



# ***JPRS Report***

## **Soviet Union**

### ***Military Affairs***

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# Soviet Union

## Military Affairs

JPRS-UMA-88-011

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15 June 1988

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**Prokhanov Reflects on New Thinking, Social Criticism of Defense Sector, Afghanistan**  
*18010364 LITERATURNAYA ROSSIYA in Russian*  
6 May 88 pp 4-5

[Article by Aleksandr Prokhanov: "Defense Consciousness and New Thinking"]

[Text] Forty-three days have passed since the memorable day when the crimson banner of our great victory first waved over the Reichstag. But the farther the river of time carries away in its unceasing flow the days of triumph at the price of long suffering, the more vivid is the grandeur of the feat in the people's memory. Why is it that in these very days we look so intently in the mirror of history. It is probably because the tradition of evaluating the past on memorable dates stems from man's striving to understand and evaluate himself in all dimensions of history: past, present, and future. It is on these days that we understand best of all that the present is never an end and that the future is always a beginning. It is specifically from this standpoint that writer Aleksandr Prokhanov tries to evaluate the relationship between society and its armed forces.

The intellectual process in today's society is largely focused on the analyst and very serious, caustic—at the level of skepticism, even nihilism—research. Many constants that only yesterday were virtually our essence and that therefore seemed unshakeable are now tested for their strength, endurance, and truthfulness. Values are immersed in this acid of social consciousness and those of them that are imaginary or ersatz dissolve, disappear without a trace, and are washed out of public life evidently forever. Only the patina and the rust are removed from the same values that survive the test of this "aqua regia" and they begin to shine with a new light, with a new intensity. Therefore we need not fear such an analytical test however severe. To the contrary, we must expose everything to it: the truth will survive.

Among the constants that are associated with the life of state institutions, among the views of whole periods in our history and of personalities, authorities, conceptions, and models of culture and sociology that are immersed in this caustic potion, there is also the conception of the army and national defense. The very categories—army, defense—are presently the subject of intensive research and fierce attacks for the most part by our cultural intelligentsia.

What are the directions of criticism of today's army, of today's defense concepts? In my view, there are several of them.

First, it is said that the army is a threatening, awesome, negative force that has led to the militarization of the world, to the militarization of history, to the militarization of life. And it is specifically the army, that possesses death-dealing weapons, that has placed the world on the verge of the final catastrophe, the verge of annihilation.

Second, it is believed that it is specifically the army, because of its inflexible, conservative, closed nature, that is the source of all that is stagnant and conservative, of everything that rejects the new thinking, perestroyka, and experimental models of behavior of the nation and the state. That is, the army is coming to be identified with the opponents of modernization.

Third, the army is accused of having become lazy in recent years, of having lost its combat knowhow and of therefore failing to cope with its military obligations: leaving "holes" in the frontier for aircraft from other countries (for example, the Rust affair that was highly injurious to our prestige), of frequently not knowing what it is doing (we recall the situation with the South Korean Boeing). The army is criticized for being in a rut, for lagging in large measure behind modern military doctrine. It is also eroded from within by the degradation of cadres. Non-regulation relations flourish. A number of officers are involved in corruption. Protectionism and many other purely social disorders reign in the army.

And finally the direction of criticism that has intensified particularly literally in the last few weeks—the army and the Afghanistan problem. The liberal flank of our society, which is most active today, criticizes the army for the very fact that it went into Afghanistan, considers this an inadmissible, erroneous and harmful step, and charges the army with a host of transgressions in this regard.

A certain segment of society, on the other hand, considers the withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan a mistake that is fraught with political and military-strategic complications.

In general, the problem of the fighting army in Afghanistan is also becoming the subject of embittered discussion.

Naturally each of these very serious positions needs to be analyzed. I want to be so bold as to take part in the discussion of these problems, especially because during the last 10 years I, while not a professional military man, was nonetheless very closely connected with the army; I saw its units in combat, in missile silos, on submarine cruises, and had the opportunity to carefully study the modern army in all genres: global and everyday.

What can I say to the first claim: that the army has militarized the world and brought it to the brink of global catastrophe? It seems to me that the blame for this rests not with the army but with the entire course of world history in the last 30 years resulting from the idea of total confrontation—the confrontation of sociums [sotsii], the confrontation of two superstructures. What is more, the entry of high-speed technological means into this confrontation gave it an extreme, I repeat, total military character. This brought into the confrontation

not only the military but the entire human potential: the means of propaganda and ideological doctrine and the entire economy worked for this. Culture also worked largely for it.

And it was specifically this total confrontation, this perplexing phase in world history that concentrated two enormous potentials in different parts of the world, that pitted one against the other and armed them with sophisticated weapons, that generated the enormous crisis. A military, political, philosophical, general human crisis. The army was an element in this crisis. The remaining components of human society, which perhaps also include in part pacifists, ecologists, and religious mystics, can be the other elements. Because while in the first derivative, these forces are outside the zone of struggle for military superiority and, to the contrary, set themselves up against this struggle, in the second and third derivatives, they have already been manipulated and have already been included in the struggle and hence in one way or another also serve the idea of confrontation.

In this total struggle, we, are surrounded by powerful Western civilizations that have integrated against us. Only with the aid of the army can we retain our sovereignty. Albeit by severe means, including nuclear power and nuclear intimidation, it has enabled us to survive as a great, sovereign power. And to heap all the blame on it for this is dishonest and, I would say, unscientific. There is a switching of positions here.

In sum: the army has helped us to survive as a sovereign society that has not been thrashed by the mighty Western civilizations. Thus the army has performed its mission.

Second, contrasting the army and the defense complex with the new thinking. I would venture to say that the new thinking as a practical mode of action in the world arena became possible, changed from an abstraction into reality only after military and strategic parity was attained. Because such new thinking is not new and is not eternal. The priority of humanistic values over destructive values, the idea of universal prosperity, the idea of global integration in the name of salvation and survival—all this existed in Rousseau's time and in Plato's time. But this became practically possible only after our defense industry, the army, and the entire nation through unprecedented sacrifices concentrated all its potential in this direction, survived the race and the competition, and attained military and strategic parity. As long as parity did not exist, as long as the West was superior (possessing more warheads, more delivery systems, more high tech; as long as it dominated the most important regions in the world, as long as we did not have an atomic fleet, etc.), in a word, as long as all these factors operated against us, there could be no discussion of new thinking because one of the sides (in the given instance, their side) was always ready to trump us with its superiority. And to compromise only in the name of abstract humanism is romanticism, in any case in the

view of the people in the laboratories at Livermore or in Manhattan's financial offices. They have other laws: mathematics, the calculation of potential and strategic possibilities, the consideration of even such factors as fear. And only when parity was attained did it become clear to the enemy that the arms race could not be won in the next 10 years and that it was consequently absurd to continue it. It was then that the situation arose that made it possible to get out of this race. Specifically, to engage in new thinking, i. e., to overcome the factors of confrontation, total enmity, total confrontation.

The arms race in its present form is a puzzling phenomenon in the third quarter of the 20th century. It is a mysterious, largely incomprehensible thing that does not lend itself to superficial publicistic interpretation. I view it as a strangely designed social "engine" that operates on a global scale, that incorporates not only weapons systems but also the spatial factor, the ability or inability of a nation to fight, psychological steadfastness, economic development, mineral resources, and conglomerates of traditional and untraditional state alliances. It can also be likened to a tree whose crown reaches into space because the arms race is already branching into space; the roots of this "tree" are anchored in the ground: in molybdenum and uranium mines, in deposits of rare-earth metals required for the production of sophisticated war materiel. Its other roots extend into human psychology, into the psychology of mistrust, fear, hegemonism, people's traditional, antiquated views of superiority, etc. This is the complex and puzzling world that we interpret by the simple formula "arms race." To solve this mystery and halt this "engine" is a colossally complex task at the level of the opening of the century. Only by guessing the secret and understanding the meaning of parity, only in the bowels of the answer to this riddle—the balance of power, the balance of hatred and fear, trust and understanding—can we begin to dismantle this "engine." It must be understood, evaluated, calculated, and blueprinted, as the engineers say. Unfortunately this cannot be done by pacifistic demonstrations and "peace marches" alone. This is like appealing to a moving glacier or trying to stop a mud-torrent with gonfalons and censers. And the statement that disarmament today is possible only thanks to the pacifists and contrary to the opinion and desire of the army is simply absurd. While it is indeed true that the beginning phase of disarmament is directed by political leaders, this is done with the direct participation of military experts and strategists. And, naturally, generals will sit down next to politicians at the negotiating table because only they, who have created this megastructure are able to neutralize and slowly dismantle it so that it does not come crashing down on our heads. Amateurish experiments and rash actions can set off an explosion because the present balance is very tenuous. Figuratively speaking, the plasma has been contained in magnetic traps but it is volatile and can burst forth and explode. I therefore absolve the army of the second accusation—that it is supposedly opposed to the new thinking. To the contrary, the efforts of defense and the army are not always

evident to the world, but the parity that has been established guarantees that the new thinking can become a practical reality.

Next, the reproaches that the army has grown lazy, that it is not coping with its obligations, that it is rife with social chaos and non-regulation relationships, are probably in large measure correct. The stagnation that has spread throughout society could not fail to spread to the army. The priority of form and external luster to the detriment of inner substance could not fail to affect the army. It does not conceal this. It also feels this. It opens the door to criticism and tries to cope with these problems.

The army is also restructuring. But it has much more difficulty doing so: this is just like restructuring a flying airplane at a time when all your actions are attentively observed by the enemy. Our country is presently changing its skin, so to speak, and is vulnerable at the moment. The army must, on the one hand, continue to perform its defense mission at supersonic speeds, while on the other hand having to change the engines, frames and armaments of these gigantic airplanes at these enormous speeds, banks, and g-loads.

At the same time, the army is now focusing more and more attention on the eternal unit of everything real—man. Man in our country has been neglected for many years. Not only in the army but in society itself. He is always the victim of some supertask or other. In certain stages, there was probably justification for this. But while gradually sacrificing man to global and state tasks, we have ultimately exhausted his resources. And it has ultimately become impossible to rely on such a person for global missions.

The army has therefore turned its attention to the soldier. The soldier must be socially protected against the abomination of non-regulation relationships. His sense of pride, self-awareness, and personal worth must be returned to him. He must not be humiliated, his rights must not be violated, he must feel like an individual rather than a cog in a wheel.

Everything that has been said above also applies in no small measure to officers. What is life like for submarine sailors at our bases? After all, they perform most complex operations. The fate of the world essentially depends on their efforts. Commanders in their submarines have such power at their disposal that they can start the ocean boiling by pressing a single button. A submarine is a miracle of modern technology. It is a supermachine that civilization has filled with all the best of which it is capable. But when the masters of such a "Nautilus" go ashore, they are forced to take shelter in hovels and modest houses, to see the agony of their young wives in apartments lacking all municipal conveniences. Their sociocultural life is occasionally terrible. It is in such contrast with their peacetime tasks that it becomes painful and bitter. A person becomes divided. In service

he is tsar and God, but at home... In this regard, the criticism of the army by society is just. The army is presently devoting special attention to improving living conditions: houses, cantonments, providing work for the women.

Finally, Afghanistan. In almost 9 or 10 years of war, we have practically not talked about it. But after all, in order to arrive at an understanding of the problem, there must be continuous discussion, analysis and the exchange of conceptions. And let it be that everything that is said now, at first will be of a tentative, amateurish, emotional nature, frequently sorrowful, colored with blood, tears, and indignation—nevertheless it must be done, it is necessary to begin. After all, these are 10 years of the nation's history—very formidable, terrible years.

I only want to note that the entry of our troops into Afghanistan was not contradictory to the doctrine that we—the first and only socialist society that was for a long time surrounded by a host of powerful imperialist countries prepared to wipe us out and pulverize us—were very interested in the birth of fraternal systems and structures around us. We have always helped the peoples of fraternal countries to preserve the revolution—not only because we are emotional internationalists, but also because this was our guarantee of survival.

Before 1917 it was said that socialism could not be victorious in a single country by itself, that socialism had to be carried out simultaneously in all developed countries in order to ensure its existence. We carried out the revolution in one country surrounded by an ocean of developed capitalist countries. And in order that the revolution survive, we had to relinquish some of our limited resources for the good of the world labor movement. They were not only ideological, financial, and economic resources but were, of course, military resources as well.

And when the April revolution was proclaimed in Afghanistan, it was proclaimed as a revolution that had as its goal the construction of socialist society (NDPA radicals wanted to carry it out in 2 years) the entry of our troops was in response to a request of the legal government and was an act of support and aid of a socialist revolution that was subjected to the most powerful attacks from abroad.

I want to emphasize that the forthcoming withdrawal of the army from Afghanistan is not a defeat but an organized military withdrawal. It performed its political mission. When policy changes, the army's function changes. It simply folds up like a rug and gradually withdraws from south to north. I repeat that it will leave calmly, with dignity, not as an army that has suffered defeat, but as an army that has performed its duty.

Our arrival in Afghanistan was part of the political and military doctrine that was dominant at that time. But 10 years is an enormous amount of time by present yardsticks. We commenced this action in one era but are ending it in another. Then it was a time of total confrontation. Now it is a time of new thinking that acquires an increasingly deep nature. A vivid example—the signing of the agreement on Afghanistan in Geneva recently. What is more, the humanitarian climate itself in the world has changed. The idea of a firearm is unbearable to mankind today. This has happened literally now in the last 5 years, at a time when the antagonism for weapons in general and for firearms in particular has grown inexpressibly. If we unscrew the atomic warheads and shut down the missile silos, then the assault rifles must of course also be silent. Therefore the withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan is also, of course, associated with the reevaluation of the very conception of firearms by all mankind and by us. It does not work today. Thus this is an act that is in the context of the new state of the world.

Another problem arises—the Afghanistan veterans that will be coming home or have already returned home from Afghanistan. This is a whole social stratum that is interesting and largely enigmatic. The struggle for this contingent will now begin and has already begun in society. Our “liberals”—this is already seen in the press and on television—are trying to give them an inferiority complex, to make them into a social victim on the altar of an unnecessary and terrible slaughter, are virtually calling them “cannon fodder,” the lost generation. And having won their sympathy in this way, they try to use them to influence sociopolitical processes in the nation.

On the other hand, our “right-wing extremists” are also willing to take over this contingent, to turn the Afghanistan veterans into a virtual assault detachment, and to lead them. It is very advantageous to them to have in their ranks an organized detachment that is oriented toward the cult of force if they are able to imbue them with their ideology. There are already symptoms of this.

Finally, the bureaucrats to whom these people mean extra bother try to desocialize [desotsiirovat] them, not to notice them, to rub them clean, to make them part of the common heap, to assimilate them as soon and as widely as possible.

But the Afghanistan veterans themselves do not want to be assimilated. They are going through an interesting crystallization process. They are coming to regard themselves as a community which is making the transition from economic demands—for a place to live, for work, for a prosthesis, for a wheelchair, for a pension, from supplication more and more to ideology. The Afghanistan veterans are becoming an ideological force. They are beginning to take an increasingly active interest in their wheelchairs and pensions, in social justice, in problems of state organization, ecology, cultural monuments, and historical values. And upon becoming filled with ideology, they become a real force. After all, they do not live

on some kind of reservation: some of them work at plants, others on kolkhozes, still others are returning to universities. There are already Afghanistan veterans who are journalists. Soon there will be Afghanistan veterans who are writers. And all of them, after penetrating society's various pores, retain their solidarity. And 10 or so years later, when many of them occupy executive positions in the economic, party and ideological apparatus, they will be a consolidated force that is conscious of the idea of suffering, struggle and stoicism. And the state must use this force, use it in a positive sense because, God forbid, if a crisis should arise the state will need people who have been tested and who are willing to sacrifice themselves. I do not think that the pacifistically minded youth—the rockers, the breakers, the punks—will be willing to sacrifice themselves to save the Fatherland. If the time comes to sweat blood, they may not be ready to do so. Therefore, the Afghanistan veteran who is potentially prepared for sacrifice must be cared for, cherished, tended, and surrounded with ideological and social concern and most favored treatment.

I want to emphasize once more: defense thinking for the USSR is something that is much more complex than, let us say, for America or Japan because we, having carried out our revolution in the hope of realizing unprecedented development that was to lead to an economic and social miracle, were forced from the very first day to replace these ideas with the ideas of survival. For long years, we were compelled to curtail programs relating to social development, to the creation of heaven on earth and to use our very meager forces to protect the territory where we would someday build this miracle. We built our defenses. We were transformed from a social development state into a state with superpowerful defenses. And therefore, the defense thinking that was cultivated from the times of Narva and Pskov, from the time when the First Cavalry was founded, that has permeated our entire history—the thirties, the war, the postwar years, the beginning of the space age—took the place of and absorbed the idea of development. Glory and honor to us that we have preserved great ethical ideas as the embryo of future possibilities: good-neighbor relations between one person and another, the memory of history, historical self-awareness, the idea of sovereignty, the idea of sacrifice in the name of great, global goals.

This defense consciousness, which under superficial analysis might even seem to be barrack-like, also contains and preserves a mass of precious elements, to say nothing of the fact that the best minds, the flower of the nation in both the intellectual and physical sense of the term, are working for the defense complex. If we were now suddenly to unilaterally give defense up for lost as certain orating pacifists propose, we would at the same time be destroying the potential for our development together with the defense consciousness. Consequently, the ideological task and the political task—now that we are apparently coming to the point where we can finally begin realizing our cherished ideas—is to take the ferments, the shoots from the military complex carefully, by

teaspoonfuls and transplant them to the soil where they can grow. Roughly speaking, this means taking them out of the barracks, out of the garrison, out of the submarine and planting them in civilian soil so that they will take root, cluster and flower. In no case should they be ignored, cultivated, and patronized or thrown onto a pile and discarded. This would be the same as throwing away spent rock without realizing that it contains gold, poly-metallic and transuranic elements, etc. Thus the defense consciousness must be approached very cautiously.

The army today is a global, not regional phenomenon. With its aid, we influence the world as a whole. It seems to me that a most interesting process that I would call military convergence, i. e., the interpenetration of military trends from one camp to another, is presently taking place. Not only cultures and economies but armies as well are also converging. This is an as yet only incipient but very curious process. Convergence in itself is not new: 15-20 years ago, some philosophers maintained that convergence was inevitable since mankind is in principle using the same technical and technological means. Therefore, in their opinion, technological unity should ultimately lead to the integration of civilizations that are today divided. This was very convincing in theory. The only thing that is incomprehensible is why this is not happening. To the contrary, confrontation is rising. And it has risen specifically because the technologies that have converged in the civilian sphere (the worldwide redistribution of labor is seen; spare parts for American Fords, for example, are made in Japan or Spain) have generated weapons in the military sphere: bombers, submarines, missiles, lasers, radars—which have served the cause of scission rather than convergence. Military technology under the conditions of ideological confrontation has promoted not integration but to the contrary division, the widening of the gap. For this reason, the theoretical thesis concerning convergence was refuted 15-20 years ago: submarines [lodki] there and here are in principle identical but they are prepared to destroy one another. And only with the advent of parity and the recognition of the necessity of observing and overseeing this parity did military convergence become possible and even necessary. This is because parity requires keeping armaments at the same level and tempo.

Thus the need arises not only to monitor the enemy but also to furnish him with information about us so that he would have no illusions, so that he would not increase his spending and would not force us to raise our arms ceiling. Enemies consequently now inform one another on matters that were previously considered virtually most important state secrets and that were naturally

carefully concealed and protected. That which intelligence agencies previously strived to obtain at the price of enormous resources and efforts is frequently not only not concealed but to the contrary [is shown]. For example, the announcement of maneuvers and the invitation of observers, who of course are for the most part intelligence specialists, from the other side. And after all, serious maneuvers are a demonstration of the ability to wage war. In an unprecedented move, war ministers Yazov and Carlucci meet in Switzerland and talk. Naturally they are not discussing ikebana. Are they discussing mutual warning systems, transcontinental telecommunications?! That is, there is interpenetration of military structures.

This may be utopian, but when parity becomes an unshakeable, all-penetrating idea, I would like to see a worldwide superheadquarters staffed by people from their side and our side that would be over the armies. It would oversee the activity of the two general staffs. Then all countries could even join in the notorious SDI on a parity basis before it disappears. And oversight over the SDI would be not in American hands but in the hands of the UN.

Of course at present these are nothing more than dreams because whatever can be said about parity, it is as yet very tenuous and has not become irreversible, and SDI—which is presently in the development stage—from which the Americans naturally exclude not only us but also some of their allies as well, is a terrible threat that can in 7-10 years, if it grows, absolutely change the entire world and turn back the present peacemaking process. Therefore SDI is again a world of broken parity, a world with a dominant technotronic military civilization. And in such a case, if we do not wish to become a colony, if we do not want to be occupied by the USA from space, if we do not want to be reconciled to the existence of "space command posts" over our heads, we will have to respond to SDI. And you understand that the response cannot be made by the Union of Writers, not by a superliterature dreamed up by pacifistically minded writers, not by informal youth groups, not by rock groups singing peace songs, but can only be made by the defense industry, only by the army.

Therefore, whether we wish it or not, our armored train must still stand on a siding. And all patriots and all sober-thinking people in general must relate to this very cautiously and earnestly.

The new thinking is strengthened and guaranteed by defense consciousness.

**MSU Kulikov Commemorates 70th Anniversary of Armed Forces**

*18010073 Moscow AGITATOR in Russian No 1, Jan 88 pp 21-24*

[Article by MSU V. Kulikov, First Deputy USSR Minister of Defense and Commander in Chief of the Joint Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact Nations: "Always on Guard"]

[Text] For 70 years the Soviet Armed Forces have honorably guarded and protected the gains of Great October and have served the people loyally and selflessly. The Soviet Army and Navy have been and remain the reliable defenders of socialism and a powerful factor for peace.

The history of the Soviet Armed Forces began together with the founding of the world's first socialist state. Following the victory of the Great October Socialist Revolution, Russia's workers set about building a new life. The overthrown exploitative classes, however, relying on the support of international capital, set out on a path of open armed warfare against soviet power. The civil war and foreign intervention were forced upon our people. It was a real question as to whether or not history's first state of workers and peasants was to be, whether or not there was to be socialism in our nation.

