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
JPRS-UWE-84-003

7 February 1984

USSR Report

WORLD ECONOMY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

No. 11, November 1983



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7 February 1984

USSR REPORT

WORLD ECONOMY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

No 11, November 1983

Except where indicated otherwise in the table of contents the following is a complete translation of the Russian-language monthly journal MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA published in Moscow by the Institute of World Economy and International Relations, USSR Academy of Sciences.

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PUBLICATION DATA

English title	: WORLD ECONOMY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, No 11, November 1983
Russian title	: MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA
Author (s)	:
Editor (s)	: Ya. S. Khavinson
Publishing House	: Izdatel'stvo "Pravda"
Place of Publication	: Moscow
Date of Publication	: 22 September 1983
Signed to press	: 14 October 1983
Copies	: 30,000
COPYRIGHT	: Izdatel'stvo "Pravda". "Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya". 1983,

ENGLISH SUMMARIES OF MAJOR ARTICLES IN MEMO JOURNAL

Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian No 11, Nov 83 (signed to press 14 Oct 83) pp 158-159

[Text] O. Bykov in the article "Reason and Responsibility (Imperatives of Atomic Century)" considers key problems of international security. He notes that never before has humanity possessed such great opportunities for universal development, yet never before has there been such a fatal danger to its very existence. The author points to the pressing need to rule out the use of military means in the solution of the historic dispute between socialism and imperialism at a time when the productive forces are vigorously developing in conditions of the scientific and technological revolution, the rapid growth of the peace-loving forces and the struggle for democracy. The article analyses the two approaches to the problem of the aversion of war. The socialist approach reflects the organic linkage of class interests of the progressive social formation with the vital interests of humanity as a whole, demands the banning of the use of atomic energy for military purposes. The imperialist policy on the contrary defends the selfish interests of the most reactionary aggressive forces of the monopolistic bourgeoisie, prevailing over the interests of universal peace and stakes on qualitatively new military means. The article discloses the negative attitude of the US leading circles to the existing military and strategic balance and reveals the causes of the sharp struggle between different groups of the ruling classes of the United States and other imperialist powers. The author draws the conclusion that all the international activities of the CPSU and the Soviet State are aimed at eliminating the menace of an atomic disaster and the attainment of positive changes in international affairs.

L. Leontyev in the article "Coming Fiftieth Anniversary of Relations Between the USSR and the USA" considers two trends in American foreign politics: confrontation and limited cooperation with the first socialist state in the world. The author notes that notwithstanding all fluctuations of Washington's politics since October 1917 the confrontal approach toward the USSR has preponderated. But at the same time valuable experience in constructive cooperation in different fields was accumulated in Soviet-American relations during the Second World War and in the early 70s. The article notes that it is in the objective interests of the USSR and the USA to avert a nuclear-rocket holocaust. The special responsibility of the two states for the fate of peace urgently demands that all healthy shoots in

their relations be maintained and developed. The article stresses that these relations should be stripped of the artificial difficulties and subordinated to the long-term aims of pooling efforts to solve the problems facing humanity.

The article "Political Pluralism as a Disguise of Monopoly Power" by E. Kuzmin criticises the conception of "political pluralism" passed off by the ideologists of monopoly capital as a certain model of a state system. They specifically absolutize the independence of the bourgeois state, which as if ostensibly elevates over classes and conducts its policy in the interests of the whole society. Citing numerous examples from the life of Western states the author reveals that "political pluralism", hypocritical reasoning about the "dispersing of power", "counteraction of opposing forces", "contesting in politics" etc. are actually nothing but a tool for disguising the power used by the industrial and finance oligarchy.

The 1974-75 economic crisis has become the turning point of the postwar economic history of the industrial capitalist countries, involving essential changes in the production relations.

According to V. Kuznetsov the sphere of the state monopoly economic regulation also underwent the evolution from the conventional Keynesian theories towards the so-called "deregulation" postulates. In the article "Two Trends in the Sphere of the State Monopoly Economic Regulation in West European Countries" the author deals with three major groups of questions.

Primarily, he presents the analysis of the main factors that stipulated the necessity to look for the new approaches towards the state interference in domestic economic matters, taking into thorough consideration the economic situation of the late 70's.

Secondly, there's investigation of the similar and specific features between the two main trends in the state monopoly regulation in the West European countries namely neo-conservative concepts resembling the American monetarists' views prevailing in the United Kingdom, and the "dirigisme" comprising left Keynesian theories, institutionalism, structuralism, social-reformism.

Thirdly, the author speculates upon the real economic policy of the West European countries since 1973.

Yu. Osipov in the article "Problems of Restructuring of International Monetary System and Developing Countries" examines a wide range of problems connected with the existing international monetary order which legalizes and deepens the unequal position of the periphery in the world capitalist economy. The article considers the methods and forms of monetary exploitation and discrimination of the developing countries based on the domination of the dollar and other reserve currencies of the West. It also shows the mechanism of transferring inflation from the centre of capitalism to the outlying areas. The author comes to the conclusion that Western attempts to repair the monetary system run counter to the interests of the developing

countries which stand for a revision of the monetary order on the principles of democracy and general equality. The author analyses in detail the policy of universal monetary neocolonialism pursued by the International Monetary Fund and shows that certain palliatives introduced in the Fund's monetary system and financial politics perpetuates the monetary dependence of the periphery from the West. While criticizing the monetary restructuring the author shares the opinion of the democratic circles who link up the solution of this problem with the struggle against the aggressive nature of imperialism, with actions for the realization of all positive aspects of the international economic order both on international and national levels, movements for disarmament and social progress.

One of the most visual phenomenon of the last decade is rapid expansion of Japan, spreading its economic influence over almost all continents. A. Kollontai in the article "Economic Expansion of Japan to Western Europe" chose the West European region to describe the contemporary features, structure and particulars of Japanese foreign economic activity.

Unprecedented dynamism of Japanese penetration into the West European economies involved the emergence of the controversial situation characterized by trade discrepancies and increase of the West European debt, drastic growth of Japanese direct investments in the West European production.

The new stage of the scientific and technological revolution contributed to the crucial shifts in the structure of Japanese expansion. Nowadays Japan intensifies its foreign activity in high-technology spheres.

The reshaping of the domestic economy exerted significant impact upon the foreign activity of Japan in the early 80's. The surge of protectionism in the world capitalist economy also influenced Japanese exterior strategy.

The author speculates upon the Japanese model of penetration into the economy of Western Europe emphasizing the complementary character of commercial export and export of capital and tracing their contemporary evolution.

The predominant development of bilateral relations Japan-West Europe, the absence of the coordinated attitude towards Japanese expansion permit the conclusion that the united counteraction of the West European states against Japanese economic offensive is hardly probable at least in the short run.

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CSO: 1812/52

U.S. ADMINISTRATION URGED TO CURB ARMS RACE

Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian No 11,
Nov 83 pp 3-17

[Article by O. Bykov: "Sense and Responsibility"]

[Text] The current world situation is unprecedented. Never before have such extensive favorable opportunities for constructive development been afforded mankind, but never before has there been such a deadly threat to its very existence. The rapid development of the production forces under the conditions of the scientific-technical revolution, the growth of the forces of peace and socialism, the buildup of the struggle for democracy and national and social liberation, the acceleration of social progress--all these are creating real prerequisites for satisfying the urgent requirements of the population of the whole world. And at the same time, however, the hostile opposition of states with different social systems, given the presence in the world of colossal stockpiles of means of mass extermination, entails the awesome danger of a general conflict with catastrophic consequences for human civilization and for life itself on our planet even.

The uniqueness of the current situation is dictated by the urgent need to exclude a military solution of the historical dispute between socialism and capitalism. The impossibility of victory in a nuclear war and the inevitability in the event of it breaking out of a world catastrophe have canceled out many traditional postulates of policy and strategy. General nuclear annihilation--not to mention the fact that it would be a crime against humanity--cannot serve as a means of the achievement of any rational goal. The weapons in the arsenals of both sides have such a monstrous power of destruction that their use would inevitably bring about a nuclear whirlwind which would swallow up both combatants and noncombatants and turn whole countries and continents into scorched radioactive deserts.

The survival of the human race has now become an absolute priority of world politics and an indispensable condition not only of the solution of all other international and domestic problems but also of the ongoing development of society as such. The most convincing expression of genuine humanism and the highest morality in the sphere of relations between states is recognition of this irrefutable truth as the point of departure for all international activity. The position of any government, any party and any politician in respect of the

cardinal problem of war and peace serves in our day as the principal gauge of state wisdom and the conformity of their policy to the vital interests of the peoples.

Two Approaches to the Central Problem of the Present Day

The global nature of the military danger objectively predetermines the concurrence of interests of all countries and peoples in the prevention of general devastation. The realities of the nuclear age demand the really intelligent, responsible approach of states to the problem of preserving peace in the world. Despite the entire depth of the social, political and ideological differences of the opposite social systems, on this most important, general problem concord between them should, it would seem--in the face of the awesome specter of total nuclear extermination--emphatically and irreversibly gain the upper hand over the disagreements.

However, in real life everything proves to be more complicated and contradictory: finding a common denominator of the interests of the security of the socialist and capitalist states is a far from simple matter. The difference in the approaches to the said problem historically was caused by the antithesis of the socioeconomic and political nature of socialism and capitalism. It focuses the class bipolarity of the modern world.

Lenin's peace policy is an inalienable component of the general strategy of the building of socialism and communism and mankind's deliverance from exploitation and war. The new social formation does not need violence for its establishment and development for it is based on the invincible objective regularities of social progress. Socialism has been forced to resort to armed force only to repulse the encroachments of foreign and internal enemies. Since the time of the adoption of the historic Decree on Peace through this day the Soviet state's foreign policy has unswervingly followed a course of constructive love of peace. Aggressiveness, expansionism and the "export of revolution" are alien to it. Its main goals are ensuring in the sphere of international relations the conditions necessary for the peaceful, creative labor of the peoples of the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries, the development of all forces which are the purveyors of social progress and the expansion of mutually profitable international cooperation. The USSR and its socialist allies are doing all in their power to ensure that the historical competition of the two world systems proceed in the sphere of peaceful coexistence and not military confrontation.

Whereas socialist policy reflects the organic connection of the class interests of the progressive social system with the vital interests of mankind as a whole, in imperialist policy the narrow selfish interests of the most reactionary and aggressive forces of the monopoly bourgeoisie prevail over the interests of general peace and international security. Although the exploiter system, which is approaching its demise, can by no means count on surviving the flames of a nuclear conflagration which it lights, class egotism frequently proves stronger than the logic of cooperation even for the sake of self-preservation. Despite the radical change in the global strategic situation, militarism, the gamble on crude force and methods of diktat and blackmail continue to make a deep mark on imperialist policy.

The United States and other imperialist powers are attempting to consolidate and expand the sphere of monopoly capital's domination. Essentially reactionary and running counter to the arterial direction of the social development of our era, this policy pursues the antipopular and ultimately antihuman goals of the ruling bourgeoisie, which are contrary to the interests of the broad people's masses and the interests of the overwhelming majority of mankind. The achievement of these goals is conceived of primarily on the paths of the use of pressure, threats and violence. Imperialism's final argument in the historical dispute with socialism and all liberation movements has long been military force. It is this which has always served as the main prop of its policy of expansion, aggression and the export of counterrevolution.

The alarming situation which has now come about in the world is not the result of a chance coincidence of circumstances. Just as the scientific-technical revolution did not of its own accord end in the appearance of weapons of mass extermination, neither did the threat of a world catastrophe arise of its own accord. Imperialism, primarily American, put a great discovery of the human genius at the service of its egotistic goals and turned it against mankind. As far as the Soviet Union is concerned, back on the threshold of the nuclear age it put forward with all certainty, decisiveness and farsightedness a sensible and highly humane proposal--banning the use of atomic energy for military purposes and nipping in the bud the dangerous and ruinous nuclear arms race, which is fraught with unprecedented disasters for all mankind.

American imperialism took a different path. Attempting to turn back world development by force, immediately after World War II it gambled on a qualitatively new means of armed struggle. The appearance of atomic weapons in the U.S. arsenal and the monopoly possession of them in the first postwar years sharply spurred the military-force trends in the foreign policy of this country's ruling circles. They openly advocated use of the atom bomb as a means of establishing their domination. The most bellicose politicians and strategists called bluntly for an attack on the Soviet Union in order to wipe out socialism with the aid of the "absolute weapon". A serious threat of a new world war arose in which American imperialism, adventuristically counting on impunity, would be capable of releasing weapons of mass extermination. In this atmosphere the strengthening of the defense capability of the USSR and its friends and allies became a task of paramount importance.

The developed economic base, the latest achievements of the scientific-technical revolution, the selfless labor of scientists and workers--all these enabled the Soviet Union to very quickly create its own nuclear weapons. Liquidation of the United States' atomic monopoly and, with the appearance of ICBM's, the strategic invulnerability of its territory was a powerful means of fettering imperialist circles' aggressive propensities.

A most important factor of the stabilization of the world situation was the achievement of a balance of military forces between the world of socialism and the world of capitalism, between the Warsaw Pact states and the countries of the North Atlantic alliance and between the USSR and the United States. The appearance of general military-strategic equilibrium was the result of the

change in the correlation of forces in the international arena. The historical competition of the two world systems reached a frontier at which imperialism had lost the capacity for gaining the ascendancy over socialism by way of the use of armed might. A dependable counterweight to the military, primarily nuclear, potential of the United States and NATO was the defense might of the USSR and its allies, which was in no way inferior to the former. Given any version of the outbreak of a conflict involving the use of weapons of mass extermination, the aggressor would not escape a devastating retaliatory strike.

The fundamentally new strategic situation had a sobering impact on imperialism. Its aggressive nature did not change, naturally, but it now had to consider that unleashing a nuclear war against socialism would be tantamount to passing the death sentence on itself. The balance of military forces began to palpably curb the bellicose, reckless trends in the West's policy and stimulated the development of moderate, sober and realistic trends therein.

The new balance of military forces objectively contributed to an improvement in the international atmosphere and halted the world's slide toward nuclear catastrophe. The strategic parity between the Soviet Union and the United States served as the start of an improvement in their mutual relations. Both sides recognized that in the situation that had evolved there was no intelligent alternative to the preservation of peace and peaceful coexistence. On the basis of the principles of equality and reciprocity and noninterference in one another's internal affairs a number of important treaties and agreements was concluded, including those on the prevention of nuclear war, certain measures in the sphere of strategic offensive arms limitation and on limiting ABM systems. Talks began on questions of banning or limiting many types of weapons. The balance of military forces of the Warsaw Pact and NATO which had come about on the European continent served as an important prerequisite of the development of the positive process which was enshrined in the results of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. The first steps were taken in the direction of military detente and the consolidation of mutual trust on the continent, and talks began on a mutual reduction of the military-political atmosphere in this most important part of the world had a salutary effect on the global strategic situation.

As a result real prospects were revealed in the 1970's for a winding down of the fruitless and dangerous competition in the military sphere. Since there can be no winners either in the competition to stockpile weapons of mass extermination or in a war in which they are used, the sole sensible thing is to halt the arms race and, taking the equality which has been achieved as the point of departure, move along the path of mutual limitation and reduction of arms, particularly nuclear, given strict maintenance of balance at an increasingly low level. Not the continued buildup of arsenals of lethal weapons but a reduction in the stockpiles thereof may serve as a guarantee of international security.

From precisely such positions of sense and responsibility for the fate of peace the Soviet Union has approached and continues to approach this central military-strategic problem of our time. It has done and continues to do all within its power to remove the threat of war and direct the course of world

events into the channel of detente, an improvement of interstate relations and a strengthening of trust. Like its socialist allies, the USSR is convinced of the vital need for a reduction in the level of military confrontation, given strict observance by both sides of the principle of equality and equal security.

"The military-strategic balance between socialism and imperialism objectively contributes to peaceful coexistence," Yu.V. Andropov observed at the CPSU Central Committee June (1983) Plenum. "The achievement of this balance is a most important result of recent decades. It required of our people and the peoples of the other countries of the socialist community considerable forces and resources, and we will not allow it to be disturbed. We will continue to do everything necessary to ensure the security of our country and our friends and allies and will enhance the combat might of the Soviet Armed Forces--a powerful factor restraining the aggressive aspirations of imperialist reaction. But if it is possible to lower the level of arms and military spending on both sides and embark on disarmament, to which we actively aspire, this would be a great boon for all countries and peoples."

The USSR and the socialist community countries are convinced of the urgent need for mutual restraint in the sphere of arms and in military policy. They propose consolidation of the military-strategic stability, preservation of the evolved balance of forces, a halt to the arms race and consistent progress along the path of arms limitation and reduction.

The undertaking not to be the first to use nuclear weapons assumed by the Soviet Union (June 1982) is of truly historic significance. In adopting this highly humane decision the Soviet leadership proceeded from the fact that countersteps on the part of the other nuclear powers could lead to mutual commitments on no first use of nuclear weapons, which in practice would be tantamount to banning the use of nuclear weapons altogether. The USSR's decision has had wide-ranging international repercussions. It has been supported by the other socialist countries, the leaders of many nonaligned and neutral countries and a whole number of politicians and public figures in Western countries.

A nuclear freeze could serve to strengthen strategic stability and as an important prerequisite of a consistent lowering of the level of the evolved equilibrium. The path toward this is opened by the Soviet Union's proposal (June 1983) that all powers possessing nuclear weapons freeze all their existing nuclear arms quantitatively and qualitatively. This measure would provide for the prevention of a further increase in the sides' nuclear arsenals thanks to both existing and new forms and types of nuclear arms. Furthermore, each side would impose a moratorium on all tests of nuclear warheads, as, equally, on tests of new forms and types of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles. The observance of freeze commitments could be effectively monitored with the aid of national technical facilities. Certain additional measures could be agreed and developed, where necessary, on the basis of reciprocity. Obviously, a nuclear freeze would be most effective if it were adopted simultaneously by all the nuclear powers. But the Soviet Government considers it possible that this be done initially by the USSR and the United States, thinking that other nuclear powers would follow their example.

Thus halting the nuclear arms race is not only an urgent task but also one which is comparatively easy to accomplish under the conditions of the approximate balance of forces. Realizing the said proposals would not require difficult prolonged negotiations. At the same time, however, a freeze would be an effective first step on the way to a reduction in and ultimately to the complete liquidation of nuclear arms and thereby the removal of the threat of nuclear catastrophe altogether.

Toward a Winding Down of the Spiraling of the Nuclear Arms Race

The attitude in U.S. leading circles toward the military-strategic balance was and remains a dual one. On the one hand it is forced recognition of the qualitative change in the correlation of forces and the necessary adaptation of American policy and strategy to this fundamental fact, but on the other a stubborn reluctance to be reconciled to the change that has taken place and an aspiration to change the evolved situation to their benefit. The intrinsic contradictoriness of the positions on this question is expressed in acute clashes between representatives of different groupings of the ruling classes of the United States and other imperialist states. In the 1970's the resultant of the two confrontational directions of the West's policy took shape generally in favor of participation in conjunction with the socialist states in the process of stabilization of the international situation and the curbing of the arms race, although the inertia of the old precepts of the "from a position of strength" policy frequently made itself known.

A sharp turnabout had occurred, however, in the policy of the United States and certain other North Atlantic bloc countries by the start of the 1980's. Unwilling to take stock of the realities of the modern world--the consolidation of the positions of socialism and the successes of the national liberation movement and the developing struggle for democracy and social progress--the most bellicose imperialist forces intended to make a further attempt to freeze the objective process of the renewal of the world. And they directed the main strike against the military-strategic balance which had evolved in the world in order to disturb it in their favor and to the detriment of the Soviet Union and the socialist community and to the detriment of international detente and the security of the peoples.

Leading circles of the United States and NATO have undertaken military preparations on a scale and at a rate which are unprecedented. Programs of the production and deployment of new strategic ground-, sea- and air-based nuclear weapons are being implemented. Preparations for the deployment of weapons in space are under way. Fundamentally new conventional arms systems approaching weapons of mass destruction in their combat specifications are being created. The American forces are acquiring new conventional weapon systems in large proportions, a "rapid deployment force" is being created for use in various parts of the world and an increase in the overall numbers of the U.S. armed forces is planned. Decisions have been adopted within the North Atlantic bloc framework under pressure from Washington on a sharp increase in military budgets, on long-term arms buildup programs and on plans to deploy American medium-range missiles in West Europe.

Official explanations of the United States' feverish militarist activity are in no way consonant either with the objective state of affairs or with elementary logic. The assertions that the USSR has overtaken the United States in a military respect and that for this reason its urgent "rearmament" is necessary do not withstand contact with reality. The reality of Soviet-American strategic parity was acknowledged quite recently even by both sides, was reflected in a number of agreements and accords and can be reliably and adequately verified.

