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FORMAL VERIFICATION OF SECURITY PROPERTIES OF PRIVACY ENHANCED MAIL

Syracuse University

Shiu-Kai Chin and Dan Zhou

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13. ABSTRACT (Maximum 200 words) The increased use of networked and distributed computing makes security a major concern. The capability to verify that a system meets its security requirements will continue to grow in importance. In particular, the capability to assign security properties to engineering structures is crucial. This work focuses on verifying the security properties of Privacy Enhanced Mail (PEM). Security properties such as non-repudiation, privacy, authentication, and integrity are defined independently of any implementation structure. PEM message structures and operations on those structures are shown to have the desired security properties. All formal definitions and proofs of security properties are done using the Higher Order Logic theorem prover. This work on PEM shows the feasibility of using formal logic and computer assisted reasoning tools to describe and verify relatively complex systems.				
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Chapter 1

Introduction

1.1 Purpose

The purpose of this document is to describe in detail how security properties are related to secure electronic mail message formats and operations. We show how system-level security properties are satisfied by functional specifications of operations on specific message formats.

Our formal analysis is based on the Internet *Privacy Enhanced Mail* (PEM) described in four *Request for Comment* (RFC) papers: RFC 1421, RFC 1422, RFC 1423, and RFC 1424, [9, 8, 1, 7]. PEM is similar to military systems such as the National Security Agency's Multilevel Information Systems Security Initiative (MISSI). MISSI is based in part on PEM. While the message field names and structure may differ somewhat between MISSI and PEM, the analytical techniques used here are applicable to both.

We use several means of description. *Informal* descriptions are used to give an intuitive notion of behavior, properties, or requirements. These are derived from the above-cited documents. *Formal* descriptions are derived from the informal descriptions. These are intended to be *precise* descriptions of behavior which are subject to rigorous analysis. The types of analysis done includes *correctness* – e.g. ensuring requirements are met, and *behavioral properties* – e.g. security properties.

Our formal descriptions focus on:

- Structure of well-formed messages.
- Interpretation of message structures.
- Correctness of functions operating on messages.

Higher-order logic is used throughout. Verification is done using the Higher Order Logic (HOL) theorem-prover, [5].

INTRODUCTION

The work described here builds on two previous efforts to formally model MISSI. The first effort by Johnson, Saydjari, and Van Tassel in [4] defines various MISSI security properties in higher-order logic. The MISSI Certificate Authority Workstation (CAW) has been modeled by Marron using a CSP (Communicating Sequential Process)-like [6] process language called *PROMELA* and the *SPIN* model checker, [10].

1.2 Network Components

The objective is to send messages securely from one local area network (LAN) to another over a wide area network (WAN) like the Internet. Components appear within the context of a WAN or LAN. Section 1.2.1 gives an overview of components which exist in the WAN. Section 1.2.2 gives an overview of components which exist within LANs.

1.2.1 WAN Components

Figure 1.1 shows two local area networks, called *enclaves* in MISSI, connected to a WAN with a *Directory System* and an *Electronic Key Management System Central Facility* (EKMS CF).




Figure 1.1 Wide Area Network Components

From Figure 1.1 we can see that the concern is with secure electronic mail *between enclaves* or LANs. Local security issues *within* a particular enclave are not addressed.

1.2. NETWORK COMPONENTS

The *Directory System* functions as a "yellow-pages" for looking up people's security information such as cryptographic key information, cryptographic algorithms, the authority which has certified the authenticity of the information, and the duration or times for which the information is valid.

The *Electronic Key Management System Central Facility* serves as 1) the ultimate certification authority via the *Root Certificate Authority Workstation*, 2) support for replacing cryptographic keys (rekeying) which have expired via the *Rekey Manager*, and 3) support for *Compromised Key Lists* (CKL).

When a sender or *originator* in one enclave wishes to send email to a receiver or *recipient* in another enclave, the originator gets from the Directory System the necessary cryptographic keys and authorization to communicate with the recipient. To check if the cryptographic keys are still valid, the Compromised Key List is checked to see if the received keys are invalid because they have been compromised. As keys have finite lifetimes, user cryptographic keys must be replaced. This is done by the *Rekey Manager*.

1.2.2 LAN Components

Figure 1.2 shows the principal components within an enclave or local area network. In general, enclaves may have both trusted and untrusted workstations. The functions of the principal LAN components are illustrated by the sending of email.




Figure 1.2 Local Area Network Components

To send email, the originator must first be *registered* or *certified* as a valid system user. This is done by the local *Certificate Authority Workstation*

INTRODUCTION

(CAW). Certified users have cryptographic information and authorizations assigned to them by the CAW. Cryptographic information and authorizations are stored in data structures called *certificates*. Certificates are the means by which cryptographic information is distributed through networks.

Users have “smart cards” called *Crypto Peripherals* (CP) or *Personal Computer Memory-Card International Association* (PCMCIA) cards. Like everyday ATM cards, these cards have a PIN number known only to the user. What makes the cards smart is the information contained within them including: cryptographic algorithms, keys, and authorizations. *Type 1* cards are approved for handling classified U.S. Government information. *Type 2* cards are approved for handling sensitive but unclassified (SBU) information. The FORTEZZA card [12] is an instance of such a card. Details of its operation are not important.

A workstation with a PCMCIA card reader will take a PCMCIA card and use the cryptographic information on it for various secure email functions like encryption. Registered users have access to a variety of MISSI functions depending on their authorizations.

The first step in sending out mail is giving the destination address. Destination addresses can be gotten from the *Directory System*. If the message is going to several recipients, i.e. is being sent to a distribution list, the message is sent to the *Mail List Agent* which forwards the message to each recipient after checking each of their credentials.

The *Secure Network Server* (SNS) serves as a guard or firewall between the enclave and the WAN. Messages from untrusted workstations within an enclave must pass through the SNS before going out on the WAN. The SNS ensures only encrypted messages go to the WAN.

Messages from trusted workstations may or may not go through the SNS. If a trusted workstation has “downgraded” the security classification of a message, this downgrade must be approved by the SNS.

Messages classified as top secret or higher must pass through the SNS and then be encrypted by an *In-line Network Encryptor* (INE) regardless of whether or not they were generated by a trusted or untrusted workstation.

1.3 Electronic Mail Scenario

A typical scenario is described by Marron in [10] as follows. Emily is in enclave A. She is registered and has a certificate with her cryptographic information authorized by the Certificate Authority Workstation in enclave

1.4. MOTIVATION

A (CAWA). Benjamin is a valid user in enclave B and has a certificate with his cryptographic information authorized by the Certificate Authority Workstation in enclave B (CAWB). Both CAWA's and CAWB's certificates are authorized by a Policy Creation Authority (PCA), and the PCA's certificate was issued by the Policy Approving Authority (PAA).

Emily wishes to send an encrypted message to Benjamin, so she does the following:

1. Computes her signature (an encrypted message based on the message text) – this is easy since she knows her own key material.
2. Electronically requests Benjamin's certificate from the Directory Service Agent (DSA). Benjamin's certificate arrives, Emily sees that it is signed by CAWB, so she requests CAWB's certificate.
3. Similarly, she next requests the PCA's certificate.
4. After receiving the PCA's certificate, she can validate it without further DSA access, since the issuers (PAA's) public key material is loaded in her FORTEZZA (Plus). She then validates the certificate for CAWB and, finally, for Benjamin.
5. Now Emily has the necessary key material to perform the public key exchange with Benjamin and mail her message.

1.4 Motivation

The security requirements placed on systems such as PEM and MISSI raise the fundamental question, *"how will we precisely understand the security requirements and by what means will we assure our designs satisfy them?"* In other words, how do we build it and how do we know it works?

The engineering view we adopt is to use techniques which answer:

1. What objects are built?
2. What are the operations on the objects?
3. How is it known if the objects are correct?

In the case of PEM and MISSI, the objects of interest are electronic mail messages. Messages have defined structures. Just as language syntax is assigned meaning by a semantic interpretation, messages have a security interpretation as well. Security functions and services are determined by the particular message type or structure.

1.5 Structure of this Report

An informal overview of security functions in general and PEM in particular is given in Chapter 2. A formal theory in higher-order logic of PEM message formats, message operations, and security properties is developed in Chapter 3. Conclusions are given in Chapter 4.

Appendix A defines the notational conventions of extended Backus-Naur Form (BNF). Appendix B is a listing of the theory defining the message structure of PEM messages in higher-order logic. Appendix C is a listing of the theory defining the operations on PEM message structures. Appendix D shows the theory applicable to MIC-CLEAR messages, i.e. messages which are transmitted without encryption or encoding but are checked for integrity. Appendix E shows the theory applicable to ENCRYPTED messages. In particular, it shows the correctness of the checks for privacy, message integrity, source authenticity, and non-deniability.

Chapter 2

Privacy Enhanced Mail

PEM adds privacy, source authentication, integrity protection, and non-repudiation services to plain text email on the Internet. PEM is documented in four *Request for Comments* (RFC) documents. RFC 1421 [9] describes message encryption, authentication procedures, and formats. RFC 1422 [8] describes certificate-based key management. RFC 1423 [1] describes algorithms. RFC 1424 [7] describes key certification.

MISSI is similar to Internet Privacy Enhanced Mail (PEM) with the exception that MISSI uses guards to protect enclaves from inappropriately releasing classified information.

2.1 Security Issues for Electronic Mail

Four key issues for secure electronic mail are identified by RFC 1421 and defined by Kaufman, Perlman, and Speciner in [2]:

- **privacy** – the ability to keep anyone but the intended recipient from reading the message.
- **authentication** – reassurance to the recipient of the identity of the sender.
- **integrity** – reassurance to the recipient that the message has not been altered since it was transmitted by the sender.
- **non-repudiation** – the ability of the recipient to prove to a third party that the sender really did send the message, i.e. the originator cannot deny sending the message.

PEM does not address all security issues. RFC 1421 identifies the following security issues *not* addressed by PEM:

PRIVACY ENHANCED MAIL

- **access control** – mechanisms for restricting the use of some resource only to authorized users.
- **traffic flow confidentiality** – preventing knowledge that a message was sent.
- **address list accuracy.**
- **routing control.**
- **casual serial reuse of PCs by multiple users.**
- **assurance of message receipt and non-deniability of receipt.**
- **automatic association of acknowledgments with the messages to which they refer.**
- **message duplicate detection and replay prevention.**

In this chapter we will describe how the issues of privacy, authentication, integrity, and non-repudiation are addressed by PEM. Section 2.2 gives an overview of cryptographic functions used by PEM. Section 2.3 describes the structure of PEM messages. Section 2.4 gives examples of various PEM messages and structures. Section 2.5 describes PEM's privacy functions. Section 2.6 describes PEM's methods for source authentication. Section 2.7 describes how message integrity is checked. Section 2.8 describes mechanisms for non-repudiation.

2.2 Cryptography

Cryptography serves privacy needs by encryption. It serves source authentication and non-repudiation needs through the use of secrets. It serves integrity through message integrity codes (MIC) for secret key cryptography or digital signatures for public key cryptography.

2.2.1 Types of Cryptographic Functions

There are three kinds of cryptographic functions: secret key functions, public key functions and hash functions. Public key cryptography uses two keys. Secret key cryptography use one key. Hash functions uses no keys.

2.2. CRYPTOGRAPHY

Secret Key Cryptography

In *Secret key* or *symmetric* cryptography, the same key s is used for both encryption and decryption, as shown in Figure 2.1. Ciphertext is obtained by applying the encryption function to both plaintext and the secret key. To retrieve the original plaintext, decryption function is applied to the ciphertext and the same secret key. A message m encrypted with secret key s is denoted as $[m]_s$.




Figure 2.1 Secret Key Cryptography

Ideally secret key cryptography has following property: a message encrypted with secret key k can only be retrieved (decrypted) with the same secret key. When an initial vector(IV) is utilized in the cryptographic algorithm, it must be the same for both encryption and decryption. This can be formalized as:

$$\begin{aligned}
 &\forall msg \text{ key IV.} \\
 &(decryptS (encryptS msg key IV) key IV = msg) \wedge \quad (2.1) \\
 &(\forall msg2 key2. (decryptS msg2 key IV = \\
 &\quad decryptS msg2 key2 IV) = key = key2)
 \end{aligned}$$

The secret key scheme can be used to generate a fixed-length cryptographic checksum associated with a message, as shown in Figure 2.2; this message integrity code (MIC) can be used to check the integrity of the message sent along with it (see section 2.2.4).

PRIVACY ENHANCED MAIL




Figure 2.2 Message Integrity Code

Public Key Cryptography

In *public key* or *asymmetric* cryptography, each individual has a pair of keys: a private key d only known to the owner, and a corresponding public key e that is accessible by the world. The public key is used for encryption and the private key is used for decryption. This is shown in Figure 2.3. A message m encrypted using public key e is denoted as $\{m\}_e$.




Figure 2.3 Public Key Cryptography

Public key cryptography has following property: a message encrypted with public key e_k can only be retrieved (decrypted) with a unique private key d_k ; on the other hand, a message encrypted with private key d_k can only be retrieved (decrypted) with the unique public key e_k . This can be formalized as:

$$\forall msg \ eKEY \ dKEY. \\ ((decryptP (encryptP \ msg \ eKEY) \ dKEY) = msg) = \quad (2.2)$$

2.2. CRYPTOGRAPHY

$$\begin{aligned}
 & (\text{encryptP} (\text{decryptP} \text{ msg } dKEY) eKEY = \text{msg}) \wedge \\
 & ((\text{decryptP} (\text{encryptP} \text{ msg } eKEY) dKEY = \text{msg}) \supset \\
 & ((\forall dk. (\text{decryptP} (\text{encryptP} \text{ msg } eKEY) dk = \text{msg}) \supset dk = dKEY) \wedge \\
 & (\forall ek. (\text{encryptP} (\text{decryptP} \text{ msg } dKEY) ek = \text{msg}) \supset ek = eKEY))
 \end{aligned} \tag{2.3}$$

Public key cryptography can be used to generate signature on any message. The signature can be verified by anyone who knows the public key of the signer, and can only be generated by the one who knows the corresponding private key. This is shown in Figure 2.4. These two properties can be formalized as follows:

$$\begin{aligned}
 & \forall m1 \ m2 \ dkey1 \ dkey2. (\text{sign } m1 \ dkey1 = \text{sign } m2 \ dkey2) \\
 & \supset (m1 = m2) \wedge (dkey1 = dkey2)
 \end{aligned} \tag{2.4}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
 & \forall \text{msg } eKEY \ dKEY. \text{verify } \text{msg} (\text{sign } \text{msg } dKEY) eKEY \supset \\
 & (\forall m1 \ m2. \text{verify } m1 \ m2 \ eKEY = (m2 = \text{sign } m1 \ dKEY))
 \end{aligned} \tag{2.5}$$




Figure 2.4 Signature

The counterpart of MICs for public key cryptography are digital signatures as shown in Figure 2.5. They are used to check integrity.

Hash Functions

Hash functions are message digests or one-way transformations. A cryptographic hash function is a mathematical transformation that takes a mes-




Figure 2.5 Digital Signature

sage of arbitrary length and computes from it a fixed length number.

Hash functions have the following properties:

- If $h(m_0)$ denotes the hash of the message m_0 , there is no substantially easier way to find an m whose hash is $h(m_0)$ without going through all values of m to search for $h(m_0)$.
- It is computationally infeasible to find two values of m which hash to the same value.

Essentially, hash functions behave like one-to-one functions, i.e.,

$$\forall m, m'. h(m) = h(m') \supset m = m' \quad (2.6)$$

2.2.2 Privacy

Privacy is obtained through encryption. If Emily wants to send Benjamin a mail that only Benjamin can read, she will choose a random secret key S to be used only for encrypting that one message m . She encrypts the message with S to get $[m]_S$, encrypts S with Benjamin's public key e_B to get $\{S\}_{e_B}$ (if public key cryptography is used) or with the secret key she shares with Benjamin K_{EB} to get $[S]_{K_{EB}}$ (if secret key cryptography is used), and transmits both to Benjamin.

Privacy in PEM is gotten by using any of the following cryptographic functions: DES-CBC for secret key encryption of messages; DES-EDE for secret key encryption of Data Encryption Keys (DEKs); DES-ECB for secret key encryption of DEKs; RSA for public key encryption of DEKs and signatures. Summaries of each of the encryption algorithms mentioned here are found in [2].

2.2. CRYPTOGRAPHY

2.2.3 Authentication

Authentication verifies the identity of the communicating party. Encryption is used to prove the knowledge of secrets, hence to verify identities. The means for doing so are variations on a *challenge/response* protocol. A challenge is issued by the party wishing to verify the identity of the other principal. The principal, whose identity is being checked, issues a response based on the use of a secret key or public key cryptography.

In secret key cryptography, if Emily wants to verify the identity of Benjamin, she issues a challenge, a random picked number r , and sends it to Benjamin. Benjamin encrypts the r with the the secret key K_{EB} he shares with Emily and sends it back to Emily. Emily decrypts the response with K_{EB} and checks to see if she got back r (see Figure 2.6).




Figure 2.6 Secret Key Authentication

If public key cryptography is used, Emily chooses a random number r , encrypts it with Benjamin's public key e_B and sends the result to Benjamin. Benjamin proves he knows his private key d_B by decrypting the message and sending r back to Emily (see Figure 2.7).




Figure 2.7 Public Key Authentication

2.2.4 Integrity

Integrity of a message is maintained by using either a MIC (in secret key cryptography) or a digital signature (in public key cryptography) shown in Figure 2.2 and Figure 2.5.

For secret key cryptography, a MIC is computed by using a secret key with a known checksum algorithm. It is included as part of the header sent along with the message to the recipients. The recipients compute the MIC for the message they receive and compare it to the MIC received in the header. If the MICs match, then the message is genuine (see Figure 2.8).




Figure 2.8 Integrity Check using a MIC

For public key cryptography, integrity is protected by digital signatures. If Emily wants to send Benjamin a message which is integrity protected, she generates the digital signature of the message using her private key, and send it along with the message to Benjamin. When Benjamin receives the message with its digital signature, he verifies the digital signature with Emily's public key (see Figure 2.9).

Hash functions are used with public keys for integrity protection (see Figure 2.9). Signing a message digest is much quicker than signing a message itself. When the signature of the message digest is sent with the message to recipients, the recipients generate the message digest from the message, and verify the signature of the digest to check the integrity of the message.

2.3. STRUCTURE OF PEM MESSAGES




Figure 2.9 Integrity Check using a Digital Signature

2.2.5 Non-repudiation

Non-repudiation is the ability of the recipient to prove to a third party that the sender really did send the message. It comes automatically with public key cryptography as only the person who knows the private key can generate the signature. Comparing the message digest with the signature decrypted using originator's public key is all that is required.

2.3 Structure of PEM Messages

This section describes the structure of a PEM message. It is excerpted from RFC 1421, *Privacy Enhancement for Internet Electronic Mail: Part I: Message Encryption and Authentication Procedures*, [9]. Included is an additional message type, *CRL-retrieval request* as described in RFC 1424, *Key Certification and Related Services*, [7].

The notation used is augmented Backus-Naur Form (BNF) as described in RFC 822, [3]. A full description of the augmented BNF is in Appendix

PRIVACY ENHANCED MAIL

A.

Figure 2.10 defines the top-level structure of a PEM message. The top-level structure includes:

- A Pre-Encapsulation Boundary (preeb):
-----BEGIN PRIVACY-ENHANCED MESSAGE-----
- A PEM header (pemhdr) containing encryption information.
- A carriage-return-linefeed (CRLF) with the message text (pemtext), if any.
- A Post-Encapsulation Boundary (posteb):
-----END PRIVACY-ENHANCED MESSAGE-----

```
; PEM BNF representation, using RFC 822 notation.

; imports field meta-syntax (field, field-name, field-body,
; field-body-contents) from RFC-822, sec. 3.2
; imports DIGIT, ALPHA, CRLF, text from RFC-822
; Note: algorithm and mode specifiers are officially defined
; in RFC 1423

<pemmsg> ::= <preeb>
           <pemhdr>
           [CRLF <pemtext>] ; absent for CRL message
           <posteb>

<preeb> ::= "-----BEGIN PRIVACY-ENHANCED MESSAGE-----" CRLF
<posteb> ::= "-----END PRIVACY-ENHANCED MESSAGE-----" CRLF / <preeb>

<pemtext> ::= <encbinbody> ; for ENCRYPTED or MIC-ONLY messages
              / *(<text> CRLF) ; for MIC-CLEAR

<pemhdr> ::= <normalhdr> / <crlhdr>
```

Figure 2.10 Top-Level PEM Message Structure

A template of an encapsulated message taken from RFC 1421, [9] is shown below in Figure 2.11. The message components <pemhdr> and <pemtext> are the encapsulated header and encapsulated text portions of the message. These are described below.

Two types of encryption keys are used in PEM as reported in RFC 1421, [9].

2.3. STRUCTURE OF PEM MESSAGES




Figure 2.11 Encapsulated Message Format

- Data Encryption Keys (DEKs) are used for encrypting message text and for message integrity codes (MICs). These keys are generated on a per-message basis with no prior pre-distribution.
- Interchange Keys (IKs) are used to encrypt DEKs for transmission within messages. IKs are used over a period of time. They are typically the secret or public keys of principals depending on whether secret or public key encryption is used.

2.3.1 Encapsulated Header Portion

The header portion of the message has the encryption control information necessary to decrypt the encapsulated message text portion of a PEM message. Its format is defined by RFC 1421. Its BNF description is in Figure 2.12.

There are two types of headers:

- *normal headers* <normalhdr> – used for messages that are not requests related to certificate revocation lists (CRLs).

PRIVACY ENHANCED MAIL

- *headers for CRLs* <crlhdr> – used for messages related to CRLs.

```
<normalhdr> ::= <proctype>
               <contentdomain>
               [<dekinfo>]           ; needed if ENCRYPTED
               (1*(<origflds> *<recipflds>)) ; symmetric case --
               ; recipflds included for all proc types
               / ((1*(<origflds>)*(<recipflds>)) ; asymmetric case --
               ; recipflds included for ENCRYPTED proc type

<crlhdr> ::= <proctype>
            1*(<crl> [<cert>] *(<issuercert>))

<asymmorig> ::= <origid-asymm> / <cert>

<origflds> ::= <asymmorig> [<keyinfo>] *(<issuercert>)
               <micinfo>           ; asymmetric
               / <origid-symm> [<keyinfo>] ; symmetric

<recipflds> ::= <recipid> <keyinfo>
```

Figure 2.12 PEM Header Structure

Normal Headers

Normal headers contain:

- *process type* <proctype> – the version number of PEM being used and the type of PEM message. In this case, version 4 is the only possibility. PEM message types can be ENCRYPTED, MIC-ONLY, MIC-CLEAR, CRL, or CRL-RETRIEVAL-REQUEST. See Figure 2.13.
- *content domain* <contentdomain> – the type of mail message, in this case the only possibility is RFC822 which identifies it as an ARPA Internet text message. See Figures 2.13 and 2.15.
- *data encrypting key information* <dekinfo> – required for ENCRYPTED messages. See Figures 2.13 and 2.15.
- One or more *originator fields* <origflds> with zero or more *recipient fields* <recipflds>. The required fields depend on whether secret or public key cryptography is used. See Figures 2.13 and 2.14.

2.3. STRUCTURE OF PEM MESSAGES

```

; definitions for PEM header fields

<proctype> ::= "Proc-Type" ":" "4" "," <pemtypes> CRLF
<contentdomain> ::= "Content-Domain" ":" <contentdescrip> CRLF
<dekinfo> ::= "DEK-Info" ":" <dekalgid> [ "," <dekparameters> ] CRLF
<symmid> ::= <IKsubfld> "," [<IKsubfld>] "," [<IKsubfld>]
<asymmid> ::= <IKsubfld> "," <IKsubfld>
<origid-asymm> ::= "Originator-ID-Asymmetric" ":" <asymmid> CRLF
<origid-symm> ::= "Originator-ID-Symmetric" ":" <symmid> CRLF
<recipid> ::= <recipid-asymm> / <recipid-symm>
<recipid-asymm> ::= "Recipient-ID-Asymmetric" ":" <asymmid> CRLF
<recipid-symm> ::= "Recipient-ID-Symmetric" ":" <symmid> CRLF
<cert> ::= "Originator-Certificate" ":" <encbin> CRLF
<issuercert> ::= "Issuer-Certificate" ":" <encbin> CRLF
<micinfo> ::= "MIC-Info" ":" <micalgid> "," <ikalgid> ","
    <asymsignmic> CRLF
<keyinfo> ::= "Key-Info" ":" <ikalgid> "," <micalgid> ","
    <symencdek> "," <symencmic> CRLF ; symmetric case
    / "Key-Info" ":" <ikalgid> "," <asymencdek>
    CRLF ; asymmetric case
<crl> ::= "CRL" ":" <encbin> CRLF
<pemtypes> ::= "ENCRYPTED" / "MIC-ONLY" / "MIC-CLEAR" / "CRL"
    / "CRL-RETRIEVAL-REQUEST"

```

Figure 2.13 PEM Header Fields

- Secret (symmetric) key case: the <origflds> consists of the originator's id <origid-symm> and optional key information <keyinfo>. Id's typically look like: chin@cat.syr.edu with additional information on interchange keys (IKs). See Figures 2.12 and 2.13.
- Public (asymmetric) key case: the <origflds> consists of: 1) the asymmetric originator's id <asymmorig> which is either the asymmetric originator's id <origid-asymm> (as in the secret key case) or the certificate <cert> of the originator; 2) optional key information <keyinfo>; 3) zero or more issuer certificates <issuercert>; and 4) message integrity code <micinfo> information. See Figures 2.13, 2.14, and 2.15. Details on certificates are in Section 2.6.

CRL Headers

CRL headers contain:

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- *process type* – same as for normal headers.
- at least one CRL with an optional certificate and zero or more issuer certificates. See Figure 2.13.

Certificates are used to authenticate principals. Details are in Section 2.6.

