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CONTENTS

14 FEBRUARY 1989

CHINA

- 'Unremitting Struggle' Against Chemical Arms Urged
[Mao Ruiqing; Hong Kong LIAOWANG OVERSEAS EDITION No 4, 23 Jan] 1

EAST EUROPE

INTRABLOC

- Warsaw Pact Statement Gives Figures on Force Strengths [Moscow PRAVDA 30 Jan] 2

BULGARIA

- Government Decides on Military Budget, Forces Cut 9
 - Zhivkov Outlines Cuts [Sofia Radio 27 Jan] 9
 - BCP Daily Comments [RABOTNICHESKO DELO 29 Jan] 10
 - 'Expression of Good Will' [A. Vladkov; BTA 29 Jan] 11
- Bulgarian Defense Ministry News Briefing on Warsaw Pact Statement [Sofia Radio 30 Jan] 11
- Military Officials Positively Assess Warsaw Pact Declaration
[A. Smerdzhiyev; RABOTNICHESKO DELO 31 Jan; R. Minchev; OTECHESTVEN FRONT
31 Jan; T. Tanev; NARODNA ARMIYA 31 Jan] 12

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

- Defense Council Announces Arms Reductions 14
 - Proposed Changes Detailed [Prague Radio 27 Jan] 14
 - Defense Minister Vaclavik Details Cuts [CTK 27 Jan] 15
 - Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Applauds Plan [Prague Radio 30 Jan] 15
 - RUDE PRAVO Editorial [CTK 28 Jan] 15
 - Slovak Daily Views Announcement [CTK 30 Jan] 16
 - CSSR Public Reacts Positively [CTK 29 Jan] 16
- Editorial on Army Reorganization, Arms, Troop Reductions [RUDE PRAVO 28 Jan] 17
- Defense Minister Details Arms, Troop Reductions [M. Vaclavik; RUDE PRAVO 28 Jan] 18
- Army Chief on Troop Cuts, NATO-Warsaw Pact Balance [M. Vacek; CTK 31 Jan] 19
- RUDE PRAVO Terms Pact's Forces Statement 'Unique' [CTK 30 Jan] 20
- NATO Response to Warsaw Pact 'Disarmament Initiatives' Hit
[J. Cebrovskiy; Prague Radio 29 Jan] 20
- Foreign Ministry Spokesman on Chemical Arms Control Experiment [RUDE PRAVO 27 Jan] 22
- Results of NATO Strategy Meeting Condemned [PRAVDA 30 Jan] 22

GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

- Commentary on Vienna Concluding Document Stresses Conventional Arms
[K. Wilczynski; BERLINER ZEITUNG 18 Jan] 23
- Defense Minister Kessler Addresses Ministry Meeting on Troop Cuts
[NEUES DEUTSCHLAND 25 Jan] 23
- Western Response to 'Unilateral' Warsaw Pact Arms Cuts Urged
[NEUES DEUTSCHLAND 26 Jan] 24
- Defense Minister Kessler Comments on Warsaw Pact Statement 25
 - Article in NEUES DEUTSCHLAND [ADN 30 Jan] 25
 - Television Interview [East Berlin Radio 30 Jan] 28
- Warsaw Pact Statement, NATO Attitude Viewed [NEUES DEUTSCHLAND 31 Jan] 30
- Defense Minister Kessler to FRG TV on Conventional Forces Talks [East Berlin Radio 2 Feb] 31
- U.S. Criticized for Chemical Weapons Production [NEUES DEUTSCHLAND 28-29 Jan] 31
- Deputy Foreign Minister Discusses Arms Issues with Canadian Official [ADN 25 Jan] 31

HUNGARY

Troop Reduction Planned for 1989-1990 Time Frame	32
Premier Nemeth Announces 9 Percent Cut [Budapest Radio 30 Jan]	32
Defense Ministry Details Cuts [MTI 30 Jan]	32
Defense Minister Karpati Interviewed [Budapest Radio 30 Jan]	32
Defense Minister Karpati Views Warsaw Pact's Forces Statement [Budapest Radio 30 Jan]	33
Hungarian Defense Official on Warsaw Pact Strength Data [L. Morocz; Budapest TV 30 Jan]	33
Defense Officials Comment on Troop Reductions	34
Defense Minister Karpati Views Reductions [L. Szabo; NEPSZABADSAG 31 Jan]	34
Army Chief of Staff Comments [J. Pascek; MTI 1 Feb]	37
Defense Minister Karpati Gives Details on Partial Soviet Troop Pullout [MAGYAR HIRLAP 26 Jan]	37
News Conference Details USSR Troop Withdrawal [MTI 31 Jan]	38
News Briefing by Soviet Representatives on Partial Troop Pullout [Budapest Radio 31 Jan]	39

POLAND

3 Soviet Army Regiments To Leave 'This Year' [Warsaw Radio 31 Jan]	39
--	----

YUGOSLAVIA

Government Spokesman Welcomes USSR, GDR Troop Cuts [TANJUG 26 Jan]	40
--	----

WEST EUROPE

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

Inter-German Minister Welcomes GDR Arms Cuts Announcement [FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE 25 Jan]	41
--	----

'Unremitting Struggle' Against Chemical Arms Urged

40050258p Hong Kong LIAOWANG OVERSEAS
EDITION in Chinese No 4, 23 Jan 89 p 25]

[Article by Mao Ruiqing: "The Banning of Chemical Weapons is the Common Wish of All of Mankind"]

[Excerpt] [Passage omitted] The delegates from the various countries all approved of the banning of chemical weapons. This is a foundation for a total ban on chemical weapons. There are, however, still many problems before we actually reach an agreement. The portion of the

Geneva Disarmament Talks on a treaty for the banning of chemical weapons has already gone on for 17 years. Although we have made progress on some problems, through the mutual effort of all parties, we still have differences on some specific issues such as verification.

China's observers believe that the convening of the Paris Conference on the banning of chemical weapons is in accordance with the wishes of the peoples of all countries. However, the conference is in the final analysis only a forum and cannot fundamentally solve the problem. If the world is to realize a complete ban on chemical weapons, it must continue to struggle unremittingly.

INTRABLOC

Warsaw Pact Statement Gives Figures on Force Strengths

PM2901234989 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
30 Jan 89 First Edition p 5

["Statement of the Warsaw Pact Defense Ministers Committee 'On the Correlation of Warsaw Pact and North Atlantic Alliance Force Strengths and Armaments in Europe and Adjoining Waters'"]

[Text] The Warsaw Pact Defense Ministers Committee stresses the exceptional importance—for the cause of strengthening international peace, security, and trust—of the Soviet Union's unilateral steps to reduce its armed forces and armaments, including those in Europe, announced at the United Nations on 7 December 1988 by M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium.

Guided by the decisions of the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee conferences in Budapest (1986), Berlin (1987), and Warsaw (1988) and proceeding on the premise of the defensive nature of the pact's military doctrine, the committee considers the prevention of war, halting the nuclear and conventional arms race, and switching to consistent disarmament, to be of paramount importance in the modern age. The armed forces of the Warsaw Pact and North Atlantic alliance in Europe must be such that neither of the alliances, while reliably securing their defense, possess the means to launch a surprise attack on the other side or launch offensive operations in general. This is the goal that the participants in the upcoming talks on reducing armed forces and conventional arms in Europe should seek to achieve.

The participants in the session confirm their resolve to promote the earliest start to these talks and the resumption of the work of the conference on confidence- and security-building measures and disarmament in Europe. They advocate that these forums work toward an accord on the mutual elimination of existing asymmetries and imbalances on both a pan-European scale and in individual regions, substantial cuts in armed forces and armaments in Europe, and the development and expansion of already existing confidence measures in light of the limitation of military activity on the continent of Europe, and on the application of them to autonomous [samostoyatelnyy] air force and naval activity

The relevance of the proposal put forward by Warsaw Pact states back in March 1988 to carry out an official exchange between the two military-political alliances of numerical data on the armed forces and conventional arms of the Warsaw Pact and NATO countries in Europe increases in this regard. The NATO countries have not given a positive response to this proposal and have unilaterally published biased data based on a selective approach.

The Defense Ministers Committee continues to attach paramount importance to revealing the real data on Warsaw Pact and NATO Armed Forces and conventional arms in Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals.

At the same time it deems it necessary to show in a broader context the overall picture of the correlation of the military potential of the two military-political alliances in Europe. The armed forces form a single organism. The constituent parts—the ground forces, air forces, air defense forces, and naval forces—interact, supplement, and reinforce one another. Only a comprehensive analysis of them will permit a real correlation of forces to be made.

Proceeding from this, the Defense Ministers Committee has decided to publish numerical data on the number of the armed forces and the quantity of basic types of armaments possessed by the Warsaw Pact states, and also its assessment of the North Atlantic alliance's military forces in Europe and adjoining waters.

It is clear from the data cited in the tables (Appendixes 1 and 2) that while the ground forces and air forces are roughly equal the North Atlantic Treaty has a two-fold superiority over the Warsaw Pact in naval strength. The North Atlantic alliance is superior to the Warsaw Pact in terms of the number of strike aircraft of front-line (tactical) aviation and naval aviation, combat helicopters, and antitank missile systems. The Warsaw Pact side has superiority in tanks, tactical missile launchers, air defense troop combat interceptor planes, infantry combat vehicles, armored personnel carriers, and artillery. As far as naval armaments are concerned, NATO enjoys considerable superiority over the Warsaw Pact in terms of naval combat aircraft and the number of large surface ships, including aircraft carriers and other aircraft-carrying ships. The Warsaw Pact has a certain superiority in submarines armed with missiles and torpedoes.

The data cited are not, of course, designed to be utilized in their entirety as the starting parameters at future talks, which should be conducted in accordance with their mandate, or to replace the subject of the talks. However, this kind of comprehensive approach to the assessment of military forces in Europe should ultimately focus attention on the need to make the talks realistic in nature from the very outset and reject attempts to achieve unilateral advantages.

The military balance in Europe can, after taking all its components into account, be described as a rough parity which gives neither side the opportunity to count on a crucial military advantage. At the same time it is essential to radically reduce the present high level of concentration of armed forces and armaments in Europe in order to ensure stability in keeping with the principle of reasonable defense sufficiency.

The Defense Ministers Committee believes that the interests of European security demand the adoption of urgent measures aimed at removing existing imbalances and

asymmetries, a substantial reduction of the most dangerous offensive kinds of armaments, the attainment of reduced levels of armed forces, and restructuring of the two alliances' military structures to make them purely defensive in character. The measures to reduce unilaterally armed forces and armaments previously carried out by the Warsaw Pact countries (Bulgaria, Hungary, the GDR, Poland, Romania, the USSR, and the CSSR) and particularly the new initiatives taken by the Soviet Union to reduce its armed forces unilaterally in the next 2 years, without any linkage to the talks, by 500,000 men and to substantially reduce the quantity of its arms and combat equipment—by 10,000 tanks, 8,500 artillery systems, and 800 combat aircraft, including the withdrawal of 6 tank divisions from the GDR, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary—

serve as a graphic example of the readiness of the Warsaw Pact states to channel into practical actions their efforts to lower the level of military confrontation in Europe.

The Warsaw Pact Defense Ministers Committee expresses the hope that NATO countries will demonstrate a similar readiness to make very rapid progress toward strengthening stability and security in Europe, including the taking of unilateral measures to reduce their armed forces and armaments.

Tables of the Correlation of Warsaw Pact and North Atlantic Alliance Force Strengths and Main Weapons Types in Europe and Adjoining Waters (as of 1 July 1988):

Appendix 1.

I. Correlation of Force Strengths (thousand men)

	Warsaw Pact	Correlation	NATO
Control organs: General (main) staffs, main and central directorates of defense ministries	30.2	1:1.6	49.47
Ground forces, airborne forces, and army aviation	1,823.5	1:1.2	2,115.36
Air defense forces	550.5	4.0:1	137.7
Air forces	425.1	1:1.1	482.3
Navies	338.0	1:2.0	685.0
Units under central command (intelligence, communications, electronic warfare, VUZ's, and others)	225.4	2.3:1	96.9
Rear services units and institutions	146.3	1.7:1	87.5
Civil (territorial) defense troops	34.1	5.7:1	6.0
Total of armed forces in Europe and adjoining waters	3,573.1	1:1	3,660.2

Note: Numbers of MVD (field gendarmerie) and border troops in Warsaw Pact and NATO Armed Forces not included.

Appendix 2.

II. Correlation of Main Armament Types

	Warsaw Pact	Correlation	NATO
Combat aircraft of front-line (tactical) Air Force aviation and Air Defense Forces and naval aviation	7,876	1:1:1	7,130
Including: combat aircraft of front-line (tactical) Air Force aviation and Air Defense Force aviation	5,355	1:1	5,450
Air Defense Force combat interceptors incapable of operating against ground targets	1,829	36:1	50
Navy combat aircraft	692	1:2.4	1,630
Total strike aircraft (bombers, fighter-bombers, ground-attack aircraft) within front-line (tactical) Air Force aviation aircraft and naval aviation aircraft	2,783	1:1.5	4,075
Combat helicopters, including naval	2,785	1:1.9	5,270
Tactical missile launchers	1,608	11.8:1	136
Tanks	59,470	1.9:1	30,690
Antitank missile complexes	11,465	1:1.6	18,070
Infantry combat vehicles and armored transports	70,330	1.5:1	46,900
Rocket-propelled salvo-fire systems, field pieces (75 mm and above), and mortars (50 mm and above)	71,560	1.3:1	57,060
Submarines (excluding submarines armed with strategic ballistic missiles)	228	1:1:1	200
including nuclear-powered	80	1:1	76

II. Correlation of Main Armament Types

	Warsaw Pact	Correlation	NATO
Large surface ships (aircraft carriers, battleships, cruisers, destroyers, frigates, amphibious warfare ships with a displacement of 1,200 tonnes and over)	102	1:5	499
including:			
aircraft-carrying ships [aviansushchiye], aircraft carriers	2	1:7.5	15
ships armed with cruise missiles	23	1:11.9	274
amphibious warfare ships (with a displacement of 1,200 tonnes and over)	24	1:3.5	84

Explanation of Tables I and II

In computing the correlation of the forces in Europe and adjoining waters, the two military-political alliances' ground forces, air forces, air defense forces, naval forces, and troops ensuring operational and rear support, and civil and territorial defense, have been fully included in the overall number of the personnel and the quantity of armaments.

The forces of all the fleets stationed in the European zone, including the Soviet Northern, Baltic, and Black Sea Fleets, have been fully included in the calculation of the armed forces of the Warsaw Pact states. On the basis of an analogous approach, the forces and systems [sily i sredstva] of the navies of all West European NATO countries have been included in the assessment of North Atlantic alliance naval forces. The number of personnel and the quantity of armaments of the U.S. Navy operating in the North Atlantic and Mediterranean are also included.

The number of personnel and quantity of armaments belonging to the United States and Canada located on their own territory, in regions of the Atlantic directly adjoining them, and in the whole of the Pacific and Indian Oceans have not been included in the overall balance of armed forces. The strength of USSR Armed Forces stationed in the Asian part of the country has not been included in the overall balance. The personnel and the armaments of Soviet and U.S. strategic nuclear forces and missile formations and units being scrapped under the treaty on intermediate- and shorter-range missiles have not been included in the computations.

In view of the fact that British and French missile-carrying submarines, (S3) missiles on the Albion Plateau, and Mirage-IV bombers are not included in the overall balance, Soviet medium bombers of the Tu-22 type (except for naval aviation aircraft) are not included.

Workers and employees of the Armed Forces and military construction workers on both sides have not been included because they do not undergo military training in peacetime and do not carry arms.

The main types of armaments and military equipment found in the forces, at depots (in reserve), and in centers of combat use have been taken into account when comparing the armed forces. These comprise:

Combat aircraft of the following type:

In the Warsaw Pact, front-line bombers (Su-24), fighter-bombers (Su-22, Su-76, Su-17, MiG-17, and MiG-27), ground-attack aircraft (Su-25), fighters (MiG-29, MiG-23, MiG-21, and Su-27), Air Defense Forces fighter-interceptors (MiG-31, MiG-25, Su-27, Su-15, Tu-128, and Yak-28), reconnaissance and electronic warfare planes (MiG-25, MiG-21, Su-17, Su-24, and Yak-28), naval aviation (Tu-16, Tu-22, Tu-142, Il-38, Be-12, Yak-38, Su-17, MiG-21, MiG-23, MiG-29, and Su-27);

In NATO, fighter-bombers (Buccaneer, Tornado, F-111, Mirage 5, F-4, F-15, F-16, F-18, Jaguar, Mirage III, F-104, Mirage 2000, F-100, F-35 Draken [as published], F-5, F-84, and G-91), ground-attack aircraft (A-7, A-10, Harrier, and Alpha jet), fighters (F-16, Tornado, Mirage 2000, F-4, F-104, Mirage F-1, F-5), Air Defense Forces fighter-interceptors (Lightning), reconnaissance and electronic warfare aircraft (EF-111, RF-4, Tornado, Jaguar, Mirage F-IR, R-F5, Mirage IIIR, RF-16, Nimrod, Orion P-3, G.91R, RF-104, RF-84, EC-130, DC-8, Canberra, and Shackleton), naval aviation (A-4, A-6, A-7, F/A-18, Sea Harrier, AV-8, Etendard, Super Etendard, F-4, Tornado, F-104, F-14, Crusader, ASW aircraft, reconnaissance, and electronic warfare planes), and combat support aircraft;

Combat helicopters of the following type:

In the Warsaw Pact, gunship (Mi-24), assault transport (Mi-8), reconnaissance and fire adjustment [razvedka i korrektyrovka] (Mi-24 and Mi-8), electronic warfare (Mi-8), and Navy helicopters (Ka-25, Ka-27, Ka-29, and Mi-14);

In NATO, gunships (Apache, Huey Cobra, Cobra-TOW, Bo-105P, Lynx, Mangusta, and Gazelle), multirole (Iroquois, Black Hawk, Bo-105M, Alouette, Lynx, AB-204, AB-205, AB-206, and AB-212), reconnaissance (Kaiowa, Gazelle, and Alouette), assault transport and specialized (Puma, EH-1H, and EH-60), Navy helicopters (Sea King, Wessex, Lynx, Super Frelon, Alouette, AB-212, Sea Cobra, Sea Stallion, Sea Hawk, and Iroquois);

Tanks—all types of tanks with which the Warsaw Pact and NATO are equipped;

Antitank missile systems:

In the Warsaw Pact, ATGM combat vehicles of front-line, army, divisional, and regimental echelon and portable systems of the battalion echelon;

In NATO—systems similar in terms of designation and characteristics;

Infantry combat vehicles, armored personnel carriers, combat assault vehicles, combat reconnaissance patrol vehicles, and combat reconnaissance vehicles;

Salvo-fire missile systems, field artillery pieces of 75-mm caliber and above, and mortars of 50-mm caliber and above.

[Footnote: The data disclosing the strength of the personnel and the number of armaments relative to each of the Warsaw Pact and NATO countries in Europe are appended (Appendixes 3, 4, 5, 6).]

Appendix 3. Force Strengths of Warsaw Pact Countries in Europe (Thousand Men)

[PRAVDA publishes the following two tables as a single table covering half the width of the page. Columns are headed as follows: A—Warsaw Pact Total; B—Of Which, Bulgaria; C—Of Which, Hungary; D—Of Which, GDR; E—Of Which, Poland; F—Of Which, Romania; G—Of Which, USSR; H—Of Which, CSSR. A footnote to the table states: "The strength of the Ministries of Internal Affairs and border troops has not been included in the Warsaw Pact forces."]