The equality of the strategic forces was acknowledged by the three preceding U.S. administrations. In connection with the signing in June 1979 of the SALT II Treaty President J. Carter observed that neither the United States nor the Soviet Union had the chance to gain the upper hand over the other. "Each side has to reckon with the inevitability of military equivalence with the other," he emphasized, "and there can be no superiority or victory in nuclear war."*

A similar evaluation of the correlation of the nuclear forces of the USSR and the United States was made by responsible representatives of the American leadership in the course of discussion of the SALT II Treaty in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in July 1979. Pointing to the differences in the structure of these forces, they observed that in the overall balance the differences balance each other out and that a stable situation of rough equivalence exists on the whole. Thus then Defense Secretary H. Brown gave the following description of the correlation of strategic forces of the Soviet Union and the United States in a speech to the Senate committee: "As a whole we are in a state of essential equivalence."** Gen D. Jones, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee, also noted the existence of "military equality" and "strategic equivalence".***

However, shortly after the American assessments of the evolved balance of forces came to be revised. This process was accelerated sharply with R. Reagan's arrival in the White House. First the mass media and then officials started up a clamorous campaign concerning the alleged "window of vulnerability" which had opened up in the U.S. strategic system. The provocative proposition that the Soviet Union had already gained the military advantage and could achieve decisive superiority over the United States was advanced.

Having canceled out its recent assessments, in the very first months following the change of leadership in Washington the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee began to sound the alarm over the fact that "the correlation of military forces is changing not to the benefit of the United States and its allies." And just 2 years later Defense Secretary C. Weinberger unceremoniously declared that "the Soviets have acquired definite nuclear superiority in the majority of the most important categories of these arms while maintaining superiority in the sphere of conventional armed forces. Therefore for the United States to possess a strong and convincing restraint capability we must increase our military potential--both nuclear and conventional--as quickly as possible."****

* J. Carter, "Keeping Faith. Memoirs of a President," London, 1982, p 249.

** "The SALT II Treaty. Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 96th Congress," Part 1, p 99.

*** Ibid., pp 368, 374.

**** "Report of the Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger to the Congress on the FY 1984 Budget, FY 1985 Authorization Request and FY 1984-88 Defense Programs," 1 February 1983, p 34.

Such assertions cannot be taken seriously. The correlation of military forces of the USSR and the United States cannot change and has not changed fundamentally. Modern arms systems require a decade on average for their development, production and deployment. It is practically impossible to accomplish in 2 years a "spurt" which would enable one side to decisively outpace the other in military competition. Nor can it be assumed that in the past the American side evaluated the dynamics of the arms race incorrectly and "overlooked" possibilities of the modernization of existing and the deployment of new Soviet strategic arms which have become apparent to it only now. All possible variants were duly taken into consideration.

Up to the start of the 1980's themselves the U.S. military-political leadership did not consider the correlation of strategic forces with the Soviet Union disadvantages for itself. In particular, during the discussion of the SALT II Treaty in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee the Pentagon's highest authorities proceeded in their evaluations of the development trends of both sides' strategic forces from the fact that parity would be maintained between the United States and the USSR in the foreseeable future. Defense Secretary H. Brown declared at that time: "...With the programs proposed by the administration we will maintain an adequate strategic balance through 1985 inclusive and we will consolidate the approximate equivalence after this period. While it is in effect the SALT II agreement will secure for the United States more favorable conditions for maintaining the balance than would be the case in the absence of the agreement."*

Now, however, Washington is seeing everything in a different light: the wide-ranging military programs which had been planned earlier are declared inadequate, and the external conditions for maintaining the strategic balance are characterized as unfavorable. Such propaganda tricks cannot, of course, conceal the real state of affairs. Objectively the global strategic picture remains unchanged. It is from this irrefutable fact that the USSR proceeds in its evaluations of the world situation and the prospects of the development of mutual relations with the United States. As Marshal of the Soviet Union D.F. Ustinov, minister of defense of the USSR, declared with all certainty: "the approximate equality of forces which has taken shape between the USSR and the United States and between the Warsaw Pact and NATO exists today also both in the sphere of strategic and other nuclear arms and in the sphere of conventional forces."**

It is clear to any unprejudiced person that the changes in the military-strategic evaluations and concepts occurring in the American leadership have been caused by no means by the change in the correlation of military forces. The whole point is that the task of an unprecedented overarmament whose purpose is to create a preponderance in all categories of nuclear and conventional arms has been moved to the forefront in Washington. Whatever slogans conceal this militarist goal, whether "equalization of the balance" of "prevention of imbalance in the future," its aggressive essence is obvious: it is a question of the achievement of the United States' military superiority over the Soviet Union.

* "The SALT II Treaty. Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations...", Part 1, p 302.

** PRAVDA, 20 August 1982.

Bellicose groupings of the American ruling circles and the all-powerful military-industrial complex by no means wish to reconcile themselves to the fact of the establishment of strategic parity. Even at the time of the Nixon, Ford and Carter administrations there was an intensive strengthening of the United States' strategic arms by way of an increase in the number of nuclear warheads and a considerable increase in their accuracy. Work was undertaken simultaneously on increasing the yield of the warheads, hardening the launch silos and fitting ICBM's with a retargeting system and strategic bombers with guided missiles.

Following R. Reagan's victory in the 1980 presidential election the United States' militarist preparations were stepped up considerably. Reliance on the achievement of military superiority became the core of the new strategy of so-called "direct confrontation". The hopes of the most bellicose circles for the creation of the prerequisites for the "extermination of socialism as a sociopolitical system" and the establishment of global American domination are directly connected with the achievement of a position of superior strength. Having proclaimed as the goal a "crusade" against the progressive forces of the present day, the U.S. military-political leadership had adopted a policy of the creation of a dominant might with which it could determine the course of all world development. Achievement of the capability of striking the Soviet Union where and when the United States deems it expedient, calculating that it itself can avoid a crushing retaliatory strike or appreciably weaken it, has become the pivotal direction of official policy.

The U.S. leadership is not abandoning the adventurist precept of victory in a nuclear war and is developing various specific scenarios of the use of weapons of mass extermination. Their purpose amounts to "optimizing" the limited and general and short and protracted nuclear war concepts. In the annual report to Congress (of 1 February 1983) Defense Secretary C. Weinberger speaks of a "restoration of peace on favorable terms" by way of the use of nuclear weapons and given "as low as possible a level of damage to the United States and its allies."* In accordance with the strategic concept of "regulating the scale, duration and intensiveness" of a nuclear conflict adopted by the R. Reagan administration, the "restoration of peace" is proposed by means of hitting the Soviet Union with nuclear strikes in the broadest range. Emphasis is put here on the physical capability of the U.S. armed forces for conducting combat operations and on the unleashing of a "hot war".**

American military thought remains under the spell of ideas of the past and essentially ignores the fundamental and irreversible fact of the balance of forces.

As before, U.S. strategic concepts are being built on the premise of the preemptive use of nuclear weapons, as if the United States is capable of depriving the Soviet Union of the possibility of recourse to an all-devastating retaliatory strike.

* "Report of the Secretary of Defense...", p 32.

** Ibid., pp 35-36.

In the light of the irrefutable data concerning the catastrophic consequences of a nuclear war the American concept of "victory," which testifies to the adventurism of its authors, spurs the arms race and increases international tension. And, on the contrary, the precise, high-minded position of the Soviet Union concerning the impermissibility of nuclear war is an important factor of strategic stability. The USSR proceeds from the fact that to count on victory in a nuclear war given the evolved correlation of forces is dangerous madness. Such hopes can only be entertained by those who are set on suicide and simultaneously a monstrous crime before mankind. If an aggressor uses nuclear weapons, he will bring the peoples untold disasters, but no conceivable advantages from a preemptive strike will lead him to victory.

Honest Negotiations or Concealment of an Arms Buildup?

The Soviet Union and the other socialist community states are doing all within their power to avert the military threat. Displaying forbearance and vigilance in the face of the dangerous intrigues of the enemies of peace, they are multiplying efforts geared to halting the slide toward the abyss of nuclear catastrophe, halting the stockpiling and sophistication of weapons, embarking on real disarmament and clearing the way toward the solution of the urgent and most acute international problems. The peace initiatives of the USSR and its allies are distinguished by a bold and realistic nature and are imbued with a clear understanding of the danger of the situation that has taken shape in the world and the high responsibility for the fate of all mankind.

The USSR has declared repeatedly that there is no type of arms which it would not be prepared to limit or reduce on a reciprocal basis. At the UN General Assembly Second Special Disarmament Session the Soviet Union presented a comprehensive program of measures aimed at curbing the arms race. It collated both positions of principle and the most important specific proposals. They concern all spheres of arms limitation and disarmament--from nuclear and chemical weapons through conventional arms and states' naval activity. The main purpose of these initiatives is to close off all channels of competition in the stockpiling of weapons, halt the flywheel of military preparations and lower the level of dangerous confrontation.

Seeing as a principal path toward a reduction in the threat of nuclear war the achievement of an accord with the United States on the limitation and reduction of strategic arms, the USSR proposed, given the maintenance of parity, a mutual 25-percent reduction in such arms in order that the number of strategic weapon delivery vehicles of both sides be equal. It also proposed an appreciable reduction in the number of nuclear warheads and the maximum limitation of the qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons. The Soviet proposals provide for the envelopment of all types of strategic weapons without exception, a reduction of many hundreds of units in the arsenals thereof and the closing off of all possible channels of a continued arms race in this sphere. An accord on this just basis could serve as the starting point for progress toward an even bigger mutual reduction of nuclear arms--with regard, of course, for the general strategic situation in the world. To facilitate progress in this field the Soviet Union proposed a freeze on both sides' strategic arsenals while the negotiations are conducted.

The USSR also approaches the other negotiations in Geneva--on limiting nuclear arms in Europe--from constructive positions. While upholding the validity of its proposals made previously either on the complete renunciation of nuclear weapons in Europe, both medium-range and tactical, or on a threefold mutual reduction in medium-range arms the Soviet Union expressed readiness to consent to leave in Europe only as many missiles as possessed by Britain and France. Thus the USSR would cut back hundreds of medium-range missiles, including dozens of the most modern missiles which the West calls SS-20's. This means that an accord must also be reached on a reduction to equal levels on both sides in the number of aircraft which carry the medium-range nuclear weapons in this region both in the USSR and in the NATO countries.

Convincing testimony to the Soviet Union's endeavor to promote the achievement of an accord was also its decision to halt the deployment of medium-range missiles capable of hitting targets in West European countries and to cut back a considerable number of such missiles. The USSR proposed an arrangement concerning equality in each interdependent period of time of nuclear potentials in Europe not only in terms of delivery vehicles (missiles and aircraft) but also the warheads on them. As a result the Soviet Union would have in the European zone considerably fewer medium-range missiles and warheads on them than prior to 1976, when it had no SS-20 missiles.

For the purpose of averting the next and, furthermore, extremely dangerous twist of the arms race spiral in Europe the Soviet Union took one further major step. In the event of the achievement of a mutually acceptable agreement, including the United States' renunciation of the deployment of new missiles in Europe, it would upon the reduction of its medium-range missiles in the European part of the country to a level equal to the number of missiles of Britain and France liquidate all the missiles being cut back, including a considerable number of SS-20 missiles. Thus any reason for the assertions spreading in the West that the USSR intends to hold on to the SS-20 missiles which are to be cut back by way of removing them from the European part of the country beyond the Urals is removed, as is, simultaneously, any justification for the concern being expressed by China and Japan concerning the possibility of such rebasing.

A further convincing demonstration of the Soviet Union's good will and its resolve to contribute in practice to a winding down of the arms race was its new initiative aimed at averting the militarization of space. The USSR proposed an agreement on the complete banning of the testing and deployment of any space-based weapon for hitting targets on Earth in the atmosphere or outer space and also on the liquidation of existing antisatellite systems and the banning of the creation of new ones. Simultaneously the Soviet Union undertook not to be the first to put any type of antisatellite weapon in outer space, that is, imposed a unilateral moratorium on such launches for the entire time that other states, including the United States, refrain from putting any kind of antisatellite weapon in space.

Balancing the forces which confront one another, which are being modernized continuously, is becoming increasingly difficult to control as a consequence of the rapid development of military equipment and the deepening of the differences in the structure of the sides' arms and armed forces. Whereas, as

the experience of the 1970's testifies, given mutual good will, it was possible to surmount these objective difficulties on the paths of the formulation of appropriate agreements based on equality and equal security, now the present Washington administration is manifestly not displaying a serious aspiration to an accord in this sphere. On the scale of its priorities questions of arms limitation and disarmament have been relegated to one of the last places. Through its fault corresponding bilateral and multilateral negotiations have been suspended or postponed indefinitely and ratification of the SALT II Treaty and other agreements on limiting competition in the nuclear and other military spheres has been frustrated. In addition, U.S. politicians and military leaders are manifestly leading matters toward the undermining of treaties and agreements which have already been concluded. In particular, the expediency of continuation of the ABM Treaty, which is of an indefinite nature, is being called in question. The Soviet-American Agreement on Preventing Nuclear War is also being undermined.

Possessed by the idea of superiority, the American side is blocking all approaches to the formulation of agreements on limiting and reducing arms--both by way of the frustration of some negotiations and the creation of blind alleys at others by means of the advancement of knowingly unacceptable proposals. All these initiatives are essentially subordinate to the same obsessive goal--upsetting the evolved balance--and utterly unrealistic design--achieving the Soviet Union's unilateral disarmament. Washington would like to limit merely individual components of the strategic forces which suit it and to leave the others outside of the framework of an accord, in no way hampering their continued development. The calculation is obvious: destroy the evolved structure of the Soviet nuclear potential, but keep its own hands free in the nuclear arms buildup.

This is how matters stand at the talks on limiting and reducing strategic arms. In putting forward the at first sight seemingly tempting proposal on a reduction in the level of ICBM's of each side to 850 the United States thereby puts the USSR on unequal terms. Owing to the historically evolved differences in the structures of the sides' strategic forces, 70 percent of warheads in the Soviet Union are deployed on ICBM's, whereas over 80 percent of the United States' warheads are carried by submarine-launched ballistic missiles and heavy bombers. If the American proposal were adopted, the USSR would be forced to dismantle more than 90 percent of its ICBM's, which constitute the basis of its strategic potential, while the main strike power of the American strategic triad would remain virtually untouched.

The same thing is also occurring at the talks on limiting intermediate-range nuclear arms in Europe. Here also the American side is demanding the impracticable: adoption of its "zero option" would mean that the Soviet Union would have only half the NATO countries' number of delivery vehicles and one-third as many nuclear warheads.

There can be no talk of either equality or reciprocity here. The position of the United States flagrantly ignores the Soviet Union's legitimate security interests and is aimed at undermining its nuclear might. It is essentially

being proposed a version of an agreement which would make it easier for the United States to gain military superiority. Such a position is knowingly hopeless and unrealistic. It testifies merely to the fact that the present U.S. Administration is not disposed to seriously seek paths toward mutually acceptable solutions. The deeper the talks enter a blind alley, the more obvious it becomes that they are needed by the American side chiefly to create an impression of movement toward agreements and thereby conceal the development of the unprecedentedly wide-ranging military programs of the United States. Washington's assurances of its aspiration to "flexibility" and "compromise" also serve these goals.

It is possible to speak of a desire to meet the Soviet Union "half-way" as much as one likes, but this does not alter the real content of the United States' proposals. It testifies to one thing alone--an accentuated reluctance to seek mutually acceptable solutions based on the principle of equality and equal security. Hints, on the other hand, concerning the possibility of the formulation of "compromises" based on the American initiatives are deliberate disinformation of the world public and attempts to persuade it that Washington is concerned to achieve agreements and not military superiority. There cannot be and will not be such "compromises," just as there will be no unilateral concessions by the USSR following the deployment of new U.S. nuclear arms. Yu.V. Andropov declared with all firmness and certainty: "If it comes to deployment, we will not surrender our positions and will not weaken our defense but will adopt timely and effective retaliatory measures protecting the security of the USSR and its allies."*

The negative attitude of the U.S. leadership toward the vitally important tasks of curbing the arms race is also displayed with all unambiguousness on such questions as a nuclear freeze and renunciation of first use of nuclear weapons.

The idea of a freeze is having extensive repercussions throughout the world, including the United States. Referenda have been held in many American cities, neighborhoods and states in the course of which an overwhelming majority favored an immediate halt to the nuclear arms race. Influential public figures and politicians and former high representatives of government departments are speaking in the same spirit. The sentiments of millions of Americans are also being reflected in the U.S. Congress. The House of Representatives adopted a resolution appealing for "a mutually verifiable freeze and reduction of nuclear arms" of the United States and the USSR (May 1983). In a book devoted to the freeze problem Senators E. Kennedy and M. Hatfield emphasize that a halt to the creation of nuclear arms would be fair to both sides inasmuch as the nuclear might of the United States and the Soviet Union is in balance.

However, Washington officials reject out of hand the very idea of a nuclear freeze, attempting to prove that it would be "harmful" or even "dangerous" for the United States insofar as it would enshrine its "lag" behind the USSR in

* PRAVDA, 6 July 1983.

the nuclear arms sphere. The tendentiousness of such reasoning is obvious. It is spearheaded against nuclear equilibrium. The fraudulent proposition concerning "Soviet superiority" is being circulated to conceal the policy aimed at the achievement of American military superiority.

The U.S. Administration and the NATO leadership are unwilling to follow the Soviet Union's example and renounce first use of nuclear weapons. This shows for the umpteenth time their reluctance to consent to the adoption of sensible measures to lessen the military danger of their endeavor to drive international development into the channel of power confrontation. In turning down the Soviet proposal they are thereby demonstrating the aggressiveness and senselessness of imperialist policy and strategy, which are capable of thrusting the world into the depth of untold disasters.

Not only broad circles of the public of the most diverse countries but also sober-minded politicians of the United States see the adventurism of Washington's policy. Characteristic in this respect is the position of authors of an article in the journal FOREIGN AFFAIRS--M. Bundy, G. Kennan, R. MacNamara and G. Smith--who formerly held prominent positions in the foreign policy and military spheres. It is their profound belief that under the conditions of strategic parity all parties must renounce first use of nuclear weapons. "Today," they emphasize, "the Western alliance most needs not the perfection of nuclear options but a clear-cut decision to avoid them if this is how others act."*

A pretext on which the United States refused to undertake not to be the first to use nuclear weapons was the proposition that the USSR and its allies would not consent to this undertaking being extended to conventional arms. At the time of the Soviet-American summit in Vienna (June 1979) President J. Carter declared that the United States could consent to a renunciation of first use of any military force--both nuclear and conventional.**

Undoubtedly, strategic stability would be firmer if together with a mutual renunciation of first use of nuclear weapons the sides undertook not to use military force at all. It is this which is proposed by the Warsaw Pact states. The Political Declaration which they adopted (4-5 January 1983, Prague) puts forward a specific proposal--the conclusion of a treaty on the mutual nonuse of military force and the maintenance of peaceful relations between the states of the two military-political groupings--the Warsaw Pact and NATO.

The United States and its NATO allies, however, are declining a response to this initiative. They refer, as before, to an imaginary "threat of a nuclear attack" reinforced by the "accelerated" buildup of the USSR's strategic potential. Such assertions are so groundless that authoritative specialists in the United States itself even essentially cannot agree with them. Among them are members of the presidential strategic forces commission--the so-called Scowcroft Commission--which is made up of former defense secretaries and other high representatives of foreign policy, military and intelligence departments in the recent past. In the report to the U.S. President (April 1983) the

* FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Spring 1982, p 762.

** J. Carter, Op. cit., p 251.

commission members made together with the most contradictory recommendations the following highly unambiguous evaluation: "Soviet military programs do not in themselves testify to an intention to undertake a nuclear attack."*

It is clearer today than ever that it is by no means a matter of apprehensions concerning the mythical "Soviet threat". The present Washington leadership, which has taken the path of accelerated militarist preparations, is opposing with all its might strategic stability and a curbing of the arms race. It is for this reason that it is virtually blocking the negotiations and attempting to use the mere fact of their being conducted as a tactical maneuver drawing public attention away from the massive buildup of the United States' military might.

Critical Stage of International Relations

The R. Reagan administration's intention to embark on the deployment of new nuclear weapons on European soil reflects in concentrated form the large-scale trend of the growth of the military threat as a result of the militarist activity of the United States and NATO. The plans to deploy the Pershing 2 and cruise missiles in direct proximity to the Soviet Union and the other socialist states are merely a kind of tip of a giant iceberg with which the bellicose forces of imperialism intended to bar the path to lasting peace, "freeze" international cooperation and turn world development back to the time of the cold war. Counter to the realities of the modern world, they are attempting to break up to their benefit the course of history, paying no heed to the disastrous consequences to which their adventures could lead.

U.S. ruling circles would like an international peace which would be based not on general security but achieved at the expense of the security of others. They see it not in the context of cooperation and consent but on the paths of subordination of all to overwhelming American might. "Peace must be based on strength"** is how R. Reagan formulates the main foreign policy concept of the United States.

