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Soviet Union

KOMMUNIST

No 9, June 1988

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Soviet Union

KOMMUNIST

No 9, June 1988

JPRS-UKO-88-015

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6 OCTOBER 1988

[Translation of the Russian-language theoretical and political journal of the CPSU Central Committee published in Moscow 18 times per year.]

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KOMMUNIST

No 9, June 1988

CPSU Central Committee Plenum 23 May 1988

18020015a Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian

No 9, Jun 88 (signed to press 6 Jun 88) p 3

[Text] The CPSU Central Committee regular plenum was held on 23 May 1988.

The plenum considered the item "On the Draft Theses of the CPSU Central Committee for the 19th All-Union Party Conference." A speech on this item was made by M.S. Gorbachev, CPSU Central Committee General Secretary.

The following comrades spoke at the plenum: V.P. Demidenko, first secretary of the Kustanay Obkom, Kazakhstan Communist Party; A.N. Gerasimov, first secretary of the Leningrad CPSU Gorkom; G.G. Veder-nikov, deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers; V.K. Mesyats, first secretary of the Moscow CPSU Obkom; B.I. Gostev, USSR Minister of Finance; F.V. Popov, first secretary of the Altay CPSU Kraykom; G.I. Revenko, first secretary of the Kiev Obkom, Ukrainian Communist Party; L.A. Borodin, first secretary of the Astrakhan CPSU Obkom; R.-B.I. Songayla, first secretary of the Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee; A.A. Logunov, vice president of the USSR Academy of Sciences, rector of the Moscow State University imeni M.V. Lomonosov; Ya.P. Pogrebnyak, first secretary of the Lvov Obkom, Ukrainian Communist Party; Ye.P. Velikhov, vice president of the USSR Academy of Sciences; Ye.Ye. Sokolov, first secretary of the Belorussian Communist Party Central Committee; G.M. Korniyeko, first deputy head of the CPSU Central Committee International Department; D.I. Patiashvili, first secretary of the Georgian Communist Party Central Committee; V.A. Ivashko, first secretary of the Dnepropetrovsk Obkom, Ukrainian Communist Party; Ye.F. Muravyev, first secretary of the Kuybyshev CPSU Obkom; V.V. Zagladin, first deputy head of the CPSU Central Committee International Department; G.V. Kolbin, first secretary of the Kazakhstan Communist Party Central Committee; and A.P. Nochevkin, first secretary of the Odessa Obkom, Ukrainian Communist Party.

The concluding speech was delivered by M.S. Gorbachev, CPSU Central Committee General Secretary.

The plenum adopted a resolution on the topic under discussion, which is published in the press.

The plenum considered the organization problem. It promoted V.V. Karpov, first secretary of the board of the USSR Writers' Union, from candidate member to member of the CPSU Central Committee.

With this the CPSU Central Committee Plenum concluded its work.

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05003

On the Theses of the CPSU Central Committee For the 19th All-Union Party Conference

18020015b Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian No 9, Jun 88 (signed to press 6 Jun 88) p 4

[CPSU Central Committee Plenum Resolution of 23 May 1988]

[Text] 1. To approve the CPSU Central Committee theses for the 19th All-Union Party Conference, submitted by the Central Committee Politburo.

2. To publish the CPSU Central Committee theses in the press for their extensive discussion by the party organizations and all working people.

3. Instructs M.S. Gorbachev, CPSU Central Committee General Secretary, to submit a report at the 19th All-Union Party Conference.

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05003

In the Main Unit of Renovation

18020015c Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian No 9, Jun 88 (signed to press 6 Jun 88) pp 5-16

[Discussion by A.I. Teplenichev, party committee secretary (Lipetsk) and Yu.P. Arkhipov, party committee secretary (Leningrad); discussion materials prepared by V. Kadulin and N. Tyurin, KOMMUNIST editors]

[Text] We have marked on our work calendar the middle of the 12th 5-Year Plan, and the eve of the 19th All-Union CPSU Conference, which will be a most important political event and will give a second breath to perestroika. What kind of time was this for the Soviet people, a time the counting of which began with the April 1985 CPSU Central Committee Plenum? It was, above all, a period of intensive considerations of the fate of socialism in our country, and a search for solutions which would fill the party concept of perestroika with specific actions in all areas of social practice. The period of renovation already has its own history and its difficult and, therefore, particularly valuable experience.

In June and October 1986, together with the Lipetsk and Leningrad CPSU Obkoms, the KOMMUNIST editors held roundtable meetings at the Novolipetsk Metallurgical Combine imeni Yu.V. Andropov and the Izhorskiy Zavod Production Association imeni A.A. Zhdanov. The topics which were discussed were predetermined by the initial stage of perestroika, and the documents of the 27th Party Congress. What is the current situation at these

enterprises, which are famous not only in our country but also abroad, for their first-rate output, technical facilities and innovative potential? What changes are occurring in the main, the basic unit of renovation, as we justifiably described the labor collectives of enterprises and associations? Party committee secretaries A.I. Teplenichev (Lipetsk) and Yu.P. Arkhipov (Leningrad) speak of the most important trends of perestroika.

The Right to Decide

"The establishment of real pluralism of opinions and the open confrontation of ideas and interests are characteristic features of our time. It is thanks to this that the Soviet people are given the opportunity to make full use of their intellectual and moral potential and to become more actively involved in public life." From the CPSU Central Committee theses.

A. Teplenichev. Democratization and the establishment of the new economic mechanism are eliminating a variety of forms of alienation of the worker from the means and results of his toil and awakening in the people the feeling of ownership, which had been lost for many years.

A characteristic trait in the many-colored picture of events occurring around us is the visible change in the content and style of the letters received by the party committee. Frankly, I thought that the moment we stopped reacting to anonymous letters the number of letters would decrease. Nothing of that sort happened! Today the people write more frequently. They are more demanding and do not fear to sign their letters. Statements at party and worker meetings are much sharper and more open. At such meetings one can see sometimes a shop chief blushing. Public criticism is a bitter medicine! Furthermore, the speakers are not always calm, restrained and tolerant of their opponent. Occasionally, there are those who confuse democracy with anarchy, with total permissiveness. Under such circumstances it is easy to feel insulted and react in anger. However, all of us now must learn the difficult art of dialogue. One must clearly realize that under circumstances of increasing glasnost and democratization of all aspects of life, in a certain sense it becomes more difficult to work, for engaging in an open discussion with people, persuading them and taking their increased requirements and various interests into consideration is much more difficult and troublesome than giving orders. However, perestroika is gathering strength.

Is this not confirmed, for example, by the fact that with increasing frequency workers are the initiators in replacing a weak manager. Such a measure was recently requested in the brigade of operators of the continuous steel smelting system at the first converter shop. The reasons? The foreman was arrogant and rude to his subordinates. He was unable to unite the people. Naturally, the shop's leadership acceded to the brigade's demand.

Yu. Arkhipov. Elections were being held for a chief of shop No 33: There were two candidates, each one with his own program for production development and the social area, secret balloting, and a protocol of the tallying commission, ratified by the assembly. Several days later a statement signed by almost 25 percent of the shop's personnel was presented by V.G. Vasilyev, chairman of the association's labor collective council, to the general director. It read as follows: "According to the electoral rule, the winning candidate is the one with more than 50 percent of the vote. We believe that with the existing tally of 49.7 percent of the votes cast for Arevkov, this would indicate his victory, considering that many people in the shop are unfamiliar with Arevkov. At the same time, 50.3 percent of the vote was cast for Shurshov, who is known to the entire shop; we consider this to be his defeat. The collective of shop No 33 asks that Comrade Arevkov be appointed shop chief." After the shop's labor collective council had considered the petition, a second round of elections was held. A total of 121 votes were cast for Aleksandr Vasilyevich Shurshov, and 184 for Aleksandr Mikhaylovich Arevkov, who was appointed shop chief.

I shall not get into the details of this situation for probably this first shop meeting should have been prepared better and the candidates for the position should have waged their electoral campaign in such a way as to exclude any innuendoes or obscurities. In itself, however, the fact that part of the collective disagreed with the results of the vote proves that great changes have taken place in the awareness and behavior of the people. I believe that 2 or 3 years ago nothing of this kind could have happened here. Incidentally, the event in shop No 33 is not the only one of its kind. Obviously, such is the way things should be, for if the people are not indifferent to who their leaders are, this means that they believe in the possibility of influencing their selection and work.

A. Teplenichev. I shall not conceal the fact that in some cases, guided by group egotism, a collective would choose a leader "convenient in all respects." Obviously, it would be difficult totally to exclude such a thing in the future. However, we do not fear this. The maturity of the collective and its party organization are tested through elections. Only 3 years ago we were the first in the sector to practice in our combine the competitive system for filling vacant engineering positions and electing economic managers. This system proved its usefulness. Between 1986 and 1988 alone we had 13 competitions with some 80 applicants. During that period seven shop chiefs, 77 chiefs of shifts and sections, 284 foremen and 426 brigade leaders were elected at the combine.

Quite recently, as a result of elections, Vladimir Petrovich Nastich became head of the new dynamo steel shop. Previously he had worked as chief engineer at the sheet rolling production facility. Frankly, the elections were difficult. One of the candidates for the position made generous promises of ensuring "universal well-being," there were letters written to the party committee with

reports, which were subsequently confirmed, of character unscrupulousness of another applicant, and totally groundless hints of favoritism concerning a third candidate for a responsible position. Altogether there were five candidates. Heated debates developed at the meeting which lasted an inordinately long time. The mood of the participants in the meeting swung back and forth. In my view, and not mine alone, it was the best candidate who nonetheless won. This is confirmed by the indicators: In March, having caught up with a 2-month lag, the shop was able to fulfill its quarterly plan for contractual deliveries. The collective of sheet rolling workers is working successfully during this second quarter as well.

Yu. Arkhipov. After active or even stormy meetings at which labor collective councils were elected in dozens of plant subdivisions (in approximately one-half of the cases the agenda of the meeting included the question of ratifying heads of shops and departments), it would have been natural to expect sharp changes in moods and work indicators, particularly in areas where the view of the collective had been established in the course of a struggle. That is what happened in most cases. However, we must frankly admit that a certain quiet followed the fast and virtually comprehensive increase in social activities in a number of collectives. What is this? Is it a normal stage of interpretation and regrouping of forces or recurrences of the notorious campaign approach which, alas, is not in a hurry to disappear?

I believe that both factors are valid in this case. Let us take the example of a quick survey conducted by our sociological laboratory among the delegates of the conference on STK [Labor Collective Councils] in the association, last December. More than one-third of those surveyed (37.4 percent) said that such a conference means a turn to self-management. An almost equal number questioned this—36.8 percent. Another 21 percent displayed a very skeptical attitude toward this "turn." It is indicative that the most pessimistic among all social-work groups was that of the higher management. Here is another typical feature: The question asked as to the competence of the STK was the most difficult for the participants in the survey to answer. The sociologists also noted the lack of knowledge about the Law on the State Enterprise. Nonetheless, however, virtually 20 percent of the surveyed conference delegates expressed the wish to be STK members and the confidence that they would be able to cope with this new function. The level of expectations of positive changes in connection with the democratization of production management was high among workers, brigade leaders and most shop and department chiefs.... Therefore, the necessary potential for self-government exists.

A. Teplenichev. The combine's STK has already asserted its existence. For example, it objected to the decision made by the Ministry of Ferrous Metallurgy, which had arbitrarily and on three occasions, violating the assignments of the 5-year plan, increased the enterprise's plan for the production of consumer goods, regardless of the

real possibilities of implementing this plan. Without anyone's prompting, that same STK suggested that the combine workers withhold one day's worth of earnings to finance the recently created Soviet Children's Fund.

It is important to see to it that the labor collective councils, which have been granted extensive powers, strictly observe the law in the course of their activities. Furthermore, they must not remain passive in dealing with the administration. If the enterprise's STK is headed by the director, as we were able to see literally only a few months later, it puts both the council and the economic manager in an equivocal situation. What is the solution? We have been able to create an essentially real and not "paper" reserve of cadres for promotion. In my view, it would be better in all respects for the councils of labor collectives to be headed by such "reservists." Leading the STK would be for them a good training in independence. They have an adequate amount of competence. In such cases the combine's STK would be free to make decisions and would find it easier to engage in a dialogue with the enterprise's administration and the superior management authorities.

Frankly speaking, the Law on the State Enterprise (Association) has still not become to the fullest extent the standard of life of the collective. The superior administrative levels are not showing proper respect for the law and are even violating it. However, it is not enough to shrug one's shoulders as we find disparities between its stipulations and real practices. We must stubbornly learn how to exercise the rights which have been granted and to defend them to the end.

Yu. Arkhipov. It is no simple matter to change the atmosphere of social indifference and inertia, which took decades to develop. Strict technological requirements and the organization of the production process have become for some workers a shield behind which they conceal their unwillingness to interfere in the clearly obsolete order of things which, however, is "sanctified" by instructions.

We are as yet to blend discipline in large-scale machine output with individual initiative. Frankly speaking, our greatest concern is the fact that the expectant attitude toward perestroyka (although essentially supportive) is being replaced all too sluggishly with active and practical participation in it. For example, the study of data acquired over a period of 2 years of work of the "Attention" sociological service, which conducts telephone surveys, which was described in great detail at the KOMMUNIST roundtable meeting, indicates that dominating the structure of appeals of the working people to the service are complaints and questions, i.e., passive forms of participation. No more than 20 percent of the personnel in the association submitted suggestions related to restructuring the production and social areas.

A. Teplenichev. The nature of the attitude of a person toward life and his labor and social obligations and mood depend on a number of greatly disparate factors. Everything matters here, from the moral climate in the shop or section to reducing the waiting time for housing.

What has been accomplished in this area in the 2 years since the KOMMUNIST roundtable meeting? In particular, the combine built 110,000 square meters of housing. Two kindergartens for 600 children with swimming pools were completed. The children of our workers were given two new schools for 1,400 students. Another 14 health recovery centers appeared in our shops, in addition to the already extant several dozen. Each such center has its own sauna, a mental relaxation room, a medical office, and a room for medicinal physical culture or sports. The objective is to rebuild the worker hostels over a 3-year period.

We are also implementing the combine's food program. There are two auxiliary farms operating on an industrial basis, engaged in the production of milk and meat for plant personnel. Fresh fish is sold in the plant on a daily basis. Last year the two industrial fish shops operated by the combine sold 280 tons of fish. Our immediate task is to average 30 kilograms of meat (as compared to 15 currently) and 10 kilograms of fresh fish per person. The construction of a greenhouse for vegetable growing has been undertaken.

The combine already has four cooperatives which bake cakes, organize garden plots, and repair housing and private cars. I believe that this is merely the beginning. The area of application of forces by cooperatives and individual labor activity and leasing facilities is huge, bearing in mind the needs of the combine's working people. However, the question of additional personnel and of the wages of those who would like to lease facilities appears right away.

Yu. Arkhipov. Without discussing in detail individual facts, let me say the following: The dynamics of the social development of our collective is not bad. The necessary development fund should total this year more than 11.5 million rubles which, added to the carry-over funds, will be more than double last year's amount. The number of items financed out of the social development fund has been increased to 56 as compared to 40 last year. In other words, funds are and will be available. The use of such funds also appears to be clear. In this connection, however, I would like to point out an aspect of democracy, such as the connection between management decisions and public opinion.

Why conceal it, based on the unwritten rules of the command-administrative system, in the overwhelming majority of cases the only particle of the broad spectrum of public opinion which was taken into consideration was the one which coincided with the viewpoint of the command or else which came close to it. Perestroika

rejects this approach, if one may call it such. But how to act in situations when the stand taken by a collective or social group conflicts with seemingly fair proposals suggested by the management?

For example, in frequent cases the personnel of sectors engaged in work dangerous to the health resolved the dilemma of "good ventilation versus dietetic milk" in favor of the milk. Or else the following problem: The enterprise employs some 500 people who are chronic alcoholics and double that number undergo preventive treatment. The daytime outpatient hospital for 50 people cannot deal with the treatment of this entire group of people. We must build treatment-labor prevention facilities for approximately 200 people, which would cost 5-6 million rubles. Such funds, however, could be used to build several residential homes. If the question of financing LTP is submitted to the labor collective council (which, naturally, will have to be done), I am not so sure that this will not create sharp discussions, which will be reflected in the vote.

The combination of the daily requirements of an individual, social group or collective with broader interests which exceed the limits of the individual enterprise is of great concern to us. Clearly, many difficulties await us in this area. In short, the democratization of social life continuously faces us with ever new problems the solution of which cannot be avoided by hiding behind bureaucratic instructions, as we did in the past. Today's practice means essentially constant learning, graded by life itself....

A. Teplenichev. The growth of the people's political and labor activeness is inseparably related to the assertion of social justice. This is possible only in an atmosphere of glasnost. Today labor collectives decide by open vote who of the needed production frontrankers should be given priority in housing or a place for his child in the kindergarten, and who among the specialists should be assigned to work abroad. Glasnost helps the just distribution of the bonus fund and seeing to it that wage supplements are given to those who deserve them.

Starting with 1 January 1987, the NLMK and the Magnitka were the first in the sector to convert to full cost accounting under conditions of self-financing and self-support. One year of new-style work convinced us that it is possible to enhance the human factor to a maximum only on the basis of the cost accounting interest of labor collectives aimed at improving end work results.

Trial by Cost Accounting

"Restructuring on the level of sectorial ministries is clearly falling behind enterprise restructuring. In this connection, we must uncompromisingly condemn actions which distort the nature of the economic reform and directly or indirectly undermine the Law on the Enterprise." From the CPSU Central Committee theses.

Yu. Arkhipov. Working under the new economic conditions and upgrading the autonomy and responsibility of the labor collective for the results of economic activities demand a restructuring of its relations with the ministry. Yet the effect of the old approaches continues to be felt.

With an arbitrary decision, ignoring specific production features and the already approved plan, the ministry ordered Izhorskiy Zavod to master the production of extraneous items such as sample-printing presses. The USSR Gosplan has set a limit of deliveries by our enterprise of 13,030 tons of steel sheets. Meanwhile, the ministry's main administration for material and technical supplies issued an order that such deliveries be increased to 15,173 tons, thus threatening the interests of other consumers who are relying on our output, based on state orders. With the same type of light-handedness, the ministry removed from our enterprise 1,100 tons of rolled sheets, used by the machine builders who are working on orders placed by our association, ordering that this metal be delivered to other sectorial enterprises.

A. Teplenev. The role of the ministries must be changed. This was convincingly discussed 2 years ago at the KOMMUNIST roundtable meeting. What is happening today?

The mental stereotypes which took shape under the conditions of an economy based on orders are durable. There is in jurisprudence a concept of presumption of innocence. The central departments are not very willing to proceed on the basis of this presumption in their attitude toward production collectives. The upper management levels prefer to treat the latter as criminals who, if left free, are bound to do something conflicting with the public interest.

Last year, despite all difficulties of the transitional period, the combine earned well. The above-plan commodity output which was produced was sold for 35.5 million rubles; above-plan profits totaled 28.2 million rubles. Labor productivity increased by 1.6 percent over and above the planned figure and the planned assignment on reducing production costs was overfulfilled by 1.8 percent. It is true that we were able to fulfill contracts for production procurements by no more than 99.6 percent. However, we hit the 100 percent mark in the first quarter of this year.

How did the ministry interpret the results of our activities? It claimed that our plan had proved to be too easy and that we had tricked it! If such was the case (although it was not the case in the least!), even thorough preparations for work under the new conditions, as carried out by the collective, could be declared unsatisfactory. That is precisely what the ministerial commission which visited the combine did. It also questioned the worth of the intracost accounting system which had been developed at the combine by highly-skilled specialists working within our economic service. However, the collective

adopted this system. Obviously, like any innovation, it will need some corrections. Its advantage, however, lies in its simplicity and clarity. Furthermore, the collective which, as a whole, has been working successfully on the basis of self-financing and self-support, is clearly able to decide by itself how to develop cost accounting relations within its own enterprise.

We could not describe as a demagogue the worker who, standing up at the meeting, labeled as puppets the director and the party committee secretary. Today people are unwilling to be toys in anyone's hands. They want to believe in the irreversible nature of perestroika, for which reason they condemn bureaucratic games which discredit the very idea of the radical economic reform, distort its meaning and hinder the shaping of a new economic mechanism. Let us consider the state orders. All that remains of this good idea is its name. In converting to the new system, we thought that state orders would amount to something between 75 and 80 percent of our output while the other 25 or 20 percent we would be able to sell ourselves at contractual prices. This would include sales abroad, thus earning foreign exchange with which to purchase equipment to modernize our production. Actually, the planned output of the combine is based on 100-percent state orders. Furthermore, state orders are issued also for goods produced above the plan. In addition, there also are so-called sectorial orders which must be mandatorily met!

Yu. Arkhipov. What should be singled out from the experience of the past 2 years?

Naturally, the conversion to the new wage rates and salaries, state inspection of output and the initial months of work under self-financing conditions have each one of them demanded hard work and truly creative efforts on the part of production organizers, engineers, economists and workers. Suffice it to say that in the basic shops all technological processes were subjected to a thorough study and 600,000 time norms for all types of operations were reviewed; more than 13,500 jobs held by workers and more than 5,000 jobs held by managers, specialists and employees were subjected to certification. Since May 1987 some 21,500 workers, foremen and specialists have been trained in the principles of cost accounting; intensive studies are being offered in seminars for leading personnel in the association. A total of 832 jobs have been closed down by expanding functions of others and 385 people have been laid off.

I shall not continue with the enumeration of such abundant figures. Obviously, it is more important to answer the main question: Are changes taking place in the consciousness and behavior of the people under the influence of technical-economic, organizational and educational measures?

Yes, they are changing as confirmed by numerous facts. Without getting into particulars, let me say that in the first quarter of this year the collective overfulfilled its

plan for profit increases; it met its contractual obligations 100 percent and production rhythm improved substantially. Nearly 97 percent of the output subject to state inspection is accepted. Unquestionably, there exists within this overall positive process a number of shortcomings which do not give us the right to relax and to rely on the automatic functioning of this working mechanism. I repeat, however, the direct connection between economic management methods and human actions is becoming increasingly easy to trace.

A. Teplenichev. We can speak confidently of the tangible upgrading of the overall economic standards of the working people and their increased interest in mastering economic knowledge. The number of suggestions "from below," aimed at saving labor and materials and improving production quality, has increased noticeably. The workers themselves are expressing the wish to set up contract brigades, to repair the machinery and to manufacture the necessary spare parts for this purpose. The machine fleet at the combine is substantial but the shift coefficient is low: We are short of machine-tool operators. Today, however, an increasing number of young people are expressing their readiness to service machine tools on a contract basis.

But what is it that concerns us? The fact that we are leaving equalization behind us all too sluggishly. I read about the RAF experience, where the advent of a new director led to the fact that a frontranking worker earns four times the wage of a careless one. I dream for this disparity to be perhaps only 50 percent at the NLMK. Such a procedure would stimulate good and highly productive work. Here it is not a matter merely of a difference in the amount of rubles but in self-respect as well. It is only by surmounting equalization on the basis of the comprehensive development of cost accounting that it will become possible to awaken the initiative of the best part of the collective—the perestroyka aktiv. For the time being, we cannot accomplish this to the fullest extent. Foremen are afraid of insulting people. The good worker shies from speaking against equalization. That is all that the loafer needs. I believe that we should not fear to let the collective split into two camps, after we have fully introduced economic incentives. There may be two groups today but literally tomorrow, unquestionably, there will be only one.

Yu. Arkhipov. What is the greatest obstacle blocking cost accounting? I believe, above all, that it is the fragmentary, the partial application of cost accounting principles which have still not been established firmly in each brigade and workplace. This is hindered, in particular, by the shortage of measuring instruments to determine outlays and the scarcity of complementing items. This hinders relations between the plant and other enterprises, departments and organizations.

Let me explain this with an example. In the course of the roundtable discussion sponsored by KOMMUNIST a great deal was said about the problems and difficulties

which accompanied the installation of the "5,000" mill in our metallurgical production facility. This is a one-of-a-kind set of machinery for the production of specialized grades of steel sheets. After the meeting, the journal printed the official answers of the USSR Gosplan, the USSR Minchermet and USSR Minpribor, which indicated that they had taken the criticism addressed at them into consideration and that matters will be and were already being corrected. The crux of the matter, however, is that nothing has essentially changed in the installation of the "5,000" mill. It is thus that the worker, the engineer and the manager can see that equipment which would be the most advantageous to both the state and the enterprise, has not been properly handled; suitable electronic equipment has not been provided and electronic equipment is being used like trying to drive nails into a wall with a microscope. We spent some 200 million rubles on the installation of the mill and our returns do not exceed 120,000 rubles annually; we are using it to produce ordinary steel, the cost of which is double that of current prices. The Izhorok metallurgical workers are pondering about the worth of their labor based on cost accounting in the balance of departmental confusion. Under such circumstances it is difficult, very difficult to call upon the people to display initiative, creativity, responsibility and high work quality, without which no real cost accounting can be applied.

I am deeply convinced that my fellow party-committee members and many workers in the association agree with the view that for the time being the various sectors, above all those responsible for the production of consumer goods, and the departments of the USSR Gosagroprom, are restructuring themselves very slowly. The point is that material incentives under present circumstances can operate within rather narrow margins. According to our estimates, in those areas earnings can reach approximately 400 rubles monthly. Understandably, I am considering the situation as a whole, not based on the size of the specific family budgets, which could differ greatly. However, I increasingly hear from workers and engineering and technical personnel that "why should I earn more?" Does this mean that all the needs of the people have been met? No, and once again no! The reality on the commodity market today, however, is such that it is difficult to spend one's earnings usefully. Matters in this area must be corrected faster.

A. Teplenichev. We have started talks with a well-known Yugoslav firm which has undertaken to build and submit turnkey a shop with modern highly productive equipment for the manufacturing of consumer goods, with an output worth 500 million rubles annually. This would mean the appearance of excellent washing machines, refrigerators, freezers, gas and electric ranges and metal furniture on our market. We would settle our accounts with our foreign partners by deliveries of above-plan output. However, concluding a mutually profitable contract did not prove to be all that simple. It is true that we obtained the agreement of our ministry. However, we must as yet go through many stages of coordination of

the conditions for the deal with the central departments, including those involved in foreign trade. We do not know how long this procedure will take.

However, the production of consumer goods with our own forces is sometimes equally difficult. This year we were allocated 12,000 cubic meters of timber for the production of consumer goods. In turn, the trade organizations appropriated funds to purchase such commodities. However, we did not obtain a single cubic meter of timber! The timber procurement workers in Krasnoyarsk have refused to ship us the timber, claiming that such procurements had been imposed upon them in the form of a counterplan. We were unable to fulfill our quarterly plan for consumer goods and were fined.

Under circumstances in which the entire output of enterprises must be marketed on the basis of state orders, wholesale trade and direct relations are no more than fashionable statements.

We are being assigned directly to a supplier who cannot accept our order for, in his case as well, the entire output has already been allocated. The Gossnab claims that one item or another (such as tiles or linoleum of which we are extremely short) is now being sold on the wholesale market. However, it is unavailable, no one is trading in it. Every year the combine builds 55,000 to 60,000 square meters of housing and roughly the same amount of housing undergoes capital repairs. Yet less than one-half of the requirements for construction materials and sanitation conveniences are met.

Yu. Arkhipov. Let me share with you a new development on which we rely greatly. In the last days of April the association's party committee and the labor collective council supported the initiative of setting up the Energomash State Intersectorial Production Association (GMPO) in Leningrad, to produce equipment for the fuel and energy complex. Experimentally it was planned to combine within a single structure a group of leading enterprises and organizations of Minelektrotekhprom and Mintyazhmash, which would work as a "reactor-turbine-generator-control system" set. Izhorskiy Zavod is part of this organization without losing its economic autonomy. The Energomash Association, however, will not be under the direct jurisdiction of the respective ministries. In short, we are initiating a project which is tremendous in terms of scale, novelty and complexity, the purpose of which is to define the basic principles of intersectorial integration.

A. Teplenichev. I believe that our sector needs daring and extensive experimentation aimed at releasing the powerful potential of labor collectives working on the basis of cost accounting principles. Everyone realizes today that it is high time decisively to simplify the structure of the sectorial ministries which, in their present aspect and with their present machinery, are one of the strongest centers of obstruction. The reorganization of other central economic departments and the Gossnab has also

become excessively slow. Combine representatives are going from one authority to another, without whose approval one cannot take even a single step. In those agencies, some personnel have either not left but intend to resign or else are waiting for someone to make a decision concerning their jobs, for which reason they do nothing; others are new appointees and are being "introduced in the work." Meanwhile, matters are at a standstill.

Reality Versus Dogmas

"Based on the assignments of the CPSU as the political vanguard and the profound changes occurring in society, we must seriously restructure the activities of the primary party organizations." From the CPSU Central Committee theses.

Yu. Arkhipov. The roundtable discussion which was sponsored by KOMMUNIST in the autumn of 1986 in our plant touched only briefly on matters of party work. The main attention was focused on problems of production organization and management, scientific and technical progress, wages, development of the social infrastructure and other aspects of restructuring economic life. If the individual was discussed as such, invariably words such as "factor," "system," "function," "structure" and so on were used. I thought the following: Is it possible at all to distinguish in the plant "purely" human and "purely" production aspects of reality? Furthermore, is this necessary? Whatever one may say, the people go to the shop to produce goods and not to engage in self-analysis.... Nonetheless, today at the party committee we are increasingly realizing that we must more persistently free the area of party concern from the domination of technical and economic approaches.

Let us consider as an example the current plan of our party committee. Literally each one of its pages is crowded with items such as "analyze the situation concerning the lowering of defects," "consider the problem of the work of instrument production in upgrading the output of fittings," "supervising the building of the carbon dioxide station,".... This means exerting administrative rather than party influence. Where is here the personality of the party member and the line of his political behavior? How to define the efficiency of our influence on specific production processes? These are difficult problems. Let me frankly say that, for the time being, no simple answers can be provided. Since perestroika raises with maximal urgency the problem of separating the functions of party committees from those of the state, economic and public agencies, combined efforts are needed in establishing the ways and means of solving this difficult problem. In this connection we set great hope on the 19th All-Union Party Conference.

A. Teplenichev. Today the party committee is particularly concerned with putting an end to bureaucratic administration and the rudeness of some managers. It is very important to achieve this precisely now, during the

period of humanizing all aspects of our life. That is why the party committee exigently takes to task people for callousness and abuse of power. Our sociologists conducted a study of the style and methods of work of virtually all shop chiefs. There are more than 100 at the combine. Both labor collectives and managers were informed of the results of these studies. With the help of a survey conducted last December, we established what the party members attitude toward the secretary of the combine's party committee and his deputies was. We did not have to resign. However, the survey helped us to see that what some of us lacked more than anything else was the ability to keep up an atmosphere of free and spontaneous exchange of views. In some cases there was lack of willingness and ability to avoid the use of "power pressure" in relations with people, and the skill to persuade them.

Yu. Arkhipov. Despite all the positive features which have appeared in the practices of our party organization in the course of perestroyka, it is impossible not to see that the most serious problems of democratization of intraparty life remain unsolved. What am I referring to?

Since I was elected party committee secretary recently, I have not forgotten my experience in economic management. Consequently, willy-nilly one compares both areas of activities and the rights and extent of responsibilities which applied yesterday and apply today. Thus, in taking over the management of the party committee, I asked for a list of laid off party workers. It turned out that this document was being kept at the party raykom, and as to the right to change the table of organization and be more flexible in job appointments, it turned out that our 5,000-strong party organization had no such right. Today excessive centralization of internal party life is becoming an increasingly tangible obstruction.

Many such examples may be culled from the activities of great many primary party organizations, and it is a good thing that in the course of the discussions preceding the All-Union Party Conference, the party members are persistently speaking of the need to streamline relations between primary party buros and party committees and superior party authorities and giving a specific meaning to the stipulation of the CPSU statutes, as recorded in paragraph 21: "All party organizations are autonomous in solving local problems as long as such decisions do not conflict with party policy."

A. Teplenichev. The activities of any party organization and upgrading its vanguard role in the labor collective are largely determined by the personality of the secretary and his political, practical and moral qualities. Under the conditions of perestroyka this is more important than ever.

How to identify a promising party leader? I consider that the solution lies in the competition system, which has proven its usefulness in the selection of economic managers. A competition among candidates, accompanied by

democratic and open discussions of their character would help the party members, in my view, to appoint their worthiest comrades as their leaders. The current CPSU statutes regulate a certain procedure for the election of party authorities. As long as this procedure has not been amended, we can have no independent activity in this area. In the course of perestroyka, however, the process of democratization of intraparty life will inevitably gather strength. In my view, the competitive system applied in the choice of party cadres could play a useful role in its development and the legitimacy of its use should be codified in the CPSU statutes.

Yu. Arkhipov. Today the problem of the salaries of party workers is triggering a number of conflicting opinions. In our association differences in the wages of party workers and economic managers range from 50 to 80 percent and, in this connection, there are constant difficulties in finding able and ideologically mature people who would agree to take a substantial wage loss in transferring to party work. One could hear the following: One must be conscientious. Yes, one must! Looking at the past, and seeing examples of comrades at work, I can definitely say that selflessness has been and remains a feature of the party member. However, promoting the standards of asceticism and, in specific terms, making the implementation of the functions of a party leader largely mandatory, entail the danger of the alienation of the party from society. Or else let us consider the question of the so-called "snowdrop," secretaries of party buros of shops and sections who must hold a full-time regular job. Has the time not come to consider this category without dogmatic lenses and, once and for all, determine what is more important to the party in terms of their activities: Is it their party or professional career, and what is the specific structure of their workday or, correspondingly, what is it that a person is being paid a salary for?

A. Teplenichev. Frankly, people are not very willing to go into party work. Occasionally they sense a certain prejudice toward it, which has its reasons. In some cases they fear for their subsequent career, should they fail. Furthermore, material considerations are not the least important in this case. It is true that the wages of party workers were raised somewhat a year ago. However, in switching from production to party work, to this day a person loses substantially in terms of wages. All of this makes it necessary particularly to care for party cadres. Naturally, they must be renewed and the regular replacement of cadres must become a norm of party life. However, it would be hardly economical to part forever with party leaders who have proven their worth. In order to prevent them from ensconcing themselves in the same position, however, and become accustomed to shortcomings, they could be horizontally transferred on a periodical basis.

Simple appeals are insufficient for party committees and buros to become true agencies of political guidance. We must show some concern also for creating the necessary prerequisites to this effect. That is why we have tried to

see that the secretaries have a place where they can meet and speak frankly with the people. We drafted and coordinated a regulation for the work of secretaries who hold full-time jobs: With the agreement of the administration we have given them part of their working time (in some cases 2 days weekly or several hours daily) to prepare for party meetings, collect membership dues, and meet and talk with people. Understandably, in a number of cases this proved to be a half-way measure. However, more than that we cannot do.

In accordance with the statutes, the party organization should number no less than 150 members before it can be headed by a full-time secretary. It seems to me that such a purely quantitative approach is to a great extent formalistic. Quite frequently a party organization has a somewhat fewer number of party members while the collective in which it functions employs hundreds of nonparty members. The party secretary must work with them too! However, this is not taken into consideration by the statutes. It is exclusively the size of the party organization that determines its structure and the party committee personnel. Yet the salary of a party secretary does not depend in the least on this size. We believe that the primary party organizations should be granted greater independence in solving all such problems.

We are also concerned with the problem of social production and the independence of party organization secretaries, particularly those who hold full-time production jobs. Why conceal it, such secretaries are materially dependent on the shop chief who, if he so desires, could always find a way of hurting the party secretary. An excessively zealous administrator could tell a principled secretary: Remember that sooner or later you will have to come here asking for work. Under those circumstances, not everyone has the strength of character to defend his rights. This leads to the appearance of the notorious "pocket" secretaries, who obey the administrations. The combine's party committee has invariably and firmly taken up the defense of secretaries who, in disputes with the administration, have assumed a principled position, and has severely punished managers who are party members, who have tried to order such secretaries or harm them in some way. We keep the collective informed of such cases.

Yu. Arkhipov. It is our view that it would be extremely useful to grant the primary party organizations the right to keep part of the membership dues. Such funds would enable us, for instance, drastically to increase the arsenal of ideological work. The live practical experience of perestroika demands of the party members to open the doors of party committees as widely as possible, to initiate debates, to increase contacts with young people, and to acquire practical experience not only by visiting the neighboring enterprises but also any part of the country or a foreign country. Or else let us consider visual agitation: A great deal here is being done by inertia, without any fresh ideas. Highly-skilled painters should be invited, a seminar should be held with our

specialists and deputy party buro secretaries in charge of ideological affairs. However, it takes more than initiatives. One must "find" funds or, in simpler terms, beg economic managers for money to solve something which is strictly a party problem. Such practices, triggered by the administrative-command system, do not motivate the party workers to be concerned with the efficient use of thus obtained funds.

Improvements in the life of the party and society as a whole, which were initiated in April 1985, and perestroika, with the entire variety of its manifestations, are affecting all areas of life of the association and its party organization. A number of specific examples could be cited. To advance and to look ahead is a Leninist instruction which we interpret today as the need to concentrate on the most pressing problems of development.

As we can see, the old and the new are closely interwoven in the practices of the party organizations and labor collectives of the Novolipetsk Metallurgical Combine and the Izhorskiy Zavod Production Association. The clash between these principles, which is characteristic of our time of transition, assumes under enterprise conditions an aggravated, an extremely specific aspect. Naturally, by no means have all the problems of perestroika described here been solved or analyzed: The life of each labor collective is much richer than the description of it. However, even the data we cited and the views expressed are adequate to draw the conclusion that the changes in the life of the party and the society, which were initiated in the post-April period, today pertain to the basic foundations of the consciousness and behavior of thousands and thousands of working people and are becoming increasingly irreversible. The array of difficult questions dictated by practical experience is substantial and increasing steadily. However, also tremendous is the amount of innovative suggestions submitted of late by party and nonparty members, by anyone to whom perestroika has become a close personal matter. Now, on the eve of the 19th All-Union Party Conference, we realize most clearly that there is no alternative to perestroika and that we must follow this path, which is the only true one, step by step.

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05003

Return to Moral Sources

18020015d Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian No 9, Jun 88 (signed to press 8 Jun 88) pp 17-21

[Article by Aleksandr Isaakovich Gelman, playwright, motion picture script writer]

[Text] We are witnessing a growing concern on the part of society for the moral aspect of our party's activities. Today a moral reckoning is being demanded of the

historical past and present party policy. This concern comes above all from below, from the party masses, the people. It is legitimate, pertinent and more than timely.

Party and morality and party policy, particularly after Lenin's death, and morality is a historical conflict filled with drama, pain and despair. It is a topic which must be studied, analyzed and investigated. We must gain exhaustive, fullest possible knowledge of this topic.

How did the party begin? Not with the fact that its founders had read Marx at one point. The party began with the human indignation with the difficult situation of the working classes, the majority of the people, with sympathy, compassion for the oppressed and insulted. The party grew out of humanistic aspirations. Such are its human nutritive roots. It appeared as a moral, a spiritual force. We can say that the moral requirement, the moral constitution of mankind became part of the party's political program as its essential foundation, as the foundation of its national character.

However, there was trouble after Lenin's death: step by step there occurred an alienation of the party, particularly its leadership, from universal human values, from its prime roots. This was manifested most strongly, above all, in a growing scorn for democracy as a form of organization of social life. In my view, this was the result of the absolutizing, the universalizing of a strictly class approach to reality. The fact that changes in the class nature of a society and the disappearance of the exploiting class do not eliminate general contradictions and the essential nature of man, or his mentality; nor do they eliminate individual and group egotism or, in short, that which I have thought of as the objective laws of subjectiveness, was forgotten. Yet it is precisely the requirements of these laws, the eternal laws, if you wish, discovered by many generations of humanists, studied to an incredible depth in Russia by Dostoyevsky, Tolstoy and Chekhov, that created, as early as ancient Greece, the idea of democracy as a form of the most sensible organization of society. As a philosophy of management, democracy took into consideration the inevitable situation that nature endows man with an equal capacity for good and evil. The idea of democracy took into consideration that every person is also a particle of the common body of the people, one of the many yet strictly individual, sovereign beings, unique and one and only.

The October Revolution provided the broadest possible opportunities for democratic change. However, such changes remained largely unused by the party as the guiding force of society. Both in theory and practice groundless hopes were expressed that the very fact of the socialization of the land and industry would automatically ensure economic and spiritual blossoming. People failed to notice that without democratic management, ownership essentially became not public but nobody's. On the one hand, the working people were not given full managerial rights; on the other, those who had power felt themselves in temporary positions, superimposed in

managing for a while, and then removed from their functions with or without reason. The overall task of managers of all ranks became not to ensure production efficiency but display subservience. Essentially the administration worked "for itself," for easing, for simplifying the administrative process. Since virtually anyone could become a chief, mediocrity rushed into the administrative staffs. The people forgot that even after the expropriation of the land and the factories and the comprehensive collectivization of the countryside the most powerful production force, the most powerful production tool—the human brain, this greatest of all machines, the inventor of all machines in the world and the source of labor will and human desire—remained the private property of the individual and could not be taken away from him. It was equally forgotten that people consume goods separately, within their own families and, consequently, that the personal interest of the individual is indestructible. The arrogant violation of such universal factors led to scorning cooperation and prohibiting individual labor activity; it led to equalization, depersonalization, indifference toward talent and denigration of professional and human dignity.

One after another, in the course of our entire history, people kept being rejected. At first it was the class enemies and the relatives of class enemies, including distant relatives; this was followed by various deviationists, dissidents and war prisoners; matters went so far that people could be considered rejects because of the length of their hair or the width of their trousers and, quite recently, for sipping some wine. Individual features of the personality, individual biographic facts and individual, partial, features of people were ascribed total significance. This was a primitive, an ignorant view of man as such. This was a profound sin of simplification of human nature, of the human spirit. This was the ideology of mediocrity which had assumed power and which judged and ranked people according to its own yardstick. Dozens and hundreds of thousands of people were thus discarded.

The far-fetched and complacent theory of the special party morality, according to which the party was compared almost to a secret order of knights, played its treacherous role. Once again the fact that the moral constitution of mankind is the same for all and that it was drafted through humanistic visions throughout the entire history of the nations, was forgotten. There neither was nor is there now any need to invent a separate moral code. On this level, socialism does not have to invent its own code but bring to light its tremendous practical opportunities for the optimal observance of mankind's legacy. It is precisely this, something which is of great importance, that is the basic moral difference separating socialism from capitalism. Here class differences are determined by the volume of opportunities and conditions for achieving the universal moral ideal.

Stalinism distorted the moral sources of the party. It divided, it separated, it broke the unity between politics

and morality. Fraud, hypocrisy and the impudent pragmatism of mafia-type groups blossomed during times of stagnation.

After Stalin's death, the party made an attempt at cleansing and return to its moral origins. This could not be completed to the end. Three years ago, the beginning of a new powerful effort for self-cleansing was initiated: perestroika. A great deal was done but the obstruction forces were strong and they are growing and, apparently, will continue to grow.

Perestroika is advancing in spurts. The last one was on the occasion of the preparations for the 19th Party Conference. It was quite serious and important. Attentively and unhurriedly, the party took a close look at itself.

Does it have enough courage, patience and endurance to look at itself fully, to the point of total clarity?

There is one aspect here which is quite determining. The moment we undertake to analyze our party history we become dumbfounded at the errors, illegalities and crimes that become apparent. We become afraid that a systematic and objective study of party history would leave no bright spot: it would show total blackness or, at best, grayness. We then begin to look for a solution where no solution is possible: we hurl accusations of defamation, we cover gaps whenever this seems possible, we describe Stalin as nothing more than a controversial figure and, in the final account, we almost openly say that, you know, some things are more important than the truth.

Nonetheless, it seems to me, the situation is by no means hopeless. There is no need to be uptight or be tossing about. We must simply in a normal, calm and unprejudiced way look at the complex, dramatic and unique history of our party. Finally, we must see and acknowledge that although we have one party, its history after Lenin's death split into two parts. It has not one but two lines of development which, although intertwined, did not blend but remained distinct. We must see that alongside Stalinism, which was an open betrayal of the Leninist moral principle, the party had and has always had, at all times, a line which was loyal to Lenin, loyal to spiritual and human nobility.

This is not a question of separate cases or single unbending individuals or isolated humanistic events. It is precisely a question of a historical line, a moral line followed in the history of our party.

We are simply poorly acquainted or virtually unacquainted with that side of the party's history. We are virtually unacquainted with its heroes, with the party saints. Yet they number in the dozens, hundreds and thousands. They represent a broad spectrum of moral actions by party members. They include cases of suicide as an

extreme form of rejection of Stalinism; blunt declarations of Leninist positions under conditions when this could cost one's life; courageous defense of those innocently accused, and cases of direct collective disobedience, in the face of which even Stalin occasionally yielded; warnings of danger, which enabled people to go into hiding and save themselves; moral support given in Stalin's prisons and propping up the hope, and faith in the rebirth of violated ideals, faith in the fact that mass repressions are not a law of socialism but a tragic violation of its objectives; and such an unparalleled stress of internal forces that we find difficult to understand where they came from, so that, despite everything, one worked conscientiously, defeated the fascist occupation forces and contributed to strengthening the power of the first socialist state in the world which, as the honest communists believed, had not only a Stalinist but also a different, a noble, a human future.

Therefore, there is no impenetrable darkness and, in order for the feeling that it exists does not appear, we do not need in the least to twist, embellish or conceal even the most horrifying facts. The spiritual, the moral charge which was set in the birth of the party, during the years of preparations for revolution and during the days of October and after October, while Lenin lived, was so powerful and the popular principle it carried was so strong that this force never dried out or disappeared. This force did not barely breathe or survive but was able to take the party initially to the 20th Congress and now to revolutionary perestroika.

Recently OGONEK published an article on Leningrad sociologist and journalist A.N. Alekseyev. How powerful was his unbending morality, how consistent he was in defending democracy, and what unbreakable faith he had that the truth would prevail. Alekseyev was expelled from the party, the Union of Journalists, from everywhere, for qualities and actions of such lofty rank that those who were expelling him could not even dream about. Today he has been readmitted in the party and the rehabilitation was difficult, with interruptions and counteraction. With the same type of difficulties and a counteraction politics and morality are being reunited today within the party. The amount of work to be done here is tremendous. In this connection, I consider two aspects to be of exceptional importance.

Morality is related to evaluation processes. Evaluations, criteria and procedures for evaluation are the moral factor. It has its law: if we wish to enhance the level of morality it is very important to provide extensive opportunities for the free, equal and reciprocal assessment of the activities of party members, regardless of rank. For many years, and to this day, the situation is still one in which superiors confidently rated subordinates whereas reverse assessments remained unsaid and unpublished, accumulating inside and strangling the people's soul. The feedback of assessments was violated and the struggle among evaluations was distorted grossly. Yet assessments which were not expressed and published and their

accumulation have a destructive influence: they trigger the escalation of extremism, explosions of indignation, nervous collapses or, conversely, they quietly, slowly and imperceptibly corrupt the spiritual forces of man and create a depressing irony and durable skepticism.

