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# ***JPRS Report***

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# **Near East & South Asia**

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# Near East & South Asia

JPRS-NEA-89-050

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## PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS

### Palestinian State Institutions, Armed Forces Described

44040466 London AL-MAJALLAH in Arabic  
21-27 Jun 89 pp 22-28

[Article by Salih Qallab et al: "New Palestinian State"]

[Excerpts] Last November, the PNC [Palestinian National Council] decided in the special session it held in Algiers to establish the independent Palestinian state. Last April, i.e., nearly 5 months later, the Central Council, which is the second rung below the PNC in the Palestinian leadership ladder, unanimously selected Yasir 'Arafat as the president of this state. The successive developments coming in light of the occupied territories' intifadah [uprising] confirm that establishing the Palestinian state on real estate in the West Bank and Gaza Strip has merely become a matter of time. [passage omitted]

#### State Institutions

The special Arab summit which convened in Casablanca, Morocco, recently issued a resolution approving the resolution the PNC had adopted in its special session in Algiers last November proclaiming the independent Palestinian state and the resolution the Central Council had adopted in the session it held in Tunis last April selecting Palestinian Leader Yasir 'Arafat as the president of the independent Palestinian state, in addition to his position as PLO chairman. Thus, the Palestinian state is ready and its fundamental structure has come into existence in light of its aforementioned lengthy experience.

In light of the latest developments and of the selection of 'Arafat as its president, the Palestinian state is actually in existence. All that remains is to move its bodies and institutions to its desired capital, the city of Jerusalem, and to take a limited number of steps dictated by the necessities of transforming this government from a government in exile into a government on the homeland's soil and to have the West Bank and Gaza Strip inhabitants participate in this state's bodies and agencies.

If international recognition is the leading issue impeding the creation of states, then the Palestinian state has come as an objective result of the rise of the Palestinian national identity and of the Palestinian people's struggle throughout the past quarter century. This state has been born with an unprecedented international recognition, not enjoyed even by the State of Israel which has been in existence for more than 40 years.

Through 'Arafat's presidency, the Executive Committee and the Unified Leadership at home, this state's political leadership is present and prepared. Through the PNC and the National [as published] Council, the legislative authority is present and prepared. And so are the other

agencies, such as the emigrant press and the press at home. As for the police and various security agencies, they are, in light of the armed struggle experience, also present and prepared.

The dilemma which will be encountered by the Palestinian state in the near future is the dilemma of armed forces: Should this state have its own Army? Will the treaties to be concluded permit this state to take advantage of its long past experience?

In the information area, data show that nearly 150 [Palestinian] periodical publications, weekly magazines, daily newspapers, and quarterly publications and reports are issued in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, in Cyprus, Yugoslavia, Lebanon, Egypt, and a number of other Arab countries.

It is well known that one of the components of the Palestinian state is the large number of universities proliferating in the cities of the occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip. Some of these universities have achieved the level of the most deep-rooted international universities. In addition to these universities, the biggest of which are Bi'r Zayt and al-Najah Universities, there is a number of specialized institutes, technical colleges, and teachers colleges.

If the Palestinian state possesses all the components, beginning with the skilled leadership cadre and the executive and legislative authorities and ending with a crystallized independent Palestinian national identity, then will this state have its Armed Forces, or will it be a demilitarized state protected by international guarantees in accordance with the treaties expected to be concluded within the framework of the proposed solution plan?

Palestinian military capabilities comparable with the abilities and capabilities of modern armies have been developed over 2.5 decades. Where will these capabilities go? Will they be absorbed within the framework of a small professional army whose task is to safeguard the new state's security and sovereignty or will they be merged within the framework of this state's civilian agencies?

In a report it published recently, JANE'S DEFENSE WEEKLY, a British magazine, says that Palestinian President Yasir 'Arafat has, in his capacity as general commander of the Palestinian Armed Forces, instructed that a 3,500-strong force be trained in South Lebanon to become the army of the new Palestinian state.

But it is well known that the Palestinian Army, which is the Palestine National Liberation Army, is extant and has been present for long years with all its weapons and units. Many may be surprised if we say that this Army, in addition to the commando [al-maghawir] units and guerrillas present in South Lebanon, who have ceaselessly continued the war of attrition against Israel throughout recent years, includes among its numerous

units an air force, an artillery corps, an armored corps, a naval corps, and an engineering corps, in addition to the other branches known to modern armies.

The Palestinian forces evacuated from Beirut alone in the wake of the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in the summer of 1982 amounted to 13,000 men who were distributed among a number of Arab countries, such as Algeria, the Yemen Arab Republic, the Democratic Yemen, Iraq, Sudan, and Jordan.

In the period since the departure from Beirut and in accordance with military agreements concluded between the PLO and a number of Arab and non-Arab countries, several military missions, from the level of petty officers to the level of high-ranking officers, have been sent for training.

In the early 1980's, the Palestinian leadership made a decision to unify the Palestinian body military. It formed the Palestine National Liberation Army from al-'Asifah Forces—Fatah's military wing—and al-Yarmuk Forces, 'Ayn Jalut Forces, al-Qadisiyah Forces, Hittin Forces, and Badr Forces of the Palestine Liberation Army.

Currently, all these forces are under the control of the Palestinian military and political command, excluding Hittin Forces which are deployed in Syria and which adopt the same position taken by the dissident factions who oppose the PLO even though they receive their budget from the Palestinian National Fund.

It is well known that in addition to these forces which operate under the Palestine National Liberation Army, each Palestinian faction, whether within or outside the PLO, has its private forces. There is also a higher military council which is headed by the Palestinian president and in which high-ranking Palestinian officers and representatives of a number of the Palestinian factions participate.

Even though the PLO refuses, for security reasons, to divulge exact figures on the size of the Palestinian military forces, some estimates indicate that the size of the various branches in these forces amounts to tens of thousands, not to mention the special militias and the popular forces formed recently in the occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip within the Palestinian intifadah's framework.

Because the assessments indicate that the treaties to be concluded between Israel and the Palestinian state within the framework of the proposed solution plans will stipulate that no Palestinian military forces may be deployed in the West Bank and Gaza Strip except within the limits needed to preserve security, it is expected that the Palestine National Liberation Army will be merged with the Jordanian armed forces to form together the army of the confederal Jordanian-Palestinian state.

The Jordanian Armed Forces, formed of the sons of the Jordanian and Palestinian peoples, will face a new experience. But it should be noted in this regard that the Palestinian Badr Forces which are stationed in Jordan have firm coordination relations with the Jordanian Army even though they are subject to the Palestinian military and political command's orders and instructions.

In light of the above, it is evident that the fundamental elements for creation of the Palestinian state in accordance with the specifications of the modern state are available and that the only step this state needs is to move with its cabinet ministries, its executive and legislative institutions, and its numerous agencies and departments from exile abroad to the holy city in the West Bank.

## BAHRAIN

### Island To Host Major Banking Conference *44000554b Manama GULF DAILY NEWS in English 6 Jun 89 p 5*

[Excerpt] Bahrain's daily supply of desalinated water is set to increase by 10 million gallons within the next three months.

The new Saudi-financed al-Dur Desalination plant in the south east of the island is to begin its trial run at the beginning of next month for about three months.

The plant was originally planned to be opened in 1986 but was hit by delays.

Officials declined to comment on the reasons.

The plant, built at a reported cost of BD17 million will boost daily water supply to 40 million gallons per day.

"While it will not solve Bahrain's shortage of water, it will ease the pressure on ground water supplies and improve water quality," said Mr Jamil al-'Alawi, Assistant Under-Secretary for Power and Water Affairs.

### Consumption

Bahrain's daily water consumption is averaging at 65 million gallons.

The Sitrah and Abu-Jarjur desalination plants provide 30 million gallons a day, and the rest is pumped from underground.

"The Government is studying plans for meeting Bahrain's future needs," said Mr al-'Alawi.

The al-Dur plant uses the reverse osmosis method, like the Abu-Jarjur plant.

### Oil Output Reported

44000554a Manama GULF DAILY NEWS  
in English 7 Jun 89 p 11

[Text] Manama: Bapco processed 90 million barrels of oil last year, when the refinery operated at more than 95 percent of its design capacity.

Total production was up from 88.1 million barrels in 1987, according to the company's annual report.

The average daily crude run in 1988 was 242,000 barrels, of which 199,000 barrels came through the undersea pipeline Saudi Arabia.

The rest was supplied by the Bahrain Field, which accounted for 15 million barrels during the year.

More than 90 percent of the refinery's production is exported to the Far East, East Africa and Europe.

Development Minister Yusuf al-Shirawi, who is chairman of Bapco, said it was the third successive year the plant had topped 90 percent of its design capacity.

Mr al-Shirawi described it as "an outstanding achievement equalled by few industrial complexes.

At a board meeting attended by Government officials and senior Caltex executives, Mr al-Shirawi stressed the need to remain competitive in an aggressive international oil market.

Every effort must be made to reduce operating costs, while maintaining safety and reliability, he added.

### Plans for Poultry Privatization Discussed

44000554c Manama GULF DAILY NEWS  
in English 12 Jun 89 p 5

[Article by Indira Chand]

[Text] The Government is considering selling its shareholdings in some island poultry firms.

Plans are being drawn up to dispose of state interests in the General Poultry Company, the National Poultry Company and the Delmon Poultry Company.

The Government has a partial stake in the National and Delmon firms, while the National Poultry Company is wholly state-owned.

Siddiq al-'Alawi, Commerce Ministry Assistant Under Secretary for Agricultural Affairs, said there was a plan to withdraw the Government's stake from these companies.

"But this is still in the planning stage and nothing has been decided yet," said Mr al-'Alawi.

"In the case of the General Poultry Company, it is being considered whether it should be privatized partially or fully," he said.

"A study is being conducted along these lines and it is too early to say more."

Mr al-'Alawi said the move for privatization was being considered to give the private sector a boost.

"This is a new approach to boost private sector and the economy. We are trying to give the private sector a bigger role," said Mr al-'Alawi.

The move follows an announcement in April that the Government planned to sell its ownership in some companies to the private sector.

Rashid al-Mir, Finance ministry Under Secretary had said the Government was planning to hand over a number of agricultural projects.

These included poultry, eggs, animal slaughtering, milk, dates and fisheries.

Mr al-Mir had said that having decided to hand over ownership of agricultural projects, the Government was devising the best method of implementing the decision.

## EGYPT

### Delegation to Libya Meets With Success

45040379b Cairo AKHIR SA'AH in Arabic 7 Jun 89 p 6

[Article by Nihad Rajab and Muhammad 'Abd-al-Razzaq: "Successful Talks by Egyptian Delegation in Libya; Issue of Compensation for Egyptians Settled and Aviation Resumed"]

[Text] Tripoli—As of tomorrow morning, Thursday, and on all following days, an Egyptian airliner will depart from Cairo airport for Benghazi and Tripoli, Libya, on regular flights after an 11-year interruption. This was preceded by the first flight of an Air Egypt plane to Tripoli, carrying the first Egyptian delegation representing the Egyptian Foreign Ministry, the Federation of Egyptian Workers, business and tourism representatives, and representatives of the Federation of Exporters and Investors and of the Egyptian media to purify Egyptian-Libyan relations and to restore normal conditions in the wake of the opening of the Egyptian-Libyan borders.

In the wake of the meeting held between President Husni Mubarak and Colonel Mu'ammarr al-Qadhafi in Casablanca and in an expression of welcome and fraternity, Chairman al-Qadhafi received at his residence Jamal Husni Mubarak, who accompanied the delegation which reopened the air route between Cairo and Tripoli.

With all manifestations of love and cordiality, the Libyan people and high-ranking Libyan officials received the first Egyptian airliner to land in Tripoli in 11 years, carrying the delegation which held successful talks. The problem of reparations for Egyptian workers has been settled.

Fathi al-Bukush, the general secretary of the Communications Secretariat, i.e., the Libyan Ministry of Communications under secretary, headed those receiving the delegation.

The Egyptian delegation included high-ranking officials of the Foreign Ministry, Air Egypt Company, and the Civil Aviation [Authority], and a group of businessmen and representatives of the Egyptian Workers Federation.

Jamal Husni Mubarak, President Mubarak's son, accompanied the first Egyptian delegation to arrive in Tripoli on a visit to the Libyan Jamahiriyah.

The Libyan people received the Egyptian delegation members with roses upon their disembarking from the Egyptian airliner.

After the expressions of welcome, cordial and positive talks between the Egyptian and Libyan delegations started at the Great Hotel in Tripoli.

#### **Relations To Be Restored Shortly**

Ambassador Nabil al-Sallawi, head of the Africa Desk at the Foreign Ministry, has told AKHIR LAHZAH [as published] that meetings were held with prominent Libyan Foreign Ministry officials on developing Egyptian-Libyan relations in light of the historic meeting held between leaders Husni Mubarak and Mu'ammarr al-Qadhdhafi and that the meetings were characterized by the utter love which both peoples harbor for each other.

Al-Sallawi also said that the meetings held in Tripoli between the delegations of the two countries' foreign ministries are initial steps on which agreement was inevitable and that the most important issues discussed were the issues of reopening the embassies in both countries and of arranging a meeting between Dr 'Ismat 'Abd-al-Majid, the deputy prime minister and foreign minister, and the Libyan foreign minister. This meeting is expected to be held very shortly to take more effective steps toward bolstering and developing Egyptian-Libyan diplomatic relations. Ambassador Nabil al-Sallawi further said that a meeting between the two countries' foreign ministers is normal, now that Presidents Mubarak and al-Qadhdhafi have already met in Casablanca.

Ambassador al-Sallawi added that he will submit a report on the outcome of his talks in Tripoli to Dr 'Ismat 'Abd-al-Majid, the deputy prime minister and foreign minister, who is currently in London as part of his European tour.

#### **Reparations for Egyptians in Libya**

On the problem of compensating the Egyptians who returned from Libya in 1984, Ahmad al-'Amawi, the chairman of the Egyptian Workers Federation who accompanied the Egyptian delegation on its visit to Libya, has said that he met with officials of the Producers Federation (Libyan Workers Federation), that he found full understanding on the problem of compensating Egyptians, and that the Producers Federation agreed in principle to disburse the required compensations in accordance with the documents submitted by the Egyptian workers. The federation has referred the issue to the Libyan Government to make the decision to disburse the compensations, estimated at nearly 5 million Libyan dinars. Nearly 10,000 workers have submitted complaints to get their dues. But those who have actually submitted documents number nearly 3,000 workers. We hope that the outcome of the meetings with the Producers Federation officials will materialize in the next few days.

#### **Agreement To Guarantee Rights**

Ahmad al-'Amawi added that the Producers Federation has demanded that guarantees be established for contracts concluded with labor going to Libya, by concluding such contracts either with the Workers Federation or with the Ministry of Manpower, in order to eliminate the problems that face Egyptian workers in Libya as a result of imaginary contracts and of these workers' being victimized by some Egyptian contractors who exploit those seeking work abroad.

Al-'Amawi added that there is concurrence on the need to conclude an international agreement between the two countries to guarantee Egyptian workers' rights in the future. Agreements between federations are not recognized internationally, whereas international organizations recognize governmental agreements. We seek to achieve such an agreement in the near future.

#### **Resuming Flights**

Other talks were held on resuming and strengthening flights between the two countries. The first flight by a Libyan airliner was made on Monday evening, 2 days ago. Officials of the Libyan company expressed their readiness to offer one of their offices at the company's main headquarters in Benghazi until independent offices can be obtained for the Egyptian company. It has also been decided to furnish another office in Tripoli. Egyptian airliners will begin their flights to Libya tomorrow, Thursday.

Air Vice Marshal Wafiq 'Abd-al-Hamid, an adviser to the President of Air Egypt, has stated that the resumption of flights between the two countries will save both companies time and money as a result of reopening direct air routes between Egypt and Libya.

He said that Egyptian airliners have been using European air routes to Tunisia, Morocco, and Algeria. Libyan airliners have been in the same position. These [routes] amounted to burdens which the two countries' airlines have shouldered. 'Abd-al-Hamid added that resuming the flights at this particular time fits in with the return of Egyptian teachers from Libya and encourages Arab tourists from various Libyan cities, especially Tripoli and Benghazi. It has been agreed that both airlines will operate 7 flights weekly.

Air Vice Marshal Wafiq 'Abd-al-Hamid further added that the talks have resulted in granting Egyptian airliners all facilities. Libyan aviation authorities have allowed the operation of additional flights without restriction.

He asserted that there is no problem in the resumption of the Libyan airline operations. The company's offices are as they were and there are no obstacles to the company's employees' engaging in their work. He added that the Libyan authorities have emphasized that Egyptians are permitted to enter their territories without a visa.

#### **Egypt, Holland Sign Health Agreement**

*NC1007163889 Cairo MENA in English  
1334 GMT 10 Jul 89*

[Text] Egypt and Holland today signed a health cooperation agreement whereby Holland is to help Egypt eradicate tuberculosis from the country over four years.

Holland is to offer Egypt a 9-million Egyptian pounds grant to improve laboratories and provide health care units with equipment required for examination and diagnosis as well as the training of physicians.

The agreement, signed by Minister of Health Dr. Raghab Duwaydar and the ambassador of Holland in Cairo, is part of the ministry's plan aimed at eradicating communicable, endemic and childhood diseases.

#### **Projects Grants From FRG, CSSR, Canada**

*NC1007174589 Cairo MENA in English  
1617 GMT 10 Jul 89*

[Text] The West German Government has agreed to advance to Egypt a 10-million DM non-refundable grant to be applied in establishing a training center at Fa'id east of here. The center is to serve the staff of the Canal electricity region. The grant also goes to the establishment of a new workshop for training on welding high-pressure boilers. This was stated here today by Mahir Abazah, minister of electricity and energy.

The grant, he added, involves the training here and abroad of technicians required to train staffers of the Egyptian Electricity Authority.

The minister referred to a plan by the authority to establish a training center in each of the five electricity regions of the republic.

Within this context, he indicated, a training center has already been built with a British grant of 2 million dollars.

Another center being built in Aswan and costing 20 million dollars, is funded by the World Bank, he noted.

Technical facilities are provided by Czechoslovakia for work to start in establishing a similar center at Talkha, in the al-Daqahliyah Governorate, the minister said.

A Canadian grant of 12 million Canadian dollars will contribute to developing a similar institute south of the capital here, he added.

#### **Fundamentalist Demonstrators Arrested in Suez**

*NC1407060589 (Clandestine) Radio Free Lebanon  
in Arabic 0445 GMT 14 Jul 89*

[Text] It has been announced in Cairo that Egyptian police arrested 12 Muslim fundamentalists in Suez for staging a demonstration before the 'Id al-Idha prayers, in which they carried placards attacking the Egyptian regime.

#### **Police Said To Arrest 18 Muslim Fundamentalists**

*NC1507124189 Beirut Radio in Arabic  
1030 GMT 15 Jul 89*

[Text] Today police sources in Cairo said that the police have arrested 18 Muslim fundamentalists who had demonstrated to demand the release of Shaykh 'Umar 'Abd-al-Rahman. It is believed that those arrested are members of the banned Islamic al-Jihad Organization. They were arrested in Bani Suwayf during demonstrations demanding the release of Shaykh 'Abd-al-Rahman.

#### **Authorities Arrest 57 'Muslim Activities'**

*NC1107105789 Paris AFP in English  
1048 GMT 11 Jul 89*

[Text] Egyptian authorities have arrested 57 Muslim activists in the al-Sharqiyah region of the Nile delta on charges of training youths to carry out acts of violence, newspapers reported here Tuesday.

The reports, which did not say when the arrests took place, said the activists had been coaching children aged between seven and 15 to carry out attacks and chant anti-government slogans.

#### **Islamic Group Denies Link to Bani Suwayf Incident**

*JN1307191289 Cairo AL-SHA'B in Arabic 11 Jul 89 p 5*

[Text] Dr 'Ala' Muhyi-al-Din, one of the leaders of the Islamic group in Asyut, has stated that his group had nothing to do with last month's regrettable events in

Bani Suwayf in which Husam al-Battuji was killed. He added that neither side to the dispute owed allegiance to the Islamic group or its leader Dr 'Umar 'Abd-al-Rahman.

Dr 'Ala' said good relations exist between his Islamic group and other Islamic groups in the arena which abide by the ethics of Islam.

In a related development, the group issued a statement explaining the implications of the incident, alleging that the security services played a large part in driving a wedge between the two sides to the conflict, spreading false rumors and setting traps that led to the ugly homicide.

The statement denied press claims on the existence of divisions and conflicts among members of the Islamic group in the republic.

#### **Supply Ministry Adopts Projects To Curb Staples Shortage**

*45040379a Cairo UKTUBAR in Arabic 28 May 89 p 44*

[Article by Ibrahim Abu-Zayd: "Will Supply Ministry Projects Succeed in Eliminating Struggle to Get Flour or Rice or Bread"]

[Text] The strange phenomena in our daily life have become diverse: Masses are struggling in front of cooperatives to get a sack of flour or rice; civil servants seek such sacks eagerly and carry them into their offices; men of different status are in the markets; and, despite the numerous control agencies, the quality of the bread loaf has dropped and its price has risen.

The government is doing its utmost to fight and eliminate these phenomena. Recently, the government has told the masses frankly that wheat prices are high and wheat is difficult to supply. The government has also begun concerted studies and projects on supplying wheat in abundance and storing it to meet growing consumption needs.

The Supply Ministry is working at full effort and has instructed the public sector authorities for rice-hulling facilities, flourmills, silos, and bakeries to intensify their efforts to implement their 5-year plan projects to develop and modernize the equipment needed to improve the domestic and export rice industry, and to store wheat in silos rather than open granaries to insure a year-round supply.

The Canadian Government has offered a grant to build silos and the Japanese Government has offered a grant to build rice silos fitted with the most advanced equipment.

Egyptian engineering consulting firms were assigned to prepare blueprints, feasibility studies, and designs jointly with the foreign components in a manner compatible with our circumstances, capabilities, society, and environment.

The Egyptian Office [as published] has succeeded in putting these plans in the realm of reality.

Along with a number of university professors, Consulting Engineer A.D. Ahmad al-Nimr is one of the few Egyptians in charge of consulting offices. He is currently working in the Higher Organization for Developing al-Riyad City. Al-Nimr has spoken to me about the firm's role in preparing blueprints and feasibility studies for numerous service construction projects in the governorates for ministries and authorities looking for solutions to chronic problems—projects such as the U.S. AID [Agency for International Development] educational buildings in Cairo and al-Gharbiyah, a number of modern factories in 10 Ramadan City, the services complex, expansion of Al-Daqahliyah Yarn and Textile Company, houses and housing towers in Suez City. Al-Nimr points out that projects begin with a study of the soil, through laboratory analyses with the latest scientific equipment, to draft recommendations for designing building foundations and determining the number of floors.

Dr al-Nimr adds that the ministries' and organizations' confidence in the Egyptian Office's capability has motivated the office to exert maximum efforts and to work with the spirit of a team and of national belonging and to rise above the arrogance and the carelessness which often afflict the Egyptian official as soon as he achieves his first success.

Al-Nimr presented the architectural blueprints which are being currently studied and which took 36 months to prepare. He also presented Canadian reports lauding Egyptian expertise. Al-Nimr said that this project is a grant from the Canadian Government valued at 36 million Canadian dollars; the construction of these silos in the cities of al-Mansurah, al-Zaqaziq and Shibin al-Kawm is a first-time event in Egypt.

The diameter of each of these metal silos is 20 meters. Their construction will be entrusted mainly to the Al-Timsah Company. There are 26 silos fitted with the latest electronic equipment to load and unload grain. To find out more, I interviewed Dr Ahmad 'Abd-al-Ghaffar, head of the Flourmills, Silos and Bakeries Authority, who praised the Egyptian Office's success—praise cited in the Canadian reports—in drawing up the blueprints and said: The flourmill companies are making progress in their production and profit plans. In most of the sites we visit, we find that the workers' efforts exceed expectations.

Engineer Mustafa 'Abd-al-Razzaq, the director of Al-Daqahliyah Flourmills Company, pointed out to me the role of a silo in preventing wheat loss. He said that 8 silos will be built in al-Mansurah and 10 in Shibin al-Kawm. The capacity of each is 4,000 tons of wheat and each is fitted with equipment for sifting and drying before storage. Grain is loaded and unloaded automatically. The silos will receive all the imported wheat arriving in Egyptian ports. A new flourmill will be built next to the silos and will operate at full capacity to produce top-grade wheat. Dump trucks to transport the wheat will eliminate the use of hemp sacks, thus saving hard currency and eliminating the constant loss caused by the current storage in granaries.

The Supply Ministry continues to exert utmost efforts to combat the strange phenomena so that we may not see the civil servant searching for a sack of flour or rice and keeping it in his office. The minister has opened a number of production units in Damietta Governorate at the rice drying and storage site built with Japanese-Egyptian cooperation and a grant to develop and modernize the rice industry.

Husayn Salam, the director of the Damietta and Balqas Rice-Hulling Company who has successfully implemented the ministry's and the authority's plan to build numerous advanced production sites, said in an interview we had with him: The Egyptian engineering offices have successfully drawn up the blueprints that befit our environment and society to modernize the rice industry and to produce macaroni, fodders, ice [as published], and improved bread.

I have also interviewed Engineer Rashad Wahbah, the chairman of the al-Daqahliyah rice-hulling facilities, who has said that replacement, renovation, and modernization are going on constantly in all five production units, utilizing the most sophisticated international electronic systems. Our production represents 12.5 percent of the Republic's entire production capacity.

A macaroni factory is being built, in addition to automatic bakeries that produce 2,000 loaves per hour. This bread is sold to workers and others.

The fact confirms that the workers of the Supply Ministry and its organizations are making efforts to eliminate the strange phenomena by implementing sophisticated modern projects. The decision to build the silos in cities far from ports is decisive in providing wheat throughout the year in the face of growing consumption which must be curtailed by the housewife who is not careful in preparing meals, especially in preparing the loaf of bread, half of which is thrown away because it is not [properly] divided.

We need conservation, which is more important than the seeking of flour or rice that has become a strange phenomenon preoccupying minds and homes.

## **Price of Flour Reportedly Raised by 80 Percent**

*JN3006160589 Cairo AL-SHA'B in Arabic*

*27 Jun 89 p 1*

[By 'Ali al-Qammash]

[Text] The Ministry of Supply yesterday—Monday—decided to raise by 80 percent the price of domestic flour distributed by village warehouses. It is to be recalled that the day before yesterday, the industry minister announced that there will be no price increases.

The Supply Ministry has meanwhile given the go-ahead for investment firms to increase by 30 percent the prices of their flour-based products, including pasta—the second such hike in a month.

The ministry has further decided to reduce the content of sugar packets from 1 kg to 900 grams without changing the price and to impose the purchase of 5 pounds worth of slow-selling items for each 6-pound can of cooking oil.

## **Family Planning Seen as U.S.-Israeli Conspiracy**

*45040347b Cairo AL-MUKHTAR AL-ISLAMI*

*in Arabic May 89 pp 60-61*

[Article by Dr Layla Bayyumi: "They Kill Children for Fear of Poverty"]

[Text] One of my relatives decided to stop having children after her third pregnancy. It had been a surprise when God bestowed twins upon her. At the time of her decision, she started using the contraceptive means about which people are talking. She said to me, "Life is difficult. It is enough for us to raise these four." However, it was God's will that she had a fourth pregnancy—despite the torrent of announcements which surrounds everyone, and despite a certain woman radio announcer (she assuredly works for the Ministry of Family Planning, not for the Ministry of Information) who habitually ends her interviews by asking, "How many children do you have?" If he says, "I have none," she almost goes crazy with joy, thanks him, and immediately plays for him whatever song he requests. Alas for him if he has three or four children! In that case, she chides him, cuts his interview off, and ends her talk with the words, "To Egypt all love!" She should really say, "All love to America!" But what connection does America have with the reproduction of Muslims?

