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Joint Private Ventures With Diaspora Eyed
46050026c Montreal HORIZON in Armenian
17 Apr 89 pp 7, 13

[Interview with Albert Hovhannisyan, president of the "Andranik" Council of Soviet Armenian Cooperatives, by correspondent G. M.; through telephone link from Montreal to Yerevan on 30 March 1989 Montreal time]

[Text] Albert Hovhannisyan is the president of the "Andranik" Council of Soviet Armenian Cooperatives. In the Soviet Union a cooperative is the only legal means of owning a private business. Soviet cooperatives are allowed to sign direct agreements with foreign companies. We had a telephone conversation with A. Hovhannisyan to learn more about this subject.

[Question] When was the "Andranik" Council of Armenian Cooperatives formed?

[Answer] "Andranik" was formed on 2 June 1988.

[Question] Are all the cooperative owners in Soviet Armenia part of this Council?

[Answer] Not all of them. But soon all of them will become members.

[Question] Is the Council officially recognized?

[Answer] It is recognized in accordance with the law on cooperatives.

[Question] We heard that the cooperative owners in Karabakh recently joined "Andranik."

[Answer] They formed an oblast-wide association; it is that association that joined the "Andranik" Council.

[Question] What is the general status of the cooperative owners in Karabakh?

[Answer] First, it must be stated that the cooperatives in Karabakh are underdeveloped compared to those in Armenia. Second, most of the cooperatives in Karabakh depend on various enterprises in Armenia; those enterprises are carrying out work there so that the cooperative owners in Karabakh can become operational. Most importantly, a substantial portion of Karabakh's cooperatives are obliged to fulfill government orders.

[Question] What agreements have been signed with overseas so far by or through "Andranik"?

[Answer] We already have a firm contract with Hungarian cooperatives for collaboration. We are already implementing concrete plans on furniture production. There are other technologies in Soviet Armenia which we are willing to sell to them. At the same time, their cooperative owners must visit us and ours must visit them. Beside Hungary, we have contracts to collaborate and to

form joint ventures with firms in the FRG, the United States, Ireland and South Korea. We have already determined the preliminary terms. Now we are making plans so that collaboration can begin in April. In addition, Armenian-Americans in Los Angeles have formed an association for assistance to Armenia headed by [Armenian-American International College President] Garbis Der Yeghiayan. We are going to engage in similar collaboration with them.

[Question] Generally in what areas?

[Answer] With such charitable organizations—such as the one Der Yeghiayan is heading and the "Cooperation Armenie" which was formed in France by Patrick Par-seghian and other young French-Armenians—we intend to build small cities for people who have emigrated from Baku and to employ these people in workplaces in those cities. These organizations must help us to build cooperative-enterprises there in lieu of charity.

[Question] In what general directions do you think relations between the Diaspora and cooperatives in Armenia and Karabakh should develop?

[Answer] The cooperatives in Armenia and Karabakh must first concentrate on the packing of various agricultural products and native wild fruits. They must also work on the packaging of various spices. We would also like to produce mulberry and cornelian cherry wine and various types of preserves—particularly the thorn apple jam which is of Armenian origin and preserves of other native wild fruits—in Karabakh and Armenia. In addition, given that there is a fairly large number of unemployed workers in Armenia at present we would like to employ them in the manufacture of shoes, clothing and knit products. The tourism industry in both Armenia and Karabakh also has good potential and must be developed substantially. Tourism in the mountains must be developed extensively because it can secure very large revenues for our Republic.

[Question] Can that be done through cooperatives?

[Answer] The law on cooperatives allows tourism to be organized through cooperatives.

[Question] How, for example?

[Answer] We can build hotels with all the required amenities. We can organize convenient hotel-apartments where people can come and rest with their families in mountain surroundings. In the same areas, skiing facilities can be built for the winter season. We have paid very little attention to the tourism business and we are very underdeveloped, but we have very good potential.

[Question] Is it possible to engage in the tourism business without working with state-owned airlines and corporations, or should they also be included in the arrangements?

[Answer] The cooperatives can arrange all that. We must order the airline tickets from government corporations. They accept our orders.

[Question] How are overseas contracts signed? What is the proper way to do it?

[Answer] The proper way is as follows: If, say, our diaspora communities help us today... For example, different cooperatives have built here, I would say nearly ten, hotels on a cooperative basis. In these hotels we do not have proper locally-made furnishings. If our building is very beautiful and well-built and if the interior furnishings were supplied by a foreign corporation, an agreement can be signed with them whereby that corporation can operate half of the hotel for a period of, say, 5 years. That corporation can sell touristic packages in the United States, Canada or France on its own and send tourists here to stay in its half of the hotel. The only problem that would remain would be the question of meals. The fare for lodging would be kept by the overseas corporation because the sale was made overseas.

[Question] In other words, if someone from overseas agrees to supply the furnishings for the hotel, he can keep part of money collected overseas in accordance with an agreement?

[Answer] He can do it, because he buys everything with his own money. An agreement can be signed whereby we agree to repay him by letting him sell tour packages abroad and keep the money, while we service the tourists in the hotel here. We may agree, for example, that he will recover his expenses and turn a profit in 4 or 5 years. That would solve the problem.

[Question] What arrangements could be made in other areas?

[Answer] The same terms can be implemented in other areas. There are numerous areas of business in which we can construct the buildings here, supply the workers, the energy and the communications, and the foreigners can bring in the machines and the tools.

[Question] How would the profits be used?

[Answer] It could be as follows: If the products manufactured are such that part of the production can be exported to the partner's home country or to some other country, the partner can receive its share from those sales. That would be the easiest way. There is another way whereby the production may stay in our country, but some other product may be bought from us which can be easier to sell in the partner's home market.

[Question] Given that with the new law the republics will themselves determine the taxes and duties to be collected from cooperatives, what course do you think this process will take in Armenia? Will it favor the cooperatives or will it discourage them?

[Answer] We, this republic's cooperative council, will not, so to speak, sit down and do nothing. We are now busy studying the experience of various foreign countries. We must put forward our proposals to make it easier for the government when it begins examining these issues to listen to our opinions on what directions are more desirable. I think that our ideas will not be viewed negatively.

[Question] Beside you, who else is a member of the Council?

[Answer] Our Council has a permanent administration made up of the presidents of various cooperatives. They do not receive any pay from the Council. They work in their cooperatives, but defend their interests in the Council.

[Question] If a contract is signed are you allowed to travel abroad?

[Answer] Yes, we are allowed to do that. I visited Hungary twice recently and signed contracts. In this regard I would like to state the following: I met here various Armenian philanthropes and businessmen. Armenians take a timid and cautious approach to the idea of starting joint ventures. In my opinion, this cautiousness is unnecessary today. Now we have good opportunities to help the Republic pull out of its present situation.

[Question] Can contracts be signed with cooperatives in Karabakh through your organization?

[Answer] The Karabakh cooperatives are part of our structure, and in principle we can resolve all issues concerning them without consulting with anyone.

Biographies of Arrested Activists

46050025 Beirut AZTAG in Armenian 7 Mar 89 p 4

[Text] Below is some biographical information about the members of the Karabakh Committee and other leaders of the Yerevan rallies who were arrested by the communist authorities of Soviet Armenia between 10 December and 7 January and who were later sent to Moscow where they now await their trial. It will be recalled that immediately after the 7 December disaster in Armenia, the Soviet Armenian authorities, who until then regarded the Karabakh Committee as a legitimate leadership born out of a popular movement, reversed their position and changed their policies. Exploiting the situation created by the earthquake, they launched a vicious campaign against the Committee, arrested all of its members and also made other mass arrests.

On 23 February, the Soviet Armenian prosecutor's office issued an indictment against the members of the Karabakh Committee and Khachik Stampolsyan, charging

them with organizing demonstrations without permission, "appearing in public with provocative calls, inciting the participants in the demonstrations into collective activities and thus upsetting public order and the operation of state organizations and agencies."

Ashot Manucharyan

Born in Yerevan in 1954, Manucharyan graduated from the physics department of Yerevan State University in 1976. Between 1976 and 1979 he worked in the Yerevan State University as the secretary of the Leninist Communist Youth Association Committee. Later he worked as an engineer in the scientific research institute. After 1981 he served as the deputy principal of School 183 of Yerevan. In 1988 he was expelled from the ranks of the Communist Party for not complying with its decisions and for engaging in irregular activities. He was elected as a deputy to the Armenian Supreme Soviet in the special elections held in 1988. However, Soviet authorities declared his candidacy illegal and annulled his election. As a result, his parliamentary immunity was revoked.

He was arrested on 7 January 1989.

Levon Ter Petrosyan

Born in Aleppo, Syria, in 1945, Ter Petrosyan immigrated to Soviet Armenia in 1946. He graduated from the Arabic studies section of the philology department of Yerevan State University in 1968. He graduated from the Oriental Studies Institute of Leningrad in 1971 with a postgraduate degree. He worked as a junior researcher in Ancient Armenian Literature Department of the Institute of Literature of the Soviet Armenian Academy of Sciences until 1978.

In 1972 he became a doctoral candidate in philology in Leningrad. In 1987, he earned the degree of doctor of sciences.

He has published four monographs and nearly 60 research articles on literature studies and philology. He served as the executive secretary of the journal, *BANBER MATENADARANI* [Journal of the National Library], and worked as a member of the editorial board of the collection, "Ancient Armenian Translation Monuments."

He was arrested on 10 December 1988.

Ambartzum Galstyan

Born in the Kaputan village of the Abovyan region in 1956, Galstyan graduated from Yerevan State University in 1973. After his graduation he worked in the Ethnology Museum of Soviet Armenia (in Sardarapat) first as a researcher, then as a senior researcher and finally as head of department. In 1980 he was admitted to the Miklukhoy Makla Ethnological Institute of the Soviet Academy of Sciences in Moscow and was granted

a postgraduate degree in 1983. Later he worked as a deputy director in the same museum. Until his arrest he worked as a scientific adviser in a Yerevan cooperative. He is a doctoral candidate in history.

He was arrested on 7 January 1989.

Babgen Araktsyan

Born in Yerevan in 1944, Araktsyan was admitted to the mathematics department of Yerevan State University in 1961. He graduated from the mathematics department of the M. Lomonosov University in Moscow. In 1966, he was admitted as a postgraduate assistant in the same university in Moscow. After his graduation from Moscow he went to Yerevan and worked as a researcher in the computational center operated jointly by the Soviet Armenian Academy of Sciences and Yerevan State University and later in the Academy's Institute of Mathematics. He served as the head of the applied mathematics department of Yerevan State University. In 1970 he became a doctoral candidate in physicomathematical sciences.

He was arrested on 10 December 1988.

Vanik Siradekhyan

Born in the Koti (presently Shavarshavan) village of the Noyemberyan region in 1946, Siradekhyan graduated from the journalism section of the philology department of Yerevan State University in 1974.

He worked in the editorial bodies of various newspapers and magazines in Soviet Armenia. In 1978 he began publishing his short stories which have been translated into Russian, Ukrainian, Czech, Bulgarian and Spanish.

In 1982 he was awarded the best short story award of the monthly, *DRUZHBA NARODOV*.

He has published two sets of collected stories, "Sunday" in 1983 and "Heavy Light" in 1988. He has been a member of the Soviet Armenian Writers' Union since 1985.

He was arrested on 24 December 1988.

Vazgen Manukyan

Born in Leninakan in 1946, Manukyan was admitted to the mechanical-mathematical department of Yerevan State University in 1963. He dropped out of that university and entered the M. Lomonosov University in Moscow. He was expelled from this university for actively participating in the Armenian national movement. In 1968 he reentered Yerevan State University to continue his education. After graduation, he worked as a junior researcher in the computational center operated jointly by the Soviet Armenian Academy of Sciences and Yerevan State University. He was admitted for postgraduate

studies in Novosibirsk. After graduation he worked in the numerical solutions department of the university. Until his arrest he worked as an assistant lecturer in the same department. He is a doctoral candidate in physicomathematical sciences.

He was arrested on 10 December 1988.

Davit Vardanyan

Born in Yerevan in 1950, Vardanyan graduated from the physics department of Yerevan State University in 1971. After graduation he worked first as a junior researcher and later as a senior researcher in the laboratories of the physics institute of the University. He is a doctoral candidate in physicomathematical sciences.

He was arrested on 7 January 1989.

Samuel Gevorgyan

Born in the Zarenja village of the Talin region in 1949, Gevorgyan was admitted to the philology department of Yerevan State University in 1966 and graduated from the University in 1971.

He taught in the school of the Bazmaberd village of Talin as a teacher of Armenian language and literature.

In 1972 he became the head of the literary department of the regional paper, ASHTARAK. Between 1973 and 1988 he worked in the Soviet Armenian State Television and Radio Committee as editor and head of the economic news division. He is a member of the Soviet Armenian Journalists' Union.

He was one of the active members of the protest movement against environmental pollution in Soviet Armenia.

He was arrested on 13 December 1988.

Aleksan Akobyan

Born in Yerevan in 1955, Akobyan graduated from the history department of Yerevan State University in 1978. After graduation he worked in the Soviet Armenian Ethnological Museum (in Sardarapat). In 1981 he earned a postgraduate degree in Leningrad. The same year he returned to the Ethnological Museum and worked as a researcher in the Caucasology and Byzantology division. He specialized in the study of the philology of Albanians in the Caucasus. He has participated in several international scientific conferences. He has authored nearly 30 scientific studies and papers. Until his arrest he worked as a researcher in the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Soviet Armenian Academy of Sciences. He is a doctoral candidate in history.

He was arrested on 10 December 1988.

Rafayel Khazaryan

Born in the Armavir village of Krasnodar in 1924, Khazaryan is a radiophysicist by training. He graduated from the Electrotechnical Institute of Moscow in 1951. He received his doctorate in 1975.

He founded the department of radiophysics and electronics in Yerevan State University in 1958 and was the head of the department until 1969. Since 1970 he has been the head of the quantum electronics division of the Soviet Armenian Academy of Sciences.

Khazaryan is an experienced scientist and researcher. He played a key role in the construction of an operational multichannel laser telephone network—one of the first in the world—between Yerevan and Burakan in 1964.

More recently he has been studying the propagation of light waves in the atmosphere and increasing the efficiency of laser communications. He is a veteran of the Great Patriotic War and a correspondent member of the Soviet Armenian Academy of Sciences.

He was arrested on 7 January 1989.

Samson Khazaryan

Born in the Tufashen village of the Artik region in 1953, Khazaryan graduated from the history department of Yerevan State University in 1978. Until his arrest he worked as a history teacher in School 183 of Yerevan. He has also worked as a correspondent for the daily, AVANGARD.

He was arrested on 24 December 1988.

Igor Muratyan

Born in Baku in 1957, Muratyan graduated from the G. Plekhanov Institute of People's Economics in Moscow in 1979.

Between 1979 and 1982 he worked in the Institute of Economics of the Azerbaijani Gosplan. In 1982 he moved to Armenia and established residence in Yerevan. Until his arrest he worked as a senior researcher in the Institute of Economics and Planning Research of the Armenian Gosplan.

He has received a postgraduate degree from the Institute of People's Economics in Yerevan. He is a doctoral candidate in economics and a former member of the Karabakh Committee.

He was arrested on 15 December 1988.

Arkadi Manucharov

Born in the Kharabulakh village of Nagorno Karabakh [NKAO] in 1931, Manucharov graduated from V. Koybishev Institute of Architecture and Building in 1953.

Between 1958 and 1967 he worked in Nagorno Karabakh first as the head of building administration and then as the head of construction for the entire oblast. He became a member of NKAO Communist Party Central Committee and was elected as a member of the bureau of the Stepanakert city committee of the Communist Party and a deputy in the NKAO Soviet of People's Deputies.

In 1965 he was one of the most active members of the campaign to unite NKAO with Armenia. He was one of the organizers of the movement and one of the authors of the famous letter of 13. He was persecuted by the authorities and fled to Armenia.

Between 1967 and 1977 he worked as the head of the trust of the Soviet Armenian Construction Ministry. From 1977 until his arrest he worked in NKAO as the director of a building materials factory. He has been awarded the "Peoples' Friendship" medal and the honorary title of "Veteran Inventor."

He is the leader of the Krunk Committee of the Karabakh movement.

He was arrested in December 1988.

Khachik Stampoltsyan

Born in the city of Vardenis in 1940, Stampoltsyan graduated from the physics department of Yerevan State University in 1964. After graduation he worked in the Institute of Cardiology. From 1970 until his arrest he worked as a researcher in the Institute of Experimental Biology of the Soviet Armenian Academy of Sciences. He is the founder and president of the Armenian Benevolent Association, "Charity." He was elected as a deputy in the Soviet Armenian Supreme Soviet in the special elections held in 1988. However, Soviet Armenian authorities annulled his election on grounds that his candidacy was illegal and revoked his parliamentary immunity.

He was arrested in December 1988.

REGIONAL AFFAIRS

Moshe Ma'oz Interviewed on Syrian, PLO Intentions

44040376 Jerusalem AL-BAYADIR AL-SIYASI in Arabic 15 Apr 89 pp 42-43

[Interview With Moshe Ma'oz, expert on Palestinian-Syrian affairs at Jerusalem's Hebrew University; "Israel's Interest Is in Negotiating With PLO; My Meetings With PLO Leaders Have Persuaded Me of Credibility of Palestinian Tendency for Peace"; date and place not given]

[Excerpt] [Passage omitted] [AL-BAYADIR AL-SIYASI] Developments have occurred in the PLO recently. What is the extent of their effect on the Palestinian-Syrian relations?

[Ma'oz] I have dealt with the issue of the Syrian-PLO relations in my latest book, "Al-Asad." I believe that Syria (was involved) in the creation of the PLO. The Palestinian organizations were given aid by Syria when Hafiz al-Asad was minister of defense so that they may be an instrument in Syria's hand against Israel and the Arab countries. The Syrians did not wish to expose themselves to danger and so exploited the PLO in their conflict with Israel. Syria imposed its control over the PLO whenever any disagreement developed between the two sides. There are examples of this, such as Hafiz al-Asad's imprisonment of 'Arafat in 1966 and the attempt to kill 'Arafat. There was then the Black September case in 1970 when Hafiz al-Asad prevented reinforcements from reaching the Palestinians in Jordan in order to preserve his relations with Jordan and to avoid a confrontation with Israel and the United States. In 1976, the Syrian forces blockaded Tall al-Za'tar and perpetrated massacres against the Palestinians living there. When 'Arafat was expelled from Damascus during Israel's 1982 invasion of Lebanon, Syria helped the dissident movement led by Abu Musa.

[AL-BAYADIR AL-SIYASI] Is Syria concerned with the splits within the PLO?

[Ma'oz] Yes. Hafiz al-Asad has been interested in controlling the PLO and turning it into an obedient instrument in his hand. He has fought the PLO mercilessly whenever he has failed to achieve this end. As for the PLO policy under 'Arafat's leadership, 'Arafat refuses to have the PLO decisions tied to Syria or to any other Arab country. All the conflict that has occurred between 'Arafat and Syria has centered on the independence of the PLO's decision-making. To put it briefly, the Palestinian interests are in conflict with the Syrian interests because the PLO is trying to achieve a peaceful solution with Israel whereas Syria rejects any solution beyond the framework of the Syrian conditions and demands. It seems that Israel and the PLO have common positions against Syria because each of Israel and the PLO are trying to fight the Syrian influence. But regrettably, our

leaders do not comprehend this. So far, the Syrian leadership has failed to shake the PLO's influence. The facts attest that the majority of the Palestinian people support the PLO and its policy which seeks to achieve a peaceful solution to the Palestinian issue. Syria continues to try to strike the PLO by way of the pro-Syria Palestinian factions. I believe that Israel's interest is in negotiating with the PLO to develop a solution because if this opportunity is lost, the Palestinians will turn to radicalism, to the factions controlled by Syria or to the religious radicalism represented by Hamas. If this [negotiating] is not done, then it would mean a loss to both Israel and the PLO. It is possible to negotiate with the PLO but impossible to do so with Hamas because these people know nothing other than fighting and because they reject negotiation.

[AL-BAYADIR AL-SIYASI] Are you asking Israel to negotiate with the PLO?

[Ma'oz] I do, of course, support such negotiation because the PLO is the Palestinian people's sole legitimate representative. In the past, there were other possibilities, such as the Jordanian option and talking to Palestinians outside the PLO. But these solutions have become outdated. The only possibility at present lies in negotiation with the PLO. The U.S. recognition of the PLO as a partner with whom negotiations can be conducted encourages the occupied territories' inhabitants to reject the creation of an alternative leadership to the PLO. If we truly want to solve the Palestinian problem, then we must talk to the PLO. I believe that the PLO is interested in reaching a peaceful solution with Israel. I have observed the developments within the PLO from 1974 until the PLO recognized Israel's right to existence. I have had meetings, whether within an academic or a political framework, with numerous PLO leadership figures at the various levels, including Bassam Abu-Sharif, Sami Musallam, Labib al-Tarazi, Edward Sa'id, and Ibrahim Abu-Lughud. I have emerged from these meetings with good impressions, especially from the PLO's centrist wing, and I am convinced of the credibility of the Palestinian tendency toward peace.

I believe that they have abandoned the idea of eliminating the State of Israel, even though some Palestinian factions continue to hold to this idea. The PLO has recognized the Jewish state and has renounced terrorism, even though in Israel's opinion, terrorism continues to exist. The PLO's centrist wing cannot control the radical factions. Despite all this, I see in the PLO the only partner with whom we can negotiate.

[AL-BAYADIR AL-SIYASI] It is well known that Syria's objective is to create the Greater Syria. Does this objective continue to exist in Syria and is Syria concerned with establishing a Palestinian state?

[Ma'oz] The Syrian dream to create the Greater Syria persists, at least ideologically. But Hafiz al-Asad, who is a pragmatic person, knows that this is impossible. However, he is trying to set up a strategic organization which

he controls. It is not important to him if a state exists in Jordan, one in Lebanon and one in Palestine. What is important to him is that these states be under his control. I believe that he is interested in establishing a Palestinian state and restoring the Golan to Syria. Even though he says that the Palestinian issue is the crucial issue insofar as he is concerned, he wants primarily to regain the Golan. I believe that he is interested in a peaceful solution if such a solution leads to restoring the Golan to him. But he fears that the Palestinian issue will be solved without Syria's participation, as happened in 1979 when the Sinai issue was settled by Egypt and Israel without a solution to the Palestinian issue. Al-Asad has repeatedly stated that he is interested in peace in return for restoration of the Golan and the establishment of a Palestinian state in the bank, the strip and Jerusalem. But to al-Asad, these statements do not mean the establishment of diplomatic relations [with Israel] or open borders.

[AL-BAYADIR AL-SIYASI] What are the internal forces of which al-Asad has fears for his regime and how dangerous are these forces to this regime?

[Ma'oz] Al-Asad controls the situation effectively and successfully. He rules through the 'Alawite minority which controls the system of government in a country where the population majority is a Sunni Muslim majority that is not pleased with al-Asad. He is 'Alawite and religious Muslims view 'Alawism as infidelity and apostasy from Islam and the 'Alawites as more infidel than others. Al-Asad has tried to separate state from church. The Sunna Muslims belonging to the middle class have been harmed economically by the economic policy of the Ba'th Party which rules Syria and by the human rights violations. Considering that there is no party plurality, the Muslim Brotherhood took the stance of opposition and posed a serious threat to al-Asad's regime in the late 1970's, especially in Hamah. But since then, there has been no opposition and al-Asad controls the Syrian army and intelligence effectively. Moreover, he is trying to base his rule on the support of popular sectors, especially among the Sunna and particularly among the rural population and the workers, by distributing land, developing agriculture and improving the workers' conditions and through health and educational services. He has devoted great attention to educating the youth and to raising a generation that believes in the Ba'th as a system of life and that operates through this system. Al-Asad is emulating the Bolshevik Russia which worked to raise a generation that believes in communism. This is not an easy thing to accomplish. Today, the Syrian regime faces no effective opposition that may affect its survival.

[AL-BAYADIR AL-SIYASI] Define the Syrian-Soviet relationship in light of the new Soviet policy and of the Soviet-Israeli rapprochement.

[Ma'oz] The Syrian-Soviet relationship is not the relationship of leader and follower. It is the relationship of two allied states, one of them a major power and the

other a small country, which have joint interests. If conflict arises between the two countries' interests, then al-Asad's Syria pays no attention to the Russians. I will give you examples:

In the 1973 war, al-Asad joined the war despite Soviet opposition and even though the Soviet Union had asked Syria not to take part in the war.

In 1976, Soviet Prime Minister Aleksey Kosygin asked Syria not to deploy its forces in Lebanon, especially since a civil war had been going on in Lebanon (prior to the Arab Deterrence Force) and since Russia had in Lebanon allies who did not want the Syrian forces to get involved (the Progressive Socialist Party—Kamal Junblatt—and the PLO). Al-Asad did not receive Kosygin until the latter had waited for 2 days in Damascus. Look how al-Asad treats the prime minister of a superpower such as the Soviet Union. During the 2 days Kosygin spent waiting in Damascus prior to meeting with al-Asad, the latter sent his forces to Lebanon. This was a strong slap to the Soviet Union. We have other examples with the PLO in 1982 and 1983.

As for Gorbachev, the engineer of glasnost and the man for political solutions, he asks al-Asad not to embark on a military conflict with Israel, to seek a political solution and not to engage in an arms race with Israel. Russia has a role in persuading Syria to accept a political solution, especially since Syria will be isolated if it rejects a political solution when the other Arab countries accept it.

The Iraqis hate al-Asad and are waiting impatiently for his final hour. Al-Asad's relations with Egypt are tense. He is also experiencing grave economic problems. All these factors and others will compel him to accept a political solution.

[AL-BAYADIR AL-SIYASI] Despite Syria's intense economic crisis, al-Asad still insists on a strategic balance with Israel, not only militarily but also in all other aspects. How do you interpret this?

[Ma'oz] The strategic balance al-Asad wants is not a military balance but a social, economic, cultural and technological balance. He wants to build a strong Syrian society that can confront Israel. But he is still too far from this end. I believe that he has achieved a strategic balance quantitatively, but not qualitatively, in missiles, tanks, aircraft, manpower, long-range missiles, and biochemical weapons.

Threat of Further Food Production Shortage
44040335b Dubayy AL-BAYAN in Arabic 1 Mar 89 p 3

[Article by: "Population Explosion Threatens Arab World With Horrifying Escalation of Food Production Shortfalls"]

[Text] Most Arab countries suffer a shortage of foods they produce to meet their consumer needs. The gap

between production and demand has widened to include all Arab nations in the first half of the seventies, according to a study by the Jiddah chamber of commerce and industry.

The study said Arab populations, estimated at 182 million in 1985, will reach 209 million by 1990 and 275 million by the year 2000, assuming a constant annual increase of 2.78.

Given these estimates, Arab countries may face an unprecedented population explosion and officials should therefore make planning decisions based on the dictates of certain priorities and considerations.

Arab demand for food is estimated at 102.44 million tons in 1990 and 137.58 million tons by the year 2000.

Arab demand in 1990 is estimated at 21.37 million tons of wheat, 7.49 million tons of rice, 5.39 million tons of sugar, 3.21 million tons of grain, 10.68 million tons of fruit, 21.37 million tons of vegetables, 1.28 million tons of vegetable oil, 2.14 million tons of red meat, 1.71 million tons of poultry, 2.14 million tons of fish, 1.8 million tons of eggs, and 21.37 million tons of milk.

This demand for food will escalate by the year 2000 to 28.72 million tons of wheat, 10.6 million tons of rice, 7.19 million tons of sugar, 4.32 million tons of grain, 14.36 million tons of fruit, 28.72 million tons of vegetables, 1.72 million tons of vegetable oil, 2.87 million tons of red meat, 2.29 million tons of poultry, 2.87 million tons of fish, 1.44 million tons of eggs, and 28.72 million tons of milk.

Current food production in Arab countries, the study said, must be augmented and ensured if it is to meet future Arab demand for various foodstuffs. This would call for evaluating the volume of current as well as future domestic production needed to meet needs of the proposed consumption plan in the period 1990 to 2000. The net product anticipated for 1990 is estimated at 11.68 million tons of wheat, 4.91 million tons of rice, 4 million tons of sugar, 1.73 million tons of grain, 1.14 tons of fruit, 68,000 tons of red meat, 1.32 million tons of poultry, 75,000 tons of eggs, and 13.37 million tons of milk.

This will rise by the year 2,000 to 19.3 million tons of wheat, 7.48 million tons of rice, 5.8 million tons of sugar, 2.84 million tons of grain, 4.82 million tons of fruit, and 12.18 million tons of vegetables.

The solution to the food problem in the Arab world would depend on diligent efforts to augment warehoused food reserves and the institutions involved, encourage intra-Arab trade in foodstuffs, and provide the credit facilities necessary to secure needed food imports. It would also be necessary, according to the study, to widen the scope of joint food projects.

PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS

Convening of International Conference Discussed

Conditions for Conference

44040372 Jerusalem AL-BAYADIR AL-SIYASI in Arabic 8 Apr 89 p 25

[Article: "Proposal to Form Palestinian Delegation; Between Projects and Obstacles That Obstruct Their Implementation; Numerous Perils and Varied View-points"]

[Text] There have been recent reports to the effect that the PLO has agreed in principle to forming a Palestinian delegation from within [occupied territories] that would include inconspicuous characters from the bank and the strip to hold dialogue with the Israeli leadership as a first step on the path of opening an official Palestinian-Israeli dialogue. More than one political and diplomatic source has asserted that active consultations are underway in this regard at the PLO's highest levels.

But Ahmad 'Abd-al-Rahman, the PLO official spokesman, had denied at a time prior to the reports that the PLO agrees to this proposal. So what is the true situation? Is there truly an idea to form such a delegation? What future movements are expected and what are the "perils" of forming such a delegation and taking such a step?

Diplomatic sources in Cairo have reported that Jordan and Egypt proposed this idea to the PLO as a conditional first step to be followed by steps for direct dialogue between the PLO and Israel through the preparatory committees that must be formed to prepare for the international conference. These sources have said that certain PLO leaders support such an idea and say:

First, convocation of the international conference must be preceded by phased steps to prepare for the conference.

Second, as long as the delegation members, be they from within or from abroad, believe in the PLO, then this [membership] will not affect the PLO and is not in contradiction with the Palestinian constants.

Third, forming a delegation from within the territories will subject Israel to a difficult test vis-a-vis the peace procession, especially since the Palestinians will prove through this delegation that they are greatly determined to achieve peace.

But those who oppose this idea say:

First, accepting such an idea will mean the PLO's approval of the Camp David provision on self-rule. It will also mean the start of negotiations between Palestinian representatives from the bank and the strip [and Israel].

Second, approving this idea means accepting Israel's proposals for excluding the PLO from the struggle arena.

Third, no Palestinian can accept to be a mat on which others walk. Moreover, the negotiations or dialogues must be started by the leadership members themselves because this leadership is, as the people say, the legitimate leadership.

Fourth, the appointment of members to this delegation will create confusion and disagreements at home and will lead to numerous conflicts even if the leadership elects the members to such a delegation.

Fifth, forming the delegation or accepting the idea will allow Israel to "veto" certain names. Israel will try to exploit this idea and insist on the principle of holding general political elections to elect representatives. Consequently, the path will be prolonged, the objectives will be lost and nothing will be accomplished.

Sixth, Palestinian opposition abroad and at home will grow stronger and this opposition will try to engage in oneupmanship over such steps and will consider them a "concession."

Seventh, what are the issues which the delegation, if it is formed from within, will discuss and on what will it, by itself, hold dialogue with the Israeli leaders? What powers will be given this delegation and who will guarantee that the agreements, agendas or ideas the delegation concludes will be implemented or will be observed and respected by the Israeli side?

Eighth, if the delegation has to be formed, then why should it not include members from home who are living abroad as a result of forceful deportation and who hold important positions in the PLO?

Numerous circles have advised the PLO not to take such a step at present and not to agree to these proposals which have their perils and dangers. These circles have said that there is nothing to prevent the PLO from beginning consultation and sending trial balloons at the Palestinian level in this regard.

Other circles have encouraged the PLO to make a decision in this regard. There are also those who have demanded that the delegation members be moderate Palestinians, that the PLO consult with Arab leaders on this issue and that it listen to the opinion of these leaders and these Arab circles.

On the Palestinian side, a large number of officials have suggested deliberation in this step and have urged the need to study it because it is premature. They have also urged the need to have it approved and passed by the Palestinian institutions concerned. These institutions include the Executive Committee and the Central Council and even the National Council, if the need arises.

All the signs indicate that the PLO rejects this idea at present. They also indicate that such ideas and proposals are premature and that the current consultations, which have been reported by the media, are not confined to this issue solely but include important and sensitive issues connected with the cause and with the peace procession.

There remains an observation that must be noted, namely that if this idea matures and if it is approved at the Palestinian level, then this would be a confirmation, and perhaps a clear sign, that important and significant progress is being made, that the viewpoints are moving close to each other and that the peace procession has begun to move on the path of the just and final solution.

Pros, Cons of Conference

44040372 Jerusalem AL-BAYADIR AL-SIYASI in
Arabic 8 Apr 89 p 26

[Article: "Calm Reading of 'Benefits' and 'Negatives' of Participation in Conferences and Symposiums on Issue; Conditions That Must Exist When Any Conference Is Held in Order That Benefit May Be Greater"]

[Text] From time to time, political conferences on the Palestinian issue are held either at home or in a U.S. or European city. Palestinians, politicians from various nationalities and Israelis, often representing the Israeli left, take part in these conferences. The conferences have given rise to numerous questions and have evoked varied reactions. The most important questions are: What use are such conferences? Do they serve the interest of the Palestinian issue? Are they in the interest of peace, in Israel's interest or in the interest of only those who participate in them?

It is very difficult to assess the "benefits" or "disadvantages" of these conferences until such benefits or negatives are examined calmly, fairly and impartially and until a quick review is made of the positions of those who oppose and who support the conferences.

Those who oppose these conferences say that they do not at all serve the peace procession and that participation in the conferences means siding with the line hostile to the people. They base their position on the following:

These conferences are exploited so that the participants may offer through them, by way of embarrassment and by way of making one's position more attractive to the others, concessions and statements contrasting with the Palestinian constants whereas these people should express the Palestinian opinion frankly and firmly.

The issues discussed in these conferences usually raise question marks regarding the objective behind their convocation.

One must take into consideration "who calls for these conferences and who finances them," especially if a conference stands with Israel and supports its positions openly and unequivocally.

The invitations are at times addressed to certain individuals who take part in numerous and varied economic, health, information or legal conferences as if they were specialists in all these areas. The fact that only these people are invited gives rise at times to the question: Why don't others participate?

Ordinarily, the Israeli side to these conferences generally supports the Palestinian national rights and the right to self-determination. Therefore, there is no need to convince if of this point and of the Palestinian positions.

Israeli participation in a conference is considered in itself a propaganda gain for Israel because this participation gives the world and Israeli public opinion the impression that there is democracy and that Israel does not stop these leftists, even if they are Knesset members, from taking part in these conferences.

Constant participation in these conferences gives, in the eyes of the world public opinion, rise to a "leadership or leaderships." Israel may exploit such conferences to harm these leaderships and distort their patriotic positions while at the same trying to give the world public opinion the impression that an alternative leadership to the legitimate current leadership can be found for the Palestinian people.

On the other side, supporters of these conferences say explicitly that the "benefits" of participation in these conferences are big and many, including:

It is necessary to explain the Palestinian positions to the world public opinion through the agreed constants. Explaining a position bolsters an issue strongly and, at the same time, increases the number of its supporters.

These conferences generate governmental reactions. For example, the conference which was held at Columbia University last March and in which Palestinians from home and abroad, Israelis and Americans participated produced big fundamental results, including:

A. The United States was compelled to grant entry visas to prominent PLO members. This step legitimized the PLO's entry into the U.S. public opinion [arena].

B. The Palestinian position was explained to the U.S. public opinion, considering that the U.S. media gave the conference full coverage.

The participants in these conferences focus on the Palestinians' fundamental principles and refuse to give any concessions. They only discuss raised issues and ideas with the others and they constantly stress that they are

not part of the official authority empowered to give a final opinion or make a certain promise. There is no place whatsoever for concessions in these conferences.

To demonstrate the true and sincere intentions toward peace, there has to be participation in these conferences to refute the ideas of the others who are hostile to and who distort the Palestinian positions.

To change the world public opinion toward Israel, conferences and more conferences must be held to eliminate the barrier of fear and to remove the distorted Palestinian image implanted in the minds of most Israelis. A just peace must inevitably lead to peaceful coexistence between the Palestinian and Israeli peoples.

There is an evident difference in the positions supporting and opposing the holding of joint conferences. An impartial person may say that such conferences can be beneficial and successful if they meet the following conditions:

First, if the participating Palestinian side adheres to the Palestinian constants and refrains from making statements contrary to or conflicting with these constants.

Second, if the Palestinian participations in any conference coordinate their positions in advance, if they agree on the role each of them will play and on what he will say and if they do not disagree at the conference.

Third, if the objectives behind holding the conference are clear and if there is balance between the Palestinian and Israeli sides. It is unreasonable that the Palestinian side consist of figures specialized in medicine, for example, while the Israeli side consists of specialists in teaching mathematics when the conference is on teaching mathematics. This equivalence and balance will, of course, prevent one side from gaining superiority over the other and will not allow the audience or the media to get a poor impression of the Palestinian side, [which will happen] if its members are not specialized in the issues raised.

The impartial say that all must agree on the issue of holding conferences and must approve its principle. The agreement must be clear and such conferences must not [be allowed to] be an element that divides and "splits" the Palestinian ranks. If the agreement is achieved, the holding of conferences and symposiums will have big positive effects and will close the door in the face whoever will try to exploit those who oppose the holding of conferences and to misrepresent the national figures participating in any symposium.

Shaykh Ahmad Yasin Discusses Palestinian State, Israel, Hamas

44040416 Jerusalem AL-NAHAR in Arabic
30 Apr 89 p 4

[Interview with Shaykh Ahmad Yasin, leader of Hamas, by unnamed interviewer: "Shaykh Ahmad Yasin in a Comprehensive Conversation (Conclusion)"; place and date not given]

[Excerpt] [Passage omitted] [AL-NAHAR] Don't we as Palestinians have to be realistic?

[Yasin] Reality exists. We look at it as it is. We look at it just as it is and know what the reality is. But when a man cannot obtain his right, he does not relinquish it.

[AL-NAHAR] Isn't the indifference of the Arab states toward the Palestinian issue a justification for the flexibility that Yasir 'Arafat has shown?

[Yasin] By God, I don't believe that if the others err, we should err like them. We ought to realize that. If the Arabs err and become indifferent, we do not have the right to err and do what they have done.

[AL-NAHAR] But isn't the issue an Arab issue?

[Yasin] No, it is bigger. In my view, it is an Islamic issue.

[AL-NAHAR] But don't you see the Muslims flagging?

[Yasin] I have said that time is part of the remedy and that today's world will in a few years be different from what it is now.

[AL-NAHAR] Do you want to wait until Israel realizes its hopes of nuclear superiority?

[Yasin] Sorry. Israel, I say, has built up its nuclear force and has finished. Israel is living in its youth. Youth does not remain youth; its end is old age. But the child reaches youth.

[AL-NAHAR] Is it part of manliness for a man to be killed in his prime?

[Yasin] (Angrily) Whether a man is killed in his youth or in his maturity, the crime of murder is murder, whether the person killed is a child, young person, or elderly. The crime is indistinguishable. Murder is legally forbidden in all religions.

[AL-NAHAR] Then don't you want a Palestinian state from the [Jordan] River to the [Mediterranean] Sea?

[Yasin] I want a Palestinian state.

[AL-NAHAR] What are its borders?

[Yasin] Palestinian has well-known borders. These are the borders of the state of Palestine.

[AL-NAHAR] Where, then, is Israel?

[Yasin] Israel is in Palestine.

[AL-NAHAR] Can you clarify the concept of the Palestinian state in your view?

[Yasin] The Palestinian state must be established on any inch of Palestine we liberate, but without our relinquishing the rest of our rights.

[AL-NAHAR] Salah Khalaf (Abu Iyad) and Faruq al-Qaddumi (Abu al-Lutf) have stated that the establishment of a Palestinian state on the land of the West Bank and Gaza is only a stage in the final liberation. What is your opinion?

[Yasin] This is very, very excellent language.

[AL-NAHAR] Do you support the steps of the PLO?

[Yasin] I support and oppose. I support my having a state; I oppose relinquishing the rest of the land of my homeland, Palestine.

[AL-NAHAR] Dr 'Atif 'Adwan, lecturer in the Islamic University, recently stated that basic elements for the Palestinian state do not exist. Do you support this statement of his?

[Yasin] Certainly not. I do not support what 'Adwan has said. Thank God, we have many basic elements for our state.

[AL-NAHAR] Do you support the establishment of a confederation with Jordan?

[Yasin] Why not, provided that there is equality between them and us?

[AL-NAHAR] Do you support Yitzhak Shamir's initiative to hold elections in the West Bank and Gaza?

[Yasin] The fact of the matter is that we oppose holding elections under the occupation.

[AL-NAHAR] 'Arafat has taken a serious position on elections. Do you support it?

[Yasin] Yes, very strongly. He stipulated complete Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank and Gaza and placement of the occupied territories under international supervision. I hope he doesn't retreat from this position of his.

[AL-NAHAR] Do you expect him to retreat?

[Yasin] (Did not answer this question.)

[AL-NAHAR] Will the Islamic movement win in these elections, if it enters them?

[Yasin] Yes. I am confident that our people are Muslim and do not reject Islam. I am confident of that.

[AL-NAHAR] Do you know what is hidden [i.e., the future]?

[Yasin] Yes, I know what is hidden. I am completely confident that the Islamic movement will not be defeated in any elections, unless the governing authorities perpetrate fraud or falsification.

[AL-NAHAR] In an interview with Israeli television, you said that the Islamic movement is ready to negotiate with Israel. Is that correct?

[Yasin] Yes, but only if Israel acknowledges our rights fully and recognizes the right of the Palestinian people to live within their homeland free and independent. However, the movement will not negotiate in place of the PLO. As the proverb goes, "The right hand doesn't take the place of the left."

[AL-NAHAR] Do you recognize Israel?

[Yasin] If I recognized Israel, the problem would be over. I would no longer have any right to Palestine.

[AL-NAHAR] But if Israel withdraws from the West Bank and Gaza, will you recognize it?

[Yasin] There is a saying for every event!

[AL-NAHAR] But would it then be necessary to recognize Israel?

[Yasin] I leave this matter to the representatives of the Palestinian people.

[AL-NAHAR] Who are they?

[Yasin] Those whom the Palestinian people will elect.

[AL-NAHAR] But before the elections, to whom do you leave this matter?

[Yasin] To those who represent this people in dispersion and emigration—the PLO. Again I say that I am not against the PLO, but against its line that does not espouse Islam as a concept and constitution. The more the PLO approaches Islam and adheres to it, the more I adhere to the PLO.

[AL-NAHAR] What is your opinion of Yasir 'Arafat?

[Yasin] I am a person who loves and respects Yasir 'Arafat, just as I love any Palestinian anywhere. Islam is built upon love and friendship.

[AL-NAHAR] What is your concept of national rights? If you want to do away with Israel, with whom will you negotiate?

[Yasin] Who said that? I do not want to do away with Israel. We will negotiate with Israel on the basis that the Palestinian people at home and abroad will live in Palestine. The problem will then end.