	A	B	C	D
Control organs: general staffs, main and central directorates of defense ministries	30.2	1.1	1.2	2.5
Ground forces, airborne forces, and army aviation	1,823.5	70.4	54.7	103.3
Air defense forces	550.5	17.6	19.8	29.9
Air forces	425.1	4.5	1.6	4.7
Naval forces	338.0	6.3	-	14.2
Units under central command (intelligence, communications, electronic warfare, VUZ's, and others)	225.4	14.2	23.5	5.5
Rear services units and institutions	146.3	2.7	6.0	13.0
Civil (territorial) defense troops	34.1	0.7	-	-
Total of armed forces in Europe and adjoining waters	3,573.1	117.5	106.8	173.1

	E	F	G	H
Control organs: general staffs, main and central directorates of defense ministries	2.8	2.2	17.1	3.3
Ground forces, airborne forces, and Army aviation	169.8	110.0	1,187.2	128.1
Air defense forces	49.8	22.0	389.1	22.3
Air forces	40.9	5.4	345.0	23.0
Naval forces	22.2	6.4	288.9	-
Units under central command (intelligence, communications, electronic warfare, VUZ's, and others)	21.1	12.0	133.2	15.9
Rear services units and institutions	33.5	12.0	75.1	4.0
Civil (territorial) defense troops	6.9	1.0	22.4	3.1
Total of armed forces in Europe and adjoining waters	347.0	171.0	2,458.0	199.7

Appendix 4. Force Strengths of NATO Countries in Europe (Thousand Men)

[PRAVDA publishes the following four tables as a single table covering half the width of the page. Columns are headed as follows: A—NATO Total; B—Of Which, Britain; C—Of Which, FRG; D—Of Which, France; E—Of Which, Norway; F—Of Which, Denmark; G—Of

Which, Belgium; H—Of Which, Netherlands; I—Of Which, Luxembourg; J—Of Which, Italy; K—Of Which, Greece; L—Of Which, Portugal; M—Of Which, Spain; N—Of Which, Turkey; O—Of Which, United States in Europe; P—Of Which, United States in Atlantic; Q—Of Which, Canada in Europe; R—Of Which, Canada in Atlantic; S—Of Which, Iceland. A footnote to the table states: "The strength of field gendarmerie and border troops has not been included in the NATO forces."]

	A	B	C	D	E
Control organs: general staffs, main and central directorates of defense ministries	49.47	1.0	1.8	5.0	0.08
Ground forces, airborne forces, and Army aviation	2,115.36	143.9	342.0	238.2	21.2
Air defense forces	137.7	13.0	31.3	15.0	2.0
Air forces	482.3	74.9	71.3	70.7	6.9
Naval forces	685.0	71.0	36.0	62.0	8.0
Units under central command (intelligence, communications, electronic warfare, VUZ's, and others)	96.9	2.7	6.5	38.5	1.7
Rear services units and institutions	87.5	4.7	5.0	13.1	1.2
Civil (territorial) defense troops	6.0	-	1.1	-	-
Total of armed forces in Europe and adjoining waters	3,660.2	311.2	495.0	442.5	41.08

	F	G	H	I	J
Control organs: general staffs, main and central directorates of defense ministries	0.06	1.0	1.0	0.03	17.0
Ground forces, airborne forces, and Army aviation	17.3	59.2	60.4	0.71	234.75
Air defense forces	1.5	5.1	4.0	-	21.2
Air forces	4.5	15.7	13.4	-	51.4
Naval forces	6.0	4.0	18.0	-	45.0
Units under central command (intelligence, communications, electronic warfare, VUZ's, and others)	0.1	4.2	2.75	0.3	19.65
Rear services units and institutions	1.5	2.8	1.5	-	6.0
Civil (territorial) defense troops	-	-	0.8	-	1.0
Total of armed forces in Europe and adjoining waters	30.96	92.0	101.85	1.04	396.0

	K	L	M	N
Control organs: general staffs, main and central directorates of defense ministries	0.3	1.9	2.3	18.0
Ground forces, airborne forces, and Army aviation	135.4	43.6	185.0	420.0
Air defense forces	11.4	-	12.0	12.0
Air forces	15.2	9.0	23.1	44.2
Naval forces	22.0	13.0	48.0	52.0
Units under central command (intelligence, communications, electronic warfare, VUZ's, and others)	4.3	1.0	8.8	5.1
Rear services units and institutions	1.2	1.5	3.3	44.5
Civil (territorial) defense troops	0.2	-	0.5	2.4
Total of armed forces in Europe and adjoining waters	190.0	70.0	283.0	598.2

	O	P	Q	R	S
Control organs: general staffs, main and central directorates of defense ministries	-	-	-	-	-
Ground forces, airborne forces, and Army aviation	208.8	-	4.9	-	-
Air defense forces	9.2	-	-	-	-
Air forces	80.1	-	1.9	-	-
Naval forces	32.5	261.5	-	6.0	-
Units under central command (intelligence, communications, electronic warfare, VUZ's, and others)	-	-	1.3	-	-
Rear services units and institutions	0.9	-	0.3	-	-
Civil (territorial) defense troops	-	-	-	-	-
Total in armed forces in Europe and adjoining waters	331.5	261.5	8.4	6.0	-
	593.0		14.4		
	[combined U.S.]		[combined Canadian]		

Appendix 5. Quantity of Main Armament Types of Warsaw Pact Countries in Europe

[PRAVDA publishes the following two tables as a single table covering half the width of the page. Columns

are headed as follows: A—Warsaw Pact Total; B—Of Which, Bulgaria; C—Of Which, Hungary; D—Of Which, GDR; E—Of Which, Poland; F—Of Which Romania; G—Of Which, USSR; H—Of Which, CSSR.]

	A	B	C	D
Combat aircraft of front-line (tactical) air force aviation and air defense force and naval aviation	7,876	234	113	307
including:				
combat aircraft of front-line (tactical) air force aviation and air defense force aviation	5,355	234	113	283
air defense force combat interceptors incapable of operating against ground targets	1,829	-	-	-
Navy combat aircraft	692	-	-	24
Total strike aircraft (bombers, fighter-bombers, ground-attack aircraft) within front-line (tactical) air force aviation aircraft and naval aviation aircraft	2,783	69	-	65
Combat helicopters, including naval	2,785	51	96	74
Tactical missile launchers	1,608	72	27	80
Tanks	59,470	2,200	1,435	3,140
Antitank missile complexes	11,465	360	270	620
Infantry combat vehicles and armored transports	70,330	2,365	2,310	5,900
Rocket-propelled salvo-fire systems, field pieces (75 mm and above), and mortars (50 mm and above)	71,560	3,990	1,750	2,435
Submarines (excluding submarines armed with strategic ballistic missiles)	228	4	-	-
including nuclear-powered	80	-	-	-
Large surface ships (aircraft carriers, battleships, cruisers, destroyers, frigates, amphibious warfare ships with a displacement of 1,200 tonnes and over)	102	-	-	-
including:				
aircraft-carrying ships [avianesushchiye], aircraft carriers	2	-	-	-
ships armed with cruise missiles	23	-	-	-
amphibious warfare ships (with a displacement of 1,200 tonnes and over)	24	-	-	-
	E	F	G	H
Combat aircraft of front-line (tactical) air force aviation and air defense force and naval aviation	480	380	5,955	407
including:				
combat aircraft of front-line (tactical) air force aviation and air defense force aviation	480	156	3,682	407
air defense force combat interceptors incapable of operating against ground targets	-	224	1,605	-
Navy combat aircraft	-	-	668	-
Total strike aircraft (bombers, fighter-bombers, ground-attack aircraft) within front-line (tactical) air force aviation aircraft and naval aviation aircraft	108	128	2,276	137
Combat helicopters, including naval	43	220	2,200	101
Tactical missile launchers	81	50	1,221	77
Tanks	3,330	3,200	41,580	4,585
Antitank missile complexes	435	400	8,840	540
Infantry combat vehicles and armored transports	4,855	5,000	45,000	4,900
Rocket-propelled salvo-fire systems, field pieces (75 mm and above), and mortars (50 mm and above)	3,065	6,600	50,275	3,445
Submarines (excluding submarines armed with strategic ballistic missiles)	3	1	220	-
including nuclear-powered	-	-	80	-
Large surface ships (aircraft carriers, battleships, cruisers, destroyers, frigates, amphibious warfare ships with a displacement of 1,200 tonnes and over)	-	1	101	-
including:				
aircraft-carrying ships [avianesushchiye], aircraft carriers	-	-	2	-
ships armed with cruise missiles	-	-	23	-
amphibious warfare ships (with a displacement of 1,200 tonnes and over)	-	-	24	-

Appendix 6. Quantity of NATO Countries' Main Armament Types in Europe

[PRAVDA publishes the following three tables as a single table covering half the width of the page. Columns are headed as follows: A—NATO Total; B—Of Which, Britain; C—Of Which, FRG; D—Of Which, France; E—

Of Which, Norway; F—Of Which, Denmark; G—Of Which, Belgium; H—Of Which, Netherlands; I—Of Which, Luxembourg; J—Of Which, Italy; K—Of Which, Greece; L—Of Which, Portugal; M—Of Which, Spain; N—Of Which, Turkey; O—Of Which, United States in Europe; P—Of Which, Canada in Europe; Q—Of Which, Iceland]

	A	B	C	D	E	
Combat aircraft of front-line (tactical) air force aviation and air defense force and naval aviation	7130	835	850	880	100	
including:						
combat aircraft of front-line (tactical) air force aviation and air defense force aviation	5450	740	680	680	100	
air defense force combat interceptors incapable of operating against ground targets	50	50	-	-	-	
navy combat aircraft	1630	45	170	200	-	
Total strike aircraft (bombers, fighter-bombers, ground-attack aircraft) within front-line (tactical) air force aviation aircraft and naval aviation aircraft	4075	410	615	460	50	
Combat helicopters, including naval	5270	700	450	700	-	
Tactical missile launchers	136	12	26	36	-	
Tanks	30690	2000	4900	3190	370	
Antitank missile complexes	18070	1480	2760	2000	150	
Infantry combat vehicles and armored transports	46900	5480	6840	4520	190	
Rocket-propelled salvo-fire systems, field pieces (75 mm and above), and mortars (50 mm and above)	57060	3320	3190	8510	2320	
Submarines (excluding submarines armed with strategic ballistic missiles)	200	28	24	17	11	
including nuclear-powered	76	16	-	4	-	
Large surface ships (aircraft carriers, battleships, cruisers destroyers, frigates, amphibious warfare ships with a displacement of 1,200 tonnes and over)	499	66	16	54	11	
including:						
aircraft-carrying ships [avianesushchiye], aircraft carriers	15	3	-	2	-	
ships armed with cruise missiles	274	31	13	40	5	
amphibious warfare ships (with a displacement of 1,200 tonnes and over)	84	10	-	9	3	
	F	G	H	I	J	K
Combat aircraft of front-line (tactical) air force aviation and air defense force and naval aviation	100	170	200	-	450	450
including:						
combat aircraft of front-line (tactical) air force aviation and air defense force aviation	100	170	180	-	430	450
air defense force combat interceptors incapable of operating against ground targets	-	-	-	-	-	-
navy combat aircraft	-	-	20	-	20	-
Total strike aircraft (bombers, fighter-bombers, ground-attack aircraft) within front-line (tactical) air force aviation aircraft and naval aviation aircraft	50	110	11	-	160	230
Combat helicopters, including naval	-	70	20	-	540	130
Tactical missile launchers	-	6	8	-	12	-
Tanks	350	530	1250	-	2330	2000
Antitank missile complexes	310	560	764	6	2130	320
Infantry combat vehicles and armored transports	1090	2020	3240	-	6440	1720
Rocket-propelled salvo-fire systems, field pieces (75 mm and above), and mortars (50 mm and above)	1750	1620	1410	10	5510	3950
Submarines (excluding submarines armed with strategic ballistic missiles)	7	-	5	-	10	10
including nuclear-powered	-	-	-	-	-	-
Large surface ships (aircraft carriers, battleships, cruisers destroyers, frigates, amphibious warfare ships with a displacement of 1,200 tonnes and over)	10	4	17	-	27	29
including:						
aircraft-carrying ships [avianesushchiye], aircraft carriers	-	-	-	-	-	-
ships armed with cruise missiles	5	4	17	-	19	8
amphibious warfare ships (with a displacement of 1,200 tonnes and over)	-	-	-	-	3	9

	L	M	N	O	P	Q
Combat aircraft of front-line (tactical) air force aviation and air defense force and naval aviation	150	295	640	1960	50	-
including:						
combat aircraft of front-line (tactical) air force aviation and air defense force aviation	150	280	630	810	50	-
air defense force combat interceptors incapable of operating against ground targets	-	-	-	-	-	-
navy combat aircraft	-	15	10	1150	-	-
Total strike aircraft (bombers, fighter-bombers, ground-attack aircraft) within front-line (tactical) air force aviation aircraft and naval aviation aircraft	130	140	410	1150	50	-
Combat helicopters, including naval	-	160	310	2180	10	-
Tactical missile launchers	-	-	-	36	-	-
Tanks	470	1850	4320	6980	150	-
Antitank missile complexes	40	190	2350	4940	70	-
Infantry combat vehicles and armored transports	280	1720	5270	7590	500	-
Rocket-propelled salvo-fire systems, field pieces (75 mm and above), and mortars (50 mm and above)	1870	5010	4900	3520	170	-
Submarines (excluding submarines armed with strategic ballistic missiles)	3	8	17	57	3	-
including nuclear-powered	-	-	-	56	-	-
Large surface ships (aircraft carriers, battleships, cruisers, destroyers, frigates, amphibious warfare ships with a displacement of 1,200 tonnes and over)	17	29	31	173	15	-
including:						
aircraft-carrying ships [aviansushchiye], aircraft carriers	-	1	-	9	-	-
ships armed with cruise missiles	-	13	10	109	-	-
amphibious warfare ships (with a displacement of 1,200 tonnes and over)	-	6	7	37	-	-

BULGARIA

Government Decides on Military Budget, Forces Cut

Zhivkov Outlines Cuts

AU2701195789 Sofia Domestic Service
in Bulgarian 1830 GMT 27 Jan 89

[Text] Today, 27 January, a joint meeting of the State Council and the Council of Ministers of the People's Republic of Bulgaria was held. It discussed a proposal on unilateral reduction of the Armed Forces, armaments, and the military budget, submitted by Comrade Todor Zhivkov.

In the speech he delivered on this occasion he stressed: Today, this joint meeting of the State Council and Council of Ministers of the People's Republic of Bulgaria is called upon to discuss and decide on a question of exceptional importance, related to the unilateral reduction of Armed Forces, armaments, and the military budget.

I think it would not be exaggerating to state that this act in itself is an eloquent indicator of the considerable changes that have occurred in recent years in the international atmosphere. In accordance with the new political thinking, the Soviet Union and the socialist countries, and together with them, the People's Republic of Bulgaria, are adopting a series of bold initiatives on the

international scene. These initiatives are intended to shift the decisive focus from military to political factors in safeguarding national security, and thus to consistently and positively solve the main issue of international policy—namely, the question of war and peace.

Positive, new trends are making headway in present-day inter-state relations, and opportunities exist for them to assert themselves and become lasting and prevailing. We are observing profound changes in the various spheres of social, economic, and political life of the states; we are observing changes in the way of thinking and the philosophy of leading political circles, and of social strata and groups.

With the historical INF Treaty signed between the USSR and the United States, mankind accomplished the first step toward the actual elimination of nuclear weapons. It was again with political, and not military means that the knots of numerous regional conflicts and hotbeds of tension began to loosen on our globe.

The recently completed Vienna CSCE conference and the decisions adopted mark the beginning of a new stage in European policy. In March 1989, new negotiations between the Warsaw Pact and NATO member states will begin that are related to the reduction of armed forces and conventional weapons from the Atlantic to the Urals. Negotiations among all European states, the United States, and Canada on confidence and security measures are being resumed.

We are about to begin publishing data on the armed forces and armaments of the Warsaw Pact and NATO. In the Balkans, too, a process of multilateral cooperation in areas of mutual interests is already developing. These new trends give us the possibility of and the justification for looking in a new way at the entire complex of questions connected with security.

In these circumstances of improving East-West relations, the Soviet Union, the GDR, and Poland adopted decisions on the unilateral reduction of their armed forces.

I think it would do no harm to Bulgaria's security and to the security of our allies if we were to implement a unilateral reduction.

For this reason I propose the following: The 1989 budget of the Ministry of National Defense is to be reduced by 12 percent. The numerical staff of the Bulgarian People's Army and its armaments is to be reduced by 10,000 men by the end of 1990. The armaments are to be reduced by 200 tanks, 200 artillery systems, 20 aircraft, and 5 naval units.

I propose that the State Council and Council of Ministers of the People's Republic of Bulgaria should adopt such a decision.

This decision is an expression of the consistent, peace-loving foreign policy of our party and state. It will be our contribution to the joint efforts for the consolidation of peace in the world, Europe, and in the Balkans.

There is no doubt that our people will support this peace-loving and humanitarian act.

Taking into consideration the successful development of the all-European process, the favorable conditions established for a further reduction of military confrontation, and for the strengthening of European and world security on the basis of confidence and cooperation, as well as considering the agreements reached among the Warsaw Pact member states, the State Council and the Council of Ministers of the People's Republic of Bulgaria decided:

To reduce the country's military budget for 1989 by 12 percent. To reduce the Armed Forces of the country by 10,000 men, 200 tanks, 200 artillery systems, 20 aircraft, and 5 naval units.

BCP Daily Comments

*AU3001103789 Sofia RABOTNICHESKO DELO
in Bulgarian 29 Jan 89 p 1*

[Editorial: "Goodwill"]

[Text] This is already a fact, one which we not only desired, but also anticipated, and which evokes not only satisfaction and hope, but also self-confidence.

Bulgaria is unilaterally reducing its 1989 military budget 12 per cent, and its Armed Forces and armaments by 10,000 soldiers, 200 tanks, 20 aircraft, and 5 naval units.

Is this a large or small quantity? It is, both literally and figuratively, a sufficient quantity and a timely measure. This is especially so if we assess the decision of the State Council and the Council of Ministers within the context of the change in international relations toward peace and security for all people, as a result of the bold and decisive initiatives of the USSR and the other socialist countries, including the People's Republic of Bulgaria. It is a sufficient quantity because it guarantees the reliable defense of our country's sovereignty and the peaceful work of its citizens and does not harm the interests of our allies. It is a timely measure because thus we occupy our place and assume responsibility in the world peace process.

Not long ago one could not even think about such a development of international relations. That was the time of the "cold war" and the fatal arms race. Mankind reached the precipice of nuclear destruction and faced a choice with no alternative. The beginning of the great change was marked by the decisions of the 27th CPSU Congress and the subsequent USSR peace initiatives, whose attractiveness and effectiveness were enhanced by the activity of Mikhail Gorbachev and the fraternal country's party and state leadership.

The striving toward a balance of interests and giving priority to universal human interests facilitated the unique event of 1988—the ratification of the INF Treaty. The voluntary destruction of weapons began for the first time in history. Afterward, the decisions of the USSR and the other socialist countries to unilaterally reduce armed forces and withdraw Soviet and equipment from central Europe were announced. Soon data will be published by the USSR and its allies on the troops and armaments on the European Continent.

The peaceful offensive of socialism, coordinated with the new historical world situation, asserts the new political thinking in international life. The People's Republic of Bulgaria is in the front ranks of this offensive. Despite its small size it actively participates in international relations and the world processes. With the decision of 27 January 1989 to reduce the Armed Forces and armaments, adopted at the proposal of Comrade Todor Zhivkov, and with its example, our country demonstrates that there are no big and small states in the struggle for peace and mankind's future, and that all states are equally responsible and can make their own contribution. This decision is a logical expression of our consistent and peace-loving foreign policy. With its initiatives aimed at turning the Balkans into a zone free of nuclear and chemical weapons, developing cooperation in the spheres of ecology, economy, and culture, and strengthening confidence among nations, Bulgaria has acquired deserved international recognition and authority.

The decision to reduce the Armed Forces and armaments has not only military, but also political importance as a fact that confirms the truth that peace is the essence of socialism. In guaranteeing national security it transfers the gravity from the military to political factors and thus positively solves the main problems of war and peace. As far as the specific application to our country is concerned, Bulgaria again proved that now, at the stage of our society's revolutionary restructuring, it broadly opens itself to the world, and that its foreign policy of peace and cooperation is not determined by ad hoc considerations.

This important step, made together with the USSR, the GDR, the CSSR, and Poland, which also adopted decisions on unilaterally reducing their Armed Forces, is also economically important, because thus human and material resources will be released and activated for the benefit of the people and the peaceful competition among nations.

