



**FOREIGN
BROADCAST
INFORMATION
SERVICE**

JPRS Report

Near East & South Asia

REPRODUCED BY
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
NATIONAL TECHNICAL INFORMATION SERVICE
SPRINGFIELD, VA. 22161

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A

**Approved for public release;
Distribution Unlimited**

19980713 066

Near East & South Asia

JPRS-NEA-89-031

CONTENTS

20 April 1989

NEAR EAST

REGIONAL

King Husayn's Growing Regional Isolation Examined [Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST 15 Mar]	1
GCC Report Predicts Improvement in Gulf Economies [Dubayy GULF NEWS 22 Feb]	1
Charter of the Arab Cooperation Council [Amman JORDAN TIMES 16-17 Feb]	2
IDF Area Commander Interviewed on Southern Lebanon [Tel Aviv BAMAHAANE 18 Jan]	4
Lahd's Current Leadership Abilities Examined [Tel Aviv DAVAR 3 Feb]	5
Israel, Jordan Making Joint Earthquake Preparations [Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ 16 Jan]	6

PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS

Deputy Speaker of PNC Interviewed on Peace Process, Constitution [Kuwait ARAB TIMES 12 Mar]	7
Al-Husayni Defers All Negotiating to PLO [London AL-MAJALLAH 15-21 Mar]	8
West Bank Civil Administration Attempts To Block PLO Payments [Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST 13 Mar]	9
Weakened Dinar Fuels Fears in Financing Intifadah [Tel Aviv MA'ARIV 17 Feb]	9

ALGERIA

Increased Freedom of Press Urged [ALGERIE ACTUALITE 23 Feb-1 Mar]	12
Union Official Discusses Future Unity [ALGERIE ACTUALITE 23 Feb-1 Mar]	13

EGYPT

Political Thinkers View Democracy's Future [AL-MUSAWWAR 10 Feb]	15
---	----

IRAQ

Committees To Rewrite Laws for Political Parties, Press [BAGHDAD OBSERVER 27 Feb]	22
Expansion of Railway Lines, Facilities Described [BAGHDAD OBSERVER 20 Feb]	23
New Agricultural Projects To Be Completed [BAGHDAD OBSERVER 20 Feb]	24

ISRAEL

Jewish Settlement Continues Despite Intifadah [MA'ARIV 10 Feb]	25
Israel's Renewal of Relations With African States Explored [AL HAMISHMAR 18 Jan]	27
Defense Budget Cuts Examined [MA'ARIV 6 Jan]	28
Chambers of Commerce Head Proposes 'Israeli Perestroika' [THE JERUSALEM POST 16 Mar]	30
Uri Sagi' Comments on Combined Unit Training, West Bank [BAMAHAANE 1 Feb]	32
Military Duty in Nabulus Casbah Described [THE JERUSALEM POST 27 Feb]	33
Israeli-Palestinian Medical Ties Examined	34
Ramallah Physician Criticizes Dependency on Israel [HA'ARETZ 25 Jan]	34
Ramallah Medical Services Discussed [HA'ARETZ 25 Jan]	35
Founder of State of Judaea Interviewed [HADASHOT 13 Jan]	37

OMAN

Gas Project To Be Completed Soon	[TIMES OF OMAN 16 Mar]	39
----------------------------------	------------------------	----

QATAR

Oil Export Facilities Inaugurated	[Dubayy THE KHALEEJ TIMES 24 Feb]	40
-----------------------------------	-----------------------------------	----

SAUDIA ARABIA

Electricity Generating Program Described	[ARAB NEWS 21 Feb]	41
--	--------------------	----

SUDAN

AL-SIYASAH Prints Open Letter From Nubians to al-Mahdi	[AL-SIYASAH 22 Jan]	41
Study Assesses Influence of Foreign Companies, Investment	[AL-SIYASAH 19 Jan]	43
Article Questions Effectiveness of Customs Tax	[AL-ASHIQA' 31 Jan]	45
Columnist Opposes Minister's Stand on Foreign Reliance	[AL-SIYASAH 19 Jan]	45

UNITED ARAB EMIRATES

Iran-EEC Dispute May Affect Dubayy Trading	[GULF NEWS 22 Feb]	46
--	--------------------	----

SOUTH ASIA

INDIA

Gandhi Meets Newsmen, Discusses Election Plans	[THE STATESMAN 23 Feb]	48
Gandhi Addresses Scheduled Tribes Meeting	[THE TIMES OF INDIA 26 Feb]	48
Congress Seeks Contacts With Foreign Political Parties	[PATRIOT 27 Feb]	49
India Reported Making Overtures Toward Saudi Arabia	[THE HINDU 13 Feb]	50
Reports on Developments in Indian Relations With Iraq		50
Iraqi Special Envoy	[THE TIMES OF INDIA 28 Feb]	50
Gandhi Visit Planned	[THE TIMES OF INDIA 25 Feb]	51
Increase in Indo-Japanese Technical Cooperation Noted	[THE TIMES OF INDIA 28 Feb]	51
Officer Discloses Indo-Pakistan Firing at Siachen	[THE TELEGRAPH 24 Feb]	52
Newly Developed Pakistan Missiles May Sour Indian Ties	[THE TIMES OF INDIA 25 Feb]	53
Defense Studies Director on Pakistan Missiles	[THE TIMES OF INDIA 28 Feb]	53
1989 Naval Review Accentuates Navy's Growth		55
Ships Described	[THE TIMES OF INDIA 16 Feb]	55
Chief of Naval Staff Interviewed	[THE TIMES OF INDIA 15 Feb]	56
Influx of Bangladeshis a Problem to Border States		58
Crossing Into West Bengal	[THE STATESMAN 16 Feb]	58
Infiltration Into Tripura	[THE STATESMAN 16 Feb]	58
Papers Report on State Conferences of CPI		59
Gupta at Maharashtra Meeting	[THE TIMES OF INDIA 24 Feb]	59
More on Maharashtra	[PATRIOT 25 Feb]	60
Andhra Pradesh Meeting	[THE TIMES OF INDIA 25 Feb]	61
Karnataka Conference	[PATRIOT 26 Feb]	61
Summary of Draft Report for CPI-ML Conference Reviewed	[THE TIMES OF INDIA 14 Feb]	62
North Tripura Mizos Vow To Continue Agitation	[PATRIOT 11 Feb]	62

PAKISTAN

Port Visits by U.S. Ships Opposed	[AMN]	63
Caution Urged on Treaties With India	[NAWA-E-WAQT 26 Jan]	63
Sind's Reaction to Proposed Repatriation of Biharis Examined	[AMN 27 Jan]	64
Commentary Examines Bhutto's Hold on Power		65
Writer Introduces the Advisors of Bhutto	[RAVIVAR 22-28 Jan]	65
Commentary Examines Bhutto's Hold on Power	[RAVIVAR 22-28 Jan]	65

REGIONAL

King Husayn's Growing Regional Isolation Examined

44000409 Jerusalem *THE JERUSALEM POST* in English 15 Mar 89 p 1

[Article by Yehuda Litani]

[Text] A sense of growing isolation and despondency is gripping the royal palace in 'Amman, Israeli experts say. And the more the U.S. dialogue with the PLO expands, the greater the feeling. This week's renewal of the Washington-PLO talks is bound to compound this gloomy mood.

Despite the fact that it was King Husayn who decided to cut his ties with the West Bank more than six months ago, the Jordanian monarch is described by Europeans who have met him recently as "moody and frustrated."

The king is worried not only because Jordan's economy is deteriorating, but mainly because what is known as the "the Jordanian option" seems extremely far off. While the PLO leaders publicly declare their hope of establishing a confederation between the future Palestinian state and Jordan, the Jordanians suspect that deep down the PLO leaders don't put much stock in this idea.

West Bank Palestinians have expressed their dismay over the fact that Husayn—the most veteran and eloquent ruler in the region and, until recently, a master in the art of ruling and diplomacy—could so thoroughly have missed the mark in presuming that West Bankers would ever come grovelling to him and ask his return after so many years of Israeli occupation. This hope was still alive in the mid-1980s.

They are also surprised that the king misjudged the effects of the intifada, and cherished the hope that West Bankers would once again want to be linked to his kingdom in one form or another, after having carried out such a revolution on their own.

Twenty-one years of occupation have brought radical changes to the social structure of the West Bank and Gaza. The old guard leadership, traditionally loyal to the king, are either dead or out of power. The new generation, which is steering the uprising, grew up under Israeli occupation with no ties to or identification with Jordan, which they consider almost a foreign country.

For the time being the Palestinian majority in Jordan does not pose an immediate threat to the Hashemite crown. This is mainly due to the tight rein kept on security by the secret police and the army, which are predominantly controlled by men of Bedouin origin loyal to Husayn. But the prospect of this Palestinian majority living side by side with an independent Palestinian state would almost certainly pose an irredentist threat to continued Hashemite rule.

Husayn is well aware of these realities, but apparently only now has he realized that his chances of regaining guardianship over the holy Muslim shrines in Jerusalem are becoming slimmer and slimmer. The PLO leadership, which he formerly treated as a poor relative of which he was ashamed, is in the process of slowly outstripping him in importance in the eyes of a world in which 93 nations have already formally recognized their recently declared independent state.

But the politics of the region are fluid and quick to change and the wheel could again turn in favour of the king, who in the final analysis is bound to play an important role in whatever settlement is achieved. There still may be bitter splits within the PLO ranks (mainly between 'Arafat, Habash and Kawatimah) that could bring Husayn back to the forefront.

In the meantime, the king is faced with the prospect that he is no longer the main player in the game, one that, for the time being, he must play from backfield.

GCC Report Predicts Improvement in Gulf Economies

44000396 Dubayy *GULF NEWS* in English 22 Feb 89 p 13

[Text] Abu Dhabi (WAM)—Domestic demand will continue to grow in the Gulf states during 1989 and a general resumption of normal business is widely expected, according to a report on the economic outlook for the six-member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC).

The report said the year 1988 closed on several positive developments: The end of hostilities between Iraq and Iran, a new OPEC accord limiting the organisation's production to 18.5 million barrel a day for the first half of 1989, strong economic growth in the industrialised countries generating higher demand for oil, further rapprochement between the two superpowers enhancing the geopolitical outlook of the world economy, and an apparent stability of the U.S. dollar in the exchange markets to which the Gulf currencies are in effect pegged.

These developments together with the recently released non-contractionary 1989 budget for Saudi Arabia and the slightly expansionary budgets for Kuwait, Oman, Bahrain and Qatar gave a boost to the overall level of optimism in the region, it said.

The 22 percent drop in oil prices last year, from an average of \$17.5 a barrel for Arabian light crude in 1987 to an average of around 413.7 a barrel in 1988, has had a telling impact on the region's external sectors and overall economic growth conditions."

The contribution of the oil sectors to the GDP [gross domestic product] of the respective Gulf countries is still quite sizeable, ranging from 20 percent in Bahrain, to 28 percent in Saudi Arabia and more than 35 in other Gulf countries.

The non-oil sectors of the country continued to move ahead in 1988 with domestic demand picking up momentum especially in the fourth quarter. Indicators pointing in that direction include the noticeable improvement in commerce and retail sales activities, higher commercial bank profits, the gradual recovery in construction and housing activities, the slight improvement in rents and the upturn in real estate prices.

Another significant indicator of the improvement in domestic economic activities is the generally higher prices of stocks trade in the region.

The report expected nominal GDP growth rates to be generally lower in 1988 than the year before due mainly to the decline in oil revenue not fully made up for by a continuing surge in the non-oil sectors.

Inflation in the various Gulf countries remained subdued last year. However, the momentum of domestic activities was associated with a slight increase in the local inflation rates as measured by the rate of change of consumer price indices, it said.

The contribution of higher import prices to inflation last year was subdued as the Gulf currencies, and the U.S. dollar to which they are effectively pegged, maintained their value against currencies of Western Europe and Japan, the region's major trading partners, the report said.

Charter of the Arab Cooperation Council
44000368 Amman JORDAN TIMES in English
16-17 Feb 89 p 4

[Text] Following is the text of the Arab Cooperation Council's (ACC) statute as proposed by Jordan, Egypt, Iraq and North Yemen:

Preamble

The Arab Nation with its rich Arab culture and with a major role to play in human civilisation looks forward towards cooperation, solidarity and joint action in all fields. The nation is motivated towards this goal by a deep feeling towards unity, a desire to project its national entity through its cultural identity and to protect its security and safeguard its legitimate interests, and to pursue its relentless efforts to achieve progress and prosperity and enhance its positive and constructive role in the world in order to serve peace and security causes and to contribute towards cooperation and advancement and fruitful cooperation among world nations.

The Arab Nation has gone through numerous experiences in joint action, cooperation and solidarity and has achieved some forms of unity and learned lessons with positive and negative elements; foremost among these lessons was cooperation in areas which corroborate spiritual, cultural ties among members of the Arab countries. This cooperation is continuously sought through joint action because it constitutes the main and basic foundation for the attainment of higher goals and the fulfillment of the Arab Nation's most sublime of aspirations, pan-Arab unity. The present trend among world nations is the formation of economic groups and blocs which provide a great measure to protect for national interests and contribute towards the attainment of development and economic progress.

The Arab countries believe that cooperation in these fields assume added importance in view of the threats posed to the Arab Nation's security politically, economically and culturally. This had been obvious in the Iranian aggression on Iran and the continued Israeli threats to the Arab Nation.

The Arab Nation believes that the Iraqi victory in the Gulf war was partially achieved as a result of the pan-Arab awareness and deep faith in the national unity of the Arabs and the requirements for national security. In addition the Arab Nation believes that the prevalence of security, peace and stability in the region requires a strengthening of this awareness among Arab people through practical cooperation, coordination and pan-Arab solidarity on the basis of collective security and its prerequisites and requirements.

As Jordan, Egypt, North Yemen and Iraq are linked together under similar circumstances and since these countries have a deep faith in the principles and values aforementioned, and in expression of the deep desire on the part of these countries to find practical and realistic means to corroborate and develop formulas for inter cooperation which had been going on for a number of years yielding good results, and acting upon a feeling of responsibility towards enhancing the elements of pan-Arab security against current or future threats, and based on the provisions of an agreement reached at the historic meeting in Baghdad between Feb 15 and 16 between His Majesty King Husayn of Jordan, President Saddam Husayn of Iraq, President Muhammad Husni Mubarak of Egypt and President 'Ali 'Abdallah Salah of North Yemen, the four countries decided on the following:

Article One

The Arab Cooperation Council (ACC) will be established from Jordan, Iraq, Egypt and North Yemen in accordance with the provisions contained in this agreement. The ACC will be considered as one of the Arab Nation's organisations which will be committed to the charter of the Arab League and the joint defence pact and the economic cooperation agreements as well as the various other organisations affiliated to the Arab League.

Article Two

The ACC aims to:

Achieve the highest possible levels of coordination, cooperation, integration and solidarity among the four members specially in the economic, financial, customs, industrial, agricultural and trade fields and in facilitating the flow of capital and easing transport and communications and telecommunications operations between them and to promote their cooperation in scientific research, the exchange of expertise and experience in education, culture, social affairs, health, tourism and allow for employment, transportation and residence in these countries. The ACC will also seek to achieve an Arab common market and an Arab economic unity and will boost inter-Arab action and strengthen inter-Arab relations.

Article Three

The ACC will aim to achieve its objectives through plans and practical measures including the prospect of unifying legislations in all fields.

Article Four

ACC membership will be open to all Arab countries wishing to join. Membership to the ACC will be pending approval by two thirds of the ACC members provided the founding members would give approval.

Article Five

The ACC will be formed from: a higher council, a ministerial council and a general secretariat.

Article Six

The higher council will group heads of state of ACC members and will be considered as the highest authority.

Article Seven

The ACC's higher council will be entrusted to draw up the ACC's higher policies, decide on matters related to resolutions submitted to it by the ministerial council, entrust the ministerial council to look into different matters of its jurisdiction, endorse principles of and procedures for the ACC's functions and amendments, appoint ACC's secretary general and introduce changes and form committees whenever they are needed.

Article Eight

The higher council will hold ordinary meetings once a year in any of the ACC members states on a periodic basis to be chaired by the head of the hosting state. But extraordinary meetings can be called by the higher council or at the request of any member backed by another. The extraordinary meetings will be held in the

country whose head is the head of higher council at the time. The higher council meetings will be considered valid if the majority members attend.

Article Nine

The ministerial committee comprises heads of governments in the ACC member states.

Article Ten

The ministerial committee will:

1. Study issues within its jurisdiction.
2. Prepare and submit plans, proposals and recommendations to the higher council.
3. Take practical measures to implement the higher council's decisions.
4. Study any matter elated to cooperation and refer issues to specialised committees which can submit proposals.
5. Prepare principles for the work of the ACC and submit to the higher council for endorsement.
6. Endorse and amend administrative, and financial regulations referred to it by the general secretariat upon a decision to be taken by the majority of the ACC members and which will be binding for all.
7. Discuss and approve the secretariat's budget and the report on the final accounts as well as the administrative financial reports.
8. Set up temporary committees as needed.

Article Eleven

The higher council holds ordinary meetings once every six months. The council's sessions will be chaired by the head of government of the state whose head is chairman for that year. The head of the ministerial council has the right to hold extraordinary meetings. The higher council meetings will be valid if the majority members are present.

Article 12

The ACC member states seek to achieve consensus and agreement in all resolutions but if this is not possible, resolutions will be taken by majority of voices and the decisions will be binding for all.

Article 13

1. Amman will host the headquarters of the ACC's general secretariat to be headed by a secretary general supervising the work of staff.

2. The higher council will select the secretary general from among the citizens of the ACC member states based on the criteria of personal efficiency and commitment to the achievement of the ACC's objectives. The secretary general will serve for two years subject to be renewed for another term.

3. The secretariat's staff will be selected from the ACC member states.

4. The secretary general and main staff members will enjoy immunity and privileges necessary to help them to discharge their duties.

Article 14

The secretary general is the higher executive member of the secretariat and he will be directly responsible before the higher ministerial council about the secretariat's work. The secretary general will be required to follow up the implementation of ministerial council. He will prepare reports on the ACC activities to be submitted to the higher and ministerial council. He will prepare a draft budget and final accounts of the ACC. He will appoint staff to the ACC's general secretariat. He will suggest administrative and financial regulations and submit them to the higher council.

Article 15

The secretary general will conclude an agreement over the ACC's headquarters on behalf of the ACC council.

Article 16

The general secretariat will prepare the ACC's annual budget in which the ACC member states will be required to share.

Article 17

This agreement will be binding and come into effect as of the date of its endorsement by the four heads of the state. This agreement will be regarded as binding to all nations joining the ACC in accordance with Article Four.

IDF Area Commander Interviewed on Southern Lebanon

44230062 Tel Aviv BAMAHAHE in Hebrew
18 Jan 89 p 9

[Interview with Brigadier General Ze'v Zakhrin by Dan Raviv; place and date not given; first paragraph is introduction]

[Text] The Amal-Hizballah battles have not diverted the IDF's [Israel Defense Force] main attention in Southern Lebanon from the Palestinian organizations. The past year was characterized by a significant increase in attempted strikes by these organizations, along with

stability, or a decrease, in attempted strikes by Hizballah due to those battles. Brigadier General Ze'v Zakhrin, commander of the liaison unit to Lebanon, on the wild South.

[BAMAHAHE] Brigadier General Ze'v Zakhrin, commander of the liaison unit to Lebanon, it seems that in the past month there was a considerable increase in the number of attempts to infiltrate into Israel.

[Zakhrin] I would not use the past month as a measure, but [rather] examine the data on an annual basis. There has been a significant increase in attempts by Palestinian organizations to infiltrate and carry out attacks in the territory of the State of Israel, along with stability in the number of such attempts by Hizballah, a stability that can be attributed to the Amal-Hizballah battles. We must focus the spotlight, as we are doing, on the Palestinian organizations.

[BAMAHAHE] It may be assumed that the IDF is certainly following closely the battles between Amal and Hizballah. Is the IDF ready for the possibility that Hizballah will win?

[Zakhrin] We have no basis for the assertion that Amal is preventing activity by Hizballah, even when the reference is to sectors under Amal control—and it will do everything in order to keep Hizballah from undermining its control in the South. On the other hand, the IDF's actions in Maydun and in al-Luwayzah had a very good effect and dealt a heavy blow to Hizballah. We did not limit ourselves to this surgical strike activity, and we continue on a regular basis with various actions by the IDF and the SLA (South Lebanese Army) in the sector.

[BAMAHAHE] Would it be correct to assume that, due to Amal's battles against Hizballah, potential attacks against Israel are in fact being prevented?

[Zakhrin] We have no basis for the assertion that Amal is preventing activity by Hizballah. Even referring to sectors under the control of Amal, there exist in the villages secret Hizballah cells, which Amal has tried and still tries to extirpate. I cannot assert that Amal is preventing attacks by Hizballah, but it definitely wants to have control, and it is using every means in the field so that Hizballah does not undermine its control.

[BAMAHAHE] Last week there were still doubts about the destination of the eight terrorists who were liquidated by an IDF force. Has it already been proven that they were on their way for a strike in Israel, or that they intended to reinforce their comrades in the battles against Amal?

[Zakhrin] That was a group of terrorists that moved along the northern boundary of the security zone, in the Aram Tehuna sector. We believe that they moved to reinforce the Iqlim al-Tuffah area, near the village of al-Luwayzah. But we do not make a distinction between

whether they moved to reinforce or not. The moment that they approach SLA positions, there is one order—to open fire. This was a very good action by IDF forces, who in a short battle destroyed eight terrorists and wounded others.

[BAMAHANE] The SLA commander is still recovering from a wound. Who commands the SLA today?

[Zakhrin] The SLA is not built on one man. General Lahd has a second-in-command, and the SLA has divisional commanders subordinate to him. These commanders commanded the SLA in the general's absence, and with no small success.

[BAMAHANE] Let's assume that the general is not able to return and take up command. Is there today a commander in the SLA who could replace him?

[Zakhrin] The SLA continued to function well also when the general was in the hospital, and I am sure that the troops are doing this to no small extent for Lahd himself, to let him know that his investment is indeed paying off today in the field.

[BAMAHANE] Aren't you concerned that one day, given the Lebanese reality, the creature will rise up against its creator due to a revolution within the organization?

[Zakhrin] This question is asked frequently. I do not expect that in the next 1 or 2 years there will be a process at the end of which the SLA will suddenly turn its gun barrels in our direction.

Lahd's Current Leadership Abilities Examined *44230066 Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 3 Feb 89 p 15*

[Article by Shim'on Weiss]

[Text] "Lahd appears pale," a newspaper photographer confided to his colleague after they photographed Prime Minister Yitzhaq Shamir and General Antoine Lahd, the commander of the South Lebanon Army [SLA], as they smiled at one another—not without embarrassment—during a visit made by the prime minister to South Lebanon last weekend. General Lahd's health situation is more serious than the impression given in the optimistic reports which accompanied his departure from the hospital after a 2 and 1/2 month stay following an assassination attempt against him. It was easy to discern that he is not his old self. He appeared pale and thin and spoke with difficulty; his pressed uniform hung loosely on him, and his smile was weak. It is therefore no surprise that—as much as northern regional commander Yosi Peled and Lahd himself attempt to make an atmosphere of return-to-normalcy prevail in the SLA—the feeling in South Lebanon, and among those close to what is happening, is that Lahd "has returned from the

grave," and that it is doubtful whether he will again command his army with the same daring and strong will which characterized him before he was injured.

In the months which preceded the assassination attempt, Lahd's position had become very strong. At times, he demonstrated excessive independence in the form of initiatives, which IDF [Israel Defense Force] officers attached to him did not like, to the say the least. For example, General Lahd did not submit to IDF entreaties, and instead went to Beirut on the eve of presidential elections in order to attempt to influence them. Lahd, it is reasoned, felt secure and strong enough to take this security and political risk, which in the Lebanese sphere, can also lead to the riddling of one's body by the bullets of anonymous killers.

Lahd has now returned, tired, wounded and without immunity. Knowledgeable sources in south Lebanon state that it would be easier for Israel to function and to exert an influence with an SLA commander who is physically limited. Lahd remains the leader of south Lebanon, but his limitations are turning him into a puppet in the hands of Israel because he is almost unable to do anything. The wounding of General Lahd is interpreted as serving to strengthen the appreciation felt for Israel by South Lebanon residents because of the work of physicians at Rambam Hospital who treated Lahd and saved his life. "Did you see how the Israeli doctors treated him?" they ask one another with surprise in South Lebanon. They still find it difficult to understand why Israeli physicians invested such great efforts to save the life of the Lebanese patriot.

Lahd is known in South Lebanon as an outsider. It is not forgotten that he came to Marj 'Ayun from Beirut, bringing with him modes of behavior which were alien to the residents of the south, who are distant from the glowing western life which characterized Beirut in its better days. Slowly, and with patience and Israeli support, but mainly by dint of his stubbornness and ability to bridge differences in mentality, General Lahd managed to establish his position as the leader of the South, and to win acceptance from all of the residents of the area despite their communal and religious differences. The injuries he sustained, his struggle to remain alive, and his return to South Lebanon brought Lahd a wave of support and appreciation, even among residents of South Lebanon, who were removed from the SLA and Lahd's Christian environment.

Despite all the sympathy, and the charisma which General Lahd still radiates, there is a feeling in the area, and among senior IDF commanders, that a central link between the IDF and the SLA is now missing—the same link of responsibility and discretion embodied in Antoine Lahd. This is one of the reasons which made it possible for a handful of SLA fighters, who were seeking revenge, to storm the Muslim village of Shaq'ah at the foot of Mt. Dubb last week, and to expel about 40

residents from the security zone, including elderly people and children, without any serious reason. Subsequently, it became clear that this was a local initiative undertaken by Lahd's soldiers. As they did not report their action to their command, neither the SLA nor the IDF's South Lebanon liaison unit became aware of the incident until after UNIFIL [UN Interim Forces in Lebanon] personnel protested the behavior of SLA personnel. Senior IDF commanders say that it is difficult to estimate the political implications of the SLA action at Shaq'ah vis-a-vis the excitability of South Lebanon. SLA personnel thought that the matter involved the firing of an illumination bomb, which did not require giving advance notice or receiving permission.

The northern command is concerned that Lahd is finding it difficult to regain his strength and demonstrate his authority, despite his return to his command in Marj 'Ayun. The northern command has come increasingly to view Lahd as a stopper preventing the loss of control over what is occurring in the area. The IDF will probably have to find—and quickly—a substitute with his leadership qualities and ability to restrain his soldiers.

In the security zone of South Lebanon, as in the northern command, no one is overly impressed by the extent of the relative quiet prevailing in the area. This period of quiet stems not only from the cold and rainy weather, which freezes any terrorist initiative, but also—and perhaps mainly—from the temporary ceasefire between the Shi'ite factions in the area, which was obtained by the Syrians and Americans. This cease-fire depends on restraint and on the exhaustion of the two parties; however, hatred and zeal continue to feed relations between Amal and Hizballah, and the ideological struggle for the control Lebanon's Shi'ite community is at its peak.

The breakdown of the ceasefire is only a question of time. Meanwhile members of Hizballah are chiding their rivals in Amal, accusing them of links with Israel, and thereby compelling Amal to prove the opposite. Consequently, in the last 2 months, members of Hizballah have not once attempted to strike against the SLA and the IDF, and all terrorist attacks have originated in the Amal workshop in south Lebanon. It seems that Hizballah members will soon join the system, and whoever thinks that the relative quiet in southern Lebanon will continue, entertains illusions and false hopes. True, the Palestinians have not been seen in the field for a while because they are preoccupied with protests and demonstrations over their low wages and desperate financial situation; however, there will always be those who are willing to cross the security zone and attempt to strike at Israel, and if possible, at the SLA on the way. In this period of quiet, they are not learning love of Israel in the refugee camps and base camps for terrorist attacks in South Lebanon.

The big test of the commander of the SLA will be in the near future. Is the sympathy felt toward him by south Lebanese residents because of his struggle to again command the SLA despite being injured sufficient to unite

the ranks of the SLA, or will the IDF have to emerge from behind the scenes to impose order and authority so that the area will not again become chaotic. In the final analysis, the IDF knows that it must prevent attacks against settlements in the Galilee.

Israel, Jordan Making Joint Earthquake Preparations

44230060 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew
16 Jan 89 p 3

[By Aqiva Eldar and Roman Priester]

[Text] A senior government source said yesterday that Israel and Jordan will exchange information and will cooperate in preparing for the possibility of an earthquake of high intensity. He said that in light of lessons [learned] in the world, it was decided to deal seriously with the subject. According to the source, monitoring and preparations in the field are continuing, with care being taken to restrict information to the inhabitants in order to prevent a panic. "Although low-intensity earthquakes generally reduce the probability of a high-intensity earthquake, in this case energy was not released during those earthquakes," the man said.

While in on-the-record conversations members of the government and senior officials are condemning the publication of the forecast of an expected earthquake along the Jordan Rift, there were sharp arguments over the publicity policy during internal discussions in recent weeks. Some persons proposed that the real situation be presented to the public.

It was learned yesterday that even before last week's cabinet meeting, during which the ministers received a report on the preparations for the possibility of an earthquake, there was a preliminary discussion in the ministerial committee that deals with environmental issues. Already at that time, it was decided to take a series of measures, including "gradual informational activity" among the residents of the areas [expected] to be affected.

The cabinet decided to keep the matter secret for fear that publication of the warning document of the Seismological Institute would cause panic and result in the flight of the residents. Energy Minister Moshe Shahal recommended a series of measures, mainly the examination of public buildings and schools. It was decided to pass the subject to the defense authorities and even to place on alert the special unit that had been sent to assist in the rescue of victims of the earthquake in Armenia.

"There is No Substantial Danger"

Shahal released calming announcements yesterday, in which he asserted that there is no real and substantial danger of an earthquake. But one cabinet member told

HA'ARETZ that he understood from the report he had heard last week that the possibility that this would occur in the next few months is quite high.

During the cabinet meeting yesterday, the chief of the Seismological Institute, Dr Avi Shapira, said that "the possibility that nothing will happen is very high." According to him, after two consecutive earthquakes, as occurred recently in the Bet She'an region, "within 2 to 3 months, there may be an earthquake stronger than the two previous ones." Dr Shapira noted that, despite everything, the probability that another earthquake will indeed occur does not exceed 5 percent, and if one does occur, the force of the quake will be 5 to 5.5 on the Richter Scale.

Assistant Prime Minister David Levy, who is a resident of Bet She'an, condemned the publication, saying, "The publication contained [elements] that could cause concern. I support bringing all the information to the knowledge of the public so that it will know what is the matter, but whoever put the public into a panic made a mistake." Levy said that he would not leave Bet She'an.

Minister Shahal rejected the criticism by Levy and others, who argued that he had contributed to the creation of panic among the public. "The calming announcements that I made at the end of the cabinet meeting were meant to sum up a given situation, in which all necessary measures had already been taken to prepare for any possible trouble," Shahal told HA'ARETZ.

The minister was referring to military preparations, including concentration of heavy equipment and other technical means, in the regions that had been mentioned as liable to be hit by an additional earthquake. Moshe Shahal said that the Defense Ministry had refused for a long time to accept operational responsibility for handling victims of natural disasters. Only after lengthy discussions did the IDF [Israel Defense Force] agree to handle disasters that are liable to be caused by earthquakes of greater intensity than 6 on the Richter Scale.

The director of the Seismological Branch, Dr Avi Shapira, said that the location of the quake is of no importance, due to the size of the State of Israel. In his opinion, if the Bet She'an Valley will have an earthquake of 6.5 or more on the Richter Scale, it will have implications in Tel Aviv and Haifa, as well. "The problem," he said, "will become a national problem."

PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS

Deputy Speaker of PNC Interviewed on Peace Process, Constitution

44000418a Kuwait ARAB TIMES in English
12 Mar 89 p 3

[Article by Lima al-Khalfawi]

[Text] A top Palestinian official says the Palestine Liberation Organisation is currently working on a constitution for the provisional government of the Palestinian

independent state that will be open to all the Palestinians in the world. But he said, "We will not accept any condition concerning this issue." He added that all the Palestinians have the right to return to their homeland in accordance with the UN Resolution 149.

The Deputy Speaker of the Palestine National Council and the Fatah representatives to the Gulf and Kuwait, Salim al-Zunnun, also told the ARAB TIMES that the first round of the international conference would be held later this year but would be restricted to the five permanent members of the Security Council while the next round would be held sometimes next year that would be attended by all concerned parties.

Opposition

Israel is the only party which refuses to sit at the negotiating table alongside the Palestine Liberation Organisation al-Zunnun said, adding that all regional problems in the world included the wars had been settled only through the negotiations. Al-Zunnun noted that Israel has been calling on almost all the Arab countries to negotiate the Middle East peace but refused to adopt the similar position with the PLO which is the sole legitimate representative of all the Palestinian people.

He claimed that the majority of the Israelis favour negotiations with the PLO, according to a recent opinion poll. "The intifada has made the majority of the Israelis to understand the crux of the Palestinian problem."

Concerning the Muslim-Christian representation in the proposed Palestinian government al-Zunnun said: "We in Palestine never felt or faced such a sectarian issue as we always lived in harmony. This question never aroused and in all the governments in Palestine even before and during the British mandate, there were Christian members. The PLO executive committee also has Christian members."

Al-Zunnun said a provisional government will be declared when the date is set for an international peace conference. The provisional government will also announce the Palestinian delegation to take part in the peace conference. He said the level of the Palestinian delegation to the conference will depend upon the level of other delegations.

Al-Zunnun criticised the U.S. position in the United Nations for blocking a move to admit Palestine as a full member in the United Nations. He said that this requires the approval of the UN Security Council, where United States can deny this by vetoing any resolution. But he said there are attempts being currently carried by Soviet Union and some European countries to try and change the U.S. position.

About the aid to the Palestinians under Israeli occupation, al-Zunnun said that in spite of all the Israeli measures against banks, and exchange offices to block aid flow to the Palestinians the PLO is successfully providing not less than \$750,000 every day to the occupied territories.