[AL-NAHAR] Shaykh Ahmad, you want to live in Palestine, but under what government: an Islamic government? one or two authorities? one state or two states?

[Yasin] (Did not answer this question.)

[AL-NAHAR] The Palestinian people want a democratic state. Why are you resisting them so obstinately?

[Yasin] I, too, want a democratic, multi-party state, where authority belongs to whoever wins in elections.

[AL-NAHAR] If the Communist Party won, what would your position be?

[Yasin] Even if the Communist Party won, I would respect the wish of the Palestinian people.

[AL-NAHAR] Let us talk about foreign policy. What is your view of the new American position?

[Yasin] America doesn't have a new position and another one that is old. It has an established position of alignment with Israel. The new position America has taken is a position that benefits Israel alone.

[AL-NAHAR] Do you think the American-Palestinian dialogue is for Israel's benefit?

[Yasin] That is the way I understand it.

[AL-NAHAR] Don't you see in it an American opening toward understanding our rights?

[Yasin] I think the Palestinian-American dialogue is another means of relieving the pressure on Israel and obtaining the greatest gains for Israel.

[AL-NAHAR] But the dialogue is a victory for the PLO, not Israel. Don't you want the PLO to win?

[Yasin] History will determine whether it is this or that.

[AL-NAHAR] Many European states have shown their openness to the Palestinian peace initiative. Most recently, the Elysee Palace has invited Chairman Yasir 'Arafat to visit France. Isn't this to be deemed a victory for the PLO?

[Yasin] God spoke the truth when He said, [Koran 2:120]: "Never will the Jews be satisfied with thee, neither the Christians, not till thou followest their religion. Say: 'God's guidance is the true guidance.'"

[AL-NAHAR] If talking to the Europeans is a mistake, why are Rafsanjani or Velayati going to meet the one they consider "the Red Devil" in Moscow?

[Yasin] Who said that? I never said that talking to them is a mistake. I say that they want us to draw closer to them; and the closer we draw to them, the more they understand us and draw closer to us.

[AL-NAHAR] What is the Islamic movement's position on the Lebanese war and on Muslims plunging into the thick of this insane war that must be deemed a blatant violation of human rights?

[Yasin] We cannot cast blame on one side rather than the other. Everyone is involved jointly in this war. But who is fueling this war and working for its continuance? The criminals abroad are fueling it, so that they can guarantee their survival and the survival of their power.

[AL-NAHAR] God says, [Koran 58:22, modified]: "Surely God's party—they are the triumphant." Does this verse apply to the Lebanese Shi'ite Hizballah [the Party of God]?

[Yasin] I do not think the Hizballah Party in Lebanon, which is a Shiite party, adheres to the Book of God and the Sunnah of His Prophet. The Muslims are [people of the] Sunnah, and not Shi'ah. I think the true party of God is the one that adheres to the Book of God and the Sunnah of His Messenger. There is a great difference between Sunnah and Shi'ah. The Hizballah in Lebanon does not represent us or the Muslims in Lebanon. It represents only itself.

[AL-NAHAR] Then why did Hamas cheer Hizballah's last operation in Lebanon 6 months ago?

[Yasin] The enemy of my enemy is my friend; the friend of my enemy is my enemy.

[AL-NAHAR] Why didn't Hamas cheer the armed operations of the Palestinian left?

[Yasin] When was Hamas born? It was a child of the intifadah. In any case, we are on the side of every hand that works for the benefit of the homeland.

[AL-NAHAR] If the elections show that the Palestinian people want a democratic, multi-party state, what will your position be?

[Yasin] (Angrily) By God, we are a people with dignity and rights. If the Palestinian people express their rejection of an Islamic state, I respect and hold sacred their desire and will.

[AL-NAHAR] "Land belongs to whoever liberates it." What is your opinion?

[Yasin] An excellent saying.

[AL-NAHAR] But they exist. Why are you trying to deny it?

[Yasin] The communists are a dead plant in a dead land that produces nothing. I say that they represent only a marginal part and small group of the people.

[AL-NAHAR] As Shaykh 'Abd-al-'Aziz 'Awdah has acknowledged, the Islamic movement has had a history of active militancy only since after the 1967 war. What is your view?

[Yasin] (Angrily) Whom did you say? Shaykh 'Awdah?

[AL-NAHAR] By the way, one of the exiled brothers who attended the National Council meetings in Algiers, someone reckoned within the Islamic tendency, told the Abu Dhabi newspaper AL-ITTIHAD that he preferred the DFLP [Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine] (Nayif Hawatimah), despite its Marxism, to the Hamas movement, since the latter had no prominent figures who have engaged in the struggle. What is your view?

[Yasin] I would say to that person, "Thank you, you have defined yourself by yourself."

[AL-NAHAR] What do you think about the results of local elections domestically?

[Yasin] The Islamic movement achieved a smashing victory and occupied local councils.

[AL-NAHAR] It is being said that those who voted for the movement did so not out of love for it, but because they were tired of the promises of the Democratic Front for Peace and Freedom. What is your opinion?

[Yasin] That is specious nonsense.

[AL-NAHAR] The Hamas movement called a strike to protest the National Council's resolution proclaiming a Palestinian state. Isn't that a strange position?

[Yasin] Who said that? Hamas never opposed the state. Who dislikes having a state?

[AL-NAHAR] In its slogans, Hamas stresses the importance of national unity. At the same time, it rejects joining the Unified National Command. Why this contradiction?

[Yasin] Who said that? Hamas supports joining the Unified Command. It is the Command that rejected it and is ignoring Hamas.

[AL-NAHAR] Isn't it necessary to ignore any movement that is an obstacle to national unity?

[Yasin] Yes, but Hamas is not an obstacle. If you want to seek an explanation, ask them.

[AL-NAHAR] Aren't you a spiritual leader?

[Yasin] Yes, but not an active leader.

[AL-NAHAR] April 16 was the first anniversary of the martyrdom of Khalil al-Wazir (Abu Jihad). What do you think of him?

[Yasin] I never lived in close contact with Abu Jihad, but I have heard that he was a cadre in the Muslim Brotherhood. So he was a Muslim leader of the Palestinian people.

[AL-NAHAR] Before his martyrdom, he stated that the Muslim tendency had influence and a place in the PLO. Do you agree with him?

[Yasin] By God, he knew best! If he said that, then it is a good saying.

[Box, p 4]

Shaykh Ahmad Yasin in Outline

He was born in 1936 in the village of al-Jawrah in the district of al-Majdal.

He was active head of the Islamic Academy, whose establishment the Israeli Government approved in 1974.

He was arrested on a weapons possession charge late in 1984 and sentenced to 13 years in prison, but was released in a prisoner exchange deal between Israel and the PFLP [Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine]-General Command on 23 May 1985.

He hails from an old family, considered one of the greatest families in al-Jawrah. He is the brother of Professor Badr Yasin, director of al-Zahawi School in Gaza, and the mayor of the people of al-Jawrah.

BAHRAIN

Statistics on Bahrainization Reported

44040375 Manama AKHBAR AL-KHALIJ in Arabic
.2 Apr 89 p 3

[Article by Burwayn Nasrallah: "Private Sector and Employment of Bahrainis, Problem Seeking Solution; Bahrainization in Major Companies Does not Exceed 12 Percent; Private Sector's Allegation Regarding Consequences of Recession Is Lie; What Happened Is Drop in Profits; In Year 2001, Percentage of Youth Seeking Employment Will Amount to 61 Percent"]

[Text] The private sector and the employment of Bahrainis is still an issue raised and it will continue to be so

with the increasing number of people seeking work year after year. The private institutions continually declare that they are on their way to Bahrainization and that the percentage of Bahrainis employed is rising constantly. The reality belies this allegation. This percentage does not exceed 12 percent. Moreover, the percentage of people between ages 15 to 30 years looking for employment will amount to 61 percent in the year 2001.

In the private sector, one hears oft-repeated justifications. They say that the Bahraini is not committed and does not accept hard work, that the economic recession has had its consequences and that the required quality is unavailable. On the other hand, economists respond that the Bahraini is done an injustice. He can get hard work only while the foreigner sits behind a desk. They also say that the consequences of recession are a lie. What is happening is that the private sector is making a profit, but not as in the past. In the face of the private sector's justifications and the economists' defense, the issue continues to be raised, urgent and serious.

The dimensions of the issue are defined by a study made by Dr 'Abd-al-'Aziz Jalal and published in Kuwait in 1985. What does the study say?

The researcher says:

In the [Arab] Peninsula's oil societies, the negative features of contempt for manual work continue to influence all aspects of life. Dealing with society's members differs according to their origins and social positions. Fortunes are amassed through speculation and without any economic calculation or clear effort to accumulate them. All this has shaken the work ethic and has led to laxity in work. An industrious person without social support and without a fortune has become the model of the poor despised individual whereas people with social relations or connections have become the owners of social status and of wealth. These tendencies and the consequences they have produced are destructive to any society because the element of work loses its capability of making the worker the decisive factor in determining the financial and moral reward and because society is turned into a bloc of people with mutual interests who consume excessively without exerting any effort for their consumption.

All this is reflected on society's members generally. They lose their faith in work and some of them rush toward the cheap competition to share the interests while the majority succumb to the call [as published] and give up as a result of the prevalent (manipulation) they witness.

These serious dimensions which are defined by the study demonstrate to us what could happen as a result of the private sector's disregard for its national duty to develop society and to contribute to solving its problems by opening the means of livelihood for its members.

This is a somewhat lengthy, but necessary, introduction before embarking on the issue raised. In Bahrain, there is a large number of firms which alone can absorb all Bahrainis seeking work. So why don't they do it? This is the perplexing question. To find its answer, it is preferable that we review the position of a number of these firms. They have been ceaselessly announcing that they are Bahrainizing swiftly and resolutely and have been constantly declaring the percentages they have achieved in Bahrainizing jobs. What is the true nature of these figures? The reality says that a firm for the maintenance of oil installations has 189 foreigners and 5 Bahrainis. A total of 56 percent of Ahmad Mansur al-'Ali's employees are foreigners. 'Abdullah Nas has 818 foreigners and 46 Bahrainis and Muhammad Jalal has 944 foreigners and 123 Bahrainis. 'Ali Ibn Ibrahim's establishment has 1,327 foreigners and 61 Bahrainis; Hajji Hasan al-'Ali has 1,065 foreigners and 93 Bahrainis; Khalil Kanu 157 foreigners and 28 Bahrainis; Hasan Ya'qub al-'Ali 135 foreigners and 10 Bahrainis; G.B. (Zachariadis) 690 foreigners and 7 Bahrainis; Yusuf Khalil al-Mu'ayyad 317 foreigners and 37 Bahrainis; the Comed Engineering Services Company 154 foreigners and 25 Bahrainis; Panorama for Contracts and Engineering Services 260 foreigners and 14 Bahrainis; Seven Up 149 foreigners and 4 Bahrainis; Al-Khalij [Gulf] Plastics Plants 74 foreigners and 17 Bahrainis; Dalmun al-Khalij Construction Company 288 foreigners and 12 Bahrainis; the Arab Printing and Publication Establishment 169 foreigners and 25 Bahrainis; Ahmadi Plants 289 foreigners and 39 Bahrainis; Project Company 198 foreigners and 3 Bahrainis; Bramco Company 262 foreigners and 30 Bahrainis; (Airmic) 130 foreigners and 60 Bahrainis; and the Regency Hotel 354 foreigners and 44 Bahrainis.

We have obtained these statistics from our private sources. Even though the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs stipulates that these establishments must have Bahraini employment of at least 20 percent, the Bahrainis employed in them do not exceed 12 percent. The jobs available range from construction workers to drivers, general clerks and accounting clerks.

What do these firms' officials say?

At Yusuf Ahmad al-Mu'ayyad Company, they said that the Bahrainis do not stay in their jobs. Some work for a short period. In a verbal work contract, there is no obligation. Some work for a time and then leave without notifying us. We spend large sums of money on some of them and we send some abroad [for training]. But upon their return, we are surprised to find that they have moved to another job. We cannot recover the money we spend on such people.

Few Last

Many apply to us for work and we give them jobs. But few last. These are usually employees with middle-level education. College graduates prefer banks and major

companies. We have accounting jobs in the sales department. But Bahrainis do not like the salaries we pay in this area and the Ministry of Labor does not send them to us, even though our salaries are no less than 150 dinars. It is not true that we pay salaries of less than 100 dinars.

We do not set conditions for employment. It is enough for an applicant to have a command of English. I propose that the Ministry of Education develop its curricula and teach English in a better way or that coordination be established between the firms and the ministry to provide business training at the firms during the study period, as is the case in vocational training. On the occasion, we are currently training 20 students enrolled in vocational education. I am certain that most of them will leave us upon graduation. It may be said that the salaries are small but it is my opinion that 150 dinars is not a small sum. This salary changes if the worker proves his capability.

Let me cite an example. We have a female employee in the computer section who earns no less than 200 dinars as a result of her industriousness. The same goes for the accounting section where we have good Bahraini employees. But there are those who come and demand to be supervisors as of the first day of their employment. One such person was a graduate of the industrial school who was no more than 18 years old. He demanded (certain conditions to work for us), worked for a few days, and then left without notifying us. Another employee who was in charge of the workers' passports left and took the passports with him. We were compelled to get the passports back by force. There are good Bahrainis and there are Bahrainis who harm others. With awareness, people change for the better.

Interest by Bahrainis

Muhammad 'Ali, the official in charge of al-Khalij Plastics Plant, has said that the company is inclined to employ Bahrainis, especially since they are interested in working in all fields. When consumerism prevailed in the 1970's, many people proceeded to work in the stock market trade, in trade registers and in similar activities. We used to see people carrying their briefcases in their hands. But the situation has changed now and people are inclined toward production. We see them in pickup trucks. Many Bahrainis do not demand a certain job position in their applications. The problem is that they do not accept the salary offered even though the Ministry of Labor stipulates that this salary must be equal to government salaries. However, the businessman has his problems also. He takes his conditions and the profit and loss level into consideration. This is why he tries to pay the worker a salary that does not negatively affect his income, especially since the business activity has been receding and bankruptcies have multiplied. The country's production sector is trying to balance income with expenditure. Moreover, we cannot compare our private sector with the European countries' private sector.

There, the businessman determines the profit he wants, taking into consideration the national interest in employment and training. He also takes into consideration other aspects that serve his sector, such as advertising and other activities. Our private sector's production is weak and limited and the purchasing power is also limited. The private sector does not get money out of the blue and it constantly tries to cut down spending. Without integration of the Arab world or Gulf integration, it will be difficult to solve the problems. There is multiplicity of plants. There are in the Gulf states 28 plastics plants similar to ours. In the past, we paid no heed to the effect of offhanded planning in the creation of repeated [similar] and unfeasible projects because of the high price of oil. But the problems have surfaced now. Even though the Iraq-Iran war has ended, the economic recession continues because of the low oil and dollar prices.

Cooperation With Ministry

Muhammad 'Ali added: I have noticed that businessmen have begun to cooperate with the Ministry of Labor in employing Bahrainis. However, capital is always cautious. It is a straining effort for business to look for Bahrainis to replace foreigners. Moreover, the market needs middle-level professions and such professions are not available. As for us, we coordinate with the Ministry of Labor. We offer training to students in vocational education and then give them the option to stay with us or leave upon graduation. The plant offers various jobs, such as warehouse manager, quality controller and sales, packaging and accounting jobs. Some of these specializations are not available in Bahrain. If found, they are inclined to take up other jobs. As for accounting, we are trying to Bahrainize them gradually, depending on our economic circumstances. Under the canopy of austerity, we have reduced the number of foreigners and we now have 78 foreign and Bahraini employees. Last month, we employed 9 Bahrainis, thus raising their number to 25. This is the latest statistic we have.

We Welcome Youth

'Abdullah Darwish, the personnel affairs director at the 'Abdullah Nas Establishment, has expressed an opinion that is not different from that of many in the private sector, saying:

We welcome any youth who comes to us asking for a job, provided that he is serious. But regrettably, we have tried a large number of workers and they included the good, the bad and those who did not want to work. We have tried them in construction, as drivers and in clerical jobs. We have found that those who claim to be clerks are not fit to be clerks and those who claim to be accountants are fit to be no more than ordinary clerks. We cannot put these people in the place of the foreigners whom we selected in their countries, who have long experiences and who want to work for us. The education of these [Bahraini] youths is below high school, some of them are quarrelsome and some of them wear strange outfits, use chains and behave inappropriately. Many of them use

our establishments as a crossing where they spend some-time until they get better employment, even though our salaries are no less than 150 dinars and may reach 200-300 dinars for highly qualified people. A while ago, we employed nearly 120 Bahrainis as masons, carpenters, clerks and other in jobs. Those people left and then others followed and more followed those. We wish the Ministry of Labor would put pressure on the workers to remain in their jobs. There are people who quit their work and who are not committed to it. Some people employed as drivers failed to observe their early work hours while other workers waited for them [to be transported] and then used the pretext of fixing the car as an excuse. Those who worked in construction failed to report to work whereas the contractor had to complete the work according to a schedule set by the side assigning him to build the project. It is noticed that those who apply to work for us as masons and carpenters are not aware of the nature of the work and that, therefore, they do not stay in their jobs. These people come under the pressure of need and not out of the desire to work. The Ministry of Labor is supposed to categorize everybody's vocation, to test the worker and then to send him to us if he is fit for work.

I do not deny that there are serious people in the country. But these people prefer other work. We wish to employ the Bahraini who is committed to his work. Where is such a Bahraini? We, unlike the big companies which have a good capital, cannot pay beyond our capacity.

Untrue

Responding to the private sector's allegation that it is suffering from the economic recession, Researcher Muhammad al-Sayyad has said that this is untrue. The sector is not suffering from a recession but its profits have fallen below the level they reached at the time of the oil upsurge period. In an attempt to maintain the profit levels, the businessmen resort to reducing the cost of their economic activities and reducing the wages of the labor they employ. This has caused the minimum wages to decrease at a time when the country is experiencing an increase in the cost of living. If the businessmen claim that they make profit only if they employ foreign labor, that their projects cannot function without this labor and that they lose if they employ national labor, then these are serious statements that are remote from the spirit of patriotism. Therefore, these projects must be reexamined and their economic feasibility must be studied.

I believe that the citizen is entitled to earn a wage compatible with his cost of living because a wage is nothing but one of his rights to the national income. When this income is distributed and redistributed, the private sector also gets its share by engaging in economic activity, considering that the government assigns some of its projects, embodied in construction projects and others, to the foreign and local private sector to build the services which are provided to everybody, including the private establishments and companies and their workers.

The government shoulders the burdens of the health services and of providing water and electricity. These services are estimated to cost 300 dinars per capita.

As for the private sector's allegation that the Bahraini does not keep his job in this sector long, as long as the private sector claims that it is free in its economy, then the worker also has the freedom to move to any job he likes. All the justifications used by the private sector are feeble and have already been dealt with by studies on the employment problem which have tried to develop a solution to this problem. But the situation has not changed at the level of the reality.

Al-Sayyad went on to add: However, our country's so-called free economy is different from the free economy of other countries. Despite the presence of negative features in this system, the worker, employee and woman have full rights [in other countries]. If we review the western economic system's historical background, we will notice that capitalism began to rise after its triumph over feudalism. Free labor untied to any circle became available. At the same time, small factories began to emerge and to strike feudalism and it became possible to attract labor. This is why that period's capitalism is viewed as a victory over feudalism and a progressive step. Initially, capitalism called for freedom and gave the workers some rights in the form of laws regulating the relationship between worker and business owner. Capitalism then developed from free capitalism to monopolistic capitalism until the 1929 crisis [depression] surfaced and continued until 1933. The European governments then began to correct capitalism's course and to intervene in the economic process from time to time with their economic and fiscal agencies. The central banks also began to intervene. Thus, economic planning started. Capitalism also enlisted the help of the socialist applications. The state intervenes to maintain the economic balance and to protect establishments on the verge of collapse by purchasing and reorganizing such establishments. Capitalism resorts to bolstering its general budgets by curtailing its consumption. It also submits reports on the budgets of its companies to the government. Consequently, the government learns how big these budgets are and then collects from the companies taxes amounting to a certain percentage of their profits. Therefore, it is noticed that the companies that pay bigger percentages [sums] dominate the political decision-making. The state also intervenes to solve the problems of inflation and rising prices and banks intervene to protect currency. Labor organizations try to protect the workers' rights.

The capitalist system has its negative points. It exploits cheap labor from the less-developed European countries, the developing countries and the semi-capitalist countries, as well as Yugoslavia. However, the workers' rights are codified and protected.

After this tour, I believe that the problem is intricate and will not be solved by a symposium, a report or a study. Political decisions are required to solve the problems of

those looking for employment. These decisions are tied to the cooperation of several circles. If the private sector is not committed to employing Bahrainis, then the government can create new spheres that provide work opportunities or can force the private sector to accept Bahrainis. A large part of the private sector rejects Bahraini employees. Even though the major companies allege that the percentage of their national labor is high and that it amounts to 60 percent or more, we demand more of these companies. Else, how could they be national and how can the private sector ask the government to assign its projects to it when this sector refuses to employ the citizens. It may be said that the Bahraini is lazy and negligent. But we cannot force a youth to work from morning to evening in construction jobs and in hard labor for a wage of 150 dinars while his colleague the [government] employee takes it easy, collects the same salary or more, and then works at another job at the end of his work hours!

EGYPT

Ambassador to USSR Interviewed on Relations
45040237a Cairo AL-MUSAWWAR in Arabic
24 Feb 89 pp 14- 15

[Interview with Ambassador Ahmad Mahir by Dr Sami 'Amarah in Moscow; date of interview not given]

[Text] Unarguably, Egypt occupies a favored, unique position on the chart of the Soviet Union's international relations, supported and backed by its long, deeply-rooted history and its present, as embodied in the prominent role it plays on the Arab, African and international scenes.

Perhaps by following Egyptian-Soviet relations we can learn the true value of the person chosen to represent Egypt in the Soviet Union, one of the superpowers, unmatched in its international position and influence. It was thus when Dr Murad Ghalib assumed the ambassadorship in Moscow, during the Egyptian-Soviet rapprochement under the late President Jamal 'Abd-al-Nasir, as it was also when Ambassador Hafiz Isma'il arrived in Moscow as Egyptian ambassador in the mid-seventies and when President Mubarak chose Ambassador Salah Basyuni to mend what had been sundered and to rebuild what "fate" had destroyed in Egyptian-Soviet relations from the 1970's to mid-1984, when the decision was made to return the Egyptian and Soviet ambassadors to Moscow and Cairo. It was also thus when President Mubarak decided that al-Shahid Ahmad Mahir would succeed Ambassador Salah Basyuni as Egyptian ambassador in Moscow.

We do not need to mention that this was a wise choice. Ambassador Ahmad Mahir is a well-known political and legal figure, who is well qualified on all levels: in Brussels, where he headed our diplomatic mission; in Lisbon, where he held the same post; and in all the international

conferences in which he participated, the last of which was in Geneva. He was undoubtedly one of the architects of our victory in the Taba issue, for which history will remember him.

We met in Ambassador Mahir's elegant office in the heart of the Soviet capital. Naturally, at the beginning of our interview, we asked him his opinion of Egyptian-Soviet relations:

[AL-MUSAWWAR] What was the status of Egyptian-Soviet relations when you arrived in Moscow last October? What is your opinion of these relations now?

[Mahir] When I arrived in the Soviet Union in October 1988, I found that Egyptian-Soviet relations had made great progress in the right direction and that many obstacles were being removed. I also found that political consultation was in progress on various important subjects. Letters had been exchanged between President Mubarak and President Gorbachev, as well as between the foreign ministers of our two countries, and our deputy prime minister and foreign minister had visited Moscow. In other words, political consultation was proceeding normally.

In the economic sphere, progress had been made in trade exchange and economic and industrial cooperation, which has continued since I have been in Moscow. For example, in the scientific-cultural realm, the executive program for 1989-1990 was signed, and in the trade sphere, the 1989 trade protocol was concluded and was signed in Cairo. In the industrial sphere, there was an exchange of visits by various delegations from our countries to look into spare parts and expansion requirements of Egyptian factories set up with Soviet cooperation. All this indicates that contacts are continuing between the two countries in all spheres. The latest such contact may be the letter Gorbachev sent last week to President Mubarak concerning relations between the two countries and the international situation.

[AL-MUSAWWAR] The Soviet media have published nothing about this letter. What was the subject, and what issues did it discuss? If we may ask, of course.

[Mahir] President Gorbachev's letter was in reply to the letter President Mubarak sent at the end of last year in the context of his contacts with world leaders for the sake of a settlement in the Middle East and to guarantee the rights of the Palestinian people. I can say that President Gorbachev's letter dealt extensively with this subject, as well as other important international political subjects.

I cannot say more than this; however, I would like to say that something of a tradition has been established between our two countries with consultations between them beginning at the summit level and extending to other levels. For example, last year Soviet officials visited Egypt to discuss issues raised at the United Nations,

subjects concerning the Middle East, and the international situation. The undersecretary in the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Economic Affairs also visited Egypt, as did the Soviet minister of electricity, who discussed energy projects with the Egyptian minister of electricity. I believe that we can expect these contacts with the minister of electricity to yield significant results. We hope that Minister of Electricity Engineer Mahir Abazah will favor us with a visit to Moscow. It is also expected that the Joint Commission, with the Soviet side led by Minister of Foreign Economic Relations Konstantin Katushev, will meet in Cairo.

[AL-MUSAWWAR] From the heart of the Soviet capital, how do you view Arab-Soviet relations and the future of these relations? What about the rumors that the Soviet Union is interceding to improve Egypt's relations with Syria and Libya?

[Mahir] I know nothing of any Soviet mediation between Egypt and any other country. Egypt needs no intermediary with its Arab brethren. Egypt's hand is always extended and its heart always open to all, and its positions are public and well known. There is no need for intercession. Rather, the Arabs who are still pursuing cautious policies need to realize where the higher Arab interest lies.

As for Arab-Soviet relations, it is obvious that the Soviet Union supports Arab positions and supports the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, as well as their right of self-determination. It has also supported the resolutions of the Palestine National Council and concurs with the Arab position that the only way to reach a settlement in the Middle East is to hold an international conference with the participation of the permanent members of the Security Council and the parties concerned, including the PLO. For this reason, we can say that there is no conflict between the Soviet Union and the Arab countries on the primary issue: the issue of the Palestinian Arab people and Israel's withdrawal from the territories it occupied in 1967. The Soviet Union affirms that it uses all its international contacts to achieve this goal, whether in the United Nations or in its current contacts with Israel. Simply put, if the goal is to solve the problem through an international peace conference and for the Soviets to have a role in this, for this role to be productive, they must of course be in contact with all parties. This is the same position we took with the United States. We said that if the United States wished to assume a positive role, it must begin a dialogue with the PLO, which actually came to pass. I believe that the greater number of parties that are discussing preparation for an international peace conference, the greater the opportunity will be to hold such a conference in the near future. The important thing is that the Soviet Union is using all its contacts to promote peace efforts in a direction compatible with the policy and interests of the Arab world.

[AL-MUSAWWAR] This leads us to another issue, that of relations, or more precisely, Soviet-Israeli contacts. There are reports that Israel is now proposing to the Soviet Union that the idea of an international conference be replaced with direct negotiations in which the Soviet Union would have a guaranteed role. In other words, the discussions would be between Israel and whomever the Palestinians choose within the Palestinian-Jordanian option, with the United States and the Soviet Union participating. The tremendous quantitative and qualitative changes we are now seeing in the Soviet Union both domestically and in foreign affairs make many fear that the Soviet Union will agree to this. What is your opinion?

[Mahir] This is not an issue to be evaluated. The issue of replacing an international conference with a meeting attended by the Soviet Union and the United States was proposed by certain Israeli officials in public statements. The Soviet Union clearly stated that it adhered to the concept that an international peace conference must be held. This is not an issue of conjecture or rumor; it is one of public, official statements known to all. There is no need for evaluation, but there is a need for a proper reading of all the statements made by officials of the various countries concerned. Soviet-Israeli contacts are within the framework of the sovereignty of every country and its absolute right to contact whomever it wishes. All this means to me is that in these contacts, the Soviet Union takes positions compatible with the Arab position on a settlement in the Middle East.

[AL-MUSAWWAR] Returning to Soviet-Israeli contacts, PRAVDA, the leading official newspaper, has published statements to the effect that "The circumstances are right for resumption of diplomatic relations between the Soviet Union and Israel." This could have been a trial balloon or could arise from Soviet conviction. Circumstances change. As confirmed by the Soviet official spokesmen, the Israeli consular delegation can pursue political activity beyond the framework of purely consular affairs. Is it more akin to an embassy without an ambassador? What can you say in this regard?

[Mahir] First of all, embassies are established only by establishment or resumption of diplomatic relations, neither of which has happened. Secondly, I will not comment on this subject because it is within the framework of Soviet sovereignty, in which we do not interfere.

Perhaps what the PRAVDA publication referred to was the statement by Israel Communist Party Chairman Me'ir Vilner. This is his opinion and he expressed it. I do not believe that the Soviet Union concurred with his statement. In fact, he later refuted it. I would like to say that under the policy of glasnost, since I arrived I have read many opposing, conflicting views. The winds of freedom of expression have reached the Soviet press. We read about many subjects that touch on the essence of life in the Soviet Union. We read many debates and opposing views. For this reason, I believe that the

expression of these conflicting views is one form of the glasnost, openness or candor that the Soviet government is practicing. The official statements and Soviet official positions are what matter.

[AL-MUSAWWAR] **Community groups in the Soviet Union are also expressing their fears of the sweeping attack by some groups, which for the sake of discussion we can call "Jewish groups." A committee of community groups opposed to resumption of diplomatic relations with Israel has more than once stressed that what is happening in the Soviet Union in this regard is not normal because, by granting Jews more rights under the veil of human rights, the rights of other nationalities are affected. In other words, rights are granted to one people at the expense of another. Please give us your opinion on this.

[Mahir] In all honesty, I do not wish to get into Soviet domestic affairs. It is not my place to do so. What I will say is that we welcome increased respect for human rights anywhere in the world. Human rights must be guaranteed without affecting the rights of others. However, I do not allow myself to get involved in the domestic issues of Soviet citizens. I have already given my opinion on the Soviet Union's foreign policy as regards Egypt and the Arab world.

[AL-MUSAWWAR] When Muslims in the Soviet Union see what the West does for Jews and Christians in the Soviet Union, they find themselves deprived of their rights, if we may say so, by their brethren in the Islamic world. Some have said on more than one occasion that Muslims in the East do not fulfill their obligations. Although they have not stated so openly, they need Qur'ans, religious publications, and Islamic scholarships to universities in the Arab world. Does this not warrant the attention and interest of Islamic circles?

[Mahir] Muslims in the Soviet Union are, first of all, Soviet citizens. I believe that, based on this situation, the Islamic countries do what they can to provide scholarships and opportunities to make the pilgrimage for some Soviet Muslims. The ties between Soviet Muslims and Muslims in the Arab and Islamic world are normal in the framework of Soviet laws and the principles of international law that govern relations between countries.

[AL-MUSAWWAR] On 15 February, the last Soviet soldier left Afghanistan, as Mikhail Gorbachev had been saying for almost a year. Does this not mean greater credibility in "the statements of the Soviet leader and the possibility of stronger Soviet relations with the Arab countries and Egypt?" [quotation marks as published]

[Mahir] All along, the Egyptian position has been that the Soviet Union must withdraw from Afghanistan and the Afghan people must be allowed the right of self-determination. This is a general principle which Egypt applies to Afghanistan and other countries because we believe in the right of self-determination. Under the

Geneva Accords, the Soviet Union agreed to withdraw, and a date was set for withdrawal. There is no doubt that we enthusiastically welcome strict adherence by the Soviet Union and all parties to the agreement signed in Geneva.

[AL-MUSAWWAR] Some national liberation movements and Third World countries express their fears that the reconciliation between the superpowers will cause their issues to get lost or ignored because of the priority of superpower concerns. What do you think?

[Mahir] The Soviet-U.S. reconciliation will not occur at the expense of other peoples; in fact, it may help hasten these people's attainment of their rights. Namibia is a good example of this. In the framework of this reconciliation, agreement was reached on Namibia's independence, which is a very positive point. I believe that the Soviet-U.S. reconciliation may also help bring about an international peace conference in the Middle East and thereby help achieve the just and comprehensive peace we desire. As long as there are righteous demands, this reconciliation can be a positive tool enabling peoples to obtain their rights.

[AL-MUSAWWAR] Even though you have been in Moscow a short while, this period may have shown you much about the Soviet Union and its relations with the Arab countries from the view of the Soviet press. What do you think about what is published in the press about Arab issues?

[Mahir] First, we must establish that the Soviet press is primarily preoccupied with domestic issues. The Soviet Union is going through a stage of utmost importance, with the restructuring of various aspects of Soviet life. Political and economic reform and continual, active political movement occupy most of the attention of Soviet citizens and their press.

Secondly, this means that media treatment of Arab issues may not be the same quantitatively as in the last few years. However, qualitatively, I feel Soviet support for Arab positions on which there is agreement. I also see the Soviet press distancing itself from unresolved disagreements in the Arab world. When a dispute breaks out among Arab countries, the Soviet press does not lean toward one side or the other.

[AL-MUSAWWAR] Many Egyptians from the political and media spheres who are sent to Moscow point out great similarities between what is happening in the Soviet Union today and what happened in Egypt in the 1970's, specifically the economic open-door policy under President al-Sadat in Egypt and under Gorbachev in Moscow. How do you see it?

[Mahir] I would like to say that apparently we discovered perestroika and glasnost before the Soviet Union did. Egypt has pursued economic and political openness for a long time. It has positive experience in this sphere and

negative experience that it has tried to rectify. We can say that there are similarities between the two campaigns, even though the points of departure were, of course, different between the two countries. However, openness is a characteristic of our era and can take different forms and paths.

Muslim Brotherhood Members Arrested in Qus
45000156 Cairo AL-SHA'B in Arabic 16 May 89 p 5

[Text] The campaign of arrests led by [Interior Minister] Zaki Badr is continuing against Muslim Brotherhood supporters. On the Thursday before last [11 May], security forces in Qina arrested a number of Muslim Brotherhood supporters in the city of Qus. Among those arrested were 'Ammar Hasan Hanafi, archeological inspector and nephew of Shaykh al-Qadi al-Hanafi, an inspector of sermons in Qina and prominent Brotherhood leader, and Mahmud Bilaylah, a teacher in Qus.

New Free Zone Investment Laws Issued
45400252B Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic 25 Feb 89 p 32

[Article: "Egyptian Changes in Investment and Free Zones System"]

[Text] The Egyptian minister of economy and foreign trade, Dr Yusri Mustafa, recently issued a decree changing some provisions of the implementation regulation of the Arab and foreign money investment system and the free zones, under Law 43 of 1974.

According to the change, wages, salaries, and other sums owed to Egyptian workers, as well as compensations and allowances for Egyptian chairmen and members of boards of directors shall be paid in their Egyptian pound equivalent, based on the highest exchange rate announced on the 20th day of the month when these sums fall due. The employer shall convert foreign currency equal to the said sums through accredited banks on the basis of the exchange rates announced by the administrative committee of the free banking market for foreign currency.

The decree also stipulates that establishments licensed to operate in free zones must keep a special foreign currency account in an accredited bank in Egypt, to be known as an "operating account." Withdrawal will be made from this account to cover local payments connected with the activity the establishments are licensed to carry on in the free areas, in addition to wages and salaries of Egyptian workers and compensation and allowances of Egyptian chairmen and members of boards of directors.

The Investment Authority set a minimum balance for this account at no less than a month's operating expenses. The bank that holds the account must obtain from the owner of the enterprise a pledge that withdrawals will not exceed this limit without the approval of the

authority. The decree also obliges owners of enterprises established in free zones to set their workers' wages, salaries, and compensations in free currencies. The daily wage of a worker is not to be less than the equivalent of \$2. These sums owed to Egyptians, as well as compensation for Egyptian chairmen and members of boards of directors, are to be paid in their Egyptian pound equivalents at the highest exchange rate announced on the 20th day of the month when payment falls due.

The owner of the enterprise must exchange through authorized banks foreign currency equal to what is due to be paid, based on the exchange rates announced by the administrative committee of the free banking market. The decree also stipulates that enterprises must open an operating account in local currency at an authorized bank. This account is to be supplied with the Egyptian pound equivalent of the sums that are sold from the operating account to accredited banks at the highest announced exchange rate, as well as being supplied by the enterprise's revenues collected in local currency.

Asyut Governor Discusses Population, Youth Issues

45040334A Cairo AL-MUSAWWAR in Arabic
21 Apr 89 pp 40-42

[Interview with Maj Gen Muhammad 'Abd-al-Halim Musa, governor of Asyut by Tal'at Fayiz, Muhsin al-Zayyat and Taha al-'Isawi: "At Asyut's Centennial Celebration Governor of Asyut Speaks Candidly with AL-MUSAWWAR, Says, 'I Am Loyal Servant to Asyut's Poor and Toilers;' Governor's Most Important Wishes at Centennial: Construction of Elevated Bridge over Nile To Connect Eastern, Western Parts of City; Construction of the Asyut-al-Ghardaqah Highway To Bring to Asyut's Residents Endless Supply of Blessings;" date and place of interview not specified]

[Excerpts] [Passage omitted]

[AL-MUSAWWAR] A person who visits the Governorate of Asyut every now and then can see the continuing change which is taking place everywhere in production, employment and service activities. The change is obvious, but what needs to be clarified and explained is this: What does the popular development plan bring to the governorate?

[Musa] As you know the population is growing [at the rate of] 1 million persons every 7 months. This population growth must be met by increasing the services which the state offers citizens. As President Mubarak says in his speeches, "The only thing we can do is produce." [passage omitted]

[AL-MUSAWWAR] We know what citizens have to go through to find housing, and we all know that housing is the main problem throughout the country. What is being done in Asyut Governorate to check this problem?

[Musa] We thank God that at the present time housing is no longer a problem for us in Asyut. I can say with confidence that "For Rent" signs did appear once again in some of the popular residential areas in the governorate. They even appeared in some of Asyut's recently built areas.

Let me tell you how this problem was solved: we attacked it seriously. Over a period of 16 months, which is almost the length of time I have been in Asyut, 6,000 residential units were built and work was completed on another 1,600 units where all work had come to a halt because of a few obstacles like sanitary drainage, electricity, or other matters like that. [passage omitted]

[AL-MUSAWWAR] There are many food security projects in the governorate. What do these projects do? Is that enough to make the governorate and its residents self-sufficient in food?

[Musa] Honesty requires me to mention that food security projects in the governorate alleviate the hardships experienced by the toiling classes. They also balance the prices of those goods they make available to citizens. So far, for example, 1 kilogram of meat sells for 375 piasters; 1 kilogram of water buffalo milk sells for 55 piasters; and 1 kilogram of cow milk sells for only 45 piasters. These goods are always available. In fact, at the present time, for example, we have a surplus in dairy production. That is why we are presently making preparations for completing a dairy processing plant that will produce yoghurt, bottled pasteurized milk, or cheese.

The poultry industry in Asyut had floundered a little because of a few circumstances that were beyond its control. Now, however, that industry is back on its feet, and it is operating with outstanding efficiency. Furthermore, it is also making a profit. A chicken, for example, sells for about 3.5 pounds only.

With regard to the fish hatchery, operations at that project have started. The fish hatchery will soon give us a crop which we will be able to make available to citizens who wish to set up their own private fish farms. That will increase the quantity of fish in the governorate, especially since God Almighty did bless us with a natural body of water. The River Nile, which has always been generous, flows through what is approximately a distance of 130 km in the governorate. We can use the presence of the river in the governorate to increase fish production.

Among other things Asyut Governorate is proud of the fact that several private sector projects have been set up to raise rabbits. Rabbits, after they are slaughtered and dressed, are sold for 250 piasters a kg.

But what is more important than all that is the loaf of bread. Now, thank God, people in Asyut do eat a whole loaf of bread. Not only do they eat the whole loaf, but they do so with relish. An individual who used to eat two

loaves of bread is now satisfied with one loaf and a half because he eats the whole loaf and does not throw any of it in the garbage as he used to do before. Statistics show that flour consumption in Asyut declined because attention has been devoted to making bread.

I can affirm that prices in Asyut for most foods did not rise, especially prices for those foods which are offered to Asyut residents by the governorate's projects.

[AL-MAJALLAH] President Muhammad Husni Mubarak has been putting emphasis on young people and the attention that must be devoted to them throughout the country. What is Asyut Governorate doing to steer young people in the right direction and raise their standards so they can become responsible citizens?

[Musa] If I tried to explain to you the extent of Asyut's interest in young people, I will need several pages, but I will try to be brief. All of our attention is truthfully devoted to young people. This is manifested in the following:

- In housing, for example, young people occupy approximately 55 percent of the housing which is built by the governorate. As far as employment opportunities are concerned, every young man who applies for a job in any one of the governorate's projects while he waits for the Manpower Office to appoint him to a job is hired immediately. In addition, any young man who wants to reclaim an area of land and who comes to me seeking help receives assistance and material as well as moral support promptly. I provide him with the basic needs: the means of production or seeds.
- In the education sector I can tell you that I did not have a single student here who was away from home and complaining about not being able to find housing during the academic year. The governorate provided those students who were unable to find campus housing an opportunity to share accommodations. It provided rooms whose dimensions are five meters by five meters, and each one of those rooms was shared by three students each of whom had a bed, a closet, and a desk. The rooms have both cold and hot water, and each student has transportation to class in addition to one meal. For all this the student pays no more than 10 pounds a month.

We try to put young people's efforts to good use during the vacations by setting up environmental service camps for university students, for students at al-Azhar academies and for secondary school students. Young people who attend those camps stay with us for 12 days doing work that serves the environment. They do that for 2 hours every day, and then they attend meetings and lectures on culture, religion and sports. When they come to camp, young people receive a uniform which they can keep after the camp is over. In addition, each young person receives 2 pounds a day in pocket money, and that, of course, is above and beyond his board. These

camps are held so that young people can become accustomed to having a commitment to their environment, their town, and their community. [passage omitted]

And for the first time young people are holding 60 percent of the local council seats on all levels in Asyut Governorate. Of the 2,500 persons who serve on these councils, young people are represented by 1,600. Also for the first time we find that young people are occupying 16 seats in the governorate's local council. Most of these young people are instructors, assistant professors and professors at Asyut University. [passage omitted]

Al-Azhar Professor Discusses Muslims Who Have 'Lost the Way'

45040326A Cairo ROSE AL-YUSUF in Arabic
17 Apr 89 pp 30-33

[Interview with Dr Mahmud Ibrahim al-Juyushi, dean of Islamic Missions Faculty, al-Azhar, by 'Abdallah Imam: "The New Kharijites"; Cairo, date not given]

[Excerpts] Dr Mahmud Ibrahim al-Juyushi is the dean of the Faculty of Islamic Mission. The faculty is in charge of graduating missionaries for God's religion who, after a course at al-Azhar's primary, preparatory, and secondary institutes, and then 4 years in this faculty, possess learning, understanding, awareness, study, and knowledge. Missionaries are required to have memorized the entire Koran.

Dr al-Juyushi is the man with primary responsibility for preparing these missionaries to confront people with the word and opinion of Islam, as derived from the Book of God and the Sunnah of His noble Prophet.

The man has spent a lengthy portion of his life in the service of Islamic missionary work in Egypt and abroad, before occupying this foremost position in the field of preparing missionaries.

