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East Europe Report

POLITICAL, SOCIOLOGICAL AND MILITARY AFFAIRS

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29 February 1984

EAST EUROPE REPORT
POLITICAL, SOCIOLOGICAL AND MILITARY AFFAIRS

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YUGOSLAV WEEKLY NOTES 'PARADOX' IN MARSHAL KULIKOV'S STATEMENTS

Zagreb DANAS in Serbo-Croatian 15 Nov 83 p 32

[Article by Miroslav Lazanski: "The Difference Is in Philosophy"]

[Text] A tall, strong man with a typically Slavic face framed by still thick gray hair, with a surprisingly mild look, Viktor Georgievich Kulikov is a marshal of the Soviet Union, first deputy minister of defense, and the supreme commander of the Warsaw Pact forces. Recently he has appeared in public on several occasions announcing Soviet and allied countermeasures as a response to the deployment of new American missiles in Europe.

Even before now, Marshal Kulikov has had under his command short-range tactical missiles called the FROG and SCUD in the West, and now as part of the army and probably even the division artillery, he will receive new missile systems with a so-called increased short range of the type of the SS-21, SS-22, and SS-23. Thus the striking power of the first military echelon of the Warsaw Pact forces will be noticeably increased, and Marshal Kulikov will have an opportunity to play new war variants in the numerous maneuvers of the Warsaw Pact.

A Surprising Paradox

Marshal of the Soviet Union Viktor Georgievich Kulikov was born in 1921, and together with Army General Aleksandr Terentievich Altunin (also born in 1921), he is the youngest military leader in the Soviet military leadership. His career went in a straight line: from 1941 to 1945 he was a chief of staff in tank units, from 1947 to 1950 he occupied a command position in a tank unit, and in 1953 he completed his education at the Frunze Military Academy, to spend the next 4 years in the post of chief of staff of a division. From 1967 to 1969 he was the commander of the Kiev military region (i.e. the 7th military region of the Soviet Union), and then became the commander of the Soviet combat group in East Germany, where he spent 2 years.

He became the first deputy minister of defense and head of the General Staff of the Soviet armed forces in 1971, and spent the following 5 years in that post; at the end of 1976 he also became the supreme commander of the combined Warsaw Pact forces. Several months after his appointment to that post he also became a marshal of the Soviet Union. He has been a member of the CPSU Central Committee since 1971. He belongs to the so-called young guard of the Soviet

military leadership--the technologists, as they are called in the West--who have recently begun to speak out publicly, to the general surprise of the world public. Up until now that has been the "privilege" of the party and political leadership of the country.

It is paradoxical that while the political and party leaders of the Soviet Union speak about the "principle of equal security" in their peace offers to the West, stressing that there is a "global balance of forces" between the two blocs, the military leaders of the Soviet Union are expressing different comparisons of the potential of the two sides, asserting that the West still has a military advantage over the East. It appears that the Soviet marshals, while citing data on the predominance of the West's military potential based exclusively on Western sources, are making the same efforts as American generals as they portray the "danger resulting from Soviet military power."

A Theoretical Challenge

In several recent speeches--and he does not appear in public very often--Marshal Kulikov repeated the already well-known theses that Moscow will not permit any American military superiority, and that the Soviet Army has "everything that it needs." Advocating an increase in the defense capability of the Warsaw Pact forces, he also stressed the need for further development of Soviet military skill, and a more active introduction of more progressive methods and modern experience into the command system, demanding the "elimination of formalism, bureaucratism, and localism, which are hindering the strengthening of the army." "Everything that has become obsolete or has been outmoded should be resolutely removed," Marshal Kulikov said. Later speeches by Marshal Kulikov, as well as other Soviet military leaders, were met in the West with speculations about a "new generation of Soviet military theoreticians relying on dialectical materialism."

Some Western analysts asserted, and still assert, that Soviet military science has only partially accepted modern strategies with the application of systems theory, situation simulations, and computer technology (which is already routine in NATO). Marshal Kulikov responded to all of these speculations in an article with the view that "the real difference with respect to the American opponents is not in theory, but in philosophy."

With respect to Washington's new military strategy, it is a theoretical challenge for Soviet military doctrine, and so even though the Soviet military theoreticians are conducting polemics against the Western concepts of "mass terror" and "flexible response," calling them "inhumane" and "suicidal," the fact is that even Soviet doctrine considers that any attack against the USSR, even a tactical one, has to be answered with a total counterattack.

