




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Near East & South Asia

JPRS-NEA-89-022

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Supreme Soviet Decision on NKAO, Arrests Analyzed

Supreme Soviet Decision Well Received

46050017c Montreal HORIZON in Armenian
23 Jan 89 pp 1, 4

[Excerpts] After a delay of 1 month because of the earthquake, Moscow decided on 12 January to link the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast [NKAO] to Moscow temporarily and administratively while keeping it part of Azerbaijan geographically.

The 12 January decision of the USSR Supreme Soviet appoints a nine-member committee to run Artsakh's administrative, political, economic, cultural and miscellaneous affairs. Five of the committee members are officials of the central administration, and four are from Karabakh. Of those four, three are Armenian and one is Azeri.

In the words of a Soviet Armenian intellectual, "what we were doing until we were able to win this decision was child's play; the real work begins now." Indeed, the 12 January decision is positive to the extent that it creates legal and objective conditions for the development of NKAO and the establishment of closer ties between NKAO and Soviet Armenia. Persistent work with redoubled efforts is needed to take maximum advantage of these conditions. The presence of an Azeri in the committee does not make that work easier. On the other hand, the appointment of Arkady Volski as the chairman of the committee gives to some circles in Soviet Armenia the assurance that the committee will carry out its work impartially. Volski's statements to the press and television on his views regarding the work of the committee support that optimism. In any event, it is widely accepted in Soviet Armenia that this is not a final arrangement and that the battle must continue for the return of Artsakh. [passage omitted]

Karabakh Committee's Status

According to sources in Soviet Armenia, the Karabakh Committee members who were arrested in Armenia were transferred to Moscow on 10 January to be tried collectively as a single body. It is obvious that they should have been tried where they are accused of committing offenses. The members of Karabakh Committee will be tried on charges of instigating "interethnic hostility and massive disorder." The Committee's members have claimed responsibility collectively and individually and have demanded that their trial be open to the public with the presence of foreign reporters and jurists.

The intelligentsia has sent letters of protest to party and official organizations, while the people have been collecting signatures in defense of the defendants.

Stance of ArSSR Authorities Defended

46050017c Beirut ZARTONK in Armenian
13 Jan 89 pp 2, 4

[Editorial: "Let Us not Lionize Unnecessarily"]

[Text] As has been stated, the Soviet Armenian government treated the Karabakh Committee with the spirit of tolerance and glasnost, of course with Moscow's advice or blessing but also because of a correct evaluation of the internal situation. It chose the path of persuasion and political action, as the Armenian Communist Party First Secretary S. Arutyunyan declared in his 8 October 1988 speech. (Indeed, a Ramgavar [Democratic Liberal Party] delegation which was in Yerevan at that time lauded the Soviet Armenian government's truly democratic posture in its talks with senior officials.) At the same time, the Soviet Armenian government undertook to live in an unprecedented state of coexistence with the said Committee at the expense of putting itself at risk, principally motivated by the consideration that by solving the Artsakh problem in one way or another it would deprive the Committee of its popular support. A situation was created whereby those who were doing the real work for Artsakh, namely the government leadership and our mature intelligentsia, appeared in a diminished role in the eyes of the people and became the target of daily attacks and criticisms. In fact, it appeared that the Karabakh Committee gave instructions and the government machinery implemented it; the former enjoyed much greater popularity than the latter. The rule of talk appeared to be stronger than the rule of work. Moreover, in the eyes of our people in Soviet Armenia (and elsewhere), it was the Karabakh Committee which was the only pursuer and defender of a just solution to the Artsakh problem while in fact—this must always be emphasized—the true de jure and de facto pursuer and defender of the Artsakh cause was and remains the Armenians of Artsakh who have reserved the important role of diplomatic and political support to the Soviet Armenian government and people.

Taking advantage of this situation, the Karabakh Committee—which went through organizational changes twice and which was infiltrated by certain suspicious elements—engaged in an arm-wrestling match with the Soviet Armenian government and openly challenged its authority and standing. It often resorted to cheap clamoring tactics and expanded its domain of activity and propaganda to issues which had nothing to do with the Artsakh demands. For example, the endorsement of a uniform national spelling system was examined before a crowd of approximately 100,000 people. The committee's orators often went far beyond the boundaries of peril when, for example, they provoked anti-Russian and anti-Soviet sentiments or blabbered about forming an alliance with Turkey.

In effect a dual authority was set up in Soviet Armenia. The central authorities in Moscow and other sinister forces hiding behind them were partly responsible for

that by dragging their feet on the reasonable and just cause of Artsakh, by subjecting it to intolerable conflicts and by mounting a propaganda and sabotage campaign aimed at insulting our national dignity. They thus put the Soviet Armenian authorities in a cross-fire and weakened it.

The signal Mikhail Gorbachev gave during his visit to Yerevan was for the purpose of ending this situation. As a result of the Great Disaster, the Soviet Armenian republic was confronted with insurmountable difficulties and heavy losses and found itself in a needy position politically and economically. The presence of an illegitimate authority had become intolerable and dangerous, especially because a third center of power, the military had appeared on the scene. It was necessary to end the activities of the Karabakh Committee which was willing to exploit even the disaster to expand its de facto authority. Massive work needed to be done, and a central authority was needed to do that. That authority became the administration of Prime Minister Ryzhkov, who won the deep affection of our disaster-stricken nation, while First Secretary Arutyunyan's authority received low grades.

Then came the well-publicized arrest of the members of Karabakh Committee and its active supporters with the obvious purpose of prosecuting them in court.

And a great mistake was made. While a fresh blow was dealt to our people, which, as was stated in yesterday's article, was on the verge of losing its psychological balance after the Great Disaster and which believed that the Karabakh Committee was its only true defender, the Soviet Armenian government was discredited in the eyes of its people because, as far as we know, it was not the one that made the decision for the arrests. Moreover, that decision unnecessarily lionized a handful of young people just as a person like B. Ayrikyan, a traitor to the Armenian nation and the Artsakh cause, was lionized previously.

It is our deep belief that there were other means of warning the members of Karabakh Committee, making them face up to their national responsibilities and, naturally, purging their ranks and that those means were in the hands of the Soviet Armenian government even before the Great Disaster. The latest arrests deprive the Soviet Armenian government of precisely those means.

What was needed was to block the path of heroism for the young men of Karabakh Committee.

Turkish View of Karabakh Issue Analyzed
46050017a Beirut AZTAG in Armenian 20-21 Jan 89

[ARMENPRES article by L. Eyranyan, R. Safrastyan and A. Kirakosyan: "On the Position of Turkey's Mass Media on the Nagorno-Karabakh Issue"; originally carried on 17 January]

[20 Jan 89 p 4]

[Excerpts] The Nagorno-Karabakh issue has been broadly echoed by the international press. The mass

media in Turkey have devoted particular attention to the coverage of events related to the problems of Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast [NKAO]. That is not surprising. Turkey has a common border with the said region of the USSR, it is an active member of NATO, and every major problem in our country—not just the events in Azerbaijan and Armenia—is the subject of intense interest in Turkey. In addition, the history of Soviet-Turkish relations contain evidence of a not-so-uninterested posture on the part of our southern neighbor with respect to the Transcaucasian region. [passage omitted]

What information does the ordinary inhabitant of Turkey receive about the events in NKAO and developments related to that issue? How are these events and developments presented on the pages of newspapers and on radio and television broadcasts?

Some of the coverage provided by Turkish mass media is of informative nature. These reports are generally obtained from western news agencies and are published or broadcast with proper references to their sources. Such reports appear most often in CUMHURİYET (REPUBLIC), which is known as Turkey's most serious daily publication. The Turkish television tries to give the appearance of avoiding any political interpretations by broadcasting the most recent events in daily news programs and analyzing the developments in Karabakh in the monthly news program "32d Day." The Turkish radio and television prefer not to carry long reports about NKAO, or live reports on the massive demonstrations in the Theatre Square in Yerevan, though they do not lose any opportunity, perhaps naively, to shift the focus to other issues in order to cover up the essence of the issue and to portray minor details as being important. Moreover, a recent report by the Turkish radio broadcast service on the population of Azerbaijan stated without any comment that most of the victims of the recent tragic events in that republic were Azerbaijanis.

The television program "32d Day" broadcast on 5 December 1988 was interesting in that respect. The program's film crew visited Moscow, Baku and Sumgait in November. In addition to some impartial information, the program contained overtones which do not correspond with facts. For example, the program stated that the Armenians keep the Western press under surveillance and that that is why the Karabakh developments are reported from their viewpoint.

Some newspaper columnists wish to give their interpretation to the Karabakh problem, but in the process they demonstrate their complete "ignorance" of the true causes and nature of the events. Turkish newspaper reports often carry openly ill-motivated and inflammatory overtones. This practice has reached the point where Turkey's mass media purposefully try to distort the truth; provoke their readers with inflammatory reports; put the entire blame for the incidents in NKAO and Azerbaijan on Soviet Armenians, the Armenian

organizations in the Diaspora and the Armenian church; and support their allegations with absurd theoretical assumptions. For example, Mehmet Ali Birand, a prominent Turkish journalist, says that relations between Armenians and Azerbaijanis began to deteriorate in the mid-1970's as the anti-Turkish campaign over allegations of "the so-called Armenian genocide" gathered momentum (MILLIYET, 11 March 1988). Meanwhile, Professor Hasan Koni (MILLIYET 7 March 1988) and Sami Kohen, a prominent columnist, (MILLIYET 12 March 1988) cynically declare that the Armenians decided to raise the issue of merging NKAO with Armenia with the complicity of the Armenian church, Armenian parties in the Diaspora and Armenian extremist and terrorist groups taking advantage of the more liberal policies of the new Soviet administration and having been encouraged by the European Parliament's endorsement of the resolution on "the political solution of the Armenian question" in 1987. [passage omitted]

The basis of the interpretation the Turkish press has presented on the developments in NKAO is the traditional ideological mindset which provokes anti-Soviet and pan-Turkist sentiments in Turkey and which tries to portray the Soviet Union as an aggressor intent on enslaving the Turkish people and other Turkish-speaking peoples to the Turkish public. The reactionary precepts and principles of pan-Turkist and pan-Islamic ideologies are widely employed for this purpose.

[21 Jan 89 p 4]

[Excerpt] [Passage omitted] One often finds on the pages of the Turkish press claims that Turkey is the country that has the biggest interest in the resolution of the Karabakh problem after the Soviet Union and that the Karabakh issue is only a part of the general Armenian question and is directly aimed at Turkey. According to some Turkish observers, if the NKAO is united with the Armenian SSR, then "the next step the Armenians will take is to make territorial demands on Turkey" (MILLIYET 2 April 1988 and CUMHURIYET 18 July 1988).

That appears to be enough for MILLIYET (NATIONALITY) to declare that "in resolving the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict, the Soviets must first take into account Turkey's position on this issue" (2 April 1988). Moreover, the Turkish press occasionally resorts to the deliberate distortions contained in the statements of Turkish official spokesmen. For example, HURRIYET (FREEDOM) quotes a statement by I. Batu, head of the press relations department of the Turkish Foreign Ministry, to the effect that "Turkey has voice over the Nakhijevan issue" and then, on its part, extends that "right" to "NKAO as well as Zankazur" (18 April 1988). Let us note that the text of the Moscow Treaty of 1921 makes no reference to Nagorno-Karabakh or Zankazur. Hence, such allegations by the Turkish press have no basis. An article entitled "Should Turkey Sympathize with USSR's Problems?" is a full acknowledgement that "there is a prevalent conviction among certain Turkish

circles that it is essential to intervene in the Karabakh events and to support one of the sides in the conflict." The author of this article advises "not to take any risks, to stay away from openly supporting any side and to take a wait-and-see posture" (MILLIYET 12 March 1988). However, the analyses carried by Turkish press publications convey exactly the opposite sense.

TERCUMAN recently carried a report about a press conference held by Mehmet Aral, the president of the recently formed "Azerbaijani National Center." The press conference, held in Ankara on 5 March 1988, focused on the Karabakh issue. During the conference, Aral said: "The ancestral Turkish lands on the Araks, the Kura and the Caspian can never belong to the Armenians or the Russians. The Armenians are deeply mistaken if they believe that they can take Karabakh and Nakhijevan with the help of Gorbachev, Aganbegyan and others. The day is coming when that Armenian movement will be crushed by the 'iron hand' of the 22 million Azerbaijanis of northern and southern Azerbaijan."

Let us note that the establishment of such an organization in Turkey—an organization which considers itself the government-in-exile of Azerbaijan—and statements such as this by its president violate the Moscow Treaty of 16 March 1921, a document about which the Turkish press frequently blabbers. Article 8 of the Moscow Treaty states that the RSFSR and Turkey are obligated not to form or harbor on their territories organizations and groups which dispute the role of the government or the territorial makeup of the other side and which intends to wage war against the other side. Consequently, the diagnosis of "Western hands" made by one article can certainly be attributed to the Turkish side's position on the Karabakh issue.

By analyzing the reports of the Turkish mass media on the Karabakh issue it is possible to reach the following conclusion. The coverage of the Karabakh problem by the Turkish mass media is part of Turkey's traditional anti-Soviet campaign and is aimed at interfering in the internal affairs of the Soviet Union, increasing tensions between nationalities in a multiethnic nation, distorting the history of the Armenian people and in the process denying the genocide of 1915. It is evident that, in these days when the process of establishing a healthier general political atmosphere and consolidating mutual trust among nations and governments is gaining strength, Turkey's mass media could demonstrate more restraint in reporting a complex problem such as Karabakh which is fully subject to the jurisdiction of the Soviet Union and could perhaps avoid the appearance of interfering in the internal affairs of a neighboring state.

Soviet Writer Blames Government for Extent of Quake Damage

46050017b Paris HARATCH in Armenian
18 Jan 88 p 2

[Excerpts from Zori Balayan article: "The Living and the Dead"; originally published in Yerevan GRAKAN TERT on 6 January]

[Excerpts] [Passage omitted] We must judge not only the builders but chiefly those who are responsible for urban

construction in the republic. The leaders who suffered from guilty indifference and the fever of megalomania lack the sense of responsibility for tomorrow. They are literally capable of anything; they are both the judges and the defendants. It would not be fair to say that the public remained silent. The public has been screaming and shouting for 20 years that building a nuclear power plant in the heart of the Ararat plain, the people's only store of food, is equivalent to committing a crime against humanity. The writers managed to write a few lines on this issue with great difficulty and using ingenious pretexts. They said that the power plant is not too far away from our ancient city of Ani and the magnificent Zvartnots cathedral. It is through such clever means that they were able to note that Ani and Zvartnots were destroyed by earthquakes and requested and begged that the tragic lessons of history not be ignored. But all that was in vain. They did not permit us to write a single word about how the giant dam built on Marmarik River cracked without help from nature. It was fortunate that they had not yet filled the "artificial sea" behind the dam. In Yerevan, a heavy bridge collapsed killing several workers. Nothing was said. The people silently buried the victims. Meanwhile, the writers sent their declamatory articles to Moscow. They requested that they be read at least in official circles. To no avail. Ironically, that year, as in previous years filled with no fewer tragedies, the republic was declared a winner in socialist competition and was awarded a red flag. A newly-erected building scheduled for inhabitation in 1 or 2 weeks collapsed before the very eyes of Yerevan residents like a sand castle. The concrete shell on several segments of the Arpa-Sevan aqueduct was damaged without help from earthquakes. The papers wrote about this crime. But immediately "objective" causes were found. While the leadership exonerated

itself before the public, fresh damages occurred at various locations. The criminal policy of enlarging the suffocating city of Yerevan with "skyscrapers" continued.

On my desk I have reports about the 1926 earthquake [in Leninakan]. I am astonished by the similarities between that earthquake and this one. It is impossible to watch without teary eyes the pictures of those old days. Many of the victims are children. Even their deaths did not teach us a lesson. They forgot them too soon. They did not even try to familiarize themselves with the views of experts who proposed various methods of rebuilding Leninakan. A competition was announced for "plans for erecting earthquake-resistant buildings for human habitation." I can state with conviction that neither the officials of the republic nor even the officials of Leninakan are familiar with these 60-year-old documents.

The republic is filled with large blocks of masonry residential buildings which look like matchboxes. They fill rayon centers, new cities and even villages. All of them collapsed in the quake area. All newly-built schools, without exception, collapsed. In that sense, Yerevan can be considered as a symbol of soullessness and criminal short-sightedness. What would happen if the epicenter of the earthquake was a few hundred kilometers southeast of where it was? Even in their hour of tragedy the legendary citizens of Leninakan said: Leninakan was destroyed, but Gumri [former name of Leninakan] remains. Nothing would have remained of Yerevan. Therefore, it is essential to end immediately the foolish policy of expanding the capital's limits and to implement expeditiously the program of reinforcing all of its buildings. We have no other choice. [passage omitted]

PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS

PLO Financial 'Flooding' of Territories Examined
44230055 Tel Aviv MA'ARIV (Section B) in Hebrew
13 Jan 89 p 4

[Article by Avino'am Bar-Yosef]

[Text] A long line of cars moved slowly at the roadblock at Tapuah Junction. Dawn had not yet broken. The soldiers were checking the papers and contents of every vehicle from the territories seeking to enter Nabulus to deliver goods to the local market.

The Palestinians, who relate with seriousness to the declaration of independence in Algiers, view Nabulus as the temporary capital of their state, even though the main political activity takes place in East Jerusalem.

After the Tapuah roadblock, one encounters very few soldiers (certainly not Israeli civilians travelling on foot). There are many IDF patrols on the main axes. The "Shabab" [Palestinian youth] rule in the neighborhoods. The IDF sometimes pushes inside the neighborhoods to disperse demonstrations, using plastic bullets to put to flight the "Palestine Army" (young people dressed in improvised uniforms who undertake symbolic marches), and then hastening to withdraw.

The residents describe with colorfulness and pride, the marches of the youngsters of the "Shabibah" (the youth movement of Fatah), who march in step, calling out nationalistic slogans and waving Palestinian flags. Passersby standing on the sides of the alleys encourage what is called "The army of the people."

My companion is Dani Rubenstein, from DAVAR. We enter the "center of Palestinian independence." For greater security, we leave the car next to the military administration building and begin to walk, holding Arabic newspapers so as not to arouse special attention.

The city has only begun to awaken. On the main streets, where the military presence is conspicuous, the local residents seem depressed, troubled, and somewhat bent as they hurry to open the shutters of stores, garages, and restaurants. They open only the door shutter. In many cases it is riddled with bullet holes.

The further one penetrates into the narrow alleyways of the casbah [old city], the more the atmosphere changes. Heads are lifted high, the din is great, young men wear kafiyahs, women hold shopping baskets, and children are shouting.

In the "liberated" casbah of Nabulus, there is, in addition to the market, a residential neighborhood. The poor of the city live here. There is no reminder of Israeli rule here. Every corner bears nationalistic slogans in the

different colors of the factions. There are Fatah flags drawn on pieces of paper the size of postcards, and there are leaflets bearing the image of Yasir 'Arafat on the walls.

There is an astonishing abundance in the market. The stores are filled with in-season fruits and vegetables. The prices are cheap. The produce vendors shout out "4 kg of potatoes for 5 sheqels! A sheqel and a half for a kg of tomatoes." In the Mahane Yehuda Market [in West Jerusalem] vendors would be selling such tomatoes by shouting: "Each one is of the finest quality!" Very nice potatoes too. Fresh goods.

Searching for the exit to the main street, we chance upon the butchers market. It is not nice. Israelis have not tread here at least since the intifadah [uprising] broke out. Butchers are cutting the meat with knives and using axes to separate the bones. Puddles of blood are on the floor from that morning's slaughter. The decapitated heads of sheep hang in the stores. Boys run with large trays filled with the thighs of sheep and the flanks of lambs.

In Clock Square, we talk with the mayor of Nabulus, Hafiz Tuqan, at the soap factory he owns. After the threats against the mayors, he announced his resignation. He no longer goes to city hall. It was always tense there. Here, he is at ease. He receives us with a benevolent expression. He complains about the authorities, and recounts the heavy pressure exerted on him to return to work, both on the economic level and in the form of raids on his house and business.

The government denies most of the complaints. However, it seems that Israeli pressure concerns Tuqan less than threats made by the PLO against appointed mayors. He describes the difficult economic situation, which contradicts the abundance in the casbah of Nabulus.

The delicatessens in East Jerusalem also appear to be fully stocked. At the stores of the Ja'far chain of delicatessens in Bayt Haninah and Bethlehem, the shelves and refrigerators are filled with everything good—"Melita" coffee from Brazil, Dutch and French cheeses, Hungarian "Hertz" sausage, and Russian caviar. There are luxuries, a sign that there are also buyers.

Where does the population obtain the financial means [to purchase such items] in the light of the continuing paralysis of business initiatives, commercial strikes, and the cessation of workers going to work in Israel?

The routine of the intifadah makes it possible for the residents to carry out a reasonable level of activity. Business hours are limited, but the shopkeepers continue to sell, sometimes behind closed doors, or in homes. Garages and workshops operate behind closed shutters, after business hours as well. Many of those working in Israel continue to work on strike days as well, and when travel on the highways is dangerous for them, they sleep inside the green line.

However, security elements believe that the most of the compensation [paid] to the population comes from PLO money, which is continuing to flow despite the close monitoring introduced at the bridges and the close monitoring of the Bank Cairo-Amman. The directives to limit the amounts permitted to be transported across the bridge (from 2,000 Jordanian dinars or \$5,000 without reporting, to 200 Jordanian dinars at present) present difficulties but do not prevent money from being brought into the territories. The money entering legally reflects only a small portion of the true sums that find their way inside by prohibited means. The PLO transfers 50 Jordanian dinars per month to the family of every unmarried detainee, and 60 Jordanian dinars (about 250 NIS [New Israeli Sheqels]) to every married detainee per month.

Families of official members of the organization receive much greater financial assistance, in accordance with the position and rank of the member. The largest amounts of money are sent to build houses destroyed by order of the IDF authorities.

A glance at construction materials stores indicates that business is flourishing even in these times—Italian porcelain, marble from Hebron and Turkey, and bathtubs from France and Britain.

Since the large amounts are brought in secretly, it is difficult to estimate exactly how much "prohibited money" entered the territories last year. The rough estimate of security elements is somewhere in the area of \$60 million.

Akram Haniyah, 'Arafat's advisor for territories affairs, has claimed on more than one occasion in private discussions that the amount is much greater. According to him, last year the PLO channeled an amount which is equal to the total amount transferred to the territories since the Israeli occupation began 20 years ago.

As a matter of fact, there have been no significant disclosures in this area until now, and matters have proceeded without rippling the surface.

Only once did security elements succeed in siezing a large amount of money from a woman from Nabulus, Janan Baytar. She admitted that she received 100,000 Jordanian dinars from the PLO to distribute in the area of her residence. She went to Jordan in March of last year to organize the transfer of the money.

The charge sheet submitted to the military court in Nabulus indicates that the amount was transferred directly to her home by an anonymous messenger. She did not know, or did not wish to disclose the identity of the messenger.

Senior security elements emphasize that there is no chance of changing the situation as long as Israel operates according to the regulations which are customary in Western banks, and permits world media representatives and international organizations to act freely.

Indeed, some of the deals are transacted through money changers in the territories. However, there is no cause to close down the money changers in Jerusalem if they establish branches in Amman, London, and other capitals, and the Israeli banks refuse to allow the General Security Service to examine the accounts of their clients.

Among other things, the Arab Aid Association in Geneva, whose registered capital is \$100 million, is transferring money to the Palestinian Woman's Association, to workers' organizations, and to the "Sons of the Village." Arab merchants in Israel are also dealing in the introduction of money, and it has been reported that even Jews from Me'a She'arim and Bney Braq are also involved in channeling money to the territories in exchange for a fee of 25 percent.

In the opinion of security elements, the new economic policy of encouraging foreign investments is liable to exacerbate the situation further.

In principle, the only remaining technical problem is the distribution of the money to those entitled to it according to the criteria of the PLO. Local nationalistic elements say that the problem was solved by distributing sums to each faction of the organization individually; thus, separate amounts were distributed to Fatah, the communists, and the "rejectionist front."

A large amount of money is also directed to organizations and bodies for the acquisition of foodstuffs, fuel, and raw materials supplied directly to the villages. For example, when the refurbishment of the fuel supply was suspended, emergency stockpiles were established in the territories. They already have a substantial amount of fuel purchased in Israel to be used in the event of a shortage. Nationalistic elements state that the widespread corruption of the past has disappeared, as "dregs in Palestinian society were shaken up together with the shaking [of the intifadah]."

According to nationalistic elements, who are corroborated by security elements in Israel, "Shabibah" is collecting money from merchants to finance its activities in exchange for assuring their security and preventing the entrance of Israeli tax inspectors. In the casbah of Nabulus, for example, the payment collected by "Shabibah" is 10 Jordanian dinars (about \$40) per month. The collectors give the store owner a receipt to prevent double demands.

The abundance in the markets and stores does not mean that the residents of the territories are not paying a heavy and draining price for the intifadah. Not every one can

allow himself to buy these delicacies. It is certain that this abundance will not compensate for the sons who were killed, injured, or arrested.

The closure of the schools is also causing great suffering. A father who sees his 10 children are running about in the streets during the year instead of studying is not encouraged. However, the financial compensation makes endurance possible. Financial compensation is currently an especially important element in view of the increase in motivation to continue the struggle resulting from the U.S. decision to hold a dialogue with the PLO.

Nevertheless, there are shortages in certain areas in Nabulus. Despite the improvised reserves of fuel, only one gas station was open on the day we visited. Tanker drivers are afraid to come. We ran low on gas and were compelled to wait in a very long line to fill our tank. There was only 91 octane gas at the station. From time to time, one of the vendors inserted a long pole in the storage tank so as to be able to signal to those waiting if the supply ran out.

An IDF patrol stationed at the side for greater security discerned the Israeli plates on our vehicle: "What are you doing here?" the patrol personnel asked. We thought we were buying gas. "Are you crazy? It is dangerous here," they told us.

Israelis no longer come. When my companion, Dani Rubenstein approached a store to buy a kg of tangerines, I said to him: "Stop; if they stab us in the back, they will at least say 'They fell in the line of duty.' If you hold a basket of fruit in your hand, the headlines will herald that two Israeli reporters were murdered because they went to find a good deal in the casbah of Nabulus."

Activist Faysal Al-Husayni Profiled

44230065 Tel Aviv MA'ARIV (Section B) in Hebrew
3 Feb 89 p 2

[Article by Amos Gilbo'a and Avino'am Bar-Yosef: "Faysal al-Husayni, the 'Godfather' of the Territories"]

[Text] Winter 1967. It is cold, but the sweet taste of the brilliant victory of the Six Day War still puts warmth in the heart and euphoria in the head of Dayan, the warden from Ramla prison. As was his wont, he checked the cells of the security prisoners several times a day and raised his voice at them, while they, bent and submissive, got up from their pallets and stood to attention.

Only one of them was different, and it amazed the warden. He was young, 27, tall, well built, with hazel eyes. Dayan always found him standing up straight, braced against his yelling, with a thin, exasperating smile on his lips.

One day Dayan could no longer hold off and asked: "Say, why are you always smiling at me, what's so good about this rotten dark cell?"

"Well, you see, the wall doesn't smile at me, the sun doesn't smile, and certainly the fate of my conquered people doesn't smile at me. There's nothing I can do about those things, but my self-esteem and my pride are in my hands, are up to me, and they are smiling."

From that moment on Dayan stopped his domineering behavior toward that young man, Faysal al-Husayni.

He had been arrested by the security forces in August of the same year and accused of belonging to a terrorist organization and of arms possession. The weapons in question, a Kalachnikov and a Czech Samoval, had been given to him some 2 months previously in Ramallah by Yasir 'Arafat, at the time Fatah's chief operations officer.

'Arafat was not caught and escaped to Jordan. Faysal was sentenced to 1 year imprisonment thanks to a plea bargain struck by his lawyer, Shlomo Tusiya Kohen.

One year later he was released from prison, a quasi-anonymous man, and was swallowed up among the population of East Jerusalem.

Some 20 years later he was brought in the "Pusta," the prisoners' van, from Jerusalem's High Court of Justice to the temporary detention facility at Ramla (from where he was transferred to the Kfar Yona prison, near Natanya, the site of his latest administrative detention). On the way, the guard in charge left his route and drove to the Soldiers' Home near the Knesset building.

"Men, men," he shouted, "come and see who we have here." Soldiers gathered around curiously. "This is Faysal al-Husayni, the leader of the intifadah [uprising]. Look at him well, so you'll know for what you're fighting," the guard continued, while Faysal smiled his smile.

On the way they began to talk about peace and destruction, and later, on subsequent rides to the court in Jerusalem, a sort of friendship developed between them. Faysal's personal charm and his soft way of talking had their influence on the guard.

Who is Faysal al-Husayni, what shaped his personality, his life, and his views?

Faysal was born in "exile" in Baghdad in 1940. His father, 'Abd al-Qadir al-Husayni, was the head of one of the largest Arab bands (known to the Arabs as the Army of the Holy Jihad) in the Jerusalem area during the 1936-39 riots (known to the Arabs as "the Great Arab Rebellion") directed against the British, too.

He was a legendary figure in Arab myth. He belonged to the al-Husayni family, the greatest, richest, and most respected among Arab families prior to 1948. That was

the cream of the Palestinian nobility that spawned the Mufti Haj Amin al-Husayni, but today nothing is left of it but memories, as well as considerable wealth and...Faysal al-Husayni.

Faysal almost never saw his father. The father was always on some mission for the mufti. On 8 April 1948, he was killed in the battle for the Qastel. His funeral on the Temple Mount was the biggest ever in Jerusalem. The family learned of his death in Cairo, where they were living at the time.

A light comes into Faysal's eyes when he remembers his widowed mother, Wajihah, who raised her four children while at the same time ruling the family affairs with an iron hand. She died in London 25 years after her husband. She was also a member of the al-Husayni family. The eldest daughter, Hayfa, is today a teacher in Tunis. The older brother, Musa, a physician, has been living for many years in Saudi Arabia. The younger brother, 'Azzi, made it into the high ranks of Fatah.

