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Worldwide Report

ARMS CONTROL

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29 August 1985

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GENERAL

GORBACHEV GREETINGS TO SCANDINAVIAN FORUM

LD091506 Moscow TASS in English 1501 GMT 9 Aug 85

[Text] Oslo, August 9 TASS -- Tens of thousands of people today filled the bowl of the Holmenkollensports complex to reaffirm their resolve to work for peace and disarmament and to demand from states and governments the immediate implementation of the idea of establishing nuclear weapon-free zones.

Participants in the rally enthusiastically responded to a message of greetings of M.S. Gorbachev, the general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, which reads:

"Esteemed participants in the meeting in Holmenkollen,

I welcome your striving to contribute to the joint efforts of all peoples aimed at terminating the arms race that is sweeping the world and at averting the threat of nuclear war. We fully share your preoccupation with the existing complex international situation.

The Soviet Union solidarizes with the slogans advanced by you: 'No to Nuclear Weapons!' 'For a Nuclear-Free North!', 'For a World Without Weapons and Wars!'.

Our country follows the course of peace and peaceful coexistence, doing everything that depends on it to ensure the security of peoples, to uphold their sacred right to life and peaceful constructive labor. The Soviet foreign policy is completely subordinated to these noble aims.

That is precisely why we resolutely come out in favor of terminating the arms race on earth and preventing it in space, freezing nuclear arsenals, terminating the testing of nuclear weapons and in the final analysis prohibiting and eliminating them, in favor of general and complete disarmament.

However, the threat of nuclear war remains real and that is why it is the imperative need of today to intensify in every way the struggle against nuclear threat, and further to promote cooperation of different social and political forces based on good will in the name of peace.

The attention of your forum is centered on the demand of establishing a nuclear-free zone in the north of Europe. The realization of that demand could become a major step toward ensuring the security of the peoples of your countries and ridding the European Continent of nuclear weapons. As is known, the Soviet Union supports this idea and for its part is prepared to take specific steps in order to translate it into reality.

I wish the participants in the meeting, the entire peace loving public of the countries of northern Europe big successes in their noble efforts in the name of safeguarding world peace."

Numerous envoys of public, political and youth organizations and trade unions, statesmen, and many ordinary people, young and old, members of the numerous detachment of the activists of the peace movement of the Nordic countries, arrived in the Norwegian capital to attend a peace festival.

Posters with the key slogans of the festival -- "Nordic Europe Must be a Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone" and "No To Another Hiroshima" -- were carried by participants in a peace march from the Frogner Stadium through the entire city to Holmenkollen. They chanted, "No to Missiles!" and "Treaty now!"

The festival in Holmenkollen was the final of the wide-ranging events in the framework of a year-long campaign in northern Europe for proclaiming that region a nuclear-free zone.

CSO: 5200/1355

29 August 1985

GENERAL

GORBACHEV REPLY TO ANTI-NUCLEAR JAPANESE GROUP

LD051003 Moscow TASS in English 0949 GMT 5 Aug 85

[Text] Moscow, August 5 TASS -- Follows the full text of the reply by the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Mikhail Gorbachev to a message from the Japanese Council of Organisations of victims of atomic bombings:

"Dear Madam Ito,

I was deeply moved by your letter.

I deeply sympathise with the grief and terrible sufferings that fell to the lot of the victims of the barbarous American atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

I fully share your ardent desire to prevent the tragedy of Hiroshima and Nagasaki from ever being repeated anywhere in the world so that there would be no new victims of nuclear arms on our planet.

The Soviet Union persistently presses for the liquidation of nuclear arms from the moment of their origination. It was already in 1946 that my country proposed to conclude an international convention on the prohibition of atomic arms but the implementation of this proposal was blocked by the United States.

And today, too, we encounter on the part of the West an absence of readiness to achieve a complete prohibition and liquidation of nuclear arms, thus confronting us with the need to search for possible intermediate solutions of this paramount task.

The USSR is actively campaigning for the elimination of nuclear weapons at present as well. We are prepared to start nuclear disarmament at any time in case of an agreement with other nuclear powers. The USSR is holding talks with the United States in Geneva so as not to launch an arms race in outer space, terminate it on earth and start drastic cuts in nuclear armaments down to their total elimination. The posture of the American side at these talks, however, blocks the reaching of an accord.

The Soviet Union will not start nuclear war, it assumed the pledge not to be the first to use nuclear weapons. If all the nuclear powers made the same step, favourable conditions would be created for concluding an international treaty banning the use of nuclear weapons.

Our new peace initiative -- the decision to stop unilaterally any nuclear explosions starting from August 6 this year, the day of the Hiroshima tragedy, is directed at ending the dangerous competition in building up nuclear arsenals. Our moratorium will hold until January 1, 1986, but it will remain in effect as long as the United States, on its part, refrains from conducting nuclear blasts.

The resolute approval and broad support with which this initiative was met by world public opinion confirm that it meets the aspirations and hopes of all the peoples. Now it is the turn of the U.S., as well as other countries possessing nuclear weapons, to put an end to their nuclear explosions too. It would be not only a tribute to the memory of victims of the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, but also a real contribution to the consolidation of strategic stability and peace on earth. In this way favourable conditions would be created for concluding an international treaty on complete and universal banning of nuclear weapons tests.

Our country understands the striving of many countries to create nuclear-free zones in various parts of the globe. We support the creation of such zones, for example, in northern Europe, in the Balkan peninsula, in South-East Asia, in Africa. The efforts of South Pacific states aimed at creating a nuclear-free zone in that region deserve approval.

On the eve of the 40th anniversary of the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, it is particularly urgent that nobody should contravene Japan's non-nuclear status enshrined in the "Three Non-Nuclear Principles," which, as we understand, are an expression of the will of the mass of the Japanese people. The Soviet Union honours these principles. It is important that others should also do so -- not by word, but by concrete deeds.

Yet, we cannot disregard the growing attempts at turning Japan into a U.S. nuclear base, at increasing its military role both in the system of the alliance with the USA, and in the present-day world in general. Such attempts are fraught with a sharpening of tensions in the Far East and in the Asian-Pacific region. Apparently, not all people have yet drawn the proper conclusions from the lessons of the Second World War, from the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

The Soviet people, who lost 20 million lives during the Second World War, is fully resolved to prevent a nuclear catastrophe. The tragedy of Hiroshima and Nagasaki is broadly known in our country. The Soviet people solidarize with the anti-war, anti-nuclear movement in Japan and in other countries, that favour complete and ultimate elimination of the nuclear threat all over the world. This movement will be the stronger, the broader the composition of its participants and the more rallied its ranks.

I wish the Japanese Council of Organisations of victims of atomic bombings, all of its members very success in the struggle for preventing nuclear war, for prohibiting and scrapping nuclear weapons.

Yours respectfully, M. Gorbachev".

[Moscow TASS in English at 1016 GMT on 5 August transmits a service message adding the following passage to the end of the referent item: "Co-Chairman of the Japanese Council of Organisations of victims of Atomic Bombings Sakae Ito in a letter to Mikhail Gorbachev notes the importance and urgency of the prohibition of nuclear weapons and urges the Soviet Union to press for the removal of the nuclear threat."]

GENERAL

SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTER MEETS COUNTERPARTS AT CSCE MEETING

Talks With Shultz

LD311854 Moscow TASS in English 1850 GMT 31 Jul 85

[Text] Helsinki July 31 TASS -- The USSR's Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze today held a conversation with U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz.

The sides had a thorough exchange of views on issues of Soviet-American relations and topical international problems. The discussion was first of all concerned with the forthcoming meeting between General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Mikhail Gorbachev and U.S. President Ronald Reagan.

The Soviet side stressed the need for practical steps towards a turn for the better in Soviet-American relations, improving the international situation on the whole. Correspondingly, the efforts by the sides, the preparations for the summit meeting should be focused primarily on security issues, concentrated on the search for effective solutions to the problems connected with the reduction and ultimately elimination of the nuclear threat. Of priority significance in this connection is prevention of an arms race in outer space and putting an end to it on earth.

Eduard Shevardnadze pointed out the incompatibility with that task of actions leading to heightening tensions, increasing the level of military confrontation, spreading military rivalries to new fields, and also inadmissibility of interference in the internal affairs of other countries. It was pointed out that at this crucial juncture a manifestation of maximum restraint in the field of security and in international relations in general is necessary.

The Soviet side stressed the exceptional significance of the USSR's new initiative -- the decision to impose a moratorium on nuclear blasts, which would remain in force also after January 1, 1986, provided the USA also refrains from conducting nuclear blasts.

It was stated that, in the opinion of the Soviet leadership, the forthcoming summit meeting and the preparations for it can and must, given the reciprocal readiness of the American side for this, give an impulse to the development of relations between the USSR and the United States on the basis of equality, non-interference and mutual account of each other's lawful interests.

The big importance of the meeting of the leaders of the two countries and the need of constructive preparations for it was also stressed from the American side. At the same time it did not follow from the remarks of the secretary of state on a number of questions that the American side is correcting in a due way its policy and its concrete positions, especially in what concerns the removal of obstacles standing in the way of the limitation and reduction of armaments and a genuine normalisation of the situation in the world.

On the whole the discussion was described by both sides as useful, frank and necessary. It was agreed that the exchange of views shall be continued through diplomatic channels and at the meeting of the ministers during the forthcoming session of the United Nations General Assembly.

Talks With France's Dumas

LD311331 Moscow TASS in English 1321 GMT 31 Jul 85

[Text] Helsinki, July 31 TASS -- Member of the Political Bureau of the CPSU Central Committee, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR Eduard Shevardnadze had a conversation today with the French Minister of External Affairs Roland Dumas.

Special attention was paid to questions connected with the forthcoming visit to France by the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Mikhail Gorbachev. Both sides proceed from the premise that this visit is called upon to impart a new impulse to the development of Soviet-French relations in the political and other fields, enhance the growth of understanding between the USSR and France on the main international problems.

Eduard Shevardnadze stressed the importance of the Soviet decision to introduce a unilateral moratorium on any nuclear explosions, noting that it serves as a good example for the United States and other countries possessing nuclear arms.

Views were also exchanged on questions related to the work of the meeting in Helsinki of representatives of countries that took part in the European conference on security and cooperation. The sides expressed their intention further to press for strengthening the mainstays of European peace, for preserving and consolidating all the positive that had been brought by the policy of detente.

LD011619 Moscow TASS in English 1609 GMT 1 Aug 85

[Text] Helsinki, August 1 TASS -- The USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs Edward Shevardnadze had a meeting with Deputy Federal Chancellor, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the FRG Hans-Dietrich Genscher.

During their conversation the ministers noted the immutable importance of the August 12, 1970 treaty between the USSR and the FRG, which serves as the basis for the development of bilateral relations and serves the cause of strengthening peace and security in Europe.

Edward Shevardnadze outlined the Soviet Union's principled approach to the tasks of improving the situation in the world, ending the arms race, averting nuclear war and stressed that a termination of nuclear explosions -- a practical positive response to the new major initiative of the USSR -- would be an important contribution to the cause of strengthening peace. He expressed concern at the FRG government's line of giving actual support to the United States plans of spreading the arms race to outer space.

Hans-Dietrich Genscher said his country was interested in ensuring strategic stability at a lower level of armaments and in an improvement of relations between the West and the East.

Noting the usefulness of the political dialogue conducted within the framework of the present meeting of representatives of the participatory countries in the European Conference on Security and Cooperation, both sides confirmed their intent to facilitate the development of the all-European process in accordance with the Helsinki Final Act.

Britain's Howe

LD011537 Moscow TASS in English 1438 GMT 1 Jul 85

[Text] Helsinki, August 1 TASS -- USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs Edward Shevardnadze had a meeting with the British Secretary for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs Geoffrey Howe.

Questions of the state and prospects of development of Soviet-British relations in the political, trade, economic and other fields were discussed in their general aspect during the conversation that passed in a businesslike atmosphere.

Edward Shevardnadze stressed the exceptional importance of the Soviet Union's new peace-loving step -- the decision to unilaterally stop any nuclear blasts starting with this August 6, and expressed hope that other nuclear powers, too, would positively respond to this initiative and stop their nuclear blasts.

The British minister's attention was drawn to the Soviet peace initiatives directed at averting the danger of nuclear war, limiting the arms race and returning to the relaxation of international tension. In this connection special emphasis was made on the importance to adopt urgent measures to prevent a militarization of outer space.

Both sides noted the need of further developing the all-European process started ten years ago in Helsinki as meeting the interests of peace and the security of peoples, serving extensive mutually advantageous cooperation on the European continent.

LD011607 Moscow TASS in English 1525 GMT 1 Aug 85

[Text] Helsinki, August 1 TASS -- The USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs Eduard Shevardnadze today had a meeting with Canada's Foreign Minister Charles Joseph Clark. They discussed questions of Soviet-Canadian relations and also some topical problems of the international situation.

E. Shevardnadze stressed the need of liquidating the dangerous tension in the world and the importance of every country making a constructive contribution to the fulfillment of this task. The Canadian minister's attention was drawn to the USSR's major initiatives directed at preventing an arms race in outer space and stopping it on earth, at radically improving the international climate.

Both sides confirmed their striving to expand relations between the two countries on the basis of the possibilities that exist for this in various fields. The importance of the ongoing developing of the all-European process in the interests of strengthening peace in Europe and in the whole world was noted.

Meets Italy's Andreotti

OW010155 Moscow Television Service in Russian 0010 GMT 1 Aug 85

[Text] A meeting has taken place in Helsinki between Comrade Shevardnadze and the Italian Foreign Minister, Andreotti. During the conversation the sides confirmed their adherence to the accords reached at the recent talks between Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev and Craxi, the chairman of the Italian Council of Ministers, in Moscow on promoting the preservation and further development of the all-European process and on lowering the level of nuclear confrontation in Europe and the world as a whole.

Guided by these aims, Comrade Shevardnadze noted, the Soviet Union occupies a constructive position at the Soviet-U.S. and other talks on major problems of disarmament and strengthening of international security. New proof of this was the USSR's initiative to unilaterally halt nuclear blasts from 6 August this year.

Having expressed satisfaction with the active nature of the Soviet-Italian political dialogue, the ministers spoke in favor of further intensification of cooperation between the USSR and Italy, in the interests of both countries and to the benefit of peace and peoples' security.

CSO: 5200/1356

GENERAL

USSR'S BOVIN VIEWS ARMS ISSUES IN SUMMIT CONTEXT

PM121011 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 11 Aug 85 Morning Edition pp 4-5

[A. Bovin "Political Observer's Opinion": "On the Distant Approaches to Geneva"]

[Excerpts] There is still quite some time left before the forthcoming Soviet-U.S. summit meeting in Geneva, but journalists are always in a hurry to take a look at tomorrow or even the day after tomorrow. Many views are being voiced about the influence the November meeting will have on the state of relations between the USSR and the United States and therefore on the course of world politics as a whole. Of course, any views on this subject are hypothetical. The fundamental possibility of unexpected turns and various surprises obliges them to display caution.

However, there is no doubt that the very fact of acquaintance, personal contacts, and the exchange of opinions is of positive significance. They could create the preconditions for changing the atmosphere of subsequent political exchanges, but they could also fail to do so. The point here is not the "quality" of preparation. Both Moscow and, I believe, Washington are preparing most carefully for the meeting. The point here is the existence (or absence) of the political will to go halfway to meet each other and to outline possible compromises.

Is Washington ready for this? I should very much like to hope so. But unfortunately the Americans are still behaving in a way that does not leave much room for hope.

The USSR has unilaterally halted nuclear explosions. We suggested that the United States join the moratorium and make it bilateral. Of course, in the context of all the problems of disarmament this is a partial solution. But it is a specific one. It is verifiable. It creates conditions for enhancing mutual trust and advancing toward new, broader, goals. But what has happened? The Americans have adopted all-around defense. They do not want to halt nuclear weapons tests. I fear that the categorical rejection of that minimal consensus which is possible today, right now, is not the best way of preparing for the Geneva meeting.

Washington politicians can sympathize with anyone they like; in the past there have been Chiang Kai-shek and Syngman Rhee, Franco and Salazar, Batista and Somoza, and now Pinochet, Savimbi, the "contras," and so forth. But the United States has no right to arm and train killers and bandits and interfere in sovereign states' affairs. Any attempts to arrogate this right and to don the uniform of international gendarme cannot but meet with resolute opposition from the Soviet Union. This is worth thinking about on the eve of Geneva, if there is a desire not to leave empty-handed.

I repeat, we want to negotiate and reach an agreement. We are seeking to understand America's interests and concerns. But we have the right to count on reciprocity. We also have our interests and concerns. And one gets the impression that Washington is inclined to forget that.

And one more important factor. When one reads some foreign articles it is as though all Soviet foreign policy were focused on Soviet-U.S. relations. This is a long way from the true state of affairs. Naturally, we are fully aware of the importance of relations between the USSR and the United States for our two countries and for the international community as a whole. But the Soviet Union's foreign policy interests encompass an incomparably broader range of problems and perspectives.

First of all, mention should be made of European problems and European perspectives. The Geneva meeting will be preceded by a visit to Paris. The thrust of our European policy is the continuation of the Helsinki process. There have been many difficulties and there are many difficulties, but in Europe factors of peace and cooperation undoubtedly outweigh factors of war and confrontation. This was shown by the jubilee meeting of foreign ministers in the Finnish capital.

Speaking in Helsinki, French External Relations Minister R. Dumas said: "Europe cannot give a monopoly on the discussion of questions of its security to the two superpowers, however influential and desirable meetings between them may be." The minister was right. The voice of Europe advocating security -- that is, disarmament -- must be heard more loudly.

In Vienna and in Stockholm there are opportunities for emerging from the impasse and finding mutually acceptable solutions. What is preventing this? I shall not give a full list of the obstacles but shall highlight just one: the delaying influence of forces outside Europe. This comment is by no means aimed at causing the United States and West Europe to quarrel, as the Soviet Union is often suspected of doing.

No, we do not want to cause allies to quarrel (indeed, they are quarreling even without our assistance). We want our European neighbors to use their transatlantic influence to, so to speak, improve the political culture of their ally across the ocean. After all, the latter, who regards Europe as a possible theater of military operations, is jeopardizing Europe's existence.

In general the continuation of the Helsinki process demands the intensification of Europe's constructive, stabilizing role in world politics and East-West relations.

On the other hand, if Geneva does not become a turning point in the development of Soviet-U.S. relations, that will mean the difficulties will remain on the path of the resurrection of detente, on the path of disarmament, and that a period fraught with crisis situations will continue. But the world political process is multifaceted. And positive changes in other avenues of Soviet foreign policy, the intensification of European cooperation, the growth of political stability in Asia, and the development of the Soviet Union's mutually advantageous relations with the states of all continents will sooner or later also help to return Soviet-U.S. relations to their normal channel. Of course, we prefer a more direct, quicker path. For that, we agreed to Geneva. But not everything depends on us.

GENERAL

SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTER ON ARMS ISSUES AT CSCE ANNIVERSARY

PM310900 PRAVDA in Russian 31 Jul 85 First Edition pp 4-5

["Constructive Mutual Commitments"--TASS report]

[Excerpt] Esteemed Mr Chairman,

The signing of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe by right ranks among major events in post-war international affairs. That document of truly historic significance was sealed here, in the capital of Finland, on August 1, 1975, by the signatures of the leaders of European states, and also the USA and Canada.

The preparation and successful holding of the European conference required prolonged, persevering efforts of the participating states. It took political will and the art of diplomacy to develop and consolidate in state-to-state relations the fundamentals of peaceful coexistence, cooperation, and trust.

Everyone at that time made efforts towards a concerted accord. As a consequence, the Final Act became a code of constructive mutual obligations. It orients states to living in peace, to cooperating fruitfully and to refraining from imposing one's views and orders on others.

Wherein lies the vital force of the Final Act? It lies primarily in that it rests on the foundation of peaceful coexistence of states with different socio-economic and political systems.

The objective need for peaceful coexistence was keenly foreseen by Vladimir I. Lenin, the founder of our state. It was corroborated in practice by the entire history of the 20th century. There just is no sensible alternative to peaceful coexistence today, in the nuclear age. Expressing the will of the Soviet people, Mikhail Gorbachew, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, stressed: "We will firmly follow the Leninist course of peace and peaceful coexistence."

It is quite natural that precisely Europe become the first experimental field for fostering relations of peaceful cooperation among states belonging to the opposite social systems. Europe is suited, perhaps better than any other continent, for peaceful cooperation by virtue of the close intertwining of the economic, cultural, and historical ties of its peoples.

But it is also here, on the European Continent, that the two strongest military-political alliances confront each other. Awesome concentrations of troops, unprecedented in peace time, have been amassed here. Ever newer armaments, primarily the deadliest ones, nuclear weapons, are incessantly being accumulated.

In this situation the policy of detente became a manifestation of high responsibility and true statesmanship. The Final Act is pervaded with its spirit from beginning to end.

No one expected, naturally, that the "golden age" of cloudless relations would be ushered in immediately after Helsinki. But a good deal of what was accomplished at that time has put down roots and survived. Even the serious aggravation of tensions, which could not have helped the situation in Europe, has not uprooted detente.

It is our conviction that the detente of the 1970's was not a chance phenomenon, which has now passed onto oblivion. It is valuable experience reinforcing the belief that constructive dialogue and mutually beneficial cooperation are a natural condition of state-to-state relations, which meets common interests.

The development of the entire international situation depends to a large extent on the way relations in Europe shape up. European security as a whole is strongly linked to world security. If the storm clouds are dispelled effectively by joint efforts here, the sun shines brighter for everyone, The European states must not overlook this aspect of their responsibility either.

The contribution of the European peoples to the development of world civilization is truly priceless. It is the supreme duty of the present European generations to preserve it and to make Europe a continent of peace and construction. They, we believe, must have enough sense of responsibility to mankind and political wisdom based on age-old experience to accomplish this.

We point this out also because we will soon mark the 40th anniversary of the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. That tragedy left a deep scar in human memory. The interests of all the countries and peoples demand that such actions should never be repeated. Obviously, if nuclear weapons were actually used today, the consequences would be catastrophic for the whole of mankind.

The Soviet Union has strongly advocated the prohibition of nuclear weapons ever since their appearance. Throughout these years our country has been consistently and energetically struggling against the stockpiling of nuclear arsenals and for an end to rivalry in the development of increasingly advanced systems of these weapons.

The treaty on banning nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere, in space, and under water became an important step in that direction, but for a nuclear test ban to be truly effective, we are convinced, it should be complete and universal.

It is perfectly obvious that a moratorium on all nuclear blasts would contribute to providing auspicious conditions for the comprehensive solution of this problem. The Soviet Union has on more than one occasion offered the nuclear powers to take such a measure beginning with a definite agreed-upon date. However, there has been no positive response to our proposals.

Seeking to contribute towards ending the dangerous rivalry in the buildup of nuclear arms arsenals, the Soviet Union has taken another bold step and decided to terminate unilaterally all nuclear explosions beginning on August 6 this year. This new major initiative of the USSR, prompted by concern for the destinies of the whole of mankind, was announced yesterday by Mikhail Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee.

The moratorium, in effect until January 1, 1986, will remain in effect beyond that date if the United States also refrains from conducting nuclear explosions.

The Soviet Union expects the United States to respond positively to our initiative and to stop its nuclear explosions. A joint moratorium by the USSR and the United States would set a good example for the other states possessing nuclear weapons as well.

The only sensible thing to do now is to initiate vigorous cooperation among all states for the sake of their common future of peace.

The Soviet Union seeks to ensure that its relations and contacts with European countries develop in a solid and stable manner. European affairs have always had a substantial place in Soviet foreign policy and will continue to do so. This is graphically illustrated by our country's profound commitment to the process of peaceful cooperation born of the European conference.

The core of the Helsinki Accords, as everyone knows, was the formalization of the territorial and political realities that stemmed from the great victory over German fascism and from post-war development. However, attempts have been newly revived to call into question the European territorial and political realities. The agreements concluded by the allies in Yalta and Potsdam, which have been effectively serving the interests of peace for 40 years now, are being attacked. Revanchist claims are again being aired -- moreover, openly.

All this is grossly at odds with the letter and the spirit of the Final Act as well as with the letter and the spirit of relevant international treaties. But the progress of history is irreversible; this should be remembered by those who are trying to build today's politics on the ruins of yesterday's ambitions.

It is clear how better to use the potential of Helsinki for the good of the peoples. What should be paramount is respect for and scrupulous observance of all the jointly elaborated principles of state-to-state relations that were recorded in the Final Act. The Soviet Union imparted the force of law to those principles, formalized them in its constitution and is faithfully following them in its policy. Our country is prepared both today and in the future to comply in full with the obligations assumed by it in Helsinki.

We expect the same approach from all the states that signed the Final Act. Facts, however, show differently.

New U.S. first-strike nuclear missiles began and continue to be deployed in Western Europe contrary to the interests of the peoples. Every component of the U.S. strategic offensive nuclear potential is being intensively built up. NATO is going ahead with a long-term program to develop ultramodern conventional weapons, which approximate nuclear weapons in their effects, and has embraced an aggressive doctrine for their use. The development of advanced types of chemical weapons, including binary weapons, which are planned to be deployed particularly on the European Continent, is in full swing in the USA.

Washington is going to call into question the time-tested treaties, those limiting both strategic offensive armaments and anti-missile defense systems. In other words, they are about to dump the capital that has been accumulated with so much effort in curbing and restricting the arms race.

The U.S. Administration is seeking to carry through by all means its "star wars" plans. There are designs to involve allies in that dangerous venture. The implementation of these plans is fraught with grave adverse consequences for security in Europe and all over the world.

The peoples are expecting a good deal from the Soviet-U.S. talks on nuclear and space weapons. The failure so far to make real progress at those talks cannot help but disappoint them. We are motivated at the Geneva talks by the firm desire to reach accords. The desire is manifest in well-substantiated constructive proposals both in Geneva and elsewhere.

However, what we are faced with is that, contrary to the joint accord on the subject and goals of the talks, there is unwillingness to discuss and resolve in a business-like manner problems of concern to the world; namely, ways to prevent an arms race in space, to terminate it on earth, and to limit nuclear weapons and move toward their radical reduction and eventual complete elimination.

The Soviet Union has stated more than once at the most prestigious level that it is prepared to effect sizeable reductions in both strategic and medium-range nuclear systems. What is needed for this is restraint from opening up another area of the arms race, space. Our concrete proposals and our unilateral measures of restraint and goodwill in the context of the Geneva talks are known both in America and in Europe. What is needed is only reciprocity, a constructive response from the United States, and this, regrettably, is not yet forthcoming.

The efforts to break the stalemate at the Vienna talks on mutual reductions in armed forces and armaments in Central Europe have so far been in vain. We are hearing incessantly in Vienna: Give us figures. The USSR its allies do supply figures -- but they are not to the liking of their partners. Clearly, the point is not figures. Our partners just have no wish to reach accords.

Many countries think that progress at the Stockholm conference could be more dynamic. Some ground has already been covered to ensure such progress. It is time to move without delay to the formulation of initial accords on major mutually complimentary confidence-building measures in both the political and military fields. The socialist countries tabled at the conference well-balanced proposals relevant to both fields. But, naturally, a constructive contribution is needed from all the other states participating in the conference.

I defined only some most topical issues whose solution would facilitate the termination of the arms race and the consolidation of European and international security.

Meetings will be held shortly between General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Mikhail Gorbachev and President Francois Mitterrand of France and United States President Ronald Reagan. The significance of the top-level meetings by far exceeds, of course, the framework of bilateral relations. The Soviet leadership proceeds from the promise that they should bring about a softening in the present dangerous tension in the world and a turn for the better in European and world affairs.

I would like to stress once again that the Soviet Union favors accords in a fair and equitable basis, which would help all to advance towards the desired objective of the total elimination of the nuclear war menace and the consolidation of the foundations of universal peace.

One more thing should be made clear: If someone hopes to conduct talks with the Soviet Union "from the position of strength," let him abandon these illusions. In the face of the acceleration of military preparations by the NATO Bloc, the Soviet Union and its allies will be able to ensure their security, to safeguard their legitimate rights and interests. Any attempts to upset the existing military balance and gain unilateral advantages will continue to meet effective counteraction from our part.

It is our firm belief, however, that confrontation, either in the military, political, or economic spheres, is not the road that Europe should take.

CSO: 5200/1356

GENERAL

SOVIET PRESS COMMENTS ON ARMS ISSUES AT CSCE ANNIVERSARY

INF, SDI Issues

PM251342 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 25 Jul 85 First Edition p 1

[Sergey Losev "International Review": "Europe at the Crossroads"]

[Excerpts] The jubilee meeting of foreign ministers of 33 European states, the United States, and Canada, scheduled for the end of July in Helsinki, is visible evidence of the viability of the decisions of the CSCE which 10 years ago laid the foundations for detente which proved advantageous and beneficial for all. Now, when the threat of war is so close that its searing heat can be felt, mankind will not allow the Helsinki Accords to be turned into a historical document.

Yet what can the U.S. Administration cite to match our country's constructive proposal to establish the lowest possible level of medium-range missiles in Europe, a proposal in which the Soviet Union would have not one iota more than the French and the British have both as regards the number of missiles themselves and the number of warheads?) They can cite absolutely nothing!

As is known, the Pentagon and the State Department have responded to the USSR's unilaterally declared moratorium on the deployment of its medium-range missiles and the suspension of other retaliatory measures in Europe until next November with intensified pressure on Belgium and the Netherlands to extort from them their consent to the deployment of U.S. first-strike missiles.

Is it surprising that among the United States' partners the fear is growing that after the siting of the Pershing II and cruise missiles, U.S. strategists will then accord priority to trying to limit a nuclear clash with the Soviet Union to the European theater of war, and moreover in situations that do not even directly involve the national interests of the European NATO member-states themselves?

Nothing has contributed to the spread of these feelings of alarm on the continent more than the announcement of Reagan's "star wars" program aimed at the implementation of

unrealizable plans for gaining decisive military superiority over the USSR, in this case through the militarization of space. All West European countries, with the exception of the FRG, believe that the deployment by the United States of a large-scale ABM defense including space-based elements would undermine strategic stability, impair their security, jeopardize current arms limitation agreements, and spur on the strategic offensive arms race. As (J. Mendelson), former member of the U.S. delegation to the Salt II negotiations, noted in the NEW STATESMAN recently, the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) has created more tension within NATO than any other of the current U.S. Administration's decision.

U.S. Vice President G. Bush's attempts during his recent tour to compel the allies to back the SDI program have failed. Plans to win the allies' support for the "star wars" program at the June NATO council session in Portugal have also collapsed. France, for instance, officially refused to take part in scientific research within the framework of the SDI and pointed out that one of the aims of the U.S. program was to ensure the transfer across the ocean of scientific cadres and technical know-how and provide for the preferential development in the United States of at least six advanced fields of scientific and technical progress. The view that the SDI program may devalue the British nuclear potential and undermine Great Britain's role as a great power has been expressed in British Government circles.

Even the most orthodox of Atlanticists in West Europe suspect that the creation of a large-scale ABM defense system including space-based elements to protect the United States against strategic missiles would inevitably lower the threshold of the utilization of nonstrategic nuclear facilities; that is, medium-range missiles and battlefield nuclear weapons. It does no harm to recall in this context the remark of B. Scowcroft, former U.S. presidential national security adviser, that the implementation of the "star wars" project itself will "encourage" a first strike.

The U.S. theory of "limited nuclear war" and the Reagan administration's refusal to pledge nonfirst use of nuclear weapons only serve to reinforce existing misgivings.

West European politicians, in particular in Bonn, who take comfort in the illusion that "star wars" presents a threat only to socialist countries are deeply mistaken.

The path to stability in Europe does not lead via a further buildup of nuclear arms or the extension of the arms race to space, but via arms limitation and reduction based on the principle of the sides' equality and identical security and via the ultimate complete elimination of nuclear weapons from Europe as proposed by the Soviet Union.

IZVESTIYA Editorial

PM301353 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 30 Jul 85 Morning Edition p 1

[Editorial: "Charter of Peace in Europe"]

[Excerpts] This historic Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe opened 10 years ago in Helsinki in the white marble Finlandia Palace submerged in the greenery of Hesperia park. Its work was crowned by the signing of the Final Act, endorsed by representatives of 33 European countries and the United States and Canada. It was a truly major event of postwar history.

The year 1985 is the year of the 40th anniversary of the victory over German fascism and the 10th anniversary of the signing of the Helsinki Final Act. The simple coincidence in time develops, if you think seriously about these two milestones, into a dialectical symbolism. It gives the key to an understanding of why the European peoples have succeeded in entering their fifth decade of peaceful life. Ridiculing the latest plan for an "eternal peace" in Europe, Voltaire once sarcastically dubbed it "the purest chimera, as unacceptable to sovereigns as it is to elephants and rhinoceroses." The building of the edifice of European security is no longer a chimera but a feasible aim. The path to it is indicated in the Final Act.

Now, as 10 years ago, we are rightly proud that it was the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries which acted as the initiators of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. This is another very graphic reflection and confirmation of their principled foreign policy course toward peace and disarmament, cooperation, and detente.

The all-European conference was brought into being by the powerful flow of detente. And in turn it has lent it powerful impetus for further development, opening a new chapter in the history of long-suffering Europe. The Helsinki Final Act showed that detente can and must be filled with specific material content. It is the materialization of detente, whose cornerstone is military detente, which is the reliable basis for an all-embracing system of European and international security. And the linchpin of military detente is disarmament. It is not for nothing that the Final Act obliges the states which signed it to seek effective measures aimed at reducing military confrontation and promoting detente.

The Soviet Union and the other socialist countries sacredly observe this behest of the Final Act. It was precisely to develop and implement it that they put forward the impressive program of military detente for Europe. It includes the continent's total liberation from nuclear armaments, both medium-range and tactical, its liberation from chemical weapons, the reduction of the military expenditure of the Warsaw Pact and NATO states, the conclusion between them of a treaty on the mutual nonuse of military force and the maintenance of peaceful relations, the creation of nuclear-free zones in various parts of Europe, and some other initiatives.

But Washington and its West European NATO allies are blocking all these proposals. This reflects a process alien to detente, the impetus for which was provided by the U.S. foreign policy course in the late seventies and early eighties. The sabotage of the Vienna talks on the mutual reduction of armed forces and armaments in Central Europe and the sabotage of the Stockholm conference -- on a package of political and military confidence-building measures -- are of the same nature. With Washington's proclamation of the "star wars" program, that is the creation of offensive space armaments, the shadow of the danger of war looming over Europe became even denser. The transatlantic space pirates are "magnanimously" suggesting to West Europe that it become a subcontractor to its potential grave-diggers! The futility of the first two rounds of the Geneva talks shows that the United States is oriented not toward nuclear disarmament and the demilitarization of space but toward the unrestrained arms race where both liberally and figuratively the sky's the limit.

It is perfectly obvious that this course is undermining the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and is a flagrant violation of them. But despite the grave harm which Washington and NATO have caused to the detente process, they have not succeeded in halting it; the process is continuing. Nor could it be otherwise. The ideas of detente have taken too deep a root in European soil. Europe has paid too high a price for an awareness of their vital necessity and urgency. But the resurrection of the detente process does not mean a mechanical return to what was achieved in the seventies. Time does not stand still; it is advancing irrepressibly. That is why we must seek far more. From this imposing historical perspective detente is not the final aim but only a transitional, albeit necessary, stage from a world bowed down under the burden of the arms race to a world without wars and weapons, from a world of confrontation to a world of cooperation, to a reliable and all-encompassing system of international security including Europe, of course.

That is the only way to guarantee the primary, most important human right -- the right to life.