In that situation the Communist Party, headed by V.I. Lenin and relying upon the support of the workers and peasants, established the proletarian state's army within an extremely brief period of time, an army capable of providing reliable protection for the revolutionary gains, a new, socialist type of army. Lenin's premise that "any revolution is only worth something if it is able to defend itself" ("Poln. sobr. soch." [Complete Collected Works], Vol. 37, p.122) became a matter of direct revolutionary praxis.

On 28 January 1918 V.I. Lenin signed the Decree of the Soviet of People's Commissars Establishing the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army, and on 11 February of that same year, the Decree Establishing the Workers' and Peasants' Red Navy. The development of the latter had to be started practically from scratch. "The matter of developing the Red Army," Vladimir Ilich said at the 8th RKP(b) [Russian communist Party (Bolsheviks)] Congress, "was something entirely new. It had never been raised even theoretically.... We undertook a job such as no one in the entire world had ever before undertaken on that scale.... We went from experiment to experiment..., feeling our way, testing to see how the task could be accomplished in the given situation. And the task was clear. We could not exist without armed defense of the socialist republic" (Vol. 38, pp. 137-138).

Having gained a victory over internal counterrevolution and the foreign interventionists, the Soviet State consolidated its internal situation and its international position, and was able to focus its efforts on peaceful

economic and cultural development. The situation of hostile capitalist encirclement, however, made it essential to perform not just creative tasks but defensive tasks as well. This was all the more necessary since the Soviet Union's successes in the development of socialism gave no peace to reactionary imperialist circles. They never abandoned the idea of getting social revenge and restoring capitalism in Russia. Such intrigues led more than once to direct armed actions against the Soviet State. In 1938 the Japanese militarists invaded Soviet territory near Lake Khasan. The Red Army decisively fought off the aggressor's attack. In 1939 there was another aggressive act by Japan's militarists against our friend, the Mongolian People's Republic, on the Khalkhin-Gol River.

In the situation of the growing threat of an attack by the imperialists against the USSR, the Communist Party and the Soviet government took the steps necessary to further strengthen the nation's defense capability. They had not accomplished everything they had planned by the time imperialism's strike force, fascist Germany, treacherously attacked the USSR. We did not have the time needed for the complete, technical rearming of the army, the navy and the air force. The combat capability of the Armed Forces suffered greatly during the '30s, when many military cadres were subjected to unwarranted repression.

On 22 June 1941 fascist Germany, together with its satellites, made an attack of enormous force upon the Soviet Union. The invading army consisted of 190 divisions, 5.5 million officers and enlisted men, around 4,300 tanks and assault guns, almost 5,000 combat aircraft, 47,200 guns and mortars and as many as 200 combat ships.

The war imposed upon us by fascism was a rigorous test of the socialist system's viability, of the strength of the multinational Soviet State and its Armed Forces, of the strength of the Soviet people's patriotic spirit. It was a battle for the freedom and independence of the homeland of October and for the liberation of mankind from the threat of fascist enslavement, a battle unprecedented in bloodiness, scale and intensity.

The USSR passed that test by fire and sword because the war became the Great Patriotic War for the Soviet people and their Armed Forces. The Communist Party unified the people and the army, and achieved unity of political, economic and military leadership of the nation. Issuing the call "Everything for the front, everything for victory!" it turned the Soviet State into a unified military camp and made the front and the rear area inseparable.

For 1,418 days and nights, almost 4 years, our people and their Armed Forces conducted a fierce battle against the fascist invasion. The beginning of the war was particularly difficult. Withdrawing under the onslaught of the invaders' superior forces, Soviet forces fought selflessly and persistently for every inch of Soviet land and

inflicted large losses of personnel and equipment upon the enemy. The heroic defense of Leningrad, Kiev, Odessa, Sevastopol, Tula, Murmansk and the Brest Fortress, and the battle at Smolensk thwarted the invaders' hopes of a victorious invasion of Soviet land. The routing of the German fascist forces at Moscow was a crucial military-political event of the first year of the war. The fascist plan for a blitzkrieg against the USSR was frustrated once and for all in that battle, and the Wehrmacht suffered its first large defeat of World War II.

The victory achieved by the Soviet Armed Forces at Stalingrad is one of the most glorious pages in their heroic chronicle. It laid the foundation for a basic turn in the course of the Great Patriotic War and World War II. In the battles at Kursk, in the Right-Bank Ukraine and in Belorussia the Soviet Armed Forces inflicted a defeat upon the fascist invaders from which they could not recover, and the German fascist army was faced with disaster.

Following the victory over fascist Germany, the USSR, loyal to its commitments to its allies, went against militaristic Japan in August 1945. Within a short time the Soviet Armed Forces had routed the main assault grouping of Japan's ground forces, the Kwantung Army, which was Japan's largest defeat in World War II. It foreordained the military collapse of militaristic Japan. The Armed Forces of the USSR accomplished their mission of liberation also in the Far East, driving the Japanese occupiers out of Northeast China (Manchuria) and Northern Korea.

The Soviet Union and its Armed Forces thus made the decisive contribution to the routing of fascist Germany. The Soviet-German front was the main front in World War II. A total of 607 enemy divisions were destroyed, taken prisoner or routed there. Germany lost 10 million people in the war against the USSR, which accounted for three fourths of its total losses and more than 75 percent of its losses of weapons and military equipment. The Anglo-American forces accounted for 176 of the enemy's defeated divisions.

The war demonstrated the invincibility of socialism and the inexhaustible possibilities of its sociopolitical, economic and spiritual strength. Our victory was at the same time an outstanding military victory, a victory of the Armed Forces, of Soviet military science and military art.

During the war command cadres at all levels developed, matured and grew strong under the party's leadership. Outstanding military leaders coming out of the midst of the people—G.K. Zhukov, K.K. Rokossovskiy, A.M. Vasilevskiy, I.S. Konev and other renowned marshals, generals and officers—those who commanded the fronts and armies, the corps, divisions and regiment, battalions, companies and platoons—demonstrated the force

of their talent. The enormous political will, purposefulness and persistence, and the ability to organize and discipline people which I.V. Stalin demonstrated during the war played a role in the achievement of the Victory. The main burden of the war fell upon the common Soviet soldier, however, flesh and blood of the people, great laborer, courageous and loving his homeland.

The war ended. It seemed that the prospect which had opened up for mankind was one of a just, strong and lasting peace. The smoke had not dissipated over the ashes, however, and the whole world's rejoicing at the great victory over fascism had not died down before reactionary imperialist circles led by the USA launched preparations for new wars. They consigned to oblivion the Yalta and Potsdam agreements, setting out on a path of armed confrontation with the USSR and the popular democratic nations, and establishing aggressive military blocs directed against them. In that situation the CPSU, the Soviet State and our nation's people were forced to devote special attention to protecting the gains of socialism, enhancing the defensive strength of the USSR, strengthening its security and the preparedness of the Armed Forces to check imperialism's aggressive intrigues. Thanks to the steps taken in both the political and the defensive area, imperialism's plans for getting revenge against socialism were not realized. The establishment of strategic military parity between the USSR and the USA, between the Warsaw Pact Organization and NATO, was an historic achievement. The CPSU Program points out that it strengthened the positions of the USSR, the other socialist nations and all progressive forces, and upset the hopes of imperialism's aggressive circles for gaining a victory in a nuclear world war.

The 27th CPSU Congress was an important landmark in the USSR's struggle for peace and security and for consolidating the gains of socialism. It developed a new concept of international security, revealed its basic principles, offered mankind a political philosophy of peace and a platform of specific actions for achieving peace, and demonstrated that new thinking is required for eliminating the nuclear threat. It essentially consists in recognizing the need to reject wars and the policy of force in international affairs, and a search for new approaches to matters of war and peace.

The promulgation of the military doctrine of the Warsaw Pact states is highly important with respect to the relaxation of tensions. In a document approved at the conference of the Political Consultative Committee in Berlin in May 1987, they openly set forth their objectives and intentions in the military area. These involve the practical embodiment of the new political thinking on matters of war and peace in the nuclear age and problems having to do with defense and the provision of equal security for all states.

The main feature of the Warsaw Pact's military doctrine and the military doctrine of each participant is that it is subordinated to the accomplishment of the main task

facing mankind, that of preventing both nuclear and conventional war. Its purely defensive nature is a second special feature. The allied states will never be the first to employ nuclear weapons and never, under any circumstances, be the first to take military action against any state or alliance of states unless they themselves are the target of an armed attack.

The emphasis of the Warsaw Pact's military doctrine on defense enables the allied states to fully realize all of the possibilities for preventing war. This means that the aggressor has strategic advantages, because it can at its own discretion select an advantageous time, means and methods of attack, and take advantage of the surprise factor. Steps must therefore be taken to neutralize the enemy's advantages. In other words, the defensive nature of our doctrine does not reduce the requirements set for the combat readiness of the armies and navies of the fraternal nations—on the contrary, it increases those requirements.

In view of the real threat that imperialism could unleash a new world war, the military doctrine orients the Soviet Armed Forces toward the need to maintain their combat capability at a high level of readiness. "As long as there remains the danger of war, as long as social revenge continues to be the pivotal point in the West's strategy and militaristic programs," Comrade M.S. Gorbachev's report states, "October and the restructuring, the revolution, continues" and we shall continue to do everything necessary to maintain our defensive strength at a level ruling out military superiority for imperialism over socialism."

Accordingly, within the framework of the existing strategic military parity between the USSR and the USA, we are maintaining our strategic nuclear forces, which include the following: the Strategic Rocket Forces (RVSN) and the strategic forces of the Navy and Air Forces. They are in a constant state of readiness immediately to inflict a retaliatory strike.

The Ground Forces are the largest branch of the Soviet Armed Forces. They have modern missile systems, various tube and rocket artillery, tanks and infantry combat vehicles, antiaircraft guns and self-propelled artillery pieces, effective antitank weapons and small arms, and control facilities. The striking power, mobility and maneuverability of the motorized rifle troops have increased.

The Airborne Troops have undergone further development. They are armed with first-rate combat equipment which can be air-lifted and dropped in the required areas, and can enter into battle from the march after landing. These forces have good combat training and are always prepared to carry out their missions, interacting with units and formations of the branches of the Armed Forces and troop arms.

The Air Defense Forces protect the state, the army and navy from enemy attack. They are equipped with modern air-attack warning facilities and with powerful ground-to-air missiles, airborne and radar equipment capable of detecting and destroying existing and future air targets at various altitudes, in bad weather and despite powerful electronic counteraction by the enemy, on the near and distant approaches to the facilities they are defending. The antiaircraft missile troops comprise the backbone of their fire power. The air defense fighter aviation has good combat capabilities.

The Air Forces are an important branch of the Armed Forces. The Air Forces are armed with supersonic, all-weather aircraft with the latest missiles, and with military transport planes and helicopters with large carrying capacities. They are capable of carrying out strikes deep in the enemy's rear area, of gaining air superiority and air-lifting personnel and heavy combat equipment large distances. The Air Forces include long-range, tactical and military transport aircraft. The army air force also has a large role in modern combat. It operates in the direct interest of the combined-arms formations and units and is equipped with helicopters outfitted with various weapons and reconnaissance equipment.

The main strike force of the Navy consists of nuclear-powered missile submarines and naval missile-carrying aircraft. There are no areas in the World Ocean which are not accessible to the nuclear-powered submarines. The Soviet Navy has aircraft-carrying cruisers, nuclear-powered missile cruisers, large ASW ships, destroyers and other ships. The naval infantry has landing ships, armored and other equipment. Units of the coastal rocket artillery forces have effective weapons.

The Rear Services of the Armed Forces are being improved. They have been completely motorized, and the maneuverability and mobility of rear service agencies have been enhanced. The railway, motor-vehicle and road repair and traffic control troops, and pipeline transport have undergone further development. Mechanization of the supply processes has increased, and the medical and other types of rear support for the forces are being improved. The Rear Services have the organization and equipment to reliably carry out their assigned missions.

The Armed Forces of the USSR also include the border and internal security groups. Their equipment and training enable them to accomplish their assigned missions.

Such is the state of the Soviet Armed Forces at the contemporary stage. In the situation in which imperialism's aggressiveness is growing and the pace of development of means and methods of warfare and of military affairs as a whole are increasing, greater demands are being made of their combat readiness than in the past.

A restructuring is presently underway in the Armed Forces and throughout the nation. The main thing is to achieve a real advance in the improvement of the combat and political training, the universal establishment of strict regulation order and the enhancement of combat readiness in the subunits and units and on the ships. Inveterate elements of a braking mechanism are hampering this process in individual cases, however. Among other things, this resulted in an unprecedented violation of the Soviet Union's air space by a sport plane from the FRG. An investigation revealed important omissions in the combat readiness and in the organization and the standing of alert duty, particularly in the air defense forces. This necessitated the most stringent establishment of regulation order and the strengthening of military discipline for purposes of enhancing the combat readiness of the army and navy. No indulgences can be tolerated when it comes to our state's defense. Eliminating manifestations of stagnation in the most resolute manner and in the shortest possible period of time—this is a fundamental aspect of the restructuring today.

We have to work seriously to enhance the state of the troops and naval forces. The restructuring pertains not just to individual matters but to all areas of the life and activities of the Armed Forces and of every serviceman. The military cadres and all the personnel of the subunits, units and ships have involved themselves in it and are working persistently to root out deficiencies and omissions, and striving steadfastly to enhance the combat readiness of the army and navy.

The Soviet Armed Forces have traveled a glorious path during the 70 years. It has been a path of difficult trials and great victories, a path of constant improvement and strengthening. Today, the 27th party congress pointed out, the Soviet Army and Navy have modern weapons and equipment, well trained personnel, command and political cadres prepared and selflessly devoted to the people. They are fulfilling their duty in a worthy manner in a most complex, at times harsh, situation.

Soviet fightingmen made a large contribution to the mop-up operation following the accident at Chernobyl. Around 100 enlisted men and officers have been awarded the great title Hero of the Soviet Union for feats performed in Afghanistan, and many have been awarded orders and medals. The personnel are providing good models of military courage and valor in the day-to-day training and service. Fightingmen of the Soviet Armed forces are closely united round the Communist Party and its Central Committee, and are selflessly devoted to the homeland. They are fulfilling their duty to the homeland in a worthy manner and, together with fightingmen of the fraternal socialist nations, are vigilantly guarding the historic gains of our peoples.

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**Comparisons: U. S. - Soviet Nuclear,  
NATO-Warsaw Pact Conventional Forces**  
*18010339 Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA in  
Russian 6 Apr 88 p 4*

[Unsigned article: "Missiles, Tanks and Good Sense"]

[Text] *A group of youths preparing for service in the USSR armed forces requested that the editors discuss the real correlation of military forces between the Warsaw Treaty Organization and NATO countries, as well as nuclear missile parity.*

The signing of the treaty between the USSR and the U. S. on the elimination of their intermediate and shorter-range missiles, and its forthcoming ratification, caused lively public interest in questions of nuclear missile parity and the status of the armed forces of the Warsaw Treaty Organization and NATO.

As was noted at the 17 December 1987 session of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, the treaty on elimination of intermediate and shorter-range missiles is historic, since it expressed the decision of the two sides to actually destroy two classes of USSR and U. S. nuclear weapons. The strictest monitoring measures are also provided for, which reliably ensure inspection of the fulfillment of this treaty.

However, not all assessments of this event are positive. It is cause for concern that the enemies of detente and cooperation are standing in the way of changes for the better in the international situation, and demanding that the U. S. leadership not go far, and stop the disarmament process. They seek to have urgent measures taken to "compensate" for the American intermediate and shorter-range missiles eliminated by the treaty, and propose different variants for building up NATO armaments and intensifying the rates of buildup of nuclear and conventional weapons of the Western European countries. And all this is presented under the pretext that the Warsaw Treaty Organization countries supposedly have "overwhelming" military superiority over the NATO bloc in conventional weapons, and that supposedly the treaty to eliminate intermediate and shorter-range missiles is disrupting the strategic balance in favor of the USSR. Therefore, they say, measures are necessary to eliminate the "military lag" of the West. The technique is an old one, and so are its objectives. The propaganda campaign being carried out by the West pursues the objective of trying to get greater concessions from the Soviet side.

In reality, there is no disruption of the military balance, either in the world as a whole or in Europe.

To assess objectively the military balance of forces between the Warsaw Treaty Organization and the NATO bloc is a task that is entirely accomplishable. To accomplish it, it is necessary to combine and consider political, economic, physical-geographic, psychological

and purely military factors. Using this method of compiling all factors, military-political figures and scientific research organizations in a number of leading states (for example, certain former U. S. secretaries of defense, and the London Institute for Strategic Studies) have come to a unanimous conclusion: at present one can speak about the existence of approximate equality of USSR and U. S. strategic forces, and military balance between the Warsaw Treaty Organization and the NATO bloc.

The strategic balance between the USSR and the U. S. took shape in the first half of the 1970s, when the Soviet Union, concerned about strengthening its security, created a nuclear capability comparable with that of the U. S. The existence of strategic equality between the USSR and the U. S. was checked and confirmed repeatedly during the process of working out the SALT-II Treaty, and subsequently in the course of Soviet-American negotiations. The U. S. administration has no justification for asserting that the USSR ever violated the principle of equality and equal security. This was not and is not the case. The quantitative indices of USSR and U. S. nuclear forces shown in the table confirm the existence of strategic parity.

**Data on Numbers of USSR and U. S. Strategic Offensive  
Weapons (on 1 January 1988)**

|                                                                                                          | USSR          | U. S.                |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------|----------------------|
| ICBM launch platforms                                                                                    | 1,390         | 1,000                |
| including:                                                                                               |               |                      |
| ICBM launch platforms equipped with MIRV'd warheads                                                      | 812           | 550                  |
| SLBM launch platforms                                                                                    | 942           |                      |
| including:                                                                                               |               |                      |
| SLBM launch platforms equipped with MIRV'd warheads                                                      | 388           | 640                  |
| Total ICBM and SLBM launch platforms                                                                     | 2,332         | 1,672                |
| including:                                                                                               |               |                      |
| ICBM and SLBM launch platforms equipped with MIRV'd warheads                                             | 1,200         | 1,190                |
| Heavy bombers                                                                                            | 162           | 588                  |
| including:                                                                                               |               |                      |
| Heavy bombers fitted for cruise missiles                                                                 | 72            | 161                  |
| Total ICBM, SLBM and heavy bomber launch platforms                                                       | 2,494         | 2,260                |
| including:                                                                                               |               |                      |
| ICBM, SLBM and heavy bomber launch platforms equipped with MIRV'd warheads or fitted for cruise missiles | 1,272         | 1,351                |
| Total nuclear weapons on strategic carriers                                                              | approx 10,000 | approx 14,000-16,000 |

(data taken from PRAVDA)

It can be seen from the table that the USSR has somewhat more carriers (USSR—2,494, U. S.—2,260), on the other hand the U. S. continues to have substantially

more warheads on them, and, after all, the destructive capability is possessed by the warheads, and not by the carriers in and of themselves. Overall, approximate equality exists.

Seemingly the truth is obvious and must be acknowledged. Nevertheless, in propaganda when assessing the strategic forces of the two sides, some representatives of the U. S. administration resort to ignoring some or overemphasizing other figures, or even simply to distortion. For example, it is said that the Soviet Union has approximately 70 percent of its nuclear warheads on land-based ICBMs, and the U. S. has approximately 20 percent. But, this ignores the fact that this does not disrupt the overall balance of strategic capabilities, since the U. S. has more than 80 percent of its nuclear warheads on submarine launched ballistic missiles [SLBM], and heavy bombers; i.e., several times more than on the corresponding components of Soviet strategic forces.

Arguments about the particularly destabilizing role of Soviet heavy ICBMs frequent figure in Washington's arsenal of arguments. But, they are not based on anything. Approximately 20 years ago, when the U. S. had substantial superiority over the USSR, they did not call such missiles destabilizing weapons. But now, when the Soviet Union has gained the ability to retaliate adequately to a strike upon its territory by striking U. S. territory, Soviet heavy ICBMs have become the "main source of instability."

All of these propagandistic "proofs" are presented in order to justify U. S. military programs, attempt to destroy strategic parity and move to positions of military superiority. However, the U. S. policy line to undermine strategic equality is hopeless. The military-economic and military-technical capabilities of the two sides are today such that no efforts by one of them to achieve superiority in the military field can be crowned with success. The other side will not permit this. Precisely this situation was written in a joint declaration by the leaders of the USSR and U. S., in which they promised not to attempt to achieve military superiority. Under contemporary conditions it is impossible to win the arms race. "Both sides," emphasizes M. S. Gorbachev, "must become accustomed to strategic parity as the natural state of Soviet-American relations. And, if there is something to talk about, it is about how, through mutual efforts, to reduce the level of this parity. In other words, to take real steps to reduce nuclear weapons on a mutual basis."

The meeting in Washington brought the leaders of the USSR and U. S. close to a solution to the central problem of Soviet-American relations — a radical reduction of strategic offensive weapons of the two sides, under conditions of observing the ABM Treaty. The contours of an agreement that provides for a 50 percent reduction of strategic offensive weapons have actually been worked out.

After we agreed to eliminate intermediate and shorter-range missiles and seemingly approached constructively a solution to the problem of attaining a radical reduction of strategic weapons, the importance of questions of armed forces, and tactical nuclear and conventional weapons in Europe became more clear.

Why are negotiations on these issues necessary? The military confrontation in Europe is too great and therefore also too dangerous. Here huge groupings of the armed forces of the NATO bloc and Warsaw Treaty Organization oppose one another. And the buildup of nuclear capability continues. The development of conventional weapons is moving to fundamentally new bounds—their power, accuracy, speed of employment and range are growing. The destructive effects of a war with the use of conventional weapons have become virtually comparable to the consequences of nuclear war. War with the use of conventional weapons is subjected less and less to any limitations, either in terms of the gravity of the consequences, or in the scale of losses. Gradually it is becoming more and more clear that in it as well it is difficult to achieve victory. War with the use of only conventional forces, if it is unleashed, may turn out to be fatal to Europe, considering the high population density and the existence on its territory of a large number of nuclear electric power plants, chemical enterprises, large hydro-electric plants, and other facilities that represent great danger to people's lives if they are destroyed. In this regard the importance and urgency of European negotiations are obvious.