Perhaps the absolute dimensions of our reductions are not decisive or essential against the background of the entire world; however, they have a significant moral weight. Only a few days after the Vienna meeting, which gave a mandate for talks on reducing armed forces and armaments from the Atlantic to the Urals and adopting further measures on strengthening confidence and security, our country has given a positive example of goodwill and readiness to actively participate in this process.

'Expression of Good Will'

*AU2901185389 Sofia BTA in English
1625 GMT 29 Jan 89*

["A Signal of Constructive Approach"—BTA headline]

[Text] Sofia, January 29 (BTA political observer Aleksandur Vladkov)—The decision of the State Council and of the Council of Ministers of the People's Republic of Bulgaria on a unilateral reduction of the Armed Forces and on cuts in the country's 1989 military spending is an act of great military and political consequence.

With the existing military force capabilities in Europe, the Bulgarian-declared reductions will hardly alter the overall East-West balance of power. Judged by the standards of Bulgaria, however, their value is far from inconsiderable. Still, this is not what matters most in this case.

Introducing the motion on this decision, State Council President Todor Zhivkov emphasized that the idea of such initiatives is to shift the decisive centre of gravity in safeguarding national security from military to political factors and thus to help strengthen peace and international security. Moreover, these initiatives are launched at an important stage of the development of international relations, when every political goodwill gesture gives an important impetus to the positive tendencies of the last few years.

Combined with the similar steps taken by the U.S.S.R. and the other states parties to the Warsaw Treaty, the Bulgarian state leadership's decision to make unilateral reductions of troop levels, combat materiel and military spending acquires the value of an important politico-military initiative. The socialist countries have always addressed the problem of disarmament guided by an awareness of the need to achieve the lowest possible level of armaments in Europe on a continental and a regional scale. The unilateral reductions which Bulgaria now implements give this awareness its tangible dimension and exemplify this country's pursuit of security, cooperation and goodneighbourliness in the Balkans.

The first reaction to this move in Bulgaria and abroad shows that this expression of goodwill is viewed by the Bulgarian and the international public as a specific manifestation of new political thinking, as a signal of a constructive approach at the forthcoming talks in Vienna on the reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments from the Atlantic to the Urals.

Bulgarian Defense Ministry News Briefing on Warsaw Pact Statement

*AU3001200289 Sofia Domestic Service
in Bulgarian 1830 GMT 30 Jan 89*

[Text] A news conference was held at the Central Club of the Bulgarian People's Army in Sofia today on the occasion of the statement issued by the Defense Ministers Committee of the Warsaw Pact member states on the correlation of the numerical strength and armaments of the Warsaw Pact and NATO in Europe and in the adjacent territorial waters.

The news conference was opened and chaired by Boyan Traykov, chairman of the Bulgarian Journalists Union and chief director of BTA.

In his statement Colonel General Semerdzhiev, chief of the Bulgarian People's Army General Staff and first deputy minister of national defense, pointed out that the questions related to the military potentials of the Warsaw Pact and NATO forces are the focus of attention of the entire world public.

The most numerous and most efficiently equipped military groups are accumulated in Europe, which represents a great danger, not only to our ancient continent, but to the fate of all mankind.

The question arises concerning which platforms the two sides will present when they appear at the negotiations on conventional disarmament in Europe, scheduled to take place in March 1989, and at the resumption of negotiations on strengthening confidence measures and security, Colonel General Atanas Semerdzhiev pointed out. The question is whether the two sides are ready [words indistinct], he further stated.

Dwelling on the figures contained in the NATO document submitted in November 1988, Colonel General Atanas Semerdzhiev stressed that on the NATO side a deliberate exclusion of those components of armed forces in which NATO retains a decisive superiority is evident in this document, while the areas in which the Warsaw Pact is prevailing are emphasized. Simultaneously, NATO has deliberately manipulated the numerical data in the aforementioned document, which is a totally unjustified action in this case.

Colonel General Atanas Semerdzhiev stated: Our approach is by no means subject to propaganda interests. The main thing for the Warsaw Pact is to reduce the staff and to establish a well-balanced [words indistinct] which is neither to the advantage of the Warsaw Pact, nor to NATO, so as to create a feasible basis and prerequisites for the implementation of the negotiations on conventional weapons. The goal is to achieve a real disarmament and to consolidate stability in Europe and the world.

Dwelling on the situation in the Balkans, Colonel General Atanas Semerdzhiev pointed out that the Bulgarian people welcomed with satisfaction the [words indistinct] to which our country is also contributing.

The liberation of the Balkans from nuclear and chemical weapons would be an important step toward strengthening security not only in the Balkans, but all over Europe.

Colonel General Atanas Semerdzhiev, in closing his statement, declared that the Declaration of the Warsaw Pact member countries defense ministers was published immediately following the announcement of a considerable, one-sided reduction of the USSR Armed Forces, as well as following the announcement of considerable reductions of the armed forces, armaments, and military budgets of several other allied countries.

Colonel General Atanas Semerdzhiev pointed out in this connection: Hardly anyone would doubt that these are bold decisions, not totally without a certain risk, which reflect the spirit of our epoch, and, above all, the profound meaning of the fundamental ideas of new political thinking, as well as the spirit of the restructuring process in socialist society.

In addition to Colonel General Atanas Semerdzhiev, first deputy minister of national defense and chief of the General Staff of the Bulgarian People's Army, the news conference was attended by Colonel General Khristo Dobrev, first deputy minister of national defense.

Both exhaustively answered the numerous questions of Bulgarian and foreign journalists.

Military Officials Positively Assess Warsaw Pact Declaration

AU010211[Editorial Report] Sofia RABOTNICHESKO DELO in Bulgarian on 31 January on pages 1 and 4; Sofia OTECHESTVEN FRONT in Bulgarian on 31 January on pages 1 and 3; and Sofia NARODNA ARMIYA in Bulgarian on 31 January on pages 1 and 2, carry respectively: a 4,000-word article by Colonel General Atanas Semerdzhiev, first deputy minister of national defense and commander in chief of the General Staff of the Bulgarian People's Army, entitled "The Conventional Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact and NATO (The Truth About Their Combat Potentials);" a 2,500-word article by Lieutenant General Radnyu Minchev, first deputy head of the General Staff of the Bulgarian People's Army, entitled "Words Supported by Real Deeds;" and a 2,000-word interview with Lieutenant General Tanyu Tanev, deputy head of the General Staff of the Bulgarian People's Army, by Colonel Rangel Zlatkov, NARODNA ARMIYA chief editor, entitled "In the Interest of Confidence and Mutual Security."

Col Gen Semerdzhiev maintains in his RABOTNICHESKO DELO article that "the military possibilities of the countries and the balance between the two basic military-political groups—the Warsaw Pact and NATO—have been viewed for a long time as a decisive factor not only of the countries' defense, but also of international security." Asserting that "mankind ever better understand that there cannot be a winner in the nuclear war," Col Gen Semerdzhiev points out that "this explains why the importance of conventional armed forces and conventional military power constantly grow." Consequently, Col Gen Semerdzhiev says, "sharply reducing" the concentrations of conventional troops and armaments in Europe "increasingly becomes an essential need and one of the main directions of strengthening not only European, but also international security."

Against this background Col Gen Semerdzhiev reviews various disarmament proposals of the Warsaw Pact, such as the appeal of the June 1986 meeting of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact member states and several proposals made at the Vienna meeting, and laments "NATO's slow reaction" to these proposals. He stresses that "the initiative to exchange numerical data on the quantity, structure, and general combat potential of the two alliances' armed forces belongs to the Warsaw Pact," and emphasizes "the unreserved readiness of the Warsaw Pact to broadly exchange such information." He lists specific proposals related to the exchange of information, voiced by the "documents of the 1986 Budapest meeting of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact member states;" "the special document adopted at the end of March 1988 in Sofia by the Committee of Ministers of Foreign Affairs;" and the "specific statements made in the months afterward by Eduard Shevardnadze and USSR Defense Minister Dmitriy Yazov." According to

Semerdzhev, these documents and statements demonstrate "the honest approach and unconditional sincerity of our countries." In this context he notes that "NATO has rejected our insistent proposals to exchange information at a coordinated moment and on a mutual basis," and instead "decided to publish a unilateral report" on 25 November 1988.

Col Gen Semerdzhev compares the NATO document and the recently published declaration of the Committee of Defense Ministers of the Warsaw Pact, and notes six basic differences:

1. The Warsaw Pact document "takes into consideration all components of the armed forces, except the strategic nuclear systems, the systems of medium and shorter range, which will be destroyed, and the tactical nuclear weapons." On the other hand, NATO's document "really takes into consideration only ground troops and the air force."

2. NATO's document is biased because "it includes data on the anti-air force means of the socialist countries, despite the fact that these means have a purely defensive character." NATO's document "further distorts the reality" by including data on the Soviet naval transport aviation, "and many obsolete aircraft, that have been stripped of their weapons," while at the same time "it only notes several kinds of transport aircraft of the NATO countries."

3. In comparing the two sides' military potential NATO's document "completely ignores" the issue of its countries' naval aviation, intended "to inflict massive strikes on ground targets." Semerdzhev notes that "the distortion of the air force capabilities, on the part of NATO, and the attempt to present tanks and artillery as the main factors in the attack potential and basic destabilization, are, to put it mildly, groundless."

4. Semerdzhev further notes the "fundamental difference in determining the data related to ground forces." He asserts that NATO includes in its document data on the Warsaw Pact countries' "units, including artillery divisions and brigades," which actually do not exist in times of peace, while such units "are strongly developed in NATO's structure." Nevertheless, the NATO documents "treat them as bases or warehouses for storing armaments and equipment," Semerdzhev says. In this context he maintains that NATO "crudely ignores the requirements of accuracy and objectivity."

5. Semerdzhev notes that "the authors of the NATO document broadly use another incorrect approach, namely, consciously uniting armaments and equipment for combat and auxiliary purposes." He maintains that "thus they conceal their superiority in combat means." On the other hand, "our methodology clearly distinguishes between combat and auxiliary means," Semerdzhev says.

6. Finally, Semerdzhev asserts that "the other side broadly decreases the data on their own armed troops, while those of the Warsaw Pact have been consciously increased."

On the basis of these differences he concludes that "there is a fundamental difference in the approach of the authors of the two documents," and that the authors of the NATO document aimed at "concealing the real purpose of their military preparations," "checking the increasing resistance of the Western public against NATO's plans for 'compensation'," and "creating favorable preconditions" before the opening of the Vienna talks on conventional weapons.

In the final part of his article, Col Gen Semerdzhev reviews the declaration of the Committee of Defense Ministers of the Warsaw Pact and concludes that "the goal of the USSR and the allied countries is to create a world without weapons and war."

Stating that "achieving the lowest possible level of military confrontation corresponds to the interests of the Warsaw Pact member states," Lieutenant General Minchev in OTECHESTVEN FRONT describes in detail the recent announcements of the socialist countries on unilaterally reducing their armed forces and armaments as "a shining example" of the "striving of the socialist countries to prevent war and strengthen the foundation of international security."

Against the background of these announcements Lt Gen Minchev analyzes the Declaration of the Warsaw Pact Committee of Defense Ministers. In this context he notes that the NATO document on the armed forces and conventional armaments in Europe contains "incorrect and biased data, aimed at presenting a great superiority of the Warsaw Pact and thus to influence the world public opinion." He compares the NATO document and the Warsaw Pact declaration much along the lines of Col Gen Semerdzhev's RABOTNICHESKO DELO article, and concludes that on the basis of "the comprehensive analysis of the balance of power it can be stated that there is an approximate parity between NATO and the Warsaw Pact in everything related to conventional weapons."

Lt Gen Minchev describes the Warsaw Pact declaration as "another proof of the peace-loving foreign policy of the Warsaw Pact member states and their striving to reduce the armed forces and conventional weapons in Europe and remove the imbalances and asymmetries in the military area." He points out the positive response to the Warsaw Pact declaration, "which is viewed by the peoples as an exceptionally constructive and peace-loving document."

In conclusion, Lt Gen Minchev asserts that the "process of detente still is not an irreversible process," and that "the NATO states are tacitly continuing their military preparations and are not decreasing their military

budgets." This fact, he says, obliges us "to maintain the combat readiness of the troops and the defensive ability of our fraternal countries at such a level that would guarantee the peaceful work of our peoples and a reliable defense of the achievements of socialism."

In Lieutenant General Tanev's interview appearing in NARODNA ARMIYA he answers the first question, related to the "necessity of publishing the data on the armed forces and conventional weapons of NATO and the Warsaw Pact," by emphasizing that "the publication of the quantitative and qualitative characteristics of the military potential of NATO and the Warsaw Pact is an important direction of the efforts to strengthen confidence and international security in Europe and an important condition of achieving this goal." According to him "the world public, and first of all the European peoples have the right to know and must know the truth about the superiority of the Warsaw Pact, broadly publicized by the NATO leadership, and whether the imbalances are unilateral or bilateral and mutually compensated."

The second question refers to the nature of the NATO assessment of the military potential of the two blocs. Lt Gen Tanev asserts that "both NATO and the Warsaw Pact do not consider the data that has been published as final," but rather as a basis for conducting talks. He criticizes the NATO document as being "selective in everything related to the scope of the armed forces," and "selective in choosing the categories of comparison." He describes NATO's "selectiveness" along the lines of Col Gen Semerdzhiev's RABOTNICHESKO DELO article and asserts that "NATO manipulates the numerical data," and that its document "aims at propaganda goals."

Asked about his assessment of the Warsaw Pact document, Lt Gen Tanev describes the Warsaw Pact document as a "complex evaluation that encompasses all components of military power." He compares the two documents and reaches the conclusion that the superiority of the two blocs in various areas compensate each other and produce an approximate parity.

Asked about the balance of power in the Balkan peninsula, Lt Gen Tanev says:

"The People's Republic of Bulgaria is seriously concerned with the balance of power along its borders. In all compared categories the balance is in favor of NATO and is greater than the accepted ratio of 3 to 1, something that provides NATO with the ability to conduct decisive attacks."

In conclusion, Lt Gen Tanev stresses the necessity of "conducting talks on all components of military power. Unilateral reductions are desirable and they create favorable conditions for the talks, but they cannot replace the talks."

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Defense Council Announces Arms Reductions

Proposed Changes Detailed

LD2701161389 Prague Domestic Service in Czech
1500 GMT 27 Jan 89

[Text] By a decision of the National Defense Council and in harmony with the military defensive doctrine of the Warsaw Pact member states, in 1989-90 organizational changes will be made to underline the defensive nature of and to reduce the number of personnel and armaments in the Czechoslovak People's Army.

In this way, the CSSR is gradually beginning to implement its initiative on creating a zone of trust, cooperation, and goodneighborly relations on the line of contact between the Warsaw Pact and NATO member states. It is thus aligning itself with the Soviet proposals made by Mikhail Gorbachev at the UN General Assembly last December.

The envisaged changes take into consideration the demands for high efficiency and economies. At the same time, conditions are being created for a significant increase in the contribution of the Army to implementing the tasks of the national economy, in accordance with the decision of the federal government, within the framework of the Army helping the economy and its substantial expansion, particularly in the building industry and in railway transport.

In this connection, the following measures were decided upon:

To reduce planned national defense spending in the years 1989-90 by 15 percent; to reduce the number of soldiers in combat units by 12,000 and to strengthen Army construction organizations by 20,000; to reduce the number of tank and air force regiments in the organizational structures of the ground forces; and to withdraw and gradually liquidate a total of 850 tanks, 165 armored cars, and 51 combat aircraft from military armaments.

Three general Army divisions [vsevojskove divize] are to be reorganized. Their arms and equipment are to be mothballed, leaving only the required number of people for maintenance and guard duty. The number of divisional and regimental tactical exercises is to be reduced by 50 percent, the number of live rounds fired [bojovych streleb] by 25-30 percent, and the number of reservists called up for exercises by 15,000 people.

The aforementioned measures are based on the principle of defensive sufficiency for the secure and reliable defense of the state. These measures are being carried out unilaterally as a firm contribution by the CSSR to increasing confidence and security in Europe.

If the NATO member states are willing to carry out similar measures in their armed forces, then we are prepared to continue the process.

Defense Minister Vaclavik Details Cuts

*LD2701230189 Prague CTK in English
2106 GMT 27 Jan 89*

[Text] Prague Jan 27 (CTK)—Czechoslovak Defence Minister Army General Milan Vaclavik stressed here today that Czechoslovakia's unilateral and extensive measures in the military sphere announced today concern three basic spheres—spendings on the Army, the strength of Armed Forces and armament.

In an interview for CTK he said that these three spheres are linked together, and that the cuts reach on average 10-15 per cent. The scrapped number of tanks and armoured vehicles corresponds to two and half tank divisions, the minister said.

Asked about the realization of measures concerning the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Czechoslovak territory, Milan Vaclavik said that four complete formations with equipment will be withdrawn in 1989 and the rest of one tank division will follow in 1990. In other units of the Central Group of Soviet Forces in Czechoslovakia, organizational measures will be realized to increase the defensive character of the forces.

On the reorganization of three Army divisions into military depots, Milan Vaclavik stated that it means reduction of the combat value of the Czechoslovak People's Army by three Army divisions at the time of peace. However, there exists the possibility to restore their combat ability by calling reservists in case of need within 10-15 days. This measure is a real step towards the creation of a zone of confidence along the line dividing the Warsaw Treaty and NATO states. Besides this, the minister stressed, other divisions will be reorganized in order [to] fulfil exclusively defensive tasks.

Dealing with the tasks for the current training year, Czechoslovak Defence Minister Milan Vaclavik stressed above all the necessity of achieving higher effectiveness of training and its organization.

"The reduction of the number of exercises and reservists is our contribution to the joint effort at the effective and economical use of social means", Milan Vaclavik said.

"Adopting these measures, we are fully aware that defence capability of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and our allies must be unconditionally ensured. As the present military and political situation in Europe cannot be neglected, our possibilities of reducing the Armed Forces are limited. These limits ensue also from the fact that Czechoslovakia is situated on the border with NATO states, the joint frontier is almost 250-kilometre long. We must also take into consideration

NATO's reaction to our one-sided measures", Army General Milan Vaclavik pointed out.

He emphasized that the new measures require mobilization of all forces to retain security of the state and the socialist community.

Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Applauds Plan

*LD3001100189 Prague Domestic Service in Slovak
0900 GMT 30 Jan 89*

[Text] The Soviet Union has expressed support for the decision of the Czechoslovak Council for Defense to reduce the number of troops and armaments of the Czechoslovak People's Army and to restrict the military budget. Viktor Komplektov, deputy Soviet minister of foreign affairs, stressed today that this decision fulfills in real terms the defense doctrine agreed upon by leading representatives of the Warsaw Pact member states. He also recalled that the joint effort of the Warsaw Pact to support, by practical unilateral steps, the implementation of the defensive military doctrine, has been proven by the decision of the Soviet Union and other Warsaw Pact countries to reduce the number of troops and conventional armaments.

RUDE PRAVO Editorial

*LD2801081589 Prague CTK in English
0712 GMT 28 Jan 89*

[Text] Prague Jan 28 (CTK)—RUDE PRAVO today described Czechoslovakia's decision to cut its troop strengths, announced yesterday, as "a proof of goodwill and example of the political decision that we consider disarmament in Europe the priority of our foreign policy."

In an editorial on the planned reduction of the Czechoslovak Armed Forces by 12,000 men, 850 tanks and other weaponry the paper said that Czechoslovakia has experienced two wars, both world ones and both ignited in Europe by the expansionism of world imperialism and the ambition to dictate to others.

"European history documents that it is wrong to believe that only those who are armed mean something in the concert of nations. The way to the realization that the security of each state is not safeguarded by military but political means was long. The realization is growing. The world public increasingly understands that the projects of human future will not be decided by military force and the quantity and quality of weapons but by the results of activity of human brain, talent and the ability to understand objective social laws".

The paper urged "decisions of one to be examples and an appeal to others. Disarmament is not just a technical, military matter but primarily a political one". This idea was voiced by Czechoslovak Communist Party General Secretary Milos Jakes last February when he said that political decision takes effect when it is combined with

concrete proposals and measures, and this is the essence of the proposal to create a zone of confidence, cooperation and good-neighbour relations between the Warsaw Treaty and NATO made by Czechoslovakia.