"I did not shed one tear when the news of father's death came," said Faysal years later. "Only a few days later, when the Egyptian Government informed us that we were entitled to free education, did I understand that I was an orphan, and that's when the tears streamed down my face."

The figure of the legendary father, "who was never defeated," has been pursuing him since. For years he was obsessed by the question of how exactly his father died at the Qastel and why, whether accidentally, as a result of negligence, or heroically.

In the rented villa in which he now lives in East Jerusalem there is a wood carving of the father sporting an ammunition belt across his chest.

The date 8 April was decreed a Palestinian day of mourning, the "Day of the Fallen." His mother held a yearly memorial day in Cairo. The entire elite of the Palestinian exile attended, and Faysal watched and listened. After 1967 he used to go to the Qastel, lay a wreath, and commune with his father's memory. He has not been able to do that since 1982, when his movements were put under administrative restrictions. He would continue the tradition, if only he could.

Faysal grew up fatherless in the Cairo house that immortalized the defeat of 1948 and the pain of humiliation and exile. The mufti ("who was like a second father to me," Faysal said), a Hitler ally who escaped from a French prison after World War II and went to Cairo, was a frequent visitor to the house. Yasir 'Arafat, Faruq al-Qaddumi, and Abu Iyad, the future leadership generation of the Palestinian movement, made the "pilgrimage."

Those were the days of ascending Nasirism, and the atmosphere was permeated by aspirations for the great Arab unity. Faysal fell prey to its charms and joined the ranks of the pan-Arab organization that later became George Habash's organization.

The 1958 Qasim revolution in Iraq prompted him to go to Baghdad and enroll there in the Military Academy. But he became disillusioned 1 year later, returned to Cairo, studied geology at the university for 2 years, then quit. Activist enthusiasm and the spirit of the times moved him to become active in the "Union of Palestinian Students."

That seems to still bother him. He is surrounded by people with academic degrees. Years later he began a correspondence course with the University of Beirut—Greek philosophy and history—but he was once again forced to stop before securing a degree. That did not detract from his love for literature and philosophy, and he still reads a lot.

The year was 1964. The PLO was established under Ahmad Shukayri and Faysal, 24 at the time, returned to the family's original home in Jerusalem. He worked in the PLO offices and there, in mid 1966, he transferred from the administrative to the military track. He went to a 1-year officers' course in Halab, Syria, within the framework of the Palestine Liberation Army [PLA], and continued his training in military engineering in Damascus.

The Six Day War cut his training short. He had just enough time to fire 22 anti-aircraft shells at an Israeli airplane that was bombing Damascus before he and a friend took a truck full of weapons and ammunition and made tracks to Lebanon.

In the Druze village of Kayfun, which looked down on a breathtaking vista of Beirut—at the time the "little Paris" of the Middle East—the two established the first PLO training camp in Lebanon. That was the focus of the first bloody conflict between the PLO and Lebanese citizens, a conflict that in the coming years was to claim thousands of victims.

"The camp was dismantled after 1 month," Faysal said. "I was faced with the fateful decision of whether to remain outside or go inside. I decided to go to Jerusalem, in Palestine, and to stay there."

In July 1967 he crossed the Jordan and made it to East Jerusalem. His other decision was: "If I agree to live there without trying to change the situation, although I am aware of my people's humiliated life, the shame will be worse than death."

How does one change the situation? Through political means, military means, or a combination thereof?

He argued about that with 'Arafat in the Renault car in which they rode through the sunny streets of Ramallah in August 1967. The outcome of that was that he spent 1 year in jail. During that time he revealed his views in an interview he gave to Knesset Member Amnon Rubinstein, who at the time was a journalist with HA'ARETZ: "The solution must be political and peaceful: the establishment of one state, the return of the Arab refugees, and the cessation of Jewish immigration. Both nations have rights to this country. History calls for war between them, but reality calls for coexistence."

The 1970's brought him into close contact with Israel. He won Israeli friends, toured the country, had a good time in it, traded with it, and learned to know and understand Israeli society with its weak and strong points. He used the time to improve on the Hebrew he learned in jail. For that purpose he enrolled in the Bet Ha'am Ulpan [Hebrew language school] in the western part of Jerusalem.

"I understood that the Jews wanted a homeland and had won it. We Palestinians, too, must solve our problem, but not at the expense of the Jews," he said.

He gradually came to the decision that perhaps one had to give up the grand dream of the one state and be content with the smaller dream of an independent Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza. That, however, without giving up the principle of "the right of return" and without burying the grand dream.

During those years he married Najat, a cousin on his father's side. His eldest son, who is now 16 years old, was named Mahmud 'Abd al-Qadir. The father, once again.

He himself (a wealthy man, with lots of property) worked like a simple mortal. He worked as a tractor driver, a radiology technician, and sold sweets. During that same time he struggled stubbornly to get the insurance document that could serve him in the next decade and prevent his exile: a Jerusalem identity card.

The receipt he had received from Jerusalem's city hall in 1967, attesting that he was a resident of that city, was lost in jail, and without it he could not get an identity card. Only after the birth of his daughter Fadua in 1976 did he manage to secure it. The great irony was that when he was arrested the last time, on 31 July 1988, his identity card ended up in the washing machine together with a pair of pants.

With an identity card and an established Palestinian identity he was able to become active and began to come into the limelight: toward the end of 1979 he established the "Institute for Arab Studies," which was later described by the security service as a center of PLO underground activities in the territories. Faysal himself said about it: "That is my weapon, just as the stone is the weapon of the young people in the streets."

The institute began to develop ties with bodies throughout the world, in the Arab countries, and in Israel. Faysal worked hard, 16 hours a day. His office became like "the court of a rabbi." Activists, members of all currents, especially young people, were frequent visitors.

At the beginning of 1982 the security forces put restrictions on his movements: he was forbidden to leave Jerusalem and was forbidden to leave his house after dark. But the activities of the institute intensified and Faysal became known as a man who was prepared to suffer and continue the struggle.

That is when a big void opened in the Palestinian leadership in the territories. The "Committee of National Guidance," a pro-PLO body, was banned by law. The majority of the elected mayors were removed from their jobs, some of them were banished, and some were targeted by the Jewish underground. Names of leaders like Bassam al-Shak'ah, Karim Khalaf, Muhammad Milhim, and Fahd al-Qawasimah disappeared from headlines and from the arena.

Faysal kept climbing the leadership ladder. Additional names cropped up, but they were not leader material like Faysal.

He was modest, polite, almost always informally dressed. In winter he wore a sweater and raincoat, and in summer an open-neck shirt. He drove an Autobianchi or an Austin Montego despite his wealth. He was straight, credible, frank, warm, democratic in his behavior to everyone, while at the same time radiating authority. He knew how to draw people to him, but he kept due distance from his enemies.

He was not argumentative and did not burn his bridges to any organization: not with the Muslim fundamentalists, not with the communists, and not with the "Rejectionist Front." He was always the arbitrator, the compromiser, and the calming factor. He knew how to gather around him clever and polished intellectuals like Sari Nusaybah and how to activate them. At the same time, he knew how to fire up the youth.

Faysal is sensitive to street rumors and to public opinion, and he knows how to shape the latter according to the most topical need. On top of all that, his family name and tradition and his past as a suffering prisoner also give him points. He became a symbol for the younger generation "which did not know Husayn" and which is carrying on the intifadah.

After consolidating his position, Faysal in a way became the "godfather" of the territories. Almost every conflict at Nabulus' al-Najah University, at Bi'r Zayt, or in Bethlehem finds its way to his desk.

By the end of 1986 his leadership was already prominent and overt. He opposed meetings between Palestinian notables and British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher,

U.S. Vice President George Bush, and Secretary of State George Shultz. He knew how to use pressure from below for his purposes, bringing street youths to the parlors of the traditional leadership in order to prevent the meetings.

He opened a peace campaign directed at the Israeli public, established ties to various leftist groups, and fruitlessly tried to make contact with the top Israeli establishment and to meet with Prime Minister Yitzhaq Shamir, through Moshe Amirav, among others.

During the months preceding the intifadah and during most of 1988 he was in jail as a result of a series of administrative detentions.

The High Court of Justice in Jerusalem stated that it has been proven that his activities were of an undermining nature and dangerous to public and state security, and that he was a senior Fatah activist. His institute served as a money transfer center for terrorist organizations and for coordinating their activities. His type of sabotage was more dangerous than physical violence. It was proven that he was involved in organizing demonstrations and riots.

Now he is once again free. Has the time spent in jail hurt his leadership and prominence? Will he continue to be No 1 in the territories?

Faysal al-Husayni thinks he will, but he also knows that he now stands before a new trial period. That is the impression that we gained from our talk with him.

[Box, p2]

[Interview with Faysal al-Husayni by MA'ARIV reporters Gilbo'a and Bar-Yosef at his Jerusalem home; date not given]

Any Hint of Renunciation of the Right of Return Is More Damaging to Us Than Being Hit by Lightning

After the outcry around Faysal al-Husayni's house on the Mount of Olives after his release died down, the visitors changed. The dozens of journalists were replaced by Palestinian activists who had accompanied him on his political way and by hundreds of youths who were carrying on the intifadah at the local level. The international media hailed him as the underground leader returning from the cold. He disconnected his telephone in order to be able to go back to work.

At the Kfar Yona detention installation more than 3 weeks ago he met with Shmu'el Goren, activities coordinator in the territories, an establishment man who has switched over to handling Arab affairs there. The interview with Goren took place before the Rabin plan.

"That meeting had to take place," al-Husayni told us this week in his house during a talk that lasted several hours. "Goren knew my file backwards, so it was only natural that he should want to meet me in the flesh. It was a good discussion and the atmosphere was pleasant. I viewed that as natural, although I do understand its political significance.

"Goren mainly wanted to find out what we wanted, what our short-term aspirations were, and what we envisaged for the future. We talked a lot about the right of return. He recalled Yasir 'Arafat's statements about 6 million Palestinians."

[MA'ARIV] That means that you discussed the core of the problem. There is nothing that worries the Israelis more than your claims for the right to return. Yitzhaq Rabin said that only a mad Israeli would agree to that request.

[Al-Husayni] "If there is peace, then we must think in terms of a new scenario. France and England were always at war. Today, who cares if a Frenchman wants to live in London or the other way round? The world is now geared to bloc agreements, common markets, and political pacts.

"Israel must fit into the Middle East in preparation for the 21st century. You must choose between being a junior partner in Europe or a senior partner in the Middle East market. If that comes to be, then there will be such freedom of movement that if I want to build a house on the sea shore in Akko, no one would mind."

[MA'ARIV] That means that you are still talking about a binational state?

[al-Husayni] "Not exactly. There are all kinds of options. For example, residence in Netanya would not give Palestinians the right to vote for the Knesset. Whoever lives there, or in Jaffa, or in Akko would vote for the Palestinian Parliament. Asking us to give up the right of return means discriminating between the local Palestinians and the PLO and the Palestinians who live in exile. Any hint along that line is worse than being struck by lightning."

[MA'ARIV] The Israeli fears stem mainly from the demographic problem. From our viewpoint, that is an existential problem. Where would you settle the refugees? There is not enough room in the territories, and Israel would not agree to absorb them.

[Al-Husayni] "I can set your mind at rest on that score. There are not 6 million Palestinians in the whole world, more like 4 and 1/2 million, if that. Half of them already live here, in the territories and within the Green Line. No one knows how many of the others would want to return. We do not mean to endanger your security, just as we do not want to arouse fears for Husayn's throne.

"Israel must define for itself what it wants, and say:

A. In principle we do not object to the establishment of a Palestinian state.

B. Our fears stem from the deterioration in the demographic situation in the wake of the request to realize the right of return to Israel and to the Palestinian state."

[MA'ARIV] And what about the refugees?

[Al-Husayni] "Then we can talk about a solution within the framework of an international conference, or decide on direct talks on the subject. A solution must be found that will satisfy the refugees, who must be returned to their homes and lands or receive financial compensation."

Al-Husayni then took off on distant dreams of a peace without frontiers:

"The Palestinian state will not have an army. Otherwise we cannot invest in development and compete with you in the regional market. Maybe you'll like that idea, too, and dismantle your army, or perhaps you'll 'strive' to persuade us that one cannot live without an army."

He viewed his meeting with Shmu'el Goren as a natural occurrence. He first refused to confirm it, admitting to it only after Rabin told the cabinet about it. The coordinator stayed with a general discussion. Right at the very beginning he informed him that it had been decided to release him, so that he would not hesitate to state his views. He formed a positive impression of Goren. He did not sound high and mighty, and the handshake at the end of the talk was warm...

Through the years he has found out that many of the IDF [Israel Defense Forces] men genuinely and sincerely fight for a better world. Thus, for example, he came to the "Peace Now" conference that took place before his latest arrest in the car of Janet Avi'ad, a Jerusalem activist who feared that Israelis of the extreme right may try to hurt him. She brought along a reserve paratrooper to be his bodyguard.

His statements about elections in the territories elicited criticism from some young activists, who tried to take his place in the leadership while he was in prison.

There is nothing new under the sun. In the wake of Faysal al-Husayni's unequivocal support for the Abu Sharif document (which advocated recognition of Israel), many people thought that he had withdrawn from his earlier position and had become more moderate. Today, when the document has been adopted by the PLO, his critics are isolated and his position is stronger than ever.

BAHRAIN

Island's Water Use Reviewed

44000328 Manama GULF DAILY NEWS in English
28 Jan 89 p 5

[Text] Water consumption in Bahrain is rising at an alarming rate, according to a top official.

The normal consumption rate is 54 million gallons of water daily, half of which is pumped from underground aquifers.

But in July last year it reached an all-time high of 64 million gallons.

To meet the rising demand without putting additional pressure on underground water would mean building a new water desalination plant every two or three years, said the director of water supply Mr Sayf 'Isa al-Binali.

Mr al-Binali told AKHBAR AL-KHALIJ newspaper that since 1986, demand for water had been rising alarmingly, which led to increased pumping of underground water, particularly during the summer.

"This affects the quality of drinking water supplied to consumers," he warned.

Because of the pumping of underground water, its salinity levels had gone up, said Mr al-Binali.

"The water supplied to the consumer has a salinity level of 1300 to 1600 particles per million which is an internationally approved standard," he said.

EGYPT

Foreign Minister Views Settlement Moves

PM1003145189 London AL-MAJALLAH in Arabic
8-14 Mar 89 pp 30-31

[Unattributed interview with Egyptian Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Dr 'Ismat 'Abd-al-Majid in Cairo; date not given]

[Text]

[AL-MAJALLAH] It is noted that Cairo has recently become a center for diplomatic moves aimed at a peaceful settlement in the Middle East. It is also noted that these extensive moves have still achieved no tangible return. How do you interpret this, and who is responsible for delaying that return?

[Abd-al-Majid] First of all, if we talk about a "return," that gives an economic concept to a noneconomic task. Economic criteria do not apply to diplomacy. We must know first that diplomacy is work that entails a great deal of secrecy and delay, but its results emerge after a while, when many ideas and matters crystallize. I would like to

say that recent Egyptian contacts are the product of an Egyptian position which has always been logical and committed, seeking to reactivate the Palestinian issue and give an impetus to the peace process. I believe that this was clear in the contacts in question and the eagerness displayed by everyone without exception, Arabs and non-Arabs, to convene the meetings and listen to the Egyptian viewpoint, hold consultations, and exchange views. Egypt adopts a distinctive position because it always opens dialogue and talks with all parties without exception at a time when those parties are not talking to one another. But it is clear that there is a long road ahead of us which we must follow. Anyone who follows the right path will reach the objective; and we are on the that path.

[AL-MAJALLAH] This leads us to a question about Egyptian foreign policy, which is now witnessing a period of prosperity.

[Abd-al-Majid] First of all, there is a conscientious political leadership represented by President Husni Mubarak. It is clear that is he who defines the Egyptian foreign line and its complementary organs [as published]. Clarity of vision, credibility, and direct, reasonable handling of the issues lead us to the objective desired.

[AL-MAJALLAH] Let us once again return to the question of a settlement in the Middle East. There are differing views of Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze's visit to Cairo. What is your comment?

[Abd-al-Majid] Reactivating peace is very important. We are interested in seeing an active Soviet role. The development in that role has not been confined to the Middle East. There has been development in Soviet foreign policy itself. I recall my meeting with Gorbachev last year, when I went to Moscow on the first official visit. I met with him for 90 minutes, during which I sensed his developed thinking. We in Egypt have been anxious to maintain cordial relations with the two superpowers and the European states, and to reach an understanding and hold a dialogue with Israel in order to urge the need for Israel to cooperate in the move toward peace, because that is not only in the interests of the Palestinian issue or the Middle East problem, but in Israel's interests as well. The Israeli practices which we are witnessing must be brought to an end.

[AL-MAJALLAH] In light of your knowledge of the Soviet position and the European position, do you consider it possible to coordinate the two positions so as to form a force to pressure the parties concerned into a settlement?

[Abd-al-Majid] Yes, I believe that there is European-Soviet coordination, because as we speak, the Spanish foreign minister, who is the present EC chairman, is in Moscow and U.S. Secretary of State James Baker is in

Vienna. So there are active moves vis-a-vis the Palestinian problem which might have been forgotten before the intifadah [uprising]. The intifadah has brought about development, and the question now is: How can the intifadah be translated into political moves? It has changed the balance in the region.

[AL-MAJALLAH] Among Shevardnadze's important proposals in Cairo is the 5-member committee idea, which has received some response from some parties. What is Egypt's position on participation in that committee, and what is Egypt's position in general?

[Abd-al-Majid] We are for the idea of the states concerned with the Arab-Israel conflict meeting to consult and unify the position. When Shevardnadze informed us of the 5-member committee idea, we welcomed it.

[AL-MAJALLAH] Are the five parties ready to join such a committee?

[Abd-al-Majid] We understood from Shevardnadze that the Syrians have agreed and the other parties have showed no opposition.

[AL-MAJALLAH] Do you think that that committee could lead to positive results with regard to crystallizing the Arab position?

[Abd-al-Majid] The mere convening of the committee, its meetings, and consultations among the five states for the first time must be beneficial.

[AL-MAJALLAH] Has the level been determined?

[Abd-al-Majid] No, it has not yet been determined.

[AL-MAJALLAH] With regard to the recent U.S. position demanding that the PLO cease fedayeen operations in the occupied territory, what is the Egyptian position?

[Abd-al-Majid] We hope that the Palestinian-U.S. dialogue will continue and that it not be hampered, but will deepen further.

[AL-MAJALLAH] But what is your position regarding the U.S. demand?

[Abd-al-Majid] I hope that these events will not lead it to suspend the dialogue, because that would be a setback for present moves at a time when everyone is trying to boost them.

[AL-MAJALLAH] With regard to the U.S. position, there is a view that Bush is slow by nature in making his decisions and that he is still working to put his house in order. Do you believe there is a chance of a major development in the U.S. position, or a chance of its being reactivated under the present Bush administration?

[Abd-al-Majid] I believe that President Bush has experience and a background that qualify him to play a serious and effective role in reactivating that position. His experience, his work, and the positions he has held qualify him to do that. So we must understand that, at this stage, he is working to put his house in order. I believe, however, that the meeting held in Tokyo between President Mubarak and President Bush was important. So was the meeting between President Bush and King Husayn. We hope that matters will change faster.

[AL-MAJALLAH] To what extent did the Tokyo Mubarak-Bush meeting, which you described as important, show that there is accord or disagreement between the Egyptian and U.S. positions on a Middle East settlement?

[Abd-al-Majid] I did not attend that meeting.

[AL-MAJALLAH] The Israeli position is still wavering vis-a-vis the settlement question. They tend to offer a card and then withdraw it again. In your opinion, how long will that unclear and vague Israeli position continue?

[Abd-al-Majid] We hope it will not continue for long, and that Israel will realize that it is in its own interests before anything else to achieve a just, comprehensive peace. This is Egypt's conviction, and we are completely ready to cooperate in this regard with Israel and all peace-loving states.

[AL-MAJALLAH] There is talk from time to time about the election issue in the occupied territories. What is the Egyptian position on the call for such elections? And what conditions should be available to hold the elections?

[Abd-al-Majid] First of all, the Palestinian brothers have the first and final decision in this regard. We believe that free and honest elections can only be held under neutral control. So long as there is an Israeli occupation, it will be very difficult to hold elections.

[AL-MAJALLAH] What is your view of the idea of including the elections among steps leading to a settlement?

[Abd-al-Majid] These matters can be discussed, but not now. Our first objective is to convene an international conference. President Mubarak was clear in his description of that conference. In his recent statements, he said that direct negotiations among the parties would begin within the framework of that conference.

[AL-MAJALLAH] Do you think the region could see that conference in the near future?

[Abd-al-Majid] Every effort must be made to achieve that.

[AL-MAJALLAH] How do you view the Egyptian opposition forces' criticism of the agreement reached with Israel on Taba?

[Abd-al-Majid] Egypt is a free country and has a free press which criticizes the way it likes. What is important, however, is that Taba has been returned to Egyptian territory.

[AL-MAJALLAH] In view of the formula reached with Israel, do you expect that to lead to further normalization of Egyptian-Israeli relations?

[Abd-al-Majid] What happened has eliminated an element that used to poison Egyptian-Israeli relations. There is nothing between us and Israel but to work together to achieve peace. The Taba problem is now behind us, and we are looking for cooperation that will lead to the achievement of peace and stability. That is Egyptian policy's objective.

[AL-MAJALLAH] In Sudan there is talk about Egypt's role in what is happening in Khartoum at present. What has been the Egyptian role in this regard?

[Abd-al-Majid] I know nothing about that talk. But I hope that Sudan will resolve its problems and restore stability, security, and unity.

[AL-MAJALLAH] Sudanese Prime Minister al-Sadiq al-Mahdi's position toward Egypt is known and has been stated in the past. Why was the Egyptian reaction declared by President Mubarak delayed until this moment?

[AL-MAJALLAH] On the contrary, there has been cooperation and understanding. The Egyptian position emerged after the statement he made about a neutral Egyptian stance. President Mubarak replied to him in order to set matters right.

[AL-MAJALLAH] Abu-'Ammar [Yasir 'Arafat] makes very many visits to Cairo. Do you believe that continuous consultations require all these visits, or is there something bigger in preparation?

[Abd-al-Majid] These visits achieve both objectives. We always welcome Abu-'Ammar in Egypt and are pleased to meet with him. It is in the interests of peace and the Palestinian cause to hold more talks and consultations with him.

[AL-MAJALLAH] Is there anything new in relations with Libya and Syria?

[Abd-al-Majid] There is nothing new at all.

Economic Minister Reviews Trade Figures With CEMA

*NC1303191489 Cairo MENA in Arabic
1730 GMT 13 Mar 89*

[Text] Dr Yusri Mustafa, minister of economy and foreign trade, said that in 1987-88, trade between Egypt and the CEMA countries reached approximately 2.4 billion Egyptian pounds, that is, around 14 percent of Egypt's foreign trade. He added: "Thus, the CEMA group comes in second place after the European group, with which our trade represents 40 percent of Egypt's foreign trade."

This came in a statement that Dr Mustafa delivered to the Consultative Council today on Egypt's trade relations with the CEMA countries.

He declared: "Egypt's exports to these countries represent 23 percent of our exports. The deficit in the trade balance with these countries is caused by the increased local demand for the importation of a number of essential materials from these countries, such as newsprint and timber. This has made imports exceed exports."

He added: "Regarding the Soviet Union, there is a surplus in the trade balance which is in Egypt's favor. This is the result of the Soviet Union's need for many Egyptian exports, mostly consumer goods. It is a good market and our exports to it are gradually increasing."

The minister referred to the 1989 trade protocol with the Soviet Union. He said: "The volume of this protocol has increased to around 600 million accounting sterling pounds, that is, the equivalent of 1.8 billion Egyptian pounds. The most important aspect of this protocol is the inclusion of the new commodities which Egypt is exporting to the Soviet Union, such as carpets, moquette, paints, chemicals, and ready-made clothing. Our importation of some Soviet products, such as fertilizers, frozen fish, and timber, has also increased in accordance with our need for them."

Dr Mustafa stated: "Our economic relations with the CEMA countries are constantly developing. Joint committees between Egypt and these countries have resumed their activities. These countries have also granted Egypt aid, credit facilities, and loans. Between 1984 and now, five of these countries have given aid worth around \$620 to finance Egypt's equipment and spare parts requirements."

The minister of economy and foreign trade went on to say: "Regarding the Soviet Union, we have, after a 10-year stagnation, started a new phase since the signing of the May 1988 trade agreement. The Soviet Union is expected to grant Egypt huge loans for productive projects and to participate in major projects, such as the aluminum complex."

He then dealt with the question of conducting transactions with the Soviet Union in accounting sterling pounds. He said: "Studies are under way now on this. They concern the sterling accounting rate and whether this should be the same as that of free currencies or whether there should be a slight difference, so that there will be excessive commodity prices on either side in the interest of trade between the two countries. He added that the exchange rate of the accounting sterling pound has today become 3 pounds instead of 70 piasters."

Socialist Labor Party Elects Leader

*JN1103164489 Cairo AL-AKHBAR in Arabic
10 Mar 89 p 1*

[By Iman Anwar]

[Text] Elections were held yesterday to elect the leader and Executive Committee members of the Socialist Labor Party [SLP]. Engineer Ibrahim Shukri won the post of SLP leader unopposed. Seventy-five party members nominated themselves for Executive Committee membership; 30 of them will be elected. Counting of votes is still underway.

The elections witnessed the exchange of hostile slogans between the SLP's old members and representatives of the Islamic alliance. Moreover, the Executive Committee elections showed a conflict between the socialist front led by Hamid Zaydan, Ahmad Mujahid, and Fu'ad Hadiyah, and the Muslim Brotherhood front led by 'Adil Husayn and 'Abd-al-Hamid Barakat.

Eng Ibrahim Shukri said the SLP is considering the issuance of a daily newspaper to express the SLP's thought, especially since remarks have been made by SLP members regarding the attitudes of the newspaper AL-SHA'B. Shukri also condemned some SLP leaders who disseminated rumors about the party through newspapers, which resulted in the party losing many of its members.

First Witness in Egypt's Revolution Case Testifies

*NC0803180489 Cairo MENA in Arabic
1550 GMT 8 Mar 89*

[Excerpts] The Higher State Security Court held a session today to hear the testimony of Brigadier General Fahd Najm-al-Din of the state security police, who is the first witness in the Egypt's Revolution case. The court decided after its 3-hour session to adjourn until Sunday to hear the remainder of the witness' testimony.

At the beginning of the session, counselor 'Abd-al-Majid Mahmud, the first public attorney at the state security prosecution, stated that the prosecutor's office had asked the Egyptian Foreign Ministry whether or not the third defendant, Ahmad 'Isma-al-Din, had been interrogated by the U.S. Embassy [in Cairo]. The Egyptian Foreign

Ministry informed the prosecutor's office that it had received a letter from the U.S. Embassy affirming that no interrogations had been conducted in this respect.

Counselor Mahmud added that, regarding the request to listen to the testimonies of the Israeli witnesses in the case, the Israeli Embassy replied that its government is not legally authorized to compel any Israeli citizen to travel to Egypt to give his testimony before the court. As for the U.S. witnesses, the U.S. Embassy stated that the U.S. Government has decided to lift the diplomatic immunity of the three U.S. witnesses in the case so that they can give their testimony in writing, provided the court's questions are handed to them in writing. [passage omitted]

In his testimony, Brig Gen Najm-al-Din said that the third defendant, Ahmad 'Isam-al-Din, had confessed to him that he and his brother Mahmud Nur-al-Din met in Cairo with Khalid 'Abd-al-Nasir [son of the late president Jamal 'abd al-Nasir and defendant in the case]. There they informed him of the establishment of a Nasirist organization whose military wing is supervised by Mahmud Nur-al-Din and whose objective is to eliminate the Israeli presence from Egypt and to end the Camp David agreement.

Brig Gen Najm-al-Din added that defendant Ahmad 'Isam-al-Din had confessed to him that a machine gun, another automatic weapon, and a number of revolvers were bought by the organization members from an arms dealer named Mahmud Yusuf. The organization's members kept track of the Israelis' activities in Egypt and planned the assassinations that took place later, which were preceded by training courses in the desert.

Brig Gen Najm-al-Din added that defendant 'Isam-al-Din had emphasized to him that Khalid 'Abd-al-Nasir was informed after every assassination carried out by the organization. [passage omitted]

Suez Area Students Strike After Campus Arrests
45000123 Cairo AL-SHA'B in Arabic 14 Feb 89 p 2

[Text] The Interior Ministry has arrested 15 suspects who allegedly established an extremist religious organization aimed at overthrowing the ruling regime.

The organization includes three brothers, Husayn, Ahmad, and Hasan Mahmud al-Khudari; 'Abd-al-Latif 'Ali 'Abd-al-Latif; Hasan Abu-al-Hajjaj Muhammad; and Muhammad Mukhtar Ahmad Musa. All of this is in spite of the fact that they have been imprisoned for a year and did not participate in any of the incidents that happened this year.

Also, the students at Suez Canal University threatened a sit-in if their fellow students in the Islamic societies, who were arrested on the university campus, are not freed.

Muhammad al-Shami of the faculty of education and Muhammad al-Alfi, Muhammad Jum'ah, and Khalid

Nufal of the faculty of business were all imprisoned. A riot at the university immediately followed this. University Union Secretary Ahmad Salim, a Port Said engineering student, threatened to call a university-wide sit-in and study strike.

At the University of Alexandria last Sunday, opposition press correspondents were surprised by severe security directives forbidding them from attending a meeting with the minister of education that was set up by the faculty of law.