The reality is that America has paid large sums to Egypt and to many Islamic countries to be spent specifically on birth control for Muslims, calling it "family planning projects." In past years, Egypt, for example, received \$65 million in 1986, approved by the People's Assembly. In addition, the Council of Ministers approved \$102 million a few months ago as a gift for family planning during the next 5 years. Dr 'Abd-al-Ghaffar 'Aziz, professor of Islamic missionary activity in the faculties of theology and missionary activity at al-Azhar University, during a discussion of the subject in an interview with him

mentioned that in addition to the millions of dollars America is paying for birth control projects there are gifts of materials being sent to the medical schools and some universities in the form of equipment and implements for abortions. Regretfully, some of this equipment, valued at approximately \$13,300,000, has been sent to the hospital of al-Azhar. This all confirms that America and other Western countries are working at combatting Islam through many varied means.

For whose benefit are fetuses being killed in their mothers' wombs and their blood drained? For whose benefit are men and women being sterilized? For whose benefit have the Egyptian media become infatuated with birth control, with Islamic advisory bodies and many government 'ulama sharing their infatuation?

In fact, the claim that increased population causes economic deterioration and a lowered standard of living is a lie refuted by divine truth. In addition, many scholarly essays have proven that birth control is aimed at Muslims alone. America, and with it the enemies of Islam, has allocated millions of dollars for it and has founded organizations to supervise its implementation and bring it to the heart of Cairo and the Egyptian countryside.

And finally, is America worried about poverty for us, when Ben Gurion says, "The greatest problem facing Israel in the coming 20 years is the increase in the ratio of Arab residents"?

America's ambassador in Moscow, Rockefeller, felt reassured because Egypt was on the way to birth control, because he considers population more dangerous than the atomic bomb.

### **Unimplemented Law Causes Housing Problems**

45040390 Cairo AL-JUMHURIYAH  
in Arabic 15 Jun 89 p 5

[Article by Badawi Mahmud: "Law Is Not Being Used To Provide Access to 1 Million Locked Apartments; Why Don't Governors Use Law To Finish, Rent Locked Apartments?"]

[Text] Two years ago, in April 1987 to be specific, the Central Agency for General Mobilization and Statistics announced the preliminary results of the general census of the population, housing, and establishments. The figures revealed by the census created more than one outcry, but the loudest outcry was the one which had to do with vacant apartments and unfinished buildings.

The figures stated there were 997,526 vacant residential units in cities: approximately 251,000 of these units were in Cairo alone; 100,000 were in Alexandria; and 121 were in al-Jizah. The figures also showed there were 792,372 vacant residential units in rural areas. This means that the number of unoccupied residential units which were built to provide shelter, including single room dwellings, luxurious apartments, and single-family

homes, amounts to approximately 1.8 million units. Some housing experts estimated the value of these units then to be 40 billion pounds, or more than Egypt's civilian debt. The figures also showed there were 210,435 unfinished buildings whose owners had not attempted to finish them. These include high-rise apartment buildings, homes, and rural dwellings.

A storm of questions arose, asking how and why that could happen and what was the solution to that situation. A number of members of the People's Assembly asked questions, submitted requests for information, and questioned the minister of housing and reconstruction. The ministry, however, did nothing more than question the accuracy of the figures of the largest data collection agency. A committee was formed to verify the accuracy of these figures.

Although the furor eventually subsided and the issue was put to rest, the case remains open. According to Dr Mahmud Jalal Hashish, a professor at the College of Engineering at 'Ayn Shams University, all the signs and indications affirm that the number of vacant apartments is increasing even as the housing crisis is getting worse. During the past 2 years land prices for construction lots rose by 20 percent or more. In remote areas of Nasr City, such as the 10th suburb, 1 square meter of land sells now at prices that start at 270 pounds. In remote areas of al-Muqattam Mountain, 1 square meter of land sells for 225 pounds. In poor neighborhoods the price of 1 meter rose from 250 to 350 pounds. In middle class neighborhoods 1 meter of land which used to sell for approximately 400 pounds is now being sold for 600.

### **Stagnant Market**

The rise in land prices means that demand for land is growing. Construction remains an area in which investments are secure because it involves no risks and because construction materials are available in the local market. Furthermore, Egyptians by nature love land and like to build.

On the other hand, prices for apartments which are being offered for sale are coming down. An average apartment which was selling 2 years ago for approximately 450 pounds per 1 square meter is now being sold for under 400 pounds per square meter, and an apartment which was selling for 400 pounds per square meter is now being sold for approximately 350 pounds per square meter. Prices are falling despite the erosion in the value of the pound and the rise in construction material prices and construction costs.

The housing market is somewhat stagnant now after hundreds of thousands of citizens lost their savings in the delusions created by investment companies. The stagnant housing market is also the result of unstable oil prices and the fact that the Egyptian labor force in Arab markets has been shrinking.

To put it briefly, construction activity remains vigorous, but the market for selling apartments remains indolent and stagnant. This means the surplus in residential units which are available on the market, especially in luxurious and above average housing, is growing. It also means that the surplus in economy housing is smaller. And yet, apartment sales are expected to pick up in the coming months as Egyptians who work abroad return to Egypt and the shock wave which accompanied the collapse of investment companies is dissipated.

At any rate, the residential units which the previous census showed were vacant remain vacant because nothing has been done about them by any agency.

Also, according to the plan the state is building 200 residential units every year in new cities, like Tenth of Ramadan, Badr al-Jadidah, and al-Amal al-Jadidah, and in satellite cities, like al-'Ubur and 15 Mayu. But according to 'Adil Wali, a member of the People's Assembly Housing Committee who represents the Socialist Labor Party on that committee, these units are built without the necessary facilities like schools, universities, movie theaters, theaters, and so on. That is why many people prefer not to move to these cities where they can start new lives. That is why large numbers of these apartments remain vacant, and no tenants can be found for them. Also, many families which moved into these cities still hold on to their older homes as a precaution for the future. This is exactly what happened when people who had left their homes in cities on the canal in 1973 and 1974 returned to those homes. Many of them kept their apartments in Cairo or elsewhere, and they continue to keep them even today.

### Slack Enforcement Is Deliberate

Under the conditions of the current housing shortage, buildings which have been unfinished for many years also represent an unacceptable level of indifference. Most of these high-rise buildings and homes are subject to rent control rules which are spelled out in the laws that regulate the relationship between landlords and tenants. These laws provide landlords with a return that is approximately seven percent of their investment. Under the best circumstances the return could be about 10 percent. Such returns are low compared to the profits investors can get by investing in other areas.

But there are also other reasons why the owners of some of these buildings leave them unfinished. These include, for example, legal disputes between landlords and tenants over key money or exceeding the allowable height for a building in the building permit. Such legal problems could go on in the courts for scores of years. Other times owners may be unable to finish a building because of their own economic conditions.

What is odd here is that Article 8 of Law No 49 for 1977 stipulates that "being deliberately slow in finishing a building and getting it ready for occupancy shall be

considered tantamount to keeping the building vacant. In that case the duly qualified governor may notify the landlord by registered letter with return receipt that he is to finish construction of the building and prepare it for occupancy in a period of time which is to be determined by the governor."

The same article then states: "If this period expires before the building is finished by the landlord, the governor may entrust any firm with the task of preparing the building for occupancy. This will be done at the owner's expense in accordance with rules issued in a decree from the minister of housing and reconstruction. The firm which is entrusted with that task may lease [to others] units in the building which had not been previously leased, and it may claim the rent due from all units in the building until it recovers all its expenses and the administrative costs it incurred in finishing the building. The landlord may receive 20 percent of that rent every month."

Although the text of the law is unequivocal and in spite of the fact that the minister's decree was issued, neither the law nor the minister's decree was enforced during the past years: not even in a single case. Similarly the section which states that "a person may not without cause hold in one city more than one dwelling" has not been enforced. There has also been no enforcement of the section which affirms that "homes which are ready for occupancy may not be kept vacant for over 4 months if a tenant who is willing to pay the legal rent for them can be found." It is as though laws were being enacted for amusement, not to correct problems or enforce legal provisions.

Government buildings are another issue. It is no secret that contracting firms drag their feet when it comes to finishing and delivering residential units. This is because they have to wait a long time before then can get paid by the firms which hired them to do the job. Quite often the concrete structure of a building is completed, but then nothing is done about the building because it remains unfinished.

### Freedom To Enter Into Contracts

Sa'id 'Amir, a contractor, says, "Vacant apartments and unfinished buildings are natural products of the housing laws and the successive reductions in rent. Rent no longer constitutes a lucrative return for a person with capital.

"The solution is to give landlords and tenants the freedom to make their own agreements about renting vacant apartments. Landlords and tenants should have the right to agree on the rent amount and the duration of the lease. A landlord should also be entitled to receive 4 years' rent in advance instead of only 2 years' rent. It is my own experience that when Law No 136 for 1981 was issued, giving landlords the right to receive 2 years' rent

in advance, the market surged for a while. Soon, however, that surge was brought to a standstill when prices for construction materials rose.

"This is how the contracting industry can be revived; this is how vacant apartments can be put on the market once again. At least 1 million vacant residential units will be on the market, and these apartments will be subject to supply and demand. Rent for new apartments will definitely be affected by the increase in supply.

"As far as the unfinished buildings are concerned, a contracting organization specializing in this kind of work must be established. The fact that governors would have the authority to finish these buildings is not enough. They must also have the means by which they can exercise that authority. Henceforth, building permits should stipulate that a building be finished in a period of time that is not to exceed 4 years. Otherwise, a penalty would be incurred, and a landlord would be required to pay a fixed fine."

'Adil Wali thinks, however, that the only way to solve the problem is to abolish the system of owning an apartment and the system of renting furnished apartments. He thinks a progressive tax should be imposed on vacant apartments. Mr Wali also thinks that rent for older buildings should be raised, and the principles upon which such rent is computed should be altered. Thus, landlords could feel they are receiving a return which is commensurate with their investments, and tenants could feel that they can afford to pay the new rent because the rent amount is compatible with their incomes.

Finding the proper balance, of course, is difficult, but it is not impossible. That would be the only way we can convince those who have vacant apartments to make them available for rent. Then "For Rent" signs which had disappeared since World War II would reappear.

But dealing with the phenomenon by sanctioning the principle of a fixed term lease will only create problems for hundreds of thousands of families which may find a dwelling for a period of time. But then that family would have to start looking for another dwelling in a matter of months. Moving every now and then is not easy economically or psychologically for an Egyptian family.

The new bill which is being proposed to regulate the relationship between landlords and tenants addressed the main premises which are to be used in confronting this problem. This was affirmed by Mustafa Bakr, under-secretary for legal affairs at the Ministry of Reconstruction and Housing.

- The first premise involves a vacant apartment which is held by its owner for the marriage of one of his children. In such a case a landlord may not be forced to lease the apartment to another because in this case it would be more appropriate to protect the interests of the family. The bill also includes a provision that

gives a landlord the power to rent one or more vacant units for one or more fixed terms which expire before the son's or daughter's marriage. The bill gives the landlord the right to evict a tenant at the end of the agreed upon lease period. But if the landlord's son or daughter marries in another apartment, the reason for which the landlord had held the apartment vacant ceases to exist.

- The second premise involves an apartment which is held by a tenant who is unable to trade it for another apartment because the landlord refuses such an exchange. These cases are common mostly in buildings where the amount paid in rent does not constitute a burden for the tenant. A landlord's unwillingness to go along with such an exchange is based on a provision in the present Housing Act, Law No 49 for 1977. This provision obligates the two tenants who wish to exchange apartments to obtain the approval of the landlords of both buildings. The new bill allows tenants who agree to such an exchange to go ahead with the exchange, but it gives landlords the right to contest the agreement made between the two tenants if the exchange of apartments was made for the purpose of hurting the landlord's interests.
- The third premise: If the lease permits, the present law allows a tenant to assign his residential unit to another tenant for a fee, provided he pay the landlord 50 percent of the sum he is being offered to give up the apartment. Since this case represents the majority of the problems we face in residential units which are being kept out of circulation, the bill stipulated that a tenant be given the right to assign his residential unit to another tenant without getting the landlord's written permission, provided the landlord receive half of the proceeds the tenant receives for giving up the apartment.

#### **Writer Questions Motives Behind Defense Minister Removal**

*45040347a Cairo AL-I'TISAM in Arabic May 89 p 39*

[Article by Abu-'Abdallah: "Are We Really a Democratic Country? What Is Happening Now Proves the Opposite."]

[Text] The justification that government newspapers have presented for the replacement of the defense minister is unconvincing and unacceptable. "Real" democratic countries give their citizens the right to know what goes on around them. This right is something sacred and not to be trifled with. Citizens in these countries know why a minister was appointed, why he was removed, or why another one resigned—not to mention the timing. When they become interested in reports of appointments and dismissals, they do not have to resort to guesses, supposition, and rumors.

The position of secretary of defense in the United States was the subject of much discussion involving Senator John Tower, the person whom President Bush nominated to be secretary. The American Congress rejected

his appointment after long discussions and stories. This indicates that people in those countries control their own affairs.

Egyptians were very surprised when they heard the news that Field Marshall Abu-Ghazalah had been appointed assistant to the president and that Major General Abu-Talib had been appointed defense minister. People talked a great deal about the secret behind the change. The conjectures and guesses ranged from predictions that Abu-Ghazalah would be appointed the president's deputy or successor, to stories about accusations directed at his person, not to mention the story of the office of presidential assistant, who would carry the president's messages to others. The case points to a riddle that has not been solved as of the writing of these lines.

The conjectures and guesses also spoke about the secret behind the appointment of a former military man who had left military service about 10 years ago as minister of defense. One need not make comparisons with Israel, since the difference between them and us is great. Nevertheless, people have drawn many imaginary conclusions. It would have been better if the government, wanting to make a change, had informed the people of its intention and raised the objective facts about the subject. Instead, there are these surprises that have harmful effects and which require a long time to remedy and erase from people's memory.

Doubtlessly, some of the predictions deserved serious interest, since the matter is crucial to the people, as well as the government, like the talk about the pressure exerted by the debt fund and others.

The question now is whether the government insists that we are really a democratic country.

What took place confirms the opposite.

## IRAQ

### **Military Weapons Show, Production Projects Described I**

44040430 London AL-TADAMUN in Arabic  
15 May 89 pp 31-33

[Article by Ahmad 'Abd-al-Majid: "First Full International Demonstration of War Production in the World: 200 Kinds of Sophisticated Weapons"]

[Text] Twenty-eight countries and 200 manufacturers of military equipment participated in the first Baghdad International Fair for Military Industrialization held under the motto, "Defense Equipment in the Service of Peace and Prosperity," as part of Iraq's celebration of President Saddam Husayn's birthday.

For five days (28 April to 2 May 1989), these countries and companies displayed their latest war production inventions of air equipment and land and operational

military ware. The show consisted of two main wings: an air equipment wing which occupied an area of the Muthannah Airport and was accompanied throughout the days of the fair by air shows presented by pilots from 9 countries and 12 companies; and a land equipment wing which occupied the whole Baghdad International Fair grounds.

According to Husayn Kamil Hasan, Iraqi minister of industry and military industrialization, the purpose of the fair is to interact with the leading arms-producing countries and to send a message to the rest that Iraq has a human, material and military power capable of defending its sovereignty and security. In a press conference he held on the sidelines of the fair, the minister added: "The war has given us an opportunity to look for our capabilities within ourselves, especially that Iraq is not a small country." He emphasized that peace has not impeded the military industrialization process for Iraq indeed has an active program for the future.

The fair, whose opening ceremony was attended by high-ranking officials representing the participants, represents an opening for the holding of international war production fairs at a rate of one every two years while maintaining the tradition of holding an annual fair for the Iraqi Military Industrialization Organization. The fair's significance lies not only in the countries' size and the progress they have made in the war production field, (USSR, Spain, Brazil, Czechoslovakia, Austria, Italy, India, Rumania, Poland, Portugal and Turkey), but also in the Iraqi displays of equipment, rockets and new sophisticated weapons, including 200 types shown for the first time.

It is understood from statements made by the fair directors that Iraq exhibited in its pavilion—the largest and most important one—models of equipment and weapons developed in light of the war's operational requirements, including, for example, an early-warning aircraft (Baghdad-1), a modified version of the Soviet-made Ilyushin aircraft which includes a complete air-control system resembling an operations room, a MIG-25 aircraft with an Iraqi-added mid-air refueling system which changed its strategic employment ranges.

Based on remarks by Colonel Lu'i Badr-al-Din, director of the Baghdad fair's air wing, made in a TV statement, it is likely that these aircraft were used to destroy vital economic installations in the Iranian depth. In interviews with AL-TADAMUN, military experts did not rule out the possibility that the Iraqi-modified MIG-23 was used to destroy the installations of the distant Siri and Arak Islands located along the gulf coastline which the Iraqi air force was able to reach and destroy in 1987-88.

### **Tour of Land Equipment Wing**

Twenty-eight countries and 150 companies participated in the land equipment wing. The USSR, the French group, Egypt and Iraq had the largest pavilions. The

Soviets displayed sophisticated weapons and equipment, including air defense rocket systems, anti-armor weapons, guided missiles and modern guns. This pavilion exhibited a total of 9 items, signifying the fact that Soviet participation in international military industrialization and war production fairs is generally limited.

The Egyptian pavilion displayed tanks, armored cars, anti-aircraft guns, radar-controlled guns, miscellaneous infantry weapons, aircraft and air-defense rockets. In the French pavilion, Iraqi pilots with over 2,000 hours of flying time on French military planes were awarded medals in appreciation of their skills and in recognition of their high technical capabilities.

The management of the Baghdad International Military Industrialization Fair is noted for its outstanding management ability. According to statements by Arab (Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Egypt) and foreign pavilion officials, the fair was a surprise to them in terms of capacity, variety and the size of international participation, something rare in international fairs. It is customary to hold specialized exhibits in only one field of war production while the Baghdad fair had the unique distinction of including about eight branches, thus putting on a comprehensive exhibit. An official told AL-TADAMUN that "the Baghdad fair actually included 8 specialized exhibits."

#### In the Air Equipment Wing

This wing included pavilions by 11 companies and 9 countries: France, Great Britain, Switzerland, Italy, Spain, Poland, the USSR, Egypt and the United States which participated with the small Gulfstream transport plane. In explaining this boycott by American companies, the Iraqi minister of industry and military industrialization said: "The American State Department forbade military equipment manufacturers from participating in the fair, save for one civilian aircraft of the Gulfstream type and some General Motors jeeps." He pointed out that Iraq was not upset by this stance which is an American policy matter.

What was striking about the air wing is the amazing progress achieved by the warplane industry. France displayed a Mirage-2000 plane, the fighter Alpha-1, an Alpha jet trainer, a transport plane and a helicopter. Among the technical specifications of the Mirage-2000 is that it weighs 15 tons on take-off, carries 4 air-to-air missiles and can hit a target at 25 kilometers with a 5.5 ton load of projectiles. The Mirage is known for its high ability to maneuver [steer] a 500-meter perimeter at an altitude of 40,000 feet in 2.5 minutes. It is equipped with a homing radar and can fly for 1,800 kilometers without auxiliary tanks and 2,100 kilometers with auxiliary tanks. It is produced by the Dassault Company. French pilot Jean Jacques Rose, born in 1954, piloted this plane in the air show held Saturday morning, 29 May 1989, in the Iraqi capital.

The Soviet Union exhibited two kinds of aircraft: the MIG-29, piloted in the air show by Iraqi pilot Khalid Khalil; the Sukhoi-24 and the Sukhoi-22M4. Britain had participated with a Hawk-100 training and air support plane; Italy with the MB-339 trainer; Switzerland with 3 types of small trainers; Spain with the C-1 airplane; Poland with the Mi-2 helicopter; and Egypt with the Alpha jet trainer, the Gazelle helicopter and the Tucano trainer presented in the air show by Iraqi pilots who showed great versatility in using it.

It is noteworthy that this was the first time that a Soviet MIG-29 participates in an international air show and is expected to participate in the Paris International Show next June. The plane is 15.53 meters long and 14.10 meters wide. It has a speed of up to 1,000 kms an hour with a thrust of 4,100 kilograms. Air Lieutenant General Hamid Sha'ban, commander of the Iraqi air force, was quoted as saying that the air show, which included 27 different airplanes, was a model of innovation balanced with precision and that it matched the importance of the Baghdad Fair which was marked by broad participation and good quality at the air and equipment level.

Jamal-al-Din Isma'il, minister of state for war production in Egypt who attended the fair and met with President Saddam Husayn earlier, said: The broad international participation is proof of the status Iraq has achieved in the arms industry and of its place among the producing nations."

#### Iraqi Pavilion...Broad Participation

Iraqi pavilion displays were the surprise of the Baghdad fair with regard to its visitors and pavilion officials. It displayed new planes, guns and armor shells, including the fuel and hollow shell which is superior to its kind in that its weight of 250.05 kilograms is five times greater than the others. The pavilion also included new weapons, rockets and equipment, including the Asad Babil tank which is equipped with a 125-mm gun, the two al-Husayn and al-'Abbas surface-to-surface missiles which were successfully tested in the war. This is in addition to different kinds of 210 mm and 155 mm self-propelled guns, rockets of various ranges and the Faw-1 interception rocket which was tested after the gulf war cease-fire. Moreover, the Iraqi pavilion included 200 new items, part of which were chemical and industrial raw materials and the other part, military and civilian integrated systems.

#### Iraqi War Industry Horizons

According to Iraqi Minister of Industry and Military Industrialization Husayn Kamil Hasan, the industrial strategy in Iraq is based on giving priority to the military industry and the introduction of every innovation in this field. In addition, short-term items on the visible horizon are represented as follows:

- Production of all types of sophisticated guns and their ammunition, including the 210 mm self-propelled gun, as yet unmatched in the world in range and capability, and continued production of cluster bombs of different sizes and uses.
- Production of the 155 mm self-propelled gun with a barrel three times as durable as its Spanish and Austrian counterpart.
- Iraq has not received any assistance in rocket production and efforts are still under way to produce rockets of over a 900-km range.
- Iraq is planning to set up an integrated program for the manufacture of fighter airplanes. Iraqi experts are in the process of choosing a French or Soviet capability to assist in this field.
- In the field of naval industry, Iraq is producing several kinds of important weapons such as mines, rockets, boats and sea launchers. Efforts are being directed toward setting up an Iraqi shipyard to manufacture boats and large ships.
- Continuation of the plan for the production and future development of the Asad Babil tank which is a copy of the Soviet-made T-72 M1.
- Production of the 23 mm double-barrel gun and work toward the production of 30 mm seven-barrel guns and a 57 mm anti-aircraft gun.
- Iraq has no intention of producing nuclear weapons.
- Iraq supports any steps toward integration in the arms production field if such integration does not impede or hamper individual roles. Discussion is under way to produce a joint Egyptian-Iraqi tank.
- Iraq welcomes any Arab country desiring to purchase its military products in the interest of bolstering Arab solidarity and integration. In this respect, it places conditions congruent with its national tendencies.

## ISRAEL

### Escalating Tensions Create Jewish-Arab 'State of War'

44230110 Tel Aviv HADASHOT Weekend Supplement in Hebrew 19 May 89 pp 8,9

[Article by Tzvi Gilat]

[Text] Finally our Israel is beginning to think and is falling back on her own resources. The nation has been called to arms. The entire vehicle fleet of the General Histadrut is already under orders to pick up soldiers at the hitchhiking stops that will be combed by the civil guard. It is, perhaps, a strange situation in which citizens are drafted to look after the welfare of their soldiers. In Ashdod they are seriously intending to move to Jewish labor. "We managed to muster 25 Ethiopians," the director of the city's employment services, Yosy Cohen, said this week unashamedly. "They will work for almost the same wages as the Arabs, but with additional hours it went up to 1,500 shekels." We will also use technology, as it were, in this war of independence. Modern trash cleaning machines will soon replace the lines of bent-backed Gazans, and at the Technion they are now

working on the development of new technology to tile apartment floors without the touch of human hands. There is a national effort in this area. "We will appeal to the Treasury Minister to increase the wages of manual laborers," promised the mayor of Ashdod, Tzvy Tzilqer, and called on the inhabitants not to litter and to keep public areas clean. Today even the tossing of a banana peel on the sidewalk might be seen as having "nationalistic implications." It may really be that we shall shortly achieve independence.

It may be that what is called "the government of Israel's peace program" is an optical illusion and an attempt to gain time in the hope that the Palestinians will reject it out of hand. But, except for the possible international effect of showing us in a new light to the world, it also has strong moral effect inward. This step would have been required even if Dennis Ross had not breathed down the Prime Minister's back (had he not come here Sunday in a display of impatience, it is doubtful that the program would have been discussed at all); this step was also required because in the last several weeks there has been an increasing feeling of fear and alarm among the Israeli populace, a feeling that the whole matter is about to break apart. There is war on the border, in the cities, in the villages, and in this war Israel is losing and her leadership is losing control. This feeling of loss of control is widespread, by the way, among the Palestinians, as well.

Y. [as published], an institutional psychologist who lives in the central part of the country and is the daughter of holocaust survivors, has been active the past year in setting up meetings between Jewish and Arab women in the territories because of a feeling that "I at least have to do something." Recently she has been trying to organize a bazaar to sell products made by women in the territories: pickled vegetables, wickerwork. Her friends agonize over whether the bazaar represents support for the intifadah [uprising]. "When I was a girl," she says, "and after I heard my family's stories (we talked openly, which may have saved me a lot of complexes), I had an obsessive dream that kept coming back. I am in school, but in my class there is a choking feeling. Around the school are Nazi watch towers and I know that we have to flee, but there is no way out so I just sit in class and wait for the worst."

This year after Holocaust Day, that same dream which I had been free from for years started coming back with slight variations. "I am in the house and I know that the Arabs are coming to take the children. They have to come to us, too, so I take my son and hide him by somehow managing to squeeze him into a table drawer. A few minutes later an Arab appears, a good friend of mine, with a row of children behind him. He makes a search of the house and I am afraid, but he doesn't find anything. Before I can breathe free, he suddenly returns and opens the table drawer with a smile." This dream, which has been recurring over the last several weeks,

moves her. Although she absolutely abhors whenever comparisons are made between the Jews and Nazis, she feels the dream is a kind of projection. It isn't the Arab, it's us.

Apropos children, on the eve of Independence Day all the private boarding schools in Israel were closed down. The Treasury Ministry would not agree to renew the tariffs, as the law requires it to do, for the children's maintenance. Four thousand children were sent out into the streets. This time that was no exaggeration; it was literally into the street. In a demonstration held by the children and their parents on Monday across from the government offices, Dr. Yitzhaq Qadman met one of those children. The boy had entered the school 4 years ago, when he was 7 and ½ years old. His father had died and his mother was incapable of raising him. Two days after he entered the school, he fled to Tel Aviv. He didn't know where Tel Aviv was, but "good people" helped him. Gradually, despite repeated attempts at running away, he learned to build ties to his environment. On Monday he arrived for the demonstration in Jerusalem, from where, he told Qadman, he was traveling to Tel Aviv. To whom in Tel Aviv? To Tel Aviv. He simply doesn't have a home to return to.

At the moment there are about 4,000 kids in the street. The number of boarding school students in Israel is 10,000. The rest are in boarding schools under various public bodies, but those, too, will be closed if there isn't some kind of change. The WIZO [Women's International Zionist Organization] boarding school "Ahuzat Yeladim," a Haifa boarding school with a 50-year history, will be closed at the end of the school year. This is an absolutely cynical process. The government appointed a committee headed by Dr Aharon Langerman, the former general director of the Welfare Ministry, a gentle man who produced some gentle conclusions after a year and a half of fundamental work. At the Treasury Ministry today people ask, "Who is this Langerman fellow?" The Deputy Minister of Labor and Welfare, Rabbi Ze'ev Feldman, is more successful at mustering funds for religious institutions than the 10 million shekels needed per year for the boarding schools, a sum that is half the retroactive update given to the parties to cover their expenses in the municipal elections. With 4,000 children in the street, this year was proclaimed, at the President's House, "the year of children's rights."