He lived many years in England, proclaiming Islam, making it known, confronting its enemies, and calling people to it, before coming to Egypt to continue his career in teaching.

His long life in Europe, part of which he spent in study, has given him broad horizons of experience, erudition, and broad-mindedness. His knowledge includes an excellent command of the English language. He studied at London University and obtained the doctorate. Dr al-Juyushi was the second Islamic thinker with whom I had a long meeting lasting several hours. It is difficult to abridge its content into a limited number of pages, but we will try.

With the dean of the Faculty of Islamic Mission, one has to begin from missionary activity itself. Who carries on missionary activity? What is its method?

We live in a time when anyone who wears a gown and lets his beard grow makes himself into a missionary or perhaps the commander of a group.

He insists that people follow his ideas, or else they have departed from Islam, and that he has been charged with returning them to it—by bomb, bullet, chain, and stick. This is the method we see around us and hear about in various places.

This being so, the man with primary responsibility for graduating missionaries of the Islamic religion with learning, understanding, and awareness must have a definition of the specifications of a missionary.

Replying to my question, Dr Mahmud Ibrahim al-Juyushi said:

“Whoever engages in missionary activity must be ready for it in aptitude, thinking, and ability. He must be learned in that which will enable him to present ideas he advocates strengthened by support from the Book [of God] and the Sunnah [of the Prophet].

“Those who lack this should not become involved in missionary activity, because by doing so they cause more harm than good.” [passage omitted]

Finally, Dr al-Juyushi believes that the missionary must be informed about the events of history. He must know the ideas, issues, and schools of thought current in this age. He must address people in accordance with their minds; he cannot influence a society without studying the environmental conditions that surround it.

[ROSE AL-YUSUF] Doctor, those who want to teach us our religion according to their vision are a confused mixture of students from the practical faculties and workers in various professions. Never have I seen a single person among them who studied at al-Azhar or for whom Islamic mission was a subject to be pursued with learning, understanding, and study!

[Al-Juyushi] If these zealous young people who have ideas they believe correct reconsidered and became acquainted with Islamic studies, they would realize that much has escaped them and that they have lost the way.

There is an example before me in the Kharijites who appeared in the reign of the fourth caliph, Ali. When they rebelled against him, he talked to them, and many of them returned to the ranks of the community. Afterwards, ‘Abdallah ibn ‘Abbas talked to them, and again many of them returned to their senses. They continued to exist until the time of ‘Umar ibn ‘Abd-al-‘Aziz; he talked to them, and many of them again returned to their senses, due to the persuasiveness and magnanimity of thought that distinguished these negotiators.

Missionaries must study the life of these men. Then they will realize that missionaries must pass through many stages and learn much from these men. [passage omitted]

[ROSE AL-YUSUF] If the method of Islamic missionary activity is, as you have said, “wisdom and admonition,” when the missionary sees an evil, does he have the right to change it by force?

[Al-Juyushi] The person who changes things by force is the ruler. If I were to change things by my own hand and you by yours, the result would be the spread of anarchy.

There must be agreement upon who has the right to change things by force. Part of our experience in history is that people respond to good admonition. Stubborn opposition, however, leads to persistence in error. If I allowed myself to change by my own hand something that I have no right to change, and you did the same, the result would be that society would fall into anarchy.

I know this is an error, I say. If it is in the circle of my jurisdiction, where there is no aggression against others, such as my son, daughter, and household, it is possible.

But if I go beyond this circle to society in general and use my hand, the result would be anarchy and fighting.

Muslim scholars are agreed about changing evils, if it does not lead to greater evil. If your changing an evil will lead to something even more dangerous, stop!

[ROSE AL-YUSUF] Dr al-Juyushi, do you believe that history is now repeating itself and that there are people in our society whom we can call “the new Kharijites”?

[Al-Juyushi] The term “new Kharijites” is too much. We can say that they have lost the way to a correct understanding. They may be sincere—the Kharijites of old were also sincere—but they do not have enough knowledge to help them to a correct understanding. They do not have sufficient study to show them the way that is right.

The word “Kharijites” was used in a historical period at a certain time. But these are zealous young people who have superficial learning. They think this learning is everything, but it represents only the beginnings of knowledge. Those who possess it need to absorb and study. They have to go to the people of knowledge and learning. [passage omitted]

[ROSE AL-YUSUF] And the violence that they use, how does one confront it?

[Al-Juyushi] Responding to them with violence may be a cause of it. When we condemn violence, we condemn it on the part of anyone who uses violence.

[ROSE AL-YUSUF] The problem is that the whole world is surging with currents and schools of thought. The world is preoccupied with political and intellectual problems. For a long time we have seen that violence has been linked to those who say that they are advocating Islam. Is violence part of the nature of Islam?

[Al-Juyushi] Violence is not part of the nature of Islam; persuasion and wisdom are. Those who are characterized by violence—how many Muslims do they represent? In any society there are deviants in thought and belief. These people represent only a very small proportion, and they have not received a full measure of correct instruction.

For example, take al-Azhar University, where students study Islamic learning from beginning to end. Have you found any of these people who are affiliated with al-Azhar University?

Most of them are young people who have graduated from practical faculties and who have not been given an opportunity to study Islam sufficiently.

[ROSE AL-YUSUF] Such a person would say to me in disapproval, "Should I study Islam from a preacher whom the government appoints and whose salary it pays? He is the government's preacher; I will not listen to what he says."

[Al-Juyushi] Speak to him as follows: This preacher who draws a salary from the government, does he say to you that the government told him to say, "God said" and "His Messenger said"?

He is a preacher because he has come to have competence in speaking the word of God. He was given a salary in order to live.

I do not know the difference between government and nongovernment. We are all employees in the state—in missionary work or in other jobs. Everyone performs his special competence—the doctor, the engineer, the teacher, and the missionary. Why do you call him "the government preacher"?

[ROSE AL-YUSUF] And the government mosque?

[Al-Juyushi] The mosque is God's mosque. "The places of worship belong to God; so call not, along with God, upon anyone" [Koran 72:18]. Although the Ministry of Awqaf arranges funding for the mosque, it does not pay out of its own funds, but out of the funds of Muslims [as a community]. If there were no one to take care of the affairs of the Muslims, there would be anarchy.

[ROSE AL-YUSUF] Basically, he takes as point of departure the vision that says that the society is not an Islamic society.

[Al-Juyushi]—Meaning that Islamic Shari'ah law does not rule it. However, Islamic values prevail in it. The means to this: we are all brought up in Islam. Each of us adopts an Islamic path in his life. But is violence an Islamic path? It is not.

The Messenger of God, may God bless him and grant him peace, kept calling [to Islam] in Mecca for 13 years, mixing with polytheists, and eating with some of them. No one said that the Messenger of God had not done his duty. Should I take my method of missionary activity from the Messenger of God, or from some other person?

[ROSE AL-YUSUF] The main problem with some others is their belief that the society is infidel. Do you believe that?

[Al-Juyushi] How should it be infidel?

[ROSE AL-YUSUF] Is it a pre-Islamic society?

[Al-Juyushi] How should it be pre-Islamic? It is a Muslim society in which there are certain deficiencies needing correction. All societies are like that. Why did God establish punishments? Because there was deficiency in the days of the Messenger, and there were hypocrites. So is the society non-Muslim?

[ROSE AL-YUSUF] Perhaps these people think in this way because the Islamic punishments are not applied in this society.

[Al-Juyushi] It is not non-Muslim. It is a society deficient in the application of Shari'ah law. It is a society whose individuals are characterized by their having the belief of Islam. Each of them is trying to do the work of Islam. Only if society insists on rejecting Islam, the principles of Islam, and the values of Islam, is the society non-Muslim. But [this is not the case] if it says that it is striving to remedy the deficiency and progress gradually. Islam came gradually. Take the position of Islam forbidding wine. It did not come all at once.

If the society is ready to correct the wrongdoer, we help it; but we do not come to them with sticks or violence, because that will lead to dispute. Who is person whose opinion ought to be taken into account? It is the one who knows Islam more, who knows the Book of God and Sunnah of His Prophet more. But this talk of "an infidel society" and "a pre-Islamic society" is excessive. It deviates from calling "with wisdom and good admonition," as God has said.

[ROSE AL-YUSUF] So we could say that in [such excesses] there is deviation from Islam!

[Al-Juyushi] Deviation from the way, error in application; but you cannot declare a person to be an infidel, if he says, "There is no god but God; Muhammad is the Messenger of God."

[ROSE AL-YUSUF] Should I wage holy war against this person?

[Al-Juyushi] What is holy war? Does one Muslim kill another Muslim? No. Give advice. Explain.

I have to deal by fair means with this person who believes violence is the way, explaining to him the different sides, and clarifying for him what has escaped his notice. [passage omitted]

[ROSE AL-YUSUF] What about dealing in the black market?

[Al-Juyushi] There are many Prophetic traditions that warn against it. Among them is the report that says, "O God, if anyone have charge over my nation in some matter and distress them, distress Thou him!"—be it a matter of trade, agriculture, or instruction. There are many Prophetic traditions that warn and caution against those who monopolize people's sustenance.

We in Islamic society are suffering now from a moral crisis. People need to apply the ethics of Islam in their behavior and dealings. If the child finds someone to direct him from the beginning—his father and mother—and to tell him "This is right, and this is wrong," he will take to it; but if he sees his father and mother lie, he will lie.

The second stage is the school and a serious religious education.

[ROSE AL-YUSUF] The actions we read about in the newspapers—killings and bloodshed in the name of Islam—are strange and repellent.

[Al-Juyushi] The Muslim does not kill. The majority of Muslims follow the right path. If I err, is Islam to be held accountable?

[ROSE AL-YUSUF] These are the ones who challenge, talk, and fill the world with noise about the role of al-Azhar and the generality of learned scholars.

[Al-Juyushi] Those who speak for Islam are the scholars of Islam. These people are not the scholars of Islam. They are students who have learned something of Islam and thought that it was the truth. I have told you that they need to correct their conceptions and debate "with wisdom and good admonition."

Do not hold Islam responsible for the mistake of an individual or group. Some ask why, if Islam is the religion of culture and progress, the Muslims are backward. They are backward because they need to apply Islam. The Muslims are not an argument against Islam; Islam is an argument against them. [passage omitted]

[ROSE AL-YUSUF] I move to another and final point with Dr al-Juyushi, namely the non-Muslim. If they

attack Muslims.... But why do we disapprove of their attacking non-Muslims?

[Al-Juyushi] Attacking non-Muslims who live in our nation is an attack against the covenant of protection granted by the Messenger of God, may God bless him and grant him peace, because they are people who have been granted protection.

Once someone from the generation that followed [the Companions of the Prophet] saw a Muslim attack a protected non-Muslim. He immediately stood up to that Muslim and killed him. "By God," he said, "I cannot rest while the protection of the Messenger of God, may God bless him and grant him peace, is disregarded." We are called upon to treat them well, even though we differ from them in doctrine. The Jews used to invite the Messenger of God, and he would eat of their food. Once, while he was sitting, a funeral procession passed by. He stood up. When they told him it was a Jew's funeral, he said, "Is it not a soul?"

[ROSE AL-YUSUF] Dr Mahmud Ibrahim al-Juyushi is the son of the governor of Damietta. He studied at al-Azhar and obtained the doctorate in England.

What does he say to the followers of Islamic currents that we have spoken about?

[Al-Juyushi] I say to them, "Study. Insufficient knowledge is the problem."

[ROSE AL-YUSUF] Dr al-Juyushi, it is truly a problem, as evidenced by what we are suffering in many areas, this being one of them.

Columnist Calls for Formation of 'Green Party'
45040327B Cairo AL-AHALI in Arabic 12 Apr 89 p 5

[Article by Isma'il Sabri 'Abdallah in "Words and Meanings" column: "The Greens"]

[Text] For the last 20 years, the capitalist West has been witnessing the emergence and growth of true popular movements outside the organized political parties. Today these movements have come to have a strength that has forced some of these political parties to conclude election agreements with them. These movements represent intersecting, but not coinciding circles. The broadest of these movements, especially in the United States, is the circle of advocates of limiting nuclear weapons in preparation for their total abandonment. The scope of this circle is shown by the fact that it includes individuals who believe that wars are a part of human life and that talk of lasting peace arouses a dream whose realization is improbable. Next to that circle, there is the peace movement, with all its components. Its thought has developed from merely a struggle against the possibilities of war between the socialist and capitalist camp into promoting

the concept of lasting peace based the idea that abolishing nuclear war is not enough and that mankind has reached a level of maturity that enables it to solve all its conflicts without appealing to arms. Then comes the circle of defenders of the natural environment.

In West Germany in particular, the name "Greens," which the environmentalists have applied to themselves, has become prominent as a designation for a group of people active in all the above directions. The astonishing victory of this tendency in the parliamentary elections (they obtained 29 seats the first time and currently have 37, if my memory has not betrayed me) caused the international media to apply the name "Greens" to similar tendencies. This direction has come to be represented in the European Parliament. (To do so, it had to obtain more than 4 percent of the votes.)

We on the left should understand the nature of "Green" attitudes and their social significance. The popular struggle against nuclear weapons fundamentally influenced the concluding of a Soviet-American agreement to destroy medium-range nuclear missiles. This was no small matter. The most the peace movement had been demanding was a halt to the production of more weapons. This is the first time that an agreement to destroy actually existing weapons has been signed. This attitude has been influential in stopping the proliferation of nuclear power stations. As a result of concern to protect the environment from the dangers of pollution, companies have become threatened with loss of their profits, if they bear the burdens of preventing pollution. The rate of economic growth might therefore retreat and unemployment might increase. The environmentalists have pondered this matter and have ended by condemning the style of life in extensive consumption societies. This style, they say, overlooks man's nonmaterial needs and, at the same time, ruins the environment in a way that may threaten human existence on the planet earth. Thus, the concept of "quality of life" has emerged, in opposition to the continual increase of consumption. The environmentalists have not presented a complete picture of an alternative society. Sometimes this makes them look like people who do not want to choose between capitalism and socialism. In reality, however, they direct the deepest and most penetrating criticism against capitalism, since they condemn capitalism's most important sources of pride: continual increase of consumption, reshaping of nature, and domination over its movement through the use of the discoveries of science and technology. In the name of this progress, the supporters of capitalism have justified all of capitalism's drawbacks.

The Committee on Political Parties has refused permission for the formation of a party for the "Greens" in Egypt. We have the right to ask what the committee's members know about the popular movements we have pointed to. We leftists should include in our programs and bring into our movements considerations of the environment on the strength of our knowledge of the seriousness of the phenomenon and the relevance of the issues it raises.

Commentator Criticizes Effectiveness of Arab Economic Groups

45040326B Cairo ROSE AL-YUSUF in Arabic
17 Apr 89 p 82

[Article by Philip Jallab: "One Condition—Not Forming a Committee!"]

[Text] I confess that it is difficult, if not impossible, to follow the committees and resolutions of the Arab League, the Council of Economic Unity, and the four-, five-, and six-member cooperation councils in the most important things they work for—coordination, integration, or unity in economic matters.

Some of these councils are recent in origin and cannot be called to account at this early date. Others, such as the Arab League and the Council of Unity have had a long shelf life that has almost ended without a single Arab citizen's knowing what coordination, integration, or development has happened or is happening on the Arab economic front.

If the Arab citizen, like the Arab governments, lacks the most important information about his affairs and the affairs of his nation, who is it that knows? Maybe the intelligence agencies, perhaps? Maybe! But they, like us, probably do not know, since nothing worth knowing has happened on the economic level.

All we know, quoting from our local newspapers (who quote from foreign newspapers and information centers), is that we are about 200 million people. Together, we possess all the elements of agriculture, industry, and strategic raw materials. We have perhaps the largest official balance of funds in foreign banks and companies. We have the largest balance of funds smuggled into foreign banks.

Yet most of our citizens live beneath the poverty limit. We import more than half our food, either paying cash, or with aid that can be classified as charity.

We read about "holding companies" among the Arab states, and "nonholding" or "level" companies, about committees that meet to set rules to regulate their work and regulate other committees, about a schedule of yearly meetings fixing the role of each party in the chairmanship of the main committee and the subcommittees, about agreements on trade of commodities we might produce or accumulate, and about competitions that cause sadness or laughter at Arab markets surrounded by protective tariff walls against Arab products.

And then what?

Under the auspices of the Center for Arab Studies, a conference was recently held in Cairo on the Arabs and Europe in 1992. The journalist, Muhammad Hasanayn Haykal, politely and respectfully pulled the rug out from under the conferees. Where are the Arabs who in 1992

will face a Europe with a single market based on 320 million people and an agriculture and industry able to challenge the United States and Japan?

Why don't we behave modestly and try to do something before the current sweeps us away? We have a food problem, a problem of the loaf of bread. We have—fortunately, or perhaps unfortunately—millions of fed-dans of arable land. We have the money and the experts and the farmers. Why don't we forget the imaginary major strategic projects about which we convene committees, and think about starting a wheat-growing project for all the Arab groupings?

A tenth of what we expend on importing wheat could produce Arab wheat for consumption and for export to this "united nation with an eternal mission."

The product, as agricultural experts attest, will be merely wheat, which sides neither with Camp David nor against it; has no position on partial solutions or a comprehensive solution; can be eaten by supporters of armed struggle and supporters of unarmed struggle; and will provide every party with enough time to fight about issues of strategy, destiny, and unity from the Gulf to the ocean, or in the opposite direction.

The one condition is that we not form a committee and not create a holding company.

IRAQ

Ambassador Interviewed on French-Iraqi Relations

44040373 London AL-TADAMUN in Arabic
11 Apr 89 pp 19-20

[Interview With Dr 'Abd-al-Razzaq al-Hashimi, Iraq's ambassador to France by Hamidah Na'na', date, place not given]

[Text] Paris—An interview with Dr 'Abd-al-Razzaq al-Hashimi, Iraq's ambassador in Paris, has been an inevitable necessity in the current phase. French-Iraqi relations which have always been characterized as special continue to hold to this day a distinctive position in France's foreign relations priority ladder.

Despite the war years, Iran's threats to France, the explosions Iran staged in the heart of Paris, the capital, and the kidnapping of hostages in Lebanon with the aim of curtailing the Iraqi-French relations, France has continued—the fact that its political administrations have shifted from right to left, to right and then to left again not withstanding—to rely on a number of constants in its relations with Iraq.

AL-TADAMUN has held the following interview with Iraqi Ambassador Dr 'Abd-al-Razzaq al-Hashimi:

[AL-TADAMUN] French diplomatic circles and political departments believe that Iraqi-French relations, whether economic or political, have their special character. The question of rescheduling Iraqi debts to France was raised during the French foreign minister's (Roland Dumas') latest visit to Baghdad. It is certain that the Iranian-French rapprochement was also the subject of discussion. As your country's ambassador, what is your assessment of Iraqi-French relations at present and what are the horizons of these relations?

[Al-Hashimi] When we want to discuss French-Iraqi relations, it is not right to discuss them in isolation or separately from the international situation, meaning that the collective world countries' relations with the region, including Iraq, and the relationship of this situation intertwine and complicate the political and economic situation prevailing in our region. Therefore, Iraq and France take these conditions into consideration in their bilateral dealings. We are aware that the U.S.-Arab relations are governed by the complex of the U.S.-Israeli relationship and that the Japanese-Arab relationship is void, by its nature, of depth and a political dimension by virtue of its reliance on the economic aspect solely. This makes Europe the party actually eligible to have distinguished relations with the Arab area for years to come. The special character of France's distinguished relations with the Arab group gives France the opportunity to be the most eligible party for these relations.

From this simple analysis, we see that the importance of Iraqi-French relations is not only in the past and present but, more importantly, also in the future. From this analysis, we can conclude that there is no fear for Iraqi-French relations for years to come, despite the intricacy and complexity of the general political situation in the region. The Iraqi-French relationship has been built on the basis of mutual respect and joint interests. So the relations are firm and the proof of this firmness is the fact that these relations have continued to be outstanding despite all the political changes that have occurred in France in the past 15 years and despite all the events which the area has experienced and which could have had negative consequences. It is noticed that the relations have always been developed and firm, and they will continue to be so. Yes, problems, whether economic or at other levels, do emerge. But the two sides always meet to deal with them and they always develop solutions that guarantee the two sides' interests and that bolster their relations.

The current talks between Iraq and France to tackle the problems existing in the economic area will not produce results different from the previous cases.

[AL-TADAMUN] Will France have priority in the post-war economic projects as a token of appreciation for its distinguished position during the war years?

[Al-Hashimi] The question is not one of priority. In case of equal competition, the priority will certainly be given to France as a result of its positive stance.

[AL-TADAMUN] What is your assessment of Arab-French relations, particularly of the French position on the Palestinian issue?

[Al-Hashimi] Regarding France's relations with the Palestinian issue, the French position is, when compared to any other western position, distinguished. There is a clear understanding of the Arab Palestinian people's aspiration and right to self-determination. The reception given to Yasir 'Arafat in Strasbourg by French Foreign Minister Roland Dumas is a positive step and the talk about a likely meeting between Francois Mitterand and Yasir 'Arafat reflects France's positive tendency vis-a-vis the Palestinian issue. We can consider elevation of the level of the PLO office's representation in Paris in the wake of proclamation of the Palestinian State a confirmation of the positive French stance.

[AL-TADAMUN] What about the French efforts to hold the international conference?

[Al-Hashimi] The developments of the past 2 years concerning the Palestinian issue, especially the Intifadah, King Husayn's relinquishment of the [West] Bank and the entrenchment of the PLO as the Palestinians' real representative, have imposed fundamental changes on the international conference concept prevailing before these developments. The image of the international conference seems today to be Palestinian-Israeli and not Arab-Israeli as it was in the past.

In other words, the Palestinian figure which had been absent from the previous concept of the international conference has now become in the current formula an important figure which cannot be overlooked under any circumstances. The importance of the French role in the international conference emerges here through France's distinguished understanding, when compared with the other western positions, of the Palestinian issue.

[AL-TADAMUN] In the lecture you delivered to the diplomatic academy a few days ago, you spoke of the main joints of Iraq's Arab, international and economic policy. This lecture has had its reverberations in the French press and in the other media which have raised a question concerning Iraq's future economic tendency in the peace era.

[Al-Hashimi] I find it strange that French public opinion is surprised by what I said about Iraq's economic tendency. Whoever has followed the entire movement of the party and the government in Iraq and has read the speeches and interviews of the leader president (Saddam Husayn) notices that what is happening now in the Iraqi arena at the economic and political level is not new. His excellency the president asserted as of the mid-1970's that it is not necessary that the state participate in the

minute details of Iraq's economy, meaning that the state guides the general, comprehensive and principled movement of the economic situation without involvement in the executive details, especially in the final stages of the economic process when the citizen, in the form of the private sector, is required to play his role in these activities. If we believe in democracy for man, which is actually the case, then democracy is not just political freedom but economic freedom also.

[AL-TADAMUN] What about political democracy in Iraq?

[Al-Hashimi] You may have perhaps read His Excellency Leader President Saddam Husayn's recent interview with AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in which he referred to this issue precisely. As he has said, Iraq is living nowadays in a state of triumph. It is usual for third world countries to remember democracy when they are faced with problems, in the believing that their adoption of democracy will solve the problems. Iraq is projecting the democratic issue nowadays through confidence in the masses and through (the leadership's self-confidence). The people who fought for 8 years deserve to enjoy democracy because we are confident that they will utilize and exploit it to strengthen Iraq's future.

Party Plurality

[AL-TADAMUN] In his interview with AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT, his excellency the president underlined party plurality. Does this mean that he will abolish the National Front concept?

[Al-Hashimi] Yes. The new system of party plurality will eliminate the National Front and the political arena will be open to whoever will serve Iraq better by enjoying this right. The National Assembly elections, scheduled for 1 April 1989, have been postponed so that the opportunity may be given to the largest number of people wishing to run for election and to compete for National Assembly membership.

[AL-TADAMUN] For sometime now, we have been noticing the successive press and media campaigns against Iraq, beginning with issue of the use of chemical weapons and ending with human rights. Most often, issues are raised against Iraq for no reason. How do you interpret this issue?

[Al-Hashimi] With Iraq emerging triumphant from the war, numerous calculations and theories in which the Arab nation's adversaries said that it is impossible for Iraq's and the Arab nation's enemies to capitulate to this state of triumph have been dropped. They are certainly trying to slight the proportions of these triumphs so as to limit Iraq's role which is capable of serving Iraq and the Arab nation. These campaigns fall within this framework. They started at the end of the war with the issue of the use of chemical weapons against the Kurds and then with the issue of the biological weapons. The latest such

campaign provoked the issue of torturing children. All these reports are tendentious and are refuted by a single fact, namely that the Iraqi people fought a vicious enemy for 8 years and remained united. Logic says: An oppressed people cannot fight and triumph. This is history's and the peoples' logic. The war lasted not one or two days but 8 years. Such a period is enough to subject the values, principles and ideals in which the people believe to a real test. The achieved state of triumph proves indisputably the soundness and firmness of these ideals and values and the depth of our people's belief in them.

This is enough to refute the allegations and the rumors.

ISRAEL

Arab Knesset Member Talks With 'Arafat, Discusses Likud

44040340 Jerusalem AL-BAYADIR AL-SIYASI in Arabic 25 Mar 89 pp 22-24

[Interview With 'Abd-al-Wahhab Darawishah, Arab Democratic Party chairmman, by 'Ali Yahya Salman and Rami Mahmud Nasrallah, at Jerusalem's Arab University (on 14 March 1989); "AL-BAYADIR AL-SIYASI Interviews 'Abd-al-Wahhab Darawishah, Arab Democratic Party Chairman; 'Arafat Deals With Big and Small Humbly, Humanely and With Pride in His Palestinian Identity; I See National Movement in Islamic Movement; I Hope Labor Party Will Rid Itself of Its Complicated Leadership"]

[Text] Jerusalem—Life Synopsis:

Born in 1943 near Iksal village in Marj Ibn 'Amir. Married and has 7 children: Lubna, Rim, Raniyah, Basil, Haytham, Tariq and Wahibah. Completed his studies at Jaffa's Arab Teachers Institute and then enrolled in Jaffa University where he completed his studies in general history, administration and inspection. He worked as a teacher, a comprehensive secondary school principal and inspector at the Ministry of Education. As member of the Teachers Union, he represented the Arab teachers for numerous years.

In 1984, he was elected to the Knesset as a candidate on a Labor Party list. He left the Labor Party on 23 January 1988 in protest of the oppression policy followed in the occupied territories. He founded the Arab Democratic Party on 9 April 1988.

[AL-BAYADIR AL-SIYASI] You met with 'Arafat in Cairo. What took place between you, what issues did you discuss in connection with the peace process and why was the meeting revealed a month after it had taken place?

[Darawishah] The fact is that I revealed the meeting with Chairman Yasir 'Arafat a month later because some of my friends in the Knesset's leftist bloc with whom I had

shared the secret of this meeting asked me not to reveal the meeting so as not to jeopardize the meetings that were simultaneously taking place between Palestinians and Israelis in Paris and another meeting between the Israeli peace forces and Palestinians in the Hague, the Netherlands. Those friends said that revealing the meeting with 'Arafat would overshadow these meetings and that it was better to delay revealing it. I decided that for the public interest and for the peace issue generally, it was better to postpone revealing the meeting so as to give the opportunity to more Israelis to meet with Palestinian leaders and with PLO members.

In any case, the meeting was held in Cairo after I had received an invitation from the Egyptian Workers Federation. Brother Ahmad Ahmad 'Imadi, the Egyptian Workers Federation's secretary general, sent me the first-ever invitation of its kind to an Israeli citizen to take part in an activity that was being organized by the Egyptian Workers Federation. The invitation was to attend a conference scheduled by the Egyptian labor unions for 6 January to support the intifadah [uprising] and to celebrate the Palestinian revolution's 24th anniversary with the participation of Palestinian and Egyptian leaders and the chairmen of Arab labor unions. Brother Yasir 'Arafat was also invited to this conference and he delivered an address to the conferees. We were then invited to a luncheon and there I met with brother 'Arafat. The discussion dealt with the peace issues and with the political developments. Brother Yasir 'Arafat also sent the Israeli people a clear peace message telling them that peace is a firm strategy of the Palestinian people and the PLO and that the PLO is prepared to negotiate with Israel in order to establish in the area a comprehensive and lasting peace that guarantees the Palestinian and Israeli peoples' rights. This was a clear peace message. 'Arafat also expressed his willingness to negotiate with any Israeli prime minister. The truth is that I am convinced that this is a clear peace message which reflects a courageous position that seeks peace and that is willing to sacrifice for peace. The message shows that the PLO has charted for itself a clear strategy for achieving a just and lasting peace in the area.

[AL-BAYADIR AL-SIYASI] The United States started a dialogue with the PLO under ex-President Ronald Reagan's administration. How do you see the position of the new U.S. Administration on the Palestinian issue?

[Darawishah] Actual preparation in the U.S. policy began at the end of Reagan's administration. It is my opinion that Bush had a hand in this change because he wanted to inherit from the [Reagan] administration positive stances, not the rigid and negative stance which characterized Reagan's and Shultz' administration. I have also heard and learned that Bush demanded the adoption of better stances so that he may inherit an easier position that enables him to complete the change trip. It is my opinion that there are actual changes—slow perhaps, but continuous—in the U.S. policy because the

United States and the Soviet Union, the two superpowers, have become convinced that it is impossible to maintain the status quo in the Middle East region, Israel's occupation of the Palestinian territories, the wars, the violence and the ceaseless aggression committed by Israel against the Palestinians, whether in Lebanon or in the occupied territories. The two superpowers have developed the conviction that it is now impossible to maintain the status quo in light of the Middle East's serious arms race and that it is necessary to establish a just and comprehensive peace. The new U.S. Administration has begun to act on the strength of this conviction. Perhaps the U.S. Administration has not yet applied the required pressure on Israel because this administration has a problem: On the one hand, the U.S. Administration does want to pressure Israel but the administration itself is subjected to pressure from the strong and influential U.S. Zionist pro-Israel lobby. This is why the U.S. Administration is trying to free itself of the U.S. Zionist pro-Israel lobby's pressure so that it may put pressure on the Israeli Government. It is my opinion that Bush's administration is freer of the U.S. Zionist pressure than Reagan's administration was. This [situation] will bear fruit. Even though Shamir and Arens asked the Shultz [as published] administration to terminate the dialogue with the PLO, the U.S. Administration is determined to engage in this dialogue. It is my opinion that the dialogue will continue and intensify, especially when the U.S. Administration forms the team that will negotiate with the Soviet Union, that will arrange matters insofar as the Middle East is concerned and that will adopt a clearer and more daring policy. Until this team is formed, there will be additional steps. This team will be formed in the coming weeks and the U.S. Administration will begin taking more effective and positive steps in connection with the Middle East conflict.

[AL-BAYADIR AL-SIYASI] Let us return to your meeting with Yasir 'Arafat. Was this meeting coordinated with Knesset members supporting negotiation with the PLO and is there a plan to form in the Knesset a lobby to pressure the Israeli Government to negotiate with the PLO?

[Darawishah] The meeting took place on my personal initiative and at the invitation of the Egyptian Workers Federation. No member of the Israeli Knesset had had knowledge of this meeting. Upon returning from Egypt, I talked with a number of leftist Knesset members and familiarized them with the meeting. In any case, we are working within the Knesset to develop a strong and clear position supported by a large number of Knesset members—a position that says yes to negotiation with the PLO and yes to a just and comprehensive peace that guarantees the creation of a Palestinian state next to Israel, i.e., 2 states for 2 peoples living side by side peacefully and with cooperation and understanding. This vision is shared by a considerable number of the Knesset members, amounting, in my estimate, to nearly 20 members from the leftist blocs and Labor Party doves.

[AL-BAYADIR AL-SIYASI] Is there coordination among them? Is there the possibility of coordination in the future?

[Darawishah] In fact, there is no strong coordination. Each member acts according to what he deems fit. But there is constant dialogue and understanding among them. I hope that the Knesset's dovish faction will revive within this Knesset the peace forces that operated within the previous Knesset. In this Knesset, this faction has not met even once. In the previous Knesset session, I took the initiative and got this faction together. We will resume this faction's activities when the Knesset members who are now holding meetings in New York and other places return home. There is a need to intensify the efforts to unite the leftist forces and the Arab-Jewish peace forces in the country in order to develop a strong and clear position that supports the peace procession.

[AL-BAYADIR AL-SIYASI] We have recently heard that Yasir 'Arafat has expressed his willingness to visit Israel. Did you discuss the question of this visit during your meeting with 'Arafat in Cairo? What is your comment on Israel's rejection of such a visit?

[Darawishah] Rabin and Shamir have rejected it. This rejection is no surprise because both Rabin and Shamir represent the Israeli Government's official position which is a position of rejection, rigidity and intransigence. But history will force Israel to change its position. I recall that Begin, an ex-prime minister, took rejectionist positions and promised the settlers of (Sina'ut Sinya), an Israeli settlement in the Sinai, that he would go live there when he retired. But he was the first to return Sinai to Egypt because the international circumstances forced him to do so. It is my opinion that Shamir is not the only one playing in the international arena. There are numerous other forces that are more important than Shamir. In my opinion, the State of Israel and the Israeli Government are not strong enough to oppose the world, especially if they are subjected to U.S. pressure. They will not be able to withstand such pressure and will be forced to accept the realities of history, geography and politics which will require them to recognize the PLO and negotiate with 'Arafat. Proceeding on this basis, I sent today, 14 March 1989, a message to Shamir denouncing his rejectionist position and his rejectionist and intransigent response to Chairman Yasir 'Arafat's initiative and to his willingness to visit Israel and talk to the Israeli Government on a peaceful solution to the conflict. I have denounced this position and asked Shamir to take another position that says yes to the PLO, that is willing to negotiate with the PLO and that says welcome to 'Arafat as Menachem Begin previously said welcome to Egyptian President al-Sadat.

[AL-BAYADIR AL-SIYASI] From your meeting with 'Arafat, how did you find his personality?

[Darawishah] 'Arafat is an intelligent and realistic man. With his personality, he symbolizes Palestinian nationalism and true Arabism. I also encountered the affection 'Arafat displays toward whoever contacts him and the sincere feelings which make him deal with both big and small humbly, humanely and with pride in his Palestinian identity. In my opinion, all these qualities give him favorable and positive advantages which distinguish him when compared with many world leaders. My opinion is that 'Arafat, unlike al-Sadat, does not seek an independent solution with Israel. Yasir 'Arafat says: I am prepared to visit Israel and to meet with the Israeli leaders, provided that the Arab states and Arab leaders agree to this. He does not seek an independent solution, and this is what distinguishes him positively from other leaders.

[AL-BAYADIR AL-SIYASI] Several meetings have been held in Cairo, such as the Eduard Shevardnadze-Moshe Arens meeting and the Shevardnadze-'Arafat meeting. How do you explain the relationship between Egypt and the PLO, considering that Egypt has become a center of political movements?

[Darawishah] Under President Husni Mubarak's administration, Egypt has come to hold an excellent position in whatever pertains to the area's peace procession. The current Egyptian administration does actually want to push the peace process forward. Egypt's relations with the PLO are very firm and there is full Egyptian-Palestinian coordination. Moreover, Egypt is distinguished by having diplomatic relations with Israel and is the only country that has concluded a peace treaty with Israel. Egypt also has excellent relations with the United States, the Soviet Union, the western countries and the overwhelming majority of the Arab countries. This enables it to actually be a center for every dialogue and a pressuring force that pushes the peace process forward, especially since it feels that there is an Egyptian, as well as an Arab, interest in establishing peace. Egypt yearns for peace. I have realized this from my meetings with the Egyptian leaders, even with the Egyptian opposition. All the Egyptian people are now unanimous on the need to move the peace process forward and to achieve a just and comprehensive peace that guarantees the establishment of an independent Palestinian state.

[AL-BAYADIR AL-SIYASI] Local government elections were held in Israel 2 weeks ago. In the Jewish circle, the Likud Party made gains that have turned it into the number one party and the central party. How do you explain the Likud's success and the Labor Party's failure?

[Darawishah] The primary outcome is the failure of the Labor Party, or rather the failure of the Labor Party leadership, to lead the Labor Party bloc to success in the local government elections. The Labor Party also failed in the Knesset elections because the wornout and complicated leadership—Rabin, Peres, Navon, Bar-lev and others—cannot, in my opinion, lead this party to any

success because it is floundering. Politically, these leaders have no clear line. They talk of peace while simultaneously embracing an oppressive policy in the occupied territories. They talk of their desire to take part in an international conference while, on the other hand, they say: We refuse to talk to the PLO. Thus, the Israeli people don't have 2 options. The peace party used to be the Labor Party and the war and rejection party was the Likud Party. The picture is unclear now and there is great confusion and floundering. This situation does not give the Israeli people the opportunity to elect a peace party. The Labor Party tried to depict itself as such party but failed to persuade either the Arab or the Jewish ordinary Israeli citizen that it is a true peace party. This is why the Labor Party lost the Knesset elections battle and the local government elections battle and why it will lose a lot more of its positions in the Histadrut elections and in the labor councils as long as the wornout leadership persists in its abortive policy and continues to steer the Labor Party's rudder. I hope that the Labor Party will rid itself of this wornout, unsuccessful and complicated leadership and will be able to bring forth a young and moderate leadership from among the doves and the young forces to lead this party. We will then feel optimistic.

[AL-BAYADIR AL-SIYASI] What is your opinion of the outcome of these elections in the Arab circle?

[Darawishah] As happened in the Jewish circle, the failure of the Labor Party's wornout and complicated leadership was reflected in failure for the front's [not further specified] wornout and complicated leadership. This leadership has failed abysmally. It tried to monopolize the national action and to institute itself as the sole leadership on the Arab scene. This failure has been translated in abysmal failure for the communist party and for the front leadership which has fought the emergence of any new movement in the arena. This leadership has fought the Land Movement, the Progressive Movement, the Islamic Movement and the Arab Democratic Party. The success of the Islamic Movement, of the Progressive Movement, which has gained the chairmanship of 'Arrabat al-Butuf that used to be an impregnable frontal and communist position, and of the Arab Democratic Party—the Islamic movement's success has been a real revolution for change in the Arab local authorities. I see this [success] as an endeavor to change the political, social and religious framework because the Islamic Movement arose as a socio-religious force seeking to achieve political objectives as well. I see in the Islamic Movement a national movement seeking to make actual changes and not just raise slogans, as the front has done in numerous positions. Let us, for example, consider the major success achieved by the Islamic Movement in Umm al-Fahm. What happened in Umm al-Fahm is that the Islamic Movement was able to mobilize the overwhelming majority of the inhabitants to make a change by ousting Hashim Mahamid who had failed abysmally in managing Umm al-Fahm Municipality and to change the front's authoritative control of Umm al-Fahm. Yes,

there is a racial discrimination policy from which our masses are suffering. We all fight this policy. But what we do not condone is that we discriminate against each other and do each other injustice, as has happened in Umm al-Fahm and in other places. The Islamic Movement rose to correct these conditions. I wish Shaykh Ra'id Salah success and good luck and I congratulate the heads of the Arab local governments and wish them success in leading their villages forward and in overcoming the obstacles placed in their path. Within the local and regional framework, the Arab Democratic Party has made major accomplishments, except for Jit where a family grouping worked against Ahmad Abu-'Usbah. Local council chairmen were elected through the Arab Democratic Party—'Abd-al-Ra'uf al-Muwasi in al-Furaydis, A'ad 'Azayiziyah in Dabburiya, Ahmad Abu-Layl in 'Ayn Mahil and Ahmad 'Abbas in Tuhaf, in addition to local council members in numerous villages.

[AL-BAYADIR AL-SIYASI] The question now is: Is there an end to the internal disagreements in the Arab circle?

[Dawrawishah] We have always called for uniting and consolidating the ranks of the Arab Palestinian masses in Israel. This is our political program. We also advocate this in our daily action. We have taken part in all the popular struggle activities undertaken by our Palestinian masses in Israel. We have done this through the Higher Arab Citizens' Affairs Followup Committee. In all the popular activities, we call for unity. But regrettably, the front leadership does not act, and I say this with utter pain, on the strength of a purely Arab Palestinian interest because it is a joint Jewish-Arab front and because the main influence in this leadership is the Jewish influence. The front leadership has never been willing to participate in any action on a nationalist basis. When we called in the Followup Committee for establishing in the country an Arab national fund to fight the policy of racial discrimination, they [leadership] rejected the call. When we called for forming an Arab national lobby, they rejected this also. I call with utter sincerity and with full willingness to sacrifice everything for unity between the Islamic Movement, the Progressive Movement and the Arab Democratic Party and for waging the Histadrut elections with a single list and then the Knesset elections with a single list in order that we may make great accomplishments and may have proper representation through which we can form a lobbying force to achieve equality at home and just peace in the region.

[AL-BAYADIR AL-SIYASI] Does the law which prohibits meetings with PLO members pose an obstacle to Israelis wishing to negotiate with the PLO?

[Darawishah] The Knesset passed this law in 1986 in an endeavor by the Israeli right to obstruct dialogue with the PLO when this right saw that Knesset members and numerous Israelis were engaged in dialogue and meetings with the PLO. But I call this law, which they have called the terrorism-prevention law, the terroristic law

which seeks to obstruct dialogue between the Palestinian and the Israeli. I rejected this law and voted against it at the time. I twice submitted proposals to the Knesset agenda to rectify this law and to permit meetings with the PLO. I have refused to obey the law and will continue to refuse to obey it. I have met with PLO leaders and will continue the meetings so as to enhance the peace process, acting on the strength of the firm principles and of the voice of the national conscience in which I believe and through the Arab Democratic Party's program which advocates negotiation with the PLO. This terroristic law will not deter me. I urge more Knesset members and Israeli notables to meet with PLO leaders to discuss peace. I will continue the meetings with Palestinian leaders. The [Israeli] police summoned me for interrogation but I refused to answer the summons and notified the Knesset chairman that I am not willing to be interrogated on this issue and that if my parliamentary immunity is lifted, I will be prepared to shoulder all the consequences.

'Abd-al-Wahhab Darawishah stressed that the PLO is, in its capacity as the Palestinian people's sole legitimate representative, the only party entitled to reject or accept any peace initiative.

LEBANON

Al-Huss, 'Awn Express Views on Recent Clashes
44040354 London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic
10 Apr 89 p 4

[Report on interviews with Acting Prime Minister Dr Salim al-Huss and General Michel 'Awn, by unnamed interviewer: "AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT Interviews Two Rival Heads of Government About the Syrian Military Presence"; Beirut, date not given]

[Text] Beirut has learned from its experiences not to trust cease-fire agreements. Residents are careful to use the truce in order to send for more sand bags to fortify their homes and shelters. "The cease-fire will not last long"—that is what you hear in the two halves of the capital. The politicians confess that the truce is fragile, because there has been no agreement yet on anything. They admit that the question has gone beyond the problem of the ports and has turned into an open dispute about the Syrian military presence in Lebanon. Prime Minister Dr Salim al-Huss thinks this question can be discussed only in the framework of a united government. Military government head General Michel 'Awn thinks that Syrian withdrawal is necessary to enable the Lebanese to talk and agree about reform. Syria thinks that the solution begins with "removal of 'Awn."

AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT asked the two rival heads of government about the question of the presence of Syrian forces and the confrontation going on between them and 'Awn's brigades.

Prime Minister al-Huss stressed the transitional nature of the two rival "governments" and condemned the "massacre" that the capital and surrounding areas had witnessed. He preferred not to take up many questions and responded briefly to the subject of 'Awn's demand for the withdrawal of Syrian forces.