Press Reportedly Ordered Not To Mention Hamas

45000114 Cairo AL-LIWA' AL-ISLAMib
7 Feb 89 p 26

[Text] Stringent instructions have been issued to all daily and weekly national newspapers not to allude to the name of the Islamic Resistance Movement, Hamas, in the news or analyses covering the intifadah [uprising] of the Palestinian people. This came about after Egypt recognized the independent state of Palestine. What is unusual is that our newspapers—may God not protect them—call attention to all of the events arranged by the Islamic Resistance Movement and the strikes, demonstrations, and protests which it calls and links them with the so-called "Unified Command." These newspapers' practices were exposed because most events organized by Hamas occur on Fridays. The strange thing is that this blackout on Hamas has even extended to some of our party newspapers, and we do not know the reason.

Consultative Council Approves Press Appointments

JN1403104589 Cairo AL-AKHBAR in Arabic
12 Mar 89 pp 1, 4

[Text] The Consultative Council held a session yesterday under its chairman, Dr 'Ali Lutfi, during which it approved the general committee's nominations for the national newspapers' chairmen of boards of directors and editors in chief whose terms have expired. Three new chairmen of boards of directors and one new editor in chief have been appointed. The terms of other chairmen of boards of directors and editors in chief have been renewed.

Sa'id Sunbul has been appointed chairman of the board of directors of the Akhbar al-Yawm Publishing House and editor in chief of AL-AKHBAR; Samir Rajab, chairman of the board of directors of Al-Tahrir Publishing and Printing House and editor in chief of AL-MASA'; Mahmud al-Tuhami, chairman of the board of directors of Rose al-Yusuf Establishment and editor in chief of ROSE AL-YUSUF magazine; and Mufid Fawzi, editor in chief of SABAH AL-KHAYR magazine.

These nominations are to fill vacancies resulting from reaching the age of retirement by Husayn Tal'at al-Zuhayri,

chairman of the board of directors of Akbar al-Yawm Publishing House; 'Abd-al-Muhsin Muhammad 'Abd-al-Muhsin, Chairman of the board of directors of Al-Tahrir Publishing and Printing House, 'Abd-al-'Aziz Khamis, chairman of the board of directors of Rose al-Yusuf Establishment; and Louis Jiryis, editor in chief of SABAH AL-KHAYR magazine.

The Consultative Council also approved the general committee's nominations of the editors in chief of the national papers who have not reached the retirement age in accordance with Article 28 of the Press Law. They will continue as editors in chief until 27 June 1990, as a complementary period for the terms that ended on 27 June 1987. This will be as follows:

1. Al-Ahram Establishment

AL-AHRAM	Ibrahim Nafi
AL-AHRAM AL-IQTISADI	Isam Rif'at
AL-SHABAB WA 'ULUM	Muhammad
AL-MUSTAQBAL	'Abd-al-Wahhab Mutawi'

2. Akhbar al-Yawm Publishing House

AL-AKHBAR	Sa'id Ibrahim Sunbul
AKHBAR AL-YAWM	Ibrahim 'Ali Sa'dah
AKHIR SA'AH	Muhammad Wajdi Qandil

3. Al-Tahrir Printing and Publishing House

AL-JUMHURIYAH	Mahfuz 'Awad al-Ansari
AL-MASA'	Samir Rajab
EGYPTIAN GAZETTE	Sami Khalil Ibrahim

4. The MIDDLE EAST NEWS AGENCY

Mustafa Najib Nabih

5. Rose al-Yusuf Establishment

ROSE AL-YUSUF	Mahmud Sidqi al-Tuhami
SABAH AL-KHAYR	Mufid Fawzi Sa'id

6. Dar al-Ma'arif Establishment

UKTUBAR	Muhammad Salah al-Din Muntasir
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7. Dar al-Hilal Publishing Institution

AL-MUSAWWAR	Makram Muhammad Ahmad
HAWWA'	Mrs Su'ad Ahmad Hilmi
AL-KAWAKIB	Mrs Husn Salih Shah
TABIBAK AL-KHAS	Dr 'Abd-al-Rahman Mukhtar Nur-al-Din
SAMIR	Mrs Nafisah Ibrahim Rashid
MICKY	Mrs 'Iffat 'Abd-al-'Aziz Nasir

8. Dar al-Ta'awun Establishment

AL-SIYASI	'Abd-al-Hamid Rida
AL-TA'AWUN	Muhammad Rashad 'Abdallah
AL-RIYADI	Ahmad Muhammad al-Manshalini
AL-TALABAH	Mrs Khayriyah Husayn Darwish
AL-MAJALLAH AL-ZIRA'IYAH	Muhammad Basyuni 'Amirah

Columnist on Arab Cooperation Council

JN1403115089 Cairo AL-AHRAM AL-IQTISADI
13 Feb 89 p 10

["With Freedom" column by Dr Sa'd al-Din Ibrahim: "Promising Egypt and Investment Under Arab Unity"]

[Text] The promising Egypt of the nineties is the Egypt of culture and tourism and that of attracting the Arab and Egyptian funds abroad. It is the Egypt of investment under democracy. We have spoken about all these sides in previous articles. This week we will speak about the Egypt of investment under Arab unity. Fortunately, this talk coincides with what the Egyptian president and the Jordanian monarch announced a few days ago regarding the intention to establish a quadripartite Arab grouping that includes Egypt, Jordan, Iraq, and the Yemen Arab Republic [YAR].

The promising Egypt in the nineties is the one that can, in light of its organizational and historic heritage and its current reserve of human and economic potential, begin to finalize a practical formula for the dream of Arab unity. There is nothing more realistic for this unity than the economic grounds. This quadripartite grouping includes:

- A market with a population of 80 million,
- A gross national product of \$100 billion,
- A manpower of 24 million.

Egypt has almost half of these three elements, including its most versatile productive economic base. This is also shared by Iraq, which has a considerable industrial base, particularly in military industrialization, which has developed continuously throughout the past 8 years due to the Gulf War. Of this quadripartite Arab grouping, Jordan possesses the most advanced basic structure of services, roads, transportation, and communications. The YAR has a new and growing oil wealth. This means that the four countries together have common resources that can give this grouping all the characteristics of rapid progress. Moreover, in the eighties, a network of bilateral agreements between each country and the other three in several fields developed.

The trade exchange among the four countries in the early eighties did not exceed 5 percent of their total foreign trade. In figures, it did not exceed \$500 million. However, the volume of this trade exchange has grown steadily during the past 5 years to reach \$1.5 billion. This means that, due to bilateral agreements alone, the volume of trade exchange increased threefold in less than 5 years.

This also means that it is possible to double the trade exchange several times during the next 5 years due to collective agreements among the four countries.

As an example of this possibility, let us take the volume of exchange between Egypt and Jordan. This exchange has increased from less than \$20 million in 1984 (before the group of bilateral agreements) to approximately \$250 million in 1989. This means that it increased 17 times. This means that the current volume of trade exchange among the four countries, which is \$1.5 billion, can grow up to 10 times to reach \$15 billion, at least, before the middle nineties.

The most important conditions for the success of this proposed plan is that it should be practical, that it should not exaggerate in its ambitious aspirations in the short run, and that it should abide by the principle of the enlightened intrinsic interests of each party. In other words, no party should expect to benefit quickly from each step, but it has the right to benefit from all steps in the medium term. Moreover, enlightened intrinsic interests mean that no party should expect exaggerated sacrifices from any party to this grouping.

Another condition for the success of this plan is represented by giving a growing role to the private sector. While governments can reach agreements and encourage, those who can weave the threads of true interaction and cooperation are individuals, companies, and the entrepreneurial spirit. This what had actually happened in the EEC experiment. One person thought of and promoted the idea, and at the beginning a group of institutions, institutes, and private companies listened and responded to him. Then governments came to set up the basic framework for this experiment in 1959. After this, individuals, institutions, institutes, and private companies assumed the responsibility of building the structural units of this experiment one after another until it became a huge structure. The most serious danger that could stifle the experiment of the quadripartite economic Arab grouping is for all its affairs to be purely confined to Arab governments and bureaucracies.

Finally, among the conditions for the success of this unionist economic grouping is support by a gradual democratic change in the four countries, provided that each country has the choice of the best formula and the appropriate time for this change. Fortunately, this change actually began in Egypt several years ago, in the YAR last year, and Iraq has announced its intention to begin democratic changes soon.

Egypt's investment under democracy and Arab unity is the best it can give for itself and for its Arab nation in the nineties.

Commentary Views Poison Gas Factory Report
NC1103221689 Cairo Domestic Service in Arabic
1840 GMT 11 Mar 89

[Baha'-al-Din Shu'ayb commentary from the "Newsreel" program]

[Text] In the name of God, the compassionate, the merciful. President Husni Mubarak has denied a report published by THE NEW YORK TIMES claiming that Egypt had built a poison gas factory. President Mubarak said that this is the first time he has heard of this issue. The truth is that stories about poison gas factories or petrochemical plants have recently proliferated and things have gotten very confused in this regard. No one knows any longer where the facts about poison gas factories begin and where the political maneuvers end.

We are not now embarking on a defense of Egypt and its concern to preserve man's life and dignity. It is sufficient to say that Egypt's voice at the Paris Conference to ban chemical weapons was raised loudly in support of every international effort to prevent the proliferation of chemical and nuclear weapons. Egypt has always called for the Middle East, the Mediterranean, and Africa to be kept free of nuclear weapons. Egypt has suffered more from wars than other countries over the last 30 years, and it fully realizes the ugly destruction that can be wrought on human life in the inferno of battle. Egypt has always fought its battles without departing from the noble traditions that take pains to ensure that the humanity of people is not violated and that they are not subjected to fatal suffering.

As President Mubarak asserted in his responses to reporters' questions on this matter, Egypt's position can be summarized as follows: Egypt disapproves of chemical warfare and the building of chemical weapons plants, and it believes that the elimination of such factories and nuclear weapons projects from the Middle East is imperative.

Egypt, whose president has made a point of attending the environmental conference in The Hague which is discussing the erosion of the ozone layer, will not under any circumstances allow its international reputation to be tarnished by the construction of a poison gas factory. Likewise, Egypt, which is building up its economic structures and developing its facilities and infrastructure, would not, in any circumstances, squander a single pound in a venture that would not benefit its people. Egypt is constantly seeking peace and is investing all its capabilities in attaining a peaceful settlement in the Middle East. Hence, the reports circulated by some quarters and carried by some media regarding false allegations about a chemical plant north of Cairo are designed to cause confusion about Egypt's heroic role in promoting the peace process.

We believe that such allegations can never affect Egypt's reputation. Those who try to harm it with such lies will suffer by their own lies. They will achieve nothing because Egypt's international reputation and its pioneer peace role are more substantial than all these falsehoods.

Columnist on Public Sector Fears, Doubts About ACC

JN1403113489 Cairo AL-AHRAM AL-IQTISADI in Arabic 27 Feb 89 pp 10, 20

["With Freedom" column by Dr Sa'd-al-din Ibrahim: "The Arab Cooperation Council- Misgivings of the Public Sector Leaders"]

[Text] The Middle East Center for Business Administration at the American University of Cairo last week organized a seminar in what it termed "the leaders' program" in the city of al-Ghardaqah. The participants included about 50 board chairmen of major Egyptian companies, most of them public sector companies belonging to the Egyptian Government. Since the seminar coincided with the declaration of the Arab Cooperation Council [ACC], the participants held an additional session during which they requested the main lecturers, myself and a friend, Dr 'Ali-al-Din Hilal, to discuss the new ACC. We immediately responded to this request, especially since we were among those who had carried out several studies on this subject and publicized it over the past 10 years, whether through the Arab Unity Studies Center in Beirut, or the Arab Thought Forum in Amman,.

The first peculiar thing I noted was that, while the leaders of the private sector were generally more sympathetic with the ACC plan, the leaders of the public sector, the direct economic arm of the Egyptian Government which signed the ACC agreement, were more reserved and expressed certain misgivings about the nascent Council.

The first reservation expressed by the public sector leaders was that they were taken by surprise and that the ACC was announced without any preparation or a general national debate in each of the four member states, especially Egypt. Their misgiving was that the step may have been taken without adequate study, which reminded them of the decisions which used to be made at the top under the 'Abd-al-Nasir and al-Sadat administrations without the participation of the people or institutions. Some of them said this method seemed strange under President Mubarak, who is normally very very deliberate and cautious. Therefore, they were very apprehensive of the plan.

The second reservation was that the four ACC member states are all countries with foreign debts and internal crises. What benefit is there, they asked, from lumping several debtor economies together? Does this not mean

an aggregate of negatives? Would it not have been better, they asked, had each of them concentrated on putting its own house in order before entering into such an integration plan?

The third reservation voiced by the public sector leaders was that Egypt may have been involved in this plan for certain hidden reasons serving the objectives and ambitions of the other three countries. The leaders said Egyptians are normally a good-natured people who are easily made to pay heavily for their good nature. Some leaders cited as proof the fact that Egyptians workers in the Arab countries, including some ACC member states, are not treated respectfully and not paid adequately like the citizens of the host countries or even workers from other countries. They said the Egyptian Government does not stand by Egyptian workers or defend their rights out of politeness, courtesy, or sheer neglect. Some of those present began to relate personal stories about painful experiences in some of these countries.

The fourth reservation stemmed from some leaders' personal resentment against the Egyptian Government itself for not listening to their complaints and proposals concerning public sector reform. They referred to the government's sluggishness or reluctance to take decisions on urgent domestic issues and its enthusiasm for not-so-urgent foreign issues.

The fifth reservation came from a minority of public sector leaders who do not believe in Egypt's Arabism. They believe Egypt is better off keeping away from the Arabs and their problems. They remarked that Egypt's current crisis stems from its involvement in the Arabs' problems, conflicts, and wars in the past. This involvement, they said, has impoverished Egypt and changed it from a rich country in the region to a poor country begging for foreign aid and loans.

I and my friend, Dr 'Ali-al-Din Hilal, replied to the reservations and tried to remove the misgivings. In our reply, we used reports and data which we fortunately obtained from a major research we conducted for 5 years (1983-1985) on the future of the Arab homeland. The conclusion we reached at the end of that work was that an Arab country, whether big or small, rich or poor, can overcome its current problems and crises only through some form of Arab cooperation, integration, or unification, and that intermediate groupings such as the Gulf Cooperation Council, the ACC, and the Arab Maghreb Union are the best formula possible in the short and medium term as long as they are based on careful and rational studies and are established gradually. Our belief is that the step which has been taken does indeed fulfill these conditions.

After the al-Ghardaqah meeting with the Egyptian public sector leaders, I left directly for the Jordanian capital, Amman, without stopping in Cairo. There, I met with Jordanian Crown Prince Hasan. The first question he asked me was: How do our brothers in Egypt feel about

the establishment of the ACC? I told him I did not have the chance to read the opinions and reactions of Egyptian public opinion, however I heard the opinions of one important sector—namely, the public sector leaders. I summed up these opinions as already outlined here. Since the man is very enthuasiastic about joint Arab action, especially with Egypt, he proposed inviting these leaders to Amman to meet with their Jordanian, Iraqi, and Yemeni counterparts to discuss these reservations and misgivings and to choose the best means of tackling any real and legitimate reservations and misgivings.

Agricultural Strategy Devised To Solve Food Crisis
45040171a Cairo AL-JUMHURIYAH in Arabic
13 Dec 88 p 5

[Article by Dr Husayn al-Manwati, Chief Researcher at the Agricultural Research Center]

[Text] Crises have become a feature and a basic part of the individual's daily life in the developing countries. The most serious and the ugliest crises of these are the food crises. This is because of the direct and serious effect this kind of crises have on society's political and economic system and climate and, consequently, on internal security and social stability.

In order to deal with this crisis, governments are forced to postpone many development plans which could have direct effect on the social climate and individual behavior, such as housing projects, utilities, and agricultural development.

There is no crisis in the world known to man that affects people's lives and stability and, probably, even their livelihood and dignity like food crisis.

The reason for this crisis in Egypt is due to several factors:

- The steady increase in the population which is increasing at the rate of 2.8 percent annually, which is higher than any natural increase in other countries.
- The year after year decrease of the cultivated area by taking parts of it for urban and industrial development or because of scooping the top soil of arable land for use in the brick industry.
- The ineffectiveness and inflexibility of the policy of crop structure and its incompatibility with the climatic conditions and the nature and fertility of the land as well as its incompatibility with the state of demand for crops for food processing or export and with the local market conditions, which leads to the producer failing to adhere to this structure and to his indifference to fines and violations imposed on him.
- The failure of agriculture as a profession and a science to keep abreast with scientific progress and the new methods developed to increase and develop production.
- The rapid and unexpected change in the way of life.

Immigration of farm workers has directly affected the balance needed for life stability of individuals and their attachment to the land and has accelerated the momentum of change in the pattern of pursuit of livelihood from other sources.

- The sudden changes in the world and their effect on the national economy. As a reaction to the rise in oil prices, imported food prices have increased, particularly with new classes entering the consumer market. According to the Ministry of Supply's estimate, the rate of our import of foodstuffs in the year 2,000, compared with the predicted production and consumption, is expected to increase by 85 percent for wheat, 55 percent for millet, 78 percent for legumes, 8.5 percent for sugar, 38 percent for rice, 90 percent for edible oil, 56 percent for red meat, and 34 percent for poultry and fish.

In order to reduce the extent of this crisis and alleviate its acuteness as much as possible and to build an Egyptian economy that would achieve its objectives of providing a better standard of living, scientific and sound planning for a firm strategy with specific objectives, graduated dimensions, and a commitment to implementation need to be laid down.

The most important components and principles of this strategy are:

1. To consider agricultural development as part of the state's economic structure so that it will not once again lag behind because of its close link to social, political, economic, and cultural structure and, therefore, should always be taken into consideration in case of any change or evolution that may occur or crop up. In other words, it should be one of the elements of comprehensive development and even a basic part of it.
2. To choose modern scientific methods commensurate with our financial and social capabilities with a view to boosting increase in productivity and variety, reducing waste, and seeking to find a place for this production in foreign markets.
3. To choose species, to ensure their soundness, and to determine their suitability for exporting or processing and to achieve greater productivity in crops that have reached an advanced stage and boost the productivity of other species that have not yet reached this level.
4. Not to rely on vertical development only as a basic principle in the elements of the national strategy since increasing productivity per feddan might achieve a higher rate in the early stages of development, but this increase has limits that cannot be exceeded. Therefore, horizontal development is the strategic objective in the long term.

5. To consider export as a national strategic objective. Therefore, agricultural products must be developed while focusing on competitive commodities, particularly non-traditional crops.

6. To maintain a balance in boosting the various branches of agricultural and animal development, while linking agricultural production to a comprehensive marshalling of the capabilities of processing it and exporting it, and to define the methods of handling products, including storage, in order to reduce all kinds of waste, from the field and up to the point of human consumption.

7. To preserve land and water resources used in agricultural production with all means possible in order to prevent encroachment on them or violating them.

8. To establish a comprehensive crops structure for agricultural land with the aim of achieving a better exploitation of land and water resources and attaining a maximum profit rate within the framework of specialization and relative preference of crops within this crops structure. The present cultivated area is less than 6 million feddans while the potential crops area is 11.5 million feddans, representing a 1.9 percent expansion rate.

Therefore, when a crops structure is worked out the following should be taken into consideration:

- That the crop structure should achieve maximum profit for the farmer and the state, while concentrating on processing food products such as oil and sugar as well as animal products such as meat, dairy, poultry, and eggs.
- That the crops structure policy is consistent and in harmony with its relevant factors and conditions, such as water resources, the degree of land fertility, the climate of the area, the country's need for food supplies, and the industry and export needs in the light of the state's capabilities in the field of transportation and storage, while taking into consideration the international and regional changes affecting the movement of the trade balance.
- That all the departments concerned should contribute their in-put with regard to this structure so that there will be a firm commitment to a national objective to implement this policy. It is essential that reclaimed lands should have a share in the formation and implementation of this policy and that farming these lands should not be carried out in a whimsical or haphazard manner that would affect or upset the balance required to provide all the food products.

These objectives and principles of the agricultural policy that should be followed bring to the fore the importance of consolidating the economic, social, and political structure of the state which should be the focal point in the coming years as a national objective and a responsibility

toward the coming generations, a safeguard against falling into subservience and the loss of freedom in decision-making, since he who does not own his daily bread does not have the freedom of decision-making nor dignity.

IRAQ

Construction Activities in Al-Muthanna Province Described

44000326 Baghdad BAGHDAD OBSERVER in English
26 Jan 89 p 2

[Text] Al-Muthanna, Jan 25. A multi-million construction boom has been planned for 1989 in this southern province, while work has just been completed on a number of projects which cost the coffers of the province a total of 18 million dinars (45 million dollars).

The Mayor of the Province, Mr Ibrahim Zangana broke the news of the new construction boom at a press conference recently given to local correspondants.

The Mayor said that one major project of this year is a large water plant at the cost of 2.5 million dinars. The first phase of the project is scheduled to be completed late this year with a total capacity of 1,460,000 gallons a day. The project is designed to provide al-Samawah, the provincial centre, and al-Rumaythah, a nearby district, with drinking water. The Mayor explained that the project consists of two large concrete ground stores, each with capacity of 6675 cu.m. of drinking water.

A good sum of the allocated 16.6 million dinars for 1989 projects would also go for maintenance and expansion of water projects in a handful of towns and residential districts. The Mayor said that upon the completion of these projects, water shortages would be eliminated and a good storage would be available.

Mr Zangana elaborated that the investments cover the cost of building seven primary schools in al-Samawah, al-Rumaythah, Khidr and Hilal districts. Also additional classes are to be built in some schools in different parts of the province.

On agriculture and irrigation, the mayor said the irrigation and drainage networks will be subject to maintenance. "It was really a demanding task," the mayor said adding that a campaign to clear the rivulets in the province has been under way to provide abundant water resources for the areas under cultivation.

Referring to the road-construction projects which were completed in 1988, the Mayor said that these included Shanafiyah-Qadisiyah highway with a total length of 42 kilometres. The highway links al-Muthanna province with the provinces of Qadisiyah and al-Najaf. The authorities also did maintenance to the 30-kilometre-long Khudayr-Darraji highway and constructed 11 primary and intermediate schools in al-Samawah, al-Rumaythah, al-Warka and Khudayr districts.

In the last year too, the government constructed sewage and rain water discharge systems in different areas of the province.

The Mayor explained that telephone services have been improved as more families are now on the phone. New lines have been added to the already-installed exchanges in some areas. Also telephone channels linking al-Samawah with Baghdad, al-Basrah, Najaf and Karbala' have been expanded.

ISRAEL

Palestine on East Bank Seen From Strategic Aspect

44230059 Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 22 Jan 89 p 10

[Article by Shlomo Perlah]

[Text] The recent diplomatic gains of the PLO require Israel to wage an extraordinary diplomatic campaign. It must not pursue a policy of response at present; rather it must initiate a policy aimed at a comprehensive solution to the Middle East conflict. The political strategy of this policy would aim at making a full partner of the Soviet Union, not just the United States, in determining peace arrangements, and would be based on the assumption that it is necessary to view the Arabs of the territories as a separate national entity.

Even if the Middle East conflict stems historically from an inevitable clash between the Arab world and the Jewish World, which sought to renew its independence in the land of Israel, the Middle East problem, at least since the Six Day War, has been perceived in the international arena as a problem that focuses on the Palestinian people, who are seeking only to realize their natural aspiration for their own state. The question of whether a Palestinian people exists is relevant only at the level of academic discussion. It is probable that such a discussion would indeed lead to the conclusion that a Palestinian entity is only fictitious. However, when one considers the Palestinian question on the political level, the aforementioned academic discussion is not at all relevant.

I would add, parenthetically, that this is not to say that historical truth and moral principles are not at all relevant in the game between nations. Rather, the extent of their relevance is determined only insofar as they are used to support pragmatic political interests. Therefore, it is sought here to determine that, without any connection to this or that political truth, the present phase of the Arab-Israeli conflict, which has been on-going since 1967, is characterized by the predominance of the Palestinian issue. Hence, the settlement of the conflict must be considered only in terms of solving "the Palestinian problem."

Approaches which seek to apply a band-aid to the painful political situation by means of "autonomy," i.e., self-determination of one type or another and the like, do not take into account the most important basic given, which is that the Palestinians will not quiet down until they achieve political sovereignty for themselves. Any attempt to offer them fragments of sovereignty is futile. One is never "a little pregnant," and there is no such thing as half or quarter sovereignty, just as no partial agreement can be a durable solution for a situation of profound conflict. Therefore, offering autonomy to the Palestinians, but denying them the right to maintain an army, is tantamount to offering them nothing. The Palestinians are not seeking the right and authority to determine matters of religion, education, irrigation, or sewerage. They are demanding a sovereign state, and they will continue fight as long as their desire is not satisfied.

The aforementioned begs the question of whether Israel needs to concede the territories for the sake of the establishment of a Palestinian state. The response is definitely no: Even in the age of modern warfare, territorial depth has great importance. The conquest of territories is not carried out by means of bombs from the air and missiles, but by foot soldiers. A second argument is that a Palestinian state in Judaea and Samaria would be no more than a political enclave which would be unable to exist for long because of its geo-political position and because it could not support itself economically. The existence of such a state would be a sure recipe for the continuation of the conflict in the Middle East, inasmuch as a state of such size would certainly seek greater living space for itself. Add to these two arguments the basic historical fact that Judaea and Samaria are a central part of the land of Israel, and you have sufficient reasons arguing against the establishment of a Palestinian state in the West Bank.

However, the current situation cannot continue forever. The dynamics of international relations will create pressures for a settlement in the Middle East. The State of Israel must initiate policies to solve the Palestinian problem by exploiting the historical dialogue between Washington and Moscow.

The essence of the plan which Israel must initiate, with Russian-American cooperation, is the establishment of a Palestinian state in the territory currently occupied by the Kingdom of Jordan, without excluding the possibility of annexing certain areas in Judaea and Samaria to this state, mainly for the propose of removing demographic obstacles. The historical-ethical basis of this plan cannot be doubted, because it is well known that the Kingdom of Jordan was established in an arbitrary manner, in violation of international law, on territory which was part of mandatory Palestine, which is the land of Israel.

From this standpoint, Israel must emphasize that the claim that the Palestinians have no homeland is a historical distortion. Jordan's King Husayn himself

expressed, on more than one occasion, the ethnic and national unity between the Jordanians and the Palestinians. From Israel's standpoint, the establishment of a Palestinian state east of the Jordan River has the following advantages:

- A Palestinian state in expanded territories would be more viable, and it should be assumed that this would reduce the danger posed by the pressures that it would otherwise exert on Israel.
- Israel would be exempt from external and internal pressure regarding the future of the Jewish settlements in Judaea and Samaria.
- The Jordan River would be the effective strategic barrier; at the same time, Israeli control of the heights in Judaea and Samaria would enable it to control the movements of the armed forces of the neighboring country.

To implement this plan, it is necessary to wait for the opportune moment with the departure of King Husayn. At present, Israel must initiate secret diplomatic activities to prepare the international background for the implementation of the program, as it is clear that the plan could be implemented only as the fruit of an agreement between the two superpowers.

Such an agreement could be likened to an agreement on the Europeanization of the Middle East—in other words, the division of the entire Middle East into areas of superpower influence. The assumption is that Russia would view positively the establishment of a Palestinian state in Jordan if such a state were to be included in its area of influence. It is certain that, in exchange, the United States would strengthen its presence in the Persian Gulf states, and would even bring about (by agreement with Russia) the restoration of Lebanon as a decidedly pro-West state. Thus, a strong Western axis, comprising Lebanon, Israel, and Egypt, would be created. Also, the strategic importance of Israel would increase in the perception of the Americans.

Obviously, the implementation of this program is liable to pose serious security problems for Israel inasmuch as the background would be created for the establishment of a pro-Soviet front, which would include Iraq, Syria, and Jordan-Palestine. However, it is assumed that the potential threat of this Eastern axis would be neutralized from the outset by the existence of the Western axis.

Does this plan have any chance of being accepted by the superpowers? It appears that the USSR is currently interested in long-range international agreements which would enable it to rehabilitate its economy; however it would not agree to an agreement which does not assure its interests in the Middle East. Its central interest is not oil, but a "strategy of principle," which is to say that the United States should not have exclusive presence in the

Middle East. The Americans, for their part, are interested in consolidating their strategic position in the Mediterranean Basin; the establishment of a Western axis would further this interest.

Israel would be able to advance this strategic peace initiative by secret diplomatic means alone, and not by means of an international conference. Only a secret framework could make possible effective discussions of extraordinary and radical proposals. Convincing the superpowers of the strategic advantages in store for them as a result of the implementation of this plan will certainly aid in presenting the historical-ethical truth that Jordan is a part of Palestine, because of which, the Palestinian people are entitled to establish a state on the lion's share of the land which they call Palestine, while the Jewish people would continue to consolidate their rule in the Western land of Israel.

Trade Attache to Egypt Discusses Problems, Prospects

44230068 Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT (Financial Supplement) in Hebrew 31 Jan 89 p 8

[Interview with Yosef Sabo, former Israeli trade and economic attache in Egypt: "Some 75 Percent of the Egyptian Market Is Inaccessible to Israelis"; by Smadar Peri—date and place not given]

[Text] "If the Egyptians want Israeli tourists in Taba, let them run after us, not the other way round; we must not abase ourselves," said Yosef Sabo, who until 1 month ago served as trade and economic attache at the Israeli Embassy in Cairo, in an interview he gave to MAMON [YEDI'OT AHARONOT's Financial Supplement]. Sabo went to Cairo, his birthplace, 2 and 1/2 years ago, after a long military career during which he served in the civilian administration in Gaza and as IDF attache to Zaire. "That was about 1 month before the Peres-Mubarak summit talks in Alexandria," he recalled, "when it seemed that the cold peace was finally thawing and that a new page was being turned. The Ministry of Industry and Trade, which sent me, viewed the development of relations with Egypt as part and parcel of the promised normalization, and I hoped to make the economic and trade ties between us and Egypt a two-way street, thus capitalizing on this huge potential."

[YEDI'OT AHARONOT] And what is the situation in our economic relations today? Did the anticipated improvement indeed take place?

[Sabo] Some 75 percent of the Egyptian economy and businesses belong to the public sector, which works according to government instructions, and they are inaccessible to us.