But it is probable that the most recent inclusion of the new missiles with an increased short range in the Warsaw Pact forces will also bring something new on the theoretical level, and so one should also expect new articles or speeches by Marshal Kulikov. After all he is a very productive military writer, but unfortunately not too inclined toward interviews....

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CS0: 2800/138

SHORTCOMINGS IN WORK OF ADMITTING NEW PARTY MEMBERS

Tirana ZERI I POPULLIT in Albanian 17 Jan 84 p 2

[Article by Kudret Topciu: "The Rejuvenation of Party Ranks--A Permanent Task," while studying the 40th Volume of Comrade Enver Hoxha's Works]

[Text] Increasing party ranks with new communists has been and remains one of the most important and continuing tasks of the party organs and the basic party organizations. Comrade Enver's teachings and recommendations in some materials contained in the 40th Volume of his Works are clear guidance for better, more scientific and more responsible work for admissions into the party.

As is known, admissions are done by the basic party organization and its work is of a decisive importance. This is why Comrade Enver recommends that it is important that we make "the basic party organizations aware of...the new admissions, properly understanding the great ideological importance of the matter, because, it deals with the injection of new blood into the party, the rejuvenation of its organs from which depends the future of the party and of our country."

In general, the experience of the basic party organizations so far has been good. Especially in recent years, experience has become more apparent in the execution of the party guidance regarding the perfection of the procedure of admissions into the party. This, however, the party teaches us must be further improved and enriched. The district party committees have examined and constructed their work in regard to the issue of increasing the party ranks by concentrating their attention and care on the role of the basic party organizations. Many party committees, such as those in Tirana, Korce, Lezhe, Gjirokastra and elsewhere, have distinguished themselves especially in good work and in building their work mainly with the bureaus and the basic party organizations in order to explain the content of directives and guidelines and the practical ways for their execution. The leadership organs of these districts have concentrated themselves especially where there have been misunderstandings and wrong activities not only to correct them, but also to prevent other wrongdoings in the future. However, it is observed that when dealing with these issues, some committees, sometimes, communicate more with the secretaries, and do not work sufficiently with the basic party organizations and the communists so that they will properly

understand and master the party directives. The lack of this complete and correct understanding of the directive is the reason that in some cases, such as in Fier, Pogradec and elsewhere, some basic party organizations do not act properly and forcefully to correctly execute the set criteria and directives, both in regard to quality, the rate of admissions, the composition of society, and so forth. Thus, there is no insistence in the comprehensive work of the basic party organizations and of every communist for the continual good progress of this work. Also, as experience shows, it is necessary for the party committee to assist them so that they will improve the level of their study work for a more concrete and systematical organization and monitoring of admissions, in opposition to the manifestations of spontaneity, properly entrusting the communists with tasks and asking them to work even harder for this purpose. The fact that in Dibre, Skrapar and other districts there are basic party organizations which have not carried out any admission into the party for some consecutive years, despite the requirements for it, does not speak about the issue of monitoring.

The Eighth Party Congress re-emphasized that the quality of admissions has been and remains decisive in the party policy on increasing its ranks. Comrade Enver raises this problem with a special impact in the materials of this Volume and assigns tasks for better work, because, the quality of the party and of its members is the source of the victories achieved, and to be achieved in the future, by our people and country on the road to the building of socialism and the defense of the country. Nevertheless, the present conditions and possibilities are greater and this must be understood and practically implemented in the best way possible. Both the characteristics of sectarianism and of the spirit of liberalism, of opportunism, of tribe and of sick nepotism in the creative execution of the Marxist-Leninist policy of our party regarding the increase of its members have always been and are foreign characteristics for our basic party organizations.

The party recommendation to admit very young men and women in its ranks is of great importance; this needs a more continuous and forceful determination; and this issue must not be treated in a formal and bureaucratic manner, simply in order to be on the safe side with percentage figures.