Al-Huss said: "We are careful, first of all, about there being absolutely no equivalence between an enemy and a brother. We do not allow ourselves to draw parallels between the Israeli occupation of the South and the Syrian presence in most other Lebanese regions. Israel is an enemy that occupied our land as a result of its 1978 attack and major sweep in 1982. There are Security Council resolutions calling for the immediate and unconditional departure of the occupation forces from the South to the internationally recognized border.

"The Syrian presence, on the other hand, is the result of a Lebanese decision taken at the highest level of legitimate authorities in 1976 and strengthened by an Arab resolution passed at the Cairo summit in October 1976. The summit resolution called for the creation of Arab Deterrent Forces, and Syrian Arab forces formed the backbone in them. During the 1982 Israeli sweep, the Syrian Arab forces withdrew from some regions, but they subsequently returned to some of them, including the capital, Beirut, by a Lebanese decision given expression at the time by the prime minister, the late Rashid Karami, as well as by the position of the head of the Chamber of Deputies, Mr Husayn al-Husayni, and a number of ministers. This was after a series of bloody and destructive engagements that the capital witnessed in its streets and lanes between armed organizations and parties. Based on that Lebanese wish, Syrian forces returned to end these engagements in February 1987. We say that Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon takes place by a Lebanese decision that must issue from the Council of Ministers in a single, united government. We do not think it is General 'Awn's right to make such a decision by himself, not to mention the fact that we do not think he has the character of legitimacy to say this."

He added: "On this occasion, we must recall the resolution of the 1982 Fes summit, discussing Lebanese President Amin al-Jumayyil's request on this subject. The resolution stipulated the need for agreement on this matter between the Lebanese and Syrian governments.

"Finally, we must point out that the majority of Lebanese do not recognize the legitimacy of the so-called military government headed by General 'Awn. Even those of his faction who hold it to be legitimate do not think that so basic and important an issue as the presence of Syrian forces is one of the issues that a transitional government can deal with. One fears that the real inducement to raising this issue at this particular time is to invent a reason to prolong the present abnormal situation embodied in the division of the government and thus to lengthen the stay of the so-called military government. Furthermore, in many Lebanese regions,

the Syrian Arab forces guarantee stability and the non-recurrence of a state of fighting between armed militias. Therefore, talk about the withdrawal of those forces before an alternative is found to perform this security function is out of place."

The head of the military government talked about the presence of Syrian forces and about that bloody confrontation that began in Lebanon on 14 March. Here is the text of the interview with him:

[AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT] Why did the fighting flare up?

[Awn] The answer is simple. It was because the Lebanese government made a serious move to expel the foreign armies from Lebanon. We are not the ones who started the fighting. The manner in which it is taking place is not the manner we chose. We announced the beginning of a battle for liberation—a transition to a new stage of resistance—but we were not the party that began the artillery and rocket barrage. All we have done since the middle of last month is to respond to sources of fire that are pouring their projectiles onto civilian and economic targets.

[AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT] But didn't you at least contribute to the creation of a climate of war?

[Awn] If our demanding sovereignty and independence in a united country elicits a reaction like this, it means that the clash is inevitable. We are not going to relinquish any region of Lebanon's internationally recognized borders, nor are we going to abandon the country's destiny. Through this demand, the government is expressing the feeling of all Lebanese equally, even if it is now difficult for a portion of them to raise their voice aloud.

Spark of the Ports

[AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT] Some people accuse you of kindling the fighting when you began a blockade of some of the ports. What is your reply?

[Awn] The breakup of the state and its institutions in recent years tended to encourage the militias to take over public utilities and ports. The danger of this action lies not only in the government's being deprived of the greater part of its revenues, but also in making these ports a launching point for terrorist infiltration and drug trafficking. This harmed Lebanon's relations with the world. An international desire became apparent for the legitimate government to extend its authority over these ports. The government undertook the regaining of the port of Beirut and its restoration to legitimate authority. The step was welcomed by the very quarters that later began talking about the alleged siege. The Lebanese army interfered with no legitimate port. It merely prevented ships from entering illegitimate ports. To be clear and frank, I say that the question is not a question of

ports. It is a question of the presence of foreign armies. The current conflict will not be ended by a solution to the ports question; it requires a solution to the question of the presence of these armies on Lebanese territory.

Foreign Armies

[AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT] What foreign armies do you mean?

[AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT] Whether I call them foreign armies or non-Lebanese armies, the result is the same. I mean the Israeli Army that occupies part of South Lebanon, and the Syrian Army spread over more than 60 percent of Lebanon's territory and lacking any legitimate justification for its presence there. I also mean the armed groups that facilitated Syria's entry—the Iranian groups, for example.

[AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT] But your attack seemed focused during the last weeks on the Syrian Army alone.

[Awn] Perhaps this seemed to be the picture because of the military conflicts between the Lebanese and Syrian Armies. However, the Syrian reaction to our demand for the withdrawal of Syrian forces came in violent, military form, as if we had dared to raise a subject they had classified as tabu.

[AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT] Don't you think it illogical to demand withdrawal of Syrian forces while the Israeli occupation of part of South Lebanon continues?

[Awn] First, I want to remind you that Syrian forces entered Lebanon 2 years before Israeli forces entered the South. Then, the past years have seen no friction between the two armies, except when Israel swept through the city of Beirut. What we expected from Syria was help in regaining the South. That, essentially, is one of the duties of a brother. Unfortunately—we say it with bitterness—every regional state is using the presence of another regional state as a pretext to maintain its army in Lebanon. This game has pushed Lebanon into a state of fragmentation that would have threatened its existence and survival, had we not begun the process of resistance and reuniting the forces that believe in the unity and sovereignty of Lebanon.

[AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT] Didn't Syrian forces enter Lebanon by Lebanese request?

[Awn] That is correct, but they entered in the framework of the Arab Deterrent Force whose mission was ended by the president of Lebanon when he gave notice to the Syrian authorities and Arab summit. Since that time, Syrian forces have had no legitimate presence in Lebanon. Under international law, this presence has turned into an occupation. This state of affairs is what complicates relations between Lebanon and Syria. We want relations to be normal, marked by cooperation between two independent states, like all our relations with Arab states.

[AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT] Some people accuse you of having dragged Lebanon into a military adventure and of now having become prisoners of the slogans on whose basis you entered the confrontation.

[Awn] Undoubtedly, what is now happening embarrasses a number of parties who preferred not to raise the questions so frankly and clearly, so that they would not be forced to take a stand. I find it strange to describe a people's decision to resist as an "adventure." If we granted this logic, it would mean that the Algerians should not have caused resistance to break out, and the same for the Afghans. Inequality between military forces does not justify surrender. The existence of a local cover that these armies try to provide does not give the conflict an internal character. The existence of French who supported the Germans did not turn the conflict into one between French. Furthermore, large armies are strong in their own states and countries; they do not have such strength when they are on the territory of others and against them. To be even clearer, we are not looking for a clash with Syria. Many given facts require the existence of relations of cooperation between the two states and armies—on condition, however, that relations be based on two free wills, and that each of the two armies be in its own country.

[AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT] On whom did you rely at the regional or international level in order to announce the beginning of resistance?

[Awn] I did not rely on any power, and I asked no one's permission. I relied on the Lebanese people, who understand the facts completely and understand that their country is being pushed toward complete breakup and disappearance, if the foreign armies are not expelled. I think it is in the interest of the Arabs and the world for Lebanon to regain its sovereignty and for the legitimate authority to return to every inch of Lebanese territory. Fellow Arabs and the world have paid the price for Lebanon's conversion into a pit of terrorism. There are no secrets in this field. The great powers understand that the terrorist groups that have carried out operations in Arab and European states have camps and positions in the Biqa' region, where the legitimate Lebanese government has no presence. Everyone understands that the breakup of Lebanon will increase the danger of terrorism and give it a permanent base. I asked no one's permission, but I am certain that the change in position can only be to Lebanon's advantage.

'Awn and Washington

[AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT] Could we know the reason for the stormy meeting between you and the American ambassador in Beirut?

[Awn] It was not a stormy meeting. However, after the formation of this government, the ambassadors found themselves facing a new language that would not accept leaving the actor unknown or accept the role of the

victim forbidden even to cry out and protest. We understand that the great powers have regional calculations and interests, but at the same time we insist on defending our interest as a state and as a people. I did not ask the United States for weapons or for help; I asked it for what is in keeping with the slogans it raises: the departure of all non-Lebanese armies from Lebanon, and support for Lebanon's unity, independence, and sovereignty. The same was the case with the other great powers. Certain changes have indeed begun to appear. The great powers have all the necessary information. Military attaches can ascertain with the unaided eye that the Syrian forces are the ones shelling our areas. The French envoy announced this after the French Embassy picked up a telephone call ordering the shelling of the embassy and its surroundings. I hope the other countries will follow France's position.

[AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT] Is the cease-fire holding, or is it collapsing?

[Awn] We are not the ones who decide. The matter is in the hands of the side that essentially began the shelling. We have notified the Arab League of the cease-fire violations committed by the other side. I have for this reason asked for a Lebanese-Syrian military committee both to oversee the cease-fire and to discuss scheduling the withdrawal of Syrian forces.

[AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT] Prime Minister al-Huss says that the question of Syrian withdrawal can be discussed only in the context of a united government. Don't you think it would have been better to have agreed on reconciliation and reforms before raising this subject?

[Awn] I find this question very strange. Have all these years not proved that reconciliation is forbidden and that a meeting between Lebanese is forbidden? All this is forbidden because any reconciliation will lead to raising the question of the presence of foreign armies. I have called for dialogue between Lebanese. I hold that the questions that cannot be a matter for discussion are the axioms of Lebanese independence, unity, and sovereignty. The system requires reform, and I am certain that the Lebanese are capable of agreement—but in a free dialogue. In the shadow of guns no agreement can be reached, as long as there is someone forbidding the commanders, politicians, and leaders from meeting with the other leaders. In this regard, I find it strange that some people justify their presence in Lebanon by the system's need for reform. This is just one more blatant indication of open intervention in our internal affairs. Reform of the system on the basis of justice and balance is a possibility; imposing on the Lebanese a formula that attaches them to a foreign will is utterly unacceptable. I understand Dr al-Huss's circumstances, but I tell him that history shows no mercy. We have to be brave and expose ourselves to danger in order to remove this danger from our country.

[AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT] What will you do if this confrontation continues?

[Awn] We will move on every level. We are a founding member of the Arab League and have always abided by its covenants. Obviously, we will count on the league's role. We have therefore explained the facts to the Arab ministerial committee and given all support to its efforts. Allowing a fait accompli to be imposed upon Lebanon will constitute a very dangerous precedent for the league and for inter-Arab relations. Next, we will move toward the international organization. Clearly, the period of ignoring the Lebanese problem has ended. The new relaxation of tension must include Lebanon.

[AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT] What if nothing tangible is accomplished in diplomatic contacts?

[Awn] We have no choice but to resist. This does not mean mutual shelling. That is not the right way to get an occupying army out. There will be resistance in every sense of the word. But as for shelling, we turn to it only to respond. My orders are clear: response to Syrian sources of fire and those coming from areas of Syrian deployment.

[AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT] What about calculations of gain and loss?

[Awn] The agencies and television have carried a picture of the situation and the insane shelling that has targeted areas subject to the Lebanese government, as well as civilians and economic installations. Imagine 7,000 shells falling on these areas in a single night, and not a single soldier wounded!

[AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT] Is it right for an official to say that he will fight to the end, even if Beirut is destroyed?

[Awn] There is no half independence and half sovereignty. There are those who think that destroying Beirut will make the Lebanese surrender. I wanted to say that we are people with a cause, and we will resist to the end.

[AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT] Are you ready for dialogue with Syria?

[Awn] At any time, but on the basis of dialogue between two independent countries, on the basis of noninterference in internal affairs, and with the dialogue to begin on the subject of scheduling the withdrawal of Syrian forces from Lebanon.

MOROCCO

Study of Moroccan Population Abroad
45190073f Casablanca LA VIE INDUSTRIELLE ET
AGRICOLE in French 5 Apr 89 pp 10-11

[First four paragraphs are LA VIE INDUSTRIELLE ET AGRICOLE introduction]

[Text] According to a study conducted by the Directorate of Statistics in the Ministry of Planning, the number of Moroccans living abroad in 1984 exceeded 1,140,000.

Three-fourths of them were in Arab countries (22 percent) or in America (3 percent) [sentence as published]. It should be noted that nearly 44 percent of all emigrants were in France, with Belgium (14 percent) and the Netherlands (13 percent) ranking second and third, respectively.

Moroccan emigrants in the Arab countries are mainly workers, while those in Europe tend to have their families with them, since they have also been there longer. From 1968 to 1984, the number of emigrant Moroccans increased almost 5.7 times, for an average annual increase of 8.8 percent.

The breakdown by sex and age group shows that 40 percent of Moroccan emigrants to the European countries are women. That trend toward a larger percentage of women among our emigrants has been strengthened in recent years by the policy in several European countries of reuniting families. Moroccan emigrants are also characterized by their youth (38.6 percent are under 15 years of age, and 53.6 percent are less than 25 years old), whereas the 25-54 age group makes up 43.6 percent of the resident Moroccan population.

Lastly, statistics as to the type of activity engaged in by our emigrants are available only for France, Belgium, and Spain. In France, the active population totaled about 40

percent in 1982, whereas it had exceeded 58 percent in 1975, and 15 percent of the population was reportedly out of work. In Belgium, the rate of activity among Moroccans (27.4 percent) is much lower than in France.

The table below shows the breakdown of Moroccans living abroad by their country of residence in 1984. It shows that the total number of Moroccans living abroad comes to over 1 million and that 74 percent of them are in Europe, followed by 22 percent in the Arab countries and, lastly, by about 3 percent in North America. A negligible number are in the sub-Saharan African countries.

Nearly 44 percent of all Moroccan nationals abroad are in France, a traditional immigrant country, and they account for 59 percent of those living in Europe. Belgium and the Netherlands are in second and third place, with 14 percent and 13 percent, respectively, of Morocco's nationals living in Europe.

Moroccan emigration to the Arab countries (except Algeria) is relatively recent and, in general, is the result of agreements between Morocco and those countries (Libya, Saudi Arabia, and Iraq). Almost all Moroccan emigrants to those petroleum-producing countries have gone there to work, contrary to the situation in Europe, which has passed that stage by also accepting the families of workers.

Distribution of Moroccan Population Living Abroad by Region and Country of Immigration in 1984 (in thousands)

Region and country	Number		Source*
	Thousands	Percent	
Total	1,140.4	100.0	
Europe	842.4	73.9	
France	500.0	43.9	(1)
Belgium	119.0	10.5	(2)
Netherlands	106.4	9.3	(3)
FRG	46.0	4.0	(1)
Spain	32.6	2.9	(4)
Great Britain (incl. Gibraltar)	17.0	1.5	(4)
Italy	15.0	1.3	(4)
Scandinavia	5.0	0.5	(5)
Switzerland	1.4	0.1	(4)
Arab countries	248.0	21.7	
Algeria	200.0	17.5	(6)
Libya	23.0	2.0	(4)
Saudi Arabia	11.0	1.0	(4)
Other Arab countries	14.0	1.2	(4)(6)
North America	40.0	3.5	
Canada	30.0	2.6	(6)
United States	10.0	0.9	(6)
Sub-Saharan Africa	10.0	0.9	(6)

*[There is no explanation of these numbers.]

Moroccan emigration is not a recent phenomenon. In fact, some Moroccans even helped fill the gaps caused by the losses suffered by France during World War I. But not until after World War II did emigration begin to intensify, and it has been sizable since the 1960's.

At first, almost all emigrants went to France. But in recent years, the flow of Moroccan emigrants has begun to spread out and include a number of industrial countries as well as a few petroleum-producing Arab countries.

The table below shows how the number of Moroccans living in the most important immigration countries has grown. The Scandinavian countries are included because the data are available, whereas the Arab countries are not for the opposite reason. But that limitation does not affect our conclusions, since the countries listed in the table account for about 68 percent of all Moroccans abroad and 92 percent of those in Europe. It should be pointed out that the increase in the number of Moroccans is due both to a natural increase and to migratory flows.

Increase in Moroccan Population Living in Certain European Countries (in thousands)

Year	France	Belgium	Holland	FRG	Scandinavia	Total
1968	84.2	21.0	12.6	18.0	n.a.*	135.8
1975	260.0	65.9	33.2	25.7	3.1	387.9
1982	431.1	110.2	93.1	42.6	4.8	680.9
1984	500.0	119.0	106.4	46.0	5.0	776.4

*notavailable

In looking at the figures in this table, we see that from 1968 to 1984, the number of Moroccans in those immigration countries increased by a factor of 5.7. That is an average annual increase of 8.8 percent. The largest increase occurred in the Netherlands, where the number of Moroccans was more than 9.6 times greater in 1984 than in 1968. In the FRG, on the other hand, the number increased by a factor of only 2.6, making that the smallest increase. It increased by a factor of 5.9 in France. That growth, which reflects the immigration policies of those countries, particularly as regards the reuniting of families and the cooperation agreements between Morocco and each of those countries, shows that France is still the favorite immigration country for Moroccans. Of all the Moroccans in those five countries, France accounted for 62 percent in 1968 and 64 percent in 1984.

The percentage of Moroccans in Belgium also increased slightly from 15 percent in 1968 to 17 percent in 1975, then dropped back to 15 percent in 1984. This places Belgium in second place, followed by the Netherlands in third place with 9 percent in 1968 and 14 percent in 1984. But the percentage of Moroccans in the FRG, which is in fourth place, dropped by half: from 13 percent in 1968 to only 6 percent in 1984.

Spain, which is not shown in the table above because of the lack of data for the years before 1981, is also an immigration country for Moroccans. The Spanish census of 1981 reported 30 million Moroccans. Compared to the figure of 32.6 million Moroccans living in Spain in 1984, we note a relative change of 9 percent.

It must be emphasized, however, that the changes described above do not take into account those Moroccans living in certain Arab countries—especially Libya and the Arab countries on the Gulf—that had already begun to attract migrants.

Characteristics of Moroccans Living Abroad

In attempting to study certain characteristics of Moroccan nationals abroad, we ran into the problem of the reliability or lack of data to a greater extent than previously. The gaps affecting estimates concerning all Moroccans living in a particular country also affect, and to an even greater extent, estimates as to their distribution according to such characteristics as sex, age, or activity. This is due in part to the fact that the groups being studied are smaller and thus more subject to survey errors and in part to what one could call the "migrant group" effect. For example, in looking at the marital status of migrants, it is often observed that the number of unmarried people is underestimated in terms of those who are married.

Moreover, few countries have statistics on the characteristics of the Moroccan community abroad, a fact that limits the possibilities for a complete analysis of the characteristics of all Moroccans abroad.

However, since our attention is focused on relatively sizable migrant population categories in the countries with the largest Moroccan immigrant populations, it is possible to establish certain basic indicators relative to Moroccans abroad.

Distribution by Age Group

From 1982 to 1984, the number of Moroccans living in France, Belgium, the Netherlands, the FRG, and the Scandinavian countries rose from 681,800 to 776,400, for a relative increase of 14 percent. Those Moroccans are unequally divided between the sexes: three out of every five Moroccan nationals are males.

In recent years, however, thanks to the policy of reuniting families that has been adopted by some immigration countries in Europe, there has been a slight increase in

the number of women among Moroccans in Europe, although they still number fewer than the men. For example, the percentage of Moroccan women in France rose from 26.7 percent in 1975 to 38.9 percent in 1985, while in the Netherlands it rose from 37.5 percent in 1982 to 41.9 percent in 1985 and, in the Scandinavian countries, from 38.0 percent in 1982 to 40.4 percent in 1984. In Belgium, which has the largest percentage of Moroccan women in comparison with the other countries, there has been no significant change in the percentage of women.

Table 2.3 [not shown] also reveals that the smallest percentage of women is found in France, which is the oldest and largest country of emigration for Moroccans, and in the FRG.

We note that in Spain, which is a special case, men account for 51 percent of the total.

Moroccan nationals in Europe are characterized by their youth (see table 2.4 [not shown]): 38.6 percent were less than 15 years old and 53.6 percent were under 25 years of age, whereas only 0.6 percent were 65 or older in 1984. That distribution results from the fact that emigration is highest among the young, who leave the national territory looking for a job or higher pay. It is also due to the policy of encouraging the reuniting of families, which has resulted in the presence of a large number of women and children in Europe. At first, emigration abroad was exclusively a matter of adult males emigrating to find work. But with the passing of time, the age structure of Moroccan nationals abroad has come to show an increasing number of young people and a growing percentage of women.

Belgium and the Netherlands have the largest percentages of children (under 15 years of age) (46.3 percent in 1981 and 42.1 percent in 1985, respectively). The figure is about 36.3 percent in the FRG and 35.7 percent in the Scandinavian countries. This means higher levels of dependence in two first-named countries—Belgium and the Netherlands—than in the other countries.

France has the highest percentage of old people (0.9 percent). This is probably due to the fact that France is the oldest immigration country, a circumstance that has made it possible there more than elsewhere for some Moroccans to reach retirement age and possibly to settle there.

We find that 43.6 percent of the resident Moroccan population is between the ages of 25 and 54—that being roughly the age of the active population in Europe. This age group consists largely of men. In fact, women constitute only 30.1 percent of the total population in that age group. That is less than the percentage of women in the entire population (all age groups combined) (40.1 percent), thus confirming the idea that international emigration is a characteristic of men.

It is in France that we find the largest percentage of adults between the ages of 25 and 54 (46.4 percent), whereas the lowest percentage is found in the FRG (31.3 percent). (Those percentages are not for the same period.)

By sex, the percentage of women is only 28.6 percent in France (1982), making that the lowest percentage of all, whereas the highest percentage is found in Belgium (37.6 percent in 1981). Situated between those two extremes are the Netherlands (33.6 percent in 1985) and the Scandinavian countries (31.4 percent in 1984). Figures for the FRG are not available.

Moroccans in Spain (1981) are both younger and older than those in the other countries: 54.5 percent are under 15 years of age, while 8.4 percent are over 55 years of age. At 37.1 percent, the percentage of adults between the ages of 25 and 54 is the lowest anywhere with the exception of Belgium.

Distribution by Type of Activity

Since data on the types of activity engaged in by Moroccans living abroad are available only for France, Belgium, and Spain, we will consider only those three countries. The emphasis will be on France, for which the data are less scarce and more detailed.

In France, the active Moroccan population numbered 167,600 in 1982, compared to 152,200 in 1975. It accounted for 38.9 percent of the total Moroccan population in 1982, but 58.5 percent in 1975. A perceptible drop in the rate of activity is therefore noted. In 1982, 89.1 percent of the economically active Moroccans were men. That percentage was higher than the percentage for all foreigners as a group (76.3 percent).

Of the active Moroccan population in 1982, 15 percent were unemployed. That unemployment rate was sharply up from 1975, when it totaled only 4 percent (a factor of 3.8). For the French themselves, the unemployment rate (8.4 percent in 1982) had increased by a factor of only 2.5, while for foreigners as a whole the factor was 3.0. (the unemployment rate among foreigners in France was 14 percent in 1982).

The figures for Belgium are less recent. They indicate that the rate of activity among Moroccans (27.4 percent) is much lower than that reported for France in the censuses of 1975 and 1982. The percentage of men in the active population (86.0 percent) is also lower than in France, whereas the unemployment rate is identical to that in France in 1982.

The Spanish census showed a higher rate of activity for the Moroccan population (62.4 percent) and an unemployment rate of 11.8 percent, which is lower than in France or Belgium.

The breakdown by type of activity among Moroccans abroad varies noticeably depending on the immigration country. For that reason, hasty conclusions should not be drawn concerning Moroccan nationals abroad as a group.

SUDAN

Ummah Party Splits Over Ministerial Appointments

45040304C Khartoum AL-HADAF in Arabic
29 Mar 89 p 1

[Article: "Worsening of Ummah Party Disagreements"]

[Text] AL-HADAF's investigations confirm that disagreements continue to widen within the Ummah Party as a result of the party's current ministerial selection. A high source in the Ummah Party said that Prime Minister al-Sadiq al-Mahdi had bypassed the decision of the Ummah Party's parliamentary group, which had approved objective bases and national standards for the selection of ministers in the united national front government. The source indicated that al-Sadiq al-Mahdi had bypassed the decision and had exploited his mandate in order to appoint some leaders whom the source called "local leaders and members of the al-Mahdi household." The source said that this bypassing had evoked angry reactions within the party's parliamentary group. The source described the new government's ministers from the Ummah Party as "feeble and unsuited to conditions of the critical period through which the country is passing, a period that demands ministers with a capacity for great responsibility." He indicated that the majority of ministers that party leader al-Sadiq al-Mahdi had chosen had proved to be failures in previous governments. Their choice did not express the interest of the people, but only the interest of a particular group within the Ummah Party.

The source added that the prime minister had tried to minimize the role of the party's parliamentary group, so that it would not have an influential role in setting the party's political line and choosing its ministers. The source stated that these disagreements would not be soon resolved. He pointed to the conflicting wings inside the party, wings that did business with each other only in exchange for accommodations to satisfy their narrow viewpoint. An example was Mubarak al-Fadil's group, which represented the Islamic Front tendency within the Ummah Party.

Aid Slowdown, Instability Reportedly Affect National Deficit

45040275C Khartoum AL-HADAF in Arabic
19 Mar 89 p 1

[Article: "State Budget Deficit Grows"]

[Text] AL-HADAF's sources indicate that, compared to the financial status during the same period of the past fiscal year, the deficit in the state's general budget has grown significantly during the past 9 months.

These sources add that the deficit has grown primarily because foreign aid has been curtailed due to the fact that the civil war in the south continues. The deficit has grown because expenditures which are not related to production rose and because tax revenues and customs revenues fell. These sources also indicate that the protraction of the political crisis has led to a major decline in the flow of foreign aid. The political crisis is paralyzing the state's machinery, and it is causing the growth of operations by means of which funds are smuggled out of the country.

On the other hand, it is being said in Khartoum that because of the political instability, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development [IBRD] has frozen its activities in the reconstruction projects which had been agreed to with the government. The IBRD is waiting for the new government to be formed; it is waiting to find out what its economic policies and its broad directions will be. These policies and directions will be indicated by the items of the step-by-step program which was signed by political parties and trade unions.

Observers think that inflation rates and prices will rise sharply in the coming period because the state is virtually non-existent and because it is borrowing from the banking system. Inflation rates and prices will rise because the exchange rate for the U.S. dollar rose to 12 pounds in the official market. On the black market the exchange rate rose to over 16 pounds.

Darfur Deputy Reviews Security Situation, Alleged Intervention

45040257C Khartoum AL-USBU' in Arabic
7 Mar 89 p 7

[Interview with Dr Muhammad Adam 'Abd-al-Karim, Ummah Party parliamentary deputy for Darfur, by 'Afaf 'Abdallah and Iman Muhyi-al-Din: "Security Conditions in Darfur"; date and place not given]

[Excerpts] [AL-USBU'] Central African authorities recently arrested about 113 Sudanese merchants in Suq Sam in the Central African Republic [CAR] and sent 83 of them to Bangui. Do such conflicts exist continually between the Sudan and the CAR?

[Abd-al-Karim] The disturbances in Darfur, especially in the border regions, are the result of involvements between the population and tribal groups in Darfur and neighboring countries. The CAR later entered as a party in these struggles. Various activities, commercial or agricultural, link us to the CAR. There used to be complete understanding between authorities in the two countries. Visits were usually exchanged between governors, and security committee meetings were held in the neighboring governorates to discuss all security problems and each party's grievances. What happened recently was the result of activity by intelligence agencies—either Israeli agencies, through the activity of

Israeli companies that buy gum arabic smuggled from Darfur into the CAR, or the intelligence agencies of other countries that have entered as parties into the regional struggle in the Chad-Sudan area.

As for the information that has been received about the arrest by CAR authorities of a group of Sudanese merchants coming from Darfur, the picture of what really happened has not yet become clear.

[AL-USBU'] Information has recently been reported confirming that French Jaguar airplanes have flown over the villages on our border with the CAR. What is your comment on this?

[Abd-al-Karim] There is a French air base in the CAR. As part of their reconnaissance and information gathering activity, we find these airplanes circling over the Sudanese border. This is objectionable, since it is a violation of our airspace and sovereignty.

Chadian Intervention in Darfur

[AL-USBU'] Now that you have spoken to us about the security situation on our border with the CAR, let us move to Chad, with your permission. Tell us about the beginning of Chadian intervention in the Darfur region.

[Abd-al-Karim] Chad is directly involved in the security problem in Darfur. Regular Chadian soldiers are carrying out a large part of the incidents of armed robbery. [passage omitted]

Given the spread of weapons, as well as the fact that the Chadian army is itself more like a group of militias than a regular army, security has broken down in the region. Armed groups began attacking the Darfur region for plunder and gain. Arms for the tribes slipped in. Some of the tribes that had migrated from Chad became party to the conflicts and local frictions. Foreign intelligence agencies, especially Chadian, but also certain others, became active. They took advantage of tribal involvements in the region and employed some of the common border tribes. This activity has affected the Darfur region negatively.

[AL-USBU'] What is the connection between what was mentioned previously and the conflict going on between Arabs and Fur in the region?

[Abd-al-Karim] The connection between what was mentioned previously and the conflict going on between Arabs and Fur is that the conflict began between a group of the !Raziqat with the Fur—i.e., between herders and farmers. This is something normal, but the question was complicated as a result of intervention by other parties. Thus we find that some of the Chadian Arab tribes have become a party to the conflict. There are attempts by these tribes to settle permanently in various areas of the region at the expense of the population.

Libyan Intervention in the Region

[AL-USBU'] How did Libya become a party in the struggle going on in the Darfur region?

[Abd-al-Karim] Libya entered as a party in the conflict from the perspective of its support for the Chadian factions opposing the government. These factions are using Darfur as their crossing point from the Chadian border, especially after Libya's defeat in Chad and the withdrawal of Libyan troops from Chad. It then became difficult, even impossible, for Chadian opposition factions to enter Chad across the Libya-Chad border. At the same time, we find that the large quantities of Libyan weapons seized by Chadian forces in their battles with Libyan forces directly contributed to fanning the flames of tribal war in Darfur, a war that no particular side will win, and where the only loser is the region and its people.

Parties With an Interest in Continuation of the Civil War

[AL-USBU'] Are there parties that have a particular interest in the continuation of the civil war in the region?

[Abd-al-Karim] The region's only way out of its predicament is a peace effort between the various tribes present in the region. Peace is needed to stop the war's bloodshed, devastation, destruction, and fighting between families and brothers, and to put an end to foreign interventions. However, there are parties with a direct interest in a continuation of the civil war. We expect them to try to obstruct the peace process in order to achieve their interests. Decisive measures are therefore needed.

[AL-USBU'] What is your role as a parliamentary deputy and the role of the government in treating the situation in the region?

[Abd-al-Karim] As parliamentary deputies, we are not separated from our societies. More than military action, the civil war in the region requires an integrated effort to reconcile points of view, even though there must also be military action to cut off outsiders and aggressors. On this point, the government's role is to provide the necessary military force and support the regular forces, so that they can carry out this role. The popular effort is our responsibility as people of the region. Against this background, most Ummah Party deputies will go to the region this week. We will stay there for a time to move peace efforts forward.

Khartoum Meeting Allegedly Plots Darfur Tribal Unrest

45040275A Khartoum AL-HADAF in Arabic
15 Mar 89 p 1

[Article: "New Plot To Disrupt Security Conditions in Darfur"]

[Text] AL-HADAF's investigations confirm that the criminal plot whose aim was to foment civil strife among the tribes and start a full-fledged civil war among the

tribes of the region is still progressing steadily. This criminal plot is being supported and financed by a neighboring country.

In one episode of this plot a meeting was held in Khartoum on 9 March. Three people took part in that meeting: one of them served as minister in the previous government; one is a member of parliament; and the other is an adventurer who is of mixed Sudanese and Chadian origin. Our inquiries indicate that this group is being prodded and funded by a neighboring country which has earmarked 36 million Sudanese pounds for that plot. These funds are being used primarily to support partisan militias which are originally found in the region. Members of these militias are unconsciously involved in this criminal plot.

It was decided at that meeting that 150,000 pounds would be sent every 2 weeks for distribution among these groups. A decision was also made to make plans for starting a lengthy war east of Jabal (Marrah) and in areas of north Kabkabiya and Birkat Saira.

The aim of the plot was to recruit additional groups of trainees so that training can be expanded in some tribal circles. Groups of some tribal members would be sent to a neighboring country where they would receive military training. Our sources indicate that an important figure who holds a prominent position is expected to arrive in Khartoum these days to make arrangements for the departure of these groups to receive military training.

On the other hand, AL-HADAF's sources indicated that a decision was made at the aforementioned meeting to move a force of 1,500 armed men to the southwestern region, Wadi Salih, to heighten tensions in the fighting which is going on there among the tribes. In revealing this information, AL-HADAF is extremely confident in its sources. It is making this information available to authorized security agencies so they can perform their patriotic role of protecting the unity and cohesiveness of tribal relations in the region. This information brings to mind what the Socialist Arab Ba'th Party has been saying repeatedly for the past 3 years. This party has been talking about the dangers which a foreign presence in Darfur poses to national sovereignty and to relations between the tribes. An atmosphere of cohesiveness, fraternity and coexistence had prevailed among these tribes throughout history because the Ba'th Party was always asking al-Sadiq's successive governments to take patriotic, responsible and stern positions regarding the foreign presence in Darfur. The Ba'th Party was always telling al-Sadiq's government about the harmful effects that this foreign presence would have on relations between the region's tribes. The Ba'th Party was always asking al-Sadiq's governments to go after this foreign presence, to chase it away militarily and to close the western borders. The party was always asking for the creation of a proper climate for tribal reconciliation conferences in accordance with prevailing tribal reconciliation practices. It was always asking the central and

regional governments to ignore those conferences until results were achieved to restore cohesiveness and solidarity to tribal relations in Darfur.

Radio Calls For Air Raids Against Rebels
EA2905173089 Khartoum National Unity Radio in Arabic 1445 GMT 28 May 89

[Excerpt] [Passage omitted] With regard to operations carried out by the Sudanese People's Liberation Army [SPLA] and operations likely to be carried out, we say the following to our brothers in all the war zones, particularly Equatoria, Upper Nile, and Bahr al-Ghazal. There are huge concentrations of those agents that call for air raids by the Air Force. These concentrations are particularly large at Ulang, al-Nasir (Pan Ayang), (Jikmir), Waat, Akobo, and the surroundings of Ayod and Bor. Reliable information has confirmed the presence of agents in these areas. Normally they do not camp at these towns, but in the surroundings of those areas. Therefore, we instruct our citizens to keep away from SPLA areas. They should move their property and cattle out of harm's way.

We also inform our brothers in the western area, particularly Bentiu, Rub Kona and Mayom, that according to intelligence reports we have received, rebels are active in those areas. This requires a joint effort by Anyanya-II and the [Sudanese] Armed Forces [SAF] to crush those agents and liberate the area.

We want to tell all you citizens about the people's defense legislation. This legislation was drafted, basically, to defend our citizens against attacks by the agents. It is intended to provide support for the SAF. We also have this to say to those who speak negatively about this defense. Those outlaws are afraid of the people's defense and the people's support for the SAF. As long as a citizen carries a gun against the mercenaries and the agents, we regard this as a positive contribution, which we support and back.

We also want to talk about tribalism, the cause of problems among the citizens of one country. National Unity Radio says that tribalism is being practiced by John Garang. This tribalism exists. The proof is that whenever these people go abroad, the majority of their delegates are of Dinka Bor origin.

Some people think we are against the Dinka Bor. But the Dinka Bor, themselves, are divided into northern and southern Bor. They practice tribalism among themselves and colonialism against other southerners. These people are crazy for power. They say God created them for power and destruction. For this reason, we alert our citizens to the fact that joint efforts are the only way to bring peace. What John Garang says is just double-talk meant to waste time until autumn, but none of his initiatives will work.

The government has formed a legal committee with Abel Alier as a member. These people know very well that the committee was formed to tell John Garang that what he is saying is incorrect. This committee is sending a delegation to talk to you. We will put an end to your lies. Everything should be clear. If you want peace, tell us. If you want war, you, and your masters who supply you with arms and money to kill your brothers and people, should also let us know.

NIF 'Secret Office' Documents Published
45040274A London AL-DUSTUR in Arabic
13 Mar pp 19-22

[Article by Qasi Husayn: "NIF 'Secret Office' Documents Uncovered; Front's Easily Available Funds Spent in Name of Security on Those in and outside Front Who Bilk It; Front Planning To Abort Democracy by Conspiring against All Political Forces in Country; Front's Security Agency Spies on Front's Spies, Not Just on Front's Political Opponents"]

[Text] The Sudanese newspaper, AL-HADAF, which is published by the Socialist Arab Ba'th Party, has been publishing for weeks important secret documents that were issued by the National Islamic Front [NIF]. These documents revealed part of the NIF's plan to use Islam to abort the democratic regime in Sudan and establish a civilian dictatorship or support a military coup that would take advantage of the strikes and abnormal conditions which are instigated by the NIF and result from its actions and schemes. The NIF was planning to silence people and create an opportunity for its program to be applied and played out in full.

The Goals of the NIF's Plan

The NIF's main goals which it is striving to achieve by means of secret schemes are manifested in the following:

1. The NIF plants false information with the various security agencies and with specialized executive and legislative agencies to induce them to take repressive measures against the forces of the uprising, chief among which is the Socialist Arab Ba'th Party. The NIF plants this false information to make those agencies enact laws that would curtail democracy and establish a civilian dictatorship on its ruins. Such laws and the so-called the Political Parties Regulatory Act would target political parties, trade unions, the press, a variety of organizations and various forms of expression.

2. The NIF wants to keep the Democratic Unionist Party out of government, and it wants to control as many power positions as possible by expanding its presence in the state's top, decision-making positions and by penetrating security agencies, the army and military intelligence. Now the NIF controls what amounts to "half the country's economy," and what it controls is being used to serve narrow, personal, class and partisan interests.

3. The NIF wants to break ties and the relationship between the Ummah Party and the Democratic Unionist Party. It wants to have the Ummah Party on its side once and for all, and it wants to benefit from the fact that the Ummah Party is the majority party in the Constituent Assembly. The NIF then wants to undermine the Ummah Party itself for its own benefit.

4. The NIF wants to employ surreptitious methods to move toward establishing a civilian dictatorship and a one-party system. It wants to consolidate the authority of predatory capitalists under a false, religious rubric by means of:

a. Passing repressive legislation and laws.

b. Seizing the district attorney's position and using that position to get corruption cases thrown out of court, to release the corrupt members of the May regime, to influence the next elections law and to tailor that law to serve the NIF's plan.

The NIF's Means for Achieving Its Goals

The secret documents which were issued by the NIF's so-called "Secret Office" revealed that the NIF was not using the ordinary means of peaceful, political conflict to achieve its goals. Instead, the NIF was using clandestine, conspiratorial means to achieve its goals. These include, "planning conspiracies;" "staging incidents and accusing others of involvement in those incidents" to justify strikes against them; recruiting clients and spies; and compromising people's integrity. The secret documents revealed the following:

1. The NIF set up a "secret office" whose members were distributed among numerous sections including the Operations Section, the Studies Section and so on. The Operations Section, which is the most dangerous of these sections, has "security functions" which include, among other things, watching and monitoring other political forces, observing what they do, putting their cars and personnel under observation, and so forth.

2. The NIF allocated for this office and for its various security agencies large sums of money that exceed what is allocated for the state's official security agencies. According to the documents, the NIF is spending in 1 month 75,000 pounds on incidentals for 5 people only, not to mention their official salaries and their fixed appropriations. Such a large amount of money is not at all compatible with the magnitude of what is happening locally or with the nature of conditions which are being experienced in Sudan. It is not compatible with the fact that Sudan has a democracy.

3. The NIF is trying to recruit as many clients, spies and brokers as possible. These people can be used in purchasing operations which are carried out to accomplish specific tasks that serve the NIF's conspiracies.

To provide a complete picture of the situation, we are publishing here the documents which were obtained and published by AL-HADAF. We will also print that newspaper's commentary. These are as follows:

The First Document The Islamic Front: General Headquarters

Number: DA/203/WN Date: 24 Safar 1409 A.H. Coinciding with: 5 October 1988 A.D.

[To] the Colleagues, the Section Chiefs in the Secret Office: Blessed Greetings from Almighty God.

After examining the reports that were sent to us about the grave conspiratorial plan which is being carried out by client forces against the Islamic Tendency, we ask that you take the following points into account and that you act upon them.

1. All divisions of the Secret Office must call all working personnel to action, and they must prod them to use all their energy to uncover more secrets about this plan.

2. All divisions of the Secret Office are to disburse additional incentives to those who cooperate with the NIF, and they are to encourage them to report to the Secret Office the information they receive as quickly as possible.

3. NIF colleagues who are responsible for the divisions of the Secret Office are to write detailed reports about the information they receive concerning this plan. These reports are to be sent to us regularly so we can forward them to members of the Political Office who would make the appropriate decision in that regard.

May God grant success. For the Secret Office, the official responsible for clandestine activity

Commentary on the First Document

The Information and Studies Office of the Socialist Arab Ba'ath Party obtained the document written by a member of the NIF's Secret Office on behalf of an NIF official responsible for clandestine activity. This letter, which is addressed to division chiefs of the Secret Office, carries the number, DA/203/WN, and is dated 24 Safar 1409 A.H., which coincides with 5 October 1988. The letter is sealed and stamped "Top Secret." What is the significance of this letter?

1. The letter confirms that the NIF has a secret office with numerous divisions. In other words, the NIF's Secret Office is a complete security system that has its own divisions and its own administrative hierarchy.

2. The Secret Office has a staff of people who work for it full-time, and it has clients and others who work with

it as informants. Those are dealt with piecemeal, and they are paid in accordance with the information they provide.

3. It is the function of this security agency to spy on political and trade union forces and to watch what they do and where they go.

4. This agency fabricates dangerous conspiratorial plans. It invents trumped up charges against other political forces, and it arouses the fears of NIF leaders so it can bilk as much money as possible in appropriations and incentives for its leaders and those who work with them.

5. This agency is run by a senior executive official. We can assume, therefore, that he reports to official agencies all the conspiracies and trumped up charges that are fabricated by his own security agency against other political forces.

At this point, let us ask the prime minister, the district attorney and the minister of the interior the following questions:

1. Is it permissible for political parties functioning in a democracy where the rule of law prevails to set up their own security agencies to watch other political parties and the leaders of political parties and trade unions?

2. A security agency that spies on others, puts them under observation and eavesdrops on them has to use advanced technological devices to be able to do that. Where did these devices come from, and how were they brought into the country?

3. If the NIF has a security agency that watches people's comings and goings and keeps a record of its observations, does that agency's function stop there? Is the NIF's security agency a trained and armed agency that watches people and collects information for a political and a security purpose? Will the NIF's security agency use this information when necessary to eliminate political opponents? What do the authorities think about that, especially following an admission by one NIF leader that the NIF had its own militias? What do the authorities think about that since recurrent reports indicated that the NIF had sent its people to Lebanon's Biqa' Valley where they are being trained in assassination and sabotage operations?

4. When the NIF's Political Office examined the details contained in reports about "the dangerous conspiratorial plan against the Islamic Tendency," what steps did it take after that, and what security instructions did it issue?

