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2 DECEMBER 1986

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CAUSES OF CHANGES IN CSSR-HUNGARY AGREEMENT ON DANUBE DAM EXPLAINED

Prague TRIBUNA in Czech No 39, 1 Oct 86 pp 1, 11

[Article by Petr Marada: "His Majesty, the Danube: Comprehensive Survey of the Environment"]

[Text] When we conducted a poll focusing on the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Water Project System, many of the respondents had hardly any idea what exactly it meant; it was not because they lacked earlier opportunities to learn about the objectives and progress of that construction project. Yet, as it appeared, most of those who were almost completely ignorant about that undertaking automatically opposed the construction of the water project. They remained suspicious of everything new, everything that people's imagination cannot clearly comprehend and practically compare.... We could understand them. It is truly difficult to visualize, for example, an approach flume twice as wide as the Suez Canal. After all, people regard Suez as quite a feat!

Nevertheless, we did not encounter ignorance just among laymen. One of the most relevant questions is: "How will the level of underground waters change after the water project is built?" Today it is still a topic of speculation discussed by groups which cannot be considered "well-wishers" of the plan. We posed it to managers of state farms and agricultural cooperatives. However, in many in fact, in most -- instances they could not specify the optimum level of underground waters. Many of them quite seriously thought that underground waters only provide moisture for trees.... Such ignorance may be easily misled because in history many advanced ideas which would be beneficial to humanity have been "wasted" precisely by ignorance.

During my recent visit to Budapest, more or less by chance, I met Gabor Kapuvári, editor of MAGYAR NEMZET, the daily of the National and Patriotic Front. My invitation to a meeting did not take him by surprise. In recent years our southern neighbors had discussed and written on countless occasions about the construction of the water project. However, the past tense in this context is inappropriate because Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros is one of the three most important investment projects of the [Hungarian] Seventh 5-Year Plan. Along with the construction of additional units of the atomic power plant in Paks, which is now several years behind schedule, and with the partnership in the building of the Progress gas pipeline, Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros is one of the

developmental programs which, when completed, will provide a safe "blood" supply for the Hungarian national economy for many years to come. To obtain a guaranteed source of energy, almost 80 billion forints were allocated for the current 5-year plan, i.e., about 6 1/2 percent of investments in the socialist sector. I was most interested in the views of my colleague, a journalist and at the same time, an expert in construction engineering, not only because "one of the greatest obstacles to the growth (of national income) is the insufficient amount of available sources of energy," and because "we (in Hungary) are not so much concerned about inadequate (investment) plans as about their inadequate finding." I borrowed these two quotations from the "Program of Our Social and Economic Development -- The Seventh 5-Year Plan," whose author, Ferenc Havasi, is a member of the Politburo of the Hungarian Workers' Party and secretary of the Central Committee of the MSDS.

In their light, next to the construction of the water project, the adjunct program motivated by the "System" in 1983 also has gained extraordinary importance. Both its scope and the involvement of scientific and technological capacities are most unusual. Until its conception no similar comprehensive environmental survey had been undertaken in Europe in conjunction with the building of a water project, although several scores of such facilities are currently in operation. This was the first time ever on a worldwide scale that a state had conducted a comprehensive land survey and studied the efficiency of its measures for environmental protection, nor sparing funds, energy and interest. This did not concern only the residents of Szigetkoz, one of the loveliest areas as well as our southern neighbors' grain belt on the banks of the Danube.

The comprehensive study was concluded in June 1985. Partial surveys in the Komarom-Budapest area were conducted with the participation of 36 organizations--research and planning institutes, university departments, several hundred scientists and experts. In more than 50 of their analyses they focused on the classification of both the positive and the negative effects of the water project construction on the environment from the most diverse points of view and positions. Their main concern, however, was that the proposed design apply positive changes to the greatest extent and eliminate or mitigate the negative impact of the construction as much as possible.

If we include the initiative of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, the direct survey operations continued over 4 years following the surveys conducted in the previous decades. For example, even before the intergovernmental agreement on the construction project were signed, the Institute of Technology in Budapest, the Research Institute for Water Economy, several departments of agricultural colleges in Godollo and Keszthelyi and other institutions had conducted surveys for at least 15 years. It was not only during such surveys that the undertaking had been debated by the planners with economists and biologists representing no less than two institutes of biology. A comprehensive study submitted to the government at its session on 15 August 1985 is the outcome of a "round table" conference in which more than 40 experts, scientists (from research institutes and departments of the Academy of Sciences), planners, investors and representatives of appropriate ministries took part....

"The Council of Ministers of the Hungarian People's Republic discussed the report on ecological effects of the dam and other tasks presented by the chairman of the State Water Economy Bureau and the plenipotentiary for the construction of the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros water project. It stated that preparations and actual work were progressing according to the interstate agreements. The findings of the scientific surveys focusing on the environmental consequences of the water project in conjunction with the building and operation of the project were acknowledged; the Hungarian Academy of Sciences and the State Council for Environmental and Land Protection opposed the study which was prepared in cooperation with experts and scientific institutions by a governmental commission appointed for that purpose. The government considered the result of the survey useful and in the interest of the construction of the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Water Project System, of environmental and land preservation, and of further development of that area. The government expressed its appreciation to the surveyors and experts who had fulfilled a task which is extraordinary from the world perspective. The government decided to apply the results of scientific analyses in the planning, construction and operation of the water projects." (Session of the Council of Ministers of the Hungarian People's Republic.)

"A team of experts discussed all controversial issues and concluded that the construction of the water project system is in our interest -- in the interest of our nation. Only by this act of cooperation (with the CSSR) can we fully exploit the Danube as our national resource." (Peter Havas, the plenipotentiary of the Hungarian People's Republic for the construction of the water project system.)

The scientific surveys confirmed that the construction of the water project, along with investments in environmental protection, will not only help exploit the great river efficiently, but by the same token, it will have a beneficial effect on development of agricultural production because it will make it possible to build additional irrigation systems for an area of 110,000 hectares in southern Slovakia. The quality of the water in the Danube will improve, which will be of great importance for the fisheries. Underground waters will maintain a desirable level all year round, regardless of weather conditions; the supply of drinking water will be improved.... To be sure, in the preceding parts of this serial I have already described some "consequences" of this venture. Even after the future water project begins to operate, scientific surveys will continue with the cooperation of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences and of the Slovak Academy of Sciences to help eliminate any unfavorable effects of the construction, all of which cannot be fully foreseen at this time. As I was told by Prof Gyorgy Kovacs, corresponding member of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, "some biological issues still need to be ironed out. We have the necessary means and, as a matter of fact, we have the time as well."

Naturally, for such an enormous intrusion into the age-old natural order as the construction of the water project on the part of the Danube between the CSSR and Hungary has attracted the Hungarian public's attention and, moreover, caused certain anxieties, which is quite logical. However, in the

interpretation of certain small groups whose programs are supported -- and not only in the moral sense -- by the West, those fears expressed political implications. The fact that since the early 1970s environmental protection has been one of the most relevant forms of social action was misused for political aims that have absolutely nothing in common with ecological issues.

In addition, "reliable" analyses of developments connected with the construction on the Danube are being blasted from the pages of right-wing dailies, weeklies and the air waves of "well-informed" radio stations mainly in West Germany and Austria. To a layman some of their allegations may sound believable. Their touching "concern," however, always leads to the same conclusion: "...our friends, the CSSR and Hungary, will soon be stricken with an ecological disaster of their own making. The consequences of the planned construction are causing serious, scientifically grounded concerns. None of us democrats (most of whom, however, have sold more than their conscience) can permit the residents of the lowlands along the Danube to suffer from hunger and thirst...." And exploiting the lack of information or the ignorance of some individuals, they now act more Catholic than the Pope and turning into the legendary serpent they whisper:

"They say that the state is to blame, if for nothing else than because it has launched the construction of the largest water economy system of this kind in Europe, if not in the world." -- But that confirms that the state is strong in more respects than in the economy!

"They say that the planners and scientists are to blame; it is absolutely certain that they will not be able to manage such gigantic facilities," -- which can be said only because, unfortunately, much less has been written about the scientific surveys and changes in the plans to the benefit of ecology than about the continuous progress of construction work.

"They say that in any case socialism is to blame. There can be no doubt about it," -- the "evidence" in support of this allegation can always be found in the arguments of Western propaganda, naturally, with appropriate "examples."

In simple terms: the intent is to cast doubts on the construction's future by grasping at every possible lack of citizens' information because multiple exploitation of rivers is the focus of attention all over the world. Due to the energy crisis and more rigorous demands of environmental protection, the importance of hydraulic power, which is inexhaustible, has substantially increased. At the same time, hydroelectric power plants do not generate any toxic by-products. Furthermore, cascades provide better protection against floods in adjacent areas and offer a better water supply; they make it possible to develop river transportation, international traffic or recreation. Thus the creation of the cascades will enhance the economic power of both countries.

The CSSR and the Hungarian People's Republic adopted the schedules for the construction of the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Water Project System in 1977 when they

signed an interstate agreement; in view of changes in economic conditions since that time and other circumstances, the schedules were later amended. The deteriorating international situation in the late 1970's forced both socialist states to reassess the objectives of their investment policies.

In 1981 the Hungarian party to the agreement proposed that the construction project be slowed down or suspended until 1990; at the same time, it stopped work on its territory. On the basis of this request, in 1981-1982 both partners reviewed technical and economic issues related to a potential slow-down or suspension of the joint project. The possibility of immediate stoppages was averted in view of the high number of facilities under construction and in view of the necessity of maintaining the quality of projects awaiting completion. Because in their plans both partners had counted on the electric power to be generated by the water project system, they concluded an agreement according to which construction cannot be interrupted while the entire situation is being reviewed.

The progress of the construction thus far was assessed jointly with the conclusion that due to the delay in launching the operation, caused by the Hungarian party, and in view of grouting problems in the Czechoslovak section, the first power unit in the Gabčíkovo dam will not start operation until 1990 and the power unit in Nagymaros will not begin until 1993. The entire project will be finished in 1995, i.e., 4 years behind the original schedule.

These newly adopted deadlines were affirmed in the "Records of the Amendment to the Agreement Between the CSSR and the Hungarian People's Republic Concerning the Construction and Operation of the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Water Project System," signed by the prime ministers of both countries on 10 October 1983 during the visit of György Lazar, chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Hungarian People's Republic. The adopted documents did not in any way change the contents, spirit and basic principles of the previous agreement and contract; they only stipulated the deadlines for construction.

Hungarian construction workers resumed their operations on their territory in 1983 and later joined in digging a waste channel for the Gabčíkovo hydro-electric plant.

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CSO: 2400/16

AUGUST 1986 ECONOMIC RESULTS SUMMARIZED

Prague HOSPODARSKE NOVINY in Czech No 39, 1986 p 2

[Commentary by Engineers Marie Hormannova and Alena Polakova, Federal Statistical Office, under the "Information on Plan Fulfillment" rubric: "August 1985"]

[Text] In the sphere of material production, one workday fewer than in the comparable periods last year affected the growth rates of the basic indicators in August and from the beginning of the year as well. After conversion to the same number of workdays, the growth rates of output in industry and construction were faster than the planned annual growth rates. This despite the fact that the August production tasks were not fulfilled entirely, because more workers were on vacations.

Fulfillment of the annual plan's targets by the end of August was as follows: industry's gross output, 65 percent; industry's commodity output, 64.9 percent; volume of construction work in place, performed by the construction enterprises' own personnel, 64.7; procurement of slaughter animals (including slaughter poultry), 65.1 percent; main trade systems' retail turnover, 63.3 percent; total import, 60.4 percent; total export 59.7 percent; and freight hauled by public carriers, 66.3 percent. At the same time, the first eight months accounted for 66.0 percent of the total number of workdays this year.

Industry's gross output in August rose by 0.5 percent over the same month last year. Average daily output increased by 4.0 percent. The industrial enterprises as a whole fulfilled their monthly production plans 98.0 percent, but more than 40 percent of the enterprises fell short of the gross output planned for August.

Industrial gross output in January through August totaled 547.6 billion korunas, 2.9 percent more than in the same period last year. The annual state plan calls for a 2.6-percent increase. Average daily output during January-August rose by 3.3 percent. Overall fulfillment of output in the enterprises' economic plans for the period was 100.4 percent, although there were shortfalls at about 30 percent of the enterprises.

For January-August, fulfillment of adjusted value added in the enterprises' economic plans was 99.2 percent, with shortfalls for this indicator at about a third of the industrial enterprises.

Basic Indicators of National Economy's Development in August 1986.
Increases Over Comparable 1985 Period (in percent)

	<u>Aug</u>	<u>Jan- Aug</u>	<u>State plan¹</u>
Centrally Administered Industries			
deliveries for:			
- domestic trade			
at wholesale prices	.	1.5	1.8
at retail prices	.	1.5	2.7
- export to socialist countries			
at wholesale prices	.	3.8	3.2
at f.o.b. prices	.	3.8	2.1
- export to nonsocialist countries			
at wholesale prices	.	-1.5	6.0
at f.o.b. prices	.	-5.4	2.0
- other sales for productive consumption and operations, at wholesale prices	.	1.4	.
volume of industrial production	0.5	2.9	2.6
average number of employees	0.5	0.6	0.7
labor productivity based on gross output	-0.0	2.3	1.9
Construction			
construction work performed with own personnel	1.0	2.6	2.9
average number of employees	0.7	0.6	1.1
labor productivity on construction's basic output	0.3	2.1	1.8
housing units delivered by contracting enterprises	-9.1	-14.3	-26.0
Procurement			
slaughter animals (including poultry)	-0.8	-0.9	-0.5
milk	1.1	1.2	-2.0
eggs	-1.5	-2.5	0.1
Retail Turnover			
main trade systems	-0.1	2.5	2.1
Foreign Trade			
export to socialist countries	.	2.1	-0.1
export to nonsocialist countries	.	-9.6	0.3
import from socialist countries	.	2.6	1.4
import from nonsocialist countries	.	8.9	15.8

1. Relative to actual 1985 results.

Labor productivity in industry, based on gross output, increased at a faster rate in January through August (index 102.3) than what the annual state plan calls for (101.9) for the entire year. The increase in the work force during this period was 0.6 percent, which is lower than the rate of increase in the annual plan (0.7 percent).

The planned tasks in marketing the industrial output were fulfilled well on the whole for January-August, in deliveries to practically all the principal

destinations; there was a shortfall in the economic plan's deliveries for export to nonsocialist countries, at wholesale prices. The most significant overfulfillment of the marketing plans occurred in deliveries for export to socialist countries. But here, too, fulfillment of the planned tasks was not quite even.

In construction, the volume of construction work that the construction enterprises performed with their own personnel increased by 1.0 percent in August over the same month last year. Average daily output increased by 5.8 percent. Fulfillment of the construction enterprises' planned production tasks was 99.1 percent in August.

In January through August, the volume of construction work in place increased by 2.6 percent over the same period last year (the annual state plan calls for a 2.9-percent increase); the average daily output in construction during the first eight months rose by 3.2 percent.

Fulfillment of the economic plans' volume of construction work that the enterprises performed with their own personnel was 100 percent for the first eight months, although 44 percent of the construction enterprises fell short of their production tasks for this period.

Based on the volume of construction work in place, labor productivity at the construction enterprises rose by 0.3 percent in August, and by 2.1 percent from the beginning of the year through the end of August, whereas the planned annual increase is 1.8 percent.

Adjusted value added in construction was 4.6 percent higher in January through August of this year than in the same period last year. Labor productivity based on adjusted value added rose by 4.1 percent. Fulfillment of adjusted value added in the construction enterprises' economic plans for this period was 100.5 percent, but again with shortfalls at more than 30 percent of the enterprises.

In housing construction, the contracting construction enterprises delivered 21,921 housing units to the local councils during January-August, which is 44.8 percent of their planned annual target.

In agriculture, fulfillment of the August procurement schedules for slaughter cattle, slaughter hogs, and eggs fell short, but the procurement schedules for slaughter poultry and milk were exceeded.

The January-August procurement schedules were overfulfilled for all principal livestock products, except slaughter hogs. During the first eight months, as compared with January-August 1985, the procurement of slaughter animals was lower by 1.2 percent (or 12,700 metric tons); and the procurement of eggs, by 2.5 percent (or 51.7 million eggs). But the procurement of slaughter poultry rose by 1.3 percent (or 2000 metric tons); and the procurement of milk, by 1.2 percent (or 50.8 million liters)..

The volume of freight hauled by public carriers in August was nearly 54 million metric tons, about 0.2 percent less than the same month last year. The August tasks in freight transportation were fulfilled 99.9 percent.

Overall fulfillment of the freight volume in the public carriers' economic plan for January through August was 100.9 percent. In all they hauled 428.7 million metric tons, 2.1 percent more than during the same period last year. At the same time, the average number of freight-car units loaded during a 24-hour period increased by 2.4 percent, and the average turnaround time per freight-car unit was shortened by 1.0 percent.

In domestic trade, the August retail turnover of the main trade systems remained practically at the same level as last year. During the first eight months, the main trade systems' retail turnover nearly reached 162 billion korunas, 2.5 percent more than in the same period last year.

The retail turnover's rise was the fastest at the following trade organizations: Industrial Goods Stores (by 5.4 percent), Department Stores (4.5 percent) and Shoes Stores (3.5 percent). Overall fulfillment of the retail turnover in the economic plans of the main trade systems' organizations was 100.3 percent. There were shortfalls at the following trade organizations: Food Stores, Fruit and Vegetable Stores, and Textile Stores.

In foreign trade in January-August, the growth rates of export to socialist countries, and of import from these countries, exceeded the growth rates specified in the state plan. At the end of August, fulfillment of the annual state plan's export to socialist countries was 62.4 percent; and of its import from socialist countries, 63.8 percent.

On 31 August, the amount of currency in circulation reached 59.5 billion korunas, 3.6 billion more than a year earlier.

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CSO: 2400/44

CAUSES OF FIRE DAMAGE IN SSR DISCUSSED

Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 29 Oct 86 p 1

[Editorial: "Fire Is a Good Servant, But . . ."]

[Excerpt] The mission and importance of fire protection are neither a new discovery nor a new fad, but an essential part of every new building. The more so in the economically advanced countries where large-scale farming and the rapid expansion of industries--with their new production technologies, high temperatures and pressures, and highly flammable raw materials--have geometrically increased the danger of fires. Czechoslovakia is likewise no exception. Last year alone, the 8755 fires on our territory killed 131 persons and injured 716. Fire caused 312.5 million korunas of property damage, and the consequential damage amounted to 210 million korunas. These figures speak for themselves. But the statistical reporting of consequential damage is incomplete. When a 50-year-old plant burns down, its remaining book value is small. But replacing the plant requires the construction of new buildings and the installation of new equipment, at costs several times greater. Not to mention the damage that the dropout of a single link causes in the chain of input-output relations.

Some ministries tend to offer statistics as proof that fire protection in "their" areas of responsibility has improved in recent years. Such arguments are unacceptable. For in the area of fire protection, we can hardly speak of an "improvement in the situation." The expression reeks of demagoguery, because the damage caused by fires, explosions and accidents is always needless damage, no matter how successful the economists may be in "objectivizing" the causes of the events. Under the 7th Five-Year Plan, in the SSR the state treasury had to write off more than 400 million korunas of damage caused by fires and accidents; 225 persons lost their lives, and 750 were injured. On average, the amount of damage each year is 7.5 million korunas more than under the 6th Five-Year Plan. Then how can we speak of an improvement?

The most serious is the fact that the causes of the fires remain practically the same, recurring year after year. Nearly three-fourths of all emergencies have human error as their common denominator. Negligence in the performance of duties, indifference, violations of operating instructions and technological discipline, and the belittling of hazards are the typical features of

accidents. At the all-Slovakia party aktiv on the questions of fire protection, held recently at the Duslo National Enterprise in Sala, Slovak Interior Minister Stefan Lazar called attention to the subjective nature of the causes of most fires. To illustrate, he used an example from the host enterprise. Only a few days before the aktiv was held, a fire broke out there, in a warehouse for agricultural chemicals. The cause of the fire was negligence in monitoring the temperature and moisture content of the stored products. It is paradoxical that in its instructions the producer, Duslo itself, warns customers about the danger of spontaneous combustion when the products are stored under unsuitable conditions. After the fire, the responsible manager issued appropriate instructions, but nobody carried them out. Thus, four days and another fire later, the enterprise added 2.5 million korunas to its loss column.

In sum, the situation regarding fire protection, training or even fire-fighting equipment cannot be regarded as satisfactory. The equipment of the fire brigades at many plants is inadequate considering the risks involved, and the protection of high-rise buildings is a serious flaw. Most items of specialized fire-fighting equipment have to be imported from capitalist countries. Admittedly, foreign exchange is scarce. But a cause of this unsatisfactory situation is also the pathological desire of some managers "to save at all cost." Our governing bodies also discussed these problems last year. Their resolutions provide the prerequisites for a substantial improvement in equipping the fire-fighting units, and presuppose wider cooperation with the CEMA countries. But experience shows that the most effective fire protection is prevention, a systems approach to protecting the citizens' property, life and health. The principle applies, or at least should apply, that fires must be prevented. Even the smallest fire can develop into a serious emergency.

The basic document from which we expected much for practical application was the Slovnaft National Enterprise's appeal to all productive and nonproductive organizations, for greater consistency in implementing the 1972 Resolution of the CPSL Central Committee's Presidium on Fires and Accidents in the National Economy. The political and economic management of Slovnaft, Bratislava, presented this appeal at the December 1982 all-Slovakia party political aktiv on these questions. The appeal reads in part: "A high level of technological and labor discipline, in the broadest sense, is one of the prerequisites for preventing undesirable emergencies. We also regard as especially important reinforcing the principle of the unity of the plan, production and protection, as an inseparable part of managerial work, because it points the way to intensifying the political and legal responsibility of the senior economic, technical and other workers, for the assets entrusted to their care." To date, 1400 organizations from entire Slovakia have joined Slovnaft's appeal. But to what extent has this initiative fulfilled our expectations? There are numerous indications that the approach of many organizations to joining the appeal is merely a perfunctory one, and that elaboration of the appeal at not one enterprise is merely paper shuffling that can be heard already from a distance. Judging by the results to date, the document has not had much effect on the awareness of top managers in particular, and at quite a few organizations not even the local party, trade-union or youth-union committees have devoted sufficient attention to the appeal. In

addition to perfecting the fire-alarm system and supplying the most modern technology to the fire brigades, therefore, the most comprehensive task remains changing the attitude and thinking of the managers and other workers. The Slovnaft National Enterprise's appeal has to be fleshed out with specific deeds, and transplanted into everyday life, so that its spirit becomes an inseparable part of the production tasks. A situation must be achieved such that the state of fire protection at any organization is evaluated as demanding as any mandatory indicator of the state plan. Thus the requirement that "everyone manages his own workplace" applies also here, with equal urgency.

To split a task into smaller ones means subjecting social practice to a thorough analysis. Stricter consideration of all violations of fire regulations, and the full enforcement of the possible sanctions seem inevitable. The new law on fire protection provides sufficient room for this. Thus primarily the okres administrations of fire brigades will have to master their new tasks with responsibility. But the most work awaits us in educating our future citizens and workers, from early childhood on. And not only because children under 15 caused 752 fires and 15.5 million korunas of damage in the SSR during the past five years, in the course of which over 20 children lost their lives. For it is best to inculcate in childhood a sense of responsibility for society's assets. Especially the Slovak Fire Fighters' Union has a wide range of duties in this area. The work in recent years of this 170,000-member voluntary organization can be evaluated favorably. Thanks to the hundreds of selfless officials and chapter heads, there is wide public awareness of fire protection. Nearly 4,000 student collectives and over 40,000 children participated in the "Flame" fire-fighting game this year alone. With the effective support of the Ministry of Education, this is a good foundation for the union's activity that produces results which extend at their summit beyond the republic's borders. But working with youths must remain a key task for the Fire Fighters' Union. It will be worth investigating especially why interest in union activity is noticeably lagging among youths in the 14 to 18 age group. Here the union is less successful and will therefore have to intensify its efforts, in cooperation with the Socialist Youth Union. For when a youth joins the work force, it is already too late to inculcate in him a sense of responsibility for protecting society's assets, and the lives and property of citizens.

1014
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POSTAL, TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW ESTABLISHES NEW PROVISIONS

East Berlin WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT in German Vol 17 No 3 (signed to press May 86)
pp 62-63

[Article by Dr Hans Rother: "On the New Postal and Telecommunications Law"]

[Text] On 1 May 1986, the postal and telecommunications law of 29 November 1985 went into effect. (Footnote 1) (Gbl [GDR Legal Gazette] I, No 31, p 345; see the service regulation in this regard of 29 November 1985 (Gbl I, No 31, p 345) and subsequent regulations (Gbl I 1985, Nos 8 to 12; Gbl Special Editions No 1267 and 1268) It forms the legal basis for ensuring that postal and telecommunications better fulfill the requirements of the national economy in the formation of developed socialist society. The law and its subsequent provisions aim at further perfecting the management and planning of postal and telecommunications in the GDR; legally establishing the status of postal and telecommunications in the system of production of socialist society; and developing more rapidly the efficiency of the postal and telecommunications system itself, as well as improving order, safety and discipline.

Baumann/Baecker have already elucidated the new legal provisions in detail. (Footnote 2) (S. Baumann, H. Baecker, "The Law on Postal and Telecommunications," NEUE JUSTIZ 7/86, p 285)

On Tasks, Legal Status of German Postal System

The operation of public postal and telecommunications in the GDR is the responsibility of the German Postal System alone. It is obligated to provide services adequate to the requirements of developed socialist society. The tasks, privileges and duties of the German Postal System have therefore been formulated in the postal and telecommunications law so that, based on the latest findings of science and technology, in the future:

--The conventional postal and telecommunications services will be able to be provided more efficiently and in better quality, as well as with greater utility for the public:

--Conditions will be created for new postal and telecommunications services, as for example in the field of data transmission and other modern postal and telecommunications services;

--The transmission of information and data for the fulfillment of manifold social telecommunications needs is effectively supported by new technologies.

The German Postal System has at its disposal considerable assets of the national economy. Essential features which characterize it as a structural element of the socialist national economy are:

--Portions of the national economy given to the German Postal System to be used and increased (resource holdings);

--Statutory independence (legal entity);

--Its own name;

--Its self-contained, relatively independent production system;

--Its use of the principles of economic accounting.

In the operation of public postal and long-distance communications and the distribution of printed matter, the German Postal System enters into legal relationships with economic entities. These legal relationships are of an economic-legal nature.

The German Postal System's legal relationships with economic entities result, for example, when, with its scientific-technical facilities, it influences the development of communications technology. Thus, the production of radio facilities, landline telephone facilities and telecommunications equipment, which are designed for connection into the German Postal System's telecommunications network or for operations in cooperation with it, must be approved by the German Postal System. The importation of telecommunications elements and equipment which are to be installed into the German Postal System's telecommunications network or are to operate in conjunction with it, also requires permission of the authorized scientific-technical agencies of the German Postal System. In addition, legal relationships result when nonpublic postal and telecommunications of economic entities are carried out over postal and telecommunications facilities which are financed through their resource holdings. This applies to so-called in-house mail, in-house telephoning, and data transmission on the premises of an enterprise, etc.

In postal and telecommunications over the postal and telecommunications facilities of the German Postal System, the economic entities are contractual partners of the German Postal System in regards to the services and conditions of service as established in the postal and telecommunications law. The respective legal relationships are, in accordance with Article 1, Paragraph 2 of the law of contracts, legally regulated economic relations, and the German Postal System, as public institution, is a contractual partner according to Article 2, Paragraph 2 of the law of contracts.

In the operation of public postal and telecommunications the economic entities and their authorized representatives deal with the local operating elements of the German Postal System and their employees. The latter, however, are not the contracting party of the legally regulated economic relations; rather, the German Postal System in its entirety is the legal partner.

On Individual Arrangements

Article 5 of the law on postal and telecommunications establishes norms for the German Postal System's cooperation with local state organs for the improvement of postal and telecommunications service to enterprises. Long-range postal and telecommunications designs for the provision of postal and telecommunications services within the nation's territory are coordinated with the district and county councils, and the Postal System's plans must, for approval, be in accordance with the provisions for national development plans.

Telecommunications networks exist in industry which fall within economic entities' resources jurisdiction. The coordination of these networks with the German Postal System's telecommunications network is effected in the government Commission for Telecommunications Networks.

The issuance of permits allowing participation in telecommunications is the responsibility of the German Postal System. This applies to public and non-public telecommunications traffic in accordance with Paragraph 12 of the law and the operating regulations issued in this regard. There are connection permits for such things as participation in public telecommunications, the construction, modification and operation of landline telecommunications installations for nonpublic telecommunications, and the construction and operation of radio facilities.

The reckless damaging of postal and telecommunications equipment, disturbing telecommunications by harmful interference, violating permit requirements, and obstructing the German Postal System's employees in the exercise of their rights of maintenance, result in legal disciplinary measures. Citations and fines in amounts ranging from M10 to M500 are levied by the directors of the German Postal System's district administrations, postal and telecommunications offices, telegraph offices, central post offices, or by other authorized representatives of the minister for post and telecommunications. The hearing is conducted according to the provisions of the 12 January 1968 law for the prosecution of misdemeanors. (Footnote 3) (Gbl I, No 3, p 101)

Article 38, Paragraph 2 of the postal and telecommunications law amends the penal code. A third paragraph for the prevention of reckless interference with telecommunications traffic was added to Article 204 of the penal code. In accordance with it, negligent actions by workers in industry, agriculture, and especially the construction trades, which are undertaken in intentional violation of legal or professional obligations and which result in the disturbance, damage, or inoperability of postal and telecommunications facilities and thereby impede the flow of telecommunications, are subject to criminal penalties. The fact of reckless interference with telecommunications is therefore of a different legal nature than violations against the regulations for the protection of under and aboveground telecommunications landlines which are classified as misdemeanors in the regulations for the protection of telecommunications. (Footnote 4) (Work regulation of 28 February 1986 on the protection of under and aboveground landline telecommunications of the German Postal System--Telecommunications Protection Regulation--(Gbl 1, No 12, p 163))

For the systematic preparation and operation of postal and telecommunications, the right of coequal utilization of properties, structures and building sites for the systematic preparation and operation of postal and telecommunications traffic is established by Article 20 of the German Postal System legal code. The previously valid provision, which viewed the matter of utilization as an administrative decision, was cancelled and the issue is now considered in terms of contractually agreed-upon co-utilization. The contractual agreement with economic entities is regulated in accordance with the building site law. (Footnote 5) (Law of 15 June 1984 on the acquisition of properties for construction undertakings (Gbl I, No 17, p 201)) If a contractual agreement is not arrived at in an individual instance, the German Postal System can, upon petitioning the county council, order the co-utilization. In justified cases the contractual agreement is created by order of the local governmental authority. This order may be contested. The law and its compliance provisions include extensive provisions for appeal and regulations regarding material liability in cases of claims against the German Postal System. Article 34 of the law stipulates that economic entities' claims against the German Postal System can, as a rule, be advanced in State Contract Court with the exception of those cases included in Paragraph 2 of Article 34.