It has been 10 years since the signing of the peace treaty and we are still totally banned from the government sector. All the professional associations boycott us. I

visited the State Trade Office once, but they did not follow up. They ignored us. There is only one exception in this stubborn boycott: oil. They sell to us because of the economic advantage.

[YEDI'OT AHARONOT] Did you try to bring a delegation of Israeli businessmen to Egypt?

[Sabo] I tried several times, but they turned down every such attempt. For example, 2 years ago on the eve of the International Trade Fair in Cairo, I tried to secure an official invitation for Israeli businessmen, and many were interested. But the Egyptian economic ministers ignore our appeals on principle.

Genuine progress was made after the International Trade Fair that featured an Israeli pavilion. Some 200,000 Egyptians visited it and snapped up our pamphlets. Among them there were businessmen, too, who evinced curiosity, but last year we were banned, literally at the last moment, from participating in the fair. We had finished all our preparations and had a lot of money invested in exhibits. The fair director claimed that our pavilion, which had been standing for 7 years, 'did not meet the criteria.' And he smiled when he said that. I asked him: Why are you smiling? He said: If you want to know the real reason that you are not participating, go ask at our Foreign Ministry.

[YEDI'OT AHARONOT] And now, 2 months before the annual fair, Israel is almost begging to participate, while Egypt is dragging its feet?

[Sabo] You must remember that the fair is the only opportunity that Israel has for positive exposure in Egypt. We can reach thousands of businessmen at the fair, not to mention the hundreds of thousands of other visitors. We also take the opportunity to circulate economic and tourist material about Israel, something that we cannot otherwise do through the normal channels because of the media boycott.

[YEDI'OT AHARONOT] Have you ever tried to go to an Egyptian newspaper and offer to pay them to run an advertisement?

[Sabo] I tried to publish an advertisement with the address of my office. They did not say no, but they also did not reply in the affirmative. 'We are checking on it,' they said. The exact same reply was given to Koor, Agrisco, and Netafim [Israeli companies]. Everyone who tried to run an ad was turned down, and there were no exceptions among the Egyptian press.

[YEDI'OT AHARONOT] Despite the difficulties, I often saw you in Cairo in the company of local businessmen.

[Sabo] Whenever I was invited to someone's house—and the Egyptians are marvelous hosts—only the family was present. Never any friends, so that there would not be unnecessary witnesses to the 'collaboration.'

Any Egyptian who wants to import irrigation equipment, seeds, chemicals, dyes, alarm systems, etc. from Israel must secure a permit from the Ministry of Finance and from the security services. That is a process that takes weeks, during which time the man becomes known as an 'Israeli collaborator.' Many businessmen were deterred by that sort of exposure. Another obstacle is that the Egyptian in question must open a letter of credit in cash and cannot split it into installments. That forces him to take out dozens of permits for the merchandise, which arrives only once a month. And yet another obstacle: when our embassy was opened in Cairo it was announced that only the Suez Canal Bank and no other bank would conduct financial operations for us. And lo and behold, 3 months ago the bank caved in to the Arab boycott, so that today we are forced to work indirectly, i.e., to deposit money in European banks, Lloyds, for example. We open a letter of credit in England and from there money is transferred to Egypt or to Israel. And that, of course, makes every operation more expensive.

And another obstacle: our businessmen and agricultural advisers cannot receive long-term visas in Egypt. Just as they begin to overcome obstacles, they are forced to get out and wait for a new visa.

[YEDI'OT AHARONOT] What is the truth about stories of questioning that the Egyptian security services allegedly do at the entrance to our embassy?

[Sabo] One Egyptian businessman told me that he had to register with the police at the entrance to the embassy. Later I heard a similar story from other businessmen. Imagine what would happen if Israeli businessmen had to register with our security service at the entrance to the Egyptian Embassy, and then receive a house call on top of that.

Some of them were even asked to give details about the nature of their relations with the embassy, and for the most part the questions were meant to convey the hint: 'Are there no markets other than Israel?' The businessmen often disappeared because of this whole 'obstacle course.'

Any businessman who wants to visit Israel must go through an investigation and must change his passport. Once in a while the opposition newspapers of Cairo publish new names of people 'suspected' of cooperating with Israel, something that is immediately followed by social pressure. Once, after such a publication, we tried to call one of the people whose name had appeared on the 'list,' but his wife told us that he had died. A year later I ran into him, but he ignored me.

[YEDI'OT AHARONOT] So how is there any trade nevertheless?

[Sabo] I found a few businessmen who found ways to overcome all the obstacles. They did business with Israel, and visited, too. We are talking about 10 individuals.

[YEDI'OT AHARONOT] What is the potential for trade relations between us and Egypt once relations are normal?

[Sabo] There is a huge potential, particularly because of the geographical proximity between the two countries and because we have things to offer to Egypt and the other way round. Not counting oil, I estimate, as a first stage, that we can trade worth \$50 million a year.

[YEDI'OT AHARONOT] Here and there I heard rather unpleasant stories about us, about Israelis who cheated or "fixed" Egyptians.

[Sabo] There was one case of an Israeli who put up agricultural projects on land that was unsuitable for the respective crops, thereby causing heavy financial losses to his Egyptian partners. He also left debts of hundreds of thousands of dollars when he cleared out of Cairo. I was asked to salvage the projects, not to return the money. I suggested that they sue.

There were also tourism people who left debts of tens of thousands of dollars and cut off all contacts. There was also one Israeli businessman who imported books worth hundreds of thousands of dollars for Arabs in Israel and who left debts totaling \$80,000.

When he came to me, I inquired: Why did you not stick to the rules, why did you not secure a letter of credit? The Egyptian told me that he had consulted his priest whether it was safe to trust Israelis. The priest told him that the Jews were honest. The Jews are remembered positively; one can seal a deal with a Jew with a handshake, one doesn't need anything else. And that's what the Egyptian businessman did.

The same story of complete trust in Israelis and of great disappointment repeated itself. I know of at least four other similar cases.

[YEDI'OT AHARONOT] And what about Israelis? Were any Israelis burnt, too?

[Sabo] No Israelis were burnt. No Egyptians cheated them. But there is great disappointment in the fact that expectations did not materialize. All the ties that were established were with small businessmen. The big ones still stay away from us to this day. Israeli businessmen wasted time and energy in Cairo, invested money, and got nothing for it. Not because of the local businessmen, but because of policy from up high.

[YEDI'OT AHARONOT] So what is to be done until the green light is given from up high?

[Sabo] One can circumvent the obstacles indirect import: Israeli merchandise can reach Egypt through a third country, and the other way round, since Egyptian exporters also face the same difficulties when they try to sell to Israel.

[YEDI'OT AHARONOT] What can Egypt offer to Israel?

[Sabo] We import \$20-million worth of cotton yarns from Egypt annually. But the trade goes through Switzerland, since the Egyptian Government company does not want to export directly to Israel. This awkward procedure makes the merchandise more expensive because of the long route and the cuts that the Swiss take.

[YEDI'OT AHARONOT] What wares can Israel offer?

[Sabo] Egypt is in the midst of an agricultural 5-year plan which calls for increasing cultivated land by 2 million dunam by reclaiming desert land. They need our expertise, drip irrigation, seeds, and chemicals. We have all of that, and it is cheap. They also need electronics, and we can provide service close to home. Foodstuffs, too: milk products and eggs. We offered such things at very low prices, but they refused on the grounds that 'It's not needed.' The same goes for fish reservoirs, cement plants, and auxiliary industry. Egypt has an inexpensive labor force and we have the know-how and large world markets. We could jointly manufacture solar heating boilers, for example, or textiles. Many Israelis tried, but without trade agreements, tax exemptions, and free transit, there can be no profit for either country.

[YEDI'OT AHARONOT] For some months there was a Koor representation in Cairo. Why was it closed down?

[Sabo] One year ago Koor won a public bid to import pesticides worth about \$500,000 to Egypt. We duly celebrated the event. Israel had finally won a bid. However, to my regret, the Egyptians failed to open the letter of credit on schedule, so Koor did not deliver the pesticides. When they asked for the bond money back, the Egyptians refused to pay it on the grounds that we did not observe the delivery schedule. The Egyptians wanted to get the merchandise without any obligation for payment.

There was also the case of the Egyptian businessman who wanted to import alarm systems for cars. The authorities refused to give him an import permit for security reasons. The man inquired and found out that Egypt feared that Israel could plant listening and locating devices. That was the excuse. I don't believe that they suspect us of such things.

[YEDI'OT AHARONOT] And now, despite the difficulties, Israel insists on participating in the International Trade Fair? Egypt "still has not decided." Why are we so insistent?

[Sabo] There is still no decision despite all the high-level appeals and inquiries both in our country and theirs. A last-minute invitation would not allow us to organize properly. Nevertheless, if such an invitation did come in the next few days, I would advise optimistic businessmen, like myself, to come, to establish ties, and to prepare plans 'for the drawer.'

[YEDI'OT AHARONOT] Is Industry Minister Ari'el Sharon right when he claims that Israel should pull out of Taba only in exchange for improved economic relations?

[Sabo] In my opinion, the two should not be linked. Egypt won Taba in arbitration and we have to fulfill our obligation. There is no point in presenting conditions, because if Egypt is not interested in expanding the normalization, no pledge can help once Taba is returned. They can very well promise and not keep their promises.

[YEDI'OT AHARONOT] If so, you must agree with me that we are degrading ourselves by talking about agreements to allow Israelis access to Taba after the withdrawal.

[Sabo] Absolutely. We should not insist on that. If the Egyptians want us, let them run after us, not the other way around. We returned all of the Sinai without preconditions. The less we chase after them, the more they'll seek us out. They should be the ones to express an interest in special agreements, it should come from them, not from us.

Druze Poet Comments on Free Expression
44000341 Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST
in English 9 Feb 89 p 5

[Report on interview with Samih al-Qasim by Marda Dunskey: "I Believe in the Power of the Word"; date and place not given]

[Text] It was night-time, wartime. The train chugged its way from Jordan to Palestine, and the passengers aboard it were afraid.

Samih al-Qasim, then a very young boy, was crying. Keep him quiet, the others told his parents, the German aircraft overhead will hear his cries and bomb us. But the child continued to sob, alarming his fellow travellers even further, and they threatened to kill him.

The boy's father, an officer in the British Arab Army, was obliged to draw his pistol to protect his son. He admonished the others: You stupid people, do you really believe the cries of a young child can be heard by the

German pilots? Only then did the other passengers come to their senses, and the minor crisis passed. But it left an indelible mark on the young al-Qasim, one that remains.

"I had the feeling that someone was trying to shut my mouth," he recalled in an interview in his Haifa office, nearly 50 years after the train trip home from Jordan. "Maybe this is one of the reasons I protect very strongly my right to express myself."

Al-Qasim, as one of Israel's outstanding Arab poets, has continued to travel in the company of those who have not much appreciated what he has had to say. "It is clear to me," he says of the battles he has waged with Israeli authorities over the course of his career, "that there was a confrontation between two desires, between my wish to write and their wish to keep me silent."

One such confrontation arose in 1969 when 1,500 copies of an anthology of al-Qasim's poems, "And the Thunderbird Shall Come," were confiscated and the poet arrested. Discrepancies were found between the published version and that previously approved by the censor.

"I couldn't accept an officer who hardly knows Arabic deciding whether my poems were to be published or not," he says. "I took responsibility for what's in them—and there was nothing anti-Jewish or anti-Israeli in them."

Yet the authorities believed otherwise, suspecting that some of the poems in the collection contained messages of incitement against the state, among them a piece entitled "I Promise You Will Inherit Jet Horses."

"Arabs like horses," al-Qasim says, "and I was trying to mix images of mythology and technology." Yet the censor interpreted "jet horses" to represent MiG fighter planes, he says.

Also objectionable to the censor was another poem in the collection called "The Fall of the Mask," in which al-Qasim lamented the outcome of the Six Day War, "a painful poem in which in the end I am the lost one, alone with my own tragedy."

Yet arbitrarily, he says, the censors insisted that the title of the poem be changed to "To King Faysal." Equally as exasperating to al-Qasim was the censor's objection to the thunderbird insignia on the cover of the book, which was inspired by the legend of the American Indian Zoni tribe.

"The censorship inquisition," al-Qasim says, "said the thunderbird looked like an eagle, and the eagle is the military symbol of Egypt and Syria." Despite his having written in the introduction to the collection that Zoni legend holds that "when the thunderbird comes it will rain and the land will be green and we shall be happy," the poet found himself under siege on yet a third count.

"No comic could create such a thing," he muses. "So I was confiscated and the book was arrested." Only after his colleagues here and abroad, among them Jean-Paul Sartre and Allen Ginsburg, flooded the Israeli government with telegrams of protest, was al-Qasim released a few days after his arrest. He was allowed to publish the book again, but only after he agreed to change the cover design and the titles of the two poems.

A decade later another brouhaha erupted over the publication of several stanzas of al-Qasim's "Lamentations" in the edition of the Foreign Ministry's literary quarterly ARI'EL marking Israel's 30th anniversary.

The poet was wary of the ministry's request for a sample of his work. He recalls thinking: "If I refuse, they'll say 'Yes, it's because he is against Israel. But if I accept, why should I participate in the anniversary of the state?'"

In the end he decided to contribute "Lamentations," which had already been published elsewhere, "as a gesture of good will."

The gesture has been lost on then-MK Zalman Shoval, who served at the time as chairman of an advisory committee to the Foreign Ministry. Shoval objected to the poem, which was included in a survey of Arabic literature in Israel, on the grounds that it expressed in allegorical form Arab nationalist and anti-Zionist feelings.

Al-Qasim had written:

I mourn my lot in the vine of life
An upturned beetle, a squall—
I pound on the doors of the United (or Disunited)
Nations
In the frost of the desolate plazas I shrivel—
And then extend to the four corners of the earth.
My face is a spaceship denied by this planet,
My heart a pomegranate, a nuclear bomb,
My arm a legend
My paces a mission...

The poem was sent to a panel of Israeli intellectuals for review, and passed. And again, the poet's Israeli colleagues rallied to his defence, saying that if his poem was excised from the quarterly, they would withdraw their works.

In the end, the stanzas from "Lamentations" were published, along with a one-page insert into the magazine claiming that not all the material therein represented the opinions of the Foreign Ministry.

"It was a dibuk," al-Qasim says. "A mamash dibuk."

Al-Qasim was born in 1939 in al-Zarqa', Jordan, where his father was serving during World War II. After the war, they returned to the Galilee village of Rama, where the al-Qasims, a prominent Druse family, have lived since the 12th century.

During the 1950s, the fiery charisma of Egypt's Jamal 'Abd-al-Nasir proved irresistible to the young al-Qasim. "I believed in Arab socialism, pan-Arabism and Arab unity," he recalls. "I dreamed of the revival of a great Arab nation. These were legitimate dreams for a young poet."

Al-Qasim found an outlet for his political convictions in al-Ard, which struggled unsuccessfully, from 1959 through the mid-'60s, to create a non-Communist political body that would speak for the Arabs of Israel—but his activism cost him his teaching job in an Israeli public school.

Even darker days were to follow. The shattering blow inflicted on the collective Arab psyche by the Six Day War diminished the allure of Nasserism, which had proven to be, in al-Qasim's view, a mere "castle of words."

He was jailed during the war, and today the memory of his imprisonment evokes a trace of bitterness. "The government was afraid that I would use my missiles, my air base, my submarines to interfere in the war," he says.

"In prison, I had to choose between religion or going in a more revolutionary direction. And that's how I came to the Communist Party of Israel."

In a poem entitled "Resignation From the Death Insurance Company," he declared:

Ladies and Gentlemen.

We are here
On a crossroad
Let the drowned be drowned
If he wishes, and let him harness fire horses
If he wishes. But if I am
Asked, I choose
The Left in my march
The sun and the Left
Wheat and the Left
Tears and the Left
And death until the earth changes its orbit
To the Left.

Over the years, the press has chronicled al-Qasim's political activity thus:

His being placed, along with other Communist Party activists, under strict police supervision in 1968; his signing in 1974 of an appeal by Jewish and Arab writers for, among other things, the establishment of a Palestinian state; his denial last December that he had met face-to-face with Yasser Arafat during a recent visit to Egypt.

Despite his activism, al-Qasim maintains that his writings do not reflect a strictly nationalist case. While his poetry, on a political level, does advocate "the right of my people for freedom and independence," he says this goes hand in hand with "a wish for peace, friendship and brotherhood, not just between Israelis and Palestinians, but for people all over the world."

Moreover, he says, while Palestinian poetry in general does have "a tragic feeling, a clear pain" about it, it is not to be viewed as a stream of nationalist outrage—but as a legitimate expression of a people living under a specific set of circumstances generated by a specific set of historical events.

"What is considered political by someone for us means life itself," he says, adding that his are not only poems of resistance, but "poems of existence."

"It is the situation of a whole people, the future of a nation." While it is true, he acknowledges by quoting George Orwell, that we live in a political century, "the relationship between two nations is not all politics."

Al-Qasim infers that such a lesson can be drawn from the controversy generated by the publication last spring of "Those Who Pass Between Fleeting Words," a poem by Mahmud Darwish, considered a moderate in the PLO executive committee.

The poem, widely interpreted as a call for Jews to quit all of Israel rather than just the West Bank and Gaza, which Darwish subsequently denied was his intention, sparked a hue and cry in Israel that al-Qasim characterizes as being "very far from sincere."

"The whole case was political," he says, "intended to tell Israelis that there is no Palestinian partner for negotiations.

"But we have to take into consideration that the poem was written at a time when every day at least one Palestinian was being killed and one injured, and this continues today," al-Qasim says.

"It is human and understandable that someone says 'Goddammit and go to hell'; to say get lost and go away and leave us alone. It is normal.

"When you humiliate the national feeling of somebody, you must expect some reaction. But people who haven't a real human feeling and appreciation of these things are not ready to understand them."

Al-Qasim sifts through a mound of papers on his desk, looking for a pen to note down one of the myriad messages recorded on his answering machine. The messages indicate that the poet is thriving: invitations to cultural events come in from around the country and abroad; he must contact his publisher about his new collection of poems, "A Rosary of Registrations," out just last month.

His works to date include 31 books of poetry as well as prose, plays and two novellas, and have been translated into English, German, Russian, Swedish, Swahili and Vietnamese, among others. Two years ago Spain awarded him the Laurel Poetico prize and he recently received the Solidarity Prize from the Arab community of France. He serves as chairman of the Arab Writers Union in Israel and as manager of the Popular Cultural Society in Haifa.

And he says that he sees some encouraging signs: the ARI'EL incident would not likely be replayed were it to happen today as it happened a decade ago, thanks to "a polarization between madness and sanity.

"Today the climate is more moderate because the whole Palestinian case has a different position in the political mentality in Israel," he says.

"There are different approaches to the problem. Even Mr. Arens, known for his extremist points of view, talks today of the need for respecting national rights, both Israeli and Palestinian."

"I hope," he says, "that the change will continue, because I believe in the power of the word. The word can do many things. If I would lose this belief in the power of the word, I would stop writing."

Nevertheless, the train ride is still not without its sharp bends in the track, and many passengers continue to feel threatened by the cries of their fellow travellers.

"Today," says al-Qasim, "instead of poets, they are attacking singers singing nationalist songs at weddings." He quotes: "My country, I write your name on the sun which will never set. My country, dearest beloved of mine."

JORDAN

Phosphate Company Conducting Research To Obtain Uranium

44000356 Amman JORDAN TIMES in English
16 Jan 89 p 3

[Text] Amman (J.T.)—The Jordan Phosphate Mines Company (JPMC) is currently conducting research to obtain uranium from phosphate which abounds in Jordan and plans to set up an experimental laboratory to extract uranium from phosphoric acid, JPMC Director General Wasif 'Azar said in a statement published in the local press.

Uranium, which is a basic component of phosphate, can be saturated and then sold for a good price, but the cost of producing it is high—running at the estimated rate of \$55 for every kilogram.

The company also plans to purchase the 'Aqabah Railway Corporation which now transports most of the phosphate, extracted from the company's four mines in southern Jordan to 'Aqabah for export, 'Azar said.

At present the company mines the mineral at Hasah, 140 kilometres south of Amman located at Tafilah governorate, Wadi al-Abiyad, which is to the north of Hasah and al-Shidiyah which started operations at the end of the past year 'Azar continued.

He said the al-Rusayfah mine, the first to be exploited for phosphate, had been closed down since 1980 for economic reasons.

These mines last year together produced five million tonnes yielding a net profit of JD 22 million 'Azar noted.

But, the total revenue in 1988 stood at \$350 million and this year it is expected to rise to \$400 million, he added.

But not all the produced phosphate had been sold. According to 'Azar only 2.5 million tonnes of the mineral were marketed worldwide in the past year which witnessed a total world marketing of 48 million tonnes.

'Azar said that an agreement with the Royal Scientific Society (RSS) to conduct joint cooperation to control the amount of phosphate dust produced in the process of loading the mineral at 'Aqabah Port terminal is still valid, and it is hoped that the end of 1991 will witness the end of any dust that cause pollution.

The phosphate dust constitutes a major problem for the company, the importer of Jordanian phosphates and the residents of the port city, according to 'Azar.

He said the dust floats in the air and pollutes the port region during loading and transportation processes from the mines to the port.

By the end of 1991 the company would install special equipment at the phosphate mines to separate dust from rock so loading areas in Aqaba would be completely free from falling dust, 'Azar added.

Private University for Expatriates' Children Planned

44000352 Amman JORDAN TIMES in English
9-10 Feb 89 p 3

[Text] Amman (J.T.)—Jordanian expatriates will be given the lion's share in the number of seats at the projected private university which is to be established within the Greater Amman region, according to Dr Sayf al-Wadi al-Rumayhi, the general coordinator for the new university.

Nearly 90 per cent of the seats will be assigned for children of Jordanian expatriates, a move that will ensure an inflow of between 300 Jordanian dinars to 500 million Jordanian dinars in foreign currency into Jordan on an annual basis, Rumayhi said in a statement published in SAWT AL-SHA'B daily.

The university's initial capital is expected to be 10 million Jordanian dinars of which the expatriates are expected to provide 5 million Jordanian dinars, Rumayhi noted.

But, he said, the expatriates have only provided 2.3 million Jordanian dinars so far and these came from those expatriates living and working in Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia.

As soon as the expatriates pay up their expected share the door will be open for registration, and this could take place by the end of the coming month, Rumayhi noted.

He pointed out that the broadlines for the university's programmes and the essential infrastructure for the new project have already been laid and study could start by January 1990.

He said that though the university will be located within the Amman region, it could have branches in Zarqah, Irbid and Mafraq.

Rumayhi noted that the idea of a private university was endorsed by the Jordanian expatriates conferences held in Amman over the past years.

Registration in the new university, he said, would be in accordance with regulations set by the Ministries of Education and Higher Education but the private university will have to organize entrance examinations for its students.

KUWAIT

Bank Chairman Describes Economic Prospects With Cease-Fire

44000336b Kuwait ARAB TIMES in English
28 Jan 89 p 9

[Article by M. C. Bose]

[Text] Shaykh Ahmad 'Abdallah al-Ahmad al-Sabah, the chairman and managing director of Burgan Bank in Kuwait told the ARAB TIMES in an exclusive interview that the sentiment in the Gulf Region, particularly in Kuwait after the declaration of the ceasefire has improved. This probably marks a turning point in the economic health of this region, he added.

Elucidating, he said that in both Iraq and Iran, the ceasefire is leading to a significant increase in demand for goods and services. The Arab Gulf states, and Kuwait in particular, are in a good position—both economically and geographically—to supply these two countries.

On the issue of investing surplus of Arab funds in the Arab world rather than abroad, the official said that there is no doubt that it is good for Arab investors to finance Arab capital projects. This is becoming easier as regional financial markets develop depth and integration, although there is still some way to go in this respect.

Investment

He added that it is important to balance investment flows. Too much will bid up the prices of goods and services, including real estate and share prices, causing inflation. Alternatively, if there is a scarcity of funds, valid investment opportunities might be missed.

In Kuwait, the markets are sufficiently well developed and it is unlikely that viable investment projects will suffer from a lack of finance. Accordingly, investment abroad is not bad if it increases the country's future income.

Speaking on overall growth prospects of the Kuwaiti economy, GNP growth, different facets of financial system and Kuwaiti banking, Shaykh Ahmad said that the end of the war between Iraq and Iran, and consequently their reconstruction needs, should help the Kuwaiti economy. He added: "We are in an excellent position to develop our role as the major Gulf entrepot to Iraq. The extra demand for exports from Kuwait should provide a substantial boost to GDP.

Continuing, he said quite apart from re-export business, local industrial and commercial companies will supply goods and services to the neighbouring countries. This will be translated into a higher pace of transactions at the banks, with more buoyant demand for credit and trade

finance. At Burgan Bank "we are fine-tuning our services for import-export and other industrial and commercial concerns operating through Kuwait and in Iraq and Iran."

With regard to the financial markets, it is encouraging to note that they remained stable throughout 1988. Inter-bank interest rates were very low at the start of the year, which helped the new market in treasury bills and bonds. Domestic interest rates rose in the second half of the year, mainly reflecting pressures from higher interest rates worldwide.

The dinar was steady all through 1988, trading in a range of between 270 and 290 fils to the dollar. Activity in the bond market was uneventful, while the stock exchange received a welcome push from regulatory improvements in May, and the ceasefire in July, the official said.

High

However, he added, the overheating in the American and British economies will keep interest rates high in these countries. This will naturally maintain pressure on interest rates in Kuwait. At the same time, there may not be too much progress on reducing the U.S. budget and trade deficits, and the U.S. dollar could weaken further.

On the issue of economic recession and declining oil income leading to social problems in Arab countries, Shaykh Ahmad said that Arab countries have had several years to adjust to lower oil prices and revenues, but there are no signs of resulting social problems. It is sensible to consider oil prices in the longer-term context.

On privatisation of the public sector industries in the Arab world as called for by 70 leading Arab and international economists, the banker said that he generally took the view that private sector entrepreneurs are better at running businesses than are bureaucracies. Privatisation has indeed proved successful in the industrialised countries, he added. However, he said, it is necessary to consider each case on its own merits, taking into account such issues as "national interest," which are wider than pure profit motives.

Loans

On Kuwaiti banks rising syndicated loans to Iran and Iraq, the official said that the commercial banks in Kuwait are already exploring the prospects for helping Iraq and Iran to finance their reconstruction. We are ready to consider all viable proposals, he added.

On the impact of introducing higher interest rates on the Kuwait Stock Market and real estate, the official said that the Central Bank increased its discount rate by 2-1/2 percent to 7-1/2 percent. It is clear that the Central Bank has resisted external pressures well, considering that

since February 1988, U.S. interest rates have risen by three percent to 9-1/2 percent while UK rates have jumped by four percent to 13 percent.

Encourage

Clearly, higher interest rates will encourage people to save, and to switch their deposits into the dinar from other, now less-attractive, currencies. The local banks are able to pay between 7-1/2 percent (for 30-day customer deposits) and 8-1/2 percent (for deposits with a life of more than six months). This compares favourably with rates of under six percent in Germany and Switzerland, and is close to the higher rates available in dollars and sterling, especially considering exchange rate risks.

Consequently, it makes much more sense for people in Kuwait to keep their money in the KD. Indeed, there are signs that investors are switching out of foreign currencies and back into the dinar, Shaykh Ahmad said.

Significance

He added, this is the key significance of the interest rate rise in Kuwait. Initially, bank deposits may seem more attractive than stock market and real estate investment opportunities. But with the additional build up of liquidity in Kuwait, these investment vehicles will benefit in the longer term.

On the allegation by the Group of 10 industrialised countries that Arab banks including developing nations' are high-risk for lending purposes, the official said that there is a wide range of risks among banks in the Arab world. He added: "I agree that I would classify some as high-risk for lending purposes." However, the banks in the Gulf states are better rated than Arab banks in general. And banks in Kuwait are especially well regarded. With the backing of the Central Bank and the government, Kuwaiti banks are considered to be A-rated by commentators worldwide, Shaykh Ahmad concluded.

LIBYA

Report Describes Accomplishments of Electrical Products Company

45040161c Tripoli AL-FAJR AL-JADID in Arabic
11 Dec p 5

[Text] The Public Company for Wires and Electrical Products was established in accordance with statute No 11 of 1976, with a capital of 7 million dinars, wholly owned by the society. The main center of this company is in the city of Benghazi along the coastal road, on al-Jamahiriyah Street. This company also has a branch in the city of Tripoli, and distribution centers in Darnah, Sabha, Misratah, al-Zawiyah, Tripoli, and Benghazi.

The purpose of establishing this company was to cover the Jamahiriyah's needs for electrical wires and cables of all kinds.

The company began with the building of the first of its plants, namely the plant for low voltage cables of up to 1000 volts, according to German VDE [Association of German Electrotechnicians] specifications, as well as international IEC [International Electrotechnical Commission] specifications. It has a productive capacity of 3,000 tons a year. When the company began its task, it used to cover its deficit in cables by importing all kinds from abroad. Because the partners in this bastion of industry decided that it would be necessary to raise production capacities in order to attain self-sufficiency in cables, studies were begun on adding additional lines and developing machines that would bring about self-sufficiency. The production capacity of cables was in fact increased to about 6,000 tons a year.

Consideration was given to adding new plants for distributing the cables, and in view of the increased construction and agricultural activities in the country, the factory for capillary wires for flexible cables was built. It began operations at the beginning of 1986 at a productive capacity of 65,000 km a year of various gauges of flexible capillaries, such that the maximum production capacity of the plants was up to 8,000 tons a year.

The company's activity was not limited to the manufacture of cables only; it also considered the possibility of looking for local sources of raw materials, so that it would be able to utilize local raw materials as much as possible in its industry. Because plastic is needed as a principal component in the manufacture of cables, consideration was given to manufacturing this material locally, since the plastic powder is available locally, and produced in the Abu Kimash complex. Limestone is also available locally, and these two materials represent about 75 percent of PVC [polyvinyl chloride] plastic. The contract has been signed for the plastics granulating plant and the limestone treatment unit, which will go into actual operation during the first week of the month of Ayy al-Nar, 1989.