Regarding children, at the end of last week Awad Jarias, 14, from Kafr Makr, was murdered in the market at Acre. A resident of Ashdod appeared in the market and said that he "wanted to avenge the blood of the soldier Avy Sasportas." Awad Jarias happened to be in the way of his knife. The man who stabbed him was pronounced mentally unstable and sent off for observation. "When they kill an Arab, they always say the man is crazy," complained the father, Khalil Awad Jarias, in his home in the village. He is 56 years old, a shoemaker who makes his living in Karmi'el since his family moved of the old

city of Acre a few years ago. He has 10 children, and Awad, may Allah have mercy upon him, has a twin sister, Jacqueline, who, at the time that all this happened, was in the house and suddenly felt a stabbing pain in her heart. That's the way twins are, the father says. If you are a twin and your twin brother is a soldier who is wounded far away, you feel it. An hour later they got the news. "The blood of an Arab is like the blood of a dog," says the father. "Just imagine what would have happened if they were to murder a Jewish boy, God forbid. Wouldn't they immediately close down all of Acre? Wouldn't they start beating? Wouldn't they impose a curfew? If the murderer were an Arab, wouldn't they shoot him straight off?"

If only my son, who was an innocent bystander, were the last victim of this dispute! "There is no hatred between us and the Jews. I have a friend in Acre, a Moroccan, still from the time that I lived in the old city, and he is like a brother to me. We even call each other, 'brother'." This friend didn't come to comfort him in the village, he only contacted him to let him know that he was afraid to come. Nor did anyone come from the factory where he works in Karmi'el. Nor did the mayor of Acre come, nor anyone else from the government. "Even if the murderer were to come into my house, I wouldn't do anything to him," the father says. "At most, I would tell him that I don't forgive him and to get out."

When a crazed Muslim stabs two old lawyers in the heart of Jerusalem, they hold a royal funeral for them, as they should, and look for those in the terrorist organizations who sent the psychopath. When an Arab child is murdered in Acre, no one for the time being—even though the murderer himself talks about a nationalist motive—even considers the possibility that the family is a victim of hostile acts.

In the morning while the mayor of Acre, Ely de Castro, was sitting in his office, someone from the water department came in to say that the electricity had been cut in one of the neighborhoods. De Castro asked him to find out if it was an act of sabotage. A year ago, he assures me, that possibility wouldn't have crossed his mind. "It isn't people from Acre," the mayor says, "in Acre there are very good relations between the segments of the population, a third of which is Arabs and two-thirds, Jews. It's people from outside who dirty the air." He is now going to ask the government to give the same incentives to Acre that it gives to Nahariya, which is known as a "confrontation settlement." Those incentives, he explains, are causing a negative migration from Acre to Nahariya, and precisely from the more well-to-do layer of society. Those who are screwed stay where they are. If additional budgets will attract affluent Jews to live in Acre, he is convinced that will increase moderation in the city.

"The joint Jewish-Arab housing units have failed," says the head of the opposition, Asher Iluz. Members of Likud and the mayor agree with him. "It simply won't

work because of the mentality. On Yom Kippur, for example, we fast, and they want to have a cookout in the yard. It's not their fault. It's their mentality." In his opinion the solution is to set up a broad-based Jewish coalition. That would give the Jews in the city a feeling of security, of unity. Why shouldn't there be Arabs in the coalition, I ask him, in order to stress the coexistence thing? Sure, there should, he says to appease me. I am not against it, but they shouldn't have a deputy mayor on the payroll. For your information, the explosion will come from the Jews. People are talking—I hear them in the streets. I know what I'm talking about. Those people have to feel that Acre is Jewish.

That day a crowd of family members of those arrested in Nazareth for rioting on Saturday after their team's game in Nahariya had gathered outside the police station. Even a soccer game, on the way up to the national league, turned into a nationalist confrontation. Also Bruria Rotman, 57, the director of the boarding house who was murdered in Nahariya on March 14, was murdered for nationalist reasons. The confrontation has even reached Nahariya, which is recognized as a "settlement on the confrontation line." An internal confrontation, with the knife, not with Katushas.

The whole business is falling apart: a thirty-percent rise in drug-related crimes as compared to the same period last year; a 130-percent rise in murders within the green line; forty-four murdered since the beginning of the year as compared to 19 for the same period last year. "There is no explanation for it," says Commander Yehoshu'a Kaspary, chief of investigations in the police department. It is also therefore impossible to attribute the hard facts directly to the intifada. It is clearly the case that a not insignificant portion of the incidents were committed by people who are insane. A madman by the name of Pinhas Va'qnin fires at prostitutes in Tel Barukh, Muhammad Zakot of Jab'aliya goes crazy on Yehoshu'a bin Nun Street in Tel Aviv and murders Dr Moshe Shlinger, a lunatic murders Awad Jarias in the Acre market. Another lunatic murders Oren Brahmy in Jaffa. But in the current situation all point in one direction—the murder of Brahmy, the murder of Sasportas, the murder of the cab driver Shimo'n Adary, the death of Jerasy from Alfe Menashe. The murder cases of Adary, Brahmy and Sasportas have not yet been solved, the death of Jerasy was explained as a fuel leak into the passenger compartment of his van, but this has entered the national consciousness. The feeling of siege is growing.

Finally, one of the Gush Emunim activists told me today, we are beginning to understand that this is war—a real war. He lives in O'rpa, the settlement from which have come several activists from the Jewish terror organization as well as several of the moderates in the Gush. Last week, he says, he sat guard duty. Between 10 and 11 at night no less than 10 families arrived at the village who had been hurt on the way by stones. Not only that, but some of the car windows had been completely shattered.

At the start of the intifada, he says, we simply ignored it. Maybe it was part of the suffering of the exile, the people around us said, and we, the more ideological among the people, had to pay the price. But by doing that, we fell asleep. Take me, for example. Two months ago I was doing my reserve service near Tul Karem. An Israeli driver came in and said that 20 meters away they threw stones at him. I smiled at him because "nothing can be done." Do you understand, not even a small feeling of failure on my part. Not even the feeling of shame I had when I really messed up on navigation in basic training. But it was failure. Security failure. The army is failing. Suddenly we figure out what's what and say: wait a minute, wait a minute, what's this all about. This is war; in wartime you do the things that war calls for. On the eve of Independence Day a group left the settlement for A'yin Yavrud with a microphone. We came to the center of the village, and near the mosque we called out to the residents and warned them that we wouldn't keep still any longer, that we'd had it. You should have seen the rain of stones that came flying at us. The problem, he says, is that you don't understand it. When the intifada has been raging for a month in Tel Aviv, then you'll understand. But they don't give us any credence.

The settlers blame the army for the breakdown in their security, and the finger of blame pointing to the senior IDF [Israel Defense Forces] staff is having its effect (for example: the rebuke by the Prime Minister of the corps of the General Staff on the eve of Independence Day, without mentioning that they had no backing from the politicians). If it has not yet had its effect, it will have. There will be someone to fan the flames, someone to demand the heads of Matzne'a and Shomron. In Kibbutz Ashdot Ya'akov they decided a week ago, by vote, not to install mezuzahs in the dining room. The paper SIXTH DAY made sure to point out that Dan Shomron's brother is now the secretary.

Confidence in the IDF is breaking down; confidence in the regime is breaking down. "What is this," one of the Ashdodians shouted at me as he was demonstrating on the eve of Memorial Day at the crossroads of the highway to Ashqelon, "can't we express our opinion?" The Ashdodians expressed their opinion this week when they demanded of the owner of a poultry shop that he hand over to them the Arab employee who had worked for him for 16 years. Give him to us and we'll know who he is.

"Go away, go away," shouted a farmer from Sde 'Uzia being pursued by the police, "go away, go away, reporters, leftists, maniacs." Aren't we all Jews, they asked him there? "Yes," he said, "but there are Jews who love Arabs and Jews who hate Arabs. That is the division, and here we hate them."

They hate more and more, both here and there. They hate to the point of explosion.

"Sometimes I would like to be a bomb myself and explode in the heart of Jerusalem," a friend of mine from the eastern part of the city told me this week, a man who supports coexistence and works for it. "We feel despair. What else has to happen. True, there is already indirect negotiation between Israel and the PLO, there is already direct negotiation between the PLO and the United States, but the Palestinian leadership has the feeling that they have already put all their cards on the table—recognition of Israel, a declaration of an end to terror, 'c'est caduc' [it's obsolete], to the Palestinian charter—and where is the change? Instead we get a program that Israel wouldn't agree to 10 years ago: autonomy, self-rule, elections where no one is ready to say who can choose and who can be chosen, a program kept a closely guarded secret, even from government ministers. Your side, according to one person I talked to, prefers to deal with Hamas's people. They don't want to talk to the moderates, they want to go on fighting. To the end.

The end is still a long way off. The intifada has, indeed, weakened, says an activist in the popular committees in the north of the West Bank. People don't have strength, they don't have money, and they are all exhausted, but your army confronting us makes sure that it keeps on going. Wherever the army will be, that's where the intifada will be. It has already been almost half a year since it was called in. The meeting with him took place in one of the houses in the village, not his house, and on the way there the man who accompanied us was forced to call out greetings to every group of children, a kind of border guard. In the house we waited for him a long time. In the heart of the village Palestinian flags wave from all four corners of the square, like in a parade. On the walls of the local post office are full-color pictures of Abu-Jihad and Arafat. The local committees act according to the placards of the united leadership, but the locals are given a lot of room for interpretation, he explains. The order of precedence has to work out: killing collaborators, banning Israeli merchandise, refusal to pay taxes.

In his area, the problem of collaborators is more or less solved. As early as the first days of the intifada, many who were known to be collaborators were chased out. Some of them now spend the night in tents outside the nearby military base. There have already been incidents where these collaborators came to the village and exacted vengeance on the people in the fields and in their cars. You have to watch out for them. You have to watch out for any suspect vehicle, even if it bears West Bank plates. In his village, as in others, no vehicle may move after 1900. The conversation with him was suddenly cut short when a messenger arrives to announce that "the army is in the village." Someone comes and takes him somewhere. On the way out, it turns out that within minutes they had already set up roadblocks in the center of the village. No army. The children report some unknown vehicle with blue tags.

For the first time in years the residents of Gaza are told to return to their homes to honor the general curfew imposed there this week. The Israeli Left will apparently

be able to be pleased for they are setting up the Green Line for Tehiya. Now they are determining where the border line is, only it isn't clear exactly where it passes. The head of the Migdal Ha'emeq town council warns the residents of Nazareth the way General Yitzhaq Mordekay warns the residents of the Strip. The mayor of Petah Tiqva, Giora Lev, calls for tightening up on the Arab workers in the city and for setting up concentration points outside its precincts. You shouldn't make fun of those declarations. The mayors, more than the directors of government societies or our flying ministers, live among their people and know how they feel. The fact that today there are more mayors from Likud is certainly significant. Things move to the local level. What was condemned 2 years ago when Arab labor was done away with in Qiryat Arba' following a coalitional agreement with "KAKH" [Meir Kahane Party] is today a fact in many places. Racism, which is always based on fear, is today based on a much broader belt of fear.

The process going on today between Israel and the Palestinians is somewhat reminiscent of what happened more than a decade ago between Israel and Egypt—violent confrontations, sudden initiatives, and afterwards complex and compound negotiations that lasted for years. Only right now it is hard to tell where we are in the process: on the way to interim agreements or at the height of the Yom Kippur War.

#### Statistics Show Drop in Trade Deficit

TA1007145289 Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST  
in English 10 Jul 89 p 7

[Report by economics correspondent Avi Temkin]

[Excerpts] A marked increase in exports of metal and electronic goods during June, accompanied by a stable level of imports, combined to bring a large drop in the country's trade deficit.

Figures released yesterday by the Central Bureau of Statistics showed that the seasonally adjusted average trade deficit for May and June was 30 percent lower than in the previous two months. In June the deficit totalled \$219 million, bringing the cumulative figure for the first six months of the year to \$1.3 billion, a drop of 6.8 percent from the deficit for the same period in 1988.

The bureau said exports were 19 percent higher in May and June compared with the previous two months while imports were ahead by only 2 percent. [passage omitted]

The figures released yesterday showed that exports last month totalled \$846.3 million. In the first half of the year the exports of goods totalled \$5 billion, 3.4 percent more than at the same period last year. [passage omitted]

## Settler Violence Examined

### 'Provocation' Discussed

44230122 Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT Weekend  
Supplement in Hebrew 2 Jun 89 pp 20,21

[Article by Ron Ben-Ishai: "Zealots Want Explosion"]

[Text] "Had this been one of our organized actions, it would have looked different," Benny Katzover said about the latest outbreaks by Jewish settlers against Arabs and against the army. The view from his office window in Alon Moreh is of bald mountains streaked with green here and there. The air smells faintly of smoke; a small brush fire. The wind will spread it during the day and the fire will consume some of the pine forest near the settlement. Men will go out with fire extinguishers and shovels to put it out, wondering whether it was arson or bad luck.

But for the time being, during the morning hours of this Wednesday, the atmosphere is calm at the offices of the Samaria Regional Council: "Had the 'Amana movement been in action against the Arabs, the scope of the operation would have been much wider and the damage much greater," says Council Chairman Katzover with a knowing smile.

That does not mean that Katzover and his colleagues are satisfied with the situation. On the contrary. "We were not born here, nor did we immigrate to be pelted with stones by Arabs, like dogs. The army officers would know what to do, but their hands are tied. Shamir himself told us he is not prepared to intensify the expulsions or arrest the heads of the intifadah [uprising], and that gives rise to tough debates among ourselves as to how to proceed," Katzover continued. However, 'Amana members realize that public complaints about shaky security would only encourage the intifadah leadership.

The memory of the media outcry caused 1 year ago in Israel and overseas by Daniella Weiss and her friends' rioting in Qalqilyah is still fresh. Gush Emunim members know that all such disorderly behavior undermines their political objectives. Every clash with the army erodes popular support in Israel. Every outbreak against Arabs contradicts their claim toward international public opinion that there can be peaceful coexistence between Israelis and Arabs in the territories. That is why "genuine" settlers are showing restraint.

Katzover, the leader who, against his will, holds back his comrades, will direct you to the right address: "Most of the outbreaks are spontaneous; they are carried out by city settlers, and they occur when someone is hit by a stone or a fire bomb. It is the same thing in Ma'ale 'Adumim or Ari'el as in Ashdod or Ashqelon. People coming from a large and strong municipal Jewish background are not willing to accept Arabs bothering them

right next to their houses. They feel humiliated and threatened and they blow up in rage, against the IDF [Israel Defense Forces], too."

The regional army commander, Amram Mitzna', agrees with Katzover's view. He confirms that settlers who came there out of ideology usually maintain restraint. The city settlers, those who came to find cheap housing and life quality "5 minutes from Kfar Saba," are the initiators of most of the incidents involving Arabs and army in the territories.

"However," the general qualified his statement, "in comparison with the impulsive reactions of Israeli citizens to Sasportas' murder and Sa'adon's disappearance, people's behavior here has been much more responsible and restrained. The media tends to exaggerate and to blow up incidents. Since the beginning of the intifadah there have not been more than eight incidents between Jewish settlers and the army. Nevertheless, it is better to turn on warning signals before things get out of hand."

What prompts city settlers to take to the roads in the West Bank is mainly the need to find an outlet for their rage and frustration. Those people whom the government enticed to Samaria with the promise of inexpensive housing, in many cases belong to the same social category as the rioters at the Ashdod-Ashqelon crossroad. They are not interested in political and ideological objectives, and that is why they are not deterred by the damage their outbreaks cause to Israel's position in the world and to that of Israeli settlers among the Israeli public. Most of them have a profound feeling of having been cheated. The government did not keep its end of the bargain and is not providing the security it promised. Why? Because the defense forces are too soft on the Arabs. Therefore, they feel entitled to seek justice for themselves. The declarations of support and the understanding shown by various public figures only strengthen that feeling.

The head of the Ari'el Council, Ron Nahman, believes that the outbreaks are a means of releasing psychological pressure and feelings generated by the "siege mentality." "Once, we used to go in the evening to the movies in Petah Tiqwa or shopping in Tel Aviv whenever we felt like it. Today we think twice and three times before each trip. People who used to visit us don't come anymore. That is also the reason that less people join the settlements and that house sales have dropped dramatically. All that gives us a feeling of being choked. We can't accept not being able to drive freely on the roads in Samaria." According to Ron, the siege mentality is exacerbated by the rejecting attitude of some Israelis against the settler movement in Samaria.

Ari'el's Council head is aware of the damage caused by outbreaks, but he hints that at times he has no choice. When he does not manage to preempt them, he provides

support and even joins incursions into Arab villages in order to maintain his leadership and not lose control of Ari'el's people. A similar hint was also heard from Katzover.

But the most disturbing problem to the army are the planned incidents and provocations staged by a relatively small, but united and determined group. These are Jewish religious-nationalist fanatics belonging to KAKH [Kahane's party] and other organizations based in Qiryat Arba' in Hebron, whose prominent leader is Rabbi Levinger. Members of the Qever Yosef Yeshiva of Nablus, who this week rioted in Kufal Harith, apparently joined that group without belonging to it organizationally.

"Those people feel superior to the Arabs, something that promotes a deep feeling of hatred and contempt," said an expert who is very familiar with those people and their motives. "They simply cannot digest the fact that Arabs will throw stones and Jews will have to defend themselves. They feel a need to act at any cost to recover lost Jewish honor. Or, as they call it, to restore Jewish deterrent capability."

The actions of this group follow a clear strategy. Its members want to achieve one of two possible lines of action: either the Arabs will be defeated and the intifadah will end unconditionally, or the army will take extreme measures against the Arabs. Such action would bring about what they call an "explosion." In other words, a general violent flare-up, using fire arms even, at the end of which the Arabs will become refugees; they will take their possessions and leave the West Bank for Jordan or Lebanon. This group uses its own language and terminology which turn illegal actions into basically "pure" ones. Thus, for example, much like the Orwellian model, firing upon Arab villagers barricaded in their homes becomes in their parlance, "routing" those villagers.

What all the West Bank settlers and their leaders share in common is their criticism of politicians and of the IDF. "We do not trust the defense minister," Benny Katzover said. "He keeps saying that there is no security justification for our existence, and he wants us to go away from here. That is why we act against him. He claims that we are not viable, like the northern settlements, but he does not say that the northern settlements are not necessary."

Ron Nahman, too, is pained by this comparison to northern settlements. He claims that the inhabitants of the West Bank would have displayed the same resistance and restraint as the northern settlements, had they enjoyed the same attitude from the Israeli population as the inhabitants of the northern border area. "I asked Rabin to come and meet with the people of Ari'el the way he meets with people on the northern border, but he sent us Mitzna, said the council chairman, a Likud member, hurt and furious.

As of 1 year ago, settler leaders presented a general plan for fighting the intifadah to the defense minister and Shamir. The plan, which contained 30 paragraphs, called for the expulsion of some 600 intifadah inciters and activists, as well as Arabs released in the wake of the "Jibril deal." "We must hit the generals of the intifadah, not arrest privates and sergeants," Katzover said.

Settler leaders requested that all Palestinian institutions and associations in East Jerusalem be closed down, that the houses of stone throwers be destroyed en masse, and that the opening fire regulations governing IDF soldiers be changed. "Throwing stones is like firing a gun and the response should be shooting, without hesitation and in earnest," Katzover added.

The plan was turned down. According to them, it did not even win a serious reaction. The prime minister did meet with them, but nothing came of the meeting. Settler leaders claimed that Mitzna' and Dan Shomron torpedoed the plan and that Rabin did not try to stop them. The chief of staff and the commander of the Central Command are permanent targets for the settlers' arrows, who view them as political opponents. For the time being they do not have the courage to say that in so many words, but in the future it may well burst out.

After their plan was rejected, settler leaders decided to wait until after the general elections of November 1988. However, the hope that a Likud victory will bring about the implementation of its leaders' promises was dashed when a coalition government was formed. Ron Nahman: "The defense minister is the same and the chief of staff is the same. The necessary changes were not made by the army command. There is a feeling that the left is interested in the continuation of the intifadah in order to promote their preferred political solution."

Settler leaders decided to stage a sitting strike. In January-February they sat in a tent across from the prime minister's office in Jerusalem, but that did not help either. That is probably when the leadership decided to try rioting. The reins were slackened about 2 months ago. When the IDF drastically cut back its troops and almost completely ceased undertaking any action, Palestinian violence on the roads escalated, and the regulating public apparently came to the boiling point. The prime minister's political plan caused ferment among marginal extremist groups, and that was an additional contribution to mounting Jewish violence.

Unpleasant as it was for some people to admit it, it seems that Jewish violence did bring about change in IDF standard operations. About 1 month ago, the troops in the territories were beefed up and initiating actions were resumed. The outcome of these planned actions, initiated by General Mitzna' and carried out under his supervision, is already visible in the field.

In the past few weeks, several draft bills designed to facilitate the expulsion of inciters and blowing up houses, have been under consideration by the cabinet, as well as subsidies to protect the windows of settlers' cars and to pave detour roads around centers of unrest.

The settlers also noticed a new tone in statements by the defense minister and the commander of the Central Command, who now talk about the settlers' right to self-defense, without, however, including fire bombs or fire arms in that right. In other words, a person who has stones thrown at him has the right to defend himself. That, at least, is the settlers' interpretation. This fact may create a new and dangerous situation, and the leaders of the defense complex should thoroughly clarify their intent.

Alon Moreh people are not excited by all this. They are skeptical about what was done so far and continue to build up and reinforce existing settlements. "We are keeping ourselves and our ammunition for the day when we will have to go out and fight against some dangerous autonomy plan or against catastrophic elections," said a veteran settler. "We will not use fire arms under any circumstance," said Katzover. "No situation or struggle can justify the use of arms. Certainly not against Jews. However, it is possible that if some people are pushed with their back to the wall, they may use guns."

The telephone rang. Benny Katzover slammed closed the skeleton plan file and lifted the receiver. "Right. The Finance Commission yesterday approved the 30 million, thank God. People from the Housing Ministry already want to come inspect the area. I want to take them to Har Brakha, Qdumim, and Avney Hefetz, for them to see what can be done with the money." The head of the Samaria Regional Council agreed with the details of the inspection tour and hastened to end the conversation.

Another call was on hold. Katzover listened and his face turned serious. He covered the mouthpiece with his hand: "They tell me from the center that a delegation of MAPAM [United Labor Party] and Peace Now is on its way to Ari'el. They want to protest the identification tags that Ron Nahman (Ari'el Council head) issued to Arabs. What cheek on their part. There's going to be fighting, I tell you, there's going to be fighting."

Katzover's somber prediction did not materialize. There was no fighting on Wednesday in Ari'el. At the time, the Council head was in Jerusalem, and the MAPAM delegation handed their protest to his secretary. It was explained to them that the tags were necessary to identify Arab workers who had passed a security check and were allowed to be and work in Ari'el.

The MAPAM delegation listened and left quietly. The people of Ari'el, too, showed restraint that time, and contented themselves with a deluge of telephone messages of support and identification to Ron Nahman's office. It seems that the incident that took place the

previous day in the neighboring Kifl Harith village had a moderating effect on the settlement hot heads. The killing of a 14 year old girl during a retaliatory action by Jewish religious zealots seemed to have made it clear to the settlers how far the situation may deteriorate.

### Settlers Interviewed

44230122 Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT Weekend  
Supplement in Hebrew 2 Jun 89 pp 21,22,26

[Ari'ella Ringel-Hoffman article: "Touring and Shooting"]

[Text] The MAMATZ [United Zionist Camp] staff has just moved into its new headquarters, which consists of four rooms on the first floor of an apartment house in Jerusalem, in the middle of the Qiryat Moshe district. The apartment is not yet lived in or furnished. Only the room of Ya'aqov Nowick, who heads the staff, has a desk, a telephone, and outlets for five more telephones.

The idea of a MAMATZ staff was cooked up in the past 2 months by general consensus in the wake of what they refer to as American recognition of the PLO and some feeling of approaching doom following fresh political initiatives across the Atlantic. The Shamir-Rabin plan also contributed to its establishment.

By definition, the staff belongs to the West Bank-Gaza Council. Its purpose is to organize and run public struggle for the integrity of Greater Israel in an orderly, continuous and on-going fashion. That is to say, daily struggle. Trips to the West Bank, Hebron and Mate Binyamin constitute a primary, on the spot expression of that. So far, the trips are the only expression of such daily action. This is what the idea is all about, according to Nowick: The door we knock on is not our door. We go into our neighbor's house only after knocking on the door, but into our own house we go right in. The trips are an indication of ownership of the area. They are the answer to attempts to scare off the settlers, to restrict them to ghettos, and to delimitate areas from which it is dangerous to go forth. We want to eliminate the tendency to drive on safe roads only, i.e., roads made safe by the IDF. If Judea and Samaria is their home, then they will take trips to Bitah and Kifl-Harith, 'Eyn Rogel, Tel Orma, Tel Balatah, to the Kfar Yisif Springs, Sebastyah, and everywhere else.

Nowick speaks in military terms. In military terms, Nowick is a KAMBATZ [Military Operations Commander], as well as a personnel commander. He receives lists of people who go on trips, and his office processes travel routes and performs the necessary coordination work.

Still in military terms, it is very possible that the correct expression for those trips is violent excursions.

The model for the tours are Orde Wingate's night companies. We do not know whether this application of his model is causing Wingate to turn in his grave, but we must not forget that today we have a Jewish government, a Hebrew army, and an orderly assignment of functions, something that did not exist in Wingate's time.

The trip taken by members of the Qever Yosef Yeshiva to Kifl-Harith was organized along the lines of the above idea. Yeshiva students, together with settlers from the area, planned to go to Bitah. The army asked them not to go there, and the route was changed.

They set out for the tomb of Yehoshu'a Bin-Nun, but on the way, miracle of miracles, they stumbled upon Kifl-Harith. The trip ended in one or two bonfires on the edge of the village, one or two dead donkeys, broken windows, leaking water boilers, and a dead 14 year old girl. Nowick said that was part and parcel of the Zionist action, that people did what they had to do to come away alive. Coming away alive means taking control into one's own hands. They did not go around the village but through it; they did not run away when the situation heated up; they did not run for cover, and did not wait for help from the IDF. What they did in the village was a small-scale replica of what people do in Judaea and Samaria, and that is, assault.

Ya'akov Nowick, 38, was born in Kefar Haro'e. He went to school at the Nehalim Yeshiva in Kefar Haro'e, a rabbinic center. In the army he served in the Engineers Corps, stage B, which is a shortened service for Yeshiva students. He began his long years of activity within Gush Emunim at Sebastya, 15 years ago. He was also active in the Committee for Underground Detainees. He lives in Jerusalem, is married, and has seven children.

Nowick's manpower reserves feature some 5,000 registered members from some 130 settlements. That is the foundation. When the scope of actions will be expanded, Nowick will tap other manpower sources, too. He will appeal to synagogues, educational institutions close to Gush Emunim, and B'nei Akiva youth.

Each one of the above 5,000 are expected to donate 1 day every 2 months for the trips. So far, on an average, between 10-15 people go on trips during the week. Several dozens go on Fridays, sometimes even 50 people. Adults only, no children, most of them armed. They start in the morning, usually around 9 o'clock, from an agreed upon gathering point—Tapuah crossroad or the gate of one of the settlements—and wind up their trip in the early afternoon.

Most of the outings are on foot. They are guided by instructors from the Shvi Shomron field school. Under the heading "nature and scenery trips," the routes cover scenic spots such as the Kafr Yisif Springs, Ayn Farah, or the Umm Safah forest, or historic sites, mostly ancient Jewish remnants, such as Bin-Nun's tomb, Biblical Anatot, and the synagogue in Susiyah.

Although there is no obligation to coordinate trips with the army, since they are touring the area where they live, and since it does not involve youth, from the beginning of the implementation of this project the policy was to involve the IDF. The staff coordinated the trips with the army, and the army was thus brought in through the back door and not entirely of its own will.