The 10 years which have elapsed since the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe have been filled to the limit with events of a varied nature. Some events have helped the implementation of the Helsinki Final Act, while others have led to its emasculation and undermining. The experience of this decade has shown that the former accords with the vital interests of the peoples of East and West Europe while the latter are grossly at variance with these interests. Celebrating the 10th anniversary of the European charter of peace, the Soviet Union again appeals to all states of Europe, to all states which signed the "green paper," to rise above their differences and to become partners in the sphere of security, in the struggle against the mortal threat to our common home -- the danger of nuclear annihilation looming over all mankind.

Army Paper Commentary

PM311056 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 30 Jul 85 Second Edition p 3

[Article by N. Severov: "Reason Must Prevail; On the 10th Anniversary of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe"]

[Excerpts] On 1 August 1985 it will be 10 years since the day when the heads of state and government of 33 European countries, the United States, and Canada assembled in Helsinki and signed the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.

This conference, convened on the socialist countries' initiative, was a most important event without precedent in the history of international relations. It summed up the collective political result of World War II, recognized the territorial and political realities in Europe, and opened up new potential for strengthening peace and the peoples' security and for deepening detente.

The 10th anniversary of the signing of the Final Act is being celebrated in a complex international situation which has been sharply exacerbated through the fault of the forces of imperialism. The United States is building up all types of offensive arms at an accelerated pace, deploying Pershing II and cruise missiles, and creating plans for the militarization of space. Revanchist forces are trying to question the Yalta and Potsdam agreements and the territorial and political realities that have prevailed in Europe since World War II. Washington is refusing to abandon the "crusade" it has announced against socialism, which exacerbates international tension still further, increases the threat of war, and runs counter to the spirit and letter of the Helsinki accords.

However, the interests of the peoples of Europe and the entire world persistently demand that detente be revived and that further progress be made toward a reliable system of international law, order and security. Europe must return to the path indicated by the Final Act of the All-European Conference. The strict observance and implementation of all the principles and provisions of this document is the current imperative and the cornerstone of the detente policy.

This is what the Soviet Union and all the European socialist countries firmly, resolutely, and consistently advocate. They are making active efforts aimed at curbing the arms race -- above all the nuclear arms race -- and at consolidating the foundations of peace in Europe and worldwide and are striving to develop extensive mutually advantageous cooperation among states with different social systems. The USSR has put forward and upholds specific just and realistic proposals on a wide range of international problems. These proposals include the adoption of a commitment not to be the first to use nuclear weapons by all the nuclear powers, the mutual renunciation of the use of military force, the freezing and reduction of nuclear arsenals, the ending of all nuclear weapons tests, and the prevention of the militarization of space.

The Soviet Union advocates a Europe free from both medium-range and tactical nuclear weapons and chemical arms. It actively supports the idea of creating nuclear-free zones in various parts of the European continent, including northern Europe and the Balkans.

The socialist countries are acting constructively at the Stockholm Conference in Europe, striving to reach substantive accords on complementary confidence- and security-building measures of a political, international, legal, and military-technical nature.

All the proposals of the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries are imbued with concern to strengthen peace and European and international security. They are fully in line with the Helsinki Final Act and are convincing testimony to its vitality and topicality even now, 10 years after its signing. The peace initiatives of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries meet with ardent approval worldwide and are supported by the peoples of all countries.

In order to improve the situation in Europe and the world as a whole, it is necessary for the United States and its NATO allies to react positively to the Soviet proposals aimed at removing the nuclear threat, preventing the militarization of space, and strengthening mutual trust and equal cooperation among all states.

However, the U.S. and NATO attitude toward the socialist countries' proposals is unconstructive. The position adopted by the United States at the Soviet-U.S. talks in Geneva and by its closest allies at the Vienna talks and the Stockholm Conference does not promote the settlement of urgent international questions of vitally great importance for the peoples of Europe and the other continents.

Under conditions where imperialist U.S. circles and their partners in the aggressive NATO bloc are continuing to build up the arms race and are stirring up international tension, the Soviet Union and the other Warsaw Pact countries are forced to show constant concern for strengthening their own defense capability. The armed forces of the states of the Warsaw Pact, which recently celebrated their 30th anniversary, reliably protect the peaceful labor of the peoples of the socialist countries.

The meeting of top party and state figures from the Warsaw Pact countries in Warsaw this April, at which the protocol on extending the term of the Warsaw Pact was signed, showed that the socialist countries will continue to strengthen their defensive alliance and at the same time, redouble their efforts in the struggle to curb the arms race, to ensure disarmament, and to remove the threat of a nuclear catastrophe.

The Soviet Union and all the socialist countries have the firm political will to secure peace, end the arms race on earth and prevent its extension to space, and completely prohibit and eliminate nuclear weapons. The fraternal countries favor a return to detente and the organization of normal and good-neighborly relations with all states, irrespective of their social systems.

Achieving positive shifts in international relations is a realistic matter, despite the complexity of the world situation. The danger of nuclear war can and must be removed from mankind. This requires active and vigorous efforts from all countries and peoples.

U.S. Strategic Plans Hit

PM311347 Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA in Russian 31 Jul 85 p 9

[Vitaliy Kobysh "Observer's Opinion": "Helsinki: The First 10 Years"]

[Text] The Finnish capital's name is increasingly frequently linked with Yalta and Potsdam: More can be seen from a distance. The jubilee meeting in Helsinki of the foreign ministers of 33 European states plus the United States and Canada, held to mark the 10th anniversary of the CSCE, makes us give new thought to many things.

To this day some people in the West are reluctant to agree, but it is a fact that the Helsinki Final Act became the symbol, charter, and legislative basis of the detente policy. For the Soviet Union, this document is so important, authoritative, and historically justified that the principles it contains for relations between states have, as is well known, been incorporated in the text of the USSR Constitution, which gives them the force of law in our country.

Unfortunately, in the last 10 years much has happened that directly contradicts the provisions of the Helsinki accords, which has made it more difficult to pursue the course of cooperation among the European peoples and the policy of detente. Of course, it is not a question of geography as such. All the same, is it not strange that the icy winds which have to some extent frozen European detente blew primarily from across the ocean, and that if tension and fear of the nuclear threat exist in Europe today, this is the result above all of Washington's aggressive strong-arm course? Its line of confrontation with the Soviet Union and of raising the level of military confrontation have increased the risk of the outbreak of nuclear conflict on our continent, which is a threat to the West European NATO allies of the United States. Those countries, with every reason, have a growing suspicion that after stationing American Pershing II and cruise missiles in Western Europe, in elaborating its strategic concepts and military plans, Washington attaches prime importance to the possibility of confining a nuclear clash with the Soviet Union to the territory of the European "theater of war."

More and more West Europeans are realizing, too, that the United States could use these missiles for military-strategic purposes of its own which have nothing to do with the situation or events in Europe itself. Albeit somewhat belatedly, they are becoming clearly aware that these medium-range facilities could be used by Washington, in particular, to bring pressure to bear on the Soviet Union and blackmail it in situations which do not have the slightest bearing on the interests of the European countries themselves.

So the missiles which were extolled by U.S. and NATO propaganda as a guarantee of the West European states' security have put them in a position which is, at best, vulnerable in a possible nuclear conflict, and led to a major destabilization of the military-strategic situation on our continent. The provisions of the Helsinki Act did not, of course, permit anything of the kind.

The U.S. nuclear facilities on the West European countries' soil take on a particularly sinister character in connection with Washington's plans to create a large-scale ABM defense system. Regardless of what people in the White House and, indeed, in a number of West European capitals now claim, the implementation of the "star wars" program will inevitably lower the threshold for the use of nonstrategic nuclear facilities -- in other words, medium-range missiles and the so-called battlefield nuclear weapons. You do not have to be a military expert to realize that this prospect promises nothing good for Europe.

This harsh, tough reality cannot hide another. True, the situation is tense, and a major blow has been struck against all that was established in Helsinki. But the policy of detente, expressed in the Final Act, did not spring up from nowhere; it was the fruit of long, difficult work, above all by the USSR and the other socialist states. Detente has deep roots. It can not be destroyed, and however complex the situation, there is a real prospect not only of breathing new life into detente, but of moving further along the path of ensuring the European peoples' security at a significantly lower level of military confrontation and with a minimal role for nuclear weapons. The proposals of the USSR and the other Warsaw Pact countries provide a practical basis for this. We proceed on the basis that the commitment to the nonuse of force and the complete liberation of our continent for nuclear weapons, both medium-range and tactical, are very closely interdependent.

In the prevailing conditions major significance is attached to the idea of creating nuclear-free zones in Europe, as is envisaged in the corresponding proposals of the socialist community states.

29 August 1985

On a bilateral or multilateral basis, we are prepared to conclude agreements which would adhere strictly to the three widely known and increasingly popular principles: "not to have," "not to produce," and "not to import" nuclear weapons.

Some people -- especially if they are far away from our continent, which has seen a great deal in its long history -- may call this a ruse by the "Soviet bloc" or, more simply, "propaganda." But there is no room for "ruses" or "propaganda" here -- it is a question of matters which are too serious and which are directly related to the future; ours and that of our children and grandchildren. The world wars began in Europe. This must not happen again. On the contrary, there is every reason for our continent to set an example to the rest of the world of how to live without wars, in consensus and cooperation. There are real opportunities to stop those who hamper this. One such opportunity -- a very important one -- is the strict observance of the provisions of the Helsinki Final Act, which, although it was adopted only 10 years ago, there is every reason to describe as historic. It lives on, and it gives the peoples of Europe clear guidelines.

PRAVDA Highlights Test Moratorium

PM081354 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 3 Aug 85 Second Edition p 4

[PRAVDA special correspondents Yu. Zhukov and M. Kostikov dispatch: "Reliable Compass"]

[Excerpt] Helsinki, 2 Aug--Yesterday the halls of the Finlandia Hall were filled with lively debates, ministers were speaking, and, one after another, delegation spokesmen were meeting with journalists. Cameras were clicking, movie cameras were whirring, and hundreds of teletype machines were clacking. Now there is silence, a silence conducive to reflection on everything that we have seen and heard here over the past few days.

Let us sit in the corner by the entrance to the session hall, from which workers are carrying out innumerable boxes of television equipment, and consider what the participants brought to this meeting and what they have taken away from it.

...We recall the bright and sunny day of 29 July. That day the report of the Soviet Union's decision to unilaterally end nuclear tests, effective 6 August this year, sped round the world.

Then the Soviet representative was one of the first to mount the rostrum in the Finlandia Hall to set forth a profoundly well conceived plan of action capable of making the process of all-European cooperation initiated 1 August 1975 by the signing of the Helsinki Final Act genuinely effective.

The Soviet Union proceeds on the basis that the Final Act has immense and as yet unutilized potential. Making a high assessment of this potential, the USSR included in its constitution the principles of interstate relations formulated in this historic document and made them the basis of its policy. The Soviet Union focused the attention of the Helsinki meeting on the question of ending nuclear tests, which would ultimately mean ending the nuclear arms race.

Nuclear tests are one of the main gears driving the entire mechanism of the arms race, a spokesman for the Soviet delegation said, explaining the purport of the USSR's new initiative in a talk with journalists. No military specialist will embark on the creation of a new missile, a new nuclear submarine, or a new bomber if he does not know how the charges prepared for these delivery vehicles will work or if they will work at all.

The USSR's new initiative immediately gained the sympathies of many participants in the Helsinki meeting. Supporting the opinion that questions of the struggle against the arms race must now be placed at the forefront of all-European cooperation, Spanish Foreign Minister F. Ordonez stated:

"The need to slow down the arms race is becoming increasingly urgent. Our concern for security demands it. Attention in our country is riveted on the problem of the arms race, and we cannot remain indifferent to it."

Both Ordonez and his colleague, French External Relations Minister R. Dumas, recalled that when the question of holding the Stockholm conference was settled in Madrid it was decided that it would not only discuss the question of confidence-building measures but also the problem of disarmament in Europe. The conference has been working for many months now and it has still not gotten around to discussing the disarmament problem.

The tone set by the Soviet delegation largely determined the development of the discussions at the meeting. The meeting became businesslike and increasingly focused on the fundamental questions of concern to the peoples of Europe: the struggle to end the arms race, universal security, and all-European political and economic cooperation.

The Washington administration approached the Helsinki meeting from a diametrically opposite standpoint. Its "psychological warfare" services clearly intended to turn the meeting into an arena for confrontation and, if possible, to undermine the entire process of all-European cooperation.

As for the problems of ending the arms race, the U.S. delegation simply ignored them. Moreover, Secretary of State G. Shultz, who arrived in Helsinki soon after the radio and television reports of the USSR's decision to end nuclear tests, immediately stated to the waiting journalists that the United States rejected the USSR's appeal.

CSO: 5200/1356

GENERAL

MOSCOW WEEKLY PROGRAM: TEST MORATORIUM, PROGRESS AT GENEVA

LDO41744 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1130 GMT 4 Aug 85

["International Observers Roundtable" program with publicists Vitaliy Ivanovich Kobysh and Nikolay Vladimirovich Shishlin and Central Television and All-Union Radio political observer Vladimir Yakovlevich Tsvetov]

Hiroshima Anniversary, Test Moratorium

[Excerpts] [Tsvetov] Good day, comrades. On 6 August it will be 40 years since the day of the U.S. atomic bombing of the Japanese city of Hiroshima. I shall not describe now the damage left by the explosion in the city and when the first shock caused by terror had passed when people slightly came around and when the first stores were opened in the city, among them there was a flower store -- flowers and atomic ash, flowers and atomic ruins. I see in this a vivid symbol of the fact that when an atomic bomb destroyed Hiroshima, the thirst for life survived anyway. In this talk dedicated to international questions I have not started talking about such categories for nothing, because it is precisely love of life that nourishes with strength the worldwide antiwar and antinuclear movement. Before 6 August 1945 mankind was immortal both in practical and psychological ways. After 6 August 1945 mankind became mortal. If previously war was the antithesis to peace then now total catastrophe is the antithesis to peace. Because of this, love of life is so important now. But love for life alone is not enough to prevent the repetition of a Hiroshima and Nagasaki. A precise, concrete, consistent program of action is required, aimed at ensuring that Hiroshima and Nagasaki will always be first and last examples of limited nuclear war. This anniversary requires some evaluation. On the 40th anniversary of Hiroshima's tragedy we can proudly say that exactly thanks to the policy of our party, our state, nowhere in the world have new Hiroshimas and Nagasakis been known. The latest moratorium initiative put forward by Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev is one more manifestation of this highly human, highly moral policy.

[Kobyshev] This initiative is a special one. If somebody is keeping, so to speak, an inventory of all the peaceful proposals of the Soviet Union and if it is done with a serious and thoughtful approach, something special, I would say exceptional, should be seen in this proposal of the Soviet Union. If the United States responds, other nuclear powers also will follow them. If the United States adopts the same path as us, rejects testing nuclear weapons, declares a moratorium on such tests, then essentially this would mean the beginning of the end of nuclear arms. I do not want to simplify, to say that this end would come immediately, but this would be a principally new situation after that extremely gloomy situation which, from my point of view, you depicted very realistically, Vladimir Yakovlevich, when the Americans dropped an atomic bomb and this changed the world.

[Shishlin] The reaction of the Americans is known, it was destructive. As a matter of fact, the Soviet initiative has been rejected by the United States. Here I ask the question: Well, does this mean that this Soviet step was useless? I think that the answer to this question is no. I think that in shaping the political climate in the middle of 1985 this step, perhaps, is the most significant intervention in the world political climate, an intervention designed to change this climate for the better.

I also want to add one more thing. The American response on the whole fits into that line being implemented by the Washington administration. This is not an accidental or short-term line, but in general is linked with U.S. strategic calculations aimed at the continuation of the arms race, at the breakthrough to military superiority, and, I must add, at the exhaustion of the Soviet Union, exhaustion of the socialist world in this ruinous arms race. As regards the breakthrough to U.S. military superiority, there are no prospects. As regards the exhaustion of the socialist economy, first and foremost of the Soviet economy, they cannot build any illusions, especially in the light of those results of our national economy obtained during the first half year and in the light of those major, really courageous revolutionary measures being undertaken in order to sharply raise the efficiency of production both in city and in the village. Taking into account the world reaction to the Soviet initiative, we can say that this initiative has really evoked a broad response, of which we still have a lot to hear and which of course will influence the international situation in the forthcoming months of 1985.

[Kobysh] You stated very correctly the great importance of the new Soviet initiative and this significance is an unusually capacious one. The moratorium on underground nuclear explosions now has a key significance for the following reasons: First of all it can slow the rate of the nuclear arms race. If first-strike nuclear weapons cannot be tested, they cannot be made either. If the 1963 treaty had included a ban on nuclear explosions not only in the air, space, and underwater but also underground, then multiple warheads and cruise missiles which complicate so much the situation in the world, would not exist now. Secondly, the moratorium leads toward the gradual liquidation of the nuclear arsenals that have already been accumulated. Both sides test these arsenals selectively to see how many remain suitable for use. It is impossible to carry this out without underground explosions.

If there is no total confidence that they can be used successfully it is dangerous to make a decision to use the nuclear arsenals.

Finally, the moratorium will make it possible to create the conditions for the conclusion of an international treaty on a total and all-embracing ban on testing of nuclear weapons, because other possessors of nuclear weapons besides the United States and the Soviet Union would not be afraid that these countries would press ahead in the improvement of such weapons.

I wonder how the Japanese view all of this. Vladimir Yakovlevich, you lived and worked in that country for many years, you used to report to us about it and to a certain degree opened it up to us. I would just like to know what they think about the situation?

[Tsvetov] I received a piece of news from an old acquaintance of mine, Hisaka Nagata. She thanked the Soviet Union for being the first to respond to the appeal by the victims of the atomic bomb and announcing a moratorium on underground nuclear explosions. On 9 August 1945 Hisaka Nagata, who was then 10 years old, was in Nagasaki. She received

burns, her respiratory organs were afflicted and for a long time she was unable to breathe without a special apparatus. It was only thanks to the selfless work by doctors from the Botkin hospital in Moscow that she was finally able to breathe properly, but it proved impossible for her to regain her normal speech. When I held an interview with Nagata a few years ago, I had to turn the volume up to maximum on the tape recorder to record it. Now Hisaka Nagata, probably remembering that interview, says: The Soviet Union heard even a weak voice such as mine because it wanted to hear it, and the Soviet Union has put an moratorium on underground nuclear explosions.

[Kobysh] The United States was the first to use nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union is now suggesting to the United States that it join with us in our statement never to make first use of those nuclear weapons, but the United States refuses. The Soviet Union says: Join us in our moratorium on nuclear weapon tests. But the United States refuses. We are taking the step to suspend those tests. We believe that the power of reason, the power that stands opposed to the nuclear threat, is able to overcome the pressure of the militarist circles. That is the optimistic vision of the world from which we proceed.

[Tsvetov] Ichiro Moritaki, the head of the Japanese association of victims of the atomic bomb, said the following: The struggle for nuclear disarmament, the struggle for peace, is not in vain, by its initiative, the Soviet Union has shown that the world antinuclear movement has enormous potential; and it is now the task of the antinuclear movement to compel the United States to follow the example of the Soviet Union. Our meeting at the round table is taking place at a time when the world is marking yet another date: the 10th anniversary of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. I think we shall be talking a little later about the importance of that conference for the whole world, but I should like to dwell on the following thought. Helsinki is placed side by side with Yalta and Potsdam, and that is quite right, of course, in the sense that the name of the Finnish capital has become a noun meaning a historic event of enormous importance. There were gathered together in Helsinki the representatives of two camps who were not united, as before, by a common aim, that of destroying fascism and Japanese militarism. It was therefore more difficult to come to agreement in Helsinki than in Yalta and Potsdam. But the fact that it is proved possible all the same to come to agreement in Helsinki was evidence of the fact that the concept of detente had emerged in the political life of the world. That was probably the very highest result, at the current stage of history in the life of mankind, of state wisdom and political will.

Little Progress in Arms Talks

[Shishlin] This determines now the need for a qualitatively new upswing in the struggle for a curtailment of armaments, above all nuclear armaments, and for the return of international relations to their normal tranquil course. What really does the position of the Soviet Union, whether at the Stockholm conference, the Geneva talks with the United States, or at the Vienna talks on reducing armaments and armed forces in central Europe, boil down to? I would, of course, like to give some pleasure to our listeners by saying that some noticeable movement had been achieved at Stockholm, Geneva and Vienna, but, alas, one cannot say that this is so. In Vienna and in Geneva the United States has been adopting a completely unyielding position, which is directed and dictated not by considerations in favor of curtailing the arms race but by the U.S. Administration's course of pushing ahead with all its military programs. For this reason, really, they have constantly been attempting to use the negotiations both in Vienna and in Geneva not for finding sensible solutions and a sensible compromise, but to use these talks for some kind of cover, and a fairly attractive cover, for their efforts to build up arms and to achieve that unrealistic and completely illusory goal for which they are striving -- namely, a breakthrough to military superiority.

[Tsvetov] The Soviet Union has done the maximum to create an atmosphere in which the achievement of results, for instance, at the Geneva talks would be possible. I would remind listeners that in 1982 the Soviet Union undertook not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, and it did so unilaterally. In 1983 the Soviet Union embarked on a moratorium on the launching of antisatellite weapons into space. Finally, this year the Soviet Union introduced a temporary moratorium on the deployment of its medium-range missiles in Europe. It would seem that in such an atmosphere the United States might fully be able to embark on responding to the aspirations of the peoples of the world that are linked with the Geneva talks. However, the United States has not been doing so.

[Shishlin] Well, of course, the logic here is simple. If you want to set about disarmament and you want somehow to limit the armaments race, the first thing you should do is to make a halt, and for this really there is absolutely no need for any extravagant actions and so on. What it requires is political good will -- the political good will which the Soviet Union has and which one would like to see on Washington's part.

[Tsvetov] The argument most commonly used by the United States when it rejects Soviet proposals is the alleged impossibility of verifying any accord that may be reached. Thus, for example, the United States is attempting to justify its refusal to join the moratorium on underground nuclear explosions on the grounds that it is, they claim, impossible to verify observance of the moratorium. This is not true -- verification is possible, and there are fully sufficient national means to do this. According to American scientists' data, the U.S. national facilities are capable of registering a 1-kiloton nuclear explosion, and it is well known that explosions of up to 5 kilotons in power cannot have any military significance. Or, for example, let us take the Vienna talks on the mutual reduction of armed forces and arms in central Europe. The head of the Soviet delegation to the talks aptly remarked to representatives of the Western countries that when it becomes a question of deeds, the West loses the word "arms" and only the word "control" remains. Naturally, control is necessary, but only when there is something to control. In the absence of agreement on and clear perceptions of how the basic substance of the proposed agreement will look -- say, on the reduction of armed forces and arms in central Europe -- it is pointless even to begin discussing control. In all cases, whether the reduction of armed forces and arms in central Europe, the moratorium on underground nuclear explosions, or the reduction of strategic and other nuclear weapons, the extent of control should correspond precisely to the extent of the measures stipulated in the agreements. There can be no other approach. Against a background of world tension, at a time when we are hearing various kinds of threats, the socialist countries cannot fail to exercise greater circumspection as regards plans for inspection, verification and control, behind which usually lurk patent espionage aims. The socialist countries and the Soviet Union threaten nobody, but do not have the intention of forgoing their own security.

[Kobysh] In my view, alongside the very dramatic nature of the events occurring in the world today, there is a process of a kind of growth of public awareness. This process has not yet taken shape very clearly, but it is so obvious that, as I said earlier, the governments of the United States and other Western countries are now being obliged to take some kinds of measures and engage in talks which do not fit in to their military doctrine and militaristic philosophy. On the one hand, there is an attempt to break through to military superiority through space, and on the other, the peoples' demands for the conclusion of an agreement banning nuclear weapons and for the placing of a barrier to the arms race as a whole.

[Tsvetov] As you have quite correctly noted, it is becoming ever more difficult for the United States and its allies to display to the world their negative attitude towards Soviet proposals. I think that the talks on the mutual reduction of armed forces and arms in central Europe are a very indicative example in this respect. As our listeners probably remember, on 14 February the Soviet Union proposed that, since the West was not willing to make a comprehensive reduction in forces and arms, there should be an initial reduction in some part -- a mutually acceptable part -- of the USSR's and the U.S. ground forces, followed by a freeze on forces and arms levels. This proposal took into account all the views previously expressed by the Western countries. The Soviet Union put forward the proposal; our partners in the negotiations were not able to turn it down on the spot and said that they would study it. And they are still studying it today. This fact alone shows that the Soviet Union's efforts, based on the real situation and real circumstances, are aimed at achieving some kind of result in the end. It is becoming ever more difficult for the United States and its allies to resist these efforts. Of course, they can drag out their study of the new Soviet proposal made in Vienna -- they can drag it out for a long time -- but it is difficult to reject it.

[Kobysh] Just as it is now going to be difficult to refuse to give a clear answer to the question of why the United States is not joining our moratorium. How can one explain this to the people of the world, people living in constant fear of the threat of nuclear war? They cannot explain it, and for that reason, they are being cunning and trying to get out of giving a clear answer to the question by employing some kind of propaganda tricks.

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GENERAL

PRAVDA REVIEW: TEST MORATORIUM, SDI, NPT, IAEA, PACIFIC NFZ

PM140933 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 11 Aug 85 First Edition p 4

[Vladimir Bolshakov "International Review"]

[Excerpt] Preventing New Hiroshimas

The anniversaries of two tragedies fell last week, on 6 and 9 August. On those dates 40 years ago the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki were consumed in atomic conflagrations ignited by order of U.S. President H. Truman.

"The name of Hiroshima is seared on the conscience of all mankind" is how the American CBS television company began its broadcast from that city on 6 August. Yes, the pain of Hiroshima and Nagasaki is the pain of all mankind. But the correspondent of that television company was right when he stated during his reportage that "It is difficult to forget that it was not just any bomb that fell on the city but an American atom bomb." Indeed, this can be neither forgotten nor forgiven.

To pay fitting tribute to the memory of the victims of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, today we must do everything possible to ensure that their tragedy is never repeated anywhere in the world and that there are no new victims of nuclear weapons on our planet. This is precisely the Soviet stance, reaffirmed in M.S. Gorbachev's reply to the appeal issued by the Japanese council of organizations of atomic bomb victims.

Almost 40 years have elapsed between 1946, when the USSR proposed that an international convention banning atomic weapons be concluded, and the recent decision by our country to unilaterally stop all nuclear explosions from 6 August through 1 January 1986. These have been years of persistent campaigning by the USSR to eliminate the nuclear threat.

The USSR continues to actively fight for the elimination of nuclear weapons. We are ready to proceed to nuclear disarmament at any time, should an accord be reached with the other nuclear powers. The USSR is conducting talks with the United States in Geneva in order to prevent an arms race from beginning in space, to stop the arms race on earth, and to switch over to making radical cuts in nuclear arms, going so far as to eliminate them altogether.

Unfortunately, Washington continues to prevent this. At his press conference on 5 August the White House boss found nothing better to say in response to correspondents' direct questioning about why the United States was refusing to embark with the Soviet Union on a mutual cessation of all nuclear explosions than to repeat the Pentagon's hackneyed thesis about America's "lag" behind the USSR in this area.

Whereas in the first half of the year the United States and the USSR carried out an equal number of nuclear explosions, the United States has carried out in total, according to figures from the prestigious Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, roughly one-third more nuclear explosions than the USSR. But Washington is not sated. Initially it declared that the United States did not intend to stop its nuclear tests until it had finished "modernizing" its arsenal.

Then it was clearly stated that the President "had proposed no new initiatives" at his press conference and that he "had not said" that the United States would agree to a complete moratorium on nuclear explosions when the testing of new strategic arms was completed.

Abandon hope all ye who enter here, is the message. Information has also filtered into the press that the "nonnuclear" "star wars" program, the U.S. Administration's favorite brainchild, also provides for nuclear tests to be carried out. This is yet another piece of evidence illustrating Washington's hypocrisy as it tries to assure the world that its "Strategic Defense Initiative" (SDI) is designed to "prevent nuclear war."

What the SDI, like the entire American "modernization" program, is aimed at is breaking the rough USSR-U.S. parity in nuclear armaments in order to achieve a decisive superiority over the socialist world. For this the Pentagon needs more and more nuclear weapons tests.

Washington does, of course, realize that the United States has no serious reasons for rejecting the Soviet proposals. And, as always in such cases, to use the words of the newspaper UNSERE ZEIT, it resorts to the "defense of the cuttlefish" which, when in danger, emits an inky cloud to hide beneath. And that, judging by all accounts, is precisely how the White House is responding to the Soviet initiative. The antimoratorium campaign is clearly coordinated and directed. "With alarming unanimity," THE NEW YORK TIMES observes, "the major American mass media have begun uncritically propagandizing the White House's claim that the Soviet initiative is nothing more than a propaganda ploy."

This is all an attempt to stem the wave of sympathy that exists for the Soviet proposal both in the United States itself and throughout the world. The important new Soviet proposal is, after all, truly far-reaching and promising. It opens up a direct path to a complete ban on nuclear tests and therefore to halting improvements in nuclear weapons, freezing research in that sphere, and, in the final analysis, eliminating all nuclear arsenals.

That is precisely how the Soviet proposal has been interpreted by the world community. The states signatory to the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons have also seen in it a real prospect for ridding our planet of nuclear stockpiles. The treaty was signed long ago -- the third conference to examine its operation is being held this month -- but there has, unfortunately, been no observable progress in nuclear disarmament. Work on nuclear weapons continues in Pakistan, Israel, and South Africa. The U.S. invitation to its allies to participate in the "star wars" project is effectively in breach of the provisions of the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The Soviet moratorium proposal could set up a reliable barrier there, too.

Those who are distorting the Soviet proposal and employing misrepresentation are pursuing a different strategic goal. Washington would like the Soviet Union as a matter of fact to "give its blessing" to the arms race and to recognize it as quite acceptable and even "necessary" for modern civilization. This, incidentally, is precisely the aim of the well-known American proposal to the USSR that it send observers to routine nuclear tests at the Nevada test site. This has been made on the pretext of "improving monitoring." But this is fallacious. Even former CIA director W. Colby has stated that nuclear tests can be fully monitored using national technical means.

The USSR is in general interested in verifying the observance of accords that are adopted, particularly since the United States is known to be a violator of the provisions of many international agreements. But the monitoring measures must be adequate. The USSR, incidentally, also announced recently the possibility of direct, on-the-spot inspection of certain nuclear installations in accordance with IAEA rules.

And Soviet spokesmen have repeatedly stated that it would also be possible to find opportunities for on-the-spot inspection within a treaty on a general and complete ban on nuclear tests, should such a treaty be concluded. The problem is not that of monitoring, which the USSR has never opposed in principle. The problem lies in the reluctance of U.S. ruling circles and its military-industrial complex to have done with the cult of brute force, which has been symbolized, since the time of the Manhattan Project, by the atomic bomb.

It is symptomatic that the cult's adherents are "indignant" at the Soviet people's assessment of the decision 40 years ago to drop atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Yes, we do describe the bombing as barbaric, because it was not prompted by military necessity. This is borne out by serious foreign researchers, including Americans. It was designed to intimidate the whole world, particularly the Soviet Union, with U.S. atomic might. The adherents of the atomic bomb cult intended to use it to control the destiny of the planet's peoples and to impose their own political system on them. That has been the core of American "atomic diplomacy," which they now want to augment with "'star wars' diplomacy."

The nuclear missile, electronic, and laser hardware may be state of the art. But the views.... Take, for example, the reports sent back by Peter Jennings of the American ABC television company, who recently traveled specially to Hiroshima in order to tell his compatriots that the "Japanese are grateful to the United States for the atomic bombing," because the United States thereby "...taught them democracy." Such "missionaries" of "nuclear democracy" unfortunately, thrive not only in journalism but in the top echelons of the present U.S. Administration. Fortunately, they represent a minority of the American people. Honest Americans consider Hiroshima and Nagasaki their nation's shame and seek to expiate it. They showed this again the other day when they formed protest demonstrations at military bases, nuclear plants, and test ranges, demanding the immediate cessation of American nuclear weapons tests. Aware of this feeling, many prominent American legislators -- including A. Cranston, deputy leader of the Democratic minority in the Senate, E. Kennedy, and a number of congressmen -- have come out in favor of accepting the Soviet proposal, urging the U.S. President to reconsider his hasty, negative response to the initiative. Republican Senators C. Mathias and D. Durenberger, for their part, have said that every opportunity must be taken to resume talks between the USSR, the United States, and Britain on a general and complete ban on nuclear weapons tests.

White House pressure on Congress has prevented any specific resolutions being adopted on the basis of these statements. But the statements themselves are indicative of the United States today.

Arm-Twisting...

The Soviet leadership again stated the other day: "Our country regards with understanding the desire of many states to create nuclear-free zones in various regions of the world. We are in favor of such zones, for example, in northern Europe, the Balkans, Southeast Asia, and Africa. The efforts of states in the South Pacific to create a nuclear-free zone in the region deserve approval." The U.S. response to such initiatives is diametrically opposed to the Soviet one.

The 16th session of the South Pacific Forum, which approved a treaty to create a nuclear-free zone in the region, finished in Avarua (Cook Islands) on 7 August. Eight countries belonging to the regional organization, including Australia, Fiji, and New Zealand, immediately signed the treaty in Avarua. The remaining five intend to sign it in the near future. But the ink on the treaty was hardly dry before American diplomacy began its usual "arm-twisting."

The main aim of these maneuvers is to prevent the states belonging to the new nuclear-free zone from following New Zealand in denying access to U.S. ships and planes carrying nuclear weapons.

U.S. agents are operating particularly actively with regard to New Zealand, whose government they are trying to force to renounce its intention to enshrine the country's nuclear-free status in law. The United States, it would appear, is rehearsing and making practical preparations for a scenario familiar from the events in Australia in 1975. Then the CIA mounted a "quiet revolution" in the country through the agency of the former governor-general and people close to him, which resulted in the Whitlam Labor government's being removed from office ahead of term. That was how Labor politicians paid at that time for their attempt to place American military bases on Australian territory under national control.

Some Western press organs do not rule out the possibility of similar "scenarios" for Wellington, as well as other "recalcitrant" states in the South Pacific. It is no coincidence that Pentagon chief Weinberger is making provocative appeals to the "New Zealand people" over the head of their government. Nor is it coincidental that the State Department is trying to intimidate the island states with the "Soviet threat," advising them "not to trust the USSR" or trade with it. In roughly the same way, that is, as they tried to intimidate the Australians in 1975.

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GENERAL

DENMARK JOINS NORDIC PROPOSAL FOR TOTAL NUCLEAR TEST BAN

Copenhagen INFORMATION in Danish 29-30 Jun 85 p 5

[Article: "Denmark Joins Nordic Proposal For Total Nuclear Test Ban: Pronounced Disarmament Points Of View Get Support From Government"]

[Text] The Danish government views a "comprehensive nuclear test ban agreement" supported by all countries as an "effective improvement" in chances to prevent the acquisition of nuclear weapons by many countries.

This emerges from a reply by Foreign Minister Uffe Ellemann-Jensen to the foreign policy spokesmen of the Social Democratic, Socialist People's, Radical Liberal and Leftist Socialist Parties.

Together with the other Nordic countries, Denmark will make a proposal on this matter at a conference in which countries which have signed the so-called non-proliferation agreement will participate.

The conference will take place at the beginning of September and will review progress and setbacks of attempts to prevent even more countries from getting their hands on nuclear weapons.

The minister stated that the Nordic countries have engaged in "intensive cooperation with regard to coordinating and harmonizing points of view."

"The background is of course that the Nordic countries jointly have a better chance of being heard and that the Nordic countries are known for taking a positive and progressive position" on the non-proliferation agreement.