It will operate with two work shifts, at a production capacity of 10,500 tons a year of all kinds of plastic granules, according to customer demand. It will also produce chalk as a raw material.

And now the company operates three large plants, as we said before:

1. The low-voltage electrical cable plant.
2. The plant for flexible capillary wires of various kinds, coated with PVC.
3. The plastics granulating plant and the limestone treatment unit.

In view of the increasing demand for high voltage cables, and of what the Jamahiriyah will need of this quality during the conversion plans, the high-voltage and telephone cable project was completed 18 Dec 1980. It has a

production capacity of 535 km a year of telecommunications 11 kf 30 k [wire], 10,665 km a year of conductor wires with multiple couplings and reinforced with steel for telephones. Steps are being taken now to open credit.

An international company specializing in this field was contracted with on following the most advanced methods of modern technology in the field of cable manufacture.

The company did not stop there, rather it gave the specialist technicians in the company, engineers and technicians, the task of studying adding electrical products ventures to the field of the company's activity. A number of projects have been studied, namely:

1. A unit to produce windings for motors, with a capacity of 1000 tons a year.
2. A unit to produce ornamental strings.
3. A unit to produce antenna wires at a capacity of 500 km a year.
4. A smelter for scrap copper.

Studies are continuing on other projects, such as: electrical appliances plugs, electrical connections, lamps, and other electrical products.

The total area covered by the projects of this company in one site is about 18 hectares.

In addition, there are up to about 700 producers from among national elements in this company. By al-Fatih'88, surplus production had reached a value of 17 million Libyan dinars; it is of various kinds and dimensions, and ready for market.

We take this opportunity to invite the marketing and distribution channels to which society has given this task and which are represented by the National Company for Markets, whose offices are in the municipalities, and the consumer associations and the individual distributors as well as the public companies which occupy themselves with marketing and distribution activities, we invite them all to draw their needs from the production surplus available from the Electrical Wires and Cables Company, since the product is in accordance with international IEC specifications and German VDE specifications, and is comparable in quality to world production.

In addition we call upon the partnerships and parties working in the field of the PVC production industry to turn to the management of this company to reserve their needs for 1989.

We also hope that the parties responsible for granting import licenses will not grant any licenses for importing electrical wires and cables and PVC plastic granules unless the management of this company reports that what is needed is not available. This is in order to protect the national industry.

OMAN

Study To Formulate Industrial Strategy Under Way

44000348b Muscat *TIMES OF OMAN* in English
16 Feb 89 p 2

[Text] Oman will shortly be undertaking a study to help formulate an industrial strategy for the next 50 years, the minister of commerce and industry, Salim ibn 'Abdallah al Ghazali said on Sunday.

Addressing a meeting with local industrialists, the minister said the study would be carried out with the help of the United Nations Industrial Development Organization, whose officials had already arrived in Oman.

The plan is expected to cover various sectors, both in public and private, with special emphasis on the development of manpower resources.

Oman had also reached an agreement with UNIDO to develop tourism in the Sultanate, Mr Ghazali disclosed. The minister also discussed various problems faced by local industrialists and the ways to solve them.

Incentives To Promote Industry Discussed

44000348a Muscat *TIMES OF OMAN* in English
16 Feb 89 pp 1, 2

[Text] Customs duties were imposed on the import of several products competing with local goods and duty exemption given to several industries during the period between January 1979 and June 1988, in the government's ongoing drive of industrialization.

Maximum encouragement to industries is the watchword—with a view to reducing the dependence on imports, providing employment of skilled hands and diversifying the sources of national revenues.

Competitiveness

Pursuant to the provisions of the Law Organizing and Promoting Industry, contained in a royal decree, all efforts are being made to enhance the competitive capacity of the industry in order to enable it to confront similar products imported from abroad.

There are a set of eight incentives which the government is granting to industries:

1. Exemption from customs duty on equipment and machinery needed for installation during the period of construction and the period of expansion;
2. Exemption from customs duty on raw materials and semi-manufactured material needed for production;
3. Imposition of increased customs duty on imported goods which compete with the local products. Such products are often banned or their imports restricted in order to protect the national products;
4. Recommendation on reducing the prices of electricity used for industrial purposes;
5. Total of partial exemption from taxes for a period of five years, subject to renewal;
6. Recommendation that national products should be granted price priority in government purchases up to the amount of 10 per cent, provided these products are not of a lesser quality and below specifications as compared to similar imported products;
7. Conducting surveys for the purpose of industrial investment and preparation of feasibility studies for projects vital to national economy. Such surveys and studies are provided to the private sector;
8. Provision of planned industrial plots and supply of services to these lands so as to set up industrial projects.

Customs and tax exemptions are generally given by the government to promote industrialization.

During the period between January 1979, and June 1988, customs duties were imposed on products competing with local products. These were: cement and its products, pipes, paints, polyurethane, cartons, vegetable oil, detergents and barbed wire.

The total number of incentives granted to industrial installations (customs protection or customs exemption) were 44, 51 and 47 during 1985, 1986 and 1987, respectively. During the first half of 1988, a total of 18 specified incentives are on record. There has been a remarkable increase in these cases, compared with the situation before 1985. In 1979, 80, 81, 82, 83 and 84, such cases numbered 3, 2, 5, 8, 11 and 32 respectively.

The Rusayl Industrial Estate set up six years ago, is playing important role in promoting the drive for industrialization in the country.

Estates

The success of the one hectare estate has encouraged the government to plan additional industrial estates in different wilayats of the Sultanate. The current third five-year development plan, which expires next year, has made the necessary allocations for the building of these estates.

The first estate, to be set up in Suhar is due to be inaugurated in 1990.

The second estate will be set up in Raysut in Salalah. Planning and consultative study began last year while actual implementation will start during this year. The project is due for opening in 1990.

The third industrial estate will be created in Sur. The final land allocation has just been made and consultative and planning activities are due to start this year. Implementation will begin in 1990.

The industrial estate in Nizwa will be the fourth new estate to be set under the current Five-Year Plan. Preliminary approval has been granted for land allocation and work is scheduled to commence this year.

All the four industrial estates will be provided with basic infrastructural utilities like roads, gas, electricity, telecommunications and drainage. Industries which are set up within these industrial estates will be given electricity at reduced rates, as compared with those outside these estates. Consumption during the winter period will be calculated at the rate of 12 baizas per kilowatt hour as compared to 16 baizas per kilowatt hour for factories outside the estate.

Under the terms of a Ministerial decision, issued by the Minister of Electricity and Water, industrial installations outside industrial estates of Rusayl are now paying only 16 baizas per kilowatt hour and 24 baizas per kilowatts hour during winter (8 months) and summer (4 months) respectively. Consumption for the factories situated within the estate is calculated at the rate of 12 baizas per kilowatts hour for the winter months.

QATAR

Educational Cooperation With Studies Discussed 44000330 Doha GULF TIMES in English 5 Dec 88 p 3

[Article by T. M. Anantharaman]

[Text] Talks on educational cooperation between Qatar and Saudi Arabia began in Doha yesterday.

The Qatari team at the second meeting of the Qatari-Saudi Committee for Cooperation in Education and Culture is led by Education Undersecretary 'Abd-al-'Aziz 'Abdallah Turki. Saudi Undersecretary for the Ministry for Higher Education Dr 'Abd-al-Rahman al-Shubayli leads his country's delegation.

The first such cooperation talks on educational matters was held in Riyadh three years ago.

Undersecretary Mr 'Abdallah Turki told Daily Gulf Times that the joint committee would discuss cooperation in three main areas: general education, culture and Islamic heritage and higher education.

He said the two countries were expected to exchange experts in health education in schools, educational planning, compact literacy, curricula development, technical education and school buildings.

The talks also aimed to exchange experiences in teaching Arabic language for non-Arab students and would cover experiments in teaching disabled children and education of gifted students, school activities, exchange of student visits to schools, boy scouts programmes and development of school theatre.

On Islamic heritage and culture, the Qatar National Library and the Saudi National Library could exchange expertise in library services, biographies, manuscripts and cultural exhibitions.

Mr 'Abdallah Turki said Qatar placed great importance on cooperation in higher education with Saudi Arabia.

"In the last three years we have around 65 to 75 Qatari girls and boys studying in Saudi Arabia, especially in Saudi medical faculty. Many Saudi students are in Qatar University too," he said.

The education undersecretary said another aim of the talks would be to exchange teachers between the two countries' universities for a short-term and exchange experiences on higher education curricula, researches and magazines.

Saudi Undersecretary Dr al-Shubayli in his opening statement at the joint committee meeting said a main goal of Saudi Arabia was to establish strong ties on education and cultural matters with Qatar.

"We would like to exchange experts and see the development of a similar educational policy between the two countries," he said.

The Saudi undersecretary said this was also the goal set for the Arab Gulf region as a whole.

The two sides are expected to sign an agreement on cooperation today following the talks at Mr 'Abdallah Turki's office in the Ministry of Education.

SUDAN

Sudanese leader Interviewed

LD1103211389 Tripoli JANA in English
1442 GMT 11 Mar 89

[Text] The prime minister of sisterly Sudan al-Sadiq al-Mahdi asserted that the various plots to which Sudan is being subjected were aimed at returning the country to the era of deposed Numayri in terms of subjugation and axis. He added this is a matter rejected by the Sudanese people's will.

In a special interview conducted with him by the Radio of the Voice of the Greater Arab Homeland—the voice of revolutionary committees, he said that we rightly believe that salvation lies in the people ruling itself by itself away from tribalism and racialism. These meanings are supreme objectives and very demanded from the popular masses in Sudan.

Al-Sadiq al-Mahdi lauded the proposal made by the leader to the African countries adjacent to the Sahara to join the Arab Maghreb union.

He said that Sudan commends highly that project and welcomes Arab unionist moves in various fields.

SYRIA

Al-Asad Biographer Interviewed on Syrian Regional Concerns

44230054 Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT (Sabbath Supplement) in Hebrew 20 Jan 89 p 11

[Interview with UK author Patrick Seal by 'Uzi Mahanayimi in London; date not given]

[Text] London—One of the few Westerners who knows Syrian President Hafiz al-Asad well is British author and journalist Patrick Seal. Seal recently published the most comprehensive biography written to date on the Syrian president.

In the process of gathering material for his book (Asad, The Struggle for the Middle East, chapters of which were published for the first time in YEDI'OT AHARONOT), Seal has met many times in recent years with the Syrian president, and with members of his family. Seal—a Briton of Jewish origin married to a woman of Syrian origin from one of the most respected families in Damascus—has excellent connections with the leadership of the Syrian regime.

He is therefore an excellent source for understanding present-day Syria and its relations with the Arab world, the USSR, and Israel.

[YEDI'OT AHARONOT] Permit me to begin by asking a naive question: Does President al-Asad hate Israel?

[Seal] I think that the answer is affirmative. More than any other state, Syria feels that it is a victim of Israeli aggression. For Egypt, Israel was distant, and the establishment of the State of Israel did not damage it. The Syrians view the establishment of the State of Israel as a blow against them and the appropriation of part of their territory.

Sometimes, you in Israel do not understand that the Syrians feel threatened by you. The bloody wars of recent years created hatred. Yes, President al-Asad hates you; however, his hatred is not so great as to undermine his pragmatism and strategic world view. He is a sober politician, and, contrary to what you and the Arab world think, it is possible to discuss "business" with him.

[YEDI'OT AHARONOT] The "business" which has increasingly taken shape recently—the contacts between the United States and the PLO—leave al-Asad outside the circle. Is there a chance that he will join the political process?

[Seal] You must understand that al-Asad is not a rejectionist. He wants an honorable agreement, and his conditions are clear: An Israeli withdrawal to the 1967 borders and recognition of the right to self-determination of the Palestinian people. I cannot speak in his behalf, but he told me a number of times that he is prepared (on the basis of his conditions) to enter a peace agreement with Israel.

The problem is that al-Asad believes that Israel is not ready for such an agreement. There exists here a psychological block of the type about which President al-Sadat spoke in his time. Nevertheless, it is possible to attain peace with al-Asad, and he will stand by, and honor a peace agreement. Take this into account.

[YEDI'OT AHARONOT] Are the rumors about an agreement between Syria and Israel in Lebanon correct?

[Seal] No. In my opinion, there is no secret agreement which divides areas of influence in Lebanon between Israel and Syria. There are red lines which the two countries do not cross in order to prevent a confrontation. Al-Asad told me a number of times: We will not concede control in Lebanon, because the security of Lebanon is an inseparable part of the security of Syria. At the same time, the Syrians are not interested in annexing Lebanon.

Syria, like Israel, will not concede a presence in Lebanon, because otherwise, Lebanon would become a base for aggression against it. Syria's interest is to prevent the cantonization of Lebanon, the opposite of the Israeli conception.

[YEDI'OT AHARONOT] Is President al-Asad willing to demilitarize the Golan Heights?

[Seal] Certainly. You already have a separation agreement with the Syrian president (the forces separation agreement arranged immediately after the Yom Kippur War). Syria did not oppose the agreement and has honored it so far.

[YEDI'OT AHARONOT] What would al-Asad do if a political process were to begin soon between Israel, the Palestinians, and Jordan without Syrian participation?

[Seal] Look at what Syria did between 1984 and 1987, when Shim'on Perez thought he could reach a separate agreement with Husayn. Al-Asad turned the world upside down to make it clear to Husayn that Syria would not agree to such a separate agreement. The Syrians instigated, inter alia, terror against the king and exerted other pressures. The perception of Perez, according to which a separate agreement could be reached with Jordan, was divorced from the Arab reality. Any additional attempt to isolate Syria would suffer the same fate.

[YEDI'OT AHARONOT] Would Syria initiate a war against Israel to thwart a political process which did not include it?

[Seal] My impression, following tens of hours of conversations with the Syrian president and with his senior advisors, is that Syria is neither willing nor able to wage a war against Israel. In their opinion, they are strong enough to frustrate or stop an Israeli attack, but certainly not strong enough to initiate an independent attack.

[YEDI'OT AHARONOT] Israeli experts on Syria argue that Syria and al-Asad are weaker today compared to the past. Can you confirm this perception?

[Seal] Without doubt, Syria has absorbed several slaps in the face in the recent year. The war in the Gulf did not end as Syria had expected, and its traditional enemy, Iraq, is now free to harass it in Lebanon. The Palestinian issue also underwent a turning point, which is undesirable as far as Syria is concerned.

Moreover, the Syrians are mired in difficulties in Lebanon, al-Asad's relations with Gorbachov are cold, and Syria has complex economic problems. Nonetheless, Syria experienced difficulties of no less a magnitude in the past, and overcame them. Al-Asad adheres to iron-clad, clear principles, and his staying power is great. As a master of the art of the possible, he is already adapting himself for a change in Syria's position.

[YEDI'OT AHARONOT] How?

[Seal] He is a great survivor. In recent months, it is possible to see how he has been slowly adapting himself to the new situation in the Middle East, and to other political developments.

His relations with Egypt are a prime example in this respect. Based on what I have heard, a renewal of diplomatic relations between the two states can be expected within several months. There is no talk yet of warm relations, however Syrian willingness "to swallow the bitter pill" and agree to a renewal of links with Egypt testifies that al-Asad understands that if he cannot beat his enemy, it is better to join him.

As far as I know, a renewal of relations with Morocco will precede a renewal of relations with Egypt. al-Asad and Mubarak will sit next to each other for the first time at the next Arab summit.

[YEDI'OT AHARONOT] What can you relate concerning current relations between Syria and the USSR?

[Seal] There is no agreement between al-Asad and the leader of the USSR, Mikhael Gorbachov, regarding the situation in the Middle East. This does not stem from the personalities of the two leaders or the absence of chemistry between them. Rather, it stems from the Syrian interpretation of Soviet policy.

From my conversations with Syrian leadership, I received the impression that it is felt in Syria that the USSR will reach an agreement behind their backs. Al-Asad is disappointed that Gorbachov does not share his perception regarding the Syrian need for "a strategic balance" with Israel.

I also know that the Soviets are not supplying the Syrians with the weapons which they are requesting. The Syrians pressed the Soviets to supply them with more surface-to-surface missiles, which, in their opinion, will deter Israel. However, the Soviets rejected the request. The Soviets also rejected a Syrian request to augment Syria's air defense units.

The differences of opinion are fundamental: Al-Asad believes that he must become equipped with modern weapons to prevent an Israeli attack. The Soviets respond by saying that more weapons will actually cause an Israeli attack.

[YEDI'OT AHARONOT] How great is the feeling in Damascus that the USSR will initiate a political process which is not in accordance with the Syrian conception?

[Seal] Very great, so great that al-Asad initiated political processes in order to join with Egypt and Jordan in moving toward the possibility of a political process. He will never agree to be on the outside. Al-Asad feels that the Soviets will accept the American concept of bilateral peace talks (between Jordan and the Palestinians one hand, and Israel on the other). For his part, al-Asad is interested in talks occurring in the broadest possible framework, in which the Syrians would be able to influence their fellow Arabs.

The settlement which al-Asad aspires to attain is similar to the settlement between the superpowers: An agreement based on mutual deterrence, and which is not the result of [the superiority of] Israel's military power. Al-Asad has always argued that wars in the region were caused by the absence of a balance, and that if he cannot attain a military balance, he will not concede the political balance.

[YEDI'OT AHARONOT] It is said that al-Asad's daily schedule has changed, and that he works considerably less than in the past.

[Seal] Al-Asad is a workaholic. He is not a sociable person with whom one can become intimate. When he is not working, he spends his free time with his family. Since his collapse in 1984 (from exhaustion according to Seal), he is much more careful about his health. He exercises in the morning and walks in the garden at the presidential palace.

[YEDI'OT AHARONOT] Is there a successor to Al-Asad?

[Seal] He is only 58, and I have never heard him speak about a successor. I was once in his office, and someone present flattered him by saying that he should live till 90. Al-Asad quickly muttered that he will live to 150 as did Abraham, our forefather...

[YEDI'OT AHARONOT] What is the position of his son, Basil? There are those who believe that al-Asad is grooming him to succeed him as president?

[Seal] I know Basil well. He is courageous, eloquent, and an excellent athlete. Basil is currently responsible for the military force which is part of the Presidential Guard. I do not think that al-Asad is thinking in terms of a dynasty. He prefers that his successor continue his political line, and be faithful to his world view.

UNITED ARAB EMIRATES

Al-Shariqah To Implement New Foreign Ownership Law

44000317 Dubayy KHALEEJ TIMES in English
25 Jan 89 p 17

[Article by P. S. Ramanathan: "Al-Shariqah Law on Full Foreign Ownership Soon"]

[Text] The law on full foreign ownership of business establishments proposed by the al-Shariqah government is to be a reality by April.

"It will spur an unprecedented inflow of foreign capital and technical knowhow to the emirate, making it and the UAE at large a force to reckon with among industrialised countries," al-Shariqah Chamber of Commerce and Industry's chairman Shaykh Muhammad Ibn-Salim al-Qasimi, told The KHALEEJ TIMES yesterday.

The proposed law, which has the blessings of His Highness Dr Shaykh Sultan Ibn-Muhammad al-Qasimi, Member of the Supreme Council and Ruler of al-Sharīqah, would enable foreign companies and individual investors to steer clear of the present requirement to have a local for their sponsor or partner. The foreign entities would instead enter into a "service agent" arrangement with a local, who at no stage would be held responsible for any kind of debts or market liabilities of the former.

"The draft law, submitted to the Federal authorities in August to ensure that it is in conformity with the country's general policies and guidelines, is in the final stages of scrutiny. Hopefully, it should be ready for release before the first quarter of 1989 is through," Shaykh Muhammad said.

New Thinking

"It is in line with the new thinking in al-Sharīqah, on liberalising procedures and concessions, for attracting large scale foreign investments. It has been designed to give full ownership and security to the investors.

"We have had deliberations with many multinationals and investment firms before evolving the draft law. Within its ambit, both the foreign businessmen and the local interests will do well, mutually protected."

Shaykh Muhammad said the draft law, excerpts of which were published in The Khaleej Times on August 4, 1988, has evoked "a lot of response from multinationals."

"Till the end of December, 84 inquiries had been received at the al-Sharīqah Chamber of Commerce and Industry office. Included in them are such companies as Mitsui of

Japan and Mobile of USA, Shaykh Muhammad said, adding that "major industrialists from the Indian sub-continent are also interested."

One Big Free Zone

The economic outlook for the 2,600 sq km emirate with a population of around 269,000 is looking very bright. Current indications are that an increasing number of companies are moving into al-Sharīqah. And the government and the al-Sharīqah Chamber of Commerce are sparing no efforts to transform the emirate into "one big free zone," as Shaykh Muhammad puts it.

The emirate witnessed an 80 percent spurt in the number of applications for new licences last year. This reflects the fact that "between 30 and 40 percent of all new investment in the UAE in 1988 has been in al-Sharīqah. We have one of the most diversified manufacturing bases in the Gulf region."

Al-Sharīqah now has 270 factories, covering heavy and light industries. Recent start-ups include a Dh22 million paper processing plant with Japanese technical know-how, a Dh18 million food processing and packing factory and a Dh10 million iron-and-steel recycling unit.

The industrial sector has been developing rapidly, partly because of the facilities the emirate offers for re-exporters—twin ports and a growing sea-air cargo activity.

The emirate sees a good future in food packaging and canning for instance, for tomato ketchup, as there is a surplus of locally produced tomatoes. The country absorbs between 15 and 20 percent of the farm produce from the Kalba and Khawr Fakkan area.

Shaykh Muhammad listed the following major incentives for industrialists: no taxes; no limit on repatriation of profits; 70 percent subsidy for utility supplies; nominal land lease charges; low labour rates; minimal red tape; and project licence approval within 10 days.

BANGLADESH

Editorial Assails Government Failures in Family Planning

46070009 Dhaka SANGBAD in Bengali 28 Dec 88 p 4

[Editorial: "Family Planning: A Success on Paper"]

[Text] In implementing family planning projects, the information that is sent from the grass roots levels to the Center has no relationship to reality. Even though this discrepancy has been discovered during the survey of family planning activities in only two subdistricts, it does not appear the picture would be much different in other subdistricts. With some exceptions, government activities proceed in the same manner in almost all subdistricts.

According to a high-level analysis, it has become clear that all the information about the success of family planning projects sent from the grass root levels is totally groundless or false. If not looked into, this information would have been accepted as truth. Grass roots level workers try to earn praise by creating these false pictures. The government and the people assume that considerable activities are going on in family planning. However, some were always suspicious about these success stories because, there was not much correlation between government accounting and what was actually happenings. So far, government circles have not paid much attention to these suspicions.

In various levels of activities of the family planning project, provisions have been made to give away saris, lungis [local dress], and cash as incentives. However, never it has been disclosed that a large quantity of these saris, lungis and cash were being misappropriated. Unless the policy of the offering of incentives to people is considered as means of gratifying the interests of the government employees, the authorities should take strict accounting of these items.

Instead of success, the amount of failure is so enormous that the Project Implementation and Evaluation Department of the government doubts that the set target of reducing the population in the second 5-year plan to 1.8 percent can be accomplished even in the final year of the third 5-year plan. There is even some doubt about the accuracy of the government report concerning the rate of growth of the population.

The objectives in filing false reports on the part of grass root employees are to protect their jobs and also to receive commendations. Now the workers of the family planning department have been brought up to the union level. If the number of workers had continued in the same relation to the amount of work, the rate of population explosion would be minimized. A long time ago overpopulation was identified as the number one

national problem; authorities should evaluate the reason for the failure even to make a scratch on that problem during the past twelve years.

The President has rightly said that unless the population can be kept at a reasonable level, the situation will go beyond control in the year 2000, and the nation's existence will be threatened. At the same time, it is apparent that if activities continue at the current pace, the population cannot be contained at the desired level in the year 2000. This means, inevitable disaster is looming ahead.

Overpopulation has been a national burden for some time. That burden is getting so heavy, day after day, that it is becoming impossible to bear. Certain calamity is becoming inevitable. The seven reasons the Project Implementation and Evaluation Department has cited as the causes for the failure to achieve the desired results are inconclusive, and have not received proper attention. Poverty, illiteracy and unemployment have been cited as the major causes for the rapid increase of population. We know that family planning is less effective among the poor and the illiterate. Freedom from poverty and expansion of literacy go hand-in-hand in population control and family planning. Consequently, we believe we should pay more attention to these matters. Since, the poor and the illiterate have more children, they should be made the prime "target group" in controlling the population explosion. Furthermore, it is not enough to enlighten the poor about family planning, they need to be helped with family planning measures and medicines. A "follow up" program is needed. If attention is not paid to reaction to the drugs, the result will be detrimental to the family planning project.

One of the preconditions of the success of the family planning projects is to reduce infant mortality. If a poor man could become somewhat sure that his first two children would survive, he might not be as anxious to have more children. The poor have found out that only two or three out of six or seven children actually survive. Consequently, they become parents of a larger number of children. In a male dominated society, desire to have more male children also can be a reason why population explosions occur. The need to establish proper rights for women can result in controlling population.

Absence of efforts and initiatives on the part of the grass root level employees have been cited as the main reason for the failure to achieve desired success of the family planning program. They are not employed merely to draw their salaries without doing anything. Why are they devoid of initiative. This needs to be evaluated. Do they face opposition at the village level? If so, how much help and cooperation do they receive from the government? How effective is their reporting process? Unless the senior employees properly supervise the activities of their subordinates, lack of productivity is bound to occur.

Who is responsible for the inability of making the family planning centers at the unions fully operational; for the paucity of family planning measures and medicines in the villages; for the absence of doctors fully trained in all aspects of family planning; and for not adopting the guidelines and plan of action set by various ministries?

It is good news that the government has identified these problems. However, it is not enough to identify them. The success of the family planning project depends upon the speed of remedying these causes.

INDIA

Burmese Chin Rebels Seek Indian Intervention

Report on Mizoram-Chin Rebel Hideouts

46000112 Calcutta SUNDAY in English
19-25 Feb 89 pp 15-17

[Article by Subir Bhaumik: "Inside Burma's Rebel Hide-Outs"]

[Text] The trek into Burma from Mizoram's border town Champai is an arduous one. The leg to Tlang Tlang, a tiny village about 25 kilometres within the Land of the Pagodas, is the hardest. Tlang Tlang nestles in the mountains halfway between Champai and Haka—the largest town in the Burmese Chin Hills. Two kilometres before the town, a road veers sharply towards the left. It leads to a village that my three Chin escorts—all of them insurgents, in their twenties and armed with revolvers—insist I must not identify.

At the village, I am quickly led to a house which belongs to one of the locals. In it, ready and waiting, is the man who I have come to see—Pu Tialkhal, chairman of the Chin National Front. The 2,000-member underground organisation of Chins (who are described as ethnic cousins of the Mizos) has lately been urging Indian to liberate the Chin Hills and include it within the Indian Union.

Burma's Chin state, which is twice the size of neighbouring Mizoram, appears to be preparing for a protracted bush war. Recent developments suggest that the insurgency will intensify. The Chin National Front (CNF)—a underground tribal outfit which had long been struggling for greater autonomy—has now called for secession. The CNF has an estimated 2,000 guerrillas. But its leaders claim to have recruited 4,000 more in the last four months or so, many of them students. The new recruits have been sent to camps in the states of Karen and Kachin to train with other tribal rebel outfits.

The transition from pressing for greater autonomy to demanding a separate state has an interesting twist. The CNF—the largest underground group representing the three million Chin population—sought support from the Indian government for its secessionistic designs. But recently, the tribal group went even further. It requested

that Chin state become part of India. A letter written last fortnight by CNF chairman Pu Tialkhal to Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi reads: "The popular demand of the Chins is to unite with their ethnic group within the Indian Union. I therefore request your honour to suitably respond to our humble request to liberate the Chin people to enable them to join their brethren within the Indian Union." The letter goes on to plead that Indian provide the "necessary political and economic facilities for liberating Chins from the heavy yoke of the Burmese rulers".

The reference to the ethnic group within India that the Chins want to unite with is the Mizos, with who they have much in common. Earlier, the CNF had fought for an independent Mizo-Chin state, but its leaders have apparently given this up now as an unviable idea. The willingness to become part of the Indian Union is related—oddly enough—to Rajiv Gandhi's politics. The many accords that the Prime Minister has signed with chief ministers of states dominated by minorities may be viewed as failures in India, but they have greatly impressed the Chins. Particularly, that with Laldenga in Mizoram. Said CNF Chairman Tialkhal to SUNDAY: "We realise now...our best bet is in joining the Indian Union, where national minorities enjoy more rights and freedoms than in any other Asian state (see interview)." Added general secretary Michael Tangleimang: "Our only aspiration, if we join India, is a special administrative autonomy for Chins in India."

Tialkhal, a former police officer, formed the CNF in 1970. He was the zonal secretary for the Chin Hills between 1958 and 1962 and a member of the former Prime Minister U Nu's Parliamentary Democracy Party. After General Ne Win pulled off his military coup, Tialkhal went underground and formed the Zomi Liberation Front (ZLF). The ZLF colluded with Laldenga's Mizo National Front (MNF) to fight for a separate Mizo-Chin state. Their partnership broke over the question of leadership. Laldenga wanted the ZLF to become part of the MNF, but Tialkhal insisted that their battle be waged through a 'joint command'. In time, the relation between the two groups soured. "Laldenga wanted to arrest the ZLF leaders and even sent his commandos," recalls Tialkhal.

With the formation of the CNF, the struggle became centred around the demand for greater autonomy for the Chin Hills region. Last year, the CNF became a member of the Democratic Alliance of Burma (DAB)—a loose confederation of 23 organisations ranged against the military regime of Saw Maung. DAB was constituted with four objectives: overthrowing Saw Maung's government; establishing a democratic government in Burma; ending the civil war and restoring peace; and bringing about national reconciliation and creating a federal union.