Why do they need the IDF in on this? Nowick: "Because wherever there are Jews there must be troops to ensure their safety. Wherever there are no troops, pockets of Palestinian statehood develop de facto, and people who, like me, live in the area, know that if the intifadah will rule the villages it will also spread to municipal centers and take over the roads."

Thus, they began by informing the army, then coordinating with the army, and ended with military escorts on outings to sensitive spots.

Last Wednesday, the IDF did not authorize a trip which was planned to go as far as the Kafr Yisif Springs. The previous day the army prohibited the daily tours to Hebron. The Hebron trips are reported through Nowick's staff, but are not organized by him. They are organized by Bela Gonen of Qiryat 'Arb'a, a municipal council member.

The Hebron trips began more or less in parallel to the MAMATZ staff tours. Having then was decided at a stormy meeting held by Qiryat 'Arb'a residents under the slogan, come out of your holes. The idea was to once again make their presence felt in the town. Gonen, who undertook to organize the outings, drafted a list of approximately 150 people out of the approximately 5,000 town residents. There, too, children and youth were not included.

Tours went out to Hebron twice a day, at 1000 in the morning and at 1800 in the afternoon. Quiet tours took 1 hour and 1/2, noisy ones up to 3 hours.

On Tuesday we were waiting for Gonen at the entrance to Bet Hadassa in Hebron. This was after the Kifl-Harith incident, and the army had done everything possible to preempt similar local incidents. Colonel B., one of the commanding officers in Hebron, explained to Gonen, through Deputy Council Chairman Tzvi Katzover, that he was not allowing the tours to take place. Gonen decided to cancel, although she unequivocally added that they were under no obligation to obey the army.

So we stood there, several people from Qiryat 'Arb'a who did not know that the tour had been cancelled, a military jeep, and several people from Bet Hadassa. Several stones had been thrown at the troops guarding the Jewish enclave inside Hebron, but the soldiers did not manage to find out from what direction.

The Hebron souq was crowded and a long line of cars was crossing it slowly. It was the first nice day after 3 days of hot wind blowing from the desert; the temperature was lower than the average for the season, and merchants were covering cases of tomatoes and carrots with moist bags.

Bela Gonen, who has been living in Qiryat 'Arb'a for 18 years, said that the tours are nothing new; they were simply continuing to do what they had been doing before the intifadah: taking walking tours through Hebron. All of a sudden they discovered that the intifadah had put them under siege, that people stopped coming to Hebron, and so the time came to do something about it.

[YEDI'OT AHARONOT] Where are we going?

[Gonen] "We're going to tour the city. The Qasbah, for example, is very, very interesting. There are many empty houses there. Have you heard about the Kabbalists' Court which is there?"

[YEDI'OT] Are they all armed?

[Gonen] "Almost all. I am not. I walk with a walkie-talkie and report on what I see."

[YEDI'OT] What happens on these tours?

[Gonen] "At the beginning, everything went smoothly. The people of Hebron could not grasp that we had such hutzpa. When they realized what was going on, they began to lay in wait for us. They have their own methods: they stand behind walls and throw stones at us quietly. And then the pursuit begins."

[YEDI'OT] How does it end?

[Gonen] "It ends with us causing the troops to get moving. We don't let them be here like UN observers, we force them to get involved."

[YEDI'OT] What if the army were to forbid any further tours from now on?

[Gonen] "We won't obey. What does it mean? We live here, for 18 years we have been going into every alley, and we will continue to do so."

One Saturday a youth group went on a tour. The group was made up of 18-19 year old Yeshiva students, younger boys, and children. They were pelted with stones. The Yeshiva students, who did not quite know how to react, panicked. The incident could have ended very badly, had not the army arrived post haste. Since then, youngsters and children are no longer allowed on outings.

[YEDI'OT] Are you scared when you are on a tour like this?

[Gonen] "No."

[YEDI'OT] Do you hate Arabs?

[Gonen] "No. But I also don't want them next to me. Before the intifadah I had friends, whom I would have been sorry to see them leaving if there was a transfer. Today I no longer feel that way."

[YEDI'OT] Is transfer, in your opinion, the only solution?

[Gonen] "Yes. The two nations cannot live here together. They must leave. There is no alternative. Two months ago they came in droves toward the Qiryat 'Arb'a wall, threw stones at cars, and shouted, "God is Great." Our people responded in kind, threw stones back at them, and did some 'remodeling' on their roofs, solar hot water boilers, and antennas, fixed them up."

[YEDI'OT] Did you participate in the "remodeling?"

[Gonen] "No. I let the ones who were up to it do it. Later, I was summoned to an investigation. They wanted to know who had participated in the affair. I said I did not participate and did not know who had done what."

Gonen is raising eight children: six of her own and two adopted. For many years she worked at the Ethiopian Absorption Center in Qiryat 'Arb'a. She is active in the Association for Step Children, and is a member of the municipal council. She lives in a large, beautiful house in the Giv'at Harsina neighborhood, and she said that not only does one not leave such a house, one would not build it if one thought one had to leave.

On her tours, she said, the participants don't fire in the air, they fire at the stone throwers. The people of Hebron are aware of that and are careful around them.

When are they going to vindicate us, she asked at the end of our talk, after we had coffee and tea, after we admired the beautiful view from her porch, and after we agreed that it did not let out even a hint of the powder keg 1 centimeter under the surface, when will they vindicate us, she repeated, when we are dead?

No'am 'Arnon, Gush Emunim spokesman and head of the Hebron Academy, has been 15 years in the touring and excursions business. The Academy organized and continues to organize touring groups. The intifadah cut into the list of applicants, so a planned campaign is necessary to revive interest.

A Jew can live anywhere, he said, and he can also go on trips everywhere. It is the duty of the government, through the army, to ensure tourists' safety. According to him, anyone who disputes the right to go on tours, of necessity disputes our right to live here and consequently, our native land.

'Arnon talks about the tours as part and parcel of education in the spirit of love for the Land of Israel. That is the foundation of Jewish education. He recommends patience, faith, and sufferance, because time works in our favor in the long run, even though that does not appear to be the case in the medium and short run.

[YEDI'OT] Are you developing the symptoms of a society under siege?

[Arnon] "Not in the least."

But, I said to him, whoever does not agree with you is viewed as an enemy, the Shamir-Rabin plan is considered a part of the "Zionist scheme," the army is not doing its job in your opinion, and you take the law into your own hands. You call these tours, but in fact you mean something else.

A normal people, 'Arnon said, does not give up its native land. The ones who live here suffer more than the ones in Tel Aviv. We are not the ones who are isolated, maybe the media is. The tours began as tours. The attacks on them turned them into demonstrations.

What is the moral of the Kifl-Harith story? Nowick said: "The moral is that on Monday already we will resume our trips." Anything else by way of moral? "That when people have no alternative, they seek to save themselves any way they can." What about the violent nature that these trips have acquired? "So what can we do? Pack up? This is a war of attrition. It was the withdrawal from Lebanon that caused the intifadah. Withdrawal from the West Bank would lead to struggle for the Galilee."

Posters printed by the West Bank-Gaza Council hang behind Nowick and right over his head. One of them says, "ETZ [initials of Ofarim and Tzoref], not Palestine," referring to the establishment of two other settlements, Ofarim and Tzoref. Another poster reads, "Teach the PLO a Lesson," followed by a list of eight planned settlements and the picture of eight beautiful children. A "Jerusalem" poster invites the people of Israel to festivities marking Jerusalem Day.

Similar posters are on display at the Gush Emunim offices in Ramot Eshkol in Jerusalem, especially a large one that reads, "Returning to the Good Land." The actual text says: "Far from the media and politics, close to nature, scenery, and... neighbors. Dip into the springs, gaze on irises, stroll between villages, emanate faith and self-confidence.

Peace on you, face to face. Speak of peace to the neighbors, now. For 'Peace Now' that is only a dangerous slogan, a surrender to schemes to destroy the State of Israel. On MAMATZ tours that is a daily reality designed to strengthen the sovereignty of the people of Israel in their own land."

There is also the picture of No'am 'Arnon, abroad smile on his face, with an old Arab in a kefiyah. Behind them no doubt, even though the camera did not catch them, must be a string of weapons and the vaunted view of olive trees, mountain laurels, and rocky hills.

### Life Among Hebron Settlers

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[Article by Ya'ir Sheleg]

[Text] After several photographs at the entrance to "Hadassah House", the photographer said that it felt like a ghetto. It's hard to deny the obvious facts: the house is surrounded by heavy iron fences, an IDF [Israel Defense Forces] shack in front and in back. (As is the case with the other Jewish homes in Hebron. In all, a company of reservists is assigned to guard "the settlers of Hebron" 12 hours a day for each soldier, in 6-hour shifts.)

The children, and there are many, can play only in installations prepared for them next to the building's ground floor. On the street, where there are another two houses held by Jews (Shne'urson House and Hason House), movement is still somehow easy, thanks to the soldiers' field of vision, but outside of the street—mortal danger.

A visitor from the outside strongly feels a suffocating sensation of siege, but the settlers themselves say that they don't feel that way. Rabbi Moshe Bleicher, the head of the local yeshiva, says that the children also do not refrain from going from house to house, and his son, sitting next to him, nods in agreement. "In general," he adds, "in Hebron I enjoy myself much more than in the other places we've been." (The Bleicher family was also in Moshav 'Atzmona in the Yamit Region and in Qiryat Arba').

The Passover season is one of great significance in the short history of the settlement in Hebron. On Passover Eve, 21 years ago, Rabbi Levinger arrived at the head of a group of comrades and rented the Qavasame family's Park Hotel under an assumed name in order to celebrate in the City of the Patriarchs the first Passover Seder after the 6-Day War. For the next 11 years, Levinger stayed on with a small group of Jews in the city's Military Government building. Only 10 years ago on 29 Nisan 5739, a permit was granted for a few families to take up permanent residence in "Hadassah House", but not before Levinger's wife, Miriam, led a group of women in a sit-in there.

A year later, on the eve of Lag B'omer, the murder occurred at the entrance to "Hadassah House." That was the place where I stood last week, and looked at the place from where the shots were fired. Six youths were killed then, three of them students at the military service yeshiva in Qiryat Arba', which to this day serves as the main manpower reserve for Jewish settlement in

Hebron. That murder, and the ones that followed it—Aharon Gross, Yehoshu'a Salome—only strengthened the Jewish determination to hold on to the place. The Likud governments, which also did not want to appear as surrendering to terror, followed in the settlers' wake and invested in the reclaiming of various Jewish houses. Actually, all of the development and construction in the houses held today by Jews are government investment. In addition to those houses, seven families live in a separate Jewish neighborhood, Tel Romeyda, which is located in a region also known as "Jesse's Lands". There, according to tradition, Jesse, the father of King David, is buried.

A total of about 40 Jewish families and about 120 yeshiva students live today in Hebron. According to Na'am Arnon, a resident of "Hadassah House," there are also many more Jewish houses and plots in the city, on "Jesse's Lands", that await reclaiming, and settlement there does not require any expropriation. The problem, according to Arnon, is that the minister of defense narrowly interprets government decisions that refer to the development of "the Jewish courtyard" in Hebron, and is only willing to approve construction there, and not the reclaiming and development of other areas.

"The Jewish Courtyard", by the way, is the name that was given to the courtyard next to the "Abraham Our Forefather" Synagogue. There, any utterance, for or against, immediately came up against long-range historical baggage, which serves as the settlers' main argument. The names of the other houses—"Shne'urson House", "Hason House", "Romano House"—are also an historical argument. These are the names of Jewish families that lived in the city until the massacre in 1929, and what, the settlers will say to you, is more just than to redeem their homes?

The feeling of stubbornness that accompanies the desire to settle an historical account is, undoubtedly, a central component in the fact that Hebron is one of only three places to which Jews returned after the 6-Day War (the other two are the 'Etzion Bloc and the Jewish Quarter in Jerusalem). These three places are the only ones for which the memory of being cut off from them was fresh, so that even someone who didn't feel in his innermost being the desire to settle in the places where the Prophets walked, could not deny the justice in the "small" historical account.

And now, the intifadah [uprising]. For the settlers of Hebron, who so strongly stress long-term historical relationships, the intifadah is in essence only one more stage in a long process. When I ask about the present difficulties, Na'am Arnon answers me again with an historical argument: "For persons who live in the historical dimension, who feel that what we are doing here is a rather direct continuation of the Patriarchs, the Arabs are grasped as a relatively new factor, to which I don't give much weight." Even the instinctive fears are not spoken of "merely" in terms of personal anxiety, but in terms of

injury to the very basis of Zionism. "If I hear," says Yehi'el Leiter of Tel Romeyda, "that a Jew here was harmed because he is a Jew, more than the injury pains me, I am disturbed by the significance of the thing—that the State of Israel does not serve even the minimal function of a temporary refuge."

By the way, with regard to the intifadah, the settlers assert that it began to be felt in Hebron only about 1 and ½ months ago. Until then, this city stood out precisely as a relatively quiet place. Zambish Friedman, one of the heads of the Company for Developing Hebron, says that precisely "the fact that there are Jews here, and the army, deters and also, in effect, prevents the organization of mass demonstrations." The organization of such demonstrations takes time, and before one begins, the army already appears and disperses it. In his opinion, the peasant mentality of the residents, who are less educated and economically weaker, also explains their lesser involvement in politics and spirit of rebellion. "But the weakness of the IDF in repressing the intifadah in other places has caused it to finally arrive here, as well."

On the other hand, he notes, the composition of the local residents also makes it very easy to draw them in through religious incitement. "The Hamas [Islamic resistance Movement] is the leading movement here, and not the PLO Youth."

Despite the "freshness" of the intifadah in Hebron, it quickly blazed to a high pitch. Stones were thrown at Jewish homes, and in some cases they even injured persons inside. Stones were also thrown at the kindergarten in Romano House, and it was a miracle that children were not injured. In one case, a large iron ingot was thrown into a home. About 2 weeks ago, tens of worshippers, incited by Friday prayers at one of the mosques, went out and threw stones for a whole hour into "the Jewish Courtyard." In that case, I was told, soldiers stood nearby, watching and waiting for instructions.

An outside visitor expects to find among the settlers in Hebron a higher level of tension and anxiety than in other places in Judaea and Samaria, and also a higher level of aggressiveness towards the Arabs. After all, nowhere else in Judaea and Samaria is the level of the intense friction with the Arabs, and their hostility, so high. In the words of the settlers themselves: "In every other settlement, at most the way home is dangerous, but when you arrive home you can relax. Here, even the movement from house to house is dangerous, and now even merely sitting at home has become dangerous."

Nevertheless, there is no sign that the feelings here are sharper than in other places in Judaea and Samaria. Here, too, there is repressed criticism of the army, and sharper criticism of the political level. Here, too, there is indecision over the two proper approaches in response to the situation: should an optimistic, calming approach be taken, that would express a strong stand but might

encourage the continued indifference concerning security, or should the demand be made more nervously for resolute action, and in that way to broadcast insecurity? Na'am Arnon: "Both feelings are present, because there is something correct in each of them. Meanwhile, the army tries to convince us that the curve of violence is about to turn downwards, and that is what delays the outburst."

This mode of response, and the comforting talk about the tension here not being greater than elsewhere in Judaea and Samaria, may be explained by the fact that the intifadah in Hebron began only a short time ago, but that is definitely not the entire explanation. The answer is also the character of the residents: whoever comes to a place like Hebron is generally equipped with not a little idealistic patience.

The Jewish settlement in Hebron, in contrast to the accepted image, is not sociologically identical with Qiryat Arba'. In the Qiryah, there is a large number of secular residents. Many of them, as in the "5 minutes from Kfar Saba" settlements, arrived out of the desire to find cheap and convenient housing solutions. These individuals do not have ideological and psychological reserves that facilitate restraint in difficult periods. Their outbursts are immediate and spontaneous.

In contrast, in Hebron the graduates of B'nai 'Akiva [religious Zionist youth movement] and of the ideological education of Merkaz Harav and Qiryat Arba' are dominant. There is a willingness to suffer difficult periods, and, on the other hand, when there is an aggressive outburst towards the Arabs (such as the affair of "the underground"), it is calculated and premeditated. It is intended to create a deterrent "balance of terror" and not only for the release of pent-up frustration.

However, it is true that the daily friction with the Arab population is a potential field for attracting extremist Jewish elements who are interested in provocations and showing "who's the boss around here." The persons with whom I spoke said that they are aware of this possibility and are not interested in it occurring (the name of Barukh Marzel, a resident of Hebron, was not mentioned specifically, but was definitely the background for the discussion on the subject). They are well aware that unnecessary provocations will only interfere with the continuation of settlement in the city. "Zambish" and Rabbi Bleicher say that various measures have been taken to neutralize the extremist elements, but they are not interested in giving details on those against whom the measures were taken, and the nature of those measures, "in order not to worsen relations in the settlement."

Above all, the central question remains: What is the purpose of all this? What is the benefit of insisting stubbornly on the reclaiming of another Jewish house and on another Jewish room, when it is clear to everyone that Hebron, at least in the present round, will remain an

Arab city (this, by the way, is an expression that my hosts dislike—not "an Arab city," they correct me, rather "a city where the majority of the population is Arab") even if it has 70, 100, or even 200 Jewish families? What makes the persons living here bring upon themselves a perpetual state of fear (and, at least, the potential of fear), a constant need for military protection, in going from house to house, and entirely unpleasant relations with the neighbors?

In this sense, Hebron is indeed a kind of microcosm that represents in intensified form the national debate. A man who served a month in the reserves here last winter told me that in the battalion that served there before his unit, there were instances of soldiers standing guard at night, in freezing cold, and screaming things like: "Crazy settlers! You're sleeping and we're guarding you." According to him, in his company, which is a reserve company of military yeshiva graduates, most of whom are "right of center," there definitely were also second and third thoughts about the point of living in the heart of Hebron.

The persons with whom I spoke generally tried to minimize the importance of these phenomena. According to them, this does not differ from arguments with reservists serving in other settlements in Judaea and Samaria. Na'am Arnon: "We try not to get into arguments with them. It also is not good that soldiers will hold political debates." But Yehi'el Leiter admits that he has heard from reservists, "and not necessarily leftists," criticism in the vein of "why must you insist precisely on this hill in the heart of the city?" According to him, the criticism derives mainly not from political disagreement, but from the viewpoint of daily life—why cause so much fear and anxiety to families and to children?

"Zambish" admits that the situation with the reservists is complicated: "Some of them arrive with attitudes that create problems, and express themselves stridently towards our people. I also know of cases in which reservists coordinated in advance with journalists the publication of hostile reports at the end of their tour of duty." In his opinion, two factors influence the soldiers' behavior: the fact that the scope of activity in Hebron is indeed different from any other settlement, and also what he terms "the commanders' level of motivation." "If the company commander is a leftist, the officers under him catch which way the wind is blowing and then the month is very unpleasant. The orders from above are also filtered, and there are also problems in relations with us: complaints, accusations, clarifications." By the way, a reservist whom we met at the entrance to Hadasah House said that there is a clear tendency not to call up for operational duty in Hebron soldiers regarding whom there are fears of friction with the settlers, "and mainly not those who have already published criticism in the press."

On the other hand, Hebron is also a microcosm representing the real motive of the "settlers." Here, as Yehi'el Leiter also notes, it is impossible to speak of the importance of the settlement for security, and what's left is the

ideological principle: the right of the Jews to settle everywhere in the Land of Israel, and even in the heart of Hebron. The deep historical associations, both short and long-term, that are sunk in Hebron, only sharpen the principle: how can it be that precisely the City of the Patriarchs, whose Arab name (al-Halil) is even linked to the Arab name of Abraham our Forefather, will be devoid of Jews?

In conversations with my hosts here I try to present the dilemma that the Jewish settlement in Hebron presents in terms of justice versus wisdom. There is undoubtedly justice in the demand that Hebron, precisely Hebron, will not be "Judenrein," but the question is whether it is wise to insist upon the realization of the principle, especially when the debate over settlement in Judaea and Samaria is still the subject of sharp national and international controversy, and it is difficult to say that its future is entirely secure. Here and there, I quoted to my hosts things that I had heard several times in other political contexts from Rabbi 'Amital, a sharp opponent of settlement in Hebron. In politics, 'Amital said, as on the road, the saying goes: don't be right, be smart!

The quote from Rabbi 'Amital arouses them. I heard two principled answers concerning the attempt to oppose "justice" to "wisdom." One, for those of scant belief, who are in need of practical calculations, is that there is wisdom precisely in insisting on the maximum, and it is that which also makes possible the partial achievement. Rabbi Bleicher: "It is always better to take one step forward than two steps backward." Na'am Arnon says: "The settlement in Hebron helps to divert the debate from the other settlements. When there is a debate about Hebron, there is no argument about Qiryat Arba', and if we perhaps sit in the Gil'ad, there will not be a debate about Hebron." Rabbi Bleicher: "The concept of 'be wise' judges everything from the practical aspect, and if that had been the feeling from the beginning of Zionism, it would never have moved." Yehi'el Leiter speaks in the same vein: "In the twenties there also was a debate about the wisdom of insisting upon a Jewish state, and today that debate is entirely behind us, so that justice does not contradict wisdom, but rather requires it."

The contrary insistence upon this principle is, in the final analysis, the force that motivates the Jewish families in Hebron, but the principle itself—freedom of settlement and movement everywhere in the Land of Israel—is also a source of the frustration, as there is nowhere in the Israel where the gap between this idea and reality is so large as in Hebron. The distance between the fenced-in Jewish enclave and a real feeling of freedom is as far as the distance between East and West.

How does one struggle with this painful gap? From the educational-ideological viewpoint, they struggle in a manner described by Na'am Arnon: "The Blessed Sages already touched upon this frustration, when they said that one of the tests of Abraham our Forefather was the

fact that he had to buy the Cave of Makhpela from the sons of Het, with supplications, even though the Holy One, Blessed be He, had promised him the entire land. Abraham did not see in this a contradiction with the great vision that had been promised to him. It is true that in the present situation in Hebron there is definitely a contrast between the vision and reality, but the wisdom is not to be broken, to believe that the situation will yet change, just as the first Zionists believed. In this sense, we are members of MAPAI [Israeli Workers Party]."

And if faith, nevertheless, does not suffice to cover up the moments of daily frustration ("Why must we be afraid to go about in our land?"), there are two more alternatives, and both of them are used. On the one hand, the people of Hebron insist upon conducting their lives as if there were no fear. Arnon: "We send the children to kindergarten or to school in Qiryat Arba' every morning, and also all the enrichment activities are conducted in the Qiryat as usual. We insist upon not foregoing any activity to which we were previously accustomed. Yehi'el Leiter adds: "We agreed not to reduce the trips to which we had become accustomed. If a woman needs to go to the mikveh in Qiryat Arba' or "just" to the swimming pool, she'll continue to go as usual. Likewise, we insist upon travelling precisely on every road that the Arabs want to block. There will be no red roads for the Jews in Hebron.

Another possibility is to cause the Arabs not to feel comfortable also, so that they, too, will have a taste of frustration and anger. Thus, for example, are born small provocations such as the insistence to hold in the heart of Hebron a Purim parade, during which PLO flags were burned, or "small" harassments of merchants. In a conversation with me, no one will at first justify this kind of provocation, but they note that "one shouldn't take them out of context and out of all proportion. Maybe someone loses his patience sometimes."

A quick glance at what is happening suffices to show that these things do not represent the entire picture. A stone thrown at a vehicle that transported us from "Hadassah House" to the "Settlers' Restaurant" next to the Makhpela Cave was enough to get Avner the driver, who works in Hadassah House and lives in Qiryat Arba', to load his 'Uzy and prepare to fire. Only the release of the magazine by chance prevented him, according to the driver himself, from opening fire. When he returned to the car, he said angrily: "Apparently, the Holy One, blessed be He, did not want me to shoot today, and so caused my magazine to fall out."

And there is also a third way, the way of Gershon Elinson of the "Settler's Restaurant." When we enter his restaurant, on the afternoon of Passover Eve, there isn't a single customer, and this is an ideal place for a tourist restaurant, next to the Makhpela Cave. Elinson, formerly a resident of Qiryat Arba' who lives today in Efrat in the Etz'ion Bloc, says that this situation has been going on already for a year. He relates that the restaurant was the

first Jewish institution established in Hebron after the war, exactly 20 years ago when the settlers succeeded in convincing the late Yig'al Alon of its importance for the needs of the many visitors to the place. That restaurant, says Elinson, actually began the renaissance of the Jewish settlement in Hebron.

Elinson, who also earns his living as a photographer for the Zoom 77 news agency, knows that the difficult security situation is liable to result in his starring in one of his colleagues' pictures. He follows two of the paths used by his comrades from Hadassah House: Like them, he acts stubbornly, and he admits openly that he has threatened his merchant neighbors that if his restaurant is hit, they will be the first to pay for it. But, in contrast to the people of Hadassah House, he is not ready for struggle at any price, or up to the last moment. He says that if the business situation continues as it is today, he'll close down in another 2 or 3 months. He harbors resentment against his comrades from Hebron for not assisting him, because they do not understand the symbolic significance if the first Jewish institution in Hebron after the war were to close down. The Arabs, he says, definitely understand: "They have already told me that if I close down, for them it will be a clear sign that they have won."

The talk with Elinson reveals what the bustling life and continuing construction in the Jewish region succeed partially in concealing: The 40 families living today in Hebron are almost the only Jews that visit the city today. Tourists and just plain visitors—forget it! Even many relatives of the people of Hebron have already reduced the frequency of their visits to the place. But the nucleus, the tens of families, will remain until the struggle is finally decided, one way or the other—just as in 'Atzmona, one of the previous residences of Rabbi Bleicher, where the construction of the synagogue proceeded until the day of the evacuation itself.

#### **Excerpts From Giva'ti Soldiers' Verdict**

*44230123 Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT  
in Hebrew 28 May 89 p 18*

["Excerpts" from Giv'ati Soldiers' Verdict as reported by Ron ben Yishay]

[Text] People in the IDF [Israel Defense Forces] are not so excited about the verdict in the trial of the Giva'ti soldiers. No one is preparing any special explanatory or educational material, and the general intent is to get on with the order of the day.

During the long months of the trial many felt, both in the regular army and in the reserves, like people sitting in the judgment seat together with the Giva'ti people. Some of them gave the instructions, others served in the territories and took part in events similar to that in which the

Jabaliya resident was killed. The civilian sector perceived the Giva'ti people as scapegoats who would pay the price of the mistakes of Israeli society and the mistakes of its political leaders.

It is thus not surprising that both those in the civilian and military spheres took a deep breath and went about its business. The acquittal of the four of murder was understood in the IDF and on the streets of Israel as a kind of retroactive pardon for what was done in the territories during the "period of beatings."

But that was not what the judges intended. In general a reading of the explanation of the verdict raises much more serious questions than whether the four Giva'ti soldiers were guilty of the killing or not.

The court decided that the four were given a "patently illegal order." Somebody, after all, had to give it. Who, then, was the commander or commanders who gave that patently illegal order? Why weren't they brought to trial?

The judges hint that, in their opinion, the orders handed down to the field were completely legal and kosher until they reached Colonel Q., the district commander in which the Giva'ti battalion operated.

The judges devote three pages of their explanation to Colonel Q.'s orders. They hint that the permission or request to strike the hands and feet of the locals, even after they were apprehended and shackled, originated with Colonel Q. The lower-ranking commanders, company and battalion commanders, so the judges believe, only carried out his orders.

This is not the first case of improper behavior toward the locals in which the finger of guilt is pointed at Lieutenant colonels and colonels who command forces in the territories. There have been too many incidents of this sort during the intifadah [uprising], like Col. Me'ir, who was drummed out of the army, and others. Shouldn't the IDF investigate this phenomenon?

Might it be that the person of senior rank in the territory, the one who is supposed to translate the instructions of the defense minister, the chief of staff and the commanding general into the language of implementation, did not understand those instructions and therefore did not carry them out fully and precisely? Or perhaps there were two systems of orders and instructions here that came down from the office of the Defense Ministry and the chief of staff: one formal and kosher and the other informal and not so kosher. If so, didn't the Lt. colonels and colonels follow the guidelines of the informal instructions and thus fail in their mission and cause those subordinate to them to fail?

