself out of its contradictions and in the end expand on a gigantic scale?

And most importantly: could the so-called revolution of the new technology be capitalism's renewal and rearrangement, a process in which the working people participate compulsively? Finally, what is the Left's role in such a process? If all study and thinking focused in this direction, the Left could perhaps discover its role in a country which, while not playing a leading role in the process, is for many reasons its captive.

3. Finally, the anticipated place of the new party in the overall arrangement of the political forces is about the same as that of KKE-Int. The new party claims, as did the old one, a place in the area between KKE and PASOK.

Its ambition--which is not so realistic--is to slip (by Gorbachev's grace) into the first and gain the leftist losses of the second. Congress did not even raise the question what its role and the role of the Left in general would be if nothing of the above is realized and the center of gravity shifts to the Right as it seems possible if not certain.

The great test for the new party will come with the first elections. Today, Congressional leaders stand proudly firm on the party's self-reliance with the impetuosity of a new convert who thinks he will conquer the whole world.

However, it is certain that in an electoral confrontation--even with the simple proportional system--the survival of the new party will depend on alliances, collaborations and other alignments. One could say that the Congressional leaders--and the obvious leadership of the new party--avoided, under the pretext of self-reliance, any commitment to the delegates concerning the handling of this critical issue.

The question from now on is not whether the new party will collaborate electorally or not, but with whom it will collaborate--with KKE or with PASOK--since cooperation with any other party makes no sense and brings to mind the unforgettable "Alliance".

On other issues Congress was not so important. The vendettas, personal scheming, etc. prevailed.

BRIEFS

NO KKE-PASOK COOPERATION SEEN--We should not expect the KKE and PASOK to cooperate in the government. Not only because the KKE would prefer --as we wrote in the previous issue of EMBISTEVTIKO GRAMMA-- to have no part of the decline and popular indignation that would be shared out to the two parties. But also because the KKE demands as a necessary condition the existence of a permanent government program, which PASOK cannot accept because of the response it would provoke from Greece's foreign creditors. [Text] [Athens EMBISTEVTIKO GRAMMA in Greek 18 Feb 87 p 9] 12593

CSO: 3521/103

IMPACT OF ISLAMIC CONFERENCE SUMMIT RESULTS EXAMINED

Istanbul CUMHURIYET in Turkish 6 Feb 87 pp 16,10

[Cengiz Candar report]

[Text] It has been 18 years since the burning by arson of the Al-Aqsa mosque in Jerusalem which is the Muslims' first direction of prayer and third holiest place of worship. Born out of the flames of that fire, the Islamic Conference Organization managed to overcome extremely unfavorable international conditions and successfully convened its 5th summit conference in Kuwait following similar meetings in Rabat, Lahore, Mecca-Taif and Casablanca. Three years later, the leaders of the Islamic countries--which encompass a geographical area inhabited by 1 billion people--will meet for a sixth time far away from the war-weary coast of the Persian Gulf. They will meet for the first time in a black African country, in Senegal on the Atlantic Ocean.

It is hard to predict from now the things that will happen on the road from Kuwait to Senegal or which Islamic leaders will be able meet in Senegal and under what conditions. However, the most striking outcome of the Kuwait summit is that despite major differences in the political regimes of the member countries the Islamic world prefers to have the 46-member Islamic Conference Organization rather than not to have it.

The most difficult issue tackled by the summit was undoubtedly the war between the two Islamic countries, Iran and Iraq. The fact that the summit's final declaration was drafted "in a way that slightly favored Iraq but which took care not to offend Iran" did not prevent Tehran from dismissing the most important document of the summit as "useless." The second most important issue at the summit was the "battle of the camps" in Lebanon. Although the participants passed a resolution calling for a truce, reports from Lebanon indicate that the battle is continuing.

Does the unfolding of events which rendered meaningless the issues most emphasized by the final declaration before even the ink dried on it mean that the Islamic Conference Organization is irrelevant?

Rather than replying "yes" to this question, it would be more appropriate to view this situation as a transient period whose depth and seriousness is set by the Gulf war and the battle of the camps in Lebanon.

Outcome from Turkey's Standpoint

How should the final declaration of the Islamic summit--whose most major provisions were violated before the ink on the document dried--be evaluated from Turkey's standpoint?

The two issues which concerned Turkey directly were Cyprus and the condition of the Bulgarian Turks; Turkey's principal interest in the conference was how the final declaration would treat these two issues. Turkey's demands were largely satisfied on these two issues. Being unfamiliar with the mode of operation of the Islamic Conference Organization, some observers interpreted the absence of a resolution on Cyprus and the Bulgarian Turks as a failure for Turkish diplomacy. In fact, the segment of the final declaration dealing with the two issues refers to previous resolutions and reaffirms them. The resolution which paralleled the Turkish position on Cyprus most closely was taken at the Islamic Foreign Ministers' conference in Dhaka, Bangladesh, at the end of 1983 prior to the summit conference in Casablanca. A highly satisfactory resolution was passed with regard to the status of Bulgarian Turks by the 16th Islamic Foreign Ministers' Conference that convened in Fez, Morocco, in January 1986.

Moreover, Turkish diplomacy has gained a diplomatic advantage over the Greek Cypriot side by accepting UN Secretary General Perez de Cuellar's 29 March 1986 document. Turkish interests would not be served by a radical resolution which might overshadow that advantage.

In addition, Turkish diplomacy believes that every passing day in Cyprus consolidates and strengthens the position of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus [TRNC] and therefore does expect dramatic steps on Cyprus from the Islamic conference platform. On this issue, it is considered sufficient "not to retreat," "not to let previous gains to erode away," "not to lose what has been gained" and perhaps to take a small step forward. These goals were achieved in Kuwait.

U.S. Congress: Main Battleground

One unfavorable development against Turkish diplomacy was the failure to prevent the Greek Cypriot side from mounting a diplomatic offensive in Kuwait--in fact within the complex where the summit was being held--during the time of the conference. What escaped attention was that the host of the summit, Kuwait, and Turkey's ally, the United States, were equally responsible for that situation. It was learned that the new Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman, Claiborne Pell, and Senator Joseph Biden, the new chairman of the Subcommittee on Southern Europe and the Near East which is responsible for Turkey, Greece and Cyprus, launched an initiative before the summit and tried to prevent "a resolution in Kuwait envisaging the recognition of the TRNC." Paul Sarbanes, a senator of Greek origin, is also a member of the said subcommittee. Senators Pell and Biden, who currently occupy very influential positions, have in the past cooperated with the Greek lobby in the United States.

It is also rumored that Pell and Biden are preparing to propose a cut of \$200 million in U.S. military aid to Turkey on grounds that the said amount is used to maintain Turkish troops in Cyprus. Consequently, the real "battleground" for Turkish diplomacy on the Cyprus issue is the U.S. Congress rather than the Islamic summit conference. In any case, it can be said that the desired goals on this issue were achieved in Kuwait.

In addition, the mention of the Cyprus issue in Islamic Conference Organization Secretary General Sharifuiddin Pirzade's report--which is part of the official records of the summit--in a language compatible with Turkey's preferences should also be chalked up in the gains column.

Rights and Wrongs

As for the issue of Bulgarian Turks, Turkish diplomacy would prefer to settle this issue through bilateral talks between Turkey and Bulgaria. Resolutions passed at such international forums must be evaluated within the framework of this fundamental posture. From that perspective the final document of the Kuwait summit was satisfactory for Turkey. If a criticism is to be made then it should be leveled against Turkish diplomacy's basic posture toward Bulgaria.

Are these statements of any value other than the fact that they have been written down on paper?

In international forums where very different regimes come together, what is seen significant is the status of a country's diplomatic position rather than quick solutions for international problems. From that standpoint, what is more important in final declarations and resolutions is whether a country is able to have what it wants recorded on paper rather than the practical implications of what is written on paper.

Another misconception among observers--in addition to their excessively high expectations from the Islamic summit--is that they do not realize that the Islamic Conference Organization is a political and not a religious organization. Consequently, while some circles have questioned secular Turkey's membership in this organization, others interpreted the appearance of a female interpreter without a headcover behind President Kenan Evren at the opening session of the summit as "a gesture by Turkey." Had everyone realized that the Islamic Conference Organization is a political and not religious association and noticed that the female officials of the Senegal delegation seated just a small distance away from the Turkish delegation were also not wearing headcovers and that even the Kuwaiti female officials were not wearing headcovers, they would not have reached the conclusion that "Turkey was making a gesture."

Interesting Indications

The issues on the agenda of the summit undoubtedly went far beyond such matters. The most noteworthy development was a private meeting between Syrian President Hafiz al-Assad and Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak for the first

time in a long time and their entrance into the conference hall holding hands on the second day of the summit. That development notwithstanding, the Egyptian spokesman told us that later on Al-Assad made a speech criticizing Egyptian policies and thus "spoiled everything." Meanwhile, the Syrian spokesman insisted that the meeting between the two leaders was "purely coincidental," but Saudi sources have claimed that intense negotiations had been under way for a long time for the meeting between Al-Assad and Mubarak.

While it is impossible to say that differences between Egypt and Syria have been overcome and that their policies will be changed by a 22-minute private meeting and a hand-in-hand parade through the conference hall, the short-lived Al-Assad-Mubarak courtship reaffirmed the principle that "nothing is impossible" in the Arab world. However, the conflicts engulfing the Arab world left no room for an "unofficial sideline Arab summit." While Hafiz al-Assad stated flatly that he will not meet with Yassir 'Arafat, the Palestinian leader, unaware of this statement, was lobbying to have Mubarak included in a sideline summit that could not be convened.

Even so, there was a relative improvement of relations between 'Arafat and King Hussein at the Kuwait summit, and it was decided to revive the Jordanian-Palestinian joint committee for aid to the West Bank and Ghazza. This move effectively blocked Israeli attempts to remove the PLO from the scene and share the responsibility of governing the Palestinian people with Jordan.

Meanwhile, the "mini Arab summit" among Algerian President Chadli Bedjedid, Syrian President Hafiz al-Assad, Jordanian King Hussein, Saudi King Fahd and Kuwait's Amir Shaykh Jabir, can be seen as a first step toward a future "Arab consensus."

This geopolitical diversity of the Islamic world will become even more distinct if Iran attends the summit to be held in Senegal 3 years later. In a sense, even the fact that the 6th summit will be held in a non-Arab black African country underscores this phenomenon.

Black Senegal must not only symbolize the colorful and pluralist character of the Islamic world but must also underscore the need for a "multicolor" foreign policy for Turkey.

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CSO: 3554/191

'EEC TEAM' FORMED IN STATE PLANNING ORGANIZATION

Istanbul MILLIYET in Turkish 6 Feb 87 p 4

[Article by Deniz Arman: "1500 Qualified Experts Will Prepare Turkey For Europe: EEC Team Is Being Formed"]

[Text] The State Planning Organization is forming a 1,500-person "EEC Army."

On the eve of government's application for full membership in the EEC, the State Planning Organization (SPO) will recruit personnel through an entrance examination solely for employment at the EEC desk. First, a 20-person "vanguard group" will be designated in these examinations, through which 1,500 employees will be selected this year.

This vanguard will receive a gross salary between 300,000 and 500,000 Turkish Liras and four bonuses; their required qualifications are as follows:

--Commanding English or French well enough to negotiate various subjects with foreigners, to present reports and to defend these reports. Speaking one of the two languages is a reason for preference.

--Having work experience of several years.

--Being logical and intelligent.

--Being well cultivated.

--Being presentable to be able to properly represent Turkey.

One thousand of the 1,500-person EEC army will serve at Central Headquarters, i.e., in Turkey and 500 will work at the advance post, i.e., Brussels.

However, it will not be that easy to work at the EEC desk under "good material and spiritual conditions." Those candidates fulfilling the State Planning Organization's requirements are hired after four five stages of oral examinations. At the last stage a four-man team consisting of SPO Assistant Under-secretary Imdat Akmermer, SPO consultant Unal Altintas, SPO Research Group Chief Dogan Yorukhan and Deputy Chief Yasar Yakis of EEC Relations "make the candidates sweat." If no unanimity is reached at this last interview, the candidate is not accepted by the SPO.

SPO Assistant Undersecretary and Acting General Secretary Imdat Akmermer stated that warm relations with the EEC created the need for qualified personnel and therefore they have been doing a very thorough screening. He also said the following:

--Apparently Greece trained a full 25,000 people before joining the EEC. Turkey has the power to do better than Greece. By training thousands of people from state enterprises and the private sector both in the country and abroad we will make them experts of the EEC.

--There are a lot of qualified personnel at the SPO and other state enterprises. However, we cannot pull them from their jobs and employ them here. Some balances might be upset.

--Nobody should try to use their connections with influential people. It does not work at all. One person came and we told him to explain his resume in English. He started by saying "I am from Mersin" in Turkish. We immediately got rid of him. We have no pity on anyone. Anyway, Yusuf Ozal already asked us not to listen to requests for special favors from anyone.

--The most important qualification of the person that we will employ is this: "Is he of the caliber to which we can entrust Turkey?" We look at this. In other words, can he represent Turkey at a meeting with his speech, language, knowledge and world view? This is important.

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CSO: 3554/190

NEW FOREIGN MINISTRY APPOINTMENTS DISCLOSED

Istanbul TERCUMAN in Turkish 8 Feb 87 p 13

[Ali Tartanoglu report]

[Text] Ankara--Having advised the "seniors" at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to retire, Foreign Minister Vahit Halefoglu has virtually completed his "operation to rejuvenate the ministry." Halefoglu will thus be the only "elderly" person left at the Foreign Ministry where bright diplomats who are at most 50 years old and who have just been promoted to the rank of ambassador have been appointed to senior positions both at home and at Turkish missions overseas.

The "rejuvenation operation" at the Foreign Ministry began with the appointment of Nuzhet Kandemir--who served his first ambassadorship post in Baghdad--as Undersecretary of the Ministry replacing Ambassador Necdet Tezel who was appointed as envoy to Rome. Turkish ambassador to the Hague Ayhan Kamel was named Deputy Undersecretary for Multilateral Political Relations replacing Ambassador Cenap Keskin; Turkish ambassador to Tokyo Nurven Nures was appointed Deputy Undersecretary for Bilateral Political Relations; and Turkish ambassador to Morocco Metin Mekik was named Deputy Undersecretary for Personnel and Administrative Affairs.

Foreign Ministry spokesman Yalim Eralp was appointed as ambassador to New Delhi to replace Ildeniz Divanlioglu who will return to headquarters in the next few months. Eralp will be replaced as ministry spokesman and Deputy Undersecretary for Information by Inal Batu, currently ambassador to Pakistan.

The ministry's Director of Personnel, Gun Gur, will replace Metin Mekik as ambassador to Morocco; Gur's Department of Personnel will be headed by Yalcin Oral, currently serving at the Turkish embassy in Ottawa. Before being named as Director of Personnel, Gur had served as the first secretary of the Turkish embassy in Paris--as "second man" to Ambassador Adnan Bulak--during a most troubled period in relations with France.

Ambassador Umut Arik, envoy to Jiddah, will replace Nurver Nures as ambassador to Tokyo and will be replaced by Ercan Vuralkan, currently the ministry's Director of Administrative and Financial Affairs. Together with ambassador to Kuwait Guner Oztek, Umut Arik served as assistant and adviser to President Kenan Evren at the Islamic summit conference [in Kuwait].

