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24 October 1983

NEAR EAST/SOUTH ASIA REPORT

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OVER 2,000 ARMENIAN ATHLETES TAKE PART IN GAMES

Tehran ETTELA'AT in Persian 12 Sep 83 p 14

[Text] The 18th round of games by Armenian athletes of Iran was opened at the Ararat Gymnasium by "Ardak Manukian," the Archbishop of Iran's Armenians. The representatives of the Patriarchate Council of the Armenians of Iran, the representatives of various Armenian religious groups, the Armenian Majlis deputy and over 20,000 spectators were present at the opening ceremony. Over 2,000 athletes from 50 athletic clubs and individual groups from Tehran and 13 provinces participated in the games.

It is reported that the torch of the games was lit by the Armenian Archbishop at St. Sarkis Church and then it was carried to the gymnasium, by runners via specified routes. The torch of the games at the gymnasium was lit by one of the athletes after running once around the gymnasium.

Through the initiative of Ararat Athletic Club, the games have been held regularly every year for the last 20 years, with the exception of only 2 years.

Since the establishment of Ararat Gymnasium a few years ago, and the availability of better facilities, every year, the standard of the games have improved.

Since last year, through the initiative of Ararat Athletic Club, the games have been organized according to a new plan.

The Executive Board for the games will be elected by the representatives of the participating athletic clubs at the request and invitation of Ararat Athletic Club. The Executive Board consists of seven individuals who will be elected from the representatives of the participating athletic clubs and are responsible for all operational and technical matters pertaining to the games.

This year 165 teams participated in 5 different sports, such as soccer, basketball, volleyball, table tennis and track. Over 400 athletes are lodged in the camp.

CSO: 4640/351

ARMENIAN AFFAIRS

BRIEFS

ARMENIAN DEMONSTRATION APPROVED--Tehran, 7 Oct (AFP)--About three thousand Armenians demonstrated today in Isfahan, central Iran, on behalf of Hampartzum Sassunian, an Armenian charged in the United States with killing a Turkish diplomat, a Hampartzum Sassunian Committee spokesman told the AGENCE-FRANCE PRESSE office here by phone. The spokesman said Mr Sassunian "and the other young Armenian fighters in American imperialist prisons must be released unconditionally." A member of the Armenian Youth Federation, Mr Sassunian was arrested in Los Angeles, California in 1982 for the murder of Turkish Consul-General Kemal Arikan. Mr Arikan was killed in Los Angeles on 28 January 1982. Mr Sassunian, who was 19 at the time of the assassination and risks the death penalty, has denied the murder charge. The Isfahan governor's office said today's demonstration had been approved by authorities. [Text] [NC080018 Paris AFP in English 2133 GMT 7 Oct 83]

CSO: 4600/41

LIFESTYLE OF WESTERN DESERT BEDOUINS VIEWED

Cairo AKHIR SA'AH in Arabic No 2543, 20 Jul 83 pp 25-27

[Article by Usamah 'Ajjaj: "Life inside the Camps of Western Bedouin Tribes; the World of the Awlad 'Ali Is Here; How a Secular, Traditional Court Settles Disputes"]

[Text] Here is a unique, curious and self-sufficient world. It is the world of the Bedouins. It is a world that has its own attraction and its alluring charm. It is a world with profound secrets and unique customs and attitudes. This world also has its own laws and statutes which are strictly and firmly enforced.

What is life like inside this provocative and rugged world? What are its customs, traditions and conventions? What is the story behind "al-mi'ad" [a day set for consultations], and what happens on that date?

This is an attempt to come closer to a world that is far away, very far away from the noise, the tumult and the gatherings of Cairo. It is an attempt to experience the life of a completely different world, the world of desert society with all its secrets.

The place is far from inhabited areas; it is far from asphalt, from urbanization, from civilization and from congestion.

The time is a day to be determined.

The occasion is that of "al-mi'ad," the day on which the Bedouin court is in session. The judge does not have a degree in law; but he may be the chief of the tribe or one of its elders.

It is here that the role of the law and the police fades and is taken over by the role of conventional, secular law whose stipulations are conservative. [It is here that] payment of blood money is the penalty for killing, and it is here that a killer may be acquitted if an oath is taken on the Koran [to that effect]. [It is here that] in cases where murder has been proven, disputes are settled and their continuation checked by having the [offender's] tribe change its place of residence.

AKHIR SA'AH traveled hundreds of miles to Marsa Matruh to find out first hand about the laws, customs and traditions of Bedouins.

There is no doubt that the life of the Bedouins and tribes that live in some areas of Egypt has its own attraction and charm, driving any person to seek information about the life styles of Bedouins and the ways in which they celebrate [memorable occasions] and settle their disputes. There were other things as well I was interested in while I was in Marsa Matruh. I was assisted [in my quest] by the fact that I was accompanying Maj Gen Yusri al-Shami, the governor of Marsa Matruh on his visit to the tribe of (Hanta'arah) in the administrative district of al-Dab'ah. The governor visits these tribes on an ongoing basis; he is always making these continuous visits. He had assured me that these visits "were one of the means for solving problems in the governorate. When I go there to visit, all the governorate's executive officials and popular leaders come with me. In the course of a lengthy session that may last the whole day in one of the Bedouins' tents all the problems the tribesmen are facing are presented. After all the aspects of any problem are discussed in detail in the presence of all the executives, a solution to that problem is always found."

The Custom of the Awlad 'Ali

When I wanted to find out about the customs and traditions of Bedouins, everybody told me to go to al-Hajj Khalid 'Abd-al-Majid. This was not because he was the most knowledgeable about these customs and traditions, but because he was the oldest. Respect for older people is one of the sacred things in desert societies.

Al-Hajj Khalid said, "Because of the special circumstances of Bedouin societies, such as the vast distance between the places where Bedouins congregate and in the past the difficulty that men from the administration had in reaching those places, the tribes of the Awlad 'Ali--and these are the tribes that are scattered throughout the area of Marsa Matruh--resorted to laying down what is called "The Custom of the Awlad 'Ali." This is a secular, conventional law or constitution that is binding on all tribes in all situations. This code of law is based on the canonical laws of Islam or the provisions of the Islamic faith in settling issues of murder, payment of blood money, battery as well as marriage and divorce. This code is put into effect on what is called 'al-mi'ad,' which is the date on which the Bedouin court is in session at a well-known place and time. Problems and cases that are presented to the court are considered on that day. One may not fail to show up on that date, nor may one disobey the rulings of the court or appeal its judgments elsewhere."

Compensation for Injury and Blood Money for Murder Victims

Lawsuits and disputes are settled on "al-mi'ad" or at the secular, conventional court by one known as "al-murdi," [a conciliator], who is a man known for his commendable morals. He is [usually] a man of sound thought who does not deviate from the truth and who is knowledgeable about and experienced in "The Custom of the Awlad 'Ali." He is also a man who is familiar with the conditions, customs and traditions of these tribes. "Al-murdi" [or a conciliator] is chosen by these tribes, and there may be more than one representing both sides of a dispute. If two conciliators disagree, they seek the arbitration of a third who would settle their differences, and that conciliator's judgment in this case is final. "Al-nuzzar" [or inspectors] also take part in the arbitration process, particularly in estimating the material damages for injuries, broken bones and wounds. Damages paid to an injured party depend upon the kind of injury that was sustained. The importance of inspectors is due to the fact that they represent

experienced physicians whose experience is recognized by the tribes. An "al-sawfam," however, is an expert who estimates damages to all kinds of plants, wells and dams.

Tribal law indicates that it is essential that blood money be paid, particularly in a murder case where a killer would pay about 400 pounds in cash and 100 camels if the murder was willfull. In case of manslaughter blood money is 300 pounds paid in cash or half of that sum in cattle. The amount of blood money has changed; it has now reached 1,000 pounds. In rare cases it reached 300 pounds [sic] for a willfull murder. Many tribes receive no blood money in cases of manslaughter when a person is killed unintentionally, such as in automobile accidents, for example. [In such cases] tribes even refuse to have a killer live with the tribe. It is curious that blood money for women is half that for men in the case of willfull murder and manslaughter as well. If a killer's family cannot pay blood money, the victim's family may agree to have the killer work for them until the blood money is paid for [by his work]. This means that a killer becomes a servant to the victim's family, doing everything he is asked to do.

In case someone is killed in a battle between two tribes, both tribes make peace if both tribes lose an equal number of men. But if losses in life are greater in one tribe than they are in another, blood money is paid for the additional number of lives lost. If a person is killed while trying to break up a fight between two tribes, and if his killer cannot be identified, the two feuding tribes have to pay blood money. The only case in which a killer is turned over to the police is that in which a person kills another while committing a robbery.

Because solidarity among members of a tribe is fundamental, causing a tribe to assume responsibility for a crime committed by one of its members, a practice called "al-barawah" was introduced. This means that a tribe would disown its prodigal, unruly son. The process of disowning the member of a tribe is completed by convening a family council which is called for by the chief of the tribe. That council consists of senior family members. The council summons the individual [in question] who is confronted with the reasons why the tribe is disowning him. If he renounces his unruly conduct, the process is halted, but if he persists in those actions that hurt the reputation of the tribe, that council can issue a decision disowning that person whose life can then be taken with impunity.

An Oath Is Decisive Criterion

I went back to al-Hajj Khalid 'Abd-al-Majid to ask him this, "If a murder is committed publicly, the punishment for it is well-known. But what about crimes that are committed for which there were no witnesses?"

Al-Hajj Khalid said, "In most or all murders, the perpetrator makes his crime known to his tribe which reacts [to the situation] on that basis. However, to get a conviction, a person who is suspected of committing the crime is formally charged. To prove the innocence of a suspect or the residents of his region, 55 men from the suspect's tribe chosen by the family of the victim take an oath that they did not cause the death of the victim and that they did not know who committed the killing. After such an oath is taken, the killer is considered unknown, and the feud between the two tribes thus comes to an end.

"Most disputes between Bedouins and Arabs have to do with disputes over land and

land ownership. To find out who is entitled to the land, [arbitrators] turn to those who live around the land. If this method does not succeed, an oath is taken by 25 men to determine ownership, particularly in cases where there is one well on the land or more."

Punishments for Moral Crimes

According to Khayr Allah Fadl 'Ataywah, secretary general of the governorate of Marsa Matruh and former speaker of the People's Assembly, "One of the serious crimes that occurs infrequently because it leads to war between the tribes is that of ravishing or seducing women." Mr Khayr Allah made that statement in his important book, "Rihlah al-Alf 'Aam ma'a Qaba'il Awlad 'Ali," [The Thousand Years' Journey with the Tribes of the Awlad 'Ali]. As a precautionary measure, the tribes set down a few conventional laws to keep this crime in check. In case a virgin is kidnapped in front of a witness, the offender is obligated to pay a fine of 300 pounds. If the young unmarried woman were of age, that fact is considered evidence in the absence of witnesses. If the offender denies committing the offense with which he is charged, five members of the defendant's tribe have to assert his innocence under oath. If they fail to do so, the previous fine is to be paid unless the financial status of the offender is such that he cannot pay. Then, his tribe is to help him pay the fine in addition to paying twice the dowry set by the family of the young unmarried woman who was raped.

The secular Bedouin court often rules that, in addition to the previous sentences, an offender is to be tied in a place where he would be exposed to the sun and that he be deprived of food and drink. If an unmarried young woman bears a child out of wedlock, the secular Bedouin court sentences the offender to pay a fine of 200 pounds in addition to a dowry similar to that offered for the marriage of one of the young woman's paternal cousins to a man from another tribe. If a young man seduces a young unmarried woman and encourages her to elope with him, he will have to seek the protection of a man of distinction, a mayor or a tribal chief who would give him refuge. There he becomes a guest and enjoys the protection of that tribal elder or chief who would summon the girl's family and persuade them to accept her marriage to that young man. The girl's family would then impose a fine on the young man in addition to asking him to pay twice the ordinary dowry. The marriage is then completed at this chief's house. This crime rarely happens.

Being Banished and Moved to Another Place

One of the laws found in the Bedouin's conventional law is [a principle] called "al-nazalah." It involves separating the killer's tribe from the victim's tribe by a distance of 30 kilometers. It is the killer's tribe that moves and goes to live under the protection of another tribe. This takes place only with the approval of the victim's tribe. After 1 year reconciliation measures are completed, blood money is paid through the host tribe, and the families of the victim and the killer are brought together on a certain day. That meeting is attended by representatives of most neighboring tribes, by clergymen and by senior tribesmen. All those assembled share a meal, the blood money is paid, a pact is made, and the reconciliation measures are completed. In case [the victim's tribe] avenges itself, it lives under the protection of the host tribe for 3 months, and the same reconciliation measures are followed [after those 3 months]. The blood money plus one fourth of it is returned as punishment for violating the pact and the peace.

Marriage Customs

We went back to Jab-Allah to try to get a closer view of Bedouins' marriage customs and traditions.

Jab-Allah said, "There are three [steps] in the case of marriage: 'al-khultah' which is an agreement for marriage [sealed] by reciting the introductory chapter of the Koran. It means the same as an engagement. Then there is 'al-'urs,' which is the day of the wedding feast and the wedding ceremony. Then there is 'al-zur,' which is the day, 1 week after the marriage, when the bridegroom's family visit their in-laws. Among Bedouins an engagement takes place by having the bridegroom's mother or sister make preparations to meet with the bride's mother, sister or one of her relatives. After that, the father [of the bridegroom] would go to the bride's father to ask for her hand in marriage. Then a date is set on which a positive or a negative answer is made to that proposal. This is due to the fact that the bride's family present the marriage proposal made for their daughter to her cousins. If one of them wants to marry her or if one of them objects to the bridegroom because of a dispute between him and the bridegroom or his family, the marriage would not take place unless the bridegroom's relatives go to that man with [an offering of] slaughtered animals, share a meal with them, come to a reconciliation and end the dispute. After that a certain day is designated on which the bridegroom's family would call on [the bride's family] with a group of men and a few women. They would bring with them no less than 3 slaughtered animals, as many as 30 sheep and a number of cows in accordance with the bridegroom's financial condition or in accordance with the status of the bride's family and the dignity of her relatives.

"There is no engagement ring, and the bridegroom does not meet the bride until the wedding day. In most cases the bride's family keeps the dowry in its entirety while the bridegroom, in addition to paying the dowry, has to pay all [other] costs for clothing and housing. A long time ago a wedding would be held 2 days or a few days after an engagement. However, the problems of making preparations for a wedding and preparing a trousseau put an end to that custom too.

"On the wedding day the bridegroom's relatives come [to the appointed place]. They are a group of men, women and young people. Until a short time ago they used to come [to the appointed place] on camels, and they would bring along 'al-karmud' [a camel litter] for carrying the bride [to the bridal tent]. The bride would be accompanied by one or two men and one or two women who are her relatives to ascertain her virginity. This takes place following the afternoon prayer in a tent where only the bride and the bridegroom are present. After the bride's virginity is ascertained, the evidence is posted at the entrance to the tent. The women utter shrill sounds of joy, and young men fire their guns in the air to express joy over the honor of the bride. Guests are served a meal of white rice, boiled meat and tea."

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AL-QADHDHAFI'S ATTITUDES, POLICIES DESCRIBED

Bonn AFRIKA-POST in German Sep 83 pp 20-23

[Article by Erwin E. Hirschmann: "Chad-Crisis: Qadhdhafi: Marabout or Charlatan?"]

[Text] "From the desert comes a new age for humanity: The era of the masses. The desert is neither dry nor infertile. To be sure, it does not produce grass, but it nevertheless creates genuine values and conveys an eternally valid message of civilization."

Mu'ammarr al-Qadhdhafi

For the American president, Ronald Reagan, he is world enemy number one, for his followers, on the other hand, a Marabout, a holy man of the desert, or even the new Saladin, a new legendary leader capable of resurrecting the glory of the Arab people. Mu'ammarr al-Qadhdhafi is controversial like no other leader of the Third World. The attributes which are given to him range from the highest praise to the most intense contempt. Thus the assassinated Anwar al-Sadat once spoke of the "fly Qadhdhafi", which would be squashed should it ever land on an Egyptian coffee table.

Fundamentalists Accuse Him of Heresy

At least so far as Qadhdhafi is concerned, Sadat made a mistake. The Libyan is by no means a fly which would let itself be squashed. Rather the fist which would send other flies to their death--as demonstrated by his most recent adventure in Chad.

Qadhdhafi, however, makes it easy for his critics. He, who so vehemently opposes foreign (Western) influence in the internal affairs of other states, intervenes, of course, if this fits into his concept. He is (or was) the friend of despots--the confidant of the mass murderer Idi Amin as well as of the butcher of children, Bokassa. And he acknowledges these friends quite openly, as for example in an interview with the Italian journalist Oriana Fallaci.

But he does not intervene when innocent people are killed by terrorists all over the world with his money and with weapons furnished by him. For Qadhdhafi, these terrorists are merely "a result of capitalist society", "expression

of a society which must be overthrown". And further: "Although I am against the kidnapping of people and airplanes, I would not like to interfere with what they are doing."

Every time when Qadhdhafi is asked about his engagement for international terrorism, he is evasive--not because he is ashamed of his support, but because this question is of secondary importance for him. Colonel Mu'ammār al-Qadhdhafi, "leader of the revolution", "servant of the people", feels obligated to only one idea: To spread Islam and--through the establishment of the unity of all the Arab peoples--to complete the work of his idol, Jamāl 'Abd-al-Nasir. In so doing, he is not greatly disturbed by the fact that Moslem fundamentalists accuse him of heresy. For them, the "brother Colonel" is an apostate, a man who does not trouble himself about the words of the prophet, who furthers women in profession and life, although he himself says that "women are mostly pretty and are inclined to cry".

And did not Mohammed, the prophet, who like Qadhdhafi came from the desert, speak of the unity of Islam? Is not the unification pursued by Qadhdhafi pure heresy since what is at issue is the unification of all believers against the infidels, the "umma", the Islamic community without national frontiers, which stands against the "kuffar", the non-Moslems? For the fundamentalists, the case of Qadhdhafi is clear, for him, however, likewise, for in the end he had the followers of this sect, which in his fraternal country of Syria caused such great problems for the government, simply hanged, and since that time he has had peace from internal rebellion from the religious camp.

The "Nasir sagir", the little Nasser, as his followers call him, does not let himself be disconcerted by all of these hostilities--regardless of the direction from which they come. He believes in his mission, which his father already placed in his tent on the Gulf of Sidra. Mu'ammār means "builder"--and the Libyan wants to go down into history as the builder of another great era for the Arabs and for Islam.

Already at the age of 7, the now 41-year old learned the most important suras from the Koran, the holy book of Islam. As the only child of a poor bedouin family from the steps between Tripoli and Benghazi, he attended the 30-mile distant elementary school in Surt [Sidra]--an uncle raised the money to send him to school.

In school Qadhdhafi experienced the pain which an outsider from the desert must suffer during his encounter with city children. He was different from the others. His schoolmates were acquainted with differences in rank and descent, he did not, for bedouins regard the character and power of resistance of the individual as most important. The young man began to develop an interest in politics, later--in secondary school--this occupation became an obsession.

For the Revolution He Needed the Army

His hatred for the exponents and sycophants of the self-appointed Sanusi dynasty increased. He saw the corruption--beginning with the senile King Idris and ending with the last official. He saw (and also said very clearly) that

his country, this artificial formation called Libya, is exploited by strangers, by Americans, Englishmen and Italians. Qadhdhafi was finally expelled from secondary school in Sebha for agitation, but managed to complete his secondary school diploma in Misratah.