The Minister sees it as natural for the Nordic countries to sit down together after the conference in order to assess its results. He is open to the idea that the political parties be able to send representatives to the conference, which will be the case in the other participating countries.

Uffe Ellemann-Jensen's letter is a reply to an inquiry from the foreign policy spokesmen of the Radical Liberal, Social Democratic, Socialist People's and Leftist Socialist Parties.

The four spokesmen encouraged the foreign minister to act on a series of recommendations to the government in a motion for a decision from the Socialist People's Party which was not approved before the summer recess.

It is implicit in the minister's letter that the government will act on proposals from the security policy majority, as it has agreed with them all along.

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GENERAL

BRIEFS

IAEA TO INSPECT SOVIET PLANTS--Vienna, 7 Aug (AFP)--The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) will inspect two nuclear power stations and an experimental reactor in the Soviet Union before the end of this month, an agency spokesman said here today. The spokesman said the nuclear sites were chosen from a list of several submitted by Moscow last February. He declined to indicate the precise location of those to be inspected. The Soviet Union authorized verification in an agreement signed 21 February with the IAEA, a UN agency which monitors use of nuclear power. [Text] [Paris AFP in English 1558 GMT 7 Aug 85]

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U.S.-USSR GENEVA TALKS

USSR: PROGRESS DEPENDS ON NATO ATTITUDE

PM131513 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 13 Aug 85 First Edition p 4

[Article by V. Kashirin: "Do the NATO Leaders Want Success in Vienna?"]

[Text] The Vienna talks on the mutual reduction of armed forces and armaments and related measures in central Europe are one forum where Soviet representatives together with delegations from the fraternal countries are waging a persistent struggle for headway on the path of military detente.

Why the Marathon?

The Vienna talks opened 30 October 1973. Since then the old-world Hofburg palace has witnessed over 30 rounds and still no end is in sight. Why?

The start of the Vienna dialogue seemed promising. During preliminary consultations which ended in the Austrian capital in the summer of 1973, the subject matter of the talks was defined (it is described by the forum's official name, cited above) as was their common task, helping to create more stable relations and to strengthen peace and security in Europe while observing the principle of not impairing the security of any country.

At the same time, the borders were delineated for the region of the reduction and for the application of measures related to this reduction: the totality of the territories of the GDR, Poland, and the CSSR and also the FRG, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg. It was also decided that not only the armed forces personnel but also the armaments of the states with troops in central Europe, to wit the USSR, the GDR, Poland, and the CSSR on the one hand and the United States, Britain, the FRG, Belgium, the Netherlands, Canada, and Luxembourg on the other, would be subject to reduction. These countries were called the direct participants in the talks while the others (Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania, and Italy, Norway, Denmark, Greece, and Turkey) had special status.

Finally it was stipulated later that, as a result of all reductions, the total numerical strength of the Warsaw Pact and NATO Armed Forces in Central Europe should be reduced to equal collective levels; 900,000 men each, including 700,000 ground troops for each side.

The main task of the Vienna talks, halting the buildup and reducing the concentration of armed forces and armaments in central Europe without impairing anyone's security,

thus gained the necessary conditions for its solution. And had the West displayed due political will, a mutually acceptable accord could have been reached long ago. That did not happen. Moreover, through the fault of the United States and its NATO allies the talks have been deadlocked for a long time. The recently completed 36th round also failed to make any headway.

It is not the numerous disputes and complications which depress world public opinion everywhere. As is well known, talks do not usually proceed smoothly, especially on such a complex issue. But the trouble is that obstacles in Vienna are being created artificially, exclusively to vindicate the reluctance of the United States and its allies to reach an agreement with the Warsaw Pact states on the basis of the principle of parity and identical security.

Two fundamentally different approaches toward the implementation of the talks' mandate appeared long ago in Vienna. Proceeding from the approximate equilibrium which has formed between the two military groupings in central Europe, the socialist countries have suggested a mutual reduction of armed forces and armaments on the basis of equal numbers or an equal percentage.

Washington and its partners have set themselves a totally different goal. Here it must be noted that the forces which are blocking the success of the important talks are directing the actions not only of the U.S. delegation but also of a number of delegations of the West European NATO countries. In particular the position of official Bonn, which is giving a hostile reception to any proposals which restrict the Bundeswehr even slightly, is far from constructive.

In brief, the NATO side is "borrowing" the worst experience of other talks on problems of military detente. It invariably tries to foist onto the Soviet Union and the other Warsaw Pact states inequitable conditions and restrictive commitments which, if they were realized, would create unilateral military advantages for NATO.

The Same "Figures Barrier"

The notorious "concept of disproportions" serves as the political and propaganda justification for the NATO officials' claims. According to this concept, the Soviet Union and the other Warsaw Pact countries have a substantial superiority in central Europe in terms of the numbers of armed forces and the quantity of their main conventional armaments and therefore should reduce their troops in far greater volumes than the NATO countries.

Yet the "figures discussion," which has been going on for several years with regard to the numerical strength of each side's armed forces in the area of reduction and during which there has been on two occasions, in 1976 and 1980, an exchange of figures on each side's troops, has merely confirmed the existence of approximate parity. For instance, as of 1 January 1980, NATO had 991,000 men in Central Europe, including 792,500 in the ground forces. The total numerical strength of the Warsaw Pact countries in this region as of 1 August 1980 (after the Soviet Union had unilaterally withdrawn 20,000 troops from GDR territory) was 979,000, including 796,700 in the ground forces.

The Western demands, deliberately unacceptable to the Warsaw Pact, on the question of monitoring the agreement's fulfillment are another serious obstacle. These claims were formulated in concentrated form in the "package" of accompanying measures submitted by the NATO countries. It contains, for instance, demands such as the monitoring of extra-garrison activity of troop formations beginning at division level, the extension of control beyond the agreed region of reductions, including the USSR's eight western border military districts, and ground and air inspections. In brief, the NATO countries were guided not by interests in achieving a mutually acceptable accord, but by a desire to control virtually the entire military activity of the Warsaw Pact Armed Forces.

The obstructionist nature of the NATO countries' stance is also making itself felt in the persistent refusal to reduce armaments together with troops, and to limit the numerical strength of their air forces to 200,000 men and the size of military exercises to a ceiling of 40,000-50,000 men.

In an attempt to overcome the deadlock and above all the "figures barrier," the socialist states suggested a different approach in February 1983, a simple and practical one which would open the way to reaching an agreement. Its thrust is to stop the futile "figures discussion" and for each side to reduce its troops in central Europe as much as is needed to reach a lower level, the same for NATO and the Warsaw Pact, enshrined in a treaty, 900,000 for each alliance. To develop this proposal and to give it a basis in treaty and law, on 23 June 1983 the socialist countries submitted the draft "agreement on the mutual reduction of armed forces and armaments and related measures in central Europe." But this initiative of the Warsaw Pact states failed to meet with a positive response from their Western partners in the talks. Their proposal in reply, made in April last year, does not help to bring the sides' positions closer and on a number of issues it even sets them back.

The Point of the New Step

The lack of any prospect of reaching a broad-scale agreement in Vienna, would only please the adversaries of detente, if it could please anyone at all. That is why the socialist countries have taken a step on the path of seeking at least a partial agreement. The USSR and its allies, while leaving in force their draft agreement, submitted, on 14 February 1985, a draft "basic provisions of an agreement on an initial reduction of ground forces and armaments in central Europe by the Soviet Union and the United States and a subsequent nonincrease in the levels of the sides' armed forces and armaments in this region."

What specifically are the Warsaw Pact countries now proposing?

First, that within a year of the agreement coming into force the USSR and U.S. troops in central Europe be reduced by 20,000 and 13,000 men respectively in the form of combat units and their standard weaponry; up to 10 percent of these reductions could be carried out in the form of individual servicemen.

Second, upon the completion of the projected reduction of Soviet and U.S. troops, all states involved in the agreement would undertake, on a collective and national basis, not to increase the level of their armed forces and armaments in central Europe for the next 2 years.

Third, alongside the use of national technical means of control at the sides' disposal, specific measures for ensuring the agreement's fulfillment are planned such as the exchange of lists of units subject to reduction and withdrawal; reciprocal notification of the beginning and end of practical reduction measures; and the creation by each side, for the withdrawal period, of three or four observation posts through which the troops subject to reduction would be withdrawn.

The draft stipulates that after it has been implemented, talks on further, larger reductions would be continued until the ultimate aim was achieved, establishing equal collective levels for the sides' armed forces in central Europe at a lower level.

The point of the Warsaw Pact countries' new proposal is that it makes it feasible to achieve the first specific results on the way to practical reduction of the excessive concentration of troops and armaments in the center of the continent. This is the best that can be done in the present situation at the Vienna talks. Take note: The socialist countries' proposal focuses attention on those elements on which it is possible to have an agreement right now.

The achievement of the first specific positive result in Vienna, even in the form of a partial agreement, would be of important military-political and psychological significance. The level of military antagonism in central Europe would be substantially reduced (by 33,000 men). For the first time in several years, a limit would be set on the buildup of armed forces and armaments. Mutual trust would be strengthened and the prestige of the talks themselves would be asserted. The situation on the continent would improve.

Some 6 months have elapsed since the socialist countries' new proposal was submitted. But the NATO countries have still not voiced a principled attitude toward it. During the recent round of talks they kept to their old, stagnant positions. Hackneyed allegations that the so-called "geographical factor" operates in the Warsaw Pact's favor were again put into play. (The thrust of this factor is that the USSR is in the immediate vicinity of the reduction zone while the United States is separated by an ocean; but here it is "forgotten" that nine NATO states are adjacent to this zone). There was talk of the "inexpediency" of resolving the question of reducing or not increasing armaments; of the "inadequacy" of the monitoring measures proposed by the socialist countries; and so forth.

In brief, the last round showed that neither the United States nor its closest allies want to do anything really substantial to reduce the level of military antagonism. The only thing the NATO leaders would not object to is that the Vienna talks lead to a certain reduction in the numerical strength of military personnel alone. But here too, terms unacceptable to the socialist countries have accumulated, terms in the nature of hypertrophied monitoring measures which have nothing in common with the interests of normalizing the situation in Europe.

The Western countries' obstructionist line in Vienna and the unilateral nature of their positions, like their reluctance to seek mutually acceptable decisions, are no accident. They are a continuation and reflection of NATO's military-political concepts and practical actions, which are in flagrant contradiction with the talks' aims and point. One cannot fail to see that the material military preparations and accelerated programs for the technical updating and qualitative improvement of the armaments of the armies of all leading NATO countries are by no means aimed at curbing and restricting the growth of armed forces and armaments, but at their all-around buildup. The Western delegations' approach in Vienna is increasingly adapting to the NATO bloc's long-term military planning, which is pursuing the unrealizable goal of military superiority over the Warsaw Pact.

Without forgetting the interests of reliably safeguarding their defense capability, the socialist countries, at the same time, have done and are continuing to do everything possible to curb and limit the arms race through sensible agreements. But headway, including on the "Vienna salient," does not depend only on the Warsaw Pact. Let the NATO states stop pretending that there is absolutely no need for them to make adequate constructive efforts to achieve mutually acceptable solutions and a positive result at the Vienna talks. There is a possibility of making headway in Vienna. It depends on whether the NATO countries finally give a constructive reply to the socialist countries' recent proposal. This reply will show whether the NATO countries want the talks to succeed.

U.S.-USSR GENEVA TALKS

USSR: KVITSINSKIY STRESSES INTERDEPENDENCE OF GENEVA ISSUES

AU141316 East Berlin HORIZONT in German No 8, Aug 85 p 5

[Interview granted by Ambassador Yuliy Kvitsinskiy, head of the Space Weapons Working Group of the USSR delegation to the Geneva negotiations, to HORIZONT Moscow correspondent Gerhard Zazworka on 25 July 1985 after the Moscow press conference on space armament]

[Text] HORIZONT: What must be done at the Geneva negotiations to prevent a further acceleration of the armament spiral and to bring about the final objective of halting the arms race at least in the most dangerous fields?

Yu. Kvitsinskiy: The one step that must not be delayed in order to prevent a further acceleration of the armament spiral is a prohibition of offensive space weapons. This is the key issue in the negotiations. If the arms race in space is not prevented, it will not be possible to halt the nuclear arms race. These subjects are mutually dependent. This has found expression in the Soviet-American agreement of January 1985, in which the goal and subject of the Geneva negotiations were established. This agreement has to be fulfilled in all parts. If this is done, then there are chances for solutions in all three main parts of the negotiations concerning offensive space weapons, strategic offensive weapons, and medium-range weapons.

In all three fields concrete results must be reached while always taking into consideration the interrelations between the problem of preventing armaments in space and halting the arms race on earth. If this were not taken into consideration, it would not be possible to work out steps for comprehensively reducing nuclear weapons.

HORIZONT: How do you assess the course of the Soviet-American negotiations in Geneva to date?

Yu. Kvitsinskiy: The basic assessment of the course of the negotiations and the U.S. position was contained in Mikhail Gorbachev's speech in Dnepropetrovsk in June. Since then the situation at the Geneva negotiations has not changed. The U.S. side is blocking any advance. The United States keeps the negotiations running in pace, particularly by refusing to carry out any effective measures to prevent armament in space. It is, however, especially this problem on which the situation in other fields of the negotiations depends. This is no precondition; it is an objective fact.

It is impossible to agree on a reduction of nuclear weapons, if it is not clear what is happening in space.

Also, in the case of strategic offensive weapons in general, the U.S. position is as obstructive as it is on the question of preventing armament in space. The proposals submitted by the United States during the negotiations reiterated the former position of 1983, which even then thwarted a reduction or a halt of the arms race in the field of strategic offensive weapons. The current U.S. Administration again and again asserts that the former Soviet-American agreements have not resulted in a real reduction and that now the United States is striving for such a reduction. But these words are not confirmed by any facts. The American position at the negotiations is aimed at an increase and improvement of offensive nuclear weapons.

Concerning the field of medium-range missiles in Europe, the situation at the negotiations is also unsatisfactory. The United States has not followed our example of introducing a moratorium on medium-range missiles. It is, on the contrary, increasing the nuclear confrontation in Europe by continually deploying first-strike weapons.

Our position is: We are against a further exacerbation of nuclear confrontation. We are for a drastic reduction of the level of nuclear confrontation in Europe concerning medium-range missiles and medium-range planes.

HORIZONT: American and Western European mass media are still proceeding from the old NATO slogan that the USSR has military superiority, so that the United States cannot conclude an agreement in Geneva from the viewpoint of equality in armament reduction. In addition the United States is blocking a ban on space weapons, arguing that the USSR only wants to safeguard its military lead in this. What do things really look like?

Yu. Kvitsinskiy: All contentions of the United States that a moratorium on space and nuclear weapons is impossible because this has unilateral advantages for the Soviet Union contradict reality. Concerning offensive space weapons it is a fact that both sides do not yet actually have any weapons of this kind. Why should any advantages result for one side, therefore, if development, testing, and deployment of such weapons were prohibited? Concerning the situation in the field of strategic offensive weapons the SALT II Treaty determines a balance of these weapons. Observing this balance would be of no harm to either side. A moratorium on strategic offensive weapons would fully comply with the principle of equal security.

Concerning the medium-range weapons in Europe there is an approximate military balance. NATO has a superiority of 1.5 times in nuclear warheads for these weapons. Therefore a moratorium on these weapons would by no means signify that NATO is making unilateral concessions.

Since, however, to date the United States has not done anything which might lead to reductions in armament and to halting the arms race in all three main fields, it is clear that it does not actually strive for effective steps to check the arms race. But it is precisely such measures that are demanded by peoples all over the world, and particularly in Europe.

CSO: 5200/1355

U.S.-USSR GENEVA TALKS

BRIEFS

SOVIET-DANISH CONSULTATIONS--Copenhagen, 9 Aug (TASS)--Soviet-Danish political consultations on a broad range of international questions, including the problem of ending the arms race, the state of affairs at the Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe, preparations for the 40th U.N. General Assembly session, were held at Denmark's Foreign Ministry on 8-9 August. Taking part in the consultations from the Soviet side were First Deputy Foreign Minister of the USSR Viktor Maltsev, USSR Ambassador to Denmark Lev Mendelevich, head of the Scandinavian Countries' Department of the USSR Foreign Ministry Georgiy Farafonov, from the Danish side--Director-General of the Foreign Ministry, First Deputy Foreign Minister Otto Moeller, Denmark's Ambassador to the USSR Rudolph Anton Thorning-Petersen, head of a department of Denmark's Foreign Ministry V. Egebjerg, other senior officials of the foreign ministries of the two countries. Viktor Maltsev was received by Prime Minister of Denmark Poul Schluter, and had a conversation with Foreign Minister Uffe Ellemann-Jensen. In the course of the meetings an exchange of opinions was held on questions of the USSR-Denmark relations and also on some international problems of mutual interest. [Text] [Moscow TASS in English 1758 GMT 9 Aug 85]

CSO: 5200/1355

USSR: JULY-AUGUST COMMENTS ON ALLIED RESPONSE TO SDI

Fears of U.S. 'Brain Hunt'

LD071514 Moscow TASS in English 1449 GMT 7 Aug 85

[Text] Moscow, August 7 TASS -- By TASS news analyst Leonid Ponomarev:

THE TIMES of London reports today that the U.S. embassy in Britain sent a letter to leading British scientists inviting them to take part in carrying out President Reagan's "star wars" program. Among the promises and assurances the embassy makes in the letter it mentions specific sums which the Pentagon allocated for the realization of different ideas linked with the development of a variety of weapons and means of their protection. This is nothing new for Washington to buy up brains. But the letter of the embassy demonstrates that the Washington administration is launching a large-scale "brain hunt" outside the United States in order to concentrate scientists on the early realization of space militarization programs. Groups of U.S. experts have already visited a number of countries to dispell fears of U.S. partners concerning the dangerous implications of the "star wars" program, or the "Strategic Defense Initiative", as it is called for camouflage. At the same time U.S. NATO allies and Japan are being lured by promises of vast economic benefits allegedly involved in efforts to give the United States space-weapons capability.

However, there are some very serious doubts concerning these promises. U.S. Western partners have no reason to trust Washington which always pursues its own self-serving interests everywhere. To hope that it will share the latest findings with its allies/rivals means to engage in wishful thinking. Canada's TORONTO STAR writes in this connection that the participation in President Reagan's space plan is not likely to yield much money or create many jobs. There is little hope that significant economic benefits will be derived from the plan, the paper stresses, while the impact on industry will be minimal.

The matter is that the Pentagon uses the "Strategic Defense Initiative" solely for the purpose of developing new types of weapons. That is why, as Robert Reich, political economist with Harvard University believes, prospects for commercial application of military technology (for civilian purposes) are narrowing down. The NEWSWEEK magazine admits that the military and the scientists pool their efforts primarily at arms development laboratories. As to the "Strategic Defense Initiative", it opens such vast prospects that, as American physicist Lawrence West put it, the development of a number of new types of weapons is limited only by creative capabilities of researchers.

Hence, from the military point of view the "Strategic Defense Initiative" is a step leading into an abyss.

Coming to think of the "economic benefits" promised by Washington, by ideas and technologies which after all may stem from the "star wars" program will surely benefit primarily the American monopolies. Western European and other companions will undoubtedly find themselves in an inferior position, since the "brains" bought up by Washington will leave their "products" in the United States. It is natural that the "brain drain" will inevitably weaken the economies of those countries in general, for they will be unable to compete with the United States on a par. Americans do not bother to conceal that they are hunting for everything new, even if that damages the interests of their friends. James Abrahamson, the general in charge of the realization of the "star wars" program, told one of the committees of the Congress that the Washington administration was specially interested in diverse new equipment and technology which made it possible, as he put it, to react to rapidly changing requirements.

And these requirements are defined by the over-all military strategy aimed at attaining superiority over all potential adversaries and competitors of the United States.

U.S.-UK Differences

LD122036 Moscow TASS in English 1944 GMT 2 Aug 85

[Text] London, August 2 TASS -- There are serious differences between Britain and the United States over the participation of British companies and research establishments in conducting research into technologies under the "star wars" programme. British observers write commenting on a round of talks between Michael Heseltine, British secretary of state for defence, and later Margaret Thatcher, prime minister, and Caspar Weinberger, U.S. defense secretary, that have recently been held in Washington.

Britain is pressing the United States into paying over 1,000 million sterling for Britain's participation in the programme linked with the "Strategic Defence Initiative", a Washington correspondent of the DAILY TELEGRAPH writes. The U.S. Administration, the paper points out, was caught unawares by the demand made by M. Heseltine and M. Thatcher during their visits to the United States. Some of the Americans naively counted that Britain would ensure the initiative a political back-up and the United States would confine itself just to offering Britain some "crumbs from the master's table".

The British proposals substantially transcend the framework of the project which was initially advanced by Washington, the FINANCIAL TIMES writes. Observers, the paper goes on, are convinced that by putting forth its proposals the United States counted on its allies' political support rather than on their involvement in the development of space arms. Whereas London would like to receive guarantees from the United States that work to realise the U.S. initiative would mean a technology exchange on a bilateral basis.

The money, which Britain tries to get from Washington, are intended for British companies, universities, and state-run research institutions that are capable of making their contribution to implementation of the U.S. project, the DAILY TELEGRAPH writes. It is expected, however, the FINANCIAL TIMES points out, that the U.S. Congress will oppose access for Britain to sensitive research work. This stand is certain to fuel fears both in Britain and in other European countries that involvement in the "star wars" project may lead to a one-way "brain and technology drain" across the Atlantic Ocean.

Heseltine-Weinberger Talks

LD232149 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1645 GMT 23 Jul 85

[From the "International Diary" program presented by Igor Charikov]

[Excerpts] Talks have begun in Washington between the Secretaries for Defense of the United States and Britain, Weinberger and Heseltine. UPI reports that the question of Britain's participation in research work on the "Star Wars" program--this is the U.S. administration's plans to create strike space weapons--is being discussed at the talks. I asked my colleague Viktor Levin to comment on this report.

[Levin] If one is to believe the leading British bourgeois papers, then British Secretary of State for Defense Heseltine is faced with what is all but a technical task: to find out, at the TIMES wrote, from his American colleague whether British firms will be allocated the role of subcontractors or whether they will get some main contracts. The DAILY TELEGRAPH formulates the British minister's task in approximately the same way. The secretary of state for defense, it wrote on the eve of Heseltine's visit over the ocean, will try to clear up two questions: The areas in which British scientists and industrialists may use their potentialities, and the extent to which the United States will restrict the transfer of progressive technology to Great Britain.

In fact, what is concerned here is Britain's joining in the program of research work on the creation of a strike space weapon. And this is primarily not of technical significance, but of political significance. The essence of it lies in the fact that Britain is the first to express readiness to actively support the dangerous American plans for the militarization of space, which are fraught with a sharp increase in the threat of the outbreak of war. And if one takes into consideration that even among the United States' NATO partners caution clearly dominates with respect to the "Star War" plans, then Britain's zeal acquires particular significance.

[Charkov] Viktor Nikolayevich, you said that according to the DAILY TELEGRAPH Heseltine intends to find out what the Americans can propose to British scientists. But after all, it is known that the majority of British scientists are resolutely against "Star Wars."

[Levin] Quite true, and particular attention should be paid to this aspect of the matter. In a letter to the GUARDIAN, Cambridge University Professor Robert Hind notes that the "Star Wars" program will lead to an undermining of international agreements, in which the need for peaceful coexistence is acknowledged. And this is what a petition signed by 70 well-known British scientists in the sphere of computer technology, said: They firmly reject participation in development of the American "Star Wars" program. We, the scientists stressed, do not intend to work on this plan, as its realization would be equivalent to suicide. Incidentally, the SUNDAY TIMES, after this petition was published, noted that the scientists' stand will put the Thatcher government in a delicate situation. But as Heseltine's trip to the United States shows, the present Cabinet of Ministers is even ready to disregard

the opinion of its own scientists, in its striving to please Washington.

[Charikov] Yes, and the Washington administration is acting in exactly the same way. The Union of Concerned Scientists which includes several hundred eminent scientists, members of the National Academy of Science, came out in favor of a ban on the creation and testing of space weapons. But President Reagan did not even begin to discuss their proposal.

[Levin] And this was in particularly sharp contrast against the background of Comrade Gorbachev's reply to the appeal by the Union of Concerned Scientists. The Soviet leader said that the Soviet Union would not be the first to move into space with weapons and would make every effort to convince other countries too, above all the United States, not to take such a fateful step which would inevitably increase the threat of nuclear war and give American and British scientists and specialists from other countries understand this threat very well, as the facts show. But the British Government, together with its senior partner from Washington, is closing its eyes to this threat and taking a heavy responsibility upon itself. It is in this way, and only in this way, that Heseltine's visit to the United States should be assessed.

Opposition Grows in Britain

LD300656 Moscow TASS in English 0464 GMT 30 Jul 85

["Britain and 'Star Wars'"]---TASS headline]

[Text] Moscow July 30 TASS -- The intensive political struggle now unfolding on the international scene over Washington's "star wars" program is displaying more and more clearly one symptomatic tendency: The more persistent and energetic the White House is pushing through this program, the stronger the public protests and the keener and more substantiated the criticism of the Pentagon's plans to militarise space by those who are aware of the dimensions of the threat posed to mankind, PRAVDA's London correspondent Arkadiy Maslennikov says. In Britain, as in other Western countries, this growing criticism is spearheaded by scientists, who understand by virtue of their occupation the nature of the technical and military-strategic problems involved in the implementation of that program.

Since the "star wars" concept was formulated in March 1983, the British Government, like the governments of some other NATO countries, has made quite a few controversial statements. It is trying to work out a stand which would not "offend" the powerful overseas ally, on the one hand, and would not be too divergent from the sentiments of the British public, unwilling to become involved in the new ventures of the Pentagon, on the other. That is why the British Government says that, though it is not against the pursuit of the "research part" of the SDI program, it would like the actual spread of the arms race into space to be avoided, the correspondent says.

The voice of the peace-loving public is carrying especially much weight in this situation. In Britain this voice is sounding ever stronger at rallies and demonstrations organized by progressive political parties, trade unions and various anti-war organisations, the role and public prestige of which have grown immeasurably over the past few years.

The campaign for nuclear disarmament, which today has a membership of about 110,000 activists, is making energetic efforts to block the spread of the arms race to space. The Labour Party of Britain is consistently opposed to the extension of the arms race to space as well. Notable members of the Liberal and Social Democratic parties and sensible politicians from among the conservatives themselves have lately made quite a few critical remarks on the U.S. plans to militarise space.

The conviction is gaining momentum in the broad public and political sectors of Britain today that the hopes of the U.S. "hawks" to achieve world supremacy through the militarisation of space must be crushed.

'Keen Debate' in FRG

PM311117 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 28 Jul 85 First Edition p 4

[Yevgeniy Grigoryev "International Review"]

[Excerpt]

A Keen Debate

It is the holiday season, "gherkin time," in West Germany, when political life is at a standstill. But this has not reduced the temperature of the debate taking place there in the political and public arena about the question of FRG involvement in the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) program, or rather, the creation of space offensive weapons and militarization of near-earth space.

There are a number of reasons for this; first, the significance of the problem. Federal Chancellor H. Kohl, who is, in principle, a supporter of SDI, noted the other day that it "will have a very strong influence on relations between East and West and on relations between the United States and Europe." He admitted that this venture is a "risk" as well as an "opportunity." Second, the FRG, by the dint of its leading position in NATO, and its economic, financial, and scientific and technical potential, finds itself at the epicenter in Western Europe of all the problems caused by the appearance of the U.S. "star wars" program.

"When the FRG shouts, the rest of Europe jumps," the U.S. paper THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR observed. "This explains the intensive campaign to involve Bonn in the U.S. program."

But it also means that the present FRG leaders have a special responsibility for what happens on the continent and whether or not the spread of the arms race to space is prevented. Finally, since we are talking about security problems, and they are the main problems in the FRG's relations with the socialist countries, then the stance that Bonn adopts is bound to have a significant effect on its Ostpolitik.

As we can see, the "star wars" program has turned out to be a tough nut for West German ruling circles, especially since a broad strata of the country's public have fathomed its aggressive and egotistical nature. The Social Democrats and the Greens Party, not to mention the powerful opposition outside parliament, have opposed participation in SDI. On behalf of its 7.6 million members, the German trade union federation stated recently that "the implementation of the SDI concept would fundamentally disrupt

strategic equilibrium and give rise to a new round of an arms race of unprecedented proportions." The FRG public's attitude toward the "star wars" program is predominantly negative.

But there is another pole. It is the extreme right wing of the Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union (CDU/CSU) bloc, personified by such figures as Bavarian Prime Minister F.J. Strauss and CDU/CSU Bundestag faction chairman A. Dregger. They are demanding that Bonn rush headlong into "star wars" and "participate in the program at a state level." On setting off for the United States this week Strauss again declared categorically that the "FRG Government must consider the question of concluding a treaty between Washington and Bonn on FRG participation in SDI."

Apparently, right-wing views continue to determine Bonn's line. But its leaders cannot turn a blind eye to the country's mood. France's definite "no" to the U.S. program canceled the original Rhine design to use the EEC countries' collective participation as a cover. This must also be taken into account in Bonn's calculations. The situation in the ruling coalition itself evidently presents certain difficulties too, since there have been demands from the ranks of the Free Democratic Party parliamentary faction for "the most critical approach" to participation in SDI. All this is prompting Bonn to make new maneuvers and even take initiatives.

On one hand, the FRG ruling circles apparently want to avoid involvement in the "star wars" program. Judging by a recent interview with W. Schaeuble, leader of the federal chancellor's department (in DIE WELT), they have opted for a "bilateral agreement" with the United States which would regulate participation in SDI by West German private firms alone. The logic behind it is as follows: If the government does not contribute to the financing of the agreement, then it cannot be seen as a form of state participation. The minister also talked about the conclusion between the FRG and the United States of a "model treaty" which would serve as an example to other West European governments. But for all its efforts, Bonn is still performing the part of fixer for the "star wars" program in Western Europe. The differences between participating in the program for the creation of space strike weapons on a state or private monopoly basis are not enough to cosmeticize a complicity that endangers peace.

It is known that Bonn has decided to join in the Eureka technological program put forward by France, which its authors assure us, is designed to serve purely peaceful purposes. But it was Schaeuble again who made the meaningful statement in this connection that there are "related fields bordering on scientific research for military purposes." It is noted on the Rhine that SDI and Eureka do not contradict one another and do not "counterbalance" one another. It was there that first, A. Dregger and then others introduced the notion of a "supplement" to SDI.

It was only the other day, as GENERAL-ANZEIGER writes, that Bonn departments came up with the idea of elaborating and implementing a "European defense initiative." It is proposed to implement it in tandem with Eureka and with the utilization of its results; the intention being to create an integrated ABM system, an "intelligent weapon" to strike deep into enemy defenses, and also spy satellites. This looks like a desire to actually, rather than formally, link the development of space and supplementary weapons systems on both sides of the Atlantic. Obviously, if these plans are implemented, the arms race would assume an even more massive and unbridled character. And Bonn, judging by all its activity, would be one of the senior "coauthors."

But Bonn must see what kind of deadlock this brings about. Indeed, Vice Chancellor and Foreign Minister Genscher noted that "the policy of detente in the world and an arms race and confrontation in space are incompatible." There have been other calls on the Rhine lately for a "new phase in the realistic policy of detente." But can detente be realistic if the aforementioned Bonn ideas and intentions are actually implemented?

FRG Weapons Plans

LD051948 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1445 GMT 5 Aug 85

[From the "World Today" program presented by Aleksandr Zholkyer]

[Excerpt]

The latest flight of the American spacecraft Challenger is to be completed tomorrow. In this connection the American press notes that the flights of the 'shuttle' system are being ever more widely used by the Pentagon for the preparation of "star wars."

For the implementation of these plans Washington is also seeking to utilize the military and scientific-and-technical potential of its allies. In Western Europe this is first of all the FRG. Very influential forces exist here which would not be averse, via the notorious U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative, to join in the production of the latest kinds of armaments.

Dregger, the chairman of the CSU/CDU group in the Bundestag states unequivocally that participation in American space projects is desirable in the interests of West German industry.

Strauss, chairman of the Bavarian CSU, is one of the principal pushers of the American "star wars" plans. He is connected especially closely with military concerns in the FRG whose major enterprises are situated in the selfsame Bavaria.

FRG Business Support

LD271853 Moscow TASS in English 1748 GMT 27 Jul 85

["Dangerous Cooperation"--TASS headline]

[Text] Moscow July 27 TASS -- TASS political news analyst Sergey Kulik writes:

With obvious connivance of the Bonn authorities war industry corporations of the FRG join in the competition for profits they can get from participation in the U.S. plans of the militarisation of space. Following a statement of West German Defense Minister Manfred Woerner that his government is striving to conclude a basic agreement with the USA which would make possible the participation of FRG firms in the United States programmes, "Messerschmitt-Boelkow Blohm" aviation and space corporation announced its intention to take part in the U.S. project of the preparation of "star wars".

Another major war industry corporation of the FRG, "Rheinmetall" in cooperation with Lower Saxony Government intends to embark shortly on the setting up of a big research centre which will be developing the latest types of arms, including those that are envisaged by the U.S. programme of "star wars".

In an interview to FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU, a spokesman for the corporation confirmed that it has been cooperating closely with the United States in the military sphere for a long time.

Vast interest of the West German militaristic circles in the development and creation of strike space arms is nothing surprising. For the joining in Washington's programme of the militarisation of space would enable Bonn to enhance its military-political status still more, to largely "compensate" for the bans on the production of nuclear and chemical weapons in the FRG and thus enable Bonn to become a force capable of dictating its will in Western Europe. The interest in this on the Rhine goes so far that Bonn sharply declares against any attempts of its West European allies, specifically France, to conduct an independent policy in some or other degree.

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Despite the obvious opposition of the majority of West European countries to Bonn's solidarity with Washington in the question of the preparation of "star wars", the conditioning of Western Germans in favor of the militarisation of space is conducted full blast. But it fails to achieve the expected result. This is explained, partially, by the effect of the "Pershing Syndrome", which is manifested, specifically in the fact that people who were quite recently promised that they will acquire greater security with the deployment of U.S. first strike missiles on the FRG territory now feel to have been deceived. And the matter is not only that. The awareness of all the dangerous consequences of the militarisation of space becomes ever more clear.

This is what the West German journal DER SPIEGEL writes in this connection: "The FRG's backing for the SDI programme will mean the FRG being reduced to the role of the United States' complete vassal... the consequences are easy to foresee: an end to detente, a new confrontation, new crisis situations. The United States will take complete control of the destiny of the Federal Republic."

Italian Senators Demand Briefing

LD051243 Moscow TASS in English 1222 GMT 5 Aug 85

[Text] Rome, August 5 TASS -- The group of communist senators has demanded that the Italian Cabinet clearly express its stand on the issue of the "star wars" program. The inquiry addressed to Prime Minister Bettino Craxi says that the Communist Party of Italy opposes any participation of the country in the implementation of the plans to create a large-scale ABM system with space-based elements. Representatives of the Italian Communist Party have urged the government to inform the Parliament about the results of the recent visit to the USA of an official Italian delegation to discuss the possible plans of Italy's participation in the so-called "Strategic Defence Initiative."

ASAT Arms in Japan

PM300842 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 29 Jul 85 First Edition p 5

[TASS report: "Including Japan"]

[Text] Tokyo, 28 Jul -- The Pentagon is preparing to deploy space weapons on the Japanese islands. The newspaper AKAHATA reports today that the F-15 fighters stationed at the American Kadena Air Base on Okinawa will be equipped with antisatellite missiles of the ASAT system. Some 72 F-15's are based at Kadena. In the very near future these aircraft will start to be reequipped with the latest electronic equipment needed to launch these missiles, which has already been delivered to Kadena.

