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Worldwide Report

# ARMS CONTROL

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TASS: FURTHER REPORTS ON SDI DEVELOPMENT

Possible NASA Role

LD290843 Moscow TASS in English 0831 GMT 29 Aug 85

[Text] New York 29 Aug TASS--The Reagan Administration is speeding up the outer space militarization programme, attracting even civil departments to its realization. As is reported by the American journal "AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE TECHNOLOGY," General James Abrahamson, the head of the organization which is in charge of realization of the "Strategic Defence Initiative," has held negotiations with the leadership of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration. Considered during the negotiations was the question of putting NASA in charge of creating and putting into orbit satellites which the Pentagon needs to study the actions of laser rays beamed from earth to outer space.

Lockheed, Grumman, TRW Contracts

LD292008 Moscow TASS in English 1929 GMT 29 Aug 85

[Text] Washington 29 Aug TASS--The U.S. "Lockheed," "Grumman" and "TRW" military-industry concerns have received a 60-million-dollar contract from the Pentagon for "working out the concept" of a new space system of detecting and tracking missiles at the boost phase. This is the first step towards the practical development and creation of the "space weapons" guidance system.

CSO: 5200/1393

SDI AND SPACE ARMS

JAPAN'S JSP, CPSU URGE BANNING SPACE ARMS RACE IN COMMUNIQUE

OW200815 Tokyo KYODO in English 0801 GMT 20 Sep 85

[Text] Moscow, 20 Sep (KYODO)--The Japan Socialist Party and the Soviet Communist Party reached a complete agreement to ban the arms race in space, a joint communique issued here said Friday.

Both parties shared concern about growing danger of a nuclear war amid intensifying international tensions and agreed on the urgent and significant need to promote nuclear disarmament, it said.

Denouncing the United States for promoting research and development on the "Star Wars" space antimissile defense program, the communique called for an early conclusion of an international arrangement to ban any plan designed to militarize outer space.

The two parties said that the United States, Soviet Union and other nuclear powers are greatly responsible for nuclear disarmament, it said.

The communique was issued after the leader of Japan's largest opposition party, Masashi Ishibashi, and his team had a series of talks with Communist Party General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev, alternate Politburo member Boris Ponomarev and other Kremlin officials.

Ishibashi, chairman of JSP's Central Executive Committee, is here as head of a 13-member party delegation since last Saturday on a 13-day tour of the Soviet Union and East Germany.

The two parties also confirmed the need to ban all nuclear tests and nuclear first strike and to conclude an agreement prohibiting nuclear powers from nuclear attacks against non-nuclear states, the communique said.

The main Japanese opposition party welcomed superpower disarmament talks resumed in Geneva earlier this year and the U.S.-Soviet summit planned also in Geneva 19-20 November. The Japanese party strongly hoped for constructive results toward nuclear arms through those talks, the communique said.

JSP called for removal of U.S. Tomahawk cruise missiles, Soviet SS-20 medium-range missiles and all other nuclear missiles from the Asia-Pacific region. In response, the Soviet Communist Party said it was ready not to beef up its missile deployment in the region unless the United States takes action to change the strategic balance there, the communique said.

The Japanese party showed an understanding or broad support for a Soviet proposal to convene an Asia-Pacific security conference.

On the tense Korean peninsula, divided since 1945, both parties sided with North Korea supporting Pyongyang's peace initiatives for pullout of all foreign troops from the peninsula, it said.

The communique did not mention the Soviet-occupied northern Japanese territories but described it abnormal that no peace treaty has been concluded between the two countries 40 years after the end of World War II.

The two parties agreed to make efforts to pave the way for a bilateral peace treaty and shared the view that improvement of Japanese-Soviet ties is useful and essential for peace in Asia.

Despite some difference of view, the parties reached complete agreement on many issues, the communique said.

JSP officials said the difference of view involves the territorial issue which Moscow says does not exist.

Japan has repeatedly called for return of Etorofu, Kunashiri and Shikotan islands and the Habomai group all located just east of Hokkaido.

The Japanese Socialists and Soviet Communists pledged efforts to overcome differences and promote friendship, the communique said.

CSO: 5200/18

SDI AND SPACE ARMS

NATO'S CARRINGTON ON 'STAR WARS,' USSR POSITION

AU181721 Paris AFP in English 1705 GMT 18 Sep 85

[Text] Brussels, Sept 18 (AFP) -- North Atlantic Treaty Organization Secretary General Lord Carrington called here today on the Atlantic alliance "to be aware of the divisive potential of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI)."

He said NATO nations should be wary of reaction to the space-based U.S. initiative, popularly known as "star wars."

"We must work to ensure that we do not leave the public debate to those who assume that the Americans are either deliberately or carelessly embarked on the creation of a Frankenstein's monster that will lurch inevitably towards disaster," said Lord Carrington in a public statement released at NATO headquarters prior to a scheduled two-day trip to Portugal, to begin tomorrow (Thursday).

Lord Carrington had originally planned to present his statement in a speech to a NATO assembly in Porto, Portugal today. But he was held up here due to disruptions in European travel from a French air controllers strike.

Lord Carrington said NATO must "work to ensure" that SDI does not lead to a new arms race, adding that this was "why the U.S. Administration has so consistently put the emphasis on proceeding by negotiation to a strategic balance that allows for very substantial reductions in offensive weapons."

Lord Carrington said Soviet propagandists "go too far" in claiming that no "agreement can be concluded on offensive weapons unless the Americans renounce their SDI programme." "Quite apart from the problem of verification, (the Soviet argument is) misleading in at least one important respect," he said, referring to Soviet rejection of arms reductions as a trade-off for U.S. modification of SDI.

On the U.S.-Soviet disarmament talks that resume tomorrow in Geneva, Lord Carrington said the West should be patient since "being seen to want something badly, and to want it in a hurry, is not the way to strike a satisfactory bargain."

CSO: 5200/2780

SDI AND SPACE ARMS

FRANCE EXPRESSES DOUBTS ON SDI FEASIBILITY

PM171229 Paris LE MONDE in French 15-16 Sep 85 p 8

[Unattributed report: "France Remains Hostile to American Plan but Its Industries May Participate in It"]

[Text] "We do not support the general concept underlying the Strategic Defense Initiative [SDI], according to which nuclear weapons will become powerless and obsolete," Prime Minister Laurent Fabius said on Friday 13 September when addressing the Higher National Defense Studies Institute on the U.S. ABM space defense project.

"This concept," Mr Fabius explained, "strikes us as highly hypothetical and hence dubious. The importance of technologies, some of which do not yet exist, could not lead to an abrupt change in strategic concept. In view of the state of uncertainty which characterizes it, this U.S. initiative may therefore constitute a factor destabilizing the whole strategic scene. Under these conditions France is not in a position to give its support."

The prime minister added: "In this framework it is important to give greater consideration to the effective development of strategic cooperation among Europeans, while not failing to recognize the need for a significant American presence at our side.... Moreover the Eureka project proposed by France aims to mobilize the European nations, some of which do not belong to the alliance, for the production of the advanced technology products necessary for the future. Unlike the SDI, it is not an arms program, although the repercussions at strategic level are obvious for those countries which decide to use them."

In an interview for the specialized monthly NATO's SIXTEEN NATIONS, which is close to NATO circles, Defense Minister Charles Hernu said: "The French Government has decided not to participate in the SDI. However, this decision does not mean that French industry does not have the opportunity of participating in that program, if it proves to be in its interest to do so."