It is dangerous to manipulate processes of reciprocal assessment in society and, even more so, in the party. Yet, as in the past, many structures within the apparatus on all levels of management remain unbreachable to inverse evaluations.

The freedom of reciprocally assessing activities is, actually, true socialist freedom. It is precisely the fullness of such freedom that would enable us to engage in full, uncurtailed and serious competition with anyone.

The second aspect pertains to a universal criterion, in my view, applied in assessing activities of individuals and organizations. I am referring to the possibility of using as such an absolutely accurate fact: the brevity of human life. This fact is greatly binding to society, the state and the party. Whenever something is being planned, when decisions are made on any level, particularly on a high one, and when various rules, regulations and procedures are being set, the first thing we must remember is that man has been granted a short stay on earth. In the final account, all activities related to the management of society are reduced to the creation of a certain structure within which man will spend his short life span. What more could we do for a person than see to it that he does not waste the days and years of his short life?

It is terrible to think of the number of hours, days and years during which our unbreachable bureaucratism been getting and continues to get fat! Standing in line, asking for references, resolutions or tickets for a trip or for the theater, nothing remains unaffected! It may take a year to write a play but 3 years to have it accepted. The life span of a person is priceless, and even more so that of someone with talent. How many of our inventors are wandering around, although they are true miracle makers and although one inventor could give more to the people than an entire plant. If in our life, so full of shortages, someone should be granted various benefits, they should go above all to such people.

Everything must be gauged according to this reliable criterion, which is both human and economic. In recent years, finally, some concern was shown for environmental protection. However, in our nature the most valuable item is our compatriots, the short life span of each one of us. It is in this area that we must compete with the West and win the competition: the way the life of a person is used and who, we or they, spends more productively his days and years of life. Perhaps a certain governmental expert commission should be created to check on the "plans of our community" from this viewpoint?

I recently gave a good person a recommendation for the party. I typed and signed it. He took it to the party bureau where he was told that it was invalid, it had to be handwritten. I transcribed it by hand. Once again it was unsuitable: it had to be redone in violet-colored ink. I did not regret the time I had spent, I had become accustomed to it; I was ashamed thinking of the young person who, in his very first contact with the party, even before he had become its member, would grin bitterly, amazed at our party bureaucracy.

To kill the human life span is a crime. For the time being, this form of crime is widespread in our country, it has become customary. Could it be that we are so merciless when it comes to the life span of man because, until recently, we were merciless toward his very life as such?

Perestroika is advancing in spurts, with difficulty. Alas, this applies to the party as well. Two historical traditions clashed face to face: the Stalinist and anti-democratic, and the Leninist, the democratic. Essentially, these are two political cultures within a single party, the two faces of our party. One of them, represented by party members such as Alekseyev, the Leningrader, promises, after a very difficult transitional period, a rebirth of moral values and the merger of politics with humanity.

Naturally, for the time being, this should be mentioned only as a thing of the future. However, this is a realistic future and, essentially, the only possible one. Because if the processes of democratization are truncated, if perestroika is rejected, it is moral death that awaits our party. In any case, this is my personal conviction. Either perestroika will become irreversible or the party will irreversibly begin to wither away. With such a turn of events the healthy forces would leave the party or else they will be forced to leave.

Consequently, to us perestroika is decisive and there is no solution other than taking **this perestroika to its completion**. This is not simply a task, it is a destiny. I hope that the 19th Party Conference will evaluate the situation and the prospects of the party and society precisely in this context.

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05003

The Soviet Electoral System: Reform Strategy
18020015e Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian No 9,
Jun 88 (signed to press 8 Jun 88) pp 22-30

[Article by Georgiy Vasilyevich Barabashev, doctor of juridical sciences, professor, head of the Department of State Law and Soviet Building, MGU Law School, and Konstantin Filippovich Sheremet, doctor of juridical sciences, professor, editor in chief of the journal SOVETSKOYE GOSUDARSTVO I PRAVO]

[Text] Electoral systems are a necessary component of contemporary civilization, firmly tied in the minds of the people to democracy, freedom and political standards. In a democracy, K. Marx wrote, the governmental

system itself acts as the self-determination of the people and, turned to the actual person, the state becomes the object of man; in a democracy elections are a political act through which society becomes a political committee in charge of handling its own affairs (see K. Marx and F. Engels, "*Soch.*" [Works], vol 1, pp 251-253, 353). As indicated by historical experience, serious political reforms in different countries have invariably affected the electoral system or even given priority to changing it.

Elections in Contemporary Political Thinking

Perestroika classifies reform of the country's electoral system among the urgent tasks. The extent to which this conclusion is consistent with social expectations is confirmed by the sharp interest displayed by citizens and mass information media in prospects for future changes.

What is it today that dissatisfies society in terms of current electoral procedure? Actually, the answer to this question determines the very idea of change in the electoral system. Above all, the encountered violations of democratic principles in the Soviet electoral system, as codified in the Constitution, are intolerable. However, these could be eliminated even without a reform. Other problems exist, which are more substantial. The freedom of the working people to choose their representatives to the soviets, which was initially inherent in the system, was replaced, as a result of the growth of bureaucratism and formalism, and with the domination of administrative-command management methods, with the type of organization of elections in which citizens were given the opportunity essentially to express their full approval and support of the only candidate, who was nominated virtually without their participation. The triumph of such a "guided democracy" was based on two postulates: the first proceeded from the conviction that in the absence of antagonistic classes, and under the conditions of a one-party system, there were no grounds for the pre-electoral competition of candidates. The second, which surreptitiously shaped electoral practices, was that with the administrative-command management style and the emphasis on the future transformation of the soviets into public organizations, deputy activities were actually considered a variety less of political representation than customary social instruction. The Marxist-Leninist understanding of elections as the attitude of the people toward the system was, in a certain sense, reversed: elections became the manifestation of the attitude of the system toward the people. Thus, subsequent to the adoption of the 1936 USSR Constitution, the thought of the possibility of promoting and including in the slate several candidates was systematically promoted; this choice was even given priority, while in practical terms, starting with the mid-1920s, the objective was to exclude any electoral campaigning and competition among candidates. The legislation called for the free nomination of candidates at different meetings, while practical experience rigidly defined the social proportions of the deputy corps, all the way down to the individual soviet.

All of this could not fail to influence the mass consciousness and the feelings of the personality apparatus, and even the deputies themselves. An attitude of indifference toward the personality of the candidate became widespread among many citizens and, at the same time, the confidence, which was not groundless, that to vote against the only candidate was proof of mistrust in the authority in general. The idea was developed in the awareness of the apparatus that some essential aspects of electoral practices should not be made public and that the actual initiative on the part of the voters would represent a challenge to the values of socialism and even an action against them. In the minds of the candidates (and, subsequently, the deputies) this practice turned into an exceptionally low rating of their own independent role during elections and in activities of soviets. A direct psychological dependence developed between the passiveness of candidates for deputies and of members of soviets.

Taking the sum of such negative factors into consideration leads us to the conclusion that perfecting the soviet electoral system cannot be limited to the elimination of isolated shortcomings and introducing individual innovations in electoral legislation. It must be a question of a deep restructuring, not only of the electoral laws but of all political practices in this area. This applies, above all, to replacing mandatory-command and administrative methods in the organization and holding of elections with democratic mechanisms, of an open development of self-governing principles of interaction among voters, party organizers, the public, the labor collectives, and the candidates themselves, aimed above all at conscientiousness and persuasion, within the framework of such an important and broad political process such as an electoral campaign.

The main objective of the reform is to enhance the activeness of the voters and, on this basis, upgrade the quality level of the corps of deputies. The type of deputies who can perform the functions of representative authorities of the state system competently and with initiative, become the leading force in the elaboration and adoption of the most important governmental decisions and ensure the absolute supremacy of the soviets over the executive apparatus must be elected to the soviets. This means not only an enhancement of requirements concerning the professional and general educational standard of the deputies but also the more extensive use of a criterion, such as the level of their social activeness and civic initiative. In other words, the quantitative aspect in the social features of the deputy corps, frequently understood formally, should not prevail over the evaluation of the personal qualities of the candidates.

No active and competent soviets can exist without initiative-minded and competent deputies who would exert full power, however extensively legislation may be developed in this area. This thought, which we consider obvious, should be implemented in electoral practices as the demand of the voters themselves in their evaluation

and choice of candidates. Hence another strategic task of the reform: to ensure the more efficient and true participation of the voters at all stages of the pre-electoral and electoral campaign. The mechanism of choosing candidates ignoring the voters must be replaced by the competition among candidates in front of the voters, by the mechanism of true choice.

The main objective of the electoral reform is subordinate to the task of changing the role of the legal factor in the organization of elections. The inseparable link between democracy and its legal manifestation means that in the area of legal regulation that part of electoral relations which at the present time appear like the concealed, i.e., the overwhelmingly substantive part of the electoral "iceberg" must become essentially included. Thus, in our view, the legislation must include procedures which would define the actual subjects for nomination to a given soviet and the basic forms of competitiveness among candidates. The meaning of this "legalization" is found in reliably ensuring full openness and electoral glasnost, without which the strategic objectives of the reform cannot be reached. There should be no secret other than the secret of the voting booth in the organization and holding of elections.

The strategic objectives of the electoral reform cannot be implemented without the leading role of the Communist Party. The indivisibility between elections and party-political activities is a general political law. The establishment of political parties itself under the bourgeois system was related to establishing the institution of holding elections. Under democratic conditions, any political party tries to ensure the implementation of its program by accessing to the instruments of power through elections. In this respect the socialist system is no exception. The problem is that under circumstances of a one-party system and the leading status of the Communist Party as the headquarters of the political system, it is necessary firmly to reject the temptation of influencing the elections through directive-command methods. In the course of the profound democratization of society, the substantive aspect of the party's participation in electoral campaigns must be enriched by establishing broader contacts with the voters, persuasion and explanatory work, and efficient agitation based on local needs; opportunities must be created for the candidates to compete on the basis of specific programs of activity and to ensure the more active participation of the party organizations in all work among the electorate.

Some Debatable Problems

Seeking the solution to contemporary problems within the historical experience of the Soviet electoral system plays a significant role in the reform ideas. There is a substantial reason for this.

The high road in the development of electoral systems in the contemporary world has been marked with clear milestones leading to a universal, equal and direct voting

right and secret vote. It was the radical bourgeoisie which set those markers. However, the barricades which were erected on this way by the bourgeois class itself had to be brought down by the labor movement. Our country covered a distance from the almost zero mark (tsarist Russia had absolutely no democratic electoral system) and within the shortest possible historical time. As a result of the socialist revolution the broadest possible toiling masses became involved in elections. Today universal equal voting right and secret vote are values of Soviet democracy not subject to revision. And when it becomes a question of the need to restore the Leninist ideas and the initial practices of elections to soviets, which developed as a result of the governmental creativity of the masses themselves, usually something else is meant. Above all, reference is made to the advantages noted by V.I. Lenin of holding elections by industrial electoral districts and the practice of multiple-round elections (see "*Poln. Sobr. Soch.*" [Complete Collected Works], vol 37, p 256; vol 38, p 92). These are important problems and we should analyze them more profoundly, taking contemporary conditions into consideration.

The closest possible and steadily renewable ties between soviets and elections, on the one hand, and production cells, on the other, were considered by V.I. Lenin the basic advantage of the soviets compared to bourgeois representative institutions. This connection appeared in the course of the organization of the soviets. It has retained its essential significance at the present stage of social development as well, for it expresses the direct interconnection, which Lenin emphasized, between democracy and economics under socialism and is consistent with the nature of the soviets as assemblies of labor representatives and the enhanced role of labor collectives in administration affairs. However, it can be hardly assumed that the specific forms of implementation of this idea are not developing and that today "returning to Lenin" means simply restoring elections based on industrial electoral districts. The existing procedure for the nomination of candidates for deputies (essentially at meetings of labor collectives), and the obligation of the deputies to do deputy work in their collectives and not only in their electoral districts, and to report to them, as well as many other forms and guarantees which have been legislatively codified, ensure quite fully a representation of the interests of the labor collective in the soviets. We must also bear in mind that in industrial electoral districts by no means can all collectives have the right to nominate their member to one or another soviet: it is no secret that the right to nominate is the virtual prerogative of large collectives while small ones do this extremely infrequently.

The following consideration favors the retention of territorial electoral districts: in the course of perestroika the significance of taking into consideration the variety of social needs and interests of various groups and strata in Soviet society is increased, particularly those related to the implementation of the party's social policy. Their satisfaction is the most important function of the soviets

as territorial administration authorities. These interests are essentially those of the population of specific areas. Separating elections to soviets from the territorial organization of the state would inevitably lead to major distortions in representation and in meeting the interests of the population; it would reduce the role and significance of the needs of the citizens who are not directly related to production affairs. This applies to the maintenance of housing, the work of schools, hospitals, transportation and commercial services, and so on. Finally, by no means is it possible to hold elections on an industrial or even mixed industrial-territorial basis in all cities and urban rayons, if no sufficiently large enterprises are located in those areas (such as, for example, large residential microrayons). As to mixed-type elections (based on a combination of industrial with territorial districts), in our view such a system would create more problems than it would solve. One example would be the implementation of the principle of equal electoral rights: it is clear that working voters, unlike those not employed in public production, would be granted double electoral rights, so to say.

The supporters of a return to multiple-round elections to rayon, oblast, kray and all supreme soviets emphasize, above all, the simplicity and economical nature of this decision and, on the political level, its advantage that it strengthens vertical ties between soviets and the influence of lower soviets on the shaping and activity of the superior ones.

But is a relatively low cost the main criterion in assessing the efficiency of democracy, and could it justify its violation? Naturally, from the standpoint of the apparatus of thinking, multiple-round elections are more advantageous. They save on efforts to organize mass electoral campaigns and make possible to bypass the problem of the type of competitiveness among candidates for deputies in superior soviets in which the voters themselves could become the arbiters. All of this is true. However, at the same time, it also means a reduction or, more accurately, a termination of the direct ties between members of superior representative bodies and the population.

Naturally, the indirect election of some authorities should not be totally rejected. As we know, indirect elections for individual units within the system of representative authorities are practiced in the PRC and Hungary. In some cases, there could be an alternative to direct elections under our circumstances as well. For example, deputies to the USSR Supreme Soviet Council of Nationalities could be elected at sessions of supreme soviets of Union republics and other respective authorities. Possibly, such a procedure could be even more consistent with the idea of representation in that chamber of national-state and autonomous structures, represented as integral units.

The electoral reform is closely related to the overall task of enhancing the role of the soviets, and ensuring their full rights in the Leninist understanding of the term.

However, this cannot be accomplished without enhancing the activities of the primary cell of the Soviet representative system, the people's deputy, and his activities in the soviet and among the voters. During the period of the cult of personality, which demanded essentially the discipline of obedience and, if initiative was displayed, to be displayed, once again, by obeying superior instructions, a corresponding type of deputy behavior developed, which remained virtually unchanged under the conditions of stagnation, from the 1960s to the beginning of the 1980s.

The restructuring of soviet activities presents the deputies with new requirements. They must show greater competence and display maximal civic activity. They must have their own views and defend them in the soviet and its agencies. The main thing is for the contemporary requirements concerning a candidate to become set in the minds of the population, the electorate and the labor collective, and be a decisive feature in choosing among several candidates in the course of the balloting process. At electoral meetings and meetings with candidates, the voters must not only become acquainted with the qualities of the candidates but also directly express their requirements concerning the latter's work in the soviet.

A specific program for the activities of a candidate for a soviet, within the framework of the electoral program presented by the bloc of communists and nonparty members, must become the foundation for electoral campaigning. The candidates must be able to present their own vision of the problems which the soviet must solve in the interests of the voters and submit to the voters' judgment their work priorities. It is inadmissible for a candidate for deputy to be no more than the object of an electoral campaign and not its most active participant. The legal guarantees which our legislation offers to candidates for deputies should truly contribute to their activeness in the course of the electoral campaign.

Let us now consider one of the most durable concepts of elections, the accuracy of which is occasionally questioned in the course of the discussions on the restructuring of the Soviet electoral system. Essentially, it is that the body of deputies should reflect as much as possible the societal structure with its class and social strata and professional groups, and ensure the equal representation of men and women and the multinational structure of the population. Variety in the structure of the deputies is an important factor which enables us to represent the entire variety of interests and opinions and be a guarantee against subjectivism and group distortions in decision making. Its political significance is particularly high if we take into consideration the multinational composition of the country's population. Finally, it embodies one of the most important gains of the Soviet system: the accessibility of its agencies to workers and peasants.

In our view, it would be erroneous to pursue "elitism" in the body of deputies, and to organize it, let us say, exclusively on the basis of a professional-technocratic

approach to management. Whatever the circumstances, it is extremely necessary to abandon rigid directive-oriented methods of determining in advance the social parameters of the composition of soviet deputies. In this case we must proceed from a sufficiently broad range. The most important thing is radically to change the means of ensuring the necessary variety in the social representation in the soviets. The only possible way in this case is the consistently democratic one: to direct at the proper time the territorial party authorities and primary party organizations toward the preliminary study of the real possibilities of nominating candidates by labor collectives and at places of residence and, on the basis of the resulting overall picture, to argue and convince the public of the need to take into consideration, in nominating a candidate, the socioprofessional structure of the population on the territory of the given soviet and to do this openly and democratically.

The practice of promoting candidates on the basis of position has been severely criticized in recent years. Despite a certain generally insignificant reduction in the number of such individuals among the deputies, however, as a whole in the upper echelons of the apparat and the central and local authorities, the firm opinion has remained that it would be shameful for a certain category of managers not to be deputies. We believe that further efforts must be made to surmount this delusion under which, incidentally, a theoretical foundation is sometimes laid: there is talk of combining legislation with management through that expedient method. We also think that the principle of the incompatibility between a deputy mandate and holding a leading position (minister, head of department or administration) in the administrative organs set up by the soviets or subordinate to them, should be strengthened and systematically implemented for, to say the least, it would be illogical to be part of an agency which is directly controlling a person's activities.

We believe that the problem of the competence and activeness of the deputies and ensuring the most important social parameters within the people's representative authorities should be solved along with taking steps to reduce the number of deputies, particularly in middle- and superior-level soviets. The purpose of this step is to make the soviets more flexible in the organization of their activities, give a broader scope to the work of the deputies and make it possible to channel the thus saved funds into creating conditions for the greater concentration of deputies on their work in the soviet and among the electorate.

Organizational Aspects of the Reform

The first practical step on the way to the electoral reform was the 1987 experiment which was conducted in the course of elections for local soviets of people's deputies. Let us briefly recall its content and results. The experiment related to elections to rayon, city (cities under

rayon administration), settlement and rural soviets covered 5 percent of the country's rayons. Rayons in which elections for the respective soviets were held differently from the past, not on the basis of a single but multiple-mandate electoral districts, were singled out in oblasts and union republics without oblast divisions, and autonomous republics. More than 94,000 deputies were to be elected for all of these districts, as a rule from three to five per multiple-mandate district. The principle governing such an organization of electoral districts was to ensure balloting for a larger number of candidates than there were vacancies in each district. Indeed, the candidates competed within each such multiple-mandate district; approximately 25 percent more candidates than positions available in the multiple-mandate districts were entered in the slates (over 120,000 candidates). Candidates who garnered the largest number of votes, exceeding the necessary minimum of 50 percent plus one vote, became deputies. The other candidates, who obtained more than one half of the vote became reserve candidates and 599 candidates failed to garner the necessary majority and were not elected (see "Structure of Deputies of Executive Committees, Permanent Commissions and Reserve Deputies of Local Soviets of People's Deputies for 1987," p 261).

Before discussing the results of the experiment, let us note another parallel experiment was, this time on the scale of the entire country. At a number of meetings more than one candidacy and, occasionally, several candidacies for deputies were submitted and discussed. All in all, for the country at large, about 4 million candidates for 2,322,000 deputy seats were discussed at electoral meetings. However, (with rare exceptions) the slates included a single candidate. Comparing such data with the results of elections in multiple-mandate electoral districts, in our view we should consider as the main accomplishment of these initiatives the proven possibility and even necessity of converting to competition among candidates for elections to all soviets. As to the electoral experiment with multiple-mandate districts, the latter eliminated the excessive sociopsychological stress and a certain psychological discomfort for the candidates, related to the pre-electoral competition, for they gave them the chance to become, perhaps, reserve deputies.

Sociological studies conducted in the course of and based on the results of the experiment affected essentially assessments of its expediency by the candidate deputies themselves (before and after the elections), the voters and the heads of the local party and soviet authorities. As a whole, the resulting data are in favor of the new practice. However, it needs certain changes indicated by the lessons learned in the course of the last electoral campaign.

The first question which arises is the following: is the organization of multiple-mandate electoral districts mandatory, and the only ones admissible in holding elections for a local soviet? In our view, the answer is no.

Multiple-mandate districts should be set up as a rule. However, taking into consideration the specific nature of the territory of a soviet and its demographic characteristics, single-mandate districts could be set up as well, as would be the case in small settlements of rural soviets, from the population of which, in accordance with representation norms, one deputy is elected to a rayon and, in some cases, a rural soviet. However, even in a single-mandate electoral district the nomination of more than one candidate for the district should be ensured. The basic possibility of such a solution is confirmed by the experience of the last elections, where candidates had to compete among each other in several dozen single-mandate districts. It is not excluded that in the future changes in the mentality of both candidates for deputies and voters, who have become "accustomed" to the practice of competing candidates and the overall atmosphere of the electoral campaign related to such competition, would make it possible, in general, to return to a system of single-mandate electoral districts, but this time with a legislatively codified requirement of nominating no less than two candidates per district. At the present time, the right to solve the problem of the specific combination of multiple with single-mandate electoral districts should be granted to the local soviets themselves.

Another noteworthy problem is that of the further democratization of the procedure for candidate nomination. The right to nominate them is currently exercised primarily by labor collectives at meetings. The question of what specific collective has the actual right to make the nomination has been answered until recently with directives, outside any legislative control or glasnost. The elimination of this situation is possible through the utilization of the democratic mechanisms in the organization of elections. We believe that prior to the nomination of the candidates the question of which collectives should make use of this right should be considered at pre-electoral conferences. Furthermore, it would be necessary to codify this function legislatively, including the requirement of making the procedure open. As to the other labor collectives, they should be approached by trusted representatives of the candidates who would appeal to them to support a given candidate. Refusal of such support could become an objective reason for appealing to the respective collective at a pre-electoral conference to withdraw the nomination.

At the present time the practice of nominating candidates for deputies at places of residence is limited only to the rural territories and rural rallies, and even there it has not become properly established. Strengthening representation in the local soviets, particularly on the primary level, taking territorial interests into consideration and strengthening the ties between the deputies of such soviets and their constituencies require that a certain percentage of seats by electoral district be reserved for the nomination of candidates at meetings of the rural and urban populations. In such nominations, obviously, priority should go to the candidate who lives or works

within that district or in its vicinity. A recommendation for establishing such districts, in "bedroom" urban microrayons for example, could be formulated at electoral conferences.

Organizational problems related to elections to supreme soviets, including the USSR Supreme Soviet, present a separate set of problems of the electoral reform. Let us point out immediately that because of the large sizes of electoral districts for elections to such soviets, their combination, within multiple-mandate districts, would be inexpedient in our view. It could lead to a drastic weakening of ties between supreme soviet deputies and the population, the electorate.

Uniformity in the democratic principles of the electoral reform should ensure the competitiveness among candidates in all electoral districts in elections for the respective supreme soviets. As in the case of elections to local soviets, recommendations as to the labor collectives and public organizations which should be the first to exercise their right to nominate candidates, could be issued at district pre-electoral conferences for elections to supreme soviets. In this case as well extensive use should be made of candidate representatives, who would ask for the support of their candidates in other labor collectives and, possibly, at citizens meetings in places of residence. However, unlike elections for local soviets, it should be stipulated that entering the name of a candidate for deputy to a supreme soviet in the slate should be practiced only in the case of the two or three candidates who obtained the highest percentage of support by the electorate at meetings of labor collectives and places of residence. In this manner candidacies who lack substantial mass support could be dropped.

Generally speaking, we believe that it is time to abandon the mental stereotype, which is quite widespread today, according to which "the more candidates there are the more there is democracy." This is fraught with turning the elections into a struggle among group, parochial, departmental and even purely individual interests. For example, we would hardly have a reason to fear the self-nomination of a candidate and his public statement that he is able and willing to work in a soviet. However, such a self-assessment of a possible candidate should be backed by a close evaluation of his qualities by public organizations, labor collectives and a certain percentage of voters, even before the question of entering his name on the ballot has been raised. Finally, let us turn to the question of the efficiency and possibilities of the institution of reserve deputies, which was raised as an electoral experiment. Judging by the periodical press, the question of reserve deputies is considered by the public and the specialists and by themselves essentially as participation of the "reserve" in the activities of the soviet in implementing deputy obligations. As a whole, reserve deputies are not displaying any particular activeness at sessions of soviets and their permanent commissions, frequently considering themselves "second-rate deputies." In this connection, it would be expedient, we believe, to go back

to the initial idea of identifying such deputies not as reserve but as substitutes, as they were known previously, in the 1920s, and raise the question of the participation of such deputies in the work of the soviet as it deems fit.

We believe that the institution of substitute deputies could be considered also in elections of deputies to supreme soviets, in single-mandate districts. It should be legislatively stipulated that the voter has the right to mark two candidacies on the ballot. The candidate who will have obtained the highest number of votes, but no less than 50 percent plus one, would become the deputy. The other candidate could become his substitute, providing that he has garnered the necessary minimum of votes.

The role of substitute deputy of the supreme soviet can be considered on a somewhat different level than that of substitute deputy in a local soviet. Above all, to be a substitute deputy in the highest representative authority of the governmental system is, in itself, honorable and particularly responsible. Let us also take into consideration that in the future it would be expedient to increase the time spent in direct activities by supreme soviet deputies in the local areas, and in the permanent commissions, which would mean a rather lengthy absence from the electoral district. In such cases, the substitute could take up work among the population, including the seeing of constituents. The need for this could be explained by the large size of electoral districts.

The reform of the electoral system in our country is, to a certain extent, a "voyage into the unknown," for by no means could everything be anticipated from the viewpoint of social consequences, based on our previous and, even more so, on foreign experience. However, we can say as of today quite clearly that the reform of the electoral system is not a formal-procedural step but a means of developing the social activeness of the Soviet people and the implementation of their interests and needs in the area of the administration of the state and society.

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Democratization of the Party Means Democratization of Society

18020015f Moscow *KOMMUNIST* in Russian No 9,
Jun 88 (signed to press 6 Jun 88) pp 31-44

[Text] Continued publication of letters on problems of party building and further democratization of the party and society (see *KOMMUNIST* No 18, 1987; Nos 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8, 1988)

In the Mirror of Sociology

V. Shostakovskiy, rector, Moscow Higher Party School, and V. Yatskov, head of laboratory for the study of experience in party, soviet and ideological work, Moscow Higher Party School.

Last February the laboratory for the study of experience in party, soviet and ideological work of the Moscow Higher Party School conducted a survey in the party organizations of Moscow's Kuntsevskiy, Sovetskiy and Frunzenskiy Rayons, which represent the labor collectives of basic sectors and areas of the national economy in the capital. The purpose of the survey was to determine the range of views on the suggestions which were received by the 19th All-Union Party Conference from plenums, party meetings and the press. The respondents (a total of 1,142 people) represented different social groups of party members and, essentially, the party aktiv.

The survey included 109 suggestions; an additional 936 were submitted in the course of the study. As the survey indicated, the various social groups of party members had developed sufficiently uniform concepts on most problems related to improving internal party life and methods of party leadership of governmental agencies and public organizations. Nonetheless, the assessments of 25 percent of the respondents (most frequently a multivariant approach to the solution of a single problem) showed certain disparities and, in 10 percent of the cases, the views of one or two social groups were substantially different from those of the rest. The overwhelming majority of participants in the survey spoke out in favor of the immediate implementation of 70 out of the 109 basic suggestions. We believe that the collective view of the party members we surveyed on the ways to reorganize party work will be useful in the discussion of the CPSU Central Committee theses for the 19th All-Union Party Conference.

On the Quality of Party Ranks

About 70 percent of the overall number of surveyed party members (53 percent of them workers) supported suggestions on reviewing the current established concept on regulating the social structure of party ranks. In particular, it is a question of granting to the members of the scientific and technical intelligentsia, and the engineering and technical personnel and employees equal opportunities for joining the party alongside the workers. In the opinion of the respondents, this would be consistent with the changes which are currently taking place in the structure of the society under the influence of scientific and technical progress.

With a view to ensuring a stricter selection of party members, the proposal was submitted at the plenums to require a recommendation issued by the labor collective in the acceptance of new members. This was favored by nearly 60 percent of the surveyed party members. The

overwhelming majority of respondents believe that admission to the party should be open and public. Obviously, this explains the fact that the suggestion of admission through secret vote was not supported by the majority of party members.

The view on the suggestion that responsibility for issuing a recommendation be valid for 5 years after the recommended person has been admitted to the party was equivocal. It was approved by 46.5 percent of the surveyed party members. The others consider this step either totally void of practical meaning or ahead of its time. Obviously, this problem requires a more detailed study. More than 60 percent of the respondents (65 percent of the workers) supported the suggestion of lifting the artificial barriers of admitting people over the age of 30.

Comprehensive improvements in the qualitative structure of party ranks was and remains the steady concern of the CPSU. It is particularly important today, however, for the party to encompass the best forces of the Soviet people. Public opinion has fully realized the relevance of this problem. We must not fail to take into consideration that the loose criteria used during the 1970s in the matter of party admissions, applied by a number of party organizations in pursuit of "good" statistical indicators, and the absence of real control over the behavior of party members led to an increase in the number of passive party members and of individuals with a negative behavior. In this connection, suggestions on the purity of party ranks and on upgrading the personal responsibility of party members for observing the standards of party life assume particular importance.

The participants in the survey highly rated suggestions relative to changing the procedure for the consideration of personal affairs. More than 86 percent approved of the recommendation concerning the need to initiate the consideration of such cases in party groups and shop party organizations; 71 percent spoke in favor of considering personal cases at open party meetings. The additional suggestion was made of codifying the possibility of recalling unworthy individuals, who are members of the CPSU, on the initiative of labor collectives. More than one-half of the surveyed party members spoke out in favor of the need to draft a list of mandatory questions which would be included in the party references. About 80 percent of the respondents supported the proposal that the question of expelling from CPSU ranks of individuals charged with criminal liability be considered only after the courts have pronounced sentence.

In additional suggestions, some party members noted that so far rigidity and demagoguery are cultivated under the guise of struggle for the purity of party ranks and Marxist ideology, instead of truly strengthening the standards of reciprocal relations and high morality and humaneness.

Some of the suggestions dealt with the more efficient deployment of party members in party organizations. From the two suggestions on the registration of retirees who are party members, almost half of the respondents expressed a preference for assigning them to the party organizations at their place of residence. The other choice, which called for granting the primary party organizations the right to solve such problems, was supported by 44 percent of the participants in our survey.

Some respondents submitted additional suggestions on providing real possibilities of leaving the ranks of the CPSU. They recommend that party members who do not actively participate in the life of party organizations for reasons of health, old age, etc., be given the option voluntarily to drop out of CPSU ranks (based on their petition) without suffering negative consequences. In the case of individuals with services to the party and long party membership, the status of "honored party member" should be instituted.

On the Primary Party Organizations

The development of labor collectives requires steady improvements in the structure of the party organizations. The current practice of solving such problems does not satisfy the majority of party members; 57 percent of those surveyed insist on having such problems solved at party meetings, without the need for ratification by the CPSU raykom buro. An equal number believe it important for large shop party organizations, which the status of primary party organization, to be allowed to collect membership dues from subdivision organizations.

With a view to perfecting the work of the party committee and party buro, the majority of party members (60 percent) suggested that the assessment of its work be changed from a two- to a three-point system: unsatisfactory, satisfactory and good. Considering the fact that today the organizational and economic situation of collectives is changing rapidly, and bearing in mind that the present commissions in charge of controlling administrative activities by no means always implement their responsible roles successfully, it was suggested that such commissions only ensure for the efficient solution of specific problems and that their membership be changed on each specific occasion. More than one-half of the participants in the survey favored this method.

The majority of party members (71 percent) deemed necessary the inclusion in CPSU statutes of a section on the status and functions of the party organization secretary; ensuring his social protection subsequent to his re-election (61.5 percent); requiring that the dismissal or punishment of a party buro secretary or member take place only with the agreement of the party body (79 percent of respondents). With a view to upgrading the efficiency of party work, the suggestion was made of

releasing the secretaries of party buros in party organizations numbering more than 100 members be freed from their full time jobs (68.5 percent).

The overwhelming majority of party members (72 percent) deemed expedient to change the time for accountability and election meetings in primary party organizations from August-October to January-March, in order to be able to assess the activities of the secretary and the party buro (party committee) on the basis of the results of the economic year. One-half of the respondents supported the suggestion of holding nothing but open party meetings, with the exception of accountability-election ones.

Views on the periods of holding accountability and election conferences were divided. Not one of the suggestions submitted for evaluation obtained the support of the absolute majority of respondents. Nonetheless, preference was given to two among them: that of retaining the rule of holding party buro elections once every 2-3 years only for organizations numbering in excess of 100 party members (42 percent) and allowing the primary party organizations to hold their accountability and election meetings when they see fit.

In the course of the survey the respondents formulated a number of suggestions aimed at ensuring more efficient work by the party aktiv under cost accounting conditions. Nearly 90 percent of the party members supported the need to simplify bookkeeping in shop party organizations, which should deal "only with work plans, minutes, rosters of party members and records on the payment of party dues." Nearly 70 percent called for allowing party activists to take some working time off to perform their social obligations; more than 60 percent supported the view that a certain percentage of membership dues be kept by the party organizations to pay for the working time spent by secretaries of primary and shop party organizations and party group organizers in carrying out their functions, while having a regular job. An even higher number (more than 82 percent) spoke out in favor of leaving a portion of the party dues to be used for visual agitation, party work offices, etc.

On Party Committees and Their Apparatus

The search for more democratic forms of structure and activities of party authorities met with an interested response on the part of the party members. This was confirmed by the number and variety of suggestions submitted on this matter. Most of the respondents (57 percent) supported the suggestion of a timely (6 months prior to a convention) establishment of an organizational committee in charge of preparations for the congress or conference; two-thirds of the participants in the survey called for holding regular all-union party conferences in the period between congresses.

Some of the most important steps which ensure the fuller study of the opinion of the broad strata of party members and nonparty people included, in the view of the respondents, party referendums on topical problems (73 percent were in favor) and systematic sociological surveys (78.5 percent).

The majority of respondents supported the following among the suggestions aimed at intensifying control over party committee activities:

Submission of reports by the buros of CPSU obkoms, gorkoms and raykoms no less than once between conferences; by party committees and party buros, once between accountability and election meetings. On such occasions their activities must be assessed and, whenever necessary, their membership should be renewed fully or partially (72 percent);

Preliminary discussions within party organizations of the theses of reports and draft resolutions to be submitted at future plenums (67 percent);

Making it incumbent upon the elected buro to draft and submit for ratification at the next plenum a program for its activities until the next congress or conference is held (55 percent of respondents).

About one-half (41 percent of party workers) favored introducing in party practices questions submitted by party members similar to those submitted by deputies.

The suggestion that the CPSU Central Committee and other leading authorities supply more extensive information to the population met with a lively response. More than 60 percent of the participants in the survey believed that the press should publish in full materials of CPSU Central Committee plenums; 46.8 percent called for publishing them in special bulletins. Nearly 90 percent suggested that the results of public opinion surveys be regularly published in the press. Almost 80 percent believed necessary to restore the practice of discussing in party organizations CPSU Central Committee letters on problems triggering sharp debates. An additional suggestion was made of providing more democratic and open control over party budgets.

More than one-half of the respondents favored the renovation of no less than 50 percent of the members of party agencies through elections (35 percent of the party workers spoke in favor of this step). The overwhelming majority of respondents (71 percent) favored the system of structuring the membership of rayon and city CPSU committees, starting with the primary party organizations, on the basis of competitions; members of an obkom or kraykom to be elected at rayon and city conferences, and so on. Each candidate should be given a voter's instructions. About 60 percent of the respondents (45 percent of the party workers) deem necessary to adopt the rule that every member of a respective party

committee represent the party organization which nominated him and make essential decisions on its behalf. More than 70 percent of the participants in the survey favored granting the rights to organizations, if necessary, to recall members of a superior party body they had nominated, prior to the expiration of their term.

A number of suggestions were submitted on the need for the comprehensive study of the practical and political qualities of candidates prior to their election as members of a party committee. More than two-thirds of the respondents believe it expedient to hold conferences with members of delegations to discuss candidacies 1 month prior to the elections; three-quarters of the respondents approved adopting the rule of having pre-election meetings between candidates and party members.

On the subject of procedural problems of voting, the respondents deem necessary to include in the slates subject to secret vote a number of candidates exceeding that of available positions in the elective authority (approved by 80 percent of the respondents), marking in the ballots, opposite the name of the candidate, the words "for" or "opposed" so that every party member could express his attitude toward the candidate.

Some 80 percent of the respondents deem it important to draft a regulation on the party apparatus, on the basis of which the functions of the party members would be delineated more clearly. According to 76 percent of the respondents, the efficiency of the party apparatus could be improved by adopting a measure such as granting the local party committees the right independently to determine the structure and table of organization of their apparatus within the limits of the stipulated wage fund.

A number of suggestions on improving the promotion system within the party apparatus were submitted. The majority of surveyed party members (83 percent) consider that it would be timely and valuable to appoint people as members of the party apparatus only on the basis of assignments and recommendations of primary party organizations.

Almost 60 percent of respondents preferred the election of party committee secretaries through direct secret vote, on a competitive basis. This recommendation was supported by 65 percent of the surveyed workers and more than one-half of the party workers. About 60 percent of the participants in the survey (some 70 percent among the workers and 46 percent among party workers) insisted that party committee secretaries report on their work to the primary party organizations no less than twice annually.

Public opinion is concerned by the fact that we still come across cases in which the real reasons for releasing leading party and state personnel from their positions are not made public. Almost 94 percent of the surveyed party members call for making this action public.

About 80 percent of our respondents favored the introduction of age restrictions in holding leading positions on the Union and republic levels—65; 62-63 percent, on the oblast and kray levels; and 60 percent on the rayon level. At the same time, almost three-quarters of the respondents supported the idea of limiting the holding of a position as follows: CPSU Central Committee secretaries, no more than 10 years; secretaries of central committees of communist parties of Union republics, 8-10 years; kraykoms and obkoms, 7-9 years; okruzhkoms, gorkoms and raykoms, 5-7 years. One-half of the respondents deemed useful the formulation for all party committees of comprehensive target cadre programs for the period through 1995. Only 12 to 17 percent of the respondents totally rejected this suggestion.

Some evaluations obtained in the course of the survey call for a closer study. We know how negatively the party members occasionally react to co-opting the party committee secretaries. The survey suggested that in order to avoid this, an interim secretary be appointed for no more than 6 months, with a mandatory subsequent consideration of this problem at an extraordinary conference or congress. However, this suggestion was supported by no more than 47 percent of the respondents.

Somewhat unexpected was an assessment of the suggestion to abolish sectorial departments within the party apparatus. In recent years their work style has been severely criticized. There has been frequent mention at party fora and in the press of the fact that they become "spliced" with the economic authorities, take over their work, engage in petty supervision and, as a result, to a large extent result in the party committees' loss of political functions, while the soviet and economic cadres abandon their responsibility for assignments. In this connection, the suggestion was to close down sectorial departments. However, this idea was supported only by 40 percent of those surveyed (the approach was quite unanimous: the suggestion was supported by 40.4 percent of the workers and 43.7 percent of party workers). It is true that only 11 percent of the respondents totally rejected the expediency of this step.

The majority of respondents spoke out in favor of withholding from profits earned as a result of economic management, thus providing material incentive to full-time party workers (58 percent of respondents). Another suggestion which was supported (62 percent) was that of redistributing personnel and salaries among raykoms on the basis not only of the number of party members of the rayon party organization but also in accordance with the specific nature of the primary organizations and the size of the rayon's population. Nearly 63 percent of all respondents (more than 75 percent of full-time party workers) consider quite important for party organization secretaries to have the right to bonuses, not to exceed one-third of the basic salary, and to include the possibility of merit increases. About 68 percent of the full-time

party workers who participated in the survey (47 percent of all party members) noted as important the suggestion of introducing differentiated positions and salary rates for apparatus instructors.

The respondents showed differences in their views on suggestions concerning the need to collect party dues on a centralized basis, through the bookkeeping office of the organization and the enterprise. This was considered important by 47.5 percent of the party members at large and by no more than 36 percent of full-time party workers.

On Ties With the Public

More than one-half of the party members who participated in the survey deemed necessary the restoration of the tradition of nonparty conferences, in the proceedings of which members of all strata of Soviet society, active public organizations and informal associations would be represented. It was suggested that reports at such conferences be submitted by the first secretaries of party committees and the chairmen of executive committees of soviets of people's deputies.

Three-quarters of the respondents supported the suggestion that candidates for deputies mandatorily present to the voters their electoral programs. About 62 percent of the respondents noted the need to register candidate deputies in the electoral districts in which the collective which appointed them sets up an electoral commission and promotes mass agitation work.

As the study indicated, an opinion widespread among the party members concerns the need to disband public organizations which are incapable of independently carrying out their assigned functions. This suggestion was one of the most popular five (86 percent) among the respondents. Our respondents believe that public organizations should earn the right to exist through their efforts and not only because of dues paid by people who are nominal members.

Let us note that the party members did not support the suggestion of creating nonstatutory party groups within labor collective councils. For the time being, most of the surveyed party members did not actively support the suggestion of setting up directors' councils and councils of party organization and establishment secretaries by economic sector.

The study of the opinions of Moscow party members on suggestions directed at the 19th All-Union Party Conference confirm that their absolute majority realize the existence of a number of contradictions which have accumulated in internal party life and the need for their fastest possible resolution. The answers prove the firm support given by the majority of party members to the

political course of the April Plenum and the 27th Congress for the development of democracy and glasnost as effective means of party renovation and self-development.

On Party Resolutions

S. Borodin, doctor of juridical sciences, professor, CPSU member since 1948.

In speaking of the democratization of party and society we cannot avoid the question of CPSU Central Committee resolutions, the overwhelming majority of which are directives mandatory not only for party authorities but also soviets, ministries, and so on. The CPSU Central Committee theses suggest that this system be abandoned. I fully share this suggestion.

However, here is what remains unclear: When we read the latest Central Committee resolution we unwittingly ask ourselves about its authorship. Actually, who adopts such resolutions: the CPSU Central Committee, the Politburo or the secretariat? It would be more accurate to consider as CPSU Central Committee resolutions only those which have been truly discussed by the entire Central Committee. Resolutions issued by the Politburo and the secretariat should be (and are indeed known as) respectively documents issued by these high party bodies. I also believe that now the Central Committee members and the members of the territorial party committees should be granted the right to submit for discussion by the Central Committee Plenum problems including those subject to consideration by the Politburo or the secretariat. In my view, this must be entered in the party statutes.

Another equally important question is that of supervising the implementation of party resolutions. In the past 20 years the question has been repeatedly raised at party congresses, Central Committee plenums and resolutions of higher party and state bodies of upgrading the role of soviets. Alas, so far little has changed in this area. As has been repeatedly pointed out, these resolutions were ignored by the administrative-managerial apparatus. However, since they have been adopted, the CPSU Central Committee should be the first to act precisely in accordance with said resolutions, setting the example of their strict implementation. At that point the disparity between words and actions shown by the other bodies would become less frequent.

I believe that the members of the Central Committee must systematically work within that body. In my view, a certain percentage of Central Committee members and candidate members should actively participate, on a steady basis, in the current work of the party's Central Committee, including in drafting party resolutions. The Central Committee secretaries and Politburo members should rely on them as well and not only on the party apparatus. One of the most important tasks of Central Committee members should be their daily participation

in supervising the implementation of the resolutions passed at congresses and plenum decrees and Central Committee resolutions centrally and in the local areas.

The Political System: Demarcation of Functions

F. Petrenko, doctor of philosophical sciences, Moscow.

The CPSU Central Committee theses speak of the restoration of the Leninist concept of the leading role of the Communist Party as the political vanguard of the working class and of all working people. Its activities must be directed toward solving essential problems "pertaining to politics" and the unification of efforts "of all soviet and party institutions and all organizations of the working class" (*Poln. Sobr. Soch.* [Complete Collected Works], vol 40, p 238), and not substituting for them. Whatever aspects of party activities V.I. Lenin discussed, he invariably emphasized that the party must provide political leadership. The demands which he formulated in the last years of his life were "to demarcate much more accurately between the party's functions (and those of its Central Committee) and the soviet authorities; to upgrade the responsibility and autonomy of soviet personnel and soviet institutions and leave to the party the overall guidance of the work of all state authorities, eliminating the current all too frequent, irregular and often petty interference" (op. cit., vol 45, p 61) were, essentially, one of the most important features in the political testament of the leader of the party and founder of the Soviet state.

After Lenin's death the meaning of his ideas on the nature of party activities was actually grossly distorted and party leadership became misshaped. In his interpretation of Lenin in the work "On Problems of Leninism," Stalin erroneously absolutized and, essentially, vulgarized Lenin's characteristics of the mechanism of dictatorship of the proletariat. He ascribed a self-seeking significance to the metaphorical comparison between soviets, trade unions and cooperatives, on the one hand, and "gears," etc., on the other. We know today the major impact which the consequences of the transformation of the ways and principles of building socialism and changing its very aspect, substantiated by Lenin, had on the life of the country and the people. The party itself should bear a certain blame for this although it too turned out to be a hostage and victim of Stalin's despotism.

On the basis of the experience of past decades, I believe that the constitutional-legal regulation of the relationship between the party and state and public authorities and methods of party activities would be of essential significance in the efficient solution of the problem of distinguishing between the functions of the party and those of the other institutions within the political system. The Central Committee theses stipulate that "in relations between the party and the state we must proceed on the basis of the Leninist principle of the clear distinction between their functions. All party organizations must operate within the framework of the USSR Constitution

and Soviet laws. The promulgation of resolutions by party committees, issuing direct instructions to state and economic authorities and public organizations must be excluded. The CPSU implements its political course through the party members who work in the state agencies and in all areas of social life." In order for such requirements, which are of essential significance, to be systematically implemented, I believe that they must be codified in a constitutional-legal form. What makes this all the more important is the following: The stipulation of Article 6 of the constitution is not efficient as a governmental-legal regulation which prevents the substitution by party authorities of state and economic functions, as confirmed by a number of examples.

The autonomy of soviets, trade unions, cooperatives, the Komsomol and other state and public organizations means not only their right to freedom of expression in terms of full support of the course charted by the political vanguard, the Communist Party, or the resolutions passed by its central and local authorities. It also means the right to defend one's own viewpoint. Each public organization must defend the interest of population groups and strata rallied within it. This precisely is the true manifestation of socialist pluralism, of political polyphony in the views of those involved in our cause.