AKAHATA emphasizes that antisatellite missiles are a constituent element of Washington's so-called "Strategic Defense Initiative." The plan to deploy space weapons on Japanese territory attests to the fact that the Reagan administration intends to include Japan within the orbit of the aggressive "star wars" strategy.

Canadian Labor Congress

LD191435 Moscow TASS in English 1425 GMT 19 Jul 85

[Text] Ottawa, 19 Jul (TASS)--A call to the Canadian Government to refuse to participate in the Reagan programme of "Star Wars" was made by the Canadian Labour Congress, the biggest Canadian trade union organization, which has a membership of over two million people. The statement of the Canadian Labour Congress addressed to the Parliament notes that the majority of the Canadians declare against any measures that could lead to the militarisation of space. The congress demanded that the Canadian Government should promote in every way the conclusion of an agreement on nuclear arms limitation and reduction, the easing of tension in East-West relations.

Israel To Join

LD311359 Moscow TASS in English 1330 GMT 31 Jul 85

["Half a Loaf Is Better Than no Bread"--TASS headline]

[Text] Moscow, July 31 TASS -- By TASS political news analyst Boris Shabayev

United States Assistant Secretary of Defence Richard Perle, speaking at a press conference in Bonn, has solemnly announced that Israel has become the first country to give its final consent to participation in the American "star wars" project which Washington stubbornly portrays as a "defence initiative".

The sigh of relief which escaped Perle's lips is easy to understand. They in Washington are hell-bent to draw their allies in the implementation of the extremely dangerous undertaking and thus make them share responsibility with the present U.S. Administration for the destabilization of the entire system of international relations and the unpredictable exacerbation of the political and military confrontation, perilous as it is already.

White House emissaries of various ranks tour Western European capitals, resorting to persuasion and threats, but to no avail so far. Mr Perle himself admits that the allies either reject the American proposal or "free concern" about the true designation of Ronald Reagan's "initiative". None of the 17 countries approached has so far officially agreed to join in the implementation of the "star wars" programme.

At least, the Americans receive a present: it is not individual firms at whose readiness to participate in the "star wars" research effort Washington vaguely hinted time and again, but a whole nation -- Israel -- which expresses the desire to take part in the militarization of outer space. Making the announcement in Bonn, Caspar Weinberger's assistant apparently aims at encouraging it to follow in Tel Aviv's footsteps and openly back Washington without any reservations in its attempt to disrupt the existing strategic balance in the world.

Only time will show whether the White House emissary will fulfill his difficult mission. Observers, however, point to a very interesting detail: It is not an Israeli representative who told the world about his country's decision, but a highly placed Pentagon official. Well, it is indeed he who pays the piper, calls the tune.

Conservative Parties' Conference

PM300856 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 29 Jul 85 First Edition p 5

[TASS report: "From Similar Positions"]

[Text] Washington, 28 Jul -- The conference of leaders of right-wing political parties belonging to the so-called "International Democratic Union," which has ended here, did not demonstrate the "full unity of views" of its participants.

This time, according to the U.S. Administration's plans, a discussion of the so-called "Strategic Defense Initiative" was to have been the chief theme of the conference. However, of the 20 participants at the meeting, essentially only British Prime Minister M. Thatcher, who called, in particular, for talks to be conducted with the Soviet Union from a "position of strength," and F.J. Strauss, chairman of the West German Christian Social Union, who is well-known for his ultrareactionary views, came out in favor of realizing the dangerous U.S. plans.

The American side had to content itself with a formulation in the final communique of the conference which merely points to its participants' "understanding" of "research work" within the framework of the program.

On the whole, the conference participants supported Washington's anticommunist positions.

CSO: 5200/1349

USSR: FURTHER COMMENTS ON SDI TECHNICAL DEVELOPMENTS

Contracts for Hyper-Velocity Guns

LD302136 Moscow World Service in English 2010 GMT 30 Jul 85

[From the "News and Views" program]

[Excerpts] The United States Air Force has concluded its first contracts for the development of space weapons, reports in Washington say. Commentary by Viktor Olin.

The space weapons in question are hyper-velocity guns intended for deployment in orbit. The guns should become one of the elements of the system designed to destroy enemy missiles.

The contracts, worth a total of about \$53 million, have been signed with Boeing, Ford and General Dynamics. If the official version is to be believed the contractors are responsible only for preliminary research in the principles of operation of hyper-velocity guns. Facts however show that they will have quite a practical assignment: To develop a weapon and make it ready for use already in the near future. The work has to be completed and presented to the U.S. Air Force for final appraisal already in October 1987.

All this further refutes as false the arguments of the United States Administration about the research character of the so-called Strategic Defense Initiative. Once all the paper and design work is done it will be no problem to make operational models for testing and then for putting the new system of weapons to full-scale production. It is this kind of procedure that the United States intends to use in developing hyper-velocity guns, high power laser beams, antisatellite missiles and other systems of space weapons.

And the latest example of this attitude is the resolve of the United States to continue nuclear tests despite the unilateral moratorium introduced by the Soviet Union.

Further Contracts

LD281043 Moscow TASS in English 2048 GMT 27 Jul 85

[Text] Washington July 27 TASS -- The military-industrial consortium including the Aeros Ace group of General Electric and also Sparta, Shaffer Associates and Nichols

Research has won a contract worth 5 million dollars to conduct research into advanced technology intended to be used in the development of attack space weapons. A spokesman for the organization concerned with the implementation of the "Strategic Defence Initiative" said that it was the first of a series of such contracts.

Yet earlier U.S. military-industrial corporations were granted contracts totalling 10 million dollars to carry out research related to the 'star wars' program.

U.S. Generals on Shuttle Role

LD241531 Moscow TASS in English 1443 GMT 24 Jul 85

[Text] Washington, 24 Jul (TASS)--The Pentagon is making active use of reusable spaceships to further its plans to militarize near-earth space. Lieutenant-General James Abrahamson, chief of the "Strategic Defense Initiative" organization, has told a joint hearing of two subcommittees of the U.S. House of Representatives that space transportation systems were of extreme importance to the "Star Wars" project. He said the Pentagon intended to use the shuttle as the primary launch vehicle for many of the technological experiments scheduled under the program.

Between fiscal 1987 and 1991, for example, the Pentagon planned to reserve one equivalent shuttle flight a year for its basic research into the field and stage a variety of experiments. Abrahamson said President Reagan recently had ordered the Pentagon and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration to conduct a space transportation and support study. In this connection he urged the development of several versions of reusable spaceships.

Brigadier-General Donald Kutyno, director of the Space Command and Communications System Office of the USAF Space Command, said that the Pentagon was going to use shuttles to orbit up to 80 percent of its surveillance and other satellites. NASA spokesman Chester Lee admitted in this connection that by 1992 it was planned to increase shuttle launches to 28 a year, but NASA and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration would count for only 12 of them.

Weinberger: Tests Continue

LD041523 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0935 GMT 4 Aug 85

[Text] Washington, 4 Aug (TASS) -- Reagan's administration does not intend to give up the dangerous plans to militarize space near earth. It has been confirmed again by U.S. Secretary of Defence C. Weinberger in his interview with CNN. To make the "Strategic Defense Initiative" an issue of the Soviet-American talks on nuclear and space armaments in Geneva means to commit a "terrible blunder" - the Pentagon's boss has asserted bombastically. At the same time, he was, sparing no paint, illuminating the program to militarize space as a "new concept" which ostensibly "gives a great hope to humanity" for deliverance from the nuclear threat. Simultaneously, the head of the military department let it be understood clearly that along with creation of space armaments, a

build up of the U.S. nuclear missile potential for delivering a first strike will be continued in a unrestrained way. "We need offensive armaments," - Weinberger declared.

Tests on components for the newest strike weapons in the framework for realizing the "star wars" program are being carried out at U.S. ranges and in its research centers. According to a report by the organization for realizing the "Strategic Defense Initiative" which has been published here, tests of an interceptor missile have already been held, a series of experiments with X-ray lasers has been carried out, and systems of handling and control specially designed for the space armaments are being elaborated. Beam weapons are being created at a forced rate; equipment tests for aiming a laser beam at targets located at a near-earth orbit have been carried out.

Shuttle in Tracking Test

PM061043 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 6 Aug 85 Second Edition p 3

[TASS report: "Speeding Up..."]

[Text] Washington, 5 Aug -- The United States is speeding up preparations to realize Reagan's "star wars" program.

According to a report by news agencies, the astronauts on board the reusable Challenger craft have conducted an experiment of great significance for implementing Washington's plans for the militarization of near-earth space. The craft's motors were started up so that radio astronomy observatories in Australia and the United States could study the "corridors" which arise in the ionosphere as a result of fuel being burned by the craft. According to AP, the importance of this experiment lies in the fact that it is connected with the planned "use of laser or beam weapons to intercept and destroy enemy missiles in the upper layers of the atmosphere."

U.S. Defense Secretary C. Weinberger has once again confirmed that the Reagan Administration does not intend to abandon the dangerous plans for the militarization of space.

CSO: 5200/1349

SPACE ARMS

TASS REPORTS FURTHER CRITICISMS OF SDI

Soviet Academician

LD232222 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1117 GMT 23 Jul 85

[Text] Moscow, 23 Jul (TASS)--The use of orbits in outer space has recently taken on a particularly dangerous coloring--it is a matter of the preparations by the United States to put weapons systems into orbit, Boris Raushenbakh, the well known Soviet scientist stated to a TASS correspondent. It is precisely concern, in connection with this, for the fate of the world that has provided the motivating force for convening in Stockholm an international conference against the militarization of space, which was held from 4-6 July. Raushenbakh took part in the conference as a member of the Soviet delegation headed by academician Yevgeniy Velikhov, vice-president of the USSR Academy of Sciences. Politicians and scientists from many countries, including Britain, India, the United States, the FRG and a number of socialist countries, were invited to the conference. Analysing the work of this meeting Raushenbakh, corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences, said that different points of view had been expressed at the conference. The position of the Soviet delegation was clear: a peaceful outer space which increases the powers and possibilities of people in the outside world, and not an outer space bearing death--this is what peoples of all countries and continents are waiting for from modern science.

The successes of Soviet space exploration enable Soviet people to affirm that this most difficult task is being addressed successfully in the USSR. "It is possible to cite many examples of the effectiveness and purposefulness of the research carried out on board orbital stations. Among these are astronomical and geophysical experiments, research in the field of medicine, biology, space technology and sciences concerned with the earth.

Such research, the scientist stressed, is possible only in conditions of peace, for the preservation of which the USSR is doing everything possible. This is shown in particular by the USSR's decision to introduce a unilateral moratorium on launching anti-satellite weapons. It was the Soviet Union which offered to the UN General Assembly a simple and reliable formula--to ban putting weapons of any type into space orbit. But the United States has from the very beginning taken up a position blocking discussion on this question.

Raushenbakh stressed that the Soviet Union always stood for international cooperation in mastering space. A demonstration of the success of the united efforts of science is the creation of an international service for space "first aid"--"kospas-sarsat." There should be many such examples, for space should be peaceful. Such is the will of the peoples of the world, the scientist said.

Soviet Cosmonaut

LD071015 Moscow TASS in English 0948 GMT 7 Aug 85

["Evil Plans Must Be Thwarted"--TASS headline]

[Text] Moscow, August 7 TASS -- "A mortal danger may come to haunt every country in any part of the world and every city if the U.S. Administration carries through its plans to station weapons in space," TASS has been told by Soviet Cosmonaut Vladimir Aksenov.

We know, he explained, that air space is divided between countries and that a foreign plane can enter national air space only with the permission of the country concerned. This sovereign air space extends 100 kilometres upwards, and higher on begins space, which is not divided by borders or controlled by nations. It is there, some 100 kilometres over any sovereign territory, that new weapons, including nuclear ones, are going to be deployed. Not only cities and villages but even individual buildings are visible from space and can become at any moment targets for destruction.

I cannot understand the way of thinking of people who, despite the huge nuclear arms arsenals already stockpiled, are seeking to introduce new weapons of mass destruction, Vladimir Aksenov continued. Are they ultimate egoists? Are they disregarding everything in their lust for profits from new military orders? Are they possessed with the mad illusory hope of achieving military-strategic superiority? Whatever their motives, their plans are criminal as they pose a threat to mankind.

We people living in the country which is firmly and consistently working for peace and disarmament are outraged and worried by these plans, the cosmonaut stressed. This worry is manifest in thousands of letters and telegrams received by the Soviet peace foundation, which finances the movement of Soviet peace campaigners and their anti-war actions. More than 90 million Soviet citizens contribute to the foundation. I can say as the foundation's deputy chairman that Soviet people have now stepped up their protests against the militarisation of space. They believe that reason will gain the upper hand and that evil plans can yet be thwarted.

U.S. Manhattan Project Scientists

LD171736 Moscow TASS in English 1545 GMT 17 Jul 85

[Text] Washington, 17 Jul (TASS)--According to an AP Agency report, American scientists, who worked on the first atomic explosive devices, in particular those, which were blown up in Los Alamos Proving Range (New Mexico) 40 years ago, then over Hiroshima and Nagasaki, criticized on Tuesday the Reagan administration's intention to place nuclear weapons in outer space.

Philip Morrison, who was a member of the American Manhattan Project that built and exploded the first atomic bomb, said, as the AP Agency reports, that the nuclear blasts over Japan ultimately weakened rather than strengthened American national security by eliminating oceans as realistic barriers against war. He stressed that way back 40 years ago he and his colleagues realized three crucial facts: There are no nuclear secrets that can be kept for long, there will be no real defence against nuclear weapons, and there must be international agreements against their use.

The scientist stressed that the opinion in Washington that technological superiority can ensure national security is wrong.

Victor Weisskopf, a former group leader at the Los Alamos National Laboratory, expressed the view that the implementation of the U.S. President's "Strategic Defence Initiative" will merely prod the Soviet Union to develop counter-measures and lead to new "spiraling of the arms race."

Hans Bethe, former head of the theoretical division at Los Alamos, said that Reagan's arguments that "'Star Wars' will be a catalyst for arms reduction... is at best wishful thinking."

"The future does not look good unless we can really get a reduction in nuclear weapons started," said Robert Bacher, former head of experimental physics at Los Alamos.

U.S. Peace Council

LD281508 Moscow TASS in English 1232 GMT 28 Jul 85

[Text] New York, 28 Jul (TASS)--TASS Correspondent Andrey Sidorin reports:

The programme of "Star Wars" has nothing in common with defence and is aimed at achieving military superiority over the Soviet Union and creating the potential for dealing the first-nuclear strike. This is stated by authoritative organisation of the U.S. democratic public, the U.S. Peace Council.

A booklet brought out by the council cites the opinions of prominent American scientists. It is stressed in the booklet that contrary to what is asserted by the White House, the implementation of Washington's so-called "Strategic Defence Initiative" will not lead to the creation of a "space shield" against nuclear arms. It will only step up the nuclear arms race and increase the threat of a global conflict. The militaristic plans of the Reagan administration can lead to a dangerous aggravation of international tension and undermining of efforts at arms control, the document says.

The programme of "Star Wars" is aimed at undermining the existing important agreements in this sphere, above all the timeless 1972 Soviet-U.S. treaty on the limitation of ABM systems. Washington's course at the militarisation of space, its refusal to accept the Soviet Union's peaceful proposals and thus to put an end to the arms race gives the lie to propaganda statements of the

U.S. administration about its "adherence" to international peace and "striving" for disarmament, it is stressed in the booklet.

The programme of "Star Wars" is the main obstacle to the achievement of progress at the Soviet-U.S. talks on nuclear and space arms in Geneva, said prominent American public figure M. Bechtel, the editor-in-chief of the NEW WORLD REVIEW. She stressed that the unwillingness of the U.S. side, contrary to the earlier achieved agreement, to conduct a constructive discussion of the question of the space arms, can hardly be accessed as anything but a deliberate torpedoing of the talks.

Deng Xiaoping

PM051607 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 4 Aug 85 Morning Edition p 4

[TASS report: "On the Issue of 'Star Wars'"]

[Text] Beijing, 3 Aug -- According to XINHUA, Deng Xiaoping, chairman of the CCP Central Advisory Commission, has declared that the "star wars" program must not be realized because its implementation would introduce qualitative changes in the arms race.

During a meeting with R. Maxwell, chairman of Pergamon Press, the Anglo-American publishing firms, the Chinese leader noted that the "star wars" plans are a fundamentally different matter from adding a few nuclear warheads to the arsenal or developing a number of new types of missiles.

Bulgarian Official

LD312136 Moscow TASS in English 2117 GMT 31 Jul 85

[Text] Sofia, July 31 TASS -- The Final Act of the all-European conference in Helsinki is a document of historic importance reflecting the peoples' striving to rid themselves of the nightmare of war, to safeguard peace in Europe and all over the world, said Stanko Todorov, a member of the Political Bureau of the Bulgarian Communist Party Central Committee and chairman of the National Assembly of the People's Republic of Bulgaria. Addressing a meeting here to mark the 10th anniversary of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, he emphasized that the convocation of the conference, preservation and development of the process, which had begun in the capital of Finland, had become possible due to the political will and efforts of the countries of the socialist community and, above all, the Soviet Union. The socialist countries, he said, strictly observe the provisions of the Final Act.

At the same time Todorov said that certain circles in the West make attempts to revise the accords reached, put up obstacles and create difficulties in the issues of building up confidence in the military field and the development of mutually beneficial and equitable cooperation in other areas.

The speaker denounced Washington's military preparations and its plans to militarize outer space, aimed at achieving military superiority over the countries of the socialist community, and reiterated the resolve of the Warsaw Treaty member-states not to allow imperialism to upset the military-strategic balance in its favour.

Vienna Scientists' Conference

LD282333 Moscow TASS in English 2057 GMT 28 Jul 85

[Text] Vienna, July 28 TASS -- An international conference of scientists from the East and West with 25 countries taking part in it ended its work here today.

The discussions which lasted for three days centered on the problem connected with the prevention of a third world war. The overwhelming majority of the conferees denounced the U.S. plans of militarizing outer space, went on record for the limitation of nuclear arms race, the return to the policy of international detente and the creation of an atmosphere of confidence in relations between states with different social systems.

The conference adopted a resolution which calls upon the scientists of all countries to unite in their struggle for the prevention of a world nuclear catastrophe, for the establishment of reliable and stable peace for all people and for the carrying out of a policy of goodneighbourliness and co-operation.

CSO: 5200/1349

SPACE ARMS

USSR ACADEMICIANS EXPLORE ARGUMENTS FOR SDI

PM051505 Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English 21 Jul 85 p 5

[Unattributed report: "Space Weapons--A Freeway To a New Danger"]

[Text] "The belief that our peace would be more secure if supported by new 'more stabilizing' weapons systems, such as those that are proposed for outer space -- is a dangerous illusion," says Academician Yevgeniy Velikhov, chairman of the Committee of Soviet Scientists in Defence of Peace, Against the Threat of Nuclear War, vice-president of the USSR Academy of Sciences. Velikhov, together with a group of other prominent specialists representing the committee, spoke with journalists in Moscow.

Yevgeniy Velkhov: According to the "star wars" concept, a large-scale weapons system will be deployed over our heads in outer space and all-out efforts are being made to make it look defensive. We must keep in mind that since it is such an intricately sophisticated system, composed of information gathering networks, aiming and guidance systems, strike components, means for checking on target damage, etc. It can never be tested under real conditions. Therefore, it would be highly unreliable, and this only increases the chances of accidental nuclear war. But its advocates in the USA are proffering such a system as a "reliable shield," of some sort.

I had a chance recently to attend a conference in Atlanta in the USA, at which Henry Kissinger expressed a desire to clarify the question: How could a system be both unreliable and simultaneously be undermining universal security? Garwin, a well-known U.S. physicist, gave a good illustration of this -- if you go to a store and buy a toy plastic gun, which is only an imitation of the real thing, this, in itself, would not be a dangerous weapon. But if you train this toy pistol at an armed policeman and take aim at him, then the toy becomes an extremely provocative weapon. Such is the logic of the situation.

The world in which we would find ourselves after the setting up of a broad-scale ABM system with space-based elements would be far from safer. Just the opposite.

First of all, the research and development work done in the USA on "star wars" weapons is being accompanied by the continued production of offensive arms -- the MX and Trident-2 and the future Midgetman missiles.

Alongside this, the emergence of a space-based ABM system can very well stimulate a more intensive development of cruise missiles, because such a space system will, apparently, have little effectiveness against them. The other means of delivery -- air-

craft and submarines -- will be perfected, too. And, maybe, something else will be invented. In such a way the development of the most diverse types of weapons will be constantly taking place.

In order to understand what we are up against today, we need to remember what has been learned from history.

The ABM problem attracted widescale world attention for the first time in the late 60's. When all the assessments were made the USSR and the USA signed an agreement in 1972 which imposed very rigid limitations on the development of antimissile weapons. In spite of that R & D work continued in the USA on technology that would penetrate ABM systems -- with the aid of MIRV offensive missiles. The USA calculated that the MIRV's would give it a big edge on the USSR and that it would take 10-15 years for the USSR to catch up. This offers a good example of the dangerous development which arises when the weapons created continue to live a life all of their own even if the strategic situation radically changes. And this is a very important lesson of history.

Where has this led us? Firstly, the number of warheads on strategic carriers had increased drastically. Secondly, the so-called advantages of MIRV's have turned out to be a myth -- the USSR developed similar systems very quickly. The Americans immediately felt this answer and then another myth emerged -- the myth about "a window of vulnerability" which Reagan's administration inherited when it came into power.

In real life, however, no "window of vulnerability" ever existed, nor does it exist now. This example shows how a weapons system, which has not even been fully completed, has created the danger of disrupting the balance of power, causing a chain reaction in the development of offensive weapons.

We must follow these developments with extreme caution lest history repeats why we are so concerned now by the development of the entire "star wars" concept and is being carried out.

Aleksey Arbatov, D.Sc. (History): The regimen and the process of talks on the limitation and reduction of strategic arms is the most important security element in the world today. The signing of the treaty on the limitation of the ABM systems between the USSR and the USA in 1972 has established what is, in fact, a direct link between the limitation of both offensive and defensive strategic weapons. This helped create the necessary conditions for both sides to go over to the limitation and reduction of offensive strategic weapons.

The building up of a large-scale ABM system in the USA will, inevitably, wreck the ABM treaty. Therefore, the entire contractual relations and the dialogue between the great powers concerning the limitation of the arms race would, in fact, be severed. This, of course, will have extremely adverse consequences both strategically and politically.

It is perfectly clear that no matter how many echelons of the ABM system the USA would deploy and no matter how much money it spends on it -- This system will be ineffectual for the protection of the main part of the population and industry of even the biggest powers. Let's remember that in the 60s, MacNamara, then US Secretary of Defense, calculated that only 400 nuclear warheads were needed to inflict unacceptable damage on the USSR, or the USA, i.e., to destroy and annihilate over 70 per cent of their industry and over a third or even a half of their population. What are 400 warheads today? A very small part -- about 4 per cent of the strategic stockpiles. If the USA implements its

"strategic defense initiative" (the "star wars" concept), then this will whip up a build up in offensive nuclear arms. By the time the ABM system is deployed these stockpiles might grow 2-3 times and even more. Correspondingly, these 400 warheads will constitute then, maybe, only 1 per cent of strategic stockpiles.

From the scientific point of view, even a theoretically perfect space-based ABM system will not be able to intercept over 99 per cent of the attacking warheads. Therefore, trying to protect a population with the aid of such a system is a completely unrealistic task.

The idea that a space-based ABM which preserves ICBM launch silos and other strategic forces bases rather than people, could increase a country's "deterrent" capability, is not logical. The already accumulated strategic forces are more than adequate for mutual deterrence. And therefore in this context the "Strategic Defense Initiative" (SDI) turns out to be an unsuitable, extremely costly and dubious enterprise.

Andrey Kokoshin, D.Sc. (history): It was pointed out already in the April 1983 Appeal to All Scientists of the World made by the academicians of the USSR Academy of Sciences, that there are no effective defence in the event of a nuclear war and that it is practically impossible to develop one. The research done by the Committee of Soviet Scientists and by many of our counterparts in the West, has many times confirmed this conclusion, especially if one considers the various means of counteracting the space-based ABM.

As a reminder, these means -- both active and passive -- include the so-called space mines, obstacles created in the trajectories of combat space vehicles, false missile launchings, all sorts of coatings that reflect the laser beam, etc. We arrived at the conclusion that an effect network of such means can be developed and employed much quicker and to a great extent with already existing technology, then the U.S. broad-scale ABM system which lays claims to high effectiveness. And the counteraction system can be built at less expense. In one of the combinations we had analyzed, its cost is, for example, a mere 1-2 per cent of the cost of the broad-scale ABM system.

A number of the U.S. governmental experts, including rather high-placed officials, also recognize, to this or that degree, the vulnerability of the space-based ABM system. Still, the very same experts lend their support to the "star wars" idea. This for us is one more proof that it is being developed not for defence but for attack.

The matter is that an ABM system, not securing, apparently, protection against a massive first strike, might, at the same time, look adequately effective, in the eyes of the U.S. strategists, to ward off a weakened reply strike, after the USA delivers the first strike against the Soviet strategic nuclear forces. In other words, its purpose is to dampen the strength of the retaliatory strike. It is quite in place here to remind people of the Soviet commitment not to be the first to use nuclear weapons -- a pledge which the U.S. leadership refuses to make. Everything taken together tells us that the "star wars" system is being developed primarily in order to secure for the US a first-strike capability.

Yevgeniy Velikhov: As I see it, one of the reasons why the U.S. administration proposed the SDI in March, 1983, is as follows: At the time the mighty antinuclear movement in Western Europe and in the USA itself had convincingly showed the ever growing danger of making a new attempt to achieve superiority over the USSR and its allies through a nuclear buildup. But instead of trying to achieve a constructive agreement with the USSR on the limitation, reduction and then complete destruction of nuclear arms, the U.S. administration came up with the idea of developing weapons in space under the guise of the defence

system. In so doing it is creating a new immense road-block on the way to disarmament and diverts the public's attention from the only realistic way to guarantee universal security -- by ending the arms race and by the reduction of weapons.

Now a few words about the "research" programme for the SDI, which the USA doesn't want to scrap no matter what, and in which it is striving to involve its allies. Caspar Weinberger, the U.S. defense secretary, said in one of his speeches that the demand placed on the SDI are that, at any moment, as soon as the research is completed, it must make it possible to assemble the elements of the system and to deploy it as a whole. No wonder that this programme, on which 60 billion dollars to be spent in a decade, is three times as great as the Apollo programme and exceeds 5 times the planned spending on the development of a thermonuclear installation for peaceful purposes. To regard this as a "purely research programme" would be indulging in self-deception. Moreover, many of the component-by-component tests within the contest of this programme already in the most nearest future would be contradicting the 1972 ABM Treaty.

The race of ABM and space arms and the limitation of nuclear weapons are simply two different courses that are opposed to one another and which cannot be combined. That's why the Soviet delegation in Geneva takes an absolutely firm stand on this and why our committee gives it our complete support.

Andrey Kokoshin: What is the chief argument used by the U.S. Administration to brainwash the public in Western Europe, its political leadership and industrialists so as to lure them into research on the SDI programme? It is that the implementation of the "star wars" programme would, supposedly, provide a "tremendous impulse" to science and engineering, including also peaceful sectors. It is obvious that some politicians and even scientists have swallowed this bait. Fears are voiced in some industrialized Western countries that they might be left outside the "new high-tech market" which the U.S. enticers are so lavishly promising.

Everything in this argumentation is turned topsy-turvy. Military research and development does not feed the civilian sectors of the economy. Just the opposite: The contemporary development of science and technology for military purposes is completely based on a general scientific and engineering foundation. This means that a very large amount to resources and money which could be better used for peaceful purposes, including the working out of international cooperation, will be taken from the peaceful sectors and used, instead, for the development of the different components of the "star wars".

Brown, former U.S. defense secretary and well-known physicist, showed clearly in his book, published in 1983, that at the end of the 50's and outset of the 60's the profit from U.S. military R and D was considerable for the U.S. economy, science and technology as a whole. At present the situation has radically changed -- a new cycle has started in which today just the opposite is happening. Therefore, the real goal of the U.S. promoters of the "star wars" research programme is to use the resources of Western Europe and Japan both directly for this programme and for the establishment of the U.S. control over a whole number of trends in R and D work and over scientific and technical relations. The USA proceeds from the premise that the general bulk of U.S. science is larger than of its allies and the USA therefore has more chances to control all these exchanges and research than, let's say, the EEC members who often find it hard to coordinate their common policy in relation to the USA.

SPACE ARMS

USSR: MILITARY PAMPHLET ATTACKS JUSTIFICATIONS FOR SDI

TASS Announcement

LD261724 Moscow TASS in English 1557 GMT 26 Jul 85

[Text] Moscow July 26 TASS -- The Reagan administration has its sights on militarizing outer space. It counts on outstripping the Soviet Union by developing space strike weapons, which, U.S. strategists believe, will reduce the value of the Soviet defense capability, it is said in the booklet "Star Wars. Delusions and Dangers." It has been put out in a mass edition by the military publishing house in Moscow.

As is borne out by Pentagon's papers that recently attracted public notice, the USA began elaborating a concept envisaging use of anti-satellite weapons as far back as in 1956. The first plan for developing an anti-satellite system, codenamed Saint, was placed before the U.S. secretary of defense already in 1959.

The United States was the first country to test anti-satellite weapons when, in October 1959, a missile fired from a B-47 bomber intercepted an "Explorer-6" satellite. In the sixties the U.S. was the first to fit out two land-based anti-satellite systems in the Pacific Ocean -- one on the Kwajalein atoll and the other -- on Johnston Island.

As is noted in the booklet, the United States made its sharp turn towards militarizing outer space in recent years. This is illustrated by growing appropriations for military space programmes. In 1983, they amounted to 8.5 billion dollars, and went up to 9.3 billion dollars and 12.9 billion dollars in 1984 and 1985 respectively. Further increases in real terms are envisaged, with the military space budget expected to rise to 20 billion dollars in 1988.

The main emphasis is on development of space strike weapons, above all space-based anti-satellite and anti-missile weapons. The manned space shuttles, for which a variety of weapons are being developed to hit targets in space, are being ever more candidly directed to military use. Global surveillance and armed forces command and control facilities are to be deployed on long-life military purpose orbital stations planned to be developed.

"The idea is to upset the now existing strategic parity and secure a decisive military superiority over the USSR and other countries of the socialist community, which is fraught with calamitous consequences for peace and international security", it is said in the book.

Army Paper Review

PM300844 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 28 Jul 85 Second Edition p 3

[Lieutenant Colonel G. Yemelyanov book review: "New Threat to Mankind"]

[Text] Setting their sights on confrontation with the Soviet Union and the achievement of military superiority, the U.S. ruling circles are continuing to implement a giant program of pushing ahead with the creation of more and more types and varieties of weapons. The so-called "Strategic Defense Initiative" (SDI) proclaimed by President Reagan in March 1983 and aptly termed by the Americans themselves the "star wars" program is part and parcel of this adventurist U.S. course, which is dangerous for the cause of peace, in the quest for the mirage of military superiority.

The brochure "Star Wars, The Illusions and The Dangers" (footnote) ("Zvezdnyye Voyny, Illyuzii i Opasnosti" Moscow, Military Literature Publishing House, 1985, 56 pages, price 25 kopeks) published by the Military Literature Publishing House is devoted to exposing the real aggressive aims of the "star wars" plans that are being implemented in the United States and to setting forth the Soviet program of measures aimed at averting an arms race in space and ending it on earth.

On the basis of specific facts, the brochure convincingly shows that since the very start of the space age the Soviet Union has persistently and consistently advocated that space be used purely for peaceful purposes. Soon after the successful launch of the world's first artificial satellite the USSR proposed in a memorandum on disarmament questions dated 15 May 1958 that all types of military use of space be banned without exception. At the time, the Soviet initiative was not supported by the United States and its allies. However, subsequently a number of international agreements were nonetheless concluded which established obstacles to the militarization of space in certain directions. One of the most important of these is the 1972 Soviet-U.S. ABM treaty, which prohibits the deployment of ABM systems in the interests of defending U.S. or Soviet territory (that is, large-scale ABM systems), the creation of the basis for such a defense, and the creation, testing, and deployment of systems or components for a sea-, air-, space-, or mobile ground-based ABM defense.

Consistently pursuing the line of preventing the militarization of space, the Soviet Union also submitted a radical solution to the problem of antisatellite weapons by proposing the renunciation of the creation of new weapons and the scrapping of systems already in existence. Moreover, with a view to setting a personal example, the USSR has unilaterally undertaken not to be the first to put any types of antisatellite weapons into space for all time as long as other states, and that includes the United States, refrain from putting such weapons into space.

As is well known, this March on the Soviet Union's initiative the USSR and the United States embarked on new talks on nuclear and space arms. At the talks, the Soviet Union is advocating the strict observance of the provisions of the Soviet-U.S. accord, in accordance with which one of the most important goals of the talks is to avert an arms race in space. The Soviet side has shown its readiness to work out practical solutions and reinforced it with specific proposals on all aspects of the talks. Evidence of that is the Soviet proposal on the introduction by both sides of a moratorium on the creation of space weapons and a freeze on strategic nuclear arsenals for the entire duration of the talks. In pursuing this line the Soviet Union unilaterally announced a moratorium on the deployment of medium-range missiles and the buildup of other retaliatory measures in Europe for the period from April through this November.

However, the U.S. side has to all intents and purposes embarked on torpedoing both the January agreement in Geneva on the goals and subject matter of the talks and the new Soviet peace initiatives. It has not only failed to submit serious proposals at Geneva on scaling down the arms race but, on the contrary, is taking steps which make such a scaling down impossible. Flying in the face of common sense, Washington is stating its intention to continue implementing its "star wars" program under any circumstances.

A great deal of space in the brochure is devoted to detailed exposition of the illusory and dangerous U.S. course of achieving military superiority over the USSR by using the militarization of space. The White House proceeds on the basis that space is a kind of "absolute position," the military conquest of which opens up the way to world domination. That is why near-earth space is seen as the latest springboard for waging aggressive wars. This, in particular, is attested by the facts cited in the brochure, which point out that the U.S. plans to militarize space are coordinated with programs for deploying the latest strategic weapons systems. Thus, it is clear that the United States is not thinking of "defense" but of acquiring the potential for a first disabling nuclear strike against the USSR and its allies.

The brochure convincingly exposes the lie disseminated by Washington concerning the allegedly purely theoretical research on the "star wars" program. It notes that the "Manhattan" project to create the atom bomb also started in the United States with scientific research which later ended in the tragedy of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

The "star wars" plans are leading to the destabilization of the international situation, and their implementation is inevitably linked with undermining the existing agreements on the limitation of the arms race and strengthening international security. This applies primarily to the open-ended ABM treaty (1972); the treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space, and underwater (1963); and the treaty on principles governing the activities of states in the exploration and use of outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies (1967).

Undermining the above agreements would mean destroying the foundations of the entire strategic arms limitation process, further cranking up more and more spirals of the arms race, and spreading it to space. This concerns the fate not only of the Soviet and American peoples, but the fate of the peoples of the entire world. We must prevent a new stage in the arms race and provide man with peace in space and confidence in the future before it is too late.

As for the Soviet Union, its position is well known. It does not seek unilateral advantages. Its aim is not an arms race and spreading it to space, but ending it and totally eliminating nuclear weapons everywhere. In confirmation of this, the brochure extensively reveals the ways proposed by the Soviet Union of curbing the arms race.

