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FULL-DIMENSIONAL PROTECTION:


SAFETY BEGINS AT HOME

by

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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.



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## ABSTRACT

*Joint Vision 2010* presented four new operational concepts designed to help the joint force commander conduct decisive operations. Paramount among these concepts is full-dimensional protection.

Expanding beyond the traditional idea of force protection for troops deployed to the battlefield, the application of full-dimensional protection is much further reaching. In a time and world where the likelihood of an asymmetric attack against our armed forces increases, analyzing the applicability of full-dimensional protection to soldiers, sailors, and airmen within the boundaries of the United States is critical. The challenges facing the military today to ensure the safety and defense of the United States are outlined in both the recent National Defense Panel report and our National Security Strategy. Because of their potential for strategic impact, it is imperative that we recognize and study the existing and future threats to our forces at home, so that the military's freedom of action across the entire range of military operations, not be restricted.

The luxury of the United States geographical and political position has bred a national perception of invulnerability to homeland attack. Under this "umbrella of safety" the roles of the military and domestic nonmilitary agencies have become exclusive. We must take steps now to ensure the coordination of effort and cooperation among these two distinctly separate structures to ensure the full-dimensional protection of our armed forces within the borders of the United States.

Failure to recognize and counter asymmetric threats that exist for our armed forces, especially on the homefront, or to effectively combine the military and nonmilitary agencies responsible for our national safety will place the United States at a distinct disadvantage in the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

Full-dimensional protection, or “the multilayered offensive and defensive capability to better protect our forces and facilities at all levels from adversary attacks while maintaining freedom of action during deployment, maneuver and engagement,”<sup>1</sup> is the most critical of the four new operational concepts presented by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in his defining document, *Joint Vision 2010*. To ensure the protection of the United States’ military forces from asymmetric attacks at perhaps their most vulnerable location, the home front, it is absolutely necessary to consider full-dimensional protection well beyond the boundaries of what has traditionally been thought of as the battlefield. Achievement of this aspect of control of the battlespace will require an unprecedented coordination of effort and cooperation between the military and nonmilitary authorities to ensure force protection against the ever increasing threat of asymmetric attack from those who wish to challenge the military superiority of the United States.

The aim of full-dimensional protection, in simplest terms then, is to ensure that we provide our forces protection from the full range of current and anticipated threats, regardless of the dimension from which the threat comes, allowing for their freedom of action across the entire range of military operations.<sup>2</sup> The concept of full-dimensional protection, and the duty of ensuring it, go well beyond the traditional idea of force protection. The effects of dominant maneuver, the effectiveness of precision engagement, and the advantages provided by

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1. John M. Shalikashvili, Joint Vision 2010 America’s Military: Preparing for Tomorrow. (Washington: 1997), 22.

2. The Joint Staff, Concept for Future Joint Operations: Expanding Joint Vision 2010 (Washington: 1997), 52.

focused logistics are reduced when the freedom of action ensured by full-dimensional protection is absent.

### **Operational Environment**

As the United States military finds itself reducing the number of personnel stationed overseas, and drawing its forces back within its own borders, the likelihood of an asymmetric attack on these warriors within the United States increases. The traditional and culturally embedded belief that our shores are safe from any foreign invader neglects to adequately address the future of warfare. Adversaries who paid even passing attention to the Gulf War easily recognized the folly of challenging the strengths of the United States' military. It is logical therefore to assume that the opponent of the future, whether state-sponsored or not, will attempt to present us with problems at all levels of war, and across the entire spectrum of warfare, by avoiding our strengths and attacking our weaknesses. It is this asymmetric warfare, or "unconventional approaches that [will] undermine our strengths while exploiting our vulnerabilities,"<sup>3</sup> that presents the greatest threat to the military forces of the United States.

The congressionally mandated National Defense Panel report *Transforming Defense --National Defense in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century*, released in December 1997 focused on the long-term issues facing United States defense and security, and identified the operational challenges for the military. Focusing on the idea that no adversary can confront us head on, the report suggests that attempts will be made to:

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3. National Defense Panel, Transforming Defense: National Security in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century (Washington : 1997), 1.