2.3.2 Encapsulated Text Portion

An important distinction is to be made between *encoded* versus *encrypted* messages. *Encoded* messages are those which have been modified in such a way so that there are no “funny characters” and no lines which are too long which would cause any mail system to modify the message contents. An example of this is the UNIX *uuencode* program. Of course, such encodings must be readily reversible so that the un-encoded text can be retrieved, e.g. the UNIX *uudecode* program. *Encrypted* messages are messages which have been processed using a cryptographic algorithm which of course, should only be reversible by those having the proper keys.

Table 2.1 gives the encoding used by PEM. The encoding works as follows:

- PEM sends encoded information 32-bits at a time which corresponds to four *8-bit* encoded characters.
- The four encoded *8-bit* characters are derived from four *6-bit* inputs. The six input bits have a range of possible values from 0_{10} to 63_{10} – 000000_2 to 111111_2 .
- Each 6-bits is encoded as an ASCII character as shown in Table 2.1. For example, 000000_2 is encoded as ASCII character A.
- Each ASCII character is sent out as an *8-bit* quantity – *7-bits* representing the character plus one bit for parity (the most-significant bit). For example, A has an *8-bit* hex encoding 41_{16} or 01000001_2 . This can be sent as $P1000001_2$ where P is the parity bit. The subset of ASCII characters used falls in the range at or below $7A_{16}$, so the entire subset can be represented with *7-bits* plus one bit for parity.
- Finally, *four* encoded *6-bit* characters (*24-bits*) are sent at a time as a 32-bit word. If the data are not a multiple of *6-bits*, the data are extended to the next multiple of *6-bits* by adding 0s as *padding bits*.

2.4. EXAMPLES OF PEM MESSAGE TYPES

Table 2.1 PEM 6-Bit Encoding

value ₁₀	character	ASCII representation
0	A	41 hex
⋮	⋮	⋮
25	Z	5A hex
26	a	61 hex
⋮	⋮	⋮
51	z	7A hex
52	0	30 hex
⋮	⋮	⋮
61	9	39 hex
62	+	2B hex
63	/	2F hex
padding	=	3D hex

If the data are not a multiple of four characters (*24-bits*), *padding* characters are sent. Padding *characters* are encoded as ASCII =, i.e. $3D_{16}$ or $P0111101_2$.

Figure 2.14 shows BNF form of the encoded binary characters, *<encbinchar>*. *<encbinchar>* are the upper and lower case letters – ALPHA; the digits 0 through 9 – DIGIT; and the characters +, /, and =.

A group of encoded binary characters *<encbingrp>* is exactly four encoded binary characters $4*4<encbinchar>$. A body of encoded binary character groups is zero or more *lines* of up to 16 character groups or *64 characters per line* – $*(16*16<encbingrp> \text{ CRLF}) [1*16<encbingrp> \text{ CRLF}]$. This can be seen in the example messages which follow.

2.4 Examples of PEM Message Types

There are five types of PEM messages – 1) *ENCRYPTED*, 2) *MIC-CLEAR*, 3) *MIC-ONLY*, 4) *CRL*, and 5) *CRL-RETRIEVAL-REQUEST*. ENCRYPTED, MIC-CLEAR, and MIC-ONLY messages have secret key and public key variants.

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```
<encbinchar> ::= ALPHA / DIGIT / "+" / "/" / "="
<encbingrp> ::= 4*4<encbinchar>
<encbin> ::= 1*<encbingrp>
<encbinbody> ::= *(16*16<encbingrp> CRLF) [1*16<encbingrp> CRLF]
<IKsubfld> ::= 1*<ia-char>
; Note: ",", removed from <ia-char> set so that Orig-ID and Recip-ID
; fields can be delimited with commas (not colons) like all other
; fields
<ia-char> ::= DIGIT / ALPHA / "'" / "+" / "(" / ")" /
              "." / "/" / "=" / "?" / "-" / "@" /
              "%" / "!" / ">" / "_" / "<" / ">"
<hexchar> ::= DIGIT / "A" / "B" / "C" / "D" / "E" / "F"
              ; no lower case
```

Figure 2.14 Character Descriptions

ENCRYPTED messages indicate their message bodies are encrypted. MIC-ONLY messages are those whose messages are encoded but *not* encrypted and have a MIC computed as an integrity check. MIC-CLEAR messages are those whose messages are neither encoded nor encrypted and have a MIC computed as an integrity check. CRL-RETRIEVAL-REQUEST messages have no message but are used to request CRLs. CRL messages store CRLs or reply to CRL retrieval requests.

2.4.1 ENCRYPTED

Public Key Variant

Table 2.2 shows the format of PEM messages which are encrypted using asymmetric (public) keys, [2]. Figure 2.16 is an example message taken from RFC 1421. Figure 2.17 shows the processing of PEM message on sender side, Figures 2.18, 2.19 and 2.20 show the processing of PEM message on receiver side.

Secret Key Variant

Table 2.3 shows the format of PEM messages which are encrypted using symmetric (secret) keys, [2]. Figure 2.21 is an example message taken from RFC 1421.

2.4. EXAMPLES OF PEM MESSAGE TYPES

Table 2.2 Encrypted, Public Key PEM Message Format

-----BEGIN PRIVACY-ENHANCED MESSAGE-----	pre-encapsulation boundary
Proc-Type: 4, ENCRYPTED	type of PEM message (version,type)
Content-Domain: RFC822	message form
DEK-Info: DES-CBC, 16 hex digits	message encryption algorithm, IV
Originator-Certificate: cybercrud	sender's encoded certificate (optional)
Originator-ID-Asymmetric: cybercrud,number	sender ID (present only if sender's certificate not present)
Key-Info: RSA,cybercrud	key-info for CC'd sender (if needed)
Issuer-Certificate: cybercrud	sequence of zero or more CA certificates
:	(possibly whole chain from the sender's certificate to the IPRA's)
MIC-Info: RSA-MDx,RSA,cybercrud	message digest algorithm, message digest
	encryption algorithm, encoded encrypted MIC
Recipient-ID-Asymmetric: cybercrud,number	For each recipient: recipient ID (encoded X.500 name of CA
Key-Info: RSA, cybercrud	that signed certificate, certificate serial number); key-info for recipient
:	Blank line
:	
cybercrud	encoded encrypted message
-----END PRIVACY-ENHANCED MESSAGE-----	post-encapsulation boundary

Table 2.3 Encrypted, Secret Key PEM Message Format

-----BEGIN PRIVACY-ENHANCED MESSAGE-----	pre-encapsulation boundary
Proc-Type: 4, ENCRYPTED	type of PEM message (version,type)
Content-Domain: RFC822	message form
DEK-Info: DES-CBC, 16 hex digits	message encryption algorithm, IV
Originator-ID-Symmetric: entity identifier, issuing authority, version/expiration	sender ID
Recipient-ID-Symmetric: entity identifier, issuing authority, version/expiration	For each recipient: recipient ID; key-info for recipient
Key-Info: RSA, cybercrud	
:	
:	Blank line
cybercrud	encoded encrypted message
-----END PRIVACY-ENHANCED MESSAGE-----	post-encapsulation boundary

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```
; This specification defines one value ("RFC822") for
; <contentdescrip>: other values may be defined in future in
; separate or successor documents
;
<contentdescrip> ::= "RFC822"

; Addendum to PEM BNF representation, using RFC 822 notation
; Provides specification for official PEM cryptographic algorithms,
; modes, identifiers and formats.

; Imports <hexchar> and <encbin> from RFC [1421]

<dekalgid> ::= "DES-CBC"
<ikalgid>  ::= "DES-EDE" / "DES-ECB" / "RSA"
<sigalgid> ::= "RSA"
<micalgid> ::= "RSA-MD2" / "RSA-MD5"

<dekparameters> ::= <DESCBCparameters>
<DESCBCparameters> ::= <IV>
<IV> ::= <hexchar16>

<symencdek> ::= <DESECBencDESCBC> / <DESEDEencDESCBC>
<DESECBencDESCBC> ::= <hexchar16>
<DESEDEencDESCBC> ::= <hexchar16>

<symencmic> ::= <DESECBencRSAMD2> / <DESECBencRSAMD5>

<DESECBencRSAMD2> ::= 2*2<hexchar16>
<DESECBencRSAMD5> ::= 2*2<hexchar16>

<asymsignmic> ::= <RSAsignmic>
<RSAsignmic> ::= <encbin>

<asymencdek> ::= <RSAencdek>
<RSAencdek> ::= <encbin>

<hexchar16> ::= 16*16<hexchar>
```

Figure 2.15 PEM Cryptographic Algorithms, Modes, and Identifiers

2.4.2 MIC-ONLY or MIC-CLEAR

Public Key Variant

Table 2.4 shows the format of MIC-ONLY and MIC-CLEAR messages using public keys. Figure 2.22 is an example of a MIC-ONLY message. MIC-ONLY messages encode their messages as described in Section 2.1. MIC-

2.4. EXAMPLES OF PEM MESSAGE TYPES

```

-----BEGIN PRIVACY-ENHANCED MESSAGE-----
Proc-Type: 4, ENCRYPTED
Content-Domain: RFC822
DEK-Info: DES-CBC, BFF968AA74691AC1
Originator-Certificate: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Key-Info: RSA,
I3rRIGXUGWAF8js5wCzRtKdh034PTHdRZY9TuvM03M+NM7fx6qc5udixps2LNg0+
wGrtiUm/ovtKdin6ZQ/aq==
Issuer-Certificate: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iQ077nJLDUj0hQehCizEs5UWJ35a5x
dD2jMZ/3HsyWKwGsfOeH/AJB3qr9zosG47pyMnTf3aSy2nB07CMxpUWRBcXUpE+h
EREZ4z4+32ofGBIXaialnOgVun00zSYgugiQ077nJLDUj0hQehCizEs5UWJ35a5x
MIC-Info: RSA-MD5, RSA,
UdFJR8u/TIGHfH65ieewe2l0W4tooa3vZCvVWNGBZirf/7nrgzWDABz8w9NsXSxv
AjRfBh0nPzBuxwmOAFeAOHJszL4yBvhG
Recipient-ID-Asymmetric:
MFEXczAjbGwvBAYTA1VTMSAwHgYDVQKExdSU0EGRGFOYSBTZW1cm10eSwgSW5j
LjEjEPMAOGA1UECnMGQmV0YSAxMQ8wDQYDVQQLEwZOT1RB1Ulk=,
66
Key-Info: RSA,
06BS1w9CTyHPtS3bMLDL+L0hejdvX6Qv1HK2ds2sQPEaXhX8EhvVphHYTjwekdWv
7x0Z3Jx2vTAh0YHmccqCJA==

qeWlj/YJ2Uf5ng9yznPBtD0mYloSwIuV9FYRy+gzY+8iXd/NqRXHfi6/MhPfPF3d
jJiCqAXvld2xgqQimUzoS1a4r7kQQ5c/Iua4LkQeq3ciFzEv/MbZhA==
-----END PRIVACY-ENHANCED MESSAGE-----

```

Figure 2.16 Example ENCRYPTED Message (Public Key Case)

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


Figure 2.17 Processing of PEM message on sender side: *ENCRYPTED*

Table 2.4 MIC-ONLY or MIC-CLEAR Public Key Format

---BEGIN PRIVACY-ENHANCED MESSAGE----	pre-encapsulation boundary
Proc-Type: 4, MIC-ONLY or MIC-CLEAR	type of PEM message (version,type)
Content-Domain: RFC822	message form
Originator-Certificate: cybercrud	sender's encoded certificate (optional)
Originator-ID-Asymmetric: cybercrud,number	sender ID (present only if sender's certificate not present)
Issuer-Certificate: cybercrud	sequence of zero or more CA certificates
:	(possibly whole chain from the sender's certificate to the IPRA's)
MIC-Info: RSA-MDx,RSA,cybercrud	message digest algorithm, message digest encryption algorithm, encoded encrypted MIC
	Blank line
message	message (encoded if MIC-ONLY)
---END PRIVACY-ENHANCED MESSAGE----	post-encapsulation boundary

CLEAR messages do not use encoding.

Secret Key Variant

Table 2.5 shows the format of MIC-ONLY and MIC-CLEAR messages using secret keys. MIC-ONLY messages have their message contents encoded as described in Section 2.1. MIC-CLEAR messages do not use encoding.

2.4. EXAMPLES OF PEM MESSAGE TYPES




Figure 2.18 Processing of PEM message on receiver side - Retrieve DEK: *ENCRYPTED*

2.4.3 CRL-RETRIEVAL-REQUEST

Table 2.6 gives the format of a CRL-RETRIEVAL-REQUEST message. Figure 2.23 is an example from RFC 1421 of such a request.

2.4.4 CRL

Table 2.7 gives the format for CRL messages. Figures 2.24 and 2.25 illustrate CRL storage request and retrieval reply messages.

PRIVACY ENHANCED MAIL

Table 2.5 MIC-ONLY and MIC-CLEAR Secret Key Format

----BEGIN PRIVACY-ENHANCED MESSAGE-----	pre-encapsulation boundary
Proc-Type: 4, ENCRYPTED	type of PEM message (version,type)
Content-Domain: RFC822	message form
Originator-ID-Symmetric: <i>entity identifier, issuing authority, version/expiration</i>	sender ID
Recipient-ID-Symmetric: <i>entity identifier issuing authority, version/expiration</i>	For each recipient: recipient ID; key-info for recipient
Key-Info: RSA, cybercrud	
:	
:	Blank line
<i>message</i>	message (encoded if MIC-ONLY)
----END PRIVACY-ENHANCED MESSAGE-----	post-encapsulation boundary

Table 2.6 CRL-RETRIEVAL-REQUEST Format

----BEGIN PRIVACY-ENHANCED MESSAGE-----	pre-encapsulation boundary
Proc-Type: 4,CRL-RETRIEVAL-REQUEST	type of PEM message (version,type)
Issuer: <i>cybercrud</i>	for each CRL requested:
:	the encoded X.500 name of the issuing CA
:	
----END PRIVACY-ENHANCED MESSAGE-----	post-encapsulation boundary

Table 2.7 CRL Format

----BEGIN PRIVACY-ENHANCED MESSAGE-----	pre-encapsulation boundary
Proc-Type: 4,CRL	type of PEM message (version,type)
CRL: <i>cybercrud</i>	For each CRL retrieved: encoded X.509 format CRL; encoded
Originator-Certificate: <i>cybercrud</i>	
:	X.509 certificate of the CA that issued the CRL
:	
----END PRIVACY-ENHANCED MESSAGE-----	post-encapsulation boundary

2.5. PRIVACY IN PEM




Figure 2.19 Processing of PEM message on receiver side - Retrieve plaintext message and MIC: *ENCRYPTED*

2.5 Privacy in PEM

The cryptographic algorithms, modes, and identifiers for PEM are defined in RFC 1423, [1] along with the content description in RFC 1421, [9]. The structural definition in BNF form appears in Figure 2.15.

The cryptographic functions used in PEM are:

- DES-CBC – (*Data Encryption Standard Cipher Block Chaining*) for secret key encryption of messages.
- DES-EDE – (*DES encrypt-decrypt-encrypt*) for secret key encryption of DEKs.




Figure 2.20 Processing of PEM message on receiver side - Verify digital signature: *ENCRYPTED*

- DES-ECB – (*DES electronic code book*) for secret key encryption of DEKs.
- RSA – (*Rivest, Shamir, and Adleman*) for public key encryption of DEKs and signatures.
- RSA-MD2 – (*RSA message digest 2*) for secret key computation of message integrity codes.
- RSA-MD5 – (*RSA message digest 5*) for secret key computation of message integrity codes.

2.6 Authentication in PEM

2.6.1 Certificates

Authentication in PEM is done using *certificates*. Certificates are data structures which contain the public information of users. This public information includes:

2.6. AUTHENTICATION IN PEM

```
-----BEGIN PRIVACY-ENHANCED MESSAGE-----
Proc-Type: 4, ENCRYPTED
Content-Domain: RFC822
DEK-Info: DES-CBC,F8143EDE5960C597
Originator-ID-Symmetric: linn@zendia.enet.dec.com,,
Recipient-ID-Symmetric: linn@zendia.enet.dec.com,ptf-kmc,3
Key-Info: DES-ECB,RSA-MD2,9FD3AAD2F2691B9A,
          B70665BB9BF7CBCDA60195DB94F727D3
Recipient-ID-Symmetric: pem-dev@tis.com,ptf-kmc,4
Key-Info: DES-ECB,RSA-MD2,161A3F75DC82EF26,
          E2EF532C65CBCFF79F83A2658132DB47

LLrHB0eJzyhP+/fSStdW8okeEnv47jxe7SJ/iN72ohNcUk2jHEUSoHinvNSIWL9M
8tEjmf/zxB+bATMtPjCUWbz8Lr9w1oXIkjHU1BLpvXROUrUzYbkNpkOagV2IzUpk
J6UiRRGcDSvzrsoK+oNvqu6z7Xs5Xfz5rDqUcMlK1Z6720dcBWGGsDLpTpSCnpot
dXd/H5LMDWnonNvPCwQUHt==
-----END PRIVACY-ENHANCED MESSAGE-----
```

Figure 2.21 Example ENCRYPTED Message (Secret Key Case)

- User name.
- Public key.
- Name of issuer which vouches for information.
- Time interval over which data are valid.

RFC 1422 describes the key management architecture for public-key certificates. RFC 1422 and [2] define the certificate format as shown in Figure 2.26.

The integrity of a certificate is checked by verifying the *signature* in the *encrypted* field against the certificate with the public key of the issuer of the certificate.

The authenticity of a certificate is checked by seeing if there is a path leading from the issuer back to the root certificate authority.

2.6.2 Certificate Hierarchy

User certificates are the leaves in a tree with the root certificate authority, the *Internet Policy Registration Authority* (IPRA). The IPRA certifies other certification authorities. These are known as *Policy Certification Authorities* (PCAs). [2] lists three types of PCAs:

PRIVACY ENHANCED MAIL

```
-----BEGIN PRIVACY-ENHANCED MESSAGE-----
Proc-Type: 4,MIC-ONLY
Content-Domain: RFC822
Originator-Certificate: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Issuer-Certificate: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-Info: RSA-MD5, RSA,
jV20fH+nnXHU8bnL8kPAad/mSQ1TDZ1bVuxvZA0VRZ5q5+Ej15bQvqNeq0UNQjr6
EtE7K2QDeVMCyXsdJ1A8fA==

LSBBIG1lc3NhZ2UgZm9yIHVzZSBpb1BOZXNOaW5nLgOKLSBGb2xsb3dpbmcgaXMg
YSBibGFuayBsaW51OGOKDQpUaGlzIGlzIHROZSB1bmQuDQo=
-----END PRIVACY-ENHANCED MESSAGE-----
```

Figure 2.22 Example MIC-ONLY Message (Public Key Case)

```
To: cert-service@ca.domain
From: requestor@host.domain

-----BEGIN PRIVACY-ENHANCED MESSAGE-----
Proc-Type: 4,CRL-RETRIEVAL-REQUEST
Issuer: <issuer whose latest CRL is to be retrieved>
Issuer: <another issuer whose latest CRL is to be retrieved>
-----END PRIVACY-ENHANCED MESSAGE-----
```

Figure 2.23 Example CRL-RETRIEVAL-REQUEST Message

2.6. AUTHENTICATION IN PEM

```
To: cert-service@ca.domain
From: requestor@host.domain

-----BEGIN PRIVACY-ENHANCED MESSAGE-----
Proc-Type: 4,CRL
CRL: <CRL to be stored>
Originator-Certificate: <CRL issuer's certificate>
CRL: <another CRL to be stored>
Originator-Certificate: <other CRL issuer's certificate>
-----END PRIVACY-ENHANCED MESSAGE-----
```

Figure 2.24 Example CRL Storage Request

```
To: requestor@host.domain
From: cert-service@ca.domain

-----BEGIN PRIVACY-ENHANCED MESSAGE-----
Proc-Type: 4,CRL
CRL: <issuer's latest CRL>
Originator-Certificate: <issuer's certificate>
CRL: <other issuer's latest CRL>
Originator-Certificate: <other issuer's certificate>
-----END PRIVACY-ENHANCED MESSAGE-----
```

Figure 2.25 Example CRL Retrieval Reply

PRIVACY ENHANCED MAIL

The X.509 certificate format is defined by the following ASN.1 syntax:

```
Certificate ::= SIGNED SEQUENCE{
    version [0]      Version DEFAULT v1988,
    serialNumber     CertificateSerialNumber,
    signature        AlgorithmIdentifier,
    issuer           Name,
    validity         Validity,
    subject          Name,
    subjectPublicKeyInfo SubjectPublicKeyInfo,
    issuerUniqueIdentifier Optional (permitted in version 2 only),
    subjectUniqueIdentifier Optional (permitted in version 2 only),
    algorithmIdentifier repeat of signature field
    encrypted        signature on all but last of above fields}

Version ::= INTEGER {v1988(0)}

CertificateSerialNumber ::= INTEGER

Validity ::= SEQUENCE{
    notBefore      UTCTime,
    notAfter       UTCTime}

SubjectPublicKeyInfo ::= SEQUENCE{
    algorithm      AlgorithmIdentifier,
    subjectPublicKey BIT STRING}

AlgorithmIdentifier ::= SEQUENCE{
    algorithm      OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
    parameters    ANY DEFINED BY algorithm OPTIONAL}
```

The components of this structure are defined by ASN.1 syntax defined in the X.500 Series Recommendations. RFC 1423 provides references for and the values of AlgorithmIdentifiers used by PEM in the subjectPublicKeyInfo and the signature data items. It also describes how a signature is generated and the results represented. Because the certificate is a signed data object, the distinguished encoding rules (see X.509, section 8.7) must be applied prior to signing.

Figure 2.26 Certificate Syntax

2.7. INTEGRITY IN PEM




Figure 2.27 PEM Certificate Hierarchy

- High Assurance Certification Authorities (HACAs). HACAs will not grant a certificate to organizations unless they are also highly assured.
- Discretionary Assurance Certification Authorities (DACAs). DACAs do not impose constraints on organizations they certify except to ensure that organizations are who they say they are.
- No Assurance Certification Authorities (NACAs). NACAs have no constraints except they cannot issue two certificates with the same name. No assurance is given that the organizations or people they certify are using their real identities.

Figure 2.27 illustrates the certification tree hierarchy.

2.6.3 Certificate Revocation Lists

A *certificate revocation list* (CRL) is a list of serial numbers of certificates that are invalid, much like a listing of bad credit cards. CRLs are updated periodically, so they also include the period of time they cover.

Figure 2.28 shows the CRL syntax as specified by RFC 1422.

2.7 Integrity in PEM

Integrity is maintained by either *message integrity codes* or *digital signatures*. Both are denoted as MICs in this report. MICs are computed for the message and included as part of the header. In secret key variant, recipients of the message compute the MIC for the message they receive and compare it to the MIC sent in the header. If the MICs match, then the message was unaltered (see Figure 2.8).

The following ASN.1 syntax, derived from X.509 and aligned with the suggested format in recently submitted defect reports, defines the format of CRLs for use in the PEM environment.

```
CertificateRevocationList ::= SIGNED SEQUENCE{
    signature      AlgorithmIdentifier,
    issuer         Name,
    lastUpdate     UTCTime,
    nextUpdate     UTCTime,
    revokedCertificates
        SEQUENCE OF CRLEntry OPTIONAL}

CRLEntry ::= SEQUENCE{
    userCertificate SerialNumber,
    revocationDate UTCTime}
```

Figure 2.28 Certificate Revocation List Syntax

In public key variant, recipients of the message compute the message digest of the message they receive, and verify the MIC sent in the header against the computed message digest with sender's public key. If it succeeds, the message was unaltered (see Figures 2.9 and 2.20).

CRLs and certificates are signed. The signature of a CRL or certificate is included so the recipient can validate the CRL or certificate against the signature which was sent.

2.8 Non-repudiation in PEM

When public-keys are used, signatures provide non-repudiation as only the originator could have created the signature of a message, MIC, CRL, or certificate.

Chapter 3

PEM in Higher-Order Logic

In this chapter, we show the development of all the security functions that are needed to address the security issues raised before: privacy, authentication, integrity, and non-repudiation. The development is done in higher order logic using the HOL system, [5]. Standard predicate calculus notation is used, $\wedge, \vee, \neg, \supset$ denote *and, or, negation, and implication*. $\forall$ and $\exists$ denote *for all* and *there exists*. $cond \rightarrow t_1 | t_2$ denotes *if cond is true then t_1 else t_2* . $\Gamma \vdash t$ denotes a *theorem*, i.e. whenever the list of logical terms in Γ are all true, then the conclusion t is guaranteed to be true. The logical development presented in this paper is a *conservative extension* of the HOL logic, i.e. no axioms were used and the underlying definitions are guaranteed to be consistent. Definitional extensions to HOL are denoted by $\vdash_{def}$.

3.1 Security Functions in HOL

Throughout this report, we identify a person by his/her keys. In public key cryptography, the person is identified by public key which is known to everyone. Since a private key belongs to only one owner, the corresponding public key uniquely identifies a person. In secret key cryptography, two or more people who share a secret key are identified by that secret; a key uniquely identifies the group who shares it.

3.1.1 Privacy

Function `is_Private` checks the privacy property of a mail message. It declares the message as private if the decrypted received message matches that of the original plaintext.

PEM IN HIGHER-ORDER LOGIC

Since both secret key encryption and public key encryption are used to protect the privacy of messages, two variants of **is_Private** are given. The difference between **is_PrivateS** for secret key and **is_PrivateP** for public key is: secret key encryption takes an initial vector while public key encryption does not.

is_PrivateS has parameters: 1) *decryptS* - a secret key decryption function, 2) *message* - the original plaintext, 3) *rxmsg* - the received (encrypted) message, 4) *decryptIV* - initial vector for decryption and 5) *key* - the shared secret key.

```
is_PrivateS
  ⊢def ∀decryptS message rxmsg decryptIV key.
    is_PrivateS decryptS message rxmsg decryptIV key =
      decryptS rxmsg key decryptIV = message
```

is_PrivateP has parameters: 1) *decryptP* - a public key decryption function, 2) *message* - the original plaintext, 3) *rxmsg* - the received ciphertext and 4) *dkey* - the private key of the recipient

```
is_PrivateP
  ⊢def ∀decryptP message rxmsg dkey.
    is_PrivateP decryptP message rxmsg dkey =
      decryptP rxmsg dkey = message
```

is_Private is true if and only if there is one and only one person who can read the original message, namely the intended recipient.