After having attended school, the young man knows that he will never return to his tent as a nameless bedouin. He wants to enter politics and tries, by means of a program of studies in history in Benghazi, to acquire the necessary knowledge. For two years Mu'ammarr al-Qadhdhafi endures it there, then he had enough of studying and enters the army--together with a number of like-minded fellow-students. He, the born political and military leader, wants the revolution and needs the army for this. It is no irony, but rather logical, that Qadhdhafi receives the final touch to his education at the British military academy at Beaconsfield. In 1963 he returns to Libya, serves as officer in the corps of engineers and, together with his political friends, carefully and thoroughly prepares the revolution.

On 1 September 1969 the time has come. The "Association of Free Officers"--named after the Egyptian model, but a Libyan organization through and through--overthrows the senile King Idris. In his first radio address to his countrymen Qadhdhafi challenges the Libyans laconically: "Let us go to work"! He and his officers provide the example: The British military bases are closed, the country is cleansed of foreign influence and Arabic is declared to be the only official language of the country. In the new Libya there are no longer any taverns and bars, prostitution is prohibited, the new government purchases water desalinization equipment from the French, employs American "rainmakers" for the oases, and launches a literacy campaign without precedent. At the time of Qadhdhafi's seizure of power, 80 percent of the Libyans were illiterate--today, 14 years later, at most 15 percent are still illiterate.

But while his colleagues in the revolutionary council concentrate their work on returning to their people control over their own land, Qadhdhafi is not satisfied with the department for "Arab politics" of which he is in charge. From the very beginning he has regarded himself as an internationalist, as a leader without a people. Since the approximately 3½ million Libyans, because of their comparatively small number, cannot satisfy his drive for greatness, Qadhdhafi is constantly courting his neighbors with new offers of unification.

Egypt is the preferred goal of his advances for the formation of a nucleus of the Greater Arab Empire. In 1973 he marches with his followers in the direction of Alexandria in order to drive from there to Cairo. Through threats and enticements with the better world, Anwar al-Sadat succeeds in persuading him to stay put in the desert in the vicinity of Marsa Matruh and to camp there until the final signing of the agreements for the unification of the two countries by Cairo.

Qadhdhafi agrees to Sadat's proposal. In the middle of the hot month of June, he waits in his tents in front of Marsa Matruh and hopes in the burning sun for the realization of Sadat's promise. But the Egyptian lets his little "brother" be parched with heat, in the ultimately justified hope that water shortage and sun would see to it that the agitator withdraws to his own country.

Sadat is proved right, Qadhdhafi withdraws. His radio, however, heaps abuse on Sadat and calls upon the Egyptians to rise up against their president. When Sadat is finally assassinated, the killer-commandos sent out by Qadhdhafi are not involved. The Egyptian is killed by his own countrymen.

For Qadhdhafi, however, the Egyptian rebuff is not a lesson, on the contrary. He tries his luck with ever new partners, with states in the Arabic sphere or in Africa, always mindful of Nasser's thesis of the three concentric circles--his own country, the Arab lands, and Africa. Qadhdhafi supports and finances putsch attempts especially in Africa, but sees himself soon as the prophet for the entire Third World and propagates the wisdoms of his thin "Green Book" as the third way between capitalism and communism.

Rigorously he proceeds to liquidate in his own country everything which could even remotely remind anyone of forms of democracy--regardless of what stamp. Power now proceeds, without parliaments, directly from the people, revolutionary committees watch over the revolutionary fervor of the people, spy upon the Libyans in all situations, and the people then sees to it that the People's Congress, the highest panel of the Jamahiriya, which meets three times a year, makes the appropriate decisions.

Above all of this, however, soars Qadhdhafi, the first servant of the people, without whose word nothing moves in Libya. He and only he rules in Libya, he and only he plans the bloody adventures of his Islamic legion and finances those who can make him comprehend how useful they are for him.


Mu'ammarr Qadhdhafi's world view is a strange mixture of realism, mysticism and wishful thinking, an intricate conglomeration in which rational considerations hardly have any place. He, whom the CIA already a number of times kept from being overthrown, regards Americans and, with gradations, West Europeans as the incarnation of the devil. He fights against everything that is "capitalist", and Israel for him belongs into the first line of this category.

And without hesitation Qadhdhafi would use the atomic bomb if he had it. Already during Nasser's time he asked the latter whether Israel has the bomb. Nasser replied: "Perhaps." Thereupon Qadhdhafi: "Then we will buy one". To date he has not yet purchased it and--because of lack of mass in his own country, has not been able to produce it. With the annexation of the Chad Aozou Strip, however, this could change, for uranium is suspected there. Whatever else is necessary for the bomb can be produced by the technicians and these, including the necessary enriching installations, Libya can definitely purchase.

And even if the adventure in Chad--like other expeditions previously--should end in failure, Qadhdhafi does not give up. In his "Green Book", from which the introductory citation was also taken, the revolutionary leader teaches patience and modesty as two virtues. To be sure, he does not always have patience, but enough nerve, not to let himself be discouraged by failures. He tries to demonstrate his modesty through his ascetic way of life in a desert tent or in the Aziziyah barracks in the vicinity of Tripoli, but his frequently Italian custom-made clothes give the lie to this attitude.

His Adventures Are Easy to Grasp

Whatever Mu'ammarr al-Qadhdhafi does, he does it in front of everyone. His policies, even if not calculable, are nevertheless obvious and his foreign policy adventures are easy to grasp. Obvious are also his exhibition of asceticism and the emphasis of his religiosity. And equally clear is his sense of mission which is not clouded by any self-doubt. Thus Oriana Fallaci asked the Libyan at the end of her interview: "Do you believe in God?" Qadhdhafi: "Of course, why do you ask me such a thing?" Oriana Fallaci: "Because I thought that you were God."



(24) Arabertum, Islam, Sozialismus: Drei Schlagworte, die Ghaddafis Wirkungsfeld kennzeichnen

Key:

- | | | |
|--------------------------------|---|---------------|
| 1. Qadhdhafi's Field of Action | 14. Benin | 25. Arabs |
| 2. Morocco | 15. Algeria | 26. Others |
| 3. Mauritania | 16. Niger | 27. Egypt |
| 4. Senegal | 17. Nigeria | 28. Sudan |
| 5. Guinea | 18. Cameroon | 29. 600 kilo- |
| 6. Sierra Leone | 19. Tunisia | meters |
| 7. Liberia | 20. Libya | 30. Zaire |
| 8. -- | 21. Chad | |
| 9. Mali | 22. Central African | |
| 10. Upper Volta | Republic | |
| 11. Ivory Coast | 23. Predominantly Islamic population | |
| 12. Ghana | 24. Arab nationality, Islam, socialism: | |
| 13. Togo | Three slogans which characterize | |
| | Qadhdhafi's field of operations | |

Qadhdhafi's "Hit List" in Africa

Not only the Arab states, but also more than 15 African countries have felt the pinch of the permanent expansion plans and unification advances of the Libyan revolutionary leader Mu'ammarr al-Qadhdhafi during the past few years. With changing success, Qadhdhafi tried to install presidents in African countries who were sympathetic to him, or to let presidents less well disposed toward him develop doubts as to their power in their own country. In so doing, Qadhdhafi made use of his two probably most important weapons for power and influence in Africa: The petrodollars and the Islamic legion, which finds its recruits primarily among Africans.

Ethiopia

In 1981 Qadhdhafi succeeded in inducing Ethiopia and South Yemen to sign an agreement which expressly obligates the three countries to fight against "imperialism" in Africa. By imperialism was primarily meant American influence in Ethiopia. Since in the final analysis, however, the promised Libyan petrodollars failed to appear, Ethiopia in the past has disengaged itself more and more from the agreement, without officially retracting it though.

Somalia

Libya supports the "Front for the Rescue of Somalia", an organization which is fighting against President Siad Barre. In spite of the massive use of petrodollars, however, the rebels to date have not succeeded in overthrowing Barre.

Sudan

The president of Sudan, Ja'far al-Numayri, is target No 1 on Qadhdhafi's "hit list", who has sworn a number of times to overthrow Numayri, no matter what the cost. To date, however, all attempts to assassinate the Sudanese president have ended in failure.

Uganda

When in 1979 Tanzania sent troops to Uganda to support the rebellion of Milton Obote, Qadhdhafi assisted the dictator Idi Amin with his own troops. In the fighting approximately 1,000 Libyans or members of Qadhdhafi's Islamic legion became prisoners of Tanzania.

Mauritius

Through the use of considerable financial means, Qadhdhafi saw to it that the left-oriented "Mauritius Militant Movement" was able to win the parliamentary elections of 1982. In spite of the petrofunds, however, Qadhdhafi could not prevent that the left-oriented coalition disintegrated and new elections had to be called. The goal of Qadhdhafi's intervention was the retraction of the agreement with the Americans concerning the use of the naval base of Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean.

Burundi/Rwanda

Both states were generously provided with financial means by Qadhdhafi and in turn obligated themselves to provide shelter for Libyan-supported guerillas from Uganda and Zaire on their territory. Qadhdhafi also financed the establishment of an airline in order to get his hands on spare parts for the Boeing fleet of the Libyan Airline, which are unobtainable because of the American embargo.

Kenya

In Kenya Qadhdhafi incurred the wrath of President Daniel arap Moi when it became known that prominent journalists in the country were being supplied with Libyan oil money in order to sketch a more positive image of Qadhdhafi and to steer the media carefully in the direction of the Libyan president.

Nigeria

The government in Nigeria holds Qadhdhafi responsible for unrest in the north of the country. President Shehu Shagari finally gave in to the urging of the Libyan and received him for a state visit. During this visit Qadhdhafi reportedly promised not to interfere in the internal affairs of Nigeria for the time being.

Ghana

One of the few African politicians who after their Libyan-supported successful putsch profited from the oil money is Ghana's president, Jerry Rawlings. Since the coup d'etat on New Year's Eve 1981, Libya supplies Ghana with weapons and supplies oil at preferential prices.

Upper Volta

The present ruler, Thomas Sankara, openly admitted after his putsch that in preparation for the coup d'etat he held intensive discussions with Qadhdhafi concerning the future orientation of his country. According to reports from Ouagadougou, Qadhdhafi also supported his friend Sankara financially.

Niger

In 1976 Libya annexed a part of the territory of Niger. Prior to and after this time, Qadhdhafi tried, without success, to destabilize the country to such an extent that a government acceptable to him could come to power. During the past few months, however, the Libyan gave up on these attempts.

Ivory Coast

According to information by Felix Houphouet-Boigny, the Ivory Coast is the next target of Qadhdhafi's expansion plans. In the view of observers, the fear on the part of Houphouet-Boigny of a coup d'etat was one of the important reasons which induced the moderate African president to request aid for Chad in Paris and Washington.

Tunesia

For years Qadhdhafi has been trying to overthrow the government of President Bourguiba through unrest instigated by him in this neighboring country of Libya. That Bourguiba has not yet forgotten the subversive activities of Qadhdhafi is also demonstrated by the visit of the Libyan leader during this summer: While Qadhdhafi was able to speak with politicians of the ruling party, Bourguiba asked to be excused because of a "bad cold".

Morocco

For years the Polisario Movement, which is fighting against Morocco, has been supported by Libya financially and materially. The surprising visit by Qadhdhafi to King Hassan in July of this year, too, did not change anything with respect to this support. To be sure, the two Maghreb politicians to cultivate "fraternal relations"--but Libya continued its material support of the Polisario even after this meeting.

8970

CSO: 4620/28

TEA CULTIVATION PART OF DEVELOPMENT EFFORT

London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic 28 Aug 83 p 7

/Article: "European Common Market Financing Upper Talinga Tea Project in Sudan"

/Text/ Self-sufficiency planning in the Democratic Republic of Sudan, in terms of basic and necessary commodities, has become a matter of life or death for the Sudanese people, especially in light of world economic conditions and the rise in prices of these commodities worldwide.

Sudan, which is very preoccupied with obtaining free currencies by various means, including attempts to encourage Sudanese cash exports, along with Sudanization of foreign funds and banks, must follow a straight course to boost its exports and achieve gains in self-sufficiency of these commodities that are imported from abroad in great quantities with free currencies. One of these commodities is tea, which was an import monopoly of one tea company that imported it from many nations, including India, Ceylon, People's China, Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania and England, which sells the tea packaged. Therefore, the thought arose that it would be appropriate to cultivate tea in Sudan.

Sudan's variety of climates makes the elevated areas of southern Sudan, such as the Imatong Mountains, the most suitable spot to experiment with tea growing, in terms of the climate and the yearround ample rains, as well as suitable soil. Accordingly, a feasibility study was begun in 1977, financed by the European Common Market, to experiment with the cultivation of excellent varieties of tea plants in the Upper Talinga area in Equatoria. Tea experts who had practiced this work in the neighboring country of Kenya were brought in, in January 1978, and planning was started to reclaim the land by uprooting the ground shrubs and the forests filled with wild animals.

The type of tea to be cultivated was selected from among the superior varieties brought in from Kenya. Its bushes are distinguished by large leaves and small stems. In fact, some 600 tons of teabush stalks were planted to develop through propagation. Housing was built to accommodate the residents who were brought in especially from neighboring areas to work on this project.

This area was developed over the past 5 years and has become a residential colony, in which 1,500 Sudanese families reside. They have been provided with houses built to be suitable for the surrounding environmental conditions and

the copious rain. They have also been provided with suitable social conditions by establishing food supplies for them, through the cultivation of grains, such as durra and ground nuts, as well as vegetables. Therefore the tea project has a farm, installed on 250 feddans, which produced 75 tons of durra, from which the workers and their families are fed, with the surplus sold in neighboring local markets to bring in a cash profit for these new settlers in Upper Talinga. A silo was built for them to keep the grain required for their food throughout the year. They are also making use of items the forest produces.

The project, which encompasses buildings, storage facilities, schools and paved roads, has obtained various sources of financing, including Sudan's central government, the government of Equatoria, and the European Common Market. The latter has given some \$20 million for the project's first stage, which will be completed in September 1985. The United States has also given \$.5 million to build a grain silo. The World Food Program has given food assistance valued at \$1.13 million for the project's workers.

An agreement for this assistance was signed between the Sudanese Government and the World Food Program last May. Other small-scale assistance has also been provided, including a school built at the European Common Market's expense, and flour mills, sowing machinery and storage facilities from the United States.

With the completion of the project's first stage in 1985, planning is underway to expand the cultivation of tea in a coming stage. Currently, administrators and those who supervise the project's workers are being trained in a 6-month training program in East Africa. A number of persons are currently being trained over periods ranging from 6 to 9 months on the operations of the tea factory and the mechanics therein. There is also a 1 year course to study the cultivation and processing of tea and coffee.

This project which started with 30 workers and 2 administrators now requires 2,000 persons to cultivate 1,000 hectares of tea, to breed the cattle required for the project to produce meat and dairy products for the workers, as well as to protect this herd from wild animals of the Imatong area. In addition, there is the cultivation of 400 fertile feddans with coffee trees.

There is optimism that Sudanese tea will begin to appear in local markets in December 1984. This is a beginning, but how will the Sudan be able to achieve self-sufficiency in tea, of which 21,000 tons are imported each year from abroad, using free currencies? Planning must be done for expansion after the initial success, especially since the European Common Market is expressing considerable interest in the stage following 1985, and is currently encouraging ongoing studies of this development. Moreover, the project's management is currently planning to attract Arab agricultural investments, and probably to convert the project into a commercial company in October 1985.

7005
CSO: 4504/587

POTENTIAL FOR DEVELOPING ABUNDANT LIVESTOCK RESOURCES CITED

Riyadh AL-RIYAD in Arabic 15 Aug 83 p 21

/Article by Ja'afar al-Riyabi: "Meat Crisis Despite Huge Livestock Resources"/

/Text/ A few weeks ago, the residents of the Sudanese capital faced a severe shortage of meat for daily consumption. The vast majority could scarcely find even a minimum of their necessary requirements, despite arriving early in the crowds around the shops in the numerous markets scattered about the various sections of the city. The fortunate minority that was able to obtain some of their needs paid double their value at prices set by the butchers themselves.

We asked for the reason, and received some unconvincing justifications, including the paucity of cattle offered in the markets, despite the fact that the truth of the matter is just the opposite, and that the butchers refrain from purchasing cattle and, consequently, refrain from slaughtering them, because of their objections to the unrewarding pricing, in their opinion, which the authorities have established, despite the fact that they sell at prices for which they are not accountable.

It is also well known that meat represents a staple item in the Sudanese diet. The Sudanese seldom are without meat on their tables for the three daily meals. It is also well known that Sudan enjoys vast livestock resources, estimated at about 55.9 million animals, including 20.7 million head of cattle, 18.6 million sheep, 13.8 million goats and 2.8 million camels. The growth of production and the annual increase in livestock resources is estimated at 3.7 percent. The drawouts of cattle represent about 10.8 million head. The Sudanese consume about 6.5 million head locally out of the total annual drawouts, with the remainder slated for foreign export. This is a small percentage compared with the local consumption.

Certain studies made by the International Bank, the World Food and Agricultural Organization and the Arab Organization for Agricultural Development, prove that average annual schedule of drawouts of cattle is 8 percent, sheep 25 percent, goats 25 percent and camels 6 percent. In the future, it is expected that the exports of beef drawouts will increase, while the relative percentage of lamb will decline, because the Sudanese prefer lamb for their tables. Furthermore, another study has clearly shown that the Kordofan and Darfur regions can annually provide approximately 1 million head of cattle suitable for fattening. Half of

this amount can be allocated for domestic consumption with the other half available for commercial use, which the state will encourage through the purchase of these drawouts from the civilian sector. The state would then fatten them through intensive feeding of durra and agricultural waste products, which are plentiful in the Sudan, such as cottonseed cakes, of which some 95,000 tons are produced annually with only 28,000 tons exported. There are also groundnut cakes, with 192,000 tons annually, of which 120,000 tons are exported, and molasses, with about 65,000 tons produced locally each year.

In addition to that, the state produces more than 3 million tons of durra annually. All of those waste products, and some of the durra produced, are used as food for intensive fattening and for the fodder industry, which recently has begun production. That industry is indispensable in the development and modernization of livestock production in Sudan. The Southern Region provides the highest percentage of cattle, but its exploitation is less than ideal, which affects local consumption instead of exports. The reasons for that are the grazing habits prevailing there and the popular traditions with respect to owning livestock. The possession of cattle is considered one of the most important factors in gaining the respect of society in those areas. For that reason, cattle owners refrain from selling them, except in rare conditions. In addition to that region, there are the areas of consumption in the north. It is hoped that after the completion of the Jonglei Canal, with vast areas liberated from the swamps land and the flood waters of the White Nile, pasture lands will be doubled and the varieties of shrubs on these lands improved, in order to permit the establishment of an intensive meat industry in the southern part of the country in the near future.

The abundant cattle now in Sudan, whether for domestic consumption or export, come from the regions of Kordofan and Darfur, where cattle are raised on the excellent grazing lands during a large part of the year. In addition, they are provided with the waste products of agricultural crops produced in the rainy agricultural areas. In view of the fact that these two regions are considered the most important cattle-producing areas in Sudan, they enjoy the highest standards of veterinary care, the preservation of natural grazing areas, along with the provision of fresh water sources. Moreover, cattle herders in western Sudan are noted for natural technical skills not available in other areas, because cattle breeding with them is the basic profession, handed down through the generations. Therefore, the cattle of western Sudan are noted for being numerous, healthy and fat, which results in their annual drawouts being superior to the drawouts of the other areas. When we review the movement of drawouts to markets and their prices in the markets of the producing areas, we see that that is characterized by being seasonal in terms of the marketing stages. The state has recently established a cattle and meat marketing organization, in order to absorb this seasonal characteristic and to reduce its influence on the movement of livestock, through its planning and programming, such as for an overland cattle road, and the allocation of trains especially for transporting cattle and sheep from Kordofan and Darfur, as well as by organizing local markets.

