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MILITARY POLICY OF CPSU, READINESS DISCUSSED

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 9, Sep 78
signed to press 24 Aug 78 pp 3-10

[Article by LtGen Ye. Nikitin, professor and doctor of historical science, and Col B. Kanevskiy, lecturer and candidate of historical science: "The Problems of the Country's Defensive Capability and Combat Readiness of the Soviet Armed Forces in CPSU Military Policy"]

[Text] Proceeding from a comprehensive Marxist-Leninist analysis of the main problems and trends in world development, the 25th CPSU Congress planned a detailed program in the struggle for a further relaxation in international tension. At the same time, it pointed out the specific sources and causes of the danger of war which still exists; it substantiated the need for an even greater increase in vigilance and for strengthening the country's defensive capability and the combat readiness of the Soviet Armed Forces. "...Our security and the peaceful labor of the Soviet people," it was pointed out at the 25th CPSU Congress, "must be reliably guaranteed and defended since there are forces in the world which are inimical to detente and which reject the principle of peaceful coexistence as the basis for relations between states with different social systems."¹

The decisive role in the matter of organizing the USSR's defense against imperialist aggression belongs to the CPSU--the nucleus of Soviet society's political system. This is caused by the fact that our Leninist party expresses the interests of all the workers and it is able to ensure the class and political direction and unity of action of governmental agencies, public organizations and individual citizens. "Armed with the teaching of Marxism-Leninism," the USSR Constitution states, "the Communist Party determines the general prospects for the development of society and the course of the USSR's domestic and foreign policy; it directs the great creative activities of the Soviet people and gives their struggle for the victory of communism a planned, scientifically substantiated nature."²

The party's military policy is an integral part of its overall political activity. It includes defining the longterm and short-term goals and missions for all the CPSU's multifaceted military activity, developing overall plans for the country's economic, scientific, technological and ideological preparation to repel aggression, developing comprehensive programs for military organizational development, as well as organizing their implementation with consideration for the changing situation of peace and wartime. Its central mission is to ensure favorable conditions for building communism in our country and ensuring the effective military defense of the USSR and the entire socialist commonwealth. This mission arose before the Bol'shevik Party in all its sharpness and complexity immediately after the victory of the Great October Socialist Revolution since, as V. I. Lenin foresaw, the initial break in imperialism's chain in one country caused "a direct attempt by the bourgeoisie of other countries to defeat the victorious proletariat of the socialist state."³

In repelling the onslaught of the interventionists and White Guards during the Civil War, the workers of the young Soviet republic waged the first war in history in defense of their socialist fatherland. In analyzing its lessons, V. I. Lenin stated: "We...will not allow ourselves to be lulled into not denying the capitalist countries an opportunity for military interference in our affairs in the future. We must maintain our combat readiness."⁴

The requirement for strengthening the defensive capability of the country of socialism and the combat readiness of its armed forces, which was put forward and substantiated by the leader of the proletarian revolution, is one of the unshakeable principles of the CPSU's military policy.

As stated in the CPSU Program, the party's main mission in the military sphere consists of "maintaining the Soviet state's defensive might and the combat readiness of its Armed Forces at a level which will ensure the decisive and complete defeat of any enemy that dares to encroach upon the Soviet motherland."⁵ In complete compliance with this program proposition, the new USSR Constitution classifies defense of the socialist fatherland as one of the most important functions of the state and a matter for all the people. The main requirement for the Armed Forces is also clearly formulated in it: "...maintain constant combat readiness, guaranteeing an immediate rebuff to any aggressor."⁶

The country's defensive capability, its defensive might, includes economic, scientific, technological, moral, political, as well as a purely military, potential. The inseparable unity of all the components of this complex system is an important condition

for its continual strengthening and development. This was emphasized with new force in the report of Mar SU D. F. Ustinov, USSR Minister of Defense, "Guarding the Achievements of October for 60 Years," where it is stated: "The party is strictly following Lenin's instructions on the dialectical unity of economic, scientific, technological, moral, political and military potential as the main components of the state's defensive might. Under contemporary conditions, this unity is becoming even more lucid and multifaceted."⁷

Utilizing the advantages of the planned socialist economy is of primary importance in accomplishing the mission of continually increasing the country's economic potential. A fundamental approach to this issue was pointed out by the 15th AUCP(B) [All-Union Communist Party (Bol'shevik)] Congress directives on drawing up the first five-year plan for developing the national economy. "Considering the possibility of a military attack on the proletarian state by capitalist states," they stated, "in developing the five-year plan, it is necessary to devote maximum attention to the swiftest development of those sectors of the national economy in general, and specifically industry, upon which the main role will fall in ensuring the country's defense and economic stability in wartime."⁸ This mission was subsequently clarified by considering changes in the domestic and international situation.

The propositions and conclusions of the classics of Marxism-Leninism on the economy's role and importance in waging war are the theoretical basis for the party's activity in this area. "The relationship between the country's military organization and its entire economic and cultural system," wrote V. I. Lenin, "has never before been as close as it is at the present time."⁹

Under the growing threat of war for the USSR, a special Commission of the Defense Committee was created on the basis of a party decision in the years which preceded World War II; it was later reorganized as the Military Industrial Commission. Its main responsibility, the AUCP(B) Central Committee decree stated, was mobilizing and preparing "both defense and non-defense industry to completely ensure the implementation of Defense Committee plans and assignments for producing and delivering armament to the WPRA [Workers and Peasants Red Army] and the People's Commissariat for the Navy."¹⁰ The activity of this commission promoted the utilization of the country's achievements in socialist industrialization for the purpose of creating the necessary material bases of combat readiness for the Soviet Armed Forces in the prewar period.

Through its correct and purposeful military policy during the Great Patriotic War, the party provided an unprecedented concentration of materiel and manpower to ensure a military economic victory over the enemy. Suffice it to say that 68 percent of all the industrial enterprises were mobilized to work on the needs of the front and 57 percent of the national income was allocated for military purposes.¹¹ Proof of the advantages of the socialist economy is also provided by the fact that from a single million tons of steel smelted in our country: 1.5 times as many aircraft were produced as in England, 2.6 times as many as in fascist Germany and 3.2 times as many as in the US; 3 times as many armored vehicles were produced as in Germany, 3.8 times as many as in England and 6.3 times as many as in the US.¹² Each unit of power plant capacity and each kilometer of rail line in the USSR were used three times more efficiently than in the capitalist countries.¹³

The mission of increasing the country's economic potential has become more complex under contemporary conditions. Therefore, while defining the main directions for developing the USSR national economy in the Tenth Five-Year Plan, the 25th Party Congress also devoted the necessary attention to economic support for the Soviet Union's security, which presupposes an accelerated development of the economy--industry, agriculture, transportation, communications--preparations to support the Armed Forces and the people in wartime, an accumulation of stockpiles of strategic resources, as well as conducting other measures.¹⁴

The issues of increasing the country's level of scientific and technological potential occupy an important place in the CPSU's military policy. This is not simply explained by the fact that modern science is participating in the creation of the new and latest equipment for armed combat to a significantly greater degree than before. Its role has significantly increased in the timely introduction and mastery of this equipment, developing methods for its combat employment, organizing combat and political training, improving the process of force command and control and in developing strategy, operational art and tactics. With the unprecedented militarization of scientific discoveries and inventions in the countries of imperialism, the slightest lag in Soviet science or a delay in introducing its achievements in military affairs would be fraught with serious consequences. Therefore, the continuous acceleration of scientific and technological progress and the proposition put forward by the 25th CPSU Congress that the practical introduction of scientific achievements is a no less important task than developing them are of special importance for increasing the country's scientific and technological potential.¹⁵

In the USSR, scientific research is being conducted on a centralized planning basis both for civilian and military purposes. The Military Technical and Artillery committees had already been created and were successfully operating in the 20's.¹⁶ The activity of the Scientific and Technological Council of the USSR CPC [Council of People's Commissars], which was organized in the postwar period for the practical realization of the mission of creating nuclear weapons, can serve as vivid confirmation of the superior efficiency of centralized state control in the area of scientific and technological policy.¹⁷ This agency's work contributed greatly to the fact that the USSR eliminated the US monopoly in this area within a matter of years and surpassed it in creating the hydrogen bomb.

At the present time, the Communist Party and the Soviet government are even more efficient in coordinating the work of, and ensuring a close interrelationship between, the major scientific research centers and facilities which are working in the interests of further strengthening the Armed Forces and the country's defense as a whole. "Our country's economic system, science and technology," said Mar SU D. F. Ustinov, Minister of Defense, "is in a position to ensure the creation of any weapon which our enemies might try to rely on." ¹⁸

The CPSU is directing and regulating the entire multifaceted activity of the governmental, public and military agencies and organizations which are connected with creating and improving not only the material but also the spiritual bases of the country's defensive capability and the combat readiness of the Armed Forces. "We all understand," said L. I. Brezhnev, "the enormous significance of the country's defensive and economic potential. The society's morale and political condition and the spiritual and moral makeup of the people--upon which, incidentally, the strength of defense depends to a great extent--are of no less importance...."¹⁹

The potential for political morale is an integral part of the country's defensive capability. It presupposes a qualitative state of social awareness and of all its elements and forms which will make it possible for the people and the army to tune out the mood of peacetime within a very short time, staunchly and courageously bear the burdens of war and not permit their will to achieve complete victory over the enemy to weaken under any circumstances.

The activity of the CPSU, as well as the public organizations (trade unions, Komsomol, defense societies and others) which are led by it, is directed at creating and continually maintaining superior esprit among the people and their servicemen; this activity consists of an entire system of organizational,

sociopolitical and theoretical ideological measures. Forming a Marxist-Leninist world view in the Soviet people is at the heart of it. Military patriotic indoctrination of Soviet citizens based on glorious revolutionary and combat traditions, forming superior morale, fighting efficiency and psychological qualities in all the members of socialist society, organizing technical military propaganda among the populace and the Armed Forces, unmasking the aggressive policy of international imperialism, zionism and maoism and indoctrinating hatred toward the enemies of peace and socialism are taking on special significance in this process.

The indoctrination of all workers in a spirit of proletarian internationalism and brotherhood-in-arms is most important due to the coalition nature of a possible war and the politico-military integration which is being carried out in the countries of the socialist commonwealth for joint defense of their revolutionary accomplishments.

A successful solution to the entire complex system of problems which makes up the substance of a country's potential for political morale is impossible without an irreconcilable struggle against bourgeois ideology in general and against imperialism's military ideology in particular. "We must defend revolutionary development and struggle against the bourgeoisie both by military means and even more by ideological means..."²⁰ taught V. I. Lenin.

The entire diversity of measures being accomplished by the CPSU in the area of increasing the potential for political morale is aimed at accomplishing the main mission--indoctrinating the Soviet people in a spirit of high vigilance and constant ideological, moral and psychological readiness for a military defense of socialism's great accomplishments. It also presupposes a decisive struggle against any manifestations of carelessness, irresponsibility and laxness.

The level of economic, scientific, technological and political morale potential brings about the combat readiness of the Armed Forces. "...As at a focal point," said L. I. Brezhnev in his 5 July 1967 speech at the reception in the Kremlin in honor of graduates of military academies, "the enormous efforts and material expenditures to equip the army, the fullness of understanding, the combat training level and discipline of all servicemen, the skill of command personnel in controlling forces and much more is concentrated in force combat readiness. In the final analysis, this is the crown of the troops combat expertise in peacetime and the key to victory in war."²¹ The fundamental, objective causal relationship between the country's

defensive capability and the Armed Forces combat readiness is not developing spontaneously and automatically; it is developing under the directing influence of the CPSU and its organizational and ideological activity, which encompasses a broad range of problems. They can be somewhat arbitrarily broken down into three groups.

The first group consists of the problems of organizing and maintaining a close relationship between the country's defensive capability as a whole and the Armed Forces combat readiness. The party's military policy ensures an inherent relationship between the country's economic system, its entire social system and military organizational development; it ensures the timeliness of equipping the Armed Forces with first-class weapons and high quality manpower; it stipulates measures for strengthening the contact between the Armed Forces and the people. The activity of the Communist Party in strengthening combat cooperation with the armies of the fraternal socialist countries also belongs to this group.

The second group unites the problems of ensuring combat readiness of the Armed Forces, which are accomplished within the forces themselves. "The main thing," Mar SU D. F. Ustinov, Minister of Defense, stated in his appearance at the applied scientific conference of leading political workers of the army and navy, "consists of steadily improving the combat readiness of large units, units and ships, improving their tactical and specialized training and reducing the period of time for bringing the forces up to readiness to accomplish the assigned combat missions under complex conditions."²² The CPSU defines the principles and main missions for training command personnel and all army and navy personnel, as well as the fundamental problems of mobilization deployment of the Armed Forces in case of war; it establishes the main directions for developing theoretical military thought, among which the problems of combat readiness occupy the central place.

The third group consists of the problems of forecasting the politicomilitary situation for the purpose of evaluating the constantly changing balance of politicomilitary power in the world and its separate regions and defining and developing a "scale" of military threats to our country and the entire socialist commonwealth. A politicomilitary forecast makes it possible to foresee the appearance of international political crises, military conflicts and wars of different sizes and types, which are being unleashed by the imperialists, ahead of time. It makes it possible to carry out the necessary measures of a political and military mobilization nature in a timely fashion.

Through military doctrine--which is developed by the state's political and military leadership--military policy has a direct influence on the readiness of the country and the Armed Forces to decisively repel any aggression against the Soviet motherland. It includes the most important propositions on the nature and special features of a future war and on the main directions for military organizational development.

Soviet military doctrine ensures a unity of views and the coordination of efforts between party, governmental and military agencies and all the builders and defenders of communist society on the fundamental problems of the country's defensive capability and the Armed Forces combat readiness. It provides for waging armed combat together with the fraternal armies of the socialist commonwealth countries in defense of the interests of peace and socialism.

Soviet military science, military art and especially its integral part--military strategy--serves as another channel for the direct influence of our party's military policy on Armed Forces combat readiness. It is called upon to bring to light everything new which has appeared in the means and methods of armed combat and management of it; it is called upon to correctly evaluate the politicomilitary and strategic military situation in the world both at any given moment and for the foreseeable future. Any sort of reliable provisions for the country's defensive capability and the Armed Forces combat readiness is unthinkable without this.

Military policy's influence on the combat readiness of the army and navy through military strategy is dependent upon the social and class nature of this policy, its goals and historical trend. For example, Hitler's strategy of "Blitzkrieg warfare," which was adventuristic by its inner nature, was a distorted product of the aggressive aspirations of German fascism and its delirious political military plans of gaining world domination. On the contrary, the policy of defending revolutionary achievements, collective security and of a decisive defeat for fascist aggression, which was conducted by our party, was a most important source of realism and of the superior scientific level of Soviet theoretical military thought in the prewar years.

A long time before the war even began, Soviet military strategy--directed by the party's military policies--had pointed out the possible methods for preparing, unleashing and waging it on the part of the probable enemy and it provided the appropriate recommendations for developing plans of defense for the USSR in a timely manner. Its unqualified merit was its conclusion on the possibility of a coalition war against the aggressors,

its determination of the theaters of military operations and the main theater--the Western--and its forecast of the war's drawn out nature. All of these ideas were appropriately reflected in the plans for defense of the USSR which were developed by the General Staff and approved by the AUCP(B) Central Committee Politburo and the Soviet government. These plans were in conformance with the country's level of socioeconomic development, its material resources and the international situation. They were based on the forms and methods for waging war which were developed by strategy and which made it possible to achieve the greatest results with the least expenditure of men and equipment.²³ Consequently, Soviet military strategy promoted purposeful preparations for the country and the Soviet Armed Forces to repel imperialist aggression.

Military historical science plays an important role in the scientific and theoretical support for the country's defensive capability; it is called upon to analyze and summarize everything of value from indigenous and world historical experience in solving this complex politicomilitary problem; it is also called upon to draw the necessary lessons from difficulties or miscalculations which arose in the past. The experience of past wars, especially world wars, points out the need for the timely formation of all the factors which ensure the country's readiness to repel aggression. Military history knows a lot of examples where a lack of proportion in developing these factors has had a disastrous effect on the course of the war and its final results.

In the years preceeding the Great Patriotic War, the decisive (material and spiritual) foundations for the Soviet Armed Forces combat readiness were created in the USSR. In the final analysis, this also predetermined our victory over the forces of fascism. To a great extent, the failures of our forces during the initial period of the war are explained by the fact that individual elements of the army and navy's combat readiness were not complete and they lagged behind the level of readiness which had been achieved for the country's defense as a whole and also behind the requirements which were raised by the politicomilitary situation which had developed on the eve of the war. Definite shortcomings were permitted in force technical equipment and force organization and in planning operations in case of a surprise attack on our country. The underevaluation of a certain type of combat operation, such as defense, and primarily at the strategic echelon, had an especially serious effect on the level of the Soviet Armed Forces combat readiness. The large gaps in echeloning the operational formation of forces on the eve of the war and during the first period of the war and the large gaps in the location of strategic reserves and materiel supply centers resulted from this.

The experience of the Great Patriotic War teaches a comprehensive approach to the problem of force combat readiness. The conclusion drawn from it on the need for the balanced development and optimal fit of all the factors which ensure and shape the country's readiness for defense and force combat readiness is acquiring even greater significance under contemporary conditions due to the appearance of new means of armed combat which are opening fundamentally new opportunities for the aggressor in using the factor of surprise.

The scientifically substantiated military policy of the CPSU is materializing in the concrete actions of Soviet servicemen in increasing the combat capability and combat readiness of the Armed Forces. The level of force readiness to accomplish combat missions is determined by the full complement of personnel, weapons and combat equipment for large units, units, ships and sub-units and by maintaining them in working order; by the combat teamwork of all the services of the Armed Forces; by vigilantly standing combat duty; and by the ability to operationally deploy troops and forces in a timely manner, successfully repel an enemy surprise attack and inflict crushing blows on him.

The CPSU's military policy withstood the test of time and was one of the decisive sources of our victory during the Great Patriotic War. We are obligated to it for the fact that the Soviet people have been living in peace into the fourth decade now and the combat capability and combat readiness of the Soviet Armed Forces are at a level which meets contemporary requirements.