A clear constitutional stipulation concerning the way of acting by the Communist Party, the basic methods of party leadership and the definition of the nature and forms of relations between the party and state and public organizations on the basis of equal cooperation would be a major prerequisite for establishing such relations among institutions within the Soviet political system, which would be consistent with the nature of socialist democracy and socialist self-government.

It would be useful to make corresponding amendments in the CPSU statutes as well. The statutes say very little about the ways and means through which the party authorities should do their work. Furthermore, Paragraph 41 includes the stipulation concerning the tasks of party organizations and their leading authorities, which some officials tend to interpret quite broadly. The paragraph stipulates that "republic, kray, oblast, okrug, city, and rayon party organizations and their committees... do **all the work** (my emphasis, author) within the boundaries of the republic, kray, oblast, okrug, city or rayon in implementing the party's policy...." However, as one can easily understand, carrying out "the entire work for the implementation of party policy" is the task not only of the party organizations but also of state, economic and public organizations. That is why it is inadmissible to use this formulation as a reason for allowing the party committees to act in violation of existing divisions of functions among said organizations.

We know that the party statutes grant the primary party organizations of enterprises the right to control administrative activities. Strictly speaking, however, granting

such rights is the prerogative of the superior state authority—the USSR Supreme Soviet. No such control is stipulated in the constitution or any governmental-legal act. The political leadership provided by the party is not the same thing as performing legislative functions. It would be accurate for the right of control to be granted constitutionally to the party and for its limits and forms to be legislatively clearly demarcated, the more so since this most important social function, related to the adoption of the Law on the State Enterprise (Association) will be exercised under essentially different circumstances.

Lenin frequently pointed out the need for strictly regulating relations between the party and the other public and state institutions. In his time, on the basis of his suggestion, the 9th RKP(b) Congress approved a resolution on the trade unions, which defined in detail their relations with the party and the state. In connection with the creation of the Main Political Education Administration, which was assigned the task of unifying all political education work in the country, the RKP(b) Central Committee Politburo issued, on Lenin's suggestion, an instruction on providing a "particularly detailed formulation of organizational interrelationships between agitation and propaganda institutions of the RKP and the educational institutions of the people's commissariat of education, subject to their leadership" (op. cit., vol 41, p 397). The respective constitutional stipulations or other documents which define the limits of the competences and methods of activities of the various institutions of social management are today clearly in short supply. Unquestionably, this prevents the individual administrative authorities from handling strictly their own affairs rather than with the affairs of others.

Solving the problem of the demarcation of functions calls for concretizing the concept of "party-organizational work." In practice it is frequently interpreted too broadly, ignoring the fact that political organization work is substantially different from administrative organizational one. This leads to the erosion of differences in the nature of political and administrative-production or administrative-technical management and, in the final account, to a substitution by individual party committees of soviet and economic authorities.

It is self-evident that higher political standards will have to be applied if we are to ensure the successful practical implementation of the principles and standards governing the demarcation between the functions of the party and those of the other institutions within the political system, and between party workers and deputies, the apparatus of the soviet executive committees and all personnel working in cooperatives and public organizations. A serious, persistent and systematic study of democracy, the steady elimination of command-administrative habits and of the willingness to adopt them will be required.

The current structure of the party apparatus, with its concentration on solving specific problems related to managing narrowly specialized sectors in the heavy,

machine building, chemical, light and other industrial sectors and in agriculture, objectively leads to duplication in party and state activities and creates organizational prerequisites for replacing party committees with state and economic authorities. Today, in connection with the conversion of the economy to new economic management conditions, such a structure has objectively become an obstruction to perestroika, the more so since a large number of sectorial party committee departments are subject to departmental influences. For this reason, we believe that the changes in the structure of the party apparatus, contemplated in the Central Committee theses, should be paralleled by the strengthening of their structural subdivisions and, at the same time, the further broadening of its structural subdivisions and, at the same time, the further expansion of the rights and competences of corresponding governmental and economic authorities. The solution of this dual task will unquestionably strengthen the ideological-political and political-organizational trends in the work of party committees and will upgrade the overall efficiency of social management.

Unquestionably, the further improvement in the structure of elective authorities and the party apparatus is of essential significance. In recent years they were reinforced primarily with specialists from the various economic sectors. In 1987 84.5 percent of Central Committee secretaries of communist parties of Union republics, kraykoms, and obkoms and more than two-thirds of secretaries of raykoms, gorkoms and okruzhkoms had engineering-technical, economic and agricultural training. This has not only positive but also serious negative aspects.

Naturally, the competence of the party apparatus in its approach to production matters has improved. However, we should not ignore the fact that a substantial segment of the specialists came to the party apparatus from industry, lacking adequate experience in political-organizational and ideological work, and frequently introduced in the party bodies administrative management and command methods. This inertia, inherited from the past, to this day seriously hinders the clear demarcation between the functions of party and economic authorities. So far, an unjustifiably small number of party personnel have been trained in the humanities.

Naturally, a mandatory prerequisite for the successful solution of this problem is increasing trust in management cadres in soviet, economic and social agencies. The Leninist requirement of forcing state agencies and officials to engage in "independent and responsible management within the limits of their rights and obligations" (op. cit., vol 45, p 153) remains valid. Perestroika indicates that frequently it is a matter not only of the lack of corresponding rights granted to the soviets and their executive committees or to economic and social organizations, but the inability or unwillingness to make full and efficient use of already extant ones.

Today the same people are frequently "ex officio" members of elected party bodies and soviets. Such a combination of party with state functions in the hands of the same individuals, which has now become customary, and the way they solve problems of party or governmental and economic problems equalize their responsibilities and fetter their initiative.

This problem has another aspect. In setting up any elective managing authority we must take, above all, the need for staffing it, so that it may perform its functional assignments most efficiently, assignments which have their specific nature in the party and in the soviets. An approach based on position does not provide such guarantees. It may be more useful if party committees and soviets are staffed by noted specialists in various areas, people who do not hold leading positions, as well as by workers, and kolkhoz members who enjoy not only the necessary authority but also who have clearly manifested a vocation for and ability to engage in political work.

The demarcation between functions and competences is a decisive prerequisite for ensuring the optimal functioning of the political system of socialist society and the efficient practice of socialist democracy. It will determine the fate of perestroika to a tremendous extent.

The Party Is Responsible!

A. Shekhirev, Naberezhnyye Chelny.

I warmly support the idea expressed in the CPSU Central Committee theses on the need for a constant influx of fresh forces into the Central Committee. In this connection, we cannot fail to recall V.I. Lenin's suggestion formulated in his "Letter to the Congress" of increasing the membership of the Central Committee with workers. I believe that the same should apply to party committees of lower status. However, this is only part of the matter. The main thing is to involve workers who are members of party committees into active work. I believe that the example in this case should be set by the party's Central Committee. In reading the reports on CPSU Central Committee plenums I look, above all, for the names of workers who have spoken and I am quite saddened when I find no more than one or two in the long list of speakers.

And what happens with industrial enterprises? It is primarily workers who are accepted as CPSU members; the secretaries of party committees and buros are, as a rule, engineering and technical personnel and economic managers. Do we not have worker-party activists who could be elected heads of party organizations? I am convinced that we should look for such people. In my view, promoting economic managers to party work is one of the main reasons for the durability of the command-administrative style in the activities of party agencies.

Voluntary associations of the working people assume great importance in the period of democratization of society. It is no accident that the theses pay great attention to them. In practice, unfortunately, however, the party agencies and organizations do not pay such attention to them, as a result of which voluntary societies are occasionally replaced by various informal associations some of which have little in common with communist ideology.

It seems to me that the All-Union Party Conference should consider the question of radically improving the activities of all all-Union and republic voluntary societies. The work of party members in the voluntary societies should be considered a most important party assignment which must always be supervised and guided. The party's influence must be felt both in the primary organizations as well as the central authorities of the voluntary societies, which are a structural element of our political system.

Finally, the effort to separate J.V. Stalin from the party, clearly apparent in a number of publications, triggers major objections. In criticizing Stalin's actions, he is depicted as some kind of emperor, acting strictly by himself, while other people remain totally uninvolved. Stalin, however, was Central Committee general secretary and not an all-Russian autocrat! It seems to me that it must be clearly pointed out at the party conference that every party member must bear his share of responsibility for the activities of the entire party.

I know a party member who, in reading today's newspaper articles on the period of stagnation, exclaimed: "Well, what did I tell you!" Yes, indeed, in the past he did speak of the scandals which were taking place but he discussed them as something abstract, which did not affect him personally. Yet what occurred during the period of stagnation is precisely our common fault as members of the ruling party! The All-Union Party Conference should help the party members to realize this. In my view, the conference should consider also the reasons for the excessive praise heaped on L.I. Brezhnev. How could it happen that, despite the exposure of the cult of Stalin and numerous assertions that no such thing would ever happen again, 20 years later there were recurrences of the "leader-principle," although in a different form? The main attention should be focused on the circumstances which contributed to its appearance and thought should be given to steps for the democratization of party life, such as to exclude similar phenomena once and for all.

What the Experiment Proved

I. Shuvalov, first secretary of the Krasnopresnenskiy Rayon CPSU Committee, Moscow.

The CPSU Central Committee theses suggest, taking into consideration the enhancement of the party's role as a political vanguard and the separation of functions

among party committees and state and economic authorities, making necessary changes in the structure and composition of the party apparatus. In my view, it would be useful in solving this problem to consider the lessons of the experiment which was carried out in several rayon party committees. The new experimental structure of the apparatus was introduced in March of 1987 in the Krasnopresnenskiy Rayon CPSU Committee in Moscow.

We began by closing down the sectorial departments, replacing them with five groups of instructors to which we assigned the primary party organizations of the respective categories. Whereas previously three instructors from different departments were all responsible for the state of affairs within each of these organizations, which led to a certain discrepancy in their activities, according to the new system the new instructor (we describe him as linear) is in charge of from seven to 24 party organizations, depending on their size and the complexity of the sector. He is in charge of the entire set of problems of the primary party organizations. Let me say for the sake of comparison that not so long ago an instructor in a sectorial department was in charge of dealing with the affairs of 35 to 40 party organizations.

Second, five sectors were set up: economic analysis, work with cadres, organizational-statutory problems, political education and ideological-education work. The plan calls for making them the "brain trusts" of the raykom, in charge of formulating the strategy and tactics of the rayon party organization in charge of translating general party stipulations and resolutions of superior authorities into the language of practical affairs.

Each group and sector has its "own" CPSU raykom secretary. The first secretary of the raykom is in charge of the overall coordination of their work.

The third important element in the experiment is the right of the raykom buro independently to choose instructors (in the past such problems had to be coordinated with the Moscow City Party Committee) and to differentiate among salaries paid to different categories of personnel, thus enabling the raykom buro to motivate the best among them.

Were we able to meet the purpose of the sectors as subdivisions within the raykom apparatus which, by virtue of their status, must be analytical? Let me immediately say, that we have had partial success. The point is that they assume the main share of the work related to interacting with the sectorial department of the Moscow City Party Committee and the preparation of reports, references and data required by superior authorities. It became clear that with the preservation of the sectorial structure on the higher levels, our sectors played the role of "cover" for the groups of instructors, enabling them

substantially to concentrate on work directly in the primary party organizations. The sectorial personnel also had to be recruited for performing a variety of day to day operations.

But even with this situation of the sectors, there was a tangible increase in the opportunities of the raykom, compared with the past, to study the processes occurring in the rayon party organization. For example, in the course of the accountability reports submitted by the party committees of the primary organizations concerning the management of perestroyka, the raykom received more than 2,000 remarks and suggestions. Within a relatively short time the sectors consolidated and summed up these suggestions and studied the possibility of acting on them. The economic analysis sector began to play a significant role. We realized this when on the basis of data prepared by this sector, with the help of facts and figures we were able to prove to the managements of a number of enterprises the need for solutions other than those they favored. Thanks to the sector of work with cadres that was set up, gradually systemic elements began to develop in this most important area of party activities. All in all, each of the sectors already has gained perhaps small but encouraging results.

We obtained higher returns from the instructor groups as well. Naturally, many problems exist here, above all those caused by a certain lack of training on the part of instructor cadres for acting as "universal" advisers, equally knowledgeable in the entire set of problems involved in the work of a primary party organization. Unfortunately, the strict specialization of this category of personnel within the framework of the old structure of the apparatus can be felt.

The work style of the apparatus, which had developed in the past, had developed in many of our instructors qualities, such as good performing discipline, efficiency, and concentration on solving current problems. However, analytical ability, the conceptual and systematic consideration of situations and problems and the ability to single out the crucial problems and find efficient ways of solving them were frequently lacking. Furthermore, as data of sociological surveys indicated, along with our own experience, some personnel continue to consider the raykom as a kind of executive authority holding the highest position within the system of economic and public organizations on the rayon's territory. Hence recurrences of an authoritarian style of management, to the detriment of political methods. I believe that the time had come for us to think of ways to ensure the more serious and thorough training of instructor cadres.

The assessment of our experiment, which came, so to say, "from below," from the secretaries of primary party organizations, as well as "from above," from members and candidate members of the party raykom, obtained in the course of the survey, is not without interest. In the opinion of the majority of members of the rayon aktiv, the new structure of the raykom apparatus takes more

accurately into consideration the new conditions in which priority is given to methods of political and economic management. For example, 65 percent of those surveyed expressed the view that the new structure made it possible to upgrade the autonomy of the party organizations of labor collectives; 56 percent gave a positive assessment to the activities of our instructor groups (however, 21 percent abstained from answering); 75 percent of those surveyed noted as a positive consequence of the experiment the reduced number of conferences, meetings and summonses to the raykom. Many comrades related this circumstance to the work of instructor groups among primary party organizations.

The aktiv positively assessed the new approach to discussing the resolutions of the February 1988 CPSU Central Committee Plenum. The traditional raykom plenum was replaced by open party meetings which were held in 39 schools and educational institutions; 126 raykom members and candidate members, some 100 sponsors, 65 Moscow Soviet deputies and deputies in the rayon soviet, parents and students were involved in the preparation and holding of these meetings. The suggestions and remarks which were expressed became the foundation for a joint plan for priority measures to be implemented by the CPSU raykom, the rayon soviet executive committee and the Komsomol raykom and of the "Public Education" program, approved by the party raykom buro. The new approach proved the efficiency of interaction between apparatus personnel and the elected party, soviet and Komsomol rayon aktiv.

I would not like to create the impression that the new structure became a panacea for all of our old troubles. Naturally, the problem is more complex. Some of the difficulties which have appeared are, in my view, temporary and, and will be resolved as we gain experience. Others, obviously, are related to the more complex (compared to the old) hierarchical structure of the raykom apparatus. Despite all obstacles, however, the new development is opening the way to positive trends in party work.

Let us note above all that the new rayon party committee structure is far less related to still extant reliance on formal-quantitative indicators and to the "gross output" approach to party work. It has reduced the urge of the raykom to interfere in the affairs of soviet, economic and other authorities. At the same time, this innovation increases the number of "disturbing" questions asked about the efficiency of our activities, leading to the conclusion that on this basis we must more persistently seek opportunities for upgrading the standards of party work and abandon the old criteria under which the apparatus and the formal indicators of its results were of self-seeking importance.

For example, in creating groups of instructors and assigning them to primary party organizations, based on the principle of sectorial affiliation, we approached the

problem traditionally and, frankly speaking, pragmatically. Thus, the party organizations of industrial enterprises, scientific-production associations and design buros were combined within the same group; another group contained the party organizations of creative collectives and schools; a third consisted of party members working at trade, public catering and consumer service enterprises, and so on. The consideration was simple: to create a platform for strengthening relations among party members and promoting their cooperation and work for the common interests.

Generally speaking, that is precisely what happened. Judging by the intensiveness of the work of the business meetings club, which now seems to have gained a second breath, it is precisely within the framework of its activities that we obtained the desired result. Furthermore, increasing the exchange of views, the revival of debates as a norm of our life and the creation of conditions for the joint search for optimal ways and means for the solution of the raykom's problems are becoming a fact.

Meanwhile, a foundation for solving a much more important problem appeared within the framework of said classification of primary party organizations: the full restoration of the role and significance of elected party authorities and eliminating the groundlessly inflated powers of the apparatus.

The concept is the following: Party raykom members and candidate members working in the primary party organizations, based on the principle of sectorial affiliation and headed by a party raykom buro member, are members of various commissions or, if you wish, councils (the name is immaterial). Therefore, the instructor groups become assigned to these councils and carry out the assignments and instructions of party raykom members and candidate members. This ensures the priority of members of elected party authorities over the apparatus personnel. Incidentally, this was precisely the method applied in the Leninskiy CPSU Raykom in Leningrad, who were visited by a Krasnopresnenskiy Raykom delegation for purposes of trading experience.

However, the problem which arises here is one which, in our view, should be discussed at the 19th All-Union Party Conference. The conversion of enterprises and organizations to cost accounting raises a number of new requirements for the members of the elected party authorities. Can they carry out intensive and difficult political activities, as is demanded by our time, if the evaluation of production labor, based on end results, increases the value of each working minute?

For example, we came across the case that the election of a head of a cost accounting brigade as a rayon soviet deputy and member of the executive committee was questioned precisely because in the opinion of the collective this could make such a manager to neglect his

direct obligations for the sake of participating in the work of the soviet authorities. Would such a situation not face the members of elected party authorities as well?

In this connection, I would like to suggest that a regulation be formulated on activities of members of elected party authorities and for the party organizations to set aside funds to pay for the time which our aktiv will spend in public work.

The experiment raised a number of questions. We believe that this precisely is its main value.

Party Building as Well Needs Restructuring

V. Kulinchenko, professor, CPSU Central Committee Academy of Social Sciences, Party Building Department, doctor of philosophical sciences.

The CPSU Central Committee theses note that in the light of perestroika the party's role as the leading and organizing force in Soviet society assumes a new aspect. Therefore, reality dictates the need for new quests in the area of party work and, in this connection, in the creative development of the theoretical foundations of party building. Today we must acknowledge that during the period of stagnation stereotypes, dogmatism, descriptiveness, compilations and avoidance of problems and comments on practical activities, including unwarranted praise prevailed in the formulation of such foundations. Another radical shortcoming was the fact that party building was developed and studied for a long period of time primarily as a science of organization. Suffice it to leaf through the various textbooks and aids to realize that party activities, which are comprehensive, had been reduced to organizational and, frequently, administrative activities. The same could be said about the interpretation of the complex combination of internal party relations and ties. As a result, party discipline and the ways of shaping and strengthening it are limited to developing a feeling of obligation, assiduity and even thoughtless obedience. This, whether we wish it or not, distorts the Leninist understanding of party discipline which is based on high idea-mindedness and conscientiousness, voluntary participation and comradely mutual aid among like-minded party members.

Reducing party building to problems of organization and organizational relations among party members led in fact to underestimating party theoretical, ideological and educational work. All of this could not fail to have a negative effect on party practical activities in which the command-arbitrary and bureaucratic style of management, which is one of the main obstacles to perestroika, gained firm positions. This style became the reason for the appearance of a number of stereotypes, including assertions which became extensively widespread in the past, on the need for firmly exercising the party's power function, interpreted most frequently in the purely administrative-legal sense. For that reason, the scientific and truly democratic forms of activity inherent in the

party (free exchange of opinions and comradely debates, agitation and persuasion, collectivity and glasnost) were gradually restricted as a result of excessive organization, bureaucratic administration, and one-man orders and commands.

Life poses a number of difficult problems such as, for example, about ways through which the primary party organizations can implement their guiding role in production, and the nature of their interaction with labor collective councils and public organizations. Such problems face the party raykoms and gorkoms as well. Nonetheless, these are partial problems stemming from the general aspect of the functions inherent in the Communist Party as the political vanguard of society, which demands its reinterpretation. The authority of party committees and organizations will be defined by their ability to ensure the vanguard role of the party members in solving the difficult problems of perestroika. This can be achieved not by command methods but by setting the example of a creative attitude toward the work, interest and sincere concern for perestroika and for the fate of socialism.

In our view, under contemporary conditions we cannot develop the theoretical and methodological problems of party building and structure intraparty life and the leading activities of the Communist Party on a scientific basis without studying and bringing to light its dialectical interconnection with society. Unfortunately, this most important problem of party building has been left virtually outside the range of our studies. The interrelationship between society and the party is complex and varied. That is why it cannot be considered and developed one-sidedly, exclusively in the manner in which the party influences society.

The study of these relations is the starting point in understanding the basic problems of party building. It enables us to identify the real problems existing in the development of society and to formulate the ways and means of solving them which, precisely, is the pivot of any scientific policy.

The role of critical analysis in party activities, which may seem a sufficiently well mastered problem in theory, also awaits innovative approaches. The reason is that for a long time one-sidedness predominated in the development of criticism and self-criticism, for they were concentrated essentially on identifying errors and shortcomings. It was most frequently the external, the visible phenomena which were subjected to criticism, anything which was on the surface, such as negative technical and economic indicators and errors in the organization of labor and production and in the management and administration systems. Such criticism was, and is, essentially after the fact. There is no reason to lower the importance of such criticism. Nonetheless, although

important it is but only one aspect of party critical activities. Its absolutizing would indicate an impoverishment and distortion of the essence and social purpose of criticism and self-criticism.

Unquestionably, many other problems of party building exist which await their fastest possible solution.

Reserves of Direct Democracy

A. Berezhnev, associate, USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Biochemistry and Physiology of Microorganisms, Pushchino, Moscow Oblast.

The pivotal idea of the CPSU Central Committee theses is the all-round democratization of society and reform of our political system. They earmark the trends of soviet perestroika. In my view, however, an antibureaucratic nature of activities in the political system can be achieved by expanding the representative democracy of the soviets with the direct participation in social management of all citizens without exception.

For the time being no integral organizational structure exists to this effect, although its individual elements, such as general meetings, letters to higher organizations and discussions in the press, have already proved their usefulness. The task of democratizing society in practice is, in my view, one of organizing such elements within a single orderly system related to the current power institutions. Debate clubs organized by the soviets of people's deputies and the labor collective councils could become one of the foundations of such a system. Compared with any appointed or even democratically elected authority, the advantage of this system is that it provides no opportunities for elitism or bureaucracy, for no special benefits could be gained from participating in the work of the club. The only authority which would be recognized here would be that of the proper argument.

The very meaning of the activities of a debate club, as a form of collective, free and practical discussion of problems and decision made under the conditions of openness and extensive involvement of the citizens in administrative processes and the creation of conditions for a nationwide, educated control, would give it a special status. The debate club should not only supplement the already existing system of political and economic training but be a kind of brain trust of the soviets, a working agency of democracy and a primary organizational form for the formulation of decisions related to the management of socioeconomic processes.

The first shoots of the future structure of direct democracy, used in solving problems of social and economic development—discussion clubs, philosophical (methodological) seminars, centers for the study of public opinion and some other similar associations, unless the nature of their activities make them formal—which are already showing up were not particularly noticed as long as the results of their work did not affect any social

requirements. Healthy cost accounting and self-financing relations in economics and the restoration of social activeness in the political area of such institutions require special organizational time and place for the discussion of economic, political and legal problems and a wide range of problems which inevitably affect the most significant aspects of the life of individuals.

Useful information, suggestions, and recommendations for the adoption of specific decisions by state authorities (such as soviets of people's deputies) or labor collectives (labor collective councils) could become the practical outcome of the activities of debate clubs. An equally significant result would be that of developing political standards and confidence in the people in the possibility of really influencing the course of events without the need for any special efforts, actually opposing elitism and bureaucracy from which, for the time being, no single elected authority is ensured.

Excerpts From Letters

V. Truntov, docent, CPSU History Department, Krasnodar Polytechnical Institute, candidate of historical sciences:

I frequently have the opportunity to lecture in the various cities and villages in this kray. I ask rural and industrial workers if they have lists of cadre reserves. "They are in the safes," they answer me. Is this not a clear sign of the recent past?

In my view, the reserve list must be made public for all to see. I am confident that the working people will make the right decision as to who should remain on the reserve and be trained for future work and who is unsuitable. Necessarily, suggestions will be formulated as to people who could be included in the reserves. I am profoundly convinced that making the reserve public will "urge on" those who hold leading positions today. Glasnost would be very useful also to those who are members of the reserve.

V. Timoshkin, senior assistant to the Mordovian ASSR prosecutor:

Article 23 of the CPSU statutes stipulates that the party apparatus is created for purposes of current operations in organizing and controlling the implementation of party decisions and helping the lower organizations in their activities. The structure and personnel of the party apparatus are determined by the CPSU Central Committee.

However, the party training and selection of cadres for the party apparatus are not regulated by the CPSU statutes. Yet such cadres do not include merely simple executives but frequently quite influential individuals.

It is precisely the lack of regulation governing the training and selection of cadres that, in my view, is the reason for the bureaucratization of the party apparatus, servility and subservience. Such negative phenomena among party workers are, willy-nilly, extended to other areas of our life.

In my view, the selection of cadres for the party apparatus should be conducted on a competitive basis, with subsequent ratification at party committee bureau sessions. Mandatorily the recommendations of the party organizations concerning the individual candidates must be heard. A similar method could be applied in choosing candidates for enrollment in the higher party schools among party members with an inclination for political work, regardless of the nature of their employment. That is why, in my view, Article 23 of the CPSU statutes should be expanded with an indication of the means of shaping the party apparatus.

V. Bogayevskiy, war and labor veteran, working retiree, Artem:

I am always puzzled when I come across criticism addressed at no one in particular, despite our claims to glasnost, democracy and openness! Newspapers, journals and the television name those who have initiated the criticism and who disagree with any faulty or unsuitable practice in our life. Yet we can only guess at the identity of those who are criticized. Increasingly the names of organizations and ministries are being given but, most frequently, no personal names. It would be worthwhile to name the specific individual, his position and place of work. Let everyone know about him.

K. Golubev, lecturer, Nelidovo CPSU Gorkom, Kalinin Oblast:

One of the important conditions for the democratization of internal party life, in my opinion, is introducing in the practical work of party committee plenums and party meetings the principle of discussing alternate draft resolutions. Taking into consideration that all of them are published in advance and that the party members are thus given the opportunity to study them, one could assume that the discussion of such documents would be lively, interested and thoughtful. With such an organization of the matter, the program for future joint activities will have to be properly drafted rather than putting a stamp of approval, as is currently the case, on draft resolutions prepared by the party committee apparatus.

Ye. Lukovnikov, CPSU member since 1944, Yakutsk:

Today solving the question of whether the secretary of a primary party organization should be relieved of his regular job or not depends on the number of party members registered with the organization. In my view, the total number of people employed at an enterprise or establishment should be the decisive condition, for by virtue of their nature, party activities involve all working

people. According to my observations, the other side of the current restrictions on paying a salary to thus released party workers is the fact that the nonreleased secretaries of party organizations frequently become members of the administrative apparatus. The seemingly pretext is always present: They have greater possibilities of doing party work compared, for example, to those of ordinary workers. In frequent cases party leaders are considered members of the production personnel. Such circumstances, one way or another, determine their dependence on the administration and make them "pocket" secretaries of party organizations.

V. Gnyp, party group organizer, Leningrad:

We frequently hear appeals to display greater principledness, firmness and persistence and to defend our viewpoint to the end. But let us honestly admit to the following: After so many years of universal "unanimity," and the still not surmounted fear of possible "consequences," is everyone capable of doing so? Nor should we ignore the heavy burden of the legacy of the past, still alive among the masses. That is why I consider as hasty suggestions to eliminate secret balloting. Real conditions must be taken into consideration.

The discussion of the theses of the CPSU Central Committee for the 19th All-Union Party Conference marks the end of the first stage of the roundtable discussion by correspondents sponsored by **KOMMUNIST** on problems of party construction and further democratization of the party and society. This discussion triggered a great deal of interest among our readers, as confirmed by the hundreds of letters sent to the editors. We express our sincere thanks to their authors. After the 19th All-Union Party Conference **KOMMUNIST** intends to continue the roundtable discussion of topical problems of the democratic renovation of all aspects of party and social activities. The editors hope that the journal's readers will most actively participate in such a discussion.

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Capital Construction: Problems and Ways of Restructuring

18020015g Moscow **KOMMUNIST** in Russian No 9, Jun 88 (signed to press 8 Jun 88) pp 45-55

[Article by Yuriy Petrovich Batalin, deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, chairman of the USSR Gosstroy]

[Text] The implementation of the strategic course of perestroika, and the radical renovation of our society set important tasks to the construction industry. The state of affairs in this area greatly determines the radical reconstruction of the national economy and the accelerated development of the social sphere.

Initial Principles of Perestroika in the Economic Management System

For many long years capital construction ensured the dynamic growth of the country's socioeconomic potential. In the 1970s, however, a substantial drop in the growth rates of investments and the commissioning of capital assets took place. The length of construction time exceeded the set standard by a factor of two or three; the dispersal of financial and material and technical resources among a large number of simultaneously built projects increased. Unfinished construction reached significant amounts (85-90 percent of the annual volume of capital investments). Plans for the commissioning of production capacities remained systematically unfulfilled.

We cannot say that no steps were taken to surmount the negative trends. However, their practical return was insignificant.

The plan called for focusing on the most efficient projects, on the basis of curtailing the growth of investments, and increased return on capital investments and consumption resources by reducing accumulations. Although the increased volume of capital investments was indeed reduced (compared with the 8th 5-Year Plan, it was 41.3 percent in the 9th, 27.5 in the 10th and 17.5 percent in the 11th), their returns continued to decline. During the 8th 5-year period, the national income per ruble of industrial capital investments increased by 33.9 kopecks; it increased by 23 kopecks for the 9th, 17.3 for the 10th and 14.9 for the 11th. The result was a drop in the growth rates of the consumption fund, although its share in the national income increased somewhat. The situation was further worsened by the fact that the greatest cuts were in investments in the social area, the development of the infrastructure and environmental protection. The aspiration to solve current socioeconomic problems to the detriment of long-term ones intensified.

By the end of the 1970s decisions were made to improve economic management methods in construction, above all by introducing new plan indicators and assessments of activities of contracting organizations. However, no actual improvement of the situation in the sector took place. During the 11th 5-year period the completion of the most important types of production capacities and projects in the social area continued to decline rather than increase.

The concentration of forces on a limited number of most important priority projects contributed to a certain acceleration of their completion. However, the degree of completion of construction projects began to decline. In industrial construction it was seventeen percent in 1985, as compared to 20 in 1980 and 43 as required. This threatened the completion of projects in the future. Nor

were we able to achieve a reduction in the length of construction time which averaged, by industrial project, 9.3 years in 1980 and 9.5 years in 1985.

The course of accelerated socioeconomic development, which was charted after the April 1985 CPSU Central Committee Plenum, called for enhancing investment activities and making radical changes in its management and in the economic mechanism of construction work itself.

The new economic mechanism in the sector was established on the basis of the overall concept of a radical restructuring of economic management. Considerable attention was paid to the observance of fundamental principles such as collectivism and cost-accounting, above all on the enterprise and brigade levels. It was precisely through these most important production structures that the tie between individual and social interest is established, and an attitude of proprietorship is manifested.

For a long time the dominant viewpoint was that the advantages of socialism, including its collectivistic nature, are exercised automatically. Experience proved, however, that a legal document of socialization is a necessary but insufficient prerequisite for the assertion of collectivism and making the worker the real master of the production process. In practice the idea that every working person is the owner of the means of production on the scale of the entire national economy became, in the case of society, the reason for which many of its members began to react to socialist ownership at the specific enterprise as belonging to no one. An alienation of the worker from the means of production and lack of coordination among individual, collective and public interests appeared. This became one of the most serious contradictions in the development of socialism.

The solution of this contradiction and the laying of economic foundations for collectivism are related to the application of full cost-accounting which shapes the unified interest of the entire collective.

However, the use of cost-accounting on the enterprise level does not solve all problems. The problem of combining the individual interest of the worker with that of the entire collective remains. This requires for the principles of cost-accounting to permeate all levels and all structural production subdivisions. However, even this is insufficient. The economic mechanism of the reform, the pivot of which is cost-accounting, should be organically linked to the mechanism of democratization and self-government and to granting the labor collectives and their subdivisions real economic power and rights and responsibilities. Actually, cost-accounting presumes democratization. It is only thus that a proprietary attitude toward production and awakening of the initiative and creativity of the workers can be achieved. All of these are principles of the radical reform in economic management, based on cost accounting as the economic

foundation of the system, on collectivism as the most important social quality of our system and self-government as the mechanism for democratization in production; they became the foundations for the establishment of the new economic management system in capital construction. Use was also made of the experience acquired under the conditions of the previous economic mechanism and the specific tasks of the sector were taken into consideration. In particular, it was necessary not only to ensure the accelerated completion of projects in the immediate future but also to lay the necessary foundations for future completion, to put in order the disturbed construction system and to ensure the rhythmical work and steady workload of the different specialized subdivisions involved in construction. This required, to begin with, directing the economic mechanism not only toward the soonest possible commissioning of projects but also toward increasing the amount of work performed.

It was also necessary to block the trend toward increased construction costs, to apply the anti-outlay mechanism and to make resource conservation economically profitable to all participants in the investment process: customers, designers and construction workers.

A different approach frequently prevailed in practice: "Build at all cost." In some cases this was justified, for the result of the commissioning of new capacities substantially outstripped additional construction costs. However, after the economy had virtually exhausted extensive sources of growth and acute shortages of all types of resources developed, reducing expenditures became a decisive prerequisite for normal economic development.

The situation which developed this 5-year period has been particularly grave. The main trends of economic and social development of the USSR and the amount of work done were to be increased by 16-17 percent as against 11 percent, which was the actual result attained in the 11th 5-year period. However, the implementation of the resolutions of the 27th Congress called for increasing the construction program and the 5-year plan called for a 23 percent increase. No corresponding development of material and technical facilities for construction were stipulated in the 5-year plan. For that reason, substantially reducing overall resource outlays became exceptionally important.

Customarily, it is considered that the conservation of resources can be achieved above all in the course of production work itself. In a number of cases this is indeed the case. Furthermore, negligence in construction sites is what strikes us first. Nonetheless, the greatest opportunities for lowering outlays reside in the engineering designs. The mechanism of contractual prices, which was developed in the course of experimentation in Belorussia and several other areas, creates substantial incentives for the economic utilization of resources and the use of progressive design.

Like any complex system, the economic mechanism presumes the interconnection and coordination of the work of all of its elements, assemblies and units. No significant results can be achieved by introducing or eliminating individual indicators, incentives or sanctions. Nonetheless, putting into action simultaneously all the elements of the new economic mechanism is difficult. Taking this into consideration, priorities were set up, providing conditions for a conversion to economic management methods, motivating labor collectives to master them as quickly as possible. The use of collective contracting was emphasized. At the present time the organizations within the construction complex have converted almost entirely to this work method. Despite frequent cases of formalism in the use of contracting principles, results have been quite significant. Experience has confirmed that collective contracting makes it possible to create a joint interest on the part of managers, specialists and workers, and to establish among trust subdivisions and services relations of reciprocal responsibility and directly link wages to production and economic results. This encourages initiative and enterprise, and changes the attitude of the people toward the job, and contributes to improving the financial and economic results of enterprise activities. The development of production democracy and involving the working people in management, which are inseparable from collective contracting, make it possible to leave behind the stereotypes of a command-oriented economy with its mentality of bureaucratic administration and issuing directives. This leads to the shaping not only of economic but also of sociopsychological prerequisites for the further development of economic reform in construction.

The incentives provided by the collective contracting method are supported by the interests of workers, managers and specialists in particular, in converting to the new wage rates and salaries. It is precisely these two areas in the work that accounted for a significant share of the results of accelerated development in capital construction.

In 1986-1987 the increase completion of productive capital, based on all sources of financing, averaged 5.6 percent annually as compared to 3.1 percent in the previous 5-year period. Compared with 1985, in 1987 completion increased as follows: housing, 14 percent; schools, 27; preschool institutions, 16; polyclinics, 33; and vocational-technical schools, clubs and houses of culture, 70 percent. In the majority of cases they were completed much faster than in the past. Within that period, the average length of construction of industrial projects dropped substantially, from 9.5 to 8 years. The trend toward lowering the state of readiness in construction was halted. All of this largely became possible thanks to the sharp increase in the volume of construction and installation work which showed an annual increase of 6.3 percent in 1986-1987 compared to 1.7 percent in the previous 5-year period. The financial situation of the sector improved. In 1987 the number of

organizations working at a loss declined by a factor of 1.6; for the first time in the last 3 years the profit plan was fulfilled; profitability increased and the decline in capital returns was halted.

Nonetheless, no radical upturn was achieved in construction. For example, the 27th Party Congress set the task of reducing the length of construction time by 50 percent over the 5-year period, i.e., by an average of 15 percent annually. In practice, the average annual reduction did not exceed 9 percent. The timely completion of many important national economic projects was not achieved and the amount of unfinished construction continued to grow, reaching 141 billion rubles in 1987 or 80 percent of the volume of capital investments. The growth of unfinished construction over the past two years was due to the failure to complete industrial projects. A study indicated that a considerable percentage of such failures was caused by the forced mothballing of a number of started construction projects, and delays in the completion of some projects due to the lack of coordination between construction deadlines and equipment deliveries.

The major shortcomings which remain in capital construction are related to a number of factors, the main one of which is the lack of noticeable improvements in the management of investments and normalizing the construction front.

Streamlining the Investment Process

For a long time the country's construction program exceeded the actual possibilities of the economy. This led to a grave shortage of construction resources and the actual freezing of huge funds. In order to normalize the situation, in recent years the number of construction projects was reduced by 13 percent. More than 21,000 projects were mothballed, involving capital investments of some 8 billion rubles.

To this day, however, the front of construction projects remains unjustifiably long. More than 300,000 industrial projects included in the plan are simultaneously under construction. Their completion alone would require 4.4 years. On the threshold of a conversion to self-financing, contemplating significant restrictions in "free" capital investments, ministries, departments and enterprises literally started a competition for obtaining governmental decisions on the development of individual sectors and regions financed out of centralized funds. As a result, the implementation of decisions already made would require investments of approximately 1.1 trillion rubles in the 13th 5-year plan.

Nonetheless, the results of studies have indicated that in a number of cases there is no urgent need for new construction. The capacities of enterprises which were commissioned between 1981 and 1986 are used on an average of 85 percent; 20 percent of the projects which were surveyed operate at less than one-half capacity. However, no reliable prevention of new construction has

been organized. Administrative measures are not working. This is largely related to the fact that in solving a number of problems the sectorial approach prevails even in the USSR Gosplan and other central authorities.

For the time being, economic instruments as well are inefficient. Furthermore, some elements of the economic mechanism used in industry actually encourage the building of new enterprises and production facilities rather than improving the use of existing capacities. For example, the wage funds of the overwhelming majority of enterprises come from a basic wage fund and an additional fund allocated on the basis of a growth rate of the volume of output. For each percentage of this growth the fund is increased by 0.2-0.3 percent, i.e., if the output is doubled the wage fund increases by no more than 20-30 percent. What kind of incentives are these in terms of improving the use of available capacities, upgrading their work shift coefficient and, therefore, increasing output! Yet this would enable us substantially to narrow the construction front and to halt building projects with low technical standards.

Under the existing circumstances, a detailed study should have been made of all projects under construction or being prepared for construction, starting with taking a general inventory of construction projects. It would be necessary to assess the technical standard of the projects, the possibilities of producing and supplying the equipment they need, consistently planned completion deadlines, and availability of manpower, raw materials and energy for the created enterprises, and the possibility of increasing the output at related enterprises. Naturally, it would be impossible to make a complete inventory covering the entire country, within a short time. That is why the first stage should be that of concentrating the efforts above all on territories overloaded with construction programs, so that the results of inventory taking could be already applied in drafting the 1989 plan. However, by the end of the year the inventory-taking should be completed comprehensively. At that point its results will become the base for the formulation of the investment program for 1990 and the 13th 5-year period. Unquestionably, many construction projects, above all those with a low technical standard, which could not promote the efficient structural reorganization of the economy, would have to be dropped.

In addition to mothballing already initiated construction projects, it would be expedient to reduce the number of newly started construction. Certain changes have been noticed here in the recent past. Whereas in 1986 the construction of 3,700 projects was initiated, the number dropped to 3,200 in 1987. However, even now the plans for many projects either under construction or the construction of which is contemplated do not meet contemporary requirements. No more than 10 percent of the projects are consistent with world standards. The responsibility for this falls above all on sectorial experts. At the same time, it is important to upgrade the role and responsibility of expert evaluations by the USSR

Gosplan, the GKNT and the USSR Gosstroy. Halting the implementation of obsolete projects would enable us to shift resources sensibly and to concentrate them on areas considered of priority importance to the national economy. Such an administrative step is necessary. Above all, however, we must find the necessary economic instruments for managing investments.

Conversion to self-financing could contribute a great deal to this. However, we should not expect of this step any streamlining of processes in the investment area at the very first stage. The point is that many enterprises have considerable available funds at their disposal. Under these circumstances, the inertia of the past, which is to undertake construction by all possible means, and the still-extant fear that unused funds would be withdrawn, would encourage the initiation of construction projects, although in some cases there may not be any urgent need for them or the possibility of the timely completion of the projects may not exist.

Currently payment for fixed capital is practiced virtually everywhere. Yet there is no economic influence on resources invested in construction projects. In my view, it would be expedient to charge payments for unfinished construction of industrial projects. After the stipulated deadlines have elapsed, the size of the payments should be raised to the level of payments for installed assets. This step would limit enterprise demand for new industrial construction and reduce the existing disparity between the solvent need of enterprises and material and technical resources channeled into the investment area.

Economic Management System in Construction: Improvement Trends

The restructuring in the management of the investment process should be organically interrelated with the further advancement of the economic mechanism in construction output. Only thus can we radically upgrade the efficiency of capital construction.

In practical terms, the sector has been working under the new economic management conditions since 1987. This is a short period of time. However, the situation is changing rapidly. The Law on the State Enterprise was enacted, which offers extensive opportunities for further improvements in the economic mechanism. The main thing now is the use in construction of the second model of full cost-accounting, the leasing contract and cooperative forms of labor organization and incentive.

Whereas the first model, based on the rated distribution of profits, essentially separates the establishment of the wage fund from the most important indicators of cost-accounting activities—income and profit—the second model makes all funds of the collective directly dependent on a surplus of results over costs.

In that case the members of the labor collectives can feel directly, through their earnings, the efficiency of the work of the organization as a whole. This considerably upgrades the effectiveness of the economic instruments, incentives and penalties stipulated in the economic mechanism, and encourages the completion of projects and savings on all types of outlays.

The conversion to the second model, in which the wage fund is linked to the end results of the work of an organization and to its cost-accounting income, eliminates a certain interest on the part of the organizations in simply increasing the volume of construction and installation work. Currently more than 80 trusts within the construction complex use the second model of cost-accounting. Unquestionably, its extensive application will require a tremendous amount of work to strengthen the financial position of the organizations, to eliminate work at a loss and to upgrade profitability.

The actual beginning of such work in construction was laid with the application of the collective contracting method. However, this method does not solve all problems. In the first stage it led above all to upgrading labor productivity and reducing the number of workers but had little effect on the economical utilization of material resources and fixed assets.

These problems can be successfully solved with the use of internal cost-accounting, which ensures a correlation between outlays and results on all management levels and takes into consideration not only labor outlays but outlays of all types of resources, thus enabling us to establish the true contribution of each subdivision and brigade to the final results. It is only in this case that a conversion to full cost-accounting, to its second model in particular, could be accomplished.

For that reason, last year the construction organizations undertook to apply internal cost-accounting and the progressive collectives developed an efficient and specific way of its application: the checkbook system. Its utilization introduces full clarity in the work of each subdivision: your earnings will be consistent with your output. This reliably blocks waste for, to begin with, anyone's negligence becomes obvious and public; second, it immediately hits at the pocketbook and imposes material punishment.

Combined with a well-organized economic training in engineering, the checkbook system is efficiently applied by the Daugavpils Construction Trust of the Latvian SSR Ministry. Here something like a bank has been set up in which each brigade keeps an account. Payments for resources and services are made by check. Every month results and outlays of each brigade are correlated, and wages are computed on the basis of such correlation. Here the implementation of the principles of the second model of cost-accounting essentially begins precisely on the brigade level.

The development of internal cost-accounting and the checkbook system not only offer major economic opportunities but also have a profound sociopolitical content. Internal cost-accounting economically supports the process of democratization in society, particularly in production. If it is well-organized, workers and specialists will see to it that the positions of brigade leaders, section chiefs and heads of administrations and trusts are held by people who can ensure high production efficiency, order and discipline and eliminate irresponsibility, for it is only thus that the material and moral interests of collectives and individual workers could be satisfied.

Practical experience has indicated that the application of cost-accounting in brigades and sections is being obstructed by the lack of interest on the part of managers and specialists. This is entirely natural as long as cost-accounting does not bring them anything other than additional efforts and obligations. In order to make progress, in frequent cases administrative pressure had to be applied on the managers. Conversion to full cost-accounting, to its second model in particular, eliminates such obstacles. At this point the entire collective becomes vitally interested in the development of internal cost-accounting.

Collective contracting, internal cost-accounting, the checkbook system and, finally, conversion to the second model of full cost-accounting are the main stages in the systematic application of the new economic mechanism in construction.

Furthermore, many other important trends exist, which must be extensively developed. Particularly important among them are those which accelerate scientific and technical progress. So far we have been unable to actuate this decisive development factor. The conversion to new economic management methods by construction, engineering and scientific research and design organizations should change the situation. A great contribution to solving this problem could be made by applying in price-setting practices price lists per unit of consumer effect of construction output, per square meter of housing area, kilometer of pipeline or road, and so on. The conversion to such price lists and contractual prices established on their basis would strengthen the anti-outlay mechanism and the orientation toward end results not only by production organizations but also by the other participants in the investment process, for a significant part of the results of the application of progressive solutions would be distributed among them through the use of contractual prices.

The conversion to a price-list system would exclude unjustified increases of contractual prices by construction workers. Furthermore, their application offers a type of competitive alternative under the conditions of the still-remaining monopoly status of many producers. Currently price lists have been drawn up for virtually all projects in the social area and for a considerable number of frequently duplicated industrial projects.

Any further improvement in the economic management system in this sector calls for expanding the rights of organizations in formulating their own production programs. In accordance with the Law on the State Enterprise, such programs must be drawn up by the labor collectives independently. This year, however, we were unable to implement this stipulation and the virtually entire program was drafted by superior authorities.

The 1989 plan will be drawn up differently. In addition to the control figures, as initial data for concluding contracts, the construction organizations will be issued state orders for the most important industrial, housing and social projects. The control figures would make it possible to ensure the coordination between construction programs and limits of contractual work for customer organizations, while the state orders will deal with the most important economic and social tasks of the country.

Improvements must be made in the system of direct commodity-monetary relations between customer and contractor. In accordance with the established course of broadening the rights of enterprises and organizations, obviously it will be expedient to allow them the possibility of determining by themselves in their contracts the procedures for account settling and the amounts and deadlines for receiving advances on the work they do, taking into consideration the type of construction, the specific way in which it is carried out and other factors.

A conversion to the delivery of turnkey projects is an efficient organizational-economic method which ensures concentrating on end results. Under this construction method the contracting organization assumes the obligation to solve problems of engineering, procuring equipment, construction and tuning and start-up operations.