The "hallway agenda" is fraught with rumors that Versan Senturker will be appointed to the new post of ambassador to Sana (Yemen); that Erdogan Sanalan, currently the ministry's Director General of Cultural Affairs will be named to the new post of ambassador to Luxembourg; and that Nusret Aktan will be appointed ambassador to Australia. Another hallway rumor is that Luxembourg is not an appropriate post for Erdogan Sanalan who is a fairly senior ambassador.

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CSO: 3554/188

MP URGED TO DEFEND OVERSEAS TURKS, UNIFY RIGHT

Istanbul TERCUMAN in Turkish 8 Feb 87 pp 3,13

["Sunday Chat" column by Agay Oktay Guner: "The Great Responsibility of the Motherland Party"]

[Text] If the domestic and foreign political conditions of Turkey are examined with a cool head and a clear conscience, it is seen that the government has great responsibilities. Since the Motherland Party [MP] is the government it is obligated to shoulder these responsibilities. In discharging these responsibilities it will and must have support for the interests of the country.

While making the transition from empire to nation-state we inherited all the negative elements which were the enemies of our powerful centuries-old dominion. We must admit this as candidly as we are proud of the positive elements we inherited.

When the Lausanne Treaty granted official recognition to the Turkish Republic, it created mini-states which did not have the traditions of statehood in our former geographical configuration. From that standpoint, Iraq, Syria, Jordan and [Saudi] Arabia are not states. The causes of Iraq's and Syria's attitude toward terrorists must be sought in the absence of traditions of statehood in those countries.

Iran, on the other hand, is a state. Persian nationalism has turned Shiism into a sword and Khomeyni into a banner and is now assaulting the Islamic world. Shiism is Iran's source of strength.

Meanwhile, the presence of Israel in the region has been based on a tradition of terrorism from the day of its establishment. Turkey must carefully monitor the short-term and long-term goals of Israel.

Greece relentlessly continues its efforts to monopolize the Aegean Sea.

The state of our neighborly relations with the Socialist Bloc countries are well known.

In these conditions, the government is obligated to pursue a well-organized "national foreign policy strategy" under the direction of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The essence of this strategy must be "to defend Turkey's borders outside of Turkey." The principal goal of this policy must be to protect Turkey's security by preserving the Turkish presence abroad. The continued existence of the Turkish tribe in the Rhodope Mountains [Bulgaria] as well as Turkish communities in Syria, Iraq and Iran must be guaranteed. Iran, half of whose population is Turkish, will and must act cautiously with us only if it realizes the importance of this great force in our favor.

The way to do that is to keep the unity of language, religion and history alive using all available technological means and avenues of international law.

To that end, international forums must not be left unattended, and all avenues of international law must be utilized to make the world public know that the Turkish presence in foreign lands is not unguarded. Our national rights must be persistently pursued without forgetting that time will tell the truth. Let us not forget that all great feats are accomplished by acting as if we would never die.

Moreover, Ataturk's maxim of "peace at home, peace in the world" must not be used as a cover for a passive and lethargic foreign policy. Ataturk showed how he interpreted this principle by his actions on the Hatay issue.

National unity and integrity at home must be carefully preserved. To that end, the government's educational and cultural policies must be reexamined in the light of new conditions. Terrorism and separatism must be countered with definitive deterrent measures. It is for these reasons that we are saying that the MP has great responsibilities.

The Prime Minister must set the parameters of staff changes in the government, the MP's parliamentary group and the party administration in the light of the domestic and foreign political conditions enumerated above.

Being a party of rightist political philosophy, the MP must not veer away from its goal of uniting the right. To that end, it must take a warm posture toward the Correct Way Party [CWP] having in mind the prospect of forming a coalition government with that party in the future. Naturally, the CWP must respond with a softer and more constructive attitude. New divisions on the right must not be allowed.

Political stability must naturally be preserved and to that end political rights must be freely granted. The bans must be immediately lifted. In the presence of Article 4 in the Constitution, fiddling with Article 175 could lead to extremely unfavorable developments.

The MP must pay attention not to lose touch with its electoral base. Otherwise, it would risk its political effectiveness and strength.

The individuals who have been successful by these standards are well known. Such persons should be reinforced with new and powerful staffs. Such persons currently exist in party cadres. Let us not forget the saying: "The true value of many people are hidden inside them like rough diamonds." The MP must first preserve democracy and show that civilians can govern the country very well. Therefore, it would be correct to say that success for the MP will mean success for the nation. We hope that the MP's execution of its office will befit the greatness of its responsibilities.

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CSO: 3554/194

OZAL COMMENTS POINT UP GROWING CONSTITUTIONAL DEBATE

Istanbul CUMHURIYET in Turkish 8 Feb 87 p 3

[Column "The World Today" by Ali Sirmen: "Constitutional Debate"]

[Text] You may have read the debate between Prime Minister Ozal and Constitutional Court member Yekta Gungor Ozden. The verbal duel between this member of the high court and the prime minister adds a new dimension to the constitutional debate on Articles 4 and 175, already dominating the political arena.

It must be immediately pointed out that as long as the 1982 Constitution is in effect, it is futile to expect constitutional debate to come to an end in Turkey. This is because the 1982 Constitution is irreconcilable with the principles of democracy due as much to the method by which it was ratified as to its content. And without solving the problem of the 1982 Constitution, Turkey will be unable to arrive at a satisfactory solution to making progress toward modernization and to assuming its place in the modern world. Aldikacti's draft law, full of technical and fundamental flaws unprecedented in any modern country, was made even worse by the NSC [National Security Council], then proffered to the public for its opinion the (so-called referendum) in an environment in which debate was forbidden, democracy was absent and opposition to the text, itself neither fish nor fowl, was punishable by imprisonment; an environment offering no alternative, in which, to be more precise, the public was told that even worse solutions were likely if the text was not approved. In truth, in spite of all the claims, the 1982 vote was more of a plebiscite than a referendum, seeing that it became a compulsory vote for one person.

To say that 92 percent of the populace voted for this constitution under such circumstances is both unrealistic and invalid.

In fact, the Aldikacti-NSC text is not a constitution but rather an unconstitution, because all of the freedoms which are said to exist therein are later restricted for one reason or another. Furthermore, the 1982 Constitution, rather than guaranteeing rights of the Turkish people vis-a-vis the state and the ruling party, has continuously limited them and lowered them below previously existing levels.

However, constitutions are fundamental laws providing guarantees of the rights of citizens. In other words, a constitution does not limit the rights of the

individual, the citizen and the social classes; it is a document limiting the autonomous political power and scope of activity of the state.

It is because of this that the 1982 Constitution is not even a constitution in the modern sense.

On the other hand, we must take pains to avoid falling into error at this point in the debate. Henceforth, we must understand that amending the 1982 Constitution is inescapable, mandatory, but, unfortunately inadequate.

One of the most important problems facing Turkey's progress toward becoming a modern, democratic society is the leaders' understanding of the meaning of the constitution; their accepting its limitations on the scope of their own activity and power and their understanding that in a democracy it is mandatory that the ruling body coexist with the constitution.

However, our country has not seen such an era in many years. It is common knowledge that the "Commission of Inquiry" investigating the Bayar-Menderes regime held no regard for the constitution. Every knows but, unfortunately, some have forgotten recently what kind of anticonstitutionalism Suleyman Demirel championed between 1960 and 1980 and how the 1971 operation which overthrew him fostered constitutional initiatives.

The enmity toward the constitution of those who mounted the 1971 coup is so obvious as to bear no discussion.

Those statesmen who have regarded the constitution with respect since 1960 are Inonu, Urguplu and Ecevit.

In this initial announcement of the 12 September 1980 operation, Mr Evren, openly, and so as to leave no room for doubt, revealed his views on the subject of rights and freedoms.

To tell the truth, every day we see indications that even the leaders find it difficult to live with the 1982 Constitution which is in force today and which no one regards as a modern constitution.

The most interesting aspect of this matter is the written, pictorial and spoken documentation of Mr Evren's having acted in contradiction to the constitution during his regular discourses on political lawsuits, while describing himself as guarantor of the 1982 Constitution.

As for the prime minister, everyone sees every day how he views the body which oversees and interprets the constitution, its provisions and their enforcement. Wishing to be delivered from the restraints of the constitution, Mr Ozal hopes to use a skillful maneuver employing the tactic of a simple majority in the Assembly and a populist referendum. And his recent comments about the Constitutional Court were truly unfortunate from the standpoint of the regime.

Those who want democracy and a civilian society in Turkey must understand the restrictions which are imposed by the constitution on those in power. For the constitution, while limiting their powers for the good of the basic rights and freedoms, is at the same time their own greatest support and guarantee.

CWP EXPRESSES VIEWS ON FOREIGN POLICY

Istanbul TERCUMAN in Turkish 8 Feb 87 p 13

[Text] Ankara--Correct Way Party [CWP] deputy leader Mehmet Dulger declared that Turkish-U.S. relations contribute nothing to this country other than ambiguous claims and disorganized attempts which produce no concrete results because of the government's insidious and impotent attitude in defending national interests. Dulger said: "The first prerequisite for membership in the EEC is to have a flawless and true democracy as practiced in Western Europe." Dulger also said that "not completing the deficiencies of democracy is a great shame."

In a press conference at the CWP headquarters yesterday, party deputy leader Dulger spoke about foreign policy issues. Noting that in foreign policy public attention has recently focused on three major issues, Dulger first made a general evaluation of Turkish-American relations.

Dulger said that when Turkey asked for a renegotiation of the Turkish-American Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement [DECA] in 1985 it initially created the impression that it was standing on infirm grounds. Dulger continued: "The concept of 'more trade instead of aid,' which was promoted as a wonderful idea but which created doubts about the justification of our demands because it contradicted the concept of common defense, has emerged as a government posture which has overshadowed the seriousness and the long-term goals of our foreign policy."

Stating that Turkey has a deficit of \$700 to \$800 million a year in its trade with the United States, Dulger said: "Ambitious claims have been made with regard to the DECA with the United States. It has been claimed that cooperation between the two countries has gained an economic dimension. However, the result is that the agreement which expired in 1985 has been extended for another 5 years with a mere exchange of letters."

Flawless and Genuine Democracy

Expressing his views on "Turkey's relations with the EEC," Dulger said: "The first prerequisite to membership in the EEC is to have a flawless and genuine democracy as practiced in Western Europe."

Noting that Turkish-EEC relations stagnated when democratic life was disrupted in Turkey in 1980 and that the current government initially made statements minimizing the importance of the EEC, Dulger continued:

"The government took a posture which suggested that it could take part in other organizations of cooperation. The government also tried to use the free movement rights of our workers as a bargaining chip to secure the release of frozen credits and to gain other economic advantages. Now it is making the efforts that should have been made from the outset and is knocking on the EEC's door."

Insisting that the government has not approached relations with the EEC with sufficient sensitivity and seriousness, Dulger said: "The problem primarily rests on Turkey's ability to resolve the democracy issue definitively. When that is done it will be seen that all closed doors will open one by one."

Middle East Problem

In the last part of his speech, Dulger evaluated the situation in the Middle East. Stating that Turkey is obligated to defend its existence and integrity, that it would not want to jeopardize itself and that it does not wish to be embroiled in Middle Eastern conflicts, Dulger said: "If we take a long-term view of the problems, we see that we have been careful to treat all countries in the region evenhandedly. We would like to see these countries take the same careful posture toward Turkey. We cannot tolerate postures such as providing sanctuary to bandits intent on destroying the integrity of our country and interfering in the internal affairs of our country on inappropriate occasions."

Dulger added:

"The continuing failure to rectify irregularities in our democracy is at the root of the shadow hanging over the seriousness and continuity of our foreign policy; the failure to defend our rights in a conscious, resolute and vigorous manner; and our weak and delayed reactions to events.

"However, a government which is the product of the circumstances of 6 November 1983 still continues to insist on its claim of 'getting things done'--a claim which has not been proven in foreign policy."

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CSO: 3554/191

CWP'S CINDORUK CALLS FOR OZAL RESIGNATION, EARLY ELECTIONS

Istanbul CUMHURIYET in Turkish 9 Feb 87 p 7

[Text] Ankara (CUMHURIYET Bureau)--CWP [Correct Way Party] Chairman Husamettin Cindoruk has called for the government's resignation and for early elections in June. Asserting that Prime Minister Ozal has disregarded the country's problems, Cindoruk said, "Neglecting the woes of his own nation, the Prime Minister has begun to struggle with the concerns of other countries."

At a press conference held yesterday at CWP headquarters, Cindoruk pointed out that their real challengers are the leftist parties and they do not consider the MP [Motherland Party] a challenger and said, "The prime minister must also have taken note of this and is seeking his chances for election in the United States."

Describing Ozal's U.S. tour as a "holiday visit," Cindoruk noted that during his 10-day tour the prime minister met with President Reagan for only 25 minutes.

Criticizing rising prices and the high cost of living, Cindoruk stated that the middle class is being suffocated by food inflation, food costs having multiplied by 5.5 in 3 years. Cindoruk had this to say:

"The average salary of a civil servant who has been working for 25 years is 69,000 liras. Meat costs 2,700 liras; bread 100 liras. The middle class has been forced to feed its children bread boiled in hot water with a little oil. The taxes imposed on tradesmen, transporters, farmers and workers are unbearable. The state raises the price of all its products; the people are of no concern to this government. It acts with hostility toward the middle class."

Pointing out that Ozal has wasted 3 years of the nation's time, Cindoruk said, "In addition to this, the prime minister and his family are having a fine time in America."

Recalling the 1987 budget deficit of 1.2 trillion liras, Cindoruk ended his speech thus:

"The nation has withdrawn its vote of confidence from the government. The vote in the by-elections is obvious. The only increase the administration has failed to achieve in 3 years is one in its percentage of votes. The minority government

has been gradually growing weaker. A weakening ruling party is unable to conceal its ineffectiveness."

Stating that a government reshuffle will not solve the problem, Cindoruk said, "This government cannot be patched up; it must be removed entirely."

13334/12232

CSO: 3554/189

OPPOSITION DESCRIBED AS INEFFECTUAL

Istanbul CUMHURIYET in Turkish 9 Feb 87 p 7

[Column "From Ankara" by Yalcin Dogan: "No Recipe for Opposition"]

[Text] The party described as the "smallest" in the Assembly is causing trouble. Everyone's attention is riveted on this party. Its remarks are debated, themes are developed on what it says, its remarks bring up short both the other opposition parties and the ruling party.

The percentage of the vote of "the smallest party" in the Assembly is approximately 8-9 percent. In spite of this, it demonstrates a distinct model of "the way in which the opposition objectives of the smallest party can be carried out." "The smallest party" is changing the country's agenda. Its remarks are always being discussed.

By raising their vote to 9 percent in the last elections, the "Greens" of Germany drew a picture which should be an example to everyone. The opposition it presents is so effective that "its own ideas" influence all of the other parties. It brings the ruling and other opposition parties into its "own field of debate." In the last elections in Germany, "ten topics" crystallized as the focus of debate. Of these "ten topics," the first two were presented by the "Greens." "Stopping environmental pollution and the use of atomic energy."