Al-Zunnun denied that there are any differences between the unified national leadership of the intifada and the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas). He added that although there are different views on some issues, both stand on the same platform to fight against the Israeli occupiers.

Reconciliation

The official said that Soviet Union recently exerted some efforts to bring about a reconciliation in the Syrian-Palestinian relations but these efforts lead to nothing as the Syrian leadership is still against the PLO leadership. He announced that PLO is trying with the Soviet Union to arrange a meeting of the five Arab frontline countries, Egypt, Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, and the PLO to create a five member committee to adopt a unified stand in the peace conference. He added that the Soviet Union refused to resume diplomatic relations with Israel until it agrees to hold the international peace conference where the PLO will take part.

Al-Husayni Defers All Negotiating to PLO

44040343A London AL-MAJALLAH in Arabic
15-21 Mar 89 p 11

[Interview with Faysal al-Husayni, Director of Jerusalem's Arab Studies Institute, by 'Abd-al-Karim Samarah; date and place not given; "Interviewed by AL-MAJALLAH on Eve of His Tour, al-Husayni Says Palestinian Moderation Started Abroad Before Starting at Home"; first paragraph is AL-MAJALLAH introduction]

[Text] In the wake of the eruption of the intifadah [Palestinian uprising] in the occupied territories, the Israeli authorities accused Faysal al-Husayni, the son of martyr 'Abd-al-Qadir al-Husayni, of being the intifadah's actual leader and the PLO's number-one representative in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The Israeli authorities thus pursued al-Husayni and subjected his movements and travel to strict surveillance. They then jailed him repeatedly. To drive a wedge into the occupied territories' united position, these authorities began to rumor that al-Husayni holds positions which are at variance with the Palestinian consensus, and that he agrees to the holding of elections in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. These elections are part of a plan offered by Israeli Defense Minister Yitzhak Rabin recently.

'Abd-al-Karim Samarah, AL-MAJALLAH correspondent in Jerusalem, conducted the following interview with al-Husayni on the eve of al-Husayni's recent European tour:

[AL-MAJALLAH] It is noted that Israel, after having pursued and arrested you several times, has now moved to meeting you and holding dialogues with you. What is the reason?

[Al-Husayni] Israel arrested me several times, even as early as June 1967, on the charge of weapons possession and of belonging to the Fatah movement. Israel rearrested me a year before the intifadah and then released me. After the intifadah, Israel launched a campaign of suppression, killing, imprisonment, deportation, displacement, home demolition, and institution closures. As a Palestinian citizen living in the occupied territories, I got my share of these practices. As for the meetings and dialogues, they are a different story. All there is to the matter is that a MAPAM member visited me in prison and we talked about political conditions and the Palestinian demands. My answer was that the solution lies in convening the international conference and in Israel's recognition of the Palestinian national rights, including the right to establish an independent state. The visitor asked about the possibility of holding municipal elections in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. My answer was that this is possible, provided that the election is not tied to the self-rule proposed by Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir. Shmuel Goren then visited me and we discussed various issues, including the election issue. My response was the same. Because the Israelis spread the rumor that al-Husayni supports the elections as proposed by Rabin, I proceeded to clarify my position to the media upon my release from jail and stressed that there is no place for a negotiator from the West Bank and Gaza and that whoever wishes to negotiate has to go to the right address, namely the PLO.

[AL-MAJALLAH] What is the truth of the document issued in your name and in which your position seemed to be different from the PLO's position?

[Al-Husayni] The Palestinians at home and abroad are one people. We exchange opinions through the press and the media. Therefore, the said document is the outcome of interactions between home and abroad. The document's story is well known, namely that Israeli intelligence found it in my office at a time when it was available to dozens of our people. The intelligence people then spread the rumor that it was my document, keeping in mind that moderation started abroad before starting at home.

[AL-MAJALLAH] Why has Israel chosen you personally with whom to hold all these meetings and contacts?

[Al-Husayni] To be clear, I have had no meeting with any official Israeli figure, except for the meeting with Goren in prison. I consider this a compulsory meeting between a man in power and a prisoner. The other meetings have been with the opposition parties. Even the Labor Party members I have met belong to this party's opposition wing. Thus, the meetings cannot be characterized as contact with the official establishment. Rather,

they can be characterized as something taking place between the outright opposition and the veiled opposition. I can say that there is an Israeli endeavor to persuade us to accept the elections. The voters can then declare that Israel has to negotiate with the PLO, meaning that Israel's agreement to negotiate with the PLO will come in 2 phases: First, the elections and, second, negotiation with the PLO in accordance with the voters' demand.

[AL-MAJALLAH] But why has Israel chosen you specifically?

[Al-Husayni] No, this is not true. The Israelis have contacted numerous Palestinians. Even insofar as the meetings are concerned, I was not the only one who participated in them.

[AL-MAJALLAH] What was accomplished in these new meetings? Weren't the previous meetings held to clarify the Palestinian viewpoint to the Israeli officials?

[Al-Husayni] The discussions have dealt and continue to deal with our viewpoint and with the serious Palestinian peace movement, as well as the election issue. It is my opinion that our viewpoint on recognizing Israel and accepting resolutions 242 and 338 must be made known to the broadest Israeli sector possible. Moreover, one must utilize the current propaganda clamor and must take advantage of the obvious developments in Israeli society vis-a-vis the Palestinian issue.

[AL-MAJALLAH] Have you convinced the people you met of your viewpoint?

[Al-Husayni] Yes, we have convinced numerous Israelis of the unsoundness of the illusions Rabin is pursuing. We have also convinced them that it is impossible to find an alternative to the PLO's leadership.

[AL-MAJALLAH] Finally, where is the intifadah heading?

[Al-Husayni] The intifadah is now going through the phase of the last 10 minutes of the confrontation. The Israeli positions are characterized by greater oppression, fanaticism, a ferocious economic war, and an endeavor to spread disagreements to divide the Palestinians. But the intifadah stands fast and continues and it will persist until Israel submits to the world community's will and agrees to negotiate with the PLO.

West Bank Civil Administration Attempts To Block PLO Payments
44000418b Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST in English 13 Mar 89 p 10

[Article by Joel Greenberg]

[Text] The Civil Administration in Nabulus has required its Palestinian employees to sign forms committing them not to accept money from the PLO or other hostile

organizations, following moves by the PLO to pay monthly salaries to Civil Administration employees, sources in the city said yesterday.

The written commitments carry a penalty of five years in jail and a NIS 105,000 fine for violators, according to reports from Nabulus.

According to Israeli and Palestinian sources quoted by Reuters, the PLO has deposited sums equivalent to five months' salary in accounts at the Arab Bank in Amman for each of the 20,000 civil Administration workers.

The Palestinians, formerly salaried by Jordan, were sending relatives from the West Bank to collect the money, Reuters said.

The employees, mostly teachers but also health officials, judges, lawyers and administrators, receive their main salary from Israel.

Before King Husayn severed ties with the West Bank last July, Jordan paid them between 30 and 300 dinars (then \$90 to \$900).

Weakened Dinar Fuels Fears in Financing Intifadah

44230070 Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew
17 Feb 89 p 2 (Section 'B')

[Article by Avino'am Bar-Yosef]

[Text] The machines in the textile and mattress factory south of Bethlehem continued to operate at full power despite the late hour. The owner of the factory does not make light of the uprising command; however, as he says, mouths must be fed at home, and in any case, a substantial portion of savings has been consumed by the decline in the value of the Jordanian dinar.

The noise of the machines in the textile factory in the afternoon to some extent explains the economic stamina of the residents of the territories despite the frequent strikes, the reduction in the hours of commercial activity, and the continuous suffering due to the intifadah [uprising] and the inflexible policy of the security system.

This week, the dinar was the main topic of discussion in the territories.

The economic crisis affecting the Hashemite kingdom overshadows the economic difficulties experienced by residents of the territories in recent months. Although a large portion of transactions in the territories is carried out with shekels, the dinar—in the days of its florescence, and in the days of the decline in the value of the shekel and the dollar—has served as the main currency for investment and savings. Also, salaries and allocations transferred by the PLO to residents of the territories are paid in dinars.

What happened to the ordinary Israeli as a result of the shares collapse has been happening to the residents of the territories in recent weeks as a result of the fluctuations in the value of the Jordanian dinar, which scraped bottom when its value declined to equal 2.2 shekels, less than half of its original value.

Security elements in Israel estimate that the collapse is not only liable to strike hard at the residents of the territories, but is also liable to damage the foundations of the Hashemite rule in Jordan.

These estimations are based not only on the devaluation in the value of the Jordanian dinar, but also on the drastic measures taken by the Jordanian government in order to resuscitate its economy. These measures bring to mind the period of Yig'al ("I do not have!") Hurvitz in Israel, when limitations were imposed on the import of luxury items.

The limitations recently imposed in Jordan mainly damage the merchant and money changer class, which is primarily composed of Palestinians. Visitors who returned this week from Jordan relate that cans of imported soft drinks, French cheese, and smoked fish from the Netherlands, Denmark, and Norway have disappeared from the shelves of the delicatessens in Amman. Likewise the import of durable goods, such as television sets and washing machines, has ceased.

To this, Israeli security elements add the demographic problem facing Jordan, the inspiration being derived by the Palestinian majority in the east bank from their brothers "who are shaking themselves free of the Israeli occupation," the awakening of Islamic fundamentalist movements, and the regular aid of rich Arab states, which has also been cast into difficulties. This means the undermining of the Hashemite regime according to the same elements.

The economic implications of the crisis in Jordan have already been a subject of discussion in senior forums in the security system. The main question being asked is how the crisis might affect the continuation of the uprising. Will the economic distress spur more unemployed persons to demonstrate in the streets, or will it strengthen the view among those who continue [to work] that their future is intertwined with the economy of Israel?

Professional elements in the security system have no unequivocal answer to this question.

There are those who believe that the economic situation is liable to result in disaster and hunger, and cause many to feel that "they have nothing to lose." Others, making the best of a bad situation, say that the situation in Jordan complements the measures that were taken to increase the economic dependence of the local population on Israel.

The last leaflet published this week by the unified uprising command in the territories demonstrates a fear that the economic crisis will help Israel. Nationalistic Palestinian elements are calling for an increase in acts of civil disobedience, an absolute boycott against Israeli goods, and the introduction of the dinar as the sole legal tender in the territories.

Recently, the Shabab confiscated Israeli goods in the stores of Nabulus and Janin, and used them to set bonfires on the outskirts of the cities. Likewise, not long ago in Hebron, two stores next to the Makhpelah Cave, which sold Israeli products of the "Tenuva" [workers' cooperative] dairies, were set on fire.

There is no doubt that support of the dinar this week even surprised the king of Jordan. The authors of the leaflets, who are not considered supporters of King Husayn (to say the least), fear that running to the shekel is liable to exacerbate the situation. This week, the local uprising committees demanded that trading in Jordanian currency be stopped to parallel the closure of money changers' offices in Jordan.

A tour through the cities shows that it is still difficult to speak of distress and hunger despite the decline in the value of savings.

In the morning hours, there is still cargo on the road, and trucks filled with goods cause noncommercial traffic to slow. The department of public works is industriously widening the highway to Gush 'Ezriyon to four lanes. Palestinians joke that the Zionists decided to build them a gift, the first autostrada.

As a result of the relative calm recently attained, the IDF [Israel Defense Force] removed most of the roadblocks on the highways.

At the textiles and mattresses factory, we are received by the owner with exemplary hospitality. Over a cup of tea, the future of relations with the Palestinian population did not seem as bleak as the picture portrayed by the media's survey of the demonstrations.

The speaker refused to be identified by name. However, a telephone conversation which he conducted in pure Hebrew with an important customer from Tel Aviv left no doubt as to the continuation of his business connections with Israel despite the intifadah.

"To tell you the truth, the intifadah did not damage business at all. Everything continued as before. We work at full capacity and the children, whose studies were brought to an end, have joined the production force," he states.

He and his brother have, in the same building, close to 20 looms. They produce plain cloth, buying thread, and most of their raw materials and tools in Israel. They produce mattress springs in Gaza, and he brings them by truck from there. He buys the sponge in Tel Aviv.

The local uprising committee requested that he acquire sponge from a factory in Ramallah. But they asked for 180 shekels per cubic millimeter instead of 150 shekels, the price in Tel Aviv.

He sells the finished product in Tel Aviv. He collects 70 shekels for a regular mattress, which is sold for five times that amount in Tel Aviv and Jerusalem.

Following the Six Day War, the residents of the territories purchased the majority of the old textile machines from Bene Beraq, Yafa and south Tel Aviv. The owners of the Jewish factories could not compete with the cheap labor in the territories. In the area of Hebron alone, there are at least 500 looms, which supply a substantial portion of the plain cloth sold in Israel. Another area in which the Hebron residents are very successful is the shoe branch.

A substantial portion of the athletic shoes sold in prestige shops in the cities of Israel under well-known Israeli names are produced in Hebron. In Gaza, they specialize in the production of jeans carrying extravagant Italian and French labels.

"The most worrisome matter is that the young people who are leading the uprising are beginning to lose their heads," states the owner of the factory. "How is it possible to produce if they prohibit us from buying raw material in Israel? Who produces thread in the territories, who will sell us the leather and plastic for shoes? If they compel me to obtain expensive sponge from Ramallah, I would buy ten truckloads in Tel Aviv for every truckload bought in Ramallah, because otherwise, my production costs would increase.

"However, let us assume these problems are solved, how can they force me to use only dinars when I sell all my goods in Tel Aviv? How can they prevent us from drinking milk, and where will we obtain flour and rice?" he asks despondently.

Afterwards, when we told him that we were continuing on to the casbah of Hebron, he said: "What, are you crazy? I am afraid to go there in my own car. I will call a taxi for you and you will park your car in my yard."

This statement gives concrete form to the internal terror on account of the continuation of the struggle.

The uprising command has answers for all of these questions: "The Israelis will not present us with a state on a silver platter. There is no alternative but to establish strict discipline. The Jews used milk powder in times of austerity. The Palestinians can as well."

The crooked road in the center of Hebron on the side of the casbah is filled with vehicles. A hail of rocks suddenly rains down. We escape with light damage to the car, which we park next to the Jewish courtyard, and then continue on foot. Here, we see the sparkling new building of the Association for the Renewal of Jewish Settlement in Hebron.

Again, as if nothing has changed, Arab construction workers continue to build the houses of settlers. This building will soon house the center of the Beitar Movement, and nine additional families will join the rest of the settlers living in the city.

Another riveting image in Hebron: The flag of Israel flutters on the roof of the Romano House, where the Jews live, while the Palestinian flag is painted in bright colors on the front wall of the adjacent house.

Is this a harbinger of friendly coexistence, or a cause for additional friction?

The owner of the neighboring store says that the intifadah arouses excessive hatred between peoples. He understands the children who are throwing the stones at Israeli cars in order to vent their frustration, but he also understands the settlers who respond by firing in the air in order to frighten them and put them to flight. Only economic cooperation will remove the partitions, he believes.

Despite the economic distress, the wholesale market is filled with goods. A box of tomatoes weighing 15 kg is sold for 18 shekels. Athletic shoes costing 75 new shekels in Jerusalem are sold here under another label for 13 new shekels, and there is still room to bargain.

The money changers responded to the call of the local council and closed their businesses, but they are operating in the casbah, just as their cousins are operating on (Lileinblum) Street [in Tel Aviv]. Their exchange rate is 3.20 new shekels per dinar, which is 30 agoras higher than the rate offered by the nearby branch of the Cairo-Amman Bank. The bank continues to operate under the guard and protection of a concealed television camera which sounds an alarm if there is any suspicious movement in the front of the building.

At 1200 exactly, the shutters of the stores will be closed, and the voices of the muezzins will mix with the splitting sounds of megaphones being used by soldiers to direct drivers of vehicles to keep moving in order to keep the main thoroughfares clear.

Hebron has apparently become a ghost town. However, the facts demonstrate that the focus of economic activity has shifted to the homes of merchants. They keep a stock of goods in one room and continue to serve their customers. Here, everyone knows each other. As is the case with the textiles factory south of Bethlehem, the

shoe manufacturers will continue to work behind closed shutters, and goods will go out on time to the mother factories in the coastal plain.

A new daily routine, or perhaps the secret of the strength of the *intifadah*.

ALGERIA

Increased Freedom of Press Urged

45190053b Algiers ALGERIE ACTUALITE in French
23 Feb-1 Mar 89 p 14

[Article by Arezki Metref: "The Press—Fourth Estate or Fifth Wheel?"]

[Text] A backward glance is enlightening. Twenty-six long, full years of the practice of muzzling, forcefully when necessary, has—despite its resistance—reduced the national press, which is nonetheless rich in professional potential, to nothing more than an amorphous organ of a haughty totalitarianism. Bound hand and foot, under fire from a battery of texts and practices dictated by the planned economy of a meddling political regime when it comes to any question which could threaten a phantom consensus to one degree or another, and governed since 6 February 1982 by an information code which would cause the criminal code itself to pale with envy, the press, which in other climes serves as a fourth estate, has been locked in our country into the superfluous role of a fifth wheel on the cart. Doctrinary rather than informative, verbose, and very rarely effective, our national press has sunk by gradual degrees, when and as it has been ripped apart for ventures deemed iconoclastic, to the pursuit of a lengthy, optimistic, and unanimous discourse which seems to have swept away, once and for all, every trace of nuance and disagreement.

The secular arm, in its way, of a regime unwilling to tolerate anything but itself, the press exists only to reiterate with careful consistency a political liturgy which has no basis in reality. The individual and collective battles waged by journalists to loosen the bureaucratic vise and to perform a mission of public service while surrounded by an infinite number of constraints have regularly come up against the very essence of the prevailing concept of the information system and the press. If, in a multiparty regime which shows self-respect by respecting the rules of the democratic game, a press which expresses partisan opinions and does not conceal that fact can coexist with a press which is in the public service, and is supposed to be above the fray and ensure the balance of forces and the honesty of political competition—what can be said of an entire domestic press sector limited to a partisan perimeter? This is what we have had since independence was won, and it is hardly surprising that as a result, those citizens whose right to information is invoked to constrain the press ever further, who have become increasingly skeptical and fed up with the tireless harping on a single point of view by a

press serving as both judge and jury—those citizens turn to the foreign press, very scantily available, to inform themselves about the reality in their own country.

However, if the downward leveling of the press was in the end imposed as a reality, it was assuredly not for lack of professional efforts made, despite the muzzling of the press, to preserve a minimum of independence in the exercise of a profession which had become highly perilous, was held up to public obloquy on all sides, and found itself trapped between the mistrust of the political regime and the distant apathy of the reader.

The restraints of an institutional environment, dark "guideline" practices, pressure, and worse: repression, have not prevented continued experiments. They have for the most part been short-lived, but they bear witness, a posteriori, to the fact that the democratic demand for and concern with a process of breaking through the obstacles to provide information on the level expected by the citizens, are nothing new. Because it recognized its duty to inform readers about the maneuvers designed to torpedo the agrarian revolution, the staff of LA REPUBLIQUE lost their jobs. This Western Algerian daily newspaper, which enjoyed a real audience at the beginning of the 1970's, then began its slow but inevitable decline into hell. REVOLUTION ET TRAVAIL, the central organ of the UGTA [General Union of Algerian Workers] was subjected to a suspension, pure and simple, for a year. The reason? It published a communique issued by the Secretariat of the Central Trade Union (December 1967) appealing, among other things, for the democratization of the political apparatus. Brandishing Article 120/121, the officials of the FLN [National Liberation Front] Party brought to heel the organ of the UNJA [National Union of Algerian Youth], L'UNITE, at the end of 1981, because it was guilty of seeking to continue the democratic spirit of the 1976 debates. The information code, the culmination of this practice of systematically sealing off the press, dropped like the blade of a guillotine in 1982. The space for freedom, already reduced to a marginal area, dwindled further.

This overview of democratic experiments within a press sector on which a strict watch is being kept reminds us, if there need be, that the demand for democracy is not a recent innovation, and like any battle, it has had its victims. Is there some relaxation today? It is obviously illusory to foresee a political system governed by democratic principles or, a fortiori, liberal democracy unless freedom of the press and its total independence from any form of dictatorship can be guaranteed. The drafting of an information code consistent with the new Constitution, which recognizes the freedoms of political association and individual and collective expression, is of capital importance based on this point of view. The fact that the Constitution says not a word about freedom of the press, specifically, has been deplored, and quite rightly. If the information code is called upon to close the

gap, the fact nonetheless remains that unlike the Constitution, for which the revision mechanisms are somewhat more complex, a code, on the other hand, can be revoked in no time.

What kind of a code would a liberal Algeria need? The citizen's right to information is the basis, and the national information code commission, which had barely 6 days to draft a first version, recognized its importance. The preliminary draft includes guarantees of the right to independent exercise of the profession, and in theory, censorship is prohibited.

If one adheres to the Constitution, it goes without saying that any political association, if legally recognized, is fully entitled to have its press organs to defend its line of thinking. By the same token, nonpolitical associations can publish periodicals in accordance with their purposes. Nor does anything prohibit a private individual from starting a general news journal for public service purposes. The current press law, having been totally revised, will become a public service statute. These press organs, the inalienable assets of the national collective, cannot in any event be turned over to private parties. If these private parties want to be active in the press sector, they have only to invest in it. But to plan on inheriting it ready-made—that would be greedy liberalism!

Union Official Discusses Future Unity

45190053a Algiers ALGERIE ACTUALITE in French
23 Feb-1 Mar 89 p 10

[Interview with Tayeb Belakhdar, secretary general of the UGTA, by Messaoud-Khelifi Abderrachid; date and place not given]

[Text] [ALGERIE ACTUALITE] Mr Tayeb Belakhdar, the statement by the central trade union has just been made public. It reaffirms the commitment to the building of a socialist society. In connection with the constitutional revision, it urges the workers "to go to the polls en masse [and] express their choice on the future of the country, within the framework of the reforms initiated by the FLN [National Liberation Front]." It appears that free choice to vote his conscience is left to each worker. Is this the case?

[Belakhdar] I will tell you this. The UGTA [General Union of Algerian Workers] is faithful to its previous commitments, in accordance with which it clearly has expressed its support of the political reforms initiated by Brother Chadli Bendjedid, president of the Republic and president of the FLN, and approved by the Sixth Congress of the FLN Party. The consistency of the positions of the UGTA is beyond any discussion, interpretation, or correction. This must be clear. I will refer you, if necessary, to the positions adopted by the central trade union in connection with the 3 November 1988 referendum and the presidential election. It is not our intention to deny today what we said yesterday.

Moreover, the UGTA has voiced these commitments after considering the opinions, aspirations, and concerns of the base level and the elected union officials. This is true of all the positions set forth in the past by the National Council of the UGTA and the National Secretariat.

[ALGERIE ACTUALITE] Once the new constitution is approved, nothing will ever again be as it was before. In that connection, what will be the future of the UGTA? Where will it be? Against whom? And with whom?

[Belakhdar] In fact, a new era is being planned and designed in this country, and it can only be supported by a clearly asserted popular will.

Multiple needs and expectations, requirements, and legitimate demands are being expressed in various ways in connection with the development of our society, and also the very harsh constraints born of the world economic crisis.

Answers are being proposed, involving changes in institutions and structures, a political regime organized and distributed differently, and new spaces available to democracy and individual freedoms.

I support certain of these changes, along with the new conquests which the workers, in particular, must manage responsibly, with the necessary maturity and vigilance.

In fact, what will never be the same again is the rules of the political game.

For my part, I say that in view of these new realities, confidence in our own strength, commitment to our profound convictions, and above all, our unity and our cohesion will provide healthy, firm, and enduring foundations on the basis of which the workers will truly take charge of their own future.

It will fall, then, to the workers, united within the UGTA, to occupy the space which comes back to them thanks to the new prospects resulting from changes, breaks, and alterations to ensure the effective and legitimate defense of all of their moral, material, and political interests.

There are new political realities. Quite naturally, they call for a redefinition of our methods of work, our discussions, and our method of organizing and directing the action of the workers as a function of the political facts of the moment and the economic and social programs which will be born of the democratic game.

What will not change, on the other hand, is what there is within ourselves. That is to say, our ideas, our convictions, our commitments, and our aspirations.

Thus the workers and the UGTA will continue to work democratically to build a socialist society in Algeria, and for political and economic independence for the nation.

In the future, then, and within the FLN, to which we will continue to affirm our ideological affiliation, the task and the calling of the UGTA will be to assert itself as an active and essential force with the mission of waging the struggle for socialism.

And the socialism we want is that which will derive its strength from its renewal, the just nature of its goals, and the continuity in our spiritual values, the ideals of November 1954, and the democratic, concrete, and full participation of the masses in the building of the country.

Where the future of the UGTA is concerned, it will obviously be the future the workers want for it, with absolute respect for the principles of democracy and open honesty. I will devote all my efforts and dedicate all my convictions to this.

What I might add, and what I ardently hope, is that the UGTA will have a presence everywhere that the moral, material, and political interests of the workers dictate.

It will, quite naturally, be active at the very heart of the contradictions which will inevitably emerge between the upper bourgeoisie, the very wealthy, and the business class, on the one hand, and the laboring masses, on the other.

It will be present and active in any place and at any time that the inclination to pose a real and basic challenge to the political and economic independence of the country may be taking concrete form.

On whose side will the UGTA be? Obviously, it will stand with our national charter and its principles, which we hold to be immutable, and, quite naturally, with the FLN.

Similarly, the UGTA will stand beside all of the forces which, free of any confusion or demagoguery, will as of the present be heeding the needs and legitimate aspirations of the workers in connection with purchasing power, living conditions, and, in particular, their work.

It will support and stand beside all the forces waging the struggle to maintain the popular gains and the social conquests, and to strengthen the public sector, within the framework of proper implementation of the economic reforms which the UGTA openly and wholly supports.

[ALGERIE ACTUALITE] The sometimes radical challenge of the classic trade-union methods and structures, which seem to have become archaic, and the demand for representative and efficient trade-union structures have upset a whole system of thinking and organization. In your view, is it a question of new blood or of excess?

[Belakhdar] Our society is passing through an intensive phase of schism and change, alteration, and transformation. This is sometimes the price history asks of us for moving forward.

The labor world is quite naturally affected by the rhythm of these changes. What is certain and comforting is that things are developing in the proper direction, thanks to the great political maturity of the workers, their sense of responsibility, and their patriotic spirit.

What is really happening within the trade-union movement?

At the base level, the workers are taking charge of their future and that of their enterprises as never before. In all of the sectors in which they are directly involved, they are expressing their hopes and their legitimate demands. When we believe that there have been excesses, we say so frankly. We accept our responsibilities.

Sincerely and with conviction, there are some who are asking questions and even worrying about the new realities which have disrupted certain habits, certain ways of thinking. All of this is normal.

But I profoundly believe that we must have confidence in the base level. There, where some see a kind of excess, there is nothing in fact but the result of a democratic thrust, a need for self-expression and affirmation at the base level. The trade-union movement is also passing through a phase of readaptation, the full significance of which must be realized.

All of our efforts should move in one direction today. We must listen to the workers, take up their aspirations, and efficiently ensure the defense of their interests.

The central concern of the trade-union cadres today and in the future should be reflected in their determination to work tirelessly for the unity of the workers, the unity of the Algerian trade-union movement, and for a UGTA which is strong and more representative of all the workers, without any exceptions or exclusions.

Unity is our strength. Unity is our future. Unity is the only guarantee of success in our future struggles.

[ALGERIE ACTUALITE] This 24 February, the UGTA celebrates the 33d anniversary of its establishment. What, in your view, is the significance of this event?

[Belakhdar] In this period of development and profound change in the political, economic, and, social sectors, the 24 February celebration is of very great importance. I might say that this year, the anniversary of the creation of the UGTA has a symbolic significance and importance which are and which must be equal to the demands, the challenges, and what is at stake at this time.

The workers will celebrate this 24 February under the sign of unity, democracy, and socialism. This is in fact a veritable program for work which the workers should urgently embrace.

This day is also an opportunity for the workers to turn their thoughts back to the past, so as better to appreciate the present and to prepare for the future. Absolute loyalty to our martyrs and to the sacred values of November 1954 should unceasingly be reaffirmed so that the workers and the UGTA can continue their advance along the path traced by their brothers and sisters who were martyrs of the revolution.

I would like to take this opportunity to appeal, on behalf of the National Secretariat of the UGTA, to all the workers for mass participation in the festivities being organized this 24 February in order to reaffirm their unity, their unending devotion to the ideals of November 1954, and the immutable principles of the national charter, which is the expression of the will of the people.

EGYPT

Political Thinkers View Democracy's Future

45040214 Cairo AL-MUSAWWAR in Arabic
10 Feb 89 pp 18-23, 74-77

[Report on Symposium on Future of Democracy in Egypt; dialogue paper prepared by Dr Salwa Abu-Sa'dah; report prepared for publication by Sulayman 'Abd-al-'Azim and Majdi al-Daqqaq']

[Excerpts] The dialogue on Egypt's democratic experiment, past and future, is always a dialogue aimed at preserving democracy and protecting the gains achieved for the country and the citizen. But primarily, it is a comprehensive open-minded dialogue which debates with responsible freedom the "weak" points, if they exist, which discusses how to avoid the negative features, regardless of their dimensions, and which, at the same time, stresses the positive features and works to enhance and entrench them so that all the elements of success, rooting, and reinforcement may be brought to the experiment.

Perhaps this is what has motivated AL-MUSAWWAR to open the door of dialogue on Egypt's democratic experiment in a broad symposium which encompassed a large number of thinkers and knowledgeable men, including Ahmad Kamal Abu-al-Majd, Dr Sa'd-al-Din Ibrahim, Judge Tariq al-Bishri, Dr Muhammad Nur Farahat, and Dr Mustafa Kamil al-Sayyid. Numerous significant and constructive points were raised in the dialogue including: Is it time to seek a more advanced formula than the democratic formula currently existing in Egypt?

How can a sensible pace be established for the relationship between democracy and development?

Why do some of the Islamic current's forces reject the rules of the democratic game?

Will the radical groups which are not a part of the Muslim Brotherhood agree to get involved in official political activity?

All spoke in detail on these points and on other issues connected with the experiment and expressed their opinions in full. This truly enriches the experiment and pushes it toward new horizons that require attention, evaluation, and observation. Here is the detailed text of the dialogue with AL-MUSAWWAR's guests on Egypt's democratic experiment.

[AL-MUSAWWAR] We imagine that we in this symposium will discuss a sensitive issue of the utmost importance because of its influence on and complications for the domestic political situation. This is the issue of the current democratic situation in Egypt, of its problems, and of the challenges facing it.

Therefore, we will, if you permit us, first address our questions to Dr Kamal Abu-al-Majd concerning his view of the current democratic formula in Egypt: Is it time to seek a more advanced formula or do our conditions require us to be deliberate and cautious? We would like to learn his view of the nature of the current party institutions and of the current institutions connected with democracy. Has the performance of these institutions had its influence on what we may call the further reinforcement of democracy? Moreover, what is Dr Abu-al-Majd's position on two fundamental issues connected with the Egyptian democratic problem, namely: The economic issue and the issue of radicalism? Some people believe that these two issues require a degree of caution and of deliberateness in Egypt's democratic course.

[Dr Abu-al-Majd] The issue or problem of democracy generally is not the only major issue in Egypt's current reality. Perhaps the economic crisis which is casting its shadows or impact on the people and the people's concern with this crisis is the number one issue. However, I will hasten to stress two points, considering that it is a most dangerous thing for somebody, anybody, to think that the economic crisis can be effectively dealt with within a reasonable time in the absence of democracy, and I am speaking of Egypt in the entirety of its circumstances.

The first point is that the development plan relies ultimately, especially in the poor countries, on the main asset, i.e. on the human force or on the people.

Therefore, the most dangerous thing that could happen to a nation experiencing an economic crisis is for this nation to imagine that it can postpone the issue of democracy until it has completely settled the economic problem.

The second point is that Egypt's democratic reality can be understood only when we review the democratic legacy we inherited from the previous phases. In brief, I think that this legacy comes from three phases: The pre-1952 phase which had distinct characteristics and in which democracy was practiced, in accordance with the liberal west European model.

The second phase is the revolutionary phase. This phase was launched in Egypt under the aegis of a paternalistic leadership eager to achieve the public welfare on its own and through its vision. Most of the institutions established in this phase were to a large degree, and this is my contention, an extension of the will of a revolutionary leadership that did not add much to the implementation of democracy. [passage omitted]

As for the gradual transformation which began with the 1971 constitution and which assumed its clearest form in the numerous platforms that later turned into parties, the truth is that many things still need to be resolved in this transformation. The transformation encompasses pluralistic tendencies. But it also embraces fundamental reservations which set a limit and a precondition for this pluralism. An unfortunate circumstance which has accompanied the party plurality experience is perhaps embodied in the fact that there are parties that seek to prosper, to contradict, and to oppose at a time when the people say that all the problems require unity and agreement on the national objectives.

In conclusion, I add that it is very regrettable that there are two problems: The economic problem which calls for centralized solutions supervised by the government—and this in itself is not the climate most conducive to political plurality—and the problem of general terrorism and violence in society. Perhaps the most damaging aspect of this problem is that it provides a constant argument for postponing or for not expanding the implementation of democracy because there is no end to the security considerations. If the security consideration is the predominant consideration, then democracy will never exist. Political skill lies in the act of maintaining security under the protection of democracy. [Passage omitted]

The executive authority needs popular support and popular participation which add further legitimacy to any measures taken to confront violence and terrorism. I am afraid that this is not only untrue in practice but is also theoretically "false." I think that any intelligent government needs to expand the base of popular participation in order to make sound decisions. [passage omitted]

Democracy and Development

[Dr Sa'd Ibrahim] There is no connection between democracy and development or accomplishment. This is true. It is possible for one to achieve an extremely dazzling economic accomplishment without democracy.