In order to reduce dependence on drawouts from the traditional grazing sectors, the state is encouraging the establishment of grazing farms, specializing in the production of calves for fattening on feedlots in an organized and programmed

way, without being influenced by the seasonal aspect of the traditional production areas. The state is also encouraging mixed farms, in which both livestock production and grain production are integrated and balanced.

Despite all that, shortages of meat occur in Khartoum and the regional capitals, which is considered an impediment to all those ambitious plans, aimed at satisfying the citizens' needs at reasonable prices commensurate with Sudan's abundance, in addition to the country's gains in terms of hard currency which will share in Sudan's prosperity.

7005

CSO: 4504/587

TUNISIA

BRIEFS

SOVIET AID ON HYDRAULICS--Tunis, 11 Oct (TAP)--Financial negotiations on an agreement protocol aimed at continuing Tunisian-Soviet cooperation in implementing hydraulic works were held yesterday between the Tunisian secretary of state attached to the minister of foreign affairs responsible for international cooperation, and the vice-chairman of the USSR State Committee for External Economic Relations. The negotiations dealt with the forms of the Soviet contribution to the construction of a hydraulic complex and three small dams. [Text] [LD120625 Tunis TAP in French 1300 GMT 11 Oct 83 LD]

COMMUNIST PAPER SUSPENDED--Tunis, 11 Oct (KUNA)--The Tunisian Government Tuesday suspended a leftist newspaper for six months, confiscated all copies of its latest edition and will try its chief editor for publishing a "false story." AL-TARIQ AL-JADID newspaper, organ of the Communist Party, has said that 200,000 Tunisian dinars were embezzled from the scholarships account of the Tunisian Embassy in France. The paper added that the embezzlement was the third of its kind from the same account. The official AL-'AMAL newspaper, however, said the embezzlement story was baseless. The mass circulation independent newspaper 'AL-SABAH said early this month that a Tunisian Embassy abroad has embezzled but did not name the embassy. On Tuesday, the paper said the embezzled money of the embassy in Paris was for scholarships. [Text] [LD112143 Kuwait KUNA in English 1856 GMT 11 Oct 83]

CSO: 4500/6

PAPER CRITICIZES NEUTRALITY ON IRAQ-IRAN WAR

JN250904 Baghdad INA in Arabic 0650 GMT 25 Sep 83

[Text] Baghdad, 25 Sep (INA)--The newspaper AL-JUMHURIYAH says that those who claim to be neutral regarding the Iraqi-Iranian war are shirking their international responsibility toward a most important and sensitive area of the world. In an article today entitled "This Is Not Neutrality," AL-JUMHURIYAH adds that this shirking of responsibility is not only a political shortcoming but also a moral one because it contradicts with the meaning of affiliation to the United Nations and the acceptance of its charter.

The paper says: Neutrality is acceptable when it is about an obscure issue or a debatable right. When the issue is clear and the right established, neutrality cannot be called as such even if it is well meant. Neutrality here is shirking responsibility, justification for aggression and complacency in supporting our just causes.

The paper goes on to say that announcements by international bodies that they are neutral toward the Iraqi-Iranian war would appear at first to be logical, fair announcements. In fact they are not because they mean neutrality between war and peace, between the aggressor and the victim of aggression. This is not neutrality but a bias in favor of war, an international or unintentional bias in favor of the aggressor who insists on continuing his aggression, the paper adds.

The paper says that those who claim to be neutral are relieving themselves of the duty to pressure Iran and force it to stop the war and cease its threats against Iraq, its aggression against Iraqi territory, and its interference in Iraq's internal affairs. This neutrality in effect means silence over Iran's aggression against Iraq and encouragement to Iran to continue and expand the war and threaten the security of the entire region. The paper adds: Furthermore, this kind of neutrality is exposed by the manner in which Iran is being supplied with weapons, ammunition, and spare parts. Those who claim to be neutral are those who make it easy for Iran, which is an aggressor and which insists on continuing the war, to obtain weapons on the black market or through their allies and satellites.

Concluding its article, AL-JUMHURIYAH says: No matter how much we try to think well of this neutrality, it will remain a negative attitude because the

neutrality, it will remain a negative attitude because the neutral sides are not taking any tangible, effective action to end the war but are leaving this to circumstances. Their only excuse is that they are neutral, thus, satisfying the Iranian rulers' desire to continue the war rather than heeding the world public opinion's call for peace.

CSO: 4400/19

ARABLE LAND PREPARED FOR JORDAN RIFT VALLEY SETTLEMENTS

TA091829 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1705 GMT 9 Oct 83

[Text] Some 12,000 dunams of arable land have recently been added to the Jordan Rift Valley settlements. In a comprehensive campaign carried out by the various land settling departments and the IDF, land abutting the Jordan River was prepared, literally turning fields that were once sown with mines into fertile soil. Our correspondent David Friedman toured the Jordan Rift Valley today.

[Begin recording] [Friedman] The shortage of arable land was the only reason which had earlier prevented the development of Jordan Rift Valley settlements. For years the land abutting the Jordan River lay barren. The land involved is a narrow strip directly adjacent to the river stretching from Mehola in the north to Bet Ha'arava in the south. The land is extremely fertile with soil deposited by the Jordan River. This area was full of mines, security fences, with IDF observation posts interspersed between them. The area was cleared of the mines and the IDF subsequently deployed along a new security line. This is what the military commander of the Jordan Rift Valley, Colonel Avraham, told us.

[Avraham] This involved erecting fences and moving them from one side to the other to create the optimal conditions for security. This will allow me to let the farmers till the fields with a clear conscience. Even now cultivating the land is linked to daily security operations.

[Friedman] There are 30 settlements in the Jordan Rift Valley. Another 10 will be established in the next few years. A girdle of six settlements was set up around Jericho. The two cochairmen of the Jewish Agency's Land Settlement Department toured the Jordan Rift Valley today, and Ra'anah Weitz believes there is no more room for the Allon plan.

[Weitz] Ultimately we will not be able to ignore the right to self-determination, but since we are sitting on the Jordan River and guaranteeing our security, I am not sure which is the political solution to the Palestinian issue that is most favorable to us.

[Friedman] His colleague, Matityahu Drobles, said even blunter things.

[Drobles] By setting up settlements around Jericho the Allon plan becomes dead and cannot be anything but defunct. It is completely unreasonable to dream about it.

[Friedman] The development activity in the Jordan Rift Valley has been accelerated, and now the arable land that has been added will turn the area into an even more fertile region. [end recording]

CSO: 4400/23

EGYPTIAN STUDENTS' VIEWS ON PEACE WITH ISRAEL SURVEYED

Jerusalem KOTERET RASHIT in Hebrew No 39, 31 Aug 83 pp 41-42

[Article by Emanu'el Sivan: "How the Cold Peace Thaws"]

[Text] Matters are tiresome--this is how Israeli-Egyptian relations for more than a year can be summed up. The reasons are known and there is no sense in going into details. But even those who will lay the main blame for it on the government of Israel--because of its rigid position in the autonomy talks and the declarations on neutralizing Egypt during the war in Lebanon--will admit that the Egyptians' hands are not clean. The difficulties that they impose on Israeli travelers to Sinai, the obstacles (not official but effective) that were intended to deter Egyptians (including Coptic pilgrims) from visiting Israel; the systematic sabotage of attempts to establish economic and cultural ties; the destructive attacks launched against Israel by the semi-official press--all this contributed to turning the peace into something disappointing, a cold peace.

Disappointing, maybe because of the unrealistic expectations accompanying the peace from the beginning. It is not simple and easy for Egypt to rid itself of a legacy of hostile positions and deep suspicions that were cultivated for 30 years; the 2 countries do not have too many common economic interests, especially since the Israeli economy is geared more and more--and justifiably--to exporting to Europe and other developed nations. It is true that actions by both governments aggravated the situation, but even without them things did not seem so good. The main argument for peace was and remains the evacuation of Sinai, which removed a basic pretext for war on the Egyptian side, and granted Israel a military guarantee against their turning the Sinai into a hostile base for the third time. These two conditions--the evacuation and the demilitarization--have been strictly adhered to and continue to be kept for more than 4 years. On this basis, realistic dovish thought hoped for a gradual improvement in mutual relations, in the scope of bilateral relations, their nature and climate. These hopes did not materialize, for the most part because of the policies of the two governments. In spite of this, the cold peace, with the low profile, has its own dynamics: Israelis visit and work in Egypt and this must influence the image; information on Israel (verbal and written) flows more freely than in any period since 1948; maintaining the peace agreement (at least in all that relates to bilateral relations) removes perhaps

something from mutual suspicions. All this is in the realm of assumptions that are hard to prove. And maybe only wishes?

Egyptian research which has just been published supplies a few answers, partial but more reliable than the impressions of tourists and journalists. In the spring of 1982 Dr 'Abd-al-Mun'im al-Mashat of Cairo University, administered a long, detailed questionnaire to a representative sample of Egyptian students. It was before the war in Lebanon and it is possible that changes occurred in some of the data. Nonetheless, this was an opinion survey, which is rare in the Arab world on any subject. The sample was selected from the total Egyptian student population, with extra rigor to include in it all the faculties and all types of universities (prestigious universities, provincial colleges and the religious university al-Azhar). Also, more or less proportional representation was provided for those who came from villages, Copts, and women.

One can not say that this research is about the elite since it refers to a public of hundreds of thousands. Indeed, it is not research about all of Egyptian public opinion. The research falls somewhere between the two poles. However, if we remember that the universities have an open door policy toward accepting students, that is, every high school graduate is accepted to a university (even though not to every faculty), here there is an interesting sample of the middle and lower-middle class, the classes for whom 'Abd-al-Nasir opened the gates of higher education, and to be more specific, a sample of youth of these classes (average age 22), a generation whose key experience was the October War and the peace initiative. Furthermore, this public constitutes a major portion of the political segment in Egypt; that is, that public which is not large (relative to democratic nations) with a rate of 10 to 15 percent, a public interested in politics, which reads newspapers, reacts to it and is attentive to the world outside the immediate family circle.

What are the findings then?

Dr al-Mashat found that two-thirds of those questioned approve of the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty (only 27 percent are opposed), half believe that the treaty indeed brought peace between Israel and Egypt (compared to a third who don't think so). This data is especially impressive because the student population in the universities is under the systematic propaganda attack of the religious opposition on the right and the Marxists on the left; both are enemies of the peace process (in the eyes of the religious opposition, which is the stronger of the two, the peace is rejected even without a connection to the Palestinian issue). The primary positive aspect of the peace--which is especially meaningful to the youth who are the army veterans--is the prevention of a future war between Israel and Egypt: 42 percent of those questioned believed that it will indeed prevent war (32 percent did not think so; the rest had no opinion on the matter). In the same connection, 46 percent answered in the affirmative to the question, "Do you expect an improvement in your life as a result of the treaty?" (34 percent in the negative). The improvement is not only in relation to the dangers of war but also in connection to expectations of economic growth as a result of reductions in the defense burden.

The heavy shadow on this cautious optimism is the Palestinian shadow; a large majority of those surveyed do not think that the treaty will achieve their rights for the Palestinians, that the autonomy talks will succeed, or that an Arab-Israeli war will be prevented, because of the Palestinians. Furthermore, an especially high rate (86 percent) believes that Israel and Egypt have no right to conduct negotiations on behalf of the future of the Palestinians.

Those surveyed are equally divided on the subject of normalization: 42 percent are for it, 48 percent are opposed. This almost equal division is similar and apparently not unrelated to the division between those who are for Pan-Arabism and those opposed to it (44 percent are for it and 44 percent are opposed). A very surprising finding, according to Dr al-Mashat, which represents a marked decline in the proportion of devotees of Pan-Arabism compared to his previous survey.

Israel, in the eyes of those surveyed, emerges as guilty of harming the rights of the Palestinians. Nonetheless there is a substantial public which accepts normal relations with Israel as something definitely reasonable. Moreover, 53 percent of those surveyed would like to visit Israel, even though (in an answer to a second question) only 33 percent responded that they indeed intend to do so. It is possible that this difference stems, among other reasons, from restrictions and unofficial warnings about a visit to Israel.

All of the above findings become meaningful, in my opinion, in two contexts. The negative context is that those surveyed are not obsessed with Israel; for the most part they believe economic problems are "the main threat to Egypt's national defense"; among the enemies of Egypt they rank the Soviet Union almost equal to that of Israel. When they were asked about urgent solutions to the problems of their nation, they put at the head of the list "more economic equality," then "more democracy" and only in third place "more military power," in fourth place "alliance with Arab countries." The economic problems thus reduce the urgency of foreign policy problems: The students are bothered by the economic policy crisis of "the open door," by the lack of sufficient investment in manufacturing industries and by the large gaps in the distribution of income. These problems are especially relevant to young people who are concerned about their economic and professional absorption.

The positive context is Israel's image; some of the negative elements remained (and maybe even worsened as a result of the Lebanon war). More than 60 percent believe that Israel is aggressive, has a persecution complex (only 15 percent rejected these claims). On the question, "Does Israel just defend its security?" only 20 percent answered in the affirmative, 70 percent answered negatively. On the other hand, the great majority agreed that Israel is "strong," "progressive," and "democratic." (The latter term has a very positive connotation in the Egyptian public debate about their regime.) A small majority agreed that Israel is a homogeneous society in the sense of a unified society; this is the opposite of the Nasserite contention that Israel is "a dust of people that was gathered from the corners of the world"; a similar majority defined Israel as a "liberal society," an "open society"--both are positive terms in the present Egyptian political language.

These things speak for themselves; any additional analysis would only cloud the complicated picture, in which light and shadows blend, a picture which has more than a spark of light for better days than at present with Egypt. Maybe the best evidence for this is that Dr al-Mashat privately stated that opposition forces had strongly attacked him for his findings, which they claimed distort the "true position of the young toward the peace process."

9944

CSO: 4423/175

ATTEMPTS MADE TO COUNTER 'DOLLAR PANIC'

Tel Aviv AL HAMISHMAR in Hebrew 24 Aug 83 p 3

[Article by Yosef Shami: "Panic of the "Greens"]

[Text] The public has bought \$700 million in three panic waves as a result of government policy, or more accurately, that of the minister of finance. He has no intention of getting rid of the "greens." We will not dwell here on the reasons for the panic, which were varied throughout the year, but the fact is that the Ministry of Finance contributed to the panic when it was unable to keep secret the plans for the "supplementary steps for the correct economy." The policy of slowing down the devaluations actually returned the economy to the system of setting exchange rates without considering market forces. By loosening restrictions on the acquisition of foreign currency, this policy restores the old problems and adds a new one--the flight of the small saver from the shekel to the dollar. In the past such flights also occurred but then the public could not enter banks and buy dollars as it desired, instead of investing in linked dollars, stocks or savings plans. After procrastinating, the government was forced to pay rate differences to exporters, hoteliers and others and to increase currency exchange rates voluntarily.

The government monetary policy, which is a mixture of different views, in the final analysis is an explosive threat to the economy. At the time this policy was defended with the claim that slowing down the devaluations would stop the inflationary spiral. Today, they no longer explain it this way but say that a big devaluation will be more destructive than guarding what already exists. No one has an answer as to how to keep the dollars from the consumer, who consumes his savings, buys everything, and travels abroad en masse.

To deter the public from buying dollars, as a means of overcoming the ravages of inflation, the difference between the rate for buying dollars and the rate for selling dollars was recently increased to 3 percent. In addition, one should add the "Peace for Galilee" levy and the bank fees, totalling more than 4 percent. In such a situation one should not be surprised that people who expected a large devaluation fled the stock exchange because of lack of confidence in Minister Aridor, and are keeping dollars and not selling them after a devaluation of 7.5 percent. It is clear to every intelligent person that a sale, which involves the loss of 4 percent, after a devaluation of 7.5 percent, is not worthwhile. Today, the Ministry of Finance is trying to

force the public to sell the foreign currency which it holds and return to stocks, but it is hard to believe that this will succeed. The methods that were supposed to deter the "returning of the greens" had the result that now few are going to desert the foreign currency and return to stocks, linked savings, etc. In this manner the government helps perpetuate the situation of fiscal strangulation.

The acquisition of \$700 million and freezing the money in bank accounts or mattresses is not the result of economic policy. A plan of budget cuts and tax levies does not indicate any solution except an effort to hold the head above water for a period of a few more weeks. It is clear to everyone that the source of the problem is the war in Lebanon and the upkeep of the army there for an unlimited time, plus the construction of bedroom cities in Judaea and Samaria. As long as this government is in control, there will be no change in the situation and therefore no chance that the economy will be on the road to recovery. Seven hundred million dollars in the refrigerator is another example of the unfortunate situation we are in, a situation which was not even described in the most extreme anti-Likud campaigns during the 1977 and 1981 elections.

9944

CS0: 4423/175

SUGGESTIONS ON INDEXING METHOD

Tel Aviv HATZOFE in Hebrew 24 Aug 83 p 1

[Article: "Bank of Israel Governor: Without Linkage--Inflation Would Decrease to 25 Percent a Year"]

[Text] Dr Moshe Mandelbaum, Bank of Israel governor, expressed his support for a proposal by the International Monetary Fund to cancel the linkage system which exists in Israel, in order to overcome inflation.

The governor made these comments to United Jewish Appeal delegation members from the U.S. whom he met yesterday in Jerusalem. The governor added that the government is willing to adopt the recommendation of the IMF but the Histadrut is opposed to it. He claimed that if not for the linkage system, the rate of inflation would have approached 22-25 percent annually.

Moreover, the governor noted that cancelling linkage in the present situation will badly hurt public savings, which constitutes a third of the income of the average Israeli family. Therefore, it is worthwhile to raise interest rates.

Dr Mandelbaum stated that despite the high rate of inflation, Israel is supported by a strong economic base and her condition should not be compared to other countries whose economies are shaky.

In the important chemical, medical, agricultural and weaponry industries, and also in the banking system, Israel is among the leading nations of the world. The United Jewish Appeal delegation met on Tuesday with the former settlers of Yamit and with Falasha newcomers in the absorption center in Ofaqim.

A Bank of Israel spokesman reported later that the governor stated that a recommendation to cancel linkage is not practical at the present rate of inflation.

9944

CSO: 4423/175

NEW DRUZE VILLAGE BEING ESTABLISHED

Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 31 Aug 83 p 6

[Article by Yehuda Ariel: "New Druze Town Is Being Established in Central Galilee"]

[Text] A new Druze village is being established near Kefar Qasra, near Tafa region. The village will serve as the administration and service center of the only Druze regional council in central Galilee.

No Name Yet

The village has no name yet. A regional comprehensive high school was established on the site a year ago. The Jewish National Fund is paving roads to the village after an approach road to the site was opened. As told to a HA'ARETZ writer, the new village should provide building space for the young generation in villages where building restrictions make it impossible to build new houses.

Mr Dani Hod from the rural building division said that at this stage, 400 "do it yourself" housing units are planned.

A population committee will determine who is eligible for a building plot. Released soldiers will obviously have top priority. An education and sports center, as well as commercial center, will be built in the village. A bank, an infirmary, and a regional council building, as well as other public buildings, are also planned.