If the United States begins the militarization of space and thereby undermines the prevailing military-strategic equilibrium, the Soviet Union will be forced to take retaliatory measures adequate to meet the threat which may be created for our country and its allies. This must always be remembered by those who, contrary to reason, are traveling the path of implementing the "star wars" plan that is dangerous for mankind.

American Illusions

LD282232 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1400 GMT 28 Jul 85

[From the "International Panorama" program presented by Gennadiy Gerasimov, NOVOSTI political observer]

[Excerpts] One night last month, the American ABC television company canceled all previously announced broadcasts and showed a 3-hour film about the nuclear threat. It is very unusual to reckon on holding the attention of the, in general, distracted American viewer for three hours in a row, and if the TV company took such a step, it must have reckoned on really getting through to the viewer. The film begins with Albert Einstein's famous words, that the power of the split atom has changed everything in our lives apart from our modes of thought, and thus we are sliding into an unprecedented catastrophe. The film is called "The Fire Unleashed," or we could translate the title as "The Fire Loosed From the Reins."

Forty years ago there came a moment unlike anything else. In July 1945, the first test of an atomic weapon was carried out in the desert of the U.S. State of New Mexico. To date, almost 800 U.S. tests have been carried out. There have also been two trials in combat, after which was inscribed on the Hiroshima memorial: "The mistake will not be repeated." But in order for it not to be repeated, we must think in a new way. But the U.S. is thinking in the old way. President Reagan, praising his "star wars" program, said: "The force is with us." But these are thoughts in the old mold. With every new missile, the United States becomes stronger and stronger, that is beyond dispute. But this does not add to its security, because in the atomic age, security can only be achieved jointly. Separately, we end up with the arms race, or rather the agitation of it.

The mechanism of this race is explained by Robert McNamara, former U.S. defense secretary. He says: Mutual apprehension leads to a constant escalation in the production and deployment of nuclear weapons. Each side reacts to the other's actions by increasing weapons production and stepping up the escalation. Of course, ideological disputes remain, and there remain political passions. But they can and must be resolved by the weapon of criticism, and not by the criticism of weapons.

Hans Bethe Nobel prize-winning physicist, says: It is absurd; what difference does it make to an atom whether a country is capitalist or Communist? What meaning will this have if the whole of our civilization perishes? The atom has proved to be the great leveller. It has deprived the pursuit of military superiority of sense.

Here is what U.S. General David Jones, who until recently headed the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee, has to say on the subject: Even if we manage to show that they have a greater megatonnage, or that they are ahead of us in some other way, I think that in practice, we are still approximately even.

If we are to think in a new way, we can save civilization jointly. But if we think in the old way, we have to defend ourselves from the nuclear threat. From the point of view of ordinary logic, what can be blameworthy about defense, if after all, it is not attack? But it is precisely this logic that is parasitized by the so-called Strategic Defense Initiative. It lures Americans with the hope of getting rid of the nuclear threat. And this hope coincides with their desires; who does not want to be rid of the nuclear sword of Damocles hanging over us by a hair?

Here, physicist Edward Teller acts as the evil genius behind the President. He has gained the label of father of the hydrogen bomb, although it is more accurate to say that he is the stepfather, and took it when other, more scrupulous scientists had rejected the monster. And now this Herostratus of science wants to be the father of the X-ray laser, which is also a nuclear bomb, but a devilishly specialized one. Teller says: I have dreamed of such a defense for a long time. But it is only in the last few years that the hope of realizing it has emerged, and I began supporting it with trebled energy.

Sometimes, the new is to be found beneath a forgotten past. The problem of antimissile defence has already been discussed in great detail, on the threshold of the 70's. The uselessness of ordinary logic, according to which defense was beyond criticism, was demonstrated. The United States and the Soviet Union recognized the essential relationship between strategic offensive and defensive weapons, and that only mutual restraint in the sphere of defensive weapons opens up the possibility of reducing offensive weapons. Otherwise, the nuclear equilibrium is upset. And the exotic military novelties that have emerged since then do nothing to change this objective relationship. This is discussed in detail in a book just issued in several languages by the military publishing house of the Soviet Union's Ministry of Defense.

It is called "Zvezdnyye Voyny -- Illyuzii i Opasnosti" ["Star Wars -- the Illusions and the Dangers"] Well, what are the illusions, and what the dangers here? The first illusion is the belief in the possibility of creating an effective antimissile defense. Here is a diagram of such a defense where the missiles are destroyed in three stages, first at the acceleration stage, in the active stage of the flight trajectory; then in the middle stage, in space; and finally, what gets through becomes the target in the final section. In the diagram it is clear, it goes smoothly on paper; but, as they say, they have forgotten about the enemy, or in our case, that we will not sit with our arms folded, but will adopt countermeasures. Yet, even without these, the task looks impossible. There is plenty of authoritative evidence on this score. Here is Gen. Jones speaking again: I do not believe we will be able to create a defense such that we will cover the possibility of our cities being bombed by Soviet missiles. And Hans Bethe, with whom we are also familiar, adds: Everyone would be happy if President Reagan proved to be right. However, laser physics has a different opinion.

Here, a tricky question arises. If the American enterprise is pointless, expensive and easily neutralized, that's three arguments against it, then how can it be dangerous, provocative and destabilizing at the same time? Is it worth worrying if the Americans are so keen to throw money down the drain? In the final analysis, it is their money. TIME magazine recently printed an interesting letter from a reader. He suggested that the Soviet Union stop criticizing the "star wars" plans, sit comfortably in an armchair, and gleefully watch America bankrupt itself in the end, for the costs are enormous. But if one proceeds solely from this illusion concerning defense, if one presupposes that all there is here is nuclear day-dreaming and nothing more, then in fact it is not worth worrying about. But the point is by no means in the highly moral and at the same time naive plans to make nuclear weapons impotent and obsolete, as the President put it. The point is that Washington would like to build not a defense, but space offensive weapons. It will be easier to hit a missile at the launch site than in flight using a future laser, so that the new system might also be used for attack. Thus, the U.S. plans can give rise to the second, and this time dangerous illusion, of gaining the opportunity for an unpunished attack.

The third illusion can also be called dangerous. This is the belief in American technical genius, a belief that is limitless, going as far as political cretinism. There is

one General James Abrahamson who is responsible for implementing the "star wars" program. He recently stated: Remember that the Russians are afraid of our technology, that's the crux of the matter. The general has completely forgotten the whole history of the arms race. Here is a more sensible opinion concerning the relationship between technology and policy. Speaking is Donald Kerr, director of the Los Alamos National Laboratory, where new systems of nuclear weapons are developed. He says: We are always looking for technical innovation, which in any case lasts a short time, and sometimes the (?thinking) is wrong, especially when one is dealing with deep-rooted social differences such as exist between the Soviet Union and the United States. His thought is continued by Herbert York, a physicist whose voice you can hear [video shows submarine-launched missile being launched, with caption "voice of Herbert York;" English faintly audible in background]. Certain forces are trying to strengthen national defense by means of technical developments. In my opinion, this attempt has gone on too long, everything stays at the previous level. We should somehow step up political activity through diplomatic channels, and through talks. This seems to have greater prospects than seeking technological solutions to the problems. There you have thinking in the new way.

Unfortunately, the Reagan administration continues to be guided by its astral delusions. Former President Jimmy Carter recently expressed the hope that the "star wars" plans would not survive Reagan's presidency. But one cannot pin any hopes on this, because, as they say, there are immense intellectual forces and financial means involved here, and there is also momentum; it will be difficult to stop after starting. It would be better to think twice now. And the ABC film gives another reminder of the threat hanging over life on our planet.

'Covert Tool of Blackmail'

LD291642 Moscow TASS in English 1407 GMT 29 Jul 85

["Booklet: 'Star Wars', Delusions and Dangers"--TASS headline]

[Text] Moscow, 29 Jul (TASS)--The booklet "'Star Wars'. Delusions and Dangers" has been issued in Moscow. Its authors draw attention to the fact that the propaganda drive about the defensive nature of the "Star Wars" programme, announced by the U.S. administration, is really nothing but a screen behind which the U.S.A. is covertly forging a tool of blackmail and aggression.

The booklet stresses that the plans propagated by the United States as "strategic defence initiative" are in fact ominous major elements of the U.S. war preparations envisaging a step enhancement of the U.S. offensive nuclear capability. Pentagon strategists assume that by means of space strike weapons based on new physical principles--various kinds of beam weapons, electromagnetic guns as well as anti-missiles they will ensure "reliable" destruction of enemy missiles. The booklet points out that these space strike weapons can, as authoritative experts, including American ones, hold, serve as a most effective offensive weapon. They may be used not only to knock out ballistic missiles after the latter are launched, but also to deliver a strike from outer space at earth, air and sea targets.

"The fundamentally new detection, guidance and destruction technologies that are being developed in the United States are usable both for defense and attack, regardless of what the U.S. administration is telling people in the

United States and its NATO allies about the purposes of the presidential strategic programme," the booklet says.

"Whatever Washington may say to justify the 'strategic defense initiative,' its exceedingly dangerous and aggressive character is more than obvious," the authors of the booklet write. "The 'Star Wars' plan is part of the U.S. strategy directed to preparing the stage for a nuclear war. The true purpose of the 'strategic defense initiative' is to obtain an opportunity for launching a nuclear attack with impunity, and for continuously harassing the Soviet Union and other countries by means of nuclear blackmail."

SDI Not 'Pure Research'

LD301126 Moscow TASS in English 1004 GMT 30 Jul 85

["'Pure' Science or 'Manhattan 2'"--TASS headline]

[Text] Moscow, July 30 TASS -- "The U.S. Administration maintains that the 'Strategic Defense Initiative' is merely a program of research. But the only 'pure' thing about all this talk is its purely deceptive nature". This is said in a pamphlet "'Star Wars': The Delusions and the Dangers", brought out by the Military Publishing House and the Progress publishers in Moscow.

The authors of the pamphlet recall that "in its time, the Manhattan atomic bomb project, too, started out as a research program. And everybody knows its effect for the people of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Ever since then the world has lived in the shadow of a nuclear threat. The 'star wars' program will bring mankind new and still greater dangers. It has got to be banned, therefore, banned completely, not excluding research, before it is too late."

The lie about the 'star wars' program being a purely theoretical exercise is easily refuted if we recall the unprecedently large appropriations for this research, which stand at 60 billion dollars in the ten years of 1984-1993.

It is all too clear that the project is not at all an "innocent" academic study, but a most important and crucial stage in the development of space strike weapons, the pamphlet says.

Its authors call in question the U.S. Administration's assurances that after completing research the U.S.A. may renounce deployment of a 'nation-wide' ABM system with space-based elements.

The pamphlet recalls Washington's categorical demand that its NATO allies and Japan contribute financially and technically to the realization of the 'star wars' plan. Every possible ploy is used to exert pressure on them blackmail with 'Soviet military superiority'; concealment of the true aims of the 'star wars' program; Washington's contacting FRG, British, Italian and French firms directly, by passing the governments of the respective countries, to win their cooperation; and speculation on promises to share the latest technology with its allies.

"It will be a fatal mistake in terms of mankind's vital interests if outer space is allowed to become the arena of an arms race. Those who do not want this to happen must not put up with anything that is designed to further the development of space strike weapons. Participation in such work is tantamount to complicity in the new crime that the U.S. militarists are about to commit against the nations", stress the authors of the pamphlet.

SPACE ARMS

SOVIET PRESS CONFERENCE ON NEW PAMPHLET DENOUNCING SDI

Moscow TV Report

LD251753 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1445 GMT 25 Jul 85

[Text] A news conference entitled, For Space Without Weapons, was held today at the Press Center of the USSR Foreign Ministry for Soviet and foreign journalists. The news conference was conducted by Comrade Lomeyko, head of the Press Department of the USSR Foreign Ministry.

[Begin recording] [Lomeyko] Our news conference is dedicated to the subject, For Space Without Weapons. Taking part in it are Yuliy Aleksandrovich Kvitsinskiy, special envoy; Colonel General Nikolay Fedorovich Chervov, head of directorate of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces; and Vladimir Borisovich Tulinov, a sector chief in the International Information Department of the CPSU Central Committee. We should like to tell you once again that a few days ago the brochure, "Star Wars -- the Illusions and the Dangers", published by the Voenizdat publishing house in Moscow and translated into a number of languages was issued here. The brochure sets out the Soviet point of view on this question. Now I would like to give the floor to Yuliy Aleksandrovich Kvitsinskiy to make an introductory statement.

[Kvitsinskiy] Today's news conference is dedicated to a problem whose acuteness and significance are difficult to exaggerate. Mankind has reached a dangerous point in its development. A real threat has risen out of the arms race emerging into space. Space, the conquest of which opens up truly boundless possibilities for progress and peaceful cooperation among all states and peoples, may turn into the source of a lethal threat to our planet and our civilization. The plans to extend the arms race into space are vigorously being done up by their authors in various attractive packages for those people not in the know. They are being called a defense initiative, a humane task, a stake in the progress of science and technology, and a way of saving people from the nuclear threat. They want to pass them off almost as the high road leading to a new golden age for mankind. However, there is nothing further from reality than the assurances which the advertising of the U.S. "star wars" program is permeated with. The brochure, "Star Wars -- The Illusions and the Dangers", which is being presented at this news conference, uses extensive and specific material to describe the true aims of that program and the extremely dangerous consequences of its being realized.

Whatever the American side might say about the aims of its so-called Strategic Defense Initiative, one should look truth straight in the eye and grasp the main thing: The implementation of SDI would lead to the appearance in space of weapons in the true meaning of this word. In the arms race, mankind would cross that boundary beyond which there would most probably no longer be a way back.

True, it is alleged that the space strike weapons being developed in the United States are being created solely for defense. But the talk about defense is nothing more than a facade. It is quite clear that the so-called anti-missile space-based means can be used to deliver strikes on similar systems belonging to the other side, were they to be created, not to mention satellites having the most diverse purposes. Can there be any doubt that space strike weapons can be quite easily used to hit targets on earth and in its atmosphere? The U.S. press writes openly about this.

That is why the Soviet Union proposes a simple radical and effective solution: Not to start a space weapons race, to ban the entire class of space strike weapons, and to place a moratorium on their creation, testing, and deployment without delay. This would be in accordance with the interests of the USSR and of the United States and the interests and aspirations of all the states and peoples of the world.

A practical solution to the task of preventing an arms race in space is possible. But for this, political will is needed on both sides. We have such a will and desire. The United States must finally review its present, unconstructive position on space and show a conscientious approach to the whole complex of questions that are to be examined and solved at the talks in Geneva. [end recording]

The floor is given to Col Gen Chervov.

[Begin Chervov recording] The American "star wars" program is only one part of the general military plan of the United States based on an offensive nuclear strategy and aimed at achieving military superiority over the Soviet Union. In its chase after superiority, Washington is rapidly creating the potential for a first nuclear disarming strike.

Why is the United States now putting its stakes on space? This is happening because it believes it can achieve military superiority through space. The nuclear arms race, which was unleashed by the United States, has given them no advantages. In these conditions space was selected as the new sphere in which the United States has conceived the idea of achieving a decisive military preponderance over the countries of socialism.

The White House leaders are trying to stupefy themselves into thinking that allegedly with the help of "star wars" they will be able to shoot ahead militarily and dictate their will to the Soviet Union.

What do the dangerous consequences of the so-called Strategic Defense Initiative consist of? From the military point of view, the realization of the U.S. "star wars" program finally destroys the Soviet-U.S. accords in the sphere of maintaining strategic stability. As everyone knows, this is now based on reciprocal restraint and on the understanding that neither side will carry out a nuclear strike first, since retribution will inevitably follow, even under the most unfavorable conditions. Ignoring the experience of history, the real correlation of forces, and the inevitable fateful consequences for the American people themselves, the Washington leaders have conceived the idea of a great adventure: To try to make the United States invulnerable in a nuclear conflict by means of space weapons, and thus to escape the horrors of a nuclear war unleashed by themselves. The calculation of gaining victory in a nuclear war and establishing world domination is the fevered dream, both waking and sleeping, of the Washington strategists.

This is where the real threat of "star wars" for the whole of mankind is concealed. The White House leaders have no serious arguments at all in defense of the aims and con-

sequences of SDI that were announced in January 1983. None of their arguments are serious ones, they have been invented out of thin air.

For example, they say that the "star wars" are simply defensive and that the space weapons being developed are harmless systems which do not lead to the militarization of space. That, however, is a big deception. SDI has no relation whatever to defense. And to say that space weapons are not weapons, as U.S. Secretary of Defense Weinberger does, can only be naivety or incompetence. To protect its plans for the militarization of space, Washington also resorts to the false argument that the Soviet Union has already practically created a system like the one that the United States wants to create. Weinberger recently alleged that the Soviet Union is already on the threshold of creating an antimissile defense system for its territory. Of course it would be a wonderful miracle if we already had such a system, but miracles don't happen on earth.

The Soviet Union is not creating space strike weapons, and is not building a large-scale, anti-missile defense system, nor the basis of such a defense system. It is strictly implementing the open-ended antimissile defense treaty of 1972. We propose that the United States join us in this and, while there is still time, abandon its plans for the militarization of space. The Soviet Union is striving to achieve honest accords in Geneva, but if necessary, we have the means to counter the U.S. line of seeking military supremacy. We have both the economic and intellectual potential to reliably safeguard the security of our country and the entire socialist community. [End Chervov recording]

The participants in the press conference then answered questions from journalists.
[begin recording]

[Lomeyko] Question: The U.S. side asserts that the Strategic Defense Initiative makes nuclear missiles unnecessary. What is your opinion on this? This question is asked by (Faikhtinger), a correspondent of VOLKSTIMME.

[Kvitsinskiy] In my view, such assertions belong in the category of political shamanism. You have probably noticed that in Washington the people in the know about military matters are now saying less and less that SDI will lead to the elimination of nuclear weapons. Instead, they are now saying that space systems should enhance the effectiveness of the nuclear deterrent and complement strategic offensive weapons -- all types of which, incidentally, are consistently being given the capacity for being used in a first strike. SDI is leading to the militarization of space, which will inevitably give rise to countermeasures by the USSR, including in the area of strategic offensive and defensive weapons. As a result, there will be no elimination of nuclear weapons and no elimination of nuclear missiles, but an arms race running in all directions: Objectively, that is how things stand.

[Chervov] I should like to add a little something to the question you are asking about the fact that the U.S. side wants to eliminate missiles by means of SDI. Why then is it creating six new types of missiles? Why then is the U.S. side building up those missiles? It is creating the MX, it is creating the Midgetman, there is a program for 12,000 cruise missiles, and stationing of the Pershing missiles is continuing. So what exactly is happening? They speak about being against missiles, but in practice they are deploying thousands of missiles. I think that will fill out the answer.

[Lomeyko] A question from the GDR magazine HORIZONT. What is the correlation of military forces in Europe at the moment?

[Chervov] In terms of strategic armaments there is, at the present time, a rough parity between the United States and the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union has somewhat more strategic armaments carriers. The United States has several thousand more nuclear warheads mounted on strategic armaments. But, in general, there is a parity between the strategic potentials of the United States and the USSR. This is confirmed by competent sources in the West and the Soviet Union, and also in the United States.

As far as the correlation of medium-range nuclear armaments is concerned, the picture here is somewhat different. By deploying Pershings and cruise missiles, the U.S. side and the NATO countries tried to upset the parity in these armaments in Europe. With the adoption of counter measures by the Warsaw Pact states this rough equilibrium was restored, but at a high -- at a higher level, of course. At the present time the picture as regards medium-range systems is as follows: The Soviet Union's stock of these armaments consists of 850 carriers, which can carry about 2,000 nuclear warheads at one go. The NATO countries, that is the United States, Britain and France, have 990 of these carriers and about 3,000 nuclear warheads.

Apart from that, one has to bear in mind that the NATO countries are now deploying, in addition to the Pershings and the cruise missiles, aircraft which belong to the medium-range category. These are the F-16, the F-18 and the Tornado. So, in this respect, too, the balance will fluctuate somewhat. If one takes missiles alone, medium-range missiles, and excludes aircraft, both NATO and the Soviet Union now have roughly the same numbers in Europe. But the whole point of the situation is that we declared a moratorium, to last from 7 April to November, and have halted deployment, whereas the Americans are continuing their deployments. If these deployments continue, there will be an advantage on the NATO side in this area too.

[Lomeyko] Are there other questions, please? Go ahead.

[Shishkovskiy] Vsevolod Shishkovskiy of USSR Central Television. Representatives of the U.S. Administration publicly declare that work on the so-called Strategic Defense Initiative is fully compatible with the ABM Treaty. Could you tell us, please, in what specific ways this work does not accord with the ABM Treaty.

[Chervov] First and foremost, it is necessary to say the following: The Strategic Defense Initiative and the ABM Treaty are opposites. They are not compatible with each other. Here there are no alternatives or choices. Why do we say this? The ABM Treaty says that space-based ABM systems must not be created, tested, or deployed. Territorial ABM systems and the foundations for such defenses must not be created. The official purpose of the SDI, which was formulated by the President, consists of the creation of offensive space armaments and a large-scale ABM system. In other words, the SDI is specifically aimed at achieving something which is banned by the ABM Treaty.

[Lomeyko] What is your question?

[Thatcher, in English with Russian translation phrase by phrase] Garry Thatcher from the CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR. I have two questions. What do you plan to do if there is no positive answer from the United States to the moratorium, when it expires in November? And my second question is: What do you think can be done concretely by the leaders of the Soviet Union and the United States when they meet in Geneva in November to further the business of arms control?

[Tulinov] To your first question I would answer as follows. The general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee said very clearly in a conversation with a PRAVDA editor in April that the period of validity of the moratorium lasts until November this year. The

decision that will be taken by the Soviet Union after that depends, naturally, on whether the United States will follow the example of the Soviet Union and whether or not they will halt the deployment of their medium-range missiles in Europe. I think we should wait until November.

[Lomeyko] Evidently the main thing is for the U.S. side, be it the members of the delegation holding the talks in Geneva or the whole administration, including its head, to follow the accords reached in January on the subject and aims of the talks. If they follow those accords, the prospects for achieving mutually-acceptable accords on the whole range of problems under discussion will improve, and progress can be expected.
[end recording]

The participants in the press conference also answered numerous other questions from correspondents.

TASS Version

PM251625 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 26 Jul 85 First Edition p 4

[TASS report: "For a Cosmos Without Weapons"]

[Text] A press conference "For a Cosmos Without Weapons" was held at the USSR Foreign Ministry Press Center in Moscow 25 July for Soviet and foreign journalists. The pamphlet "Star Wars: Illusions and Dangers," published by the Military Publishing House, was presented.

Special envoy Yu.A. Kvitsinskiy, who spoke at the press conference, noted that mankind has reached a dangerous stage in its development. A real threat of the arms race spreading to space has arisen. This must not be permitted. As M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, has noted, the problem of preventing the militarization of outer space requires a bold approach. Yesterday's yardsticks and narrow ideas about unilateral benefits and advantages, which, moreover, are illusory, are hardly applicable here. Now more than ever before, what is needed is a farsighted policy based on an understanding of the realities and the dangers which we will inevitably encounter tomorrow if today those who can and must adopt the only correct decision evade their responsibility.

The authors of the plans to extend the arms race into space work hard to present them in various kinds of packaging to make them attractive to the ignorant. They call them "a defense initiative," a "humane task," "a stake in scientific and technical progress," and a "means of delivering people from the nuclear threat" they seek to pass them off as practically a highway leading to mankind's new golden age. The true aims of this program and the extremely dangerous consequences of its implementation are described, on the basis of substantial, concrete material, in the pamphlet "Star Wars: Illusions and Dangers," which is being presented at today's press conference.

Whatever the American side may say about the aims of its so-called Strategic Defense Initiative, it is necessary to face the truth and understand the most important point: The implementation of the SDI would lead to the appearance in space of weapons in the strict sense of the word.

True, it is claimed that the space strike arms being developed in the United States are being created only for defense. But talking about defense is a mere facade. It is

quite clear that the so-called space-based "ABM systems" could be used to carry out strikes against similar systems on the other side, were they created, not to mention satellites designed for all kinds of purposes. Space strike arms could certainly be used to hit targets on earth and in its atmosphere. The American press writes openly about this.

Thus it is a question of creating a new, highly dangerous class of armaments. The potential for their use would depend entirely on the intentions of those who possessed them. And these intentions can certainly not be defined by any means as the desire to ensure defense, as is claimed in public, but as a striving for military superiority and an illusory gamble on escaping a retaliatory strike with impunity.

The appearance of space strike arms, the speaker went on, is, of course, not a way to end the arms race on earth or a means of eliminating nuclear weapons. The birth of space strike systems means the start of an arms race in space, the rapid diversification of the arms in question, their improvement, and the consistent extension of the potential for their use.

At the same time it is a stimulus to an intensified nuclear arms race and to increasing and improving such arms.

The creation of space strike arms means the breakdown of the ABM Treaty, on which the entire process of nuclear arms limitation and reduction is founded, and at the same time the breakdown of that process itself.

The creation of space strike armaments is not a method of effecting scientific, technical, and economic progress. On the contrary, it diverts massive intellectual and material resources from the solution of the very important, urgent tasks facing the modern world.

The Soviet Union proposes a simple, radical, and effective solution: not to start a space arms race, to ban the whole class of space strike armaments, and to impose an immediate moratorium on their creation, testing, and deployment. This would meet USSR and U.S. interests and the interests and aspirations of all states and peoples of the world.

Without preventing the arms race in space, we cannot halt it on earth or achieve deep reductions of nuclear armaments. These are objective realities of the present situation.

They were reflected in the Soviet-American accord on the subject and aims of the talks on nuclear and space armaments. The present unsatisfactory and even alarming situation at the talks stems from the U.S. refusal to stick to the accord and elaborate and adopt effective measures to prevent a space arms race. By behaving in that way the U.S. side is displaying its reluctance to adopt measures to prohibit, reduce, and limit arms in general, and it is consequently going against the peoples' legitimate demands for deliverance from the threat of nuclear catastrophe.

If the United States starts to militarize space, thus undermining strategic military equilibrium, the Soviet Union will have no choice but to adopt countermeasures to restore parity. But the USSR will not be the first to put weapons in space. "We," M.S. Gorbachev said, "will make every effort to persuade other countries, above all the United States, not to take such a fateful step, which would be bound to increase the threat of nuclear war and spark off an unbridled arms race in all spheres."

USSR Armed Forces General Staff Directorate Chief Colonel General N.F. Chervov dwelt on the military aspect of the question.

The U.S. "star wars" program, he said, is just part of the overall U.S. military plan based on an offensive nuclear strategy and geared to achieving military superiority over the USSR. In pursuit of it, Washington is pushing along the creation of a first, "disarming" nuclear strike potential: It comprises MX, Trident I, and Trident II strategic missiles, B-1B heavy bombers, Stealth, Pershing II missiles, and thousands of long-range cruise missiles. The United States is also building up its conventional armaments which, since they are nearly as destructive as nuclear weapons, would make it possible to destroy Warsaw Pact forces to a depth of many hundreds of kilometers. On top of all this, work is now under way to create space strike armaments and an extensive ABM system.

Why is the United States now gambling on space? It is reckoning on securing military superiority through space. The nuclear arms race unleashed by the United States has not given it an advantage. It has been adopting one strategic arms system after another. But not one of them has strengthened or will strengthen its own security. On the contrary, because of the Pentagon strategists' shortsightedness serious harm is being done to U.S. security, because the USSR makes a commensurate response to their actions.

Washington's hopes of winning a nuclear war are also ceasing to make sense, as a consequence of the inevitability of nuclear retribution.

Under these conditions space has been chosen as the new sphere in which the United States has conceived the intention of achieving decisive military superiority over the socialist countries. The leaders of the White House dream that with the help of "star wars" they will be able to forge ahead militarily and dictate their will to the Soviet Union. But Washington's endeavors are in vain. The Soviet Union will do everything possible [vozmoznoye] to wreck these adventurist plans.

What are the dangerous consequences of the "star wars" program? Its realization will finally liquidate the Soviet-American accords in the sphere of maintaining strategic stability. Washington sets this aim: For the United States -- acquire the capacity to inflict a nuclear first strike with impunity, and for the USSR -- to deprive it of the possibility of a counterstrike, that is, for disarm the Soviet Union. This means that SDI objectively recognized and permits the possibility of using nuclear weapons and making a nuclear first strike and the possibility of winning a nuclear war. This is SDI's real threat to all mankind.

The leaders of the White House have no serious arguments in defense of the aims and consequences of SDI announced in March 1983. All their arguments are fabrications. However, the United States tries to justify the "star wars" plans, their realization will inevitably lead to the emergence of space weapons, the destabilization of the entire system of international relations, and still more acute political and military confrontation than now -- from where it is not far to the very worst.

In order to shield SDI, Washington is resorting to the false argument that the Soviet Union has virtually already created a system similar to that which the United States wishes to create. Defense Secretary Weinberger recently stated that the USSR is allegedly "on the verge" of creating ABM defenses for the country's territory. This is not so. The USSR is not creating space strike arms, it is not building a large-scale ABM defense system or the foundation for such defenses, and it is strictly fulfilling the 1972 ABM Treaty of unlimited duration. We propose that the United States act in the same way and abandon its plans to militarize space.

The Soviet Union is striving to achieve honest accords in Geneva. But, if requested, we have the wherewithall to oppose the U.S. line of military superiority, we have the economic and intellectual potential to reliably ensure the security of our own country and of the socialist community. "If the preparations for 'star wars' are continued," as M.S. Gorbachev noted, "We will have no choice but to take countermeasures, including, of course, increasing and improving offensive nuclear weapons." The USSR will choose the means of action which correspond best to the interests of its defense capability, and not those toward which Washington figures would like to persuade it. Our measures will be adequate to the threat which may be posed to the Soviet Union and its allies.

Participants in the press conference replied to correspondents' questions.

Question: Is it possible to eliminate nuclear weapons using SDI, as Washington declares?

Answer: No. People in Washington are talking less and less about eliminating nuclear weapons. Instead of this, they are now saying that space means should increase the effectiveness of nuclear deterrence and be an addition to strategic offensive weapons, all types of which consistently have the ability to be used in a first strike.

As is known, the United States is by no means curtailing its nuclear programs. On the contrary, it is forcing them on space.

SDI leads to the militarization of space, which will inevitably provoke countermeasures from the USSR, including along the line of strategic offensive and defensive weapons. As a result nuclear weapons will not be eliminated, but there will be an arms race in all directions.

If space is free of space strike arms, then broad prospects will be opened up for reducing nuclear weapons. This is a perfectly real prospect.

Question: What facts can be cited to refute Washington's claims that the United States displayed restraint and even "stood still" in the development of its armed forces in the seventies?

Answer: There are many such facts. For instance, the United States developed MIRV's in the seventies, quadrupled the total of nuclear charges on its ICBM's and SLBM's, and doubled it on all strategic delivery vehicles (at a rate of three warheads per day). In 1970 U.S. strategic offensive arms were equipped with 5,000 charges, whereas the figure for 1980 is 10,000 charges. Would you call this restraint?

Between 1974 and 1981, 2,000 strategic and tactical missiles, 9 nuclear submarines equipped with Trident missiles, around 6,000 tanks, 3,300 fighter planes, 1,200 helicopters, and 94 warships were produced in the United States. In the seventies work began on the development of a new generation of weapons (including six new types of strategic offensive arms) which are now coming into service.

No one can refute these facts. They indicate that the United States was instrumental in escalating the arms race during the seventies, while the USSR was forced to respond to these threats to safeguard its own security.

Question: In your view, is it feasible to monitor compliance with a ban on the development of space strike weapons, especially at the research stage?

Answer: At a relatively early stage, this work is inevitably accompanied by indications -- mock-ups, models, experimental prototypes, and all kinds of tests -- which lend themselves to monitoring by national technical facilities.

The violation of accords, were it to take place, would inevitably be discovered long before the prototypes of the given arms were built.

Question: What is the correlation of forces as regards medium-range nuclear arms in Europe at the moment?

Answer: With the siting of the U.S. medium-range missiles in European attempt was made to impair the approximate balance of forces in medium-range facilities. The retaliatory measures adopted by the Soviet Union enabled us to redress the balance. We have now introduced a moratorium until November, while the United States continues to build up its medium-range missiles, and the balance is tilting in favor of NATO.

At present the USSR has around 850 delivery vehicles and approximately 2,000 nuclear charges in Europe; NATO has 990 delivery vehicles and more than 3,000 nuclear charges. Furthermore, NATO countries are being equipped with new types of aircraft -- the F-16, F-18, and Tornado -- which also constitute medium-range facilities and affect the balance of forces. Comparing NATO and USSR medium-range missiles in Europe only, their number is approximately the same on both sides.

Consequently, the Soviet proposal to establish a moratorium on medium-range missiles in Europe does not pursue any one-sided military advantages. It is an honest and just proposal.

Other questions asked by journalists were also answered.

Army Paper Account

PM251625 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 26 Jul 85 Second Edition p 3

[Captain 2d Class V. Kuzar and Captain 2d Class Ye. Nikitin report on press conference "For Space Without Weapons" held at the USSR Foreign Ministry Press Center in Moscow on 25 July for Soviet and foreign journalists under the heading: "Saving Mankind From 'Star Wars'; Moscow Press Conference"]

[Text] There is no more important task today than to lift the threat of nuclear war which hangs over mankind, stop the arms race on earth, and prevent it from spreading into space. The true aims of the "Star Wars" plans being elaborated in Washington, the nature of the approach of the USSR and the United States to the problem of the use of space, and an assessment of the pernicious consequences for the world's peoples which arise from the program of militarization of outer space which is being implemented in the United States are set forth in the pamphlet "'Star Wars': Illusions and Dangers." It is published by the Military Publishing House.

The pamphlet was presented at a press conference for Soviet and foreign journalists held in Moscow 25 July. Taking part were V. B. Lomeyko, chief of the USSR Foreign Ministry Press Department; Special Envoy Yu. A.

Kvitsinskiy; Colonel General N. F. Chervov, chief of a USSR armed forces general staff directorate; and V. B. Tulinov, chief of a sector at the CPSU Central Committee International Information Section.

Yu. A. Kvitsinskiy, who spoke at the press conference, stated, in particular:

Our press conference is devoted to a problem whose urgency and significance can hardly be overstated. A real threat of the arms race spreading to space has arisen.

The authors of the plans to extend the arms race into space work had to present them in various kinds of packaging to make them attractive to the ignorant. They call them "defense initiative," a "humane task," "gambling on scientific and technical progress," and a "means of delivering people from the nuclear threat"; they seek to pass them off as practically a highway leading to mankind's new golden age. The true aims of this program and the extremely dangerous consequences of its implementation are described, on the basis of substantial, concrete material, in the pamphlet "'Star Wars': Illusions and Dangers," which is being presented at today's press conference.

Whatever the American side may say about the aims of its so-called "strategic defense initiative," it is necessary to face the truth and understand the most important point: the implementation of the SDI would lead to the appearance in space of weapons in the strict sense of the word.

True, it is claimed that the space strike arms being developed in the United States are being created only for defense. But talking about defense is a mere facade. It is quite clear that the so-called space-based "ABM systems" could be used to carry out strikes against similar systems on the other side, were they created, not to mention satellites designed for all kinds of purposes. Can there be any doubt that space strike arms could be used to hit targets on earth and in its atmosphere? The American press writes openly about this.

The appearance of space strike arms, the speaker went on, is, of course, not a way to end the arms race on earth or a means of eliminating nuclear weapons. The birth of space strike systems means the start of an arms race in space, the rapid diversification of the arms in question, their improvement, and the consistent extension of the potential for their use.