- ◆ Employ military tactics that cause high casualties among U.S. forces and thus possibly deter U.S. involvement
- ◆ Attack critical information systems
- ◆ Turn to weapons of mass destruction (perhaps including the use of ballistic or cruise missiles)
- ◆ Use terror as a weapon to attack our will.<sup>4</sup>

Additionally, the panel describes protection of the homeland as the “principal task of government.”<sup>5</sup>

The paramount goal of the National Security Strategy of 1997 is to ensure the protection of American fundamental and enduring needs, to include protecting the lives and safety of Americans and maintaining the sovereignty of the United States by countering weapons of mass destruction and fighting terrorism.<sup>6</sup> Furthermore, the strategy calls for stronger measures to protect the nation’s information infrastructure and to provide for an effective missile defense.<sup>7</sup> The extension of these threats from the general population to the military in particular is not at all difficult. If an attack upon our shores, whichever of the above forms it may take, can be accurately targeted, what could possibly be more effective than a strike directed at the heart

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4. Ibid., 11-12.

5. National Defense Panel, 25.

6. White House, A National Security Strategy for a New Century (Washington: 1997), 5.

7. Ibid., 14.

of the mechanism through which retribution might be effected? Full-dimensional protection, as applied to forces within the United States, is a portion of the grandly-termed "homeland defense," and measures taken to ensure one, reinforce the other.

### **Nature of the Threat**

As the United States military looks to the future and attempts to ensure their own protection from the wide spectrum of potential threats, it would be impossible to expect the country to be fully prepared to handle all of them expertly. Instead, we must focus our efforts on the most likely threats or the ones that would have the most extensive negative impact on the military's ability to carry out its assigned tasking. Several of these threats have strategic and operational implications that far outweigh the impact that any conventional tactical defeat could ever have.

In particular, the following forms of attack against our military forces are of the utmost concern:

- ◆ use of weapons of mass destruction to attack forces stationed within the borders of CONUS
- ◆ information operations to target CONUS-based command and control networks, intelligence support, or logistic resources
- ◆ a campaign of terror, striking at homeland bases and support facilities designed to influence the will of the nation to fight.

Each of the above areas must be effectively countered to ensure full-dimensional protection. The military will obviously play the leading role in this effort, but as will be discussed later, there will exist a need for domestic interagency cooperation at a level that currently does not exist.

### Weapons of Mass Destruction

The threat presented by the proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, as well as the means to deliver these same weapons, is the most significant direct menace facing the military today. The threat is unique in its importance because a single incident of use by an adversary could result in extreme damage, both physically and psychologically. This threat is severely complicated by the number of potential adversaries who have achieved access to, and may be inclined to use, this asymmetric method to strike at the military strength of the United States.

General Henry H. Shelton, writing while still Commander, US Special Operations Command, recognized that the technology trends and future nature of warfare will not allow the United States to discount a future attack on our territory. He clearly expresses his concern over what he feels to be foremost in his mind as a threat to the United States:

“[T]he potential for chemical and biological terrorism against the United States is perhaps the threat of most concern at the moment and the one receiving substantial attention. . . . Some in government believe the United States is not equipped to deal with chemical or biological terrorism.”<sup>8</sup>

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8. Henry H. Shelton, “Special Operations Forces: Looking Ahead.” Special Warfare, Spring 1997, 10.

More specifically, a new study entitled "Assessment of the Impact of Chemical/Biological Weapons on Joint Operations in 2010" has recently been released. The study, prepared under contract for the Department of Defense, calls attention to the crippling effect on United States power projection capabilities that would arise if airfields and ports from which American forces would deploy were subjected to chemical or biological attack.