The status of the armed forces and weapons of the NATO bloc and Warsaw Treaty Organization make it possible, observing the principle of equality and equal security, to reduce substantially the level of military confrontation in Europe on a mutual basis. How can this be done?

In accordance with the Budapest Declaration by the leaders of the Warsaw Treaty Organization states, the countries of our defensive alliance favor carrying out an initial one-time reduction, over a 1-2 year period, of the numbers of NATO and Warsaw Treaty Organization forces by 100,000-150,000 men on each side; in the early 1990s reducing ground forces and tactical strike aviation of both military alliances in Europe by one-fourth (overall by more than 1 million men on both sides); and in the future continuing to reduce armed forces and conventional weapons of all the European states, the U. S. and Canada.

In the U. S., many speak about the so-called "overwhelming superiority" of the Warsaw Treaty Organization countries in conventional weapons, and, therefore, they say that they must agree to unilateral reduction. Such statements do not correspond to reality.

Take, for example, the naval forces of the two sides. According to this component of armed forces, the NATO bloc has substantial superiority over the Warsaw Treaty

Organization; almost 3:1 in large surface ships (battleships, cruisers, destroyers, missile frigates); 2.5:1 superiority in naval aviation aircraft; and 2:1 in overall military naval ship tonnage. A White House report of 28 January 1987, for example, stated: "Superiority at sea enables us to make use of the geographic vulnerability of the Soviet Union, and create a global threat to Soviet interests."

The NATO countries have quantitative and qualitative superiority in military aviation that is impossible to conceal. According to data cited in the Pentagon brochure "Soviet Military Power" (1986 edition, page 89), this superiority consists of 1,150 aircraft, not counting the air forces of France and Spain. According to our assessment, NATO in Europe has 1,400 more strike aircraft.

It is possible to speak about some "superiority," if the calculations on the NATO side do not count the armed forces of France and Spain (1 million men, 20 divisions)? On what basis is that part of the armed forces that is under the national subordination of the NATO countries not counted in the balance of forces, and are reserve formations, and depot reserves of weapons and equipment not taken into account? Why are data on NATO armed forces deliberately understated, and in the armed forces of the Warsaw Treaty Organization exaggerated (military construction troops, border forces, militia, and DOSAAF are counted)? As a result, a distorted picture of the correlation of forces is obtained, and this lie is taken as proof of the overwhelming superiority of the Warsaw Treaty Organization in conventional armed forces and weapons.

What is the real picture of the correlation of forces? The numerical strength of the NATO and Warsaw Treaty Organization armed forces is approximately equal. At present 3 million man armies oppose one another in Europe.

The number of combat ready large units (divisions and brigades) of the NATO bloc is almost 1.5 times greater than those of the Warsaw Treaty Organization. And the numerical strength of an American division is 16,000-19,000 men, and that of an FRG division is up to 24,000 men, while a division of the Warsaw Treaty Organization armies numbers a maximum of 11,000-12,000 men.

As for tanks, the Warsaw Treaty Organization in Europe has approximately 20,000 more of them. But, NATO has almost 1.5 times the combat helicopters, including those equipped with anti-tank weapons, and approximately twice the number of anti-tank missile systems.

We are told that the Warsaw Treaty Organization countries have superiority in Central Europe. If this is so, it is only without counting the French forces. But, NATO has superiority on the southern flank of Europe: in number of personnel and strike aviation aircraft by 2.6:1; in combat helicopters by 5.8:1; and in artillery by 1.9:1.

If the problem of the correlation of forces in Europe as a whole is taken, the picture is as follows: NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organization have approximately equal overall numbers of personnel and amounts of artillery. The Warsaw Treaty Organization is superior to NATO in tanks. NATO has a greater number of combat ready large units, and fighter-bombers. Overall, approximate equality, rough parity, in conventional weapons is evident. According to data of the London Institute for Strategic Studies, "the overall balance of forces in conventional weapons is such that neither of the two sides possesses sufficient aggregate power to guarantee victory."

Consequently, it is necessary to take an attentive and businesslike attitude toward the concern of the two sides in questions of conventional weapons. Future European negotiations on this problem have every chance for success, if they discuss mutual and simultaneous reduction, and mutual elimination of asymmetries and imbalances.

The success of new negotiations would be facilitated by confidence building measures, in particular, by solving such a most important problem, which troubles the European people, of reducing the danger of a surprise attack. For this purpose, the Soviet Union and the other countries of the Warsaw Treaty Organization offer specific measures: to reduce the concentration of armed forces in the zone of contact of the two military alliances to a minimum agreed level; remove from this zone the most dangerous offensive types of weapons; create a nuclear-free corridor along the Warsaw Treaty Organization and NATO line of contact 300 km wide (150 km on each side), from which all nuclear weapons are removed on a mutual basis; create in Europe zones free of nuclear and chemical weapons, and zones of reduced concentration of weapons and increased trust; and at the level of experts compare the military doctrine and discuss "imbalances." We await a response from the U. S. and the NATO countries, and for them to set forth for us their position on our proposals.

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**Col Gen Kovtunov: 1988 Training Year Will Increase Emphasis on Defense**

*18010071d Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
3 Jan 88 p 1*

[Article by Col Gen A. Kovtunov, Commander of the Central Asian Military District: "Establishing the New: Reflections on an Important Subject"]

[Text] The desire of the personnel to commemorate the year of the 19th All-Union CPSU Conference and the 70th anniversary of the Armed Forces with new achievements in their military work places special responsibility upon those who organize and direct the combat training.

**At the request of the editors, Col Gen A. Kovtunov, Commander of the Central Asian Military District, shares his thoughts about the beginning of the training.**

I have just visited some remote garrisons. One is gratified by the orientation of the people toward selfless work, toward quest and a creative approach to the tasks facing the forces at the new stage of the restructuring.

Changes in the training process dictated by the requirements of military doctrine have been received with understanding. Necessary adjustments have been made in the combat and political training plans and, accordingly, in the training schedules. Greater attention is being given to problems of defensive combat than in the past. This calls both for a stepped-up struggle against simplifications and indulgences, and for a search for new and more effective methods of employing the weapons and equipment.

The course of intensification and improvement of the training process has made it necessary for the commanders and staffs to take a more economical approach, if it can be put that way, to the planning. As a matter of fact, the combat training directorate and the sections and services of the district headquarters have set an example. In the planning of demonstration activities, for example, what has already been accomplished in the forces in this or that area was taken strictly into account, and duplication was avoided. The same is true of the units, where the stress is on teaching the personnel primarily that which is necessary in modern combat. Along with increasing the specific proportion of subjects for teaching the troops what to do in a defense, the plans call for increased attention to be given to preparations for marches conducted in the daytime or at night, in diverse weather conditions, in difficult-to-travel mountainous and semi-desert areas. At the training center it is planned to conduct special exercises designed for developing in the fightingmen psychological stability, skills in combatting tanks and incendiary substances, and to teach them what to do in a situation in which the enemy uses weapons of mass destruction.

The beginning of the training year in the units ordinarily involves an influx of inspectors and monitors. This time we have taken a more differentiated approach to the organization of the monitoring. The stress is on the independence of commanders. This does not rule out assistance for those who need it, of course. The work of those commanders who committed blunders in the past and have not always ensured the precise fulfillment of combat and political training plans and schedules is being rigidly monitored. A plan is just that. It must be the law governing the life of the unit and subunit. Naturally, we are devoting special attention to the young commanders who have recently been assigned to that position. They are being helped by veteran officers from the district and formation headquarters. The task is one of teaching the personnel on the spot, however, and not

one of providing a safety net or taking over for them. We shall maintain our line of granting independence to commanders, staffs and political organs throughout the training year.

We proceed from the premise that excessive tutelage, as experience has shown, is not beneficial. It will be more beneficial if we grant the opportunity to demonstrate independence, creativity and initiative to those commanders who know how to organize the combat training in the units and subunits entrusted to them in accordance with the modern requirements. This certainly does not mean, however, that we will not be monitoring those officials who ignore the regulations and do things contrary to the present requirements for organizing the combat training.

We have some painful experience in this area as well. Lt Col L. Ovsyanov was relieved of his duties as regimental commander not long ago, for example. The decision to punish in such a harsh manner was not made at once. Many attempts were made to help the officer, to teach him to rely on the party organization in the work. Ovsyanov turned out to be one of those people who get carried away with authority, as they say.

What we have done in recent months to improve the training materials and equipment base also provides a good foundation for extending greater independence to the commanders and staffs in the accomplishment of the combat training missions. Field facilities and classrooms have been universally put into order and repaired. The fighting men who serve at the district training center can be cited as an example of industry and creative handling of the job. They have worked well and put the complex training equipment into a state of total readiness. The operational reliability of the systems and machinery has been improved by the adoption of rationalization proposals. Training facilities are well prepared for the classes in the Guards Motorized Rifle Regiment which was commanded until recently by Guards Lt Col A. Kosyakov, and in a number of other units. Unlike last year, the subunits will no longer have to drive many kilometers to the tank training grounds, moving-target gunnery ranges and tactical training areas.

We also have our problems, however. Many of them result from a shortage of training equipment, among other things. Unfortunately, those few trainers which the forces receive frequently do not meet the needs of the trainees with respect to their technical specifications. We will therefore have to continue using the combat training group's materiel for the training. This complicates the training processes and is inefficient from the standpoint of economy. One would hope that the scientists and designers would begin working more vigorously to develop inexpensive and convenient trainers.

There are many other matters which need to be resolved, of course. But the fact that the commanders, staffs and

political organs consider the combat training to be the main part of their work instils confidence that our plans and the socialist commitments are realistic.

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### **Benefits for Servicemen Who Have Fulfilled 'International Duty'**

*18010071c Dushanbe KOMMUNIST  
TADZHIKISTANA in Russian 24 Dec 87 p 4*

[Article by Maj Gen A. Yusupov, military commissar for Tajik SSR: "For Those Who Have Fulfilled Their Military Duty"]

[Text] **Servicemen fulfilling their international duty frequently serve in difficult situations, risking their lives in many cases. Many of the servicemen have been singled out for state awards for courage and heroism demonstrated in the performance of their international duty. In view of the specific nature of their service, a number of benefits and privileges have been established for them and their families.**

Upon being discharged from active military duty, servicemen who have fulfilled their international duty are entitled to housing on a priority basis, and those who are classified as disabled in Group I as a result of wounds, shell-shock, maiming or diseases received in military operations or in the performance of other military duties are entitled to receive housing out of turn. The disabled in this category who have the proper medical certificates are authorized to receive free prosthesis and a free Zaporozhets motor vehicle with manual controls, also out of turn.

Upon being released into the reserve or retirement, servicemen who have fulfilled their international duty may obtain interest-free loans of up to 3,000 rubles for individual housing construction, to be repaid within a 10-year period, beginning the 5th year after construction is completed. They are authorized to enter higher and secondary specialized educational institutions on a non-competitive basis and are entitled to an annual leave at a time convenient to them, to an additional leave of up to 2 weeks annually, without pay, to priority passes issued at their place of work to sanatoria and health centers and to membership in gardening associations (cooperatives).

While in the reserve or in retirement, servicemen who have been wounded, shell-shocked or maimed in the performance of their international duty retain the right to a 50-percent discount on the cost of a one-way trip by train once a year, and in areas lacking rail transport, by water, air or intercity motor transport.

Local soviet organs must give constant attention to the needs and requests of servicemen discharged from active military duty after fulfilling their international duty, and the families of servicemen who lost their lives.

Servicemen disabled as a result of wounds, shell-shock, maiming or diseases acquired in the fulfillment of their international duty are granted the benefits established for the disabled from the Great Patriotic War.

Parents, wives and children incapable of working of servicemen who were killed or died as a result of wounds, shell-shock, maiming or diseases acquired in combat operations or in the performance of other military duties during their fulfillment of their international duty are paid lump-sum allowances in the established amounts.

Preferential terms for designating and paying pensions for loss of bread-winner are provided for the families of servicemen killed while fulfilling their international duty. Specifically, a pension for loss of bread-winner is designated for the parents and wives of these servicemen who are unable to work, regardless of whether they were dependents of the servicemen. In addition, pensions are designated for the wives upon their reaching the age of 50 years. The children of these servicemen who are still in school are paid a pension until they graduate from a secondary or higher educational institution, but not after they reach the age of 23 years.

The families of servicemen who lost their lives, which are in need of improved housing, are provided with housing on a priority basis. A total of 50 percent of the rent is paid for the housing occupied by the families of servicemen who died, which are receiving a pension for loss of bread-winner, and up to 15 square meters of extra housing is paid for at a single rate. They also receive a 50-percent discount on municipal services. These benefits paid for housing and municipal services are granted to the pensioned wives and parents of servicemen who lost their lives, regardless of the kind of pension they are receiving.

Gravestones are provided at state expense for the graves of servicemen and other citizens who died as a result of wounds, shell-shock or maiming received in the performance of their international duty.

Blue- and white-collar workers who received wounds, shell-shock or maiming during the performance of their international duty receive a lump-sum payment, and a lump-sum payment is made to their families if they lost their lives.

A certificate of entitlement to the benefits is the document confirming the right to benefits established for servicemen who have performed their international duty. In addition to the certificate of entitlement to the benefits, coupons for 50-percent discounts on tickets for travel by rail or some other kind of transport are issued as benefits to servicemen who have received wounds, shell-shock or maiming in the performance of their international duty.

For servicemen disabled as a result of wounds, shell-shock, maiming or diseases acquired in combat operations or in the performance of other military duties, the benefits established for disabled war veterans are granted on the basis of certification that the disabled individual is entitled to the benefits and coupons for traveling on privileged terms by the agencies designating the pensions.

The established benefits are granted to the families of servicemen who lost their lives on the basis of information provided by the agencies designating the pensions.

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### **Description of Life in Disciplinary Battalion**

*18010071a Moscow SOVETSKIY VOIN in Russian No 23, Dec 87 pp 14-16*

[Article by Maj V. Romanchuk and Maj A. Gusev, SOVETSKIY VOIN special correspondent: "It Does Not Count Toward Length of Service"]

[Text] There is a tall, solid barrier on the approach to the disciplinary battalion. Beyond it is an equally high row of barbed wire, a control-tracking strip, more barbed wire and another fence. There are signs a yard high stating "Halt! We fire without warning!" both at the barrier and inside the zone (which is what the territory containing the housing and other structures for the convicts is called). This is the reality.

The column marches in measured cadence: the subunit is on its way to the evening meal. The soldiers seem like soldiers... but not quite. There is not a single chest insignia on the service blouses. The convicts, known locally as transient privates, are not permitted to wear chest insignia or other decorations.

Here is another column, this time outside the gates of the disciplinary battalion. They have neither the insignia nor the neatness, spring and alacrity in their walk which are typical of the military formation. There is tension on the faces of the convicts. What does tomorrow have in store for them? Work? Yes, hard work, behind a barbed-wire fence. Their thoughts are foremost, however, thoughts which are even more difficult to bear than the work.

The column is surrounded by men with semi-automatic rifles. They are the guard. Whom are they guarding? From what? They are guarding you and me. The soldiers are not being guarded. They are being escorted.

They go to work under escort. They work under escort. They return from work under escort. That is the procedure.

There is a bench on the unit grounds, not far from headquarters. Parents sit on it, waiting for a meeting with their children. The word "meeting" is an ordinary

one, but it pierces the ears in this situation. For exemplary service in the army one receives a discharge or a short leave to go home. Here there is a meeting once a month, and then only if there have been no reprimands. Only the bench knows how many parental tears have been shed there.

There is a room in the unit where people talk, leaning their heads close together, quietly, almost in a whisper, as though in the room of one seriously ill. "Son, how could you have done that"? The parent's question weighs heavily. The answer is silence, convulsive ringing of hands and tears, tears and more tears....

And just how could they have done it?

A pile of standard files with the ordinary label: "File...." Questionnaires, references, personal records. One sees statements like the following: "has a record in the children's section at the police station" and "has been brought before the police." For the most part, however, there is nothing unusual. They were born, they went to school, and many of them worked before entering the army. Almost all of them were Komsomol members. But this information is followed by the findings of an investigation and a military tribunal. Physical violence, insults, mockery. Can this be the people who, according to the files, are supposed to have honest faces and who carried Komsomol cards in their pockets?

The very same!

Junior Sergeant A. Martynov, deputy platoon commander, did not have much time left before his discharge into the reserve, when he struck a subordinate. The incident did not go unpunished. Martynov was demoted and removed from his position. He could no doubt have been punished more severely, but his personal circumstances were taken into account: he had a wife and son waiting for him at home.

One would think that he would have learned his lesson and derived conclusions from it. Once, a short time later, however, when he took over a KP detail he was not satisfied with the cleanliness of the mess hall. He complained to the preceding detail, first orally and then, when he received no satisfaction, he used a broom handle to prove his point. What was the result? A. Martynov became a transient private in a disciplinary battalion, and his reunion with his wife and small son was postponed for a fairly long time. One cannot help thinking how different his life would have turned out had he acted in accordance with regulations and reported the deficiencies to the duty officer. He would long since have been with his family, perhaps studying at the institute about which he had dreamt. Once he had lost his restraint out of a sense of impunity, however, he had thrown the broom and his dream had burst like a soap bubble.

Transient Private I. Krivtsov also trampled his dream of entering an institute. He could draw fairly well and wanted to become an artist. But then—who would have thought it possible?—he and two other fellows from the same district decided to have a “heart-to-heart” talk with an NCO who had dared to report to the commander on a violation of the daily schedule which they had committed. The trio was then brought before a military tribunal.

This is how they destroy their future, foolishly and cruelly canceling out their hopes, their dreams, their careers. The investigation, the session of the military tribunal and the sentencing have all been left behind, days during which events merged for them into an unbroken chain, when they had still not lost hope: No, I will not go to prison for that. Everything will turn out all right. They did not see the light until they were here, after the gates of the disciplinary battalion had clanged shut behind them. The moral factor is one of the most important in the life of a transgressor. An awareness of his place in the society and his responsibility to it for the deeds he has committed.

All of the convicts with whom I met and talked now bitterly regret what happened. They say—and one wants to believe that they are sincere—that they will never again do such a thing in their life. But just how could they have done in the first place?

“A fairly typical picture,” said Major V. Ivanov, as he leisurely restacked the pile of files he had shown us. Vladimir Afanasyevich is not hasty in his actions and is thoughtful in his discussions. This is not from an inborn slowness, however, nor from the weightiness of his thoughts. It is simply that he has dealt with broken lives for more than a single year, and that is oh so difficult.

He knows how one can offend with a gesture, a word, a hint of distrust or disregard of those who are drawn to one, those who have begun to seek different standards for their lives.

Like other officers, Ivan joined the disciplinary battalion from a line unit. He did not immediately become accustomed to his new situation or his new job. He soon became convinced, however, that the theory he had derived from his own experience on the place and role of the political worker in the army was also valid there. This is how he put it: “In the army the commander is considered to be the soldier’s father. But who in the army is supposed to be the soldier’s mother? To be complete, a family has to have both parents, after all. The answer is clear: the political worker. Not in the sense that he prepares the meals and wipes noses. There must be someone in the army to whom the soldier can come and open up his heart, to whom he can speak out about both his joys and his pains. The political worker is worthless if he is not that for the soldier.”

Nor does he pamper the convicts. We accompanied him to the unit guardroom. “I need to visit Zaytsev,” he said. “I think he is going to be difficult. He managed to commit an infraction even on the trip to the disciplinary battalion. He has begun his stay here in the guardroom. We are still going to make an effort for him, though!”

Transient Private S. Zaytsev was somber. He gave monosyllabic answers to the questions. He expected anything here but an officer’s concern for his fate. Bitterness and distrust are typical features of those who end up here. They will not have it easy. People will fight for them here, though. Fight to return citizens into the society. Perhaps in a few years a letter will arrive in the unit from Zaytsev, and Vladimir Afanasyevich will read the following: “Greetings, Respected Comrade Major; Thank you so much..., and so forth.”

One other observation: Most of the convicts were brought up in ordinary, good families, as they say. Some of them even studied at institutes. One is struck by something else in those who end up in the disciplinary battalion, however: social immaturity and a total absence in the young people of a concept of themselves as members of the society.

The young men arrive in the army the way they have developed by their 18th year: good and bad, sincere and devious, industrious and shirking, unaccustomed to work but enjoying the benefits of other people’s labor.... Could their lives before the army not have taught them “the difference between right and wrong”? And do you think that some of the convicts did not know that people are held criminally liable for just such nonregulation relations? They knew. They heard lectures, legal experts spoke to them, and there are plenty of posters in every unit. They knew, but it did not penetrate into their minds. It seemed to them that it could happen somewhere, to someone, but never to them.

In my opinion we see a somewhat different side of the problem of military discipline here in the disciplinary battalion.

During their time in the service all of the convicts undoubtedly saw people sometimes go unpunished for this or that infraction of military discipline. They got by with it once, a second time.... Subconsciously they began to get the idea that one can say one thing and do another. The regulations, it seems, were not written for everyone. Their own conviction therefore came like a bolt out of the blue.

One cannot help drawing the conclusion that we will not make any progress as long as people in the units and subunits ignore even petty infractions, infractions which at first glance appear insignificant. Impunity provides the soil for rapid growth of the weeds of nonstandard relations. How can they be suppressed? By the whole world. Commanders and political workers, but mainly the military collectives themselves, must create a climate

of absolute intolerance of any deviations from the regulations and assess every infraction of military discipline openly and from a standpoint of principle.

At the present time, it is sometimes unfortunately felt that this matter should concern only the commanders and political workers, while public opinion and the force of the collective are somehow disregarded. Think about the phrase "force of the collective." How harmonious it is: "the collective is a force." Experience has convincingly confirmed this. Take the experience of the disciplinary battalion. The command element can petition the military tribunal for the early release on probation of a convict for working conscientiously and behaving in an exemplary manner. The public councils of the subunits first decide who is worthy of such a reward, however. And it is not easy for the convicts to earn it.