The creation of space strike arms means the breakdown of the ABM treaty, on which the entire process of nuclear arms limitation and reduction is founded, and at the same time the breakdown of that process itself.

The creation of space strike armaments is not a method of effecting scientific, technical, and economic progress. On the contrary, it diverts massive intellectual and material resources from the solution of the very important, urgent tasks facing the modern world.

That is why the Soviet Union proposes a simple, radical, and effective solution: not to start a space arms race, to ban the whole class of space strike

armaments, and to impose an immediate moratorium on their creation, testing, and deployment. This would meet USSR and U.S. interests and the interests and aspirations of all states and peoples of the world.

The question of banning space strike arms is now at the center of the attention of the entire world public. Without preventing the arms race in space, we cannot halt it on earth or achieve deep reductions of nuclear armaments. These are objective realities of the present situation.

They were reflected in the Soviet-American accord on the subject and aims of the talks on nuclear and space armaments. The present unsatisfactory and even alarming situation at the talks stems from the U.S. refusal to stick to the accord and elaborate and adopt effective measures to prevent a space arms race.

If the United States starts to militarize space, thus undermining strategic military equilibrium, the Soviet Union will have no choice but to adopt countermeasures to restore parity. But the USSR will not be the first to put weapons in space. "We," M. S. Gorbachev said, "will make every effort to persuade other countries, above all the United States, not to take such a fateful step, which would be bound to increase the threat of nuclear war and spark off an unbridled arms race in all spheres."

Col Gen N. F. Chervov then spoke. He stressed that the American "Star Wars" program is just part of the overall U.S. military plan based on an offensive nuclear strategy and geared to achieving military superiority over the USSR. In pursuit of it, Washington is pushing along the creation of a first, "disarming" nuclear strike potential: it comprises MX, Trident-1, and Trident-2 strategic missiles, B-1B and Stealth strategic bombers, Pershing-2 missiles, and thousands of long-range cruise missiles. The United States is also building up its conventional armaments which, since they are nearly as destructive as nuclear weapons, would make it possible to destroy Warsaw Pact forces to a depth of many hundreds of kilometers. On top of all this, work is now under way to create space strike armaments and an extensive ABM system.

Why is the United States now gambling on space? It is reckoning on securing military superiority through space. The nuclear arms race unleashed by the United States has not given it an advantage. It has been adopting one strategic arms system after another. But none of them has strengthened or will strengthen its own security. The leaders of the White House dream that with the help of "Star Wars" they will be able to forge ahead militarily and dictate their will to the Soviet Union.

What specifically are the dangerous consequences of Washington's DSI? From the military viewpoint the implementation of the American "Star Wars" program will finally liquidate Soviet-American accords in the sphere of maintaining strategic stability.

The "space shield" dreamed up by the Reagan administration with the simultaneous buildup of offensive arms systems, severely undermines this stability. The aim is set: for the United States--to acquire the capacity to inflict a nuclear first strike with impunity; and for the USSR--to deprive it of the possibility of a counterstrike, that is, to disarm the Soviet Union. This

means that SDI objectively recognizes and permits the possibility of using nuclear weapons and making a nuclear first strike and the possibility of winning a nuclear war.

The leaders of the White House have no serious arguments in defense of the aims and consequences of SDI announced in March 1983. All their arguments are not serious, they are fabrications.

The order to protect its space militarization plans, Washington is resorting to the false argument that the Soviet Union has virtually already created a system similar to that which the United States wishes to create. Defense Secretary Weinberger recently stated that the USSR is allegedly "on the verge" of creating ABM defenses for the country's territory. This is not so. The USSR is not creating space strike arms, it is not building a large-scale ABM defense system or the foundations for such defenses, and it is strictly fulfilling the 1972 ABM treaty of unlimited duration.

The Soviet Union is striving to achieve honest accords in Geneva. But, if required, we have the wherewithall to oppose the U.S. line of military superiority, we have the economic and intellectual potential to reliably ensure the security of our own country and of the socialist community. "If the preparations for 'Star Wars' are continued," as M. S. Gorbachev noted, "we will have no choice but to take countermeasures, including of course increasing and improving offensive nuclear weapons." The USSR will choose the means of action which correspond best to the interests of its defense capability, and not those toward which Washington figures would like to persuade it. Our measures will be adequate to the threat which may be posed to the Soviet Union in its allies.

Participations in the press conference replied to correspondents' questions.

Question: In the U.S. administration's opinion, work in the SDI sphere falls within the framework of the ABM treaty. If you do not agree, please tell us in what way this work does not accord with the treaty.

Answer: The ABM treaty and the SDI are incompatible--they are at opposite poles. The ABM treaty does not permit the creation, testing, or deployment of space strike arms or a large-scale ABM defense, or the base for such a defense. The U.S. administration has officially announced that the purpose of the SDI is the creation of space strike arms and a large-scale ABM defense system with space-based elements.

Question: What will be the USSR's countermeasures in the event of the U.S. deployment of a large scale ABM system with space-based elements?

Answer: The U.S. plans to deploy a large-scale ABM system with space-based elements are aimed at "devaluing" the USSR's strategic nuclear forces, that is, disarming us, while themselves acquiring the potential to threaten a nuclear strike with impunity.

If this turn of events, which is dangerous to international peace and stability, cannot be prevented, the Soviet Union's countermeasures will be aimed at thwarting those plans.

Question: What is the correlation of forces as regards medium-range nuclear arms in Europe at the moment?

Answer: With the siting of the U.S. medium-range missiles in Europe an attempt was made to impair the approximate balance of forces in medium-range facilities. The retaliatory measures adopted by the Soviet Union enabled us to redress the balance. We have now introduced a moratorium until November, while the United States continues to build up its medium-range missiles, and the balance is tilting in favor of NATO.

At present the USSR has around 850 delivery vehicles and approximately 2,000 nuclear charges in Europe; NATO has 990 delivery vehicles and more than 3,000 nuclear charges. Furthermore, NATO countries are being equipped with new types of aircraft--the F-16, F/A-18, and Tornado--which also constitute medium-range facilities and affect the balance of forces.

Question: What facts can be cited to refute Washington's claims that the United States displayed restraint and even "stood still" in the development of its armed forces in the seventies?

Answer: There are many such facts. For instance, the United States developed MIRV's in the seventies, quadrupled the total of nuclear charges on its ICBM's and SLBM's, and doubled it on all strategic delivery vehicles. In 1970, U.S. strategic offensive arms were equipped with 5,000 charges, whereas the figure for 1980 is 10,000 charges. Would you call this restraint?

Between 1974 and 1981, 2,000 strategic and tactical missiles, 9 nuclear submarines equipped with Trident missiles, around 6,000 tanks, 3,300 fighter planes, 1,200 helicopters, and 94 warships were produced in the United States. In the seventies, work began on the development of a new generation of weapons (including six new types of strategic offensive arms), which are now coming into service.

No one can refute these facts.

The participants in the press conference also received answers to other questions.

CSO: 5200/1348

SPACE ARMS

LEADING FRG PHYSICIST ASSAILS SDI TECHNOLOGY, MOTIVATION

Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German 15 Jul 85 pp 28-42

[Article by Prof Hans-Peter Duerr, director of Werner-Heisenberg-Institut of the Max-Planck-Institute for Physics and Astrophysics at Munich: "The Heavens Are Becoming the Vestibule of Hell"]

[Text] Prof Hans-Peter Duerr on the madness of the "Strategic Defense Initiative" (SDI).

West German scientists on a broad front are warning against participation by the FRG in the "Strategic Defense Initiative" (SDI) of the United States. Their most prominent spokesman is Prof Hans-Peter Duerr, 56, director of the Werner Heisenberg Institute of the Max Planck Institute for Physics and Astrophysics in Munich.

On 23 May, before an audience of 1,500 at Munich University, Duerr, a student of the nuclear physicists Heisenberg and Teller, discussed the absurdity and the dangers of the star-wars concept. Duerr, who spoke in Munich without a manuscript, wrote down the most important passages of his lecture for DER SPIEGEL.

On 23 May 1983, U.S. President Ronald Reagan presented a television speech on a "defense program of the future." In the speech, which was the starting shot for the "Strategic Defense Initiative" (SDI), Reagan said, among other things:

"As long as nuclear weapons have existed, defense measures have concentrated more and more on deterring aggression by proclaiming retaliation.... This method of achieving stability through an offensive threat has worked.... We and our allies have been successful in preventing a nuclear war for more than three decades.... In recent months, however, my advisers...have emphasized the necessity of breaking loose from a future that, in regard to our security, relies exclusively on an offensive retaliation.... Would it not be better to save human lives than to avenge them. Are we not in a position to demonstrate our peaceful intentions in that we summon all of our abilities and all of our inventiveness to achieve a truly lasting stability? I believe that we can do it, indeed that we must do it!

"I have become convinced that there is a way. Share with me a vision of the future that offers hope. It involves the fact that we are initiating a program to counter the dreadful Soviet missile threat through measures that are defensive....

"I know that this is a tremendous technical task--a task that may not be accomplished before the end of this century....

"I am very well aware that defense systems have their limits and present certain problems and uncertainties. When they are paired with offensive systems, then they could be viewed as fertile soil for an aggressive policy--and no one wants that. But in carefully considering all of these thoughts, I call on the community of scientists who have given us these nuclear weapons to dedicate their great talents to the cause of mankind and world peace so as to give us the means of making these nuclear weapons impotent and obsolete....

"This evening I am taking an important first step. I am giving the order for a comprehensive and intensive effort to work out a long-term research and development program so as to come closer to our final goal of eliminating the threat from strategic nuclear missiles...."

So much for Reagan--truly a grandiose vision. An appeal to scientists to "uninvent" the atomic bomb.

Reagan's speech contains some essential points that I can fully accept. In my opinion, it is correct that:

--The deterrence doctrine is inhuman. For a long time now, the peace movement has passionately stressed this standpoint.

--In the long term, the doctrine of deterrence is unstable. A form of defense that reacts to an enemy threat with an increased counterthreat will necessarily lead to an arms race that must ultimately end in a catastrophe.

--Measures are urgently needed that will make nuclear weapons superfluous in securing peace. They are totally unsuitable for carrying out any objectives because they would destroy what they are intended to defend. In principle, there is no possibility of making them inoperative, even by scrapping all existing nuclear weapons. Because of the existing knowledge, they could be rebuilt within a few weeks.

In the following, I would like to show that SDI cannot meet the announced expectations, for they are based upon false concepts. For the overwhelming probability is that the attempt to realize the vision presented by SDI would achieve precisely the opposite of the intended purpose; it would lead to an extreme destabilization of the already precarious situation and thus further reduce our security and humanity's chances of survival.

I am a high-energy and nuclear physicist. But this does mean that I have detailed knowledge of the technical questions that have to do with an antiballistic system. I have become informed by studying the public literature, and especially the American literature. What I have to say is not

new.

But much important information is subject to military secrecy. So, one asks, what can I or what can the authors of the publications that I relied upon contribute of significance to this group of questions? For it is claimed that only one who has access to secret information can be competent to evaluate such complex military systems. Edward Teller, my former teacher, was sometimes effective in taking this standpoint in public, especially, it seems to me, when he got in trouble with his arguments.

With most of my colleagues, on the other hand, I take the position that no technical details are needed for an overall judgment on SDI, especially when one has in mind the demand for a total defense capability against the nuclear threat, but that an evaluation is possible merely on the basis of general physical and geometric considerations. The situation here seems to be similar to that in the assessment of a "perpetuum mobile." Through knowledge of the first and second propositions of thermodynamics, one knows that such a machine can never work. It is therefore hardly necessary to delve into the details of such a machine.

In the following, therefore, I will take the standpoint that everything that does not contradict physical laws is somehow technically feasible and should be operational, and I will not concern myself with how far the current level of technology is from this possibility on principle.

Opinion varies widely on how one is to envision a strategic nuclear attack and our only hope is that we will never know. Some consider that in the worst case only a "harmless" nuclear warning shot above the atmosphere is possible, whereas others fear the large-scale missile attack. Since we do not know, we are forced to assume the worst case.

At present and in the near future, this would mean that more than 9,000 nuclear warheads carried by more than 2,000 Soviet intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM's) and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM's) could attack the West simultaneously, whereby each warhead has an average explosive force of about 70 Hiroshima bombs (equivalent to about 70 times 15 kilotons of TNT) and could reach the United States after a flight time of about half an hour. In addition, Europe is threatened by the many intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBM's), the long-range tactical missiles (TBM's) with a flight time of less than 7 minutes, and the cruise missiles (GLCM's).

Even 1 percent of these missiles, that is, about 100 warheads with an explosive force of a total of 5,000 Hiroshima bombs would be sufficient to deliver an "unacceptable" destructive strike. This means that a defense system, if it is to fulfill its purpose, must achieve the fantastic capability of neutralizing over 99 percent of all nuclear missiles in an attack. This high level of protection needs to be provided not only for the "hard targets" such as military targets--missile silos or command centers, for example--but it must also be achieved above all for the many vulnerable "soft targets" such as population centers, in which most of our people live.

So as not to reject such a high level of protection as an unreachable utopia, it is indispensable to set up a defense at all possible levels, that is, at the level of the intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched systems and intermediate-range missiles, tactical missiles, cruise missiles, and all other levels that will be developed in the future, in part as a reaction to this defense.

At every level and in every phase of the flight path, in turn, an optimized defense form must be developed in regard to the particular characteristics of this phase.

It is generally considered that it is absolutely hopeless to achieve the lofty goal of a 99 percent destruction of nuclear missiles if one is not at least successful in neutralizing the majority of the land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles in their short ascent and powered phase.

In these considerations, we are not taking into account the even earlier point of time, that is, the destruction of the missiles before their ascent in their silos, for this would correspond to an offensive option and not to a defensive option, which is what we want exclusively. But it should be noted here that an enemy can never be certain that he can really count on this restriction.

An interception in the start or propulsion phase is preferred because of a number of very favorable circumstances:

- The missiles are relatively large objects, about 30 to 50 meters long.

- The missiles are very vulnerable because of their sensitive drive units and inflammable fuel.

- The many warheads (10 for the MX and SS-18) are all still together.

- The highly luminous fiery tail of the missile is easily detectable from a distance of tens of thousands of kilometers through satellite-supported infrared sensors.

- The bright fiery tail is an outstanding target for sighting the missile for the purpose of shooting it down. (The damaging shot must naturally be fired at the vulnerable parts of the propulsion unit several meters above the tail.)

The other flight phases offer comparatively less favorable conditions with the possible exception of the final approach phase to hard targets such as missile sites or command centers.

There are, however, some serious disadvantages to interception in the propulsion phase, especially the generally great distance between the place of ascent (somewhere in Siberia) and the location of the defense system (somewhere in the United States, for example), a distance that can amount to a good 10,000 kilometers if one does not come closer with ships and submarines. Because of the curvature of the earth, the launch site and ascent phase of the missile are therefore visible only from a high platform stationed in near-earth space.

This means that defense against missiles in the propulsion phase must be carried on directly or indirectly from space stations. Since the propulsion phase lasts only a few minutes, the defensive weapon must also be able to react extremely quickly. There are in principle two possibilities for a stationing in space. The initially simpler and more convenient possibility from a technical standpoint is that of stationing the systems needed for defense in space before the emergency. In this connection, it initially appears better to put these defensive stations into the lowest possible orbits, at an altitude of 1,000 kilometers, for example, so as to be as close as possible to the targets--the ascending missiles.

The time of revolution of the lowest possible combat stations is about 2 hours, which means that they are in a favorable firing position for only a fraction of their time. In this connection, one must consider that in the case of a favorable orbit of the combat stations over the poles, the earth under them turns about 30 degrees, or several thousand kilometers, with each revolution of the combat stations. The result is that, depending upon the range of these defensive combat stations, one needs as many as 20 such satellites to cover a single missile site.

To avoid this unfavorable circumstance, one is therefore inclined to put the combat stations in a geostationary orbit, that is, at an altitude of 36,000 kilometers above the equator. These combat stations are then, to be sure, about 39,000 kilometers away from their targets in Siberia, which puts extremely high demands on the aiming accuracy of the defensive weapons.

One can also counter this difficulty by making use of a second stationing possibility. The defensive system is not sent up until the moment that missiles are launched, that is, it is triggered by the early-warning system. Naturally, such pop-up systems must be small and light so that they can be sent up into a suitable firing position sufficiently rapidly.

To measure the chances of success of a defensive system, it is important to consider the various tasks that it must successfully handle in the short time of the missile ascent.

Things start with an early warning from a geostationary satellite that is equipped with an infrared sensor and is continually watching the silos, a satellite that registers a fiery exhaust or something similar. This signal must initially be evaluated to see whether it actually involves missiles and, if it does, how many and what kind.

Then begins the precise locating and determination of the velocity of these missiles; the most exact possible determination of the missile trajectories is essential for further tracking and combatting these objects (a task that causes some fundamental difficulties from 36,000 kilometers, for in the time of more than one-tenth of a second that light, with a speed of 300,000 kilometers per second, requires to travel from the missile to the satellite, one can easily upset the trajectory).

This information must then be transmitted to a suitable defensive system, that is, one must select a combat station with a suitable firing position, this

station must be aimed precisely at the target, and finally, the destructive shot must be triggered. Afterwards, the result must be controlled and, in the event of a miss, the entire procedure may have to be repeated until ultimately success is achieved.

To be able to overcome the large required distances (in any case, at least 3,000 kilometers) and to react within the short times (less than 2 minutes), the defensive weapons require systems that

--work at an extremely high speed,

--permit an extremely good aiming, so as to be sufficiently accurate at this great distance, and

--can transmit sufficient energy to ensure the desired interference or destruction.

Especially in regard to the high velocity, therefore, one can consider above all the so-called directed-energy weapons (or more precisely, directed-energy beams), whose "bullets" travel at or near the speed of light (300,000 kilometers a second).

Here one thinks in particular of a highly concentrated electromagnetic beam in various wave lengths, a beam similar to that produced by the so-called laser. Best known and most intensive are the chemical lasers, which are based upon chemical reactions and have wave lengths in the area of several microns (thousandth of a millimeter). Also suitable are the free-electron laser, which radiates in the range of visible light with wave lengths of about one-half micron, the eximer laser in the even shorter ultraviolet range, and of late the X-ray laser as well with wave lengths of 1 to 10 angstroms. Also suitable, in principle, are concentrated beams of high-energy elementary particles such as electrons, protons or similar neutral particles and atoms.

Today chemical lasers with very high output can already be produced--carbon dioxide lasers, for example, with up to 400 kilowatts of radiation output and hydrogen-fluorine lasers (HF-lasers) with up to 2.2 megawatts. We assume that the infrared light of such a laser or laser system is collected by a mirror and is aimed at the far-distant missile by means of a large adjustable concave mirror. Let us suppose that this laser is to be stationed in a near-earth orbit. Because of the wave nature of light, one cannot concentrate the light as sharply as one would like (diffraction) even if one assumes perfect optics (precise adjustment of the lasers and perfect mirrors). In the case of a concave mirror with a diameter of 10 meters and a laser light with a wave length of 3 microns, at a distance of 3,000 kilometers one obtains a focal spot with a diameter of at least 1 meter.

The laser light is to destroy the missile by burning a hole in the sensitive hull of the drive unit, for which in the case of a solid-propellant missile such as the American MX, for example, an energy density of about 20 kilojoules per square centimeter or 200 megajoules per square meter is needed. If we assume a laser with a continual radiation output of 25 megawatts--possibly achievable in the future and 10 times stronger than the strongest laser of

today--then the energy density spread evenly every second over the 1-meter focal spot (ignoring all losses) requires about 8 seconds to destroy the missile if it moves into the focal spot.

This means that in the launch phase of the missiles lasting a total of 2 minutes, a laser can destroy a maximum of 15 missiles if all missiles are launched simultaneously.

But the assumption of a laser in a near-earth orbit means that if one envisions the silos of the Soviet intercontinental ballistic missiles along the Trans-Siberian Railway as the possible starting points of the missiles, then--with the assumed range of the lasers--seven satellite stations may possibly be enough to reach an average of one silo at any one time.

Since each combat station can destroy a maximum of 15 missiles. this means, in the case of 1,400 Soviet ICBM's, that one needs at least 700 such combat stations to be able to fire at least one shot at each missile.

We now want to make a rough estimate of the costs that arise through the deployment of the lasers. We thereby initially want to limit ourselves to calculating what it would cost just to put into orbit the fuel needed for the laser.

To produce one kilojoule of radiation in an HF-laser, we need about 2 grams of fuel, ignoring all losses. For 25 megajoules/second for 120 seconds, one needs six tons of fuel per laser.

It currently costs about \$3 million to put 1 ton into a near-earth orbit in the equatorial plane. (The orbit over the poles that is needed for our purpose would be substantially more expensive, for in this case the additional thrust through the turning of the earth is absent). For 700 lasers, this means that about \$13 billion would have to be spent just for transporting the fuel. In the case of a payload weight of about 30 tons for a Space Shuttle, this means that with 10 flights per year one would need about 14 years to set up this system.

It is obvious that this calculation greatly underestimates the true costs. Thus, consideration of the equipment associated with the transport costs would mean at least a doubling of our estimates. In addition, we assumed lasers with ideal behavior (efficiency 100 percent), perfect mirrors, and a perfect aiming of the beam. If we view all of these factors realistically, then we would have to adjust downward our estimate for the radiation output.

By ignoring all time losses in the processing of information, in firing decisions and commands, in realigning the mirror and the like, we have also greatly overestimated the propulsion time of the missile available for hitting the target. Consideration of all of these factors would mean the necessity of even stronger lasers and a further increase in their numbers, which increases costs accordingly.

Also not considered are the immense costs that must be met for the research, development and construction of these laser stations and for the associated command and control systems.

And heretofore we have also given no thought to whether these defense systems in space, in turn, need their own protection to be able to do their destructive work without being interfered with by the enemy. In this connection, however, we come to an extremely delicate point of the the entire SDI project, which we must later discuss in detail.

The envisioned antiballistic system with laser satellites sounds quite fantastic and utopian and one can justifiably object that conceptually it is planned in a rather primitive and naive manner. It is, after all, the goal of research to indicate entirely new ways here and to achieve ingenious simplifying and cost-cutting breakthroughs. Completely new mechanisms and technologies will therefore be sought.

The point of departure for such "improvements" involves considerations in the direction of a reduction in the number of combat stations, of which, according to the above concept, only about 15 percent are operational at any one time because of unfavorable firing positions.

It seems appropriate to avoid this difficulty by putting the combat lasers into suitable geostationary orbits so that they are constantly on watch above the silos or displaced somewhat to the south over the equator. But as previously noted, the serious problem in this connection is the more than 10 times greater distance to the ascending missiles, that is, a distance of about 40,000 kilometers compared with the 3,000 kilometers heretofore assumed.

Because of light refraction, this means a focal spot 10 times as large, or, to achieve the same effect, a laser 100 times more intensive (2.5 gigawatts) or a focusing mirror 10 times as large (100 meters). That sounds absolutely hopeless.

One can, however, attempt to compensate for the increased distance by, for example, making use of an eximer laser radiating in the ultraviolet waveband with a wave length one-tenth as long as that of chemical lasers. One then has essentially the previous relations with respect to mirror size, the size of the focal spot, and output. But two difficulties arise.

The eximer laser is a mixture of an inert gas (xenon) and chlorine that is activated by a gas discharge requiring much electric energy. Compared to the chemical laser, therefore, it is somewhat of a monster that is hardly suitable for deployment, especially in such a high orbit. A second difficulty involves the fact that the great distance not only increases the expansion of the focal spot but also makes aiming accuracy more difficult. Since the target is given through the fiery tail radiating in the infrared range, one needs "sighting telescopes" with diameters of about 100 meters.

Neither difficulty can be overcome technically in this way. The American physicist George Keyworth has therefore proposed the alternative project of stationing the eximer laser on earth, which is much simpler, and routing its

ultraviolet laser light to the missiles by way of a large mirror revolving in a geostationary orbit.

To get around the difficulty with aiming accuracy, the ultraviolet laser light is initially to be directed from the mirror in geostationary orbit to combat mirrors in near-earth orbits, whose closer proximity is to permit a precise sighting of the individual missiles.

This procedure, in turn, also has serious disadvantages. Since the combat mirrors are stationed in near-earth orbits, we again have the old difficulty that they are usually in an unfavorable position relative to the silos that they are watching over. So we must again increase their numbers to guarantee a continual close watch over the silos.

Because of the simpler structure of a mirror compared to a laser, one can possibly accept this. But the geostationary main mirror must then accurately adjust its alignment to the orbit of each combat mirror that is ready for firing and, at certain moments, shift to a new combat mirror in a more favorable position. Will it work that way? But these are technical problems that we do not wish to concern ourselves with.

Likewise disadvantageous is the fact that, in the case of a laser stationed on earth, the laser beams must first pass through the earth's atmosphere, where they are not only partially absorbed but--worse--also scattered by fluctuations in the atmosphere (an effect familiar to us in the twinkling of the fixed stars in the night sky). Such a scattering would spread out the ultraviolet beam in an unacceptable manner.

To counteract this, one can, under some circumstances, consider "active optics." For this purpose, one sends a small eximer laser about 900 meters ahead of the geostationary main mirror and lets it beam its concentrated ultraviolet light through the atmosphere to the large eximer laser on the earth. In accordance with the atmospheric fluctuations, this beam is "blurred" when it strikes the main laser and therefore, in being used as the trigger for the avalanche of radiation in the laser, produces a correspondingly blurred main beam, which then, in passing through the same spot in the atmosphere, is returned to an undisturbed form according to the principle: blurring x reciprocal blurring = not blurred.

I am presenting this in such detail so that you can see that one need not immediately throw in the towel when there are technical problems. But you probably also recognize the kind of immense problems that one must put up with here.

But now to the costs of such a system. If we return to the 1,400 missiles, we must probably reckon with about 70 main mirrors in geostationary orbits, whereby each must be assigned the task of knocking out about 20 missiles over the corresponding combat mirrors numbering at least 500 .

We again limit ourselves to the costs of providing the lasers with energy. To destroy 1,400 missiles, we need about 200 gigajoules of energy that must be provided during the approximately 100 seconds that the ascent phase of the missiles lasts.

This means that the laser must be capable of emitting an overall radiation output of at least 2 gigawatts (GW). An eximer laser requires not only chemical fuel but also electric power for the gas discharge. It is about 16 times as great as the output emitted in the radiation (6 percent efficiency), so that 32 GW of electric power--equal to the output of about 32 nuclear power plants--must be provided, which then, to be sure, would be needed for only about 2 minutes.

But that is still not all. The ultraviolet light is absorbed in the atmosphere, especially when the sky is overcast. A clear sky under the laser cannot always be guaranteed and must therefore be compensated for through a larger number of laser systems on earth. This easily leads to an increase by a factor of 3 to 10 in the capacity that must be made available, that is, it leads to electric power values of 100 to 300 GW, equivalent to 20 to 60 percent of the installed electric power in the United States.

It must constantly be available on a spontaneous basis, although for only a short time, which requires electric power plants conceived especially for this purpose. If, in installing this capacity, one assumes \$300 per kilowatt--a value that is far below the usual installation costs--then this would correspond to an expenditure of between \$40 billion and \$120 billion.

Here I would again like to stress that the costs would be substantially higher in a realistic estimate.

Thus the idea with main and combat mirrors sounds even more Utopian and one could simply give up. But there are people, including Edward Teller, who are of the opinion that one just has to reach for more exotic solutions.

An X-ray laser, which is now in the experimental phase, can be considered as one of these exotic solutions. X-rays have a wave length a thousand times shorter than that of visible light and therefore have a correspondingly smaller diffraction.

X-ray laser light, that is, a sharply concentrated and intensive X-ray, is, however, substantially more difficult to produce. For this, one must stimulate the electrons of the inner shells of higher atoms, which requires greater amounts of energy--in the approximate magnitude of 1 kiloelectron volt or the temperature equivalent of about 10 million degrees.

Despite the lesser diffraction, one cannot concentrate X-ray light as well, because in producing it one cannot apply the usual laser-amplification mechanism, which makes repeated use of reflection of the light in the laser. X-rays pass right through material. To construct the analogue of a laser, one can utilize very long and very thin metal filaments. If the metal filament is stimulated through a suitable energy source, then it will emit X-ray laser light at its end.

One needs a gigantic energy source to put such an X-ray laser in operation and then to be able to produce a sufficient energy density on the focal spot for destruction.. Only nuclear energy is a suitable energy source. Therefore, it will be attempted to drive, or "pump" the laser with an atomic bomb.

A great disadvantage of the X-ray laser with nuclear pumping is that it is itself destroyed when triggered by the nuclear explosion. Since the gamma rays are a tiny fraction of a second faster than the destructive shock wave, there is just enough time for the X-ray to escape. So the X-ray laser permits only one shot. To be able to use it to shoot down several missiles, one must stockpile a larger number of metal filaments, whereby each one would have to be aimed, absolutely straight and precisely, at a different target. (Everyone is at liberty to imagine the technical hurdles in solving this problem.) Readjustment after a miss is not possible.

The effect of the X-ray on the missile is not the same as in the case of the continually operated chemical laser. The X-ray laser does not burn a hole in the wall of the missile but delivers a blow that can knock the missile off its trajectory or dent it. Because of the short time of the effect, realignment of the beam is unnecessary, which is advantageous. To be able to seriously disturb missiles, one probably needs atomic bombs with the strength of more than 20 Hiroshima bombs as a laser pump.

Since the weight of the X-ray laser is relatively slight, it seems suitable for use as a pop-up system. Not until a missile attack occurs would it be sent up to a suitable position, from where the missiles can be hit. It is, for example, possible to station such pop-up systems on submarines cruising in the northern Indian Ocean.

It will hardly be possible to reduce the ascent time of the X-ray laser from a submarine to the necessary altitude to less than three and a half minutes. But this is not sufficient to intercept the missile in its launch phase, for one can easily reduce this time to less than 2 minutes. The necessity of an immediate reaction also means that in this connection no intermediate human control is possible. The first nuclear explosion--here that of an X-ray laser--in space over the enemy's territory could only be controlled by computers with no human help and with all of the catastrophic consequences.

A second serious disadvantage of the X-ray is that X-rays cannot penetrate the atmosphere. So as long as a missile is within the atmosphere, up to an altitude of about 100 kilometers, the X-rays can have no effect on it. It would be relatively easy for the Soviets to strengthen the thrust of their missiles to the point that the propulsion phase is over before the projectiles leave the protection of the atmosphere.

In principle, besides the electromagnetic rays, high-energy beams of elementary particles can also be considered as defensive weapons, for their behavior in their propagation through space is similar to that of light and their velocity is not far behind that of light.

High-energy beams can be produced most easily with electrically charged stable elementary particles (such as electrons and protons) that one brings to great velocities in high-energy accelerators (as is done, for example, at Cern in Geneva or at Desy in Hamburg).

The disadvantage of charged particles is that they--in contrast to uncharged light--are deflected in the earth's magnetic field. Thus one cannot fire at very long ranges. In addition, fluctuations in the earth's magnetic field lead to large deviations in trajectory and any nuclear explosions also cause large course disturbances.

A possibility of avoiding this difficulty involves neutralizing the particles after they are accelerated. One can, for example, transform a proton beam into a neutral neutron beam in its passage through a suitable material, but then, to be sure, it is no longer very well concentrated and already has a diameter of 1 kilometer at a distance of 1,000 kilometers.

Here it seems more feasible initially to accelerate H-ions (hydrogen nuclei with two electrons) and then remove their extra electron, producing a high-energy neutral hydrogen beam. In this case, it is probably possible to achieve beam diameters of at best 10 meters at a distance of 1,000 kilometers.

There are reports of laboratory success in capturing charged particles in a channel that a laser beam leaves behind through ionization in a highly rarified gas, but I have difficulty in fathoming these reports.

In any case, because of the great expenditure in acceleration and because of the difficulty in achieving high enough energies and intensities, particle-beam weapons play no role in the current discussion. Their application for a defensive system is not considered feasible.

But the difficulties in developing defensive weapons become immeasurable when we consider that the potential enemy missile launcher is not going to submit idly to all of these measures but is going to take suitable countermeasures.

From a technical standpoint, the greatest weakness of a strategic antiballistic system is in the fact that its implementation requires new and still unknown ingenious technologies and extremely complicated and expensive systems, whereas with no great difficulty one can come up with a large number of enormously effective countermeasures that are already available or almost available and are controllable as well as relatively simple and inexpensive.

A defense system that can be made ineffective with simpler and cheaper methods than it itself requires for its construction becomes senseless. Indeed, it is even dangerous, for it leads to a mutual escalation of destructive forces.

To prevent his missiles from being intercepted by the described defensive system, the attacker can begin by seeking above all to protect his missiles better. In this connection, there are a number of simple measures:

--Through additional artificial fiery exhausts, he can simulate the launching of several missiles and thus engage defensive weapons;

--he can shorten the propulsion phase and thereby make the missiles invulnerable against X-ray lasers and particle-beam weapons because of the protection by the atmosphere;

--by dropping an apron over parts of the fiery exhaust or through fuel admixtures, he can shift the focal point of the light intensity of the fiery exhaust, thus thwarting correct target locating;

--he can prevent a burning through by making the surface of the missile reflective, by strengthening its walls, by rotating the missile about its axis, and by the use of heat-absorbent layers or sensor-controlled cooling, or he can intercept the impact of the X-ray laser by attaching a protective shield (on the principle of the motorcycle helmet) or curtain.

--through small nuclear explosions in the upper atmosphere, he can produce an infrared background against which the ascending missiles can no longer be spotted clearly.

However, the attacker can also resort to active countermeasures and attempt to destroy the defensive system. In this connection, it is important that all space-based systems are extremely vulnerable to all possible forms of offensive weapons--also those of a mechanical nature, for example.

It is true in particular that all systems developed to defend against missiles are also superbly well adapted to hit such space-based systems, mirrors, lasers, and combat stations, whose orbits are, after all, precisely known. Ground-based parts of the system, such as an eximer laser, can be knocked out by ejecting light-absorbing material or dust clouds, which can be done by a submarine missile, for example.

One should thereby consider in particular that such countermeasures can easily lead to a situation where they, in turn, increase the threat and thus thwart the actual purpose of the protective shield, that of improving security. A simple and very obvious measure would be to increase the number of intercontinental ballistic missiles to compensate for the possibility that some will be intercepted.

In the flight phases after the burnout of the missile, there are, in principle, opportunities for combatting the missiles that are similar to those in their ascent phase. An advantage in the later phases is above all in the fact that one has substantially more time, namely about 20 to 30 minutes for the intercontinental ballistic missiles and about 10 to 15 minutes in the case of the submarine-launched missiles.

But opposing this advantage are quite critical disadvantages that are due to the fact that with the end of the burning operation, the targets become much colder and are therefore quite difficult to "locate." Enormous difficulties are also caused by the large number of targets that, with 1,400 missiles, can easily amount to hundreds of thousands due to the many added dummies.

To be able to combat these effectively, it is necessary, with passive and active methods of radiation probing at various wave lengths (infrared and shortwave, for example), to achieve a differentiation between true warheads and the numerous decoys, for the ballistic characteristics of the various objects in airless space do not permit such a differentiation. This represents a tremendous task for supercomputers that probably have to handle more than a billion arithmetic operations per second for an effective combat management. For the various objects must not only be identified but also their flight paths must be calculated precisely to permit the aiming of a defensive weapon to hit them.

In principle, probably all of the previously described weapon systems (chemical lasers and nuclear-pumped X-ray lasers) can be considered as defensive weapons, as can the so-called electromagnetic railed guns or kinetic energy weapons, with which highly accelerated projectiles are fired at the targets.