JNF Develops Arab Villages

The JNF engineer in the northern zone, Mr Altman, said that development work and road paving are carried out for the Druze and Arab sectors--not only for Jewish settlements. The road paving for the new Druze regional center was commissioned by the government. Roads have also been paved in the villages Makhar, Kefar Yasif and Judeida, near 'Akko, and in Basmat Tab'un, in order to facilitate new housing and an easier approach to residential areas in these villages.

Aid for Agricultural Development

The JNF paved a new road, 1.3 miles long, to replace an unpaved route to Mt Hilel near the Druze village Bet Gan. This road enables excursion cars of the Nature Preservation Society to reach the site of rare flora on Mt Meron. The new road also enables farmers to reach and cultivate plots of land which have been unreachaeable, and therefore neglected so far.

12320

CS0: 4423/180

JERUSALEM HOSPITALS SAID REFUSING TO PERFORM ABORTIONS

Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 5 Sep 83 p 1

[Article by Lili Galily: "Jerusalem Women Have To Travel to the Central District in order to Have Abortions Approved by the Committee"]

[Text] Jerusalem women legally eligible for abortions, who receive a permit from the special committee, are obliged to travel to hospitals in the Tel Aviv area or to turn for abortions to private Jewish and Arab doctors.

Three hospitals have carried out the abortions law in Jerusalem so far: Misgav Ladakh and the two Hadassa branches in Mt Scopus and En Kerem. The two other hospitals in the city, Biquat Holim and Sha'ar ey Tzedeq, with mainly religious personnel as well as patients, have refrained from participating in the legal arrangement.

The Misgav Ladakh hospital and its public management were severely pressured lately to stop performing abortions. While the Kupat Holim has no hospital in the capitol, Misgav Ledach has given abortions service to the Kupat Holim members in Jerusalem.

Relying on the Conscience Section

The major part of the pressure put on the hospital has consisted of the spreading smear that the hospital was serving as an "abortions center." The management, encouraged by the Chief Sephardic Rabbi of Jerusalem, decided practically to stop fulfilling its obligation to carry out the abortion law. The hospital personnel relied in this decision on the conscience section in the abortion law, which enabled the physicians in the Sha'arey Tzedek and Biquat Holim religious hospitals to refuse to perform approved abortions.

The space shortage prevailing in the Hadassa hospitals as a result of the doctors strike has aggravated their abortion service. This service is given mainly to unmarried students and women soldiers, and to the city's northern neighborhoods.

Abortions are at the bottom in the Hadassa hospitals' priority scale.

Victims of Conservatism

Lota Zalzheimer, the municipal official in charge of the family and community office, and a member of the family planning project, told a HA'ARETZ writer that the abortion arrangement in Jerusalem has in fact collapsed.

Mrs Zalzheimer said that the committee did not function properly, and that even if an abortion was approved, it was suspended because the hospitals had no obligation to carry it out. Women have to turn to private doctors in the Jewish or the Arab sections of the city, or to hospitals in the Tel Aviv area. According to her, Jerusalem women are victims of the conservative trends and of the fact that the administration bodies involved have washed their hands of the matter.

12320

CSO: 4423/180

LAND MINES THREATEN LIVES IN SODOM REGION

Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 5 Sep 83 p 9

[Article by Mordekhay Artzi'eli: "Fighting an invisible enemy"]

[Text] One of the smallest settlements in the country, if not the smallest, is located in the Sodom region, approximately 1320 feet below sea level, where the heat reaches 120°F in the summer. This tiny settlement, En Tamar, has few families and less than 30 children, of whom the oldest is not yet 9. They are not complaining about the heat or about their isolation, not even about the generator which is supposed to provide them with electricity but keeps breaking. They are not complaining about their concrete-made houses, 132 square feet each, and not about the drinking water which is brought in tanks from a long distance and is distributed in small quantities. They are not complaining that since they had settled a year ago, they have not seen a single theater show.

What they find to be worrying, annoying, and frightening, is an invisible enemy--a dangerous enemy which has severely injured two family heads. Fighting it is almost impossible. Nobody knows when it will strike again. The enemy is not big--the size of an ashtray--but its strike is fatal: a land mine.

Since the small settlement was established last September, more than 25 mines have been found in its fields. Four of the mines exploded, of which two injured two settlers. Early this year, Sami Dadon was injured and still cannot work. Two weeks ago, Ya'akov Me'iri was injured and his right leg was amputated. A 26-year-old settler, Jennie Even, says: "Up to the mines business I've been happy here. I could see my future and my children's future here. I am ready to wrestle with many hardships, but I cannot let my husband wrestle with mines. If the problem is not solved, I cannot see my future here any more."

The settlements administration had started to prepare the 125 acres intended for agriculture last August--a month before the settlers arrived. The workers who prepared the area found 14 anti-personnel mines. Following regulations, the IDF was immediately informed. The IDF Engineering Division, as well as the Ministry of Agriculture division in the Negev district, were not surprised--they know the region very well.

The agricultural areas of En Tamar and its neighbor, Ne'ot Hakikar, are located where the Arava River's flood water flows. The river spreads, in many branches, on the Jordanian border. In the early 60's, the IDF buried many mines along this 113-mile-long river. The mines were mapped, but nobody could conceive then that the flood water would remove them and shift them to new places. Some of the thousands of mines, nobody knows how many, were swept to the agricultural area of En Tamar. After Ya'akov Me'iri's severe injury, the settlers decided unanimously not to enter the fields. This extreme decision means stopping agricultural work, the settlers' only work.

One of the settlers, Ydel Even, says: "A few weeks after we had settled, we found several mines while preparing the fields for sowing and planting. We reported it, and were told that the IDF closed the area. After a few days, we were told that the IDF allowed us to enter the area again. During the agricultural season last year, we found more mines, and the IDF closed and opened the area several times."

A senior IDF officer in the Southern Command responds: "There are certain measures we take in order to clean an area suspected of being mined. The IDF Engineering Division carries out whatever is to be done. If we conclude that the area is clean, we allow entry. But if after all our various checks we are not 100 percent sure that the area is indeed clean of mines, we close it again. En Tamar's agricultural fields are worse and more dangerous than a regular mine field. A regular mine field is mapped, so we know how many mines were buried. We know nothing about the settlement's 125 acres. We can find mines and remove them, but the first flood may bring dozens of new ones. Ne'ot Hakikar has also suffered from this problem in the past, and even today, after each flood, there is no guarantee that new mines will not be found there. We were informed that villagers in the Arava region had found mines and had removed them on their own without even notifying us, so that we would not close the area until the check was finished. It is a difficult problem, no doubt."

After the two accidents, En Tamar's union asked the settlements administration for an alternative agricultural area. The 18 safe, unmined acres can provide for three or four families only. According to the union members, the administrators of the Jewish Agency told them that they had no solution at that time, and asked for more time to investigate the matter.

But the settlement's members have their own suggestion. They say that in the Amazyra river area, near the settlement, no mine has been found yet. They therefore asked to prepare it as their alternative agricultural area. But the settlements administration has its reservations. A senior administrator asks: "How can anybody know for certain that no mines will be found in the Amazyra river area?" He adds: "The IDF is concerned with the settlers' lives. The IDF authorities demanded that we perform several checks in the area before delivering it to the settlers. We did exactly what we were told to do, and yet, only the day before yesterday several mines were found in the area. A solution will probably be found in a few days. An appropriate high area where the flood water does not flow has been located east of the village. This 175-acre area is intended to be prepared soon, but will not be ready for the agricultural season which is starting now. In order not to forsake En Tamar's members, 50 acres of Ne'ot Hakikar will be at their disposal temporarily."

FOREST FIRE SPREADS IN UPPER GALILEE

Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 2 Sep 83 p 5

[Text] In a great fire running wild in the Kefar Shamma forest in Upper Galilee from 11:20 am until late last night, an area of approximately 500 acres of natural forest went up in flames. Four fire-fighting cars, 30 Jewish National Fund workers, and dozens of volunteers of the Nature Preserves took part in extinguishing the fire.

Helicopters of the Jewish National Fund were also summoned to fight the fire where there was no approach by foot.

The chief of Zefat's fire-fighting station, Victor Dror, reported that each year there has been a fire in this area, a fact which stirred grave apprehensions.

According to the fire fighters, the fire started at two major points: one in the village Kefar Shamma and the other just nearby. The village has been in great danger for some time because it is very neglected and the vegetation is close to the houses. Only urgent action on the part of the tenants and the fire-fighting teams prevented grave damage to poultry and agriculture. The local telephone wires were severely damaged. The helicopters will resume fire fighting tomorrow morning because the fire is still burning in many places where there is no approach by foot. The Israeli Police and the fire-fighting station are investigating the cause of the fire. Among other causes, the possibility that the fire spread as a result of an attempt to burn thorns is being investigated.

12320

CSO: 4423/180

ISRAEL

BRIEFS

CREDIT LINES WITH HUNGARY--The Bank of Israel and Hungary's central bank signed an agreement to grant mutual credit lines to finance trade between the two countries. It was disclosed that \$15 million will be the credit line for each nation. This is the first agreement of its kind that Israel has signed with a Communist country with whom it has had no diplomatic relations since 1967. Then all the Warsaw Pact nations, with the exception of Romania, broke diplomatic relations with Israel. Despite the lack of diplomatic relations between Israel and Hungary, trade between them was not halted. Last year Israeli exports to Hungary totalled \$3.8 million and Hungarian exports to Israel reached \$8.2 million. Business sources estimate that each year dozens of Israeli businessmen visit Hungary to execute business deals and trade ties. [Text] [Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 24 Aug 83 p 2] 9944

DONATIONS FOR MINORITY VILLAGES--Nazareth, 12 Oct (ITIM)--Tens of thousands of dollars have been injected over the past few months into the minority villages in Israel in the form of contributions from various organizations abroad, some of which are not sympathetic to Israel. ITIM reports that a Christian cultural center will soon be built in the 'Isfiya on the Karmel mountain thanks to donations from FRG congregations, funneled through the World Council of Churches' aid fund. The cultural center, which will serve all the villagers, will be the most luxurious of its kind in the Arab sector. Similar donations have reached Nazareth, Dayr al-Asad and Kafr Yasif in the Galilee. It is noted that the delivery of the contributions has been going on for an extended period of time already, and has helped in carrying out a number of projects in the Arab sector, primarily in the cultural sphere. Nationalist elements have also taken advantage of this to promote their political goals. Some of the organizations who send their donations to Israel are not identified as being supportive of Israel, and in some cases there is no telling which body is actually behind these contributions. [Text] [TA121452 Tel Aviv ITIM in Hebrew 1425 GMT 12 Oct 83]

CSO: 4400/23

IMPLICATIONS, CONSEQUENCES OF TRIBAL UNREST DISCUSSED

Government Makes Promises

Nicosia AL-HURRIYAH in Arabic No 83, 14 Aug 83 p 24

[Text] Attempts by the Jordanian government to contain the aftereffects of the clash with the tribes of Bani Hasan continued. Repercussions of that clash, which occurred late last June, have continued till last week.

Jordan's prime minister, Mudar Badran visited the villages of Bani Hasan last week. During that visit the prime minister inaugurated a plan to connect electricity to four villages. The prime minister also heard village residents voice their requests and needs and, according to the Jordanian News Agency, was engaged in a candid and open dialogue with village residents. During his visit to those villages Badran stated, "The government will consider with extreme care all the demands that were presented, and it will solve as many as possible of all the problems that are facing citizens in the region."

The prime minister promised the people that the government will shorten the period of time [set] for connecting electricity to the remaining villages of the region and that instructions will be issued to utilize water from wells to provide drinking water for citizens. The prime minister said the government would soon lift the ban on digging artesian wells in the region for agricultural purposes, and he promised that more roads would be built and maintained.

A number of officials made statements consecutively, emphasizing the interest of the state and its institutions in providing basic services to the northern villages of the steppes, particularly electricity, health care clinics, post offices and other services.

Official media agencies were careful about covering news of Badran's visit to the northern steppes, that is, the traditional territory for the tribes of Bani Hasan. Newspapers were instructed to provide extensive and unusual coverage for the visit. SAWT AL-SHA'B, for example, devoted a full page to pictures of the visit, and this happens only when King Husayn himself tours the territory.

One day before Badran's tour media agencies published the text of a statement they attributed to the tribes of Bani Hasan. The statement affirmed loyalty to the "principles of the great Arab Revolution and its leaders of the Hashemite

family." The statement was signed by a number of prominent members of the tribes of Bani Hasan who serve in the Senate and in the National Advisory Council and by other tribal notables as well. Although the aim of the statement was to respond to "some organizations that tried to take advantage of a simple incident between members of a single family," and to affirm loyalty to King Husayn, the statement emphasized that the tribes of Bani Hasan were adhering to the rights of (al-Khalayilah) and (al-Zawahirah) clans to their land.

The authenticity of the statement and the signatures affixed thereto notwithstanding, the mere fact that the state did issue the statement--even though it did so 1 month after the incident--and the fact that Mudar Badran was compelled to visit the centers of Bani Hasan, where he made many promises to improve services in those villages, affirm that the implications of the aftereffects of the clash that occurred between Badran's government and the tribes of Bani Hasan were serious to the point that the government was forced to offer real material and moral concessions to contain the aftereffects of the clash and to prevent the situation from getting worse. Publication of the statement and Badran's visit to the villages of Bani Hasan indicate that the clash was not merely a passing incident that was contained there and then as official media agencies claimed [at the time].

But it would be a mistake for the Jordanian government to assume that it had contained the aftereffects of the clash by forcing a few of Bani Hasan's tribal elders, who are the government's functionaries and beneficiaries, to issue a very late statement. It is certain that the Jordanian masses, including the young people of Bani Hasan and all other clans, have learned the lessons of standing up to the government's operatives. It is certain that they understood the government's retraction--and particularly Mudar Badran's--of its arbitrary measures in the face of citizens' insistence on their rights and the solidarity of different sectors of the population with them.

The statement that was issued by the young people of Bani Hasan may reveal quite clearly the level of maturity and awareness they have reached in understanding their role and the means for standing up to the government and forcing it to retract its transgressions against citizens' rights and its oppressive policy. This statement is merely a practical example of the growth of awareness among the Jordanian masses and of the willingness to struggle that exists particularly among young people.

Once again we call upon the forces and factions of the National Movement to understand the indications of the incident and derive the necessary lessons from it.

Statement Calls for Democratic Measures

Nicosia AL-HURRIYAH in Arabic No 83, 14 Aug 83 p 25

[Text] The memorandum from the tribes of Bani Sakhr to King Husayn makes significant demands for democracy.
Our demands: lifting martial law and curbing corruption in the machinery of the state.

The tribes of Bani Sakhr sent a memorandum to King Husayn upon his return from

abroad. A number of significant political and democratic demands were made in the memorandum as well as other significant demands concerning the steppes and the rural areas. Because of the important position held by those who presented the memorandum, that is, the elders of the tribes of Bani Sakhr, which is one of the largest tribes in Jordan, we are printing below the text of the memorandum.

"We, all the tribes of Bani Sakhr, assembled in this place as Jordanians, share with the Jordanian people their grief and their hopes. We share their feelings and their aspirations. After deliberating among ourselves, we decided to present to your majesty some demands since you are the first and foremost authority in this land.

"Foremost among these demands is the preservation of the Jordanian citizen's dignity by applying the statutory laws that are enacted by the real representatives of the people in accordance with the stipulations of the Jordanian constitution. Administrative decisions are to be limited, and martial law under which the country has been run for many years is to be lifted.

"The second of these demands is to survey and register land that has not been registered in the names of its owners. In referring to the records of the Land and Surveying Office we find that no more than 5 percent of all land in Jordan is registered. There are 100 million donums in Jordan. Thus, ownership of 95 percent of the land in Jordan is not designated, or the land is considered to be owned by the treasury. It is known that most of this land is shared by the tribes and has been owned by the same people for hundreds of years. However, this land is not registered in their names despite repeated requests made by them to register it. It is our opinion that this land should be surveyed and registered in the names of its owners, particularly since we feel that this country is being threatened by the conspiracy of an alternative homeland.

"The third of these demands involves doing something about the poor situation in rural and desert areas by concentrating on increasing services in those areas. A network of rural roads is to be built, and old roads that have not been repaired or maintained for a long time are to be maintained. Entrance and exit ramps are to be built to every village located on the Queen 'Aliya' International Airport Road. Water and health services are to be connected to all villages; the educational competence of rural schools is to be upgraded; and the conditions and averages [of students] at desert and rural regions are to be taken into account to ensure [their] admission to Jordanian universities and institutions.

"The fourth of these demands is to draw up an integrated agricultural plan to help farmers utilize their land and protect what they produce. This may be done by devising agricultural efficiency plans and programs; by expanding irrigated farming, which may be done by digging more wells, lifting the ban on digging wells and building dams for irrigation; and by trying to protect farmers and what they produce from middlemen and from people who exploit others and tamper with prices.

"The fifth of these demands is to try and curb the continuing rise in prices which has been a burden on Jordanian citizens, particularly in rural and desert areas. The low incomes of Jordanian citizens in those areas in the face of the tremendous rise in [prices for] goods that are essential for life has created a

class of opportunists who accumulated millions in wealth at the expense of those citizens. We also hope that an end will be put to bribery and corruption, both of which have become widespread in recent years in many of the various state agencies.

"These are some of our demands which we thought we would bring to your majesty's attention in the hope that you will give them your care and attention."

[Signed], All the tribes of Bani Sakhr.

8592

CSO: 4404/562

ISSUE OF PROTECTIONISM DISCUSSED

Kuwait AL-WATAN in Arabic 10 Aug 83 p 14

[Article by Mahmud 'Abd-al-Wahhab: "Protective Tariffs: Protecting Established Industries Will Pave the Way For Industrial Investment By the Private Sector"]

[Text] The question of protective tariffs certainly arouses controversy in many economic systems, and rightfully so. The question has not yet been settled.

Kuwait's current situation may be an appropriate one in which to raise the issue for discussion.

There is no question that the changes in oil revenues, the deficit in the national budget, the crisis in the stock market and the ensuing consequences to the Kuwaiti economy as a whole are all reasons which together make the matter of encouraging nascent Kuwaiti industries and providing the reasons to protect them an important topic for discussion.

Discussion about encouraging Kuwaiti industries is an obligation for everyone concerned with the Kuwaiti economy inasmuch as planning for industrial change and establishing an industrial infrastructure are the only way to safeguard future generations.

Therefore, the importance of protective tariffs would appear to be in confronting a huge industrial world and giant companies with plans to monopolize the world market and transform its countries into warehouses and its citizens into mere quantities of consumers.

First of all, it would not be completely correct to say that Kuwait's economic system is based on the principles of the free enterprise system, with free trade and labor. In the actual application of the free enterprise system in many of the economically stronger countries some method of protective tariffs is resorted to to protect national products. The increase in customs duties by the European Common Market on melamine exported by Kuwait may be one indication of this. Similarly, the negotiations between this same group of countries and Egypt to force Egypt to discontinue its exports of cheap aluminum is another indication. The United States' recent imposition of another indication. The United States' recent imposition of restrictions on Japanese exports of cars and electrical equipment to protect American industry is a third sign. Thus we find that the world, both east and west,

socialist and capitalist, uses protective tariffs. The only disagreement involves the gradation between absolute protection and partial protection.