The "Greens" are a small party, with a vote of approximately 8-9 percent. But the opposition they conduct is so effective that the first two of the principle "ten topics" are "Greens" concerns.

As long as the Greens' concerns occur in this lively atmosphere of debate, like it or not, the Greens are going to be the most controversial party. When "The Greens" are discussed, interest in them increases. Increased interest and an increased percentage of the vote are interdependent.

This, precisely, is "opposition." So what is opposition?

Very simple; first, to follow closely "the official agenda."

To follow very closely "the official agenda," that is, the topics presented by the ruling party and those it wishes to discuss. To have a very good understanding of the "official agenda," that is, of the direction which the ruling party would like the country to take.

Second, to offer new proposals which will draw the country outside the "official agenda." To offer another agenda to the nation. To discuss proposals presented by the opposition. Even, despite the resistance of the ruling party, "to bring it into debate of topics it does not want to discuss." In short, to get society discussing its won ideas, not the ruling party's.

Just like Germany's "Greens."

Why are Turkey's opposition parties, and particularly the social democrats, ineffective? Three reasons. First, the two social democrat parties, both the SDPP [Social Democratic People's Party] and the DLP [Democratic Left Party] pay poor attention to "the official agenda." That is, they are from understanding what Ozal wants to do. They are on the trail of Ozal's ideas but can not quite catch up. Second, they can not bring "new points of debate" to the national agenda. That is, they are incapable of changing the country's official agenda. And Third, whenever they speak up, it is against each other rather than against the ruling party. In particular, the DLP, instead of opposition to the ruling party, puts itself in opposition to the SDPP, targeting the other social democratic party. This infighting between the two social democratic parties shakes confidence in both of them.

In the days ahead, Turkey will be seized by a new "wave of elections." On 7 June, about 100 habitation centers, villages and towns will hold local elections. And if you have municipal elections, village headman elections, village elections and township elections, it is obvious that 7 June is creating "general election atmosphere" prior to 1988. The 7 June general [as published: local] elections are becoming a kind of "trial general election."

How are the opposition, and especially the SDPP, approaching 7 June? Is the SDPP informed about the country's "official agenda," that is, about the topics Ozal wishes to have discussed around the country?

What is the SDPP thinking of proposing to the nation by 7 June as a departure from "the official agenda"?

According to our impressions, it is not thinking of offering very much as this time.

These days the SDPP is being influenced much more by "an atmosphere other than the election atmosphere." The elections related to the program convention, and the "interim administrative staff" that will be created together with it, are having a much greater influence on the SDPP.

The SDPP will discuss its program. But where is this program? Where is the program that will be discussed 2 1/2-3 months from now? Hidden away in safes or chests? What kind of debating method is this? Look at the other social democrat parties of the West; the program adopted by a convention is first discussed for a full 2 years by all levels of the party and by the public. In Turkey...it is as though the guys are going to start a revolution, "the party program is so hidden away.

While the program is tightly locked up and hidden away, the country is witnessing changes which ought to shake up the SDPP. Some segments of society, accustomed to voting for the social democrats for many years, are now gradually switching over to the Correct Way Party. This shifting is seen here and there in village and municipal elections. The fact that worldwide, the "left is in deep crisis" is intimately affecting social democracy in Turkey. Add to this the distorted and personal conflicts, the incompetence and ruthless personal ambitions, and the social democratic opposition in Turkey fails the grade.

Its poor report cards are affecting democracy.

13334/12232

CSO: 3554/189

OZAL'S DAUGHTER INTERVIEWED

Istanbul CUMHURIYET in Turkish 5 Jan 87 p 6

[Excerpt] [Question] Mrs Zeynep, before going over the allegations with regard to your store, I would like to ask you about the issue of reactionarism, your family's view of this issue and your relationship with your uncles.

Zeynep Ozal: Everyone is saying something else, but it is a fact that there is a reactionary movement in Turkey. I agree with my father on one issue. Attacking this issue persistently and talking about it constantly is not a solution. Clear-cut measures need to be taken and I think they are being taken. As for my family, my father is a person who says his prayers, who does not drink and who has gone on pilgrimage [to Mecca]. But his abstinence from alcoholic drinks has nothing to do with the fact that he has gone on pilgrimage. It is said that he used to drink too much at one time and that they made him swear off drinking. They made him a teetotaler. We have never seen my father saying prayers in the house. When it is time for prayer, he disappears; he says his prayers and then he returns. He does not drink but he permits us to smoke or drink in his presence.

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BRIEFS

APPOINTMENTS ANNOUNCED--Ankara (ANKA)--Ilhan Mufit Demir, a branch director of the Ministry of Public Works, was appointed to the post of assistant general director for construction at the same ministry. Ali Bulent Ipekgil was appointed chief inspector of the Inspection Board of the Ministry of Public Works. In the meantime, Irfan Saruhan was appointed consultant to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and I. Erol Gonderten was appointed a member of the Board of Directors of the Petrochemical Corporation. According to the appointments listed in the RESMI GAZETE, Oguz Gedik, Social Insurance Organization assistant regional director for Antalya was appointed Eskisehir regional director. [Text] [Istanbul CUMHURİYET in Turkish 9 Feb 87 p 14] 12990/12232

SINGER QUESTIONED FOR KURDISH PROPAGANDA--Upon allegations that Turkish folk singer Ibrahim Tatlisles has sung Kurdish songs upon request and engaged in Kurdish propaganda in Sweden's capital Stockholm during his foreign tour, an investigation was opened by the Istanbul State Security Court. On account of the investigation, opened in response to a letter from our Stockholm Embassy explaining the event, the Istanbul State Security Court took a statement from Ibrahim Tatlisles. Ibrahim Tatlisles came early in the morning to the State Security Court and answered the questions of Aytekin Gani Ataman, an assistant district attorney, for about half an hour. The singer denied the accusations. Ibrahim Tatlisles said, "I was requested to sing a Kurdish song, but I rejected it. During my concert, I only sang an Arabic song upon request. Probably the officials thought this song to be in Kurdish. We had gone to Sweden as part of the schedule made up by our agent." [By Ahmet Tanyolac] [Text] [Istanbul TERCUMAN in Turkish 7 Feb 87 p 7] 12990/12232

CSO: 3554/190

STATISTICS ON ATHENS AFTERNOON READERSHIP

Athens MESIMVRINI in Greek 10 Mar 87 p 4

[Article by Khr. P.: "Who Are MESIMVRINI's Readers?"]

[Excerpt] The readers of Greek newspapers (fewer, unfortunately, than in any other European country) want to know more from time to time about the "personality" of their newspaper since from such data they perceive how reliable it is and how positive a role it plays in shaping public life.

MESIMVRINI, even though as a matter of principle and as a rule, avoids its self-projection, feels obliged to give such data not in order to stand apart from the rest of the newspapers, but mainly because such information strengthens the trust of its readers in it and clearly defines its reading public.

Five MESIMVRINI Records

Indicative of MESIMVRINI's high prestige are the Nielsen Tables for 1986 from which it is manifestly clear that of all its readers:

--47.4 percent belong to the higher socio-economic class. This percentage is the highest of all afternoon newspapers.

--80.6 percent belong to the highest and middle socio-economic class. The percentage is also the highest of all afternoon papers.

--41.4 percent are women while 39 percent are housewives. This percentage is second of all afternoon newspapers.

--76.9 percent are graduates of senior high schools and of higher and highest institutions of learning. This is the highest percentage of all afternoon newspapers.

--69.4 percent is in the 25-to-54-year age bracket. These readers are already established citizens who reach decisions or participate in the decision-making process and exert influence in their environment. This percentage is also the highest of all afternoon newspapers.

Of course, these facts commit MESIMVRINI to maintain and safeguard at any sacrifice its high qualitative standard no matter if its circulation rise is slow.

Moreover, thanks to the high prestige of its readers, the appeal of this newspaper and its intervention in the country's public life is positive, while its criticism of the government is effective--to the point its present solvent phase allows.

The data mentioned in this article are taken from the annual report prepared by MESIMVRINI's editor Spyros Spyridis under the title: "1986: Another Negative Year in the Rich Liability of the Press (March 1987)."

Comparative Tables of the Afternoon Newspapers'
Reading Public Composition For The Year 1986

a. By socio-economic class (in percent):

Newspaper	Higher	Middle	Low
APOGEVMATINI	20.7	50.0	29.2
AVRIANI	10.9	40.5	48.5
VRADYNI	37.9	37.2	25.0
ETHNOS	21.4	46.1	32.5
ELEVTheros Typos	28.9	53.4	17.7
ELEVTherotypia	35.0	41.8	23.1
MESIMVRINI	47.4	33.2	19.4
NEA	28.1	41.2	30.7

b. Educational background (in percent):

Newspaper	El. School	Jr. H.S.	Sr. H.S.	Higher-Highest
APOGEVMATINI	29.9	19.9	36.7	13.5
AVRIANI	50.3	17.4	22.7	9.6
VRADYNI	25.6	8.7	51.8	13.9
ETHNOS	33.2	19.0	35.1	12.8
ELEVTheros Typos	18.8	18.8	43.0	19.4
ELEVTherotypia	14.8	14.0	32.5	38.7
MESIMVRINI	14.3	8.7	43.6	33.3
NEA	27.7	14.1	31.5	26.8

c. By sex (in percent):

Newspaper	Men	Women	Housewives
APOGEVMATINI	51.5	48.5	40.7
AVRIANI	62.6	37.4	31.5
VRADYNI	58.8	41.2	38.6
ETHNOS	59.5	40.5	33.5
ELEVTHEROS TYPOS	57.7	42.3	32.6
ELEVTHEROTYPIA	63.1	36.9	29.2
MESIMVRINI	58.5	41.4	39.0
NEA	58.5	41.5	36.1

d. By age groups (in percent):

Newspaper	15-24	25-44	45-54	55-64 and Over
APOGEVMATINI	14.2	48.6	19.0	18.1
AVRIANI	17.6	34.7	30.7	17.1
VRADYNI	13.1	35.8	28.2	22.9
ETHNOS	28.9	47.6	15.7	7.8
ELEVTHEROS TYPOS	27.6	47.6	17.8	7.8
ELEVTHEROTYPIA	27.4	53.3	13.8	5.5
MESIMVRINI	10.8	40.6	28.8	19.9
NEA	20.7	51.8	15.7	11.9

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CSO: 3521/105

RESULTS OF TURK-IS CONVENTION

Istanbul TERCUMAN in Turkish 5,6,7 Jan 87

[5 Jan 87 p 2]

[Excerpts] At 1500 hours, Sunday, 28 December, tension peaked as the ballot box was opened in the DSI [State Hydraulic Affairs Directorate General] conference room.

Election results of the Turk-Is [Turkish Confederation of Labor] general council meeting, which had lasted 8 days, were anxiously awaited. The anticipation of a "lottery drawing" enveloped the delegates and onlookers who filled the convention hall. Would it be Yilmaz or Selvi or Ozbek who emerged victorious? It had been said that each candidate would win. But, the final word of the delegates, who would determine their fate, would come from the ballot box. In the end, it was Sevkettin Yilmaz, the candidate who had long had the backing and stamp of the left, who had outmaneuvered Selvi on the left and had crossed the finish line in first place with but a 12-vote margin.

Despite all accusations, despite claims that he had lost his power and vitality, Yilmaz was vindicated. From the ballot box came 152 votes for Yilmaz, 140 votes for Cevdet Selvi, and 104 votes for Mustafa Ozbek.

Yilmaz' Chances

Earlier, an event occurred that would determine Yilmaz' destiny. Zeki Gedik, an older-generation unionist known to be close to the ANAP [Motherland Party], was removed from the post of chairman general of Tek Gida-Is [Turkish Tobacco, Intoxicants, Food, and Ancillary Workers Union], the most powerful member of Turk-Is. Orhan Balta, a "moderate RPP [Republican People's Party] member," replaced him. Balta was considered to be a younger generation unionist. He was hard-working. He did not become a leader by beating the air, by gaining support from outside the union. He was an organization man. Moreover, he had been known, years before, to be Ibrahim Denizci's heir apparent. Thus it was that Gedik was chairman general of Tek Gida-Is for a period only with the approval of Balta. The dignified union leader, Balta, had come to be accepted as a tradition at the Turk-Is general council meetings. Other than Yilmaz, the chairman general of Turk-Is had always been elected from the Tek Gida-Is

community. For years, this had been so. In fact, Seyfi Demirsoy, Halil Tunc, and Denizcier were all products of this understanding, had all been chairmen general.

Because he had only recently become head of his own organization, Balta wanted neither himself nor one of his colleagues with whom he works to head Turk-Is. However, he did not want to allow Turk-Is to pass into the hands of "opportunists" either. He did not refrain from clearly proclaiming his position. He said, "Our union's candidate for chairman general is Yilmaz."

He was not yet Tek Gida-Is chairman general when he made this announcement, but he expected to take that office. As a matter of fact, he became chairman general of Tek Gida-Is so as not to put Gedik up for candidacy again.

At about this time, Selvi added another link to his chain of errors. Selvi participated in the efforts of a clique at the union congresses of Tek Gida-Is and Belediye-Is [Municipal Workers Union], which are seen as the two influential unions that can make or break a Turk-Is chairman general candidate, and, when his compatriots suffered defeat at these meetings, he earned the enmity of the groups that retained office.

Secret Discussion

Meanwhile, Yilmaz was making contacts and believed he would obtain enough support to be reelected. However, he wanted not only himself, but those on his slate to win as well. A week following the Tek Gida-Is general council meeting, Yilmaz telephoned Balta. He asked to speak with him in private at his home. The two leaders met at Balta's residence in Maltepe, out of everyone's sight. Through this discussion, Balta came to be the key person in the Turk-Is general council. Emin Kul, candidate for secretary general, also participated in this talk. Vahap Guvenc, first region representative of Turk-Is, took Kul to Maltepe. No one knows what was discussed by the three leaders. Yilmaz, however, returned to Ankara with a happy heart.

[6 Jan 87, p 2]

[Excerpts] Kul, Maritime Workers Union chairmen general, very reluctantly accepted candidacy for the post of Turk-Is secretary general. He had earlier sought election on the social-democrat slate and lost. He was concerned that another defeat would destroy the credibility he had obtained within his own union. He did not want to be weakened further. Meanwhile, Balta insisted that his colleagues in Tek Gida-Is support Kul.

Former chairman general Gedik, who was selected to be a delegate to the Turk-Is general council meeting, and several of his friends agreed to back Sadik Side. It appeared that it would be difficult for Tek Gida-Is, which sent 33 delegates to the Turk-Is convention, to support Yilmaz' slate without some sort of loss to the union. Balta used his influence and power to work to overcome this problem. In fact, until the day the congress convened, the Izmir Tek Gida-Is delegates stubbornly backed Side. Meanwhile, Yilmaz fervently believed in cooperating on an administrative level with the social democrats. He believed that the moderate Kul would be able to obtain the vote

of the rightist and liberal factions that traditionally supported him.