The race for hegemony has so taken possession of the instigators of the "crusade" that they are simply losing a perception of reality, exaggerating their possibilities and discounting the possibilities of the other side. They link the establishment of a "pax Americana" no more, no less than with the achievement of the United States' military preponderance and with the Soviet Union's renunciation of the pursuit of a socialist foreign policy and with the liquidation of its socialist social system even.

Whatever aggressive imperialist circles do, they will not succeed in changing to their benefit the correlation of forces in the world and breaking up the military-strategic balance. The USSR and its friends and allies have sufficient possibilities and resolve to prevent the evolved balance being upset. "All attempts to achieve military superiority over the USSR are in vain," Yu.V. Andropov emphasized. "The Soviet Union will never permit this and will never

* "Report of the President's Commission on Strategic Forces," April 1983, Washington, p 5.

** THE NEW YORK TIMES, 24 August 1983.

find itself defenseless in the face of any threat."* Nor is any doubt on this score left by the Soviet Government Declaration of 28 May 1983, which says that in view of the increased threat to the security of the USSR and its allies as a result of the buildup of the U.S. strategic forces it has been confronted with the need to adopt retaliatory measures to strengthen its defense capability, by way of the deployment of appropriate new strategic systems included.

The decision of the United States and NATO to embark on the deployment of new American missiles in West Europe, if implemented, will force the Soviet Union to reexamine the decision it adopted on a unilateral moratorium on the continued deployment of medium-range missiles in the European zone. The need would also arise to implement following an arrangement with other Warsaw Pact states other measures pertaining to the deployment of additional missiles for the purpose of creating the necessary counterweight to the growing grouping of U.S. forward-based nuclear missiles in Europe and the nuclear arms of other NATO countries. It would also be necessary to adopt appropriate measures with reference to the territory of the United States itself.

The position on this score is also formulated clearly and precisely in the joint statement adopted on the outcome of the meeting of leading party figures and statesmen of Bulgaria, Hungary, the GDR, Poland, Romania, the USSR and the CSSR in Moscow on 28 June 1983. "Proceeding from the interests of peace and their security," it says, "the participants in the meeting declare that they will in no event permit military superiority over them. They emphatically advocate a balance of forces at the lowest level."

Attempts to upset the military-strategic balance will lead to an undermining of international stability and are fraught with consequences which would inevitably affect the interests of the instigators of this hopeless and risky undertaking themselves. Engendering a danger for others, they will not fail to bring it onto themselves. Causing instability, they themselves could suffer from it. The unpredictability of the results of an arms race and confrontation put both sides in a difficult position. These truths are becoming so obvious that they are beginning to be recognized even by some of those who not without reason have the reputation of "hardliners". H. Kissinger, for example, writes: "Under current conditions, however we or our enemies increase the scale and improve the quality of our strategic arsenals, this cannot alter a cardinal fact: a general exchange of nuclear strikes threatens to destroy civilized life as we know it."** Z. Brzezinski expresses the fear that the high level of strategic confrontation is fraught "not only with the continued deployment of arms but also the undermining of the security of both sides."***

The fruitless and dangerous race for military superiority ultimately cannot fail to also be reflected in the domestic situation of the United States and other NATO countries. The colossal, constantly growing unproductive spending for

* PRAVDA, 27 March 1983

** H. Kissinger, "Years of Upheaval," Boston, 1982, p 999.

*** Z. Brzezinski, "Power and Principle," London, 1982, p 150.

military purposes is intensifying inflation, preventing removal of the budget deficit, complicating the structural reorganization of the economy, stimulating the slump in business activity and leading to cutbacks in social programs. The protests of antiwar public forces against the wasteful militarist preparations, which are a threat to world peace, are growing.

Whither events continue to move will depend on whether it is possible to achieve a change from hostile confrontation toward constructive cooperation. A critical moment in the development of the political situation in the world is approaching.

Possibilities for reaching a just accord still exist. Despite all the seriousness of the international situation, mutually acceptable solutions can and must be found, to which the successful completion of the Madrid meeting of representatives of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, in particular, testifies.

The entire international activity of the CPSU and the Soviet state is geared to removing the threat of nuclear catastrophe and achieving a decisive change for the better in international affairs. The Soviet Union and the other socialist community countries are the most consistent defenders of the interests of detente and peace and the interests of each people and all mankind. These goals of socialist policy are profoundly consonant with the objective requirements of our era and the securing of man's primary right--the right to life.

"In the nuclear age the world cannot be viewed through the aperture of narrow egotistical interests," the statement of Yu.V. Andropov, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, emphasizes. "Responsible statesmen have just one choice--doing everything to prevent nuclear catastrophe. Any other position is myopic, more, suicidal.

"For the Soviet leadership the question as to what line to follow in international affairs in the present serious situation also does not arise. Our policy is aimed, as before, at the preservation and consolidation of peace, the relaxation of tension, the curbing of the arms race and the expansion and intensification of cooperation between states. Such is the invariable will of the CPSU and the entire Soviet people. Such, we are convinced, are also the cherished aspirations of all peoples."*

In the seriously complicated international situation it is the duty of all states to strive to ensure firm, reliable and lasting peace, consolidation of the military-strategic balance and a consistent lowering of the level thereof and to aspire to the limitation and reduction of arms, as far as their complete liquidation. The USSR and the other socialist states are convinced that it is still not too late to halt the dangerous development of events. They hope that the United States and its allies will carefully weight the consequences to which the arms race and confrontation are inexorably leading and respond to their constructive proposals. Responsibility for the fate of peace, the fate of mankind demands that sense gain the ascendancy over nuclear madness in international affairs.

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ANNIVERSARY REVIEW OF U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS SINCE 1917

Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian No 11,
Nov 83 pp 18-30

[L.Leont'yev article: "Fiftieth Anniversary of the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations Between the USSR and the United States"]

[Text] With the assumption of office in the United States of the present administration a profound departure occurred in American foreign policy from everything positive which had been achieved in Soviet-American relations in the sphere of detente in the 1970's. As a consequence of this, tense relations in practically all spheres, as Comrade Yu.V. Andropov put it, have taken shape between the Soviet Union and the United States.

The main goal which the U.S. ruling upper stratum sets itself is halting and rolling back the inexorably developing process of the revolutionary renewal of our planet. The main prerequisite for this is the achievement of military superiority over the Soviet Union in order from positions of such superiority to dictate to it American terms, which amount ultimately to the demand that the USSR renounce... socialism.

After an interval of more than 20 years national security Presidential Directive 75, which was signed by R. Reagan, again proclaims as a "national goal" of Washington's foreign policy the task of seeking "internal changes" in the Soviet Union. Secretary of State G. Shultz argues the need for the United States to endeavor to ensure "evolution of the Soviet system and the Soviet economic structure." The directives governing the organizational development of the U.S. armed forces approved by Defense Secretary C. Weinberger candidly and clearly state the United States' intention of "encouraging long-term political and military changes within the confines of the Soviet empire," meaning as a final goal the "destruction of socialism as a social system."

One involuntarily recalls that we have had all this before. This was how the United States argued in the now distant 1920's, in the closer 1930's and following World War II. "Crusades" and "rolling back communism" slogans were proclaimed and fervent speeches were made about the "amorality" of those who declined to align themselves with bellicose anticommunism. The refrain was that same thought, the same untenable dream--dealing with our country was possible only if it ceased to be Soviet and socialist.

The outcome of all these attempts is well known and obvious. The USSR is now the main obstacle in the way of the imperialist policy of aggression and expansion and an inspiring example for many countries and peoples opting for the path of independent socioeconomic development or already proceeding along it. The fraternal socialist community states are the most dynamically developing part of mankind. Socialism now has a definite impact on the entire course of world development.

It cannot be said that imperialism operated insufficiently assertively and energetically in its attempts to rid itself of socialism. Nothing of the sort, as we know. On the contrary, the victory of socialist revolutions and the struggle for the consolidation of socialism were very difficult for the working people of the fraternal countries, primarily owing to the resistance of local and international reaction, which was invariably supported by the United States. This struggle has not ended even now.

Nonetheless, nothing came of all the attacks on the new social system. Nothing came of them even when socialism was weaker than capitalism economically and militarily and when imperialism undoubtedly dominated world politics. Do the instigators and disciples of the present "crusades" know this? They must. What, then, in this case are the strategic goals of the Reagan administration?

In conception, an adventure, and not only because such gambles have already been made in the past with a far more favorable confluence of circumstances for the West's ruling circles and still failed to have the desired effect. A most important indication of a realistic policy is a capacity for correctly determining the price of a possible miscalculation and correlating it with the goals of the policy being pursued. In the modern world this price could be a nuclear conflict, which, of course, is not capable of serving as a means of achieving any rational goals.

Psychologically, an odd mixture of fanatical, pathological anticommunism, obtuse self-assurance and flagrant irresponsibility before its own people even, a manifestation of a kind of class and historical desperation and an involuntary recognition that imperialism essentially lacks the resources to halt mankind's socioeconomic progress.

In nature, the preparation of an unprecedented crime against humanity and at the same time disregard for the most burning problems confronting the United States itself and the majority of our planet's population, primarily such as providing millions of working people in different parts of the world with conditions of existence worthy of the human personality.

U.S. policy in respect of the world's first socialist state fluctuates between two trends, each of which reflects a specific reaction of a certain part of the U.S. ruling class to the socialist world: its successes and achievements and the peace-loving foreign policy which it pursues. Recognizing existing realities, the supporters of one of them see a need for maintaining correct Soviet-American relations, desire their development within these limits or the other and allow the possibility of the cooperation of the USSR and the United States in areas of mutual interest. This line has invariably encountered and will continue to encounter understanding and support in our country.

The disciples of the other approach, on the other hand, categorically refuse to recognize the real state of affairs and to develop positive, constructive relations with the Soviet Union and allow the possibility of maintaining mutual relations with the USSR only in the event of their discerning in the latter a means of subverting and weakening the positions of socialism. It is these circles which in dealings with our country are unwilling to heed any moral, ethical standards and limitations, laws and customs of interstate relations. It is they which have repeatedly brought about crisis situations in relations between the two powers. Such an extremist position is currently occupied by the R. Reagan administration. But never before has the content of imperialist policy revealed itself so plainly and in such dangerous forms as in our day. It is not surprising that such a policy is encountering the growing rebuff of the peoples.

I

It did not take the U.S. ruling circles much time to determine their attitude toward the great October Socialist Revolution. The class instinct worked automatically. On 9 November 1917 the U.S. State Department made an official statement from which it followed that the new authorities in Russia, denying private property, for that very reason "could not be tolerated" and for this very reason the Soviet Government would not be recognized by Washington.

The State Department statement cannot be denied the clarity of its authors' class positions and the precision and unambiguousness of their attitude toward the world's first worker-peasant state. The fact that Washington's position could not have been and was not a response to any act whatever of the Soviet side is also perfectly obvious: the Soviet Republic, which by this time had been in existence only several dozen hours, simply could not have engaged in any act in respect of the United States which could have been interpreted as unfriendly.

However, the first foreign policy step, of the most fundamental significance, of the victorious socialist revolution had already been taken, and it could not, of course, have caused satisfaction in Washington. It is a question of the Decree on Peace, which was proclaimed on 8 November 1917 and which contained an ardent appeal of the Russian proletariat to the peoples and governments of all warring countries to end military operations and embark immediately on peace negotiations. America's ruling circles could not permit this.

We recall that the United States had entered World War I on the side of the Entente powers only on 6 April 1917, when it formally declared war on Germany. However, its practical entry into combat operations occurred even later: the first American divisions arrived at the front in France only at the start of 1918, while the full deployment of U.S. armies in Europe was planned for no sooner than the summer of 1919. Dragging out entry into the war to the utmost, the United States was extremely interested in its utmost prolongation in order to achieve as great a mutual weakening and exhaustion of the warring parties as possible and, as a consequence, a strengthening of its own positions in the world. America, the Sixth Russian Social Democratic Workers Party (Bolsheviks) observed, in 1917 even was "the new giant of imperialism and claimant to world hegemony."

Naturally, Russia's departure from the war canceled out American imperialism's plans, and this reason alone was more than sufficient for its leaders to do all in their power to prevent such a course of events. Which they attempted to do.

While refusing the Soviet Government recognition, prohibiting all U.S. diplomatic missions from "having any official relations with Russian diplomatic representatives who recognize the Bolshevik government or who have been approved by it"* and taking steps to organize the armed ouster of Soviet power by the forces of internal counterrevolution and foreign military intervention the American leadership at the same time did not abandon hopes of prompting the Bolsheviks to continue Russia's participation in the world carnage that had been organized by imperialism.

However, the attempt to induce the socialist republic to dispatch "cannon fodder" to the front in exchange for Washington's dollars pursued with such obviousness the main goal: endangering the young Soviet authority simultaneously by both internal counterrevolution, which by this time had already unleashed civil war in Russia, and the still quite strong German--Kaiser--militarism in the hope that the victorious socialist revolution would not withstand such a test.

Having taken the path of ignoring the Soviet Government and at the same time declaring recognition of the mythical "Russian state," represented by it was not known whom, Washington simultaneously actively sought out puppets deserving of its trust and speeded up the preparations for open military interference.

In connection with the inglorious end to the American military intervention in Russia arguments of roughly the following kind can be heard in the United States in our day: "What is there to tell? Yes, American servicemen were indeed on Russian soil with weapon in hand in those years. But there were, after all, so few of them, they were such a short time in Russia and did not operate very actively. An unfortunate misunderstanding--nothing more. Is it worth recalling in our day, particularly if we want an improvement in Soviet-American relations?"

It is worth it, and precisely for the final reason. The development of constructive mutual relations between states, even less between those belonging to different socioeconomic systems, cannot only be the result of good intentions. They have to be built on a sober, rational basis, with regard for the sides' historical experience, primarily in their relations with one another. And "leaving out of the song" these words or the other means calling in question the very foundation of mutual trust on which the edifice of detente and peaceful coexistence can alone be erected.

This also has to be recalled because the American interference aimed at ousting the power of the soviets was by no means as small-scale, almost innocent, as some people would like to portray this. The United States did indeed send to Russia approximately 10 times fewer of its soldiers than such countries as, for example, Japan, Britain or France. But it was the principal

* This directive of then U.S. Secretary of State R. Lansing, which was dated 15 December 1917, remained in effect right up until the day the United States recognized the Soviet Union--16 November 1933.

creditor of the anti-Soviet foreign intervention as a whole, investing in this "enterprise," according to the most modest estimates, approximately \$4 billion--immeasurably more than any other participant in the intervention could have permitted itself. The United States also performed the role of inspiration, organizer, instigator and coordinator of the intervention.

In addition, the attitude of Washington officials toward Soviet Russia, which took shape under the impact of its own imperial ambitions and claims in the very first days and weeks following the Great October, was for decades to come, right up to the present, a kind of "model" of American policy in respect of virtually any revolution and any national liberation movement, where and whenever they occurred: in Russia or China, in India or Iran, in the Near East or Africa, in Mexico in the 1920's or Central America in the 1980's.

The heroic struggle of the working people of all nationalities of the land of soviets canceled out imperialism's plans. It did not succeed--either directly or via the hands of others--in overturning Soviet power and breaking into pieces the territory of the world's first socialist state, having planted its puppet-protégés. A big role was performed by the movement which had spread in the West, including the United States, under the slogan "Hands Off Russia!" the revolutionizing impact of the entire situation in the Soviet Republic on the interventionist troops, the scale of their losses and the soldiers' unwillingness to fight for the interests of the imperialists and Russian White Guards, which were alien to them. "We were tied hand and foot by the situation," R. Lansing later acknowledged, justifying the incapacity of the administration of which he was a member to develop the intervention more broadly.

But the victorious socialist revolution was "guilty" before Washington not only of the fact that it had been accomplished and had known how to hold out against all the attacks of internal and foreign reaction. It also frustrated the plans which had been hatched by the United States for the establishment of world domination under conditions where its main imperialist rivals would have been mutually exhausted by the war which had taken place. Having entered the war at the last moment and on the side, by all indications, of the victorious coalition, the United States aspired to secure for itself the place of arbiter of the postwar peace settlement and, what is most important, in the postwar world as a whole. "We will be in charge not only of Germany but all of Europe," certain American diplomats declared. "The peoples expect much of us, primarily peace, and they will obtain it, but on our terms and at our price!"

The same thought was formulated with the utmost clarity by then President W. Wilson. He defined the United States' postwar role in the world in the following words: "Financial leadership will be ours. Industrial leadership will be ours. Commercial advantage will be ours. Other countries of the world will follow our leadership and direction."

As far as finance and economics were concerned, U.S. superiority here was perfectly apparent. It had gained from World War I more than from any other war of the period preceding it. Having occupied almost through the very end of the 19th century a relatively modest place in world politics, as a result of this war the United States moved up to the leading parts among the

capitalist states. As V.I. Lenin emphasized, the American billionaires, having profited the most, "...made all countries, even the wealthiest, their tributaries."* They did not, however, obtain what they had hoped for in terms of the maximum calculation. A new socialist state had arisen on the political map of the world which not only itself declined to "follow American leadership and direction" but also presented a convincing exposure of the essence of the domestic and foreign policies of the imperialist powers and their struggle to divide and partition the world and set the exploited and oppressed throughout the world an example of successful struggle for the right of each people to free and independent development and the creation of a society corresponding to the interests of the working people's masses.

It was for this reason that the Great October in Russia was immediately perceived by U.S. ruling circles as a "challenge" to their plans for the establishment of world domination and a "threat" to the very system of social inequality and exploitation. It was for this reason that international imperialism exerted the maximum efforts to stifle the socialist revolution in its cradle. But could not.

II

The attempts to defeat the revolution in Russia by military means failed. At the same time, however, although the United States had emerged from World War I with its positions markedly strengthened, its main competitors-- Britain, France, Germany and Japan--still remained quite strong. The seriousness and intensity of the interimperialist conflicts forced American diplomacy to maneuver and seek additional political opportunities. For this reason as of the start of the 1920's the United States' official policy began to undergo periodic fluctuations--from hard-line confrontation with the USSR with the use of a broad set of means to a cooperation limited in its spheres and scale.

As a rule, fits of malicious helplessness shook Washington every time that it seemed to U.S. ruling circles that they held this magic "card" or the other capable of putting an end to the existence of socialism on the planet and securing American world domination. Interest in cooperation with the USSR, on the other hand, was displayed (at official government policy level, and not only of the circles of American society which had always advocated it) when sufficiently weighty reasons of an objective nature combined with an urgent need for this adjustment or the other to be made to American foreign policy as a whole prompted this.

Subsequent decades reveal one further regularity. Each successive period of an exacerbation of relations with the USSR has been accompanied by a variety of campaigns in the "psychological warfare" style designed to portray our country sometimes as the "spawn of hell," sometimes as the vector of this "threat" or the other and sometimes as the "evil empire". Such campaigns have pursued, apart from anything else, narrow tactical domestic policy goals. And each time considerations favoring at least limited cooperation with the Soviet

* V.I. Lenin, "Complete Works," vol 37, p 50.

Union and the achievement of agreements on specific issues and fundamental problems of world politics have gained the ascendancy in part of the ruling class and government of the United States, the poison of the mistrust and dislike of everything connected merely with the word "Soviet" which had been sown earlier and of the constantly cultivated hatred of the USSR objectively impeded such beginnings. All this has served as the political basis and nutrient medium for the actions of the opponents of detente and cooperation, not to mention having created additional domestic policy difficulties for the U.S. Administration itself.

Bourgeois America could not reconcile itself to the birth of a socialist state. The power and presumption of its ruling class explain a distinctive phenomenon observed by all American and foreign historians: the profound belief of the ruling upper strata that such a state "should not" and "does not have the right" to exist and, consequently, for this reason alone will not exist. "The policy formulated ultimately (by the U.S. Administration--N.K.)," the prominent American historian W. Williams wrote back in the 1950's, "was based partly on the premise that... the Soviet Government would collapse or ought to collapse."

The Republican administration headed by W. Harding, which took office at the start of 1921, defined its attitude toward the Soviet state similarly. In response to an appeal of the RSFSR All-Russian Central Executive Committee to Congress and the new U.S. President proposing the restoration of relations, primarily in the economic sphere, the U.S. Administration declared that, in its opinion, grounds for the examination of this issue would emerge only after it had obtained proof of the implementation of fundamental changes in Soviet policy, in other words, after the restoration of capitalism in Russia. A gamble was thus made on stifling Soviet power by means of economic blockade, simultaneously with attempts to stimulate the activity of the Russian counterrevolutionary underground and all that subsequently came to belong to the category of the worst samples of "psychological warfare".

However, the economic boycott of Soviet Russia and the persistent attempts to make all the Western powers without exception participants therein brought U.S. ruling circles no dividends--either economic or political. At a price of tremendous efforts Soviet people overcame the devastation left by the civil war and foreign intervention. The first significant breakthrough in the sphere of Soviet Russia's economic relations with the West occurred in 1921: a series of agreements of a semicommercial, semipolitical nature was signed between the RSFSR on the one hand and Britain, Germany, Norway, Austria and Italy on the other. The successes in domestic building and the formation of the USSR in 1922 promoted a wave of diplomatic recognition. By the end of 1924 the USSR maintained diplomatic relations with 22 states, including all the major capitalist countries with the exception of the United States.