Because of the threat that weapons of mass destruction present to our forces at home, our operational concepts must stress preventive measures. These defensive measures may be either active or passive in nature, and may include but are not limited to:

- ◆ expanded intelligence operations enhanced through the maintenance of information superiority
- ◆ an improved homeland defense, possibly to include missile defense systems
- ◆ coordination between the multiple organizations responsible for border and domestic security
- ◆ developed means to manage or reduce the consequences of an attack upon our forces within our borders.

There is no simple solution or single response to the threat posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems. Thus we should not allow ourselves to be deluded into believing that no adversary will ever successfully penetrate defensive measures that may be in place. What is essential is that with the threat now being recognized as a part of the world in which we live, the United States must develop the means of ensuring, to the maximum extent possible, the safety of our forces. On the strategic level, we must do our

level best to assure that the threat of attack using weapons of mass destruction, applied against our forces within the United States, never be allowed to impair our strategic concept of power projection.

### Information Operations

Information operations are actions taken to affect adversary information and information systems while defending one's own information and information systems.<sup>9</sup> It is the second part of this definition and its relation to full-dimensional protection that must be considered.

The achievement of *Joint Vision 2010*'s Full Spectrum Dominance relies upon the capability of the United States to attain and maintain information superiority. It is this information superiority that full-dimensional protection depends upon to provide the awareness and assessment crucial to allow our freedom of action while denying the enemy his.

The potential for an adversary to attack information systems vital to the United States armed forces, particularly in the areas of command and control, intelligence dissemination and logistic support, is on the rise. Upwards of 90 percent of all military information still moves over commercial "information highways," many of which have few or none of the protective measures in place to make these invulnerable to "cyber-assault." The susceptibility of these information systems to attack from a technologically adept opponent may make them the most hotly-contested battlefield of the next war.

At the core of full-dimensional protection lies the ability to continuously and effectively employ our forces while degrading opportunities for the enemy. An adversary who is even

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9. National Defense Panel, 91.

partially successful in entering into the complex systems that are critical to the United States military's maintenance of tactical and operational informational superiority, can create effects that will have far-reaching strategic impact. The Department of Defense Task Force on Information Warfare warned in January of 1997 of an "electronic Pearl Harbor" and of a "... recipe for a national security disaster" in the event that our friendly information networks were compromised.<sup>10</sup>

While our armed forces may in fact be deployed outside our shores in combat, they are extremely dependent upon timely information to complete their mission. As always, an operational commander who has superior situational awareness, typically maintains an advantage on the battlefield. There is an increasing reliance by our commanders on real-time or near real-time information about the adversary, in order to achieve maximum effect with minimum unnecessary risk. Typically, this information at the operational level, is derived not just from reports from the battlefield, but fused with intelligence from a variety of national resources. Along with modern logistic and command and control networks, both of which are essential to our freedom of action, enemy penetration of any one of these networks (C<sup>2</sup>, intelligence, or logistics) could be fatal in war.<sup>11</sup>

The soldier of the future will be technologically well-trained, and in fact, may find himself almost totally dependent upon the "picture" provided to him via satellite from

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10. J.R. Wilson, "Waging the Infowar." Jane's IDR Extra, April 1997, 3.

11. Arsenio T. Gumahad, "The Profession of Arms in the Information Age." Joint Force Quarterly, Spring 1997, 19.

intelligence centers based in the United States. An adversary who effectively uses information operations to cause an interruption in this flow of information, can strike networks within the United States and place our forces in positions for which they have not been adequately prepared or trained. A loss of information superiority, upon which the warriors of today and the future are becoming more dependent, can spell doom for those on the "pointed end of the spear."

The public has grown accustomed to the "clean" war, with minimal United States military casualties. The vision of the future relies heavily on the maintenance of information superiority to keep casualties low in any military operation throughout the entire conflict spectrum. A loss of this superiority, and any resultant loss of American lives, especially against an enemy perceived to be inferior, will cause many to question why the United States is involved in a situation which many may believe to be less than vital to our security interests.