RUDE PRAVO also supported the idea voiced by Mikhail Gorbachev that disarmament will not make progress until it is practically demonstrated that weapons can be scrapped.

"However, we do not succumb to illusions", RUDE PRAVO wrote and stressed that the Czechoslovak Peoples' Army will continue to defend the security of the country and the people. "We realize what a huge military force stands against us, west of the Bohemian Forest."

Czechoslovakia is situated in the heart of Europe, on a territory over which wars rolled in history. "This is why we do not passively watch the heaping of arsenals of conventional weapons in Europe... why we take decisions, together with our allies in the Warsaw Treaty, which are our contribution... to disarmament", the paper wrote.

Slovak Daily Views Announcement

*LD3001101889 Prague CTK in English
0855 GMT 30 Jan 89*

[Text] Bratislava Jan 30 (CTK)—The Czechoslovak decision to cut military spendings and reduce armed forces and armament is a concrete and prudent step, an active contribution of Czechoslovakia to the deepening of confidence and increasing security in the centre of Europe and on an all-European scale as well, the Slovak daily PRAVDA said today.

Of some statements in the West minimizing the importance of the unilateral disarmament steps of the USSR and other socialist countries that the Warsaw Treaty will continue to be superior in the military sphere, the paper said these are a demagogic simplification. Considering the balance or imbalance is a very difficult task, the paper said, adding that not only quantity but also quality indices must be taken into account. Undoubtedly there exist asymmetries in Europe but they are not only to the benefit of the Warsaw Treaty, it said.

Armed forces must be given an exclusively defensive character and this is the goal pursued by the organizational changes in the Czechoslovak Army and the Soviet Army, as well as the armies of the other Warsaw Treaty member states, PRAVDA said.

CSSR Public Reacts Positively

*LD2901204189 Prague CTK in English
1757 GMT 29 Jan 89*

[Text] Prague Jan 29 (CTK)—The statement on the reduction of the number of troops, armament and organizational changes in the Czechoslovak People's Army, which was published on January 27, has aroused wide response among the Czechoslovak public.

Deputy Chairman of the Central Committee of the Czech National Front Rudolf Dusek said: "It is good that words are followed by deeds, and thereby actually by concrete implementation of the Czechoslovak initiative to create a zone of confidence, cooperation and good-neighbour relations on the line of contact between the Warsaw Treaty and NATO. The question of security is thus solved by political and not military means because the future of mankind must be decided by the activity of human reason and talent."

Doctor Otakar Bartos, chief health officer for integration projects in the Soviet Union, stated: "The Czechoslovak initiative aimed at strengthening confidence in the military sphere is a result of the peace-making work of the Soviet Union and all socialist countries, which has brought easing of tensions in international relations. It documents that the road we have taken is correct. However, more patient work, persuasion and gaining of positive forces of the world for the benefit of calm and peace among nations will still be required."

Josefa Karnoldova, deputy headmistress of the 33rd Basic School in Plzen, said: "Cutting planned defence spendings by 15 percent and scrapping military equipment means hastening the aims of construction... I am convinced that the decision of the Council of State Defence will increase Czechoslovakia's authority on an international scale and strengthen its position in enhancing confidence and cooperation between countries having different social systems."

Alena Stancevova, deputy chairwoman of the Czech Central Committee of the Czechoslovak Red Cross Society, stated: "The Czechoslovak Red Cross, which is commemorating the 70th anniversary of its birth these days, has furthered in its activity the ideas of peaceful coexistence between nations of the whole world throughout its existence. Members of our organization are aware that suffering is caused by war and therefore, I believe, they welcome all steps leading to the easing of international tension."

Academic painter Miloslav Prochazka stated: "In 1945, I experienced the end of the Second World War in Prague. Windows shone brightly, the streets were full of light, the eyes rid of horrors of war... I wish that posterity finds after us only children's toys, sculptures, paintings and books speaking about a beautiful land, about hope for the future. If the NATO states are willing to take similar measures in their armed forces, there is a chance that this desire will come true."

Josef Kubista, chairman of the Mir United Cooperation Farm at Humburky near Novy Bydzov stated: "I regard Friday's [27 January] statement of the Council of State Defence as another step towards a situation in which people will no longer be haunted by the threat of a nuclear holocaust. In my opinion, such a step could be taken thanks to the successful Soviet-U.S. talks at summit level and to the relaxation of overall tension. I am

glad that by reducing spendings on state defence we will gain resources and will invest them where our society needs it in restructuring."

Magdalena Trhanova, shift head at the transport office at the railway station in Sturovo, stated: "I appreciate that the statement comes at the right time, in a period of the easing of international tension and the restructuring of society. It is my sincere wish that railways always carry only goods designed for life and a peaceful work of people. This is helped by this concrete initiative of our state and its People's Army."

Ludek Bohmann, 1971 European championships gold medallist, at present coach of the national sprint team, stated: "Positive changes in international relations are immediately reflected in sport... the Czechoslovak initiative aimed at strengthening confidence in the military sphere is another step to stadiums, pools and sports halls remaining the only battlefields."

Editorial on Army Reorganization, Arms, Troop Reductions

*AU3101084889 Prague RUDE PRAVO in Czech
28 Jan 89 p 1*

[Editorial: "Our Contribution to the Disarmament Process"]

[Text] Today we carry on our front page the official declaration on the reduction of the strength and armaments of the Czechoslovak People's Army (CSLA) and on certain other organizational changes in the CSLA. Let us recapitulate the facts: 850 tanks, 165 armored personnel carriers, and 51 aircraft will be eliminated. The armaments of three all-purpose Army divisions will be transferred to warehouses and mothballed, the number of soldiers in combat units will be cut by 12,000, and 20,000 men will reinforce the Army's construction organizations.

These numbers speak for themselves; they are the first thing that attracts attention. However, the unilateral military measures taken by our state have a much broader, deeper significance. Above all else, they are steps undertaken in full harmony with the basic principle of our People's Army—its defensive nature.

The measures prove our goodwill and demonstrate our political decision to consider disarmament in Europe as the elementary principle of our foreign policy. We do not want to live in a Europe filled to the brim with arms arsenals—we do not see our own future life and the life of our partners and neighbors as taking place on a continent eternally divided by a line, by a kind of iron mound of tanks, guns, and aircraft produced for the eventuality of a military clash. Our idea of life is different; our program is not focused on war. We are in favor of a common European home, of coexistence in peace, of good-neighborly relations. We have learned from two wars, both of which were world wars and which broke

out in Europe from the combustible materials ignited by world imperialism's lust for conquest, by its craving to order others about, to rule and instruct them.

European history bears witness to the erroneous belief that only those who are armed count for something in the concert of nations. The path toward grasping the fact that the safety of every state is safeguarded by political and not by military means has been a long one. But this has been grasped; this realization is growing, and the world public is beginning to realize more and more profoundly that the projects for mankind's future will be decided by the results achieved in exercising the human mind and human talent, and the ability to understand objective social laws, not by military force and the quantity and quantity of weapons. Yes, the decisive thing will be peaceful competition—the comparison of results achieved by this or that kind of society and its system. Only a century ago such thoughts were considered Utopian.

We are justly proud that the socialist states were the ones to push through the policy of peaceful coexistence in practical international relations, in close cooperation with realistic politicians from countries belonging to the other political system. Moreover, the socialist states have embodied the ideas of humanism and of the program of human civilization in practical measures and specific steps.

We are substituting deeds for words, because deeds possess the decisive moral force—they rouse and mobilize people. Let us stop haggling and endlessly arguing about who has more arms and who has less, and which army is stronger and which weaker—let us start acting, so that the decision of one can become an example and an appeal to others. Disarmament is not just a technical, military matter—it is primarily a political matter.

This idea was voiced by Milos Jakes, general secretary of the CPCZ Central Committee, as early as February 1988, when he said that a political decision is essential, but that it nevertheless takes effect and makes an impact only if it is accompanied by a specific proposal, a specific measure. This is also the substance of setting up a zone of confidence, cooperation, and goodneighborly relations along the line of contact between the Warsaw Pact and NATO.

Understandably, the first and foremost concern is preventing the possibility of an unexpected attack. We suggest that troops and formations possessing an offensive capability be withdrawn farther back from the joint borders. But we are also striving to achieve much more: mutually advantageous, useful cooperation in the economy and culture, in the solution of significant, burning problems, such as ecology.

The statement made by Mikhail Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, from the UN rostrum justly deserves to be called the "project of

mankind's future," for the specific measures that it contains also express the thought that is part of the Czechoslovak initiative: that disarmament will not make progress as long as we do not demonstrate in practice that weapons can be scrapped.

The socialist states are offering the international community a new philosophy of coexistence, one from which the military element should be eliminated until it totally disappears. True, this will be a lengthy process, but it is an inevitable one, a process which cannot be postponed in the nuclear age.

Unilateral disarmament steps serve as a key to opening doors, as a healthy, stimulating impetus for serious talks which must necessarily lead to disarmament measures based on the principle of mutuality and equal security. Disarmament, both in Europe and throughout the world, must be understood as our common feat and our common interest.

Nevertheless, we are not succumbing to illusions. Our People's Army will continue to guard the safety of our fatherland as the apple of its eye, and to defend the safety of our people. We are a firm component of the socialist community. We can count things as well as the other side, and we realize what a powerful military force is facing us to the west of the Sumava Forests. The Czechoslovak Armed Forces are, as the military experts say, a front-line army; they defend not only our own border but are also a significant and irreplaceable part of the defense of the entire socialist community.

We do not conceal the fact that, just like our allies, we too must spend considerable financial means on maintaining the military equilibrium in Europe, which is part of the overall military-strategic equilibrium of the world. The financial means and resources squandered on arms could promote the upsurge of mankind and the advancement of man and his personality.

Any serious response or suggestion from the West which can contribute toward detente, toward eliminating the danger of a confrontation and frustrating the possibility of war breaking out, are welcome. What is more, we are waiting for this, striving for it, appealing for it. These are not empty words for us. We want to take the path of realism, of political dialogue, which is the source of mutually acceptable disarmament measures.

We are living in the center of Europe, in a territory over which many wars have rolled throughout history. Our call for peace, security, and disarmament is the outcome of our own painful, hurtful experience. That is why we are not passively watching the arsenals of conventional weapons accumulate in Europe—the destructive force of these systems approaches that of nuclear weapons—and that is also why we and our allies in the Warsaw Pact are adopting decisions that are our contribution to attaining a truly humanist ideal: disarmament.

Defense Minister Details Arms, Troop Reductions *AU3101111789 Prague RUDE PRAVO in Czech 28 Jan 89 p 1*

[CTK report: "Realistic Confidence-building Step; Talking to Milan Vaclavik, Minister of National Defense"]

[Text] Prague—Army General Milan Vaclavik, CSSR minister of national defense, granted CTK an interview on Czechoslovakia's confidence-building contribution in the military sphere on Friday [27 January].

[CTK] Comrade Minister, the Czechoslovak public has been informed about the personnel and armament cuts and the organizational changes in the Czechoslovak People's Army (CSLA). Could you tell us something about the purpose of these measures?

[Vaclavik] Our citizens were recently informed about the Warsaw Pact member states' disarmament measures. The CSSR is also about to carry out unilateral—and, I would like to stress, extensive—measures underlining the CSLA's defensive nature.

The purpose of these measures is to strengthen confidence and security in Europe, in line with our military doctrine.

We have thus joined the USSR's initiative, which presented by Comrade Gorbachev to the UN General Assembly on 7 December 1988. At the same time, we approach the fulfillment of provisions set down in the Stockholm document as vigorously and positively as up to this point, following up the stimulating proposals of Comrade Jakes, CPCZ Central Committee general secretary, on the establishment of a "zone of confidence."

[CTK] Can you explain what the reduction will mean for the CSLA?

[Vaclavik] The reduction concerns three basic areas: Army expenditures, and personnel and armament strengths.

All these areas are interlinked, and we can say, briefly, that the reductions amount to about 10-15 percent.

Together with the reinforcement of the Army's construction organizations, the reduction of combat unit personnel mentioned above amounts to two all-purpose combat formations, including support equipment. The reductions in tank and air regiments also correspond to this.

In terms of combat potential, the number of scrapped tanks and armored personnel carriers amounts to two and ½ tank divisions.

[CTK] Could you tell us how the announced measures for the withdrawal of a portion of the Soviet troops from CSSR territory will be carried out?

[Vaclavik] The withdrawal of Soviet troops and armaments from CSSR territory within the framework of the unilateral reduction of the number of USSR Armed Forces will take place as follows: Four complete formations will be withdrawn in 1989, complete with their equipment; the remaining troops of a tank division will be withdrawn in 1990; and organizational measures will be carried out in the other units of the Central Group of Soviet Forces to enhance their defensive nature.

[CTK] How should one view the reorganization of all-purpose Army divisions into depots?

[Vaclavik] An all-purpose Army division is a group of combat and support units destined to carry out combat activities independently. These groups of units represent the decisive strength of our Army. Their combat potential is naturally determined by their complete combat strength and the total preparedness of professional soldiers and soldiers on basic military service.

Their transfer to depots represents a dissolution of the combat group of units—in other words, a reduction of the CSLA's combat potential by three all-purpose Army divisions in peacetime. However, this leaves us the possibility of restoring the combat ability of the group of units if it is needed, by calling up reservists within 10-15 days.

This measure is a realistic step toward establishing a zone of confidence on the dividing line between the Warsaw Pact and the NATO member states.

Apart from this, I want to stress that the other groups of units will be reorganized to accomplish tasks of an exclusively defensive nature.

[CTK] The declaration states that the number of tactical troop exercises, of live rounds fired, and of reservists called up for exercises will be reduced. Will this not lower the training standards, and thus also the readiness of our Army?

[Vaclavik] Naturally, this is a serious issue, one that seems to be directed against our efforts to carry out the thorough training and education of our troops and to achieve our staffs' perfection in managing combat activities—which is surely the main purpose of our work. We must not permit the training standards in units, formations, and groups of units to deteriorate on any account.

We regard as decisive one of the tasks set for this training year: enhancing the effectiveness of training and improving its organization, adequately providing for every job. Our aim in this is to make training substantially more economical, and we currently are appraising its results primarily from this aspect.

By reducing the number of exercises and by calling up reservists we are contributing to our common effort to make effective and economical use of the national means.

[CTK] The Czechoslovak public welcomes and supports the disarmament initiatives of the Warsaw Pact member states. It will no doubt support our own share in this process, too. Nevertheless, this involves another question: Will this not threaten the CSSR's security and that of the socialist community?

[Vaclavik] We approach the adoption of all these measures in the awareness that it is imperative to safeguard the defensive ability of the CSSR and its allies. Because must necessarily take the current military-political situation in Europe into account, our present possibilities of reducing the Armed Forces are limited; the limits are also imposed by the fact that we lie on the line of contact with the NATO countries. Our common border is almost 250 km long, and our Armed Forces are frontline defense troops of the Warsaw Pact. At the same time, we must bear in mind the way that the NATO states react, or fail to react, to our unilateral measures.

Up to now we have been speaking of the need to achieve a high combat preparedness in the CSLA. I want to underline that the present measures do not mean that we have reduced our demands—on the contrary, it is necessary to mobilize every effort to fully provide for the safety of our state and of the socialist community even while taking these measures.

Army Chief on Troop Cuts, NATO-Warsaw Pact Balance

*LD3101194189 Prague CTK in English
1620 GMT 31 Jan 89*

[Text] Prague Jan 31 (CTK)—“Czechoslovakia has in all of its history sufficiently proved it has neither interest nor any power, legal or territorial motivation to enter into an armed confrontation with any neighbour or other state,” Chief of the Chiefs of Staff of the Czechoslovak People's Army Lieutenant-General Mirsoslav Vacek told a news conference here today.

He said that Czechoslovakia “is a small country with limited human, raw material and energy resources and therefore cooperation not only with socialist states but also with other states of the world is needed and necessary for us.”

He dealt mainly with two important documents published lately, the statement on troop and armament reductions and organizational changes in the Czechoslovak People's Army, which includes the decision of the Czechoslovak Council of State Defence, and the statement of the Warsaw Treaty Defence Ministers' Committee on the Warsaw Treaty and NATO arms and troops ratio in Europe. The two documents are, in his words, “a significant contribution to the further strengthening of

East-West confidence in the military sphere." In this connection he added: "By publishing the official data we want to show goodwill and help speed up the process of creating confidence and reduce the armed forces to the level of reasonable sufficiency. This should also put an end to various speculations with numbers which do not contribute to constructive negotiations between the Warsaw Treaty and NATO states."

The statement of the Warsaw Treaty Defence Ministers' Committee stressed the need to adopt immediate measures to remove the existing imbalance and asymmetry, to substantially reduce the most dangerous offensive types of weapons, to ensure lower numbers in armed forces, to restructure the two blocs with an aim to give them an explicitly defensive character, Lieutenant-General Miroslav Vacek said.

"Czechoslovakia actively supports the demands of the Warsaw Treaty as the burden of military confrontation seriously concerns our country. The decisions of the Council of State Defence on basic changes are aimed at increasing the defensive character of our Army. They are also based on the principles of a proposal submitted by Czechoslovak Communist Party General Secretary Milos Jakes in February 1988 to create a zone of confidence, good-neighbour relations and cooperation on the line dividing the NATO and Warsaw Treaty states," Miroslav Vacek said recalling also the joint proposals of Czechoslovakia and the German Democratic Republic to create zones free of chemical and nuclear weapons in central Europe.

Answering a question about whether there still exists a war threat to Czechoslovakia, he said: "The answer is clear—it does, even in the situation when the Soviet Union and other countries of the socialist community sincerely seek improvement of relations with the NATO states and strive to decrease the war threat by political means."

Miroslav Vacek further said: "We in Czechoslovakia are concerned over the considerable extent and intensity of operational and combat training of NATO Armed Forces in Europe which in no way decreased in 1988." He recalled, e.g., that last year's biggest military exercises of NATO forces "Certain Challenge" were attended by 128,000 men and took place in West Germany close to the territory of Czechoslovakia and the GDR.

"The West has not yet found a proper answer to the peace initiatives of the socialist countries. It is adopting measures to improve the quality of its arms systems, both in conventional and nuclear means," Lieutenant-General Miroslav Vacek said and stressed: "The Czechoslovak People's Army in alliance with other armies of the Warsaw Treaty will also in the qualitatively new conditions created by the disarmament measures taken by its individual member states ensure the necessary level of combat readiness and training of its forces."

RUDE PRAVO Terms Pact's Forces Statement 'Unique'

*LD3001093989 Prague CTK in English
0830 GMT 30 Jan 89*

[Text] Prague Jan 30 (CTK)—"The NATO members and the entire world public have now been given from our side an official document whose character makes it unique and first ever of its kind," RUDE PRAVO wrote today on the Warsaw Treaty defence ministers' statement on the ratio of the Warsaw Treaty and NATO armed forces and armament in Europe.

The daily pointed out that the NATO states have not yet issued any official document on the strength of their armed forces and armament. It stressed, however, that it is now important to prepare a constructive atmosphere for the disarmament talks agreed on at the Vienna follow-up meeting and starting on March 6, and that both sides should provide documents presenting detailed stands on the ration of the two blocs' armed forces.

"It is possible to cut the Gordian knot of asymmetries. The Warsaw Treaty is offering a realistic and acceptable principle—not to build armament to the level of that side which has superiority in a certain kind of weapons but on the contrary to reduce it to the level of that side which is weaker in this or that type of weapons. Thus the balance would be strengthened but on a lower level, with a lower number of arms and soldiers. This itself is a marked progress on the road of disarmament," the paper said.

On the mechanism of control it said that socialist states stand for all-round control of disarmament measures including the right to control on the spot and stress that the check must not be rejected by anybody.

"The socialist states accepted unilateral disarmament measures already before the publication of the Warsaw Treaty statement. This has been done also by Czechoslovakia. We want to confirm, together with our allies, goodwill by a gesture which has a considerable political and military impact. Disarmament is the prior issue of our foreign policy," the daily said stressing, however, that disarmament cannot be reached on the principle of unilateral measures.

