

FUTURE OPTIONS FOR SWEDISH SECURITY POLICY

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

by

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
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
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
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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the Swedish Armed Forces or U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (Reference to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

ABSTRACT

FUTURE OPTIONS FOR SWEDISH SECURITY POLICY by LTC Bengt Svensson, Sweden, 162 pages.

The situation in Europe and the tendencies affecting its future security environment challenge current Swedish policy of neutrality and nonalignment. This study investigates the official policy, the situation in Europe, and the Baltic Region to deduce factors that are important for Swedish security in 2007-2010. The study evaluates options and focuses on two rarely discussed: collective defense with Finland and regional Baltic collective security.

The most favorable option for Sweden is collective security. This study emphasizes the need for a mixed security arrangement, with focus on soft preventive security, linked to the European security process. This provides a framework to influence organizations and nations. Hence, Sweden obtains long term security, along with the greatest possible freedom of action to achieve national interests and to select its role in Europe and the Baltic Region. The study examines the risks, regionalization and the relative strength, of a collective structure.

This study explains the concept of neutrality and nonalignment, as well as Sweden's rationale to pursue them. The study suggests the need to change the current policy due to the altered situation in Europe and the subsequent transformation of nonalignment. Collective defense has only marginal advantages compared to the current policy.

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Swedish security policy is, as the European security process in general, a complicated topic. To capture it in a thesis is not possible without help. I owe a great debt of gratitude to a number of outstanding persons and institutions.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

La Suède et la Finlande composent un royaume large... sous un climat rigoureux, qui n'a presque ni printemps, ni automne. L'hiver y règne neuf mois de l'année.¹

Voltaire, Charles XII of Sweden

No European country, except for Sweden, is in a similar position to Russia's.²

Carl von Clausewitz, On War

The historical choice, voluntarily or not, has been if, and to what extent, a geographically isolated Sweden should become engaged in the rest of Europe. The quotes from Voltaire and Clausewitz illustrate the perception of Sweden as an isolated and cold Kingdom in Northern Europe- like Russia easily defendable, also like Russia too vast to conquer.³ The Swedes shared, and still share, this view of their country. As a consequence, the Swedish choice from the beginning of the nineteenth century until the end of the Cold War was to play a limited role in European politics and to pursue a policy of neutrality.

In 1995, the Swedish Government described Sweden's situation after the Cold War:

Sweden's security situation has dramatically changed after the Cold War. Old threats to our country's security have disappeared or been reduced. New possibilities have opened for our security policy. At the same time new risks and strains for our country and people have emerged.⁴

Clearly, the Government appreciates the altered situation in Europe. In response, Sweden made its most important change of international relations in modern times: membership in the European Union (EU).⁵ This broke the paradigm in relations with the rest of

Europe. Policy changed, but Sweden retained the core: nonalignment in peace, aiming at neutrality in war.

This is the background to the research question: Which of the future options for Swedish security policy is the most favorable?

Two assumptions form the basis of this question. First, that the changes in Europe after 1989 challenge Swedish security policy to such a degree that an evaluation is necessary, also of the core of the policy. Second, without a perceived threat, a large majority of the people and most politicians are reluctant to join European military alliances, in particular NATO, within the next 5-10 years. The interaction between the altered situation and the unwillingness to choose the most apparent alternative form the framework to examine other options for future Swedish security policy.

This thesis attempts to explore the Swedish policy and situation, while evaluating options that are not evident. The focus is on two rarely discussed options: collective defense with Finland and collective security in the Baltic Region. A third alternative, continued neutrality, forms background and reference. A comprehensive study, from the perspective of an officer in the Swedish Armed Forces, of the background and these alternatives is new.

The two alternatives are interesting for several reasons. The similarities in current situation, public opinion, policy, and old historical ties make the Finnish option worth consideration. Changing European organizations may leave room for regional development in the Baltic area. This situation would bring states with common interests together.

Definitions

Key elements of this thesis require definition: options, security, collective security, and collective defense.

Options are the alternatives for Swedish security policy. These alternatives are the Swedish relationships to organizations and nations in Europe, primarily in the Baltic Region. The general context implies two basic alternatives: limited interaction or alliance with entities outside Sweden. Other options are variations of the degree and/or nature of the relationship. They also contain an assumption: that alternatives exist and that Sweden has freedom to choose. The thesis explores this assumption.

Security is an ambiguous term, not easy to define. One approach is to focus on objectives for security and the threats to it. The objective often refers to the survival of society, nation, region, or international system.⁶ This thesis uses the Swedish official definition: the preservation of the nation to develop the society according to the will of the population.⁷ The threats perspective leads to an additional definition: hard and soft security. Traditionally discussions of security have implied military threats to the nation and military measures to counter them.⁸ Other threats, economic, refugees, crime, environmental, are more directed at the society and require other actions to manage. Hard security deals with military aspects and soft security with other threats and measures.

“Security policy,” a broad term, needs further definition. To make the current policy comparable with other alternatives the official Swedish definition is the most appropriate. The thesis analyzes this definition. Three elements define collective security and collective defense: commitment, direction, and scope. Collective security is a vague term: several definitions exist. Two examples of definitions are:

The maintenance of international peace and security by the concerted efforts of the nations, especially the peacekeeping operations of international organizations such as the League of Nations and the United Nations. The collective powers of the great majorities would be used to prevent or punish aggression by any state or group of states.⁹

It [collective security] asserts that the security dilemma of states can be best overcome...through the institution of communal commitments whereby each state undertakes to join in common action against those who threaten the territorial integrity or political independence of others.¹⁰

The main difference is the commitment to act. The definition implies that only some nations would participate in crisis or war; there is an element of freedom of action not to become involved. Both definitions imply that integration of armed forces is excluded. Collective defense, in contrast, refers to alliances with strong commitment and integrated armed forces: "one for all and all for one."¹¹

Collective security focuses on problems within the structure, and not to external threats. The purpose is to manage and prevent conflicts between members and, depending on the nature of the structure, possibly within states.¹² The direction of collective defense is against threats outside the collective.

The scope of collective security is broader than collective defense. Security covers all areas, hard and soft, but the emphasis is on preventive soft security measures.¹³ Collective defense concentrates more on military hard security aspects. These definitions are the framework for a discussion of alternatives in this thesis. Chapter 3, Methodology, contains additional definitions.

Method

The nature of the problem indicates the method. The most applicable research method to answer the posed question is a qualitative approach. The interaction of nations is difficult, if not impossible, to examine with empirical and quantitative methods.

Written documents provide the raw data for this thesis. The organization of this input figures in descriptions, quotations, and examples. The next step is to analyze and compare these elements to determine how they will influence future Swedish policy. The basic assumption is that an analysis of history and the current situation indicates trends that make it possible to foresee future perspectives. This assumption and the multitude of factors that influence future Swedish security policy imply that, to some extent, a holistic treatment is necessary. The current, and probably future, European security environment is a complex system.

To understand the Baltic part of this system, this thesis needs a model. A general model breaks down the complexity of the problem. The basis for the analysis is a realistic approach to international relations. This approach considers nations as the major actors.¹⁴ A national gain/loss calculus heavily influences a nation's decisions and policies.¹⁵ The "gain" is achievement or protection of national interests. Gain is dependent on the nation's resources and implies that states are rational actors.¹⁶

However, the effects of organizations modify this approach. Some theorists claim that security structures work as a balancer, operating independently of national motives, among a number of states.¹⁷ The implication is that organizations, as entities, influence nations, and that small nations through these structures are more powerful than their

resources normally allow. The structure also forms norms for international interaction. Consequently, this thesis examines both nations and organizations.

Three parts constitute the analysis aimed at answering the primary research question: Swedish security policy, the current situation in Europe and the Baltic Region, and future options. The thesis uses backgrounds and factors from the two first parts to determine which option is most favorable for Sweden in the time frame 2007-2010. In addition, two brief theoretical discussions are necessary: the concept of neutrality (nonalignment) and organizations.

The most favorable option must provide Sweden with the largest possible freedom of action to achieve national interests and the freedom to choose Sweden's role in Europe and the Baltic Region. The option must also be feasible in European and Baltic contexts as well as be effective in managing future threats. The Swedish perspective, what is best for Sweden, dominates this thesis.

Delimitations

This thesis approaches the problem with explicit delimitations in time and geography. Focus is on the period after 1989 and, concerning changes in Swedish security policy, on developments after 1995. These changes are the consequences of trends before 1989, but it is results that challenge the policy.

The period 2007-2010 is the limit for the future perspectives. There are two reasons for this choice. First, the situation in Europe 1997 shows signs of stabilization after eight turbulent years, and it is possible to detect trends for the future. Second, although the process is ongoing, the next ten years will determine to what degree, for example, integration and enlargement of organizations are successful. In 2007-2010,

Russia will have transcended the first post Soviet phases, and a more long-term situation is probable.

Although developments in Europe as a whole affect Sweden, the geographical focus is on the Baltic Region. This area affects Sweden's security policy fundamentally and her defense policy directly.

Sources

There is an abundance of literature that discusses Swedish security policy. The eight years since fundamental change in Europe began is a period long enough to permit research and publication of both books and articles. Therefore, this thesis uses four criteria, as the 'Methodology' chapter shows, to focus on important parts of the literature. The purpose is to concentrate on the period after 1989 and to be as contemporary as possible.

However, only a small part of the literature deals with the alternatives discussed in this thesis. The current debate in Sweden and in the Baltic Region focuses on continuation of neutrality and NATO enlargement. The literature reflects this. A number of books and an avalanche of articles deal with these two aspects of Swedish security. Only a small part of the literature discusses other alternatives.

The thesis uses five groups of sources: Swedish Government documents, books, academic papers, media, and Swedish military education as well as lectures. The most important are Government documents and journals. Government documents, Parliament's rulings from 1995 and 1996, show the current policy and the reasoning behind them. Journals provide the most current information and cover a broad scope of issues in Europe and the Baltic Region.

Structure of the Thesis

Three chapters, "The Swedish Policy and Situation," "The Situation in Europe and the Baltic Region," and "Future Option for Swedish Security Policy" are the analysis of this thesis. Subsections divide each part according to the subquestions. Conclusions from the first two parts drive the choice and evaluation of options. Chapter 7 comprises a summary of conclusions from previous chapters and a final analysis of the most favorable option for Swedish security policy.

The purpose of this thesis is to determine the most favorable Swedish relationship (security policy) with organizations and nations in situations at the beginning of the next millenium.

¹ [Sweden and Finland is a large kingdom...with a harsh climate; there is scarcely any spring or autumn. The winter lasts for nine months per year] Rene Nyberg, "The Baltic Countries and the Northwest Russia: A European Challenge," Europeans Security 3, no. 3 (Autumn 1994): 529.

² Carl von Clausewitz, On War (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989), 365.

³ Ibid., 529-530.

⁴ Regeringen, Regeringens Proposition 1995/96:12, Totalforsvar i fornyelse (Stockholm: Forsvarsdepartementet, 1995), 3.

⁵ Ibid., 4.

⁶ Joenniemi, Pertti and Carl-Einar Stalvant, Baltic Sea Politics. Achievements and Challenges (Stockholm: Nordic Council, 1995), 62.

⁷ Regeringen, 39.

⁸ Joenniemi, 64.

⁹ Walter Laqueur, ed., A Dictionary of Politics (New York: The Free Press, 1974), 102.

¹⁰ Graham Evans and Jeffery Newham, The Dictionary of World Politics (Cambridge: The University Press, 1990), 53.

¹¹ Joenniemi, 61.

¹² Heinz Gartner, "Small States and Concepts of European Security," European Security 2, no. 2 (Summer 1993): 607.

¹³ Joenniemi, 61.

¹⁴ Ingemar Dorfer, The Nordic Nations in the New Security Regime (Washington, DC: The Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1997), 2.

¹⁵ R. F. Driscoll, "European Security: Theoretical and Historical Lessons for Emerging Structures," European Security 2, no. 1 (Spring 1993): 19.

¹⁶ Ibid., 18.

¹⁷ Ibid., 17.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

General

The abundance of literature implies a broad review. The following treatment organizes the literature into an overview of five groups. It also gives examples of literature in each group. The bibliography lists all sources mentioned in the text.

First, there are Swedish Government documents from the Parliament on the decisions of 1995 (ruling on security policy) and 1996 (defense policy). These documents contain not only the decision, but also the reasoning behind it. They represent present Government policy and how the political actors perceive future options. The Defense Plans of 1996 and 1997 describe defense policy and the military perspective on security policy.

A second category includes books that discuss the theory and history of neutrality, as well as other security issues. Several of these books deal with the concept of neutrality and Swedish security policy. Other books discuss the situation in Europe and the Baltic region, as well as the future perspectives and options. One disadvantage of these books is that few have been published after 1995.

Academic papers form an important segment of sources. Six examples of papers dealing with Swedish security policy are Cole, Gunn, Patterson, Rosenqvist (Brigadier in the Swedish Army), Ericsson (Captain in the Royal Swedish Navy), and Skinner (U.S. Navy). The focus of the first two is the history of Swedish neutrality. Patterson discusses the compatibility of neutrality with EU concerning Austria, Finland, and Sweden. Rosenqvist, Ericsson, and Skinner orient, from their respective time period and

perspective, on the future policy. The Swedish Parliament decision of 1987 concerning the Armed Forces is the topic of Rosenqvist. Ericsson discusses three future alternatives: neutrality, membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and membership in the Western European Union (WEU). Skinner discusses, from an American viewpoint, Sweden's integration with the EU and its implications for the U.S. Although all these papers provide valuable inputs, it is important to note that none of them discusses the alternatives outlined in this thesis. In addition, and more importantly, they are older than the decisions of the Swedish Parliament in 1995 and 1996.

The fourth group is the debate in media appearing in magazines, newspapers, and journals. The Swedish media describe the nature of the current debate in Sweden, incorporating public opinion and political discussion. Media reflect conflicting views vis-à-vis the official policy and the responses of the Government. The most important authors are Swedish politicians (Bildt, Leissner, etc.), Sir Douglas Hurd, General Bengt Gustafsson (former Swedish Commander-in-Chief), Max Jacobsson (former Finnish diplomat) and ministers of the Swedish and Finnish Governments.

The most important single source is journals: European Security, Foreign Relations, and Foreign Policy. These publications, despite being American in origin, contain essays from a variety of authors, which cover a broad scope of issues in Europe and the Baltic Region. The journals depict not only developments from 1989, but also outline the present situation as well as future tendencies. Moreover, they provide the most current information.

The last group consists of Swedish military education and lectures. Education at the National Defense College complements the Defense Plans and reflects the military debate. Lectures are transcripts from both foreign and Swedish seminars.

The following discussion organizes the literature using the elements of the problem, policy, situation, and future options. The last part discusses media and lectures.

The Policy

Literature concerning Swedish policy consists of sources dealing with current policy, neutrality as a principle, and the history of Swedish policy. The most important sources are the two Government documents from 1995 and 1996. These are the Cabinet's proposals to the Parliament. The majority of the Parliament made them Government decisions, without changes or amendments. The first proposition consists of security policy, defense policy, and aims for the total defense and general principles for structure and economy of the Armed Forces in 1997-2001. The second proposition consists of the detailed structure of the Armed Forces in 1997-2001.

The Defense Plans from 1995 and 1996 are the Armed Forces' contribution to the mentioned political decisions. The Government used these documents as one element in the process before the decisions. Parts of these documents are argumentative and represent the military perspective on security policy and structure of the Armed Forces. The Defense Plan from 1998 represents the Armed Forces' response to the latest decision of the Parliament, that is, the military result of the process.

The propositions and the Defense Plans show the present policy and tendencies for change. It is important to note that the propositions are political in nature and argue

for a certain policy. Besides defending current policy, they provide the rationale for choice. They show what is politically possible, but not necessarily the most favorable.

A number of sources criticize current policy. Two of the more important books are Agrell and Dorfer. Agrell, a Swedish intellectual working at the University of Lund, illustrates elite discussion of Swedish security policy. His book Alliansfri – tills vidare [Nonaligned – for now], written in 1994, deals with Sweden's membership in the EU and the basic reasons for neutrality, and argues for a more thorough discussion of Swedish policy.

Dorfer, director of research at the Swedish Defense Research Institute, former advisor to the Minister of foreign affairs, and educated in the U.S., is a well-known debater of security policy. His book, The Nordic Nations in the New Western Security Regime, forcefully argues Swedish membership in NATO. In doing so the book thoroughly analyses current Swedish policy, the situation, and the Baltic Region. This book is a key source to compare with the official policy. In addition, the book is contemporary.

A number of books discuss the principle of neutrality, the traditional policy and the pursuit of the policy. The most important are Karsh, Ogley, Sundelius, Agrell, Allison, Cole, Dohlman, Gunn, Packard, and Patterson.

The first three authors deal with the principle of neutrality. Karsh, an Israeli intellectual, and Ogley, a British intellectual, give insights into both neutrality and nonalignment. Sundelius' The Committed Neutral, published in cooperation with the Swedish Institute of International Affairs, is a broad discussion of Swedish neutrality aimed at spreading knowledge to an American audience.

Allison's The Soviet Union and the Strategy of Non-alignment in the Third World shows the Soviet Union's (as one belligerent) policies and views on neutrality and nonalignment.

Cole, Gunn, Packard, and Dohlman describe Swedish policy during the Second World War and the Cold War. Packard and Cole discuss the policy from a Western perspective and are very critical. Packard (Portland State University) mostly used American sources, while Cole (John Hopkins University) did much of his research in Sweden. Dohlman (London School of Economics) provides a good description of the economic consequences of neutrality.

A number of journals complement the books and academic papers. Arter (Finnish Institute, London), Zwygart (Swiss Army), and Gartner (University of Innsbruck) discuss, respectively Finnish, Swiss, and Austrian neutrality in the Post Cold War situation and their prospects in the future. Carlnaes' article, "Sweden Facing the New Europe: Whither Neutrality," is a theoretical analysis of Sweden's neutrality policy in the past and in the future. He shows to what degree the policy has changed.

The Situation

Perspective and geography divide sources that describe both the situation in Europe and the Baltic Region and future perspectives. These sources are both books and journals.

The literature views, as shown in figure 1, the situation and future outlook from four perspectives.

General European				
Dogan	Asmus	Gerosa	Kuzio	
Harris	Barry	Haglund	Rudolf	
Kelleher	Dombusch	Ham	Ruhle	
Larrabee	Driscoll	Herspring	Sherr	
Lynn-Jones	Feldtstein	Jacobsen	Talbot	
Murray	Flockhart	Kaiser	Whalen	
Roper	Gartner	Kupchan		

Collective Security		Threats		Regional	
Dursch		Anderson	Jamiolo	Joenniemi	Krohn
Nolan		Blank	Shear	Knudsen	Newhouse
Russel		Ikenberry	SIPRI	Lund	Nyberg
				Archer	

Figure 1. Literature dealing with the situation

Dogan and Murray (collection of essays) describe strategies and defense policies of nations in a generic way. Their writings represent a realistic approach: that interests of nations are the driving forces for policies and actions.

Kelleher (Brookings Institution, former advisor to President Carter), Larrabee (RAND), and Lynn-Jones (Harvard University) represent a general perspective concerning the situation in Europe and future perspectives. Kelleher gives a comprehensive analysis of the European situation and its trends, while Larrabee concentrates on Eastern Europe and touches on regional cooperation. Lynn-Jones' The Cold War and After: Prospects for Peace is a collection of essays (first published in 1991) that deals with developments after the Cold War. Two essays are of particular interest. Kaysen's "Is war obsolete?" deals with change in international relations. His conclusion is: no, not yet. Mersheimer discusses increased instability after the Cold War.

The literature on collective security is large, and Durch, Nolan, and Russel are three examples. Durch and Nolan discuss primarily a global perspective and Russel deals with future collective security in Europe.

Two elements dominate the literature concerning threats. The first considers the wars in the former Yugoslavia, and the second discusses problems in Eastern Europe.

Sources that discuss the Baltic Region are as follows.

1. Finland: Aster and Niemien
2. The Baltic States: Gunn, Petersen, Smith, Rauch, Zaccor.
3. Russia: Borawski, Garnett, Kaminski, Mark, Matloc, Mroz, Piper, Prium
4. Poland: Burant, Kaminski, Piatkowski, Spero
5. Germany: Gutjar, Peters, Hamton, Heilburn, Stares, Zelikov
6. Denmark: Heurlin

These sources illustrate both a national perspective and external views on the country in question.

Future Options

The literature describes and discusses four main options: security arrangement within the EU, membership in NATO, membership in WEU, Post-Cold War neutrality. All types of sources deal at length with these alternatives. The most frequent approach (Patterson, Agrell, etc.) to membership with the EU is to examine its implications for continued neutrality. The most intense debate, however, is over future Swedish membership in NATO. Opposition to current official policy characterizes this part of the literature.

Several sources, in particular Agrell and Dorfer, discuss security arrangements with Finland. Debate is brief and often characterizes this option as a side-track compared to the NATO-alternative.

A number of studies concentrate on regionalization in Europe and in the Baltic. Newhouse's (Brookings Institution) "Europe's Rising Regionalism" is one example of the European debate over regionalization. The literature often describes regionalism as a contrast to European integration or national states.

Archer (University of Aberdeen, Scotland), Lund (Rand), Krohn (Christian Albrechts University, Kiel), Nyberg (Finnish delegation to CSCE), Joenniemi, and Knudsen focus more on the Baltic Region. The most important of these are two studies: "Baltic Sea Politics. Achievements and Challenges" (Joenniemi, 1995) and "Subregional Cooperation in the Baltic Sea Area" (Knudsen, 1995). The first is a collection of essays published by the Nordic Council, while the second is a report from the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs. Both of these documents openly advocate regionalization and examine the attitudes towards a strengthened Baltic structure. It is important to note that none of these sources compares alternatives or discusses the problem from a Swedish perspective. In addition, they deal almost exclusively with soft security, often considered to be compatible with current Swedish policy.

Media

Media, to include newspapers and magazines, depict the current debate. Figure 2 shows the media used for this thesis.