Parties' Influence

Political parties had become a factor within the Turk-Is general council months before. It was Selvi who was most open about his intimacy with a party. He publicly stated that he had the support of the SHP [Social Democratic Populist Party]. Social democrat delegates to the general council meeting did not hesitate to say, through their SHP provincial organizations, that they were drawn to him. In fact, Selvi, who fought more of a battle than Kenan Durukan for social democrat unionist leadership within Turk-Is, was able to procure acceptance of his candidacy for chairman general by applying extreme pressure on Durukan, SHP's union chief.

The SHP did not deem it objectionable to use a number of union leaders who dream of becoming national assembly deputies in 1988 to achieve its own aspirations. Thus it was that Selvi patterned his convention tactics after those of the SHP. Old and new SHP high-ranking officials such as Ugur Batmaz and Muzaffer Sarac struggled desperately, backing Selvi. Furthermore, former professors and bureaucrats such as Tefvik Cavdar and Cahit Talas did not refrain from transforming the Turk-Is election into a battle between the SHP and Yilmaz.

However, it would be difficult to say that Turgut Ozal made a special effort to have Yilmaz reelected. To the contrary, Ozal was known to have said to colleagues something like, "Not Yilmaz, anyone else." There remains the fact that it was more believable that Yilmaz, a former AP [Justice Party] deputy, was closer to Suleyman Demirel than to Ozal.

It is certain that Demirel, both while he was in office and in today's controversial administration, favors a moderate, no-nonsense leader at the head of Turk-Is. No one doubted that Demirel wished to see Yilmaz as chairman general of Turk-Is. Because of this viewpoint, the number of persons who claimed that Yilmaz was a DYP [Correct Way Party] member was excessive.

In addition, estimates of Demirel's mathematical strength at the convention came to be a significant development that was given credence and was debated within the general council. It was claimed that Demirel had long before stated that Yilmaz would be victorious at the Turk-Is convention. According to Demirel, Yilmaz would be reelected with 200 votes. Demirel's numerical error, however, was due to Side's speech. When Side, who attacked and accused his colleagues of serious infractions, ensured that a portion of the votes going to Yilmaz went over to Selvi, he diminished his own chances of victory and enabled Kul to win.

Pendik Meeting

Prior to the convention, an intense backstage drama took place. Tek Gida-Is Chairman General Balta and Belediye-Is Chairman General Huseyin Pala were seen to have played the major roles.

The degree of success gained by Yilmaz partisans surfaced at the Pendik

meeting of unionists and was reported by an Istanbul newspaper.

The chairmen general of BASISEN [Press Workers Union], Belediye-Is, Hava-Is, [Turkish Civil Aviation Workers Union], and Toleyis [Turkish Hotel, Restaurant, and Amusement Place Workers Union], known to be social democrat, met with Tek Gida-Is Chairman General Balta at a restaurant in Pendik to discuss the future of Turk-Is. At this meeting, Kul was approved for the post of secretary general. Maritime Workers Union Chairman General Kul was also in attendance and asked that his candidacy not be announced. The news report of the meeting had the effect of a bomb in the inner sanctums of unions, because Kul's candidacy for the post of secretary general meant that no one else had a chance. Furthermore, the Istanbul unionists agreed to support Cetin Gocer, from Belediye-Is and a candidate on Yilmaz' slate, for the position of financial secretary.

Selvi Panics

This news created panic among Selvi's faction, for Belediye-Is Chairman General Pala, Hava-Is Chairman General Ibrahim Ozturk, and BASISEN Chairman General Metin Tiryakioglu are effective labor leaders whose words are heeded within the social-democrat wing. More importantly, it was understood that Tes-Is [Federation of Turkish Energy, Water, and Gas Workers Unions], one of the most powerful unions in Turk-Is, would also join this group. It was said that, although Tes-Is Chairman General Faruk Barut is known to be a liberal, a significant number of Tes-Is delegates were social democrats.

When making calculations that demonstrated he was on his way to power, Selvi relied far too much on the social-democrat votes he would snatch from these organizations. Based on this voting bloc, Selvi proceeded, inspired as always by the SHP. He began to accuse union leaders who supported Kul and the party of being false social democrats. He worked to seduce delegates in this manner.

In fact, no one monopolized the social democrats. All of Selvi's efforts were in vain.

The delegates listened to Ibrahim Ozturk, Pala, and Tiryakioglu to the same extent they listened to Selvi. It was known that Kul had withdrawn from public life for a period of time and that he is not chauvinistic. However, it was also known that Kul has the qualities of a sincere, well-informed, and serious leader.

Moreover, incidents that took place in the Petrol-Is [Turkish Petroleum, Chemical, Nitrogen, and Atomic Workers Union] general council did not escape watchful eyes. At that convention, leadership of his own union slipped out of Selvi's hands. It was Munit Ceylan, Petrol-Is' true gentleman, who walked off with the post of secretary general of this organization. Selvi was its number-one man only in appearance. In fact, Ceylan proposed at the convention that two changes be made in the administration. As a result, two friends who had supported Selvi for years failed to be elected to the new administration. According to a rumor, Ceylan pushed Selvi into a visible fight to the end for leadership in order to spare Turk-Is from him. Ceylan replace Selvi in the

extreme leftist camp, and, for this reason, DISK [Confederation of Revolutionary Worker Union] and its leaders heartily applauded the Petrol-Is general council "even though it did not come to the convention." In contrast, Turk-Is and its officials booed.

The groups that sided with Ceylan at the general council meeting did not stop with merely voicing their desire to turn Turk-Is into another DISK. Furthermore, they did not refrain from attacking Turk-Is' legal identity. Petrol-Is acted as if it were a member organization of DISK, not Turk-Is.

Turk-Is' Protector

The Petrol-Is general council meeting revealed, before its time, the real face and goal of those who were pulling for Selvi. The point was reached at which Petrol-Is would either be locked to Turk-Is or would become fertile soil for DISK. It would not be correct to expect true social democrats, who oppose communism and divisiveness, to remain inactive in such a case. They recognized their duty to stand as protector of Turk-Is and to rally around Yilmaz for the salvation of The Turkish workers' movement.

[7 Jan 87, p 2]

[Excerpts] What attracted the most attention was that those who accused Yilmaz of forming a junta of men from the Black Sea were concocting a course of action using the Kurdish, Alevi, and a combination both factors and brought this up before a portion of the delegates.

Final Events, Results

Twenty-four hours before the election, the slates of candidates were finalized. Yilmaz was the first to announce his slate.

Yilmaz, who sought election for the post of chairman general, had as running mates social democrat Kul, secretary general candidate; Cetin Gocer from Belediye-Is and known as a DYP member, financial secretary candidate; social democrat Orhan Balaban, organizational secretary candidate; and DYP member and Saglik-Is [Turkish Health Workers Union] Chairman General Mustafa Basoglu, education secretary candidate.

Selvi's slate included Harp-Is [Turkish War Industry and Allied Workers Unions Federation] Chairman General Durukan for secretary general; Behzat Akdogan for education secretary; Guvenc, from Basin-Is [Turkish Journalists and Press Industry Workers Union] for organizational secretary general; and Bass [expansion unknown] Chairman General Raci Bayulke for financial secretary.

Ozbek kept his candidate for secretary general secret until the last minute. He eventually announced that he supported Side. Ozbek's running mates consisted of Demiryol-Is [Railroad Workers Union] Chairman General Mehmet Acidereli, secretary general; Bahattin Cezer, education secretary, and Tes-Is member Orhan Ercelik, organizational secretary.

Interpretation of Results

Looking at the election results, it was social democrat Balaban and DYP member Basoglu who received the highest number of votes. Balaban earned 169 votes; Basoglu, 161. Kul received 138 for the secretary general post; Durukan, 136; and Side, 120. Omer Ergun, who ran as an independent for financial secretary had 15 votes; Gocer, 154; Bayulke, 118; and Acidereli, 104. Whereas Balaban obtained 169 votes for the organizational secretary position, Ercelik obtained 125 and Guvenc, 93.

Education secretary candidate Basoglu collected 161 votes; Akdogan, 146; and Gezer 83.

When the ballot box was opened, Yilmaz, Kul, Basoflu, Gocer, and Balaban emerged as winners. The race for chairman general and secretary was close. In contrast, the other positions made the difference and ensured that Yilmaz' slate was victorious. The election results proclaimed Yilmaz victor by a 5-0 margin.

Future

It was a convention that left union leaders offended by each other due to serious accusations and ruthless electioneering. Difficult though it was, Yilmaz gave an account of what had taken place. He succeeded in clearing his name.

However, the results of the general council meeting have been interpreted in various manners, from varying viewpoints. Selvi claimed that social democrats had won a decisive victory. There is a grain of truth in this boast. It is true that the social democrats achieved more than had been expected, but there was not an explosion, as Selvi asserted, nor a demonstration of social-democrat supremacy.

The number of votes of this faction ranges between 120 and 160 at any Turk-Is convention. Because the rightists and liberals were split for the first time, Selvi lost the election by a very narrow margin.

The members of the right and liberal wing again had a two-thirds' majority of the total votes. They were, however, divided among themselves and came face-to face with a situation that led to turning over the administration to the left, which was the minority.

Because Selvi blew DISK's trumpet, he was unable to receive anticipated backing from a significant portion of the social democrats. At the same time, Ozbek, by pounding away at Yilmaz to Selvi's benefit, dragged both himself and the rightists and liberals to the door of defeat.

No one possessing common sense believed that Ozbek would win, for Ozbek had chosen as running mates Side, whose credibility was very seriously tainted; Acidereli, who was not liked and won his post in his organization by a hair; and Ercelik, who lost in his union election and retired from the union. It was stated repeatedly that Ozbek's slate could not even win as many votes as Selvi's. In the end, those who made these predictions proved to be correct.

The results of the Turk-Is convention are a lesson for every sector. They point to the need to pay more close attention to the balance that will exist henceforth within this workers' organization.

No matter what anyone says, common sense was victorious at the convention. The large, powerful, 34-year-old workers' organization was saved from falling into the hands of opportunists, even though by a narrow margin. Leftist unionists, who are preparing for the 1988 elections, could not defeat again the rightist and liberal wing they had collared during its weakest hour. It will not be difficult, with a program that refrains from repeating old mistakes, for the new administration to eliminate the concerns and doubts about Turk-Is felt by various sectors.

The year, 1987, was looked upon as a year of extremely difficult union struggle. However, Yilmaz, with a harmonious, hard-working team, came to power. In fact, the new team is composed of powerful leaders who can overcome any difficulty they encounter.

What workers expect, as a first step, is to put accusations and resentments behind them.

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CSO: 3554/186

ASSEMBLY SPEAKER DEFENDS TGNA MOSQUE

Istanbul CUMHURIYET in Turkish 9 Feb 87 p 7

[Text] Ankara (CUMHURIYET Bureau)--TGNA [Turkish Grand National Assembly] Speaker Necmettin Karaduman says that he absolutely does "not consider it likely that the mosque under construction at TGNA will pave the way to religious exploitation." Karaduman stated that "there is no compulsory reason that necessitates holding elections earlier than 1988" and said, "Turkey will be a country which will successfully hold the 1988 elections."

Speaker of the Assembly Necmettin Karaduman, when answering CUMHURIYET's question, said that it is necessary to hold the 1988 elections at the scheduled time. Karaduman said "Turkey should complete the general elections with great success and be in a condition to arrange its programs after 1988 as a country which successfully conducted its elections." On this subject he spoke as follows:

"A stronger Turkey will emerge from the 1988 elections. A new Turkey will be born that opens new horizons to its problems. Our country will gain a great strength with the 1988 elections.

"Our most important problems are the economic and social issues. It is our earnest desire that we get to work on them. We think it would be better for our press and Assembly to step up and intensify their efforts directed towards these issues and for them to take priority on Turkey's agenda."

Regarding the views that "the deputies might exploit religion by praying together with their constituencies in the mosque under construction at the TGNA," Speaker Karaduman said the following:

"Because the small chapel in the TGNA does not serve the need, prayers are performed in the corridors and even in front of the main entrance of the Assembly. This situation is neither safe nor with the spirit of the Assembly. It is inappropriate. There is no mosque near the TGNA. Therefore, in order to serve this need and to eliminate this primitive scene, the idea of building a mosque at the Assembly was given a lot of thought for a long time, and finally during this term it was decided to settle this gangrenous matter once and for all.

"Can this lead to religious exploitation? I absolutely do not consider it likely. If such a notion existed, it would be possible to see evidence of it today. There is a small chapel at the Assembly. We have not observed anything like this to date. I do not consider it likely at all that it would be used for political demonstrations."

OZAL URGED TO TAKE CLEAR STAND ON FUNDAMENTALISM

Istanbul GUNAYDIN in Turkish 5 Jan 87 p 6

[Article by Necati Zincirkiran]

[Text] Prime Minister Turgut Ozal is skillful at making an about-face when squeezed into a corner.

After ANAP [Motherland Party] Deputy Chairman General Kececiler spoke about the disputes over the ban on the wearing of veils, saying:

"If necessary in order to lift the prohibition of veils, we can do away with the YOK [Higher Education Council]," Ozal, knowing full well the chaos that could be created by such a statement, told reporters in Mersin:

"Can the YOK be abolished?" Then, he added:

"You misinterpreted Kececiler's words.

"Absolutely no steps have been taken to eliminate the ban on veils at universities."

Listen to what Kececiler told veiled coeds who sought his assistance the day before:

"We will, in fact, solve this problem sooner or later. If we cannot solve it through YOK decisions, we will explore legal means. The Motherland Party will then take charge. We will then work together with you. We cannot remain silent when a generation questions whether education or beliefs are to be given priority. Be patient, for we will pursue this issue. Yours is not the only generation that has been treated with contempt. We, too, have suffered for years. Through the same repression, we arrived at this obvious place. You, too, will engage in the struggle. And, following your struggle, definite results will, perhaps, be achieved."

Look at how Kececiler, organizer of the National Salvation Party's infamous Konya meeting prior to 12 September 1980 and inventor of the destructive law, now incites veiled youths to protest and battle.

He wishes to say, "Protest and fight so that specific results can be obtained." Furthermore, he does not at all refrain from speaking about a proposal for a fatwa.

He says, "Should women's heads be covered or not? The Religious Affairs Directorate must rule on this."

You can also see how, in time, masks fall.

In whose hands is the Motherland Party?

Let Semra Hanim try, alone, to protect the good name of her Turkish bathhouse as much as she wishes.

Let her go out bareheaded, wearing modern clothing, smoking Cigarillos in front of everyone, sipping whiskey on-the-rocks undeterred.

This is not sufficient to conceal the implication that the head of the ANAP--that is, Chairman General, Prime Minister Ozal--supports political reaction.

Political reaction has found courage and become widespread during Ozal's administration. Secularism has been shaken at its roots. Millions of citizens who are attached to Kemalist reforms and the principles of a democratic republic are concerned and worried by this situation.

Where is Turkey headed?

It is imperative that ANAP Chairman General, Prime Minister Ozal, clearly express his views on this topic to the people.

On one hand, Necmettin Erbakan Hoca can say of Prime Minister Ozal:

"He is one of us." On the other hand, Semra Hanim can state the opposite and attempt to prove that this is untrue.

A man cannot be two-faced. And true faces cannot be hidden by masks.