We attended a session of a military tribunal which was considering early release on probation for some convicts, and we saw the tensely expectant, pale faces of those for whom what might be the most important matter in their still fairly short lives was being decided. And we saw how, following the court's decision, A. Andrianov, once again a private in the Soviet Army, straightened up, how his eyes lighted up and a smile, albeit a timid one, crossed his face. And he had only seven days of his term left to serve. One wondered why he was taking it so seriously: a week would fly by, and he would be free. Private A. Andrianov did not take the easy route, however. He was fighting not for release 7 days early but for the right to tell himself and other people: "Yes, I acknowledged my guilt and came to understand a great deal. Believe me." And he was believed.

The subject of the role of public opinion in army life was continued in an unexpected and different manner in a discussion with Transient Private A. Martynov.

"This is what I would do," he said, sharing his thoughts. "I would serve well, conscientiously, and be discharged into the reserve in 2 years the way it is supposed to be. I played the fool and associated with violators of discipline, and had to serve an extra year. The commanders have the deciding voice, of course, but they must take into account the opinion of the collective and all the fellow soldiers. Neither "youth" nor hometown buddies can save you. You learn that the service is a matter of regulations."

One could argue, of course, with the essence of this suggestion and with the way it was expressed, but one has to say something else: the person had begun to think. And not just about his own fate.

...It was either the habit of not leaving any blank spots in the TDY report or the fairly bleak atmosphere in the disciplinary battalion that prompted us to plunge back into a more accustomed situation, to see how those who guard the zone serve. The visit to the guard unit

did not bring the anticipated outpouring of good spirits, however. Just what is the service like for these fellows? Senior Sergeant V. Ptachenko summed it up.

"I could be a rated tankman, artilleryman or missileman. Or a paratrooper," he said. He went into a dreamy silence as though trying on the light-blue beret and the striped vest. "But I have been guarding these people for 2 years," he said, nodding toward the zone.

Senior Sergeant V. Tkachenko does have the right to that opinion. For 2 years he has put on the rifle sling every other day, to guard.... Whom?! Young men just like him, broad-shouldered and full of strength, who removed themselves from the ranks of the homeland's defenders with their own hands.

...does not count toward length of service.... That is the harsh but just situation. And all of the years spent in the disciplinary battalion are years of youth, which means that they are years filled with energy and vital plans. What are they like when they leave the disciplinary battalion? I carefully read a thick folder holding reports from the unit commanders where the former "charges" of the disciplinary battalion have returned to serve out their term. I found only one negative report among dozens of positive ones. Just one!

Or take the following incident. During the summer a fire flared up in one of Moscow's old lanes. A large garage was on fire. Military firefighters arrived and rapidly extinguished the flames on the outside, but they continued to rage inside the building. Quite nearby were residential buildings in which there were women, children and old people. The garage contained property worth thousands of rubles. The firemen entered the flames, with Private I. Gvozdovski among the first. He entered the flames but did not come out. Private Ivan Ivanovich Gvozdovski died at the age of 20 without fulfilling his military duty. And 6 months before the fateful fire he had been released early on probation from a disciplinary battalion, where he had been serving a sentence for those nonregulation relations. Was it really necessary for him to pass through the KPP [control and check point?] of the disciplinary battalion in order to see the light, in order to establish himself in life?

But for now....

"Greetings, dear Mama, Papa and little sister Natasha,

"Right at the start I want to tell you about my... trouble.... I'm sorry, Mama, that I did not follow your instructions to be obedient to the commanders and not disgrace you. They gave me 3 years.... I can see now that I am a fool and still a child...."

The letter was written by round-faced, shaved-headed Transient Private S. Kaurov. He was completing his first day in the disciplinary battalion....

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**Review: Biographic Dictionary of Heroes of Soviet Union**

18010071b Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
24 Dec 87 p 2

[Review by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent L. Lagodskiy of book "Geroi Sovetskogo Soyuz. Kratkiy biograficheskiy slovar" [Heroes of the Soviet Union: A Brief Biographic Dictionary: "A Galaxy of Immortals"]]

[Text] KRASNAYA ZVEZDA reported on the preparation of this book on the eve of the 40th anniversary of the Victory. Now I hold in my hand the first volume, a heavy book in a red cover with gold embossment. We have never before had such a publication on Heroes of the Soviet Union, one based on thoroughly verified documentary sources. The book could be described as a sort of memorial to the legendary feats of the Soviet people, an encyclopedia of their courage. It contains a concise but fairly complete and cogent account of almost 12,700 of our homeland's best sons and daughters.

One has a sense of excitement when reading the terse material, void of emotion. Behind it are destinies; behind it are history, our past and present; behind it are great spirits, the most brilliant manifestation of patriotism and internationalism.

But let me acquaint you with some of the articles to give you a fuller picture of the two-volume work.

Vysotskiy, Yevgeniy Vasilyevich: born 4 April 1947 in the city of Belev, Tula Oblast, into the family of a white-collar worker; Russian; CPSU member from 1970; moved to the city of Termez, Surkhandarya Oblast, where he completed 11 grades; joined the Soviet Army in 1966; graduated from the Tashkent Higher Command Tank School in 1970 and the Military Academy imeni M.V. Frunze in 1978.

Lt. Col. V., commander of a motorized rifle regiment, was awarded the title Hero of the Soviet Union on 20 September 1982 for courage and heroism demonstrated while providing international assistance to the DRA.

Lt. Col. V. continues to serve in the army. He has been awarded the Order of Lenin, the Red Star, "For Service to the Homeland in the Armed Forces of the USSR," 3rd degree, and medals.

Ivanov, Ivan Ivanovich: born 8 October 1909 in the village of Chizhovo, presently a part of the city of Fryazino, Moscow Oblast, into the family of a blue-collar

worker; Russian; CPSU member; completed five grades and worked as a blacksmith on a kolkhoz; joined the Soviet Army in 1931; completed a military pilots' school in 1934; took part in the liberation campaign of Soviet forces in the western Ukraine and western Belorussia in 1939, and in the Soviet-Finnish War of 1939-1940.

On the first day of the Great Patriotic War, 22 June 1941, Senior Lieutenant I., flight commander in the 46th Fighter Regiment (14th Air Division, Southwest Front), rammed an enemy bomber in an air battle and perished himself. The title Hero of the Soviet Union was conferred upon him posthumously, on 2 August 1941. He was awarded the Order of Lenin.

A bust of the Hero has been set up in Fryazino. A school is named after him in the city of Shelkovo, Moscow Oblast, as well as a street and a secondary school in the city of Dubno, Rovno Oblast, where he served, and Fryazino School No. 1. A stele has been erected in the city of Dubno, an obelisk at the site where his aircraft crashed, near the village of Zagorshcha in Rovenskiy Rayon, Rovno Oblast, and a memorial plaque in Shelkovo.

Korobchuk, Aleksandr Kondratyevich: born in 1918 in the village of Ruzha in what is now Chemerovetskiy Rayon, Khmel'nitskiy Oblast, into a peasant family; Ukrainian; CPSU member; completed a rural school; worked on a kolkhoz, later in a mine; joined the Soviet Army in October 1938.

He participated in the fighting in the Great Patriotic War from 1942. He commanded a machine-gun section of the 262nd Guards Rifle Regiment (the 87th Guards Rifle division, 2nd Guards Army, 4th Ukrainian Front). As a company political organizer, Guards Senior Sergeant K. distinguished himself on 12 April 1944, during a breakthrough of the defense on Chatyrlyk Hill (Krasnoperekopskiy Rayon, Crimean Oblast). With no other means available, the valorous fightingman covered the firing port of an enemy earth-and-timber emplacement with his body, which contributed to the accomplishment of the combat mission. He was posthumously awarded the title Hero of the Soviet Union on 16 May 1944. He was awarded the Order of Lenin.

He is buried in a fraternal grave in the village of Vorontsovka, Krasnoperekopskiy Rayon. A monument to him has been erected in the village of Ruzha. The school where he studied bears the Hero's name.

Kamzarakov, Dmitriy Konstantinovich: born 1918 in the village of Chabachevka (no longer in existence) in Soltonski Rayon, Altay Kray, into a peasant family; (Kumandiyets); joined the Soviet Army in 1939.

He participated in the Great Patriotic War from 1941. As an assistant platoon commander in the 757th Rifle Regiment (222nd Rifle Division, 33d Army, 2nd Belorussian Front), Senior Sergeant K., Komsomol member,

skilfully organized the fording of the river Pronya near the city of Gorkiy (Mogilev Oblast) and combat on the opposite bank on 23 June 1944. More than 150 Hitlerites were destroyed in the process. He was awarded the title Hero of the Soviet Union on 24 March 1945. He was awarded the Order of Lenin and a medal.

He died in battle on 23 August 1944 and is buried in the city of Vilkavishkis, Lithuanian SSR.

As one becomes acquainted by name with the Heros and becomes engrossed in their biographies, one becomes convinced with special force that this glorious cohort was made up of representatives of the most diverse nationalities and that most of them were Communists. They were joined together for eternity by their loyalty to the Leninist party, a desire to serve their people selflessly and a readiness to attempt any feat for the sake of socialism.

The publication was prepared for press by the Main Personnel Directorate and the Institute of Military History of the USSR Ministry of Defense. It makes extensive use of documents and information from the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, the Central Archives of the USSR Ministry of Defense, the Central State Archives of the Soviet Army and Navy and the Central Naval Archives. The Central Museum of the Armed Forces took an active part in the selection of photographs. A lot of work had to be performed by the personnel agencies of the branches of the Armed Forces and troop arms, and by many other organizations. Reliable answers to a number of questions were obtained with the assistance of local soviet and party organs, military commissariats, families and close friends of the Heros, and from the Heros themselves.

The publication "Geroi Sovetskogo Soyuza. Kratkiy biograficheskiy slovar," which is being published on the eve of the 70th anniversary of the Soviet Armed Forces,

will unquestionably enrich our military-patriotic work. More than one generation of Soviet people will be indoctrinated with the example of the Heros, with the model of courage and valor.

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**Obituary: Col Gen A.G. Shevtsov**

*18010382 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 3 May 88 Second Edition p 4*

[Unattributed article]

[Excerpts] A participant in the Great Patriotic War, Hero of the Soviet Union Colonel-General (ret) **Shevtsov**, Aleksandr Grigor'yevich has died unexpectedly. He was a member of the Communist Party since 1941.

A.G. Shevtsov was born on the 17th of October 1918 in the city of Shevkino, Kursk oblast. An active participant in the Great Patriotic War, he commanded an aviation squadron and an aviation regiment. ... In 1943 he was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. ... From 1961 through 1976 he served in the Strategic Missile Forces, in the course of nearly 10 years serving as chief of the Main Staff—first deputy commander-in-chief of the Strategic Missile Forces.

**Yu.P. Maksimov, V.F. Tolubko, V.S. Rodin, Yu.A. Yashin, S.G. Kochemasov, A.P. Volkov, G.N. Malinovskiy, A.A. Ryazhskikh, V.P. Shilovskiy, P.P. Svtin, V.V. Korobushin, A.A. Maksimov, I.I. Kurinnoy, G.S. Titov, I.A. Aver'yanov, P.A. Gorchakov, V.M. Vishenkov, K.V. Gerchik, I.A. Shevtsov, P.V. Akindinov, A.S. Butskiy, K.M. Vorob'yev, A.F. Panuyev, A.Ya. Popov, K.A. Fedorenko, S.A. Starikov.**

UD/335

**Use of Smoke in Decreasing Effectiveness of PGM's**  
*18010300 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian*  
27 Jan 88 p 1

[Article by Maj A. Lyutsko, Baltic Military District, under the rubric "Combat Readiness: Contrasts in Methods": "Two Attacks Which Demonstrated What Should and Should Not be Done in Combat"]

[Text] After brief preparatory fire the motorized riflemen rushed into the attack. At first everything went according to plan. The motorized riflemen dismounted upon reaching the designated line. Immediately thereafter a loud "Hurrah!" swept over the combat training field. One more rush, it seemed, and the attackers would be at the target....

Just at that moment, however, plumes from explosions rose up in front of the extended attacking lines. The defending artillery was firing by direct laying. And to give them their due, they were firing accurately. The pace of the attack slowed drastically. The battle order of the company commanded by Senior Lieutenant A. Mishchenko broke down entirely. To make matters worse, the "enemy" undertook a counterattack on precisely that sector. It completely muddled all of the plans of the motorized riflemen. The initiative had been lost.

The battalion officers received many admonitions during the critique of the exercise. They included the following: when preparing for the attack the fact was not taken into account that they would have to operate in the open. In that situation the natural thing to do would have been to ask what could be done to deprive the "enemy" of his main advantage, the possibility of making full use of his guns.

Different attack alternatives had been considered during the reconnaissance. They included the following, for example: laying artillery smoke screens in the area of the "enemy's" strong point during the preparatory fire. They had the means also of covering the battle orders of the attackers. They only discussed this, however, but undertook no practical action to achieve it.

Why did this happen? It turned out that there were several reasons. The first was the fact that the commanders were inadequately trained in the use of smoke in a tactical exercise. We know that this is not as simple as it might appear at first glance. It requires certain skills. Where are they to be acquired, however, if such matters are frequently avoided—this fact was brought out—in the exercises. As a result, the subunit commanders have only a very vague, frequently only theoretical, concept of this matter. One of the officers, for example, frankly admitted that during the past training year his company had never once practiced tactical missions involving the use of smoke.

Today, when we are oriented toward quest and initiative in the combat training, facts like this seem strange at the very least. Furthermore, this is not such a new procedure. The

Great Patriotic War experience showed, after all, that the extensive and tactically competent use of screening smoke makes it easier to accomplish the combat missions. However, it seems that some people feel that today, when the troops have immeasurably more effective weapons, smoke screening has lost its importance.

This is profoundly erroneous. Our experience in exercises has shown, for example, that the use of smoke makes it considerably more difficult for the enemy to employ high-precision weapons in modern combat, makes it possible to deceive him and reduces the effectiveness of the artillery, antitank guided missiles, rocket launchers and firearms, as well as air strikes. The specialists calculate that losses by the attacking subunits can be reduced considerably by making skilful use of smoke screening.

We have examples of thoughtful actions in this area. For example, this is what occurred in the dynamic of a tactical exercise in the tank battalion commanded by Maj K. Gnatenko. Having advanced to the designated line, his companies resolutely attacked the strong point. The "enemy" proved to be a hard nut to crack, however. Powerful antitank fire rained down upon the attackers. The pace of the attack began to slow. A short time later the attacking subunits were halted. The defenders undertook a powerful counterattack.

Maj Gnatenko was in a difficult situation. After assessing the situation, however, he concluded that it could be saved if the battalion were withdrawn to a line prepared in advance. What was the best way to do this? After pondering it a short time, the officer decided to use covering smoke. What is more, despite the rapidly changing situation, he had also prepared a dummy withdrawal area, which was also to be covered with screening smoke. Let the "enemy" figure out what was what. In the meantime, the thing would have been accomplished....

The mission was assigned to the tank company commanded by Lt S. Shmaytser. The officer was ready for it. The first thing he did was to check out the weather situation—it is very important to accurately determine the direction of the wind when smoke is used—and study the configuration of the land on a map. All of this made it possible to correctly position the combat vehicles designated for generating the smoke.

The tank drivers/mechanics turned on the smoke equipment precisely at the designated time. A few minutes later the battlefield was enveloped in a whitish smoke. Smoke screens were simultaneously laid at the forward edge and in the defensive depth by attached subunits. This helped to blind observers and the crews manning the "enemy" guns, and made it difficult for them to conduct aimed fire.

...Two attacks, two approaches. They demonstrate the extent to which the accomplishment of the combat training missions depends upon the focus of the personnel on creativity and the use of all possibilities for

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## GROUND FORCES

achieving success. As a matter of fact, the basic principle of teaching that which is essential in combat demands this of each of us. The pity is that it is not implemented with proper persistence everywhere.

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**Soviet Hydrographic Activities in the Baltic**  
*18010249 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian*  
*30 March 88 p 1*

[Article by Capt. 3rd rank V. Lyubimov; "Weather for Battle: on the Baltic"]

[Text] At noon the hydrographic ship where Lt. V. Volkovskiy serves as assistant to the commander left the moorings and set a course for the open seas. There were eighteen points in various regions of the Baltic designated for hydrological survey included in the technical instructions on hydrological work given to the commander of the ship before leaving port.

The ship arrived at point number one and began to drift. It was then up to the hydrologists who were on board to take what is called a cross-section of the layers of the waters, that is, to determine the distribution of temperatures by depth. The engineer-hydrologists Ye. Belov and V. Yanchevskiy begin their measurements. With the

help of a windless bathythermograph [batitermograf] is lowered over the side. The bathythermograph is a device which gives impressions of the characteristics of the temperature curve. At the same time, another device is prepared. It is reminiscent of a christmas tree wreath - a hawser, covered with bathometers. These devices measure the temperature of the water and collect a sample in a container on the so called standard levels [standartnyy gorizont].

The temperature readings are taken and an electrochemical analysis of the water is conducted. The data are computed according to a special method. The one time hydrological station, as the hydrologists call the work conducted at a single point, is completed. It took one hour. The processed data will be sent by radio to the Navy's hydrologists and to the hydrologists from the Baltic Fleet. The hydrographic ship then sets a course for the next collection point.

**Moldavian Conference: 'Important Shortcomings in Series of Ministries, Departments'**  
18010338 Kishinev SOVETSKAYA MOLDAVIYA in Russian 6 April 88 pp 1-2

[Unsigned article: "To Improve Civil Defense"]

[Text] *A conference was held in Kishinev at which the results of a Moldavian SSR command and staff civil defense exercise were summed up. During this exercise the readiness of all civil defense subunits and formations to accomplish tasks associated with eliminating the consequences of disasters and natural calamities was tested. The leaders of ministries and departments, responsible republic party, Soviet and economic officials, and generals and officers from the country's civil defense headquarters and the Red Banner Odessa Military District were invited to the meeting.*

*Army Gen V. L. Govorov, deputy USSR minister of defense, and chief of civil defense, analyzed the state of civil defense in the Moldavian SSR, and the preparedness of civil defense subunits to operate in extreme situations.*

*S. K. Grossu, first secretary, Central Committee, Communist Party of Moldavia, spoke at the meeting.*

It was noted at the meeting that the republic has carried out definite work toward the further improvement of civil defense. The system of protective measures is continuing to be developed, and measures are being implemented to improve the stability of the functioning of the economy, and ensure the vital activity of the population under conditions of possible natural calamities, major accidents and disasters. Annual training of civil defense control organs and non-militarized formations has been organized, and instruction of the population on confident actions to take under extreme conditions is being carried out. As the exercise showed, the status of civil defense in the republic on the whole meets today's high requirements. Owing to the joint efforts of party and soviet organs, many questions associated with improving civil defense are being effectively solved. Work accomplished in this direction has already given tangible positive results.

At the same time, there continue to be a number of essential shortcomings in the organization of civil defense, and implementation of party and government instructions on this matter. Improved planning of measures to prepare civil defense for work in peacetime is required. Practice indicates that many of the plans developed by civil defense elements of a number of ministries and departments are sketchy, and do not take into account local conditions and the situation that may occur. They have not worked out problems of ensuring the stable functioning of individual facilities, and of economic branches as a whole. The system of observation and laboratory monitoring needs to be strengthened, and experience in building up and practical utilization of protective structures is slow to be worked out.

In a number of ministries and departments the work of creating a reliable system of control and communications has dragged out unjustifiably. At many of the facilities under their control the elements of preventing possible accidents and eliminating their consequences are not being worked out with sufficient precision. The system for warning the population of the republic in case of natural calamities and disasters requires improving. The interactions of republic control organs with the enterprises, organizations and institutions they control are poorly coordinated.

Leading cadres of ministries and departments, and ispolkoms of local soviets are ordered to eliminate promptly these and other shortcomings revealed during the exercises.

The need for further improvement in party control of civil defense was indicated. Party gorkoms and raykoms must become deeply involved in the state of affairs in this area, give principled assessments of instances of inactivity on the part of individual leaders and officials responsible for this work, and render all-round assistance to party committees and party buros of primary party organizations in mobilizing communists, workers, employees, kolkhoz peasants and the entire population to fulfill civil defense measures.

The leaders of ministries, state committees and departments, party gorkoms and raykoms, city and rayon civil defense chiefs, and chairman of extraordinary commissions should take specific measures to eliminate the shortcomings and omissions revealed, and take urgent steps to maintain all elements of the civil defense system in constant readiness to accomplish the tasks assigned to them. Particular attention must be paid to working out control by civil defense organs and forces during elimination of the consequences of accidents, disasters and natural calamities.

The republic civil defense headquarters needs to strengthen organizational work and monitoring of the unconditional accomplishment of civil defense tasks and measures by all soviet and economic organs, prevent instances of indulgences and formalism in this matter, render more practical assistance to ministries, state committees, departments, extraordinary commissions, and city and rayon ispolkoms in the planning and conduct of civil defense measures, and take urgent steps to improve civil defense, as the decisions of the 27th CPSU Congress require.

A large group of exercise participants was awarded honorary badges of USSR civil defense, for ably organizing, leading and ensuring the accomplishment of civil defense tasks and measures.

N. F. Bondarchuk, G. I. Yeremey, A. A. Moku, A. N. Sangeli, V. I. Smirnov, M. I. Snegur, N. A. Tsyu, G. M. Volkov, V. K. Pshenichnikov, and V. V. Runkovskiy,

members and candidate members of the Central Committee Buro, Communist Party of Moldavia; CPSU Central Committee official N. N. Dolgin; and Col Gen I. S. Morozov, commander, Red Banner Odessa Military District, took part in the work of the conference.