Among DAB's members are all the ten groups that form the National Democratic Front (NDF)—which was set up with similar objectives. The Front's constituents,

however, were all tribal groups; DAB, on the other hand, has many members which represent the majority plainland Burmese. General Bo Mya of the Karen National Union is the elected chairman of DAB. The organisation has three vice-chairmen—General U Thwin of the People's Liberation Front, Maran Brangsein of the Kachin Independence Organisation and Nai Shwe Kyn of the New Mon State Party.

One indication of the confidence of DAB is, perhaps, its attempts to distance itself from the country's biggest left grouping—the Burmese Communist Party (BCP). The communists stand for a “broad-based unity of all revolutionary groups” and have offered DAB arms, training and sanctuary. DAB has shunned such offers. One reason for keeping the BCP at a distance could be ideology—DAB's political charter advocates free enterprise. Then, there is the suspicion of the party's role between 1981 and 1984, when it tried to secretly negotiate an understanding with the Ne Win government, due to Chinese pressure. Says Thangleimang: “The BCP can mortgage our revolution at China's insistence, if Beijing and Rangoon become friends.”

The Chin guerrilla leaders appear hopeful of getting a positive response to their request from India. However, they admit that they have not received any reply whatsoever, yet. Last December, a Chin activist called Mangkhapau travelled to Delhi in an attempt to get an audience with the Prime Minister. Rajiv did not meet him, but he is reported to have met Union minister of state for home affairs, Santosh Mohan Dev. What transpired during the meeting is not known.

CNF leaders say that Mangkhapau had nothing to do with their organisation and has no following at all among the Chins. But it is well known that he is linked to some political leaders in India who have mooted a Mizo-Chin state.

The Chin leaders attach more importance and great hope to Rajiv Gandhi's remark during the recent Mizoram polls that “India sympathises with the democratic aspirations of the Burmese people”. In the light of the fact that the government has strongly opposed the establishment of a Mizo-Chin state, the significance they accord this remark seems grossly misplaced. Moreover, Rajiv himself has said in Mizoram that India “doesn't want anybody's territory, including Burma's”.

But the CNF plans to fight Saw Maung and his government even if Indian help is not forthcoming. Its members are being trained in guerrilla warfare by other tribal rebel outfits and, as Thangleimang says, it will not be difficult for them to procure arms even without India's help. “We can still give the government a fight,” said the general secretary ominously.

Report on Mizoram-Chin Rebel Hideouts

56000112 *Calcutta SUNDAY in English*

19-25 Feb 89 p 16

[Interview with Pu Tialkhal, CNF chairman: “We Seek Merger With India”]

[Text] [SUNDAY] How do you reconcile the fight for greater autonomy, the main objective of the Democratic Alliance of Burma (DAB), with your secessionist designs?

[Pu Tialkhal] Our basic desire is to secede from Burma and join our cousins in India. Once, we dreamt of a sovereign Mizo-Chin state, by unifying the Mizo hills in India and the Chin Hills of Burma. But we now realise that such a state would not be a viable one. Our best bet is in joining India, where national minorities enjoy more rights and freedoms than in any other state.

We are sticking with DAB to keep our options open. We do not mind if democracy and federalism are established in Burma soon. But we are afraid that DAB will not be able to achieve these in the near future. So, we seek merger with India.

[SUNDAY] Have you got a positive response from India to your request for help?

[Pu Tialkhal] No, not yet. This is why we have to rely on DAB. The Chins want Indian help desperately.

[SUNDAY] But will Rajiv Gandhi help you, given all that he recently said during the election campaign in Mizoram?

[Pu Tialkhal] If Gandhi means exactly what he says, then he should back us to restore democracy in Burma. The Rangoon rulers will relent if they realise that unless they allow democracy to flourish, India will back rebel groups in Burma. Our struggle is at a crucial stage. We have to keep our options of accepting autonomy, but be prepared to fight for secession. Our patience is running out.

[SUNDAY] What would your free Chin state be like, if established?

[Pu Tialkhal] A free society based on Christian ideals. Exactly the way we are. We believe in democracy, not communism. We have nothing to do with parties like the Burmese Communist Party (BCP). Burma has abundant resources, but it has to beg for aid today. It is the result of socialism, of Marxism. We can be another Japan or South Korea, provided there is justice, democracy and free enterprise.

[SUNDAY] If you fail to get Indian support, will you approach any other power?

[Pu Tialkhal] Yes, we might approach the USA, which is the second biggest democracy after India. But it would be in both India's and our own interests if we got New Delhi's backing. Other rebel groups like the Arakans and the Kachins may join us in our secessionist struggles, if they knew India was behind us.

[SUNDAY] Are you receiving support from the political parties or the people of Mizoram?

[Pu Tialkhal] Yes, Mizo people, including some of their leaders, are in touch with us. The movement for a Mizo-Chin reunification has built up an emotional support base and this will help us.

[SUNDAY] In what way?

[Pu Tialkhal] To get shelter in Mizoram, even if India formally refused to support us.

[SUNDAY] How do you raise your revenues?

[Pu Tialkhal] Through collection. We tax the people, the Burmese establishment, the government employees—all of them. We tax people involved in the border trade.

[SUNDAY] Even the drug runners?

[Pu Tialkhal] No, we don't encourage drug runners. We are good Christians. We hate drugs and those who peddle it. We [are] just tax smugglers. We also get funds from our sympathisers in Mizoram. And then, many of our boys—I don't mean guerrillas—work in Mizoram. They send us money.

Indigenous Submarine To Be Ready in 6 Months
46001281 Bombay *THE TIMES OF INDIA* in English
13 Jan 89 p 6

[Text] New Delhi, January 12: The first SSK-class submarine being built by Mazagon Docks in Bombay will be finally ready for sea trials by the middle of this year.

A second similar submarine will be ready one year later and after that the programme, for which considerable infrastructure was built, will be abandoned.

According to Rear Admiral M. M. Puri, chairman and managing director of Mazagon Docks Ltd., the original schedule fixed for the construction of the submarine, the first such venture undertaken in the country, was very ambitious and slightly unrealistic.

The West German shipyard involved delayed the transfer of equipment and technology. A problem also cropped up because the West German welding techniques proved unsuitable to the Indian environment.

On the Indian plan to build an aircraft-carrier, Rear Admiral G.T. Wadhwani, chairman and managing director of Cochin Shipyard, said that after the order was

placed for the carrier, the shipyard would take about seven years to build it. The first two years would be required for ordering the equipment.

After the design of the aircraft-carrier was finalised, facilities at the Cochin Shipyard will be upgraded. The shipyard was most suitable for undertaking the project in view of the large size of the dock, he said. It can build an aircraft-carrier 250 m. long.

Light Combat Aircraft Prototype Flight By 1992
46001274 Bombay *THE TIMES OF INDIA* in English
23 Dec 88 p 5

[Text] Bombay, December 22. The first prototype of the light combat aircraft (LCA) will fly in 1992 and its production version will be ready in 1996, Dr Kota Harinarayana, LCA programme director, Aeronautical Development Agency, said here today.

Giving a detailed account of the LCA with the help of slides, at a seminar on "electronics and defence", he said that contrary to what it was years ago, the weapons systems today leads the aircraft and two-thirds of its cost was on avionics alone. The seminar was organised by *Electronics Today* to mark its 20th anniversary.

Describing the LCA project as a national programme, he said that it would be the smallest fighter on the drawing board belonging to the same generation as the French Rafale, the European Fighter Aircraft (EFA) and the Swedish Grippen.

Dr Harinarayana said that the futuristic fighter would fulfill its role as an advanced tactical fighter in air combat and offensive air support operations. It would be highly agile at subsonic speed and would have supersonic manoeuvrability. The LCA would light in weight and could be exported, he said. "It should be better than the F-16," he added.

The aircraft's designer who was addressing Bombay audiences for the first time said that the LCA would have advanced aerodynamic concepts, flight control systems and materials. It would also have ring laser gyroscopes.

With an advanced engine system the Indian fighter would be equipped with a electronic flight control system.

The aircraft would be unstable with compound delta wings. There would be seven multi-purpose stores stations, he said.

Referring to the avionics of the LCA, he said, that they would include a head-up display (HUD), a threat warning system and two five-inch multi-function displays. "The challenge now is making all these displays in the country within the time limit," he said. Dr Harinarayana said that the Aeronautical Development Agency needed the help of the industry in producing the aircraft.

In an informal talk with the reporters, he said, that the metal for the first aircraft would be cut in the next few months. Seven prototypes would be made and there would be collaboration with foreign agencies in the area of composites and the flight control systems.

Earlier, the scientific adviser to the defence minister, Mr V. S. Arunachalam, told *The Times of India* that the development cost of the LCA would be around Rs 2,000 crores and the development of the GTX-35 engine, which would power the production version of the aircraft was going on schedule.

Between 200 and 300 aircraft were slated for production for the Indian Air Force and navy, he said.

The director of the Aeronautical Development Establishment, Dr K. G. Narayanah, told reporters that the simulator for solving some of the issues connected with the design of the LCA was already in existence and another simulator for air-to-air combat would be ready in two to three years.

The LCA training simulator is expected to be ready in 1994 and 1995, he said.

Dr Narayanan said that the ADE was seriously considering simulators for the MIG aircraft, and MIG 23 and 27 would remain a part of the IAF fleet for a long time.

Writer Tells Condition of Refugees From Bangladesh

46001272 Calcutta THE STATESMAN in English
24 Dec 88 p 9

[Article by Udayan Namboodiri: "Hindus Hounded Out of Bangladesh Find No Place for Shelter"]

[Text] Madhyamgram (North 24-Parganas), Dec 23—For years, Bangladeshi infiltrators and their shanties have been part of the landscape of this, and many other places, in the district. But since June thousands of new infiltrators have arrived, bag and baggage, to settle in West Bengal for good. They are all minorities fleeing Bangladesh and they give graphic accounts of the terror unleashed in the countryside of Khulna, Barisal, Jessore, Faridpur and other districts by the Jamaat-i-Islami and Al Badar Muslim fundamentalist groups, since President Hussein Mohammed Ershad brought about the Eighth Amendment to the Bangladesh Constitution, which has turned that country into virtually an Islamic State.

As one turns northwards from Madhyamgram and takes the road to Sodepur, the shanties are everywhere. Their inhabitants have been staying there for varying lengths of time, some as long as five years, but most have arrived in the recent past. Their dwellings have been built along the entire stretch. The newcomers have no place to put up except with relatives who arrived earlier and could find place for a hut. The large majority of the others have to

rent rooms from villages in the area at exorbitant rates. But most being very poor, cannot afford that and soon leave for places in other districts.

As yet, no official agency has taken a headcount of these arrivals, but guesses place at 20,000 those who crowd the stretch between Madhayamgram and Sodepur alone. At least 200,000 have settled on either side of the railway tracks between Sealdah and Barasat. The Sankhayalaghu Kalyan Parishad, an organization for infiltrators, has six "local committees" for the railroad encroaches alone.

The inhabitants of the shanties say they are mostly poor agricultural labourers, but many among them are school-teachers, jute mill workers, skilled workers and homoeopathic practitioners. "There were no jobs for minorities and even those engaged in business were prevented from working. Robberies and looting was rampant. The prime targets are women who were carried off in broad daylight and the police turned a deaf ear to our complaints", said Kiron Chandra Bala, who had fled his home in Gajendrapur village in the Dumuria area of Khulna district earlier this year and now runs a "Homoeo Hall" in Sajerhat.

Bala said he had a lucrative practice for four years in Ambhitabazar near his village for four years and earned about Taka 150 daily. He fled, leaving his pregnant wife, and crossed over at a place near the Gojhadanga checkpoint near Basirhat. He fled mainly for political reasons. A follower of Gazi Abdul Hadi, the Awami League chairman of No 2 Raghunathpur Union Council, Khulna, Bala was forced to flee in the wake of terror unleashed by Jatiya Party activists on Awami League workers, most of whom are minorities. His leader was arrested thrice on false charges, Bala recounts. "After the third time, the Ghazi told me he was powerless to defend us, so I fled. Till today I have not seen my daughter who was born after I left. Of course, I get news about my family from new entrants".

Each day, at least ten new families arrive. But lack of space at Sajerhat forces them to move to places more distant from Calcutta. Jagadish Chandra Dhali of Telighati village in the same district resigned from his job as a compounder at the Ajax Jute Mill. "My eldest son, Gautam and eldest daughter Dipali, fled before me and are now staying in Sajerhat with my nephew, who came here much earlier and now owns a house. Dipali and my wife were beaten up by Jatiya Party goondas last October right in our house", he says.

After he arranges some work for himself, Dhali intends returning to his village to bring back the rest of his family. But he admits there is very little possibility of finding any work because he is nearing 50. "I was an influential man in my village. Most of the inhabitants of the village were Hindus. There was very little oppression on us till 1975. But after that we became subjects of their terror. And now it is impossible for minorities to live in that country any longer".

A strapping 27, Ashok Kundu was Dhali's colleague at the Ajax Jute Mill. In a land where jobs are scarce, Kundu took home more than Taka 2,000 a month before he fled. A native of Maheswar Pasha village, Ashok was forced to flee because he and his friends had formed a group to fight the molestation of girls. From him one hears many stories of girls being abducted and being lost to their families.

In Ramkrishnapur village, in the Dumuria area of Khulna, a girl was allegedly picked up in the marketplace and raped. Rabindranath Guin of Dakatia village in the Kultala area lived in fear of his teenaged daughter being carried off, when Ashok fled last month. The daughter of Kanailal Halder, a well-known singer with the Khulna station of Bangladesh TV, was threatened by hoodlums who entered his house to say that his daughter would be carried off. Ashok now has no information about their fate. He fled after a youth warned him that he would be killed soon because the Jamaatis had come to know of his activities.

Mrs Lakshmi Sil of Ruprampur village in Khulna said that her family had to flee to protect their womenfolk. Bijoy Das of Borogopaldwip village in the Baukhal area of Barisal district says his maternal aunt and sister had been abducted by Jamaatis last year. Joymala Devi of Diganga, in Mollarhat area of Khulna, who is now staying in Hridaypur with at least 1,200 other new migrants, said that recently the hoodlums attacked their village and indulged in looting and molesting women.

The inmates of the shanties know their tormentors as only "goondas", but Kiron Chandra Bala gives a clearer picture. "For the past 10 years, we were openly called, 'Moloyon'—a derogative. But nowadays, since Islamization, the very people whom Hindu schoolteachers had taught and doctors treated, are realizing that joining the Jamaatis will fetch them the Hindus' land. The police have now joined them, acting under the assumption that all Hindus are Communists working for the Sarbojha Party. This makes the Jamaatis and other fundamentalists immune from the police".

"Return to your own homes. You have stayed long enough in your uncle's home", is the message that the fundamentalists are driving home to the minorities. Once predominantly Hindu villages are now undergoing a demographic change. Almost the entire Hindu population of Labanchera village of Nazirpara Upazilla; Kochua village of Bagerhat Upazilla in Khulna and others like Ashok Kundu's village, are seeing a mass exodus. From Jhalokathi village in Barisal, at least 2,000 are learnt to have crossed over to India. Every day since Islamization, somewhere in Bangladesh, land like the plot held by the Bapari family of Kuriana in Barisal, is taken over forcibly or someone like Kartick Chandra Roy of Janmari in the Uzirpur area of Barisal, is forced to commit seculage or someone like Makhanlal Mondol of Rajnagar in Bagerhat has to see his house being burnt down.

Says Binod Biswas of Kamargathi village in Khulna, who has been living in Sajerhat since August: "My brother, Bimal, is now sitting in our house in the village. He has the records of the 80 bighas of land that our family held. Now the land is gone, only the records remain."

Santosh Kumar Majumdar of Khajoria village in Kalia, Jessore district, whose seven brothers, wife and three children are still across the border, is one of the few in Sajerhat from his district, although he says many of his former neighbours can be seen in Haringhata and Bhirgachi near Ranaghat in Nadia.

Signature Forced

Land grabbing, says Santosh, is common in his district. When the word gets around that a Hindu family is about to flee, the "goondas" come to his house with forged documents and a "baina" worth a fraction of the property's worth, which the head of the family is forced to sign. But often the land is snatched without such formalities, as in the case of Binod Biswas and the Bapari family.

The tales of woe are endless. In his tiny hut, beside a pond full of hyacinth in Sajerhat, Benoy Kumar Sarkar, secretary of the Sajerhat "local committee" of the Sankhyalagh Kalyan Parishad, shows small green cards on which he has registered details of families that have arrived. On card number 7649, Nirmal Biswas has listed seven members of his family, from a three-year-old daughter to his mother of 80. "I used to trade in *gur* in Jessore", begins the description of the reasons for his fleeing. Then follows the usual story. Harassment every day, ignominies for being a "Moloyon", attack on men returning home with money and then the limit—the wife catching the attention of goondas.

Even Sarkar cannot give an accurate figure for the number of "infiltrators" in his area. "It is impossible to keep count. New families arrive every day and leave soon because there is simply no space left" he says. The people of the nearby villages like Sahapur, Talderia, Krishnapalli, Pallimangal and Madhyamgram, used to rent space for Rs 60 a month till recently. But now space cannot be had even for Rs 100.

Rupchand Roy was a carpenter in Surat village in the Kotalipara area of Barisal. He fled, leaving his family a month ago, after "goondas" attacked him and robbed him of his daily earnings. He holds up his palm, which still bears marks of the violence. "They did not find much money on me and left threatening to come back and burn my house". He now sells bangles, amulets and charms in Madhyamgram, to somehow eke out a living. But hundreds of others like Mukul Dhali from Teghoria village in the Gopalgunje area of Faridabad are not so lucky. They take the local trains every day to Ultadanga, Calcutta, and try to find some work.

On the political plane, the harassment has been perpetuated by branding minorities Communists. The Sarbahara Party, Maoist-Islamic group, has both Hindu and Muslim cadre. But there are more than one instance of young Hindus being harassed by the police as well as the Jatiya Party. Since March this year in the Kuriana Union area of Swarupkathi Upazilla, a largely Hindu area, young men and women of Adamkati, Sangetkati, Jinderkati, Rajpur, Dhalahar, Abadari, Mahamarkati and some other villages were carried away by the police, the men beaten up and women molested.

In another instance, Hindu youths, Subodh Haldar, Asim Mondol, Miranmoy Bapari and 11 others were carried away in Pirojepur district. These young men were mostly college graduates which indicates that the educated youth are being systematically brought to the police records. It is estimated that more than 7,000 Hindu students have already escaped and entered India for fear of being branded Sarbahara Party activists.

That the police is also joining the fundamentalists in wreaking terror on Hindus is proved by the incident on July 4 this year in a village in the Babuganj Upazilla in Barisal, when the wife of Mrityunjoy Mandal was carried away from her home and raped in the police lockup.

Their settlement in Sajerhat has no sanitation or drinking water worth the name. The local administration ignores them and workers of local political parties some time approach other settlements to register them as voters by giving them ration cards, but as yet no such overture has been made in Sajerhat.

IRAN

Official Announces Reconstruction Plans

46400056 Tehran ETTELA'AT in Persian 7 Dec 88 p 2

[Text] Discussion on the bill for the "Amendment of Paragraph C of Note 22 of the 1367 [21 March 1988-20 March 1989] Budget Law" continued in the open session of the Majles today, and, following the statements of the spokesman for the plan and budget committee and the representative of the government, the general points of the bill were ratified with a decisive majority vote of the representatives.

According to a report by the ETTELA'AT parliamentary correspondent: In accordance with this bill, 50 billion rials have been projected for the reconstruction of the country this year, which will be spent on the construction and reconstruction of war-torn buildings and providing household equipment, housing units, and so on.

Speech of the Government Representative

According to this report: In defense of the general points of this bill, the representative of the government, first estimating the enormity of the damages resulting from

the imposed war, said: Considering that since the acceptance of the peace resolution we have lost more than 4 months, we hope, with this small fund, to start the reconstruction program as a step in solving the people's problems.

Then, explaining the government proposal that has projected 50 billion rials for the first phase of reconstruction, he said:

Of the total amount of 50 billion rials in funds proposed by the government, 10 billion rials must be given to the people as compensation for damages.

Also, in addition to the war-torn provinces, 12 other provinces have also been damaged. In some places, the people will be given funds for reconstruction.

The representative of the government continued: Of the total reconstruction funds, the amount of 10 billion rials represents the foreign currency which must be paid by all government organizations to the Central Bank for the purchase of equipment, which will ultimately be 30 billion rials of the net funds for reconstruction for this year.

Also, concerning the sources of reconstruction funds, he pointed out: In Note 22 of this year's budget law, the government is allowed to borrow a maximum of 160 billion rials, of which 50 billion rials have been allocated to reconstruction for this year, and it is proposed that a part of the deficits be made up through the sale of foreign currency at the "preferred" rate.

Then, emphasizing the need to reconstruct the water outreach network of the country, the government representative announced: 25 health centers and 37 hospitals must be reconstructed, for which funds have been projected in the 1368 [21 March 1989-20 March 1990] budget.

Also, 177 schools in the Province of Bakhtaran, 25 schools in Ilam, 51 schools in the Province of Western Azarbaijan and 588 schools in the Province of Kordestan must be reconstructed.

In this connection, more than 30 cities in 5 war-torn provinces need drinking water networks.

He continued: The government has projected 420 million rials to reconstruct the atomic energy plant, and in the same area, if the program proposed by the Ministry of Petroleum is implemented and the necessary funds are procured, within the next 6 months, the refineries of the country will be reconstructed.

Also concerning the power plants, if their production capacity is fully utilized, nearly 2,000 megawatts of electricity will be added to the nationwide energy production network.

In another speech, the representative of the government considered as among the priorities of the reconstruction program after the war the timely expansion and operation of industrial units damaged in the war, such as the Khuzestan paper production factory and the "Haft Tappeh" sugar cane unit. He emphasized that attention must be paid at the same time to the expansion of the road and transportation network, radio and television transmitters, health and treatment and the education of the country during the reconstruction period.

Continuing his speech, he explained the future government programs and expressed hope that the reconstruction program will be able to eliminate the problem of production and employment in the areas damaged by the war in order to produce construction materials.

Our correspondent reports: Following the ratification of the general points of this bill, discussions concerning the details of the bill continued in the Majles, a report on which will be published in the next issue of ETTELA'AT.

Minister Details Road Projects Under Way

*46400055a Tehran ETTELA'AT in Persian
18 Dec 88 p 4*

[Text] Chabahar—On the basis of the bill enacted by the Majles for investment in projects by the Ministry of Roads and Transportation, use will be made of banks and other nongovernment financial resources.

Among the projects expected to go into service by early next year is the continuation of the Qazvin-Takستان-Zanjan highway.

This was announced by Engineer Mohammad Sa'idi-Kiya, minister of roads and transport, who had come to Chabahar to participate in a national seminar for the nation's provincial directors of roads and transportation.

In an interview with the correspondent from the ISLAMIC REPUBLIC NEWS AGENCY, he explained this matter and also discussed the principal measures taken by this ministry and its policies for the future, especially for reconstruction, new construction, road expansion and other issues relative to this ministry.

Engineer Sa'idi-Kiya discussed this ministry's plans for rebuilding the country. He said: The nation's 5-year reconstruction plan now being written by the government will specify the policies and methods of operation in this area. The Ministry of Roads and Transport, along with the Ministry of the Reconstruction Crusade and the Ministry of Post, Telegraph and Telephone, is studying the various common difficulties in achieving this goal. He discussed the current status of the nation's transportation industry and the current bottlenecks there. Noting the poor planning which was done in this area in the years prior to the revolution, he stressed that at the present time, due to lack of infrastructures, as well as the shortage of terminals and warehouses and the weak

points of the railroads, and finally the failure to properly adapt existing resources, etc., the transport of passengers and freight is slow to a certain extent. Due to these malfunctions, 35 to 40 percent of the trucks usually operate with underweight loads. The Ministry of Roads and Transport, aware of the wear and tear on trucks and roads and of driver fatigue, is trying first of all to equip the railroads, to make newly-built lines two-way and make other improvements in order to overcome this deficiency. Secondly, it is trying gradually to promote the use railroads by the people.

The minister of roads and transportation discussed the important projects which have been completed or are now being carried out. He said: The largest projects which have been carried out in the years after the revolution by this ministry, which plays a basic role in creating the nation's transportation facilities, include the two-way Bafq-Bandar 'Abbas railroad, the Bandar Imam facilities project, the existing docks at Chabahar, the Urmia Lake road, and finally the construction of 40 kilometers of rural roads with the help of the Ministry of the Reconstruction Crusade. Likewise, numerous projects are underway or are being studied, including the completion of the two-way Tehran - Qom and Bafq-Bandar 'Abbas railways and the Bafq-Mashhad railway, along with tens of other projects.

He discussed this ministry's role in the nation's economic life, comparing the road network to the human body's circulation system. He said: This ministry's responsibilities include expanding travel centers and promoting travel, whether political, economic or military.

Elsewhere in this interview, Engineer Sa'idi-Kiya said: In the years prior to the Islamic Revolution there were 4 kilometers of roads for every 100 square kilometers of land in the country. This figure has now increased to 6.5 kilometers of roads per 100 square kilometers of land. With the the completion of the projects now being carried out and studied, there will be nine kilometers of roads per 100 square kilometers of land. In view of the nation's geography and the need to expand roads, overall there is a need for about 25 kilometers of road for every 100 square kilometers of land.

He predicted that within 25 years the minimum length of roads in the country will be 12 kilometers of road for every 100 square kilometers of land.

The minister of roads and transport discussed the expansion of the nation's railroads. He said: There are now 4,600 kilometers of railroad in the country, and 1,000 kilometers are under construction.

According to him, about 10,000 additional kilometers of railroad are needed which must be built in the country in the coming years.

Engineer Sa'idi-Kiya discussed this ministry's problems and difficulties, adding: Actually the Ministry of Roads and Transport does not need that much foreign exchange to perform its duties, except for the airlines and railways.

He added: In order to expand roads, only construction materials will be needed such as cement, rods and other materials, and since the nation has sufficient manpower, there is no problem in this respect.

In conclusion the minister of roads and transportation was asked about the creation of roads and facilities related to the transportation industry in the deprived province of Sistan va Baluchestan. He mentioned the creation of port facilities at Chabahar such as the Shahid Beheshti, Shahid Kalantari, Shohada-ye Haftom-e Tir, the Sayyadi Puzm and Beris docks and others, as well as the study for the construction of the Iran Shahr-Chabahar road and the Bam, Kerman, Zahedan Railroad, which were undertaken precisely to relieve the shortcomings in this project, and the equipping of ports of Imam Khomeyni, Bandar 'Abbas and Chabahar to provide service respectively to the nation's west, the center, the south, the east, and the northeast.

Construction of Port Facilities Planned
46400055b Tehran ETTELA'AT in Persian
27 Dec 88 p 15

[Text] Bandar Lengeh—ETTELA'AT Correspondent—The minister of economic affairs and finance announced: Soon, with the implementation of projects such as export-import terminals, Lengeh and Kang ports will be active.

Mr Iravani, minister of economic affairs and finance, went to Bandar Lengeh yesterday morning at the head of a delegation. At a gathering of people and seamen at this port's customs site, he also discussed the problems of the Province of Hormozegan. He said: The officials of this province must be given greater discretion for solving the problems of Hormozegan Province.

He said: The more the government makes crippling regulations in customs and hinders the people in the matter of trade, the more they will break the law, and positive steps must be taken in this area.

The governor-general of Hormozegan gave a talk where he discussed export and import restrictions planned for border cooperatives. He said: If the government gives the border cooperatives greater export discretion, a good reaction will be seen in the area.

He then discussed the problems seamen have in getting seamen's cards issued and extended. He expressed the hope that the extension or issuance of the card would not take more than one month.

During this trip, in which the Majles representatives of Bandar Lengeh and Bandar 'Abbas also participated, the minister of economic affairs and finance inspected the customs office, the port office and the dock at Bandar Lengeh and Bandar Kang.

Data Collection on Mineral Reserves Begins
46000085b Tehran KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL
in English 3 Jan 89 p 8

[Text] Tehran, Jan 2 (IRNA) Iran's Statistics Center Monday started estimation of reserves in the country's chromite, barite, iron ore, lead, zinc, white clay, dolomite, manganese, turquoise, perauxite and orpiment mines. The estimation will last forty days and will also include other minerals such as gypsum, decoration slabs, kaolin, coal, limestone and salt reserves, in addition to gathering of mineral related data.

Summer, Fall Prices of Essential Goods Compared
46400060a Tehran RESALAT in Persian
10 Jan 89 p 11

[Text] Economics Desk—The Prime Minister's Center for Social Studies has conducted a study on the prices of goods and services in Tehran this year during fall and winter. It was published this month under the title "A Study of Prices of Certain Goods and Services Used by Families and a Calculation of the Changes in Two 3-Month Periods."

That study was conducted in Tehran's 20 districts to calculate the rate of inflation on the free market in two successive periods. The goods and services chosen, whether in the primary group or the secondary groups, were to have the highest indicators of importance so that the pertinent indicator of importance would be at least 50 percent or more. Pricing was done in the middle of the season so that the seasonal changes would be observed. In all 20 districts samples were taken with each district divided into five separate regions, northern, southern, western, eastern and central. Checks were made with retailers, and prices were elicited naturally. In the pricing, only the free market prices were considered, not the announced prices.

The two periods of the study were 8 Mordad July] to 20 Mordad 1367 [30 July-11 August 1988] and 8 Aban to 19 Aban 1367 [30 October-19 November 1988].

In the fall period, there was a significant change in the average price of rice. The average price of meat dropped 3.4 percent from the previous 3-month period. More than anything else this was due to the reduction in the official prices (15.5 percent) for poultry, mutton with bones and fat (5.4 percent), and this decrease occurred while the price of sausages increased 12.5 percent.

The milk, milk products and eggs group increased 16.5 percent from the previous 3-month period, and this was due to the increase in the prices for all the goods in this group, while most average price increases were seen in the increased prices for pasteurized butter (36.6 percent) and eggs (19.7 percent).