11673

CSO: 3554/183

ROLE OF VEIL IN 'ISLAMIC REVOLUTION' EXAMINED

Istanbul HURRIYET in Turkish 5 Jan 87 p 14

[Article by Ertugrul Ozkok]

[Text] It can be seen that the wearing of the veil has gradually become a political action. Young women with heads fully covered are going to the national assembly, are visiting political parties, are appearing suddenly before the highest representatives of the state, and are attempting, at every opportunity, to focus the attention of the press and the public on themselves. The name for this in political science is "activism."

If activism consists of actions "directed toward the acquisition of a right without resorting to the use of force," then it can be accepted as a principle of democratic life. However, the recent incidents related to the veil have begun to take on a quality that has engendered concern among the people and at the highest levels of the government. The source of this concern is the appearance of an artificial reaction within the community and the possibility of clashes. When ANAP [Motherland Party] Deputy Chairman General Mehmet Kececiler suddenly brought up the topic of a "fatwa" yesterday together with the frightening memories of the Konya meeting that took place prior to 12 September, this proved to be "provocation," which, in turn, nurtured these concerns.

Religious issues are sociological factors that require sensitive treatment in all societies. Everyone dealing with religious practices must look at recent history and refrain from taking positions and engaging in behavior that provokes or incites the Turkish community. However, what should be emphasized is that recent developments have brought us to the point where, today, 63 years following proclamation of the republic, the concept of secularism is being debated. The issue of the veil must be evaluated within this context. The topic is no longer merely a matter of belief, but has been transformed into a political action based on a desire to return to the past. Turkey is a country whose population is almost entirely Muslim. Because of this, citizens who possess common sense and who support the principles of the republic can draw attention, when expressing their feelings about the veil issue, to these points:

1. Criticism is not a form of interference in the carrying out of religious

obligations by those holding religious beliefs, but is a reaction to the mentality that seeks to use the veil as a uniform in a battle against the principle of secularism.

2. Except for several brief periods, Turkey has, since 1950, been administered by conservative, rightist governments. Throughout this time, we have always had young women studying at universities. Why, then, has the number of coeds wearing veils suddenly increased during this administration? Was the number of believers in past administrations that much smaller?

An interesting aspect is that a portion of the left is also participating in this debate, siding with those wearing the veil. A portion of the left, as reflected in various newspapers and journals, sees in this activism a striving for a democratic right and a new model for the transition to a civilian community. But, in fact, it is not necessary to look very far to see that it is not a new model for this. It is sufficient to look only at the heads of the action in Iran. Throughout all phases of the Khamenei movement, the robes worn by imams and women's overgarments were symbols of the movement itself.

The movement, which began in Iran and which is called, "Islamic fundamentalism" (conducting one's life entirely by Islamic principles), is now having an effect on Turkey. It is clear that Turkey has special importance within this movement, for it is the only Islamic nation that has been able to succeed with a secular system. Tunisia, which is attempting to apply this system, began to experience serious problems recently. Therefore, attacking the "Turkish ring" in this chain is especially important to the "Islamic revolution," which seeks universality.

It is, for this reason, important to look at the veil issue in Turkey within this framework and to explain calmly and convincingly that it has absolutely no relationship with beliefs.

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SOCIAL

TURKEY

EDUCATION MINISTRY'S PUBLICATIONS LARGELY RELIGIOUS

Istanbul CUMHURIYET in Turkish 6 Jan 87 p 9

[Text] Have the Religious Affairs Directorate deliver "sermons" in order to battle contagious diseases in schools. Have the Ministry of National Education, Youth, and Sports propose booklets reproaching students who eat with their fingers. Punish, as a warning, and banish teachers who do not allow students that wear head coverings to take exams. It is certain that such an "undaunted battle" will produce fertile results in the years ahead, will not be in vain.

The most recent example of this is noted in the JOURNAL OF THE TEACHER'S WORLD. The journal lists the titles of some of the booklets and pamphlets released during the 1986 calendar year by the Ministry of National Education, Youth, and Sports in its communications publications. The titles are:

"Teaching How To Perform an Ablution," "Teaching How To Perform the Prayer Ritual," "Teaching the Fundamentals of Our Religion." "Learning the Prayer Ritual," "Going on Pilgrimage to Mecca," "What Is Fate?," "God's Great Reward," "Scientific Knowledge in the Holy Quran," "All About the Quran and the Sunnah," "Women's Rights in Islam," "Religious and Health Aspects of Pork," "Divine Wisdom in the Living Kingdom," "Legends from God's Friends," "Forty Sayings of Job," "Modern Sciences in the Quran," "Divine Wisdom," "Miracles of the Quran that Enlighten Our Age," and "The Religious Child's Journals."

Most of those who read the names of these booklets and pamphlets published in the COMMUNICATIONS' JOURNAL series ask, "Is this a journal of the Ministry of National Education or of the Religious Affairs Directorate?"

11673

CSO: 3554/183

THREAT TO SECULARISM LINKED TO RELIGIOUS FOUNDATION-BUSINESS CONNECTION

Istanbul CUMHURIYET in Turkish 6 Jan 87 pp 1,10

[Article by Ugur Mumcu]

[Text] Korkut Ozal, Prime Minister Turgut Ozal's brother, one of our "new Kemalists," and an "old politician, new billionaire," has established another religious foundation. Its name is Oz-Ba. The other founders are Bahattin Bayraktar, Talat Icoz, Murat Mehmet Ozal, and Mustafa Ali Ozal.

Besides arranging religious ceremonies, "opening small and large mosques, and instituting Koran classes," one purpose of the foundation is:

"To give financial assistance to those fined for crimes that are not shameful."

This is not the first religiously-oriented foundation with which Korkut Ozal is affiliated. Last month, the Bereket Foundation was established through the efforts of ANAP [Motherland Party] Istanbul Provincial Chairman Eymen Topbas and the Al Baraka-Turkish Private Financial Institution.

The latter was formed by the Saudi financial institution, Al Baraka, together with the Hak Investment Corporation, for which Korkut Ozal serves as administrative council chairman in Turkey.

The Hak Investment Corporation belongs to ANAP Istanbul Provincial Chairman Topbas.

Now, Korkut Ozal has formed the Oz-Ba Foundation with Bayraktar, a partner from the Ozbayrak Corporation as well as the Bereket Foundation through Topbas, a partner in the Hak Investment Corporation.

The ANAP government took office on 14 December 1983. A decision dated 16 December 1983 made it legally possible to establish Saudi-Turkish financing institutions. Since that date, the Faisal Financing Institution and the Al Baraka-Turkish Private Financial Institution were formed.

Later, the sale of property to Arabs was placed on the agenda. Sevda Peak on

the Bosphorus was sold. The purchaser was Saudi Arabian Veliahti Abdullah Bin Abdulaziz. That was not all. The title-deed transfer was carried out in the official office of Istanbul Municipal Director Dalan rather than at the land-registry department. Thereafter, Saudi corporations entered partnerships with ANAP Istanbul Municipal Chairman Dalan and ANAP Izmir Municipal Chairman Atilla Yurtcu.

Korkut Ozal was appointed advisor to the Islamic Development Bank. At about the same time, his brother, Prime Minister Ozal, submitted to the Council of Ministers a law bill providing the Islamic Development Bank a tax exemption.

Trade partnerships were formed with the Saudis. Billions of liras were made through these partnerships, and "foundations with religious purposes" were established with a portion of these billions. Through these foundations, Koran classes, large mosques, and small mosques will be set up; ceremonies will be held; and scholarships will be awarded.

These are the ties that have been formed between the Islamic Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the secular Republic of Turkey Office of the Prime Minister.

This "Islamic government" sometimes establishes political and religious relations, sometimes ideological and trade relations.

For this reason, we do not find it at all strange for "completely veiled young girls" to hide themselves or for groups to engage in political activities. We are not at all surprized by the words of the ANAP deputy chairman general, who wants a "fatwa" from the Religious Affairs Directorate. There is a lot to protect. They are protecting relationships.

They are protecting these business relationships, these political relationships.

While doing so, they added religiously oriented material to a speech made by the president of the republic on Teachers' Day, printed 500,000 copies, and sent them to every school, every teacher. They placed on covers of history books they entitled, "National History," lines recalling the "influence of the president" and attempted to give the impression that Cankaya favors them.

At the universities, they do not assign faculty members who are trained in the field classes in the "history of revolution." They include political propaganda in required religion courses. In violation of the religious instruction law, they appoint imam-preacher lycee graduates to positions of religious leaders and to the state bureaucracy.

Henceforth, let the state try all it wishes to provide a secular education. "Brother foundations" with Saudi backing and religious goals will ensure political and financial support somehow or other to these circles. The "secular state" will slowly and gradually be turned over somehow or other to these "Islamic cadres."

In fact, our young girls are not the only ones wearing veils. An attempt is being made, it is almost certain, to cover the eyes of some in order to prevent them from seeing clearly this multinational Islamic system of government.

RELIGION ISSUE PROMPTS CALL FOR AFFIRMATION OF DEMOCRACY

Istanbul MILLIYET in Turkish 6 Feb 87 p 8

["Telex" column by Teoman Erel: "Fear"]

[Text] A question that cuts like a knife into the heart of the matter:

"If communism and the sharia [Koranic law] can make their virtues accepted to the 20th century man in an environment of free debate and if the underlying principles of our republic remain helpless against them and cannot prove themselves to be worthy of acceptance, then why should we endorse those principles as unquestionable truths? On the other hand, if the basic principles of our republic are indisputably superior to the other systems and the chances of those systems to gain acceptance over the republic's principles is slim--as in Europe--then why are we afraid?"

We thank Mr Ibrahim of Kecioren, who describes himself as a "devout Muslim," for his interesting letter and the crucial question he asks.

We wanted to write our thoughts on this issue. The said letter provided additional urgency.

Is the Republic frightened? Why did we have the 24 January program which had a highly erosive effect on the concept of industrialization of the economy? Why was 12 September staged? What was the reason for the legislative arrangements--primarily the 1982 Constitution--which restrict democracy, union rights and university freedoms? Why do we seek sanctuary in bans? Why do we seek security in a system fraught with prohibitions?

According to Mr Ibrahim's reasoning, if communism or the sharia are "perils" and "anachronistic," then our people will not endorse them even if the bans are lifted. Our reader asks in his letter with a sarcastic tone:

"Would a person knowingly accept the risk of danger?"

Now it is time for answers.

As you very well know Mr Ibrahim, a person would knowingly accept the risk of danger. When circumstances push a person to the mentality of "whatever will

be will be," even suicide becomes possible. We know that the Anatolian saying "the anguish of the oppressed will oust the shah" became reality in Iran. Why did the Iranian people, tired of the Shah's repression, accept the calamity of Khomeyni?

We must state frankly that the Republic is afraid. Because the present trustees of the Republic know that the masses will move toward right or left-wing radicalism in times of economic crisis (or when poverty grows).

We are experiencing this situation in Turkey. The Republic is uneasy and disturbed since that day of "virtual bankruptcy" 10 years ago when it was disclosed that the "government does not even have 70 cents."

Here, we need to correct a minor but critical misrepresentation by the devilishly clever and "devoutly religious" Mr Ibrahim. The defenders of the Republic are not doubtful about the basic principles which constitute the Republic. Those principles are sound, consistent and compatible with the country's structure.

The Republic has been put in a difficult position by governments which breach those principles and failures and faulty implementations which impede Turkey's progress. The realization that industrialization and development have come to a standstill and that the economy is declining has led to fear.

The fear over being unable to appease the masses leads to concerns that the masses may turn to radical movements. That in turn leads to prohibitionism.

The hidden reason for the 12 March intervention was disclosed by Memduh Tagmac at a meeting:

"The pace of social awakening has surpassed the pace of economic development."

When the economic stability measures taken to breathe life into the failing economy during that temporary period of fear achieved success, prohibitionism was replaced by courage and democratic progressivism. The formation of a coalition government between the leftist RPP [Republican People's Party] and the fundamentalist NSP [National Salvation Party] in the aftermath of the 1973 general elections and the declaration of a general amnesty was a progressivist and courageous step forward for the Republic.

The RPP-NSP coalition did not survive. When polarization and tension was compounded by economic bankruptcy, fear returned.

Fear and prohibitionism will not extricate the Republic from this crisis either. Let us not be deceived by temporary periods of crisis; the true character of the Republic is its progressivism. That is what is needed. Solutions and sound balances may be found by moving forward and by expanding limited resources. A Turkey with a population of 50 million today and 70 million tomorrow cannot overcome fear, prohibitionism and helplessness with policies which cannot expand production, increase per capita income and bring about declines in health, education and culture. The concept of 24 January

has abandoned its initial purpose of "stability" and has moved to seek a free market economy and the leadership of the Islamic world.

Renouncing industrialization, retreating from democratization, disfranchising the masses and seeking remedies from the submissivism of Islam can make Turkey not like Italy or Japan but like Pakistan.

Those who believe in the principles and the future of the Republic must insist on leaping forward. Industrialization must be accelerated, economic development must be put its tracks, prosperity must be increased and real steps must be taken toward democratization. When a population of 50 million remains backward one cannot find "a balance through shrinkage" and "security through prohibitionism." Because fear is no remedy for collapse; it is the cause of collapse.

If we insist on staying the present course, the clever proponents of the sharia will ask the citizens--and us--with a sinister smile:

"If the Republic is so successful, why is it banning communists and proponents of the sharia? Is it afraid that the people will choose those systems over Ataturk's Republic?"

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CSO: 3554/188

COMMENTARY RESPONDS TO UNCERTAINTY OVER RELIGION ISSUE

Istanbul TERCUMAN in Turkish 8 Feb 87 pp 3,13

["Through the Historian's Eyes" column by Yilmaz Oztuna: "When Did the Turks Become Muslims?"]

[Text] The number of letters, phone calls and questions we have been receiving with regard to religion has grown substantially in recent days. I have the sense that Muslim Turks are concerned--if not afraid--that there will be new restrictions on their moral convictions in their own homeland and in the state founded by their ancestors.

This concern is unfounded, even though it is true that there are circles who wish to create uneasiness and to divide the nation by dragging it into Byzantine arguments. These circles are not at all homogeneous. Some of them want to bring back the officers and to regain the seats of power they found so pleasant.

Some of them are ancient enemies of the Turkish state and nation. They do not need a detailed description.

Because the nation cannot forget the times when special attention was paid not to utter the term "God" except when saying "God be with you," it still suspects that those times could come back. They will definitely never come back. If they do, then that should be labeled reactionarism and those who consider the uttering of the word "God" reactionarism must be called "reactionaries."

Our devout people must refrain from excess and fanaticism and must reject that which does not originate from us. We must acknowledge that a Khomeyni-style concept of religion is treason against our state, our ancestors and our religion. On the other hand, nobody should object to anyone's mode of dress and worship. That is what Islamic decency requires. Excepted, of course, are obscene publications which constitute a vile assault against our people. It is our right to dislike them.

The letters and phone calls also reflect a quest for roots. One of the most frequently asked questions is: "When did the Turks become Muslims?" I have written extensively on this subject in my books. However, as new generations grow they are naturally forgotten.

In fact one of my readers asks: "After which war did the Turks convert to Islam?"