The claims which economic entities can advance are cited in the compliance provisions. In cases where the German Postal System is to pay compensation, petition to conduct legal proceedings is to be made to the State Contract Court if the German Postal System refuses to tender compensation.

In conclusion it can be said that, on the basis of the new postal and telecommunications law, favorable conditions have been created to even better utilize postal and telecommunications, as an important element of productivity and efficiency in socialist society, for the increase of operational efficiency.

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RAMIFICATIONS OF NEW LAW GOVERNING PRIVATE SECTOR

Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP in Hungarian 9 Oct 86 p 5

[Article by Lenke Elek: "The Silent Partner Stayed in the Background; New Laws Governing Private Merchants--Prohibitions and Continued Permissions"]

[Text] A new Order that modifies the Domestic Commerce Law as well as the existing Order governing private merchants went into effect on October 1. This article describes the most important changes that affect private merchants.

Previously, the Order governing private merchants did not specifically mention that a merchant may engage in rendering services to foreign tourists. The new Order emphasizes this fact. But the public is more interested in a new provision that requires private merchants to be professionally qualified in their fields of business, and this requirement may be waived only on rare occasions. As a matter of background one must realize that in the past, many private businesses have been run by silent partners--one had the money, the other the expertise. These two factors will not merge into one person just because of the new legal provisions. It could be expected, however, that more civil law partnerships [PJT] will be formed, because within PJT-s it is not necessary for each partner to possess expert qualifications. This fact, however, will tend to increase the workload of councils and of the courts, because PJT-s carry financial responsibility. This fact was brought out by the National Free Organization of Retailers [KISOSZ]. On the other hand, PJT-s will also have to pay partnership taxes and their members will have to share the profits.

Ice-cream Parlors, Athletic Fields

The fields of business open to private merchants have also been changed. "Ice cream parlor" is the designation of a new field of business. Obviously, many privately owned pastry shops have sold ice cream before, but now this field of endeavour acquires a new designation. It is noteworthy that alcoholic beverages may not be sold in ice cream parlors.

A truly nouveau provision permits private businessmen to operate athletic facilities, such as skating rinks and sports equipment rental shops. In theory even a swimming pool could be established and operated by a private businessman.

While enlarging the areas of endeavour for private merchants, the Order provides for some new limitations. For example, a private merchant must personally participate in his business. This requirement is linked to the professional qualification criteria also. Permits to conduct private business may be issued only after having satisfied the respective council that the proposed location for doing business is suitable for the kind of business for which a permit is being applied for. As mentioned before, the sale of alcoholic beverages requires a permit from different authorities. Permits to sell alcoholic beverages that have already been issued by the police may be revoked by councils in the event that a council repeatedly finds the absence of civilized conditions for the consumption of alcoholic beverages. Grounds for revoking permits to sell alcoholic beverages include the disturbance of peace and the public order. Henceforth the hours of business for private merchants will be specified in the permits issued by councils. This provision is supply-oriented, and serves the interest of public convenience. The councils will enforce the punctual opening of private businesses also. In some instances private retail businesses may be jointly operated with small trade, especially in areas where such services are not being provided otherwise.

Within given fields of business, councils may mandate private merchants to carry certain products, such as milk and bread. On the other hand, councils may also permit private merchants to carry products that are not within their field of business! Henceforth, requirements for small restaurateurs will indicate what they cannot purchase. Previously they were told what they may purchase. All this seems like a formality, nevertheless it represents expansion. It suggests that the local councils' scope of authority will increase--and so will the opportunity for corruption, if local councils do not increase their expert staff as well as their pay.

The "Victoria" Example

Local councils must revoke the permits of private merchants upon discovering circumstances that would void the permit or would exclude the possibility of conducting the authorized business activity. An article by ministerial assistant division director dr Laszlo Drabik (COMMERCIAL REVIEW, No 9) exemplifies this situation in the context of a private boarding house that was not classified within any business category. Tamas Zorandi, chief executive of the National Tourist Office [OIH] mentions examples of fraudulently obtained certificates of good moral character, and of professional qualifications. It certainly must have been the "Victoria" case that provided ground for the boarding house example. A new restriction provides that the area of a camping ground may not exceed 12,000 square meters. Twelve-thousand square meters constitute quite a large area--some 500 people may raise tents there--but the line had to be drawn somewhere with respect to the size of land that may be leased and with respect to private investment.

Let us review the changes that affect employees. The limitation to a maximum of 12 employees, including "helpers" and family members, remains unchanged, but with respect to restaurants, hired musicians will not be considered as employees. One may not become a private merchant if he has current debts stemming from contractual operations or from inventory shortages. Councils may revoke permits in cases where employees or family members have been convicted for crimes against the economy or criminal offenses involving property. Similarly, permits may be revoked if those employed have been penalized for three rule violations within a two year period, and provided that such employment has not been terminated within eight months from date of receipt of the applicable determination. The fact that penalties for violations against individual employees within a given business will be viewed collectively in the context of the business itself, represents a tightening of the rules.

The provision that prohibits the advertisement of alcoholic beverages and of tobacco products, as well as of any materials that are harmful to the environment, affects private merchants also. Provisions concerning products and materials that are harmful to the environment are still vague. Councils may prohibit the use of certain names under which businesses operate, provided that such names are contrary to law. In other words: only Hungarian terms, or foreign terms that have been accepted as part of the Hungarian language may be used to designate businesses. Foreign words may only be used if Hungarian equivalents cannot be found. (This wave of "hungarianization" will be somewhat hard to swallow ...) The interests of foreign tourism must also be taken into consideration, and one should expect that state and cooperative enterprises will be subject to the same standards.

The role of KISOSZ is being strengthened by the Order. Henceforth revocation of private merchant permits may be initiated at the level of KISOSZ. At first sight this appears to be a surprising move--after all KISOSZ represents the interests of private merchants. But it is in everyone's interest to separate weed from grass, and to protect the larger interest of consumers. Henceforth KISOSZ too may participate in the framing of legal provisions, by articulating such interests. Hopefully they may also object to certain provisions.

There Is a Need for It

As stated by the ministry spokesman: "the confidence of private merchants in government must be strengthened through governmental action. We must endeavour to establish standard conditions for their participation in market competition." This is a significant idea, but as of today only the term "endeavour" is applicable. It is well known that private merchants are not authorized to engage in a number of very important activities. Several products may not be acquired by private merchants the way cooperatives may acquire the same products. Private merchants may not engage in wholesaling, and, as of recently, they may not conduct auctions in order not to raise prices, and so forth and so on. We could continue with this list.

And yet it is important to state that there is a long-term need for honorable privately operated small businesses. True, we seldom emphasize the term "honorable" with respect to enterprises and cooperatives.

PRIVATE SECTOR TAXATION: PROBLEMS, IMPROVEMENTS REVEALED

Budapest NEPSZAVA in Hungarian 10 Oct 86 p 5

[Article and interview with Imre Fekete, small merchant, President, Heating Fuel and Building Materials Section (Section), National Free Organization of Retailers (KISOSZ); Attila Keszthelyi, private merchant, member of the executive board of the KISOSZ Section; Janos Tivadar, private merchant and Secretary of the KISOSZ Section; by Laszlo Deaki: "An equitable share of the public burden; how do private merchants pay their taxes?"]

[Text] Taxes. Door taxes, estate taxes, war taxes, one-forint taxes, land taxes, house taxes, and so on and so forth. These concepts are of historic proportion, designating particular practices by which the public burden has been shared at various points in time. Yes, shared, even though for long periods of time the nobility had been tax exempt. Tax exempt all the way to the mid-19th century.

Taxation is the practice of our days also. But today it applies to all citizens, irrespective of their individual status. Among other things, taxation serves the purpose that tax objects--in plain Hungarian: tax payers--pay their proportionate share of public expenditures in a manner directly dependent on their real income, and that their contribution to defray the public burden shall be dependent upon their personal gain. In practice, however, these principles do not always prevail. The case of private merchants provides an example.

Personal relations with authorities

[FEKETE] Many, many contradictions had aggravated the small merchants' difficulties. Estimates had played an almost determinative role in the establishment of tax assessments, and so did certain subjective factors, which, in some instances raised, in others decreased the values. It did happen: everything hinged upon whether a particular person--I should say-- was on good terms with the authorities.

[DEAKI] Are you talking about bribes?

[FEKETE] Let's just call it 'connections'. The other thing is that the authorities were not likely to accept tax returns, papers that indicated a decrease in sales volume, and thus a decreased income. They took into consideration those items only that could be expressed in forints, and disregarded the fact that in the meantime prices had gone up and that expenses too had increased. In other words, it has happened that the sales volume leveled out or shrunk, but the actual gross income remained the same or even showed an increase. And this way the taxes increased too. The proof provided had not always been compared with the tax returns, so as to ascertain whether they were correct. Accordingly, in a sense we were at the mercy of the previous [now defunct] partnership in communal taxation of Budapest, and at the ultimate level, of KISOSZ. We were at the mercy of the very group that represents our interests, because in an economic sense the former belonged to the latter.

[DEAKI] Could you have appealed?

[KESZTHELYI] Indeed, we could have, but only within the same circle, and only with respect to estimates and to the legality of the assessments. There is no flawless practice with respect to tax returns. One cannot establish figures that are accurate to the penny regarding amortization, machines, buildings, and the deterioration of tools. This is similar to calculating the necessary empty run of a truck before and after loading and delivery, etc. Their prevailing principle had been that in this field of commerce the volume of sales cannot decrease. It cannot decrease even if the volume shows a real decrease. It happened for instance that one of the merchants changed his location. He lost his shirt and pants in the transition and it was August when he was able to start again. In spite of a decrease in volume, his tax base had been raised to the level of the previous year.

Itemized list

[TIVADAR] Merchants are very sensitive with respect to sales volume, income, and ultimately to the extent of taxation, because the amount of their social security contribution depends on these factors. If one factor increases, the other factor increases also.

[FEKETE] It increases by rather substantial amounts. Business has been slower than usual last year, so we decided to close down unless the tax issue is resolved. The tax rules are good. Although the rate of progression is steep, there is nothing we can do about it. The one who works can earn a decent living. There are flaws in employment practices. Documentation prepared by the Mineral Oils Commercial Enterprise [AFOR] and by the Fuel and Building Material Trade Enterprise [TUZEP] had been submitted last year to the new secretary of the partnership in communal taxation. We provided itemized data showing who purchased how much from AFOR and TUZEP for purposes of resale. One of the financial executives did not want to even consider the documentation. He did not want to, simply because, one might guess, he was finished with the assessments based upon estimates, based upon the previous year's practice. Secretary dr Lajos Krizsa, however, saw to it to have the data compared, so as to achieve correct levels of taxation. And so, the things that happened before could not happen again. It cannot happen again

that based upon identical, or at least similar sales volume and income one of our colleagues paid 120,000 forints in taxes, while the other paid more than twice that amount.

[TIVADAR] The sum total of last year's taxes has barely changed. The change took place with respect to the distribution of taxes. The facts speak for themselves. In tax year 1984, 57 percent appealed their taxes. Last year only 9.6 percent appealed. Our aim is to achieve that the actual volume, income and tax of each merchant be examined each and every year. Based on correct data.

[FEKETE] We believe that personal and institutional conditions for such examinations now exist. The new system, the changes are accessible, and the guarantee for good practice, or, perhaps a better practice may be a continuous dialog between tax authorities and social organizations.

[DEAKI] The picture would not be complete if we would fail to state that as of July 1, the Capital City Tax Office, an independent institution, took the place of the partnership in communal taxation. Dr Krizsa is its deputy director. The work of this Office affects 8,000 small merchants, and some 25-27,000 small tradesmen.

[FEKETE] Social organizations participate in the establishment of levels of taxation. In this manner, the merchants' organization that is supposed to comment upon and to establish levels of taxation is also participating. That organization has been elected on the basis of democratic principles. As a first step the Office is supposed to establish taxes, in due consideration of positions developed by the respective organizations. There is an opportunity for social organizations to make recommendations with respect to the tax base of those who pay their taxes in advance. There are no problems if they agree on the amounts. If they do not agree, a committee established to determine the taxes will decide. The assessment, however, may be appealed at several levels.

According to new principles

[DEAKI] This seems to be quite complicated. A layman would think that an accurate tax assessment could be made on the basis of bills and accounting.

[FEKETE] Seemingly things are this complicated because, for example, the records of purchases from private persons cannot always be traced. The accounting discipline is rather weak in this respect. Incidentally, this is not at all characteristic with respect to building materials. It is no coincidence that appeals occurred only occasionally. It is our goal to put an end to anomalies in every field. The on the spot acquisition and provision of data must be expanded, because this is the only method by which volumes of sale can be controlled. The Office will do a good job only if merchants can feel the positive effects of reorganization. These effects should be felt as soon as possible.

[DEAKI] Dr Krizsa has indicated that his Office does not have an "income" perspective: the fulfillment of an income quota is not an expectation. In other words they do not endeavour to make the private sector pay more taxes. Instead, they endeavour to achieve that everyone in the private sector pay an equitable share of the public burden, based upon a realistic ratio between sales volumes and levels of profit.

After all, the ultimate goal is to expand private commercial activities so that public demands be better satisfied.

12995
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CHANGES IN RURAL PERSONAL CONSUMPTION PATTERNS, 1980-1984

Warsaw WIES WSPOLCZESNA in Polish No 7, Jul 86 pp 59-66

[Article by Bozena Gulbicka: "Consumption on Private Peasant Farms"]

[Text] The aim of this study is to present the changes occurring in the level and structure of consumption on private peasant farms during the years 1980-1984. During that period peasant families attained a higher quantitative and qualitative level of food consumption than did urban families, owing to the resources of their own farms. On the other hand, their access to nonfood goods is not as good. Hence, the consumption of nonfood consumer goods in peasant families has declined markedly.

The basis for this analysis is the records of farms on which bookkeeping is maintained. To be sure, farms with bookkeeping represent a special group in research analyses, because the structure of that group diverges from the structure of farms as a whole in Poland. It contains a higher proportion of larger farms, and the average farm in that group is economically stronger than the statistical average farm in this country. In 1984 16.5 percent of the farms with bookkeeping exceeded 15 hectares in area, whereas for the country as a whole the proportion of such large farms was barely 5.4 percent. In 1984 12.7 percent of the farms with bookkeeping were no larger than 3 hectares, whereas for the country as a whole this proportion was 31.2 percent.

Although the economic performance of the farms with bookkeeping is superior to the nationwide average, and hence they are not representative of the whole, they do mirror clearly the trends under investigation.

Consumption problems are closely linked to production problems on peasant farms. Farm bookkeeping data provide an overall picture of the economics of a private peasant farm, and family budgets are part of such studies. As a result, it is possible to gain a true picture of consumption in that group of households.

Dynamics and Division of Incomes

Incomes of farm families derive from two sources: the farm itself and outside the farm. The chief source is farm income, whose percentile share in personal income was as follows in individual years: in 1981, 75.3 percent; in 1982,

79.7 percent; in 1983, 74.3 percent; and in 1984, 74.4 percent (in current prices).

The disposition of incomes in peasant households is determined by the consumption and production needs of these households. Personal income is ultimately divided into two parts: consumption and accumulation. A large part of the latter is spent on augmenting productive capital.

Longterm analyses of the economic situation of farms with bookkeeping point to the genuine interest of farmers in their production facilities. This is demonstrated by the growth of the share of accumulation in income. The present analysis corroborates the pattern, characteristic of private farms, of a direct relationship between rise or decline in income and definite changes in its structure. Thus, as incomes rise, accumulation and consumption rise also, but accumulation increases at a faster rate than consumption. In its turn, a decline in incomes is accompanied by an even greater decline in accumulation whereas consumption then fluctuates only slightly. In the presence of a decline in their incomes, peasants have been trying to maintain their previous level of consumption.

In 1981 personal incomes (in 1982 prices) increased by 48 percent over the preceding year; at the same time consumption increased by 6.5 percent and accumulation by 288 percent. In 1982 personal incomes declined by 25.6 percent, which entailed a 50-percent decline in accumulation and a 10.3 percent decline in consumption. In 1983 personal incomes decreased by an additional 5.3 percent but consumption remained at previous year's level. In 1984 personal incomes increased by 6.3 percent, consumption by 2.4 percent, and accumulation by 21 percent.

The varying pace of changes in income, accumulation, and consumption during the period under investigation ultimately resulted in a relatively higher share of accumulation than consumption. This would point to the inclination of peasants to protect accumulation during the period of the crisis. In the years 1980-1984 personal income per farm at farms with bookkeeping increased by 10.7 percent (in 1982 prices), consumption declined by 2.0 percent, and accumulation grew by 84.9 percent. The supply of consumer goods continued to be poor, and their high prices and low quality restricted the growth of consumption. At the same time, farmers, being guided by the interests of the farm as a whole in view of the rising prices of machinery and other investment goods, must accumulate more money for their future expenses. (Footnote) (The rise of savings and disposable income represents part of accumulation on farms with bookkeeping.)

Despite the crisis, no large-scale decapitalization of fixed capital has been observed on farms. During that period, expanded reproduction was even undertaken owing to increased supplies of machinery to the nonsocialized sector. Outlays on machinery and implements were higher than their depreciation rates. A somewhat different situation occurred in farm construction. Owing to the feed shortage, farmers began to raise fewer hogs and poultry, and hence the construction of livestock pens ceased to be an urgent problem.

In housing construction the situation was somewhat better. But in this field too the investment rate has been slow, although it was higher than in farm construction.

Savings at peasant households declined during the 1980-1984 period, even at times of decline in real incomes (1982 and 1983). Such disposable funds represent deferred demand for means of production and consumption. For the rise in the prices of investment goods prompts farms to increase savings. To be sure, loans provided some financial assistance. But the resulting indebtedness of farms has been rising at a slower rate than savings. Thus, the amount of savings in banks per farm with bookkeeping in 1984 was nearly three times as high as in 1980, and there was fourfold as much cash on hand as in 1980, while farm indebtedness increased insignificantly.

Changes in Structure of Consumption

The level of per capita consumption in peasant households nominally increased by 244.1 percent in the years 1980-1984, but if allowance is made for the rise in the prices of goods and services, it actually declined by 0.9 percent (in 1982 prices). Real per capita consumption during that period was as follows: in 1980, 80,500 zloty; in 1981, 87,500 zloty; in 1982, 77,900 zloty; in 1983, 77,500 zloty; and in 1984, 79,800 zloty.

This period is characterized by soaring increases in the prices of goods and services. During the years 1980-1984 the prices of consumer goods and services as a whole increased by 247.7 percent; the prices of food derived from the peasant's own farm (close to procurement prices), by 226.9 percent; and the prices of purchased food, by 273 percent. As for the prices of nonfood goods and services, they increased by 229.3 percent.

Peasant households did not attain a higher level of consumption owing to the reduced supply of nonfood consumer goods and marked increases in their prices, and also owing to a high level of savings, chiefly with the object of acquiring liquid capital for future purchases of investment goods.

As for the changes in the structure of consumption during 1980-1984, they consisted in an increased share of food in the family budget -- 46.1 percent in 1984 versus 42.7 percent in 1980 (in current prices). At the same time, the nature of food consumption changed: the consumption of food from one's own farm (natural consumption) increased, while the consumption of purchased food grew slightly. It is worth noting that the 20 years preceding the years under consideration had been a period of decline in the share of natural consumption of food in overall consumption and rise in the share of food purchased outside.

In recent years, expenditures on nonfood consumer goods and services have been accounting for about 40 percent of the peasant family budget. However, the available variety of nonfood consumer goods is poor. The low quality of the available goods and their high prices simplify the structure of purchases.

A number of disadvantageous trends pointing to a deterioration in the living standards of peasant families can be gleaned from data reflecting changes in

the structure of consumption on farms with bookkeeping during 1980-1984. They include chiefly the steady decline in expenditures on culture, education, hygiene, and health during that period. Compared with the 1970's, in which the expenditures on these purposes had been low anyway, these expenditures decreased even more -- by about 20 and 25 percent. Until 1982 the share of alcohol in the peasant family budget increased steadily (by 50 percent), but subsequently it fell back to its initial level. The rate of expenditures on durable consumer good was low: their share in peasant family budget decreased to 1.3 percent in 1984 [as published] from 2.0 percent in 1980, whereupon it again increased in 1984 to 2.0 percent. The supply of these goods was limited, and their high prices also were not without significance; besides, the ownership of certain durable consumer goods (chiefly black-and-white television sets and radios) had already been high. In 1984 the situation improved somewhat, and the supply of certain durable consumer goods increased, but their quality was very low. To be sure, during 1980-1984, the ownership of television sets, radios, washing machines, refrigerators, vacuum cleaners, sewing machines, and passenger cars per 100 households increased somewhat, but there still were too few color television sets and automatic washing machines. In nonfarm households (per 100) there were three times as many of these appliances. Part of durable consumer goods has been used in peasant households for many years. Hence, a high replacement demand by peasant households is to be expected.

Food Consumption

During 1980-1984 food consumption displayed the same trends as in the 1960's and 1970's. Namely, the proportion of starchy foods decreased and the proportion of foods containing animal proteins increased.

On peasant farms with bookkeeping the consumption of meat and processed meat products [per family member] increased to 56.4 kg in 1984 from 51.5 kg in 1980, while the consumption of milk, dairy products, and fish decreased. On the other hand, the consumption of hog fats increased markedly. Butter consumption decreased during 1980-1984.

Within the group of carbohydrate products, the consumption of processed grain products decreased markedly. Compared with 1980, it declined by 15 kg per person in 1983, and its level was 103 kg [annually] in 1984 [as published], whereupon it rose to 116 kg in 1984. Potato consumption stabilized at the level of 160 kg. Sugar consumption, following a decline during 1981-1983, reached the level of 25.1 kg per person annually in 1984. A particularly low level of sugar consumption is recorded for 1981 -- barely 17.7 kg per person annually. This decline was, as known, due to the cut in sugar rationing by an average of 40 percent. During the years 1982-1984 sugar consumption rose again owing to an increase in rationed allocations for consumers and in norms for sugar beet producers.

Analysis of the dietary level of peasant families during 1980-1984 indicates that their food needs were quantitatively met. This was reflected in the stabilization of the caloric value of the food consumed (about 3,400 cal). During that period, overall protein consumption remained at a more or less stable level (87.6 to 89.6 grams per person daily). In the consumption of

animal protein (about 51 grams daily) the proportion of meat protein increased (to 39.0 from 32.8 percent), while the proportion of protein from milk and dairy products decreased (to 47.9 from 53.4 percent).

An assessment of the dietary level at the farms selected for this study reveals an excessively high consumption of animal fats (excluding butter) and eggs and, at the same time, low consumption of vegetables, vegetable fats, and fish. This evokes reservations.

In the years 1980-1984 peasant families attained a satisfactory level of nutrition owing to the growth of their natural consumption. They set aside for their own food needs a substantial part of their final output. This part increased to 24.2 percent in 1983 compared with 1980, but in 1984 it decreased to 22.5 percent.

During the crisis a larger part of food consumption was in the form of natural consumption, especially as regards meat and animal fats. In previous decades, natural consumption had been gradually giving way to consumption of purchased foods. In its time this process was regarded as a sign of the modernization of consumption. It was also a premise of the consumption policy in the 1970's. In the 1970's such "denaturalization" applied only to certain products, namely, processed grain products, meat and processed meat products, pork fats, and butter. At present the natural consumption of these products has increased.

In the 1980's the consumption of meat, processed meat products, and pork fats in peasant households was, owing to their greater self-sufficiency, higher than in other family groups. Private farmers received ration coupons for meat only during the harvesting season, as well as lower rations of butter and fats. Thus, since the early 1980's, and owing to economic difficulties, consumption policy has been based on the premise of growth in natural consumption.

Surveys of family budgets conducted by the Main Office of Statistics indicate that the consumption of meat and processed meat products in the households of nonrural families in 1984 was 52.8 kg per person annually, and the overall consumption of fats, 15.6 kg. Caloric intake was likewise lower in nonrural families than in peasant families, amounting to about 2,800 calories daily. Similarly, their protein consumption was lower -- 76 grams (of which 47 grams of animal protein). Comparisons of consumption in both family groups indicate that in 1984 meat consumption per person on peasant farms with bookkeeping was 6.8 percent higher than in nonrural families; fat consumption, 5.8 percent higher; caloric intake, 21.4 percent higher; and protein intake, 18 percent higher (animal protein intake, 8.5 percent higher).

In these years, which have been years of crisis to the entire economy, peasant families attained a higher dietary level than other groups of families. Their ready access to food promoted growth in consumption. Good nutrition acquired in the countryside an importance close to that of owning durable consumer goods.

Consumption on Peasant Farms of Varying Area

Differences in level of consumption among peasant farms occupying differing areas of land are not large. At the same time, it should be borne in mind that

the land area of a private farm affects tremendously its economics. And hence also it is not only the size of a farm's income that determines the consumption level on private peasant farms. Here mention could be made of various factors that equalize the differences in consumption level on farms of differing size. On larger farms net output increases at a slower rate, and farm income increases at an even slower rate. This trend reflects the rapid growth of the scale of social expenditures (and especially of wages for hired labor). Even more equalized is personal income, i.e., farm income plus nonfarm income, which decreases with increase in area of farm.

Personal income on private farms is divided into two parts: consumption and accumulation. But on small farms the share of consumption in personal income is greater than on large farms. Owing to their greater production-related needs, large farms must accumulate a greater part of personal income than small farms. As the size of a farm increases, the share of accumulation in personal income rises from 11.7 percent for farms measuring up to 3 hectares in area to 40.9 percent for farms measuring 15 and more hectares in area (in 1984).

Owing to the operation of these factors, the consumption level per farm for the group of farms measuring 15 and more hectares in area is only 106 percent higher than in the group of farms measuring up to 3 hectares in area (659,000 and 320,000 zloty, respectively), although farm income in the former group is greater by a factor of 5.9 than in the latter (1,023,000 and 172,000 zloty, respectively).

A more explicit equalization of differences is observable when investigating the consumption level per family member. For family size increases with size of farm, from 3.21 persons on farms of up to 3 hectares in area to 5.0 persons on farms of more than 15 hectares in area. By the same token, the gap in consumption per family member between small and large farms decreases to 33 percent (132,000 and 99,800 zloty, respectively).

The structure of consumption on small farms as compared with large farms differs chiefly with respect to the share of food in the household budget. This share decreases with increase in size of farm, whereas all other expenditures increase.

The larger the farm the more diverse the changes in food consumption. The consumption of products in the carbohydrate group (except sugar) decreases slowly with increase in farm size, and the consumption of milk and dairy products displays the same trend.

By contrast, the consumption of meat and animal fats (except butter) clearly increases with increase in farm size. Its level is largely determined by the farm's production level.

The larger the farm the higher the caloric value of the daily diet and its content of protein and sugar. The quality of the diet does not differ markedly, with the exception of fats. Their proportion is too high from the standpoint of health, especially on the larger farms.

In analyses of consumption problems in peasant households the differences in consumption level within groups of farms of the same size can hardly be overlooked. These differences are considerable, especially on farms measuring 15 and more hectares in area. A decisive factor here is the number of persons in a family. Consumption level in large peasant families is low, regardless of the area of land cultivated. Such large-family households derive incomes that are below average for the given group of farms of similar size, and their productive assets, especially machinery and implements, are lower. At the same time, many of households strive to augment their productive assets, chiefly machinery and implements. They often succeed in this by limiting their food consumption levels, especially the levels of consumption from their own farms.

It is noteworthy that the farms with high consumption levels have a higher production capital. They thus attain higher productivity and incomes, and at the same time they manage to set aside funds for investments and consumption. Interest in developing the farm and modernizing it is much smaller on farms measuring up to 3 hectares in area. This is demonstrated by the negative accumulation on these farms, on which the consumption level is the highest. On these farms also the consumption level is greatly influenced by nonfarm income. A condition for a further increase in consumption level at peasant households which derive their living from farming is an increase in capital outlays on production and facilities as well as an increase in labor productivity.

The 1980's brought not only a decline in consumption level at peasant households but also tremendous changes in the structure of consumption: a substantial increase in the share of food in the family budget, a return to natural consumption of food, and a decline in expenditures on culture and housing.

Disposable income, which represents deferred demand for consumer goods and means of agricultural production, is increasing in peasant households year after year. The shortages of consumer goods and their very high prices (e.g., those of books) unfortunately promote unfavorable changes in the structure of consumption, hindering the development of higher needs.

The shortage of not just luxuries but also staple consumer goods has forced peasant families to limit their expenditures on these goods. At the same time, in order to maintain their previous level and quality of diet during the crisis period, peasant families have increased their natural consumption. The proportions between self-sufficiency and outside purchases have changed.

The consumption structure that evolved during the years 1980-1984 represents a return to the consumption model that had existed in the early 1970's, except that the dietary level became quantitatively and qualitatively higher owing to the increase in the consumption of food from the farm itself. In their overwhelming majority, peasant families show no inclination to "save on food." A reduction in the consumption of, e.g., meat and fats with the object of increasing their sales yields cash profits that are too modest, especially when compared with the rising prices of machinery, building materials, and

means of agricultural production. Thus, a continuing rise in the on-the-farm consumption of food is to be expected, along with the evolution of a model of consumption in which meat replaces milk and dairy products. The position of meat has become even more perpetuated owing to the rise in natural consumption. These trends in food consumption are present on farms as a whole regardless of size.

1386

CSO: 2600/30

COUNTRY'S ECONOMIC-SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT EXAMINED

Bucharest REVISTA ECONOMICA in Romanian No 34, 21 Aug 86 pp 7-9

[Article by Nicolae Ionescu, director general of the Central Directorate of Statistics: "Accomplishments of Historic Importance in Economic and Social Development"]

[Text] The great victory in August 1944 created the conditions for Romania's steady advance along the path of socialism, the making of radical changes in all fields of economic and social life, the forging of a new, free life, and the affirmation of national independence and sovereignty. As Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu, the party's secretary general and country's president, stressed in the speech given at the solemn gathering organized on the occasion of the 65th anniversary of the creation of the Romanian Communist Party, "In a relatively short historical period..., our country has gone through various historical stages of development. From an agrarian country with poorly developed industry and backward agriculture--about which the bourgeois-landlord ruling circles said that it had to remain a predominantly agricultural country--Romania has been turned into an industrial-agrarian country with strong, modern industry, equipped mostly with the most advanced technology, and with socialist agriculture in full swing."