There is nothing metaphysical, whether in the Asian or non-Asian human being insofar as this issue is concerned. Muhammad 'Ali the Great achieved enormous accomplishments. The Egyptian revolution achieved, without democracy, enormous accomplishments, at least in its first decade, i.e. between 1952 and 1962. A country like Korea has achieved a vast accomplishment. Taiwan has achieved a vast accomplishment. Japan, before turning toward democracy, achieved an enormous accomplishment. So in both east and west, accomplishments can be achieved without a liberal democracy, in the western pluralistic sense of the world. [passage omitted]

[Al-Bishri] [Passage omitted] Regarding development and the degree of its connection or lack of connection with democracy, it seems to me, without paying attention to the theoretical connection, that when I think of development at present, I do not find enough stability, whether in terms of the development method or of the development visualization. In our society, there is no agreement between the political forces on a minimum-level understanding concerning a complete or fundamental concept of the various aspects of development that occur in society.

There are also some obstacles connected with the existing economic conditions, be they in the state's administrative apparatus or in the private sector. It is very important to criticize these issues to a degree that helps jostle the ossification existing in the economic structures. Generally, I think that what is required is a collective decisionmaking so that the decision may be rational. The issue here is not the issue of the rights of individuals or of human rights. For the decision to be rational, it is required that a large number of specialized fields interact to determine the various aspects of the decision. [passage omitted]

[Dr Nur Farhat] [passage omitted] The question is: Why are cultural plans in the Egyptian society undermined and why do they fail to bear fruit by adding further accomplishments to the Egyptian history's continuous progress? The answer to this question is well known to all of us, namely that these plans have been carried out by a broad elite at the top of the Egyptian social pyramid. The plans are undermined as soon as this elite leaves its position. The rule says that this happens either by the effect of time, by colonialist intervention, or by struggle with forces hostile to the plan. Had there been a democratic base for Muhammad 'Ali's plan or for 'Abd-al-Nasir's plan—which, it is hoped, will flourish—these plans would not have been destined to be set back. This is the basic difference between the Egyptian society's cultural plans and the cultural plans of the states or societies that are currently embracing development and democracy simultaneously. Consequently, I can say that development can be created as a temporary plan or as a plan set within a specific period of history.

The problem is not one of creating development for one or two decades but of creating development within the framework of an ongoing revival plan relying on popular

will. This is why the answer is: No cultural development plan can endure, unless within the framework of reliance on a popular base that supports this plan and moves it forward. This is the issue.

It must be established in the Egyptian social and political conscience that democracy is an essential condition for the continuation of development. On the other hand, it must also be established that development is a condition required to make democracy serve the interest of the poor and of the broadest masses which have an interest in democracy. There can be no democracy without development and no development without democracy. [passage omitted]

[AL-MUSAWWAR] We must reflect at length on the current democratic experiment in a serious endeavor to discover its shortcomings, the challenges facing it, the nature of the existing institutions and whether they are capable of survival. When we speak of the institutions, we do not mean one institution to the exclusion of another. We mean the party institutions. We mean the government institutions. We mean all the relevant institutions. We imagine that Dr Sa'd-al-Din Ibrahim can offer a panoramic view of these points.

[Dr Sa'd-al-Din] It is my assessment that the democratic accomplishment in Mubarak's Egypt, if we may use the phrase, may be the fundamental accomplishment. Therefore, we must hold fast to and preserve this accomplishment. Not only this. We must also expand the accomplishment because the prerequisites for expanding and entrenching it are present in Egypt's structure.

To begin, there is a liberal legacy. Despite all the faltering of the previous liberal experiment, this legacy is still present in the collective Egyptian memory.

Secondly, there is a broad social class created by the 23 July revolution's accomplishments. In the history of all the eastern and western democracies, including Asia, the evident fact is that a broad middle class is an essential mainstay of democracy in its pluralistic sense. This new middle class in Egypt is now a major class encompassing 40-55 percent of Egypt's total population.

Here, we come to the crux of the issue concerning the expansion or reinforcement of the current practical application of democracy, namely the inability of the currently existing channels to respond to this large middle class and, to a large degree, to the organized sectors of the modern working classes.

When I speak of the inability of the channels, I mean by these channels all the political parties, be they the opposition parties or the ruling party. The testimony is that the membership of these parties is still limited, perhaps exceeding no more than 10 percent of the number of those eligible to participate in political and party activities.

Ninety percent are still outside the parties. Even though they are prepared to participate, they are not participating in these party channels due to various considerations, including their feeling that the language of the political address and of the party dealings offered by the currently existing parties is not up to the level required under our current circumstances. The second consideration is the lack of credibility in each of these parties, in the parties' relations with each other, and in party dealings.

So, the starter and the substance which can enrich the democratic experience is squandering its capability far from the existing political channels. Moreover, there are social forces which have not been able so far to find legitimate political forms, i.e. new parties, that better reflect and respond to their demands. This leads us, of course, to talk of the free formation of parties. Unless this democratic accomplishment is reinforced, and reinforced by being expanded, it will continue to be faced with a threat—not the threat of the regime's retreat from the actually existing practices but the threat of the masses' turning away from the accomplishment because it is not sacred. The accomplishment has its momentum and if this momentum is stopped, then the entire experiment will be faced with the threat of the masses turning away from it. [passage omitted]

[Tariq al-Bishri] [passage omitted] It is true that we have moved from the single-party system to the multi-party system, meaning that we now have parties which did not exist previously. But I don't think that we have moved from the single-party rule to the multi-party rule. We are still within the bounds of a situation where the existing parties are no more than pressure groups. We do not view the regime solely through the constitution but also through its dealings. Thus, I believe that we live under a system in which the capabilities of its many parties are no more than the capabilities of pressure groups that can pressure and can prepare public opinion for certain policies or can use pressure to achieve certain modifications in the existing policies.

As for the question of one of the existing parties attaining power, the currently existing channels are not yet capable of leading to this end.

[AL-MUSAWWAR] Is this due to the deficiency of the channels, of the parties or of both?

[Tariq al-Bishri] Of both. The parties are deficient and the channels are also deficient. What has happened so far is that the ruling party has secured the guarantee of owning two thirds the seats at least, which is the important majority that can amend the constitution. What has happened so far is that at least 75 percent of the People's Assembly seats belong to a single party. This allows the competition to ordinarily be for the remaining 25 percent, without touching the other high percentage. This insures that the situation will remain unchanged.

The second point I am thinking of is the position of the president of Egypt. The presidential office has its traditional power. As democracy has its legacy, the presidential office has had its legacy since 1952, and even before then. This is an issue connected with the core of the Egyptian society and one that has an extremely significant role.

This is why when the 1971 constitution stated that the president of the republic is the umpire between the various authorities, it brought up the point that the president of the republic must have a degree of influence in dealing with the machinery of government. But this point, along with chairmanship of the ruling party, charges the presidential office with greater influence than the other branches of government can withstand. The question that faces us here is: Is it possible or impossible for us to embrace in the near future policies that provide the opportunity for some sort of multi-party sharing of power.

This point determines how negative, indifferent, or positive is the citizens' attitude? It is an extremely important point.

Insofar as the parties are concerned, I believe that there are political forces which are not recognized in the political action arena yet. The forces that reflect the Islamic current and the forces that reflect the pan-Arab current have no opportunity in the area of institutionalized action. This also influences the degree of interest in or indifference toward engaging in political action.

I imagine that this is tied to the issue of violence. Whenever the official channels fail to reflect political currents which have their weight and influence in society, there will be violence.

The issue is not one of resisting violence the way we think it should be fought. Violence must be resisted. But the way it is resisted in politics is different from the way the other manifestations of violence are resisted.

Economically, I believe that manifestations such as the scarcity of goods and their increasing prices can be solved by compulsory pricing, by the supply police, or by bringing contravening merchants to court. But this alone will not solve the problem finally. Economists must formulate a final solution to the very roots of the problem so that no black market may develop.

Here, we have a black market for politics. We must acknowledge that we have a black market for politics and that we are increasing the possibilities of political activity among the hidden factions.

There are certain political forces that will operate secretly if they cannot operate openly. If they are not peaceful, they will engage in violence. Openness or

confidentiality are not in themselves sufficient for violence. Rather, they are the fertile environment in which the violent tendency develops.

[Kamal Abu-al-Majd] [passage omitted] The qualitative change introduced under President Mubarak's administration has assumed two forms: The first is the people's belief that the leadership which has given can take back on the following morning. Second, there is no well-known system in society by which power is transferred from ruler to ruler.

Third, the so-called ruling party, and permit me to use the phrase, is neither a party nor does it rule. It is tantamount to a group which sells the government decisions after the fact. We wish it were a "preparatory group." Rather, it is a group which sells the government decisions after they are made. So why should I join such a party when joining it adds nothing? The decision-making is in the executive authority's hands. The opposition parties scream [in protest] but the structure does not permit them to change anything. [Passage omitted]

As to what Dr Sa'd-al-Din and Counselor Tariq al-Bishri have raised regarding the pan-Arabist and the Islamist currents, I regret to say that these currents are assessed from the angle of security. The pan-Arabists are lumped together in one bloc over which a question mark is raised. They are said to be an extension of the comprehensive Nasirist socialism which rejects economic openness and are, consequently, opposed to all that is happening and are not prepared to separate or diagnose issues.

The other concept is that whoever uses the word "Islam" in his speech is a terrorist through and through, is violent, alleges irreligiousness, rejects the positive laws, and believes in violence and in underground activity. Permit me to say, and I am responsible for what I say, that this is an extremely backward and gravely damaging viewpoint which poses a great danger to security and the [public] interest.

It is necessary to define a role for the ruling party and a role for the opposition parties. We criticize the ruling party when nobody has defined the role this party should play. This party continues to contain a part which is an extension of the Socialist Union. Activity in the party is measured by what degree of support the member gives the party, regardless of whether it is right or wrong.

Moreover, all the opposition parties are afflicted with chronic frustration, considering that they have attached to their entire struggle an implicit condition written in very fine hand and stating that they will not participate in the government. God, may He be praised and exalted, said: "You may love another." What is this partisanship which despairs of participating in the government effectively if doors are closed in its face? Therefore, revitalizing the political life requires revitalizing the ruling

party and reformulating its role. It also requires revitalizing the opposition parties. There is a proportionate relationship between opening the doors of hope to the opposition parties and the rationality of these parties. A party which has one percent hope of gaining the seat of responsibility will not embroil itself in irresponsible statements. But a party which says "I will lose, I will lose, I will lose and I will never rule" is a party which will try to write its name in the heroes' book and that will make unreasonable statements with which to embarrass the government. Enough! The issue requires, naturally, calm study and a new formulation. [passage omitted]

[Dr Nur Farhat] [passage omitted] The answer given by numerous factions, be they in the government or in the opposition, says that Egypt's current democracy is much better than its democracy in previous phases and much better than the practices that take place in the Arab world.

But we must make a distinction between democracy and some aspects of human rights, especially civil rights. Democratic policy is, if we wish to define its meaning precisely, a right to which the masses are entitled and by which they are able to influence political decisionmaking. This influence comes in phases: The first is the phase of securing the right to free expression and organization and the second is the phase of securing the right to participation in the government, either through taking direct control of power or through influencing the decisionmaking positions in the political authority by well-known and pre-established means. In my own opinion, what we have in Egypt now is not so much progress toward democracy in the manner depicted by some people as it is observance of some aspects of the basic human rights, especially civil and political rights. This observance has not yet led to the desired objective, i.e. the ability to influence the political decisionmaking. This is one point. Another question is: Is Egypt's democracy in a crisis at present?

Are there obstacles that impede the rule and spreading of a democratic climate in Egypt now?

On the basis of my personal conviction, I stress that democracy is in a crisis. I fully agree with Dr Sa'd-al-Din Ibrahim's statement that the legitimate political movement in Egyptian society is occurring on society's surface only. [passage omitted]

Social obstacles: We must consider the patriarchal family structure of the Egyptian society which continues to be prevalent in the poor and rural sectors of society. Illiteracy, which amounts to 50 percent, continues to distort the class structure of the Egyptian society which has developed since the introduction of the open-door economic policy. This is a serious challenge that imposes itself on the Egyptian political parties, especially the opposition parties. [passage omitted]

In addition to the previous aspects, the third aspect is the legislative aspect. There are numerous laws that devoid the democratic practice of its content. I have a list of these laws. It is time to reconsider them because they were established, as Dr Kamal Abu-al-Majd has said, to prevent the circulation of political power among society's various social groups.

This phenomenon is not confined to the Egyptian society but is a pan-Arab phenomenon. Perhaps the only remaining manifestation of Arab unity is the phenomenon of preventing the circulation of political power among the various social groups. These laws must be reconsidered in a way that tackles this phenomenon.

The final obstacles are the executive obstacles. I mean by these the administration's intervention to distort the voters' will when they cast their votes in the ballot boxes. The opposition has demands which cannot be contested. [passage omitted]

[Dr Mustafa Kamil] [passage omitted] Egypt's political parties are not a part of society's fabric. They merely consist of groups of people who are fond of politics and who discuss special issues, paying no attention to the issues that preoccupy the overwhelming majority of the citizens.

How can we overcome this situation?

We ask ourselves: What is the government's role?

The government has a very important role in this connection. It is true that the government took the initiative to expand the sphere of political participation by permitting party plurality in the mid-1970's. But the prevalent vision at the time and in the early 1980's was the belief that this development should take place in phases or gradually. Perhaps the justification for this belief was [the fear that] if the sphere of political participation expanded [suddenly], it would undermine the political and social stability. [Passage omitted]

So, how can these broad sectors of citizens be made to change their opinion of the political game in Egypt? I believe that the first step lies in respecting the rules of this game at all levels. If elections are held and if these elections produce certain results, then these results must be respected. The judiciary institutions' decision must also be respected. Respect must be further given to the rules which must exist in the election processes themselves. Moreover, this respect must not be confined to the People's Assembly elections or to elections for the parliamentary institutions. It must be extended to elections at all levels, be they in the universities, in labor, professional or vocational unions or in other institutions.

Moreover, the office of president of the republic must be separated from office of chairman of the ruling party. I will even go further and say that it is important to

separate the government from the ruling party. Why should the state agencies or the information media reflect this party's viewpoints? Why aren't prominent people from the opposition parties or independent personalities allowed to rise and why aren't their voices heard over the broadcasting stations except during certain seasons, i.e. in the election seasons? Why should all chief editors of the national papers be members of the ruling party? Furthermore, why should university presidents also be party leaders? I believe that separating state from party is what assures citizens that the political game is a serious game which merits their participation.

Thirdly, I believe that one thing that bolsters the citizens' confidence in the serious nature of the game is practicing the game at the local level. I was greatly disappointed when the election law governing the local councils was issued. This law was issued to reaffirm one party's control of these institutions.

Finally, I believe that it is very important that we should not neglect the citizens' social and economic aspirations.

If the citizens' hardship persists under the auspices of a democratic game that accomodates a large degree of participation, then the citizens will not believe in the game and will look for any regime that promises bread and butter in return for their sacrificing their democratic rights. [passage omitted]

[AL-MUSAWWAR] If it is true that we reject the pan-Arabist forces and the Islamic tendency forces, then it is in fact noticeable that some of the Islamic tendency forces fundamentally reject the rules of the democratic game.

They basically believe that democracy is a sham and a farce. Conversely, one of the main features of their political thinking is a feature that calls for a return to some sort of a new totalitarianism through a regime dominated by a religious minority. They declare this openly. The question here is: How ncan the real separation take place? [passage omitted]

Let us call things by their names. We have a tendency which we have agreed to call the moderate tendency and it is represented by the Muslim Brotherhood group. This tendency has participated in the election process. But we cannot disregard the ongoing war of chains between the brotherhood and the more radical groups which believe that the brotherhood's participation in the democratic game is some sort of deceit and entry into the buffoonery, something which is rejected because the entire system is rejected.

There is another problem. If one gives the Islamic tendency an opportunity, then one should also give the brother Copts an equal opportunity in this regard. So far, the Islamic thinking or the moderate Islamic tendency has not been able to at least shed light on how these two problems can be solved. Conversely, these moderate

tendencies have not even voiced their opposition to the tendencies that call for declaring society infidel, for terrorism, for abandonment, and for radicalism.

[Dr Kamal Abu-al-Majd] I believe that this issue requires further study and sorting because I fear that some judgements are unfair. There is, moreover, another reason. I believe that under the auspices of the individual election system, this issue will not arise with such intensity. Under this system, whoever wishes to run for election can do so. We will not ask the individual candidate about his political program. Consequently, a greater opportunity will be provided for representation of all the tendencies. Whoever declares this system to be ungodly will not get involved in the elections. The problem was aggravated under the auspices of the list election system by tying the lists to parties and by requiring the parties to meet certain conditions. If the individual election system is restored, perhaps part of this problem will be solved.

I will make another claim here: Whoever participates in democratic political life gains some experience in this life and develops some commitment to it. I will also contend that some of those who have been occupying the seats of absolute opposition from afar may develop a more responsible, more understanding and more reasonable position when they realize the dimensions of the problems faced by society and by the government.

There are moderate forces and tendencies which believe in the democratic experiment and believe in the legitimacy of what exists. But these forces and tendencies seek reform by propagating their viewpoint, as others propagate their viewpoints. What I want to say is that the formula is not totally easy. However, the solution does not lie in abolishing it because it is encountering some difficulties.

[AL-MUSAWWAR] What is the most significant decision by the communist parties and the Muslim Brotherhood?

[Dr Sa'd-al-Din] [passage omitted] We have seen that throughout the past 6 or 7 years, they have done so, and done it to prevail. First, since 1970, none of the Muslim Brotherhood factions that are known, at least to the security agencies or the social inspection agencies, to have been involved in criminal acts have been denounced.

The other point is that when the Muslim Brotherhood has been given an opportunity for, in my opinion, limited participation in the political process, the brotherhood has participated and participated capably. So, we have national evidence that some political forces which had rejected democracy in principle have now modified their tendency and that the more they are merged into the mainstream of Egyptian political life, the more moderate they become. I must state here that in its election program for the alliance it formed during the

latest People's Assembly election, the Muslim Brotherhood was very eager to further reassure the Copts. This is why the brotherhood re-emphasized citizenship rights. To underline and to confirm their emphasis, they placed a number of Coptic candidates at the top of their candidate lists. The brotherhood did this to an even greater degree than the ruling party.

What I want to say is that when the opportunity is given, this opportunity constitutes the true test for these forces' political plans and for the degree of their commitment. Even if the commitment is purely tactical, then let us try to transform, with time, the tactic into a strategy.

I agree with you on the question of graduality because democracy is gradual by nature and because not all people will participate in it overnight.

[AL-MUSAWWAR] We are waiting to hear a detailed dissertation from Tariq al-Bishri on the issue of the Islamists and politics.

[Al-Bishri] [passage omitted] Even though conditions in the 1980's are more democratic and more liberal than previous conditions, I believe that a ruthless war has been going on between the various ideological tendencies in the past 5 years. This war helps intensify the entrenchment and militarization of the war-like thinking within the Islamic tendency. I have noticed that the various dialogue issues raised in recent years have been connected with women, with the Islamic Shari'a, and with the veil. There has been a denial of fundamentals in Islamic ideology. Our dialogue group has been talking from the position of denial of fundamentals in Islamic ideology. This denial pushes matters directly toward and gives predominance to the ideological war policy within the various tendency. This is why when we call for providing the opportunity for a certain tendency or for moderation, our call does not mean a political opportunity only but also an ideological opportunity. I have numerous examples but there is no time to cite them. Articles have been published in this period and these articles reflect a great degree of denial of rules and principles on which this tendency is founded. These articles fall beyond the sphere of dialogue and turn what exists from a dialogue to an exchange of arguments that do not convince the other side. An example of this situation is that Shaykh al-Ghazali, moderate as he is, was forced at one time to defend the principles of the [Islamic] thinking.

[Dr Nur Farhat] [passage omitted] I will present some ideas that do not so much express firm convictions as they express reflective assumptions which we may ponder together.

Issuing a law that permits all the political groups, regardless of their programs, to move within the political game with legitimate means will constitute some sort of a cure that seeks to contain the violence of these groups, will

allow them to come out into the open and will demonstrate their real weight through the social solutions they offer to deal with society's problems. I believe that a statement that impressed me most was a recent statement Counselor Tariq al-Bishri made to a symposium in which we both participated at Kuwait's AL-WATAN. He said: There is no single Islamic solution nor is there a single Islamic model. There are numerous Islamic solutions.

Second, isn't there a difference between preventing the formation of political parties, banning the formation of political parties founded on a religious basis, and banning the creation of political parties on the basis of programs founded on religious principles? What I mean is that I fully agree that one should not permit the presence of a party in which only Muslims are involved or of a party in which only the Copts are involved because such a party contradicts the fundamental principles of human civilization as revealed in the divine religions and in the international charters. There is nothing to prevent the presence of a party with a social program that allows followers of the religions to enter it while claiming that it derives its principles from religious roots. There are parties of the kind in Europe. There are Christian democratic parties and Christian socialist parties. Therefore, a clear distinction must be made between the two types of parties. We must prevent religious or sectarian parties as they are found in Lebanon. [Passage omitted]

[AL-MUSAWWAR] You are talking of civil political parties that derive some of their programs from religious principles. You have cited the example of some European parties. But what we fear is that what we have been talking of is just a different banner or the changing of banners so that we may allow the formation of what will necessarily be an Islamic party or a Christian party!

[Tariq al-Bishri] Here is a vital point: Is there or is there not a political presence for an existing political force? We are not about to impose conditions on such a force but are asking how possible is it for us to recognize it and how important is this recognition to political stability and to the growth of the political experience? Insofar as I am concerned, I do not make my judgement merely on the basis of a rational assessment of the existing political forces or of how fit these forces are.

[AL-MUSAWWAR] The ban is not a purely rational ban. The ban emanates from [fear of] the consequences of the presence of two opposed religious parties which will further divide the country and which will transform the sectarian issue into one of the axes of society's political strife.

[Tariq al-Bishri] This problem does actually exist and I agree with you on this point. But let us together consider these forces and think with the spirit of avoiding this problem and developing the most successful solutions

which allow the existing political forces to be reflected more clearly. At the same time, let us try to avoid the side-effect which, I agree with you, must be avoided.

I also agree to a large degree with what Dr Nur Farhat has said.

[Dr Mustafa Kamil] Will the Islamic tendency agree to transform itself into a political organization?

[Tariq al-Bishri] We should ask it and find out!

[Dr Mustafa Kamil] Tunisia has undergone this experience. The Tunisian Muslim Brotherhood agreed to remove the Islamic banner and to engage in political action through a political banner. But is the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, in its capacity as the advocate of a call, speaking of the call or speaking of a political organization?

[AL-MUSAWWAR] The Muslim Brotherhood has accepted the banner of another party. Moreover, the Muslim Brotherhood has proven that it is very pragmatic and extremely practical and has agreed to join a party with a different banner. [Passage omitted]

[Dr Mustafa Kamil] I must first note that the political forces which have been described as being denied legitimacy are the Nasirists and the communists. These forces entered the 1987 legislative elections and they have a tangible presence in the cultural arena, as well as the political arena.

As for the connection between expanding the sphere of political participation and the tendency for employing armed violence, there is nothing to theoretically or practically guarantee that expanding the sphere of political participation will lead to the total disappearance of these forces. As Dr Nur Farhat has said, the experiences of Italy, France, the United States, and Japan constantly give rise to small groups that are inclined to employ violence. But the important question is: How can the growth of these forces be prevented?

There are two approaches. The first approach views these forces as representatives of groups of sick people who are characterized by qualities that make them different from the others in society. This approach is the one embraced by the security agencies in handling the violent groups. The only way to deal with these groups is by force.

But there is another approach which views these groups as the reflection of social, cultural, economic, and political problems and of narrow political participation by certain ethnic groups. This approach tries to deal with the roots of [the problems of] these groups.

I believe that the second approach is the more effective and the more applicable to our Egyptian situation, especially since the historical experience with these

forces that are denied legitimacy and particularly the experience of the violent confrontations between the government and the Muslim Brotherhood has proven to be catastrophic to these political forces every time they embarked on violent confrontation against the state, with all its force and its might. I believe that the Muslim Brotherhood leaders have come to the firm conclusion that the method of confrontation against the state will bear no fruit and that it is better for them to proliferate their call with wisdom and with gentle words. I believe that this viewpoint is strategic, not tactical. As for the formation of parties, I will go further than Dr Nur Farhat and Judge Tariq al-Bishri and ask: What harm is there in the presence of an Islamic party, regardless of its structure, and of a Coptic party?

I don't think that "all" of Egypt's Copts will vote for a Coptic party or "all" of Egypt's Muslims will vote for an Islamic party because the Egyptian political issues are not religious issues. There are numerous issues.

This is why I think that the major part of Egypt's Coptic minority will be inclined to vote for a moderate party that takes into consideration this minority's legitimate aspirations.

The true judge of any party's credibility are the citizens. I believe that the Egyptian citizens have proven that they possess a high degree of political vigilance that justifies our allowing them to be the judge who determines which parties survive if we open the door of the free formation of political parties.

[AL-MUSAWWAR] Concluding this rich dialogue, we thank the gentlemen guests.

IRAQ

Committees To Rewrite Laws for Political Parties, Press

44000399 Baghdad BAGHDAD OBSERVER in English
27 Feb 89 p 1

[Text] Baghdad, 26 February, INA—Iraq has taken new measures to cement democratic practices in the country with a decision taken by the Leadership to draft a new constitution, allow political parties other than the Arab Ba'th Socialist Party and more freedom of the press.

The Iraqi leadership has formed a committee to draft a new constitution for the country as another committee has been charged with drafting a law allowing political parties to form in the light of principles discussed and announced earlier by the Leadership.

This came in a joint meeting of the Revolution Command Council (RCC) and the Regional Command of the Arab Ba'th Socialist Party chaired by President Saddam Husayn here on Sunday.

The meeting decided to set up a committee to lay down the draft of a new constitution for Iraq. The committee is to be headed by Mr 'Izzat Ibrahim, Vice-Chairman of the Revolution Command Council.

The meeting also set up another committee headed by Mr Taha Yasin Ramadan, Member of the Revolution Command Council and First Deputy Prime Minister to lay down a draft law to "organise political party life in Iraq" in accordance with basics discussed by the RCC and the Party in previous meetings.

President Saddam Husayn recently stressed the desire by the Iraqi Leadership to further promote democracy in the country by introducing a multi-party system.

The President told Arab lawyers in Baghdad last year that Iraq had planned to allow the formation of political parties other than the Ba'th Party more than two years ago. But the announcement of this measure had been postponed lest it should be associated with similar moves in other parts of the world.

In his meeting with the lawyers on 27 November last year, President Husayn said, "We will work for the expansion of democratic representation base by allowing the formation of new parties in addition to the parties that are currently members of the National Front."

Other recent measures to this effect have touched on the National Assembly elections as certain amendments have been introduced to allow a greater number of candidates to compete for same seats in their constituencies.

On Sunday meeting, a third committee was set up to lay down a draft law for freedom of the press in the country. The committee is led by Mr Latif Nusayyif Jasim, Minister of Information and Culture.

The meeting also discussed the outcome of a visit to Saudi Arabia on Saturday by President Husayn's envoy to King Fahd.

President Husayn's envoy, Mr Taha Yasin Ramadan on Saturday visited Saudi Arabia where he met with King Fahd to deliver a message to the Saudi Monarch.

The meeting of the Leadership on Sunday expressed satisfaction at the outcome of Mr Ramadan's visit and the promotion of relations between Iraq and Saudi Arabia in the interest of the Arab nation, cooperation and solidarity.

The leadership also discussed the outcome of a visit to Iraq by Soviet Foreign Minister, Mr Eduard Shevardnadze. The outcome of the visit was appreciated as regards its impact on further promoting the relations of friendship and cooperation between Iraq and the Soviet Union.

The meeting also discussed the issue of reaching an agreement between Arab states, and particularly member-states of the Arab Cooperation Council (ACC), which would lead to abstention from interfering in internal affairs, halting intelligence and security activities and refraining from use of force in problems that crop up between Arab states in the light of principles declared by President Saddam Husayn in his inauguration speech of the ACC Summit held in Baghdad on 16 February.

Preliminary ideas and formulas on the issue were discussed during the meeting which entrusted competent authorities to follow-up discussion so that a final draft would be laid down to this effect.

Expansion of Railway Lines, Facilities Described
44000400 Baghdad BAGHDAD OBSERVER in English
20 Feb 89 p 2

[Article by Sabah Y. Yunan]

[Text] Iraqi Railways Department is to open a new railways maintenance factory in Baghdad's western suburb of Abu-Ghurayyib during the second half of 1989.

A source at the Department said that the factory which is now in advanced stages has cost the Iraqi Railways some L2,445,332. It is established on an area of 80,000 square metres and the location is designed to serve various cross-country railways lines.

The factory comprises two main buildings and large yards in which railway-lines are installed to enable trains enter for maintenance.

The first building includes management offices and lecture and training halls equipped with advanced equipment for developing skills, and a depot for storing spare parts needed for repairs and maintenance. A laboratory for testing different materials and for issuing validity certificate will also be available.

The building contains electronic laboratory for checking and repairing electronic devices used in controlling train movements and another laboratory for checking electrical equipment and measurements.

The new railways factor's second building comprises workshops for manufacturing locomotive spare parts and wagons. It is fitted with equipment for carrying out periodical and regular check-ups and maintenance works. It also comprises an advanced unit for carrying out heavy checking of modern locomotives introduced recently to Iraq.

The Building No 2 of the factory is equipped with two ceiling cranes and three bunkers of various heights to provide different levels for checking wagons or locomotives.

Iraqi Railways Department has recently expanded its services nation-wide with the opening of a number of new lines which stretch for thousands of kilometres.

This included the launching of two railway lines for public transport between Baghdad and Ramadi and Baghdad and al-Qa'im in western Iraq. Four trains operate every day between Baghdad and Ramadi and vice-versa whereas three trains per day are operated between Baghdad and al-Qa'im.

On the other hand, the Department has expanded its services with the opening of the Kirkuk-Ba'iji-Haditha line.

Another line was opened recently for ferrying cement from Muthanna province. Besides, the whole load of solid sulphur produced by the North Gas Company is transported by trains.

The Department has opened more day-time passenger lines between each of the two major cities of al-Mawsil, in the north, and al-Basrah, in the south, and the capital Baghdad.

During 1987, three million passengers used trains compared to around two million in 1980. Five million tons of commodities were carried by cargo trains last year.

To enhance its work, the Iraqi Railways earlier this year held its first conference.

New Agricultural Projects To Be Completed
44000401 Baghdad BAGHDAD OBSERVER in English
20 Feb 89 p 2

[Article by Yu'arash Nisan]

[Text] Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation has been active in implementing a variety of irrigation projects including reclamation, dredging, digging canals and building dams, according to an irrigation official.

About 286,000 donums of agricultural lands (donum - 2,500 square metres) were reclaimed until mid last year in the area between the Tigris and Euphrates rivers. The projects was designed for high density agriculture.

Director of the project, Mr Lu'ayy Rashid said about 94 percent of the land reclaimed was allocated for winter crops and the rest for summer crops.

The project reclaimed a vast area of land in the basin of the two rivers. It covered 28 sub-contracts involving such areas as Saqlawiyah, Abu-Ghurayyib, Radwaniyah, al-Yusufiyah, al-Latifiyah, al-Iskandasiyah and others.

Some 641,000 donums were included in the plans for irrigation, mostly in the province's of Baghdad, Babylon and Anbar. Mr Rashid said this will be launched once the 286,000 donum project is completed.

For an efficient irrigation system, a dam was constructed on the Euphrates to supply the land reclaimed with enough water through many reinforced cement canal systems.

Dredging of canals and rivers has had its share of the projects of the Ministry. The Nasir Maintenance Company of the Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation, undertook the clearing of a 50 kilometre-long irrigation project in al-Radwaniyah, Baghdad.

According to the scheme, irrigation and drainage canals are to be cleared off alluvium and sediments deposited in the canal beds.

The Company was also dredging the southern part of al-Khalis 140 km-long-irrigation project and its drainage scheme in Diyala province.

In Karbala, the main canal of al-Husayniyah was dredged by the firm. The 24-km canal supplies the citrus orchards and other farms around the city of Karbala.

Canals of al-Musayyib irrigation projects were also dredged last year. Other dredging and maintenance of many irrigation projects covered those of Hawija in Ta'mim, Zunakurah in Anbar province, Al-'Aziziyah in Wasit.

The Iraqi Land Reclamation Company has plans to open a giant canal north of the city of Samarra as part of an irrigation network which was also meant to thwart dangers of floods. The project would divert millions of cubic metres of water from the Tigris to a nearby valley.

The valley is to become a big water reservoir with a capacity of billions of cubic metres.

Digging artesian wells was among the irrigation projects of the Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation during 1988. The Water Wells Company planned to dig 350 artesian wells in various parts of the country. Feasibility studies and field surveys were carried out.

Earlier, the Company has dug 287 wells.

Two irrigation dams have been completed and others are nearing completion. Work on some of these dams started almost a decade ago.

Al-Qadisiyah Dam was completed along with an attached hydro-electric station last year. Work started on the project early 1978 and the 388 million dollar giant irrigation project is now operational.

Duhuk Dam was also completed last year. The project was launched on 6 October 1980.

ISRAEL

Jewish Settlement Continues Despite Intifadah
44230071 Tel Aviv MA'ARIV (Section "B") in Hebrew
10 Feb 89 p 4

[Article by 'Aharon Dolev]

[Text] A tortuous road runs along the spiraling curves of the mountain pass. On the map, it is designated Nahal Shila. Two Arab villages, Kafr al-Dik and Dayr Balut, are located at the crossroad. The intifadah [uprising] was ignited relatively later in these two villages, which experienced a quiet year, until the Shabab ascended the heights overlooking the road to stone vehicles belonging to Jews.