NATO Response to Warsaw Pact 'Disarmament Initiatives' Hit

*LD2901143789 Prague Domestic Service in Czech
0830 GMT 29 Jan 89*

[Sunday foreign political commentary by Jiri Cebrovskiy]

[Text] Last Sunday [22 January] I said that even the best-formulated document will remain a dead letter if it is kept closed in diplomats' files. I was thinking of the need to implement the ideas confirmed by the signatures of the 35 countries of Europe, the United States, and

Canada to the document of the Vienna follow-up meeting, the need for concrete steps—the absence of which the old continent feels so clearly—as well as often the daring to be an example, to give proof of good will and the willingness to do something which will be beneficial to everyone.

Seven days later we can already speak of some practical results. After the Soviet Union announced that it will reduce the number of its Armed Forces and armaments, there was an agreement on the withdrawal of the Soviet military contingent from Poland. The schedule for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary is fast coming to fruition. The GDR and Czechoslovakia this week announced unilateral disarmament measures. There is no doubt that these are good decisions, for they destroy the idea that Europe must be an arsenal for eternity, filled to bursting with the most modern means of destruction. This strengthens the idea that security increases proportionately to how quickly the military stores are being emptied and arms are being scrapped.

The unilateral measures of socialist states also prepare the ground for political and diplomatic talks. In this case it is a matter of a successful prologue to the meeting of the Warsaw Pact and NATO which should begin in Vienna on 6 June. And last but not least, our measures mean lightening the load of considerable financial resources spent on preserving the military balance in Europe.

The disarmament initiatives of socialist countries create a new situation in Europe and prove the truth of the saying that he who gives quickly, gives twice as much. In our case, he who reacts and acts quickly brings an atmosphere of trust and security, which is so greatly desired, into European relations. It would thus seem to be natural that the unilateral steps by our countries would also be welcomed by the other side. It would also be logical to ask whether the NATO member states are preparing a positive reply in the form of analogous measures. Regrettably, there is neither hide nor hair of anything of the sort.

Instead, for example, West German Chancellor Kohl is rejecting the proposal of the Social Democrats to reduce the size of the Bundeswehr and to cancel the decision to extend military service by 3 months, and this despite the fact that the chairman of the military committee of NATO and the Bundeswehr, General Altenburg, considers it realistic to reduce the size of the West German Army by 13 percent, and that according to a public opinion poll almost 90 percent of the FRG population wants the Kohl cabinet to begin with disarmament proposals, including limitations on conventional and tactical nuclear weapons. Embarrassment, the shuffling of feet, and hesitant opinions are characteristic of today's thinking in NATO.

According to the REUTER news agency, although they officially welcomed our initiatives, nevertheless those in

Brussels think that the measures taken by the socialist states are aimed above all else at influencing public opinion. NATO spokesman Robert Thetford on the other hand concludes that it is not necessary to follow the East European countries, because, he says, the Warsaw Pact continues to hold supremacy over the pact [NATO]. The new man in the entourage of the new U.S. President, his National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft, reacted in a curious way. He announced on television that the motive for Gorbachev's peace offensive is his interest in stimulating unrest in the Western alliance, and that the United States thus has the right to look with suspicion at the Soviet Union and to have as its point of departure that after solving their internal problems, the Soviets will return to the old policy. Former U.S. Secretary of Defense Frank Carlucci also added his bit. He wrote in THE NEW YORK TIMES that the cold war is not yet over, and that the developments in the Soviet Union to date do not justify far-reaching conclusions demanding a change of strategy.

From the opinions and attitudes of the people who decide, or until recently decided policy in the capitalist countries, we have the right to assume that the disarmament measures of socialist countries are not to their liking, and by using words about how we want to confuse the public they wish to conceal the fact that they are the ones who hoodwink them. Even this has its own aims. Certain circles of power in the West do not favor changes in international relations and their perspectives. Radical disarmament is unthinkable for them. To be able to keep to such a negative position, it is not difficult for them to falsely accuse the socialist countries of supremacy one minute and the next minute try to smuggle into the Westerner's consciousness the thesis that because the extent and kind of development in the USSR is unknown, it is necessary to modernize nuclear weapons, build new supplies for modern nuclear weapons, increase the number of strategic bombers and modern jets, continue work on SDI, and maintain the military bases surrounding the Soviet Union.

To a certain extent it is depressing that NATO formally expresses itself in favor of a reduction in the number of conventional weapons but that when it receives a concrete offer we are witnesses to a fast backtracking. This is why Western countries today are already insisting that naval and air forces not be on the agenda of the March talks in Vienna, that the question of dual-designation weapons—that is, those that can be equipped with conventional and nuclear armaments—should not be discussed here. We are thus becoming, for the umpteenth time, participants in the stereotype game in which only one side intends to dictate the rules. We know from experience, however, that such an approach and attitude leads only to increasing the heat of political and diplomatic confrontation and the growth of mistrust and suspicion.

In any case, it is certain that if the West does not soon put forward its own convincing concept of how to

continue the disarmament talks, it will be continually more difficult for the politicians of ruling parties to convince their own voters of the need to spend billions on defense. The one-time reality of a threat is thanks to Gorbachev's policy becoming more and more part of the land of legend. This statement was made by the West German newspaper FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU, and let us say at once, why not agree with it? This is because it is truly difficult and exhausting to deny obvious facts and to hide the truth. In the West some circles mind the fact that the socialist countries's steps for disarmament influence the public. But what is so bad about the people in London, Bonn, Paris, or Washington finding out that Moscow is reducing the number of soldiers by so much, that in Prague, Sofia, or Berlin they decided to liquidate so many tanks or armored carriers? It is absolutely certain that if the West undertook something similar, such steps would undoubtedly find a favorable reaction in our country. So far, however, such actions are missing.

Foreign Ministry Spokesman on Chemical Arms Control Experiment

AU3001135789 Prague RUDE PRAVO in Czech
27 Jan 89 p 1

[CTK report: "The CSSR Does Not Own, Produce, or Store Chemical Weapons"]

[Text] Prague (CTK)—As was set out in the CSSR Government statement of 5 January on questions of the prohibition and liquidation of chemical weapons, the CSSR does not own, produce, or store these weapons on its territory. We have an extraordinary interest in a speedy completion of the draft text—which is being drawn up at the Geneva Conference on Disarmament—of a convention on the general and complete ban on chemical weapons and on their liquidation, Ivan Kulhanek, spokesman for the CSSR Foreign Ministry, said in a statement on Thursday [26 January].

Czechoslovakia has voiced its readiness to take part in a series of control experiments proposed by the Soviet Union that would, even prior to the conclusion of the convention, reply to one of the most complicated problems: how to reliably control civilian chemical production and bar the possibility of it being abused to produce chemical weapons.

In this context, a number of quite specific measures have been worked out and adopted, which are summarized in the CSSR Government statement. On the basis of these measures, an experiment on the national level was carried out in Czechoslovakia on 25-26 January, involving the control of the nonuse of civilian industry to produce chemical weapons. This experiment was successfully carried out in the Mnisek plant of the "Association for Chemical and Metallurgical Production Usti nad Labem" state enterprise in Liberec District. This plant manufactures chemicals for the textile and leather-processing industries.

Experts from the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and National Defense and from the chemical industry confirmed that effective control of the civilian chemical industry is possible and enforceable. It does not disrupt the production process in any serious way, nor does it interfere with the confidential nature of production or commercial secrets. The CSSR will notify the Geneva Conference on Disarmament through diplomatic channels of the results of the experiment. Subsequently, on the basis of obtained experience and the completed evaluation [of the experiment], an analogous experiment is to take place with the participation of foreign inspectors. This step is also the CSSR's contribution to implementing the final declaration of the international conference on chemical disarmament that took place in Paris from 7 to 11 January 1989, which was adopted with the consent of the 149 participating states.

Results of NATO Strategy Meeting Condemned

AU0102115189 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak
30 Jan 89 p 1

[CTK Bonn dispatch: "Are They Ignorant of the Warsaw Pact's Unilateral Disarmament Steps?; On NATO's Future Strategy"]

[Excerpts] Bonn (CTK correspondent)—At the 26th so-called defense studies seminar that ended in Munich yesterday, 170 leading Western politicians and soldiers consulted on NATO's future strategy. The 2-day meeting showed that considerable disagreements and disparate views on the bloc's further course of action persist.

John Tower, the new U.S. secretary of defense, called for the modernization of conventional and nuclear forces in Western Europe. [passage omitted] He once again pleaded for new tactical air-to-surface [rakety vzduchem] missiles to replace the Lance missiles, and for modern artillery weapons. At the same time, Tower complained about procrastination and conflicts between the United States' allies in solving these questions.

The West German right-wing politician Alfred Dregger, chairman of the CDU/CSU parliamentary group in the Bundestag, warned, on the other hand, against bringing arms into the sphere of tactical nuclear weapons and said that this is wrong from the strategic viewpoint.

The speech of Rupert Scholz, FRG minister of defense, was full of contradictions. Even though he called for a "drastic limitation" of tactical nuclear weapons, he claimed that the remaining nuclear potential must also remain effective and modern in the future. In connection with the latest Soviet disarmament initiatives, the minister resolutely rejected unilateral disarmament steps by NATO and reiterated his views concerning "Eastern superiority." [passage omitted]

Although Tower repeatedly called for NATO cohesion, the Munich meeting gave evidence that the pact is

grappling with considerable problems and that there are great disagreements about the course to be pursued further. [passage omitted]

The consultations at the so-called defense studies seminar demonstrated that NATO not only cannot come up with any initiatives of its own, but also that many of its politicians act as if they were ignorant of the socialist countries' unilateral steps.

GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

Commentary on Vienna Concluding Document Stresses Conventional Arms

AU2001180289 East Berlin BERLINER ZEITUNG
in German 18 Jan 89 p 2

[Klaus Wilczynski commentary: "Vienna Has Set the Course for European Detente"]

[Text] The Vienna CSCE meeting entered its final stage yesterday. The foreign ministers of all 35 participating states from Europe and North America will take the floor to pay tribute to the final document which has been submitted. It took more than 2 years to formulate it and to reach a consensus and to get the agreement of all parties involved.

This is a long time, and a faster conclusion would have been certainly possible if some of the NATO states had adopted a more constructive attitude from the start. However, after all, the final result is decisive. And this is good. Good for each of the 35 countries, good for the common European home. The Warsaw Pact, as well as NATO, talk of an historical document. It continues the process of European security formulated in the famous green book in Helsinki.

Even in 1975 in the Finlandia Hall, all regarded the CSCE summit not as the end, but as the beginning of cooperation that is constantly being advanced and developed, the reduction of confrontations, and the development of peaceful coexistence. Vienna, already the third Helsinki follow-up meeting, proves once again the viability of the European security process. Now this meeting has benefited from the perceptible detente in the international situation, the decisive basis for which was established by Helsinki.

Of course, the Vienna final document is the result of compromises. Otherwise, no consensus can be reached between different social systems. In these compromises, nobody has had to give up principles and, from this point of view, everybody has given priority to the most important common concern—further strengthening peace.

Again, in addition to the socialist countries, the non-aligned and neutral states have contributed to balancing the interests. In a progressive way, the Vienna document equally comes up to all three Helsinki baskets, the

questions of security in Europe, economic cooperation, and cooperation in the humanitarian sector.

Above all, a new stage in the fields of confidence-building measures and conventional disarmament has been initiated in Vienna. The socialist states have attached the greatest importance to this specific aspect of the European process. The USSR's comprehensive disarmament concept, its unilateral reduction of armed forces and armaments, has created good prerequisites for further steps. The adoption of a mandate for negotiations between the 23 Warsaw Pact and NATO states on reducing armed forces and conventional armaments in Europe is connected with the successful conclusion of the Vienna CSCE meeting.

As early as in March, this new disarmament forum is to start its work. It will deal with establishing a stable and safe balance of conventional forces on a low level. Imbalances impairing stability and security, just like the capability of surprise attacks, are to be eliminated.

The socialist states will enter into these negotiations with a willingness to achieve the objective, an agreement on a real reduction of the level of military potentials, as fast as possible. Completely in accordance with their policy of peace and cooperation, they will implement the resolutions developed in Vienna. Thus, they consistently follow the principles of Helsinki, their basic stipulations of national sovereignty, independence, noninterference, territorial integrity, and the inviolability of borders.

Nobody is entitled to pose as the guardian of other states. On the contrary: In Helsinki, by their signatures, all 35 participants committed themselves to refrain from this. For history has taught us that all interference in the affairs of others has always been detrimental to peace. More peace has been the objective in Vienna. And this is also the gratifying result.

More peace, more cooperation, more human contacts, hopefully also fewer weapons—of course, all this does not mean that ideological confrontation between opposed social systems will stop. This will now be shown by the foreign ministers' speeches in Vienna.

Defense Minister Kessler Addresses Ministry Meeting on Troop Cuts

AU2601213389 East Berlin NEUES DEUTSCHLAND
in German 25 Jan 89 p 1

[Text] East Berlin (ADN)—Army General Heinz Kessler, member of the SED Central Committee Politburo and minister for national defense, addressed generals, admirals, and officers of the National People's Army, of the GDR Border Guards, and of the Civil Defense, at a commanders' meeting in the Defense Ministry.

The defense minister discussed the tasks and measures that result from the decision to reduce the National

People's Army unilaterally and independently of negotiations which was announced by Erich Honecker, chairman of the State Council and of the GDR National Defense Council on Monday [23 January]. He reiterated the members of the Armed Forces' full support for the GDR party and state leadership's decision in the interest of confidence, greater security, and stability in Europe.

With this initiative, the GDR proves once again its firm determination to actively help ensure that war will never again emanate from German soil, but only peace; that the nuclear and conventional arms race will be stopped; and that a transition to a continuous disarmament process will be made.

The reduction of personnel, tanks, aircraft, and defense spending, as well as the structural changes in the National People's Army which have been decided upon, are new proof, according to the military doctrine of the Warsaw Pact member states and the GDR, of further developing the defensive character of the Armed Forces, which has always been the basis of their practical action.

This significant measure is closely related to the GDR's policy of dialogue to implement the policy of peaceful coexistence between the states with different social orders.

Discussing the military-political situation, Army General Heinz Kessler referred to the high responsibility, now and in the future, of the people's soldiers to protect peace and socialism. "We cannot and will not overlook that there continues to exist influential forces of the military-industrial complex which attempt to revise the results of World War II, to change borders that have been established by international law, and thus belatedly to win the war that was initiated and lost by German imperialism," Kessler said. "This would unavoidably result in a catastrophe for Europe."

One must not forget that NATO continues to adhere to the strategy of first strike and to the use of means of mass destruction for this purpose, the minister stressed. Therefore, the soldiers of the National People's Army, together with the members of the Soviet Armed Forces and the other fraternal armies, will continue to guarantee the protection of the peaceful work of the working people for the further construction of the developed socialist society at the necessary level and they will do everything to reliably secure peace.

Western Response to 'Unilateral' Warsaw Pact Arms Cuts Urged

AU2801095389 East Berlin NEUES DEUTSCHLAND in German 26 Jan 89 p 2

["W.M." article: "Steps of Goodwill—and Food for Thought"]

[Text] When in March the delegations of 23 states, according to the mandate of the Vienna meeting, convene to negotiate measures to reduce conventional

armed forces, such measures will already have been decided upon, in the region where the concentration of military potentials is highest, at the dividing line of the military blocs in the center of Europe—however, unilaterally. First, only on the side of the Warsaw Pact. These steps of good will should be met with steps of good will from the other side. At least this is the unequivocal tenor of the strong response with which the USSR's and GDR's announcement to reduce troops and armaments have met in the international public.

At his meeting with the Swedish prime minister in Berlin, Erich Honecker stressed that we fully support the USSR's new peace initiatives, which Mikhail Gorbachev announced to the United Nations and that the unilateral withdrawal of Soviet Armed Forces from GDR territory takes place in close agreement between the two governments.

The Soviet soldiers, who will now return to their native country, and the tanks and other weapons they will take back with them, will not be replaced by additional soldiers and armaments of our National People's Army. On the contrary: At the same time, the GDR, following a decision of its National Defense Council, is making yet a further constructive contribution to the disarmament process, which has to be carried out without pausing. It shows by deeds its goodwill and its readiness to disarm.

The GDR is reducing its National People's Army unilaterally by 10,000 men until the end of 1990. During this period it will dissolve 6 tank regiments and 1 aircraft squadron, convert 600 tanks for purposes of the national economy or scrap them, and take 50 fighter aircraft out of commission. At the same time it will reduce its defense spending by 10 percent. It will reshape the structure of the National People's Army in such a way that it will have a still more strictly defensive character.

These measures are courageous and characterized by optimism, considering the fact that on the other side there are strong forces, which try to prevent further agreements on balanced disarmament from being concluded. However, we expect that our advance concessions so strongly will mobilize the forces of peace, of realism and reason, that the disarmament process, which has now been launched, will receive strong impulses. We also expect that the intrigues of those who respond to the initiatives of socialism for disarmament with new projects of the arms race will be frustrated.

With our measures we are showing the world that we are taking the defensive character of our military doctrine seriously. Its supreme concern lies in the reliable prevention of any war. It is directed at strictly preserving the military balance of both sides at an increasingly lower level until it reaches non-aggression capability. By making the defensive character—which has always been characteristic of our Armed Forces—even more pronounced, in correspondence with this doctrine, the protection of socialist achievements will of course continue

to be fully guaranteed. Starting on the principle of reasonable adequacy, everything will be done to guarantee the national defense of the GDR in the interest of its citizens at any given time. In doing so we bear in mind our concrete conditions, the present requirements, and our duties within the alliance of the Warsaw Pact states. In this sense, our people's soldiers will have an even higher responsibility in complying with their class assignment that is serving peace.

According to Erich Honecker, our socialist state acts in correspondence with its historical responsibility and its humanistic assignment to do everything in order to ensure that war will never again emanate from German soil, but only peace. This is in the vital interest of our people, but also in the interest of the other peoples on our continent. We orient ourselves on the principle of creating peace with fewer weapons, fewer soldiers, and less money.

The new GDR step is the latest link in a whole chain of constructive and stimulating contributions to advance the disarmament process. It is proof of sincerity and predictability of our peaceful policy and it is the expression of reason, sense of proportion, and willingness to compromise. It is proof of the right understanding of the GDR's important contribution toward implementing socialism's peace program, even though the international public describes it as an interesting incentive for other European states. It is above all NATO which is expected to make its own substantial contribution to the reduction of its attack potential. After all, it is easily understood that in the long run, disarmament can be achieved only on the basis of mutuality.

This holds particularly true for the FRG as the strongest military power in Western Europe. "Modernizing" short-range missiles, concepts of deterrence, and new expensive military aircraft are outmoded today. The time is ripe for acting according to the statement, which is contained in the joint communique issued at Erich Honecker's official visit to the FRG in September 1987, that progress in nuclear disarmament most urgently requires conventional disarmament with the objective of greater security and stability in Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals. Time is also ripe for acting according to the obligation that was accepted at the same time, that the GDR and FRG, as a result of the responsibility derived from the joint history, have to make special efforts for peaceful coexistence in Europe.

This is what matters now, particularly in this year, which will see the 75th anniversary of the outbreak of World War I and the 50th of World War II. In a time in which the chances for making an important step forward to protect mankind from world war III are better than ever before, actions are needed that lead to early agreements on drastic reductions of conventional armed forces, to nonattack capability on both sides, and to greater security for all.

Defense Minister Kessler Comments on Warsaw Pact Statement

Article in NEUES DEUTSCHLAND

LD3001131889 East Berlin ADN International Service
in German 0300 GMT 30 Jan 89

[Text] Berlin (ADN)—Under the headline "The Cards Are on the Table," NEUES DEUTSCHLAND publishes on Monday an article by Army General Heinz Kessler, member of the SED Central Committee Politburo and GDR minister of national defense. The text of the article is as follows:

According to the resolutions of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact member states, the statement of the Defense Ministers Committee "On the Correlation of the Numerical Strength of Armed Forces and Armaments of the Organization of the Warsaw Pact and the North Atlantic Alliance in Europe and Adjacent Sea Areas" has been published.

The GDR party and state leadership has actively and constructively supported the preparation and harmonization of this statement. The result meets with its approval.

The document should be assured of a strong response by international public opinion. The citizens of our country too will pay careful attention to it. It conveys to everyone a true picture of the military potential of the Warsaw Pact and NATO in Europe.