CSO: 5200/2780

SDI AND SPACE ARMS

NORWEGIAN POLL SHOWS BARE MAJORITY BACKS SDI RATIONALE

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 19 Sep 85 p 3

[Text] A majority of Norwegians think the Americans ought to implement their space weapons program because the Soviets have previously deployed space weapons, according to a Gallup/NOI public opinion [poll] commissioned by the magazine TRYGG POLITIKK. The poll shows 43 percent back this reasoning, 40 percent oppose it and 17 percent have no opinion.

The greatest backing for this view was found among male voters for the Conservative and Progressive Parties, with 66 and 60 percent respectively; while the voters for the Labor Party are opposed to the space weapons program by 49 percent to 35 percent. In the Christian People's Party, all of 54 percent are opposed, while a majority of Central Party voters said yes [to the proposition]. The Socialist Left Party has a massive majority against, with 14 percent giving their approval to the program.

In the 18-24 age group, there is a majority for the space weapons program, while the oldest voter groups are opposed. It is the three largest cities--in which all of 54 percent answered yes to the proposition--which provide the majority for the proposition that the Americans should continue with their space weapons program in order to catch up with the Soviets' lead.

CSO: 5200/2783

SDI AND SPACE ARMS

SPAIN'S GONZALEZ DISCUSSES SDI

PM181017 Madrid EL PAIS in Spanish 14 Sep 85 p 12

["F. B." dispatch: "Prime Minister Reasserts That He Will Conduct Clear Campaign in Favor of NATO"]

[Excerpt]

The prime minister, who was applauded by the reporters of the Japanese Press Club on entering the room, said that he has verified that Spain's NATO membership "in no way diminishes Spain's foreign policy." Japanese newsmen also asked about Spain's position regarding SDI, which was criticized by Gonzalez last week in Beijing during his talks with his Chinese counterpart, Zhao Ziyang.

Gonzalez said that the Spanish Government has not yet made a decision on the subject and that the various possible lines of research are being examined by the Defense, Industry, and Foreign Ministries. "Spain, being a country with a free economy," he added, "has no means of preventing enterprises interested in participating in SDI from doing so. As a government," he said, however, "we do not want to contribute to something that will serve to increase the arms race, although I am anxious about it." "Spain's preference," he concluded, "is for Eureka."

"As a Spaniard," the prime minister said, "I could not accept Spain's unilateral disarmament; neither would I be favorably disposed toward Europe's doing so."

CSO: 5200/2782

SDI AND SPACE ARMS

18 COUNTRIES REVIEW PROPOSED CHARTER FOR EUREKA

AFP Report

AU181922 Paris AFP in English 1915 GMT 18 Sep 85

[Text] Bonn, Sept 18 -- Representatives from 18 West European countries, including the ten Common Market nations, today reviewed a proposed declaration of principle for the Eureka project for European technological cooperation, informed sources here said.

The declaration, to be the constitutive charter for Eureka, will be adopted at a minister-level meeting of the 18 countries in Hannover, West Germany, November 5-6, the sources said. According to a copy of the declaration seen by AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, Eureka, widely considered the European response to the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) for space-based defense, is to function as loosely as possible, free of rigid bureaucratic structure.

Each participating country, as well as the executive body of the European Economic Community, the European Commission, will delegate a representative to serve as the liaison among the firms and institutions working on Eureka projects.

Financing is to come from the firms and institutions themselves, from money raised through public offerings and, if necessary, from government funds.

Eureka, unlike SDI, is a strictly civilian venture. It will concentrate on such high technology areas as high-speed computers, robotics, biotechnologies and lasers.

Turkey Participates

TA190732 Ankara Domestic Service in Turkish 2021 GMT 18 Sep 85

[Text] High-ranking officials of the 18 countries that are participating in Eureka, the European technological development project, have convened a meeting in Bonn, the capital of the FRG. Turkey is being represented by a delegation headed by Ambassador Mustafa Aksin, who said that by joining the Eureka project, Turkey will strengthen its position in Europe and contribute to technological cooperation to the best of its ability. Our correspondent in Bonn, Hakki Akduman, reports that during the meeting the delegates will discuss proposals concerning the Eureka project, the project's role in developing European technology, and financing issues. During the 2-day meeting the delegates will also work on the preparations for the meeting to be held by the foreign ministers of the 18 countries in Hannover on 6 November.

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FRG RESEARCH MINISTER INTERVIEWED ON SDI, EUREKA ISSUES

DW091540 Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German 9 Sep 85 pp 27-30

[Interview with Research Minister Riesenhuber by editors Richard Kiessler and Winfried Didzoleit in the Bonn Research Ministry; date not given]

[Text] SPIEGEL: Mr Riesenhuber, you promote technology, for example microelectronics, allegedly for the citizens' benefit. However, the advance of chips in 1982 and 1983 cost about 30,000 people their jobs. Have these citizens already thanked you?

Riesenhuber: The total number of lost jobs has not been determined. However, it is certain that the number of lost jobs will rise considerably if we do not use the new technologies.

SPIEGEL: Entrepreneurs modernize if it worthwhile. If the research minister encourages such investments by way of tax policy measures, the unemployed of the future thereby indirectly speed up their own "release."

Riesenhuber: At present, investments in production expansion are growing more than are modernization investments. Of course, modernization is also taking place. However, there is a major opportunity for creating additional jobs. This year, as many as 100,000 jobs have been created.

SPIEGEL: It is easy to find reasons for state subsidies. It has always been said that this is the only way for the economy to be internationally competitive. Is it really the state's business to guarantee German industry's competitiveness?

Riesenhuber: The question is whether we are allowed to help in the case of new products. In a free market that would obviously be unnecessary and even inadmissible. You are talking about chips and microelectronics. The market here obviously is not ideal.

If in Japan the Ministry of Posts alone invests DM1 billion every year for basic research on microelectronics, and if in the United States all departments, in particular the Pentagon, invest many billions of dollars every year, they no longer have an ideal competition in open international markets. Then we must also be allowed to create conditions for our industry to be competitive--by means of money as well as common European standards and training.

SPIEGEL: Subsidies for shipyards and the steel industry are also justified by the claim that other states distort competition through subsidies.

Riesenhuber: The difference is that at the end of such a "process of subsidies" I want to have a viable, independent, and competitive industry. Thus if Siemens and Philipps, without assistance, develop the megachip in international cooperation, they are supposed to advance to the top of competing countries and then get along on their own.

SPIEGEL: Industrialists and politicians have for many years deplored the fact that the Federal Republic allegedly lags too far behind in many fields. When U.S. President Reagan proclaimed the "Star Wars" project and....

Riesenhuber: ... he did not use the term "Star Wars."

SPIEGEL: ... When he launched the "Strategic Defense Initiative" (SDI) your fellow party members--ranging from Helmut Kohl to Lothar Spaeth--immediately agreed. Join in or revert to the stone age--that was the alternative.

Riesenhuber: The term "Stone Age" does not come from the vocabulary of CDU/CSU politicians.

SPIEGEL: Okay, but their memory goes back to that time.

Riesenhuber: That is the sound knowledge of the powerful tradition on whose foundation we shape the future.

SPIEGEL: From the slingshot to the laser gun--we have made real progress.

Riesenhuber: The question is: Is SDI a technical possibility that protects us against offensive nuclear weapons? The second question is: If this technology achieves that--how does it fit into our concept of disarmament policy, alliance policy, and foreign policy? These are the two demands that the U.S. President's SDI project must be assessed by.