To know in what work-front the communists are--on the front line or the rear line--and how they execute their tasks is to deal with the quality of admissions into the party and, further, of the communists themselves. At the meeting of the Secretariat of the Party Central Committee in 1969, Comrade Enver stressed that "in the future we must strongly insist that the people, who will fill the party ranks in greater percentages, must come from the grassroots and the production sector, educated with such a spirit that, when they become communists, they stay in the production sector, because, this is how the party organization will be further strengthened." This directive has been executed; and it is a fact that currently 80 to 85 percent of those admitted into the party come from the production sector and from its main fronts. However, in this field, there is room for greater thoroughness for the party organs and basic party organizations in order to carry out a more careful work with greater exigency in the struggle against spontaneity and

against work with campaigns, for a more scientific management. This is not a matter of statistical reports and percentages which would open the road to formalism. The main point is that the best among the best elements, the most devoted, must always and in all cases come into the party and that workers must come into the party not only because they are workers, but, because they are known for having great awareness, for being elements educated in work and in life and for being passionate and well learned. However, in some districts, such as Kolonje and Puke, there are tendencies here and there that specific communists seek to leave their village, the work with shifts, the difficult work-fronts, the construction site, the mining center and so forth; these tendencies are harmful, especially, for the communists. This fact influences the quality of work of the party organization and its active and achieving force.

Now, in general, we are proceeding properly; the thought of the masses is widely involved through various forms before the basic party organization decides on admissions into the party. The masses always give valuable thoughts; however, they would do this better if the directives and requirements of the party are explained to them, especially, in regard to the qualities which the communists must have. If this is done properly by all basic party organizations, then, some manifestations of formalism, which sometimes are observed in the adoption of this thought and in the evaluations that are given, would be properly avoided. If this is properly carried out, then, better than up to now, more people from the ranks of sounders in geology and petroleum, of miners and, of shepherds in the livestock sector, and so forth would come in the party. This is essential in order to always have a wide and unique opinion that the party admits in its bosom only the best among the best elements, those who deserve this honor and confidence, simultaneously, first of all, from the main and most difficult lines of work and production. Addressing the Ninesh cooperative members in Fier District in April 1969--address which is included in this Volume--Comrade Enver recommends: "You must always remember that the party belongs to you, because it comes from your bosom. Those, who come into the party, are among the best of our people, of our working class, of our peasantry, of our intelligentsia. The interest of the people is that its cream of the crop enters the party...." And, further down, he says: "...If a communist does not possess these qualities, the people must say openly that he does not deserve to be in the party, advise the basic party organization and, if it is necessary, force him to review his situation."

These recommendations of vital importance for the party are always current. They serve to reinforce work and to increase efforts so as to prevent any concession in the future in regard to these requirements. This must be taken into consideration at any time. The tasks for this year, and for those which await us, as the Eighth Plenum of the AWP Central Committee pointed out, are great. The work for the rejuvenation of the party ranks must also be seen closely linked with these tasks and possibilities, taking into account the entire great program of the party for future progress in all fields.

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CZECHOSLOVAKIA

CHARTERISTS PROTEST AGAINST SOVIET DEPLOYMENT

Oslo NY TID in Norwegian 11 Jan 84 p 17

/Article: "New Missiles Cause Unrest"/

/Text/ Prague--Czechs are frightened over the new SS-20 missiles which are to be deployed. To date the feeling of impatience and conscience have not caused any large mass protests, but the potential is there.

This is how Jiri Hazek--the member of Charter 77 who has been most involved in efforts toward disarmament and peace--sums up the possibilities for a wider peace movement in Czechoslovakia.

Recently there have in fact been more signs of disquiet in Czech society over the plans for deployment.

Missile Protests

According to THE HERALD TRIBUNE, in November factory workers in the city of Hradec Kralove (100 kilometers east of Prague) sent a petition to Communist Party leader Gustav Husak. The 24 members of the Socialist Workers Brigade protested in their letter against the deployment of new missiles, but also demanded the removal of all similar missiles from Czech soil.

The same day, 10 November, the party organ RUDE PRAVO, reported that the editorial office had received a letter from a reader expressing fear over the imminent deployment.

Arrests

During the same month, youth people organized a petition campaign against new nuclear weapons in both the East and West. Several hundred people--many young--had signed the appeal which were presented to the Czech government and president.

The authorities acted before more could sign: 15-20 demonstrators were arrested and interrogated; some received lengthy sentences.

It was Charter activist Anna Sabatova who related this to us in Prague. She herself had allowed the primary initiator of the letter protest, 23-year old Petr Pospichael, to hide in her apartment.

"After three days the police came and took Petr with force. We have heard nothing from him since," says Sabatova.

The young man has been sentenced twice previously for "treasonous" activities. This time the imprisonment could be long-term.

The authorities also arrested and interrogated additional Charter members because they suspected that the human rights group was behind the protest.

Apprehensive

The November arrests and the authorities' threats of 15-year prison terms for clamorous protests against deployment of the SS-20 missiles show that Husak and company are apprehensive. The regime is clearly fearful that the unease will grow and assume greater unorganized dimensions.