The whole set of profound changes that occurred in the period of the forging of socialism's technical-material base and of the implementation of unitary socialist production relations assumed a strong form especially in the years that followed the ninth congress, when the people's most beloved son, Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu, was chosen to head the party. Through the amazing successes that our people have obtained in building the new society in this period, it is, with good reason, going down as the most glorious period in our whole existence, which, with utmost respect, we all call the Ceausescu Era.

The balance sheet of the remarkable successes obtained in all fields of material and spiritual life in the years of socialist construction is graphically illustrated by the evolution of the main indicators of economic and social development in comparison with 1950, a year which marks, roughly speaking, the restoration of the economy's level before the war and which, at the same time, constituted the basis from which we started in preparing the first 5-year plan for developing the country (Table 1).

Table 1. The Main Indicators of the Country's Economic and Social Development

Indicator	(1950 = 100)	
	1965	1985
Population	116.7	130.3
Employed population	115.6	126.4
Number of worker personnel	203	361
National income	413	18-fold
Industrial production	649	40-fold
Construction-assembly production	600	21-fold
Gross agricultural output	193	415
Volume of investments	748	33-fold
Existing fixed assets	223	12-fold
Labor productivity in industry	343	11-fold
Volume of foreign trade	478	39-fold
National income per capita	354	13-fold
Average net pay of worker personnel	305	839
Expenditures for social and cultural actions from the state budget	607	26-fold

In 1985, as compared with 1945, these increases are far more significant: 107-fold for industrial production and more than 7-fold for agricultural production. On this basis, the national income achieved in 1985 was over 30 times higher than in 1945. In industry, the labor productivity--a decisive element for social progress, for growth in national wealth--was 18 times higher in 1985 than in 1945.

The well-founded policy of accumulation provided for the growth of the volume of investments by 110-fold from 1945 to 1985. On this basis, the fixed assets in the national economy, which represent an important component of national wealth, rose 17-fold in the 1945-1985 period, reaching nearly 2,780 billion lei, about 90 percent of which represents the creation of the past 20 years, contributing decisively to the growth of the national wealth accumulated by about 5.5-fold since 1965. In the 1945-1985 period, nearly 10,000 main industrial, agricultural, and zootechnical production capacities were put into operation--most of them, about 8,000 capacities, in 1966-1985 alone. In the past 20 years, there was a rise of nearly 3.4 million in the number of workplaces in the national economy, with the number of worker personnel per 1,000 inhabitants rising, at the same time, from 226 in 1965 to 337 in 1985.

In the 1966-1985 period, as a result of the expansion of scientific research activity under the direct guidance of Comrade Academician Dr Eng Elena Ceaușescu, a prestigious scientist of high international distinction, 35,000 machines, pieces of equipment and apparatus, and installations were put into manufacture and about 12,000 new and improved technologies were applied in production. In each 5-year period, nearly half of the production of the branches was renovated and modernized. One should note the fact that technical progress provided about 52 percent of the rise in labor productivity in the 1981-1985 5-year period.

The socialist industrialization of the country constituted the party's central objective in the work of socialist construction. As a result of high rates of development, industry became the national economy's basic branch, equipped at a higher and higher technical level and capable of utilizing the country's natural resources more and more efficiently and helping to equip the national economy's other branches and sectors and to promote technical progress in them. The fact that a high average annual rate of growth, 9.5 percent, which puts Romania among the countries with the most dynamic industry, was achieved over a rather long period--20 years--represents an essential trait of the process of industrialization in the period that followed the ninth party congress. As a result, this branch's contribution to the creation of national income rose from 26.5 percent in 1945 to 48.9 percent in 1965 and about 63 percent in 1985. In addition, industry's percentage in the total employed population rose from 12 percent in 1950 to 19.2 percent in 1965 and 37.1 percent in 1985.

The implementation of broad programs for expanding the base of energy and raw materials was and still is among the economic choices and priorities adopted by the party to develop industry, bearing in mind that the progress of industry, of the whole national economy, is conditioned by the providing of resources of raw materials and fuel and by the rational utilization of them. The efforts made to develop the Romanian power industry were concretized in the growth of the production of electric power from 1.1 billion kilowatt-hours in 1938 to 17.2 billion kilowatt-hours in 1965 and 71.8 billion kilowatt-hours in 1985.

Along with the achievement of high rates of development in Romanian industry, there were also profound qualitative changes in the structure of industrial production. New, high-tech industrial branches and subbranches that provide for the utilization of the country's natural and human potential under conditions of higher efficiency and for more and more intense participation by Romania in the international division of labor, in international economic cooperation, were created and developed in the years of socialist construction and especially in the period that followed the ninth party congress.

Within the two branches mentioned above, the subbranches bearing technical progress had particularly high increases: means of automation and of electro-technical and electronic computer technology, products of the precision-machinery and optics industry, hydraulic and pneumatic equipment and elements, machine tools for processing metal by cutting and by other metal-detaching procedures, products of fine-synthesis and low-tonnage chemistry, and petrochemistry--a new subbranch that was created in the past 20 years. The continual diversification of the production of the machine-building industry caused over 90 percent of the investments in equipment and machines to be covered from domestic production in recent years, as compared with 71.3 percent in 1965 and only 5 percent before the war.

The strong development that industry's basic branches--electric and thermal power, metallurgy, machine building and metal processing, and chemistry--underwent led to the growth of the percentage of these branches in the total industrial production from 26.8 percent in 1950 to 42.0 percent in 1965 and

nearly 54 percent in 1985. These changes in the structure of industrial production are especially significant because, shortly before World War II and in the years just after the war, the branches of light industry and of the food industry provided about half of the country's entire industrial production, while about 13 percent came from machine building and chemistry together.

In the years that followed the ninth congress, in order to develop agriculture, the second basic branch of the national economy, more and more investment funds were allocated--coming to about 15 percent of the volume of investments in the economy--which contributed to the strong development of this branch's technical-material base, as can be seen from the data in Table 2.

Table 2, Components of the Growth of the Degree of Technical Equipping of Agriculture

Component	1950	1965	1985
Physical agricultural tractors (units)	13,713	81,356	184,408
Self-propelled grain combines (units)	44	292	63,435
Applied chemical fertilizer (thousands of tons)	5.9	266.4	1,200
Total area set up for irrigation (thousands of hectares)	42.5	229.9	2,956.3

Within the program for the new agrarian revolution, in order to provide steady and stable agricultural outputs, special attention was devoted to the mechanization of agricultural work, to agrobiological science, and to personnel training. As a result, the arable area per agricultural tractor fell from 684 hectares in 1950 to 121 hectares in 1965 and 54 hectares in 1985. Practically the whole fleet of self-propelled grain combines and other farm equipment and machines was achieved in the 1965-1985 period. The amount of chemical fertilizer applied in agriculture on the average per hectare of arable land reached 121 kg in 1985, as compared with only 0.6 kg in 1950 and 27 kg in 1965. As a consequence of the steps taken, especially after the Ninth RCP Congress, a large part of the investments were oriented toward facilities for irrigation, which had a much faster rate of growth than in the preceding years, with the area set up for irrigation being nearly 13 times greater at the end of 1985 than in 1965. The facilities for irrigation now cover nearly 30 percent of the arable area of the country.

The effects of developing the technical-material base and improving the production relations in agriculture were reflected, above all, in the growth of vegetable agricultural production, whose annual average for the main crops was 2.5-3.5 times higher in the 1981-1985 period than in the 1951-1955 period; for some crops, such as sugar beets, the increase was far higher (nearly 5-fold). In 1984 and 1985, the total grain output exceeded 23 million tons, going down as record yields in the country's history and coming to more than 1,000 kg of grain per capita--thus securing the attainment of the target set in the party's program for the current stage. Along with the growth in vegetable production, the complex steps taken to develop and modernize agriculture also led to the development of zootechny, it being known that growth in animal production represents an important factor in raising the people's standard of

living--all these things conferring a more and more modern form on the structure of Romanian agriculture.

Within the general policy of socialist industrialization, the rational distribution of the production forces throughout the country constituted a permanent objective in orienting the investments, especially in the period that followed the ninth party congress. The orientation of the investments with priority toward some once poorly developed counties such as Bistrita-Nasaud, Botosani, Buzau, Calarasi, Covasna, Dimbovita, Gorj, Harghita, Mehedinti, Olt, Satu Mare, Salaj, Teleorman, Tulcea, Vaslui, Vilcea, and Vrancea caused the average rate of growth of the fixed assets in these counties in the 1965-1985 period to lie between 9.5-13.5 percent, outstripping the national average of 8.9 percent, which helped to reduce the gaps existing in the economic potential of the counties. Thus, in 1965, the majority of the counties (38) had a volume of total economic activity of up to 20 billion lei, with only 2 counties and the municipality of Bucharest exceeding this limit, but, in 1985, practically all counties of the country had a volume of total economic activity of over 20 billion lei, with more than half of them exceeding the value of 40 billion lei. As a consequence, the objective set by the 12th party congress--that each county would have capacities in which a volume of economic activity of at least 70,000 lei per capita would be achieved--was attained in 1985.

On the basis of the remarkable successes obtained in the growth of material production and of its efficiency, the means for raising the population's material and spiritual standard of living--this constituting a basic coordinate of the Romanian Communist Party's policy--were created in the years of the construction of socialism. The growth of total national income by over 30-fold from 1945 to 1985 was the basis for the steps taken by the party to raise the material and spiritual well-being of the whole populace, to achieve qualitatively important changes in all areas of the quality of life, to provide all of the conditions for instruction and education, for culture and civilization. In this regard, it can be stated that the past 2 decades also represent the most fruitful period in accomplishments in the field of the standard of living and the quality of life.

The national economy's transition in the 1986-1990 5-year period from the stage of a developing socialist country to a country with average development from an economic and social viewpoint is based on a suitable program of accumulation and investments, with life demonstrating the close interdependence between the size of the part of national income devoted to economic and social development, economic growth, and the rate of growth of national wealth as a sure basis for raising the standard of living.

The documents of the 13th Congress of the Romanian Communist Party provide for the transformation of the quantitative accumulations up to now into a new quality, reflected in the widening of the intensive character of expanded socialist reproduction. This objective will be attained through the further modernization of the production structures, the raising of the technical and qualitative level of products, the growth of labor productivity, and the accentuation of the specialization and integration of production with a view to utilizing the production capacities with maximum efficiency.

In the future, a decisive role in the development of the national economy on intensive bases and in the growth of economic efficiency will go to science and technology, to the matter of rapidly and steadily introducing into production the results of research, the new gains of modern science and technology. The substantial growth of the technical and qualitative level of products, the improvement in the structure of production, and the more and more efficient utilization of economic resources will lead to the growth of the degree of competitiveness of Romanian products on the foreign market, with about 95 percent of Romanian products being at a world level from a technical and qualitative viewpoint and 2-5 percent even exceeding this level by the end of this 5-year period.

In industry, the intensive character of the development of the national economy in the future will be reflected in the further providing of a high rate of growth, with the industrial production in 1990 being 43.3-49.0 percent higher than in 1985, growing at an average annual rate of 7.5-8.3 percent. The development of industry will be achieved under the conditions of improving and modernizing the structure of production, with faster growth being achieved in those branches and subbranches which provide for the advanced utilization of resources and the more efficient utilization of the work force and which help to promote technical progress throughout the economy. Thus, higher average annual rates are provided in the machine-building industry (10.3 percent) and the chemical industry (10.2 percent), and within them, special attention will be devoted to the subbranches that represent peak technology: the electronics industry and the industry of means of automation and management of manufacturing processes, the precision-machinery industry, fine-synthesis chemistry and low-tonnage production, etc.

The steady growth of labor productivity, whose level in national industry, due to the mechanization, automation, and robotization of production, is to rise at an average annual rate of 11.2 percent, lies in the center of the intensification of the action of the qualitative factors of development.

In agriculture, according to the national program for securing steady and stable outputs, the intensive character of this branch within the new agrarian revolution will be reflected, above all, in the preparation of over 2.6 million hectares for irrigation, amounting to 5.6 million hectares of irrigated land at the end of the 5-year period. At the same time, provision is made for the year-by-year growth of the quantity of chemical fertilizer furnished to agriculture, which will total 14.5 million tons of active substance for the whole 5-year period. In addition to these factors, the overall mechanization of all agricultural work will help to raise grain production to 32.5 million tons in 1990.

The development of industry, agriculture, and the other activities producing national income will lead to considerable growth in national wealth. This growth will be stimulated by significant growth in national product and national income, whose volume in 1990 will be, respectively, 36.4-40.6 percent and 60.4-65.4 percent higher than in 1985. The intensive character of the development is also reflected by the average annual rate of growth of national

income (9.9-10.6 percent), higher than the rate of growth of national product (6.4-7.1 percent).

Even the brief listing of the main provisions for Romania's economic and social development in the 1986-1990 5-year period demonstrates conclusively that their implementation will lead to our homeland's rise to new heights of progress, to the implementation of the party's program on the whole. This will provide for Romania's entry into a new stage of development, making a big forward step along the path of forging the multilaterally developed socialist society and advancing toward communism, and will provide for our whole populace's rise to new heights of civilization and progress, of material and spiritual well-being.

12105

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INCREASED INVESTMENTS TO IMPROVE TECHNICAL-MATERIAL BASE

Bucharest REVISTA ECONOMICA in Romanian No 34, 21 Aug 86 pp 10-11

[Article by Angelica M. Vrabie: "The Creation of a Strong Technical-Material Base by Carrying Out a Broad Program of Investments"]

[Text] The construction of socialism in our country, especially in the past 2 decades, caused radical economic and social changes, at the basis of which were the creation, expansion, and modernization of the production forces and of the technical-material base of production, social, and cultural activities, the steady promotion of technical progress, and the harmonious and balanced development of all areas and localities, which raised our homeland to new heights of progress and civilization.

Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu's view regarding the necessity of keeping constantly high the part of national income devoted to development had a decisive role in creating the present strong technical-material base: 29.5 percent between 1966-1970, 33.7 percent between 1971-1975, 35.3 percent in the 1976-1980 5-year period, and about 30 percent in the past 5-year period, with it also being between 28-30 percent in the current 5-year period. As a matter of fact, "life, the experience of the 40 years of socialist construction," Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu stated, "but especially of the past 20 years, demonstrates strongly that only by allocating a large share to the development fund do we continually strengthen cooperative and state socialist ownership and are the necessary technical-material conditions provided for continually developing the homeland and, on this basis, raising the people's general well-being."

As a result of a high rate of accumulation, the volume of investments as a chief way to provide for expanded socialist reproduction, to draw natural resources into the economic circuit and highly utilize them, to provide highly technical equipment for the workplaces, and to rationally position the production forces rose continually. Thus, the volume of investments devoted to our national economy was about 4.5 times higher in 1985 than in 1965; in the 1981-1985 5-year period alone, 1,147 billion lei were allocated to the economy, which represents a rise of about 23 percent in comparison with the preceding 5-year period and of 1.8-fold in comparison with the 1971-1975 period.

The systematic growth of the volume of investments throughout the period of the forging of the new order, especially after the ninth party congress, was

concretized in the appearance of many economic, social, and cultural facilities and a big supply of housing on the map of the homeland. In 1985, the total volume of fixed assets came to 2,780 billion lei, more than 90 percent of them achieved after 1965. After the ninth congress, over 8,500 main industrial, agricultural, and zootechnical production capacities were put into operation; over 250 industrial zones and platforms with a complex makeup were created; and impressive work was done, such as the Danube-Black Sea Canal (the most magnificent construction in the country's millennial history), the subway in the country's capital, the Iron Gates II Hydroelectric Power Station, the coal-using thermoelectric power stations in Turceni and Rovinari, the heavy equipment combines in Iasi, Cluj-Napoca, and Craiova, the petrochemical combines in Midia, Navodari, and Pitesti, the chemical combines in Giurgiu, Slobozia, and Arad, important metallurgical units in Calarasi, Tirgoviste, Zimnicea, Zalau, and other localities, and many units in light industry and the food industry. The 19.5-percent rise in the volume of investments in the current 5-year period (which will mean a total volume of about 1,400 billion lei) will add to the existing ones about another 900 important industrial, agricultural, and zootechnical production capacities and 750,000 apartments.

According to our party's view and taking into account the national economy's needs for achieving dynamic economic and social development, the decisive part of the investments were oriented toward the sphere of production, especially toward the development of industry and its base of energy and raw materials. The analysis of the structure of the investments according to spheres and branches of activity permits the formulation of a useful conclusion in this regard. Our calculations indicate the fact that over 83 percent of the total investments carried out in the national economy, coming to nearly 90 percent in the past 5-year period, were allocated to the productive sphere in almost the entire 1965-1985 period (except for the 1976-1980 5-year period).

Table. The Evolution of the Structure of the Investments Carried Out in the National Economy According to Spheres and Branches of Activity

Spheres and Branches of Activity	(in percent)			
	Period			
	1966-1970	1971-1975	1976-1980	1981-1985
Total, including:	100	100	100	100
Productive sphere	83.0	83.3	74.8	89.4
Industry	5.0	50.5	49.2	49.1
Construction	3.9	4.7	5.9	10.6*
Agriculture and silviculture	16.0	14.4	13.8	16.0
Transportation and telecommunications	10.2	10.2	3.1	11.3
Commodity circulation	2.9	3.5	2.8	2.4
Nonproductive sphere	17.0	16.7	25.7	10.6

Note: In 1963 prices for 1966-1970 and 1971-1975; in prices on 1 January 1977 for 1976-1980; in current prices for 1981-1985.

*Only dwellings (in 1985).

In the current 5-year period too, according to the directives of the 13th party congress, about 88 percent of the investment funds will be directed toward raising the economy's production potential. Industry alone will receive 841 billion lei, and within it, a special accent will be put on developing the base of energy and raw materials; in addition, big projects will continue to be carried out, the Arges will be set up for navigation along the Bucharest-Danube route, the nuclear program for this 5-year period will be carried out, about 2.5 million hectares of farmland will be irrigated, and other important objectives with a productive character will be attained.

At the same time, although about half of the total investments went to industry, the percentage of between 14 and 16 percent of the total investments that agriculture received, rising in the past 5-year period in comparison with the two preceding ones, indicates the concern of our party and, personally, its secretary general, Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu, for eliminating agriculture's backwardness, in a certain period, and providing an optimum ratio between the two basic branches of the economy.

However, the change in the structure of the investments in the favor of nonindustrial activities in the 1981-1985 period in comparison with the preceding 5-year period was accomplished under the conditions of keeping industry's percentage approximately unchanged and even raising by 6.6 percent (which, in total volume, meant another 105 billion lei) the investment effort in this branch. The more marked growth of the investments in the big branches in comparison with the growth of the total volume of investments is even more indicative of the improvement in the structure of the investments; between 1965-1984, for example, increases of 4.77-fold in industry, 5.55-fold in construction, 5.17-fold in transportation and telecommunications, and 4.34-fold in agriculture corresponded to a 4.31-fold rise in the total volume of investments.

Between 1965-1984, within industry's two groups (A and B), especially the investments allocated to group B--producing consumer goods--rose (6.24-fold in comparison with the 4.62-fold rise of those that group A--producing means of production--received). The above situation was caused by the necessity of optimizing the ratio between the industry producing means of production and the consumer goods industry, especially as a relative lag had been found in light industry.

In its turn, the analysis of the dynamics and structure of the investments in the economy's two spheres--productive and nonproductive--indicates an up-and-down evolution of the indicators in the nonproductive sphere, namely: in comparison with the preceding 5 years, a slight decrease between 1971-1975, a big increase in their percentage between 1976-1980 (from 16.7 percent to 25.2 percent), and a decrease between 1981-1985. However, the decrease in the percentage of the investments in the nonproductive sphere between 1981-1985 in comparison with the preceding periods did not also mean the reduction of their absolute volume, but, on the contrary, in the past 5-year period, in absolute volume, the investments in the nonproductive sphere were 1.74 times higher than those in 1971-1975 and 3.68 times higher than in the 1966-1970 period.

The growth of the role of science, turned into a direct production force under the conditions of the contemporary scientific and technical revolution, necessitated greater efforts to provide its technical-material base, a reason why a volume of investments about seven times higher was allocated to this activity between 1965-1984, as compared with the 4.31-fold rise in the total volume of investments throughout the national economy.

Regarding sources of investment financing, the analysis of the data brings out the fact that the predominant and continually rising part of the investments in our country were covered from state funds; throughout the 1965-1984 period, the state participated in investment financing with between 88 and about 93 percent--as a result, also the nationally important character of the majority of the economic and social facilities in the country. In industry alone, for example, about 77 percent of the enterprises existing in 1984 constituted state property, and 97.6 percent of their total was of national subordination.

The cooperative and public organizations made a relatively small but slightly rising contribution to our country's financial effort in the seventh 5-year period in comparison with the preceding one, both relatively and absolutely, with the rise of only 0.1 percent in the contribution of the cooperative form of ownership being equivalent to additional participation of about 900 million lei between 1981-1984. Consequently, the cooperative and public organizations, stronger and stronger and better and better organized under the conditions of the expansion of economic and financial self-financing and self-management, are becoming more and more capable of providing with their own forces the technical-material base for expanded reproduction.

Of the total investments, the part that the country's population provided through the contribution in money and labor (which is added to the socialist sector) was four times higher between 1981-1984 than throughout the 1976-1980 5-year period (that is, 0.8 percent as compared with 0.2 percent), which was equivalent to more than another 7 billion lei. In contrast, the population's funds, which represented only 2.1 percent in the last period analyzed, as compared with 3.5 percent throughout the preceding 5-year period, decreased in the structure of the investments according to the source of financing.

From the viewpoint of their nature, the investments in our country's economy were used for construction-assembly work, equipment, geologic work, and other investment work. The fact that the volume rose and the structure of the investments was diversified considerably in favor of the active ones from one period to another represents a positive aspect of major significance for general economic and social development (both a requirement for and a consequence of technical progress). Thus, the investments in equipment represented about 43 percent in the past 5-year period, as compared with 36.4 percent between 1966-1970.

In conformity with the active part of the investments, higher in their total in recent years, the degree of technical equipping of labor also rose continually. Thus, the installed power that serves industrial production rose from a total of 6,087,000 kilowatts, which means 429 kilowatts per 1,000 workers in 1965, to 18,086,000 kilowatts, that is, 1,028 kilowatts per 1,000 workers in

1984, which means a rise of 5.17-fold in the first indicator and 2.4-fold in the second indicator (under the conditions in which the number of workers in industry rose 2.3-fold in the same period).

One remarkable aspect of the investment policy promoted by our party and state consists of the fact that Romanian industry's continually rising potential to meet from its own production the need for equipment and technologies for the new investments was secured on the basis of the highest technology. In 1984, for example, the part of the domestically produced equipment in the total investments in equipment reached 91.1 percent, as compared with 77.9 percent in the 1976-1980 period and only 71.3 percent in 1965, which is equivalent to a corresponding cut in importation. The domestic production of the equipment needed for investments is also a positive phenomenon in that it stimulates the development of our own machine-building industry, our own creative thinking, our own scientific and technical conception with favorable consequences regarding the growth of production, the improvement of the quality and competitiveness of products, the raising of the economy's degree of technicality, and the more complete and efficient use of our human potential. In addition, by using domestically produced equipment, the periods for putting the new facilities into operation can be cut, the turnover of the funds can be faster, and the newly created value can be higher; additional possibilities of balancing the balances of trade and of payments--on the one hand, through the reduction of importation and, on the other hand, due to the growth of the prestige of Romanian products through the growth of their competitiveness and affirmation on the foreign market too--are also created.

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
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MFS HEAD WOLF INTERVIEWED ON NUREMBERG TRIALS

East Berlin WOCHENPOST in German Vol 33 No 39, 26 Sep 86 pp 16-17

[Interview with Col Gen Markus Wolf, head of MFS (Ministry of State Security) by Brigitte Zimmerman and Horst Hoffman, date and place not indicated: "In the Name of World Conscience; 40 Years Ago, the Verdict at Nuremberg"; first paragraph is WOCHENPOST introduction]

[Text] Our interlocutor Markus Wolf was born at Hechingen, Wuerttemberg, 19 January 1923, the son of the writer Friedrich Wolf, MD. Together with his parents, he emigrated to Switzerland, France, and the Soviet Union in 1933. In the USSR, together with his brother Konrad, he attended the Karl Liebknecht School and in 1940 took up the study of technology. After returning to Berlin in May 1945, Markus Wolf worked as a radio commentator under the pseudonym of Michael Storm. He covered the Nuremberg trial of the main war criminals for Berlin radio and BERLINER ZEITUNG. After the founding of the GDR, he was first counselor at our embassy in Moscow. Since 1951 he has served in the armed forces of the GDR. He was made a general at the age of 29.



WOCHENPOST: On 1 October 1946, when the principal fascist war criminals were sentenced in Nuremberg, you, Comrade Colonel General, were among the few German journalists who reported the event direct from the Court of General Sessions Hall of the Courthouse. How had this come about?

Markus Wolf: Of course I had never dreamed it would come to that, any more than that I would be working as a journalist. Though, being the son of a writer, I was not unfamiliar with writing, I actually had planned something different for myself. My radio activity was something of a coincidence. Having been called away from my technological college studies in the Soviet Union by the German Communist Party during the war, and having been prepared for the political struggle in Germany, I acquired basic knowledge of radio work as spokesman, commentator, and editor at the "German People's Radio," the "Voice of the National Peace Movement." In May 1945, together with a small group of German antifascists gathered around Hans Mahle, I was then thrown into the water of independent editorial work at Berlin radio...

WOCHENPOST: Listeners at that time knew you by the pseudonym of Michael Storm which removed you from immediate reference to your famous father. But who proposed that you should report on the Nuremberg trial?

Markus Wolf: Frankly, the proposal was mine. Various political programs had been developed. Together with Comrades Rudi Meisner and Alfred Duchrow, we had also brought younger people into radio work. Gradually we also felt the echo among the people we addressed. One must not forget that at that time, when there was no television as yet, radio occupied a monopoly position as a mass medium. When the question arose in late August 1945 as to who might report from Nuremberg, our director, Comrade Mahle, accepted my proposal.

Across the Border in the Dark and Fog

WOCHENPOST: It cannot have been all that easy at that time to get to Nuremberg from Berlin.

Markus Wolf: I was to experience that firsthand.

On Monday, 19 November 1945, our convoy, consisting of a jeep belonging to the Soviet news bureau SNB and an old Opel from TAEGELICHE RUNDSCHAU, started out in the direction of Plauen. A letter written by my director and a covering letter from the deputy head of the SMAD [Soviet Military Administration in Germany], Army General Sokolovskiy, identified me, a passenger, as special Berlin radio correspondent appointed to cover the Nuremberg trial. However, we got lost in dense fog in the Fichtel Mountains that night. Somewhere near Hof we crossed the green border between the Soviet and U.S. occupation zones and were received and led onward by an amazed U.S. sergeant. On 20 November after some delay, we reached the press camp of the IMT [International Military Tribunal] which was stationed in the castle of pencil tycoon Faber at Stein, southwest of Nuremberg. But there was no getting in there with my letter of accreditation: "Off limits!" No Germans permitted. My knowledge of English, an ID in Cyrillic I happened to have brought along, and the right kind of intuition for the psychology of an American GI opened doors for me which were closed to Germans at that time. In the afternoon I sat in court with my "press badge" on what was to become my regular chair.

WOCHENPOST: For 10 months you covered the biggest criminal trial of all time. How did you feel when for the first time you saw with your own eyes those bigwigs of the Third Reich who had more than 50 million people on their conscience?

Markus Wolf: My feelings were determined by what I had lived through. I left Germany with my parents and my brother in 1933. We grew up abroad, the Soviet Union became our second homeland. We had fought for this end with its people, so severely tested by the Hitler war, with our German comrades, and with anti-fascists from many countries, and at the same time also waited for vengeance for all the terrible crimes. Now I was sitting in the same hall with the instigators of those crimes, for whom we had so often pictured an especially unpleasant end. Yet what still remained of their overbearing megalomania, their puffed-up pomp, and their showing-off of former years? It was almost disappointing to see what ordinary, shrunken figures, afraid for their forfeited lives, had remained from the Hitler gradeur of those men who were supposed to defend the ideas and deeds of the Nazi party and the Hitler Reich. The initial impression of such pitifulness continued to grow in the course of the later proceedings: cowardly creatures, with everyone denying responsibility.

How different was the way our comrades appeared before their judges, the anti-fascist fighters of so many countries: their heads raised high, aware of the justice of the cause for which they fought and gave their lives.

WOCHENPOST: Were there any differences in the demeanor of individual defendants, and were any groups formed?

Markus Wolf: A certain exception was the coldblooded mass murderer Kaltenbrunner, who made a cynical bow when the sentence was announced, and the dirty crook Streicher, who is said to have shouted hysterically when he was already on the scaffold, "Just wait, the Russians will cut you all down yet!"

In the course of time two main groups formed, and their respective members also gathered together during the intermissions. On the one hand, there were the veteran Nazis around Hermann Goering, the main defendant, who were gambling that the Allies would become divided. Others thought they were better off because they had not bloodied their hands themselves; they gathered around Schacht, who had held Hitler's stirrups. When after taking an inventory of the crimes of the Hitler state, the Nazi party and its formations, the Wehrmacht and its General Staff, the trial finally also took up the question of the personal guilt of the individual defendants, even the high and mighty Reich marshal and greedy plunderer turned into a minor recipient of orders who claimed he had not known anything about it all. He said he had fallen into disgrace with Hitler and had tried to save a Jewish doctor. And so were they all: Nothing remained of their martial demeanor, and they did not even make a monstrous or satanic impression, they only seemed puny, ugly, and repulsive. In their opinion only Hitler should have been in the dock.

WOCHENPOST: What actually was your daily routine as a correspondent?

Markus Wolf: In the beginning it was a one-man operation for two media, which had me chasing back and forth between courtroom and press center, office and teletype. Unlike the generally strong teams of other radio stations,

newspapers, and agencies, I confronted the plethora of material and also the technical-organizational tasks as an individual fighter, as it were. So, during the first lunch break, I did not know what to do as I sat with my notes at the telegraph switched to Berlin. Though I had seen such a machine, I had never used one. As soon as I pressed one of the keys, it rattled away, and Radio Berlin identified itself at the other end. After some trial and error, I finally managed to file my first report. Soon it was no more than a matter of routine to rush to the office with my notes made in the courtroom and a batch of marked files and, just in time, file the due report direct by teletype. A trial run, such as is customary these days, was something I could only dream of until the sentencing.