With the extremely large number of highly dangerous objects approaching at great speed in a more or less large cloud of matter, it seems worthy of consideration simply to explode a large number of large atomic bombs uniformly in this cluster. But the volume to be mopped up is so great and the destructive range of the radiation from a nuclear explosion is relatively so small (100 kilometers) that one would probably require nuclear explosions in the magnitude of 100 million Hiroshima bombs, whose horrendous "side effects" cannot be imagined by anyone.

Heretofore we have had very little idea of the consequences of shooting down single nuclear warheads in space, neither in the case that it thereby explodes (the consequences can probably be calculated better in this case) nor in the case that it does not explode and scatters its highly toxic and radioactive load over the atmosphere. In any case, this will not be as harmless as is demonstrated in the Star Wars simulations on the television screen.

An effective interception in the middle phase of the missile approach flight is also problematical because here as well there are numerous and relatively simple measures to interfere with the defense. Thus it is not difficult to increase substantially the number of dummies or to deceive the sensors of the defensive system through many clever tricks so that the large-capacity computers are driven to despair (that is, saturated in their capacity).

In the final phase of the flight, the cloud of matter enters the atmosphere and at this time, 1 to 2 minutes before impact, there is a clear separation of the heat-resistant warheads from the dummies, which burn up immediately. Here one differentiates between two defense zones: a high zone ("Heads" = high endo-atmospheric defense system) between 90 and 46 kilometers, in which the warheads glow with heat and ionize the air surrounding them, and a lower zone ("Loads" = low endo-atmospheric defense system) below 46 kilometers.

In general, it can be said that in the final phase a defense of point targets (one's own missile silos or command centers, for example) will probably be possible to a certain extent, for here the cone in which an attacking warhead must enter is well known. On the other hand, a defense of soft targets such as large cities seems practically impossible.

The ABM systems developed on both sides, such as the American Safeguard system (since 1970) working with nuclear intercept missiles and the Soviet "Galosh" system, can be considered above all as possible defensive weapons. The disadvantage of this nuclear-equipped defensive system is that the nuclear explosions can cause considerable damage, at least the feared "electromagnetic pulse" (EMP), which can possibly destroy one's own electronics and thus make the communications and control system ineffective. This can be avoided if the interception is successful above 46 kilometers and if one utilizes smaller nuclear charges (as in the American Sentry system).

Nonnuclear intercept systems in the end phase now seem to be gaining importance. In these systems, the approaching warhead is mechanically destroyed with a weighted shieldlike structure, for example.

In my opinion, it is obvious from the considerations presented here that an adequate defense--functioning with more than 99 percent reliability--against nuclear weapons is, in all probability, not possible.

This estimation is not based upon technical pessimism. In essence, it can be left to everyone to form his own opinion on the "genius" or "lack of imagination" of future researcher intellect as long as he does this equally for measures as well as countermeasures. For it is obvious that:

--All future progress in the realization of the ABM system (the development of a functioning X-ray laser, for example) again makes this system itself more vulnerable.

--Every imaginable defensive system that is physically and technically feasible in principle remains, in turn, enormously vulnerable, for it can be overcome with simpler, more effective and cheaper means.

--Every conceivable defensive system must be extremely complex and therefore necessarily requires the development of extremely complicated hardware, software and evaluation procedures, for which a realistic and comprehensive test is not possible. For this reason, no one will be prepared and in a position to put enough faith into this system to put his hand in the fire for its operability and reliability.

--If there is little confidence in the reliability of the system and its degree of effectiveness in an emergency is uncertain, then it is improbable that one side will ever decide to reduce its offensive weapons.

The main weaknesses of a defensive system against nuclear missiles are:

--that one can underfly it, perhaps through sea-based systems, intermediate-range missiles, tactical nuclear missiles, and especially through cruise

missiles, and, in the future, perhaps with exotic methods such as smuggled-in rucksack or suitcase warheads and possibly even more "ingenious" tricks;

--that it can be overcome through a large number of missiles or a great density of silos at one location, through disruption or destruction of the space-based systems, by blinding the sensors through nuclear explosions, etc.--because it is simple enough to cause unacceptable damage with 5 or even just 1 percent of 10,000 warheads;

--that one can fool it by saturating the computers with a vast number of ingenious and sophisticated dummies and penetration aids;

--that it costs much too much, probably as much as \$1 trillion (DM3 trillion) for the first main phase--if it is at all technically functional.

To be honest, I must admit that all of the technical questions already discussed and consciously presented in some detail play hardly any role in my own evaluation of the pros and cons of SDI. My hidden intention thereby was to give you some insight into the thoughts and ideas of people whose chief occupation today is to work on a "more stable" securing of peace.

Perhaps you have also been able to recognize that behind all of these questions is a peculiar fascination, a desire to reach for the stars everywhere, not stopping in an ambitious and impetuous striving--in part serving one's own vanity--for what is even bigger, more powerful and more insane, even though all of mankind's signals have long since been stuck on red.

This fascination is part of its own dynamics that, beyond any threat from outside from a supposed enemy, is heating up the arms race and driving us toward the abyss.

The goal that we all envision is to search for ways to make peace secure in the long term. That is why the question of the consequences of SDI for security, beginning with the first step of even striving for something like SDI, is of enormous importance.

I am firmly convinced that the problem of securing peace is no longer solvable militarily (if it ever was) and therefore cannot be solved even with some technical tricks.

We need new methods for solving conflicts and these methods must be of a political nature. Technical military measures can at best take on the role of lengthening the fuse and thus can sometimes be justified to gain enough time for producing the necessary political changes. But they can never replace political measures.

The SDI program is following the old static conceptual model of the fallacy of the last move, in which one attempts to solve a momentarily existing problem without considering the changes that are caused by the solution method. We must learn to think dynamically: every action brings about reactions that have a retroactive effect on the original action, changing it in its value and significance.

The countermeasures evoked by SDI and strengthened through the meager predictability of such an enormously complex system must, based upon worst-case considerations, necessarily lead to a further and even more dangerous arms race at a higher level, in which, because of the more and more difficult verification, one can easily reach a point of no return.

In judging SDI, it is fateful to proceed from the idea of a final state that was perhaps never feasible in principle, a perfect protective screen with negligible offensive weapons, without having an idea of what the path would look like from the current situation with its enormous offensive capacity to this visionary situation.

Because of a combination of powerful offensive weapons and an inadequate screen, this path is characterized by extremely unstable intermediate phases. Since, in view of the overwhelming probability of self-destruction, the danger of a nuclear war arbitrarily started by one side or the other seems slight, the question of crisis stability must continue to have the very highest priority in all future decisions and actions.

All measures that act to stabilize the situation must be promoted. This also includes the strict observance of all existing arms-control agreements. SDI is ultimately incompatible with the 1972 ABM treaty. It even appears urgently necessary to expand the ABM treaty and include in it a prohibition of all antisatellite weapons.

In the combination of offensive potential and partial defense protection, SDI would give the attacker great advantages in all intermediate stages. For a screen that appears inadequate in protecting against a first strike could be enormously effective in defending against the enemy's counterstrike after one has gone ahead and struck the enemy first. This fundamental possibility of a successful first strike or just the fear that the other side could achieve such a first-strike capability gives rise to an extreme destabilization.

Compared to this danger of destabilization, the improvement of deterrence by increasing its credibility, as Caspar Weinberger is attempting to do for SDI, is negligible. Because of the already existing multiple overkill capacities of nuclear weapons, such marginal changes are of no consequence.

The big question after all of this is what might be the true reasons why a project with so many flaws has now acquired so much weight in the military and political discussion. I suspect that there are essentially three reasons behind this:

--For many people, a role may indeed be played by the vision that scientists, who brought this devilry into the world, must also be able to eliminate it.

Because one sees no way out politically one hopes, through his faith in science and technology, that science and technology can do miracles.

--The announcement of SDI fits perfectly into a "policy of strength and superiority," for one is "making a renewed attempt" precisely in an area where one was already superior to the adversary, namely in microelectronics and data processing. In this situation, the adversary can be blackmailed and manipulated. He returns to the negotiating table out of "fear." In addition, the demonstration of one's own strength raises the morale and confidence in the country; with the claim that one is now working only on true defense and no longer on increasing the threat, one reduces moral scruples and demonstrates one's own will for peace.

--The large-scale technical project SDI creates new economic prospects, euphorically preparing for the technological leap into the 21st century. It promises beneficial and lucrative innovations in the civilian area as a by-product of the monstrous military technical efforts.

Allow me to close with a few words on the question of a possible technological push to innovation through SDI. This aspect in particular is the talk of the town right now and everywhere it causes experts to frown considerably because, on the one hand, one cannot--at least as a European--be so happy with SDI as a military project but, on the other hand, one does not want to miss the fast technological train into the 21st century.

If one truly wants to promote the civilian sector, then by far the best and most efficient method is to put the money and the creative forces directly where they are needed instead of merely being content with the indirect by-products of a gigantic arms machinery. The thought of wanting to give new impulses to the civilian economy through increased armament so that it can (even) better satisfy the essential needs of people is even more out of place than the idea that one has only to make the rich even richer to improve the lot of the poor in this world.

The more that arms technology is concentrated on solving more and more extreme tasks, the less will be available for everyday use, unless, of course, one continues to deform our needs in the direction of an immoderate gigantism.

The ability to forge a sword may still be useful for the production of a plowshare but where in a normal life is the need for burning holes in metal at a distance of 3,000 kilometers, for having supersonic aircraft with swing-wings speed along a few meters over the treetops, or for typewriters--let us say--that still work reliably after being quick-frozen, hurled to the pavement from the 10th floor, and immersed into the sea? The technical demands of the military people are of this sort. I know that there are other examples--one can use a high-performance laser for nuclear fusion (which does not mean that a useful nuclear-fusion reactor will ever come out of it), one can use sophisticated microelectronics, supercomputers and superprograms for industrial production, and so on, but why not do it directly and without being burdened with secrecy requirements as well? Are not the Japanese providing a good example of the fact that one can do quite well economically despite a minimal defense industry?

I ask myself why it is not possible to make the truly great challenges of our time--the problems of protecting our resources, of environmental protection, of the Third World and the world economy, including the problem of unemployment--the focal point of a direct and purposeful large-scale research and development program? For these problems as well signal worldwide catastrophes if we do not quickly and resolutely attempt to solve them. And they too threaten our security.

I know that this possibility is Utopian and yet I do not understnad why. I see with melancholy, resentment and also despair how many of the young, open-minded, enthusiastic, self-sacrificing and enterprising minds of our time are misused to make the heavens into the vestibule of hell instead of offering these talents the chance to dedicate their strengths to the high goals of mankind, to the possibility of its survival, and to the possibilities for a peaceful coexistence of peoples.

Let us not give up hope. Only this Utopia can save us. This is my vision.

9746

CSO: 5200/2711

ITALIAN CP'S NATTA'S REPORT TO PLENUM ON 17TH CONGRESS TASKS

PM061205 Milan L'UNITA in Italian 23 Jul 85 pp 9-11

[PCI Secretary General Alessandro Natta 22 July report to PCI Central Committee and Central Control Commission session in Rome: "Natta's Report on Proposal To Convene 17th PCI Congress"]

[Excerpts] We must concentrate our attention on the real innovations, starting with the international situation. The resumption of the U.S.-USSR dialogue, which is politically the most significant factor, has certainly attenuated the previous very acute tension but it now raises some serious questions. There is cause to wonder to what extent the current Geneva negotiations in fact reflect a return to detente or whether instead the forces opposed to this process will succeed in hindering their positive potentials.

The main problem is space weapons. We hope that a decisive step forward will be taken at the scheduled meeting between the leaders of the two superpowers, but this does not affect our duty to form a careful assessment of the issue that has been raised by the idea of the possibility of instruments of defense that can make the nuclear deterrent obsolete. It is an idea that obviously embodies an undeniable attraction, if only it had any scientific credibility and were rigorously based on a bilateral pledge.

However, the U.S. strategic defense initiative was of a different nature and this is why we consider valid the basic criticism that both we and other democratic forces have made--both on account of the elements of violation of the ABM treaty that it implies and on account of the prospect of a new arms race.

The stances adopted by the Socialist International, by prominent groups of FRG and U.S. scientists, by religious bodies, by governments including France's, and by parties including the German and Swedish Social Democrats and the British Labor Party reinforce our convictions and aims to ensure a growing commitment in Italy and internationally--within the variety of specific motivations--to avert another frightening resumption of the arms race and, on our part, to encourage the Italian Government to adopt a clear-cut stance to discourage such an eventuality.

The resumption of the Geneva talks is partly the result of this vast mobilization of awareness and forces over the Euromissiles issue and the breakoff of the Soviet-U.S. disarmament talks. But above all it is a reflection of anxieties and attitudes that have gradually come about even within political alignments and governments very far removed from that movement and primarily on the part of the world's major powers.

EC, Unity and Autonomy

There are also profound splits on the Left and between European democratic forces, and we must be fully aware of the problems that will be posed by the building of an autonomous and united Community in the course of time in all fields, including the field of security policy, which is an essential element of any foreign policy and an issue on which--as far as it affects Italy--our party must now complete an analysis and a debate that began some time ago.

There is great food for thought here with a view to reaching informed, albeit necessary and urgent, decisions. We appreciated Mitterrand's Eureka project both because it sets the priority--unlike the U.S. space project--of civilian technological research and because it attempts to pool capital, brainpower, and political will which, if drained by the U.S. project, would ultimately open the way--perhaps irreversibly--to the subordination of a fragmented Europe.

Nevertheless the launching of the Eureka project too raises the crucial issue: The autonomous EEC is a strong ideal if it is viewed and pursued within the context of the struggle for disarmament, detente, and the building of a system of peaceful coexistence, within an outlook that aims at the gradual elimination of the continent's present division.

CSO: 5200/2734

SPACE ARMS

QUESTIONS ARISING FROM PARTICIPATION IN SDI, EUREKA

Athens TO VIMA in Greek 15 Jun 85 pp 4-5

[Text] The current challenge of the technological revolution that appeared in Greece under a new form as "Space Defense Initiative (SFI)(sic) [SDI] and the related "star visions" of President Reagan have caused serious concern among the European allies of the United States. The initial reactions of the Europeans went from skeptical willingness to open opposition for the plan which international public opinion has code-named "Star Wars."

However, as American determination in promoting the space defense program became progressively more evident, despite the refusals and reservations among the allies, there began to evolve in Europe a climate of critical acceptance of the space research from across the Atlantic.

This climate can be explained if the interests of the West European firms are taken into common consideration along with the strengthening of the European scientists' interests that result from the forthcoming technological "boom" in America.

The West European advanced technology firms and Europe's scientific potential are attracted by the idea of drawing money from the financing that the American budget will allot for the implementation of the space defense programs.

The European governments, despite their traditional propensity of resorting to the cover of the American diplomatic and strategic umbrella, realized the danger in the widening of the technological gap between the USA and Western Europe and the brain drain.

The "Eureka" program proposed by President Mitterrand last April can be considered to be an independent European alternative answer to the increasing militarization of space by the Americans.

The proposals contained in "Eureka" place emphasis on the use of new technologies for peaceful purposes by promoting research in the areas of optics, lasers, new materials, large computers, artificial intelligence and microelectronics.

With the favorable reception of the "Eureka" prospects within the EEC's Council of Ministers of Research and Technology taken for granted, the dominant trends

for the future of the European technological community began to take shape. In view of the fact that there does not exist a "defensive Europe," the new trend favors an independent European policy in the field of non-military research and high technology even if it is susceptible to more remote applications in the military field.

On the other hand, there is a trend developing which does not consider as being compatible the program of the European space and technology research for peaceful purposes and the US's Space Defense Initiative.

Between these two approaches, the Greek position was laid out within NATO and EEC after the weighing of realistic facts without, however, ignoring the ideological peculiarities of Greece's diplomacy on strategic matters.

Greece, on a common front with France and Denmark, refused to support the American "Star Wars" program during the recent meeting of the foreign ministers of the Atlantic Alliance, whereas, during the EEC's political cooperation and technological deliberations, it took a position in favor of a common European policy in the area of advanced technology.

According to the Greek point of view, without the equalization of the economic and technological level of the member-countries of the EEC, any planning for European unity is devoid of any substantive meaning.

The problem for the less industrialized countries of Europe, whenever they are faced with grandiose plans for technological development, is the lack of the proper infrastructure in the areas of research, industrial application and education.

From this point of view, beyond the diplomatic evaluations being made by the area desks in the Greek Foreign Ministry, it is natural for the technological, economic and organizational dimensions of an eventual Greek participation in the French "Eureka" program to be examined by other sectors of the Greek administration.

What is being sought is a completed proposal for action at the level of government planning. The formulation of detailed proposals for Greece's participation in the technological progress influences both the peaceful sector of the economy and, indirectly, national defense,

The utilization of advanced technology for national advantage can be achieved through effective planning divided into two working groups whose corresponding task would be to develop concrete proposals for advanced technological applications both in the national defense sector and in the more general area of the national economy.

What is being sought is:

a. Which of the various areas of microelectronics, data processing and communications offer realistic possibilities for development in our country after they have been correlated with the international apportioning of labor in the corresponding sector?

b. What is the indispensable preparation for the scientific support of a technological development program?

c. Which is the suitable timetable and the sequence of the various phases of the technological planning and industrial applications?

An initial evaluation listed the various agencies that show decided possibilities for drawing advantages from the process of the emerging European technological cooperation.

In the academic field, it is the Data Processing Institute in Crete, which is the trailblazer that has additional experience from its participation in the European "Esprit" program. Points of concern emerge in the data processing department of the Greek Metsovion Polytechnic School, in the electrical engineering department and data processing department of the Polytechnic School of the University of Patrai and the telecommunications systems department of the School of Literature of the University of Thraki.

However, in the sector of Greek defense industry, the EVO [Greek Arms Industry] and the electronic section of the EAV [Greek Aircraft Industry] can become the spearhead of the Greek technological thrust. Even some small, sharp private units that have recently succeeded in the area of management, control and information systems offer a worthwhile potential.

The weight of the response to the "Eureka" program is destined to fall on the governmental organizations after their strategic cooperation with dynamic private firms.

For this reason there will be the need for an especially sharp coordinating apparatus in order to secure the interconnection of the research activities, both locally and abroad. Its success will depend on how well the difficulties that arise because of bureaucracy and communication problems are overcome through a procedure that will benefit from both the positive and negative experiences of the past in the research and technology area.

9731

CSO: 5200/2691

SELECTED POLISH REPORTING, COMMENTARY ON SDI RAMIFICATIONS

Laser Tracking Experiments

Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in Polish 5 Jul 85 p 4

[Article by (P): "New Experiments Associated with 'Star Wars'"]

[Text] New York (PAP): Continuing intensive preparations for "Star Wars," in the near future the Pentagon intends to conduct new tests of the striking components of space weapons. The journal AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE TECHNOLOGY reports that wide-ranging experiments are planned within the framework of the project.

During the tests, a laser beam from an instrument mounted on the summit of the mountain Maui (Hawaii) will be aimed at missiles fired from the Burking-Sands range (Hawaii) to a height of 576 kilometers and equipped with a special reflector to reflect laser beams.

The first such experiments with a device for the accurate aiming of a laser beam from the earth at objects located in space near earth were recently conducted during a flight of the American shuttle "Discovery." These tests are taking place as part of the development of weapons capable of destroying objects in space and on the earth with the aid of a reflected beam.

The journal PROGRESSIVE states that the implementation of Reagan's "Star Wars" program will lead to the disruption of the existing system of arms control agreements.

Canadian Opposition to SDI

Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in Polish 2 Jul 85 p 4

[Article by Ewa Boniecka: "Against SDI"]

[Text] The Canadian social democrats have added their voices to the opposition parties and forces in Western Europe that are sharply condemning both the American program for the development of space weapons, and the support of their governments for the so-called research phase of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). Although it is relatively little known outside

Canada, the New Democratic Party headed by John Edward Broadbent is a force to be reckoned with in the politics of that country.

As a result of the general elections in September 1984, the Canadian social democrats obtained a larger representation in the federal parliament than the liberals. They perform a significant role on the benches of the opposition, and J. E. Broadbent, who is presently considered to be senior among the other leaders, i.e. Conservative Prime Minister Mulroney and Turner, the leader of the liberals, enjoys universal respect.

Thus, the fact that at the national congress of the New Democratic Party in Ottawa a resolution condemning Reagan's "Star Wars" program and Canada's participation in its "research work" was adopted unanimously constitutes a warning signal for the Conservative government, especially since peace movements in Canada are continually demonstrating against tests of new American nuclear missiles in the northern part of their country and warning against an increase in Canada's military ties with the United States.

The Mulroney government is also aware that Canada's position and its possession of a joint air defense system with the United States make it subject to strong pressures from Washington to agree to participate in carrying out the plans of the Strategic Defense Initiative.

The Reagan Administration also cannot close its eyes to the fact that the West German social democrats, the British Labor Party, and now Canada's New Democratic Party are clearly disassociating themselves from the plans for the development of offensive space weapons, since this confirms the growing polarization of political parties in the allied states in regard to U.S. military policy. It is mobilizing public opinion in the West to oppose an arms race in space.

European 'Eureka' Versus SDI

Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish 27 Jun 85 p 6

[Article by Rudolf Hoffman: "The Debate Over 'Eureka'"]

[Text] "The Americans threaten and curse. They want to manage the entire world. That is their business. But if Europe does not work together, then we will be crushed by a steamroller. The historic question is, 'Do we want to continue to exist?' It is only together that we can meet this challenge."

These dramatic words, recently uttered by the chairman of the EEC Commission, the Frenchman Jacques Delors, in an interview for the West German weekly DER STERN, clearly describe the situation that Western Europe is in now that the United States has begun to carry out its program for the militarization of space (the so-called SDI).

The invitation to participate in this global military and strategic enterprise that was offered by President Reagan to Western Europe during the May "summit" of the heads of the governments of the 7 most developed states

of the capitalist world met with a determined refusal from French President Francois Mitterrand. The French head of state presented his own "civilian" space plan, under the name "Eureka," which is currently subject to modifications. It is being handled by the above-mentioned EEC commission in Brussels, which intends, at a "summit" of the heads of government of the 10 EEC states scheduled for the end of June in Mediolan, to propose the concept of a "technological Europe."

Mitterrand, along with an increasing number of politicians, scientists, and businessmen in Western Europe, is aware that the SDI constitutes the most formidable scientific, technological, and industrial effort by the United States in our century. They quickly realized that the American strategy is aimed at achieving two goals: transferring the arms race into space and achieving absolute military superiority over the USSR, and shifting the trans-Atlantic relationship in the field of scientific research capacity and development in the area of technical progress and competitiveness in the world market in favor of the United States.

As the achievement of the first goal is rather doubtful, the threat of American technological superiority over Western Europe becomes more realistic.

Nevertheless, in spite of current opinions, Western Europe is still serious competition for the United States in the area of scientific research and the development of technology. As shown by the data of the EEC Commission, in such fields as nuclear energy, high-energy physics, and environmental protection technology, the old continent is not only keeping pace with the United States and Japan, but even surpassing them in certain branches.

On the other hand, in such areas as information science, in the broad meaning of that term, biotechnology, and laser technology, the EEC countries are considerably behind the United States and Japan. EEC officials do not see the reason for this phenomenon as being either human or financial potential. In fact, in 1979 the number of scientists employed in research work in the United States was 560,000, compared to 360,000 in the EEC countries and 330,000 in Japan. Delays for civilian research purposes in 1984 were as follows: 34 billion Ecus (the Common Market currency unit) for the United States, 27 billion for the EEC, and 20 billion for Japan.

In the opinion of specialists in Brussels, the disproportions in the effectiveness of the scientific research work of Europeans are occurring mainly as a result of European linguistic heterogeneity, isolation within the borders of a given region, state, or institution, and a lack of cooperation between industry and scientific research centers.

The data show that thus far joint technological research within the EEC framework has played a secondary role. This is best demonstrated by the fact that the proportion of expenditures for scientific research purposes in the EEC budget is barely 3 percent.

So far, joint scientific research work has not been an object of interest on the part of the governments of the EEC states. No concrete treaties

have even been developed on this matter. The only exception is the treaty on Euratom, which is however limited only to supporting research work in the area of nuclear energy, and particularly the efficient utilization of that energy.

This state of affairs undoubtedly had a major influence on Mitterrand's concept of creating, under the slogan "Eureka," a West European "civilian" technological community in the form of a scientific research agency, with respect to which the EEC would only be an associate member. In the opinion of Paris, the "Eureka" program should concentrate on such areas as large computers, high-speed and miniature electronics, artificial intelligence, high-capacity lasers, optical electronics, and new materials.

Jacques Delors recently stated at the European Parliament in Strasbourg, "The Americans are selecting from the European shop window what is most attractive to them from the technological standpoint. We do not even have an area where we could discuss things together with them." These words reflect a fear that the establishment of the SDI program may lead to a massive outflow of highly qualified scientists from Western Europe to the United States. In connection with this, an urgent task for the EEC is creating incentives for industry and scientific research centers on this side of the Atlantic that would keep these scientists.

It is not an easy task, especially since, as indicated by leaks from the EEC Commission building in Brussels, the French plan for creating a "technological community" provides for building it on the basis of a new convention, not the EEC treaties already in existence. A suspicion thus arises that Mitterrand wants to use the American SDI to carry out his own plans for a far-reaching political integration of the EEC, exploiting for this purpose the fears that the Americans might achieve technological superiority among their West European partners.

On the other hand, rumors from Bonn, London, and Rome indicate that government circles there are considering it possible to coordinate implementation of the "Eureka" plan with the American SDI concept.

This will thus be the dominant topic at the EEC summit in Mediolan. It is difficult to predict whether the governments of the community want to offer effective opposition to the American technological and military challenge, or whether they intend to give in to American dictates and only work out more favorable conditions for any participation in the American "Star Wars" program.

The resistance from the public in the states of Western Europe to the plans to draw their countries into the orbit of the American "Star Wars" strategy is considerable. This was mentioned by Italian Prime Minister Bettino Craxi and former FRG Chancellor Willy Brandt during their recent visits to Moscow. A return to the policy of detente and political dialogue between the East and the West therefore appears to be the only sensible alternative to the American SDI program.

Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDI in Polish 26 Jun 85 p 6

[Article by Wlodzimierz Lozinski: "Barriers of Academic Freedoms"]

[Text] Recently the president, i.e, rector, of one of the most prestigious technical schools in the United States, the California Institute of Technology (Caltech), Marvin Goldberger, protested against the "false statements attributing to Caltech support for the government's Strategic Defense Initiative program" and weapons in space. In the letter containing this protest, which was sent directly to the director of the program for the so-called Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), Gen. James Abrahamson, the rector justified his position in terms of the need to express the will of the majority of the scientific staff, which was not participating in carrying out the aims of the Defense Department.

A similar protest came to the Pentagon at the same time from the best known American school serving the military complex, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. The president or also rector of that school, Paul Gray, permitted himself more ominous qualms of conscience, as a result of the Pentagon's statements "attributing to MIT institutional support for the Strategic Defense Initiative," since in the meantime the plans for space weapons only had "individual adherents among scientific personnel."

The protests, which are important from a moral point of view, came during growing discussions throughout the United States on the subject of a qualitative leap in space weaponry. The Defense Department, wanting to obtain a majority in Congress for anti-missile and "Star Wars" budget expenditures next year, sent a statement to the Capitol that was full of assurances about support from a majority of schools and scientists for the entire research program, and for weapons in space near earth. The opinion of the scientists was to be the strongest argument in the struggle for close to \$4 billion, most of which obviously will be received by the higher schools that have accomodating and fruitful cooperation with the Pentagon. As luck would have it, precisely at the same time that the discussion of the military budget was going on in Congress and the statement from the Pentagon was being passed around all the commissions, a group of several dozen members of the U.S. Academy of Sciences, teaching at respected schools, assessed "the arms undertakings in space as improper from the moral, scientific, and international point of view," In this situation, the presidents of the schools could not close their eyes to the actions dictated by the consciences of professors who were their colleagues.

Did the protests sent to the Pentagon have any effect, however? Did the presidents shut off the sources of dollar transfers for military research originating from the institutions of the Pentagon? Finally, did the open letter from the scientists close university laboratories to orders for the antimissiles, lasers, and beams of elementary particles that the heads of the "Star Wars" program are dreaming about today?

Not at all. The protests submitted to the Pentagon were intended exclusively to "clear the name" of the schools, not to take profitable work away from the personnel who agree to cooperate with military institutions. After all, such intentions are confirmed by the President of MIT himself, Paul Gray, when in a talk with the school council he said that "no participant in research on resources for the Strategic Defense Initiative conducted at the school can be exploited for the political advocacy of this program." The protesters were thus satisfied with the assurances of the management of the Office of the Strategic Defense Initiative that "neither the school nor individual scientists will be used for propaganda purposes or for other manipulations."

"We are not looking for advertisements," Gen. Abrahamson added to these words, "but for the best scientific minds."

The consequences of the protests can be considered exhausted. Neither Caltech, nor MIT, nor any other respected U.S. school can afford to demonstrate too much freedom or independence from the government, since it would cut off the roots that nourish it. To prove this, I will add that for example, on the same day that the president of the California Institute of Technology protested against the misuse of the name of Caltech, the head of his department of electrical engineering, D. Meredith, received a \$50,000 assignment from a military consortium for investigating and improving "high-speed computer systems for processing signals."

The California school and MIT belong to the brain trust consortium created by the Pentagon, and none of the scientists intends to alter this reality. MIT's Lincon Laboratory joined the consortium in spite of the will of the individual employees, because it specializes in perfecting various missiles. The Dayton Institute, which specializes in systems for the electronic guidance of missiles and nuclear warheads, also works for the Pentagon. The list of the participants in the consortium is too long for me to present it here.

The main thing seems to be to state that the protests described are giving rise to many false illusions about academic freedom in the United States. In the first place, the private nature of higher education does not create it, in spite of appearances. In seeking income from private sources, the schools have to serve the one who pays well. Among those paying, the Pentagon is the one in top place -- especially now, when the U.S. defense budget is over \$300 billion each year, and when at least 10 percent of the outlays are for research or the improvement of military equipment. The schools that draw on the Pentagon's treasury have it better than those that are omitted from the list of the consortium of the military-industrial complex.

In the second place, the state treasury, as the basis for the existence of many schools, is acquiring particular significance now, when as a result of the demographic decline the influx of applicants to the universities has fallen by nearly 20 percent in comparison with the end of the 1970's. With the natural decline in the number of applicants, American schools were faced with a dilemma: how to accept a smaller number of students and announce higher tuition, since who can afford \$10,000 a year to study, for

example at MIT? In turn, keeping relatively low tuition (partial) will finish any school as a good scientific center. Thus, only finding wealthy patrons can contribute to maintaining and developing every American higher school. Only the Pentagon can ensure the most rapid and most profitable development for every school.

Consequently, under such conditions can one speak of opposition or protests against the government and state institution? It probably is merely a question of appeasing one's conscience, as cheaply as possible, without leading to a disturbance of the existing order, not to mention a reduction of the subsidies coming in.

This is not just a question of the Pentagon and its money. It also has to do with civilian business, which is indirectly linked with the system of the state authority. It also maintains only the schools that serve it best. And the most important thing is that no one in the United States considers this a violation of academic freedom.

9909

CSO: 5200/65

SPACE ARMS

BRIEFS

PRC'S DENG CRITICIZES SDI--Beidaihe, Hebei Province, 2 Aug (XINHUA)--Chinese Communist Party (CPC) leader Deng Xiaoping said here today that "star wars" plan must not be carried out because it would cause qualitative change in the arms race between the two superpowers. He pointed out that the "star wars" was different in nature from adding a few nuclear warheads or changing a few new types of missiles. Deng, chairman of the CPC Central Advisory Commission, made these remarks at a meeting with Robert Maxwell, chairman of the Pergamon Press and Mirror Group newspapers, and his party at the north China summer resort here today. [Excerpt] [Beijing XINHUA in English 1605 GMT 2 Aug 85]

CSO: 5200/4048

CHEMICAL/BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

CONTROVERSY IN FRG OVER U.S. CHEMICAL WEAPONS PLAN

Defense Ministry Remarks

LD071741 Hamburg DPA in German 1524 GMT 7 Aug 85

[Text] Bonn, 7 Aug (DPA) -- The Defense Ministry and the Foreign Ministry have denied a report by the Social Democrat Parliamentary Political Press Service (PPP) in connection with chemical weapons in the Federal Republic. PPP wrote today that U.S. Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger told Defense Minister Manfred Woerner that CDU/CSU parliamentary floor leader Alfred Dregger could not quote Weinberger as a source with regard to the withdrawal of chemical warfare agents from the Federal Republic. A Defense Ministry spokesman said that any such intervention by Weinberger was "completely unknown."

Dregger, in contrast to SPD Deputy Erwin Horn, stated after a visit to the United States that according to Weinberger, in the course of new production and stockpiling of chemical weapons in the United States, all old chemical weapons in the Federal Republic would be removed. The so-called binary chemical weapons would be stationed in the United States.

The Foreign Ministry spokesman rejected as a misrepresentation the PPP claim that the Foreign Ministry had tried in vain to influence the United States not to link production of the new binary chemical weapons with deployment in the Federal Republic. The Foreign Ministry did not interfere in internal U.S. affairs, he said. The spokesman stressed that the deployment of such weapons was a question that required consultation and negotiation within the alliance. These consultations had not yet begun.

With binary weapons the poisonous substances become active only when they combine after having been fired.

Juergen Todenhoefer, the CDU/CSU disarmament policy spokesman, who was in the United States with Dregger, said yesterday that Horn had not reported correctly the attitude of the U.S. Administration on the issue of deployment of chemical weapons. Weinberger's statement still stood. According to PPP, however, Horn disputed this today, saying that members of the Senate and the House of Representatives told him in Washington that there was no such promise. It had been invented by Dregger.

29 August 1985

SPD, CDU Deputies Differ

DW071037 Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 7 Aug 85 p 10

[Editorial by "RH": "Binary Option"]

[Text] The quarrel between SPD Deputy Horn and CDU Deputy Todenhoefer is about the question of whether the United States is planning to stockpile new binary chemical weapons or whether these weapons will only be flown in in the event of war. The matter requires an interpretation with which politicians for a long time did not want to burden the public. There is a big gap between conventional and nuclear defense in NATO's entire defense system. The Soviets are fully prepared for chemical war. This also applies in particular to the troops' hardiness training which cannot be rapidly made up for. They are in a position to make NATO bases inoperable within a few minutes by launching a small number of missiles with chemical warheads. So far, NATO has taken no countermeasures. Thus the strategists only threatened that the response to such chemical attacks would be a nuclear one. However, because this type of deterrence has become increasingly undesirable, deterrence with similar weapons must be made possible. This means that enough chemical ammunition must be procured. Stockpiled, its two components (therefore, "binary" C-weapons) are harmless; only when they are fired do they combine to become a chemical war agent. However, because this simple logic of defense has so far been evaded, there will probably be heated discussions yet on the subject.

CSO: 5200/2735

NUCLEAR-FREE-ZONE PROPOSALS

TASS CITES WEINBERGER REMARKS ON NEW ZEALAND

LD071750 Moscow TASS in English 1711 GMT 7 Aug 85

[Text] Washington, August 7 TASS -- The recent interview given by U.S. Defence Secretary Casper Weinberger is assessed here as a direct attempt at interference in New Zealand's domestic affairs.

The Pentagon chief said, specifically, that the "New Zealand people" can stop the plans of the government which intends to introduce legislation that bans nuclear warships from the country's ports.