For the moment it is still Charter 77 which articulates the loudest protests against new nuclear weapons in Czechoslovakia. The human rights group has gradually involved itself in the peace debate and established closer contacts with the peace movement in the West.

At the same time, Charter 77 believes that the fight for peace and human rights cannot be separated. The spokeswoman for Charter 77, Anna Marvanova, expresses it as follows:

"It is not possible to fight for peace without there being respect for human rights. If we express our protest--even in the form of a petition--we risk 15 years imprisonment. The authorities' justification for this is that our efforts undermine national security."

Information

Another problem which Marvanova touched upon was information, and she used as an example the Peace Convention in June in which Western peace activists participated: "Women from Greenham Common knew about missiles in England; we Czechs knew virtually nothing about missiles in Czechoslovakia," states Marvanova.

Additionally, people are fed one-sided information daily. Every day there is talk on Czech television about the danger of war and about the United States being the party responsible for that.

The only possibility for obtaining alternative information is from the West. One listens to Austrian radio, and to some extent magazines, newspapers and books are smuggled in.

Debate

Anna Sabatova speaks also about a dialogue with the Western peace movement: Charter 77 is interested in such contact.

She also emphasizes the point that peace and human rights are intertwined--indeed, one presupposes the other.

"It is very important to view the concept of peace in a larger context and couple it with human rights. We believe that it is important to emphasize that the situation in the East is very different from that in the West. It is for this reason that we stress so strongly the issue of human rights," states Anna Sabatova.

Sabatova discloses that there is debate within Charter 77 on this issue, on the relationship with the Western peace movement and about whether the West ought to have contact with the official Czech Peace Committee.

Charter 77 has recently exchanged ideas in the East with peace groups in GDR and Hungary, and in the West with English, German and Dutch activists. She believes that it is very significant for Westerners to support the small beginnings of peace activities which now are brewing in Czechoslovakia.

Opinions within Charter 77 are divided concerning relationships with the Peace Committee. Some believe that Western peace movements should maintain contact with the committee while others are strongly opposed.

Charter 77 itself has absolutely no contact with the official Czech Peace Committee.

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GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

INCREASED EMPHASIS PLACED ON TRAINING WITH SIMULATORS

East Berlin MILITAERTECHNIK in German No 6, 1983 (signed to press 9 Sep 83)
pp 287-288

[Article by Col Dr H. Koesling, engineer, and Lt Col Dr H. Preissler, engineer: "Design Requirements for Trainers and Simulators of Combat Equipment"]

[Text] The progressive modernization of weapons and equipment in our armed forces demands of all members of the army that they use the available training time effectively and learn mastery of combat equipment quickly and thoroughly. With the help of trainers and simulators, a special group of teaching and learning media, training can be carried out much more effectively in many cases.

1. Design Fundamentals

Design requirements for trainers and simulators must take into account general psychological and pedagogical fundamentals, as well as those specific to the medium. Design is influenced by educational and training objectives, the content of the training, the design method for conducting the training process, the specialized qualifications of the trainer, didactic functions and what is possible technically.

Three didactically important characteristics of the teaching and learning media must be considered in developing trainers and simulators:

--Preprogrammable

Educational and learning devices contain stored information which they can give out as often as needed and at any time desired during the period of their service life.

--Objective

In contrast to the information which the trainer presents orally in his instruction and which is open to subjectively determined influences, the information derived from teaching and learning devices is objectified and is therefore not affected by external influences.

--Designable

The developers of a teaching and learning tool have the opportunity of storing the desired information already prepared in accordance with didactic-methodological considerations.

The specifics of the individual information sources must also be taken into consideration.

To realize the didactic functions of trainers and simulators, the principal objective in their design consists, on the one hand, of approximating the flow of operations as closely to those of the original as the training objective requires. A trainer does not have to do the same as the original equipment. For example, it does not need to destroy a real target, it does not absolutely have to lift loads weighing tons or move at high speed. This is extremely advantageous from an economic point of view.

On the other hand, the principal objective of design consists of integrating the possibilities for pedagogical guidance and of finding solutions which optimally match the physical and psychic peculiarities of the person using them. In this respect trainers and simulators have to have a considerably higher level of performance than the original equipment.

The stipulation requiring the trainers and simulators to be optimally adaptable to man gives rise to the necessity of exploiting fully the design fundamentals specific to the medium.

If the currently known trainers and simulators in the military area are analyzed, the attempt can be made derive general design requirements from them. Certain requirements must be set with respect to the three components of hardware, software and teachware for the trainers and simulators. These will be considered separately for methodological reasons.