The parents of the accused, who broke out in righteous indignation at the perversion of justice visited upon their children, were inclined to forget that the judges did find

the four guilty of brutality. And not just them and their comrades in the compound, those who were not brought to trial, had also acted brutally towards the Arab prisoners.

The judges have tried without success to find an answer to the question how a situation could arise in which fighting men from a select unit, who had apparently received a good education, could be guilty of such bad behavior. This question, tossed into the air, as it were, needs an answer not only from the parents, educators and commanders of the four Giva'ti soldiers, but also from the general public.

The soldier, even if he is young and lacking in the experience of life, still must be responsible for his actions and account for them. But nowhere is it fair to ask that he distinguish, in the heat of events in the territories, between a patently illegal order and a legal one; that he know where on the body and with how much strength he may strike and when he will be brought to trial.

The very nature of the situation in which IDF soldiers find themselves today in the territories lends itself to a process in which the senses become dulled and one's behavior becomes more animal-like. If the situation continues, there will be more such events. From that point of view, this trial has done a great service to the IDF. It has somewhat lifted the fog obscuring the border between the permissible and the forbidden. That is why it is so important.

#### **What Is the Connection Between Kfar Qasem and the Giva'ti Incident?**

The verdict in the trial of the Giva'ti soldiers has resulted in a wave of comparisons with the verdict handed down in 1957 in the Kfar Qasem incident. At that time IDF and border police commanders were brought to trial for having given instructions at the time of the Sinai Campaign to shoot residents of Kfar Qasem, in the triangle. The latter had violated a curfew, because they had no idea there was one, and paid for it with their lives.

In explaining the verdict in that trial, judge Binyamin Cohen set a precedent. He distinguished between a "patently illegal order," which must not be obeyed, and a simple illegal order, which must be obeyed.

The prosecutor in the Kfar Qasem case was State's Attorney, and later judge, Qolin Gilon, the father of judge Alon Gilon, a major in the reserves and district court judge in Jerusalem, one of the three who judged the Giva'ti case 32 years later.

#### **The Giva'ti Verdict: A Horrifying Picture of Descent to the Lowest Levels**

"It is difficult to understand how soldiers from a select unit could be guilty of such vile behavior," write the three judges in their 93-page verdict. Below are some excerpts.

The first four accused, First Sergeant Yitzhaq Adler, Private Ron Haqahal, Private Arye Lutzato and Private Yitzhaq Qibody, at the time soldiers in the 432nd battalion who were brought to trial in this case for violation of the statute against killing, paragraph 298 of the criminal law code of 1977.

In the particulars of the case, they were accused of being the IDF soldiers who, on 22 August 1988 in the Jabaliya refugee camp in the Gaza Strip, caused the death of Hany Bin-Dib al-Shami, by hitting him severely on all parts of the body, using, among other things, the butts of their personal weapons and pieces of wood as well as by kicking and jumping on his body from the height of an adjacent bed.

Accused number 5, Captain Dr. David Nusam, at the time a physician in reserve service in battalion 8117, was found guilty in this verdict of causing death through negligence, paragraph 304 of the criminal law code of 1977. In the particulars of the case, he was accused of being the IDF soldier on said date, in the capacity of physician in the compound at Jabaliya in the Gaza Strip, who caused by his lack of caution, through rash or uncaring failure of duty, which is not equivalent to criminal negligence, the death of Hani bin Dib al-Shami, by being negligent in his examination and medical evaluation of the situation.

...Despite attempts from time to time to deflect judicial consideration to philosophical problems and thus to draw the attention of the media, we, the judges, have not forgotten for a moment that the issue in this case is a criminal trial involving soldiers accused of serious offenses, and that is our duty to act in accordance with the rules of jurisprudence to determine responsibility for the event.

Let us preface this by saying that the incident before us in this case is serious because of its tragic outcome in which a resident of the Jabaliya refugee camp, a 43-year married man and father to his children, found his death, and because of the circumstances which accompanied and caused the death of the deceased: beating to death, by soldiers. Indeed, the debate that ranged between the two sides over the course of the trial was: Were these, the accused, the ones who beat the deceased to death, as the prosecution claimed, or was it the work of other soldiers.

Either way, there is no dispute over the fact that the deceased found his death as the result of a violent attack by soldiers. His body showed signs of violence so unusual that even the pathologist from the Forensic

Medical Institute in Abu Kabir was forced to admit that in his 20 years of service in forensic medicine, this was only the second incident in which he had seen such serious injury on a man's body, the result of brutal violence.

It seems to us that the manner in which it was caused must horrify any civilized person, anyone with feelings of ethics and justice, and that the life of any man is precious to him and constitutes for him the supreme value in the scale of values of human society.

In the course of the trial we were astounded to hear expressions of hatred and contempt for the life of the deceased from some of the witnesses because he was a part of that population ruled by the armed forces. We shuddered when we heard testimony from members of the IDF, who watched this degrading spectacle of beatings of prisoners within a military camp, prisoners under their control with no hope of salvation, and were indifferent to what their eyes saw and closed their ears to the screams of the beaten, only because those same people were suspected of disturbing the peace and belonging to a hostile population, as if that justified spilling their blood.

...This shameful occurrence, of brutally beating helpless prisoners, not only violates the law, it also violates the dictates of conscience and ethics of every person in an enlightened society, especially if he belongs to the Jewish people and to this country.

The dry analysis of the material testimony, which we shall get to forthwith, can in no way cover up or hide the horrifying picture presented to us of descent to the lowest levels by those who took part in the indiscriminate, merciless attack on the prisoners; it took place within a military camp and did not stop until the tragedy occurred which is the subject of this case.

...A difficult question which aroused amazement in us from the beginning of the trial, amazement which only increased as the trial progressed and we came to know the people involved in this case, was how a situation could come about in which fighting men from a select unit who had apparently received a good education could be so derelict in their behavior, could unload themselves of the entire ethical baggage which their parents and teachers had instilled in them and could undergo such a psychological metamorphosis that they would be ready and capable of striking "murderous blows," in the words of pathologist Dr. Levi, a mature man old enough to be their father, to the point of causing actual death.

That is a question that we the judges could not find an answer to. It is doubtful whether the reader will find it either by going through the protocols of this case. That question still disturbs us as we register this verdict. We

are not disposed to say that the answer to that question is to be found in seeing the behavior of the accused, or of the others caught up in this incident, as that of deviants.

In our opinion the accused are not deviants and are no different than thousands of other soldiers in their brigade. We feel, therefore, that the behavior of the accused cannot be explained in terms of deviant personality. In their words, it is the rotten fruit of not being strict about norms, which, as it were, acquired legitimacy and even encouragement from officers, sadly, even from senior officers.

We shall see later on how an order that was basically correct was eroded as it passed down the chain of command until it reached the soldiers who were to implement it, losing along the way its value and all semblance of a legal, permissible order.

In our opinion, there is not the slightest doubt that the order given to the soldiers to use force and beat anyone suspected of disturbing the peace, even after the person had been taken into custody by our soldiers and no longer resisted arrest that was an illegal order on the face of it and in terms of its content.

We do not accept the distinction made in this court, even by senior officers, that there should be a difference under the law between what can be done to someone who disturbs the peace within the State of Israel and what can be done to someone who disturbs it within the territories occupied by our armed forces.

Rather, the same law applies in both cases; just as one may not strike a suspect in a disturbance of the peace in the State of Israel after he has been arrested and offers no further resistance, so no violence may be used against someone who disturbs the peace in the territories once he has been arrested and offers no resistance to detention.

The background to the incident which is the subject of this case was a violent disturbance in the Jabaliya refugee camp in the Gaza Strip on 22 August, 1988, an unusually bad day in terms of the number of disturbances by residents of the camp. Large numbers of army troops struggled that day to control the demonstrators and restore order. The military force responsible for accomplishing this included, among others, a company of regular troops from the 432nd battalion, reservists from the 8117th battalion and additional troops from the 299th battalion as well as border police.

The task force that went into the camp passed through the military compound on the outskirts of the Jabaliya refugee camp. At the time this compound was under the command of Captain 'Uzi Noi, the commander of C company of the 432nd battalion, which resided then within the compound. It is nearly certain that close to the hour of 16:00, army forces were again called into the camp to control the demonstration that was occurring there. Among those who went there was a military force

under the command of an officer from the 432nd battalion by the name of Lieutenant Rafi Tawil and the first four accused, who were under his command during that incident.

They left with a number of motor vehicles, and while on their way stones were thrown at them. In one of the alleys, the officer saw two youths who had thrown stones, as they were escaping into an adjacent house. Lieutenant Tawil ordered his soldiers to stop and split the force into two, one part under his command and the other, under the command of the first accused, First Sergeant Yitzhaq Adler.

The force went out in search of those youths, into the house into which they had disappeared. When they arrived, Lieutenant Tawil remained outside with his men and instructed First Sergeant Adler and two of the men in his command, the accused Corporal Ron Haqahal and Corporal Yitzhaq Qibodi, to enter the house and arrest the two youths.

It should be noted that none of the three accused identified the two youths, so that it is unclear on what basis they were going to arrest people whom they had not seen at all prior to that.

The three accused mentioned, joined later by the accused Arye Lutzato, encountered resistance to the intended arrest by the deceased, resistance that manifested itself by his not opening the door of the room in which he was hiding his children. Again there is no dispute that after they had overcome that resistance, they could have carried out the arrest without the use of force. However, for reasons that we will consider below, that was not the way things worked out.

The deceased was beaten by the four accused, and only after about 20 minutes were he and his 15-year old son taken out and brought to the military compound where they were given over to other soldiers. The time was, almost certainly, a little after 17:00. In the compound at the time was the fifth accused, Dr. David Nusam, who had been called to treat a prisoner who had been shot in the leg. The deceased was brought upon his arrival to Dr. Nusam, or he may have approached him on his own. However it is clear that Dr. Nusam, apart from treating a local wound on his lower lip, saw no need to do any further physical examination.

...About what happened in the house, there is before the court the testimony of the accused to the Investigating Military Police, their testimony to the court and the testimony of two of the deceased's sons. First Sergeant Adler reported during the investigation that on the day of the incident he had gone to Jabaliya refugee camp together with his commander, Lieutenant Rafi Tawil. After they entered the camp, Lieutenant Tawil identified the house into which some of the stone throwers had fled; they split into two groups and entered that same

house from both sides. Lieutenant Tawil found nothing, while he, Ron Haqahal and Yitzhaq Qibodi went into the house through the south entrance.

Upon entering they saw people going into another room and closing the door behind them. They tried to open the door, but even though it wasn't locked, there was resistance from the other side. This attempt lasted about 4 or 5 minutes until they were able to squeeze their rifle butts into the space between the door and the frame, using the butts as a lever to ultimately overcome the resistance and open the door.

The accused notes that in the house were also four females, three women and a girl. These had been told to go into one of the rooms and stay there, but they began to scream. When the soldiers entered the first room, they found a man about 40 years old (there is no dispute that this was the deceased, the father of the household), a youth about 13 or 14 and two little children 6-8. The little children, in the version of the accused, were not hit hard, "a few slaps and kicks, while the father and older boy were hit harder."

First Sergeant Adler added that because they didn't have truncheons, they hit them with the broomstick that was in the house and with the butts of their weapons. "The blows were deliberately aimed at their legs, the sides of the thigh and the kneecaps. They were also hit by our hands on the head and were slapped. Most of the blows that we delivered were delivered with our hands. We hit them for about 10-15 minutes."

While they were beating them, Lutzato arrived and joined in. Adler notes that the citizens in the house were not beaten continuously for 15 minutes, but rather at intervals, with intermissions. In his opinion, the deceased was hit the hardest. "During the beatings the little children were shoved into the corners where they received their blows without trying to stop them."

At the time of the beatings, notes the accused, the deceased sat on the floor and tried to deflect the hands and weapons of his attackers. Only when one of his sons suddenly straightened up did he try to get up."

Apparently First Sergeant Adler tried to compare the blows he administered the deceased with the force of blows in other incidents. Then he notes: "He got the same blows we always give, no harder." After they finished beating him they took the deceased and his older son into the yard where they tied their hands behind their backs with fetters. Their feet were not bound, nor were their eyes.

The deceased and his son walked on their own two feet, normally, and the soldiers were completely unaware that they had been injured seriously, if at all. The accused adds that he waited with the deceased until he got into the weapons carrier and heard no complaint from him. The deceased got into the weapons carrier by himself.

With regard to the instructions for dealing with those who cause disturbances, the accused notes that they were told to catch them, "to beat them hard, at times even breaking bones, so that they would not be able to walk." The instructions forbade hitting them in the genitals or any other sensitive organs, but to go mainly for the hands and feet. They were not to be beaten after they were shackled, which was true of the present case, as well.

...Apparently in response to an investigator's question as to how the deceased's resistance was expressed, the accused noted: "The Arab resisted arrest by closing the door," but he adds that from the moment the door was breached and they were inside, "there was nothing to prevent them from putting on shackles and taking him up to the weapons carrier. He did not resist going with us."

If so, why did they hit the deceased? "We hit him because when we enter and arrest someone, we strike them. At first the local resisted by not agreeing to let us take his son, i.e., he didn't let into the room, and therefore he was beaten. Other than that he did not resist."

...From the testimony of accused number 4, Corporal Yitzhaq Qibodi: "I got up on the bed and jumped onto the father, who sat on the floor. I landed with my feet on his shoulder, then I went outside to speak with Rafi to have him call for the patrol." The accused notes that the instructions he got from the officers were to beat, but not about the head. He quotes his commander: "They shouldn't walk on their feet."

...The first of the witnesses to allude to the attack on the deceased in the compound was Second Lieutenant Shimo'n Zagen, who served at the time of the incident as Assistant Operations Officers in the civil administration in Gaza. At the beginning of his testimony, the witness notes that he remembers the event during the course of which the deceased and his son arrived at the compound, that there were clocks on the western wall of the living quarters.

The deceased was dressed in bloodstained white jalabiya. He tried to speak with the deceased, asked his name and address, but instead of that, heard him sigh: "I am going to die." The witness noted that at the time the witness and his son leaned on the wall shoulder to shoulder. He noticed that blood was oozing from the defendant's mouth. But it was congealed blood, not regular blood.

Second Lt. Zagen notes that at the time he threatened the deceased and told him to shut up or he would break his head. His moans bothered him. Despite the fact that he continued to try and talk to the deceased, he heard the same response: "I am going to die." The deceased seemed "drained" to him. Afterwards he turned to the doctor and asked him to treat the deceased. In his version, the doctor was in no hurry getting to the

deceased; he estimates that 15-20 minutes passed from when he had asked the doctor to treat him. Only then did he see the doctor approach him. He himself left the place.

Later, when he came back, he saw that the blood around the deceased's mouth had been cleaned up. Around 21:30 hours he heard loud screams and a lot of commotion from within the refugee camp. He went up onto the observation roof of the compound and observed that they were beating the prisoners. He saw them to be reservists by their long hair. He imagined to himself that the blows were "hard, very hard."

...Another witness to what happened to the deceased in the compound was his son, Joseph, a part of whose testimony we dealt with in another context. This witness notes that when they arrived in the compound, they put his father in the yard, while they took him behind the tent. After a while they returned him to his father, it was already dark then. His father turned to him and asked him if it was him, his son Joseph. The witness responded in the affirmative and then his father told him: "I don't feel good, come tell me goodbye. I feel that I am going to die. Then I told him that I don't want him to die."

### The Medical Testimony

First and foremost we will examine the findings of the analytical report on the deceased at the Institute for Forensic Medicine, as discovered by Dr. Levi Bartolin, senior physician at the Institute. This is the analytical report that he composed the following day.

In his courtroom testimony the doctor noted that in all his professional experience as a forensic physician, he had only once, in a similar incident, seen such severe bruises on a person's body as he had seen on the body of the deceased.

We might add that even a lay person, a non-expert in the field of medicine, looking at the pictures of the deceased, would be hard put not to be impressed by the horror committed on the deceased. The proper description, in our opinion, is "an act of vengeance" was inflicted upon him, in view of the many bruises scattered all over his body.

In our opinion it was a shameful spectacle to see all those witnesses threading their way up to the stand trying to modify their original testimony to make us believe that the deceased behaved like a healthy man going out for a walk in the meadow and not like a man who just a few minutes before had suffered severe trauma in the harsh attack by the accused...We now come to the stage in which the deceased was brought to the military compound in Jabaliya.

...We accept those words of the experts. Even the most stringent of them did not feel that the deceased could have remained alive more than three hours after he had

been struck the lethal blows. If so, there is no reason now not to accept the courtroom account of the fifth accused and other witnesses who supported that version, that when the deceased came into the compound he was not suffering respiratory distress. On the other hand, we do not accept that the deceased complained about pain only in his mouth. That description was incorrect and we don't accept it.

Given these findings, it is easy to understand that a lethal act was committed on the deceased between the hours of 18:00 and 21:00 of that evening. The inescapable conclusion is thus that the deceased was struck in a cruel and criminal fashion while he was a prisoner in the military compound.

### The Judicial View.

Remember that the first four accused were charged with the crime of murder. Accused number 5 was charged with the crime of causing death through negligence.

...We can thus determine, with a high degree of probability, that the physical action which led to the death of the deceased, was not the behavior of the accused. As we have said, it cannot be determined which of the bruises was caused by the accused. But in light of the previous conclusions, it can be ascertained that the bruises which brought about the death of the deceased, especially in the area of the chest cavity, were not caused by the accused.

...Thus, therefore, we come to the question of what the force was of the order given to the soldiers to hit anyone who disturbs the peace about his hands and feet until he was shackled. This question of the use of force has hovered like a shadow over the entire trial, and bore witness to the struggle within the army on the one hand, to carry out its mission firmly without compromises, and, on the other, that the mission be carried out legally.

...We confess that we have struggled with this, and only after many hesitations have we arrived at the conclusion that the order received by the accused was patently illegal. The starting point for this conclusion was that an attack on a human being must immediately arouse a feeling in each of us that it is forbidden, except where the soldier has sufficient reason to believe that military necessity is behind the violence that might dull the inner command of "forbidden."

...As we said, it is to be regretted that this was the feeling of senior commanders. But even so, we feel that does not change the legal nature of the order, which should have made any soldier feel not just discomfort but inner rebellion against a command to hit a person who is no longer endangering anyone, only to settle accounts, as it were, going beyond the punishment meted out by the court.

Apart from those exceptions recognized by the law for the use of force against someone, any other beating of a person about his body must be understood as patently illegal, or, if you prefer, tinged with patent illegality. As we said, we reached this conclusion after considerable soul-searching, after evaluating the difficulties and hardships that the soldiers face anew each morning.

...The testimony of the Chief of Staff, Lt. Gen. Dan Shomron: here it should be explained that we granted the request of the representatives of accused 1 and 2 to invite the Chief of Staff, since the defense was trying to prove its claim de facto, if not de jure, two systems of orders: one, the written orders and two, a spoken set that contradicted the written ones.

Attorney A'tzmon spared no effort in trying to get the Chief of Staff to back up his claim that the order passed down the chain of command having to do with treatment of the those who caused disturbances, had the force of instructions from the Defense Minister. On the this matter the Chief of Staff was unequivocal and explained that even though he holds regular meetings with the Minister, the man who commands the army is the Chief of Staff, and he alone.

The Chief of Staff explained that in his opinion an order to strike in the context of an "event" and during the "event" is proper, but if that same person no longer resists, continued striking is no longer connected to the event and is therefore improper.

The Chief of Staff went on to say that the use of violence against those who cause disturbances is only one of a variety of means that result in deterrence. But that does not mean that deterrence is the goal of the violence. The deterrence is simply the result of the use of a particular means, it is not the goal itself.

...Soldiers in the territory should be equipped with clear, written guidelines on everything having to do with events in which the use of force is permissible by emphasizing all the events in which it is forbidden. Assistance should be sought in this endeavor from the IDF's legal service, both in preparing the guidelines and in briefing the soldiers.

Even though we are well aware of the many problems with which the military justice system has to cope these days, we nevertheless feel that because of the special nature of the army's activity in those areas, it would be advisable to have regular assistance from jurists who would be at the disposal of the commanders and the troops, at least at certain levels of the military echelons.

We should produce suitable guidelines for the commanders of the military compounds to which prisoners are brought, to have them make all the necessary arrangements for guarding the prisoners and assuring their safety.

Guidelines should also be produced by the chief medical officers or the command medical staff on everything having to do with areas of responsibility and the way in which the military medical staffs must treat prisoners brought to the compounds so that we never again have a situation in which there is uncertainty about the need for, quantity or timing of treatment.

In the future we must try to have arrests of local residents in their homes carried out by officers and under their supervision and in circumstances that will not endanger the welfare of their soldiers.

### **Drug Raids Carried Out, Sentences Given**

TA0870844

[Editorial Report] Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew on 7 July says in a page 2 report that "the Tel Aviv District Court imposed a 12-year sentence on Shlomo Huli, 28, of Lod, after convicting him of smuggling 838 grams of cocaine from Colombia." It says that the prosecutor charged that the drugs had been hidden in a talcum powder container airmailed from Colombia.

Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT in Hebrew on 6 July, in a page 16 report by Yoram Yarqoni, says an anonymous letter by a 14-year-old girl, and complaints by teachers and parents led to a comprehensive investigation by the Tel Aviv police into drug abuse among teenagers. "So far, 15 teenagers between the ages of 16 and 17, mainly high school students with no criminal records, have been arrested and interrogated. Some will stand trial in Juvenile Court." Various drugs, including hashish, speed, LSD, and methadone, were found in their possession. Police later detained four adults suspected of providing the minors with the drugs. "Several male and female soldiers in the regular army are also suspected of providing the teenagers with drugs."

Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew on 6 July, in a section a, page 10 report by Me'ir Hare'uvani, says Nazareth police 2 days ago made 12 arrests in a night raid on people suspected of possessing and dealing in drugs. "Quantities of hashish, cocaine, smoking instruments, and special scales for weighing drugs were seized at the suspects' homes."

### **Jump in Consumer Gasoline Prices Explained**

44230106 Tel Aviv MA'ARIV Business Supplement in Hebrew 9 May 89 p 12

[Article by 'Oded Shorer]

[Text] "Terrible, just terrible," says Avraham Agmon, general manager of a gasoline company, upon relating to the latest price jumps in the gasoline prices in Israel. "We are used to thinking that the gasoline companies are apathetic toward price changes. As if, what difference does it make to us as far as profit is concerned, actually. But that's not so. I see, first of all, the good of the economy," he continues. "It does me no good to come

today and say: 'I told you so,' but every intelligent person sees today that implementation of the reform in the gasoline economy, on the scale authorized in the Energy Ministry despite the opposition of the gasoline companies, is causing damage to the economy. I hope that many who criticized us at the time, now understand that our opposition to the reform on the present scale was relevant for fear of damaging the economy and did not result from narrow considerations. The fact is that in the present situation there is no connection between the reality in Israel and the projections of the reform. Suddenly, we are suffering from what happened in Alaska. What's the connection between us and Alaska? We're buying our oil in Egypt."

### **Israel Chose Europe**

Avraham Agmon presents the pricing data for the years 1986-1988 and emphasizes that even then there was perversity in the world oil economy, but, in the same period, the consumer in Israel enjoyed relative stability. Many surely remember, he says, the gasoline lines in the United States in 1973-1974. In Israel, there were no lines. Why? Because there was a different policy in the gasoline economy.

The director of the gasoline administration, Shim'on Gilbo'a, has a different opinion: "Gasoline did not become more expensive because of the policy of the Energy Ministry or because of the reform in the gasoline economy. We simply had bad luck." In his opinion, the prices for the consumer are updated in Israel according to the state of prices in a certain market in northern Italy near the Italian-French border, called La Vera-Genova, for the two adjacent cities in which the refining industry is centered and where there is commerce in oil products. Israel chose Europe as the framework for determining the ceiling price at the gateway of the refineries out of the desire to avoid what was customary in the past—that the government determined the prices through lengthy negotiations with the gasoline companies. The La Vera market was set up so that it would be the closest to the eastern Mediterranean Sea basin.

It is not difficult to understand why the prices rose in Israel when we examine the change in prices with Israel's traditional suppliers, continues Shim'on Gilbo'a. Egypt sold its light oil, Suez blend, for \$11 per barrel at the end of December 1988. Today, the price is \$17.40. The heavy oil, grive, sold at the end of December for \$10.45 per barrel and, today, \$15.10, while on 1 May Egypt raised its prices by \$0.35 per barrel. We are speaking of a 36.4 to 44.5 percent increase since December 1988. In November 1988, Mexico sold its light oil of the isthmus type for \$11.46 per barrel, while, today, it is being sold for \$18.57. Its heavy oil, maya, sold in November 1988 for \$9.50 per barrel, while today, it is \$14.27. We are speaking of a price increase of 50 percent and more. A ton of top quality benzine which, on 31 January 1989 was sold on the options market in Europe for \$159 was sold on 26 April for \$264. This is a 66-percent increase.

The jump in prices throughout the world in 1989 was reflected in Israel, as well. In the past, when oil prices were relatively low, the Israeli consumer won price reductions. These were the "fat" years, but now the situation is more difficult. In 1986, Israel paid for crude oil that brought an average price of \$12.29 per barrel. In the course of 1987, the large OPEC exporters began to close ranks and to coordinate its general policy with the world's actual consumption, and this was reflected in the prices. In the course of 1987, Israel paid an average price of \$16.56 per barrel for purchased oil.

In the course of 1988, the quarrels among the oil producers were renewed. Saudi Arabia and other large oil producers announced that they would not cut back their production in order to atone for the production sins of other OPEC companies. Israel took advantage of the market situation and, thus, the average price per barrel in 1988 was close to \$12.50 per barrel.

January 1989 realized the change in world oil production when the majority of oil producers were towed behind OPEC. In addition to this, psychological pressure was created on the prices because of the obstacles in the North Sea and Alaska, which reduced the supply of crude oil for the market. The director of the gasoline administration quotes oil merchants in London, who said that they do not understand why the price of gasoline increased so much. If someone were to come to them in January and contract a price increase of 50 percent within 4 months, they would have thrown him out the window. In January 1989, the average price per barrel that Israel paid rose to \$13. In April, the average price that Israel paid jumped to \$16-\$17 per barrel, while the price of oil in the North Sea moved to about \$20.20 per barrel. A further explanation is needed.

Why such frequent turbulence in prices in Israel? Shim'on Gilbo'a explains that the Energy Ministry updates the gasoline prices once every 2 weeks and, thus, a change in the La Vera market directly influences the cost to the consumer in Israel. In the past, he says, there was an equalization fund for gasoline prices that served as a sort of buffer for frequent changes in gasoline prices to the consumer.

The fund benefitted from a levy collected from the price to the consumer of benzine, for example. The money served two purposes: one, a subsidy for gasoline products, such as mazut for industry at the expense of the benzine consumers; the second, compensation for the gasoline companies in the event of a price rise on the world market, so that they did not demand an appreciation in gasoline prices to the consumer. The appreciation was effected at relatively long intervals and at a relatively moderate rate. In a period of world price declines, the fund soaked up money from the gasoline companies and this was set aside for a "black day."

The reform in the gasoline economy symbolized the first step in the reduction of government interference in the gasoline economy and, thus, the equalization fund was cancelled. "We worked toward the stabilization of several lines of defense from the aspect of our reserves at the end of 1988, but we did not anticipate such a sharp jump in prices," he says.

What will happen now? In Gilbo'a's estimation, the crude oil prices are nearing the ceiling. He accepts the estimates of experts that oil prices will lower slightly and will stabilize around \$17 per barrel.

### The Reform—A Mistake

In the opinion of Avraham Agmon, the government took an erroneous step in passing the reform, since the present policy in Israel, which links the price in Israel to the price in the European market, is wrong. One of the reasons is the fact that Israel is based on a peripheral market in which every small deal causes its price to jump. "Ask companies in Italy and France about the La Vera market and they'll look at you as if you're crazy. If we are basing ourselves on the prices in Europe, why not take as a framework the average relation of six developed European countries once a month?" he asks.