If we examine the customs laws currently in effect in Kuwait, we see that they are based on extremely flexible principles designed to encourage trade. This might be understandable and accurate in a specific period and for a specific time. But with economic progress it has become necessary to treat them with a view to the customs policy as a whole. The rules still require a 4 percent tax on all goods imported into Kuwait with the exception of those goods for which the minister of trade has issued a decree imposing higher taxes. Law number 42 of 1964 which codifies import laws specifies that the maximum rate that can be imposed by authority of the minister of trade cannot exceed 30 percent. The law also gives him the power to impose absolute protection by forbidding the import [of specific product].

Customs duties in effect in Kuwait range from this beginning rate to various rates for different items according to the schedules specified by the law that is part of the customs regulations and which is known to everyone.

What concerns us here is that the tariff rate and the ways by which it is determined need to be reexamined in light of a full understanding of the importance of protective tariffs. For instance, food processing--which everyone will admit is an industry--by a state-owned company in Kuwait is now at a high level of development. A decree was recently enacted giving absolute protection to the candle company's products, as well as to the Kuwait Cement Company, the shipbuilding company, and several other state-owned companies which have been achieving a high level of service with a high level of competence, and reasonable prices. Don't these state-financed operations bearing the state's name deserve more protection than they are currently getting? Much economic activity has recently begun in the private sector. Because non-Kuwaitis are forbidden by law to own these enterprises, it is also in the interest of the Kuwaiti economy and society to protect the industrial activities undertaken by individuals and companies. The paint industry, for example, enjoys absolute protection, as does the pipe industry. Don't other young industries in various parts require the same protection, regardless of their vitality or their degree of economic importance? It is sufficient, then, at this early stage, for individuals to be assured that industrial activity will be profitable. Otherwise they will turn away from it, preferring other businesses and economic activities which provide faster and surer profits.

It is absolutely incumbent upon the state to encourage these private initiatives in the sphere of industry. By studying the market and its needs the state can determine the amount of protection that will be necessary and the extent to which an enterprise will be able to satisfy the market. At the same time the government must ensure that the proprietors of the enterprise do not achieve a monopoly. Students of financial systems know how to achieve the delicate tripartite balance among national production, the consumer, and the state as guardian. So, does not an adjustment to customs duties in order to achieve protection simply represent another source of non-oil revenue for the state's GNP?

The entire question has produced more than one opinion because it involves more than mere taxes and a decision here or there. Rather, state policy is involved, and the expression of its serious intent to encourage its industry and economy. This encouragement begins in the transit warehouses and piers with protection from being overwhelmed from abroad.

9123

CSO: 4404/574

VOLUME OF IMPORTED GOODS DECLINES

Kuwait AL-WATAN in Arabic 10 Aug 83 p 11

[Article by Wafa' Khifaji: "Dr Ibrahim Makki Tells AL-WATAN: 'There Has Been a Sharp Decrease In the Volume Of Commercial Cargo Arriving In Kuwait'"]

[Text] The question continues to rage, and there is no easy answer. Everyone has his own opinion about it.

We have made an attempt to provide an answer about the effect of the "Suq al-Manakh" on the commercial traffic within the country, and to determine whether the ongoing events have had an effect on the volume of the commercial exchange and on the volume of goods which reach Kuwait.

To obtain a precise answer to this question--with the statistics--we interviewed Dr Ibrahim Makki, director general of the State Port Authority. We asked him several questions about the volume of commercial cargo being unloaded in Kuwait's ports compared with previous years. We also asked about the most significant factors which influence the movement of goods. He answered as follows:

"The volume of commercial goods reaching Kuwait by sea is lower in 1983 than it was in the previous 2 years. This may be seen in an examination of the statistics. These figures indicate that the quantity of goods unloaded in Kuwaiti ports during the last 3 years has begun to decrease, and is lower in 1983 than it was in 1981 and 1982.

"In January 1981 143,704 tons of goods were unloaded in transit; in January 1982 151,326 tons; and in January 1983 it rose to 209,379 tons.

"If we compare the figures for February we find that the volume of these transit goods in February 1981 amounted to 131,585 tons; in February 1982 149,860 tons; and in February 1983 145,933 tons.

"In March 1981 the volume of these goods was 228,014; in March 1982 it was 221,137; and in March 1983 it fell to 136,560.

"In April 1981 the volume of these goods was 161,977; in April 1982 it was 171,107; and in April 1983 it dropped to 123,871.

"The second statistic indicates the quantities of goods and containers unloaded at the al-Shu'aybah port during the period from January to April in 1981, 1982 and 1983. The total amount of cargo unloaded in January 1981 was 472,597; in January 1982 716,224; and in January 1983 it was 428,232. In March 1981 the total of these goods was 727,692; in March 1982 it was 626,082; and in March 1983 it was 521,858. In April 1981 the total of these goods amounted to 690,409; in April 1982 it amounted to 514,618; and in April 1983 it was 428,318.

"So we see that the quantity of goods unloaded was 778,149 in 1982 and 1,009,309 in 1983. There were 1,746,956 tons of transit goods in 1982, which dropped to 728,017 tons in 1983.

"In January 1981 152 ships were unloaded in the port of Kuwait. That number rose to 237 ships in January 1982, but dropped to 194 in January 1983. In February 1981 it was 137 ships and 210 in February 1982. The number dropped to 155 ships in February 1983.

"In March 1981 it was 157 ships, in March 1982 there were 247 ships, but the number dropped to 171 in March 1983.

"In April 1981 there were 171 ships. There were 226 in 1982. The number dropped to 165 in 1983.

"The total quantity of goods unloaded during this same period was 2,058,070 in 1981 and 2,446,512 in 1982, dropping to 1,964,475 in 1983.

"So we see that traffic in commercial transactions, ships and goods has fallen sharply in 1983 from previous years."

Dr Makki added, "There is certainly more than one reason for this. The crisis in al-Manakh--the events in the stock market, and the loss of liquid assets by many businessmen--is considered an important reason, particularly in view of the fact that anyone who scrutinizes the name of the perpetrators and the victims of the al-Manakh crisis will find that they are people from various walks of life, including importers. Furthermore, people's purchasing power has decreased. Individuals from many sectors have been affected adversely as a result of the freezing of assets which involved their Gulf adventure. Therefore, consumer spending can only be accomplished by wider availability of capital.

"Furthermore, the transit business has suffered considerably. This is in part due to foreign importers obtaining better facilitations in other countries than they obtain from us. Some of them have complained about the complicated bureaucracy involved with transit goods. In addition, imports to certain countries, which had been passing through Kuwait, have decreased for specific reasons over which we have no control."

He concluded as follows: "I cannot predict what the situation will be this year. But I am quite confident of Kuwait's strategic position in the transit and reexport business. I believe that the situation will improve in the coming years, and we must prepare ourselves for that."

BRIEFS

NATURALIZATION FIGURES--According to the Ministry of the Interior's 1983 statistical bulletin naturalized citizenship was granted to 10,794 people last year. In 1981 the figure was 7,610; in 1980 8,095; in 1979 7,081; 1978: 6,970 1977: 15,057; 1976: 6,483; 1975: 6,272. The number of people granted citizenship starting with 1981 was 66, 11 in 1977, 156 in 1976 and 345 in 1975. The number of people granted citizenship pursuant to article seven was 3,562 last year and 1,784 in 1981, compared with 1,745 in 1980, 1,534 in 1979, 1,230 in 1978, 964 in 1977, 1,119 in 1976 and 676 in 1975. The number of people granted citizenship pursuant to article five, according to the bulletin, was 63 in 1981, 16 in 1980, 35 in 1979, 37 in 1978, 154 in 1977, 116 in 1976, and 149 in 1975. The number of people granted citizenship pursuant to article eight was 308 in 1981, compared with 285 in 1980, 326 in 1979, 103 in 1978, 241 in 1977, 279 in 1976, and 272 in 1975. [Text] [Kuwait AL-QABAS in Arabic 8 Aug 83 p 3] 9123

CSO: 4404/574

PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS

MONTE CARLO INTERVIEWS NIMR SALIH

JN072212 Paris Radio Monte Carlo in Arabic 1752 7 Oct 83

[Interview with Nimr Salih, a Fatah dissident leader, by Radio Monte Carlo correspondent in Damascus Louis Faris for the "It Happened Tomorrow" program; date not specified--recorded]

[Text] [Faris] Brother Nimr Salih, Fatah Central Committee member and one of the leaders of the opposition within the Fatah movement, what is the current size of your movement?

[Salih] We cannot determine the size of this movement with numbers, but I can say that more than 90 percent support our demands, and that more than 90 percent of the military forces and political cadres in the Lebanese and Syrian arenas as well as in the other Arab countries surrounding our occupied homeland support our demands and our upheaval. In the wake of the upheavals that took place last week, upheavals which represented a large segment of the military forces--a segment which had called for the movement's unity, had submitted a program to achieve this unity, and a segment which included large numbers of officers, military forces, and political cadres. Therefore, after becoming convinced that the brothers on the other side were not serious in their attempts to unite the movement and end this dispute on the basis of the movement's unity and the protection of the Palestinian people's achievements, the young men in this segment announced their support for the upheaval at a news conference. These young men also met with Yasir 'Arafat and Khalil al-Wazir in Tripoli, and told them: We are joining the upheaval. We disagree with you and cannot remain with you. They ['Arafat and al-Wazir] told them: Remain with us and take what you want.

Kam al-Shaykh [not further identified] told Abu 'Ammar [Yasir 'Arafat] 4 days ago: We want Fatah, and we want Fatah to be strong and the vanguard of the Palestinian people, in the wake of the upheavals which took place last week when a large force, representing a group of honest and patriotic young men, joined the upheaval, we can say that the upheaval has succeeded and that it represents the majority within the Fatah movement. A few have remained outside the upheaval, and they will join us very soon. There are others whom we will not accept, because one of the conditions for joining the upheaval is that we do not accept those who have deviated politically and those who have harmed the revolution.

[Faris] Brother Nimr Salih, the other side is making accusations that you are massing troops, that you have the Syrian forces at your side, and that you are imposing a siege on the al-Baddawi and Nahr al-Barid Refugee Camps in preparation for a military action against these two refugee camps. What do you have to say to these accusations?

[Salih] Their false and exaggerated description of the situation is indeed a very sad thing. Our forces, the other forces, and the Syrian forces--whom are they besieging? They are besieging some emblems of the [Lebanese] second bureau in Tripoli and the al-Baddawi Camp. They are besieging some of the remaining thieves in our camps, who are now trembling. Whom are they besieging? This too has been exaggerated.

You all know about the massacre that was perpetrated in Tripoli 1 week ago, the massacre during which more than 18 innocent Palestinians were killed. Who committed this crime in broad daylight? Was the massacre committed by the Syrian forces and the rebel forces, which is the term they use for us? This massacre was perpetrated by the Lebanese second bureau and the thieves from the Palestinian resistance who enjoy the support of 'Arafat and Khalid al-Wazir in Tripoli. I say that those who dream of transforming Tripoli into a capital for the counterrevolution and conspire against the Palestinian revolution and the National Salvation Front from Tripoli are deluded.

Reports such as these are merely for propaganda purposes in order to win the sympathy of the people and obtain Arab support for exacerbating the situation in Tripoli. Nothing of what they are claiming really exists. One can easily confirm this. This press, even your radio, can go to Tripoli and see what is taking place in al-Baddawi and Nahr al-Barid refugee camps. The Palestinian refugee camps there in Nahr al-Barid and al-Baddawi support the upheaval and our demands. The Palestinians in these camps even refuse to have the deviationists live in these camps, because the Palestinians know very well who are the cadres of the Palestinian revolution.

They know and they write to us every day about the injustices they are suffering at the hands of elements of the second bureau and Egyptian intelligence, which are shadowing their movements in our camps. Matters are being exaggerated, I can say that it is not true that there is a siege in the north. It is not true that we are on the threshold of internecine fighting in the north, as they claim. But it is true that as a result of the crime they committed in the north--and everyone knows this--some of our units moved to the north, not to fight, because we are against fighting, but to tell the deviationists: your fate will be in danger if you continue to call for internecine fighting. We tell them: Keep away from the camps. Our camps will not be at the service of Egyptian intelligence or the Second Bureau. Our camps and the city of Tripoli will not be a base for the counterrevolution.

[Faris] But Brother Nimr Salih, how do you expect the situation to be settled in northern Lebanon?

[Salih] Actually, the situation must be settled by returning to the people, to the desire of the people. It must be settled by stopping blackmail. It must also be settled by facilitating freedom of expression for the people, so that they can join the upheaval and support the National Salvation Front.

[Faris] Are you planning to evict Yasir 'Arafat from Tripoli?

[Salih] Truly, we are not saying this. What we are saying is that the Palestinian people should rally around the objectives of the revolution. Yasir 'Arafat came to Tripoli. We do not know who brought him and how, but I will not be disclosing a secret if I tell you that for the past 48 hours now Yasir 'Arafat has been trying his utmost to get out of Tripoli, with the help of Arab and friendly states.

[Faris] Abu Iyad says that the objective now is to liquidate the pro-'Arafat Fatah in Syria and Lebanon. Abu Iyad told our radio 2 days ago that you are in the process of settling up a new leadership for the PLO. What is your answer to this?

[Salih] How strange of Abu Iyad. He, Abu 'Ammar, and Abu Jihad are calling for the removal of the revolution in Lebanon. Abu Iyad made a statement in which he said: Amin al-Jumayyil gave us a memorandum requesting this removal. Khalil al-Wazir is the one who called for the withdrawal of the Palestinian forces. Yasir 'Arafat also called for this withdrawal when Amin al-Jumayyil announced that he had sent a message calling on 'Arafat to pull the Palestinian forces out. The question of the liquidation of the revolution in Lebanon was decided by Abu 'Ammar, Abu Iyad, and Abu Jihad. However, the upheaval foiled this decision and firmly established the revolution in the Lebanese arena.

[Faris] Allow me, Nimr Salih. Are you in the process of forming a new leadership?

[Salih] I believe this also is an act of blackmail to precede events. We want to safeguard the gains of the Palestinian people. We want to safeguard the PLO. We also want to safeguard the Palestinian revolution. Unfortunately, we had to purge the revolution of deviationist figures.

[Faris] I had an interview today with Brother Talal Naji from the PFLP-GC. He considers that Abu 'Ammar is no longer qualified to be a leader. Do you share Talal Naji's view?

[Salih] Perhaps Talal, from his position as member of the PLO Executive Committee and of an independent group in the framework of the PLO, holds such a view. But we believe that we must hold a conference of the Fatah movement to try Abu 'Ammar and all of those who harmed the Palestinian people and abandoned the independent Palestinian decisionmaking; all of those who [word indistinct] for laying down the rifle, who held contacts with Israel, and who instigated Palestinian infighting. All of these people must be brought to account by Fatah. The difference between us and our brothers in other groups of the Palestinian resistance is that we in Fatah call for the trial of all of those who harmed the movement and the Palestinian people.

[Faris] What about the Syrian and Libyan support?

[Salih] We work everyday, and here I cannot but thank Syria, Libya, Iran, the PDRY, and all of the friendly world states who showed a real interest in our political objectives and who extended the proper aid in a fierce conflict, such as you see now. Here are the United States and NATO in Khaldah and off the Lebanese coasts, facing an impasse. The United States is facing an impasse now. All of this was the result of the Palestinian conflict which was caused by the upheaval and its allies in the Palestinian arena--the allies who, with the cooperation of the National Salvation Front, defeated the objectives of the U.S. solution for the Lebanese arena. Such a defeat was brought about by the National Salvation Front; the upheaval and its allies in the Palestinian arena; their Arab depth, represented by Syria, Libya, and the PDRY; and the international depth, which extends to the USSR.

We have not infiltrated into Lebanon. We were in Lebanon, and we have developed our situation. In reply to those who say that there are some who seek to liquidate the Palestinian question, I can say that the current number of Palestinian forces in the Lebanese arena is double the number there on the eve of the upheaval. We are proud of those Palestinians who join the revolution everyday from the Gulf, Jordan, the West Bank, and Syria. Our forces are now watching the U.S. positions closely. Our forces are at the disposal of Walid Junblatt. If he asks us to fight the Americans, then this will be our pride, because we want to defend Lebanon and the Lebanese people in the same manner that we defend Palestine and the Palestinian question.

[Faris] Your listeners may imagine that you are leading a new revolution. Is this the right impression?

[Salih] In fact, the upheaval is a process of renewal of outworn concepts within the framework of the Palestinian revolution and the Arab liberation movement.

[Faris] But Abu Salih, yesterday the figures of the occupied territories issued a statement expressing their support for the Palestinian legitimacy and Yasir 'Arafat's leadership. What do you say about this?

[Salih] Who are these figures? Our people in the occupied territories view our movement with delight. However, there are some figures there whose support we do not seek, because we do not mix between the nationalists and the non-nationalists in the occupied areas. In the occupied homeland, there are known figures who are firmly linked with Jordan and Israel. These elements are the ones who frequently express their support for the Palestinian legitimacy represented by Yasir 'Arafat.

[Faris] I ask you specifically, do you think that 'Arafat's end will be in Lebanon?

[Salih] I cannot predict this, but I can say that 'Arafat has nothing left in Lebanon.

CSO: 4400/14

KUWAITI PAPER INTERVIEWS SYRIA'S KHADDAM

GF071900 Kuwait AL-ANBA' in Arabic 6 Oct 83 p 19

[Interview with Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister 'al al-Halim Khaddam by AL-ANBA' Correspondent Basim al-Mu'allim in New York--date not given]

[Text] [AL-Mu'allim] Tell us about your meeting with U.S. Secretary of State Shultz which the U.S. press described as the alternative to Shultz's meeting with Soviet Foreign Minister Andrey Gromyko.

[Khaddam] The main topic which I discussed during my talk with Secretary of State Shultz was Lebanon. We discussed the civil war in Lebanon and al-Shuf and ways of ending it. One of the main ideas suggested by Shultz was the possibility of stationing international observers linked with the United Nations to supervise the cease-fire. We rejected this idea for the following reasons:

1. What is happening in Lebanon is a civil war and an internal matter. The stationing of UN observers would be a serious precedent in the interference in the affairs of states.
2. The U.S. offer to station UN observers is a violation of the agreement reached a few days ago calling for a cease-fire. When we discussed the cease-fire agreement the idea of stationing UN observers was rejected and the stationing of neutral observers. [sentence as published]
3. The stationing of UN observers will result in the freezing of the situation in Lebanon, or in other words it will lead to the cyprotization of Lebanon. We want an end to the aberrant state of affairs in fraternal Lebanon so as to prevent its partition. I asked the ministers during my meetings with them to withdraw their forces from Lebanon and not to interfere in its affairs.

[Al-Mu'allim] What was the response to the request to withdraw the multinational force from Lebanon?

[Khaddam] The answer was that they were in Lebanon at the request of its legitimate government. Discussions were held on the legitimacy of the presence of the multinational force in Lebanon. We are convinced that its continued presence poses a threat to the security of Lebanon and the security of the entire region.

[AL-Mu'allim] It is well known that the French do not want to become embroiled in the Lebanese crisis and want to leave Beirut at any cost. Was this your impression following your talks with Claude Cheysson?

[Khaddam] The door is open for them to leave Lebanon. There is nothing to prevent them from doing so. Why do they not leave? Of course, we hoped that there would be no French, Italian or British involvement in Lebanon. The door is open for anyone who wants to get out of this dilemma.

[Al-Mu'allim] Let us return to the cease-fire agreement. I have already referred to neutral observers. Who will decide who these observers will be? Will it be the legitimate Lebanese authorities represented by Amin al-Jumayyil and the Lebanese Army or whom?