Newspapers	Character
Aftenposten	Norwegian daily
Aftonbladet	Swedish, Labor party
Arbetet	Swedish, Labor party
Blekinge Lans Tidning	Swedish, Liberal
Dagens Nyheter	Swedish, Liberal
Expressen	Swedish, Liberal
Forenade Landsortstidningar	Swedish, Independent news agency
Goteborgs Posten	Swedish, Liberal
Huvustadsbladet	Finnish
Helsinki Sanomat	Finnish
London Times	
Svenska Dagbladet	Swedish, Conservative
Sydsvenska Dagbladet	Swedish, Liberal
Tidningarnas Telegrambyra	Swedish, Independent news agency
Uppsala Nya Tidning	Swedish, Liberal
UD Pressbyra	Swedish Foreign Office's news agency
Vaster Norrlands Allehanda	Swedish, Conservative
Magazines	
Armed Forces Journal	
Jane's Defense Weekly	
Svensk Tidskrift	Swedish, Conservative
Tempus	Swedish journal for international affairs
Vart Forsvar	

Figure 2. Media

The media represent two perspectives: the general European and the Swedish. The first focuses on European security linked to an organization, normally EU or NATO. A few articles (Hurd, Gustafson, etc.) discuss regional solutions or structures for security.

Newspapers reflect Swedish public opinion. Articles in the press describe opinions towards NATO and EU membership as expressed in current polls. Stutz's Opinion 96 examines public opinion more thoroughly. His report, based on polls made by The Swedish Board for Psychological Defense (a Government body) in 1995-1996, shows the Swedish public's attitudes towards different aspects of security policy. No poll examines the alternatives examined in this thesis.

Lectures

Notes and transcripts document lectures. The notes are the author's from lectures at the Swedish National Defense College. The transcripts are from lectures given by Sir Douglas Hurd and from seminars presented at the Royal Swedish War Science Academy. The members of the Academy are high-ranking Swedish military officers, civil servants, and politicians. The focus of the seminars and lectures is defense policy and other aspects of security policies.

Conclusions

An abundance of literature since 1989 deals with European and Swedish security. With regard to Sweden, the focus is on future Swedish security policy within the context of membership, contrasted to neutrality, in the EU, NATO, or WEU. Hence, a gap exists concerning a broader discussion and comparison between neutrality and less apparent alternatives: an arrangement with Finland or collective security in the Baltic Region. This thesis intends to fill that gap from a Swedish perspective.

CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

This presentation divides the research methodology into two parts. The first breaks down the basic question into subquestions to lend structure to the problem at hand. The next component describes the method: how to answer the questions. Last in this chapter are assumptions, limitations, delimitations, and definitions not treated in the introduction.

The Structure of the Problem

The analysis to answer the primary research question consists of three main parts: the security policy, the situation, and future options (see figure 3). Each part comprises elements of description, analysis, and comparison.

The policy part focuses on Sweden's security policy and situation. The purpose is to define current policy, its background, and tendencies for change. The nature of the policy emerges: nonalignment aiming at neutrality, albeit changed, is still the core. Furthermore, public and political opinion illustrate opposition to NATO membership. This discussion provides a starting point not only for the basic alternative, continuation of the current policy, but also for a discussion of other alternatives.

Five questions reflect the approach to policy:

1. What is security policy and neutrality?
2. What has been the traditional policy, and what are the reasons for it?
3. How has the policy been pursued?
4. What is the present (1997) policy, and what are the trends for change?
5. What are Sweden's interests, role, and freedom of action?

Descriptions of generic neutrality, Swedish security policy until 1989, and the reasons for it answer the first two questions in the form of elements of the traditional policy. After that, the traditional policy and the pursuit of the policy form the basis for comparison. The pursuit of policy relies on a selection of periods when the policy was tested.

The three first questions provide background to describe the changes after 1989, in particular after 1995, and to analyze current policy and tendencies for change. A description of the option to prolong current policy and factors (mainly Swedish interests, role and freedom of action) that influence the choice and evaluation of options form conclusions from this part.

The situation part affords alternatives to the current policy and attempts to foresee the situation in 2007-2010. The present situation in Europe and the Baltic Region forms the basis to analyze future developments and to indicate possible alternatives for Swedish security policy. The future perspectives section illustrates the environment for various options.

Three questions govern an examination of the situation:

1. What is the present (1997) situation in Europe?
2. What is the present (1997) situation in the Baltic Region?
3. What are the future perspectives?

A description of the changes from 1989-1997, resulting in a "map" of the present situation, answers the first two questions. This description depicts the actors in Europe and the Baltic Region. The third question requires an analysis, based on the answers from the first two, of the situation to identify tendencies leading to future trends. The analysis focuses on organizations, the Baltic Region, and future threats. The assessment of

organizations includes a generic discussion of integration and enlargement. Generic scenarios and images of potential situations in 2007-2010, naturally involve future perspectives. Conclusions from this part become factors for the choice and evaluation of alternatives.

The last part narrows down future options to three alternatives and evaluates them, taking into account backgrounds and factors from the “Policy” and the “Situation” discussion. Such an approach facilitates a discussion of future options and an evaluation of these options. As indicated in the beginning of this chapter the future options concentrate on alternatives other than membership in NATO. The thesis discusses additional options, but not in detail. The thesis concentrates instead on three alternatives:

1. Post Cold War nonalignment (neutrality)
2. Collective defense with Finland
3. Collective security with the states in the Baltic Region

The thesis defines and compares these alternatives.

The basic criterion for comparison is that which is most favorable for Sweden. The evaluation of options starts with the fundamental choice of prolonging, albeit changed, the policy of nonalignment, aiming at neutrality. The motives to discard this policy, which has been successful for nearly 200 years, must be strong. This analysis concentrates on the reasons for the traditional policy and how they apply to future situations. The expectation is to determine if there is a need for a change in policy.

The next step compares all three alternatives using elements from the “Policy” and “Situation” parts of this thesis. Swedish interests, freedom of action, and perceived role help identify the most favorable option from a Swedish perspective. However,

Sweden does not exist in a vacuum. Further comparison of alternatives identifies their feasibility in a European (generic scenarios) and Baltic (the interests of the nations in the region) context, along with effectiveness (prevent, manage, and limit effects on Sweden) against threats. Advantages and disadvantages summarize and weigh the result for each alternative.




Figure 3. The structure of the problem

Answers

The qualitative research method consists of three elements. The first part is data collection and a review of literature. In order to provide both description and analysis, the research embraces a broad spectrum of sources. The very nature of the topic gives rise to an abundance of sources and the following criteria assist in discrimination among sources:

1. The thesis uses, except for historical background, sources from 1990 - 1997. The changes in Europe after 1989 make older sources of limited value.
2. Focus on sources from 1995-1997. The rapid changes in Europe after 1990 make recent sources of higher value and in 1995, the Swedish security policy started to change.
3. Sources with focus on the Baltic region have priority before sources with a general European perspective. The focus of this thesis is on the Baltic Region.
4. The last day for research is 15 February 1998.

The second element of the research method is to organize the information provided by the sources. The organization of information retains the same structure as the breakdown of the problem.

The third element is analysis of the information provided by the literature. This is the decisive ingredient that enters into answering the research questions. The critical parts of the analysis link conclusions from the situation and the policy to test the three alternatives.

Assumptions

Swedish interests and perceived role, as described in Government documents, are applicable in 2007-2010.

Limitations

The thesis uses only open sources, since the author is a Swedish officer in the U.S.

Delimitation

The analysis of nations focuses on external policy. The thesis discusses internal problems only if they affect foreign relations. As noted in the introduction, the number of options for evaluation is limited to three. Existing regional structures, such as Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS), are neither the subject of this thesis nor the basis for the collective security alternative. The thesis only contains a brief description of CBSS.

Definitions

“Baltic Region” is the Baltic Sea and the surrounding countries: Sweden, Finland, Russia, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Poland, Germany, and Denmark.

“Baltic States” is Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania.

“Current” or “Present” is 1997.

“Nordic States” is Sweden, Finland, Denmark, Norway, and Iceland. This thesis does not discuss Iceland.

“Region” is a geographical area; a part of a continent.

“Regionalization” is a cooperation between states in a region. The focus and commitment of the states are on the problems and development of the region.

Involvement from states outside the region is limited.

CHAPTER 4

THE SWEDISH POLICY AND SITUATION

The Background to the Policy

The Concepts of Neutrality and Nonalignment

Neutrality deals with war, while nonalignment, a more recent concept, is more connected with peace and the Cold War. The following discussion describes and analyzes first neutrality, and then nonalignment.

Neutrality as a concept within the law of warfare has a long history; it was first recognized in the Declaration of Paris in 1856 and in two Hague conventions (1907 and 1923) to protect smaller nations that wanted to stay out of European wars.¹ These conventions formalized a concept that had been alive for centuries. One of the earliest examples of neutrality is from the Peloponnesian Wars in the fourth century B. C.² A more general acceptance of neutrality occurred during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, with the rise of national states.³ This was also an age of declaration of war and subsequent declaration of neutrality.

Two of the earliest neutrality examples in Europe are Switzerland and Belgium. The Congress of Vienna guaranteed Swiss neutrality after the Napoleonic wars.⁴ In 1830, the London conference proclaimed the neutrality of Belgium, which was set as a condition for Belgian independence.⁵

The definition of neutrality in this thesis is:

The legal status of a state during a war between two other states whereby the states adopt an attitude of impartiality towards the belligerents that they recognize

and which creates rights and duties under international law between the neutral state and the belligerents.⁶

This definition describes neutrality as a concept in war and international law.

To be credible, and consequently effective, a policy of neutrality requires the neutral state to uphold rights and obligations. A declaration of neutrality in war gives the state rights to uphold self-defense, to maintain territorial integrity and to continue to trade.⁷ It is also possible for a neutral state to offer safe haven for ships or planes in emergencies, even if these belong to the warring parties.⁸ The rights do not preclude self-expression and the freedoms of media.⁹ To be respected the declaration requires the state to defend itself, to protect its territorial integrity and to intern soldiers from the warring parties. A neutral state may not cooperate with, or benefit, any of the parties.¹⁰ In essence, the state must be impartial towards the belligerents.¹¹

These definitions form the basis for analyzing the nature of the concept, as well as interaction, perceptions, methods, consequences, and reasons to choose it.

Neutrality is mainly military in nature, a posture in relation to a military threat or war. The neutral state tries to stay out of the military aspects of conflicts. To what a degree a neutral state may be politically and economically connected to the belligerents may be an issue, but by the definitions given earlier, military alliances are not possible. Consequently, neutrality deals mainly with hard security.

Neutrality is the interaction among at least three parties. Interaction occurs in a situation in which there are at least two adversaries and a third party that does not want to become involved in the conflict. The focus of the opposing states is on each other and not primarily on the neutral state. If the neutral state becomes an adversary, it is no longer

neutral. Without conflict neutrality is more a description of a state's relationship with the rest of the world. It implies that one entity is not going to become involved in any relationships, whatever situation may occur. Consequently, it is difficult to be neutral without a defined conflict or threat of conflict between adversaries.

There is a link between neutrality and sovereignty. The policy describes the relationship between national states and is, therefore, only possible for a sovereign entity.

The perceptions of neutral states and the surrounding states are the basis for neutrality. The neutral state makes the assumption, depending on the perceived threat, that it is possible to stay out of potential or actual war. If war would immediately involve the neutral state, the policy of neutrality is ineffective.

The perceptions of the surrounding states are important for the success of neutrality. The adversaries in a conflict do not wish to give their opponent unnecessary advantages. One advantage is the territory and resources of a neutral state. To respect neutrality the adversaries must perceive three factors. First, that the neutral is indeed neutral and will stay that way. Second, the neutral state must be able to defend against attacks on its territory. Defense implies an element of deterrence or cost/benefit analysis. Third, the neutral state must not offer, by its strategic importance, decisive advantage for either of the opponents. For example, Germany did not, during World War I or II, respect Belgian neutrality because of the necessity to outflank the French Army.¹² These three perceptions of the surrounding states determine the possibility to be and stay neutral.

Part of perception depends on a cost/benefit analysis. Rarely can a neutral prevent occupation, but it can make the costs unacceptable. The attacker must compare the

advantages of occupation, the cost of an offensive, the benefit of continued neutrality, and the risk if the opponent strikes first.

The methods to achieve neutrality may be legal, political, economic, and military. These methods mainly concern the preparation for neutrality: nonalignment. The legal method consists of treaties with neighbors, parts of the constitution of the neutral state or laws passed in the parliament.¹³ The neutral state must not, politically, economically or militarily, be committed to or be dependent on either adversary.

Neutral countries in Europe have chosen different kinds of neutrality. For example, Switzerland chose to base its neutrality on treaties with its neighbors and to incorporate it in the constitution.¹⁴ Sweden, in contrast, has no treaties with neighbors and no legal obligation to follow the policy; it is just a declaration of intent.¹⁵

The descriptions of neutral European states offer two additional distinctions inherent in the concept of neutrality. The Swiss neutrality is perpetual neutrality not linked to a specific situation, while the Swedish and Austrian variants are more ad hoc.¹⁶ In the case of Switzerland, neutrality is not dependent on a conflict or situation, but is more a description of the state's permanent relationship with the rest of the world. For Sweden and Austria, neutrality is more a result of the situation. For example, in 1955 Austria had to choose between joining the Eastern bloc or the Western bloc or becoming neutral.¹⁷ The only acceptable alternative for all involved was neutrality.

The situation is often a question of freedom of choice. In the examples above Switzerland and Sweden made a free choice to be neutral, while Austria's and Belgium's neutrality were a prerequisite to gain independence.¹⁸

The second distinction is the degree of interaction with other states. The Swiss policy, for example, is essentially defensive aloofness.¹⁹ Sweden, however, tries to interact actively with major powers to influence them.²⁰ The aim is to avoid violations of neutrality in case of war.

The consequences of a policy of neutrality are far-reaching for a state. To be credible, neutrality requires long-term preparations consistent with long-term objectives. A stable policy is important and adjustments to daily events are difficult. Neutrality also requires military capabilities sufficient to deter attack and defend the country. A single neutral state cannot share defense costs within an alliance. The economy must be strong enough to sustain the military capability and to avoid economic dependence on other states. Political actions, mainly foreign policy, cannot support one side in a conflict. The neutral state is probably less limited economically and politically, but actions in peacetime must ultimately not discredit the policy of neutrality in war.

The degree of consequences depends on the flexibility of the policy of neutrality. Permanent neutrality may cause rejection from other states.²¹ The neutral state may suffer accusations of not participating in the international system. The policy may lead to isolationism as, for example, Japanese policy did before 1860.

States choose neutrality because it provides the best possibility to achieve national interests in a given situation. Neutrality is one of many methods to satisfy national interests.²² The interests normally achieved through neutrality are long-term basic national interests: security and sovereignty. In a situation in which there is a conflict, or risk for conflict, between adversaries that could affect a third state directly, the basic national interest takes precedence. The choice of a policy of neutrality may affect other,

less prioritized interests. For example, the requirement for a strong defense may affect the economic development of the state.²³ Consequently, a link exists between policy, long-term basic national interests and a situation in which they are threatened.

The emergence of a bipolar world, shaped by two major military alliances after the Second World War, gave birth to the concept of nonalignment.²⁴ The militarization of international relations during the Cold War era caused a number of states to adopt the term 'nonalignment' to remain outside the struggle between the Communist bloc and the Western world.²⁵ In 1955, 29 of these countries met at the Bandung conference and formed the Nonaligned Movement.²⁶ Nonalignment is a stance, a posture in relation to alliances in peacetime, taken by states that are not members of a military alliance. The posture bestows no rights and obligations under international law.²⁷

Nonalignment is normally a preparation for neutrality; the link is credibility. Neutrality requires preparations during peacetime, since perceptions are important. One way to prepare is nonalignment, even if this peacetime relationship does not automatically lead to neutrality in war.²⁸

Nonalignment and neutrality have many similarities, except for the nature of the concept and its consequences. The interaction among at least three parties and the importance of perceptions are similar. Nonalignment is more political than military: it relates to acts and attitudes of nations involved in power conflicts short of war.²⁹ Since nonalignment is a preparation for neutrality, it limits the nation's freedom of action in peacetime. The envisioned status in war makes ties with other states in peacetime difficult.

Nonalignment reflects the changed nature of conflicts and war. During the Cold War the earlier clear distinction between war and peace, with declarations of war, was blurred. Other instruments of power and proxy states were more prevalent.

The link between national interests and the situation causes the concepts of neutrality and nonalignment to change. What a state pursuing these two policies can do varies with how it defines the policies according to interests, the perceptions of the surrounding states, and the situation. For example, in 1973 Ireland joined the European Community (EC), a move that was unacceptable to the rest of the neutral states in Europe.³⁰ Although the EC lacked a military dimension, the Cold War made membership impossible. The Irish situation, located at the periphery of Europe and surrounded by NATO states, made membership possible. The changed situation in Europe in the 1990s permitted other neutral states to join. This means that the legal principles of neutrality may be violated, but that neutrality may still be militarily and politically acceptable depending on the circumstances.³¹ Nonalignment, with no legal definition, may change even more. It is therefore fair to assume that both concepts evolve and will continue to evolve.

Neutrality, with rights, obligations and consequences, is a policy connected with war and international law. The nature of neutrality involves the military and hard security. Nonalignment, a peacetime concept, is a posture in relation to military alliances and is often a long-term preparation to facilitate neutrality. It is difficult, without risking isolation, to be nonaligned and neutral without a defined conflict or threat of conflict between belligerents. Both concepts distance a nation from alliances and conflicts. Hence, the nation achieves a higher degree of sovereignty. Sweden has used this distance,

in contrast to more aloof neutrality, to actively influence the nations surrounding her. The possibilities for both policies depend on the surrounding states' perceptions. The consequences, among them limited freedom of action in peacetime and the costs, are substantial. National interests as defined in present and future situations must balance these disadvantages with benefits. Both policies have and continue to evolve because they depend on definition of the neutral state's policies, the perceptions of surrounding states, and the situation.

In this thesis, "neutrality" describes a concept pertinent to war and "nonalignment" as a peacetime concept.

The Traditional Policy

The most used phrase, both by Swedish politicians and among the public, to describe Swedish security policy is: nonalignment, aiming at neutrality in war.³² This definition is, as the previous discussion has shown, not sufficient to analyze the policy and to discuss future policies. The Swedish definition of security policy, the traditional policy, the reasons for the policy, and its implementation, require further examination.

The term "security policy" normally consists of an aim together with measures or methods to achieve that aim. National freedom, sovereignty, and promotion of national interest are generally elements of the aim. To achieve the aim a nation uses the various instruments of power: diplomatic, informational, military, and economic.³³

The Swedish concept of security policy has traditionally concentrated on foreign policy and defense policy. The Government decisions of 1989/90 and 1991/92 stated that: "The security policy is essentially formed in the interaction between foreign and defense policy."³⁴ This understanding has traditionally focused the policy on only two

instruments of power: diplomatic and military. The emphasis is also on hard security. In contrast, other nations have a broader definition; for example, the National Security Strategy of the US includes all the instruments of power.³⁵ However, as discussed later, this Swedish concept of security policy has started to change.

Swedish security policy has traditionally been a policy of neutrality. From this envisioned status in war followed a posture of nonalignment in peace.

The Swedish policy of neutrality has deep historical roots. The historical choice, voluntary or not, has been if, and to what extent, a geographically isolated Sweden should become engaged with the rest of Europe. The involvement before the sixteenth century was very limited, but, with the consolidation of Sweden as a nation state in the sixteenth century, the participation in foreign affairs and wars dramatically increased. After involvement in the Napoleonic wars, this ambitious policy started to change, and the concept of neutrality was first established.³⁶ From 1870, the policy of noninterference in the affairs of other nations became a doctrine.³⁷

The wars of the twentieth century reinforced the policy of neutrality. With the Swedish declaration of neutrality during the First World War, the policy not only became a part of the political culture of Sweden, but also came to be accepted within the international community.³⁸ In the period between the wars, Sweden maintained the policy of neutrality with one exception- it joined the League of Nations. Sweden tried, despite severe strains, during the Second World War to remain neutral.

After the war Sweden reevaluated the policy and chose to maintain its neutrality. In 1946, Sweden joined the United Nations, believing that this organization would be an effective instrument for peace. Sweden, faced with rising tension in Europe in the late

1940s, tried to form a Nordic security pact, and when this failed again chose a policy of noninterference in the form of nonalignment aiming at neutrality war. Sweden did not join the EC, but participated in European Free Trade Association (EFTA) and was active in the Nonaligned Movement.

With neutrality as its cornerstone, assistance to third world countries and disarmament in Europe dominated Sweden's policy during the Cold War. Substantial aid to undeveloped countries and a strong commitment to the UN supported the global perspective. In contrast with some of the aid programs, all Swedish military operations abroad were under UN mandate. Sweden only took sides on behalf of the UN. The security policy in Europe was limited to support of CSCE/OSCE (Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe/Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe), confidence building on the divided continent, and disarmament.

Swedish neutrality is a chosen method, based on consistency and strong defense, to preserve national independence and sovereignty. Other powers did not force the policy on Sweden; it was a choice made over a long period. The policy had a clearly stated aim: to preserve freedom and national independence.³⁹ The policy of neutrality was a method to obtain this. Sweden would "in all situations and with methods of our own choice... secure national freedom of action."⁴⁰ Consequently, the policy of neutrality relates mostly to security, not ideology, economic relations or other aspects of international affairs.⁴¹

Declaration of intent formed the basis for Sweden's neutrality. No agreement with neighbors or major powers secured the policy, instead the Swedish Government unilaterally declared it when war approached. The policy has never been a part of the constitution or received formal recognition under the auspices of international law.⁴²

With time neutrality has passed from being ad hoc or temporary to being accepted by the international community; it appears to be an example of “continuous, conventional neutrality without an international legal basis.”⁴³

It is important to note that neutrality gives Sweden considerable formal freedom of action. A single Government decision can alter Swedish neutrality, since there are no legal restrictions or international agreements. However, it takes decades to reestablish revoked neutrality. For example, in the 1930s Belgium broke its defense agreement with France and tried unsuccessfully to reassert neutrality.⁴⁴

Swedish neutrality was limited geographically. Global engagement was easier than regional engagement. Close ties in Europe would endanger the policy of neutrality. All Swedish military operations abroad were under UN mandate. This made them impartial and not in conflict with nonalignment. However, other actions were not within the same framework. For example, Sweden took sides in the Cold War by supporting North Vietnam and Cuba. Swedish engagement in the third world shows that Swedish neutrality was not global; it only concerned Europe.

The Swedish kind of neutrality reinforces the need for a consistent foreign policy and a strong defense. Since no legal protections exist, the requirement for consistency is important. A favorable perception, based on the pursuit of the policy, of the surrounding states is the only means to achieve success. A strong defense strengthens credibility.