It is stressed here that the American defence secretary's latest remarks were openly instigatory, and constituted Washington's fresh attempts to exert pressure on the New Zealand Government with a view to forcing it to abandon the plans to endorse legislatively the country's non-nuclear status.

CSO: 5200/1354

NUCLEAR-FREE-ZONE PROPOSALS

IZVESTIYA CITES BULGARIAN PREMIER ON BALKAN ZONE

PM121525 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 11 Aug 85 Morning Edition p 4

[TASS report: "Talks in the Kremlin"]

[Excerpts] As has already been reported on 9 August Soviet-Bulgarian talks were held in Moscow. N.A. Tikhonov, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers; N.I. Ryzhkov, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and secretary of the CPSU Central Committee; N.K. Baybakov, deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers and chairman of the USSR Gosplan; and N.D. Komarov, USSR first deputy minister of foreign trade, took part on the Soviet side, and G. Filipov, member of the BCP Central Committee Politburo and chairman of the Bulgarian Council of Ministers; O. Doynov, member of the BCP Central Committee Politburo, secretary of the BCP Central Committee, and Bulgarian minister of machine building and electronics; S. Bonev, candidate member of the BCP Central Committee Politburo, deputy chairman of the Bulgarian Council of Ministers, and chairman of the Bulgarian State Planning Committee; K. Zarev, BCP Central Committee Secretary; and K. Kheistov, Bulgarian foreign trade minister; took part on the Bulgarian side.

The USSR Government held a luncheon in the Kremlin in the guest's honor which took place in a cordial, friendly atmosphere. During the luncheon, N.A. Tikhonov and G. Filipov exchanged short speeches.

On behalf of the Soviet leadership, N.A. Tikhonov cordially welcomed Comrades G. Filipov and O. Doynov and all the Bulgarian friends present at the luncheon.

The policy of the Soviet Union, Bulgaria, and the other fraternal socialist states is a policy of peaceful creation. That is why our main efforts in international affairs are aimed at eliminating the threat of nuclear catastrophe and preserving and strengthening peace by all means.

On his own behalf and on behalf of the Bulgarian comrades, G. Filipov expressed cordial thanks to the CPSU Central Committee and the Soviet Government for the hospitality they had given.

The international conditions under which our countries are working remain complex and tense. It is known who is to blame. It is the Reagan administration which, despite its demagogic assertions, has not abandoned and is not abandoning its plans for a global offensive against the forces of socialism and progress and above all on our community or its attempts to acquire military-strategic superiority.

Our party and government firmly support the course steered by the Soviet leadership in the international arena and at the talks in Geneva -- in the field of nuclear arms, that means a course aimed at defending the peoples' rights to self-rule and their own development and at resolutely rebuffing attempts at enslavement, a course aimed against methods of blackmail, diktat, and others.

We believe the new initiative put forward by Comrade M.S. Gorbachev on halting nuclear weapons tests, which is a graphic new manifestation of this course, to be exceptionally important. The Soviet initiative has met with a very broad international response. The U.S. Administration should heed world public opinion if it is sincerely seeking the relaxation of the international situation and the consolidation of the peoples' security.

We can state quite definitely that our party and our socialist state are taking an active part in the joint struggle of the socialist community headed by the Soviet Union for peace and the assertion of the principles of peaceful coexistence. The series of initiatives and specific steps in our foreign policy implemented under the direct leadership of Comrade T. Zhivkov, general secretary of the BCP Central Committee and chairman of the Bulgarian State Council, with a view to establishing a nuclear-free zone in the Balkans, and also the vigorous contacts which Bulgaria maintains within the framework of the fraternal countries' unified coordinated line in the international arena can serve as proof of this.

In conclusion, I should like wholeheartedly to wish the Soviet peoples and the working people of the Soviet Union successes in this decisive year of the current 5-year plan and a fitting greeting to the 27th CPSU Congress, which will undoubtedly be an important milestone not only in the sociopolitical and economic development of the fraternal Soviet Union, but also of our entire community in the development of world revolutionary progress and in the struggle of the world's peoples for peace and social progress.

CSO: 5200/1354

NUCLEAR-FREE-ZONE PROPOSALS

PRAVDA REPORTS GREEK-BULGARIAN TALKS ON BALKAN NFZ

PM251325 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 25 Jul 85 First Edition p 4

[TASS report: "On an Official Visit"]

[Text] Athens, 24 Jul--Talks between T. Zhivkov, chairman of the Bulgarian State Council, who is here on an official visit, and Greek Prime Minister A. Papandreou and other officials have ended.

In the present tense international situation, it was noted at the talks, united actions are needed by all peace-loving forces to avert the nuclear threat, end the arms race, and prevent the militarization of space.

The profound conviction was expressed that the development of Bulgarian-Greek relations is the two countries' joint contribution to the cause of confidence, security, and cooperation in the Balkans. At the same time attempts by those forces which do not like the positive processes in the Balkans and which seek to destabilize the situation in the region, to interfere in sovereign states' internal affairs were condemned. The common conviction was expressed that these attempts are doomed to failure.

The two countries again expressed their readiness to work on the implementation of the idea of turning the Balkan peninsula into a nuclear-free zone.

CSO: 5200/1354

NUCLEAR-FREE-ZONE PROPOSALS

TASS REPORTS ON SOUTH PACIFIC FORUM NFZ TREATY

Forum Session

LD020920 Moscow TASS in English 0845 GMT 2 Aug 85

["Pacific Should Become Nuclear-Free Zone"--TASS headline]

[Text] Moscow, August 2 TASS -- The attention of the public in many Asian and Pacific countries is centred today around the far-away Cook Islands where the 16th session of the Forum of South Pacific Countries will open the day after tomorrow, "SELSKAYA ZHIZN" writes. Its agenda turns the session into the event whose significance goes far beyond the boundaries of the region. Participants in the session are to discuss a draft treaty on proclaiming that part of the globe to be a nuclear-free zone.

It took the working group of this organization which is made up of 13 countries (including Australia, New Zealand, Fiji, Vanuatu, Papua New Guinea and others) 13 months to work out a draft treaty which provides for the banning of the production and possession of nuclear weapons, the banning of nuclear weapon tests and of the dumping of radioactive waste in the region.

In this connection the newspaper draws attention to two important things. First, the anti-imperialist nature of the document and the fact that it is directed against the imperialist intrigues in the Pacific region are obvious. It is not accidental that Washington got so worried about the anti-nuclear stand of New Zealand. The struggle around the treaty reflected the attempts of the White House to curb the anti-nuclear feeling in that part of the globe. It is noteworthy that Australia -- the U.S. ally by the ANZUS bloc -- opposed the including in the treaty of the provisions that would not permit the calls at the ports of those countries of ships with nuclear weapons on board.

Second, the very fact of holding the session is a vivid demonstration of the growing popularity of the idea of creating nuclear-free zones.

Treaty Adopted

LD070551 Moscow TASS in English 0539 GMT 7 Aug 85

[Text] London, August 7 TASS -- The heads of state and government of Australia, New Zealand and eleven island states in the South Pacific have adopted a treaty proclaiming the region a nuclear-free zone.

They approved the treaty at the 16th session of the regional forum in Avarua, administrative center of the Cook Islands.

The treaty was announced on behalf of the session participants by David Lange, prime minister of New Zealand which had earlier closed access to its waters to America warships with nuclear weapons on board.

The treaty bans the use, ownership and stationing of nuclear weapons in the South Pacific as well as the dumping of radioactive wastes there.

CSO: 5200/1350

NUCLEAR-FREE-ZONE PROPOSALS

SOVIET REPORTS, COMMENTS ON SOUTH PACIFIC FORUM AGREEMENT

PRAVDA Commentary

LD090820 Moscow TASS in English 0640 GMT 9 Aug 85

["A Signal From the Cook Islands"--TASS headline]

[Text] Moscow, August 9 TASS -- Avarua, the administrative centre of the Cook Islands has, perhaps, never attracted to itself so much attention as on these days since the time when more than two hundred years ago the famous English seafarer set foot on the land, Igor Melnikov points out in the commentator's column in PRAVDA today. The leaders of thirteen states incorporated into the South Pacific Forum, who got together here, have unanimously passed a decision declaring that region to be a nuclear free-zone. A treaty was concluded, banning for ever the stationing, production and testing of nuclear weapons. The delegates to the forum have also decided to ban the dumping of radioactive wastes into the ocean.

That treaty is a significant, far-reaching document setting a good example. The creation of nuclear-free zones is known to be placed by the international public on a par with other important measures to curb the nuclear weapons race. The stand of the United Nations Organization, which has more than once adopted resolutions approving the idea of zones free from nuclear weapons, is also unequivocal.

The first specific step on this way was the signing in 1967 of the Tlatelolco Treaty prohibiting nuclear weapons in Latin America. Yet the plans to create other nuclear-free zones have been so far frustrated because of the negative stand of the NATO member-countries, above all, of the USA. This time again the decision adopted on the Cook Islands has met with a hostile reception from the USA and the other Western powers. Official Washington began intensively pressuring some states in the region into refusing to sign the approved document. Yet eight participants in the Avarua meeting representing the major states of the region, including Australia, New Zealand, Fiji and Western Samoa signed the treaty right after it was drawn up. In this day and age, the creation of nuclear-free zones has become one of the essential trends in the struggle for curbing "the nuclear jinn". The "Avarua Treaty" is fresh proof of that. There is no doubt that other acts of detente in the military field, whoever may take them, will be supported by the peoples. A vivid example of such support is the worldwide approval of the Soviet Union's major move, the announcement of the unilateral moratorium on all nuclear blasts.

The importance of creative nuclear-free zones is obvious to all those who seriously set the aim of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and a stabilization of the international situation. There is no doubt that the signal, which has come from the Cook Islands, will attract much attention all over the world, the commentator stresses.

IZVESTIYA Report

PM081107 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 8 Aug 85 Morning Edition p 4

[Own correspondent I. Kovalev report: "Important Decision of Cook Island Forum; Treaty on the Creation of a Nuclear-Free Zone Concluded by Pacific Countries"]

[Text] Manila -- Here is Radio Australia's latest report: Representatives of the 13 countries belonging to the South Pacific Forum meeting in the Cook Islands, have unanimously adopted a decision in favor of declaring the South Pacific a Nuclear-Free Zone and concluded a treaty banning the deployment, production, and testing of nuclear weapons on those countries' territory forever.

Participating in this meeting were representatives of Australia, New Zealand, the Cook Islands, Papua-New Guinea, Niue, Nauru, Kiribati, Tuvalu, Tonga, Vanuatu, Fiji, Western Samoa, and the Solomon Islands.

Radio Australia reports that a number of delegations are ready to officially sign this treaty immediately, while others will convey it to their governments for definitive approval. It is expected that by the end of this year the treaty will be approved by all 13 states taking part in the meeting of the forum, which was created to resolve common problems.

The meeting decided to introduce a ban on dumping radioactive waste in the waters of forum member states, since, as New Zealand Prime Minister D. Lange said, the economies of most of the forum countries depend on fishing. The Paris newspaper LE MONDE writes in this connection that in that part of the world France, together with the United States, remains the last colonial power and, moreover, the power which by its nuclear tests is polluting the ocean -- "our granary", as the local inhabitants say. The islands are also protesting against U.S. and Japanese attempts to dump their nuclear waste near the islands.

The Cook Islands forum decisions will undoubtedly provoke widespread international response, since they reflect the desire of the peoples of all continents for peace and peaceful cooperation and for the removal of the threat of nuclear catastrophe.

Movement for Other NFZ's Continues

OW090534 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1400 GMT 8 Aug 85

[From the "Novosti" newscast; commentary by Vladimir Dmitriyev]

[Text] A summit meeting of representatives of South Pacific countries has ended in Avarua, the administrative center of the Cook Islands.

[Dmitriyev] Hello, comrades. The participants in the session, the presidents and heads of state of Australia, New Zealand, and 11 other island states, approved a treaty on creating a nuclear-free zone in the region. It calls for rejecting the development, use, and testing of nuclear devices, and also forbids the acquisition of nuclear weapons. The document will soon be signed at the same level and will come into force.

The decision is testimony to the fact that the idea of creating nuclear-free zones is steadily taking effect and finding ever-increasing supporters throughout the world.

As is known, as far back as the end of the 1950's, specific projects began to appear for creating nuclear-free zones in central Europe and the Balkans, as well as the Adriatic and Mediterranean regions, in northern Europe, Africa, Latin America, and other regions. However, owing to the negative stance of the United States, Britain, and France, or because of disagreements between the participants in certain zones, the majority of projects have not been realized.

However, the movement for their realization is not weakening. Here are just a few examples: A huge 4-day festival has begun in Oslo with its main slogan: "For a nuclear-free north." Thousands of representatives from northern European countries, who are striving for the proclamation of their region as a zone free of nuclear weapons, are taking part in rallies, meetings, and discussions. A colloquium was held in the Portuguese city of Loures attended by activists of political parties and public organizations and the mayors of many of the country's cities. They firmly came out in favor of the entire Iberian peninsula being free from nuclear weapons.

It is quite obvious that the creation of nuclear-free zones is an effective means against the proliferation of nuclear weapons. It is an important trend in the struggle of peoples to strengthen their security and reduce the threat of war, primarily the nuclear one. Now, when the world's people are mourning the victims of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, one should stress with particular force that this struggle continues to strengthen.

Australian Embassy Briefing

LD131321 Moscow TASS in English 1231 GMT 13 Aug 85

[Text] Moscow, August 13 TASS -- A briefing for the press was given in the Australian Embassy in Moscow today of the results of the 14th session of the forum of South Pacific countries on the Cook Islands. The session proclaimed a nuclear weapon-free zone in that vast region. Robert Tyson, Australia's charge d'affaires in the USSR, read for the journalists the text of a treaty announcing the South Pacific a nuclear weapon-free zone, which had been unanimously approved by the participants in the session. It was noted that that document reflected the profound worry of 13 South Pacific states with the continued nuclear arms race and the threat of nuclear war. The member countries of the forum are seriously worried by French nuclear tests at the Mururoa Atoll and by plans to dump nuclear waste on the ocean floor.

The treaty envisions that no country participating in the forum shall (?produce), acquire or receive any explosive nuclear devices from other countries. No nuclear devices shall be tested in the region. Nuclear weapons shall not be deployed in the territories of the participating countries. New activity in nuclear physics, including export of fissionable materials, shall be conducted under strict safety measures and exclusively for civilian, non-military purposes.

At the same time the treaty stipulates the rights of parties to independently decide such matters as access of ships or planes of third countries to their sea ports and air fields.

There are three protocols to the treaty. The first urges the USA, Britain and France to apply the provisions of the treaty to their South Pacific territories.

The other two protocols appeal to the five nuclear powers not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against the countries participating in the treaty and not to conduct any nuclear tests in the zone.

It was said at the briefing that the participants in the forum had welcomed the on-going arms control talks and expressed the wish that they should lead to a reduction in the nuclear arms arsenals and to the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons, and also contribute to the prevention of the spread of the arms race to space.

U.S. Tests, Deployments Hit

LD141822 Moscow World Service in English 1431 GMT 14 Aug 85

[Excerpts] Thirteen states of Oceania, including Australia and New Zealand, are known to have approved a treaty declaring the southern Pacific a nuclear-free zone. They did so at the recent session of the South Pacific Forum held on the Cook Islands. The leaders of eight of the countries have already signed this treaty with the others due to do so shortly. Our observer, Yuriy Afonin, makes the following comments:

The idea to create a nuclear-free zone in the region was born when most of the now independent states of Oceania were colonies. Nations of the region have suffered great damage from American nuclear tests on the atolls of Enewetak and Bikini, British tests on Christmas Island, and French tests on the Mururoa atoll. In spite of their protests, France has carried on with its nuclear testing.

With the American Pacific Fleet adopting Tomahawk nuclear cruise missiles, Oceania may well turn into a giant American nuclear base. For this reason island nations of the Pacific are resisting Washington's militarism in an effort to restrict its military expansion in the region. The Republic of Palau for one has adopted a nonnuclear constitution saying it would not allow a base for American nuclear submarines to be built on its territory. The Republic of Vanuatu and the Solomon Islands have decided to ban port calls by American nuclear ships. Despite strong pressure from Washington, New Zealand has done the same. Its position has been appreciated throughout the world. In fact, New Zealand's resolve helped to speed up the drafting of the treaty declaring the southern Pacific free of nuclear weapons.

The conference of the South Pacific Forum was reported to have received the Soviet position with deep satisfaction. The West, however, shows an entirely different attitude to a nuclear-free southern Pacific. This adds to the problem of eliminating the nuclear threat.

CSO: 5200/1354

NUCLEAR-FREE-ZONE PROPOSALS

REPORTAGE ON SOUTH PACIFIC FORUM NUCLEAR-FREE-ZONE TREATY

Australia's Hawke on Treaty Prospects

BK060923 Melbourne Overseas Service in English 0830 GMT 6 Aug 85

[Text] The prime minister, Mr Hawke, has said he is confident that the South Pacific Forum meeting at Rarotonga in the Cook Islands will endorse the Australian proposal for a nuclear-free zone in the region. Speaking after the 1st full day of the forum, Mr Hawke said that while there was not complete agreement on the draft treaty, it has the general support of South Pacific leaders.

Mr Hawke said all of the forum leaders were agreed that a nuclear-free zone is desirable but some had marginally different views on the content of the proposed treaty. He said he was hopeful that when talks resume tomorrow, he could satisfy several countries that the proposed draft is appropriate and worthwhile. Mr Hawke said there was a chance that the nuclear powers with the exception of France would adhere or agree to the protocols that accompany the new treaty. This would include an undertaking not to use nuclear weapons against forum members and not to carry out nuclear tests in the region.

Nuclear-Free Zone Endorsed

BK070806 Melbourne Overseas Service in English 0500 GMT 7 Aug 85

[Text] South Pacific Forum nations have formally adopted a treaty declaring the region a nuclear-free zone. It was endorsed on the 2d full day of the South Pacific Forum conference, which ends in Rarotonga in the Cook Islands today.

Correspondents say the treaty has been offered for signature, and some countries have indicated that they are willing to sign it. It is expected that a signature ceremony will be held later today, although some countries have said they will have to refer to their parliaments before they can add their signature. But the New Zealand prime minister, Mr Lange, who is also the forum spokesman, estimated that all countries will have signed the treaty by the end of the year.

The treaty will oblige all signatory nations to ban forever the stationing, manufacture, or testing of nuclear weapons in their territory. It also bans the dumping of nuclear waste in the South Pacific nuclear-free zone.

Mr Lange said officials would begin immediate consultations with the five nuclear powers -- the United States, the Soviet Union, China, Great Britain, and France.

The treaty's adoption came as an American-based research organization revealed that there may already be nearly 600 nuclear weapons deployed by the two superpowers in the Asia-Pacific region. According to the (?Nautilus) Pacific Action Research Group, the United States and the Soviet Union each have up to 300 nuclear weapons deployed in the region.

A Radio Australia correspondent in New York, (Andrew Krueger), said figures were compiled from documents obtained under America's Freedom of Information Act and from Pentagon sources. (?Nautilus) calculates that in the event of an all-out nuclear war in the Pacific, a total of more than 5,000 nuclear warheads could rain down on targets stretching from Western Australia to Japan.

New Zealand's Lange on Details

HK070837 Hong Kong AFP in English 0746 GMT 7 Aug 85

[Text] Rarotonga, Cook Islands, Aug 7 (AFP) -- South Pacific Forum members, including New Zealand and Australia, yesterday signed a treaty banning testing, possession or use of nuclear weapons in their region of the southern hemisphere.

New Zealand Prime Minister David Lange, spokesman for the consultative group, said eight heads of government had signed immediately but the other five full members had constitutional formalities to complete. However the expected all to have signed in the next few months. The document, a kind of non-proliferation treaty, covers an area stretching from the equator to the antarctic and from western Australia across the Pacific.

Mr. Lange, whose Labour government has effectively excluded itself from the ANZUS pact with the United States and Australia by refusing to allow U.S. nuclear warships to call at its ports, added that the treaty would allow signatories to authorize transit and access of nuclear vessels.

Australia, New Zealand, the Cook Islands, Fiji, Kiribati, Niue, Tuvalu and Western Samoa signed the treaty at the close of the two-day meeting. The Solomon Islands, Vanuatu (formerly New Hebrides), Nauru and Tonga would undertake formalities at home. The 14th delegate to the forum, Micronesia, has observer status only.

Mr. Lange said the forum would be submitting three protocols to powers present in the Pacific.

In a first move, Britain, France and the United States would be asked if they would authorize the "association" of their territories in the region. The only British possession involved is Pitcairn. Washington would mainly be asked about American Samoa, and Paris about French Polynesia and New Caledonia.

(Speaking after the closing session, Papua New Guinea Premier Michael Somare said France had made big efforts in New Caledonia -- where militant Melanesians are demanding independence -- and he would not press for the territory to be put back on the United Nations decolonization list.

(On June 3, Papua New Guinea, Vanuatu and the Solomon Islands had pledged to press for this U.N. action. However Mr. Somare said yesterday that France was organizing elections in New Caledonia and he had advised Melanesian leaders to avoid any violence in their struggle for independence.)

In a second step, these three powers plus the Soviet Union and China would be asked to commit themselves not to use nuclear weapons against forum members.

In the third move, all five powers would be asked to refrain from nuclear tests in the zone covered by the forum treaty.

This last demand is aimed specifically at France, which tests its nuclear weapons underground on Mururoa Atoll, in French Polynesia.

Mr. Lange said France was likely to sign the first two protocols, as it had the Tlatelolco Treaty, which in 1967 decided on a similar non-nuclear policy in Latin America, but was not ratified or applied by all signatories. However he acknowledged that it would be difficult to get Paris to sign the test ban agreement.

France has carried out almost 100 nuclear tests at Mururoa, with four this year. Pacific countries have repeatedly demanded a stop to the tests, but France has said it will only end them when the two superpowers reach a genuine nuclear arms limitation agreement. France also holds that a 1983 study by Australian and New Zealand scientists found no harmful radiation levels in French Polynesia.

Mr. Lange said if France failed to sign any of the protocols, this would be an "arrogant" gesture, as it had signed Tlatelolco and agreements on the Antarctic. He added that a delegation would visit the five nuclear powers over the next few months.

On Australia's uranium exports, Mr. Lange said the treaty would not ban them, provided they were covered by "proper safeguards" and Canberra checked the uranium would not be used for military purposes.

CSO: 5200/4349

NUCLEAR-FREE-ZONE PROPOSALS

INDONESIA: FOREIGN BASES BAR ASEAN ZONE

HK091236 Hong Kong AFP in English 1210 GMT 9 Aug 85

[Text] Jakarta, Aug 9 (AFP) — Indonesia shares South Pacific nations' concern over nuclear tests and arms, but feels the possibility of declaring Southeast Asia a nuclear free zone is "some way off," Foreign Minister Mokhtar Kusumaatmaja said today. Leaders of eight South Pacific nations this week signed a treaty at a forum in the Cook Islands, banning possession, testing, and use of nuclear arms in the South Pacific and five other countries were also expected to follow suit.

But Mr Mokhtar told a weekly briefing that the reality of big power military bases in Vietnam and the Philippines meant that talks of a nuclear free zone in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) region was premature. ASEAN groups Indonesia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia and Brunei, and holds as one of its tenets that the area should be a zone of peace, freedom, and neutrality. The forming of a South Pacific nuclear free zone, Mr Mokhtar said "is a manifestation of the long-standing strong feeling of the countries in the Pacific dating back to the first nuclear test explosions in the 1940's." More recent concerns, he said, had been French tests and the dumping of nuclear wastes.

"Could it be applied to ASEAN? Yes, why not, but it is still some way off. There are the factual realities -- the bases in the Philippines and Vietnam," Mr Mokhtar said. The Soviet Union maintains air and naval bases in Vietnam, and the Philippines hosts the U.S. Clark Airbase and Subic Naval Base.

CSO: 5200/4352

NUCLEAR-FREE-ZONE PROPOSALS

BRIEFS

INDONESIA BACKS PACIFIC NFZ--Indonesia supports the Pacific Forum leaders' decision to declare the region a nuclear-free zone. Foreign Minister Mokhtar Kusumaatmaja said in Jakarta that the statement by the Pacific nations to set up a nuclear-free zone reflects the regional countries' determination to reject nuclear weapons since the 1940's. The recent Pacific Forum leaders' statement, according to Minister Mokhtar, was aimed at France which has conducted frequent nuclear tests in the Pacific region. [Excerpt] [Jakarta Domestic Service in Indonesian 1200 GMT 9 Aug 85]

CSO: 5200/4352

BRAZILIAN FOREIGN MINISTER'S 'IMPLICIT DOUBT' ON MORATORIUM

PY302336 Paris AFP in Spanish 2205 GMT 30 Jul 85

[Text] Brasilia, 30 Jul (AFP) -- Brazilian Foreign Minister Olavo Setubal today expressed an implicit doubt regarding the suspension of nuclear tests proposed by the USSR, because there is a lack of knowledge regarding the effects of the explosions that are carried out for peaceful purposes. Setubal granted a press conference today, upon arriving at the Brasilia Air Force Base on his return from Lima, where he participated in the inaugural ceremonies of the new Peruvian president, Alan Garcia.

Mikhail Gorbachev, the secretary general of the USSR Communist Party, has announced a unilateral suspension of nuclear tests as of 6 August 1985 and has invited the United States to adopt a similar position. The United States has rejected the Soviet offer.

Setubal believes that the measure must be studied from a technical viewpoint. At this time, and without consulting experts, I cannot say whether that measure will contribute to the peaceful development of nuclear energy, Setubal added.

Brazil has not adhered to the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Arms Treaty because it considers it to be discriminatory, but has signed the Tlatelolco Treaty that denuclearizes Latin America, although Brazil has not yet ratified it.

The foreign minister highlighted President Francois Mitterrand's reply to a letter that was addressed to all the chiefs of state of industrialized nations by Uruguayan Foreign Minister Enrique Iglesias in his role as secretary pro tempore of the Cartagena Consensus. In the letter Iglesias asks for the understanding of the industrialized nations regarding the economic problems of Latin America. The French president's answer was one of understanding, Setubal said. The other answers were conventional.

Setubal also indicated that Argentina, Brazil, Peru, and Uruguay have offered more cooperation to the Contadora Group and its efforts to achieve peace in Latin America.

CSO: 5100/2155

NUCLEAR TESTING

REAGAN'S CONDITIONAL 'YES' ON TEST BAN VIEWED

Seen as Propaganda 'Trick'

LD062043 Prague Domestic Service in Czech 1630 GMT 6 Aug 85

[Commentary by Antonin Kostka]

[Text] Unspoken hopes and expectations are linked with today's tragically important anniversary. On the day when another 5,200 names were added to the monument of victims of the mass atomic murder of the inhabitants of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, when, after 40 years of suffering, the atomic death took another 5,200 human lives to add to the 300,000 who had already died -- on such a day it is rightly expected that the people will be given a tangible assurance, a guarantee that similar barbarism will never be repeated. This is expected in particular from the statesmen of the country that took upon itself in the eyes of history the responsibility to be the first to use a nuclear weapon. It is expected all the more because today's nuclear bombs are 700 times more destructive and the overall destructive potential of today's nuclear arsenals is already 1 and 1/2 million times greater than the destructive potential of the bomb that razed Hiroshima 40 years ago. It is expected with even greater justification because today the moratorium on nuclear tests unilaterally declared by the USSR came into effect.

But instead of a serious assurance, instead of an important step, the people get conjuring tricks, not worthy either of the importance of the matter or the position of their source, the President of the United States of America. Ronald Reagan, instead of making serious conclusions, attempted at yesterday's White House press conference to justify the use of the nuclear bomb against civilian inhabitants. It could have been understandable. Though still inexcusable, if it was simply a natural attempt by an American to rid himself of a feeling of guilt, but within the context it sounded like a justification of the use of nuclear arms as such, to the extent that a question arises: What will happen to the world when they decide in Washington tomorrow that in their life interests they have the right to use nuclear weapons?

The changed American attitude to the moratorium was clearly linked to precisely this concept. The original decisive No to the moratorium was modified by Reagan, after a strong reaction from the world public, to a conditional Yes -- conditional to the extent that it is almost the same as the repeated no, linked, what is more, with an attempt to dodge responsibility for thwarting the moratorium. The United States is, it is reported, willing to maybe undertake a moratorium on nuclear tests, but only after ending the planned series of allegedly vital tests. But although they are planned, Reagan could not even give an approximate length of time for this unspecified

series. This series of testing might last, it was said, until the United States catches up with the Soviet lead, that is, when Washington says so, maybe in 10 years time. An argument that is just as old as this is unconvincing. Washington has been using it for 8 years, which is how long Washington dragged out the talks on nuclear tests in the atmosphere, underwater, and in space. It uses an argument which is quite in the spirit of the American practice of dragging out talks on disarmament questions as a cloak for further rearming.

However, the whole postwar period is unequivocally characterized precisely by the fact that not the United States but the USSR has always had to catch up with the American lead in new arms and arms systems. Reagan himself cast a lot of doubt on his proclamation when he repeated the offer to exchange observers at nuclear tests, an offer already rejected by the USSR as an attempt to legalize further tests. This dubious offer also reflects the fact that Washington does not see the moratorium as a point of departure for an end to nuclear arming, or a subsequent liquidation of nuclear arms as a whole. Why would it otherwise need to catch up even if it wasn't only a lie and excuse. For Washington it is simply a trick to hoodwink and calm down the public, a trick which is, however, as transparent as it is dangerous because it can thwart the achievement of a lasting moratorium and thus postpone indefinitely and end to nuclear arming.

Aides Reverse Offer

LD061617 Prague CTK in English 1521 GMT 6 Aug 85

[By Karel Filek]

[Text] Washington, Aug 6 (CTK) -- Statements on halting nuclear tests made by U.S. President Ronald Reagan at a press conference on Monday aroused hope among most Americans and the progressive public of the whole world, but they were soon reversed.

During his 25-minute meeting with journalists, the President said inter alia that the United States is willing to join the Soviet moratorium on nuclear weapons tests, but only after it completes a planned series of tests of new nuclear weapons, and when mutual control of such moratorium is secured.

Less than 24 hours later, a White House spokesman hastened to "correct" the statement. Edward Djerejian told journalists that the President suggests no new initiative, nor does he alter the present American policy. He said so the very day the whole world commemorates the 40th anniversary of the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and the Soviet moratorium on all nuclear weapons tests came into force.

Reagan's surprisingly reconciliatory tone had evidently to be harmonized with statements by his closest advisers who shortly after the Soviet Union declared the moratorium clearly turned it down as "propaganda" and an "attempt to influence the world public opinion" before the Geneva meeting of Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev.

CSO: 5200/3081

NUCLEAR TESTING

UK FOLLOWING U.S. LEAD IN REJECTING TEST BAN

LD011113 Prague Domestic Service in Czech 0500 GMT 1 Aug 85

[Text] Geoffrey Howe, British foreign secretary, has rejected the new Soviet peace initiative. This step is being commented on by our permanent London correspondent, Karel Stary:

[Stary] Geoffrey Howe, British foreign secretary, only confirmed in Helsinki the unofficial stand of the government spokesmen who have so far reiterated the constantly negative reply of the White House to the Soviet proposals. The reaction of the British press demonstrated that the United States yet again replied to the very serious Soviet proposals with mere propagandistic maneuvering, and now this attitude has been supported by the British foreign secretary. Britain could support the Soviet proposal to halt nuclear tests by announcing a halt to the tests of its own nuclear weapons being conducted in the United States. Instead, the parliamentary Committee for Defense yesterday supported the government expenditures multiplying the British offensive nuclear force in the coming years by buying the latest U.S. nuclear missiles -- Trident -- placed on submarines.

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NUCLEAR TESTING

U.S. SHOULD ACCEPT SOVIET NUCLEAR TEST BAN OFFER

AU011116 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 31 Jul 85 p 7

[Article by Milan Rusko in the "Word on Events" column: "An Example That Gives Hope"; uppercase words published double-spaced]

[Text] The threatening growth of the world's nuclear weapons arsenals constitutes a growing threat to the existence of mankind. The spiral of the arms buildup, quantitatively as well as qualitatively, is skyrocketing. Such a trend often gives rise to concern about whether it is at all possible to achieve a reversal.

Now, the USSR, in the sense of the Leninist principles of its peace foreign policy, has again presented telling proof that such a possibility exists. As a natural followup to its previous peace proposals and initiatives, pursuing the most ardent aspirations and interests of nations aimed at averting a nuclear catastrophe, CPSU Central Committee General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev, in a declaration addressed to the U.S. Government, proposed an agreement on halting ALL nuclear weapons tests. Such a ban is in effect today for tests on the ground and in the atmosphere, but underground tests continue. "It is no secret," Comrade Gorbachev stated "that in the course of these tests new and more dangerous kinds and types of mass destruction weapons are being tested and perfected." Therefore such a ban is most urgent.

More than once the USSR has proposed to states possessing nuclear weapons a moratorium on ALL nuclear explosions -- so far without success, however. Now, in an effort to help end the dangerous competition and set an example, the USSR has decided to UNILATERALLY HALT THEM beginning 6 August 1985. "We appeal to the U.S. Government," the declaration stresses, "to end its nuclear explosions as of the same date, which is commemorated throughout the world as the day of the Hiroshima tragedy."

That moratorium is in effect until 1 January 1986, but should the United States take the proposed step, it will continue to remain in effect. The Soviet initiative is an "act of immense political and moral significance, an impetus to creating an atmosphere of trust," the Bulgarian daily RABOTNICHESKO DELO writes. The press of the socialist countries, too, highly values the Soviet step, which is also being appreciated by the peace-loving public in other states.

And how did Washington react? According to REUTER, "a high official of the Reagan government has said in an interview that the United States will not go along with the Soviet proposal." He cited objections of a technical nature regarding verification of adherence to the moratorium, but today even averagely informed people know that, given the big powers' technological possibilities, these objections will not stand

up to examination. On top of this, the United States invited the USSR to attend a test of a new American nuclear weapon. Despite the fact that Larry Speakes, White House press spokesman, depicted it as "proof of U.S. willingness to achieve a verifiable agreement on the limitation of nuclear weapons," this can be viewed, rather, as an expression of cynicism. This is not the first time that the American Government has tried in this way to legalize nuclear tests in the eyes of the world public, and again reveals that it is not at all interested in their genuine and total ban. Let us recall that it was the United States that unilaterally walked out of negotiations on the total and universal ban of nuclear weapons tests conducted by Great Britain, the USSR, and the United States. In the past, the United States has torpedoed in the UN forum several Soviet proposals on limiting nuclear weapons and their tests. The topicality of that issue increases from day to day, and Washington should responsibly assess the gravity of the situation and not continue to search for ways of gaining nuclear-strategic hegemony.

Washington should at last take a constructive stance on the Soviet proposals, which are based on the principles of maintaining parity and equal security. That is the only way to preserve the hope that the world will avoid a nuclear catastrophe.

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NUCLEAR TESTING

BRIEFS

U.S. TESTS HARMED MEXICO--Mexico City, 22 July (PRAVDA correspondent N. Ognev)--According to Moises Orosco, a Mexican ecologist and president of a peace fighters' assembly, Mexico suffered irreparable harm from American nuclear tests, which the United States first carried out about 40 years ago. As a result of atomic explosions in the Almagordo desert, in the American state of New Mexico, bordering Mexico, the atmosphere and the waters of the Colorado and Bravo rivers and of the gulfs of Mexico and California were contaminated. He noted that probes which had been taken showed "a danger to all living things from atomic residues in the soil and water table of such heavily-populated Mexican states as Chihuahua and Coahuila." [Text] [Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 22 Jun 85 p 5]

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