In the oils and animal fats group, increased prices were also seen in all the items in the group. In the fall period the prices for vegetable shortening and vegetable oil showed striking increases from the previous period (28.7 and 26.8 percent respectively).

Among the items in the fruits and vegetables group, apples decreased in price significantly from the previous period (27.1 percent), and this was due to the onset of the fall season and the consequent arrival of various Lebanese, red and yellow apples which flooded markets throughout the country. By contrast, tomatoes, an item in the bush vegetables group from the fruits and vegetables group, increased quite sharply (87.8 percent) in the fall period. This was due to the end of the season for producing that item in Tehran and the surrounding areas, and inevitably the southern tomatoes came onto the market at very high prices. (It is significant that due to the water shortage, increased worker wages, increased costs for transportation and crates, as well as the shortage of chemical fertilizer and reduced production and supply, prices were higher in general, and this matter was more visible with regard to tomatoes.)

Of the dried fruits and grains group, while there was a slight decrease in the price of dried fruits, there was a significant increase in price on the items in the grains group, meaning navy beans and chick peas (21.2 percent and 17.8 percent respectively).

From the sugar cubes, sugar, sweets, coffee, tea and cocoa group, there was a significant decrease in the prices for sugar cubes and sugar. In the fall period loaf sugar decreased 23.7 percent and sugar decreased 19.2 percent.

From the ready-to-eat foods and smoking materials group, while all items showed price increases, the smoking materials increased an average of 26.3 percent from the previous period. Most of this increase was attributable to Iranian cigarettes, which increased in price 43.1 percent from summer to fall.

The study of the prices of non-food items and a comparison of them with the previous three-month period gives the following results:

In the clothing and shoes group, most of the increases were in the prices for men's jackets and pullovers due to the approach of the cold season (57.6 percent), while there were also significant increases in the prices for other cold-weather clothing such as children's blouses, trousers and knit wear (23 percent). After men's jackets and pullovers, the largest increases were for cotton

chador cloth (37 percent) followed by shoes, shoe repairs, and hand-made women's shoes (24.8 percent). In this period the prices for two items, chintz and men's summer clothing fabric, decreased 36.2 percent and 35.3 percent respectively.

In the fall period the indicator for construction materials in the housing group decreased 14.6 percent, influenced by the drop in the prices of steel beams (19.2 percent), steel doors and windows (7.1 percent) and some other items in this group, while other items such as construction and mosaic stone increased 12.6 and 10.0 percent respectively.

Among the various items in the household supplies, furniture, necessities and services group, only laundry detergent (14.4 percent) and electric refrigerators (0.9 percent) had price increases. All the other items in this group decreased in price, with most of the decreases were seen in the prices for drapery fabric, pressure cookers and carpets (27.1, 16.1 and 15.8 percent respectively).

The items in the transportation and shipping group, like those in the previous group, all decreased in price with the exception of Peykan passenger automobiles. The price for this item, whose price had dropped sharply in the summer because of the effects of accepting Resolution 598, increased 12.1 percent over the average summer price. In the health and health care group, all items increased in price, especially the fee for performing an appendectomy, which increased 61 percent.

In the recreation, entertainment and services group, most of the price increase were seen in the tape recorders, with a 16.8 percent increase, while there was a 26.1 percent decrease in children's tricycles.

Among the items in the last group studied, meaning miscellaneous family goods and services, the highest increase was seen in the prices for hotel accommodations (with an increase of 37.1 percent), while there was also a sharp increase of 34.2 percent in the price for gold coins from the previous 3-month period.

In the fall period, the availability of some goods was as follows: Cube sugar was scarce, imported pasteurized butter was extremely scarce, liquid corn oil was sometimes available, black cement was extremely scarce, 4500 Coolers were rarely seen, and iron beams were scarce.

Textile Guild Issues Protest Over Television Programs

46400060b Tehran RESALAT in Persian
11 Jan 89 p 11

[Text] Economics Desk—In a letter to His Holiness the Imam, the Islamic Society, the Union and the Tehran Textile Retailers Cooperative protested the Voice and Vision [Television] programs.

Part of this letter said: The great leader of the Islamic Revolution always wants the active participation of the private sector in commerce and in reconstructing the nation. His Holiness Ayatollah al-'Ozma Montazeri has also given guidance following Your Excellency's emphatic commands. Nevertheless it is not clear what things are about to transpire, since for some time they have been threatening the bazaar merchants and cooperatives through the media, and, knowingly or not, they are aiming at separating the bazaar from the revolution.

Another part of this letter mentions the principal responsibilities of the Voice and Vision in guiding the people and preventing the spread of discord among the various classes of people. It says: On Wednesday 9/30/67 [21 December 1988] the Face of the Revolution program subtly portrayed the bazaar strike during the revolution as having been for the purpose of protecting material interests. Several nights ago it attacked the various cooperatives, including the Tehran Textile Retailers Cooperative, airing material which was far from reality, in a scornful tone.

The letter notes: Some organizations, by taking over the domestic factories and importing goods in the name of procuring their own needs and selling these goods on the free market to profiteers and impostors, create problems for the people. In this regard, Ayatollah al-'Ozma Montazeri has condemned and forbidden such activity. Unfortunately, the responsibility for this kind of activity is being laid upon the bazaar guilds and cooperatives.

At the end of their letter, the Islamic society, the union and the Tehran Textile Retailers Cooperative called for a restoration of credibility and prevention of the repetition of these insults.

NEPAL

Men Imprisoned for Changing Religion

46000108b Kathmandu THE MOTHERLAND
in English 9 Feb 89 p 1

[Text] Bhadrapur, Feb. 8—Jhapa District Court has sentenced Thulo Budhai Hastha Sathar, Prakash alias Sano Budhal Sathar, Shibu Urau and Ramesh Bada Urau of ward no. 2, Chandragadi Village Panchayat to one year imprisonment on the charge of changing their religion from Hinduism to Christianity.

American, Canadian Acquitted of Religious Charges

BK0403040089 Hong Kong AFP in English
1916 GMT 3 Mar 89

[Text] Kathmandu, Mar 3 (AFP)—A Nepal district court has acquitted a U.S. and Canadian citizen on charges of proselytization of Christianity in this Himalayan Kingdom, official sources said here Friday [3 March].

They said the Panchthar District Court on Wednesday acquitted U.S. citizen David Richard McBride and Canadian citizen Mervyna John Budd of the charges.

The two were arrested six weeks ago at Panchthar, some 340 kilometers (212 miles) east of Kathmandu, for allegedly trying to promote Christianity and selling Christian-oriented publications, the source said.

Western diplomatic sources said Amnesty International, the United States, Great Britain, West Germany and Canada had strongly protested the arrests.

About 40 people including Indians of Nepalese origin from Darjeeling and several Europeans are under detention on charges of propagating Christianity in Nepal.

Proselytization is banned under Nepal law.

Foreign Trade Initiatives

46000108a Kathmandu THE RISING NEPAL
in English 3 Feb 89 p 6

[Article by P. Kharel: "What Ails Our Foreign Trade"]

[Text] What is needed is a comprehensive plan in every sense of the meaning. Too little too late will be futile at worst and inadequate at best. We cannot afford to draw experience merely through a trial-and-error method. The pressing need is for all concerned to straighten up and evaluate the situation with the urgency and seriousness it merits. A few facts and statistics may be able to provide a bird's eye view on what the situation is really like.

Whenever trade figures are flaunted to indicate a steady increase, the audience may be tempted to take them with either a degree of scepticism or simply a pinch of salt. And they cannot be blamed wholly for nursing such an outlook.

It is high time that we took stock of the prevailing situation in a spirit of critical appraisal of this potentially rewarding sector so as to pave the way for the right measures with appropriate approach. And to the full hilt, amply backed by comprehensive programmes with long-term perspectives. This scribe seeks to only go through the issue briefly in comparison to the actual problems so vast in size and scale, representing only a lay view.

Facelift

The captains of foreign trade and the skippers of the industrial sector need to come closer with a coordinated approach—of course adequately supported by equally imaginative and enthusiastic backing from the government—to shore up the trade and alleviate the existing malaise. It clearly requires a major facelift. Nothing perfunctory nor anything done on ad hoc basis will really be able to respond efficiently.

What is needed is a comprehensive plan in every sense of the meaning. Too little too late will be futile at worst and inadequate at best. We cannot afford to draw experience merely through a trial-and-error method. The pressing need is for all concerned to straighten up and evaluate the situation with the urgency and seriousness it merits. A few facts and statistics may be able to provide a bird's eye view on what the situation is really like.

Imports may have fallen marginally percentage-wise if compared with the export figures. When it comes to the actual money drawn from exports as against the amount spent on footing the bulging import bill, the difference is glaring; trade deficit is deep and staggering. Why not try to few statistics for what they are worth? [sentence as published]

In the past five years, imports have barely doubled from approximately six and a half billion rupees to a little less than 13 billion. On the other hand, exports have more than doubled from one billion 684 million rupees to four billion ten million rupees. But it does not tell the full story. In terms of money, hard money, the difference in trade deficit is more huge today at a staggering 8.9 billion rupees. This represents well over twice the total export figures.

One of the persistent arguments put forward with regard to trade deficit over the decades is attributed to import of development materials and machinery. This requires a separate, depth study. But one thing is certain: How long are we to trumpet this argument? Do we have plans to turn the tide in our favour within the next two decades or even three? If yes, what are they? If not, now is the time to begin in real earnest.

Fifteen years ago, jute, timber and, at times, rice would rank in the top list of this country's export items. Timber export has been stopped since the last several years—and with good reasons under the prevailing circumstances. Rice exports have fluctuated, depending on the national production. As for jute, it is in a shambles. Its overseas export is dismal, though jute and jute goods still account for a sizeable export commodity to neighbouring India. But this means, the price is less than what overseas export would fetch.

Inflation and devaluation of currency are other constituents that at times present a picture more impressive than it actually is. There are also a number of positive sides to the story. Employment opportunities have been generated in this sector. Timber, rice and jute have been overtaken by other items like woollen carpets, ready-made garments and leather.

Carpet is now easily the leading export commodity, fetching over 1.22 billion rupees last year. In fact, it is the only export item that has crossed the one billion rupee mark in foreign exchange in a single year. Ready-made garments last year were exported to the tune of nine hundred million rupees. The spurt in carpet and

readymade garment exports was, however, dramatic. Carpets recorded an increase of 93 percent and ready-made garments 47 percent. Will this be sustained, considering the glut of these exports in our main overseas markets, West Germany and the United States?

Other Asian countries, too, are competing for the same market. Quality is of special significance for sustained market penetration and increased quantity of commodities. Overseas import companies are believed to have complained regularly in this regard. This sure is no good publicity.

The current situation is such that three items—carpets, readymade garments and leather—constitute about 90 percent of our total overseas exports. This underscores the extremely heavy dependence on so few an item.

Trade diversification, both in terms of products and destination, has been a major slogan since the past fifteen years. Some headway has, indeed, been made. India, for instance, accounted for an overwhelming share for our foreign trade at one time. An arithmetic breakdown of foreign trade markets of the Kingdom today shows a better picture. India accounts for 37 percent of total exports and 36.5 percent as an import market.

But with diversification in export products, overseas markets can be expanded by way of the total number of destinations. This can, however, be done only after suitable measures are initiated. Much of our carpet export is absorbed by West Germany and readymade garments by the US. Probing for other markets would expand the market potential and generate more room for raising the production of commodities in greater volume.

Concerned sources admit in private that no earnest efforts are being made to identify new export commodities. Woollen carpets, for instance, have been doing quite well on the export front. But would it be wise to depend so much on a single item? What if there is a further glut and the demand for the same shrinks sharply? Moreover, would it not be more prudent to explore into other commodity possibilities? After all, new items for exports on the one hand, and sustained export of the already identified commodities on the other, would help raise export earnings substantially.

Such an approach promises to contribute effectively to trim the trade deficit in a genuine process of eventually securing even a surplus, say 25 years later. To reiterate, this means more effective planning and matching follow-up action.

New avenues for export possibilities include coffee, sericulture, floriculture (notably orchids), vegetable seeds, utility type handicraft and souvenirs as well as jewellery. Vegetable seeds could find a ready market in India and other countries of South Asia, provided the right type of seeds are identified for individual markets.

What is also needed is a more serious thrust on the part of the line ministries—Industry, Agriculture, Forest and Finance. An integrated and coordinated approach would do a whale of good. The ministries should include export in a specific manner in their annual programmes. An earnest commitment in this respect would produce better results.

Indeed, there have been announcements of a number of programmes. There was a nine-point export programme introduced several years ago, designed as it was to raise products, provide incentives and increase investment. The NIDC was to invest 10 percent of its total investment on export-based industries. But the programme does not seem to have made much headway. If it is thought unsuitable, it should be replaced by a new and better one.

There is also a high level Export Product Development and Export Promotion Council which includes the line ministries as well as the private sector. There is also an Export Trade Development and Management Committee consisting of the Commerce Minister, the Commerce Secretary and representatives of the private sector. Unfortunately, they suffer a famine of regular meetings. One of them met recently after three years!

The private sector is also devoid of any initiative in helping foster new commodities, giving the impression that it is more interested in immediate and quick profits than calculating on long-term gains. There undoubtedly are quite a few constraints for the private sector but it certainly has a scope to contribute its shares under the existing situation which is surely better now than in the past.

Depending on only three commodities for overseas exports that account for over 60 percent of the total export trade would not be a prudent policy. Woollen carpets, which make so much news, deserve fresh designs and patterns to boost sales. Recycling of the same patterns for too long could reach a point of diminishing return.

Commodities in the list of small volume high value also merit special attention. The Trade Promotion Centre is supposed to be a focal forum for export promotion activities. But its annual budget of three million rupees is too meagre for any notable research and publicity work. The potential for turning TPC into a highly effective institution for its assigned role is considerable but only if it is well equipped with trained and qualified staff in adequate numbers together with a sound budget.

TPC, of late, is attempting at developing a self-support scheme but to expect it to be impressive under the given situation would amount to being unrealistic. Foreign assistance should not be a big problem if the right proposals are made to the right institutions. The International Trade Centre, UNCTAD/GATT, ESCAP and EEC are possible sources for approach. What these

institutions would want are integrated programmes incorporating the various stages from production to marketing with all necessary specifics wherever possible and feasible.

In sum, therefore, the emphasis should be on integrated export development approach supported by full coordination among all concerned government and private agencies. Incentives, guaranteed on a specific time-bound basis without any ambiguity, would prove to be a sound recipe for boosting trade. In India, for instance, air freight on readymade garments exported to Latin America is free. A recent incentive, the scheme is clearly aimed at tapping and expanding fresh overseas markets.

Window

Simplification of export procedures is another equally important aspect. A policy of one window system would be highly welcome. This entails procedures related to such aspects like licence, foreign exchange control, customs clearance and inspection under a single roof.

Our achievements on the foreign trade front have been better than the performance recorded 15 years ago or so. This modest performance must, however, be improved upon with more effective measures raising healthy optimism that, within a specific time frame, our foreign trade will expand greatly—and in our own favour.

PAKISTAN

Bhutto Accused of Giving In to Indian Position on Kashmir

46560017a Karachi JASARAT in Urdu 22 Jan 89 p 3

[Excerpt] It is a fact that our former governments, as a policy, have not presented to the world the sensitive and important issue of Jammu and Kashmir with the courage and fearlessness that it deserved. [passage omitted]

Till the fall of Mr Bhutto's regime there was no progress between India and Pakistan under the Simla Agreement. This was followed by martial law rule. In all of this period even though Jammu and Kashmir was mentioned in international forums, no constructive step was taken in this direction and the Jammu and Kashmir issue remained where it was. Following the end of the martial law administration and the establishment of the new democratic government, a conference of SARC heads of states was held in Pakistan where the Kashmir issue was not even mentioned. Later when there were meetings and talks between Pakistan Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto and the Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, the Pakistani people were at a loss to know whether the two heads of state touched on this important and sensitive issue or not. Later when a joint press conference of the Pakistan prime minister and the Indian prime minister was held in Islamabad and in answer to a question from a newspaper reporter, Rajiv Gandhi remarked very insolently that Kashmir is under a government of the

Kashmiri people and eight elections have been held there and that Kashmir is now out of question, our prime minister merely kept staring at the Indian prime minister. It was beyond her to cut short the Indian prime minister right there and then and retort: Look Mister! The Kashmir issue remains on the agenda of the United Nations and under the Simla Conference Agreement also it still remains to be resolved. Therefore how can you claim that there is no such thing as the Kashmir problem. But she kept quiet and thus accepted that the Kashmir issue has been resolved in accordance with the wishes of Rajiv Gandhi. At the time when Benazir Bhutto's performance met with denunciation all over the country, the foreign minister Sahibzada Yaqub Khan, proving that justification of sin is worse than the commission of sin, was in the senate expressing his views on his meeting with Rajiv Gandhi at the SARC heads of state conference. He said that during the meeting between Benazir Bhutto and Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, which was regarding international, regional and bilateral relations, Pakistan's principled stand on the issue of an independent Jammu and Kashmir was fully explained and emphasis has been laid on resolution under the Simla Agreement of this issue which has been pending between the two countries for a long time and which still needs to be resolved. Now it is difficult to say whether in order to mollify the masses, the Pakistani foreign minister gave this speech in the senate on instructions from Benazir.

We want to let the Government of Pakistan know that the Jammu and Kashmir issue is such a vital issue that the very freedom and prosperity of Pakistan depends on it. Need of the hour is that it should be resolved through talks with India under the Simla Agreement and if, as is its habit, India keeps dragging its feet and does not resolve it, in that case steps should be taken to raise this issue in the United Nations once again and the leaders of Free Jammu and Kashmir should be taken into confidence regarding government's Kashmir policy but if the Pakistani government is not able to discharge its duties on this issue, the masses of Free Jammu and Kashmir and Pakistan will never relax their efforts to end India's military occupation and will leave no stone unturned in their endeavor to join Kashmir with Pakistan and to give back to Kashmiris their right of self-determination, which has been snatched from them. Pakistani people's true feeling is that only by helping Kashmiri people gain their freedom, can we safeguard our own freedom.

Administration, Media Blamed for Promoting Frivolity

46560019 Karachi JASARAT in Urdu 29 Jan 89 p 3

[Editorial: "Measures Taken by the New Government"]

[Text] Mrs Benazir Bhutto, prime minister of Pakistan, both prior to the national elections and afterwards, repeatedly has pledged against adopting any legislation which would be inconsistent with Islamic teachings or take any action which would harm Islamic values. After attaining power, she traveled to the Holy Land, she

received the honor of performing the Umra and she visited the Prophet's shrine. Thus, she assured the people of Pakistan that not only does she herself act upon the teachings of Islam, rather she desires that the Islamic values are promoted in Pakistan, and that a campaign should be initiated to abolish and reject such actions that, contrary to the Islamic teachings, are in force in the country right now. Most people in Pakistan perceived such measures to be taken by the prime minister with an eye of approval. They took a sigh of relief when the new administration did not have any intention of detaching itself from Islamic values, and that there would be no deviation from Islamic teachings in the country. However, soon after gaining power, the prime minister changed the head of the television. She granted them full freedom to initiate measures against Islam on television. For years there had been no dancing of women on the TV. The new head of the TV, by granting women permission to dance, inflicted harm upon the Islamic teachings. Moreover, he did not stop there, rather he ended even the smallest amount of publicity which Islamic teachings used to get on TV. He introduced programs on TV which astonished the viewing public. In our society, the sanctity of the relationship between a brother and a sister is always borne in mind, and such measures that adversely effect the sanctity of that relationship are avoided. However, the present head of the TV, by pushing our Islamic traditions to the background, granted permission to a brother and a sister to sing and dance on television. Not only that, but in a setting just like places of prostitution in Europe, he granted permission to the participants, the majority of whom were young women, to twist and belly-dance shoulder to shoulder with men and to clap to the music. The people absolutely disliked that frivolous program. They raised a voice of protest against it and proclaimed it as obscenity.

The matter did not rest there, rather, an arrangement was made to introduce the most notorious communist writer, Maxim Gorki's novel about the classes, "The Enemy," and its first part was broadcast on television. The People's Party government, soon after coming into power, on one hand, began campaigning to promote nudity and obscenity, while on the other hand, commenced the task of publicizing socialist ideologies. Maxim Gorki, in this novel, has introduced passions to arouse the class struggle. He has very shrewdly tried to entangle the people in a class war. The promotion of nudity and obscenity, and the publicity of socialist ideologies brought the deceased Bhutto's government to an end. A similar kind of situation is surfacing again now. Benazir's administration will achieve nothing except disgrace by displaying such immorality. Exhibitions of frivolity, nudity and obscenity should be terminated on Pakistan's television. This department should perform by staying within the limits of Islam. If the People's Party administration ignores this fact, its impact would cause the people to start thinking that the former administration was better than this one. This would elevate the honor of the previous administration. The fact that should never be forgotten is that a very big

majority of Pakistanis dislike this nonsense. They do not like to see mixed dancing and joint singing of a brother and a sister in their homes. The people have started to think that if this is how the People's Party government has started, how will it end? On one hand, a visit is paid to Kaaba and Medina, and there are exhibitions of prayers etc., while on the other hand, to mislead the people, they are being taught obscenity and nudity through the media.

We wish to remind the People's Party administration that the founders of this country promised the Muslims of the subcontinent that they wished to acquire such a region where Muslims could freely follow Islamic teachings, and live in an Islamic culture. They were never prepared to cooperate with anti-Islamic actions. They attained their region through the cooperation and sacrifices of the people. Now, however, contrary to those promises, anti-Islamic rites are being promoted in the country. Dancers from London are coming over here to teach music and dancing. Their programs are being prepared. Belly-dancing, body twisting and relaying of filthy songs and music is becoming customary for the Pakistan television. We wish to inform the People's Party administration that a vast majority of the Pakistani people is displeased with such activities. The people are astonished as to how an administration that calls for Islamic teachings, is itself taking anti-Islamic measures. There is still time to stop such indecencies and anti-Islamic activities, and to avoid all such measures which inflict mental and spiritual distress upon ordinary Muslims. If, however, by ignoring the demands of the people, such filth is continued and fun is made of Islamic teachings, the consequences of that would not be any better. The people will not tolerate such improper actions for too long. It is better to try to reform the situation, and not to overlook the promises made to the nation at the time of the elections. This is a Muslim country, and there are Muslims living here. An anti-Islamic method of procedure can never work here.

Nuclear Program Defended

46000111d Karachi DAWN in English 11 Feb 89 p 7

[Article by Mohsin Ali. First paragraph was boxed in article.]

[Text] All evidence indicates that Pakistan is not engaged in a nuclear weapons-manufacturing programme... Pakistan's nuclear plans are geared to peaceful purposes. They are so above board that the country has offered a string of proposals designed to eliminate nuclear proliferation.

Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto has reiterated her Government's commitment to the development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

Speaking at the commissioning of the 400 mw Kot Addu power plant, the Prime Minister declared that there should be no doubt and misunderstanding regarding Pakistan's nuclear programme which was for peaceful purposes only.

"When we say peaceful, we mean it and exclude the development of nuclear weapons," she stressed.

Gratefully acknowledging the financial and technical assistance extended by France and the Federal republic of Germany in making the Kot Addu project a reality, the Prime Minister said it demonstrated the value of international co-operation in meeting energy requirements of the developing countries.

She urged the industrialised nations to come forward and help Pakistan in building nuclear power plants for the purpose of overcoming its chronic energy shortage.

"Perhaps nowhere in the world is the need for nuclear energy as grave as in Pakistan keeping in view its rising population, the soaring expectation of the people and the hopelessly inadequate sources of conventional energy," she remarked.

She said nowhere in the world is the commitment to peaceful uses of nuclear energy and the goal of non-proliferation as great as in Pakistan.

Pakistan's need for nuclear power generation is glaringly obvious. Natural gas, for instance is a valuable chemical feedstock in the fertilizer industry and its purely thermal use in power generation ought to be minimised.

Thus the only realistic option for power generation in Pakistan, according to experts, are coal, hydel and nuclear. Coal can only make a minimal contribution on account of its low quality and small quantity. By the year 2000, coal-fired stations are estimated to give us a total of a mere 1000 kw. As for hydro, the existing installed capacity is 2550 mw and another 27000 mw are planned for construction. By then, the more favourable sites would be exhausted and it would be unrealistic to expect more than 7000 mw of hydro capacity by the turn of the century.

Hence even if Pakistan were to press into service for power generation, 3000 mw or so, the country would still be faced with a massive shortfall of 8000 mw by the year 2000, assuming a moderate 5.1 percent growth per annum in the Gross Domestic Product (GDP).

The only technically proven and economically viable source to meet this shortfall is nuclear energy.

Pakistan has slowly developed the basic infrastructure in terms of technology, manpower, research and development (R&D) facilities and operating personnel for embarking upon such a nuclear programme.

According to Mr Munir Ahmed Khan, Chairman of the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission, the latest assessment of Pakistan's electricity needs, carried out in collaboration with international consultants, indicates that if the total power generating capacity is to reach 18,000 mw by the year 2000 (corresponding to a GDP growth of the order of 5 percent per annum), the required nuclear component would have to be at least 5000 mw. This means that Pakistan would have to commission over the next two decades or so as many as five power reactors of 1000 mw each.

Pakistan's nuclear programme has to be viewed against this backdrop. Indeed, it was in the context of this pressing energy needs of Pakistan that the Government of Pakistan approved—and in fact invited tenders—for the first plant of the series. This is to be the 900 mw nuclear power station CHASNUPP to be erected at Chashma in the north on the bank of the Indus River.

However, the nuclear suppliers club, led by the United States has successfully dissuaded all suppliers from bidding for the tenders. And so no tender has come and the Chashma nuclear power plant is yet to see the light of day.

This despite the fact that the Chashma plant would operate under the full scope safeguards and inspection of the Vienna-based United Nations Nuclear watchdog body, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

The Karachi Nuclear Power Plant (KANUPP), it may be added, also operates under the full-scope safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). KANUPP's 187 mw reactor and the fuel rods, and cooling tank are under the round-the-clock surveillance by specially mounted IAEA television cameras. Moreover, IAEA Inspectors from Vienna pay periodic visits to KANUPP to ensure the plant's compliance with the IAEA full-scope safeguards regimen.

Apart from KANUPP, the only other functional reactor in Pakistan is the five mw research reactor at the Pakistan Institute of Nuclear Science and technology near Islamabad. This reactor too operates under the IAEA full-scope safeguards.

At Kahuta, not under IAEA safeguards, Pakistan has embarked on a modest programme of uranium enrichment to the extent of 3-5 percent. Weapons grade uranium requires 70-90 percent enrichment which Pakistan is not attempting. It has not got the sophisticated equipment required for weapons grade uranium enrichment. Kahuta is a R&D project to gather experience and train personnel for the Chashma plant which would operate on enriched uranium, unlike KANUPP which runs on natural uranium heavy water moderated.

The Government of Pakistan has repeatedly emphasised that it neither has the resources nor the intention to produce nuclear weapons.

Even the Reagan Administration with its vast intelligence network has been certifying every year so far that Pakistan does not possess a nuclear device. This year, according to WASHINGTON POST such a certificate may not be forthcoming. The paper said the Reagan Administration informed the Congress before it left office that the United States was unlikely to be able to certify this year that Pakistan does not possess a nuclear bomb.

Without such certification required annually by law, Pakistan would not be eligible to receive United States economic and military aid beyond the current fiscal year.

The Reagan Administration budget for the fiscal year 1990 includes a request for 621 million dollars assistance to Pakistan as part of 4.02 billion dollar six-year package.

According to the POST story, the Reagan administration officials had told law-makers privately that Pakistan was so close to building a bomb that "it had been a very close call" to renewing the certification last year.

"They (Reagan Administration) made the decision that they are not going to be able to certify again" the POST quoted a Congressional source as saying.

In fact, Pakistan is today as far from building a bomb as it was last year or ever was. Pakistan today as its Government has said has not got the bomb. What is more, it has no intention of building one.

If Pakistan indeed is a "bomb in the basement" there was no reason to hide it. It would have openly crowed about it as a proud accomplishment by our scientists and technicians.

But all evidence Pakistan has supplied indicate that the country is not engaged in a nuclear weapons manufacturing programme.

True Pakistan is enriching uranium. But it is not weapons grade enrichment. Moreover, Pakistan is not the only country that is enriching uranium. In fact, there are about a dozen or so countries in the world that are today engaged in uranium enrichment without producing nuclear weapons. These countries include Japan and West Germany.

Furthermore, if Pakistan has the bomb, why would it be so eager and anxious to stop nuclear proliferation in the region? And why would it offer its nuclear facilities and installations to inspection on a reciprocal basis?

A country with a clandestine nuclear weapons programme would not adopt this straightforward course of action to have its plants inspected.

In fact, Pakistan's nuclear programme is geared entirely to peaceful purposes. It is so above board that the country has offered in the regional context a string of proposals designed to eliminate nuclear proliferation from South Asia.

Pakistan has bent all its energies against the possession, manufacture and use of nuclear arms in the region. Only two years ago, Pakistan proposed a nuclear test-ban treaty with India. Since the nuclear proliferation problem is a regional one, Pakistan to make clear its intention has proposed a number of regional solutions.

Any one of these solutions would serve the broad objective of nuclear non-proliferation—the aim the United States Administration is said to have in view. There is, for instance, Pakistan's offer for the declaration of the region (South Asia) as a nuclear weapon-free zone—an offer endorsed by an overwhelming majority of the United Nations every year since 1974, the year India exploded her nuclear device close to the Pakistan border.

Pakistan also suggested that India and Pakistan jointly sign a solemn declaration proclaiming their intention to renounce the acquisition or manufacture of nuclear weapons.

Yet another proposal offered in this connection is that the nuclear installations and facilities of both India and Pakistan should be open to mutual inspection to ensure that nuclear energy is not being diverted to purposes other than peaceful. After all, only last December during the fourth Summit of SAARC (South Asian Association of Regional Co-operation) at Islamabad, the Prime Minister of India and Pakistan signed a formal treaty not to attack each other's nuclear facilities and installations.