Steps are currently being taken to convert to turnkey construction in housing, schools and kindergartens and, by the end of the 5-year period, in standardized industrial projects. The organizational foundation for the solution of this problem is the development of a wide network of engineering-construction associations. Currently more than 170 such associations operate in the country.

However, organizational prerequisites are insufficient in order to convert to turnkey construction methods. Practical experience has indicated that tangible incentives must be created, which would make construction workers interested in the application of this method. The same type of incentive will lead to the use of price lists.

Intensifying the Social Trend of Investments and Enhancing the Human Factor

In accordance with the course charted at the 27th Party Congress, this 5-year period the social trend in capital construction increases sharply. Particular attention is being paid to solving the housing problem. In order to

provide every Soviet family with its own apartment or house by the year 2000, in April 1987 the CPSU Central Committee and the government resolved to build during the present 5-year period housing totaling a minimum of 630 million square meters, as compared to the 565-570 million stipulated in the Basic Directions in the Economic and Social Development of the USSR. Whereas in 1985 113 million square meters of housing were completed, the figure rose to 120 million in 1986 and 129 million in 1987; this year the plan will be overfulfilled and 135-140 million square meters of housing will be completed.

In the future the housing construction program will be steadily increasing. By the year 2000 a minimum housing area of no less than 2 billion square meters will have been completed.

Based on forecasts on population increases, the number and structure of families and other factors, in order for virtually every Soviet family to have its own apartment or home by the year 2000, over a 15 year period 36 million apartment units or approximately 2.4 billion square meters of housing will have to be built. This will mean 800 million square meters for the 13th and 900 million square meters for the 14th 5-year period.

This acceleration will become possible largely thanks to increasing private and cooperative housing construction. This approach will enable us to satisfy the need for housing faster, meet solvent population demand better and thus improve incentives to work and the aspiration to work better and to earn more.

Our history is familiar with periods of explosive growth of labor productivity, which was typified, for instance by the Stakhanovite movement. The breakthroughs which occurred during that period in many areas of the national economy were achieved, to a decisive extent, thanks not only to the enthusiasm but also the new forms of organization of labor, based on decisively eliminating equalization in the earnings of individual workers. The use of the individual piece-rate wage method make it possible to break down the existing concepts of possible levels of earnings and to achieve their increase by several hundred percent for many production frontrankers. This became possible when shock labor was given proper material encouragement. The successes of the frontrankers created conditions for the faster growth of the economy.

Subsequently, however, equalization trends began to appear, which limited the possibility of making use of the potential of the socialist system and the implementation of the principle "from each according to his capabilities and to each according to his work." Today, in a drastically changed sociopolitical and economic atmosphere, conditions have developed for a breakthrough in many areas in terms of upgrading production efficiency and increasing labor productivity. Perestroyka and democracy have triggered an upsurge of enthusiasm

and brought to light the tremendous creative potential of the working people. Highly efficient collective forms of organization of labor and production and of the entire economic management system have been developed. Collective contracting, which rests on an essentially new type of basic economic relations—collective piece-rate work, the second model of full cost-accounting, combined with internal cost-accounting and the leasing method—provides, in our view, much greater prerequisites for upgrading public production efficiency, compared with those at our disposal during the period of development of the Stakhanovite movement. Today all of this must be applied. We must lift the artificial restrictions imposed on the growth of labor income and thus provide a powerful impetus for the practical manifestation of the creative potential and the labor activeness of the people.

The brigade forms of labor organization and incentive play a special role in the solution of this problem. Unfortunately, as practical experience has indicated, strengthening the unified interest of the entire production collective was occasionally achieved at the expense of weakening the role of the brigade. To a certain extent this is an objective process related to the priority interest of the entire collective over that of its individual units. Some managers, however, concluded that under the conditions of collective contracting there was no need to apply contracting and cost-accounting principles on the brigade level. In our view, this is a very wrong attitude.

Naturally, the development of collective forms of labor organization and incentive creates major problems in implementing the principle "from each according to his capabilities." Their resolution calls for the creation of conditions which would enable every member of the collective to display his individuality and make full use of his possibilities. At that point, Stakhanovites will unfailingly appear in the contracting brigades.

Today the problem of surmounting equalization is quite pressing not only in terms of individual workers and subunits but of entire labor collectives. The implementation of the principle "from each according to his capabilities and to each according to his work" in the primary units can be achieved to the fullest extent only if it applies to the enterprise. However, in order to make proper use of collective contracting and cost-accounting in this case, the problem of economic rates must be solved.

The point is that in the remaining time of the current 5-year period the construction organizations were issued individual rates for withholding funds for the budget, wages and the production and social development of collectives. They actually reflect the existing practice of redistribution of funds from adequately to poorly working organizations. This was necessary, for the 5-year plan had already been drafted and the rates could not ignore its indicators.

A different approach is needed today. We must as of now get to work so that in the next 5-year period we can convert to a uniform or, as a minimum, a group rate and, possibly, a taxation system which would regulate relations between the enterprise and the budget and the rates of distribution of cost-accounting income among individual funds. As to equalizing economic management conditions, this can be achieved by paying for resources and increased rental payments. This approach could be strengthened by undertaking the certification of organizations and, if necessary, re-evaluating their fixed assets. This approach would enable us to truly limit subjectivism and administrative interference in the cost-accounting activities of construction organizations and to increase their autonomy.

The leasing method and the establishment of cooperatives provide vast opportunities for upgrading the labor activeness of the workers and for increasing production efficiency. Even prior to the enactment of the Law on the Cooperative, experimentally several cooperatives had been set up within the construction complex. They were different from each other in terms of scale of activities, types of work and forms of production organization. Within a short period of time, however, the cooperatives proved their high efficiency.

Thus, in the first half year of its activities, the Dolomit Cooperative, which was set up on the basis of a losing gravel-extraction enterprise in Sverdlovsk Oblast, increased its volume of output by a factor of 6.3, while reducing the number of personnel by more than 40 percent. The cost per cubic meter of gravel dropped from 11.9 to 2.8 rubles, i.e., by a factor of 4.25.

Good financial and economic results have been achieved by many cooperatives with the use of state prices, and on the basis of improving the organization of the work, eliminating idling and absenteeism and ensuring the efficient use of the equipment. Frequently high productivity is achieved through multiple-shift work and increased length of the working day. However, if a person wishes to have additional earnings through his honest work, why should he be subject to artificial restrictions and obstructions?

The distinguishing feature of a number of cooperatives is the fact that they structure their work on the principles of leasing, making use essentially of the means of production leased from state enterprises. The leasing method, in its various aspects, seems the most promising, for it enables us to combine the powerful material incentives which were characteristic of a cooperative organization of the work with the nationwide ownership of means of production.

Perestroyka faced construction workers with responsible economic, social and political tasks. Upgrading the efficiency with which investments are managed, further improvements in the economic mechanism, based on the Law on the State Enterprise, and the enhancement of the

human factor would enable construction workers to cope with their assignments and make a worthy contribution to the country's socioeconomic development.

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Consumer Market and Balancing Possibilities
*18020015h Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian No 9,
Jun 88 (signed to press 6 Jun 88) pp 56-64*

[Article by A. Orlov, doctor of economic sciences, director of the All-Union Scientific Research Institute of Market Conditions and Demand]

[Text] The country's domestic market entered the new stage in its development with a number of accumulated contradictions and deformations. Commodity shortages remain. Unsatisfied demand has increased, worsened by economic waves of uproar. Meanwhile, the mastery of the new conditions of economic management in commerce and light industry is encountering difficulties. It is obstructed by rigid retail prices and commercial discounts. Wholesale trade is being organized sluggishly. The old planning systems are being superimposed on the new nature of economic relations.

The party's social strategy is aimed at radically improving population food supplies, solving the housing problem, saturating the consumer market with goods and services, and ensuring a balance between supply and demand. The relevance of these tasks is increased by the continuing fast increase in population income. In 1987 worker and employee wage increases were consistent with the tasks of the 5-year period, while kolkhoz wages outstripped them.

Certain positive changes have taken place on the consumer market. Population demand for some animal husbandry products, cotton and linen fabrics, bedding, porcelain and glassware, motion picture and photographic equipment, truck gardening tools, lumber and construction materials, is being satisfied better.

The female toiletry goods produced by the Komsomolka Association in Minsk, knitted goods produced by Tallin's Marat, shoes manufactured at Moscow's Zarya, Minsk, Biryus and ZIL refrigerators, Elektron and Gori-zont TS-355I television sets, the Tom-209 tape recording set, and radio equipment produced by the Vega Association in Berdsk are in great demand. So far, however, these enterprises have few competitors and without competition and the fight for customers, guidelines could be lost in domestic trade and, even to an even greater extent, in shipping to the world market. Yet the demands of this market are becoming increasingly strict.

As a whole, the imbalance between supply and demand on the consumer market has worsened. In 1986 unsatisfied demand for food products, clothing, shoes, and household items totaled some 15 billion rubles; at the start of 1988 the figure was substantially higher. The worsening of the situation is largely the result of the scarcity of commodity resources. The gap between them and the growing purchasing power of the population has widened. Population purchases of alcoholic beverages from state retail stores declined by more than 15 billion rubles in 1987, compared to 1984. Meanwhile, the planned increase in the production of goods was not achieved and foreign imports were reduced. The level of commodity stocks dropped substantially below the norm.

As reported by trade correspondents of the VNIKS, compared with 1986, in 1987 trade worsened in the case of 270 out of 880 types of watched commodities. The scarcity of items, such as toothpaste, inexpensive lotions, eau-de-Cologne, shaving cream, tea, coffee, vegetable oil, tights for women and children, galvanized elements and washing detergents, worsened. In many areas the list includes sugar, children's shoes, inexpensive clothing and shoes for the elderly. Shortages of jam, zephyr, fruit fudge, fruit candy, fruit drops, chocolate, and dietetic products and products for diabetics exist virtually everywhere. Waves of demand crest periodically, and cyclical shortages and imbalances are noted.

The cyclical nature of shortages and the stir of demand, which accompanies them when several factors come together (rumors, social stress), are created by even more serious reasons than errors in the orders placed by trade organizations although, naturally, we should not ignore efforts to protect oneself from shortages by hoarding.

Thus, there have been periodical shortages of coffee and tea. The acute shortage and the first wave of unsatisfied demand for coffee in 1978 gradually developed between 1975 and 1977. Procurements of raw coffee dropped in a single year from 28,000 to 19,000 tons. Correspondingly, the average annual per capita consumption level declined from 110 to 73 grams. In 104 out of 130 cities surveyed by VNIKS trade correspondents, virtually no coffee was sold freely. Naturally, this triggered increased demand for tea. At first such demand was consistent with the increases in supplies. During that period, per capita tea consumption increased from 520 to nearly 590 grams and there were no difficulties in tea sales. The 500 percent increase in coffee retail prices was able to lower the scarcity but only temporarily. As a whole, the situation was not corrected. Shortages declined somewhat but later once again broke out with their previous severity. The cyclical nature of the "coffee" shortage is due also to the lack of reserve stocks to compensate for poor crops, and the inability of foreign trade organizations to find reliable partners on the market. As a result, the 1975 level of coffee procurements for the domestic market was not reached even once.

Per capita tea consumption continued to grow and reached 940 grams in 1987. At the same time, however, the scarcity of tea as well worsened. As a result of the pursuit of gross output, the quality of the tea, Georgian and Azerbaijani in particular, dropped catastrophically. The population refused to accept this product as tea, and there was ever growing demand for Indian and Ceylonese tea.

The situation remains extremely difficult. Last year, coffee procurements totaled 25,000 tons. In order to normalize the market, taking into consideration higher income and increased demand, 35,000-40,000 tons would be needed. Coffee is regularly sold in only 16 percent of the cities. There are no difficulties in tea sales in 90 percent of the cities. But what about its quality?

Unless purchases of raw coffee beans are not increased in 1988-1989, the steadily rising demand on the domestic market will bring about an even worse scarcity in the next 2 to 3 years.

In my view, a radical long-term change in the situation can be achieved by developing coffee production with the help of their Soviet partner, in Vietnam and Laos, where climatic conditions for this crop are excellent. This would enable us to ignore any adverse changes in the world coffee-market. This method is successfully applied by the GDR. Why should we stand aside?

Another aspect of the problem of the cyclical nature of shortages is made apparent by the study of the situation with toothpaste and tooth powder. In my view, in this case the scarcity cycles are related not to the dynamics of supply but to demand. A wave of shortage of tooth powder welled in 1973, 1977 and 1980. This affected above all large families and the retired. The scarcity of toothpaste worsened in 1973 and, particularly, in 1987-1988. Today toothpaste can be bought freely in less than one-half of the cities. Once again this year the situation with sales of tooth powder has worsened.

Toothpaste production increased from 240 million tubes in 1983 to 304 million in 1987. However, toothpaste imports were drastically curtailed. As a result, no more than 40 to 60 percent of the request submitted by the USSR Ministry of Trade for the procurement of toothpaste for the domestic market was met in 1987-1988. I believe that without steady imports and efficient trade, organized directly between commercial enterprises, we shall be unable to eliminate this shortage in the next few years.

The reasons for the continuing worsening of mass shortages are largely related to "failures" in commodity supplies. Light industry failed to fulfill its assignments for the production of leather shoes and clothing. The quality rating of nearly 20 million meters of fabrics, about 3 million pieces of knitted goods and 9 million pairs of shoes had to be lowered or else the items were discarded as defective. Production shortfalls included

more than 700,000 television sets, 200,000 tape recorders and almost 190,000 washing machines. These are essentially goods in greater demand. Losses from rejects, returns and finishing-off, added to losses in food products, totaled no less than 18-20 billion rubles. It is obvious that additional goods worth this sum would be obtained by meeting contractual obligations and ensuring the high quality of the goods.

Meanwhile, consumer reaction to the low quality of goods became sharply aggravated. They justifiably consider low quality a concealed form of retail price increases.

The overall level of commodity consumption and structure has remained virtually unchanged. In 1987 the per capita physical volume of commodity sales rose by no more than 0.7 percent. Meanwhile, population savings continued to grow. Deposits in savings banks exceeded 275 billion rubles; according to some estimates, 60 to 65 billion are so called surplus savings, i.e., savings related not to putting aside funds needed for major purchases, but the impossibility of finding the necessary goods on the market. In addition to current unsatisfied demand, such savings are exerting increasing pressure on the consumer market. The situation is becoming intolerable. Today the solution of consumer problems is assuming not only a socioeconomic but a major political significance as well. According to the plan, the volume of retail trade in the state and cooperative trade systems should increase this year by 22 billion rubles. The plan calls for increasing the volume of paid services by 11.9 percent, totaling 63.1 billion rubles. Steps are being taken to increase the production of new and especially fashionable types of clothing, shoes, sports goods and construction materials. This could substantially influence the normalizing of the situation on the consumer market. We are encouraged by the implementation of the sales plan for April and May of 1988. However, in no case should we belittle the difficulties, many of which have come to us from the past. We cannot avoid taking radical steps in the production area or a radical restructuring of the economic mechanism and gradual revision of retail prices.

According to VNIKS computations, between 1971 and 1975 average increases in retail prices accounted for about 30 percent of increased sales figures; they accounted for 49 percent in the 1976-1980 period, 57 percent in 1981-1985 and more than 60 percent in 1986-1987. In the past 17 years average retail prices increased overall by 35-38 percent, including 25 percent as a result of structural changes in the variety and quality of goods. This process was difficult to control.

The practiced price policy had no clear social guidelines. The share of expensive and luxury goods increased. Attracting the monetary resources of the high-income population strata compensated for the overall scarcity of

goods. Nonetheless, the aggravation of shortages, and rumors about a monetary reform increased the dissatisfaction of the elderly, people of retirement age, large families and young people.

Price benefits and subsidies are distributed essentially in proportion to income and find their way to the middle- and high-income population groups. In families of workers and employees with an income not exceeding 50 rubles per month per member, per capita expenditures for purchases from state and cooperative stores were lower by a factor of 6.5 for meat products, 6.8 for dairy products, 5.6 for eggs, and 10 for fruit, compared with families whose income was in excess of 200 rubles per person.

Several different prices have been set for food products and durable goods, depending on the channels through which they are sold, ranging from fixed to free market prices. For example, in the case of meat and meat products the following are used: 1. Fixed state retail prices; 2. Commercial prices (with a lower and upper limit) in stores of consumer cooperatives and the agroprom (higher than fixed prices by a factor of 1.2-2); 3. Prices regulated by the foreign exchange rate, in Berezkatype stores, for the highest quality goods (a factor of 2.6-6); 4. Free prices on urban markets (higher by a factor of 2-5); 5. Fixed prices in the free-access network of public catering enterprises (higher by a factor of 1.2-2); 6. Subsidized prices in restricted public catering enterprises—in enterprises, establishments, hospitals, sanatoriums, kindergartens and schools (lower by a factor of 1.1-1.4); 7. Free prices in cooperatives and individual-family coffee shops, restaurants, pelmeni stores, shish-kebab and pirozshki stores and family boarding houses (higher by a factor of 3-6); 8. Physical consumption in terms of value, of products grown in private auxiliary farms, kolkhozes and sovkhoses (lower by a factor of 1.2-2). Goods marketed at fixed and subsidized prices are differentiated in terms of quality and variety, depending on the category of the food stands, cafeterias, sanatoriums and stores.

The restructuring of retail prices presumes their flexibility, combined with centralized control over the volume of goods marketed at the different prices and setting up ceilings for their changes by individual commodity category. In addition to a comprehensive and gradual revision of the entire system of retail prices, one-time steps must be taken at the present stage. This would involve increased internal-variety price differentiations, taking into consideration differences in quality, packaging and presentation of goods, and categorizing stores bearing in mind mark-ups based on the quality and array of trade services.

The reform in price setting should solve not only problems of current balancing of supply and demand or eliminating structural price distortions. The supertask behind it is to eliminate the scarcity of goods and to ensure the freedom of consumer choice. In my view, this

can be achieved by changing the forms of retail trade, such as to prevent trade monopoly, by increasing the variety of types of trade, categories of goods and stores (based on quality).

Changes in the production area influence prices to an ever greater extent. Without the real elimination of economic management based on outlays, which reproduces shortages and ignores the consumer, price controls would be nothing but a palliative. Estimates have indicated that by retaining the present volume of commodity output a balance between supply and demand would become possible by raising food prices 20-30 percent, without cash compensations. I am convinced that this solution is socially unacceptable. Furthermore, no one has suggested it.

Restructuring the APK would have a particularly strong impact on balancing the consumer market. However, the situation here is changing sluggishly. Kolkhozes and sovkhozes were given the right, as part of fulfilling their state plan, to sell as much as 30 percent of their crops at contractual prices, which would include direct sales in city markets. In practical terms, however, we are far from having achieved this, due to several obstacles: the APK enterprises have neither the skill nor taste for marketing. So far they find it difficult to compete on the markets with the private auxiliary farms in terms of production quality, variety, presentation of the goods, flexibility and ability to control sale prices efficiently (on an hourly basis). Furthermore, the APK enterprises fear that ties between suppliers and consumers, which took years to develop, will be broken. The desire for flexibility and for mastering new trade ways and means is clashing with support for customary systems. Nor is there full trust as yet between kolkhozes, sovkhozes and consumer cooperatives, and the new cooperatives, which are not always able to purchase goods during the mass procurements season because of weak material and technical facilities.

The agrocombines, agrofirms and other integrated enterprises, which combine production, transportation and storage of food products and trade in them, could contribute to making the food market more flexible. They could achieve this by relying on brigade and family contracting and leasing.

True commercial activity on the market presumes the mastering of marketing techniques, which are systems of ways governing a market orientation (from the study of potential consumers, markets and active advertising to efficient varietal and price controls). We must also set up commercial risk funds and commodity reserve funds to counteract outbursts of demand. In the case of prolonged scarcity, when domestic reserves are low, it would be expedient to make fast additional purchases abroad. To this effect, in my view, we need to set up a special foreign exchange fund and a reserve of commodities with which

to trade. Such funds, as is currently being done in Czechoslovakia, could be created from assets taken from producers who have failed to produce the necessary amount of scarce goods.

Unless replaced by rationing (strict funding), trade is based on the ability to purchase and sell goods quickly and profitably. A certain risk is always inevitable: a fast turnover and high income can be guaranteed only when commodities are available in their full variety and are consistent with consumer demand and availability of choice. For a long period of time this true role played by trade was simply ignored. Stores were looked upon as distribution centers. We are now harvesting the results of this attitude. Numerous resolutions have been passed on the need to set up reserve stocks of goods, raw materials and capacities and numerous resolutions are being adopted to this day. It is simply impossible to formulate production plans and to direct available capacities into satisfying trade orders without reserves. The cost of setting up and maintaining reserves must be correlated with possible losses. For the time being we shall have to face losses into the billions of rubles.

As we study market demand and situations, we must be able to anticipate shortages and, should they become aggravated, eliminate increasing waves of demand by taking a set of active steps.

That is why the comprehensive study of the consumer market is becoming one of the basic national economic problems. Currently it is being applied exclusively to trade. Unlike cooperatives, enterprises and associations react with great delays to changes in the structure of needs and demand. They are unprepared for pursuit of a new varietal policy even when resources are available, as they are, for example, on the new market of lumber and construction materials. That is why it would be expedient to expand the area of study of situations and demand and to include the market of means of production. Work on a model for market control is very important. It should rely on medium- and long-term forecasts of the volume and structure of solvent population demand, and a study of the economic behavior of enterprises under the conditions of perestroika of the economic mechanism, which are intensifying the orientation toward the market.

We must accurately compute of the balance of population monetary income and expenditures. Until recently by no means were all types of monetary income considered. The actual second economy was ignored although it had its own laws and prices. Current and accumulated unsatisfied demand was not taken into consideration, such as surplus savings, or income from cooperative and individual labor activity.

Obviously, a "market model" must be multisectorial. It must take into consideration in the offer of commodities demand and trade correlations among state, kolkhoz-cooperative, individual-family sectors, the consumer cooperative and the various socioeconomic, sex-age population groups and types of consumers.

The manifestations of demand are specific: they are related to time and place, type of commodity, population group, price fluctuations and monetary income. In the course of determining demand, the consumer turns from some abstract "person" into a specific worker, employee, kolkhoz member, member of a cooperative, student, or pensioner. General considerations on needs are translated into the language of economic prose with its remaining shortages and unsatisfied demand.

With scarcity the consumer's choice is limited. He spreads his income among goods and services not under the influence of demand and even less so of need but according to forced availability. In this case the consumer does not influence the producer, for his influence is distorted. He has virtually no influence on the price and, consequently, on the producer's profit. Actually, no real economic relations exist between them. The lack of freedom of consumer choice makes their relationship more administrative than economic.

However, if the consumer does not influence prices and supply as well as the overall economic behavior of the producer, there can be no democratic potential for market relations. Although they may look like market relations, all they do essentially is to conceal the diktat of the producer and the administrative regulation of consumption. The consumer is deprived of the possibility to indicate through the market his assessment of the production process and to control its consistency with the real needs of the people.

For that reason the elimination of scarcity has become a vitally important task. We cannot achieve the true sovereignty of the consumer on the socialist market without solving this problem. Naturally, the sovereignty of the consumer is ensured not only as a result of eliminating scarcity but also through an extensive price differentiation, the possibility of obtaining objective information on the consumer qualities of goods, high quality commercial services, alternate forms of trade, and so on. However, all of this can become reality only on the basis of balancing supply with demand. Unfortunately, today the dynamics of this balance is unfavorable. That is precisely why we urgently need to take measures aimed at changing the structure of demand, involving goods which are in the shortest supply and, above all, take steps to stimulate the supply of the necessary commodities and services.

Editorial Comment by Ye. Gaydar, editor, political economy and economic policy department.

After publishing these considered views by a specialist, we can say that the situation which has developed on the consumer market instills legitimate concern. The fact that the further worsening of the already grave situation in the consumer goods area really threatens perestroika can be confirmed by the tone of many letters to the editors of our journal. The lowered living standard and the aggravation of scarcity are frequently related in the

public mind to the current economic policy and the economic reform, ignoring the fact that we are dealing above all with the consequences of the grave errors made in the area of economic policy in past decades.

The attitude toward the cooperatives is characteristic in this connection. Last year, state enterprises and kolkhozes supplied the trade network with goods worth 17 billion rubles less than planned. The overall volume of commodity marketing by cooperatives, including those engaged in processing recycled raw materials, amounted to 350 million rubles. As we can see, these figures are simply not comparable in terms of scale. Nonetheless, the idea that the members of cooperatives are responsible for the aggravation of shortages in the consumer goods trade has already become commonplace.

Efforts are being made to correct the situation on the consumer market. In particular, last year sales of timber and construction materials to the population increased substantially (by 40 percent). The heavy industry sectors, including defense enterprises, are increasingly undertaking the production of consumer goods. However, these and similar measures proved insufficient to compensate for the reduced sales of alcoholic beverages and imported goods.

A severe scarcity on the market is by no means the best possible situation in which to implement an economic reform. The superior authorities are "pressuring" the enterprises into increasing the volume of output at all costs. The lack of real competition makes it possible to raise prices and sell substandard goods. In order for the positive changes which have nonetheless taken place in the national economy (faster lowering of production costs, increased labor productivity in industry and construction, and faster working capital turnover) to be able to influence condition on the consumer market, time is needed. Meanwhile, the stock of the people's faith in the policy of perestroika is substantial but not unlimited. More than 3 years have gone since it was started and the people are waiting for tangible positive changes in living standards, changes which are occurring sluggishly. Hence the yearning for a firm hand, on the part of some, and social apathy and mistrust in real change, of others. In order to prevent a shift in the attitude of society toward the initiated profound socioeconomic changes, we must surmount the adverse trends on the consumer market within the immediate future. If the situation continues to worsen, we shall have to face the following choice: either empty shelves in the stores, longer lines, rationing and, against this background, the blossoming of the black market, or else uncompensated price increases and, therefore, a drop in real population income. Both choices are equally unacceptable and, furthermore, they are fatal to the cause of perestroika.

In our national economy the situation with retail trade is most closely related to the financial situation, the state budget above all. The drastic worsening of the scarcity of consumer goods, which is currently taking place, is

combined with the extensive use of economically improper sources of financing state expenditures or, in simple terms, substantial state budget deficits. The interconnection is obvious: excessive governmental expenditures trigger an influx of population income without any commodity backup.

Premature and as yet excessive plans and economic adventures are being financed out of the state budget, alongside normal expenditures required to meet the needs of society; inefficient sectors and enterprises are being supported. The growing budgetary deficit proves the inability to redistribute resources among the types of activities which can satisfy solvent demand.

Currently attention is focused on the question of subsidizing food products. Suggestions that prices of meat and dairy goods be raised are frequently related precisely to reduced budget expenditures. We must clearly realize that this can solve no more than part of the problem of stabilizing the market and that it is a totally impossible way of solving the problem of budget deficits. A full compensation, needed in order to avoid a drop in the population's living standard, would require a corresponding increase in the other types of monetary payments to the population, which, once again, will have to be financed by the budget. Switching some of the demand for meat and dairy products to industrial consumer goods, which would take place after normalizing the price structure, would not correct the overall market situation.

Since we shall not agree to lowering the real level of the population's income or to "savings" in the social area, what are left are 2 major groups of budget expenditures which must be essentially reviewed. First, defense expenditures; second, outlays for the financing of industrial capital investments and compensations of losses of unprofitable enterprises. Possibilities of saving in the first area are determined by an array of foreign policy factors which are objective in nature, in terms of economic activities. However, lowering the second group of expenditures is becoming today a strict requirement demanded by reality.

For many decades efforts were made to compensate for the faulty economic management mechanism, in the agroindustrial complex for example, with a flow of funds channeled into that area. One way or another, most of those costs were paid out of the budget and out of loans, which lost their specific nature and became a variety of inflationary budget financing. It is precisely the state budget that is financing large-scale water reclamation projects, which are not yielding promised results, and the building of reinforced-concrete cattle "palaces." It was precisely the state budget that paid for the tempestuous increase in procurements of substandard agricultural equipment. That same source made possible the increased production of chemical fertilizers and the compensation for losses resulting from their inefficient use.

It would be unnecessary to prove yet once again that it is only when the land acquires a master, when the command style is no longer applied in agriculture, that such resources will begin to yield returns. Now it is important to meet the demand of agricultural enterprises for the type of equipment and projects for which they are prepared to pay, be it land reclamation, or procurements of tractors or chemical fertilizers. Therefore, should the state continue to finance the development of water resources, thus preventing reclamation enterprises to undertake the type of projects for which kolkhozes and sovkhozes are ready to pay? Why should it finance the production of combines which must then be forced upon agriculture? Why should it pay for increasing the production of tractors the number of which, as it were, exceeds that of tractor drivers?

State financing of large scale investments, the purpose of which is to increase the production of raw materials, energy and fuel, must be seriously reconsidered. Many of them will not yield returns until the next century, but it is today that they are exerting a major pressure on the budget, the consumer market and the entire economic structure. On this matter both tactical and strategic objectives agree: it is much more efficient to achieve major changes in lowering the resource-intensiveness of public production than to finance the squandering of natural resources.

Work is currently under way to make an inventory the major industrial construction projects. The task was set of having a major shortening in construction deadlines and concentrating resources on the most important and most efficient projects. This is the second time that such an effort is being made in the course of perestroika. The steps which were taken in this area in 1986 yielded very modest results due to the fierce opposition of sectorial ministries and local party and soviet authorities. Another defeat of the center in this matter would have an extremely adverse effect on the entire course of economic perestroika. Shortening the period during which public resources are frozen in construction is necessary also in order substantially to lighten the load imposed upon the state budget. It is particularly important to secure the full amount of resources for construction projects which could increase the availability of consumer goods in the immediate future.

The large-scale use of uneconomical and morally and physically obsolete equipment, is a significant factor in the excessive use of resources which must be paid for, one way or another, out of budget funds. Twenty-five percent of blast furnaces, and 40 percent of Martin and rolling mills in our country are more than 30 years old. The trend toward the increased physical obsolescence of productive capital in industry has not been determined as yet (it was 41 percent in 1985 and 43 percent in 1987).

Abandoning state subsidies of the wasteful utilization of resources and making the production process consistent with demand would substantially ease the pressure on

the basic economic sectors and enable us to write off the most heavily worn-out assets and abandon the least efficient mineral deposits; it would enable us to reduce the need for budget funding even further. We must decisively adopt a policy of closing down economically inefficient types of activities which are ruinous to society. Significant opportunities to save funds appear within the framework of this strategy.

By reducing state expenditures we can redistribute resources in favor of enterprises working to meet solvent demand. Major efforts will be required to retrain cadres and reconvert production facilities. However, this is objectively necessary in order for the economy to turn toward the individual. The thus released cement, reinforced concrete structures and lumber could be used to expand cooperative housing construction, the plans for which were once again unfulfilled last year, or increase their direct sales to the population. The flow of cash not backed by actual commodity stocks would be reduced drastically. The enterprises would be forced to reorient their work toward types of activities for which the consumer is prepared to pay.

Reducing purchases of industrial consumer goods on the foreign market dealt a major blow to the budget income in its retail trade area. The increase in the physical amounts of exports of our traditional goods (petroleum, petroleum products, natural gas and timber) as well as noticeable changes in exports of machine building output are insufficient to compensate for worsened trade conditions. Although the foreign debt in convertible currency is, for the time being, relatively small, unquestionably its growing trend must be stopped. So far the actual situation in the national economy does not justify the confidence that borrowed funds would be spent quite efficiently and that such loans would be repaid subsequently without pain. The question of where should foreign exchange be saved is a different matter.

With a substantial disparity in the prices of industrial consumer goods and their quality level on the domestic and foreign markets, reducing purchases in convertible currency by several hundred million rubles would open gaps in the budget and in the balance of retail trade, totaling several billion rubles. In 1987 the relatively minor foreign exchange savings achieved in the purchase of clothing and shoes led to a drastic worsening of the situation in the domestic market for such goods and, for the first time in many years, the absolute amount of the deliveries of such goods to the stores declined.

Imports of furniture, coffee and paper also dropped in 1986-1987. Meanwhile, imports of machines and equipment remained on their previous level and imports of pipes increased. Yet the sum total of imports from developed capitalist countries of clothing, shoes, furniture and medicinal drugs accounts for no more than 12 percent of the value of imported machines and equipment.

Today facts confirming the irresponsible handling of imported equipment by many departments have become common knowledge. Capital construction warehouses contain equipment worth 12.7 billion rubles, including 4.3 billion's worth of imported equipment. Such equipment is becoming obsolete, it is frequently stored under open skies. It becomes unusable and is cannibalized. In 1987 stocks of uninstalled imported equipment increased by a factor of 5 in the warehouses of the Minneftegazstroy, and doubled in the warehouses of the Minugleprom.

According to the specialists, increasing their reliability and other operational features of agricultural equipment, such as to match the standards used in the developed capitalist countries, would enable us to reduce metal consumption for the production and repair of such goods by a factor of 2.5-3, without any reduction in the volume of agricultural work. Today 8 percent of the machine building output is made of rolled metal purchased with convertible currency.

Under this situation it is difficult to consider justified the solving of foreign trade problems at the expense of the people's consumption. Abandoning the financing of economically unsubstantiated projects, triggered by the still operating old economic management mechanism, and increasing purchases of industrial consumer goods by no more than 1.5-2 billion foreign exchange rubles per year would result in the appearance of an essentially different situation on the consumer market and would enable us drastically to reduce the scale of budget deficits. The road would be opened to the accelerated implementation of the economic reform in sectors working for the consumer market: the steep competition provided by imported goods would enable us rapidly to identify enterprises which are making a truly efficient use of resources and to ensure their faster development. Administrative pressure aimed at achieving an increase in the volume of consumer goods would become totally meaningless.

The computations made by the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Economics and Forecasting Scientific and Technical Progress indicate that in the medium term the only sensible and objectively necessary trend in the structural maneuver made in our economy is a turn toward the consumer and a sharp increase of capital investments in the production of passenger cars, essentially new technically complex durable goods, establishing a developed system for their servicing, mass allocation of garden plots, increasing the production of garden huts and the sale of construction materials, mechanization facilities, and other goods to the population. The study of the situation which has developed on the consumer market indicates that the time for such a change has come. The faster the people accept as real the impact of perestroika on their living standard the more irreversible will the process of change in our society become.

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**Minutes of the Sixth (Prague) All-Russian
RSDWP Conference**

*18020015i Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian No 9,
Jun 88 (signed to press 6 Jun 88) pp 65-87*

[Text] (* Continued from No 8, 1988)

Tenth Session

23 (10) January 1912

Tenth Session

[Boris] I declare the session open.

[Albert] On the subject of the interruption. This applies to all organizations abroad, such as those of the Letts, the Poles, GOLOS SOTSIAL-DEMOKRATA, and others (* There is a gap in the further records. Reference to the fact that these organizations had sent greetings to the German Social Democratic Party on the occasion of the success of the Reichstag elections of January 1912). I think that the TsO could send a greeting on its behalf. For considerations of secrecy the conference cannot do so. The ROC could, on its own behalf. They should know that there is an ROC. We shall soon have to turn to them.

[Zinovyev] We may send greetings but ask that they not be published.

[Viktor] I motion that such greetings be sent either on behalf of the conference or the TsO.

[Albert] I oppose that they be sent on behalf of the conference. They are unfamiliar with the Russian conditions and publish everything in the press. This would create a scandal and we have no guarantee whatsoever as far as the press is concerned.

[Zinovyev] I withdraw my motion.

[Boris] I support Viktor's motion. A letter could be written on behalf of the conference but sent in 3 to 4 days. Greetings could also be sent by the ROC and the TsO. What is important is for the Germans to know that a conference has taken place here.

[Albert] It could be drafted now on behalf of the conference but sent later.

[Boris] We could instruct Comrade Lenin to draft the letter (* A telegram was sent. See "KPSS v Rezolyutsiyakh....," vol 1, p 404), and to submit it to the conference and then we can discuss when to send it.

Matter put to a vote and unanimously adopted.

[Boris (chair)] We now move on to the report on the insurance draft bill.

[Aleksandrov] (reporting). Due to lack of time I cannot give you an economic study of this draft law. However, a great deal has already been discussed in the legal press and the Duma. The purpose of the report is to substantiate items in the resolution on which social democratic agitation must concentrate. The first problem which everyone encounters is how did the idea of worker insurance originate. It stems from the contemporary situation of the workers in capitalist society and becomes necessary with the development of society. In capitalist society manpower is considered a commodity, for which reason the worker is paid only as much as he needs to maintain his ability to work under normal conditions, i.e., if he works. That is why the moment the worker finds himself in abnormal conditions, i.e., he does not work, he is literally left without any means of existence. This could be caused by disease, injury, old age or disability, when a situation develops which makes him unable to work before reaching old age. In women workers this includes pregnancy, giving birth and, subsequently, unemployment, closely related to the situation in capitalist society, when a worker, despite his entire wish and ability cannot find a job. With all of these enumerated cases the workers cannot support themselves and it is in the interest of society for the workers not to die out. In the past this was helped by charity. However, charity was rather limited and of a random nature, depending on the generosity of capitalists and, above all, it was a drop in the sea and one could not subsist on such crumbs. Naturally, therefore, the question arose of who was to blame for loss of ability to work. The culprits are the state and the capitalists. Many countries still have the system of individual insurance which, however, suffers from a great deal of inconveniences. For example, if the enterprise collapses, what should he (the worker) do? Even from the viewpoint of capitalist society the need to protect the workers from dying out and to insure them whenever they do not work became apparent. State insurance exists in Germany, which is a classical country in terms of insurance. In Austria, France and England there is even unemployment insurance. This means, above all, that insurance must be taken over by the state. Then, it should cover all hired labor. If a worker has hired out he must be insured. The third principle is the fact that insurance should cover any loss of ability to work. It is stupid to insure someone for illness and not for old age. If this does not exist (it is) an indication of the restricted nature of bourgeois class policy, which is characteristic of bourgeois reformers, even whenever this is demanded by the interests of capitalist development. Furthermore, who should assume financial responsibility? The worker serves capitalist society. Therefore, the obligation to pay must be assumed by the culprit, i.e., by society. Finally, we have the question of the organization of the insured. This must be subject to entirely autonomous work and autonomous activities in the organizations. These are principles on the basis of which governmental insurance

should be structured if it claims to satisfy the interests of the working class. I apologize, I forgot to mention obligations: in cases of voluntary insurance the pressure on the entrepreneur could be strong and go beyond the limits of criminal liability.

Therefore, if we consider the Duma draft bill, the first thing is that not the entire working class is subject to insurance: it applies to one-sixth of the workers and, according to other estimates, one-twentieth of the working class with wives and children; it excludes the worker stratum which needs insurance more than anyone else. Nowhere else is such a treatment (of workers) so bad as in agriculture. This is more than even a cynical mockery, as Markov said. Also excluded are construction workers, an area in which workers are treated with cynical neglect, where dozens of workers are being killed from construction accidents in Petersburg and Kiev. Salesmen are not covered. The coverage does not apply to worker strata who were most active in 1905 and who threateningly formulated their demands and the fact that they would not tolerate their situation. Furthermore, insurance applies only to illness and injury. At one point, in 1905, there was insurance for old age as well. There was a time when the Tsar spoke of insuring rural workers. Therefore, no one should claim that this is a new project, as was stated by a representative of the government (* Rest of the text missing). It is clear that they are using this moment of calm and domination of the counterrevolution and make this small concession to distract the attention of the public.

Now as to the financial aspect: (insurance) from illness (falls) entirely on the workers; for accident, although it is assumed by the entrepreneurs, it has become worse compared to the previous situation: thus, minor disability of up to 13 weeks must be paid out of hospital insurance funds which are established essentially out of worker payments. Minor accidents are the most numerous. This is a disgusting mockery of the lean pockets of the workers. As to self-activity and self-government, the insurance organizations are managed exclusively by the entrepreneurs. In Germany, they act in a consulting capacity. In our country, however, they say the following: If we are making the payments we control the funds and out of such associations blacklists and other such documents will pour out abundantly. The insurance fund is supported by the workers. Here as well, however, the influence of the entrepreneurs has been secured dishonestly. To begin with, they have the right to have as many members of the board as have the workers. At a general meeting they have the right to appoint their own chairman. The government says that the workers are uneducated whereas the entrepreneurs are people of culture. The government has expelled (the workers) from participation in the handling of disability funds, arguing that it is the entrepreneurs who are making the payments. All right, but what about hospitalization funds? Is culture being promoted there as well? Furthermore, there are officials present and a representative of the Council of

Ministers, and two representatives of the fund. In Germany such representatives are elected at congresses. But how can a worker congress be held in our country! And so, entrepreneurs are elected to the hospitalization funds in the capital, i.e., in Petersburg. They attend meetings of the council and get fat salaries, while the workers are paid per meeting. The same prevails with self-government in the local areas: the "cultured" entrepreneurs, the police and the bureaucracy and representatives in the guberniyas and noted bureaucrats sit in the council, headed by the Synod procurator. Therefore, we have here the worst possible scandal which will not be encountered in Western Europe. Is this an accident or is this (phenomenon) closely related to the current age of counterrevolutionary excess? In the past the Tsar spoke about insuring rural workers for old age. Later, when the revolutionary wave calmed down, there was a conference with representatives of the bourgeoisie and the scientists and this draft bill was looked over and submitted to the Tizengauzen ⁷⁶ Commission, where it languished for 3 years and it was only the strong speeches by the social democratic faction that got it out of the commission. Now it will go to the State Council where Krestovnikov ⁷⁷ sits and where it will be subject to higher up decisions.

The history of this draft bill emphasizes the fact that a worker reform developed on a parallel basis with the revolutionary movement. If the revolution goes up, so does the reform; if the wave abates, the reform is pushed back. We must emphasize this in our agitation work. Then the (agitation) must be of a systematically social democratic nature. It would be embarrassing to write in the resolution that the social democrats must agitate in a social democratic spirit. Actually, this does not change matters. In connection with the situation of the working class in capitalist society, we must say, contrary to what the social reformers say, that a reform does not protect from revolution but prepares for revolution. Our social democratic faction has made this quite clear. (The reform) does not void the (social) revolution but prepares for it, clearing the way. As social democrats, we must prove to the worker that if he wishes to have any kind of labor reform, he must be strong and work for such conditions. Here as well the faction has given us tremendous material. The conference must evaluate the behavior of the faction. In the West the labor reform led to the outbreak of violent aggravations within the party and the faction. In France there was a split even within the faction and a minority voted in favor of the Briant reform, arguing that for the first time a principle of state insurance is being applied. ⁷⁸ The revolutionary social democrats said that principles should not be separated from circumstances. GOLOS SOTSIAL-DEMOKRATA approved the behavior of these social democrats. We must emphasize the accuracy of the faction's (behavior) by voting against the draft bill. This is important in terms of the future. A great deal of the speeches delivered at the Duma were typical. Let us look at the situation through the eyes of the representative of the government. On the first occasion he boasted by saying that this is a masterpiece of legislation. The second time, after

Kokovtsov⁷⁹ had just been appointed prime minister and had delivered his first speech on the draft bill in the Duma, in order better to position himself he blamed the bourgeoisie, saying that in the government's draft the entrepreneurs should pay for all accidents. The Duma Commission had amended it, by allowing some of the expenditures to be paid by the workers. Thus Kokovtsov proved his sympathy with the workers and Tizengauzen accused him of taking the side of the social democrats. He was followed by the representatives of the right wing. In the general readings, as was customary, they insulted the revolution and the Yids; in the second reading, the priest Mashkevich⁸⁰ introduced amendments on broadening the range of insured. Even Tizengauzen pointed out to him, after an amendment, that (this) was now being suggested by Kuznetsov.⁸¹ The demagogy here is clear. The speeches by the representatives of backward capitalism, the Octobrists, were also interesting. Tizengauzen said that it is criminal to make use of this draft bill for purposes of exciting political passions, and so on, but, as a representative of backward capitalism, he worsened the bill. He was totally unable to adapt himself to the bourgeois development of the country and considered that everything was collapsing, as was the entire bourgeois policy. The representatives of enlightened capitalism, such as the Cadets, are more far-sighted and have a better understanding compared with the Octobrists. They realize that if they drag matters like the Octobrists, they would come closer to the situation of 1905. Stepanov's⁸² advice is to introduce gradually and cautiously the law although, naturally, this is a poor law. Shchepkin⁸³ says that "with such a policy you are leading to catastrophe." They speak of self-government, saying that the draft bill is more than enough but that nonetheless the "funds" must be under the control of governmental institutions. The Cadets have shown up as firm opponents of the social democrats in all their speeches; the Octobrists remained silent, hoping to solve the problem simply by raising their hand. In was the Cadets who waged the ideological struggle and the duel, at all times, was fought (between) Kuznetsov and Predkalnyy⁸⁴ (on the one hand) and the Cadets, on the other. Kuznetsov is not disposed to fight the Cadets or to expose them, which is an error committed by the faction. He was unable to restrain himself and mounted a desperate struggle against the Cadets. Whenever the social democrats spoke out, they shrieked that the later were engaged in meeting speeches, and so on.

I forgot to mention that another tremendous shortcoming is the factory type of organization: it will be organized by factory and not by district. The factory type binds the worker. One can always influence one's workers thus illegally influencing hospital insurance funds. There are two types of insurance funds in Germany and we see that there the situation with the factory type is bad and that payments are lower. Sick workers are accused of malingering, and so on. The factory funds are drying out while the local funds are increasing. The factory funds have already been proven wrong by Western experience. The Cadets, however, have supported

the preservation of the factory type, by citing the German example. The Cadets spoke in that sense and the debates provide tremendous material concerning the attitude toward the reform and the working class. It is important to point this out in our agitation.

[Boris] Your time has expired.

The matter is put to a vote and the majority is in favor of a time extension.

[Boris] Continue.

[Aleksandrov]. We must also watch out for agitation by the liquidationists who distort and reduce the scope of the agitation. We already saw that this draft bill should not be postponed. Khizan scoffed, saying that it should be considered not from the general viewpoint but of that of the program (see VOZROZHDENIYE, No 6). We see here how agitation can be reduced, even from his viewpoint. He says that we must assess events not from the viewpoint of rosy ideals of the future but of sad necessity. In other words, we must adapt to the regime which was instituted on 3 June. The reason is your passive, i.e., rejecting attitude. He calls for actively rejecting the financial aid of the state. And even if we were to (happen to put the blinkers) of loving the workers, we would be bound to adapt to the Tizengauzen reform. According to Olenich we must deliberately concentrate on conducting an entirely legal campaign. (That) which calls for extensive and public debate cannot be conducted in secrecy (* See note 75). All of this can be written up in the legal press. Legal language is not all that terrifying. Furthermore, we should try to promote legal meetings, based on the 4 March law.⁸⁵ If we formulate the question thusly, all that we would be clutching would be the tail. In conclusion, we must direct our efforts on defeating this bill. In France the workers defeated the Briant reform and Lafargue used the following interesting agitation method: initially he called for a show of hand as to who should pay, and there was a forest of arms raised. He then asked who could be the recipient (of a pension), and there were only one or two hands raised and the government withdrew the bill in order to redraft it. Such a defeat would hardly be possible in our country. In our country they would simply withhold funds from earnings and should the bill pass it would offer a tremendous opportunity for the use of legal possibilities, involving the entire network of worker organizations. All worker organizations, even the sports, should be used. In this case this "self-seeking" matter would affect the thick of the workers and it will be important for us to make use of all of this and to emphasize the matter of agitation in our resolution.