Sweden has made considerable investments in her defense. A strong defense supported, except for the period between 1938-1942, the policy of neutrality until the 1970s. After that, the Armed Forces' share of the GNP fell from approximately five percent to two percent.⁴⁵ However, the Air Force maintained its strength, and the national

aviation industry continued to build planes for the Swedish Air Force.⁴⁶ Swedish politicians consider this ability, unique for a nation of only nine million inhabitants, as an expression of Sweden's commitment to the policy of neutrality.

Credibility was the basic problem for Swedish security policy. A policy of nonalignment in peacetime reinforced credibility. Long-term and consistent foreign, trade, and defense policies would provide the basis for the policy of neutrality.⁴⁷ The consequences were far reaching. For example, neither military dispositions nor interoperability were to give the impression that easy integration into another party's military structure was possible.⁴⁸ Foreign or economic ties that would undermine neutrality were unacceptable.⁴⁹ Sweden avoided overdependence on imports.⁵⁰ Consequently, the policy of nonalignment often came into conflict with economic development. Sweden tried to balance requirements and chose to give the security policy priority.

Swedish efforts focused on maintaining a perception of nonalignment mainly in the eyes of the Soviet Union. Strong economic and cultural ties with the West often clashed with the requirements to maintain neutrality and produced dilemmas.⁵¹ Maintenance of balance was the major challenge for Swedish security policy.

In summary, that policy was a freely chosen, geographically limited policy based on declaration of intent to achieve basic national interest. The policy was supported by a strong defense, but heavily dependent on credibility built on nonalignment. The focus was on military hard security.

Reasons for the Policy

Geography, fear of commitment, the concept of balance in the Nordic Region, tradition, economic strength, military capability, and success in the past are all reasons for the policy of neutrality. The following is a description of the factors that have influenced or still influence the policy choice. This thesis later discusses their validity for future Swedish security policy.

The location and geography of Sweden favor a policy of neutrality. Sweden has not been in the mainstream of European conflicts, unless it chose to be, because of its peripheral location. Expansion from the center (France and Germany) and confrontation between West and East caused most wars during the last two centuries. From this perspective, the Nordic countries are on the northern flank and are of secondary importance except as means to influence the main battle area. The Baltic Sea, the Skagerak, the mountains, and the arctic terrain would protect Sweden even if a conflict spread to the periphery.

The perception was that membership of a military alliance was an unnecessary limitation of Sweden's freedom of action. This reason was most applicable during the Cold War. Joining NATO would have ensured military assistance in the case of a Soviet attack, but also automatically meant that a conflict between East and West would involve Sweden.⁵² The geographical position as a "border state" between NATO and the Warsaw pact was unfavorable for Sweden. A war was very likely to spread to Swedish soil immediately. Without membership it was still possible, albeit more difficult and risky, to join NATO in case of war.⁵³ Furthermore, it was probable that the Western nations would

give assistance for narrow selfish reasons: to protect Norway and Denmark. Sweden had more freedom of action as an outsider.

An enduring consideration for Swedish security policy was, and still is, the historic and cultural ties among the Nordic countries, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, and Finland-the so-called Nordic Balance. During the Cold War, all these countries made considerable efforts to reduce tension in the northern part of Europe.⁵⁴ For example, both Norway and Denmark limited their commitment to NATO by not allowing nuclear weapons and permanent positioning of foreign units within their borders. Sweden and Finland remained neutral with the ability to defend their territory and thereby created a buffer zone for both NATO and the Soviet Union. From this perspective, a neutral Sweden would also be in the Soviet interest.⁵⁵ Finland went a step further and adjusted its policies more closely to Soviet demands-"Finlandization." The concept of the Nordic countries intertwined with each other as a security policy system, contributed to stability and a reduction of tensions in the region.⁵⁶

A major concern for Sweden was the Finnish situation. Finland was from 1809 to 1918 a part of the Russian Empire, and this put Russian troops on the Swedish doorstep. The result was a cautious Swedish policy during the nineteenth century. For example, Sweden remained neutral during the Crimean War to avoid a war between major European powers on Swedish soil. Finnish independence in 1917 improved the situation, but Finland remained a concern.

The long common border with the Soviet Union, close to strategically vital areas like Murmansk and Leningrad, and two wars made the Finnish situation difficult. The Finnish situation, compared with Sweden's, depended far more on Finland's eastern

neighbor.⁵⁷ The treaty of mutual understanding, forced on Finland by the Soviet Union after the wars, further limited Finland's freedom of action. A Swedish movement towards NATO or increased NATO activity in Denmark or Norway could result in Soviet pressure, using the treaty, on Finland.⁵⁸ The argument worked both ways: a Soviet move on Finland could force Sweden to establish closer links with the West. An independent Finland became a prerequisite for Swedish neutrality.⁵⁹

Swedish security policy is the result of a long process, and is deeply ingrained in the people as an expression of national independence. The Swedish people, with an historic inheritance of nearly 1000 years of independence, a great power for 200 years, and limited contacts with Central Europe, consider participation in alliances a break with tradition. Several recent public opinion polls show a large majority of Swedes against membership NATO. For example, in a poll from 1996, 70 percent approve of a continuation of neutrality, while only 18 percent want membership.⁶⁰ The explanation, according to the poll, is that the old policy has created the impression that independence and neutrality are synonymous.⁶¹

The policy of neutrality has brought economic advantages for Sweden. The period of this policy coincided with industrialization and economic growth. In the nineteenth and twentieth century, Sweden could continue, in particular during two world wars, to develop and trade without involvement in European turmoil.

A strong military defense made it possible for Sweden to remain neutral. A strong military tradition, coupled with advantageous geography, enabled Sweden to build armed forces of considerable strength. Furthermore, these forces remained intact after every major war.

The concept of marginality reinforced the Swedish ability to defend itself. The basis for this concept was the assumption that in a conflict between East and West only limited resources of the belligerents could be allocated for the Nordic area. The brunt of the forces and the main attention would fall on the struggle in Central Europe.⁶² The only thing Sweden had to do was to maintain sufficient defense to discourage any attempt by the belligerents to outflank their opponent.⁶³ In fact, Sweden was to function using a military term, as an economy of force operation in the north for both warring parties.

The combined effect of all these factors resulted in a successful Swedish security policy, which in itself has become an argument against change. In the opinion poll mentioned earlier, the mere success of nearly 200 years of neutrality is an explanation for strong opposition to a change of policy.⁶⁴ The necessity to change a successful security is not apparent policy when the risk of war has decreased.

To Pursue a Policy of Neutrality

The success of a policy of neutrality depends on its consistent pursuit in the past. As described earlier, the policy is dependent on the perceptions of the surrounding states, which in turn link it to how consistent it is. The acts of the neutral state have to be predictable and trustworthy. Any deviation causes a "crack in the armor" and reduces credibility. The history of Swedish neutrality is, therefore, not only of interest for historians, but affects future security policy. The following is a closer look at periods when the policy was tested. An analysis of all periods and incidents is not the purpose of this thesis. Some selection is necessary.

The choice rests on four periods because they represent events that are important for understanding Swedish neutrality and have implications for the future. The beginning

of the Second World War challenged the policy in several ways. During the war, strains on neutrality forced Sweden to give up, at least temporarily, the policy. After the war, in the late 1940s, the quest was not to remain neutral, but to find a new security arrangement. During the Cold War Sweden pursued policies that retain far-reaching implications for the future. The following is a discussion of these four periods.

In 1939 Sweden pursued a policy of neutrality, together with several other states, but lacked means for an adequate defense. Sweden had nourished this policy throughout the 1930s with the aim of staying out of an increasingly likely conflict between the great powers.⁶⁵ The resolution on defense of 1925 reduced the Swedish Armed Forces by two-thirds and transformed it to an instrument only capable of guarding the territorial integrity.⁶⁶ The first increase in defense spending came in 1936 and renewed rearmament in 1938. The Armed Forces could not support a policy of neutrality before 1942, when the spending began to affect the strength of the defense.⁶⁷

Meanwhile, Sweden had declared its neutrality at the outbreak of the Second World War, but had chosen not to be neutral in the Winter War. Sweden hoped to repeat its successful policy during the First World War in the conflict between the Great Powers on the Continent.⁶⁸ The reaction to the Soviet attack on Finland was different, and Sweden declared itself as a non-belligerent country.⁶⁹ Sweden was thus not required to pursue a policy of neutrality in this regional conflict and could give considerable assistance to Finland.⁷⁰ The reasons for this break in traditional policy were several. First, public opinion in Sweden strongly favored support to Finland.⁷¹ Second, a strict policy of neutrality would have made it very difficult for Finland to receive vital assistance from abroad; it risked isolation from the rest of the world.⁷² Third, a Soviet occupation would

have removed the buffer zone in the East. However, direct involvement would have dragged Sweden into the war, even a war on the Continent.

Policy during this period illustrates freedom of action to satisfy national interests.⁷³ Strong ties with Finland and the proximity of the conflict made a strict policy of neutrality difficult, but the long-term interest to stay out of a major war and the weak Swedish Armed Forces hampered direct involvement. Swedish policy reflected a non-doctrinal approach to neutrality and an ability to adjust to circumstances.

Swedish security policy during the next period, the Second World War, was armed neutrality with the aim to stay out of the war. On 9 September 1939, the King in a speech, expressed the Government's determination to stay out of the war and to expand the Swedish Armed Forces as much as possible.⁷⁴

The first test of the policy was trade: export of iron ore to Germany and Swedish imports from the Western World. Germany needed iron ore from Northern Sweden for its war machine, and the Swedish economy was dependent on income from this export.⁷⁵ Sweden managed to convince Germany that it would receive an uninterrupted flow of iron ore if Germany left Sweden alone, and, in the event of an attack, would defend the mines to the utmost of Sweden's ability.⁷⁶ Probably a German cost/benefit-analysis encouraged the Nazis to leave Sweden alone.

Despite the occupation of its neighbors in 1940, Sweden maintained its neutrality, but had to give concessions to Germany. Sweden, surrounded by German forces, made considerable concessions. German troops passed through Swedish territory to Norway. In total, 670,000 German soldiers transited Sweden.⁷⁷ In 1941, a whole German division passed through Sweden to Finland.⁷⁸ Furthermore, the Government censored anti-

German articles in Swedish press.⁷⁹ Therefore, a sort of understanding existed: Sweden would secure the export of iron ore, allow transit traffic, and not criticize Germany, and in return, Germany would not attack.⁸⁰

Swedish policy adapted to the course of the war. The first sign of shift was in 1941, after the U.S. had entered the war, when Sweden refused new credits to a financially hard-pressed Germany.⁸¹ After strategic circumstances had changed fundamentally in 1943, exports to Germany and the transit traffic decreased. The press received more freedom and the shift was complete in the last months of the war.⁸² It is also important to note that the Allies during the whole war used Swedish designed military equipment. For example, the Bofors 40 mm anti aircraft gun was standard equipment on many ships.

The analysis of this period concerns the aim of security policy, national interests, and perceptions. The aim of Swedish policy was not neutrality: it was to preserve independence and sovereignty. Surrounded in 1941 by Germany, cut off from any possibility of assistance from the West, the only possible policy was to stay out of the war.⁸³ Clearly, Swedish concessions were not in accordance with strict neutrality; the aim of the policy was far more important. The basic national interest of survival took precedence. Furthermore, for the Allies the principle of neutrality was less important than their own national interests.⁸⁴ It was more important that Sweden not become a German ally. Sweden's increasingly strong defense would have required a considerable effort of either party to defeat, and the occupation of Sweden never became a critically vital interest for either party.⁸⁵ The benefits were not worth the costs.

The Allied perceptions of Swedish neutrality were sympathetic to the Swedish situation. The Allies generally looked upon Sweden as a nation with its back to the wall, trying to be neutral.⁸⁶ For example, reactions to the transit of the German division in 1941 were surprisingly mild from the West and, even from the Soviet Union.⁸⁷ It was accepted that Sweden did not lack the will or the determination to pursue a policy of neutrality – merely the means.

The last and most important period for the future Swedish security policy was the Cold War. This period is not only closer in time to the present, but during this period, Sweden consolidated, at least officially, the policy of nonalignment. In contrast to the described difficulties during the Second World War, Swedish freedom of action during the Cold War was considerable, at least in the beginning. The discussion consists of three aspects of the policy: the efforts to create a Scandinavian Defense Union (SDU), trade policy and Swedish preparations to receive military assistance in case of war.

After the experiences of the war and in view of growing tension in Europe, Sweden was prepared to reevaluate the policy of neutrality. The Swedish Government perceived three alternatives: SDU, neutrality, and membership in a Western alliance.⁸⁸ Sweden proposed talks on SDU with Norway and Denmark in April 1946.⁸⁹ Norway, based on the experience of 9 April 1940 and traditional ties with the West, abandoned its policy of neutrality, refused to participate in SDU, and joined the Atlantic Pact.⁹⁰ Denmark chose to join the Western alliance and give up its neutrality. Consequently, Sweden was quite prepared to adjust to the new circumstances and give up its traditional policy that had served her during two world wars.

The reasons for the Swedish SDU-initiative reveal the Swedish approach to neutrality at the time. First, Sweden did not want to see either Denmark or Norway join NATO, because that would increase tension in Northern Europe.⁹¹ In addition, alignment with the West could further deteriorate the Finnish position vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. A neutral bloc in the North would enable Sweden to remain neutral in the growing conflict between East and West. Second, an effective Swedish defense against a Soviet attack was difficult.⁹² A credible defense would require considerable investment, maybe even in nuclear weapons.

Swedish restrictions on trade with the Soviet Union placed serious strain on Swedish security policy. In 1949, a number of Western nations formed the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Exports Controls (COCOM).⁹³ The aim of the Committee was to list goods and services of potential military application denied to the Soviet bloc.⁹⁴ COCOM became the vehicle for economic warfare. Sweden remained outside the formal structure, but largely adhered to the restrictions.⁹⁵ Dependence on Western technology motivated this break with neutrality, participating in what became a trade boycott.⁹⁶

The last and most serious aspect of the security policy during the Cold War was Swedish preparations to receive NATO assistance in case of war. Official Government papers from 1994 clearly state that a number of preparations were made: high level military commissions were prepared to be sent to NATO countries, communication links for air defense were established, Swedish airfields were adapted for heavy bombers, and the Air Force prepared installation of U.S./UK Identification-Friend-or-Foe (IFF) systems.⁹⁷ It is also probable that cooperation in the intelligence field took place, even if there is no mention in the Government's report. Swedish logic for these steps, that were

clear breaks with the official policy, was assessment of the Swedish defense capability. Until 1965, the assumption was that Sweden would not immediately get involved in a war; the main battlefield was Central Europe. With increasing Soviet capability for rapid attack, the situation changed and it became prudent to prepare for early NATO assistance.⁹⁸ Sweden developed an operational security relationship with NATO.⁹⁹

Analysis of the Swedish security policy during the Cold War has two dimensions: national interests and perceptions. Clearly, on several occasions the national interest took precedence over strict neutrality. More serious, however, were perceptions of Swedish neutrality. Not only did the Soviet Union consider Sweden to be a part of the West, but was well aware of bilateral agreements with Western states.¹⁰⁰ The Soviet Union considered Sweden to be a NATO ally and planned accordingly.¹⁰¹ It is probable that the West also considered Sweden an ally; at least a potential one. More important is the publication of official Swedish recognition of its double policy: now everybody knows.¹⁰²

A comparison with the traditional policy summarizes the pursuit of the policy during these four periods. Figure 4 shows a schematic comparison.

Elements of the traditional policy	The pursuit
Freely chosen	Yes, but concessions if the situation required.
Nature of policy	Military, hard security.
Geographically limited	Yes, different policy in the Nordic area if necessary.
Declaration of intent	Yes
Activism	Yes
Basic national interest	Yes, focus and took precedence.
Supported by strong defense	Yes, but not always in a timely manner.
Built on nonalignment	Yes, seen as preparation for neutrality.
Credibility	Yes, efforts to build, affected by the Cold War.

Figure 4. Comparison of traditional policy and the pursuit of the policy

The Current Policy

A discussion of the current policy serves as a starting point for discussion of the future Swedish security policy. The approach is to describe the official policy, the official reasons, and defense policy. It is also necessary, in order to understand the current position, to discuss Sweden's national interests, perceived role, important changes, freedom of action, and the current debate.

The Official Policy

A comparison among three Government resolutions describes the official policy. The first decision is from 1989/90 made before the end of the Cold War, and the second from 1991/92. This later ruling is from the period after the Cold War, but during a turbulent time when future security arrangements in Europe were difficult to determine. The third (1995/96) is the most recent and remains the current official policy. Figure 5 on the next page shows extracts from these documents. The highlighted parts are important changes.

Resolution 1989/90	1991/92	1995/96
The aim of Swedish security policy is ultimately to preserve our country's freedom and independence.	The aim of Swedish security policy is ultimately to preserve our country's freedom and independence.	The aim of Swedish security policy is ultimately to preserve our country's freedom and independence.
The objective of our security policy is to be able, in all situations and in forms of our own choosing, to secure national freedom of action. This will make it possible, within our borders, to preserve and develop our society politically, economic, socially, and in all other aspects ...	The objective of our security policy is to be able, in all situations and in forms of our own choosing - as single nation or in voluntary cooperation with other countries – to develop our society politically, economic, socially, and in all other aspects.	The objective of our security policy is to be able, in all situations and in forms of our own choosing, to secure national freedom of action - as a single nation and in cooperation – to develop our society.
An important part in this is to contribute to continued peace and stability in the Nordic area...	An important part in this is to contribute to continued peace and stability in the Nordic area and adjacent area...	
The security policy is essentially formed in interaction between foreign and defense policy.	The security policy is essentially formed in interaction between foreign and defense policy.	Our security policy has national and international dimensions that are formed in constant interaction between foreign and defense policy.
The main element of the security policy is neutrality, which means nonalignment in peace, aiming at neutrality in war.	Swedish security policy changes in a changing Europe. The new political situation creates new possibilities to participate in foreign and security policy cooperation with other European states. ...the hard core of the policy is nonalignment...	Nonalignment is also in the changing Europe the best national security framework to achieve Swedish security interests. Our strive is to cooperate, concerning peace promoting, with all European security organizations.

Figure 5. Comparison of official policies. Sources: Regeringen, Regeringens Proposition 1989/90: 100, 37; Regeringen, Regeringens Proposition 1991/92 102, 36; Regeringen, Regeringens Proposition 1995/96:12., 39.

The aim of the policy and the aspect of neutrality have not changed, but the policy is more open to international cooperation. The formulations of the aim are identical. The middle version is more open to a change of neutrality, but the last version clearly states that the policy will continue, despite changing circumstances. However, cooperation with various organizations in Europe is possible and the Government recognizes increasing

international interaction. The impression is of a policy of nonalignment, aiming at neutrality, which allows participation in EU, PfP (Partnership for Peace), etc. This is an important change in policy.

Differences between the version from 1991/92 and the other two are due to different administrations. In 1992 Sweden was governed by a coalition of non-socialist parties, traditionally more inclined to security cooperation.

The term “security policy” is broader in current policy. The international dimension mentioned in the documents above emphasizes cooperation concerning democracy, social development, economy, and ecology.¹⁰³ The documents also refer to problems with refugees, crime, and the environment.¹⁰⁴ The new policy reduces the traditional focus to only two instruments of power: the diplomatic and the military.

The official rationale for continued neutrality is that it is the best way to pursue Swedish security interests and at the same time maintain stability.¹⁰⁵ The new security situation, though “drastically change” and new possibilities for Swedish security policy do not necessarily prescribe a new course.¹⁰⁶ The official attitude towards NATO is positive: “NATO contributes, not least as an instrument for United States’ presence and engagement, to stability and security in Europe.”¹⁰⁷ However, the Swedish interest in an undivided Europe, a long-term relationship with Russia, and the risk of instability results in the conclusion that: “the Swedish military nonalignment remains.”¹⁰⁸

Profound restructuring of the defense policy in 1996 followed the limited changes of security policy. The decision reduced, based on the assessment that an armed attack was unlikely, the defense budget by approximately 10 percent.¹⁰⁹ The Armed Forces’ structure changed from considerable strength with high readiness to deter invasion, to a

reduced force with lower readiness. The Government introduced the concept of “adjustment” to maintain the ability to defend the country if the situation should deteriorate.¹¹⁰ The revised time element gives the Armed Forces one year to prepare for a limited threat and several years for a larger one.¹¹¹ The new tasks (see figure 6) for the Armed Forces also reflect the new course.

1. Prepare for the defense of the nation.	3. Provide forces for international operations.
2. Maintain the nation's territorial integrity.	4. Provide support for society during severe strains and stresses in peacetime.

Figure 6. Tasks for the Swedish Armed Forces. Source: Regeringen, Regeringens proposition 1995/96: 12. , 33-35.

The first task determines the structure and long term development of the forces, but the last three are more important in the current situation.¹¹² The third task implies that Sweden might participate in operations abroad other than traditional peace keeping under UN mandate. Consequently, the situation in Europe permits a continuation of neutrality with reduced defense capability, but may require Swedish participation in military operations abroad.

Interests and Perceived Role

National interests are the driving forces for the security policy. These are normally the state's wants, needs, and concerns.¹¹³ The Government resolution of 1995/96 describes official Swedish interests on three levels: global, Europe (with the Atlantic link), and the Baltic area.¹¹⁴ Figure 7 shows the structure.

Level	Interests
Global	• Ability by international organizations to meet new threats (refugees, environmental, criminality etc.) and support European structures.
European	• Continued European integration with maintained openness to the rest of the world. • Continued process of reforms in eastern Europe with the development of relations with Russia. • Development of EU with balance between national sovereignty and deeper integration. • Maintain the Atlantic link. • Reduce conflicts in South Eastern Europe. • Development of NATO: no division of Europe. • Strategic balance in Northern Europe including U.S. involvement and a defensive Russia.
Baltic Region	• Independent, stabile, democratic Baltic states. • Democratic Russia. • Long term relationship with Russia. • Maintain the region as a part of Europe; no regionalization. • Maintain Swedish defense capability.

Figure 7. Official Swedish national interests. Source: Regeringen, Regeringens proposition 1995/96: 12. , 33-35.