When a mail message satisfies assumptions listed below, the correctness theorem of **is_Private** can be proved by using definitions of **is_PrivateS** and **is_PrivateP**. The assumptions are: 1) The received message is the same as the transmitted message, 2) the transmitted message is the original message encrypted with a key (either a shared secret key, or a public key), 3) for any encryption key, (in either secret key cryptography or public key cryptography), there is a unique decryption key which can be used to retrieve the original text. They are taken as antecedents of a nested implication.

Theorem **is_Private.DEK** is the privacy property of the DEK used in PEM which is encrypted with the recipient's public key and is retrieved using the recipient's private key. (See Figure 2.18.)

3.1. SECURITY FUNCTIONS IN HOL

```
is_Private_DEK
  ⊢ ∀decryptP encryptP message txmsg rxmsg ekey dKEY0 dkey.
    (rxmsg = txmsg) ⊃
    (txmsg = encryptP message ekey) ⊃
    (∀msg. decryptP (encryptP msg ekey) dKEY0 = msg) ⊃
    (∀msg d2.
      (decryptP (encryptP msg ekey) d2 = msg) ⊃ (d2 = dKEY0)) ⊃
    ((dkey = dKEY0) = is_PrivateP decryptP message rxmsg dkey)
```

Theorem `is_Private_msg` is the privacy property of the original plaintext message in PEM which is retrieved with the DEK. Since DEK is known only to the intended recipient, as proved by theorem `is_Private_DEK`, the confidentiality of the message is preserved.

```
is_Private_msg
  ⊢ ∀decryptS encryptS message txmsg rxmsg decryptIV KEY0 key.
    (rxmsg = txmsg) ⊃
    (txmsg = encryptS message KEY0 decryptIV) ⊃
    (∀msg key.
      (decryptS (encryptS msg key decryptIV) key decryptIV = msg) ∧
      (∀msg key1. (decryptS msg key1 decryptIV
        = decryptS msg key decryptIV) = key = key1)) ⊃
    ((key = KEY0) =
      is_PrivateS decryptS message rxmsg decryptIV key)
```

In both cases, if the received message is not the same as that transmitted, that is, either the data exchange key (DEK) is modified or the encrypted message is modified over the net, the intended recipient of the message will not be able to read it. The plaintext message is still private since nobody else can retrieve it, but the recipient encounters a denial-of-service attack here.

3.1.2 Source Authentication

We have defined source authentication in two ways. If verification of the signature against the received message succeeds, the recipient is sure of the source of the received message. In `is_Authentic`, the signature is verified against the original message. In `is_Authentic2`, the MIC (digital signature) of the message is verified against the hash of a message.

The parameters `is_Authentic` takes are: 1) *verify* - public key signature verification function, 2) *message* - plaintext, 3) *signature* - signature of the plaintext, 4) *ekey* - signer's public key.

PEM IN HIGHER-ORDER LOGIC

```
is_Authentic
  ⊢def  ∀verify message signature ekey.
        is_Authentic verify message signature ekey =
        verify message signature ekey
```

The parameters **is_Authentic2** takes are: 1) *verify* - public key signature verification function, 2) *hash* - message digest algorithm, 3) *message* - plaintext, 4) *mic* - digital signature of the plaintext, 5) *ekey* - signer's public key.

```
is_Authentic2
  ⊢def  ∀verify hash message mic ekey.
        is_Authentic2 verify hash message mic ekey =
        verify (hash message) mic ekey
```

The desired property of source authentication is the check is true if and only if the originator of the message is the one identified by the public key we use to verify the signature.

The assumptions we made on source authentication are: 1) the received message is the same as transmitted, 2) the transmitted message is a digital signature of plaintext, 3) there is a unique private key *dKEY0* associated with a signature which can be verified through the corresponding public key *ekey*.

In the following theorem it is proved that if these assumptions are satisfied, the originator of the transmitted plaintext is known if and only if it passes the **is_Authentic2** check.

```
is_Authentic_msg
  ⊢  ∀verify sign hash message txmic rxmic ekey dKEY0 dkey.
      (rxmic = txmic) ⊃
      (txmic = sign (hash message) dkey) ⊃
      (∀m1 m2 dkey2. verify m1 (sign m2 dkey2) ekey = dkey2 = dKEY0) ⊃
      ((dkey = dKEY0) = is_Authentic2 verify hash message rxmic ekey)
```

If the first assumption is not satisfied, the source authentication fails and the recipient of the message cannot be sure of the source of the message.

3.1. SECURITY FUNCTIONS IN HOL

```

not_Authentic
  ⊢ ∀verify sign hash MESSAGE0 txmic rxmic ekey dKEY0.
    (txmic = sign (hash MESSAGE0) dKEY0) ⊃
    (∀m1 m2. verify m1 m2 ekey = m2 = sign m1 dKEY0) ⊃
    (∀m1 m2 dkey1 dkey2. (sign m1 dkey1 = sign m2 dkey2)
      ⊃ (m1 = m2) ∧ (dkey1 = dkey2)) ⊃
    ¬(rxmic = txmic) ⊃
    ¬(is_Authentic2 verify hash MESSAGE0 rxmic ekey)

```

3.1.3 Integrity

is_Intact is defined for message integrity checking. It takes several parameters: 1) *verify* - a function verifies the signature, which takes a plaintext message, a signature and a key, and returns *true* if the signature is signed on the given plaintext with the private key paired with the given key, otherwise, it returns *false*. 2) *hash* - the message digest algorithm; 3) *message* - the plaintext part of the message retrieved from the mail; 4) *ekey* - the public key of originator used by the recipient to verify a signature; and 5) *mic* - the received digital signature of the message.

It declares both the message and its digital signature are intact if the verification of the digital signature of the original message against the hash of the received message succeeds. The definition matches the scheme shown in Figure 2.9.

```

is_Intact
  ⊢ def ∀verify hash message mic ekey.
    is_Intact verify hash message mic ekey =
      verify (hash message) mic ekey

```

The assumptions made about the received message are: 1) the received signature is generated by signing the hash (message digest) of the transmitted message. 2) it is computationally infeasible to find two messages m_1 and m_2 which hash to the same value, so if two hashes are equal the two messages are the same; 3) the verification process succeeds if and only if the signature is generated on the plaintext that is being verified.

What we want is for **is_Intact** to be true is-and-only-if the received message is identical to the one transmitted. Under these assumptions, the correctness theorem is proved using the definition of **is_Intact** with the assumed properties in the antecedent of the nested implication.

```

is_Intact_msg
  ⊢ ∀verify sign hash txmessage rxmessage txmic rxmic ekey dkey.
    (txmic = sign (hash txmessage) dkey) ⊃
    (rxmic = txmic) ⊃
    (∀m1 m2. (hash m1 = hash m2) ⊃ (m1 = m2)) ⊃
    (∀s1 s2. verify s1 (sign s2 dkey) ekey = s1 = s2) ⊃
    ((rxmessage = txmessage)
     = is_Intact verify hash rxmessage rxmic ekey)

```

When the received MIC is not the same as the one sent by originator, the following theorem proves that the recipient cannot be sure the integrity of either MIC or plaintext message.

```

not_Intact =
  ⊢ ∀verify sign hash MESSAGE0 txmic rxmic ekey dKEY0.
    (txmic = sign (hash MESSAGE0) dKEY0) ⊃
    (∀m1 m2. verify m1 m2 ekey = m2 = sign m1 dKEY0) ⊃
    (∀m1 m2 dkey1 dkey2. (sign m1 dkey1 = sign m2 dkey2)
     ⊃ (m1 = m2) ∧ (dkey1 = dkey2)) ⊃
    ¬(rxmic = txmic) ⊃
    ¬(is_Intact verify hash MESSAGE0 rxmic ekey)

```

3.1.4 Non-Repudiation

is_non_Deniable is the security check of the non-repudiation of the message system. It checks the non-deniability of the sender of the message by verifying the signature against the received plaintext. It has following parameters: 1) *verify* - public key signature verification function, 2) *message* - original plaintext, 3) *signature* - signature of the plaintext, 4) *ekey* - signer's public key. Since both source-authentication and non-repudiation of a message is obtained through its signature, **is_non_Deniable** is defined in the same way as **is_Authentic**.

```

is_non_Deniable
  ⊢iff ∀verify message signature ekey.
    is_non_Deniable verify message signature ekey =
    verify message signature ekey

```

The assumptions we made for checking the non-deniability of a message are: 1) the received MIC is the same as the transmitted MIC, 2) the

3.1. SECURITY FUNCTIONS IN HOL

transmitted MIC is generated by the originator on plaintext MESSAGE0, 3) it is computationally infeasible to find two messages $m1$ and $m2$ which hash to the same value, so if two hashes are equal the two messages are the same. 4) it is computationally infeasible to find two messages $m1$ and $m2$ and two private keys $k1$ and $k2$, which can generate same signature, so if we can verify one signature against a message with a public key, then the private key and the plaintext used to generate signature are unique. If the above assumptions are satisfied, the verification process succeeds if and only if the signature is generated on the plaintext that is being verified with the unique private key that is known only to the signer. This scheme matches that shown in Figure 2.9.

Under the above assumptions, the non-repudiation check is true if and only if the received message is generated by the originator whose public key is $ekey$, so that the originator cannot deny having sent the message. The correctness theorem `is_non_Deniable_msg` is proved using the definition of `is_non_Deniable`.

```
is_non_Deniable_msg
  ⊢ ∀verify sign hash message MESSAGE0 txmic rxmic ekey dKEY0 dkey.
    (rxmic = txmic) ⊃
    (txmic = sign (hash MESSAGE0) dkey) ⊃
    (∀m1 m2. (hash m1 = hash m2) ⇒ m1 = m2) ⊃
    (∀m1 m2 dkey2. verify m1 (sign m2 dkey2) ekey
      ⇒ (m1 = m2) ∧ (dkey2 = dKEY0)) ⊃
    ((dkey = dKEY0) ∧ (message = MESSAGE0) =
      is_non_Deniable verify (hash message) rxmic ekey)
```

When the received MIC is not the same as transmitted MIC, then the recipient cannot show to a third party that the originator has indeed sent the message. This is shown in the theorem follows.

```
is_deniable =
  ⊢ ∀verify sign hash MESSAGE0 txmic rxmic ekey dKEY0.
    (txmic = sign (hash MESSAGE0) dKEY0) ⊃
    (∀m1 m2. verify m1 m2 ekey ⇒ m2 = sign m1 dKEY0) ⊃
    (∀m1 m2 dkey1 dkey2. (sign m1 dkey1 = sign m2 dkey2)
      ⊃ (m1 = m2) ∧ (dkey1 = dkey2)) ⊃
    ¬(rxmic = txmic) ⊃
    ¬(is_non_Deniable verify (hash MESSAGE0) rxmic ekey)
```

The definitions and properties developed in this section are independent of any particular implementation. What we must do is link the particular implementation to the general definitions and properties. For this we must define the structure of PEM messages in detail.

3.2 Message Structure in HOL

Each PEM message type has public key variant and private key variant. In this section, only the public key variant will be discussed, since it is the only one in use. Also, some PEM messages are encoded to avoid the “mailer mangling” problem. Encoding is not discussed here as it does not contribute to the security services we are concerned with in this report.

As an example, we discuss the structure of MIC-CLEAR messages using public-key signature algorithms. Table 2.4 shows the format of MIC-ONLY and MIC-CLEAR messages using public keys. Figure 2.22 is an example of a MIC-ONLY message. MIC-ONLY messages encode their messages to avoid mailer problems. MIC-CLEAR messages do not use encoding.

MIC-CLEAR messages are *8-tuples*: $(preeb \times proctype \times contentdomain \times id_asymmetric \times (certificate)list \times MIC_info \times pemtext \times posteb)$ as shown in Table 2.4. However, not all *8-tuples* are valid MIC-CLEAR messages. When a proper subset of possible representations is identified as a *new type*, reasoning about messages is simplified because only valid representations are considered. The next section briefly illustrates the concepts of defining new types in HOL.

3.2.1 Type Definition in HOL

New types are introduced in HOL by identifying a subset of an existing type whose properties correspond to the properties of the new type, [11]. *Isomorphic* (one-to-one and onto) mappings between elements of the new type and elements of the subset of the existing type are defined. One mapping is the *representation* of the new type in terms of the existing type. The other is the *abstraction* of the existing type into the new type.

For example, say we wish to introduce the type *color* which has only two members, *black* and *white*. In BNF, we write:

$$color ::= black \mid white \quad (3.1)$$

Suppose we choose to represent *color* by the cartesian product $bool \times bool$. There are four elements in $bool \times bool$ but only two are needed. We choose to represent *black* as (T, F) and *white* as (F, T) as shown in Figure 3.1.

Defining new types in HOL is a three-step process. The first step finds an appropriate subset of an existing type to represent the new type. The second step extends the syntax of HOL to include the new type by using

3.2. MESSAGE STRUCTURE IN HOL




Figure 3.1 Defining Type *color*

a *type definition axiom* which defines the relationship between the new type and its representation. Finally, from the type definition axiom, the properties of the new type are derived.

In our example, the valid representation of boolean pairs is defined by *is_Color*.

$$is_Color(x, y) = ((x, y) = (T, F) \vee (x, y) = (F, T)) \quad (3.2)$$

As there is at least one value of (x, y) which satisfies *is_Color*, the following type definition axiom holds which states that there is a representation function *rep* which is isomorphic between *black* and *white* and (T, F) and (F, T) .

$$\begin{aligned} \vdash \exists rep : color \rightarrow (bool \times bool). \\ (\forall a_1 a_2. rep\ a_1 = rep\ a_2 \supset a_1 = a_2) \wedge \\ (\forall r : (bool \times bool). is_Color\ r = (\exists a : color. r = rep\ a)) \end{aligned} \quad (3.3)$$

A valid representation function for *color* is *any* function which has the isomorphic properties defined above.

We refer to objects having a property *P* with Hilbert's ϵ -operator, [11]. The semantics of ϵ are given below.

$$\vdash \forall P. (\exists x. P\ x) \supset P(\epsilon x. P\ x) \quad (3.4)$$

For example, if $P\ x$ were $1 < x < 4$ where x is a natural number, $\epsilon x. P\ x$ would be either 2 or 3 and $P(\epsilon x. P\ x)$ is *true*.

We define the representation and abstraction functions *REP_color* and *ABS_color* as follows.

$$\begin{aligned}
 \text{TYPE_DEF } P \text{ rep} = & \\
 & (\forall a_1 a_2. \text{rep } a_1 = \text{rep } a_2 \supset a_1 = a_2) \wedge \\
 & (\forall r. P r = (\exists a : \text{color}. r = \text{rep } a))
 \end{aligned} \tag{3.5}$$

$$\text{REP_color} = \varepsilon \text{rep}. \text{TYPE_DEF is_Color rep} \tag{3.6}$$

$$\text{ABS_color } r = (\varepsilon a. r = \text{REP_color } a) \tag{3.7}$$

REP_color is any function satisfying the one-to-one and onto properties of *TYPE_DEF*. *ABS_color* *r* returns a color whose representation is *r*. Given the associations in Figure 3.1 we define *black* and *white* as follows.

$$\text{black} = \text{ABS_color } (T, F) \tag{3.8}$$

$$\text{white} = \text{ABS_color } (F, T) \tag{3.9}$$

Given the definitions of *TYPE_DEF*, *REP_color*, the semantics of ε , and *ABS_color*, the following properties are easily proved. These properties state that *REP_color* is one-to-one and onto; *ABS_color* is one-to-one and onto within the constraints of *is_Color*; and *REP_color* and *ABS_color* invert each other.

$$\vdash \forall a_1 a_2. \tag{3.10}$$

$$\text{REP_color } a_1 = \text{REP_color } a_2 \supset (a_1 = a_2)$$

$$\vdash \forall r. \text{is_Color } r = (\exists a. r = \text{REP_color } a) \tag{3.11}$$

$$\vdash \forall r_1 r_2. \text{is_Color } r_1 \supset (\text{is_Color } r_2 \supset \tag{3.12}$$

$$(\text{ABS_color } r_1 = \text{ABS_color } r_2 \supset r_1 = r_2))$$

$$\vdash \forall a. \exists r. (a = \text{ABS_color } r) \wedge \text{is_Color } r \tag{3.13}$$

$$\vdash \forall a. \text{ABS_color } (\text{REP_color } a) = a \tag{3.14}$$

$$\vdash \forall r. \text{is_Color } r = (\text{REP_color } (\text{ABS_color } r) = r) \tag{3.15}$$

The same techniques used to define *color* are generally applicable. In the next section, we show how to apply type definition techniques to the message integrity code field of messages.

3.2. MESSAGE STRUCTURE IN HOL

3.2.2 MIC_info as a Type

We focus on the *MIC_info* portion of a message. Figure 2.13 gives the BNF definition of *<micinfo>*. It is a 3-tuple where the first element identifies the hash function used to compute the MIC; the second element is the signature algorithm used to encrypt the MIC; and the third element is the signed message digest for the transmitted message. The particular algorithms are defined in Figure 2.15.

As some of the algorithms (like RSA) are used in more than one capacity, we first introduce the algorithm identifiers as a separate *abstract* type – *algid*, i.e. we do not care about how the members of the type are actually represented.

$$\begin{aligned} \text{algid} ::= & \text{DES_CBC} | \text{DES_EDE} | \text{DES_ECB} | \\ & \text{RSA} | \text{RSA_MD2} | \text{RSA_MD5} \end{aligned} \quad (3.16)$$

Valid *MIC_Info* fields are a proper subset of all 3-tuples of (*algid* × *algid* × *asymsignmic*). The predicate *is_MIC_info* identifies the valid 3-tuples for *MIC_Info*. Note, *FST* and *SND* are destructors for pairs, e.g. *FST* (*a, b, c*) = *a* and *SND* (*a, b, c*) = (*b, c*).

$$\begin{aligned} \text{is_MIC_info } x = & \\ & ((\text{FST } x = \text{RSA_MD2}) \vee \\ & (\text{FST } x = \text{RSA_MD5})) \wedge \\ & ((\text{FST}(\text{SND } x) = \text{DES_EDE}) \vee \\ & (\text{FST}(\text{SND } x) = \text{DES_ECB}) \vee \\ & (\text{FST}(\text{SND } x) = \text{RSA})) \end{aligned} \quad (3.17)$$

From the definition of *is_MIC_info* we can prove the theorem $\vdash \exists x. \text{is_MIC_info } x$ which allows us to introduce a new type *MIC_info* as follows.

$$\vdash \exists \text{rep. TYPE_DEF is_MIC_info rep} \quad (3.18)$$

Using the above type definition axiom, we define the representation function *REP_MIC_info* and the abstraction function *MIC_info* as follows, (notice that the abstraction function is the same name as the MIC-info field identifier).

$$REP_MIC_info = \epsilon rep. TYPE_DEF is_MIC_info\ rep \quad (3.19)$$

$$MIC_info\ r = (\epsilon a. r = REP_MIC_info\ a) \quad (3.20)$$

The properties of REP_MIC_info and MIC_info are proved in exactly the same way as the properties of the representation and abstraction functions are for *color*. The next two theorems state that REP_MIC_info is one-to-one and onto.

$$\vdash \forall a\ a'. (REP_MIC_info\ a = REP_MIC_info\ a') \supset a = a' \quad (3.21)$$

$$\vdash \forall r. is_MIC_info\ r = (\exists a. r = REP_MIC_info\ a) \quad (3.22)$$

The next two theorems state that MIC_info is one-to-one and onto.

$$\vdash \forall r\ r'. is_MIC_info\ r \supset is_MIC_info\ r' \supset ((MIC_Info\ r = MIC_Info\ r') \supset r = r') \quad (3.23)$$

$$\vdash \forall a. \exists r. (a = MIC_Info\ r) \wedge is_MIC_info\ r \quad (3.24)$$

The next two theorems state that MIC_info and REP_MIC_info are inverses.

$$\vdash \forall a. MIC_Info(REP_MIC_info\ a) = a \quad (3.25)$$

$$\vdash \forall r. is_MIC_info\ r = REP_MIC_info(MIC_Info\ r) = r \quad (3.26)$$

Since MIC_CLEAR messages are *8-tuples*, and given the formal definition of each of the message fields as data types, we define various accessor functions to get the MIC hash, signature, and signed MIC portions of the MIC_Info field.

$$get_MIC_algid\ x = FST(REP_MIC_info\ x) \quad (3.27)$$

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$$\text{get_MIC_sigalgid } x = \text{FST}(\text{SND}(\text{REP_MIC_info } x)) \quad (3.28)$$

$$\text{get_MIC_mic } x = \text{SND}(\text{SND}(\text{REP_MIC_info } x)) \quad (3.29)$$

Based on the above characterization of *MIC_info* as a type, any x which is a member of *MIC_info* has a valid representation as a 3-tuple (*algid* $\times$ *algid* $\times$ *asymsignmic*). This is stated by the following theorem.

$$\vdash \forall x. \text{is_MIC_info}(\text{REP_MIC_info } x) \quad (3.30)$$

The above theorem coupled with the definition of *is_MIC_info* leads to the following correctness properties of the hash and signature accessor functions. In particular, each accessor function when applied to a valid *MIC_info* field will yield only the specified hash and signature algorithms.

$$\vdash \forall x. (\text{get_MIC_algid } x = \text{RSA_MD2}) \vee (\text{get_MIC_algid } x = \text{RSA_MD5}) \quad (3.31)$$

$$\vdash \forall x. (\text{get_MIC_sigalgid } x = \text{DES_EDE}) \vee (\text{get_MIC_sigalgid } x = \text{DES_ECB}) \vee (\text{get_MIC_sigalgid } x = \text{RSA}) \quad (3.32)$$

As the algorithm names in the *MIC_info* field are just names and not the actual hash and signature functions, we define signature and hash selector functions which take a function name and return its corresponding function. For simplicity, we do not define the actual functions here, but just define them as function names with the proper type signatures. For example, *fDES_EDE* is of type *asymsignmic* $\rightarrow$ *key* $\rightarrow$ *asymsignmic* and is the signature function corresponding to DES-EDE.

$$\begin{aligned} \text{MIC_sign_select } x = & \quad (3.33) \\ & ((\text{get_MIC_sigalgid } x = \text{DES_EDE}) \rightarrow s\text{DES_EDE} \\ & | ((\text{get_MIC_sigalgid } x = \text{DES_ECB}) \rightarrow s\text{DES_ECB} | s\text{RSA})) \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned} \text{MIC_hash_select } x = & \quad (3.34) \\ & ((\text{get_MIC_algid } x = \text{RSA_MD2}) \rightarrow f\text{RSA_MD2} | f\text{RSA_MD5}) \end{aligned}$$

Other selector and accessor functions are defined similarly and have properties similar to those shown above. The development of these functions is listed in the appendices.

3.3 Functions for MIC-CLEAR Messages

Given the MIC accessor functions for MIC-CLEAR message, the hash and signature selector functions, and the general integrity checking function **is_Intact**, we now define the integrity checking function **MIC_CLEAR.is_Intact** for MIC-CLEAR messages. It is the general integrity function **is_Intact** with its parameters specialized with the hash and signature selection functions.

$$\begin{aligned}
 \text{MIC_CLEAR.is_Intact } msg = & \quad (3.35) \\
 & (\text{let micInfo} = \text{get_MIC_CLEAR_MIC_Info } msg \\
 & \text{in} \\
 & \quad \text{let ekey} = \\
 & \quad \quad \text{get_Key_from_ID } (\text{get_OriginatorAsymID.info } msg) \\
 & \text{in} \\
 & \quad \text{is_Intact} \\
 & \quad \quad (\text{MIC_sign_select micInfo}) \\
 & \quad \quad (\text{MIC_hash_select micInfo}) \\
 & \quad \quad (\text{get_MIC_CLEAR_text } msg) \\
 & \quad \quad (\text{get_MIC_mic micInfo } ekey)
 \end{aligned}$$

Given the definition of **MIC_CLEAR.is_Intact** and the general correctness theorem **is_Intact**, we can prove the following correctness theorem for **MIC_CLEAR.is_Intact**. It states that under similar assumptions to the general **is_Intact** correctness theorem, **MIC_CLEAR.is_Intact** is true if-and-only-if the transmitted and received messages are the same. When **MIC_CLEAR.is_Intact** is false, then what was received differs from what was transmitted. The theorem assures that given the assumptions the intent of the integrity function is satisfied for MIC-CLEAR messages. Similar functions for other message types and security properties can be defined and verified.

$$\begin{aligned}
 \vdash \forall \text{mic_clear_msg sign txmessage dkey.} & \quad (3.36) \\
 & \quad \text{let micInfo} = \\
 & \quad \quad \text{get_MIC_CLEAR_MIC_Info mic_clear_msg} \\
 & \text{in} \\
 & \quad \text{let ekey} = \text{get_Key_from_ID} \\
 & \quad \quad (\text{get_OriginatorAsymID.info mic_clear_msg}) \\
 & \text{in} \\
 & \quad \text{let hash} = \text{MIC_hash_select micInfo}
 \end{aligned}$$

3.4. FUNCTIONS FOR ENCRYPTED MESSAGES

```

and
verify = MIC_sign_select micInfo
and
rxmessage = get_MIC_CLEAR_text mic_clear_msg
in
(get_MIC_mic micInfo = sign (hash txmessage) dkey)
⊃
(∀m1 m2.(hash m1 = hash m2) ⊃ (m1 = m2)) ⊃
(∀m1 m2.verify m1 (sign m2 dkey) ekey = m1 = m2) ⊃
((txmessage = rxmessage) =
MIC_CLEAR_is_Intact mic_clear_msg)

```

3.4 Functions for ENCRYPTED Messages

For simplicity, *ENCRYPTED* messages are modeled as an 8-tuple: $(preeb \times proctype \times contentdomain \times dekinfo \times id_asymmetric \times (certificate)list \times MIC_info \times (id_asymmetric \times Key_info)list \times pemtext \times posteb)$.