While the stone throwers climb the mountain, the stoned neighbors descend to the junctures in the wadi to blockade the entrances to the Arab villages in a display of passive power. "We only wanted to signal to the security system that hostile activity has also been introduced into the area of southwest Samaria."

In the secretariat of the Pedu'el community settlement—which was established by graduates of the Har 'Etziyon Yeshiva, where students combine military service and religious studies—'Ofer Tahuri states: "The army read the signal, and came. The height advantage is no longer exploited freely against us."

On the way to Pedu'el, the driver remarks that this mountain pass reminds him of the Mitlah Pass in the Sinai. But that does not really say anything. Here we see huts, houses of stone, olive trees on the mountain slopes, and a small block of Jewish settlements spread across the hills. Below, the plains are turning green and the valleys are a colorful blaze of spring efflorescence. Above, is Pedu'el, whose residents have lived in prefabricated [trailer] homes for 4 years, the coastal plain in the palm of their hands.

A "neighborhood of old-timers" is beginning to burgeon on "build-your-own-house" lots. There are 28 young families with about 70 children. At the height of the intifadah, seven of them left nice apartments in the cities of the Gush Dan area to come to live in prefabricated homes in Pedu'el.

'Ofer: "Seven families is an annual increase which is greater than that in each of the 3 years which preceded the disturbances in Judaea, Samaria and Gaza."

[MA'ARIV] In spite of, or because of the intifadah?

"People say that, ironically, a difficult period strengthens ideological motivation. Most of the members are students of Rabbi Yehuda 'Amital in the Har 'Etziyon Yeshiva. Not everyone identifies today with all of his

political ideas. There is motivation to thicken settlement in all parts of the land of Israel, but you will not find zeal here. There is a willingness to consider this or that political settlement."

At the end of the summer, when the intifadah entered its ninth month, 'Ari Singer, 29, and his wife Rahel, packed the contents of their apartment—"100 cubic meters in a good place in Petah Tiqwa"—and moved with their two small children to live in a prefabricated family home (40 cubic meters) in Pedu'el.

Since then, they have had a third child, Shirah. 'Ari, tall and strong (a captain in the reserves), is a native of New York. He immigrated with his parents in 1972, several days before his Bar Mitzvah. He lost a brother, Ya'aqov, may his memory be for a blessing and peace, age 20, in active service in the Giv'ati Brigade.

[MA'ARIV] Why would a settled man take his small children and pregnant wife, and move them from secure Petah Tiqwa to highways threatened by rocks and gasoline bombs?

[Singer] First of all, there is no need to exaggerate the threat. It is not terrible, and one does not become excited about it. Secondly, is this not the question asked of my father when we immigrated to Israel? Many said to him: "What happened to you, Singer? Have you gone mad? Can a diamond cutter such as yourself succeed in leaving New York, and take his wife and small children to the strife-torn Middle East?"

I believe that what my father told them is also valid here at present. The meaning of life is not just looking out for oneself and the comfort of one's family. One needs a goal in life. This is how I was educated from the earliest age at home, and subsequently in movements in New York, at the Rav Kook village and at the Golan Yeshiva in Hispin.

"What is a goal? The dearest goal is to decide that the intifadah of our neighbors is the right time to stand up and do something for the people of Israel. The dearest goal is to leave a calm city in order to strengthen a small settlement. Meanwhile, since we have been here, I have come to recognize that this is a mutual strengthening. Just as I strengthen my friends, I am strengthened by them.

[MA'ARIV] What about the stones, and the neighbors who do not want you here?

[Singer] They do not want us anywhere. Should we leave on account of stones? My wife is a kindergarten teacher on maternity leave. She works in the kindergarten in Ari'el. She travels daily, back and forth between our house in Pedu'el and her work place in 'Ari'el. She has

already been stopped at barriers and stoned. Except for her current maternity leave, she has not missed one day at the kindergarten at 'Ari'el. The intifadah will certainly not break us.

[MA'ARIV] Let us assume that the Israeli Government decides that you must evacuate and return to the other side of the green line?

[Singer] We are here, because, according to our belief, we are needed, and because the people want us here. If the people decides—let us assume in the framework of a referendum—that we are not needed, we would not fight the people; with great sorrow and pain, we would move to another place. Against whom would we fight, against the IDF? We are the IDF. Everyone here serves.

The evacuation of Yamit sufficed for me personally. At the time, I was a soldier at the end of my regular service. I was sent to block the infiltration into Yamit, of activists opposed to the withdrawal. I saw a disheartening sight. The sorrow and anger over the evacuation were understood. A struggle with the army—no.

The secretary of the Council of Judaea, Samaria, and Gaza, Uri Ari'el: "If from afar, the impression is created that settlement in Judaea, Samaria and Gaza has ended because of the intifadah, I have news represented by figures: In 1988, the year of the intifadah, the [Jewish] population of Judaea, Samaria, and Gaza experienced a normal year of average growth. Of the 2,700 families waiting for population permits, 1,700 families, or about 7,000 people moved to Judaea, Samaria, and Gaza.

"Two-thirds were absorbed into urban settlements, such as Ari'el, Elqana, Giv'at-Ze'v, 'Imanu'el, Efrat and Qiryat Arba', and one-third settled in village settlements. Not a single empty apartment or house remained in urban and village settlements. Were it not for the obstacle posed by construction, which is lagging behind demand by a rate of about 1,000 families, the year of the intifadah would actually have been recorded as a year of massive growth."

[MA'ARIV] That sounds a bit strange compared to reality.

['Ari'el] So argue with the figures. In this regard, we are deriving encouragement from the continuation of the flow of people to our settlement. I am also reminded of the public discussion, in which Member of Knesset Dedi Tzuqer said—to Dani'el Weiss—that if we, the settlers, grew quantitatively in the year of the intifadah, it would be a sign that we have a chance of victory in this matter. Thus, according to Dedi Tzuqer's reckoning, the figures testify that we have won.

[MA'ARIV] Are there 1,700 families willing to put themselves through hell, and settle in Judaea, Samaria, and Gaza for ideological motives?

First, the matter of putting oneself through hell is greatly exaggerated. People come to the areas of the settlements, and discover that it is possible to exist. We too do not say that it is impossible to live with this. We say that there is no reason or justification to continue to allow the Arabs to stone us.

Second, not all who have settled in this difficult year can be classified in the idealist camp, such as the people whom you met in Pedu'el. The Af-'Al-Pi ['nevertheless'] movement constitutes an estimated one-third of us. These are families who consciously summoned themselves to settle in Judaea, Samaria, and Gaza; when they encounter difficulties in reaching their goals, they say to themselves that this is the time to advance and achieve.

Many of this year's new settlers actually went to problematic settlements, in the eye of the storm. You will find them at 'Eynav, on the Tulkarm highway, in Nabulus, in Dolev west of Ramallah, at Berakha above Nabulus, and at Elon-More, which lives at the crossroads of the intifadah.

"At Elon-More, 12 families were absorbed in the year of the intifadah—more than in any year since it was established. You will discover, in every secretariat of these settlements, a pressuring list of candidates facing a zero absorption capability due to the shortage of housing. Most of the settlers live in trailers, then in stone structures, and then in tin huts. They obtain electricity from generators and live as pioneer communities.

Two-thirds are people in search of quality of life in a community framework, who aspire to improve their housing conditions, move away from ecological nuisances, and flee the overcrowding and drug culture of the compact coastal plain.

The majority of new settlers in the year of the intifadah, a hard core of about two-thirds, are therefore not dedicated to the [concept of the] entire land of Israel, but they are also not dedicated to the green line.

'Ofrah, 32 years old, and Arnon Yosov, 39 years old, for example, are the directors of the publications department of the Yahatznit Company in Tel Aviv. On Friday, two weeks ago, they left a four-bedroom apartment in a modern apartment building in Rishon LeZiyyon, took their three children aged 10, 7, and 1, and moved to a trailer in Ba'le-Zahav, the secular neighbor of Pedu'el, at the end of the upper ridge of the same "Mitlah Pass."

For 2 weeks now, 'Ofrah and Arnon have been commuting to their office in Tel Aviv, a round trip of about 80 km. Their children travel daily with a military escort to the regional school at Bet-Arye, a large settlement in southwest Samaria.

[MA'ARIV] What sort of cockroach entered your heads?

[Ofrah] Cockroach? What are you saying? Another two families moved with us last Friday, and we are enjoying every minute.

[MA'ARIV] What are you enjoying?

[Ofrah] What are we not enjoying?—the view, the air, the open spaces, the people.

'Arnon was discharged from the signal corps after 12 years of service in the career army. The Yosov family lived in 'Arad for 5 years. "'Arad is a great place. We liked it, but 'Arnon had better employment opportunities in his profession in Gush Dan."

In 1982, they sold their apartment in 'Arad for \$20,000 ("3 bedrooms—those were the prices there"), began renting an apartment in Rishon LeZiyyon, and secured entitlements to a [government-subsidized] mortgage. "About 2 months ago, it became clear that the cost of renting in Rishon LeZiyyon was more expensive than the costs of a mortgage in development areas.

"In Rishon LeZiyyon, we were required to pay \$700 per month in rent. We are entitled to a mortgage which cost \$400 per month. We began to search for a building site within a reasonable commuting distance from the office in Tel Aviv, which would also offer worry-free temporary living arrangements until the completion of construction.

"We found what we wanted at Ba'le-Zahav—a temporary prefabricated home (for 2-3 years) at 100 new Israeli shekels per month, quality of life in a natural surrounding, and a nice community of 48 young families with children, half of whom are already in line to occupy permanent houses."

[MA'ARIV] What about the intifadah? Are you not sitting on the seam connecting Samaria, Judaea, and the Benjamin region?

[Ofrah Yosov] It is correct that we first ascertained whether the main arteries are safe. If we had had fears, the dream would have had to have been shelved, because the safety of the children comes first. Meanwhile, the children go to school everyday with a military escort, and we travel to work with a quiet mind, especially as the compensation is not only ecological, but also educational.

The move from Rishon LeZiyyon to Ba'le-Zahav greatly improved the educational framework of the children. In Rishon LeZiyyon, classes had 40 students. At Bet-Arye, there are only 22 students per class, and greater opportunities for students to receive individual treatment.

[Arnon] I already explained our motives in settling in Samaria. I do not want to be dragged into ideology, but the formula of settlement and security going hand in hand is apparently correct. Take any densely-settled

highway anywhere in Israel—there are no rocks there. Hence, in our area as well, as the movement of Jews and settlement increases, so also will security increase.

Israel's Renewal of Relations With African States Explored

44230061 Tel Aviv 'AL HAMISHMAR in Hebrew
18 Jan 89 p 11

[Article: "The Road to Nigeria Is Long"]

[Text] With the announcement yesterday by the president of the Central African Republic, Kolingba, of the resumption of full diplomatic relations between his country and Israel, the number of states on the black continent (not including Egypt and South Africa) that have full relations with us reaches ten. In Ghana, Israel has an interests section. In comparison, during the heyday, the period between the 1967 and the 1973 Wars, Israel had relations with 31 black states.

It is hoped and believed in Israel that, following the announcement by Kenya, only recently, of the resumption of relations with Jerusalem, announcements of the establishment of full relations will begin to flow to Israel from all over the great continent, and that the Central African Republic is only the harbinger. The republic is a very poor state, despite its giant uranium deposits. It belongs to the Francophone bloc of states. Major General (Res.) Gorodish [nickname of Shmu'el Gonen] is prospecting there for diamonds. Previously, during the period of the corrupt Bokassa, who called himself emperor, the republic was in headlines the world over. It has sunk into anonymity in recent years. It appears that for budget reasons, Israel will not establish an embassy in the capital of Bangui, and will make do with a nonresident ambassador, as in Lesotho (the ambassador resides in Swaziland).

Israel now has full relations on the neighboring continent with Liberia, the Ivory Coast, Cameroun, Zaire, Kenya, Malawi, Swaziland, Lesotho, and, as of yesterday, the Central African Republic. Israel's next target: the resumption of full diplomatic relations with Nigeria, which, together with Kenya, is the leading state on the black continent. In fact, Israeli-Nigerian relations are better than her relations with many states with which Israel has full diplomatic relations. However, for understandable reasons, Israel is interested and active in establishing full relations. Responsible sources in Jerusalem estimate that the news will arrive already in the coming months.

Quite a large Israeli community, of approximately 700 families, has been living and active for many years in Nigeria. The IDF [Israel Defense Force] and the defense authorities also have an active presence in the giant state. A large Israeli school operates in the capital of Lagos.

At a background briefing for journalists last Saturday, the President of Nigeria, Ibrahim Babangida, declared that his country is interested in the resumption of relations with Israel. He added that his personal opinion is that "the matter of relations is only a question of time." The words were broadcast on television. It is estimated in Israel that the president himself seeks the resumption of relations, but he heads a coalition government. The decision can be made only if all the participants in the government agree. It appears that he is trying quietly to convince his colleagues, mainly the Muslims from the north (an important part of the government and of the state).

Dave Kimche, today a private person and, when necessary, a special emissary of the prime minister for delicate missions, was very active on the African subject when he was director-general of the Foreign Ministry in the 1980's. Together with the director of the Africa Department at that time, Avi Primor, who also is an individual who loves adventures and trips, he worked all of East and West Africa, but with little practical political success. One of the great "achievements" of their period, was the visit to Israel (August 1984) of two traditional leaders—chiefs, in popular language—from Nigeria. - chiefs, in popular language. [One was] Alahaji Bajaro, the Emir of Kano, who was then considered the most influential Muslim leader in all of West Africa, not only Nigeria. He "ruled" over tens of millions of believers in Nigeria. Together with him came Obah Situadah, a Christian of the very influential Yoruba tribe. One of the members of this tribe, Chief Owolowo, had served as prime minister of Nigeria [as published]. The two [visitors] met with the President and the Prime Minister—then, as now, Messrs Herzog and Shamir.

Following their arrival, there was a great media celebration and even greater hopes. Shamir said to the guests: "I hope we will exchange ambassadors." It became clear rather quickly that the mountain of expectations did not bring forth even a small mouse. The Government of Nigeria repudiated the visit. Furthermore, the two chiefs were punished severely. They were suspended from their positions for 9 months, their passports were seized and it was forbidden them to leave their city of residence. Nigerian-Israeli relations received a blow. In Arens's Foreign Ministry, the incident is remembered, and over-optimism is avoided. They hope and even believe that the situation has changed, but they are cautious nonetheless. Until there is an official announcement, it would be dangerous to make declarations.

Israel is acting also in other countries on the continent, with the aim of convincing them to resume relations with it. To this end, Shamir is again aided by Kimche's good services. On Saturday, the foreign news agencies reported Kimche's visit to Zambia. This column, too, has reported previously on contacts to renew relations with Ethiopia. It would not be surprising to learn in the coming period of the resumption of relations with

"Marxist" Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Congo, Brazzaville [as published], Ghana, Madagascar, the Seychelles Isles, Mauritius, Guinea, and Gabon.

Defense Budget Cuts Examined

44230049 Tel Aviv MA'ARIV (section "B") in Hebrew
6 Jan 89 p 2

[Article by Emanu'el Rosen]

[Text] The current minister of tourism, Gid'on Pat, is the one who, some years ago, coined the term "tales of the red cap" in reaction to the claims of members of the general staff that the security threat to Israel precluded drastic cuts in the defense budget. Pat spoke as he did during a session of the government held in the conference room of the general staff in Tel Aviv.

The hosts at that time hoped, in vain, that the military atmosphere would make it easier for them to convince the political authorities that defense could not be touched. But Pat clearly was not convinced. And he was not the only one.

Some years have passed since then, and the sacred cow known as the defense budget has grown very lean. On the other hand, the wolf in the red cap has grown and become more dangerous. But the government is not afraid. Apparently, that is the explanation for the fact that the defense minister, Yitzhaq Rabin, who gathered military reporters in his office this week for the opening round against the budget cuts, set out every imaginable reason proving that we cannot cut the defense budget, passing over just one: the security threat facing Israel that has worsened considerably during the past 2 years.

Rabin knows that this is his knockout argument, the decisive one, against cuts in defense. But he apparently also understands that, 15 years after the last war started by the Arabs against Israel, it is not just Gid'on Pat who is likely to see it as "tales of the red cap."

Thus, Rabin this week turned to justifications of another sort entirely; harm to industry, dismissals, and unemployment at defense factories and in development towns, and destruction of the institutes for research and development. All this, spiced up with an allusion to the "outdated army" and to the chilling threat of "the cost in human life," will be necessary, in the defense minister's opinion, to shake even the "Pats" out of their complacency.

In the corridors of the general staff, the spirit of battle had returned this week, and the common expression was "This time we cannot give in!"

The defense minister was very combative on his arrival, arguing hard against the cuts. He took pains to point out this week that the members of the general staff are even more extreme in their position.

Rabin did not show any sign of anger when the newspapers published reports that the general staff opposes his readiness to compromise on part of the \$250 million earmarked for covering the expenses run up in the territories. From this point of view, the general staff is saying what Rabin wants but finds difficult to say. Indeed, the night Peres entered the Finance Ministry, Rabin promised Peres that he would "agree to a compromise on the defense budget."

The talk heard this week at the general staff was sharper and more caustic even than Rabin's apocalyptic warnings. "If this figure is reduced, we will be able to assure the political level less freedom of action during a threat of war."

Anyone who was angered by these words, and perhaps even tried to deny the legitimacy of a senior officer to say them, was able to go back 1 month to an interview that Chief of Staff Lt Gen Dan Shomron gave MA'ARIV. Answering a question about the possibility that the defense budget might not be increased (the possibility of a cut never crossed his mind), the chief of staff replied:

"Inasmuch as the budget has been reduced and the threats have grown, a gap has been created so that, if we do not cover it, we are taking risks...Taking risks also may mean the closing off of steps of freedom of action for the political level.

"For example, in a situation in which intelligence estimates a high likelihood of war, there will be no choice except to open a counter attack in advance. The politicians will have to take the responsibility and this is not a problem of bargaining with someone responsible for budgets in the Treasury Department."

It cannot be argued that the chief of staff is forbidden to speak out in this way. These are not threats or an attempt to dictate a decision to the government, but an honest appraisal of the situation that the military is obliged to offer.

The import of these remarks is clear. Continuing to cut the defense budget raises a question mark over the ability to maintain the existing defense concept that rejects a preemptive strike when war seems to threaten. A small army with old equipment will not be able to deal the enemy a powerful, effective blow if it holds its fire until the last moment.

The defense minister this week went on to say that such an IDF [Israel Defense Force] would also absorb higher losses in war. The soldiers will not have at hand those armaments that cuts in the defense budget will leave on the drawing board.

All the analyses performed this week reveal two clear facts:

- The threat to Israel has grown (the end of the Iran-Iraq War, the introduction into the region of ground-to-ground missiles accurate at long ranges, the real possibility of the use of chemical weapons, the threat to the rear, the Arab states' huge weapons deals, their partial outfitting with western weapons of the highest quality, and so on).
- The defense budget has been reduced in recent years by the sum of 700 million shekels a year, and the overall burden of defense has dropped from about 11.5 percent of the gross national product in 1981 to 8.8 percent in the last 2 years. The share of the defense budget within the national budget has gone down from 30 percent at the beginning of the 1980's to about 17 percent today.

While the threat has grown, the IDF has been shrinking. Combat planes and tanks have been withdrawn from the order of battle, units and command posts have been eliminated, and more than 7,000 soldiers of the regular army and civilians working for the IDF have been dismissed. The levels of stockpiles in emergency storage have nearly reached the danger point, and training has been slashed to the limit.

Aid from America, worth less and less in real terms, also is not safe from cuts. Rabin even hinted this week that a readiness to cut the defense budget to restore the economy will signal the Americans that they can do likewise. The message: \$1.8 billion from America is not a figure that can be regarded as unchangeable and taken for granted.

Another unforeseen and very expensive factor has entered on the scene: the intifadah [uprising].

During its first year, the cost of the intifadah was 400 million shekels. The army requested 260 million to cover this cost and in the end received only 100 million, with a promise for another 80 million in the current fiscal year. This year, the IDF will save 150 million in expenditures on the intifadah and is seeking 250 million. Rabin is willing to compromise on less.

The argument that the intifadah is part of the army's activity and not a ground for paying the army for it can be accepted in the event that the size of the original budget is preserved, but not when the budget is to be cut.

Beyond this, as the chief of staff said, the matter now is not simply one of budgetary bargaining with Treasury officials. Finance Minister Shim'on Peres, a man well versed in defense, must ask in turn what the IDF itself will be required to give up in order to finance its forces for the intifadah.

There is no possibility of continuing to reduce the size of the combat order of battle. On that score, the IDF has already taken risks that the general staff views as excessive and fraught with disaster.

The slow rate of equipping the army and replacing old equipment with new is colliding with the IDF's fundamental concept. The result is that we must be ready for war as though it were about to break out any minute.

In manpower reductions, too, the IDF has exhausted its possibilities. After the dismissal of 7,000 men, it may be possible to let go some hundreds more. More than that would gnaw away at the essential technical-maintenance basis of the IDF, most of the professional manpower of which is in the regular army.

A decline in service conditions will be the day of adding insult to injury for the poor, when the army runs around in circles trying to keep the good men in uniform and releasing those less worthy. Many good men today do not see the army as an attraction and are leaving the field broken up for mediocrity.

Only at the last moment has this worrisome process begun to slow down. A significant deterioration in service conditions, which today are not exceptional and are like those in any other sector of the economy, will send the wagon rolling down again into the depths from which it was pulled with difficulty.

Without a doubt, it is still possible to find fat to cut in the army, but the money involved is only marginal.

Given all this, the only possibility is to cut back on orders from the defense industry.

Contrary to what the defense minister alleged, the main problem in that situation is not unemployment and damage to the industry itself. The problem is that the weapons awaiting the IDF on the shelf are the minimum necessary today as a qualitative response to the quantitative priorities of the Arab states.

These weapons are unique. They are supposed to deter the Arabs from starting a war, and to win it if it nonetheless breaks out. These are not warplanes like the "Lavi" or other such show-off projects, but weapons that will assure the IDF victory in war with a minimum in losses.

Without them, victory will be less certain, less clear, and much more costly.

And without them, a small, out-of-date IDF, with depleted stockpiles, will be a breach winking at all those seeking strategic parity with Israel.

Chambers of Commerce Head Proposes 'Israeli Perestroyka'
44000404 *Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST*
16 Mar 89 p 5

[Text] Mention budget cuts or public-sector dismissals to Danny Gillerman, and he scoffs. "Let's be realistic, it's not going to be done—now or ever." The only real solution to the country's economic woes, in his view, is "an Israeli perestroika—a total restructuring of the economy."

Gillerman, president of the Federation of Chambers of Commerce—if you haven't guessed yet—is a leading advocate of free market enterprise in this country. He is also—as you can imagine—rather controversial.

Some dismiss him as a lobbyist and opportunist, others as a spoiled rich boy with a big mouth. But even his worst enemies can't deny that he is "in" with the powers that be in this country, including such prominent names as Shim'on Peres. He is also very "in," in the north Tel Aviv sense of the word—with his cleancut Ivy League looks, tasteful clothing, perfect English with a hint of a British accent, glamorous foreign-born wife, and fancy car complete with telephone. And you can also be sure of his name featuring prominently in the gossip columns of the national tabloids, with detailed accounts of where he's been hanging out.

So it's not surprising that Gillerman, who loves being provocative, was the first person to take on Bank of Israel Governor Mikha'el Bruno last December and demand his resignation, following the highly controversial 5 percent devaluation. His next well-publicized battle was against the imposition of a surtax on high income-earners, a move he described as "surrendering to the demagoguery of the Histadrut." And before it became a national pastime, Gillerman was one of the first to attack the government for bailing out what he described as the "mis-managed" kibbutzim, demanding equal debt-rescheduling terms for all sectors of the economy.

Although he has fought fiercely against many government decisions, he has enjoyed major input into others, including the new economic growth programme launched last January, and has been privy to many closed-door sessions with the country's economic decision-makers.

Indeed, it was Gillerman and Dov Lautman, head of the Manufacturers Association, who were filmed on television walking out of Peres's office the night before the programme was launched—and not, as might have been expected, Histadrut Secretary-General Yisra'el Qeysar.

These days, however, Gillerman is less enthusiastic about the programme, which he believes has been basically cut to shreds. In fact, he is pretty much down on all economic programmes. "What really worries me is that in Israel we have economic programmes almost every year. The question I ask myself is 'when will Israel finally have an economic programme which will do away with the need for any future programmes?' More to the point, when will we finally have a real, viable self-sustaining economy?"

He returns to his dream of an Israeli perestroyka. "The only way to cut public spending is to really have a free-market economy and a viable private sector which will be so attractive, that workers will leave the public sector in droves. But as long as we are strangling the

private sector by not allowing it access to the capital markets, by imposing prohibitive tax rates on it, by paying lip service to the Histadrut and giving into populism and demagoguery, we will not get people to work, invest, or immigrate to Israel.

"Sad as it sounds, people will just not come here anymore for pure idealistic reason. They want to live well. The days of clearing swamps and paving roads are over."

Gillerman was born 45 years ago in Tel Aviv to a well-to-do family and grew up right next door to Menachem Begin—"my claim to fame back then." He completed his high school studies in England—"it was the thing to do in those days"—where he met his future wife, Janice, who, defying her parents, followed Danny back to Israel at the age of 17 and converted to Judaism. The couple have two children—Karen, 19, and David, 16.

After receiving a B.A. in political science and economics from the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Gillerman decided that instead of working in the family grain importing business, he would try his hand at what was then a new and growing field in Israel—advertising. Although he landed a job as an accounts executive at one of the country's most prestigious advertising firms, after about five years he became disillusioned with the business. "My dreams of spending days on the beach photographing semi-nude models at sunset disintegrated into spending time at the printers and going over newspaper ads."

Eventually, he made contact with a Swiss chemicals company which was looking for a representative in Israel and started his own business, which today includes companies dealing in international trade and the import of chemicals and other raw materials.

In July 1985—coincidentally the very same day that the economic austerity programme was launched—he became president of the Federation of Chambers of Commerce and has since turned it into one of the most powerful economic organizations in the country.

Before Gillerman came on the scene, the federation was just another lobbying organization. Gillerman revolutionized the organization, bringing along with him some young and energetic blood. "One of my key objectives was to make the chambers of commerce a more prominent voice in the Israeli economy, less of a lobbying force and more of a partner in the execution of economic policy in this country.

The chambers of commerce include among its members most of the country's importers, export companies, banks, insurance companies, retailers, computer and software houses, gas stations, advertisers, real estate agents, and department stores. Aside from providing services and information to its members and representing them in their conflicts with the authorities, Gillerman says he sees the role of the federation as "being the

true representative of business and private enterprise in Israel towards the government and acting as a partner to the government and the unions in the formulation of economic policy." Taking advantage of this partnership, the chambers of commerce, in fact, had a major say in the tax reforms and capital markets reforms introduced in the past few years.

Under Gillerman's leadership, the chambers of commerce have gained the importance and prominence of the Manufacturers Association in representing Israel's business sector. But Gillerman doesn't deny that there are inherent conflicts of interest between the two giant organizations, which have made him the victim of vehement attacks from many industrialists. "The Manufacturers Association sees its job first and foremost as protecting industry, while we see our main duty as preaching free trade in Israel. The manufacturers support benefits for certain sectors, while we oppose them.

"They believe industry should be regarded as a preferred sector, while we support a free-market economy which does not distinguish between sectors; they support tax benefits for industry, while we believe there should be no discrimination."

All very nice on paper, but speak to some small-time industrialists struggling to export their products to the U.S., and they'll tell you Gillerman's trying to sell them out in order to protect the country's importers, who represent the bulk of the federation's membership.

Gillerman says he would be more than happy to see certain industries, in which Israel has no relative advantage, done away with entirely. "Israel should concentrate at what it does best and not try to do everything. There is no way to escape the painful transition of restructuring Israeli industry, in order to move from what Margaret Thatcher called the sunset industries to the sunrise industries."

Probably one of the most important changes to take place in the chambers of commerce since Gillerman took over is that they have become instrumental in fomenting and strengthening commercial ties between Israel and those countries with which it has no formal diplomatic relations.

In the past year alone, Gillerman has visited the Soviet Union, where he reached an agreement in principle with Soviet officials to set up bi-national chambers of commerce in Moscow and Tel Aviv. Plans to set up similar chambers have already been finalized with Yugoslavia. Gillerman was also responsible for bringing business delegations from Hungary and Bulgaria in recent months and was instrumental in fostering closer ties with Poland.

He is now setting his sights on the Far East, where he is working especially hard, but behind the scenes, at strengthening Israel's commercial ties with Red China. "Look here, I've got two letters just today from China," he says, pulling two envelopes out of his desk drawer.

"We found that many countries like China prefer dealing with our chambers of commerce, at least in the initial stages, because it's seen as a non-political channel."

All this training in diplomacy may eventually come in handy for Gillerman, who doesn't hide the fact that one of his dreams is to become Israel's ambassador to the United States. Considering that he seems to have a knack for always knowing the right thing to say—whether when toasting his Hungarian guests at a festive luncheon or when opening a discussion panel on Israel-EC relations—this might not be such a bad idea.

Does he have any political aspirations? "Had I wanted to enter politics at this stage, I could have done so during the last elections, when I received very tempting offers from both big parties. But I realize there will come a time when I'll feel I've done as much as I can here and the only way to have more influence or continue to have a say is in politics. I don't believe politics is a dirty word."

Gillerman prefers not to speak about his political leanings, but one indication comes in response to another question, in which he cites as his modern-day heroes, Margaret Thatcher and Menachem Begin.

In any event, Gillerman laughs off the suggestion that he himself has become a kind of superstar in Israeli society. "The point is I don't represent myself. I represent a large number of people, who are trying to get up every day and earn a living in a very difficult society."

Uri Sagi' Comments on Combined Unit Training, West Bank

44230067 Tel Aviv BAMAHAHE in Hebrew
1 Feb 89 p 5

[Interview with Field Forces Commander Major General Uri Sagi' by Dan Raviv; date and place unspecified]

[Text] The training which soldiers currently undergo is more complex, and constitutes the touchstone of training for operational units, states Major General Uri Sagi', field forces commander, in a special interview with BAMAHAHE to mark the passage of 5 years since the establishment of the field forces command. According to Sagi', the training system for regular units has become completely stabilized following a year of revolt in the territories. "Regular soldiers are involved in activity in the territories, however the damage caused to training by this involvement is negligible."

[BAMAHAHE] Last week, you finished a multiforce exercise capping courses for officers of field units. To what extent does this exercise, and the cooperation displayed in it, reflect the totality of field forces training?

[Uri Sagi'] An exercise is nothing but a means to make the units—and not just the commanders—knowledgeable, aware, and capable. The forming of combined combat teams is essential. Without it, the execution of missions would be more difficult and fraught with error. These exercises, which are carried out in officers courses, as well as in battalion and company command courses, are the touchstone of training for operational units.

[BAMAHAHE] Is training currently more complex and complicated due to the need to absorb the subject of cooperation?

[Uri Sagi'] Training is more complex, and requires more skill and professionalism on the part of soldiers. From time to time, it is clear that difficulties arise—mainly due to external factors—in carrying out training, as seen this year for example in reserve training, and to a lesser extent in regular forces training.

[[Uri Sagi'] Have you eased safety directives pertaining to training in order to establish interforces cooperation?

[Uri Sagi'] The safety directives were not changed out of a lack of consideration. None of the changes in the safety directives pertaining to training condones negligence or exposure to danger any greater than that which we knew in the past. Nevertheless, changes were made everywhere we found technical constraints which were not sufficiently justified, as for example in the area of artillery or atomic-biological-chemical warfare. At the same time, there is no justification for endangering human life just to improve an exercise.

[BAMAHAHE] Does the pursuit of cooperation at all levels negatively affect the desire to advance the professionalism of the soldiers?

[Uri Sagi'] No, the exclusive professional training of each soldier or body separately has priority over cooperation, and this was expressed in the recent exercise. There is no doubt that it is prohibited to neglect the professional level of soldiers in favor of the need to integrate them in exercises.

[BAMAHAHE] It was recently published that you appointed a team to examine the IDF's [Israel Defense Forces] activity at al-Na'imah. Which aspects will this team examine?

[Uri Sagi'] Everything that the IDF does and does not do in professional areas is not the media's concern. Every operational activity having a bearing on combat means and doctrine is examined without connection to the place and time of the activity in order to derive lessons and to make applications in the future.

The activity at al-Na'imah, as well as other activities, is no exception to the IDF's desire to derive lessons.

[BAMAHANE] To what extent is the field forces command, which is not an operational command, aware of the operational activity of the IDF?

[Uri Sagi'] Great importance is attached to separating the training of manpower and the maintenance of its capability from responsibility for operational activity. The field forces command neither requires, nor is able to be a substitute for the operational commands vis-a-vis their responsibility for operational activity in the IDF. In general, it is best that operational requirements not overshadow manpower training. However, there is a need to monitor what is done [operationally] in order to study and instruct regarding that which requires correction.

[BAMAHANE] Have you overcome the damage caused by the uprising to the training of soldiers, which was noted in the first months of the disturbances?

[Uri Sagi'] The training system of regular units has become completely stabilized. Training courses are being held with almost no disruptions, and although course participants are involved in operational activity in the territories, the damage caused to training is negligible. Regarding the reserve system, I estimate that in the coming year, we will succeed in balancing the damage caused to the training of reserves, and a change for the better will occur in this area. The training of reserve units will last 1-2 weeks, in addition to training for commanders and exercises.

[BAMAHANE] Chief officers in the field forces command spoke of the positive aspects of the employment of their soldiers in the territories, in referring to the activity of their units there.

[Uri Sagi'] The military aspects of activity in the territories can also be advantageous. Such activity contributes to the skill and independence of units in the field, self-confidence, the ability to operate weapons, and even the personal bravery of soldiers. We did not have to invent the need for force employment solely for the sake of these positive aspects. However, because we are obviously required to carry out this task, it is also important to see its positive, professional aspects.