[Boris] I interrupt. A delegate (* S.S. Spandaryan) has arrived, representing the Baku and Tiflis organizations. Allow him to attend the conference with full voting rights.

[Sergo] Naturally, no other way is possible.

[Valentin] I suggest that the reporter be asked questions. I would like to ask a question.

[Boris] It may be better at first to read the resolution and then ask questions.

[Valentin] I have nothing (against it).

Follows the reading of the resolution (* For the final draft see "*KPSS v Rezolyutsiyakh....*," vol 1, pp 396-398).

[Valentin] I would like to know how are hospitalization funds set up, how is the money collected, and so on?

[Boris] What happens when a worker changes jobs from one factory to another in the factory type insurance? Does he take his payments with him?

[Aleksandrov] Collections and the establishment of funds are based on the number of workers and I do not recall how many of them can set up a fund. If there are more workers, there may be two or three funds or in the opposite case, funds may be combined. They are legislated by the General Assembly which elects a board. The capitalists have the right to assign as many representatives as the workers. This is followed by elections in the presence of representatives of the local funds, conducted at general meetings and the council consisting not of all hospitalization funds but only those of the capital. The congress elects two chairmen. The entrepreneurs are given the right to appoint a representative. If a worker transfers from one to another factory, he loses nothing, for he has no long term rights. The situation is based exclusively on deposits. If the worker makes deposits, he has the right to insurance. In the West there are uniform funds for all programs and insurance companies also demand a single fund. Even a minister has said that the factory funds have become obsolete.

[Savva] I wish to suggest to the reporter to note the Christian-reformist intrigues on the part of the right-wing and of Kokovtsov. Thus, our Aleksandrovsk workers chose Father Mashkevich.... In the West the social democrats are forced to wage a serious struggle against the Christian socialists,⁸⁶ and we must indicate this circumstance in our agitation.

[Viktor] I would like to ask whether we could replace the part which speaks of the overthrow of autocracy by saying "the overthrow of tsarism."

[Aleksandrov] Essentially, Savva is exaggerating but this would be hardly necessary to note in the resolution and would even be incorrect. The position of the right-wing is one of patriarchal attitude toward the workers. The view taken by Mashkevich is not typical of the right-wing. What is characteristic is that in order to be able to rely on the masses, they must resort to demagoguery. If we note this in the resolution (it would appear) as though indeed Markov is acting as a defender of the worker, which is totally alien to him. Better leave the old wording.

[Savva] It seems to me that we are formulating a line. Should we draw attention to the right-wing? They are making approaches to us, saying that general policy is one thing and you, workers, are another. We too are against capitalism and for insurance and even for striking. Their hypocrisy must be exposed.

[Boris] I am against Savva's amendment, for the position of the right-wing is not the same as the one taken by the Christian socialists as is the case in the West but rather coincides with the position of the old autocracy, i.e., governing above the classes and protecting all classes. Autocracy has been manifested even in worker reforms on the left of the Octobrists. It is they and not the Christian socialists who defend the government. This would be wrong.

[Valentin] I motion that we put an end to the debates.

Eight votes were cast in favor.

[Savva] Amendment: Where we speak of agitation in connection with Duma activities on the subject of insurance, let us point out the demagogic Christian-reformist intrigues of the right-wing.

(Savva's amendment is put to a vote).

There is no vote for and the majority is against. The motion is defeated.

[Aleksandrov] In defense of "autocracy." Allow me to defend the old slogans. Here we speak of the definitive overthrow of autocracy; somehow the social content is not related to the word "Tsarism," and "autocracy" covers the entire ruling system. The Tsar is simply the representative of the supreme power.

[Zinovyev] In my view the word "Tsarism" does not imply the idea of a system. Even the Cadets speak of the overthrow of autocracy. In my view, the resolution would improve if we replace the word "Tsarism."

[Viktor] I motion that in the words "until the final overthrow of autocracy" we use the word "Tsarism" instead of "autocracy."

Viktor's amendment is put to a vote.

(There are nine votes for and none against). Adopted.

[Timofey] Replace "democratic system" with the words "democratic republic."

[Zinovyev] Delete both "system" and "republic."

[Timofey] I motion that both amendments be discussed. Let there be a debate.

There were five votes for and three against.

[Zinovyev] In Germany Bismarck introduced the universal vote, which meets to a certain extent the interests of the working class. The reform concerning the 9-hour work day in that country is eminent, and this is under a monarchy. Here we are not promoting a republic; I am ready to repeat this 20 times over. We shall be told to "wait for a democratic republic." You would like to exclude the possibility of a worker reform which may meet to a certain extent the interests of the working class, whatever the system.

[Viktor] We cannot consider that a democratic republic guarantees full freedom of the class struggle. I am in favor of keeping the term "democratic republic" but with a correction: replace the words "somewhat satisfactory" with "truly satisfactory."

[Aleksandrov] I oppose Grigoriy's view. It is based mostly on a misunderstanding. We must point out the general situation. The German example is not indicative. In Germany Bismarck himself said that the reform is the work of the social democrats. In England the reforms passed thanks to the conflict between agrarians and capitalists.⁸⁷ Autocracy, like Bonapartism⁸⁸ may grant reforms. We must point out that all reforms are the result of the class struggle and that their full possibility exists under a democratic republic. At this point, if we adopt Timofey's amendment, we would immediately lean toward Grigoriy's argument. Until a democratic system has been established, this would be accurate.

[Savva] The trouble is that Grigoriy does not think like a Marxist. We do not support Bismarck and the appearance of a Bismarck in our country is unlikely. There can be no Bismarck in our country and reforms are possible only as a result of the class struggle. How do we want to win this class struggle? According to Aleksandrov, the question can be raised either from the liquidationist or utopian viewpoints. We must point out that in our country reforms are impossible without a struggle.

[Timofey] At one point we replaced the word "autocracy" with the word "Tsarism," as being more consistent with the situation. The words "a democratic system," as suggested by Aleksandrov seem too vague and loose. This is acknowledged even by the Cadets. The worker must be informed of the meaning of a democratic system. An overthrow is possible only with an uprising and if such is the case, all of a sudden, we speak, as a result, of some kind of democratic system. We must clearly describe the nature of the democratic system. Grigoriy's objections, citing historical facts, support his idea of "somewhat satisfactory to the working class," but this has been done by our autocracy as well, and it is strange. A "true satisfaction of the interests of the working class" could (exist) only under a democratic republic. We know that in France social reforms have come to a stop. In Russia they would be possible only

under a democratic republic. This must be emphasized. Of late, however, it has been steadily ignored. Thus, the liquidationists favor a coalition, a "petition" and other campaigns.

[Timofey] (Amendment): Replace the words "democratic system" with "democratic republic."

Three votes were cast for and seven against. Defeated.

[Zinovyev] I support a democratic republic and oppose the liquidationists. However, we must not do something for the sake of spiting the liquidationists and say things which are not true. Argentina is a republic yet it destroyed all worker printing presses, they were simply burned down. America is a republic and is dead set against strikes; it is untrue that labor reforms are related to a specific political system. It is possible that in a republic as well there may be no reforms while under other systems reforms may be made for one reason or another. Bismarck made reforms not for the sake of playing a game but by necessity. An armed uprising was imminent in that country. I submit three amendments: first, to speak of the reform and not of reforms in general; then, to delete "full freedom for a class struggle." This does not exist anywhere. Everywhere there is a relative freedom of class struggle. I also consider Timofey's amendment even more unacceptable. It is true that in Germany there is a (more) democratic system. The fact that no reforms are possible applies only to autocracy. As long as autocracy has not been overthrown, we can scientifically prove the impossibility of any serious reform whatsoever. We are speaking of the circumstances under which any somewhat serious reform in favor of the workers could be achieved. Germany is not a republic (but) has a substantial insurance law. You are making agitation work more difficult.

[Viktor] We are faced with two concepts: the overthrow of tsarism and the institution of a democratic system. No reform whatsoever is possible under tsarism. We must point out the situation under which a reform could be truly satisfactory, which is possible only under a democratic republic. There are truths which should be repeated on a daily basis.

[Timofey] Amendment: Under the condition of a more or less free class struggle.

There were three votes for and six against. Defeated.

(The resolution) passed as a whole, with one abstention.

Eleventh Session

23 (10) January 1912

10 January. Eleventh evening session.

Timofey's report on Baku: I shall begin with the Caucasus. The last time the Caucasian Oblast Committee was elected was in 1910, after which no COC was elected; it has a large membership (which) does not live in the Caucasus. An Armenian comrade received a telegram on the Caucasian Conference⁸⁹ and it turned out that on the basis of a superior decision, he was appointed representative from Baku. The organization itself cannot be "located". It has no committees, no cells and no membership dues. "We have reduced membership dues to a few kopeks but this is not helping." Cells gather to discuss problems of legal work but no such problems are discussed whatsoever. All that remains is the legal Georgian newspaper; to give you an idea, let me say that not a single one of the 40 issues which have come out has been subject to persecution. Kostrov has opposed Lenin's hegemony of the proletariat and the "ossification." The city дума is engaged in legal work. It has a group rallied around the social democrats representing the extreme "opposition."⁹⁰ The members of this "opposition" have demanded that black lists be drawn up listing the names of servants. The oblast members set up, for the new elections, a new group of voters. Accused of internationalism and socialism, they answered that they have nothing in common with them. In 5 years there has been not one clandestine leaflet or any kind of economic struggle. The COC is not displaying any leadership features. All it has is a number of newspapers considered (democratic).

It is on this basis that in Tiflis several old comrades proclaimed themselves an initiative group⁹¹ and issued a leaflet on the occasion of May Day, which was distributed openly and, in a park, among soldiers. There are a number of cells, some 100. The most conscientious people are being selected, quite cautiously. Another leaflet was published (the Batumi organization sold out the printing press). These cells meet twice weekly. They do not include a single intellectual. Everything is being done by the workers. Theory classes are meeting. Together with the Tiflis Committee, the COC issued a statement that if the group were to publish yet one more leaflet, its members would be considered provocateurs. We have promoted unity with them. We set (conditions): recognition of the Organizational Commission Abroad and reciprocal control. These conditions were rejected. They asked to be granted the right to exercise separate control over the group. The group is still at work. It opposed Chkheidze.⁹² The faction deputies have not shown up a single time. There have been no collapses. Activities are expanding, (although) no Russian worker is participating. The COC is doing nothing. Small groups exist in Sukhumi and Poti.

Baku. Economic reaction enabled the capitalists to eliminate three quarters of all gains. The entire mass is social democratic. Naturally, this too has influenced the organization which has become smaller but has improved its quality. There have been failures. The committee met.⁹³ Today it consists exclusively of workers. Kostrov went to

Baku and recommended to the workers not to participate in the conference but the workers refused. The Trade Union is linked with the party organization. In both Baku and Tiflis the organizations are quite democratic. In Baku social democrats will unquestionably assume leadership of the workers.

About the Letts. In accordance with the ROC Resolution, we decided to address ourselves to the nationals. I was able to establish contacts with the Letts. Initially, the Letts wanted to make decisions without hearing the report of the ROC, but hear out the Bundt speaker only. To begin with, however, they decided to convene a propaganda collegium. I attended despite the wish of the Central Committee (of the SDLK). The members of the Central Committee said that this (conference) is a factional rally and that it would be unfair to offer the Letts three seats. I gave them my answer. The majority did not even understand the Central Committee. With one exception, they are all representatives of rural organizations (* As recorded). The representative of the Central Committee became confused and raised the question of representation (for the conference). The resolution was to have (one) representing the Riga Committee and two representing the Central Committee (one from the minority). The day after this resolution was passed, the majority of the Central Committee members refused to pass the resolution; after that the Riga Committee passed the resolution (* See note 15) but the Letts are afraid of a split. The Letts are against the Central Committee (of the SDLK) but want to struggle legally against the liquidationists. The Latvian comrades in the Central Committee opposed the legalists at the conference. The general impression is that they are all working together.

(Odessa.)

The people in Kharkov were preparing to hold a conference.

Public meetings were held and songs were sang in Riga.

Quite frequently groups expressing the desire to work in the party showed up in Petersburg. The associations in Peter are by no means liquidationist. The liquidationists are employed and being hired. I did not find liquidationists among the workers. I made speeches on the conference to representatives of some trade unions: printing workers, gold and silversmiths, stevedores, etc. These were active party-minded comrades. They should have chosen (a delegate) but decided to postpone this in order to hold (elections) with a broader representation.

I mentioned two trends: party members and liquidationists. The liquidationists are already organizing their own party. There were no liquidationists among (the workers). The worker-mensheviks are firm party members. The liquidationists play no role in the labor movement. In Vasileostrovskiy Rayon the VPERED people elected conference delegates. Their two representatives attended the city conference which elected (delegates) for the

(all-party) conference. In my view, they acted improperly on behalf of the VPERED people. Feelings are getting stronger. Strikes are breaking out constantly. The attraction of the party everywhere is tremendous. However, there are no workers, there are no workers whatsoever. This is the trouble (* A note on the local situation was written by Lenin (see PROLETARSKAYA REVOLYUTSIYA, No 1, 1941, pp 146-152)).

The decision (to discuss) party work abroad was made (* No record has been kept of the beginning of the discussions. A draft resolution was read on the party organization abroad, probably written by O.A. Pyatnitskiy (Albert), the text of which has not been preserved).

[Albert] I must point out that the party exiles may be found only in Paris and Switzerland. As to Germany and other cities, virtually all of them are students who, other than financial, do not provide or have ever provided any kind of support. Let us recall the substantial funds contributed by the people abroad after the 3rd Congress, for which reason I believe that the OCA made a mistake by undertaking exclusively to organize the rich. It is an error to raise the demand (for all groups) to be subordinated to the ROC. We know that the majority of assistance groups are helping GOLOS SOTSIAL-DEMOKRATA, the Bundt and others, and that the slogan of rallying around the ROC is an error. I believe that the Central Committee, which will be elected at this conference, should issue an appeal to those living abroad to help the party.

[Sergo] I must point out that we shall not discuss the organizations abroad at length, for we have no right to annul our resolution (in this regard). We know that all this time the people abroad have given us nothing good. However, I also know that all those trouble making leaflets, which have been issued by groups abroad, claiming that Comrade Aleksandrov had disbanded the (Central Committee Foreign Bureau) and raided its funds, the way Lenin was amnestied, and so on,⁹⁴ have been of no help. Let us consider the Plekhanovite groups. What have they accomplished in 5 months? First they kept silent and then they spoke out but, in any case, not on the (matter). We, comrades, must look at things as they are. As to the fact that only the rich have been rallied, I do not share Comrade Albert's optimism to the effect that one and all could be united. I question this, for I personally have dealt with the conciliationists. They not only failed to help the ROC but hindered it throughout. In any case, we must assess everything done abroad and only then issue our resolution.

[Timofey] I am unfamiliar with the appeal issued by the OCA.⁹⁵ The reporter said.... I am in favor of disbanding all of these innumerable little groups. Iron discipline must be used. There must be a single center. We should not recognize any other centers. The horrible picture that emerges is that anyone who has the opportunity writes leaflets, prints letterheads, collects money, sends agents

in Russia, disrupting the (revolutionary) public endlessly. Those who wish to work, let them come to us in Russia and work and then approach us. Comrade (Aleksandrov) said (* No record kept) that we must create here groups which would collect money, write leaflets, and send (propagandists). Money can be collected, we must not organize a special center which would (organize) groups and write leaflets. This would lead to the division among people abroad, the public would be disappointed, and all that. Some Trotsky would assume the right to send agents, to organize conferences⁹⁶ and so on. This is scandalous. I remember how many comrades have been in jail because of such squabbles abroad. This, comrades, is horrible and not funny.

[Boris Ivanovich] I support Timofey.

[Lenin] Let me explain to you why I laughed so hard. Sergo said that "the foreign countries are zero." Timofey said "we must impose...."

[Boris Ivanovich] They should have no freedom of speech.

[Lenin]. Why is all of this ridiculous? Because none of this is serious. They started by criticizing Comrade (Aleksandrov) and ended with a call for decisive steps. They say that we must struggle against the people living abroad. However, one must know what one is struggling against. No study was made here of this entire squabble. The squabble is the result of the struggle between two trends which have become (noticeable) in recent years. There is a squabble in each Russian circle. In order to say "disband" we must win. For the time being, we have not. The reason for squabbles abroad is because in Russia there is a struggle between two parties. Squabbles and insults will vanish but differences will remain. We must prevail. As long as there is a Stolypin Russia there will be emigration and the emigres will be (linked) with Russia with thousands of threads which can be cut by no knife. The chaos stems from the fact that you did not settle with the liquidationists. The roots must be extracted. You are complaining of division and breakdown quite rightly. However, it must be understood that the building of a party opposed to liquidationism has only begun. That is the essence. All party elements must be united and discipline established (* As recorded). You oppose the motion by Comrade (Aleksandrov). This is a misunderstanding... (* As recorded). The point is (that) the OCA will support the conference. This is precisely what you are asking.

[Pavel] Monetarily only.

[Zinovyev] The resolution read by the comrade is essentially wrong (the record ends at this point with the note "not recorded further").

[Sergo] Comrades, I was disturbed by the speeches of Comrades Lenin and Grigoriy. Lenin spoke of a squabble between Marx and Bakunin (* The preserved record

of Lenin's speech does not mention the relationship between Marx and Bakunin. In all likelihood, he spoke another time on the subject).⁹⁷ Once again, however, I ask you what have here London and all those sorry little groups have to do in this case and Lenin did not answer me as to what have the OCA and others to do with it? Lenin mentioned cheap demagoguery and the fact that we were complaining. Had we been complaining, you would not have had this conference. Lenin did not answer a single one of our questions. Here in one of his speeches Comrade Savka hinted that the people abroad had helped us. I repeat that this is untrue but I will say and I ask that you review the minutes and you will see the way Comrade Savka, after receiving the resolution from San Remo⁹⁸ began to bombard us with (declarations) about rejecting the conference in the proceedings of which he had so diligently participated previously.

[Timofey] (* The records are interrupted at this point with the note "recorded by Viktor." Viktor's records have not been preserved).

[Boris Ivanovich] Comrades, as I listened to the speech by Comrade Lenin I regretted that a major force such as Lenin would be sitting abroad and looking at everything from the point of view of a foreign country in which the (Russian) circles are considered through foreign dirt. I claim that Lenin is wrong. When Comrade Albert read the revolution, Comrade Zinovyev said: "What, you are disbanding the groups of (Plekhanovites) and the (VPERED) people?" Let me say that you would speak otherwise had you seen these groups in Russia. I entirely join the motion formulated by Matvey (* Matvey's motion which probably deals with disbanding the OCA is not found in the remaining sections of the records).

[Aleksandrov] Comrades, I shall now discuss a practical problem. As the representative of the OCA I must answer to those who have (deputized) me and you must give me an answer. Your practical answer is to disband everything. You here, comrades, have abused the people abroad quite substantially but I, comrades, will use even stronger insults for all three evenings. By disbanding everything, you are killing the organization which (was formed) to help you. Meanwhile, you are shutting neither Martov's mouth nor that of PRAVDA (* Reference to PRAVDA published in Vienna. See note 39), and so on, which do not recognize you. If you keep insulting those abroad, we shall do the same and we suggest that such squabbling be eliminated and that we be helped and I ask of you to issue your resolution on the OCA.

[Albert] The comrades misunderstood me when they say that I (spoke out) against the OCA. All I said was that they are making attendance here difficult.

[Valentin] It seems to me that all the comrades who spoke here digressed and plunged into eloquence. The question is as follows: Should we support the OCA, and there is no reason here to express witticisms on the subject of those little girls and weak minded people. I

think of how to rally the true social democrats who are numerous here and the fact that we too can always find ourselves in this position and I think that these comrades must be rallied in support of the party. I do not particularly care that two or three rich people will become indignant and will help the party.

[Lenin] (No record of his speech has been preserved).

[Aleksandrov] Comrade Albert is solving the problem conventionally but is the victim of misunderstanding. It is true that the real big contributors were invited but when we wrote the notification (* See note 95), ideally we imagined an organization abroad which would unite all party elements. It is a question of only such an organization. We are pleased with anyone who supports the party and the conference. You, Comrade Albert, have confused two aspects: the preparatory aspect and the aspect of organizational work. I address myself to the conference to solve this problem in its positive meaning. The organization must be supported, this is clear (* At this point the records of the 11th Session come to an end).

Draft Resolution "On the Party Organization Abroad" (Drafted by Zinovyev).*

(1. It is noted regretfully by the conference of the splintering which is taking place abroad into groups and small groups and the exacerbation of the essential differences created by petty and very petty arguments, which can only hinder the already difficult work being done within Russia.

(2. The conference expresses the hope that on the basis of the support of the resolutions drafted by the representatives of Russian organizations at the conference all true party elements abroad will unite, ignoring factions.

(3. The conference approves the organization of the RSDWP Abroad and its OCA as an organization which has assumed the initiative of uniting all party elements and adopted the viewpoint of party-mindedness and subordination to the ROC around which all party organizations in Russia have rallied.

(4. The conference rejects responsibility for the behavior of the small groups abroad which will not support the RSDWP and its Central Committee and will not obey the resolutions of the party's supreme authority.) (* The materials of the discussion and the drafting of the resolution have not been preserved. For the final edition of the resolution on the party organization abroad see "KPSS v Rezolyutsiyakh....," vol 1, pp 402-403).

Twelfth Session

24 (11) January 1912

11/24 January 1912, Twelfth Session.

[Albert] I speak out of turn. A letter has been received from the Northwestern (area), from Gomel: "From the Western area. There are news here: 1. Under my influence a group of party members was organized and is already helping me with addresses, lodgings for the night and manpower. The Bundt, with which I am in contact, initially expressed its satisfaction of this fact but, learning of the nature of the trend I represent (Albert: he is a Plekhanovite), began to avoid contacts, considering me an "enemy," and ignored my offer to put at its disposal a certain number of (Albert: obviously, referring to publications). I did not insist on receiving an answer. At a most critical point for me I turned to it for the necessary (Albert: passport). It promised but did nothing and even did not let me spend the night. In general, it is behaving as an alien force, for which reason I was refused money as well. At that point arrived the Bundt Central Committee member Yu-vech.⁹⁹ He reported on the situation. He spoke on the basis of rumors of the full isolation of Lenin even from the Polish social democrats and the Latvian social democrats and the fact that the "nationals" had decided to set up some kind of commission for the restoration of the Central Committee. I sadly also noted that the "isolated" have local contacts whereas the groups with which they have merged have no such contacts in Russia, for which reason the "nationals" would like to stew in their own juice."

The mandate of the Baku (organization) is ratified: Sergo; the mandate of the Tiflis organization is ratified: Timofey.

[Lenin] Next on the agenda is the organizational problem. Is there a scheduled speaker and if not who would like to take the floor?

[Boris] This is a serious matter and cannot be discussed without preparations. I do not know the level on which the discussion should be held. I believe that a commission should be set up to prepare the materials.

[Valentin] The debates must be started now. One cannot formulate a resolution without any materials. If no one wants to speak, let me say the following: The fact that the suggestion of the chairman was met with silence proves that the problem is quite important and extensive and is a sensitive spot for the Russian workers. This is also confirmed by the private discussions which were held. Although nothing definite resulted from them, it was clear that they were unsatisfactory. Everything indicates that circle work is not satisfactory and that people are not willing to attend them and that (circles) cannot encompass everyone. The faults must be corrected. The circles must be revived and we must develop the type of methods which would make it possible to include the broad masses. Above all, the question must be accurately formulated. The liquidationists accurately formulate the matter when they say that the political clandestine method has become obsolete. I do not agree with this but this means that, above all, we must raise the question of has indeed the clandestine form become obsolete? The

liquidationists say that the clandestine organizations are doing nothing and that it is only the legal organizations that are active. Allegedly, such organizations are alive and everything. We should consider this and assess it. I believe that the (dissatisfaction) with clandestine organizations is due to the counterrevolutionary times we are experiencing. We must indeed have to listen to complaints within the circles. This inactivity and dissatisfaction are nurtured essentially by the indifference of the masses. This becomes particularly clear if we compare the clandestine with the legal organizations. I am certain that the same type of poverty of action prevails in the associations, relative to collecting funds, shuttling among apartments, and so on. Those are the activities of the associations. The Moscow legalists themselves say that the associations exist only for the sake of paying for housing rentals. Police persecution and, to an equal extent, the indifference of the masses were the culprits, if one has to speak of culprits and poverty of action. Despite our best efforts, no more than 80 to 100 (people) would attend a meeting, although thousands could have come. This indicates that in general the masses are indifferent to political life. The legal (organizations) also struggle for the same things as the clandestine organizations, although in a different manner. The shouts of the liquidationists were supported exclusively by the apathy and indifference of the masses during this counterrevolutionary time. We seem to have (experienced) the worst and the future will not be so grave. However, this does not mean that we should stay idle and wait for the counterrevolution to come. Partially, this crisis is explained by the flight of the intelligentsia. In as much as we have to anticipate the future, unquestionably it is a matter above all of working within the legal societies. We must protect the clandestine workers from falling into the trap of such legal societies which are (joined) by workers and break down four months later. We must promote a division of labor. Efforts were made to convince me that this is impossible. Indeed, the workers are few and we must work in both areas. Nonetheless, the conference must formulate the necessary ways of division of labor. If this is impossible today, it will become possible soon, in connection with the revival. By division of labor I mean the division among workers. Thus, the legal workers set up a collegium, and establish relations with the representative of the committee. Today in our area the entire group is working within the legal societies and there has been a general routing. As to the use of legal possibilities, we have already passed a resolution. Two types of circles exist. The first is the propaganda circle which is successfully used by a suitable person. The one shortcoming of such a circle is that it gets excessively involved in propaganda and it is difficult to make the people engage in any kind of active action. The second type is the one attended by people who do not particularly wish to study, and in such circles dissatisfaction is a most frequent phenomenon. The fault is partially ours, in that we were unable to tell those people what to do. They are unwilling to study and cannot find anything else. They must be given a certain direction, a certain

political function, such as the distribution of publications, and so on. We have been unable to set real targets for such circles. A great deal was said about flexibility. It seems to me that we should not hurry with elections. The right to co-opting must be emphasized and we do not have to take formalities into consideration. Such formalities take a great deal of time. As Timofey says, there is full democratization in Baku but in Russia this is impossible. Other formalities include elections to a committee, papers and files and this is asking for Article 102.¹⁰⁰ If this is what Comrade Lenin implies (* Probably a reference to Lenin's discussions on this topic with delegates in the breaks between sessions), I agree with him and see nothing else. We must also pay attention to relations with other organizations. We would fail in one city and do not know where to go. The situation with money is also bad. In general, I believe that we must restate the 1908 Resolution. In terms of the motivational part, in some areas it has become obsolete, for it was written under different circumstances; however, that which was suggested at the 1908 Conference is acceptable to us as well. Co-opting must be confirmed. The oblast centers and, particularly, the matter of the division of labor must be (mentioned) somehow.¹⁰¹

[Viktor] A great deal was said about flexibility and it was repeatedly mentioned in the resolution. But where is this flexibility? I believe that in this case we have not invented any kind of prescription. This must be left for the local organizations. However, we must take notice of what has become obsolete. We must not raise the question of some kind of quality and quantity. We cannot build an organization in such a way as to make it impossible to catch. This is utopia. Detentions are inevitable. I believe that we must pay attention to the theoretical circles, for in that area there is dissatisfaction. I think that the main reason here is the separation of the economic struggle. The social democratic movement must be a synthesis, a rallying principle. This is basic. Only then one could draw conclusions, but I shall not discuss this at this point. There is no point in saying that the circles are unsatisfactory and that they satisfy only some of the workers. They meet and they have nothing in common among each other and there is mistrust and secrecy. I believe that one could become organized by shop or profession, in which case connections would be more active. Matters must be organized on a broader basis; seven or eight (representatives) should discuss all problems of local life. At one point, in 1905-1906, such an organization did exist in Kiev: all plants and enterprises sent representatives to a section or a conference, after which an executive commission was elected. Such a conference made various decisions on all problems of political and economic life, and they were implemented by the executive commission. We must combine economic with political struggle. Naturally, no greater details should be provided.

[Lenin] I would like to discuss another aspect of the matter, that of flexibility. It seems to me that this does not apply to co-opting or traps. The (1908) resolution

was correct, and that must be emphasized. I would like to draw attention to the important aspect. Let us take as an example a legal society. I cannot speak for all of Russia but I can name some five cities, in which (this) is possible. Therefore, what does a legal society provide above all? Obviously, it is allowed to offer lectures of a Marxist nature. I read in the press that this is allowed in the big cities. It is said that it is difficult to find lecturers. A worker could become a lecturer and should be paid for such work. The workers themselves must train lecturers and pay them. Then (such a society) has a library and a reading room. I do not know whether ZVEZDA is permitted. The legal organizations also sponsor various entertainment projects. This is important from the financial viewpoint and, on the other hand, thanks to such entertainment, a kind of club develops. If such a type of association is not fiction but reality, which is unquestionable, we should ask ourselves, did we work on expanding such societies? Have reports been submitted on such societies at factories and plants? Were efforts made to organize such societies? Furthermore, how should such societies be used? We now come close to the type of German organizations during the period of emergency laws.¹⁰² Our situation is both more difficult and easier. It is more difficult because they had legal possibilities and, furthermore, their Central Committee was a member of the Duma faction (* As written. Reference to the German Social Democratic Party faction in the Reichstag), met legally and could invite clandestine workers. It is easier because the German social democrats met with no sympathy around them and the entire bourgeoisie was against them. Our masses show a great deal of sympathy for and support of the social democrats. In each one of our societies there should be small social democratic cells, closely linked to the party, and each problem must be solved in the spirit of the party's resolutions. This no longer agrees with the old hierarchical party. Such cells do not need any shaping and it would be better for them to be fluid. They must not be cumbersome as are rayons and subrayons. Petersburg and Riga are my type of associations. Little was done in Moscow in this respect. Such cells allow a different type of party structure. In the past, in my time, we had to do everything ourselves. Now the trade unions and the (organizations) have taken over some of the work. As much as is possible, the legal Duma faction is also engaging in the political struggle and if legal societies with such a structure could be increased the revolution would become invincible. This is also a matter of the flexibility of the organizations. It would be the ideal in terms of rebuilding our organization. These clandestine cells, surrounded by a network of legal cells, would give them a new foundation. All relations have been reduced to a minimum, as though there both is and is no organization. Let there not be meetings; party work would assume a different aspect. The new form has already made its way within the old. Let it be less well shaped but let work in the legal societies expand. Each step toward culture should be imbued with social democratic spirit, social democratic culture. This would mean waging a decisive struggle against liquidationism.

Scope alienates the worker from the party (* As recorded). They have cells, they are linked with the TsO, once a year they get in touch with it and are 100 times more active than in the past. We have worked insufficiently within the legal societies. We must take them out of the hands of the liberals, we must (take out) the entire legal movement. The legal societies must be disseminated and expanded. Specifically, attention must be paid on how the work in the legal societies is organized. Everywhere illegal cells must be surrounded by a network of legal cells (* V.I. Lenin, op. cit., vol 54, pp 359-361).

[Zinovyev] Against the background of the upsurge our dissatisfaction with the organizational problem is increasing. Even the people abroad have felt this dissatisfaction. When the liquidationists are blaming us (for the fact that there is no life in the clandestine (organizations), they are referring to what is being done in the unions. The unions as well are in a state of crisis, although they are legal. Meetings are attended by 30 to 40 people, although around them there may be a thousand more workers. This means that the crisis was within the working class itself and not the upper strata. A collective contract was being concocted in the unions, resembling far-fetched political campaigns, such as "petitions." It is only after the working class has come out of the crisis that this paleness which is noted now will come to an end. The economic struggle was not headed by the unions, they should not be blamed for this. They quite naturally cared for their legal status. And how can you discuss having a strike when the police are present? Therefore, the main function—the leadership of the economic struggle—shifted into the hands of some kind of clandestine committee. However, the unions have a tremendous amount of work. They have newspapers and it is bad that they are not in our hands. Our task is to take over their editorial boards. However, one should not (tolerate) for the clandestine groups to be withering away, not willing to interfere in the economic struggle. The party must intervene in the economic struggle. It has happened that there have been huge strikes while the clandestine organization was unaware of them. This is closely related to the problem of organization. Organization by shop is rather hasty. This would be a step backward. However, there is a healthy note in it: one must organize while making an alliance with the social democrats (* As in the text). This precisely would be an organization by shop. We must combine, we must synthesize. In the Bundt the shop organization has yielded good results. In a big city such as Peter, however, this is impossible. We must bear in mind that in connection with the revival, the old forms of organization will reappear. Larin said that one could organize as many as 200 people. The forms of organization may be anything one wishes. They could include labor exchanges and so on.

At this point Comrade Lenin is exaggerating by saying that one should not pursue quantity and form. Our task, however, is to find new forms. Let others be concerned

with lack of form. With a new situation we must have a new form. A clandestine party will soon become possible on a broad scale. We must not imitate everything the Germans do. They had their Central Committee represented by the Bebel faction in their national assembly and they were firmly established legally. They co-opted the clandestines, whereas in our country the opposite situation prevails. Naturally, we have a tremendous influence on the workers, which the Germans did not have at that time. One must emphasize the establishment of the clandestine party.

[Savva] Comrades, some people are still engaged in intellectual discussions. One must be familiar with working conditions in Russia. One must know that in Peter and other cities, at all times we have worked and are working, we have struggled, we have accomplished and are accomplishing things. Perhaps this was not the case of individual comrades, but as a whole the party should not be blamed. What would have happened had the workers listened to Comrade Lenin to the effect that the party must be restored on the basis of legal societies, while a struggle is being waged with the liquidationists? The workers realize that the party must aspire to achieve legal status. Everything that could be done in the legal societies has already been done. Comrade Lenin said that there is a sector of activities, such as the Duma faction, which has not been utilized. Let me say that there as well we have tried to do everything but did everything clandestinely, for no other way was possible. The social democrats are not conspirators but no legal struggle among the masses is possible. The liquidationists as well could sometimes say good things. Questions were asked in the Duma and could such questions be discussed legally? It is not possible. There are meetings but could this be mentioned in a resolution? One must not think that if we adopt a resolution an open, a legal existence would become possible. Is it possible to hold a legal (meeting) even on the topic of insurance? It would not be permitted. The unions were persecuted steadily even when they were doing nothing and, nevertheless, they were being closed down. One must not have the illusion that a great deal could be accomplished within the legal societies. The masses have no experience and the traditional need for unions has been steadily argued by the social democrats. Speaking of forms applicable to all of Russia, there are no lecturers in Petersburg and there are even fewer in the provinces. Even the Cadets are not allowed to deliver (lectures) to the workers and a worker club was even burned down. These are the means of struggle against the workers. Naturally, the legal societies must be used but one must be familiar with the conditions. One must consider the organizing of lecturers. Can the workers read? We cannot distinguish between legal and clandestine workers. The social democratic workers must participate most closely in the work of the unions in order to gain influence. A division of (labor) could be made between professionals and workers. Generally speaking, it would be harmful to create a division of labor for this would benefit strict legalists-liquidationists.

[Boris] (In) 1907 a conference was held in Teriokakh.¹⁰³ At that time Dan said that this was "playing at secrecy." Accompanied by general applause, Lenin said that this was a mockery. I do not know how to describe the ideal picture depicted by Lenin but he did not invent it. I could cite a number of facts in proof of his thought but even a larger number which refute it. In the past, in the legal society, we read lectures, lectures were delivered by Grigoriy, Rozhkov and others. They delivered good lectures and dealt even with purely organizational and secret matters such as the congress. Now, however, this is no longer possible. A great deal could be said on the way societies were banned and closed down and we must take this into (consideration) in the elaboration and structuring of new forms. Furthermore, matters are not the same everywhere, this too must be taken into consideration. Here as well we find the flexible forms which were mentioned for the first time in the Moscow Resolution (* The resolution has not been identified). The workers have grown up. And since the clandestine cells would like to survive they raised the question of working within the legal societies. Failure to do so would lead to their disappearance. Such is the contradiction and it is necessary to (formulate) a flexible form for managing and encompassing the situation, taking the police circumstances under consideration as well. That precisely is what characterizes the determination of forms of organization. I agree with Lenin on the use of all legal societies and opportunities. The form would be a small cell surrounded by a network of legal cells. Democracy is discussed only in two cities while in other areas this is absolutely impossible. It is important to be able to manage, what is important is quality and not quantity. The cell must be able to use the influence it generates with its work and not the fact that it has been selected. There is no question of lack of form, for this in itself is a form. I can say from personal experience that it is impossible to train the masses for clandestine forms of work but that legal institutions are necessary. The most difficult problem is to organize such training, something to which Lenin provides no answer. What Lenin suggests is something loose. It is impossible to lead the party with the help of clandestine publications. A center is needed which would direct and guide the activities of the cells. Our main difficulty is that there is no connection between the individual forms. The task is to combine all of these forms and Lenin does not answer this question. How to solve it? At this point, comrades, I recall a specific case. Some comrades, older ones, set up a group and each one of them was to become a member of a legal society in order to work there and dig in and set up a social democratic cell. Naturally, they were linked to the Petersburg Committee. I do not know why but these cells were wrecked. I think the reason was that (there were) a number of intellectuals in the collective. We must adopt Valentin's suggestion on the division of labor. We, Muscovites have been blamed for doing nothing. However, we do have a legal collective related to a clandestine collective. As to the division, we had two unions closed down and the clandestine organization suffered. I believe that Lenin's suggestion of managing a small cell

surrounded by a network of legal cells is acceptable. We should not take into consideration the possibility of elections and a democratic concept must be ignored and we must underscore co-opting.

[Stepan] I support Lenin. This is a serious matter. The Petersburg organization has not changed its structure. However, realizing this, should we seek the possibility of expansion, it would prove to be impossible. The moment some kind of organization is set up, a provocateur would show up and once again everything would collapse. Of late, after the disappearance of the Petersburg Committee, individual groups remained, which had lost all energy to promote centralization. Some comrades said that we have legal societies and a law and that we should organize the party members in educational societies and unions. And so, bylaws of an (educational society were drafted) by three founders and a permit was requested. The first time it was refused but the society continued to expand. There are no intellectuals, the circles broke down and the work was concentrated in the educational society. In one of the plants 30 people organized a meeting on their own, for a lecture. They did not charge any fee for it in order to attract the public. However, our premises are small and we have no funds. We leased different premises and, when suitable conditions appeared, we moved somewhere else. In order to attract the public we organized a concert, invited lecturers, even Cadets; we held a dance and the society became known widely and it became the obligation of all social democrats to agitate in favor of worker organizations. Today this society is prosperous. It has 500 (members), some 300 of whom pay dues. Although aspersions were cast upon us, we did pay our rent. That is what the social democrats were doing at the time that relations were interrupted. The (society's) board consist of social democrats. There is a reading room and a library. As to the use of Duma reports I did not know that it had been possible to make use of the society. That is why when the ROC appeared in Petersburg, it obviously turned to the society, where a social democratic public can always be found (* As recorded). This society has had an extensive influence on the masses. We expanded it and began to organize public lectures. At one point we had a variety singer, but the social democrat who had invited her was expelled. It is much better to gather a circle in such premises, compared to a small and stifling apartment. I may have idealistic concepts, but I believe that the (society's) board must consist of social democrats. Imagine, if we were to have in all societies and unions social democratic cells subordinate to the Petersburg Committee, we could establish connection among them by appointing one person per cell as the representative of the Petersburg Committee, who will always know what is going on. There are no policemen on the board, and one can always submit reports and make speeches. If we are divided into legal and clandestine, there would be more movement.

[Matvey] The situation as depicted by Valentin is the following: in Russia the organizations are divided into higher and lower types of circles. The higher are working

well, for they include intellectuals and if there are no intellectuals it means that the circles break down. It is true that in the past there was no other solution. Now we can no longer work as in the past. Comrade Lenin pointed out that we have a Duma faction. However, other possibilities exist as well. It is possible to deliver lectures, which has been and is being done. Not only did the intellectuals leave but also so did the workers and when we sponsored lectures, they dealt with literature only. There were no lectures on other (problems) and only half of the problems were of interest. When we did nothing was only in places where there was nothing to do. In the legal societies, nonetheless, we did something. However, this precisely is the inconvenience. The board frequently sinks into the petty matters of the union. The board must be the leader. If the board is arrested, the clandestine organization suffers. There are no intellectuals throughout Russia. Today we cannot work in circles. There are no workers to be satisfied with the circles. The only possible circles are the mobile ones. They take a legal newspaper, they read and find out the situation. They must study scientific problems at home. This should not be the work of the committees. There is no useful book to be had.

[Timofey] The organizational problem is indeed serious and has become quite pressing. I have not heard anyone in support of preserving the old forms. Changes have taken place since 1905. Now we must consider how to link the legal with the clandestine organizations and how to use legal possibilities. The time of the old propaganda circles, attended by students who were familiar with Marx's biography is now in the past. To this purpose now we have publications. All that is necessary is to point out where some information could be obtained, perhaps in PROSVESHCHENIYE¹⁰⁴, and the workers would be able to engage in agitation, to educate others, etc. We must create a clandestine center in every city, which would guide the economic and political struggle. Our situation is such that the unions cannot engage in the economic struggle, whereas we...(* At this point the record ends with the note "See Continuation in Notebook No 7." Notebook No 7 has not been preserved).

(The delegate of the Moscow RSDWP Organization) (* The beginning of the record (2 pages) is missing. The session at which this speech was made has not been determined but it deals with the organizational problem). for the entire period of the counterrevolution. The question is only of the content and the form which it assumed. Let us note the dual nature of achieving the worker aspirations for organization. The main trend followed the line of organizing legally: in unions, clubs, schools, different societies, and so on, and, at the same time, since engaging in open active work under these circumstances is impossible, the progressive workers were forced to organize themselves clandestinely (in groups, clubs, schools and unions, (central bureaus) and interclub committees, groups for reviving the work, etc.). Therefore, in addition to organizing special clandestine cells for social democratic work, the clandestine groups,

to the extent to which they accurately understood their task of working among the working class, invariably set themselves to do social democratic work. In confirmation of this situation I can refer to the fact that such groups exist in absolutely all unions in Moscow; I can refer to the activities of the (central bureaus) and the work of groups throughout the summer, until the murder of Stolypin, the group in Rogozhskiy Rayon which organized a workers club, the groups of club organizers..., and so on.

Furthermore, we keep seeing the uninterrupted birth of clandestine cells engaged exclusively in social democratic work: 1. An entire series of orderly organizations appeared between 1907 and 1911 which broke up when the leadership collapsed, leaving behind them on the lower level (organized) social democratic cells; 2. In the 1909-1911 period one could note a purely social democratic academic trend, if one may express himself (so), i.e., the aspiration to set up propaganda circles within the social democratic movement; 3. Of late we have noted a return of the old workers, the (party) workers, to the social democratic movement, initially establishing contacts on the basis of personal acquaintanceship from previous joint work, but soon aspiring to leave their own narrow circle and engage in action, in work among the masses. Therefore, despite outside influence, an entire range of clandestine cells is always present among the masses, ready to enter the organization the moment such an organization appears. This is the base on which structuring a party apparatus is quickly and frequently possible, the more so since in all cells there is the constant aspiration to become interconnected and to merge with the organization. Such is the foundation for the appearance of the organization which exists today. In addition to political conditions, this also determines the form and content of the work. The main problem under discussion, both within the central group and the Moscow Committee and the rayon committees was the work plan, as follows: 1. On the lower levels steady work is being done and there are permanent cells; the leading centers have an explosive nature; perhaps the organization should be structured on the basis of maximal secrecy and protection; 2. The labor movement, like social democratic work, subsequent to the 1905-1906 Revolution, extensively took the line of making use of all legal possibilities and in terms of the clandestine mass movement, what is needed is a flexibility of organization, and the ability to include the existing aspiration to organize and to influence all forms of the labor movement. The following organizational plan was established: the strictly clandestine party apparatus is structured on the basis of secrecy of the higher organizations and consists of a rather limited number of cells and of a limited number of members in those cells (it is of interest to note that in the discussions within the rayons most workers were opposed to the election of leading centers, particularly the Moscow Committee, both for reasons of secrecy and, subsequently, the fact that under the given circumstances it is impossible to adopt the elective principle and the result is playing at democracy. Such elections

had to be rejected because of the fear that the rayons will not obey the Moscow Committee in the case of differences, and it is the rayons which elect members to the current Moscow Committee). Therefore, the essential clandestine apparatus should consist of the Moscow Committee and the rayon committees, without hindering but also without trying to set up an entire array of lower cells. The full attention must be focused on the type of work and thus earn the trust of the masses. In order for the rayons to be in touch and be familiar with the life of the workers, weekly survey leaflets are disseminated in plants and factories noting changes and conflicts at the individual plants. Furthermore, the Moscow Committee has set up a clandestine central committee to organize legal work. The nature of the work is determined by the collective itself, in the presence of a representative of the Moscow Committee. Practical steps are also planned for the electoral campaign for the Fourth Duma, i.e., the creation of a circle of 15 workers as possible candidates, kept temporarily secret from the members of the organization; study within that circle problems of party program, party history, parliamentarianism and Duma procedures, so that by the time of the elections there may be a trained group to wage the electoral campaign among the workers. As to the conference, both the collective and the Moscow Committee consider it an exceptionally important fact in party life and have elected two delegates (see the resolution) (* The record stops at this point. No other materials on the discussion of the organizational problem have been kept; the theses of the resolution were drafted by Zinovyev).

Theses of the resolution "On the Nature and Organizational Forms of Party Work."

1. On the basis of the initiated revival among the workers, the fruitful change in organizational forms used by clandestine party organizations and their enrichment with a new political content become possible. Basic confirmation of the December Resolution (* Item 1 was redrafted in accordance with Lenin's remarks. Following is its new text: "Recognizing that the experience of the last 3 years unquestionably confirmed the basic concepts of the resolution on the organizational problem, submitted at the December (1908) Conference, and believing that on the basis of the initiated revival within the labor movement, the possible further development of organizational forms of party work become possible along that way, i.e., the creation of clandestine cells surrounded by the largest possible widespread network of all kinds of legal worker societies, the conference....." With minor editorial corrections, this text was used in the final draft of the resolution).

2. The most active participation of the clandestine party organizations is necessary in leading the economic struggle (strikes, etc.) and establishing in this area cooperation between clandestine party cells and trade unions in general, and with the social democratic cells within the

trade unions in particular, and with individual leaders of the trade union movement, the energetic participation of social democratic party organizations in setting up strike committees, etc.

3. Being social democratic cells in the trade unions and organized on the basis of trade union characteristics, it would be desirable for such cells (taking local conditions into consideration) to combine their work with the party cells structured on the basis of the territorial principle.