5. The emotive language of the letter classifies everyone who is not with the NIF as belonging to a group of client forces. This confirms the NIF's evil intentions: it is mobilizing its own people against other political forces

and accusing those political forces of acting as clients. NIF people can thus be induced in the future to carry out any orders against those forces. What do the authorities think about that?

Our final question, which is addressed to the NIF's security agency, is this: Are those who work with the NIF's security agency believers in the Islamic Tendency, or are they merely mercenaries selling their information and willing to work harder for those who pay more? Does the NIF's security agency use the provisions of the defunct state security system in its incentive system, or is the NIF's security agency more generous in its rewards because the millions which were unlawfully accumulated through corruption and predatory activity have grown?

The foregoing affirms that the NIF is a fascist organization which thinks its survival depends upon eliminating its political opponents and inventing trumped up charges against them so they would be falsely accused and hanged. The NIF does this as a matter of expediency to justify its transgression and its deceptive assertion that "the war is a trick." It is a disaster that all this is being done in the name of Islam, and Islam is innocent of all this. While the NIF has appeared to coexist with democracy, it is secretly plotting and striving to curtail democracy. The NIF is trying to restore dictatorship so it can control believers' lives.

The Second Document

The National Islamic Front: General Headquarters

Date: 6 Safar 1409 A.H. Coinciding with: 17 September 1988 A.D. Number: WY/208/BD

To: Mr 'Ali 'Uthman Muhammad Taha Deputy Secretary General of the National Islamic Front

Blessed Greetings from Almighty God:

In accordance with your letter number AN/168/J, dated 12 Dhu-al-Hijjah, which coincides with 25 July 1988 A.D., concerning conducting a complete study about the client Ba'th Party organization, the NIF's authorized committees did conduct several studies about the Ba'th Organization and its client leaders. These committees are now in the process of writing their final reports on that subject. We will send these reports to you as soon as we receive them. May God grant success.

Member of the Political Office Official responsible for clandestine activity

Commentary on the Second Document

This document is a letter sent by a member of the Political Office who is also the official responsible for the NIF's clandestine activity. The letter, which is addressed to the deputy general of the NIF, was sent on 17 September 1988 in response to another letter that was

dated 25 July 1988 requesting that a complete study be conducted on the Ba'th Party organization. This letter states that the authorized committee had conducted several studies on the Ba'th organization and its leaders and that it was now in the process of preparing its final reports on that subject.

The question which is being asked concerning this document is this: Why does the NIF want a complete study about the Ba'th Party and its leaders? Why has a committee been designated to conduct that study, and why is the Secret Office undertaking the task of completing that study?

Specifically, why is the Secret Office involved in this? Is a Secret Office required to conduct studies on political parties? Is there something else behind this matter? But we do not wish to anticipate events, and we do not wish to move ahead of ourselves and talk about the documents which expose the NIF's comprehensive plan against democracy and against all the main political forces in the country: the Ba'th Party, the Ummah Party, the Unionist Party, the Sudanese Communist Party, the armed forces and security agencies as well. At this point, we will limit ourselves to the following comment on this document:

Various NIF agencies held several meetings—we have the full minutes of those meetings—and they devised several extraordinary plans, all of which may be characterized as "conspiratorial, malevolent and cunning." They have nothing to do with political, intellectual and humanitarian activity, whose aim is to use reason and argument to persuade the masses and honorable methods to win them over. But all the NIF's plans are based on "confidential information and reports and confidential studies" which are prepared by "authorized agencies." "Undercover institutions and individuals" are entrusted with the task of carrying out the NIF's plans. Eventually, the whole country would fall into the NIF's hands. As devised by the NIF, the broad characteristics of these plans have the following objectives:

1. To break the ties and the relationship between the Ummah Party and the Democratic Unionist Party and to get the Ummah Party on the NIF's side once and for all. The NIF wants to take advantage of that situation to undermine the Ummah Party itself in the interests of the NIF.

2. To keep the Democratic Unionist Party out of power. Now that the NIF does in effect control what amounts to "half the country's economy," it wants to occupy as many positions in power as possible for the purpose of strengthening and expanding its presence within the various top state agencies.

3. To try and induce authorized agencies to enact laws that can be used to hurt and eliminate the forces of democracy and peace in the country, foremost among which is the Ba'th party. To accomplish this, the NIF

uses surreptitious methods and false information, and it schemes and stages incidents. The NIF puts emphasis on penetrating security agencies, military intelligence, and the army, using them all as tools in its efforts to carry out certain actions.

4. To recruit as many "clients, spies" and brokers as possible who can be used in purchasing operations that are conducted to carry out specific tasks that serve the NIF's interests.

5. To use surreptitious methods to move toward establishing a civilian dictatorship, a one-party system, and a predatory capitalism under the rubric of a religious state. This document, which is part of this comprehensive plan, a small part of which has been revealed here with the rest still to be revealed, is one piece of correspondence which has the characteristics of an intelligence document. Any citizen would have to stop and think about the most important point in this document whose significance is unusual. Why are studies about political parties conducted by secret offices, and why is this being done as an intelligence gathering activity? Why aren't these studies conducted by cultural offices, and why aren't they published in the NIF's innumerable newspapers and made available to the public?

This is the answer to the question: These "studies" are not studies; they constitute a conspiracy against democracy.

The Third Document

The National Islamic Front: General Headquarters

Date: Tuesday, 25 Muharram 1409 A.H. Coinciding with: 6 September 1988 A.D. Number: WN/206/MB

To: Mr 'Ali 'Uthman Muhammad Taha Deputy Secretary General of the National Islamic Front

Blessed Greetings from Almighty God.

1. We ask that you be kind enough to authorize for our use from security funds the sum of 75,000 pounds only. These funds will be earmarked as incidentals and will be spent on our new colleagues who have agreed to work with us and to provide us with valuable information about the client Ba'th Party organization and the activities and movements of its hired leaders and its clients inside the country and abroad.

2. We also wish to inform you that we did conduct some of the necessary inquiries about our new colleagues, and we found out that they have been dealing with us truthfully.

3. Attached is a list of their names in sequence. They are:

A. 29 years (al-'A'id) B. 25 years (al-Muntasir) C. 27 years (al-Khalil) D. 32 years (al-Thaqafi) E. 24 years (al-Rumh)

May God grant success.

The official responsible for operations in the Secret Office

Commentary on the Third Document

The previous document is a letter sent by the operations official in the NIF's Secret Office to the deputy secretary general of the NIF. The letter, which is dated 6 September 1988, requests authorization to spend 75,000 pounds from security funds which will be earmarked as incidentals for 5 persons who agreed to work with the NIF's "Secret Office" and provide it with information. The document describes this information about the Ba'th Party organization and about the comings and goings of its leaders inside the country and abroad as "valuable." The document states that the Secret Office had conducted some necessary inquiries about those persons and had found out that they had dealt truthfully with the office.

In commenting on this document we wish to make the following points immediately:

A. The terms and phrases which deserve to be pondered as we start this commentary on this letter are: 1. "... security funds..." 2. "We did conduct some of the necessary inquiries..." 3. "... 75,000 pounds will be earmarked as incidentals and spent on our new colleagues." 4. "... providing us with valuable information..." 5. "... the official responsible for operations in the Secret Office"

These terms and phrases confirm two significant facts:

First, the NIF did establish a secret office whose members are scattered among the various divisions of the NIF. One of those divisions is called the Operations Division. The NIF has a security agency whose function is to watch and monitor other political forces.

Second, the NIF did allocate funds for that agency, and those funds exceed allocations for the state run security agency. Evidence for this is provided by the fact that the NIF spends 75,000 pounds on 5 persons only. This sum which is described as incidentals, not to mention "official salaries and fixed appropriations," is to be spent in 1 month only. Such amounts are not at all compatible with the magnitude of what is happening in Sudan or with the nature of conditions which are being experienced by our country. Such amounts are not compatible with a country that has a democracy.

B. The NIF's office divisions, the funds earmarked for those divisions, and the functions they perform make the NIF's actions actually worse than those of the world's largest intelligence agencies. According to the document, for example, this office does not limit itself to watching

political opponents inside the country. The document states that political opponents abroad are also placed under observation. This is something that ordinary institutions affiliated with a political party do not do. Such actions are taken only by major security organizations such as Israel's Mousade, America's CIA and Khomeyni's Savak.

C. The document describes the information it receives about the Ba'th organization as "valuable." How did this information come to be described as "valuable," if the action which is being sought by obtaining it is not "major and grave?" This action may even be "an assassination" or an "explosion." Such information might even be shared with forces who would be upset by the growth and development of the Socialist Arab Ba'th Party as the heart of the Arab Revolution. These forces are most certainly the forces of imperialism and Zionism. Let us not forget that the biggest force which presented itself as an objective equivalent to Islam, that is, the Khomeyni regime, did deal with Zionism. Al-Turabi is surrounded by a cloud of suspicion because of his involvement in allowing the Coca Cola Company, which has ties with Israel, to operate in Sudan. Al-Turabi is also suspected of being involved in deporting the Falashas to Israel, in the burial of nuclear waste in Sudan, in arranging military exercises for American troops in the area and in other things.

D. The document states that the office did conduct some of the necessary inquiries about the five persons. This means quite unequivocally that the NIF's security office spies even on its spies. Thus, espionage in the NIF is cyclical: each team or group spies on another. This leads us to conclude that the NIF's leaders, its key personnel and those who are employed in its security agencies are themselves subject to being watched and observed by other security circles and so on.

E. This letter proves that there are people who try to bilk the NIF and get their hands on its easily available funds in the name of security. The letter requests 75,000 pounds in incidentals only for 5 people. It describes their information as valuable in order to justify disbursing that sum of money. This is the question: Will the author of this letter make all this money available to those persons as incidental expenses, or will he just pocket most of it himself? The other question is this: Are these five persons actually providing proper, accurate and valuable information to the NIF's security office, or are they merely bilking the NIF and giving it false and fabricated information?

We thought that for the time being we should not reveal the real names of those five persons who are mentioned in the letter. We will reveal this information another time, and we will return to that matter.

The Fourth Document

The National Islamic Front: General Headquarters

A Special Study

After examining the report which we received from our confidential source, al-Thaqafi, about the military organization of the client Ba'th Party, the authorized staff of the Secret Office checked the information provided in the report and compared it with information that is available to us. It has now been indubitably confirmed that the client Ba'th Party has made significant progress in the military field. This is a grave matter which could in the future threaten the country's security in general and the NIF's security in particular. This client organization, which is alien to the Muslim Sudanese nation, is being prodded into action and financed by outsiders who have long term objectives in Sudan. In this regard, several important points have to be made.

The organizational makeup of the client Ba'th Party utilizes military training as a basic element in building up the party's organizational structure. That is why we find military courses coinciding with educational courses which are taught to members of the Ba'th Party during the preparatory stage.

The Sudanese Ba'th Office in Baghdad, in cooperation with the command of the People's Army (the military wing of the Ba'th Party) organizes intense military courses for Sudanese members of the Ba'th Party of all grades and levels. The qualifications of those trainees are then supplemented by active duty when they are sent to the front to fight alongside the Iraqi army against the forces of the Islamic Revolution of Iran. Many of those trainees, most of whom are Sudanese workers and students studying in Iraqi universities, lost their lives.

It has been confirmed to leaders of the client Ba'th organization that to achieve power they have no other choice but to resort to a military coup and to seize power by force of arms. That is why we find those leaders making a maximum effort to prepare their military wing properly so it can be ready to carry out the tasks which will be entrusted to it in the future. Leaders of the client Ba'th organization are putting emphasis on training their special forces and their intelligence forces. According to information available to us, most of the military men who are members of the Ba'th Party in Sudan are intelligence operatives and members of the special forces.

The report and the information which is available to us have made it clear that members of the Ba'th party are engaged in intense activity in the army for the purpose of recruiting some officers as well as rank and file officers and soldiers and getting them to work for the Ba'th Party. These officers and soldiers would organize Ba'th Party cells in the army, and these cells would be used at the proper time. Our own personnel in the Secret Office have been watching these activities and collecting sufficient information about those who are involved in them. We will submit complete information about these people to our own people in the state security agencies so they can take the necessary measures against them.

An additional sum of money must be appropriated from security funds and earmarked for the Secret Office to help it devote all its resources to breaking the mystery surrounding the military wing of the client Ba'th organization.

The Secret Office, the Studies Division

Commentary on the Fourth Document

The fourth document which is being presented by the Information and Studies Office of the Socialist Arab Ba'th Party is a study prepared by the NIF's Secret Office about the Socialist Arab Ba'th Party. This study was submitted to the NIF's command.

The Office's Commentary:

1. According to the third document, the information in the [fourth] document is based on information provided by the NIF's confidential source, al-Thaqafi, who is one of the Secret Office's paid informants.

2. Because the NIF is a fascist organization that does not believe in democracy and pluralism and can function only in a civilian or a military dictatorship, it is always making plans to conspire against democracy. Because it cannot act out of character or think in any other way, the NIF believes that all other parties are conspiring against democracy just as it is doing.

3. When the NIF talks about an alleged military conspiracy by members of the Ba'th Party, it sees that as a threat to the country and to the NIF, but it makes no mention of the fact that such a conspiracy would also be a threat to a pluralistic democracy. It makes no mention of that because basically the NIF does not believe in such a system.

4. Throughout its alliance with the May regime and throughout the period during which the NIF shared power with that regime, followers of al-Turabi used the cover of government sponsored student and youth camps to offer their people military training. That is why NIF members believe that members of the Ba'th Party are doing the same thing they have been doing, linking educational courses with military training. In future documents we will reveal which organization is providing its people with military training in student and youth camps.

5. The NIF adopted a non-national and a non-Islamic posture toward Iran's attack on the fraternal country of Iraq. Because it sided with the aggression and made a tactical change in its position at its recent conference only after Iraq's victory appeared to be imminent, it wants to distort the actions of Sudanese citizens who volunteered to fight with Iraq. Members of the Ba'th Party were among those who volunteered to fight with their fellow Iraqis. They participated in defending the eastern gateway to the Arab homeland. The NIF is

turning these actions around and portraying them, as its sick imagination sees them, as conspiratorial actions against democracy.

6. Although the NIF was compelled to alter its declared position due to tactical considerations so it can become acceptable in the Arab community, its in-house letter remains an indicator of its true position. The NIF sees the Iranian regime and its forces of aggression, the forces of the Islamic Revolution of Iran, as an Islamic revolution.

7. The Secret Office asserts that Ba'th Party leaders are convinced that a military coup is the only choice they have to achieve power. But the intelligent Secret Office overlooked the fact that the Ba'th Party is a historical, cultural movement that uses a long term approach in its struggle. This is supported by the party's experience in struggling for over half a century in various countries of the Arab homeland. If the Sudanese Ba'th Party were a party that thought along opportunistic and adventurous lines and was inclined to risk a coup d'etat, it would not have chosen the popular, people-oriented approach in confronting the dictatorship of the May regime. It was the NIF that formed an alliance with that regime, and it was NIF people who became that regime's lackeys and spies.

8. This document as well as those which preceded it and those that will follow reveal that it is the NIF that is interested in intelligence operatives. It is the NIF that is interested in the special forces, in spying on others, and in organizing a secret office and special security agencies. By no means are members of the Ba'th Party interested in those matters.

9. The NIF's statements about the fact that there are members of the Ba'th Party in the army are not new. Ever since the transition period the NIF has been making up charges and conspiracies which it attributes to the Ba'th Party. But the document reveals that after the NIF puts those charges and conspiracies together in its secret operating chambers, it uses its own people to report them to the state security agencies.

10. Who is conspiring then? Are the conspirators the people against whom false charges are being made by the NIF's security agencies, or are they those whose secret offices and intelligence agencies admit to having their own people in the state's security agencies? The NIF admits that it has its own people in state security agencies and that those people are fed information from the NIF's Secret Office and receive their orders from it. Does it matter whether or not these people are members of the NIF or people like al-Thaqafi who are paid to do this?

11. The principal point in this document comes in the last paragraph which requests an additional sum of money to be earmarked for the Secret Office so it can monitor the military activity of the Ba'th Party. The

Secret Office fabricated all this information to scare NIF leaders and get more of the NIF's easily available funds.

12. The document constitutes a new and grave admission that the NIF is not satisfied with having its own armed militias. This admission was made by a senior NIF leader, an official in its Political Office, and minister of the interior under Numayri. Ahmad 'Abd-al-Rahman, who is a minister now, also made that admission to AL-SIYASAH. The NIF went further and set up a complete intelligence agency. It penetrated the country's security and military agencies and set up its own people in those agencies.

13. The document reveals the source from which the NIF's trembling media receive their information. It reveals the source of the lies the NIF media publish about the Ba'th Party and other political forces. The NIF media most certainly get this information from the Secret Office which fabricates these stories to get its hands on the NIF's easily available funds.

We conclude from these aforementioned documents and from the comments that were made about them that the NIF's security agency, its Secret Office, and that office's various divisions derive their methods of action from the world's largest intelligence agencies. They are dealing with the political situation in Sudan in the same way that Zionism and its organizations deal with conditions in those countries where Zionism has a footing.

SPLA Involvement in Ethiopia Plot Hinted

EA2805221089 Khartoum National Unity Radio in Arabic 1445 GMT 28 May 89

[Excerpt] Brothers and sisters, sons of the south, citizens of Sudan: Today we would like to inform you, as well as the people of Ethiopia and the Ethiopian leadership, about the plots John Garang hatches. Some people believe he is one of those who fled for the sake of Sudan. But the thing people should know is that those agents, the mercenaries, fled for the sake of cheap office. They fled in order to trade on the name of the citizens of the south and the citizens of Sudan. That is why we want to tell the Ethiopian Government and Mengistu that they shouldn't dirty their name by dealing with such people. These are destructive, mercenary people.

The new thing we want to comment on is the role of John Garang and some of his agents in the recent coup. This is very good. If you rear a snake in your house, it will try to bite you. It is known that, quite apart from the activities he carries out, John Garang was a friend of the Ethiopian Air Force commander who was killed during the plot against the system in Ethiopia.

Of course, views on this differ. When people participate in things like this, it could be on orders from the Soviet Union or other foreign countries. This is why we in Anyanya-II are aware of the betrayals that John Garang and his group are capable of in any area.

News agencies reported that some weapons in Sudanese People's Liberation Army stores in certain areas had disappeared. This is evidence that John Garang has rebelled against Mengistu's system. This is very good news for Sudan. If John Garang rebels against Mengistu, peace will come quickly while Garang and Mengistu are left to dispute with one another. [passage omitted]

Article Lists SPLM Intentions, Urges Support for SAF

*45040273A Khartoum AL-SIYASAH in Arabic
3 Mar 89 p 7*

[Article by Brig Gen Muhyi-al-Din al-Najib, attorney at law: "Armed Forces Are To Be Strengthened To Defeat Enemies, Replace Ugly War in South With Peace"]

[Excerpts] God Almighty said, "Muster against them all the men and cavalry at your disposal, ... If they incline to peace, make peace with them," [al-Anfal: 60-61].

Mao said, "If what you want is an absence of guns, carry your own."

An American report states, "We want peace, but we do not want the peace that would be imposed on us the way war is."

The Russians said, "We are advocates of peace, but we prepare for war for the sake of peace."

Strengthening the Armed Forces: Theory and Application

A review of the history of warfare—different kinds of warfare, especially modern, scientific warfare—leads us to make the statement that strengthening the Sudanese Armed Forces [SAF] so they can perform their constitutional mission of defeating the enemy and establishing a just and lasting peace in the south and in Sudan is no easy theoretical matter. We make that statement based on our modest experience as soldiers and officers who studied in the Command and General Staff College, earned master's degrees in public administration from Khartoum University, and studied in the armed forces and elsewhere in the Arab Republic of Egypt. We make that statement as soldiers and officers who specialized in support, supplies and provisions, and management. We make that statement as soldiers and officers who taught and practiced these subjects in the armed forces. Establishing peace is not easy; many complicated obstacles stand in the way. These include political, economic and military obstacles and the fact that the purposes and interests of Sudan's enemies are served by prolonging the war in the south and in all Sudan.

To make support for the SAF both scientific and practical, the following questions must be asked and answered. Who are Sudan's enemies? Why is the ugly war in south Sudan being prolonged? What are the objectives of Sudan's enemies and how are their interests served by

prolonging this war? How are Sudan's enemies supporting the Sudanese People's Liberation Movement [SPLM]? What does the SPLM do in return for this support? What is the military plan devised by Sudan's enemies to carry out their objectives in Sudan? Will the war achieve those objectives for them? What dangers has Sudan faced and what dangers will it face should Sudan's enemies carry out their objectives in the country? What kind of support does the SAF need to defeat the enemies and the grave danger facing Sudan? What kind of support does the SAF need to replace the ugly war in the south and in all Sudan with a just and lasting peace? Do the enemies of Islam really want peace, or are they using it as a tactical goal to achieve their objectives in Sudan? We will answer the aforementioned questions in the following paragraphs.

Sudan's Enemies

The SPLM is Sudan's enemy and the enemy of the SAF. It is the SPLM which is fighting the SAF in the south. All countries, organizations, authorities, groups and individuals who support the SPLM are Sudan's enemies. All those who oppose a just and lasting peace in the south and in Sudan are Sudan's enemies. [passage omitted]

The Intentions and Interests of Sudan's Enemies in Prolonging the War in the South

Although Sudan's enemies have not revealed their ultimate thoughts and intentions, which remain hidden, those intentions, which include some or all of the following, can be determined and analyzed.

The SPLM's Intentions

- The SPLM wants to occupy the entire country, or it wants to use armed force to liberate it and establish a military or a civilian dictatorship that is controlled by the movement's army and by the racist or religious minority which would dominate the majority in Sudan.
- It wants to put into action the ideas, principles, doctrines and religions it believes in, and it wants to utilize and distribute Sudan's wealth among its own people.
- It wants to liberate Sudan from the Sudanese who are of Arab origin, or it wants to consider them foreigners or second or third class citizens.
- It wants to pay Sudan's enemies for their support of the SPLM's army by remaining in their sphere of influence and by taking their side to help them achieve their objectives, even if those objectives are incompatible with Sudan's supreme interests.

The Intentions of Islam's Enemies

- Islam's enemies want to stop the expansion and the spread of Islam in Africa.
- They want to stop everyone who is spreading Arabic and Arab culture in Africa among Christians.
- They want communists to spread communist ideas, theories, beliefs and culture in Africa.

The Intentions of Countries with Aspirations in Sudan and in the World and Countries Revolving in Their Sphere of Influence

- These countries want to set up a sphere of influence which extends across Sudan from the Red Sea to the Mediterranean Sea. They want to take advantage of the huge oil resources in the Arabian Peninsula, in the Gulf states and in other countries whose oil resources are considered to be the world's vital reserve in the near future.
- They want to spread their influence over Sudan to take advantage of its tremendous agricultural resources, which, in the near future, will become the world's food reserve. They want to take advantage of Sudan's other untapped resources in that country's vast areas.
- They want to use Sudan to dominate Africa, and they want to exploit its untapped resources through direct or indirect investments.
- They want to preserve the balance of power between the two superpowers and their camps so they can hold their own in the coming wars which are inevitable.

Those with Other Interests

They are all those who oppose replacing the ugly war in the south and in Sudan with a just and lasting peace because of private, public, partisan, sectarian, doctrinal, religious or other interests.

Thus, the contradictory objectives and interests of Sudan's enemies have converged to prolong the ugly war in the south, the armed robbery in the west and other atrocities elsewhere. [passage omitted]

The Plan of Sudan's Enemies to Carry Out Their Intentions

Based on the foregoing, we can say that Sudan's enemies will try to carry out their plan to realize their intentions in accordance with the following military tactics and operations.

First, they will occupy the south by surrounding every small, isolated, military unit with a force that is more than six or seven times the size of these small armed forces units, which are scattered among the posts, centers, areas, villages and cities. They will then engage them in skirmishes and isolate them from the troops to which they are subordinate. They will cut supply routes to these units by land, river and air, and they will then attack and occupy these posts. Then, they will leave a small force there and move on to another location. They will continue to do that until they occupy all of south Sudan. This is what happened in Kurmuk, Qaysan, al-Nasir, and Jokau. This is what is happening now in Torit, Juba and other cities.

Second, if they manage to occupy all the south, they will occupy north Sudan because they will have defeated all the SAF there and seized all their weapons. The SAF in the north may have fewer arms and less training than the SPLM. Before starting their attack on the north, Sudan's enemies will issue orders to their fifth column in the north to carry out sabotage operations, to explode bombs and mines, to engage in guerrilla activities and to commit armed robbery and other mischief. Security would thus be disrupted and chaos would prevail. Sudan's enemies will continue their efforts to break up and undermine the internal front. They will try to win dissidents over to their side, or they will neutralize them so they would not oppose them. They may also carry out a rapid and swift attack on the north before the SAF in the north are armed and trained and before the Sudanese people can be ready to stand alongside the SAF. Sudan's enemies may also carry out the same operations and follow the same tactics they carried out and used in the south. They would thus occupy all of Sudan and carry out all their aforementioned intentions.

The Intentions of Sudan's Enemies Were Not and Will Not Be Achieved by War

Anyone who studies the military, political and economic history of warfare realizes without any doubt that war did not and will not achieve the enemies' or rebels' intentions. The intentions of those who are engaged in warfare, especially against peoples, will not be realized, even if they were to fight forever. Examples of this are France's war against Algeria, America's war against Vietnam, Russia's war against Afghanistan, the civil war in south Sudan and in Lebanon, and the Iraq-Iran war. Other civil, local and limited regional wars, as well as world wars in Asia, Africa, Latin America and all over the world did not realize the intentions of those who were fighting.

Accordingly, neither Col John Garang's army nor any of Sudan's enemies did or will achieve their aforementioned intentions in Sudan. Even if they had managed to occupy or, as they claim, liberate all of Sudan, they would have given the majority of the Sudanese people, especially Muslims, one of two choices: surrender, humiliation and degradation; or warfare and death on the most honorable of fields. The Sudanese people will have to face a vicious war fought by guerrilla troops and regular army troops. They will have to face a war which may take on a religious character. They may be defeated in this war, and Sudan may be liberated. A new round of guerrilla warfare would then ensue, and Sudan would thus continue to experience guerrilla warfare. The war in the south would thus go on forever, and the only loser in this ugly war will still be Sudan. Sudan's enemies will be the only ones to benefit from this war. [passage omitted]

The military support which the armed forces have to have is quite substantial. It cannot be narrowed down and listed in a hurry. At any rate, the following items provide examples, rather than an exhaustive list of this support.

Supplies and provisions. The SAF must have personnel, weapons, ammunition, food, provisions, clothing, equipment, machinery, means of transportation, and telecommunications equipment. The SAF must pay salaries and bonuses and provide housing and health care for its people. Everything which is needed for modern, scientific warfare is to be provided based on the armed forces' short-term, intermediate and long-term budgets. This is to be done in accordance with the first, second, third and other sections of the state budget, which covers hundreds of thousands of items.

It is worth noting that the armed forces' budgets are calculated, determined and governed by laws, regulations, rules and orders. They are governed by the purpose of the administration's military plan, by an evaluation of that plan's status, and by orders to the administration. The armed forces' budgets are determined by supplies, provisions and operations and by the armed forces' purposes, goals and intentions. They are determined by a minor and a major strategies, and these are carried out to defeat Sudan's enemies and replace the war in south Sudan with a just and lasting peace. Modern, scientific warfare has become so precise that the speed of supersonic bullets, missiles, rockets, airplanes and other methods of modern, scientific warfare is computed and determined by using the most modern tools of modern science in the military and in other fields as well. Now, any error in calculations, even if it involved less than one second, would cause death, defeat, dishonor, humiliation, debasement and colonialism. Although the SAF require unlimited political and economic support, we will summarize this support as follows:

First, the people and the government are to assume their full responsibility in this regard by supplying the armed forces with all their aforementioned needs before it is too late.

Second, a just and lasting peace is to be established in Sudan.

Third, a major political, economic and military strategy is to be devised to include the purposes, goals and aims of the military strategy. All these strategies are carried out to strengthen the armed forces and achieve their intentions, which are the same as those of Sudan.

Fourth, we are to rely on ourselves and we are to reorganize the government, especially the executive branch. Government is to be run efficiently and economically. High morale is to be restored, and all human and material efforts are to be channeled into production so that strengthening the armed forces can be possible.

Fifth, political, economic and military methods which take Sudan's supreme interests into consideration first and foremost are to be pursued. Sudan can thus win friendly and fraternal countries to its side. It can also get countries in the international community, in the west, east, north and south, to take its side and to help it

strengthen its armed forces and replace the ugly war in south Sudan with a just and lasting peace.

Let us tell the Sudanese people what Tariq ibn Ziyad told his army, "The sea is behind you and the enemy is in front of you." Let us tell them what Churchill told the British people in World War II, "I have nothing to offer but sweat and blood" [sic]. Tariq was victorious; Britain was victorious; and, God willing, Sudan will be victorious.

Peace: the Enemies' Intentions and a Tactical Goal

The peace we want and in whose context we would accept a peace initiative to replace the ugly war in the south is a just and lasting peace. As we see it, this just and lasting peace may be summarized as follows: The people are to choose the system of government, the constitution, and the legal system they want. They are to make that choice freely and independently by means of free, direct elections. The constitution is to guarantee human rights, citizenship rights, and equal rights and duties under the law. It is to guarantee equal opportunity for public and private positions, from the lowest position to the highest one. Wealth is to be distributed fairly, and freedom of religion and worship for the non-Muslim minority is not to be infringed upon. One national armed forces organization is to serve all of Sudan, and its functions are to be defined in the constitution.

We hope we are mistaken, but our analysis of the foregoing shows that the goals and objectives of Sudan's enemies are inconsistent with the peace we want and the peace initiative itself. This is why we accuse Sudan's enemies of not wanting a just and lasting peace. This is why we accuse them of using the peace initiative to achieve tactical purposes and goals, to procrastinate, to gain time, and to have us overlook their aforementioned ultimate objectives of killing several birds with one stone. If the peace initiative is not accepted, Sudan's enemies will have assured themselves that they have divided and undermined the internal front. They will have won countries and the international community to their side. Those new friends will then stand by Sudan's enemies and double their support for them, thereby enabling them to continue fighting to achieve their objectives. If the initiative is accepted, Sudan's enemies can become obstinate and insist on the literal implementation of the terms of that initiative. They can thus abort the initiative and claim that it was the other party which aborted it. Sudan's enemies are trying to isolate Sudan and to keep military support away from it.

And yet, let us tell Sudan's enemies that we are willing to accept the peace initiative in the context of the just and lasting peace we want. Let us tell them, "If you really want that too, let us convene a constitutional conference immediately and set forth the peace initiative and the just and lasting peace we want. If you do not want this just and lasting peace, we refuse to surrender even if the war were to go on forever."

God Almighty said, "Muster against them all the men and cavalry at your disposal, ... If they incline to peace, make peace with them, and put your trust in Allah.... Should they seek to deceive you, Allah is all-sufficient for you. He has made you strong with His help and rallied the faithful round you..." [al-Anfal: 60, 61, 62].

Returning Expatriates Face Employment, Economic Troubles

45040276B London AL-MAJALLAH in Arabic
22 Mar 89 pp 40-41

[Article by Nahid Hafiz: "Problems of Sudanese Expatriates Returning From Arab Countries"]

[Text] There are several reasons for reverse immigration, and some of them are attributed to labor market conditions in the oil countries. The decline in oil prices affected the labor market in both the public and private sectors. Furthermore, because these countries are turning to a policy of using natives and hiring citizens to fill vacant positions, employment opportunities for foreigners have been reduced.

One of the reasons why Sudanese expatriates are starting to return to Sudan may be due to the fact that, on the one hand, their conditions in their country improved after they achieved the goals they were seeking by working abroad. In addition, there are family and social conditions that cause them to return to their country.

It has been noticed that most of the cases of returning professionals (reverse immigration) involve craftsmen who lack adequate training. In most cases they become involved in activities of limited magnitude which lack the components of modern production. Although these activities undoubtedly help meet the shortage in that sector, they do not help reduce prices. Prices are rising as a result of the influx of private capital in a country where demand is growing and quick return rates are high. Upon their return to Sudan these groups have no difficulty finding work because they can invest their savings in setting up small workshops.

Dr Muhammad Adham 'Ali, a researcher at the Council for Economic and Social Research in Khartoum, noted that the three levels of the educational system were represented among the returning expatriates.

When one considers the local labor market, one finds that it is afflicted with structural flaws: Sudan has a growing surplus of secondary school and college graduates whose studies were theoretical in nature, and it has a noticeable shortage in secondary school graduates who studied business and industry.

Dr Adham thinks that this flaw is clearly evident in the fact that surplus workers are congested in clerical jobs and professions. In addition, it is also evident in the unemployment problem which will rise sharply amidst

these groups. Unemployment will rise regardless of Sudan's high rates of population growth, which amounted to 3.6 percent.

In Dr Adham's view this problem is exacerbated by the fact that the Sudanese economy lacks the elements that would enable it to expand its ability to provide employment for these groups of people.

In the course of his social analysis of the situation, Dr Adham offered two observations on this phenomenon. He thinks that the buying power of returning expatriates has been strengthened because they have cash. This puts a great deal of pressure on prices for local products, and that causes inflation rates to rise and creates competition in speculative and marginal activities. Dr Adham's second observation is that families are re-united when expatriates return. The return of expatriates makes it easier for their children to enter the educational system in Sudan where courses are suitable to the environment. On the one hand, however, expatriates' families will face the situation described by Dr Adham in his first observation, and, on the other hand, they will face the problem of high prices and scarce goods.

Husayn Hasan 'Ammar told AL-MAJALLAH that the government had to think seriously and quickly about putting the expatriates' savings into agricultural, industrial and crafts projects. Government should give expatriates incentives in the form of exemptions from customs fees so they can bring their personal savings into the country when they return to Sudan for good. Government should allow returning expatriates to have checking or savings accounts in free currency in banks in Sudan to keep them from depositing those savings in other countries like Egypt and Britain, as was the case in the past.

Returning Expatriates Tell Their Story

In its effort to find out the facts about the phenomenon of reverse immigration, AL-MAJALLAH met with a few people who lived through the experience. They talked about the conditions that led them to return to Sudan and about the circumstances they faced in their country. The first one to speak was Mr Haydar 'Abd-al-Rahman Ahmad. He had worked for approximately 7 years in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and had returned to Sudan 1 year ago. Because he is a craftsman, the only problem he faced was that of finding a place for his workshop. He noticed that rents were high in the industrial zone in Khartoum and that it was difficult to open a workshop in residential neighborhoods. However, he succeeded recently in co-signing a lease for a workshop in the industrial zone. He also opened a furniture showroom in a residential neighborhood.

Mr Haydar 'Abd-al-Rahman said that he took advantage of the easier customs terms when he returned to Sudan. He imported the electrical equipment and machinery which would make his work in Sudan easier.

Mr Haydar 'Abd-al-Rahman's report reflects a true picture of what returning expatriates suffer from. But Mr 'Uthman Abu Sha'irah, an engineer who had spent 11 years away from Sudan, told AL-MAJALLAH that his children were the main reason why he returned to Sudan. "In Sudan, they have an opportunity to enroll in the university, especially the colleges of science like the College of Medicine and Engineering. They are not allowed to do that abroad because they are foreigners."

Mr Abu Sha'irah's second reason for returning to Sudan had to do with work, where things had started to deteriorate. The level of employment fell from what it was previously, and there were several reasons for that including the fact that the infrastructures which required labor have almost been completed. In addition, the loans which citizens used to receive to help them build have been reduced. In general, citizens in the Gulf states now have sufficient experience which they gained from their education or from the expatriates. Now, they are doing the jobs which they did not do previously.

Mr Abu Sha'irah is still employed in the same field: engineering and contracting. He is troubled most by the workers' lack of discipline, the failure to meet deadlines, and the extremely slow pace. A Sudanese worker has to be closely watched. Construction materials are scarce; prices set by the government fluctuate; and most construction materials are monopolized by the black market. These things represent a major obstacle in this line of work.

Mr Abu Sha'irah adds that the most important problems a family faces lie in the educational system which is different. Children need to make a major effort so they can keep up with education in Sudan. There is also the problem of transportation which they are not accustomed to. Because transportation was readily available in their expatriate country, returning expatriates have to deal with the hardship of transportation.

In general, however, and despite what they are going through, their sense of stability enables them to surmount all daily problems.

Mr Hasan Khattab Hasan, who was employed as director of accounting in a major firm for 9 years, returned to Sudan with his family to settle down. He came back to Sudan after completing construction on his house and after setting up a large supermarket. "I had a specific goal before I left Sudan to work abroad. I wanted to invest in a stable business that would provide me with sufficient income. The salary I earned before I left Sudan was not enough. That is why as soon as I achieved my goal, I decided to come back to Sudan.

"A few friends strongly urged me to stay abroad for a few years until conditions become settled in Sudan, but the problem is that my children were going to school in Sudan. Their circumstances were such that they could

not concentrate on their studies because they had to deal with many problems in my absence.

"I did not think at all of going back to my previous position in the government because salaries are low and do not provide anything in this difficult age."

Problems of Returning Expatriates

According to a study prepared by Dr Muhammad Adham 'Ali, a researcher at the Council for Economic and Social Research in Khartoum, the problems which trouble returning expatriates differ from one person to another. Dr Adham surveyed a sample of 629 returning expatriates. Approximately 26 percent of the sample in his study encountered the problem of finding employment; 11 percent had problems in their efforts to find housing; 8 percent faced the problem of transportation from one place to another; and 2 percent reported a change in their customs. This manifested itself in their dealings with people in the family. Approximately 7 percent of returning expatriates were not able to adjust to working conditions in Sudan; 13 percent had problems meeting the requirements of every day living; and 2.1 percent encountered other problems.

Union Leaders Assess New Government, Unions' Role

45040318 London AL-DUSTUR in Arabic
17 Apr 89 pp 12-13

[Article by Khalid Muhammad 'Uthman: "Unionist Leaderships and Watch Over Implementation of Phased Program"]

[Text] Khartoum—Since last month, Sudan has been living under a new reality which developed with the events that led to the resignation of the Ummah Party-Islamic Front alliance government. New forces have emerged effectively and strongly in this reality. These forces play their role in guiding and correcting the domestic policy from outside the Constituent Assembly, the parliament. Within the context of the interactions of Sudan's political movement, these forces are formulating a new program that will gain them realistic legitimacy through their representation (previously absent) in the constitutional institutions. Among these forces, the federations, unions and armed forces have figured fundamentally in the events, motivated by the national achievement accomplished by the DUP [Democratic Unionist Party] with its conclusion of the Sudanese peace initiative with the Sudanese People's Liberation Movement, with its resignation from the cabinet and with its call for the formation of an expanded cabinet in which all the eligible forces from within and from without the assembly participate to lay the foundations for peace and to tackle the issues of development, of the economic and security conditions and of the corruption which has touched even Sudan's foreign policy, thus negatively affecting Sudan's foreign relations, especially

with countries supporting Sudan's economy. The unionist forces moved effectively when the armed forces presented their critical memorandum [ultimatum] to the government. They tried to form a six-member coordination committee to (support) and participate in the call which rose demanding salvation. These forces also submitted another memorandum to the government in support of the armed forces' memorandum, expressing the unionist movement's national demands and stressing the legitimacy of those demands which embodied the common Sudanese concerns.

Legitimacy of Salvation Demands

While examining this new reality, AL-DUSTUR has interviewed a number of union leaders and discussed with them their opinion of the new government, the representation of the modern forces, the guarantees needed to accomplish the national salvation program and the labor federation's refusal to take part in the government.

At the outset, Engineer 'Abd-al-Kabir Adam, the deputy chairman of the Professionals and Skilled Workers Federation, said: "A coordination council including the six federation had to be created when we saw that the solution to Sudan's crisis was not in the hands of the conventional forces solely and that all the efforts had to be united to produce a salvation program in light of the armed forces' memorandum. This is why we submitted in this context a memorandum to the Presidential State Council and to the other authorities concerned in support of the contents of the army's memorandum which reflected the unionist movement's demands. We underlined the legitimacy of those demands and urged the formation of a national salvation government that includes the forces inside and outside the Constituent Assembly. We took part in drafting the salvation program at the palace [not further specified] and demanded that the modern forces be represented with two seats. On the basis of previous positions, we believe that an 18-member cabinet is enough. We rejected the appointment of ministers of state in order to reduce spending. We also demanded participation in a number of specialized councils, such as the National Planning Council and the Election Committee, and the demand was approved. As for the guarantees of salvation, we say that if the new government adheres to the program, it will take a major step toward rescuing the country by adopting the peace initiative because it is the key to solving Sudan's other problems."

Attempts To Foil Plan

Muhammad Babakr, the [Government] Employees Federation secretary, said: "Formation of the new government and the response to the salvation program or plan are a step in the direction of solving Sudan's crisis. This is why the call was made for the formation of an expanded cabinet to work in accordance with this program. While acknowledging legitimacy and the Constituent Assembly's presence, we believe that adherence to the program and,

fundamentally, to achieving peace in accordance with the peace initiative and ratifying a new election law that takes into consideration the position of the modern forces—we believe that all this will so entrench and cement democracy that it will not allow any attempts to attack it.

“As for the guarantees of achieving the phased program, we have nothing more than the resolve and adherence of the parties which signed the program to their demands and their resolve not to relinquish any of the program’s provisions. It is certain that we expect numerous endeavors from the various circles that seek to raise all kinds of obstacles. But the forces eager for the program must remain alert to foil whatever may obstruct its implementation.

“Regarding representation of the modern forces, we say that the unionist movement representatives in the new government represent the entire movement, not just their two persons or their two federations. They will work to enhance and bolster the Coordination Council which includes all the unionist notables. Therefore, these two representatives are supported by broad bases embodied in the base, middle-level and leadership organizations. These bases will work to facilitate the two representatives’ tasks in the government and will cooperate with their two ministries optimally, in addition to contributing to the other positions. We are exerting efforts to make the new Council of Ministers take these facts into its consideration.

“As for the decision of the Federation of Labor Unions’ Central Committee to reject participation in the government, we have expressed our regret for this decision, especially since the committee had adhered since the early signs of the crisis and until the Labor Federation was selected to fill one of the cabinet seats to the principle of representation of the modern forces and the unionist movement. The committee then surprised us with its decision to reject participation on the grounds that it affects its independence as a unionist movement. But ultimately, we respect this decision by the federation as an independent organization which has its own will and right to take whatever resolutions it deems fit, keeping in mind that the federation’s two representatives pointed out that the Central Committee’s decision can only be reviewed by the congress and that those selected, whether from the Labor Federation or from any other federation—and it is all the same to us—represent the entire unionist movement.”

Labor Federation’s Refusal To Participate

AL-DUSTUR then went to the Labor Federation to examine with its leaders the details of its rejection, as well as their opinion on what has been said above. Yusuf Abu-Shamah Hamid, the federation’s secretary general, said: “We founded our opinion on the grounds that the existing disagreements and problems are based on partisan tendencies that seek to implement a certain political plan as a result of the conflict of opinions. We took into

our consideration the contradiction and the disagreements between the parties. It is also no secret to anybody that the unionist movement is a front that encompasses all the tendencies and that its program does not provide for involvement in government. The movement resists and is not a crossing bridge for attaining power. Polarization [tamahwur] of the movement within any partisan framework poses a threat to it. It is our opinion that if the Labor Federation, the body encompassing the great majority of the Sudanese, enters the government, it will weaken the base forces. When we demanded expanded participation in the government, we did not demand our entry. We supported the principle of amending law 86 because this was one of the fundamental demands since the uprising and because a law had to be established for representation of the modern forces in closed districts where the competition depends on the General Federation’s size or membership. This is why by virtue of the nature of its structure, the labor movement has sought to be independent and not subject to any party entity because it is national in structure. Now, these forces must have a voice in the legislative apparatus, considering that it charts the general policy through binding laws, projects and plans. Therefore, the law amendment must accommodate this group, the modern forces must have assigned districts and voting must be done through the local and regional government councils. To participate, we must have a constitutional support. We are required to create specific districts for the workers because this is tantamount to an authorization by the workers. We will then participate in a codified manner and not in the manner that has been followed. We seek to entrench this (approach). In this context, we have a committee that is working to draft a certain vision of the new election law, of the number of districts, of the method of (voting and of candidate nomination) according to the size of membership, in addition to a number of projected options.