The Turks are one of the few nations in the world who changed their religion and endorsed Islam out of their own volition. They are a nation virtually chosen by God to defend Islam. Yes, the Arabs and the Persians converted to Islam under the sword. But that was never the case for the Turks.

In the 8th and 9th centuries millions of Turks migrated from Central Asia to the Middle East. They became Muslims. Many of them began serving the Islamic empire and the caliphs as professional soldiers. Eventually their influence grew to a point where they could enthrone or dethrone Abbasid caliphs. Many individuals of Turkish origin contributed substantially to the development of Islamic civilization and culture.

But the sovereign Turkish state remained faithful to its ancestral Kok Tengri (Sky God) until the 10th century. Although several Turkish tribes had converted to Islam and established their own dynasties previously, the ruling Turkish state was made up of and governed by the Karahanlilar dynasty which was descended from Mete Han. They held the crown of the Turkish great khan.

Satuk Bugra Khan, born in 901, rose to the throne in 924 replacing his uncle as the great khan of the Karahanlis. He had converted to Islam during the time he was a prince. As soon as he was enthroned he took the name Abdulkerim. He declared the Islamic religion of the Sunni-Hanafi sect (which was the religion of the Abbasid caliphs) as the official and sole religion of the Turkish empire. When he died in 955, the Turkish empire and most Turks had converted to Islam.

The year 924 is one of the most important turning points of Turkish history. It not only shaped the future of the Turkish nation, but it changed the course of history.

9588

CS0: 3554/194

MIDDLE EAST RELIGIOUS MOVEMENTS SEEN AS WARNING SIGNS

Istanbul TERCUMAN in Turkish 8 Feb 87 p 4

["Commentary" column by Professor Fahir Armaoglu: "Still Shots From the Middle East"]

[Text] A recent edition of TURKISH DAILY NEWS carried two noteworthy reports side by side. One of the reports was datelined Jerusalem while the other one originated from Beirut. Both reports were about "reactionary" movements in those two countries. What was most noteworthy was that these "pro-sharia [Koranic law]" or "radical Islamic" movements are concentrated in universities in both countries.

The report from Jerusalem focused on "nationalist" movements gaining prominence among Palestinians in Israeli-occupied territories. Students who study at the Bir-Zayt University near Ramallah, the An-Najah University in Nablus, the Bethlehem University in Beit Lahm and the Islamic and Hebron universities in Gaza and who support 'Arafat, Syria or some faction are trying to form a united nationalist front against Israel and Jordan. This movement of "Palestinian nationalism" has also spread among professionals such as doctors, engineers and journalists.

Another important aspect of this nationalist movement is that these Palestinian nationalists have to fight against "reactionaries" and pro-shariah students at the said universities. The Islamic University in Gaza is the center of the radical Islamic movement and is trying to bring under its control the other universities in the West Bank. As a result, the Islamic University has succeeded to wrest control of the student council of the Hebron University and has won 34 percent of the votes of Bir-Zayt students. Even so, however, physicians' and engineers' associations in Gaza are controlled by the "nationalists."

According to the report from Beirut, walls in Muslim West Beirut are covered with posters of Khomeyni and his militants, and these posters carry slogans calling for the formation of an "Islamic state" in Lebanon which is home to 16 different religious sects. In the streets, the bearded men of Hezbollah, Iran's arm in Lebanon, distribute propaganda leaflets carrying the same message. At the University of Beirut female students who have "rediscovered

Islam" have recently begun entering classes with headcovers. Women wearing coats covering their forearms and ankles who could only be seen in the Shiite neighborhoods of Beirut are now a common sight in the central districts of the city. In the past, Shiite militants have bombed bars and shops which do not lower their shutters on Fridays--similar to acts committed in Egypt last year.

These two reports present two graphic still shots which tell a lot to Turkey, Iran's neighbor.

9538

CSO: 3554/194

INTELLECTUAL HEARTH PANEL DISCUSSES RELIGIOUS FREEDOMS

Istanbul TERCUMAN in Turkish 8 Feb 87 p 13

[Text] Speaking at the panel discussion entitled "Democracy and Freedom of Thought, Ideas and Faith" organized by the Intellectual Hearth, the editor-in-chief of our paper, Taha Akyol, said: "Where there is no democracy there is no freedom of faith and ideas. Indeed, there is neither freedom of religion and conscience nor freedom of thought in Iran, Russia and all dictatorships."

Stating that the transition to democracy in Turkey has brought about freedom of religion and conscience and that democracy has made religious education possible, Akyol said: "Individuals with totalitarian positivist views describe the people's insistence on their freedom of religion and conscience as reactionarism, and while claiming to be 'democrats' they have banned the turban."

Stating that liberal democracy must be defended for the sake of our own faith and all types of ideas, Akyol said: "However, we must know the limits of freedom." He continued:

"The boundaries of freedom end where we begin stepping over into the freedoms of others and we begin harming the territorial and national integrity of the Turkish Republic. The limits of freedom are set by democracy."

Also speaking at the panel discussion, Assistant Professor Mukbil Ozyoruk, a columnist at our paper, noted that secularism is a term borrowed from the West and added: "It is a mistake to implement the secularist concept of the Christian world in a Muslim society and state."

Ozyoruk defined the concept of secularism in Turkey as "the nonimplementation of purely religious rules in the state's legal system." He said: "Forcing a woman not to cover her head against her wishes is as antiseccular as forcing a woman to wear a headcover against her wishes."

The other speaker on the panel, Professor Salih Tug, said that "the test of the existence of freedom of religion and conscience is the visibility of religious beliefs and religious education." He added that if people's religious beliefs require them to worship, to conduct religious rites and to wear special religious garments, then they have the right to wear those garments and cited examples from the Declaration of Human Rights.

9588

CSO: 3554/194

BRIEFS

IRAN CLAIMS ISLAMIC RESURGENCE IN TURKEY--The Iranian radio broadcasts aimed at fanning reactionary acts in Turkey are continuing. Quoting a report from a Pakistani paper, the Voice of the Iran Islamic Republic claimed that "there is a strong inclination toward Islam in Turkey." Meanwhile, YENI NESIL, a daily published in Istanbul, alleged that the turban has been banned by the Cankaya Mansion. In a supplement entitled "Headcover," YENI NESIL advised President Kenan Evren to read the Koran. The Voice of the Iran Islamic Republic, monitored from Mardin by a correspondent of the Mil-Ha news agency, claimed on the basis of a report in PAKISTAN TIMES that "there is a strong inclination toward Islam in Turkey." In the "Universal Islamic News" segment of the Turkish broadcast aired from Tehran 2 days ago, the report of the Pakistani newspaper was cited as follows: "Turkey is dependent on the EEC. Muslim women, students and people have objected strongly to the ban against Islamic covers. Judging from the latest incidents, it appears that Islamic groups in Turkey are based in universities and government offices. In addition to the protestations of female and male students in universities various groups in Turkey are supporting Islamic groups with regard to the headcover issue." [Text] [Istanbul MILLIYET in Turkish 6 Feb 87 p 8] 9588

CSO: 3554/188

RESEARCH SPENDING TO INCREASE IN 1988

Paris L'USINE NOUVELLE in French 2 Apr 87 pp 16-17

[Interview with Jacques Valade, minister of research, by Marc Chabreuil and Pierre Virolleaud; date and place not given]

[Text] The arrival of Alain Devaquet's replacement in the Ministry of Research and Higher Education coincided with the first positions taken by the prime minister in favor of research. This will be a valuable asset for Jacques Valade if he wishes, between now and March 1988, to take the measures needed in a sector that has lain fallow since March 1986. However, a university professor and researcher himself, the senator from Gironde--Chaban's "heir apparent," it is said in Bordeaux--has more than one trick up his sleeve. With his colleague in Industry, he is now drafting a policy on research and innovation that will be presented to the Cabinet in a few weeks.

[Question] The prime minister has announced that research would constitute a prime objective in the 1988 Budget. Can you be more specific?

[Answer] Our fellow countrymen did indeed hear Jacques Chirac say repeatedly, in Strasbourg, Toulouse and Lyon, that research is a priority for the development of business and he is now asking us to express that in concrete action. Work on the budget has not yet begun and I cannot therefore go into detail. For the time being, we see two possible ways to express the remarks and instructions of the prime minister: On the one hand, capital endowments to national enterprises or organizations should benefit their investments in research. Second, subsidies and aid to research, whether public or private, must be improved.

[Question] Will there be new direct or indirect aid to industry?

[Answer] We are now looking at that question with Minister of Industry Alain Madelin. In the field of indirect aid, it has now become commonplace to say that tax credit should be expanded. At the present time, in consultation with business executives, we are reflecting upon the timeliness of modifying the rules. The tax credit could benefit from improved regulation that would wipe out effects due to sudden variations in research investments from one year to the next.

Concerning direct aid, the discussion is more political. The scales tipped heavily in the direction of eliminating such aid. We can in fact see that businesses still have trouble investing and in allocating more financing to research, while the fresh money they take in goes first of all into their treasury. Things change. At the outset, we came to question the very existence of ANVAR [National Research Development Agency], although, as the prime minister himself has said, its role is now being redefined. This is an important revision.

All of this goes hand in hand with profound modifications in our manner of managing credits.

[Question] Is it a question of a reform of the Research and Technology Fund?

[Answer] Yes. We are going to update and improve our way of using that fund, based on certain principles which I personally think are obvious, but which I shall gladly repeat.

The first principle: There is no "situation" income. Every proposal must be matched by a demonstration of its competitiveness.

Second principle: Evaluation will be the task of professionals. Committees will rule on proposals based on evaluations of research work.

In other words, everyone will report on the use of funds and we shall see whether we must continue to support the request being made.

My first objective is to facilitate the transfer of results from research to industry. However, please do not believe that I am not concerned with basic research; on the contrary. We observe a real consensus on this subject and business executives are not the last to say that in their opinion, we must promote basic research more. To sum up my philosophy, I would say that it seems essential to me that the researcher be concerned with the potential application of his work.

[Question] Do you have the means of evaluation required by this policy?

[Answer] At the present time, no. There are means of self-evaluation within the organizations, a sound discipline that each one of us in the scientific community must abide by, but that is not enough. There are also many centers here and there that handle evaluation, but all that is too scattered. This is why the conclusions of the mission with which the government entrusted Roger Martin will soon help us to see more clearly. Finally, in my own ministry, I have begun to analyze all the means and tools of independent evaluation that we have.

[Question] Is the High Council on Scientific and Technical Research (CSRT) among those means?

[Answer] Yes, precisely. I attended the last general assembly of the CSRT, which gathers together some 50 members of the different scientific, economic

and social milieux and I told its vice president, Kourilsky, of my interest in its work. It so happens that his term, like that of part of the council, is coming to an end. I therefore asked Jean-Pierre Causse, one of my advisers who is also deputy general director in charge of research at Saint-Gobain, to prepare for the change.

When we have reached that stage, we shall redefine the High Council, which I believe should be in a position to do more. I hope to turn it into more of a council of the minister and the government, a real high council, like that of the Bench. Rather than taking up a given problem of status, an organization or team, it would make much more global evaluations. I can easily imagine that it could evaluate the state of advancement, as well as the policy to be followed in France, of a given discipline. The guidelines in biotechnology provide us with an up-to-date example.

[Question] Is the concern for evaluation and economic profitability shared by all researchers?

[Answer] First and foremost, I believe it is useful to say clearly that researchers, because of their participation in the national community and the future, deserve the highest consideration from French society. In exchange, they must show that they are concerned about redistributing their talents and the product of their imagination. Just because a specific type of research is not profitable does not mean it should be eliminated. France also has a cultural mission that I am not forgetting. If one of my distinguished colleagues feels like studying Sanscrit or Gregorian chant, that is his right. I simply say that that must be intelligently quantified. If I were to sum up my viewpoint in a few words, I would say that economic valorization is necessarily based on the initial choice.

[Question] Researchers are accused of not being mobile. Is their status not an obstacle?

[Answer] For years, only the security of researchers was at stake or, at least, trying to achieve a common status based on a multitude of the same that were brought together. As soon as researchers were placed in the most secure environment possible, one cannot then immediately ask that such stabilization generate mobility! You will never hear me say that researchers should not enjoy the social benefits of other wage earners, but I believe there may be ways to allow passage from one system to another. This is not the case, either with respect to salaries, retirement or paid vacations. I have asked for study of a system that would truly permit mobility. I can easily imagine that it would have the form of an intermediate status to which the researcher from a university or an organization going into the private sector or the reverse would aspire.

In a word, the temporary nature of this situation must be taken into account and everyone must then be able to return to the previous status. I am totally aware of this urgency in a European perspective and that is why I have already made a number of suggestions. Today there are enormous disparities and yet, a researcher living in London or Cologne must be able to go work in Montpellier

or vice versa. I know a number of British researchers working in Paris in the new materials sector and who are thrilled to be under the French social security system. But when a European researcher goes to the United States, such coverage is nonexistent, unless the effort is made to pay in. But since researchers have scholarships that barely give them enough to live on, it is difficult to see how they would pay for that social security coverage in addition, especially since they are usually persons between the ages of 25 and 30, married and sometimes with children.

[Question] How are negotiations going on the European programs?

[Answer] The choices have been made: Esprit, Brité, Race and Euram. The last time I met with my European colleagues in Brussels, we spent about 20 hours negotiating on the content and financing of the framework program. A decision was made by ten nations, with Great Britain and Germany soon to announce their positions. Between now and 1991, some 6.4 million ECU [European currency units] will be invested. This package includes the conclusion of previous programs not yet carried out in 1987. Since we have the impression that this program will not be finished in 1991, after a heated discussion, I was able to make them add at least 16 percent (900 million ECU) by 1992. However, confidentially, I hope that it will be more than 16 percent.

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CSO: 3519/104

COOPERATION WITH BRITISH AEROSPACE ON AIRCRAFT

Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek 9 Apr 87 p 2

[Article by D. K.: "BAe [British Aerospace] and EAV [Greek Aircraft Industry] to Cooperate on Production of 'Anglo-Greek' ATP Aircraft. Its Advantages"]

[Text] Yesterday British Aerospace presented the advantages of its new turboprop ATP aircraft at a press conference. At the same time the company discussed the prospect that it and EAV may cooperate so heavily in the production of the aircraft that it will become an "Anglo-Greek" plane.

Points made by the BAe spokesmen about the ATP, which had originally been approved by an Olympic Airways committee although a final decision has not yet been made, included the following:

--It is the largest plane of its type constructed on a "moving" line. It carries up to 72 passengers and is capable of handling the traffic encountered on this country's domestic routes at the height of the tourist season. By carrying more passengers, it requires fewer flights and reduces the congestion usual at Elliniko Airport and at certain island airports (Kos and Mykonos).

--The ATP can operate out of all the airports in mainland Greece and the Aegean islands except for STOL airports, which are used only by the D 228 because they are so small.

--The ATP saves airlines operating it at least \$5 million a year compared to its nearest competitor and also helps keep fares low on domestic routes.