4. Greater initiative must be displayed in organizing the work in the legal societies: unions, reading rooms, libraries, urban self-government, various worker entertainment societies, distribution of union printed matter and guiding trade union bodies in a Marxist spirit, making use of Duma speeches delivered by social democrats, training workers to act as legal lecturers, creating electoral committees by workers in connection with the elections to the Fourth Duma by rayon and street, etc.

5. Energetic efforts must be made to increase the number of clandestine party cells and to broaden, spread and introduce greater variety and necessary features in developing clandestine leading party organizations within each city, and the creation and dissemination of forms of mass clandestine organizations, such as "exchanges," plant party meetings, etc.

6. It would be desirable for propaganda circles to become involved in participation in daily work, such as economic struggle, dissemination of publications, etc.

(7. Never abuse the "elective principle" and allow co-opting on a broad scale.

(8. Be particularly active in practical daily work in the trade unions where propaganda is in the hands of social democrats.)

9. Particular attention must be paid to agitation through printed matter and to the role of the regular dissemination of and cooperation with the clandestine party newspaper in the area of linking legal to clandestine (work).

V.I. Lenin's remarks concerning the draft resolution "On The Nature and Organizational Forms of Party Work"

Include at the beginning of (a) confirmation of the resolution adopted in December 1908 or confirmation of its valid experience over a 3-year period; (b) acknowledgment that the work of the local social democratic forces is developing in our country a type of party which comes closer to that of the German party of 1878-1890.¹⁰⁶ This method must be followed further (replacing point No 1).

Delete from point five the word shaping and replace the word "expansion" with strengthening.

Item 7. Be more cautious, like the resolution of December 1908.

Item 9. Present matters that in the sense of political agitation and in the guidance of the revolutionary struggle and for the sake of interlinking all clandestine organizations and clandestine cells in the various societies, the regular dissemination of an accurately and frequently published clandestine social democratic newspaper is particularly important (* See V.I. Lenin, op. cit., vol 21, p 485. For the final draft of the resolution see "KPSS v Rezolyutsiyakh....," vol 1, pp 393-394.

Fifteenth Session

25 (12) January 1912 (* The date and number of the session are indicated on the back of the draft resolution "On the Present Time and the Party Tasks." The beginning of the records of the 15th session has not been preserved. The matter was discussed earlier at the 7th session. No records of the 13th and 14th sessions have been preserved.)

[Lenin?]....The wrong method was used and this is not our formula. As to the essence of the matter, we, bolsheviks, cannot abandon this idea nor do we find this necessary. Savva may question the concept of pseudo-constitutionalism. One can only be astounded by his doubt: officially, it is a constitution which conceals the existence of serfdom, which is Russia's reality. "The serf owners," Savva says, "i.e., some of them, were opposed to the 9 November ukase." Comrade Savva does not refute this in any way.... The policy is bourgeois but it is exercised by serf owners. Comrade Savva defended Martov on the matter of taking a step backward by tsarism in the age of counterrevolution. However, this is not the full question, Comrade Savva. Characteristically, this step backward is being taken jointly with the counterrevolutionary bourgeoisie. That is what you ignore in discussing Martov. "There is no autocracy," Comrade Savva says. This is a truly monstrous error based on totally forgetting the historically developed tremendous bureaucratic apparatus. This apparatus has interests of its own; whenever such interests demand it, autocracy goes against its best allies among the nobility, the starry chamber, etc. "Why particularly emphasize and note the need for republican propaganda? This we must always do and have done...." (* The text stops at this point and the next three sheets of the minutes are missing).

Draft resolution on the present time and the party's tasks

Above all, the conference ratifies the resolution "On the Present Time and the Party's Tasks," which was adopted at the party conference in December 1908 (See note 56). The conference stresses the particular importance of this resolution, the stipulations of which concerning the historical significance and the class nature of the entire 3 June regime, on the one hand, and the relative growth of the revolutionary crisis, on the other, have been fully confirmed by events over the past 3 years.

Among these events the conference particularly notes the following: a. The agrarian policy of the tsarist (government), with which the governmental parties of land owners and the big bourgeoisie and the counterrevolutionary liberals linked their counterrevolutionary interests, not only failed to lead to the creation of any whatsoever stable bourgeois relations in the countryside but also failed to rescue the peasant population from mass hunger, indicating extreme worsening in the situation of the population and a tremendous loss of productive forces.

b. Remaining helpless in the world competition provided by contemporary capitalist countries and increasingly being pushed back in Europe, allied with the Black Hundred nobility and the strengthening industrial bourgeoisie, autocracy is now trying to satisfy its predatory interests by pursuing a gross "nationalistic" policy aimed against the more cultured areas (Finland, Poland, the northwest) and through colonial conquests aimed against the peoples of Asia engaged in a revolutionary struggle for freedom (Persia, Mongolia).

c. The starting economic upsurge is being paralyzed to a tremendous extent by the total dislocation of the economic state of the peasantry, the predatory budgetary policy of autocracy and the total breakdown of the bureaucratic apparatus and, on the other hand, the increased cost of living is aggravating the needs of the working class and the broad population masses.

d. In this connection, during the 5 years of existence of the Third Duma, the broad population masses have become increasingly convinced of its unwillingness, inability and helplessness in doing anything whatsoever to improve the situation of the broad popular masses, and of the anti-people's nature of its ruling parties.

e. A start of political revival may be noted in the broad democratic circles and, above all, among the proletariat. The worker strikes of 1910-1911, the beginning of demonstrations and proletarian meetings, the beginning of a movement among the urban bourgeois democracy (student strikes) and so on, are all symptoms of the growing (active protest) on the part of revolutionary-leaning masses, opposing the 3 June regime.

On the basis of all of these data, the conference confirms the tasks facing the party, indicated in detail in the resolution of the December 1908 Conference, and draws the comrades' particular attention to the following:

1. The fact that, as in the past, the item on the agenda is lengthy work in socialist education and the organization and unification of the conscious masses of the proletariat;
2. The need to engage in intensive work for the restoration of the clandestine organization of the RSDWP, making even more extensive use than in the past of any and all legal opportunities, an organization which could assume

the leadership in the economic struggle waged by the proletariat and which would be the only one capable of guiding the increasingly frequent political actions by the proletariat;

3. The need for organizing and expanding systematic political agitation and providing comprehensive support to the initiated mass movements, expanding them under the banner of the full implementation of party slogans.

Republican propaganda against the policy of the tsarist monarchy must be particularly encouraged as part of the general and in opposition to the extensive propaganda for shortening the slogans and adapting to existing "legality" (* See V.I. Lenin, op. cit., vol 21, pp 125-127).

Zinovyev's amendment in item "c" of the resolution: Glimpses of economic upsurge.

(Two votes in favor the majority against).

(Lenin's amendment): "Economic upsurge."

(First round of balloting): Six votes for and four against.

(Second balloting): Five votes for.

(Third balloting): Seven votes for.

[Sergo]: I motion that the debates be terminated.

(Amendment by Viktor and Savva): The motion is made of replacing the word "peasantry" with the words "rural and urban democracy" (* Corrections included in the text of the minutes on the basis of preserved notes. The subsequent text is that of the recorded minutes).

[Timofey] I fail to understand Comrade Savva. He spoke of the vagueness of the term "peasantry" and accepted the term "petite bourgeoisie." Yet this is one and the same. The term "peasantry" is clearer, more commonly accepted, and must be used.

[Viktor] I insist on my amendment.

The amendment suggested by Viktor and Savva is rejected (with only one opposing vote).

The next item:

(1. The fact that, as in the past, the item on the agenda is, above all, the lengthy work of socialist upbringing and the organization and unification of the conscious proletarian masses).

[Sergo] I motion that the word "lengthy" be deleted in the place where the tasks involved in our work are discussed. In the past it made sense to speak of length. VPERED people participated in the 1908 Conference. Now this trend has become obsolete. Furthermore, the situation itself has changed.

[Pavel] I do not know whether or not there were VPERED people at the 1908 Conference for which reason, in counteracting them, it was allegedly necessary to include in the resolution on the present time the concept of length. The fact is that today in some areas there is great confusion (in the matter) of means of work. Many workers claimed that petty work is not necessary but that we should wait for some kind of upsurge, and so on. The word "lengthy" clearly defines the nature of the work.

Sergo's amendment is defeated. There was one abstention.

[Savva] I motion that the words "conscious (masses)" be deleted.

[Timofey] I oppose. In our social democratic work we have in mind....(* At this point the minutes are interrupted. This is followed by Viktor's replica, which is printed on the basis of his note).

[Viktor]. I motion that the words "conscious masses" be replaced with the words "progressive masses of the proletariat."

(Seven votes for and three against) (* No other materials on the debates on the resolution have been preserved. For the final text see "KPSS v Rezolyutsiyakh....," vol 1, pp 388-390).

Draft resolution "On Elections For the Fourth State Duma"

On Elections For the Fourth State Duma (* Records by Zinovyev and Kamenev. The minutes on the discussions of this and subsequent resolutions have not been preserved).

I

The conference accepts as absolutely necessary the participation of the RSDWP in the forthcoming electoral campaign for the Fourth Duma, the submission of independent candidates from our party and the establishment of a social democratic faction in the Fourth Duma, subordinate to our party as a whole, as being part of it (propaganda for nonparticipation by the social democrats in the Fourth Duma and refusal to help the party in the forthcoming electoral campaign are considered by the conference as incompatible with RSDWP membership).

The main task of the party for the elections (* Subsequent insert: "and the future social democratic faction in the Duma itself"), a task to which all other tasks must be subordinated, is socialist class propaganda (and revolutionary agitation. The main party task in the elections and in the future social democratic faction in the Duma itself is) the political education of the broadest possible popular masses (* Subsequent insert in the text "and the

organization of the working class) (explaining above all the antipeople's nature of the 3 June regime with its actual domination of serf owners and its Duma founded on the type of electoral law which automatically ensures a majority for landowners and big capital, i.e., preaching the overthrow of the monarchy through revolution).

The main electoral slogans of our party at the forthcoming elections must be (basic demands formulated by the revolutionary Russian proletariat during the 1905 Revolution. These demands are) a democratic republic, an 8-hour work day, confiscation of all landed estates (without compensation). (It is only) as inseparably related to these basic requirements that the individual requirements of our social democratic minimum program must be promoted, such as universal electoral rights, freedom of coalitions, (responsibility) (* In the course of the debates the word "responsibility" was replaced by "electiveness by the people"), of officials and judges, worker insurance, and so on. (The social democrats must particularly strongly emphasize to the masses the calamities to the people, which are only worsened and aggravated by contemporary monarchy, and the persecutions and repressions which are imposed by the 3 June regime on the entire democratic system in general and, particularly, the working class and its organization. In their agitation the social democrats must prove to the broad popular masses that rescuing the country from constant hunger experienced by tens of millions of peasants and workers, the elimination of the shameful phenomenon of the dying of tens of thousands of urban poor from cholera, and rescuing democracy in general and the working class in particular from the violence and arbitrariness of the government can be achieved only by totally uprooting the tsarist monarchy).

II

The overall tactical line pursued by the RSDWP for the elections must be the following: the party must engage in a decisive struggle against tsarism and the party of serf owners supporting it, as well as against bourgeois liberalism (mainly the Cadet Party) with its counterrevolutionary preaching and false democracy. Particular attention must be paid in the electoral struggle to separating the positions of the Proletarian Party from those of all nonproletarian parties and explaining both the petit bourgeois nature of fictitious socialism of the populist parties as well as their hesitations on matters of the struggle for a revolutionary-democratic change.

As far as electoral agreements are concerned, while remaining on the grounds of the resolutions of the London Congress (* Reference to the 5th RSDWP Congress), the party must:

1. Everywhere in worker affairs offer its own candidates and prevent here any kind of agreements with other organizations;

2. Bearing in mind the great propaganda value of the very fact of nominating independent social democratic candidates, see to it that in the second congress of urban voters as well and, possibly, in the peasant areas, the party nominates its own candidates;

3. Submit in the five cities (St. Petersburg, Moscow, Riga, Odessa and Kiev) which (in the second curia) have the right of direct elections with reballoting, at the initial elections, its independent social democratic candidacies. In the case of reballoting, considering the absence of Black Hundred threats, as anywhere else wherever deemed necessary, to accept agreements with the non-party left-wing and populist groups with a view to defeating the Cadets. Agreements with left-wing (populist and nonparty) groups do not apply to drafting a common platform or assuming any type of political obligations by social democratic candidates and should not stop the social democrats from firmly criticizing the halfway nature and inconsistency of such leftist groups;

4. In the second stage of the elections (uyezd meetings of representatives, guberniya meetings of the electorate, etc.), wherever there has been a breakdown in the Octobrist-Black Hundred or, in general, governmental ticket, if necessary, to conclude agreements on the allotment of deputy seats above all with the Trudoviki and, subsequently, the liberals, the nonparty people and the progressives.

III

All social democrats must immediately undertake preparations for the electoral campaign, for which reason particular attention must be paid to the following:

1. The need for immediately organizing clandestine social democratic cells everywhere, so that such cells may pay particular attention to the preparations for a social democratic electoral campaign for the Fourth Duma. The local party organizations (committees, groups, cells, etc.) must assume leadership over the entire electoral campaign;

2. Proper attention must be paid to strengthening the legal labor press;

3. All electoral work must be carried out in closest possible alliance with labor trade unions and all other legal worker societies. The legal status of such societies must be taken into consideration in selecting the forms of participation;

4. Particular attention must be paid to organizational and agitation preparations for the elections for the worker curia in the six guberniyas where the electoral law guarantees the election by workers of their representative (the guberniyas are the following: Petersburg, Moscow, Kostroma, Vladimir, Kharkov, and Yekaterinoslav);

5. Because of governmental persecution, detention of social democratic candidates, and so on, particularly sustained, systematic and cautious work is necessary so that, by all possible means, and taking quickly into consideration all sorts of tricks and violence and possible changes in governmental tactics, to block all tricks and violence on the part of the government and send social democrats to the Fourth Duma;

6. Candidates from the Social Democratic Party must be approved by the local clandestine organizations and groups or the oblast centers, or else by the party's Central Committee;

7. If despite all efforts, by the time of elections no party congress or conference can be held, the conference will entrust the Central Committee or any institution appointed by the later, to issue specific instructions on matters of conducting the electoral campaign in the individual areas or the special conditions which could develop, and so on (* For the final draft of the resolution and differences with this draft see "KPSS v Rezolyutsiyakh....," vol 1, pp 390-392).

Amendment to the draft resolution "On the Duma Social Democratic Faction," with corrections by V.I. Lenin (Notes by Lenin and Ordzhonikidze. No other materials on this discussion of the draft of this resolution have been preserved. For the final text see "KPSS v Rezolyutsiyakh....," vol 1, p 393).*

The conference recognizes, all in all, that the Duma social democratic faction has used the Duma rostrum in accordance with the line (and nature) defined at the December 1908¹⁰⁷ Party Conference, and which must (remain the leading line for the social democratic faction) and which remains guiding in the party's work in the Duma.

Viktor, Stepan, Timofey, (Sergo)

Materials for the resolution "on the 'petition campaign'" (See V.I. Lenin, op. cit., vol 21, pp 486-487. Parts of the document have been destroyed. For the final text of the resolution see "KPSS v Rezolyutsiyakh....," vol 1, pp 398-399).*

Resolution on the petition campaign

Topics:

1. Fabrication by literary workers unrelated to the masses, (not) (stemming) from the masses;

2. Invalid notes without clear (slogans), without agitation among (the masses) and with no interest (on the part of the masses);

3. The text and nature of the petition are unsatisfactory;

4. Deletion of partial demands, when circumstances put on the agenda general basic conditions for freedom (for) the entire people;

5. Collapse: 1,300 signatures. Not supported in Kiev, Yekaterinoslav, the Caucasus, etc.;

6. Interest in proletarian meetings has indicated that ("the way") to the masses, followed by the liquidationists, cannot be found there.

Result:

Acknowledge that the failure is final.

A petition based on specific circumstances (of the age) is one of the least (suitable) means of agitation.

Appeal for agitation for the freedom of (coalitions) in connection with the general (political) remarks and revolutionary agitation among the masses.

Draft resolution

To acknowledge:

1. That the initiated... (so) called "petition campaign" (* See note 19) was initiated (by a group of Petersburg literary workers) with a liquidationist trend, is not in the least the product (of the struggle waged by the masses), being unrelated to the active initiative...of labor organizations or progressive workers;

2. That the thus described (campaign, by virtue of its nature) is a petition, for also by virtue of general political conditions (it has inevitably become a mere formality) and an invalid (piece of paper) of no interest to the masses and (without) the extensive participation of the workers in the discussions...of such a petition either in the press or at meetings;

3. That said petition, which was circulated, and the comments which were made in this connection by the liquidationists, eliminated the requirement of political struggle for one of the (most) progressive and most revolutionary class, making this requirement (unrelated to general) basic conditions for political freedom (for the entire people), thus distorting the task of the struggle waged by the proletariat, which is (the leader)...of the entire people against tsarism and condemning the "campaign" to (failure);

4. That the fate of said (petition campaign) clearly confirmed the erroneousness of this initiative and its alienation (from the worker masses): the petition garnered no more than 1,300 signatures; (in this case) within all party organizations, including (in the Caucasus), Yekaterinoslav and Kiev and even those who sympathize with the liquidationists...the petition campaign, clearly not supported (by the masses, did not meet with absolutely) no

support and nor was it supported (by our social democratic faction in the Duma) (* Followed in the draft are items 5, 6 and 7, written by Zinovyev, the text of which has not been recovered).

Draft resolution "On Liquidationism and On the Group of Liquidationists," drafted by V.I. Lenin (* See V.I. Lenin, op. cit., vol 21, pp 130-131).

On Liquidationism and On the Group of Liquidationists

Taking into consideration:

1. That for some 4 years the RSDWP has been engaged in a decisive struggle against the liquidationist trend which was defined at the party's December 1908 Conference as "an attempt by a certain segment of the party intelligentsia to liquidate the existing RSDWP organization and replace it with a shapeless association within a legal framework at all costs, although the later would be purchased at the cost of a clear rejection of the program, tactics and traditions of the party) (* See "KPSS v Rezolyutsiyakh....," vol 1, p 312);

2. That in January 1910,¹⁰⁸ in continuing the struggle against this trend, the Central Committee Plenum unanimously acknowledged it as a "manifestation of bourgeois influence on the proletariat," and called for true party unity and merging the old bolshevik and menshevik factions and total break with liquidationism and total elimination of this bourgeois deviation from socialism;

3. That despite all party resolutions and the obligation assumed at the January 1910 Plenum, the representatives of menshevism and some mensheviks rallied around the petty journals NASHA ZARYA (* See note 5) and DELO ZHIZNI,¹⁰⁹ refused to help in the restoration of the Central Committee (refusal by Mikhail, Yuriy and Roman (* See note 14) not only to become members of the Central Committee in the spring of 1910 but also even to appear at a single session for co-opting new members);

4. That it is precisely after the 1910 Plenum that said publications have taken up decisively and comprehensively liquidationism, not only "belittling" (despite the plenum's resolution) "the significance of a clandestine party," but also directly rejecting it, proclaiming as already liquidated and as "reactionary utopia" the restoration of the clandestine party, pouring on it from censored journals mockery and abuse, and calling upon the workers to consider party cells and hierarchy as "dead," etc.;

5. That the few local petty groups of liquidationists, consisting essentially of members of the intelligentsia, in continuing their efforts to destroy the party, have not only rejected the appeal, which was repeated in 1911, to help rebuild the clandestine party and to convene its conference but, rallied in entirely independent little groups, engaged in direct agitation among the workers against the clandestine party and in a direct struggle against its restoration,

including areas where party mensheviks were in the majority (such as Yekaterinoslav, Baku, Kiev, etc.) (* Following a debate item five was deleted and Lenin recorded the following on it (see separate sheet No 6 on the correction);

The conference proclaims that said group (* The words "said group" in the final text replaced with the words "the NASHA ZARYA and DELO ZHIZNI" has definitively placed itself outside the party because of its behavior.

The conference calls upon all party members, regardless of trends and hues, to struggle against liquidationism, to explain the entire harm it causes to the liberation of the working class and to stress all efforts to promote the restoration and strengthening of the clandestine RSDWP (* As a whole, the resolution was unanimously adopted. See "KPSS v. Rezolyutsiyakh....," vol 1, pp 399-400).

Draft Amendments to the Party's Organization Statutes, Written by V.I. Lenin (* See V.I. Lenin, op. cit., vol 21, p 484. For the definitive text see "KPSS v Rezolyutsiyakh....," vol 1, p 401. This is a reference to amendments in the party's organizational statutes adopted at the 5th RSDWP Congress in 1907. The note has been deleted from the manuscript).

Organizational statutes

Item one: same.

Item two: Add the admissibility of co-opting as a provisional measure (as per the resolution of December 1908).

Item three: Same.

Item four: Same.

Item five: Same.

Item six: Same.

Item seven: Same.

Item eight: Delete. Granted to the Central Committee plus the local areas.

Item nine: Replace 1,000 voters by 30 or 50 and delete (temporarily) proportional representation.

Remark: Considering the emergency state of affairs, the 1912 Conference was structured as the party's supreme authority (see the resolution on the conference).

Materials for the selection of the RSDWP Central Committee

Motions on the procedure for the election of a Central Committee and the co-opting of Central Committee members. (* Drafted by S.S. Spandaryan)

1. Elect at this time a Central Committee consisting of seven (members).

2. Grant the right to co-opting by simple majority without restrictions on the number of co-opted individuals.

3. The Central Committee will be elected by secret balloting.

Timofey, Sergo, Valentin

Secret voting ballots (* Eleven have been preserved)

1. Lenin; 2. Zinovyev; 3. Boris Ivanovich; 4. Sergo; 5. Timofey; 6. Viktor; 7. Konstantin.

1. Lenin; 2. Zinovyev; 3. Albert; 4. Sergo; 5. Timofey; 6. Viktor; 7. ???

Lenin, Grigoriy, Zinovyev, Sergo, Timofey, Viktor, Konstantin, Boris Ivanovich.

Russia: 1. Timofey; 2. Konstantin; 3. Sergo; 4. Viktor; 5. Valentin. Abroad: Lenin, Zinovyev.

1. Lenin; 2. Grigoriy; 3. Sergo; 4. Konstantin; 5. Viktor; 6. Valentin; 7. Matvey.

Lenin, Zinovyev, Timofey, Sergo, Konstantin, Valentin, Matvey.

Lenin, Grigoriy, Valentin, Timofey, Konstantin, Viktor, Foma.

Timofey, Valentin, Sergo, Viktor, Konstantin, Zinovyev, Lenin.

Lenin, Zinovyev, Viktor, Konstantin, Boris Ivanovich, Sergo, Timofey.

Lenin, Zinovyev, Sergo, Viktor, Konstantin, Boris Ivanovich, Timofey.

Lenin, Zinovyev, Sergo, Timofey, Albert, Konstantin, Viktor.

Vote count

Lenin, 13; Zinovyev, 13, Sergo, 12; Viktor, 12; Konstantin, 12; Boris Ivanovich, 5; Timofey, 12; Valentin, 5; Albert, 2; Matvey, 2; Yerema, 1; Pavel, 1; Foma, 1.¹¹⁰

Statement by V.I. Lenin, L.B. Kamenev and Z.Ye. Zinovyev on Bolshevik Property

Statement

The undersigned representatives of the bolsheviks, with whom the Central Committee concluded the familiar contract (at the 10 January plenum) hereby state that they put bolshevik property at the disposal of the conference, constituted as the supreme party authority, and to the Central Committee it has elected.

Yu. K(ameney), G. Z(inovyev), N. L(enin).

Draft resolution "On the Property In the Hands of the Former Holder and On Financial Accounts"

Appraised of the statement of the legal representatives of the bolsheviks, with whom the Central Committee plenum signed a contract in January 1910 on the conditional transfer by the bolsheviks of their faction property to the Central Committee, the conference:

1. Considers that the representatives of the bolsheviks, because of violations of the contract by the liquidationists and because of the refusal of the holders to accept the role of arbitration tribunal, have all the legal rights to handle as they see fit the property at their disposal as well as the one in the hands of the former handler, Comrade Tsetkina;

2. Following this statement by the representatives of the Bolsheviks, the conference considers that the funds held by Comrade Tsetkina unquestionably belong to the party as represented by the Central Committee elected at the conference; therefore

3. It instructs the Central Committee to take all the necessary steps for immediately taking over the party property from Comrade Tsetkina.

(Sergo, Timofey) (* Both texts drafted by Zinovyev. For the resolution see "KPSS v Rezolyutsiyakh....," vol 1, p 402)

(Passed unanimously).

Footnotes

76. Ye.Ye. Tizengauzen (born 1860): Octobrist, deputy to the third state Duma, chairman of the Commission on the Workers Problem.

77. G.A. Krestovnikov (1855-1918), Octobrist. Member of the State Council since 1906.

78. Reference to a draft bill on old age pensions for workers, which was discussed for about 10 years by the french public, and passed by A. Briant, the prime minister, through the National Assembly, in April 1910.

79. V.N. Kokovtsov (1853-1943), Russian minister of finance from 1904 to 1914 (except for 1905-1906); since 1911 also Council of Ministers chairman.

80. D.F. Mashkevich (born 1871): priest, member of the Black Hundred. Deputy in the Third State Duma.

81. G.S. Kuznetsov (born 1881), worker, Menshevik. Deputy to the Third State Duma, member of the commission on the workers problem. Reference to his Duma speech on 17 October 1911 on the worker insurance bill (see V.I. Lenin, op. cit., vol 21, pp 18-21).

82. V.A. Stepanov (born 1872), Cadet, deputy to a Third and Fourth State Dumas. Repeatedly spoke out in the commission on the worker problem and at Duma sessions during the discussions of the draft insurance bill, criticizing some aspects but, as a whole, supporting the government's draft bill.

83. N.N. Shchepkin (1854-1919), zemstvo leader, member of the Cadet Party Central Committee. Deputy to the Third and Fourth State Dumas. Repeatedly spoke out at meetings on worker insurance, arguing with the social democrats.

84. A.Ya. Predkalin (1873-1923), physician, Latvian social democrat, deputy to the Third State Duma, member of the social democratic faction, supporter of the bolsheviks.

85. Reference to the provisional regulations on societies, unions and meetings, promulgated on 4 March 1906.

86. The increased influence of Christian socialism in some Western European countries at the turn of the 20th century was related primarily to the activities of the Christian trade unions which were established as one of the means of dividing the labor movement.

87. N.A. Semashko probably has in mind events from the history of the struggle for passing social legislation in England in the 1830s-1840s, when some laws, considered progressive for their time, were introduced by the agrarians in an effort to undermine the growing influence of the new industrial bourgeoisie.

88. Reference to the reforms instituted by Napoleon III.

89. In order to strengthen its position in the Caucasus, the liquidationist Transcaucasian (Caucasian) Oblast Committee summoned a conference of Transcaucasian RSDWP organizations. It was not representative, for even the largest Transcaucasian organization, the one in Baku, was not informed of the event.

90. Reference to the so called "Tiflis Duma opposition."

91. This group, which described itself as the "Organizational Group," was set up at the beginning of 1911. It consisted essentially of workers. It was able to set up several social democratic cells. The group was headed by Ye.D. Stasova.

92. N.S. Chkheidze (1864-1926) was a menshevik leader.

93. The leading nucleus of the Baku RSDWP Committee was arrested on 30 September 1911.

94. G.K. Ordzhonikidze mentions the resolutions adopted by the menshevik groups abroad in support of the liquidationist line of the ZBTsK, full of slanderous attacks on Lenin and the bolsheviks in connection with N.A. Semashko's leaving the foreign bureau of the RSDWP Central Committee. As the committee's treasurer, in June 1911 Semashko put all available funds at the disposal of the conference of RSDWP Central Committee members.

95. On 12 January 1912 the OCA published a leaflet on the conference of bolshevik groups abroad, held in Paris in December 1911. See "*KPSS v Rezolyutsiyakh....*," vol 1, pp 375-381.

96. Reference to the preparations for the conference of liquidationists, which was held in Vienna in August 1912; it was there that the antiparty August bloc, headed by Trotsky, was organized.

97. M.A. Bakunin (1814-1876) was a Russian revolutionary, one of the ideologues of anarchism. He participated in the activities of the First International, within which he organized a secret alliance of anarchists ("Social Democratic Alliance"); he tried to pit it against the International and to seize the leadership of the General Council. On Marx's insistence, Bakunin was expelled from the International in 1872 for his disruptive activities.

98. Probably a reference to the resolution rejecting the Prague Conference as an all-party conference, passed by a group of mensheviks-party members in San Remo (Italy) with the participation of G.V. Plekhanov.

99. Probably I.A. Ayzenshtadt (Yudin) (1867-1937), one of the Bundt leaders.

100. Article 102 of the penal code of the Russian Empire of 1903, which stipulated punishment for participation in the clandestine struggle against the established governmental system.

101. Referring to the mandatory part of the resolution passed at the 5th All-Russian RSDWP Conference (December 1908) on the organizational problem.

102. The "Emergency Law Against the Socialists," was enacted in Germany in 1878 by the Bismarck government with a view to fighting the workers and the socialist movement. This law banned all organizations of the social democratic party, mass worker organizations and the labor press. In 1890, yielding to the pressure of the mass and intensifying labor movement, this "emergency law against the socialists" was abrogated.

103. The conference of the Petersburg RSDWP Organization was held in Teriokakh on 27 October (9 November) 1907. At the conference Lenin spoke on the Third State Duma and the participation of social democrats in the bourgeois press (see V.I. Lenin, op. cit., vol 16, pp 133-138).

104. PROSVESHCHENIYE was a monthly bolshevik theoretical journal published legally in Petersburg from December 1911 to June 1914.

105. P.A. Stolypin (1862-1911) was Council of Ministers chairman and Russia's minister of internal affairs in 1906-1911.

106. Reference to the Social Democratic Party of Germany during the period of the "Emergency Law Against the Socialists" (see note 102).

107. At the 5th All-Russian RSDWP Conference the resolution "On the Duma Social Democratic Faction" was introduced by the bolsheviks; it evaluated the activities of the faction and stipulated its specific tasks. The addition to the resolution was drafted by Lenin (see op. cit., vol 17, p 334).

108. The RSDWP Central Committee Plenum, known as the "Unification" Plenum, was held between 2 and 23 January (15 January-5 February) 1910 in Paris.

109. DELO ZHIZNI was a legal journal, the organ of the menshevik-liquidationists; it was published in Petersburg between January and October 1911. Nine issues came out.

110. The following were elected: Lenin, Zinovyev, Ordzhonikidze, Spandaryan, Shvartsman, Malinovskiy and Goloshchekin.

At the end of the conference of the RSDWP Central Committee Plenum, it was decided to co-opt as Central Committee members I.S. Belostotskiy and J.V. Stalin. G.I. Petrovskiy and Ya.M. Sverdlov were co-opted as Central Committee members later.

111. Reference to the contract concluded in January 1910 by representatives of the bolsheviks and the RSDWP Central Committee on transferring some of the funds belonging to the bolsheviks to the Central Committee through an international arbitration authority headed by K. Kautsky, K. Tsetkin and F. Mehring. The arbiters were the "keepers" of the bank account in which the funds were deposited. After Kautsky and Mehring refused in October 1911 to implement the obligations they had assumed, K. Tsetkin continued to perform the functions of "keeper" alone and refused to give the funds back to the bolsheviks.

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At the First Stage of the War; A Military Historian's Notes

18020015j Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian No 9, Jun 88 (signed to press 6 Jun 88) pp 88-94

[Article by Nikolay Grigoryevich Pavlenko, doctor of historical sciences, professor, lieutenant general]

[Text] The date 22nd June is particularly memorable to us, inevitably leading us to think of the past war and, above all, of its initial period, which was extremely difficult and dramatic for us. The restoration of historical truth calls for exposing the roots of the military errors and failures through which and despite which the Soviet soldier carried the victory flag to Berlin.

In no single area of human activities is the question of the quality of leadership of people so pressing as in an armed struggle. This is due, above all, to the fact that in that struggle everything is paid in blood, both successes and failures. Frequently, the price of errors, omissions and failures is much higher than that of even major accomplishments on a strategic scale. That is why troop leadership in war is not only inadmissible but also criminal if practiced by the "trial and error" method.

Military history shows that a maximal avoidance of errors is possible only with high professionalism of command cadres, their profound knowledge of the enemy's combat experience and practices. It is precisely such cadres that we were short of at the initial period of the war. The mass repressions among the Armed Forces in the country which had taken place in 1937 and 1938 had deprived it of more than 40,000 commanders, political workers, military engineers and specialists. "Had there been no 1937," Marshal A.M. Vasilevskiy noted in this connection, "possibly the war may not have taken place at all in 1941. The fact that Hitler decided to start a war in 1941 was greatly determined by the assessment of the extent to which military cadres had been decimated in our country.... A number of divisions were commanded by captains, for anyone else of a superior rank had been detained." Although in subsequent years the damage caused to the cadres was numerically corrected, this was not accomplished in terms of quality. Many command and staff positions were filled by people who were insufficiently experienced and trained. Under the most difficult circumstances of the initial period of the war, naturally they made numerous errors.

Something else should be acknowledged as well, however. The gravest errors, some of them tragic, took place on the strategic level of troop command. Many of them were committed personally by J.V. Stalin who, in the view of Marshal G.K. Zhukov, had a very vague idea concerning military affairs both before and at the start of the war. Nonetheless, for more than 18 months (starting with the autumn of 1941) he ignored the views of

military specialists, considering himself the only strategist. It was only the harsh reality of the autumn of 1942 that somewhat cooled off his ambitions as military leader.

Our military history publications frequently state that at the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, the experience from the period of the civil war was taken into consideration in the creation of the special authorities such as the State Defense Committee (GKO) and the Supreme Command Headquarters (VGK). However, there are reasons to believe that great differences existed between these special agencies in different wars, including in the methods used in their operation. The main feature of the Worker and Peasant Defense Council of the civil war was the fact that it did not replace or take over the functions of party and government authorities. At that time the main problems related to the conduct of combat operations were considered at meetings of the Sovnarkom and the Politburo, at Central Committee plenums and at RKP(b) congresses. In the Great Patriotic War no plenums, not to mention party congresses, took place and all essential military problems were solved by the GKO or, more specifically, by Stalin personally. That is why it is difficult to agree with the claim that the GKO, headed by Stalin, had as its prototype the Worker and Peasant Defense Council which, as the Military Encyclopedia claims, for example, was headed by V.I. Lenin (see vol 2, p 622).

There were substantial differences in terms of structure and work methods between the Republic Revolutionary Military Council, which operated during the civil war, and the Supreme Command Headquarters. The differences applied, on the one hand, to the specific nature of the circumstances and, on the other, the subjective positions and views held by the political leaders of the country in either war.

As the head of the government and chairman of the Worker and Peasant Defense Council, Lenin did not consider it possible to assume the function of heading the war department, not to mention the obligations of commander in chief of the Armed Forces. During the civil war major military specialists were commanders in chief of the country's Armed Forces: I.I. Vatsetis initially, followed by S.S. Kamenev. They were also members of the Republic Revolutionary Military Council. In the course of their practical work they were guided by the directives issued by the RKP(b) Central Committee and the instructions issued by Lenin and the Revolutionary Military Council. The commanders in chief were trusted by the Soviet government and dedicated all their activities to leading the armed struggle. They had at their disposal the RVSR Field Headquarters, headed by its commander. Let us note that during the civil war such an organization in managing the fronts was entirely justified. The problems which faced the Armed Forces were solved usually successfully and with high professional standards.

Stalin virtually rejected the experience of the civil war in the organization of the strategic leadership of the Armed Forces. Although headquarters numbered, at different times, from six to eight members, actually it consisted of two or three people. Here is the way the activities of headquarters and its interaction with the GKO were described by G.K. Zhukov at a meeting of military historians in the autumn of 1966 in the editorial premises of VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, according to a record made at that time: "It was difficult to understand where the GKO ended and headquarters began, and vice versa. One of the reasons for this was that Stalin was chairman of the GKO and, at the same time, headed Supreme Command Headquarters. One would go to Stalin and not know where one was: attending a GKO meeting or a headquarters conference. One could be equally abused. In practice what happened was that Stalin was headquarters and Stalin was also the State Defense Committee. He commanded everything, he directed everything. His word was final and subject to no appeal."

Here is the way headquarters was assessed by Marshal A.M. Vasilevskiy: "In the course of more than 30 months of work as chief of General Staff, and subsequently as a member of headquarters, I did not see a single meeting held by the Supreme Commander in Chief with the full membership." According to Vasilevskiy, Stalin paid little attention to whether or not a military commander was a member of headquarters.

As we know, during the Great Patriotic War Stalin held an entire series of most important party and governmental positions. He was general secretary of the VKP(b) Central Committee, chairman of the USSR Council of People's Commissars, Supreme Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces and USSR People's Commissar of Defense. In addition to this, he had other high leading functions: He headed the Transportation Committee, and dealt almost daily with the people's commissariats in charge of armament and ammunition production; together with people's commissars and designers he dealt with problems of improving military ordnance, etc. Naturally, such an overloading of the Supreme Commander in Chief could not fail adversely to affect his own military activities. It prevented him from studying matters in depth. "Resolving on a daily basis hundreds of major and minor problems," recalled A.V. Khrulev, former chief of the Main Administration of the Rear of the Soviet Armed Forces, in conversation with me, "occasionally Stalin issued most contradictory instructions, which were mutually exclusive. Since usually no records and minutes were kept of this, some of his orders remained unfulfilled. Naturally, those who, by virtue of a variety of reasons risked to do so, always had a prepared loophole so that they could blame someone else...."

As we assess the quality of the strategic leadership of the forces during the initial period of the war, again and again we go back to the eve of the war. At that time the

various alarming facts included some which could simply not be ignored such as, for example, the increasingly frequent flights of German aircraft across our borders and the landing of sabotage and reconnaissance groups on Soviet territory; or else the mass relocation by the German authorities of Poles away from the border areas, moving pontoon facilities toward rivers, stockpiling ammunition on the ground and removing barbed wire fences. Such facts have always been an indication that the enemy would attack not in weeks or days but even hours.

Proceeding from an erroneous assessment of the intentions of the fascist leadership, Stalin forbade the Soviet military command to take the necessary mobilization steps, to regroup the forces in the border districts and to bring them to a state of combat-readiness. Beriya and his apparatus were put in charge of supervising the strict implementation of Stalin's instructions.

While he was still chief of General Staff, on the basis of the study of historical, geographic and operative-strategic factors, Marshal B.M. Shaposhnikov concluded that in the case of war against Germany, the German command would concentrate its main strike in the Smolensk-Moscow direction. Stalin rejected this conclusion out of hand. He said that in order to wage the war Germany needed grain, for which reason the main strike would be dealt in the Ukraine. Understandably, Stalin's view became mandatory to our military command.

In the spring of 1941 the bulk of the German-fascist forces (including three out of four tank armies) were concentrated along a line north of Polesye. It became obvious that the main strike of the enemy would nonetheless be in the direction of the Smolensk "gate." No one, however, dared report to Stalin his error. It was decided, however, as a "routine" step to transfer some forces from the Ukraine to the Smolensk area.

Many important problems, including new means of warfare by the Wermacht, were "overlooked" also as a result of quick changes of cadres on the higher command levels. Suffice it to say that within a single year, from the summer of 1940 to the summer of 1941, there were three chiefs of General Staff: B.M. Shaposhnikov replaced K.A. Meretskov who was replaced by G.K. Zhukov who, once again, was replaced by B.M. Shaposhnikov. Such moves took place in the other higher military authorities. All of this hindered the formulation of new approaches to the strategy and tactics of the Wermacht, which had started combat operations in Europe not with some forces, as had been the case in World War I, but by immediately committing to battle its main forces.

As Zhukov subsequently pointed out, the striking power of the German Army proved to be unexpected by us. Equally unexpected was its eightfold superiority of forces in the decisive directions. "It was above all this that predetermined our losses in the first period of the war," the marshal emphasized.

The errors and blunders of a military-strategic nature which were made led to major Red Army defeats in the summer of 1941. It would be pertinent in this connection to recall Zhukov's familiar statement: "Had the forces in the border districts been brought to a state of full combat-readiness in advance, during the first days of the war greater damages could have been caused to the enemy and the western defense lines could have been held longer. All of this could have enabled us to commit to battle units which were coming up from the military districts of the interior." In other words, it would have meant the failure of the enemy plan for waging a "lightning war" not along the Leningrad-Moscow-Rostov-na-Donu line but far more to the west.

Stalin's personal qualities and his frequent irritability and even hysteria caused great harm to organizing the control of the operative fronts in 1941. Let me refer to a case described to me by Marshal I.S. Konev: On 4 October 1941 in a telephone conversation with Stalin he requested permission to withdraw troops which had suffered a defeat, to one of the rear lines. To his amazement, instead of answering the question directly, Konev heard the following, said in the third person: "Comrade Stalin is not a traitor, Comrade Stalin is not a renegade, Comrade Stalin is an honest person and his entire error is that he trusted the cavalry too much...."

After heavy and exhausting fighting, the Soviet forces were able to halt the enemy along the entire strategic front by the end of 1941. Furthermore, they were able to inflict on him a series of defeats. They achieved particularly major successes in the winter of 1941/42 at Moscow and in a westerly direction, in which the "Center" group of armies suffered a major defeat.

It was decided to follow up these successes with a general offensive. Stalin believed that after the battle for Moscow the enemy was in a state of confusion and that this was "the most suitable time" for such an offensive. A discussion of the outlines of the plan took place on 5 January 1942 at Supreme Command Headquarters. Zhukov favored a more powerful offensive in a westerly direction by strengthening the fronts with reserves, and abstaining from offensive operations in other directions. As he confirms, N.A. Voznesenskiy, Gosplan chairman, who attended the meeting, opposed a general offensive, arguing that there was an acute shortage of material facilities and that it was impossible to supply ordnance to all fronts simultaneously.

Naturally, the fronts converted to offensive operations but nowhere were any substantial results achieved. "Stalin demanded of us to advance," G.K. Zhukov noted at the 1966 meeting I mentioned. "He said: If you have no results today you will have results tomorrow and you will furthermore block the enemy. Meanwhile, there will be results in other sectors. Naturally, these were juvenile considerations.... As a result, casualties were high, there were great outlays of material facilities and

no general strategic results whatsoever. Had the forces and means at our disposal at that time been used in a westerly direction, the results would have been different."

Stalin held another conference in March 1942 to discuss the possible nature of operations by the Red Army in the summer. Considering enemy superiority and the lack of a second front, in a thorough report Chief of General Staff Shaposhnikov suggested that for the immediate future the forces limit themselves to active defense. The main strategic reserves, which would not be committed, be concentrated in the central direction and, partially, in the Voronezh area where, in the view of the General Staff, the main events could take place. In analyzing the plan of the command for operations in a southwestern direction, for the purpose of developing the Kharkov offensive, Shaposhnikov tried to point out the difficulties of organizing it. According to Zhukov, Stalin interrupted the chief of General Staff by saying "we must not wait in a defensive position for the Germans to strike first! We must deal a number of preventive strikes along a broad front and determine the readiness of the enemy." The conference ended with an instruction issued by the Supreme Commander in Chief to prepare and carry out in the shortest possible time partial operations in the Crimea, in the direction of Kharkov and in a number of other areas.

A number of individual offensive operations were organized in accordance with this instruction, covering a vast front stretching from the Barents Sea to the Crimean Peninsula. The Karelian Front was issued the assignment of clearing Soviet territory from the enemy in its sector and restoring the state border; the Seventh Army was to seize a bridgehead on the northern bank of the Svir River. The task was also set of lifting the Leningrad blockade, liquidating the Demyanskiy enemy group and crushing the Rzhev-Vyazma, Orel and Kharkov groups. In the south, an operation was planned to liberate the Crimea. As the enumeration of such assignments shows, what came out of a sensible and considered plan drawn up by the General Staff was, essentially, a new plan which called for an entire series of isolated offensive operations.

Because of poor material and technical support, most of them failed to achieve their objectives. Furthermore, the operations in the direction of Kharkov and in the Crimea ended catastrophically for us, which laid the beginning of new defeats. As a result of these failures and, subsequently, the defeat of our troops at Voronezh, the enemy gained the strategic initiative and mounted a headlong offensive toward the Volga and the Caucasus. The Soviet forces had to make a tremendous effort to hold back the enemy offensive in the foothills of the Main Caucasian Ridge and along the banks of the Volga and Don Rivers.

The defeats suffered by the Red Army on the southern flank of the Soviet-German Front cannot be explained by the circumstances used, to a certain extent, to justify

our defeats in the summer of 1941. The main reason for the failure of the summer 1942 campaign was the erroneous decision made by the Supreme Commander in Chief to "suspend" the strategic defense for the sake of engaging in numerous isolated offensive operations along all fronts. This led to a dispersal of the forces and the premature expenditure of reserves, which clearly doomed Stalin's plan to defeat.

As a result of the retreat of the Soviet forces to the banks of the Volga and the foothills of the Caucasus, more than 80 million people found themselves living in territories temporarily occupied by the fascists. The country was deprived of its largest industrial and agricultural areas which accounted for more than 70 percent of the pig iron, 58 percent of the steel, 63 percent of the coal, 42 percent of the electric power and 47 percent of all arable land. This meant that henceforth the Soviet state could use in the war against Hitlerite Germany and its allies actually no more than one-half of its economic potential.

The first symptoms that the style and methods of strategic leadership had begun to change appeared by the autumn of 1942. Stalin appointed G.K. Zhukov deputy supreme commander in chief. It must be pointed out that at that point Zhukov no longer considered Stalin the embodiment of wisdom and able to find a solution to even the most difficult situations. Enriched by combat experience, he defended more daringly in front of Stalin not only his own suggestions but also the views of the General Staff. This had a favorable influence on the decision-making process.

This already became noticeable in the preparations for the counteroffensive at Stalingrad, in the autumn of 1942. At that time Stalin began to listen much more closely to the views of military specialists and aides. In the past this happened only during extreme and critical situations such as, for example, the period of the battle for Moscow. At that time, according to Marshal Zhukov, "he listened very closely to advice. Unfortunately, however, sometimes he made decisions which were inconsistent with the situation. Such was the case of putting in the reserve the First Assault Army and the mounting an offensive along all fronts."

In discussing the first period of the war, which was most difficult for us, we must give its due to the courage and heroism of the Soviet soldier who displayed unparalleled examples of firmness and of indomitable moral spirit. We must also give their proper due to commanders and political workers and to the great galaxy of Soviet military leaders and commanders who, in the most critical moments, were able to preserve the combat power of the Armed Forces, to correct the strategic situation and to make possible a turn in the subsequent development of events.

Few were the countries in the history of World War II which could, after suffering major defeats at the initial stage, surmount the situation and come out victorious.

Taking into consideration the tremendous difference in the conditions of waging the armed struggle, this applies to the USSR and the United States. Naturally, the extent of the severity of the blows they suffered was extremely different. However, also different was the approach taken by the state leadership to the reasons for the defeats.

In the United States, the investigation of the reasons for the Pearl Harbor catastrophe was launched 10 days after the outbreak of the war. Naturally, it was incomparably simpler for the Americans to solve such problems, for the combat operations were taking place away from their shores. What matters is something else: The errors and blunders of senior military personnel in Washington were exposed and the reports of the commission led to the drawing of proper conclusions concerning military building, improving the management of armed forces from top to bottom, etc.