SPIEGEL: Konrad Seitz, Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher's planning chief, thinks that we should quickly forget these "propagated goals" and--perhaps--participate nonetheless, so as not to miss the technological bus into the third millennium.

Riesenhuber: SDI cannot be justified by its application for civilian research. It must be justified by alliance policy and strategic reasons. Only when SDI can be justified in this way, will the technology minister have to examine what positive factors or risks may be involved for our civilian technology development.

SPIEGEL: Should you not say something about it in advance?

Riesenhuber: I state that technological criteria may not be decisive. SDI is justified if it is what it claims to be: a safe shield against nuclear weapons. Thus it is a matter of defense technology, alliance strategy, and disarmament policy.

SPIEGEL: The technological boost for civilian development promised by SDI advocates is no reason for you to participate in SDI?

Riesenhuber: No, not a sufficient one. However, if I see how technology for strategic aims is being developed for billions, I want to know how we can use it in the civilian sector.

SPIEGEL: Do you believe in a great technological upswing through SDI?

Riesenhuber: Such examples exist. The highly integrated chip was militarily developed. At the time, direct civilian use could not be foreseen. However, once it was there, it created its own markets ranging from entertainment electronics to machine tools and telecommunications. In such enormous technical efforts you never know what useful things may spin off from it for everyday life.

SPIEGEL: The ability to forge a sword can be useful for producing a plowshare, writes SDI opponent Hans Peter Duerr, a professor of physics. Yet, where in real life do you find the necessity to burn holes into material over a distance of 3,000 km, an indispensable ability for SDI?

Riesenhuber: Right now I do not see any need for such a laser ray on earth. However, if SDI as such makes sense and if the laser ray is developed for it then it will serve its purpose within SDI. I have never justified SDI by saying that civilian applications, the so-called spin off, might be derived from it. This at best is a nice bonus which always arises where nobody expects it.

SPIEGEL: Wouldn't it then be appropriate for the research minister to form his own judgment about whether this multi-billion dollar project can be implemented at all? Duerr, who is, after all, the director of the Werner Heisenberg Institute in Munich, holds that from the point of view of physics, the proposed nuclear shield "is in all probability impossible."

Riesenhuber: This is something rather bold to say for a physicist. As to SDI we actually do not know yet what it constitutes in detail, let alone the question about the criteria along which we would have to examine it.

SPIEGEL: Duerr says that his assumptions are the following: No secret technical details are needed to arrive at a general judgment on whether a total defense against all Soviet nuclear missiles is feasible. Such a crushing judgment on the chances of SDI would be scientifically possible on the basis of physical and geometrical considerations. Are Duerr's assumptions wrong and his conclusions faulty?

Riesenhuber: The correct approach actually is that such a project is being examined from the inside out and in this respect I will soon have much more data available than now. Then I will have here the answers to some 200 to 220 questions which the chancellor's adviser Horst Teltschik took with him to the United States. Then I will have available the study made by the U.S. "Office of Technology Assessment."

SPIEGEL: ... which is also very skeptical.

Riesenhuber: ... then I will have available the judgments of our own scientists and technicians who are among those traveling with him to the United States. Maybe it will turn out that in the meantime a combination of various conceivable technologies has been developed and that plenty of individual ideas have been combined. Something like this by far exceeds the productive power of one individual, even that of a great physicist.

SPIEGEL: Politicians, who are not great physicists, have already been shouting hurrah even without having these findings. Is participation in SDI unavoidable because the federal government is not in a position to make a different decision once Ronald Reagan embarks on this road?

Riesenhuber: The federal chancellor's government statement lists criteria and framework conditions within which the FRG's participation in SDI would make political sense. This is not a blind yes.

SPIEGEL: The federal chancellor has already said yes blindly. However, some people actually begin to see daylight after seven days.

Riesenhuber: That is your assessment. What I have described is the actual situation.

SPIEGEL: Not much remains, as it were, of the dreams for SDI harbored by a number of CDU/CSU politicians, such as Alfred Dregger. The Americans are planning to place subcontracts with enterprises which they consider interesting. Chancellor adviser Teltschik will negotiate a framework agreement in this respect in the United States. Are German enterprises not in a position to negotiate any reasonably equitable agreement without the help of officials from the chancellor's office?

Riesenhuber: The enterprises are grown up and free. It is not the job of the state to act on their behalf. However, secrecy, for instance, touches on the state's domain.

SPIEGEL: There is quite a different reason for the fact that the call for the state exists. During the past few years there have been difficulties time and again with the U.S. Government because Washington had blocked the delivery of sophisticated technology. The Americans suspect that what they install in the FRG will soon find its way to Moscow.

Riesenhuber: Cooperation in the field of science is completely satisfactory in 99 percent of the cases. Likewise, we have always settled economic issues in harmony.

SPIEGEL: You are drawing a very rosy picture. Well, in the meantime a high-ranking official has created a vacancy in the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution....

Riesenhuber: You paraphrase it in a really elegant way.

SPIEGEL: ... and deserted to East Berlin. Do you fear adverse effects of the intelligence service affair? Will the Americans be even more cautious about technology transfer?

Riesenhuber: Although the incident is not helpful at all, I do not believe that it will lead to problems on principle. By the way, we are working most closely together in top technologies related to the space station. This also extends to other fields.

SPIEGEL: SDI is a military project that is being paid for and determined by the U.S. Government in Washington. In April the Europeans all of a sudden invented a civilian technological alternative, namely "Eureka." Now, 5 months later, U.S. Defense Secretary Weinberger still asks mockingly what this actually is supposed to be. Could you explain it to him in plain language?

Riesenhuber: Well, to begin with "Eureka" is a challenge. This challenge reads: Europeans, think up something about how we can jointly solve the problems that cannot be coped with individually! That is the starting point. That is the basic idea; it is not a description of technology but the chance to challenge technologies.

SPIEGEL: Now Mr Weinberger certainly is in the know.

Riesenhuber: Here is an example: We can see that on the world markets chips are being integrated to an ever faster and higher degree, and we also can see that some firms, that are already big and not typically located in Europe, are very far ahead in this development.

If we are of the view that what is involved is a key technology then we must produce it ourselves. However, such projects are so big that they exceed the capability of even a big national enterprise; these projects are that big not only with respect to expenditures but also regarding the number of heads--and these, above all, are scarce.

What matters also is the question of whether various firms can get together and set up excellent teams that in a limited period of time are in a position to cope with very complex issues and develop answers to them?

SPIEGEL: Does "Eureka" serve civilian research and development exclusively?

Riesenhuber: Yes.

SPIEGEL: How is it possible then that the "examination of high-capacity ultra-violet laser (excimer)" appears on the provisional project list--a technology which also appears on the wish list of the military SDI program?

Riesenhuber: If the term "laser" is listed there, then this word can have completely different meanings. High-quality lasers can be used for material-processing purposes. In addition, it is characteristic of very advanced technology that it can be used for military as well as civilian purposes. Any possible military use does not alter the civilian nature of "Eureka" if the development of this technology was justified for the intended civilian purpose.

SPIEGEL: However, with a view to not irritating the Americans, the civilian "Eureka" is to be "compatible with SDI." What does this mean?

Riesenhuber: I think that the simplest explanation, which was given by the French, is the following: Participation in "Eureka" does not rule out participation in SDI, neither politically nor with regard to the matter itself. "Eureka," after all, is not a rejection of SDI.