The security, accessor, and selector functions for *ENCRYPTED* messages are defined in the same way as they are for MIC-CLEAR messages. They are the general security functions with the parameters specialized with the selection functions. We assume all the fields in PEM message are successfully retrieved, except the ciphertext and encrypted MIC fields.

With the specialized security functions and the general correctness theorems, we can prove the specialized correctness theorems for *ENCRYPTED* messages.

3.4.1 Privacy

The privacy check functions **ENCRYPTED_is_PrivateP** and **ENCRYPTED_is_PrivateS** are defined using the general privacy functions **is_PrivateP** and **is_PrivateS** with their parameters specialized with hash and signature selection functions.

```

ENCRYPTED_is_PrivateP
⊢ if ∀msg txDEK.
  ENCRYPTED_is_PrivateP msg txDEK =
  is_PrivateP (DEK_encrypt_select (getEN_KEY_info msg)) txDEK
  (getEN_msg_EncryptedKey msg) recipientkey

```

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```

ENCRYPTED_is_PrivateS
  ⊢dtf ∀msg message.
    ENCRYPTED_is_PrivateS msg message =
      (let rxDEK = getEN_msg_DEK msg
       and
       decryptIV = getEN_msg_MsgEncryptIV msg
       in
       is_PrivateS (msg_Encrypt_select (getEN_DEK_info msg)) message
        (getEN_Message_info msg) decryptIV rxDEK)

```

Given the definitions of **ENCRYPTED_is_PrivateP** and **ENCRYPTED_is_PrivateS** and the general correctness theorems **is_Private_DEK** and **is_Private_msg**, we can prove the correctness theorems for **ENCRYPTED_is_Private_DEK** and **ENCRYPTED_is_Private_msg**. The following theorem states that under similar assumptions to the general **is_Private_DEK** correctness theorem, **ENCRYPTED_is_Private_DEK** is true if-and-only-if the received DEK is not disclosed during transmission.

```

ENCRYPTED_is_Private_DEK
  ⊢ ∀Encrypted_msg encryptP DEK dKEY0 dkey.
    let Key_info = getEN_KEY_info Encrypted_msg
    in
    let decryptP = DEK_encrypt_select Key_info
    and
    rxmsg = getEN_msg_EncryptedKey Encrypted_msg
    and
    dkey = recipientkey
    in
    (rxmsg = txmsg) ⊃
    (txmsg = encryptP DEK ekey) ⊃
    (∀msg. decryptP (encryptP msg ekey) dKEY0 = msg) ⊃
    (∀msg d2.
      (decryptP (encryptP msg ekey) d2 = msg) ⊃ (d2 = dKEY0)) ⊃
    ((dkey = dKEY0) = ENCRYPTED_is_PrivateP Encrypted_msg DEK)

```

The theorem below states that under similar assumptions to the general **is_Private_msg** correctness theorem, **ENCRYPTED_is_Private_msg** is true if-and-only-if the received original plaintext is not disclosed during transmission.

3.4. FUNCTIONS FOR ENCRYPTED MESSAGES

```

ENCRYPTED_is_Private_msg
  ⊢ ∀Encrypted_msg encryptS message DEK.
    let DEK_info = getEN_DEK_info Encrypted_msg
    in
    let decryptS = msg_Encrypt_select DEK_info
    and
    rxmsg = getEN_Message_info Encrypted_msg
    and
    decryptIV = getEN_msg_MsgEncryptIV Encrypted_msg
    and
    KEYO = DEK
    and
    key = getEN_msg_DEK Encrypted_msg
    in
    (rxmsg = txmsg) ⊃
    (txmsg = encryptS message KEYO decryptIV) ⊃
    (∀msg key.
      (decryptS (encryptS msg key decryptIV) key decryptIV = msg) ∧
      (∀msg key1.
        (decryptS msg key1 decryptIV = decryptS msg key decryptIV) ⇒
        key = key1)) ⊃
    ((key = KEYO) ⇒ ENCRYPTED_is_PrivateS Encrypted_msg message)

```

3.4.2 Source Authentication

The source authentication check function **ENCRYPTED_is_Authentic2** is defined as the general source authentication function **is_Authentic2** with its parameters specialized with the hash and signature selection functions.

```

ENCRYPTED_is_Authentic2
  ⊢id ∀msg.
    ENCRYPTED_is_Authentic2 msg =
    (let micInfo = getEN_MIC_info msg
     in
     let ekey = get_Key_from_ID (getEN_OriginatorAsymID_info msg)
     in
     is_Authentic2 (MIC_sign_select micInfo)
      (MIC_hash_select micInfo) (getEN_msg_message msg)
      (getEN_msg_MIC msg) ekey)

```

Given the definition of **ENCRYPTED_is_Authentic2** and the general correctness theorem **is_Authentic_msg**, we prove the correctness theorem for **ENCRYPTED_is_Authentic_msg**. It states that under similar assumptions to the general **is_Authentic_msg** correctness theorem, **ENCRYPTED_is_Authentic_msg** is true if-and-only-if the received original

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plaintext is sent by the originator identified by the public key stated in the received message.

```
ENCRYPTED_is_Authentic_msg
  ⊢ ∀Encrypted_msg sign txmic dKEY0 dkey.
    let micInfo = getEN_MIC_info Encrypted_msg
    in
    let verify = MIC_sign_select micInfo
    and
    hash = MIC_hash_select micInfo
    and
    message = getEN_msg_message Encrypted_msg
    and
    rxmic = getEN_msg_MIC Encrypted_msg
    and
    ekey = get_Key_from_ID (getEN_OriginatorAsymID_info Encrypted_msg)
    in
    (rxmic = txmic) ⊃
    (txmic = sign (hash message) dkey) ⊃
    (∀m1 m2 dkey2.
      verify m1 (sign m2 dkey2) ekey = dkey2 = dKEY0) ⊃
    ((dkey = dKEY0) = ENCRYPTED_is_Authentic2 Encrypted_msg)
```

3.4.3 Integrity

The integrity check function **ENCRYPTED_is_Intact** is defined as the general integrity function **is_Intact** with its parameters specialized with the hash and signature selection functions.

```
ENCRYPTED_is_Intact
  ⊢iff ∀msg.
    ENCRYPTED_is_Intact msg =
      (let micInfo = getEN_MIC_info msg
       in
       let ekey = get_Key_from_ID (getEN_OriginatorAsymID_info msg)
       in
       is_Intact (MIC_sign_select micInfo) (MIC_hash_select micInfo)
        (getEN_msg_message msg)
        (getEN_msg_MIC msg) ekey)
```

Given the definition of **ENCRYPTED_is_Intact** and the general correctness theorem **is_Intact_msg**, the correctness theorem **ENCRYPTED_is_Intact_msg** can be proved. The theorem states that under similar assumptions to the general **is_Intact_msg** correctness theorem, **ENCRYPTED_is_Intact_msg** is true if-and-only-if the received plaintext after processing is the same as the original plaintext before encryption.

3.4. FUNCTIONS FOR ENCRYPTED MESSAGES

```
ENCRYPTED_is_Intact_msg
  ⊢ ∀Encrypted_msg sign txmessage txmic dkey.
    let micInfo = getEN_MIC_info Encrypted_msg
    in
    let verify = MIC_sign_select micInfo
    and
    hash = MIC_hash_select micInfo
    and
    rxmessage = getEN_msg_message Encrypted_msg
    and
    rxmic = getEN_msg_MIC Encrypted_msg
    and
    ekey = get_Key_from_ID (getEN_OriginatorAsymID_info Encrypted_msg)
    in
    (txmic = sign (hash txmessage) dkey) ⊃
    (rxmic = txmic) ⊃
    (∀m1 m2. (hash m1 = hash m2) ⊃ (m1 = m2)) ⊃
    (∀s1 s2. verify s1 (sign s2 dkey) ekey = s1 = s2) ⊃
    ((rxmessage = txmessage) = ENCRYPTED_is_Intact Encrypted_msg)
```

3.4.4 Non-Repudiation

The non-repudiation check function **ENCRYPTED_is_non_deniable** is defined as the general non-deniability function **is_non_deniable** with specialized parameters for hash and signature selection functions.

```
ENCRYPTED_is_non_deniable
  ⊢def ∀msg.
    ENCRYPTED_is_non_deniable msg =
      (let micInfo = getEN_MIC_info msg
       in
       let ekey = get_Key_from_ID (getEN_OriginatorAsymID_info msg)
       and
       hash = MIC_hash_select micInfo
       in
       is_non_deniable (MIC_sign_select micInfo)
        (hash (getEN_msg_message msg))
        (getEN_msg_MIC msg) ekey)
```

Given the definitions of **ENCRYPTED_is_non_deniable** and the general correctness theorem **is_non_deniable_msg**, we can prove the correctness theorem for **ENCRYPTED_is_non_deniable_msg**. It states that under similar assumptions to the general **is_non_deniable_msg** correctness theorem, **ENCRYPTED_is_non_deniable_msg** is true if-and-only-if the originator of the retrieved plaintext identified by the public key stated in the received message cannot deny having sent the message.

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```
ENCRYPTED_is_non_deniable_msg
  ⊢ ∀Encrypted_msg sign MESSAGE0 txmic dKEY0 dkey.
    let micInfo = getEN_MIC_info Encrypted_msg
    in
    let verify = MIC_sign_select micInfo
    and
    hash = MIC_hash_select micInfo
    and
    message = getEN_msg_message Encrypted_msg
    and
    rxmic = getEN_msg_MIC Encrypted_msg
    and
    ekey = get_Key_from_ID (getEN_OriginatorAsymID_info Encrypted_msg)
    in
    (rxmic = txmic) ⊃
    (txmic = sign (hash MESSAGE0) dkey) ⊃
    (∀m1 m2. (hash m1 = hash m2) = m1 = m2) ⊃
    (∀m1 m2 dkey2. verify m1 (sign m2 dkey2) ekey =
      (m1 = m2) ∧ (dkey2 = dKEY0)) ⊃
    ((dkey = dKEY0) ∧ (message = MESSAGE0) =
      ENCRYPTED_is_non_deniable Encrypted_msg)
```

Chapter 4

Conclusions

The increased use of networked and distributed computing makes security a major concern. The capability to verify that a system meets its security requirements will continue to grow in importance. In particular, the capability to assign security properties to engineering structures is crucial.

This work focuses on verifying the security properties of Privacy Enhanced Mail (PEM). Security properties such as privacy, source authentication, integrity and non-repudiation are defined independently of any implementation structure. PEM message structures and operations on those structures are shown to have the desired security properties. Various PEM structures are defined as types. Security interpretations are defined as operations on these types.

All the definitions and proofs are done using the Higher Order Logic (HOL) theorem-prover. While at times the proofs are intricate, the proofs are well within the capabilities of engineers who have been trained to use HOL.

The work done on PEM shows the feasibility of using formal logic and computer assisted reasoning tools to describe and verify relatively complex systems. The advantages of using these methods is the assurance of correctness of the specifications given to implementers. If the specifications are correctly implemented, then the desired security properties will be achieved.

Appendix A

NOTATIONAL CONVENTIONS

This appendix is excerpted in part from RFC 822, *Standard for the Format of ARPA Internet Text Messages*, [3]. It defines the augmented BNF notation used for describing PEM message formats.

This specification uses an augmented Backus-Naur Form (BNF) notation. The differences from standard BNF involve naming rules and indicating repetition and “local” alternatives.

A.1 RULE NAMING

Angle brackets (“<”, “>”) are not used, in general. The name of a rule is simply the name itself, rather than “<name>”. Quotation-marks enclose literal text (which may be upper and/or lower case). Certain basic rules are in uppercase, such as SPACE, TAB, CRLF, DIGIT, ALPHA, etc. Angle brackets are used in rule definitions, and in the rest of this document, whenever their presence will facilitate discerning the use of rule names.

A.2 RULE1 / RULE2: ALTERNATIVES

Elements separated by slash (“/”) are alternatives. Therefore “foo / bar” will accept foo or bar.

A.3 (RULE1 RULE2): LOCAL ALTERNATIVES

Elements enclosed in parentheses are treated as a single element. Thus, “(elem (foo / bar) elem)” allows the token sequences “elem foo elem” and

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“elem bar elem”.

A.4 *RULE: REPETITION

The character “*” preceding an element indicates repetition. The full form is:

$\langle l \rangle * \langle m \rangle \text{element}$

indicating at least $\langle l \rangle$ and at most $\langle m \rangle$ occurrences of element. Default values are 0 and infinity so that “*(element)” allows any number, including zero; “1*element” requires at least one; and “1*2element” allows one or two.

A.5 [RULE]: OPTIONAL

Square brackets enclose optional elements; “[foo bar]” is equivalent to “*1(foo bar)”.

A.6 NRULE: SPECIFIC REPETITION

“ $\langle n \rangle$ (element)” is equivalent to “ $\langle n \rangle * \langle n \rangle$ (element)”;

 that is, exactly $\langle n \rangle$ occurrences of (element). Thus 2DIGIT is a 2-digit number, and 3ALPHA is a string of three alphabetic characters.

A.7 #RULE: LISTS

A construct “#” is defined, similar to “*”, as follows:

$\langle l \rangle \# \langle m \rangle \text{element}$

indicating at least $\langle l \rangle$ and at most $\langle m \rangle$ elements, each separated by one or more commas (“,”). This makes the usual form of lists very easy; a rule such as “(element *(“,” element))” can be shown as “1#element”. Wherever this construct is used, null elements are allowed, but do not contribute to the count of elements present. That is, “(element),,(element)” is permitted, but counts as only two elements. Therefore, where at least one element is

A.8. ; COMMENTS

required, at least one non-null element must be present. Default values are 0 and infinity so that "#(element)" allows any number, including zero; "1#element" requires at least one; and "1#2element" allows one or two.

A.8 ; COMMENTS

A semi-colon, set off some distance to the right of rule text, starts a comment that continues to the end of line. This is a simple way of including useful notes in parallel with the specifications.

A.9 ALPHABETICAL LISTING OF SYNTAX RULES

address	= mailbox	; one addressee
	/ group	; named list
addr-spec	= local-part "@" domain	; global address
ALPHA	= <any ASCII alphabetic character>	
		; (101-132, 65.- 90.)
		; (141-172, 97.-122.)
atom	= 1*<any CHAR except specials, SPACE and CTLs>	
authentic	= "From" ":" mailbox	; Single author
	/ ("Sender" ":" mailbox	; Actual submittor
	"From" ":" 1#mailbox)	; Multiple authors
		; or not sender
CHAR	= <any ASCII character>	; (0-177, 0.-127.)
comment	= "(" *(ctext / quoted-pair / comment) ")"	
CR	= <ASCII CR, carriage return>	; (15, 13.)
CRLF	= CR LF	
ctext	= <any CHAR excluding "(", ")", "\" & CR, & including linear-white-space>	; => may be folded
CTL	= <any ASCII control character and DEL>	; (0- 37, 0.- 31.) ; (177, 127.)
date	= 1*2DIGIT month 2DIGIT	; day month year ; e.g. 20 Jun 82
dates	= orig-date	; Original
	[resent-date]	; Forwarded
date-time	= [day ","] date time	; dd mm yy ; hh:mm:ss zzz

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day = "Mon" / "Tue" / "Wed" / "Thu"
/ "Fri" / "Sat" / "Sun"

delimiters = specials / linear-white-space / comment

destination = "To" ":" 1#address ; Primary
/ "Resent-To" ":" 1#address
/ "cc" ":" 1#address ; Secondary
/ "Resent-cc" ":" 1#address
/ "bcc" ":" #address ; Blind carbon
/ "Resent-bcc" ":" #address

DIGIT = <any ASCII decimal digit> ; (60- 71, 48.- 57.)

domain = sub-domain *("." sub-domain)

domain-literal = "[" *(dtext / quoted-pair) "]"

domain-ref = atom ; symbolic reference

dtext = <any CHAR excluding "[", "]", "\", & CR, & including linear-white-space> ; => may be folded

extension-field =
 <Any field which is defined in a document
 published as a formal extension to this
 specification; none will have names beginning
 with the string "X-">

field = field-name ":" [field-body] CRLF

fields =
 dates ; Creation time,
 source ; author id & one
 1#destination ; address required
 *optional-field ; others optional

field-body = field-body-contents
 [CRLF LWSP-char field-body]

field-body-contents =
 <the ASCII characters making up the field-body, as
 defined in the following sections, and consisting
 of combinations of atom, quoted-string, and
 specials tokens, or else consisting of texts>

field-name = 1*<any CHAR, excluding CTLs, SPACE, and ":">

group = phrase ":" [#mailbox] ";"

hour = 2DIGIT ":" 2DIGIT [":" 2DIGIT]
; 00:00:00 - 23:59:59

HTAB = <ASCII HT, horizontal-tab> ; (11, 9.)

LF = <ASCII LF, linefeed> ; (12, 10.)

linear-white-space = 1*([CRLF] LWSP-char) ; semantics = SPACE
; CRLF => folding

local-part = word *("." word) ; uninterpreted
; case-preserved

A.9. ALPHABETICAL LISTING OF SYNTAX RULES

```

LWSP-char  = SPACE / HTAB                ; semantics = SPACE
mailbox    = addr-spec                    ; simple address
           / phrase route-addr            ; name & addr-spec
message    = fields *( CRLF *text )       ; Everything after
                                           ; first null line
                                           ; is message body

month      = "Jan" / "Feb" / "Mar" / "Apr"
           / "May" / "Jun" / "Jul" / "Aug"
           / "Sep" / "Oct" / "Nov" / "Dec"

msg-id     = "<" addr-spec ">"             ; Unique message id

optional-field =
    / "Message-ID"      ":" msg-id
    / "Resent-Message-ID" ":" msg-id
    / "In-Reply-To"     ":" *(phrase / msg-id)
    / "References"      ":" *(phrase / msg-id)
    / "Keywords"        ":" #phrase
    / "Subject"         ":" *text
    / "Comments"        ":" *text
    / "Encrypted"       ":" 1#2word
    / extension-field   ; To be defined
    / user-defined-field ; May be pre-empted

orig-date  = "Date"      ":" date-time
originator = authentic   ; authenticated addr
           [ "Reply-To"  ":" 1#address ] )

phrase     = 1*word        ; Sequence of words
qtext      = <any CHAR excepting <">,
           "\" & CR, and including
           linear-white-space>

quoted-pair = "\" CHAR      ; may quote any char
quoted-string = <"> *(qtext/quoted-pair) <">; Regular qtext or
                                           ; quoted chars.

received   = "Received"    ":"
           [ "from" domain] ; sending host
           [ "by"  domain]  ; receiving host
           [ "via" atom]    ; physical path
           *( "with" atom)  ; link/mail protocol
           [ "id"  msg-id]   ; receiver msg id
           [ "for" addr-spec] ; initial form
           ";" date-time    ; time received

resent     = resent-authentic
           [ "Resent-Reply-To" ":" 1#address ] )

resent-authentic =
    = "Resent-From"      ":" mailbox

```

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```

/ ( "Resent-Sender"   ":"   mailbox
    "Resent-From"     ":"   1#mailbox )
resent-date = "Resent-Date" ":"   date-time
return      = "Return-path" ":" route-addr ; return address
route       = 1#("@" domain) ":"         ; path-relative
route-addr  = "<" [route] addr-spec ">"
source      = [ trace ]                   ; net traversals
              originator                   ; original mail
              [ resent ]                   ; forwarded
SPACE       = <ASCII SP, space>           ; ( 40, 32.)
specials    = "(" / ")" / "<" / ">" / "@" ; Must be in quoted-
              / "," / ";" / ":" / "\" / "<" ; string, to use
              / "." / "[" / "]"           ; within a word.
sub-domain  = domain-ref / domain-literal
text        = <any CHAR, including bare    ; => atoms, specials,
              CR & bare LF, but NOT        ; comments and
              including CRLF>               ; quoted-strings are
                                              ; NOT recognized.
time        = hour zone                    ; ANSI and Military
trace       = return                       ; path to sender
              1*received                   ; receipt tags
user-defined-field =
    <Any field which has not been defined
    in this specification or published as an
    extension to this specification; names for
    such fields must be unique and may be
    pre-empted by published extensions>
word        = atom / quoted-string
zone        = "UT" / "GMT"                 ; Universal Time
              / "EST" / "EDT"               ; North American : UT
              / "CST" / "CDT"               ; Eastern: - 5/ - 4
              / "MST" / "MDT"               ; Central: - 6/ - 5
              / "PST" / "PDT"               ; Mountain: - 7/ - 6
              / 1ALPHA                       ; Pacific: - 8/ - 7
              / 1ALPHA                       ; Military: Z = UT;
<">        = <ASCII quote mark>           ; ( 42, 34.)

```

Appendix B

PEM SYNTAX

B.1 pem_syntax.theory

Theory: pem_syntax

Parents:

string
MML

Type constants:

preeb 0
posteb 0
pemtypes 0
proctype 0
contentdescrip 0
contentdomain 0
algid 0
IV 0
dekinfo 0
certificate 0
id_asymmetric 0
Key_info 0
origid_asymm 0
MIC_info 0

Term constants:

is_preeb (Prefix) :string -> bool
REP_preeb (Prefix) :preeb -> string
BEGIN (Prefix) :string -> preeb
is_posteb (Prefix) :string -> bool
REP_posteb (Prefix) :posteb -> string
END (Prefix) :string -> posteb
REP_pemtypes (Prefix) :pemtypes -> (one + one + one + one + one) ltree
ABS_pemtypes (Prefix) :(one + one + one + one + one) ltree -> pemtypes
ENCRYPTED (Prefix) :pemtypes
MIC_ONLY (Prefix) :pemtypes
MIC_CLEAR (Prefix) :pemtypes
CRL (Prefix) :pemtypes
CRL_RETRIEVAL_REQUEST (Prefix) :pemtypes
is_proctype (Prefix) :num # pemtypes -> bool
REP_proctype (Prefix) :proctype -> num # pemtypes
Proc_Type (Prefix) :num # pemtypes -> proctype
REP_contentdescrip (Prefix) :contentdescrip -> one ltree
ABS_contentdescrip (Prefix) :one ltree -> contentdescrip
RFC822 (Prefix) :contentdescrip
REP_contentdomain (Prefix) :contentdomain -> contentdescrip ltree
ABS_contentdomain (Prefix) :contentdescrip ltree -> contentdomain
Content_Domain (Prefix) :contentdescrip -> contentdomain
REP_algid (Prefix) :algid -> (one + one + one + one + one + one) ltree
ABS_algid (Prefix) :(one + one + one + one + one + one) ltree -> algid
DES_CBC (Prefix) :algid

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```

DES_EDE (Prefix) :algid
DES_ECB (Prefix) :algid
RSA (Prefix) :algid
RSA_MD2 (Prefix) :algid
RSA_MD5 (Prefix) :algid
REP_IV (Prefix) :IV -> one ltree
ABS_IV (Prefix) :one ltree -> IV
IV (Prefix) :IV
is_dekinfo (Prefix) :algid # IV -> bool
REP_dekinfo (Prefix) :dekinfo -> algid # IV
DER_Info (Prefix) :algid # IV -> dekinfo
REP_certificate (Prefix) :certificate -> string ltree
ABS_certificate (Prefix) :string ltree -> certificate
Certificate (Prefix) :string -> certificate
REP_id_asymmetric (Prefix) :id_asymmetric -> string ltree
ABS_id_asymmetric (Prefix) :string ltree -> id_asymmetric
ID_Asymmetric (Prefix) :string -> id_asymmetric
is_Key_info (Prefix) :algid # string -> bool
REP_Key_info (Prefix) :Key_info -> algid # string
Key_Info (Prefix) :algid # string -> Key_info
REP_origid_asymm (Prefix) :origid_asymm -> (one + one) ltree
ABS_origid_asymm (Prefix) : (one + one) ltree -> origid_asymm
certificate (Prefix) :origid_asymm
id_asymmetric (Prefix) :origid_asymm
is_MIC_info (Prefix) :algid # algid # string -> bool
REP_MIC_info (Prefix) :MIC_info -> algid # algid # string
MIC_Info (Prefix) :algid # algid # string -> MIC_info

```

Axioms:

Definitions:

```

is_preb |- !s. is_preb s : s = 'PRIVACY-ENHANCED MESSAGE'
preb_TY_DEF |- !rep. TYPE_DEFINITION is_preb rep
preb_ISO_DEF
|- (!a. BEGIN (REP_preb a) = a) /\
  (!r. is_preb r = REP_preb (BEGIN r) = r)
is_posteb |- !s. is_posteb s : s = 'PRIVACY-ENHANCED MESSAGE'
posteb_TY_DEF |- !rep. TYPE_DEFINITION is_posteb rep
posteb_ISO_DEF
|- (!a. END (REP_posteb a) = a) /\
  (!r. is_posteb r = REP_posteb (END r) = r)
pentypes_TY_DEF
|- !rep.
  TYPE_DEFINITION
  (TRP
    (\v t1.
      (v = INL one) /\ (LENGTH t1 = 0) /\
      (v = INR (INL one)) /\ (LENGTH t1 = 0) /\
      (v = INR (INR (INL one))) /\ (LENGTH t1 = 0) /\
      (v = INR (INR (INR (INL one)))) /\ (LENGTH t1 = 0) /\
      (v = INR (INR (INR (INR one)))) /\ (LENGTH t1 = 0)))
    rep
  pentypes_ISO_DEF
  |- (!a. ABS.pentypes (REP.pentypes a) = a) /\
    (!r.
      TRP
        (\v t1.
          (v = INL one) /\ (LENGTH t1 = 0) /\
          (v = INR (INL one)) /\ (LENGTH t1 = 0) /\
          (v = INR (INR (INL one))) /\ (LENGTH t1 = 0) /\
          (v = INR (INR (INR (INL one)))) /\ (LENGTH t1 = 0) /\
          (v = INR (INR (INR (INR one)))) /\ (LENGTH t1 = 0))
        r =