Once again, the counter to the threat of information operations within the United States which are conducted as a means of reducing the level of full-dimensional protection for our forces, is neither singular in nature nor simple. Measures taken to ensure the security of our information systems within the United States, and thus assure the safety of our combatants on the battlefield, must include:

- ◆ increased counterintelligence efforts to deny the adversary access to our information networks
- ◆ coordination between military and federal agencies to identify and actively pursue those who attempt to discover or exploit any weaknesses in our current

information systems

- ◆ cooperation among all levels of government to apply lessons learned from successful network penetrations to decrease the likelihood of similar methods use to infiltrate the military's vital networks
- ◆ development of backup (possibly war reserve) information systems to ensure uninterrupted intelligence, logistic, and communication capabilities for operational commanders.

Information is a potent weapon in war, and the United States' supremacy in the collection, processing, integration, analysis, evaluation, interpretation, and dissemination of this information is crucial to the protection of our forces and the assurance of their freedom of action. It is essential that we adequately address, in order to counter, the susceptibility of our information networks to asymmetric attack by a militarily inferior enemy attempting to gain an operational or strategic advantage.

### Terrorism

The terrorist threat to the United States and our military forces is a low-risk, high-payoff strategy (for the enemy) that is complex and difficult to counter. Sometimes referred to as the "weapon of the weak," terrorism "provides [an] opponent a force projection capability that far exceeds their conventional military means."<sup>12</sup> Terrorism is a broad topic, and may occur in any

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12. "Terrorism . . . an Undeclared War." Defense '96, Issue 6, 18.

one of many possible methods. In fact, the previously discussed threats of weapons of mass destruction and information operations, are often considered terrorist operations. For purposes of discussion though, this portion of this paper will focus on the idea of a conventional attack, directed at military bases and support facilities as a way of affecting the will of the nation to fight. Recent military operations have shown that the United States' strategic center of gravity is clearly the will of the people. Among the many critical strengths of the United States is our military might. An adversary who is capable of striking at our forces within the United States will certainly affect a decisive impact upon our nation's ability to accomplish its military objectives.

The most difficult aspect of combating terrorism is the fact that the front is potentially everywhere.<sup>13</sup> Terrorism is attractive to potential adversaries because one effective use of it against CONUS-based forces severely restricts our freedom of action. The challenge of ensuring the security of our forces and their support structure, scattered across the United States is tremendous in scope. The truth of the matter is that without intelligence support to indicate the increased likelihood of a specific attack, our forces at home are all too vulnerable. It would be unwise to lull ourselves into believing either that the security measures in place are sufficient to prevent a successful terrorist attack at a base, or that we could maintain a heightened security posture for an extended period of time. It must be remembered that time is typically on the terrorist's side.

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13. H. Allen Holmes, "Military Operations in the Post-Cold War Era." Defense Issues, Vol.12 No. 34, 2.

Because a successful terrorist attack could debilitate our national security strategy, it is imperative that steps be taken to improve our ability to combat terrorism at home and thus ensure the full-dimensional protection of our armed forces. Specifically these measures may include:

- ◆ improvement of domestic interagency cooperation to blend military security and traditional law enforcement efforts to ensure base protection
- ◆ increased roles for the National Guard and other Reserve components to protect the homeland
- ◆ expanded antiterrorism and counterterrorism efforts, to include better sharing of information between civilian and military authorities, to prevent an attack.

The use of our traditional military might to counter terrorism, given the political situation of the world today, would almost certainly be retaliatory in nature. This assumes that the responsible parties could be identified and responded against. Allowing this “stance” to remain unchanged has dramatic implications for our military’s freedom of action. It is incumbent upon the leaders of the nation, both military and political to recognize the need for enhanced, cooperative security efforts to effectively combat the terrorist threat.

#### **Coordination/Cooperation**

The complexities of full-dimensional protection within the borders of the United States arise from the traditional separation of civilian and military roles in homeland defense.