The official version has a global dimension probably due to traditional Swedish support for the UN. Regional security structures are not, in the Government's view, a Swedish interest because of the risk of spheres of interest.¹¹⁵ Developments in Poland and Germany are not included in the interests.

Stability in the Baltic Region and developments within the EU and NATO dominate the interests. The relationship with and the development of Russia, as well as the future of the Baltic States, are important Swedish interests.

Several interests conflict. Developments of both NATO and the EU contradict national sovereignty and maintained openness with the rest of the world. This realization

illustrates the tension between neutrality and integrating and enlarging organizations in Europe. The thesis discusses this dilemma later.

Swedish perception of Sweden's role in Europe and the world is somewhat mixed, but there has been a shift in geographical focus. The focus has changed from global engagement in third world countries and the Nonaligned Movement to more involvement in Europe. The role in the EU is to "strengthen our possibilities to, together with other nations, form a common future in peace and democracy, and social and economic development"¹¹⁶

The Swedish Government perceives a limited role for Sweden in the Baltic region. Engagement in this area has three main features: the Council of Baltic Sea States (CBSS), bilateral, and multilateral support. Sweden plays an active role in CBSS to promote democracy, economic development, and nuclear security.¹¹⁷ Unilateral support is considerable and includes, for example, increased Baltic ability for territorial surveillance and control.¹¹⁸ Sweden supports, in cooperation with the Nordic countries and Great Britain, a Baltic battalion for peacekeeping operations.¹¹⁹ These features show that Sweden is prepared to play a role in the region.¹²⁰ However, this role is in cooperation with other states and organizations to further integrate the Baltic Region in the European cooperation.¹²¹ A larger more unilateral role is not perceived.

The global role, mainly through the UN, continues and balances the European role. Participation in a "UN-brigade" strengthens commitment to the UN.¹²² Sweden is also currently a member of the Security Council. The global role is important since "other international organizations than the EU play an important role" and the European structure needs support from effective global institutions.¹²³

Important Changes

Two important parts of the current policy are cooperation with NATO and membership of EU. Sweden participates, within the framework of NATO, in PfP and the Stabilization Force (SFOR) in former Yugoslavia. Sweden joined the partnership with a certain hesitation. It smacked too much of NATO, and Sweden wanted to make sure that Russia also would participate.¹²⁴ Many participants view PfP as a preparation for membership of NATO, but Sweden, together with Finland and Austria, has officially declared that the cooperation is from a neutral standpoint.¹²⁵

In December 1995, the Swedish UN-forces in Bosnia were transformed into parts of IFOR (later changed to SFOR) under NATO command. The UN tradition to participate in international peace operations paved the way for closer cooperation with NATO.¹²⁶ The Swedish battalion is part of a Nordic brigade, periodically commanded by a Swedish brigadier, in an American division.¹²⁷ Soldiers from 32 nations, including Poland and Russia, constitute SFOR.¹²⁸

Increased contacts with NATO show a change in policy, but represent no serious break with the policy of neutrality. This is the first time that Sweden has openly and extensively cooperated with a military alliance since the beginning of the last century. The experiences and large number of contacts facilitate future integration: the step to membership becomes smaller. Although, this is a break with strict neutrality, the damage to perceptions of Swedish policy is limited. A large number of nations participate in both forms of collaboration and include, more importantly, Russia and other Eastern states. In addition, the NATO operation in Bosnia is under UN-mandate.

The most important part of the current policy is membership in the EU. The Swedish people, after an intense campaign from the Government and with the thinnest of margins, voted for joining the EU.¹²⁹ The process for Swedish integration started in 1990 and the main reasons, as indicated by the Parliament, were economic: to maintain peace with prosperity.¹³⁰ The changed situation made possible a move that Sweden had refused several times during the Cold War.

There is a conflict between membership of the EU and the policy of neutrality. First, there are strong forces within the Union that want to transform it from a basically economic structure to a tool for foreign and defense issues. When the Maastricht Treaty went into effect on the 1 November 1993, it provided a blueprint for deeper integration.¹³¹ The troublesome part is the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).¹³² Even if the process is slow currently, it is still moving ahead and constitutes a serious break with strict neutrality.

EU membership affects perceptions of Swedish neutrality. A number of Eastern European states perceive membership as an implicit security guarantee. It is probable that other European nations, for example Russia, view the situation the same way.

Sweden recognizes the dilemma but chooses to wait and see. The Swedish Government had problems from the start with the compatibility of neutrality and CSFP. One way out of the dilemma was to reduce the importance of the defense dimension. For example, the Government stated in 1992 that: "It should be noted that 'security policy' in the EU vocabulary does not automatically have a defense dimension."¹³³ Another approach was to describe CSFP as a slow process and to assert that nothing was decided yet.¹³⁴

The current policy combines the element of slow process with a Swedish desire to remove common defense from the agenda. The Parliament ruling from 1995/96 describes the road to CFSP as “A preliminary conclusion is that a continued deepening cooperation on foreign and security policy is a slow process. The enlargement Eastward will for a long time dominate the development of the EU.”¹³⁵ The description of the situation with common defense and the Swedish policy is:

Many EU countries strive after a common defense, but the question has been put in the background. Sweden and other countries, on the other hand, have pursued a policy that the member states in an increasing degree shall be able to make decisions, within the so called Petersbergs’s area, i. e. peace keeping operations, disaster relief and crisis management, that can be carried out by a developed WEU.¹³⁶

Consequently, the current Swedish policy is a way of solving the dilemma by postponing it and in the meantime encouraging the development of an EU compatible with continued neutrality.

Freedom of Action

Freedom of action for Sweden is a function of policy and circumstances.

Neutrality, in itself, constrains freedom of action in peacetime in order to obtain freedom in case of war. Restrictions may affect, for example, economic cooperation. There are two alternatives to increased freedom: redefine the concepts of nonalignment and neutrality or give them up totally. Since both policies are evolving, the Swedish Post Cold War definitions need clarification, and the thesis does this later. The other alternative, to abandon the traditional policy, is possible because Sweden’s neutrality is voluntary. Consequently, Sweden has freedom of action concerning policy.

Freedom of action today is greater than for a long time, but membership in the EU probably reduces it. Sweden was for long periods, during 1940-1945 and the Cold War, forced to prioritize basic national interests. After 1989/90, the possibility of pursuing other interests increased, and there is less need, at least in short-term perspective, to be neutral in a traditional way.¹³⁷ This is also officially recognized: "New possibilities have been opened for our security policy."¹³⁸ At the same time, membership in the EU and the increased dependency on European and global economy reduce this new freedom. To leave the EU would probably have serious economic consequences. Consequently, the link between development in Europe and Sweden is closer than ever: "Swedish interests are closely linked to the development of the EU."¹³⁹

Swedish resistance to some aspects of European integration illustrates a shift in the nature of freedom of action. Sweden tried during the world wars and the Cold War to achieve freedom of action in a military context. Currently the threat to sovereignty is deeper integration, and the Government uses nonalignment to protect this interest.

Public Opinion

To better understand the current policy and the tendencies for change, it is necessary to examine Swedish public opinion. Two sources illuminate the question: the political debate (the elite) and mainstream public opinion.

The deeply divided political debate focuses on membership in NATO. Two political parties in parliament argue for Swedish membership in NATO; if not now, then later.¹⁴⁰ The rest of the parties, including the present Government, do not want membership.¹⁴¹ The Conservative Party has for some time argued for NATO. The main arguments are that the Swedish defense capability is too weak for neutrality, and Sweden

cannot remain outside as NATO grows.¹⁴² The Liberal Party claims that an enlargement of NATO Eastward makes Swedish neutrality obsolete.¹⁴³

The Social Democrats, supported by the Center Party, resist membership, but are willing to cooperate with the organization. Their main arguments are:

1. Swedish security, in case of a renewed aggressive Russia, would not increase by membership.

2. The situation in Europe would not improve.

3. An enlargement of NATO could provoke nationalistic forces in Russia.¹⁴⁴

In contrast, there appears to be a larger acceptance for an enlarged EU.¹⁴⁵ Cooperation with NATO, in Bosnia and in PöP, will continue and the Swedish Government's declaration for the parliament in 1997 confirmed it.¹⁴⁶

The debate touches on a Nordic defense structure. The former Supreme Commander, General Bengt Gustafsson, first revived the idea of a Nordic solution in 1992.¹⁴⁷ He argued that a European Security system would be too fragile in the Nordic area; a separate arrangement would be necessary. A broader debate encompasses a regional Nordic solution. This discussion urged Sweden and Finland to assume a larger responsibility for Baltic security.¹⁴⁸ Finnish diplomats, German defense minister Volke Ruhe, American Scholars, and Sir Douglas Hurd supported a Nordic solution.¹⁴⁹ Both the Swedish and the Finnish Governments rejected this concept.

Public opinion, as shown in polls, is strongly against NATO membership, but wants Sweden to be an active partner in a European security context. In a poll from 1996, 70 percent wanted nonalignment, and only 18 percent favored membership in NATO.¹⁵⁰ In a more recent poll, the figure against is still high: between 60 and 70 percent.¹⁵¹ A poll

from 1998 confirms the resistance.¹⁵² Rising opinion against membership in the EU, 61 percent, shows the same tendency.¹⁵³ However, 55 percent support intensified cooperation with NATO.¹⁵⁴ About one half of the population wants Sweden to be an active partner in European security.¹⁵⁵ Consequently, there seems to be massive opinion against membership of NATO, but other forms of security arrangements may be acceptable.

Conclusions

The descriptions and analysis of Sweden's situation and policy encourage two sets of conclusions. The first involves current Swedish security policy, and the second concerns factors that affect the choice and evaluation of future options.

A comparison between characteristics of neutrality (nonalignment) and the current policy illustrates the nature of Sweden's Post Cold War neutrality. Swedish neutrality and nonalignment are still mainly military in nature; the emphasis is on military independence and hard security. Neutrality, a concept associated with war between two belligerents, is still viewed in the context of a potential East–West conflict. This is the conflict in which Sweden expects to be neutral. The basic Swedish assumption is that it is still possible to stay out of this type of conflict. The Government considers nonalignment as a preparation for these circumstances and in relation to, or against, two alliances: NATO and the military dimension of the EU.

Both neutrality and nonalignment have evolved. The first concept has evolved less because military cooperation remains limited and does not yet affect neutrality in war. The changes in nonalignment are more profound. It is no longer a posture between two military alliances; instead it involves a description of relations with the rest of

Europe. The Swedish Government has set clear limits upon its involvement in NATO and the EU. This is not just out of consideration for neutrality, but also, more importantly, for reasons of sovereignty. Sweden seeks actively to influence the process in Europe to protect neutrality and sovereignty. The policy of nonalignment protects Swedish independence. Economic and political dimensions are separate from military aspects. Clearly, the Swedish definitions of nonalignment and neutrality allow economic cooperation. This cooperation does not, according to the Government, affect policies. The emphasis on nonalignment is currently associated more with soft security. Sweden's current security policy seeks to balance the requirements of neutrality and nonalignment with increasing international interaction and the need to influence it.

A comparison (figure 8) of elements of the traditional policy, the pursuit before 1989, and the current policy illustrates the Post Cold War policy.

Elements of the Traditional Policy	The Pursuit	The Current Policy
Freely chosen	Yes, but concessions if the situation required.	Yes, but influenced economic considerations.
Nature of policy	Military, hard security	Military, hard security
Geographically limited	Yes, different policy in the Nordic area if necessary.	Yes, but more focused on Europe and the Baltic
Declaration of intent	Yes	Yes
Activism	Yes	Yes, but only one party left.
Basic national interest	Yes, focus and took precedence.	Yes, but economic interests are growing in importance.
Supported by strong defense	Yes, but not always in a timely manner.	Yes, but dependant on the ability to adjust.
Built on nonalignment	Yes, seen as preparation for neutrality.	Yes, preparation and a question of sovereignty. Tendencies for soft security.
Credibility	Yes, efforts to build, but affected by the Cold War.	Yes, efforts to build, but affected by EU membership.

Figure 8. Comparison of traditional policy, pursuit, and current policy

There are seven factors to consider concerning future Swedish security policy:

1. It is difficult to be nonaligned and neutral without a clearly defined conflict.
2. Perceptions, affected by the Cold War and EU membership, of the surrounding states determine the strength of neutrality.
3. Reasons for the traditional policy.
4. Officially stated national interests.
5. Perceived Swedish global, European, and Baltic roles.
6. Swedish freedom of action.
7. Public opinion.

The three most important factors are interests, Sweden's role, and freedom of action.

These factors form the basis for any future Swedish security policy. The first three affect the future prolonged neutrality option. Public opinion conditions politically possible options.

¹ The New Encyclopaedia Britannica, vol. 8, 15th ed., s.v. "neutrality." (Chicago, IL: Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc., 1993).

² Christina Patterson, "Neutrality and its Compatibility with the European Union: Comparative Case Studies of Austria, Finland, and Sweden" (Thesis, Washington, D.C.: The American University, 1994), 23.

³ *Ibid.*, 24.

⁴ Graham Evans and Jeffery Newnham, The Dictionary of World Politics, s. v. "Neutrality" (Cambridge: The University Press, 1990); and Efraim Karsh, Neutrality and Small States (London: Antony Rowe Ltd, 1988), 18.

⁵ Karsh, 271.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 19.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 23.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ Goran Andersson, "Neutrality" (Lecture by the Swedish attaché to DDR and Austria, Stockholm: National Defence College, 27 November 1992).

¹¹ Karsh, 23-24.

¹² Karsh, 32.

¹³ Patterson, 85.

¹⁴ Andersson.

¹⁵ Patterson, 85.

¹⁶ Patterson, 27.

¹⁷ Andersson and Ulrich Zwygart, "Swiss Neutrality, The Swiss Army, and European Security," European Security 3, no. 2 (Summer 1994): 331.

¹⁹ Walter Carlsnaes, "Sweden Facing the New Europe: Whither Neutrality?" European Security 2, no. 1 (Spring 1993): 77.

²⁰ Ibid., 78.

²¹ Patterson, 25.

²² Karsh, 22.

²³ Patterson, 76-77.

²⁴ The term "neutralism" is sometimes used instead of nonalignment. In this thesis "nonalignment" is used. The New Encyclopaedia Britannica, vol. 8, 15th ed., s.v. "neutrality." (Chicago, IL: Encyclopaedia Britannica Inc., 1993).

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ Karsh, 28.

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ Patterson, 181.

³¹ Karsh, 21.

³² Wilhelm Agrell, Alliansfri - Tills Vidare (Stockholm: Natur och Kultur, 1994), 19.

³³ Ted Davis, "A Brief Introduction to Strategic Concept," DJCO Selected Readings Book. Fundamentals of Operational Warfighting I. Module I (Fort Leavenworth: USACGSC, 1997), 1-A-8—9.

³⁴ Regeringen, Regeringens Proposition 1989/90: 100 (Stockholm: Forsvarsdepartementet, 1989).

Regeringen, Regeringens Proposition 1991/92: 102 (Stockholm: Forsvarsdepartementet, 1991).

³⁵ Davis, 1-A-9.

³⁶ Patterson, 71.

³⁷ Jerrold M. Packard, Neither Friend nor Foe: the European Neutrals in World War II (New York: Maxwell Macmillan International, 1992), xii.

³⁸ Patterson, 71.

³⁹ Regeringen, Regeringens Proposition 1989/90: 100

⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹ Patterson, 72.

⁴² Ibid.

⁴³ Ibid., 74.

⁴⁴ The New Encyclopaedia Britannica vol. 8, 15th ed., s.v. "Belgium." (Chicago, IL: Encyclopaedia Britannica Inc., 1993).

⁴⁵ Forsvarsmakten, Forsvarsmaketens underlag infor totalforsvarsbeslut 1996 (Stockholm, Hogkvarteret, 1995), III.

⁴⁶ Forsvarsmakten, Facts and Figures 1997 (Lidköping: Grunditz & Forsbergs tryckeri AB, 19997), 7.

⁴⁷ Agrell, 21.

⁴⁸ Ibid., 22.

⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁵¹ Ibid.

⁵² Ibid., 17.

⁵³ Ibid., 18.

⁵⁴ Agrell, 17.

⁵⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁷ Trevor, J. Gunn, "Neutrality and alignment: Selected aspects of Swedish and Norwegian policies towards the Soviet Union, 1987- -1991" (Ph.D. diss., London: University of London, 1992), 34.

⁵⁸ Agrell, 17.

Gunn, 29.

⁵⁹ Gunn, 35.

⁶⁰ "Massiv opinion mot NATO," Dagens Nyheter, 13 February 1996, 5.

⁶¹ Ibid.

⁶² J. A. Skinner, "Sweden after the Cold War: Implications for US Regional Strategies" (Thesis, Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 1993), 33.

⁶³ Agrell, 20.

⁶⁴ "Massiv opinion mot NATO," 5.

⁶⁵ Packard, 26.

⁶⁶ Forsvarsmakten, Facts and Figures 1997, 6.

⁶⁷ Ibid., 7.

⁶⁸ Agrell, 14.

⁶⁹ Ibid., 15.

⁷⁰ Packard, 97. The Swedish support to Finland was considerable: 80000 rifles, 50 million cartridges, 122 field guns and howitzers, 300000 artillery shells, 25 planes, oil, and 8000 Swedish volunteers. The support continued throughout the Second World War, but decreased when Finland joined Germany in the attack on Russia. One interesting aspect is the Stella Polaris Operation in 1944. Fears of a Russian victory led the Finish Intelligence service to move personnel, archives, and equipment to Sweden. 750 persons fled to Sweden, with the Swedish Government's permission, in September 1944. Stefan Forss, "Mojligheterna for militart samarbete i Norden," (Lecture at Kungliga Krigsvetenskaps Akademin, 18 October 1994).

⁷¹ Packard, 15.

⁷² Ibid.

⁷³ Ibid., 15.

⁷⁴ Packard, 85.

⁷⁵ Ibid.

⁷⁶ Ibid., 91.

⁷⁷ Ibid., 242.

⁷⁸ Ibid., 236.

⁷⁹ Ibid., 228.

⁸⁰ Ibid., 227.

⁸¹ Ibid., 242.

⁸² Ibid., 300, 308, 312.

⁸³ Ibid., 363.

⁸⁴ Ibid., 245.

⁸⁵ Ibid.

⁸⁶ Ibid., 239.

⁸⁷ Ibid.

⁸⁸ Gunn, 35.

⁸⁹ Ibid., 30.

⁹⁰ Ibid., 33.

⁹¹ Ibid., 53.

⁹² Ibid.

⁹³ Ibid., 289.

⁹⁴ Ibid.

⁹⁵ Ibid., 294.

⁹⁶ Ibid., 293.

⁹⁷ Ingemar Dorfer, The Nordic Nations in the Western Security Regime (Washington, DC: The Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1997), 67-68.

⁹⁸ Agrell, 25.

⁹⁹ Skinner, 17-19.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid., 34-36.

¹⁰¹ Ibid., 34.

¹⁰² Agrell, 24-26.

¹⁰³ Ibid.

¹⁰⁴ Skinner, 13.

¹⁰⁵ Regeringen, Regeringens proposition 1995/96: 12, 38.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid., 3.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid., 35.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid., 37-38.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid., 29, 44.

¹¹⁰ Ibid., 64-69.

¹¹¹ Ibid., 64, 70.

¹¹² Ibid., 70-71.

¹¹³ Ted Davis, "A Brief Introduction to Strategic Concepts," DJCO Selected Readings Book Fundamentals of Operational Warfighting I Module I (Fort Leavenworth: USACGSC, 1997), 1-A-4.

¹¹⁴ Regeringen, Regeringens proposition 1995/96: 12, 33-35.

¹¹⁵ Regeringen, Regeringens proposition 1995/96: 12, 36.

¹¹⁶ Ibid., 4.

¹¹⁷ Ibid., 21. The Baltic Council was formed in 1992 as structure to develop regional cooperation.

¹¹⁸ Ibid.

¹¹⁹ Ibid.

¹²⁰ Ibid., 40.

¹²¹ Ibid., 36.

¹²² Ibid., 7.

¹²³ Ibid., 33-34.

¹²⁴ Ibid.

¹²⁵ Regeringen, Regeringens proposition 1995/96: 12, 23.

¹²⁶ Dorfer, 29.

¹²⁷ Ibid., 54.

¹²⁸ Ibid., 53.

¹²⁹ Ibid., 4.

¹³⁰ Patterson, 4.

¹³¹ Patterson, 149.

¹³² Ibid., 150.

¹³³ Forsvarsdepartementet, Sakerhets och försvarspolitik: Samtryck ur 1992 års försvarsbeslutsproposition (Stockholm: Forsvarsdepartementet, 1992), 12.

¹³⁴ Ibid.

¹³⁵ Regeringen, Regeringens proposition 1995/96: 12, 22.

¹³⁶ Ibid.

¹³⁷ Agrell, 131.

¹³⁸ Regeringen, Regeringens proposition 1995/96: 12, 3.

¹³⁹ Ibid., 34.

¹⁴⁰ "Smooth sailing," Armed Forces Journal, December 1997, 31.

¹⁴¹ Ibid.

¹⁴² "Nara samarbete med NATO," Svenska Dagbladet, 22 September 1997, 11.

Carl Bildt, "Sverige kan inte försvara sig utan NATO," Expressen, 23 September 1997, 4.

¹⁴³ Lena Hjelm-Wallen and Tage G Pettersson, "Natomedlemskap helt uteslutet," Dagens Nyheter, 13 June 1996, 3.

¹⁴⁴ Ingvar Carlsson, "Nato – ny moderatmiss," Aftonbladet, 26 August 1997, 3; and UD Pressbyrå, 11 August 1997.

¹⁴⁵ Hjelm-Wallen, 4.

¹⁴⁶ UD Pressbyra, 11 August 1997.

¹⁴⁷ Bengt Gustafsson, "OB vill ha sakerhet pa nordisk grund," Sydsvenska Dagbladet, 20 July 1992, 2.

¹⁴⁸ Dorfer, 81-82.

¹⁴⁹ Dorfer, 71, 81, 82.

¹⁵⁰ "Massiv opinion mot NATO," 5.

¹⁵¹ "Smooth sailing", 31.

¹⁵² "Svenskarnas motstand mot NATO vaxer," Svenska Dagbladet, 19 January 1998, 4.

¹⁵³ "Massiv opinion mot NATO," 5.

¹⁵⁴ Dorfer, 67.

¹⁵⁵ "Smooth sailing," 31.