```

B.1. PEM_SYNTAX.THEORY

```

REP_pemtypes (ABS_pemtypes r) =
  r)
ENCRYPTED_DEF |- ENCRYPTED = ABS_pemtypes (Node (INL one) [])
MIC_ONLY_DEF |- MIC_ONLY = ABS_pemtypes (Node (INR (INL one)) [])
MIC_CLEAR_DEF |- MIC_CLEAR = ABS_pemtypes (Node (INR (INR (INL one))) [])
CRL_DEF |- CRL = ABS_pemtypes (Node (INR (INR (INR (INL one)))) [])
CRL_RETRIEVAL_REQUEST_DEF
|- CRL_RETRIEVAL_REQUEST =
  ABS_pemtypes (Node (INR (INR (INR (INR one)))) [])
is_proctype |- !proctype. is_proctype proctype = FST proctype = 4
proctype.TY_DEF |- !rep. TYPE_DEFINITION is_proctype rep
proctype.ISU_DEF
|- (!a. Proc_Type (REP_proctype a) = a) /\
  (!r. is_proctype r = REP_proctype (Proc_Type r) = r)
contentdescrip.TY_DEF
|- !rep. TYPE_DEFINITION (TRP (v t1. (v = one) /\ (LENGTH t1 = 0))) rep
contentdescrip.ISU_DEF
|- (!a. ABS_contentdescrip (REP_contentdescrip a) = a) /\
  (!r.
    TRP (v t1. (v = one) /\ (LENGTH t1 = 0)) r =
    REP_contentdescrip (ABS_contentdescrip r) =
    r)
RFC822_DEF |- RFC822 = ABS_contentdescrip (Node one [])
contentdomain.TY_DEF
|- !rep. TYPE_DEFINITION (TRP (v t1. (!c. v = c) /\ (LENGTH t1 = 0))) rep
contentdomain.ISU_DEF
|- (!a. ABS_contentdomain (REP_contentdomain a) = a) /\
  (!r.
    TRP (v t1. (!c. v = c) /\ (LENGTH t1 = 0)) r =
    REP_contentdomain (ABS_contentdomain r) =
    r)
Content_Domain_DEF |- !c. Content_Domain c = ABS_contentdomain (Node c [])
algid.TY_DEF
|- !rep.
  TYPE_DEFINITION
  (TRP
    (v t1.
      (v = INL one) /\ (LENGTH t1 = 0) /\
      (v = INR (INL one)) /\ (LENGTH t1 = 0) /\
      (v = INR (INR (INL one))) /\ (LENGTH t1 = 0) /\
      (v = INR (INR (INR (INL one)))) /\ (LENGTH t1 = 0) /\
      (v = INR (INR (INR (INR (INL one)))) /\ (LENGTH t1 = 0) /\
      (v = INR (INR (INR (INR (INR (INL one)))) /\ (LENGTH t1 = 0)))
    )
  )
rep
algid.ISU_DEF
|- (!a. ABS_algid (REP_algid a) = a) /\
  (!r.
    TRP
      (v t1.
        (v = INL one) /\ (LENGTH t1 = 0) /\
        (v = INR (INL one)) /\ (LENGTH t1 = 0) /\
        (v = INR (INR (INL one))) /\ (LENGTH t1 = 0) /\
        (v = INR (INR (INR (INL one)))) /\ (LENGTH t1 = 0) /\
        (v = INR (INR (INR (INR (INL one)))) /\ (LENGTH t1 = 0) /\
        (v = INR (INR (INR (INR (INR (INL one)))) /\ (LENGTH t1 = 0)))
      )
    )
  )
  REP_algid (ABS_algid r) =
  r)
DES_CBC_DEF |- DES_CBC = ABS_algid (Node (INL one) [])
DES_EDE_DEF |- DES_EDE = ABS_algid (Node (INR (INL one)) [])
DES_ECB_DEF |- DES_ECB = ABS_algid (Node (INR (INR (INL one))) [])
RSA_DEF |- RSA = ABS_algid (Node (INR (INR (INR (INL one)))) [])
RSA_MD2_DEF
|- RSA_MD2 = ABS_algid (Node (INR (INR (INR (INR (INL one)))) [])

```

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```

RSA_MD5_DEF
|- RSA_MD5 = ABS_algid (Node (INR (INR (INR (INR one)))) □)
IV_TY_DEF
|- !rep. TYPE_DEFINITION (TRP (λv t1. (v = one) /\ (LENGTH t1 = 0))) rep
IV_ISU_DEF
|- (!a. ABS_IV (REP_IV a) = a) /\
  (!r.
    TRP (λv t1. (v = one) /\ (LENGTH t1 = 0)) r = REP_IV (ABS_IV r) = r)
IV_DEF |- IV = ABS_IV (Node one □)
is_dekinfo |- !a. is_dekinfo a = FST a = DES_CBC
dekinfo_TY_DEF |- !rep. TYPE_DEFINITION is_dekinfo rep
dekinfo_ISU_DEF
|- (!a. DEK_Info (REP_dekinfo a) = a) /\
  (!r. is_dekinfo r = REP_dekinfo (DEK_Info r) = r)
certificate_TY_DEF
|- !rep. TYPE_DEFINITION (TRP (λv t1. (!s. v = s) /\ (LENGTH t1 = 0))) rep
certificate_ISU_DEF
|- (!a. ABS_certificate (REP_certificate a) = a) /\
  (!r.
    TRP (λv t1. (!s. v = s) /\ (LENGTH t1 = 0)) r =
      REP_certificate (ABS_certificate r) =
        r)
Certificate_DEF |- !s. Certificate s = ABS_certificate (Node s □)
id_asymmetric_TY_DEF
|- !rep. TYPE_DEFINITION (TRP (λv t1. (!s. v = s) /\ (LENGTH t1 = 0))) rep
id_asymmetric_ISU_DEF
|- (!a. ABS_id_asymmetric (REP_id_asymmetric a) = a) /\
  (!r.
    TRP (λv t1. (!s. v = s) /\ (LENGTH t1 = 0)) r =
      REP_id_asymmetric (ABS_id_asymmetric r) =
        r)
ID_Asymmetric_DEF |- !s. ID_Asymmetric s = ABS_id_asymmetric (Node s □)
is_Keyinfo |- !x. is_Keyinfo x = FST x = RSA
Keyinfo_TY_DEF |- !rep. TYPE_DEFINITION is_Keyinfo rep
Keyinfo_ISU_DEF
|- (!a. Key_Info (REP_Keyinfo a) = a) /\
  (!r. is_Keyinfo r = REP_Keyinfo (Key_Info r) = r)
origid_asymm_TY_DEF
|- !rep.
  TYPE_DEFINITION
  (TRP
    (λv t1.
      (v = INL one) /\ (LENGTH t1 = 0) /\
      (v = INR one) /\ (LENGTH t1 = 0)))
  rep
origid_asymm_ISU_DEF
|- (!a. ABS_origid_asymm (REP_origid_asymm a) = a) /\
  (!r.
    TRP
      (λv t1.
        (v = INL one) /\ (LENGTH t1 = 0) /\
        (v = INR one) /\ (LENGTH t1 = 0))
      r =
        REP_origid_asymm (ABS_origid_asymm r) =
          r)
certificate_DEF |- certificate = ABS_origid_asymm (Node (INL one) □)
id_asymmetric_DEF |- id_asymmetric = ABS_origid_asymm (Node (INR one) □)
is_MICinfo
|- !x.
  is_MICinfo x =
    ((FST x = RSA_MD2) /\ (FST x = RSA_MD5)) /\
    ((FST (SND x) = DES_EDE) /\
      (FST (SND x) = DES_ECB) /\
      (FST (SND x) = RSA))

```

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```

MIC_info_TY_DEF |- !rep. TYPE_DEFINITION is_MIC_info rep
MIC_info_ISQ_DEF
|- (!a. MIC_Info (REP_MIC_info a) = a) /\
  (!r. is_MIC_info r = REP_MIC_info (MIC_Info r) = r)

```

Theorems:

```

REP_preeb_INVERTS |- !a. BEGIN (REP_preeb a) = a
REP_preeb_ONE_ONE |- !a a'. (REP_preeb a = REP_preeb a') = a = a'
REP_preeb_ONTU |- !r. is_preeb r = (!a. r = REP_preeb a)
ABS_preeb_INVERTS |- !r. is_preeb r = REP_preeb (BEGIN r) = r
ABS_preeb_ONE_ONE
|- !r r'. is_preeb r == is_preeb r' == ((BEGIN r = BEGIN r') = r = r')
ABS_preeb_ONTU |- !a. !r. (a = BEGIN r) /\ is_preeb r
REP_posteb_INVERTS |- !a. END (REP_posteb a) = a
REP_posteb_ONE_ONE |- !a a'. (REP_posteb a = REP_posteb a') = a = a'
REP_posteb_ONTU |- !r. is_posteb r = (!a. r = REP_posteb a)
ABS_posteb_INVERTS |- !r. is_posteb r = REP_posteb (END r) = r
ABS_posteb_ONE_ONE
|- !r r'. is_posteb r == is_posteb r' == ((END r = END r') = r = r')
ABS_posteb_ONTU |- !a. !r. (a = END r) /\ is_posteb r
pentypes
|- !e0 e1 e2 e3 e4.
  !!fn.
    (fn ENCRYPTED = e0) /\
    (fn MIC_ONLY = e1) /\
    (fn MIC_CLEAR = e2) /\
    (fn CRL = e3) /\
    (fn CRL_RETRIEVAL_REQUEST = e4)
pentypes_INDUCT
|- !p.
  P ENCRYPTED /\
  P MIC_ONLY /\
  P MIC_CLEAR /\
  P CRL /\
  P CRL_RETRIEVAL_REQUEST ==>
  (!p. P p)
pentypes_DISTINCT
|- ~(ENCRYPTED = MIC_ONLY) /\
  ~(ENCRYPTED = MIC_CLEAR) /\
  ~(ENCRYPTED = CRL) /\
  ~(ENCRYPTED = CRL_RETRIEVAL_REQUEST) /\
  ~(MIC_ONLY = MIC_CLEAR) /\
  ~(MIC_ONLY = CRL) /\
  ~(MIC_ONLY = CRL_RETRIEVAL_REQUEST) /\
  ~(MIC_CLEAR = CRL) /\
  ~(MIC_CLEAR = CRL_RETRIEVAL_REQUEST) /\
  ~(CRL = CRL_RETRIEVAL_REQUEST)
pentypes_CASES
|- !p.
  (p = ENCRYPTED) /\
  (p = MIC_ONLY) /\
  (p = MIC_CLEAR) /\
  (p = CRL) /\
  (p = CRL_RETRIEVAL_REQUEST)
REP_proctype_INVERTS |- !a. Proc_Type (REP_proctype a) = a
REP_proctype_ONE_ONE |- !a a'. (REP_proctype a = REP_proctype a') = a = a'
REP_proctype_ONTU |- !r. is_proctype r = (!a. r = REP_proctype a)
ABS_proctype_INVERTS |- !r. is_proctype r = REP_proctype (Proc_Type r) = r
ABS_proctype_ONE_ONE
|- !r r'.
  is_proctype r ==
  is_proctype r' ==
  ((Proc_Type r = Proc_Type r') = r = r')
ABS_proctype_ONTU |- !a. !r. (a = Proc_Type r) /\ is_proctype r

```

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```

contentdescrip |- !e. !!fn. fn RFC822 = e
contentdescrip_INDUCT |- !P. P RFC822 ==> (!c. P c)
contentdescrip_CASES |- !c. c = RFC822
contentdomain |- !f. !!fn. !c. fn (Content_Domain c) = f c
contentdomain_INDUCT |- !P. (!c. P (Content_Domain c)) ==> (!c. P c)
contentdomain_CASES |- !c. !c'. c = Content_Domain c'

algid
|- !e0 e1 e2 e3 e4 e5.
    !!fn.
        (fn DES_CBC = e0) /\
        (fn DES_EDE = e1) /\
        (fn DES_ECB = e2) /\
        (fn RSA = e3) /\
        (fn RSA_MD2 = e4) /\
        (fn RSA_MD5 = e5)

algid_INDUCT
|- !P.
    P DES_CBC /\
    P DES_EDE /\
    P DES_ECB /\
    P RSA /\
    P RSA_MD2 /\
    P RSA_MD5 ==>
    (!a. P a)

algid_DISTINCT
|- ~(DES_CBC = DES_EDE) /\
   ~(DES_CBC = DES_ECB) /\
   ~(DES_CBC = RSA) /\
   ~(DES_CBC = RSA_MD2) /\
   ~(DES_CBC = RSA_MD5) /\
   ~(DES_EDE = DES_ECB) /\
   ~(DES_EDE = RSA) /\
   ~(DES_EDE = RSA_MD2) /\
   ~(DES_EDE = RSA_MD5) /\
   ~(DES_ECB = RSA) /\
   ~(DES_ECB = RSA_MD2) /\
   ~(DES_ECB = RSA_MD5) /\
   ~(RSA = RSA_MD2) /\
   ~(RSA = RSA_MD5) /\
   ~(RSA_MD2 = RSA_MD5)

algid_CASES
|- !a.
    (a = DES_CBC) /\
    (a = DES_EDE) /\
    (a = DES_ECB) /\
    (a = RSA) /\
    (a = RSA_MD2) /\
    (a = RSA_MD5)

IV |- !e. !!fn. fn IV = e
REP_dekinfo_INVERTS |- !a. DEK_Info (REP_dekinfo a) = a
REP_dekinfo_ONE_ONE |- !a a'. (REP_dekinfo a = REP_dekinfo a') = a = a'
REP_dekinfo_UNTO |- !r. is_dekinfo r = (!a. r = REP_dekinfo a)
ABS_dekinfo_INVERTS |- !r. is_dekinfo r = REP_dekinfo (DEK_Info r) = r
ABS_dekinfo_ONE_ONE
|- !r r'.
    is_dekinfo r ==>
    is_dekinfo r' ==>
    (DEK_Info r = DEK_Info r') = r = r'
ABS_dekinfo_UNTO |- !a. !r. (a = DEK_Info r) /\ is_dekinfo r
certificate |- !f. !!fn. !s. fn (Certificate s) = f s
id_asymmetric |- !f. !!fn. !s. fn (ID_Asymmetric s) = f s
REP_Key_info_INVERTS |- !a. Key_Info (REP_Key_info a) = a
REP_Key_info_ONE_ONE |- !a a'. (REP_Key_info a = REP_Key_info a') = a = a'
REP_Key_info_UNTO |- !r. is_Key_info r = (!a. r = REP_Key_info a)

```

B.2. PEM_SYNTAX.SML

```
ABS_Key_info.INVERTS |- !r. is_Key_info r = REP_Key_info (Key_Info r) = r
ABS_Key_info.ONE_ONE
|- !r r'.
  is_Key_info r ==>
  is_Key_info r' ==>
  ((Key_Info r = Key_Info r') = r = r')
ABS_Key_info.OWTO |- !a. !r. (a = Key_Info r) /\ is_Key_info r
  origid.asymm
|- !e0 e1. !!fn. (fn certificate = e0) /\ (fn id.asymmetric = e1)
REP_MIC_info.INVERTS |- !a. MIC_Info (REP_MIC_info a) = a
REP_MIC_info.ONE_ONE |- !a a'. (REP_MIC_info a = REP_MIC_info a') = a = a'
REP_MIC_info.OWTO |- !r. is_MIC_info r = (!a. r = REP_MIC_info a)
ABS_MIC_info.INVERTS |- !r. is_MIC_info r = REP_MIC_info (MIC_Info r) = r
ABS_MIC_info.ONE_ONE
|- !r r'.
  is_MIC_info r ==>
  is_MIC_info r' ==>
  ((MIC_Info r = MIC_Info r') = r = r')
ABS_MIC_info.OWTO |- !a. !r. (a = MIC_Info r) /\ is_MIC_info r
```

B.2 pem_syntax.sml

```
(*=====*)
(* File:          pem_syntax.sml                                *)
(* Description:    PEM message syntax                            *)
(* Date:          July 2, 1996                                   *)
(* Author:        Shiu-Kai Chin, with small modification       *)
(*               by Dan Zhou                                     *)
(*=====*)

load_library(lib = hol88.lib, theory = "");
open Psyntax Compat;

(* Definition of PEM messages. *)
new_theory 'pem_syntax';
new_parent 'string';
use "/amd/humboldt/sw/hol90.7/library/string/src/ascii.conv.sml";
use "/amd/humboldt/sw/hol90.7/library/string/src/string.conv.sml";
use "/amd/humboldt/sw/hol90.7/library/string/src/string.rules.sml";
open String.rules;

add_definitions_to_sml 'string';
add_theorems_to_sml 'string';

add_theory_to_sml 'pair';
add_definitions_to_sml 'pair';
add_theory_to_sml 'list';
add_definitions_to_sml 'list';

(*:      :      :      :      :      :      :      :      :      :*)
(* Define pre-encapsulation boundary *)

val is_preb = new_definition ('is_preb', (s: string) =>
  (s = 'PRIVACY-ENHANCED MESSAGE')));

val exists_preb = TAC.PROOF(
  ([], -- 'is_preb s',
  EXISTS_TAC (s = 'PRIVACY-ENHANCED MESSAGE') THEN
  REWRITE_TAC [is_preb]));
```

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B.2. PEM_SYNTAX.SML

```
(*      :      :      :      :      :      :      :      :      :      *)
(* we will just take pemtext as a string, so there is no need *)
(* to have a separate type for it *)

(*      :      :      :      :      :      :      :      :      :      *)
(* Definitions of header structures *)

(* Define the message types. *)
val pemtypes = define_type
  {name='pemtypes',
   fixities=[Prefix,Prefix,Prefix,Prefix,Prefix],
   type_spec = 'pemtypes : ENCRYPTED | MIC_ONLY | MIC_CLEAR
               | CRL | CRL_RETRIEVAL_REQUEST'};

val pemtypes_INDUCT :
  save_thm('pemtypes_INDUCT',prove_induction.thm pemtypes);

val pemtypes_DISTINCT :
  save_thm('pemtypes_DISTINCT',prove_constructors.distinct
    pemtypes);

val pemtypes_CASES :
  save_thm('pemtypes_CASES', prove_cases.thm pemtypes_INDUCT);

(*      :      :      :      :      :      :      :      :      :      *)
(* The Proc_type field has two subfields. The first is a number *)
(* identifying the version of PEM. The second identifies the *)
(* type of security used. *)

(* Define the subset of pairs *)
val is_proctype = new_definition
  (<'is_proctype',
   --'is_proctype(proctype:(num#pemtypes))
   = (FST proctype = 4)'--);

add_theorems_to_sml 'pair';

(* Show at least one element exists in the type *)
val exists_proctype = TAC.PROOF(
  [<[],<--'ix:(num#pemtypes).is_proctype x'-->>,
   EXISTS_TAC <--'(4,ENCRYPTED)'-->
  THEN REWRITE_TAC [is_proctype,FST]]);

val proctype_TY_DEF = new_type_definition('proctype',
  <--'is_proctype'-->,exists_proctype);

val proctype_IS0_DEF = define_new_type_bijections
  'proctype_IS0_DEF' 'Proc_Type' 'REP_proctype' proctype_TY_DEF;

val REP_proctype_INVERTS :
  save_thm('REP_proctype_INVERTS',CONJUNCT1 proctype_IS0_DEF);

val REP_proctype_ONE_ONE :
  save_thm('REP_proctype_ONE_ONE',prove_rep.fn.one.one
    proctype_IS0_DEF);

val REP_proctype_ONTO :
  save_thm('REP_proctype_ONTO', prove_rep.fn.onto
    proctype_IS0_DEF);
```

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B.2. PEM_SYNTAX.SML

```

(*:      :      :      :      :      :      :      :      :      :      *)
(* Fake dekparameters -- just 16 hex characters for an initialization
   vector *)

val IV : define_type
  {name : 'IV',
   fixities : [Prefix],
   type_spec : 'IV = IV'};

(*:      :      :      :      :      :      :      :      :      :      *)
(* Definition of dekinfo *)

val is_dekinfo = new_definition('is_dekinfo',
  (---'is_dekinfo(a:(algid#IV)) = (FST a = DES_CBC)---));

val exists_dekinfo = TAC_PROOF(
  ([],(---'a.is_dekinfo(a)---)),
  EXISTS_TAC (---'(DES_CBC,IV)---) THEN
  REWRITE_TAC [is_dekinfo,FST]);

val dekinfo_TY_DEF = new_type_definition('dekinfo',
  (---'is_dekinfo'---),exists_dekinfo);

val dekinfo_ISO_DEF = define_new_type_bijections
  'dekinfo_ISO_DEF' 'DEK_Info' 'REP_dekinfo' dekinfo_TY_DEF;

val REP_dekinfo_INVERTS =
  save_thm('REP_dekinfo_INVERTS',CONJUNCT1 dekinfo_ISO_DEF);

val REP_dekinfo_ONE_ONE =
  save_thm('REP_dekinfo_ONE_ONE',prove_rep_fn_one_one
    dekinfo_ISO_DEF);

val REP_dekinfo_ONTO =
  save_thm('REP_dekinfo_ONTO', prove_rep_fn_onto
    dekinfo_ISO_DEF);

val ABS_dekinfo_INVERTS =
  save_thm('ABS_dekinfo_INVERTS', CONJUNCT2 dekinfo_ISO_DEF);

val ABS_dekinfo_ONE_ONE =
  save_thm('ABS_dekinfo_ONE_ONE',prove_abs_fn_one_one
    dekinfo_ISO_DEF);

val ABS_dekinfo_ONTO =
  save_thm('ABS_dekinfo_ONTO', prove_abs_fn_onto
    dekinfo_ISO_DEF);

(*:      :      :      :      :      :      :      :      :      :      *)
(* Definition of certificate *)
(* cert - fake it for now as a string *)
val certificate = define_type
  {name : 'certificate',
   fixities : [Prefix],
   type_spec : 'certificate = Certificate of string'};
(* since we don't really use certificate right now, will jsut *)
(* leave it here - 4/18/96 *)

(*:      :      :      :      :      :      :      :      :      :      *)

```

PEM SYNTAX

```

(* Definition of ID Asymmetric *)
(* id_asymmetric - fake it for now as a string *)
val id_asymmetric : define.type
  {name : 'id_asymmetric',
   fixities : [Prefix],
   type_spec : 'id_asymmetric : ID.Asymmetric of string'};

(*
  :
  :
  :
  :
  :
  :
  :
  :
  *)
(* Key-Info *)
(* this is the per-message encrypted by each recipient's public key *)

val is_Key_info : new_definition
  ('is_Key_info', (---'is_Key_info(x:algid#string) :
                  (* asymsgKey *)
                  (FST x) : RSA'---));

val exists_Key_info : TAC_PROOF<
  (□, (---'x:algid#string. is_Key_info(x)---)),
  (* asymsgKey *)
  EXISTS_TAC (---'(RSA,'abcd')---) THEN
  (* asymsgKey *)
  REWRITE_TAC [is_Key_info, FST, SND]);

val Key_info_TY_DEF : new_type_definition('Key_info',
  (---'is_Key_info'---), exists_Key_info);

val Key_info_ISO_DEF : define_new_type_bijections
  'Key_info_ISO_DEF' 'Key_Info' 'REP_Key_info' Key_info_TY_DEF;

val REP_Key_info_INVERTS :
  save_thm('REP_Key_info_INVERTS', CONJUNCT1 Key_info_ISO_DEF);

val REP_Key_info_ONE_ONE :
  save_thm('REP_Key_info_ONE_ONE', prove_rep.fn_one_one
    Key_info_ISO_DEF);

val REP_Key_info_ONTD :
  save_thm('REP_Key_info_ONTD', prove_rep.fn_onto
    Key_info_ISO_DEF);

val ABS_Key_info_INVERTS :
  save_thm('ABS_Key_info_INVERTS', CONJUNCT2 Key_info_ISO_DEF);

val ABS_Key_info_ONE_ONE :
  save_thm('ABS_Key_info_ONE_ONE', prove_abs.fn_one_one
    Key_info_ISO_DEF);

val ABS_Key_info_ONTD :
  save_thm('ABS_Key_info_ONTD', prove_abs.fn_onto
    Key_info_ISO_DEF);

(*
  :
  :
  :
  :
  :
  :
  :
  :
  *)
(* Definitions for origids -- just asymmetric for now *)
(* asymmid - it's either a certificate or id_asymmetric *)
val origid_asymm : define.type
  {name : 'origid_asymm',
   fixities : [Prefix, Prefix],
   type_spec : 'origid_asymm : certificate | id_asymmetric'};

(*
  :
  :
  :
  :
  :
  :
  :
  :
  *)
(* Definitions for MIC_info *)

```

B.2. PEM_SYNTAX.SML