"The essence of our military policy," it is stated in the greeting of the CPSU Central Committee, the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium and the USSR Council of Ministers to the servicemen of the Soviet Armed Forces on their 60th anniversary, "is everything necessary for efficient defense and nothing more. Everything that the Soviet people are doing in the military sphere is being done to protect themselves and their socialist friends from attack and to forestall aggression."²⁴

FOOTNOTES

1. "Proceedings of the 25th CPSU Congress," Moscow, Politizdat, 1976, p 154.
2. Constitution (Basic Law) of the USSR, Moscow, Politizdat, 1977, p 7.
3. V. I. Lenin. "Poln. sobr. soch." (Complete Collected Works), vol 30, p 133.

4. Ibid., vol 42, p 22.
5. "Program of the CPSU," Moscow, Politizdat, 1971, p 111.
6. Constitution (Basic Law) of the USSR, p 15.
7. PRAVDA, 23 February 1978.
8. "The CPSU in Resolutions and Decisions of Its Congresses, Conferences and Central Committee Plenums," vol 1, part 2, 7th ed., 1953, p 332.
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13. P. I. Trifonenkov. "Ob osnovnykh zakonakh khoda i iskhoda sovremennoy voyny" (Basic Laws on the Course and Outcome of Modern Warfare), Voenizdat, 1962, p 46.
14. "Proceedings of the 25th CPSU Congress," pp 83, 151.
15. Ibid., p 48.
16. K. Ye. Voroshilov. "Speech at the Military Scientific Society Congress" (VOYENNIY VESTNIK, 1926, No 1, p 20).
17. I. N. Golovin. "I. V. Kurchatov," Moscow, Atomizdat, 1973, p 59.
18. PRAVDA, 23 February 1978.
19. L. I. Brezhnev. "Leninskim Kursom," vol 3, Moscow, Politizdat, 1972, p 349.
20. V. I. Lenin. "Poln. sobr. soch.," vol 41, pp 400-401.
21. L. I. Brezhnev. Cited work, vol 2, p 49.
22. KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 8 July 1976.

23. "Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy voyny," vol 2, Voenizdat,
1974, p 172.

24. PRAVDA, 23 February 1978.

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POLITICAL TRAINING IN THE ODESSA MILITARY DISTRICT

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 9, Sep 78
signed to press 24 Aug 78 pp 11-17

[Article by LtGen P. Fomichev, member of the Military Council and chief of Red Banner Odessa Military District Political Directorate: "Efficiency and Quality are Important Criteria of the Activity of Commanders, Political Workers and All Personnel"]

[Test] At the 25th CPSU Congress, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev said that our 10th Five-Year Plan has been called the five-year plan of efficiency and quality. "There is no other way to successfully accomplish the diversified economic and social tasks facing our country," emphasized Leonid Il'ich, "than by a rapid growth in labor productivity and a sharp increase in the efficiency of all social production."¹

The servicemen of the Red Banner Odessa Military District are alive with the same dreams and concerns as our people. Their intense military labor flows into the common channel of the Soviet people's creative activity and their struggle for the complete and high quality fulfillment of the grandiose socio-economic program developed by the 25th CPSU Congress. Profoundly aware of their lofty constitutional duty and their responsibility to reliably defend socialist achievements, they are devoting all their strength, knowledge and energy to a steadfast mastery of weapons and equipment, a tireless improvement in combat expertise and an increase in vigilance and combat readiness.

The instructions given by Comrade L. I. Brezhnev during his trip to Siberia and the Far East have aroused a new surge of creative activity among the district's personnel. The CPSU Central Committee General Secretary, USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium Chairman and Defense Council Chairman's meetings and talks with party and Soviet activists and with workers and servicemen was just another very vivid testimony of the tireless concern manifested by the

CPSU and its Leninist Central Committee for further developing the socialist economic system, steadily raising the Soviet people's standard of living and for reliably ensuring our motherland's firm and efficient defense.

The personnel of the Red Banner Odessa Military District are confirming their devotion to the motherland and the Communist Party with concrete deeds. The results of the winter training testify to this. The overwhelming majority of units and sub-units demonstrated an increase in combat expertise and the ability to successfully accomplish complex missions under difficult conditions.

The achievements were primarily the result of the large amount of organizational and ideological indoctrination work of commanders, staffs, political agencies and party and Komsomol organizations. The content and style of their practical activity were defined by the decisions of the 25th CPSU Congress and the subsequent Party Central Committee plenums, the new USSR Constitution, the most important political documents connected with the 60th anniversary of Great October and the 60th anniversary of the Soviet Armed Forces, the Letter of the CPSU Central Committee, the USSR Council of Ministers, the AUCCTU and the Komsomol Central Committee on developing socialist competition in 1978, the propositions and conclusions contained in the report and speeches of Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, and the requirements of the USSR Minister of Defense and the chief of the Soviet Army and Navy's Main Political Directorate.

The generals and officers of the district's staff and directorates are setting an example of purposeful, energetic and efficient work. While visiting the troops, they are taking an in-depth look at the state of affairs on the spot; with a party attitude, they are analyzing the course of combat and political training, the state of military discipline and the organization of socialist competition; they are uncovering shortcomings and pointing out ways to eliminate them; they are looking for reserves and resources which are not being used to further intensify military labor and increase its efficiency and quality. The results of the comprehensive inspections are frequently submitted to the district's Military Council or Political Directorate for discussion. Thus, LtGen G. P. Yashkin, the deputy commander for combat training, presented a report at one of the meetings of the Military Council on the fulfillment of the plans for combat and political training, military indoctrination and socialist pledges. ColGen I. M. Voloshin, the district troop commander, summed up the discussion of the report. The Military Council developed recommendations for speeding up socialist competition and using it

in the struggle for a further increase in unit and subunit combat readiness and in the efficiency and quality of the process of indoctrination. Specifically, the Military Council proposed that commanders and political workers manage socialist competition in a more concrete fashion during each stage of combat and political training; improve its organization under field conditions; increase the role of officer personnel in the struggle to achieve outstanding results; when organizing assistance for lagging servicemen; and consider the level of combat readiness achieved by units as the main criterion when evaluating the results of socialist competition in units.

The Military Council's recommendations have helped commanders, political agencies and staffs, party and Komsomol organizations in their practical activities.

Listening to political worker LtCol A. I. Kotikov at the district's Political Directorate was beneficial. This event was preceeded by an all-round comprehensive inspection which was conducted in the unit by officers of the district's directorates and services. They pointed out the multifaceted and purposeful work on the ideological, political, military, labor, moral and legal indoctrination of personnel, which is efficiently promoting an increase in combat readiness. At the same time, the group also uncovered a number of significant shortcomings in organizing and conducting lessons and mass political events.

For example, the antiaircraft gunners of the battery where SrLt V. K. Agarkov is the commander did not conduct the target search and firing on targets during the comprehensive exercise in the field as was planned. Moreover, the antiaircraft gunners had adopted high socialist pledges. There was a patently obvious discrepancy between words and deeds.

Similar shortcomings were also uncovered in other subunits. At times, the voices of party and Komsomol activists were not heard during the exercises in the field where combat expertise is directly forged and where the struggle for quality and efficiency is most sharply felt. After all, combat work with equipment is just the time when the agitator or political information worker, the lecturer or reporter's appearance is not only desirable but necessary. As the saying goes, the combat leaflet, the flash leaflet and the field radio center's broadcast are to the point here...

This large topic of the unity of word and deed and the unity of party decision and its realization and control; the topic of continually increasing party and political work as the missions being accomplished by the troops become more complex was also the subject of discussion at the district's Political Directorate.

Comrade L. I. Brezhnev's reminiscences "Malaya zemlya" and "Re-birth" became handbooks for all of us--these are works of enormous journalistic force; they contain very rich, vital experience which provides an extremely clear picture of what a political worker of the Soviet Armed Forces should be; they reveal the forms and methods of party political work under the very difficult conditions of war and the period of reconstruction.

After being subjected to serious criticism, the officers of the unit where A. I. Kotikov is serving drew the proper conclusions. They efficiently conducted a number of official meetings and party and Komsomol meetings; they mobilized personnel to eliminate the shortcomings which were uncovered and they eliminated them within a short period of time. The servicemen of the unit finished the winter training period with good marks in training and duty.

The continuous, purposeful work of the district's Military Council, Political Directorate and staff is directed at profoundly confirming the basic principle of combat training--teaching the troops what they will need in war. The more complex the situation is during an exercise, the more creativity, ingenuity, expertise and endurance it demands from the trainees and organizational and party political work must be conducted more intensively and efficiently.

The district's Military Council, Political Directorate and staff are striving to develop the ability in commanders, political workers and all officers to approach the job in an analytical manner, see the beginning of the new and advanced, evaluate it on its merits and put it into practice.

It is precisely this formulation of things which has made it possible for the command element, party and Komsomol organizations of the artillery regiment commanded by Col V. G. Papusha to achieve outstanding marks in combat and political training for a great many years now.

A persistent struggle to conduct each exercise and each training session at a superior qualitative level has developed in the unit.

The commanders, political workers and party and Komsomol organizations have stimulated personnel to accomplish complex missions and overcome difficulties; they have widely propagandized the experience of the leaders in combat and political training; they have evaluated and announced the results of socialist competition on a regular basis.

And things are now proceeding in an outstanding manner in the regiment. During the first six months of this year, rated specialists have already increased by 10 percent more than during the entire previous year in this artillery unit; combat and political training experts have increased by 20.3 percent, outstanding detachments and crews by 10 percent and outstanding platoons by 8 percent. The number of outstanding batteries has doubled. KRASNAYA ZVEZDA recently wrote about this unit. Other military collectives are adopting its experience.

A great deal of interesting and instructive experience has also been accumulated in the aviation regiment which was commanded by Col V. T. Kopanев until recently. They have a firm understanding of the immutable truth that the quality of the airmen's combat training and efficiency in accomplishing flying missions is directly dependent upon the degree of consideration and the level of organization in the entire process of personnel training and indoctrination. Increasing the quality and efficiency of ground training has become the heart of this work. The communists are setting the pace in this. They stepped forward as the initiators of the enterprises "Prepare and Conduct Each Flight in an Outstanding Manner" and "Destroy the Target on the First Attack." Here is just one example of this.

Capt N. P. Klimchakov, the secretary of the party organization of an outstanding squadron (he is also the leader of an outstanding flight), decided to introduce items into the pilot's socialist pledges on those elements of flight training which would be attractive in their novelty and complexity. He shared his thoughts with the communists. They supported the secretary and, together, they developed the new pledges. Without going into specifics, we will point out that they increased the airmen's interest in their studies to a great extent. As a result, the efficiency of their military labor noticeably increased.

The commanders, political workers and party organizations of the overwhelming majority of the district's units and subunits are waging the struggle for an increase in the quality and efficiency of combat and political training just as steadfastly, purposefully and creatively; specifically, the tank regiment headed by LtCol A. G. Latushkin and the subunits commanded by officers A. A. Yefimenko and B. A. Ushnikov.

Efficiency and quality are concrete concepts. They are developed from the results of each serviceman's military labor. These categories find their objective expression directly in the company, battery and squadron, that is, at that echelon upon which common success depends in the final analysis. It is

precisely there that the new undertakings and the advanced experience are springing up. The soldier assimilates his combat expertise there and receives his ideological, political, morale, physical, psychological and moral tempering there.

In addition to political lessons, political information sessions, discussions, topical evenings and other diverse mass ideological, indoctrination and sporting events, a good deal of attention is devoted to propaganda on technical military knowledge in these subunits. A lot of societies, which are promoting a further improvement in the servicemen's combat specialties, are at work in them; question and answer evenings, quizzes on the servicemen's functional duties, competitions on knowledge of a weapons parts and its employment and contests on finding malfunctions quickly and eliminating them are conducted frequently. This emphasis on technical training for personnel is not accidental. As Comrade L. I. Brezhnev emphasized, "the man who has mastered his equipment to a tee remains the main, decisive force in the war."²

In a number of the district's units, the communists stepped forward as initiators of a campaign for superior reliability in the work of each specialist. This patriotic movement was prompted by the collective nature of equipment and weapons maintenance.

For example, at an expanded meeting of the party committee in the leading tank regiment commanded by LtCol A. G. Latushkin, the communists proposed introducing an efficiency coefficient for exercise performance. It is made up of the time spent on firing, the number of hits, the number of shots (which shell hit the target--the first, second...) and a qualitative evaluation of all the operations--loading ammunition, preparing the initial data, the rate of fire, etc. This constant, which is isolated with sufficient accuracy by the experimental method, makes it possible to more correctly determine the tanker's level of preparedness and to uncover both the strong and weak sides of their military labor. It helps them see what distinguishes them from each other and makes it possible to make appropriate corrections to the training process.

The commander supported the communists and approved their idea. The unit methods council developed the criteria for evaluating each operation.

The result of the collective search had its effect rather quickly. Additional, objective work incentives appeared among the tankers; their aggressiveness, competitiveness, accuracy, speed and the other indices of military labor noticeably increased during the exercises. As a result, quality rose in the entire training process, its efficiency increased and people had a noticeably sharpened sense of responsibility for the common cause.

To the good repute of the communists and Komsomol activists of the district's units and subunits, there were a lot of other good deeds and aspirations directed at achieving superior efficiency and quality in military labor. In this respect, we can mention their work on improving training facilities and their constant tutelage of the skilled, army craftsmen who are at times creating unique training devices and aids and automatic equipment which makes it possible to save time during equipment maintenance and when personnel are working in the training areas, firing ranges, tank training areas and other field facilities. But, is this really all? You can't count it all. However, there is one aspect of the activity of commanders, political agencies and party organizations, which should be related in more detail.

The climate of morale in the collective--a situation of superior mutual insistence on high standards combined with an attitude of concern and respect between servicemen--plays an important role among the components of efficiency and quality. Sincere sensitivity is the foundation of this attitude. This is an indisputable truth, just as the fact that sincerity is a party trait is. Paying attention to a person and timely praise inspire him and they arouse a desire to storm new heights. This kind of favorable moral atmosphere reigns in the majority of our units and subunits. In the majority but, unfortunately, not in all of them.

There are still individual commanders and chiefs who believe it is normal to reprove their subordinates in a loud tone of voice and "dress them down" on top of it. This throws people off balance and has a disastrous effect on their work and duty.

In this regard, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev's book "Malaya zemlya" says it very well: "Even if a man has made a mistake, nobody has the right to insult him with a bawling out...no one should wound people's pride in any way or denigrate their dignity."³

We have a lot of educators who are thoughtful, exacting and attentive to people and who possess all-round refinement and pedagogical tact. The soliders are proud of them and they send them kind letters full of gratitude long after their transfer to the reserve. These officers have an in-depth mastery of Lenin's principles of unity of command and they skillfully combine an insistence on high standards with fatherly concern and sensitivity. The fact that their number is constantly growing is the result of the tireless efforts of political agencies and party organizations. Lecture bureaus on the problems of military pedagogy and psychology are operating in units and garrisons for officers and warrant officers. The tutorship of experienced officers over commanders who are just beginning their work and of senior EM over junior EM is widely developed. The role of propagandists, political information workers and members of

agitation and propaganda groups is growing in uniting the military collectives and creating a favorable climate of morale in them, a climate which is filled with intolerance toward unprescribed relationships and toward everything alien and immoral which hinders our forward movement. Combat cooperation evenings have begun to be conducted more frequently. Discussions on the topics of morale and ethics and discussions of books, films and TV shows devoted to the firm frontline friendship between Soviet servicemen during the years of their most difficult trials have made a good showing. The servicemen are deriving a lot that is valuable and beneficial from Comrade L. I. Brezhnev's reminiscences "Malaya zemlya" and "Rebirth."

While analyzing the experience of comprehensive personnel indoctrination, the Military Council and the Political Directorate arrived at the conclusion that they were beginning to consign one of the most important ideological principles--the indoctrination of each specific individual--to oblivion in some units in their rush for numbers of mass political functions. The Military Council pointed out that there are a lot of costs in the work of some echelons stemming from the fact that they do not have the necessary system and sense of direction in organizing the process of indoctrination directly in the companies, batteries, squadrons and especially in individual work.

The Military Council recommended that the results of all forms of ideological indoctrination work be efficiently studied and corrections be made in a timely fashion to the organization and comprehensive accomplishment of this process in the interest of achieving its greatest efficiency.

Among the district's forces, commanders, political workers and party organizations are conducting a significant amount of work directed at an in-depth study of the Proceedings of the 25th CPSU Congress, the new USSR Constitution, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev's speeches at the 18th Komsomol Congress and other very important party and governmental documents. Lectures, reports and theoretical conferences are being conducted in the units for this purpose. Readings of Lenin, topical evenings and mornings and issues of oral newspapers devoted to topical issues stemming from the decisions of the 25th Party Congress and other party and governmental documents are very popular among the servicemen. Leadership personnel actively participate in organizing and conducting all this work. For example, Gen's Yu. R. Khomchenko and N. V. Bodrov, Col V. D. Chernykh, LtCol V. A. Kishchuk and Maj V. N. Kochkin frequently appear before the servicemen with reports, lectures and discussions.

The issues connected with improving the ideological and political indoctrination of personnel are continually being discussed at

meetings of commanders and political workers, at party committee meetings and at meetings of the party and Komsomol organizations.

Propaganda lectures have recently occupied a firmer place in the life of the district's servicemen. Its role is noticeably increasing in the process of forming a scientific world view and superior ideological, political and moral qualities in servicemen and in developing an active life position. In turn, this is having a beneficial effect on increasing the efficiency of combat training and strengthening military discipline. This was undoubtedly facilitated by the efficient implementation of the requirements of the CPSU Central Committee decree "On the condition of and Measures for Improving Propaganda Lectures."

The quality of Marxist-Leninist training for officers, warrant officer political training and political lessons with EM and NCO's has noticeably improved. This is the result of an increased insistence on high standards for training propagandists, monitoring student training and creating favorable conditions for their independent work.

In a number of political lesson groups, they have introduced file folders with recommendations on what literature and visual aids--schematics, diagrams, illustrations, photographs, records, slides, tape recordings--it is advisable to use for a particular topic. The activists suggested and made detachable map cases, rotating screens and other devices which make it easier to use the aids. It is now a rare lesson which does not use a movie projector, a film viewer, a tape recorder and other technical propaganda equipment.