Stalin approached the reasons for the defeats suffered by the Red Army at the beginning of the war differently. In order to exonerate himself, he and his closest retinue organized a trial. On the basis of forgeries, a large group of generals was sentenced and executed. They included D.G. Pavlov, commander of the forces on the Western Front, V.Ye. Klimovskikh, chief of staff of the same front, A.A. Korobkov, commander of the Fourth Army, and other military commanders.

Under conditions of a strict control over various types of "discussions," military commanders who tried to analyze the reasons for the defeats became suspect and subject to reprisals. Thus, Gen V.A. Melikov, the noted military researcher and author of a fundamental work on strategic deployment, was accused of "defeatism" and sent to jail, where he died, for having had confidential talks with fellow soldiers on the possible errors made by the command in strategic matters.

Along with reprisals for attempts to analyze the reasons for defeat, the version was actively promoted of the suddenness of the attack mounted by the enemy, along with other semitruths. However, whereas during the war and in its immediate aftermath concealing the truth may be somewhat understandable, after the cult of Stalin's personality was debunked it might have seemed that the truth about the initial period of the war and the responsibility for blunders and failures should have been brought out in its entirety. However, to this day we come across distorted views on this account not only in ordinary thinking but also in some works on the history of the Great Patriotic War.

Typically, some of them carefully bypass the word "punishment" which, as a rule, is replaced by the more modest "accusation." Thus, we read in the second volume of the 12-volume *"Istoriya Vtoroy Mirovoy Voyny 1939-1945"* [History of World War II, 1939-1945] the following: "In 1937-1938, as a result of groundless accusations, a significant number of commanders and political workers were dismissed from the Armed Forces" (p 206). It is further

stated that the appeals of those dismissed were allegedly considered and to a large extent the errors were corrected. There is not even a hint of the physical destruction of a tremendous number of commanders and the deaths of a number of outstanding military leaders. The text is drafted in such a way that Stalin's most severe crimes are presented as innocent errors.

This example is a typical reflection of the so-called style of "surmounting distortions" in the assessment of the cult of personality, which has been promoted in the science of military history for 20 years, starting with 1965. The attachment shown by many researchers to the systems and stereotypes which developed during that time and the undeleted prohibitions to access to an entire number of sources and materials have all thrown the historiography of the Great Patriotic War far back. One can only regret that time has been lost, many participants and witnesses of events have left us and the most essential problems of the initial period of the war must be studied essentially from scratch.

Efforts are currently under way for the creation of a new fundamental work on the history of the Great Patriotic War. Taking into consideration the sad experience of many previous studies, it should be conducted by professional historians. This chronicle of tragic and heroic war days should reflect the entire historical truth. This problem can be successfully solved only if, unlike the past, military historians are not guided by the fashion of the day but subordinate their research to the recreation of historical reality and to drawing the necessary lessons from it.

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Grassroot Initiatives. An Informal View
18020015k Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian No 9,
Jun 88 (signed to press 6 Jun 88) pp 95-106

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[Text] We arrived to the need for a systematic work on this topic by different ways. Some of us, who participated at the very start of the 1980s, in the creation of

youth application firms, clubs for adolescents and environmental protection units, tried to interpret available experience. Others, in organizing initiative groups at the present time, felt the need to discuss their achievements and problems. Others again saw the need to consider this phenomenon through the eyes of the deputy or the scientist. Gradually, all of us acquired factual data based on the results of surveys, documents, editorial mail, results of business games, and others.

We are concerned by the fact that the gap between the number of articles "on the hot traces" of initiatives and the theoretical interpretation of a given phenomenon is widening. We are particularly concerned by the fact that under the guise of "informality," we find today initiatives of high civic value along with ordinary circles and groups of drug addicts or simply some antisocial elements.

Another problem is the imperceptible devaluation of the concept of "initiative." This name has been given to virtually any idea or suggestion. Therefore, we believe that it has become necessary to analyze the history, structure and dynamics of autonomous initiatives as a social phenomenon.

Present and Historical Facts

Initiatives coming from below may be found in all areas of social life. In 1960 there was a single student unit for environmental protection in the country; there were 11 in 1970, 57 in 1978, 96 in 1985 and 121 in 1987. Three or 4 years ago there was not a single ecology club. Today there are several dozen. Hundreds of youth housing complexes have appeared and as so have even larger number of clubs for adolescents. The number of youth initiative foundations, family clubs, charity clubs and clubs for the protection and restoration of historical and cultural monuments is growing steadily. As a whole, we estimate that, one way or another, 7-8 percent of the urban population over the age of 14 are engaged in independent initiative projects.

Broadening the social base of initiatives is an important symptom of perestroika. Their scope is widening, reflecting a general pattern in the development of restructuring: The number and activeness of associations and groups are greater in the big cities compared to the small and the rural areas, and there are more of them in the western part of the country than, shall we say, in Central Asia.

However, we must immediately draw up several demarcation lines. Generally speaking, it is incorrect to divide society into formal and informal structures, for the latter can exist both inside and outside the formal ones or at the margin between the two. Furthermore, such division is flexible: Under our very eyes some informal associations have become cost accounting organizations, cooperatives or mixed social-state associations.

Another important aspect is that, having entered in its decisive stage, perestroika has not only brought to life a variety of initiatives but also led to a certain polarization of forces, some of which have legalized their activities as informal associations. As a result, we are dealing not only with positive but also with conservative or criminal initiatives. In short, it is not a question of "informality" but of the nature and trend of autonomous groups and associations. It is here that we find the most numerous and socially significant type of such initiatives—civic initiatives—which are distinguished above all by their socially significant objectives and constructive activities.

Reality indicates that during periods of drastic social change there have always been intensive "bursts" of independent activities. They were triggered, on the one hand, by the inefficiency of existing organizational structures and, on the other, by the fact that they offered the people the opportunity to apply their social potential. "A few months of revolution," wrote V.I. Lenin in 1905, "in some cases educate faster and more completely the citizens than decades of political stagnation." Already then self-education, self-help and other types of groups appeared. After the February revolution, "unauthorized democratic organizations" appeared in Petrograd (Lenin), which supervised the allocation of housing, and food, fuel and clothing supplies. "Literacy schools," cultural-educational commissions, and kindergartens were created as well. During the first post-revolutionary years two channels for the development of initiative became noticeable. The first included various forms of local self-government and self-aid, the purpose of which was to satisfy the vital needs of the people. The second was aimed at satisfying social and spiritual needs, including an initial exposure to knowledge and the skills of management, the arts and high-class creative activities.

The first decade of the Soviet system, which was difficult in all respects, was nonetheless marked by intensive activities of voluntary societies and associations. The work of the organizations which had been created before the revolution (society of lovers of the Russian language, association for mobile art exhibits, society of lovers of ancient literacy and art) continued their work. Societies for regional and historical-cultural studies appeared ("Old Petersburg"), along with a large number of literary-artistic associations which combined professional with civic activities (auctions in favor of the Army and the hungry) and individual intercourse. Many initiative groups of young writers, poets and painters rallied around equally young initiative-minded publications (OGONEK, GOROD, RELSY). Even by contemporary standards cultural life in the big cities, particularly by the end of the decade, was quite rich. Communes were also set up—industrial, consumer and service—whose members tried to apply directly the ideas of a communist organization of society. An intensive inventions movement was initiated. As witnessed by V.D. Bonch-Bruyevich, in the very first months of the Soviet system the Sovnarkom was drowned in offers of various new inventions and adaptations in industrial production. A large

number of designs appeared (for housing and for the cities of the future). Although their implementation was not contemplated, such "paper planning" and programs for socialist reorganization of the human habitat substantially influenced domestic and world culture.

Nonetheless, the danger of excessive organization of social initiatives was noted as well. "In a contemporary club," N.K. Krupskaya wrote, "there is excessive supervision and regulation." One must find a "place for talks, for a comradesly discussion," and "sense the live ways for the implementation of such internal club democracy." Delegates to the 14th VKP(b) Congress noted that all club work should be based on autonomy, voluntary participation and initiative-mindedness of the club members, without any shade of imposition, command or coercion.

In the 1930s, however, many such voluntary associations ended their activities and the centralized activities of social organizations intensified. The concept of the aggravation of the class struggle within the USSR in the course of building socialism and the series of loudly publicized "sabotage" trials, the concept of "interfering in everything," and the steady emphasis on the gravity of the political moment ("either-or") as well as demands for mobilization and military discipline and extremes in assessing any inordinate phenomenon in literature and the arts did not contribute in the least to the development of independent initiative.

Meanwhile, the legislation regulating the activities of voluntary associations changed noticeably. Whereas in the 1920s all that was necessary to register and approve them was for the objectives of a society not to violate the constitution or other laws, now the consistency between these objectives and the tasks and plans of state organizations became the main factor. The line of eliminating so-called duplication led to excessive centralization and standardization of all social activities.

Another legacy of the 1930s is the extensive lack of clarity in the procedure for registering autonomous organizations, which to this day triggers administrative arbitrariness in this respect. Nonetheless, they were not required to observe the principle of democratic centralism (in other words, the mandatory establishment of a centralized controlling "superstructure" over local initiatives), as is being suggested today in one of the drafts of the law on voluntary societies.

The period between the end of the 1950s and beginning of the 1960s was noted by a new upsurge in social activeness. Autonomous groups, reflecting the cultural and educational growth of the population, the desire to communicate on the basis of common interests and discussions of contemporary and historical problems began to appear in the areas of culture, education and science. Unfortunately, a number of reasons hindered the development of this process.

To begin with, Lenin's ideas on self-government were not restored to their fullest extent. A variety of slogans on activities for the masses ("creating conditions for the people," "work with the population at places of residence") and efforts by scientists to define "sensible needs" and compute an "efficient time budget," were all factors which encouraged an understanding of independent activities as forms of recreation, within which the "masses," guided by professionals, would be exposed to culture.

As in the past, social organizations were interpreted as extensions of professional activities to leisure time (such as the Gosgrazhdanstroy of the Association of Architects, DOSAAF, of the Ministry of Defense, and so on). Legal experts took a hand in the establishment of such "subordination" as early as the 1930s. They called for reducing the size of the social organizations so that each one of them could be subordinated to a specific people's commissariat.

Second, the social policy was aimed essentially at the creation of mass social organizations of an educational type (people's universities of culture) which would provide a sensible organization of the leisure time. Essentially, however, they were oriented toward a consumerist exposure to culture rather than independent activities. Efforts were made to meet the urgent need for adolescent and "adult" types of creative activity at home with the old (circle) forms which were considered both by the population and the organizers as a secondary occupation. Television, which developed rapidly, deprived these local centers of culture of their last stronghold.

Third, something particularly worth mentioning, was the long years of subordination of all social life to production and production plans, rhythm and organization, which developed even in strongly initiative-minded people, a rather simplistic idea of the problems of life outside the plant gates. Production innovators and front-runners, who had seen the negative consequences of the growing lag in the social area, repeatedly made efforts to develop and improve it. Usually this took the form of sponsorship by a plant over a microrayon or a city. The typical motivations, such as "we are doing this free of charge," "what does it cost to our enterprise to help the school," and so on, prevailed. These were truly noble motivations for people who worked evenings and Sundays. A specialist employed in a progressive production facility was sincerely convinced that life in a school or a household club had only to be "organized" and provided with a "material facility" (equipment, workshop) for later everything to develop by itself. Occasionally, only after retirement and observing this life on a daily basis and from the inside, the person began to realize how important yet how difficult and heterogeneous it was, and what tremendous experience and knowledge one had to have to understand human relations.

At that time the potential of primary initiatives was still small and was supported essentially by enthusiastic professionals, educators above all. The influence was felt

of dissatisfied but vitally important needs, the overexertion of forces and the burden of recent losses and punishments; it was difficult to abandon all of a sudden the customary stereotypes of subordination and obedience. Some time had to pass before the people themselves began to suggest and try some forms of activities and, furthermore, for this to become the social standard, i.e., to gain social approval. It was also during that period that public design bureaus were set up, the Communar movement developed and the first units for environmental protection and clubs for amateur singing appeared.

A potential of unrealized initiatives intensively developed in the 1970s and beginning of the 1980s. Today the reasons for this are quite well known and a great deal is being written about them. The various population strata became increasingly aware of the need to close the gap between the demands of the job and society, and the state of the social and cultural environment in which the most important social qualities take shape and multiply.

Civic initiatives, as we noted, have always appeared during turning points, when the social and intellectual energy within society finds no outlet through the existing organizational forms of economic management, administration, science, etc. The contradiction which appeared was "resolved" by adapting initiatives to the existing structures, while preserving their objectives and values.

Today a different situation prevails. The stagnation phenomena of the past 20 years made masses of initiative-minded people disappointed in the announced objectives as well as the ways and means of attaining them. The gap between the overall potential of social activeness of the most educated and best informed and thinking members of society and the ossified structures of bureaucratic action and primitive forms of "work with the masses" reached a critical point. In this case no compromise is possible, for the purpose of such structures, which is to serve the common good, actually stopped serving it, locked within the objective of securing their departmental interests.

That is why civic initiatives born of perestroika are distinguished not only by their mass nature and unparalleled variety of forms but, above all, their purpose and content. They are characterized by the aspiration to develop and test their own programs and plans for solving pressing social, economic, ecological and other problems, relying on the actively replenished information stock and a serious social analysis.

What Motivates People

The question of the value orientations of participants in initiatives is particularly important. The key feature here is an orientation toward autonomy, which is considered by the people as a value unto itself. According to a study made in 1987 in Novosibirsk, 40 percent of those surveyed noted that participation in initiatives enables them to apply their suppressed creative potential and to

communicate with people of the same mindset; 15 percent indicated the possibility of solving important problems through joint efforts; and 10 percent believed that this would improve their knowledge of life.

The core of such an orientation is creative and meaningful work, belief that this is needed by society ("if not I, who else?" "if we do not do it no one will"), and the opportunity of independently setting objectives and making decisions and controlling the course of events. The people are particularly attracted by the possibility of independently correlating objectives with results and feeling truly useful.

To the participants in initiatives autonomy, therefore, becomes synonymous with free nonalienated labor. They highly value the democratic principles governing the activities of their groups and the possibility of being minimally dependent on bureaucratic regulations.

An equally attractive factor is the possibility of self-fulfillment. Activists choose their projects according to their inclinations and, consequently, they can display to a maximal extent their individuality. Characteristically, as surveys have indicated, in frequent cases it is those who are unable to fulfill themselves at work who become leaders and active participants in initiatives. However, we must also take into consideration that within the institutionalized areas, for decades leaders of activities have been promoted based on the principles of "convenience," "obedience," and lack of personality. Creative capabilities, and the serious thinking shown by individual people were considered rather negative qualities which stood in the way of "calm work." Compared to their social environment, the life of initiative groups and associations offers much greater opportunities for a choice (of area, targets and means of activities) and is substantially less subject to the effect of prohibitions, whether external (regulations and instructions) or based on "self-censorship," which developed during the years of stagnation. This makes it possible to work with much greater dedication.

The small collective (the group) and intercourse within it are highly valued, above all because they are established naturally: These are groups of like-minded people, which are created to solve problems which people set for themselves. Such collectives compensate for the lack within society of equal, of a partnership-type intercourse (such as dialogue and discussions), and are a counterbalance to the "vertical," the command-performing forms of social interaction. However, these groups also have the practical value that today they implement the important functions of adaptation to the new conditions, and to changes in society. Twenty-four percent of those surveyed in Novosibirsk noted that participation in initiatives broadens the outlook and provides practical knowledge on standards of economic and social life;

VUZ students, who have come from the outlying areas, become adapted to an urban way of life and to the sociopsychological specifics of their future professional activities.

Finally, the initiative groups, having no funds for material rewards to their members, create quite extensively developed means of moral rewards. Observing moral guidelines and developing a feeling of performed duty become particularly valuable. Therefore, let us note, members of an initiative usually do not get upset by outside criticism but are very sensitive to the opinion of their comrades.

A healthy, well developed environment, built on friendly intercourse, is a most important resource which increases the chance for attaining set objectives. Family-neighborhoods cooperatives, clubs for adolescents and building occupants, youth housing complexes, environmental protection units and groups for the protection of monuments and parks all promote the creation and maintenance of a safe and attractive habitat, the value of which is especially realized by the people today. "Environmental" initiatives, as they are known, develop also because they meet the need of millions of migrants to set "roots" and establish ties with history and culture. Nature and communing with and preserving it are values unto themselves. The majority of participants not only in environmental protection but also in many other initiatives share this view, demand the observance of legislation, participate in local "protective" actions and practice a "resource-conservation" way of life.

Naturally, differences exist among such value orientations. There are those who support a specific idea (such as, one related to education). Some rationalists try to create a specific model of efficient job or recreation activity. Conversely, there are those who experiment, who seek an area for the application of their creative plans. Initiatives appear also on the basis of already existing communities (such as student associations) or of the aspiration to preserve such an association ("the Afghans"). Despite this entire variety, the key value positions we indicated can be seen quite easily. They are not always apparent in their pure aspect, for a great many reasons. Values which may not have been approved or proclaimed but which were suppressed in reality (such as the aspiration to be the "boss"), necessarily remained "concealed," and changed their aspect. To the extent to which they were not implemented adequately in the labor process there was a painful separation between "spheres of influence." At work the individual continued to follow regulations and instructions while independent activities and creativity were left to the nonproduction area. We know that by virtue of this people frequently changed jobs, in order to have the opportunity to dedicate maximal time to their favorite project. They dedicate to it their entire free time, including paid leave and their time off. However, such opportunities are not limitless. For that reason the range of people who sympathize with initiatives is much broader

than those who act on them. Furthermore, the burden of assumed responsibility, exhausting struggle against bureaucratic obstructions and slovenliness force others somehow to "separate" in their activities the essential values (autonomous activity and independent action) from daily and different activities (work "from-to," mechanical implementation of "obligations"). This, however, is dangerous.

The structure of value orientations we considered is what distinguishes above all civic initiatives, aimed at achieving positive values, from that part of "informal associations" the activities of which are of a purely emotional nature (such as the rockers), or else means a withdrawal from social problems; in some cases, it pursues destructive, divisive and extremist objectives. The participants in civic initiatives are united by a specific project and have assumed moral obligations (which is what distinguishes them from ordinary clubs as forms of intercourse based on interests).

Here is a typical example: When demonstrations in defense of human health, nature and historical-cultural environment took place in Leningrad, Ryazan and other cities, a great variety of groups participated. However, whereas the objective of the majority was to draw the attention of the urban authorities to a dangerous situation and publicly suggest means of resolving it, the main purpose of some of the groups was to draw attention to themselves.

We are far from the idea of idealizing civic initiatives, for today everyone is learning democracy. However it is easy to see that their constructive trend is reflected in the way of thinking and actions of their participants. They display earlier than others civic maturity, moral firmness and the aspiration to rely on science, as well as respect for cultural traditions. They are also distinguished by understanding the difficulty of their cause and the need to cooperate with state and public organizations. This, we believe, is particularly worth mentioning.

Relations With Other Organizations

It is no secret that frequently stress and clashes appear in relations between initiative groups and existing economic-managerial structures. Clearly, this is natural, for initiative, autonomy, administration and command-bureaucratic management methods are mutually incompatible. Such clashes are typical of the present stage of perestroika and for a society which is rising to a much higher level of self-organization of all areas of social life.

A certain mistrust of local authorities shown by the participants in initiatives is the result of decades of unsolved social and ecological problems, ignoring petitions, letters and records listing abuses by officialdom, etc. To this day the members of initiative groups constantly meet with refusals: They are unable to obtain data or to conduct basic surveys needed for work at their place of residence. Bureaucratic administration created official arrogance ("who are you to force me to talk to

you?"), and the firm conviction of the apparatus personnel that it is only what is stipulated in a directive or instruction must be implemented, and that all autonomous organizations exist only for them and for the sake of assisting them (let us note that the need for the creation of autonomous groups became apparent only after their participants had repeatedly tried to act within the framework of existing governmental and local organizations).

In the course of perestroika, the party and soviet managers began to meet with increasing frequency with the population and the leaders of initiatives; as a rule, they try not to assume any obligations. Here, for example, is a typical assessment of the results of such a meeting on the part of the population of a Moscow rayon: "The leadership does not study our suggestions; it considers us only as complainers and petitioners; it meets with us only for official purposes, for the sake of saying that thus and such was coordinated with the public."

Unfortunately, the study of the press and our personal observations in Moscow, Leningrad, Zaporozhe, Ryzan and other areas indicate that whenever the public seriously criticizes decisions made by the local authorities, as a rule the latter concentrate not on the struggle against shortcomings but against the initiative groups, trying to prove to the population and the labor collectives that such suggested measures would harm their interests. At the same time, using administrative means, they promote the implementation of the criticized projects.

The impression is occasionally created that the local authorities find it preferable to aggravate their differences with initiative groups and to provoke them to take drastic action, thus presenting all of their criticism as "undermining the foundations." Using the existing stereotypes developed in the mass awareness ("an initiative could come only from above or else should be approved by superiors"), the apparatus tries to depict the public as an incompetent or even a harmful force. The more conservative are the positions taken by the local authorities and the less developed are the democratic procedures for decision-making, the easier it becomes (against such a background) to depict the public as "irresponsible informalists."

For that reason we are convinced that the rights of the public and the procedures for the consideration of suggestions and protests by initiative groups should be legislatively codified (in the laws on voluntary societies, the youth and others, currently being drafted) and reflected in corresponding legal regulations and statutes of public organizations and, mainly, in the behavioral codes of the administrative apparatus. All of this would mark real steps toward the implementation of the Leninist idea of comprehensive control by the masses over the

activities of the apparatus. Progress is possible only when any authority, departmental or territorial, becomes morally and materially interested in cooperating with initiative groups.

For the time being, participants in initiatives are forced to write heaps of letters and telegrams and send messengers to the capital in order to advance one project or another. In nine out of 10 cases all such appeals are returned to the local areas, to the oblast and city authorities, thus closing the circle. Society is equally displeased with "post facto" glasnost (such as a press report on removing a monument, or the building of a highway, when nothing can be done any more although it is obvious that the problem could have been resolved differently). Through their silence and inaction the local authorities encourage the population to engage in acts of protest. Unnecessary tension is created also by temporary instructions and rules governing "mass undertakings in public places," which are essentially of a "prohibition" variety. Finally, there have also been cases of open lies to the public by officials. Initially enthusiasts are recruited for building, let us say, a promised facility for an amateur club; subsequently, citing "state interests," the building is taken over.

If the problems formulated by the public are comprehensively considered at open hearings held by city and oblast soviets and if, in general, the people are trusted more, without "backing" such trust with the militia, there would be significantly fewer extremist groups and even fewer demonstrations. Whatever position may be adopted by the people, nonetheless a snow-cleaning truck (at Oktyabrskaya Square in Moscow or anywhere else) is not the most persuasive argument, for it could turn opponents into opposition groups.

We do not wish to present matters as though cooperation between civic initiatives and local authorities is always burdened with conflicts. However, if such a conflict breaks out, its "scenario" is quite typical. At first an initiative is looked upon as meaningless, insignificant. Should the initiative group continue persistently to draw attention to itself, the second stage occurs: Efforts are made to disband or discredit it (since it conflicts with the interests of the department or does not meet the standards of the apparatus). The third stage is acknowledging the right to independent activity but "within the framework" and without official support. The fourth is the attempt to "take over" the initiative ("we have been considering this for quite some time") and make it fit the existing very conservative organizational structures.

Conversely, wherever an initiative group is acknowledged as an independent subject of social life and a practical partnership corporation is organized with it, the expediency of creating "intermediary" (sociostate) organizational structures becomes apparent. These are various temporary task groups and commissions, local foundations, and public expertise councils dealing with

urban construction, the environment, protection of monuments and others. In that case the decisions which are made by the local and departmental authorities are made consistent with the specific conditions and needs of specific individuals. Such integrative structures combine to the greatest extent three main qualities: interest, competence and rights.

Nonetheless, conflict situations occur far more frequently than partnerships. The reasons may be found in the shortcomings of the excessively centralized administrative economic management and administration systems.

In particular, one of the main sources for such tension is the contradiction between the rigid (departmental or territorial) organization of social life and the integrative and exterritorial nature of the activities of autonomous collectives. The youth initiative foundation, which is a broadly specialized organization and the actual infrastructure of all social activities by young people on the territory of a rayon or city, is forced to seek departmental patrons or else finds it difficult to fit in the activities of the local soviet or Komsomol authorities. The activities of broadly specialized family, adolescent and other clubs poorly react to subordination to administrative-economic units, such as DEZ, or house committees, which are imposed upon them. Nor are the comprehensive activities of environmental protection units able to fit within the framework of departmental subordination, territorial division and financing. Large enterprises and establishments willingly organize recreation and other associations but limit access of the "outside" population to them.

Conflicts break out also because of different criteria in gauging the activities of state and public organizations, on the one hand, and initiative groups, on the other. The city planning authorities plan and the city soviet reports on the development of urban culture on the basis of the completion of corresponding institutions (most frequently simply the area around them). Meanwhile, the population is deeply interested in the quality, the content of future cultural life. Furthermore, the plans issued by superior authorities rarely take into consideration the social, demographic or other features of a specific area. Clearly, this requires a more efficient feedback between the population and the administrative authorities and the reorientation of social planning toward end results.

At this point we come close to a problem which is currently quite extensively debated and which is directly related to further democratization of the activities of local soviets. Today the nomination of candidates for deputies is based exclusively on the production principle. The result is the election of people who lack the knowledge and skills needed for solving problems of organization of local life and territorial administration. Correspondingly, the structure and composition of the permanent deputy commissions are no longer consistent with the variety and complexity of the problems which

life poses today. The members of territorial deputy groups are passive, observing the procedures stipulated by superiors concerning received complaints, and rarely participate in solving problems of the habitat, which are of vital importance to the population (location of enterprises, laying major highways) and in frequent cases simply have no time to deal with the problems of autonomous groups.

In our view, therefore, it would be expedient for the population of settlements or even microrayons, together with the autonomous organizations, to make use of the right to nominate well recommended activists as candidates for deputies to local power authorities (with a mandatory discussion of their programs for work on a given territory). We also believe that it is time to take the next step in the democratization of local life: legislatively codifying the right of the population to be informed of any changes in the urban (and not only urban) environment, the participation of representatives of the population in drafting plans for the social development of the rayons as well as the right to independent expert assessments of such plans should serious questions arise in this respect.

The economic aspect of initiatives is an entirely new matter. This should be a topic of a separate discussion. Nonetheless, let us note the fact that no uniform principle could exist here (by virtue of the variety of objectives and nature of initiatives alone). The legal foundations for operations by trade unions or other organizations cannot be applied. A foundation for such activities must be tested and developed. As the participants themselves note, cost accounting and withholdings of funds from departments are no panacea. For example, young people are frequently guided by the formula that "commercial activities must be at the service of altruistic efforts."

Particular mention should be made of relations between participants in civic initiatives and mass public organizations. A number of problems remain in this area although on the surface the overwhelming majority of independent groups operate "under the wing" of the public organizations.

Ignoring Lenin's idea of the need to combine enthusiasm and personal interest with cost accounting, the public organizations, the Komsomol above all, exploited for a long time and without restrictions the enthusiasm of the people without, however, providing the necessary protection of youth interests. Hence the strong aspiration of the most active part of the young people to operate outside the influence of mass organizations, to be separate, to create their own recreational structures and to implement their own programs. A contributing fact to this, particularly among young people in small towns and settlements, was the feeling of social injustice in terms of the possibility of access to culture. Let us incidentally note that the leaders of a number of youth initiatives,

environmental protection movements and family clubs we surveyed never mentioned the trade unions among their supporting organizations.

A great deal of formalism and bureaucratism remain in the activities of the other public organizations. For example, the 1988 plans of the All-Russian Environmental Protection Society list the number of primary organizations and individual members, lectures, exhibits, environmental protection areas, thousands of planted trees, and so on. However, nothing is being said on discussions related to the problems of Lake Baykal and the formulation of suggestions in connection with the drafting of the new general plan for Moscow or other major environmental protection problems which are currently of interest to the republic's population. The elected authorities of the society include many representatives of different establishments related to the utilization (or control over the utilization) of natural resources. The principle governing the interdepartmental shaping of the governing machinery of this organization is no better.

The leaders of civic initiatives consider intolerable a situation according to which leading officials of executive committees are given leading positions and full-time jobs in public organizations. The public organizations must be managed only by those who make a real contribution to their activities and their personnel must be periodically replaced and be truly accountable to the public.

Grassroots initiatives are a source of growing variety of ideas and means of solving the topical problems of perestroika. The more initiative is displayed the greater becomes the social potential and the faster conservatism and inertia are eliminated.

From the Viewpoint of the Future

Already now the specific usefulness of civic initiatives can be measured in terms of rubles, the number of repaired premises, the number of natural and cultural monuments preserved, the reduced crime rate and pollution, and so on. However, what matters is the change which takes place under the influence of civic initiatives within the people themselves and the entire society.

How does the individual benefit?

For example, what were the landmarks of the civic maturing of the members of the group which set up a youth initiative center in Yoshkar-Ole? Initially, one of its participants says, we had very big projects. It seemed to us that our available knowledge and organizational talents would suffice. The proud feeling that we were working for the good of the city and its population predominated and, consequently, the view that they should share with us the burden of organizational affairs. That is how we had been raised. However, a sobering-up

period came soon afterwards, particularly after we concluded the first economic contract. It turned out that we had to do everything ourselves and that we did not know anything about governmental and economic laws. We had to hit the books and to consult specialists. Another important conclusion is that self-organization is not synonymous with spontaneous development. When we created the center we kept the doors open to everyone. However, people began to show up who had little concern for the objectives of the center but who tried, at all costs, to "promote" their own idea. The need arose, therefore, to formulate a procedure for membership in the center. It was quite democratic but prevented irresponsibility and meaningless fantasies.

The study of long-lasting initiatives confirms the politicizing of the awareness of their participants, particularly of late. There has been a clear shift in orientation from "one's own project" (preservation of a monument, the local club) to problems of social environment, interaction with other social and initiative groups and, in the final account, to the key problems of our society. Thus, the participants in the youth initiative foundations, starting with the idea of an "initiative bank," realized the full need of creating an infrastructure for youth recreation in their city or rayon. The same conclusion was reached by many collectives of youth housing complexes, although initially all they were concerned with was the solution of the housing problem. From a program of the struggle against poaching, student units are converting to the study of the reasons for industrial and agricultural pollution, means of molding public opinion and ecological awareness.

The extent to which the population becomes involved in a given initiative is an indicator of this process. Initially the population feels the need "to be informed." It determines the extent to which the initiative affects it personally; this is followed by a period of "sympathetic nonparticipation" (attending meetings) and, finally, the population enters "support groups" of the initiative and actively participates in the discussion and formulation of its objectives and programs.

As conditions change, including internal ones (evaluation of the situation and of one's own possibilities) the leaders of an initiative keep "raising the stakes," undertaking ever newer and more difficult tasks. That is why we note a periodical advance from simple to more complex forms of activity such as, for example, from mass environmental protection campaigns to the formulation of strategies in the struggle against the exhaustion and pollution of small rivers.

What does society gain from the development of civic initiatives?

Let us take the example of science. Initiatives are an efficient means of linking it with society. In particular, they serve as important sources of social assignments set to science and as an indicator of social or ecological

problems which have been either neglected or demand a new approach, and as a reserve of additional intellectual resources for the implementation of experimental programs (particularly in the social area); above all, they promote new developments and consolidate results locally, for supporters of initiatives have a clear idea of the traditions and specific nature of the way of life of local social and ethnic communities. Initiative groups take over the testing and completion of new technological solutions. They create independent application firms, etc. The role of initiatives is very important in organizing intensive contacts among professions. In terms of the level of information and intellectual potential, the best independent collectives are as good as the "invisible collectives" and problem groups in science.

Local initiatives are an inseparable element of the strategy of development of social ecology, i.e., the creation of a permanent system of cells in social life, which enables us to accumulate, consolidate and pass on results to future generations. Such a network of cells is functionally necessary in an intensively developing society, for it enhances the flexibility of social structures and their receptiveness to innovations.

Equally important is cultural ecology, which is the interaction among cultures and between cultures and their past, as well as the aspiration to preserve the natural and cultural environment. It is indicative in this sense that people of many different nationalities opposed the building of biochemical plants in Kazan and other cities. In Alma-Ata, Yoshkar-Ole and Ufa the concern shown by Russians and members of other non-native ethnic groups on the subject of protecting national traditions and monuments was as high as that of the native population.

Another essential feature is that the participants in initiatives master not only the practical skills of builders, restorers, technicians, landscapers, and so on. It also involves training in the broad meaning of the term, for they gain the ability independently to make decisions, the ability to organize the local population and to formulate its demands; they learn the standards of debates in their own environment and in dealing with party and soviet managers. In a word, this is a school of democracy.

The opinions of participants in initiatives relative to socially significant phenomena and decisions (although critical and frequently conflicting with each other) and the alternate choices they offer are very important in the establishment of democratic forms of our sociopolitical life. It is only the existence of such disparate voices and the shaping and strengthening of real social communities, which can defend various viewpoints and offer ways of solving pressing problems, that can ensure the dynamism and flexibility of social structures and block stagnation phenomena and trends.

At the same time, such a "multiplicity of subjects" within the framework of a common system of political and social values, promotes equal intellectual rivalry in the search for optimal ways of social development. It is not the aspiration to settle accounts, it is not a question of "who-whom" but an awareness of the need to reach a mutually beneficial solution which would satisfy the various groups and the conversion from one's own private viewpoint to a more common one through open discussions and reciprocal understanding that such characteristics of the new way of thinking can develop and become widespread but only under the conditions of variety and democratic equality among social forces actively participating in the solution of a great variety of problems of the country's social, economic and political life.

Finally, perhaps the most important feature is to realize the innovative role played by civic initiatives in terms of culture as a whole. The cost of the years of stagnation was the fact that obedience (with internal passiveness) began to be valued in the people more highly than activeness and inner activities and the aspiration to broaden one's own knowledge and enhance one's level of culture. That is why initiatives are valuable above all because of the democratization of creative work and reducing the distance between professional and amateur creativity. They are valuable also because they reduce the amount of passive "cultural consumption" (attendance, listening) by promoting active types of activities (building, discussing, experimenting). The audience-attendance stereotype in life yields to the work of the mind and to assessing and experiencing one's own activities. Hence interest in other people and their human qualities and, in general, in individualized culture.

Let us note that leaders and activists in the area of civic initiatives are a real reserve for the reinforcement of party, Komsomol, soviet and scientific cadres. That is precisely what is happening. Many of the organizers of the Novosibirsk youth initiative foundation today work for the Komsomol Central Committee. The head of the Penza center for youth initiative was made a member of the Komsomol Central Committee staff at the BAM. Many activists in the ecological movement have become scientists, journalists and public figures.

In principle, the way of developing initiative from independent activities to institutionalization is possible and, in some cases, even natural. However, this may be a dialectical process: Some elements which appear within an initiative may be separated from them and become forms of activities of state and public organizations; others are recreated and tested within initiative groups. What is needed precisely is dynamics and not efforts to create "suprainitiative" bureaucratic authorities, something which is being attempted today with increased frequency.

Some Conclusions. Informal initiatives are a necessary prerequisite for the development of our society, a norm in the process of its democratic renovation. Strictly

speaking, each new project has an element of informality to the extent to which it makes its way outside approved plans and developed forms of social life. It is our deep conviction that the slogan "more socialism" means, in particular, more civic initiatives and initiative organizations. That is why it is a grave mistake to consider their activities as "avoidance" of social problems or as contrary to society's interests. Autonomous initiatives are not some kind of "external" force but an efficient factor of perestroika and a vivifying ferment of democratic change.

It is important to see behind the pluralism of ways and means of civic initiatives, and their blending with or separation from social or cooperative organizations, their main feature: Self-aid groups, family associations, foundations, centers and associations are all various means of testing the elements of a "civic society," based on a high level of self-organization. As perestroika intensifies, an ever increasing number of people will be willing and able to solve problems by themselves. Such an opportunity must be offered to them as of now. Today the amount of faith in perestroika is quite high among the participants in initiatives. However, resources of enthusiasm are not limitless. Exhausting struggle against bureaucratic obstructions is fraught with the loss of initial objectives of initiatives and the emasculation of their humanistic content.

If autonomous initiatives are blocked and suppressed, paralleled, as is frequently the case, with the use of force and the open violation of human dignity, the plus can quite rapidly turn into a minus: Opposition to perestroika, apathy and disappointment, particularly among young people, would permeate the pores of society.

Clearly, to head initiatives in the old ways, to regulate each step, means to hinder perestroika. To know, to help, to rely on and to learn are the guidelines for the necessary changes in the attitude of the local party, soviet and public organizations toward autonomous initiatives. In this case "to know" also means to know the people, the participants in initiatives and to penetrate into the essence of the problems they formulate. Not only "big politics" but also interrelationships must be based on scientific conclusions, including those of sociology specialists.

Naturally, initiatives need a great variety of help but not based on the principle of "erasing the traces" of activities of enthusiasts. "Relying" means that an increasing number of tasks must be entrusted to their responsible and independent solution. With the support of the party and the local authorities, civic initiatives are a powerful anti-conservative force. Relations of partnership are a common denominator here. In order to achieve them we must surmount the psychological barrier of mistrust on the part of the leading personnel of activities not sanctioned by superiors. One could learn from the participants in initiative efficiency, antibureaucratic methods, and the ability to interest, to involve people on the basis of the main

catalyst of social activeness: human values and motivations. However, this also requires proper training on the part of leading cadres and a drastic improvement in the level of their skills, so that they can competently judge of the problems formulated in autonomous initiatives and assist them organizationally.

Finally, it is particularly important to surmount the residual principle in the work with voluntary groups and associations. This must not be done after all the planned assignments and mandatory projects have been completed, in between projects, but by dealing with them constantly, seriously, responsibly and respectfully, by getting into the heart of the problems and the needs of this mass public movement.

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Reform: Stabilization, Acceleration

180200151 Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian No 9, Jun 88 (signed to press 6 Jun 88) pp. 107-114

[Article by Miklos Nemet, Politburo member and secretary of the MSZMP Central Committee]

[Text] Hungary is undergoing a specific stage in its history. The All-Hungarian Party Conference, which summed up the results of the debate on basic problems of the country's further progress on the way to socialist renovation, became a major event in MSZMP life. Within a relatively short time after the 13th MSZMP Congress and the approval of the 5-year plan for the development of the national economy, two party resolutions on the situation in the economy and the tasks arising in this area were adopted. In July 1987 the MSZMP Central Committee formulated the country's socioeconomic program. The main purpose of the program is to provide a new impetus to building socialism through the renovation of all areas of social and economic life.

Why did this become necessary? The point is that the processes of converting the economy to intensification, which were earmarked with the resolutions of the party congress and the assignments of the Seventh 5-Year Plan, were still not adequately developed in our national economy. Furthermore, there were breakdowns in some areas and, here and there, adverse trends intensified. We were unable to achieve the planned growth of the national income and in the last 2 years it even declined as a whole, while spending increased. From positive the foreign trade balance turned negative and the state budget deficit increased substantially. After a certain reduction, which took place in the first half of the 1980s, the country's foreign debt in convertible currency began to increase, and repaying the principal and the interest became a significant burden for the national economy. Imbalance intensified in internal economic processes,

more funds were appropriated for subsidizing production and consumption and price increases accelerated. All of this was in conflict with our most important economic aspirations.

The existing situation is influenced equally by external and internal factors and circumstances, of both long-term and short-term nature. The most essential among the external factors is the new stage of the scientific and technical revolution which has developed in the world in recent decades. It is under its influence that the previous economic policy was reviewed, economic structures were reorganized, price and value proportions in international trade were changed and so was the correlation of forces in politics and economics; new forms of cooperation appeared and the number of countries participating in the international economic competition increased. Such changes became a major test even for countries economically more developed than Hungary. Naturally, the Hungarian economy could not protect itself from this influence because of its scale and great dependence on foreign trade. Our answer to the challenge of the international market and the steps we took, as can be noticed today, turned out to be inadequate.

In the last few years we had assessed the situation in the economy as being more favorable than it actually was. This led to the making of the type of decisions in finding reserves and trends of possible actions and means of management which were frequently inconsistent with the requirements of the specific situation.

The optimistic assessment of the situation was also determined by the fact that thanks to efficient efforts, within a short time we had been able to substantially improve the balance of payments and liquidity and come out of the state of crisis in which the country had found itself in mid-1982 under the influence of international political and financial-economic factors. Hungary solved this problem quite successfully compared with some other countries. We reduced the pace of economic growth but, with a view to achieving external and internal economic balance, we allowed the generating of national income to exceed its internal consumption by 2-2.5 percent. This was the foundation for improving the external balance of the national economy. However, under those circumstances we had neither the time or strength nor the courage to solve obsolete structural problems and were unable to lay the foundations for stable development.

An important characteristic of the past years was also the fact that despite our intentions we were unable organically to link production with consumption. We failed to make the structure and level of consumption consistent with the existing situation. The excessively optimistic evaluation of results and of developing opportunities was assisted by the fact that the pace of economic development had risen toward the mid-1980s to an acceptable level and the country's foreign trade balance had improved substantially. It seemed at that time that

this marked the beginning of a turn toward new processes reflecting the structural reorganization and the adaptation of the economy to the changes in the foreign market. On the basis of this conclusion we formulated in our plans a number of priority targets in economic policy. It seemed to us that, on the basis of the results we had achieved, we would be able to implement our ideas on balancing, growth rates, holding back inflation and ensuring the efficient employment of the population, formulated in the Seventh 5-Year Plan. However, in the course of the formulation of the annual plans it became clear that we were unable to solve simultaneously such a large number of priority problems.

We especially fell behind in realizing that with the existing economic structure it was impossible to increase the growth rates and that any revival in production leads to violations of its balance because of the imperfect structure of the Hungarian national economy. The serious lesson learned in the past years is that we must approach the priority objectives in economic policy above all from the viewpoint of the possibility of attaining them.

The MSZMP Central Committee April 1984 Plenum passed an important strategic resolution on the comprehensive improvement of the economic management system. However, the actual economic mechanism frequently included formalistic and conflicting elements. Unfortunately, so far we have accomplished little in improving internal economic management conditions, intensifying competitiveness and establishing market relations.

The very understanding of the need for a comprehensive approach to improving economic management is, unquestionably, valuable. It put an end to illusions that such improvements can be achieved merely with periodical changes in economic controls. In the past, whenever a given target could not be met, the initial reaction of the economic leadership was the wish to change the price system and to regulate enterprise income and taxation. Many long years had to pass before we realized that in economic management the task of perfecting economic instruments is as important as that of perfecting planning, adapting the organizational structure of management to changing requirements, making proper corrections in the system of economic institutions, decision-making and drafting legal regulations.

The significant lag in improving the elements of the economic mechanism, going beyond the limits of economic controls, may be traced to 1968. At that time we daringly and firmly abandoned mandatory planned enterprise assignments. However, in order to ensure greater safety in converting to the new system we built within it, temporarily as was assumed at that time, certain obstructions. We did not dare to change the system of economic institutions and the monopoly status of some enterprises, which would have created conditions for competitiveness on the socialist market. To this

day we are still unable to boast of any significant results in improving the organizational structure or the system of decision-making and the economic institutions.

The intensification of trends, noted in recent years, which derived from our intentions, required the all-round study of the existing situation and the need to define the tasks proceeding from this situation. Such analytical work was carried out on the initiative and under the leadership of the party, with the extensive involvement of state authorities and scientific organizations. Its most significant result was the November 1986 MSZMP Central Committee Plenum decree, which called for removing obstacles standing in the way of the revival of economic development, upgrading the standards of management and providing the political, social, organizational and cadre prerequisites needed for improving the work.

The determination of the reasons for the problems which had appeared in the economy, initiated in 1986, led to the fact that in July 1987 the Central Committee was already able to formulate a position on the program for socioeconomic development. The development of this problem, covering 3 years of a stage of economic stabilization, was approved by the country's National Assembly in September 1987. We proceeded from the need to find a socialist solution to today's problems. The fact that the power of the people is strong in the country, that socialist relations are the determining factor and that the leading role in our society is that of the MSZMP provides the necessary foundations for the implementation of the socioeconomic program. The strategic political course formulated by the party is accurate, as confirmed by the practice of the past 30 years. It is of inestimable importance to us that in terms of the main objectives there is unity within Hungarian progressive and patriotic forces. The strength of the country is further increased by its affiliation with the community of socialist states and its solidarity with peace loving and progressive movements which acknowledge the realities of our age. It is our duty to protect such values for which we are answerable to history.

The program for socioeconomic development rests on two foundations. The first is the modernizing of the economy and updating of its structures; the second is accelerating reform in the society.

The party realized that in the future it will become necessary to adopt interrelated and reciprocally boosting steps of a comprehensive nature, aimed at improving the economic mechanism, for in the opposite case we would be unable to achieve our targets. Significant changes will have to be made in the management system in the next few years. In 1988 priority is given to tasks related to the price and tax reform and to preparing the necessary conditions for this. In 1989 the wage system will be reorganized, a new pension system will be introduced, housing construction and availability of housing will be restructured on a new basis and the law on associations

will be improved; prerequisites will be created for the freer movement of monetary and investment funds and manpower. By 1990 we must prepare reforms needed for accelerated economic development, such as perfecting the system of the institutions for and means of pursuing social policy and the activities of the central management authorities.

Experience led us to a number of essential conclusions, the most important among them, and the one which is determining from the viewpoint of further progress, being the following: An economic revival is possible and attainable only on the basis of structural change. This is also supported by the experience of the Soviet Union. Everywhere the view that an economic revival is possible on the basis of upgrading efficiency and balanced development, achieved through structural changes, is making its way.

The past teaches us another important lesson as well: Since we failed to achieve the necessary harmony between production and consumption, for a few years, temporarily, a restrictive economic policy will be pursued. However, this must be done on a selective and differentiated basis. It is important for the possibilities of efficient enterprises to be expanded, while those which are unable to improve their work to be dismantled, as an extreme measure. It is only thus that our economic productivity can be improved. That is why we give priority to restructuring of the production system in accordance with the requirements of technical progress.

The third and equally important conclusion is the conviction that the creation of favorable economic management conditions is, in itself, insufficient in laying a firm foundation for the acceleration of socioeconomic development. Changes in the economic area must be supplemented by improving the ideological and political prerequisites for acceleration. The acceleration program includes sociopolitical conditions, such as perfecting the system of political institutions, the implementation of the party's leading role and the solution of ideological problems.

It is also natural, based on past experience, to draw the following conclusion: We cannot modernize the system for national economic management partially, by singling out its individual elements and isolating them from each other. A radical and all-embracing reform is needed: price-setting and taxation are among its structural components.

The question which frequently arose was the following: Is it possible to advance without changing the existing price and taxation system and the system for regulating income? Why is it that the country's leadership is taking a step fraught with serious consequences such as reform of the price-setting and taxation systems?