```
val is_MIC_info = new_definition
  ('is_MIC_info', (---'is_MIC_info(x:algid#algid#string) =
    (* asymsignmic *)
    <<<(FST x) = RSA_MD2> \/\ <<(FST x) = RSA_MD5>> /\
    <<<(FST(SND x)) = DES_EDE> \/\ <<(FST(SND x)) = DES_ECB>
    \/\ <<(FST(SND x)) = RSA>>---));

val exists_MIC_info = TAC.PROOF(
  ([],(---'!x:algid#algid#string. is_MIC_info(x)---)),
  (* asymsignmic *)
  EXISTS_TAC (---'<(RSA_MD2,DES_EDE,"abcd")---' THEN
    (* asymsignmic *)
    REWRITE_TAC [is_MIC_info, FST, SND]);

val MIC_info_TY_DEF = new_type_definition('MIC_info',
  (---'is_MIC_info---',exists_MIC_info);

val MIC_info_ISU_DEF = define_new_type_bijections
  'MIC_info_ISU_DEF' 'MIC_Info' 'REP_MIC_info' MIC_info_TY_DEF;

val REP_MIC_info_INVERTS =
  save_thm('REP_MIC_info_INVERTS', CONJUNCT1 MIC_info_ISU_DEF);

val REP_MIC_info_ONE_ONE =
  save_thm('REP_MIC_info_ONE_ONE', prove_rep.fn.one_one
    MIC_info_ISU_DEF);

val REP_MIC_info_ONTO =
  save_thm('REP_MIC_info_ONTO', prove_rep.fn.onto
    MIC_info_ISU_DEF);

val ABS_MIC_info_INVERTS =
  save_thm('ABS_MIC_info_INVERTS', CONJUNCT2 MIC_info_ISU_DEF);

val ABS_MIC_info_ONE_ONE =
  save_thm('ABS_MIC_info_ONE_ONE', prove_abs.fn.one_one
    MIC_info_ISU_DEF);

val ABS_MIC_info_ONTO =
  save_thm('ABS_MIC_info_ONTO', prove_abs.fn.onto
    MIC_info_ISU_DEF);

(*      :      :      :      :      :      :      :      :      *)
(* issuer's certificate *)

(*      :      :      :      :      :      :      :      :      *)
(* recipient information *)
(* a recipient information is: (id_asymmetric#key_info), *)
(* all recipient information is: (id_asymmetric#key_info) list *)

close_theory();
export_theory();
```

Appendix C

PEM_DEFINITIONS

C.1 pem_definitions.theory

Theory: pem_definitions

Parents:
pem_syntax

Type constants:

Term constants:

```
msgreceiver (Prefix) :string
recipientkey (Prefix) :string
sDES_EDE (Prefix) :string -> string -> string -> bool
sDES_ECB (Prefix) :string -> string -> string -> bool
rRSA (Prefix) :string -> string -> string -> bool
fRSA (Prefix) :string -> string -> string
fRSA_MD2 (Prefix) :string -> string
fRSA_MD5 (Prefix) :string -> string
fDES_CBC (Prefix) :string -> string -> IV -> string
get_Key_from_ID (Prefix) :id.asymmetric -> string
get_DEK_algid (Prefix) :dekinfo -> algid
get_DEK_IV (Prefix) :dekinfo -> IV
msg_Encrypt_select (Prefix) :dekinfo -> string -> string -> IV -> string
get_Recipient (Prefix)
:string list -> (id.asymmetric # string) list -> id.asymmetric # string
get_Recipient.key (Prefix) :id.asymmetric # string -> string
get_Recipient.asyID (Prefix) :id.asymmetric # string -> id.asymmetric
get_MIC_algid (Prefix) :MIC.info -> algid
get_MIC_sigalgid (Prefix) :MIC.info -> algid
get_MIC_mic (Prefix) :MIC.info -> string
MIC.hash.select (Prefix) :MIC.info -> string -> string
MIC.sign.select (Prefix) :MIC.info -> string -> string -> string -> bool
get_KEY_algid (Prefix) :Key.info -> algid
get_KEY_asymKey (Prefix) :Key.info -> string
DEK.encrypt.select (Prefix) :Key.info -> string -> string -> string
is_PrivateS (Prefix)
:(string -> string -> IV -> string) -> string -> string -> IV -> string ->
bool
is_PrivateP (Prefix)
:(string -> string -> string) -> string -> string -> string -> bool
is_Authentic (Prefix)
:(string -> string -> string -> bool) -> string -> string -> string -> bool
is_Authentic2 (Prefix)
:(string -> string -> string -> bool) -> (string -> string) -> string ->
string -> string -> bool
is_Intact (Prefix)
:(string -> string -> string -> bool) -> (string -> string) -> string ->
string -> string -> bool
is_non.deniable (Prefix)
```

PEM_DEFINITIONS

:(string -> string -> string -> bool) -> string -> string -> string -> bool

Axioms:

Definitions:

```

get_DEK_algid |- !x. get_DEK_algid x = FST (REP.dekinfo x)
get_DEK_IV |- !x. get_DEK_IV x = SND (REP.dekinfo x)
msg_Encrypt_select
|- !x.
  msg_Encrypt_select x =
    ((get_DEK_algid x = DES_CBC) => fDES_CBC | fDES_CBC)
get_Recipient_key
|- !recipient. get_Recipient_key recipient = SND recipient
get_Recipient_asymID
|- !recipient. get_Recipient_asymID recipient = FST recipient
get_MIC_algid |- !x. get_MIC_algid x = FST (REP.MIC_info x)
get_MIC_sigalgid |- !x. get_MIC_sigalgid x = FST (SND (REP.MIC_info x))
get_MIC_mic |- !x. get_MIC_mic x = SND (SND (REP.MIC_info x))
MIC_hash_select
|- !x.
  MIC_hash_select x =
    ((get_MIC_algid x = RSA_MD2) => fRSA_MD2 | fRSA_MD5)
MIC_sign_select
|- !x.
  MIC_sign_select x =
    ((get_MIC_sigalgid x = DES_EDE)
     => sDES_EDE
    | ((get_MIC_sigalgid x = DES_ECB) => sDES_ECB | sRSA))
get_KEY_algid |- !x. get_KEY_algid x = FST (REP.Key_info x)
get_KEY_asymKey |- !x. get_KEY_asymKey x = SND (REP.Key_info x)
DEK_encrypt_select
|- !x. DEK_encrypt_select x = ((get_KEY_algid x = RSA) => fRSA | fRSA)
is_PrivateS
|- !decryptS message rxmsg decryptIV key.
  is_PrivateS decryptS message rxmsg decryptIV key =
    decryptS rxmsg key decryptIV =
      message
is_PrivateP
|- !decryptP message rxmsg dkey.
  is_PrivateP decryptP message rxmsg dkey =
    decryptP rxmsg dkey =
      message
is_Authentic
|- !verify message signature ekey.
  is_Authentic verify message signature ekey =
    verify message signature ekey
is_Authentic2
|- !verify hash message mic ekey.
  is_Authentic2 verify hash message mic ekey =
    verify (hash message) mic ekey
is_Intact
|- !verify hash message mic ekey.
  is_Intact verify hash message mic ekey =
    verify (hash message) mic ekey
is_non_deniable
|- !verify message signature ekey.
  is_non_deniable verify message signature ekey =
    verify message signature ekey

```

Theorems:

```

is_Private_DEK
|- !decryptP encryptP message txmsg rxmsg ekey dKEY0 dkey.
  (rxmsg = txmsg) ==>

```

C.1. PEM_DEFINITIONS.THEORY

```

(txmsg : encryptP message ekey) ==
(!msg. decryptP (encryptP msg ekey) dKEY0 = msg) ==
(!msg d2.
  (decryptP (encryptP msg ekey) d2 = msg) == (d2 = dKEY0)) ==
((dkey : dKEY0) : is_PrivateP decryptP message rxmsg dkey)

is_Private_msg
|- !decryptS encryptS message txmsg rxmsg decryptIV KEY0 key.
  (rxmsg = txmsg) ==
  (txmsg = encryptS message KEY0 decryptIV) ==
  (!msg key.
    (decryptS (encryptS msg key decryptIV) key decryptIV = msg) /\
    (!msg key1.
      (decryptS msg key1 decryptIV = decryptS msg key decryptIV) :
      key =
      key1)) ==
    ((key = KEY0) : is_PrivateS decryptS message rxmsg decryptIV key)

is_Authentic_MD
|- !verify sign message txmsg rxmsg ekey dKEY0 dkey.
  (rxmsg = txmsg) ==
  (txmsg = sign MD dkey) ==
  (!msg. verify msg (sign msg dkey) ekey : dkey = dKEY0) ==
  ((dkey : dKEY0) : is_Authentic verify MD rxmsg ekey)

is_Authentic_msg
|- !verify sign hash message txmic rxmic ekey dKEY0 dkey.
  (rxmic = txmic) ==
  (txmic = sign (hash message) dkey) ==
  (!m1 m2 dkey2. verify m1 (sign m2 dkey2) ekey : dkey2 = dKEY0) ==
  ((dkey : dKEY0) : is_Authentic2 verify hash message rxmic ekey)

is_Intact_msg
|- !verify sign hash txmessage rxmessage txmic rxmic ekey dkey.
  (txmic = sign (hash txmessage) dkey) ==
  (rxmic = txmic) ==
  (!m1 m2. (hash m1 = hash m2) == (m1 = m2)) ==
  (!s1 s2. verify s1 (sign s2 dkey) ekey : s1 = s2) ==
  ((rxmessage = txmessage) : is_Intact verify hash rxmessage rxmic ekey)

is_non_deniable_msg
|- !verify sign hash message MESSAGE0 txmic rxmic ekey dKEY0 dkey.
  (rxmic = txmic) ==
  (txmic = sign (hash MESSAGE0) dkey) ==
  (!m1 m2. (hash m1 = hash m2) = m1 = m2) ==
  (!m1 m2 dkey2.
    verify m1 (sign m2 dkey2) ekey : (m1 = m2) /\ (dkey2 = dKEY0)) ==
  ((dkey : dKEY0) /\ (message = MESSAGE0) :
    is_non_deniable verify (hash message) rxmic ekey)

not_Authentic
|- !verify sign hash MESSAGE0 txmic rxmic ekey dKEY0.
  (txmic = sign (hash MESSAGE0) dKEY0) ==
  (!m1 m2. verify m1 m2 ekey : m2 = sign m1 dKEY0) ==
  (!m1 m2 dkey1 dkey2.
    (sign m1 dkey1 = sign m2 dkey2) ==
    (m1 = m2) /\ (dkey1 = dkey2)) ==
  ~(rxmic = txmic) ==
  ~(is_Authentic2 verify hash MESSAGE0 rxmic ekey)

not_Intact
|- !verify sign hash MESSAGE0 txmic rxmic ekey dKEY0.
  (txmic = sign (hash MESSAGE0) dKEY0) ==
  (!m1 m2. verify m1 m2 ekey : m2 = sign m1 dKEY0) ==
  (!m1 m2 dkey1 dkey2.
    (sign m1 dkey1 = sign m2 dkey2) ==
    (m1 = m2) /\ (dkey1 = dkey2)) ==
  ~(rxmic = txmic) ==
  ~(is_Intact verify hash MESSAGE0 rxmic ekey)

is_deniable
|- !verify sign hash MESSAGE0 txmic rxmic ekey dKEY0.

```

PEM_DEFINITIONS

```

(txmic = sign (hash MESSAGE0) dKEY0) ==
(!m1 m2. verify m1 m2 ekey = m2 : sign m1 dKEY0) ==
(!m1 m2 dkey1 dkey2.
  (sign m1 dkey1 = sign m2 dkey2) ==
  (m1 = m2) /\ (dkey1 = dkey2)) ==
"(txmic = txmic) ==
"(is_non_deniable verify (hash MESSAGE0) rxmic ekey)
get_DEN_algid_CASES |- !x. get_DEN_algid x = DES_CBC
get_MIC_hashid_CASES
|- !x. (get_MIC_algid x = RSA_MD2) /\ (get_MIC_algid x = RSA_MD5)
get_MIC_sigid_CASES
|- !x.
  (get_MIC_sigalgid x = DES_EDE) /\
  (get_MIC_sigalgid x = DES_ECB) /\
  (get_MIC_sigalgid x = RSA)
get_KEY_algid_CASES |- !x. get_KEY_algid x = RSA

```

C.2 pem_definitions.sml

```

(*=====*)
(* File:      pem_definitions.sml                               *)
(* Description: general functions for PEM                        *)
(* Date:      Sept. 13, 1996                                    *)
(* Author:    Shiu-Nai Chin, Dan Zhou                          *)
(*=====*)

(* msgsender:  the actual sender of the message                *)
(* Originator: the stated sender in the message                *)
(* msgreceiver: the actual receiver of the message,             *)
(*              the one that performs PEM services             *)
(* Recipient:  the intended recipient of the message           *)
(* verify:     takes msg, signature, and key                    *)
(* message:    plain text                                       *)
(* msg:        cipher text                                       *)
(* mic:        message integrity code, or digital signature     *)
(* encrypts:   plaintext -> ekey -> IV -> ciphertext           *)

new_theory 'pem_definitions';

load_library(lib = hol88.lib, theory = '');
open Psyntax Compat;

new_parent 'pem_syntax';

add_theory_to_sml 'pem_syntax';

val msgreceiver = new_constant ('msgreceiver',
  ==:'string'==);

(* the private key of recipient *)
val recipientkey = new_constant ('recipientkey',
  ==:'string'==);

val sDES_EDE = new_constant
  ('sDES_EDE', ==:'string->string->string->bool'==);
val sDES_ECB = new_constant
  ('sDES_ECB', ==:'string->string->string->bool'==);
val sRSA = new_constant
  ('sRSA', ==:'string->string->string->bool'==);

```

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```

val fRSA : new_constant ('fRSA', ::':string->string->string'::);

val fRSA_MD2 : new_constant ('fRSA_MD2', ::':string->string'::);
val fRSA_MD5 : new_constant ('fRSA_MD5', ::':string->string'::);

val fDES_CBC : new_constant ('fDES_CBC',
    ::':string->string->IV->string'::);

val get_Key_from_ID : new_constant
    ('get_Key_from_ID', ::':id.asymmetric->string'::);

(*
  :      :      :      :      :      :      :      :
  (* these are the algorithm ID and IV for encrypting/decrypting *)
  (* message *)
val get_DEK_algid : new_definition ('get_DEK_algid',
    (--'get_DEK_algid (x:dekinfo) :
    FST(REP_dekinfo x)'--));

val get_DEK_IV : new_definition ('get_DEK_IV',
    (--'get_DEK_IV (x:dekinfo) :
    SND(REP_dekinfo x)'--));

val msg_Encrypt_select : new_definition ('msg_Encrypt_select',
    (--'msg_Encrypt_select (x:dekinfo) :
    ((get_DEK_algid x : DES_CBC) => fDES_CBC | fDES_CBC)'--));

(*
  :      :      :      :      :      :      :      :
val get_Recipient : new_constant (
    'get_Recipient',
    ::':(string list) ->
    ((id.asymmetric#string) list) -> (id.asymmetric#string)'::);

val get_Recipient_key : new_definition ('get_Recipient_key',
    (--'get_Recipient_key (recipient:id.asymmetric#string)
    : SND recipient'--);

val get_Recipient_asymID : new_definition ('get_Recipient_asymID',
    (--'get_Recipient_asymID (recipient:id.asymmetric#string)
    : FST recipient'--);

(*
  :      :      :      :      :      :      :      :
val get_MIC_algid : new_definition ('get_MIC_algid',
    (--'get_MIC_algid (x:MIC.info) :
    FST(REP_MIC_info x)'--));
val get_MIC_sigalgid : new_definition ('get_MIC_sigalgid',
    (--'get_MIC_sigalgid (x:MIC.info)
    : FST(SND(REP_MIC_info x))'--));
val get_MIC_mic : new_definition ('get_MIC_mic',
    (--'get_MIC_mic (x:MIC.info)
    : SND(SND(REP_MIC_info x))'--));

val MIC_hash_select : new_definition ('MIC_hash_select',
    (--'MIC_hash_select:MIC.info->(string->string))
    (x:MIC.info) :
    ((get_MIC_algid x : RSA_MD2) => fRSA_MD2 | fRSA_MD5)'--));

val MIC_sign_select : new_definition ('MIC_sign_select',
    (--'MIC_sign_select:
    MIC.info->(string->string->string->bool))
    (x:MIC.info) :
    ((get_MIC_sigalgid x : DES_EDE) => sDES_EDE |
    (get_MIC_sigalgid x : DES_ECB) => sDES_ECB | sRSA)'--));

```

PEM_DEFINITIONS

```

(*:      :      :      :      :      :      :      :      :*)
(* encrypted PEM information *)
val get_KEY_algid = new_definition ('get_KEY_algid',
  <--'get_KEY_algid (x:Key.info) =
    FST(REF_Key.info x)'-->);

val get_KEY_asymKey = new_definition ('get_KEY_asymKey',
  <--'get_KEY_asymKey (x:Key.info) =
    SND(REF_Key.info x)'-->);

val PEM_encrypt_select = new_definition ('PEM_encrypt_select',
  <--'(<PEM_encrypt_select:Key.info->(string->string->string))
    (x:Key.info) =
    (<(get_KEY_algid x = RSA) => fRSA | fRSA)'-->);

(*:      :      :      :      :      :      :      :      :*)
(* key convention: *)
(* in public key cryptography: ekey: public key *)
(*                                dkey: private key *)
(* in secret key cryptography: key, ekey, dkey: same thing *)

(* term convention: *)

(* MIC: a fixed-length quantity generated cryptographically *)
(* and associated with a message to reassure the recipient that *)
(* the message is genuine *)

(* digital signature: same for MIC, in public key case *)

(* signature: a quantity associated with a message which only *)
(* someone with knowledge of your private key could have *)
(* generated, but which can be verified through knowledge of *)
(* your public key *)

(* if you can retrieve the original message by decryption, then *)
(* you are the intended recipient *)
val is_PrivateS = new_definition ('is_PrivateS',
  <--'is_PrivateS
    (decryptS: string -> string -> IV -> string)
    (message: string) (* plain text *)
    (rxmsg: string) (* cipher text *)
    (decryptIV: IV)
    (key: string) =
    (decryptS rxmsg key decryptIV = message)'-->);

val is_PrivateP = new_definition ('is_PrivateP',
  <--'is_PrivateP
    (decryptP: string -> string -> string)
    (message: string) (* plain text *)
    (rxmsg: string) (* cipher text *)
    (dkey: string) =
    (decryptP rxmsg dkey = message)'-->);

(* is.Authentic: if I can check the signature, then only *)
(* the person who knows the private key could have signed *)
(* the text *)
val is.Authentic = new_definition ('is.Authentic',
  <--'is.Authentic

```

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```

    (verify: string -> string -> string -> bool)
    (message: string) (* plain text *)
    (signature: string) (* signature of message *)
    (ekey: string) =
      verify message signature ekey'--));

(* is_Authentic2: if I can check the digital signature of a *)
(* message, then only the person who knows the private key could *)
(* have signed the text *)
val is_Authentic2 = new_definition ('is_Authentic2',
  (--'is_Authentic2
    (verify: string -> string -> string -> bool)
    (hash: string -> string)
    (message: string) (* original plain text *)
    (mic:string) (* received signature of the MD*)
    (ekey: string) =
      verify (hash message) mic ekey'--));

(* if you can verifying the signature of a message digest, *)
(* then you can be sure if the message is intact *)
val is_Intact = new_definition ('is_Intact',
  (--'is_Intact
    (verify:string -> string -> string -> bool)
    (hash: string -> string)
    (message:string)
    (mic:string)
    (ekey:string) =
      verify (hash message) mic ekey'--));

(* a private key uniquely identifies with a principal *)
(* so if the message is signed with an dkey, then only the *)
(* owner of dkey would have signed it *)
val is_non_deniable = new_definition ('is_non_deniable',
  (--'is_non_deniable
    (verify: string -> string -> string -> bool)
    (message: string) (* original plain text *)
    (signature:string) (* received signature *)
    (ekey: string) =
      verify message signature ekey'--));

close_theory();
export_theory();

(* : : : : : *)
(* prove the property is_private *)
(* *)

(* the per message key is secure *)
(*val is_Private_DEN =
  |- !decryptP encryptP message txmsg rxmsg ekey dKEY0 dkey.
    (rxmsg = txmsg) ==
    (txmsg = encryptP message ekey) ==
    (!msg. decryptP (encryptP msg ekey) dKEY0 = msg) ==
    (!msg d2. (decryptP (encryptP msg ekey) d2 = msg)
      ==> (d2 = dKEY0)) ==
    ((dkey = dKEY0) = is_PrivateP decryptP message rxmsg dkey)
*)

val is_Private_DEN = prove_thm ('is_Private_DEN',
  (--'!(decryptP:string->string->string)

```

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```

(encryptP:string->string->string)
(message: string) (* plaintext *)
(txmsg:string)      (* ciphertext *)
(rxmsg:string)      (* ciphertext *)
(ekkey: string)
(dkey0: string)
(dkey: string).
(rxmsg = txmsg) ==
(txmsg = encryptP message ekkey ==
!msg. (decryptP (encryptP msg ekkey) dkey0) = msg) ==
!msg d2. ((decryptP (encryptP msg ekkey) d2) = msg)
== (d2 = dkey0)) ==
((dkey = dkey0) = is_PrivateP decryptP message rxmsg dkey)--),
REPEAT GEN_TAC THEN
DISCH_THEN (in th => REWRITE_TAC [th, is_PrivateP]) THEN
DISCH_THEN (in th => REWRITE_TAC [th]) THEN
DISCH_THEN (in th => ASSUME_TAC
(SPECL [--'message:string'--] th)) THEN
DISCH_THEN (in th => ASSUME_TAC
(SPECL [--'message:string'--, --'dkey:string'--] th)) THEN
EQ_TAC THENL
[DISCH_THEN (in th => REWRITE_TAC [th]) THEN
ASM_REWRITE_TAC [],
PURE_ONCE_ASM_REWRITE_TAC []];

(*val is_Private_msg :
|- !decryptS encryptS message txmsg rxmsg decryptIV KEY0 key.
(rxmsg = txmsg) ==
(txmsg = encryptS message KEY0 decryptIV) ==
(!msg key.
(decryptS (encryptS msg key decryptIV) key decryptIV = msg)
/\ (!msg key1. (decryptS msg key1 decryptIV
= decryptS msg key decryptIV) = key = key1)) ==
((key = KEY0)
= is_PrivateS decryptS message rxmsg decryptIV key)
*)

val is_Private_msg :
prove_thm ('is_Private_msg',
--'!(decryptS: string -> string -> IV -> string)
(encryptS: string -> string -> IV -> string)
(message: string) (* plaintext *)
(txmsg: string) (* ciphertext *)
(rxmsg: string) (* ciphertext *)
(decryptIV: IV)
(KEY0: string)
(key: string).
(rxmsg = txmsg) ==
(txmsg = encryptS message KEY0 decryptIV) ==
(!msg key. (decryptS
(encryptS msg key decryptIV) key decryptIV = msg) /\
!msg key1. ((decryptS msg key1 decryptIV
= decryptS msg key decryptIV) = key = key1)) ==
((key = KEY0) =
is_PrivateS decryptS message rxmsg decryptIV key)--),
REPEAT GEN_TAC THEN
DISCH_THEN (in th => REWRITE_TAC [th, is_PrivateS]) THEN
DISCH_THEN (in th => REWRITE_TAC [th]) THEN
DISCH_THEN (in th => MP_TAC
(SPECL [--'message: string'--, --'KEY0: string'--] th)) THEN
DISCH_THEN (in th => ASSUME_TAC (CONJUNCT1 th) THEN
MP_TAC (SPECL
[--'(encryptS: string -> string -> IV -> string)

```

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```

        message KEY0 decryptIV'--,
        --'key:string'--] (CONJUNCT2 th))) THEN
DISCH_THEN (fn th => ASSUME_TAC th) THEN
EQ_TAC THENL
[DISCH_THEN (fn th => ASM_REWRITE_TAC [th]),
UNDISCH_TAC (---'(<decryptS: string -> string -> IV -> string>
  (encryptS message KEY0 decryptIV)
  KEY0 decryptIV = message'--)) THEN
DISCH_THEN (fn th1 => (DISCH_THEN (fn th2 => ASSUME_TAC (GSYM(
  (SUBST [(<GSYM th2>, --'x:string'--)]
  (---'(<decryptS: string -> string -> IV -> string>
    (encryptS (message: string) KEY0 decryptIV)
    KEY0 decryptIV = x'--)) th1))))))
THEN
RES_TAC THEN
ASM_REWRITE_TAC []];

(*
  =
  =
  =
  =
  =
  =
  =
  =
  *)
(* prove the property is_authentic *)
(*val is_authentic_MD =
|- !verify sign message txmsg rxmsg ekey dKEY0 dkey.
  (rxmsg = txmsg) ==
  (txmsg = sign MD dkey) ==
  (!msg. verify msg (sign msg dkey) ekey = dkey = dKEY0) ==
  ((dkey = dKEY0) = is_authentic verify MD rxmsg ekey)
*)

val is_authentic_MD = prove.thm ('is_authentic_MD',
  (---'(!<(verify:string->string->string->bool>
    (sign:string->string->string)
    (message: string) (* plaintext *)
    (txmsg:string) (* ciphertext *)
    (rxmsg:string) (* ciphertext *)
    (ekey: string)
    (dKEY0: string)
    (dkey: string).
    (rxmsg = txmsg) ==
    (txmsg = sign MD dkey) ==
    (!msg. verify msg (sign msg dkey) ekey = dkey = dKEY0) ==
    ((dkey = dKEY0) =
    is_authentic verify MD rxmsg ekey)'--),
  REPEAT GEN_TAC THEN
  DISCH_THEN (fn th => REWRITE_TAC [th, is_authentic]) THEN
  DISCH_THEN (fn th => REWRITE_TAC [th]) THEN
  DISCH_THEN (fn th => ASSUME_TAC
    (SPECL [---'MD:string'--] th)) THEN
  ASM_REWRITE_TAC []);