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### Breakdown of Training at Gosagroprom Institute

**How They Reduced the Department, Part I**  
*18010315a Moscow VOYENNYE ZNANIYA in Russian No 8, Aug 87 pp 10-11*

[Article by special correspondent A. Zaytsev: "How They Reduced the Department"]

[Text] *The Ryazan All-Union Institute for Raising the Qualifications of Leading Workers and Specialists of the Engineering and Technical Service of USSR Gosagroprom has been in existence more than 10 years. The civil defense faculty has worked harmoniously, actively and with good results during all of this time. In March 1987, however, they unexpectedly reduced the list of official categories of leading workers and chief specialists who are to study civil defense. They reduced the load and dismissed several teachers and it was no longer necessary to have an independent department. It is now united with the department for labor protection and represented by a cycle of three people.*

*Let us try to determine how this came about.*

### The Director Responds

Let us begin with the basic document, the facility civil defense plan. It was developed in August 1981 and affirmed by former institute director A. Garkushin. Since then, it has been corrected repeatedly. There are no notes indicating that D. Amelin, who has headed the institute for almost 4 years and is its civil defense director, is familiar with it. The personnel lists of the formations are old. How many dead souls do they contain—people who have not worked for a long time! For example, the position of RKhN [not expanded] is held by Z. Shestrekin but the two subordinates were dismissed. The situation is the same in other subdivisions.

And the notification diagram. This document, which to a considerable extent determines the readiness of the facility, is infinitely obsolete. The people whose names, telephone numbers and addresses are shown there have long since left. They did not use these materials and did not carry out facility training for so long that they themselves failed to notice this shortcoming!

And orders in the institute take their own course. Thus, in the order presenting the results for 1986 and determining the tasks for the new 1987 academic year, we read: "Little attention is being paid to the practical

instruction of the personnel of formations.... Not all employees have mastered the methods and means of fulfilling civil defense standards.... Workers' attendance of classes remains low." These are phrases that migrate from document to document. There is not a single family name and not a single specific offender.

Yu. Onokhov, chief of staff for the institute civil defense, admitted: "For more than 2 years now, we have not carried out exercises and we have not organized classes with workers and employees in the defense against weapons of mass destruction." Let us continue—for five educational groups, they selected only two leaders and they did not begin their duties. There is a schedule but no classes.

"Viktor Vasilyevich, how many communists are in charge of formations," I ask deputy secretary of the party bureau Yurchenko, who has worked in the institute since the day of its founding.

The answer was indefinite.

"And in which formations are there deputy political officers and who are they?"

He does not know that either.

It turned out that there is one deputy political officer—in the rescue group. That is V. Solovova, in charge of the library, but she is not a party member. It seems that out of half a hundred communists there was not a single person whom they would recommend for this position. They party bureau did not deal with the disposition of communists nor with the question of the covering of people if necessary.

The institute has several good basement rooms that if desired can be equipped if not into refuges then into reliable antiradiation shelters. In 10 years, however, nothing has been done in this connection. And matters stand no better with the assimilation of the suburban zone.

Over many years, there has not been a single meeting in which they discussed questions in the defense of the labor collective against weapons of mass destruction.

When on the eve of the holiday of the Soviet Armed Forces the chairman of the institute's DOSAAF committee organized competition in shooting, V. Yurchenko revoked it, declaring that during working time he will not permit should measures to be carried out. But no one thought about disrupting the academic process: they invited only those who had no classes.

That is how they understand here the requirement of the CPSU Program that every communist and every Soviet individual is obligated to do everything he can to support the country's defensive capability at the proper level.

Who in the institute is responsible for civil defense? In the opinion of V. Yurchenko, it is the chief of staff. Hence the indifferent attitude of the party bureau to defense matters and the self-removal of the director from civil defense. But it is precisely he above all who, as civil defense director, has full responsibility for the state of affairs. He is entrusted with the collective and it is he who must think about its defense. And this task is not a minor one for the party organization. The facility's civil defense staff is a working staff and it is necessary to manage it and organize its activities.

And the institute's leadership also has a strange attitude toward the military and patriotic education of its employees. How do you think they answered the question: Why were such veterans of the Great Patriotic War who have been awarded many orders and medals as N. Martynov, director of the civil defense department, and senior instructors Ye. Vorobyev and A. Aleksandrov not included in the council of veterans?

"We decided to look after them and not overload them with additional public work," said Z. Pecherskikh, chairman of the trade union committee.

This is the "concern" that they showed, offending people to the depth of their soul!

V. Yurchenko himself is surprised that this could happen. And it was also only later that he found out that M. Piganova, senior instructor of the accounting department, was elected chairman of the council. It is sad but true: such an important event in the life of the collective took place without the participation of the party bureau.

#### How is it With the Subject?

The institute received from USSR Gosagroprom a list of official categories of leading workers and specialists with whom it needs to hold classes in civil defense in the system for raising qualifications. The management decided to refine it taking into account its own specifics and the profile of the work of those being taught locally. But they forgot or perhaps did not want to bring in the specialist N. Martynov, who for many years had headed the civil defense department. They excluded from the list the shop directors and those in charge of workshops, the heads of departments for the protection of labor and safety equipment, principal mechanics and power engineers, leading specialists of the supply bases, directors of teaching combines, and other categories. D. Amelin himself signed the new list and affirmed it with an order dated 1 February 1987.

B. Chuloshnikov, director of the educational methods department, decided to ask the students in educational groups and find out who among them is studying civil defense locally. Some hands were raised and a few voices were heard. "There, you see, they do not need the subject 'civil defense'," said the administration in presenting "convincing" arguments.

In addition, they organized the questioning of those being taught. The first version of the questionnaire included, for example, the question: "Are the classes in civil defense useful?" Consciously or not, it thereby cast doubt on the advisability of teaching people measures to defend against contemporary weapons of destruction.

A. Nepogodyev, deputy institute director for educational and scientific work, thinks that it is certainly enough to instruct people in civil defense courses but that it is necessary to free educational institutions for raising qualifications from this.

"We went through the 27th CPSU Congress and Central Committee plenums and perestroyka has gotten under way in the country," says institute director D. Amelin, "and we are looking for ways for a more rational utilization of instructional time and are freeing ourselves from secondary themes. We think that in civil defense as well it is necessary to give students only what is new and extremely necessary, taking into full account the specifics of the agroprom. It is necessary to shift from lectures to lessons at the facilities and to make more extensive use of technical means of education. In our opinion, all of this will make it possible to reduce the time for the study of the subject by about half. But the civil defense authorities as well as USSR Gosagroprom are in no great hurry. The classes continue to be held according to the program for 1983 and their content, forms and methods are not being changed. So we released several instructors and combined the rest in the department for labor protection.

But to decide the fate of the subject without those responsible and without discussing the matter with the administration is not acting up to date. And it is useful for the cause?

#### One Should Have Compared

"We thought," says former head of the civil defense department N. Martynov, "that the events in Chernobyl will remind some of our workers that students need to deepen their knowledge of civil defense. For in the zone of radioactive contamination there are peculiarities in land use, animal husbandry is carried on in a different way, and agricultural production is organized differently. This did not happen. To be fair, it is necessary to note that the instruction was often general in nature and people expected experience and information about where and how specific questions are being resolved and what difficulties and mistakes are being encountered. The instructors did not take any trips and did not always know what problems exist locally and what reserves there are."

The elimination of the civil defense department was presented under the most plausible pretext—[one or more words omitted] of time, and the striving to give the students more of precisely what the need directly in production.

But how can one compare what is needed today with what may be useful tomorrow? What will decide the fate of people, determine their ability to survive, and provide stable work for agriculture and the entire agroprom? For civil defense is needed not only during wartime. It is no less important in time of peace, when it is necessary to deal with natural disasters and accidents. As experience shows, momentary apparent economy sometimes results in great losses.

Yes, in the period of perestroyka it is necessary to seek ways for the optimum resolution of problems, to think about the saving and efficient utilization of instructional time, and to strive for better final results. But it is necessary to do all of this in a manner that is well thought out, weighing all the "pros" and "cons," objectively examining the work of the department, and discussing it in the collective.

Did everything take place so unexpectedly then, in March? Let us recall that initially the role of civil defense among the permanent staff was reduced, lessons and exercises were stopped, gradually less attention was paid to military and patriotic education, and a certain public opinion was developed on the uselessness of civil defense. The institute is not suffering from its absence and it seems that it is also unnecessary in the facilities from which students came. The conclusion: reduce the number of those who will study the subject and, at the same time, reduce the civil defense department for it is useless.

*From the editor's office. The events in Ryazan showed that they had their own attitude toward the problem of the study of civil defense in the educational institution. And how does the USSR Civil Defense Staff and USSR Gosagroprom assess the actions of institute leaders? The editor's office is awaiting answers from competent authorities. What do readers think about the questions raised in the article?*

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**How They Reduced the Department, Part II**  
18010315b Moscow VOYENNYE ZNANIYA in  
Russian No 1, Jan 88 p 35

[Article: "How They Reduced the Department"; first two paragraphs are VOYENNYE ZNANIYA introduction]

[Text] In the article under this heading (No 8, 1987), we told of shortcomings in the training of employees for defense against weapons of mass destruction and of the negative attitude of the administration toward civil defense problems in the Ryazan All-Union Institute for Raising the Qualifications of Leading Workers and Specialists of the Engineering and Technical Service of USSR Gosagroprom.

Readers responded to the journal's article. Below we present excerpts from several letters.

**Viewpoints**

**R. BELOZOROV**, head of the Civil Defense Department of the Institute for Raising Qualifications of the Ministry of the Maritime Fleet, candidate of naval sciences, and lecturer (Odessa)

One can consider the events that took place in the Ryazan institute to be typical. To some degree or another, many IPK's [institutes for raising qualifications] are experiencing pressure from an administration that is trying to curtail both the number of hours allocated to the study of civil defense as well as the number of official categories of students and, consequently, to reduce the teaching staff.

Unfortunately, the position of the USSR Ministry of Higher and Secondary Specialized Education also contributes to this. Its representatives do not hesitate to express their opinion about the undesirability of so-called "decreed" disciplines, to which they also assign civil defense, and about the necessity of reducing the number of hours for the study of this subject. For example, the responsible worker of the USSR Ministry of Higher and Secondary Specialized Education Yu. Tatura spoke directly about this from the rostrum of a union conference on scientific methods held in 1986 at the Leningrad Polytechnical Institute. They hold to the same opinion in the Directorate for Raising the Qualifications of Leading Workers and Specialists of the National Economy of the USSR Ministry of Higher and Secondary Specialized Education.

Much also depends on the attitude of the workers and employees of the corresponding directorates (sections) of ministries and departments to the problem of defense. The administration of the IPK would hardly have been able to eliminate the department if the leadership of USSR Gosagroprom Civil Defense had taken an interest in the work of their own institute in this important area. Classes at the institute for raising qualifications make it possible to present the demands of guiding documents and the new views on the organization of particular processes to students in a timely and thorough manner. Unfortunately, practice shows that in a number of cases they underestimate the possibility of utilizing the IPK in such quality in accordance with the requirements of civil defense.

To eliminate the existing distortions, it is essential to check the work of the IPK periodically and to reveal in time how fully the operative civil defense program is being realized. The time has come to raise questions in the study of civil defense under contemporary conditions more specifically and acutely, especially in connection with the increase in its role and importance in peacetime. It is necessary to have a more precise list of

the official positions that must study and know civil defense measures thoroughly so as to carry them out in their own facilities competently and confidently.

**Z. SHAPOROV, senior civil defense instructor of the IPK (Minsk)**

The reduction of the official categories with which civil defense classes are to be held also took place in our branch of the institute for raising the qualifications of leading trade workers and specialists of the USSR Ministry of Trade. A new list arrived and it follows from it that for many the defensive measures against weapons of mass destruction are not necessary. But most of them must be in charge of mobile feeding centers and the supply of food and materials, lead groups and links in the protection and disinfection of food, and participate in the work of evacuation agencies. And where can they now deepen and expand their knowledge, so to speak, and raise their own qualifications in special civil defense questions?

The problems in the study of civil defense in the IPK are becoming more and more acute. They need to be resolved.

**V. SHCHERBAKOV, chief of staff for civil defense of the Vtorchermet Production Association (Leningrad)**

I read the article "How They Reduced the Department" twice. It was, let us be frank, an unprecedented case. Something similar could happen in a collective that cannot get into the style and rhythm of our general perestroika. I do not intend to give a ready prescription for the treatment of the identified "illness" but I think it is essential to exchange opinions.

If chief of the institute's civil defense staff Yu. Onokhov has no trained leaders of educational groups and deputy secretary of the party bureau V. Yurchenko does not know any communists in the formations and neither of them under civil defense director D. Amelin are concerned about the defense of their own collective, then that means that they have simply forgotten their party, official and civil duty.

But there can be no difference of opinion on the question of "whether civil defense classes are useful." It is necessary to seek ways to improve civil defense rather than reasons and justifications for one's miscalculations and underestimates. It is clear that the bureaucratic cobwebs that have formed around the institute's civil defense are strong.

My advice to the director: it is necessary to know how to defend one's own position and to face the urgent tasks of civil defense, upon whose competent resolution the life of people under extreme conditions will depend.

**B. NOVIKOV, production instruction expert for civil defense courses (Syzyran)**

I think that a crime was committed in the Ryazan IPK. Such actions do not correspond to the spirit of the time under the conditions of the restructuring of civil defense, when its efforts are aimed mainly at carrying out measures to eliminate the consequences of production accidents and natural disasters and when they are increasing the role of the knowledge of the leading and command personnel. Only in the IPK can one truly deepen his knowledge and improve his habits. Why did they forget about this is Ryazan? Why did they learn nothing from Bhopal or Chernobyl?

**N. VOLKOV, chief of the civil defense staff of the production directorate for the provision of domestic services to the public (Glazov, Udmurtskaya ASSR)**

It seems to me that such an attitude toward civil defense questions exists not only at the Ryazan institute. In 1987, for example, three of our specialists went through training in courses for raising qualifications in Leningrad (branch of the Moscow Technological Institute for Domestic Services). They had no civil defense classes at all, although they were foreseen in the curriculum. It is not surprising that some shop directors who studied in this UZPK [expansion not given] do not now consider the organization of civil defense in shops to be their concern.

**B. BELIMOV, veteran of war and labor (Kurgan)**

One can only be astonished by such a solution to the problem. Do they really not understand in USSR Gosagroprom that to shown concern about the defense of the labor collective means to carry out the requirements of civil defense?

We know from the experience of Chernobyl how expensive a Philistine attitude to the fulfillment of civil defense measures is. And if some leading workers do not deal with these matters of state importance, then how can they be kept in such positions? In this situation, V. Yurchenko, B. Chuloshnikov and A. Nepogodiev not only look bad but perhaps socially irresponsible.

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**Letters on Introduction of Collective Contract Into Military Construction**

*18010079 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
7 Jan 88 p 2*

[Letters to editor under the rubric "The Construction Complex": "There Is No Time for Warming up: How Are We Approaching the Reform?"]

[Text] The editors receive letters in which our readers actively discuss matters pertaining to the radical economic reform and the specifics of its implementation at military enterprises and construction sites.

The conversion to the collective contract will be one of the phases of this reform for the military construction workers. As KRASNAYA ZVEZDA reported earlier, an experiment has already been started in a number of organizations this year. Its purpose is to identify bottlenecks and resolve problems which may occur, some of which are already apparent.

The letters we are publishing today discuss this.

**More Precise Norms Are Needed**

In our district we have a good example of working under the collective contract. It involves the work supervisor's section headed by Col S. Lomashko. Its labor productivity has grown by more than 26 percent in a year, whereas the average monthly earnings per worker have increased by only 14 percent. The quality of the work has improved, half of the workers have raised their skills rating, and every fourth worker has mastered related specialties.

I cannot say that everything went smoothly. The collective's work has been affected by a lack of good production facilities, which are only now being provided. Despite this, the results are evident.

Intensive preparations were made for converting the district construction directorate to the collective contract, but despite this we have not succeeded in accomplishing everything. We have not managed to consolidate all of the brigades and convert them to complete economic self-sufficiency. We have not completed the development of measures in the administration of production or its engineered preparation. It is particularly important, however, to make every individual aware that working under the collective contract is no guarantee that wages will increase. It primarily involves increasing responsibility by raising the material interest.

As of January the main document governing the activities of the work supervisor's section will be the annual schedule for construction and installation jobs. Among other things, it is closely coordinated with material and technical supply, the delivery and installation of equipment, the work of subcontracting and adjustment organizations, with the machine operators and haulers. Its

implementation requires that the itemized capital construction lists remain stable and unchanging for the year and for the five-year period. The official planning and estimate documents must be issued by the specified deadline—that is, prior to 1 June of the year preceding the planning year.

Far from all of the issues have yet been worked out. For example, for one of the apartment buildings, which is to be released for occupancy in December 1988, scheduled deliveries of materials also end in December. This practice provides no freedom for maneuvering and no time reserve, and results in production spurts and all-out, last-minute efforts. This has a negative effect upon the quality of the construction and the timely release of the projects. This kind of planning is clearly unacceptable for working under a collective contract.

Neither the clients nor the construction workers, and all the more the financing agencies, are not satisfied with contractual prices worked out at the stage of the technical and economic calculations, which is presently specified. Belorussia's construction workers, whose experience is well known in the nation, consider this approach to be obsolete. They have already switched to stable, average prices—per square meter of housing, linear meter of engineered communications and so forth, for example. This has enabled them to apply more economical plans and to significantly reduce construction costs. The district military construction workers are also prepared to switch to this system, and the practical steps have been taken, but there has been no support yet from higher agencies.

When the matter of preparing for switching to the collective contract was discussed in the district military council, the fact was stressed that new wage-rates and salaries must be simultaneously introduced. Unfortunately, the norm for the formation of the wage fund is still being determined in the old manner, based on "what has been accomplished." The increments introduced during the conversion to new rates and salaries were not taken into account for 1988 for the district construction directorate, for example. This makes it practically impossible to utilize them. I believe we need to demonstrate that a norm must be neither good nor bad, but correct, and must objectively reflect the standardized wages.

The collective contract can result in an "explosive" growth of social and labor activeness, and create a situation conducive to the most vital participation in production control by blue- and white-collar workers of the Soviet Army and military construction workers. The necessary economic preconditions have to be established in order to achieve this, however.—Colonel Yu. Kosolapov, chief of a finance service department, Belorussian Military District

### Without Petty Tutelage

I believe that stagnation in the work of district finance agencies is one of the factors hampering the switching of the military construction workers onto the new rails. One has the impression that they are concerned not with ensuring the uninterrupted financing of construction projects in order to release them on time, but exclusively with formal control.

The workers in the finance agencies assume that they have helped matters by not paying certain construction bills. Helped whom? The construction workers stop working when there are no funds to buy materials or to pay the workers, after all, and everything comes to a standstill. This occurs mainly because of errors made in the itemized lists and estimates. For these very reasons we frequently refuse to pay bonuses, which nullifies the material incentive system.

There is no question that control is needed, but one would like to know why the finance agencies cannot be precise at the stage of compiling and coordinating the itemized lists and estimates. They have the authority. The construction workers would then have a stable financial situation, which is a guarantee of absolute plan fulfillment.

I believe that control on the part of the finance agencies should be qualitatively different in the new economic situation. Take the simple example of the use of motor transport in the economically self-sufficient collective. KRASNAYA ZVEZDA raised this issue on 4 July 1987 in the article "What the contract Has Revealed." One has to agree with the author, section chief A. Sachkov, that the work superintendent and foreman cannot get along without motor transport. But they should decide themselves on issues pertaining to paying for and maintaining it within the estimated cost limits. That is, an economic regulator should be used instead of keeping the equipment idle for months on end. I believe that the finance service specialists should take more preventive steps and not content themselves with a kind of petty tutelage. In connection with this, I feel that the finance departments should take on the task of examining the

itemized lists and estimates and questions pertaining to the financial interrelations of organizations in the accounting for materials, machinery and motor transport.—Colonel (Reserve) L. Savranskiy, Odessa Military District

### What Would Appear To Be Simple Matters

Our organization is a subcontractor which performs sanitary engineering jobs. We are preparing to convert the sections to economic self-sufficiency, and we have encountered numerous problems. We learned how to resolve some of them from an article by Lt Col A. Meshcheryakov, chief of the construction directorate for the Odessa Military District, published in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA on 29 December 1987 with the title "Discipline, Economy, Order." Many things have still not been cleared up, however.

When a section converts to the collective contract, for example, the leaders of the work supervisor's section commit themselves to provide the section with everything necessary right on time: materials, machinery, workers. Except for its daily requests, the section has no levers whatsoever for seeing that these commitments are kept. And what about the work supervisor's section? Unfortunately, a great deal depends also upon it: the higher organization concludes the agreements, the general contractor provides the work front, and subcontractors provide the machinery. How can they be influenced? Once again, by requesting and urging? By complaining to the main directorate?

The present economic mechanism is not efficient, and we still do not have a new one. The new one must be not an administrative but an economic-accountability mechanism.

Unfortunately, we still have many so-called "special-order" projects, on which management makes its own decisions and funnels as many resources into them as it considers necessary. The collective contract is out of the question in this situation.—Colonel (Reserve) Ye. Frolov

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### Yegorov Keynote Speech to Tenth All-union DOSAAF Congress

18OIO227 [Editorial report] Moscow SOVETSKIY PATRIOT in Russian 16 February 1988 publishes on pages 2-3 a 6,000 word speech by DOSAAF Chairman G. M. Yegorov delivered at the X All-union DOSAAF Congress entitled "Review of the Work of the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee and Tasks for the Defensive Society's Organizations in Light of the Decisions of the CPSU's 27th Congress". Yegorov states: "In recent years the membership of DOSAAF has grown significantly, as has the number of its primary organizations. However, so far we have not seen a corresponding improvement in its quality indicators. There are significant shortcomings in the work of the USSR DOSAAF central committee, its presidium, the bureau of the presidium headed by the chairman, as well as several of the republic, kray, and oblast-level central committees.

"The adherence by the central administration of many of the kray and oblast committees to the administrative style of direction hinders the development of initiative and the deepening of principles of spontaneity at the local level. In mass-organizational work the tendency towards a merely formal acceptance of the population as members of DOSAAF still predominates. As for the concerns about attracting workers and young people into training on the fundamentals of military affairs, and the increase in people's activity, the results here have been less than pleasing.

"In independent DOSAAF organizations, a tendency towards administrative methods of activity to the detriment of genuine mass-work among the populace has been noted. This contradicts the very nature of the defense society as a self-administrating social organization. It is here that the weakening of attention of the committees towards the work of the primary organizations and to the increase in their initiative arises.