According to the present policy, it has become clear that the petrochemical industry in Israel will be compelled to pay a much higher price for its main raw material, naphtha, than its competitors in Italy. Why? Because that is today's price in La Vera.

Ariye Levy, director-general of the Paz company, defines the reform as "half of a pregnancy." In his words, "the situation in which the Energy Bureau is attempting to restrict its responsibility for the import of crude oil, on the one hand, but determines the consumer prices on the other hand, prevents the administration of logical business policy. If they were to open the entire gasoline market to free competition, and not just a third of it, this would enable more flexibility in the gasoline economy. There is reason for every company to prepare for periods in which price increases are anticipated in the world. If I knew that I could pass on the price differences to the consumer, I would be willing to take a chance and increase my reserves. But if my country tells me, 'Buy, but we will determine the consumer price according to external considerations,' I am very likely to lose my shirt. Who in the world would be willing to operate in accordance with such dictates?"

The opinion of Ariye Levy on the reform in its current format would not pass censorship. Instead, he wants to remain involved, because he presented the negative projections of the transition for updating the prices in Israel according to the La Vera market more than a year ago. He simply ran on the computer the La Vera prices of 1988 and earlier, and pointed out the problems that would befall the Israeli economy as a result of it.

The daily bulletin of the world oil industry, the Platt Report, showed that already the day after the increases in Israel, the price of naphtha, solar oil, and mazut decreased by 2 to 4 percent. It is impossible to seize upon a point in time and confuse the economy in Israel, he says, and emphasizes: "The need of the hour is the equalization fund," and recommends renewing its operation in order to moderate the changes in gasoline prices to the consumer.

The lowest rate in history wouldn't hurt here. In September 1986 the oil prices reached a new low. The gasoline companies turned to the Minister of Energy and suggested taking advantage of Israel's great storage capacity and purchasing 10 million barrels of oil at a price of approximately \$7 per barrel. The minister pulled this approval through and was not sorry. Within a few months, the world price doubled and more. Israel found itself with a "profit" of \$80 million in the equalization fund for gasoline prices.

In September 1988, the story repeated itself. On 13 September, the director-general of Paz writes to the Minister of Energy and suggests that he take advantage of a low in the oil market and increase his reserves with opportune purchases. "In the past," he writes, "such decisions were made at a meeting of the heads of the gasoline economy, known as the Council of Crude Oil. Today, the reform has changed the rules and, today, the reserves are built on rigid purchases in the framework of permanent contracts. I propose instructing the gasoline manager to guide the companies in purchasing significant oil acquisitions in the options market for reserves in order to ensure savings in foreign currency and the existence of cheap oil reserves for the economy." Ariye Levy did not receive a reply to this.

November 1988. The heads of the gasoline companies go to Egypt to discuss the purchasing plan for 1989. They return worried. The market trend shows stabilization and a tendency toward a rise in prices. The gasoline companies turn to Minister Shahal and propose returning to the 1986 exercise. But, this time, executives in the Energy Ministry, the Treasury, and the Energy Ministry [as published] decided not to respond to the proposal "out of a goal to decrease the government's involvement." This fact was confirmed to MA'ARIV.

"Whoever didn't want to buy at \$10 per barrel now is forced to buy at a price of \$18 to \$19 per barrel," says Avraham Agmon. "The economy lost a hundred million dollars because the government refused to buy reserves due to the claim that 'there is a reform and the government won't interfere.' If the government had operated intelligently, it would have prevented today's turbulence, expressed by the negative influence on inflation, and would have enabled stability in prices for almost the entire year. What is good for European countries is not good for Israel. Gasoline must be treated like ammunition."

In his opinion, the government is running away from its responsibility in determining the energy policy in that it is laying its burden on the marginal market in Europe. Israel needs to create conditions for growth and, thus, we must use the gasoline economy as a tool to aid growth. These conditions dictate the need to preserve a low price for industrial mazut, electricity for industry, raw materials for the petrochemical industry, in order to enable the Israeli industrialist to be competitive abroad. According to this, he says, the prices for benzine, solar energy, and gas must be cut to the consumer. The framework for calculations must be such that the price of the products will cover the price per barrel of crude oil and its related expenses. The price of gasoline must be subject to the good of the economy and not vice versa.

Concludes Avraham Agmon: "The time has come to quietly and intelligently discuss, perhaps within the framework of a professional committee, the difficult question—where is the reform leading the economy. It seems to me that the decisionmakers in the energy field do not see the general picture of the economy. We must weigh against each other the good of the economy against the personal ambitions of politicians and to cut the prices in Israel according to the needs of the State of Israel."

## MOROCCO

### OCP Criticized for Poor Treatment of Workers 45050321 Rabat AL-TARIQ in Arabic 1 Apr 89 p 4

[Excerpts] Phosphate workers live amidst much misery, oppression, and poverty, for while they work for the Moroccan Phosphates Office [OCP], they are under the hell of severe pressure from the administration in the form of frequent arbitrary acts, unfair punishments, and wholesale firings, in addition to work-related accidents and harsh work conditions inside or outside of the mines. Moreover, when they return to their homes they run into a hell of other problems that go back essentially to the low wages that do not enable them to meet their obligations of providing food, clothing, rent, medical treatment, and schooling for their children, as well as other of life's essentials. This forces many of the workers to resort to loans from others, so they are at the mercy of a handful of brokers to the benefit of the "lucky ones," who are known in Khouribga, which adds to their hardships and burdens them with debts and promissory notes.

Such a scenario is reflected in their minimum demands, which they have outlined on many occasions. Some of these are:

- Improved wages, bonuses, and allowances, as they no longer are appropriate to the circumstances of work and living.
- Review of retirement conditions, and raising pension levels by not less than 100 percent.

- Guaranteed housing for everybody, giving ownership of homes, distributing lots, giving real estate loans with simplified guidelines and conditions.
- Improving treatment methods, and giving attention to work-related accidents and vocational illnesses.
- Reviewing promotion steps and improving work conditions.
- Respecting the dignity of the workers and putting a halt to arbitrary punishments and illegal firings, and a review of the standards and conditions on the basis of which the worker is rehired after having been fired or laid off (maintaining seniority).
- Representative participation of the workers in the running of the establishment, and opening a dialogue with them in order to solve all unresolved problems.

### Low Wages

The low wages, which cannot meet the high cost of living and the exorbitant rise in prices, are no longer adequate for the phosphate worker even to maintain himself and his health in order to be able to face his exhausting work again, much less meet the other necessary demands of

life for himself and his family such as food, clothing, medical treatment, and schooling for the children. These wages have not seen any increase worth mentioning, and the last two increases since 1975 have been worthless in view of the continuous rise in prices and the failure to apply a sliding scale to wages. At the same time, it is not reasonable for wages to remain very low at a time when the OCP is experiencing a large expansion, because the workers have intensified their efforts at their various levels. That is obvious, for example, in the continuous growth in production and sales of phosphate during the following years:

Production: 20.8 million tons in 1980; 21.9 million tons, 1981; 21.4 million tons, 1982; 21.06 million tons, 1983; 21.51 million tons, 1984; 23.79 million tons, 1985.

Sales: 18.66 million tons in 1980; 19.1 million tons, 1981; 17.9 million tons, 1982; 20.1 million tons, 1983; 21.3 million tons, 1984.

During 1978, for example, workers' wages in Khouribga were as shown in the following table:

**Workers' Wages in Khouribga**

| Employee Type     | Category | Hourly Wage | Professional Salary | Average Pay | Class Average Pay |
|-------------------|----------|-------------|---------------------|-------------|-------------------|
| Workers/Employees |          |             |                     |             |                   |
| Lower Categories  | 1A       | 1.710       |                     | 362.05      | 499.07            |
|                   | 1B       | 1.786       |                     |             |                   |
|                   | 1C       | 1.881       |                     |             |                   |
|                   | 2A       | 2.069       |                     | 441.23      |                   |
|                   | 2B       | 2.182       |                     |             | 591.49            |
|                   | 2C       | 2.302       |                     |             |                   |
|                   | 3        | 2.559       | 516.91              | 591.49      |                   |
|                   | 4        | 3.345       | 676.09              |             |                   |
| Upper Categories  | 5        | 3.796       | 766.79              | 889.87      | 694.47            |
|                   | 6        | 4.355       | 879.71              |             |                   |
|                   | 7        | 5.065       | 1023.13             |             |                   |
| Tech/Admin. Staff | 1        |             | 879.70              | 1055.93     | 1749.20           |
|                   | 2        |             | 1047.60             |             |                   |
|                   | 3        |             | 1240.50             |             |                   |
|                   | 4        |             | 1441.40             |             |                   |
|                   | 5        |             | 1771.50             |             |                   |
|                   | 6        |             | 2034.70             |             |                   |

The average wage that a worker in the lower categories earns (not counting allowances) is 499.07 dirhams a month, keeping in mind that the number of workers who get this paltry amount is more than 8,900, while the total number of workers in Khouribga is more than 12,000 (73 percent).

The average wage received by a worker in the higher categories, from category 5 to 7, is 889.87 dirhams a

month, and the number of workers who benefit from this wage is around 1,246, or 9.8 percent.

The average wage of the technical and administrative staff (TAMCA scale 1 to 6) is 1055.93 dirhams a month, and the number of workers benefitting from this wage is around 1,307 (or 10.8 percent).

The average wage for engineers and doctors is 6000.00 dirhams a month for a regular engineer, 8000.00

dirhams for the head engineer of the outfit, and 15,000.00 dirhams a month for directors.

If, using simple calculation, we were to compare the wages of a worker in the average lower categories, who gets about 800.00 a month, to the average wage of a regular engineer of 6000.00 dirhams, we would see that the latter makes 8 times what the simple worker gets. The same difference is found in housing and family allowances and retirement pensions.

Family allowances: Engineers get monthly allowances of 200.00 dirhams per child, but a worker or staff member does not get more than 24.00 dirhams per child.

Housing allowances: Engineers get allowances of up to 1000 dirhams, but a worker gets between 100.00 and 400.00 dirhams.

Retirement: Engineer: from 3000.00 to 4000.00 dirhams; staff: from 600.00 to 1000.00 dirhams; worker: from 150.00 to 500.00 dirhams.

As an example of the discrimination practiced against the worker, we see that a worker in category 3 who has spent about 15 years in the service of the office, married with 3 children, gets a monthly salary of around 1209.60 dirhams, plus a housing allowance of around 360.00 dirhams and a family allowance of around 150.00 dirhams, bringing the total to 1719.60 dirhams.

From this example the falseness of the OCP propaganda is apparent: It circulates the notion that the workers are getting high wages, though this propaganda can in fact be applied only to a select group of upper level staff representing less than 2 percent of the total OCP workforce, which consisted of 21,226 workers in 1985. At the time of the protectorate, this group was composed mostly of Frenchmen, and even though some 33 years have passed since independence, this staff has remained foreign; until recently it formed a large proportion in the field of operations.

In addition to what the workers suffer in the way of low wages, they are subject to strong pressure at work because of the many arbitrary acts, unfair punishments, firings, and work related accidents. Each year the administration fires hundreds of workers, including union officials. [passage omitted]

In view of this despicable situation experienced by OCP workers every day, it is clear that the office is as far as it can be from meeting the minimum demands that its workers require, even in the case of a worker falling victim to an accident that takes his life or causes permanent disability. That is why it is necessary to oppose this situation and work to see that justice is done to the workers of the aforementioned office through dialogue over their just demands.

## SUDAN

### Southern Leaders Interviewed on Regional Issues

**Samuel Aru**

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5 Jun 89 pp 18-19

[Interview with Samuel Aru, president of Political Grouping for South Sudan by Abu Bakr al-Siddiq al-Sharif: "Samuel Aru Says, 'Ethnic Composition, Lack of Freedom Made Problem of South Stand Out'"; date and place of interview not specified]

[Text] AL-TADAMUN has devoted this issue's installment of "Sudan Under AL-TADAMUN's Microscope" to the problems of the south. For that purpose it interviewed Mr Samuel Aru, president of the Political Grouping for South Sudan; Mr Angelo Beda, chairman of the Supreme Council for South Sudan; al-Tijani al-Sisi, governor of Darfur Region; and Johannes Akol, official spokesman for the Bloc of Afro-Sudanese parties.

Samuel Aru, a veteran southern politician, lived through the postindependence period and the period of General 'Abbud's administration from 1958 to 1974. He was an active key political figure from the south in the administrations of the May regime from 1969 to 1985. He served as deputy prime minister under the present democratic government, and he was the first Sudanese politician to contact the Movement of the People's Army To Liberate Sudan, which is led by John Garang. Mr Aru made that contact under the transitional government of Lt Gen 'Abd-al-Rahman Siwar al-Dhahab. His direct contact with the movement paved the way for talks between al-Sadiq al-Mahdi, as president of the Ummah Party, and John Garang's movement.

At the present time Mr Samuel Aru serves as president of the Political Grouping for South Sudan. He is a member of the Constituent Assembly, the Parliament, and, as one of the symbols of the forces of the uprising, is a constant figure on Sudan's political scene.

### Racial, Religious, or Economic?

[AL-TADAMUN] How does the Political Grouping for South Sudan classify the crisis in the south? Is it racial, religious, or economic?

[Aru] All these racial, religious and economic reasons together form the foundation and the cause of what we call the problem of south Sudan. It is the "ethnic" composition of the Sudanese that made this problem stand out to that extent. Furthermore, the freedom of Sudanese citizens and their rights as citizens had been confiscated. We have to study these causes separately as well as collectively to understand the situation in Sudan as a whole and particularly the situation in south Sudan.

The absence of development is an economic factor which could bring about radical change in the country's class makeup and in the makeup of the relationships of production in Sudan. Essentially, this affects both people in the north and in the south, and it plays its part in the process of forging a nation that is united, a nation with the same national traits and national goals.

Do not forget that all the institutions of government and power in Sudan ignored development and the injustice which befell all the Sudanese. The effects of that were more clearly evident on the citizens of south Sudan. This is a main reason for the outbreak of the crisis in the south, and a main reason why that crisis continues today.

[AL-TADAMUN] You have been accused of having a secret relationship with the Movement of the People's Army for the Liberation of Sudan. After your departure from the cabinet as deputy prime minister in the interim government, your position on the crisis in the south was described as passive.

[Aru] It is true that in 1985 the government of the uprising faced the puzzling problem of contacting the People's Movement for the Liberation of Sudan directly or indirectly at its headquarters in Addis Ababa or outside Ethiopia. The movement used to describe the government of the uprising and Sudanese officials who took over power after the ouster of Ja'far Numayri as the group that made up the second May regime. That is, the movement saw that group as an extension of the May 1969 regime which carried out the coup that was led by Ja'far Numayri. That point of view had a considerable effect on the fact that the explosive situation in the south was not contained promptly.

Officials of the Movement of the People's Army for Liberating Sudan would not even answer the government's letters. After a long time, however, they sent a letter to the prime minister, who was then Dr al-Jazuli Dafallah. It was ironical that they sent the letter to the commander of the government's al-Nasir Military District in the Upper Nile Region. That letter was delayed with the military for about 4 months, and after all this delay it was delivered by the military to the central government in Khartoum.

When we asked why such a roundabout method had been used to send the letter instead of using a diplomatic, regional, or international messenger, or why a member of the movement was not sent to Khartoum to deliver the letter, we were told that movement officials wanted to test the position of the government's Army. They wanted to know if the Army was with the government or against it, and they wanted to know whether or not it supported peace and the effort to stop the war. They said that was why they had sent the letter through the Army.

I did in fact make contacts, and I developed relations which resulted in the establishment of relations between Sudanese politicians and the movement in Ethiopia.

These relations paved the way for the contact which was made between Mr al-Sadiq al-Mahdi, as president of the Ummah Party, and John Garang. Mr al-Mahdi went to Ethiopia where he met with Garang. Although the meeting between the two men ended in failure, it affirmed that communications between the two parties was possible.

These communications continued even after al-Mahdi became prime minister.

As the political grouping we contacted the movement through Uganda, Ethiopia, and Kenya. What we got from these countries was a peace program which officials in Khartoum did not respond to. We were not passive at all. I took part in formulating the resolutions of the Koka Dam Conference to establish peace in south Sudan, and I contacted people inside the country and abroad to safeguard talks with the Movement of the Popular Army to Liberate Sudan. I supported the initiative undertaken last year by Mr Muhammad 'Uthman al-Mirghani, the leader of the Democratic Unionist Party [DUP]. That initiative culminated in a meeting between Mr al-Mirghani and Garang which resulted in a specific agreement to hold a constitutional convention that would look into the problem of Sudan and that of south Sudan. How can all these positions be passive?

[AL-TADAMUN] It is being said that conditions of political life in Sudan are such that the presence of some southerners in the jungle is inevitable. In other words, it is inevitable that there will be a group in the south rebelling against the central government. How true is such a statement?

[Aru] First of all, we have to know why southerners head to the jungle to lead rebellious movements or guerrilla warfare against the government. The reappearance of injustice and the fact that minorities' rights are being disregarded are objective reasons for that. Also, attempts to infringe upon religious beliefs are being made, and people have a sense of being subjected to social prejudice and social injustice.

The emergence of these features is one of the characteristics of how the course of government, the administration, and the law is being steered in Sudan. Every time one of these causes I mentioned would surface on the political or social map in the south, a group of people would flee into the jungle and take up arms.

Taking unequivocal positions is what is required in such a case. A steady policy in the south that respects citizens' rights there in every form is also required.

The question that you asked continues to be asked here in a new form: What can be done if a new rebellion should emerge in the south after an agreement with the Movement of the People's Army to Liberate Sudan is reached? This could happen if a situation conducive to rebellion and a cause prompting it should develop. We

now have to assume an objective stance so that no new negative circumstances would emerge to force all or some southerners to rebel. The Addis Ababa Agreement established peace in Sudan in 1973, but former President Numayri broke articles of that agreement and violated several of its aspects. Southerners felt they had to rebel once again, and they declared the war which continues to this day.

[AL-TADAMUN] What do you think about the fact that Parliament has postponed the proposed criminal laws, which are Islamic and religious in character?

[Aru] It is certain that Parliament made a great decision to postpone these laws and suspend its discussion of them. These laws, with their religious character, discriminate between citizens in Sudan and block the road to peace. In general, we do not support the establishment of a religious state in Sudan for reasons which have to do with the makeup of Sudan's population, which is made up of Arabs and Africans as well as Muslims, Christians, and people who subscribe to no religion. This being the case, how can we call for the establishment of a religious state, Islamic or Christian?

[AL-TADAMUN] What do you think about Sudan's foreign policy?

[Aru] We need a foreign policy that is balanced between Arab countries, African countries and other countries in the international community. We need to develop economic relations, and we need to set up common economic projects with neighboring Arab and African countries so that our foreign policy can be based on nothing else but common interests and joint cooperation.

#### **Al-Tijani Al-Sisi**

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5 Jun 89 p 19

[Interview with al-Tijani al-Sisi, governor of Darfur, by Abu Bakr al-Siddiq al-Sharif: "Al-Tijani al-Sisi Says, 'No Dissidents in Darfur; Strife Is Old Tribal Conflict'"; date and place of interview not specified]

[Text] West Sudan, specifically Darfur region, has become another source of worry for Sudan because its cities and villages have been subjected to incidents of armed robbery as a result of the burdensome legacy left by the civil war in Chad and the murderous feud which exists between Tripoli and Ndjamen.

AL-TADAMUN followed these gory events which occurred in Sudan during the first 2 weeks of April this year, and it conducted this interview with al-Tijani al-Sisi, the governor of Darfur Region. This is the text of the interview.

#### **Political Vocabulary for Khartoum**

[AL-TADAMUN] The worsening tensions in Darfur Region added terms like dissidents, armed gangs, and other such terms to Sudan's political vocabulary. Who is fighting whom in Darfur Region?

[Al-Sisi] The extreme sensitivity of good neighborly relations between Sudan and Chad to any tension is well understood in Darfur. We understand that any tension will have an effect on Ndjamen, on Khartoum, and perhaps on other capitals. That is why terms added to the political vocabulary by incidents in our region remain pertinent to the people of Khartoum.

Actually, there is no dissident activity in Darfur, but the strife which is going on there is a tribal conflict which has been going on for a long period of time. Serious efforts are being made, however, to contain it.

[AL-TADAMUN] Does this mean that Darfur has not been affected by what happened in Chad?

[Al-Sisi] No, that is not the case, but it may be said that all the reasons for the unrest are due to the tension in Chad and to the foreign intervention in that country's affairs. As a result, Chad has become the victim of a destructive civil war which has destroyed everything in the country and will continue to destroy more. One look at the geographic strip which links our two countries [makes us say] that we as well as our brothers in Chad are paying the price for this bitter war.

[AL-TADAMUN] How is that? Who are those foreign agencies which are being referred to?

[Al-Sisi] The foreign intervention in Chad is backed by superpowers and by countries that are Chad's neighbors. We believe that the intra-Chad war and the war between Chad and Libya were the main reason why the security situation in Darfur Region has been getting worse. Whether or not that was the aim of countries interfering in Chad, security in Darfur has been getting worse.

[AL-TADAMUN] How do you think this war can possibly be settled?

[Al-Sisi] We opposed all the aforementioned foreign interventions quite forcefully. We are now and have been against any attempt by foreigners to use arms to interfere in Darfur Region. In that regard we submitted a specific program to solve the tribal problem. At the present time we are trying to convene a conference in al-Fashir, the capital of Darfur. That conference would look into a working paper which contains suggestions for settling the tribal conflict in the region.

[AL-TADAMUN] Would it be possible to examine that program in its general form?

[Al-Sisi] This program was outlined by Darfur's regional Council of Ministers after a temporary initiative in that regard was outlined and presented to the feuding parties. Some success was achieved. Afterwards, the region's Council of Ministers conducted a 19-day fact-finding tour of the locations of the conflict where they met with the parties in question. Thus, all parties became firmly convinced that their aim was to look into courses of action which would narrow the differences and bring about a peaceful settlement to the disputes, since both sides on all levels had been hurt significantly by this tribal conflict.

### A Peaceful Settlement

[AL-TADAMUN] Are there indications that a peaceful settlement is possible?

[Al-Sisi] We held a conference at the end of the aforementioned tour for officials in the civilian administration, and we discussed this matter. As a result of this discussion a committee of "magnanimous people" [quotes as published] or mediators was formed to settle the discord. The talks which were conducted by the committee almost convinced us that all parties were in agreement about achieving a formula for reconciling the feuding parties.

[AL-TADAMUN] To what extent are you counting on this committee achieving the peace which is being sought?

[Al-Sisi] We believe that everything so far indicates that this committee could succeed in its mission because the various parties agree that a peaceful solution is essential.

[AL-TADAMUN] Don't you believe that a regional or an international role is important to settle the tension which exists in the region?

[Al-Sisi] We are convinced that good, neighborly relations between everyone are essential. In our opinion, establishing programs for economic and cultural cooperation can become the strongest tools for controlling political tensions between neighboring countries. We believe that the relations we have with neighboring countries like the Libyan Jamahiriyyah, Chad, and Central Africa are old. But this regional area did experience a regional conflict which tempted international forces to interfere. That led to the fact that conditions between us have become tense. We expect some parties to interfere in Darfur to prevent the forthcoming tribal reconciliation, but we are lying in wait for them.

[AL-TADAMUN] How do you believe are the interests of these parties served by prolonging the tension in Darfur?

[Al-Sisi] Some of them believe that a threat to the security of Darfur is a threat to Sudan's national security. Accordingly, Darfur is the western gateway to Sudan. Therefore, any unrest in Darfur would spontaneously spill over into Kordofan and from there to the rest of Sudan.

[AL-TADAMUN] It is being said that Sudan is inclined to bring up the question of tension in West Sudan and present it to the League of African Nations. How true is that?

[Al-Sisi] It must be understood that we will not accept discussions in the vicious circle of international organizations about questions which have to do with our sovereignty, even if we had a case of clear foreign intervention that required no proof. That is why we are the ones who will settle everything which has to do with our sovereignty. Despite our appreciation and our respect for African and international organizations, we will not turn to any one of them to settle such matters. When it comes to anything that infringes upon Sudan's sovereignty over its territory or anything that infringes upon the honor of its citizens, we will all act in accordance with the Arab poet's statement, "High honor does not become immune from harm until a great deal of blood is shed."

### Johannes Akol

45040391 *London AL-TADAMUN in Arabic*  
5 Jun 89 pp 20-21

[Interview with Johannes Akol, official spokesman of the Bloc of Afro-Sudanese Parties, by Abu Bakr al-Siddiq al-Sharif: "Johannes Akol Says, 'If Democratic Unionist Party's Agreement with Garang Is Executed, Constitutional Conference Will Achieve Peace';" in Umm Durman; date of interview not specified]

[Text] Johannes Akol is considered one of the young and distinguished leaders of the political movement in south Sudan. That is why he is qualified to assume the position of official spokesman for the Bloc of Afro-Sudanese Parties which, in addition to being the largest parliamentary bloc for citizens of south Sudan, has taken the initiative of proposing a secular political action program. The Bloc of Afro-Sudanese Parties also brought under its banner a party from West Sudan, confirming thereby the weakness of the argument which states that ethnicity is the focus of the conflict between the northern part of the country, which is Islamic and Arab, and the southern part of the country, which is Christian and black.

### The Peace Initiative

That proposition and numerous vital issues which are currently being talked about in Sudan were the focus of the interview which AL-TADAMUN conducted with Mr Johannes Akol in Umm Durman. The text of the interview follows.

[AL-TADAMUN] What is the position of the Bloc of Afro-Sudanese Parties on the peace initiative? To what extent are you counting on it?

[Akol] It seems necessary, first of all, to clarify a few concepts to avoid confusion. There is one group of southern parties in Parliament, and that group is headed by Aldo Ajo. Our group is the group of Afro-Sudanese parties: In addition to parties from the south, the National Party for South Kordofan is also a part of our group. Thus, we represent a majority of political parties in the south. With regard to your question, we support the Sudanese peace initiative which the People's Movement and the DUP [Democratic Unionist Party] signed on 16 November 1988. We support all articles of that agreement without reservations. We believe it is the only method by means of which peace can be achieved at the forthcoming constitutional convention.

[AL-TADAMUN] To what extent are you counting on that initiative?

[Akol] We do not count on unknown things. We think, however, that if all the articles of the agreement are implemented, peace will find its way into the corners of this country which has been drained by the civil war. We are counting on that provided that Sudanese officials do their homework before going to the constitutional convention. This is because, as we see it, the agenda for the constitutional convention will concentrate on a list which will include issues of government and questions about the distribution of wealth and power. The question of determining Sudanese identity and the question of the Sudanese state which has not yet taken shape will also be on the agenda. These are pressing issues, and the time has come to resolve them by involving everyone and developing a national consensus. The fact that we are counting on the agreement is based on everyone's commitment to the foregoing. We believe that everyone in Sudan joins us in counting on this agreement.

#### **Suspending the Criminal Code**

[AL-TADAMUN] What do you think about the fact that the Constituent Assembly complied with one of Garang's most important conditions, namely, the resolution to suspend the criminal code?

[Akol] We see this resolution as a sound one. We see it as a resolution which is concerned about efforts for peace. Although it comes late, it is a step in the right direction. As such, it is better than nothing. We believe that this resolution, which was made to save what can be saved, is a daring step on the road to peace. It removed one of the obstacles which had stood in the way of achieving peace. I am referring to the first article of that resolution which asks that no Islamic laws be enacted until the constitutional convention is convened. The fact that such a decision was made will inevitably lead to attention being devoted to direct communications. It will lead to the establishment of a steering and technical committee to

look into the joint sector laws and to consider how a cease fire can be achieved and how a constitutional convention can be convened.

[AL-TADAMUN] Under Sudan's current economic conditions and this marathon effort which is being undertaken to bring about a peaceful settlement, the question that remains has to do with the resources for financing the anticipated peace process.

