The Egyptian Staff Solution: Operational Art and Planning for the 1973 Arab-Israeli War.
Abstract
Operation BADR, the coordinated Egyptian-Syrian attack on Israel which initiated the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, provides a clear historical example of a nation's use of a major military operation to achieve its strategic objective. Specifically, it ended the politically ambiguous relationship of "no peace", no war" between Egypt and Israel and set the conditions for the eventual negotiation of an Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty. Operation BADR also demonstrates that a relatively weak state is capable of reforming its military and overcoming a powerful adversary through skillful application of operational art and thorough planning. The paper first places the 1973 Arab-Israeli War in its strategic context. It defines Egyptian President Sadat's national policy objective, describes the historical background to the war, and explains the strategic alternatives available to Egypt. Next, it analyzes Egyptian operational planning, with emphasis on the analysis of Israel's critical factors and Egyptian analysis and balancing of the operational factors of space, time, and force. It then briefly describes the execution of Operation-BADR and finally draws a series of conclusions useful to operational-level commanders.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Feb 13, 1998
- Accession Number
- ADA348901
Entities
People
- Edwin S. Cochran
Organizations
- Naval War College