Meetings with participants in battles for the motherland and their lively tales about feats of Soviet servicemen have a great deal of influence on servicemen. Thus, immediately after the publication of Leonid Il'ich Brezhnev's reminiscences, "Malaya zemlya," N. M. Vorontsov, the former party organizer of one of the 18th Assault Army's battalions, Hero of the Soviet Union P. I. Derzhavin and other participants of the battles at Novorossiysk were invited to visit the servicemen of our district. Their penetrating words of love for the motherland and party and of the unparalleled courage of the warriors who defended their native land from the fascists at the risk of their lives aroused the desire in our servicemen to tirelessly grasp for the difficult art of victory with even greater persistence and effort.

The district newspaper ZASHCHITNIK RODINY makes a significant contribution which promotes an increase in the militancy of party organizations and an improvement in the quality of ideological work. The problems which worry political workers, propagandists,

party and Komsomol activists are widely discussed in a practical manner on its pages. In our opinion, the discussion of the articles by the young propagandists, Lt G. I. Olenko "What Influence Will Our Word Have?," by the deputy battery commander Lt S. A. Grigoryan: "The Lofty Calling of the Political Worker" and by Guards Sr Lt V. I. Panchenko "The Range of Lesson Quality" proceeded in an interesting and instructive manner.

Our district's Military Council and Political Directorate are far from thinking that all the problems connected with increasing the efficiency and quality of military labor have been successfully resolved. Both problems and unfinished business are still encountered; there are still a lot of unused reserves. But, the high level of enthusiasm among the troops--which was aroused by the CPSU Central Committee, the USSR Council of Ministers, the AUCCTU and the Komsomol Central Committee Letter on developing socialist competition in 1978 and by the Proceedings of the July 1978 CPSU Central Committee Plenum and the Ninth Session of the USSR Supreme Soviet--the desire of personnel to accomplish their military duty to the motherland in an exemplary fashion and the harmonious and purposeful work of commanders, political workers, staffs and party and Komsomol organizations provide us with a complete assurance that the year of the 60th anniversary of the USSR Armed Forces will truly be a year of shock military labor. "Work better today than yesterday and work better tomorrow than today!"--this is the slogan of the day. This is our duty to Lenin's party and to our people.

FOOTNOTES

1. "Proceedings of the 25th CPSU Congress," Moscow, Politizdat, 1976, p 43.
2. L. I. Brezhnev. "Leninskim kursom," vol 2, Moscow, Politizdat, 1970, p 51.
3. Leonid Il'ich Brezhnev. "Malaya zemlya," Moscow, Politizdat 1978, p 26.

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NEED FOR INCORPORATING WARTIME EXPERIENCE INTO TROOP TRAINING STRESSED

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 9, Sep 78
signed to press 24 Aug 78 pp 48-53

[Article by LtGen Ye. Touzakov, Chief of Staff, Order of Lenin Leningrad Military District: "Put the Experience of the Great Patriotic War Into Practice in Troop Training"]

[Text] The Great Patriotic War convincingly demonstrated the advantage of Soviet military science and military art over the military science and military art of the fascist German army--one of the strongest armies among the capitalist states at that time. Therefore, the experience of the Soviet army's combat operations in the past war is our invaluable wealth. Not a single army in the world has this kind of experience.

But, the years pass and the people pass, the people who directly accomplished the most complex missions on the fields of battle in achieving victory over the enemy. It is necessary to see to it that everything that is indispensable and of value does not escape from military theory and practice with them. There are misgivings. The experience of the past war is being openly underrated in some places by citing the fact that it has completely lost its importance with the employment of weapons of mass destruction. This is a false interpretation.

Unfortunately, this has also taken place in our district. For example, the work on studying and synthesizing the experience of the past war was being conducted poorly until recently in the units where officers A. Kuznetsov, V. Ivanov and A. Gayduk are serving. Insufficient attention was being devoted to ski training and subunit tactics and subunit operations as part of a flanking detachment in "infiltrating" the enemy's flanks and rear; this frequently brought success during the Great Patriotic War.

And this also happened. While organizing combat during the exercises, we asked commanders and chiefs how similar missions

were accomplished during the war and who was operating in this area; several of them were not able to answer.

This required that the district leadership take the necessary measures for the purpose of clarifying the work for officers and generals to study the experience of troop combat operations during the past war since it has not lost its importance under contemporary conditions. This applies especially to decisions on the most important issues of operational art by our command personnel, such as selecting the sector for the main thrust and massing manpower and equipment in it, forming-up troops, ensuring an interrupted offensive at a high tempo, forcing water obstacles, as well as conducting party political work and others.

A knowledge of this experience and its introduction into troop training practice make it possible to solve the problems of modern military organizational development more successfully; they facilitate an expansion of the military theoretical horizon of generals and officers and they help them to better understand the dialectic of military affairs. "It is impossible," V. I. Lenin pointed out, "to learn how to accomplish our missions with today's new methods if yesterday's experience did not open our eyes...."*

The need for using the experience of the Great Patriotic War in the troop training process is dictated by the fact that a constant rejuvenation of command personnel is underway in the army and navy. Young officers are arriving to replace the older generation in units and subunits; they are well trained in theory but do not have practical skills. The experience of the war is as necessary to them as the air they breathe.

It goes without saying that, as in other matters, you should not blindly seize upon everything old. It is necessary to approach the mastery of past experience critically, from the point of view of employing it under modern conditions of armed combat. In compliance with the decisions of the 25th CPSU Congress, Mar SU D. F. Ustinov, USSR Minister of Defense, demands that research on the most topical problems of military history be accomplished persistently, while directing it at ensuring the successful accomplishment of the missions being accomplished by the Soviet Army and Navy today.

There cannot be any limit to the search for the new based on the experience of the old; all the more so when the swift development of equipment and weapons is underway, when it is necessary to constantly improve the methods for conducting an operation (battle), troop organization and the combat expertise of servicemen, increased combat readiness and improve party political work.

* V. I. Lenin. "Poln. sobr. soch.," vol 44 p 205.

The General Staff's activity during the Great Patriotic War and in the postwar years is an example of a creative approach in studying combat experience. A special department on using the experience of the war was created in the General Staff. In 1942, it published "A Collection of Materials on Studying the Experience of the War" No 1, which was intended for troops of the field army, reserve formations, military educational institutions and command personnel of the central directorates of the People's Commissariat of Defense. It summarized the experience of combat operations during July-August 1942 and it pointed out the need for introducing this experience into combat practice. Altogether, 26 collections were published on studying and summarizing the experience of combat operations of our forces and the enemy.

The experience in studying and summarizing the combat operations of forces which was gained during the Great Patriotic War should also be used today. This work must personally be headed by the commanding generals (commanders) and the best trained and experienced generals and officers who have commanded companies (batteries), battalions (artillery battalions), regiments and divisions. It would undoubtedly be better if this work were to be conducted by participants of the Great Patriotic War, who have experienced all its difficulties and special features themselves.

Our district's command element is doing a lot to make the experience of the past war accessible to officers and generals; it is directing their work and striving to make it more concrete. Thus, while preparing a routine exercise, the district staff developed and sent historical military material to subordinate staffs: "The 14th Army in the Battles to Liberate the Polar Region," "Combat Operations of the 19th Army During the Great Patriotic War" and "Party Political Work While Preparing and Conducting the Offensive Operations of the Karelian Front During the Great Patriotic War"; it organized their study by officer personnel within the officer training system.

It should be pointed out that plans now call for a mandatory study of the war's experience, and especially those problems which have to be worked out when preparing for command post and troop exercises in units and large units. The greatest attention is being devoted to organizing reconnaissance, fire destruction of the enemy, troop formation in defense and offense, combat employment of tanks, engineer support, maneuver under the difficult conditions of wooded-marshy terrain and lake country, organizing command, control and communications, and to the special features of materiel support. The climatic conditions which had an effect on combat operations are also being analyzed in detail.

All of this is having positive results. Many officers and generals have now begun to approach the solution of the problems of organizing troop combat operations during combat and operational

training in a more in-depth and concrete fashion. Their work methods are also changing: it is as if they are being transformed into the commanders who preceded them and who achieved victory over a strong enemy.

When new officers and generals arrive for service with us, senior commanders familiarize them with the special features of local conditions and assign them tasks for independent study on the experience of battles which have taken place within the district's territory. This helps them train personnel more efficiently.

The study of the experience of combat operations and its introduction into troop training practice is well organized in the unit where Comrade I. Ye. Balakliyets is serving. Heroes of the Soviet Union (Reserve) LtCol I. T. Puzanov, (Reserve) Maj F. T. D'yachenko, war veteran S. A. Tulyakov and others have appeared before personnel on numerous occasions here. Trips to battle sites are organized on a periodic basis.

In our opinion, the meeting with a group of war veterans--former platoon, company and battery commanders--was instructive for junior officers. They talked about tactics and methods for organizing and waging combat, which are still of current interest, while illustrating them with vivid combat episodes; they expressed their opinion on ways for using combat experience. Based on concrete examples, they demonstrated the importance of thoroughly organizing coordination in an area, firm command and control of subunits during combat and displaying initiative and persistence to achieve surprise and secrecy of maneuver and attack. In conclusion, the leader of the meeting provided instructions on what should be reflected in subunit personnel training and indoctrination and on how combat experience should best be used. In the last war, a surprise attack by an aggressor presented an enormous danger; now, it has increased many times since the means for a surprise attack have become more modern and powerful. Therefore, maintaining the army and navy in constant combat readiness is one of the most important and responsible missions assigned to us by the Communist Party. The lessons of the past war must be taken into account not only in theory but also in the practice of troop (force) training so the mistakes of the past will not be repeated and so the enemy will not be permitted to take us by surprise.

Comrade L. I. Brezhnev's instructions that peaceableness and a readiness to repel aggression must be melded together in our policy are of exceptional importance in accomplishing these missions.

Military historical work on studying the experience of the Great Patriotic War must be planned and conducted on the basis of the general methodological principles of Marxism-Leninism, the Marxist-Leninist doctrine on war and the army and in compliance with party decisions as well as the requirements of orders and directives from the USSR Minister of Defense. Its main goal is to increase the combat capability of subunits, units and large units, to increase their constant readiness for decisive and aggressive operations against a strong enemy under any conditions and to improve command and control elements. A study of ways of solving the problems connected with preparing and conducting a modern operation and battle--especially in the efficient employment of weapons and equipment and increasing the tempo of the offensive and reliability of command and control--is by no means unimportant.

In accordance with the assigned missions, the most typical operations (battles) of the Great Patriotic War are being defined; they must be studied, the appropriate conclusions must be drawn from them and they must be put into service with due regard for modern requirements.

Many years of experience attests to the fact that studying the experience of troop combat operations and introducing everything positive into the job of training personnel must not be organized on a voluntary basis; it must be centralized under the direct supervision of commanders and chiefs who assign the basic tasks for military historical work and who determine its specific content and the executors. The staff plans this work, gets the missions out to the executors, monitors its accomplishment and organizes the study of materials.

Moreover, the forms and methods can be the most diverse: military historical conferences at which the main operations and instructive battles are examined; reports; lectures; accounts; drawing positive examples from the experience of battles at exercise critiques; studying the experience of troop operations during field trips in specific sectors; compiling and getting descriptions of battles to the troops; independent study of memoirs and descriptions of battles by generals and officers; and others.

Independent work of generals and officers in studying the war experience must be planned and monitored. It is necessary to point out in the assignments what is to be specifically studied and summarized and it is necessary to set a deadline for when the report or account must be given.

The museums and rooms of combat glory, which have been created in the district, large units and units, have become reliable assistants for the commanders, political agencies and staffs in propagandizing

the experience of the past war. Thus, during the past year alone, over 300 lectures and topical tours have been conducted and more than 50 meetings between servicemen and predraft age youth and veterans of the party, Armed Forces and district and winners of socialist competition have been held in the museum of the district's history, where reserve officer A. A. Lyakhovskiy has been working as the chief for many years. Amateur documentary films are shown here on a regular basis, such as "Pages of Combat Glory," "Dressing on Achievement," and others.

The employees of the district museum provide methodological assistance to the museums and rooms of combat glory of units and large units and a travelling photo exhibit created from museum materials is shown at remote garrisons on a periodic basis.

The command element, political agencies and staffs are also making wide use of such forms as scientific-historical conferences and creative discussions. During the past two years alone, scientific-historical conferences on the topics "The Defensive Engagements at Leningrad and in the North in the Summer and Fall of 1941," "The 35th Anniversary of the Luzhskaya Defensive Operation" and others have been held in the garrisons of Leningrad, Vyborg, Petrozavodsk and Murmansk.

In March 1978, a jubilee applied scientific conference devoted to the 60th anniversary of the Order of Lenin Leningrad Military District was held. The reports and speeches of the participants uncovered the district's heroic path as an integral part of the Armed Forces and its very rich combat experience, which was acquired during the Great Patriotic War; they demonstrated the war's influence on preparing and conducting modern combat operations and ways for introducing it into troop training and indoctrination practice.

The applied scientific conferences on L. I. Brezhnev's books "Malaya zemlya" and "Rebirth" aroused enormous interest among the district's troops. ColGen M. I. Sorokin, a participant of the battles at Novorossiysk and the district troop commander, gave a report at the Leningrad garrison on the "Urgent Issues of Further Improving Troop Leadership in Light of the Propositions of L. I. Brezhnev's Books 'Malaya zemlya' and 'Rebirth'."

In their speeches, members of the Military Council--LtGen Novikov, chief of the district's Political Directorate, Gens A. P. Borisov, B. V. Sharyy, A. N. Lezin and others--(Reserve) LtCol F. A. Kalinin, a participant of the battles at Malaya zemlya and a Hero of the Soviet Union, and others profoundly revealed the importance of L. I. Brezhnev's books in indoctrinating officer personnel, developing superior political and practical qualities in them and in

further increasing the efficiency of troop leadership; they pointed out the need to introduce the experience of the battles at Malaya zemlya and the experience of the political and organizational work into troop training and indoctrination practice. Attracting a large group of officer personnel, especially participants of the Great Patriotic War, lively reminiscences and a widespread exchange of opinions make scientific-historical and applied scientific conferences interesting and instructive.

Reserve and retired generals and officers--veterans of the Great Patriotic War--are conducting an enormous amount of work in propagandizing the experience of the past war and in indoctrinating Soviet servicemen and young people based on the glorious combat traditions of the Armed Forces. They are preparing their memoirs and descriptions of combat operations for publication; they are writing about their reminiscences in district and servicemen newspapers and they are actively participating in the preparations for military historical and readers' conferences and in trips to combat sites on the district's territory. They are giving lectures and reports and conducting discussions in military units, on ships, in military schools, at draft centers at military commissariats, at museums and also on radio and television.

By order of the district troop commander, 70 famous veterans were rewarded for their active participation in the military patriotic indoctrination of servicemen and young people based on combat traditions. Among those decorated were ColGen (Retired) M. P. Konstantinov, chairman of the Leningrad Section of the Soviet War Veterans Committee and Hero of the Soviet Union; MajGen (Retired) I. P. Knysh, his deputy; LtGen (Retired) Yu. M. Abramov, chairman of the Military Scientific Society; (reserve) Col G. A. Khazov, chairman of the Petrozavodsk Leninskiy Rayon Military Commissariat Committee for Promoting Military Patriotic Education; (Reserve) LtCol L. A. Gomzyakov, basic military training inspector for the Arkhangel'skiy Oblast Department of National Education; and others.

The form of studying and using the experience of the past war, such as trips by generals and officers to the sites of the most instructive engagements and operations during the Great Patriotic War, is also proving itself. We recently visited the areas of combat operations for the large units of the 14th Army of the Karelian Front in the Petsamo-Kirkenesskaya Operation (1944). Directly on the terrain, the participants of the trip analyzed troop operations and decisions of commanders at different lines for the separate phases of the operation and they analyzed the combat employment of branch arms and special troops in the mountainous-tundra terrain of the Polar Region. They conducted

several, short operational tactical exercises connected with the themes of troop exercises and they finished with a critique during which the leader devoted primary attention to the issues of organizing and maintaining coordination and troop command and control in an operation and he pointed out what had retained its significance from the experience of the past and could be used in operational and combat training.

This kind of trip, which was planned and prepared ahead of time, undoubtedly promoted not only an expansion of the operational and tactical horizon of its participants but also the practical study and use of the combat experience of the past.

Before the exercise, a similar trip was conducted to battle sites on the Karelian Isthmus during the summer of 1944.

To a great extent, the success of these trips depends on their well thought out and methodologically correct organization. Otherwise, they can turn into the normal tour to sites of battles and engagements and they will not achieve their purpose.

The libraries of military units and officer clubs must provide indubitable assistance in propagandizing the experience of the past war. They must have catalogs on material containing the experience of the war, recommendations for studying newly delivered literature and specially equipped reading rooms.

It is advisable to have card files on classified literature in staffs and to set aside facilities to work with it. It would be beneficial to announce the arrival of new material which summarizes the experience of the war on a regular basis at officer calls and to study and discuss the most important articles.

The manuals and regulations, where everything necessary and beneficial from the experience of the past war and the postwar practice of troop combat training is reflected in distilled form, must not be forgotten.

It is most advisable to study the experience of the Great Patriotic War about the area where the troops are stationed. For example, in the Leningrad Military District--in the North, since its special physical and geographical features, which required a different approach to planning and conducting operations (battles) in comparison with other sectors, are here. We have summarized and systematized the experience of many troop combat operations on the northern flank of the Soviet-German Front--the Vyborg Operation (10-20 June 1944), the Svirsk-Petrozavodsk Offensive Operation (21 July-9 August 1944), the Petsamo-Kirkenesskaya Operation (7-27 October 1944) and others.

The study of the experience of combat operations during the Great Patriotic War helps commanders, staffs and political agencies organize training under conditions which maximally approximate combat conditions, inculcate superior morale and political and psychological qualities in servicemen more efficiently and it helps them develop willpower, endurance and persistence in achieving planned goals. In addition, work which is assigned well in this plan makes it possible for generals and officers to gain a profound understanding and knowledge of the processes of military affairs and the changes which are taking place both in the theory and practice of the Armed Forces. It makes it possible to understand the evolution of the forms and methods for waging modern war and to more skillfully solve the problems which arise.

The VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL renders a great deal of assistance in combat and political training. Unfortunately, it does not have widespread distribution among officers in all the garisons. We hope to eliminate this shortcoming in the near future.