In order to provide an accurate answer to this question, knowledge of the state of affairs in the economy and of the corresponding system of evaluation criteria and accuracy in determining the results of economic activities are vitally necessary if we are to establish what is efficient and profitable and what is not. Unless we are able to ensure that outlays and conditions for supply and demand are reflected in the prices, no efficient influence on economic activities can be exerted. Each decision has its share of risks. However, by preserving the previous conditions for economic management, at each step we increasingly conflict with our own interests. This in itself spoke in favor of price and taxation reforms. Such reforms introduce greater clarity in economic life, and in management. They strengthen the functions of the forint as a measurement of value and as currency. We are trying to see to it that not the conditions governing the use of income but the conditions for earning such income be made stricter.

In the course of structural reorganization and technical development, equally important tasks are increasing profits in our trade with Western countries and thus reducing the growth of the foreign debt and stabilizing it by 1990. Problems of a different nature exist in our cooperation with CEMA countries. After the substantial worsening of foreign trade conditions for Hungary over a period of a number of years, essentially in trade with the Soviet Union, the trade ratios are changing in our favor. It is thus that a positive balance may develop, which would exceed the figure stipulated in our plans, for possibilities of increasing imports from the socialist countries are quite limited. We must look for the type of solution which would enable us to retain the dynamism of trade and import more needed commodities.

At the present time the program for the stabilization of our economy is structured, from this viewpoint, in accordance with the risk factors. We hope to broaden reciprocal trade with the socialist countries by improving "economic diplomacy," and increasing the interest of enterprises and their management in "ruble" imports.

At this stage of stabilization we must formulate a different policy of planning and economic incentive compared to the one which has guided us so far. Present policy proceeds, essentially, from the type of resources at the disposal of the country and the type of growth which could be achieved on their basis, and amounts to be appropriated for the implementation of international obligations and for internal distribution. Invariably, the distribution plan has been overfulfilled. Yet the creation of resources and their increase frequently fell behind the planned figures. As a rule, the balance was covered by the state budget, by increasing the foreign debt. Now, if we follow this practice, the aspiration develops to reduce the internal use of the national income—capital investments and consumption—with a view to achieving a balance. In the years to come this logic should be corrected. In the future, in the production area in which there is competition, capital investments must always

reach their stipulated level. The point is that today changes in the production structure can be achieved only selectively, by expanding the area of economic competition and the investment possibilities of the processing industry.

It is not reducing or supporting imports that is a basic requirement but increasing them to meet the needs of competitive production facilities. Otherwise we cannot lay the foundations for the necessary technical progress for acceleration and structural reorganization. Our domestic market conditions, and cooperative ties and cooperation with foreign countries are such that four-fifths of Hungarian imports from the West are materials and spare parts. The share of machines and equipment and new technology accounts for less than 10 percent and should not be increased substantially. This is a firm requirement. Based on the results of the latest study, a considerable percentage of imports (approximately 20 percent) should be replaced with domestic production or through the better utilization of the socialist market. However, this calls for changing the approach to imports on the part of economic managers. Nor should we continue with the practice of artificially distinguishing among capitalist, socialist and domestic markets.

Possibly the most important prerequisite for the formulation and implementation of a structural policy is the accurate and fast determination of what should fall within the competence of the state and the government and what is part of the rights of competing enterprises and the market. The management and economic control systems should be shaped accordingly. It is essential, in the interest of the reorganization of the structure, that changes be made in the system of state subsidies and that we eliminate the type of activities which, even if subsidized, remain losing. Their preservation does not allow us properly to broaden the maneuvering possibilities of those which manage better and at the expense of which (and of loans) unprofitable production is subsidized. This procedure has become intolerable.

Temporarily, in the course of the structural reorganization, employment problems may arise. Since ensuring rational employment is the task of enterprises and that of full employment is the obligation of the state, we are updating the arsenal of ways and means of utilization of the manpower and of employment policy. A so-called policy fund in employment has been set up, which contributes to finding jobs for the released manpower; the retraining system is being updated and so are the activities of the job placement bureaus. The practice of ensuring employment at nongovernmental small enterprises is being expanded. We are going back to the study of the expediency of recruiting in Hungary manpower from other countries and granting Hungarian citizens greater freedom in finding jobs abroad. A reform in the educational system is forthcoming. Today it is providing excessively specialized knowledge which narrows the area of its application and retraining possibilities.

In addition to a restructuring of policy in the area of employment, social policy must be unavoidably renewed. It is accurately claimed that under present circumstances the efficiency of social insurance can be upgraded through a more centralized use of material and financial resources. However, taking into consideration planned changes in the economy, we must implement the type of social policy in which the principles of justice and giving priority to the satisfaction of the needs of the least prosperous population strata must be implemented. The role of the local self-government authorities and councils in dealing with social security problems must be enhanced. We intend to provide support to the most needy strata and groups (such as the retired, the young and large families) with funds from special centralized assets, and are developing mechanisms which would maintain the real value of social benefits. This is necessary for the reason alone that particularly in the next 2 to 3 years the population will assume some of the burden related to stabilization. The income of the working people will be increased only with the improvement of production indicators. In other words, the influence of the enterprises on shaping the living conditions of the working people is increased.

Unquestionably, more money will be needed to solve the numerous problems related to social and human factors, such as the adverse development of demographic processes, the worsened state of health of the population and problems of social adaptation, weakened labor morality, defects in labor standards and the need to lower stress. A great deal could be accomplished by ending waste, improving the organization of labor and regrouping resources. The main reserve, however, is developing a more daring and efficient feeling of initiative.

State and cooperative ownership is the foundation of our economic system. This must be particularly emphasized for the reason alone that it is only on such an inviolable foundation that we could enrich forms of ownership and their greater intertwining with each other. We have no reason, other than a misconception of ideological stability, for not making efforts in this direction. The socialist society, which is able to renovate itself and which is indeed undergoing a renovation, can also ensure the adaptation of all elements and phenomena which serve the cause of social progress. Let public ownership of the means of production exist wherever it is most profitable to society. For that reason we are trying to achieve the further "unfreezing" of state ownership, including for the sake of upgrading the interest of labor collectives and individual working people in increasing such property. We would like to create equal conditions for competition among organizations in the state, cooperative and private economic sectors. By supporting individual and group ownership and forms of private labor activity, closely interacting with socialist enterprises, we enhance the socialist aspect of these forms.

The development of socialist society requires, in the course of the conscious development of social processes, the exercise of the party's political leading and initiating

role, the result of which would be to mobilize society for the solution of topical problems. This can be achieved only by identifying and coordinating the variety of interests. This leads to a reciprocal understanding among social groups, which strengthens our socialist system even further. The identification and coordination of interests leads to the development of socialist democracy and to improving the system of political institutions and of anything which contributes to ideological, political and social progress.

The implementation of the objectives of social policy derives from economic conditions, for which reason the party's task is to formulate the objectives of economic policy and to create political conditions for its implementation. Party activities must be consistent with changes in economic, political and social life. They must take into consideration the international situation and remain loyal to the fundamental principles of socialism, which have passed the test of time.

The party can efficiently implement its role in managing the economy when its functions do not blend with those of state and representative authorities and public organizations. Only then can we demarcate and define the political responsibility of all cooperating sides. The party must not assume the rights of state managing authorities. It must create the type of organizational framework and mechanisms which, on the one hand, would guarantee the impossibility of repeating the errors of the past and, on the other, would ensure a reform consistent with plans and competent and responsible programs and provide favorable conditions for involving the party members and all active citizens in the process of decision-making and control over implementation.

It is important for the working people to know where we are going and why, and to understand what must be done and why. This formulates stricter requirements than in the past concerning political work in all areas and dictates the need for new approaches in the activities of the primary party organizations. We must create the type of sociopolitical atmosphere which would provide adequate scope for the efficient utilization of the spiritual and material resources of the country and for allowing highly skilled people, who are in step with the time and who have progressive knowledge and possess high moral qualities to fill leading positions on all levels.

Improving the activities of the central management authorities, ensuring the division of labor between them and economic organizations and upgrading the work standards of the central authorities and more efficiently defining their range of competence and reciprocal responsibility would ensure the successful implementation of the stabilization program. This applies above all to the activities of the government. We are trying to have the Council of Ministers make decisions essentially on major problems instead of burdening itself with petty individual matters. Naturally, if necessary, the government must make decisions on current problems as well.

A group of experts has been set up under the Council of Ministers, which will control the professional-sectorial approach, which is absolutely inevitable in the work of the state apparatus, and will formulate the unified view of the government on specific problems. The collective nature of activities of the Council of Ministers will be intensified and the autonomy and responsibility of ministers and ministries and the role of the national approach and readiness for cooperation with other departments will be enhanced. The internal and external reorganization of the ministries could contribute to improving such cooperation.

We firmly intend to establish a more efficient control over the activities of the government by the National Assembly and to create to this effect the proper organizational conditions. At the same time, we are planning to reduce the range of problems pertaining to the competence of state management authorities and to reduce the structure of such authorities.

Perfecting the state management of the economy also affects the self-governing activities of the local councils. We deem it very important to develop relations between the local councils and the population, to accelerate bookkeeping and decisively to eliminate its bureaucratic features. By continuing to decentralize state management we shall set up a two-step regional and local administration system.

The basic condition for the success in the program for socioeconomic development is formulating the type of social atmosphere which would have a favorable influence on economic and social renovation. We are broadening the area of the rights of public organizations and representative organs and updating the forms and contents of their cooperation with state management authorities. We hope that a true "socialization" of management will take place and that relations between the government and the other authorities representing the interests of the working people will be structured on the principle of partnership.

Under the leadership of the MSZMP Hungary and its people have chosen the path of socioeconomic acceleration. The fact that the fraternal socialist countries are working on solving similar problems and that we have the opportunity to make ever better use of the experience of our friends and, in turn, they from our experience and thus to accelerate restructuring will help to reach the set objectives.

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New Thinking-New Policy

18020015m Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian No 9, Jun 88 (signed to press 6 Jun 88) pp 115-125

[Article by Aleksandr Yevgenyevich Bovin, IZVESTIYA political columnist]

[Text] Major recent events—the beginning of the withdrawal of the Soviet forces from Afghanistan; the fourth, Moscow, meeting between M.S. Gorbachev and Ronald

Reagan; the publication of the theses of the CPSU Central Committee for the 19th All-Union Party Conference—mark the practical implementation of the principles of the new political thinking. The study of these principles and looking at the new political thinking against the vast background of contemporary world realities present major and interesting problems the solution of which our science is beginning to tackle.

As a rule, major quality changes in political thinking and political philosophy are triggered by the need to adapt the level and instruments of political thinking to revolutionary shifts in the development of society, and to realize the new dangers and new opportunities which transitional ages carry with themselves. In terms of our own 20th Century, two quality leaps are quite clearly visible in the history of political thinking. The first was brought to life by the Great October Socialist Revolution. The existence of a socialist state in a condition of capitalist encirclement and the cooperation between the worker-peasant system with its class and social antagonists did not fit the framework of ordinary political concepts. Radically new approaches were needed and they appeared. Their foundation, their pivot was the Leninist concept of peaceful coexistence among countries with different social systems.

The second turn in political thinking began and is taking place under our very eyes. It is related above all to revolutionary changes in the area of military technology. Stockpiles of nuclear weapons exceeded the critical level and gave mankind the ability to commit suicide. Nuclear war lost its political sense. A new political thinking was needed in order to understand this and to identify the struggle for the prevention of nuclear war with that for the survival of mankind. The need for it was expressed in their time by Albert Einstein and Bertrand Russell. However, it was only in the mid-1980s, when the new political thinking became the methodological, the intellectual foundation of the Soviet approach to international affairs that it became a substantive, an efficient factor in world politics.

In the new system of political coordinates peaceful coexistence is considered not simply a preferable, a desirable condition of relations between socialist and capitalist countries but the only possible and absolutely necessary condition. There is either peaceful coexistence or nonexistence. There is no third choice.

1

The view that Lenin approached the October Revolution with a ready (or almost ready) doctrine of peaceful coexistence, developed in his work written in 1915-1916, is still prevalent in Soviet scientific publications. This view is substantiated by the dogmatic interpretation of the Leninist idea of the possibility of the victory of socialism "initially in few countries or even in a single

separate capitalist country" (*"Poln. Sobr. Soch."* [Complete Collected Works], vol 26, p 354). Acknowledging this possibility, we are being told, also includes the possibility of peaceful coexistence between two types of countries.

It seems to me that this approach is inconsistent with the actual history of the subject. The close study of Lenin's creative legacy indicates that Lenin's thoughts and concepts relative to the socialist revolution and the interaction between the two "camps" followed a more complex and lengthy development and that the idea of peaceful coexistence appeared on the basis of the real experience of the October Revolution and postrevolutionary development.

This problem cannot be solved by interpreting and reinterpreting for the hundredth or the thousandth time any "separately considered" quotation. All statements made by V.I. Lenin on the eve of the October Revolution, of which we are aware, during the revolution and in the immediate aftermath, and the entire behavior of the leader of the revolution indicate that he considered the Russian revolution only a starting point, a prologue to a world revolution. It is no accident that Lenin repeatedly described the defeat of the foreign and domestic counterrevolutions a "miracle:" what was happening seemed quite unexpected, incredible and inconceivable: the preservation of the only socialist republic within a ring of hostile encirclement. The fact that it happened—the hold-up in the global revolution, the "loneliness" of the proletariat which had won in Russia, and the need, one way or another, to adapt to life under the conditions of a hostile encirclement exceeded the framework of the theoretical concepts developed by Marx and Engels and adopted by V.I. Lenin.

"We knew then," V.I. Lenin said, recalling the October days of 1917, "that our victory would be a lasting victory only when our cause would win throughout the world, for we had started our cause exclusively relying on a global revolution" (op. cit., vol 42, p 1). Lenin returned to that topic at the 3rd Comintern Congress: "We thought that either the international revolution will come to our aid, at which point our victories would be entirely secured, or else we would do our modest revolutionary work aware that, should we fail, we would have nonetheless served the cause of the revolution and that our experience would be of use to other revolutions. It was clear to us that without the support of the international world revolution the victory of a proletarian revolution was impossible" (op. cit., vol 44, p 36).

Considered from the aspect which is of interest to us, this means that V.I. Lenin's concepts on the socialist revolution (regardless of whether it would begin in one country or several countries) as a universal, an international process, were not essentially different from the views respectively held by Marx and Engels. History confirmed the possibility of a break in the chain of capitalism initially within a single country. Nonetheless, history

proved to be more complex, "trickier" than theoretical concepts: we were unable to widen the breach in the capitalist front. It was thus that the October Revolution faced the party and its leader with a number of major political problems to which no answer could be found either in past experience or in the theoretical works of prerevolutionary times. It was at that point that Lenin's creative genius, the depth of his thinking and his inimitable ability to find a solution to seemingly hopeless situations were manifested to their fullest extent.

The tactics of preserving the "oasis of Soviet system" in a raging imperialist world sea (see op. cit., vol 36, p 341), the peaceful breathing spell, a peaceful period and peaceful cohabitation, were the ways through which the idea of peaceful coexistence matured and gained its clear political outlines. To rephrase Lenin, we can say that Soviet Russia truly "suffered" peaceful coexistence in fierce clashes with the counterrevolution and sharpest possible internal party debates, and clashes between innovation and realism, on the one hand, and sluggishness and illusions, on the other. In terms of its significance and inner radicalism, this turn in thinking and step in the development of political philosophy—toward peaceful rivalry and peaceful coexistence with the social antagonist and the class enemy—could be compared, without forgetting that all analogies and metaphors are conventional, to the revolution which Copernicus' theory made in the concept of the world.

The second half of the 20th century, which confirmed the viability of the concept of peaceful coexistence, demanded qualitatively new approaches to politics. Either live in peace or not live at all: such a formulation of the matter is dictated by the new circumstances in which mankind found itself. This is the way the question was formulated by the gradual increase in the instability of civilization, caused by nothing other than the activities of people themselves.

The stockpiling of nuclear weapons created a real, a technically attainable possibility for the suicide of mankind. The discovery of the effects of the "nuclear night" and "nuclear winter" deprived the optimists of their last shelter. The influence which human industrial activities had on nature assumed an increasingly dangerous turn. The absence of ecological discipline and of mass ecological awareness is bringing closer a time after which a chain reaction of irreversible changes, fatal to mankind, could start. Social tension is rising. It is based on striking contrasts in social developments among various parts of the world.

No single country, however powerful, and no group of countries could cope with the extremely pressing and terrible problems which are burdening mankind. It is only universal interaction under conditions of peace, and only an awareness of universal interdependence and giving priority to the tasks of mankind that would enable the people to become confident, to prevent social and ecological catastrophes and, finally, simple to survive.

Several decades had to pass before it was realized that mankind had become mortal and before this understanding could be made the foundation of political philosophy. It was our party that initiated the turn toward new political thinking as a foundation for international activities. The Soviet communists proceed from the fact that despite all differences in the world arena and all clashes of interests one can no longer live according to the millennial traditions of the "might makes right." This dictates the need and makes urgent a radical break in many customary approaches to foreign policy and a break in the traditions of political thinking and views on problems of war and peace, defense, security of individual countries and international security.

2

New political thinking means, above all and essentially a scientific way of thinking. The methodological concepts which must guide the politician are virtually indistinguishable from the concepts which must be used by a scientist who is studying society. Naturally, with the difference that the politician is concerned less with interpreting the world than with changing it.

I would put here in the first place the ability to see the world as it is, in its entire complexity and contradictoriness, without ignoring "unpleasant" facts or turning away from processes and phenomena which do not fit the framework of traditional theoretical concepts, or soothing oneself with the type of information which has been sifted and polished and whose sharp angles have been rounded, the type of information which the bureaucratic apparatus is preparing so skillfully and on such a scale. Without merciless realism, without the courage to look the truth in the eye, however bitter it may be, the new political thinking loses its meaning.

It also loses its meaning without a permanent readiness self-critically to assess one's own conclusions, views and behavior. This applies also to historical self-criticism, so to say, i.e., to the ability and willingness to draw lessons from history, from past experience, as well as self-criticism related to the latest news and to the shaping and implementation of today's political course. Flexibility, ability promptly to note and acknowledge one's errors, to change the scale of priorities and to "retarget" policy are inseparable features of the type of thinking required today.

Finally, in its essence the new political thinking is strictly creative. It is unfamiliar with an ideologically restricting process. It means breaking into a multicolored world, filled with surprises, the understanding of which presumes a constant renovation and revision of the available theoretical baggage and a critical but nonetheless constructive interaction with the theoretical elaborations of our ideological and social opponents. The a priori

rejection of any kind of view merely because it has been formulated and developed by a non-Marxist or an anti-Marxist is an indication of one's own narrowness of views.

Therefore, merciless realism, self-analysis and self-criticism, and receptiveness of anything that is new are, we believe, the main methodological features of the new political thinking. In themselves, in one aspect or another, such features have been long mastered by philosophy and science. Taken together, however, and applied not only to the process of political analysis but also that of the adoption of foreign policy decisions, they acquire a new life.

The meaningful aspect of political thinking in the nuclear age encompasses above all that which has appeared in the political life of mankind of late and without the understanding of which no rational political course can be charted.

Let us note here in the first place a categorical rejection of the role of violence, of military force, in solving the historical argument between capitalism and socialism. Shifting the problems of war and peace to the system of nuclear coordinates solved the dilemma of capitalism or socialism in its military-political dimension. No one can win a nuclear war but everyone could perish. Therefore, nuclear war stops being a means of attaining any kind of political objective whatsoever.

Correspondingly, the arms race as well loses its irrational substantiation, for under contemporary conditions stockpiling weapons does not mean "stockpiling" security. Such a race leads (and has already led) to an impasse. This is a dangerous impasse, for the continuing stockpiling of mountains of weapons increases mistrust and, therefore, makes the balance which, so far, has saved everyone increasingly unstable.

The only way out of this impasse is to start a movement toward a nuclear-free world. The suggestions contained in the Moscow program and, if one wishes, the "timetable" for nuclear disarmament were presented in M.S. Gorbachev's 15 January 1986 declaration. The signing of the INF Treaty marks the start along this road. The road has been chosen but it will not be an easy one.

The sharp debates, which took place in the United States on the subject of the ratification of the treaty, indicated that it has numerous and active opponents. Many of their arguments bordered on falsifications and many of them were of a specific and even "captious" nature. However, there were also arguments which were based on general philosophical-historical concepts and on the rejection in principle of the legitimacy and possibility of peaceful coexistence between capitalism and socialism.

Let me cite as an example an extensive quotation from the article by Charles Krauthammer in THE WASHINGTON POST. "Agreements on arms control are

essentially symbolic. Their essential purpose is to prove to the Western public that the arms race is under control. They have little in common with security and even less with peace. True detente," Krauthammer claims, "will be the result not of nuclear treaties but of agreements of an entirely different nature. Hostility between East and West will decline and, with it, the threat of war once the Soviets have clearly demonstrated the presence of two historical changes in their behavior: the fact that they do not intend to extend their domination (in foreposts such as Afghanistan, Nicaragua and Angola) and that they do not intend to destroy the spirit of humaneness wherever they rule, i.e., when they convincingly begin to dismantle the machinery of totalitarianism."

Let us ignore worn-out cliches such as "domination" or "totalitarianism." Let us pay attention to the essence of the approach. Krauthammer bases the possibility of "real detente" on the "freezing" of social changes in the world and the erosion of socialism. We have heard this frequently before. And we have frequently answered that the entire meaning of detente, peaceful coexistence and agreements on arms control means precisely to learn how to cooperate with a partner who is different from you, who you may not like but from whom you cannot become "estranged."

Does this mean that we reject any critical remarks concerning our behavior in the international arena or practices at home? Naturally, it does not. While defending and protecting our interests and supporting our friends, we shall take into consideration the interests of the other participants in the world community. We shall restructure our own domestic practices as well. However, not for the sake of "softening" socialism, as our opponents would like, but for making it even stronger.

The INF Treaty was ratified. However, neither the President himself nor his allies or many of his opponents consider this treaty a step toward a nuclear-free world. All the indications are that the bourgeois mind, and even more so the mind of the ruling groups (with some exceptions) is still unable to vanquish the "nuclear syndrome" and has not matured to the level of understanding the need for, the salutary nature of a world free from nuclear weapons. Bearing this in mind, Moscow has formulated the end objective clearly and unequivocally, suggesting a number of intermediary, of individual solutions the purpose of which is gradually to prepare the people to accept a nuclear-free world.

On the conceptual level, the gradual progress toward a nuclear-free world demands radical changes in nuclear strategy. From deterrence through intimidation and the threat of total retribution, we must gradually convert, while retaining military-strategic parity at all stages, to "defensive deterrence." In practical terms, this means reducing the military potentials to a level which would exclude the possibility of a sudden and effective attack which would deprive the opposite side of its nuclear-missile potential.

Efforts are being made within the framework of the old political thinking to restore nuclear war to the status of a rational political instrument and to formulate a strategy for a victorious nuclear war. In principle, it is impossible to solve this problem. However, illusions on this account could cost mankind its future. The new political thinking solves the problem of preventing a suicidal nuclear war and eliminating the possibility of nuclear war in general. The solution of this problem is very difficult but is one which guarantees the future.

The choice which is offered with the new political thinking is based on the fact that no class or group interests and no ideology is worth collective suicide. The survival and preservation of civilization are in the interest of mankind, an interest which prevails over that of any class or social group. V.I. Lenin wrote that "...from the viewpoint of the basic ideas of Marxism, the interests of social development are superior to the interests of the proletariat...." (op. cit., vol 4, p 220). Time has invested in this formula a much richer content than was conceived at the turn of the 20th Century. It is only by assuming the position that universal human interests have priority that we can suitably approach the entire set of problems of war and peace in its present dimension, accurately assess the dangers triggered by the contradiction between the development of technology and the preservation of the biosphere and undertake the narrowing and, subsequently, the closing of the ecological, social and cultural gap between North and South. Paradoxical though this might seem initially, it is precisely the universal human approach that is the main guarantee for social development in our world imbued with class and social contradictions.

Giving priority to the interests of all mankind and approaching from the viewpoint of such interests the main problems of global politics does not mean in any way that we are abandoning class guidelines in social analysis and social practice. The interests and demands of social groups continue to play a decisive role in social life. They determine the nature of political decisions. At the same time, however, the realm of universal interests, of problems the solution of which is consistent with the interests of all classes and all social groups, has appeared and is expanding. In order successfully to solve problems of universal significance we must assume control over class contradictions and subordinate them to the supreme objective. That is what giving priority to the interests of mankind means.

If the concept of the priority of universal values is not "balanced" with a class analysis of events, the temptation arises of questioning the antagonistic nature of relations between capitalism and socialism in the world arena and the class nature of the policy of peaceful coexistence. From the universal-historical viewpoint, capitalism and socialism are not two variants of civilization which exist on a parallel basis but two rungs, two stages of civilization, one of which replaces the other. Such is the deepest content of their antagonism. The

policy of peaceful coexistence does not eliminate this antagonism but calls for giving a civilized shape to the struggle, to the rivalry between civilizations.

The more the angle of approach of peaceful coexistence we have chosen becomes universal, the more important becomes the need for comprehensive cooperation in economics, politics, culture and even ideology. However, it is precisely the insurmountable fact that we are dealing with cooperation among classes which are different and opposite in terms of their place in history, that inevitably burdens this cooperation with acute rivalry and confrontation, the desire to outstrip one's partner and to win over public opinion. Strictly peaceful forms of confrontation and politics, dictated by the existence of an objective confrontation ceiling, would urge on economic rivalry and stimulate the ideological struggle.

The struggle of ideologies is by no means the simple contraposition of words, slogans or ideas. It means, above all, a contraposition of ways of life in the broadest meaning of the term (material security of the people, civil rights, possibility of spiritual and material advancement of the individual). The real way of life is the main store and generator of arguments which influence the people's frame of mind.

Obviously, at this point we must touch upon another matter: as we know, the new draft of the CPSU program no longer defines peaceful coexistence among countries with different social systems as a "specific form of class struggle." The purpose of this innovation is to emphasize that an objective limit for class confrontation in the international arena—the threat of universal destruction—has appeared. This reemphasizes the peaceful nature of CPSU political strategy and the firm intention of the USSR not to raise the class confrontation to said limit, and to give priority to universal interests, to that which rallies the global working class and the world bourgeoisie: the aspiration to survive, to continue to make history.

This, however, does not mean in the least that the CPSU is abandoning the class analysis of the reasons for the threat of war, events of international life and policy of peaceful coexistence. "The Leninist concept of peaceful coexistence," M.S. Gorbachev emphasized in his report at the ceremonious session which was held in Moscow on 2 November 1987, "naturally experienced changes. Initially, it was based above all on the need to create minimal external conditions for building the new society in a country which had made a socialist revolution. However, as the extension of the class policy of the victorious proletariat, in the future and, particularly, in the nuclear century, peaceful coexistence became a prerequisite for the survival of all mankind." He also said that "we cannot fail to take into consideration the class heterogeneity of the forces acting in the world arena and ignore the influence of class antagonism on international relations....." As we mentioned, class interests could

coincide or oppose universal interests; in any case, the scientific approach requires a consideration of both facets of the social process—the universal and the class.

3

The common struggle for the preservation of human values and of civilization does not nor could invalidate in the least the fact that classes and global systems will inevitably use the policy of peaceful coexistence in pursuit of their own objectives. In principle as well peaceful coexistence offers everyone a chance. "Live and let live," is the way its broad meaning could be described. The most energetic representatives of the global bourgeoisie, who are the most confident in the possibilities of capitalism, intend to make use of this chance. Thus, in his recently published book "Game Plan," Z. Brzezinski directs the U.S. ruling class toward a lengthy competition with the Soviet Union, in the course of which, in the final account, the United States would prevail. "However," he writes, "I must immediately add that the aspiration to prevail should be considered as something entirely different from a traditional victory. To prevail means to create international conditions which would favor our values and would contribute to changes in the Soviet Union, which would make the Soviet Union more tractable from the viewpoint of such international agreements."

A similar viewpoint is developed by various more or less liberal personalities. In opposing the "traditional victory" and "extravagant expectations" from detente, they insist on the need for a long-term foreign policy which, by increasing contacts along all lines, through businessmen, scientists and journalists, would influence those who "make policy" in the Soviet Union and would strengthen "reformist trends."

The result is the following picture: initially, after the October Revolution and the intervention, the ruling Western bourgeoisie was forced to accept peaceful coexistence with the socialist state only because it lacked the necessary strength to crush it. Such forced peaceful coexistence was quite unstable. It was undermined by the systematic attempts on the part of reactionary circles to acquire the necessary power and settle their accounts with socialism: if not to destroy it, in any case to weaken and isolate it, to shove it to the margin of world politics. Supporters of this policy remain to this day. However, a different political stance is becoming increasingly typical: to accept the challenge of peaceful coexistence, but not because it cannot be rejected but because the hope exists of outperforming socialism peacefully. By acting intelligently, our historical opponents think, by avoiding "extravagances," and not relying on "traditional victory," i.e., on the pressure of force, on war, in the course of peaceful coexistence one could gain the upper hand over socialism and achieve its gradual and peaceful restructuring and its rapprochement with "improved" capitalism.

As a communist I cannot accept such a prospect. My views on the future are related to the "sweeping off" of capitalism from history. However, suffice it to emphasize here that such "optimistic" expectations of the bourgeoisie, regardless of what our reaction to them is, whether we accept or reject them, could serve as an initial base for the assertion and strengthening of peaceful coexistence and cooperation and for rescuing mankind from the nuclear threat.

The new political thinking sets increased interdependence among countries as the objective foundation for increasing interaction in the international arena and strengthening the policy of peaceful coexistence. The very fact of the growing significance of interdependence and interaction, a fact which reflects the internationalization of production forces, was "mastered" by bourgeois theory and bourgeois practice a long time ago. Obviously, it is along this line that we should consider the trend toward a coordination of the policies of the developed capitalist countries and, particularly, of their leading group ("the seven"). Such coordination has taken place both on nongovernmental ("the tripartite commission," the Club of Rome, the Bilderberg Club) and governmental ("Common Market," OECD and conferences of the "seven") grounds. This trend is opposed by centrifugal forces and prevents profound and grave interimperialist contradictions. Nonetheless, the aspiration of the leading capitalist countries to coordinate their internal socioeconomic course and policy in the world arena will have an increasingly noticeable impact on the state of affairs in the world. I do not exclude the fact that this may lead to the establishment of some sort of "ultraimperialism," if we mean by this an informal alliance among leading countries in the capitalist world, which would exclude military clashes between them and would be based on the formulation of a joint political and economic strategy toward the socialist and developing countries.

The imperialist understanding of interdependence includes traditional concepts of the uneven status of participants in the global community, although updated in accordance with the conditions prevailing at the end of the 20th century. It is thus that the idea of "asymmetric interdependence" arises, according to which some (a few) would be less dependent than others (the majority). It is precisely the idea of "asymmetric interdependence" that is the foundation of the policy of collective neocolonialism. The social meaning of the imperialist form of interdependence and interaction is strengthening capitalist relations in the Third World, isolating the countries with a socialist orientation and their constant diffusion within the neocapitalist system of the 21st century.

Interdependence and interaction have another social meaning in the Soviet concept of new political thinking. We consider their meaning as one of coordinating the efforts of all mankind, directed at preventing a nuclear war and, in principle, all wars in general, the elimination

of hunger, disease and ignorance and maintaining a dynamic balance between the biosphere and the technosphere. The spontaneous interdependence, triggered by the objective internationalization of production forces and the equally spontaneous intensification of the international division of labor cannot solve these problems. In order to become a prerequisite for purposeful interaction, interdependence must be understood by the people. The new political thinking puts interdependence and interaction under the control of social awareness and thus converts them into an instrument for the conscious restructuring of international relations.

The Soviet understanding of interdependence and interaction proceeds from the acknowledgment of the total equality among all participants in international life. Interdependence based on independence, an interdependence which rejects one-sided dependence, and interaction as the common and mutually profitable action by equal partners is the way the question is formulated. It is only total equality, i.e., equality of rights and obligations, that could give interdependence and interaction the type of aspect in which all countries and peoples will gradually reach the same level of utilization of the benefits of material and spiritual culture. That is why, in particular, the Soviet Union actively supports the concept of a new international economic order, formulated by the developing countries.

Let us note that efforts are being made in the West as well to take a new approach to changes in the world arena and to reinterpret customary positions and roles and, above all, to reinterpret the role played by Washington as the indisputable God-given leader of the "free" nations. Americans (at least some of them) cannot be denied the courage of self-criticism. "...the United States is no longer the master of its destiny, confidently dictating the rules of the game to friends and foes," writes M. Ruby in U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT. "...Our mind, however, does not acknowledge what our heart knows. ...It appears as though our allies are equally paralyzed. Both we and they acknowledge verbally the new "interdependence" of the world and the need for rapprochement. However, no one can fully understand how to accomplish this, and even less so what compromises should be made."

The gap between emotions and reason is a rather widespread disease of transitional ages. It is time that causes this disease and it is time that cures it, forcing the people to see the new interdependence without quotation marks. Speaking out in support of the concept of "responsible internationalism," Arthur Schlesinger, New York University professor, writes the following in another American journal, FOREIGN AFFAIRS: "This means acknowledging interdependence as the primary fact of international life. It means responsiveness to the interests of other countries, readiness to consult with allies and to engage in talks with opponents. It means support by the United States of Latin American peace initiatives in Central America. It means making a new, a

more active use by America of the United Nations and other multilateral organizations. This would put an end to the unpleasant sight of the United States behaving in the world as though it is the embodiment of the law and would restore the historical confidence of America that a world based on the power of the law is consistent with national interests." One could hardly disagree with such a concept of interdependence.

The demilitarization of international relations, toward which we are oriented by the new political thinking, the increased share of universal values in world politics and the gradual development of a global awareness, without which efficient interaction is impossible, are all factors which would make it possible to undertake to surmount the age-old confrontation between politics and morality in international life.

The actual gap between policy and morality is traditional and has the strength of prejudice. Equally strong are constant references by politicians to moral considerations. The first is used as justification of the second. The farther away from morality real political steps were, the thicker was the layer which concealed their moral blush. Machiavelli, the Italian, measured the depth of hypocrisy which existed during his age. He was not a cynic. He did not praise immorality in politics as something necessary. He merely proved that in the existing kingdom a policy which claimed to be successful could be only immoral. Exceptions did exist but, as they should, they merely confirmed the rule.

Prerequisites for involving moral principles in the making and evaluation of political decisions gradually began to appear only toward the end of the 20th century. Externally, this has been manifested in the fact that in addition to the customary and traditional power factor, global public opinion is beginning to play an increasingly noticeable role. Power is resisting and is still holding decisive positions. With increasing frequency, however, we come across situations in which power turns out to be powerless. The Americans have had the opportunity to realize this on several occasions. Now, in reference to Afghanistan, we too have gained experience. "The influence of realities of the contemporary world and possible modifications of a number of objective factors which lead to wars," the CPSU Central Committee theses stipulate, "let us think that ensuring the security of countries will increasingly shift from the area of correlation among military potentials to the area of politics, to the primacy of the law and universal morality in the implementation of international obligations."

The new political philosophy of the age, while emphasizing a strictly realistic vision of society and its development trends, proceeds from the fact that the change in socioeconomic systems and civilizations will take a much longer time than was imagined previously by the communists, and will occur in forms which will go beyond the framework of present theoretical concepts. Everything seems to indicate that the transitional period

will be crowded with changes in both capitalism and socialism. Both types of social system will be forced to adapt to revolutionary changes in the technological base of production and to master and imbue themselves with the results of an accelerating scientific progress. Both types of social systems, in order to preserve themselves and mankind, will be forced to compete, to interact and to exchange material and spiritual values.

All of this ascribes particular weight and special significance to peaceful coexistence. The principle of peaceful coexistence appeared as the foreign policy doctrine of the socialist state. Subsequently it became a universally acknowledged standard of relations among countries with different social systems. In front of our eyes it is gradually becoming a standard of relations among countries regardless of their social system. This steady expansion of the political area in which the principle of peaceful coexistence is applied proves that in the nuclear age it is adequately reflecting the vital interests and needs of different nations, classes and social groups.

The fact that peaceful coexistence is becoming universal, i.e., that it is spreading over an increasingly broad area of international relations, is also paralleled by the strengthening of its social, its mass base. "...We must help the peoples to intervene in problems of war and peace," V.I. Lenin said on 8 November 1917, addressing the Second All-Russian Congress of Soviets (op. cit., vol 35, p 16). This Leninist concept of the democratization of foreign policy and the active and conscious participation of the masses in the struggle against war and for peace has always been indivisible from our view on peaceful coexistence. However, it was only in the second half of the 20th century that it began to be applied in the practices of mass democratic movements. Their strength—the strength of traditional as well as so called "new social movements"—is the strength of progressive global public opinion, which reflects and expresses the main interest of mankind: to escape destruction, to survive in the nuclear age.

It is precisely this interest that nurtures the policy of peaceful coexistence, making it stable and promising. The policy of peaceful coexistence is a necessary prerequisite for the shaping of a planetary awareness; it is a prerequisite and means of democratization and of humanizing the entire system of international relations. It is a specific manifestation of the tremendous potential for self-preservation, which combines the instinct of man and the judgment of mankind. It is only peaceful coexistence in an interdependent world that can provide the political foundations for preserving the earth's biosphere, humanizing scientific and technical progress, surmounting the backwardness of the Third World and protecting the future for the sake of the new generations.

The solution of all of these problems is the external, the international front for the materializing of the new political thinking. But there also is an internal, a decisive, front as well: the revolutionary restructuring of our

way of life. It is only if we win here, at home, that we could hope for success abroad. ...That is why there is no measure with which to determine the degree of our responsibility to ourselves and to all mankind.

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Evolution of the Social Democratic Movement

18020015n Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian No 9,
Jun 88 (signed to press 8 Jun 88) pp 126-127

[Review by N. Maslennikov of the book "*V Poiskakh 'Tretyego Puti': Evolyutsiya Ideologii Sotsial-Demokratii v Sovremennuyu Epokhu*" [In Search of a "Third Way:" Evolution in the Ideology of the Social Democratic Movement in Our Time] by S.S. Salychev (Yu. N. Afanasyev, responsible editor). Mysl, Moscow, 1988, 316 pp]

[Text] Today the social democratic trend in the international labor movement is facing a number of problems never encountered before, down the entire complex and twisty path it has covered in the past decades of the 20th century. It would be no exaggeration to say that the solutions which will be found for such problems will greatly determine the future aspect of our contradictory but increasingly integral world.

Nonetheless, any forecast concerning the ideological and political evolution in the social democratic movement would be unrealistic and simply impossible without the profound and objective study of its historical experience, development contradictions and change mechanisms which predetermine its present quite complex situation. Under the current circumstances, when the tasks of renovation of civilization become most closely intertwined with the problem of survival, international cooperation and a common search by all progressive forces of alternatives to an antagonistic society and confrontational tension in the world arena have become an imperative of our time. One of the most important prerequisites for efficient progress along this important way is that of improving standards of reciprocal relations between communists and social democrats. In turn, this presumes the need for a sober and thoroughly reason for the initial and continuing division between the two main trends in the labor movement, the nature of the historical dynamics of relations between them and the real opportunities and prospects for engaging not only in parallel but joint cohesive actions. This book, the last work by the noted Soviet scientist S.S. Salychev, published posthumously, is a contribution to these complex and increasingly topical problems.

The monograph under review is a serious study of various stages covering a long historical period, from World War I to the start of the 1980s, of the theoretical

concepts of the most representative leaders of the international social democratic movement. It provides an extensive description not only and simply of the history but the logic of its ideological and political evolution. Essentially the book offers a comparison between ideological views on problems in which Marxist-Leninist world outlook and the practical activities of revolutionary parties differ from those of social democratic reformism. This includes the attitude toward revolution and reforms, bourgeois parliamentary democracy and the mass political activeness of the working people, the socioeconomic contradictions within the capitalist system, the national liberation and national democratic movements in the democratic countries, etc.

The author convincingly describes the dialectics of the social price which the social democrats must pay for advancing along their selected "third way," and the by no means accidental interconnection between their gains and losses. Thus, after World War I, having accepted the fictitious dilemma formulated by the bourgeoisie of either revolution or democracy, the right-wing and centrist social democratic leaders set for themselves the requirement of perennially having to solve the contradiction between the objectives of social progress and reformist activities within the framework of capitalist political institutions. Inevitably, the efforts to "reconcile" such contradictions turned into the ideology of eclecticism and the frequently narrowly pragmatic nature of party programs and, in the political area, class cooperation with the bourgeois parties, isolation from the communists and intensification of the division within the working class.

The overall situation within the social democratic movement began noticeably to change during the 1970 and, particularly, the 1980s. Whereas in the course of all previous decades social democratic ideology had been steadily leaning toward the right despite the various fluctuations in the political course of individual parties, for the first time this trend was interrupted in the 1970s.

According to the author, "the study of the activities of the main parties within the international social democratic movement allows us to speak of a general swing to the left, albeit slow and uneven" (p 253). Naturally, anything which is taking place today in the international social democratic movement is the object of increased attention and, in frequent cases, of a sympathetic communist attitude. This is a situation in which the social democrats have reached a certain historical landmark at which an intensive process of interpretation of the changes which have taken place in the world is taking place, changes which have exceeded the framework of the old concepts and programmatic stipulations. The social democrats themselves include among them social, economic and ecological limits of industrial growth; freedom from the illusions relative to the neutral development of science and technology; growing conviction that the development of science and industry could make it possible to be rid of irrational and destructive forces;

loss of jobs in the course of the structural reorganization of the economy; limits of state financing of social policy; demands formulated by new social movements; development of new types of armaments and the related reappraisal of the possibilities for ensuring safety; aggravation of poverty in third world countries, etc.

The social democrats seek and frequently come up with their own answers to global problems, such as lifting the threat of nuclear war, protecting the human habitat and eliminating underdevelopment in third world countries, frequently close to and understood by the communists. Their activities in the 1980s, when they experienced the satisfaction of successes and bitterness of defeats, are an indication of their intensified search for solutions to new problems. The future will reveal their outcome. What is clear, however, is that problems which set their own historical challenge are of an essentially qualitative nature and, as it reacts to them, the social democratic movement will inevitably change itself.

The monograph does not claim to cover the entire variety of conditions which have defined and are defining the ideological and political evolution of the international social democratic movement. It covers relatively briefly objective factors, such as changes in the capitalist economy, socioclass structure, social consciousness and the political activeness of the masses. This is largely the result of the intent of the author and the overall condition of scientific studies in this area. The systematic analysis of all circumstances which influence changes in the social democratic ideological platform remains a topical task in the area of Marxist social studies. Nonetheless, in this case a guarantee of full knowledge is that of drawing self-critical lessons by all left wing forces, above all by considering the historical experience of relations between communists and social democrats as the by no means least important factor in the ideological evolution of social reformism.

A new situation is currently developing in the labor movement. A favorable atmosphere appears for broadening the extensive dialogue between its two main trends—communists and social democrats—which actually began at the meeting among representatives of parties and movements who attended the celebration of the 70th anniversary of the Great October Revolution in Moscow. Today the views of the Socialist International on problems of security and disarmament are in frequent cases similar to those of the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries and a similarity of approaches to the solution of many other global problems is apparent.

Naturally, many other problems remain in which the ideological differences separating communists from social democrats are substantial, leading to differences in political assessments. They include a view not only of the ways of transition to socialism but of its very nature as a new social system, the nature of the socialist ideal, the principles of democracy and social justice, human rights, self-government by the working people, etc. However,

the imperative of the time is that all this could and should become the subject of a theoretical and political debate on all levels under conditions of equality and mutual respect.

The processes of extensive democratization in the economic, social and political areas, initiated in our country, clearly prove that an entire array of differences in the views concerning the socialist society, its economic base and political superstructure, previously considered insurmountable, are actually not. This is one of the international aspects of perestroika, which is bringing back an interest in socialism not only in the international working class but also among the intellectuals and other strata which, at one point, had lost it.

The readers will probably not agree with all conclusions and assessments found in this book. Some views may seem excessively categorical and arguable, requiring clarification or confirmation in the light of the new realities. The premature death of the author, unfortunately prevented him from completing his work on the text, in the course of which he would have unquestionably made necessary additions and corrections in preparing the book for publication. Nonetheless, the content of this interesting book, saturated with factual data, makes us think. It will stimulate the further intensified work on the problems formulated and noted in the work and earmark promising areas of fruitful scientific discussions. As a whole, this book will help us to realize the need to master the difficult art of reinterpreting the present and the future, drawing valuable lessons from historical experience. This is the main thing.

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Chronicle. Meetings With the Editors

18020015o Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian No 9, Jun 88 (signed to press 6 Jun 88) p 128

[Text] A meeting between the editors and journal readers was held at the USSR Academy of Sciences Scientific Center for Biological Research in Pushchino, Moscow Oblast. On the eve of the 19th All-Union CPSU Conference, tasks related to perestroika in economics and politics and in the development of basic sciences were discussed.

An extensive discussion on the participation of KOMMUNIST in party activities related to providing ideological support to perestroika and a review of the CPSU Central Committee theses for the 19th All-Union Party Conference took place at a meeting with general officers and officers from the General Staff and its administrations of the commander in chief of the Air Force. Wishes concerning improvements in the journal's work and efficiency were expressed.

Discussions at meetings between KOMMUNIST associates and propagandists from the production combine of the USSR Chamber of Commerce and Industry and the Moscow City Main Architecture and Urban Construction Administration were focused on problems of upgrading the role of the CPSU as a political vanguard and the activities of party organizations under the conditions of perestroyka.

The editors were visited by Nguyen Man Kam, ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam in the USSR. He showed an interest in the journal's participation in preparations for the 19th All-Union CPSU Conference, the course of the economic reform, problems of democratization of intra-party and social life and the development of criticism, self-criticism and glasnost in Soviet society.

In a talk with the journal's editors, the members of a Mexican Socialist Party delegation, headed by Eduardo Valle, member of the party's National Executive Committee Committee and Secretariat of the MSP National Council, were interested in the course of perestroyka in the economic and social areas and its reflection in the journal's work.

The KOMMUNIST editors were visited by the American economist Jan Mladek, former director of the central banking administration of the International Monetary Fund. The discussion dealt with topical problems of financial and credit-monetary policy under the conditions of the economic reform undertaken in the USSR.

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Publication Data

18020015p Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian No 9, Jun 88

English Title: KOMMUNIST, No 9, June 1988

Russian title: KOMMUNIST, 9 (1325), Iyun 1988

Editors: N.B. Bikkenin (editor-in-chief), A.I. Antipov, E.A. Arab-Ogly, B.S. Arkhipov, K.N. Brutents, Ye.T. Gaydar, I.A. Dedkov, V.I. Kadulin, S.V. Kolesnikov, O.R. Latsis, Yu.L. Molchanov, Ye.Z. Razumov, V.F. Rubtsov, N.N. Sibiryakov, Yu.A. Sklyarov, V.P. Trubnikov, P.N. Fedoseyev, S.F. Yarmolyuk.

Publishing House: Izdatelstvo "Pravda"

Place of Publication: Moscow

Date of Publication: June 1988

Signed to Press: 6 June 1988

Copies: 1,025,000

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