Not Vengeance But Justice

WOCHENPOST: What did you emphasize in your reports, Comrade Wolf?

Markus Wolf: I knew from my more than 6 months as a reporter in postwar Berlin that portions of the German people rightly or wrongly felt they shared the blame for the Nazi crimes and considered themselves codefendants in Nuremberg. It was vital to make it clear to these fellow countrymen that the Nuremberg trial was directed not against the German people but against the fascist war criminals, that the victorious Allies by no means were out for vengeance but wanted justice. This was demonstrated unequivocally by the way the IMT conducted the trial, during which 346 witnesses of the 29 counsels for the defense were admitted in 218 days of proceedings and in 403 public sessions. But I also knew that a large part of my listeners, taken up completely by their struggle for mere survival, did not want to hear about these things any longer. It was therefore necessary for me in my reports about the entire course of the proceedings to find the kind of connection with particularly characteristic and gripping individual facts that would open the way to the minds and hearts of these very people. The same problem confronted my other Berlin colleagues, such as Max and Doris Kahane and Bernt von Kuegelgen, who later came to Nuremberg, and Arthur Mannbar, the head of the news department of Radio Berlin, who took my place for a time.

WOCHENPOST: What other colleagues can you remember?

Markus Wolf: First of all my Soviet colleagues, who were set up on the premises of the Faber castle and who welcomed me cordially in their midst. I have particularly fond memories of my evenings with Boris Polevoy, war correspondent of PRAVDA, who had just begun writing his famous book "The True Man," of Sergey Krushinskiy of IZVESTIYA, and Yuriy Korolkov of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, with whom I was friends until he died. This opportunity of consulting with friends was so important because complicated questions arose during the trial. But I also remember the U.S. reporter and writers John Steinbeck and John Dos Passos, and Marlene Dietrich and Erika Mann.

Goering's Red Scarf

WOCHENPOST: The time of the Nuremberg trial coincides with certain imperialist forces adopting the line of cold war. Was it possible to notice any of that?

Markus Wolf: In Nuremberg too there were initial indications of a departure by imperialist Western powers from the aims of the anti-Hitler coalition and the beginning of the cold war. The addresses by Winston Churchill in Zurich and Fulton and the speech by U.S. Secretary of State James Byrnes in Stuttgart, which signalled this transition, were delivered during the time of the trial. This development was contradictory at first, however, and not always easy to detect in its consequences.

As an observer, I was struck by the fact that after the detailed reports and headlines of the initial weeks the grand bourgeois newspapers soon only dealt with superficialities and minor "sensations," with the red scarf Goering was wearing and with the headphones he took exception to. Touching descriptions of his wife Emmy and little daughter Edda appeared. Finally the new waves of anticommunism drove the Nuremberg trial entirely off the front page. The correspondents of the first hour, who had reported from the very front line, were replaced by journalists oriented toward the new line.

WOCHENPOST: All machinations notwithstanding, it was not possible, however, to prevent the judgment of Nuremberg which, for the first time in history, punished crimes against peace and humanity. What do you think were the main reasons for that?

Markus Wolf: Their megalomania and the belief in their invincibility which lasted to the very end caused the Nazis to provide complete evidence of their crime. Corresponding documentation had even been evacuated to safety. Protocols concerning the oral argumentation of the prosecutors, about 240 interrogations of witnesses, and the final arguments, among other things, filled 16,000 closely printed pages. At any proceeding, generally only individual sentences were quoted from many of the 5,300 submitted documents which we received verbatim, as well as from the 38,000 affidavits. Every day of the trial dealt with broad historical contexts, with the fate of millions of people, ~~but also with sometimes terrible individual fates.~~ I think the crucial reason ~~---~~ why sentence was passed despite all disruptive attempts was the concordant will of the peoples and the basic antifascist consensus in the International Military Tribunal, and in addition the consistent line contributed personally by Soviet prosecutors and judges, but also by the chief U.S. prosecutors Robert Jackson and Telford Taylor.

Ruins and Pitifulness

WOCHENPOST: What do you remember of the city of Nuremberg in 1946?

Markus Wolf: On the eve of the sentencing, I tried to relax by taking a walk through the deserted streets in the totally destroyed old town on both sides of the Pegnitz. I will never forget that unimaginable landscape of ruins. Only at the antiaircraft bunker, which served as housing for refugees, did I see specterlike figures, keeping watch over some laundry they had hung out to dry. The ghostly remnants of the once so grand architectural monuments of the "little treasure trove of Germany" were mute accusers against the Nazi leaders. Through this old Nuremberg they had marched during the Reich party congresses, fancying themselves to be rulers of the world. Now nothing was left but ruins and a pitiful bunch of people awaiting sentence in their cells.

WOCHENPOST: Your father, Friedrich Wolf, wrote the scenario for the DEFA [German Film Corporation] movie "Rat der Goetter" [The Council of the Gods] which was produced in 1950. Were you able to be of help to him with the experience you had gathered in Nuremberg?

Markus Wolf: I think I was, for during the trial I gained deep insight into the structure and mechanism of the abuse of power by that unholy trinity of armament manufacturers, general staff officers, and civil servants; Eisenhower, departing U.S. president in his own country in 1961 and five-star general coined the term "military-industrial complex" to describe them. At the time of my stay in Nuremberg, the Western powers initiated the policy of sabotaging the Potsdam Agreement and of reviving German imperialism and militarism in their sphere of influence. The United States applied the methods of a reactionary policy of occupation in South Germany which it had first tested in North Africa and then practiced in Italy. Examples of this are the establishment of the German administration in Bavaria, the influence exercised on the establishment of parties and organizations, and also by the manipulation of the first municipal elections and other things. The drastic change from denazification to restoration of the imperialist system, to the reappointment of its supporters in Munich, the Bavarian capital, was described to me by Herbert Gessner, whom I met during the trial in Nuremberg. He was then still a commentator with Radio Munich. This development then led him to make his sensational protest by joining Radio Berlin. There we worked together with Karl Eduard von Schnitzler, became good friends, and founded the radio series "Treffpunkt Berlin" [Berlin Rendezvous].

Death by Hanging

WOCHENPOST: In your handwritten notes about the sentencing, you put down "Tod durch den Strang" [death by hanging] in the case of Keitel and others, but "death by hanging" [in English] in the case of some others, such as Frick. What does that signify, and what impression did the final session make on you?

Markus Wolf: When on Monday, 30 September 1946 the main figures of the trial were led through the narrow door behind the dock into the completely filled courtroom, nothing could be felt any longer of the sober atmosphere of the past 10 months. The reinforced MP guards with their white helmets were set off from the dark wall paneling, the defendants looked pale, nervous, and anxious. Nothing remained of their frequently displayed equanimity and impudence. All participants sensed the importance of the hour. I switched to the various language channels for a time--German, Russian, English, and French--and made notes.

It was certainly to the credit of the radio officers still acting in the spirit of the antifascist alliance, including Comrade Vladimir Mulin on the Soviet side and Mr Field Horine of the United States, that this historic event and its atmosphere were communicated direct from the courtroom for 2 days to all listeners in Germany, Austria, and Switzerland. By decision of the four occupying powers, the sentencing, in accordance with a coordinated plan and uniform scheduling, was broadcast by hookup over all German-language radios. The guidelines ruled out jazz and "music of the heavy Wagnerian Valhalla type."

No director was allowed to interrupt the broadcasts from Nuremberg. Each occupying power furnished a reporter for the direct broadcasts. Transmission times for the reports and reportages as well as for the concluding commentary from Nuremberg radio were divided up precisely. Since I was delayed by necessary coordination in the courthouse, I arrived too late at the radio. But Mr Horine was kind enough to give me the last word.

WOCHENPOST: How did you feel as the sole communist among the four concluding commentators?

Markus Wolf: I was keenly conscious of my mission as reporter of the German democratic radio. Whereas the commentator for the radio in the U.S. Zone spoke of the "bottom line" and came up with sentimental words to describe the fate of those now sentenced, I spoke of the beginning of the road that must be traveled from Nuremberg by all antifascists. I strove to glean from the sentencing the historical causes and connections, including the guilt of German monopoly capital. I therefore protested, on behalf of all German antifascists, the acquittal of Schacht, Fritzsche, and von Papen, calling for their punishment by a German court. As far as the representatives of the USSR were concerned, who recorded their reservations against the acquittals, agreement with the Western allies in condemning the main war criminals was accorded priority. When, on the way home from Berlin, I heard on the car radio the speech by Wilhelm Pieck at a demonstration on Bebelplatz, I was very pleased that he raised the same demand that I had in my commentary.

WOCHENPOST: What do you consider to be the current lessons of Nuremberg?

Markus Wolf: In light of world-wide tensions, the Nuremberg judgment is of extreme current significance, for it declared not only that it was criminal to plan and prepare a war of aggression but that anything serving the planning and preparation of aggression was criminal. War propaganda and a policy of blackmail, provocations and acts of subversion grossly contradict the spirit and letter of Nuremberg international law. If one compares the scenarios of the preparation and execution of the attacks on the sovereignty of other states, their territorial integrity, and the inviolability of their borders--carefully covered and irrefutably proved in Nuremberg--with the aggressive actions of imperialism in the postwar area to the present day, one will find striking similarities of procedure. The music accompanying rearmament, particularly in the form of the constantly repeated lie about a threat from the East, combined with assurances of peace, almost puts the Goebbels propaganda in the shade. Great current significance also continues to attach to the clear evidence produced in Nuremberg about the actual men behind the scene, the representatives of the military-industrial complex interested in preparation for war and armament, the "Council of the Gods."

Alliance of Reason--the Lesson of Nuremberg

The big difference between now and then, however, is that it is now easier for any thinking person to judge politicians not by their words but by their deeds. The experience of World War II, including that of Nuremberg, strengthened the awareness of history and the weight of international law among many people; particularly, of course, wherever it is constantly kept alive and

promoted by the state, by society, by all forces fighting for preserving peace. To make internationally valid law prevail remains one of the most important tasks of the present, and it depends on the strength of the forces of peace. The worldwide alliance of reason and realism is also in accordance with the lessons of Nuremberg.

WOCHENPOST: We thank you for the interesting interview, Comrade Wolf, and in conclusion would like to quote from your "final remarks" of 1 October 1946:
"The world court has passed sentence.... The enemies of the peaceful coexistence of peoples now have to realize that they can no longer escape responsibility, whether they have been heads of state, leading civil servants, military, or anything else."

8790/5915

CSO: 2300/28

CONVERSION KITS FOR COASTAL MINELAYING CRAFT

Warsaw WOJSKOWY PRZEGLAD TECHNICZNY in Polish No 7-8, Jul-Aug 86 pp 315-316

[Article by Lt Col Dr Eng Jerzy Garstka and Capt Dr Eng Mirosław Rozin: "A Kit To Lay Mines Using PTS Boats"]

[Text] Defense units of the naval engineering forces do not have now special equipment to lay barriers of anti-landing mines in coastal waters. To lay mines, they now use PTS boats equipped with so-called assembly tables to arm mines and with discharge ramps secured to the boats' afts, which can be opened. The method of placing mines and detonators on a boat's deck and the way mining operations are organized depend on the experience, ingenuity and training of the sappers (miners). Placing mines on tables, arming them and discharging them into the water are done manually.

Laying barriers of anti-landing mines should be done quickly. To do so, the sappers must be equipped with special mining equipment. The currently employed dilatory placement of mines and accessories on a boat's loading platform, which is also occupied by the mining crew, may cause an accident, especially when navigating in high waves or through waters of varying depths (shoals and deep water). The use of standardized and universal mining equipment will simplify training, accelerate the mining process and improve its safety.

The kit developed to enable PTS boats to mine coastal waters is a universal kit for laying any type anti-landing or anti-tank mine used by the Polish Armed Forces having anchors weighing 30 and 60 kg. Depending on type of mine being laid, certain kit components can be assembled or disassembled. A 5-kN capacity hoist (davit) permits rapid assembly and disassembly of kit parts as well as loading of mines on a boat. The boat employs a flat side (PTS equipment to drive piles) that permits the discharge ramp to be joined directly to the discharge equipment. By itself, the side is used only to enclose the boat's hull. It requires 35 minutes to replace a PTS boat's standard side with a flat side. The replacement is done manually by the crew (1 officer and 6 enlisted men) during the preparatory mining operations. The entire kit can be loaded and assembled on a boat in a maximum of 25 minutes. To assemble the kit and replace the side requires 60 minutes.

The PTS boat kit to mine coastal waters is shown in figure 1. The discharge ramp (2), which is joined to the hoist (3), consist of a curvilinear part

inclined at 35 deg that is 0.5 m long, and a rectilinear part that is 2.6 m long. It is constructed of steel plates supported by a tubular frame and angle bars welded to the plates. The angle bars function as mine rails.




Figure 1. PTS Boat Kit to Mine Coastal Waters

Key:

1. flat side
2. discharge ramp
3. hoist
4. mine platform
5. mine tracks
6. separation platform
7. auxiliary platform

The mine hoist (3), whose angle of elevation is 50 deg, enables the mines to be lifted vertically from the mine platform level (4) to the discharge ramp level (2). The tubular-construction hoist is equipped with two hoisting winches and independently moving trays, which also function as mine arming stations. The hoist is so designed that two such stations are possible.

The mine platform (4) consists of a tubular supporting structure with a latticework overlay. The platform is rigidly connected to the mine hoist (3) and secured to the boat's transport grips by means of bolts.

The mine tracks (5) are designed to guide mines toward the hoist. They consist of two rigidly connected angle bars. The spacing between the angle bars correspond to the wheel track of a PDM-3Ja mine. The mine tracks are joined to the mine platform (4).

The auxiliary platform (7) consists of a tubular support structure with a latticework overlay. Two tubular loading davit sockets are located on the supporting structure.

The separation platform (6) permits the mines to be shifted from the side rails to the center. It is equipped with two trays that move perpendicularly relative to the boat's longitudinal axis. The construction of this platform is similar to the construction of the mine platform, and the two channel irons function as tray rails.

The flat side (1) is constructed of rolled steel sheet welded to an angle-bar frame. Its weight (100 kg) plus the weight of the mine hoist counterbalance completely the weight of the PTs standard side. The trusses to secure and

fasten the flat side are compatible with the vehicle's sockets.

Photo 1 [not shown here] shows the kit assembled on the deck of a PTS boat. Photos 2 and 3 [not shown here] show the kit being used to lay MPR and PDM-3Ja mines.

The design of the PTS kit to mine coastal waters is simple, and easy to operate and maintain. Its use improves mining safety and accelerates mining operations significantly. The kit can also be used to mine rivers and lakes.

11899

CSO: 2600/26

NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS SYMPOSIUM REPORTED

Warsaw ZOLNIERZ WOLNOSCI in Polish 18 Sep 86 p 2

[Article by Wieslaw Cetera: "A Symposium of Telecommunications Specialists"]

[Text] Of what should our telecommunications consist? Does the future belong to digital teletransmission? What are the prospects for fiber-optic telecommunications systems, satellite transmissions or radio link transmissions? These are but a few of the topics being discussed during the National Telecommunications Symposium organized by the Communication Institute and the Telecommunications Section of the Polish Academy of Sciences Committee on Electronics and Telecommunications.

Over 200 scientists from all the science centers in Poland are participating in the symposium. Industry and operators of communication equipment are also represented.

"Above all," stated Prof Dr Stanislaw Slawinski, "our symposium must serve as a means of exchanging information. Though this may sound absurd in the age of computers, this is the most effective form of contact and transmission of knowledge. This is especially important to young scientists. It provides an opportunity for them to present their work at an established forum and to make contacts. In addition, good cooperation between individual science centers should ensure good results."

The symposium's organizers and participants emphasize its high quality, as indicated by intensively conducted research. Theoretical developments precede not only the resources accumulated by the communication industry but also its production possibilities.

Communications is an area in which technical electronic innovations are applied rapidly, and in attempting to strive for world leadership, one must be concerned not only with the scale of production of telecommunications equipment (which is too small) but with their quality as well. The shortcomings of Polish microelectronics are reflected in the technical centers.

Certainly, the symposium will fulfill its role as a forum for exchanging ideas and experiences. The organizers are unanimous in predicting that the symposium will become an annual event.

In addition to obtaining information at the symposium, the participants also learned a little about the postal service. Not all participants received the conference material that was mailed much earlier! We may be strong in theory, but what about in practice?

11899

CSO: 2600/26

POLAND

OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY OF MILITARY'S CIVILIAN EMPLOYEES

Warsaw ZOLNIERZ WOLNOSCI in Polish 1 Oct 86 p 5

[Article: "Military Civilian Employee Union Aktiv Deliberates"]

[Text] The final meeting of the Main Administration of the Military Employees NSZZ was held at the Naval Oksywski Club. The status of occupational health and safety in plants represented by this union and the observance of the law on social labor inspectorates were discussed. Piotr Bogusz chaired the meeting.

The naval club was chosen intentionally as the meeting place. Among the military forces, navy civilian employees have one of the best union organizations, occupying first place regarding number of union members. It represents a model for cooperation with military leaders and concern about occupational health and safety. During the meeting, it was emphasized that much is being accomplished to improve working conditions at military establishments, but it is still insufficient.

Rear Admiral Piotr Kolodziejczyk met with the meeting's participants. He informed the unionists of the navy's tasks regarding the defense of Poland's sea boundaries. Cdr Waldemar Raczkowski described the tasks delineated by the PZPR 10th Congress.

11899

CSO: 2600/26

BILAK LECTURES FUNCTIONARIES ON NEED FOR CHANGES

Prague RUDE PRAVO in Czech 10 Oct 86 p 1

[Article by CTK: "About Urgent Issues of Our Day"]

[Text] On Thursday in the city of Usti nad Labem, Vasil Bilak, member of the Presidium and secretary of the CPCZ Central Committee, discussed urgent issues and tasks in the fulfillment of decisions stipulated by the 17th CPCZ Congress.

In his address before a work conference of party and state officials and economists from North Bohemia he dealt with issues of our domestic and foreign policies and their implementation after the 17th CPCZ Congress. We focused on the fulfillment of tasks outlined by the Congress, especially on the acceleration of our society's socioeconomic development with regards to the new needs and actual processes which are taking place in our country and the world.

He said: "If we wish to improve the quality of work in every area and in every link of management, we have to put an end to all formalism, bureaucracy, lack of discipline, mediocrity, and negligence -- to everything that paralyzes the initiative of individuals and work teams and that hampers efforts of our party, trade-union and youth teams at individual worksites."

He continued:

"Just about everybody is talking about the new way of thinking, about new approaches. Those words are repeated so often that they are in danger of turning into cliches. We do not think seriously enough about their contents which demand that we work conscientiously, become good managers of our places of work, live honestly, think not only of ourselves but also of the collective, society, our socialist homeland. What is new about that? Has this topic not been extensively discussed? Its new aspect is that we must in fact proceed from words to deeds in every place of work, in every sector of our life.

"Moreover, our society must learn to appreciate the contributions and accomplishments of work teams and individuals. We are talking about social justice; that does not mean that everyone should get the same reward, but rather that good work deserves better reward. Egalitarianism is not the socialist method of reward. Furthermore, it kills all initiative, impairs workers' morale, and antagonizes honest workers."

In the next part of his address Vasil Bilak underscored the necessary link between political education and the work of the management in every sector of our political system. He said: "These correlations have been quite extensively discussed by the session of the CPCZ Central Committee in March of 1980 which dealt with the party's ideological program. Why has the fulfillment of its decision been so slow? The ideological front itself deserves some of the blame because it failed to demonstrate appropriate courage in dealing with departmentalism, to stop to thinking in generalities and abstractions, and to adopt a firm attitude. On the other hand, the decisive problem is that the importance of ideological work is grossly underestimated in certain places. Some leading economists are not even aware of the harm they are causing when they tolerate production of inferior or unsalable goods -- production that fails to meet the needs of the market and of our people and that wastes labor, raw materials and energy. How can that influence education?

"What we need is revolutionary optimism. Without it we cannot build socialism. But that does not imply blind trust. Revolutionary optimism stems from thorough knowledge of the fact that socialism is the most just social order to which the future belongs. Building socialism is not like a leisurely walk in the "pedestrian walkway" -- it is a fierce fight and constant search, a struggle of the new with the old, with one's own self, overcoming errors and shortcomings. If life proves that it is necessary to go back sometimes, we must not be afraid to do so."

In the section focusing on urgent issues of the foreign political situation, Vasil Bilak emphasized that the whole world has reached a historical turning point -- in the way of thinking about and understanding new phenomena and realities. Qualitatively new problems and controversies have sprung up, new opportunities and new pitfalls have appeared. On the one hand, conflicts in the modern world have intensified, and on the other, all states in the world community became more interdependent. We must take a look at war and peace from a different angle. The course of history is presenting us with a dilemma: destruction or survival. The struggle for peace and social progress represents two sides of the same process which are not mutually exclusive; on the contrary, they affect each other, and to some extent, they determine each other and are dovetailed. Imperialism cannot ensure peace. Peace may be achieved only if progress and socialism are intensified, but socialism may develop only in peace. To follow the old way of thinking -- the notion there is some chance of winning or surviving the war -- is tantamount to suicide.

Vasil Bilak stressed that the struggle for man's thought and action, for man's mind and heart, is now attaining enormous dimensions and has far-reaching domestic and international implications.

Vasil Bilak, member of the Presidium and secretary of the CPCZ Central Committee, then answered many questions concerning domestic and foreign political problems.

9004/12624

CSO: 2400/13

RESEARCH SHOWS INSUFFICIENT POPULATION INCREASE

Prague TUDS LPAYO to Czech 1 Oct 86 p 4

[Article by Prof. Jaroslav Kraus, Federal Statistical Office: "How Many Children in a Family?"]

[Trans.] V. Briefly all young people who decide to get married discuss the question of how many children to have. Because the number of children per family is the basis for population increases it is a figure that is monitored closely. From time to time studies are conducted to determine the attitude of selected families on this issue in relation to their economic and social status. The most recent such survey, named Research in Planned Parenthood, was conducted by the Federal Statistical Office last fall in conjunction with other censuses.

The survey delivered mailed questionnaires to which selected families responded anonymously. The sample was structured to include marriages five years or less in length in which the husbands were no older than 30 years. Responses were received from 6,184 families. These families were distributed evenly throughout all regions of the CSSR and all social groups of young urban population.

The first finding of this study was that all the households led very active lives and viewed the subject of the study very positively. This shows that questions related to parenthood are of some concern to young couples and that they are actively involved in dealing with them. Slightly more responses were received from the CSR than from the SSR. The greatest number of respondents in the CSR came from the 20-24 age group, while more responses were received from the 25-29 year group in the SSR. The average length of marriage in the sample was three years.

Several early questions sought to determine the number of children in the family, both present and how many the parents plan to have eventually. These numbers showed a moderate decline from previous years, but the average family in the CSR still has two children. More families in the SSR than in the CSR are planning to have families with three or more children. Relatively more families in the CSR are planning to have one child. Only a small percentage of families are planning to remain childless or are undecided as to how many children they want. These findings imply that if the number

of children in families does not increase the population of the CSSR will not crease either, and in the case of the CSR there is a real possibility that the population may decline over the longer term. These results also show that the number of planned children is gradually converging with the ideal number of children. At the end of the 1970s the ideal number of children per family was clearly higher than the actual figure. The situation now is just the opposite. The number of children born in the CSSR is relatively high when compared to almost every other western European country, including Hungary and the GDR.

The fundamental problem in the population growth of the CSSR is not, however, the number of children per family or the related statistic of female fertility, but rather the question of fertility in relation to the historical deformation of the age structure of the population. In these terms current fertility levels are inadequate because the decline in the number of births results in more rapid aging of the population as a whole. These factors will be important in the age structure of the population for at least one more generation.

The families in this sample identified additional paid maternity leave as the most effective form of assistance. Maternity leave contains a financial component, but more importantly an emotional component, the opportunity to be with a child for a longer period. Second in order of importance were state subsidized loans, whose importance has been demonstrated for young families. The survey indicated that these loans now constitute a major part in setting up a new household and that state payments after a child is born are important incentives to have children. Slightly fewer respondents indicated that the subsidies initiated in 1985 for mothers who continue to care for a single child after their maternity leave expires, without returning to work, were of some assistance. The program of supplementary payments for children also received high marks.

Inasmuch as the above responses represent the attitude of young families to government population policies they show that these policies are still effective but that improvements can be made in them. The number of responses to individual questions differed depending on the women's level of education and the length of their marriage, but most of all according to the number of children they have. For instance, longer paid maternity leaves were of greater interest to families with greater than average numbers of children, while those families with average numbers of children were relatively less interested.

Another group of questions sought to determine the conditions that would have to exist for parents to consider having more children. The greatest percentage of respondents voted for increases in paid maternity leave as the most important consideration, with increases in supplementary payments for children and improvements in housing conditions the next two most numerous responses. The latter consideration stemmed from the fact that even some of the couples that had been married the longest still did not have their own apartment. Families with two children listed as their first priority increases

in supplementary payments for children. This is clearly a program that these families consider to be a real incentive to have more children because once a family has three children the possibilities for employment for the mother worsen significantly for a period of at least two to three years.

The demographic study Research in Planned Parenthood contributed to a deeper understanding of the situation in Czechoslovakia after a period of 10 years during which we have witnessed moderately declining trends both in absolute and relative numbers of births.

9276/9835

CSO: 2400/22

PROSPEROUS PRIVATE FARMER DENOUNCED

Prague RUDE PRAVO in Czech 1 Oct 86 p 3

[Article by Josef Mensik, Zator, Bruntal Okres: "The New Rich?"]

[Text] On a Sunday evening in August in the town of Zator in the Bruntal okres the roar of engines comes from a field full of grain. A brand new combine arrives, then a second and a third. They line up next to each other and wait for more equipment--two trucks, two tractors. The harvest then begins on this field in picturebook fashion. It is surprising how professionally the vehicle crews carry out this harvest in their spare time.

Rest assured, however, reader, that in this case equipment belonging to the socialist sector is contributing to the illegal enrichment of a single family. And all at the expense of the property of the sectoral directorate of the State Farm in Bruntal.

Until recently a single private farmer had been working extensive holdings in the village of Zator. He kept this up until he was very old. Then the question arose of what to do with his property. However strange it may seem this gentleman, with the help of several senior managers in the state administration, sold his property for cash to a single family in Zator. An illegal transaction. It is as if these managers forgot about existing laws and regulations designed to protect the available stock of agricultural land. They also appear not to have been interested in what the new owner planned to do with this land or even why he needed such a large amount of agricultural land. If, before agreeing to transfer this land to private ownership, these managers had at least had a look at these fields they would have seen that the fields were surrounded on all sides by the fences of the Bruntal State Farm.

The new owner also reacted appropriately to this coincidence. With the help of technicians of the socialist sector he expanded his estate to include even property that did not belong to him. A bulldozer, a truck, then a backhoe worked here in turn, and substantially increased the area being worked. Not without some return, however. So make some calculations with me. Residents of the village would gladly pay Kcs 200 for 100 kilograms of barley and Kcs 300 for 100 kilograms of wheat, or even more. Figure out for yourselves the potential revenues per hectare even with an average harvest.

A very nice profit. The fields are plowed by private tractors that once belonged to socialist organizations. Then the question arises of who sold them to this person and for how much, and where he gets the fuel for them. This is probably a public secret. And on top of this he harvests this land with the help of equipment actually belonging to the socialist sector. This is but one example of how our socialist society is beginning to produce nouveau riche who are not averse to violating and ignoring our laws.

9276/9835

CSO: 2400/22

FRG WEEKLY ASSESSES HONECKER'S ASYLUM SEEKER STANCE

Bonn RHEINISCHER MERKUR/CHRIST UND WELT in German 26 Sep 86 p 4

[Article by Juergen Engert: "Honecker's Going to Send the Bill Soon: Campaign Aid for the SPD Was Simply a By-Product of the Berlin Asylum Crisis"]

[Text] It's pretty strange: For months West German politicians were pressuring the GDR in parliamentary talks and in public speeches to clamp down on the stream of refugees arriving in West Berlin via the Schoenefeld airport and continuing on from there into the FRG. The 12 nations of the EC moved into the protest front with a demarche in Moscow. NEUES DEUTSCHLAND called these efforts "summer theater."

However now, quite suddenly, there has been an about-face: Starting 1 October the GDR will only permit transit to those people who can produce a visa for continuing travel. This requirement is, of course, nothing new, since East Berlin had announced on 1 February 1986 that "Citizens of a number of nations will only be permitted transit into the FRG via the territory of the GDR if an endorsement by the FRG is in existence. This willingness had been limited, however, by the note: "The transit traffic to Berlin (West) is not affected by these regulations, since Berlin (West) is under occupation law, is not part of the FRG and is not governed by it. The problem of people seeking asylum in West Berlin does not fall under the jurisdiction of the GDR. Entry into Berlin (West) is exclusively a concern of those who, for known reasons, have to make the decisions there." This means the Western powers. It would have agreed fully with the views of the GDR and the Soviet Union, if the "East" national border, as they named the line of demarcation within the city, had been contrasted with a "West" national border for the "independent political unit of West Berlin," in order to close the route to refugees. In this manner the four-powers status of the entire city, which still exists de jure and which the Western allies are determined to preserve at all costs, would have been undermined from the West. Major politics could have been cooked up--with the refugees as fuel. Starting 1 October the fire will be extinguished.

What is the reason for this change of heart? To jump to the aid of the SPD in the parliamentary election race? To help a party that is groaning under the asylum debate, because the demand for intervention is popular throughout much of the SPD clientele and so can cost the party? Erich Honecker took this aspect into account. At a secret meeting with Minister of the Federal Chancellery Wolfgang Schaeuble on 29 August, he promised to fulfill Bonn's wish, but

swore the gentlemen from the Rhein to strict silence. In this way the President of the State Council reserved the sweets for the SPD and made fools of Schaeuble and the FRG government.

Egon Bahr, who not only has been busy with SED Politburo member Hermann Axen on the joint disarmament plans but who also has been occupied repeatedly as SPD public advisor on the dilemma of the asylum affair, might function as a loudspeaker for the GDR decision--acting as a deputy to Johannes Rau. Honecker is, of course, counting on a continuation of the Christian-Liberal coalition in Bonn after January 1987, "provided that Kohl and the CDU/CSU make no serious mistakes," but the chance to make an investment for the future came at the right time for him. Nevertheless--even with all the wishful thoughts of Honecker and his contemporaries for the "unity of the worker class," manifested in the SED and SPD closing ranks together--the affection has not gotten to the point where it could be named the cause of the new measures. The roots lie deeper.