CHAPTER 5

THE SITUATION IN EUROPE AND THE BALTIC REGION

The previous discussion concentrated on Sweden and its current policy. The situation in Europe and the Baltic region, as well as varying perspectives on them, challenge this policy. The purpose of the following discussion is, from the present situation, to analyze future perspectives and deduce factors that affect future Swedish security policy. Analysis of the present situation starts with a general European perspective, then focuses on the Baltic Region.

Present Situation in Europe

The dramatic changes in Europe since 1989 consist of three major events: the fall of Communism, changing organizations, and the wars in former Yugoslavia and Chechnya. These three changes are treated in sequence.

The Fall of Communism

The fall of Communism and the breakup of the Soviet Union resulted in the removal of the imminent military threat to Western Europe. Although the reduced military capability was an important phenomenon, the political consequences are even more far-reaching.

The end of the bipolar situation in Europe gave freedom of action for states and organizations.¹ The number of states in Europe (the Caucasus not included) increased from 27 in 1945 to 40 in 1993. Moreover, a number of states in Eastern Europe gained the ability to choose their futures. Consequently, European politics now features interaction among a larger number of states; more players participate.

Multilateral organizations in the West dominate the security structure in Europe. The number of major structures has dropped from seven (UN, NATO, EU, WEU, OSCE, the Warsaw Pact and COMECON) to six. Western nations dominate all of these, except UN, OSCE, and CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States).

Another change is the demilitarization of international relations. During the Cold War security, the military situation, and the military instrument of power dominated policies in Europe. The attention has now shifted towards politics and economics; the diplomatic, informational and economic instruments of power are now more important.² This development highlights the move from hard to soft security issues. Ideological changes are towards more conformity of systems, with an element of nationalism emerging in Central and Eastern Europe. Within the political and economic spheres, all states in Europe are either committed to, or officially striving for, the same system. Nationalistic feelings have been important elements in the struggle for freedom in, for example, the Baltic States.

Organizations

Despite the fundamental changes, no new organizations, except for the CIS, emerged. Security in Europe is dependent on the surviving structures from the Cold War. There are three reasons for this: lack of time to form new organizations, conservatism in the face of change, and the preoccupations of two major players, Germany and Russia.³ Changes occurred within the structures.

The evolution has two main features: integration and enlargement. The former is most evident in the development of the EU. Both the EU and NATO have opened themselves to new members. EU took the first step in 1995, and the next will occur in a

few years. For NATO, the first phase will take place in a few years, but the next enlargement is more problematic. Other organizations, including the OSCE and WEU, changed and enlarged.

NATO and EU emerged as the dominating structures. In 1991, Germany and France tried to increase the military role for WEU.⁴ This organization's lack of infrastructure and the costs of building sufficient forces caused the attempt to fail.⁵ For example, to provide sea- and airlift capability, now provided by the U.S., would have required tens of billions of dollars annually.⁶ France instead moved towards closer cooperation with NATO.⁷ WEU seems to move towards being a part of the integration process and has clarified its relationships with NATO and the EU.⁸ The expansion of WEU is dependent to and focused on the EU process.⁹

OSCE has failed to become a European security structure. For many the OSCE in 1991 seemed to be the obvious choice for the future.¹⁰ It alone encompassed all the states of the new Europe. For others, the OSCE was a return to collective security, like the League of Nations. The organization appeared to be weak and inactive during the coup in Moscow in 1991 and lacked the principles and procedures to handle events in former Yugoslavia.¹¹ These events highlighted the weaknesses: 53 members, too vague an organization, and lack of support from any major powers.¹² Future reduced OSCE roles are probably in the areas of preventive diplomacy, early warning, and human rights.¹³

The mission in the former Yugoslavia weakened the UN's role in Europe. Many European countries have traditionally supported the UN and continued their commitment when the UN for the first time tried to solve an armed conflict in Europe. The mission failed because of the failure of political will among the participants and the slowness of

the UN bureaucracy.¹⁴ Failure and the escalating war strengthened demands for NATO intervention and heavily discredited the UN in Europe.

The turmoil after the demise of the Soviet Union resulted in the CIS. Initially the leadership of Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine agreed to form a Slavic commonwealth, excluding other former Soviet republics. The Central Asian Republics joined to reinforce their sovereignty. Other states, for example the Baltic Republics, refused to participate. The organization has, due to a weak but still dominating Russia, limited influence.

The Post Cold War security system so far is largely the result of ad hoc changes made to structures inherited from the Cold War. No single structure has emerged, but two, the EU and NATO, have dominated the complicated process to form a Post-Cold War security system.

The European Union

The process of further integrating Western Europe not only concerns economic cooperation, but also, more importantly, political and military aspects. The Maastricht Treaty (1991) is the result of this success, the disintegration of the military threat and the ambition to strengthen the European identity. The Treaty describes the ultimate goal of European cooperation process: a common security and defense policy.

However, the process of integration slowed after the treaty of 1991. The trouble started when Denmark voted against further integration as envisioned in Maastricht.¹⁵ In addition, the ongoing war in former Yugoslavia caught much attention and revealed different opinions concerning solutions.¹⁶ Moreover, the two driving forces had problems of their own: Germany with unification, and France with internal problems.¹⁷

Slow integration continues along two lines of advance: economic and military. Monetary cooperation is the short-term financial aim. The most apparent expression of the impulse to further integration is the European Monetary Union (EMU), which is set to have a common currency in 2002.¹⁸ A European central bank will control the currency and should result in a depoliticized currency policy.¹⁹ Germany and France support the Union as mostly a political move to deepen integration.²⁰ A number of countries are hesitant to join a common currency, and only a few can meet the financial requirement for participation.²¹ Erosion of sovereignty concerns the reluctant states since the ability to have a national financial policy will almost disappear.²²

Military integration continues towards a European Security and Defense Initiative (ESDI). France and Germany remain committed, and the most evident example is the Eurocorps.²³ Another development is the possibility for Europeans to use NATO's framework for Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF) when the Atlantic alliance cannot or will not act.²⁴ A third element is CFSP within the EU, but this is currently less a policy in the sense of a specific course of action, than a process.²⁵

The American attitude towards European integration has changed fundamentally. The Bush administration reacted negatively in 1991 out of concerns over a weaker NATO.²⁶ The Clinton administration, however, embraces integration enthusiastically and considers it a complement to American foreign policy.

The process is not only about integration; it is also about enlargement. The EU expanded from 12 members in 1990, to 15 in 1995, and will expand to a probable 19 before year 2000. Clearly the new members consider it favorable to participate in the

deepening integration or difficult to stay out of it. Nearly all Eastern European countries are standing in line, wanting to be members, for economic and security reasons.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NATO is a unique alliance that is accustomed to change. During the Cold War the organization evolved from a traditional interstate structure into a unique system of standing military forces and an integrated command in peacetime.²⁷ After having played a critical role in facilitating German unification, and having recognized that the Soviet Union was no longer an enemy, the Pact went soul-searching for a new role.²⁸ The reason was obvious: the old structure could not meet new and more complicated evolving threats.

The main changes since 1989 have involved command structure, force structure, and the PfP. NATO reduced the number of major commands from three to two and created larger subordinate commands.²⁹ In Northern Europe, Allied Forces Northwestern Europe (AFNORTHWEST) replaced CINCNORTH.³⁰ The headquarters moved from Norway to England. Denmark and the German State of Schleswig-Holstein, previously under CINCNORTH, became subordinate to the new command.³¹

NATO reduced its force structure and introduced a new concept: CJTF. The large, heavy, forward-deployed forces along the border between the two German states were drastically reduced as a result of the evaporated Communist presence. The transformation to a more flexible structure started in 1994. The CJTF is an organizational scheme designed to allow separable but not separate forces for use out of area.³² This arrangement increased the ability to conduct out-of-area operations, reinforced commands within NATO, and reduced competition with the WEU.³³ The force enables

European countries to form temporary “alliances” using NATO resources in, for example, peacekeeping operations.³⁴ Such operations could be led by the WEU.³⁵ The CJTF was an effort to keep NATO relevant, increase European autonomy, and reduce the need for U.S. commitment to every operation.³⁶

NATO created PfP to contend with the new situation in Europe, in particular, to deal with increasing demands for membership. After 1990, with newly acquired freedom, many Eastern European countries wanted increased security reassurances from the West.³⁷ Russian opposition and reluctance from member states made enlargement difficult. A first step to appease the demands was the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), followed by PfP in 1993.³⁸ Many of the participants consider the partnership as a preparation for membership. PfP cannot satisfy the new states’ hard security needs and must be considered an interim solution.³⁹

Despite the changed situation, the core functions of NATO remain. As defined in Rome 1991 they are: to constitute the primary mechanism to deter and defend against attack on its members and to preserve the strategic balance in Europe, including American presence.⁴⁰ NATO remains a structure for collective defense. Article V in the North Atlantic Treaty expresses the first function: “an armed attack against one or more of them [the members] in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all.”⁴¹ This is the core of the alliance.

The military threat from the East was the driving force for the creation of the Atlantic pact. Political motives, for example, to keep Germany integrated and America committed, played a role, but were subordinate. Furthermore, the member states were, with one or two exceptions, homogenous. They shared values, to a large extent interests,

and also economic and political systems. Consequently, the external threat forced a number of like-minded states together for their own protection.

New Wars

The wars in former Yugoslavia tested the evolving security system. Europe was not prepared for this test of EU's CFSP.⁴² Europe failed even to contain the conflict and was forced to hand it over to first the UN, and then to NATO under American leadership.

There are several reasons for this failure, and some remain pertinent to the future security structure. The most important problems for the future are the ability to handle internal conflicts and the reconciliation of diverse national interests.⁴³ Both NATO and the EU lacked structures and experience to deal with internal conflicts. The members states in a security structure must perceive that their interests are threatened by a conflict to get involved.

The war in Chechnya illustrates the limits of Western European interests. The Russian Republic of Chechnya, a part of the Russian Federation, experienced a small, localized revolution on 21 August 1991 and declared its independence from Russia on 6 September 1991.⁴⁴ In December 1994, Russia intervened, and a bloody war raged until August 1996, when the Russian troops withdrew. European reactions to the conflict came in the form of only a few OSCE observers. The relationship with Russia was more important than local events in Chechnya, and no European country had any interests in the region.

The wars in former Yugoslavia and Chechnya show that armed conflict still is possible in Post Cold War Europe. Old ethnic, religious and nationalistic controversies in the Balkans, Eastern Europe and on the fringes of the continent have come alive again

and may spill over to neighboring countries and beyond. The existing security structures have not been sufficient to solve these problems.

Five features summarize the situation in Europe. First, the end of bipolarism gave freedom of action to states and organizations. This new freedom explains why descriptions of the future often emphasize unpredictability: the number of players has increased dramatically. Second, the demilitarization of relations has shifted the security emphasis security from hard to soft security. Third, from the complex web of organizations two dominating structures have emerged: EU and NATO. These structures have dealt with hard security and not with the emerging problems of, for example, environment and refugees. Fourth, the organizations are evolving, deepening the integration process and enlarging themselves. European security is now more a matter of process than structures. Lastly, recent wars have uncovered problems in current structures and have indicated that the overall evolutionary process may involve conflict.

The Present Situation in the Baltic Region

While the security situation in the Baltic Region has improved, an increased number of actors have also complicated it. The situation affects Finland, the Baltic States, Russia, Poland, Germany, and Denmark differently, and these states pursue different policies. An additional element is cooperation in the Baltic area.

Finland

The traditional Finnish security policy has been nonalignment. The Finnish situation after the Second World War was not favorable: defeat in two wars, loss of territory, Soviet bases on Finnish soil, and a treaty with the Soviet Union. Finnish

neutrality was a Cold War phenomenon of a strictly functional variety to maintain at least a degree of independence.⁴⁵

Finland is hesitant to use its increased freedom of action. In 1990, just after the fall of the Berlin wall, the Finnish Government unilaterally canceled the Paris Peace Agreement and the treaty with the Soviet Union. Furthermore, Finland bought American warplanes and joined the EU. Although these measures implied a policy more open to the West, concern for the relationship with Russia still is a limitation.

With the new situation in Europe, Finland chose to remain nonaligned, but in a modified way. A weaker Russia gave more freedom of action and made a more substantial and credible nonalignment possible.⁴⁶ A Finnish move towards the West did not include defense policy. In 1992, the phrase "military nonalignment and credible national defense" (MNA-CND) described the neutrality.⁴⁷

A slight modification took place in 1998. President Ahtisaari used the phrase "stability has been reinforced by the basic model for security policy: nonalignment and cooperation within NATO's new structure" in a speech to the Parliament.⁴⁸ What this modification means is unclear, but it is probable that cooperation with NATO continues and that the Government wants to keep the NATO option open.⁴⁹

The basic Finnish problem is geography. Unlike Sweden, Finland's military geography has not improved.⁵⁰ Finland is still a "border state" between developed and developing democracies; the market and marketizing economies; and the rich and the poor in Europe.⁵¹ In addition, Russia only has two areas with direct access to the West, St Petersburg and Kola, both close to Finland. The fundamental problem is to reconcile the geographical position with Finland's desire to be a part of Western Europe.

A strong military defense supports the policy of nonalignment. While most Nordic nations reduced their Armed Forces in the 1980s and 1990s, Finland modernized and increased its defenses.⁵² As a result, Finland in 1996 possessed the largest and best equipped army among the Nordic countries, a modern Navy, and an Air Force with F-18s.⁵³ These instruments provide a solid foundation to act and to modify security policy.

Changes in security policy include membership in the EU and cooperation with NATO. Finland joined the EU for two main reasons: a decline in the trade with Russia and the Swedish application. The problem with EU membership is plans for CFSP.⁵⁴ According to the current Finnish definition, the defense part of CFSP means: “strengthening crisis management and peace keeping capabilities.”⁵⁵ Together with Sweden, Finland argues that the EU should not enhance its ability to engage in conflict management. WEU, linked to the EU, should instead perform military tasks.⁵⁶ There is a clear distinction between crisis management and collective defense commitments.

Finland participates in PfP and SFOR. In the partnership, Finland cooperates with the same restrictions as Sweden; this is not a preparation for membership.⁵⁷ The Finnish contribution to SFOR, one engineer battalion and one infantry battalion, required an amendment to existing legislation, which only allowed Finnish participation in UN- and OSCE-led operations.⁵⁸ This is a shift from the policy of traditional peace keeping operations to more openness to peace enforcing operations.

Cooperation with NATO sparked a debate over membership. Discussion started in 1994 with the presidential elections, and the distinguished diplomat Max Jakobson summarized it in 1996: future European security scenarios would oblige Finland to choose between NATO and a gray area of isolation.⁵⁹ His arguments for joining NATO

were: integration of Russia is a distant goal, the EU will not in the foreseeable future achieve a credible defense union, and the vital aspect of American commitment to Europe.⁶⁰ Official Finnish reaction was similar to the Swedish one: membership would create more security problems than it solves.⁶¹

Finnish public opinion is against NATO membership and opposition is increasing. In 1992, 29 percent favored NATO, but the figure declined to 25 percent in mid 1995.⁶² In 1996, the figure reached 21 percent.⁶³ During the same period, the opinion against had risen to 70 percent.

The discussion also raised another option: a Nordic defense arrangement. The historical tradition of cooperation with Sweden, and similarities in situation made this alternative interesting. In 1990, the Finnish Defense Minister rejected the Nordic solution, but the debate continued, and in 1996 three Finnish diplomats pleaded for Swedish – Finnish defense cooperation.⁶⁴ In 1994, the Commander of the Finnish Armed Forces, General Gustav Hagglund, gave three criteria for Swedish defense cooperation: no major power must oppose, cooperation must not substantially increase the risks for Sweden, and both countries must have the same relationship with EU, WEU, and NATO.

Finnish support for the Baltic States has focused on Estonia, but remains limited. For historical, geographic, and linguistic reasons contacts with Estonia are extensive. The Finnish influence in Estonia is considerable. Finland gives economic, political, and military assistance to promote stability, but without any kinds of security guarantees.

Finnish security policy aims to anchor Finland in Western Europe and at the same time take the basic element, the relationship with Russia, into consideration.⁶⁵

President Ahtisaari summarized the security policy in three points in 1996:

1. Finland is not seeking NATO membership.
2. Finland supports EU membership for the Baltic States.
3. The Nordic States should not give security guarantees to the Baltic States.⁶⁶

Recent signals from the President indicate that the NATO option is unlikely, but remains open.

The political and military improvements of the Finnish situation have been considerable, but the geographical position remains, as always, less favorable. The similarities with Swedish policy and its problems are apparent.

Estonia

A perception of vulnerability dominates Estonian security policy. The Eastern neighbor, except for a brief period of Estonian independence, has totally dominated Estonia over the last three centuries. Estonia achieved total independence in 1994, with the withdrawal of the last Russian troops.⁶⁷

Geography and ethnic minorities reinforce the perception of vulnerability. Estonia is the smallest of the Baltic States and is close to a vital Russian area: St Petersburg. Together with Finland, Estonia controls the Gulf of Finland, which is the only Russian direct approach to the Baltic Sea. Estonia disputes the Eastern border with Russia since the border was changed during the Soviet occupation.⁶⁸ Thirty percent of a population of 1.5 million is Russian, and Estonians perceive this as a threat.⁶⁹ A declining Estonian birthrate and population flight have increased the problem. As a result, harsh citizenship laws were introduced after independence, but were liberalized following pressure from the West.⁷⁰

The traditional perception is that Estonia is undefendable.⁷¹ The defense force, mainly trained and supported by Finland, is small, and economic constraints limit expansion. The force would only be able to resist a major attack for, at most, weeks or even days, without help. Consequently, the defense is a tripwire, able only to define a crisis and to assert territorial integrity.

Survival dominates Estonian security policy. Perceived threats, control of economy, and borders, problems with the minority, and instability in Russia, all endanger Estonia's survival as a state.⁷² In 1992, the Estonian leadership saw three alternatives to increase security: an improved relationship with Russia, neutrality, and a move to the West (NATO).⁷³ Agreement with Russia was not possible because of lack of trust, while Estonia was too weak for neutrality. The aim is set for integration with the West.⁷⁴ The road may be first through Baltic security and then through a subregional arrangement, but the ultimate aim for national security is with the West.⁷⁵

The efforts for a Westward move are through PfP and EU. In 1994, Estonia joined PfP together with the other Baltic States.⁷⁶ Estonia has applied for, with Swedish and Finnish support, EU membership.⁷⁷

Latvia

Latvian history during the twentieth century is similar to the Estonian, but the geography is slightly more favorable. Russian withdrawal from Skruda (missile defense facility) reduced Latvia's strategic importance. Latvia borders on only one side with Russia and, depending on the development in Belarus, has a more favorable location than Estonia.

Latvia has a large Russian minority, but has tried to integrate it. Thirty four percent of the population of 2.7 million are Russians, and a large part live in the capital, Riga.⁷⁸ Like Estonia, the Latvian attitude towards citizenship for Russians after independence was harsh. Under Western pressure, however, the policy changed, and the Latvian leadership is trying to integrate the Russian minority politically.⁷⁹

The defense force is limited by economic constraints. Sweden and Denmark support the Latvian Armed Forces.

Latvia perceives the same threats as Estonia, but is slightly less concerned with survival. In 1992, three alternatives were discussed: move to the East, to the West, or neutrality.⁸⁰ The Estonian Government considers only a move to the West, for the same reasons as Estonia, sufficient security. The ultimate goal is membership in NATO to maintain independence, not survival.⁸¹ The road to the West has started with participation in PfP and application for the EU. Latvia is, in the meantime, engaged in the Council of Baltic Sea States and in bilateral cooperation with the Nordic Countries.

Lithuania

Lithuania has a longer history than the other Baltic States. Lithuania was, together with Poland, once a major power in Eastern Europe. A past with an empire and armed resistance to Soviet occupation until the 1950s gives this nation a different perspective.

Lithuania has the most favorable geographic location of the Baltic States, but is more complicated ethnically. With no border on Russia, except for the Kaliningrad region, and a border on Poland (soon a member of NATO and EU), the threat is less imminent. The largest problem is Kaliningrad.⁸² Lithuania allows, to avoid confrontation

with Russia, military transit traffic to the enclave. The Lithuanian leadership tries, so far successfully, to avoid making access to Kaliningrad a question of sovereignty. Two minorities are results of the geographical location. Of a population of 3.7 million, nine percent are Russians and seven percent Poles.⁸³ The policy is currently one of integration, despite some problems in the beginning of independence.⁸⁴

The defense force consists of a combination of elements, but is insufficient for security. The main ground force is a motorized brigade supported by the Home Guard and Border Guards. Economic constraints will probably limit strength in the foreseeable future.⁸⁵ The Lithuanian leadership has recognized that the nation's resources are not sufficient for security based on the Armed Forces.⁸⁶

Lithuania's closest bilateral ties are with Poland and Denmark. Poland has transferred equipment and signed defense agreements.⁸⁷ Denmark provides military and other assistance.⁸⁸

The security policy has the same aim as the other Baltic States: NATO and EU membership. The driving force is perceived threats: large numbers of Russian troops near Lithuania, re-integration of Belarus into Russia, Kaliningrad, and general instability in the region.⁸⁹ The objective is to expand the European zone of stability as far East as possible.⁹⁰ The road to NATO is, if membership now is not possible, via cooperation with the Baltic States and arrangement in the Baltic Region.⁹¹

To summarize the situation in the Baltic States: the states have succeeded in establishing themselves as independent states and in avoiding the most pressing problems of ethnic minorities and border disputes. While waiting to obtain the ultimate security aim of membership in Western alliances, the states are using their own limited resources,

dealing directly with Russia and cooperating in the Baltic Region, to increase security. If the aim is not obtained, the Baltic States seem prepared to turn to other, more regional solutions.

Russia

Russia tries after a period of weakness to return to protection of its basic national interests. The policy under Gorbachev stressed openness and cooperation with all potential partners to ensure economic aid and market access.⁹² In more long-term perspective, the goal was the demise of NATO, which Moscow regarded as an obsolescent symbol and instrument of the Cold War.⁹³ The Soviet Union, and later Russia, had to let Eastern Europe go, despite operational needs for the defense of the motherland. Russia slowly began under President Yeltsin to reassert its influence and security interests.⁹⁴ The new Russian military doctrine reflects this.⁹⁵ When necessary, for example in the Caucasus, the Russian regime is prepared to use force to protect its interests.