Under these conditions recognition grew in part of the the U.S. ruling class that the absence of normal relations with the USSR was, as a minimum, depriving America of profitable business contracts, which were going to its competitors. The U.S. Administration had to take the mood of business into consideration. And although officially its position on the question of

diplomatic recognition of the Soviet Union had not changed in this period, it was forced to reconcile itself to some extent to the gradual organization of commercial-economic relations between American companies and Soviet foreign trade organizations.

The increase in the trade volume was not, however, accompanied by any reduction in the scale of anti-Soviet activity. At the same time, however, the opponents of the establishment of diplomatic relations with our country used this increase to advance and "substantiate" the proposition concerning "trade without recognition," which was intended to justify continuation under the new conditions of the former official policy. It was claimed, for example, that the development of trade indicated that Soviet-American relations were "needed" more by the USSR than the United States and to that extent the advancement of political demands on our country in "exchange" for its official recognition was justified. People went as far as to say even that in agreeing to an expansion of commercial contacts the USSR was in fact seeking diplomatic recognition and that as soon as this occurred, it would wind them down. Whence the appearance of another slogan of those years--"nonrecognition improves trade".

Returning now in our thoughts to the period of Soviet-American relations prior to 1933 and subsequently, prior to the start of the Great Patriotic War and the United States' entry into World War II, one is persuaded time and again that all the obstacles to diplomatic recognition of the Soviet Union, the normalization of Soviet-American relations on this basis and the development of constructive bilateral cooperation--both economic and political--were created exclusively by the actions of rightwing, reactionary forces in the United States and not by any particular features of international relations as a whole and even less by the policy of the USSR.

What has been said becomes particularly apparent if it is recalled that 1933--the year of recognition--was not marked by any cardinal changes in Soviet domestic or foreign policy. Our people were confidently moving forward along the path paved by the Bolshevik Party. The First Five-Year Plan, for which the West had predicted crushing failure, was fulfilled and overfulfilled. The most profound economic, social and cultural transformations were occurring in the country. The USSR's authority in the international arena was rising.

On the other hand, for the United States itself this year was one of the slow, agonizing crawl out of the 1929-1932 world economic crisis, the biggest in the history of capitalism, a crisis which brought about, apart from anything else, profound shifts in the alignment of internal political forces in the country as a whole and in the ruling class in particular. This brought to office new people who recognized the need for certain "adjustments" to be made to the system of capitalism and domestic and foreign policy maneuvering for the sake of its deliverance. The exacerbation of American-Japanese conflicts in the Far East and the development of the situation in Europe, which was causing serious disquiet and where in Germany fascism had come to power, openly adopting a policy of preparations for a new world war, also prompted U.S. ruling circles to recognize our country. Both from the viewpoint of the USSR's economic successes and the growth of its weight and authority in the

international arena and in the plane of serious changes within the capitalist camp 1933 was a turning point in the Soviet state's mutual relations with the capitalist world. Explaining in his postwar memoirs the reasons for the change in U.S. policy in respect of the Soviet Union, then Secretary of State C. Hull wrote: "The world had entered a dangerous period of its development both in Europe and in Asia. With the passage of time Russia could have been of great assistance in stabilizing a situation where the military danger had become increasingly threatening."

All this was recognized by such an important, realistic and farsighted politician as President F. Roosevelt. In October 1933 he proposed to the Soviet Government the start of negotiations. Their result was an exchange of notes on 16 November of the same year on the establishment of diplomatic relations and letters which contained mutual commitments of the governments of both states concerning respect for sovereignty and noninterference in each other's internal affairs.

The normalization of Soviet-American relations was appraised highly in the report of the All-Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) Central Committee to the 17th party congress, which said: "There can be no doubt that this act is of the most considerable significance in the entire system of international relations. It is not only that it increases the chances for the cause of preserving peace, improves relations between the two countries, strengthens the trade relations between them and creates a basis for mutual cooperation. The point is that it puts up a boundary mark between the past, when the United States was considered in various countries a bastion for all anti-Soviet trends, and the new, when this bastion has been voluntarily removed from the road to the mutual benefit of both countries."

Recognition of the USSR--in itself a fact of great international significance--did not, nonetheless, remove imperialism's hostility toward the USSR. "Recognition is not a guarantee of peace and will not mean an end to military preparations against the USSR," progressive U.S. organizations warned back in the summer of 1932. It is well known that even in F. Roosevelt's administration itself there were figures of the C. Hull type who endeavored in every way to delay a decision on this question. H. Morgenthau, secretary of the treasury in the Democratic administration, subsequently observed that "in 1933 the State Department was not sympathetic, if not hostile, to the very idea of the establishment of relations with the Soviet Union."

This diehard position had its own class logic. Recognition of the first worker-peasant state would essentially also mean recognition of the right of all peoples, and not only the peoples of Russia, to decide their fate at their own discretion, rise up to the struggle against each and every form of exploitation and oppression and be victorious in this struggle. It is natural that imperialism could not, by virtue of its very nature, acknowledge such a right for the peoples and could not be reconciled with the results of the general democratic movement and the revolutionary protests of the working people if they culminated in the victory of socialism.

The establishment of Soviet-American diplomatic relations was rightly characterized at that time by the USSR people's commissar for foreign affairs

as the "fall... of the last fort in the offensive... of the capitalist world which since October had assumed the form of nonrecognition and boycott." However, while putting an enforced end to the preceding stage of American policy, the United States' recognition of the land of soviets simultaneously also turned a new page in imperialism's confrontation with the socialist world. This was confirmed by subsequent events.

Counteraction on the part of reactionary circles and in a number of instances the policy of the U.S. Administration itself prevented full use of the favorable opportunities afforded following the normalization of diplomatic relations in the sphere of the extensive cooperation of the two powers. And although certain changes for the better were achieved in this period, in the creation of a legal basis of economic and other mutual relations, for example, even the results in the commercial sphere were of a limited nature.*

The reason for this was the position of very influential reactionary forces in the United States which opposed the development of Soviet-American relations and the two states' cooperation, primarily in the defense of peace and the repulse of aggression. That which in government, in all probability, was said only behind tightly closed doors or "went unsaid" even was bluntly given out by reactionary politicians and press organs. In August 1938 the newspaper DAILY MIRROR, welcoming the creation of the Anticomintern Pact, wrote: "We greatly regret that Germany and Italy have been able to give Japan only 'moral' support. Our idea of the ideal war is a war against Russia of all three participants in the Anticomintern Pact, a war from which all would emerge defeated...." THE NEW YORK SUN expounded the same approach with reference to the Far East region: "...The longer Japan and Russia are in a state of discord, the better it will be for the United States." We may also recall the cynical statement of Sen H. Truman which he made following Hitler Germany's attack on the Soviet Union and which became regrettably well known: "If we see that Germany is winning, we should help Russia, but if Russia wins, we should help Germany, and thus may they kill as many as possible." Not 4 years after this statement the author became U.S. President and a few months later unhesitatingly gave the order for the first "combat" use in man's history of atomic weapons against the defenseless civilian population of two Japanese cities.

The United States' entry into World War II was essentially decided not by the U.S. Administration but Japan's actions and support for it on the part of Germany and Italy, which responded by declaring war on the United States for the American declaration of war against Japan following its murderous attack on Pearl Harbor. The course of events made the USSR and the United States partners in the anti-Hitler coalition; the cooperation within the framework thereof still serves in many respects as an example of the practical unification of the efforts of state belonging to different socioeconomic systems in the name of a common high and noble goal.

* Commodity turnover between the two countries, which had peaked in 1930 and subsequently declined sharply as a consequence of the anti-Soviet campaign of the Hoover administration in 1932-1933 (in 1933 almost tenfold compared with the 1930 level), although beginning to rise again in 1935, never surpassed the 1929-1930 indicators right up to the start of World War II.

But the intrigues of reactionary forces in the United States clouded this cooperation also. The delays in the organization of American assistance to the main front of the struggle against the Axis powers and in the opening of a second front in Europe, the Americans' quest for separate contacts with the leaders of Hitler's "Reich" and other well-known phenomena of the same order remain an incontrovertible historical fact. The United States' goals within the framework of this coalition also were highly reminiscent of its goals in World War I: with the minimum of its own participation, achieving the maximum weakening of its competitors among the imperialist powers, but primarily of the socialist countries. American reaction believed that the main task of the war and postwar settlement was "settling" in one way or another with socialism, while the imperialists would come to some arrangement among themselves afterward.

III

The diplomatic recognition of 1933 was essentially recognition that the "Soviet problem" could not be solved by power methods. A decade later, in 1943, the turnabout in the course of the war on the Soviet-German front was for U.S. ruling circles impressive proof that it would be impossible to carve the postwar world according to exclusively American plans. Precisely as of 1943 various forces in the United States began to ponder the nature of postwar relations with the USSR. Two trends were outlined more clearly than hitherto. One, predominantly pragmatic, did not reject continued cooperation, at least in the first postwar years and to the extent that the USSR would be prepared to accept the American proposals with respect to the postwar settlement. The supporters of the other, foreseeing a relative improvement in the United States' positions in the world at the end of the war as a consequence of the serious weakening of the leading West European powers and Japan and also, they believed, of the Soviet Union, discerned in the immediate future a unique opportunity for the United States to dictate a "pax Americana," putting the Soviet Union in its "proper place" here.

Two circumstances made considerable adjustments to all parts of the quite broad spectrum of American foreign policy thought. Although it had sustained the gravest human and material casualties in the war, the USSR emerged from it by no means weakened. At the same time, on the other hand, the relative strengthening of the positions of the United States itself was canceled out, as Washington rapidly understood, by the weakening of the capitalist system as a whole. The consequences of this--the transition of new countries and peoples to the path of socialist development and the disintegration imperialism's colonial system--were not that far off.

The other circumstance was that U.S. ruling circles had finally found a "superweapon"--the atom bomb. Back in August 1944 the U.S. Chiefs of Staff Committee forecast: following completion of the defeat of the fascist Axis powers and the end of World War II "only the United States and the USSR will remain first-rate military powers, which is explained by a combination of geographical location and huge military potential. ...Obviously, the strength and geographical location of these two powers preclude the possibility of the military defeat of one by the other, even if the British Empire joins this side (the United States--N.K.)."

The history of Soviet-American relations since August 1945, when the two Japanese cities were the tragic stage for an American demonstration aimed at the Soviet Union, needs no detailed exposition. We can distinguish retrospectively some of the most essential features and trends in the development of these mutual relations.

The supporters of a policy of strict confrontation with the Soviet Union invariably saw the growing strength of the postwar positions of the USSR and the socialist community merely as an additional incentive in support of a stimulation of their own efforts and nuclear weapons and their various forms and types and their mutual combination as the main trump card for which, they believed, the Soviet Union had or would have nothing to counter. The latest and most dangerous variety of this approach is the current policy of the Reagan administration. It is namely this approach which has brought about dangerous changes in international life and Soviet-American relations, leading ultimately not only to foreign policy defeats for the United States but also to an increase in international tension, the military danger and the nuclear threat.

A realistic policy of the development of Soviet-American relations and the constructive cooperation of the USSR and the United States on questions of cardinal significance have many achievements to their credit in the postwar period. Its summit was the first half of the 1970's, when a number of treaties and agreements was signed between the Soviet Union and the United States potentially capable of starting a new page in world politics. The "Principles of Relations" between the two countries signed in 1972 say, inter alia, that the sides "will proceed from the common belief that in the nuclear age there is no basis for maintaining relations between them other than peaceful coexistence. Differences in the ideology and social systems of the USSR and the United States are not an impediment to the development between them of normal relations based on the principles of sovereignty, equality, noninterference in internal affairs and mutual benefit."

Despite all the fluctuations of American foreign policy, its known inconsistency and the numerous and at times acute domestic policy clashes reflected in it, in the postwar period as a whole a policy of confrontation with the USSR and the socialist countries, primarily military-political confrontation, has prevailed therein.

Today documents have already officially been made public in the United States confirming that preparations were being made in this country for the start of a nuclear war against the Soviet Union. Data on wars which the United States has waged in various parts of the world, proceeding from a desire to "roll back communism" and keep its puppets in power, the methods and means of waging them and on numerous operations along American special service channels aimed against countries and peoples fighting for their liberation have been made public. The line of confrontation in U.S. foreign policy has enjoyed unprecedented expansion, intensification and material reinforcement with the assumption of office of the Reagan administration.

If on this path the United States and its proteges have achieved certain positive results for them, they have ended in tragedy and blood for the peoples which have been the victims of imperialist aggression. The United States has succeeded in imposing a massive arms race on the socialist world and thereby

diverting to a certain extent the resources and production potential of the socialist states from creative purposes. At times Washington and its allies have succeeded in provoking serious internal crises in the socialist countries and using the insufficient unity and cohesion of the anti-imperialist forces to their own advantage.

However, and this is the main point, imperialism has been unable to halt the process of our planet's socioeconomic renewal. On the contrary, this process is now developing more intensively than ever. The community of socialist states has become a powerful and influential force. The nonaligned movement, which incorporates many dozen young national states which have arisen in the place of former colonial empires, has become an important factor of contemporary world politics. The climate of international relations has changed beyond recognition: encountering vigorous resistance, imperialism can no longer operate as in the past, disregarding world public opinion on cardinal issues of the present day: it is forced to conceal the true aims of its policy. Fundamentally new problems have been put on the agenda of international relations--states' responsibility before the present and future generations, the reorganization of international economic relations on a just and democratic basis and ways of tackling the global tasks confronting mankind. Value concepts are also changing under the impact of the example of socialism and the new direction of sociopolitical consciousness which it has engendered. What was regarded in the period of the undivided sway of capitalism as moral, permissible and standing to reason even--primarily the solution by force, military force, of international and other social problems and conflict--is in our time becoming increasingly impermissible and even morally punishable and giving rise to growing public protests everywhere, in the United States itself and other Western countries included. All attempts by force to turn history back have led and undoubtedly will continue to lead to the broad public's growing condemnation and dislike not only of imperial policy but also of imperialism and capitalism as systems.

In the current situation trust is the first casualty of the arms race, while the political possibilities of reaching agreement under conditions where possession of first-strike capability will be combined with the possibility of carrying out such a strike in a matter of minutes will naturally be cardinally different from the entire preceding situation. The deployment of new American missiles in West Europe, the subsequent deployment of other new strategic systems and, even more, the spread of the arms race to space will in this respect create a fundamentally new situation unpredictable in its consequences. A genuine aspiration to peace and a desire to prevent nuclear war, which President R. Reagan has so liked to discuss recently, demand first of all that the dangerous logic of the development of arms systems capable of having a profoundly destabilizing impact on international relations as a whole in no way be ignored.

Each sincere and serious effort to normalize Soviet-American relations has elicited a sense of relief and the satisfaction of the most diverse political forces throughout the world. This fact proves for the umpteenth time that tremendous responsibility lies with the USSR and the United States not only for the fate of their own states and peoples but also for the fate of the whole world, and for this reason each specific step in the sphere of their mutual relations should be viewed and is in fact viewed primarily from the

viewpoint of that which is positive and constructive which it introduces to world development and whether it facilitates and brings closer or, on the contrary, makes more remote a solution of the problems confronting mankind. The normal, constructive state of Soviet-American relations is in our time a most important prerequisite of the continued progress of human civilization as a whole.

Yet Washington's policy, expressed by R. Reagan in the formula "Peace Must Be Based on Strength" (speech in Seattle on 23 August 1983), is complicating in every possible way the onset of each subsequent stage of Soviet-American concord. The disregard for and sometimes outright departure even from accords reached earlier and ignoring the elementary rules of international law and the generally accepted customs and traditions of interstate intercourse cannot pass without trace. Whoever agrees to the violation of international commitments, attempts to adapt international law to his own voluntarist aspirations and essentially encourages lawlessness in international relations should ponder the possible long-term consequences of this for his own national interests.

The experience of Soviet-American relations in two-thirds of our century, including the half-century following the establishment of diplomatic relations, indisputably testifies that cooperation between the two states is not simply desirable. There is no doubt that it is urgently necessary and, what is most important, practically possible. This cooperation is dictated by the objective interest of the USSR and the United States in the prevention of a nuclear catastrophe and the combination of efforts for the solution of the global problems confronting mankind.

The peaceful coexistence of states with different socioeconomic systems in our day is a life-tested reality. Each time Washington officials have displayed a sincere aspiration to reach agreements with the USSR based on genuine equality and a just consideration of the legitimate interests of each of the participants, the corresponding agreements have been drawn up and concluded, however complex their subject and however difficult the negotiations leading up to them. And these agreements have invariably been implemented until the supporters of a policy of confrontation, who have reduced to nothing what had been achieved earlier, gained the ascendancy in the United States.

"The USSR," the statement of Yu.V. Andropov, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, emphasizes, "wishes to live in peace with all countries, including the United States. It is not hatching aggressive plans, not foisting an arms race on anyone and not imposing its social practices on anyone."

The entire course of the development of Soviet-American relations confirms that consent and concord and cooperation between our two countries are possible solely on the basis of genuine equality, noninterference in each other's internal affairs, respect for the principle of equal security and elementary honesty and decency in mutual relations with the partner. It is gratifying that an increasingly large number of people in the United States, among representatives of the ruling class included, is seemingly beginning to

recognize these simple truths. It is dangerous and disturbing that both the extent of this recognition and its political influence in the country markedly lag behind the arms race being unleashed by Washington and are far from securing the long-term interests of the United States itself and the American people.

While endeavoring to preserve and develop all healthy shoots in Soviet-American relations and displaying a readiness for fruitful mutually profitable cooperation, the CPSU, the Soviet Government and all Soviet people realize that in the United States, in the present U.S. Administration included, there are sufficient fans of the "game without rules" and those who at any price, without regard for the consequences, would like to achieve military superiority over the USSR and conduct risky "crusades" against the socialist world. The Soviet people have just one answer for such politicians: a firm resolve to do everything necessary to ensure that a sense of prudence or at least elementary self-preservation prevail in a potential aggressor over the intention to unleash war.

But another America is also well known in our country. We recall with gratitude the participants in the "Hands Off Russia!" movement. We recall the American workers and farmers who, unafraid of persecution on the part of the American authorities, set off for our country in the 1920's and 1930's to do what they could at the difficult start of socialist building. We also recall the American soldiers who, together with Soviet soldiers, dreamed, having met at the Elbe, of a world without wars and believed--let us hope, correctly--that a decisive step toward such a world had been taken with the rout of fascism. The Soviet Union will always remember the representatives of the business world and realistic politicians who came here and continue to come here with a sincere aspiration to honest and equal partnership. We know that such people are becoming more and not less in the United States.

Anticommunists of all stripes have exerted much effort to portray the love of peace of the Soviet state and the forbearance and patient purposefulness of our constructive initiatives--whether in the past or the present--as evidence of the "weakness" of the USSR and the socialist world. Nothing could be further from the truth than such an assertion, and life has proven this repeatedly. The roots of our optimism lie in the nature of socialism, Soviet people's internationalism and in our faith in all that is progressive, creative and constructive that exists in every people, the American people included.

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CSO: 1816/3

GREAT BRITAIN: ELECTIONS OVER, RIVALRY CONTINUES

Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian No 11,
Nov 83 pp 108-114

[Article by S. Peregudov: "Great Britain: Elections Over, Rivalry Continues"]

[Text] The Conservative Party's second successive general election victory consolidated its positions in parliament still further and demonstrated its capacity for successfully withstanding rival competition in the struggle for the voter. All this was reason for certain bourgeois press organs to claim that the Tories' Thatcher leadership had succeeded in breaking up the model of the country's postwar political development based on the relatively frequent replaceability of the parties in power and the predominance of the moderate-reformist approach to managing the affairs of society.¹ However, are the results of the recent election that straightforward and are not those who are speaking of the onset of an era of stability in British politics oversimplifying the situation?

1. Price of Division

The June 1983 election brought more surprises than any other parliament election in the postwar period. The unusual nature of its results is not only that for the first time in many years the ruling party succeeded, having been in power for the greater part of parliament's term of office, in obtaining a "sound" mandate for the next 5 years. A no less but rather even more essential feature was the fact that for the first time since the war the opposition to the ruling party consisted of two political forces with approximately equal influence. The coalition (alliance) of the Liberal and Social Democratic parties formed in 1981 was almost equal in terms of the number of votes it obtained with the Labor Party, having obtained approximately only 700,000 votes fewer. It was this "bifurcation" of the opposition which explains the fact that the Conservatives, who gathered almost 1 million votes fewer than at the 1979 election, were able to send to parliament 58 more members.