Guarantees and Ambitions

“As for the guarantees for implementing the program, the government has been formed to implement it. We are observers from outside the government. I believe that if no adverse circumstances develop, the effort is inclined toward implementation because there is no disagreement over the program. But if the government intends to procrastinate or if it fails as the previous governments failed, then it would be premature to discuss the issue.”

National Interest

Within the framework of this dialogue, Muhammad ‘Uthman Jamma’, the federation chairman, has urged the government to put the national program above the interests of the narrow political and partisan game and that it launch immediate serious efforts for peace and national unity, for providing food and essential goods, for dealing with inflation and for establishing security, order, justice and equality. He said that this is the basic cure for strikes and that the deteriorating situation and the disrupted production and services in all the facilities

have paralyzed the state, thus generating popular frustration and despair. He said that this situation leads to coups and chaos.

He noted that the Central Committee's decision not to participate in the government is the result of the committee's conviction that the main participation podium is among the people and not in the government apparatus. In his speech to the Central Committee, Jamma' said that in its fifth congress, held last October, the federation dealt with the course of the developments, warned of the perils confronting the national security and offered the projected economic, political and social alternative to overcome the crisis. Moreover, the congress demanded application of the minimum wage limit, reduction of the cost of living and the establishment of peace as an inlet to national building or to overcoming the government crisis. This attracted the attention of the other leaderships which began, in their turn, steering the developments. On 5 January 1989, the federation issued its call for forming a broad government. Jamma' reviewed the contacts made with the other forces after the armed forces had submitted their memorandum, the drafting of the phased program to create a firm ground and minimum spending and the consensus on the formation of a national salvation government that paves the way for a balanced democracy and for reforming the constitutional institutions.

Jamma' also stressed the need to adhere to the six principles agreed to in the phased program, the need to adhere to the agreement concluded between the six unionist federations and the State Presidential Council and the need to amend the election law and to assign closed districts to the workers.

Representation of Modern Forces

Continuing the dialogue, Muhammad al-Sayyid Salam, chairman of the Bank Employees Union and treasurer of the [Government] Employees Federation, said: "Formation of the new government is a step forward toward creating the first expanded government that is, despite the parliament's presence, close to the people's aspirations, even though it is not as perfect as we wish because it is controlled by the same traditional forces controlling the Constituent Assembly. As for representation of the modern forces, it is weak and does not achieve these forces' aspirations. But the coordination between the federations and the unions to unite these forces for a better political future is a positive coordination.

"As for implementation or non-implementation of the phased program, there are no guarantees. The federations and unions must not think that by their participation in the government, the government will do what they want. They must stand united and must constantly pressure the government to achieve as much of this program as possible. We ask: If the Council of Ministers decides unanimously on something that does not agree with the modern forces' demands, what position will

these forces take? This is why we have said that the modern forces must be represented in the legislative, not executive, authorities. Generally, I believe that the participation of these forces has taken place in accordance with the step-by-step policy we follow as long as there is the so-called mechanical majority."

Journalists' Union Election Results Returned

Election Results

45040277 Khartoum AL-HADAF in Arabic
17 Mar 89 p 2

[Text] Forces of the uprising dominated the Journalists' Union elections yesterday and won the 15 council seats. The difference between the lowest number of votes obtained by candidates of the uprising forces and the highest number obtained by the [National] Front list was 58 votes. The lowest of the candidates of the Front's list obtained only 76 votes, while the lowest number of votes obtained by the uprising forces' list was 239. AL-HADAF publishes detailed results as follows:

Election Results

List	Name of Candidate	Votes
Uprising Forces	Yusuf al-Shanabli	311
	'Uthman Shinadah	279
	Muhammad 'Uthman Abu-Shawk	239
	Makki 'Abd-al-Qadir	286
	Rahmi Muhammad Sulayman	278
	Zayn-al-'Abidin Yahya	247
	'Umar 'Abd-al-Tamm	289
	'Abd-al-Rahman al-Amin	268
	Muhammad 'Abd-al-Jawad	282
	Shadiyah Hamid	297
	Al-Sirr Annay	274
	Muhammad Mahmud Raji	316
	Haydar Taha	390
	Murtada al-Ghali	324
	Muhammad Idris	298
Salvation List	Wahid 'Antar	76
	Hatikabi	44
	Sami Salim	69
	Muhammad Latif	70
	Al-Sadiq Baqadi	23
	Hashim Karrar	76
	'Abd-al-Ra'uf	44
	Maykal	45
	'Umar Tawfiq Hamid	39
	Mufti	109
	Zayn-al-'Abidin	73
	Talhah al-Shafi'	73
	'Umar Ubayy	18
	Husni	92
	'Abd-al-Salam Hamzah	14
National Front List	Saqdi	106
	Haydar Idris	114

Mahjub Khayri	95
'Awad 'Umar	94
Sharif Tambal	136
Al-Bakhit Adam	151
Al-Sirr Hasan al-Fadl	126
Titawi	152
Amsan Hasan 'Umar	141
Fath-al-Rahman al-Nahhas	177
'Umar Isma'il	132
Shu'ayb	145
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Ba'th Party Reaction

45040277 Khartoum AL-HADAF in Arabic
17 Mar 89 p 1

[Article in "Word" column: "Significance of Journalists' Union Elections"]

[Text] The great interest in voting in elections for the first council of the Journalists' Union after the uprising, along with the accompanying intense struggle marked by democracy and civility, reflected the union's great importance as an enlightened center for the defense of freedom and democracy as a crowning of the daily role that writers perform in addition to the union's professional functions in advancing the conditions of journalistic service and in serving its affiliates. This emerged in the participation of the majority of journalists, despite continued campaigns to cast doubts, first on the legitimacy of the union itself, and then on the neutrality of the committee supervising the elections.

The event's importance was increased by the victory of forces of the uprising in all union council seats in circumstances that also give evidence of a probable balance of forces in favor of the uprising forces on the broad political scene. This makes the result of the journalists' elections an additional support for the movement of the masses in its current battle from inside and outside the [Constituent] Assembly for an expanded government committed to the charters of the uprising, the peace initiative, and the programs of the current period.

The lessons learned from the experience of the Journalists' Union elections are the same theses that the Ba'th Party and all democratic forces have continued to stress—namely, that the unity and cohesion of the forces of the uprising and their uniting around their program is the only way to realize their group and national goals. This unity is the tested means for defeating the forces of backsliding on any battle ground. So, toward more unity and cohesion around timely goals and slogans!

In addition, the victory of forces of the uprising is a victory for the values and ideals of journalism and for its mission toward the people and country. On the other hand, it represents a fall for the triviality and immorality represented by some pens and newspapers connected

with the parasitical capitalistic classes and their interests. Let this victory be the beginning of work to enhance the importance of journalism and the press in our country!

Harvesters Call for Higher Wages, Peace

45040279A Khartoum AL-MAYDAN in Arabic bx;117
Mar 89 p 1

[Article: "500 Migrants to Harvest Areas Call for Peace, End to Civil War"]

[Text] A source in the Commission for Migrant Affairs has reported that the group of migrants that will leave next Monday to work at harvest sites in the Central and Eastern Regions will number over 500 people (individuals or families). This is in addition to the sultans who have returned to Khartoum to confer about the possibility of their being given ownership of independent plots of agricultural land, instead of their remaining merely hired workmen.

It is mentioned that harvest sites had previously received more than 3,000 persons who began on terms of up to 7 [Sudanese] pounds for harvesting 1 ardeb, rising afterwards to about 30 pounds per ardeb. Workers, however, have rejected this. Most of them work on the piecework system (voluntary agreement between the worker and farm owner to work according to the area to be harvested).

The Commission for Migrant Affairs held a conference the day before yesterday in solidarity with migrant women. The conference called upon the government to bring about peace, end the civil war, and stop the bloodshed. It also addressed a call to all international organizations, human rights organizations, and international public opinion, asking for an end to arbitrariness, oppression, and repression by Israeli authorities against militant Palestinian women.

Electricity Authority Faces Distribution, Service Problems

45040273B Khartoum AL-SIYASAH in Arabic
4 Mar 89 p 9

[Interview with Engineer Muhammad Ahmad Tal'at, general manager of the National Electricity Authority by Muhammad 'Uthman 'Isa and Amal Qamar: "Consumers Owe Authority 300 Million Pounds; Permanent Offices To Be Set Up at Few Locations for Reporting Emergencies, Collecting Fees; Power Problem in al-Duwaym To Be Solved by Power Line from Kusti;" date and place of interview not specified]

[Text] Why is the Electricity Authority carrying out an extensive campaign to collect fees from consumers? What is the authority's plan for collecting these sums of money? Why do some consumers receive bills containing

unbelievable figures which they did not expect? Why is it that some citizens have had their power cut off even though they had not received their bills? What about electricity in al-Duwaym?

[AL-SIYASAH] took these questions to Engineer Muhammad Ahmad Tal'at, general manager of the National Electricity Authority, and Mr Tal'at answered all of them candidly and unequivocally.

[Tal'at] We wish to make it clear, first of all, that the National Electricity Authority's bylaws stipulate that the authority be managed as a business. Therefore, it is expected to cover all its expenses, especially those which have to do with generating and distributing electricity. The authority is expected to make a reasonable profit so it can expand power production projects. To achieve that, the authority has to set up rates and collect payments for the electricity it sells. In our opinion, this is a joint responsibility the authority shares with consumers. The authority has to provide consumers with uninterrupted power service, as much as that is possible, and citizens have to pay for the electricity they consume.

Now, however, the consumers' debt to the authority has grown, and the latest estimate puts that debt at approximately 300 million pounds. This is a large sum of money which must be collected, especially when we learn that the authority's bill for the petroleum materials it consumes to produce electricity is now 195 million pounds. This bill, which is due and payable, does not include bills for spare parts, for operating materials, for salaries and wages and for other such expenditures.

[AL-SIYASAH] What is your plan for collecting these sums of money?

[Tal'at] Several studies have been made about how these sums can be collected. Because citizens' conditions and life's difficulties were taken into consideration, we thought that citizens should pay for the electricity they consume every month plus part of the amount which they owe.

The authority itself is having some problems which are delaying the implementation of this plan. These include an aversion among many people to the job of reading meters and that of delivering bills to consumers. Because many people do not want to do those things, we are now having a shortage of meter readers and employees who deliver bills to consumers even as the area of the national capital has been growing.

The second thing which is delaying the implementation of this plan is that bills are late in reaching consumers because it is not possible to read the meters every month. At the present time bills are issued once every 3 months. That also makes the late payments pile up.

Third, citizens themselves are not accustomed to monitoring their power consumption. They are not used to paying their bills before those bills arrive.

We are now in the process of issuing monthly bills because doing that reduces the payments which citizens have to make. At the same time, we are asking citizens to go to the authority's offices to find out how much they owe. We are asking them to pay what they owe and not to wait for their bills to arrive.

[AL-SIYASAH] There was a system by means of which booths were set up in various neighborhoods to collect late payments. Why don't you use that system which makes things easier for citizens?

[Tal'at] The authority has actually followed a course for collecting late payments, but it must organize a so-called campaign, a collections campaign, at regular intervals. It should determine a certain location, publicize that location in the media, and deliver the bills. Afterwards, power interruption crews and bill collectors would move into that area where temporary booths or tents would be used as collection centers. Although the word "campaign" is an ugly word, it was the method that was available to us for collecting late payments. But such an activity is seasonal and does not offer a radical solution to the problem. We are now in the process of setting up permanent offices in different locations throughout the capital. All services to citizens, such as reporting emergencies and collecting payments, will be available there.

A search is still underway for suitable locations. In the meantime, we are talking with some athletic and social clubs and asking them to allow us to use the clubs for that purpose until the authority's permanent offices are set up.

The authority welcomes suggestions from citizens. It is asking citizens to make any suggestions that would help it offer better services to them so they can pay their bills without having to resort to the method which is being used now.

[AL-SIYASAH] It has been noticed that some bills are inflated. That interferes with the payment process, doesn't it?

[Tal'at] We admit that some bills are issued for incredible amounts. There may be several reasons for that, including the fact that accurate meter readings are lacking because, as we mentioned earlier, there is a shortage of meter readers. Also, the number of people who work in the Computer Section is small, and bills are not checked after they are issued. We have now established a new computer section, and we are concentrating on the process of training workers in that section. They are being trained by a foreign company that has expertise in that field. We are conducting a comprehensive review of the meters and using temporary teams of university and secondary school graduates who actually read the meters.

All non-functioning or damaged meters are being replaced. However, any citizen who receives a bill with abnormal figures can check those bills at the authority's accounting section and have them corrected.

[AL-SIYASAH] But in the recent campaign consumers' electricity was being disconnected even though bills had not been received.

[Tal'at] It is true that in the aftermath of the tragedy which followed the recent torrential rains of the past months, the authority's liquidity has been poor. Consequently, large sums of money were spent to deal with the effects of these torrential rains.

The authority had to have the liquid cash it needed for its operations. In some areas where consumers received their bills, partial payments were made, but consumers there still owe the authority money. Citizens should have voluntarily paid the authority what they owe it in monthly installments. Since that did not happen, citizens were asked through the various media to go to the authority's offices and to pay back their late payments. In addition, consumers in other areas have received the bills that were prepared for them. Accordingly, we assume that every citizen knows how much he owes in late payments. The fact that consumers did not pay is the reason for this recent campaign.

We can say, in general, that we are operating with the same capacity we had before. We made no additions to our power generating capacity. We can say that power generation this year does not differ much from power generation last year. What we are doing now is maintenance. We are doing maintenance for all hydroelectric power plants and for thermal power plants in particular, which we rely on in the summer. We want to guarantee that thermal power plants will continue to run as long as possible with the least possible interruptions. This is the battle we have to fight.

At the authority, we are taking into consideration devising a program for distributing circuit breakers in various areas just in case we have to resort to power interruptions because of the shortage in generated power. This is what we did last year, but we will make an announcement to that effect in all the media. The authority is making an effort to ensure an uninterrupted supply of power throughout the holy month of Ramadan.

Citizens play an important role in reducing consumption in general, particularly during the periods when power is scarce or when there is a shortage in generated power. Citizens can avoid unnecessary lighting, and they can avoid using air conditioners, which are high consumers of electricity. Citizens can avoid the use of [water] heaters, electrical irons and freezers or refrigerators. All this would set consumption on the proper course and save energy for the largest number of people for the longest possible period of time. One of the biggest problems we faced last year was that of using offices as

resting places during the days of Ramadan. That phenomenon disrupted the program we had devised to go through the summer with the least possible inconvenience.

[AL-SIYASAH] What about electricity for al-Duwaym?

[Tal'at] The matter of electricity for al-Duwaym and a solution to that city's problem is tied basically to the White Nile Electrification Project. Steps to implement that project have been taken, but that project is a long term project. At the present time two generators from al-Shariqah are being installed. But because it turned out that this project, which is tantamount to building a new station and setting up its civil, electrical and other installations, would take a long time and would not be completed in less than 1 full year, a 33 kilowatt power line from Kusti is now being built to provide al-Duwaym with electricity. This is a temporary measure to deal with the electricity problem; it is the fastest measure that can be taken to deal with that problem. Work on that project is actually underway.

Article Questions Effectiveness of Parties, Democracy

45040276A Khartoum AL-HADAF in Arabic
19 Mar 89 p 4

[Article by Kamal al-Sirr: "What Are the Fundamental Causes of the Government's Crisis in Sudan? Traditional Parties, Backward Conditions, Elections Law Are Elements of Three-Pronged Crisis"]

[Text] The government's stifling crisis which was brought to a head last 20 February by the armed forces' memorandum is neither new nor ephemeral. It is an old and deep-seated crisis: as old as democracy in Sudan, and as deep-seated as our country's crisis of backwardness and ignorance. This is the fact which is confirmed by over 30 years of experience. These are the years of the post-independence period.

The armed forces' memorandum then was by no means a cause of the crisis; it was rather a product of it. This is the consensus that was reached by all the political forces in the country when they talked about the extraordinary conditions which led the armed forces to submit such a memorandum. The distinctively Sudanese and possibly unique nature of that memorandum added something new to the practice of democracy.

Where are the root causes of the crisis, and what are the fundamental reasons for it? This is the question that is most important and most pressing.

To answer this question we must, first of all, make a clear and unequivocal distinction between democracy as a system of government which is chosen unanimously by the people, and the practices which are set up by rulers as actual, working practices and called democracy.

Making this distinction is essential so that matters can be put in their proper place. It is also essential to keep some people from sliding into anti-democratic positions and holding democracy itself responsible for rulers' mistakes and their inability to act. It is important to guard against that because, regardless of the justifications for being antidemocracy, the other side of that coin, which is the only alternative to democracy, is the authoritarian dictatorship that our people have had enough of.

The problem then does not lie in democracy itself, but rather in its practices and its tools. To be more specific, there are three sides to this problem, which may be arranged as follows:

First, political parties are a tool of democracy. It follows then that their presence and development in a democracy would be indispensable. The development of democracy is contingent upon the development of political parties, the tool of democracy. Herein lies part of the problem: political parties in Sudan, especially those which are well represented in parliament, are still backward in their organizational makeup, in their programs and in the relationships between the parties and their leaders, on the one hand, and between those leaders and the membership, on the other hand.

It is a fact that traditional political parties in Sudan were born during the forties and the fifties. Their birth, therefore, was the product of the economic and social circumstances which were prevalent at the time. They are tribal and clannish in their makeup, and while they have regional divisions, these divisions also overlap with sectarian institutions. Although it may be somewhat acceptable for the birth of these traditional parties to be associated with such conditions, what is unacceptable is the fact that after almost half a century has gone by since these parties came into existence, they remain captive to the circumstances of their birth. Thus, even if we were to concede that a relative change did take place in the course pursued by these traditional parties, this change is most certainly limited by the mental attitude and the circumstances which prevailed at the time of their birth. This change is not compatible with either the time period or the rapid pace of development which the human race has experienced during the latter half of this 20th century.

The other aspect of the crisis in the traditional parties' relations with democracy is that these parties have been ruling the country in the name of democracy without providing democracy within their own institutions and their own parties.

Besides, the membership in these parties is traditional. The ties between the membership and the party are spiritual, tribal, or clannish. Because a party's program has nothing to do with that relationship, leaders of these parties find they have a free hand. Once they are in power, they can do what they want without having much fear of being held accountable for their actions by the

members of their parties. This is because the relationship between the leaders and the members of a party is not based on a clear and a specific program from the outset.

The second side of the problem lies in the existing situation in Sudan. If political parties are tools for the practice of democracy, these tools, whether they perform negatively or positively, are used in the context of a specific situation, which is characterized by backwardness, ignorance and poverty. Moreover, there are cultural and religious discrepancies in Sudan where the facts confirm that more than 70 percent of males are still illiterate. At the same time, illiteracy among females is over 85 percent. Such backwardness must have a negative effect on democratic practices because it is the masses who make up the decisive factor in a democracy. Consequently, the awareness and the knowledge that these people would have can have a major effect on democracy as it is experienced and practiced every day. A proper law, that is, a democratic law, cannot by itself lead us to achieve the proper justice and progress that we seek. Instead, what is required are proper conditions under which the law can be exercised. The law can then lead us to the proper outcome that is required.

That is why confronting the reality of backwardness, ignorance, illiteracy, poverty, and disease remains a must so that the practice of democracy and the democratic system in Sudan can be developed. Herein, however, lies another dilemma, which in my judgment, is the greatest dilemma facing the democratic experiment in Sudan. How can we get rid of this backwardness so we can establish a society in which awareness, knowledge, food and stability are available? How can we do this in a democracy that remains captive to the backwardness, poverty and disease that we have in this country?

This is the pressing question, and the answer to it leads us to the third element in the government's crisis in Sudan. This element of the crisis has to do with the law which governs the relationship between what happens in Sudan, with all its complexities, and the tools of democracy, or Sudan's political parties and the democratic institutions they create. We are speaking here of the elections law.

The elections law must take this special Sudanese situation into account. With all their complexities Sudan's circumstances and the country's actual conditions most certainly differ in grade and quality from conditions in Europe or Britain where the well-known formulas for liberal democratic practice were developed. These include the Westminster formula which is currently being used in Sudan.

To grasp this contradiction in the existing situation which is peculiar to Sudan and to achieve the required balance between the existing situation in Sudan, with all its backwardness and complexities, and the practice of democracy, which requires awareness, understanding, stability and knowledge, we bring up the subject of the

modern forces. The modern forces are a segment of Sudan's population. Because of their awareness and their knowledge and because they have had access to tools for organizing trade unions and democratic organizations, they are playing a more distinguished role than other segments of the population, and their presence is felt more than that of other segments of the population.

That is why representation for these modern forces in the democratic legislative assembly is being demanded. They are to be represented in accordance with a fair elections law that would guarantee representation for these forces and create the balance which is missing in the equation of Sudanese democracy.

But it is regrettable that the elections law we have now is using this important and essential demand for representation to consolidate the backwardness and the weakness which exist in Sudan's democratic practices. The law does that, first, by limiting the modern forces exclusively to graduates and then by tailoring its conditions to suit the National Front. The law thus consolidated the authority of the traditional forces, even though representation for the modern forces was demanded to create a balance between these traditional forces and the modern forces. That demand was made to preserve the balance in the political reality of Sudanese democracy, that is, to preserve the general characteristics of that democracy which is exclusive to Sudan.

Second, the backwardness of this transitional elections law lies in its reliance on a method of free, direct elections which splits people's votes and gives the largest minority in the country control in parliament. The total number of votes cast for members of the Constituent Assembly can be less than half the number of votes cast. That is why the existing Constituent Assembly represents nothing but the dictatorship of the largest minority. If, for example, we were to check the votes that were cast for representatives of the Ummah Party and the Front and the southerners who were their allies in the last government which resigned from office, we would find that those votes were less than 30 percent of the total votes that were cast. Accordingly, only 30 percent of Sudan's population had confidence in the authority of those who were ruling the country, but 70 percent of the people had not voted for that government.

To surmount this prodigious error the elections law in Sudan must be based on lists of candidates that voters would vote for and on a system of proportional representation. Each party would set forth its program and its list of candidates. Then all the votes that were cast for that party would be added and the percentage of votes cast for that party relative to the total votes cast computed. Each party would be represented in the Constituent Assembly in proportion to the number of votes it received relative to the total number of votes that were cast. To surmount the problem of representation for the south under this law, the southern region could become a separate electoral district. It too could be governed by

its proportional representation elections law. Other districts would be designated for the modern forces, and these would include workers, civil servants, technicians, workers, etc.

In our judgment, these are the three problems which must be surmounted to solve the existing crisis of our government in our country, to preserve the practice of democracy in Sudan and to develop that practice in a manner that is consistent with conditions in Sudan. We can thus avoid having a constituent assembly that can neither legislate nor control. We can avoid having such an assembly that would produce a government which is even more impotent than the assembly itself and cannot stay in office more than 9 months. This is what we have now.

The last important and grave fact is this: the practice of democracy must have economic and social implications. In essence, democracy, especially in the Third World, does not mean the superficial equality that manifests itself in people having the equal right to vote, to run for office, and to speak. Democracy also means having the equal right to eat and to have stability, peace and a sense of awareness. Having these rights makes people qualified to exercise properly their rights to run for office, to vote and to speak, even though people may exercise those rights differently. Herein lies the real connection between democracy and what is achieved. This is how democracy can become firmly established; this is how it can flourish. People's lives and livelihoods would become stable and secure, and their faith in democracy would grow because democracy will have secured for them their livelihood and their freedom. Without bread freedom of speech is meaningless, and without freedom bread provides no nourishment.

Editorial Sees Present as Democracy's Last Chance

*45040275B Khartoum AL-HADAF in Arabic
17 Mar 89 p 4*

[Article by Haydar Khadr: "Ummah Party's Last Chance To Tie Score in Last Quarter of Democratic Play-Offs; Loss Would Keep Ummah Party Out of Competition in Next Elections; Victory Contingent upon Completion of Plan To Defend People's Interests, Attack Corruption and Black Market; Mutual Confidence, Team Play, Quick Passes Essential To Tie Score"]

[Text] Al-Sadiq al-Mahdi and the Ummah Party still have one last chance to tie the score in the last year of democracy's life. During the past 3 years of its experience in governing Sudan, four points were scored against the party, and the party was gravely hurt by that.

We are saying this is the Ummah Party's last chance because so far the party and its prime minister have exhausted all opportunities for possible alliances. Having tried various organizations and plans—one time with the Unionist Party; another time with the Unionist Party

and the [National Islamic] Front [NIF]; and then with the NIF alone—the Ummah Party lost all four competitions. Accordingly, it had only one choice left: a new broad organization of individuals who agree on a general plan but whose decisions and experiences are different enough to enrich the experience of the team as a whole. The next round which the Ummah Party is expected to play with the expanded team, according to the agreed upon step-by-step program, is considered one of the most important and the gravest rounds for the country's future as a whole and for the democratic experience in Sudan. This round is also an important and a grave one for the Ummah Party in particular for several reasons, the most important of which are:

1. The Ummah Party's loss in this game would be considered final. The consequences of such a loss would be borne by the Ummah Party alone because it was the only constant element in the four government organizations that lost.

2. Living conditions and security conditions in the country are such that further deterioration in either or further waiting would be intolerable.

3. Only one fourth of the play time (1 year) is left in this democracy game. The country lost four previous games—the number of past governments—and four difficult points were scored against the Ummah Party in particular. That is why the party must at least tie the score during the remaining quarter by making up for these four points that were scored against it. Although this is a tall order, it is not at all impossible to accomplish.

4. It is this game in particular that will decide the outcome of the democratic play-offs. If it loses this game, the Ummah Party will be removed from the competition in the next elections, only 1 year away.

Although the Ummah Party is facing difficulties and dangers in this decisive game, there are several positive factors working in its favor. These factors would help the Ummah Party come out with an acceptable result.

1. The step-by-step program under whose guidelines the game will be played is backed and supported by the broad masses.

2. Fresh new blood will become part of the government team with the entry of trade unions and other political parties in and outside the assembly.

3. NIF members are being kept out of the government team because they are known to be corrupt and they have become known for delaying issues pertaining to banks and other matters. This will advance the possibility for collective understanding and cooperation among the remaining members of the team and will create a greater opportunity for success.

In view of these conditions and interrelated elements the Ummah Party's possibilities for winning or losing the next game will continue to depend on several factors that have to do with the game plan, with choosing competent players and with positioning those players on the field. This is especially important for the sensitive positions. For the Ummah Party winning or losing the game will depend on the team spirit and on the understanding that will manifest itself in the team's game. To win the game, the Ummah Party must take several important measures, and it must make several arrangements that are necessary.

First, it must make a total and sincere commitment to the plan of the step-by-step program, and it must make a serious effort to implement that program fully.

Second, the Ummah Party must change its old game plan which is based on maneuvers and delays and which led to its loss in the four previous elections. This is especially true for al-Sadiq al-Mahdi, the team's captain, who became accustomed to holding on to the ball as long as possible. He has been known for displaying his prowess in dodging the ball and sidelining his fellow players on the team.

Third, the party must establish confidence between the players, and it must play as a team. The party must take quick action so that the team as a whole can gain time and tie the score during the remaining play time. This must be done in preparation for the next round in the next elections.

Fourth, the party must respect the public and the public's wishes. It must not provoke the public by slowing down the game and throwing the ball out of bounds. It is to avoid that by following urgent methods to deal with the public's most pressing issues: peace, bread, and accountability for corruption.

Fifth, the party must play the game with the spirit of sportsmanship, and it must adhere to the ethics of the game and avoid foul balls.

Since the democratic experiment and the Ummah Party in particular lost all the previous games, and since four goals were scored against the Ummah Party, the game plan that is required for the next game should, first of all, be defensive so that no one can score against the party. At the same time, the party's new game plan should enable the party to score as many points as possible. To achieve that, the party must do the following:

1. It must give maximum priority to the defense ministries (the ministries of defense, interior, and domestic trade). Individuals who are known for their superior competence and integrity are to be assigned to those ministries so that security, bread and peace can be provided for the masses. Regarding the ministries of defense and interior, the armed forces and the police would be the best bodies who can nominate candidates who can function in those positions.

2. It must put emphasis on the offensive department to score as many points as possible. The foremost position in that department is that of the district attorney's office. The importance of this department stems from the next game when it will be in a position to play a decisive role. The district attorney's office will be able to demand accountability in corrupt banking practices, in cases involving public funds violations and in various corruption cases as well which are still being piled up. The Ministry of Foreign Trade can also play an important role in apprehending cases of corruption and tampering with the import-export process.

3. The party's center, which includes the ministries of foreign affairs, health and information, has the responsibility of assigning the functions of defense first so that more losses can be avoided. It is also responsible for assigning the functions of offense so that as many points as possible can be scored and balance can be maintained. There is no doubt that positions from which the game can be monitored and decided and those from which players can be held accountable play an important and a grave role in deciding the outcome of a game. And yet, the ultimate factor remains that of collective cooperation between those who play defense, offense and center. The ultimate factor which determines the outcome of the game depends on prompt action and on legitimately taking the other party by surprise when demanding accountability for corruption, for the black market, for hoarding, and so on. But it is the team captain, the prime minister, who continues to play the principal role. He is the one who distributes responsibilities among the various members of the team, and he is the one who inspires confidence in the fresh, new faces who are playing the game for the first time and in other members of the Unionist Party who participated in more than one game in the past.

Accordingly, the outcome of the game will continue to depend on these factors. Decisiveness, speed, earnestness, and respect for the public will continue to be the most effective factors in determining who is victor, especially since only one quarter of the play time is left. There is no doubt that the start of the last game will constitute an additional factor that will determine the possibility of the team's victory or defeat. To gain the time factor, it is essential that we make good use of time and that steps be taken immediately to put together a team whose characteristics would satisfy the masses and enable the team itself to score a victory. Waiting for more time is no longer possible. The public has been waiting for the team to come to the field so it can judge that team by its actions.

Editorial Regrets Union Not Participating in Government

45040274B Khartoum AL-HADAF in Arabic
15 Mar 89 p 1

[Article: "Workers and the New Government"]

[Text] At its meeting yesterday noon the Central Committee of Sudan's Federation of Labor Unions decided

that no one from the Federation of Labor Unions would participate in the government which is being proposed by people inside and outside the association and by those inside and outside trade union associations.

While we appreciate the Central Committee's decision, we note that the decision was not based on reasons that explain clearly why workers were not to participate in the proposed government. Furthermore, the Federation of Labor Unions, especially at its recent conference, had a clear and specific opinion on the economic crisis. The resolutions of that conference offered many positive and mature ways for dealing with that crisis, warding off its effects and keeping them away from workers' lives.

In the aftermath of the recent crisis which started with the December uprising, federation leaders and leaders of other trade unions proposed the idea of a National Rescue Government as an alternative to al-Sadiq's impotent government. The labor union, the trade union associations and political forces proposed far-reaching plans to overcome the crisis, and these plans involved their participation in preparing a program for that stage and in joining the government.

That is why we find no convincing justification for the fact that workers are not participating in the Rescue Government, especially when an item permitting initiative is first on that government's agenda. Other items on that agenda include convening the constitutional conference, applying the resolutions of the economic conference, and drafting a democratic law for the general elections that would guarantee the participation of modern forces in the legislative body.

We said that while we appreciate the Central Committee's decision, we hope that the decision will be reconsidered so that workers can leave their mark on the characteristics of the new stage.

TUNISIA

Ghannouchi on Ennahdha Party Concerns

45190069 Tunis REALITES in French
21-27 Apr 89 pp 6-12

[Interview with Rached Ghannouchi, chairman of the Ennahdha Party, by Moncef Ben M'rad, Hedi Mechri, and Moncef Mahroug; date and place not given; first paragraph is REALITES introduction]

[Text] The legislative elections of 2 April propelled the Islamists onto the stage. The chairman of the Ennahdha Party here discusses that development as well as the recent cabinet reshuffle, women, and the Islamists' relations with the government.

[REALITES] How do you assess the elections held in Tunisia on 2 April?

[Ghannouchi] Concerning the legislative elections, it can be noted that:

- This is one of the first direct tests of how well the democratic choice is established in the behavior of all the groups in the government and the opposition and of the administration's ability to play its role effectively and in a neutral manner. Very fortunately, the democratic option was heavily damaged in the final stretch. [sentence as published]
- The Ennahdha Party was prevented from participating in this first display of democracy.
- The election campaign did indeed take place despite the actions that tainted it, examples being the refusal to register two-thirds of the voters and the various restrictions placed on the opposition and the independents.
- The results of the balloting disappointed people's hopes and struck a severe blow at change.

[REALITES] Mohamed Moadda said after the elections that the administration had taken votes away from the MDS [Movement of Socialist Democrats] and "given" them to the independent lists. What do you think of that statement?

[Ghannouchi] If our dear friend Mohamed Moadda can prove that, we pledge to restore those votes sooner or later, and we consider them a debt.

[REALITES] What kind of support did you give the independent lists that you supported during the campaign? Did you give financial support?

[Ghannouchi] Our purpose in supporting those lists is to strengthen the multiparty system and democracy and to combat the monopoly on ideas. We supported them by calling on our masses to support them not in terms of detailed platforms but as independent forces.

[REALITES] Some people say that the Ennahdha Party is financed by an Arab country. Is that true?

[Ghannouchi] It is very distressing that we are beginning the democratic experience with such ravings. Certain democratic experiences in the East have failed because of such behavior.

[REALITES] After the results of the legislative elections of 2 April made it appear that the Ennahdha Party was the second-largest political group in the country—after the Constitutional and Democratic Rally [RCD]—some people said that the number of votes cast for the lists you supported is the most you can get. What do you think of that?

[Ghannouchi] When you consider that most of our members were deprived of the right to run for office and the right to vote because of the injustices of the old regime; that over 30 percent of the voters did not receive their voter registration cards; and that various kinds of

harassment, interference, and abuse occurred in the various phases of the campaign and especially on election day, you and everyone else will understand that the real influence of the Ennahdha Party cannot be deduced from the results as announced. And we must not forget that the independents have followers of their own who might not support the movement.

[REALITES] How many members does the Ennahdha Party have?

[Ghannouchi] The Ennahdha Party's membership consists of those who will join it if certification is received. And we will discover the real weight of the movement when—with certification received—it participates in free and democratic general elections.

[REALITES] Early in February, the Ennahdha Party again applied for legal certification. Does the renewing of that application mean that the conditions are now favorable for recognition of your party?

[Ghannouchi] Yes.

[REALITES] What will your reaction be if the authorities reject your application for certification?

[Ghannouchi] We feel that all the conditions are right for recognizing the movement so that it can contribute effectively to the fulfillment of the country's political, economic, social, and cultural rebirth.

[REALITES] Some people on the left are working to organize a big rally of the Left. Does it seem to you that such a rally might limit the influence of the Ennahdha Party?

[Ghannouchi] Our movement, which has worked and is working actively on behalf of democratic dialogue among all groups, maintains that suspect alliances which are formed against one group rather than in the interest of the people and which use escalation and deceit are not likely to contribute to a deepening of democracy or to an in-depth study, with the required composure and clear-sightedness, of the major issues facing the country. On the contrary, such behavior can only provoke crises and problems among all groups.

We do not understand, nor do we accept, those ravings, those methods of strained dialogue, the deception of public opinion which they encourage, or the diversion of people's attention from the crucial issues.

Those who are currently plotting against our movement, distorting it, and inciting the people to hatred and confrontation are the ones who have realized that society has rejected their theses and their elitist plans aimed at

breaking with our Arab-Muslim identity. They are grabbing the slogans of freedom and democracy and carrying the banner of Westernization, the single party, and uniform public opinion. All those people must stop being old fossils, hardliners, and opportunists and calmly take stock of themselves. That is the most appropriate course.

[REALITES] What if that leftist rally forms an alliance with the RCD?

[Ghannouchi] An alliance among certain political groups in the interest of the people is necessary and understandable. But forming an alliance to adopt brainwashing methods, stir people up against another group, and undermine the foundations of democratic dialogue is liable to arouse hatred among people and delay the study of issues crucial to the country—issues which must be at the center of the concerns of any responsible group with a view to contributing to the country's rebirth on all levels by impelling the country's forces toward dialogue rather than toward rupture and alliances. Because any alliance results in the establishment of an opposing alliance.

[REALITES] It is said that Abdelfateh Mourou intends to form a moderate wing within the Ennahdha Party. What about that?

[Ghannouchi] Our movement is national and moderate. The person who spread the rumors you mention is expressing his psychological complexes and his fixed ideas.

[REALITES] It seems that the Islamic Liberation Party has started to take some of your radical members who reportedly do not support your current views. Is that true?

[Ghannouchi] If true, it would mean moderation, freedom, and democratic dialogue within a many-faceted Islamic space. I leave it to you to compare that with the language of violence and the exclusiveness now current within certain organizations that have broken with the country's identity.

[REALITES] Sheikh Mohamed Lakhoua recently made statements concerning women, slavery, and enforcement of the shari'ah (stoning, amputation, and so on). It is known that in the legislative elections, the Ennahdha Party supported the list headed by Sheikh Lakhoua. Does that mean that you share his opinions?

[Ghannouchi] Sheikh Lakhoua was speaking in his capacity as a scholar and in accordance with his knowledge and jurisprudence, not as a spokesman for the independent list he headed. If the logic that confuses a man's position as a scholar with his position as head of a list were accepted, a newspaper could report what Sheikh Abderrahmane Khlif says in his lessons and consider that the platform of the list he headed and of the party to which that list belongs. And anyway, why do certain reporters cause all this fuss about Sheikh Mohamed

Lakhoua's statements concerning women and attack the Ennahdha movement but not treat the RCD the same way when Sheikh Abderrahmane Khlif says similar things on the same subject without causing those reporters to express reservations? Is it a matter of objectivity, fear, or participation in an orchestrated campaign against our movement?

The Ennahdha movement has on more than one occasion made clear its stands on the various issues you raise, both in the newspapers and in the file it submitted to the Ministry of Interior. We are placing in your hands a document describing our objectives, and we draw your attention to the section on social objectives.

[REALITES] How does the Ennahdha Party conceive of the state and the organization of society?

[Ghannouchi] That is an issue which one cannot address in a few lines. There are other issues requiring an environment of freedom in which to mature. It is enough for us to reaffirm that our plan does not consist of destroying the state edifice now in place. Rather, it is aimed at transforming the content of that state into a force influencing general policy and matters affecting people. Bourguiba drained all those areas of all content except constraint. So much so that about the only state function which remained was that of guaranteeing the security of the oligarchy in power.

The state stripped society of its sense of initiative, voluntary participation, faith in itself, and creativity. It destroyed the traditional structures that had taken responsibility for society's chief educational, economic, and helping functions. The result was indifference, the spread of the welfare mentality, and people's total dependence on the state. That is the "statist" society which Bourguiba has left behind.

Our social objective consists of helping to lay the cultural and social foundations of a civil society which takes responsibility for its most important functions—a society which the state serves and which constitutes the only source of the latter's legitimacy. There is no reason to dominate society in the name of any historical, religious, proletarian, or pseudodemocratic legitimacy. Bourguiba introduced the slogan of the state's prestige, but what that really meant was the party's monopoly, the capitalist interests in whose bosom the government situated itself within the country, and the monopoly of that state as exercised by Bourguiba.

The time has come to hold high the slogan of the prestige of society and the citizen and that of the government which serves both.

In the "statist" society we have inherited from the dictator, we can do nothing without government authorization. We are working on behalf of a society in which the government will decide policy only with the people's authorization.

In the "statist" society inherited from the dictator, what people fear most is the government's anger. And we are working on behalf of a society in which, after the anger of God, the government's greatest fear will be the anger of the people. And the real power will be the law, which everyone will fear. In such a society, there is really no reason to falsify the will of the people. Instead, it is regarded as sacred.

[REALITES] Is there room in the type of Islamic state you advocate for freedom of belief—for secular or communist parties, for example—and for freedom of expression and freedom to establish parties?

[Ghannouchi] "No constraint in religion" is a major precept of the Koran which, along with the experience of power as exercised by the Prophet in Medina, underlies the rights of the citizens, including freedom of thought, belief, expression, and what flows from that in the way of freedom of association. All of it within the limits of respect for public order and what that implies in the way of a call for good behavior and nonallegiance to the enemies of the national community. And while most contemporary Islamic thinkers have expressed reservations either as to the establishment of political parties in general in Islamic society or as to parties with ideologies hostile to Islam, we, for our part, have advocated a widening of the sphere of freedom within the limits indicated above. But political life in Tunisia has developed in such a way that all political movements, including those with a Marxist ideology, have adopted the principle of Arab-Islamic identity to the point that in this country there is no longer any group whose slogan expresses a difference or a hostility to Islam. And that is a remarkable achievement on the part of the Islamic movement. From a practical point of view, it solves the problem!

[REALITES] Some people accuse you of being democrats as long as you benefit from democracy and of putting on democratic clothes in order to obtain certification.

[Ghannouchi] That logic is rejected because it accuses us on the basis of our supposed intentions. Those who resort to such behavior are the same ones who could not stand up to logical dialogue because of the ineffectiveness of their arguments and their adoption of empty slogans that are mummified and far removed from the nation's heritage and the country's specific nature.

We need no lessons in democracy. Not from those upholding the dictatorship of the proletariat and theorizing that certain classes are going to destroy others, nor from those who have worked and are still working for the dictatorship of the single party and uniform public opinion, nor from those whose allegiance is to repressive regimes imposed on their peoples and who have practiced the worst kinds of terrorism and been the cause of this "Israeli era," nor, lastly, those who have been incapable of practicing democracy among themselves, a

circumstance that has led them into plots, coups d'etat, violence, and exclusiveness.

The one who wants to serve his country and contribute to its development must be objective, avoid accusing others on the basis of their supposed intentions, and debate the various issues without tension or narrow partisan self-interest and far from the sound of vile Bourguibian information.

[REALITES] You preach nonseparation of religion and the state. Does this mean that power must be exercised by men of religion?

[Ghannouchi] Nonseparation of religion and the state is part of our country's current constitutional structure, something that has made it possible to describe the chief of state as the "protector of religion" [hami al-hima wa al-din]. That is something which cannot be said of the chief of a democratic state in the Western—that is, secular—sense.

The Islamic nature of the state means, among other things, that the president and the top men in the ministries of sovereignty and the policy-making ministries must be Muslims. It also implies that the soul of Islam, its values, and its culture must inspire every institution in society because Islam constitutes the philosophical and theoretical basis of society. The Islamic nature of the state also means that the institutions must make no decisions contradicting Islam, that the state must consider itself to be and must act as a part of the Islamic Umma. In no way does this mean that such a state receives its legitimacy from a source other than the people, since the people are the source of power. There is no political privilege for men of religion, but they are not prohibited from participating in politics. Their position as learned men does not in itself give them legitimacy. The source of legitimacy for all equally is the people.