Recall: A year ago the GDR kept the refugee Tamils from Sri Lanka away from West Berlin. That was the fee the GDR paid the FRG government after the interest-free overdraft credit in inner-German trade had been raised from M600 to M850 million. Since then, no more Tamils have landed in Schoenefeld. The FRG government and the parties, especially the SPD, emphasize now that the GDR acted without charge with the new regulation, no money was paid and money was not once mentioned.

That is correct. But the GDR has made, in its view, an advance payment, and it will send Bonn a reminder of this advance. Not today, but tomorrow. For East Berlin is once again in economic distress. The price of oil has fallen through the floor, the dollar has caught consumption in the international currency markets. Since the beginning of the eighties, the sale of petroleum products for Western currency has been the GDR's most important source of currency. In 1985, 2.5 billion in profits were drawn from this business. The 1986 price for petroleum products, however, lies considerably below the previous year's level. ~~The loss is multiplied by the fact that the GDR discounts a~~ portion of its exports of petroleum products based on the dollar. But the dollar is expected to lose 20 to 30 percent of its value in 1986. The financial loss on the order of \$1.5 to \$2.5 billion will have an effect on GDR indebtedness in the West.

Once before, in 1981, East Berlin's credit standing was sharply weakened, because its net indebtedness rose to nearly \$8 million dollars. With a great effort it succeeded in creating a trade surplus with the Western countries and so found the means to reduce its mountain of debt. They were helped in this by the two credits of one billion that were placed at the free disposal of the GDR with the aid of the FRG government in 1983 and 1984. Between 1982 and March of this year, the GDR pushed its net indebtedness down to \$3.7 billion dollars. This favorable development was interrupted by the drop in the price of oil and the decline in the dollar's exchange rate. It is not expected that the loss in income can be balanced out with the export of other products. Their technological lag vis-a-vis the West will hinder sales. Moreover, inexpensive goods such as textiles, will be beaten out of the market by suppliers from the Far East.

East Berlin's economic difficulties are mirrored by the Soviet Union. Outside of its block, Moscow exports oil and natural gas based up to 60 percent on the dollar. After the decline in price, combined with the weak U.S. currency, the relationship between exports and imports is coming apart at the seams for the Soviet Union as well. The Soviet Union and the GDR need money; and it must be hard currency, for Gorbachev and Honecker have promised their countries modernization. The technological lag vis-a-vis the West, which--contrary to all prognoses--is not decreasing but is instead continually increasing, cannot be diminished without importing technology. For this, the Soviet Union and the GDR need credits on the Western capital market. One can expect that they will soon make known their hunger for credit. In order to satisfy it, however, there must be a political climate between East and West that is not characterized by acute tensions.

This, then, answers the question of why the Soviet Union and the GDR declared themselves willing to cooperate on the refugee problem. The economy has once again triumphed over orthodoxy for a time. True, they did try one time more to draw the three Western powers and the FRG government away from their legal position on Berlin, but the test was not taken to the limit.

Moscow has always coupled the *modus vivendi*, as it is expressed in the Berlin four-power agreement, and the obligation it includes for Soviet restraint to the condition that the West in general and the Americans in particular refrain from a confrontation with the Warsaw Pact and the Russians. In struggling with the United States for a disarmament mechanism--essential to Gorbachev because of the drive to modernize the Soviet economy, the General Secretary in Moscow has pulled at the nerve of Berlin.

As long as the opposition from Washington lasted, Gorbachev and Honecker were deaf to the issue of "asylum via Schoenefeld." After the change in scenery between the superpowers had come about, the summit between Gorbachev and Reagan had been drawn up, intransigence was no longer on the agenda. The city was, is and will remain a barometer of the political climate between East and West.

12507/12859
CSO: 2300/35

YOUTH UNATTRACTED TO PARTY MEMBERSHIP

Budapest TARSADALMI SZEMLE in Hungarian No 7, 1986 pp 45-48

[Article by Andras Toth: "The Path of Youth to the Party"]

[Text] The MSZMP has close to 877 thousand members, and each year it admits close to 30 thousand applicants to its ranks--nearly 17 thousand of whom are below the age of 30 at the time of their admission. Statistically and in general they are considered youths; they represent nearly 60 percent of all new party members. This ratio is significantly below the expected "great majority" requirement based on the directives of the leading party entities.

However, we could also paint a "more reassuring" picture of the party-building work carried-out with the youth. It is quite true that the party's pervasion in the adult population approaches the 11 percent mark. For years, party membership has been growing although the rate of growth has been steadily slowing down. Despite the respectable showing it would be a mistake to soothe the consciences of the party apparatus and organizations. After all, the opinion which may be heard on occasion that things are basically alright may perhaps be true of the present, but only with serious reservations. It is commonly known that the average age of the party membership has been increasing for years and that among the younger age groups the party's pervasion barely reaches the 5 percent mark. Thus, the evidence shows that despite every plan and wish the members of the new generation are joining the party in smaller numbers and at a slower rate than would be possible and necessary. This is occurring despite the fact that for years the party's leadership and the resolutions of the organizations have emphasized that efforts must be concentrated on educating the youth of every class and stratum to become party members. But--as it is often formulated within the party membership circles--if we are consistently unable to produce the expected results by our efforts and intentions, then this is, at the very least, worth contemplating. After all, in politics neither magic nor the various forms of suggestion are effective. In contrast, the realization that we must act if we want change to occur in some area of our activity seems simple. But we need to have a detailed analysis in order to be able to give a precise answer to the "where" question. We must clearly see the circumstances of the training of youth to become party members and their admission to party membership, their underlying causal interrelationship and, last but not least, the lessons that may be deduced from this.

In articles, lectures and elsewhere three terms are used--often inaccurately--frequently with identical or similar meanings: (party recruitment work, training to become a party member and party-building). The most narrowly defined of the expressions is party recruitment work. This spans the period of time from the initial application for membership to the time of actual acceptance. The training to become a party member refers to a far more complex and lengthy process. Theoretically, it refers to the educational process whereby someone develops the realization and internal drive that he wishes to become a member of the party. However, the needs of the party organization and the community are also closely related, prompting it to start dealing with those (youths) outside the party and expressing its intention of admitting into its ranks those seeking contact with the party. Even if we limit ourselves to strictly official institutions this process extends from the learning of the six points by the small drummers through the consciously accepted community work performed with political commitment in the KISZ to the formulation of application for party membership. We are talking of at least 12 years of political-educational work of varying intensity and its effects.

Party-building is the broadest expression. While the two previous processes essentially encompass the events leading up to admittance to the party the party-building also includes the events occurring within the party. Simplifying the concept, this expression has three components. The first one is to assure the party of a continuous supply of members from each new generation; the other is to broaden the preparedness of the party members and their political experiences; the third is the purity of the party, i.e., its divestiture of those who do not live up to the norms of the party or who oppose them. In accordance with the syntax, all three elements are simultaneously and continuously necessary for building the party. Party acceptance work, instructional and training activities within the party, the influence of the organizational life and the party disciplinary work all taken together could lead to the healthy development of the party. All this is collectively necessary to have every communist become a respected and esteemed member of his community. The basis for this is created by exemplary integrity, modest, disciplined conduct, and the fulfillment of political requirements.

The training of the new generation, the acceptance of the youth into the party and their participation in the work of local party organizations depend on many factors. Obviously it would be a mistake if one were to attempt to obtain, from only statistical data, even an approximation of the total picture of the party's contact with the young and its quality. After all, social, political, economic, and ideological factors collectively affect the success, and occasionally the failure, of this work. The effect of the party's work is influenced by, among other things, social adaptation, starting a career, creating an independent livelihood, forming a family, and raising children; it is also affected by the atmosphere at work, and the scope of concerns and opportunities for political-community activities.

It may be observed that during a dynamic time when development is encouraged, more people are drawn to the party and accept its aims more easily and with less reservations. It may be shown that changes in international politics--if not directly and immediately, at least in the long run--exercise an effect on politics and the rapprochement toward or withdrawal from the party. When the

arms race accelerates, when political and military confrontations in various parts of the world become more frequent, then the youth who must not be neglected, become increasingly introverted, apolitical and uncertain. The sudden standstill which came about at the beginning of the 80's in the economy, the development of living standards, and in general, the sphere of living and working conditions, likewise had a detrimental effect on gaining the confidence and mobilizing the young generation. Yet difficult situations also have a mobilizing effect and could awaken an interest in solving common problems.

However, it must also be taken into consideration that the increasing concerns attendant on setting up one's own home or the fact that the financial situation of the parents often has a determinant role in the conditions for establishing one's independent existence restrained the interest and mobilization of a significant segment of the younger age groups toward politics and community affairs. The net effect of all this is that the distance between certain strata of the youth and the party has increased. This is also why it is important for the party organizations to have a worthier and more realistic understanding of the circumstances and aspirations of the youth of various strata and age groups and the effect of politics on them. In and of itself, this is obviously not enough. There is a need for a series of measures which improve the possibilities for starting an independent life with its social and financial conditions. The basis for this is a more dynamic economic development than in the past years, a more vigorous technical-technological advancement, as well as better and more fruitfully planned work. The mid-range plan adopted at the XIII. Party Congress holds open the possibility that whoever is not lazy and is willing to take action may be able to get ahead on the basis of his merit. Politics will be able to create, maintain or recover its credibility if it is able to supply realistic answers to practical questions, if it addresses unambiguously, clearly, and in a principled manner the contradictions concomitant with development and their potential solutions.

The practice of society's youth policy has a strong influence on the relations and connections of the party to the younger generation. As a result of the activities conducted over the past one and a half decades, societal attention to the young has increased and significant advances have also been achieved. However, in numerous areas the preconditions for advancement have not been successfully created, and in several areas contradictions, difficulties, and strains have either appeared or reappeared. These are primarily associated with the fact that on certain issues a mistaken perspective has developed and gained ascendancy. This has also affected and had repercussions on the process of training individuals to be party members. One of the characteristic shortcomings of the youth policy is that (it classifies too great a proportion of the population as youth). There are many reasons for this, but among the most important we must cite the following: socially, young people mature later, at an older age, than previously; the trend is toward a longer average life span; the process of becoming a "full-fledged" adult has slowed and the generations are overlapping. A majority of the party organizations believe--pursuant to this perspective--that training for party membership and recruitment work may be safely extended to the mid-thirties since they members of this age group may still be considered young. And until

that point--as they say--there is the youth organization KISZ, which, for that matter, is mandated to provide the party with a new generation of members. As a result of this fairly widespread practice mature adults will not or are less likely to become party members because of their age. A detrimental effect of this delay is that in certain strata of the youth, especially among certain strata of the intelligentsia, the generational pile-up in front of the party's gateway is continuous. This has a detrimental effect on the relations between the party and the youth and may even cause its loosening.

The next weak component of the practice of our youth policy is (the attention devoted to the youth). Its content and style is often one-sided and semantic. The beneficent, fatherly and patronizing educational concept is not rare. Human and ethical demands must be made of the young who request admittance to the party, in addition the political requirements. The party is looking for youth who are knowledgeable in their professions, perform their work conscientiously, and whose personal lives are in order and free of hypocrisy. However, it must also be understood that the influence and prestige of the party is diminished if the youth encounter hypocrisy and unscrupulous behavior of party members, party groups, local party organizations or the leadership. Those are also undecided who identify politically and ideologically with the goals of the party but are unable to reconcile the faults they see, and therefore do not seek admittance. Often this is evident in the relations between the party and KISZ organizations and in the practice of the party guidance, all of which has an effect on the relationship between youths and adults, and breeds mistrust.

There is a need for a perspective which, in dealing with the youth, places the emphasis on the assignment of tasks, the setting of demands and the call to action and participation. This is also essential because only in this way is it possible to tap the opportunities which lie in the cooperation of different generations and age groups, and the sensible division of labor and the acceptance of responsibility.

The third problem area ripe for change is associated with the fact that (a suitable division of labor in the upbringing of the youth has not developed). Often, there has been too much emphasis placed on the concept of joint responsibility, in the shadow of which the responsibilities and delineation of duties of certain organizations and institutions have been blurred. This has created tensions in two areas. Numerous social organizations and movements have for many years remained deficient in the development of the content, form, and organizational prerequisites of the youth work carried out in their own spheres. Consequently, so many tasks devolved on the KISZ that their fulfillment was not assured by either the potentials of the youth association or the existing circumstances. Thus, in many instances, the work of the KISZ was frittered away and became characterless and often there was no time or energy left for precisely the substantive activities. These have jointly and continuously caused disruptions in the substance, operation, and effectiveness of the work with youth. In the area of the training of the youth for party membership, primarily the lost opportunities have caused tension: we may be certain that if the inclusion of the new generation into the building of socialism would have occurred earlier under more diverse, manifold parameters and forms, we would be further ahead in solving our problems.

In the institution of political and community affairs activities by the youth, a significant role is played by the experiences the youth gain through interacting with the party, i.e., meeting party members. Often these experiences leave a long-lasting effect on the impressions formed by the youth about the character and quality of the party. The youth do not have general contact with the party: their experience is always concrete and subjective. In high school, college, or the workplace, they see the activity of a given local party organization or group, and they meet and talk with the party secretary and party members in their locality. It has often been observed that the youth, in general, form a more favorable opinion of the party and its politics than of the local party organization and the work carried out there, which they know or are somewhat familiar with. This value judgment often manifests lack of wide-ranging knowledge, or occasional disillusionment and simplification of reality, but at times it is also based on a condemnation and criticism of the functioning of the party organization they know or of the conduct and work of one or another party member.

This demand often arises for the party to paint a credible, true, and attractive picture of itself--a picture which demonstrates its ability to lead and solve the problems facing society, to recognize and dissolve the contradictions accompanying progress, and to constantly renew itself. This is a necessary effort; the party has numerous deficiencies in this area. However, we must also see that this is primarily not a task for propaganda. A truly credible picture is formed by the daily work of the party. Wherever the party is able to genuinely influence matters, where the party supports and accepts the responsibility for bringing real interests to the forefront, where it bravely faces up to the shortcomings in our work, it elicits acknowledgment and support from the environment and the youth, and at the same time provides them with an example.

Nowhere, where the party organization and its membership do not assume responsibility for continuous political work, where it is not at the vanguard of healthy efforts to solve the problems and deficiencies that have been lingering for years, where idle talk and, on occasion, hiding behind calls for reform are substituted for real action, where the norm is triteness and politeness--we should not be surprised that the youth do not find the party attractive and that it has no real political influence. Furthermore, the honest intent of national or international politics and results achieved at the cost of great exertions cannot rectify this deficiency.

It is important for the party apparatus and organizations and for every communist to demand and take responsibility for better cooperation and the development of direct, informal relations with the youth. For this, honest, direct dialogue, and one-on-one persuasion and example are indispensable. One must be among them constantly day after day, not just once in a while or occasionally, and take the responsibility for providing honest answers to their often none too polite questions. In the interests of this it becomes increasingly necessary to radically change the attitudes and practices of the party organizations and local organizations with regard to political work and the issue of party appointments, especially where there are many youth in their composition. The execution of the actual, practical political work and the

formation of the youths' perspective must be completed and interpreted as a high-caliber party assignment to be carried out with the best efforts.

The fourth factor affecting the formation of the youths' application for party membership and their admittance is the (membership acceptance work). The guidance work is a component of this whereby the higher party organs convey the political requirements to the party apparatus and organizations conducting membership drives. This also includes taking into consideration the way in which the party apparatus and organizations evaluate the facts, results, and nuances of the work of the membership drives at any given time. The political requirement for party-building are unambiguous and clear. This was formulated in the resolution of the XIII Party Congress as follows: "In the process of admitting new members great attention must be given so that only those from every stratum of society are admitted to the party who are active in the community live in a socialist manner and are respected on the basis of their work, conduct and social activities. Every party organization and every communist is personally responsible for strengthening the party."

Two points become obvious from this quote: the party depends on every stratum of society and every party member must make party building his own personal responsibility. These requirements are increasingly integrated into the everyday practices of the party apparatus and organizations. It is also true that, on occasion, the basic party apparatus and leading party organizations themselves present many bad examples.

Not infrequently there is the temptation of using an overly mechanical breakdown of the composition of the national norms for party membership instead of having a rigid statistical view or setting political requirements. This is a mistake, because in this way suitability is not even measured. It is "sufficient" to conduct membership drives only on the basis of the formal indicators. Again and again it must be emphasized that in the acceptance of new members the principles of the evaluation of the individual as such must be enforced and this may not be confused with the necessary and otherwise correct requirements directing the formation of the party's composition.

An indispensable prerequisite for successful party-building is to raise the quality of the work performed by the local party organizations. The sponsor's responsibility must be increased, the democratic character of the preparatory work must be strengthened as well as cooperation with the social organizations and movements that participate in the training of the youths to become party members. The primary purpose of this is to have increasingly more of the youth become politically active and committed to socialism and that they come into contact with party members at an earlier stage in life than they generally do at present. A frequently used counterargument--especially in the circle of educational party organizations--is that it is risky to accept applicants at such early an age who lack sufficient life experiences.

I cannot accept the stated opinions even though I understand that, on occasion, good intentions, concerns for the party or security considerations motivate these views. There is a simple explanation for this. There is a reason why the party's organizational rules have set the earliest age limit

for acceptance into the party at age 18; this must not be viewed as a theoretical principle but rather, it must be accorded practical value.

The second reason for my objection is that more than once events in life have proven that amidst social upheavals, individuals in their teens and twenties holding responsible positions have stood their ground with us and in other parts of the world often stand their ground with conviction and preparedness. In a consolidated, peaceful, and balanced social situation this could and must be tried more often than in the present.

The third component of my counterargument is--and this is just an assumption on my part--that I think at times the justification for waiting and postponement could be convenience and unwillingness to accept responsibility. However, it is readily apparent that there is no real risk involved in accepting people for party membership who are tried and tested, who have acquired a familiarity with public affairs and who are nearing their twenties. Naturally, we must take this risk. The party organizations must protect young members from destructive influences and strengthen their conviction with wide-ranging, honest information and caring and with instruction guaranteeing their development into solid communists.

In the actual work of the party, more and more arguments could be made that it would be worth examining the further development of the evaluation of party membership acceptance work and its statistical order. The concerns are becoming ever more perceptible in two areas. The first problem is that party acceptance statistics indiscriminately define the youth age limit to be 30. It is not, for example, taken into consideration that differences exist between the situation of the working youth and the young intelligentsia. The 24-25 year-old worker youth who has at least 4-5 years of work experience, who has finished his tour of military service and who has children is, in all respects, an adult. This factor should be evaluated as such in membership acceptance work; thus, one could speak of the acceptance of worker and peasant youths until about the first half of their 20's. Accordingly, a 26-27 year-old worker party member would no longer be considered a youth.

In contrast, in the case of young college graduates, age 26-27 could be the upper youth age limit--because of their different educational paths and the time needed to adapt to society. Naturally, this change, in addition to providing a better situation report, would also permit the indication of the need for a realistic youth policy and a realistic picture of the youth. The evaluation of the individual must replace statistical perspective!

Corporate analyses and evaluations often support their conclusions with absolute numbers and ratios. However, their values only rarely reflect accuracy. The organizational indicator is probably the most appropriate for providing a relatively accurate description of the facts. If we would wish to show the party's organizational presence in the various strata of society and age groups, this could be most accurately accomplished by calculating the extent of organization in each individual stratum and age group. This method is rarely used; the indicator of party membership composition is more frequently used which, however, says precious little about the true state of affairs. The fact that in a particular city, let's say 40 percent of the

party membership is composed of workers may or may not represent a very good ratio. It would depend on the composition of the residents' professions. The mechanistic treatment of the requirements may often be traced to this. It can happen that a particular statistic may be favorable with respect to the county but may lead to a totally distorted conclusion with respect to another city. It is important that in the future, the statistical scheme of recruitment for party membership work should better contribute to improving party-building and to the deduction of more precise conclusions.

When the party says that it wants the entire new generation to be proportionally represented in its membership it does not do this out of charity or a sense of propriety. It is in its basic political interest. A party which holds as an essential element of its operation the quick and effective response to increasingly more frequent social and economic challenges and the ability to constantly renew itself may not renounce the recruitment of new generations and their inclusion in its activities. For a Marxist-Leninist party another realistic alternative amidst today's political and social conditions is unimaginable.

It is in the youths' interest to use the opportunities offered by the party as well as to actively participate in political-public affairs. After all it is readily apparent that this provides the best opportunity for the young generation to evaluate the effect and consequences of today's decisions on tomorrow and the day after tomorrow and to influence them as need be. This is how the new generation may become the guardians, developers, and enhancers of our society's revolutionary triumphs. In this way it may become a realistic goal to create social and political relations which result in wealth of financial, intellectual and cultural goods, greater social justice and more extensive democracy. And this points beyond the interests of both the party and the youth; this serves the general interests of society.

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CATHOLIC AND NON-CATHOLIC OPINION SURVEYS ON ECONOMIC POLICY

Krajowa WYKONAWCZA FUNKCYJONALNOŚĆ in Polish No 34, 24 Aug 86 pp 1,2

[Article by Piotr Szlachetka: "Public Opinions on the Economy and Economic Policy"]

[There is one, however, that are wrong but widespread is that of alluding to public opinion as the basis of intuition and inner conviction and treating as reality, or at least promoted by oneself. That is why verification of what is being said about society compared to its actual condition is valuable. Such an opportunity is offered by the third report in the series "Poles in the 1980s," developed by a group of sociologists from the Institute of Philosophy and Sociology of the Polish Academy of Sciences, entitled "Poles in 1984." This work was completed within the framework of problem MR III 17: "The political culture of modern Polish society," by Wladyslaw Adamski, Ireneusz Bialecki, Henryk Janowski, Tadeusz Jasiewicz, Lena Kolarska-Bobinska, Jadwiga Kozłowska-Balik, Andrzej Rychard, Katarzyna Staszynska, Jacek Szymanderski, Anna Tichauer and Wojciech Zaborowski.

This work was preceded by two reports, "Poles in 1980" and "Poles in 1981". Materials for this study were gathered 2 years ago and completed this year. One can assume that in the past 2 years, when there were no dramatic turnarounds, there were also none in public opinion, but rather that earlier trends continued. This is confirmed in any case by partial results from other, later research conducted by other centers. That is why "Poles in 1984" can be considered as a data material.

From this extensive report, numbering almost 900 pages, only a little data and few conclusions about public opinions on the economy have been selected. I will try to present political opinions, which are more difficult in publication, somewhat less, although both topics--economic and political--are closely tied to each other.

In this short article I cannot present the individual studies that make up the report. I am forced to choose material rather at my discretion, including numerous tables, sometimes grouping them in tables suitable to this format. Here and there in the tables there are minimal inaccuracies which do not affect the overall picture.

The starting point is obviously the crisis perceived by over 50 percent of those surveyed. But the crisis does not consist of the same thing for everyone. Half call attention to shortages in the marketplace and state control. For 22.1 percent the crisis is bad planning and management--which is more a cause than a symptom, and for 17.8 percent it is inflation and its derivatives. Also mentioned are phenomena in which effects are mixed with causes. They include poor work, lack of discipline and concern for the common good, poor interpersonal relations, apathy, moral decline, poor relations between government and the public.

Incidentally it is worth making a few remarks that will be useful with the tables. The high percentage of "hard to say," besides a lack of discernment, also means avoidance, especially when the question seems delicate to the respondent. It also appears that a similar approach may occur in choosing the "somewhat" response. Also the universality of certain opinions or lack of it may constitute a test of the effectiveness of the media, who promote or oppose a given opinion.

Going back to the assessment of reasons for the crisis, there are no significant differences in their selection on the basis of party or union membership--now and in 1981 this latter division turns out to be very important in many other instances. However, the educational level of those surveyed has a significant effect. The higher the level, the more weight is attached to poor planning and management and poor government-public relations and less to poor work, lack of discipline, dishonest and theft.

Slightly more than half do not feel that the crisis results from the bases of the socialist system. This is confirmed by the distribution of opinions in the responses contained in table 1.

It is apparent from the table that pro-socialist opinions have many more advocates than anti-socialist. But this is not a significant majority. One can see that issues of the political system are in part considered on the ideological and theoretical plane. It is worth taking a look at questions 1 and 3. Theoretically, affirmative responses to both are not mutually exclusive because one can feel simultaneously that socialism, specifically in Poland, has caused indigence but in principle has more possibilities, not yet utilized, than capitalism. One could also accept that in the entire questionnaire, 43.6 and 40.3 percent answered agree to both questions. But actually 40 percent of those who answered agree to question 3 answered agree to question 1.

The most agree answers came to question 5. Work and future security are treated as positive values and so indeed are they treated by the majority of respondents. But a certain lack of consistency on questions 1 and 3 permits the supposition that among those answering agree there was some number of advocates of unemployment, of which they are more than one-third in society--see table 3, question 12--and whose perspective on job security for everyone alienates them from socialism, just as the secure future the system creates need not suit everyone. It also does not appear that a negative response to question 9, table 1 would say much about anything. It could have had

significance 10 years after the war, but even 20 years after the war, comparisons with 1939 were somewhat provocative.

Attitudes toward socialism did not depend on age, sex, education, profession or place of residence which, as the authors of the report note, differentiate the current from the postwar situation. At that time advocates of socialism included the rural poor coming to work in the cities and part of the creative intelligentsia, while steadfast opponents included some industrial workers and the technical intelligentsia. Membership in Solidarity also did not affect attitudes toward the system. Only a comparison of Solidarity members with PZPR members reveals certain differences.

This somewhat abstract attitude toward ideology means that it has moderate significance for political opinions and even less when it comes to opinions on the economy and the means to restore it. This comes from table 6, from which it is apparent that less than half--one way or another--associate politics with the economy, while about one-third deny this connection.

One can also see this in the selection of means designed to lead to improvement. Some 40.8 percent place better, honest, more efficient work in first place, while 31 percent place change in economic mechanisms there. Here the higher the educational level, the more emphasis on mechanism, on the method of wielding authority and on control over it from the grass roots level and the less emphasis on work and repression of shirkers, alcoholics and profiteers.

A more complex but more complete picture is offered by table 2, in which one can see how respondents, without having to make a choice, relate to many of the values presented to them. Here also one can see the advantage of specifics.

From the opinions expressed in this table, several practical conclusions are apparent. One can infer that the values in items 1-8 have an integral effect on the public. As far as items 9-1 are concerned, one should note the number of total disagree and hard to say votes pointing to a lack of approval for the values presented. One should not therefore assume that the lack of an affirmative response to questions 9 means non-religiousness or animosity toward religion. It is mainly young, educated, tolerant people and PZPR members who answered disagree to that question. The latter can possibly be seen as non-religious to a greater extent, while viewing the others as groups who treat belief as a phenomenon from an order other than the socio-economic one. Party and government policy, on the other hand, fit into this order.

The dividing line among those responding to questions 10 and 11 does not run between professional groups but rather within them. Membership in the PZPR or labor unions (in 1981 trade unions and Solidarity, now new unions and independents) is significant.

Responses to question 11 show that 42.9 percent feel that it is necessary to execute government recommendations regardless of one's attitude toward them. Therefore, social and economic strategy can be effectively carried out only when it earns the approval of the majority of the public, while responses to

questions 3 and 4 show that neither a blow against public security nor a policy of long-term material self-denial would earn such approval. There is a rather justifiable conviction about the generally lower standard of living as compared to the level of our cultural development, which we discussed in the article "Work, wages" (TYGODNIK POWSZECHNY No 24). This would therefore require only such a change in the method of management that would radically improve its effectiveness.

Table 3 shows attitudes toward specific solutions. Questions 1-3 deal with means of directing the economy, while the following questions allow us to determine attitudes toward socio-political systems in the economy. Concepts 4-7 fit into the egalitarian-state control system and 8-13 into the non-egalitarian-market system. As one can see, the latter has significantly more advocates. Table 5, on selected examples from both "systems," shows how public opinions at the beginning of the 1980s have changed in this regard. Most likely the crisis has brought home the ineffectiveness of the egalitarian-state control concept. On top of this is the propaganda of reform and certainly participation in the second cycle, which appears as the effective, market type. If the clear egalitarianism of the 1980s appears to be a protest against irregularities within a system that was intended to be egalitarian, then in 1984 the majority of non-egalitarian opinions perhaps signifies disagreement with the method of management thus far. Also, opinions from the years 1980 and 1981 are very incohesive; mostly "good" solutions were selected from both broadly conceived concepts, while in 1984 one can see a certain crystallization and increase in cohesiveness of opinions. Respondents perceive to a greater extent that both system force some concrete choice between the two.

It is significant that tables 3 and 4 show that the public is at least in the majority not egalitarian and is moving farther away from egalitarianism; this is not expressed in the picture promoted by the media. The notion is promulgated that the egalitarianism of the majority of the public does not permit execution of a more pro-efficiency economic policy. Actually though, the opponents of reform, in avoiding an open statement, shield themselves groundlessly with public opinion. It is worth noting the response to question 10, where despite actually irritating propaganda against the private sector, the ratio of advocates of its growth to opponents is more than two to one. Some 89.2 percent of owners of private businesses respond in favor of growth--which is not surprising--along with 70 percent of farmers, 62.9 percent of technical personnel, 62.3 percent of skilled workers and 55.3 percent of unskilled workers. So saying that the working class is against private initiative means creating a conflict where there is none.

Let us go back to questions 1-3 in table 3. Noteworthy is the great preponderance of advocates of self-management, which must represent universal values for the majority, not merely pragmatic usefulness. Undoubtedly it is supposed to satisfy the need for democracy and participation in decision making. Advocates of both economic systems and people who take opposite stances on political issues declare themselves in favor of self-management.

Likewise, with the attitude toward the competence of managers, one sees no significant correlation with other attitudes and traits of the respondents. But

because the ratio of advocates to opponents is not great, one might accept that this issue is considered rather more pragmatically.

More significant is the role of the PZPR in the economy. One should not treat opponents of expanding its role as being in general opposition to the party. There may be those among them who feel that the party's role is already adequate as well as those who, in accepting its policies, do not accept its method of guiding the economy thus far. In any case, table 6 shows that the increase in criticism that generally goes with a higher level of education prompts support for change in all areas of the administration (party, self-management units, management). But those who are advocates of expanding the PZPR's role in the economy support the egalitarian-state control system to a greater degree than others. Also, in responding to the questions in table 1, they take a stance affirming the socialist system to a greater degree. And in responding to strictly political questions, which we are omitting here, they emerged mainly as advocates of the government and its policies. Associated with these political attitudes is a positive attitude toward price setting by central authorities and a full employment policy but negative toward private initiative and profitable tours abroad. Wages, however, are apolitical. The authors of "Poles in 1984" are of the opinion that economic options have a political nature to a great extent, certainly more than in the years 1980-81, when political attitudes were more openly expressed.