The effect of the "split opposition" proved particularly favorable for the Conservatives under the conditions of the majority voting system in effect in the country, whereby seats in parliament are distributed not depending on the amount of support obtained by this party or the other (as under the

proportional representation system) but in accordance with the number of candidates of each party which has managed to win a relative majority of votes in his constituency. It is not difficult to see that in respect of parties lacking sufficiently broad support this system is of a plainly discriminatory nature and at the same time sharply strengthens the positions of the parties which have shot ahead. For a long time the Conservatives and Labor enjoyed the advantages of the majority system to a roughly equal extent. However, under conditions where Labor's positions had been sharply weakened as a result of the split and the creation of the Social Democratic Party (SDP) and also a number of other features unfavorable to it, the main "dividends" from the effect of this system were reaped by the Conservatives. While having obtained the support of less than half the votes cast (42.4 percent), the Tories now have almost two-thirds of the seats in parliament (397 out of 650). Their absolute majority over the other parties in the House of Commons increased from 48 to 144.

By virtue of the fact that Labor supporters were concentrated in relatively limited territory of the country, the party was able to send to parliament a relatively populous group of its candidates numbering 209. This was almost 20 members more than Labor would have had if a system of proportional representation operated in the country.

The Alliance parties, whose electorate was distributed more or less evenly throughout the country, were in an extremely unfavorable position, and it was at their expense that the Conservatives gained the above-mentioned increase in their parliamentary representation. While having gathered more than one-fourth of the votes (26 percent), the Alliance was able to send to parliament only 23 of its candidates or just 3.5 percent in terms of the strength of the House of Commons. In the estimation of Essex University specialists, in order to have sent 55 of its candidates to parliament the Alliance would have had to have collected 32 percent of the total vote and to elect 100 and more MP's no less than 36 percent of the vote.²

A simple calculation shows that if a system of proportional representation operated in the country, the Conservatives would have had 275 seats in the new parliament (instead of the present 397), Labor 190 seats (instead of 209) and the Alliance parties 167 (instead of 23). Such a correlation of seats would have made the formation of a one-party government practically impossible, and, considering the irreconcilability of the Tory and Labor positions, precisely the Alliance parties would have won the right to choose a coalition partner. There is no need to say that such a correlation of forces in parliament would have created a political situation so different from the present one.

It is not surprising that both the Conservatives and as yet Labor most emphatically oppose a change in the existing voting system, whereas increasingly broad circles of the British public are in favor of electoral reform.

At the election the Alliance parties relied on winning a number of seats which would have denied both "main" parties an absolute majority in parliament and forced them to seek an alliance with the "center". As payment for consent to

this alliance the Alliance intended to demand abandonment of the negative attitude toward electoral reform. However, the insufficiently high percentage of the vote which it obtained and also the Conservatives' considerable majority over Labor reduced these calculations to nothing.

While having taken a considerable number of votes away from Labor, the Alliance parties gained virtually nothing for themselves, but objectively helped the Conservatives consolidate their positions in parliament and in the country as a whole even more. Still, although the Liberals and Social Democrats proved heavy losers and were unable to do away with or even seriously undermine the "special" position in parliament of the two main parties, nonetheless, the fact that for the first time since the war "third" parties managed to very closely approximate one of them in the number of votes obtained is undoubtedly a success which will stimulate them to continue the struggle, the more so in that the Conservative electorate also is not distinguished by constancy of behavior. It is not fortuitous that both during the election campaign and prior to it Conservative leaders feared most of all a serious drain of votes precisely to the Alliance parties. These fears were a principal reason prompting the Tories to set the election for the spring of 1983, when, according to poll data, the influence of the Liberals and Social Democrats was at the minimum "reading" (on the eve of the announcement of the election only 18 percent of the electorate was prepared to vote for them³).

The same reasons compelled the Conservatives to reduce the length of the election campaign to a minimum. Inasmuch as the runup to the election enables "third" parties to be "in view" to a greater extent than usual the Tories feared that the Alliance would again begin to win broader support, at their expense also.

The seriousness of such fears is corroborated both by the considerable, by a factor of roughly 1.5, growth in the Alliance parties' popularity during the election campaign and the fact that almost half of this growth was gained at the expense of the Conservatives.⁴

The adduced facts and figures testify to the great instability of the behavior of the British electorate and the lack of a sufficiently strong base not only for Labor and the Social Democrats but also the Conservatives. This instability is a most characteristic feature of British political life of recent years. If we look closely at how the voter behaved in the period between the 1979 and 1983 elections, we see that even before the creation of the SDP and the formalization of its alliance with the Liberals, the Conservatives' influence in the country had begun to decline markedly and that at the end of 1980 public opinion polls recorded them as lagging considerably behind Labor--by approximately 10 points. Following the creation of the SDP, the picture shifted again, and at the end of 1981 the parties of the Alliance (formalized in the summer of this year) achieved a record level of support--equal to 42-46 and, at certain moments, 50 percent. The voters' support for both the main parties declined accordingly to 25-29 percent, and the Conservatives found themselves more often than not, furthermore, not in second but in third place.⁵ And it was only by the spring of 1982 that the Alliance's influence subsided and the popularity of the Conservatives began, albeit slowly, to increase.

What are the factors and circumstances which helped the Tories achieve a breakthrough in the mood of a considerable proportion of the electorate and how was this reflected in the overall correlation of social and political forces in the country?

2. 'Authoritarian Populism' on the Offensive

Among the number of features which contributed to the success of the Conservatives practically all bourgeois observers highlight particularly the so-called "Falklands factor". The operation on the Falklands (Malvinas) carried out in spring-summer 1982 by the British armed forces and the nationalist and chauvinist hullabaloo which accompanied it were used by the Tories to present themselves to the British as the party which looks to the country's international authority and its national interests not in words but in deeds. Under conditions where the opinion had become increasingly widespread in the country that "Great Britain" had become "Little England" the Falklands crisis served as a kind of catalyst of national feelings and also of imperial sentiments and ambitions which had long since, it would have seemed, receded into the past. A considerable proportion of the British, many of whom by no means cleaved to Conservative beliefs, found itself in the possession of the nationalist, chauvinist hullabaloo. As the public opinion polls show, immediately after the decision was made to send a naval task force to the Falklands, the level of support for the Conservatives rose from approximately 30 percent to 50 percent and more⁶ and held within these limits for quite a long time.

The fact that under the conditions of the appreciably more complex economic situation and the exacerbation of the country's socioeconomic problems the style of political leadership practiced by M. Thatcher and her government appeared as more decisive and "corresponding to the spirit of the times" than the style of her predecessors, who put the principal emphasis on social and political maneuvering and the quest for a compromise policy which frequently bordered on political unscrupulousness and was disliked by the voter, also played into the hands of the Conservatives.

Both above-mentioned factors helped regalanize the "new Toryism"⁷ which contributed to the party's victory at the 1979 election, but which had almost lost its attraction in 1980-1981. The philosophy of "new conservatism" acquired additional impetus, and this enabled the party and its leaders to continue with great zeal their policy in the socioeconomic sphere.

In the runup to the 1979 election the Tories had emphatically advocated a break with the "one nation" ideas propounded by their predecessors and relied on dividing the British masses and influencing the relatively "well-to-do" part of the population against its less well-off categories, which allegedly undeservedly enjoyed the "munificence of the welfare state" and "lived off others". The offensive against the social gains of the workers' movement conducted under the guise of defense of the interests of the majority of the nation was facilitated by the fact that the social insurance, public health and education systems which had been set up since the war had become increasingly bureaucratized, were maintained on "starvation rations" and had begun to satisfy the masses' needs and requirements increasingly less.

Superimposed on this was also general dissatisfaction with the increasing state interference in citizens' social and private life, the increased taxes and the centralization and bureaucratization of the country's political control.

Having opportunely caught this antistatist mood of the broad masses and demagogically proclaiming a campaign against the "big state," the Tories were able not only to profit from this political capital but also channel the masses' discontent in a direction favorable to themselves. The passiveness of Labor, which essentially ignored this mood, contributed to the huge democratic potential contained in the antistatist, antibureaucratic aspirations of the working people remaining unrealized, whereas the "new Tories" gained an opportunity of claiming that it was they who expressed the most profound aspirations of the masses and were "in step" with the times.

This, as also an ability to portray themselves as the champions of national aspirations and "decisive" politicians, fully expressed the feature characteristic of modern conservatism which progressive British sociologists have defined as "authoritarian populism".⁸ The essence of this concept amounts primarily to the fact that the "new Tories" are not simply acting from more rightwing and, in a number of cases, avowedly reactionary positions but also doing everything to appear here as a "strong authority" allegedly expressing the interests of the masses and the will of the people or, more precisely, the overwhelming majority thereof.

Of course, the attraction of such an approach and the policy based thereon is highly relative and cannot be maintained for any length of time. Nonetheless, under conditions where the "Falklands factor" continued to operate, the level of inflation had declined appreciably (constituting approximately 4-5 percent annually by the time of the election) and certain symptoms of economic recovery had appeared and the worker and trade union movement had been weakened by mass unemployment and the loss of precise reference points of the struggle⁹ the tactics of splitting the ranks of the working class proved sufficiently effective. According to a survey conducted immediately after the 1983 election, 38 percent of skilled workers voted for the Conservatives, whereas only 32 percent voted for Labor.¹⁰ The remainder of this most important category of the working class voted for the Alliance parties and other parties which participated in the election (at the 1979 election the percentage of the skilled worker vote cast for the Conservatives and Labor was roughly equal for the first time since the war).

True, among semiskilled and unskilled workers the ratio was, as before, in favor of Labor (45 percent of the vote of this category of the electorate was cast for it, and for the Conservatives 30 percent).¹¹ However, again for the first time since the war the Conservatives were equal with Labor among physical workers as a whole: both parties gained 37 percent of the vote, 25 percent going to the Liberals and Social Democrats.¹² Traditionally approximately two-thirds of physical workers voted for Labor, and only one-third for the Conservatives.

We do not yet have data on how other categories of the British working people voted. However, the data which are already available (and which, incidentally,

are corroborated by the expanded representation of the Conservatives and the "center" in areas where relatively new sectors of industry with a more skilled and better-paid work force predominate¹³) are perfectly sufficient to draw a conclusion as to considerable changes in the electorate of both parties. But how firm are the successes scored by the Conservatives and, correspondingly, the "inroads" which they managed to make in the camp of their political adversaries?

3. Problems of the Opposition Parties

As far as the Labor Party is concerned, it suffered the biggest defeat in its history. Even in 1931, when it was also weakened by a split in the leadership and the crossover of a number of influential figures, including party leader R. MacDonald, to the enemy camp, the share of the vote which it obtained at the election was higher than on this occasion (31 percent). True, the number of candidates sent to parliament that time was only 52. However, this figure testified not only to the sharp drop in support for Labor but also to the fact that the support which existed was spread comparatively evenly around the whole country. The present, considerably more populous, parliamentary faction, on the other hand, reflects more the above-mentioned narrowness of the party's territorial base, which is confined basically to the North of England and Scotland.

Highly significant also was the fact that Labor's rivals at the election were not only the Conservatives but also the Alliance parties, and this "second" rivalry also was nearly lost by Labor.

Analyzing the reasons for Labor's defeat, the newspaper of Britain's communists, THE MORNING STAR, observed that the party appeared as deeply divided, not having surmounted the differences between the left and right wings, and that the bourgeois press and the entire British establishment were fully resolved to prevent its victory.¹⁴ British firms and corporations did not stint resources to finance the Tories' election campaign, transferring to this party's accounts the unprecedented sum of 10 million pounds sterling.¹⁵

Although the Labor Party had a quite precise and radical program, it lacked positions recognized by all or even the majority of candidates. As the weekly TRIBUNE wrote at the very height of the election campaign, "many Labor candidates are sooner apologizing for their party's policy than defending it," and the fervor of their speeches was for the most part directed against opponents within their own party.¹⁶ The Communist Party of Great Britain and other forces of the left emphatically reject the assertions of the right wing and figures thereof that the principal cause of Labor's defeat was the "excessive radicalism" of Labor programs with which they entered the election and reasonably assert that attempts to bring Labor's positions closer to those of the Alliance or the Conservatives would merely lead to the party's loss of its own identity and end in even bigger losses for it at the next election.¹⁷

Many representatives of the forces of the left are raising the question of the need for a profound rethinking of the philosophy of British Labor, the revision of a number of rooted propositions and a consideration of the changes which have occurred in the social structure and mass consciousness.¹⁸

As far as figures of the right wing are concerned, task No 1 for them is removal from Labor's program documents of such, from their viewpoint, "extreme" and "unwarranted" demands as Britain's unilateral rejection of nuclear weapons and nuclear strategy, withdrawal from the EEC, measures to considerably increase control over big capital and nationalization and also the revision of a number of decisions of earlier party forums concerning limitation of the prerogatives of the parliamentary faction and the increased role of local party organizations and their activists.

Having incurred considerable losses in the course of the election, including the defeat of T. Benn, the most consistent of the Labor left found themselves in a manifestly unfavorable situation, they being faced, in particular, by a new difficulty connected with the search for sufficiently authoritative figures for the position of leader and deputy leader of the party after both M. Foot and D. Healey had declared that they would not be candidates. This fact undoubtedly increased the chances of the so-called "soft left," who continue the "Foot" tradition and are more disposed to compromise with the right wing. However, the real state of affairs in the party will, as before, be determined not by upper stratum combinations but deep-lying processes occurring in the trade unions and local party organizations. The majority of them is opposed to attempts to revise the demands and precepts of the party program aimed at limiting the power and influence of big capital, the solution of urgent social problems and the country's pursuit of a peace-loving foreign policy.

These sentiments made a distinct impression on the entire course of the labor Party's annual conference in October. The conference approved a number of resolutions calling on the trade unions and the working class to step up the struggle against the offensive unleashed by the Conservatives against the rights and interests of the working people. It again confirmed the party's opposition to the plans to deploy American medium-range missiles in the country and refit Great Britain's nuclear submarine fleet with American Trident missiles and supported the country's complete rejection of nuclear weapons and nuclear strategy. The positions of the left wing and the "center" were strengthened in the new executive committee elected at the conference. All this, as, equally, the election as party leader of the left-of-center N. Kinnock, creates more favorable conditions for the party's organizational and political strengthening and the restoration of its fighting capacity and morale, which had been undermined by the election defeat. However, it would be unrealistic to underestimate the difficulties connected with tackling this task. The election as deputy leader of R. Hattersley, a representative of the right wing, the preponderance of the right wing in the parliamentary faction and the general tone of their speeches testify that the struggle to consolidate the party ranks, an important landmark in which was the party conference, will proceed under complex conditions.

Despite the percentage of the vote obtained by the "center" parties, which was a record since the war, here also difficult problems arose immediately after the election. There was a sharp exacerbation of the disagreements in the Liberal Party concerning continuation of the alliance with the Social Democrats, which, as many Liberal figures and activists believe, creates

considerable restrictions for the party and reduces the possibility of achieving broader parliamentary representation. They do not agree with the reasoning of party leader D. Steel and his sympathizers, who claim that in isolation the Liberal Party would not succeed in breaking through to power and that the presence in the country's political arena of a party capable of making deeper inroads into "Labor" territory is essential for expanding the base of centrism. Naturally, after the election, as a result of which the Liberals sent 17 of their candidates to parliament, while the Social Democrats sent only 6, the opponents of a close alliance with the SDP have become more assertive.

The struggle surrounding this key issue considerably complicated the situation in the Liberal Party, and it was with this that the majority of observers linked D. Steel's statement on his possible resignation as leader before the next general election. Settlement of the question of the fate of the centrist coalition will, however, be determined not so much by who gains the upper hand in the struggle within the Liberal Party as by whether the SDP itself manages to hold on to the positions it has won and strengthen the network of its local organizations¹⁹ or whether there awaits it the fate of certain other parties which appeared in the political arena for a certain time and then rapidly disappeared from it.

The quite critical situation in which the SDP found itself after the election was connected by no means only with the sharp decline in its parliamentary representation and the difficulties being brought to light in the local organizations²⁰ but also with the problem of the party's general ideological-political orientation. As the first 2 years of its existence showed, the centrist, pro-Liberal line chosen by the SDP, which was personified by an initiator of its creation, R. Jenkins, proved insufficiently attractive for the electorate.

Even in the course of the election campaign it became apparent that continuation of the policy which had been adopted originally was incapable of attracting new supporters to the party, while the style of leadership practiced by R. Jenkins was finding very limited response both within the party itself and outside. Owen's personal success in the election²¹ and at the same time its overall results, which were of little comfort to the party, prompted R. Jenkins just a few days after it to declare that he was resigning as leader and supported the election of D. Owen as the new leader. Inasmuch as Owen had no rivals, he was elected to this position almost at once.

The change of leader is being interpreted by many political observers in Britain as an expression of the consent of the majority in the party to the ideological-political reorientation of the SDP, an active supporter of which Owen has always been. It will become clear in the near future how the task of the "social democratization" of the SDP will be tackled. The general approach and ideas formulated in D. Owen's book "Face the Future" (published back in 1981²²) could gradually begin to be introduced. Their essence is moderate reformism based wholly and fully on existing practices and relations, but at the same time paying tribute to the ideas of decentralization,

"economic democracy," constitutional reforms and even "cooperative socialism". On this ideological-political platform the Social Democrats hope to win sufficiently firm positions among the working class, "middle strata" and the intelligentsia. They would like not only to retain under their influence quite significant categories of the working people who have switched to their side but also "catch" the masses of workers and employees who supported the Tories, but who will almost certainly not establish themselves for long in the conservative camp. Of course, they will have to withstand the most acute competition on the part of Labor, which, without any doubt, will be exerting the maximum effort to restore its influence in the said strata of the electorate.

There thus lies ahead a new exacerbation of the ideological-political struggle in the camp of the Conservatives' adversaries: Labor and the Social Democrats will attempt to renew their programs and establish themselves organizationally. In the event of the Social Democrats and the Liberals succeeding in preserving their alliance and acting, as in the preceding period, as a more or less cohesive bloc, responding to their offensive will not be easy. Back at the time when the SDP was being formed and also subsequently the Communist Party of Great Britain warned repeatedly against an underestimation of the challenge of the new party and the centrist association as a whole to the country's forces of the left.

The changes in the party-parliamentary arena unfavorable to the forces of the left have by no means blocked, however, the processes of exacerbation of the class struggle in the country and the growth of the dissatisfaction with the government's foreign and military policy, which is becoming increasingly dangerous and costly, and of the resistance to the continued offensive against the rights and interests of the broad masses. The longer this policy continues, and the government, to judge by everything, intends to further demonstrate its "decisive approach," increasingly broad categories of the working people will be its casualties to this extent or the other.

The policy of increased nuclear confrontation is giving rise to increasingly active protest on the part of all strata of the population without exception. A reason for the early general election, incidentally, was the Tory leaders' fear that the growth of the antiwar mood in connection with the plans to deploy American medium-range missiles at the end of the current year would weaken their political positions. Nor does continuation of the hard line in the socioeconomic sphere, which, as the weekly THE ECONOMIST wrote immediately following the election, will require quite palpable sacrifices both in the sphere of wages and in the sphere of social services from the bulk of the population,²³ promise anything good for the working people. As the seriousness of the problem of inflation is reduced, increasingly great significance is attached to the problems of employment and unemployment, and not only for the young people and the "colored" population but also for considerably broader categories of "white" and "blue" collar workers. The exacerbation of social problems caused by the rise in mass unemployment and the policy of "survival of the fittest" (the lack of jobs for a considerable proportion of a whole generation of young people, "de-industrialization" and the decline of once key industrial areas, the exacerbation of national and race relations, increased crime and so forth) is increasing dissatisfaction with the "new Tories'" policy on the part of all groups of the population.

It was not fortuitous that even at the first sessions of parliament not only representatives of the opposition parties but also the government's own "backbenchers" among the so-called Tory "wets" sharply opposed its policy. The fact that among the latter after the election there have proven to be certain former cabinet members who disagree with the policy of the Thatcher wing undoubtedly increases the possibility of a new exacerbation of the internal political struggle in the Conservative camp and even, in the event of a sharp decline in the government's popularity, a serious challenge on the part of M. Thatcher's opponents within the party. However paradoxical this may be, the increase in the government's parliamentary majority as a result of the election also has a negative side for the Thatcher leadership for the MP's who are not in agreement with its policy can now criticize the government's activity more freely, without fearing accusations that this threatens the fall of the government. Furthermore, the opposition parties, however complicated the relations between them, will aspire to increase their political capital primarily at the expense of the Conservatives.

The last election recorded the correlation of political forces which had been established by the spring of the current year, but they did not halt and could not have halted the winds of change which for some time have been strengthening markedly in the British Isles. In the 4 years between the last two general elections there was an exceptionally rapid change of "political weather": the barometer of popularity of the ruling party fell sharply and rose again just as sharply, and the orientation of the main opposition party, which also experienced surges and declines in its influence, changed appreciably. A new, centrist political grouping, which experienced even more dramatic upturns and slumps in its popularity, forced its way into the rivalry between the two increasingly divergent main parties and acquired citizenship.