We believe that it is necessary to publish special collections of articles which summarize the experience of the war and which reveal the enormous activity of our Communist Party in ensuring victory over the enemy. A methodological aid for studying and using combat experience in operational, combat and political training should also be developed for officers.

In our opinion, these are some directions for the work on studying the experience of the battles of the Great Patriotic War and on introducing this experience into troop combat and operational training practice.

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CIVIL DEFENSE TRAINING AND RELATED ACTIVITIES

Training Political Workers

Moscow VOYENNNYYE ZNANIYA in Russian No 9, Sep 78 signed to press 9 Aug 78
pp 14-15

[Article by Col Gen V. Grekov, Deputy Chief of USSR Civil Defense [CD] for
Political Affairs: "Train Formation Political Workers"]

[Text] The Soviet people with creative enthusiasm are bringing the historic plans of the 25th CPSU Congress to fruition. The workers from cities and villages, guided by the Communist Party, are participating with the interest of the country's real masters in all state, production, and social matters. Concerns about the security of the fatherland, about the invulnerability of its borders, about the readiness to protect the population against any inclinations of provocators of war are close to the heart and thoughts of every Soviet patriot.

The Soviet people, fulfilling CD responsibilities, are making a great contribution to strengthening the defensive might of our motherland since our people, as comrade L. I. Brezhnev said, know from actual bitter experience what enormous sacrifices among the population can be caused by an aggressor's actions. Therefore, Soviet CD counts on national support, on the active participation of all Soviet citizens in all its measures. Non-militarized CD formations in populated points and at national economic installations have acquired a structured organization and have been supplied with modern equipment.

The requirement to maintain such forces in readiness has been dictated by the many national disasters which have occurred and the battle against their consequences. There have been floods or mudflows, earthquakes or forest fires, heavy snows or even destructive hurricanes and non-militarized detachments, teams, and groups immediately come to the aid of those suffering in order to save people and the national wealth.

Formation personnel fulfill their duty guided primarily by the moral principles of the Soviet way of life, which presupposes a highly-developed

sense of collectivism and the readiness to immediately provide assistance to comrades. To carry out difficult and dangerous rescue operations, formations require faultless organization, a high level of training, reliable command and control, and mobility. And, all of this depends upon organizing training and indoctrinational work with them.

Uninterrupted political work varying in method conducted under the guidance of party committees with active participation by formation communists, their command and supervisory staff, trade union, and Komsomol aktiv are the decisive condition for internal coordination within detachments, teams, and groups and their ability to surmount any difficulties.

Party committees create the reliable prerequisites for a universal party influence on formations accomplishing all of the tasks assigned to them through assignment of communists, insuring the requisite party structure within each non-militarized formation, and designation of deputy commanders for political affairs. Communists confirmed by formation political workers, along with their commanders, bear personal responsibility to party committees for organizing political and indoctrinational work in the formations and the level of discipline and moral-psychological tempering of the personnel.

Many examples show that the link between mass political work and accomplishment of all practical CD missions has become even more exemplary with the introduction of this responsibility in the TO&E of non-militarized formations, training has improved and formation collectives have become better coordinated, and the capabilities for carrying out urgent operations in a complex situation have improved.

At one of the industrial enterprises in Kazakhstan, the party committee assigned communist K. Prigodich as deputy commander for political affairs in a composite detachment. He had only just become acquainted with the people and with his new duties when a suddenly-developing disaster abrogated the initial plan. The detachment subunits [podrazdeleniye] when the alert sounded departed with their equipment to repair a wash-out in the damaged body of a dam. Real combat efforts seethed for approximately four days and nights.

In the end the people won. Their industriousness, agility, courage, and consciousness averted a great disaster threatening a populated point. The party organization also gives a fitting evaluation to the contribution made by K. Prigodich, the detachment deputy for political affairs in these overall efforts.

Lessons learned from the battle against nature showed the necessity for taking quite a number of additional measures for comprehensive training of formation deputies for political affairs. The combine party committee and its secretary K. Kusenev arranged comprehensive training for these communists. The training content is tied in with the long-range planning

of the basic measures involving political and indoctrinational work in the composite detachment and in the service subunits and formations. Political workers at seminars and instructional sessions receive qualified recommendations and are afforded the possibility through the exchange of know-how to familiarize themselves with the work methods of their comrades from cooperating formations.

The party committee is placing continual attention on the indoctrination of high discipline among these communists. One of the practical forms of such indoctrination selected here is periodic reports given by deputies for political affairs about their work and about the results achieved in political support to formation readiness.

The training of formation political workers is done fruitfully in Voroshilovgrad at the Plant imeni A. Parkhomenko. After the group of communists has been approved for these jobs all of them during lessons at the rayon CD courses familiarize themselves with the foundations of the organization and conduct of CD at national economic installations and with the special features of political work in formations. However, the plant party committee finds it necessary to supplement this knowledge and augment it through the periodic conduct of seminar lessons with the deputies for political affairs. Thus, in May of this year, party committee secretary N. Sorokin, plant director T. Sidorenko, and workers from the CD staff and courses gave presentations.

The rayon party committee is placing requisite attention on similar lessons. Its first secretary V. Nikitin gave a report entitled "On Party-Political Work During Accomplishment of CD Missions." The raykom has familiarized the political workers from other installations with the organization of political work within plant formations.

As is known, integrated installation exercises are recognized as being the highest, most active form of training CD supervisory personnel and forces. Dynamism and an increase in the workload is insured during these exercises, and, consequently, the requirement arises to carry on political work continually, to bring it to the level of each individual, and to restructure it rapidly when various difficulties arise.

For formation deputies for political affairs, training and the conduct of integrated exercises is a time for a maximum workload along with the best opportunity to check and augment one's knowledge and skills as an organizer of mass political work during the joint activities of a large number of people.

V. Obukhovskiy, composite team deputy commander for political affairs, organized the political work well during an integrated installation exercise at the above-mentioned Plant imeni A. Parkhomenko. He is a deputy shop chief and has been elected as a member of the shop party organization

bureau. He has been awarded the "Victor in Socialist Competition" badge in 1975, 1976, and 1977, as well as the "For Model Labor" medal. Meritorious production worker V. Obukhovskiy also goes about accomplishment of his job as formation political worker with a high degree of party responsibility. During the integrated exercise he elaborated the political work plan with team personnel. Along with party group organizer G. Sverin, he correctly assigned the communists and Komsomol members, gave them detailed recommendations, and determined tasking. The deputy for political affairs participated in the team party meeting where the question of the missions of the communists during the exercise was discussed and he gave a report. He worked hard to explain to the personnel the goals and missions of the exercise, as well as the requirement for maintaining high discipline, organization, order, and adherence to safety measures.

In addition, he assisted the detachment subunit commanders in organizing socialist competition with the slogan "excellent mission accomplishment at the exercise--our contribution to the cause of further strengthening the country's defense capability."

The detachment commander and his deputy for political affairs placed special attention on training basic specialists for the exercise: bulldozer operators, crane operators, excavator operators, radiation supervisors, as well as on the organization of political work with the personnel of those groups and elements which were to operate in the most complex situation.

V. Obukhovskiy assigned agitators to hold discussions on materials from L. I. Brezhnev's books "Malaya zemlya [Small Land] and "Vozrozhdeniye" [Rebirth], on USSR domestic and international policy, and explain the requirements contained in the instructions on personnel operations during exercises. Publication of combat flyers was organized and arrangements were made to photograph interesting episodes during the exercise. The specific and steadfast work of deputy for political affairs V. Obukhovskiy facilitated successful accomplishment of all missions during the exercise. This composite team received the thanks of the exercise director for their skillful operations. In Dnepropetrovsk, party committee secretaries at Dneprotyazhstroy Trust, the Pipe-Rolling Plant imeni Karl Liebknecht, and the Knitting Association who had themselves earlier completed training at CD courses knowledgeably provided assistance to deputies for political affairs in the planning of political work during the forthcoming joint special tactical exercise.

The timely assistance supplied permitted consolidated mechanization work team deputy for political affairs M. Volkov, Petrov from the rescue group, and A. Shcheglov from the reconnaissance detachment to confidently play the roles of actual assistant commanders and the political leaders of the formation troops. They continually carried out individual work, skillfully explained the situation to the personnel, pointed out those who had excelled, and maintained close contacts with the party and Komsomol aktiv of a

cooperating military subunit. All of the political workers from these formations with great enthusiasm recall their training at the CD courses. Thus, M. Volkov says: "the courses provided me with CD knowledge, expanded my outlook, and convinced me of the requirement to take practical measures to protect people in every sector of the installation. The knowledge that I received at the CD courses has greatly assisted me in carrying on political work in the shop."

Staff and CD course communists guided by local party organs are improving in every way possible the training and methodological work directed toward comprehensive improvement in training formation deputies for political affairs. The methodological meetings of course instructors held in Leningrad are instructive. During this training year they collectively discussed I. Cherbov's lecture entitled "CD Political Work in Light of the Requirements of the CC CPSU and Soviet State." At another meeting they actively discussed an open lesson on the theme "Political and Indoctrinational Work with Formation Personnel," conducted by teacher S. Gavrilov.

Such goal-oriented discussions always assisted in eliminating previously-discovered shortcomings, introducing supplements which bring the training process at courses closer to those specific concerns with which a political worker comes in contact at his own installation. It is for such very weighty opinions that the courses invited A. Zarubin, secretary of the party committee at the Izmeritel Plant to their regular methodological meeting. After a report on know-how in CD political work at the plant, he responded to many questions from the instructors. In his own right, the secretary of the plant party committee, who has been trained at the same courses by the way, steadfastly recommended that a more detailed examination be made of questions of the daily political work in formations at lessons with formation political workers.

The directors of CD staffs and courses in Leningrad correctly evaluated these substantiated desires of the party workers. In accordance with the program approved by the party obkom, twice as much time is now being devoted to training deputies for political affairs in practical political work than is envisioned for other categories of command and supervisory personnel. Such an approach permitted designation as independent themes the key questions of political work, not only throughout the entire CD system, but also specifically in multipurpose formations. It is also praiseworthy that training at the courses concludes with a wrap-up seminar lesson, which facilitates intensification of knowledge and explanation of questions that arise among the students. The practice of having a representative of the corresponding party committee participate in the wrap-up session has found universal approval.

A business-like creative situation of searching for new forms and methods is being created in the course in the groups training formation communist personnel. Deputies for political affairs develop a taste for critical

analysis of their own know-how, the skill of adopting everything valuable that has been accumulated by others, of implementing it, and complication of missions.

Wishes are being expressed in party committees that not only teachers and masters of CD course production training, but also other staff workers be trained for participation in lessons with formation political workers at national economic installations. In the light of this justifiable requirement, one notes the very timely initiative put forth by the party organization of the CD staff in Sumskaya Oblast. In March of this year, a meeting of the party organization debated the report by chief of staff V. Danilenko concerning participation of communists in the training of political workers at courses, as well as in the party committees of national economic installations. The decision of the party meeting became the fulcrum of much useful work.

Teachers assigned by party organs for lessons with deputies for political affairs at rayon courses underwent training and detailed methodological instruction at oblast courses. They were addressed by responsible workers from the apparatus of the oblast and city party committees. The lessons conducted at these courses by their chief V. Belous and his deputy I. Zushenskiy received a high rating.

To implement the decision of the party meeting, ten communists from the oblast staff directly participated in the lessons conducted with formation deputies for political affairs by the party committees at national economic installations. This training was conducted in conjunction with other CD measures in rayons, at enterprises, in sovkhozes and in kolhozes. An additional result was the enrichment of these staff and course workers with the knowledge of the actual situation locally.

Formation political workers multiply their practical know-how and improve their knowledge and skills at CD courses, but mainly at drills and exercises and through daily life and labor. Deputies for political affairs study where and how their subordinates are working, what their needs are, what their life's interests are, their requests, their activeness in party, trade union, and Komsomol work. The ability to approach an individual, the simplicity of talking with subordinates, winning their confidence and respect--these are the vital qualities of a formation political worker. It is also a matter of this worker always being with people, alongside them, assisting them in every way in solving a common problem. To organize assistance, inculcate people in a readiness at any moment to come to give a comrade a hand, to approve the manifestation of these beautiful traits of the Soviet man--this is the primary duty of our political workers.

Profound ideological conviction, political consciousness, and devotion to the people and to the cause of the Communist Party were and remain the foundation of high moral spirit. Formation troops are indoctrinated on this basis with steadfastness and an inner readiness to accomplish their missions

in an extraordinary situation. Formation political workers explain to personnel the behests of V. I. Lenin concerning the defense of the socialist fatherland and USSR Constitution, the instruction of L. I. Brezhnev concerning the further strengthening of the country's defense capability. The troops are indoctrinated in a spirit of communistic ideals and angrily unmask the aggressive policy of American imperialism.

The large detachment of CD formation deputies for political affairs has undergone the test of time, is justifying the high confidence shown in it by party organizations, and is making a worthy contribution to the cause of further CD improvement.

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Letters About Staff Efficiency

Moscow VOYENNNYYE ZNANIYA in Russian No 9, Sep 78 signed to press 9 Aug 78
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[Unattributed article: "Discussion of an Important Theme"]

[Text] We are publishing the response to V. Glushkov's article entitled "O shtabnoy kul'ture" [Concerning Staff Culture]. Judging from the initial letters which the editorial board has received, it elicited the interest of many CD workers who are carrying out difficult service at national economic installations and in rayons and cities.

[Letter from Lt Col (Res) I. Panasenko, chief of an installation CD staff, Pushkinskiy Rayon, Moskovskaya Oblast: "True Path to Success"]

I have been chief of an installation CD staff for 7 years now. This, of course, is not a long time but I do have some thoughts, some know-how, and some proposals which I would like to share with those who are now embarking on the CD path. Some differences of opinion may arise. But, can such a dispute facilitate the training of real staff officers? I, for instance, did not need such a conversation at the beginning. Then came the proper time

I will begin with my becoming acquainted with the director.

"I am busy," he said. "Try not to bother me with details. In a word, go to it"

It is easy to say go to it. But, where do you start if the installation CD chief himself is unable to give you any good counsel. And then another supervisor--the production chief--frankly stated:

"You will not get anywhere. The war breaks out, the bombs fall, and everything will be decided. . ."

I wanted to slam the door after such "injunctions." But, I did some thinking. It is necessary to first sort things out, look into the essence of the matter. I had already served for almost a third of a century in the ranks of our glorious Armed Forces.

"We must improve CD . . ." came to mind the words of L. I. Brezhnev spoken at the 23rd CPSU Congress. Thus, this is a serious matter, a party matter, and therefore important.

Initially, I was ashamed to show my "greyness" as I turned to the more experienced comrades, to those who had already attended the CD courses. I read everything that involved my new job. And, I soon began to make a different evaluation of my activities.

The main task was the following: to seek those forms, methods, and approaches to the job which would facilitate profoundly recognizing the significance of CD for not only supervisory personnel, but for the entire labor collective.

I decided to speak on this subject at the trade union conference. I signed up. But, when my turn came, discussion had ceased. The time came to say a word to correct this.

"The matters discussed here without doubt are important. But, I would like to mention something no less important, that our collective is faced with further consolidating and improving CD. And, I do not understand why the chair is taking such an indifferent attitude to my request."

The hall quieted down and I was given the floor. Later, at a party conference, I had the opportunity of being one of the first to speak. Then, the decision of the conference contained two points which fundamentally changed the attitude towards CD at our installation. It would have been very difficult to fulfill my responsibilities without this.

It is no less important to establish good relationships with the supervisors of the production subunits. I remember an unpleasant incident. I entered a shop from which the director had just left. The chief and his deputy were agitated. They silently shuffled papers on their desks. I had something important to discuss with them and I began. I am still sorry to this day. From amongst the dust and heat of battle they said things to me that are terrible to recall. True, they later apologized. And I would have done the same had I been in their place. They are good people and one has to feel for them and give them another chance.

The chief of staff cannot put things in order if he does not study the production, the shop and department tasks, if he does not find a way to

approach people, if he doesn't grasp their natures, their inclinations, their business-like qualities. As comrade L. I. Brezhnev writes in his book "Vozrozhdeniye" [Rebirth], "the main thing is people, the main thing is to understand them and be understandable to them." One must be a good psychologist in order to work with people. And, this is not a partial matter but the true path to success. It is possible, of course, to adopt an official pose, but know-how demonstrates that such an approach does not lead to the desired results. And one cannot be patient when you are approached as if you were a "poor relative."

But, it is worse when the relationship of the chief of staff with the shop chiefs and formation commanders can only be maintained through orders signed by the director. And, he has enough complainers without me and enough "people making demands as well." If you sit in the reception room for an hour or so you will see the kind of questions that he gets and you will see he is the only one people want to turn to. And, they must chide you: "the exercise is coming up soon and we still have not conducted the staff drills." True, the director said this after several months of joint work. But, such interest on the part of the chief is the most valuable of all. It means that he is not indifferent to the forthcoming measure, he himself is becoming involved in preparing for the drill and what is required of everyone, including what is required of you. This means that my work was not for naught.

It is known that the chief of staff has the right to issue instructions on CD matters in the name of the director. But, if this right is often used, it can lead to the opposite result. I do this only in extreme necessary instances. But, when the order that you have prepared has been signed by the director, don't overlook monitoring and checking on its execution, insure that it has been fulfilled.

The rapprochement between the chief of staff and supervisory personnel begins almost unnoticed. This is a difficult process but required to solve all CD problems. Required here is special tact, the ability to be victorious and, it goes without saying, steadfastness. All of this in combination also creates the authority of the staff and naturally of its chief.

Profound conviction, comprehensive knowledge of the matter at hand, erudition, methodological and psychological skills, personal enterprise-- it is these, if you will, that determine the essence of staff work.

The only TO&E worker in many enterprises is the chief of staff. It is difficult for him to cope with the full volume of work. It is therefore important to select deputies and assistants from among the CD aktiv. It is a good idea if these comrades themselves wish to work in the staff, possess the requisite know-how (for example, reserve officers), and have respect within the labor collective. But, it is one thing to select such assistants and another thing to interest and train them to skillfully carry

out their functional responsibilities. Thus, the chief of staff must pass on to his subordinates all his knowledge and skill and train them during staff drills and practical work.