It is interesting that PZPR membership does not have much effect on declaring in favor of contrary economic concepts, including the role of the party (51 percent of its members against). But union membership is noteworthy. Some 29.5 percent of union members in 1984 and 19.6 percent of independents respond in favor of expanding the PZPR's role in the economy. For expanding the private sector it was 47 and 62.2 percent respectively. Similarly, in 1984, union membership in 1981 was significant, where Solidarity members in 1980 were somewhat more egalitarian and four years later more non-egalitarian than respondents in general.

In addition, in 1984 those born in the years 1947-66 (also, to a lesser degree, those born in 1927-46), the more highly educated, with higher incomes, specialists, technical personnel and business owners, were more non egalitarian. Older people, unskilled workers, manual-white collar workers, peasant-workers, rural residents and retirees were more egalitarian.

Although the connection between attitudes on politics and the economy is very complicated, from the survey it is possible to distinguish two blocks as far as attitudes are concerned--the monocentric-egalitarian and the polycentric-efficiency blocks. The attitude toward the PZPR's role, toward the economy, an entire set of attitudes, determines the approach to politics (mono- or polycentrism). Support for the government and for reform do not coincide. The party is perceived by advocates and opponents more as a force conducting an egalitarian policy, although it propounds a program of reform [----] Law of 31 July 1981 on the control of publications and performances, Art 2, item 6 (DZIENNIK USTAW No 20, item 99, amended 1983 DZIENNIK USTAW No 44, item 204).

This division does not exhaust the issue by any means. There are egalitarians who do not accept the present system and there is also a small group of non-egalitarians who accept the system.

Sixty-four percent of those responding agreed (35.9 percent agree strongly, 28.1 percent agree somewhat) with the statement, "The income and well-being of people like me depend more on policies and decisions from above than on my industriousness and capability." The response to this question does not correlate with political attitudes or with an egalitarian or non-egalitarian stance. It appears to be a statement of fact. Such a feeling explains the universality of demanding opinions, which do not have to be associated with egalitarianism by any means. One can be an opponent of egalitarianism but demand satisfaction of one's needs from the government-employer, since one cannot very well see the possibility of satisfying them himself.

The survey included a question on personal matters to be handled. Forty-one percent mentioned housing matters; 27.2 percent various aspects of improving their housing situation; 20.3 percent personal, family matters, 3.5 percent a better job, 2.3 percent improving their means of subsistence, 2.2 percent education and improving their qualifications and 3.6 percent others. The weight of housing matters, which to a great extent depend on industriousness and capability, is sufficient to confirm the truth of the attitude toward what prosperity depends on. This is confirmed by the low level of responses on better jobs and higher qualifications. But age is important since housing is an item that one waits for, while all other items are usually a long time being acquired. Also important is the proximity of the government.

It is striking that wish such a high assessment of the role of policy and decisions from above, 38.2 percent count on themselves in handling their own affairs, 32.3 percent on their families and only 15.7 percent on institutions of various kinds. This would mean that the majority feel that deciding their affairs depends on the state, but they do not count on its being able to deal with them, which must be frustrating indeed.

Table 1							
Opinions On the System of Government (percent of those agreeing)							
Opinion	Agree strongly	Agree somewhat	Total agree	Disagree somewhat	Disagree strongly	Total disagree	Hard to say
1. Socialism has more possibilities for economic growth than capitalism	17.2	26.4	43.6	20.8	12.6	33.4	22.6
2. More injustice and exploitation under capitalism than socialism	22.7	27.4	50.1	18.0	7.7	25.7	23.7
3. Socialism in Poland has caused indigence	16.9	23.4	40.3	32.0	9.9	41.9	18.5

4. Socialism is more progressive than capitalism	20.7	29.3	50.0	16.4	9.9	26.3	18.5
5. Social ensures work & secure future better than capitalism	35.4	34.7	70.1	7.3	5.0	12.3	16.8
6. Rapid rebuilding of Poland was possible only under socialism	25.7	30.2	55.9	14.1	10.8	20.2	18.7
7. Like it or not, only socialist Poland can be independent	26.6	29.3	55.9	11.7	7.8	19.5	24.0
8. We could have done much more in the 40 years after the war	14.0	16.6	30.6	25.1	10.3	35.4	33.3
9. People are generally worse off now than before the war	5.2	7.3	12.5	29.0	36.5	65.5	21.2

Table 2

Values Important For the Good of Poland (percent of those agreeing)							
Value	Agree strongly	Agree somewhat	Total agree	Disagree somewhat	Disagree strongly	Total disagree	Hard to say
1. honest, reliable work	86.5	13.1	99.6	0.3	0.0	0.3	0.2
2. lower alcohol consumption	80.9	14.7	95.7	1.9	0.4	2.3	2.1
3. a prosperous life	72.5	24.2	96.7	1.4	0.2	1.6	1.6
4. guaranteed work & living conditions	68.7	28.3	97.0	1.1	0.2	1.3	1.7
5. understanding & cooperation with people of different attitudes	62.0	31.9	93.9	1.7	0.5	2.2	3.9

6. respect for tradition	61.8	29.5	91.3	3.6	0.6	4.2	4.5
7. conduct consistent with one's convictions	54.9	31.8	86.7	4.9	1.0	5.9	7.4
8. respect for the law	53.2	37.8	91.0	2.2	1.7	3.9	5.1
9. belief in God	44.3	25.4	69.7	7.9	5.7	13.6	16.7
10. support for party & government policy	19.3	28.5	47.8	12.0	10.6	22.6	29.5
11. executing government orders, like it or not	15.9	27.0	41.9	23.7	15.4	39.1	18.0

Table 3

Concept	Socio-Economic Concepts (percent of those agreeing)						
	Agree strongly	Agree somewhat	Total agree	Disagree somewhat	Disagree strongly	Total disagree	Hard to say
1. enlarging the PZPR's role in the economy	8.1	13.1	21.2	27.1	30.9	58.0	20.5
2. expanding the influence of self-management units	36.1	40.9	77.0	6.7	2.5	9.2	13.4
3. increasing director independence	24.8	31.2	56.0	19.3	10.3	29.6	14.2
4. limiting highest incomes	29.6	26.5	56.1	22.7	12.5	35.2	8.5
5. only central authorities set prices	25.2	28.2	53.4	22.8	10.5	33.3	12.4
6. wages increase for everyone	16.0	18.6	34.6	29.3	23.1	52.4	12.5
8. strong differentiation of incomes according to qualifications	43.6	37.2	80.8	10.9	2.9	13.8	5.2

9. discharging inefficient employees	48.4	33.5	81.9	10.3	2.5	12.8	5.2
10. wider range for the private sector in the economy	24.1	35.4	59.5	18.1	9.5	27.6	12.7
11. introducing market law and competition	55.0	26.9	81.9	4.1	1.8	5.9	11.9
12. permitting unemployment	16.1	18.3	34.4	21.5	35.7	57.2	8.1
13. enabling trips abroad for employment	40.6	29.4	70.0	10.2	6.6	16.8	12.6

Table 4

Changes In Socio-Economic Attitudes (percentage of those agreeing)

Concept from

Table 3	Year	Agree strongly	Agree somewhat	Total agree	Disagree somewhat	Disagree strongly	Total disagree	Hard to say
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4. limit highest incomes	1980	70.6	19.1	89.7	5.1	3.4	8.5	1.8
	1981	50.7	28.0	78.7	9.1	4.8	13.9	7.4
	1984	29.7	26.5	56.2	22.6	12.5	35.1	8.5

5. policy of full employment

	1980	50.6	27.2	77.8	9.8	5.4	15.2	7.0
	1981	29.1	24.5	53.6	22.6	11.3	33.9	12.5
	1984	25.2	28.2	53.4	22.7	10.8	33.3	12.6

8. strong differentiation of incomes

	1980	25.3	28.1	53.4	25.1	14.2	39.3	6.5
	1981	30.3	31.6	61.9	21.4	5.2	26.6	11.2
	1984	43.6	37.2	80.8	10.9	2.9	13.8	5.2

9. discharging inefficient employees

	1980	68.6	21.5	90.5	5.0	1.3	6.3	3.2
	1981	59.0	27.4	86.4	6.4	1.8	8.2	5.4
	1984	48.3	33.4	81.9	10.3	2.5	12.8	5.2

Table 5

Education and Attitude Toward Economic Management (percent of those agreeing)

Education	Expand PZPR role		Expand self-management influence		Expand director independence	
	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No
1. elementary	26.9	43.2	68.1	8.4	44.3	31.5
2. trade, secondary, trade incomplete	24.6	54.0	81.5	6.7	54.8	29.3
3. secondary, post- secondary incomplete	18.5	64.0	78.0	9.9	56.1	33.2
4. secondary trade post-secondary	18.2	66.9	80.5	11.9	63.4	31.7
5. higher	10.5	77.4	83.2	10.1	71.2	19.8

Table 6

Connection Between the Economy & Politics

Attitude	Respondents				
	I	II	III	IV	V
1. improvement of economy requires more democracy	29.0	20.7	43.6	34.5	13.5
2. we cannot afford democracy; we must emerge from the crisis	13.0	26.2	9.3	14.7	14.7
3. state of economy does not depend on democracy or lack of it	30.7	36.2	33.0	29.1	30.2
4. hard to say	24.4	16.9	14.1	21.7	41.4

I-total, II-advocates of expansion of PZPR's role, III-others, IV-skilled workers, V-unskilled workers.

12776

CSO: 2600/36

NEW MONUMENT TO CARDINAL WYSZYNSKI ERECTED

Warsaw SLOWO POWSZECHNE in Polish 25 Sep 86 pp 1,6

[Article by Zdzislaw Szuba: "New Monument to Cardinal Wyszynski Erected" surtitled "At Komancza, the Final Place of Confinement of the Primate of the Millenium"]

[Excerpts] (Own information) Following the footsteps of his great predecessor, the Primate of Poland Jozef Cardinal Glemp consecrated last Sunday a monument to Stefan Cardinal Wyszynski of blessed memory. This monument was erected in front of the Convent of the Nazarene Sisters in Komancza, the final place of confinement of the Primate of the Millenium, where he had stayed from 29 October 1955 until 28 October 1956. Cardinal Glemp who, while Primate Wyszynski had been alive, was his secretary and close associate, had already in previous years consecrated monuments in other locales of the confinement of his Bishop and Mentor: Rywald in Pomerania, Stoczek in Warmia, and Prudnik in Silesia. The ceremony in the Bieszczady valley took place as it were on the eve of the 33rd anniversary of the arrest of Primate Wyszynski and the 30th anniversary of the October Upheaval [worker unrest in Poznan in 1956] which had resulted in Cardinal Wyszynski's return to his archbishoprics in Gniezno and Warsaw.

In mentioning this on that Sunday in the morning at a large rally of the faithful at the LaSalette Shrine in Debowiec near Jaslo, Cardinal Glemp declared, "It was precisely while in slavery [confinement] that the late primate had demonstrated his freedom of spirit and his ability to think through vital contemporary issues, issues of the existence and tasks of the church in the Fatherland, the tasks of his Nation. He had demonstrated his great faith in God as the Being who overcomes any circumstances just when man expects it the least. The programs drafted by Cardinal Wyszynski while in slavery subsequently became the essence of our pastoral work and pointed to the mission of the Holy Virgin in the church, and primarily in our Polish Church."

In his homily, preached during the Holy Mass, the Primate of Poland spoke about the life of Cardinal Stefan of blessed memory, which in its entirety was a testimony of his episcopal device, Soli Deo, meaning that one should serve only one Lord. He also described how, at the end of 1956, while a young and just ordained chaplain, he had listened for the first time to a sermon by his

Bishop, Cardinal Wyszynski, at the Gniezno Archcathedral. He recalled how the then already great primate had "dampened" as it were the enthusiasm of the young, engendered by the great changes occurring in this country, and how he had predicted that difficult moments requiring great self-mastery and responsibility would still come for the country and the church. This task had also fallen to him, the successor of Cardinal Wyszynski to the seat of the primate, in 1981 when he had to declare that Poles were about to face difficult times requiring great toughness and firmness of spirit to endure and to perceive that God is always with the Nation, that it should be seen -- as Cardinal Wyszynski saw it -- that God is always victorious and that the Holy Virgin, whose faithful associate one should be, is victorious.

Following the Holy Mass, Jozef Cardinal Glemp, the Primate of Poland, consecrated the monument sculptured from a more than 2 meters large block of Szydlowiec sandstone by the sculptor Andrzej Koss of the Warsaw Academy of Fine Arts in collaboration with another sculptor, Krzysztof Kaniewski of Przemyśl. The statue of Cardinal Wyszynski of blessed memory represents a wanderer with a simple staff in his hand such as can be seen in an archival photograph of the Cardinal taken while he was hiking in the mountains near Komancza.

The consecration itself was preceded by a common prayer for the beatification of Cardinal Stefan, led by Mother Stanisława and by the antiphonal chant "Under Thy Protection," intoned by the Reverend Primate.

The Primate of Poland Jozef Cardinal Glemp, assisted by cocelebrants as well as by the late Stefan Moskwa, the Reverend Mistrze Teodor Majkowicz, curate of the Greek Catholic Parish in Przemyśl, and the Reverend Adolf Grotkowski, Father Superior of the Polish Province of the LaSalette Fathers, cut in two the white-and-red ribbon on the monument. The choir of the Nazarene Sisters sang "Gaude Mater Polonia" and, concluding the ceremony, everyone joined in singing "God, Guardian of Poland."

1386

CSO: 2600/18

CATHOLIC COLUMNIST SEES NEED FOR JOB CERTIFICATION

Katowice GOSC NIEDZIELNY in Polish No 38, 21 Sep 86 p 7

[Article by (Nata): "Who is Fit?" surtitled "Without a Master Key"]

What happened a couple of months ago by to passengers on a Zakopane-Katowice train was like a bad dream. According to the timetable, the train was to depart at 2200 hours. But it departed 4 hours early. It should rather have departed late. That would be more humane and customary. But it departed ahead of schedule. The candidates for travelers were informed after the fact that the situation had arisen owing to various objective difficulties relating to the changes in the timetable scheduled for the next day. Both objectively and subjectively these candidates could experience a nervous breakdown and develop a lasting phobia about railroads. A thing like that should, properly speaking, not even be dreamed about. I think that this unfortunately real nightmare is a minor but characteristic contribution to the job certification drive now under way.

As known, this drive is intended to verify whether and to what extent are individuals holding various jobs suited for them. In some cases this also includes examining the validity of the job or position itself. The individuals responsible for the aforementioned daylight nightmare (and for other similar nightmares) should probably be certified as unsuited for their jobs as otherwise they might again do something extraordinary and horrible.

It would be good if the job certification would comprise (is this said correctly?) all jobs and offices without exception, all social functions, and also in general every existing occupation exercised by anyone whatsoever. May ideally the right persons hold the right jobs and cease to scramble for jobs for which they are unfitted. But I fear that a drive on such a scale will not be possible. First, because it would require exceptional courage and self-abnegation, both on the part of those whose jobs are to be certified and on the part of the certifiers, particularly if the former were not just ordinary people. They would fear to be eventually compromised, while their certifiers would fear their wrath. Second, because such an undertaking would require immediate tremendous changes, and not everyone likes changes, especially when they are universal and rapid. Third, because, unfortunately, sometimes a person must ply an occupation for which he is entirely unfit, simply because he must be replaced. I, for example, am far from being the fittest person for performing the terribly difficult home-repair chores or fixing broken appliances or furniture. It does not matter whether these chores are to be done officially or by way of even indirect friendly assistance. From the

standpoint of job certification (is this put correctly?) I should absolutely be eliminated from precisely such occupations. But then who will perform for me chores that absolutely have to be done? Let us not demand too much, and let us desist from what is called "escalation of demands." After all, an incomplete review of jobs, occupations, and possibilities, is better than no review at all.

All the same, life is not easy. Somehow, many human thoughts and actions involves great trouble. It might seem that we are not at all living in an era of frivolous unconcern as regards staffing work positions or entrusting various functions, tasks, social roles, etc., to individuals. It is long since the motto, "Performance Counts More Than Diploma" has been forgotten. It is long since also that the question of qualifications and their advancement, the question of competence, has been emphasized. The network of vocational and academic schools of various kinds has indeed been expanded as never before in history. Screening examinations have been introduced wherever possible and not just for admission to higher educational institutions. Moreover, various job positions are now competitive. Corresponding branches of psychology and sociology that are of assistance in avoiding mistakes in this respect have been developed. As the world turns, there have never been so many properly schooled and trained people as now. Thus, altogether, more rather than less caution and foresight is exercised in personnel selection. Yet, instances still occur in which incidental persons are given jobs for which they are unsuited, for reasons that are unknown. Just think that in olden times, when no one had even dreamed of psychology, sociology, modern scientific economy, and computers, personnel selection had often been done more efficiently. No groom was promoted to knighthood if he was unfamiliar with the requirements to be met by knights, and no apprentice was promoted to master craftsman if he did not master his trade. Life itself had verified and certified them. Now, however, life has as it were turned its face away from personnel selection and left it to professionals who do not always manage it properly.

I am acquainted with a couple of persons who held offices -- modest ones, besides -- to which they were appointed definitely by mistake and accidentally. Their working papers were in order and showed clearly that they had earned the required qualifications and even were industrious and disciplined. But they lacked so-called knack for the jobs they were doing. For years people had wondered just how did X and Y get appointed to their offices. It was only near their retirement age that the wonder was expressed in, so to speak, more concrete and sharper forms. That was a nasty business; after all, it concerned living persons and what was basically their wasted efforts and wasted periods in their lives. Why had not they from the outset found some other more suitable jobs?

Postscript: the entire press at present is pointing to the existence in Poland of a countless and simply exorbitant number of press spokesmen who allegedly have appeared even at quite minor institutions. Whence did they come? Bureaucrats, as known, multiply by mitosis of institutions, sections, departments. But what about these spokesmen?

1386

CSO: 2600/18

CATHOLIC MONTHLY EDITOR ON CHURCH USE OF MASS MEDIA

Katowice GOSC NIEDZIELNY in Polish NO 38, 21 Sep 86 p 3

[Interview with Fr. Jan Chrapek, editor-in-chief of POWSCIAGLIWOSC I PRACA, by Jan Dworak: "The Television Set in the Church"]

[Excerpts] The Reverend Dr Jan Chrapek, CSMA, is a member of the International Center for Research Into Culture and Communications in London. He also is a lecturer at the Institute of the Mass Media, Gregorian University, a cofounder of the Italian scientific periodical MASS MEDIA (1982), and the editor-in-chief of the monthly POWSCIAGLIWOSC I PRACA. In July 1986 he was elected General of the Congregation of St. Michael the Archangel.

[Question] In recent years in Poland the mass media have undergone considerable changes, chiefly for social and political reasons. At present, in addition, the growing number of videocassette receivers and the approaching possibility of viewing satellite-television programs will augment the scope of personal selection of information sources.

[Answer] Both videocassettes and satellite television are disadvantageous to monopolies. Not just because that they carry diverse and uncontrolled information, but chiefly because they change human mentality, upset domestic acceptance of monopoly on information, and stimulate hunger for information. The relative ease of use of video equipment promotes the creation of amateur programs. This movement will develop, whether at houses of culture under the eye of instructors or spontaneously. The church should undoubtedly participate in these changes caused by technological advances, and the exchange of videocassettes and related experience could revive various local communities.

[Question] Such attempts have already been made. The most expansive related activities, demonstrating an understanding of the potential of the tape recorder, have been undertaken by the Pastoral Documentation Center [-----] [Decree of 31 July 1981 on the Control of Publications and Entertainment, Article 2, Point 6 (DZIENNIK USTAW, Item 99, No 20; revised, DZIENNIK USTAW, Item 204, No 44)] [Censored].

A totally different level of activity exists at the Commission for the Mass Media under the Episcopate, headed by Bishop Ignacy Jez. Also operating under the Episcopate is the Bureau for the Mass Media, directed by Father Pronobis.

[Answer] Within the church in Poland serious interest in the mass media is growing. Nevertheless, at present the number of research centers dealing with these topics is insufficient. At the Catholic University of Lublin and the ATK [Academy of Catholic Theology] the related problems are investigated individually by members of the faculty rather than in a planned manner. On the other hand, note should be taken of the convening of increasingly better prepared and purposive conferences dealing with these problems. In mid-May was held the Symposium on Philosophical and Theological Aspects of the Operation of the Mass Media, convened by the Institute of Theology of the Apostolate in Oltarzewo. The presence of Professor Alicja Helman of Jagiellonian University, the Reverend Robert White, the director of the London Center of Research into Communications and Culture, and Dr Fiorenzo Tagliabue, director of the Vatican's Television Studio, assured a high level of scientific reflections; the seminar will bear fruit in the form of book now in print at the Pallottinum Press. The Institute of the Sociology of Religion under the Pallottine Fathers also intends to publish a collection of church documents concerning the mass media.

Related activities by other centers should be mentioned. The Olsztyn Historical-Theological Institute last year convened a symposium on the relations between religion and the cinema, and in the summer of this year was held a similar symposium, this time on religion and television. The Catholic University of Lublin convened last April a conference on videocassettes in pastoral work, and the Verbist Fathers held in Pieniezno a conference on the role of the mass media in missionary work. As can be seen, the church has been doing something about this matter, although it is still much too little in relation to needs.

[Question] Yes, with us at present the most important issue is to restructure awareness of absolutely fundamental matters relating to the mass media. First of all, 'the present-day church should make use of them, and that this is no mere submission to fashions of the day but a genuine pastoral need. Further, it should be made clear that each kind of mass media has its own identity and logic which have to be studied in order to be properly utilized. "Live" catechesis is something different from a printed or televised one.

[Answer] This is a sensitive question concerning the mass media and it concerns besides not just Poland but the entire church, although to a differing extent and degree in different regions. Liturgy and catechesis are fundamental functions which the church shall never discontinue, but any other means of action should be exploited in order to promote the main mission.

The newest electronic communication technologies require imagination, deep theological and philosophical consideration, professional expertise, and, this being perhaps most important, a new level of ethical sensitivity, because they harbor a new kind of perils. They represent a new and different kind of manipulation that may create in recipients illusory needs and an illusory picture of the world and provide them with a feeling of omniscience and cheap knowledge. The recipient must be aware of these perils, and so must be the sender.

On the other hand, the television camera mercilessly bares sham and inauthenticity, and hence it requires a truthful experiencing and cocreation of the reality and is very demanding so far as the firmness and personal qualities of persons transmitting evangelical programs are concerned. Every liturgical gesture must be an event, and every word must be deeply experienced. The new technology demands truthfulness.

1386

CSO: 2600/18

SYMPOSIUM REVIEWS FATE OF ROMANIAN JEWS ABROAD DURING 1940-44

Bucharest ANALE DE ISTORIE in Romanian No 5, 1986 pp 124-137

[Paper presented by Ion Calafeteanu at 1986 Romanian-Israeli symposium in Jerusalem: "The Fate of Romanian Citizens of Jewish Origin Who Lived Abroad During the Years of Antonescu's Dictatorship"]

[Text] In accordance with the cooperation agreement between the Institute of Historical and Sociopolitical Studies of the RCP Central Committee and the Yad Vashem Institute, the third Romanian-Israeli history symposium was held on 12-14 January this year. In its issue No 3/1986 ANALE DE ISTORIE summarized the proceedings of that scientific meeting. In this issue we will present the paper of one of the Romanian participants.

The situation of Romanian citizens of Jewish origin who lived abroad during the years of Antonescu's dictatorship was decisively influenced by two factors. The first was the position of the authorities in the country in which they were residing on the Jewish problem. Generally speaking one notes a direct link between their situation and the degree of intensity of the anti-Semitic policy promoted by the authorities of the respective country. Thus, the situation of those living in countries in which no anti-Semitic persecutions occurred during those years did not considerably deteriorate. On the other hand, in countries in which the authorities did promote an anti-Semitic policy the situation of those Jews worsened palpably, to the point of physical extermination even. That was the situation in Hitlerite Germany, in the territories occupied by the Nazi Reich, and in satellite countries. The topic of the present study is the situation of Jewish Romanian citizens who lived at the time in such countries.

The second factor was the Antonescu government, more precisely the manner in which it fulfilled toward that category of citizens one of the basic obligation of any state vis-a-vis its citizens--granting them diplomatic and consular protection--and on which depended the fate of thousands of Jews of Romanian citizenship. From this viewpoint Antonescu's government adopted a position that appears contradictory, ranging from total disinterest for the fate of those Romanian citizens at one time, to the full diplomatic and consular protection to which they were entitled, and even to bringing them back to Romania at another time, something that in those conditions meant saving them from certain death.

We must stress that when both factors converged in an anti-Jewish policy, the situation of Jews of Romanian citizens living abroad was very difficult and sometimes beyond help. When, on the other hand, the attitude of at least one of those factors changed--by which we mean primarily the attitude of the Romanian government, because as a rule, the majority of the Jews of Romanian citizenship in Germany, German-occupied territories, and satellite countries suffered, with very few exceptions, an extreme anti-Semitic policy--their situation improved, sometimes substantially so.

The number of Romanian citizens of Jewish origin who lived in Germany, German-occupied territories, and in satellite countries between 1940-44 is very difficult to determine with any accuracy. In the first year after the enactment of the law on citizenship revision, 1,824 Jews registered at consulates in Germany (and Austria), while 1 year later (March 1938-March 1940) that number dropped to 551 in Germany, approximately 500 in Vienna, and 73 in Prague (altogether 1,124). In the fall of 1941 1,043 Jewish families (about 3,000 persons) were still living in Germany on an unclear nationality status. (Foreign Ministry Archives [FMA], Section Problem 33, Vol 32 (Strictly confidential report of 207 September 1941, unsigned); Vol 31 (Report No 16,055 of 8 March 1939, signed by Constantin Karadja, general consul in Berlin, to Victor Brabetzianu, Romanian charge d'affaires in Berlin); Vol 30 (Report No 273 of 6 November 1943, signed by C. Karadja); Raul Hilberg, *The Destruction of the European Jews*, Quadrangle Books, Chicago, 1967, p 289, indicate the figure of 1,100 Romanian citizens of Jewish origin living in Germany.)

A large number of Romanian citizens of Jewish origin were living in France. According to German estimates, 4,885 Jewish Romanian citizens lived there in 1940, out of which about 2,000 were deported in 1942, so that by 1943 some 2,500-3,000 Jews of Romanian citizenship were still in France (600 of them in the south of France). (Yad Vashem Archive, Jerusalem, Section P6, Vol 74, p 121; FMA, Section Problem 33, Vol 32 (Report No 280 of 28 November 1943 signed by C. Karadja); Raul Hilberg, *op. cit.*, p 411, cites the figure of 3,000 for all of France. In a 30 November 1943 talk with General C.Z. Vasiliu, undersecretary of state at the Ministry of the Interior, Dr W. Filderman estimated the number of Romanian citizens of Jewish origin living in the south of France at 700 (Matatias Carp: *The Black Book*, vol III, Bucharest, 1947, p 453)) Far fewer such Jews lived in other countries: in Belgium in the summer of 1942, only 250 had "papers in order." (FMA, Section Problem 33, Vol 28 (Report No 327/5 of 5 August 1942 sent by the Romanian General Consulate in Brussels to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs); in the Netherlands, 23 in November 1942 (*op. cit.*, Vol 32 (Report No 667 of 3 November 1942 from Romanian Consul General in Berlin Gallin); some 20 families lived in Bulgaria in 1940, half of them in Sofia (*op. cit.*, Vol 33 (Report No 3,707 of 4 December 1940, signed Eugen Filotti, Romanian minister to Sofia), and in Poland there were at least 21 in June 1942 (*op. cit.*, Vol 33 (Report of 2 March 1943 by Vasile Ignat, custodian of the building of the former Romanian embassy in Warsaw).

It suffices to take the case of Hungary in order to grasp the relativity of these figures. In July 1941, according to the figures of the Romanian Legation in Budapest, 57 Jews of Romanian citizenship were registered, while in 1944

266 entry visas for Romania were issued to Jews with incontestable rights to citizenship, plus 84 pending cases (op. cit., vol 36 (Foreign Ministry note No 56,349 of 28 July 1941); vol 19 (Report on "The Jews of Budapest"). However, we must remember that in 1944 the Romanian authorities were very generous with granting Romanian citizenship to Jews in Hungary. That explains the large discrepancy between the Legation estimates and the situation in 1944).

Although, as it emerges from the above, the number of Romanian citizens of Jewish origin living between 1940-44 in Germany, its occupied territories, and satellites was not very large and differed at different times, it is extremely important to know the manner in which Antonescu's regime discharged its obligation of granting them the diplomatic and consular protection to which they were entitled. On the one hand, because it verifies the basic concept of Antonescu's regime on how to solve the Jewish problem, which was to remove that population from the country. On the other hand, because it highlights the way it deviated, in both senses, from this general line, as demonstrated by the tens of thousands of Jews who fell victims to the regime in Transnistria, as well as by the fact that Jews of Romanian citizenship were brought back to the country in 1943-44 from various countries and from Transnistria, transit visas were granted to more than 50,000 Jews mainly from Hungary, but from other Nazi-occupied European countries, too, something that in fact saved their lives. Similarly, the study of this subject, although limited in scope, highlights many cases in which members of the Romanian diplomatic and consular corps, motivated by profoundly humanitarian feelings and acting tactfully and energetically, succeeded in allaying or ending the suffering of fellow citizens of Jewish origin, thus contributing to the rescue of many Romanian Jews.

The establishment of the military-fascist regime in September 1940 marked a sharpening of the anti-Jewish policy. As many Iron Guard members entered the state apparatus the provisions of the anti-Semitic laws were implemented more strictly and made room for abuses by functionaries. Thus, passport renewal for Romanian citizens of Jewish origin was refused under the most varied pretexts (for example, for failure to pay military taxes), and their return to the country became increasingly difficult, so much so that even when such citizens were legally expelled from certain states they were not allowed to return to Romania, something that elicited protests from various governments.