The Russian geography, compared with the Soviet Union, has changed dramatically. The changed Russian geography, pressed far to the East and North, has resulted in several consequences. First, states under Soviet control no longer protect the 'heartland.' Second, Russia is, with the loss of a large part of the European territory, a smaller European power, and has more limited access to Western Europe. Russia is both a European and an Asian power, which divides Russian attention along several axis. Third, the independence of the Central Asian republics has resulted in an increased Islamic threat.

Geography and ethnic problems further divide Russia into regions. Russia consists of a multitude of regions, and not only the area around Moscow. These regions are economically and ethnically varied. The consequence may result in conflicting security interests and demands for attention from many directions. In addition, Russia is officially committed to protection of the 22-25 million Russians in the states of the former Soviet Union.⁹⁶

A reduction of defense capability increases Russian dependence on nuclear arms. The military capability has shrunk from super power status to armed forces with an array of problems: funding, training, readiness, and morale.⁹⁷ The campaign in Chechnya shows that the Russian Armed Forces suffer serious deficiencies.⁹⁸ The only considerable capability left is nuclear.

The basic Russian security policy aims at stability to protect economic development and Russia itself. Many Russians, including the present Government, stress Russia's inevitable return to greatness along with playing a necessary role in Europe to balance a stronger, united Germany.⁹⁹ Economic decline is a major cause of the present weakness. Russia's primary interest is stability to foster economic growth for at least the next decade. The policy of confrontation with the West has therefore changed to one of economic and political cooperation.¹⁰⁰

Another element is the strong desire not to have to choose between Europe and Asia. Accordingly, Russia, and other interested former Soviet republics within a reformed CIS should work together and assume responsibility for security and stability in the former Soviet Union and its periphery.¹⁰¹

Russia's interests in the Baltic Region focus on stability. Figure 9 describes these interests.

Prevent any single state to dominate the Baltic Region.	Prevent emergence of hostile organization and preventing existing ones to expand.
Prevent militarization of the Baltic States, including foreign military presence.	Secure access to the Baltic Sea and to Kaliningrad.
Protect the Russian minorities.	

Figure 9. Russian interests in the Baltic Region

Russia is more interested in a bilateral relationship than with membership in NATO or EU. The contacts with the Western organizations consist of participation in PfP since 1994, units in SFOR, agreement on economic association with the EU, membership in the Contact Group for former Yugoslavia, and accession to the Group of Seven (G-7).¹⁰² Russia recognizes that membership in NATO or EU is unlikely due to Russia's size: "How is NATO to digest an elephant?"¹⁰³ Russia seems to be more interested in bilateral relationships with the U.S., Germany, France, and the UK, than joining any Western organization.¹⁰⁴

Although Russian policy no longer calls for dismantling NATO, it is a priority to prevent the membership of any of the former Soviet republics.¹⁰⁵ Russia is against enlargement of NATO, but may accept EU-expansion. Russian authorities insist that since no threat exists there is no need for NATO enlargement.¹⁰⁶ The acceptance of the first phase of expansion in Central Europe was under duress, but incorporation of former

Soviet republics has met strong opposition. EU membership serves the new states in Europe better, argues Moscow, because this organization is less military in nature.

Russia is in a period of weakness and needs at least a decade of stability to regain economic strength. Considerable problems with geography, ethnic groups, diverse regions, and weak armed forces make this difficult. Russian interests in the Baltic Region emphasize stability and are defensive in nature. To keep other powers out of the region is a main concern. The aim is to regain status as a major power.

Poland

Poland's geographical location has affected traditional Polish security policy. The Polish dilemma has been, and still is, a location at the crossroads between East and West. Over the centuries, the borders have changed numerous times, and Poland has even occasionally disappeared from the map. To secure its borders, Poland has sought agreements and guarantees from outside powers.¹⁰⁷

At the same time, the current geographical position is more favorable, and solutions to ethnic problems are probable. Traditional border disputes with Germany seem to be solved for the moment.¹⁰⁸ Poland has in the East, except for Kaliningrad, a buffer zone against Russia. Poland devotes attention to reducing risk for conflicts with its Eastern neighbors. Treaties from 1992 with Belarus and Ukraine, as well as with Lithuania in 1994, bound the parties to respect borders and minorities.¹⁰⁹ The Polish population is today homogenous due to changed borders and a redistribution of population in the aftermath of World War II and the Nazi holocaust.

Poland's defense is potentially strong, despite reduction of the armed forces, because of budget problems and the need for a new structure.¹¹⁰ Poland intends, with

membership of NATO, to maintain a force of 200,000 soldiers.¹¹¹ However, the large population, 38 million, and a growing economy will allow considerable investment in defense in the future.¹¹²

The aim of the Polish security policy seems to have been achieved. Poland will in the near future become a member of both the EU and NATO.¹¹³

Besides membership, several other aspects of the security policy are important: relationships with Germany and the eastern neighbors. Poland is a German buffer zone, and ties with Germany are strong.¹¹⁴ Poland seeks a balance for German influence. For example, joint maneuvers with Germany often include Denmark, and the Polish battalion in SFOR is a part of the Nordic brigade.¹¹⁵ Poland maintains contacts with its Eastern neighbors to promote stability, to protect the Polish minorities, and to limit the Russian influence.¹¹⁶ The impression is one of “bridge-building” between East and West. Poland supports further enlargement of NATO eastward to erase its status as a “border state.”¹¹⁷

An additional aspect is Kaliningrad. Poland pursues a policy to promote demilitarization and to avoid collapse to maintain the area as Russian.

Within a few years, the Polish security situation, with NATO membership, will be better than before. Stability, including no changes of borders and a balance against German influence, are the primary interests. The Polish potential makes it a key ingredient for security and stability in the Baltic region.

Germany

The traditional German policy after the Second World War has started to change. During the Cold War, Germany sought to be thoroughly embedded in Western Europe to “compensate” for its history and remove fears for the future. Unification in 1990 caused

Germany to be self-absorbed while coping with the problems of the new state.¹¹⁸ In 1994, a number of indicators showed German willingness to play a larger role internationally and in Europe.¹¹⁹ For example, Germany participated, after a ruling by the Constitutional Court in 1994, in Somalia and later in SFOR.¹²⁰

German geography has changed in two respects: the buffer zone in the East, and growing importance of Northern Germany. After enlargement of EU and NATO, Germany is no longer a border state.¹²¹ The incorporation of the DDR and transfer of the capital to Berlin will increase the importance of the northern, Baltic part.¹²²

The German armed forces have undergone major changes in structure and personnel. The shift has been from a large, active force and static forward defense to smaller, highly mobile multinational units.¹²³ The development of CJTF and participation in the Eurocorps illustrate this policy.¹²⁴ Germany will reduce the size of its armed forces to 338,000 in year 2000.¹²⁵ The reduction includes preparations for force regeneration, should a more traditional threat arise again.¹²⁶ More troublesome is the shrinking international force on German soil. This could force Germany to act alone in a crisis in Central Europe with all the baggage of the past.¹²⁷ Germany tries to avoid this and adheres to a policy of multilateralism and Western integration.¹²⁸

A unified Germany will probably have a different security policy. The main impulses for change are: a larger agenda, a more critical approach to Germany's partners, political and economic interest in the stability of Eastern Europe, and the relationship with Russia.¹²⁹ A politically stable and economically advancing Poland that considers Germany as a friend, is an existential German interest.¹³⁰ The same applies for the rest of

Germany's Eastern neighbors. For reasons of history and Germany's size, a bilateral relationship with Russia is probable.¹³¹

Meanwhile, Germany's interests in the Baltic Region have increased in importance. A German littoral state has disappeared from the map, and a former Great Baltic Power has re-emerged.¹³² For Germany, the Baltic Region is a major area for trade, fishing, transportation, and a concern for protection of territorial waters.

Germany is a strong supporter of NATO and the EU. Germany is, at least for now, more interested in retaining the traditional transatlantic security policy than in strengthening the European component.¹³³ The German Government has selected NATO as the principal European security organization, and the acceptance of new members to NATO has improved German security.¹³⁴ Balancing the commitment to NATO with European integration is a complicated problem for Germany.

The German-French axis is the driving force for deeper integration of the EU. The enlargement of this organization has shifted the balance to a northern bloc.¹³⁵ The new members, Sweden, Austria, and Finland, have close links to Germany and members for the next phase, Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, will further strengthen the bloc.¹³⁶

Germany is thoroughly within the European structure, but will play a larger, more independent role in the future. An strong northern bloc will strengthen German influence in EU. Traditional ties with the West, in particular with France, are now counter-weighted by interests in Eastern Europe and the Atlantic link. To find equilibrium is a major German problem. The most important aspect of the German situation is, however,

the reestablishment of Germany as a normal European state. The First and Second World Wars have finally ended.

Denmark

Traditional Danish security policy has moved towards a more international approach. During the Cold War, Denmark pursued a cautious, tame, compliant and low-key policy. At times, NATO had problems with Denmark. For example, there was Danish resistance to the deployment of nuclear missiles in the 1980s, and there was Danish refusal to increase its defense budget. However, after the fall of the Berlin Wall, Denmark became the most internationally active among the Nordic countries.

Denmark's geographic position is now more favorable. The Soviet tank army on the doorstep of Denmark has disappeared, and two buffer zones separate Denmark from Russia.¹³⁷ Currently there is no military threat against Denmark. More important is the proximity of a the united Germany and the rest of the Continent.¹³⁸

The links between the Danish armed forces, increasingly committed to international operations, and Germany are close. Traditional cooperation with Germany in BALTAP forged close ties with the German armed forces.¹³⁹ To balance this, cooperation with British forces has increased.¹⁴⁰ Denmark has reduced the resources for her own defense in favor of international operations.¹⁴¹ In proportion to population, the number of Danish forces abroad is one of the highest in the world. The Danish Government is increasingly using the military instrument in its foreign policy.

Current Danish security policy has two trends: Europeanization and regionalization. The first trend concerns the EU and NATO. Denmark has devoted larger attention to the European track, and does not see the EU only as an economic

organization. However, Denmark does not participate in the defense dimension and is not a member of the WEU. Emphasis falls instead on NATO, and Denmark is increasingly loyal to that organization. In regional perspective, the support to Baltic States is considerable. Denmark has used its increased freedom of action to pursue a policy of activism unusual for such a small state. Still, concerns for German dominance and a concern for the role of small states in an integrated Europe prevail.

Cooperation and the Situation in the Baltic Area

The regional cooperation is weak. The states around the Baltic Sea plus Iceland, Norway, and the EU formed the Council of Baltic Sea States (CBSS) in 1992.¹⁴² The main areas of cooperation are democratic and economic assistance, environmental protection, culture, and transportation. CBSS is not a formalized structure with a permanent secretariat; therefore, it is a weak structure. CBSS only illustrates a tendency for regional cooperation.

Four factors capture the essence of the situation in the Baltic Region: general characteristics of the states, perceived threats, interest in the Baltic Region, and current policy. Figure 10 shows these four aspects.

	Finland	The Baltic States	Russia
General characteristics	Stabile, strong defense, EU member	Weak in all aspects.	Weak
Perceived threats	Developments in Russia. Unstable Baltic States. Isolation from the West.	Developments in Russia. Minorities. Isolation from the West.	Disintegration. Regional conflicts.
Interests	Normal relationship with Russia. Stability in the region. Anchored in the West.	Stability. Security guaranties from the West.	Stability for economic development. Prevent foreign domination of the region. Minorities.
Current policy	Nonalignment with increased cooperation with the West. Limited support to Baltic States.	EU and NATO membership. Regional cooperation.	Regain major power status. Opposition to enlargement. Bilateral cooperation with the West.
	Poland	Germany	Denmark
General characteristics	Large potential, soon member of EU and NATO	Major power. EU and NATO member. 'Normal state'	EU and NATO member.
Perceived threats	Developments in Russia. German dominance.	Unstable Eastern Europe, including the Baltic Region.	Few
Interests	Stability, including no changes of borders. Expand security structures East. Balance Germany.	Stability for economic development. Relations with Russia. Balance commitment in Europe.	Stability. Balance Germany.
Current policy	Integration Contacts East	NATO security structure. EU integration.	International activism. NATO's defense dimension before EU's.

Figure 10. States in the Baltic Region

Future Perspectives

The previous discussion of the present situation provides a starting point for future perspectives in 2007-2010. The main features for the future are the development of organizations, the Baltic Region with its increased number of states, and future threats. The analysis of future perspectives focuses on these three aspects.

To assess the future role of the EU and NATO, it is necessary to start with a generic discussion of organizations. The analysis of the EU and NATO, the Baltic Region, and threats result in generic scenarios and generate additional factors to consider for future Swedish security policy.

Organizations Generically

Nations join organizations, thereby giving up a part of their sovereignty, either to gain security from outside threats or to obtain advantages with cooperation. It is not possible for any nation in Europe to exist in isolation and at the same time to develop its society. The degree of cooperation and the level of ties with other nations determine how much freedom of action a country retains. For example, the Albanian regime during the Cold War chose almost total isolation to maintain all aspects of sovereignty, but paid a high economic price.

A threat is a strong incentive to form an alliance (organization), but when the threat disappears, the nations may want to leave the arrangement. After the Second World War, the perceived specific threat from the East forced the Western nations together.¹⁴³ The states in Western Europe could only counter the threat with their combined resources.¹⁴⁴ An historical analysis of alliances shows that the tendency to cooperate decreases when the catalytic effect of a threat disappears.¹⁴⁵

Shared interests facilitate the forming of an organization, but diverse interests may break it up. Nations with similar values, political, economic and social systems work more easily together, but these criteria are probably not enough; something must be gained from the collaboration.¹⁴⁶ Differences in interests or other aspects may first paralyze and then dissolve the organization.¹⁴⁷

An interim solution may be a “regionalization” of organizations. This arrangement brings together states, within the structure, with common interests and problems.¹⁴⁸

Small states join organizations for two main reasons: protection and influence. The increased resources of an alliance make it possible for small nations to counter larger threats.¹⁴⁹ Organizations based on consensus give, in principle, equal influence to all members.¹⁵⁰ However, there is always a risk in practice for domination of larger nations.

Without outside pressure, the member states of an organization must perceive benefits to continue.¹⁵¹ The basic assumption with, for example, the EU is that economic cooperation provides advantages to member states that exceed what a single state could get. This understanding keeps the organization in place.

To participate in changes within the organization, to deepen interaction, nations perform a cost/benefit analysis. Every step to further integrate, at the price of reduced sovereignty, must be beneficial for every single nation.

Enlargement changes the balance of the organization. New member states bring with them their national interests, and the decision making process gets more complicated. This fact applies in particular to organizations that rely on consensus for decisions.¹⁵²

Membership in an organization limits a nation's sovereignty, and limitation must be compensated with an advantage, a gain for each nation.¹⁵³ The member states must have a common denominator of national interests. Deeper integration must again be advantageous to appease for the reduction of national freedom. Enlargement increases the number of national interests and makes decisions more difficult to reach; every effective organization has its limit.

Perspectives for the EU

Integration and enlargement determine future perspectives for EU. Increased economic cooperation and a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) are the main features of integration.

The European Monetary Union (EMU) symbolizes the economic cooperation. The immediate effect of the EMU would be a single currency and a shift of responsibility for monetary policy to a new European Central Bank.¹⁵⁴ This development would be a considerable decrease of sovereignty, since a national currency is both a symbol and the key to the pursuit of an independent monetary and budget policy.¹⁵⁵ A number of nations are hesitant about EMU, for example Great Britain and Sweden, and others are not able to meet the criteria. These and other factor could delay the union, but probably not stop it because the forces for, France and Germany, are too strong.¹⁵⁶

EMU may create new problems within the EU. The union could create intra-European conflicts rooted in disagreement about the goals and methods of monetary policy.¹⁵⁷ In addition, Germany would probably dominate the union.

CFSP, or ESDI, is more complex and problematic. The problems, besides the question of sovereignty, are many:

1. Regionalization of security interests. The enlargement has added Nordic countries and incorporated Eastern European nations. These nations may not be willing to participate in operations in, for example the Mediterranean Sea.¹⁵⁸

2. Existing problems within the current structure between "Atlantists" and "Europeans."¹⁵⁹

3. No European consensus on Europe's global role.¹⁶⁰

4. The centrifugal forces are weak and enlargement will reduce them further.¹⁶¹

5. No integrated defense industry due to national interest.¹⁶²

These problems could lead to a loose structure within the next decade. It is difficult and time consuming to squeeze all the European interests in one straitjacket and force a common approach and policies.¹⁶³ A truly federal, supranational Europe is not acceptable to key countries like France or Great Britain, since such an organization would threaten the very existence of national states.¹⁶⁴ In the meantime, nations with similar security interests may perform operations within an EU context. For example, forces from France, Spain, and Italy may manage a crisis in Algeria with limited support from the rest of EU. Members in the North could deal with a crisis in the Baltic in a similar way.

Enlargement may affect integration and has a limit. Integration in itself is a difficult process that touches on fundamental issues for the nations involved.

Simultaneous pushes towards enlarging enhance the problem.¹⁶⁵ Enlargement brings additional national interests into the organization that need to be met. The new members in Eastern Europe have weak economies, and the costs for integration will be large.¹⁶⁶

The organization may have to choose between enlargement and deeper integration.

However, for political reasons and to ameliorate potential conflicts in Eastern Europe there are probably no alternatives. The question becomes: where is the limit?

Three main factors determine the limit: national interests, costs, and the decision making process. It is unlikely that the interests of Russia, Belarus and Ukraine can be incorporated within the next decade. The question of costs supports this standpoint and may also exclude the Balkan States. The decision-making process is more difficult to discern, but probably disqualifies the same nations.

Perspectives for NATO

The most important future perspectives for NATO center on the Atlantic link and enlargement. The U.S. complained often during the Cold War that the Europeans did not support NATO sufficiently; their defense budgets were too small. Today the European states seem prepared to assume a larger responsibility, but as a part of the integration process. For the Americans this development is probably compatible with the Atlantic link.¹⁶⁷ The United States must reconcile other external commitments with decreasing defense spending.¹⁶⁸ ESDI would facilitate America's global role and a reduction of the current strength of 100,000 soldiers in Europe. It is therefore possible that with a European defense the Atlantic link will grow weaker.¹⁶⁹

Enlargement is an important aspect of NATO's future. There are several ways the expansion could continue with the inclusion of many countries. The first way is through an "open door" policy based on the potential member's ability to meet the standards.¹⁷⁰ There is no limit to expansion. A second approach is parallel expansion with the EU. Once accepted to the EU, a country would be able to join NATO.¹⁷¹ This would allow most European countries, but not Russia and Ukraine, to be members.¹⁷² The third way is

to base enlargement on strategic considerations, i. e., on the interests of current members, and to admit only a few new members.¹⁷³ The difficulties in choosing among alternatives takes time to overcome. A probable compromise for the next decade is limited enlargement, combined with a larger EU expansion. For the Baltic Region, this compromise could mean no further enlargement after Poland. The reasons for hesitation are several: national interests, increased commitments, costs, and a more complicated decision making process.

Another aspect of enlargement is changed mission: from facing an external threat to resolving internal problems. The formation of NATO assumed that every member would be able to solve its own internal conflicts. How well NATO is suited to solve internal problems is difficult to predict, but the largest intra-NATO conflict during the Cold War, between Greece and Turkey, was only contained, not solved.

NATO in ten years time may be different from the old military structure. The basic choice between maintaining a strong small alliance and enlargement seems to have been made. This could affect, even dilute the alliance. The commitment between member states and the Atlantic link may be weaker. Consequently, the freedom of action for states and regions will increase. The new NATO may not be able to solve security problems with military guarantees to the degree that it used to be.

This rather pessimistic perspective for the two major organizations needs balance. The future evolution of the European security structure is a process; it will emerge gradually through trial and error rather than according to a single "master design."¹⁷⁴ It is therefore difficult to predict the future, but the likelihood that only one organization can deal with all aspects of security is low. Instead, a combination of organizations may be

able to balance national interests and requirements to meet threats. Membership in one organization may not offer sufficient military security guarantees.¹⁷⁵ Another perspective is looser organizations with freedom for regional solutions.

Perspectives for the Baltic Region

A solution to the Finnish dilemma of contending with its geographical position and the desire to anchor Finland in the West is a compromise. Finland has to have, for economic and security reasons, a working relationship with Russia. The relationship needs balance in the form of trade and security links with the Western European states. Equilibrium probably lies in membership in the EU and some relationship with NATO, but not membership. The continued development of NATO will determine the nature of the cooperation. Closer regional cooperation may, and probably will, complement these links between East and West. However, it is important to note that the current Finnish Government has not ruled out any options.

The Baltic States will remain weak and probably gain implicit security guarantees from the West and support for nation building, but not membership in NATO. The economic, military, and demographic potential of the Baltic States are too small to overcome dependence on other states for security. Considerations over relations with Russia, coupled with increased commitments, and a desire to limit the numbers of new members, will likely hinder NATO enlargement to the Baltic States. Instead, the states will be offered membership of the EU and receive considerable support to build various institutions. Consequently, the Baltic States will only partially achieve their security aim. Russia could consider limited Western commitment as recognition of Russian security interests in the region. The Baltic States will therefore continue to improve their security

The states in the Baltic Region constitute four groups. First, there are Denmark, Poland, and Germany, which belong to both EU and NATO. These nations have solved many of their security problems. Second, there are Sweden and Finland, which are members in EU and pursue a policy of neutrality. The short-term security prospects for these states are favorable, but long-term policies are unsolved. Third, there are the weak and vulnerable Baltic States which probably will become members of the EU, but not NATO. These states will therefore continue to improve their security in all possible ways. Fourth, there is Russia, which even with considerable problems, remains the main player in the region.

The Baltic Region has few conflicts and only one that the region has been unable to solve. Environmental, economic, and ethnic problems are small compared with other regions in Europe, for example the Balkans. The environmental legacy of the Communist regimes in Poland and the Baltic States is possible to handle by the nations themselves, with support from their more developed neighbors. The Polish economy is growing, and the Baltic States have begun a promising development. A policy of integration is the solution to problems with Russian and Polish minorities. The only unsolvable problem for the region would be a disintegrating or aggressive Russia. The instruments of power of the nations in the region are not sufficient to counter these threats. To balance an unfavorable development in Russia, the region needs security links with the West.

It is important to note that problems in the Baltic Region require soft security measures and an ability to manage hard security if developments in Russia become unfavorable.