The military has typically focused on its ability to project power outside of our borders

to influence events in the world. We were afforded this luxury because of the relative invulnerability of the continental United States to conventional attacks. In the world of today, with the United States as the lone remaining superpower, the increased threat of asymmetric attack against our military forces within our borders has risen. The role of defending our own soil, particularly in a "non-conventional" method, is something the military is poorly prepared to do.

Conversely, the "traditional" law enforcement agencies within the United States have typically focused on the prevention of crime directed from inside our own borders. They, like the military, are quite capable at what they do, and have had many successes (with some failures) at preventing asymmetric attacks at home.

As the shape of the challenge facing the armed forces of the United States today changes, becoming more likely to be directed at home, but from afar, it is crucial that the strengths of each of these two branches be combined to achieve maximum impact with minimum risk.

Consider a potential attack against a base in the United States. The adversary may be a small group of individuals who have been in the country for years, yet who are a part of an international radical organization, who in turn are sponsored by one of the several nations who support terrorism. To successfully prevent this attack would require unprecedented cooperation between several organizations: Department of Defense, Department of State, Department of Justice, Central Intelligence Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency, Federal Bureau of Investigation, local law enforcement, and perhaps myriad others.

Defining where each agency fits in the scheme of defending this hypothetical base, delineating the roles and missions of each, and developing an effective method of cooperation

and sharing of information is a monumental task at best. The National Defense Panel terms the past hand-off of responsibilities and sharing of intelligence on suspected terrorists to have been at times "dysfunctional."<sup>14</sup>

As the threat of asymmetric attack directed within the borders of the United States increases, and the potential for damage from a successful attack rises exponentially, the need for day-to-day cooperation between the military, other government agencies, and local law enforcement officials becomes critical. The National Security Strategy clearly indicates a recognition of this need:

"[N]ational security preparedness -- particularly in this era when domestic and foreign policies are increasingly blurred -- crosses agency lines; thus our approach places a premium on integrated interagency efforts to enforce U.S. security."<sup>15</sup>

As with the threats, the issues of improving coordination and cooperation is not a simple one to solve. Issues which deserve the attention of all in the positions of leadership responsible for protection of our armed forces include:

- ◆ improving the sharing of information between agencies which have typically been separate
- ◆ adequately addressing the use of military forces in support of domestic law enforcement, with ample

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14. National Defense Panel, 27

15. White House, 6.

consideration given to the Posse Comitatus Act of 1878

- ◆ effectively training the agencies to work together to minimize the threat of an asymmetric attack (to include exercises)
- ◆ preventing the “over-militarization” of full-dimensional protection within the United States, to ensure civil and Constitutional rights are not violated.

This list of issues deserving of our attention is by no means all-inclusive. Its purpose is to highlight major areas of weakness pertaining to the interagency cooperation and coordination necessary to achieve and maintain the full-dimensional protection of armed forces within the United States, particularly from asymmetric attack.

## **Conclusion**

The “new” operational concept of full-dimensional protection is critical to the achievement of our military objectives as it allows the operational commander to conduct unrestrained decisive operations. Our vulnerability to asymmetric attack and the reliance of our armed forces on bases and support systems on United States soil, makes the chance of an attack on a militarily key target within CONUS much more likely in the future.

It is easy to see then that the concept of full-dimensional protection does apply to defense within the borders of the United States. Without being able to assure this most critical of *Joint Vision 2010*'s operational concepts, achievement of Full Spectrum Dominance will be extremely difficult, if not impossible.

The information provided in this paper was designed to stimulate interest in a relatively

new operational concept, expanded to a previously unconsidered arena, the home front. The information provided herein has been presented in hopes that it will serve as a source of further thought and debate, and encourage a heightened awareness of one of the most critical issues facing our armed forces in the uncertain future.

The key to success in the coming decades is to prepare now for the threats of the future. A failure to pursue this topic further, or to adequately address the concerns raised herein will ultimately result in the operational commander of the future being placed at a distinct disadvantage against an adversary over which we are superior.

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