[BAMAHANE] Have you adjusted the field forces training system to the type of activity and new combat means required by activity in the territories?

[Uri Sagi'] There is a continual process involving the development of combat means for use in the territories, and the absorption of the combat doctrine derived from the development of combat means. This process includes supplementary courses, reference material, and of course, debriefing and monitoring of the methods for

using these means. Most of the training sessions are carried out at the instruction bases of the field forces command, and some of them are carried out at regional training bases.

[BAMAHANE] The committee which you appointed to examine ways to encourage junior officers in the field forces command to sign up for the career army will soon be submitting its conclusions. To what extent is this problem indeed significant throughout the field system?

[Uri Sagi'] The problem of junior officers signing up for the career army is our primary concern, and clearly a most important issue with which to be preoccupied. We are doing everything to develop the means to find a solution to this problem, and I assume that the committee will recommend instruments, as well as material incentives, which will enable us to bridge the existing gaps. In any case, as a result of the activity which we have already undertaken, a trend toward improvement in this area was evident last year.

[BAMAHANE] What goals has the field forces command set for itself in its sixth year?

[Uri Sagi'] The continuation of the maximal use of manpower, with the ultimate goal of aspiring to retain the best [personnel] in the ranks of the command. We will continue to develop future combat means, and we will become equipped with means whose development has been completed. We hope to maintain a level of training which will enable the IDF to maintain its readiness and capability daily and hourly, and to also handle the problems of the present.

Military Duty in Nabulus Casbah Described
44000403 Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST
27 Feb 89 p 2

[Article by Joel Greenberg]

[Text] It was almost inevitable that the first IDF [Israel Defense Force] soldier to be killed by a rock during the uprising would be slain in the alleys of the Nabulus casbah.

The warren of narrow roads and tightly packed homes has for the past 15 months been the main battleground of troops and youths in the West Bank—the scene of daily casualties and some of the bloodiest clashes of the uprising.

The casbah's jumble of buildings is classic terrain for the guerrilla warfare waged by local teenagers, who know the maze of rooftops better than any soldier and can easily take advantage of the twists and turns of the alleys, the dark tunnels and hidden rooms, to ambush the troops with stockpiles of rocks and bottles.

In the past year, a balance of terror has been created in the casbah.

Soldiers walk the streets nervously, glancing anxiously above and behind them, ready to open fire at the slightest sign of attack.

Residents of the casbah, living their daily life in this battle-zone, move furtively in the streets, glancing quickly to the sides when they walk out of their homes to make sure there are no soldiers in the area. People in upper floor apartments, who see where the soldiers are, report to pedestrians below on the location of the patrols.

Just as the soldiers walk in fear of a sudden barrage of rocks from above, residents live in constant anxiety, afraid of being shot at by jumpy soldiers.

Inside homes, people stay away from windows and off roofs, to avoid being targeted. Residents of one home have even installed heavy metal shutters for extra protection. Parents say they are reluctant to send their children out of the house. A knock on the door often goes unanswered for fear that a soldier might be standing at the entrance.

The soldiers, for their part, have been taking the offensive against the attackers on the roofs. Houses are often raided and searched, residents ordered to clear construction blocks off roofs, and at times, soldiers have occupied homes for several hours, ordering families into one room and using windows as a lookout post to ambush stone-throwers.

During clashes, soldiers posted on rooftops snipe at the youths dropping rocks, and sometimes, soldiers are sent onto buildings to outflank the attackers and shoot them from adjacent roofs.

The close combat in the casbah is the result of the IDF's policy of maintaining a presence everywhere in the area so that control of the region does not revert to the shebab.

For a brief period one year ago, the IDF stayed out of the casbah and it became a "liberated zone." Youths wielding slingshots and sticks burned tyres in the streets, flew Palestinian flags, banged on barrels and metal shop-shutters, and blared nationalist songs over loud-speakers.

The IDF responded with a massive sweep through the casbah, raiding scores of homes to make arrests and recapturing the area from the youths who controlled it. The army has remained inside ever since.

Israeli-Palestinian Medical Ties Examined

Ramallah Physician Criticizes Dependency on Israel

44230064 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew
25 Jan 89 p 11

[Interview with West Bank Physician Yasir 'Abbad; date and place unspecified]

[Text] "The intention of the policy practiced by the government is to increase the dependency of residents of the territories on Israeli services; this is true regarding

electricity, water, and health," states Dr Yasir 'Abbad, the director of the Arab Center for Health, and the director of department of internal, dialysis and intensive cardiac care at the hospital in Ramallah. Until August 1988, Dr 'Abbad was the representative of the Jordanian Ministry of Health in the West Bank. At present, following Jordan's break with the territories, he serves as a liaison officer with the Jordanian Ministry of Health, and is working to break the dependency of residents of the territories on Israeli medical services.

"The government is making an error in everything connected to the health system. If they had invested the money that they are paying to hospitals in Israel in the development of infrastructure and equipment, we would be able take care of ourselves. However, this did not happen, because the policy is to increase dependency, which makes medical services expensive for residents. The government's approach obliges physicians in the West Bank to seek alternatives in order to increase independence. Some of these alternatives are already in operation in the field.

[HA'ARETZ] How do you cope with the restrictions placed on sending patients to Israeli hospitals?

['Abbad] According to the determination of the Arab League, Palestinian patients must be given free treatment and hospitalization in every Arab country. According to this directive, I was accustomed in the past to sending between 30-60 patients per month. In recent months, as a result of the restrictions, the number of patients sent to Arab counties increased to 100-150. Kuwait and Saudi Arabia are also willing to absorb patients. According to the decision of the Arab League, the Jordanian Minister of Health is responsible for sending them there and covering travel costs. In the hospitals in Kuwait or in Abu Dhabi, there is a permanent allocation of five to seven beds for Palestinians. The hospitals there are at a higher level compared to here. Usually, the patients prefer to stay in Jordan, but there are also those who are prepared to move to more distant places if they have relatives there.

[HA'ARETZ] More than half of the population of the West Bank is not insured. How do you provide them with services?

['Abbad] Eight years ago, a group of physicians in the West Bank established a network of day clinics, called "The Arab Clinic." These clinics provide all services, including hospitalization. All of the equipment was contributed by Jordan, Kuwait, and others. The cost of a visit to a physician is 8 new Israeli shekels, and this includes diagnosis and x-rays. We have two clinics in Jerusalem, one next to the post office and the other next to the al-Aqsa Mosque for the convenience of tourists and worshippers. We also have two clinics in Ramallah, and clinics in Janin and Hebron. All of them operate from 7:00 am to 7:00 pm.

[HA'ARETZ] Is there also an intention to establish hospitalization services at minimum prices?

[Abbad] A modern, regular, 150-bed hospital will be established with contributions in 2 to 3 years in Jerusalem, in Abu Dis. The departments and clinics established at this new hospital will admit the uninsured needy for a nominal payment.

Jordanian Services Closed

[HA'ARETZ] Close to 60 percent of the population of the West Bank is uninsured. Perhaps, instead of initiating alternative services, it would be worthwhile to find a way to insure them?

[Abbad] Most of the population lives in villages, in private [detached] homes. A son lives with his father in his father's house. When he marries, and a room is added to the building, where he lives with his family. The welfare staff officer says: You live in a private home, you have means, you do not need welfare insurance. This is an incorrect approach. Everyone lives in detached homes, because that is our way of life; however, no one examines how we live.

[HA'ARETZ] Why do you claim that the health policy of the administration creates dependency on the Israeli system?

[Abbad] For 7 years, I negotiated with the authorities so that they would grant a permit to build a hospital entirely financed by contributions from Kuwait. In order to obtain the permit, I held discussions with 15 members of Knesset, five ministers, and 20 diplomats, including the French minister of health, Secretary Schultz, and former President Carter. Ultimately, I wrote a letter to Shim'on Peres, in which I informed him that if he is seeking Arab votes, he should grant the permit. The response to the letter was approval for the construction of the hospital. The hospital is currently in the planning stages, and I hope that it will begin to operate within 2 to 3 years.

In 1977, all of the Jordanian medical services in Jerusalem were closed. The authorities claimed that, since the residents of the city had become residents of Jerusalem, they were not in need of Jordanian medical services. This was done as a measure to sever them from the health services in the territories.

[HA'ARETZ] Are you satisfied with the level of services in governmental hospitals?

[Abbad] Until 1977, the policy of the civil administration was to preserve what existed in 1967, in other words, a poor health system at a low level. During 1967-77, all of the equipment became outdated and obsolete and the level continued to decline. While the level of medical services in the West Bank declined, the level of medical services in Jordan rose. In 1977, when

UN delegations visited, it was argued before them that we have no services, no equipment, no possibility for the specialization of physicians, and no continuing medical studies.

In the same year, a reversal occurred, in the framework of which an attempt was made to introduce improvements. Budgets were allocated for development, and they permitted us to receive and use contributions from abroad. We purchased equipment, made improvements, and began to send physicians for training in specialties. We attribute the momentum of the development to Dr Efrayim Sne, who was the commander of the area, and, as a physician, understood the needs of the system. The acceleration came to end at the start of 1988.

[HA'ARETZ] Did you appeal to the minister of defense and set him right about the seriousness of the situation?

[Abbad] Four months ago, I met with Minister Rabin regarding the restrictions placed on sending our patients to hospitals in Israel. I received this response: "We have problems with the health system in Israel. If you expect me to pay one agora to improve the health system in the territories [by transferring funds] from the health system budget in Israel, you are sick." I told him that the solution to all of the problems amounted to the price of one Phantom jet. He responded by saying: "The Phantom is more essential to the security of Israel."

[HA'ARETZ] Are you optimistic about finding a solution to the Palestinian problem?

[Abbad] If I were an Israeli, I would speak only with 'Arafat, especially after the brave step he took. The PLO is our authorized representative, and no Arab country can sign [an agreement] in our name. If I were in Mubarak's position, I would bring 'Arafat, and suggest to Shamir that he give him Gaza, as a gesture of good will toward a settlement. If the Palestinian problem is solved, Israel's problem with the Arab countries would be solved automatically.

The spokesman of the civil administration responded by saying that the price of medical insurance is low, and that there are discounts for population groups, such as policemen and municipal workers. The administration is continuing to do everything in its power to improve the health system in the territories.

Ramallah Medical Services Discussed

44230064 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew
25 Jan 89 p 11

[Interview with Ramallah Hospital Director 'Isa Sulti; date and place unspecified]

[Text] The director of the hospital in Ramallah, Dr 'Isa Sulti, whose area of specialization is general surgery, is proud of the services offered by the hospital under his management. As someone who worked at the institution

for 25 years, Sulti finds it difficult to become reconciled with the image of a second class medical institution, which influences the medical status of the institute as well. "Treatment of sick people is human; however, the health policy is political, as is everything in the territories in general," states Sulti. "Therefore, a change in the policy will solve the problems of both the residents and the administration."

[HA'ARETZ] Are you satisfied with the services that you provide to the population?

[Sulti] The hospital in Ramallah is the largest in the West Bank. The momentum of development, which began 6 years ago, makes it possible to develop services and additional installations, such as operating rooms, modern laboratories, cardiac operations, intensive cardiac care, surgery on children and improved x-ray services. We renovated the wards and increased the number of beds from 124 to 136. These developments are intended to match the scope of the needs of the population. The budgetary freeze in the previous year arrested development. This measure has, and will have, a negative influence on the quality of services provided to the population.

From the standpoint of daily functioning, there is no problem. On the contrary, in Israel one has to wait for a year for elective operations such as for a hernia or the insertion of a prosthesis. Here, the wait is only 2 weeks. Although our manpower per bed ration is low, and the number of beds is smaller than in your hospitals, we serve a larger population.

[HA'ARETZ] Which services do you lack?

[Sulti] As a hospital which provides "comprehensive services" to the entire West Bank, we have no intensive respiratory care, rehabilitation or oncology units. We have no genetic counseling service, nor do we have a plastic surgery unit with all of the necessary equipment. We are doing what can be done within a general surgery framework. We have no burn unit; we treat burns in the framework of the general departments. Because we have no plastic surgery department, treatment for burns is longer.

In order to care for burn victims, special bathtubs are needed along with physiotherapeutic treatment administered immediately after an injury in order to stimulate the muscles. We have neither bathtub equipment nor physiotherapy. In this case, we are offering burn victims a level of treatment that was customary 20 years ago in the hospitals in Israel. We provide first aid and dressing. Consequently, the patient is left with larger scars. If a case arrives with 80-90 percent burns, the chance that we will succeed in saving him is small.

[HA'ARETZ] How are you coping with the restriction placed on sending patients to hospitals in Israel?

[Sulti] In the past month, the sending of patients to hospitals in Israel has almost ceased. Personally, I do not support sending patients to Israel. I am interested in developing independent services here. Until this happens, there is no alternative but to continue sending patients to Israel, so that they will not suffer.

In cases of cancer, we operate here at the hospital. We have a chemotherapy treatment service, including drip infusion; however, if there is a need for radiation, there is a problem.

Several days ago, we wanted to send a heart patient, who was in grave condition, to Israel. Because of the bureaucratic arrangements, we did not manage to locate the staff health officer in order to receive his authorization. The man died. I cannot guarantee that he would have stayed alive at Hadassah; however, the fact remains that his transferral to Israel was prevented.

In the past, we were able to send a patient to a hospital in Israel, and our referral automatically obliged the hospital to allow a 3-day stay. At present, without the approval of the health staff officer, it is impossible to send patients to Israel, and there are cases whose transference cannot be delayed until after arrangements have been made.

I have no interest in operating, and afterward sending the patient to a hospital in Israel to receive a second opinion from a professor, even though I have great respect for him. I think that we can certainly provide the service here.

There are patients who do not like being hospitalized in Israel; they do not speak the language, the food is different, and it is difficult for visitors to reach the hospital. If they were to unfreeze budgets for development and equipment, we would not have to send patients to Israel. In 1988-99, there was supposed to be an increase of 10 percent in the development budget. What we actually received was a cut of 5 percent in the budget.

[HA'ARETZ] A large portion of the equipment in the hospitals is contributed by different organizations. Why do you not continue to solicit contributions, and thus free yourselves from the development budgets of the administration?

[Sulti] The hospital relies on friends of the hospital in the United States, residents of Ramallah who immigrated there. They are not willing to contribute to the establishment of a building or a wing on land under the control of the Israeli Government. They contributed equipment for the new operating rooms. Therefore, the expansion of the hospital, i.e., the construction of a wing for rehabilitation institutes and other departments, must come from the development budget of the administration. If this occurs, I believe that we would be able to receive some of the equipment as contributions.

[HA'ARETZ] How has the intifadah [uprising] affected the daily functioning of the hospital?

[Sulti] The intifadah created a problem regarding the treatment of injured people. People do not want to come to a governmental hospital out of fear that they will be arrested. There were cases in which the army transferred injured people to hospitals in Israel after they received initial treatment from us, and people are afraid [that they too will be transferred]. According to the directive of the army, every injury must be reported. We are attempting to cope with the problem, and to convince them to come to receive treatment at the hospital.

Another problem is the evacuation of the wounded. Because of the curfew and the roadblocks, ambulances cannot always move freely; when an injured person is bleeding, every delay in receiving aid endangers his life.

[HA'ARETZ] You demand the development of services. Do you have the skilled manpower to operate the new services?

[Sulti] This is another problem with which it is difficult to cope. There are 200 employees at the hospital (including 25 physicians and seven specialists), and 136 beds, i.e., 1.4 employees per bed. This is a low percentage compared to Israel, Jordan, and private hospitals in the area.

Even if we manage to recruit funds in the future, we will not be able to develop because of the shortage of manpower in government services due to the low wage level. We opened a computerized tomography unit, but the unit is almost silent. We have a half-time radiologist who works twice a week. The other days, he works in private hospitals. If we need his services when he is not here, we try to call him. If he cannot come, the examination cannot be performed. An employee here cannot exist on the salary paid by the civil administration. As a director of a hospital, I earn 1,330 new Israeli shekels per month, which is considered a high salary.

[HA'ARETZ] Are you optimistic about finding a solution to the Palestinian problem?

[Sulti] I am optimistic because the number of realistic people among the Israelis is growing. They understand that the Palestinian population in the West Bank has rights.

I am optimistic about a change in the future. I derive optimism from the fact that more and more Israelis understand that the occupation is a dangerous step, and that it also contradicts Jewish philosophy, which stands for freedom, and opposes occupation. I am certain that this will influence the position of the current Israeli Government.

Founder of State of Judaea Interviewed
44230056 Tel Aviv HADASHOT in Hebrew
13 Jan 89 p 14

[Article by Hagay Segal: "The Visionary of the State of Judaea"; first paragraph is introduction]

[Text] He was taken by force from Hatzer Adar, but no one will evict Mikha'el Ben-Horin from the state that he has woven in his dreams, the State of Judaea. The state will arise in the land that Israel will relinquish. With all due respect to Tel Aviv, says Ben-Horin, it is not exactly our history. Ben-Horin is working on the infrastructure and awaits the signal.

The State of Judaea, the younger sister of the elderly Zionist State, is already kicking in the womb. Next Wednesday, its parents and enthusiasts will gather for a state congress in Jerusalem. They will choose a flag, an anthem, and a constitution. If no unexpected surprises occur, the agriculturalist Mikha'el Ben-Horin from the Golan Heights will be elected to head the Provisional National Council and the establishment team. In accordance with the mandate that will be given to him, he will have to invest all his efforts to set up the infrastructure for a second Jewish state west of the Jordan River on the day when Messrs Shamir, Arens, and their Palestinian colleagues sign the autonomy agreement or any other political misfortune that would force Israel out of Judaea and Samaria. Not one minute too early.

In the opening speech of the congress, Ben-Horin will offer peace to the State of Israel and calm its legal advisors. "The idea of the State of Judaea," he will declare before the cameras, "is meant to be realized only in those parts of the land that the State of Israel will relinquish anyway. It is understood that at the moment when Jewish sovereignty is imposed in them, we will willingly merge with the State of Israel. Moreover, as rumors have been spread about us that the organization is in danger of violating the law (Israeli), we hereby declare: There is no incitement to revolt here, but there is Zionism. There is no law-breaking here, but there is stringent observance of the Lord's commandments."

Until the founding of the State of Judaea, Yosef Ben-Horin (41) will continue to reside far from Judaea and Samaria, and to raise plums, myrtles, and seven children. He hails originally from Ra'ananna, the son of a family "more nationalist than religious." After the army (artillery captain) and the Technion (aeronautics), he ended up in Moshav Nov in the Golan Heights. The dimensions of the knitted skullcap on his head widened quickly. Under it hides a bubbling personality. A contrary personality. The members nearby keep an ideological distance from him, but never miss a chance to argue with him. Mikha'el is always 20 paces ahead of them, followed by a long line of question marks. Begin had hardly returned from Camp David, and Ben-Horin already gone down to the Sinai to establish the settlement of 'Atzmona. Before the withdrawal from Sinai,

when it became clear that Israel did not intend to struggle seriously against the edict of withdrawal, he established the Hatzer Adar next to 'Atzmona. The soldiers had to remove him from there by force, he and his wife Ar'ela, the daughter of the famous Gavrush Rappoport of Bet Alfa. Two years later he was indicted for stealing trailer homes for the purposes of the "Movement to Stop the Withdrawal from Sinai."

His last stop before the State of Judaea was the Kach movement. Mikha'el Ben-Horin, definitely not a blind follower of Rabbi Kahana, was placed towards the end of the movement's list for the Knesset. On the day the list was disqualified by the High Court of Justice, Ben-Horin spoke angrily about the right to delegitimize the government, and promised not to remain silent about the injustice. After a week, when Yitzhaq Shamir arrived for a tour of the Golan and all the important figures of the region dressed up in his honor in the Kinar resort village, Mikha'el Ben-Horin awaited him there wearing blue work clothing and shouted a long "boo!", as only he knows how to shout. The hosts apologized for him.

After the elections, when it became clear that Likud was inclined towards a second marriage with Labor Alignment, Ben-Horin began to organize a series of parlor talks in the Golan and in Judaea and Samaria, in order to win adherents for the idea of the State of Judaea. He does not fear a unilateral Israeli withdrawal from Judaea and Samaria, but suggests to his listeners that they prepare in advance for a possible autonomy. At the end of each parlor talk, they are asked to sign a membership form for the state-on-the-way and to donate NIS 20. Whoever is interested in a certificate of citizenship is asked to attach a passport photo.

"Gentlemen, right now you are third-class citizens," he declares to the few settlers that bother to come to these parlor talks. "Both from the political and from the social viewpoints. The settler is presented in the media and in literature as an armed fascist, who eats Arabs for breakfast, expropriates, exploits, rolls his eyes, unfeeling, closed to any drop of ordinary human culture. They always write that his wife wears a wig, that she has a terrifying messianic stare, and a generally repulsive appearance. All this, friends, has inevitable consequences on your security situation. The deficient way the government is handling the intifadah is a symptom of a political problem, which was created as a result of social-character assassination. You can be sure that the police will not seize the weapon of a kibbutznik who fired into the air after stones were thrown at him. This happens only to settlers. If the guys from 'En Gev had security problems on the way home, it would have long ago been handled the right way. Until 1967 they plowed right up to the last centimeter before the Syrians, and nobody called that a provocation, as they now automatically define Friday hikes by settlers between Ramallah and Nili. All the people stood behind the legitimate struggle of 'En Gev. And now?"

The necessary conclusion, according to Ben-Horin, is that the residents of Judaea and Samaria need, if not their own state, at least a renewed collective identity and a leadership that will defend them against all slanderers. The very involvement in a conditional state early on will liberate them, in his opinion, from the present feeling of impotence, and will instill in them pride and morale: "The declaration of intent on establishing the State of Judaea will clarify that we intend to remain here forever, without being dependent on the caprice of the State of Israel, or to become enslaved en masse to the caprices of its government. Against Arafat's claim of ownership over the region, we must lay down an opposing, more just declaration: This is our home!"

Ben-Horin is doing a lot of homework before the congress: "I am walking in the footsteps of Herzl. In order to learn the subject better, I took the minutes of all the Zionist Congresses and studied them thoroughly. They are a formula for success and are also saving me a lot of preparatory work. It turns out that Herzl, at the Basel Congress, expressed complete faith in Ottoman rule. He did not declare the establishment of a state, but rather the opening of a move that would only in the end, and in coordination with the existing authorities, bring about the establishment of a Jewish state. This is exactly what we are now doing. We are not declaring the establishment of a state, but only of a state-on-the-way. If they nevertheless put me on trial, I will simply read the name of Herzl. In my opinion, they will have a problem doing that. Zionism will put itself on trial."

On the subject of Herzl, Ben-Horin says: "Whoever said that a Jewish state must be established in the Land of Israel, meant first in Judaea and Samaria. With all due respect and estimation for the Dan bloc, Tel Aviv is not exactly our history. In speaking about the Land of Israel, one speaks actually about Judaea and Samaria. Nabulus, Hebron, and Jerusalem; Tel Aviv, compared with them, belongs to the Philistines and the other nations of the sea. It is a fact that when you excavate along the Philistine sea coast, you find graven images or a Canaanite deity sculpture. Here, you find the seven-branched menorah."

One small difference between Herzl's Jewish state and Ben-Horin's State of Judaea is the matter of the Halakha [Rabbinic law]: "Herzl said that Zionism had nothing to do with religion, while we say that there is no Zionism without religion. Secular Zionism is an historical episode whose time has passed. It exploited cynically historical Jewish rights, in order to establish a secular democratic state in a land that was conquered with the blood of British and Australian soldiers. Without an obligation to our history, we would have no right to claim the land that they drenched with their blood. We received this land only by virtue of our being Jews, and a Jewish State must therefore be established here. That is the reason why the State of Judaea will be based on the foundations of the Halakha and Jewish tradition."

[HADASHOT] How will the State of Judaea treat its secular citizens?

[Ben-Horin] Like everyone else. It will not stone any Jew who travels on the Sabbath. Today there is no death penalty, because there is no Temple and no Sanhedrin. But the State of Judaea will bring the concept of a Jewish constitution down from the academic ivory tower to the possibility of actual implementation, which does not involve changing the individual's life-style. The secular individual will be able to bear his secularism as much as he wishes. There will be no compulsion. The Jewish religion does not believe in compelling people. This is not Christianity here. Only the style of government will be adapted to the Old Testament. Only a few years ago, honored scholars such as Shalom Albek and Yesha'yahu Liebovitz formulated a proposed proper Jewish constitution, and there would be no problem in adopting it immediately. If we follow it in Judaea and Samaria, we will also be able to show the State of Israel that a Halakhic state is not a state of Satan, but something that can actually work also beyond the Green Line. They'll imitate us.

[HADASHOT] The basic idea of the State of Judaea is not Ben-Horin's invention. Since Camp David, certain figures in Gush Emunim have been toying with it quietly. Elyaqim Ha'etzni, for example. Most of them are inclined today to think that Ben-Horin moved too quickly with the implementation. Some of the members of the Gush Emunim Secretariat, whose names were linked in recent weeks with the "old-new idea," quickly moved to deny this. Rabbi Levinger stated that it is a childish initiative. "Any act that calumnies, even verbally and without serious intent, the State of Israel, is extremely serious," he said. Other leading figures in Judaea and Samaria used stronger terms to denounce the idea. This is all they need now, to begin moves to cut themselves off from the State of Israel.

But Ben-Horin is not moved. He is convinced that the leadership of Gush Emunim will follow in his footsteps. Even if it refrains for the moment from showing its enthusiasm for the idea, it will not hesitate to support it openly when the time comes. In his opinion, the option of the State of Judaea will be more effective than struggles such as the present hunger strike of the Council of Judaea and Samaria opposite Shamir's office:

[Ben-Horin] What force can the head of the Council of Judaea and Samaria now use against the government? Why the moment it uses significant force, the minister of housing will stop building him the ritual bathhouse in Mikhmarsh. The heads of the councils are constrained from conducting a real struggle against the government, because they cannot spit into the well from which they are drinking. If the settlers continue to get hit on the head with stones, it is mainly because there is no extra-establishment force that compels the government to act. Only if we succeed in forming a democratic body

that will genuinely represent the residents of Judaea and Samaria, a body that does not build ritual bathhouses, will we succeed in influencing the Government.

[HADASHOT] Maybe you moved a bit fast with the new state? Is it so clear to you that Shamir has already decided to sell out Judaea and Samaria?

[Ben-Horin] When a baby is born to me, I don't wait until it contracts tetanus, but inoculate it against tetanus at the earliest possible moment. I don't take chances. Meanwhile, I'm not making bombs, not even a drop of lead or TNT, I'm only getting organized. It is preferable to get organized now, not against the background of immediate conflict with the government, than to wait until the 90th minute like at Yamit. Nobody knows what Shamir and Arens are cooking up for us behind our backs. If we get organized early enough, maybe we won't have to struggle with them at all. It's clear to me that it is enough that 10 percent of the residents of Judaea and Samaria will identify with the new idea, so that there will be no autonomy. Autonomy is possible only if there is no clear Jewish declaration that Judaea and Samaria are our home.

[HADASHOT] In case of autonomy, will the State of Judaea use its own army?

[Ben-Horin] When the Government of Israel sees that it cannot itself ensure the security of the settlers in the field, it will ask us—as a real, organized entity—to do that work for it. It is reasonable to assume that it will arm us, as the British once armed Jewish defense squads in regions that they found difficult to supervise themselves.

In the event of the sudden imposition of Israeli sovereignty in Judaea and Samaria, the visionary of the State of Judaea promises to liquidate it [Judaea] immediately.

OMAN

Gas Project To Be Completed Soon

44000416b Muscat TIMES OF OMAN in English
16 Mar 89 p 11

[Text] The \$66 million expansion of the Government gas line from Izki to Yibal is expected to be completed by contractors CCC Saipem very shortly.

The 176-kilometre pipeline, work on which began in September last year, is the second and final phase of the looping of the existing 20-inch line with 36-inch pipes from the Yibal gas plant to Rusayl.

The first phase, covering a distance of 105 kilometres from Rusayl to Izki, was completed in 1987.

"Work is moving fast and hopefully it will be completed in the next two months," Director-General of Petroleum and Gas Affairs Khalifa Ibn Mubarak al Hinai said.

The expansion has been necessitated in the wake of an increase in consumption over the years for power generation, water desalination and by industry.

Current demand is about 200 million cubic feet a day which is expected to go up to 174 mcf per day this year. The maximum daily consumption touched 243mcf in 1988.

"We are getting a bit short on capacity," Mr Hinai said, adding:

Capacity

"The expansion will increase the capacity of gas that we can bring down to the coast from Yibal, to Suhar and to the Rusayl industrial estate and will take care of our needs until the year 2010".

He also revealed that the Government was considering expanding the gas plant at Yibal. "The present capacity of 400 million cubic feet a day will take us up to 1992. It needed to be expanded to meet expected rise in demand in the future," he added.

"We have already started the preliminary engineering studies," Mr Hinai said.

Also under study, he added, was a new plant in another field.

Mr Hinai said three new wells would be drilled this year "to look for some more gas reserves."

Reserves are estimated to be around ten trillion cubic feet at present.

QATAR

Oil Export Facilities Inaugurated

44000394 *Dubayy THE KHALEEJ TIMES in English*
24 Feb 89 p 13

[Text] DOHA—Dr Jabir 'Abd-al-Hadi al-Murri, managing director of Qatar General Petroleum Corporation (QGPC) yesterday inaugurated the petroleum export-import and distribution facilities project at Abu Hamur.

The state of Qatar is now marking the 17th anniversary of the accession of the Amir, His Highness Shaykh Khalifa Ibn Hamad Al Thani. The celebrations were attended by heads of diplomatic missions, senior officials of the finance and petroleum ministry and the QGPC.

Dr al-Murri, in his speech on the occasion, said, "this vital project is a boost to our refining industry, providing it with integration and more flexibility."

The project involved the construction of a 42-km multi-product pipeline to transport petroleum products from Umm Sa'id refinery to a new storage and distribution depot at Abu Hamur in Doha, the main consumption market.

Another pipeline from the refinery to the Umm Sa'id harbour has also been laid to export the surplus refined products.

The installations include an advanced fire-fighting system to ensure safe operation of all facilities in addition to computerised control system.

He said work has been going on Phase I of the North Field development project, which aims at ensuring gas necessary for local consumption and exporting hydrocarbon liquids. It is expected to be completed by the end of 1990 as planned.

QGPC, he said, is looking forward to carrying out other diversified projects for achieving the optimum exploitation of the North Field gas and providing new revenue sources.

As for the near future QGPC is studying and evaluating new projects based on the surplus gas and on the liquids that will be available from Phase I.

"We also look forward to making a project or more to export gas in large amounts either at LNG [liquefied natural gas] or through pipelines, and to enlarge our industrial base by creating more industries using gas as a raw material or as fuel."

National Oil Distribution Co is the operator of the project.

Director general of the National Oil Distribution Company, Dr Mahmud Hamad al-Hifnawi said the project comprises two 16 and 20 inch pipelines linked to the export terminal at Umm Sa'id port in addition to pumping stations and a storage facility at Abu Hamur.

Light products are carried in a 16-inch pipeline and heavy products in a 20-inch pipeline to which is attached an electric-heater to prevent oil freezing. Pumping stations have a capacity of 1,100 cubic metres an hour for light products and 1,250 cubic meters for heavy products.

According to Dr Hifnawi, the export terminal at Umm Sa'id port is equipped with automated loading and fire-fighting equipment.

The storage facility at Abu Hamur is linked to the Umm Sa'id refinery by a 12-inch pipeline assisted by a pumping station with a capacity of 430 cubic metres per hour.

The storage facility can take in 10,000 cubic metres of gasoline, 7,000 cubic metres of super, 7,000 cubic metres of aircraft fuel and 10,000 cubic metres of diesel-QNA.

SAUDIA ARABIA

Electricity Generating Program Described

44000395 Jeddah ARAB NEWS in English
21 Feb 89 p 4

[Text] Riyadh, 20 February (SPA)—Saudi Arabia's electricity generating program is expected to add around 8,000 megawatts to the current generating capacity to meet expected demand by the end of 1410H (Middle of 1990), when the compound generating capacity will be 20,050 megawatts.

By the end of 1410, the number of subscribers is expected to be 2,354,000 and electricity will reach 13.6 million people. Moreover, the peakload in the kingdom will amount to 15,691 megawatts.

The Saudi Press Agency has learned that the electricity generating program aims in the long run at increasing the capacity available from steam stations and desalination plants so that they would constitute 50 percent of the gross generating capacity.

Steam stations will account for 6,140 megawatts of the kingdom's compound generating capacity while the rest of the 13,910 megawatts are to be distributed by gas turbines and diesel generators.

Other objectives of the electricity generating program until 1410 include:

- Program of principal and branch transferring networks: to carry on connecting generating centers with load centers.
- distribution program: which comprises the support of existing distribution networks and extend electricity services to 828,000 new subscribers.
- Administrative development and program: which comprises numerous sub-programs including manpower development whereby some 19,000 employees will be trained and improvement of communication systems. Industry and electricity will prepare studies with the purpose of determining the future role of the General Electricity Corporation.
- The improvement and strengthening of the following functions at the central level: planning, financing, rates measurements, procedures, environment, selection of sites, auditing, operation, coordination and new developments.

Under its electric energy cost program, the Saudi government has set expenditures of SR15,803 million on generators, SR11,792 million on main and subordinate transfer networks, SR11,076 million on distribution networks and SR3,260 million on administrative development under the ongoing Fourth Development Plan.

During the plan, the government is expected to have an income of SR19,770 million from the electric energy sector.

The electricity sector in the kingdom has been the most important and prominent subject that gained the utmost concern of the government. The fourth development plan strategy of electric power development focuses on improvement of efficiency and planning to rationalize consumption and coordinate the policies of the electric sector and the price policy of the energy sources.