The outlook of a worker and the level of his ideas, substantiated by a profound knowledge of the situation, should be considered the integral, perhaps even the main, element of staff culture. This pertains to the entire CD leadership and command-supervisory staff. At staff drills and command and staff exercises, we require not only a skillfull depiction of the situation on a map, but also a correct evaluation of the situation and the preparation of proposals for making decisions.

[Letter from Lt Col (Ret) S. Travkin, chief of an installation CD staff, Ryazanskaya Oblast: "Slovenliness is the Fate of the Careless"]

Staff culture is a broad concept. And, naturally, comrade Glushkov's article did not come close to exhausting all the questions involved. One thing is clear: staff culture in all its manifestations is especially necessary for us, the workers in CD staffs.

Indubitably, you cannot legalize it through an order. Comrade Klushkov is correct when he writes that staff culture includes not only neatly, rapidly, and correctly depicting the situation on a map or filling out a form in a nice fashion. The main thing is a creative attitude towards the job, a goal-oriented nature, concentration, personal discipline. One cannot but agree with this. And, the further improvement in the entire CD system greatly depends on just how high a level of staff culture our workers possess.

Good staff officers are not born. They must be trained. I spent my entire service in the Navy from start to finish in various staffs, including a fleet staff. I have not departed from this, as I now head an installation CD staff.

One must continually raise the level of culture, detect and correct deficiencies in the organization of one's work. It would seem to be a minor item-- a faded misshapen poster entitled "Be Prepared for Civil Defense" hangs in the administration vestibule. But, I. Grishachev, a reserve officer who recently arrived to work in our staff, noted this with a fresh eye and hit the mark when he said:

"Like a poor homemaker who has a dilapidated fence. . . ."

He was the one who took down the poster, restored it, and made it look more appealing.

It is a detail, but it does have a direct relationship to staff culture. Slovenliness is the fate of lazy, careless, unprepared people.

I had occasion once to visit a friend who was chief of an enterprise CD staff. I saw a battered picture on the wall in the uncomfortable room. The air was filled with tobacco smoke and a cigarette butt was smoldering in a flowerpot. His answer to my comment was "this is a working environment. . . ."

I do not think that all of this facilitates creativity in work. The slovenliness was also carried over to the documents that they filled out.

"I don't like paperwork," my friend said in justification.

And what satisfaction I felt when, in a neat room where several people were working, I noted another colleague seated at a typewriter--the non-TO&E chief of the CD staff.

"I am doing the typing myself," he said. "The annual account has been in the typist's in-box for 2 weeks. . . ."

And, showing with pride the accurately completed documents, he added:

"During the time I served in the rayvoyenkomat [rayon military commissariat] I became accustomed to precision and execution. The rayvoyenkomat hated carelessness."

I would like to use this to confirm the correctness of the thought expressed in comrade Glushkov's article: staff workers should be able not only to type, but also to use the modern equipment available.

I would like to dwell on another important question. It concerns the methodological skill of a staff worker. Possessing mastery of training methodology is one of the main qualities of a staff officer who must always go to the assistance of those who are conducting practical lessons with the personnel in non-military formations and with the population.

Take, for example, the lessons in the 20-hour comprehensive mandatory minimum knowledge program. There is a listing of the themes and a breakdown of hours, training literature and textbooks are identified. The basic elements of the themes are listed. But, as practice shows, far from all training group leaders immediately acquire the skill to prepare and conduct lessons, even after having completed a short period of training at CD courses. We must continually provide them with methodological assistance by conducting methodological and demonstration lessons for instructors. In this case, the staff worker functions as a methodologist and tutor. He teaches how best to develop the detailed lesson plan and how in a particular case to use the methodological drills.

There are serious difficulties in supplying lesson directors with textbooks, especially in rural areas. Our technical library last year was only sent

one copy of the textbook edited by Maj Gen A. Larichev. It is a good reference aid with a detailed elaboration of all themes. This is just what is required. But, there is only a single copy available and there are dozens of lesson directors. On the basis of this textbook, we should elaborate methodological recommendations, taking into consideration special features of the installation and duplicate and provide them to those who are studying.

[Letter from Lt Col (Res) N. Pertsev, chief of the CD staff, Ostrogozhsk Automobile Repair Plant, Voronezhskaya Oblast: "On a Scientific Basis"]

The scientific and technical revolution, as is known, is also reflected in methods of control and has increased the requirements for the level of supervision. "The modern director," comrade L. I. Brezhnev noted at the 25th CPSU Congress, "must organically combine in himself adherence to party principles with profound competence, discipline with initiative, and a creative approach to business." These requirements fully apply to CD staff workers, who must possess high cultural labor.

Staff culture indubitably includes a business-like approach and the ability to organize work on a scientific basis, with consideration for CD requirements and a high degree of competence. Its mandatory traits are rhythmicity and a goal-oriented approach. This is achieved by detailed and thoughtful planning of the training process and, of course, knowledge and practical skills, along with a high degree of organization and monitoring of execution. How, for example, do we do this at our installation?

During the preparatory period prior to the beginning of the training year, I along with the production and non-militarized formation commanders elaborate a training plan and lesson schedule. The party committee compiles a plan for CD party-political work and propaganda. In conjunction with the plant trade union committee, we determine the conditions for the socialist competition and the pledges for the production collectives. Measures for setting up and improving training facilities are included in the plant organizational technical measures plan. All planning documents, after approval, are then examined at a meeting of the party committee and approved by the CD chief--the enterprise director.

Extracts from the training plan and schedule are duplicated and distributed to lesson directors and formation commanders. All are supported with literature and other textual materials. Methodological mastery is polished during methodological training sessions and commander training.

CD training is a complex, multifaceted process encompassing various spheres of life in the plant. The entire labor collective participates in it. And, the organizational work of the staff acquires very important significance. When everything has been well-planned, coordinated, and approved, it makes it easier to work and control accomplishment of training missions,

to battle against simplifications and attempts to uncritically evaluate that which has been achieved, and to create better conditions for implementation of new progressive forms and methods of training and indoctrination. And, it is applicable here to again recall the words of comrade L. I. Brezhnev: ". . . . an increase in organization, discipline, and responsibility is indivisible from checking on execution of decisions." For us continual monitoring has mainly a preventive tinge and manifests itself in the form of viable creative work by the CD staff and services. It is an important element of staff culture.

Combining production and defense missions into a complex, using the mobilizing force of socialist competition, the collective in our plant has achieved notable successes in improving CD and for 5 years in a row now has been awarded the Travelling Red Banner of the ispolkom of the Voronezhskaya Oblast Soviet of People's Deputies.

Integrated installation, command and staff, and special tactical exercises and staff drills at our plant have become a fine school for raising the methodological mastery of CD staff workers, the chiefs of CD services, and formation commanders, as well as improving their staff culture. True masters of their work are A. Litvinov, G. Andreyev, V. Kundesh, V. Kotlyarov, P. Kazbanov, Z. Reznichenko, G. Smunk, V. Revin, S. Stadnikov, and others.

I think that one must include in the concept of staff culture correct mutual relations among the installation CD chief and the director of the enterprise and chief of staff. In those places where the chief of staff is looked upon with respect, there is better order and CD missions are better accomplished. But, such trust does not come in and of itself, but must be won through labor. It is important here to listen to the opinion of comrades and to be able to establish business-like relations with them.

There is no such thing as a minor matter in the work of a staff. All problems which it solves have a principled significance. Moreover, we must fill out various documents and in them, as in a mirror, we see ourselves. The staff worker, whatever the sector for which he is responsible, must intimately know when and to whom to report that which has been done at the installation. The completed document should be irreproachable and written in careful, loconic language. And, the path to achieving this is zealous accomplishment of one's responsibilities.

One more thing. It seems to us that the requirement has now arisen for the CD staffs at national economic installations to elaborate consolidated recommendations for carrying out clerical work and to establish a list of proceedings, their forms, and periods of retention. Also necessary are examples of journals for recording the training of command and supervisory personnel, non-militarized formations, and for training the population.

Otherwise, a plethora of unnecessary paperwork arises locally. This hinders the work of the chiefs of installation staffs and takes them away from their real job.

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Training Criticism--Vologdskaya Oblast

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[Article by VOYENNYIE ZNANIYA special correspondent V. Mironov, the settlement of Semigorodniy, Vologdskaya Oblast: "No, Everything is Not OK in Semigorodniy"]

[Text] Travel 2 hours northward via the suburban train from Vologda and you are in one of the timber industry managements, in the settlement of Semigorodniy. According to the recommendation of the oblast CD staff and the Vologdskoye Association, this timber industry management ranks high in the oblast for planning indicators and accomplishment of CD missions. The training plan for command and supervisory personnel and non-militarized CD formations last year, according to the association, was completely fulfilled. The inhabitants of Semigorodniy successfully coped with the logging plan.

This is greatly facilitated by the unfolding socialist competition. It now is spreading to all spheres of our life, forming such qualities as non-satisfaction with what has been accomplished, the requirement to move forward continually, a readiness at any moment to come to the assistance of a comrade. Competing, the people are working, not according to official instructions, but in an atmosphere of considerate intercourse thanks to the indoctrinational acts of public organizations and the administration.

But, as it was explained, these actions in Semigorodniy do not extend to accomplishment of CD measures, even though CD is also one of our state tasks. Practice shows that inclusion of CD pledges in the overall socialist competition improves organization, inspires people, facilitates developing an active vital position amongst them, elicits interest in defense measures, and brings to light new reserves. Critiques, prizes, certificates, and Honor Roll, simply a good word--in short, the entire system of incentives inspires the victors and urges those who are lagging behind to work better.

In CD at the lumber industry management it turns out that everyone is equal--there are no victors, no leaders, no otlichniki. I. Khodakovskiy, deputy installation director for economic affairs who also functions as chief of the CD staff, can name many comrades within his aktiv: inspector A. Popov, commander of the decontamination team V. Poliektov, commander

of the medical aid team A. Kuz'mina, political worker M. Soloveychuk, commander of the livestock and vegetation protection group Z. Bylina, commander of the communications group N. Manicheyev, commander of the radiation and chemical observation point N. Shirokov, and others. But, even based upon the results of the integrated installation exercise which reportedly was useful and worthwhile, no one was singled out. Neither the administration nor the chief of staff, who has the right to recommend workers who have excelled in accomplishment of CD missions, felt motivated to do this. The Komsomol and DOSAAF organizations did not come forward, either. Moreover, Komsomol secretary L. Levina did not even suspect that a DOSAAF organization existed.

What can you say about a complex of military-patriotic work, if everyone goes their own way? CD propaganda, an integral part of this work, was ignored by the chief of the CD staff and the party organization at the timber industry management. Reviews, competitions, displays, lectures, discussions, meetings with veterans, CD days, weeks, and months, and other forms of attracting the workers' collective to participate in defense measures--all of this is past. One can only dream about readers' conferences since the only CD literature that you can find in the departmental library is ancient brochures and the textbooks that go with them. Neither the library nor CD and DOSAAF here have heard about the magazine VOYENNYE ZNANIYA. Where are they to find out about what is going on elsewhere? One gets the impression that nobody is even interested in this.

It is known that CD staffs at all levels are direct organizers of local training. They are charged with monitoring the progress and quality of lessons, as well as provision of methodological assistance to the directors of training groups. In the settlement of Semigorodniy and other sectors within the timber industry management, this training is also conducted, but not based on the overall established 20-hour program. Instead, they use the 14-hour program. Does the rayon staff run this or do other authorities provide their enterprises with methodological elaborations on conducting lessons and exercises? Or, as they say, is this done "on the sly?"

Timber industry management director B. Gladkovskiy admitted that training, especially for workers and employees not part of a formation and for the non-working population, gets little attention. It deserves more. But, in his words, there are insufficient personnel, no time ("you usually don't get all the training done"), and the corresponding training facilities are lacking.

Let's start with the first point. Reserve officers and sergeants, war and labor veterans, and CD activists are usually appointed as training group directors. In addition, students in the upper grades who have had good CD training can be appointed as directors in rural locales. The Komsomol

members at the timber industry management who, at the present time, are not involved could be called upon to train the non-working population. But, for some reason, they don't trust the skills that these people possess here. And, the Komsomol members themselves do not know specifically how they could be of assistance. The rayon military commissar complains about the poor initial military training of youths. But, how could this be strong if the settlement school has been without a military instructor for a year already, if the DOSAAF organization in essence is not participating, and if the Komsomol organization humbly vacillates? Apparently, the installation CD chief and the party organization at the timber industry management should think about all of this seriously.

The question of time is simpler. It is scheduled through the corresponding training programs and there cannot be anything "unusual" as far as time is concerned. One cannot just voluntarily reduce the time, the program must be presented in its entirety. Moreover, during the lessons, greater attention must be spent on the moral-political and psychological training of the students, to indoctrinate them in a spirit of readiness to overcome the sense of fear, difficulty, and deprivation, the great nervous stress. All population training is built on the principal of the growing missions and requirements in today's CD. It cannot be effective without a stable training facility which permits acquiring practical skills. This presents greater difficulties for the timber industry management.

"We don't have the funds," sighs the director. "The lumber is not inexhaustible, especially under the conditions that we face as far as raw materials are concerned. The scale of the work grows. We have to watch the expenditure of concrete and metal. We have to learn to do the job. The engineering and working qualifications have increased. Why don't we have warehouses made of light fire-resistant materials, from prefabricated non-inflammable metal structures? When you build something, you want to be sure that the structure will be of service to you tomorrow. But, there are no funds for concrete, metal, and brick. And, we are felling logs with axes. The 'title list' lets you build one structure every 5 years. A bath, school, a woodchips shop, repair and mechanical shops--all of this built in the past 12 years from 'title lists' materials. And, how much have we lamented about the POL tank farm? It must be moved away from the occupied settlement. The rayon fire inspectors pointed that out a long time ago. They ordered a blueprint and selected the building site. The contractor is screaming to give him work, but what do you pay him with?"

Evidently, the CD directors in Vologdalesprom have a few things to contemplate and to think how they can assist the timber industry management.

"But, that is not all," B. Gladkovskiy continues to enumerate sore points. "There are no fire hoses or testing devices. There is little fire-fighting equipment and there is not enough special equipment. And, you have already seen our club and kindergarten. . . ."

Naturally, one cannot be content with this. And, they are not content, whether you are in the timber industry management, or if you ask the association. Its deputy chief, A. Merkur'yev, responds: "construction of a kindergarten and club in the settlement of Semigorodniy can be initiated in 1979 if the USSR Minlesprom [Ministry of the Timber and Wood Processing Industry] increases capital investments for the 'education and culture' branch."

The question of the necessity for construction of these installations and a POL farm was posed to the ministry. However, the response there was that it was not considered possible to allocate capital investments for construction of a POL tank farm in 1979; there is no money nor will there be any in the "education and culture" branch. Perhaps then, we can attempt to carry out the construction using the capital investments allocated by the association for production construction. The POL tank farm--through the use of capital repair funds.

It goes without saying that no special efforts are required to place one's trust in oblast or central organs and await "manna from heaven." It is more difficult, more troublesome to do so oneself from one's own local construction materials, especially for expansion and consolidation of the training facility, for example, construction of a training village, a training point, or a fullscale sector. And, not at the cost of the state treasury, but at formation lessons, at exercises, and so on. We recall how, during the years of the Great Patriotic War on the Volkov, Karelian, and other fronts mounded trenches, access trenches, good dugouts, and even command posts were constructed in the worst swamps.

Wood, resin, dirt--all of this is available here and there is no problem obtaining plastic, either. On the other hand, it is evident also to higher organs, including the USSR Ministry of the Timber and Wood Processing Industry, that they must think about standard radiation shelter designs for timber industry managements located, like Semigorodniy, in swampy sectors.

All of these problems are also very important from the social standpoint. Of course, new better-constructed homes made of non-inflammable arbolite panels are also being built here. But, the turn for the last guy in line must come sometime! Specialists are a demanding group and you now must give them comfort or otherwise they leave. And, they are leaving. As an example, the military instructor, the doctor, the chairman of the primary DOSAAF organization. Specialists are needed, and not only from the CD point of view. And, the youths are not impatient and are not looking towards the forest. This means that thought must be given to how to interest people, how to structure their culture and everyday life, how to provide them with protection.

This is a good time to examine another point. Every chief of staff knows that organizational monitoring of the execution of all CD measures are on

his conscience, the elaboration of plans and of operational and methodological documents are on his shoulders, and so on. And, each year, these tasks become more complex and there are more of them. One cannot say that the ministry does not recognize this. On the contrary, placing attention on the ever growing volume and complexity of accomplishing CD missions, in those areas where the number of production personnel permits, the ministry calls upon installation and CD chiefs to use released chiefs of staff as TO&E personnel for these installations. If one is to judge from the Semigorodniy timber industry management, then there should be two released workers in the staff. In fact, throughout the widely-dispersed territory of the management, there is only one person fulfilling these responsibilities as an extra duty. Naturally, the director needs him primarily in his role as economic specialist and then as chief of the CD staff. But, why should he be spread across two fronts? Why is each reduction in the administrative and supervisory apparatus made at the expense of the job of chief of the CD staff? Finally, why must CD missions be accomplished concurrently, as it were, along with "unusual" business? Evidently, this inertia, this irregularity in CD measures will continue in this way until such time as the situation is changed, until such time as responsibility for accomplishment of defense missions is placed upon the timber industry management. Then, Semigorodniy will in actuality be ranked good in all categories.

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Review of Readers' Letters

Moscow VOYENNNYYE ZNANIYA in Russian No 9, Sep 78 signed to press 9 Aug 78
pp 20-21

[Unattributed: "As Life Has Demonstrated"]

[Text] Initially for comparison we will take two national economic installations in the Armenian SSR, where integrated installation exercises were held virtually simultaneously. These are the Armenian Experimental Station in the Efirmslo Scientific-Production Association (Zh. Sarkisyan, director) and Asphalt Concrete Plant No. 1 of the Yerevan gorsovet (R. Tadevosyan, director).

According to the conclusions made by the higher CD staff, the exercise at the first installation was conducted at the requisite organizational and methodological level and was of great use to the entire labor collective. It went poorly at the second installation since simplifications were permitted. And, it goes without saying, the recommendation was made for the exercise to be conducted again.