(* assure the recipient that the sender did send the message *)
(* val is_authentic_msg =
|- !verify sign hash message txmic rxmic ekey dKEY0 dkey.
  (rxmic = txmic) ==
  (txmic = sign (hash message) dkey) ==
  (!m1 m2 dkey2. verify m1 (sign m2 dkey2) ekey = dkey2 = dKEY0) ==
  ((dkey = dKEY0) = is_authentic2 verify hash message rxmic ekey)
*)

val is_authentic_msg = prove.thm ('is_authentic_msg',
  (---'(!<(verify:string->string->string->bool>
    (sign:string->string->string)
    (hash: string->string)
    (message: string) (* plaintext *)

```

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```

(*      =      :      :      :      :      :      :      :      :      :      *)
(* prove non-repudiation *)
(*val is_non_deniable.msg :
|- !verify sign hash message MESSAGE0 txmic rxmic ekey dKEY0 dkey.
    (rxmic = txmic) ==
    (txmic = sign (hash MESSAGE0) dkey) ==
    (!m1 m2. (hash m1 = hash m2) = m1 = m2) ==
    (!m1 m2 dkey2. verify m1 (sign m2 dkey2) ekey
      = (m1 = m2) /\ (dkey2 = dKEY0)) ==
    ((dkey = dKEY0) /\ (message = MESSAGE0) =
      is_non_deniable verify (hash message) rxmic ekey)
*)

val is_non_deniable.msg = prove_thm ('is_non_deniable.msg',
  <--'!(verify:string->string->string->bool)
    (sign :string->string->string)
    (hash: string->string)
    (message:string) (* plaintext, retrieved by recipient *)
    (MESSAGE0: string) (* plaintext, used by originator *)
    (txmic :string)
    (rxmic :string)
    (ekey: string) (* public key of claimed originator *)
    (dKEY0: string) (* private key of claimed originator *)
    (dkey: string). (* private key of real originator *)
    (rxmic = txmic) ==
    (txmic = sign (hash MESSAGE0) dkey) ==
    (!m1 m2. (hash m1 = hash m2) = m1 = m2) ==
    (!m1 m2 dkey2. verify m1 (sign m2 dkey2) ekey
      = ((m1 = m2) /\ (dkey2 = dKEY0))) ==
    (((dkey = dKEY0) /\ (message = MESSAGE0)) =
      is_non_deniable verify (hash message) rxmic ekey)'--),
  REPEAT GEN_TAC THEN
  DISCH_THEN (fn th => REWRITE_TAC [th, is_non_deniable]) THEN
  DISCH_THEN (fn th => REWRITE_TAC [th]) THEN
  DISCH_THEN (fn th => ASSUME_TAC
    (SPECL [--'message:string'--,'--MESSAGE0:string'--] th)) THEN
  DISCH_THEN (fn th => ASSUME_TAC
    (SPECL [--'(hash:string->string) (message:string)'--,'
      --'(hash:string->string) (MESSAGE0:string)'--,'
      --'dkey:string'--] th)) THEN
  ASK_REWRITE_TAC [] THEN
  ACCEPT_TAC (SPECL [--'(dkey:string) = (dKEY0:string)'--,'
    --'(message:string) = (MESSAGE0:string)'--] CONJ_SYM));

(*      =      :      :      :      :      :      :      :      :      :      *)

val th = TAC.PROOF (
  [<], --'!A B. (<'A==>'B) = (<B==>'A)'--),
  REPEAT GEN_TAC THEN EQ_TAC THENL
  [DISCH_THEN (fn th => MP_TAC(IMP_ELIM th)) THEN
  SUBST1_TAC (SPECL [--'A'--,'--B'--] DISJ_SYM) THEN
  DISCH_THEN (fn th => MP_TAC (DISJ_IMP th)) THEN
  REWRITE_TAC [NOT_CLAUSES],
  DISCH_THEN (fn th => MP_TAC(IMP_ELIM th)) THEN
  SUBST1_TAC (SPECL [--'B'--,'--A:bool'--] DISJ_SYM) THEN
  DISCH_THEN (fn th => MP_TAC (DISJ_IMP th)) THEN
  REWRITE_TAC [NOT_CLAUSES]]);

(*      =      :      :      :      :      :      :      :      :      :      *)

(* This says that if I send you a message and the MIC is somehow
   changed on the way, then you cannot be sure of the source of the

```

PEM_DEFINITIONS

```

message *)

(* val not_Authentic :
  |- !verify sign hash MESSAGE0 txmic rxmic ekey dKEY0.
    (txmic = sign (hash MESSAGE0) dKEY0) ==>
    (!m1 m2. verify m1 m2 ekey = m2 = sign m1 dKEY0) ==>
    (!m1 m2 dkey1 dkey2.
      (sign m1 dkey1 = sign m2 dkey2) ==> (m1 = m2) /\ (dkey1 = dkey2)) ==>
    ~(rxmic = txmic) ==>
    ~(is_Authentic2 verify hash MESSAGE0 rxmic ekey) : thm
*)

val not_Authentic = prove.thm ('not_Authentic',
  (---!(verify:string->string->string->bool)
    (sign :string->string->string)
    (hash: string->string)
    (MESSAGE0: string) (* plaintext, used by originator *)
    (txmic :string)
    (rxmic :string)
    (ekey: string) (* public key of claimed originator *)
    (dKEY0: string). (* private key of claimed originator *)
    (txmic = sign (hash MESSAGE0) dKEY0) ==>
    (!m1 m2. verify m1 m2 ekey = (m2 = sign m1 dKEY0)) ==>
    (!m1 m2 dkey1 dkey2. (sign m1 dkey1 = sign m2 dkey2)
      ==> (m1 = m2) /\ (dkey1 = dkey2)) ==>
    ~(rxmic = txmic) ==>
    ~(is_Authentic2 verify hash MESSAGE0 rxmic ekey)---),
  REPEAT GEN_TAC THEN
  REWRITE_TAC [is_Authentic2, th] THEN
  DISCH_THEN (fn th => REWRITE_TAC [th]) THEN
  DISCH_THEN (fn th => REWRITE_TAC [th]));

(*= : : : : : : : *)
(* This says that if I send you a message and the MIC is somehow
  changed on the way, then you cannot be sure of the integrity of
  both MIC and message, since either one could have been changed *)

(* val not_Intact :
  |- !verify sign hash MESSAGE0 txmic rxmic ekey dKEY0.
    (txmic = sign (hash MESSAGE0) dKEY0) ==>
    (!m1 m2. verify m1 m2 ekey = m2 = sign m1 dKEY0) ==>
    (!m1 m2 dkey1 dkey2.
      (sign m1 dkey1 = sign m2 dkey2) ==> (m1 = m2) /\ (dkey1 = dkey2)) ==>
    ~(rxmic = txmic) ==>
    ~(is_Intact verify hash MESSAGE0 rxmic ekey) : thm
*)

val not_Intact = prove.thm ('not_Intact',
  (---!(verify:string->string->string->bool)
    (sign :string->string->string)
    (hash: string->string)
    (MESSAGE0: string) (* plaintext, used by originator *)
    (txmic :string)
    (rxmic :string)
    (ekey: string) (* public key of claimed originator *)
    (dKEY0: string). (* private key of claimed originator *)
    (txmic = sign (hash MESSAGE0) dKEY0) ==>
    (!m1 m2. verify m1 m2 ekey = (m2 = sign m1 dKEY0)) ==>
    (!m1 m2 dkey1 dkey2. (sign m1 dkey1 = sign m2 dkey2)
      ==> (m1 = m2) /\ (dkey1 = dkey2)) ==>
    ~(rxmic = txmic) ==>
    ~(is_Intact verify hash MESSAGE0 rxmic ekey)---),
  REPEAT GEN_TAC THEN

```

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```

val th3 = REWRITE_RULE [th1] th2;
val th4 = REWRITE_RULE [is_MIC_info] th3;
val th5 = CONJUNCT1 th4;
val th6 = CONJUNCT2 th4;

(*
get_MIC_hashid_CASES:
|- !x. (get_MIC_algid x = RSA_MD2) \/\ (get_MIC_algid x = RSA_MD5)
*)
val get_MIC_hashid_CASES = prove_thm ('get_MIC_hashid_CASES',
--!x. (get_MIC_algid x = RSA_MD2) \/\
      (get_MIC_algid x = RSA_MD5)--,
      GEN_TAC THEN
      REWRITE_TAC [get_MIC_algid, th5]);

(*get_MIC_sigalgid_CASES:
|- !x.
      (get_MIC_sigalgid x = DES_EDE) \/\
      (get_MIC_sigalgid x = DES_ECB) \/\
      (get_MIC_sigalgid x = RSA) : thm
*)
val get_MIC_sigalgid_CASES = prove_thm ('get_MIC_sigalgid_CASES',
--!x. (get_MIC_sigalgid x = DES_EDE) \/\
      (get_MIC_sigalgid x = DES_ECB) \/\
      (get_MIC_sigalgid x = RSA)--,
      GEN_TAC THEN
      REWRITE_TAC [get_MIC_sigalgid, th6]);

(*
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
*)
val th1 = SPECL [--!x:Key.info--]
(CONJUNCT1 Key.info.ISO_DEF);
val th2 = REWRITE_RULE [th1] (SPECL [--!REP.Key.info (x:Key.info)--]
(CONJUNCT2 Key.info.ISO_DEF));
val th3 = REWRITE_RULE [is_Key.info] th2;

(*val get_Key_algid_CASES = |- !x. get_KEY_algid x = RSA *)
val get_Key_algid_CASES = prove_thm ('get_Key_algid_CASES',
--!x. (get_KEY_algid x = RSA)--,
      GEN_TAC THEN
      REWRITE_TAC [get_KEY_algid, th3]);

(*
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
*)
export_theory();

```

Appendix D

PEM_CLEAR

D.1 pem_clear.theory

Theory: pem_clear

Parents:
pem_definitions

Type constants:

Term constants:

```
MIC_CLEAR.example (Prefix)
:string -> string -> string -> string ->
:preeb # proctype # contentdomain # id.asymmetric # certificate list #
MIC.info # string # posteb
get_MIC_CLEAR_MIC.Info (Prefix)
:preeb # proctype # contentdomain # id.asymmetric # certificate list #
MIC.info # string # posteb -> MIC.info
get_OriginatorAsymID.info (Prefix)
:preeb # proctype # contentdomain # id.asymmetric # certificate list #
MIC.info # string # posteb -> id.asymmetric
get_MIC_CLEAR_Proc.Type (Prefix)
:preeb # proctype # contentdomain # id.asymmetric # certificate list #
MIC.info # string # posteb -> proctype
get_MIC_CLEAR_text (Prefix)
:preeb # proctype # contentdomain # id.asymmetric # certificate list #
MIC.info # string # posteb -> string
get_msg_MashID (Prefix)
:preeb # proctype # contentdomain # id.asymmetric # certificate list #
MIC.info # string # posteb -> algid
get_msg_SignID (Prefix)
:preeb # proctype # contentdomain # id.asymmetric # certificate list #
MIC.info # string # posteb -> algid
get_msg_MIC (Prefix)
:preeb # proctype # contentdomain # id.asymmetric # certificate list #
MIC.info # string # posteb -> string
MIC_CLEAR.is.Intact (Prefix)
:preeb # proctype # contentdomain # id.asymmetric # certificate list #
MIC.info # string # posteb -> bool
```

Axioms:

Definitions:

```
MIC_CLEAR.example
|- !s1 s2 s3 s4.
  MIC_CLEAR.example s1 s2 s3 s4 :
  (BEGIN 'PRIVACY_ENHANCED MAIL',
   Proc.Type (4,MIC_CLEAR),
   Content.Domain RFC822,
```

PEM-CLEAR

```

ID.Asymmetric s1,
[Certificate s2],
MIC_Info (RSA_MD5,RSA,s3),
s4,
END 'PRIVACY-ENHANCED MAIL')
get.MIC_CLEAR.MIC_Info
|- !x. get.MIC_CLEAR.MIC_Info x = FST (SND (SND (SND (SND (SND x))))))
get.OriginatorAsymID.info
|- !x. get.OriginatorAsymID.info x = FST (SND (SND (SND x)))
get.MIC_CLEAR.Proc.Type |- !x. get.MIC_CLEAR.Proc.Type x = FST (SND x)
get.MIC_CLEAR.text
|- !x. get.MIC_CLEAR.text x = FST (SND (SND (SND (SND (SND (SND x))))))
get.msg.HashID
|- !x. get.msg.HashID x = get.MIC.algid (get.MIC_CLEAR.MIC_Info x)
get.msg.SignID
|- !x. get.msg.SignID x = get.MIC.sigalgid (get.MIC_CLEAR.MIC_Info x)
get.msg.MIC |- !x. get.msg.MIC x = get.MIC.mic (get.MIC_CLEAR.MIC_Info x)
MIC_CLEAR.is.Intact
|- !mic_clear.msg.
   MIC_CLEAR.is.Intact mic_clear.msg =
   (let micInfo = get.MIC_CLEAR.MIC_Info mic_clear.msg
    in
    let ekey = get.Key.from.ID (get.OriginatorAsymID.info mic_clear.msg)
    in
    is.Intact (MIC.sign.select micInfo) (MIC.hash.select micInfo)
      (get.MIC_CLEAR.text mic_clear.msg)
      (get.MIC.mic micInfo)
      ekey)

```

Theorems:

```

integrity_lemma1
|- !verify sign hash txmessage rxmessage dkey ekey.
   (!m1 m2. (hash m1 = hash m2) ==> (m1 = m2)) ==>
   (!m1 m2. verify m1 (sign m2 dkey) ekey = m1 = m2) ==>
   is.Intact verify hash rxmessage (sign (hash txmessage) dkey) ekey ==>
   (txmessage = rxmessage)
integrity_lemma2
|- !verify sign hash txmessage rxmessage dkey ekey.
   (!m1 m2. (hash m1 = hash m2) ==> (m1 = m2)) ==>
   (!m1 m2. verify m1 (sign m2 dkey) ekey = m1 = m2) ==>
   (txmessage = rxmessage) ==>
   is.Intact verify hash rxmessage (sign (hash txmessage) dkey) ekey
integrity_lemma3
|- !verify sign hash txmessage rxmessage dkey ekey.
   (!m1 m2. (hash m1 = hash m2) ==> (m1 = m2)) ==>
   (!m1 m2. verify m1 (sign m2 dkey) ekey = m1 = m2) ==>
   ((txmessage = rxmessage) =
    is.Intact verify hash rxmessage (sign (hash txmessage) dkey) ekey)
Intact
|- !verify sign hash txmessage rxmessage dkey ekey smd.
   (smd = sign (hash txmessage) dkey) ==>
   (!m1 m2. (hash m1 = hash m2) ==> (m1 = m2)) ==>
   (!m1 m2. verify m1 (sign m2 dkey) ekey = m1 = m2) ==>
   ((txmessage = rxmessage) = is.Intact verify hash rxmessage smd ekey)
MIC_CLEAR.is.Intact.Correct
|- !mic_clear.msg sign txmessage dkey.
   let micInfo = get.MIC_CLEAR.MIC_Info mic_clear.msg
   in
   let ekey = get.Key.from.ID (get.OriginatorAsymID.info mic_clear.msg)
   in
   let hash = MIC.hash.select micInfo
   and
   verify = MIC.sign.select micInfo
   and

```

D.2. PEM_CLEAR.SML

```
rxmessage = get_MIC_CLEAR_text mic.clear.msg
in
  (get_MIC_mic micInfo = sign (hash txmessage) dkey) ==
  (!m1 m2. (hash m1 = hash m2) ==) (m1 = m2) ==
  (!m1 m2. verify m1 (sign m2 dkey) ekey = m1 = m2) ==
  ((txmessage = rxmessage) = MIC_CLEAR.is.Intact mic.clear.msg)
```

D.2 pem_clear.sml

```
(*=====*)
(* File:      pem_clear.sml                               *)
(* Description: selector and security function for        *)
(*            MIC-CLEAR message                          *)
(* Date:      Aug. 20, 1996                               *)
(* Author:    Shiu-Kai Chin, with some modification      *)
(*            by Dan Zhou                                 *)
(*=====*)

(*      sign: use private key, 'dkey'                      *)
(*      verify: use public key, 'ekey'                     *)

new_theory 'pem_clear';

load_library(lib : hol88.lib, theory : '-');
open Psyntax Compat;

new_parent 'pem_syntax';
new_parent 'pem_definitions';

add_theory_to_sml 'pem_syntax';
add_theory_to_sml 'pem_definitions';

(*      :      :      :      :      :      :      :      :      *)
(* this section is what needed to be redone for a different *)
(* message structure of MIC_CLEAR                             *)

val micclearmsg = ty.antiqu
  (==: (preeb # proctype # contentdomain # id.asymmetric #
    (certificate list) # MIC_info # string # posteb) ==);

val MIC_CLEAR_example = new_definition
  ('MIC_CLEAR_example', --'MIC_CLEAR_example s1 s2 s3 s4 :
    (BEGIN 'PRIVACY_ENHANCED MAIL',
     Proc.Type (4, MIC_CLEAR),
     Content.Domain RFC822,
     ID.Asymmetric (s1:string),
     [Certificate (s2:string)],
     MIC_Info (RSA_MD5_RSA, (s3: string)),
     (* asymsignmic *)
     (s4: string),
     (* pemtext *)
     END 'PRIVACY_ENHANCED MAIL')--);

val get_MIC_CLEAR_MIC_Info = new_definition
  ('get_MIC_CLEAR_MIC_Info',
   --'get_MIC_CLEAR_MIC_Info (x: ^micclearmsg) :
     FST(SND(SND(SND(SND(SND x)))))--);

(* sender ID, this field can replace the sender's certificate *)
val get_OriginatorAsymID.info = new_definition
  ('get_OriginatorAsymID.info',
```

PEM_CLEAR

```

--'get_OriginatorAsymID.info (x:~micclearmsg)
: FST(SND(SND(SND x)))'---);

val get_MIC_CLEAR.Proc.Type = new_definition
  ('get_MIC_CLEAR.Proc.Type',
   '--'get_MIC_CLEAR.Proc.Type (x: ~micclearmsg) = FST(SND x)'---));

val get_MIC_CLEAR.text = new_definition
  ('get_MIC_CLEAR.text',
   '--'get_MIC_CLEAR.text (x: ~micclearmsg) =
     FST(SND(SND(SND(SND(SND(SND x))))))'---));

(*
  =
  =
  =
  =
  =
  =
  =
  *)
(* retrieve each sub-field from raw message field *)
(* these are not used in the following proof, other functions *)
(* are used instead *)

(* Hash Algorithm *)
val get_msg.HashID = new_definition
  ('get_msg.HashID',
   '--'get_msg.HashID (x:~micclearmsg) =
     get_MIC_algid (get_MIC_CLEAR_MIC.Info x)'---);

(* Sign Algorithm for message digest *)
val get_msg.SignID = new_definition ('get_msg.SignID',
  --'get_msg.SignID (x:~micclearmsg)
    : get_MIC_sigalgid (get_MIC_CLEAR_MIC.Info x)'---);

(* Encrypted MIC *)
val get_msg.MIC = new_definition
  ('get_msg.MIC',
   --'get_msg.MIC (x:~micclearmsg)
    : get_MIC_mic (get_MIC_CLEAR_MIC.Info x)'---);

val MIC_CLEAR.is_Intact = new_definition
  ('MIC_CLEAR.is_Intact',
   '--'MIC_CLEAR.is_Intact (mic_clear_msg:~micclearmsg) =
     (let micInfo : (get_MIC_CLEAR_MIC.Info mic_clear_msg) in
      (let ekey : get_Key_from_ID
        (get_OriginatorAsymID.info mic_clear_msg) in
       (is_Intact
        (MIC.sign.select micInfo)
        (MIC.hash.select micInfo)
        (get_MIC_CLEAR.text mic_clear_msg)
        (get_MIC_mic micInfo) ekey)))'---));

close_theory();
export_theory();

MIC_CLEAR_example;

val integrity.lemma1 = prove_thm
  ('integrity.lemma1',
   --'!(verify: string -> string -> bool)
     (sign: string -> string -> string)
     (hash: string -> string)
     (txmessage: string) (rxmessage: string)
     (dkey: string) (ekey: string).
     (!m1 m2.(hash m1 = hash m2) ==> (m1 = m2)) ==>
     (!m1 m2. verify m1 (sign m2 dkey) ekey = (m1 = m2)) ==>
     (is_Intact verify hash rxmessage
      (sign (hash txmessage) dkey) ekey)

```

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PEM_CLEAR

```

THEN DISCH_THEN (in th => REWRITE_TAC [th])
THEN REWRITE_TAC [integrity_lemma3]);

fun let_ELIM_CONV t :
  TRY_CONV (let_CONV THENC let_ELIM_CONV) t;

val th1 : let_ELIM_CONV
  (---'let micInfo : get_MIC_CLEAR_MIC.Info mic_clear_msg in
    (let ekey : get_Key_from_ID (get_OriginatorAsymID.info
      mic_clear_msg) in
      (let hash : MIC.hash.select micInfo and
        verify : MIC.sign.select micInfo and
        rxmessage : get_MIC_CLEAR_text mic_clear_msg in
        ((get_MIC_mic micInfo : sign (hash txmessage) dkey) ==)
        (!m1 m2.(hash m1 : hash m2) ==) (m1 : m2)) ==)
        (!m1 m2.verify m1
          ((sign:string->string->string) m2 dkey)ekey : (m1 : m2)) ==)
        ((txmessage : rxmessage) :
          MIC_CLEAR.is_Intact mic_clear_msg))))'--);

val th2 : let_ELIM_CONV
  (---'let micInfo : get_MIC_CLEAR_MIC.Info mic_clear_msg
    in
    let ekey : get_Key_from_ID (get_OriginatorAsymID.info mic_clear_msg)
    in
    is_Intact (MIC.sign.select micInfo) (MIC.hash.select micInfo)
      (get_MIC_CLEAR_text mic_clear_msg)
      (get_MIC_mic micInfo)
      ekey'--);

val MIC_CLEAR.is_Intact_Correct : prove.thm
  ('MIC_CLEAR.is_Intact_Correct',
  (---'(!<mic_clear_msg: ^micclearmsg>
    (sign: string -> string-> string)
    (txmessage: string)
    (dkey: string).
    (let micInfo : get_MIC_CLEAR_MIC.Info mic_clear_msg in
    (let ekey : get_Key_from_ID (get_OriginatorAsymID.info
      mic_clear_msg) in
      (let hash : MIC.hash.select micInfo and
        verify : MIC.sign.select micInfo and
        rxmessage : get_MIC_CLEAR_text mic_clear_msg in
        ((get_MIC_mic micInfo : sign (hash txmessage) dkey) ==)
        (!m1 m2.(hash m1 : hash m2) ==) (m1 : m2)) ==)
        (!m1 m2.verify m1 (sign m2 dkey) ekey : (m1 : m2)) ==)
        ((txmessage : rxmessage) :
          MIC_CLEAR.is_Intact mic_clear_msg))))))'--),
  REPEAT GEN_TAC
  THEN REWRITE_TAC [th1]
  THEN REWRITE_TAC [MIC_CLEAR.is_Intact,th2]
  THEN REWRITE_TAC [Intact]);

export_theory();

```

Appendix E

PEM_ENCRYPTED

E.1 pem_encrypted.theory

Theory: pem_encrypted

Parents:

 pem_definitions

Type constants:

Term constants:

```
ENCRYPTED_example (Prefix)
: string -> string -> string -> string -> string ->
: preeb # proctype # contentdomain # dekinfo # id_asymmetric #
: certificate list # MIC_info # (id_asymmetric # Key_info) list # string #
: posteb
getEN_DEK_info (Prefix)
: preeb # proctype # contentdomain # dekinfo # id_asymmetric #
: certificate list # MIC_info # (id_asymmetric # Key_info) list # string #
: posteb -> dekinfo
getEN_OriginatorAsymID_info (Prefix)
: preeb # proctype # contentdomain # dekinfo # id_asymmetric #
: certificate list # MIC_info # (id_asymmetric # Key_info) list # string #
: posteb -> id_asymmetric
getEN_IssuerCert_info (Prefix)
: preeb # proctype # contentdomain # dekinfo # id_asymmetric #
: certificate list # MIC_info # (id_asymmetric # Key_info) list # string #
: posteb -> certificate list
getEN_MIC_info (Prefix)
: preeb # proctype # contentdomain # dekinfo # id_asymmetric #
: certificate list # MIC_info # (id_asymmetric # Key_info) list # string #
: posteb -> MIC_info
getEN_KEY_info (Prefix)
: preeb # proctype # contentdomain # dekinfo # id_asymmetric #
: certificate list # MIC_info # (id_asymmetric # Key_info) list # string #
: posteb -> Key_info
getEN_Message_info (Prefix)
: preeb # proctype # contentdomain # dekinfo # id_asymmetric #
: certificate list # MIC_info # (id_asymmetric # Key_info) list # string #
: posteb -> string
getEN_msg_MsgEncryptID (Prefix)
: preeb # proctype # contentdomain # dekinfo # id_asymmetric #
: certificate list # MIC_info # (id_asymmetric # Key_info) list # string #
: posteb -> algid
getEN_msg_MsgEncryptIV (Prefix)
: preeb # proctype # contentdomain # dekinfo # id_asymmetric #
: certificate list # MIC_info # (id_asymmetric # Key_info) list # string #
: posteb -> IV
getEN_msg_MashID (Prefix)
: preeb # proctype # contentdomain # dekinfo # id_asymmetric #
```

PEM_ENCRYPTED