2. Design Requirements for the Technical Aspect of the Equipment

Students in the control field become acquainted with the technical aspect of trainers and simulators in two forms:

One form confronts us as integrated original equipment, for example, the cabin of an airplane, the faceplate of a piece of radio equipment, and so on. The requirements with respect to design can be taken into consideration only by the manufacturer of the combat equipment.

The second form encountered is a facsimile of parts of combat equipment. It makes it possible to install the necessary pedagogical directional aids. This involves additional costs. They can be reduced by using facsimiles.

Now let us turn to the design of facsimiles. By expedient design of the control field, a good cost-use ratio can be found.* Points of departure for the design of facsimile models can be established by identifying the various

control operations on the original equipment with respect to their frequency and the amount of time spent in the total operation, for example, by means of a work-flow study and analyzing the mistakes in the actions. Three different kinds of facsmile models of combat equipment can be identified on the basis of this type of study.¹ They differ

--in the degree of accuracy (degree of analogy)

--in cost

--in the time they are used as a proportion of the total time in which operating skills can be fully developed with the help of trainers or simulators.

A comparison of the various methods reveals the second method, a model with a medium degree of analogy, as the most expedient for the construction of trainers/simulators (Table 1). The control area departs from the original equipment in the completeness and/or construction of the control and indicator elements. Some elements are omitted. Several uniform sequences of action and partial areas of control can be reduced to one exemplary solution.

Photographic representations of the original control area on a scale of 1:1, with optical orientation indicators for memorizing the spatial arrangement of the control and indicator elements, their shape and labelling and the sequence in which they are operated, are typical of this type of facsimile model.

Table 1. Comparison of the Parameters for Types of Facsimiles

Copy	Degree of Accuracy (degree of analogy)	Cost/ Cost for Original	Time of Use/ Total Training Time
1st Type	high --exact copy of original	≥ 100 percent	> 75 percent
2nd Type	medium --not copied completely	ca. 10 percent	25-75 percent
3rd Type	low --only sections copied --high degree of abstraction	≤ 1 percent	< 25 percent

Since the control area is not copied exactly from the original, the question arises to what extent these changes affect the transferability of the skills acquired on the trainer/simulator to the original installation.

* Design of the control area means the structural execution of control areas with the control and indicator elements complete in number and accurate in detail concerning shape, arrangement and mechanical function, and labelling. It includes the additional informational means to assist in orientation, and to direct and control actions.

Completed studies allow the following preliminary statements to be made about control and indicator elements whose location is not operationally relevant (in the sense of intellectual operations)^{1,2}:

There are minor or no effects from:

--spatial displacement of entire control fields,

--spatial displacement of individual control and indicator elements (skip distance 15 cm),

--variation in the color of lamps,

--changes in the shape of control elements.

There are noticeable effects in the form of slower actions and disruptions in the operating process when individual control and indicator elements are displaced spatially by more than 50 cm and/or the labels are reduced in size or altered.

If the labelling corresponds in the design of the control area, changes can be made in the shape and color, in the number and arrangement of control and indicator elements in facsimiles of parts of combat equipment without major difficulties occurring in the transfer of skills to original equipment. Design requirements for the technical aspects in generating learning-process-dependent information in the control area or in its vicinity, for example,

--signalling sequential steps

--registering mistakes

--issuing special instructions for action and correction

--taking down records and evaluation,

must also be considered in the development of models. They are influenced basically by psychological requirements in the design of control areas and must be specially determined for each type of trainer/simulator.³ An overlap in the control and indicator elements for the facsimile model must be prevented.

3. Design Requirements for the Internal Sequence of Actions

Depending on the activities of the student in the control area, his actions are directed, supported, checked, corrected and evaluated by means of already installed programs (electrical, mechanical, hydraulic links, computer operating systems, and so on).

Certain design requirements must be established with respect to the programs. The pedagogical-technical requirements for the trainer/simulator form the basis.* These are determined by the didactic functions to be realized, the

specifics of the information source of the program and the technical design possibilities of the control sites.

Depending on the type of trainer/simulator, the student must be able to enter into a dialogue with the medium by himself, for example, in the case of freely selectable programs. The student determines which partial exercises he wants to complete.

At present only keyboards (mostly alphanumeric) are being considered as input equipment. From an operational-psychological standpoint they are designed in such a way that they do not make any other demands on the user than are normally expected, for example, in working with office machines. Paper printers and display screens are used preponderantly as output equipment. The display has the advantage of a clear, closed and rapid output.