On 22 August 1941 the Antonescu government simply barred Romanian citizens of Jewish origin from returning to the country, something that gave rise to unpleasant discussions with many states and cost thousands of Romanian Jews their lives. The fact that as of the fall of 1940 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was stripped of the power to decide on citizenship matters (for which it had to turn to the Police General Directorate, which was very unwilling to issue the permits requested, had no clear criteria for granting them, and often took contradictory decisions) added to the difficulties of the Romanian Jews living abroad ((op. cit., vol 32 (Report No 5 of 10 October 1944 signed by C. Karadja, and strictly confidential report of 27 September 1941, unsigned)). Finally, on 7 March 1941 the Romanian consulates were instructed to stamp "Jew" on passports (op. cit., vol 10, Foreign Ministry Consular Section Memo No 17157, 7 March 1941). And the fact that this measure was soon repealed (although a discreet mark, known only to the Romanian authorities,

was still put in passports) was due to the intervention of the Romanian General Consul in Berlin Constantin Karadja. On 24 March 1941 he sent a report to Ion Antonescu in which he stated that the national Romanian interests demanded the cancellation of that measure. Our interest--Karadja claimed--is to get rid of as many Jews as possible by facilitating their departure from the country through all available means. If the Romanian government can accomplish that without arousing protest among Jewish emigrants from Romania (especially in the United States), all the better, because, regardless of how the international situation develops, the Jews will continue to wield great influence in the United States and England. Therefore--Karadja added--any measure that would make their emigration more difficult or would prevent them from obtaining entry or transit visas to other countries would run counter to Romanian interests. C. Karadja criticized the administrative measures taken up to that point by the Romanian authorities against the Jews in the belief that they "were defeating their purpose." Among such measures he included the "Jew" stamp in passports. "Nevertheless, I assume" he wrote, "that the purpose of the measure recently taken by the relevant authorities is not to cause useless suffering or humiliation to Jews holding national passports, something that would at the same time detract from the prestige of our state, but to permit our consular, customs, and police authorities to immediately identify the Jews." However, adding the word "Jew" would draw the attention of foreign authorities. Consequently, Karadja stated, in Germany the Jews would be subjected to "even more chicaneries and searches than in the past," while their emigration to South and Central America, Shanghai, and Tangiers would be even more difficult. Thus, forced to stay in Germany, they would create difficulties for the Romanian authorities. "From a humanitarian viewpoint," the report concludes, "we would make the situation of a whole category of unfortunates even more difficult, uselessly raising obstacles in the way of their exodus, without deriving any benefit for ourselves from this administrative measure. On the other hand, we can be certain that once the war is over, American and Anglo-Saxon public opinion, which is already not too favorably inclined to us, would interpret this measure as a petty vengeance and as inhuman and would call us to account for it." His suggestion to replace the "Jew" stamp with a discreet mark known only to the competent Romanian authorities was adopted by Ion Antonescu (op. cit., vol 32, Report No 12867 of 24 March 1941 signed by C. Karadja, Berlin, to Ion Antonescu).

This intervention by the Romanian general consul in Berlin in favor of the Romanian Jews, tactfully worded and well argued, was in fact one of a series of similar proposals he had made before and would make later, particularly after he was appointed director of the Foreign Ministry Consular Section in June 1941.

The Antonescu government had no particular interest in the fate of the Romanian Jews living abroad, at least not until the first half of 1941. That is why for a long time it did not even adopt a policy on that category of Jews. By the end of 1940 and in the first half of 1941 two kinds of events compelled the government to shape a viewpoint on the matter. To begin with, anti-Semitic measures in German occupied territories and satellite countries escalated and that affected the Jews holding Romanian passports, too, who turned to the Romanian diplomatic and consular offices for protection. Not having received any instructions from the new regime as to what attitude to

adopt--although the old instructions, of a general nature, which had not been repealed, clearly stated that all Romanian citizens, regardless of origin, were entitled to the protection of the Romanian state--the diplomatic and consular missions asked the Ministry of Foreign Affairs if and how much protection to extend.

But what impelled the Romanian to promptly adopt a decision of principle in this matter was the need to decide the status of foreign citizens of Jewish origin living in Romania. Several diplomatic missions in Bucharest sent notes to the Romanian government stating that in their countries Jews were not discriminated against and consequently the Romanian government was asked not to discriminate against their fellow citizens residing in Romania. Different departments expressed opposed views on the issue. Thus, while the Justice Ministry believed that the anti-Jewish laws adopted in Romania did not affect the foreign Jews, the Ministry of Labor, Health, and Social Security was of the opinion that foreign citizens of Jewish origin in Romania should suffer the consequences of the anti-Semitic laws because the Jewish Statute made no reference to foreign Jews living in Romania. The Legal Committee of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs met on 4 February 1941 to discuss this problem. On 11 February 1941 the committee members issued a report with their conclusions. The report began by stating that "The nationality factor represents, for the respective individuals, a conglomeration of rights and obligations within the political, social, and economic life, which are sovereignly defined by each state for itself, so that foreign interference is out of question in this area." (Ion Antonescu wrote on this report, against point 3: "Yes." At the same time, he issued a resolution stating that Romania should dislodge the foreigners, primarily the Jews, "with energy, method, and perseverance. The international timing is opportune and we should not miss it. But we must proceed wisely and humanely. Let us begin by removing all the foreigners who came and stayed with or without passports. We must lift their citizenship and sent off all the foreigners, some who came and quietly settled in our country and in the Romanian territories after 1914; after that and in the final stage, let us begin to eliminate from the life of the country the Jews who came and settled after 1878 (Berlin) in the wake of the difficulties imposed on them by the Berlin Congress. 2. This is my viewpoint. The legislation that has been passed or will be passed, and which must be implemented, should converge on attaining this point by point... Consequently, Mr Mihai Antonesscu will convene all those competent to work on this problem to establish a general plan of action, on the basis of which the definitive legislation will be established." op. cit., vol 10, Report of 11 February 1941).

This report was the foundation on which the status of the foreign citizens of Jewish origin in Romania was finally established. Their legal situation thereafter fell under one of the following three categories: a) Foreign citizens of Jewish origin belonging to states with which Romania had residence conventions and which had not introduced any discriminations against Romanian Jews living on their territory. Citizens of those states could enjoy full rights in Romania regardless of whether they were Jewish or not; b) Foreign subjects of Jewish origin belonging to states with which Romania had residence conventions and which did implement racial discriminations against Romanian citizens living on their territory, but who in the future would enjoy full rights on a reciprocal basis. Formal agreements were envisaged to be signed

for this purpose between the Romanian state and those states; c) Foreign subjects of Jewish origin belonging to states with which Romania did not have conventions in this area, whose status was to be decided on a reciprocal basis (op. cit., report of 10 June 1941, signed by F.C. Nanu and I.B. Berciu).

The problem of the protection of Romanian Jews living abroad was closely linked to the status of foreign Jews living in Romania. This problem had become urgent by the spring of 1941 because certain authorities had taken or intended to take a series of measures against certain Romanian Jews and their property. Thus, by the end of March 1941, the German occupation authorities in northern France requested the Romanian legation to revise, by 15 May 1941, the list of residences of Romanian subjects settled in France and who were under the protection of the Romanian state (op. cit., vol 30, report No 618 of 31 March 1941, signed by Dinu Hiott, Romanian minister to France).

In order to issue the necessary instructions, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 18 April 1941 addressed the Justice Ministry, to which it communicated its point of view on the matter: "The Jews living in France, whose citizenship has been confirmed by the revisory procedure, enjoy the protection of the Romanian state for their person and property, although some of their civil rights have been curtailed under certain exceptional laws." On 6 May 1941 the Supreme Council of Public Attorneys of the Justice Ministry rallied to this viewpoint, stating that "The protection of the Romanian state is granted in principle to all Romanian subjects, regardless of their ethnic origin," adding, however, that "this principle cannot be applied to those persons of Jewish ethnic origin who lost their Romanian nationality in the wake of the revisory procedure or by individual withdrawal of the nationality, or to persons of Jewish ethnic origin coming from the lost territories of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina" (op. cit., Advisory note No 524 of 6 May 1941 of the Superior Council of Public Attorneys). A practical argument was added to the legal arguments: the Romanian state's interest that the Romanian Jews living abroad should not be stripped of their property or barred from practicing their profession in their country of residence because, if "the Jewish problem is not solved at a European or international level, we would be forced to receive these Romanian citizens impoverished to boot, thus increasing the ranks of those who cannot earn their livelihood." (op. cit., vol 10, report of 10 June 1941, signed by F.C. Nanu and I.B. Berciu)

All these conclusions favorable to vouchsafing protection to the Romanian Jews living abroad were endorsed by Alexandru Cretzianu, secretary general at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and presented the next day to Mihai Antonescu with a request to decide whether, on the basis of these proposals, "we may not arrive at a final and speedy solution of this issue, in order to, among other things, avoid that the interested foreign states adopt against us the retaliatory measures they have threatened to adopt." (op. cit., Al. Cretzianu's note of 11 June 1941)

However, several months passed before the government took a decision, during which period Al. Cretzianu made "many insistent efforts" (op. cit., vol 32, report No 5 of 10 October 1944 signed by Constantin Karadja) to bring about a solution favorable to both the Jewish population and the interests of the Romanian state. Finally, toward the middle of September 1941, the Council of

Ministers decided that the foreign Jews living in Romania should be exempted from the anti-Jewish measures "on the basis of conventions in effect and of reciprocity." On 23 September 1941 Mihai Antonescu communicated to the Ministry of the Interior that it must reexamine "any measure that was taken against foreign Jews concerning their property, residence rights, or exercise of their profession and that stemmed from the laws applicable to Jews as such," and that in the future such measures should not be taken without prior approval from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (Archive of the Institute of Historical and Sociopolitical Studies of the RCP Central Committee [AIHSS], section No XXIV, file no 3342, pp 33-34: Mihai Antonescu's 23 September 1941 note to the Ministry of the Interior)

The Council of Ministers did not adopt a specific decision concerning the situation of Romanian Jews abroad. Consequently, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs did not issue any instructions to the Romanian diplomatic and consular missions on the respective problem, and when it finally did, they were referring only to the Council of Ministers' decision concerning the status of foreign Jews living in Romania, on the basis of which, *mutatis mutandis*, the attitude of the Romanian government was established toward the Romanian Jews living abroad. Thus, the note to the Romanian legation at Vichy stated: "In view of this decision of our government (concerning the status of foreign Jews in Romania), full protection will be accorded to all Romanian subjects abroad, without any discrimination." (FMA, section problem 33, vol 30, Note No 40243 of 10 November 1941 from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Romanian legation at Vichy) On 11 November 1941 a memo of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (No 81557) instructed the diplomatic and consular offices to "accord full protection to all Romanian citizens abroad, without any distinction, noting all the cases in which their person or property had been harmed by special discriminatory measures." (op. cit., vol 32, report No 5 of 10 October 1944, signed by Constantin Karadja) Thus, an end was put to the incertitude that had prevailed concerning the obligations of the diplomatic and consular offices toward the Romanian Jews living abroad and subjected to anti-Semitic persecutions.

At the beginning of 1942 the situation of Romanian Jews in Germany and in Nazi occupied territories deteriorated abruptly, coinciding with the adoption of the "final solution" of the Jewish problem by the Hitlerite authorities. The first news of the new anti-Semitic persecutions came from Vienna. On 8 March 1942 General Consul C. Mares reported that Romanian subjects of Jewish origin (together with Croats and Slovaks) had been ordered to wear a distinctive badge, while their Hungarian, Bulgarian, Turkish, Italian, and Swiss coreligionists in Austria were exempted. On 4 March 1942 the Romanian consul asked the Reichstatthalterei for an explanation on this measure and on the distinctions made among Jews of various citizenships. On 9 March 1942 he went personally to the Reichstatthalterei, where he was told that the order had been issued upon the instruction of the Geheimstaatspolizei, probably on the basis of an agreement with the Romanian state. Unaware of any such agreement and proceeding from that fact that in Romania the Jews did not wear the "Star of David" and hence, this was no reciprocal measure, the Romanian consul requested that this order be suspended pending instructions from the Romanian government. (AIHSS, section No XXIV, file No 3342, pp 56-57, report no 1147 of 9 March 1942 from C. Mares, general consul in Vienna, to Raoul Bossy, Romanian

minister in Berlin) A few days later, a cable of the Romanian legation in Berlin reported that similar measures had been taken in the old territory of the Reich. (FMA, section problem 33, vol 32, cable No 123/42699 of 14 March 1942) During this period and in the following months the German authorities invariably replied to each intervention by Romanian diplomats and consuls on behalf of the Romanian Jews that the measures against them had been taken with the specific approval of the Romanian government and that an agreement had occurred between the two states along those lines.

On the basis of the information received, the Consular Section of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 19 March 1942 wrote a service note stressing the discriminatory nature of these measures, in contrast to the status of the foreign Jews living in Romania. The note asked Mihai Antonescu to decide whether the situation created "will elicit any step by our diplomatic or consular representatives, or whether it was taken in full agreement with the policies of the two states." (AIHSS, section No XXIV, file No 3342, pp 58-59. service note of 19 March 1942, written by C. Karadja)

Since the measures taken by the German police against Romanian Jews worsened in the second half of March 1942, and the Romanian diplomatic and consular representatives in Vienna and Berlin were pressing for instructions as to the attitude they were to adopt, C. Karadja sent a note on this matter to Mihai Antonescu, on which the latter wrote the following resolution: "Mr Davidescu. Please speak to Mr Steltzer. We have been told that German Jews are Germans." On the basis of this resolution, the secretary general of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Gheorghe Davidescu, on 14 April 1942 had a talk with the counselor of the German Legation in Bucharest, Gerhard Steltzer, whom he asked to elicit a clarification of this situation from the German authorities. (FMA, section problem 33, vol 32, service note of 1 April 1942, signed by C. Karadja)

In the meantime, the situation of Romanian Jews living in Germany and its occupied territories worsened even more. On 21 April 1942 the Romanian consul in Prague, Virgil Zaborovski reported that the German authorities had informed Jews holding Romanian passports that they were to be sent to a concentration camp. V. Zaborovski feared that, were he to intervene on their behalf in accordance with the 11 November 1941 instructions, the German authorities would demand their repatriation to Romania, since the Jews in question had had their Romanian passports renewed, but on condition that they do not return to Romania. (op. cit., cable No 8/2522 of 21 April 1942 sent by V. Zaborovski, Prague. Out of 19 applications only 7 had received passports). On 16 May 1942 the first six Jewish families holding Romanian passports (of whom only one person had received an extension visa) were deported to the Theresienstadt concentration camp. (op. cit., report No 3000/C of 16 May 1942 sent by V. Zaborovski, Prague)

Alarmed by the increasing discriminations against Romanian Jews, now threatened to lose not only their property but their lives, too, many Romanian diplomats and consuls appealed to Bucharest for instructions and suggestions on their behalf. Thus, the Romanian general consul in Vienna, C. Mares, sent a report to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs stating that many citizenship cases that he had referred to the ministry had still not been resolved, so that he

did not know whether to intervene or not in support of many Jews whose situation was not clear. The fact that the necessary steps are not taken on a timely basis, he added, can result in the most serious consequences: the Jews are in the meantime being seized and shipped to Poland, where their traces are lost, and their property is confiscated by the German state. Thus, he requested that the Ministries of Justice and of the Interior examine with greater care citizenship applications and, when those are rejected, explain the motive for withholding their approval. (On the margin C. Karadja noted: "I have been asking for this for 1 whole year, without any result.") At the same time, he asked that replies to citizenship applications should be dispatched faster, "because the German authorities do not accord long reprieves," and when a Jew cannot quickly clarify his status, "they view him as heimatlos [stateless] and apply the rigor of the law to his person and property." (op. cit., report No 1912 of 21 April 1942 from C. Mares, Vienna)

In view of the discriminations to which Romanian Jews were subjected, in contrast to the citizens of other states, something that affected the dignity of the Romanian state, and of the fact that the confiscation of the fortunes of Romanian Jews caused important material losses to the Romanian state, as well as in view of the pressure brought to bear by various factors, including the Romanian diplomatic and consular personnel, on 18 May 1942 Gh. Davidescu sent a cable to the Romanian Legation in Berlin in which he reasserted that: "The principles set down in the Memo No 81557 of 11 November are still valid; the Romanian government has not acceded to the discriminatory measures taken against Romanian Jews in Germany, and the German Legation in Bucharest has been asked to intervene at the Auswaertiges Amt on this matter." (op. cit., cable No 28723 of 18 May 1942, signed by Gh. Davidescu, to the Romanian Legation in Berlin). A few days later, a cable to the Romanian Consulate in Prague stressed: "The Romanian government never consented to discriminatory measures against the Romanian Jews. Do insist that they should be given the same treatment as those from Hungary, Switzerland, etc. Please address the ministry once again on the question of extending the passports of persons who have undisputable rights to Romanian nationality. Implement the principles of the 11 November memo No 81557 and request the release of Jews interned or deported, except for sentenced criminals. Request the release of possibly seized property. Report results." (op. cit., cable no 41399 of 17 May 1942 from Gh. Davidescu to the Romanian general consul in Prague. On 8 June 1942 an identical cable was sent to the Romanian Consulate in Paris.)

Two elements merit attention in the last cable. First, for the first time the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was requesting that the problem of extending the passports of subjects who had undisputable rights to Romanian citizenship be reopened. This can be explained by the fact that during this period discussions were underway between the Foreign and Interior Ministries on dealing with the citizenship issue more efficiently and on the basis of firm criteria; on 9 June 1942 these discussions ended with the formulation of a joint viewpoint. Secondly, also for the first time, the Romanian consuls were requested to intercede to obtain the release from camps of Romanian Jews. In the following years many similar requests were met by interventions with the German authorities; unfortunately, the majority of them yielded no results.

During the same period the Romanian authorities also altered their position toward the Jews born in Bessarabia and northern Bukovina and living abroad. While the Romanian citizenship had been denied them until then, in the new situation created by the integration of those territories into Romania, the Jews born there were again in a position to request Romanian passports, and were even treated with a certain solicitude by the Romanian authorities. As proven by the fact that on 1 July 1942 Radu Lecca, the Romanian official in charge of Jewish matters, personally sent a cable to the Romanian Consulate in Prague asking it to intercede for the release from camp of five Jews born in Bessarabia and for having their property reinstated, and to issue them Romanian passports (without, however, an entry visa for Romania). (op. cit., cable No 4057 of 1 July 1942 from Radu Lecca to the Romanian Consulate in Prague)

After the instructions of 1 November 1941 were reconfirmed, many Romanian diplomatic and consular representatives in Germany and its occupied territories acted immediately, with a haste that does them honor, to grant protection to Romanian Jews in their area. However, the results were minimal. Thus, the Jews living in northern France, Netherlands, and Belgium were not exempted from wearing the yellow star; the only concession granted by the Belgian authorities was a postponement until 31 July. (op. cit., report No 3248 of 30 June 1942 from Raoul Bossy, Berlin). In Prague, the Romanian consul obtained the suspension of any special measures against the Romanian Jews, but his efforts to obtain the release of interned Jews from camps remained unsuccessful pending the decision of the Berlin authorities. (op. cit., cable No 21/4343 of 6 July 1942 from V. Zaborovski, Prague). In Berlin, Legation Counselor Caius Valeanu discussed these matters with Counselor Klingenfuss of the Auswaertiges Amt. At those talks the Romanian diplomat emphasized the fact that, for reasons of prestige, the Romanian government could not accept those discriminations, all the more so since the Reich had requested that German Jews in Romania should be exempted from the anti-Jewish laws (October 1941) on the condition of reciprocity. Klingenfuss argued that the attitude of the German authorities stemmed from Ion Antonescu's consent given to the German minister in Bucharest, Manfred von Killinger, that the Romanian Jews living in Germany and its occupied territories be subjected to the same treatment as the German Jews. Germany, Klingenfuss stated, wants to eliminate the problem of the Jews in the occupied territories by deporting them. For that purpose, agreements had already been concluded with the Bulgarian, Croat, and Slovene governments; negotiations were at an advanced stage, contacts had been made with the Italian government, and the Hungarian government agreed that the Hungarian Jews in those territories should wear the yellow star. In these conditions, the German diplomat continued, one could no longer speak of discriminations against the Romanian Jews. He suggested that negotiations should immediately begin between the two governments to establish, on a reciprocal basis, the treatment to be applied to one country's Jews living in the other country. When C. Valeanu suggested that until the possible signing of the agreement the Romanian Jews should not wear the distinctive badge and should not be deported, Klingenfuss cynically replied that those measures could not be reconsidered because the German Jews would view the exemption of foreign Jews as a pretext for "disobedience and rebellion." (op. cit., report of 19 July 1942 by Caius Valeanu, counselor at the Romanian Legation in Berlin. On the margin of the report someone wrote in red ink: "Weak,

monstruous argument.") In Vienna, the Romanian consul several times protested at the Reichsstatthaltereier, requesting that the measures against the Romanian Jews be lifted. They continued to be implemented, however, particularly against those who did not have a clear status and who were being seized and sent to Poland; as far as those Jews were concerned, the chances of successful intervention were very slim indeed. In order to overcome this situation, C. Mares asked the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to authorize him by cable to extend, for short periods of time, the passports of Jews whose status was deemed by the consulate to be in order, pending subsequent approval by the special commission in Romania. At the same time, he asked for permission to hold future discussions with the Ostmark authorities on the following basis: no distinction to be made between Romanian Jews and Jews from other states; if the measures were general and accepted by all the other governments, the Romanian citizens should not be deported to Poland, but should be settled "around Vienna," and their property should not be confiscated, but "immediately" transferred to the possession of the Romanian state (op. cit., Report No 2992 of 20 June 1942 from C. Mares, Vienna).

The suggestions listed in the report were viewed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as representing "in fact, not merely desiderata, but even basic principles for any accord." Until their endorsement by the Romanian government the Romanian consul was directed to conduct himself in keeping with the Romanian-German treaty of 23 March 1935 (op. cit., letter of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Ministry of the Interior, No 53042 of 9 July 1942).

But the Romanian government never got around to examining these suggestions because events took an entirely unfavorable turn both for the Jews in Romania and for the Romanian Jews living in Germany and its occupied territories. In the summer of 1942 negotiations took place between Radu Lecca and Gustav Richter, the counselor for Jewish affairs of the German Legation in Bucharest, in connection with "solving" the Jewish problem in Romania by deporting them to Poland. On 8 August 1942, Gh. Davidescu learned of these negotiations in the course of a conversation with Steltzer; moreover, Steltzer confirmed that Ion Antonescu had consented, at an audience given to von Killinger, that the Romanian Jews in Germany and its occupied territories should be given the same treatment as the German Jews (op. cit., inservice note by Gh. Davidescu, 5 August 1942). On 10 August 1942, in the presence of Radu Lecca, Richter reconfirmed to Gh. Davidescu Ion Antonescu's consent. From those two discussions Gh. Davidescu came to the conclusion that the measures taken against the Romanian Jews "had the agreement of the Romanian government," and that in the future the legation and consulates should deal with matters concerning their property, its status, and possible means of liquidation (op. cit., inservice note by Gh. Davidescu, 10 August 1942).

In these conditions, on 21 August 1942 Gh. Davidescu sent a cable to the Romanian Legation in Berlin stating that "in the wake of the agreement achieved between Mr Marshal Antonescu and Minister von Killinger, the orders of principle contained in memorandum No 81557 of 11 November 1941 and in many subsequent cables and notes were repealed." In the future, the Romanian diplomatic and consular representatives were not to protest the measures taken by the German authorities against Romanian Jews, but content themselves with reporting the status of their assets (op. cit., cable No 5120 of 21 August

1942, signed Gh. Davidescu, to the Romanian Legation in Berlin. It would seem that Gh. Davidescu on 11 August 1942 wrote a draft cable along this line on which Mihai Antonescu wrote "Yes").

Although no confirmation of this statement has yet been found in Romanian archives, that does not mean that it did not occur. On the contrary. It is very probably that Ion Antonescu agreed to this just as, during this period, he agreed to other German requests which seriously affected vital Romanian interests. All the more plausible then that he consented to German requests concerning Romanian Jews living in the Reich, who held for him only a minor interest.

At the same time it is surprising that von Killinger's cable should speak of "evacuation to the east," while absolutely all the discussions held between representatives of the Reich authorities and the Romanian authorities mentioned only the fact that I. Antonescu consented that Romanian citizens of Jewish origin should be subjected to the same treatment as German Jews. What did Ion Antonescu actually agree to? If he agreed only to "equal treatment," did he know that that meant deportation to the east? Or did the German authorities content themselves with the "equal treatment" formula knowing that the German Jews would be deported to the east? If Ion Antonescu consented to the deportation to the east, was he aware that that in fact meant their death?

To the last question we can give a precise answer: at the time Ion Antonescu had his talk with von Killinger the German authorities had not yet decided to use the eastern camps for the "final solution." Such a "solution" was fundamentally opposed to the concept of the Romanian government, which, precisely for that reason, in the fall of 1942 refused to send the Jews of Romania to the Polish camps, thus saving the largest Jewish community in Europe within the orbit of Nazi Germany.

At the same time we must highlight the readiness with which Gh. Davidescu accepted the authenticity of Steltzer's and Richter's assertions ("equal treatment") without attempting to obtain, either then or later, the necessary clarifications in keeping with the seriousness of the problem. This attitude is all the more reprehensible since--as the Romanian documents clearly show--the Romanian authorities always entertained doubts as to the existence of Ion Antonescu's consent and its contents.

Thus, as of August 1942 for the Romanian Jews living in Germany and its occupied territories there followed a period in which their lives and property were in fact at the discretion of the German authorities. Many of them were interned in concentration camps, and some were shipped to Poland. At this point it is impossible to calculate with any precision how many perished during those months. What we do know is that, by the beginning of 1943 C. Karadja believed that at that time there were "at the most a few hundred persons" still left in Germany, while the Romanian charge d'affaires in Berlin, M. Stanescu, thought that already by September 1942 "the greatest majority" of Romanian Jews in Germany had been deported (FMA, section problem 33, vol 32, report No 119 of 4 January 1943; report No 2398 of 18 May 1943 from M. Stanescu, Berlin).

Toward the end of 1942 a glimmer of hope emerged that the Romanian government might change its attitude, when the Ministry of the Interior declared its agreement with the viewpoint supported by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, namely that the status of the Romanian Jews in Germany should be governed by the Romanian-German treaty of 23 March 1935. The note emphasized the fact that since in Romania the Jews were considered as Romanian citizens, they should enjoy abroad, too, the protection of the Romanian state, a situation that could be altered only if the Romanian state applied restrictions to the Jews at home or abroad. As for the confiscation of their property, the note stated that it conflicted with the interests of the Romanian state because it affected assets that had come into its possession through the Romanization laws, and with the 1935 treaty. And finally, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was requested to act to restore to the Romanian state the fortunes of Romanian Jews in the Reich (Yad Vashem Archive, Jerusalem, section P6, vol 74, p 121: SS note of 12 May 1943).

On the basis of that note, to the points of which he subscribed, C. Karadja compiled a report in which he returned to the idea that only the Romanian state was competent to decide on the protection it accorded its citizens, regardless of ethnic origin and religion. He accused the German state of having for years ignored the rights of the Romanian state and of having unjustly appropriated assets belonging to Romania. At the end of his Report C. Karadja unequivocally confronted the Ministry of Foreign Affairs with the issue of modifying its instructions of 31 August 1943 and replacing them with the provisions of the Romanian-German treaty of 1935.

This action came at a time when the condition of the surviving Romanian Jews in Germany and its occupied territories had become desperate. News arriving from Brussels, Berlin, Prague, Warsaw, Paris, Vienna, Vichy, etc., showed that the German authorities were in a rush to make the territory of the Reich and of the occupied countries "Judenfrei" as quickly as possible. In cables, reports, and telephone conversations with the relevant ministry, Romanian diplomatic and consular functionaries in those territories were querrying whether, in these conditions, the instructions of 21 August 1942 were still valid. At the same time, some of them presented the discriminatory nature of those measures, since the Jews of Italian, Hungarian, Swedish, and other nationalities were excepted; moreover, they stated that the governments of the neutral countries, as well as the Italian and Hungarian governments, had obtained authorization for their Jewish citizens to return home (FMA, vol 28, report No 46/7 of 27 January 1943 from Romania's general consul in Brussels, M. Nicolau; vol 32, cable No 99/43865 of 5 April 1943 from M. Stanescu, Berlin).

The problem of the return of Romanian Jews from Germany and its occupied territories had concerned the Ministry of Foreign Affairs ever since the end of 1942. Along this line, on 1 December 1942 the Romanian government official in charge of the status of the Jews in Romania, Radu Lecca, was approached in connection with the Romanian Jews in France; the reply was, however, that "in principle, the return of Romanian Jews living abroad is not permitted" (op. cit., vol 30, 8 December 1942 note of the government official in charge of the status of Jews in Romania to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs). But if the issue did not hold the attention of the Romanian authorities it at least

continued to feature in their actions, since on 13 January 1943 the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs communicated to the Romanian Legation at Vichy that it favorably inclined toward the repatriation of the foreign Jews living in France. "So far," the Romanian minister to Vichy reported, "I have avoided longer discussions so as not to be compelled to give an answer to the question of their repatriation" (op. cit., report No 163 of 15 January 1943 from Hiott, Romanian minister to France).

The factor that decided the fate of the action taken to modify the instructions of 21 August 1942 was the position of the Romanian government. Ever since it became clear that for the German authorities "solving" the Jewish problem meant exterminating that population, the Romanian government refused to deport the Jews of Romania to the General Government, although the relevant German authorities in Romania had taken all the necessary measures for this purpose (For details see: Jean Ancel: Plans for Deportation of the Romanian Jews and their Discontinuation in Light of Documentary Evidence, July-October 1942, in Yad Vashem Studies, vol XVI, 1984, Jerusalem, pp 381-420). During the period that followed the Romanian government once again informed the German authorities, through various channels, that according to its concept, the Jewish problem in Romania was to be solved through the emigration of the Jews from Romania (FMA, section problem 33, vol 32, 12 March 1943 memorandum on the Romanian state's measures to solve the Jewish problem in Romania).

In these conditions, on 10 March 1943 a number of Romanian Jews (24 families totalling 53 persons) in Germany requested permission to return to Romania. The application was warmly endorsed by the Romanian General Consul in Berlin Traian Gallin (who actually hastened to convey it to the Bucharest authorities the very next day), who added that he had information according to which the Nazis intended to deport all the Jews of Germany by 1 April 1943, including the foreign nationals. At the same time, he verified the fact that certain governments (Swiss, Swedish, Hungarian, etc.) had issued return visas to their Jewish citizens living in Germany (op. cit., report No 1885 of 11 March 1943 from Traian Gallin, Romania's general consul in Berlin).