This complex and detailed comparison of the armed forces and armaments of NATO and the Warsaw Pact now offers to everybody—officials of all persuasions, military experts, in short everyone—the opportunity to picture of the actual historically developed military balance of power.

Hence it offers to everybody who is genuinely interested in disarmament a comprehensive and objective survey of those disparities which have to be overcome according to the principle: He who has more must reduce accordingly.

The Warsaw Pact states are submitting this overall picture of the correlation of military strength of the two alliances in Europe and adjacent sea areas at a time when there emerge increasingly positive trends in the international arena. The mandate for negotiations on conventional disarmament in Europe agreed in Vienna also testifies to this.

Despite various complications and massive resistance from antidetente forces a change from confrontation to detente is underway. This proves that the million-fold efforts at a secure peace are paying off. But at the same time the activities of those who hinder the process of disarmament and detente or make it more difficult cannot be overlooked.

In order to make the amelioration of the international situation permanent and irreversible great efforts are still needed. Hence, the call by the highest GDR representative, Erich Honecker, that there must be no let up; the fight of those who seriously want peace continues to be valid.

It goes without saying that we view the efforts at conventional disarmament in close connection with the negotiations on the halving of the strategic offensive weapons of the USSR and United States, while strictly adhering to the ABM Treaty, and on the elimination of chemical weapons.

In view of the great opportunities but also of the still existing considerable dangers not let-up must be permitted in the process of detente and disarmament. Our state alliance is guided by this idea while publishing detailed information on the proportion of forces of the two sides.

It took place in the effort, according to the principles of the Warsaw Pact states' joint military doctrine announced in Berlin in 1987, to do everything in our power to reduce speedily mutual worry, to stop the arms race, to make the start of conventional disarmament on a realistic basis easier, and to make peace for all the peoples more secure.

This is also reflected in the statement on negotiations with regard to the reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments in Europe adopted in Warsaw in July 1988 by the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee.

As is known the Warsaw Pact states have repeatedly proposed to NATO a joint official exchange of data in order to be able to objectively analyze the existing level of forces. However, to date NATO has not been prepared for such a reciprocal, thorough analysis of the overall picture of the two alliance systems' military strength, covering all the component parts of the armed forces in Europe and adjacent sea areas, starting from identical criteria of analysis. The area for this comparison of armed forces has by no means been arbitrary. It corresponds to the objective military-strategic conditions as they exist today for our continent. After all it has to be borne in mind that actions by conventional forces would, in principle—namely also in Europe—take place in a combination—or to put it better—in joint actions by the ground, air, and naval forces; and that on both sides.

Therefore all ground, air, and sea-based forces were taken into account which influence the security situation in Europe, thereby including those military formations of the two alliances which operate in the Arctic Ocean, the Atlantic, and the Mediterranean, and which could become involved in possible armed conflicts in Europe. Excluded are the strategic offensive weapons which, as is known, are the subject of separate negotiations.

Thus the armed forces data of the seven Warsaw Pact states, the 14 European NATO states, and the Armed Forces of the United States and Canada stationed in Europe and the adjacent sea areas have been made public. Taking into account the varied structure and organization of the Warsaw Pact and NATO Armed Forces, the Warsaw Pact member states have given some 500 pieces of data on 26 categories of armed forces and armaments, revealing the total strength and national shares of the individual alliances.

With this approach our alliance has demonstrated anew its preparedness for a joint, serious analysis of the security situation of the two sides.

The comprehensive, sound comparison makes clear that there exists an approximate balance between NATO and the Warsaw Pact in Europe, and that, contrary to all present NATO statements, some of them serving dubious propaganda purposes, the two coalitions have nearly equal military power.

In this connection it appears noteworthy that the large number of NATO's long-range weapon systems designed for attack stands in glaring contradiction to the Western claim that the NATO doctrine of the so-called "flexible response," which also includes nuclear deterrence, is of a defensive nature.

It has also been proved that the overwhelming conventional superiority of the Warsaw Pact and the allegedly resulting enormous threat to the NATO states, as repeatedly construed by various NATO officials and the military, is at variance with reality.

The Warsaw Pact states have at no time made any territorial claims to revise the results of World War II, but have always and exclusively made the protection of socialist construction and the safeguarding of peace their maxim.

At the same time it shows that asymmetries and imbalances do exist for certain types of weapons which go back to both historical and military-geographical causes, and which also result from different approaches to solving certain issues of the construction of the armed forces. In this way any doubt as to our honest efforts at mutually acceptable starting positions for substantial disarmament steps should now have been removed.

In addition, the start of negotiations on the reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments, and on extending confidence- and security-building measures in Europe could be favorably influenced, namely in that region where conventional disarmament is particularly urgent.

After all, it is here that according to calculations by experts the concentration of forces, weapons, and military hardware exceeds the average 20-fold. To this must

be added the close concentration of nuclear and conventional forces and the geographical conditions of our highly industrialized continent where any military conflict contains the danger of expanding into a disaster which can no longer be controlled.

The states of our alliance were and are guided by this when repeatedly submitting new initiatives and disarmament proposals.

As is known, regarding conventional disarmament in Europe our states have proposed to proceed in three stages.

In the first stage, data on armed forces and armaments are to be exchanged, checked on the spot, and asymmetries and imbalances to be removed by both sides.

In the second stage, 25-percent reduction of troops and armaments by each side could take place. In the third stage, measures would be needed which would alter the structures, strength, and deployment, of armed forces until these are no longer capable of attack.

We are resolved to continue the dialogue for further disarmament steps and confidence-building measures, and to guarantee the security needs of all countries purely by political means.

By publishing the armed forces details the socialist military alliance has, as they say, put the cards on the table. It has thus again made a considerable contribution to confidence building.

The comparison now published, which corresponds to the state as of 1 July 1988, does not cover the far-reaching unilateral concessions made by the Warsaw Pact member states. Let us recall the reduction of the USSR military potential by 1990 as announced by Mikhail Gorbachev before the 43d UN General Assembly.

On 23 January 1989 Comrade Erich Honecker, general secretary of the SED Central Committee, chairman of the Council of State, and chairman of the GDR National Defense Council, announced that by the end of 1990 the National People's Army will be reduced by 10,000 men unilaterally and independently of negotiations. In connection with this six tank regiments and one air squadron will be disbanded, and the number of weapon systems reduced by 600 tanks and 50 tactical aircraft.

The tanks are to be converted for use in lignite opencast mines, forestry, and the transport sector, or totally scrapped. Simultaneously with the reduction measures, financial expenditure for national defense will be cut by 10 percent.

This unilateral GDR step testifies to the fact that it is fully aware of its special responsibility at the sensitive dividing line between NATO and the Warsaw Pact.

Commensurate with our state doctrine, and in agreement with the will of our citizens to the effect that never again must war be allowed to emanate from German soil, a specific contribution has thus been made toward the implementation of a comprehensive peace program by our community of states.

Seen militarily, the reduction measures of the GDR are part of translating the joint military doctrine of the Warsaw Pact member states and the GDR military doctrine, with the objective of making the nature of the National People's Army still more defensive and to do still better justice to the principle of sensible defense sufficiency.

This GDR initiative is a worthy addition to the efforts of the Warsaw Pact at improving the situation in Europe. Included in this is the withdrawal of four tank divisions, one air assault brigade, 5 training regiments, and also 11 independent battalions of the Soviet Armed Forces from the territory of the GDR which was agreed between our governments.

It goes without saying that the process of reducing armed forces and armaments can be realized in the long term only on the basis of reciprocity.

NATO can now reasonably be expected to decide, while paying regard to the true balance of power, to make a substantial contribution to reducing its offensive potential.

In the first place the FRG Government is thus asked to provide for similar measures for its armed forces and to give up the so-called modernization of nuclear weapon carriers. We are of the opinion that the two German states in particular could and must do more than anyone else to gradually reduce confrontation in the heart of Europe and to increase the awareness of joint security interests.

The GDR is taking its responsibility as a state of socialism and peace extremely seriously. The GDR pursues actively and constructively its dialogue policy which aims at detente, security, and cooperation.

Let us remember the "International Meeting for Nuclear-Free Zones" held in Berlin from 20 to 22 June which strengthened, as the hitherto most comprehensive world forum for peace issues, the coalition of reason and realism. The proposals for a nuclear-free corridor and for a chemical weapon-free zone in Europe developed by the SED, the SPD, and the CPCZ are part and parcel of a socialist peace policy.

Only recently did the relevant SED and SPD working group publish the jointly developed concept of a zone of confidence and security in Central Europe.

To strengthen peace as the highest possession of the peoples and as the fundamental precondition for the

shaping of our socialist society—this will govern the contents of all our actions in preparing the 12th SED Party Congress recently launched by the seventh Central Committee plenum. We are in favor of radical troop and armaments reductions, for one zero option following the next. But we must without illusion take into account that NATO persists for the time being with its “nuclear deterrence” and pursues intensive conventional armament.

As soldiers of the people we insistently heed the words spoken by Comrade Erich Honecker, general secretary of the SED Central Committee, at the seventh Central Committee meeting, according to which the measure of our defense efforts cannot be determined by wishful thinking but by the degree of a potential threat.

The National People's Army [NVA], during its nearly 33-year history under the leadership of the party of the working class, has always proved itself as a true army of peace and socialism. It is characterized by the nature of our state and its policy, aimed at the people's prosperity.

Any striving for changes to the status quo in Europe is foreign to this policy.

The GDR has never questioned borders, disregarded the sovereignty of other states, or raised claims to foreign territories. The task of the NVA was and is to protect the socialist achievements and the peaceful life of our citizens and to guarantee them a future in safety and security. The members of the NVA are trained, educated, and equipped for that purpose. In the proven alliance with the Soviet Army and Navy, as well as with the other fraternal armies, the NVA has helped to maintain a military-strategic balance at a constantly lower level, a condition which remains essential for the safeguarding of peace.

In the interest of the peaceful life of our citizens we shape the GDR national defense always according to our conditions, current requirements, and our duties within the alliance. To reliably guarantee the sufficient defense capability of socialism, to exclude all surprises, and always to be prepared to lower the level of military capability while as far as possible, preserving mutual security—that is and remains the most exacting task of the soldiers of socialism. This is their essential contribution to guarantee peace with constantly fewer weapons and to help gain ultimate success for the policy of peaceful coexistence in international relations.

From the statement by the Committee of the Warsaw Pact Defense Ministers, all the citizens of our republic can once more gain the optimistic certainty that the resourceful peace policy of socialism inspires and promotes the process of disarmament and detente, and strengthens international security. It is necessary and it is worthwhile to give of one's best for this—according to our slogan “My workplace is my battle station for peace.”

Television Interview

*LD3101082389 East Berlin Domestic Service
in German 2110 GMT 30 Jan 89*

[Text] [Announcer] In a statement today the Committee of Defense Ministers published information on the numerical strength of Warsaw Pact and NATO forces and arms. Army General Heinz Kessler, GDR defense minister and member of the SED Central Committee Politburo, was interviewed by GDR Television. We now bring you important excerpts from this interview.

[Begin recording] [Correspondent Goetz Fasster] Why, Comrade Minister, this publication at this time?

[Kessler] As is well known, the Warsaw Pact states have on many occasions proposed to NATO a joint official comparison of data, which should also be checked. NATO, however, is not prepared to such a mutual, thorough analysis of the military potentials of both alliances. Instead, it has undertaken a one-sided, tendentious publication of statistics on forces. We, however, consider it necessary to give the world an objective picture of the military balance of forces in Europe which has come about historically. The publication of the information on our forces and their main armaments is, we think, at the same time a further confidence-building measure by the Warsaw Pact states, and in my opinion, cuts the ground from under any speculation and doubts concerning honest efforts for mutually acceptable disarmament steps.

[Fasster] Yes, since this morning we have been able to read about the balance of forces, the military balance of forces, between East and West, between the Warsaw Pact and NATO, in terms of troops and weapons. Please tell us: What is the quintessence of the key data in political terms?

[Kessler] With pleasure. The current comprehensive inventory of forces clearly shows that in Europe, taking into account all components of the military balance of forces, there is an approximate military balance between the two alliances. It can be seen in the figures published that the North Atlantic Alliance has twice as many naval forces compared to the Warsaw Pact, whereas there is rough parity in ground and air forces. NATO is also far superior to us in its number of attack aircraft, tactical air forces, and naval air forces, combat helicopters, as well as antitank missiles.

On the Warsaw Pact side, there is superiority in tanks, launchers for tactical missiles, interceptor fighter planes, air defense troops, as well as armored tanks, armored personnel carriers, and partly in artillery. The area of the comparison of forces was not selected arbitrarily; it corresponds to the objective, military-strategic conditions as they are for our continent. For this reason, we have included all ground, sea, and air forces stationed in Europe and the islands and groups of islands belonging to Europe, as is expressed in the Final Document of

Vienna, as well as those in the neighboring sea areas, that is, all forces were included that influence the security situation of both alliances in Europe, also all those forces operating in the northern seas, the eastern Atlantic, and the Mediterranean that can affect Europe.

[Fasster] Comrade Minister, we certainly agree that things will not happen simply by counting and calculating potentials on either side—many people talk somewhat scornfully of counting peas—where do the statement and comparison of numbers produced by the Warsaw Pact fit in?

[Kessler] This is, in my opinion, a serious fundamental question. The states of our alliance are guided by the fact that a comprehensive analysis of the military balance of forces can favorably influence the start of negotiations on reducing forces and conventional arms and reaching additional treaties and confidence-building measures. It started from the assumption that the forces of each side, or of every state, are a unified organism, whose individual members—ground forces, air forces, air defense troops, and naval forces—work closely together. Their actions and combat potential complement one another in that one branch of the forces cannot successfully carry out actions or operations without the others; it can only come about through close cooperation. This comprehensive approach, which becomes clear in the tables of figures appended to the declaration, is to stress the necessity of holding the talks in a spirit of realism and to renounce attempts to achieve unilateral advantages—by both sides by the way.

[Fasster] A week ago today Erich Honecker announced during a dinner in honor of the Swedish prime minister that the GDR will reduce its forces by 10,000 men and its defense budget by 10 per cent. What is the political and military significance of this reduction which was decided by the National Defense Council?

[Kessler] The GDR's disarmament measures represent a significant prior concession and are an expression of the committed struggle by our state for peace, security, disarmament, and confidence. Seen from the military point of view, our reduction measure is part of the implementation of the joint military doctrine of the Warsaw Pact member states and the GDR's military doctrine. When the military doctrine of the Warsaw Pact was announced in Berlin, there were voices here and there wanting [passage indistinct] as their theory. We said at that time that we were in the process of putting that into practice step by step. It results from this: It is well known that our top concern is to reliably prevent any war; we want to achieve a strict maintenance of the military balance at a lower and lower level and we want neither side to have the capability of attacking the other. For this reason, we hope and also expect that other European states, as Comrade Erich Honecker expressed at his meeting with Swedish Prime Minister Carlsson, will join these initiatives to reduce military potentials. I do not hide the fact that the FRG Government should be

the first to plan analogous measures for its forces and arms, as well as finally renouncing the so-called modernization of its nuclear missiles.

[Fasster] Political pressure is somewhat great on NATO, the NATO states, and surely also on the FRG (?in the face of the) resolutions made by the National Defense Council [words indistinct], disarmament considerations, which all have the same aims of reducing confrontation in central Europe on the dividing line between the two military alliances and creating more security. Will all these ideas and proposals remain in force?

[Kessler] The joint political initiatives worked out by the SED, the SDP, and the CPCZ for a chemical-weapons-free zone in Europe—which should include at least the GDR, the CSSR, and the FRG—or a 150-km corridor in central Europe free of nuclear weapons along the dividing line between the two alliances, will considerably reduce the danger of a nuclear war. We have proposed a zone of trust and security in central Europe which could be a considerable step in preventing surprise attacks. The implementation of these and other proposals would in our opinion be an important contribution to consolidating mutual trust and peace.

Nowadays throughout the world there are influential forces, many voices—for example, the SED, the SPD, the CPCZ—[words indistinct] from the states of northern Europe, which are in absolute agreement with these proposals and are in favor of us starting to implement step by step some of these measures, to put them into force, in order to achieve further steps toward ensuring peace and ensuring the lives of people in Europe. With the recent reductions approved by the National Defense Council, which will be implemented unilaterally and independently of the negotiations—and let me stress that: implemented unilaterally and independently of negotiations—the GDR is once again making a constructive contribution to the peace program of socialism and is proving its strong desire to reduce the armed forces and weapons in concrete phases.

In the last few days, I, as probably many others have too, have been dealing with the evaluations and responses from the rest of the world to these proposals and it is gratifying that, seen from a global point of view, the response is positive and that these measures are being welcomed around the world, from varying social forces, as a real step forward and are being viewed as a confidence-building and disarmament measure; there are also calls for the NATO states to follow this example.

[Fasster] Military doctrines have, speaking informally, been talked about, certainly in the results of the resolutions of the Warsaw Pact states. You hear of non-attack capability as a result of and as a goal of further conventional disarmament, as well as the disarmament of the remaining nuclear weapons in Europe. What is the socialist military doctrine now and how is it reflected in

the level of training and arms of the united armed forces, such as the National People's Army?

[Kessler] The measures approved by the GDR National Defense Council make it clear that we are now introducing and implementing practical steps, [words indistinct] we are giving our military doctrine in the GDR an even stricter defensive character according to the military doctrine of the Warsaw Pact states. That means that we need such a standard of fighting [word indistinct] and readiness for action which guarantees that a possible aggressor will have no hope of success if he should think of unleashing a military conflict. What and how much is adequate will not be determined so much by us, but in the first place by the political goals, by the practical war preparations of the opposite side, and from the necessity of preserving the military strategic balance and of not permitting NATO military superiority. In this connection, it must also be recalled that leading NATO circles still persist in believing in a nuclear deterrent and in their capability of delivering a nuclear first strike; they intensively equip their armed forces with the most modern [word indistinct] weapons in order to significantly increase their fighting powers and combat ability. At the moment most defense efforts do not depend on pipe dreams but are determined by potential threats.

Finally, please allow me to take the opportunity of discussing the following once again: We hope—I would like to say that I am firmly convinced—that our published statement on the ratio of strength of the armed forces and armaments in Europe and the bordering sea areas will cause NATO to take a realistic position, from the very beginning onward, in the negotiations in Vienna, on the strength of the armed forces of the sides. We are also ready to begin on other levels a dialogue on the statistics of the military potentials of the two alliances. There are certainly some additions or other, some amendments or other, and we are, as I have already said, prepared to discuss all these questions practically and constructively with the aim of coming to achievable and tangible results. We are in favor, in agreement with the Soviet Union and with the other states allies to us—and as Erich Honecker stressed at the seventh session of the SED Central Committee—of the disarmament process being continued without a break through further agreements and arrangements on more far-reaching radical [word indistinct] reduction of the present weapons arsenal. We reaffirm our opinion that the proposals of the Warsaw Pact states present an opportunity for a new breakthrough in disarmament in the sphere of reducing armed forces and conventional weapons in Europe, as well as in the broader sense of the practical creation of building blocks for the entire European home. [end recording]

Warsaw Pact Statement, NATO Attitude Viewed
AU0102125989 East Berlin NEUES DEUTSCHLAND
in German 31 Jan 89 p 2

[“ng” commentary: “There Are Forces That Promote Disarmament and Forces That Obstruct Disarmament”]

[Text] The statement of the Warsaw Pact Defense Ministers Committee, published yesterday [30 January], has clearly demonstrated what must be given absolute priority at present: the prevention of war, a halt to the nuclear

and conventional arms race, and the introduction of steady disarmament.

The practical deeds of the states of our alliance are furnishing evidence of the seriousness of their intentions. Irrespective of the negotiations on conventional disarmament from the Atlantic to the Urals, which are scheduled to start in Vienna on 6 March, the Soviet Union will unilaterally reduce its Armed Forces by 500,000 men within the next 2 years. The National People's Army will be unilaterally reduced by 10,000 men by the end of 1990. In harmony with the socialist military doctrine, the CSSR, Bulgaria, and Hungary have also announced unilateral disarmament steps during the past few days.