SPIEGEL: Does this mean that a technology can be developed within the framework of "Eureka" which later on can be used for SDI?

Riesenhuber: As a matter of fact, there must be a clear-cut coordination of the goals because otherwise the choice of projects can no longer be assured. The core of the "Eureka" projects is that they are aimed at markets, and "at markets" means that they will generate products that benefit the people. That can be a European express traffic system; that can be a translation computer and it can be a video conference network between the capitals of Europe so that at long last we will have an opportunity to talk with one another instead of having a constant exchange via the press. With all due respect for the press that is ...

SPIEGEL: Do you want to put us out of work, too?

Riesenhuber: No, most probably you will get even more fascinating tasks this way. I do not worry about this.

SPIEGEL: As early as November decisions are to be made at Hannover on some of the projects. We quote Research Minister Riesenhuber: "What is worthwhile to strive for is not a Europe of technology but the application of techniques which allow man to live in peace with nature." Could you perhaps explain to us how this goal can be served with the development of a "64-megabit storage" or a "high-resolution television?"

Reisenhuber: In this respect I would like to offer you another example. Right now we are working on the following project: We want to carry out an air exchange experiment between the states of Europe in such a way that we afterwards know the answers to the following questions: Where do the emissions come from and where do emissions land? Where are the sources of harmful substances and where do they land?

If we do this in a European association we will be able, on the basis of data, to negotiate at long last with other countries which say that nothing of importance is happening within their borders. This can result in our living in better harmony with nature, because we are aware of where we cause damage and of how we can prevent it.

SPIEGEL: The technological fascination for such environmental projects is obviously kept within bounds by your principal partner, France. The judgment from Paris on the project "Decontamination and Removal of Special Toxic Waste" reads: no top technology--not suited for "Eureka."

Riesenhuber: I admit that the fascination with environmental issues varies in Europe. However, this does not mean for me that I walk away grumbling: "Oh Lord, Oh Lord"; because it is the very task of the federal government regarding environmental issues that we be the pioneers here in Europe. However, I do not play off such environmental projects against the aforementioned technical projects. We need both of them.

SPIEGEL: We can see already the well-known big corporations lining up so as to get hold of the millions in subsidies.

Riesenhuber: We are not going to have just any number of projects, but we will have to map out the really important ones.

SPIEGEL: Nothing will work with "Eureka" without state funding.

Riesenhuber: This certainly holds true, but it does not apply to each individual project. Funds certainly are needed, but the core of the matter is such assistance is bound to end in accordance with a scheme that is laid down in advance. The end must be programmed, otherwise it will not happen.

SPIEGEL: In the past the temptation not to abandon a program into which much money had been invested, has often proved to be irresistible.

Riesenhuber: A program either ends because it is a success--and then it no longer needs funding; or it ends because it is a failure, and then manly resignation is called for. Research does not rule out flops. A research that does not allow flops simply reproduces the state of the art. I have nothing against flops. I am only against careless flops.

SPIEGEL: "Eureka" is not to be confined to the EC countries. Neutral states, such as Sweden or Austria, are also invited to participate. Could you imagine that East Bloc countries would also participate, as for instance regarding the express traffic systems or environmental research?

Riesenhuber: I have not thought this through. The two examples that you have given are well-considered examples. It will have to be examined as to whether this will work within "Eureka" or elsewhere. Regarding the "Transrapid," the magnetic high-speed railway, a Hannover-Berlin line had once been discussed. It is obvious that cooperation with the GDR in this respect would make sense, if the project would materialize. And regarding environmental research we welcome any cooperation with East Bloc states.

SPIEGEL: In all your activities you actually cannot escape one thing: The government will rule as to what is understood by high-growth sectors or technologies of the future and it will allocate its resources there. Governments in the past have not been very successful in this respect. The supersonic jet Concorde, nuclear energy, the Air Bus--not all of them have become resounding economic successes.

Riesenhuber: I do not believe this is the case. Nuclear technology has been an obvious success and the Air Bus is needed in the markets. However, it is correct in principle that the state initially does not have any knowledge concerning the fate of future technologies. Our sole chance is that we will learn from those who know something about the matter, meaning the scientists from the fields of research or economy. This we are doing very intensively.

SPIEGEL: Kohl's adviser Horst Teltschik deplores the fact that the division of departments is complicating effective decision-making in technology policy. The result is duplication of effort, overlappings or departmental egotism. After 1987 a new division of labor in the ministries must be considered. Will you be participating?

Riesenhuber: One can always imagine an even better organization. I am quite satisfied with the current assignment of responsibilities to the departments.

SPIEGEL: So you are looking forward cheerfully, if the voters and Helmut Kohl so desire, to another legislative period in which you will be the research minister?

Riesenhuber: It's you that said that.

SPIEGEL: Mr Riesenhuber, we thank you for this interview.

CSO: 5200/2776

SDI AND SPACE ARMS

'CONSIDERABLE PROGRESS' MADE AT EUREKA MEETING

AU191433 Paris AFP in English 1401 GMT 19 Sep 85

[Text] Bonn, Sept 19 (AFP) -- The Eureka project on European technological cooperation is "gradually taking shape" following a two-day meeting of representatives from 18 European countries during which "considerable progress" was made, the leader of the French delegation said here today.

Claude Arnaud, who shuttled between European capitals earlier this year to develop French President Francois Mitterrand's initiative, said two further preparatory meetings were planned before the charter for Eureka is due to be adopted at a minister-level meeting of the 18 countries in Hannover November 5-6. West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl and Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher will attend the meeting, as will the French Foreign Minister Roland Dumas and Research and Technology Minister Hubert Curien.

The first of the preparatory meetings will be held in London on October 14 concentrating on finance. Differences still exist over government funding, Mr Arnaud said. Britain wants to avoid pouring in public money as much as possible. The second meeting will be here on October 16-17 to settle outstanding organisational questions. Agreement has yet to be reached on the need for a permanent body to oversee the project.

Industrialists and not civil servants will mainly define areas in which they want to participate, Mr Arnaud said. Each participating country, as well as the executive body of the European Economic Community, the European Commission, will delegate a representative to serve as the liaison among the firms and institutions working on Eureka projects.

Eureka is a strictly civilian venture. It will concentrate on such high technology areas as high-speed computers, robotics, biotechnologies and lasers.

CSO: 5200/2782

BRIEFS

ITALY'S SDI STANCE STILL UNDEFINED--Rome, 17 Sep (ANSA)--The Italian Government has still not worked out its stance on the Reagan administration's "Star Wars" proposal, more officially known as the Strategic Defense Initiative [SDI], Italian Foreign Minister Giulio Andreotti and here today. He was motivating his rejection of a debate on the problem in the Rome lower house's Foreign Affairs Commission. The request for a debate was advanced by the Communist Party's floor-leader Giorgio Napolitano. "The government will inform Parliament rapidly once its attitude has been defined," Andreotti said. [Text] [Rome ANSA in English 1540 GMT 17 Sep 85 AU]

CSO: 5200/2780

## MOSCOW: U.S. CRUISE MISSILE INCREASE IMPAIRS SECURITY

LD010221 Moscow in English to North America 2200 GMT 31 Aug 85

[Text] In the past 3 years 1,080 nuclear missiles have been deployed on American strategic B52 bombers. Another 420 such missiles are to be added shortly. Simultaneously, the United States Navy is being equipped with cruise missiles. Here is comment from Yevgeniy Nikitin:

Before the end of the year the number of United States warships carrying cruise missiles will have reached 80. Within the next few years the number will increase to 175. Land-based cruise missiles are being rapidly sited in a number of European NATO countries. The cruise missile production facilities are also being expanded steadily. Four plants have been built with the latest equipment. They include a new plant of the Boeing company in Kent, Washington. Another plant of the General Dynamics company has been reconstructed in San Diego, California. But even that is not enough for the Pentagon. Since 1983 development of advanced cruise missiles of a new generation is going ahead in the United States. The total output of cruise missiles for massive deployment in all the armed services has been fixed by the Pentagon at more than 12,000 units.