The design of the programs is determined by the pedagogical-technical requirements. It is proving to be expedient to divide the overall program into limited partial programs (sub-programs). To do this it is necessary to work out a detailed algorithm (program sequence plan) for the pedagogical process that is to be controlled with the help of the trainer/simulator.

The sub-programs that are available as modules can be combined into desired types of operation. Identical sub-programs can be used for different didactic programs. In this case they differ only in the pedagogical reference inputs.

4. Design Requirements for the Content and Methodology of Training

Training processes are determined by the relationship between the objective, the content, the methods, the media and the organization of training and education. When an established objective for training and education exists, the content must be derived primarily from it. It is described as:

--norms and ways of behavior of socialist action,

--techniques and methods of intellectual and physical activity and

--knowledge.

Design requirements for the content must set up with respect to the interpenetration of instruction and methodology. It is a matter of making the inner structure and the intersecting points of the various educative contents accessible. That is, the result is a programming or, in the broader sense, an algorithmization of the contents. These determine the pedagogical stipulations for the design of trainers and simulators. They are a constituent part of the pedagogical-technical requirements.

* Pedagogical-technical requirements are formulated by a trainers collective and, in the form of formulations of objectives, these requirements establish the desired pedagogical performance and the technical level of the trainers and simulators.

Trainers and simulators are included in the category of resources.

A close interactions exists between the resources, in our case, trainers and simulators, and the methods. In addition to this, there are repercussions for all the other categories. Different methods cannot be used for the instructional preparation of different contents until certain trainers and simulators are available.

The use or the design of trainers and simulators is always undertaken for a particular situation, that is, for a selected educational content. Established objectives are to be attained with this content, using appropriate methods which are tied to given organizational forms of learning.

A methodologically optimized application of trainers/simulators exists only when the work of the teacher and the students with them and on them is fully integrated in a process which is didactically methodical, well designed from a psychological and cognitive point of view and at the core of which is a content adequate to the objectives.

We use the term training methodology for the totality of the sides of the process. As a methodological design it reflects the systematic character of the totality of measures. It influences the design requirements for expenditures on equipment and the internal process sequence. Stipulations of this kind can exist in the most diverse forms, for example, as

- operating algorithm
- working instructions
- program control words
- command directions
- terms of reference and
- error evaluation algorithm.

Besides design requirements such as unambiguousness and clarity, the fundamentals specific to the resource must also be considered here. Normally, the accessible and necessary parts of the training methodology are available to the student in written form. As a result, the requirements for the design of the text and the illustrations and the typographical and hygienic design gain in importance.

The text design must be pervasively didactic and methodological and it must stand out by its developing, problem-type, activating method of presentation. A visually clear arrangement and a clearly formulated style are required.

In designing the illustrations, the unity of text and illustration must be considered. A high degree of perceptibility must be the objective. The criteria are, for example, the proximity of the text or optical proximity, compactness, consistency and uniformity.

Access time, redundancy and the emphasizing of small details is influenced with the help of typographic design. Typographic devices include symbols

(for orientation, to emphasize statements in the text, to explain illustrations), color (for symbolic effect, for a warning effect, or with symptomatic effect) and pointers (marginal notations, bibliographic references).

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9581

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HUNGARY

CC DEPUTY DIRECTOR DISCUSSES PARTY POLICY TOWARD INTELLIGENTSIA

Budapest UJ TUKOR in Hungarian 1 Jan 84 p 5,9

[Article by Andras Knopp, Deputy Director of the CC Department of Scientific, Public Education and Cultural Affairs: "After a Quarter of a Century"*]

[Text] Foreign--especially Western--admirers of our country's more than a quarter-of-a-century long development and present situation, but often even its biased critics, tend to present everything we have attained in terms of it being the direct result of the 1968 reform of our economic management. Stressing the importance of the 1968 reform is not unjustified, for of all the events that have affected this historical era it was undoubtedly this political initiative that has had the most far-reaching impact and resulted in the most profound changes. Still it is a one-sided and at the same time unhistorical view which dates everything that has come to characterize our party's by now even internationally widely accepted political line and practice back to 1968. The policy guidelines that also made the 1968 reform possible go back as far as 1956-1957, to the resolution of December 1956. It is to our party's policy guidelines defined in that resolution and to the party work that has subsequently evolved in practice that the origins of our 1968 reforms should be traced. It is this same spirit that has imbued and served as the basis of our cultural policy guidelines.