[Khaddam] The nationality of the neutral observers is determined by the military committee that represents the four warring parties: Amal Movement, the National Salvation Front, the Lebanese Army and the Lebanese Forces. The committee was charged with supervising and consolidating the cease-fire. Consequently, it is the military committee that determines the cease-fire requirements, including the question of neutral observers. The matter was not left to the Lebanese Government as it is one of the protagonists. It is represented by the military committee through the army. Consequently, its views are put forward during the committee's meeting. It is the military committee that decides this matter, because it was charged with supervising the cease-fire.

[AL-Mu'allim] Was this understood by the Lebanese president when he signed the cease-fire agreement? Was this point discussed before the cease-fire agreement was signed?

[Khaddam] We discussed every point. This matter was clear from the beginning. Therefore, we were surprised when the Lebanese Government took such a stand. It is a violation of the agreement. All the parties know that neutral observers are not under the UN umbrella and are chosen by the military committee.

[Al-Mu'allim] Was the U.S. side also aware of this?

[Khaddam] This matter was discussed. It is not important whether the U.S. side was aware of it or not. Our discussions were held with all the Lebanese parties.

[AL-Mu'allim] And the U.S. side?

[Khaddam] We did not discuss this matter directly with MacFarlane. The discussion was between us and our brothers from among the Lebanese sides.

[Al-Mu'allim] Is the Syrian stand on not accepting an international force, or observers from the United Nations or under the umbrella of the United Nations, or a multinational force, final?

[Khaddam] Yes, it is final. The majority of the Lebanese sides support this stand. Indeed, they asked us to support them in this matter.

[Al-Mu'allim] Let us move to the second part of the cease-fire agreement: the national dialogue. Can you give us an idea about what was agreed?

[Khaddam] From the beginning of the events in Lebanon, Syria's stand was clear; namely, that the war and fighting in Lebanon must be resolved, and that the situation is an internal matter and that the Lebanese have no way other than to resort to dialogue and national reconciliation. We acted from this premise. We entered Lebanon in 1975 at the request of the Lebanese Government to end the war and to help the warring parties to agree on a national entente that will end the direct and indirect causes of the war that broke out in 1975. Regrettably, the Lebanese Government did not make use of the calm brought about by the intervention of the Syrian forces in 1976. Thus, the Israelis managed to infiltrate Lebanon through some agents who acquiesced to being instruments in the enemy's hands. The enemy invaded Lebanon in 1982 and imposed an agreement on Lebanon that ended the independence and sovereignty of that fraternal country. The Israeli occupation of Lebanon has upset the balance. The negative aspects of the Israeli occupation and the upsetting of the balance were demonstrated by the war that broke out in Beirut and in 'Alayh and al-Shuf.

We believe that the only way to keep Lebanon a unified, independent and Arab country is by national reconciliation, and by tackling the causes that led in the past to a series of explosive incidents in Lebanon's political and social life as a result of certain conditions. The reasons that led to explosive incidents in Lebanon every now and then must be identified, and all issues must be discussed in a spirit of brotherhood under the umbrella of national reconciliation and unity.

[Al-Mu'allim] So far, none of the invitations for a dialogue which the Lebanese president said he will extend has been extended. Both Raymond Iddih and Walid Junblatt have said that they will insist on all the invitations being made. Recently, all the parties began to escalate their political stands--as demonstrated by Walid Junblatt's latest remarks and the Phalangists' reply to them.

[Khaddam] A preparatory committee representing the protagonists was supposed to have been formed to prepare for a conference of national dialogue, and discuss the matters that are likely to facilitate the dialogue. Regrettably, this has not happened yet, although it is a pressing matter. We are awaiting the formation of the committee. It is a necessary state for the success of the dialogue. Why hasn't the preparatory committee met yet? Preparation for the conference is a necessary step to ensure its success. I am surprised by the artificial uproar created against Walid Junblatt, a patriotic Lebanese leader who did not waver for one moment in making every effort so that Lebanon will remain unified and Arab.

[Al-Mu'allim] Have you heard anything from U.S. Secretary of State Shultz [in your talks] about the Lebanese-Israeli agreement, or from anyone who took part in the discussions on the cease-fire that points to some kind of pledge by the United States to bypass the Lebanese-Israeli agreement?

[Khaddam] Frankly and clearly, we have not heard anything in this regard. This matter cannot be discussed on the basis of the words if or maybe. An

agreement that has been imposed on Lebanon has reached a certain stage. The only way to deal with this agreement is to abrogate it.

[Al-Mu'allim] How long do you believe the Americans will stay in Beirut? Do you see any danger of a clash between the U.S. Navy and the Syrian forces in Lebanon?

[Khaddam] It appears that the U.S. force will stay for a short period, in accordance with congress' recent endorsement. I should like to point to the danger arising from the continuation of the situation. I hope that this force will not stay long, for the sake of the security of Lebanon and the region.

[Al-Mu'allim] What is the Soviet Union's stand on the matter? What do you year from it and what do you say to it?

[Khaddam] The Soviet Union is a friendly country that gives us support and assistance. It has taken clear stands vis-a-vis U.S. policy and involvement in Lebanon.

[Al-Mu'allim] Let us suppose that, God forbid, fighting should break out between the Syrian and U.S. forces. Will there be a Soviet intervention on Syria's side, that is, will the Soviet Union support the Syrian forces, just as the United States is supporting the Lebanese and Israeli armies?

[Khaddam] We will discuss the situation as it arises.

[Al-Mu'allim] The United States has set up an airbridge for the transport of weapons and military hardware to Beirut. It was recently reported that the Soviet Union has set up a similar airbridge from the Soviet Union and East European capitals for the transport of weapons and equipment to Damascus. Is this true?

[Khaddam] Soviet aid is received at the appropriate time. I do not think that such matters can be discussed in the media.

[Al-Mu'allim] What about the presence of Soviet experts in Damascus? Can we talk about that?

[Khaddam] What exists in Syria is Soviet expertise.

[Al-Mu'allim] Has there been any change in the number of Soviet experts in Syria?

[Khaddam] The number is not important. What is important is that we are taking as much expertise as we need.

[Al-Mu'allim] The Americans say that they have been disappointed since Israel signed the accord with Lebanon because Syria has defaulted in its declared promises to withdraw from Lebanon.

[Khaddam] If the Americans have truly been disappointed, they deserve this very much. No one in Syria told them that our force would withdraw when Israel

withdraws. [sentence as published] On 26 April we told the U.S. GOvernment that if the Beirut government reaches an accord and gives the Israelis gains, then Syria would stay longer until these gains disappear. We did not tell the Americans that we would withdraw, as they wanted us to. Rather, we told them that Israel should withdraw in accordance with Security Council Resolution 905 and that our presence in Lebanon is not tied in any way whatsoever to the presence of the Israeli aggression because the ties relations between Syria and Lebanon are not there between Lebanon and Israel. When Israel withdraws from all the Lebanese territory, we are ready to discuss a national dialogue to preserve Lebanon's sovereignty.

[Al-Mu'allim] What is your view on the situation in Tripoli and the recent events there?

[Khaddam] I do not have enough information, because as you know, I am outside the country.

[Al-Mu'allim] By my question on Tripoli I meant how do Yasir 'Arafat's return to the city and the seemingly deep difference between Damascus and Abu 'Ammar [Yasir 'Arafat] affect your relations with the PLO and the Palestinian question in general?

[Khaddam] Syria's commitment to the Palestinian question is older than the PLO and older than what followed. Syria, which is building such military strength and bears its economic and social burdens, is doing this for the sake of Palestine. It is not important to talk about what Syria is doing for Palestine because this is on top of Syria's priorities. We do not differ with anyone; it was he who created the differences. In the war in Lebanon we fought and bore the brunt of the fighting and yet this army, which offered thousands of martyrs in defense of Lebanon and our Palestinian brothers, was misunderstood. Our difference with this or that person does not affect and will not affect our pledge to support the PLO, the legitimate and sole representative of the Palestinian people. We distinguish between the issue, the Palestine issue, and the organization, the PLO, which we always try to view in the context of its role within the Pan-Arab movement and the clear political line to which the PLO was committed in the Palestine National Council resolutions. As for persons, this issue is not basic and the idea that this person or that has insulted Syria does not change anything in the stand toward the issue or the organization. He who harms Syria--which is bearing the brunt of the conflict with Zionism and imperialism in the region--harms himself and his cause.

[Al-Mu'allim] How do you see the PLO's future? Some people, particularly those in the U.S. media, claim that Syria is trying to curb the PLO, reduce it and dismember it, and is trying to create an alternative PLO tied with Damascus or under the control of Damascus.

[Khaddam] Syria is not in need of creating organizations under its control or on which to impose its decisions.

Syria, in its clear national political policy, and in its declared confrontation in defense of the Arab nation's primary goals, makes its decision and

policy binding for all. Syria, which is confronting the Israeli aggression, calling for a military equilibrium, and resisting the major conspiracy in Lebanon, is not in need of seeking applause. Rather, these people are, as they were before, in need of Syria, which has always been, for all the Arab countries, not just for Palestine alone.

[Al-Mu'allim] There is no doubt that individuals play important roles in the establishment. Has the door before Mr 'Arafat and for having dialogue with him and asking him back to Damascus been closed? And the same question applies to Amin al-Jumayyil?

[Khaddam] We don't want in any way to intervene in the internal affairs of any Arab country or establishment, and therefore talking about having dialogue with this or that is out of the question. What is required of us now is to face the conspiracy that is aimed at eliminating Lebanon as a united Arab country. We are required to face the Israeli occupation in Lebanon and in the other Arab territories. We are required to remain steadfast at this stage when everyone has disappeared and when we remain alone in the arena. This is why we have no time to waste. There is a big battle that we have to face.

[Al-Mu'allim] You stress that Syria stands alone in the field of confrontation with Israel. Where are the other Arabs?

[Khaddam] Yes, Syria is now alone in the field of military confrontation with Israel. The Syria forces, whether in the Syrian territory or in Lebanon, are the only Arab forces that stand alone in confrontation with the Israeli enemy. Where are the other Arab brothers? We all know the painful situation the Arab world is living through. A state of splits and lateral conflicts are about to drown the Arab nation. These circumstances have changed many people and changed their positions. We hope that during the upcoming summit conference which will be held in Riyadh the Arab states will be able to overcome the present situation so as to assume their natural position in the arena of conflict with the Israeli enemy.

CSO: 4400/19

LAND REFORM TO BE IMPLEMENTED IN FOUR STAGES

Kabul DEHQAN in Dari No 22, 15 Aug 83 p 8

[Text] In accordance with the resolution of the Politburo of the Central Committee of PDPA and the Council of Ministers of DRA, the implementation of the second phase of the land reform in some provinces of the country is underway. An official of the Land Reform Department in an interview with our correspondent, regarding the implementation of the land reform, said:

According to the ratification of the Joint Commission of the Central Committee of PDPA and the Council of Ministers of DRA, the democratic water and land reform will be implemented in four operational plans:

1. First Operational Plan of the Developmental Stage of the Land Reform:

Program to implement practical measures for evaluating the results of the previous phase of the land reform.

2. Second Operational Plan of the Developmental Stage of the Land Reform:

Program to implement practical measures for correcting the errors of the previous stage of land reform; investigation of the disputes on land ownership and water access right; distribution of land, water and ownership titles to farmers, landowners, agricultural cooperatives and government farms; effective arrangements to be adopted on matters of land ownership and registration of quantitative and qualitative land and water and taxation in the public records and in the records of the personnels of second operational groups.

3. Third Operational Plan of the Developmental Stage of the Land Reform:

Program to adopt practical measures to extend financial, technical and materials assistance to farmers and land owners; assistance to be rendered for organizing agricultural cooperatives and agricultural cooperative unions; increase in production activity, distribution of agricultural products and completion of buildings under construction at the level of provincial districts.

4. Fourth Operational Plan of the Developmental Stage of the Land Reform:

Program to implement practical measures in completion of constructional matters and improvement of irrigational systems, roads, schools, hospitals and

other public welfare projects; rural infrastructures throughout the country and providing equipments for installations together with sufficient personnel, equipments and materials for the benefit of our toiling people in the rural areas of the country at the same standard as practiced in the provincial districts.

As regard to number of ownership titles distributed to land owners and the collection of revenues from the sale of excess lands in the second phase of Democratic Land Reform, the same source told our correspondent:

Totally 80,651 titles of ownership have so far been distributed and ownership of 6,623 households have been settled of which a total of 4,399,220 Jeribs of land in the settled area are of the first quality lands. Likewise, a revenue of 7,424,243 Afghanis have been collected from the land assessment services.

Regarding the resolution of the 11th Plenum of the Central Committee of PDPA in acceleration of the operational plans of Democratic Land Reform, the official said:

Previously number of personnels serving in an operational group consisted of seven persons; and now they have been reduced to four persons. On the one hand, this reduction in the number of working personnel has cut down travel expenses and on the other hand, it has raised groups quality level and has guaranteed further coordination among the members of the groups. It has been decided to organize permanent general directorates of land reforms in some provinces in order to control expenditures and to solve the difficulties involved in the transportation of the operational groups which will be more effective in the acceleration of operations.

In order to prevent work stagnation, it has been decided that all allocated funds should be sent to the local offices and general directorates of land reform in each locality.

The Land Reform Department has promoted the responsibilities of the general directorates to be solely responsible in implementing the operational plannings and also has authorized them to control and to investigate matters of implementation of operational plannings of land reforms. Moreover, they have been given an active role in present control or budget expenditures and in providing better working conditions for the operational groups.

For the purposes of sound and effective implementation of land reforms and for publicizing its multilateral aims and to solve complications concerning the implementation of land reform, general directorate of assessment, general directorate of investigation, general directorate of public relation, general directorate of education and general directorate of special high board have been established from the currently available budget. Each of the aforesaid directorates has a noteworthy role in the implementation of land reform.

The official further explained the problems and difficulties with which the Department of Land Reform is presently encountered in the process of implementing the Democratic Land Reforms.

The difficulties involved in the implementation project of the Democratic Land Reform are classified as following:

--Existence of a series of articles in Law which practically interfere with the work progress. However, certain proposals in this respect have been submitted to authorities concerned for the purpose of amending the particular articles.

--Personnel shortage.

--Difficulties in transportation of the personnels of each group, which do not take place at specified time.

--Number of personnels are being attracted to other offices and organizations for higher wages and privileges.

CSO: 4665/17

FARMERS TO RECEIVE 69 MILLION AFGHANIS IN LOANS

Kabul DEHQAN in Dari No 22, 15 Aug 83 p 1

[Text] For the purpose of implementing the resolution of the 11th Plenum of the Central Committee of PDPA, the Agricultural Development Bank has also carried out fruitful task in the growth of the nation's economy.

For the purpose of protection and improvement of the agricultural products of the country, the Agricultural Development Bank in the first quarter of the current year has allotted various loans, amounting to 69 million afghanis, to individual farmers and agricultural cooperatives, in the form of chemical fertilizers, improved cultivation seeds, marketing agricultural machinery, irrigational and gardening facilities.

The Agricultural Development Bank during the spring of 1983 accomplished satisfactorily the distribution of the loans, according to the forecast plan, which is 87 percent, i.e. 32 million afghanis more than the spring of 1982.

The distribution of fertilizers is underway by the Central Department of the Agricultural Development Bank and its branches in the provinces of Kabul, Parwan, Baghlan, Balkh, Farah, Nelmruz, Helmand, Herat, Qandahar, Qruzgan, Ghazni, Paktia, Nangarhar, Samangan, Bamian, Takhar, Fariab, Badgheys, Laghman, Khost. In the district governorates of Charasiab, Deh Sabz and Bagrami.

The Agricultural Development Bank will assist farmers by providing short-, medium- and long-term loans after carrying out technical and economic assessments.

Short term loans include chemical fertilizers, cultivation seeds, light agricultural equipments, plowshare bulls, fodder, spare parts and marketing facilities. The loan is repayable in 1 year with 10 percent interest rate.

Medium term loan is repayable in 5 years and is allocated for the purchase of tractors, water pumps, agricultural machinery of different types, purchase of animals for breeding purposes, cost for constructional, repair and maintenance of small scale irrigational, gardening as well as land reclamation projects. The loan carries 8 percent interest rate.

Long-term loan will be given to farmers for the purpose of construction of irrigational systems such as deep and normal wells, construction of farm houses and purchase of agricultural heavy machinery. This loan is repayable after 5 years or more than 8 percent interest rate.

In addition to allotment of loans, the agricultural Development Bank has also sold agricultural machinery and spare parts worth 10 million afghanis to farmers who were able to pay in cash during the first quarter of the current year.

The cash sale of the bank during the first quarter showed a 100 percent increase over the forecast plan.

For the purpose of providing after sale services the Agricultural Bank has organized and established workshops in Kabul, Paktia, Helmand, Qandahar and Farah. In other provinces mobile units will assist farmers in repairing tractors and other agricultural machinery.

CSO: 4665/17

IRAN

NVOI CONDEMNS IRAN'S INTERFERENCE IN AFGHAN AFFAIRS

TA261326 (Clandestine) National Voice of Iran in Persian 1730 GMT 25 Sep 83

[Unattributed commentary: "Refrain From Interfering in Democratic Afghanistan's Internal Affairs"]

[Excerpts] Dear compatriots: One of the prominent indications of the Islamic Government's antipeople policy of dependence on America is the very harmony of this government's policy with that of America and its allies with respect to the independent and liberated country of Democratic Afghanistan.

Iran's right-wing Islamic Government, which is entertaining the vain thought of exporting its so-called Islamic Revolution--violating all international, human and moral principles and mores--is rashly interfering in the internal affairs of a neighboring country. In this respect, the Islamic Republic of Iran is now actually in the ranks of such regimes as Ziaul Haq's subservient and anti-people regime in Pakistan.

Some time ago the HAQIQAT-E ENQELAB-E SAWR newspapers, published in Kabul, carried a report disclosing the improper interventions of the Islamic Republic of Iran's Government in Afghanistan's internal affairs. This newspaper wrote that the insignia of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the imperial regime of Iran can be clearly seen on most of the weapons seized from Afghan counter-revolutionaries. Along with these weapons, some documents, periodicals and statements were seized that had been printed in Iran's Government presses with the emblem of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Additional examples of the Islamic Government's direct intervention in the internal affairs of Democratic Afghanistan are the questions put in the questionnaire of the Islamic Republic of Iran's Interior Ministry for fugitive Afghans residing in Iran. Among these are: By what means and at what date are you returning to Afghanistan? Are you ready to receive military training and fight in the ranks of the mujahedin of Afghanistan's Islamic Revolution against the aggressor communist power? Report on some of Afghanistan's domestic developments and so on and so forth.

As you are observing, the Islamic Government's regime, whose leaders outwardly speak of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries, have in practice impudently transformed a policy of intervention into the government's

normal policy, and in this respect as well they have violated and continue to violate the principles of the Islamic Republic's constitution.

What has been stated about the interventions of the Islamic Republic of Iran in Afghanistan's affairs is just part of the Islamic Government's plots against Democratic Afghanistan, which at the same time reveals the true features of the Islamic Government's leaders as an instrument of international reaction and imperialism. Both in the arena of domestic policy and in the field of foreign policy, the Islamic Government has trampled upon the revolution's goals and slogans, and has embraced adventurism. Amid such conditions of repression, should anyone dare to question the gentlemen, he is immediately called an atheist and subjected to torture in the name of Tudeh, Fada'i, Mojahed and struggling Muslim.