From the viewpoint, the United States attitude to talks with the USSR on this new type of weaponry is becoming quite clear. In the mid-1970's the United States rejected the Soviet proposals not to develop and not to manufacture cruise missiles. Later, the United States refused to ratify the SALT II treaty, and thus hampered action on a protocol to the treaty that provided on a temporary basis for limiting sea- and land-based cruise missiles with a range of more than 600 kilometers. Under the protocol the two countries pledged to consider later the issue of cruise missiles, with a view to its final solution.

As we see, the United States has approached the issue in a special way. It has started a program to manufacture large numbers of cruise missiles to equip its Armed Forces with. What are these weapons? They are cruise missiles. And why have they drawn such close attention of the military and policymakers? One of the designers of cruise missiles, Mr Siemer, said in an interview to the Italian newspaper PAESE SERA he's absolutely sure the cruise missile is certainly an offensive, first strike weapon. A weapon quite useless if it's not to be utilized for a sudden attack. Yes indeed, cruise missiles are a first strike weapon. But the weapon has another special feature: It's very difficult, even impossible, to detect it. For example, a cruise missile equipped with a nuclear warhead is very hard to tell from an ordinary missile. American specialists, who, together with policymakers, talk at length about their

allegiance to the principle of firm control and verification, have tried to make the nuclear and conventional warheads quite identical. The negative stand on the Soviet proposals to stop development and deployment of cruise missiles, a stand taken by the American leaders as far as 10 years back, has meant as could be expected, a new round in the arms race. The Washington strategists have failed, and will fail again, to attain military superiority over the Soviet Union, but security around the world, including that of the United States itself, has been greatly impaired.

CSO: 5200/1400

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

USSR: DEPLOYMENT ISSUE CRUCIAL IN UPCOMING DUTCH ELECTION

PM061517 Moscow ZA RUBEZHOM in Russian No 35, 23-29 Aug 85 (Signed to Press 22 Aug 85) pp 12-13

[TASS correspondent Oleg Pivovarov's telephone dispatch: "At the Onset of the 'Hot Fall' in the Netherlands" -- first paragraph is ZA RUBEZHOM introduction]

[Excerpts] So far the government of the Netherlands (territory 36,900 square km, population 14.5 million) has not agreed to the deployment of U.S. missiles, despite growing pressure by NATO and Washington. Two important events are due this fall: the parliamentary session during which the Labor Party, which has the largest number of deputies, is preparing to fight on the missiles issue; and the national referendum organized by the country's antiwar forces with the demand for refusal to implement the NATO decision on missiles deployment. The position of political forces advocates missile deployment is further complicated by the approaching parliamentary elections (May 1986), with chances of victory directly dependent on their stance on the missiles.

The Hague -- One cannot completely rule out the possibility that the supporters of missile deployment in the Netherlands will manage to obtain the appropriate decision by the government and push it through parliament, even if only by an insignificant majority. But in order to achieve this they would need to stifle all opposition to such a decision within the ruling coalition and primarily among the Christian Democrats. Should this occur, the struggle against the appearance of missiles will flare even more strongly along the "fall-back defense lines."

The actual deployment must be preceded by the conclusion of the relevant agreement with the United States. But the Labor Party, at present in opposition, has already declared that even if the ruling coalition urgently concludes such an agreement before the parliamentary elections due to be held next May, the Labor Party will strive for a review of such an agreement. For this purpose it has to be part of the government. All recent public opinion polls indicate that, if parliamentary elections were to be held now, this party could increase its seats in parliament from 47 to 64, while the Christian Democrats and right-wing liberals together would lose the slight majority they have at present. This means that, provided the present trend in voters' intentions is maintained, the Labor Party will gain the right to form the next government. The presence of numerous political parties in the Netherlands has resulted in a situation where not a single one of them is in a position to rule the country by itself, since it cannot obtain a majority in parliament. But if it were to come in first, the Labor Party would be in a position to force its government partners, be they the Christian Democrats or the right-wing liberals, to make substantial concessions.

There is no doubt that, despite the vast importance of the question of missile deployment for the Dutch, socioeconomic problems will also play their role in the elections. The Labor Party's position on these issues is another reason why a large number of voters have turned towards it. Relying on the trade unions' support, this party counters the present attack on the broad masses' living standards and the contraction of the social security system with a program, though limited, to combat the high unemployment, presently standing at 800,000, and also measures aimed at a fairer distribution of incomes and of the burden of the economic crisis.

But the Labor Party is a typical Western European social democratic party, limiting itself to half-measures and abandoning its election promises once it is in power. Furthermore, the Christian Democrats, to all intents and purposes having already launched their election campaign, are promising to soften their program of rigid economies and cuts of appropriations for social needs.

In any case, the two key issues -- missile deployment and socioeconomic policy -- will be at the center of the entire election campaign, promising to make it extremely tense.

CSO: 5200/1400

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

IKV'S FABER HITS DUTCH LABOR PARTY ON MISSILE STANCE

Amsterdam DE VOLKSKRANT in Dutch 23 Aug 85 p 7

[Report on interview with IKV (Interchurch Peace Council) Secretary Faber by Cor Groeneweg and Theo Klein: "PvdA (Labor Party) Essentially Wants to Modify Position on Cruise Missiles; Lubbers Might still Postpone the Placing Decision a Little Longer"; date not given]

[Text] An unexpected shadow hangs over the start of the public petition against the cruise missiles: dissension. The PvdA, a member of the organizing committee No to Cruise Missiles (KKN), has made--according to counterpart IKV--a change in the draft election program which does not chime with the what the petition calls for.

One secretary in the KKN committee, Faber of the Interchurch Peace Council (IKV), is no longer very sure that the other KKN secretary, Van Traa of the PvdA, will continue to be opposed to the placing. In order not to advertise the internal division too much, Faber kept silent at the press conference on Thursday which was supposed to provide a confident start for the petition.

In his IKV office in The Hague Faber is willing, however, to discuss the effect which, in his opinion, the PvdA position has on the petition. "Now we will have to produce one-half million more signatures to convince Prime Minister Lubbers," he concludes. After a thorough study of the election platform Faber has become, if anything, more negative in his opinion of the PvdA's position.

As far as he is concerned, the large-scale campaign for signatures now will not only be an appeal to the government and parliament to abandon the placing, but Faber also sees the petition as an appeal to the PvdA congress to revise the election platform.

Halting

"Four years ago the PvdA had an anti-nuclear arms program. They abandoned that. Now the PvdA is no longer looking for ways to eliminate nuclear arms, but it is looking at the number of nuclear arms which will suffice. The PvdA wants to halt the placing of medium-range weapons in Europe. A Dutch 'No' must promote that halting.

"However, the PvdA is accepting the number placed in the meantime. Then if there is a halt, the logical consequence is that some are allowed on Dutch soil. That is no longer a principled 'no.' What is happening here is that the PvdA is choosing the shortest distance to the CDA."