How does one explain such a contrast? Comrades who reported these facts to the editorial board note that they prepared well for the exercise at the

experimental station. All the workers and employees were trained in the 20-hour program and passed the norms. Prior to the exercise, the non-militarized formations had special training and consolidated their knowledge and skills at a special tactical exercise. A full-scale sector was set up and several simple protective structures were built. The entire population of the settlement in which the experimental station is located, including the teachers and workers in the local school, participated in the preparatory measures. In particular, with their own hands, the school students prepared more than 100 gauze bandages and cotton gauze masks.

No such preparations were made at the asphalt concrete plant and the result was that the exercise, as was noted, was in actuality very shallow and involved a simplified situation. No stress was placed upon the collective and the non-militarized formations. If at the experimental station 5 hours of difficult labor were required for the entire complex of rescue and urgent emergency restoration operations in the full-scale sector, the entire exercise at the asphalt concrete plant took less than an hour. During that time, they succeeded in bringing out one (?) "injured person" and extinguished a "fire" which was designated by two (?) smokepots.

It is evident that exercise quality depends upon how CD directors look upon preparations for them. This thought is especially underscored in numerous letters from our readers. For example, such an exercise was successfully held at the Krasnodar Radio-Measuring Instrument Plant which, as Col (Res) G. Lokhnatov writes, recently was considered to be a lagging installation. But, the party organization, plant leadership, and CD staff took active measures to eliminate deficiencies and, in the space of 2-3 years, the installation joined the ranks of the CD leaders.

The plant printing office devoted two issues to the preparation for this exercise. The newspaper wrote that two-three practical lessons and a special tactical exercise were conducted with each formation and the workers shifts trained on how to react to the "Air Alert" signal. And, it is not accidental that, during the exercise itself, the rhythm of production activities of the collectives was not disrupted and all subunits operated at full intensity.

D. Smirnov (Sverdlovsk Trade Machinebuilding Plant), N. Kostenikov (Moldavian SSR), Ye. Al'bov (Krasnodar), N. Sorochenko (Ordzhonikidze), P. Logoyda (Yaroslavl'), I. Goncharuk (Vinnitskaya Oblast), A. Valuyskiy (Tashkent), Yu. Aleksandrin (Moscow), S. Kuznetsov (Baku), S. Sivkov (Leningrad), N. Fedotov (Orenburgskaya Oblast), D. Kobrin (Kiev), V. Nechepurenko (Chimkentskaya Oblast), and many others wrote about the fruitful influence of good exercise preparation on labor collectives.

"Feverish preparations preceded the exercise at the Gay Order of Lenin Mining and Enriching Combine imeni Lenin's Komsomol," writes comrade

Fedotov. He points out the special role in this of installation CD chief R. Semigin, CD staff chief V. Noskov, chief engineer V. Pechin, and the party committee which insure skillful direction of all preparatory measures. And, there were many: drills in the shops on the "Air Alert" signal, light camouflage, and adapting the drifts as radiation shelters. The efforts of the workers and employees resulted in the preparation of more than 1,000 cotton gauze masks for family members.

K. Sivkov, chief of the CD staff at the Metallist Plant in Leningrad, one could say, became one of the pathfinders of a new effective form of training the labor collectives in CD operations under complex conditions. He writes: "There once was a conversation at the CD staff at Leninskiy Rayon on how an integrated installation exercise differs from the command and staff exercise which we conduct annually. But, when you think about it, you begin to understand the larger concept of integrated elaboration of CD measures with the participation of the entire labor collective, as well as the members of the workers' and employees' families." Comrade Sivkov recalls that, during this conversation, the chief of the rayon staff proposed that the first such exercise he conducted at the Metallist Plant. The author frankly admits that he was somewhat afraid of how the director would look upon this. But, installation CD chief A. Yermishin took charge of the exercise. It was a model for the entire supervisory staff of the rayon and was conducted at a high level.

A serious attitude toward preparation for integrated installation exercises and the personal example of enterprise directors and party committee secretaries greatly presupposes success. In a majority of instances, this refers to those directors who have not only undergone training at CD courses, but also independently studied CD theory and practice.

As P. Logoyda, chief of the Kirovskiy Rayon CD staff in the city of Yaroslavl' reported to us, party secretary V. Privalov and acting director of the Yaroslavl' Fuel Apparatus Plant F. Paderin were very business like during the period of preparing for the integrated installation exercise. Along with chief of staff M. Pautov and his assistant N. Kondrat'yev, comrade Paderin concentrated main efforts on the training of the supervisory and command personnel and the non-militarized formations. Staff drills, command and staff, and special tactical exercises were held, and the training facilities were prepared. It was during this preparatory period that a training village was built. It made it possible not only to work out operations within a complex center of destruction during the exercise, but also provide the personnel of the non-militarized formations with the requisite psychological tempering.

The party committee held an expanded meeting with participation by the chiefs of all shops and the secretaries of the primary party organizations and they discussed the tasks of communists during preparation for the exercise. Party and workers' meetings in the shops were also devoted to this question.

The majority of the letters concerning exercises that the editorial board receives emphasizes the necessity for the maximum combination of production and defense tasks. At the present time, when the imperialists are attempting to revive the "Cold War" and step up the arms race, there can be no deviation from this important principle.

"We in the Scientific Research Institute have more than two-thirds of workers and employees actively participating in the various stages of the integrated installation exercises," writes comrade Kobrin from Kiev. "And during three full days, we insure not only fulfillment but also a significant overfulfillment of production and service tasks."

As practice showed, integrated installation exercises in agricultural production have a great deal of specificity which one must take into consideration. Examples of this are the Azovskiy Sovkhoz (Krasnodarskiy Kray) and the Kolkhoz imeni Legoydo (Severo-Osetinskaya ASSR). As comrades Al'bov and Sorochenko write, the integrated installation exercises at these farms were useful.

And again, like at industrial enterprises, everything depended upon the main directors--sovkhoz director V. Klevtsov and kolkhoz chairman Hero of Socialist Labor Ye. Shcherbinin, on the ability to mobilize their collectives for accomplishment of the entire complex of production and defense tasks. They concentrated their attention on questions involving protection of livestock and plant husbandry products, on how to attract specialists--animal husbandrymen, agronomists, and machine operators--to this important task. It is also important to note that at this same farm during the preparatory period all kolkhoz workers and employees and members of their families were attracted to the CD measures. Work was done to hermetically seal residential and livestock buildings, construction of radiation shelters near dairy farms and field camps, and adaptation of cellars and basements to protect local inhabitants and the evacuated population against radioactive contamination.

Integrated installation exercises are in progress. . . that is how many letters begin. During this training year great significance has been attached to similar exercises with groups at small installations. If they are not conducted, then the complete 3-year training cycle will not be completed and CD will suffer a loss in the training of small but numerous labor collectives.

A. Kuznetsov, chief of the Grodno CD courses in Belorussia writes that, in Mostovskiy Rayon, the question of integrated installation exercises with groups of installations was discussed at the party raykom and at the ispolkom of the Soviet of Peoples' Deputies. Raykom first secretary P. Fokim and rayon CD chief V. Vashkov held a meeting with the leadership of the organizations to whom such small installations as the House of Rest, bath, laundry, communication center, and the rayon Sel'khoztekhnika Association are subordinate. Tasking was provided to settlement and rural

soviets. Exercises were initially successfully held at the rayon center and then within the rural soviets.

When discussing integrated installation exercises our readers devote a great deal of attention to the moral-political and psychological training of personnel in the non-military formations and of the entire population. This is the type of situation that was created for the non-militarized formations of the Plant imeni Ordzhonikidze (Moscow) which comrade Aleksandrin writes about. "A portion of the enterprise territory was converted into a full-scale sector, which make it possible for exercise participants to demonstrate all their capabilities under the most complex conditions of a 'center of destruction.' Numerous fires, rubble, sectors with high radiation levels--all of this was simulated and designated here and it caused the trainees to seriously think about what must be done in order to rescue 'injured' and provide protection against radioactive contamination. Everyone accepted the difficulties that confronted them as being realistic and operated in accordance with the developing situation."

Preparations for integrated installation exercises, as practice showed, require continual monitoring and assistance from high CD staffs. They determined types of monitoring, including unannounced inspections. During one such inspection, as has already been pointed out, deficiencies were brought to light at the Yerevan Asphalt Concrete Plant.

But, analysis of such inspections shows that they must be, as a rule, preventive and must be accompanied by viable assistance to eliminate shortcomings exposed. If breakdowns are observed during the exercise itself, then this is already bad. Such an exercise often must be repeated.

Great attention at many installations is devoted to internal monitoring of the progress of preparing for integrated exercises. "A. Sychuk, director of the Krasnosel'skiy Sugar Plant, party bureau secretary V. Grushko, and CD staff chief V. Mikhaylovskiy during the entire preparatory period strictly monitored accomplishment of the measures envisioned by the calendar plan. If an individual did not accomplish things on time or did poor work, then effective measures to eliminate shortcomings were immediately taken," writes comrade Goncharuk from Vinnitskaya Oblast.

Thus, as life itself has demonstrated, success, effectiveness, and a good return from each exercise stipulate its detailed preparation. Know-how acquired in organization work in this direction can be widely employed when accomplishing subsequent integrated installation exercises throughout the rest of the training cycle. An analytical approach to the evaluation of each exercise, to lessons learned, excluding errors and mistakes characteristic for initial integrated installation exercises--that is what is now required from CD staffs. Then the subsequent cycle of integrated exercises

will be successfully accomplished at a higher organizational and methodological level.

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Preparedness Instructions

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[Article by Z. Alekseyev: "Under Threat of Attack"]

[Text] When preparing for a lesson on theme five "Actions by the Population During the Threat of Enemy Attack and CD Signals," the director recommends that the students attentively read the third and fourth parts of the textbook "Eto dolzhen'znat' i umet' kazhdy" [Everyone Must Know and Be Able to Do This]. It is important to carefully explain that successful defense against weapons of mass destruction greatly depends upon the skillful and correct operations given the threat of enemy attack and in response to CD signals.

Notification of the population is accomplished, as is known, by local organs and by CD staffs through transmission of the corresponding decrees and decisions via the radio broadcasting network, local television, and by established signals. The situation can be very complex and there may be little time to carry out all required operations. Required from each citizen is a high degree of organization and discipline. During this time they should prepare to defend themselves, their family, and residents well and participate in CD measures organized at the populated point. In order that warning signals be received on time each home must have a loudspeaker turned on at all times, a radio tuned to one of the country's broadcasting stations, and televisions tuned to the main channel of the particular television center. Even small transistor receivers should be turned on. All of this at any time of the day or night will facilitate the reception of the CD signals and instructions from the ispolkom's of the Soviets of Peoples' Deputies. The activities of the residents of Leningrad during the blockade will serve as an example in this regard. They did not turn off their loudspeakers for a single minute. Thanks to this they were continually aware of air alerts, raids by enemy aviation, artillery barrages, as well as the developing situation in any part of the city.

Great attention is devoted to preparation of protective structures. Bunkers and shelters built ahead of time can be immediately placed in full readiness at the threat of attack. Dual-purpose protective structures are evacuated in the shortest possible time and cots, benches, and other necessary equipment installed. Protective structures that are lacking are built and basements and other underground structures are adapted as radiation

shelters. Other simple shelters of the trench type are also built. The entire able-bodied population actively participated in all of these operations. Everyone must know where the nearest bunker or shelter is located and how to get to it quickly.

If there is a threat of attack the entire population is furnished individual protective equipment: the members of families of workers, kolkhoz workers, and employees--on the production principle, and all others--by place of residence. If there is a shortage of gas masks, respirators are issued and cotton gauze masks and gauze bandages are prepared. Tight-fitting clothes and shoes or coveralls treated with a special solution (see VOYENNNYYE ZNANIYA No 7, 1978, p 29) were adapted to protect the skin.

Each family should acquire a home first-aid kit containing approximately the following items: a thermometer, denatured alcohol, iodine, bandages, gauze, salt, antibiotics and other medicine. Sick persons also carry the medication which they use daily.

Fire-fighting measures should not be overlooked. Moreover, given a nuclear detonation, luminous radiation is not the only cause of fires. They can be caused by broken gas pipes, furnaces, electric conductors, and from unconnected heating instruments and installations. In order to prevent fires it is recommended that curtains and drapes be removed from windows. Where possible windows should be covered with wood painted white on the outside and covered with a fire-resistant substance. Kerosene, gasoline, and other flammable materials should be taken outside the house to a safe place. Large unnecessary items should be removed from attics, stairways, entryways, and closets. Initial fire-fighting equipment should be prepared: barrels and pails with water, boxes full of sand, pails, shovels, fire extinguishers, gaffs, crowbars, and so on. When leaving the house do not leave electrical instruments, hotplates, and stoves with open flame in operation. These can also cause fires if a building is partially damaged.

All cracks in windows and doors should be filled, exhaust pipes, flues, and bolts closed, and rubber or synthetic materials used to block the aperture beneath the door in order to insure that radioactive dust and poisonous aerosols do not enter the house (apartment). The cracks in stone buildings are filled with spackle or plaster and wooden buildings are caulked. Ill-fitting windows and glass should be replaced and puttied.

At night, populated points and industrial installations are easily visible from the air at a great distance. Thus, during the threat of enemy attack, light camouflage must be carried out. Fabric made of dense non-flammable materials are most often used to darken residential and public buildings. The drapes are made wider than the window and should extend beyond the edge of the window at least 20 centimeters on each side.

At lessons with the rural population the director explains that in these locales during this period essentially the same measures are taken in the city but there are specific differences. Thus, fire-fighting measures are taken, not only in residential and public buildings, but also in warehouses, vegetable storage sheds, and animal husbandry complexes. Rapidly-erected PRU [fallout shelters] and trenches are built at field camps and grazing lands.

How does one protect food products from contamination at home? This training question can be studied in a practical manner. An assistant director selected from among the previously-prepared students can demonstrate methods of preserving food in hermetically-sealed containers. He then explains the ways to protect grain, potatoes, and other root products during harvest. If they cannot be moved from the field and placed in hermetically-sealed storage (vegetable storage house), then the grain is placed in piles and covered with plastic or canvas. Potatoes and other root crops are placed in pits, covered with a layer of straw and covered with dirt.

Of course, it is necessary to protect water sources. Wells are covered with a tight-fitting cap with roofs over them and a clay cushion, above which a layer of crushed stone, gravel, or sand has been placed, is piled around the upper edge of the well.

Livestock at a field camp are driven closer to hermetically-sealed barns and pens. Inside these buildings are feed stores and water if there is no water-piping available.

Turning to the second portion of the lesson, the director turns the attention of the students to the fact that, after the threat of enemy attack has been announced, the situation can rapidly change. At a specific moment CD signals are issued in order to warn the population in a timely manner about the direct danger of damage. There are four such signals: "Air Alert," "All Clear," "Threat of Radioactive Contamination," and "Chemical Alert."

When elaborating actions taken at the "Air Alert" signal, it is advisable to drill the students on accomplishments of norms 9 and 10. Through the use of a record player or tape recorder, suddenly the signal is simulated: "Attention! Attention! This is the CD staff. Citizens! Air Alert! Air Alert!" The sound of a siren follows.

The trainees monitored by the director and his assistants fulfill the ninth norm, occupying the nearest bunker (shelter) which has been previously prepared for the lesson.

This is a good place to state that, during the Great Patriotic War, the inhabitants of Moscow, Leningrad, Stalingrad, and other cities near the front, when they heard the "Air Alert" signal, many times went to protective structures. It can be even more complicated now. A missile with

a nuclear warhead travels much faster than does an aircraft.

"The Air Alert signal can be sounded in a public place (a store, theater, and so on)," the director explains. "In this case, the administration will point out where the nearest protective structure is located. In addition, there will be signs indicating bunker (shelter) locations on the streets."

Lesson participants may ask what should be done if the signal sounds while a person is in a trolley or bus.

"Calmly remain in your seats," the director answers. "The driver knows where the nearest protective structure is located and will take you to it and then stop the vehicle."

Actions taken in response to the "Air Alert" signal in an open area should be worked out together with accomplishment of norm 10. Here the director places special attention on the fact that, given a nuclear explosion, the trainees should skillfully use the protective qualities of local objects and not leave the back of the neck and hands exposed. This can lead to burns during a nuclear explosion.

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Training in Kuybyshev

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[Article by I. Zhdanov, master of CD courses production training, Sovetskiy Rayon, Kuybyshev: "For Practical and Group Lessons"]

[Text] The collective of the CD courses in the Sovetskiy Rayon of Kuybyshev are continually improving their training facilities. During the 1977-1978 training year alone, several new operating mock-ups were introduced to train the commanders of rescue formations and reconnaissance. The students are showing great interest in them.

B. Granikov, master of production training, is the author and builder of "Organization and Conduct of SNAVR [Rescue and Urgent Emergency Restoration Operations] at an Industrial Installation." The advantage of the mock-up is that it can be used to dynamically reflect the different variants of a situation in a center of destruction, it is possible to demonstrate the sequential nature of the operations of a rescue formation commander, and the capabilities for protecting installation workers and employees can be convincingly and clearly demonstrated. With the aid of a special attachment to the mock-up, it is not difficult to trace the movement of installation CD forces with all attached engineering equipment to a center

of destruction. Demonstration on the mock-up of a particular variant of the operations of rescue formations is accompanied by commentary taped ahead of time.

Masters of production training V. Malkin and D. Petrov assisted B. Granikov in elaborating the group exercise on this mock-up. They compiled variants of the instructions of a rescue group (element) commander. From the control panel on a table the teacher can display the actions in any sector if the students have not assimilated the particular point and can repeat the situation.

We are convinced that this type of visual aid has great effect. The trainees attentively follow the events that transpire, listen to commands, make decisions, and assimilate the material more firmly during the critique. This has been often confirmed by students and rescue formation commanders themselves such as P. Babenko--a master from SU-2 [Construction Administration-2] in Kuybyshevspetsstroy Trust, V. Tokarev--shop master in GPZ [State Ball-Bearing Plant No 9], and A. Groshev--shop master from the Strommashina Plant who have been trained at our courses.

Along with course chief A. Slivko, B. Granikov elaborated and produced still another effective mock-up--"Organization of and Conduct of Reconnaissance on the Route and in a Center of Destruction." With this mock-up, we train reconnaissance formation commanders. It is possible to create any radiation situation and attach a DP-5B dosimeter to the mock-up. The trainees can use this to take readings and make decisions.