Our homeland's people strongly condemn interference by the Islamic Republic of Iran's regime in the internal affairs of Democratic Afghanistan, with whose government we also outwardly maintain official diplomatic relations. Our homeland's people strongly condemn the setting up of camps and the training of Afghan mercenaries and U.S. lackeys in special Iranian camps, as well as their dispatch to Afghanistan with the aim of carrying out terror, planting bombs and committing murder under the pretext of defending Islam and struggling against communism.

Our homeland's people demand that leaders of the Islamic Republic of Iran's regime refrain from interfering in the affairs of Democratic Afghanistan. The slogan "Hands Off Democratic Afghanistan" is the slogan of our homeland's people.

CSO: 4640/5

PRESIDENT SAYS INTERVENTION WOULD BE 'SUICIDAL' FOR INTRUDER

Tehran ETTELA'AT in Persian 22 Sep 83 p 14

[Interview with 'Ali Khamene'i, Iranian president, date and place not specified]

[Text] On the occasion of the third anniversary of the war imposed on the Islamic revolution by world arrogance, Hojjat ol-Eslam va ol-Moslemin Seyyed 'Ali Khamene'i, president and chief of the Supreme Defense Council, gave an interview to the magazine PAYYAM-E ENQELAB in which he expressed his views on various aspects of the war. Khamene'i reviewed the war's many achievements, including the unification of the people, the emergency of talents, and the blossoming of creativity in various fields, but considered the war's greatest characteristic to be the tempering of the people. Pointing to the hardships imposed on the people during three years of war, he added: Today there is nothing this nation cannot foresee, and this fact is extraordinarily valuable for a nation which wants to strive and move forward. The president also considered another of the imposed war's accomplishments to be the exposure of the true nature of the superpowers, particularly in relation to their positions on the imposed war, and said:

We realized that the world's great powers, even those which are seemingly confronting each other in a great many matters, agree in their strategic opposition to the Islamic revolution. Despite the superficial opposition of the superpowers with each other, their general, long-term policy opposes the Islamic revolution and the Islamic republic. Except for some neighboring countries which have preserved their neutrality, this applies to the powers and their claims of good-neighborliness and friendship. Khamene'i also mentioned as characteristics of the war the awareness and realization of the divine power by which our nation, despite its lack of military preparedness and combat ability at the beginning of the war, has today achieved a position of strength. Another characteristic Khamene'i mentioned was the instruction in the religious law which has taken place on the battlefields through the observation of the victory of truth over falsehood. He added: The world thinks it can persuade us to desist from striking blows. The reason is that we have established ourselves in a position of strength, and this is nothing but divine power. The president then pointed to the benefits that the Islamic revolution has gained from the war. In light of imperialism's worldwide plots against popular revolutions which are instigated by domestic and foreign

agents, he considered the stability of the splendid Islamic revolution as one of the war's great achievements, and added: Despite the great assaults against our revolution, it neither gave up nor let its feet sink in the mud nor lost its inner strength, but instead acquired a great reputation worldwide.

The War's Future

Concerning the war's future, the chief of the Supreme Defense Council said: As long as Saddam does not leave, our reaction remains the same as it has been. If Saddam leaves, the Iraqi nation will not have any regime imposed upon it. We do not deem it likely that a state superficially popular and actually arrogant will govern there.

Continuing the interview, Hojjat ol-Eslam Khamene'i analyzed the operations of Islam's soldiers in light of the differing aspects of the various operations in which Islam's soldiers advanced to continuous victories, in particular those operations after the Guards and the Army attained their present form and achieved their extraordinary coordination with the great popular forces of the Mobilization, and after gaining experience from past operations. He added: We have gained new experience, and I think our success will be inevitable for some time, that we can continuously strike blows against the enemy, and also move into Iraqi territory. We have said before that the latter action would be for defense, and in my view we can neither defend our rights nor compensate for our enormous losses without establishing ourselves on a portion of Iraqi soil. Concerning intervention by a great power in this war, it must be said: They have already done all they can do, and we believe that any direct intervention in the war will be suicide for any power that tries it. The president of the Supreme Defense Council was asked: Our people, particularly those on the border points under the enemy's bombardment, are expecting us to put an end to the matter. The president replied: They should not worry, they are gradually putting an end to the matter.

Lebanese Situation and Islamic Republic's Position

The president also spoke about the position of the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of the Lebanese crisis and the probability of war breaking out between Israel and Syria, and said: Our position is to defend Syria. We definitely support Syria, and we believe that the Arab countries in the first place, as well as the Islamic countries, must unanimously defend Syria and Palestine against the aggressions of the Zionists. Khamene'i concluded by emphasizing the instruction of the imam as to the war's ultimate priority, and added: If we concentrate on the war and definitely solve this problem, we will get to all the other problems with a small delay. But if we do not concentrate on the war and do not resolve it, we will solve neither the war nor the other problems. War is something that can make a nation, a country and a revolution wither away.

9597

CSO: 4640/1

IRAN

IRNA ATTACKS BRITISH LABOR PARTY STAND ON IRAN

GF081702 Tehran IRNA in English 1530 GMT 8 Oct 83

[Text] Tehran, 8 Oct, IRNA--Leaders of Britain's Labour Party in a press conference in Brighton, expressed their dissatisfaction with the trend of the Islamic revolution of Iran. They said that although they supported the revolution prior to its advent, they now condemned the Islamic Republic of Iran and backed national resistance council.

Dissatisfaction of the leaders of one of the two major British parties, is not strange rather, if they were content with the Islamic revolution, world Muslims should be anxious about deviation of the revolution.

What is strange is stupidity of short memory of the leaders of British Labour Party who, impudently, claimed that they had supported the revolution in Iran. To prove futility of their allegations, it should be reminded that prior to the victory of the Islamic Revolution in Iran, the Labour Party was ruling in Britain and the then Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs David Owen would not hesitate any opportunity to announce his support for the defunct shah, to which British press is the best witness.

However, it seems that none of the present Labour Party leaders had been in their country and had not heard their fellow party members statements in a TV interview, announcing his party's unconditional support for the Pahlavi regime, while urging suppression of Muslim revolutionaries of Iran.

Meanwhile, two partys leading men from Leeds sent a resolution to the press conference condemning the Islamic Republic of Iran. It should be noted that British industrial firms in Leeds were among the first which had dealings with the Islamic Republic. These firms terminated a contract with Iran for the purchase of British-made tanks which made at least 22,000 workers at Leeds tank manufacturing plant jobless.

Now the question is why leaders of the British Labour Party are supporting a number of terrorist munafiqeen and an ailing organisation called the national resistance council? The answer might be to pave the way for coming to power of munafiqeen who would show the green light for the re-establishment of friendly ties with the West and, therefore, safeguard Western interests in Iran.

On Wednesday, simultaneously with the Labour Party's measure, first deputy prime minister of Baghdad regime, Taha Yassin Ramadhan, arrived in London. It seems that this gesture by the Labour Party's leaders and their disagreement with the Islamic Iran is to please Saudi Arabia and Arab reactionaries thus encouraging them to financially aid stagnant economy of Britain.

The Saudi Sheykhs, by granting a multi-billion dollar loan recently saved French Franc from further devaluation. These Saudi sheykhs are very wealthy and fond of having planes with gold bathrooms, yachts, building casinos and gambling houses, while the British are unemployed and ready for service.

The Saudis will pay for all military orders of Baghdad regime while Iraq is in need of military equipment and some 22,000 workers of Leeds factories are jobless.

The main point which should be emphasised in this respect is West's hatred of the expansion of genuine Islam since it knows well that such an expansion will bring under question and threaten imperialism and exploitation.

West's supremacy in fact came into existence after crushing Islamic civilisation and distorting Islamic principles. Therefore, the revival of Islam has forced the West to mediate and leaders of the British Labour Party, like their other Western and Eastern colleagues, are anxious about enforcement of Islamic justice.

It is in this respect that in the West, with no reference to the realities, and by merely relying on the statements of fugitive munafiqeen, court sheykhs, and other opponents of Islam, fabrications are presented and propagated as statistics on crimes by an Islamic Government. As an example, reports of a Western organisation which is apparently established to defend civil rights in the West, Amnesty International, should be referred to. This organisation is by no means worried about crimes being committed everyday in prisons of Britain, the U.S. France, Germany and elsewhere, but during the past few years, has been commissioned to defend all smugglers, adulterers, terrorists and plotters who, upon the instruction of enemies of Islam, had been active to harm Islamic rule in Iran.

This organisation knows well that with the freedom of people of the world from the yoke of imperialist culture of West or East, this institution will have no room. Therefore, it has to oppose Islam since it is the only means to resist tyranny.

When the Labour Party was in power in Britain, it employed all its political, economic, cultural and military means to hinder the victory of the Islamic revolution, but it failed.

And now, since the party is in its worst possible condition and the Islamic Iran is possessing a situation firmer than 1979, it is unbelievable that they could rely on a handful [of] terrorists and a meaningless organisation, the resistance council.

Observers believe that the only objective of these political games, is to disappoint oppressed in the world, to defame the Islamic Revolution and finally further please the sheykhs and reactionaries in the region.

IRAN

NVOI VIEWS THIRD ANNIVERSARY OF GULF WAR

TA232013 (Clandestine) National Voice of Iran in Persian to Iran 1730 GMT 23
Sep 83

[Unattributed commentary: "The War's Continuation is to the Benefit of America and the Counterrevolution"]

[Text] Dear compatriots: Three whole years have passed since the imposed war by bloodthirsty U.S. imperialism over the people of our dear homeland, Iran. This war has resulted in numerous indescribable human losses and material damage.

Following the victory of the glorious popular and anti-imperialist revolution of our homeland's toilers, international imperialism headed by America--which was still not able to transform the popular and anti-imperialist essence of our revolution by means of its agents in the Iranian leadership--saw all its plots to smash the revolution from within meet with defeat. Imperialism, by means of its agents in the region--including Iran and Iraq--imposed this war on our homeland and revolution in the hope that by aggression from abroad it would be able in a short time to lead the revolution to defeat, and would renew its domination over our homeland, Iran.

At that time Iran's war--outwardly with Iraq but in fact with international imperialism, headed by America--was a just war because it had encroached on our independence, freedom and our popular and anti-imperialist revolution. For this reason, all toilers, true revolutionaries and real patriots, whether struggling Muslims, Tudehis, Feda'is, Mojahedin and old and young, fought in one trench as brothers, shoulder to shoulder. They defended their homeland and revolution and created epics. The epic of Khorramshahr's liberation is an example of a just war by patriots and revolutionaries who heroically welcome death in order to safeguard their revolutionary homeland from the robbery of imperialist brigands and foreign occupiers.

The brilliant victory of the heroic defenders of our homeland and revolution in Khorramshahr created the best conditions for a victorious end to the imposed war. In those very days patriotic and true revolutionary forces, particularly the Iranian Tudeh Party, warned the leaders of the Islamic Government that one must take advantage of this opportunity and these favorable conditions, that the war must be ended, and that the legitimate rights of the Iranian nation should be seized from the aggressors. The unprecedented heroism of the broad patriotic and revolutionary masses which resulted in Khorramshahr's conquest would have forced the aggressors and the region's reactionary governments to

accept a peace that was victorious and honorable for us, and which was an admission of defeat for the aggressors and for U.S. imperialism and its collaborators. International imperialism headed by America, which had kindled the fire of a destructive war between the two fraternal Iranian and Iraqi nations in order to implement its colonialist plans in the near and Middle East and the Persian Gulf region, however, did not allow our people--by means of its agents and by exploiting the stubbornness and personal grudges of some of the leaders in the Islamic leadership--to take advantage of this favorable opportunity and to end the imposed and destructive war.

International imperialism, headed by America, had two basic objectives to gain from this imposed plot on our homeland's people and the Iraqi people with respect to the war's prolongation, and turning it into a war of (?attrition): Firstly, by drawing patriotic and true revolutionary forces to the war fronts, it would undermine the popular foundations of the revolution within the country and lead the popular and anti-imperialist revolution of our homeland's toilers to defeat from within. Secondly, by prolonging the war between Iran and Iraq, it would frighten the reactionary Arab governments of Iran and of our nation's popular and anti-imperialist revolution and prevent its expansion in the region, it would force them to surrender to America as much as possible, and would hand reactionary and subservient Arab governments a pretext so that under the mask of the Iranian danger they would sow discord in the Arab countries' steadfastness front and prepare the ground for Lebanon's occupation and for the broadest U.S. military presence in the entire region and for its direct military intervention.

The Islamic government's authorities, particularly its high-ranking leaders, by continuing the war--with the provocative and childish slogan of "Exporting the Revolution" at that, which did not and does not have the slightest practical feasibility--poured and continue to pour grist into the mill of imperialism, and are acting precisely the way that America wishes.

Although at present the favorable conditions following the conquest of Khorramshahr do not exist for us, according to the adage, wherever one stops the damage it is a profit. Any impartial and patriotic (?observer) who is the least aware of the plans of imperialism headed by America in the region, knows that the war's prolongation will achieve nothing for our homeland's toilers, and for the region's progressive, anti-imperialist and anti-Zionist forces, except numerous human and material losses. The war's continuation is only in the interest of imperialism, particularly America and its agents and puppets in the region and in our homeland, Iran. The war's continuation, under any pretext and slogan, is a fatal blow to our nation's popular and anti-imperialist revolution, to progressive anti-imperialist and anti-Zionist forces in the region, particularly to the calamity-stricken Palestinian nation and to the Palestine liberation movement and aspiration.

One can hardly believe that the Islamic Government's leaders do not understand and do not see these very obvious facts. Most of them know that prolonging the war is tantamount to implementing the orders and instructions of imperialism, especially U.S. and British imperialism, and is a betrayal of the revolution and of the blood of scores of thousands, even hundreds of thousands of killed and maimed persons. One cannot hope otherwise, however, from a

government that chains true patriots and revolutionaries, and which tortures and kills them by the thousands.

The only way to end the destructive imposed war and to achieve the legitimate rights of the Iranian nation is the unity of all true patriotic and revolutionary parties, organizations and forces, and their united battle and combat against rulers who have placed themselves completely at the service of wealth-amassers and their Western masters.

CSO: 4640/2

NVOI ANALYZES IRAN-IRAQ WAR

TA302049 (Clandestine) National Voice of Iran in Persian 1730 GMT 30 Sep 83

[Unattributed commentary: "On Every Side That People Are Killed, It Is to the Benefit of America"]

[Text] Dear compatriots: We all know that various organs of the Islamic Government, especially committees and mosques, have a certain number of salaried individuals, who are sent to rallies and Friday prayers in order to distribute and to familiarize others with slogans prepared in advance. One of these slogans is the slogan of "War, War Until Victory."

Mohsen Reza'i, chief of the guards corps, has said that if we dispatch an army to conquer Qods, as soon as this army is halfway there America will collapse. Of course, one can ignore such remarks, which are meant to deceive ignorant and simpleminded youths and youngsters, and which resemble more a joke and a jest rather than a serious statement. But when Colonel Sayyad-Sirazi, commander of the ground forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran, says that Saddam will be overthrown shortly, and that with his overthrow the key of Qods' conquest will fall into our hands, it is possible that this statement will deceive a greater number of simpleminded people. Colonel Sayyad-Shirazi must be aware that war has certain rules. Victory or defeat in war hinges on numerous factors.

In addition to weapons, ammunition, the talent and military knowledge of soldiers, particularly of commanders, effective factors in every war and victory or defeat in it consist of:

1. The relation and attitude of combatants toward the war.
2. The situation behind the front, and support or lack of support by all the people for the front's combatants.
3. The site and place of combat and battle.
4. The supporters and opponents of each of the two sides in the international arena.

Now let us see what effects these factors had, are having, and will have on the imposed war of imperialism over our people and the Iraqi people. So far,

the imposed war can be divided into two main stages. First, the aggression by the Iraqi Army on our homeland, and the expulsion of the aggressor from the homeland's soil; second, the situation prevailing now, following the cleansing of the homeland's soil from the aggressor enemy, and in the future.

By a quick glance at the developments of the war's 3 years, we see that in the first stage these factors were in our favor and to Iraq's detriment; and in the second stage, on the contrary, to our detriment and in favor of Iraq. In the first stage, the million-strong masses of the people rushed to the fronts voluntarily. Although the army had almost disintegrated, we actually and truly had a 20-million strong army which was able to stop the aggressive enemy with heroism and selflessness, and then to expel it from the homeland's soil. However, since the start of the second stage, almost no one is going to the front voluntarily. Even the guards are resigning by groups so that they will not be dispatched to the front. The committees, mosques and other organizations and organs and organs, in accordance with a program prepared for them by the authorities, are dispatching a number of youths and a larger number of youngsters to the slaughterhouses through force, threats, and intimidation. With such an army one cannot fight a war.

In the first stage, all the people behind the front considered themselves partners in the war and in the fate of the front's combatants. Throughout the country, even in the most remote villages, men, women--old and young--and children worked for the front and to assist the warriors. They did not refrain from any material and moral help, even from presenting women's and girl's jewelry, to help soldiers at the front. In the second stage, when the war lost its revolutionary nature as well as ceased to be a defense of the homeland's territorial integrity, and when Ayatollah Khomeini said that as long as the Islamic Republican system is not established in Iraq the war will continue, the fervor and enthusiasm of the people subsided, so much so that today the people are induced to forced labor and to giving what they own only by force and intimidation.

In the first stage, so long as war was being waged on our homeland's territory, not only the non-military compatriots but everyone everywhere supported us and aided our combatants morally and materially. As soon as we set foot on Iraqi soil, however, the situation changed completely; it will continue to deteriorate the further we advance into Iraqi territory, because war on foreign territory is far more difficult than war on one's soil and among one's people.

In the first stage, when we were defending our homes and havens and the independence of our homeland, world public opinion supported us. In the second stage, when Hojjat Ol-Eslam Hashemi-Rafsanjani said that we want to determine Iraq's political system, world republic opinion began to oppose us as it would any system that wants, by force of arms, to impose on another people a political and social order that it favors. No one supports nor can anyone support such a system.

In view of these and other factors, all the idle talk about the imminent end of the war and Saddam's overthrow does not have the least scientific, practical and military value. The planners of U.S. and British war strategy--who

have imposed this long war of attrition on our homeland's people and the Iraqi people--know very well that in this war, whichever side's people are being killed, it is to the benefit of America. For this reason they are trying, by means of their agents, to prolong this war as much as possible. Our homeland's broad masses, too, are realizing that projecting Karbala as the key to the conquest of Gods is trite demagoguery.

The key to driving our imperialism from the region, and crushing Zionism and the aggressive occupier, is the unity of all progressive anti-imperialist countries and forces in the region and throughout the world. In order for us to have a positive role in this alliance, we must cut off the hands of imperialist agents in the government.

CSO: 4640/4

'ISLAMIC INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL' CONVENES IN TEHRAN

Tehran JOMHURI-YE ESLAMI in Persian 23 Aug 83 p 8

[Text] Political Section of JOMHURI-YE ESLAMI--The members of the Islamic International Tribunal who arrived in Tehran on Sunday to investigate Iraq's imposed war on the Islamic Republic of Iran, participated in a press and radio television interview, yesterday evening, while foreign and local correspondents were present. They explained the goals and topics of the tasks of the tribunal in connection with the imposed war and the methods which will be used to announce the result of the resolution and final decision which will be adopted by the tribunal. The members of the Islamic International tribunal consisted of the countries of Pakistan, Sri Lanka, England, Switzerland, Indonesia and South Africa. The president of the tribunal is a distinguished Pakistani lawyer who could not leave his country, to be present at the meeting because he was prohibited by the Government of Pakistan. Also another member of the tribunal, who is an Indonesian was unable to participate for certain reasons.