The strategy has the following objectives:

- Supply of load electric services to all centers of the population growth.
- Development of the electric energy systems with the least social, environmental and economic cost.
- Encouragement of energy preservation and rationalization of electric consumption, and
- Improvement of productivity in electric utilities.

SUDAN

AL-SIYASAH Prints Open Letter From Nubians to al-Mahdi

45040206A Khartoum AL-SIYASAH in Arabic
22 Jan 89 p 5

[Article: "A Letter to the Prime Minister: Nubians Make Up Vast Majority of Expatriates; Where Are Roads, Transportation, Communications, and Police Centers on Northern Borders?"]

[Text] The Editor in Chief of AL-SIYASAH

Dear Sir:

I am sending this open letter to your esteemed newspaper, AL-SIYASAH, with every confidence that it will appear on its pages. We do this because the newspaper's truthful and independent approach and its free and total commitment in favor of the weary and the oppressed is one of the qualities that we saw in the newspaper. Everyone else has also seen it and praised it. And that has turned the newspaper into a towering beacon of light that radiates and shines over all aspects of national life. Allow me to offer your excellency my thanks and my gratitude in advance [for your assistance]. May God always protect you.

Mahmud Wali, Mahmud Muhammad Ahmad Shawkat,
Chairmen of the Lake, Canal and River Society Committee

To The Prime Minister:

Respectful greetings: We are the citizens of Nubia, the descendants of Piankhy and Taharqa [kings of ancient Cush], who were the first to bring distinction to Sudan and to let the world know through their lives and their

deeds about the greatness of Sudan and the nobility and steadfastness of its people. Where are these men now? How can they be compared with the mountains? Where are our proud ancestors? Can they peer through the windows of time and the pages of history to find out what has become of their descendants? Can they see how successive rulers have disgraced, ruined, belittled, and ignored their descendants? You, Mr Prime Minister, are the last one of those rulers who one after the other took the seat of power. When the gloomy darkness of the May regime engulfed us and shook and destroyed the very earth we stand on, you were there. We used to look at you from a distance and see the guiding light and the safe haven we were hoping to reach. It was only moments later—moments in the book of time and history—that the rule of tyranny fell, light swept over the country, and a sense of hope filled the air and revived the faithful. And you continued to be what you have been, the grandson of the awaited imam and the indispensable talisman of power. So you assumed your rightful position as chief.

Mr Prime Minister, we do not confer favors upon anyone and we do not stray from the truth when we say that we, the citizens of Nubia, constitute the vast majority of Sudanese citizens who have experienced life as expatriates. We are among the first Nubians to live our lives as expatriates and to experience the terror and pain of living outside our country. We have lived in the snow-covered regions of America, in the mountains of Greece, in the deserts and bays of the Arabian Peninsula, and in territories that my countrymen had never before set foot into. We have lived in valleys, plains, cities, and villages which no discriminating person can enumerate. We experienced all that and more, only because circumstances were cruel and oppressive. Because of deterioration and neglect, the atmosphere in our region had become poisonous, and it was driving us out of our region. Whenever the atmosphere in our region became more intolerable and conditions became more cruel, we would turn to the kind, fraternal country of Egypt. And Egypt would embrace us, take pity on us, and give us security, peace, affection, and harmony. Egypt did embrace us, and it continues to embrace us and to extend its "white hands" to us, without asking us for any favors and without dissimulation.

For example, citizens of Sudan—mostly Nubians—receive more than 100 million Sudanese pounds annually from the fraternal country of Egypt. This sum represents postemployment benefits and pensions. Moreover, countless qualified Nubians in various walks of life received their education and qualifications and were trained in all of Egypt's academies and institutions where they were taught by Egypt's most competent teachers and professors. These people are now holding the highest and the most important positions in the country and abroad. And we must not forget about the diseases which affect our children, our senior citizens, and our women, the guardians of our homes and our cities who stay behind on our fathers' and grandfathers'

land. What would they have done if Egypt had not been kind to them? What would they have done if Egypt had not dressed their wounds and soothed their pain and suffering? Yes, we did build several hospitals, pharmacies, and clinics, and we did seek each other's help and rely on ourselves in building a series of schools and institutions of learning, but the poor quality and ruggedness of the roads, the long distances, the dearth in means of transportation, and the lack of fuel, medicine, and serums deprived and robbed these health and educational institutions of their effectiveness. They turned into empty shells or even ruins. People who have a health emergency and have to be sent to the nearest central hospital either die on the spot or, at best, die en route.

If we must depend on ourselves and on what we can do with our own hands to build our educational and health institutions, which are purely local in nature and have a direct effect on our daily lives, so be it. But where then are those institutions which are national in nature and which should provide roads, transportation, telecommunications, police centers, police stations, and others?

Did you know, Mr Prime Minister, that there is no police station at all in a 600-km stretch in the western district, from our northern borders at the old city of Halfa to Dungula? Did you know that there is only one police station staffed by two policemen only in a 400-km stretch from 'Abri to Karmah? Did you know that these two policemen don't even have the minimum means and tools they need to enforce security? In fact, they themselves need someone to protect them and make them feel secure.

Mr Prime Minister, it is true that we, the people of Nubia, are peaceful, loving people. We are people who help each other; we work together; and we preserve our values and traditions. The conditions which the country is experiencing have become so pervasive, they are terrifying the faithful: there is economic decline and deterioration; there is moral decline and decay; and the security pact is broken. Among the leaders there is destruction, corruption, and neglect; and among the people there is poverty, indigence, and need. The weak willed and the wicked, who live outside the borders; the degenerate and the fallen, who come from the outskirts of cities; and the worst kinds of people anywhere will be tempted by these conditions which the country is experiencing to take advantage of the districts' citizens. Undeterred by their conscience or their fear of authority, they will entrap them and prey on them.

Mr Prime Minister, last year when Sudan went through the predicament of torrential rains and floods, different articles of aid and assistance were poured into the country, and continuous support was received from fraternal and friendly countries. And here I must remember the position of the Saudi people and the government of King Fahd ibn 'Abd-al-'Aziz, the servant of Islam's two holy sites, and I must express thankfulness and gratitude. Long may King Fahd live and reign. May God

keep him and protect his bounty in times of misfortune and disaster. The king's assistance was so generous, it even reached those who had not been affected by the tragedy. And yet, the Nubians and the residents of Sukkot and al-Mahas received little more than the crumbs of the king's bounty. In addition, some countries sent millions of dollars and Deutschmarks, especially Germany, which offered Sudan a grant to develop the agricultural sector in the district. But these millions too were dissipated, and the district received none of the funds. We do not know which district got these funds.

Mr Prime Minister, I am mindful here of the country's position and its need for hard, convertible currency. During the administration of gloom and darkness, we, the expatriate people of Nubia, had paid the tyrant's agencies millions of dollars and riyals in taxes and different fees. We had also given grants and various contributions. Now we are doing the same thing, but we are doing it at a time when such currencies are expensive and rare. These currencies are now being sought by every sponger, and they are being targeted by every gambler. And yet, the country's demand and need for them today is greater. What did we, the citizens of Nubia, gain? What did our district gain as a result of what it did and what it gave? Nubians and their district gained nothing but a lot of hot air!

Mr Prime Minister, we used to see in you the hope that we had long waited for. We used to see in you the light that could dispel the darkness in our lives. We used to see in you the merciful hand which could lift the oppression and remove the tyranny we suffer from. You came to us bearing hope and expectation. You were hailed by al-Ansar's banners which bore the perfumes of Ibba and the sweet scents of Sheikan. In the district where colonialism had distorted your ancestors' heroism and great deeds, you gave us your pledge and bestowed upon us your favor, and we gave you our confidence. And for the first time in the history of the district, your party won several thousand votes. Your party's candidate, Mr Muhammad 'Uthman Faqiri would have siezed the initiative from his opponent, had it not been for a slight organizational malfunction and the fact that the opponent was not taken seriously. Neither one of these mistakes will be repeated. This is the moral and the lesson we learn for the future.

Mr Prime Minister, we are resolved at this time to be content with this quickly compiled report, even though we feel bitter and we feel we have been wronged. Some of us went too far in their thinking and did not consider us citizens of this country. If it were not for the affection and devotion we carry in our hearts for this country, we would have directed our plea and our loyalty to another country. But may the advocates of racial separation and division perish in hell. Long may Sudan live, united under the fluttering flag of democracy. May the peace of God and His mercy and blessings be upon you.

Study Assesses Influence of Foreign Companies, Investment

45040209A Khartoum AL-SIYASAH in Arabic
19 Jan 89 p 9

[Article: "The Industrial Sector in Sudan: Problems and Possibilities for Solutions"]

[Excerpts] [Passage omitted] Although the information is incomplete, the obvious tendency is that of increased administrative fees, especially since the 1978-1979 period. We think this can be attributed to the tendency to involve non-Arab, foreign investors in administrative contracts after the entry and participation of Arab capital into the country. Although these fees are small, they continue to increase. This indicates they are important. The same thing may be said about the profits which are remitted. Payments made to foreign contractors indicate that foreign contractors are relied upon in implementing and building projects. (There is a tremendous number of foreign companies working in that field.) The available information does not show how large these contracts will be in the future. Will they start to decrease as a result of the development of experience in Sudan or not?

The direct effects on the balance of payments may be summarized from the aforementioned capital investment figures. However, the government's expectations of the effects of these indirect investments, that is, of expanding the country's capability to export, are overstated. [passage omitted]

More than two thirds of the investments that were made in Sudan were designed to produce goods for export and provide support and related services for this process. Although their effects could increase, it seems that these investments have no clear effect on creating close connections and interactions in the economy, especially open ones. And yet, some back-channel connections were established by utilizing agricultural and animal production. Semiprocessed and unprocessed agricultural goods are prevalent in most of these investments which are made to export goods to Arab countries, but not to the advanced countries. The effect of expanding the export capacity as a result of these investments can be measured when the stages of production are completed. But these investments are not expected to play any role in creating industries that would produce goods for export. With the exception of processing agricultural products, neither the government nor foreign investors have made any effort to develop the industrial base of the local or foreign market. Accordingly, Sudan's modern experience did not provide an opportunity to promote activities that would take advantage of the existence of cheap labor and produce consumer goods for advanced countries and semimanufactured goods for multinational corporations. Nor did Sudan's modern experience promote the establishment or development of a sector for the production of capital goods. [passage omitted]

Revenues From Taxes on Foreign Investments

In Sudan's case revenues from taxes are not considered a positive contribution for foreign investors. Current generous exemptions from income and business taxes and from production and customs fees, etc. limited contributions from these sources to government revenues.

During the period from 1961 to 1970 revenue loss resulting from benefits to investors granted under the Industrial Investment Development and Promotion Act is estimated at approximately 60 million Sudanese pounds. The current loss is much higher than the average loss mentioned in the estimate given above. These losses resulted basically from import tax exemptions given for machinery, equipment, spare parts, and raw materials. Several assumptions may have to be made to estimate the loss in revenue from tax exemptions. In the case of business profits, there are the following assumptions:

1. The average profitability of projects is estimated at 18 percent of the capital. This estimate (used by the Investment General Secretariat) is based on the assumption that organizations use a small fraction of their production capacity.

2. According to the same source the average profit tax payable by corporations on their total profits is estimated to be approximately 52 percent. In other words, this represents a revenue loss as a result of exemptions from the profit tax.

3. In applying tax exemptions on business profits, there are no distinctions made between projects, at least during the first period of production. In applying these tax exemptions, no distinctions are made between private, Sudanese and foreign projects or between projects in the various sectors (agricultural, industrial, services, etc.).

4. Some projects, especially foreign ones, are exempted from the business profit tax for at least a 5-year period, which may be extended.

5. The average period required for a project to start production is 4 years. As we estimated, more than 526 million Sudanese pounds in private, foreign capital was invested in the period between 1973 and 1981 (9 years). Assuming equal amounts of invested capital, approximately 58 million Sudanese pounds represented the capital that was invested annually. Accordingly, calculating total profits which may be exempted equals capital multiplied by 18. Loss in revenue equals capital times 18 times 52.

Regarding the concept, revenues from foreign capital and government revenues correspond to the following curves [as published]. In Sudan's case, however, extending the period of exemption from the business profit tax could increase the government's loss and reduce the period during which government can receive a return on these investments.

That could also help investments in short-term projects since it would be possible to earn high rates of profits (interest) during the exemption period.

This does not mean that it is not possible to collect revenues (indirectly) from local suppliers and producers, from support local services, and from local employees (income tax). However, doing that would be doubtful too because of the significant reliance on foreign suppliers and producers. Furthermore, the employees of some foreign firms are exempt from the personal income tax.

Foreign Investment and Labor

Some argue that providing employment and training for civil servants and workers and developing the capabilities of employees is considered a good thing that foreign investors are to be credited with. They explain that foreign investors prefer hiring highly qualified employees for their organizations and production operations. That requires the presence of highly competent employees. Local organizations, if any, and secondary organizations as well might be prompted by that to improve the quality of their products and, accordingly, their production and their training methods.

However, this is not considered an important condition for exporting processed and semiprocessed agricultural goods to other developing countries. It is obvious that the enforcement of strict laws in Arab countries which receive Sudanese exports to ensure the quality of these products does not go so far as to remove all incentives for making improvements in quality. And this does not mean that multinational corporations and foreign investments do not try to improve product quality and packaging and so on, but it only means that there are no incentives for making such improvements when these products are exported to neighboring Arab countries or when Sudan exports primary materials.

When the position of less developed countries like Sudan is analyzed, production technology must be considered in depth and a preference is to be indicated or a study is to be conducted of the difference between labor intensive and capital intensive projects because this is something basic to the process of development which is being sought.

Foreign investments are thought to have a fundamental effect on how income is distributed. In that regard also, we find two obvious characteristics, if we take Sudan into consideration. First, wages paid to foreign employees are high compared to wages paid to local employees. Second, Sudanese employees and workers who are employed in foreign organizations and joint projects earn high wages and salaries compared to the wages and salaries earned by those employed in private and public national sectors.

The results of our inquiry showed that approximately 5 percent or more of those employed in foreign organizations and joint projects were foreigners.

The income of a foreign manager is more than double the income of a Sudanese manager at the very least. At the same time, a Sudanese manager who is employed in a foreign firm earns an income which is five times that of his counterpart in a Sudanese firm. These differences always lead to increases in foreign currency exchange rates since foreign employees are paid in foreign currency. Some Sudanese citizens who are employed in foreign firms also receive their wages and salaries in foreign currency. [passage omitted]

It is worth noting that Sudanese labor is being depleted. There is a severe shortage in competent personnel, because qualified Sudanese citizens are immigrating to some rich countries. And foreign companies aggravated this problem by attracting Sudanese personnel. Instead of training personnel, they took the easy way out and succeeded in using the lure of salaries and a variety of work conditions to attract qualified and trained Sudanese personnel.

Some unions, like those of bank employees and accountants, for example, reacted by declaring strikes and taking other courses of action. They demanded high wages and salaries equal to those paid by foreign banks and companies. But this should not be taken to mean that these foreign firms are responsible for the relatively low wages and salaries earned by public sector employees. There are differences in wages and salaries between public sector units, and that too causes workers to leave. In addition, the state does not control prices, and the standard of living for the majority of the Sudanese people is low, and so on and so forth.

The thorny issue in the discussion about employment and the relationship between foreign firms, government organizations and the public sector has to do with their relationship with the local elite and with instances of corruption. It has to do with their contribution to changing or satisfying the tastes and modes of consumption of high income groups. [passage omitted]

Article Questions Effectiveness of Customs Tax
45040218b Khartoum AL-ASHIQA' in Arabic
31 Jan 89 p 23

[Article by Fu'ad 'Abbas]

[Text] Increases have become characteristic of our successive governments. Each time we are taken by surprise by the increases, and most recently of course, they have come in direct and indirect taxes. These increases were decided upon without study, merely for the sake of an increase with a view to the size of the desired financial return.

If we look at the Customs Administration's list imposing additional duties on imported goods as of 17 January, we find items that customs officials have subjected to these duties such as:

Cooking stoves	40 percent
Fans	40 percent
Air conditioners	150 percent
Refrigerators	150 percent

Duties were determined earlier, and additional duties were placed on these absolute necessities. For example, why did the authorities place such high customs duties on fans in a country such as Sudan, which everyone knows has a long summer with high temperatures?

It is obvious that the government wants money regardless of the means, which has brought about these additional duties imposed by the Customs Administration. The duties are impractical and incompatible with the needs of most people. For this reason, they are nothing but senseless duties that have met with only silent protest.

Customs duties are nothing new; the state imposes them. However, products and other goods should be the subject of study before increases are imposed for which the consumer will bear the full burden. If customs officials had done this, they would not have imposed such duties on fans; in fact, they might have tried to alleviate the burden borne by the citizen, to whose life the beleaguered fan is very important.

We ask our exalted government to reconsider these additional duties that the Customs Administration has so hastily prepared and tried to enforce, for the lives of the people can no longer bear such a folly. These duties on most products are unreasonable and therefore unacceptable. Even the duty on toothpaste was increased 60 percent.

Most of the people would not be concerned in the least about increased duties on certain other products. We ask for a study of these products, which would not require much effort, merely a consideration of the distinction between essentials and nonessentials. But whom do we ask?

Columnist Opposes Minister's Stand on Foreign Reliance
45040209B Khartoum AL-SIYASAH in Arabic
19 Jan 89 p 9

[Article by 'Uthman Siwar-al-Dhahab: "Economic Considerations: The Ministers of this Day and Age!"]

[Text] Once again the minister of domestic trade and supplies made another one of his unfortunate and ill-timed statements which add to our troubles and our

suffering. Quite recently he turned once again to the countries which grant us aid, including the United States, and he accused them of applying pressure on us because they were not delivering the wheat they had agreed to deliver until the debts that were due and payable were paid. The minister went on to say that this was part of the policies pursued by these countries to make us submit to their control by providing us with food. We had stated previously that we agreed with the minister's strategy, whose aim is to achieve self-sufficiency and avoid dependence on others. But we also said that this was a long-term strategy which could not be applied overnight. We said the minister's strategy would not solve our present problems which have to do with the lack of bread. Attempts that are being made to achieve self-sufficiency were not created today. This is something that the state has been seeking for over 15 years, but all the regimes which ruled this country failed to achieve it because of a lack of earnestness and continuity. These regimes failed because they have been relying on the wheat which comes from abroad and is easy to get. That is why the minister of domestic trade and supply cannot clap with one hand. That requires all parties to work together in total coordination.

According to the minister, a solution to the present shortage depends on making the debt payments which are due. But I do not believe that pressure is involved here, because the installment which is due is no more than \$8 million. For making this payment, we would receive approximately 350,000 tons of wheat annually, or the equivalent of 60 percent of total consumption. This easy-term loan is thought to be more like a grant because it is a renewable loan which started over 15 years ago. It is to be paid back over a 50-year period at an interest rate of only 2 percent, with a 10-year grace period. Where then is the pressure? Why doesn't the minister criticize his government for failing to come up with \$8 million? Why does he vent his wrath on those who are demanding something of what they are entitled to?

We have been suffering for some time from this growing problem of bread shortage. Why doesn't this minister and his colleagues work in earnest to provide this vital commodity instead of talking at nauseum in newspapers about imaginary amounts of wheat in Port Sudan and other amounts that are en route and so on and so forth? The minister is well aware of the fact that, because of the lack of wheat, mills are operating at an extremely low capacity—23 percent. The minister knows that the amount of flour which has been delivered into the capital from the first to the tenth of this month did not exceed 70,000 bags of flour. He also knows that we need to have 15,000 bags of flour or a little more than that daily. Now, all the bakeries are idle between 2 and 3 days a week because they do not receive flour. Citizens have a hard time getting a piece of bread! And in the middle of this climate which is full of frustration and scarce flour the minister comes out with a new plan for taking delivery of

flour from the Red Sea Company. This created confusion and tampering with accounts. The minister did that at a time when we were expecting him to devote himself to providing flour. He should have left the organization he wanted to make to another time when we did not have uninterrupted flour shortages such as what we are having now.

While the minister of foreign trade runs around creating shortages, another minister is doing his part. Dissatisfied with the successive shortages created by his colleague, the minister of industry was determined to knock out rather than protect local industry. This is an extraordinary situation indeed! But he was not satisfied with that! Instead, he interfered in something that does not concern him, and he directed the company which produces oilseeds to purchase beans. What is your excellency's relationship with that company, Mr Minister? Are you in a position to provide it with the liquid funds that are necessary to make the purchase, or are there other matters involved here which the public may not know of? How long will scores of factories remain idle because of decisions made by the minister of industry? Are mistakes to be corrected by more mistakes? And why should the poor consumer suffer? Now, the consumer is purchasing goods for twice their cost because they are scarce, and this scarcity in goods was created by the minister responsible for the production of goods!

While one minister tries to stabilize certain policies, his colleagues neither support his efforts nor coordinate what they do with him. Quite the contrary, each minister carries on as though he were living in an empire of his own making. But the minister of foreign trade and the economy is a special case: he is unique in his policies and approaches. Sudan's exports could go to hell for all he cares!

UNITED ARAB EMIRATES

Iran-EEC Dispute May Affect Dubayy Trading

44000397 *Dubayy GULF NEWS in English*
22 Feb 89 p 13

[Article by Arun Solomon]

[Text] The Iranian import see-saw appears to be tilting heavily in favour of Dubayy again, amid fears that yesterday's down-scaling of diplomatic ties between Iran and the EEC may develop into a major rupture, lasting longer than being anticipated presently.

Initial impact of the Iranian-European confrontation was on the Iranian rial which slid steeply and was being traded yesterday at 1,160 rials to \$1. The dollar gained 60 rials within 12 hours on word of the escalation in the diplomatic row, over Monday's close at 1,110 rials to the dollar.

Market sources said the rial is expected to slide further with the next level being speculated at 1,200 to 1,250 rials to the dollar by Thursday. The rial gained in the last two months of 1988 when the average exchange rate ranged between 850 and 900 rials to the dollar. Despite the weakening of the rial, market sources said trading volumes in notepaper currency transactions had not eased. It is estimated that \$2 million to \$3 million worth of exchange transaction take place in an average week.

Meanwhile, re-exports of selected commodities like rice, sugar, vegetable oil and some quantities of tyres, sources said, were continuing. Retail buying by Iranian travellers was also booming and this may increase if rumours of additional allowances being granted to Iranians on the occasion of Nowroz (Iran's new year) prove correct. Electronic and electrical goods retailers said, yesterday, that the expected operation of flights by Dubayy's Emirates airline could also boost traffic and thus retail re-exports.

However, import relaxations announced by Iran over the past three months have failed to generate the expected

post-war boom. Market sources said yesterday that the scenario may change dramatically in the aftermath of the new international alignments Iran may get into now.

Dubayy's re-exports to Iran on government records fell by half in 1988 as compared with the figure chalked up in 1987. Dubayy's re-exports to Iran in the first 10 months of last year were below Dh. 500 million, whereas in the corresponding period of 1987 they reached a six-year high of Dh. 1.32 billion.

Sources said yesterday that Iran may well turn to Dubayy again as a source to import high-tech goods from European countries. Dubayy has always followed a pragmatic trading policy and one of its strong points has been that it re-exports 70 percent of the goods it imports.

If the Iranian-European diplomatic row does not blow over in the next couple of months Dubayy may begin to flourish as a conduit again.

INDIA

Gandhi Meets Newsmen, Discusses Election Plans

46001356 Calcutta *THE STATESMAN* in English
23 Feb 89 p 1

[Text] New Delhi, Feb. 22—Mr Rajiv Gandhi today said the General Elections would be held "on time" and enrolment of new voters, following the lowering of voting age from 21 to 18, would be completed by April.

(Mr Rajiv Gandhi today called on the President, Mr R. Venkataraman at Rashtrapati Bhavan and had discussions with him for an hour, says UNI. The meeting was officially described as "routine.")

The Prime Minister was talking to reporters after addressing a function organized at the AICC(I) [All India Congress Committee-I] headquarters here to bid farewell to Mr Jagannath Pahadia, who has been appointed Governor of Bihar.

Mr Gandhi said that the enumeration of the new voters had started and would be completed well in time for the General Elections.

Asked if the youth were "anti-establishment" and the lowering of the voting age might harm the Congress(I), Mr Gandhi said: "I do not think we have taken a risk by lowering the voting age, and I think the youth will go along with us."

Mr Gandhi did not agree with a reporter that he was appointing party workers as Governors (Mr Pahadia's was one example). "For example, we have not appointed a party man in West Bengal," he said. "But he is an I.B. man," the reporter interjected. Mr Gandhi did not respond.

(According to UNI, Mr Gandhi asked: "Are there skeletons in West Bengal cupboard? If there are no skeletons, the Left Front has nothing to worry about.")

Asked about dissidence in the party units, Mr Gandhi said there was nothing to worry about. He said the party was not working in a coordinated manner in some States which had resulted in dissidence.

He said the AICC(I) session, which would be held in April, most probably in Delhi, would discuss the whole issue. It would be "a hard-working session" and legislation would be brought in after discussions, he said.

Asked about a change in the Bihar leadership, he said "something will be done at an appropriate time."

Gandhi Addresses Scheduled Tribes Meeting

46001359 Bombay *THE TIMES OF INDIA* in English
26 Feb 89 p 7

[Text] New Delhi, Feb. 25—The Prime Minister, Mr Rajiv Gandhi, said here yesterday that instead of offering just protection to the poor and the weaker sections, the government was now seeking to delegate power to the masses. Special strength, he said, was to be given to the scheduled castes, and the scheduled tribes.

Mr Gandhi was inaugurating the three-day national conference on Panchayati Raj and scheduled castes organised by the National Commission for scheduled castes and scheduled tribes. Though 1,000 representatives of panchayats from all over the country were expected at the conference only 600 arrived. Four opposition states—Andhra Pradesh, Assam, Tamil Nadu and West Bengal—did not send representatives to the conference.

In a reference to this boycott, Mr Gandhi said "I wanted people from all states at this conference. We want to give power to the people so that development is on the right track and the janata is strengthened but some agents of the opposition who are not keen on delegation of power."

In their three days of deliberation, he said, they should see how best to improve the power of the weaker sections in the electoral districts. This could be done in different ways. There was some criticism against the current reservation structure as some Harijans were left out.

The strength and weakness of direct and indirect elections, he said, had also to be debated at the conference. "There was a feeling that in indirect elections the poor and the weak were bullied and threatened and the weaker sections continued to remain weak. Very often there were clashes with the MPs from the area."

The reactivising of the Panchayati Raj institutions was being studied because the programmes of the government were not reaching the masses in the rural areas. Some of the programmes made at the national level did not even suit the needs of the people in rural areas in a country as wide and diverse as India. We want to do things from Delhi but can't make out where and when it goes wrong."

"Now the masses would make programmes and find the solutions to their problems." The concept, he said, was not new, Panditji had initiated it 20 years ago.

Quoting from Jawaharlal Nehru's speech of 1959 he said, "the reason for our slow progress is our dependence on official machinery. An officer, who is an expert, may help but development work can be executed only if the people take the responsibility in their own hands. Some people thought that if the responsibility was handed over to the people, they would probably not be able to

shoulder it. But it is only by providing the opportunity to the people that they can be trained to shoulder responsibilities. The people were not merely to be consulted but effective power was to be entrusted to them."

"We have to remove this "maibaap" attitude and development had to be worked out with the masses," Mr Gandhi said. He also pleaded for a change in the real sense by including women in the administration at the village level. The largest number of women at the conference were from Karnataka (10), Gujarat and Haryana (6 each), UP [Uttar Pradesh] (5) and Himachal and MP [Madhya Pradesh] (3 each).

There was repeated cheering by the delegates as he spoke of delegating power to them.

A list of 13 issues have been drawn up for discussion. The conference delegates will be unanimous in the legislative measures and electoral reforms so that persons belonging to scheduled castes [SC] and tribes can be inducted into Panchayati Raj institutions. The role and contribution of SC women is to be discussed to improve the impact of development programmes on women and children.

Mrs Rajendra Kumari Bajpai, minister of state for welfare, said 25 percent of the population was of SC and ST [scheduled tribes] and by the non-participation in the development programmes they were denied the fruits of many government programmes.

Congress Seeks Contacts With Foreign Political Parties

46001360 New Delhi *PATRIOT* in English
27 Feb 89 p 1

[Article by Satish Misra]

[Text] The Congress is making vigorous efforts to establish party contacts with like-minded political parties in the developing, socialist and the developed countries. A high point is the visit of a high level Chinese Communist Party delegation which arrived in New Delhi on Saturday for intensive discussions with the Congress leadership on Sino-Indian relations.

Possibly, for the first time after independence, the Congress is extending its hands to reach out beyond the existing governmental foreign policy structures to provide an extra input in the foreign policy decision making. The contacts, in form of protocols and informal links, are going to serve the party in good and bad times, it is felt by the party high command.

Protocols on party to party relations have been signed with about half-a-dozen socialist parties in the socialist bloc and outside. Efforts are on to devise structures with parties in western Europe, Latin America, Asia and Africa.

AICC [All India Congress Committee] general secretary V.N. Gadgil held informal talks with the Spanish Socialist Party last month. Over a dozen foreign delegations visited India last year at the invitation of the AICC.

For the first time, AICC delegations attended Republican and Democrat presidential conventions in the United States and a high level AICC delegation visited China last May paving the way for Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi's historic visit. Even for the current year, over seven foreign delegations are slated to arrive.

While professional diplomats in South Block and in world capitals have not always been very enthusiastic about the diplomatic contacts made by the Congress, party leaders themselves feel the emerging relationship and contacts have broadened understanding in important fora of the foreign parties.

With the socialist countries, party level political contact had largely been the preserve of the two Indian communist parties who maintained a close liaison, and routinely sent high level delegations to their capitals.

The new level of party to party relationship is also expected to introduce Congressmen at the MP [Member of Parliament], MLA [Member of Legislative Assembly] and party organisation levels to different political and social systems in other countries in an intensive manner. This in turn will enrich the party discussion on foreign policy and international issues. The Congress has stressed its international perspective and progressive foreign policy as a major strength over the non-Left opposition. In its recent attack on the emerging Janata Dal, it used the strength of its foreign policy to warn of what it says are the dangers to national security posed in Mr V.P. Singh's draft foreign policy.

The process began in 1980, when Indira Gandhi decided to revive the Friends of the Soviet Union (FSU) which was established by Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru. During the freedom movement, the Congress made contacts with foreign political parties at a very high level. The contacts are established and pursued by the foreign affairs department of the AICC.

But after independence, it was felt that there was no need for the party to have vigorous contacts with political parties abroad as the foreign relations would be carried out by the South Block diplomats. Pandit Nehru, who had personal contacts with most of the political personalities, could influence opinion through his numerous meetings and correspondence.

But as more and more countries became independent, and Jawaharlal Nehru engaged in major domestic and international problems, independent and extra input into country's foreign policy became increasingly rare.

The Congress foreign contacts merely reduced to attending party conferences and congresses. Reciprocally foreign delegations, mostly from the socialist blocks, attended AICC plenary and special sessions. Congress centenary session was attended by a large number of foreign delegations.

The decision to revive FSU was not only deliberate but was born out of the experience of those three turbulent years when the Congress was not ruling at the Centre. The Congress functionaries were encouraged to actively participate in friendship societies. AICC general secretary K.N. Singh and former AICC general secretary R.L. Bhatia became the president of Indo-Cuba and Indo-GDR [German Democratic Republic] friendship societies.

At the same time, it was also felt that the South Block diplomatic inputs in country's foreign policy had several constraints as it was difficult for career diplomats to pursue the country's interests comprehensively. Moreover, more than one channel for foreign policy inputs is strategically better, it was realised in the party high circles.

The policy initiated by Indira Gandhi is being pursued by Mr Rajiv Gandhi. Mr Gandhi appointed former foreign secretary Romesh Bhandari as the chairman of the AICC foreign affairs department to enlarge party contacts.

Mr Bhandari continued as head of the foreign cell till his appointment as Lt Governor of Delhi.

India Reported Making Overtures Toward Saudi Arabia

46001344 Madras *THE HINDU* in English
13 Feb 89 p 6

[Article by F.J. Khergamvala]

[Text] Manama (Bahrain), 12 Feb—After years of stagnation in political ties between two important regional powers on either side of the Indian Ocean, India has made an overture towards Saudi Arabia.

Mrs Najma Heptullah, Deputy Chairman of the Rajya Sabha and an active member of Indo-Arab institutions, has just spent a week in the Saudi Kingdom as a special emissary of the Prime Minister, Mr Rajiv Gandhi. She delivered a message to King Fahd from Mr Gandhi when she called on the Saudi Second Deputy Prime Minister and Defence Minister, Prince Sultan.

Directive From Top

Senior official sources say that a directive for opening out to the Saudis has come from the top. They also describe the Indian approach as an initial cautious feeler to convey at a semi-official contact level New Delhi's intention of reviving the relationship, largely owing to

changes in the regional situation. Though letters from the Prime Minister have now become a routine gesture intended more to open doors to senior levels in the country being visited, in this specific case its contents seek to draw a bond of common interests.

Afghanistan, the Iran-Iraq settlement and bilateral economic issues figure prominently in the message. Coinciding with open Western recognition of India's emergence as a preeminent power in South Asia is Saudi Arabia's growing role as an effective, though low profile role as not only an Arab power but also a critical agent, in the details surrounding the transfer of effective power in Kabul following the withdrawal of the Soviet forces.

Identical Interests in Afghanistan

Saudi Arabia is known to be a financial benefactor of the exiled King Zahir Shah of Afghanistan and is inclined to seek a return of the King to Kabul either in an effective or symbolic capacity for a variety of reasons. One of them being to show to revolutionary Iran that monarchy is very much in conformity with Islam. Iran is a strong votary of overthrowing feudal regimes in Islam. India's feelings about a role for the former Afghan monarch are well known.