"Not infrequently DOSAAF committee apparatuses wrongly attempt to substitute for the elective organs, they over-administrate. And this hinders the development of democracy and the strengthening of a spontaneous character in the activity of the defense society's organization. It must be noted that even the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee, and the administration of mass-organizational work and military-patriotic propaganda (V. Mosyaykin, A. Mamayev) did not show the necessary activity in a wider realization of democratic principles in the activity of the society.

"Not infrequently such tried democratic instruments of the internal life of the society, such as criticism and self-criticism operate with interruptions. Collective administration and glasnost are not always to be found at high levels.

"The pre-congress discussion and the election review campaign exhibited serious problems and shortcomings in practically all aspects of DOSAAF's activity. These problems lead one to conclude that only the first steps have been taken in the radical restructuring of mass-defense and military-patriotic work.

"I must say directly that in the military-patriotic work of several of the committees, the campaign approach is being eliminated only with difficulty. The results are still being evaluated not by the degree of influence of the upbringing on young people and workers, but by the quantity of various types of measures. These shortcomings are particularly inherent in the DOSAAF organizations in Kazakhstan and Estonia, and in Buryatiya, Yakutiya, and Orlov Oblast.

Yegorov goes on to lament the state of patriotic upbringing of youth pointing out the sort of anti-social behavior which occurs as a result: "In Murmansk and Crimea oblasts and in the city of Makeyevka young people have not only shown disdain for the military glory and fighting traditions of generations past, but they have done violence to the glorious memory and vandalized the fraternal graves of those fallen in defense of the motherland.

"One of the reasons for these occurrences, which are so alien to us, as has been noted at the report meetings, is a weakening of the work on the patriotic upbringing of our young people, for which DOSAAF organizations are also responsible. At the same time, society activists have more than once expressed their concern in connection with the dissemination of abstractly pacifistic views expressed by certain scientific and cultural figures, as well as their biased views about military service and their distorted conceptions of army life.

"DOSAAF congress and conference representatives reacted sharply to attempts to depict the army as a machine in which the creative capacities of young people atrophy and to drag onto the pages of the press and into radio and television programs, so called revelations under the flag of restructuring and democratization.

"In the DOSAAF organizations there is room for the development of young people's initiative, strength, and creativity. However, the defense society's influence on youth is so far insufficiently effective. And the fact that 'rockers' appear on our streets, 'radio-hooligans' on the airwaves, and other so called 'informal' adolescent organizations appear spontaneously is a reproach to our society and first of all to DOSAAF organizations.

"We all need to decisively overcome the neutral relations which are forming towards self-created associations of this sort. We must set right any productive contacts with them, and give all manner of support to those of them which by means of their initiative and practical work contribute to the program of restructuring and to military-patriotic and internationalist upbringing of youth.

And on the other hand, we need to deal a decisive blow to those who under the guise of restructuring, wrapping themselves in glasnost, step forward against socialism and call for political indifference and pacifism.

"The forms of internationalist upbringing of our young people must become significantly stronger and more varied. There are large reserves to be found, in particular, in the organization of Russian language instruction for pre-draft trainees as a means of international communication. This problem is especially severe in the Transcaucasus and Central Asia.

On the subject of pre-draft training in technical fields Yegorov states: "We have still not succeeded in attaining a fundamental restructuring in the system of preparation of specialists for the armed forces. From among the troops we still hear many justified condemnations of the low quality of training received in the DOSAAF schools in a whole variety of fields. And this is not surprising.

"Unobjective evaluations of the real state of affairs continue to come forth. Often the norms for the deployment of equipment adapted to the field are worked out in simplified situations. As a result, many conscripts after finishing our schools are not able to identify and alleviate defects in equipment in a timely manner, they are insufficiently trained for the use of equipment in extreme situations.

"There are shortcomings and omissions in flight safety during training of the air and ground crews especially in the Ulyanov, Kaluga, Kostroma, and Vladimir air clubs.

"One of the reasons for such a low level of practical training of specialists is the lack of a sufficient material-technical base which does not guarantee a high quality reworking of training programs. This is especially true for the schools in Tadzhikistan, Tuvin and Buryat ASSRs, and Perm and Kalinin oblasts, where comrades B. Rakhmanov, N. Korotayev, A. Yermeyev, P. Trenogin, and N. Ananyev are committee chairmen.

"The cadre selection system needs a fundamental improvement: an increase in the ideological-political level, an increase in the professional-technical knowledge of instructors and skilled workers in the area of production training, and an improvement in their systematic preparation.

"The organization [komplektovaniya] of schools and the professional and medical selection of conscripts in accord with the demands of the USSR Minister of Defense is a vital problem. We need to show more concern for medical support in the preparation of specialists for the army and navy and for the creation of the necessary conditions for this.

"The Presidium of the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee does not exclude the president of the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee or the vice-chairmen, L.

Kadatskiy, and S. Kharlamov; or the directorate heads P. Grishchuk, V. Kanastratov, and S. Maslov from responsibility for such a state of affairs in the training base and the organization of instruction in the society's schools. They obviously did not exhibit the necessary diligence in their work nor the necessary dependability in the realization of the decisions of the IX DOSAAF congress.

"Instances of assigning DOSAAF school graduates in the army and navy without consideration of their expertise continue to occur. For example, according to the data from the Black Sea and Northern Fleets, in the spring 1987 call-up only three out of four of the conscripts sent to them by the military commissariats had received training in the DOSAAF naval schools. Many military commissariats are known to send DOSAAF school graduates into services for which they have not received training. This is evidence of serious shortcomings in the influence of DOSAAF and the local organs of the military administration. We must repair this influence and repair it quickly.

"Comrades!

"The initial military training of young people at the training centers is a critical part of their preparation for service in the armed forces. To speak straightforwardly, the work of these centers has been neglected. This occurs partly because the contingent of trainees in some areas is insignificant and partly because of poor work by the rayon and city committees of our society. This is why not nearly all of the young people in Georgia (DOSAAF Central Committee chairman G. Naneysvili) in the Karel ASSR (Yu. Smirnov) in Novgorod Oblast (Ye. Belov) in Irkutsk Oblast (former chairman V. Merkushev) and in a whole group of other oblasts in the RSFSR go through initial military training prior to being called to actual military service. The USSR DOSAAF Central Committee has pointed this shortcoming out more than once but L. Kadatskiy, and V. Kanastratov, the men responsible for this area are not showing the necessary persistence in setting right the work of the training centers.

"At the IX DOSAAF Congress serious attention was given to the weak precautionary work undertaken by the committees responsible for preventing air and ground transportation accidents. However, not nearly all of our organizations have made positive improvements in this area. During the review period in DOSAAF we continued to see automobile and aviation catastrophes. They are usually connected with irresponsibility, a low level of discipline demanded by the superiors both from themselves and from their subordinates, lack of control, and an absence of the necessary efforts to curtail drunkenness. Therefore, in all the society's organizations it is necessary to guarantee a decisive change in the direction of precautionary work, to learn to point out the most vulnerable areas from the point of view of safety, and to

foresee preventative measures of an educational, organizational, and technical character. Most importantly, however, we must raise the level of discipline and execution.

"Plan assignments for the years 1983 through 1987 were completely fulfilled. More than 10.2 million people completed training and increased their qualifications in 75 different professions. Every second driver in the country received his training in the DOSAAF system. However, the organization and quality of cadre training in several republic level, kray level, and oblast level DOSAAF organizations are not presently meeting the increased demands.

"Work towards overcoming the tendency to decrease the amount of training and the quantity of professions has not been sufficiently effective. Twenty one DOSAAF organizations did not fulfill their plans for the XI five year period. We continue to see extremely low indicators on the quality of training from such DOSAAF organizations as the Georgian SSR (G. Naneyshvili), Turkmen SSR (former chairman A. Rozyyev), Northern Osetin ASSR (P. Tsallagov), Vologda Oblast (former chairman A. Ivanov) and Tomsk Oblast (V. Yaskevich). There are more than a few technical sport clubs and even schools where the material base does not guarantee an intensification in the training process or the quality of cadre training. The reasons for this are shortcomings resulting in an insufficient approach to planning, a weak material interest on the part of the cadres, and a lack of cooperation with the local organs of power and with the industrial enterprise directors both from the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee, in particular the section headed by Ye. Mityayev, and from the committees.

"The problem consists of significantly raising the quality of specialist training, guaranteeing unconditional plan fulfillment, assimilating new professions and specialties with a consideration not only of the real economic demands, but also of those demands which the party and the government present for preparing the population for the possibility of war, natural disasters, and large scale accidents.

"In many of the society's organizations there are technical courses and clubs, laboratories, and trade model buildings.

"However, this aspect of the society's work needs further development. We must implement additional measures to activate the process of the creation of new clubs of amateur technical creativity of our young people. We must do everything necessary so that they can begin to give a practical payoff more quickly. The methodological center, headed by V. Osyko, has so far shown little initiative or creativity in this area.

"Together with this, the level of development of technical sports which we have attained, clearly does not meet the demands of the times or the requirements and spiritual needs of the young. The struggle for mass participation in sports is not being actively pursued everywhere.

"A serious brake on the development of mass participation in sports and on the attainment of high results from sports is the weak material-technical base. However, this problem is being solved very slowly. The tasks assigned by the government including those imposed on DOSAAF enterprises are not being completely fulfilled nor are they being achieved with high quality. For this reason the requirements in sports equipment (cars, motorcycles, radiostations, motors and boats for water motor sports, and so on) are not close to being completely satisfied.

"Industry is giving our sports clubs an extremely small quantity of high quality target firearms, air rifles, and ammunition for them.

"The DOSAAF Central Committee is giving the Ministry of Aviation Industry a request to cover the DOSAAF organizations' demand for SU-26M airplanes which acquitted themselves well at the last European championship in 1987. They also should accelerate serial production of new helicopters.

"At the same time do we always use that which we have in a rational and economic way? We must answer directly that we do not always.

"In this regard the USSR DOSAAF Central committee deputy chairman V. Suvorov, as well as the directors of the directorates and sections of the central apparatus A. Vinnik, G. Barsukov, and S. Nikitenko deserve criticism for insufficient organizational work and for weak control over and help rendered to local organizations.

"However, working in approximately the same conditions, the local DOSAAF committees act in different ways. In Belorussia (P. Maksimov), Lithuania (G. Taurinskas), the Udmurt ASSR (K. Yusupov), the Tatar ASSR (G. Shakirov), Bryansk Oblast (A. Mikheyev), Kuybyshev Oblast (V. Glebskii) and several other oblasts for example, plans for capital construction are successfully fulfilled. At the same time, the DOSAAF organizations in Kazakhstan, Estonia, Krasnodar and Krasnoyarsk krais, (whose former chairmen were B. Baitasov, E. Pallase, F. Kolesnikov, Yu. Konev) have systematically not accepted their assigned limits and conduct construction poorly. Thus, most frequently, our business is held up by the insufficient persistence and weakness of organizational work by the DOSAAF committees and directors themselves. Being customers they do not always fulfill the functions incumbent upon them.

"We must admit that the vice chairman of the DOSAAF Central Committee, V. Suvorov; as well as the head of the administration, G. Barsukov have not produced satisfactory results in this area of initiative. Their control locally over the organization and the quality of capital construction was weak.

"Gross violations of financial discipline, thriftlessness, waste and theft of valuable materials and money have done a significant amount of damage to the DOSAAF economy. The greatest damage of this type was done in the Ukraine and Turkmenia, in Bashkir ASSR, Stavropol Kray (former committee chairmen A. Korotchenko, A. Rozyyev, v. Gataullin, and N. Golodnikov), and in Altai Kray, and Kursk and Saratov Oblasts (chairmen V. Katayev, V. Butvina, and A. Cherednik).

"Remarking the shortcomings in the financial work of the specified organizations, we cannot fail to speak about the omissions of the corresponding structural subdivisions of the DOSAAF Central Committee apparatus, first of all the directorate of financial planning, the bookkeeping, the monitoring and auditing directorates, and the production enterprise directorate. These are headed by B. Morozov, D. Tsydenov, and A. Ilyuwhchenko. They clearly do not possess sufficient precautionary direction in their monitoring and auditing work, nor the necessary exactingness toward subordinate services.

"Over the course of a long period of time a whole row of organizations lag behind in many areas of work and the committees which direct them, reconcile themselves with these shortcomings, they do not take the necessary

steps in the restructuring of their activity. This includes the Tadzhik DOSAAF Central Committee, and the Vologda, Dursk, Perm, Kamchatka, and Buryat Oblast Committees.

"Together with this, in the work with cadres we must not forget lessons from the recent past, we must draw from them definite conclusions. I want to remind you that in the review period seven chairmen of kray and oblast committees, 12 school directors, and 19 aviation organization directors were removed from their posts for shortcomings in their work and personal behavior, and for abuse of their positions. It stands to reasons that this is not merely connected with the selection of cadres but also with major shortcomings in their upbringing. The USSR DOSAAF Central Committee and its Cadres Section headed by K. Solopov bear a significant share of the responsibility for this.

"We should also mention forthrightly, that the high cadre turnover rate of the regional (city) committee chairmen, technical-sport complex heads, and practical training instructors delivers a considerable blow to mass defense work.

"The status of the direction of primary organizations and measures for its improvement have more than once been discussed in the Central Committee.

"However, there remain many shortcomings and unsolved problems in this matter. It is no coincidence that they never disappear from the pages of our press and have become an object of heated discussion at the DOSAAF selection-review meetings, conferences, and congresses.

"The work of many of DOSAAF's primary training institutions evokes particular concern. Absolutely all of our youth preparing to serve in the Army and Navy receive training in these organizations."

**WWII Policy of Shooting Retreating,  
Surrendering Soldiers Examined**

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[Excerpts] Many discussions revolve around a specific order—order No 227. It seems very symptomatic that it is today that order No 227 is increasingly at the center of attention. There is something in it that seems special, even historical, at the present time. I should like to discuss this, and something more as well.

We need not bow our heads in shame before anybody for what we did during the war. We conquered the plague of the 20th century—the fascists, who by 1941 had covered almost all of Europe. We need not bow our heads before anyone...

Order 227 was signed on 28 July 1942 by the USSR people's commissar of defense. This order is now better known as Stalin's order "Not a step backward!" There are orders that are secret and those that are not. Order 227 was not secret although, to be sure, it bears a stamp: "Not to be published in the press." Why? Simply because it discussed exclusively military affairs, or to be quite precise—it pertained only to those soldiers and commanders who were located on the front lines. The order generally discusses troop discipline or the need to strengthen it by any means available. But such orders have always been written in all armies. And they are being written today.

True, in order 227 all this was expressed, shall we say, in a more resolute form. Where was the enemy during those days? The defensive chapter of the Stalingrad epic began in July. The enemy was raging just a step away from Russia's main street—the Volga. In August German tank drivers poured water from the Volga over the tracks of their overheated machines.

Order No 323 of 16 October 1942, elaborating on order No 227, says directly that "the main reason for our temporary failures at the front was the weak troop discipline." At that time in that situation this was the most important thing for saving the homeland. In this situation what would be the point in starting conversations if on the eve of the war the troops were to be deployed... It was too late to talk about this in 1942. We must learn the lessons from what happened and not beat ourselves over the head. It is fair that everyone who lived, worked, and fought in this war now thinks that he made his contribution to the victory. It would also be fair if today everyone, from the rank-and-file soldier to the marshal, from the machine tool operator to the minister, were also to see his share of the blame, his mistakes in relation to what took place. Otherwise, what kinds of masters of our country are we?

One asks, what is unclear and incomprehensible here? Perhaps the fact that order 227 introduced officer penal battalions on the scale of each front, and on the scale of

each army, penal companies for soldiers and noncommissioned officers. And perhaps the discovery that this order stipulated having obstacle detachments at the rear lines of several divisions? But what are penal battalions. They are the same thing as disciplinary battalions during peacetime. And they have existed and still exist today in all armies, including ours. In our Armed Forces disciplinary units were created as early as the civil war. Initially, that is what they were called—penal units. Convicted deserters and those who did not wish to serve in the Red Army were sent there.

Obstacle detachments have also existed in other armies. The Germans, for example, introduced them before we did. They introduced them immediately after their crushing defeat near Moscow. And it was only at the price of these obstacle detachments and also officer penal battalions and enlisted penal companies that they managed to halt the flight of their troops after the strike near Moscow. "They finally formed special obstacle detachments, placed them behind the unstable divisions, and instructed to shoot panic mongers on the spot if they arbitrarily attempted to abandon their positions or allow themselves to be taken captive..."—it says in order 227 concerning the Germans.

This will probably irritate some people: How is it that we also introduced penal battalions? What does it mean to acquire experience at war? What does it mean to learn at war? Such is the dialectic of war.

In keeping with order 227 the only ones assigned to obstacle detachments were soldiers and officers of infantry units, the most steadfast ones who had spent some time at the front. I met several of them. Heroic people! They wore medals and had been wounded many times even before they were sent to the obstacle detachments. I listened to their stories and understood that those obstacle detachments of ours were not so much a deterrent as an effective way of helping the weak men who had never been under fire before. It was everyone's duty to shoot anyone fleeing the field of battle. And it happened that these obstacle detachment members received the major strike from the enemy. This was their main task—not to let the enemy into the rear. The German obstacle detachments consisted largely of our traitors. This is the way the German command drew its regiments into pincers: in front—the "bolsheviks" with their "commissars," and behind—even if they were no longer enemies they were still foreign and would have no pity... The German soldier at the front lines was pressed by enemies from all sides from the very beginning. Philosophy? Psychology? Behaviorism, which sees the difference between the behavior of an animal and that of a human only from the standpoint of the degree of danger? Social behaviorism, which altogether denies the concepts of freedom and human worth? The one who has nowhere to turn becomes the hero. Biology?...

No, the words they selected for order 227 were not especially literary. But where have you ever seen orders written in the language of the poet Fet? The order is a

special form of communication, it is a means of forcing, of compelling, of motivating people to give their lives. I have read many of Stalin's orders from that time, i.e. 1941-1942. There are some among them that are written in even stronger language.

But now let us ask ourselves about this: for whom specifically were this and other such orders written? For Matrosov? For Gastello? For the heroes of the Brest fortress? For whom were the officer penal battalions introduced? For Pokryshkin? For Kozhedub? For Kuznetsov? Behind whom were the obstacle detachments placed? Behind Panfilov's men? Behind Shironin's men? Around Olshan's men? Galder in his diary entry for 6 July 1941 wrote: "They report from the units that in individual sections enemy tank crews are abandoning their vehicles, but in the majority of cases they lock themselves in the tanks and prefer to burn along with their vehicles." Were these orders really written for the majority, who prefer to burn along with their vehicles. Here is another of Galder's entries: "The enemy command is operating energetically and skillfully. The enemy is fighting bitterly and fanatically, 11 July 1941." And when was order 227 published? On 28 July...1942. They were fighting well, but not all of them. And they needed everyone down to the last man. So for whom was order 227 written? It says for whom in the order itself: "A troop unit on the Southern front, following the panic mongers, abandoned Rostov and Novochoerkassk without serious resistance and without an order from Moscow, thus disgracing its flag." Without resistance. Without an order. These are the men for whom the penal units and obstacle detachments were created. But are there other, more intelligent ways of stopping units who without resistance and without an order abandon their combat positions? The order contains the lines: "We must no longer tolerate commanders... who arbitrarily abandon their combat positions. We must no longer tolerate it when commanders...allow a couple of panic mongers to determine the position on the battlefield, convince other fighting men to retreat, and open up the front to the enemy"—this is also the contingent of the penal battalions and companies. Such are the "romanticism and heroism" of these specific subdivisions. Unfortunately, it is not only on the battlefield that "a couple of panic mongers" can determine the situation. This is applicable in our peaceful times as well.

And what honorable and steadfast patriot would be degraded or shocked by these words from order 227: "Panic mongers and cowards are to be executed on the spot... Not a step backward without an order from the command... Commanders...retreating from their combat positions without orders from above are traitors to the homeland. We must treat such commanders and political workers like traitors to the homeland..." This is not a war game. This is war itself. Here they do not ask you: do you wish to be shot or do you wish to be taken captive? Execution on the spot—such is the language of the order in real war. How can one but recall here the great "Lay of Igor's Host," perhaps our very first military tale, which

passionately appeals for unity before a constant threat from outside: "And Igor said to his armed detachment: 'Brothers and comrades in arms! It is better to be killed than held captive; so, brothers, let us mount our swift steeds...' " This has been confirmed among the people for centuries. And they have succeeded in defending their native land.

Let us forget about the front for a minute. There was also the rear. This is what determines to a decisive degree the strength of the front.

I was born in Magnitogorsk and I lived in this city and also in Chelyabinsk with my parents throughout the war. Our barracks in Magnitogorsk stood on the left bank of the Ural River. At that time all of Magnitogorsk was situated there next to the enclosure of the world-famous metallurgical combine. The barracks were immense and the letter "p" designated them as "German" because before our workers settled there they were inhabited by German specialists who participated in the construction of the combine. We lived there during both 1941 and 1937. Incidentally, some authors now write about the year 1937 as nothing other than one continuous nightmare, an unrelieved blood bath. Yet there were also other colors in this terrible year. It reminds many people of something else. I am from the barracks of Magnitogorsk. Now everyone tells about himself, so I shall tell about myself. I had four aunts and an uncle. In 1937 they were all from 35 to 40 years of age. How do they remember this year? As one of self-sacrificing labor. They did not experience the repressions personally. True, one of our neighbors was taken in—for embezzlement. This bright image also remains from that time. Our "German" barracks were very good and we received a room there because our father was a Stakhanovite and one of the best steam driven crane mechanics at the combine. Yes, we each had our own 1937.

In 1937, for example, high-quality grades of steel arrived in Magnitogorsk for smelting. It is easy to say that they arrived. The former director of the combine, G. Nosov, writes: "The smelting of high-quality steel was not successful in Magnitogorsk. Thus the order for axle steel was not filled and orders for other kinds of steel with improved quality were filled with great difficulty and there were many defects. There were even rumors to the effect that at Magnitogorsk they were not able to smelt real steel. Yet it was not a matter of ability, but a lack of culture." This is what the parents of children of Magnitka lived with in 1937—how to smelt high-quality steel? And yet the first blast furnace was not started up here until 31 January 1932. On 7 July 1933 came the first marten furnace, and on 27 July 1933 the first blooming mill went into operation in Magnitka, that is, the first rolled metal was obtained on this date. Residents of our barracks did not shoot anybody and nobody "took them in."