All this taken together enables us with complete justification to reject the assertion that the Conservatives' victory at the June 1983 election marks some "turn toward stability" and enshrines the "new conservatism" as the dominant political trend. The "constancy of preference" of the voter which was allegedly demonstrated in the course of the election is of an apparent nature. In reality the election showed that the process of the regrouping of Great Britain's political forces which began back in the first half of the 1970's not only has not been completed but has entered a new, sharper phase.

FOOTNOTES

1. See THE TIMES, 11 June 1983.
2. THE TIMES, 25 May 1983.
3. THE ECONOMIST, 11 June 1983, p 20.
4. According to the averaged data of a whole number of polls, by the start of the election campaign 47 percent were prepared to vote for the Conservatives, 34 percent for Labor and, as already said, 18 percent for the Alliance parties (THE ECONOMIST, 11 June 1983, p 20). Thus in the course of the campaign Labor's support declined approximately 5 percent and the Conservatives' almost 4 percent, while support for the Alliance increased 8 percent.

5. In the course of a year, from March 1981 through March 1982, the Alliance parties won a number of sensational victories at parliamentary by-elections, and once again, furthermore, the most serious defeats were sustained by the Conservatives. As the British press observed, the level of popularity of the Conservatives and their leader, M. Thatcher, was at that time the lowest for a ruling party and prime minister since the war.
6. THE ECONOMIST, 17 May 1982, p 23.
7. See "Great Britain," Moscow, 1981, pp 294-306.
8. See "The Politics of Thatcherism," ed. by S. Hall and M. Jacques, London, 1983.
9. This was manifested, in particular, in the considerable reduction in the number of Labor candidates officially supported by the trade unions from 185 in 1979 to 144 in 1983 (THE TIMES, 24 May 1983).
10. THE TIMES, 11 June 1983.
11. Ibidem.
12. THE MORNING STAR, 20 June 1983.
13. According to data adduced in the newspaper of the Communist Party of Great Britain, the appreciable narrowing of the geographical representation of the Labor Party at the election led to the members of its parliamentary faction representing in the vast majority of cases areas where traditional sectors of industry experiencing a particularly serious crisis and devoid of any hopeful prospects predominate (THE MORNING STAR, 20 June 1983).
14. THE MORNING STAR, 11 June 1983.
15. TRIBUNE, 10 June 1983, p 3.
16. Ibid., 3 June 1983, p 1.
17. See THE MORNING STAR, 11, 20 June 1982.
18. See MARXISM TODAY, July 1983.
19. According to data published on the eve of the election, approximately 10,000 of the roughly 60,000-65,000 SDP members failed to renew their party membership in 1983 (THE TIMES, 4 May 1983).
20. Prior to the election, the SDP faction had 28 MP's, of whom 27 came from Labor and 1 from the Conservatives.

21. A week before the election public opinion polls in the constituency in which he was standing showed that only 20 percent of the electorate was preparing to vote for him, whereas 45 percent intended voting for the Conservative and a little more than 30 percent for the Labor candidate (THE TIMES, 3 June 1983).
22. See D. Owen, "Face the Future," London, 1981.
23. See THE ECONOMIST, 11 June 1983, pp 13-14.

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AUTOMATION IN WEST CRITICIZED FOR DISREGARDING WORKER NEEDS

Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian No 11,
Nov 83 pp 121-127

[Article by V. Luk'yanov: "Automation of Production and the Vocational-Skills Structure of the Work Force"]

[Text] Automation is a principal direction of the scientific-technical revolution. Like the stages of technical progress which preceded it, it is simultaneously also a new level of the social division of labor characterized by considerable changes in the vocational-skills structure of the work force. The revolution in the technical resources of production is changing its composition considerably, increasing the demand for some vocational-skills groups of the employed and reducing the need for others. At the same time appreciable changes are occurring in the functions and content of the labor of many categories of workers as automation develops.

Under the conditions of capitalism the shifts in the vocational-skills structure of the work force are giving rise not only to economic but also serious social contradictions. The reduced demand for many forms of the mass occupations caused by automation and the superseding of live labor by machines are intensifying the situation in the labor market and being accompanied by an exacerbation of the problems of unemployment and also the vocational training and retaining of the work force.

I

The automation of production affects primarily physical workers and, among these, the category of workers employed in the carrying, warehousing and transportation of raw material, semimanufactures, intermediate products and finished products. The introduction of automatic equipment is leading to a decline in the number of these operations and, correspondingly, in the numbers of the personnel performing them. For example, thanks to automation, the American Xerox company has achieved a halving of the number of workers employed in the carrying and on-site transportation of raw material and intermediate products.*

* See AMERICAN MACHINIST, January 1982, p 138.

The numbers of auxiliary personnel are also declining as a result of the automation of warehousing operations. In addition, the need for assistance in warehouses is frequently disappearing altogether inasmuch as thanks to the extensive use of computer, particularly microprocessor, equipment in scheduling and on-site planning of production's raw material, intermediate product and semimanufacture requirements, they are arriving at the shop increasingly not from the warehouse but "from the wheels," while the finished product is sent immediately to the consumer, bypassing the warehouse. Such a system of the organization of production servicing exists, in particular, at enterprises of Japan's auto industry, where the inventory level has been reduced to the minimum.*

At the same time it is far from always that the automation of production is accompanied by a sharp reduction in the need for auxiliary workers. Given partial automation and also the use of certain types of automated equipment, the demand for this category of workers could increase even. For example, for operating certain models of robots not only programmers, repairmen and troubleshooters but also a large number of assistants employed in carrying and warehousing the intermediate products and semimanufacturers in the strictly determined place are needed. Only with the transition to comprehensively automated production when all production process control functions and auxiliary operations are performed by equipment, does the need for assistants disappear completely. Modern oil refineries, where this category of workers is absent altogether, may serve as an example.

Automation also has a highly dissimilar impact on the categories of physical workers who participate directly in production. The introduction of automated equipment is leading, in particular, to a reduction in the need for operators. Thus as a result of the introduction of automated transfer lines at plants of the French Renault company their numbers have declined by a factor of 2-3. On the other hand, automation entails a change in the content of labor and the skills level of this category of workers.

Under the conditions of partial automation the operator performs the functions with respect to the direct control of production processes and auxiliary operations which have yet to be transferred to a machine. In a number of cases this conditions the narrow specialization of the worker in the performance of one or several operations. For example, in metal-working and engineering industry, given the operation of machine tools with program control (PC) and also automated transfer lines, the role of the operator more often than not is reduced to putting the intermediate product on the machine tool (line) and removing the finished product. In sectors with a continuous nature of production his functions consist mainly of summoning at the command of the computer the repairman or engineer in the event of this disruption of the production process or the other. Thus, given partial automation, in terms of the content of his labor the operator is practically no different from the semiskilled worker. Like the latter, he undergoes a short-term course

* See FORTUNE, 8 February 1982, p 37.

of instruction (from 1-2 days to several months)* directly on the job. It is also indicative that in all the developed capitalist countries both these categories of workers are equal in respect of wages.

Entirely different is the nature of the functions performed by an operator under the conditions of comprehensively automated production: here he is no longer a simple appendage of the machine, as under partial automation, but essentially the organizer of production monitoring the operation of a computer-controlled machinery complex. The operator's direct intervention in the production process is confined to instances when the computer malfunctions. In view of the fact that the performance of these functions requires a sufficiently high level of worker qualifications, technicians and even engineers are frequently employed as this type of operator.

Another category of workers experiencing the impact of automation are controllers. With the introduction of automated equipment the need for them is considerably reduced given partial automation and disappears completely given comprehensive automation. The quality of the product is evaluated by microelectronics, it removing products with defects and deciding whether (to which line, machine tool, section) to dispatch the defective product.

The automation of production is sharply complicating the finding of the causes of equipment malfunctions and shutdowns. As a result there is a considerable increase in the need for troubleshooters and repairmen, and the demands made on their qualifications are increasing also. A survey conducted in the United States in the 1970's showed that whereas at enterprises which employed mechanized equipment this category constituted on average 9 percent of physical workers and 7 percent of all those employed, at plants which employed automated equipment the proportion thereof amounted to 27 and 19 percent respectively. In the most automated sectors and enterprises this indicator was even higher--up to 60-70 percent.

However, a trend has been observed recently toward a reduction in the proportion of repairmen and troubleshooters among production personnel. It is caused basically by two factors: the increased reliability of the automated equipment by means of the extensive use of microelectronics, particularly modules, and increasingly widespread preventive planned maintenance. Thanks to this, there is not only a sharp reduction in the duration of the idle time of costly equipment but the transition to a narrow division of labor at the time of the performance of maintenance operations similar to that which exists in line-mass production is becoming possible.

As the experience of Britain and the United States shows, the introduction of preventive planned maintenance usually leads to the differentiation of the repairmen into two groups of approximately equal numbers: one consists of skilled workers employed in the event of emergencies, the second of semiskilled

* For comparison it should be pointed out that the training of a traditional all-purpose machine tool operator requires 4-5 years of instruction in a vocational-technical educational institution.

maintenance men employed in preventive maintenance. On the other hand, as the volume of such work increases, it is becoming profitable to transfer its performance to specialized repair firms. According to a survey conducted at U.S. oil refineries, this has made it possible to lower the ratio of the numbers of repairmen and operators employed in the sector as a whole from 2:1 to 1:1.

Even greater possibilities of a reduction in the need for repairmen are connected with the extensive use of automatic equipment capable of detecting malfunctions and the causes thereof. The first system for the automatic diagnosis of the causes of malfunctions appeared in the United States at the end of the 1960's. However, it was only with the creation of inexpensive and reliable microprocessor equipment a decade later that the extensive introduction of these systems in all sectors of industry of the developed capitalist countries began. In the opinion of many experts, as a result of their application the length of the search for the causes of malfunctions, which under conventional conditions accounts for 90 percent of the repairman's work time, is being almost halved. This is making it possible to reduce the number of workers of this specialty 5-10 fold and simultaneously simplify the functions they perform. The latter amount to replacement, on computer command, of the faulty module. There is a depreciation of what constituted the basis of the repairman's high qualifications--the knowledge and experience necessary for ascertaining the causes of malfunctions. The workers of this specialty are increasingly becoming typical semiskilled workers.

At the same time the use of automatic equipment for diagnosing the causes of faults is leading to a rise in the skills level of the repair workers employed at the enterprises which manufacture the corresponding equipment and in specialized companies which repair defective units, particularly modules. In order to successfully handle the removal of faults a worker frequently has to know several repair specialties.

The combination of different occupations and specialties is also characteristic of other sectors of modern automated production. For example, the introduction of microelectronic equipment has led to the integration of the occupations of operator and programmer of machine tools with PC. With the transition to comprehensive automation the boundaries between operator-troubleshooters, programmer-operators and repairmen are finally being erased. A new occupation--controller--is emerging. His functions are programming the automated equipment and the adjustment and repair of machinery in the event of the appearance of this fault or the other.

Thus the continued development of automation will ultimately not only increase but also qualitatively change the demands made on the level of skills of a number of vocational categories. The use of automated equipment is bringing about the need for the acquisition by an increasingly large number of workers of high technical training, most important components of which are sufficiently thorough scientific-technical knowledge (primarily in the sphere of electrical engineering and electronics) and the ability to apply it and an understanding of the essence of the production processes being controlled

and the principles of the operation of equipment. Furthermore, under the conditions of automation there is increased significance in such a quality as a capacity to assume responsibility for an adopted decision. All this presupposes lengthy training (over several years) in vocational-technical schools and also the periodic renewal of knowledge at special courses.

However, the development of the system of the vocational-technical training and retraining of personnel in the capitalist countries lags considerably behind the demands being made by the current stage of scientific-technical progress. The monopolies are endeavoring to shift the expenditure connected with this onto the working people themselves and the state. The latter, in turn, under the pretext of combating inflation and budget deficits, is cutting expenditure on social needs, in the sphere of education and vocational training included, in every possible way.

As a study conducted by the ILO shows, a result of the system of vocational training's lag behind the requirements of production is an ever increasing shortage of highly skilled workers and also technicians with the capacity for mobility and rapid adaptation to the new conditions connected with modernization of the production apparatus.*

II

The introduction of automated equipment is leading to the performance of an increasingly large number of production functions being entrusted to machines. On the other hand, automation is enhancing the role of the human factor in securing the conditions for the normal functioning of the production process and control of the operation of an automated machinery complex. For example, according to the data of a study conducted by Japan's Ministry of Labor, upon the replacement of traditional types of machine tool by modern models with PC labor input on the planning and preparation of production increases on average by a factor of 2-5, while its proportion of aggregate labor input increases from 2-5 to 25-50 percent.**

The very process of the introduction of automated equipment is bringing about the need to increase the numbers of engineering-technical personnel. Thus the participation of at least two engineers, not counting specialists with less high qualifications, is needed for the installation and preparation for work of a single robot. The operation of modern complex equipment also presupposes the more extensive use of the labor of engineers, technicians and other highly skilled specialists than at preceding stages of technical progress. In particular, the mass application of computers in modern automatic complexes is giving rise to demand for workers of a whole number of fundamentally new engineering-technical occupations and specialties--operators and programmers of computers*** and also machine tools with PC, systems

* See INTERNATIONAL LABOR REVIEW, November-December 1981, pp 737-738.

** OHM, May 1981, pp 68, 69.

*** The statistics of a number of capitalist countries put computer operators among office employees, although in reality they are not inferior to engineers in level of qualifications. In the United States, for example, more than half of the persons who worked as computer operators in the 1970's had junior college education.

analysts and electronic equipment specialists. For example, 1-7 programmers, 1-5 systems analysts and 1-5 operators were needed to operate a single computer in the 1970's. As a whole the representatives of the new engineering-technical occupations constitute from 50 to 60 percent of workers employed in servicing computers. Together with the increase in the percentage there is also a rapid increase in the numbers of this category. Thus in France it was more than 82,000 in 1979.

On the other hand, the growth of the scale and level of automation is leading to a relative reduction in the need for workers of certain engineering-technical occupations. The standardization of labor is contributing to reduced demand for them. Thanks to this, in the United States the number of programmers per computer declined in the period 1965-1975 from 3.6 to 1.

The need for highly skilled specialists of a number of occupations is also declining in connection with the mass introduction of microelectronics. Their use for the automation of control and managerial work is leading to a sharp reduction in the demand for financial analysts and accountants. The automation of planning-design work is being accompanied by a reduction in the number of engineers and also design engineers and designers, architects and draftsmen. With the combination in a single complex of systems of the automated planning and control of production processes the need for programmers of machine tools and lines with PC is disappearing. Some experts believe that in the near future the computer will be self-programming upon man's spoken command, and the need for programmers and operators servicing computers will disappear also.

All this could give rise to a slowing of the growth of the industry's demand for specialists with higher and secondary technical education, including those of the new professional categories, and in the more distant future lead to a reduction in the need for them both on the part of industry and the national economy as a whole. According to estimates of Britain's white collar workers' trade union, by the mid 1990's, as a consequence of the mass introduction of microelectronics, the demand for data-processing specialists on a countrywide scale will have declined 27 percent compared with the end of the 1970's.*

At the same time, however, the automation of production is complicating considerably the content of labor and giving rise to an increase in the qualifications of engineering-technical personnel. The use of microelectronics is making it possible to reduce the volume of routine work, and the opportunities for creative work requiring high professional qualifications are expanding. It is indicative that, for example, in the United States in the mid-1970's practically all systems analysts had completed higher education, and two-thirds of them had obtained a bachelor's degree and one-third a doctor of sciences degree, furthermore.

* See FUTURIBLES, September 1980, p 40.

In bringing about increased labor input in the planning and preparation of production and also control of it automation is leading to an increase in the volume of office work. Inasmuch as the use of microelectronics here is as yet confined merely to certain types of work and encompasses a comparatively small proportion of enterprises the category of office workers as a whole is growing both relatively and absolutely. The results of a survey of industrial enterprises in Britain, the United States and Canada, in particular, testify to this. As it makes clear, where the transition to automated production is not accompanied by the standardization of office work, the proportion of workers employed in it increased on average from 7 to 19 percent.*

For operating computers office workers of new occupations are required: peripheral equipment and data input and output operators and others. On average workers of these occupations constitute 40-50 percent of the personnel servicing computers. However, in the long term, as the scale of the use of microelectronics in the sphere of office work and its further standardization grow, the need for workers of the said category could decline considerably. The experience of Britain and the United States shows that the use of a single third- and fourth-generation computer for the automation of office work leads to the liquidation of 54 jobs. According to the estimate of the authors of a report prepared at the behest of the French Government, the total number of office workers will have declined by one-third in 1990 and in industry by 40 percent thanks to the introduction of microelectronics.

The automation of office work is appreciably changing the content of labor in this sphere. However, its impact is far from straightforward. Under the conditions of partial automation the worker makes good the imperfection of technology, performing operations which cannot as yet be transferred to a machine. Given the use of electronic calculators, for example, the worker's functions are reduced to pressing the appropriate button, everything else being performed by the instrument independently. Nor are the data-input and output operator's duties (they are responsible for 75 percent of office workers employed in servicing computers) distinguished by complexity: they consist of punching and sorting the cards and loading them into the machine. It is not fortuitous that in the United States over three-fourths of office workers of this category have no special education but acquired the specialty on the job.

Thus under the conditions of the partial automation of office work, which is as yet the case in all the developed capitalist countries, a considerable proportion of the workers in this sphere is engaged in the performance of simple and repetitious operations and functions. In terms of the content of labor they are in principle no different from semiskilled physical workers specializing in one or several operations. The majority of experts believes that the mass introduction of microelectronic equipment in the sphere of office work will lead to a further intensification of the personnel's narrow specialization. With the transition to comprehensive automation, on the other hand, the functions of many categories of office workers, it is believed, will be transferred to equipment, and the need for them will be reduced to the minimum.

* See SOCIOLOGY, August 1974, p 59.

Automation is leading to a growth in the relative and, in a number of cases, absolute numbers of a further category of workers--managerial personnel. However, the impact of this process on its various levels is dissimilar. On the one hand in connection with the fact that the introduction of automated equipment entails a reduction in the number of physical workers of many occupations there is also a decline in the need for managers of the lowest tier--foremen and team leaders. On the other, automation is giving rise to increased demand for engineers, technicians and other highly skilled specialists and also certain categories of office workers. There is a corresponding increase in the need for middle-tier specialists.

The numbers of the administrative-managerial staff increase most significantly at the initial stage of automation. Subsequently, as the spheres and scale of the use of computer, particularly microprocessor, equipment expands, the situation changes: the decline in the number of office workers and certain categories of engineering-technical personnel and the transfer of a number of functions of the direct control of production processes to computers lead to a reduction in the need for middle-tier managers. For example, a study conducted in Britain shows that upon the introduction of a single computer (third- or fourth-generation) for the automation of office works the managerial personnel declines on average by 4.7 units, mainly at the expense of middle managers, furthermore.*

According to numerous forecasts, in the future the extensive introduction of microelectronic equipment will lead to a considerable reduction in the numbers of managers and administrators employed in industry and the economy as a whole. Thus in the United States, according to certain estimates, the need for managers could have declined by 9 million persons by the year 2000.**

On the other hand, automation is increasing considerably the demands on the qualifications of managerial personnel, particularly its highest tier. In order to exercise effective leadership of a company top administrators must be specialists in the sphere of the science of management and make extensive use in their activity of systems analysis, computers and so forth. As far as middle-tier managers are concerned, the growing complexity of production brought about by the introduction of automation is also being accompanied by an increase in their qualifications. The extensive use of computers not only in company headquarters but also at individual enterprises is affording middle managers access to the information necessary for much decision-making. As a number of experts believe, this is frequently leading to a broadening of the powers of managers of production units.*** Furthermore, the creation of production systems controlled by microelectronics is sharply increasing enterprises' capacity for reacting rapidly to the constantly changing conditions of production and product sales.

* See P. Stoneman, "Technological Diffusion and the Computer Revolution," Cambridge, 1976, p 176.

** See BUSINESS WEEK, 3 August 1981, p 55.

*** See LONG RANGE PLANNING, December 1981, p 86; BUSINESS WEEK, 25 April 1983, pp 38-43.

Whether, however, the enumerated factors will outweigh the trends contributing to the centralization of the decision-making process in company headquarters is not yet clear. The experience of sectors with continuous production processes (oil-refining, power engineering and others), where a relatively high level of the automation of production and control has been achieved even now, shows that the extensive use of computers appreciably broadens the powers basically of one category of middle-tier managers--the directors of the plants which independently market the products they produce.

III

The vocational-skills structure of employed persons, as, equally, the content of the labor of certain categories of the work force, depends not only on the technology employed in production but also the forms of the organization of the process of labor activity itself. At the present stage of scientific-technical progress various options are possible here, and their number is increasing with the continued development of automation, furthermore.

It is understandable that under capitalism where the main goal of production is the race for profits, in each specific situation the choice falls to the option which enables the employer to extract the maximum possible from the available equipment and manpower. It is this which explains the exceptional prevalence of the Taylor system of the "scientific" organization of labor with its characteristic narrow specialization of the workers in the performance of identical operations and the sharp differentiation of personnel per level of qualifications.