A factor that has made a fresh beginning to Indo-Saudi relations easier is the emergence of a democratic government in Pakistan. After a successful visit to Riyadh by Indira Gandhi in the early eighties when the two countries highlighted common security interests, the relationship has stagnated owing to extremely divergent perceptions on Pakistan's military dictatorship. The present overture to the Saudis can hence also be interpreted as a signal that India is drawing away from treating its relationship with the Gulf as an adjunct to its policy on Pakistan, though the latter's ties with Arab countries will continue to influence India's views.

Marrying Saudi Wealth to Indian Expertise

Over the last five years Saudi Arabia has made vast progress in transforming itself from just an oil bazaar into a manufacturing economy. Given the right political impetus over a period of time, a complementarity of economic and trade interests are bound to emerge. As Mrs Heptullah's visit has brought out, one area where Indian expertise and Saudi wealth and modern education could be married is in the field of scientific research and applications.

Reports on Developments in Indian Relations With Iraq

Iraqi Special Envoy

46001358 Bombay *THE TIMES OF INDIA* in English
28 Feb 89 p 8

[Text] New Delhi, Feb. 27 (UNI)—Iraq is eager to immediately settle outstanding payments of \$500 million with Indian public and private sector companies.

The under-secretary of the Iraqi foreign minister, Mr Nazar Hamdoun, who was here as a special envoy of President Saddam Hussain, to deliver a message to Prime Minister, Mr Rajiv Gandhi, said a high-level delegation from his country would visit India very soon to settle the deferred payment issue.

Iraq owes around \$800 million to Indian companies for executing various developmental projects in Baghdad and war-torn Basra.

Part payment was made in the form of crude oil during the last three years by the Iraqi government.

Indian companies have executed projects worth Rs5,000 crores in Iraq in the past one-decade. This is the biggest contract awarded to companies of any country.

Mr Hamdoun, who met Mr Gandhi and the minister of state for external affairs, Mr. K.K. Tewary, besides a number of government officials, said his country required India's assistance in its reconstruction programmes.

He lauded the role played by India in Iraq's development, saying, Indian companies had remained there even during the worst period of the war.

Over 3,000 Indian workers remained in Basra to complete a sewage project even as the city was being shelled every day by Iranian forces.

The envoy had also extended an invitation to Mr Gandhi to visit Baghdad, which he had accepted.

Referring to Indo-Iraq relations, he said there was great scope for expansion. The joint commission meeting held in Baghdad recently had taken a number of measures to cement economic ties. Iraq is exporting crude to India, while it imports a number of consumer items.

Mr Hamdoun said he had discussions with the Prime Minister on the Iran-Iraq co-operation council.

Gandhi Visit Planned

46001358 Bombay *THE TIMES OF INDIA* in English
25 Feb 89 p 7

[Text] New Delhi, Feb. 24 (PTI)—The Prime Minister, Mr Rajiv Gandhi, has agreed in principle to visit Iraq at the invitation of the President, Mr Saddam Husayn.

The invitation was contained in a message handed over to Mr Gandhi by Mr Nizar Hamdoun, special envoy of the Iraqi President this afternoon.

A spokesman of the external affairs ministry said the date for the visit would be finalised through diplomatic channels.

Mr Hamdoun, who is the permanent under-secretary of state in the Iraqi foreign ministry, arrived here yesterday with the message.

He has already held discussions with the minister of state for external affairs, Mr. K.K. Tiwari, and the secretary (west) in the external affairs ministry, Mr Alfred Gonsalves, on the West Asian and Afghan situation.

Increase in Indo-Japanese Technical Cooperation Noted

46001362 Bombay *THE TIMES OF INDIA* in English
28 Feb 89 p 18

[Article by Surinder Sud]

[Text] New Delhi, 27 Feb (The Times of India News Service)—The Indo-Japanese technical collaboration at both official and non-official levels has increased rapidly over the years due chiefly to a good investment climate in India. The Japanese investors, including the government, seem to have appreciated the advantages India offers for safe and rewarding deployment of capital and technology.

These include a vast domestic market, rich skilled human resources, political stability and the recent trend in economic liberalisation.

The technical co-operation between the two countries, confined earlier primarily to fields like automobile industry, machine tools, pharmaceuticals, chemicals, electronics and fisheries, has gradually been diversified to include areas such as fertilisers and irrigation projects.

Of late, Japanese expertise is sought to be utilised by the railways for exploring the feasibility of introducing high-speed bullet trains on the Delhi-Agra-Kanpur segment and for modernising platforms and railways stations in Delhi.

TV Tie-Up

A recent example of a Japanese multinational company agreeing to participate in the share-holding of an Indian company is provided by the collaboration between the Hitachi Limited of Japan and JCT Electronics Limited of India. Promoted by the Thapar group, especially Jagatjit Cotton Textile Mills Limited, JCT electronics has set up a project for the manufacture of colour picture tubes at Mohali, near Chandigarh, in technical collaboration with Hitachi, well-known in colour picture tube technology. Having an annual capacity of 600,000 pieces, the project has already been implemented and has started production.

During a recent visit to the JCT plant in Mohali, a troupe of Delhi newsmen learnt that Hitachi had agreed for a token participation of 10 percent (amounting to Rs 3.3 crores) in the equity of JCT electronics because of the good performance of the company in its initial years.

JCT claims that it is already catering to a major part of the Indian market for colour picture tubes. Besides, it has obtained an export order for 400,000 pieces from the USSR.

Expansion Plan

JCT now proposes to seek approval for doubling its production capacity to 1.2 million tubes. The expansion programme will be funded largely through internal resources generation. At present, it is producing about 56,000 pieces a month which is 110 percent of the rated capacity.

About 40 engineers and technicians of JCT have received training at Hitachi's works in Japan. Hitachi has also deputed a team of technicians to co-ordinate with all the activities related to the plant and production at Mohali.

Another example of a successful Indo-Japanese technical collaboration is provided by the Swaraj Mazda project in Punjab. Promoted by Punjab Tractors Ltd, (a company of the Punjab State Industrial Development Corporation) in technical and financial collaboration with Mazda Motor and Sumitomo of Japan, this Rs 50-crore company manufactures light commercial vehicles.

The project is being implemented in three phases with progressively increasing production capacity and indigenisation. The indigenous content is expected to go up to about 70 percent by June next.

This project has helped generate fresh employment in the region by encouraging ancillary industries. Purchases from its 30 ancillaries now exceed Rs 5 crores a year.

Visiting newsmen were told that every effort was being made at Swaraj Mazda to imbibe the internationally-recognised Japanese work culture bridging the gap between managers and workers. The new practices are evident in removal of all officer-cabinets, open-hall seating, common canteen, common uniform, daily morning meetings, morning exercises, etc.

A major step in fostering employees' involvement in their work is the introduction of the scheme for inviting suggestions from workers on improvement in working practices, cost reduction, quality improvement, etc. Those whose suggestions are accepted are given an award based on consequent savings.

Swaraj Mazda has laid emphasis on local R and D from the very beginning. A major achievement has been the development of all steel ergonomically designed series of mini-buses.

Swaraj Mazda engineers have worked with this ancillary over the last three years to develop low-volume high-quality production technology suitable to Indian conditions. The Mazda Motors company has bought the

design as well as the production technology developed by Swaraj Mazda for use in other countries, notably Pakistan where high-investment technology of the parent Japanese company is not suitable because of lower production volumes.

This is being described in the industrial circles as an example of reverse flow of technology—from India to other countries via Japan.

Officer Discloses Indo-Pakistan Firing at Siachen 46001351 Calcutta THE TELEGRAPH in English 24 Feb 89 p 5

[Article by Yusuf Jameel]

[Text] Khunni Nallah (Along Jammu-Srinagar highway), Feb. 23—Indian and Pakistani troops exchanged artillery fire in the Siachen Glacier yesterday, days before the secretary-level talks between the two countries are scheduled to begin in Islamabad to resolve the dispute over the undemarcated region in Kashmir's north.

Disclosing this, Lt. General B.C. Nanda, GOC [General Officer Commanding]-in-Chief Northern Command, said no casualties on either side were reported in the fresh fighting which he described as "minor" and "routine." He did not even say which side started the firing and why but added the 72-km-long slab of ice, the scene of bloody clashes between the two forces since the summer of 1984, had been calm and quiet in recent months.

Asked about Pakistan's recent suggestion that troops from both sides be withdrawn from the area to ease tension, the Army commander said, "Let us wait for the outcome of the Islamabad talks." He was glad that the two countries were trying to resolve the dispute through negotiations and said, "As a soldier, I'll be the happiest person if a settlement is reached at these talks."

Gen. Nanda, who was talking to visiting newsmen after the reopening of a 381-foot-long bridge on a mountain stream here today, said the Siachen Glacier was not creating any major problems for the defence forces now. Asked whether the tension there and along the rest of the border in this region had eased following the political changeover in Pakistan, the commander said the borders had become "well stabilised" and "very peaceful" in the past seven to eight months, except for minor firing incidents on occasions.

Earlier, while recommissioning the strategic bridge nearly 400 feet up the mountain stream, where some serious road mishaps have taken place in the past, the commander appreciated the engineers and workers of the Border Roads Organisation for the "excellent work done in a record time of seven months" to repair the tremendous damage caused to it by falling boulders a year ago.

Newly Developed Pakistan Missiles May Sour Indian Ties

46001347 Bombay *THE TIMES OF INDIA in English*
25 Feb 89 p 10

[Article by K. N. Malik]

[Text] London, Feb 24. "Anza", the shoulder-fired, surface-to-air missile, developed by Pakistan with Chinese help could prove a sensitive issue in Indo-Pak relations.

Though Pakistan sources claim that the missile (with a range of 500 to 5,000 m has been mostly developed indigenously, the JANE'S DEFENCE WEEKLY today said that there was speculation that the U.S. Stinger missile technology was made available to Pakistan.

Western sources believe that the use of Stinger missiles tilted the war in Afghanistan in favor of the U.S. backed Mujahideen and was an important factor in the Soviet decision to leave the country.

Indian security forces have been worried for sometime that Stinger missiles could be passed on to terrorists in Punjab which would considerably enhance their fire power. "Anza" could add to India's concern.

Rocket Launcher

Pakistan has also developed a new laser range finder which has a range of 150 to 15,000m. Fifty percent of it was developed indigenously and the Chinese provided key assistance for its development. A new multi-barrel rocket launcher with a range of 25 km has also been developed.

Pakistan last month test fired two indigenously developed surface-to-surface missiles—Hatif I and Hatif II—with a range of 80 km and 300 km respectively. These SSMs were fired from mobile launching pads. The guidance system was provided by the Chinese. There are reports here that Pakistan has decided to phase out its 170 Chinese-built F-6 fighters. Forty of these aircraft are to be passed on to Bangladesh, which currently has two squadrons of these aircraft.

The Pakistan Air-Force is to acquire 75 Chinese F-7s at a reported cost of \$3 million each. It has already 20 F-7s.

Pakistan has requested additional 60 F-16s from General Dynamics of the United States. The sale has not so far been approved by the U.S. Congress. India has urged the United States not to provide additional F-16s to Pakistan.

Meanwhile, the Australian defence department, last week denied Pakistani reports that Pakistan had acquired from Australia three squadrons of Mirage III fighters. A spokesman of the Australian defence department in Canberra said that Pakistan was one of the

contenders for the purchase of Mirage III fighters but there were still a number of interested parties. No decision has yet been taken on their sale, he said.

Pakistan, it is reported, has also offered to share its missile technology with Turkey. The offer was made during the visit of the Turkish president, Mr Kenan Evren, to Pakistan last week.

Defense Studies Director on Pakistan Missiles

46001361 Bombay *THE TIMES OF INDIA in English*
28 Feb 89 p 12

[Article by Jasjit Singh; Air Commodore Jasjit Singh is the Director of the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses.]

[Text] All of a sudden a rash of ballistic missiles appears to have erupted in Pakistan, which has left many people wondering and worried. The country's tentative moves into space launch capabilities via a sounding rocket programme was generally known, but the achievement of a significant ballistic capability had been perceived as a remote future possibility. This was not only the general view in India, but even in countries like the United States.

The U.S. congressional research service's report on the potential for ballistic missile proliferation in the third world issued in April 1986 merely noted the launches of sounding rockets from a range near Karachi under co-operative programmes with the United States, the U.K. and France. A brief mention was made of reports of "an intention to develop" an indigenous space launch vehicle (SLV). U.S. non-proliferation expert, Mr Leonard Spector, writing on nuclear weapon proliferation in 1987 assumed only aircraft as the potential delivery system in Pakistan. However, by 1988, he was warning about the distinct possibility of Pakistan acquiring ballistic missiles from China; it had already supplied one version with a range of 2,500 km to Saudi Arabia, presumably with Pakistan acting as the intermediary for the deal.

Thus, when reports emerged of Pakistan having test-fired a "nuclear capable" missile on 25 April 1988, the issue was shrugged off as a possible launch of a Chinese-built one in furtherance of political purposes related to domestic compulsions of General Zia-ul-Haq. Then senator and now U.S. vice-president, Mr Dan Quayle, however, took more serious note of the development in a report in June 1988, stating that "Pakistan took a quantum leap forward last month in its effort to develop its own ballistic missile arsenal..."

Sounding Rockets

Pakistan's Space and Upper Atmosphere Research Commission (SUPARCO) has been working on sounding rockets for many years. These rockets carry payloads of less than 10 kg and are not believed to provide an adequate development base for an SLV or ballistic missile.

However, Pakistan had obtained a licence from France in the 1970s to produce a rocket motor similar to the French mammoth propulsion system. Such a system could be readily deployed as a two-stage rocket using a mammoth engine for each stage, and a 500 kg payload could be launched to a range of 800 km. It should be noted that, starting with the decision initiated in January 1972 for a nuclear weapons programme, Pakistan adopted a multi-pronged approach which extended to delivery systems as well.

The missile which was reportedly test-fired on 25 April 1988, was claimed to be capable of reaching Bombay and New Delhi, a range in excess of 800 km. The NEW YORK TIMES cited U.S. official sources confirming the development and reported their guess that the missile was of "home design" but produced with the help of Chinese experts. Earlier reports indicated that the effort might have received assistance from the Federation Republic of Germany also.

It is against this background that the launching of a "multi-stage rocket" into deep space from the test range at Sonmiani on 10 January 1989, the statement of General Mirza Aslam Beg on 5 February that Pakistan had successfully fired and tested two types of missiles having been tested on 11 February need to be viewed. From the limited information available at this stage, the tests on 5 and 11 February may be related to the same set of missiles.

The multi-stage rocket, designed and built by SUPARCO and fired on 10 January, carried, it was claimed, a payload of 150 kg to an altitude exceeding 640 km (previous efforts had achieved a 50 kg/480 kg performance). The payload was recovered over national territory. This was a creditable performance for a country with a small scientific-technological base. The height-payload combination would suggest that, as a ballistic SSM (surface-to-surface missile), it could have a range of 2,000 km or more. However, many technical problems (including those of dynamic and thermal loads, besides the guidance system) will have to be solved before such a conversion becomes an operational reality.

The two SSMs test-fired in February from the Makran coast, named HATF-I and HATF-II, have a range of 80 km and 300 km respectively. HATF-I would correspond to a number of battlefield support SSMs, the most notable among them being the U.S. Lance and the Soviet Frog-7, of which the Chinese has its own version, and their indigenous derivatives in the arsenals of Libya, Egypt, Iraq and North Korea.

There have been a number of reports of SSM attacks by the Afghan Mujahideen based in Pakistan. These missiles may have been supplied by China or some of the Muslim countries; the Western press last year spoke of Pakistani military assistance in operating these. Missiles of this type provide virtually no military value. Although

over 230 such missiles were launched by both Iraq and Iran in their long war, the effect was limited to random damage in cities and psychological concern.

The longer-range Soviet SSM Scud and its equivalents have been proliferating rapidly in the past few years. Over 632 of this type were fired by both sides in the Iran-Iraq war after 1983, mostly against cities. The missile is believed to cost around \$1 million a piece and is fired from mobile launchers. The basic design permits a 1,000 kg payload and a range of 300 km. It requires less than two hours for erection and launch. However, such missiles with conventional warheads have marginal military significance. These have a CEP (circular error of probability, measuring the radius of a circle within which 50 percent of the warheads may impact) of 1,000 metres. An earlier version had a CEP of 4,000 metres.

The 300 km SSM tested by Pakistan is apparently based on the Scud variants—the Soviet R-300 and the Chinese M-11. There is every likelihood that Chinese assistance contributed to the developments. China had agreed to assist Brazil in missile related technologies in 1986. It had started marketing the M-11 by 1988. China is not a party to the U.S.-led seven-nation group set up to impose a missile technology control regime in April 1987 to prevent the spread of relevant technologies, especially to third world countries.

Level of Maturity

At the same time assistance from other sources, including Western countries, cannot be ruled out. Their control regime ostensibly seeks to prevent proliferation of only nuclear capable missiles (defined as those beyond 300 km range and 500 kg payloads). Keeping this context in mind, the reality of a ballistic missile programme reaching a level of maturity in Pakistan must be recognised.

Besides the concerns in the United States about possible transfer of IRBMs to Pakistan by China, the important point to note is it would be possible for Pakistan to extend the range of its HATF-II. Iraq remodified its Scuds (from al-Husayn tested in 1987 to the new al-Abbas version) by lengthening the missile to carry additional propellant. This was reportedly achieved by cannibalising the propellant tanks from other such missiles to produce two from three of them. This increased the range from 300 km to 650 km without reduction in the 1,000 kg warhead payload. With reduced payload, ranges of 1,000 km may become feasible. The claim of tests last year will need evaluation in this context. After April 1988 Pakistan may have considered it expedient to downplay the long-range missile plans, while perfecting the 300 km range missile.

It would be a very long time before Pakistan by itself can improve accuracies to levels where conventionally armed ballistic missiles will be of significant military value (usually thought to require less than 20 metres

CEP). However, other countries have undertaken conversions and adaptations. South Korea converted the Nike-Hercules surface-to-air missile to SSM role, while Israel adapted the Lance guidance system to its Jericho-II IRBM. Without significant improvements in accuracy (which also requires highly accurate target data), HATF-II and its future developments would be effective only with chemical or nuclear warheads.

1989 Naval Review Accentuates Navy's Growth

Ships Described

46001346 Bombay *THE TIMES OF INDIA* in English
16 Feb 89 pp 1, 3

[Article by a Staff Reporter]

[Text] Bombay, 15 Feb—"The gleaming columns of ships are a happy affirmation of the fact that the neglect of the maritime sector of the pre-independence days is over," remarked the President, Mr. R. Venkataraman, after reviewing the mighty array of warships assembled in the Indian Ocean off the Gateway anchorage here today.

The country's prosperity and progress were closely linked to her ability to use the seas around to advantage as nearly 70 percent of her oil and 80 percent of natural gas came from them.

Mr Venkataraman was addressing nearly 12,000 officers and men of the Indian Navy on 86 ships which formed the reviewing column arranged in eight lines three miles long and two miles wide.

The President reviewed the fleet, the seventh since independence, standing on the top deck of a mine-sweeper converted into a white yacht, "Pondicherry," flanked by the chief of naval staff, Admiral J.G. Nadkarni, and Mrs Venkataraman.

The Prime Minister, Mr Rajiv Gandhi, and the defence minister, Mr K.C. Pant, and other members of the Central cabinet followed the presidential yacht in another mine-sweeper turned yacht, "Bhavnagar."

Supreme Commander

The review, a formal occasion in honour of the President in his capacity as the supreme commander of the armed forces, afforded an opportunity to the people to get a glimpse of the navy's ships, submarines and aircraft which protect the nation's coastline and vital sealanes.

As the morning mist began to lift the navy's gunners fired a 21-gun salute to signify the commencement of the review. As the President's yacht came alongside each of the ships he waved to the officers and men who responded by doffing their caps and cheering him with "Rashtrapati ki jai" three times.

The presidential inspection began with the small but powerful squadron of missile boats in the first line each armed with four surface-to-surface missiles capable of inflicting heavy damage on an enemy.

Missile Warfare

The induction of these ships into the navy in 1976 added a new dimension to missile warfare in the subcontinent. They have the latest generation of dual purpose guns capable of packing the most awesome firepower in the path of an oncoming missile.

After reviewing a variety of ships like corvettes, naval dockyard dredgers, submarine chasers, landing ships and an ocean-going tug, the President inspected the three ships of the Coast Guard, "Vijaya," "Varuna" and "Veera," which are charged with policing the waters around the coastline.

Next in line for inspection were the Kamortas which are anti-submarine ships armed with long-range torpedoes, anti-submarine rockets and depth charges. They are equipped with search-and-attack sonars and their torpedoes are highly accurate having a variety of techniques to deceive an intended target.

The sixth line consisted of the predators of the deep—submarines—of a diverse range from an advanced tactical nuclear submarine to the Foxtrot class geared with high-tech western-oriented search-seek-and-kill German and Soviet sophisticated equipment.

The first Mr Venkataraman inspected was the "Shishumar," a conventional diesel electric submarine designed for a hunter-killer role. She is characterised by her silence and complete automation making her an ideal platform for seeking out and attacking an enemy with her latest generation of torpedoes.

Since the last review five years ago, the submarine sector has undergone a qualitative and quantitative change and incorporates the latest technologies and state-of-art weapons systems today.

Submarine Power

Last in the line of submarines was the "Chakra," a nuclear-powered vessel, leased to India by the Soviet Union for training purposes. Her acquisition signifies a milestone in the navy's advance to high-tech after she was commissioned last January.

She is manned by 30 officers and 70 other crew members. Her entry into the navy heralds India's advance into the exclusive club of five nations operating a nuclear-powered submarine.

The "Chakra," though not armed with nuclear weapons, has successfully completed a year of operation in the Indian Navy giving its crew valuable experience in manning and operating nuclear submarines.

The seventh line of ships consisted of frigates constructed indigenously at the Mazagon Dock Ltd. and the first, "Ganga" commissioned in 1985, carries a powerful new guided missile and is capable of extended blue-water operations.

With an impressive array of sensors, weapons and electronic equipment, "Ganga" is capable of combating surface, air and under-water bombs. The ship has a highly advanced electronic warfare system and two single-package Seaking helicopters armed with anti-submarine missiles. The large helideck and hangar mark an achievement of design unmatched by any navy in the world.

The next frigate was the "Gomati," 80 percent of whose machinery and equipment has been manufactured by Indian public and private sector companies. The equipment fitted is very diverse and is from eight countries exemplifying the dexterity with which Indian naval engineers have interphased the varied systems.

The "Gadavari" commissioned in 1983 was the first warship built in India with a totally indigenous design and, in the last five years, had logged an impressive list of achievements.

Another frigate, "Taragiri," the first Leander-class vessel, was modified from its British design to accommodate an anti-submarine Seaking helicopter and the skill with which the mammoth mosquito machine landed on its deck won the respect of many an accomplished flier.

Mr Venkataraman then went on to inspect other frigates like "Vindhyagiri," "Dunagiri," "Himgiri," "Udaygiri" and "Nilgiri"—a total of six Leander-class frigates named after well-known peaks and hills in the country.

The final leg of the blue-water array of naval ships followed with the inspection of the first vessel, "Deepak," with its large copter-landing platform. Then followed a review of a research vessel, "Gaveshini," and a landing ship, "Magar," the largest warship to have been built in the country at the Garden Reach workshop in Calcutta.

Mr Venkataraman later inspected four guided missile destroyers—"Rajput," "Ranjit," "Ranvijay" and "Ranvir"—acknowledged as the mightiest warships in the Indian Ocean. Bringing up the rear were the two aircraft carriers, "Vikrant" and "Viraat."

The "Vikrant" had a glorious role in the 1971 Indo-Pak war when deployed in East Pakistan as her Seahawk aircraft flew as many as 125 missions between 4 December and 14 December and afforded close air support to the army.

The "Vikrant" which celebrates her 28th birthday tomorrow has been rejuvenated after an extensive modernisation refit with new machinery and modern sensors and weapons. Majestically lying on the port bow was India's second aircraft carrier, "Viraat," which accommodates 1,600 people.

As the President completed the fleet review, Chetaks took off from the ships and flew to the air space in front of the presidential yacht for the traditional flypast finale of 38 aircraft of the navy and Coast Guard.

Addressing the navy personnel Mr Venkataraman said India has the largest exclusive economic zone of over two million sq km and trade amounting to over Rs 40,000 crores a year. Therefore, travel over the seas and the security of searoutes to the Gulf, Red Sea, Cape of Good Hope and the Malacca Straits were of vital concern.

"We are on our way once again to taking our rightful place among the maritime nations," he said. He called for close co-operation and co-ordination among all maritime agencies in the country.

Among the VIPs who witnessed the review were the governors and chief ministers of the maritime states of India—Gujarat, Tamil Nadu, Karnataka, Kerala and Maharashtra, while the governor of Himachal Pradesh, Admiral C.K.S. Ghandi, was a special invitee as a former chief of naval staff.

Chief of Naval Staff Interviewed

46001346 Bombay *THE TIMES OF INDIA* in English
15 Feb 89 p 3

[Article by Yogendra Bali]

[Text] New Delhi, 14 Feb (THE TIMES OF INDIA News Service)—The Indian Navy has obtained the nuclear submarine, INS "Chakra," on lease to gain competence in the operation and maintenance of this weapon system.

At present, there is no other plan, the chief of the naval staff, Admiral J.G. Nadkarni, says.

In an hour-long interview with THE TIMES OF INDIA News Service on the state of the Indian Navy on the eve of the fleet review 1989, the chief of the naval staff points out that India has entered the vital field of producing sophisticated sonar and radar equipment and its work on the production of integrated missiles was making steady progress.

Following are excerpts from the interview:

Question: What is the achievement in the direction of indigenisation of naval design and manufacture?

Answer: One reason (why) we feel very confident of our future is that we have now a well and truly established design and construction capability in India. Since the government acquired three defence shipyards in the sixties, a number of ships have been built by them. The biggest achievement so far has been the construction of three Godavari class frigates during 1984-88. By any yardstick, they are the finest ships of their class in the world today they have a considerable amount indigenous equipment aboard. As for the future, warships or warship classes are under construction. You have also heard about our plans to design our own sea control ship (the new designation for smaller aircraft carrier) in India.

Question: What about the recent Indo-French agreement for collaboration on design of aircraft carriers?

Answer: Although we have considerable expertise in designing of warships, an aircraft carrier represents a specialised task and we do require a certain amount of assistance. Basically, we need some advice on calculations, something here and something there.

Question: What is our progress on missiles, the mainstay of modern navies?

Answer: Over the past 15-20 years, missiles have become extremely important in all the three forms of warfare—surface-to-surface, air-to-surface and surface-to-air. We are among the earliest navies to induct surface-to-surface missiles nearly two decades ago. About 10 years later we inducted surface-to-air missiles also. Sometime soon we hope to have an air-to-surface capability as well. We have to catch up in the field of submarine-to-surface missiles.

Question: What is the contribution of Indian technology in the sonar field?

Answer: I would like to take the subject a bit further. Not only radar and communication equipment but also other types of electronic equipment, such as electronic warfare equipment, are now playing a major role in naval warfare. All these can be grouped under 'sensor technology.' In this, some of the major navies of the world have great advantage over several smaller navies. Fortunately for us, we have been manufacturing a whole range of radars, sonars, electronic warfare systems and communications equipment in the country for some years. We certainly have some way to go in terms of sophistication but our research and development organisations are making spectacular progress.

To briefly talk about sonar, we in the Indian Navy have been very conscious of mastering the technology for production. Our DRDO (Defence Research and Development Organisation), especially the naval physical and oceanographic laboratories in Cochin, have been able to produce an indigenously developed sonar which is being used by Indian Navy ships. performance reports are excellent. The navy is working very closely with our defence scientists to produce even better systems.

Question: What is the benefit to the navy from the integrated missile programme?

Answer: Basically our interest is in the surface-to-air missile which they are developing. We are very much part and parcel of this particular development, and we will be using it.

Question: What kind of gains and follow-up do you expect from the acquisition on lease from the Soviet Union of INS Chakra, the nuclear submarine?

Answer: With the INS Chakra, we ventured into a new and sophisticated area. At present our aim is to learn all about this technology. The primary aim of taking one on lease is to increase our knowledge and our competence to operate and maintain this kind of submarine. At present there is no other plan.

I would like to add that most of the major navies of the world are three-dimensional. Fortunately, the Indian Navy compares very well with other navies of the world, having a balanced growth in all these three dimensions. We have a surface combat element well supported by both ship-based and shore-based air element. We also have the submarine element. We would also like to ensure that growth in future is well-balanced in all three elements.

Question: Are there major constraints on the growth of the Indian fleet due to the budgetary crunch?

Answer: It would be wrong to say that the difficult resource position has not affected the plans of the navy. Fortunately, the vital and the absolutely necessary core plans have not been affected. We, on our part, are also carrying out a very vigorous internal drive to find all means and measures of reducing expenses, especially maintenance expenses, without affecting either operational readiness or critical modernisation programmes.

Question: What is the contribution of the navy to the overall defence posture?

Answer: The major contribution we can make towards the other two services (is) in the areas of amphibious operations, sea-lift, strike and interdiction at sea and maritime patrolling. We are fairly up-to-date in comparison with a number of major navies of the world. Whether it is heli-lift from the sea, or in beaching operations, we are fairly up-to-date.

Question: What is the future of Cochin? Will it remain a training command? Or do you perceive any change in its role?

Answer: The southern naval command is the headquarters of the training command but it has a certain operational role too. Some of the ships are based here and perform a limited role. As far as I am concerned, the present system is working perfectly all right. I don't envisage any changes. We have bases in the Andamans also and they are developing slowly.

Question: Would you like to review the state of the fleet today, as compared with 1984 when the last fleet review was held?

Answer: In the last five years, the Indian Navy, as you can see, has continued along the well charted path of modernisation and gradual growth. Since 1984, a number of new ships, submarines and aircraft have joined the fleet while some ships have been decommissioned. The highlights (are) the induction of our second aircraft carrier, INS Virat, in 1987. The second is the induction on lease of INS Chakra in 1988. Other inductions include two indigenously-built Godavari class frigates, two Rajput class destroyers, eight submarines and eight long-range maritime patrol aircraft.

Question: Would you like to look into the future and try to visualise what would the navy of future be like?

Answer: We have a plan of naval modernisation stretching up to the year 2000 A.D. and beyond. Basically, our emphasis in the next 10 to 15 years would be on indigenous construction.

Influx of Bangladeshis a Problem to Border States

Crossing Into West Bengal

46001354 Calcutta THE STATESMAN in English
16 Feb 89 p 9

[Text] There has been a heavy influx of Hindu Bangladeshi nationals from across the border into some districts of West Bengal following the decision of the Bangladesh Government in mid-1988 to declare Islam as the state religion. According to a report submitted by the State's Intelligence Branch to the State's Home department recently, the Hindus in Bangladesh are being subjected to atrocities by Muslim fundamentalists. Hindu women have been molested and their temples have been desecrated.

In a sample survey conducted by the Intelligence Branch in the bordering district of North 24-Parganas and Nadia, 30,000 Hindu nationals have settled in the Barasat-Bongaon area. Another 15,000 have crossed over to the Krishnagar, Ranaghat, Santipur and Chakdahthana areas of Nadia. According to the report, "the picture of other border districts is no different."

There have been large-scale arrests of Hindus in Bangladesh suspected to have links with the Nikhil Banga Nagarik Sangha and other extremist factions in the

country. A considerable increase in the detection of Bangladesh nationals in West Bengal is another pointer to the seriousness of the problem.

The number of Bangladesh nationals detected by the State police has risen from 24,000 in 1987 to 27,110 the following year. The Border Security Force has detected over 19,000 Bangladeshi nationals last year from all over the State.

The attention of the Superintendents of Police of all the border districts has been drawn to the problem. They have been asked to take appropriate action, official sources said.

The West Bengal Government is preparing a well-documented report on the extent of the influx, according to official sources. The State administration is fully aware about the recent spurt in illegal entry from Bangladesh into West Bengal. There had already been some discussion in this regard between the officials of the State Government and the Union Home Ministry. It is learnt that the Centre on its own is also making inquiries into this complaint.

The sources said the State Government would send its report to the Union Home Ministry and further discussions on this problem would be held in Delhi on the basis of the report.

Infiltration Into Tripura

46001354 Calcutta THE STATESMAN in English
16 Feb 89 p 4

[Article by Satyabrata Chakraborti in Agartala: "Tripura's Problem of Infiltration Turning Acute"]

[Text] Tripura's chronic problem of infiltration from across the international border is again becoming serious enough to stir the Government into action. Security posts have been put on the alert to keep round-the-clock vigil over the 800-km frontier line, almost open in the plains and wooded, in the hilly terrains. The mobile taskforces were reinforced.

But there is hardly any respite in the flow of people from Bangladesh because of that country's deepening economic crisis on one hand and growing religious intolerance on the other.

Tripura is reeling under the staggering impact of evacuees. No one here wonders when patients from Bangladesh's bordering villages get themselves treated in the State's Government hospitals with or without the knowledge of the local medical authorities. Youths from across the border see films at cinemas in Tripura towns more often.

The acute unemployment in the Bangladesh countryside has forced hundreds of people to cross over to the State's bordering townships every day to offer cheap labour

during daytime and purchase essential commodities before they return in the evening. A large number of rickshaw-pullers from Bangladesh are doing brisk business here and on the outskirts.

Leaders of the ruling Tripura Upajati Juba Samity [TUJS] have brought pressure on the coalition Government for taking more effective steps to curb infiltration. The Minister for Agriculture, Mr Nagendra Jamatiya (TUJS), wants the Government to least identify the evacuees and shelter them in camps. As the Government has, in the peace accord with the TNV [Tripura National Volunteers], promised to take all possible measures to check infiltration, the former rebel supremo, Mr Bijoykumar Hrangkhawl, of late, has hinted at stirring tribal agitation in the hills to demand proper implementation of the peace agreement.