According to Faber the PvdA herewith is choosing an "essentially different line" from before. "I think that the party's supporters do not realize that, for the PvdA is still saying it is opposed to the placing of cruise missiles in the Netherlands. But it is also a matter of the policy behind it."

"That is also noticeable in the passage on the Dutch nuclear tasks. The PvdA now turns out to be a supporter of the concept of "common security," shared security. In the past their line was: reduce to one or two tasks and eliminate the rest later on. That contained an individual Dutch initiative. Now the desire for a reduction has been made dependent on a total European approach. That limits the room for our own initiative to zero. Then I think: what was the use of discussing together for so many years?"

#### Pressure

Faber ascribes the "turnabout" of the PvdA to pressure, especially from the West German and French social democrat sister parties. "Those recently have put considerable effort into trying to get the West European social democrats on one line with, for example, that concept of common security. Now the PvdA has been accommodated into that West European approach."

"That is the reason why, in the Federal Republic of Germany, the social democrats and the peace movement have grown apart so much. I fear it might happen here too. First there was a period of growing closer to each other, but now they'll start growing apart. I am worried about that. With the PvdA, no doubt the desire to take part in the government played a role. They want part responsibility for the nuclear policy, whereas for a long time they had created the impression of being against it."

[Question] But the alternative of a new CDA [Christian Democratic Appeal]-VVD [Peoples' Party for Freedom and Democracy] cannot seem very attractive to the peace movement either.

[Faber] "You might indeed wonder whether the cruise missiles can be stopped without the PvdA in the government. Therefore the PvdA is needed. But it is a matter of the nuclear policy. The way the PvdA presents it, it fits perfectly into the approach of the allies. Possibly there will be no cruise missiles in the Netherlands with the PvdA in the government, but otherwise nothing changes."

"If you want to safeguard only the Netherlands from the placing, what is the significance of that? The discussion in the Netherlands concerned a policy different in principle. This program is no longer directed at a policy which cancels placing in the other countries. In 1986, when this program is to go into effect, 2 to 300 missiles will have been placed already. But if

then they decide in Geneva to maintain that ceiling, I don't see where the PvdA gets the freedom in this program not to place."

[Question] Does this PvdA position hamper the public petition?

"No," Faber answers resolutely. "This platform is only a proposal. The party still has to decide on it. The PvdA is in the KKN on the basis of a radical no against the missiles, supplied by the first sentence in the petition's demand: 'I am opposed to nuclear armament.' Just let the PvdA put that alongside the program. The KKN slogan is policy. The platform is not policy yet."

Faber adds to that: "I admit that it does not make things easier for us. But once again, at this moment it is only a piece of paper. If the petition becomes a great success, then that will also put pressure on the PvdA to clarify its position. The draft election program must be amended. Where it states decrease, it should state removal. Then it will look fine."

[Question] On the other hand, it might perhaps be simpler for Lubbers to just forget about the petition.

[Faber] "If there is great confusion in such an important political party, it will indeed be more difficult for the public to sell the matter to the government. The public petition must break through that confusion. We will probably need one half million more signatures now to convince Lubbers. I hope that that additional number of people will indeed participate in order to put pressure on the PvdA."

[Question] And if the PvdA program should remain unaltered?

[Faber] "That won't happen. I know plenty of PvdA members who would change it right away. Believe me, in this program the CDA and PvdA can agree in the matter of the cruise missiles. They differ only in time, no longer in principle. It is no longer a principled no."

[Question] What do you expect as to the November decision?

[Faber] "I think that under these circumstances Lubbers will look for a wording which will still cause some delay, until after the elections. The PvdA hopes that delay will result in permanent delay and further causes no problems. Lubbers will take advantage of that."

[Question] How many signatures are needed to be able to speak of success and to have Lubbers pay any attention to it?

[Faber] "Millions. In any event more than 2 million. Cards are being distributed to 5.5 million addresses. Just figure it out. I like to compare this petition most of all to the two previous ones for freedom of education and for the general voting right. It was a matter of an altered conception of standards. Those petitions did not yield an immediate success, but when that altered conception has been sufficiently rooted, it persists. Perhaps the result of this petition will be noticeable only in a marginal way in the

government decision of 1 November, but then it will persist in the coalition discussions. I would not be surprised if the government created new latitude in the decision."

[Question] Thus you don't consider the chance for a direct result very great?

[Faber] "I am very doubtful as to whether the government will say "no" right away. I don't believe that. But a reaction can't fail to occur. With those two former petitions you also saw that, if the government did not respond to an altered conception among the people, the matter came up later again with much greater force. In that sense I also expect political results in the long run.

"Those cruise missiles will not come. But the condition is that the petition become a success. If it does not turn out well, only 1 million signatures for example, then one should simply determine that interest in the subject is waning. Then politics won't pay much attention to it. This PvdA program unfortunately doesn't make things easier for us."

8700

CSO: 5200/2764

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

BRIEFS

FRG'S GENSCHER ON ARMS REDUCTION--Bonn, 19 Sep (DPA)--At the start of the new round of U.S.-Soviet disarmament talks in Geneva, Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher has reaffirmed that the Federal Government's aim is to prevent an arms race in space and to achieve balanced and verifiable agreements on a drastic reduction of nuclear weapons. With this formulation Genscher recalled in Bonn today the commitment of the two superpowers, who named these goals in Geneva on 8 January. The minister noted that as the summit meeting between U.S. President Ronald Reagan and General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev draws near, the disarmament talks are of great importance. The reduction of medium-range missiles is of particular interest for the FRG Government. Bonn is still willing for a total renunciation of this category of weapons by both sides. [Text] [Hamburg DPA in German 1023 GMT 19 Sep 85 LD]

CSO: 5200/2779

CHEMICAL/BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

HONECKER CHEMICAL WEAPONS PROPOSAL TO FRG'S KOHL VIEWED  
NEUES DEUTSCHLAND Editorial

AU171037 East Berlin NEUES DEUTSCHLAND in German 16 Sep 85 p 2

[NEUES DEUTSCHLAND editorial: "A Concrete Step for Consolidating Peace in Europe"]

[Text] The 13 September 1985 letter from Erich Honecker, general secretary of the SED Central Committee and chairman of the GDR State Council, to FRG Chancellor Kohl, the text of which is published in today's NEUES DEUTSCHLAND, announces the proposal of the governments of the FRG's two eastern neighbor countries, the CSSR and GDR, to enter state negotiations on an agreement to eliminate or keep chemical weapons away from their territories. A letter to the same effect was sent to the FRG Government by Prime Minister Strougal on behalf of the CSSR Government.

The new disarmament proposal of the GDR and CSSR governments is a logical result of the longstanding efforts of the community of socialist states as well as of the joint political initiative of the SED and SPD for creating a chemical weapons-free zone in Europe. The GDR and CSSR proposal aims at making a concrete, feasible and verifiable step on the way to an all-European and, finally, global ban on all chemical weapons. Negotiations on a global ban of chemical weapons have been going on in Geneva for 15 years. Unfortunately, at present it is not expected that the negotiations will be concluded in the near future.

A regional partial solution could have a pilot function in this respect and could help achieve a breakthrough. Furthermore, it is easier for three countries -- provided that they are sincerely willing to negotiate -- to come to an understanding than for many. A chemical weapons-free zone in central Europe could be created by withdrawing existing chemical weapons and keeping them away from this area.