They can go a step further and open each other's nuclear installations to mutual inspection to eliminate doubts and suspicions. Pakistan has also suggested that both India and Pakistan place their nuclear facilities under the full-scope safeguard of the IAEA.

Finally, Pakistan has formally proposed that in order to banish mutual fear and suspicion, India and Pakistan should simultaneously sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

The point here to note is that this kind of all-embracing cast-iron, binding agreement would not be offered by any country "about to build a bomb" or having a clandestine nuclear weapons programme.

Moreover, Pakistan has repeatedly stated that if this series of proposals is not acceptable, she would like to consider any better suggestion India or the U.S. may have to lift the spectre of nuclear weapons from South Asia.

After all, the goals of nuclear non-proliferation on which the new Bush Administration is said to be so keen is being squarely met by these proposals.

IJI Stance on Eighth Amendment Criticized *46000111b Karachi DAWN in English 17 Feb 89 p 9*

[Article by Zohra Yusuf]

[Text] The issue of the repeal of the Eighth Constitutional Amendment has, regrettably, turned into a war of words between the ruling party and the opposition, with most of the weapons being fired by the IJI warriors, some of whom in the process have also exposed the hollowness of their commitment to rule of law and constitutionality.

The focus of the debate has, primarily, been the balance of power between the President and the Prime Minister, between the Senate and the National Assembly. And in this tussle for power—the IJI wanting greater powers for the President, the PPP for the Prime Minister—the issue of the violation of fundamental rights which the constitutional amendments sanction, is being overlooked.

The most objectionable amendment is Article 270 (A) which gives a blanket indemnity to all the President's (and CMLA's) orders, Martial Law orders and Regulations and laws made between 5 July 1977 and 30 December 1985, and affirms that these, "notwithstanding anything contained in the Constitution, shall not be called in question in any court on any ground whatsoever."

Above all, the so-called elected representatives ("so-called" because of the recent Supreme Court judgment on the Political Parties Act) had no right to provide indemnity to Martial Law Orders and Regulations, making them unquestionable in a court of law. It should be recalled that the indemnity given to Yahya Khan's Martial Law Orders in the 1972 Provisional Constitution could be challenged in the courts.

The IJI's present stand on the annulment of the Eighth Amendment reflects a preference for the unchallenged authoritarianism of a military regime rather than for an accountable democratic system. The IJI parliamentary leader, Choudhury Shujaat Hussain, has shown his alliance's contempt for constitutional rule by starting that the Eighth Amendment is a non-issue. The apathetic attitude of our elected representatives towards the most sacred law of the land is just one indication of the kind of legal and constitutional disorientation being promoted.

While the legal and constitutional rights of the majority of the people have been taken away by the Eighth Amendment, especially under the Revival of the Constitution of 1973 Order of 2 March 1985, incorporated in it, Choudhury Shujaat Hussain has recently said that "the IJI does not want any change in the Eighth Constitutional Amendment" (Dawn, 24 January). Apart from denying Martial Law convicts the right to challenge their

convictions, the Eighth Amendment also validates laws and decisions which are violative of fundamental rights as enshrined in the 1973 Constitution.

Article 25 (1) states that "all citizens are equal before law and are entitled to equal protection of law." According to Article 25 (2), "there shall be no discrimination on the basis of sex alone."

In matters of evidence, women and minorities are discriminated against under the Law of Evidence and the Hudood Ordinances, 1979. The Committee for the Repeal of the Hudood Ordinances has documented enough cases to counter the claims of those justifying the enforcement of these Ordinances in the name of Islamic justice. In many cases, the Federal Shariat Court—when composed of enlightened members—have given judgments quashing unjust and brutal sentences passed by the lower courts. But not all the victims have access to quick justice and often women have spent years in jail before being acquitted. Moreover, as long as the Hudood Ordinances are there, women and minorities will continue to be victimised and feel insecure.

In a recent interview for a video film 'Who Will Cast the First Stone?' Justice (Retd) Dorab Patel cites how the Hudood Ordinances discriminate against the minorities. If for example, Mr Dorab Patel's house was burgled and he happened to be the sole witness, under the Hudood Ordinance, his evidence will not be accepted since he is not a Muslim—in spite of the fact that he has been a judge of the Supreme Court of Pakistan and an Acting Chief Justice. Instances of discrimination are many and painful.

Among the plethora of statements which Choudhury Shujaat Hussain has been issuing in favour of retaining the controversial Amendment is one in which he has accused the PPP Government of wanting to encourage rape and alcoholism by repealing the Hudood Ordinances. Enconced in his ivory tower in Gujrat, the IJI leader is oblivious of present realities. Is he ignorant of the fact that the Zina Ordinance is too often used to convert rape cases into cases of adultery and the victims are treated as criminals? As for liquor consumption, statistics would show that during the 11 years of General Zia's Islamisation, consumption of alcohol—not to mention of deadlier drugs—actually increased.

The Law of Evidence which initially specified a woman's evidence to be half of that of a man's and which was subsequently amended after widespread protests from women's groups is still violative of Article 25 of the Constitution. In its present form, in financial matters the evidence of two women is equal to that of one man.

The PPP Government's own position on the amendments violative of human rights is not totally clear of reassuring. Prime Minister Bhutto and Law Minister Iftikhar Gilani have stated that they would struggle to restore the Constitution as it was on 5 July 1977. They

have, at the same time, also expressed their willingness to review the amendments made by the first PPP government. However, the statement of Malik Mohammed Qasim, the newly appointed political adviser to the Prime Minister that "there are no two opinions about enforcement of Shariah in the country and the Federal Government would welcome such proposals provided the political parties are prepared to repeal those articles which have given protection to various acts of martial law regime" (DAWN, 4 February) confirms the fear that if a compromise is arrived at with the IJI, it will be at the expense of the rights of women and minorities. The PPP manifesto commits the party to repealing all discriminatory laws, the pressures from religious parties notwithstanding.

Ensuring equality of citizens before the law and restoration of fundamental and legal rights should be one of the main objectives of the proposed annulments. Amendments 3, 4, 5 and 7 to the 1973 Constitution curtail the jurisdiction of the courts in certain crucial areas. The PPP Government should take the initiative in moving for their repeal even as it tries to achieve consensus for annulling the Eighth Amendment.

The 1973 Constitution was a document of unique unity, creating consensus among politicians of diverse beliefs and leanings. In contrast, the acrimony over the Eighth Amendment is reflective of the quality of politicians produced by the Zia era. The man who, during his 11-year rule, deeply divided the nation by his policies continues to cast a shadow over democracy, in the form of the Eighth Amendment.

Commentary Expresses Negative View of Intelligence Services

46000111c Karachi DAWN in English 21 Feb 89 p 7

[Article by Shakil Qasim]

[Text] Like most governmental systems, our Intelligence Services are also run with the same oppressive, autocratic, tyrannical and arbitrary control which once helped strengthen the colonial administrators tighten their hold over their subjects. Before we discuss our Intelligence system, I would like to draw out the difference between Intelligence work and spying.

Intelligence Services personnel are designed to obtain valuable information for the well-being and security of the State. Yet, unfortunately, here they are not looked upon with favour. They are commonly abhorred, avoided and suspected even by their friends. The reason, however, is quite obvious: Most of our Intelligent friends fail to appreciate the subtle difference between Intelligence and spying; they confuse the two.

Intelligence is gaining information with noble intentions, (service to the motherland); spying is treachery. It is supplying vital information to the enemy. It is done stealthily.

An Intelligence Service employee should keep an open mind; he should be above suspicion. Personal vendetta or prejudice should not hamper him in the performance of his duty. He should have no preconceived bias against anyone who associates himself with factions opposing the government of the day. We have seen that the loyalists of today become the traitors of tomorrow and vice versa. So it would be befitting for the Intelligence Services to stay above party politics and government changes.

Apart from some specialised Federal and armed forces agencies, the commonly known Intelligence Services may be categorised into four major branches which are considered independent, but in actual practice they supplement and coordinate with each other. Their duplication may be right to some extent but in no way should it affect the original or actual task assigned to each branch of the system. These four branches are: the ISI, the IB, the MI and the four Special Branches of the Provinces.

The ISI and the IB are expected to provide extensive internal and external coverage for collection of military and political information. We do not have a system to recruit or train incumbents for Intelligence Services. They come on deputation either from the armed forces or from the police. A small number of civilian Intelligence Officers (IOs) is also inducted into the ISI and IB. Their working with services people who are temporarily assigned to these agencies does not help in a healthy working relationship. This creates jealousy, mistrust and at times misunderstanding which lead to unproductiveness and serious lapses in their performance.

The Military Intelligence (M.I.) has its specialised tasks to collect and collate information within and across the national borders. It operates through its respective components of the Army, Navy and Air Force Intelligence Services. All three components are independent and are engaged in operational Intelligence duties only, except for MI, which had, during Gen Zia's regime, set up a number of bodies known as Survey Groups. Their main task was to keep a close watch on the law and order situation and national politics and furnish assessments. These bodies were made even more potent than the ISI as they augmented the areas the ISI was engaged in since the days of Iskandar Mirza. The ISI was busy with the Afghan issue, and had less time for political matters.

The Special Branches in the provinces are primarily meant to act as 'eyes and ears' for the provincial governments. Most of these branches are filled up with unwanted, rejected and unwilling personnel from the police department. These incumbents, instead of being assets, become a burden, as they are dissatisfied with Service conditions in these branches, and always keep manoeuvring to go back to their parent department. In

most cases, therefore, they are inept except in the Punjab, where ex-Governor Jilani, who was also an ex-DG, ISI, for a long time, made good use of his experience and made this branch quite efficient and effective.

We have seen our Intelligence agencies, particularly, the ISI, failing miserably during the 1965 war, the East Pakistan debacle, and the 1977 imposition of Martial Law. Yet we did not see any change in the command of the ISI. Its Chief Gen. Jilani, continued to remain head of the ISI for Yahya, Bhutto and Zia in spite of all the debacles. During this time, however, the IB saw many of its chiefs changed. Similarly, again in 1988, we saw the catastrophic explosion at Ojhri Camp and the tragic air crash at Bahawalpur and some important files on defence (Siachen) being passed on to the enemy. No action was taken against those responsible.

There is no accountability, no one is held responsible, no one is prosecuted for grave lapses or treachery. No one is even suspended for gross negligence. Nothing at all happens. In fact, it is the other way around. Some high-ups are even rewarded in spite of their failures and proof of gross negligence. Too much protection to the Military Intelligence personnel not only adversely affects the morale of other organisations where continuous changes are being made but also weakens the credibility of its own organisation.

Good or bad, an Intelligence system is there and we should not disturb its basic structure at this crucial stage when we are engaged in a crucial effort for the success and consolidation of the newly revived democratic order. Externally, too, big changes are taking place around us mainly owing to our efforts, and very much against the wishes of one superpower and one mini-superpower.

Our Intelligence Services, as they stand today, do have the capacity and capability to stand up to any hazardous situation that may present itself, but there is definitely a need for redefining the role and scope of these Services and disciplining them accordingly. The aim should remain the same i.e. national security and integrity.

Suggestions for closing down the political cell in ISI (as reported in newspapers on 5 February) owing to duplication of work, will not solve the problem. To some extent duplication is necessary, as it gives diversity and variety to reporting. On the other hand, a thorough process of assimilation and coordination at different levels is also necessary.

We must have an 'Intelligence Coordination Committee' at provincial, federal (I.C.C.) and national levels.

The special branches of the respective provinces should organise meetings of the I.C.C. (Intelligence Coordination Committee) and arrange fortnightly meetings. Local representatives of the IB and the army may also be asked to attend.

The Minister for Interior should chair meetings of the Federal I.C.C. with the chiefs of IB, ISI, MI and heads of the provincial SBs attending at this level once every month.

The composition of the National Intelligence Coordination Committee should be: Prime Minister: (in chair), Minister for Interior and Foreign Affairs, chief of the Services, chiefs of ISI and IB, Secretaries of Interior, Defence and Foreign Affairs, and National Security Adviser. The President could be invited as observer.

This meeting may be held once in every two or three months.

Besides redefining and reorganising these Services, we must have a comprehensive Information Cell at the Centre—preferably in the Prime Minister's Secretariat. Call it the National Information Bureau or Intelligence Data Bank, the purpose of this Cell should be to collate and tabulate all information with proper security classifications for ready reference. A general version of this information—minus Sensitive References may also be maintained for the use of various departments.

The present commission must also be requested to carry out studies on the factors and circumstances responsible for the growing importance of the ISI, during the 70's and 80's and the downgrading of the IB since then.

Any member of these Intelligence Agencies who has shown his worth, has a flair for Intelligence work and has a clean record may be retained (if willing) in the cadre on a permanent basis.

All incumbents particularly the ones deployed on field duties must be given extensive training in mind reading—an ability to perceive another's thoughts by direct or indirect contact. A complete knowledge of the individual (subject), his contacts, habits, interests, and weaknesses is essential to start understanding a person correctly.

Paper Disputes Bhutto's Claim on No Political Prisoners

46560017b Karachi JASARAT in Urdu 23 Jan 89 p 3

[Text] Pakistan Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto says that there are no political prisoners in Pakistani jails. And all such prisoners have been released. But it is being said that the prisoners that have been released are not really political prisoners and that most of them are professional and habitual criminals and that the People's Party has taken this step for the sake of cheap popularity. Incredibly enough, while releasing prisoners it was not considered necessary to consult the provincial governments. At the same time those criminal characters were also pardoned who were involved in despicable crimes like murder and abduction. In fact, criminals who had been sentenced to

death for crimes of murder, abduction and rape and were on death row waiting to be hanged, even their death sentence was commuted. No one knows what kind of justice this is and what good the People's Party government seeks to confer upon the society by releasing and pardoning these criminals. Following this step of the People's Party's federal government, the Punjab government has become cautious and it has started keeping a watch over political dissidents and criminals thus released because release of these criminals constitutes a danger to the entire society. Benazir Bhutto said with great pride that she was proud to announce that under her government's rule there are no political prisoners. At the same time she also announced that the Peoples Party will try to see that police do not raid politicians' houses or otherwise harass political leaders.

So far as Benazir Bhutto's announcements are concerned, these are naturally very welcome and the public may think that the new government has acted with commendable fairness and that it has released all political prisoners whereas the reality is exactly the opposite. All those criminals who were somehow or other connected with the People's Party and who were guilty of serious crimes were indiscriminately released and those people who had a difference of opinion with the People's Party are still locked up in jails. Cases are going on against them. In this context the case of Islami Jamiat students deserves a special notice. How surprising and amazing it is that professional and well-known criminals have been given the name of political prisoners and released but the youth belonging to the student community who do not have the remotest connection with character criminals are still languishing in jails. What should have happened is that before releasing political prisoners, detailed reports about all the criminals should have been gathered, reports examined and each prisoner released on his merits. But in this case there was no discretion shown and those people, however despicable their crimes, provided they were partymen and could be useful to the party, were released without any hesitation and an impression was sought to be created in the world that the Peoples Party does not want to detain anyone on political grounds. We request the powers to be carefully examine the situation keeping in view the seriousness of the conditions. Also, before taking any steps they should carefully consider what effect these actions will have on the country and the nation and what kind of problems will release of criminals pose for society. At the same time immediate orders should be issued for release of those prisoners who are innocent. If this method is not adopted and policies continue to be made in the moulds of the past, then it is possible that there may be momentary applause, but in the future it will not be possible to conceal the reality and people will come to know what actually transpired and what kind of means were used to gain political advantage. It should never be forgotten that the truth cannot be hidden for long and it comes out sooner or later.

Commentary Calls for Federal Province Cooperation

46000111a Karachi DAWN in English 19 Feb 89 p 9

[Article by Mushtaq Ahmad. First paragraph was boxed in the article.]

[Text] It is high time the Chief Ministers of the provinces realise that what they consider to be a matter of prestige may eventually turn out to be a road to deterioration if the futile politics of confrontation does not give way to conciliation.

The federal principle in Pakistan never had a fair trial. Now that it has a chance to prove its efficacy, some of our leading politicians are playing foul with it, not realising that with its fate is closely linked the future of democracy, for whose restoration most of them had waged a relentless struggle for many years. After all the troubles and tribulations of an autocratic rule through which the country had to pass, a return to dictatorship is bound to be disastrous for national integrity and independence.

The prevalent tension-charged political climate does not augur well either for democracy or federalism, both of which are essential for our survival as a nation-State. Despite the comfortable majority the PPP commands in the National Assembly, the IJI controlled Senate is more of a hindrance than help in the smooth working of the parliamentary system. A vestige of the old order which was supposed to have been buried, following the emergence of the new, the general elections had ushered in, it is a natural and constant irritant to the ruling party. Being a product of the partyless elections, its existence has no justification. It is an upper house with a revisory function in one sense, in another important sense, it is a house of the provinces designed for the protection of their interests and not intended to be used as a lever against the Centre. Equality of provincial representation in the chamber is subject to the proportionate strength of the parties in the provincial assemblies.

The Zia Government with or without Junejo was a none-man government, and the Senate is a part of the legacy he has left behind for his political heirs, who share power in one capacity or another. If he could dissolve the pivot of the system, that is the National Assembly, he should have had no hesitation in disbanding the Senate. This is precisely what he had done on 5 July 1977. Inherent in its retention was the late President's own ulterior motive of keeping alive the facade of democracy and not the protection of provincial rights through its agency.

While we cannot think of a federation without the autonomy of the federating units, the concept of autonomy is not synonymous with the doctrine of sovereignty. Even if the powers of the provinces are well defined in the constitution, it does not confer on them a status of equality. The federal structure is difficult to sustain if the

provincial governments start acting like states within a state. It was on this issue that a most ferocious civil war was fought in the United States to preserve the Union under the leadership of Abraham Lincoln, who also gave the world the most simplified definition of democracy—a government of the people, for the people and by the people. Central supremacy must, therefore, be upheld at all cost. Its assertion under democratic dispensation is vital for the viability of the federation. The Centre represents not only the unity and the sovereignty of the state to the outside world but is also the centre of allegiance to the people inside.

The Punjab, Baluchistan, Sind and the Frontier do not represent the State, it is the State that represents them. Its writ has to run throughout the length and breadth of the country regardless of the political hue of the governments in power in the provinces. It operates directly on the entire population and indirectly through the provinces in the jurisdiction reserved for them in the constitution.

Whatever the extent or limits of their jurisdiction, people all over the country from Islamabad to the coast of Makran, are entitled to a uniform quality of life that can be made available to them only by the formulation of policies at the national level. The implementation of those policies may be a provincial preserve but ensuring their conformity to an all-Pakistan standard, is a federal concern. Whether it is education, health, housing, population, employment or for that matter, any field of economic development or social welfare, the approach to the solution of the problems has to be free from provincial bias and prejudice. The unit of society is the individual and not the province to which he belongs. The line of demarcation between the federation and the provinces does not coincide with the line between nationalism and provincialism. Nationalism is a cementing force in contrast to provincialism which acts as a decisive agent.

A divisive agent does not only divide the State but retards its own progress and harms the interests of the people on whose behalf it takes up the cudgels. It is from the federal centre alone that initiative and assistance must stem and radiate for the realisation of national objectives to which the provincial governments must lend their helping hands in order to help themselves. The financial and fiscal resources of the Centre, however large, are now largely supplemented by external aid in the matter of defence, economic development and social services, the last two of them evenly and equitably distributed and disbursed among the provinces for whose effective utilisation the federal government owes accountability to the donor countries.

Even in a state of self-reliance a spirit of cooperation is a basic requirement of progress, quite apparent from being a constitutional obligation. With all the development we have accomplished in the past 41 years Pakistan is still bracketed among the low-income economies of the Third

World, and it is no solace to us that our per capita income is twice that of Bangladesh. The former Finance Minister of the Zia Regime, Dr Mahbubul Haq in a recent statement made an unfair and uncalled for comparison in an attempt to take credit for what he thinks to be a success of his financial policies. More important to remember, is what it means in terms of the quality of life except for a small class that maintains the lifestyle of the West, which the so-called sympathisers of the masses in the provinces and also at the Centre emulate. It is high time the Chief Ministers of the Province realise that what they consider to be a matter of prestige, may eventually turn out to be a road to deterioration and even disintegration if the futile politics of confrontation do not give way to the fruitful policy of conciliation during their tenure as custodians of the state power in their respective provinces, where so much remains to be done and so little has been achieved for the multitude on whose vote they have been elected to office.

The division of powers between the Centre and the provinces can not divide the problem or the responsibility for their solution. The sharing of responsibility is the essence of federalism its compartmentalisation that leads to conflict, is the very negation of the principle. The controversy now raging in the country is not a part of the democratic process, nor a phenomenon noticeable in federations elsewhere in the world.

The self-style champions of democracy have not been able to demonstrate its unifying influence in our body-politic. On the other hand, what we are witnessing is a dissipation of time, energy and resources of the State at the central as well as the provincial level, resulting in a policy of masterly indifference and inaction.

While the politicians are busy stealing the limelight of publicity by the ceaseless war of words they have unleashed, the people are still groping in the dark, wondering what lies in store for them. No picture has yet emerged of the plans for the reconstruction of the economy and the reform of the social order. The governments at the Centre, in Peshawar, Quetta are new. The only government that drags its past along with it is the government at Lahore. Even this government cannot claim that it has fulfilled the promises it had made to the people over the past one decade. The criterion for judging its performance is not the increasing affluence of the privileged class but the progressive alleviation of the plight of the under-privileged masses.

A few months before his death Gen. Zia had himself publicly confessed that the economy was bankrupt and the Treasury empty and a few months later, the new Prime Minister confirmed the truth of that confession. With so lamentable a state of finances, can the country afford the luxury of indulgence in the politics of power and leave unattended the problems of poverty, ignorance, disease and unemployment which in varying degrees are common to all provinces demanding a concerted effort of all the governments to seek a remedy for the nation's

economic and social ills. Working at cross purposes we shall aggravate rather mitigate their severity and magnitude, leaving the deprived and the dispossessed in a slough of despondency and despair with all the frightful consequences we had experienced towards the end of the Ayub Regime.

The problems with a national dimension cannot be provincially solved, whether they pertain to land, labour, health or education. Agriculture is a glaring example, where land reforms legislation has proved abortive, mainly due to the political hold of the landlords and their refusal to part with their estates. There are landlords owning an area as extensive as the Kaghan Valley or an income tax-free income as fabulous as rupees two crores a year. Among them are leaders of political parties claiming a national stature and also former Ministers in the government who shed crocodile tears on the plight of the peasantry in the Parliament and public platform and yet their principal pre-occupation in public life is the acquisition of power by means other than an electoral mandate. The Province-Centre controversy is a part of their exercise from which the nation has nothing to gain and everything to lose. The true test of their patriotism is the willingness to accept the verdict of the electorate to justify the confidence reposed in their leadership. Both the IJI and the PPP who are in a way co-shares in State-power cannot say that they did not have the opportunity to do so when the time for accountability comes at the next election. The time in between is the time for action and not bickering and bad blood.

Paper Accuses U.S. of International Terrorism
46560013b Lahore NAWA-I-WAQT in Urdu
6 Jan 89 p 9

[Editorial]

[Text] According to the U.S. Defense Department, American fighters while defending themselves shot down two Libyan fighters. The American Government stand is that the Libyan fighters were moving toward the American naval ship John F. Kennedy, in a hostile manner, while it was in international waters. America has also said in its defense that this action had no connection with the tension that has been building up because of the chemical arms plant in Libya. The American Government has also reaffirmed its determination to carry out its plan to destroy the plant while Libya says that only pharmaceutical products are produced in the plant. To keep America from attacking this factory, Libya has placed the doctors, nurses and pharmacists who work in this factory on the premises, to watch the factory around the clock. Libya is perhaps mistaken if it believes that this will stop America from attacking. This is because no good can be expected from a power which has no principles and which is blinded by prejudice. Twice before America has made Libya the victim of its aggression. In 1981 two Libyan planes were shot down and in 1986 Tripoli and Benghazi were bombarded. It is a matter of chance that both incidents took place during

President Reagan's time and now also when only 2 weeks remain for Reagan's presidential term to expire, America has attacked Libya for the third time. Perhaps by this hat trick President Reagan wants to go down in American history as a brave and courageous president. But the fact is that because of these events history will remember him as a terrorist in civilized times. Libyan "lawlessness" apart, America has no right to try to force the nations of the world to follow its wishes and to use force against any nation that refuses to obey its commands. The American president will have to render accounts before history not only for the blood of those who perished in the Iranian passenger aircraft but also for the Arab blood that is being shed in Israel.

How ironic it is that America at will brands anyone a terrorist but it does not examine its own actions. It is not possible to find any justification for the recent American aggression against Libya. America says that this action happened in international waters. The question is whether this sea is near Libya or near America and what was the object of American presence in international waters close to Libya with all the American war machinery. Before taking any wrong or right step, America should at least ponder lest it is suffering from a misunderstanding or whether it is the victim of a deep conspiracy. Recently a PanAm plane did perish in Scotland. However, does that mean that the Libyans had a hand in this accident. The fact is that Col Qadhafi has denied his involvement in this accident in unequivocal terms. The PLO chief Yasser Arafat also pleaded his innocence and promised full cooperation in investigation of this accident. If, despite this, America displays hostility against the PLO or Libya, this is nothing more than open prejudice and bias. In this context America should examine the role of Israel which is engaged in devilish schemes in pursuit of its interests. It is possible that in order to keep America and the PLO at loggerheads, Israel very cunningly hatches such plans which include destruction of American passenger planes. The way Israel has been indulging in banditry under American protection for the last 40 years, the possibility cannot be ruled out that Israel may have destroyed the PanAm plane so that the blame may fall on the PLO or Libya and America may get so bogged down in Middle East conflicts that the dream of an independent Palestinian state may never see the light of the day. Nowadays Israel is not prepared to listen to even its retired leaders. Israel's former Foreign Minister Abba Eban too has urged Israel to refrain from sabotaging American PLO talks but the Jewish state is at the zenith of its craze and is not prepared to pay heed to any advice. American encouragement has brought Israel to this pass and when America closes its eyes to reality and becomes obsessed with prejudice who can control its rogues. What is needed is that America should become conscious of its responsibilities as a superpower and it should refrain from such actions which could plunge the world into new tensions. Already there is enough tension. War between Iraq and Iran has ceased but the issues involved are still smoldering. The withdrawal of Russian troops from Afghanistan

is almost complete but the future of Afghanistan itself is still far from clear. The Palestinians have been moving from pillar to post for the last 40 years and now that a ray of hope is in sight, it becomes America's duty not to foul up the atmosphere by its irresponsible actions and especially if President Reagan, after 8 years of rule, cannot leave by giving the world a gift of peace, at least he should not depart leaving it in a hellish state. No one knows why he has so much enmity with the African and Arab Muslims.

The departing American president is responsible for widening the breach between America and the Islamic world as a result of the recent steps taken against Libya.

Commentary Urges Building of Kalabagh Dam
46560013a Lahore NAWA-I-WAQT in Urdu
3 Jan 89 p 3

[Editorial]

[Text] The federal minister for water and electricity, Sardar Farooq Laghari, in his first press conference, has acknowledged that the Kalabagh and the Bhasha dams are indispensable for the country's economy. However, he says that, so far, the People's Party government has not been able to decide which one to construct first. Up until a few months ago, Sardar Laghari was the leader of the opposition in Punjab assembly. Now that his government has felt the need for his services, he has been included in the federal cabinet. It appears as though Sardar has indeed got a grip on affairs of his department. Therefore, in his talk with newsmen he explained policies of the People's Party government on the most important energy issue. One welcome feature of his statement on the Kalabagh dam is that this is the first time that any responsible person of the People's Party has acknowledged Kalabagh dam's indispensability for the country's economy and despite his remark that no choice has been made between Kalabagh and Bhasha dams, he has admitted that 1,000 million rupees have been spent on Kalabagh dam's research. However, Bhasha dam has not yet reached the stage at which Kalabagh dam is and consequently if work is started on both the dams, Kalabagh dam will naturally be built first. From this point of view there is no need to get into the preference controversy and keeping in view broader interests of the country, the People's Party should give the green light for building the Kalabagh dam. The fear is that if the People's Party government gets bogged down in deliberations, it will not be able to disentangle itself from the political controversy surrounding this issue. In his just criticism of the former government, Sardar Farooq Laghari said that despite the fact that the former government remained in power for a long time, it could not make a decision on it and in it is time to end confrontation and adversarial speech mongering between various provinces. The fact is that this is exactly what happened during the former regime. By making the Kalabagh dam a controversial and political issue, it was kept in suspended animation even though millions of

rupees from the nation's treasury was spent on it for research. But can one hope that the People's Party government also will not make this issue into a new political farce. The tragedy is that varying views exist in the People's Party on this issue. The Frontier assembly has adopted an ANP [Awami National Party] resolution saying that the Kalabagh dam would not be built. This means that the People's Party members in the Frontier assembly are also opposed to this project. The ANP thinking needs no explanation. Khan Ghaffar Khan had announced that he will send this dam packing into the Karachi seas free of charge. Wali Khan has threatened to blast it with a bomb. Now this party shares power with the People's Party in the Frontier Province and it remains to be seen how it will be possible for the People's Party to free itself of the shackles and make a decision. In the context of the Kalabagh dam, the People's Party faces another challenge and that is how it can raise itself above provincial thinking and prove that it is indeed a

party with a national thinking and that it will not succumb to the propaganda that the Kalabagh dam is a project advantageous to Punjab and that to escape from confrontation between small provinces and Punjab, one should adopt the formula that whatever is in Punjab's interest should be turned down. What is needed is that Punjab's interests should be made part of the overall national interests and solution to the energy crisis is that not only the Kalabagh dam, but wherever it is possible to build a dam, work should be started there. This is merely a good fortune that research on the Kalabagh dam is complete and it is only waiting for the green light. In 5 years' time, it should be able to produce electricity and provide research for the construction of the Bhasha dam. The construction of other dams should start immediately, so that in the next century industry, agriculture and society would not face the energy crisis that they are confronted with today. Shortage of electricity has caused enough damage.

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