The Government has miserably failed to control the menace of forged citizenship certificates. A coterie is always active in the administration to protect aliens' interests in return for handsome payments. Those who have crossed over to Tripura even in the early '80s have managed to purchase land, secure government jobs and even nominations for election.

Citing an example, a mobile taskforce official said that a foreigner from the district of Comilla, who was earlier detected, produced before the local court and finally pushed back, had crossed over to Tripura again, armed with a citizenship certificate. The police could obviously take no action.

Such foreigners first get their names enrolled in the Panchayat register in the villages before seeking citizenship. The government has already issued strict instructions to the Panchayat secretaries not to enlist fresh names when existing registers of Panchayats are being scrutinized by senior officials of the Block and Panchayat Department.

Work on revision of the voters' list is now on in full swing and numerous complaints exist about inclusion of foreigners in the list under pressure from influential quarters, political party activists and close relations. Employees engaged in revision were also not, in fact, given any specific guideline by their authorities on how to deal with the situation properly.

Bharatiya Janata Party [BJP]'s implacable attitude to the problem of infiltration was explained by its leaders in a campaign in Tripura's bordering towns. More than 300,000 Bangladesh nationals had already crossed over to West Bengal, said Mr Bansilal Sonee, secretary of the BJP's North-East States Coordination Council. Almost 40,00,000 [as printed] had infiltrated into Assam and at least 200,000 Bangladesh nationals crossed over to Tripura since the liberation of Bangladesh in addition to about 45,000 Chakma evacuees now camping in the

State along with another 10,000 who took refuge in Tripura in the past several months after declaration of the Islamic Republic there, he said.

He reiterated that his party had made it repeatedly clear that those who came and were still coming from Bangladesh because of a genuine fear for their lives, property and honour and also for their faith, religion and ethnic identity, must be treated as refugees in accordance with the criteria laid down by the U.N. Commission on Refugees in 1952 and not as infiltrators. "We cannot throw them to the wolves," he remarked. Mr Sonee, however, blamed both the Congress(I) and the CPI(M) [Communist Party of India-Marxist] for reaping the electoral harvest in the deteriorating political situation.

Papers Report on State Conferences of CPI

Gupta at Maharashtra Meeting

46001373 Bombay *THE TIMES OF INDIA* in English
24 Feb 89 p 17

[Article by B. M. Purandare]

[Text] Ahmednagar, February 23. The CPI [Communist Party of India] deputy general secretary, Mr Inderjit Gupta, has urged India to condemn the nations that are violating the Geneva agreements on Afghanistan, as it has a direct bearing on the country's security environment.

Mr Gupta, who is attending the 14th conference on the CPI Maharashtra unit here, said today that while the Soviet Union had implemented the agreements, the United States and Pakistan had continued to help the rebels.

The accumulation of arms and the military build-up in Afghanistan would present a serious threat to India, he said.

He said that though the present Kabul government was friendly with India, the fundamentalists were trying to foist a conservative Islamic regime there. Why was India, a major country in the region, keeping quiet, Mr Gupta asked.

He said he had expected a strong official reaction in the Presidential address to Parliament. He wanted the country to make the United Nations act in this matter.

On the issue of the relations between the CPI and the CPM [Communist Party of India-Marxist], Mr Gupta said the situation was such that the unity of communists had assumed great importance. It did not depend on the likes and dislikes of a few leaders.

The need of the hour was for these parties to move together in all activities, and communists all over the country were interested in the reunification.

On the national situation, the CPI leader said the Congress was facing an extremely grave situation because of its anti-people policies.

Because of the Prime Minister, Mr Rajiv Gandhi's peculiar style of working, the public inclination was that there should be one opposition candidate in every constituency to defeat the Congress.

The CPI was trying to radicalize this feeling by projecting the idea that a left, democratic and secular government should take the place of the Congress.

Mr Gupta said the CPI would try to dissuade the National Front and the Janata Dal from aligning with communal parties, such as the BJP [Bharatiya Janata Party] and the Shiv Sena.

He said electoral alliances with communal forces would mean sharing of the power with them at the time of the formation of the government. This would spell disaster, he warned.

The communists would not be a party to such adjustments, he said. They would fight the BJP and the Shiv Sena, whatever the decision of the National Front, he declared.

The four-day conference, being attended by 500 delegates, would discuss the issue of the unity of all the communists—the CPI, the CPM, and even some sections of the CPI(M-L) [Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist)].

It would prepare a concrete proposal to be put up before the party congress at Calcutta in the first week of March.

The conference would take a strong view of the monopoly policies advocated by the chief minister, Mr Sharad Pawar. The open announcement by Mr Pawar to allow privatization of production and supply of electricity, construction of roads and bridges and seeking of NRI [Non-resident Indian] capital for setting up casinos, would come in for severe attack, according to Mr L.S. Karkhanis and Mr Madhavrao Gaikwad.

The party secretary's report said during the last three years both Hindu and Muslim communalism had become aggressive, and riots had spread even to small villages. Hindu communalism was on the offensive against Dalits and Adivasis.

The conference will be discussing the coming together of the Shiv Sena, the BJP and the Maratha Mahasangh. The state party would emphasize the need for the unity of all.

More on Maharashtra

46001373 New Delhi PATRIOT in English
25 Feb 89 p 6

[Text] Ahmednagar, Feb 24—The Communist Party of India would strive to forge unity of the three Left parties. CPI [Communist Party of India, CPI-M [Communist Party of India-Marxist] and PWP [Peasants Workers Party] and build up a United Left Front along with Lal Nishan, Forward Bloc, Revolutionary Socialist Party and some Dalit Panther groups in Maharashtra, according to the political and organizational report presented at the 14th State conference of CPI here.

The proposed front, the report says would have electoral front with secular and democratic parties like the Janata Dal and similar other political factions in the State.

The report made critical reference to the reticent approach of the PWP in forging Left Front as the main pivot of the wider electoral front. PWP's approach to the unity goes against the very spirit that it displayed in its Tujapur conference held last summer.

The anti-communal approach adopted by the Shetkari Sanghatana leader Sharad Joshi for the first time when Mr Joshi declared that he would strongly oppose communal stance of the Shiv Sena and BJP [Bharatiya Janata Party] is appreciated by the CPI. The party feels that it opens possibilities of working unitedly with it. The report also stressed the need to develop friendly dialogue with Shetkari Sanghatana to strengthen the struggles for just demands in the rural areas.

The report sharply criticized the callous neglect of the Employment Guarantee Scheme by the State government and its utter failure for building effective administrative machinery to guarantee work to the landless laborers who constitute almost fifty percent of the rural population.

Discussing the critical situation of the agrarian scene of the State, the report said that disparity in land holding has been widening with every passing year.

The report stressed the need to ban the middlemen (dalals) in the wholesale market in agricultural commodities, and State take-over of the foodgrains trade ensuring remunerative prices to the agricultural producers. A movement of the exploited farmers has to be launched in the rural region of the State to bring changes in the conditions of the peasantry, the report added.

The report drew the attention of the party to the serious crisis that has gripped the industrial sector where over 18,000 factories have closed down due to lock-outs, retrenchment and lay-off rendering over five lakh workers in cotton textile, sugar and engineering factories jobless.

Andhra Pradesh Meeting

46001373 Bombay *THE TIMES OF INDIA* in English
25 Feb 89 p 9

[Text] Hyderabad, February 24. The Andhra Pradesh unit of the CPI [Communist Party of India] concluded its five-day annual conference here yesterday passing resolutions severely criticizing the functioning of the state government in irrigation, industry and de-centralization of administration.

The resolution on irrigation demanded that the drought-prone Rayalaseema region be accorded priority in taking up irrigation projects.

Noting that the ambitious Telugu-Ganga project was not completed within the original schedule, the CPI said the government appeared to be interested only in announcing populist schemes and performing inauguration ceremonies for publicity.

The resolution said the government should plan a schedule for various projects, make adequate budget provisions and complete projects in time.

The resolution on industries pointed out that some 30 lakh, out of about 3.5 crore, registered unemployed people in the country were in Andhra Pradesh.

It said the government had done little to provide employment to workers hit by the closure of thousands of industrial units.

Gross production had gone down in various sectors like paper, cement, textiles, jute and steel. The resolution urged the government to make efforts to have more Central projects located in Andhra Pradesh and asked it to procure power from other states so that industry and agriculture should not be deprived.

The resolution on local bodies said while the government created administrative divisions called mandals in 1986 and conducted mandal elections spending crores of rupees in 1987, it had done little to channelize the flow of funds to mandals, village panchayats, municipalities or zilla parishads.

The CPI charged that while Central and state governments were forking out crores of rupees for subsidizing the modernization of mills, handloom workers were not being given subsidy to cover sharp increases in the price of yarn and dyes.

The resolution on handlooms asked for more work centers be organized to provide employment to all hands, and that the state and Central governments should take up responsibility for marketing cloth produced at such centers.

It also demanded that the Center review the textile policy, particularly the provision allowing powerlooms to manufacture saris, dhotis and lungis which were earlier reserved for the handloom sector.

The CPI noted in the resolution on beedi leaf collection that the state government agency organizing the activity had earned a profit of Rs 4 crores last year and said measures should be taken to spend that money for poor laborers engaged in beedi leaf collection.

It insisted that wages for collection of tendu leaves be raised to 50 paise per bundle of 100 leaves.

Karnataka Conference

46001373 New Delhi *PATRIOT* in English
26 Feb 89 p 6

[Text] Bangalore, Feb 25—The 14th Karnataka State conference of the Communist Party of India [CPI] which was held here from 17 to 21 February has decided to "turn the face of the party towards kisans and agricultural workers" to build a powerful kisan movement in the State. The conference which was attended by more than 250 delegates from all over the State also resolved to make conscious efforts to build 'unity in action with CPI-M [Communist Party of India-Marxist] and other left, secular and democratic forces and parties in the State to create a viable alternative to the discredited Congress and the corrupt and inefficient Janata Dal. The conference which discussed a lengthy political report reiterated its earlier analysis of the Janata Government which said "the policies of the Janata Government are more or less the same as that of the Congress-Government," to releasing the conference resolutions to press, party secretary M.S. Krishnan MLA [Member of Legislative Assembly] noted that during the Janata regime, the dangerous virus of communalism has spread as at no time before he also noted that protection to the socially and economically oppressed was very much the casualty. There were increasing attacks on Harijans and Girijans.

The political report of the party drew special attention to many of the corruption scandals and said that the former Chief Minister Ramakrishna Hegde who often spoke of pursuing 'value based politics' and fighting corruption was found acting against them. It said "from the actions of the Government during the last three years" it appears that all these were hypocritical slogans. It decried his attempt to bring two Legislations which would have amounted to curbing the freedom of press and rights and liberties of Legislators.

The report also severely criticized the anti-kisan and anti-working class policies of the Government. Regarding the anti-labor policies, the party said that more than 6,000 industries including 14 textile mills have been closed throwing thousands of people on the street and the Government has not done anything to come to their rescue. The party also condemned the recent price hikes of ration sugar, milk, water and power.

Summary of Draft Report for CPI-ML Conference Reviewed

46001345 *Bombay THE TIMES OF INDIA in English*
14 Feb 89 p 9

[Text] Patna, 13 Feb (The Times of India News Service)—The Communist Organisation of India (Marxist-Leninist) [COI(M-L)], which was formed with much fanfare by Naxalite leaders like Mr Kanu Sanyal, Mr Umadhar Singh and others in 1985, has said in its draft political and organisational report that the party has not acted capably, been amateurish, highly individualistic and failed to take "bold and practical steps in time."

The report will be presented at the second all-India conference of the party, to be held at Bolpur in West Bengal next week.

The report said that the organisation had "failed to realise its declared objective of uniting the communist revolutionary forces" in the country. "Our unification was achieved primarily at the top. Likewise, all our problems emanate from the top. We had made known our political differences and pledged to resolve them through organised debate. The central committee failed to launch required debates spending much of its time in hairsplitting on the differences between people's democracy and new democracy or our role in insignificant organisations" the report said.

Sounding a note of despair it added: "The future path remains tortuous. Resolution of disputes among various Communist revolutionary groups has indeed proved difficult."

Outlining the problems, the report said that the central committee worked in a disjointed fashion. It said that "the mass frontal activities of the organisation continued in a disjointed fashion without any central guideline." This was "further compounded by the smallness of the organisation and the lack of sufficient number of trained cadres."

The report also accused the party leaders of not taking their job seriously and said: "There was a lack of seriousness on our part which often made us put the priority in wrong places."

It noted that individual and personality trends in the organisation were tending to take precedence over the organisation. "Though the practice of democratic centralism has been one of our positive achievements, yet individualistic trends have also raised their heads within us," it said. The drafting committee members "had contained a lack of mutual confidence." The central committee members were also accused of "neglecting fund-raising."

Discussing the unity efforts of the COI(M-L), the report identified two major difficulties: "The serious difference regarding the assessment of CPI(M-L) [Communist

Party of India-Marxist-Leninist] as an anarchist party, and the apparent similarity on programmatic and tactical issues, beneath which there was indeed a gulf of difference in approach among communist revolutionary groups which required debate and resolution."

It said that three distinct points of opinion had emerged during the last three years. While the first was in favour of merging only the splinters of CPI(M-L) groups, the second favoured the unification of those factions which had emerged from the CPM [Communist Party of India-Marxist], and the third group, represented by COI(M-L), was in favour of the unification of all the groups by stages. The report notes that "dispite the obvious difficulties involved in uniting such diverse groups, the COI(M-L) has not given up its unification efforts and is, at present, engaged in continuing bilateral discussions with various communist revolutionary groups."

Denouncing anarchist groups like the people's war group and the Maoist Communist Centre, the report noted that such tactics make them unpopular with the masses and that they lose credibility.

The drafting committee stressed that such a situation demanded the complete reorganisation of the party. "If we are really serious...we must restructure our organisation accordingly. We must also get ready for a phase of illegality and build up a secret organisational structure. This requires a change in the organisation of our cadres also. It is unfortunate that while the reactionaries and the revisionists have become fully armed, our cadres do not even think about it."

Exhorting the ranks to arm themselves, the report noted: "The cracks appearing in the state apparatus must be taken note of. We are already aware of the large-scale discontent within army ranks. We should take advantage of the situation and carry on secret propaganda within army units and also try to build secret cells under direct supervision of the central committee."

North Tripura Mizos Vow To Continue Agitation

46001343 *New Delhi PATRIOT in English*
11 Feb 89 p 5

[Article by Our Staff Correspondent]

[Text] Agartala, 10 Feb—Five thousand Mizos of the North Tripura's Jampui Hill have resolved to continue their agitation till their demands are met. The Mizos are demanding a separate regional council and the introduction of the Mizo (Lushai) language at the primary school level as the medium for instruction.

The Jampui Mizo Convention formed to 29 January 1979, is spearheading the agitation. The convention recently organised a two-day conference and decided to continue their movement in a phased manner. The conference held on 2 and 3 January formed a five-member committee headed by the Mizo convention.

President of the convention Lalngova has to chalk out the future course of action. Altogether thousand delegates attended the conference.

TNV [Tripura National Volunteers] supremo Bijoy Hrangkhawl who was present at the conference with his wife Linda was the chief guest. Mizo convention leader in his long speech appreciated the role of TNV president for the all round development of the tribals mentioning him as the "father of Tripura tribals."

Mr Lalngova said Union Minister Santosh Mohan Dev and the present Chief Minister Sudhir Ranjan Mazumdar assured the Mizo Convention that if they returned to power they would create the regional council. Even the TUJS [Tripura Ubijati Juba Samity] in its Pencharthal State conference in 1983 accepted the demand. Only the erstwhile Left front Government opposed the demand saying that it would break the solidarity of tribals. But now the coalition government is "ignoring the legitimate demand."

Bijoy Hrangkhawl justifying the demand for the establishment of a separate regional council in the Jampui hill, said it was provided in the Sixth Schedule of the constitution and is one of the major terms of the TNV accord.

He further said that if Government was keen to implement the sixth schedule they should set up separate regional council. Severely criticising the TUJS and the CPI-M [Communist Party of India-Marxist], he said that those who were opposing the regional council demand were against the interest of tribals.

Mr Lalngova announced that on 17 February they would organise motor rally from Vaisam to Phuldongshai which would be followed by another programme of march from Vaisam to Belianchhip on 20 February.

The TNV chief had also attended the Halam community conference at Pipliputri village in Cachar district. In his speech he threatened that if the Government failed to implement the terms of the TNV accord, TNV would launch a fresh agitation. Earlier, he said he would visit Delhi to discuss with the Union Home Minister and the Prime Minister various hurdles.

PAKISTAN

Port Visits by U.S. Ships Opposed

46560020a Karachi AMN in Urdu 27 Jan 89 p 3

[Editorial: "Another U.S. Warship at Karachi's Port"]

[Text] A destroyer ship of the U.S. Navy called the U.S.S. Henry B. Wilson, equipped with guided missiles, recently anchored at the Karachi port. It was stated that the U.S. ship was on a routine visit of the region, and that it would remain on the shore of the Arabian Sea for a few more days. The ship's crew, army officers and

marines, spent all their days roaming about in the city. They also went shopping at the Sadar Bohri mall and in areas of Clifton. The U.S. Marines and officers comprise both black and white people. They really liked the mild winter of Karachi. They never needed those warm clothes that they dispatch to dry places like Pakistan and that sell very well in the 'lunda' bazaars here during winter time. The U.S. military men were instructed to be cautious when roaming about in the sensitive areas of Karachi like Lyari, Liaqatabad, etc. This U.S. ship entered the Arabian Sea through the Pacific Ocean. From here it will sail to the Philippines. A short while ago, two huge U.S. aircraft carriers, The Enterprise and the Kitty Hawk, visited Karachi. The Enterprise had highly sensitive spying devices installed on it, while the Kitty Hawk carried the U.S. Navy's Hawkeye aircrafts.

Previously also when those U.S. warships arrived at Karachi, considerable efforts were made to provide recreation opportunities in the city for the U.S. military officers and crew members. However, no protest demonstrations against their presence in the city were launched. The visits by the U.S. ships are described as something routine. The government takes no notice of them, while a strict watch is kept over the movements of our own fellow citizens. Anyone believed to be suspicious can be arrested, and after he is taken straight to the CIA [Central Investigation Agency] center for investigation, he can be made to disappear. However, the U.S. warships are granted full freedom to move about freely on our shores to learn the secrets of our national integrity. No one officially knows about the purpose of the devices and war equipment loaded on these ships. The U.S. warships do not travel in the seas of the Asian countries without any objective. It is possible that they assess the strategic strengths of these countries. By intermingling with the city folk, these military men must evaluate the social and economic conditions of the country. Under no circumstances can the government's act of ignoring their movements be regarded as satisfactory by the Pakistanis.

Caution Urged on Treaties With India

46560021a Lahore NAWA-E-WAQT in Urdu
26 Jan 89 p 10

[Editorial: "It Is Important That Former Treaties Should Be Honored First"]

[Text] Indian Foreign Secretary Mr K.P.S. Menon, during a telephone interview with the Voice of America, said that since the Pakistan Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto understands our position better, there can be further treaties between Pakistan and India. There should be treaties between Pakistan and India and there can be cooperation in various sectors. But before doing this, it will be appropriate to assess the progress made in implementing the treaties already negotiated, so as to find what has been India's attitude towards them. Indian circles continue to pay tribute to Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto's "intelligence and capability." The

Indian Foreign Secretary, by now saying that Benazir Bhutto understands their position better, has further certified their acclamation and admiration. Such behavior on the part of Indians has aroused numerous suspicions in the hearts of Pakistanis. In the past no Pakistani president or prime minister could understand the position of Indian brahmin rulers 'well.' But now all of a sudden Indian officials have started praising the Pakistani prime minister frequently for being better able to understand their position. Whatever the reason behind this change, the people of Pakistan want the Pakistani prime minister to reiterate Pakistan's demand that India withdraw its forces from Kashmir and Siachen. Indian rulers previously had the excuse that they were not prepared to accept any proposals that the non-democratic Pakistani rulers had to offer, and they more or less maintained such an attitude. Now we have a prime minister elected by the people, and she has the additional qualification of being able to understand the Indian position better. It is therefore the duty of the Pakistan government that it should try to settle this vital issue and end the Indian occupation of Siachen. Once this issue is settled, then any enthusiasm for negotiating new treaties can be satisfied.

Sind's Reaction to Proposed Repatriation of Biharis Examined

46560020b Karachi AMN in Urdu 27 Jan 89 p 3

[Column "From Jumma Khan's Pen": "Only One Faction of Sind Is Concerned Over the Repatriation of Biharis"]

[Excerpts] [Passage omitted] Everyone is aware of the fact that whereas many organizations in Sind disapprove the repatriation of Biharis, there are many groups that are launching a campaign to expedite their return. If one faction, by putting pressure, can make the administration stop the return of Biharis, the other faction can also, by using pressure tactics, compel the government to arrange for their return. But, nothing can be gained by doing so except spreading tension and enhancing hatred. The thing needed with regard to the issue of Biharis was that both the parties should have been taken into confidence, and an effort should have been made for a fair agreement. Such course of action, however, was never pursued.

What needs to be understood is that thousands of Bihari families stranded in Bangladesh wish to return to Pakistan. Punjab, the Frontier Province and Baluchistan have no objection to their return. One faction in Sind favors their repatriation, while the other opposes their settlement in that province. From whatever has been published in the newspapers, it appears that this faction does not object to their return to Pakistan, rather it opposes only their settling in Sind. This means that if the Bihari families returning to their homeland are settled in the other provinces except Sind, all the objections over their return would come to an end.

The leader of the Muhajir Quami Movement (MQM), Mr Altaf Hussain, warned a few days ago that an effort was being made to create tension over the issue of the repatriation of Biharis. He also said that if the Bihari families were returning to their homeland and they would be rehabilitated in Punjab and the Frontier Province, why should our Sindhi friends have any objection to it? He also suggested that the poverty-stricken Bihari families stranded in Bangladesh, upon their return, should be settled in all the four provinces.

Mr Altaf Hussain revealed that there were 500,000 foreigners in Sind. No one ever objects to their presence, nor does anyone say that they should be returned to their homeland. Similarly, hundreds of thousands of people from the other provinces have already settled in Sind. No one has raised an objection against them either. Nearly 4 million Afghan refugees also have been residing here for the last 8 years. No one knows how many million of those refugees will never return to their homeland. No one, however, is concerned about their return, but an objection is being raised over 200,000 to 300,000 Biharis who wish to return to their homeland.

Our Sindhi friends who object to the repatriation of the Bihari families have some among them who claim that they have lived in East Pakistan for 24 years, still they have been unable to make it their homeland. When they were living in their own province, they could not be loyal to it. Then how will such people Sind be faithful to this province once they settle here? The response given by the party that demands an early return of the Biharis to such Sindhi friends is that when Pakistan was being formed, the Biharis also, like hundreds of thousands of Muslims of the other minority provinces, decided to make Pakistan their homeland. The name of the beloved country of those refugees was Pakistan. It was not Punjab, Sind, the Frontier Province, Baluchistan or East Pakistan. Therefore when, with might, East Pakistan was changed into Bangladesh, they were unwilling to spend their remaining life there. They offered sacrifices for Pakistan during the Pakistan movement. Their life and death was linked with Pakistan. They were Pakistanis, and they desire to remain so. They do not accept to be Bangladeshis. Under what principle, therefore, can they be prohibited from entering and residing in Pakistan? Just as we have rehabilitated hundreds of thousands of people belonging to the other provinces of the present day Pakistan in Sind, and under the law and constitution we cannot stop further rehabilitation of such people, similarly we should allow the Biharis also to enter Pakistan and settle anywhere in the land. They too belonged to one of the provinces of Pakistan. Despite the change in the political circumstances, they are not prepared to terminate their Pakistani identity.

As far as issues like the increase in population, shortage of resources and unemployment are concerned, the administration and the people both realize these problems very well. But, in order to solve these problems and to control very swift increase in population, can we agree to the fact that every newborn child should be killed?

The Muslims believe that God alone is the provider of daily bread, prosperity and honor. In the past, Sind had a very small population and it was extremely backward. Today, it has a large population. This province has developed so much that 40 or 50 years ago no one could even dream of such an enormous progress.

Commentary Examines Bhutto's Hold on Power

Writer Introduces the Advisors of Bhutto

46240024 *Calcutta RAVIVAR in Hindi*
22-28 Jan 89 p 26

[Article by Rajiv Shukla: "Advisors of Benazir"]

[Excerpt] Benazir Bhutto is at this time the youngest prime minister in the world. It is true that she is very sharp and intelligent but she lacks in experience. This is why she has formed a group of five persons close to her and makes consultations with them on each and every issue. These five persons are also called political advisors to Benazir. Some people even comment that Benazir is actually under control of these persons who manipulate her as they want. The five are Nusarat Bhutto, mother of Benazir Bhutto, the Punjab governor Tikka Khan, the chief minister of Sind, Ali Shah, advisor on establishment matters Rao Rashid, and the Information Minister Javed Jabbar. Apart from them the interior minister Ittiaz Ahsan also is becoming a close associate of hers.

Nusarat Bhutto lives with her daughter almost all the time. Whatever be the occasion she is given protocol. She gives her advice to Benazir on almost all the issues. She has known the leaders of Pakistan from the very beginning, and is capable of doing all the maneuverings in the People's Party.

After the death of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Tikka Khan became like a guardian in the family. From the very beginning the Bhutto family has been taking advice and help from him. Similarly, Qayam Ali Shah had been of great help to both the mother and the daughter during their difficult days; therefore, Benazir does not make decisions without consulting him. Rao Rashid these days always moves around with her, and she gets the political run around done through him. He is like a secretary to her. Among her ministers, she considers Javed Jabbar the sharpest of all, therefore, she has governmental responsibilities taken care of through him.

Benazir's husband, Asif Zardari, has nothing to do with politics, nor does he ever interfere in the work of his wife. He follows his wife around as a party workers and often drives her car. In Pakistan most people do not like him. They wonder how this beautiful girl got involved with this dark skinned ugly landlord who squanders his money in horse races. The truth is that Asif had helped Benazir very much during her difficult days and she fell in love with him. [Passage omitted]

Commentary Examines Bhutto's Hold on Power

46240024 *Calcutta RAVIVAR in Hindi*
22-28 Jan 89 pp 27-28

[Article by Rajiv Shukla: "Benazir in Trouble"]

[Excerpt] There is a rumor in Pakistan that there had been a secret pact between Ishaq Khan and Benazir that, if she supported his candidature for the presidency, he would invite her to form the government. Benazir accepted the condition. She also fulfilled her promise. However, after having been elected president, Gulam Ishaq Khan is changing his attitude. He wants to keep all the power and control over the army, while Benazir wants to eliminate the eighth amendment in the constitution and thus cut down the powers of the president. She is trying to take control of the military and get other important matters in her own hands. On this issue there is a great discord between the two. Mr Khan is not prepared for any cut in his powers. In Pakistan only that person who has a control over the military is powerful. By means of the above amendment, Benazir wants to take control of the military, but Ishaq does not want to let her do that. In addition, Mr Khan is an old associate of the military. The chief of the military General Mirza Aslam Beg, therefore, will help him. If the United States has to make a choice between Benazir and Gulam Ishaq Khan, they will support Mr Khan.

If Benazir would have her way, she would have got the said amendment passed [as printed, actually she is trying to repeal it] in the national assembly, but her hands are tied. She does not have the required two-thirds majority in the assembly. The state assemblies also have to pass it. She does not have a majority in three of the state assemblies. The internal conflict between Gulam Ishaq Khan and Benazir has intensified. Benazir had great difficulty in getting her own man selected for the position of Director of Intelligence Bureau of Pakistan. Gulam Ishaq wanted his own man there.

The second most powerful person in Pakistan is the chief of the army Mirza Aslam Beg. He is still remaining silent and is keeping others guessing about his strategy. A man from the Azamgarh district of Uttar Pradesh (India), Mr Beg, had also entered into a pact with Benazir. Under the pact it was agreed that, after becoming prime minister, she would neither interfere in the affairs of the military nor would she curtail their rights and privileges.

Benazir is now beginning to understand that everywhere, even in small administrative units, army personnel are entrenched. She has come to the conclusion that without exerting her authority she will not be able to govern. It is possible that her interference may not be relished by Aslam Beg, and there might be a direct confrontation between the two. Recently, Aslam Beg has made some such decisions that have not been linked by Benazir at all, for example, permitting the family of Zia to stay in the army house and continuing to provide them with all the previous privileges. Again, he has decided that the

helicopter and plane services of the military will not be provided to the ministers in the government. When Rajiv Gandhi was leaving for a visit to Pakistan and Benazir was talking about friendship with India, exactly on the same day, 29th December, the military officials of Pakistan suggested to India to keep off the ocean boundary of Gujarat so that they could conduct their missile testing. Later, with great effort, Benazir got the plan postponed after talking with her military officials.

In the array of strategic planning in Pakistan, the third most important person is the chief of the senate Wasim Sajjad. It is worth mentioning that Gulam Ishaq Khan was also the chief of the senate before becoming the president. The position held by Wasim Sajjad, a very close confidant of Zia-ul-Haq, is a key one. He is openly working against the People's Party. In addition, the People's Party does not command a majority in the senate. Rather, it is more appropriate to say that in Islamabad Wasim Sajjad is playing the role of Nawaz Sharif. He puts obstacles in the way of getting any action of the Benazir government approved by the senate.

The fourth most powerful person in the Pakistan politics is Sahebzada Yaqub Khan. The whole world knows that Yaqub was a close associate of Zia-ul-Haq as well as of the United States. When Muhammad Khan Junejo removed Yaqub Khan out of his office Zia had not taken it well. From that day on, there had been confrontation between Zia and Junejo. This time under pressure from the United States Benazir had to offer the foreign ministership to Yaqub Khan. Because he is not obligated to Benazir he does not follow her directives. Benazir herself

tries to please him. At the South Asia Regional Conference Benazir was the only head of the government who referred to her foreign minister with praise. Generally, the foreign ministers praise their prime minister or president in their address. Not only this, but even during her press conference she was talking in consultation with Yaqub Khan. When it comes to the matter of improving relations with India or to the matter of Afghanistan, Benazir wants to do something positive and meaningful. Yet Yaqub Khan thinks and does things diametrically opposite to her. Before making any decision Yaqub Khan does not consult Benazir, he consults the United States. As for example, on the occasion of bilateral talks between India and Pakistan, it was decided not to raise any controversial issues. But, despite disapproval from Benazir, he raised the issues of Kashmir and Afghanistan. Ultimately, it was Rajiv Gandhi who had to shut him up. Benazir did not have the courage to stop Yaqub. It is said that later Benazir apologized to Mr Gandhi on his behalf. Similarly, Benazir wanted to see the daily confidential reports of Pakistan military intelligence, but Yaqub Khan do not allow this to happen.

Yaqub Khan also suggests that at first Rajiv Gandhi should pay an official visit to Pakistan, and then Benazir should go to India. The last visit of Rajiv to Pakistan was in connection with the South Asian Conference. Yaqub and his followers do not consider this as a visit to Pakistan. Yaqub Khan argues that General Zia had paid three visits to India, but Rajiv Gandhi had slighted him. Some times he even did not go to receive Zia. Now, therefore, it was India's turn. Somebody from there should pay a visit to Pakistan.

22161

42

NTIS

ATTN: PROCESS 103

5285 PORT ROYAL RD

SPRINGFIELD, VA

22161

This is a the
policies, views, or attitudes of the U.S. Government. Users of this publication may
cite FBIS or JPRS provided they do so in a manner clearly identifying them as the
secondary source.

Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) and Joint Publications Research Service (JPRS) publications contain political, economic, military, and sociological news, commentary, and other information, as well as scientific and technical data and reports. All information has been obtained from foreign radio and television broadcasts, news agency transmissions, newspapers, books, and periodicals. Items generally are processed from the first or best available source; it should not be inferred that they have been disseminated only in the medium, in the language, or to the area indicated. Items from foreign language sources are translated; those from English-language sources are transcribed, with personal and place names rendered in accordance with FBIS transliteration style.

Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets [] are supplied by FBIS/JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text] or [Excerpts] in the first line of each item indicate how the information was processed from the original. Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a question mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear from the original source but have been supplied as appropriate to the context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by the source. Passages in boldface or italics are as published.

SUBSCRIPTION/PROCUREMENT INFORMATION

The FBIS DAILY REPORT contains current news and information and is published Monday through Friday in eight volumes: China, East Europe, Soviet Union, East Asia, Near East & South Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America, and West Europe. Supplements to the DAILY REPORTs may also be available periodically and will be distributed to regular DAILY REPORT subscribers. JPRS publications, which include approximately 50 regional, worldwide, and topical reports, generally contain less time-sensitive information and are published periodically.

Current DAILY REPORTs and JPRS publications are listed in *Government Reports Announcements* issued semimonthly by the National Technical Information Service (NTIS), 5285 Port Royal Road, Springfield, Virginia 22161 and the *Monthly Catalog of U.S. Government Publications* issued by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

The public may subscribe to either hardcover or microfiche versions of the DAILY REPORTs and JPRS publications through NTIS at the above address or by calling (703) 487-4630. Subscription rates will be

provided by NTIS upon request. Subscriptions are available outside the United States from NTIS or appointed foreign dealers. New subscribers should expect a 30-day delay in receipt of the first issue.

U.S. Government offices may obtain subscriptions to the DAILY REPORTs or JPRS publications (hardcover or microfiche) at no charge through their sponsoring organizations. For additional information or assistance, call FBIS, (202) 338-6735, or write to P.O. Box 2604, Washington, D.C. 20013. Department of Defense consumers are required to submit requests through appropriate command validation channels to DIA, RTS-2C, Washington, D.C. 20301 (Telephone: (202) 373-3771, Autovon: 243-3771).

Back issues or single copies of the DAILY REPORTs and JPRS publications are not available. Both the DAILY REPORTs and the JPRS publications are on file for public reference at the Library of Congress and at many Federal Depository Libraries. Reference copies may also be seen at many public and university libraries throughout the United States.