Ensuring that the 1968 reform process is consistently implemented and that its political--and cultural policy--consequences are allowed to fully assert themselves is, to some extent, still one of the major tasks facing us today. In order, however, for us to be able to correctly interpret these present day tasks what we need to do is precisely to properly outline the real turning points of our post-1956 development and to put them in order of

*Exerpts from a lecture delivered by the author on 15 and 16 December 1983 at a conference on cultural policy. The full text will appear in the January 1984 issue of TARSADALMI SZEMLE [under the title "About the Party's Policy toward the Intelligentsia"]

importance. As we examine the main periods of our development from this point of view we find that the reform of our economic management came a good decade after the renewal of our party's general policy, alliance policy and cultural policy. Without our party's broad-minded policy toward the intelligentsia and without a science policy which encourages critical analyses of today's socio-economic problems the reform could never have been worked out.

Essentially, our party's cultural policy and its policy toward the intelligentsia are still determined by those--today we can already say--time-tested basic principles that were first cohesively outlined in our party's above mentioned quarter-of-a-century old document. In this sense we can also say that our party's cultural policy shows a high degree of continuity.

The reason that I stress this continuity is not because of the anniversary but because of the dramatic changes that have occurred in the international situation which first of all raises the question whether the principles of our quarter-of-a-century long alliance policy can still be preserved, in other words whether in this increasingly cold-war like situation we can still continue to pursue this policy.

I am convinced that there is only one answer to this question: as long as it remains up to us we must continue to ensure the continuity of our alliance policy. Today as the heightening of international tensions and the economic difficulties we face at home continue to test the inner cohesive strengths and breaking resistance of our society, it is the continuity of our party's time-tested alliance policy which constitutes one of the most important factors in ensuring continued trust in our party and guaranteeing our internal stability.

Another reason why this continuity needs to be emphasized today, however, is because of attempts--on the part of our party's oppositionist critics--to question, even in retrospect, the genuine nature of the alliance which our party has developed since 1956, especially with the intelligentsia. Paraphrasing Istvan Bibó's harshly condemning opinion of the compromise of 1867 these critics of the consolidation have branded the achievements of this alliance policy as a "bad compromise," a deceptive accommodation between the ruling power and the intelligentsia. The brunt of this criticism, of course, is directed not at the policy of our party--for this they reject outright--but at the Hungarian intelligentsia which because of its alliance with the party they compare to the 1867 generation which had looked upon the compromise of 1867 as a way to preserve and carry out the ideals of 1848. Behind this view we find a paradigm of a kind of non-integrating, nonconformist intellectual attitude, unwilling to compromise with the ruling power, according to which "an intellectual is a person who says no." These critics of the Hungarian intelligentsia have used

similarly undeserving terms to condemn the Hungarian working class which--in their opinion--has let its historical traditions whither away, has become indifferent toward its work and its fellow workers, has forgone its need to perform creative work, has neglected the mental and moral upbringing of its children, etc.; in fact, if it were up to them they would "replace" not only the intelligentsia but also the working class because they are not worthy of their critics.

In defending the principles and achievements of our alliance policy it would be a mistake to overemphasize this matter of continuity while at the same time failing to take into account our changed conditions. After all our situation, our external and internal conditions have changed equally profoundly in the past 25 years. There have been fundamental changes in our society, our social structure, our cultural make-up as well as in our domestic political conditions.

Similarly significant changes have occurred in our external conditions which have affected the intellectual-ideological outlook of our intelligentsia. At the time our cultural policy guiding principles were being developed and for many years after that the imperialist powers were--concurrently with the development of peaceful coexistence on the international level--forcing our country into a cold-war like isolation. These factual historical conditions were in a certain sense also reflected in the cultural policy guiding principles: the document had been prepared on the assumption of what from the point of view of our external ideological and political conditions could be called and essentially "closed" society. It did not--and indeed could not--take into account the dynamic development in international, including cultural relations that would begin to unfold in the early 1960's which later itself would favorably affect the possibilities of our intelligentsia to gather information and the development of its general mood, and which--in this respect--would become an important factor in implementing our party's alliance policy. The fact that as a result of our dynamically growing international relations our society has become more "open" during the past decades has meant, and still continues to mean that the various ideological and cultural effects directed at us can more freely assert themselves. Some of these often frustrate and hamper the realization of our declared ideological and cultural policy objectives and occasionally even work against them. A part of these unfavorable effects also have to do with the inadequacies of our own work: in some areas--such as in film making and in the program policy of our theaters--the ratios of socialist and western cultural products can not only be criticised on the basis of ideological considerations but are also unjustifiable on the basis of value considerations. There is another part of these unfavorable effects, however, which at the present level of international relations and given today's proliferation of the various means of

mass communications cannot be filtered out, hence in developing our policy toward the intelligentsia we must seriously take these circumstances into account.