The effects of this policy were also reflected at the 26th International Defense Studies Meeting in Munich during the weekend. The opinion was repeatedly expressed that Gorbachev's and Honecker's disarmament measures largely set the theme for the international debates. It is logical that, in view of such activities, the “feeling of threat” is increasingly declining among the population in Western states. SPD politician Egon Bahr described as a new development that socialism now “threatens” to eliminate the “threat.”

These statements were made before the figures on the numerical strength of the Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact and NATO in Europe were published. After the announcement of advance disarmament measures, the publication of these documents was another step on the part of the socialist military coalition. It has put the cards on the table. This significant document is an objective representation of the military potentials of the two opposed alliance systems in Europe and has once again reduced the lie about the threat to absurdity.

In its statement, the Defense Ministers Committee expressed the hope that the NATO states may adopt a similar attitude. At the Munich International Defense Studies Meeting, where important NATO politicians and military experts made speeches, nothing was heard to this effect. As far as the advance concessions of the socialist military coalition are concerned, there was no reply. Concerning measures aimed at reducing weapons and armed forces, no proposals were submitted. Instead of all this, there was a noisy confirmation of the adherence to the principle of nuclear deterrence on the part of NATO. The nuclear weapons deployed in Europe are to be modernized on all accounts—irrespective of a threat that does not exist and of the growing resistance among the population.

It would certainly be too early to assess the declarations of intent by Tower, Scholz, and Woerner and other leading NATO representatives as a reaction to the statement of the Warsaw Pact states, which was published yesterday. However, it has once more become apparent

who are the forces that are in favor of not allowing a pause in the disarmament process and who are the forces that obstruct the process.

Defense Minister Kessler to FRG TV on Conventional Forces Talks

LD0202113989 East Berlin Voice of GDR Domestic Service in German 0900 GMT 2 Feb 89

[Excerpt] In the words of Army General Heinz Kessler, GDR defense minister, all forces and types of conventional weapons must be taken into account at the coming disarmament talks in Vienna. Only then would results really be achieved, he said yesterday evening on FRG television. It is pleasing that the troop comparison put forward by the Warsaw Pact has been positively received. Kessler said he could vouch for the information. The Warsaw Pact has applied the same method of calculation to NATO's weapons as to its own. The GDR defense minister deemed it paradoxical to start to negotiate about conventional disarmament and at the same time to be busy modernizing this or that weapons system. [passage omitted]

U.S. Criticized for Chemical Weapons Production

AU3001114889 East Berlin NEUES DEUTSCHLAND in German 28-29 Jan 89 p 6

["G.L." commentary: "Ban on Chemical Weapons—a Step That Has Long Been Overdue"]

[Text] Chemical weapons are particularly cruel weapons of mass destruction. This was recently confirmed by all participants of the Paris Conference on Banning Chemical Weapons—also by U.S. representatives. However, irrespective of the Paris resolutions and of the results that have been achieved during the Geneva negotiations of the 40-State Committee regarding the desired comprehensive ban on the development, production, stockpiling, passing on, and use of chemical weapons, the United States continues to produce new chemical weapons, the so-called binary weapons, and pushes on with their further scientific-technological development. In 1988 alone, \$1.2 billion dollars were spent on the chemical weapons program in the United States. The new U.S. Defense Secretary John Tower also wants to continue the production, as he stressed in Washington on Thursday [26 January]. The facts are alarming: The standard equipment of the U.S. Armed Forces includes 155-mm artillery shells for binary combat warfare agents with an extremely high nerve gas effect (primarily organic phosphorus nerve gases of SARIN, SOMAN, and VX types). The test program for the bomb "Big Eye," which is based on binary chemical warfare agents is nearing completion, and another test program for the series production of a binary warhead for a multimiissiles system is under preparation. These are all steps that lead toward a chemical weapons arms buildup, which was already

started in 1954. Whereas U.S. Government representatives noisily advocate disarmament at UN sessions and other conferences, the program is being pushed ahead with increasingly large financial means.

In view of the actual situation, the Americans would have every reason to think about the discrepancy between word and deed. It was really grotesque how Washington tried to play the "world gendarme" at the Paris Conference. It even threatened to carry out a "preventive strike" against Libya, which is accused of building a plant to produce chemical warfare agents.

There is a pleasant contrast between such muscle-flexing and the attitude of the USSR, the GDR, and the other socialist states. The Soviet Government has officially announced that the USSR will stop producing chemical weapons and launch a large-scale program for scrapping all chemical warfare agents. At the same time the Soviet Union confirmed that no chemical weapons are deployed outside the USSR on the territories of the allied Warsaw Pact states.

These statements are apparently being ignored by the "opinion makers" of the NATO states. Quite the contrary: The decade-old campaign of lies is being continued, completely utopian figures are being cited about the USSR's chemical weapons potential, and chemical warfare agent stores in the GDR and other Warsaw Pact states are being invented. All this is happening despite the fact that the GDR has submitted the most concrete and most far-reaching verification proposals for a chemical weapons ban and declared its readiness to allow model inspections.

To put it very clearly: Like nearly all states in the world, the GDR is against any kind of chemical weapons production and the preparation of a chemical war, wherever this takes place. Our attitude finds its specific expression in the proposals for a chemical-weapons-free zone in central Europe, which was presented by the SED, SPD, and CPCZ. The international response has shown how topical this proposal is.

Deputy Foreign Minister Discusses Arms Issues with Canadian Official

LD2501112889 East Berlin ADN International Service in German 0815 GMT 25 Jan 89

[Text] Ottawa (ADN)—Kurt Nier, GDR deputy minister of foreign affairs, outlined the GDR steps, announced by Erich Honecker, for the unilateral reduction of forces and arms as well as a cut in national defense expenditures during a meeting yesterday with James Taylor, under secretary in the Canadian Foreign Ministry.

The Canadian official welcomed these disarmament measures and assessed them as significant for further progress in the disarmament process as well as for the

creation of favorable conditions for the upcoming negotiations in Vienna on the reduction of conventional forces and armaments in Europe.

In connection with international development, the interlocutors described the conclusion of and the implementation of the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles, which has already begun, as an historically significant entry into nuclear disarmament.

The participants agreed on the necessity of further substantial disarmament steps in the nuclear, chemical, and conventional spheres. In this connection, great importance was attached to Mikhail Gorbachev's initiatives for the unilateral reduction of the Soviet Union's conventional armaments and forces. The two politicians welcomed the conclusion of the Vienna CSCE follow-up meeting and stressed that it was now a question of making a determined effort to implement the mandate, agreed on in Vienna, on negotiations for the reduction of conventional forces and armaments in Europe as well as for further-reaching confidence and security-building measures.

Kurt Nier and James Taylor acknowledged the positive development in relations between the GDR and Canada and expressed the desire of their governments to further expand political dialogue and bilateral relations in the political, economic, and cultural spheres. At the same time, this would make a contribution to an improvement in the international climate and to the strengthening of the positive tendencies in world politics.

Kurt Nier was in Canada for political consultations at the invitation of Jaques Roy, minister responsible for Europe in the Canadian Foreign Ministry.

HUNGARY

Troop Reduction Planned for 1989-1990 Time Frame

Premier Nemeth Announces 9 Percent Cut
*LD3001163289 Budapest Domestic Service
in Hungarian 1500 GMT 30 Jan 89*

[Text] This year and next year, Hungary will reduce by some 9 percent the strength of the People's Army, and in accordance with this it will also reduce the quantity of weapons and tools of military technology. This was announced by Miklos Nemeth, the head of government, at the session of the Economic Chamber Presidium. The aim of the Hungarian step is for our country to contribute to the success of the discussions set to begin in March in Vienna on limiting European conventional forces. As Defense Minister Ferenc Karpati said, the reduction will affect over 9,000 soldiers, 251 tanks, and a fighter aviation squadron.

Defense Ministry Details Cuts

*LD3001193889 Budapest MTI in English
1755 GMT 30 Jan 89*

[Text] Budapest, January 30 (MTI)—Following the announcement by Miklos Nemeth, chairman of the Council of Ministers, on Monday afternoon, MTI received the following information from the Ministry of Defence:

As part of the previous programme of transforming the Army into a defensive nature, the forces of the Hungarian People's Army, and its military and technical equipment, is to be unilaterally reduced. The reduction in 1989-1990 will affect both land and the domestic air defense forces. The total number of the People's Army will continuously decrease by some 8.8 per cent, by 9,300. In the course of the unilateral reduction, among other things, 251 tanks, 30 armoured transport vehicles, 430 artillery means, 6 tactical-missile launching pads, and 9 intercepting fighter jets will be withdrawn from the People's Army. Parallel to the staff and weapons reduction, a tank brigade and a fighter jet division will also be eliminated, and further organizational streamlining carried out.

Defense Minister Karpati Interviewed

*LD3001192589 Budapest Domestic Service
in Hungarian 1730 GMT 30 Jan 89*

[Interview with Defense Minister Colonel General Ferenc Karpati by correspondent Attila Balint concerning the background to the announcement of Hungarian troop reductions; date, place not given—recorded]

[Text] [Balint] Beyond the percentages involved, what does this reduction mean to the Hungarian People's Army [HPA]?

[Karpati] With regard to the fact that the statistics of our People's Army, with respect to troop and weapons strength, have just become public, I believe that this makes for an easier task for everyone, as these figures can now be compared. When we say that we are reducing the HPA's personnel by some 9 percent over the next 2 years—that is in 1989 and 1990—this means that we are reducing the HPA's personnel by some 9,300 people.

[Balint] Does this mean that soldiers will become unemployed?

[Karpati] There will be fewer conscripts, and some 2,000-2,100 of the 9,300 affected will be professional soldiers. Half of these are officers, half are noncommissioned officers. They will not become unemployed because there is a shortage of officers and noncommissioned officers at numerous places in our country. Some of them will retire.

[Balint] The numbers appear quite considerable, again, if we just look at the percentages concerning weapons or technology. Are these operational weapons?

[Karpati] Most of them are operational, while a smaller proportion are of a type which is now in mothballs. We will withdraw these for good. This relates to 251 tanks; we will destroy a large portion of these. This means that they will end up in a smelting-works.

[Balint] Could they not be sold somewhere?

[Karpati] Naturally, we will utilize what we can make use of in the people's economy from among these items, as equipment, or something else, or components.

[Balint] Aircraft are also mentioned as being involved in the reduction.

[Karpati] We will withdraw one air squadron from the HPA. This amounts to nine interceptor fighter aircraft.

[Balint] Do you know, and can the public find out, where this reduction will have an affect, meaning in which specific areas? At which garrisons will there be fewer soldiers?

[Karpati] We will implement this reduction in 2 years. We will now work out a very exact schedule for this. When the time comes for us to carry out these changes and reductions at individual garrisons, then we will make this public.

[Balint] At the morning news briefing, you added comments to the data published in every daily, citing the strength and armaments of the European armed forces of NATO and the Warsaw Pact. At first glance, it appears that the asymmetries, the differences, are quite large. There are spheres in which the Warsaw Pact's superiority, so to say, is sweeping, and there are spheres in which the superiority of NATO's armaments is decisive. Do the reductions now announced by the Warsaw Pact countries serve to eliminate these asymmetries?

[Karpati] Yes, considerably. That was our point of departure. We are aware that in the course of negotiations, the side who has more of one thing will have to make considerable cuts. We are endeavoring to go half way in the negotiations, to facilitate their being as successful as possible, and we have now unilaterally taken steps in this direction. We seriously think that the NATO countries will also take similar steps. Our conviction is that the asymmetries must be abolished. Only in this manner, through these means, can detente be achieved in the military sphere.

Defense Minister Karpati Views Warsaw Pact's Forces Statement

*LD3001163189 Budapest Domestic Service
in Hungarian 1100 GMT 30 Jan 89*

[Text] Today's papers publish the declaration of the committee of the Warsaw Pact defense ministers concerning the armed forces and the staff level of the two military blocs. Today a briefing was held on this subject at the Ministry of Defense. Attila Balint reports:

[Balint] Within 24 hours Hungary will publish the planned reductions to its Armed Forces, in coordination with the other member states of the Warsaw Pact. This was stated by Defense Minister Ferenc Karpati at a news conference which dealt with the data published this morning on the European weaponry of the Warsaw Pact and NATO. We were able to learn that conditions now exist to extend detente to the military sphere. Mutual and guaranteed security for both sides must be made to prevail, Ferenc Karpati emphasized. The most important element of this is to eliminate forces designed for surprise military operations.

Ferenc Karpati said that a balance of forces at a lower level could come about both in the Warsaw Pact and the NATO countries. An important part of this is that the so-called asymmetries should cease, i.e. the differences between the (?data), but in such a way that the smaller should increase, and that if one of the military blocs has superiority in some category, then it should reduce or moderate it.

In the commentary related to the published figures, we were able to learn that arriving at the kind of ratios for the various types of weaponry and specific areas is also a matter of the methods used in calculations and, therefore, that there are more nuances.

It was also mentioned that among our neighbors, the Austrian Armed Forces have recently expanded instead of decreased. The news conference continues.

Hungarian Defense Official on Warsaw Pact Strength Data

*LD3101101889 Budapest Television Service
in Hungarian 2022 GMT 30 Jan 89*

[From the "Panorama" program; interview in studio with Colonel General Lajos Morocz, state secretary in the Ministry of Defense, by unidentified program presenter—live]

[Text] [Presenter] In this morning's papers you could read unusual things. Huge tables show the military strength of the Warsaw Pact and NATO, with precise numbers, with numbers and data that formerly would have been considered top secret. Nothing like this could have appeared in our country before this. Severe punishment was the rule for the disclosure of similar figures.

I welcome to our studio Colonel General Lajos Morocz, state secretary in the Ministry of Defense. My first question is that until now such a thing could not have happened, and now it can. So what has happened?

[Morocz] In my opinion, nothing unexpected has happened, because a very important element in the process of reducing armed forces and arms—at least at the start of this process, in bringing the asymmetries to the surface—is the reciprocal publication of data and their comparison.

[Presenter] Why should we believe these data? Why should we not think that there is some embellishment in this, or, as people are wont to say in Budapest, we are feeding things to the opponent?

[Morocz] Why should we believe it? In essence, what is the guarantee—if I understand the question correctly—that these data are truthful? There is a double guarantee: honesty and the possibility of control. We honestly want trust to strengthen, and we have a very important interest in having the data that we publish reflect reality. On the other hand, we are prepared, on a reciprocal basis, for the truthfulness of these data to be checked on the spot by the other side.

[Presenter] The Soviet Union now has determined significant reductions. For example, it will also withdraw from Hungary an armored division. In Budapest parlance, what will this bring to the cooking pot? How much, for instance, has supplying the Soviet troops stationed here cost us so far?

[Morocz] The withdrawal of Soviet troops means, in essence, that establishments [objektumov] within the establishments-monuments establish, a few....

[Presenter, interrupting] Castles?

[Morocz] Yes, for example, the building belonging to the Esztergom Basilica, or the Grassalkovich Castle in Godollo, and also some other monument buildings will be liberated to become housing development. The competent organs are working to utilize these. On the other hand, this does not mean a cost savings for the Hungarian state, for the cost of the troops of the Southern Army Group temporarily stationed in Hungary, starting from the big things right up to and including telephone bills, is covered by the Soviet state. So, it is not we who maintain the Soviet troops stationed in Hungary; rather, they maintain themselves.

[Presenter] However, if a division is withdrawn, will we not have to spend more on our defense? Will we not remain undefended?

[Morocz] The present European processes—the detente, the cuts in armed forces—are developing in such a way that additional Hungarian forces do not have to be used in place of the withdrawn Soviet troops. In other words,

our side does not have to make up for this withdrawal. We will not remain undefended.

[Presenter] Because we are talking about money, we are members of the Warsaw Pact. The question arises: What is the membership fee we pay for this?

[Morocz] With regard to the membership fee—if one can, in any case, term this a membership fee, by analogy—then it is this: We jointly cover our joint commitments. Thus, for instance, we cover jointly the maintenance of the staff of the joint armed forces, of this coalition staff-sector organization, and the guaranteeing of its leadership conditions. And this is done in proportion to our participation in the joint armed forces.

[Presenter] How much does this cost?

[Morocz] Annually, annually, the proportion that falls on us—I take 100 percent as a basis—is a few percent. In the past year it was R800,000.

[Presenter] R800,000. There is no hard currency involved in this?

[Morocz] There is not.

[Presenter] In any case, considering the numbers of the Hungarian Army, its strength, and the amounts spent on it, where do we rank among the Warsaw Pact member states?

[Morocz] Well, if we study the published data, then we can see that the Hungarian People's Army—both with regard to its numbers and its arms—is the smallest within the Warsaw Pact. This demonstrates several things. This shows that our Army's development in the recent years was not excessive, and that we took cognizance of our geopolitical situation and not least of all of the country's economic possibilities.

[Presenter] Thank you for the conversation.

Defense Officials Comment on Troop Reductions

Defense Minister Karpati Views Reductions

*AU0102183189 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG
in Hungarian 31 Jan 89 p 4*

[Interview with Defense Minister Colonel General Ferenc Karpati by Laszlo Szabo: "We Want To Promote Further Detente—Ferenc Karpati's Statements on the Warsaw Pact and NATO Forces and the Reduction of the Hungarian People's Army by 9,300 Troops"; date, place not given]

[Text] On 30 January the Defense Ministers' Committee of the Warsaw Pact member states published statistics detailing the number of Warsaw Pact and NATO troops stationed in Europe and in the surrounding waters, their weaponry, and the relationship between them.

Also on 30 January, in his speech at the Hungarian Economic Chamber, Premier Miklos Nemeth announced that the Hungarian Government was reducing the troop and arms strength of the Hungarian People's Army [HPA].

We asked Defense Minister Colonel General Ferenc Karpati about the details of and the connections between these two important announcements.

[Szabo] What can this recently published detailed information on Warsaw Pact and NATO military forces promote?

[Karpati] By publishing the number of troops and the basic types of weapons of all the NATO and Warsaw Pact military forces stationed in Europe, a subject that has been strictly taboo to date, in military terms, no longer is. Previously, no such data could possibly have been published by anyone here.

[Szabo] How did this become possible?

[Karpati] I would like to remind the readers that negotiations on troop reductions in Europe have been in progress for quite a while, albeit with little success. The debate has centered on who has what. The announcement published yesterday is not without precedent, however. The Stockholm agreement has already shown a major step forward, compared with previous distrust, toward greater mutual confidence and toward one of the major issues—verification. The Soviet-U.S. INF agreement was also an important stage in this process. As is well known, the Warsaw Pact member states adopted a new defense doctrine in Berlin in 1987. Following this, Yazov, Soviet defense minister and Army general, met with Carlucci, U.S. secretary of defense, in Switzerland and openly proposed that both the Warsaw Pact and NATO leaders lay on the table their military doctrines and real data on numbers of troops and their arms, and compare them to see what forces are confronting each other; who has the advantage over the other and in what types of weapons; who should make more cuts and what he should reduce to eliminate the prevailing asymmetry and distortions in balance.

This proposal did not meet with complete understanding at the time. In November 1988, NATO unilaterally published data on NATO and Warsaw Pact forces stationed in Europe, data based on its own calculations. This was not what we proposed, namely to compare our data and later publish them simultaneously.

Are These Data Realistic?

[Szabo] You have mentioned that NATO compiled the number of confronting forces on the basis of its own calculations. It seems, from this statement, that these calculations were not identical on both sides.

[Karpati] No. There are also essential differences in what each side considers important, namely what each side takes into consideration in the number of troops and their arms. For example, according to the NATO concept, the European troop reduction negotiations should not deal with naval forces because they do not count them as forces deployed in Europe. However, according to our concept, the comparison of forces should include all the military components in Europe, because only in this way can we measure up the real balance of forces and reduce "imbalances."

As for the question: Why we should do this? I think the answer is clear. When we say that we should take into consideration all the forces from the Atlantic to the Urals, we also include all the military forces deployed on the seas and waters surrounding Europe, and even on islands and groups of islands! The military force of Europe is not made up only of ground forces, as the data were compiled according to the NATO concepts, but also of aircraft carriers that threaten lands, together with cruisers, destroyers, and submarines. These can be as dangerous for Europe as the ground forces, because they can take part in maneuvers. Every component of the air force, either deployed on aircraft carriers or on dry land, should be taken into consideration. This is already a different approach from the outset.