We also use other visual aids--an operating gas-mask mock-up, an individual dosimeter, and an antiexplosive and filtering ventilation device. Teachers control the mock-ups from a special panel, carry out basic operations, and in addition, close the window drapes, raise and lower the screen, and turn the movie projector, tape recorder, and lights on and off.

In the collective at our courses we consider that the possibilities for improving technical training equipment are far from exhausted. But, the effectiveness of their use can be noticeably increased if the level of training of the masters of production training themselves increases. Therefore, methodological work with them is directed now towards fuller assimilation of the science of integrated use in the training process of all modern technical training equipment and on the elaboration of group exercises, taking into account a varied situation.

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School for Defensive Field Installations

Moscow VOYENNNYYE ZNANIYA in Russian No 9, Sep 78 signed to press 9 Aug 78
pp 24-25

[Article by Col V. Rogozin: "A Supporting School. What Should It Be Like?]

[Text] Life has dictated the necessity for creation of CD supporting schools. Workers from public education organs and CD staffs, who understand the importance of raising the quality of training children and teenagers to defend against weapons of mass destruction, have made this proposal. The first such schools with a model training facility appeared in 1976 in the Ukraine in Cherkasskaya Oblast. Participants in the All-Union Seminar on Basic Military Training and representatives from the union republic ministries of education (public education) visited them. Creation of such schools--the bearers of leading know-how was approved and recommended for universal dissemination.

At the present time the number of supporting schools and periods of their creation have been determined in republics, krays, and oblasts, work has been planned, executives have been appointed, and the necessary funds have been allocated. Hundreds of such schools are now in operation already in the country, including in the Ukraine, Belorussia, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan. However, workers in public education organs, CD staffs, and school directors are encountering specific difficulties in their practical operation because there still are no consolidated recommendations for equipping such schools and the missions which they would accomplish have not been clearly formulated. Relying on initial know-how, we will attempt to eliminate a portion of the problems which practical workers are suggesting.

Life convinces us that the basic difficulty is not so much the creation of a valuable training facility as it is the correct organization of the very work of these schools. It is one thing to create and another to use correctly.

We recommend creation of supporting schools based on those possessing an experienced collective of pedagogues well trained in CD. It is advisable to have such a school in each city and rural rayon, cities of rayon and oblast subordination, and in other populated points where there are three or more general education schools. Their number will gradually grow in the future.

The foundation of the supporting school training facility are: CD center, classroom for training medical aid teams, the training village, TO&E equipment as well as items manufactured by the teachers and students themselves. Besides the training village, it is desirable in city schools to equip the basement of the building as a bunker or use a basement located nearby in a residential sector or at a base enterprise. As is known, where corresponding space is available, all general education schools are recommended to have a CD classroom along with the NVP [basic military training] center. It is mandatory for a supporting school to not only have a classroom, but a CD center. A spacious, well-lit room is allocated for this purpose. It is desirable to place a laboratory in a contiguous room.

The CD center is set up in accordance with the "Recommendations on Equipping and Improving Training Facilities for Basic Military Training in a General Education School, Secondary Special Educational Institution, Vocational and Technical School, and Training Point." The center should have desks, methodological training equipment, training instruments, equipment, devices, and mock-ups from the TO&E equipment (attachment 2 to the NVP program), as well as modern technical training equipment and testing devices.

Let us look in more detail at how best to set up the wall in the classroom which the students face. Placed in the center is a board made of frosted glass on which films, film strips, and slides can be projected. If the laboratory is on the other side of this wall, then a door is built. If it is not, then the board is mounted in such a way that the projection equipment can be placed behind it. Suspended on both sides of the board are small automatic posters and electrified diagrams. A television set is installed. Along both walls are shelves for visual aids, instruments, and individual protective equipment. Control of all of these devices is concentrated in one panel mounted on the military instructor's desk.


Displays which are filled out in accordance with the program themes are the basic equipment in a CD center. It is desirable to have removable plotting boards. Beneath the displays along the wall are demonstrations or models for the TO&E equipment instruments, mock-up and other visual aids.

Briefly, here are the themes for the displays in a center in accordance with the CD section of the NVP program: CD organization at an installation, installation CD formations; weapons of mass destruction in the armies of the capitalist states; collective and individual protection equipment; evacuation and dispersal of the population; CD signals; radiation and chemical reconnaissance instruments; reconnaissance of a center of destruction (contamination); rescue and urgent emergency restoration operations in center of destruction and regions where natural disasters have occurred; sanitary processing of people, contaminated clothing, territory, structures, and transport.

A special classroom is allocated for training medical aid teams or it is combined with the CD, biology and chemistry centers. Since the training program for medical aid teams in the school is now being reworked and more time will be devoted in it to practical rendering of first aid and care for injured and sick in medical institutions, this must be taken into consideration when this center is equipped.

In order to reinforce practical skills, a CD training village is set up outside the support school (see the figure).

Variant of a CD Training Village Schematic
(Approximate dimensions in centimeters)



Protective Structures Area

Area for Working Out the Norms

KEY:

- (a) frame construction 20-man fallout shelter;
- (b) 16-man covered slit trench;
- (c) 16-man open slit trench;
- (d) survey area;
- (e) area for readying instruments--tables 1 and 2;
- (f) area where individual breathing and skin protective equipment is put on;
- (g) decontamination area;
- (h) hermetic sealing of a well;
- (i) chemical observation post trench.

This is a specially-designated area containing a 35-40 man radiation shelter; radiation and chemical observation posts; open and covered trenches; areas for surveying trenches, preparing instruments for operation, donning individual protective equipment, conducting decontamination operations, as well as working out medical norms and norms on "operations in response to a nuclear explosion." In addition, a rural school is equipped with a well protected against penetration by radioactive and poisonous substances. Within the training village territory are displays with the norms and CD signals. One should keep in mind that, at the present time, only four CD signals are issued for national economic installations and for the population: "Air Alert," "All Clear," "Radiation Danger," and "Chemical Alert."

All of the elements in the training village enumerated must be completely supplied with the necessary equipment which has been maintained in continual readiness for use during lessons.

The appearance of these supporting schools is a great step forward on the route to increasing the quality of training school students. Their CD training now has a careful practical orientation. Students in the second, fifth, and ninth grades simulate drills and methods of protection and accomplish the established norms. In addition, games, displays, drills, and competitions are held with them.

Methodological work with the teachers in the fifth and second grades, as well as with the physical culture instructors who in some places conduct CD lessons with young school children, must be well established in such a school. Know-how shows that, in spite of the fact that teachers have classes and CD courses, they require continual methodological assistance, especially for organization of practical lessons. With this goal it is possible to organize for them, based upon the supporting school, open and demonstration lessons guided by the military instructor or experienced teachers. And, methodological instructor lessons are conducted under the guidance of the director, supervisor of the training session, or the supporting school's military instructor.

Each teacher prior to demonstration of a particular practical drill to the students must himself learn to confidently and correctly carry out the drill. He is prepared for this at methodological instructor lessons. Teachers not only learn the sequence of carrying out the drills, but also, and what is most important, to prepare well for conducting drills on any theme, to explain the methodology and the material support, to receive advice on anything that is unclear.

On the basis of the supporting schools, it is recommended that methodological training sessions be held with directors, that they be shown these training facilities, that they become familiar with the model organization of the training process, with the training of formations and permanent staff, with the methodological work with teachers who conduct CD lessons. And, the integrated installation exercise is the concluding phase of the training of all categories of students.

Teachers should make supporting schools the methodological training centers for military instructors for all the schools in the rayon. Conducted for them here are demonstration lessons on the more important and more difficult themes in the program. They visit open lessons, exchange know-how on the organization of lessons, drills, and passing practical norms, the use of CD elements in the military sports games Zarnitsa and Orlenok, familiarize themselves with CD measures.

On the basis of several supporting schools CD courses will train the teachers from the second grades (physical indoctrination instructors)

and the class leaders of the fifth grade for the entire rayon. It is a case where, even under the most favorable conditions, it is difficult to achieve 100 percent training of teachers directly at CD courses. Therefore, some of the teachers are trained under the guidance of the CD staff and public education organs in the supporting schools. Since the schools will be methodological centers, they can provide daily assistance to military instructors and teachers. At any moment, they can receive counsel from experienced pedagogues, from the chief of the supporting school CD staff--consultations on planning measures and elaboration of the CD plan, on training the permanent staff, and from the director--on the guidance and monitoring of the state of CD.

Basic responsibility for the organization and conduct of all CD measures rests with the supporting school director as CD chief. It is very important for the pedagogical council also at its meetings to regularly discuss CD questions and to note specific measures to improve them.

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Training in Tallin

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[Article by Engr-Lt Col I. Zhemchuzhnikov, department chief, Tallin CD staff: "The Exercise Had to Be Repeated"]

[Text] Many integrated installation exercises are being held at small installations during this training year within the CD system. And, as experience shows, there are different ways to plan and conduct such exercises.

Let's say that there are branches in separated shops in a single populated point. In this case, the main enterprise conducts the exercise with them from an integrated plan. Such a principle is also applicable for integrated exercises with housing managements, medical, and other institutions.

Confirmation of this is the integrated installation exercise held by the Mustamyaesk housing management in the Oktyabr'skiy Rayon of Tallin (CD chief E. Tokhvri and chief of the CD staff E. Khallisoo) with subordinate housing administrations during which questions concerning the organization of the administration under various conditions were worked out, as were methods of sheltering and improving the practical training of the non-working population.

If small installations are located in populated points away from the main enterprises, then, in our view, it is advisable to hold the integrated exercise on the territorial principle (city, settlement, rural soviet) under the guidance of the corresponding CD chief.

Such an exercise was successfully held in the Raazikusk Rural Soviet under the direction of its chairman A. Ernesaks. Participating in it were all installations located within the Soviet's territory, including the everyday services enterprise, public dining and trade enterprises, and enterprise individual shops.

That similar measures are useful can be judged also from the example of the Narva Cafe, which took part in the exercise with a group of installations in the city of Narva. This collective works by shifts. But, nonetheless, cafe director S. Subbotina found the opportunity to deploy her mobile dining point in the training village so as to acquire firm skills in the preparation of hot food under field conditions.

Having selected the location for deployment of the feeding point, formation commander M. Medvedeva assigned missions to subordinates. The field kitchen was deployed, utensils prepared, and foodstuffs unloaded from the vehicle. Chief of the trade and food services G. Sayfutdinov attentively observed the actions of the personnel. But, something bothered him. It turns out that measures were not taken to protect the people and the foodstuffs. This is a very important element and cannot be overlooked. The shortcoming was immediately corrected. The people trained in a situation closely approximating the real thing. Rescue and other formations are in operation in the smoke over the training village. Fires and rubble lie all around. Such a situation facilitates developing psychological steadfastness and favorably impacts on training quality.

The local feeding point passes the serious examination. Concerning itself about timely and nutritiously feeding the tired rescue troops, element commander G. Kropotova, cooks L. Yudina, T. Krasnova, S. Ignat'yeva, and others are working skillfully and diligently. The formations come to the feeding point, they receive tasty hot food. The troops and commanders thank the cooks and give their work a high evaluation.

But, unfortunately, one encounters the fact that installation directors are not using all the possibilities of integrated installation exercises for the practical training of non-military formations and of the population. Thus, at the Layne Sanatorium general training for the workers and employees and for formation personnel prior to the start of the exercise was poorly conducted and not done in the full volume. Quite a number of documents from the CD plan were not elaborated. As a result, the exercise did not count. Such omissions are inadmissible. Time should not be uselessly wasted. Only after careful preparation monitored by the CD staff was the exercise repeated and, on this occasion, it went well.

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Comments on Foreign CD Measures

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[Unattributed article: "Rescue Equipment." Passages in slantlines printed in boldface]

[Text] Due to the continual increase in the number of high-rise buildings in many countries, an intensive search is underway to develop reliable means for evacuating people from upper stories.

An /extension ladder/ with cable handrails, which reaches from window to window or to the roof of the building located nearby or on the opposite side of the street.

A large /inflatable mattress/ made of strong rubberized fabric capable of absorbing the shock of a person falling from height of 25 meters. The mattress is filled by a compressor or from a compressed air bottle. Separators divide the inside cavity.

A /cable ladder/ with rigid rungs which, when rolled up, has one end fastened to the roof overhang and held in that position by an electromagnet and a catch in a special holder. The electromagnet armature is connected to a signalling circuit. In the event of fire, the electromagnet trips due to the electric signal received, the catch opens, and the ladder due to its weight drops out of the holder, resulting in the ladder being in place opposite the windows of the building.

An /evacuation system/ which permits people to evacuate from floor to floor via ladders through hatches in the balconies. Under normal conditions these are kept under each balcony in a horizontal position through the use of hinges and locks. When a special lever installed on the balcony is placed in the proper position, the hatch door opens up and one end of the ladder drops on a slant to the lower balcony.

A /rescue device/ transported on a flatbed truck without sides. The device consists of two telescoping rods with crossbars fastened on their ends and a sheet made of non-flammable fabric attached to the crossarms. The sheet stretched across the crossarms forms a slide which gets less steep the closer you get to the ground. The vehicle with the device is set up near the wall of a burning building in such a manner that people jumping from the windows land on the inclined sheet and slide along it to the ground, gradually losing speed. In order to reduce friction and prevent burns, the surface of the sheet is continually lubricated with a special fluid which is fed from holes in the crossarms. The height of the floor to which the upper crossarm is extended is determined by the length of the telescoping rods.

A /rescue system/ consisting of a collection of rope stairs usually rolled up on the roof of a building. Through the use of a remotely-controlled lever, the stop on the round axis around which the rope ladder is wound is released and the ladder, due to its weight, drops down opposite the building's windows. The stairs constructed in the form of a closed continual tape are set into motion by an electric motor installed on the roof and connected with a system of cables and block and tackle for lowering the evacuated persons from the ground.

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Training in Higher Schools

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pp 26-27

[Article by Maj Gen Tank Trps G. Chechelenko and Col (Res) G. Krasin:
"A Viable Form of Checking"]

[Text] This is not the first year that integrated installation exercises (KOU) are being held in higher educational institutions. This has taken on a planned, organized character although there have been a number of instances of them being postponed for various, not always pertinent, pretexts. CD staffs are still not sufficiently steadfast in the battle for adherence to assigned suspense periods. Exercises have been postponed, for instance, at several Moscow VUZ--the institutes of radiotechnology, electronics, and automation; of cinematography, Pétrotechnical and Gas Industry imeni Gubkin. Meanwhile, given well-established monitoring and timely measures on the part of the corresponding CD staffs, exercises can certainly be conducted at the appointed time.

One way or the other, specific know-how has been accumulated over the years. Supervisory personnel at the institutes in a majority of cases have assimilated the methodology for conducting KOU, although there have been times when they have had to learn from their mistakes. It is now difficult to find directors who have any doubts about the viability of these exercises. Inspections show that high-quality exercises were conducted in the Yaroslavl' Polytechnical, Moscow Aviation, and several other institutes. For two-three months prior to their initiation, the attention of the supervisors and CD staffs was concentrated on detailed preparation for these exercises. And, primarily on the preparation of the supervisory and command personnel. Demonstration lessons, group exercises, staff drills, and command and staff exercises were preliminarily conducted with this category of trainee. This also includes a "loss" of exercises both in the region where the VUZ is located as well as in the suburban zone. Meanwhile, the exercise directors themselves specifically occupied themselves with this. Practical lessons on general and special training and special tactical exercises were conducted with the personnel in the non-military formations.

The entire complex of measures in the preparatory period was accomplished according to the calendar plans approved by the VUZ CD chiefs.

The supervisory staff placed special attention on political and indoctrinational work during the exercises. At the Yaroslavl' Polytechnical and Moscow Institutes joint meetings of formation deputy commanders for political affairs and for party and Komsomol organization secretaries were held where preparations for the exercises and assignment of communist and Komsomol members were discussed. Also held were party and Komsomol meetings during which the missions of the forthcoming exercises were explained.

What then are basic requirements involving exercises at VUZ's? These primarily involve their high quality and mass nature. Institute and faculty directors and, at certain stages, non-militarized formations completely manned and equipped participated at a majority of instances during the entire exercise period. As pertains to students not members of a formation, they worked out several questions, in particular, notification and assembly, actions in response to CD signals, organized sheltering and protective structures, evacuation using the combined method, and so on. The entire professional and teaching staff, auxiliary teaching and service personnel, and all the students were involved at certain stages at the Yaroslavl' Polytechnical Institute. An overwhelming majority of students and teachers participated in such measures at exercises at the Moscow Aviation Institute and the Higher Technical School imeni N. E. Bauman. In addition, gas masks were issued, they were fitted and checked in the smoke chamber, and cotton gauze masks, gauze bandages, and other items were prepared at a majority of VUZ's.

By the way, discussing smoke chambers. Approximately 10 percent of the personnel at the Aviation Institute went through them. But, it is characteristic that it is primarily the entire supervisory and command staff of the institute that does this. They set the example for the remaining participants.

If for some objective reasons it is impossible to get the entire collective to the exercise then one must strive for maximum participation. However, in no instance should it be limited only to a small portion of the permanent staff.

In order to work out the enumerated questions with the entire collective, an hour-by-hour exercise schedule is carefully compiled in the VUZ's. It includes time, category, and questions which must be worked out. The schedule must correspond with the lesson schedule so that all measures can be conducted without a material disruption of the training process.

Great attention is placed on the quality of the elaboration of training problems. Directors and staffs attempted using various methods to achieve

the assigned goals and to teach each problem fully in order to guarantee useful measures and maximum stress upon participants. Special attention was devoted to the ability of service chiefs and formation commanders to carefully organize practical work for their subordinates. The timeliness of their activities and the correctness of the decision made, instructions issued, and their applicability to the situation created were also checked.

Inspection of a number of institutes confirmed that qualitative conduct of integrated installation exercises is unthinkable without creative decisions, without completing the work in compressed time frames, and without correct employment of all resources. Directors employed those methodological drills which impelled the trainees to operate energetically and decisively without being passive observers.

Personal monitoring by commanders of the work of formations and individual participants, talking with people, demonstrating model execution of a particular drill, pointing out errors and immediately critiquing them--all of this facilitated qualitative elaboration of the training questions. If an individual made an unsubstantiated decision, the director through additional inputs stimulated the correction of errors, the advisable actions to take in a given specific situation. It was made progressively more complex and encompassed all planned measures.