--BAe is able to provide for Olympic's transition from its current 737, [one character missing in original]-30, and Skyvan aircraft to a complete, new fleet of 70-passenger turboprop aircraft by the end of 1988. The cost will be at least \$10 million less than that of the nearest competitor. At the same time, BAe is prepared to lease aircraft --at a cost to be agreed on between the two parties-- to meet Olympic's needs until then. Furthermore, BAe offers 100 percent financing for this purchase. Fifty-five percent of this sum will be financed by the EEC and has already been made available to the Greek government.

--Well aware that the ATP is "ideal" for Greece, BAe gave an order to EAV for

30 wing flap systems, the first of which was delivered by EAV on schedule on 12 February 1987 and received an excellent rating. The "package" offered by BAe to Olympic provides for this cooperation to be extended, providing \$75-100 million in offsets.

--The ATP's first flights will come next August with British Midland (an order of five aircraft) and with the Caribbean's LIAT (four ordered).

--Olympic is interested in ordering eight aircraft. BAe can deliver the first ATP at the end of 1988. Each aircraft will cost "a bit under \$9 million." The systems carried by the ATP and its construction (the wings attached at the belly of the aircraft) enable it not only to fly in any weather but also to float upright in case of a forced landing on water.

The British representatives of BAe (which is the heart of the British aerospace industry, the third largest in the world after the United States and the USSR) concluded by saying:

"Naturally, while we talking about our cooperation, we hope that the Greek government will take into consideration the successful results of this cooperation with EAV, as well as the possibilities for the future if the ATP aircraft is selected. The ATP will be the 'Greek aircraft' since so many parts of it will be manufactured by Greek hands."

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CSO: 3521/103

PROPOSED WATER PIPELINE TO SAUDI ARABIA

Istanbul MILLIYET in Turkish 31 Mar 87 p 11

[Survey report on proposed water pipeline project from southern Turkey to Saudi Arabia compiled by Necati Dogru]

[Text] This Side of the Coin

Is it just a fantasy? Is it nothing but a "vain illusion"? Channeling the crystal clear waters which flow from the hilltops, foothills, plains and springs of the Taurus Mountains to the furthest ends of the Arab deserts; creating a river in the middle of a region God has designated as "desert."

One must applaud those who have conceived this fantasy. Because at the root of this fantasy is the following reasoning: "Are we always going to endure the hardships of the places we were born in? We must enjoy the benefits--as much as we endure the hardships--of the places we were born in."

If this project materializes, selling the water currently running into the sea at 2 riyals (400 Turkish lira) per cubic meter to the Arabs cannot be described as anything but enjoying the benefits of the places we were born in. However, you will read in our survey report that even the person who describes this project as a "vain illusion" is not someone who does not "think big."

The issue has another aspect: Some people are asking who invented this project which, by current estimates, will cost \$7 billion (which is nearly the same as Turkey's exports for 1 year) and which will take 15 years to complete. According to these skeptics, the project was invented by the United States and would serve the interests of the United States by making Turkey a leader in the region.

Why would a strong Turkey serve the interests of the United States? Because since the demise of the Ottoman Empire, alliances, friendships and enmities in the Middle East have been changing overnight. The United States has frequently encountered problems in controlling this rapidly shifting region. That is why the United States wants stability in the region.

However, whatever the motivations behind the project, we must support the dream of "enjoying the benefits of the places we were born in." Let us not

forget that dreaming is the first step of creation and the engine of real development.

Those Who Say It Is a 'Fantasy'

The arguments of those who say the water project Turgut Ozal has proposed is a "fantasy" are as follows:

--It is impossible to build a project like this in a region as unstable as the Middle East which encompasses countries with very different policies at least in today's circumstances.

--The cities where Ozal wants to take water already have their own water supplies. Amman receives its drinking water from the Euphrates which is 750 kilometers away. Aleppo and Hama get their drinking water from streams running off the Lebanon mountains. Mecca's water comes from Jiddah through 2-meter pipes. Why would they agree to such a costly project which may also raise legal disputes?

--The government wants to sell water to the Arabs at \$1 [per cubic meter]. If it has such means then it should supply water to neighborhoods Gaziantep, Adana and Kahramanmaras where they have no water. It should pipe water to Cyprus which is only 40 miles to the south.

--If the Arabs agree to such a massive project, then why would they choose the rivers of Ceyhan and Seyhan? Why would they not prefer the Tigris and the Euphrates which have more water, which pass through Arab territory and which are closer to Saudi Arabia?

--Nowhere in the world is water transported over such great distances. In the United States water is channeled from the Colorado River to Los Angeles, but the distance is only 1,000 kilometers.

Those Who Think the Project Is 'Realistic'

Those who defend the project put forward the following arguments:

--The Arabs have oil and we have water. It is true that the Arabs receive their water from the sources that have been mentioned, but the supplies are not adequate. That is why Saudi Arabia and the Gulf countries buy their drinking water from European countries, mainly France. They get their water for nondrinking use by desalinating water from the Red Sea and Persian Gulf. However, that process is very expensive. Water obtained by this process costs between 12 and 24 riyal (2400 to 4800 Turkish lira) per cubic meter.

--It is true that the Middle East is an unstable region. However, it is evident that the taps of water, which is increasingly becoming more valuable than oil, are controlled by Turkey which is the most stable country of the region. When the dams now being built on the Tigris and the Euphrates are completed the importance of water will increase. Because no matter how much we insist that "we will let enough water to go downstream," that will not be possible. Otherwise, how will we be able to irrigate the Harran Plain? Given

that situation, Syria and Iraq will be forced to knock on our door asking for water. In other words, our bargaining position will become stronger every passing day. Water will impose mandatory cooperation among the countries of the region. Water will restore the balances upset by oil.

--Even if they lay the water pipeline through a location close to Basra on the Shatt-al-'Arab they still need Turkey. Because we have all the water sources. If we do not let enough water downstream, where will they find the water to pump through the pipeline? The water from the Tigris and the Euphrates is already inadequate for Syria's and Iraq's needs. Moreover, in the lower reaches of the Tigris and the Euphrates the water is so dirty that it cannot be used without being purified.

--The project will be costly. However, all the countries involved will gain from the benefits and revenues the project will generate. An international consortium could easily finance the project.

--It is true that the distances involved are very long. If the pipeline is built it will be the longest in the world. But that does not mean that it cannot be built. Anything that is new will be unique and the first. Not only foreign companies, but even Turkish contractors are already planning to bid on the project.

--If this project is built, the reins of peace and stability in the Middle East will pass into Turkey's hands. This will enhance Turkey's significance in the region. A "Turkey which controls the water" will naturally be in a much more different position than it is today. Such a Turkey will become a country with which not only its friends but other countries in the region will want to cooperate.

Kahveci: 'They Also Called the Gas Pipeline a Dream'

Adnan Kahveci, the chief counselor of the Prime Ministry, defended the project as follows:

--According to a feasibility study we contracted to an American firm [Brown & Root], the project is technically feasible and profitable. It is possible to pump water from the Seyhan and Ceyhan rivers to Riyadh at 2 riyals per cubic meter.

--Saudi Arabia is interested in and sympathetic toward the project. In their most recent 5-year plan, the Saudis set aside 20 billion riyals (\$4 billion) for water. Making potable water out of sea water requires large amounts of energy. We are telling to the Saudis: "Export half the oil used for desalination, give us the value of the other half and we will sell you water."

--The project is expected to cost \$5 billion to \$7 billion. This is a very large project. We cannot complete it in less than 10 to 15 years. Technical as well as political circumstances need to mature. In other words, in addition to the Saudis, Syria and Jordan must also agree. Will they say "yes"? The entire world is moving toward cooperation.

--Some people are calling the project a fantasy. But the idea of piping Russian natural gas to Europe was also described as a fantasy at the beginning. Now it is a reality. We believe that our water project will also become a reality in 10 to 15 years.

--With the foreign currency we will earn from the sale of water we will channel water from the Southeast Anatolia Project to the Konya Plain and we will pipe the excess water from the Seyhan and Ceyhan rivers to central Anatolia.

Kutlutas: 'Both the Arabs' and Our Problems Can Be Solved'

Nurettin Kocak, the owner of Kutlutas Holding Company which has signed several large contracts in Turkey and overseas, is optimistic.

Question: The water pipeline has been described as a "fantasy."

Answer: I wish this had been thought about not today by 10 years ago. It would have solved both our and the Arabs' problems.

Question: We are going to make money out of this project. What would the Arabs gain?

Answer: Water desalination is a very costly process. Our water will cost much less.

Question: Some people are saying that water cannot be piped over such great distances.

Answer: Libya has begun a \$60-billion project to pump water from 800 to 1,000 meters below ground. It is known as the "artificial river project." It will be used for agriculture. Pipes measuring 3.5 meters in diameter will cross 1,000 kilometers of desert.

Question: Would Kutlutas bid on such a project? Do you have any preparatory work under way?

Answer: We have not done any preparatory work. The project is still at the idea stage. Ozal has a file on the issue. He discussed the issue with American businessmen. The Americans made general proposals to our firm.

Tekfen: 'We Are Ready for the Water Pipeline'

We discussed the "peace pipeline" with Necatic Akcaglilar, an official of the Tekfen Holding Company.

Question: Do the Turkish firms have the technology to build a nearly 2,000-kilometer pipeline?

Answer: Two or three Turkish firms which do business internationally have the strength to do that. I do not wish to name them.

Question: Can they do it on their own?

Answer: They can form a consortium among themselves and with foreign firms.

Question: Has the government requested any reports from you?

Answer: No. A report was neither requested nor submitted. However, we did some preparatory work on our own.

Question: Is Tekfen prepared to bid on this project?

Answer: We would of course bid on the project. We are involved in all of Turkey's major pipeline projects. We were involved in the building of the first oil pipeline from Iraq. Now we are building the second one. We are also the prime contractors on two water pipelines in Saudi Arabia.

Demirel: 'The Water Project Is a Vain Illusion'

Former prime minister Suleyman Demirel is one of the leading opponents of the water project because he finds it unrealistic.

Question: Why are you opposed to the project?


Answer: Syria's cities and Amman already have their own water supplies. They get their water from elsewhere. Why would they buy it from you? Saudi Arabia is getting its water from the sea. Mecca and Medina have small populations, so that piping water from 4,000 kilometers away is unrealistic. Moreover, if a water pipeline is to be laid, why would they choose a roundabout path when it is possible to pipe water from the Shatt-al-'Arab 700 kilometers away.

Question: It is said that when Turkey completes the dams on the Euphrates and the Tigris not as much water will flow to the Shatt-al-'Arab.

Answer: The Tigris and the Euphrates carry a total of 51 billion cubic meters of water each year. Turkey can use at most half of that. Are they going to dry up the river bed?

Question: If it is not feasible, why is the government putting forward such a proposal?

Answer: It is a vain illusion my friend. They want to keep the public busy.



[Caption] Two Alternatives for "Peace Pipeline":

According to Turkish contracting firms which have performed preliminary work on the project, there are two alternative paths for the proposed pipeline. The first, 1,950 kilometers long, originates from Ceyhan and runs to Medina and Mecca in Saudi Arabia through Syria and Jordan. The second path completely bypasses Syrian territory; it is 2,200 kilometers long and runs to Saudi Arabia's capital Riyadh through Iraq. The first line may be extended to as far as North Yemen's capital Sana'a if needed.

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CSO: 8054/3823

EDITORIAL QUESTIONS DEPOSIT INTEREST POLICY

Istanbul DUNYA in Turkish 6 Feb 87 p 1

[Editorial: "Is Lowering Deposit Interest a Remedy"]

[Text] Yesterday the Central Bank's Board of Directors decided to lower time deposit interest. According to the decision, interest on 1-year time deposits was lowered to 43 percent from 45 percent, and on 6-month time deposits annual interest was reduced to 38 percent from 39 percent. Undoubtedly, the justification of the decision is the fact that the increase rate of inflation has been slowing down and therefore real interest rates must be adjusted accordingly. Furthermore, the justification will include the goal of lowering banks' fund costs and lowering credit interest rates through this means.

It is natural for deposit interest rates in an economy, including inflation rates, to fluctuate upwards or downwards for many reasons. This change can also come about through intervention by the monetary authority. However, in market economies, intervention of the monetary authority does not occur through direct rate setting, but through employment of other means it controls. The rationale behind preferring this indirect way is not "an idealism exalting the system of free interest rates," but the concern to preserve the health of the economy.

Free market transactions lead the ways of indirect intervention in interest rates by central banks. Just like individuals, central banks can control the money supply and interest rates by entering the market and buying or selling stocks and bonds. Thus, in order to obtain the interest rate desired for the economy, instead of setting it, the equilibrium between supply and demand in the market is affected and the automatic formation of the intended interest rate is secured.

In order to see the results of interest rate settings through central decisions, one must listen to the bankers in Turkey. According to bank managers, the new interest rates will lead to the flight of deposits from banks. As a consequence of this flight, banks' funds available for credit will decrease. The effect on credit costs of the scarcity created by the insufficient supply resulting from this decline will be greater than the effect of the cost decrease created by lowering deposit interest rates.

It can be argued whether or not bankers' claims reflect the full facts. However, there is another reality to consider. Net yields that the owners of public

securities receive are between 41 percent and 43 percent. Under these circumstances, it is rather difficult for the savings holder to turn to 1-year time deposits with a net yield of 38.57 percent or 6-month time deposits with a new yield of 36.99 percent.

Banks must look for the reason behind the lack of funds not only in low deposit interest rates, but also in their own appetite" for public-sector savings. Similarly, if credit customers blame only the banks and their desire for high profits for high credit interest rates, that would be unfair to them.

12990/12232

CSO: 3554/190

AIR FORCE SEEKING WOMEN TO FILL RANKS

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 17 Mar 87 p 12

[Article by Bo Draebel: "Air Force Hunting for Girls"]

[Text] Men do not hang on trees, and there is a great demand for our time's small graduating classes of youth. The air force is taking the consequences of this. Girls are being counted on exclusively for training in electromechanics.

The air force is dreaming about being discovered by the girls, and as part of a charm offensive is setting up two classes for girls on 1 May at the special school at Vaerlose Air Station. Twenty-four girls are to be trained as electromechanical specialists here.

The reason for the charm offensive is that the air force cannot get enough men, and that the air force has had good experience with women.

There have been women in the air force's non-operational units since 1971, and the air force has been conducting an experiment with women in operational units since 1985.

"The experiment will end at the end of the year, but it has gone so well that I hope women have come to stay," says Major P. Frahn-Rasmussen of the Armed Forces Command. "About 30 women are taking part in the experiment and the female p.f.c.'s are working on equal terms with the men in air defense gun units, with Hawk missiles and on guard duty in the K-9 corps."

For the present 120 women have signed up for training as electromechanical specialists. The 24 lucky ones will be selected through an admission test at the end of March.

"We are not requiring EFG [basic vocational courses]. The classes for girls will be sheer trainee classes," says Major E.V. Hansen of the Armed Forces Command. "Grade 10 is the minimum with regard to schooling, and the girls must have turned 18. They must have reasonable proficiency in English and mathematics, and it is an advantage if they also have had some physics and chemistry. They receive a journeyman's certificate after about five years.

and the starting salary for an electromechanical specialist in the air force is about 15,000 kroner."

The 24 girls' training will start with a two-month basic training period, and they have to commit themselves for six years in order to receive the training at the State's expense. However, they are allowed to have second thoughts about the training within the nine-month trial period.