[REALITES] How do you conceive of the relationship between the man of religion and the politician? In Iran, for example, we see that the ulemas are supreme in the conduct of state affairs and that ordinary people are merely functionaries.

[Ghannouchi] Islamic experiences in the exercise of power, whether old or recent, are not models to be followed but simply experiences to be noted and from which one can take certain things while abandoning others.

[REALITES] What would you do if you were a government official and had to solve the unemployment problem that is affecting nearly 500,000 people?

[Ghannouchi] Work is a human and social right (and therefore a duty), not just an economic function. And by the way, economics, according to modern theories, is a function of many factors, chief among them the human factor.

Because of that, it needs to be considered that the major problem constituted by unemployment is not just a technical one, and it will not be solved simply with market equations.

Solving major problems requires participation by the nation in its entirety. The state is merely one element whose job is to promote participation in choices so as to ensure participation in action.

It is an established fact that the number of unemployed and semiunemployed in Tunisia is on the order of 500,000. That is a huge figure, and it is not normal. The annual job deficit totals between 20,000-35,000. That on top of the deficit in the big state enterprises and the PME's [small and medium-sized enterprises], the crisis in emigration, and so on. The problem is tending to grow increasingly unsolvable in the current system and with the choices that have been made.

The fact is that socioeconomic phenomena are more a matter of choice than of fate. A solution to the problem cannot be imagined within the framework (indeed the stranglehold) of current policies, which manage our economy on two levels—the balance of payments and the state budget—and while we are struggling along on the periphery of the Western economy.

The Tunisian economy's goals are not clear or firm enough from the standpoint of either eschatology (values), teleology (existentially—based on people's needs), or technology (where the priorities of development need to be defined). A thorough national debate dealing with those three aspects is more than vital: Who are we?, What do we want?, and What will we do?

For our part, as a group concerned about our collective being and our collective destiny, we currently feel inclined to develop our contribution to the debate in the hope of being able to present it in our party platform once certification is obtained. But for the moment, and within the limits of the space available in the columns of your newspaper, we present these few proposals aimed at an overall reform of the economic situation and a revision of ideas. So, the alternative calls for the following:

- A move toward the building of an economy based on the country's needs (self-centered) and the achievement of a considerable degree of integration.
- A move toward Arabic and Islamic economic integration in the Maghreb. Our themes must be along the lines of a Maghreb currency, Maghreb-wide means of transportation, and so on.
- Absolute priority must be given to agriculture, implementation of the principle that "the land belongs to the one who develops it," and gradual abolition of the system of landed income (income from land ownership).
- A reorganization of consumption, with pressure being put on extravagant consumption so as to promote the savings necessary for investment.

- Project financing in the form of contributions and partnerships must be facilitated.
- Great attention must be paid to training and retraining so as to adapt to the various forms of development. Progress must be controlled and guided.
- We must guarantee the neutrality and efficiency of the administration and keep it from assuming any form of totalitarianism or Jacobinism so as to reduce bureaucracy and red tape. We must rehabilitate domestic and civil society and the society of initiative and self-management.
- Encouragement of the transactional and shari'ah system of zakat to guarantee a minimum income for the residual unemployed (temporary and seasonal workers and so on) and all those who cannot produce. An unemployment fund, if you will.

It is legitimate to conclude, in short, that once they are in effect, these various measures could contribute to qualitative full employment as opposed to quantitative pseudo-full employment, which is merely a waste of time and a waste of resources.

[REALITES] Your group is known to have reservations about the option that makes tourism one of the pillars of the Tunisian economy. Why? What alternative do you propose?

[Ghannouchi] Tourism in general is not simply a deliberate "choice" or a specifically Tunisian feature, but rather a steadily growing global phenomenon. It is therefore a human, cultural, social, economic, and even political fact. So on the issue of tourism, the choice does not boil down to the simple question of to be or not to be.

We are not calling for a cloistered society. Besides, Tunisia has always been a land where people come together. This is attested by the geographic, historical, and ethnological facts. And we are delighted that this is so, because it gives us our richness and originality. We even hope that our country will promote fruitful civilizational dialogue between Islam and the world. We have more than just sun and beaches.

Tourism is and must be only one factor in development, not the sole factor. Our tourist policy cannot be pursued at the expense of genuine values. Even hospitality, of which we are proud, is not a marketable value. We are unfortunately witnessing a terrible waste of our resources: water, agriculture, and so on. "King Tourist" is a concept to be relativized. The seasonal employment provided by tourism of the same kind is not the right solution to unemployment.

Last, we say that tourist activity must be developed in the direction of a tourism of developed people—with the North, the South, the East, and the West. It is always dangerous for an economy to be based on "sand"—and shifting sand at that. At the mercy of economic conditions.

[REALITES] Your relations with the government before 7 November were very strained. How are they now?

[Ghannouchi] There is no reason to compare the two phases.

[REALITES] What is your assessment of the entry into the government of Mohamed Charfi, Dali Jazy, and Moncer Rouissi?

[Ghannouchi] We believe in the importance of opening up to all intellectual and political movements without

partiality. And we reaffirm the need to undertake a vast consultation with the people before reaching any decision on the crucial issues affecting the country's future. We also reaffirm the need to delve more deeply into our country's Arab-Islamic identity in the areas of education and teaching. And we express when necessary our fear of a return to the "Sayah plan"—that plan which, in the name of reorganization, stripped the country of its Islamic nature and its Arab character.

INDIA

Five New Ministers Inducted Into Haryana Government

46001441 Calcutta *THE TELEGRAPH* in English
31 Mar 89 p 1

[Text] New Delhi, March 30—The Haryana chief minister, Mr Devi Lal, today inducted five new ministers, including his son Ranjit Singh and the state BJP [Bharatiya Janata Party] chief, Dr Mangal Sein, to his government raising the strength of his ministry to 30.

Dr Mangal Sein has been given the rank of deputy chief minister, though he will be number three in the Cabinet hierarchy. The finance minister, Mr Banarsi Das Gupta, who too holds the rank of deputy chief minister, will continue to be number two.

Along with the expansion, Mr Devi Lal promoted Mr Subhash Katyal to Cabinet rank and Mr Lachhman Singh Kamboj and Mr Sachdev Tyagi, both deputy ministers, to ministers of state. The other new faces in the ministry are the MLA [Member of Legislative Assembly] from Rai, Mr Maha Singh (Cabinet), Mr Manphool Singh, MLA from Karnal, and Mr Hasan Mohammed, newly elected to the Haryana Assembly from Nuh.

The Cabinet expansion was on the anvil after the ouster of the agriculture minister, Mr Tayyab Hussain, and the resignation of the minister of state for local government, Mr Avtar Singh Badhana, who is not a member of the state Assembly.

Though the inclusion of Mr Ranjit Singh and two of his confidants, Mr Maha Singh and Mr Manphool Singh, makes it appear like a victory for the younger son, the expansion seems to have been equally influenced by the chief minister's elder son, Mr Om Prakash Chautala. Mr Chautala was responsible for the induction of Dr Mangal Sein as the deputy chief minister, a significant achievement considering the fact that Mr Devi Lal had been strongly opposed to the BJP chief's inclusion in the government all this while.

Mr Devi Lal's personal antipathy towards Dr Mangal Sein arises from his suspicion that the latter collaborated with Mr Bhajan Lal in bringing down his Janata government. The chief minister had earlier refused to relent even to requests from the central BJP leaders for the inclusion of Dr Sein in his government.

In the last six months, however, Dr Sein has associated himself closely with Mr Chautala and helped him in his undeclared succession war with his younger brother. At one point, Dr Mangal Sein had even issued statements to the effect that BJP leaders and workers should not participate in Mr Ranjit Singh's public programmes. Now as deputy chief minister, Dr Sein will increase Mr Chautala's influence in government.

Antarctic Team Returns Home, Achievements Cited

Return on 26 Mar

46001438 Bombay *THE TIMES OF INDIA* in English
27 Mar 89 p 4

[Text] Panaji, March 26 (PTI)—The eighth scientific expedition team to Antarctica was given a rousing reception on its return to the Mormugao port here today.

Officials, scientists, armed forces dignitaries and family members welcomed the team, led by Dr Amitava Sengupta of the National Physical Laboratory, New Delhi, as members disembarked from the vessel, "M.V. Thuleland," chartered by the department of ocean development and used by the seventh expedition as well.

The expedition, which had set off in the last week of November last, constructed the second permanent Indian Antarctica station, "Maitri" located 70 kms away from the first station "Dakshin Gangotri," established in January 1982.

During their 70-day stay on the icy continent, the team also carried out other scientific activities including ongoing research projects in mineral resources, studies in oceanography, biology and meteorology, and the effect of Antarctica temperatures on the summer and monsoon in the Indian sub-continent.

The expedition has left behind a 43-member team which will return in March 1990, and brought back the 1987 wintering team led by Col Ganeshan.

UNI adds: Dr Sengupta, leader of the expedition, fondled his two-and-half-year-old daughter Esha, as soon as he stepped out of the icebreaker, "M. V. Thuleland."

His wife, Sonali, working in New Delhi came to receive her husband with her mother-in-law. "Ours is a joint family," she said and added "we were longing for this re-union."

Colonel P. Ganeshan, station commander of the fifth wintering team presented HIMVAT 5, an annual magazine edited by the wintering team during their 16-month stay in the icy continent to Dr V.K. Gaur, newly-appointed secretary to the Department of Ocean Development (DOD) and to Dr Robin Sengupta who was the leader of the seventh expedition. Presenting the magazine, Colonel Ganeshan said, jokingly, "we were left behind by one Sengupta and brought back by another Sengupta."

The Antarctica expedition carried 6,75,000 [as printed] of fuel in the icebreaker.

India's ninth expedition to the Antarctica will sail from Goa in November this year, Dr V.K. Gaur, newly-appointed secretary in the Department of Ocean Development (DOD), told newsmen here today.

Dr Gaur said, while the details of the composition of the team was being finalised, it would take a minimum two months to finalise the team. He could not say about the size of the team.

R&D Scientists Interviewed

46001438 Bombay *THE TIMES OF INDIA* in English
30 Mar 89 p 3

[Article by Mavin Kurve: "Agony and Ecstasy of the Antarctic Team"]

[Excerpts] Pune, March 29—The agonies and ecstasies of the Indian army contingent in Antarctica while successfully establishing "Maitree," the second permanent Indian scientific station, were related by two of its intrepid members here.

Lt Col Kamla Singh and Mr R.S. Gangadhara, the two scientists of the R and D (Engineers) at Dighi, some 18 kms from here, attributed the successful mission to the joint effort put in by the different wings of the defence services and defence research organisations.

Over 550 tonnes of building stores, equipment and accessories had to be hauled by army helicopters to the selected site, some 80 km inland from the Antarctic coast. The 29-member task force led by Col S. Jaganathan was also assisted by the Fifth Wintering Team, which had braved 16 months in the sub-zero climes at the first permanent station in "Dakshina Gangotri."

In barely two months, from December 25 last, the eighth expedition team succeeded in setting up a full-fledged modern accommodation facility, capable of sustaining 25 members round the year.

The "Maitree" station is completely Indian-made and designed by Dighi's R and D (engineers).

A team from the Corps of Engineers and the Corps of Electrical and Mechanical Engineers, led by Col S. Jaganathan, will sojourn at the "Maitree" station this winter, help in its maintenance and in the completion of the remaining facilities there.

The two scientists embellished their account with a video tape of the station being set up and explained how useful the experience would prove to the defence personnel, if they had to work in sub-zero temperatures elsewhere as in the Himalayas or at the Siachen Glacier.

The two scientists, Lt Col Kamla Singh and Mr R.S. Gangadhara, were especially happy when visiting Soviet and East German expeditionists from their Antarctic

camps admired the efficiency and endurance of the Indian team. [passage omitted]

Earlier, the director of Dighi's R and D (engineers), Mr M.R. Joshi, outlined the glad tidings which the first three months of 1989 had brought for the organisation. The Republic-Day parade featured the bridge-layer tank "kartik" designed by the Dighi outfit; then the organisation secured the coveted "Silicon Trophy" for outstanding designing and research work in 1987 from the defence minister. Now the successful establishment of the "Maitree" station was another feather in the cap for Dighi's designers. [passage omitted]

Official Reports on Security Around Indira Gandhi

46001454 Calcutta *THE STATESMAN* in English
31 Mar 89 p 14

[Part II of STATESMAN report; Part I unavailable; Report by Rakesh Sinha]

[Text] New Delhi, March 30—Mr A.K. Basak, Joint Secretary, Ministry of Home Affairs, who was appointed by the Central Government (vide a Home Ministry order dated October 13, 1986) to inquire into the charges against Mr H.D. Pillai, former Additional Commissioner of Police (Security and Traffic), and Mr G.R. Gupta, former Deputy Commissioner of Police (Special Security District) records that "the contention of Mr Pillai and Mr Gupta is that no system can afford protection to the VIP if the persons who are to protect him or her betray the trust reposed in them. It is also a fact that there is no concrete evidence to prove that the charged officers failed to supervise the security arrangements and there was grave lapse in the security arrangements at the residence of the late Prime Minister. Therefore, the facts and the evidence available before us do not seem to establish the first charge."

The second charge against the two officers was that they "failed to take timely action to verify the reports of police officers deployed on security duty with the late Prime Minister and in special security district/security unit. Both the officers failed to keep an eye on their subordinates and police personnel with adverse reports continued to be posted at the residence of the late Prime Minister." An IB memo, dated July 19, 1984 and sent by Mr B.V. Wanchoo, Assistant Director in the IB, wanted to know the procedure being adopted by the Delhi Police for verification of character and antecedents and whether there was any system of keeping an eye on the activities of the staff on VIP security duties.

"The presenting officer said that IB's above-mentioned memo was an alert call to the C.Os. In spite of this no efforts were made by the C.Os., to check the antecedents and past records of service of sub-inspector Beant Singh and Constable Satwant Singh. Citing examples of Beant Singh's record of service, the presenting officer has submitted that there was censure on 7-2-84 and there

were complaints against him at different times, in July 1984 and later. The complaint dated 3-7-84 had also been received by the Deputy Commissioner of Police (SSD) [Soshit Samaj Dal] but apparently serious note was not taken. The complaint against Beant Singh dated 14-7-84 was more serious as he was habitually late in reporting and did not respect his senior officers. This was sent to DCP [Deputy Commissioner of Police] (SSD) for action but it was seen and filed."

"The complaints against constable Satwant Singh were more serious inasmuch as on a number of occasions complaints were received for his being late and irresponsible behaviour. He was also punished," explained the presenting officer.

Mr Basak states in his report: "After going through the papers it appears that the IB memo of July 19, 1984 (exhibit P-1) was issued against the background of Sikh extremists hijacking an Indian Airlines aircraft to Lahore and the communication wanted to know specifically the procedure for verification of character and antecedents of the police personnel deployed on security duty. The C.O., Mr Pillai, recorded on 1-8-84 that there was no procedure for verification and sent it to the Special Branch and Additional Commissioner of Police, C.I.D. As a result of the examination on the basis of the Commissioner of Police, Delhi's orders, the Deputy Commissioner of Police Headquarters II vide his Office No. 1042 dated 14-8-84 requested the Assistant Director, Intelligence Bureau, to send re-verification proforma. This was sent by IB vide its No. 2839 on 19-10-1984. Copy of this was sent to DCP (Security), New Delhi also. Whether any re-verification was done is not clear. The relevant file does not answer the other point, namely, whether there was any system of keeping an eye on the activities of the staff."

"It is a commentary on the system that while the C.O.s and others had reservations about the re-posting of Sikh personnel for performing security duty at the Prime Minister's residence and IB's above-mentioned memo of July 19, 1984 was in the context of activities of extremists the significance of verification and surveillance got lost in procedural matters like calling for proforma or lack of infrastructure and staff training for surveillance work. The requirements of the changed situation thus could not be met by the system."

"It would not be correct to single out C.O.s, Mr Pillai or Mr Gupta, for failure. One cannot help observing that the system did not permit officers of police administration to reorient their ideas to meet a sensitive and challenging situation," Mr Basak records.

The third charge against Mr Pillai (given as charge IV in respect of Mr Gupta) was that the police personnel posted at the residence of the late Prime Minister used to change their shifts and duty points without the approval of the senior officers which was against all norms of security instructions.

The fourth charge against Mr Pillai (listed as charge III in the case of Mr Gupta) was that the two failed to supervise the work of subordinates as they did not take any steps to activate the Special Intelligence Cell (SIC) as per Para 5(VII) of Standing Order No. 279/82 dated 2-9-82. The SIC failed to collect any reliable intelligence about the danger to the life of the Prime Minister from within the force.

Mr Basak blames the IB for not collecting intelligence about [word indistinct]. He records, "If it was felt very strongly that the Sikh personnel, after Operation Blue-star, were a security threat to the Prime Minister and in spite of their decision they were re-posted under the Prime Minister's orders then the intelligence agencies like IB should have been extra-careful and appropriately alerted the field officers. That touch of extra-vigilance is not evident nor is it clear that they instructed the field officers, including Mr Pillai and Mr Gupta that they should collect intelligence about the personnel."

Mr Basak concludes his report by stating that "it seems that if there was any omission on the part of the charged officers it was perhaps an omission on the part of the system itself."

His report came five weeks after the judgment on 21-7-87 of the Central Administrative Tribunal, which had been moved by Mr Pillai on May 25, 1986, to which he had appealed for setting aside the suspension order and his reinstatement. On January 9, 1987, Mr Pillai's appeal for interim relief by way of staying the suspension order was rejected.

In the judgment, delivered by Mr S.P. Mukherji, administrative, member of the Principal Bench, it is stated that "we have heard the arguments of the learned counsel for both the parties and gone through the documents carefully. During the course of arguments the learned counsel for the applicant (Mr Pillai) repeatedly averred that when the impugned order of suspension was passed there was no material to prove that it had been decided on the basis of a fact-finding preliminary inquiry committee's report to proceed against the applicant. Such a presumption was made by him because no chargesheet could be served on him for 22 months after suspension. He, therefore, pleaded that relevant documents leading to the issuance of the impugned order dated 7-11-1984 may be called for his inspection. The learned counsel for respondents (Union of India) claimed privilege against the disclosure of the documents but showed the relevant file to us in camera.

"In the context of facts and circumstances and various judicial pronouncements discussed, we see no reason at this stage to intervene insofar as the impugned order of suspension is concerned and uphold the same."

According to sources, the Basak report was opposed by Mr P. Chidambaram, Minister of State for Home. He is supposed to have recommended compulsory retirement

of the two officers. The matter was pending before the Union Public Service Commission for nearly a year and in January this year the UPSC is said to have sent back the file not endorsing Mr Chidambaram's recommendations. The UPSC suggested that the two officers be meted out minor penalization as per conduct rules, sources said. Nothing concrete has emerged as yet and 4-1/2 years after the assassination the two officers continue to remain under suspension despite being exonerated by a Government-appointed probe machinery. (Concluded)

IRAN

Sources in Iran Detail Attempted Coup Events
46040007 London AL-DUSTUR in Arabic
24 Apr 89 p 10

[Article by Dr 'Ali Nuri Zadeh: "A Coup in Iran: Officers Eliminated after Montazeri Is Ousted"]

[Text] The Iranian army's general staff command announced last January the promotion of 26 officers, most of whom were navy officers, "because they had played a leadership role in resisting American aggression in the Gulf at the end of the war." The communique which was issued by the army's general staff command indicated that Khomeyni, commander in chief of the armed forces, had welcomed the suggestion from the army command that these officers be promoted. The communique indicated that Khomeyni would meet these officers at his headquarters in Jamaran. But instead of receiving those officers on April 5, this month, Khomeyni ordered an execution squad at Evin Prison to meet them and shoot them.

According to a story told by an Iranian source close to the army command, 20 officers from this group were executed on the morning of April 5. The others were eliminated two days later. The Iranian source revealed that three assistants to the commander of the naval forces, Admiral Kiyanush Hakimi, Cpt Qahraman Malekzadeh and Cpt Farhad Mohammad Riyahi, were among the officers whose execution had been ordered by Khomeyni. The source added that Iran's Intelligence Ministry had accused Kiyanush Hakimi of forming a secret cell in the Navy for the purpose of inciting military men against the regime in preparation for a military coup whose purpose was to storm Jamaran, arrest Khomeyni and another number of officials, and place all of them on public trial in Liberty Square in Tehran.

The Coup's Communique

AL-DUSTUR has learned from its sources in Iran that officers in Kiyanush Hakimi's group, a group which included five generals, had drafted a communique that was to be broadcast from Iranian radio immediately after the group was to gain control over Jamaran.

AL-DUSTUR has also learned that the aforementioned communique explained the group's objectives, chief among which was the restoration of democracy and sovereignty to the people of Iran. The communique also mentioned the crimes that were committed by Ayatollah Khomeyni and his regime during the years of his rule. The communique defined those crimes as follows:

- Over 200,000 Iranians have been murdered and executed.
- A war that was a mistake was forced on the Iranian people: more than 1 million Iranians lost their lives in that war.
- More than 3 million Iranians were forced to flee the country.
- The prisons are full: more than 300,000 citizens are incarcerated.
- The sum of \$140 billion of the people's money has been wasted to satisfy Khomeyni, the mad man of Jamaran.
- The Islamic and the Arab worlds have been provoked, and their feelings against the Iranian people have been aroused.
- The image of Shi'ites in general and that of Iranians in particular have been distorted in the world.
- Khomeyni's regime aroused sectarian strife in Iran first and then in Pakistan, Afghanistan, Turkey, the Gulf states, and Lebanon.
- The blood of Muslims was shed in the holy city of Mecca during the pilgrimage season to satisfy his own whims, that is Khomeyni's whims.
- Khomeyni's regime encouraged terrorism, murder, and the kidnapping of innocent people in the name of Islam.
- Public funds were smuggled abroad.
- Plans were made for disbanding the army and establishing a force of mercenaries who were to be used to oppress the people.
- Iran, a country that is rich in human and natural resources, has been turned into a poor, backward country.
- Many acts of treason were committed, including secret cooperation with Zionists, with the Syrian regime and with North Korea.

Martial Law

Reports from Tehran indicate that the regime's fears were aroused by the discovery of the plot that Kiyanush Hakimi's group had devised to overthrow the regime. The regime fears that there might be other groups like Hakimi's in the army and in the Revolution Guards. It was that which prompted Reyshahri, the minister of intelligence, to conduct complete investigations in the ranks of the army and the Guard to check the intellectual affiliations and the outside activities and associations of officers and members of the Guard outside the camps.

It seems clear that the anxiety which has been prevalent in all parts of Khomeyni's regime since Montazeri was removed from office was the reason behind the measures

which the regime had decided to take in the past 2 weeks to confront the people. Of these measures the one that must be mentioned is the imposition of martial law in Isfahan, Najafabad, Shahriza, Na'in, Mashhad, and Shiraz. Bloody clashes were experienced in those cities during the past 2 weeks between members of the Komiteh, that is, the Revolutionary Komitehs, and Montazeri's supporters.

AL-DUSTUR's sources indicate that the name of the game in Iran now is "waiting." Besides the spontaneous demonstrations which break out every now and then in Iranian cities, especially in the capital, Tehran, there was a meeting last Friday for hundreds of relatives of Iranian prisoners. That meeting, which took place in the People's Park in northwest Tehran, was a grave event that prompted some officials to review their calculations. It was during that meeting which lasted 5 hours that the prisoners' relatives proclaimed slogans which called for Khomeyni's downfall and the return of prisoners to their families. Although the regime sent a full division of Revolution Guards units to the People's Park to arrest demonstrators and break up the demonstration, members of the Guard did no more than surround the park. They did not go into the park. After a while a few members of the Revolution Guards were seen joining the demonstrators who, after their meeting was adjourned, went to Tehran University in small groups where a Friday prayer service was held.

According to an Iranian source, the situation in Tehran now is similar to that which existed in that city in 1979. People are willing to do their duty, but the regime is unable to do anything to assuage the people's feelings. All this is happening at a time when factions are vying with each other for power to ensure their future after Khomeyni's departure.

The Problem of a Successor

Khomeyni, who fired his successor, Montazeri, and ordered him placed under house arrest, has not yet revealed what he has decided about another successor or a group of successors. While some sources indicate that the decision to select a successor for Khomeyni is no longer a decision that Khomeyni can make, pointing out that domestic and regional factors will have an effect on that decision, other sources believe that Ayatollah Khomeyni may have chosen his successor before firing the man who had been expected to succeed him. But Khomeyni will not reveal his choice before the presidential elections, which will be held next August, because the Iranian Constitution, which gives the ruling theologian powers that are superior to those of the regime, gave him the choice of naming his deputy and successor or leaving that matter to the 83-member Council of Experts. That council could choose the ruling theologian or a council of ruling theologians after the departure of the present ruling theologian.

The one thing that is not disputed by the sources is Ayatollah Khomeyni's unwillingness this time to nominate one person who would assume his responsibilities after his death. His experience with Montazeri taught him that bestowing the powers of a ruling theologian on one of his men will expose his regime to danger. This is because a ruling theologian can call for the restoration of the monarchy tomorrow, and he can call for an end to the Islamic Republic.

In his book entitled, "Velayat-e Faqih," [Rule of the Jurist Consult] Ayatollah Khomeyni says, "'Velayat-e Faqih' and the imamate in an Islamic state are the most important matters in that state; they are the cornerstone of an Islamic system. An imam is one whose example is followed by others. He is the man who is elected to steer people toward that which is good and righteous. Sovereign power comes from Almighty God, Who grants it to His messenger, to the infallible imams and to the master of the age. In the latter's absence sovereign power goes to the ruling theologian, to the imam, or to a committee of theologians. Sovereign power is not a private right; it is rather a job that is entrusted to the ruling theologian. However, authorization for the ruling theologian to assume that power can come only from the people. This means that a ruling theologian cannot function on the job unless people declare their allegiance to him and senior clergymen in particular obey his orders.

"The people's declaration of allegiance to a ruling theologian does not signify that his authority is being confirmed and supported. It rather means that the ruling theologian's authority has been realized. People cannot elect a ruling theologian because the majority of them are like sheep who need a care taker. That job is your job, that is, it is the clergymen's job. It is you, [the clergymen,] who have to agree on one, three or five theologians. It is you who have to order people to declare their allegiance to them." This is what Khomeyni says in his book, "Velayat-e al-Faqih."

The Guardians' Names

In 1984 after Ayatollah Montazeri was elected by the Council of Experts as Ayatollah Khomeyni's successor, it seemed that Khomeyni's recommendations to the council about appointing his successor had become irrelevant. The regime started recognizing Montazeri, but Iran's senior ayatollahs were not willing to recognize him. Whereas Ayatollah Shari'atmadari, Ayatollah Hasan Tabataba'i al-Oimi and Ayatollah Sadeq al-Rohani refused to submit to Montazeri's authority, and they paid a high price for their refusal, the Grand Ayatollah Golpayegani and the Grand Ayatollah Mar'ashi Najafi declared they were not satisfied with the selection of Montazeri. But Ayatollah Kho'i, a senior Shi'ite clergyman residing in Iraq, refused to recognize the principle of a theologian's authority.

Now that Ayatollah Montazeri has been ousted, Ayatollah Khomeyni and the Council of Experts are facing a difficult and an extremely serious task.

The group which Khomeyni is reported to have named in his will includes, according to some sources, his son Ahmad; Hojat al-Islam Rafsanjani; Ayatollah Ali Mashkini, chairman of the Council of Experts; Ali Akbar Mohtashemi, the minister of the interior; Ayatollah Tavvasoli, chief of the imam's office; and Ayatollah Mohammad Reza Mahdavi Kani, Iran's former prime minister.

Despite Khomeyni's confidence in those people, there is not one grand ayatollah in their midst. That is why, if they are chosen to serve as members in a ruling theologians' council, the government would have to force the people to declare their allegiance to them. According to sources close to the Grand Ayatollah Golpayegani, the silence of the grand ayatollahs in Qom and Mashhad will not last long, especially after recent developments during which the Iranian people declared in no uncertain terms what they thought of Khomeyni and the theologian's authority.

According to an Iranian clergyman abroad, Iran's ayatollahs who oppose Khomeyni's rule will lose their supporters if they do not act now. To senior clergymen the loss of supporters means the loss of their share of the crop tax and the alms tax. If these senior clergymen are not spurred into action by the people's demonstrations against the regime, their own interests in the future requires them to take action today.

Rafsanjani Reportedly Courts Extremists
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1 May 89 pp 10-11

[Text] Diplomatic sources have indicated that the announcement made by Hashemi Rafsanjani, the speaker of Iran's Consultative Assembly, its parliament, that a network of spies working for the United States and planning a military coup has been uncovered signifies that Rafsanjani is moving toward the extremists' camp in the Iranian Government. It signifies that he is abandoning his previous "moderate" positions.

Rafsanjani stated in his address on Friday, 21 April, that more than 100 officers in the Iranian Army, Navy and Revolutionary Guard had been arrested and that 17 of them had been executed. He added that a number of those who were arrested had held sensitive positions in the state. He said they were getting ready so they could make their move as soon as the death of Ayatollah Khomeyni was announced.

Sources in the capital, Tehran, think that the timing of Rafsanjani's announcement corresponds with the changes which are taking place in the Iranian regime. These changes, which started with the resignation of

Ayatollah Hoseyn Montazeri from his position as Khomeyni's successor, include constitutional amendments that give the president executive powers. They include an amendment that abolishes the position of the prime minister and another that curtails the role of the Constitutional Guard Council [as published] which, at the present time, is made up of a number of clergymen and has the power to reject the decisions made by Iran's parliament. This council can also make decisions on the matter of Khomeyni's succession. Thus, "the theologian's rule" would be conveyed to a five-member committee, and that committee is expected to be chaired by Ahmad Khomeyni, the present chairman of the Constitutional Reform Committee, who would thus inherit a significant share of his father's great constitutional powers.

Rafsanjani's announcement about the conspiracy can be explained in the context of the conflict between the factions in the Iranian regime. Rafsanjani fears the possibilities that he may be removed from office after Montazeri's departure from government. He made that announcement because he wants to win the hardliners' and the mullahs' affection so he can safeguard his position.

Succession Struggle Continues After Montazeri Fall

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[Article: "Cover Story: The Iranian Revolution Is Devouring Its Own People; the Heirs' Struggle in War of Succession"]

[Text] An official announcement was made in Tehran on 28 March 1989 stating that Ayatollah Hoseyn Montazeri, who had been chosen by Imam Khomeyni as his successor, had resigned from that powerless position.

As of this writing—Monday, 10 April 1989—Khomeyni had not yet chosen someone to fill this position. That fact has two possible implications.

The first is that no one will be appointed to that position. The fundamental dilemma of "the theologian's rule" [velayat-e faqih] would thus be resolved since that rule would come to an end with Khomeyni's death. That would make it easy for those in Iran to act in accordance with the state's requirements.

The second possible implication is that there are sharp differences about who should succeed Khomeyni because such a person must have certain qualities. Seniority and popularity among those who are under that person's protection play a principal role.

Based on our own independent interpretation of developments and on our own reading between the lines of statements and letters that were sent back and forth, it is possible to say that this is what happened: Montazeri was

ousted by a faction which is led by Ahmad Khomeyni, who thinks that now is the right time for him to take over power. Ahmad Khomeyni thinks he has a suitable opportunity to take over power now, while his father is still alive and after the basic dilemma of the position of imam's deputy, which was held by Montazeri, is resolved and brought to an end.

Should this happen, Ahmad Khomeyni could become the shining star in the developments that will take place in Iran during the coming months. He may emerge from behind the scenes onto center stage with capabilities that would enable him to settle matters and assume power. He could thus become like Archbishop Makarios who ruled Cyprus.

Ahmad Khomeyni would do that because his religious position would not allow him at any time, either sooner or later, to become the imam's deputy. Moreover, should Montazeri continue to hold that position, the man who aspires to become Iran's leader will find that his role and his capabilities are limited and curbed by the imam's deputy.

To repeat, what we are saying here is merely an independent opinion about what happened. It is merely an opinion since no one has been appointed in Montazeri's place and none of the changes has been finalized.

The article which is being published here is an interpretation of the situation in Iran with its many interrelated behind-the-scenes events. It was written for AL-TAD-AMUN by someone who is familiar with what is happening in that country. He is someone who has been following closely the major, minor and minute details of developments in that country.

The British Broadcasting Corporation, the BBC, conducted an interview in Persian with Abolhasan Bani-Sadr, the first president of Iran who now resides in Versailles, near Paris, the capital of France. In that interview the radio announcer asked Bani-Sadr whether or not the news about a wave of executions in Iran last summer was true. Bani-Sadr found nothing better to say on that matter but to read three letters written by Ayatollah Montazeri, Imam Khomeyni's appointed successor. Bani-Sadr had waited a long time for these letters, which were sent to him by his supporters and did arrive late. Two of these letters were addressed to Khomeyni himself, and one was addressed to court officials and officials at Evin Prison.

Sources close to Abolhasan Bani-Sadr affirm that it never occurred to him as he read the three letters that reading them would have such a tremendous impact in Tehran. It never occurred to him that reading the three letters would be the key factor in bringing the differences between Khomeyni and Montazeri out in the open. It never occurred to him that this incident would trigger a new stage in Tehran and in the war of succession which

has been going on for some time as a result of the "divorce" between "the grand master" and "his successor."

The question that is being asked now by everyone in Iran and elsewhere is this: Why did publicizing the letters, whose contents were well known to Iranian circles, bring about this upheaval? Aren't there other more important and more serious reasons for what happened?

Let us go back to the text of the three letters to determine the implications of this upheaval and this upset in equations for the war of succession. We find that the two letters which Ayatollah Montazeri addressed to Imam Khomeyni emphasized three main points:

- Montazeri is "relinquishing all his religious responsibilities" because of the excesses which occurred during the execution campaigns. Montazeri relates in his letter, as an example of these excesses, that one judge had insisted that a prisoner be executed even though the prisoner had repented.
- Montazeri affirms that this campaign will be construed as "vengeful and malicious."
- Montazeri reminds Khomeyni of what the Prophet Muhammad said, may God bless him and grant him salvation. The prophet said, "Do what you can to avoid enforcing mandatory legal punishments on Muslims. Release a prisoner if you find that he has an alibi. It is better to err on the side of forgiveness than to err on the side of punishment."

Observers think that in making these three points Montazeri posed a major challenge to Khomeyni and that he went beyond proper bounds, especially in the third point, where he reminds Khomeyni of a prophetic tradition. This is something that is usually not done in the context of a student-teacher relationship. Such an exchange then is even more unusual when it occurs between "the grand master" and "his successor." But the third letter which Montazeri addressed to the judge at Evin Prison and to the representative of the Ministry of Security is the harshest and the most vehement of the three letters. This letter, which can be found elsewhere in this article, is made up of 10 points. Written in the aftermath of the violent and merciless war between the Tehran regime and the Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization, the letter acquires additional significance. Observers think that in his three letters Montazeri stepped over his bounds and exceeded his power and authority. They think that because of his strong attachment to the judgment of history, he went too far.

The fact that Bani-Sadr read the three letters on a radio program that was heard clearly all over Iran induced everyone to put all his cards on the table. That happened as the other "war," which was being fought between the radicals and the moderates, was being stepped up. This war has been going on since the Salman Rushdie case erupted, and that case is essentially a conflict which is taking place in the context of the war of succession.

The war between the radicals and the moderates had become public last spring during the elections campaign for National Consultative Assembly. It is known that Hashemi Rafsanjani, the past and present speaker of the Assembly, has been the leader of the moderate faction, whereas Ahmad Khomeyni, Imam Khomeyni's son, has been the leader of the radical faction. Ahmad Khomeyni was assisted in that task by Mr 'Ali Akbar Mohtashemi, minister of the interior, and by Kho'iniha, the revolution's public prosecutor, who organized the operation to occupy the U.S. Embassy early in the revolution. The elections were preceded by a major split in the Ruhaniyat-e Mobarez group whose membership includes senior religious figures in Tehran, chief among whom is Rafsanjani. This group is considered "the backbone" of the religious and ruling institution in Iran. The split led to the emergence of a new group which called itself "Ruhaniyun-e Mobarez."

The letter which members of this group wrote to Khomeyni during the elections, outlining their policy on "the Islam of the poor versus the Islam of the rich and anti-American Islam," makes it clear that these people—and there are 23 clergymen and civilians—are the second-tier top brass, all of whom hold sensitive positions in the state and in religious and press institutions. The Ruhaniyun-e Mobarez group, which is led by Ahmad Khomeyni, managed to win a majority in the Chamber of Deputies (180 deputies out of a total of 243). Afterwards, that group gained control of the chairmanship of the Chamber's eight committees, and one of them, Mehdi Karrubi, became deputy speaker. Hashemi Rafsanjani thus found himself to be at their mercy, and he was forced, therefore, to think of another position that would keep him out of a direct confrontation, since confrontation was never part of his nature, neither before nor after the revolution.

The Salman Rushdie case fanned the fires of the ongoing war between the two tendencies. It reminded everyone of the occupation of the American Embassy in Tehran. Although history does not repeat itself, similar incidents could produce similar results. Thus, if the embassy incident brought about the fall of numerous figures, many heads will have to roll as a result of the Salman Rushdie incident. Mehdi Bazargan, the first prime minister, and Abolhasan Bani-Sadr were the most prominent figures to fall after the occupation of the American Embassy in Tehran. During the embassy incident it was the moderates who fell and the radicals who gained the advantage; they were represented by the Republican Party. In this case, it was the key figures in the moderate faction, which is called the liberal faction, who had to pay the price. It was Ayatollah Montazeri who had to pay the price. Montazeri, who was described in the West as the leader of the radical faction, had become in Iran the leader of the moderate faction because of the instructions he issued and the letters he wrote. Montazeri chose the timing: he withdrew from the scene, and he returned to his usual place in Qom, preferring "the judgment of history" to the glory of power.

But how did Bani-Sadr's reading of Montazeri's three letters become "the straw that broke the camel's back?" If one were to examine Montazeri's address to the Ten Day Dawn Committee, the committee in charge of the celebrations for the Revolution's 10th anniversary, one would realize the depth of the differences between the two men and understand the reasons which led to the divorce. One salient question in Montazeri's lengthy address, which is being published in full for the first time, asks about the reasons which led to problems in the Revolution. The answer to that question is a full admission of failure from the successor.

Ayatollah Montazeri was asked this question: "Several factors have been mentioned as causes of the problems and shortcomings which have existed throughout the past 10 years. It has been mentioned, for example, that there is a lack of religious ideas to manage society and run the Islamic government. It has also been mentioned that those who are responsible for affairs are incompetent; that erroneous methods are being pursued; and that people have no realistic sovereignty to determine the political destiny of society. It has also been mentioned that there were international pressures. Which factor, Your Eminence, is the most important one, and which one played a prominent role?"

Ayatollah Montazeri replied, "The five factors you listed are true, but what hurt the revolution more than anything else is the fact that erroneous methods were used to run the country. We will not be able to make up for these practices if it is too late. The revolution was hurt by the fact that people were not usually entrusted with the affairs of their own businesses. It was also hurt by radicalism, egocentricity, the formation of blocs among groups, the violation of rights, injustice, and a lack of concern for people and for the revolution's original values."

This answer, coming from one of the revolution's main pillars and describing the revolution's achievements in totally negative terms, acknowledges the failure of the state which was born after the revolution. It put everyone in a tight spot and created a sensitive situation which had to be dealt with. And dealing with that situation was no easy matter. Officials of the revolution could either concede that the critical remarks were true and carry out something similar to a coup by dismantling and then rebuilding existing institutions, or the revolution would have to "divorce" the successor who turned overnight into "the opposition leader" inside the regime. What this "opposition leader" said carried weight and had impact because it was being said by someone on the inside. What Montazeri said was based on daily incidents and information. His statements were not merely predictions or accusations. Imam Khomeyni chose the second solution: a divorce with the man who was "the product of his life's work."

Khomeyni's reply letter to Montazeri suggests that Khomeyni did not believe in the abilities of his successor

and that he never thought of appointing him his successor. That is why he says, "I was opposed to your election from the very beginning, and so were you." Then he mentions, "Everyone knows that you have been the product of my life's work." However, an informed Iranian source relates the truth, which is being revealed for the first time.

"What Khomeyni says about Montazeri being the product of his life's work is true. The relationship between the two men goes back to 1940 when Ayatollah Borujerdi prevented Khomeyni, who was then a professor at Feyziyeh in Qom, from teaching philosophy because his opinions were mixed with Sufi opinions. Although Khomeyni complied publicly, he continued to teach in secret. He had three students: his son, Mustafa, Hoseyn Montazeri, and Matahari, who was assassinated in the early days of the revolution. Thus, Montazeri, who has been Khomeyni's student for 30 years, subsequently became Khomeyni's foremost student and an organizer of Khomeyni's students. When Khomeyni was imprisoned and sent into exile, Montazeri became his agent or representative. When the revolution won its victory, there was a movement to name Ayatollah Talaqani, Khomeyni's successor, but Khomeyni insisted that Montazeri be named successor. This determination manifested itself in the fact that every time Khomeyni would leave Qom or Tehran, Montazeri would take his place. That is why when the Experts Committee issued its decision in 1985, that decision did nothing more than confirm a choice that had already been made.

Despite all this common history which these two men have shared, each one has his own personality and his own different constitution. The most prominent differences between the two men are:

- Montazeri, who spent a long time in prison, knows what prison is like and knows what repression means. The contact he did have with prisoners who subscribed to ideas different from his opened his mind and led him later to call for multiple parties.
- By nature Montazeri is not a man of power. He is not willing to give up everything for power. He does not have a "love for glory."

Besides this difference between Khomeyni's personality and Montazeri's, there are other factors that distinguish between the two men, and these can be attributed to the nature and effects of power. The relationship between Khomeyni and Montazeri continued to be a teacher-student relationship until Montazeri was appointed Khomeyni's successor. When that appointment was made, it was natural that everything for the former, who is the ruler, would shift to the past, while everything for the successor would shift to the future. This reflected the permanent conflict between the past and future: between a ruler and a successor. If the [waiting] period is prolonged, the conflict becomes more intense and interaction between the two is heightened. If the successor becomes determined not to remain in the shadows, a

blow-up could ensue. This is what happened: Montazeri assumed his own positions, and that created a gap between him and Khomeyni and led to what happened.

There is another important point. All those who are now in power in Tehran have ties to the imam. Their tenure in their positions of power depends on the close relationship they might have with the imam. This large group of people who understand that Khomeyni is an old man are trying to find for themselves roles and positions that would preserve their authority. Montazeri will not do this for them. Each administration has its own people, and Montazeri had already picked out his own people a long time ago. They are fierce and rigid men like Mehdi Hashemi.

Now we come to a salient point about Mr Ahmad Khomeyni, who is 46 years old and is looking for a role he can play after his father is gone. All his present power and authority are derived from his position as his father's office manager. But what will happen after his father is gone? Will he find himself in a position similar to that of "Mao's widow?"

It seems clear that Ahmad Khomeyni did reject and is rejecting this destiny. That is why he has used a plan of temporary alliances, of getting closer to his father, and of emphasizing that his position is a radical one. At the same time, Ahmad Khomeyni is not burning his bridges to the moderate tendency. It is no secret that Montazeri has always rejected any role for Ahmad Khomeyni in an administration that he could have at a later date. Montazeri's nature is completely different from that of Ahmad Khomeyni. The difference between the two men is a difference between one who has an opinion and a position and another who seeks power.