[Akol] It is our opinion that the process of establishing peace is more strenuous and more difficult than the war itself. Whereas war is destructive, peace is constructive and produces growth. We have not forgotten at all the tremendous resources which are required for the peace process. We expect to receive material assistance from all fraternal, friendly and neighboring countries. We also expect everyone in Sudan to tighten his belt so that peace can be accomplished and all the funds which are needed to establish that peace can be provided.

[AL-TADAMUN] Do you expect that obstacles will emerge to obstruct the peace process?

[Akol] One of the obstacles we have been expecting is the current position of the National Islamic Front [NIF]. NIF departed from the consensus and refused to sign the step-by-step program of the United Front Government. Then, NIF clearly declared its distaste for the resolution regarding the criminal code, arguing that Islam was in danger and that the banner of the Islamic state was flying at half mast. Overcoming such an obstacle requires effort in the media, and it requires that everyone join in that effort. Funding the peace process requires that local, regional, and international efforts be made to work together. We hope that all our brothers and our friends will take this into consideration. In addition, the peace process has to have a program which can offer something on how to rebuild what the war has destroyed; it has to have guidelines on how migrants and returnees, who lost their homes and their property, are to be received. The kind of program we are to have will undoubtedly determine the kind of funding we can get.

#### **Gaining Time**

[AL-TADAMUN] Speaking of the NIF, that organization thinks that the People's Movement led by John Garang is counting now on gaining time until the rainy season, when it would then capture the most important cities and dictate its conditions from a position of strength. What do you think about that?

[Akol] Based on the freedom of thought and the freedom of opinion as guaranteed by democracy, we respect the NIF's point of view. We disagree, however, with NIF's analyses and conclusions. We believe that NIF's point of view is politically motivated and that it stems from political hostility. At the present time Garang can capture a few cities if he wanted to because the principal cities are suffering now from an oppressive famine and

from a lack of management. The military is also suffering from a shortage in materiel and equipment, not in the fighters' morale. This is obvious. An Armed Forces memorandum had made that clear by pointing out that the Armed Forces' preparedness ratio had dropped by 50 percent from what it was in 1983.

It is our opinion, therefore, that the People's Movement does not come out of a vacuum. The movement cannot be going against public opinion in Sudan when it calls for the liberation of the Sudanese people from ignorance, disease, and poverty. It is also our opinion that local and regional conditions, and things which were done to prepare a climate in which confidence among citizens of the same country can be restored, are indicators which affect decisions made by the People's Movement to Liberate Sudan. Therefore, we expect the People's Movement to agree and to go along. We do not believe at all that the People's Movement is counting on gaining time as much as it is engaged in a deliberate process of scrutinizing the decision on which peace will be based. We believe that the People's Movement is being neither evasive nor coercive. Our dealings with it through the Bloc of Afro-Sudanese Parties proved to us that its approach to peace is credible. Now all the political forces and all the forces of peace have been put to a difficult test: either they abide by the will to achieve peace, or peace will be irretrievably lost.

### The Lost Identity

[AL-TADAMUN] Some political analysts believe that the true cause behind the war which is being fought in the south is the problematic nature of Sudan's identity, with Arabs in the north, blacks in the south, Islam here and Christianity there. What do you think about that?

[Akol] Despite our name, the Bloc of Afro-Sudanese Parties, we in that group do not think that the name indicates that we are a racial or racist group. We think the name has a cultural significance. That is why we did everything to affirm that the war in the south had nothing at all to do with racial or religious discrimination. The war in the south is rather due to the fact that some areas in our country have been sidelined, while others have been given more power and wealth than they deserve. This war then is being fought over the fair distribution of power which continues to be dominated by the golden triangle of Khartoum, Madani, and 'Atbarah. We think this question is one of backward areas' demanding balanced development. In other words, this is a conflict between one group which is being exploited and another which is doing the exploiting. This struggle, therefore, may be called a class struggle; it is a struggle for power and national resources. It is our judgment that this is a healthy struggle that unites Christians and Muslims as well as Arabs and blacks of the same class and brings them together in one front. This means that this is a struggle against those who

monopolize power and wealth whether they are Christian, Muslim, Arab, or black. There are areas in our country which have been relegated to the sidelines ever since independence was declared, and that completely contradicts justice.

[AL-TADAMUN] Let us go back to the peace initiative because it is a priority matter. What do you expect from neighboring countries?

[Akol] It is a fact that during the term of the reconciliation government, especially when Dr Hasan 'Abdallah al-Turabi was minister of foreign affairs, our country lost the goodwill it had with many neighboring countries. This was a result of a foreign policy which favored the well-known Iran alliance. That hurt our relations with Kenya and with many neighboring countries, including the Congo, Zaire, and, to some extent, Ethiopia. Therefore, it is expected that Sudan's present approach will reopen channels of communication with neighboring countries who will perceive that a change is taking place. Because Kenya took the first step in coming to Sudan's aid, we expect it to continue its assistance to Sudan, and we expect President Arap Moi to continue his distinguished role in bringing together Prime Minister al-Sadiq al-Mahdi and John Garang. We expect the president of Kenya and President Museveni to continue playing the major part they have been playing to narrow the differences. We expect them to offer the material and moral support which is required through regional and worldwide platforms to support the process of restoring peace to Sudan. This process is based on the premise that this peace will bring peace to all of Africa.

[AL-TADAMUN] The subject of trading the Eritrean issue for Ethiopia's participation in the peace process is being discussed, is it not?

[Akol] We think such statements lack logic because the question of Eritrea differs from the question which has to do with south Sudan. Each one of these two questions has its own historical roots, and it would be difficult if not impossible to cut them off from these roots for the sake of temporary solutions. The Eritrean question is something else. The war in south Sudan has its own characteristics: It is a civil war which spread throughout areas including south Kordofan and the Blue Nile region. The aforementioned concepts spread into those regions, and even east Sudan has recently started demanding things mentioned in those concepts, like restructuring the government in Sudan. Consequently, our question is purely Sudanese and cannot be traded for another. Besides, it would be difficult for a solution to Sudan's problems found outside Sudan's borders to last.

In our opinion Ethiopia is associated with the question of Eritrea. We think that to bring this problem to an end, the parties would have to sit around the negotiating table. We praise the efforts which are being made by Sudan in this regard.

[AL-TADAMUN] Do you believe an Egyptian role is important to the completion of the peace process?

[Akol] Most certainly. We believe that an Egyptian role is urgently required. Egypt is like the other countries which get their water from the Nile. Furthermore, Egyptian culture and Egypt's historic role with Sudan remain important. We do not deny that Egyptian authorities, especially President Husni Mubarak, played a major part in narrowing the differences between Ethiopia and Sudan and between the People's Movement and those who are in power in Sudan. Egyptian authorities and President Mubarak did that to achieve peace. An Egyptian role is required and vital, and it cannot be considered intervention in Sudan's affairs because what we have in common with Egypt can bring us closer together and can make us stronger and more powerful if there is stability south of Egypt. In our opinion, what is being said about Egyptian pressures is useless and serves no one but the Iran-Libya alliance. Sudan must stay away from such alliances, and it must work with everyone based on the premise that everyone is equal. Sudan must not mortgage its sovereignty to anyone. An Egyptian role would be desirable, and so would a Libyan role. But this is not the place for talking about that topic.

#### Angelo Beda

45040391 London AL-TADAMUN in Arabic  
5 Jun 89 p 21

[Interview with Angelo Beda, chairman of the Supreme Council for South Sudan, by Abu Bakr al-Siddiq al-Sharif: "Angelo Beda Says, 'Garang Lacks Justifications for Evading His Obligations'"; date and place of interview not specified]

[Text] One of the first observations made by anyone who has been following Sudan's political scene closely is that nothing is more important than the peace initiative.

While political forces in the south remain more capable of understanding that approach to peace and defining its negative or positive possibilities, the fact that Mr al-Sadiq al-Mahdi, al-Ansar's leader and Sudan's prime minister, changed his mind in favor of the aforementioned initiative shows the extent to which all political forces in the northern part of the country, except the NIF [National Islamic Front], are counting on that initiative.

This is due to the fact that political activists from the south remain more aware of the fact that the Sudan Liberation Movement, which is being led by Garang, is credible regarding its desire to end the war and bring about peace.

#### Faith in Sudan's Unity

AL-TADAMUN carried all the worrisome questions which are being asked on Sudan's political scene to its interview with Angelo Beda, chairman of the Supreme Council for South Sudan.

[AL-TADAMUN] As one who believes in Sudan's unity, what do you think about the peace initiative? To what extent are you counting on it to succeed?

[Beda] I believe this initiative has every chance to succeed, especially after the Constituent Assembly decided to suspend the laws which had replaced the Islamic September laws. This confirms the credibility of the Sudanese government about convening a constitutional convention to reject war and bring about peace.

[AL-TADAMUN] What do you think the constitutional convention to be convened will be like?

[Beda] I believe that it will be like a large parliament whose mission will be to bring about peace in the south. Development projects would be launched after that, and political, economic, and cultural laws would be enacted to give the south its due of the attention it deserves so it can make progress.

[AL-TADAMUN] Do you believe this would be enough to persuade the movement to negotiate so that a desire for peace can be brought about?

[Beda] I believe that the most important conditions for that have been met, and John Garang's movement has no justifications any more for evading its declared commitments about its desire to establish peace. All Sudan now is turning toward peace.

[AL-TADAMUN] Regarding political parties in the south, will a paper be presented at the constitutional convention which is to be held?

[Beda] The central government has jurisdiction over the subject of peace. As southern parties, we will be represented in the governmental committee. That is why we will participate at this level in a united delegation which embodies Sudan's unity and affirms everyone's wish for peace.

[AL-TADAMUN] Will the efforts you make to bring about the success of the peace initiative be limited to efforts made inside the country, or will you try to get neighboring countries to join the efforts which are being made for peace?

[Beda] Actually, there are programs which have already been placed on the agenda for the coming peace period. Chief among those programs is one for relieving the south from injustice. This means laying the foundations for development in the south and allowing the south to share in the country's wealth. Throughout the past years, this was limited to the north.

[AL-TADAMUN] What else is on that agenda?

[Beda] There are five conditions on the agenda: how to keep religion separate from the state; sharing power with the south; determining Sudan's Arab-African identity in

a decisive manner; determining the relationship between the north and the south; and deciding whether that relationship is a federation, a confederation, or something else.

[AL-TADAMUN] What is being done to persuade the countries which were being accused of supporting the rebellion to join the efforts that are being made to support the peace process?

[Beda] We are now trying to get the African countries which were supporting the movement to participate in the constitutional convention as observers so they can do their part to bring about a solution to the problem in the south. The establishment of peace would protect these countries, especially neighboring ones. Furthermore, peace would protect the Horn of Africa. That would block any foreign intervention and preclude anyone from stirring up any tensions which would have a negative effect on the stability, progress, and development of these countries.

**New Information Committee Appointed**  
*EA0607221289 Omdurman Radio in Arabic*  
*1300 GMT 6 Jul 89*

[Text] In the name of God the compassionate and merciful, in the name of the people and of the Armed Forces.

After referring to decree Number 10 of 1989, the National Salvation Revolutionary Command Council [NSRCC] has issued decree Number 29 on revocation:

First: The appointments to the Information Committee provided for in NSRCC decree Number 10 of 1 July 1989 are revoked.

Second: The following are appointed to be members of the Information Committee:

- a. Staff Colonel Sulayman Muhammad Sulayman—chairman.
- b. Colonel Hasan Muhammad Dahwi—member.
- c. Staff Lieutenant Colonel Hamzah Abdallah—member.
- d. Lieutenant Colonel (Abd-al-Azim Nur-al-Din Husayn)—member.
- e. Major Yunus Mahmud—member.

Since AL-QUWWAT AL-MUSALLAHAH [the Armed Forces newspaper] is playing an important role, Colonel Mahmud Qalandar is detached to supervise its development at this important stage.

Four [as heard]: The Political Committee: Colonel Pio Yokan is appointed member of the Political Committee.

Two [as heard]: This decree is valid with immediate effect:

By order of the NSRCC: issued on 5 July 1989.

In the name of God the compassionate and merciful.  
 Decrees of the NSRCC:

Decree Number 27 of 1989:

In the name of the people and of the Armed Forces, the NSRCC, having referred to constitutional decree Number 1 of 1989, issues the following decree:

Appointment:

One: Brigadier Ahmad Mahmud Hasan is appointed legal adviser to the NSRCC and director of the legislative and drafting office.

Two: The legal adviser will attend the meetings of the NSRCC.

Three: The legal adviser shall be authorized to have recourse to any individual or quarter in pursuance of his legal duties.

By order of the NSRCC and issued under its signature on 5 July 1989:

[Signed] Lieutenant General 'Umar Hasan Ahmad al-Bashir, chairman of the NSRCC.

## UNITED ARAB EMIRATES

**Al-Shariqah's Metal Industry Statistics Provided**  
*44040449 Dubayy AL-BAYAN in Arabic 15 May 89 p 2*

[Text] A survey by al-Shariqah's economic department survey of major industries with capitals exceeding 150,000 dirhams, reveals that basic metallurgical industries are becoming a distinguished part of the fibre of the emirate's private sector.

Basic metallurgical industries fall into three groups—iron, aluminum, and electrical appliances.

According to the survey, there are 59 major basic metallurgical industries in the emirate. This is 24.2 percent of the 244 major industrial concerns. Major metallurgical industries are capitalized at 232,111,000 dirhams or 27.9 percent of aggregate industrial capital amounting to 836 million dirhams.

Citizen ownership of basic metallurgical industries amounts to 142.16 million dirhams, or 30.6 percent of the 465 million dirhams representing citizen investment in all major industries in the emirate.

The survey puts the value of basic metallurgical products at some 206 million dirhams or 17.7 percent of the aggregate industrial output value of about 1,165,000,000 dirhams. Basic metallurgical industries in the emirate employ 1,547 persons representing 18 percent of all the industrial workers numbering 8,571 individuals. Employees of major basic metallurgical industries draw wages of some 35 million dirhams, or 22.7 percent of aggregate industrial wages amounting last year to 155 million dirhams.

Thirty iron-manufacturing establishments comprise 50.8 percent of the total number of basic metallurgical facilities. They are capitalized at 167,951,000 dirhams or 72.4 percent of the aggregate investment in basic metallurgical industries. They employ 796 workers, or 51.5 percent of all workers in this sector. They pay a total of 16.91 million dirhams in wages, or 46 percent of aggregate wages in the sector. Iron products have a value of 247,000 dirhams or 38.5 percent of the aggregate value of basic metallurgical output.

The survey also indicates that there are 16 aluminum units representing 27.1 percent of the total number of

establishments in the branch sector of basic metallurgical industries. They are capitalized at 34.6 million dirhams or 14.9 percent of sector capitalization as a whole. Citizen investment in aluminum industries amounts to 28,479,000 dirhams or 20 percent of all citizen investment in basic metallurgical facilities. Aluminum production has a value of 80,173,000 dirhams or 38.9 percent of the aggregate value of the sector's product. There are 398 aluminum workers representing 25.1 percent of all basic metallurgical workers. They draw wages of 9,188,000 dirhams or 26.3 percent of aggregate wages of all workers in basic metallurgical industries.

The survey further indicates that there are 13 electrical appliance shops capitalized at 39.56 million dirhams. They represent 22 percent of sector establishments and 12.7 percent of aggregate sector capitalization. Citizens invested 12.15 million dirhams in the electrical appliance industry that employs 353 workers with wages totalling 9,687,000 dirhams. The output of the electrical appliance industry is valued at 46,567,000 dirhams or 22.6 percent of the aggregate production value of basic metallurgical industries.

## IRAN

### Prospects for Succession to Khomeyni Discussed

46040009 London AL-TADAMUN in Arabic  
8 May 89 pp 16-17

[Unattributed commentary: "Rafsanjani Signals Left and Cuts Across to the Right; Iran after Khomeyni and Montazeri; Scenario for the War of Succession"]

[Text] Someone who has been following developments in Iran with interest since the revolution and is familiar with the details, large and small, of the composition of the clerical regime has written this analysis for AL-TADAMUN. It concerns the "war of succession" in Iran and the situation after Ayatollah Khomeyni and the resignation of his designated successor, Hoseyn Montazeri, without appointing anyone in his place.

The war of succession will be a long one. It will not end even with the death of Imam Khomeyni but will continue for some time afterwards. A decisive outcome to the war will not only denote a personal victory but the victory of a trend and an outlook and will finally determine the essential character of the "revolutionary state". The war will therefore remain a series of battles, and the victor in those battles will not, of course, always be one and the same; there will be both winners and losers.

This summary of the situation in Iran with the unexpectedly successful "flood tide" led by Hashemi Rafsanjani, speaker of the Iranian Parliament, makes it clear that the surprising element in what happened is that no development took place to upset the situation and alter equations overnight. With the eruption of the Salman Rushdie affair, through the "resignation" of the appointed successor, Grand Ayatollah Hoseyn Montazeri, and up to the petition signed by 130 parliamentary deputies on 21 April 1989 demanding an "in-depth" amendment of the constitution, Hashemi Rafsanjani and the "moderation" he represents have been transformed from a low ebb to a high tide.

This transformation did not come about by chance, but arose from a combination of two factors:

- The personality of Hashemi Rafsanjani and his skill in steering the conflict
- The minute coordination and even more meticulous execution of the smallest details of a carefully elaborated scenario for achieving this result

#### Dimensions of Rafsanjani's Character

Hashemi Rafsanjani is not a newcomer to Iranian politics, and he continues as in the past to be the pre-eminent member of Rohaniyat-e Mobarez [Original Militant Clergy]. Before its breakup, this organization formed the backbone of the religious institution that ran things in Tehran before the revolution and continued to manage

the situation after the revolution. Rafsanjani's importance, as stressed by those who have been in his entourage for years, is that he is perhaps the only man who knows the "keys to the character of Imam Khomeyni". He is therefore able to take hold of a situation at the right moment. He also knows very well when to be silent in his presence, when to step in promptly, where he must say no, and how to answer yes.

Those familiar with Rafsanjani's character add an anecdote which, in its way, represents a "key" to an understanding of that character.

According to the story, Rafsanjani's elder brother was a particularly insatiable smoker. His doctor had ordered him to quit smoking if he was to stay alive. Complying with the doctor's orders, he took an oath not to smoke. However, the smoking habit was stronger than he was. Since he was a devout man and did not wish to break the oath, he resorted to a clever stratagem. He would invite inveterate smokers and, whenever he had a craving to smoke, he would sit among them so that they could smoke, blow the smoke in his face, and he could inhale it in turn. Through this legal fiction, Rafsanjani's brother did not break his oath and satisfied his craving for tobacco.

This story also shows Rafsanjani's familial aptitude for finding the appropriate "device" for a difficult and delicate situation. For that reason too, he has been able to rise continually over a 10-year period while many others fell by the way and matters reached the stage where Imam Khomeyni accepted the "resignation" of Montazeri as his designated successor. This was later described by the newspaper ETTELA'AT as a decision that was for Khomeyni like drinking a second cup of poison, the first having been "the acceptance of resolution 598 and the end of the war"!

To round out the details of the picture of Rafsanjani and his ability to bow his head before the storm, Rafsanjani did not open his mouth, either to intimate or remonstrate, when the wide ranging campaign of dismissals from state office began following the Salman Rushdie affair. Such dismissals, and even arrests, involved dozens of senior leaders of the Revolutionary Guard, the Army, governors in the provinces, and managers of nationalized companies. He considered it preferable to accept this sacrifice rather than incur his own downfall by insisting on making his views heard or by defending his own people. When he returned, they would return with him; but if he lost, they would lose everything.

#### Preparation of the Scenario

Examination of the scenario drawn up with such precision and, with respect to its details and the manner of its implementation, executed with even greater precision, also shows the limits of this "tide" and of its prospects.

The call for constitutional amendment predates the Salman Rushdie affair and, from the time of the ceasefire in the war with Iraq, there began to be talk of "loopholes" in the constitution that had led to inconsistencies and an incompatibility in decisions taken which had often impeded implementation and had sometimes led to disaster. That was, in fact, a tangible reality in Iran, to such an extent that an expert following the details of day-to-day administration in Tehran has provided an example to that effect: "Whoever holds a particular portfolio is the master of that portfolio, even if orders overruling his decisions come from a higher authority".

The power to act accordingly comes from the exploitation of the "gaps" in the constitution and, in that connection, the "expert" in question goes on to say that Rafsanjani himself has in the past made use of these gaps in order to enhance his authority. Through his strength, authority, and understanding of the intricacies of affairs, he has endowed the office of speaker of the Majles with a power that it does not at all have under the constitution.

The call for amendment ran into the wall of "credibility". The focus had been on the amendment of article 26 of the constitution, relating to the powers of the head of state. At that time, Montazeri had told Khomeyni unequivocally that the amendment of one isolated article of the constitution would impeach his credibility, and it appears that Khomeyni was persuaded of that at the time.

Rafsanjani knew how to make use of this loophole in his appeal and therefore modified it to call for an in-depth and comprehensive amendment of the constitution ratified by the 1979 plebiscite.

#### Rafsanjani's Plan

In his call for amendment, Rafsanjani relied on a clearly defined plan which involved:

- Coordinating his initiative by recognizing two "assistants" so as to form a troika with himself at its head. They were president of the republic 'Ali Khamene'i and prime minister Musavi Ardebili.
- Bringing the deputies into the fray on the grounds that the call was a "legal and legislative" matter, then mobilizing the forces that represent the underpinnings of the regime, most prominently the "bazaar".
- Transforming the call for amendment into a public question on the way to making it a popular one.

The most outstanding feature of this strategy, however, is that Rafsanjani, finding himself for the first time without the "ear" of Khomeyni because of the cordon placed around his father by Ahmad Khomeyni and knowing that he was still close to Khomeyni's heart, relied on the use of the public sermon that could not be prevented from reaching him.

As a result of Rafsanjani's understanding of the "keys" to Khomeyni's character and of the details of the changes taking place after the Salman Rushdie affair, he launched into "revolutionizing" his position, once again stressing that he was the "man of the revolution in the state", and escalated his attacks on the United States in order to achieve what he wanted. In doing so, he exemplified the well known popular saying that he is like a driver who signals left only to cut across to the right.

#### Wave of Arrests

In the Friday sermon, always heard by Khomeyni on the radio, Rafsanjani's tale of a "conspiracy", the foiling of that "conspiracy" and the arrest of "spies for American intelligence" was no more than skillful improvisation on a theme dear to Khomeyni. The truth about the "conspiracy" is that it was no more than a widespread campaign of arrests dating from the Salman Rushdie affair which was then stepped up after the "resignation" of Montazeri. The wave of arrests involved 15 governors, 8 leaders of the Revolutionary Guard, and dozens of managers. They belong to three trends:

- That of Grand Ayatollah Hoseyn Montazeri
- The "Hojjatiyeh", that is to say the right wing of the religious establishment
- The "left", as represented by its leader Behzad Nabavi, leader of the Mojahedin-e Enqelab-e Eslami organization, who, it is said, has been obliged to resign from his ministerial post together with three other ministers. This resignation has, however, yet to be announced.

#### The Pursuit of Reyshahri

In his statement on the foiling of the conspiracy, Rafsanjani did not forget to commend the security and intelligence organs, in an unusual and even surprising manner, for their proficiency in seizing the "spies". This "commendation" was, as experts know, no more than obvious flattery of minister of intelligence and security Reyshahri and, through him, of Ayatollah Meshkini, an aspirant for the succession. Such flirtation has the sole aim of acquiring the friendship of Reyshahri, the current "man of influence", and of ensuring that he will at least remain neutral during the public campaign for the amendment of the constitution. It seems clear that Rafsanjani has succeeded in the "pursuit" of Reyshahri and in reassuring Meshkini.

The call for amendment has been accompanied by a clear emphasis on Rafsanjani's candidacy in the presidential elections in early August. Rafsanjani has mobilized all possible forces to bolster this public support. Accordingly, the bazaar has supported him, as have the Ruhaniyat-e Mobarez and the Ruhaniyun-e Mobarez [Splinter Militant Clergy] and, with such support from right and left, Rafsanjani has become the "man of consensus".

Imam Khomeyni, in turn, has led the game and conducted decisionmaking in his own way, namely allowing matters to take their course among the conflicting trends and then, when the scale begins to incline to one side, resolving the situation and making his decision. This is in fact what he did. After the petition of the 130 deputies, he left matters to take shape for 5 whole days before announcing his decision by way of a letter addressed to president of the Republic 'Ali Khamene'i in which he said: "Reform of the constitution is an imperative necessity for the Islamic society". In the letter, he also calls for the formation of a body of wise men to draft the required amendments for submission to him and, after his approval, to the people in a general plebiscite, and all of this within a 2-month period, that is to say before the middle of next June.

### The Assembly of Experts

It suffices to read the names of those included in the Assembly of Experts to ascertain that Rafsanjani is the victor first and last. The most prominent names on the list, which has not been published abroad, are clearly ranked in a significant order: Hashemi Rafsanjani, 'Ali Khamene'i, Musavi Ardebili, Hassan Habibi, Azrab Qomi (manager of the leftist newspaper RESALAT), Mohammadi Yazdi (member of the Constitutional Control Committee [as published] and supervisor of the presidential elections), Mahdavi Kani and Emami Kashani, Ayatollah Meshkini, Khoe'niha, Mir Hoseyn Musavi, Abdollah Nuri (representative of the Imam in the Revolutionary Guard), and Mehdi Karubi.

The first nine names are those of adherents or allies of Rafsanjani, all of them also are known for their moderate and even left-liberal outlook. It should also be noted that prime minister Mir Hoseyn Musavi is listed tenth. At the same time, 'Ali-Akbar Mohtashemi, minister of interior and head of the executive arm, will return to a situation in which the post of prime minister will be abolished, thereby transforming the presidency of the Republic from an honorary position into one with real authority "suitable" for the present Majles Speaker Hashemi Rafsanjani. In the event that the amendment is adopted and Rafsanjani is elected, he will become the "strong man" of the Iranian regime.

On the way to Rafsanjani's transformation into a strong successor, coordinated steps will be taken to propose the formation of a body to succeed the Imam in the role of spiritual guide, as long as there is no such successor after Montazeri. It would be natural for Rafsanjani to head this five-member committee because he is "the cleverest and the most knowledgeable about the affairs of the country".

When his leadership of the armed forces as deputy of Imam Khomeyni is added to that, then power is being concentrated in his hands.

Naturally, he will place his own people in key positions, and the candidate to succeed him as speaker of the Majles, the name of which will be changed to the "Islamic Assembly", is Mehdi Karubi (Rafsanjani's deputy, head of the Bonyad-e Shahid [Martyr Foundation], and representative of the Imam in the pilgrimage contingent).

### The Way Out of the Dilemma

The amendment of the constitution, the election of Rafsanjani as president, the concentration of powers, and so on will not be enough to extricate the "state" in Iran from its predicament. The real dilemma in which the state institutions find themselves lies in their mutual incompatibility. One expert says in that connection that Imam Khomeyni has already settled the question of the state in relation to the revolution in favor of the state and that he did so in his celebrated fatwa of 6 January 1988, in which he bestowed on it legitimacy in whatever it might do, even if it became necessary to demolish a mosque in the public interest. Two problems of the existence of the "state" nevertheless require to be settled:

1. The abolition of institutions that coexist with the state or that parallel existing institutions, such as Bonyad-e Shahid and Bunyad-e Mustaz'afan, because the decisions made by these institutions conflict with those of ministries with the same jurisdiction, such as the Ministry of Social Affairs.

2. Abolition of the plurality of centers of administrative power, and the institution of coordinated jurisdiction instead of overlapping jurisdiction. An example would be a restriction on the number of "representatives" in the ministries, who represent power centers despite the fact that they are not administratively equal (the Imam's representative, Montazeri's representative, the representative of the Guard, the representative of the ministry, etc.).