The region has two major powers that need balance. The influence of Germany and Russia need, even with favorable development, counterweight. There are a number of solutions to this problem: balancing each other, balancing by cooperation among small states in the region, and balancing by links with major powers outside the Baltic area. Furthermore, Germany and Russia have important interests outside the region. Developments in other parts of the world may affect these nations.

Future Threats

The end of the Cold War ignited a period of instability and unpredictability. The risk for a large war, i. e., a third European war, decreased, but the scope for potential conflicts grew.

Categorizing conflicts into intrastate, interstate, and those started by an aggressive major power facilitates an understanding of future threats. Intrastate conflicts might be anti-governmental or stem from a desire for separation. The reasons are, for example, ethnic or religious in nature. Border conflicts are examples of conflicts between states. A non-democratic Russia with external ambitions exemplifies an aggressive major power.

This generic description indicates that it is important to distinguish between the reason for conflict, the type, and the instruments used to solve the problem. Figure 11 shows a structure of this.

Reasons		Type	Instruments
Political	Border disputes	Intrastate	Diplomatic
Instability	Ideological	Inter states	Economic
Economic	Religious	Aggressive major	Informational
Ethical	Will to expand	power	Military
Migration	Environmental		

Figure 11. Conflicts

All the listed reasons for conflict exist in Europe today, but ideology and the will to expand are less prevalent. Instead, four major reasons for conflict are likely to dominate during the next decade. First, there is the possibility of the resurfacing of ethnic and religious conflicts, combined with weak states to deal with the problems. Second, there is the potential for general political instability during transition from a totalitarian to a democratic state. Third, social tension can boil over, following a shift to a market economy and the emergence of large economic differences between countries. Fourth, there is the potential for environmental hazards, due to lack of resources and differing priorities for protection of the environment.

All kinds of conflicts are possible, but intrastate are more likely. The risk for conflicts between states exists as long as nation states remain. The security structure in Europe and economic dependence reduce the risk. The multitudes of internal problems in Eastern Europe increases the risk for intrastate conflicts. The only possible aggressive major power in Europe is Russia.

War, as an instrument to solve conflict, is not obsolete in Europe. Wars in former Yugoslavia and in Chechnya indicate this. The example of Yugoslavia also shows that it is possible to destroy a state in Europe.¹⁷⁸ It is important not to confuse the reason for a conflict with the methods to solve it.

There are two generic tendencies concerning threats in Europe. First, there is an increased risk for conflicts on the lower end of the scale.¹⁷⁹ The Cold War suppressed problems within the multitude of new independent states. These problems will emerge as new threats that are more political and economic than military.¹⁸⁰ The enlargement process may internationalize these problems. Second, within Europe the Eastern part is the “threat centrum.” Most reasons for conflicts, for the next ten years, are in the former Warsaw Pact area. However, threats in the Baltic Region are few and, except Russia, manageable by the states in the region.

Generic Scenarios

To predict the developments in the Baltic Region and to describe scenarios in ten years time are very difficult. The unpredictability of the Post-Cold War situation makes it hard to describe all possible scenarios and almost impossible to identify the most likely. However, for this thesis it is only necessary to depict the scope of scenarios, the probable limits of the future. Swedish future security policy must be able to contend with the scope of situations.

The situational scenario, in the Baltic Region is a function of threats and the development of integration and enlargement for Europe as a whole. The previous discussion covered threats, except developments in Russia. Figure 12 illustrates possible situations in Europe as a function of integration, cooperation, and U.S. commitment.




Figure 12. European generic scenarios

The highest degree of cooperation means that the process of EU integration (CFSP, EMU, etc.) is successful. The possibly contentious roles of NATO and European defense are in harmony. The enlargement of both organizations encompasses all states in Europe with the exception of Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine.¹⁸¹ Organizations have extensive cooperation with these states. The lowest degree connotes return to a situation similar to the 1920s and, in a way, implies that Europe has lost control of development. The middle degree means that the process stops at the present stage with reference to the enlargement of NATO. EU is larger, but Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus are not members. Integration continues, but at a considerable slower pace.

A similar graph (figure 13) illustrates the Baltic Region.




Figure 13. Baltic generic scenarios

All scenarios in the Baltic Region must include Russia. Three possible scenarios are:

1. Russia cooperates in the Baltic Region with all states and recognizes that stability is the best way to achieve security and economic interests.
2. An aggressive authoritarian Russia that wants to increase its security by dominating the Baltic States and Finland. Return to East–West conflict.
3. A weak Russia with problems that spill over to the Baltic Region. Ethnic and security conflicts with the Baltic States and Finland.

These scenarios reflect two different views on Russia's future prospects. The assumption for the first is that Europe has fundamentally changed. The interaction between nations has changed character and it is possible to integrate Russia. The third scenario emphasizes the importance of historical cycles. Russia is currently only in one of its weaker periods, and has been before, will reemerge.

Conclusions

Factors to consider for future Swedish security policy:

1. Organizations, the EU and NATO, will continue to play a very important role in Europe. The security structure they provide is evolving; it is a process. Consequently, a degree of uncertainty reigns. Integration and enlargement could lead to weaker organizations that offer only limited security guarantees and leave room for regional development. Enlargement has a limit, and Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus are unlikely to become members of EU or NATO. The Baltic States will probably be EU members in ten years' time, but not members of NATO, unless this organization becomes considerably looser. All scenarios affect future Swedish options.

2. The national interests, predominately stability, of the states in the Baltic Region affect the situation, and must be taken into consideration for future Swedish security policy.

3. Finland's security problems remain, and membership in NATO is unlikely.

4. The Baltic States remain weak and will search for ways to enhance their security in the absence of NATO membership.

5. Developments in Russia remain key to the Baltic Region. Future prospects cover a broad range: peaceful, gradual economic development and democratic progress, disintegration, or aggressive major power. Russia will eventually reassert its influence in the Baltic Region and this development will require balance. Events in Russia are to a large degree out of control of states in the Baltic area.

6. Poland is probably a future key player in the region and can with its considerable potential contribute to stability.

7. The German influence is growing and needs balance.

8. The Baltic Region faces a multitude of threats, but all, except either Russian disintegration or aggression, are manageable by states in the region and are soft in nature.

The most important factors are Russian developments within organizations. Integrating and enlarging European structures affects Sweden fundamentally. Russia is potentially the largest problem or power in the region. Interests and perspectives of nations in the Baltic area help determine the feasibility of the Swedish options. How options manage and prevent threats in turn determines their effectiveness.

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³ Catherine McArdle Kelleher, The Future of European Security: an Interim Assessment (Washington, DC:Brookings Institution, 1995), 45-46.

⁴ Ingemar Dorfer, The Nordic Nations in the New Security Regime (Washington, DC: The Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1997), 73; and Kelleher, 57.

⁵ Dorfer, 74; and Flockhart, 207.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Peter van Ham, "The Prospects for a European Security and Defense Identity," European Security 4, no. 4 (Winter 1995): 531, 532.

⁹ Flockhart, 208.

¹⁰ Kelleher, 47.

¹¹ Ibid., 50; and Dorfer, 30-31.

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Ibid., 52.

¹⁴ Dorfer, 29.

¹⁵ Ibid., 4.

¹⁶ Kelleher, 11.

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Rudi Dornbusch, "Euro Fantasies," Foreign Affairs 75, no. 5 (September/October 1996): 110.

¹⁹ Ibid., 120.

²⁰ Ibid., 114; and Martin Feldstein. "EMU and International Conflict" Foreign Affairs 76, no. 6 (November/December 1997): 60.

²¹ Dornbusch, 114-116.

²² Feldstein, 61.

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ Ibid., 12.

²⁵ Ham, 531.

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ Kelleher, 3.

²⁸ Ibid., 63; and Clive Archer, "New Threat Perceptions; Danish and Norwegian Official Views," European Security 3, no. 4 (Winter 1994): 573.

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³⁰ Dorfer, 12.

³¹ Ibid.

³² Kelleher, 68.

³³ Ibid., 67-69.

³⁴ Ham, 534.

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ Kelleher, 67.

³⁷ Dorfer, 49.

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ Kelleher, 101; and James Sherr, "After the Cold War: The search for a New Security System," European Security 4, no. 4 (Winter 1995): 579.

⁴⁰ Dorfer, 64.

⁴¹ Ibid., 69.

⁴² Kelleher, 113.

⁴³ Ibid., 119.

⁴⁴ Timothy L. Thomas, "The Caucasus Conflict and Russian Security: The Russian Armed Forces Confront Chechnya III. The Battle for Grozny, 1-26 January 1995," The Journal of Slavic Military Studies 10, no. 1 (March 1997): 50.

⁴⁵ David Arter, "Finland: From Neutrality to NATO," European Security 5, no. 4 (Winter 1996): 614.

⁴⁶ Ibid., 615.

⁴⁷ Ibid., 615.

⁴⁸ "NATO diskuterades," Huvudstadsbladet, 6 Februray 1998, 6.

⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰ Dorfer, 7.

⁵¹ Arter, 615.

⁵² Dorfer, 42.

⁵³ Ibid.

⁵⁴ Arter, 616.

⁵⁵ Ibid., 618

⁵⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁷ Kelleher, 140.

⁵⁸ Arter, 620.

⁵⁹ Ibid., 621.

⁶⁰ Ibid., 622.

⁶¹ Ibid., 624.

⁶² Ibid., 625.

⁶³ Ibid.

⁶⁴ Anders Hellberg, "Vart Forsvar intervjuar fiske försvarsministern: Nej till nordiskt försvarssamarbete," Vart Forsvar no. 7, 1990, 8; and Dorfer, 71.

⁶⁵ Regeringen, Regeringens Proposition 1995/96:12 Totalforsvar I förnyelse (Stockholm: Försvarsdepartementet, 1995), 12, 20.

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CHAPTER 6

FUTURE OPTIONS FOR SWEDISH SECURITY POLICY

The following discussion describes the choice and evaluation of options for this thesis.

Choice of Options

The end of the Cold War sparked a debate in Sweden over future alternatives for Swedish security policy. The debate encompassed six main options: participation in CFSP within the EU, membership in WEU, membership in NATO, Post-Cold War neutrality, collective defense with Finland, and a collective security arrangement in the Baltic Region. The following describes the choice and definitions of options for evaluation.

Members within the EU resist CFSP. As described earlier, the process has slowed, and the result is uncertain. It is unlikely that CFSP is a sufficient security arrangement in the next decade. Membership in WEU has similar weaknesses. Hence, this thesis does not focus on these alternatives.

The most discussed alternative is NATO membership. The public debate in Sweden has focused since 1989 on this alternative, and NATO is the most apparent solution to Swedish security interests. However, the alternative poses problems:

1. Political and public opinion, as shown earlier, does not accept membership.
2. A new, changed NATO with looser security guarantees may not be sufficient for Swedish security.

3. Relationships with Finland, Russia, and the Baltic States may remain problematic.

The thesis rejects, for these reasons, the NATO alternative.

The three organization-oriented alternatives have been the focus of earlier research. As described in the literature review, a number of different sources extensively discuss options connected with the European organizations. The purpose of this thesis is to examine other, less debated, alternatives. This is an additional reason not to dwell on the EU, WEU, and NATO solutions.

Post-Cold War nonalignment (neutrality) is the most likely alternative, but needs additional definition. A majority of politicians and Swedes favor this option. The new situation in Europe requires a redefinition of the traditional policy. The Swedish definition seems to be:

1. Nonalignment with any military organization, including CFSP, with the aim to stay out of war (declaration of neutrality) and preserve sovereignty. Limited military cooperation is possible if a large number of states participate.

2. Political and economic cooperation, membership in the EU, but sovereignty remains a priority. No participation in EMU.

3. Limited cooperation militarily and politically with Finland and the Baltic States. The priority is on development of a long-term relationship with Russia.

The new situation in Europe may not allow a continuation of neutrality, and it may not be the most favorable alternative. Consequently, other options need clarification.

A security arrangement with Finland, discussed after the Second World War, is a minor part of the recent debate. The similarities in the current situation, public opinion, policy, and old historical ties make this an option to consider.

Collective defense with Finland is:

1. A bilaterally integrated defense with an automatic obligation to support the other nation, similar to paragraph five in the NATO charter.
2. Military nonalignment towards NATO and Russia, with the aim to stay neutral in war. No participation in CFSP. No commitment to defend the Baltic states, but support to build their military structures.
3. Economic and political cooperation with the EU, but no participation in EMU.

The European process could lead to weaker organizations that offer only limited security guarantees and which leave room for regional development. This evolution could bring together states with common interests in regional structures.

Collective security in the Baltic Region, implies a regional security arrangement with all states in the area as members. This structure would be an institution for regulating conflicts between neighboring states without explicit security guaranties.¹ However, this thesis includes the element of guaranties to make the alternative comparable with others.

The alternative of collective security in the Baltic Region is:

1. A multilateral limited military commitment to defend other states. Each state could decide according to the situation. There would be no integration of armed forces, but structure and exercises would exist to handle a limited crisis.

2. Political and economic cooperation through institutions. The emphasis is collective security: to prevent conflicts with soft security measures. Cooperation is a part of the overarching structure of the EU, including the development of CFSP and EMU. All members, except Russia, have joined the EU.

3. A structure aimed at problems between members in the Baltic Region, with commitments limited to that geographical area.

Evaluation of Options

Evaluation of future options for Swedish security policy starts with the fundamental choice of prolonging, albeit changed, the policy of nonalignment, aiming at neutrality. The motives to give up a nearly 200-year-old successful policy must be strong. This analysis concentrates on the earlier described rationale for the traditional policy and how it applies to future situations. The result determines if there is a need for a change in policy. The next step compares all three alternatives, using elements from the “Policy” and “Situation” parts of this thesis.

Reasons for Nonalignment (Neutrality)

Geography, fear of commitment, the concept of balance in the Nordic Region, tradition, success in the past, economic strength, and military capability are reasons for continuing the policy of nonalignment and neutrality

Flank location and easily defensible borders are the components of the geographical argument. Advantageous location assumes a main conflict in Central Europe. Today no risk for major conflict in Central Europe exists, and future conflicts are likely to be smaller, but more numerous. Furthermore, the perception of Northern Europe as a flank rests on a second assumption: the flank is less strategically important than the

rest of Europe. This latter assumption is doubtful today and in the future. Already the Soviet build up during the 1980s on the Kola Peninsula and the subsequent U.S. Maritime Strategy increased the importance of the Nordic area. The Russian withdrawal eastward and dependence on nuclear weapons further enhance the strategic importance of the periphery. The concept of defendable borders depends on military technology. Improved means of transportation-air, sea, and ground-decrease the importance of advantageous terrain on the borders. Consequently, the argument concerning geography has become weaker, concerning both location and borders.

The fear of military commitment, with reduction of freedom of action, is still valid. Membership in a military alliance is a strong tie and reduces room to maneuver. However, the former bipolar situation was the basis for the policy of nonalignment. Sweden could maneuver between alliances and perform a balancing act. The equilibrium has been broken if only one, victorious and enlarging pact remains. The argument is still in principle valid, but is more applicable to a bipolar situation.

Considerations for the Nordic balance and Finland's situation are still convincing, but emanate from a bipolar situation. A low degree of tension in northern Europe is still an interest of the Nordic countries and Russia. There is still a link between the security policies of the Nordic countries, in particular Swedish-Finnish ties. Although these reasons are still valid, the Nordic countries need not follow them. Russia is so weak that new policies to increase security are possible. Sweden must still consider how its security policy interacts with the closest neighbors, but a new balance is possible.

Tradition and success in the past are not valid arguments, but they affect public opinion. An old successful policy is no guarantee for the future. Public opinion sets limits

for what is politically possible. Opinion might not necessarily support the most favorable solution in a new situation.

A strict policy of nonalignment is probably not economically advantageous for Sweden. As shown earlier, the policy during the Cold War often came into conflict with economic development. Currently, and in the future, Sweden's dependence on exports, and trade in general, requires economic cooperation. Membership in EU is the most apparent expression of this.

A strong military defense is still a sound argument, but the concept of marginality does not apply. Swedish defense, given the general military capability in northern Europe, is still strong. The force ratio is more favorable than ever. The concept of marginality assumes that the existence of the belligerent's forces reduces the freedom of action for the opponent and that he is not able to, for example, outflank the other. Attacks on Denmark and Norway in 1940, during the phony war, show that the concept of marginality even in a bipolar situation is doubtful.

A bipolar situation does not exist in Europe today. A reemerging Russia would probably not result in a return to a static military situation. For example, the new states in Central Europe and western Russia are buffer zones for both East and West. The freedom of action to move forces to Northern Europe may be considerable. In addition, new transport technology has dramatically increased strategic mobility.

Consequently, several reasons favoring the traditional policy do not apply or are weaker. This means that the policy of nonalignment cannot be automatically prolonged. It is therefore necessary to compare Post-Cold War nonalignment, as defined earlier, more thoroughly with the two other alternatives.

Comparison of Alternatives

Three steps are used to compare the alternatives. First, attention falls on the Swedish perspective with factors from the "Policy" part of this thesis. This is the most important evaluation. Second, comes the European and Baltic perspective with factors from the "Situation" part. This gives an assessment of the feasibility of the alternatives. This step also includes a discussion of threats in the Baltic Region to determine the effectiveness of each alternative. Third, there is a description of advantages and disadvantages for each alternative to account for all factors. This part also evaluates elements specific to the alternative.

The terms "nonalignment" and "neutrality" refers to the first alternative (continuation of current Swedish policy). The second alternative (collective defense with Finland) is named "Swedish-Finnish treaty," "bilateral treaty," "pact," or "bloc." The term "neutrality alternatives" refers to both these alternatives. The third alternative (collective security in the Baltic Region) is termed "collective structure" or "arrangement."

The Swedish Perspective

Three factors constitute the Swedish perspective: Swedish official interests, Sweden's role (global, European, Baltic), and freedom of action.

Collective security best achieves the global interest of an international organization's ability to meet new threats and support European structures. This alternative supports, for example, the UN and, with only one counterpart in the Baltic Region, facilitates support to European structures. Bilateral agreement with Finland is for the same reasons slightly better than neutrality.

The European interests in continued integration with maintained openness to the rest of the world and balance with sovereignty are more complex. As discussed earlier, the interests contradict each other, and Sweden is trying to find a balance. Participation in integration gives influence, but risks sovereignty. Continued neutrality reduces Sweden's ability to influence integration, but maintains sovereignty.² Collective security creates a regional cooperation, which may influence European processes as one entity and thereby manage conflicting interests. The structure is loose enough to enable each state, at least to a degree, to pursue national integration policies. However, Sweden may have to take part in the process, since this alternative depends on support from an overarching structure. A bilateral treaty with Finland clearly marks the limit for the European integration process in the Baltic area. This pact would be a third alliance within the EU, besides NATO and WEU, and would allow Finland and Sweden to influence the process together, but to a lesser extent than a larger collective security arrangement. Consequently, collective security confers the most influence with a possibility to preserve sovereignty.

Collective security achieves the interests of maintaining the Atlantic link and development of NATO. Sweden defines these interests as maintaining the status quo: continued U.S. commitment to Europe but no increased NATO presence in the Baltic Region that risks dividing Europe. An arrangement in the whole Baltic Region reduces the need for NATO involvement; the states in the area assume responsibility for security. Hence, NATO can concentrate on other European areas and on maintenance of the Atlantic link. This avoids potential conflict between NATO and Russia over enlargement in the Baltic. A Swedish-Finnish bloc only solves part of the problem, and neutrality not at all.

Strategic balance in Northern Europe, including U.S. involvement and a defensive Russia, is more complicated. A regional structure would reduce the need for U.S. involvement in Northern Europe. This moves the focus to other, more unstable regions of Europe. The strategic nuclear relationship, manifested by Russian facilities on the Kola Peninsula, is possible to maintain bilaterally, without considerations of local states.³ The Finnish-Swedish bloc could have a similar effect, but to a lesser degree, and neutrality does not change the current situation. The effects on Russia are harder to predict, and the thesis discusses this problem later.

Interests in the Baltic Region concern the Baltic States, Russia, and regionalization. The ability to support the Baltic States partly determines their development. All alternatives give this ability, but collective security allows coordinated efforts. This alternative also provides a structure to reduce tension between the Baltic States and Russia. Collective defense offers only a limited capacity with regard to the Baltic States. The choice of security arrangement marginally influences developments in Russia, but Russian participation in collective security facilitates a long-term relationship.

Collective security means regionalization of the Baltic area. The links to the rest of Europe might grow weaker, and the responsibility for security becomes a Baltic concern. The region risks isolation, for example, in the case of an aggressive Russia. An additional risk is German domination of the isolated region. The other alternatives force European and U.S. involvement.

Sweden perceives for itself an active role globally (within the UN), in Europe (to influence the integration), and a limited role in the Baltic Region. Collective security and, to a lesser extent, the Finnish-Swedish treaty are an increased commitment to the Baltic

area. This arrangement limits, compared with neutrality, Sweden's ability to play an independent global and European role. More important, though, are the effects on Sweden's Baltic role. Collective security forces Sweden, due its geographical location, economic strength, and defense capability, to play a larger role in the Baltic area. This circumstance directly contradicts current official policy.

The ability to choose economic policy and stay out of conflicts are key elements of Swedish freedom of action. Swedish dependence on the EU for future economic development decreases the possibilities to pursue an independent economic policy, which is a prerequisite for traditional neutrality. As a result, continued neutrality is in conflict with future economic development linked to the EU. The nature of neutrality forces a choice between credible neutrality and economic ties. The same applies to the Swedish-Finnish alternative, while collective security resolves the tension.

The freedom to stay out of conflicts interacts with commitment. Neutrality provides the largest freedom of action; Sweden is committed only to her own defense. In contrast, the Swedish pledge to Finland is strong, but is geographically limited. The commitment to collective security is weaker, but a Swedish choice to stay out of a conflict in the region would damage the structure. The collective security alternative recognizes Sweden's limited ability to choose economic policy and provides an opportunity, albeit limited, to stay out of conflict.

Consequently, collective security achieves most national interests and confers the largest possible freedom of action, but risks regionalization and forces Sweden to play a larger undesirable role.

The European Perspective

The development of organizations in Europe affects all three alternatives. Earlier in this thesis, three generic scenarios portrayed integration and enlargement: a collective European security, a divided Europe, and strengthened nation states. The following remarks discuss the feasibility of options for Swedish security policy under these scenarios.