The question now is what will happen after the divorce?

The ouster of Ayatollah Montazeri from the succession has created a real crisis for the future of "the theologian's rule." According to the Constitution "a theologian" must be the "most fair, the most knowledgeable, the most courageous and the most pious." Montazeri had to spend 30 years working, becoming engaged in activities, and he had to spend years in prison and years taking courageous and free positions to earn the right to become "a legitimate" successor. Now, of all the scholars and ayatollahs who are being considered for the succession only one, Ayatollah Meshkini, has a chance of getting this position. He has a slight chance because he does not have all the required qualifications. In addition, Meshkini is an Azerbaijanian Turk who had opposed Ayatollah Shari'atmadari, also from Azerbaijan. He thus lost the support of the Turks and created for himself an additional barrier to his nomination Khomeyni's successor.

The other well-known names are those of Imam Kho'i, Ayatollah Kilikyani, Najafi Mar'ashi, Qomi, and Sadeq Rohani. The problem with all those people is that all of

them are basically opposed to the principle of the theologian's rule. Furthermore, their differences with Imam Khomeyni vary in intensity. Appointing one of those people, even should he accept such an appointment—and it seems that Kilikyani is the most likely candidate—means that a personal opponent of Khomeyni would be brought to the top, and that is more dangerous than bringing to the top one who opposes a position.

The solution now, as well-informed circles affirm, is to leave matters for a while, and to let the Council of Experts look into the matter of forming a committee for the succession. An informed source affirms here that "the theologian's rule," a notion which was tailored for Khomeyni's ascent to power, received a back-breaking blow when Montazeri was ousted as Khomeyni's successor. That is why, if that idea survives, the position of a ruling theologian will turn into some kind of "powerless royalty." That is, it will become a symbolic position, which, sooner or later, will bring about change in the makeup of the Islamic Republic and in its constitution.

Ayatollah Montazeri may have lost the succession, but he did gain authority. He earned the title of "figure of authority" because of the positions he took, not because someone bestowed that title on him.

But what are the effects of all that on the state in Iran? From now on and until the presidential elections early next summer, conditions will become more tense. Everything indicated that Hashemi Rafsanjani, who was hoping to become the next president, would succeed in realizing his hopes. Now, however, that the radical tendency has become stronger, Rafsanjani will have to make clear-cut and concrete concessions to be selected president. Otherwise, he could become the next victim. Hashemi Rafsanjani will regain his power later in proportion to his success in surviving this storm. This skillful politician whose performance as a revolutionary statesman has been sophisticated and successful must utilize all his energies to survive.

If Rafsanjani does not become president, Mir-Hoseyn Musavi, the prime minister, or Kho'iniha, the revolution's public prosecutor, will become prominent candidates for the presidency. At the same time 'Ali Akbar Velayati, current minister of the interior, will become prime minister. Because he is close to Ahmad Khomeyni, he is expected to rise to power with him. Ahmad Khomeyni is trying to get everyone out of the way so that he himself can become "the master" after his father's death.

Although the war of succession is now out in the open, other conditions and elements still appear to be unknown. One of these is the position of the Revolutionary Guard, which had paid the price of war and is now paying the price of peace. The Guard, most of whose members were committed to Ayatollah Montazeri, is

now finding itself without a sponsor. That is why assessing the effect of that situation on what the Guard will do and how it will react will continue to be a matter of interest.

Furthermore, as Iran becomes more wrapped up in itself and as the foreign siege around it grows, the economic crisis in Iran will become more severe. Although the official rate of exchange for the dollar is less than 10 tumans, it has shot up to 140 tumans on the black market. Before Montazeri's ouster, under Europe's continued boycott of Iran, the rate was about 100 tumans. This crisis could trigger a "bread revolution," and if that happens, confusion could prevail once again. Those who are involved in the conflict in the war of succession may seek a solution by running to the imam instead of confronting the situation squarely on the scene.

The Text of Montazeri's Letter Criticizing the Regime

Gentlemen: Niri, Canonical Judge Eshraqi, Public Prosecutor Ra'isi, Assistant to the Public Prosecutor Bur Mohammadi, Representative of the Ministry of Security at Evin Prison

This is regarding the imam's order.

1. I am one of the people who suffered most from the hypocrites—this is a reference to the Mojahedin-e Khalq Organization—when I was in prison and after I got out of prison. They were the ones who killed my son. If vengeance is what we seek, I am more entitled to seek it, but I am taking into consideration the interests of Islam, the revolution, and the country. I am also taking into consideration conditions for the theologian's rule and the honor of the Islamic government. I am taking into consideration the judgment of history and that of future generations.

2. This massacre of prisoners without a trial will, in the long term, turn matters to their advantage. The world is condemning us. This massacre encourages people to continue their armed struggle. It is a mistake to use repression to fight ideas and opinions.

3. Remember the method that was used by the prophet in confronting his enemies when he controlled the holy city of Mecca. The prophet forgave his enemies, and God bestowed upon him the title, "merciful to the whole world." Finally, remember Imam 'Ali's position during the Battle of the Camel [Battle in 656 A.D. in which 'Ali defeated his two main rivals].

4. Many prisoners tried to change their positions, but the treatment they received in prison from guards and judges was such that they were forced to go back to their previous positions.

5. We cannot accuse these people of fighting against us by claiming that they will join the ranks of the "hypocrites" after their release. Imam 'Ali knew that he would

be killed by Ibn Muljam, but he refused to prosecute him before the crime was committed.

6. Imam 'Ali made no judgments against anyone for fighting against him because of that person's ideas and beliefs.

7. Trials are to be conducted and sentences must be handed down in an atmosphere that is clear and unemotional. Given the slogans and the prodding of the people at the present time, the social climate does not appear to be clear. We all condemn the crimes that were committed by the hypocrites, the Mojahedin-e Khalq Organization, in the western part of the country. But why are we attacking the prisoners? Executing the prisoners who are not guilty of those crimes and who were not arrested in the act of committing those crimes raises questions about all previous judgments against them.

8. I am personally more worried than everyone about the imam's dignity and image. I do not know how he is informed about the problems. My question is this: Were all official announcements and discussions about rulings and precautions during the trials erroneous?

9. A number of judges who are fair and held in high esteem in the legal profession complained to me about practices. They gave me several examples of cases where executions were carried out on the spot.

10. Finally, the Mojahedin-e Khalq are not a group of people; they are also a theory. One cannot fight a theory by killing people. This is not the way to solve problems. The problem can be solved by offering the members of that organization a just theory.

[Signed] Hoseyn Montazeri 5/24/1367 After the Hijrah or 15 August 1988

The Text of Montazeri's Letter to Khomeyni

In the Name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate: Your Eminence the Grand Ayatollah Imam Khomeyni, may God Prolong His High Patronage. Greetings:

I received your letter of 26 March 1989, and I wish to express my thanks for your instructions and your advice. Let me assure you that now and ever since the onset of the struggle I have been an obedient soldier at all stages. I have been an obedient soldier who made sacrifices on your side for Islam and the revolution. Today, I find myself obliged to obey the imam and carry out his orders because the survival and stability of the Islamic regime depends upon obedience to the rank of the great leader. No one doubts that this great revolution has so far surmounted many dangers under the directions of Your Eminence. The great revolution has eliminated many enemies like the hypocrites whose hands are covered with the blood of thousands of Iranians and people who are dear to us, including my dear son. The revolution has

also eliminated the enemies of the revolution, the hagglers and the liberals. Can the major crimes and cowardly acts which these evil-doers committed against the country, the revolution and our beloved Iranian people be easily forgotten? If the mouthpieces of the revolution's enemies and foreign broadcasts think that by publicizing lies, falsehoods and rumors in my name, they can achieve their evil and sinister goals and penetrate the solidarity of our people, they are wrong.

I was opposed to my appointment as deputy leader from the outset, but because the problems were numerous and the responsibility was difficult, I wrote then to the Council of Experts and told them that my appointment would not serve the country's interests. And today also I proclaim unequivocally that I am not willing to accept that appointment. I am asking his eminence the imam to order the Council of Experts to take the future interests of Islam, the revolution and the country into consideration. I am asking Your Eminence to allow me to be what I was before: your insignificant, humble student in the scholarly circle. I am asking Your Eminence to permit me to teach so I can serve the revolution and Islam under your wise leadership. If mistakes are made, and people do make mistakes, we will overcome them with Your Eminence's leadership. I ask all my dear brothers and sisters to take action in my defense regarding the decree issued by the great leader and the honorable Council of Experts. I ask them to say something about the matter because the dignity of our great leader and our Council of Experts is something that serves Islam's and the revolution's interests. I hope to benefit from your valuable instructions because I am your loyal student. I ask that you pray for God's blessings to us. May the peace of God and His mercy and blessings be upon you.

[Signed] Hosein 'Ali Montazeri 28 March 1989

The Text of Khomeyni's Reply to Montazeri

In the Name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate

His Eminence Hojjat-ol-Islam Montazeri, Authority on Islam for Muslims, may his exhaustive knowledge last forever.

Please accept our greetings and our hopes for your success.

As you wrote, leading the regime of the Islamic Republic of Iran is a problem and a grave responsibility for the future. Because I do not want this responsibility to be something more than you can handle, I, like you, opposed your election from the outset. In that regard we were of the same mind. But the experts too came to that conclusion, and I did not wish to interfere with their legal authority. That was after you declared that you were not willing to accept that position. Now that I have accepted your decision, I thank you very much. Everyone knows that you are the product of my life's work and that my relationship with you is a close one. To avoid

making the same mistakes that were made in the past, I would advise you to get the evil-doers out of your house and to take serious action, without hesitation, to prevent those who oppose the regime and who claim to have a relationship with Islam and with the Islamic Republic of Iran from frequenting your house. I am also reminding you of the matter of Mehdi Hashemi. I think that the regime's interests as well as your own interests would be served if you become a theologian. The people and the regime can thus benefit from your instructions, and you would not be influenced by what is broadcast by foreign radio broadcasts.

Our people know you well. I too am well aware of the enemies' schemes and of their hostility and malice for the officials of Iran, which means that they resent Islam. This is something that our beloved students, the honorable Friday prayer leaders, newspapers, radio and television must make clear to the people because the regime's interests in Islam take precedence over everything else. We must all heed that. God willing, you will serve the circle of scholars and the regime by means of the lessons you give and the research you do.

May the peace of God and His mercy be upon you.

[Signed] Ruhollah Musavi Khomeyni, 28 March 1989

Billion Dollars Allocated to Construction of Power Plants

46400078 Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 19 Mar 89 p 14

[Text] Political service.

The open sessions of the Majles were held yesterday and the day before yesterday in the morning, afternoon and evening with Hojjat ol-Eslam Hashemi-Rafsanjani presiding.

In these sessions, the notes to the 1368 [21 March 1989-20 March 1990] national budget bill were examined and discussed, and the Majles committees and a number of representatives suggested omissions, amendments and additional proposals to these notes, a number of which, after supporting and opposing speeches and explanations by the spokesman of the plan and budget committee and the ministers of petroleum, plan and budget, energy, culture and higher education, health and treatment and economic affairs and finance, were ratified. Also in this meeting, the letter of the representatives concerning the anniversary of the Halabcheh tragedy was read.

The text of the amending notes which were examined is as follows.

Note 18. The funds for 1368 [1989-90] of the agreements for the national and provincial projects included in Addendum No 1 of this law may be increased by a maximum of 25 percent as follows.

A. From the decrease in funds for other developmental projects in any plan with the proposal and verification of the highest authority of the related executive organization or organizations and the agreement of the Ministry of Plan and Budget or related plan and budget organization of the province.

B. From the decrease in funds of projects for other plans of the same chapter, upon the proposal and verification of the highest authority of the related executive organizations and the agreement of the Ministry of Plan and Budget, provided the decrease or increase in the total funds of each plan does not exceed 10 percent.

C. Increasing the funds of provincial developmental projects in every chapter by decreasing the funds of other chapters, with the exception of agriculture and natural resources, development and renovation of villages, mines, water resources, general education and technical and trade training, health and treatment and nutrition, up to 5 percent, in conformity with the contents of Paragraphs A and B of this note, and over this amount of transfers made to the above-mentioned chapters will be permitted only once during the year, upon the proposal of related executive organizations and the agreement of the planning committee of the province.

D. Any sort of decrease in rural and tribal funds to increase urban funds or any decrease of funds of any important or major project or projects that must be completed by the end of 1368 [21 March 1990] and 1369 [21 March 1991] included in Addendum No 1 of this law is prohibited.

E. Decreasing provincial and national funds of oppressed sectors to increase other sectors is prohibited.

Note 19.

A. Permission is granted to distribute the funds in Line 105004 of Section 4 of this law, entitled "Ministry of the Interior, Municipal Offices," among the municipalities upon the proposal of the Ministry of the Interior and the agreement of the Ministry of Plan and Budget and the approval of the Cabinet. At least 80 percent of the above-mentioned funds must be distributed among the municipalities other than provincial capitals.

B. Fifty percent of the funds in Lines 503006 and 503007 included in Section 4 of this law shall be allocated to the Vahed bus company of Tehran and suburbs and the remaining 50 percent to the Vahed bus companies and bussing units affiliated with other municipalities, and the Ministry of Plan and Budget shall be granted permission, in partnership with the Ministry of the Interior, to allocate the share of each Vahed bus company affiliated with the provincial municipal offices from the 50 percent funds of the above-mentioned lines.

C. The general treasury is responsible for the purpose of self-sufficiency and distribution among the municipal

offices to place at the disposal of the Ministry of the Interior and the municipal organization funds that according to related laws and regulations are collected by the ministries, government establishments and government companies in the names of municipal offices and accumulated in the accounts of the general treasury. The Ministry of the Interior shall be responsible to submit reports to the internal committee every four months on the subject of this note.

D. Revenues obtained from the implementation of Note 46 of the 1364 [21 March 1985-20 March 1986] budget law shall be placed at the disposal of the Ministry of the Interior to be spent on providing fundamental facilities in small cities with populations under 25,000 persons in proportion to the population of those cities.

Note 20.

A. The executive organizations are responsible to devise the agreements on the details of activities related to their current funds mentioned in Sections 4 and 5 of this law within a maximum period of three months from the date of the notification of this law and submit them to the Ministry of Plan and Budget or the plan and budget organization of the province, as the case may be.

B. Before the agreements of the details of the current funding operations cited in Paragraph A of this note have been exchanged, the current funds concerning the national executive organizations shall be put into use upon the verification of the funding allocation committee on the basis of the plans and expenditure articles stated in Section 4 of this law, and in regards to local executive organization, they shall be allocated at the level cited by the funding allocation committees in Paragraph B of Note 21 of this law.

C. The increase of current funds for every program and expenditure article of the ministries and government establishments stated in Section 4 of this law and the local executive organizations stated in the agreements on the activities of Paragraph B of this note, except for Articles 8, 17, and 20, which cannot be increased, shall be permissible for Articles 1 and 2 at a maximum of 5 percent and other articles a maximum of 20 percent, upon the proposal of the highest authority of the executive organization and the approval of the Ministry of Plan and Budget or related provincial plan and budget organization from the decrease in the funds of other programs and expenditure articles for related organizations, provided no change takes place in the total current funds of that organization.

D. In order to bring about the implementation of the new general accounting law, on the basis of the new general administration organization for the economic affairs and finance of provinces, which has been prepared according to the new general accounting law of the country, permission shall be granted for the amount of the funds of the programs for government revenue

collection and supervision of government financial affairs to be shifted according to an agreement exchanged between the ministers of economic affairs and finance and plan and budget, upon the ratification of said organization.

E. Transfer of current funds between local executive organizations subject to the provincial budget system stated in Section 5 of this law shall be permitted upon the proposal of the local executive organizations and the approval of the plan and budget organization of the province for every province in one lump sum up to a maximum of 5 percent of the ratified funds of every local executive organization only once during the year in conformity with the 20 percent limitations stated in Paragraph C of this note, provided no change is made in the total current funds of the province.

F. The central executive organizations are permitted to allocate when necessary a maximum of 10 percent of their current ratified funds to the affiliated offices in the provinces which are subject to provincial budget systems, in which case such funds shall be deducted from the budget of the above-mentioned executive organization upon the proposal of the minister or the highest authority of the central executive organization by the Ministry of Plan and Budget and added to the current funds of the local executive organization in accordance with the program.

Note 21.

A. In order to expedite the progress of the national and provincial developmental projects and facilitate related payments, permission is granted to:

1. The fund allocation committee to allocate the necessary amounts for the implementation of the projects stated in Addendum No 1 of this law, for which the operational details have not been announced for justifiable reasons as a provisional payment.

The Ministry of Plan and Budget and the executive organizations are responsible to give priority to amounts that are allocated as provisional payments for the implementation of this note over funds for other operations in the details of the operations of related plans.

2. Two representatives of the Majles selected by the Majles shall act as observers in the fund allocation committee of Article 30 of the national budget law at the time of the allocation of funds for developmental projects.

3. The Ministry of Economic Affairs and Finance shall transfer a revolving fund amounting to 10 percent of the funds for each developmental project to each national and provincial executive organization to be used on the basis of fund allocation. Also, in order to operate factories that manufacture construction equipment and materials and to create seasonal coordination

in the supply and demand of construction equipment and material, up to 5 percent from the funds ratified for the 1368 [1989-90] national and provincial development projects shall be allocated for the purchase of the construction equipment and materials, spare parts and workshop machinery needed by the projects. After delivering the purchased goods and materials to the workshops, the executive organizations shall be responsible to include the cost of the consignment projects in the final expenditure account and deduct the projects that are implemented by contractors to be deducted from the list of their condition.

The implemental bylaws of this paragraph shall be prepared within a period of one month from the date of the ratification of this law by the Ministries of Plan and Budget and Economic Affairs and Finance and ratified by the Cabinet.

The revolving funds stated in this note shall be deposited by the end of 1368 [20 March 1990].

B. Current and developmental funds ratified for every province shall be allocated to the province at certain times in part by the fund allocation committee to in turn be allotted by the provincial fund allocation committee, comprised of the deputy governor general for development, the director general of economic affairs and finance and the director of the plan and budget organization of the province in accordance with the needs of and with consideration for the progress of operations.

The fund allocation committees cited in this paragraph shall be responsible to allocate the developmental funds of the fourth quarter of the Provinces of Kurdistan and Western Azarbaijan and the oppressed segments of the cold climate areas of the country by 1 Aban [23 October] at the latest.

C. Of the total funds of the national projects of every organization, 5 percent shall be placed at the disposal of the minister or the highest authority of the executive organization to be committed and paid as necessary on the basis of the progress in the operation of the related projects within the framework of the details of the operation in the exchanged agreements, and the above-mentioned funds shall be considered allocated from the beginning of the year.

Note 22.

A. After the necessary studies, the Ministry of Plan and Budget shall be responsible to allocate the funds in Line 503098, Section 4, of this law to those unfinished developmental plans and projects cited in Section 1 of Addendum 1 of this law that were to be completed by the end of 1367 [20 March 1989] but have not been completed so that these plans and projects can be completed by the end of 1368 [20 March 1990]. The share of funds for each project may be spent upon the exchange of

agreements between the Ministry of Plan and Budget and the related executive organization.

B. The fund allocation committee shall be responsible to give priority in terms of necessary fund allocation to those projects cited in Section 1 and Section 2 of Addendum 1 of this law, the completion dates of which are 1368 [1989-90] and 1369 [1990-91], or those which are identified as important projects on the basis of the physical progress of the work, and requested by the related executive organization.

C. The Ministry of Plan and Budget shall be allowed to provide the funds needed for the preservation of incomplete developmental projects that have come to a halt from the 200 million rials in funds cited in Line 503105, Section 4, of this law, to be spent upon the exchange of agreements with the related executive organization.

D. In order to expedite and facilitate the implementation of the projects cited in Section 2 of Addendum 1 of this law, the dates of completion of which are 1368 [1989-90] and 1369 [1990-91] or which are identified as important projects, should such projects face a shortage of funds due to physical progress and require more funds, permission shall be granted, upon the proposal of the Ministry of Plan and Budget and the approval of the Cabinet, on the one hand, for the 1368 [1989-90] funds for each above-mentioned project, up to the maximum amount of funds for the following years projected in Addendum 1 of this law or funds needed for the completion of that group of projects the completion of which is to be in 1368 [1989-90], and on the other hand the equivalent of the total additional funding, the use of which becomes necessary in accordance with the contents of this paragraph and also for the purpose of implementing the projects cited in Section 3 of Addendum 1 of this law and plans and projects cited in Paragraphs A and B of Note 16 of this law, to be increased up to a maximum amount of 100 billion rials, as cited in Line 710100 (borrowing from the banking system) of Section 3 of this law. The share of the projects in Section 3 of Addendum No. 1 and the funds in Lines 503079 and 503082 of Section 4 of this law shall be a maximum total of 30 billion rials.

E. Permission shall be granted for the amount of 30 billion rials in funds in Line 503121 cited in Section 4 of this law to be allocated by the end of Khordad 1368 [21 June 1989], upon the proposal of the Ministry of Plan and Budget and the ratification of the Cabinet to make up the deficit of current funds or compensate for the damages of the executive organizations mentioned in Sections 4 and 5 of this law, with the exception of the military forces, education and the Shahid Foundation, and to be added to the ceiling of the funds of the related lines.

The amount of one billion rials of the funds of the above-mentioned line must be allocated to rural administrations.

From the revenues in Line 150800, the amount of 13 billion rials shall be added to the refugee affairs fund.

The funds for the atomic energy research project shall increase by 3 billion rials, from those funds in Paragraph E of Note 22.

Note 23. In order to establish the necessary facilities to implement the law creating the developmental projects of the road and transport section through the participation of banks and other financial and monetary resources of the country ratified on 24/8/1366 [15 November 1987], the Ministry of Roads and Transport shall be given permission to collect the vehicle tolls of the Tehran-Karaj-Qazvin and Tehran-Qom expressways from the beginning of 1368 [21 March 1990] and to deposit them in the general revenues of the country and to receive an equivalent amount from the funds of Project 40901335 of Addendum No 1 of this law in accordance with the allocation of funds and exchange of agreements with the Ministry of Plan and Budget and to spend it on the implementation of the "partnership in building new freeways" projects of "Qazvin-Takestan-Zanjan" and "Tehran-Saveh-Salafchegan-Arak."

The Ministry of Roads and Transport shall be allowed to spend up to 2 percent of the allocated funds cited in this note to improve the collection of tolls.

Procedural instructions for the collection of the above-mentioned tolls shall be determined by the Ministries of Roads and Transport and Economic Affairs and Finance.

Note 24.

A. The planning committee of the province, with the agreement of the executive organization, may transfer the implemental operations of all or some projects of each of the provincial plans to the Construction Crusade of the province upon the approval of the Construction Crusade of the province.

B. The directors of the executive organizations may of their own accord and responsibility transfer to the Ministry of Construction Crusade the implemental operations of all or some of the projects of the national developmental plans, considering the capacity and qualification for implementation, so that the Ministry of Construction Crusade, if agreed, can take measures to complete them by using the transferred funds under the supervision of the executive organization that has made the transfer.

The difference in the final expenditures and the funds received for the projects or the transferred plans in this note shall be spent on the same program or the drinking water program.

Note 25.

A. It is permitted that in order to expedite the payment of debts due by the end of 1367 [20 March 1989] of

ministries, government establishments, government companies, profit-making organizations affiliated with the government and municipal offices to each other, a committee made up of the ministers of plan and budget and economic affairs and finance and representatives of the prime minister to be held in the presence of the representatives of other related executive organizations and two representatives of the Majles selected by the Majles as observers.

B. The committee mentioned in Paragraph A shall carry out within a period of four months the necessary studies to determine the debtor and creditor organizations, the amount of debt and other necessary issues, and, with consideration for the related regulations without being bound by the restrictions of transfer in the expenditure articles, to deposit the amount of debt of each executive organization included in this note from the funds ratified by the debtor organization to the creditor organization upon the approval of the Cabinet, as the opportunity arises.

C. The implemental bylaws of this note shall be approved by the ministers of plan and budget and economic affairs and finance within a period of one month from the date of the ratification of this law.

D. The Ministry of Plan and Budget shall be responsible for the implementation of this note and shall be responsible to submit the report on its operations once every four months to the plan and budget committees of the accounting office and related committees of the Majles.

Note 26. The entry of vehicles with or without aid from abroad is prohibited for all executive organizations, both military and civilian.

Note 27. The amount of 10 billion rials of the funds cited in Line 503052, Section 4, of this law shall be spent for the implementation of projects related to the building and improvement of roads and guard stations and the physical protection of the national borders, upon exchanging agreements on operational details between the concerned executive organizations and the Ministry of Plan and Budget as follows:

1. The amount of 5.5 billion rials for the building and improvement of roads.

2. The amount of 1.5 billion rials for the creation and improvement of guard stations and physical protection.

3. The amount of 3 billion rials from the funds in the above-mentioned Line once every 3 months at only the equivalent of the surplus of collected revenues of every month ("prosecutor general's office" for fighting smuggling, cited in) Line 410108, Section 3, of this law can be allocated and paid in ratio to 2.5 billion rials [as published].

The implemental bylaws of this note shall be proposed and prepared by the Ministries of the Interior and Plan and Budget and ratified by the Cabinet within one month from the ratification of this law.

The report on the operation of this note must be submitted once every four months through the Ministry of Plan and Budget to the plan and budget and internal committees of the Majles.

Note 28.

A. The government is allowed to take steps to sell all or part of the property of barracks, bases, headquarters and office buildings of the military and law enforcement forces that are no longer useful for military and law enforcement objectives because they are within the limits of city services for the purpose of creating green areas or for educational, research, athletic and treatment areas by observing the regulations and to deposit the funds obtained in the treasury, to be included in the general revenue account cited in Line 422000, Section 3, of this law.

The funds for developmental projects (fixed investments) Nos 11102243, 11103262 and 11103263, cited in Addendum No 1 of this law, amounting to 70 percent of the collected revenues of this paragraph, are considered allocated and may be used upon the exchange of agreements with the Ministry of Plan and Budget for the creation and completion of military and law enforcement projects.

The implemental bylaws of this paragraph shall be proposed by the Ministries of Plan and Budget, Defense, the Guards Corps, the Interior and Housing and Urban Development and ratified by the Cabinet.

B. In order to expedite the use of the construction projects in which investments have reached the final stages, for the purpose of savings on expenditures and change or elimination of some features of the project, steps shall be taken to form a committee made up of representatives of the Ministries of Housing and Urban Development and Plan and Budget and the operating organization to study said projects.

If upon the proposal of the Ministry of Housing and Urban Development and the approval of the majority of this committee any project is determined to be operational at any stage, provisional or final minutes of the meeting shall be made, signed and announced to the organization by the Ministry of Housing and Urban Development.

C. In order to maintain and preserve the buildings with cultural value, in every province, a committee consisting of the deputy for development of the province, the director of plan and budget, the directors general of housing and urban development and the operating organization and the representative of the

organization for the preservation of cultural heritage shall be formed to compare the existing projects cited in the 1368 [1989-90] budget law with the existing buildings which have cultural value and spend the funds projected in the 1368 [1989-90] budget law on repairs, equipment and the operation of the objectives of the budget under the supervision of the organization for the preservation of cultural heritage.

Letter of Majles Representatives

At the end of the Majles session of the night before last, a letter signed by 132 representatives concerning the anniversary of the Halabcheh tragedy was read as follows:

In the name of God the compassionate and the merciful.

Last year on this day thousands of innocent men, women and children rolled in their own blood in the most oppressive manner in Halabcheh. Without a doubt, such merciless mass slaughter has been unprecedented since the nuclear bombing of Nagasaki and Hiroshima. This occurred while all the international circles denied all claims to defend human rights with their silence in the face of this ferocious action on the part of the criminal regime of Iraq. In fact, the Paris conference held to study the extent of the crimes in using chemical bombs took no measures regarding this most horrible tragedy of the century, even though the anti-people regime of Iraq had used this terrible weapon many times on the fronts and even in the graves and regions of the south against the civilians of southern and western Iraq.

Unfortunately, due to the lack of decisive action by the international circles, ultimately, the helpless regime of Iraq most impudently resorted to this tragic crime.

Now, we, the representatives of the Majles, while honoring the memory of the nameless and unknown martyrs of Halabcheh, cry out for all oppressed human beings in this century, to all free human beings and ask all freedom seekers to use all their efforts to save themselves and other oppressed people from the rule of dictators.

The open session of the Majles adjourned at 22:15 pm and the next session was set for 3 pm on Friday.

Our parliamentary correspondent reports that in this session a proposal received was announced as follows: Legislative Proposal to Exempt Graduates of the Teacher Training University and Domestic and Foreign Grants Who Are Committed to Service in the Universities and Centers for Higher Education and Research

Report on the Majles session, yesterday.

The open session of the Majles was held yesterday afternoon with Hojjat ol-Eslam Hashemi-Rafsanjani presiding and continued its examination of the notes of

the 1368 [1989-90] budget law. Notes 30, 31 and 32 were examined, discussed and amended.

In the continuation of the session, Note 29, which concerns the allocation of foreign currency funds allocation, was examined and Paragraphs 1 to 13 were amended and ratified.

The notes examined are as follows:

Note 3.

A. Permission shall be given for all the special profits of the operations of the 1368 [1989-90] budget of the regional electricity companies, Tavanir, the Iranian electricity company and the water and electricity company of Khuzestan, upon the approval of the general assemblies of said companies, to be allocated to the investment expenditures of the projects of said companies in order to expedite and facilitate the implementation of the fundamental plans and projects of energy production and transmission. The funds obtained from this note and Note 31 of the 1366 [21 March 1987-20 March 1988] budget law shall be used to pay for the energy production and transmission projects under the supervision of the Ministry of Energy and through the concentrated fund account of the Iranian electricity organization on the basis of the ratified budget of the above-mentioned companies and operational agreements with the Ministry of Plan and Budget and with consideration for the contents of Article 17 of the national plan and budget law. The Ministry of Plan and Budget is responsible to supervise the operations of the implementation of the investment expenditures of these companies, and the above-mentioned companies shall be responsible to place any sort of information or document needed at the disposal of the Ministry of Plan and Budget.

B. The minister of energy shall be permitted to determine and approve from the beginning of 1368 [21 March 1989] the various tariffs on the sale of electricity (except for agricultural and domestic use and pumping rural drinking water, which shall be implemented on the basis of existing tariffs) in proportion to the cost.

Note 31.

A. In order to provide the financial resources necessary for the foreign currency and rial expenditures for the procurement of petroleum products needed from abroad and their transfer to the points of entry of the country and the transport of exported crude oil from the primary points to the final export points, the Ministry of Petroleum shall be allowed to export up to 200,000 barrels of crude oil per day for the purpose of procuring the foreign currency needed for the implementation of the building projects of the refineries of Bandar 'Abbas and Arak and the related pipelines, and for the project to build the motor-oil manufacturing factory of Esfahan and the complex for the production of solvents and liquid gas

cylinders and related parts, upon the exchange of agreements on operational details with the Ministry of Plan and Budget, up to 50,000 barrels of crude oil per day, the total of both of which must be no more than 240,000 barrels of crude oil per day, and to deposit the funds obtained to the account of the Central Bank of the Islamic Republic of Iran to be included in the foreign currency account cited in Section B of Chart No 1, Section 9, and its equivalent in rials included in the general revenue account of the country cited in Line 210102, Section 3, of this law.

B. Rial funds cited in Line 220001 (National Iranian Oil Company—for procuring the petroleum products needed in the country and the expenditures for the transport of export, aid crude oil), Section 4, as well as foreign currency funds in Section B, Chart No 2, Section 9, of this law shall be considered allocated on the basis of the timetable of the implementation of this note, which will be proposed by the Ministry of Petroleum and approved by the Cabinet.

C. The Ministry of Economic affairs and finance shall be responsible to place at the disposal of the National Iranian Oil Company the equivalent in rials of the foreign currency obtained from the export of 200,000 barrels of crude oil per day, cited in Paragraph A of this note, up to a maximum of 73.44 billion rials, from the funds in Line 220001 on the basis of the ratified plan cited in Paragraph B with the request of that company. Also, the Central Bank of the Islamic Republic of Iran shall be responsible to sell to the National Iranian Oil Company the foreign currency needed for the expenditures cited in this paragraph in the amount equivalent to the foreign currency obtained from the export of up to 240,000 barrels of crude oil per day, up to a maximum amount of \$1.35 billion, from the funds cited in Section B, Chart No 2, Section 9, of this law.

D. The National Iranian Oil Company shall be responsible to accumulate the rial and foreign currency funds cited in Paragraph C of this note in a separate account to be opened for this purpose at the Central Bank of the Islamic Republic of Iran and, by conforming to the content of Paragraph A, to spend it exclusively on uses cited in the above-mentioned paragraph and to return the remaining and unused portion of the rial and foreign currency account mentioned to the general treasury and the Central Bank of the Islamic Republic of Iran at the end of 1368 [20 March 1990] and at the latest by the end of Farvardin 1369 [20 April 1990].

E. If the National Iranian Oil Company should refine some of the 200,000 barrels of the exported oil per day cited in Paragraph A of this note abroad instead of selling it and should import the petroleum products into the country, it shall be responsible to notify the treasury of the amount of oil refined at the end of each month, so that the equivalent of the amount of oil mentioned will be calculated in the price of the foreign currency and rials of the projected sale of oil in this law, to be

deposited, on the one hand, in the general revenue account of the country cited in Line 210102, Section 3, and, on the other hand, to the payment account for funds in Line 220001, Section 4 of this law.

F. The Ministry of Petroleum is responsible to submit its report on the operations of this note once every three months to the petroleum and plan and budget committees of the Majles.

Note 32. Permission is granted for all the special profits of the operations of 1368 [1989-90] of the National Iranian Oil Company with the approval of the general assemblies of the national Iranian oil, natural gas, liquid gas and petrochemical industries companies to be allocated to the investment expenditures of the projects of these companies upon the exchange of agreements with the Ministry of Plan and Budget on the details of the operations in order to expedite and facilitate the implementation of the fundamental plans and projects in the petroleum, natural gas and petrochemical sector.

The Ministry of Plan and Budget shall be responsible for operational supervision over the implementation of the investment expenditures of these companies, and the above-mentioned companies shall be responsible to place all information and needed documents at the disposal of the Ministry of Plan and Budget.

In the continuation of the session yesterday, Note 29, which concerns the allocation of foreign currency funds of the organizations, was discussed and Paragraphs 1 to 13 were examined and amended as follows.

Note 29. The Central Bank of the Islamic Republic of Iran shall be granted permission in 1368 [1989-90] to take measures to allocate the foreign currency to pay or establish foreign currency commitments from the foreign currency funds received during the same year, up to a maximum of \$9,814,000,000, in conformity with the content of this law and the monetary and banking laws of the country as well as other related laws and regulations on the basis of decisions made by the foreign currency allocation committee. The allocation of foreign currency in 1368 [1989-90] for all sorts of transactions abroad must be carried out on the basis of the collections obtained and the foreign currency policies and requirements of the country, and only within the framework of the charts of Section 9 and with regard to the major merchandise items, a list of which must be ratified within a maximum of one month by the foreign currency allocation committee in accordance with the following paragraphs.

1. The foreign currency share of various organizations from the foreign currency sector of other developmental projects shall be proposed within a maximum period of one month after the ratification of this law by the related organization, with an opinion rendered by the foreign currency allocation committee and approved by the Cabinet.

The foreign currency share of various organizations shall be determined and proposed on the basis of and under the categories of the major merchandise items (major merchandise items are those that require more than \$2 million in foreign currency) within a period of one month by the foreign currency allocation committee.

2. Members of the foreign currency allocation committee are: the ministers of economic affairs and finance, plan and budget, commerce, agriculture and petroleum; the director of the Central Bank of the Islamic Republic of Iran; the representative of the prime minister and one of the ministers of the industrial sector chosen by the prime minister; as well as two representatives of the Majles selected by the Majles as observers to take part in the meetings of this committee. The committee shall be headed by the minister of economic affairs and finance, and the Central Bank of the Islamic Republic of Iran shall be its administrative office. The above-mentioned sessions shall be official with the presence of at least six members, and the ratification of the foreign currency committee shall require five votes of the official members.

3. The foreign currency allocation committee shall be responsible to devise the allocation of foreign currency shares such that at all times at least 5 percent of all foreign currency received in 1368 [1989-90], as cited in Paragraph A, Chart No 1, Section 9, of this law, is kept in the foreign currency deposit account of the Central Bank of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Failure to implement this ruling will be considered illegal use of government property.

4. From the amount mentioned in this note, the foreign currency allocation committee shall be responsible to provide the commitments created in accordance with Paragraph 6, Note 29, of the 1367 [21 March 1988-20 March 1989] national budget law (usance transactions), the deadline of the usance of which, from the date of the registration of the request in the administrative offices of the foreign currency allocation committee, is in 1368 [1989-90], over other needs.

5. The foreign currency allocation committee, through the use of facilities, for due dates of over one year, may, in addition to the foreign currency collections of 1368 [1989-90], take steps to allocate \$1.6 billion for developmental projects, production investments and defense needs in accordance with Chart No 2, Section 9, of this law. The amount of commitments mentioned above must be included in the foreign currency budget of the due date years.

6. The foreign currency share of the developmental and reconstruction plans cited in Charts Nos 4 and 5, Section 9, of this law shall be considered allocated, and each month the foreign currency of these plans shall be paid to the Central Bank on the basis of physical progress and the announcement of the Ministry of Plan and Budget. The foreign currency of other developmental

projects shall be paid upon the proposal of the Ministry of Plan and Budget and the foreign currency of the production projects on the basis of the proposal of the related ministers and the approval of the foreign currency allocation committee.

The foreign currency allocation committee shall be responsible to give priority to providing the foreign currency needed for projects needing foreign currency which have been ratified for the occupation of the combatants, in accordance with Paragraph 1 of Note 3, ;pp 7. The foreign currency allocation committee shall be responsible to allocate the foreign currency necessary to purchase and procure the construction materials needed for projects, especially as regards the developmental projects cited in Line 7, Chart No 2, Section 9, of this law on the proposal of the Ministry of Plan and Budget and, in regards to other proposals, upon the proposal of a committee made up of the ministers of plan and budget, commerce and housing and urban development, at least at the level of \$280 million, from the foreign currency funds of Paragraph A, Chart No 2, Section 9, of this law.

The responsibility for the above-mentioned committee shall be with the minister of housing and urban development.

8. The foreign currency committee may only allocate foreign currency for the procurement of materials and goods that are not available in the country or cannot be procured domestically in the amount needed.

9. The amount of \$100 million shall be allocated to the Ministry of Heavy Industries to be used exclusively for the import of raw materials and auxiliary goods, parts, equipment and secondary and auxiliary machinery for the domestic manufacture of machinery and equipment needed in the projects of Paragraph 5, Section A, Chart No 2, Section 9, of this law, to be deducted from the foreign currency share of the related projects, and to obtain warranties pertaining to quality, period of time and price. The list of the various kinds of items included in this paragraph shall be proposed by the Ministry of Heavy Industries within one month of the ratification of this law and approved by the economic council.

10. The Ministry of Heavy Industries shall be permitted to present and receive the proformas concerning the contracts of the domestic manufacturing projects, such as the manufacturing of factory, refinery, power plant, port and dock building equipment, collectively in a center for procurement and distribution, upon the examination and approval of the Ministry of Commerce, and to receive related permits.

11. The foreign currency allocation committee may place at the disposal of concerned executive organizations a ceiling amount of \$100 million from the share of foreign currency of the other currency expenditures of Section 1, Chart No 2, Section 9, of this law as the export revolving fund of foreign currency facilities necessary to

encourage and support the export of non-oil goods and exclusively for the import of raw materials and auxiliary goods and parts and equipment for packaging and other equipment necessary for the production and non-oil goods exports as well as issue export warranties and technical services abroad after receiving a guarantee that the foreign currency granted shall be returned. If the organization making use of it does not take steps to deposit the revolving funds it has received up to a year after the credit has been opened, the Central Bank shall deduct it from the foreign currency share of that organization for the following year. Goods produced using the export revolving funds cited in this paragraph are exportable upon the approval of the related production ministry and require no other legal permit.

The implemental bylaws of this paragraph shall be proposed by the Ministry of Commerce and ratified by the Cabinet.

12. In order to improve the educational, scientific and cultural level of the country, the foreign currency allocation committee shall be responsible to allocate foreign currency at a minimum of 2.5 percent of the total foreign currency received, as cited in Paragraph A, Chart No 1, Section 9, of this law, for the educational, cultural, scientific, research and propaganda needs of the Ministries of Education; Culture and Higher Education; Health, Treatment and Medical Education; and Culture and Islamic Guidance, as well as the Islamic propaganda organization, the Voice and Vision of the Islamic Republic of Iran, universities, and the national press, obtained from Line 8, Paragraph A, Chart No. 2, Section 9, of this law.

Allocation of the currency of this paragraph requires the proposal of the above-mentioned ministries and the approval of the foreign currency allocation committee.

In order to strengthen and equip the universities and research centers and the higher education establishments of the country, the amount of \$80 million shall be placed at the disposal of the Ministry of Culture and Higher Education as follows in order to be spent in accordance with the import and export law.

1. To purchase educational workshop materials and equipment for various levels.

2. To purchase books and periodical and non-periodical publications, \$15 million.

3. To purchase the necessities for the printing of the university textbooks and forms and college entrance examination booklets, \$5 million. Reports of the operations concerning this paragraph shall be sent to the plan and budget and culture and higher education committees.

In order to equip domestic hospitals to provide medical services to patients who are sent abroad or to purchase

medical services, the amount of \$50 million from the section of other foreign currency expenditures in the special account of the board of directors will be deposited in the Central Bank of the Islamic Republic of Iran, to be spent gradually upon the request of the board of directors and presented by the minister of health, treatment and medical education.

The conditions on the import of materials and equipment are only dependent on the bylaws to be prepared by the Ministries of Health, Treatment and Medical Education and Commerce. The reports of steps taken shall be sent to the plan and budget and the health committees of the Majles. Also, the amount of \$10 million from the funds of the above-mentioned sector must be divided and \$3 million of it placed at the disposal of hospitals affiliated with the Shahid Foundation for equipment, \$5 million for the domestic production of automatic cars for special self-sacrificers, and \$2 million for other equipment of the self-sacrificers to be placed at the disposal of the foundation of the self-sacrificers.

13. The Central Bank of the Islamic Republic of Iran, in order to carry out energy production investments, shall make commitments for the 2,000-megawatt Martyr Raja'i power plant, the 1,000-megawatt plants of Gharb

and Fars, and the 700-megawatt natural gas power plant, up to \$1 billion, within the framework of the regulations and rules of the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Finance and the Central Bank of the Islamic Republic in such a way that its annual repayment shall not exceed \$15 million. The installments of the repayment of these funds in the due date years shall be given priority over other needs in the foreign currency budget of those years.

Then Paragraph 14 of Note 29 was discussed. Nurollah 'Ebadi proposed the omission of this paragraph, which concerned borrowing from foreign sources. Those opposing and supporting the proposal spoke. The spokesman of the plan and budget committee and the minister of economic affairs and finance gave explanations.

Then the omission proposal was put to a vote. Because there was a difference of opinion in the counting of votes among the secretaries of the session, this proposal was put to a ballot vote and 108 votes were against and the remainder were blank ballots. As a result, the proposal to omit Note 14 was not ratified and was rejected.

At 10:35 last night, the open session of the Majles ended and the continuation of the discussion on Note 29 was left for this morning's session.

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