Finally; the issue of the succession to the Imam in the position of spiritual guide will remain an enigma, and all the more so since no one can replace Montazeri as heir presumptive and since the formation of a collective leadership to replace the Imam would be a disaster that the country must avoid at all costs, as stated by Khoe'niha, the public prosecutor of the revolution.

The real question will thus continue to be: Who will succeed the "Imam"? Or will the "velayat-e faqih" [rule of jurisconsult], in practice, have begun and ended with Khomeyni? Because Rafsanjani, even if he heads a committee to replace the faqih [jurisconsult], will never be "the most knowledgeable, righteous, and courageous" as stipulated in the constitution and as the "Morshed" [spiritual guide] is supposed to be.

The other major question is: Where does Ahmad Khomeini stand in all this? Has he in turn understood the game and allowed matters to take their course until the time is ripe? Or is he acting in concert with Rafsanjani while awaiting change?

The problem with the "war of succession" is that, regardless of the subtlety of the scenario drawn up and of any alternative or opposing scenario, there is one thing which cannot be precisely controlled, and that is life span. One's life span is in the hand of God...even for the ambitious!

### **Military School Inaugurated in Isfahan**

46400086a Tehran RESALAT in Persian 25 Apr 89 p 6

[Text] Esfahan—RESALAT reporter: In ceremonies held during the current week, the Sarbaz [Soldier] School of Group 44 of Esfahan's Artillery Training Center was inaugurated.

During the ceremonies attended by Hojjat-ol Eslam Safavi, who is the head of the Nation's Armed Forces literacy program, a group of responsible officials of the Literacy Movement of the Province of Esfahan, the Commander of Group 44 Artillery Training Center, and a team of the said Center's personnel, Hojjat-ol Eslam Safavi said in a speech: The existence of millions of illiterate persons in this country is below the dignity of Islamic society and that of a country which has been the cradle of science and literature.

In the continuation of the ceremonies, during a speech, the head of the Province's Literacy Movement said: We are very glad that the inauguration of the Sarbaz School coincides with Army Day of the Islamic Republic of Iran—it being yet another leap towards the goals of the Islamic Revolution.

Afterwards Brigadier General Parsapur, commander of the Group 44 Training Center, while greeting those present and enumerating the operational and military glories gained by the Group during the imposed war, went on to say: What is certain is that if culture prevails in our society, we shall move towards development and excellence, otherwise we will be driven towards retrogression.

It is worth noting that some 732 illiterate soldiers serving at the Center have succeeded in passing the basic and complementary courses of the Literacy Movement in 1367 [21 March 1988 - 20 March 1989].

### **PAKISTAN**

#### **Sindh Finances Said in Shambles**

46000159c Islamabad THE MUSLIM  
in English 17 Jun 89 p 9

[Article by Jawaid Bokhari in the "Commerce Diary" column: "Sindh Finances Are in Shambles"]

[Text] Karachi, June 16: Sindh's budget for 1989-90 indicates that provincial finances are in shambles despite some improvement in their share in the divisible pool. The scope of sales tax has been enlarged.

Simultaneously, the non-obligatory grants have been reduced to keep the transfer of resources from the federation to the provinces at last year's level. These grants were reduced by Rs 3 billion in the current fiscal year.

To quote Sindh Finance Minister Muhammad Ismail O'Dhejo, only 23 percent of the total revenue receipts were generated locally and the rest 77 percent come from Islamabad.

Of the Rs. 7.8 billion allocation for 1989-90 by the federation, Rs. 6.2 billion is the provincial share in the divisible pool and Rs. 1.6 billion is on account of non-obligatory grant.

Like other provinces Sindh has the constitutional right to have a share in the divisible pool of which 25 percent is retained by the federation. The rest 75 percent is distributed among the four provinces on the ratios of population. Sindh's share, on the basis of 1981 census comes to 23.34 percent.

The last National Finance Commission [NFC] award was announced in 1975. The NFC is to be reconstituted by the end of June to grapple with the problem financial autonomy to the provinces.

Presently, the overall size of the divisible pool is determined by the taxation policies evolved by the Federal Government. It is Islamabad which decides the rate of sales tax or income tax and their scope and coverage. The provinces do not have any control over their own resources. In all federal states, sales tax is a provincial subject. So it was in Pakistan in early 1950s. It was taken over temporarily by the Federal Government but never returned back to the provinces.

The Federal Government is insisting that the provinces should live within their means and observe strict financial discipline without having any control over bulk of their own resources. The resources shrink or increase because of federal decisions.

In the course of the current fiscal year, the non-obligatory grants to Sindh were reduced from budget allocations of Rs. 3.8 billion to revised estimates of Rs. 2.4 billion in three phases. This amount has been further reduced to Rs. 1.6 billion for 1989-90.

When the provincial budget for current year was finalised and printed, the Federal Government imposed an initial cut of Rs. 1099 million in its original allocation. The then governor was left with no choice but to direct that "the cut imposed by the Ministry of Finance may be shown as receivable from the Federal Government". The efforts made to get the original allocations restored did not yield any results.

The provincial resources also shrank because of deductions at source of outstanding liabilities pertaining to years 1973-77. In addition, several other expenditures had to be incurred on orders of the Federal Government that caused the provincial budget deficit to rise Rs. 2.25 billion.

The provinces do not have any effective control over their expenditures which are again decided by the Federal Government. All development projects over Rs. 30 million are approved and their priority is fixed by the Federal Government. In his budget speech Finance Minister Dr O'Dehjo observed certain liabilities were created following the orders and policies announced by the Federal Government. These included indexation of pay/pensions: Secretariat Allowance and increased volume of wheat subsidy. The five per cent increase in salary of government employees announced by Islamabad would cost the Sindh exchequer Rs. 150 million.

Despite the fact that Sindh has the highest per capita provincial tax the PPP [Pakistan People's Party] Government has taken the initiative to mobilise additional tax revenue of Rs. 242 million. It would help bridge the huge deficit in a small way but with a good beginning.

**Disinformation Seen Continuing in Press**  
46000160b Lahore VIEWPOINT in English  
15 Jun 89 p 27

[Article by Husain Naqi: "Fighting Falsehood With Truth"]

[Text] Disinformation, a policy that was religiously pursued during the dictatorial stranglehold of General Ziaul Haq—under the direct supervision of his junior, Lt-Gen (Retd) Mujibur Rahman—appears to have sunk its roots quite deep. The print media is continuing to indulge in this sordid practice even after the advent of democratic rule. You can find patently false information in news items, columns and write-ups which any discerning newspaper reader can see through.

Every morning, one comes across planted stories in the newspapers. In most cases, it appears that editorial and reporting staff are privy to the falsehood they are propagating. Their 'sources' are only too well known. The listed and trusted members of the reporting and editorial staff and, in most cases, the owner-editors are aware of the motives for which such 'news' items are being published.

#### The Air Dash Story

From this week's planted items, one would like to refer to the story about the air dash of the NWFP [North-West Frontier Province] Chief Minister, Mr Aftab Sherpao, the day Opposition parties, including the ANP [Awami National Party], issued a joint declaration in Islamabad. Some of the newspapers even reported his arrival the next morning. Mr Sherpao had not returned even the day

after the news appeared but none of those who had carried the air dash report thought it fit to publish a clarification. Mr Sherpao later returned, a day earlier than the Prime Minister, and claimed that his coalition ministry was not going to fall. Now, this statement did not receive the prominence given to those who talked about an IJI led government being formed in the NWFP after the ANP's decision to annul its agreement with the PPP [Pakistan People's Party].

The disinformation campaign appears to have infected even those newspapers which normally support the PPP. There seems to be an effort on their part to counter planted stories with their own table-stories. This week, the daily Musawat—which was brought out as the PPP mouthpiece in the seventies and reappeared later last year under a private management supporting the PPP—put words into the mouth of the PPP Chairperson, Begum Nusrat Bhutto. A story appearing in the Musawat said that Begum Bhutto had called the joint Opposition as a collection of all the 'rotten eggs' in one single basket. While Begum Nusrat Bhutto was prompt in contradicting the words ascribed to her, the Musawat editors did not care to check and wait. The result was that while the contradiction appeared on the front page, the daily's editorial comment for the same day was captioned "Ganday Andon ki Tokri" (A basketful of rotten eggs). The paper's management (or was it the editor?) did not think it appropriate to replace the editorial.

#### Stingers and Ack-Ack

Another case this week was a whole barrage of 'news' items about the big names allegedly involved in narcotics and arms smuggling. A 'news' item, run by a news agency, which has been used often to plant stories in the Press, stated that one of the big names in the trade who was earlier reported to be evading arrest and had perhaps absconded to the tribal area was in the 'custody' of a Federal agency. Another story in a newspaper said there were 'reports' about anti-aircraft guns and the famed Stinger missiles were seen atop the house of another leading drug trafficker. The man concerned has his home within the country and the newspaper which carried the report about these weapons possession did not bother to check the veracity of the item.

Disinformation has not infected the printed media alone. This is proved by a statement made on the floor of the National Assembly. Mr Hakim Ali Zardari told the House that Dr Javed Iqbal was among those who were allotted plots of land in Islamabad's Blue Area. He did not bother to check whether his facts were right. And this about a sitting judge of the Supreme Court! Mr Justice Dr Javed Iqbal was obliged to issue a contradiction. He also said that he was considering a libel suit and contempt of court proceedings against the defaulting legislator. One wonders whether this would be possible because statements made on the floor of the House fall outside the purview of courts of law. In principle, however, one would recommend such a course on a

wider scale against all cases of disinformation. (Reportedly, another Javed Iqbal was involved, but this was made known after the damage had been done.)

### Black Sheep

By discussing various kinds of disinformation in vogue, it is intended to invite the attention of the readers as well as professional colleagues to take note of the black sheep in the profession. It is incumbent upon those who cherish the ideals and principles of the profession to resist attempts at disinformation whether they are made by those in authority or by anyone else, including media tycoons and those who man reporting and news desks.

This instance of misinformation must not be allowed to be used as an excuse by the Executive, either Federal or provincial, to revert back to the policies of the previous regimes which misused or strangled the Press and the electronic media.

It is true that bad habits do not die easily and disinformation is one of them. Zia's political heirs are using it with great zeal in the ongoing tussle they are waging from their power base in Lahore. The campaign about the NWFP was launched and initiated not in Peshawar but from Lahore and the same disinformation cell is churning out lie after lie. The training and experience of the Zia years which also saw the internationally controlled and supervised disinformation exercise vis-a-vis Afghanistan proved futile in the case of the neighbouring country and its leadership. It will not succeed at home either. It should be the job of all those who are true to their calling to expose all disinformation activity by fighting falsehood with truth.

### Commentary Sees Need for UN Intervention in Afghanistan

46000160a Lahore *VIEWPOINT* in English  
22 Jun 89 pp 5-6

[Commentary: "Afghanistan: New Initiatives"]

[Text] On most matters relevant to Pakistan-U.S. relations, Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto's visit to the United States earlier this month followed the pattern set over long years by our rulers' self-cultivated addiction to large doses of American aid. However, on the crucial Afghan question, new moves were initiated, offering hope that peace may be allowed to return to that battered land. During the many functions arranged to welcome and honour Benazir Bhutto, what was said in formal speeches, or the less formal statements, offered little that is unfamiliar to our people; it merely confirmed Pakistan's status of a hapless, fawning supplicant and America's role as a somewhat condescending, if studiously generous, aid-giver. Some of the rhetoric head was a little fresher—like Benazir Bhutto's aphorism that the best revenge against dictatorship is democracy—and praise for her more effusive than is usual on such occasions; but the serious content of the favours sought and received,

and the commitments made by either side, were not a great deal different from what had been witnessed during previous visits by Pakistan's higher dignitaries.

On such sensitive issues as the narcotics trade and Pakistan's nuclear programme—specially sensitive because without acceptable assurances from Pakistan and Presidential certification, U.S. aid can be cut off—the required guarantees were given and apparently accepted. A positive aspect of one agreement signed in Washington was the promise of close collaboration to curb the flow of narcotics through Pakistan, and this may well help save our country from total ruin. Further, a noticeable aspect of this State visit was that Pakistan was now represented by a Prime Minister elected in an open election; this fact as well as her personality and known predilections gave her far greater credibility than was accorded to her recent predecessors. Finalisation of the aid agreements, considered certain now, will certainly bring great satisfaction to the establishments in both countries—on our side for the large funding always urgently needed, and on the other for the quid pro quo of 'shared aims' that are not always concerned with democratic ideals.

It can be said with fair confidence that on Afghanistan there has been a sensible shift in policies. The pre-Jalalabad scenario seems to have been abandoned. Successful defence of this and other towns by the Afghan Government forces has proved that no early military solution is possible and only a political settlement can end the fratricidal war. Their repeated failures in the battlefield have weakened the position of the Peshawar Alliance and made it more difficult for the interim government fabricated at Rawalpindi to find new allies or even maintain minimal cohesion among its coalition members. Western correspondents have reported that the withdrawal of the Soviet forces from Afghanistan, followed by repeated Kabul proclamations of an amnesty and invitations for negotiations, has encouraged the demand for a negotiated peace among the Afghan people, including the refugees. With the PDPA [People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan]'s unity restored, even hostile commentators concede that the Najibullah Government has consolidated its political base.

It is also significant that, during the last few weeks, a steady stream of Afghan refugee families have crossed the border in the reverse direction; and many more would do so if they were not threatened with dire consequences by their camp commanders—mostly representatives of the most recalcitrant groups in the Alliance—and if the UN Co-ordinator were permitted to begin his allotted task of reconstruction and rebuilding in Afghanistan. What is more, many local rebel commanders have indicated their willingness to accept a ceasefire that would be followed by talks under the aegis of a person or persons acceptable to most Afghans. It is not surprising, therefore, that ex-King Zahir Shah's name has come up once again and most Afghans hope

that he will be invited to convene the Loya Jirga that would bring peace to Afghanistan, and, possibly, open the door to a democratic dispensation with the agreement of all political forces. According to some commentators the changed situation on the ground and various other developments have begun to isolate those among the rebels who wish to go on fighting and weakened the will of their patrons abroad who once strongly favoured a military decision. More and more, it is being accepted by objective observers that, for a host of reasons, the rebels cannot win the war, and that attempts to do so will bring more bloodshed to many parts of Afghanistan and its borders.

The Pakistan Government has wisely veered away from the surrealist policy devised by General Ziaul Haq and obviously guided by his overweening ambition. He actually wanted to become the most powerful ruler in the region and also be able to carry on America's crusade into areas beyond the Amu Darya. The change of policy indicated revives the possibility of a negotiated settlement in Afghanistan—as was visualised in the Geneva Accord and favoured by the unanimous resolution adopted last November by the UN General Assembly. Pakistan has suggested—seemingly with American approval—that a neutral administration should be set up in Afghanistan to make way for a peaceful transition to democracy. This has variously been described as a government of technocrats or of Afghan dignitaries who are held in respect by a majority of the Afghan people. Even the continued insistence by Pakistan and the United States that President Najibullah should step aside need not become an insuperable hurdle to negotiations—if the basic intent is honest. The Afghan leader himself has repeatedly declared that if his resignation can help to bring peace to his land he will gladly hand over to someone else. However, to reach that stage, it is essential that serious negotiations should be conducted between the two main parties concerned, namely, Pakistan and Afghanistan.

Since Pakistan still refuses to engage in direct talks with Afghanistan, it would be best to invite UN mediation. Such mediation has been sanctioned by the whole international community, and, considering the UN's past mediatory role in Afghanistan and many other lands, it offers the best hope of devising a workable agreement. The chances of peace have greatly been strengthened by Washington's decision to begin negotiations with the Soviet Union on Afghanistan's future. For more than a year, Soviet offers for such talks had been turned down as often as they were made, presumably because the U.S. handlers of the Peshawar-based rebels had begun to believe their own projections that, without the presence of Soviet troops, the Kabul Government would crumble like a house of cards. These prophecies were obviously inspired by the wish to register a proxy victory against Moscow. The well-tried U.S. strategy of making Asians fight Asians—with America supplying weapons to the good 'gooks'—has been translated here as making Afghans fight and kill Afghans. This must now stop. All

parties to the cruel war should learn the obvious lessons that it offers; and, in contrition, they should now join hands—and pool their resources—to compensate the Afghans for their decade of suffering with genuinely humanitarian aid.

As with all other States, the desire for restoring peace in Afghanistan and helping its rehabilitation should dictate Pakistan's future policies. It should not be forgotten that, since the summer of 1978, covert intervention in Afghanistan was carried out by General Ziaul Haq and his political allies. This effort escalated when, after the Soviet intervention in December 1979, the Americans saw an opportunity to fight their cold war with the Soviet Union through Afghanistan. They sought and were offered all facilities and help by Pakistan. It is high time all these facts were faced, so that Pakistan's Afghan policy can be assessed in terms of whole truths and guided by national interests. It is plain that, whatever benefits a few individuals may have derived from the Afghan situation, it has done our country a great deal of harm. Apart from such factors as the rise in inflation, the economic burdens borne, the increased unemployment as a result of the Afghan refugee influx, and the setback to Pakistan's ecology, the tolerance of the heroin trade and gun-running have introduced evils that it will take many years to remedy. Although the plans mooted for a political settlement are still rather nebulous, Pakistan must persist with its peace initiatives and avoid fuelling the Afghan civil war. This can help us to gain our two main national objective in the Afghan context—the return of all Afghan refugees and confirmation of the Bhutto-Daoud accord on the Durand Line. Lastly, it needs to be realised—before it is too late—that the price we are ready to pay for the liberty of others must not be so heavy that we lose our own.

**Editorial Urges Reconsideration of Budget**  
*46000160c Peshawar THE FRONTIER POST*  
*in English 5 Jun 89 p 4*

[Editorial: "Budget 1989-90"]

[Text] The Federal Budget for the year 1989-90 clearly reflects the economic and political constraints under which the present Government has been functioning. The Government was in a double mind. On the one hand, in keeping with its electoral promises, it was under a compulsion to take bold new initiatives to bring about basic structural changes in the economy to ameliorate the lot of the common people. On the other, it was prevented from taking the tough decisions necessary to mobilise resources by the minatory attitude of the Opposition, poised to make political capital out of the Government's economic difficulties. It is against this background that the Budget has avoided putting any burden on the common man. The rumoured enhancement of tax on petrol, electricity and gas has not come. No doubt, under the IMF diktat, the user charges have been increased in some areas but the enhancement is specifically designed not to affect people in the lower income

bracket. Telephone charges have been increased by paisa ten per call but the facility, otherwise a necessity, is mostly in the use of the well-to-do in our midst. Similarly, there has been an increase in fare in the case of travel by plane and 1st class and air-conditioned travel by train. The lower class used by the bulk of the people has not been touched. The revision in passport fees is intended to tax people supposedly going abroad for a lucrative job. It is also the well-to-do who make most use of cheques, stay in air-conditioned hotels, or use marble and ceramic tiles in their houses. There has been some criticism of the increase in postal charges, but on the whole, the Government has sorely disappointed those honing their knives to go after it on the taxation issue. The Budget's populist approach has aborted the Opposition storm that was brewing.

But it doubtful if the Government has come up to the expectations of its friends and well-wishers, who were waiting for policies marking a departure from the economic trends of the past, or of those of the serious minded economist looking for ways to correct glaring structural deficiencies in the economy. True to the past pattern, there has been an increase in the allocation for general administration, law and order and defence, while there has been a substantial decline in that for social and economic services. In the public sector development programme for 1989-90, the allocation for industry shows a decline of 35.4 percent and that for science and technology 20 percent. The energy sector has been given more funds but the increase falls far short of the needs. The reliance on foreign resources has increased and debt servicing is to go up by 24.2 percent. The levying of tax on agriculture has once again been put off to a future date. Defence, debt servicing, subsidies etc account for 87.4 percent of the current expenditure of Rs. 140,400.2 million.

Some of the measures outlined in the Budget are in contradiction of the state national objectives of encouraging savings and quickening the pace of industrialisation. The proposed tax on dividend income from investment trusts and saving schemes will discourage investment and savings. On the one hand, the Budget seeks to stimulate industrialisation by improving the equity ratio but on the other, it has excluded 38 industries from the category of 'key industry', which will adversely affect the rate of investment in the sector. The withdrawal of the BMR facility and depreciation allowance will also not help the cause of industrialists. Nor has there been any incentive for the export sector, whose performance is far below the productive capacity of the economy. The decision to increase the pay of employees in Grade 16 and below and allocations to the Teachers' Foundation and Veterans' Fund, etc, will prove popular, but such disturbing trends as a decrease in internal resources and increasing dependence on foreign aid, raise basic questions about the direction of our economy. The PPP [Pakistan People's Party] Government needs to do some serious thinking on the matter.

### Commentary Views PPP Policies as Political Expediency

46000159e Islamabad *THE MUSLIM* (Supplement) in English 16 Jun 89 p 4

[Article by Dr Samina Ahmed: "The Policies of Justice or Expedience?"]

[Text] There are rumours afloat that the PPP [Pakistan People's Party] and JUI [Jamiat-i-Ulema-i-Islam] (Fazlur Rahman group) are on the verge of reaching an understanding whereby the JUI(F) would support the government in repealing the Eighth Amendment in return for protection given to all clauses relating to the Shariah. In addition, the PPP and JUI(F) are working collectively in drafting a Shariah Bill which would be presented before Parliament with the aim of making the Shariah the supreme source of law in the land.

The Shariah Bill was first unsuccessfully introduced by the Zia regime in the form of the Ninth Amendment. Zia then enforced the Shariah Ordinance on June 15, 1988, for a period of four months. A second Shariah Ordinance, issued on February, 1989, also lapsed since it could not be placed before the national legislature for endorsement in the prescribed period. The Senate has now referred a private Shariah Bill before a newly constituted special consultative committee headed by Federal Religious Minister Khan Bahadur Khan, which is at present preparing a draft to be placed before the legislature.

Women's groups, concerned about the possible legitimisation of anti-women legislation by a representative government, have been calling on the PPP government to stand by its previous pledges to repeal all discriminatory laws. This concern is heightened by fears of a PPP-JUI deal on a Shariah Bill as the PPP rhetoric slowly shifts from an abrogation of the 'Islamic' legislation to the need for consensus on the introduction of an Islamic code in the form of the Shariah Bill.

During the long struggle for democracy, the PPP had joined hands with womens groups in publicly demonstrating against the promulgation of discriminatory legislation such as the Hudood and Shariah Ordinances. soon after Zia promulgated the Shariah Ordinance on June 15, 1988, joint rallies were held by the PPP women's wing and several feminist organisations, including the Women's Action Forum [WAF], the Democratic Women's Association and Shirkatgah. Although these demonstrations were met with brute force, as women activists and PPP workers were teargassed and baton-charged and several PPP leaders were arrested, the resolve of the women did not weaken as they continued to struggle for their rights in public and private forums.

During the election campaign in November 1988, the PPP continued to side with women opposing the past regime's discriminatory legislation. The PPP's election manifesto categorically assured women that all laws

discriminating against them would be repealed. When the PPP government was elected, there was a stir of hope that the PPP would honour its pledge to provide equal rights under the law to women, a hope based on Prime Minister Bhutto's reiterated commitment to "repeal all laws that are discriminatory to the women of Pakistan."

Doubts, however, began to surface when the PPP government began to equate the abrogation of the Hudood Ordinance with the repeal of the Eighth Amendment. There were further misgivings after Prime Minister Bhutto's meetings with Fazlur Rahman and reports on an agreement to introduce a Shariah Bill giving full protection to the religious provisions, including the Hudood Ordinance, in the Constitution.

In a bid to pressure the PPP to stand by its pledge, WAF and other womens groups began lobbying with the government at public forums such as the recent WAF seminar in Islamabad on the Eighth Amendment and the Hudood Ordinance, where Federal Justice Minister Syed Iftikhar Gilani and Minister of State for Education Shehnaz Wazir Ali pledged to abrogate all discriminatory laws "in the shortest period of time."

The JUI(F) reacted strongly to Gilani's assurances, with Fazlur Rahman categorically stating that his party had reached an agreement with the PPP on giving protection to all constitutional clauses related to the Shariah. He further stated that a ten-member PPP-JUI committee would soon be submitting a report on a proposed Shariah Bill to the Senate, and the two parties would work collectively to achieve national consensus on the bill. He added that his party had already contacted IJI [Islamic Jamhoori Ittehad] members in a bid to obtain support for the bill.

Since then, several government ministers, including Khan Bahadur Khan and Iftikhar Gilani, have stressed that the PPP attaches "top priority" to the enforcement of Islamic legislation and that the government is keen on formulating and presenting a Shariah Bill in the Parliament which would be acceptable to all schools of religious thought. On June 3, members of the PPP-JUI committee on the Shariah Bill presented a draft to the Prime Minister, who advised them to complete their work expeditiously and also to look at the implications of the Eighth Amendment and their prospective solution so that the Shariah could be enforced in the country.

These developments have reinforced suspicion among women that the government is more than likely to introduce a Shariah Bill in a bid to obtain support in the Parliament. In private conversations with concerned womens associations, government officials have emphasised the unlikely prospect of unanimity and consensus amongst religious schools such as the Hanafi and Jafari on the Shariah. This lack of consensus, they claim, will prevent the passing of such a bill. The Supreme Council of the Tehrik Nifaze Fiqhe Jafria, (TNFJ) has in fact

severely criticised the PPP-JUI joint Shariah Bill committee, stressing that any government decision to enforce the Islamic process would be opposed if the TNFJ is not consulted beforehand.

The argument that a lack of consensus might prevent the presentation of a Shariah Bill is hardly reassuring to opponents of the enforcement of repressive laws. Only recently, the Ulema and political parties in Azad Jammu and Kashmir managed to reach consensus on the issue in the Constituent Assembly, which unanimously approved a Shariah Act on May 3 which has since been ratified by the President. According to this law, all matters relating to Muslim Personal Law will be decided by the respective Fiqh of each particular sect. by confining itself to generalities and avoiding sectarian issues, the Azad Kashmir government has obtained the consensus necessary for passing the act. The same formula could be successfully adopted by the Pakistan government.

According to the chairman of the special Shariah Bill committee, the proposed Shariah Bill is being drafted in the light of the private Shariah Bill, the revised Shariah Ordinance and the Council of Islamic Ideology's report on Shariah. Under the Shariah Ordinance, all laws considered repugnant to the Shariah would be referred to either the Federal Shariah Court or the High Court and could, after due process, be struck down. The ordinance also provides that "experienced and qualified Ulema" would be eligible to appear before the court to interpret the Shariah. Muftis would also advise the federal government upon legal matters involving interpretation of the Shariah.

The public in general and women's organisations in particular are rightly concerned about delegating decisive powers to persons and institutions not accountable to the people of Pakistan. The Islamic code has been used and is still being used to create legal discrimination against women. Hundreds of women are still in prison under the Zina Ordinance, under which the onus of proving rape, for instance, rests on the woman herself. Most of the victims of the Hudood Ordinance are poor, illiterate and without legal redress, proving that these laws not only discriminate against women, but especially against poor, rural and illiterate women.

Should the Shariah Bill be enforced, it will give our clergy, a traditionally anti-women force, the right to interpret all legislation. The limited legal protection enjoyed by women under such laws as the Muslim Family Law Ordinance (1961) would be removed, since these could be declared un-Islamic. Moreover, the Federal Shariah Court, created under Martial Law, would be given considerable jurisdiction over a large number of matters and cases.

The PPP government must do some serious rethinking about the pros and cons legitimising Zia's Islamisation policies. If it is attempting to use the Islamic card to obtain support from the right-wing, fundamentalist forces, it should remember that they have proved unreliable allies in the past. Many sects of Ulema are still in the forefront of the present campaign to destabilise the government. A Muttehada Ulema Council has in fact threatened to launch a movement against women's rule in the country.

The PPP would do far better to stand by the commitments it has made to the women who fought alongside it against the past dictatorial regime instead of adopting politically expedient policies in hope of gaining limited backing from right-wing fundamentalists. Its efforts should be directed instead toward ensuring the abrogation of all discriminatory legislation and the introduction of laws which would safeguard and promote the welfare of all citizens of Pakistan.