The report and the application arrived in Bucharest on 22 March and met with understanding at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs which, on 27 March 1943, asked the Romanian government official in charge of solving the Jewish problem in Romania to advise whether "quite exceptionally" the application could not be answered favorably (op. cit., Foreign Ministry 27 March 1943 note to the Romanian government official in charge of solving the Jewish problem in Romania). On 6 April 1943 a note on the same subject was addressed to the secretary of state for Romanization, colonization, and inventory. Generally speaking the note was worded in a manner favorable to a humanitarian solution of the problem of the Romanian Jews in Germany and its occupied territories, and stated that protecting them was "indeed an urgent matter." The same day, the following resolution was put on the note: "Mr vice president of the council has approved that the Jews in question should be brought home and sent to Transnystrria" (op. cit., vol 32, Foreign Ministry note No 28170 of 6 April 1943 to the state secretary for Romanization, colonization, and inventory). On the same day instructions were dispatched to the Romanian Legation in Berlin requesting it not to allow any discrimination of the Romanian Jews and to

issue them a visa "bon pour se rendre en Roumanie" [good for returning to Romania] (op. cit., cable No 1838 of 6 April 1943 to the Romanian Legation in Berlin). By 28 May 1943 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the General Police Directorate already had set norms for "the arrival of Jews with well established rights to Romanian citizenship, whose acceptance to Romania had been exceptionally permitted out of humanitarian consideration for the serious situation they could be facing abroad" (op. cit., vol 30, report No 46266 of 1 June 1943). About the middle of July 1943 Ion Antonescu issued an order not to send the returning Jews to Transnistria but to allow them to settle in county seat towns (op. cit., Interior Ministry note No 12003 of 19 July 1943 to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs).

At the same time, as of the spring of 1943 the Romanian authorities became more generous in their interpretation of the laws concerning recognition of the right to citizenship of Jews applying for it abroad, something that made the Romanian consul in Brussels, M. Nicolau, state that concerning the citizenship applications submitted, "the ministry's decisions are almost all favorable," and that "almost all applicants are granted the right to obtain a passport, which means that their Romanian citizenship is thus indirectly recognized" (op. cit., col 28, report No 1198/7 of 12 May 1943 from M. Nicolau, Romanian general consul in Brussels, to the Romanian Legation in Berlin).

The changed attitude of the Antonescu authorities toward the surviving Romanian Jews abroad "produced," according to Constantin Zăinescu, the Romanian minister in Vichy, "the best possible impression both among official circles, and especially among the local public opinion" (op. cit., vol 30, cable no 266/3042 of 4 November 1943 from C. Zăinescu, Vichy). This observation was equally valid for other German occupied countries, where the great majority of the public openly manifested strong anti-Nazi sentiments.

In the wake of the 6 April 1943 instructions, the Romanian Legation in Berlin on 12 April 1943 sent a note to the Auswaertiges Amt soliciting it to intervene with the "competent German services, particularly the Geheimstaatspolizei," to release the non-Aryan Romanian citizens arrested after 31 March 1943 and to issue them departure visas for Romania (Yad Vashem Archives, Jerusalem, section P6, vol 74, p 107: Note of the Romanian Legation in Berlin of 12 April 1943). For "political reasons," the Auswaertiges Amt responded favorably to the Romanian request (op. cit., p 108: Note by von Thaden of the Auswaertiges Amt to Eichmann, 17 April 1943). A memorandum sent on 30 April 1943 by the Sicherheitsdienst to all its subordinate units asked them to stop arresting Romanian Jews, but, until "instructions to the contrary," not to release the ones already arrested (op. cit., p 110: SD memorandum of 30 April 1943). Subsequently, the German authorities sought to continuously limit their consent saving from death the Romanian Jews left at freedom in the Reich and in the occupied territories.

Simultaneously with the steps taken by the Romanian Legation in Berlin, other Romanian consulates also intervened with local authorities. Thus, in Brussels, the Romanian consul repeatedly appealed to the German Legation and the Gestapo to stop arresting and deporting Romanian Jews. That was a very difficult task, because by the end of April 1943 the German Legation had still not received

instructions from Berlin concerning "the new arrangement with the Romanian Jews." Throughout this period, however, the arrests continued, which is what determined the Romanian consul to make a renewed appeal, on 6 May 1943, this time obtaining the release of the Romanian Jews arrested after 30 April 1943. Only on 12 May 1943 did the German Legation communicate to the Romanian Consulate that "measures have been taken not to arrest any more Romanian Jews, although the instructions expected from Berlin have still not arrived" (FMA, section problem 33, vol 28, report No 1198/7 of 12 May 1943 from M. Nicolau, Romania's general consul in Brussels, to M. Stanescu, Romanian charge d'affaires a.i. in Berlin). In these conditions, the consulate was in a position to deal with organizing the repatriation of Romanian Jews. The results, however, were rather modest: out of 47 Romanian passport holders who at one point desired to be repatriated, only 12 left by the fall of 1943, while the rest went into hiding--either mistrusting the Romanian authorities, or for fear of falling into German hands (op. cit., report No 1787/5 of 10 August from M. Nicolau, Romanian consul in Brussels).

That fear had a real foundation, because the German authorities had decided that the Romanian Jews should depart by 30 June 1943, after which date the measures against the remaining ones should be resumed (Yad Vashem Archives, Jerusalem, section P6, vol 74, p 124: 19 June 1943 note of the German Embassy in France). Indeed, in the fall of 1943 "massive" arrests of foreign Jews resumed in France, and the Romanian minister in Vichy managed to obtain, quite exceptionally, from the German embassy to exempt the Romanian Jews with valid passports (FMA, section problem 33, vol 50, cable No 255/2938 of 19 October 1943 from C. Zainescu, Vichy). By the beginning of November 1943, however, the arrests of Romanian Jews resumed (the only exception was made for Jews holding Turkish passports).

The German authorities explained their action by the fact that the limit date they had set for emigration had elapsed and that the Romanian government had allegedly consented that the shipment of Romanian Jews to Poland should be resumed after that date (Yad Vashem Archives, Jerusalem, section P6, vol 74, p 126: 2 November 1943 note). Repeated interventions in Berlin by the German ambassador in France (at the insistence of the Romanian minister in Vichy) to exempt Jews carrying Romanian passports elicited no reply. In this situation, C. Zainescu suggested to the Romanian government to intervene in Berlin directly and "urgently, that is to say, before the persons involved are deported from France" (FMA, section problem 33, vol 30, cable No 266/3042 of 4 November 1943 from C. Zainescu, Vichy). On the basis of this cable, C. Karadja on 6 November 1943 put together a report that he sent to Mihai Antonescu. "If our legation in Berlin," the report stated, "does not urgently receive orders to energetically intervene with the Auswaertiges Amt, it is clear to me that these Jews in France will share an identical fate with the 500 Jews from Vienna" (op. cit., report No 273 of 6 November 1943, signed C. Karadja). The result was that the very next day the Romanian Legation in Berlin was instructed to intervene. In the meantime, the German authorities had already accepted the Romanian requests: on 8 November 1943 the Romanian minister in Vichy announced the suspension of arrests of Romanian Jews, who were, however, obligated to return to Romania by 31 December 1943 (op. cit., cable No 270/3085 of 8 November 1943 from C. Zainescu, Vichy. In fact, the action of the Romanian government coincided with other, similar interventions at a more

extensive level, the final outcome of which was that the date of Germany's "purification" of Jews was postponed). The lists of those who desired to be repatriated had to be finalized and communicated to the German authorities by 1 December 1943. After that date, the Romanian Jews who did not feature on those lists were to be arrested (Yad Vashem Archives, Jerusalem, section P6, vol 74, p 127: 10 November 1943 note from the German Embassy in Paris). This short respite also explains the haste with which the Romanian Legation on 12 November 1943 published a communique informing the Romanian Jews of France who wished to be repatriated that they should send in their papers by 23 November 1943, also mentioning the locality in which they wished to settle (op. cit., p 128).

By the middle of December 1943 efforts also began to rescue the Romanian Jews of Greece and Italy, who were threatened by deportation to Poland. In point of fact, at the beginning of December 1943 Steltzer had informed the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs that the German government intended to seize all the Jews of Greece and Italy, "regardless of their nationality," and inquired, along this line, whether the Romanian government would directly repatriate the Romanian Jews from those two countries or leave them to be interned in Germany, from where they "might" be brought back to Romania (FMA, section problem 33, vol 30: Foreign Ministry note No 108273 of 10 December 1943 to the Ministry of the Interior). This time the change of attitude of the German authorities was obvious, which shows that the Romanian government's resolute position on this matter had not been in vain. The Romanian government immediately took measures to repatriate the Romanian Jews from the two countries (op. cit., Mihai Antonescu's decision on the Interior Ministry note No 3777 of 11 December 1943), although there were also suggestions to organize their emigration to Palestine (op. cit., report No 186 of 16 December 1943, signed C. Karadja).

The country in which the government's intercession on behalf of the Romanian Jews--and not only on their behalf--had the best outcome was Hungary. As of April 1944 several Romanian Jews in Hungary were informed that they were to leave the country "with the least possible delay" (op. cit., vol 36, report No 3930 of 20 April 1944, signed Filotti, Romanian minister in Budapest). On 28 May 1944 their situation had already arrived at a "critical stage" (op. cit., Foreign Ministry note No 102184 of June 1944 to the Interior Ministry). When, on 14 June 1944, the Interior Ministry "fully agreed" to bring them back to Romania, instructions were immediately dispatched to the Romanian Legation in Budapest to issue repatriation visas to 266 persons (another 84 cases were under study on 23 August 1944). No retaliatory measures were taken, such as sending to Hungary an equal number of Hungarian Jews from Romania, something which in those circumstances would have been their death sentence. Moreover, 51,537 transit visas through Romania were given to Hungarian Jews (On the Romanian government's attitude toward the Jewish problem in Hungary see: Ion Calafeteanu: The Position of the Romanian Authorities on the Situation of the Jews of Northern Transylvania (March-August 1944), in ANALE DE ISTORIE, year XXXI, No 1/1975, pp 102-111).

While the situation of Romanian Jews at freedom considerably improved after 6 April 1943 and they were beginning to regain their trust in the authority of the Romanian state, the situation of those who had already been in camps for a

while continued to remain dramatic. That was, to begin with, the case of the Romanian Jews of Germany, the Protectorate, and the General Government who, by April 1943 were almost all interned in camps. The Romanian diplomatic and consular authorities made special efforts to try to rescue them. The results attained were summarized by the Romanian minister in Berlin, General Ion Gheorghe, in a report to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs: "The response has been invariably negative. In all these cases the German authorities have informed us that they cannot release information on interned persons. As for the possibility of having any of these persons released for the purpose of repatriation to Romania or the occupied countries where they lived before internment, that is altogether out of question." The German authorities justified their viewpoint by the fact that, at the time of internment of these persons the Romanian government had agreed with those measures and hence, the internment could only be "final" and irrevocable. This response carried, according to General Ion Gheorghe, also an "unmistakable hint of reproach to us for having changed our attitude in this respect." The diplomat suggested to the competent Romanian bodies to adopt one of the following lines of future behavior: either accept the existing situation and cease all interventions ("so as not to expose ourselves to recriminations and animosity"), or to adopt "a resolute attitude and formally declare that we intend to reserve our sovereign rights over the Romanian citizens, whatever their origin." At the same time he called the attention of the minister to the fact that when he requested to be shown "when and in what form we acceded to the Germans' internment of Romanian Jews," the German authorities replied that it had been done orally. "I," Minister Ion Gheorghe concluded, "am not aware of it. If it never occurred, then solution No 2 is indicated; if, however, it did, then we must adhere to solution No 1" (AIHSS, section No XXIV, file No 3342, pp 103-104: report No 69 of 18 November 1943 from General Ion Gheorghe, Romanian minister in Berlin). When, on 22 November 1943, this report came into the hands of Mihai Antonescu, he requested a report on the entire matter. On 24 November 1943 the report, written by C. Karadja, was ready. It demonstrated the lack of legal foundation of the position of the German authorities, who were clinging to Ion Antonescu's alleged consent given to Killinger that Romanian Jews in Germany be treated the same as German Jews, and the impossibility that this verbal consent should neutralize the written clauses of the Romanian-German treaty of 23 March 1935 (FMA, section problem 33, vol 32, report No 227 of 24 November 1943 by C. Karadja).

In the period that followed the Romanian Legation in Berlin continued to intervene on behalf of Romanian Jews interned in camps. Although he himself had for a few months an opportunity to verify the uselessness of such efforts, in May 1944 Gh. Davidescu once again cabled General Ion Gheorghe that "we cannot ignore the fate of our non-Aryan citizens who request the protection to which they are legally entitled... Please try to do everything in your power to protect, liberate, and repatriate the persons concerned" (op. cit., unnumbered cable signed by Gh. Davidescu, to the Romanian Legation in Berlin). At the same time, the Jews in Romania, including the Jewish Center and the Commissariat for Jewish Problems repeatedly appealed to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to investigate the fate of Romanian Jews in Germany and in the occupied territories whose traces had been lost, some of them as early as 1942. However, although at this point the Romanian authorities wanted to help them and frequently took initiatives in Berlin for this purpose, very few of

them met with any success (The desire and the impotence to help were summarized in one of Mihai Antonescu's notes on 3 May 1944: "We do want to bring home the Jews who are Romanian subjects, but the German authorities do not allow the repatriation. What is to be done?" op. cit., vol 30, report of 2 May 1944 signed by C. Karadja).

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HEAD OF SERBIAN MARXIST CENTER URGES DEEP CHANGES FOR LCY

Zagreb DANAS in Serbo-Croatian 16 Sep 86 pp 13-16

[Article and interview with head of Serbian Marxist Center Zoran Vidojevic, by Jelena Lovric: "The Meaning of the Party"; first paragraph is introduction]

[Text] The League of Communists of Yugoslavia must become a party of profound socialist changes, open to everything that is liberating and progressive. The director of the Marxist Center of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Serbia, Zoran Vidojevic, in his book "The Meaning of the Party," which was published last summer in Zagreb, was unusually explicit and frank in raising the question that has recently been posed ever more frequently, but constantly in a roundabout, indirect, insufficiently lucid, shrouded, euphemistic way: what is the true meaning of the existence of the party, not any party anywhere, anytime, or some abstract party, but rather the League of Communists of Yugoslavia here and now? It is here that we begin our interview.

[Vidojevic] Theoretical thought concerning the revolutionary party must constantly return to its sources and to the initial questions, primarily those concerning the purpose and meaning of the party. Because if these questions, which have ontological status for theory and essential significance for the orientation of the revolutionary movement itself, are forgotten, all sorts of things slip into oblivion and distort their own meaning. The means become the end; organizations that should be servants to society become its masters; institutions devour the movement; the present remains closed to the future. This is why it is necessary that the theoretical thought of the party, as well as of socialism as a whole, be guided by a methodological principle: return to the meaning. But clearly meaning in this sense is not hard cash, facts, the ultimate knowledge that alone is necessary to be exposed in "authentic" literature and in the most worthwhile theoretical-practical achievements of the revolutionary past. Meaning is created; it is formed, revealed in the practice of these times, by means of our struggles, realizations, hopes, as well as our defeats, worries, mistakes and disappointments. Meaning is also a process. It draws strength from the future, not from just any future, but from the future of possibilities--not unique or certain possibilities, but very tenuous ones--so that tomorrow's society might be more humane, more worthy of human beings than is today's society. Thus, the axiom "back to meaning" should be combined with the demand "onward to meaning," in order to search for the full meaning of the revolutionary party, but also of that which is "older" than the party--the meaning of revolution, socialism-communism and

human existence itself. In the course of promoting the meaning of communist revolution, it is increasingly forgotten that the League of Communists could not have become an organization of random members, an organization of structurally predetermined passivity in the grassroots and hyperactivity in the leadership, but rather a league of communist delegates, fighters. Although communists are not and cannot be, at least not in massive proportions, popular heroes, Promethean entities, they nonetheless have to be characterized by a capability for theoretical and practical-political initiative in the struggle for the most progressive and most humane resolution of the main problems of social development and of the human condition in society. Today, this means the ability to struggle for a socialist solution to the crisis, for a high level and revitalization of the self-management alternative. Unfortunately, being a member of the League of Communists is not the same thing as being a communist. Because being a communist is an existential choice and investment, which does not mean joining the "party" for private gain or mere political subsistence in it. And I am afraid that a rather large number of present members of the LCY do not meet these criteria.

[Question] Is it possible to talk about these questions a little more concretely? What might this forgotten meaning in fact be, and what is its regeneration?

[Vidojevic] Marxist thought is--in a most fundamental way-- the thought of freedom, and so the party also has meaning if it is the party of freedom. If we are going to talk about the League of Communists of Yugoslavia at the present moment, which is marked by a serious crisis and involution of social development, then the meaning of the League of Communists "here and now" is that it should be the party of profound socialist change, or of opening up the social and broadest historical perspectives to the working classes and strata, but most of all that it should be wise, liberating and progressive. This meaning is asserted or is lost in the ability to struggle for a much more profound and much broader self-management economy than what we have. It is in this that the League of Communists is faced with its new, great, decisive and historical test: will it be the party of these necessary, profound socialist social changes--whereby those changes for the benefit of existing associated producers take priority, although it does not stop at this class level--or will it remain at the tail-end of events, and thus historically overrun by regressive processes and forces, delays, speculation, a short-winded policy, hesitation and the decline of civilization?

[Question] What does it mean when you say that changes should not stop at the class approach?

[Vidojevic] This primary question concerning the subject of needed changes is usually answered with a formula of how the working class must enter into the historical scenario and then everything will be resolved. It is correct that workers, or rather those who are the most progressive--thus, not all workers without exception because even workers are sharply divided according to existential situation, political practice and consciousness--certainly must come to have the greatest amount of influence. However, we must free ourselves from the specific working class pattern and dogmatism that the liberating potential of society attributes only to the working class. They are significant, but besides them there are a number of other parts of society that are also jeopardized by the present social crisis and that are demanding serious

societal changes. Naturally, the adverse social situation is not itself a guarantee of progressive political commitment, but today we need a modern alliance or, to use Gramsci's term, a historical bloc of those parts, groups, "factions," of the unprivileged working classes and strata that are capable of providing a leftist, self-management and democratic response to the crisis and who would rally around the best of the working class. The advocates of necessary changes can be those who have the greatest existential interest in them, whose living conditions are such that they must long for them, but only if they join forces with all the liberating potential of society, with knowledge, with the advocates of progressive critical awareness, with the new, courageous, genuine theoretical consciousness, but also with the new sensibility of young people, especially the unemployed. One very important question is whether the League of Communists gives voice to all of these liberating forces of society and whether it is transformed with inspiration for the need to open up to them or exercises one form or another of sectarianism and suspicion towards this broad approach.

[Question] At the recent 13th Congress of the LCY the need to create this new bloc was mentioned for the first time in debate. You wrote about this earlier in your book.

[Vidojevic] I do not mean by that a sort of "social magic wand," not only because one must anyway be careful and avoid any formula for salvation. In addition, the idea of a "new" social or historic bloc has often been understood as federations that were unable to do anything worthwhile for the most part, federations of one elite or another or, under that old false belief that everything will be resolved when the intelligentsia and the working class are unified, when the hand and the mind are joined. After all, the question of how to define the hand and the mind and the limit between them today is a big one. Naturally, the role of the intelligentsia, and not only the "humanist" intelligentsia, but all of the intelligentsia that combines knowledge and liberating consciousness, expertise and the readiness to fight for the value of an uncertain, but under certain circumstances possible, revitalized self-management alternative, is also an important role, but the forces of transformation must also make demands in all other affairs of state in the interest of socialist change.

[Question] Development of self-management?

[Vidojevic] Yes, but one must first of all pose the question of what kind of self-management can serve as a revolutionary force to permit a real way out of the present crisis. This cannot be just any self-management. It cannot be biased, group-ownership, state-controlled self-management. It especially cannot be some hybrid of a national state and self-management, which I call national self-management. I would like to see us disassociate ourselves from that mythology of self-management, from servitude to that stereotype that simply and superficially maintains that the way out of the present-day situation is to strengthen self-management. It is indisputable that this is necessary, but it is not enough for the depth and magnitude of changes that we need. It seems to me, in fact, that many of our systematic decisions are permeated with a combination of bad utopianism in the leftist or quasi-leftist mold and bureaucratic interest. In this way, for example, the progressive ideas and strategies of free and associated labor have undoubtedly

undergone a quite ugly realization, primarily because they have "slipped through the hands" of the bureaucracy. And bad utopianism demands an above-average and thus an enormous amount of coercion in both economic and political terms. In order to be able in fact to realize properly progressive and historical support of the idea of self-management, it is necessary, among other things, to take a look at its strengths a bit more modestly and realistically than is the case in our overly ideological program which purports to provide a solution for all of society's ills. Self-management cannot be put into effect merely as some "everyday," participatory democracy, because without attention to the meaning of "grassroots democracy" or direct democracy, without linking it to the development of modern production forces, to the affirmation of knowledge and expertise, without qualitative cadre changes, even self-management cannot go very far in penetrating the depths of social processes in order to become a truly convincing alternative civilization for us and in the sense of world history. The struggle for the revitalization of self-management, a new, integral and integrative self-management, and its rehabilitation are not possible without adequate changes within the League of Communists. But we lack the dialectics for changes in self-management and in the League of Communists necessary to understand the current situation.

[Question] What sorts of changes in the League of Communists?

[Vidojevic] As long as there is no answer to the question of what kind of self-management satisfies Yugoslav society today on the threshold of the 21st century, there cannot be talk of a more serious strategy of social change; but this strategy does not exist. There is no convincing answer to the question of what kind of League of Communists can serve as front-runner out of the crisis. In any case, the League of Communists is losing its meaning as self-management becomes devaluated as an idea, as a worthwhile orientation and as a practice, as it starts to disappear as a serious goal and turn into an ideological ritual, as the danger that it will become a relic of the past grows stronger. Thus, the League of Communists is destroying itself and its historical justification. It is unavoidably turning into a party of state and national socialism (and on our soil this must always increase with the level of national, religious and other divisions) or increasingly gliding along towards its own type of bad social democratization, and I emphasize the word bad here, or some hybrid of these two possibilities, which is possibly the most likely outcome if this sort of situation continues, especially if it worsens. After all, these tendencies are very much in evidence.

[Question] You said that the Party must draw a link between its existence and freedom. Many people are prepared to swear that we have an enormous amount of freedom. They back up this argument with the very widespread criticism that dominates the public scene. Is this a sufficient indication of freedom?

[Vidojevic] We live in a paradoxical situation. There has never been more criticism of the entire system, including criticism of the highest bodies, of both state and party leadership. Never has there been less change with respect to the amount and extent of criticism, but also with respect to needed changes. That is the phenomenon of Yugoslavia today. This abundant awareness of the need for change is great political capital, but since it does not yield any results, it is frozen capital. Of course, this awareness is also contradictory, but within this contradiction there is an obvious liberating vein, a

strain of revolution that, if it is not converted into concrete political energy, into concrete policy lines and programs, could evaporate or even turn into something entirely different, mass apathy, depoliticization or negative politicization. There is a real danger that the accumulated social dissatisfaction, which is currently of a predominantly socialist mold, will move in the other direction and gain an explicitly regressive character, especially if it is linked with nationalism. One example is the situation in Kosovo. If the blockade of changes for which society is ripe continues, it might continue to slip into retardation, or even into the depths of a crisis of separate existence in the autonomous areas, which in an extreme case could result in a threat to the very possibilities of socialism in that area. This [could occur] because the crisis must be considered in terms of its most extreme consequence. This is not a question of an "ordinary" social crisis, but rather a crisis of conditions and chances for development, and possibly the survival of self-management socialism. But it appears to me that the League of Communists is to a large extent moving alongside and past this class criticism of the social situation and its practice, especially the practice of its leadership, and past mounting social dissatisfaction, and that it continues to function in the old manner almost as if nothing is happening.

[Question] But is not all the criticism in public circulation today a positive sign?

[Vidojevic] I feel that we need rigorous, and I would even say radical, but also communist criticism of all existing matters, that no one and nothing has the privilege of exemption from this criticism. But besides this broad criticism in the socialist mold which emanates from nearly every pore of society, there is also growing criticism of the League of Communists and the entire society from the radical Right. In this criticism, the League of Communists is viewed exclusively as a totalitarian, anti-democratic organization, historically stagnant, incapable of any progressive initiatives and undertakings. We cannot close our eyes to this. This can be explained largely by the crisis in the communist movement, in fact by the crisis in the realization of the self-management design of our society, and by the processes of bureaucratic involution. If this critical precondition for understanding the terms of overall regressive criticism is forgotten, it is easy to arrive at a position of mere defensiveness, of the unproductive defense of what should not and cannot be defended. Criticism with rightist features may not be negated by mystifying the Party, but instead first and foremost by opening up to progressive changes in both the Party and in society as a whole, to the superiority of communist ideas and action. From a position of dull-witted pragmatism and administrative spirit, it is not possible to see how the Right throughout the world--and in our country--is not only primitive, aggressive and nationalistic, but that in our country these are its primary characteristics. In its ideological plan and longing for a complete, radical reconstruction of society, however, it can act using subtle methods, the "long march" through institutions, non-violently, through a struggle for its relevant values, the desire for its own cultural hegemony. Only then could we confront the phenomenon of an intelligent, domestic Right. Of course, all of this does not have to be understood as some dramatic warning that we are almost directly face-to-face with rightist civil subversion, if not because of this latter reason, then because I do not believe that our forces of socialism are that weak. Because this too can be manipulated: an atmosphere is being created as if socialism is a besieged fortress, which is in fact an expression of the bureaucratic reaction to

actual rightist tendencies and to the crisis of society. The processes of restoration are primarily evolutionary, "silent." In view of this, it takes the form, if not of an "intimate federation," then at any rate along adjacent points, in the joining of several important interests. Some of my friends call it a "historic compromise" between the citizenry and the (neo-) Stalinist Right.

[Question] How do you explain the persistence of the discrepancy between large-scale dissatisfaction and criticism and the inability to bring about change?

[Vidojevic] I think that that is primarily a matter of the concrete structure of societal power. It is not an unprecedented or unusual situation in history for the balance of forces in terms of awareness as well as in broad political efforts and attitudes to be such that the majority of society favors serious changes but lacks the power to carry them through. However, from the point of view of self-management socialism and its goals, this situation is unacceptable. I am convinced that the overall problems of our society today are, as a focal point, refracted straight across this vertical of actual social powers. The social present is characterized by the separate strengths and weaknesses of decentralized political bureaucracy: the strength to carry out stipulated changes, to have a monopoly on cadre policy, to assign people to whatever important function, and at the same time the weakness and inability to wrestle with fundamental social problems. Naturally, the political bureaucracy cannot be viewed as entirely identical to those persons carrying out political functions, since they become a political bureaucracy when their functions become a separate private and group possession, the basis of a power monopoly. The fact that, for example, our electoral system remains more or less within the old bounds, even though there is a serious need for change in it, indicates the actual relation of class and political forces--which for the time being apparently favors the political bureaucracy and tends to favor perhaps the capitalizing segment of the private property stratum.

[Question] The amount of discussion and all the debate and polemics prior to this year's elections on this important area of various aspects of the electoral system has yet to subside. Nevertheless, have we in practice simply been marching in place?

[Vidojevic] I would like to draw signs of new movement into the foreground, although none of them can be considered a great trend. It is not insignificant that discussion of elections in recent years has been greater and much more critical. It is a fact that breakthroughs have been made, although only partially, in certain republican party organizations with more candidates and for most leaders. But this is still not enough. This is still below the level of social needs because this should be a universal principle: not only for some, but for all environments, not only for party functions, but for all elections. It is in this sense that we need serious reforms of the electoral system. It is indisputable that some half-steps have been taken, but things have stopped midway and in some cases at the beginning.

[Question] Was this half-step not in fact transformed at the 30th congress into a step backwards because the option was once again opened up of evading the party membership's demands that it be obligatory that there be several candidates for every seat in every election?

[Vidojevic] In any case, the congress stopped short of this need because the statute left open the possibility of devaluation, of essential restraint, and even of the total annulment of the fundamental commitment that the most responsible leaders be chosen from among several candidates. But I view the consistent change of this principle as one of the key conditions for getting out of the present crisis. I am not an advocate of a putsch in personnel or cadre. I am not for institutional witch-hunts. I am not generally inclined to believe that entirely new people are necessary in order to change a situation that--to use the customary vocabulary--is very complex in all its aspects. It is also not possible to effect change through cadre renewal. But I dare say that it is clearly not possible to seek a genuine way out of the current crisis with the same people or with some of the same people who have in fact mostly contributed to everything that has caused, multiplied and intensified the crisis. Also, I think that the political bureaucracy today is for the most part governing through its monopoly in cadre policy, which is much more direct and influential than the more frequently mentioned monopoly of control through surplus products. These two most often go hand in hand even if there is no direct causal effect. Of course in order to change the overall social situation it is not enough to have several candidates in all elections, but this is a start. Because if some of the most powerful people can decide to influence the most important elections in society and can find confirmation without a great deal of criticism on nearly all levels, this is an extremely critical limit, an obstacle to necessary societal changes. Fear of "open tickets" is a typical bureaucratic anxiety, concern for one's own position, a sure sign of the extent to which there is a desire to face up to the current situation and to one's place in the hierarchy of power and authority.

[Question] But despite the unequivocal public message, the whole thing continues more or less as before. How can one not succumb to pessimism in this situation?

[Vidojevic] Every serious person, everyone who cares about socialism, every patriot, must unavoidably ask himself today where all this leads, where we are going to end up if the processes of society's increasing disintegration and an ever stronger return to the past--and often in its most dismal manifestations--continue, whether we can reliably assume that we will persevere as a society, as a state, as Yugoslavia, what will happen with the next generations, what we are leaving behind for it, to what general extent we can be convincing in our personal commitment as theorists, as the writers of books, and as workers of one kind or another. In general to what extent do books and all of our work have a deeper meaning if we permit things to continue as they are going, if we do not oppose them, and in very concrete terms in the outright practical and necessary struggle against the forces of the past when for many different reasons intellectual Marxists and many people of progressive convictions are acting as if this will all pass. The socialist, democratic forces of this society are not small in number, hopelessly weak and lacking in experience. And despite the fact that the League of Communists has great weaknesses and that there are rightist-nationalist and Stalinist elements in it, our Party has significant liberating, genuinely democratic, communist potential. But these things also exist outside the League of Communists. The hope that under certain circumstances and in the long run things will be different, better, is not entirely unfounded. But things can also be worse, much worse, and so it is necessary that we expand our range of knowledge concerning our relationship to societal reality. The categories "pessimism" and "optimism" simply do not apply here. What is needed is sober realism and a metamorphosis.

END