A collective European security structure, as a part of an enlarged and integrated organization, makes neutrality, and a Swedish–Finnish treaty less feasible, but collective security in the Baltic Region possible. It is doubtful that Sweden and Finland could remain outside a strong European structure. Dependence on trade and the risk for isolation reduce freedom of action. A collective security arrangement in the Baltic area is possible, if it is a part a larger structure. Consequently, the first two alternatives are difficult to envision in an integrated Europe.

All three alternatives are possible in a divided Europe, but offer risks. The difference between Swedish neutrality and cooperation with Finland is small because both these scenarios imply a renewed East–West conflict to be neutral to. The risks with neutrality alternatives are considerable. The states between the East and the West in a reemerging conflict are possibly Sweden, Finland, the Baltic States, and the western republics of the former Soviet Union. These states constitute a “Cordon Sanitaire” under constant pressure and competition from the two blocs.⁴ Collective security, however, is favorable in this scenario. The organizations have stopped short of taking responsibility for the region, but all Baltic nations, except Russia, are members of the EU. This situation provides a basis for regional cooperation with links to the rest of Europe.

A disintegrated Europe increases the possibilities for alternatives with neutrality aspects. The freedom of action for all states increases and they can choose their own security policy. The breakdown of European structures decreases protection for small states, which makes a Swedish–Finnish treaty favorable. Although regional collective security is possible, this alternative is by definition less likely and lacks vital links to a larger structure.

Consequently, neutrality alternatives are not feasible in an integrating Europe and offer risks in a divided continent. A Swedish–Finnish arrangement is best in a scenario of disintegration. Collective security is feasible in an integrated or divided Europe.

The Baltic Perspective

The national interests of the states in the Baltic region play an important role in determining the feasibility of alternatives.

Although none of Finland's interests are in contradiction with the alternatives, a collective defense affects the desire for closer ties with the West. This alternative implies that Finland has chosen a Nordic solution over Western integration; no further development of the links would occur with the West. At the same time, considerations for relations with Russia and Western reluctance to extend guaranties make cooperation with Sweden attractive. Collective security achieves the Finnish interest of stability, and maintains a relationship with Russia, and, to a large extent, ties to the West.

A Swedish–Finnish agreement and collective security affects the Baltic States most. The primary interest of these states is security guaranties from the West, and these states would, if this is not achieved, search for other solutions to obtain stability. They

would accept ties to the Finnish–Swedish collective defense, but they would probably prefer collective security.

Collective security is in Russia's interest. This alternative "blocs" NATO expansion to the Baltic Region and thereby prevents outside dominance. Collective security gives Russia influence in the region and provides stability. Russia would probably accept Swedish–Finnish cooperation, but would prefer Swedish neutrality. A merging of Swedish and Finnish resources strengthens their ability to act in the region. Both alternatives are better for Russia than NATO membership.

Collective security is best for the Polish interests of stability, eastward expansion of the Western security structure, and balance against Germany. The other two alternatives leave the Baltic Region more or less divided. A collective security arrangement provides a framework for stability and ties Lithuania to the structure. The alternative does not include the other Eastern neighbors, Belarus and the Ukraine, and a separate solution is probably required. German influence is at least partly balanced within the structure and with the links to the overarching structure (EU).

The effects on German interests are more complex. Collective security could provide stability and a forum for relations with Russia. Collective security solves the northern German commitment, and Germany can focus on the rest of Eastern Europe and commitment to the West. In addition, the structure is a means for German influence in the region. But, a separate solution competes with the other commitments, and Germany needs bilateral relations with Russia. Germany's participation depends on the development of a European structure; Germany should not have to choose between

structures. Swedish neutrality and Swedish–Finnish cooperation are acceptable to Germany, but require Germany to act either alone or through EU in the Baltic Region.

Collective security is most favorable for Danish interests. This structure gives stability and balance against Germany, but is a clear regionalization of Europe. As with Germany, this solution is the most favorable for Denmark if a European arrangement fails. Even if the two other alternatives are more open to Danish “activism” in the region, long-term Danish interests are in jeopardy.

Consequently, all three alternatives are feasible in accordance with the described interests. Most nations would probably prefer a collective security arrangement, if European processes are not successful. The states have a common interest in stability; collective security is in the collective interest.⁵

Threats to the Baltic Region

Generic threats and developments in Russia test the three alternatives’ effectiveness to manage and counter threats. The Eastern part of the Baltic Region, the Baltic States, Russia, and, to some extent Poland, are the “centrum” for low level intrastate and interstate conflicts linked to economic and political developments. As described earlier, the states in the region lack the capacity to handle a disintegrating or aggressive Russia. Instead, the alternatives must reduce the risk and limit the effects on Sweden.

Swedish neutrality limits the resources to act in conflicts, and the ability to stay out of a major conflict is doubtful. Even if the conflicts are low level, they require resources to resolve. Sweden could act alone or join temporary partnerships, but must adhere to the policy of neutrality. This policy limits the room to maneuver, and

cooperation becomes ad hoc. The same is applicable to negative developments in Russia. It is beyond Sweden's ability to reduce that risk. Risk reduction is possible only in cooperation with other states. Clearly, Sweden could stay out of a military conflict between, for example, Russia and the Baltic States, but this would lead to a reevaluation of Swedish security policy. The most positive outcome, depending on Russia's intentions, is a return to a Cold War scenario, but the situation would not be the same. The changed importance of geography and improved transport and weapons technology make the Baltic Region a single theater of operation.⁶ The nature of modern war makes it very difficult to sit out. Furthermore, the risk of an influx of refugees and the pressures of media coverage could force Sweden to react. Consequently, it is unlikely that Sweden could stay out of the conflict.

Collective defense with Finland increases the ability to handle low level conflict and Russia. A merging of resources increases the capability for crisis management, but may not be enough. Success depends, either in single cases or in several simultaneous conflicts on the support of other nations in the region. The same applies to the ability to manage Russian threats. The basic question is whether the combined resources are sufficient. This depends on force/resource ratio in any given situation. For example, in the late 1940s, during discussions concerning the Scandinavian Defense Union, the Swedish Government deemed military cooperation necessary to meet a Soviet threat, while Norway and Denmark assessed overall resources as insufficient. A Swedish-Finnish pact would be able to contend with a re-emerging Russia only if the threat were limited or balanced by other nations. Finally, the possibility of sitting out of a conflict are similar to the neutrality alternatives.

Collective security enhances capabilities farther if consensus exists. Coordination of support and resources make it possible to prevent and manage low-level conflicts. Even developments in Russia are, to some extent, possible to prevent. An aggressive Russia is easier to counter if links to the West are strong enough, in particular, if nuclear weapons are brought into the calculus. However, the alternative could be too weak to handle severe strains. This is the weakness of the alternative. Sweden risks, if the collective structure breaks down, being more or less without a security policy. To return to neutrality or to seek bilateral agreement in the face of a crisis would be very difficult.

Consequently, collective security is the most effective alternative because it provides a framework for soft security to manage threats to stability that are most likely to arise. It is even possible, to the extent that the region can exert influence, to reduce the risk of a disintegrated or aggressive Russia.

Nonalignment aiming at Neutrality

One word expresses the advantages of nonalignment, aiming at neutrality: sovereignty. This alternative implies the least degree of commitment and therefore gives Sweden maximum freedom of action. It also accounts for the situation in Finland, Norway, and Denmark—the Nordic balance.

The disadvantages, however, are considerable. Very few of the original reasons for this alternative are valid today, and they will probably hold even less validity in the future. The Swedish choice, with the membership in the EU, is to prioritize economic development over the policy of nonalignment. This is an admission of Swedish dependence on Europe. Moreover, Sweden cannot stay outside a more integrated Europe without risking marginalization. The risks in a divided continent are also considerable.

Militarily the alternative is even less favorable. Geography and the concept of marginality do not support the option. Swedish resources, without a ruthless prioritization for the Armed Forces, are not large enough. Only limited threats can be dealt with. It is doubtful, depending on the process of integration, if the implicit security guarantees through EU are sufficient. Strengthened guarantees contradict the policy of nonalignment.

Furthermore, the history of Swedish neutrality and recent changes discredit a prolongation of the policy. Coerced behavior during the Second World War probably did not damage the policy. The break in the official policy during the Cold War is another matter. Membership in the EU further damages neutrality. The perception of Swedish neutrality among Western countries and, more importantly, in Russia reduces the capacity to pursue a similar policy in the future—it is not trustworthy.

Collective Swedish–Finnish Defense

The main advantage linked to a Swedish–Finnish agreement is that it increases resources. This makes it favorable in a disintegrated Europe and to a certain extent in countering a renewed Russian threat. The core of the problem is whether these resources are large enough. They would be a function of the strength of the treaty and the price Sweden and Finland would be prepared to pay for their security. In addition, the partners would be able to stay neutral together and maintain parts of their sovereignty.

The disadvantages are similar to the neutrality alternative. The dependence on and the weakening of links with Europe remain. This alternative is not feasible in an integrating continent. Swedish commitment to Finland and the long contiguous border with Russia are two additional disadvantages.

Collective Security in the Baltic

The collective security alternative is a mixed security arrangement with the ability to prevent conflicts. This alternative is a solution within an integrated Europe and in a situation in which the process of organizational enlargement stops or slows. Collective security provides ability to coordinate support for all states in the Baltic Region and to build relations with Russia. Several organizations can interact in the region and manage the influence of larger nations. This arrangement provides a framework for soft security to manage threats to stability that are most likely to arise.

Sweden can with this alternative influence both organizations and nations in the region and thereby achieve most national interests while retaining the largest possible freedom of action.

Most nations in the region would prefer, depending on European integration, this alternative. The states have a common interest in stability. Consequently, collective security is a collective interest.

The most important disadvantages are inherent in regionalization and in perceptions of the strength of the structure. The Swedish interest in maintaining the Atlantic link, U.S. presence in Northern Europe, and in drawing European attention to the Baltic Region would be jeopardy. The region risks isolation with only, for example, a limited German engagement or German dominance. The nature of military security arrangements would be weak and severe strains could break it up. Furthermore, this alternative would force Sweden to play a larger role by making substantial commitments to the collective structure.

¹ Olaf F. Knudsen and Iver B. Neuman, Subregional Cooperation in the Baltic Sea Area (Oslo: Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, 1995), i.

² Ingemar Dorfer, The Nordic Nations in the New Security Regime (Washington, DC: The Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1997), 93.

³ Dorfer, 94.

⁴ Walter Laqueur, ed. , Dictionary of Geopolitics (New York: The Free Press, 1974), 34.

⁵ Heinz Gartner, "Models of European Security and Options for the New 'Neutral' Membersa in the European Union – the Austrian Example," European Security 5, no. 4 (Winter 1996): 607.

⁶ Dorfer, 92.

CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A metaphor from classical literature expresses most vividly the challenges to Swedish security policy. Ulysses' pre-emptively commanded his crew when faced with the dangerous seductive song of the sirens: "you must bind me hard and fast, so I can not stir from the spot...and if I beg you to release me, you must tighten and add to my bonds."¹ The song of the sirens comes from conflicts in Europe between major powers, while the ties are the successful policy of nonalignment, aiming at neutrality. So, what happens when the sirens not only cease to sing, but disappear? Indeed, what happens when the rocks that threatened the ships vanish? Some may argue, as Swedish politicians and the public do, that it best to keep the previously successful ties to be on the safe side. Still, if the situation has changed, and if the threats to the Swedish ship are no longer sirens and rocks, the prudent option may not be ties. This metaphor forms the framework for the question that this thesis attempts to answer: Which of the future options for Swedish security policy is the most favorable?

The most favorable option must provide Sweden with largest possible freedom of action to achieve national interests and freedom to choose Sweden's role in Europe and the Baltic Region. The option must also be feasible in a European and Baltic context, as well as effectively manage future threats. The Swedish perspective, what is best for Sweden, dominates the thesis.

This thesis attempts to explore the Swedish policy and situation, while evaluating options that are not evident. The focus is on two rarely discussed options: collective defense with Finland and collective security in the Baltic Region. A third alternative,

continued neutrality, forms background and reference. A comprehensive study, from the perspective of an officer in the Swedish Armed Forces, of the background and these alternatives is new.

Assumptions

Two assumptions formed the basis of the research question. The analysis confirms the first: challenges to the core of Sweden's current security policy. The description of Swedish public opinion, both among the elite and the public, supports Swedish resistance to participation in military alliances, in particular NATO.

Analysis

Three parts constitute the analysis aimed at answering the primary research question: Swedish security policy, the situation in Europe and the Baltic Region, and future options. The thesis uses background and factors from the two first parts to determine which option would be most favorable for Sweden in the timeframe of 2007-2010.

The end of the bipolar situation in Europe challenges Sweden's traditional security policy - the concept of neutrality. The nature of neutrality emphasizes the military and hard security. It is difficult, without risking isolation, to be nonaligned and neutral without a defined conflict or threat of conflict between belligerents. Both concepts distance a nation from alliances and conflicts. Hence, the nation achieves a higher degree of sovereignty. Sweden has used this distance, in contrast to more aloof neutrality, to actively influence the nations surrounding her. Both policies have and are evolving because they depend on how the neutral state defines policies, the perceptions of surrounding states, and the situation.

A comparison between characteristics of neutrality (nonalignment) and the current policy illustrates the nature of Swedish Post Cold War neutrality. Swedish neutrality and nonalignment are still mainly military in nature; the emphasis is on Swedish military independence and hard security. A potential East–West conflict is still the context for neutrality. This is what Sweden expects to be neutral to, and the basic assumption is still that it is possible to stay out of this type of conflict. The Government considers nonalignment as a preparation for these circumstances, and this standpoint is in relation to, or against, two alliances: NATO and the military dimension of the EU.

Both neutrality and nonalignment have evolved. The first concept has evolved less because military cooperation remains limited and has not yet affected neutrality in war. The changes within nonalignment are more profound. It is no longer a posture between two military alliances, instead it is a description of relations with the rest of Europe. The Swedish Government, and other governments such as the Finnish and Austrian, have set clear limits for involvement in NATO and the EU. This is out of consideration for neutrality, but also, more importantly, for reasons of sovereignty. Sweden actively influences the process in Europe to protect its neutrality and sovereignty. The Government uses the policy of nonalignment to protect Swedish freedom of action. Economic and political dimensions of the policy are separate from military aspects. Clearly, the Swedish definition of nonalignment and neutrality allows economic cooperation. Furthermore, the emphasis of nonalignment is currently more on soft security.

There are seven factors, deduced from the Swedish situation and policy, to consider for development of future Swedish security policy. The most important are

Swedish interests, perceived role, and freedom of action. Stability in the Baltic Region and developments within the EU and NATO dominate the interests. There is no perception of a larger Swedish role in the region. European integration affects Sweden's freedom of action profoundly.

Five features summarize the situation in Europe. First, the end of the bipolar situation gave freedom of action to states and organizations. This explains why the future often is described as unpredictable: the number of players and their options have increased dramatically. Second, the demilitarization of relations shifted security emphasis from hard to soft security. Third, from the complex web of organizations two dominating structures emerged: EU and NATO. These structures traditionally dealt with hard security and not with the emerging problems of, for example, environment and refugees. Fourth, the organizations themselves are evolving, deepening the integration process and enlarging themselves. European security is now more a matter of process than structures. Lastly, recent wars illustrate the problems inherent in current structures and indicate that the process may involve conflict.

States in the Baltic Region form four groups. First, there are Denmark, Poland, and Germany, which belong to both EU and NATO. These nations have largely solved their security problems. Second, there are Sweden and Finland, which are members of the EU, and, which pursue a policy of neutrality. The short-term security prospects for these states are favorable, but the long-term solutions remain problematic. Third, there are the weak and vulnerable Baltic States that are probably potential members of the EU, but not NATO. These states will probably continue to improve their security in all possible ways. Fourth, there is Russia, despite considerable problems, remains the main

player in the region. Russia's geographical position, large population, economic and military potential, and political culture make this probable.

The Baltic region has few conflicts and only one unsolvable with the resources of the region. Compared with other regions in Europe, for example the Balkans, the environmental, economic, and ethnic problems are small. The environmental legacy of the Communist regimes in Poland and the Baltic states are possible to handle by the nations themselves with support from their more developed neighbors. Poland has a growing economy, and economic developments in the Baltic States are promising. A policy of integration solves the problems of Russian and Polish minorities. However, the resources of the Baltic Region are insufficient to deal either with Russian disintegration or counter an aggressive Russia. The instruments of power of the nations in the region are insufficient for these threats. In order to balance unfavorable development in Russia, the region needs security links with the West. Consequently, the majority of the problems require a structure for soft security, with a capacity to manage hard security issues if development in Russia is unfavorable.

A balance, even with favorable development, to the influence of Germany and Russia, seems prudent. There are a number of ways to manage the influence: balancing against each other, cooperation among small states in the region, and links with major powers outside the Baltic area. Furthermore, Germany and Russia have important interests outside the region. Developments in other parts of the world affect them. For example, conflicts in Central Asia or the Caucasus may deeply influence the development of Russia.

The most important factors, deduced from the situation in Europe and the Baltic Region, to consider for future Swedish security policy are the developments of organizations and Russia. Additional considerations are characteristics and interests of the states in the region

Organizations, the EU and NATO, continue to play a very important role in Europe. The security structure they provide is evolving; it is a process. This makes the result difficult to predict. Integration and enlargement could lead to weaker organizations that offer only limited security guarantees and leave room for regional development. Enlargement has a limit and Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus are unlikely to become members of EU or NATO. The Baltic States are potential EU members in ten years' time, but not members of NATO unless this organization becomes considerably looser.

Swedish security policy must consider three generic scenarios for future development of the organizations: continuation of integration and enlargement, a divided Europe, and a disintegrated continent.

Developments in Russia remain the key to the future of the Baltic Region. Future prospects embrace a broad range: peaceful gradual economic development and democratic progress, disintegration, or aggressive major power. Russia will eventually reassert its influence in the Baltic Region. To manage this influence is important. Developments in Russia are, to a large degree, out of control of the states in the Baltic area.

Interests and characteristics of the nations in the Baltic area determine the feasibility of various options. The Baltic Region has a common interest in stability. Finland's security problems remain, and membership in NATO is unlikely. The Finnish

situation has many similarities with the Swedish one. The Baltic States remain weak and are searching for ways to enhance their security in the absence of NATO membership. Poland is probably a future key player in the region, with considerable potential for contributions to stability. The German influence is growing and has to be managed along with measures to promote peace, stability, and prosperity in the region.

The thesis evaluates three of six possible security options for Sweden. Three alternatives, Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), membership in NATO, and membership in WEU, were rejected. These solutions are too weak and not politically feasible. In addition, earlier papers examine these options extensively.

Recommendation of the Most Favorable Alternative

Nonalignment, aiming at neutrality, is not a favorable option. Indeed, not a viable one. One word expresses the advantages of nonalignment, aiming at neutrality: sovereignty. The disadvantages, however, are considerable. Very few of the original reasons for this alternative are valid today and are probably less so in the future. Sweden is already economically dependent on Europe. The consequence of isolation from a further integrated Europe is marginalization.

This alternative is even less favorable militarily. Geography and the concept of marginality do not support the option. Swedish resources, without a ruthless prioritization favoring the Armed Forces, are not sufficient.

Furthermore, the history of Swedish neutrality and recent changes discredit a prolonged policy. The break in the official policy during the Cold War and membership in the EU damage this alternative. The perception of Swedish neutrality among Western countries and, more importantly, in Russia, reduces the possibilities to pursue a similar

policy in the future-it does not encourage trust and confidence in Sweden as a neutral regional power.

Collective Swedish-Finnish defense has limited advantages, while the change from Swedish neutrality is only marginal. The main advantage with a Swedish-Finnish agreement is that it increases available resources. Such an option would have an appeal in a disintegrated Europe and to a certain would counter a renewed Russian threat. A hard problem arises if the resources of these two states are not sufficient to meet challenges. Disadvantages are similar to the neutrality alternative. Dependence on and weak links with Europe remain, and this alternative is not feasible in an integrating continent. Swedish commitment to Finland would limit freedom of action and the long contiguous border with Russia would pose two additional disadvantages.

Collective security is the most favorable alternative, but has risks. This option is a mixed security arrangement with the ability to prevent conflicts. This alternative is a solution in an integrated Europe and in a situation in which the process of enlargement of organizations stops or slows. It provides the ability to coordinate support for all states in the Baltic Region and to build relations with Russia. Several organizations may interact in the region and manage the influence of Russia and Germany. This alternative provides a framework for soft security to manage the threats to stability that are most likely to arise.

It is possible for Sweden to influence both organizations and nations in the region and thereby achieve most national interests while retaining the largest possible freedom of action.

Most nations in the region would prefer, depending on European integration, this alternative. The states have a common interest in stability. Hence, collective security is a collective interest.

Consequently, collective security is favorable from a Swedish perspective, feasible in a European and Baltic context, and effective in managing most threats.

The most important disadvantages are regionalization and concerns over the strength of the structure. The dangers of a ruptured Atlantic link, U.S. disengagement, and general loss of interest of European States affect this alternative. The region risks isolation, for example, in the case of an aggressive Russia and limited German engagement. An additional risk is Russian or German domination of the isolated region. The nature of the military security arrangement would be weak. Severe strains could break it. Furthermore, Sweden would risk, under these circumstances, playing a larger role and making substantial commitments to the collective structure without gaining enhanced security.

From a Swedish perspective, this discussion of options illustrates the factors that influence any future security policy. These elements are important for other studies. The factors concerning current Swedish policy illustrate the limitations of neutrality. The Swedish interests, perceived role, and freedom of action point at the importance of sovereignty. Development of organizations in Europe, the most important single factor, is a threat to traditional Swedish sovereignty, but contemporary Sweden is too dependent on Europe to stay out of the process. The solution is to participate and thereby influence the results. Participation also provides protection from potential future Russian aggression. Collective security would, therefore, be the most favorable alternative. It would provide

long term security, the largest possible freedom of action to achieve national interests, and the freedom to choose Sweden's role in Europe and the Baltic Region.

The basic Swedish choice, as illustrated in this thesis, is not between alternatives – it is between sovereignty and commitment. The choice is either to bring Ulysses' ship to a safe harbor or to continue sailing on an uncharted, unpredictable sea.

¹ Walter Carlsnaes, "Sweden Facing the New Europe: Whither Neutrality," European Security 2, no. 1 (Winter 1993): 71.

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

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
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