[Szabo] One also wonders whether the data recently published by the Warsaw Pact are realistic or not? One can negotiate on realistic bases only if these data are realistic too.

[Karpati] Indeed, the smallest agreement between the two sides is possible only if there is confidence between them and if they reveal facts to each other and are able to agree on a strict verification. A very good example of this is the fact that an agreement could be reached following lengthy negotiations on intermediate-range nuclear missiles only because the Soviet Union and the United States were able to agree on a very reliable and strict system of verification covering the entire process, from production to the elimination of existing missiles. I am convinced that this approach can be applied to all the other forces and armaments.

Advantage Here, Advantage There

[Szabo] You have mentioned that there are essential differences between the data that NATO and we have published. Would you give some examples?

[Karpati] Anyone who studied the tables could easily find out, for example, that the Warsaw Pact forces have twice as many tanks as the NATO forces, or that the number of Warsaw Pact missile launching pads is several times greater than that of NATO. We also have an advantage in artillery pieces, although I have to specify here that NATO has been arbitrary in calculating the number of its artillery: They took into consideration only those artillery pieces larger than 100 mm. Today it is

necessary to consider all artillery pieces, for smaller caliber artillery pieces are also extremely effective weapons. With such a calculation, they also present their own forces in a more favorable light.

The Warsaw Pact also has an advantage in interceptor air forces, although these are mainly defensive weapons because most of these interceptor aircraft are not suitable for bombing land targets. However, NATO has a considerable advantage in air strike forces, which are explicitly attack weapons. This shows that there are also differences in both concepts and approaches. What is the goal of NATO? NATO wants to prove that the Warsaw Pact member states have a considerable advantage over NATO in conventional forces and armaments. I still think that realistic negotiations will follow the recent publication of detailed military data, because a similar process also took place in the case of the intermediate-range missiles. This could lead to a truly considerable reduction of the large number of military forces and arms deployed in Europe by both sides. There is no other way of achieving this goal.

[Szabo] How can NATO decide whether or not the data published by the Warsaw Pact are real?

[Karpati] As I have already mentioned, they can do this by carrying out effective verification. Naturally, this requirement is valid for both sides. Just as in the case of the intermediate-range missiles, the methods of verification should also be worked out very carefully and thoroughly in the case of conventional weapons. This is also stipulated in the mandate of the talks. There is readiness in the Warsaw Pact member states, including in the concepts of their military leadership, for mutual and strict verification, including local verification.

The most important thing is to begin genuine negotiations and achieve results as soon as possible. However, we should not give up the requirement to reach future agreements on reducing all armed forces, including, for example, naval forces, that will not by now be included in the Vienna talks.

As a soldier, I think that by publishing these data, we have made a very serious step toward detente. This could lead to accelerated disarmament and the elimination of the arms race. Thus, the huge financial resources that have been and still are being consumed to perfect and produce weapons could instead be used to attain mankind's noble goals.

Two Hundred Fifty-One Tanks to the Furnace

[Szabo] While we are having this interview, Premier Miklos Nemeth has announced that in the future you intend to reduce the HPA's troop and arms strength. Can you provide a few details of this?

[Karpati] The decision announced by Comrade Gorbachev in New York in December 1988 concerning a

considerable unilateral disarmament, namely the reduction of Soviet troops by 500,000 soldiers and the elimination of a significant number of arms, is extremely important for effective progress at the Vienna talks. Hungary's leadership has also come to the conclusion that a unilateral reduction of its Armed Forces will also contribute to promoting these talks.

The HPA will be reduced by 9,300 troops, or 8.8 percent. Some of these people are professional soldiers, and the majority of them are naturally military service soldiers. We will withdraw 251 tanks, 30 armored personnel carriers, 430 pieces of various types of artillery, 6 missile launching pads, and 9 interceptor fighter aircraft. The "disarmament" of these weapons is meant to reduce the prevailing asymmetry. We will also eliminate a tank brigade and a squadron of interceptors. Naturally, further structural modernization will also be carried out. We will carry out all these tasks this year and next year by maintaining the adequate efficiency and combat readiness of our Army.

[Szabo] Will the professional soldiers lose their jobs?

[Karpati] Not at all. Our Army is struggling with a manpower shortage in many areas. For example, there are not enough company commanders! Consequently, there are jobs available where we can transfer the officers and warrant officers of units slated for elimination. We will take care of everyone in a satisfactory way.

[Szabo] What will happen to the tanks and missile launching pads? Will they be stored?

[Karpati] No. A large number of these weapons will be destroyed; that is, they will be sent into the furnace. There are also military installations that, following the transformation, will be used as equipment in civil life.

Not Because of the Budget

[Szabo] What is the connection between the current troop reduction and the budget cut?

[Karpati] We are not carrying out this troop reduction because of the budget, but rather definitely from the considerations that I have mentioned before in connection with the Vienna talks. We want to promote detente and also to progress in military terms in Europe. Of course, the budget cut does represent a problem for the Army. However, one should start only from the situation of the people's economy, and we know that the National Assembly cannot act otherwise. The troop and arms cuts will somewhat alleviate the problems. The published numbers show that, considering its size, our Army is the smallest of those of the socialist countries. This is the way that it should be. As for its quality, and all the indicators of combat readiness and training, we will continue to see that our Army fulfills these requirements.

Army Chief of Staff Comments

AU0202110689 Budapest MTI in English
1217 GMT 1 Feb 89

[Text] Budapest, MTI, 01/02/1989—Wednesday's MAGYAR HIRLAP carries an interview with Lieutenant General Jozsef Pacsek, chief-of-staff of the Hungarian People's Army and deputy defence minister, on the background to the statement published on Monday on the European-based armed forces and armaments of the Warsaw Treaty and NATO. The government daily asked him about the weight of the Hungarian People's Army in the Warsaw Treaty defence system. The chief-of-staff said:

"Our Army's tasks stem from the defensive nature of our military doctrine. It is very important from the point of view of military geography that Hungary's neighbours are friendly allies or neutral or non-aligned countries. Our affiliation to the Warsaw Treaty entails not only obligations but considerable advantages as well. The Hungarian People's Army has never prepared for an offensive task.

"In absolute terms, our People's Army is the smallest in the Warsaw Treaty Organization. Compared to the size of the population, only the Romanian People's Army is smaller (in the wake of unilateral cuts in recent years), while the Polish People's Army is the same size. A survey of military technology leads to the same conclusion: Compared to the size of its Army, Hungary has the fewest technical means. It has no offensive, long-range, land-based missiles, fighter bombers or bomber planes.

"The Warsaw Treaty member states, including Hungary, seek to maintain their armed forces at a level that makes it possible to fight off an external attack. Their military preparedness, however, will always guarantee the possibility of active defence against an eventual surprise attack. It follows that the Warsaw Treaty member states do not strive to maintain armed forces and armaments larger than the ones required for attaining these goals. They will hold these forces and means at a level sufficient for defence and the repulsion of possible aggression.

"In the course of disarmament talks, we will strive to cut armed forces and armaments to such an extent that neither side is capable of launching a large-scale, surprise attack.

"NATO is expected—rightly so—to make similar reductions in its armed forces and armaments to the ones the Warsaw Treaty did. This would create more favourable conditions for reaching concrete agreements in the Vienna talks on arms reduction that could be the basis of further practical steps towards the reduction of armed forces and armaments."

Defense Minister Karpati Gives Details on Partial Soviet Troop Pullout

AU0202122189 Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP
in Hungarian 26 Jan 89 pp 1, 2

[Interview with Defense Minister Colonel General Ferenc Karpati by correspondent "Gy.K.": "The Withdrawal of Soviet Troops Will Start Even in the 1st Half of This Year"; date, place not given]

[Text] At the UN session in December, Mikhail Gorbachev made an announcement of great importance concerning the unilateral Soviet troop reductions. From the Soviet general secretary's speech we learned that this reduction also affects the Group of Soviet Southern Forces that is temporarily stationed in our country. More than a month has passed since this announcement was made, and today we know about the composition of the Soviet troops and the planned schedule for their withdrawal from our country. We asked Defense Minister Colonel General Ferenc Karpati some questions on this subject:

[Question] Recently, party General Secretary Karoly Grosz and yourself made several statements on the troop withdrawal. Nevertheless, in these statements you have not mentioned a detailed schedule for this withdrawal. Can you give us any new information on this subject?

[Karpati] A few days ago I received a letter from Army General Dmitriy Yazov, USSR defense minister. In this letter I, and through me the Hungarian leadership, was officially informed about the configuration and the schedule for the withdrawal of the troops that will be withdrawn from Hungary. At the end of his letter, the general informed me that the information he had given me could be used to inform the public. I believe that today people in Hungary are interested in this subject, and therefore I think it is necessary to publish this information as quickly as possible.

[Question] Does this mean that the letter contains a detailed description of the schedule?

[Karpati] Yes. The Soviet minister has informed me that even in the 1st half of this year the tank divisions deployed in Veszprem and the surrounding area will be withdrawn and, also in the 1st half of this year, an armored training regiment will be withdrawn. At the end of this year, a paratroop battalion and the interceptor squadron based at Tokol airport will also leave our country.

[Question] Does this mean that the announced reduction will be concluded this year?

[Karpati] The major part of it yes, because next year, the withdrawal of another chemical defense battalion as well as the Group of Southern Forces' noncommissioned

officers school in Szolnok will conclude the reduction of troops in Hungary that General Secretary Gorbachev announced.

[Question] Do we know the number of troops that will be withdrawn?

[Karpati] The letter I received from the minister of defense does not contain any reference to the number of troops, but certainly, during the preliminary talks, this subject was also approached. Still, I believe that, in connection with the troop reduction that is soon to begin, it is not the number but rather the strength of the respective military branch that is important, as well as the fire- and offensive power of the aforementioned configuration and their military equipment—tanks, airplanes, and other equipment.

[Question] It is understandable that the public is interested in the future of the establishments evacuated by the Soviets. Are there any specific agreements on this issue?

[Karpati] We believe that the most important thing is to observe the schedule for the withdrawal. Talks between the two headquarters about the future of the establishments are still under way. Nevertheless, it has already been decided that the historic building near the Esztergom Basilica, which at the moment functions as a health-care institution for Soviet troops, will be evacuated permanently. And, a more important issue than the future of the establishments is the fact that the subject of previous justified complaints from citizens in Veszprem and Tokol will cease to exist, because in both places the environment will become quieter and the level of noise that has been criticized will be reduced. At the same time, we know that the troops who continue to remain in our country will be reorganized, with various units from the western parts of the country being reorganized first of all.

[Question] Will the reduction of the Soviet troops in Hungary not increase the burden on the Hungarian Armed Forces?

[Karpati] No, because the Soviets would not reduce their troops if the international situation did not make it possible for them to do so. If it does so, then there is no justification for us to increase them with Hungarian forces and at a cost to Hungary.

News Conference Details USSR Troop Withdrawal

*LD3101204789 Budapest MTI in English
1743 GMT 31 Jan 89*

[Text] Budapest, January 31 (MTI)—Under the terms of the Soviet Government's resolution on the unilateral reduction of Armed Forces and armaments, 22 Soviet military units are to be withdrawn from Hungary, including a tank division, a tank-training regiment, a

battalion of assault landing troops, a fighter plane regiment, a chemical defence battalion and a military staff school. Details of the previously announced Soviet troop withdrawal were given to representatives of the Hungarian and the international press on Tuesday in the house of Soviet Culture and Science by Boris Stukalin, ambassador of the Soviet Union to Hungary, Colonel-General Matvei Burlakov, commander of the Soviet Southern Army Group temporarily stationed in Hungary, and Army General Fedot Krivda, representative in Hungary of the commander-in-chief of the United Armed Forces of the Warsaw Treaty member states.

In his press statement, Mr Burlakov said that following the current troop withdrawal, the staff of the Southern Army Group will be reduced by more than 10,000: Some 2,400 officers and ensigns, and about 8,000 non-commissioned officers and soldiers are to leave Hungary.

The amount of artillery will also be considerably reduced: More than 450 tanks, more than 200 guns and trench mortars, and more than 3,000 cars and other means will be withdrawn. In the course of the troop withdrawal, to be carried out in several stages, the tank division and the tank-training regiment will be the first to leave the country in May-June. The fighter plane regiment and the battalion of assault landing troops will leave Hungary in the second half of the year. The other units will be withdrawn in 1990, and the partial troop withdrawal will be completed by the end of that year.

Preparation of the smooth withdrawal of troops, the large numbers and the major military technology involved imply considerable tasks for the Soviet military leadership. They would like the procedure to cause minimum obstruction to traffic and disturbance of the population. The troops will mainly be transported by railway, for which, according to calculations, some 80 railway carriages will be required.

Colonel-General Burlakov also mentioned that following the withdrawal, 11 Soviet garrisons will be closed and facilities handed over to the Hungarian side. The facilities include numerous monuments, for instance, the Grassalkovich Castle in Godollo, and the building of historical value next to the Basilica in Esztergom.

Among other things, the Soviet troops will hand over some 900 flats, 19 barracks, and 40 facilities will also be freed which were built by the Southern Army Group at a cost of some 36 million roubles. The order and means of handing over the facilities is shortly to be coordinated by the Soviet and Hungarian authorities in charge.

The commander particularly stressed that, in accordance with the defence doctrine of the Warsaw Treaty, the Soviet troops will be drawn back from the Austrian border. He voiced his conviction that the withdrawal of troops from Szombathely, Mosonmagyaróvár, Fertod and Győr will provide a practical example for the creation of a security zone.

After giving the time-table of the troops withdrawal, the Soviet leaders answered questions of journalists.

The correspondent of "HETI VILAGGAZDASAG" (WEEKLY WORLD ECONOMY) asked whether the complete withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary is conceivable in the long term. In his answer, Ambassador Stukalin recalled that the Soviet Government has on several occasions called for the need to dismantle the two opposing military-political blocks, NATO and the Warsaw Treaty. However, as long as the military blocks exist, it is unavoidable that the troops of the Warsaw Treaty, taking the requirements of strategy into consideration and on the basis of inter-governmental agreements with the concerned countries, be stationed in the various regions. The Soviet Union continues to uphold its proposal that the withdrawal of troops stationed abroad should be carried out simultaneously. The European conventional arms reduction forum to open in Vienna in spring will create the conditions to realize the proposal.

The correspondent of Hungarian television asked Army General Krivda about the relation between the followers of perestroika and the conservative forces in the leadership of the Soviet Army, and if there was opposition to the unilateral troop withdrawal. The Army general replied: "The entire people are united in that the troop reductions should be realized to the degree announced by Mikhail Gorbachev at the 43rd session of the U.N. General Assembly. We have declared to the whole world, and this is the key element of the defence doctrine of the Warsaw Treaty, that we do not strive to uphold larger armed forces than our NATO opponent. Our Armed Forces only serve the aim of guaranteeing our security and that of our friends."

News Briefing by Soviet Representatives on Partial Troop Pullout

*LD3101122589 Budapest Domestic Service
in Hungarian 1100 GMT 31 Jan 89*

[Text] [Announcer] You now will hear a brief roundup of the news briefing now under way in the Soviet House of Culture, and at which the plan for a partial Soviet troop withdrawal is being outlined to journalists. Attila Balint reports.

[Balint] Were there people within the Soviet Army who opposed the troop withdrawal announced by Gorbachev on 8 December? This question was put to Army General Fedor Krivda, Warsaw Treaty Supreme Command representative to Hungary. In reply to this question, he said that everyone had agreed with the decision on the troop withdrawal—not just the soldiers, but the Soviet people as well.

We learned at the news briefing that 22 units will be withdrawn from Hungary. Colonel General Matvey Burlakov, supreme commander of the Southern Army Group, announced this, and also said that the withdrawal of Soviet units would begin in May to June. At

this time, an armored division and an armored instructor regiment will leave. During the 2d half of the year, an airborne assault battalion and a fighter aircraft regiment will be withdrawn. Next year, a chemical defense battalion and an officers' training school will be withdrawn. The troop withdrawals will affect over 10,000 soldiers. Among these are 2,400 officers and ensigns, and over 8,000 noncommissioned officers and soldiers.

Eighteen hundred soldiers' families will return home from Hungary.

At the news briefing, it was also mentioned that the Soviet soldiers will leave 11 garrisons, and that the garrisons and barracks will revert to Hungary and become Hungarian property. You already know that the historic building belonging to the Esztergom Basilica and that the Grassalkovich Castle in Godollo can again be historical monuments as well as be used.

We have now heard that the Soviet formations will leave their barracks in Szombathely, Baja, Mosonmagyaróvár, and the Nyiregyhaza garrison entirely. The barracks in Fertod, Tolna, Kecskemet, Győr, and Tamási will partially become Hungarian property. Eight hundred and 5,900 dwellings, respectively, will be freed in this manner. Units will be withdrawn from along the Austrian border, thus, from Szombathely, Fertod, Mosonmagyaróvár, and Győr. Thus, the formation of a so-called security zone will become possible along the Austrian border.

USSR Ambassador to Hungary Boris Stukalin spoke in a wider context, about the Soviet foreign policy initiatives, and within this, about the unilateral armed forces reduction affecting a half a million soldiers. This announcement, as he said, is not connected with the mandate of the Vienna talks. However, it is characteristic of its magnitude that it is equivalent to the FRG Army; the withdrawal of the 10,000 tanks corresponds, regarding size, to 30 U.S. armored divisions. Alongside this, 8,500 artillery [word indistinct] and 800 aircraft will be removed from the affected territories. The news briefing is still under way as I give this report.

POLAND

3 Soviet Army Regiments To Leave 'This Year'

*LD3101184489 Warsaw Domestic Service
in Polish 1800 GMT 31 Jan 89*

[Text] The POLISH PRESS AGENCY, PAP, has reported that three Soviet Army regiments will leave Poland this year. They will be a tank training regiment, an anti-aircraft missile regiment, and an independent helicopter regiment.

Next year, a Soviet independent landing and assault brigade will be withdrawn from Polish territory.

YUGOSLAVIA

Government Spokesman Welcomes USSR, GDR Troop Cuts

*LD2601174389 Belgrade TANJUG in English
1616 GMT 26 Jan 89*

[Text] Belgrade, Jan 26 (TANJUG)—Yugoslavia positively assesses the Soviet Union's intention to withdraw part of its Armed Forces from Czechoslovakia and Hungary and interprets the move as a concrete stimulus to negotiations on the reduction of conventional weapons and armed forces in Europe, to the strengthening of trust and military-political disburdening in Europe, Yugoslavia's official Government Spokesman Ivo Vajgl said today.

Vajgl recalled that Yugoslavia has always faithfully urged the achievement of these aims and given support

to each initiative contributing to the resolving of international problems, including disarmament as a particularly important one.

Vajgl also positively assessed the G.D.R.'s intentions to reduce its regular army by 10,000 troops and its military spendings by 10 percent. Vajgl said that the German Democratic Republic's decision was a concrete contribution to the strengthening of trust, security and cooperation in Europe.

Vajgl assessed that the G.D.R.'s move was in keeping with the proposal that all countries reduce their conventional arms and military effectives by 10 percent. (The proposal was forwarded by Yugoslavia at the third special United Nations General Assembly session on disarmament last year). Vajgl reminded that Yugoslavia has already done so.

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

Inter-German Minister Welcomes GDR Arms Cuts Announcement

AU2501155289 Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER
ALLGEMEINE in German 25 Jan 89 p 2

["E.F." report: "Mrs Wilms Welcomes Disarmament Steps"]

[Excerpt] Bonn, 24 January—The minister for inner-German relations, Mrs Wilms (CDU), has welcomed the announcement of unilateral disarmament steps by the

GDR. Honecker's proposals follow "the correct line," Mrs Wilms told the Sixth Germany Policy Meeting of the Friedrich-Ebert Foundation, which is close to the SPD, on Tuesday [24 January] in Bonn. However, the FRG wants to continue its practice of developing its disarmament efforts "within the Atlantic alliance." The GDR is trying to involve the FRG in a discussion about disarmament and security policy in order to gain prestige in the foreign policy sphere. From the FRG Government's point of view, human rights issues "are excellently suited as a topic for discussion in inner-German affairs." [passage omitted]

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