Our correspondent reported that first, the secretary of the tribunal who was speaking on behalf of the participant members emphasized that the tribunal began its work on 9 June 1983 in Islamabad, Pakistan and the present location of the tribunal is in Lahore, and that in the near future a suitable site will be selected for it. While pointing at the concerned aims of the tribunal, he said: that the reason for meeting in Tehran is to investigate the following matters:

1. To find out the basic reason for Iran-Iraq war.
2. To ascertain the offender.
3. To determine the crimes committed in the war.
4. To estimate the damages occurred on the Islamic movement.

Further he said: "We have already advised the governments of Iraq and the Islamic Republic of Iran as well as the Supreme Council of the Islamic Revolution of Iraq on the commencement of the tribunal's work and have asked the involving parties to deliver us any documents and evidences if available and also to communicate their willingness for cooperation with the tribunal. Consequently the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran announced its willingness and provided the facilities enabling us to proceed to the war areas in order to gather evidence and documents. Moreover, the Supreme Council of

Islamic Revolution of Iraq has declared its willingness accordingly. The Government of Iraq has not yet responded to our request and did not provide us the necessary facilities. We earnestly hope, that while we are engaged in collecting necessary documents, the Government of Iraq extends us the opportunity to visit Baghdad." The secretary of the Islamic Tribunal, in continuation of the interview, talked about the standard and principles of the work of the tribunal and said that the principle of the work is based on the teachings of great Koran and the doctrine of the great prophet, peace be upon him. He added that the international norms and agreements on the problems of the war will be taken into consideration and certain measures have been taken to strengthen the international character of the tribunal. On the philosophy of the present existence of the tribunal, he said that this tribunal by the grace of God, intends to investigate and solve problems facing the muslim world. Now that the Iran-Iraq war enters its fourth year, none of the international organizations have taken up any decisive measures so far. "Thus, we deem it necessary to take this responsibility to investigate the matter sincerely and conscientiously according to the teachings of Islam and the doctrines of the prophet, peace be upon him." In reply to the question as to what measures will be taken if Iraq rejects the invitation and refuses to cooperate with the tribunal the secretary of the Islamic tribunal said that in judicial courts, traditionally both involved parties having disputes must be present. However, if a party is absent, the court will not refrain from issuing its verdict. He added: "We have enterprised an Islamic concern and we have nothing to do with the United Nations Organization whether they would officially recognize us or not. We cannot sit idle and be the witness for the suspension of God's commandment." The secretary of the tribunal in answering the question of a foreign correspondent who had asked him, why the tribunal has commenced its work from Tehran, said: The Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran had already confirmed its willingness on the start of the work and that the Government of Iraq still has not so far responded to our request. Whenever Iraq shows any tendency to cooperate with the tribunal, we undoubtedly shall not hesitate to visit Baghdad. While expressing hopes for reaching a positive conclusion in accordance with reality based on the principles and doctrines of the great prophet, peace be upon him, he further reiterated the self-reliance of the members of the tribunal and their nonaffiliation with any other elements. He said that the efforts of the tribunal and the system of implementing the task would be the best proof for the tribunal's independence.

At the conclusion, the secretary of the Islamic International Tribunal concerning announcement of the result of the task of the tribunal, said that the result will be released and announced through mass media; and if any problem remains unsolved, it would be brought up to the judgment of the public.

Termination of the tribunal's work depends on the time needed for collecting the required evidence from the war-stricken areas. If Iraq does not show any tendency for cooperation with the tribunal, the result of the work will be announced in Tehran and the Government of Iraq will be notified accordingly.

Members of Islamic International Tribunal Meet With War Propaganda Supervisor

The delegates of the Islamic International Tribunal who had come to our country for the purpose of visiting the suffered nonmilitary areas in the imposed war, met and held discussion with Dr Seyyed Kamal Kharazi, the supervisor of the war propaganda headquarters, yesterday morning.

At the meeting, Kamal Kharazi, first discussed Saddam's evil intentions for aggression against the Islamic Revolution, he said that the aggression was planned by the superpowers to disintegrate our Islamic Revolution, but our people with untiring efforts repulsed the aggressor's offensive. He also said that during the Saddam's aggression against Iran, most of our cities were completely destroyed and our people suffered financially and many lost their lives. He added: "We will defend our Islamic Revolution according to the principles of Islam and will drive out the aggressor from the Islamic Revolution soil."

In a part of his talk, he said: "We will continue to defend our country until such time as our proposed conditions are accepted, that is: to drive out the aggressor, to receive compensation for war damages and to ascertain the aggressor."

The supervisor of the war propaganda headquarters said: "The international organizations have either kept silent on the war crimes committed by the Iraqi Regime, or they have approved Saddam's actions. Having despaired of (any action) by dependent international organizations, we have firm intention in continuing to defend our Islamic homeland and to punish the aggressive regime of Iraq." At the conclusion of the meeting, he wished for the success of the members of the tribunal.

In this meeting, Dr Kharazi also replied to questions of the lawyers. One of the members of the tribunal asked him what Iraq's aims were by the invasion of Iran, he replied that U.S. imperialism had tried several times to crush the Islamic Revolution of Iran by military intervention (such as Tabas); by a coup, or by creating obstacles, making intrigues, economic blockades and other ill measures. However, each time the United States was faced with resistance by our self-sacrificing nation. It is our opinion that Saddam's aggression was another U.S. accomplishment, in order to weaken and annihilate the revolutionary Government of Iran and it was also sanctioned by other superpower, the Soviet Union. Saddam was thinking that within a week's time he could completely crush the structure of the revolution, but our muslim and revolutionary people's resistance proved that it is not an easy task to confront against a revolution which is rooted in the people's faith.

In reply to the question as to whether with the establishment of the revolutionary foundations, there was still any danger, the supervisor of war propaganda said: "We think that our revolution is always threatened by aggression from east and west and we must be prepared to confront against these aggressions. We have to continue the war in order to defend and protect the gains of the revolution and our prestige." The members of the Islamic International Tribunal will be visiting the cities and nonmilitary zones which have been afflicted by the aggression of the Saddam's Ba'thist army.

NVOI URGES GOVERNMENT TO END IRAN-IRAQ WAR

TA261131 (Clandestine) National Voice of Iran in Persian 1730 GMT 24 Sep 83

[Unattributed commentary: "Who is Benefitting From This Imposed War?"]

[Excerpts] Dear compatriots: Those who benefit from the imposed war of attrition between Iran and Iraq, in which Muslim brothers are killing one another, are, on the one hand, imperialism and Zionism, and, on the other, internal reaction and the people's plunderers.

The war's prolongation is a pretext for the Islamic Government, which has shown itself to be impotent in fulfilling the revolution's goals and aspirations, to prevent protests by people who yearn for broad and large-scale reforms. On the other hand, there are certain persons who are displaying obstinacy and stubbornness by allegedly exporting the Islamic Revolution to other countries, and are preventing the war from ending. It is not clear why the Iranian nation should sacrifice the lives of thousands of its youths in order to alleviate this superficial and blindly fanatical urge by unauthorized individuals.

At any rate the destructive war between two Muslim and fraternal nations, Iran and Iraq, is continuing. The only outcome of this imposed war is the killings and destruction, which should be ended as soon as possible by adopting a wise and realistic approach.

There exist just and wise solutions to end this war, among which are the liberation of all occupied lands, reparations from the aggressor, and the honoring of the 1975 Algiers agreement. The first condition for achieving this aim is that the right-wing government of the Islamic Republic of Iran desist from its nonsensical and unwise claims and its interference in the internal affairs of the fraternal Iraqi people as well as from efforts to impose a subservient government, favored by it, on the Iraqi people. Naturally, if the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran had not continued to follow its wrong calculations, and had not raised its hegemonistic, superficial and impractical demands, the two fraternal, neighboring and Muslim people would have been able to rid themselves of this imposed war, which benefits imperialism, Zionism and internal reaction. However, the Islamic Government's leaders are unfortunately showing stubbornness and obstinacy in prolonging the war. In the hope of so-called total victory, they are sending our homeland's

youths, in groups, to their death and are squandering the country's national wealth.

The war's prolongation provides to those extremists and rightists who have assumed power, by failing to implement democratic reforms, the opportunity to make the people dissatisfied with the revolution, and thus pave the way for the total suppression of the revolution.

The people are demanding that the imposed war be terminated and that the creative power of the youths who are now being killed, wounded and maimed in the destructive war of attrition, be employed for construction and development and the building of an independent and free society, a society for whose achievement our nation staged a revolution. If those who today are at the head of the government do not realize their serious responsibility toward the revolution and our homeland's history, tomorrow, a tomorrow which is not far off, they will be answerable to the nation and history.

CSO: 4640/3

RELIGION 'EXPLOITED' BY CLERGY FOR POLITICAL PURPOSES

London AL-DUSTUR in Arabic No 300, 12 Aug 83 pp 28-29

[Article by Dr 'Ali Nurizadeh: "The Politicians Play the Religious Card"]

[Text] Whoever wants to know what the situation is like in Iran should listen to a joke told by Iranians these days. One day the news about a crowd of thousands of Iranians in front of the passport agency reaches Khomeyni. Khomeyni is astonished and orders his driver to take him to the same place so that he can see for himself what he has heard.

When Khomeyni gets there, he sees thousands of people who want to get a passport and leave Iran. This is due to a decree of the authorities that allows those suffering from some severe disease that cannot be treated in Iran to ask the government for a passport to travel abroad.

Khomeyni asks his driver: "Are all of those people sick? Do all of them want to leave Iran?"

The driver answers timidly: "Yes, my lord, Some of them are suffering from physical diseases and others from mental ones."

Here someone who recognizes Khomeyni's car shouts. A minute later the people begin to leave the place. To Khomeyni's astonishment, of the thousands who were there only a handful wearing turbans and cloaks remained. Khomeyni then turns to one of those seeking to leave the place and asks: "Hey, man, why did the people leave the passport agency just when I arrived? Was this out of respect for me and the importance of my position or because they are afraid of me?"

The man answers: "No, imam, when your car arrived, someone who recognized you said you wanted to get a passport so that you could leave the country. That is why thousands of people went away - to give you the opportunity to fill out your papers."

This story reflects the situation of the Iranian people under the control of those who keep proclaiming day and night: "We seized power after 14 centuries and we won't give it up easily!"

But is this possible? Can the ruling group in Iran continue in power in view of the people's opposition and the opposition of all the nationalist and progressive forces, both religious and secular?

To be objective, we must review the facts and figures to find out the reasons for the continued existence of the regime in Iran as well as the reasons for its inevitable disappearance.

Khomeyni himself is the reason for the survival of the regime just as he will be responsible for its disappearance.

The man came to power under circumstances that would have enabled anyone to benefit from them to become a hero.

We shall now briefly describe these circumstances.

(1) Public revulsion against the Shah and the appearance of Khomeyni as a simple mystic who sits on the ground indifferent to the powers of the East or West and apparently unaffected by Carter and unafraid of Brezhnev.

(2) The leaders of the revolution in Iran wanted the election of Khomeyni to banish the West's fears for the future of Iran without the presence of the Shah.

Clearly, there was the belief that Iran would fall into the clutches of communism if the American administration did not overthrow the Shah. It is also known that the Shah's opponents were occupying some key posts in the American administration. The appearance of Khomeyni as a man of religion who hates communism and opposes the red atheists resulted in support for his position in the United States.

Some American officials like Cyrus Vance, Carter's secretary of state who detested the Shah, was able to convince Carter to halt his support of the Shah. In his memoirs, Vance admits he told President Carter that Khomeyni because of his popularity among the Iranians and Muslims (at that time) would provide us with a golden opportunity to strike at communism in the region and enable us to play the Muslim card in the Asian republics of the USSR.

(3) As for the Iranians, Khomeyni was a kind of Gandhi, an old man in his eighties who had no desires in this world, who thought of nothing but the hereafter and the day of resurrection. If Khomeyni were unable to overthrow the Shah's regime, he would retire to Qom and leave power in the hands of the nationalists who supported Mosaddegh.

Khomeyni was thus able to come to power. It must be admitted that because of what was written and said about him before the revolution, he appeared to the people, especially the masses, as a charismatic leader. As soon as he came to power, his supporters undertook the task of perfecting the "image of the divine leader" and reinforcing the theory of the "Khomeyni imamate" not as an "imam" in the sense of "someone to be emulated" but in the sense of "the infallible one."

There is a great difference between the meaning of "imam" among the Shi'ites and its general meaning among other Muslims.

Khomeyni who was deputy for the imam before the revolution became "the imam" after he came to power. The word "imam" does not exist among the Iranians in the meaning in common use in the Islamic countries. There was a "Friday imam," that is, a Friday prayer leader, but among the Iranians there was no imam except the imam 'Ali, his sons and 12 descendants.

These observations may account for the survival of "Khomeynism" until now. But there are some other factors as well, namely:

(1) The war with Iraq. At first Khomeyni was able to use the people's emotions by describing the war as a war in defense of the homeland. If we study the meaning of homeland as employed in Khomeyni's book, we learn that he does not believe in a geographic or cultural homeland. There is no difference in homeland between Syria, Iraq, Iran, and Pakistan. Khomeyni's homeland is an empire ruled by himself.

For this reason Khomeyni was able to play the Iranian homeland card because Iraqi forces were inside Iran in the geographic sense. This is contrary to what he believes a homeland means.

We do not want to examine here the reasons why Iraqi forces entered Iranian territory or the reasons behind Khomeyni's desire to export his revolution to Iraq. To give an example in this connection, we must recall what happened in the first week of the war.

Three days before the outbreak of the war, Khomeyni announced: "The National Front has become a party for infidels. Jailing and liquidating its members has become a duty and a necessity."

After these orders were given, Dr Sanjabi fled to his birthplace in Kermanshah where Khomeyni's guard attacked his tribe, imprisoned three of his brothers, and ordered their execution.

However, the war began before the death sentence was carried out and Khomeyni invited Dr Sanjabi to visit him in his palace in Jemaran. Here he appointed Sanjabi leader of the tribal reorganization in western Iran. This was after he pardoned those sentenced to death.

Sanjabi traveled to western Iran. A few months later, when he realized that Khomeyni wanted to use him in a personal rather than national war, one involving Khomeyni and his gang, he left Iran, fleeing to Europe via Turkey.

(2) We must mention the fact that the Iranian tragedy and Khomeyni's war with Iraq coincided with Israel's attack on the Palestinians and Lebanon. While international attention was focused on Lebanon, Khomeyni succeeded in gaining exclusive power after the dismissal of Bani Sadr and the attack on the Mojahedin-e Khalq with support provided at the time by the left, especially the communists. These actions were backed by the Soviet Union and the communist countries because the victims were nationalists and liberals.

Because of these events which occurred after the seizure of the American hostages, Khomeyni appeared to the masses to be an anti-imperialist and anti-Zionist leader.

When Khomeyni realized that opposition to the liberals and cooperation with the communists would cause the Westerners to worry about Iran's future, he ordered his associates to reassure them of his political independence from the Soviets. Here the West played the Anatoliy Kuzichkin card. Kuzichkin was a Soviet diplomat who defected to Britain and exposed the espionage network that was operating on behalf of the Soviet Union in Iran. The Westerners provided the Khomeyni regime with some information obtained in Kuzichkin's admissions and sat back watching for Khomeyni's reactions.

In point of fact, they were stronger than the West expected. The leaders and members of the Communist Party were arrested, thereby enabling Khomeyni to eliminate the causes of the West's fears.

All this is sufficient to account for the survival of the Khomeyni regime, and it is not possible to conceal the fact that during the last 4 years the opposition were unable to form a council or united leadership to replace the Khomeyni regime.

However, after 4 years one can say that all the factors that enabled Khomeyni to consolidate his power and get rid of his opponents to a large extent no longer exist. As we began by analyzing the reasons for the continuation of the Khomeyni regime, we must present our evidence for thinking that the time for its disappearance is approaching because the circumstances that benefited Khomeyni changed after he joined the political fray began to pass death sentences on thousands of persons, and meddled in the dismissal of officials and appointment of ministers and leaders of the regime.

Before the revolution the people had no experience with the nature of Khomeyni's governance and leadership. But now, 4 years later, the Iranians do not need evidence to judge Khomeyni, for the man stands revealed before their eyes by his words and deeds.

As for world public opinions, especially the views of Westerners, Khomeyni is not in 1983 only a mystic who wants to fight communism with the 1978 sword of Islam.

Aside from its trade relations with the west, the regime has lost its last bit of capital with international and Western public opinion. The intellectuals and politicians in the west who admired Khomeyni can no longer defend him or even cover up his actions. Moreover, the newspapers and media which were enthusiastic about Khomeyni during the revolution changed their minds after they observed his actions. They can no longer conceal his relations with Israel or other disgraceful things. This is what concerns world public opinion. If we look at public opinion, especially in the Arab and Islamic countries, we see that neither the Arabs nor the Muslims harbor any respect for Khomeyni as a man of religion who wants to spread Islam in the world. On the contrary, even those who still admire Khomeyni have become convinced that he is a politician who plays the religion card.

On the domestic front, he has shown in the last 4 years that he is not a humble Gandhi seeking justice for his people but a Machiavelli who orders killings, vengeance, and torture. He even forces the people to spy on each other, as the nationalist and liberal leaders and moderate Islamic groups discovered. Khomeyni does not want to share power with anyone. When he says power is "God's" and he is His sign on earth and has been delegated authority by God, he means wresting power from the people with the mullahs the sole rulers.

On the other hand, few religious leaders acknowledge the "rule of Khomeyni" and his supreme power, as evidenced by the opposition shown by the great ayatollahs Shari'atmadari, Tabataba'i Qomi, Golpayeghani, Mar'ashi Najafi, Seyyed Abol Fadl Zanjani in Iran and Abol Qasem al-Kho'i in Najaf. Ayatollah Shari'atmadari says in one of his books; "We must oversee the laws, but our direct intervention in politics is reprehensible. It makes our religious position difficult. Even in the early days of Islam, the politician was different from the man of religion."

Even in official circles, one cannot ignore the effect of the dispute between the Hojatiyen group and the Khatt ol-Eslam.

Finally, we must note some other factors that point to the inevitable fall of Khomeyni. After the withdrawal of the Iraqi forces from Iranian territory and Iraq's announcement that it accepted mediation, the news dispatches indicated that a satisfactory replacement for the regime had been formed and that prominent opposition nationalists might unite, as happened, for example, in the case of Dr Shahpur Bakhtiyar, leader of the National Resistance Movement and one of the leaders of the National Front in the days of the Shah, and Dr 'Ali Amini, an old diplomat and leader of the Iranian Salvation Front. Then there is the possible formation of a national council in exile involving the participation of Admiral Ahmad Madani, Hasan Nazih, and General Jam Ahmad, one of the Iranian nationalist military men. If this council can be formed, it will be supported by most of the great ayatollahs and many other religious leaders.

Last week many commentators and newsmen throughout the world analyzed the silent demonstrations that the Iranians held last 4 August in response to the appeal of Bakhtiar, Amini, and other prominent opponents of the regime on the occasion of the anniversary of the "constitutional revolution," which existed until 1979. The demonstrations were regarded as the beginning of the countdown to the collapse of the regime.

For the first time since Khomeyni came to power, the Iranians proclaimed their unconditional support for a democratic constitutional regime - royalist or republican. By taking to the streets they also proclaimed their unconditional rejection of the continuation of Khomeynism.

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