8831

CSO: 3613/57

FILLON EVALUATES COSTS, DETAILS OF PROGRAM LAW

Costs Estimated

Paris LE MONDE in French 4 Apr 87 p 32

[Text] Just a few days away from the National Assembly debate on the 1987-1991 military program bill--which will determine the nuclear, conventional, and space equipment of the French Armed forces--Mr Francois Fillon, RPR [Rally for the Republic] deputy from Sarthe and chairman of the Defense Committee in Bourbon Palace, who is to introduce this bill, published a financial estimate of the various armament projects selected under this 5-year plan. This is the first time that such a cost estimate for certain French weapons has been published although the deputy who is to introduce the bill and who worked very hard to get his information from the appropriate departments of the Defense Ministry, notes that these data do not in any way commit the administration but are a "simple group of assumptions," expressed in fund allocations.

In analyzing the strategic nuclear armament programs, Mr Fillon published the following estimates. The M-4 missiles (which carry 6 explosive warheads over ranges of up to 4,400 km) will have cost Fr37 billion, to which one must add Fr14.5 billion for the adaptation of the existing submarines to launch these missiles. The overall cost of the new-generation missile-firing submarines (a submarine model displacing 14,000 t submerged and firing the new M-5 missiles) has been estimated at Fr68 billion, to which one must add Fr73 billion for the entire M-5 program (a missile that will be ready before the year 2000 and that will have an increased enemy defense penetration capacity).

In the same strategic deterrence arsenal, the cost of the S-4 missile (the new program for a missile whose deployment is uncertain) has been estimated at Fr30 billion according to the current configuration of a surface-to-surface ballistic weapon system in fixed silos.

Concerning nuclear weapons below the strategic threshold, Mr Fillon indicated that the construction of the Mirage 2000-N aircraft (the nuclear-weapon carrying version of the Mirage 2000) will have a price tag of Fr30.3 billion on it and that the cost of the ASMP (medium-range air-to-ground)

missiles, launched by these same Mirage 2000 aircraft, has been estimated at Fr6.7 billion (for a total order of 80 missiles). The Hades missile, which will be issued to the Ground Forces regiments in place of the current Pluton and which could be equipped with the neutron bomb, would cost something like Fr13.6 billion.

Fr142 Billion

Looking next at the conventional armament programs for each of the three French services, the deputy supplies specific data on the cost of certain weapon systems which have already been ordered. The cost of 40 Atlantique-2 maritime patrol aircraft is estimated at Fr26.3 billion; the cost of eight nuclear-powered attack submarines (of the current Rubis model) is estimated at Fr14 billion, while the first nuclear-powered aircraft carrier, the "Richelieu," should carry a price tag of Fr13.9 billion to which one must add the foreseeable cost of a second vessel of the same type, estimated to come to at least Fr10 billion at this time. These prices do not include the cost of the aircraft carried on board.

In the Ground Forces, the new Leclerc tank program (which will gradually replace the AMX-30 after 1992) has been estimated at Fr45 billion for 1,000 tanks. Mr Fillon observed that this is the biggest financing project of the Ground Forces. But we note that, according to the deputy who is to introduce this administration bill, the program for a multiple rocket launcher, which some people liken to the Stalin organ of World War II, would cost Fr16.4 billion.

It is however the Air Force which contemplates the biggest investments on the occasion of the replacement of its fleet of combat aircraft with a project for a new ACT (tactical combat aircraft), derived, as the case may be, from the Rafale of Dassault. This twinjet aircraft, equipped with a new radar and ECM system, capable of carrying the MICA (air intercept and combat missile) missile, now being developed, should be used both by the Air Force and by Naval Aviation. "The figures generally given out," Mr Fillon wrote in particular, "speak for themselves: about Fr30 billion for development and Fr142 billion for the entire program, including production." This is the most expensive program among all those that are contemplated for the conventional forces.

Because of their practical implementation time, which can be spread out over 20 years, all of these armament programs are not fully covered by the military program law whose financial horizon only covers the period from 1987 until 1991.

Fixed Missiles Criticized

Paris LIBERATION in French 9 Apr 87 p 7

[Article by Jean Guisnel: "Chirac Plans Military Establishment in Person"]

[Text] The military program law has the blessing of the prime minister. The national consensus on national defense demands this.

There is nothing to force him to do so, except for his own precedent in 1976, but Jacques Chirac himself yesterday launched the parliamentary debate on the 1987-1991 military program law in order to underscore the importance he assigns at this time to questions of security, particularly in the new international context caused by the prospects of development in the East-West dialogue and the discussions on the "zero option" between Moscow and Washington. In this connection, there is nothing new under the sun as far as the prime minister is concerned: "The zero option would have negative and dangerous consequences if it were to look to public opinion as the beginning of an inevitable process of American disengagement and denuclearization of Western Europe." Unless, of course, the Europeans benefit from this opportunity in order "To become aware of our continent's security requirements regardless of whether it involves the continuation of a credible nuclear discussion, a close link that must exist with the United States, or an increasingly strong take-charge attitude on the part of the Europeans, when it comes to their own security," he said. Concerning the program law itself, Jacques Chirac emphasized the fact that it was designed to do a little bit of arm-twisting of the general staffs concerning the funds made available to them: "The administration's basic idea is to force the military leaders--in the context of an overall spending packet fixed at a high level--each year to justify their needs in a strict manner." The administration and Parliament reserve themselves the right to "proceed to the necessary arbitration with full clarity." Very much concerned with upholding the national consensus on defense issues, Jacques Chirac emphasized the fact that "the confidence of the entire nation in its army," and "the acceptance of the financial effort demanded by the maintenance of a modern defense" are at least as important assets in dealing with the allies or the adversaries as is military equipment itself: "The defense of a country is not judged only by the size of its tanks or missiles," he declared. But the man in Matignon [Palace; prime minister's office] did not want to load himself down with any possible breaches which certain members of the opposition but also some in the majority could open up in this famous "consensus." He was content with a discreet allusion to "the existence of different sensitivities that justify permanent and constructive reflection."

In the opinion of Francois Fillon, of the RPR, chairman of the Defense Committee, the deputy who will introduce the bill in his own name, the draft gives "a precise indication of priorities" in French defenses to come. He finds some grounds for reservation, however, concerning the methods of parliamentary control to ensure compliance with administration commitments or even certain equipment choices. Some of these observations are minor. Francois Fillon estimates that the number of combat aircraft which the Air Force has is rather poorly suited for its requirements or, furthermore, that the problems deriving from the aging of the light vessels of the Navy are far from having been solved. But the chairman of the Defense Committee also prods the administration on more sensitive points. He reproaches the administration for not having been firmer in the debate which it conducted against Francois Mitterrand in connection with the future strategic S-4 missile which the president of the Republic however wishes to see installed permanently on the Albion Plateau: "I must inform you of the unanimous

opinion of experts who believe that the permanent basing of all missiles would make them seriously vulnerable and who are astonished that a system of weapons, which could be put on vehicles (...) could raise problems on the occasion of any moves." The remarks made by Francois Fillon are even stronger concerning the commissioning of the French "neutron bomb" in which connection the administration has given assurance that the bomb can be placed in production the moment the decision is made at the policy level. This is precisely what makes the deputy angry; he would like to see this entire process speeded up: "We must put an end to all of this procrastination which interferes, not with the perfection of enhanced-radiation nuclear weapons (or even the neutron bomb--editor's note) as it was actively pursued over the past several years, but rather their indispensable deployment."

The deputy however recognized the problems which this could raise in Europe and he admitted: "I am not unaware of the fact that it remains for us to convince the German Federal Republic that this weapon constitutes an effective response to the problem of the imbalance of conventional forces in Europe."

As for the possibility of introducing chemical weapons into the French military arsenal, Francois Fillon considers this to be a little bit timid. He would have preferred France deciding purely and simply to manufacture its weapons and he indicated that this possibility "should be the subject of a decision" on the occasion of the introduction of the next program law in 1991.

Inflation Adjustment

Paris LIBERATION in French 9 Apr 87 p 7

[Article by J. Gl.: "A Law to Equip the Army for 5 Years"]

[Text] Adopted by the Cabinet on 5 November 1986, the 1987-1991 military program law constitutes a plan for equipping the Armed Forces for the next 5 years. Examined since last night by Parliament, it will replace, before its official termination, the present law which Charles Hernu had gotten a vote on in 1983 and which covered the period of 1984-1988.

According to the present-day majority, the vote on a new bill was justified by the delay in the prior law which was figured at Fr17 billion in 1986 but also by the commitments undertaken by the RPR and the UDF [French Democratic Union] during the election campaign which called for the French "defense effort" progressively to reach the figure of 4 percent of the gross domestic commodity product. The new law stipulates that the Armed Forces, within a period of 5 years, are to spend Fr474 billion on their equipment, with an increase rate of 11 percent for 1987 and 6 percent for the following years. The financial commitments were expressed in constant francs which implies an automatic updating each year in keeping with inflation. This innovation is paralleled by the updating of the law in 1988 which will cover the years 1992 and 1993. The procedure employed for the actual programing has been called "sliding" and will make it possible to attenuate the phenomenon of the break with the following law.

The bill currently discussed by Parliament does not in detail spell out the allocations for each equipment item although the administration did supply the Defense Committee of the Assembly--for the first time--with an estimate of the contemplated costs of the 27 most important military programs. Thus we know, for example, that the future French combat aircraft should cost something like Fr172 billion, total, and that the aircraft carrier "Richelieu" is currently estimated to carry a price tag of Fr13.9 billion. As for basic principles, the main source of the debate on the new law concerns the decision made by France no longer to deny itself possession of chemical weapons. Certain socialists, who will vote for the law in spite of everything, feel that the administration's decision, approved by the president of the Republic, was taken under pressure from the general staffs.

5058

CSO: 3519/101

U.S. BASES ISSUE TO BE POLITICAL ARGUMENT

Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek 5-6 Apr 87 p 1

[Article by D. Dimas: "The U.S. Bases in the 'Political Arena' in Possible Early Elections. Development the United States Would Like to Avoid"]

[Text] Washington (Special report)--According to American analysts the chances of early elections appear to have increased, judging by a series of domestic developments culminating in the recent Greek-Turkish crisis and the government's actions in connection with it. It is now becoming clear that Washington will in the end not avoid having the issue of the bases become a "political football" in the Greek political arena although it strove so diligently in various ways to avoid this eventuality.

The U.S. government, precisely foreseeing the Papandreou government's intentions and aware of course of the increasing probability that PASOK will lose power, wished for understandable reasons to settle the issue of the bases "in time and methodically," before the next Greek elections, so that it could not be exploited politically.

Yesterday, in fact, in connection with the publicity given to the exchange of letters between Papandreou and Shultz, the State Department noted that it would be "useful and profitable" for the talks on renewing the bases to begin soon.

When asked specifically about the exchange of letters, the State Department spokesman replied as follows:

"The Secretary of State did indeed write to the prime minister in December to suggest the start of talks on the future status of our military facilities in Greece.

"The prime minister replied that exploratory talks could begin between the foreign minister and the U.S. ambassador in Greece.

"So far no date has been set for the start of these talks. We believe that it would be useful and profitable to start these talks soon."

According to political observers, the obstructionist tendency apparent on the

Greek side in regard to the issue of the bases will also have an effect on the related question of the Greek prime minister's visit to the United States. In the present circumstances the visit will probably take place in the first half of 1988, assuming of course that domestic political developments do not prevent it.

According to the State Department there has been no change in regard to the invitation to Papandreou to visit the United States. This means that the visit still depends on the improvement in Greek-American relations, with the issue of the bases of course being one element --and a particularly important one-- in this improvement.

Papandreou is reported not to be on the list of those scheduled to visit the White House in the second half of 1987. According to political observers, this, in conjunction with the latest developments, may provide some explanation for the Greek prime minister's reaction, despite his usual sensitivity.

From this point of view, the "tense scenario" Papandreou has followed over the past 2 months, along with the ensuing acrobatics, should perhaps be interpreted as part of his efforts to reverse the prevailing feeling that he and his party are on the skids.

By adopting a "hard" line and creating the impression that there is a "foreign crisis," Papandreou believes that the people will believe, if only temporarily, that something has changed and that he is in charge, expecting of course, political observers say, that his devastating defeat in the municipal elections will be forgotten.

12593

CSO: 3521/103

DETAILS ON MANUFACTURE OF NEW ARMORED PERSONNEL CARRIER

Athens I VRADYNI in Greek 16 Apr 87 p 3

[Text] The Greek Industry of Vehicles [ELVO] (former Stager-Ellas) will manufacture the Leonidas-2 armored vehicle for battle and personnel transport. The vehicle was the final selection for meeting the Army's operational needs.

Deputy Minister of National Defense Th. Stathis made the relevant announcement and added that the complete agreement with the Austrian company which makes the vehicle will be signed after about 1 month and that ELVO will start its massive production immediately. The first vehicle will be delivered after 9 months.

In its first phase the program provides for the production of 292 vehicles at a cost of 22 billion drachmas.

Stathis said that Leonidas-2 was selected over the British vehicle Warrior because it is cheaper by 51 percent and despite the fact that operationally the Warrior ranked 4 percent better. However, the fact that the Austrian company offered higher and more specific offset benefits played an important role in the choice of Leonidas-2.

Stathis said also that Greek production of the vehicle starts at a high percentage (25 percent) and will gradually reach 100 percent; that the total outflow of exchange is limited to 16 percent (about 3.7 billion drachmas); and that the price of the new, improved "Leonidas-2 is by 8.5 percent lower than that of Leonidas-1, whose production had begun in 1984.

According to Stathis, for all exported parts favorable financing terms were secured with a 12-year loan, a low interest rate, and a 3-year grace period.

The Leonidas-2 vehicle can transport eight men and has a crew of two. A 20-30 mm or 90-105 mm cannon, or a Tooy-type anti-tank mortar or an 81-120 mm mortar can be installed in its turret. Besides Austria, Morocco, Nigeria, Tunisia, Argentina and Bolivia also have the Leonidas-2.

7520

CSO: 3521/116

MILITARY

GREECE

BRIEFS

POLICE PROMOTIONS, RETIREMENTS--Four police brigadier generals were promoted to major generals, four were evaluated as fit to continue service, and six were placed on the retired list. Specifically: At a meeting yesterday the Greek Police Supreme Evaluations Council [ASK] promoted to the rank of major general, Brigadier Generals Marinos Lambropoulos (director of Attiki Security), Lambros Papadimitriou (Salonica police director general), Tasos Gerogiannis (regional director of Makedonia-Thraki), Thanasi Kalatzis (Central and Western Makedonia regional director) and Giorgos Tzourpakis (public security director, Ministry of Public Order). The following brigadier generals will continue their service: Periklis Karambelas, Ilias Laskaris, Thanasis Morfakis, and Agam. Stamboulis. the following brigadier generals were pensioned: P. Goulas, K. Papaspiliopoulos, Th. Khriskiotis, V. Spiliopoulos, I. Vlasis, and G. Lepesiotis. On Wednesday, ASK will meet again to evaluate the 97 police directors. [Text] [Athens I VARDYNI in Greek 25 Apr 87 p 20] 7520

CSO: 3521/116

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