Problems were worked out with the non-military formations, as a rule, using the special tactical exercise method during which personnel simulated actions under the conditions of heavy damage and massive fires as well as radioactive and chemical contamination. Attention was placed on seeing that the situation was not simplified and that personnel did not lag and waste time.

As a result, types of work similar in nature to that required under special conditions were accomplished at the institutes. The knowledge of the students and teachers was noticeably supplemented and the CD training facility was improved. For example, placed in readiness at the Yaroslavl' Polytechnical Institute during the exercises were protective structures and equipment warehouses--varied materials for packing the equipment from two departments were prepared; construction began on a CD village; cargo trucks were adapted for transporting personnel; formation equipment was supplemented; and other measures were conducted.

Analogous work accomplished at other institutes facilitated improvement in their CD activities.

And, there is one more, perhaps the most noticeable, result: the supervisory and command staffs of the VUZ services and formations came to the conclusion that they must concern themselves regularly with CD. And, since the preparatory period for the integrated installation exercise and its conduct provide an opportunity to accomplish in a practical way only a

portion of that broad plan of measures for protection against modern weapons which has been noted, it permits refining the plans themselves, taking into consideration actual requirements and capabilities discovered.

The exercises were conducted in institutes that varied in profile. The accumulated know-how shows that their make-up and methodology are the same. As an example, three groups of problems can be worked out: organization of the protection of personnel in the event of a sudden enemy attack and conduct of preparatory evacuation measures; evacuation of the educational institution and dispersion in the suburban zone; and organization of the training process in the evacuation area.

Varied circumstances, of course, can arise locally and they can make more complex or simplify the elaboration of training problems. This includes the special features of the territorial dispersion, the specifics of the training process, transportation capabilities, and so on. But one thing remains--integrated installation exercises in VUZ's are the most viable and all-encompassing form of checking on their CD readiness.

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In the Lithuanian SSR

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[Article by Col M. Dudnik: "Teachers at Courses"]

[Text] We are talking with Ye. Trofimova, a teacher in the lower classes of the Yashunskiy Secondary School in Shal'chininskiy Rayon. We are interested in how she conducts CD lessons. And, Yelena Sergeyevna says:

"As you can imagine, the children are very interested in these lessons. The main thing, I am convinced, is to correctly present the material. You cannot get by here with just a tale or two, and I use visual aids, demonstrate the drills myself, and conduct training sessions. And, a mandatory component is meetings with war and MPVO [Local Air Defense] veterans."

Ye. Trofimova invited a front-line veteran, a former military pilot, to the first CD lesson. The kids then met with partisans from a detachment which had operated throughout the rayon where they live. The teachers in this rural school widely employed technical training devices, visual aids, and CD equipment. The teacher proposes that the children use drawings to demonstrate what CD means to them. And, she is pleased with the work of the students, they bring to the lessons drawings of medical workers, firefighters, rescue workers, and a variety of equipment. School director Yu. Lepenka warmly responds concerning this teacher and her methodological mastery.

In the Litovskaya SSR one can find many examples of a skillful approach of second and fifth grade teachers to CD lessons. The work of I. Zheymo, class director in the Shal'chininskiy Secondary School, is interesting. This is an experienced pedagogue. She strives to vary the CD lessons and input unexpected elements. Thus, having studied the methods and procedure for notification of the threat of enemy attack and operations involving the "Air Alert" signal under various conditions during one of the lessons, she unexpectedly played a record containing the "Air Alert" signal. The children were not taken aback and knew what to do. In an organized manner, they evacuated the classroom, followed the route envisioned in the school CD plan, went to the shelter, occupied the places set aside for them, then responded to the teacher's questions on the rules of conduct in shelters.

Lessons conducted in elementary schools correctly and in an interesting manner show that the maturity of the pupils is higher in those areas where the methodological and practical training of the teacher itself is more profound. And, the basic knowledge and methodological skills are obtained by elementary school teachers at rayon CD courses.

It had become the practice in the republic for the course masters of production training to specially study the methodology which they will use with the teachers annually prior to the teachers coming to course training. The main goal is to establish an overall understanding and unified views on illumination and teaching of the material and on the drills in conducting practical lessons with the school students. The advisability of such training for masters of production training can be clearly shown through the example of CD courses in the Sovetskiy Rayon in Vil'nyus. Masters of production training at these rayon courses A. Grigor'yev and A. Filatov are good methodologists. However, prior to the teachers courses which are usually held in January, they still prepare themselves carefully. They gather for several days at their own internal course methodological meeting in order to once again discuss the forms and methods for conducting the lessons with the teachers literally theme by theme. Required of them is special attention on the teachers of the second grade who are tasked with a responsible mission--they are the first to interest the children in CD. Stress is placed on the practical elaboration of all of the themes by the teachers themselves. Unified views are elaborated on the use of particular material, on the examination of certain measures for consolidating the resultant knowledge during lessons and outside of the classroom.

Thus, course master of production training M. Gusman conducted the training and methodological meeting this year. Studying, for example, the theme "Means for Protecting the Skin," he demonstrated all of these measures and explained how to employ them properly, as well as advising that it is necessary to prepare for the lesson ahead of time. He then provided the students with the opportunity to exchange opinions, to refine those things

not clear, to listen to their proposals. Everyone was satisfied with this lesson. He also conducted a lesson on other themes in the program in this same manner, combining explanation with demonstration, drills, and consultation.

It was noted that teachers who for one reason or another could not attend the courses or who missed lessons make methodological errors during the school lessons. This immediately manifests itself in the quality of training received by the school children. The lesson on "Measures for Protecting the Skin" already mentioned was missed by one individual. A subsequent inspection showed that teachers who had missed this very lesson took a simplified approach to explanation of the theme, did not demonstrate practical activities, and did not know the methods for increasing the protective qualities of normal clothing. One teacher advised taking a piece of soap, slicing off thin pieces, placing them on the clothing, and ironing them on with a hot iron, convinced that such a method can increase the protective qualities of regular clothing.

For this reason, rayon public education departments along with the rayon CD courses carefully monitor to see that all teachers attend the course training. During the 1977-1978 training year meetings in Shal'chininskiy Rayon, 61 of the 66 second grade teachers attended, as did 43 of the 48 fifth grade class directors. It is now mandatory for a rayon representative to attend the course meetings so that he himself will possess the required knowledge and also will better understand the state of affairs in the schools and be able to monitor lesson progress.

Know-how in the operation of CD rayon courses in Lithuania in recent years confirms that teachers at the meetings obtain sufficiently stable knowledge and this permits them to successfully cope with their assignments.

It should be taken into consideration that second grade teachers attend CD courses once every 3 years, that fifth grade directors attend once every 6-7 years. Meanwhile, the program in the fifth grade is considerably more complex. Therefore, the courses have been charged with the obligation of regularly and comprehensively providing these teachers with methodological assistance during the entire training year, as well as to consult and inspect them. To accomplish this, each master of production training is assigned 2-3 schools which he continually visits, assisting teachers in preparing for lessons, drills, and for all other practical measures envisioned by the plan for the training year. Thus, during preparation for integrated exercise at the Eyshishkes Secondary School in Shal'chininskiy Rayon, course master of production training A. Grigor'yev met with the pedagogical collective, explained the tasks and sequence of activities under various conditions, and assisted the director in preparing for the exercise. In addition, he elaborated the CD plan in detail, as well as the sequence of lessons at the training points. Special attention was placed on organization of activities with radiation and chemical reconnaissance

instruments, preparation of gauze bandages, and adaptation of daily clothing for protecting the body.

The exercise at the school went successfully. Mentioned during the critique were fifth grade director G. Slyzhevskaya, who skillfully conducted a lesson on preparation of the simplest types of individual protective equipment and her students reacted the best to the "Air Alert" signal.

Thus, one of the important problems--training elementary school children in CD--is being solved through the joint efforts of rayon CD courses and the public education departments. True, there still are some deficiencies involving the training of teachers, but the way to eliminate them has already been discovered through better organization of course training and subsequent methodological assistance.

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Medical Aid Team Training

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[Article by Col Med Serv V. Shustikov: "Infectious Disease Hospital"]

[Text] This article presents one variant of a special tactical exercise with an OPM [medical aid detachment] in an epidemic center.

This time the theme of the special tactical exercise with the medical aid detachment (OPM) was unusual. The chief doctor from the city hospital along with the rayon CD staff trained to demonstrate the activities of the OPM when an infectious disease hospital is deployed. The exercise was preceded by intense preparations which, as usual, began with elaboration of the concept and of a detailed plan. Training goals, exercise stages, the partial situation, forces, and sequence for the cooperation of the detachment's functional subunits--all of this was thought through beforehand.

The detachment had no experience in operating in an epidemic center and therefore, prior to the exercise, drills and special tactical lessons were conducted with each section in order to train personnel for rapid and skillful accomplishment for the entire complex of antiepidemic measures.

What were the goals of the exercise? To work out control of the detachment in an antiepidemic mode; provide personnel with practice in mass-scale reception of infectious patients and providing them initial medical aid; and to study the variations of deploying and assigning people, as well as the citing and organization of the work of all the detachment's sections.

All aspects of the forthcoming exercise were discussed at open party and Komsomol meetings. The OPM deputy chief for political affairs in conjunction with the secretary of the hospital party organization elaborated the plan for political and indoctrinational work during the period of preparation for conduct of the exercise. Publication of combat leaflets began. Personnel were shown two short training films on the organization of OPM work in centers of mass destruction.

The rayon CD staff supplied the detachment with communications equipment, helped the hospital with the maintenance of civil order, food, and decontamination services, and concerned itself with allocation of transport.

The city hospital, which formed the basis for the OPM, turned out to be in a center of "especially dangerous infection." The first ill persons appeared. In accordance with this situation, the content of the work of the director and all functioning sections of the detachment, training problems and variants for their solution, basic measures, the sequence, and the periods for their accomplishment were determined in the plan.

The first things implemented were the notification procedure and muster of the personnel. It then became clear that it was possible to reduce the time allotted for the muster.

The exercise director explained the situation and assigned missions to the OPM chief. The primary requirement was to evaluate the sanitary-epidemiologic state of the rayon where the first cases of dangerous infectious diseases appeared in order to determine the most advisable form for deployment of the detachment under the complicated conditions. Taken into consideration during the evaluation were the suspected type of agent, the data collected by reconnaissance on the number of ill, the time of their appearance, basic clinical symptoms of the illnesses, the diagnosis, and the severity of the illness.

Immediately after the breakout of the infection, the chief doctor at the sanitary-epidemiologic station (SES) received an order concerning the commitment of the mobile antiepidemic detachment (PPEO) into the area of the epidemic for bacteriological reconnaissance and conduct of the anti-epidemic complex of measures. Here, close cooperation was accomplished with the maintenance of civil order services, which cordoned off the center and protected the infectious isolation ward and observator, as was accomplishment of the established quarantine mode by the population. The number of people among the population who had been immunized against the given infection was determined and the supply of vaccines and antibiotics was insured.

After the report by the medical reconnaissance element commander, the OPM chief, having evaluated all information, made his decision as to the location and the time for deployment of the infectious disease hospital.

At the first stage, the OPM could have been employed as a polyclinic with the sectoral principle of serving the ill. However, the growth in the number of cases of sickness made it imperative not to delay deployment of the hospital directly in the epidemic center. Selected for this purpose is the standard general education school not far from the city hospital. Here, availability of additional water sources was taken into account since a large amount of water would have to be consumed for the simultaneous sanitary processing of patients.

In organization, equipment, and work mode, the hospital was reminiscent of an infectious disease hospital but, since it did not have the requisite staff of specialists in infectious diseases, it had to be augmented by a brigade from the specialized medical aid detachment.

Prior to deployment of the functional subunits, their personnel carefully studied the basic missions of an infectious disease hospital. It must insure reception, classification, and full sanitary processing of infectious patients along with disinfection of their clothing and footwear; hospitalization and treatment; clinical research, taking samples from the patients and from the environment, sending them for study to the PPEO or rayon SES.

Hospitalization treatment of patients was carried out in an area directly within the center of contamination in order to prevent the danger of spreading the infection. This is a matter of principle. The only exception is in the case of a threat of nuclear or chemical attack when infectious patients must be evacuated to prophylaxis hospitals in the suburban zone. These conditions did not come into play during the situation envisioned by the exercise concept.

An infectious disease hospital is divided into two units--contagious and non-contagious. The former includes two departments--a reception and sorting department with a decontamination chamber and a hospitalization department, as well as accommodations for persons intended for discharge (from the decontamination chamber) and auxiliary facilities. Located in the non-contagious unit are a decontamination chamber for personnel, a room for putting on special clothing, pharmacy, sterilization section, cloakroom, buffet, storage, and auxiliary facilities. A pre-contagious unit, which serves as the location where special uniforms can be put on and which is used as a decontamination chamber, is located between the contagious and noncontagious units.

The hospital was rapidly deployed. And, patients began to come in immediately to the distribution point manned by personnel from the reception and sorting department. Here, they were divided into three lines: the first--for those with evident signs of illness, second--those suspected of being ill, and third--those who had contact with infectious patients. All of the patients individually, by line, go through complete sanitary processing with disinfection of clothing, underwear, and footwear and

only after this has been accomplished do they enter the reception and sorting department. It was reinforced with personnel from the operating and dressing department. At the assigned time, the detachment chief was provided a disinfecting and shower vehicle which was set up in the school yard. The hospitalization section was also reinforced by some of the personnel from the operating and dressing department.

After diagnosis, the patients were given specific treatment, with the selection of optimal medication based upon the nature of the agent and sensitivity to antibiotics.

Demonstrated during the exercise was delivery of patients to the treatment section, how they were treated, and measures used by medical personnel for individual protection. As opposed to patients injured by nuclear or chemical weapons, infectious patients must be transported only in closed vehicles accompanied by medical team workers dressed in protective suits (with the driver in coveralls).

Prior to determination of the type of agent, isolation ward personnel are subjected to extreme prophylaxis with antibiotics with a wide spectrum of action (auromycin, oletetrin, and ampicillin). After determination, special prophylaxis was selected for each one. Also dependent upon the type of agent was the type of protective clothing that the medical personnel wore while working. They were allowed to rest periodically with a removable respirator and protective glasses. While working in the strict mode zone eating, drinking, and smoking were prohibited. Isolation ward personnel were under careful observation and the temperature of each person was taken once per day. Those working in the strict mode zone, going through decontamination chamber, underwent special prophylaxis.

After the recovery and discharge of all patients final disinfection was carried out in the isolation ward: extraneous articles were removed from the rooms and the area cleaned. Personnel who participated in the exercise underwent full sanitary processing.

It should be underscored that during the exercise there were posters with a listing of the responsibilities of key personnel in all functional sub-units. These were replaced by the instructors during the critique. Unfortunately, there was not time during the exercise to work out in full volume the documentation involving the reception, treatment, and discharge of infectious patients. But, that has to be done in an operational manner.

A few words about the infectious disease hospital laboratory. There are principled features in its operation. They are linked with the supply of material for bacteriological research, its classification and registration, initial inoculations, as well as the procedure for providing answers. All

this was worked out in a practical manner. In addition, bacteriological monitoring fell to the laboratory as cured patients were discharged.

We should also mention how the food for the patients was organized at the exercise. The food was supplied via a distribution point in the buffer, then to the wards in the isolation ward. Used dishes were returned to the buffet and decontaminated by boiling.

The manner of operating the disinfection point was worked out separately with a display of the disinfection equipment and norms for its consumption. Personnel from the various departments within the hospital were limited to the maximum in their movement, especially in the strict mode zone. Telephone, loudspeakers, and the radio center were used for notification.

The operations of the distribution and transloading points were demonstrated at the edge of the hospital territory. A vehicle with closed sides delivered and transloaded conditional foodstuffs and equipment. Demonstrated here as well was the organization of the territorial defense service: setting up of posts and patrolling.

Exercise success was explained in the main by the good preparation by statisticians from among the senior students in the local school and the medical aid workers. The exercise turned out to be very useful and, the main point, made it possible to test in practice the basic instructions for the operation of the OPM as an infectious disease hospital with a large number of patients.

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Medical Team Training Book Review

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[Article by V. Mikhaylov: "Textbook for Vocational-Technical Schools"]

[Text] A new textbook is now available for medical workers who are taking lessons in a PTU [vocational technical school] in the program of training for medical aid workers.* Presented in compressed form are the basic requirements and methodological recommendations for each lesson in accordance with the medical theme of the CD section, which is a portion of the basic military training program.

*M. I. Gogolev. "Podgotovka sanitarnykh druzhinits v profesional'no-tekhnicheskikh uchilishchakh" [Training of Medical Aid Personnel in Vocational-Technical Schools]. Moscow, "Vysshaya shkola," 1978.

The lesson plans reveal in detail the methodology of 35 lessons in all of the themes contained in the program. Here, great attention has been devoted to the most complex questions--the organizational questions.

The training material is compressed to the minimum due to the small size of the textbook. However, the methodological recommendations presented in the book are useful, especially on the theme "Medical First Aid During Trauma, Accidents, and Sudden Illnesses." It is a shame that there is only one figure given for this theme--the Mashtafarov bandage. It would have been better for the sake of clarity to have more illustrations in the brochure.

Taking into consideration the category of trainees, the discussion is brief on injury due to radiation and contaminants as well as on infectious illness.

Examined in more detail are the "Rules for Transporting the Injured on Stretchers and Using the Materials on Hand," and "The Work of Medical Aid Teams in Centers of Mass Destruction." Equal space should have been given to bringing to light the methodology of employing treatment processes and on the care for injured and sick. It is these things that medical aid team workers will be primarily involved with.

The restricted scope of the textbook forces the author to often use "Uchebnik dlya podgotovki sanitarnykh družhinits" [Textbook for Training of Medical Aid Personnel], edited by F. Zakharov (Moscow, "Meditsina," 1975). Actually, it is impossible to get along without this book, which is a mainstay for teachers.

The textbook is very useful also for the training of senior students in general education schools. In the main the program here is identical. Unfortunately, the circulation of the book is too low.

PHOTO CAPTION

1. p 20. The full-scale sector at the Moscow Machinebuilding Plant imeni Sergo Ordzhonikidze. Firefighters commanded by V. Chesnokov have engaged the fire in hand-to-hand combat.

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