An agreement between the GDR, CSSR, and FRG on the formation of a chemical weapons-free zone, which could be joined by other states, would particularly serve confidence-building in central Europe at the border between the two different social systems and the two strongest military alliances of our time. This would have the effect of a signal for our continent and beyond. In addition, it must be taken into consideration that central Europe is a densely populated area where there is not only a concentration of chemical industries, but where, above all, large amounts of chemical agents are already stored. The catastrophes of Utah, Seveso, and Bhopal demonstrated in an alarming way the extremely dangerous effect of accumulating poisonous chemical substances. The main danger, however, results from the fact that the United States -- as can be conclusively proved -- in its official concept of NATO warfare in Europe, considers the combined use of conventional, nuclear, and electronic weapons, as well as totally new chemical weapons.

According to international organizations, the United States already has more than 55,000 metric tons of highly poisonous nerve gas. There are 150,000 metric tons of ammunition, supplied with these chemical agents, always ready to be used in battle. This would be enough to destroy all of mankind many times over in the most atrocious way. The majority of these weapons are located in U.S. military bases in the FRG, Great Britain, and Italy, as well as on aircraft carriers in the Mediterranean and Atlantic.

For quite some time the Pentagon laboratories have been developing new binary chemical weapons and psychological agents. In this case two relatively "harmless" chemical substances can be stored or transported separately. Then, when they are mixed in the bomb, grenade, or missile, they gain their lethal, mass destructive brisance.

According to official U.S. statements, \$10 billion will be spent over the next 5 years on this program of "modernizing" the American potential of chemical weapons as part of the striving for military supremacy. Due to the resistance of the public, the U.S. Congress has currently approved "only" \$155 million as of 1 October 1986 for starting large-scale production of binary chemical weapons in Pine Bluff (Arkansas). The House of Representatives combines this with the condition that the West European NATO states agree to deployment of the new binary chemical weapons on their territory. It is clear: the United States itself does not want these dangerous substances because the risks are well known. The substances are not to be used there, either. According to the Pentagon doctrine, chemical weapons are only of military "use" if they are deployed very close to the intended "main line of resistance." For years NATO Commander in Chief General Rogers has never made a secret of where this line is: at the borders of the FRG with the GDR and CSSR.

As it is said in Washington, the United States is first secretly preparing a new NATO decision for updating the NATO forces, this time directed at introducing the new binary chemical weapons. It is therefore trying to mobilize all forces with close political connections to the United States, particularly in the FRG. As usual, in order to deceive public opinion, the lie of the century of a "threat from the East," of an alleged but not at all proven, "enormous Soviet superiority" in chemical weapons, which must be "made up for" quickly "in the interests of NATO security," is used.

This pattern is already pretty well known.

This lie of such a threat has been used to justify all new NATO weapons systems to date; the last instance concerned the new American intermediate-range missiles in Western Europe. Each new step in the arms buildup, however, has resulted in less security for the respective countries instead of more. Europe has become a highly explosive powder keg. But the peoples of the continent are realizing more and more that the armament spiral must be halted at last. They do not want to be pushed nearer and nearer to the abyss of war and their own destruction. Therefore, the joint political initiative of the SED and SPD for creating a chemical weapons-free zone in Europe has found great positive resonance on our continent from the most diverse political forces, parties, governments, and parliaments in the East and West.

Of course, the GDR did not make foreign policy passing over the FRG Government with this party initiative. It knows very well who must be addressed in Bonn when state agreements are concerned. But the GDR has declared its willingness to work together with all forces of realism and reason in the world that are ready to make concrete steps for securing peace and for warding off the threat of a nuclear inferno and a chemical holocaust.

As is demonstrated by the coming about of the SED-SPD political initiative, humane responsibility for peace and security is dominating and successful in spite of all existing political and ideological differences and contrasts.

The joint SED-SPD initiative is above all a political deed for peace and disarmament. It expressly states that it cannot substitute for negotiations between the governments, but it can stimulate and promote them. Influential European and non-European statesmen and politicians stress that the skeleton agreement proposed by the SED and SPD has been worked out in a respectable and serious manner. It is founded on the principles of equality and equal security.

Erich Honecker's letter to Chancellor Helmut Kohl directly appeals to the FRG Government. It concerns the central issue of relations between the two German states. Some politicians in Bonn consider so-called "human alleviations" as the central issue. What, however, is the greatest alleviation for a man? Past and present show that the all-encompassing question is the securing of peace and the concrete contribution of the two German states to this. A consolidated peace and a return to detente would liberate all men from the terrible nightmare of the threat of war and would let them breathe freely again.

The joint declaration on the meeting of Erich Honecker and Chancellor Kohl on 12 March 1985 in Moscow reads: "Never again must war emanate from German soil; only peace shall emanate from German soil!" This avowal is judged by men according to concrete steps towards arms limitation and disarmament. Medium-sized and small states, too, can and must take active steps toward securing peace. The creation of a chemical weapons-free zone would be a real step towards "Ensuring peace with ever fewer weapons." It would serve the national interests of all European peoples and states as well as international security.

In Berlin, the capital of the GDR, a response to this question is hoped for that is in the interests of man and highly beneficial to further development of the relations between the GDR and FRG. There is the concrete chance that the GDR, the CSSR, and the FRG can promote and facilitate the dialogue and future relations between the East and West.

The FRG Government, too, should dare to make a beginning.

CHEMICAL/BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

Ost Remarks

LD131649 Hamburg DPA in German 1551 GMT 13 Sep 85

[Text] Bonn, 13 Sep (DPA) -- Government spokesman Friedhelm Ost has said with regard to the proposal from East Berlin and Prague [for negotiations on the establishment of a chemical weapons-free zone] that the Federal Government attaches great importance to fundamental efforts to solve the problems of chemical weapons. For that reason it will give "due consideration" to the proposal.

Ost pointed out, however, that at the Geneva disarmament conference the Federal Government has supported a worldwide and comprehensive ban on chemical weapons. It made clear then that this prime goal must not "be circumvented through regional partial solution," which could bring no more security to those immediately involved. For that reason and others, it has reservations on the idea of a chemical weapons-free zone in Central Europe.

SPD Suggestion

LD151534 Hamburg DPA in German 1347 GMT 15 Sep 85

[Text] Bonn, 15 Sep (DPA) -- The SPD on Sunday called on the Federal Government to examine "in an unprejudiced and constructive way" the proposals made by the Government of the GDR and Czechoslovakia on the creation of a zone free of chemical weapons and to facilitate a worldwide agreement, SPD spokesman Wolfgang Clement said. The SPD recalled that the talks between the SED and the Social Democrats on the creation of a zone free of chemical weapons in Central Europe are now clearly bearing fruit in the proposals made by the two governments. In these talks the SPD was aiming at the development "of realistic and constructive stimuli" which should now be put into effect by the Federal Government. The SPD is prepared to support the Federal Government in this.

CSO: 5200/2778

NUCLEAR TESTING

PRAGUE: U.S. RESPONSES TO SOVIET MORATORIUM NEGATIVE

AU111419 Prague RUDE PRAVO in Czech 9 Sep 85 p 1

[Editorial: "Moratorium: An Example and a Challenge"]

[Excerpts] The Latin term "moratorium," used by lawyers for over a thousand years, has acquired in the nuclear age a new, highly relevant meaning. It denotes the decision to suspend or temporarily limit one's activity in the sphere of armament.

At a time when the termination of feverish armament and disarmament is the only sensible path of development, that is, the only path respecting the future of the human race, the moratorium is becoming an important means of seeking a realistic point of departure for negotiations on crucial problems of the present era. It is an expression of goodwill, of the honest and sincere endeavor to reach agreement. It is a weighty act of responsible policy.