However, by now the Taylor methods of the operation of manpower have lost their attraction for capital to a considerable extent. In the estimation of many bourgeois specialists--both theorists and practical workers--their application under the conditions of automated production is impeding the efficient use of equipment and leading to a reduction in labor productivity and a deterioration in output quality. Special research conducted in the West for the purpose of studying the problems which arise at the time of automation shows that the successful introduction and operation of modern types of automated equipment, particularly microelectronic equipment, and also robots require an organization of labor which provides conditions for the display of the individual, creative capabilities and initiative of every worker.*

Besides, as the general educational and vocational training of the working peoples grows, there is an increase in their need for meaningful labor and increased dissatisfaction with narrow specialization making a man an appendage of a machine. Describing the situation that has evolved, a representative of the major American Monsanto company observed that the bulk of worker occupations under the conditions of partial automation requires 6

* According to a representative of the American EXXON transnational corporation, with the transition to comprehensively automated production "the traditional forms and methods of the organization of labor... are becoming simply unprofitable" ("Management and Automation in Petroleum Industry," New York-London, 1980, p 208).

years of high school education, while business is at every step hiring people with completed secondary education and even those who have spent some time at college.*

All this has been the reason for the appearance and gradual spread at capitalist enterprises of new forms and methods of the organization of the labor process going beyond the framework of Taylorism. They include the periodic rotation (relocation) of employed persons from one job or sector to others; the "expansion" and "enrichment" of labor activity expressed in the fact that the worker assimilates several related specialties and can perform a larger number of functions and operations than before; and the creation of quality and productivity groups and also semi-autonomous teams in which the working people gain an opportunity to participate in the solution of certain questions concerning the allocation of functions within the teams.

The new forms of the organization of labor have become most widespread in Japan's industry, where paternalism, the relatively high level of the general educational training of the working people and the system of hiring for life which has long existed at many enterprises and also a number of other factors have created favorable grounds for this. In the opinion of a number of experts, the relatively extensive introduction of new principles of the organization of the labor process is a reason for the higher labor productivity and product quality in a number of sectors of Japan's industry compared with other developed capitalist countries.

Recently, however, employers of the United States and West European countries have been attempting to overcome the lag in this sphere. Labor processes are being reorganized primarily in the sectors which are making relatively extensive use of automated equipment. The leading position here is occupied by the auto and steel industries. According to the estimates of a number of American experts, in the latter half of the 1980's all workers will be performing several operations each at every fifth U.S. processing industry enterprise.

Proceeding from present trends, certain bourgeois specialists express the opinion that the continued development of automation and the introduction of new forms of the organization of labor will lead in the foreseeable future even to the gradual disappearance of narrowly specialized and unskilled labor and will considerably alter the very nature of labor activity. Does actual capitalist practice provide grounds for such a conclusion? By no means.

A particular feature of modern capitalist production is the fact that two types of enterprise "coexist" within its framework--partially and comprehensively automated--and, furthermore, partially automated enterprises, where narrowly specialized, uninteresting labor predominates, constitute the bulk of them. There is reason to believe that this labor will remain the lot of millions of working people in the foreseeable future also, considering the difficulties

* See B. Nixon, "The Labor Market Framework of Job Development: Some Problems and Prospects," New York, 1977, p 41.

being encountered by the introduction of comprehensive automation in sectors with a discrete nature of production.

In addition, practice shows that even under the conditions of comprehensive automation far from all workers are employed in the performance of functions requiring high qualifications and initiative. The very transition to comprehensive automation is being accompanied by the disqualification of some workers, who are superseded by machines. Given narrow specialization, which extremely limits the possibilities of qualifications mobility, many of them cannot find employment and fill the ranks of the unemployed. The growth of unemployment, particularly structural unemployment, currently observed in all the developed capitalist countries is a consequence of the use of the achievements of scientific-technical progress under capitalism.

We should also point to another factor impeding the development of the trend toward a rise in the skills level of the working people at the capitalist enterprise. The achievements of scientific-technical progress which already exist here are being used merely to the extent to which this corresponds to the interests of the monopolies. At every step their introduction in production is being held back by economic considerations: given the relatively low cost of semiskilled manpower, the replacement of live labor by machines frequently proves simply unprofitable.

Capitalist production relations also impose considerable limitations on the possibilities of an increase in the meaningfulness of labor afforded by the appearance of new forms and methods of its organization. The experience of the capitalist countries testifies that the changes occurring here are essentially of a cosmetic nature and more often than not amount to a simple increase in the number of simple operations or functions performed by the bulk of the workers.

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BOOK ON CONFLICTS IN CAPITALIST ECONOMIES REVIEWED

Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian No 11,
Nov 83 pp 133-134

[Yu. Shishkov review: "In the Labyrinth of Conflicts and Crises"]

[Text] The profound changes in the world capitalist economy and the crises and conflicts shaking it are attracting the increasingly close attention of Marxist scholars. These dramatic changes contain the roots of many present-day economic, social and political problems, and processes are being conceived here today which will determine the appearance of the nonsocialist part of the world tomorrow. The appearance of yet another work* whose authors examine the complex system of contradictions and conflicts of the world capitalist economy is perfectly natural, therefore.

The book attempts to ascertain the particular features of the effect of economic laws in the world arena and the nature of the mechanism regulating world economic relations. M. Bunkina and V. Motylev conclude that despite the efforts being made at state and interstate level, the world capitalist economy is an anarchic, uncontrollable system.

The authors begin the investigation of the contradiction and crises of this economy, abiding by Marxist methodology, with an analysis of the new phenomena in the material basis of world economic relations--in the production sphere and the international division of labor. The monograph shows the trend toward the increase in the specialization of the industrially developed capitalist countries in the production of science-intensive products and the crisis of the old forms of the international capitalist division of labor connected with this.

Close attention is paid to the development of international forms of state-monopoly regulation. The particular features of international government organizations of the OECD type, the IMF, regional integration associations and also the regular "summit" meetings of leaders of seven imperialist

* M.K. Bunkina, V.V. Motylev, "Protivorechiya i konflikty sovremennogo kapitalisticheskogo khozyaystva" [Contradictions and Conflicts of the Modern Capitalist Economy], Moscow, Izdatel'stvo "Mysl'," 1982, 256 p.

powers are studied. An interesting, although not indisputable, thought concerning the asynchronizing influence on the world economic cycle of the state-monopoly regulation of economic life regionally, primarily within the EEC framework (p 61), is put forward here.

The formation of the regional state-monopoly system in West Europe, the internal contradictions of this process and its economic and social consequences are examined in detail and depth and with the use of the latest material.

One of the best chapters of the book is devoted to an analysis of the correlation of the economic and scientific-technical potential of the United States, the EEC and Japan. The factors of the unevenness of the development of the three centers of imperialist rivalry and the singularities of this unevenness in the postwar period and the specific features of the development of each of the three centers are described. There is a detailed study of the role of scientific-technical progress in the present-day competition on the world market. We have to agree with the conclusion that "the future appears in the form of a bitter struggle of technologies.... Taking into consideration, however, the sum total of political-economic factors influencing technical progress in the United States, West Europe and Japan, the success of the American policy of intensifying and consolidating the other imperialist centers' technological dependence on the United States is unlikely" (p 133). Rivalry in the sphere of the export of capital and in the currency sphere is also examined in detail.

The chapter concludes with thoughts concerning two trends in interimperialist relations--toward unification and separation--and on the deep-lying political economy sources of each of them. The authors rightly caution against a one-sided exaggeration of this trend or the other. "Absolutization of the disuniting principle in interimperialist relations," they write, "could be politically dangerous" (p 154).

The book provides the author's interpretation of the energy, raw material, currency, ecological and food crises. The struggle of the developing countries for a reorganization of international economic relations is shown. In order to blunt the anti-imperialist spearhead of this struggle Western economists are elaborating liberal-bourgeois plans of such a reorganization like the J. Tinbergen report "Revision of the International Order". The work's final chapters are devoted to a critical analysis of this and other global plans. The critique of bourgeois futurological plans helps provide a scientific evaluation of the present-day global problems and the prospects of their solution. M. Bunkina and V. Motylev rightly proceed from the fact that a most important prerequisite of a solution of these problems is the removal of the threat of nuclear war hanging over the world.

Unfortunately, the monograph is not free of dubious propositions and vulnerable standpoints. It is hardly possible to agree, for example, that the crisis of the capitalist currency system is a structural crisis, the less so in that the authors themselves characterize structural crises as a manifestation of disproportions between production and consumption and as crises of the old forms of the international division of labor (pp 160, 161).

It is difficult to understand why the chapter on structural crises begins with an exposition of Marx's theory of cyclical crises of overproduction, which in this case are not apposite. It is not the case that structural crises are a consequence of underproduction. In the majority of cases in the past raw material crises were caused by overproduction and not by a shortage of products of extractive industry. The energy and raw material crises of the 1970's also were engendered by no means by a shortage of fuel and raw material, as the authors claim, but by far more complex factors in the sphere of circulation and price-forming under the conditions of a potential shortage of these commodities. Even at the height of the Iran-Iraq war the capitalist oil market, contrary to their opinion, did not experience the least shortage.

The formulation of the question of the contradictoriness of the unity of the monopolies and the state in the system of modern state-monopoly capitalism and of the insolubility of the conflict between them, which is interesting in principle (p 91), loses its profundity to a considerable extent because the authors identify monopoly regulation of the economy with spontaneous-market regulation, while state regulation is viewed as the antipode of the anarchy of market forces (pp 94-96). In reality, everything is far more complex. On the one hand the monopolies, like the state, as distinct from spontaneous market forces, also exercise purposeful macroeconomic regulation, albeit on a different scale and by other methods. On the other, state regulation does not dispense with "market forces": credit, taxation, currency and a number of other forms of state influence on the economy are based essentially on the laws of the market. Finally, the "market forces" themselves are not a realm of chaos but a definite system of the organization of social production.*

We cannot agree that a country's relative significance in the overall volume of world trade is an indicator of the extent of its participation in the international division of labor, even less a decisive indicator, as it is portrayed in part 2, chapter II. The relative significance of Belgium, for example, in world commodity turnover is dozens of times less than that of the United States, but its actual involvement in the international division of labor is six times higher (the proportion of exports in Belgium's gross domestic product in 1980 constituted 53.3 percent, but in the gross domestic product of the United States 8.5 percent).

Nor is the book free of errors of a factual nature. Page 67 says that Austria and other EFTA countries and also Turkey have association agreements with the EEC. In fact such agreements have been concluded by the community with less developed Mediterranean countries--Turkey, Cyprus and Malta--but with the EFTA countries agreements were signed in 1972 on the creation of "industrial free trade zones". There were a number of distortions in the description of EEC institutions. Thus, contrary to the authors' assertions, the European Parliament does not have either the right to ratify international agreements (p 86) concluded by the European Communities Commission--they are ratified by

* See V.I. Lenin, "Complete Works," vol 36, p 171.

the EEC Council of Ministers--or the right "to nominate candidates for the European Communities Commission... according to its party composition" (p 89). They are nominated by the governments of the member states according to mutual consent.

As a whole, the book in question testifies to the authors' endeavor to creatively interpret the new phenomena in the development of the world capitalist economy, although certain of its chapters are of unequal value in this respect.

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1982 GDR YEARBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL POLITICS, ECONOMY REVIEWED

Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian No 11,
Nov 83 pp 135-136

[L. Sergeyev review: "GDR and USSR Scholars on the Modern World"]

[Text] The latest installment of the "Yearbook of International Politics and Economy. 1982,"* which is published jointly by the GDR Academy of State and Law Institute of International Relations and the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of World Economy and International Relations, is in its own way an anniversary installment. This is the 10th volume of a periodical publication which has gained extensive and steady popularity in the years of its existence not only among specialists of the GDR and the USSR and the entire socialist community but also in broad circles of the European and international scientific intelligentsia.

Central attention in the book's material is paid to the sharp exacerbation of the world political situation caused by the present Washington administration's policy of an unbridled arms race for the purpose of securing the United States' military superiority and of the deployment in realization of this policy of new American first-strike nuclear weapons in Europe.

On the other hand, a number of articles, including those by Sh. Dernberg, N. Inozemtsev, V. Zagladin and W. Henisch, thoroughly reveal on the basis of a great deal of factual material the powerful sweep of the movement of antiwar forces, which have set themselves the task of the preservation and consolidation of peace and European and international security. A central place in this plane is assigned the peace initiatives of the USSR and other socialist community countries, which have graphically demonstrated socialism's peace-making mission on our planet.

The course of events in states of the world socialist system is traced in great detail (Z. Kvilich), the results of fulfillment of the Comprehensive Program of Socialist Economic Integration in connection with the 10th anniversary of the adoption of this document are thoroughly analyzed (O. Chukanov) and the basic problems and prospects of East-West economic cooperation are examined (M. Maksimova).

* "Jahrbuch der Internationalen Politik und Wirtschaft. 1982," Staatsverlag der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, Berlin, 1982, 600 p.

R. Wuensche's article on the nonaligned movement, the strengthening of its anti-imperialist thrust and the development and intensification of relations and cooperation between the nonaligned states and the socialist countries is of considerable interest.

As in previous installments, the articles on general, problem subjects are supplemented by material with a "narrower" thrust, particularly country surveys communicating to the reader a great deal of thoroughly checked and variously evaluated documentary and other factual material.

A survey of the state of the world capitalist economy is contained in the article by L. Grigor'yev, who examined the crisis trends in the capitalist economy on the eve and at the outset of the 1980's and in particular detail in the period 1980-1981, when a sharp new exacerbation of the crisis of overproduction occurred in the majority of Western countries. The author paid considerable attention to the deterioration of the situation in the labor market, which has been expressed in a continuous "graduated" swelling of inflation: whereas at the end of the 1960's the number of unemployed in the OECD countries constituted 2.7 percent of those with jobs, in 1975 it amounted to 5.1 percent and in 1981 to 6.7 percent (pp 143-144). This increase, the article observes, was accompanied by the concentrated offensive of the monopolies and the bourgeois state against the rights and gains of the working people achieved in preceding years. Whence the general increase in social tension, the exacerbation of class conflicts and, consequently, the growth of general political instability in the capitalist countries.

A specific aspect of the economic situation in the capitalist world--the crisis of capitalism's currency-finance system--is examined in V. Shenayev's article. Together with the general deterioration in the economic situation, the author observes, the present cyclical crisis has had a negative influence on the state of the balance of payments of the majority of capitalist and, to an even greater extent, the developing countries in the orbit of the world capitalist economy. Whereas in 1979 the balance of payments deficit of these states (excluding the OPEC countries) constituted \$67 billion, in 1980 it amounted to \$132 billion (p 150). The budget deficit of the leading capitalist countries grew continuously--for the United States it doubled in the 1970's, for Great Britain it increased by a factor of 2.9 and for the FRG by a factor of 3.6. The budget deficits, the author believes, not only stimulated inflation but also increased the unevenness of its rise. A new devaluation of a number of currencies, particularly the West European currencies, and the growth of overall financial instability were the result (p 155).

Among the material devoted to individual regions, it is essential to distinguish the survey on West Europe written by J. Dankert and (V. Erzil). The authors consider a most important singularity of the situation in this part of the world the general exacerbation of the political situation under the influence of the strategy of confrontation with the socialist countries pursued by the Reagan administration. However, Washington's aggressive policy has encountered, albeit to an unequal extent, resistance in the countries of this region, particularly on the part of the strengthened antiwar movement.

At the same time, however, a general exacerbation of economic contradictions was observed in West Europe. Within the EEC framework here, the authors believe, it reached the highest level since this international grouping was created.

As far as the relations of the West European states with the socialist community countries are concerned, despite the negative trends in their development caused mainly by Washington's pressure on its NATO allies, West Europe's definite interest in a continuation of detente policy was, as the book shows, maintained.

Of the individual-country works, mention should be made primarily of the article on the United States written by O. Nikanorov and R. Entov. The authors reveal the process of the continuous intensification of socioeconomic contradictions under way in the country. Having examined the basic features of the activity of the present administration, they conclude that Reagan's reactionary domestic and aggressive foreign policies are leading the country along a dangerous path, complicating the solution of urgent national problems and increasing the danger of a world thermonuclear catastrophe.

The article by M. Mueller and (V. Shprete), "The United Nations and its Specialized Organizations," is of great interest. The authors have succeeded here in showing the increasing influence in the United Nations and, through it, on the entire international situation of the socialist and developing states and peace-loving public forces.

Although the policy of the United States and a number of other imperialist countries aimed at a deterioration in relations with the socialist world could not have failed to have complicated and has indeed complicated UN activity, it nonetheless has not prevented it occupying a constructive position on a number of issues. "The principles and goals of the UN Charter," the authors conclude, "afford the socialist states and all forces which aspire to peaceful and equal cooperation a solid basis for struggle for the continued increase in the efficacy of this organization" (p 555).

The short, but politically highly pertinent article of V. Tereshkova (pp 556-560) is devoted to the international democratic women's movement in connection with the UN Women's Decade. The author characterizes in detail the main actions of the international women's movement and draws the conclusion concerning its increased possibilities in the struggle for peace and social progress.

It should be mentioned that numerous readers of the "Yearbook" have repeatedly expressed the wish--at readers' conferences and in letters to the editorial board--for an appreciable increase in the information content of the publication and an expansion of its reference matter. The group of authors and the editorial board have met the public half-way. The volume in question puts the emphasis on the most specific exposition of facts possible and the comparability of data pertaining to different groups of countries, the material of the statistical tables is increased considerably and a highly detailed newsreel of international events is adduced. All this has considerably enhanced the scientific potential of the publication.

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REVIEW OF BOOK ON MILITARY ROLE IN SHAPING ISRAELI STATE POLICY

Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian No 11,
Nov 83 pp 137-138

[O. Kovtunovich review: "Israeli Militarism"]

[Text] The monograph in question* is devoted to an analysis of the army's place in the sociopolitical and economic life of Israel. The author has attempted on the basis of a large amount of factual material--the period from the end of the 19th century through the start of the 1980's is covered--to show the sources of Israeli militarism, the place of the armed forces in this "garrison state" and the influence exerted by the military on the development of the most important policy decisions of long-term consequences for the entire region. This subject has not been sufficiently fully illustrated in national scientific literature.

The book helps ascertain certain internal springs of the functioning of Israel's political mechanism and answers questions connected both with the particular features of the growth of the Arab-Israeli conflict into crisis stages and with the specific features of the development of the domestic political situation in Israel.

The author begins the study with the history of the emergence of Zionist armed bands in the period of colonial Palestine. Setting as their task the utmost increase in Jewish immigration to Palestine, the seizure of land belonging to the Arabs and a reduction in the numbers of the local Arab population, the Zionist leaders employed a set of military-political measures in which, in time, an increasingly large role was assigned forcible methods. There was also a constant increase in the role of the military formations among other sociopolitical institutions of the Jewish community in Palestine.

Even in this period the Zionist leadership's reliance on the strongest imperialist power at that time--Great Britain--was manifested distinctly. Intimidated by the scale of the national liberation movement of the Arab masses on the eve and at the outset of the 1930's, the British colonial

* I.D. Zvyagel'skaya, "Rol' voyennoy verkhushki v formirovanii gosudarstvennoy politiki Izrailya" [The Role of the Military Upper Stratum in the Formation of Israel's Official Policy], Moscow, Glavnaya redaktsiya vostochnoy literatury izdatel'stva "Nauka," 1982, 160 p.

authorities began supplying the Zionist military formations with weapons and assisting them in the training of personnel and the development of strategy and tactics, actively using them to put down the protests of the Arab people of Palestine.

Following the appearance of the UN resolution on the partition of Palestine (29 November 1947), the Zionist military groupings unleashed extensive military operations against the indigenous Arab population. These actions pursued the goal of ensuring the "uninational nature" of the future state, that is, expulsion of the Palestinian Arabs from the territory assigned the Jewish state by the UN resolution and expanding the borders of the latter to the maximum. It was the clash of the Zionists, who aspired to territorial expansion, with the Arab people of Palestine which laid the foundations of the conflict which continues to this day.

Thus the appearance back in the prestate period even of armed bands, which were the forerunners of the present-day Israeli army, was brought about by the aggressive goals of the Zionists, who attempted to realize them with the aid of military force. Israel "actually inherited a ready-made political structure with the high relative significance of the military element characteristic of it" (p 6).

The country's further history is basically one of aggression and expansionism against the neighboring Arab peoples. The militarist nature of Israeli policy predetermined the tremendous role of the military establishment in all spheres of state life and the closest interweaving of military and general state policy. Furthermore, the "depoliticization of the army," which was extensively publicized in Israel and about which many Western experts still write, in fact merely disguised the unfolding of a kind of "personal union" of the head of the government and representatives of the military command and individual political groups' monopolization of "security" problems.