```

certificate list # MIC.info # (id.asymmetric # Key.info) list # string #
posteb -> algid
getEN_msg_SignID (Prefix)
:preeb # proctype # contentdomain # dekinfo # id.asymmetric #
certificate list # MIC.info # (id.asymmetric # Key.info) list # string #
posteb -> algid
getEN_msg_EncryptedMIC (Prefix)
:preeb # proctype # contentdomain # dekinfo # id.asymmetric #
certificate list # MIC.info # (id.asymmetric # Key.info) list # string #
posteb -> string
getEN_msg_KeyEncryptID (Prefix)
:preeb # proctype # contentdomain # dekinfo # id.asymmetric #
certificate list # MIC.info # (id.asymmetric # Key.info) list # string #
posteb -> algid
getEN_msg_EncryptedKey (Prefix)
:preeb # proctype # contentdomain # dekinfo # id.asymmetric #
certificate list # MIC.info # (id.asymmetric # Key.info) list # string #
posteb -> string
getEN_msg_DEK (Prefix)
:preeb # proctype # contentdomain # dekinfo # id.asymmetric #
certificate list # MIC.info # (id.asymmetric # Key.info) list # string #
posteb -> string
getEN_msg_message (Prefix)
:preeb # proctype # contentdomain # dekinfo # id.asymmetric #
certificate list # MIC.info # (id.asymmetric # Key.info) list # string #
posteb -> string
getEN_msg_MIC (Prefix)
:preeb # proctype # contentdomain # dekinfo # id.asymmetric #
certificate list # MIC.info # (id.asymmetric # Key.info) list # string #
posteb -> string
ENCRYPTED.is.PrivateP (Prefix)
:preeb # proctype # contentdomain # dekinfo # id.asymmetric #
certificate list # MIC.info # (id.asymmetric # Key.info) list # string #
posteb -> string -> bool
ENCRYPTED.is.PrivateS (Prefix)
:preeb # proctype # contentdomain # dekinfo # id.asymmetric #
certificate list # MIC.info # (id.asymmetric # Key.info) list # string #
posteb -> string -> bool
ENCRYPTED.is.Authentic2 (Prefix)
:preeb # proctype # contentdomain # dekinfo # id.asymmetric #
certificate list # MIC.info # (id.asymmetric # Key.info) list # string #
posteb -> bool
ENCRYPTED.is.Intact (Prefix)
:preeb # proctype # contentdomain # dekinfo # id.asymmetric #
certificate list # MIC.info # (id.asymmetric # Key.info) list # string #
posteb -> bool
ENCRYPTED.is.non_deniable (Prefix)
:preeb # proctype # contentdomain # dekinfo # id.asymmetric #
certificate list # MIC.info # (id.asymmetric # Key.info) list # string #
posteb -> bool

```

Axioms:

Definitions:

```

ENCRYPTED_example
|- !s1 s2 s3 s4 s5 s6.
  ENCRYPTED_example s1 s2 s3 s4 s5 s6 :
  (BEGIN 'PRIVACY_ENHANCED MAIL',
   Proc_Type (4,ENCRYPTED),
   Content_Domain RFC822,
   DEK_Info (DES_CBC_IV),
   ID_Asymmetric s1,
   [Certificate s2],

```

E.1. PEM_ENCRYPTED.THEORY

```

MIC_Info (RSA_MD5,RSA,s3),
[ID_Asymmetric s4,Key_Info (RSA,s5)],
s6,
END 'PRIVACY.ENHANCED MAIL')
getEN_DEK_info |- !x. getEN_DEK_info x = FST (SND (SND (SND x)))
getEN_OriginatorAsymID_info
|- !x. getEN_OriginatorAsymID_info x = FST (SND (SND (SND (SND x))))
getEN_IssuerCert_info
|- !x. getEN_IssuerCert_info x = FST (SND (SND (SND (SND (SND x))))
getEN_MIC_info
|- !x. getEN_MIC_info x = FST (SND (SND (SND (SND (SND (SND x))))))
getEN_KEY_info
|- !x.
    getEN_KEY_info x =
    SND (HD (FST (SND (SND (SND (SND (SND (SND x))))))))
getEN_Message_info
|- !x.
    getEN_Message_info x =
    FST (SND (SND (SND (SND (SND (SND (SND x)))))))
getEN_msg_MsgEncryptID
|- !x. getEN_msg_MsgEncryptID x = get_DEK_algid (getEN_DEK_info x)
getEN_msg_MsgEncryptIV
|- !x. getEN_msg_MsgEncryptIV x = get_DEK_IV (getEN_DEK_info x)
getEN_msg_HashID
|- !x. getEN_msg_HashID x = get_MIC_algid (getEN_MIC_info x)
getEN_msg_SignID
|- !x. getEN_msg_SignID x = get_MIC_sigalgid (getEN_MIC_info x)
getEN_msg_EncryptedMIC
|- !x. getEN_msg_EncryptedMIC x = get_MIC_mic (getEN_MIC_info x)
getEN_msg_KeyEncryptID
|- !x. getEN_msg_KeyEncryptID x = get_KEY_algid (getEN_KEY_info x)
getEN_msg_EncryptedKey
|- !x. getEN_msg_EncryptedKey x = get_KEY_asymKey (getEN_KEY_info x)
getEN_msg_DEK
|- !x.
    getEN_msg_DEK x =
    DEK_encrypt.select (getEN_KEY_info x) (getEN_msg_EncryptedKey x)
    recipientKey
getEN_msg_Message
|- !x.
    getEN_msg_Message x =
    msg_Encrypt.select (getEN_DEK_info x) (getEN_Message_info x)
    (getEN_msg_DEK x)
    (getEN_msg_MsgEncryptIV x)
getEN_msg_MIC
|- !x.
    getEN_msg_MIC x =
    msg_Encrypt.select (getEN_DEK_info x) (getEN_msg_EncryptedMIC x)
    (getEN_msg_DEK x)
    (getEN_msg_MsgEncryptIV x)
ENCRYPTED.is_PrivateP
|- !msg txDEK.
    ENCRYPTED.is_PrivateP msg txDEK =
    is_PrivateP (DEK_encrypt.select (getEN_KEY_info msg)) txDEK
    (getEN_msg_EncryptedKey msg)
    recipientKey
ENCRYPTED.is_Privates
|- !msg message.
    ENCRYPTED.is_Privates msg message =
    (let rxDEK = getEN_msg_DEK msg
    and
    decryptIV = getEN_msg_MsgEncryptIV msg
    in
    is_Privates (msg_Encrypt.select (getEN_DEK_info msg)) message

```

PEM_ENCRYPTED

```
(getEN.Message.info msg)
decryptIV
rxDEX)
ENCRYPTED.is.Authentic2
|- !msg.
  ENCRYPTED.is.Authentic2 msg :
  (let micInfo : getEN.MIC.info msg
   in
   let ekey : get_Key.from_ID (getEN.OriginatorAsymID.info msg)
   in
   is.Authentic2 (MIC.sign.select micInfo) (MIC.hash.select micInfo)
    (getEN.msg.message msg)
    (getEN.msg.MIC msg)
    ekey)
ENCRYPTED.is.Intact
|- !msg.
  ENCRYPTED.is.Intact msg :
  (let micInfo : getEN.MIC.info msg
   in
   let ekey : get_Key.from_ID (getEN.OriginatorAsymID.info msg)
   in
   is.Intact (MIC.sign.select micInfo) (MIC.hash.select micInfo)
    (getEN.msg.message msg)
    (getEN.msg.MIC msg)
    ekey)
ENCRYPTED.is.non.deniable
|- !msg.
  ENCRYPTED.is.non.deniable msg :
  (let micInfo : getEN.MIC.info msg
   in
   let ekey : get_Key.from_ID (getEN.OriginatorAsymID.info msg)
   and
   hash : MIC.hash.select micInfo
   in
   is.non.deniable (MIC.sign.select micInfo)
    (hash (getEN.msg.message msg))
    (getEN.msg.MIC msg)
    ekey)

Theorems:
ENCRYPTED.is.Private.DEX
|- !Encrypted.msg encryptP DEX dKEY0 dkey.
  let Key.info : getEN.KEY.info Encrypted.msg
  in
  let decryptP : DEX.encrypt.select Key.info
  and
  rxmsg : getEN.msg.EncryptedKey Encrypted.msg
  and
  dkey : recipientkey
  in
  (rxmsg = txmsg) ==>
  (txmsg = encryptP DEX ekey) ==>
  (!msg. decryptP (encryptP msg ekey) dKEY0 = msg) ==>
  (!msg d2.
   (decryptP (encryptP msg ekey) d2 = msg) ==> (d2 = dKEY0)) ==>
  ((dkey = dKEY0) = ENCRYPTED.is.PrivateP Encrypted.msg DEX)
ENCRYPTED.is.Private.msg
|- !Encrypted.msg encryptS message DEX.
  let DEX.info : getEN.DEX.info Encrypted.msg
  in
  let decryptS : msg.Encrypt.select DEX.info
  and
  rxmsg : getEN.Message.info Encrypted.msg
  and
```

E.1. PEM_ENCRYPTED.THEORY

```

decryptIV : getEN_msg.MsgEncryptIV Encrypted_msg
and
KEY0 : DEX
and
key : getEN_msg.DEX Encrypted_msg
in
(txmsg : txmsg) ==
(txmsg : encryptS message KEY0 decryptIV) ==
(!msg key.
  (decryptS (encryptS msg key decryptIV) key decryptIV : msg) /\
  (!msg key1.
    (decryptS msg key1 decryptIV : decryptS msg key decryptIV) :
    key =
    key1)) ==
  ((key : KEY0) : ENCRYPTED.is.PrivateS Encrypted_msg message)
ENCRYPTED.is.Authentic.msg
|- !Encrypted_msg sign txmic dKEY0 dkey.
  let micInfo : getEN_MIC.info Encrypted_msg
  in
  let verify : MIC.sign.select micInfo
  and
  hash : MIC.hash.select micInfo
  and
  message : getEN_msg.message Encrypted_msg
  and
  rxmic : getEN_msg.MIC Encrypted_msg
  and
  ekey : get_Key_from_ID (getEN_OriginatorAsymID.info Encrypted_msg)
  in
  (txmic : txmic) ==
  (txmic : sign (hash message) dkey) ==
  (!m1 m2 dkey2. verify m1 (sign m2 dkey2) ekey : dkey2 : dKEY0) ==
  ((dkey : dKEY0) : ENCRYPTED.is.Authentic2 Encrypted_msg)
ENCRYPTED.is.Intact.msg
|- !Encrypted_msg sign txmessage txmic dkey.
  let micInfo : getEN_MIC.info Encrypted_msg
  in
  let verify : MIC.sign.select micInfo
  and
  hash : MIC.hash.select micInfo
  and
  rxmessage : getEN_msg.message Encrypted_msg
  and
  rxmic : getEN_msg.MIC Encrypted_msg
  and
  ekey : get_Key_from_ID (getEN_OriginatorAsymID.info Encrypted_msg)
  in
  (txmic : sign (hash txmessage) dkey) ==
  (txmic : txmic) ==
  (!m1 m2. (hash m1 : hash m2) == (m1 : m2)) ==
  (!s1 s2. verify s1 (sign s2 dkey) ekey : s1 : s2) ==
  ((txmessage : txmessage) : ENCRYPTED.is.Intact Encrypted_msg)
ENCRYPTED.is.non.deniable.msg
|- !Encrypted_msg sign MESSAGE0 txmic dKEY0 dkey.
  let micInfo : getEN_MIC.info Encrypted_msg
  in
  let verify : MIC.sign.select micInfo
  and
  hash : MIC.hash.select micInfo
  and
  message : getEN_msg.message Encrypted_msg
  and
  rxmic : getEN_msg.MIC Encrypted_msg
  and

```

E.2 pem_encrypted.sml

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E.2. PEM_ENCRYPTED.SML

```

(* without any operation *)

(* Message Encryption Algorithm, and IV *)
val getEN_DEK_info : new_definition ('getEN_DEK.info',
  (---'getEN_DEK.info (x:'encryptedmsg)
   = FST(SND(SND(SND x)))'---));

(* sender ID, this field can replace the sender's certificate *)
val getEN_OriginatorAsymID.info : new_definition
  ('getEN_OriginatorAsymID.info',
   ---'getEN_OriginatorAsymID.info (x:'encryptedmsg)
    = FST(SND(SND(SND(SND x))))'---);

(* CA certificate *)
val getEN_IssuerCert.info : new_definition
  ('getEN_IssuerCert.info',
   ---'getEN_IssuerCert.info (x:'encryptedmsg)
    = FST(SND(SND(SND(SND(SND x)))))'---);

(* Message Digest Algorithm, Message Digest Sign Algorithm, *)
(* *encrypted* MIC *)
val getEN_MIC.info : new_definition ('getEN_MIC.info',
  (---'getEN_MIC.info (x:'encryptedmsg)
   = FST(SND(SND(SND(SND(SND(SND x))))))'---));

(* recipient ID. For recipient's certificate *)
(* this will not be used until later *)
val getEN_Recipients.info : new_definition ('getEN_Recipients.info',
  ---'getEN_Recipients.info (x:'encryptedmsg)
   = FST(SND(SND(SND(SND(SND(SND(SND x)))))))'---);

*)

(* Recipient ID: this is used to get the public/private key *)
(* of recipient *)
(* ----- this is not used right now ----- *)
(* we just assume recipient publickey and private key is *)
(* available *)

(* Recipient Key-info: per-message key encryption Algorithm *)
(* and Encrypted per-message key *)
(* this will be used temporarily *)
val getEN_KEY.info : new_definition ('getEN_KEY.info',
  (---'getEN_KEY.info (x:'encryptedmsg)
   = SND(HD (FST(SND(SND(SND(SND(SND(SND(SND x))))))))'---));

(* the encrypted message *)
val getEN_Message.info : new_definition ('getEN_Message.info',
  ---'getEN_Message.info (x:'encryptedmsg)
   = FST(SND(SND(SND(SND(SND(SND(SND(SND x)))))))'---);

(*: : : : : *)
(* retrieve each individual sub-field from raw message field *)

(* Message encryption Algorithm *)
val getEN_msg.MsgEncryptID : new_definition
  ('getEN_msg.MsgEncryptID',
   ---'getEN_msg.MsgEncryptID (x:'encryptedmsg)
    = get_DEK_algid (getEN_DEK.info x)'---);

(* Message encryption IV *)
val getEN_msg.MsgEncryptIV : new_definition
  ('getEN_msg.MsgEncryptIV',

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--'getEN_msg.MsgEncryptIV (x:'encryptedmsg)
: get_DEK_IV (getEN_DEK.info x)';--);

(*      :      :      :      :      :      :      *)
(* Hash Algorithm *)
val getEN_msg.HashID : new_definition ('getEN_msg.HashID',
--'getEN_msg.HashID (x:'encryptedmsg)
: get_MIC.algid (getEN_MIC.info x)';--);

(* Sign Algorithm for message digest *)
val getEN_msg.SignID : new_definition ('getEN_msg.SignID',
--'getEN_msg.SignID (x:'encryptedmsg)
: get_MIC.sigalgid (getEN_MIC.info x)';--);

(* Encrypted MIC *)
val getEN_msg.EncryptedMIC : new_definition
('getEN_msg.EncryptedMIC',
--'getEN_msg.EncryptedMIC (x:'encryptedmsg)
: get_MIC.mic (getEN_MIC.info x)';--);

(*      :      :      :      :      :      :      *)
(* message key encryption Algorithm *)
val getEN_msg.KeyEncryptID : new_definition ('getEN_msg.KeyEncryptID',
--'getEN_msg.KeyEncryptID (x:'encryptedmsg)
: get_KEY.algid (getEN_KEY.info x)';--);

(* Encrypted Message Key *)
val getEN_msg.EncryptedKey : new_definition ('getEN_msg.EncryptedKey',
--'getEN_msg.EncryptedKey (x:'encryptedmsg)
: get_KEY.asymKey (getEN_KEY.info x)';--);

(*      :      :      :      :      :      :      *)
(* extract DEK/original message/MIC from the received message *)
val getEN_msg.DEK : new_definition ('getEN_msg.DEK',
--'getEN_msg.DEK (x:'encryptedmsg)
: (DEK.encrypt.select (getEN_KEY.info x))
(getEN_msg.EncryptedKey x) recipientkey'--);

val getEN_msg.message : new_definition ('getEN_msg.message',
--'getEN_msg.message (x:'encryptedmsg)
: (msg.Encrypt.select (getEN_DEK.info x))
(getEN_Message.info x) (getEN_msg.DEK x)
(getEN_msg.MsgEncryptIV x)';--);

(* notice here the IV is the same as message encryption IV *)
(* this is my assumption *)
val getEN_msg.MIC : new_definition ('getEN_msg.MIC',
--'getEN_msg.MIC (x:'encryptedmsg)
: (msg.Encrypt.select (getEN_DEK.info x))
(getEN_msg.EncryptedMIC x)
(getEN_msg.DEK x) (getEN_msg.MsgEncryptIV x)';--);

(*      :      :      :      :      :      :      *)
(* Define security functions for PEM-Encrypted-Message *)

(* by this, we test the DEK is private. *)
val ENCRYPTED.is_PrivateP : new_definition ('ENCRYPTED.is_PrivateP',
--'ENCRYPTED.is_PrivateP (msg: 'encryptedmsg) (txDEK:string)
: is_PrivateP (DEK.encrypt.select (getEN_KEY.info msg))
txDEK (getEN_msg.EncryptedKey msg) recipientkey'--);
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and
  KEY0 : DEX
and
  key : getEN_msg.DEX Encrypted_msg
in
  (rxmsg : txmsg) ==
  (txmsg : encryptS message KEY0 decryptIV) ==
  (!msg key. (decryptS (encryptS msg key decryptIV)
    key decryptIV : msg) /\
  !msg key1. ((decryptS msg key1 decryptIV :
    decryptS msg key decryptIV) : key : key1)) ==
  ((key : KEY0)
    : ENCRYPTED.is.PrivateS Encrypted_msg message)';

val th2 : let_ELIM_CONV (
  --'let rxDEX : getEN_msg.DEX msg
  and
  decryptIV : getEN_msg.MsgEncryptIV msg
  in
  is.PrivateS (msg_Encrypt.select (getEN_DEX_info msg)) message
    (getEN_Message_info msg)
    decryptIV
    rxDEX'--);
val th3 : REWRITE_RULE [th2] ENCRYPTED.is.PrivateS;

val ENCRYPTED.is.Private_msg : prove.thm
  ('ENCRYPTED.is.Private_msg',
  --'!(Encrypted_msg: `encryptedmsg)
  (encryptS: string->string->IV->string)
  (message: string) (DEX: string).
  let DEX_info : getEN_DEX_info Encrypted_msg in
  let decryptS : msg_Encrypt.select DEX_info
  and
  rxmsg : getEN_Message_info Encrypted_msg
  and
  decryptIV : getEN_msg.MsgEncryptIV Encrypted_msg
  and
  KEY0 : DEX
  and
  key : getEN_msg.DEX Encrypted_msg
  in
  (rxmsg : txmsg) ==
  (txmsg : encryptS message KEY0 decryptIV) ==
  (!msg key. (decryptS (encryptS msg key decryptIV)
    key decryptIV : msg) /\
  !msg key1. ((decryptS msg key1 decryptIV :
    decryptS msg key decryptIV) : key : key1)) ==
  ((key : KEY0)
    : ENCRYPTED.is.PrivateS Encrypted_msg message)'--,
  REPEAT GEN_TAC THEN
  REWRITE_TAC [th1] THEN
  REWRITE_TAC [th3] THEN
  ACCEPT_TAC (SPECL
    [--'msg_Encrypt.select (getEN_DEX_info Encrypted_msg)'--,
    --'encryptS: string -> string -> IV -> string'--,
    --'message: string'--,
    --'txmsg: string'--,
    --'getEN_Message_info Encrypted_msg'--,
    --'getEN_msg.MsgEncryptIV Encrypted_msg'--,
    --'DEX:string'--,
    --'getEN_msg.DEX Encrypted_msg'--] is.Private_msg));

(== : : : : : : : : : *)

```

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(* 3. ENCRYPTED.is.Authentic.msg                                     *)
(* dkey: originator's private key                                  *)
(* dKEY0: the key of the one we think who sent the mail          *)
(* ekey: the public key of the one who we think sent the mail    *)
(* since ekey is publicly known. --- May need more work ---    *)

val th1 : let_ELIM_CONV
  (let micInfo : getEN_MIC.info Encrypted.msg in
   let verify : MIC.sign.select micInfo
   and
   hash : MIC.hash.select micInfo
   and
   message : getEN_msg.message Encrypted.msg
   and
   rxmic : getEN_msg.MIC Encrypted.msg
   and
   ekey : get_Key.from_ID
         (getEN_OriginatorAsymID.info Encrypted.msg)
   in
   (rxmic : txmic) ==
   (txmic : (sign:string->string->string) (hash message) dkey) ==
   (!m1 m2 dkey2. verify m1 (sign m2 dkey2) ekey
    = dkey2 : dKEY0) ==
   ((dkey : dKEY0) :
    ENCRYPTED.is.Authentic2 Encrypted.msg) '--);

val th2 : let_ELIM_CONV
  (let micInfo : getEN_MIC.info msg in
   (let ekey : get_Key.from_ID (getEN_OriginatorAsymID.info msg)
   in
   (is.Authentic2 (MIC.sign.select micInfo)
    (MIC.hash.select micInfo) (getEN_msg.message msg)
    (getEN_msg.MIC msg) ekey)) '--);

val th3 : REWRITE_RULE [th2] ENCRYPTED.is.Authentic2;

val ENCRYPTED.is.Authentic.msg : prove.thm
  ('ENCRYPTED.is.Authentic.msg',
   --'!(Encrypted.msg:'encryptedmsg)
   (sign: string -> string -> string) (txmic:string)
   (dKEY0:string) (dkey:string).
   let micInfo : getEN_MIC.info Encrypted.msg in
   let verify : MIC.sign.select micInfo
   and
   hash : MIC.hash.select micInfo
   and
   message : getEN_msg.message Encrypted.msg
   and
   rxmic : getEN_msg.MIC Encrypted.msg
   and
   ekey : get_Key.from_ID
         (getEN_OriginatorAsymID.info Encrypted.msg)
   in
   (rxmic : txmic) ==
   (txmic : (sign:string->string->string) (hash message) dkey) ==
   (!m1 m2 dkey2. verify m1 (sign m2 dkey2) ekey
    = dkey2 : dKEY0) ==
   ((dkey : dKEY0) :
    ENCRYPTED.is.Authentic2 Encrypted.msg) '--,
   REPEAT GEN_TAC THEN
   REWRITE_TAC [th1] THEN
   REWRITE_TAC [th3] THEN
   ACCEPT_TAC (SPEC

```

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[--'MIC.sign.select (getEN.MIC.info Encrypted.msg)'--,
--'sign: string -> string -> string'--,
--'MIC.hash.select (getEN.MIC.info Encrypted.msg)'--,
--'getEN.msg.message Encrypted.msg'--,
--'txmic: string'--,
--'getEN.msg.MIC Encrypted.msg'--,
--'get.Key.from.ID
  (getEN.OriginatorAsymID.info Encrypted.msg)'--,
--'dKEY0: string'--,
--'dkey: string'--] is.Authentic.msg));

(*:      =      :      :      :      :      :      :      *)
(* 4. ENCRYPTED.is.Intact.msg *)

val th1 : let_ELIM_CONV <--'let micInfo : getEN.MIC.info Encrypted.msg
in
let verify : MIC.sign.select micInfo
and
hash : MIC.hash.select micInfo
and
rxmessage : getEN.msg.message Encrypted.msg
and
rxmic : getEN.msg.MIC Encrypted.msg
and
ekey : get.Key.from.ID (getEN.OriginatorAsymID.info msg)
in
(txmic : (sign:string->string->string) (hash txmessage) dkey) ==>
(rxmic : txmic) ==>
(!m1 m2. (hash m1 : hash m2) ==> (m1 : m2)) ==>
(!s1 s2. verify s1 (sign s2 dkey) ekey : s1 : s2) ==>
((rxmessage : txmessage) : ENCRYPTED.is.Intact Encrypted.msg)'--);

val th2 : let_ELIM_CONV <--'let micInfo : getEN.MIC.info msg
in
let ekey : get.Key.from.ID (getEN.OriginatorAsymID.info msg)
in
is_Intact (MIC.sign.select micInfo) (MIC.hash.select micInfo)
  (getEN.msg.message msg)
  (getEN.msg.MIC msg) ekey'--);
val th3 : REWRITE_RULE [th2] ENCRYPTED.is.Intact;

val ENCRYPTED.is.Intact.msg : prove_thm ('ENCRYPTED.is.Intact.msg',
--'!(Encrypted.msg: ^encryptedmsg)
(sign: string->string->string)
(txmessage: string) (txmic:string) (dkey: string).
let micInfo : getEN.MIC.info Encrypted.msg in
let verify : MIC.sign.select micInfo
and
hash : MIC.hash.select micInfo
and
rxmessage : getEN.msg.message Encrypted.msg
and
rxmic : getEN.msg.MIC Encrypted.msg
and
ekey : get.Key.from.ID
  (getEN.OriginatorAsymID.info Encrypted.msg)
in
(txmic : sign (hash txmessage) dkey) ==>
(rxmic : txmic) ==>
(!m1 m2. (hash m1 : hash m2) ==> (m1 : m2)) ==>
(!s1 s2. verify s1 (sign s2 dkey) ekey : s1 : s2) ==>
--'

```

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```
and
  message = getEN_msg.message Encrypted.msg
and
  rxmic = getEN_msg.MIC Encrypted.msg
and
  ekey = get_Key_from_ID
    (getEN_OriginatorAsymID.info Encrypted.msg)
in
  (txmic = rxmic) ==
  (txmic = sign (hash MESSAGE0) dkey) ==
  (!m1 m2. (hash m1 = hash m2) = m1 = m2) ==
  (!m1 m2 dkey2. verify m1 (sign m2 dkey2) ekey
    = (m1 = m2) /\ (dkey2 = dKEY0)) ==
  ((dkey = dKEY0) /\ (message = MESSAGE0) =
    ENCRYPTED.is_non.deniable Encrypted.msg) '--,
  REPEAT GEN_TAC THEN
  REWRITE_TAC [th1] THEN
  REWRITE_TAC [th3] THEN
  ACCEPT_TAC (SPECL
    [--'MIC.sign.select (getEN_MIC.info Encrypted.msg)'--,
    --'sign: string -> string -> string'--,
    --'MIC.hash.select (getEN_MIC.info Encrypted.msg)'--,
    --'getEN_msg.message Encrypted.msg'--,
    --'MESSAGE0: string'--,
    --'txmic: string'--,
    --'getEN_msg.MIC Encrypted.msg'--,
    --'get_Key_from_ID
      (getEN_OriginatorAsymID.info Encrypted.msg)'--,
    --'dKEY0: string'--,
    --'dkey: string'--] is_non.deniable.msg));

export_theory();
```

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