The introduction of a moratorium alone is a specific and constructive act. However, its mission is to simultaneously set up optimal conditions for working out international treaties and agreement in disarmament and to establish reliable foundations for a gradual relaxation of international tension.

It is no coincidence that it was the USSR that introduced this political and deeply humanitarian act into international relations in the nuclear age. It is also no coincidence that the application of moratoriums concerns the most dangerous areas of armament. The most important of them is the moratorium in the sphere of nuclear arms tests. This is logical. The continuing sophistication of existing types of nuclear weapons and the development of new ones are associated with nuclear tests. The termination of tests would substantially limit the further development of nuclear arms and, gradually, render nuclear armament impossible as such. That is also why the USSR regards the complete and general ban on nuclear arms tests as an important long-term goal of its policy, which is aimed at disarmament.

The documents known as SALT I and SALT II and the Nuclear Arms Nonproliferation Treaty approved at the 23d session of the UN General Assembly in 1960 furnish evidence of the fact that political will and a realistic assessment of the world situation can yield specific results in dealing even with the most complicated contemporary problems. However, in the last few years these factors seem to have completely disappeared from U.S. policy. There is not only a lack of readiness for talks on reaching new positive steps intensifying this process of arms limitation treaties, but the present U.S. Administration does not even have the will to ratify and, what is more important, to observe treaties that have already been signed. On the contrary, there is an obvious effort on the part of the U.S. Administration to use all means to raise armaments to a qualitatively new level.

In his interview for TIME magazine, Comrade M. Gorbachev unambiguously expressed his disappointment over the development of Soviet-American relations.

Nevertheless, even in this situation the USSR exerts immense efforts and continuously demonstrates with specific steps its great interest in the improvement of Soviet-American relations and, hence, also in the improvement of the atmosphere in the world.

Soviet proposals provide for all sorts of negotiations and even in areas in which past negotiations have not led to a successful end. Soviet proposals establish conditions for seeking new and fresh ways toward halting nuclear armament.

A convincing and absolutely clear demonstration of this is, for example, the commitment of the USSR (in June 1982) not to be the first to use nuclear weapons.

It is also the unilateral moratorium with which the USSR unilaterally pledged, in August 1983, that it will not be the first to deploy any kind of antisatellite weapons in space as long as other states, including the United States, also refrain from such acts.

This year in April the USSR decided to introduce a unilateral moratorium on the deployment of intermediate-range missiles in Europe until November 1985.

And finally, on 6 August the USSR halted all nuclear explosions, again in the form of a unilateral commitment. This moratorium will be in force until 1 January 1986. However, if the United States joins the moratorium it will continue to be in force even thereafter.

What has been the American response to all this?

It is apparent that the United States does not intend to surrender the possibility of using nuclear weapons for a first strike. The Pentagon's first reply to the Soviet commitment not to send antisatellite weapons into space has been its announcement of a test of the ASAT antisatellite system, which is to take place before the end of September. In response to the moratorium concerning intermediate-range nuclear missiles in Europe, the United States has stepped up pressure on Belgium and the Netherlands and now even neutron warheads are to be added to the continuously increasing number of American nuclear missiles.

And finally, replying to the Soviet moratorium on nuclear tests, on 17 August the Americans went ahead with an underground nuclear explosion in Nevada. Clear identification of the explosion by the USSR and accurate determination of the locality as well as the force of the explosion have proved the hypocrisy of the American representatives, who, clinging to the usual stereotypical argument, use verification of observance of the moratorium as the main pretext for their negative attitude. Washington's pharisaical hypocrisy is confirmed, incidentally, even by U.S. and West Europe experts who declare that for a number of years already adequate technological means have been available to them for monitoring nuclear explosions anywhere in the world.

The cynicism of American reactions to serious Soviet proposals has been condemned also by commentators of a number of Western information media. The commentator of the Austrian daily DIE PRESSE even believes that prior to the meeting of M Gorbachev and R Reagan in Geneva it is more realistic to expect an escalation of anti-Soviet provocations from Washington rather than constructive attitudes.

However, much more than that is at stake. The moratoria the USSR has adopted as its unilateral commitments are not an end in themselves. They are honest, sincere, and realistic attempts at taking mutual relations out of the blind alley into which they are being continuously pushed by the United States and at contributing to the solution of vital problems of our planet.

The deadlines available to Washington for considering corresponding steps of its own are sufficient. But they are not infinite.

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GENERAL

PRAGUE DECRIES 'BAD FAITH' IN U.S. APPROACH TO NEGOTIATIONS

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[Commentary by Vaclav Kvasnicka]

[Text] It was expected that prior to the November meeting in Geneva of U.S. President Ronald Reagan with Mikhail Gorbachev, the highest Soviet party representative, the two sides would behave with restraint and undertake nothing that would exacerbate their relations and increase international tension. But it seems that there is a different view in Washington.

Instead of restraint they are taking steps that are considered to be time bombs under the Geneva conference table. One of the most serious of these is the militarist fever of the Pentagon. It is not satisfied with another nuclear test or another experiment of the MX strategic missile fired from an underground silo. In particular it is not satisfied with one test of the antisatellite weapon and is said to have at least another 10 planned.

What is more, the U.S. Administration this week once again rejected the Soviet proposal for the creation of a chemical weapon-free zone in Europe. In particular it has once again made it clear that it will not back down from the militarization of space. And as the British newspaper THE GUARDIAN has revealed, Reagan will not back down from it even if Mikhail Gorbachev arrives in Geneva with generous specific disarmament proposals for the reduction of nuclear and strategic weapons.

The true intentions of the Pentagon were recently declared by U.S. Defense Secretary Casper Weinberger. Even he made no secret of the fact that the United States will carry out the militarization of space. Earlier he had said that space weapons should not even be discussed in Geneva. In his view even the problem of first-strike nuclear weapons should be withdrawn from Geneva. What should the talks be about, then? Weinberger gave no hint of this, but instead he accused the USSR of unwillingness to reach agreement. He even claimed that he does not know of a single Soviet proposal for arms reduction. He vented his anger against the USSR, saying that it threatens the security of America and of the whole world.

The American defense secretary is definitely not behaving like this by chance. It is known that he is one of those American hawks who are at present doing everything to ruin President Ronald Reagan's meeting with Mikhail Gorbachev. They are afraid not only of Gorbachev's personal qualities, but above all they are worried that these talks could influence American and world opinion and thus slow down the realization of the Pentagon's arms program.

Reports are already leaking from Washington to the effect that further anti-Soviet provocations are being prepared at the instigation of American hawks there and elsewhere in the world, provocation that are intended to poison the international atmosphere completely so that the summit meeting in Geneva never takes place. This is because there is no other way to evaluate the expulsion of 25 Soviet diplomats, trade officials, and journalists from Great Britain.

It is no wonder, then, that developments so far do not hint at a turn for the better, and it is also not surprising that the Soviet side considers present Soviet-American relations to be even worse than before the meeting of Mikhail Gorbachev with Ronald Reagan was announced. In this context the Soviet paper PRAVDA expressed the hope that everything negative that is heard from Washington in reply to the peace steps of the USSR is not the last step of the U.S. Administration because it is possible to look for points of agreement and areas of joint or parallel interests.

There are prerequisites for this; if it were not so, the USSR would not agree to the forthcoming Soviet-American summit meeting.

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END