The work's second chapter is devoted to an examination of the role of Israel's military elite in the formation of official policy in the Near East conflict. It shows what position was occupied by the generals, who took the part of the most extremist forces in the country's political leadership, in the eve of the growth of the conflict into crisis stages. Concerned to see the speediest start of military operations, they urged on the cabinet in every way possible to take the critical decision and frequently provoked the start of large-scale actions. Using defense ministry and its own channels, the military command played an important part in the development and strengthening of the coalition ties of the Zionist state and the imperialist powers.

Of course, the impact of the military on the shaping of Israel's political line in the conflict was not always identical--it weakened or strengthened depending on many external and internal factors. However, as the author rightly observes, it has always been present as a constituent element in the elaboration of the most important government decisions.

The position of military circles is undoubtedly also taken into consideration by the government in the shaping of its approaches to the problem of a political settlement of the Near East conflict. It is well known that the

Israeli leaders cleave to an expansionist course. The military upper stratum not only implements it but also in a certain sense contributes to an intensification of extremist sentiments. Thus, I. Zvyagel'skaya believes, on the occupied territories "the army, ensuring Israeli control and acting as the executor of official decisions, has come to determine to a considerable extent the content, means and methods of Israeli policy" (p 87). An important part was also played by representatives of the top brass during the separate negotiations between Israel and Egypt under the aegis of the United States, demanding of Sadat increasingly new "concessions" on questions of principle and attempting to make Egypt and other Arab states even more vulnerable from the military viewpoint.

The third chapter of the monograph, which analyzes the army's place in Israeli society as a whole--its ideological, political and economic functions--is of considerable interest. The author shows, inter alia, how military service contributes to indoctrinating by means of the army "machine" the immigrants to the country and their integration on a nationalist and chauvinist basis in accordance with the tenets of Zionism. A large place in the book is devoted to an examination of the mechanism of the military's participation in the elaboration of official decisions--the channels of influence on policy on the part of the officer corps are ascertained and the diversity of ties between the military and political elites are revealed. The reader can see for himself that under the conditions of Israeli reality the "road to the top" is open to the most aggressive, extremist elements, many of whom are directly or indirectly connected with the military organization.

The work also touches on problems concerning the particular features of the military-industrial complex in the country and analyzes American assistance to Israel, which supports the pursuit of its expansionist policy.

The book was written before the Israeli aggression in Lebanon, which eclipsed all previous crimes of the Zionists in its cruelty, which, however, does not detract from the relevance of the study. Familiarization with the analysis of the annexationist policy of Israel's ruling elite, in which important positions are occupied by the military upper stratum, enables us to regard this aggression as a new ominous episode being inserted in full in the already well-known picture of Zionist and imperialist designs in the Near East region.

At the same time the monograph in question is not without shortcomings. The approach of the Israeli military leaders to the struggle against the PLO, which predetermined the existence of special formations within the Israeli Army, is in need of more detailed illustration, we believe. It is obvious that more attention should have been paid to an examination of the content and evolution of Israel's military doctrines. In examining the problem of the impact of the military organizations on Israeli society as a whole the author has, unfortunately, practically left untouched its role in the shaping of public opinion in the country.

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BOOK ON JAPANESE SCIENTIFIC, TECHNICAL DEVELOPMENT REVIEWED

Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian No 11,
Nov 83 pp 144-146

[D. Kuzin review: "Japan's Scientific-Technical Development"]

[Text] What drives Japan's technology? What are the factors exerting a salutary influence on its development? Such are the questions raised in the book "Japanese Technology".*

Its author, Masanori Moritani, himself, after graduating from Tokyo University, attended a big school of engineering and organizing work at the shipyards of the Hitachi company; for 15 years he was senior researcher of the (Nomura) Institute and technology and R&D specialists.

A particular feature of the book in question is that it studies Japan's achievements in individual spheres of science and technology through the prism of the interaction of production engineering, organizational and managerial factors. The "social engineering" concept, which takes account primarily of Japan's historical and cultural traditions and makes it possible to compare the conditions, environment and factors influencing the development of technology in different industrially developed countries, is made the basis of the analysis here.

We would note right away, however, that despite all the importance of the socio-psychological and historico-cultural factors, they alone may hardly serve as the basis of an explanation of Japan's successes in scientific-technical development. Of course, the efficiency of the Japanese system of management is achieved largely thanks to the skillful use of national singularities and traditions. However, for a more in-depth explanation of Japan's achievements in the sphere of advanced technology consideration of a far broader number of factors, primarily of a technico-economic nature, is needed.

* Masanori Moritani, "Japanese Technology. Getting the Best for the Least," Tokyo, The Simul Press, Inc., 1982, 237 p.

The economic results achieved by Japan are obvious: the creation of strong economic and scientific-technical potential, the high level and rate of growth of labor productivity, the competitiveness of Japanese goods, the introduction in mass production of progressive scientific-technical experience, the relatively low level of unemployment compared with other capitalist countries and others.

Today Japan, as the author claims, is on the way toward a new stage of innovations. A most interesting and unique aspect thereof is the prevalence and penetration of new technology, particularly information and electronic technology, in all sectors of industry and various spheres of public life. Japan's advantages are being reflected not only in specific spheres of technology but also in a capacity for rapid commercial assimilation of new products and their introduction to the market. The 1980's will be years of the popularization of technical innovations and the incomparable expansion of the potential of the use of such facilities as minicomputers, robots and so forth (pp VIII, 12).

A particular place in the book is occupied by an analysis of the reasons for the successes of Japanese goods and their popularity and competitiveness. Distinguishing as being among the key factors such factors as the Japanese tradition toward miniaturization, compactness and precision products and as the increasing integration in the products of various components and processes and the extensive use of subcontractors for their manufacture, the author puts in third place what is, we believe, the most interesting factor--the priority nature of production--which is manifested in Japan to a considerably greater extent than in the United States and West Europe (pp 28-42). By this is meant the close connection of all stages of the "science--production" cycle and the rapid buildup of mass series production, which is achieved thanks to the original orientation of R&D toward production, the rapid increase in investments in equipment and the standardization of individual stages of the science-production cycle. Considerable significance is also attached to the strong position of the production subdivisions in Japanese firms and the work in them of the majority of company engineers and research assistants (up to 90 percent). For this reason such subdivisions have, as the author writes, a "strong voice" in the discussion of problems of the development and designing of new products, and many ideas emanate precisely from there. Furthermore, meetings and discussions of representatives of various company departments and services and also clients, which make it possible to ascertain and solve many problems, are practiced extensively (pp 43-45).

At the same time, while speaking of the well-adjusted horizontal formal and informal relations in the firms and the flexibility of Japanese engineers and technicians in respect of the work they do the author passes over in silence the question of the fact that the personnel in the companies is split into definite categories, each of which has its own status and clearly designated privileges; for this reason insurmountable barriers exist between the groups vertically. Furthermore, he fails to show the nature of the informal relations of the workers aimed at expanding the sphere of influence of capitalist management and identification of the individual with the company.

An important singularity of the Japanese system of management is, as the book observes, not simply the priority of production but also the elite nature of this component. This is expressed in the fact that Japan's higher educational institutions specially train engineers and technicians for such work, that more than half the graduates are appointed to production and marketing departments and, finally, that this is far more prestigious work than in the United States and West Europe. Even in respect of managers in Japan, particularly in the major companies, people who have passed through all stages of the employee hierarchy, many beginning at the production level, are promoted to these positions, in the main. Furthermore, approximately 40 percent of industrial company presidents have technical education (pp 77-78).

While speaking of the reasons for the successes of Japanese technology the author nonetheless practically fails to examine such factors as the relatively low level of military spending and the orientation of the majority of research toward social and civilian needs connected with this; the actively pursued policy of state-monopoly regulation of the economy; the accelerated development of the production sphere given a considerable lagging of the infrastructure; and others.

A big place in the book is occupied by questions of the quality of Japanese goods, the lowering of production costs and the organization of labor at the enterprises. So-called quality-control groups have been in existence in Japan since 1950; currently there are approximately 100,000 such groups, and the number of people enlisted in them has passed the 1-million mark. This system is employed extensively not only in industrial firms but also in banks, the services sphere and so forth. And, furthermore, it is not just a matter of control: work is performed in the group constantly on improving the product, analyzing labor input and productivity and so forth. Thus Japan is successfully using the "in-built quality" concept, a result of the use of which is the comparatively negligible number of defects at stages of the creation of the product. For example, to gauge the magnitude of defective work the indicator of a unit per 1 million items is currently employed in Japan, whereas in the United States only per 100 commodities (pp 56-57).

Currently many leading Japanese firms regard ensuring and maintaining a high level of quality of the manufactured product as a principal goal of their entire activity, and the author rightly observes that many tasks of intrafirm management are subordinated to this. The creation of quality-control systems begins with the designing and ends with the shipment of the goods to the consumer, and the entire personnel participates here. A considerable part in ensuring product quality is also played by the stiff competition between firms and also the need for strict consideration of the requirements of the customer and the after-sale servicing of individual categories of goods.

It is indisputable that by means of the functioning of various quality-control systems Japanese firms have succeeded in achieving significant results, but nor should it be forgotten that the "quality-control groups" are also a concealed form of exploitation of the workers and employees; work in these "groups" lengthens the work day, while stimulation depends directly on the results of the work in them of the employees.

Speaking of the problems of the development of Japanese technology and the transition from the use of and an improvement in technology which has already been created in the West to the creation of its own advanced technology, particularly in the spheres in which Japan is lagging (power engineering, chemistry, industrial engineering and others), the author does not agree with the assertions of certain American specialists that the Japanese have lost the capacity for novelties and innovation. He believes that Japan now has no other way out than the creation of its own technology and that the Japanese people, the book observes, will further display their talent (p 19). At the same time M. Moritani understands that the creation of its own technology poses a number of difficult problems. He distinguishes particularly fundamental research in the spheres which will be of significance at the turn of the century and which demand absolutely fresh and original ideas and which are also subject to risk and uncertainty. Japan, he believes, has for too long played the part of the "gifted student," to whom his own road has now been opened (p 78). The author is somewhat concerned by the, in his opinion, undue showiness of Japan's achievements, which conceal real difficulties of the country's technical development.

We would note in this connection that the number of problems which currently confront Japanese industry and the development of its scientific-technical potential is far more than that which the Japanese specialist writes about. The gradually growing unemployment and exacerbation of the problem of employment, the militarization of the economy, the shortage of individual categories of skilled workers, the uncertainty of the social consequences of robotization, the shortage of raw material, water, land--all these cannot fail to be reflected in the prospects of Japanese technology.

The wealth of factual material, the originality of its exposition, examples from the practice of Japanese companies, a vast bibliography grouped by country and the multi-aspectual nature of the examination of the questions of modern technology--such are the positive aspects of the study in question. Given its critical interpretation, it could be of considerable interest to a broad circle of specialists.

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CSO: 1816/3

BOOK ON PRC ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT PROBLEMS REVIEWED

Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian No 11,
Nov 83 pp 146-147

[B. Borodin review: "Problems of Economic Building in the PRC"]

[Text] The author of the book in question* has set himself the task of providing a comprehensive description of the PRC national economy and the production-technical level and prospects of further development of its main sectors. The present state of the economy is shown here against the background of the legacy obtained by the country from the past; the national economy is examined in the process of its evolution.

As the work observes, China's experience convincingly confirms F. Engels' pronouncement that "the effect of state power on economic development could be of a threefold nature. It may operate in the same direction--development then proceeds more quickly; it may operate against economic development--then at the present time it fails after a certain interval of time in every big people; or it may erect barriers to economic development in certain areas and push it into other areas." "It is clear, however," F. Engels concludes, "that in the second and third cases political power can cause economic development the greatest harm and may bring about a waste of forces and material in a mass quantity."**

G. Ganshin observes that each time that the CCP Central Committee and PRC Government have been guided in their decisions and actions by truly socialist goals and principles, the successes have been obvious and steady. And, on the contrary, when a policy has been pursued which has run counter to the above-mentioned principles, major mistakes and failures which have cost the Chinese people dear have been inevitable (p 66).

After the death of Mao Zedong in 1976, China was forced to recognize the groundlessness of many of his precepts and the mistakes and failures which had hit the Chinese economy in preceding years. The new PRC leadership adopted a number of measures to overcome the economic chaos, the production slump and the disorganization of the economic mechanism.

* G.A. Ganshin, "Ocherk ekonomiki sovremennogo Kitaya" [Outline of the Economy of Present-Day China], Moscow, Izdatel'stvo "Mysl'," 1982, 316 p.

** K. Marx and F. Engels, "Works," vol 37, p 417.

Beijing's new line was embodied in the "four modernizations" program, which provided for the modernization of industry, agriculture, defense and science and technology. The first stage in the realization of this program was to have been fulfillment of a 10-year plan of the development of the national economy, the "basic provisions" of which were adopted in 1978. But it soon transpired that the plan's indicators were unjustifiably overstated. Accomplishment of the latest "great leap forward" had to be abandoned. Instead, a policy of the "regulation, transformation, streamlining and rise in the level of the national economy" calculated originally for 3 years, but subsequently extended by several years was approved in 1979.

As the author observes, a more realistic approach to questions of the economy came to be displayed in the course of the "regulation". Sober considerations were expressed concerning the need for a correct consideration of the PRC's specific conditions, the objective laws of development and so forth. After a number of years of a race for the fastest growth of production at any price, such concepts as product quality, efficiency, labor productivity and material incentive came to be reintroduced to China's economic life. The industrial output growth rate was lowered and capital construction reduced for the purpose of leveling the sectorial structure of industry and implementing scheduled experiments in the economic management system.

A number of new trends of a fundamental nature was observed in the economic policy of the Chinese leadership within the "regulation" policy framework on the eve and at the outset of the 1980's. The main one consists of the relatively extensive admittance of various forms of private enterprise in almost all sectors of the economy--industry, agriculture, trade and services. The further decentralization of economic management and a resuscitation of market relations are closely linked with this trend. The growth of property differentiation in Chinese society is an inevitable consequence of this trend in the socioeconomic plane.

The book examines in detail questions of the PRC's economic system, problems of the development of industry, agriculture and transport, the financial system, questions of the material and cultural living standard of the country's population and China's foreign economic relations.

The author adduces data to the effect that, as a whole, in terms of the volume of industrial production China has moved into seventh place in the world after the United States, the USSR, Japan, the FRG, Britain and France. The PRC occupies second place in world coal production, fifth place in steel smelting, seventh place in power generation and so forth. However, in such a most important indicator as industrial output per capita it lags behind the industrially developed states considerably. Thus in power generation per capita it lags behind the USSR and Japan by a factor of roughly 17 and behind the United States by a factor of 40 and in steel smelting it lags behind the USSR and the United States by a factor of 16 and behind Japan by a factor of more than 27 (p 101). Since 1957 the increase in the cereals harvest in the PRC has not outpaced population growth, as a result the amount of grain per capita remains at the 1957 level (p 104). In terms of a most important summary indicator--national income per capita--the PRC is in 125th place in the world (p 9).

The book analyzes the demographic problem, which in the present situation is complicating the accomplishment of national economic tasks, and illustrates many other pressing questions of present-day China's economic development.

Concerning the debate under way in China on problems of the building of socialism, the author notes certain "healthy discussions on possible ways out of the blind alley for the national economy" (p 312). At the same time evident from these discussions is an endeavor to prove that under present conditions the best economic structure for China would be one in which different forms of the economy based on both public and private ownership of the means of production would get along together, and for an indefinite time, moreover. The supporters of this viewpoint claim that the optimum path capable of securing China's successful socialist development should be a combination of the centralized state system and elements of market regulation. As life shows, however, attempts at such regulation are engendering new problems and difficulties.

The work adduces a large amount of factual material testifying that the PRC's expansion of economic relations with the world capitalist economy is occurring in forms which could have negative socioeconomic consequences for the country.

The book is permeated by the thought that only socialism and the restoration of cooperation and friendship with the countries of the world socialist system would permit China to successfully solve the vitally important problems of socioeconomic development, overcome the age-old backwardness and become an impressive factor of peace and social progress.

The monograph of the Soviet economist makes an undoubted contribution to the study of present-day China.

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CSO: 1816/3

BOOK ON LEGAL ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION REVIEWED

Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian No 11,
Nov 83 pp 148-149

[Ye. Yakovleva review: "Important Factor of Economic Cooperation"]

[Text] The last two decades have been marked by the rapid growth of international cooperation in the sphere of investments, science and technology, production and marketing. It has become an important factor of economic relations between different groups of countries and is acquiring increasing significance in the development of their economies. Many works have already been devoted to a study of this relatively new subject in Soviet scientific literature. Hitherto, however, the main attention of the specialists has been concentrated on the economic aspects of international scientific-technical and production cooperation. Until now its legal singularities were outlined only in the most general form. Yet an analysis thereof is not only of independent interest but is also extremely important from the standpoints of practically urgent organizational and economic tasks. It is also necessary to take account of the fact that this cooperation itself is in a process of growth constantly engendering new problems. The conditions of the realization of economic relations between socialist and capitalist countries have also changed considerably in recent years.

The book in question* addresses pertinent questions of the legal support of international economic cooperation (its most expedient legal forms, the terms of contracts, obligations and responsibility of the parties, legal protection and use the results of cooperation and others). The authors analyze in detail aspects of cooperation between socialist countries and between socialist developed capitalist states and problems of tripartite industrial cooperation.

The first part of the monograph defines the concept of cooperation relations and examines their most common forms. The second and third parts are devoted to legal questions of the scientific-technical and production cooperation of the above-mentioned groups of states.

The experience of all the CEMA countries was the basis for the study. The authors have paid the main attention to the practice of the USSR, which makes

* "Mezhdunarodnaya nauchno-tekhnicheskaya i proizvodstvennaya kooperatsiya (pravovyye aspekty)" [International Scientific-Technical and Production Cooperation (Legal Aspects)], Exec. ed. M.M. Boguslavskiy, Moscow, Izdatel'stvo "Nauka," 1982, 303 p.

the work particularly interesting for the Soviet reader not only in the scientific-theoretical but also in the applied plane. The work contains sections specially devoted to relations between Soviet organizations during the performance of R&D and at the time of international production cooperation. Such a thorough analysis of the problems arising in the intrastate sphere in connection with international cooperation is made in national literature for the first time. Questions connected with the introduction of new forms of scientific-technical and production cooperation are studied with the enlistment of the experience of Hungary, Romania and certain other socialist countries.

Of the entire complex set of legal aspects of international cooperation the authors pay special attention to the problems characteristic of the so-called microeconomic level, which, under the conditions of international cooperation in the scientific-technical and production spheres, is represented by the immediate participants in the cooperation relations. These questions have as yet been insufficiently illustrated in national legal and economic literature. The book notes the progress achieved by the socialist countries in the closer interaction of industrial and foreign trade enterprises and establishments in the cooperation process. At the same time the authors' conclusion that many organizational-economic complexities arise, as before, owing to the nonconformity of the immediate executants of cooperation operations and the participants in the signing of the agreement on them merits attention.

The conclusion of a large number of contracts signed both at the interstate level and within a country is promoting cooperation relations. Examining the contract system of cooperation agreements, the experts proceed primarily from the fact that all the agreements, the experts proceed primarily from the fact that all the agreements and contracts in respect of the subject of cooperation should be closely interconnected. The contract of international cooperation, which, as the book observes, is a new, independent type of agreement with clearly expressed specific features, is analyzed in the most detail.

The book in question is distinguished by the thoroughness of the analysis and breadth and sharpness of the questions raised. The authors not only demonstrate the positive results of cooperation but also are not afraid to show its difficulties, believing correctly that without an analysis of their causes and possible ways of surmounting them being found, subsequent steps in the development of interstate economic relations cannot be taken.

The novelty and multilevel nature of the subject illustrated in the monograph evidently prevented the authors from analyzing the entire list of problems caused by the development of international scientific-technical and production cooperation. Nonetheless, it would seem, there should have been at least a mention of the existence or, what would have been better, a portrayal in at least general outline of the particular features of cooperation between developed capitalist countries, developing and capitalist countries, between the socialist and young emergent states and between the latter directly. The relations emerging here are an organic component of present-day international economic cooperation. Furthermore, the first two streams took shape historically before those examined in the book and could to a certain extent serve as the prototype of the solution of certain organizational-technical questions. The latter two

types of relations, on the other hand, are taking shape and strengthening, and consideration of the accumulated experience of cooperation mutual relations between socialist partners and also along East-West lines would undoubtedly be useful here.

Sometimes the authors display an inclination to solve a number of problems by proceeding from current conditions of the realization of scientific-technical and production cooperation. It would be more expedient, we believe, to analyze the prospects and possible directions of its development in the sphere of the formulation of recommendations for the future.

It is also difficult to agree with the proposition that the division of production between enterprises of the partner-countries, that is, specialization in pure form, cannot always be regarded as a form of cooperation (p 261). From the viewpoint of labor such division must obviously be regarded as cooperation since it presupposes a subsequent exchange of products. In this case it is a question of cooperation of labor based not on its component or production engineering division but on division at sector or intrasector level.

The above observations do not, however, detract from the significance of the book in question; it will undoubtedly contribute to the further development of important and pertinent questions of international industrial cooperation.

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