But today some people do not seem to know much about the war Hitler waged against us. Some people have already raised a flag with a swastika. Hitler is already an

idol for some... Has the choice been made? At that time the choice was not made by Stalin. The choice was made by the people. They won. That is the way it has always been with us and that is the way it will always be. Today some people cannot seem to make their tongue twist so as to say proudly as they used to: "I am happy that I was born in the Soviet country." What next?

The first builders arrived at Magnitnaya mountain in March of 1929. A total of 35 enthusiasts. But by the end of the year there were already 7,000 people working here. Magnitka began with the barracks and warehouse facilities, with the bath and clubs, the shops and horse yards. The construction of the Magnitogorsk Metallurgical Combine was declared to be the first all-union shock Komsomol construction project. "Magnitostroy. To the director of the world giant. I am a shock worker. I even have bonuses for good work, I want to give Magnitostroy a helping hand, and I wish to come to the world giant.

"Do not write a response because our brigade has already been taken from Moscow and is on its way to you. Komsomol member, Lyashchenko." Romain Rolland, Jules Vaillant-Couturier, and Vladislav Bronevskiy have dedicated verses to Magnitostroy... People of 36 nationalities have worked on the gigantic construction project. Up to their knees in mud. In penetrating winds. In freezing weather. Wearing padded vests. With ragged sandals on their feet. Mechanization amounted exclusively to spades, picks, crowbars, wheelbarrows, and stretchers. Tents filled with holes. The mansions, that is, the barracks, appeared later. Bonfires on the frozen ground... A prison camp? A celebration of creation!...

My blood begins to boil when I read that not long before the beginning of the war Voroshilov solemnly reported that the army had been purged "down to the bones" and 40,000 people had been purged from it. There is not and will not be any pardon for those who committed these deeds. But still if a monument were raised for Yegorov, Blyukher, Tukhachevsky, and the others as "victims," I am convinced that they would be mightily offended, and they would be right. I am convinced that they would like to remain in the memories of their posterity not as victims of the jailers but as who they actually were—unbending warriors and heroes. And in general in monuments to victims of repression one sees something cold and indifferent: they shot each one individually, but the monument is for them en masse, without faces, without names.

We cannot have even a shadow of confusion in view of the rarity of such orders. Or hundreds and hundreds of us did not repeat the victory of Matrosov without any orders. Or ours is not the only army in the world in which both aircraft pilots and tank drivers have gone to the battering ram! Or it is not our people who have thrown themselves under a tank with a bunch of grenades! Or it is not our pilots who have chosen to blow up at least one more tank rather than jump from a burning vehicle! Or these things did not happen among us!... But Hitler had

a concrete plan. "The Fuhrer thinks that...the infantry units cannot take Moscow until August." What else? "During the time while the infantry units are moving toward Moscow," in his opinion, "it will be possible to clear out the entire North. After this it will be possible to concentrate tank units in the region east of Moscow." What then? Then "Afghanistan and other small countries... The colonial empire, which should include Togo, Cameroon, and the Belgian Congo. A return to East Africa is desirable but not necessary..." Yes, my Magnitogorsk was assigned a minuscule role here on the road of the fascists to world domination.

And in real wars orders always have and always will call things by their real names. "Certain unintelligent people at the front console themselves with discussions of the fact that we can retreat farther to the east because we have a great deal of territory, a large amount of land, and a large population, and with the notion that we shall always have plenty to eat—this is how they want to justify their disgraceful behavior at the front"—I am reading the lines from order 227. What I like very much here is that the order places unintelligent people right behind cowards and panic mongers. Why so? We know that cowards and panic mongers were simply shot on the spot. But what happened to unintelligent people in this situation? And what do we call a commander who for no purpose whatever, out of his own stupidity, has turned over the people entrusted to him? No, a simple reprimand will not do here. People have been shot for this. But if he was simply an unintelligent, irresponsible person and because of him a plant, a kolkhoz, or a military regiment has fallen to pieces? If because of his incompetence, ignorance, corruption, and mental laziness or, finally, because of ordinary bureaucratism a new invention was not introduced into production or advanced experience was not adopted? Previously such a figure went before the tribunal and was executed. Times are changing. Methods of leadership and management are also changing. There can be no return to the old ways. But even today what do people call a person who has destroyed a plant, a kolkhoz, or a military regiment? If they are being objective. This is crucial for all times—during both war and peace. By 1942: "We have lost more than 70 million people and more than 800 million poods of grain..."—these figures were reported in the same order. "We no longer have superiority over the Germans either in terms of human reserves or in terms of grain supplies. To retreat farther means to destroy ourselves and our homeland along with us. Every plot of land we leave behind us will greatly strengthen the enemy and will greatly weaken our defense and our homeland... Not a step backward! This must be our main appeal now. We must defend every position stubbornly, down to our last drop of blood...."

Let us look at these lines of the order once again. Before 22 June 1941, as it says in the order, we had superiority over the Germans in human reserves, grain, and, as we shall see below, in more than just these. Where did everything go during these few weeks and months? Ah,

how people like to pile all the blame onto one or two people or just onto the generals, as was done recently in an article by one of our respected writers from the front. True, during the war there were generals whom nobody remembers any more. There were also enlisted men whose names will live throughout the ages. But concerning the competence of our generals during wartime let us ask the general, the chief of the general staff of the German infantry divisions. Here is what he said about them on the fifth day of the war: "The enemy...is distinguished by firm and energetic leadership.... The stubborn resistance of the Russians forces us to engage in battle according to all the rules of our military regulations. In Poland and the West we could allow ourselves a certain amount of latitude and deviation from the established principles; now this is inadmissible." The chief of the general staff has no time for the so-called "truth of the trenches," but the time will come for us to discuss this "truth" as well. The chief of the general staff has his own level, his own counterpart—the chief of the general staff of the enemy, the enemy general staff... The chief of the general staff does not quarrel with the individual soldier, he does not quarrel with the division, the platoon, or even the regiment. He quarrels with people of equal rank—with generals. What was 1941 like, what should it be called? Those who fought without thinking about themselves will never call it a year of tragic defeats. They have always said and still do say—1941 was our most difficult year. Anyway in 1945 things were already a little easier.... Today you cannot understand some people: either they are denying what they have supposedly always believed or they have stopped concealing what they have always believed.

Many people do not like everything in our literature now. But I should like to ask some writers what they have done for the soldier of the modern army? For example, so that the soldier will be more disciplined and carry out his duty more conscientiously? With the weapon of the word. As was done, say, by Serafimovich, Furmanov, Sholokhov, Leonov, Simonov...—as was done by almost all the great Russian and Soviet writers. Perhaps they have written a short story about the modern army? A tale? A novel? Nothing of the sort. Have they created an image of the soldier in the modern army which would grip the minds and hearts of the rank-and-file troops and noncommissioned officers, the officers and generals? Yes, Dostoevsky wrote about a great deal, including about criminals. But still he did not avoid the other subject; he considered it his civic duty, the duty of a loving son of the homeland to put in a good word for the soldier as well. Where are the writers who will interpret the feats of our soldiers?

Order No 227 was read before the troop formation in every regiment. For not every member of the regiment of this front-line writer, figuratively speaking, dropped his own German at Brest or the Pripyat; they had to be forced to do that by order 227. Where? Right next door her, in the village of Kryukovo. Now this is Moscow. For it was then that the article was published with this title:

"Today Moscow is the Front." It contains these words: "We must be ready for the streets of Moscow to become the arena of heated battles, bayonet attacks, and hand-to-hand combat with the enemy. This means that every street must now assume a combat appearance, each building must become a fortress, each window—a firing point, and each Moscow resident—a soldier."

We are eternally indebted to those who turned back the fascist aggressor at Moscow, but we shall always question those who allowed the enemy to get that far. Not only the generals let them through, or at least the question is not one pertaining only to generals...

I have met many people who served at the front. Once in a compartment of a train I befriended a person who had spent the whole war, from beginning to end, on the front lines in the same job—commander of an infantry platoon. Such a miraculous case is unique, probably because infantry platoons died at the front before the rank-and-file did. What are platoon members at the front or platoon members in general? They are the best soldiers and then some—soldiers who are always in the vanguard, who are always the first to attack. As my platoon member confessed, he had completely replaced his personnel three times during the war under the paragraph "irretrievable losses." He also told me that about 20 years after the war he still did not believe that he had stayed alive, and he saw in the fact that he did survive a certain injustice with respect to those who had been in his platoon and had died. Because of this his conscience was not quite clear, as he told me. I asked him a lot of questions and I recall one question I asked him point blank:

"Why did you retreat before the Volga?"

He answered immediately, in a flash:

"We could not fire. In my platoon if three to five people were able to fire, I considered it invincible. If you approach some people they will fire with their eyes closed. You say: 'Open your eyes, there is nobody in front of you.' But he would fire like that if there were someone in front of him as well."

In this connection—who hit whom and how many—there are now endless discussions about losses, our losses. Our losses, as rule, are simply immense, and here megalomania runs free. There is a curious tendency here: the Germans estimate their losses as low as they can. The figures for our losses are greater than theirs by a factor of 4-5 and more. This did not begin just today. Here, for example, is what is written in the book "Battle of the Century" by twice Hero of the Soviet Union, Marshal of the Soviet Union V. Chuykov, one of the heroes of the battle of Stalingrad. "Hitler tried to mask the failure of his strategic plans by creating an artificial halo around the already defeated 6th Army. On 30 January 1943 Hitler's headquarters published a special announcement which said: 'The Russians are offering soldiers of the 6th

Army the opportunity to surrender, but all of them without exception continue to fight where they are." The next day the headquarters related: "A few German and Allied soldiers have surrendered to Soviet troops." These "few" amounted to more than 91,000. Hitler remained silent about the fate of their 2,500 officers, 24 generals, and Field Marshal General Paulus who was being held captive at that time... According to modest calculations, the city on the Volga cost the German command no less than 1.5 killed, wounded, missing in action, and captured men. It would not hurt to focus attention on this figure "according to modest estimate" because in some western publications the total losses of the Germans are estimated at 1.5-2.0 million... They included as losses only those who died actually during attack, in battle. Moreover the count included only "pure-blooded Arians." The rest did not count. But were these "Arians" the only ones who fought against us? What happened to their many allies? We have what one might call an entirely different method of calculating our losses. But what is the outcome? The outcome is that ten of our soldiers were killed for every one aggressor. They say that they just marched, fired, and left. They say there was nothing terrible... But that is not the way it was on the front lines. In 1942 U.S. President Roosevelt wrote: "It is difficult for me to get away from the simple fact that the Russians are killing more enemy soldiers than all the other 25 countries of the united nations taken together." Who was this trying to frighten us with some kind of syndrome. Calculations of losses in war are a very arbitrary and delicate matter. If a person has been wounded three times during a war—how many wounded are there? If a person is missing and the statistics have been sent to the higher-ups, and then a month later he is discovered in the neighboring hospital. A person is missing in action but now it is discovered that he is in Canada—he is still included in the paragraph for irretrievable losses. Moreover, there was an order: if a person has been absent for 15 days, he must be reported as missing in action. But some people went home for a month or two. And some people never did leave but joined battle with the partisans before the victory. How are they counted?

There is not doubt that the commander is to blame if he has never taught the soldier to fire with his eyes open. But what about the soldier himself. What kind of person is he? Is he some kind of a pawn who had no idea of where they were leading him from the rear? Those three to five were able. Somehow they learned how to fire their weapons. Finally, anybody who wanted to would become a Voroshilov marksman...

Perhaps it is something altogether different? Perhaps someone still did not have enough diligence? Responsibility? Perhaps some people were looking into the bottle more than through the sight of the weapon? And perhaps some people had decided that the bolsheviks could do without them in the war? All right, let us say again that the commander was bad, but you, soldier, you knew that you were the one to go into battle, where all they do is fire weapons. Why did you not learn to fire? And after this we complain that at the front there were not enough

cartridges, artillery shells, or ammunition in general. But with this kind of firing no number of plants making cartridges will be sufficient. This is timely even today, during peacetime training. It is not a commanders' whim, not an empty command slogan: "Hit the target with the first shot! Hit the target with the first artillery shell!" The person who has achieved this has no need to fear anything or anybody in any battle.

And now about those notorious rifles which were also supposed to be in short supply, with one rifle for two and sometimes three people. But first let someone who fought in the first part of the war tell about how many times he or his neighbor in panic abandoned his rifle as though it were an unnecessary stick? Twice? Three times?... Then he would come to the commander: "Give me a rifle." Never mind—discipline at the front...

For up to this very day from the fields over which the war passed one can find trails of rifles, pistols, machine guns, artillery shells—entire warehouses. How did they all end up there? After all, this is even more surprising and incomprehensible than the award that catches up with the soldier after 5 years. For if you died in combat, your rifle had to be picked up and taken away by your comrades. This was the strictest rule! If they did not do this, the weapon of the person who died on the field of battle was picked up by the enemy—special teams existed for this. One of Hitler's generals attests to this: "In each division located in the rear region and in each antitank company it is necessary to form a tank platoon of captured tanks (that is in each tank division a total of six tank platoons with four or five tanks in each). One tank platoon should be formed in each guard division." That is the way the Germans picked up our weapons and our equipment and turned it against us. So a rusty rifle out of the ground presents a big question. For it reached a point where a person would not be admitted to a hospital without a rifle. Some people today will scream: "Oh, how terrible..." Yet the more people who were captured the more people it was necessary to mobilize to replace them. But there were no weapons for them; they went with the captives. What does industry have to do with this, or mistakes in planning? But these are the statistics: the fascist invasion army in 1941 had 5.5 million men. The Soviet Union was able to resist the troops with 2.68 million men. There were 8 million rifles for that month. We are now right to speak of dependency. Its roots go deep. And the consequences can be tragic.

A dependent... Undisciplined... His many sides are to be found everywhere. But only in war is somebody's dependence, somebody's lack of discipline covered by somebody else's blood or life. And here I wish to ask: does everyone know why from the moment we moved forward and began to liberate the villages and cities we began to see these so-called field registration and enlistment offices?...

**Review of Tukhachevskiy Case Examined**  
*18010247A Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 29 Apr 88 p 3*

[Article by Viktorov, Boris Alekseyevich, Lt. Gen. of Justice<sup>1</sup>: "'Conspiracy' in the Red Army"]

[Text] I greeted the New Year of 1955 on the way from Novosibirsk to Moscow. Of course, I was bothered by the question: why was I, the prosecutor of the Western Siberian Military District, being summoned by the Procurator General of the USSR R. A. Rudenko? Roman Andreyevich opened a file that had been lying on his desk and I saw my personal records. He said:

"You are being appointed to the position of deputy chief military prosecutor. You must immediately form a group of military prosecutors and investigators who have had nothing to do with cases of special jurisdiction in the past. The group should engage in an examination of the complaints and letters regarding the rehabilitation of people who have been unfairly convicted, and above all the case of the "military-fascist conspiracy."

And so the special group of military prosecutors and investigators of the Main Military Procuracy (GVP) intended for reviewing cases in terms of "newly discovered circumstances..." Who was included in it? Nikolay Grigoryevich Savinich before the war completed the Minsk Institute of Law and participated in the Soviet-Finnish War, the Great Patriotic War... Nikolay Lavrentyevich Kozhura, a graduate of the Military Law Academy who proved his worth in practical work in the position of military investigator... Their immediate superior was Dmitriy Pavlovich Terekhov who had work experience not only in military justice agencies but also in the central party staff.

In front of us on the desk was the criminal case charging M. N. Tukhachevskiy, I. E. Yakir, I. P. Uborevich, A. I. Kork, R. P. Eydeyan, B. M. Feldman, V. M. Primakov, and V. K. Putny of crimes listed in articles 58<sup>1b</sup>, 58<sup>8</sup>, and 58<sup>11</sup> of the RSFSR Criminal Code. All of these are especially dangerous state crimes: treason, espionage, terrorism, and the creation of a counterrevolutionary organization. Just from the list of articles from the Criminal Code one could judge the severity of the crimes of the people listed on the file folder.

The first pages of the case... References to the arrest: "NKVD agencies have information concerning hostile activity..." But nothing specific about the activity itself... And where were the prosecutor's sanctions for the arrest? There were no sanctions... This could not be! We looked. We became convinced that there were none! But how was that possible?... It had only been a half year since the new Constitution had been adopted!

We continued to reflect: who were they, these conspirators?... Tukhachevskiy was a Marshal of the Soviet Union and all the others were also high-ranking military leaders. But there was absolutely nothing about their careers in life and the military. They were traitors, turncoats. And that was all.

I shall say honestly that we did not know very much specific about these people either! We had never actually seen a civil war. Then, after we were adults, we only heard about it: there had been a civil war, there had been a bitter battle with the White Guards and the interventionists, and all these victories were credited to Iosif Vissarionovich Stalin. Among the heroes of the civil war one most frequently heard mentioned Voroshilov and Budenny. Songs were sung about them. Of course we knew of Chapayev, Shchors, Parkhomenko. And that was all... But these? What had they done?

My colleagues waded through a mass of documents, books, newspapers, and magazines, and then the writer Lev Nikulin came to the Main Military Procuracy, spread his archive out on the desk, and said:

"I knew the 'chief,' Marshal Tukhachevskiy. I know all about his life..."

Briefly, literally in a couple of words, he told about Tukhachevskiy and his "accomplices."

Mikhail Nikolayevich Tukhachevskiy: born 1893; member of the Bolshevik Party since April 1918; commander of armies and navies during Great Patriotic War; awarded the Orders of Lenin and the Red Banner; candidate member of VKP(b) [All-Union Communist Party (of Bolsheviks)] Central Committee; member of USSR TsIK [Central Executive Committee]; until 11 May 1937 first deputy people's commissar of defense of the USSR and after 11 May—troop commander of the Volga Military District; arrested on 26 May 1937.

Iona Emmanuilovich Yakir: born 1896; member of the Bolshevik Party since April 1917; awarded Order of the Red Banner three times; candidate member of the VKP(b) Central Committee and member of the USSR TsIK; troop commander of the Kiev Military District; Army Commander 1st Rank.

Iyeronim Petrovich Uborevich: born 1896; member of the Bolshevik party since April 1917; awarded Order of the Red Banner three times; candidate member of VKP(b) Central Committee and member of USSR TsIK; troop commander of Belorussian Military District; Army Commander 1st Rank.

Avzug Ivanovich Kork: born 1887; party member since 1927; awarded Order of the Red Banner twice; member of USSR TsIK; head of the Military Academy imeni M. V. Frunze; Army Commander 2d Rank.

Robert Petrovich Eydeman: born 1895; party member since March 1917; awarded Order of the Red Banner twice and Order of the Red Star; member of USSR TsIK; chairman of the central council of the USSR Osoaviakhim [Society for Assistance to the Defense, Aviation, and Chemical Construction of the USSR]; corps commander.

Boris Mironovich Feldman: born 1890; party member since 1914; awarded Order of the Red Banner three times; member of the USSR TsIK; chief of one of the main administrations of the Red Army; corps commander.

Vitaliy Markovich Primakov: born 1897; party member since 1914; awarded Order of the Red Banner three times; member of USSR TsIK; deputy troop commander of Leningrad Military District; corps commander.

Vitovt Kazimirovich Putna: born 1893; party member since February 1917; awarded Order of the Red Banner three times; military attache in Great Britain (through 1936); corps commander...

In a word, we had before us brilliant specimens of real bolshevik Leninists. It seemed quite impossible to have any doubts about these people's devotion to the Soviet regime. But jurists cannot count on emotions. So far we had before us a case whose concluding document was a reprimand from special legal office which said: all of them are enemies of the people...

Behind the references to the arrests were records of interrogations. In a single voice, without any contradictions, all those arrested admitted that they had engaged in treason and espionage and, having joined together in a conspiracy, they set as their goal the overthrow of the Soviet regime. In the summary document, the conclusion of guilty, it is asserted:

"The investigatory materials established the participation of the accused, and also Ya. B. Gamarnik who committed suicide, in antistate relations with leaders of military districts of a foreign country that conducts an unfriendly policy with respect to the USSR. While in this country's military intelligence service the accused regularly delivered secret information to its military circles, committed acts of sabotage in order to undermine the power of the Worker-Peasant Red Army, prepared for the defeat of the Red Army in the event of a military attack upon the USSR, and had as their goal to contribute to the dismemberment of the Soviet Union and the restoration of the power of the land owners and capitalists in the USSR."

Attached to the file later was a copy of the announcement "In the Procuracy of the USSR" (published in the press on 11 November 1937):

"The case of Tukhachevskiy, M. N., Yakir, I. E., Ubovich, I. P., Kork, A. I., Eydeman, R. P., Feldman, B. M., Primakov, V. M. and Putna, V. K., who were arrested by NKVD agencies at various times, has been closed with the investigation and turned over to the court..."

Here is what immediately drew our attention: the lack of correspondence between the dates of the arrests and the dates of the first interrogations, which were conducted several days later. Could it be that they waited so long to interrogate the people who had been arrested? It was assumed that the interrogations had been conducted but what they revealed did not suit those who had initiated the case. Evidence was undoubtedly necessary, but what kind? Only that which confirmed their guilt. It had to be obtained at any price...

We noticed that on several pages of the records there were gray-brown spots... Such spots are left by drops of blood... Perhaps this was also blood? We consulted with specialists and ordered a forensic chemical analysis... It turned out that it actually was blood.

It was becoming increasingly obvious that we had to ask the investigators for clarification on all of these issues. But where were they, these investigators? After all, almost 20 years had passed. Workers of the GVP began to look for them...

But let us return to the materials for now. Here is a shorthand report—the minutes of the meeting of the special legal office of the USSR Supreme Court. It was held on 11 June 1937 and began at 9 a.m. V. V. Ulrikh, an army lawyer, was in charge.

It was explained to the accused: the case is being heard under the policy established by the law of 1 December 1934. It meant: the defense attorney is not allowed to participate in the legal process; the sentence is final and not subject to appeal...

The shorthand report amounted to only a couple of pages. This showed how primitive the hearing was for such serious and numerous accusations. And also the fact that the entire "process" lasted only one day also spoke for itself. There is no need to restate everything contained in the shorthand report. In order to get a better idea of the evidence given by the accused regarding one point or another of the accusation, we grouped them. And here is what we ended up with.

Tukhachevskiy declared first of all: "I had an ardent love for the Red Army, an ardent love for the Homeland, which I have defended since the civil war... As concerns meetings and conversations with representatives of the German general staff and the staff of their military attache in the USSR, these were of an official nature and they took place during maneuvers and receptions. Our military equipment was shown to the Germans and they had the opportunity to observe the changes taking place

in the organization and supply of the troops. But all this took place before Hitler came to power, when our relations with Germany changed sharply."

Similar testimony was given by Uborevich, Kork, Feldman, Yakir, and Putna. Additionally, in 1929 Yakir had studied in the General Staff Academy in Germany and delivered lectures about the Red Army there, and Kork for a certain amount of time performed the duties of military attache in Germany. But what were the kinds of military equipment or information that the accused supposedly divulged and did they actually constitute a military secret? There was no answer to this in the file. And at that time they did not look for one...

This question also arose during the trial: did the accused share the views of the Trotskyite leaders and right-wing opportunists along with their platforms? To this question Tukhachevskiy answered: "I have always, in all cases spoken out against Trotsky when there was a debate, just as I spoke out against the rightists."

This assertion was not refuted by anything or anybody. But Putna admitted "having connections" with I. N. Smirnov, and Feldman—with Pyatakov. But no clarification of the nature of these connections was made. It was announced to the court that these people had spoken out against our party's policy and hinted at the possibility of cooperation of their opposition with the military, but this did not take place...

Another grave accusation was that of sabotage to sap the strength of the Red Army. Concerning this point of the accusation Tukhachevskiy, Yakir, Kork, and Uborevich explained that, yes, they had slow rates of construction of military facilities, reconstruction of railroad centers, formation of air landing units and so forth. There were many shortcomings and omissions in the military training of the troops, for which all of them saw their responsibility. At the same time Tukhachevskiy declared the following: "If we applied a little pressure and provided additional funds, I do not think there would be any difficulty here, our position is gaining very strongly, and we can defeat the Polish-German block."

Their persistent defense of the concept of accelerated formation of tank units at the expense of reducing the number of personnel and expenses on the cavalry was regarded as sabotage on the part of Tukhachevskiy as well as Uborevich and Yakir, who actively supported him. In court S. M. Budennyi harshly condemned this concept. Other members in attendance also asked the accused questions trying to expose them in betrayal of the interests of the Red Army: both Blyukher and Belov, and particularly Alksnis, getting from Kork, for example, an answer to the question about turning over to representatives of the German General Staff information about troops of the Moscow Military District. Kork answered that he had repeatedly met with the Germans at diplomatic receptions and held conversations, but he gave them only information he was allowed to give them.

Ulrikh was constantly asking: "Do you corroborate the testimony that was given in the interrogation in the NKVD?" When Tukhachevskiy, Yakir, Kork, and Uborevich would try to explain something, Ulrikh would interrupt: "You are not to deliver a lecture, you are to give testimony." But the accused continued to assert that they were right and that the future war would be a war of engines...

Finally the question was clarified: had they made a deal to oust Voroshilov from the leadership of the Red Army? Tukhachevskiy, Uborevich, Kork, and Putna admitted that they had discussed among themselves the idea of removing Voroshilov. Uborevich explained: when they decided to raise the question of Voroshilov before the government, they were persuaded to attack him by Namarnik, who said he would "speak against Voroshilov."

Why did they want to speak against Voroshilov? What mistakes had he made and what could he be blamed for? This was not clarified in court. But the accused were treated as though they simply had hostile intentions with respect to Comrade Voroshilov.

Now about the final word of the accused. All of them with the exception of Primakov declared their devotion to the cause of the revolution, the Red Army, and Comrade Stalin personally. They requested leniency. They repented if they were guilty of anything.

Primakov's "final word" was essentially a speech accusing all the rest. He stated:

"I must tell the final truth about our conspiracy. Neither in the history of this revolution nor in the history of other revolutions has there been such a conspiracy as ours, either in terms of goals or in terms of composition or in terms of the means the conspiracy selected for itself. Of whom does the conspiracy consist? Who were united under the fascist flag of Trotsky? It united all counterrevolutionary elements; everything that was counterrevolutionary in the Red Army gathered in one place under one banner, under the fascist banner of Trotsky. What means did this conspiracy select? All means: treason, treachery, forsaking their own country, sabotage, espionage, terror. For what purpose? To restore capitalism. There was only one path—to destroy the dictatorship of the proletariat and replace it with a fascist dictatorship. What forces did the conspiracy gather in order to carry out its plan? I named for the investigation more than 70 conspirators whom I recruited myself or knew during the course of the conspiracy... I developed an opinion of the social image of the conspiracy, that is, the groups from which our conspiracy, our leadership, the center of the conspiracy came. The conspiracy is comprised of people who do not have deep roots in our Soviet country because each of them has his own second homeland. Each of them has a family abroad. Yakir has relatives in Bessarabia, Putna

and Uborevich—in Lithuania, Feldman is linked to South America no less than to Odessa, Eydeman is linked to the Baltic countries no less than to our country...”

Frankly, the GVP was impressed. What did we know about Primakov? He had been born into a peasant family in the Ukraine. At a young age he enlisted in the fight against autocracy. He experienced the tsarist torture chambers, he went through a kangaroo court, and experienced all the hardships of exile. A brave cavalryman, he commanded the renowned cavalry corps of Chervon cossacks, about whom songs were written as they were about Budenniy's cavalry. Primakov and Budenniy competed for glory... A significant circumstance is that Primakov was arrested a year before Tukhachevskiy was. They were “working” with him all that time. Well, did they break his will in all that time? Did he become an obedient person? Precise answers are needed for all these unclear questions.

Workers of the Committee for State Security, which by that time had been significantly updated, joined in the work of the Main Military Procuracy. The joint investigation became deeper in the following area: were there any materials before the appearance of the “military-fascist conspiracy”?

In one of the old cases they discovered testimonies of two officers who had served in the tsarist army in the past and who named as the inspiration for their anti-Soviet organization...Tukhachevskiy. It turned out that copies of the transcripts of these interrogations were sent to Stalin and he was informed of their content. Stalin sent them to G. K. Ordzhonikidze along with this note: “I request that you familiarize yourself with these. Since this has not been ruled out, it is possible.”

No traces of Ordzhonikidze's reaction to this note have been found. But it has been assumed that Ordzhonikidze took these statements as slander. He knew Tukhachevskiy well and knew that he had joined no opposition and was constantly being promoted. But the shadow of suspicion still remained... Earlier the People's Commissariat for Military and Naval Affairs had received information from the secretary of the party committee of the Western Military District in which Tukhachevskiy was accused of having an incorrect attitude toward communists under his jurisdiction and even of immoral behavior. M. V. Frunze added a resolution to this information: “The party has trusted Comrade Tukhachevskiy, it does trust him, and it will continue to trust him.” But the denunciation remained, and the reports from observations of Tukhachevskiy, as we see, were supplemented.

Also preserved was an excerpt from the testimony of the arrested brigade commander Medvedev who had been expelled from the party because of his adherence to Trotskyism. Medvedev stated that he had “known” since

1931 of the existence of a counterrevolutionary Trotskyite organization in the central administrations of the RKKA [Worker-Peasant Red Army].

Medvedev gave this testimony on 8 May 1937 and on 13 May 1937, on instructions from the people's commissar of internal affairs, Yezhov, they arrested Dzerzhinskiy's closest adviser, Artur Khristianovich Artuzov—one of the ranking NKVD workers. At one of the interrogations Artuzov “testified” that in information that arrived from Germany in the thirties it was announced that a conspiracy was being prepared in the Red Army and that it was headed by General Turguyev. Artuzov explained to the investigator that the investigation conducted at that time clarified that Tukhachevskiy had travelled to Germany in 1931 under the name of Turguyev. Artuzov reported this information to Yezhov's predecessor, Yagoda. He stated: “This is not significant material; store it in the archives.”

Then this same testimony from Artuzov was reported to Yezhov. And subsequently events developed as follows: Tukhachevskiy was arrested. At the same time they arrested those who were subsequently included among the organizers of the “military fascist conspiracy.” In an incredibly short period of time the brigade of investigators conducted the preliminary investigation.

We managed to clarify how the NKVD conducted investigations during those years and particularly how it began and continued with the case of Tukhachevskiy.

Shneydeman, a former investigator of the NKVD central staff who had been brought to trial during the fifties, gave the following explanation: “Yezhov's authority in the NKVD agencies was so great that I, like all the other workers, had no doubt about the guilt of a person who had been arrested on personal instructions from Yezhov, although the investigator had no materials that cast suspicion on this individual. I was convinced of this person's guilt even before the interrogation and therefore during the investigation I would try anything to get a confession from him.”

We reviewed the case of another convicted person—the investigator Radzivilovskiy. Here is his own testimony:

“I was working in the UNKVD of Moscow Oblast. Frinovskiy called me in and wanted to know if there were any military personnel among my cases. I answered that I was pleading the case of a former brigade commander, Medvedev, who had held a high position in the general staff and had been discharged from the army and expelled from the party for belonging to the Trotskyite opposition. Frinovskiy gave me an assignment: ‘You are to create a picture of a large and deep conspiracy in the Red Army. Yezhov is to have played an immense role in exposing it and deserves an immense amount of credit from the party.’ I accepted the assignment. Not immediately, of course, but eventually I obtained from Medvedev the required testimony concerning the existence of

a conspiracy in the RKKA and the leaders of this conspiracy. Yezhov was informed of the testimony I had obtained. He personally called Medvedev in for interrogation. Medvedev told Yezhov and Frinovskiy that the testimony had been fabricated. Then Yezhov ordered that any necessary means be used to force Medvedev to return to his previous testimony, which was done, and his statement of denial was not registered. And the record of Medvedev's testimony, which was obtained with physical force, was submitted to Yezhov in the Central Committee. After this followed the arrests of Tukhachevskiy and the other conspirators.... Without trying to remove all the blame from myself, I wish for people to know the situation in which I had to work.... We had an awards banquet for a large group of Cheka members. Yezhov said the following in his speech: "We must now educate Cheka members so that they become a closely welded together, closed sect that follows my orders without question. I could do nothing other than what I did...."

Taking advantage of Medvedev's testimony, they arrested B. M. Feldman. His interrogation was assigned to an investigator for especially important cases, Ushakov (alias Ushiminskiy). Ushakov wrote later in his explanation:

"When he was arrested Feldman categorically denied any participation in any conspiracy, not to mention one against Voroshilov. He referred to the fact that Kliment Yefremovich had taught, educated, and reared him. I took Feldman's case personally and as a result of studying it came to the conclusion that Feldman was personal friends with Tukhachevskiy, Yakir, and a number of other high-ranking commanders. I understood that Feldman had to be implicated in the conspiracy with Tukhachevskiy. I called Feldman into the office, locked him in there, and by the evening of 19 May Feldman had signed a statement concerning a conspiracy with the participation of Tukhachevskiy, Yakir, Eyedeman, and others."

In this same explanation Ushakov made an accusation against the investigator Glebov, who had tried to persuade Yakir to deny his testimony.

"I," writes Ushakov, "restored Yakir. I got him to return to his previous confession, and Glebov was excluded from further participation in the investigation... I was assigned to interrogate Tukhachevskiy who had already confessed for me on 26 May... Barely taking time out to sleep, I squeezed out of them a few more facts and a few more conspirators... Even on the day of the proceedings, early in the morning, I forced out of Tukhachevskiy additional testimony concerning the participation in the conspiracy of Apanasenko and others... Literally from the first days of my work on the case I guessed that there was a conspiracy of a military Trotskyite organization in the RKKA and the navy and developed a precise plan to unmask it, and I first obtained such a testimony from the

former commander of the Caspian Naval Flotilla, Zakupnev... I also proceeded confidently to Eyedeman and was not mistaken here either..."

Ushakov goes on to list his other "credits." And there turned out to be quite a few investigators who were criminals like Ushakov... Continuing our investigation, we came across another person who was thriving and succeeding in his military career but who worked in another, as it were, system. We called him in for explanations (I shall not give his name since he wrote truthful explanations). Here are some excerpts:

"Primakov was in prison for being an active Trotskyite. Later they turned him over to me. I tried to get him to confess to a conspiracy. He refused. Then Yezhov interrogated him personally and Primakov gave a detailed confession concerning himself and all the other organizers of the conspiracy. Before the defendant was taken to court all of us who had participated in the investigation received instructions from our superiors that we were to speak with the parties under investigation and persuade them to confirm in court their testimonies given during the investigation. I personally spoke with Primakov. He promised to confirm his testimony. In addition to the guards, the prisoners were accompanied by us—the investigators. Each of the defendants along with his investigator sat separate from the others. I suggested to Primakov that his confession in court would make it easier on him later on. These were my instructions from my superiors..."

Because of the statute of limitations this investigator could not be brought to trial. But he was severely penalized: he was stripped of his military rank of general and held liable before the party.

And so Yezhov and Frinovskiy were personally in charge of these investigations. Both of them, as we know, were also arrested in 1938 and convicted. Here are the testimonies they gave in court at that time:

Frinovskiy: "Yezhov demanded that I select investigators who were either completely associated with us or who had some skeletons in their closets and knew that because of this we had them under our thumbs... In my opinion, to tell the truth, I would say generally that very frequently it was the investigators themselves and not the people under investigation who gave the testimonies. Did the top ranking members of the people's commissariat, that is, Yezhov and I, know about this? We knew and encouraged it. How did we react? I, honestly, did not react in any way, but Yezhov even encouraged this..."

Yezhov did not deny this testimony. He explained in court:

"The policy for examining cases was extremely simple. It was simpler and in a sense even less controllable than it is for ordinary criminal cases... The USSR Procuracy, of course, could not but notice all of these perversions of

justice. The behavior of the USSR Procuracy, and particularly of the USSR Procurator Vyshinskiy, I explain by the fear of falling out with the NKVD and appearing less 'revolutionary' in the sense of carrying out repression. This is the only way I can explain the actual lack of any procurator supervision over these cases and the lack of protests to the government against the actions of the NKVD..."

With his reference to the USSR Procuracy and Vyshinskiy Yezhov undoubtedly hoped to make it easier on himself. As concerns the "fear of the NKVD," it was spread by none other than Yezhov himself.

We looked over the order of the USSR People's Commissar of Defense, Marshal of the Soviet Union K. Ye. Voroshilov, No 96 of 12 June 1937. It said in the order:

"From 1 through 4 June of this year in the presence of members of the government there was a military council meeting under the USSR People's Commissar of Defense. Participants in the meeting of the military council heard and discussed my report on the treacherous counterrevolutionary military fascist organization discovered by the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs which, having been kept strictly secret, existed for a long time and carried out vile, subversive sabotage and espionage work in the Red Army."

On 11 June 1937 a special judicial session of the USSR Supreme Court declared all the defendants "guilty of violating their military duty (oath), betraying the Worker-Peasant Red Army, and betraying their homeland, and decreed: all defendants were to be stripped of their military ranks, the defendant Tukhachevskiy was to be stripped of the title of Marshal of the Soviet Union, and all were sentenced to the highest measure of punishment—execution by shooting."

The sentence was carried out on 12 June 1937.

Brigade commander Medvedev was shot four days later. In his case there was no "evidence" except for his so-called "confession" that he had shared the views of the Trotskyites. And in the military collegium, chaired by this same Ulrikh, which considered the case, Medvedev did not admit to being guilty of any counterrevolutionary crimes at all. Concerning the conspiracy in the Red Army he stated that he had been forced to give false testimony. Nonetheless the illegal sentence was handed down.

But still we did find some traces of procurator "supervision" of the investigation of the case of the military fascist conspiracy. This is it, according to the explanation of Subotskiy, the assistant chief military prosecutor at the time: "Vyshinskiy suggested participating with him in the interrogation of Tukhachevskiy and the other parties who had been arrested... I said that I was not familiar with the case and had not been told to read up on it. Vyshinskiy answered: 'I will do the interrogation

myself, and you record it.' The interrogation of all eight of those who were arrested lasted only two or two and a half hours. The testimonies were extremely brief: 'We admit that we are guilty, we have no complaints...'"

Yet there were complaints... They were directed against Stalin, Molotov, Kaganovich, Voroshilov, and Malenkov. Upon reading them, the people to whom the arrested parties had turned appended their own cynical resolutions. Some of these facts were made public at the 22d CPSU Congress.

The new investigation of the Tukhachevskiy case had come to an end. In the final stage the GVP received testimonials from a number of eminent military leaders who had gained experience in large battles during the course of the Great Patriotic War. They were unanimous in their opinion that the fundamentals of conducting large-scale military operations under conditions of "machine warfare" that had been developed by Tukhachevskiy and his advisers and had been tested during maneuvers as early as the thirties had been properly evaluated, applied, and developed. They were sorry that with Tukhachevskiy's conviction this process of reinforcing the military might of the Red Army had undoubtedly slowed down. They recalled that right before the war Stalin in his speech to ranking army personnel was forced to admit that we had underestimated the role of mechanized and motorized armies and that we were being slow and making mistakes in forming divisions equipped with a sufficient number of tanks.

Unfortunately, the suspicion passed too late and through heroic efforts our people had to make up for what had been missed both in the army and in the military industry.

Immediately after the discovery in the RKKA of the "military fascist conspiracy" headed by Marshall Tukhachevskiy, in the central staff of the People's Commissariat of Defense and then in the army and navy work was begun to unmask participants in the conspiracy and people who had anything to do with it.

This became a broad campaign stirred up by appeals to increase political vigilance. It reached a point where there was not a single military unit that did not have at least one conspirator. It is not difficult to guess the scale the repression reached.

In the GVP, naturally, we studied everything that enabled us to learn a little more about the Red Army "conspiracy" itself and how practical steps were taken to "eliminate" it. From May 1937 through September 1938 alone about half of the regimental commanders were subjected to repression as were almost all the brigade and division commanders, all the corps commanders, all those in command of troops of military districts, members of military councils and political administrations of

the districts, the majority of political workers of the corps, divisions, and brigades, and many instructors at higher and secondary educational institutions.

Soon after the defeat of Hitler's Germany in the West there appeared a multitude of books which, on the basis of secret documents that had been seized, discussed the fact that within German intelligence agencies they concocted documents intended to compromise the high Soviet military command. These works were also studied attentively.

...Having finally been convinced that the accusation of Tukhachevskiy and the other military leaders of grave state crimes was unsubstantiated and the conviction illegal, the Main Military Procuracy reported its conclusion to USSR Procurator General R. A. Rudenko. Soon afterwards he sent out instructions to prepare a protest to the decree of the special judicial session.

On 31 January 1957 the Military Collegium of the USSR Supreme Court by a decision of the Procurator General revoked the sentence of 11 June 1937 and closed the case because of a lack of elements of a crime and all involved in the case of the participants in the "anti-Soviet Trotskyite military organization" were completely rehabilitated. On 27 February 1957 the Committee for Party Control under the CPSU Central Committee restored them to party membership.

Hundreds of workers of the Main Military Procuracy participated in the examination and revision of a multitude of cases in the midfifties. Believe me, this was the hardest work, and not just physically. I cannot but recall the names of S. K. Zanchevskiy, I. M. Maksimov, N. N. Zarubin, Ye. P. Zakharov, S. I. Tupolov, B. P. Bespalov, A. Z. Goloborodko, and Heroes of the Soviet Union A. G. Toropkin and B. S. Narbut. It is impossible in a newspaper article to give the names of all my colleagues with whom I shared this bitter task. But I am glad that it has been possible to share at least a little of their activity...

#### Footnote

1. Viktorov, Boris Alekseyevich, Lieutenant General of Justice, was born in 1916 in Ryazan Oblast and has been a party member since 1940. He completed the All-Union Legal Correspondence Institute; he has served in the Red Army since 1941; he was a participant in the Great Patriotic War; in January 1955 he became deputy chief military prosecutor; and he has been in retirement since 1982.

11772

**Data on BOEING BRAVE-3000 Pilotless Drone**  
*18010383 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian*  
*11 May 88 Second Edition p 3*

[Unattributed article: "Pilotless Apparatus".]

[Text] According to the journal, DEFENSE AND ARMAMENTS, the American firm "Boeing" has built a multipurpose pilotless drone, the BRAVE-3000. It is intended for the generation of electronic interference, the conduct of reconnaissance during the return flight, and for the destruction of operating enemy electronic equipment. In the latter event it is equipped with a passive radar homing nose cone with a weight of 16 kg and a warhead with a 68 kg weight.

The drone has a launch weight of 285 kg, its cigar-shaped fuselage has a length of 344cm and a diameter of around 30cm and is equipped with a folding wing with a span of 226cm and tail fins. The NPT-171 turbo-jet engine maintains a flight speed of from 450 to 700 km/hour and a flight altitude of up to 7600m. With a payload of approximately 130 kg, the range will vary from 120 to 500 km.

It is launched from a transporter-launcher container with the help of a solid fuel booster. Aside from the Air Force, the US Army, which plans to launch them from the MLRS, has demonstrated major interest.

UD/335

**Signals Troops Transfer Equipment to Afghans  
Upon Withdrawal**

*18010341 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
12 May 88 Second Edition p 2*

[600-word article by Lt Col N. Belan, Lt Col A. Mikhaylov and Major B. Nikolayev from Kabul and Moscow, entitled: "Afghanistan—Place of Victory: But Look—They are Ordinary Boys".]

[Excerpt] Today the Signals troops are putting in hard work. The first stage of the upcoming withdrawal of our troops is not for them. For the time being they will remain here. They will ensure communications for the units and subunits, as well as giving weapons training to their comrades—Afghan soldiers, to whom they will transfer their entire material-technical base, their garrison and their experience. ...

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