Given today's deteriorating international situation in which (Western) policies, especially those made in America but--although to a lesser extent--also the orientation of other NATO countries, are characterized by increasingly right-wing, anti-socialist and anti-communist trends and propaganda rhetoric, the perceptions and assessments on the part of our intelligentsia regarding our country's international position and situation are vitally important to us. In this respect we often find that some members of our intelligentsia continue to subscribe to views which used to characterize the era of detente. Encouraged by our country's favorable international reputation, by its achievements and in view of its relatively increased stability a segment of our intelligentsia tends to exaggerate our country's possibilities while at the same time often underrating the importance of our role within the community of socialist countries, in the CEMA and the Warsaw Pact.

Under the present conditions of cold-war like international ideological-political confrontation it is becoming increasingly urgent for us to take a more thorough look at the ideological and political problems that have begun to manifest themselves among our intelligentsia. The shaping of the ideological outlook of our intelligentsia was also identified as a central task in the 1958 resolution. The ideas outlined at that time, however,--at least as we see it today--were also not free of the utopism and enlightened liberalism characteristic of that era: it appears that the resolution had overestimated the possibilities and role of direct ideological influence. Today's unwillingness to engage in ideological debates is in part the consequence of illusions and ideological offensives connected with this perception. Also contributing to this careful abstention from ideological debates, however, have been cases of practical violations of the unity between our alliance policy and ideological debates. I am referring to cases where under the slogan of defending our values so much effort was made to win over important personalities of our intellectual life as allies that some of their contemporary works and even their past mistakes were essentially put beyond criticism. These phenomena, the inconsistencies that have occurred in the practical implementation of by themselves otherwise correct principles have even caused some Marxist critics to lose confidence.

None of this, of course, can explain why for a long time now representatives of the Marxist view have remained so timid and passive even in the face of ideologically questionable, confused and occasionally markedly hostile manifestations. The weakness of our debating spirit, the increasingly disheartened character of Marxist criticism has had an unfavorable effect on the ideological and political outlook of our entire intelligentsia, but especially on its classical elements.

We must be very careful, however, about the kind of conclusions we draw from this situation. Returning to the use of more direct management methods would jeopardize the democratic character of our cultural life and, therefore, also the relationship of trust that has evolved between our party and the great majority of our intelligentsia.

The diversity of our periodical culture, the multiplicity of the debating forums of our literary-intellectual life and the possibility of obtaining a wide variety of information are achievements made possible by the development of socialist democracy and cultural life which at the same time are also important factors in ensuring the good general mood of our intelligentsia. Hence, it is also vitally important from the point of view of our party's policy toward the intelligentsia that we improve and continue to develop our existing central and regional state and party controls over our cultural life in such a way so that they can help us preserve all of the achievements we have made in the course of our development so far while at the same time more effectively contributing to the realization of our party's alliance policy objectives by providing less ambiguous ideal-ideological orientation for our workshops.

In order for us to make this possible, of course, we need to have a lively spirit of debate, open discussions and a willingness to more openly espouse our quarter-of-a-century long development. It would be wrong to view the problematic tendencies found in the literary and cultural press merely as management problems without seeing the public-mood related political problems and difficulties behind them while at the same time continuing to live under the illusion that by improving management and by creating a more active and lively spirit of debate these phenomena can be completely overcome.

During the next, predictably more difficult situation facing us we can expect increased criticism and more intensive analyses on the part of our intelligentsia, especially among the younger generation, of the various processes and phenomena of our social development. Today's debates concerning the international working class and the different roads of social development found among the socialist countries will also bring the question of social and historical alternatives of socialist development into greater focus. As far as these questions are concerned, given the present conditions of international ideological confrontation the number of questionable, problematic and even hostile manifestations is not only not expected to decline but is likely to increase. While these phenomena and manifestations may be disliked and they may, and indeed must be criticised, it would be a grave mistake on the part of the ruling party of a nation not to consider their existence to be a real problem. In order for us to be able to take issue with the various problematic ideological tendencies we have

observed among our intelligentsia, and to be able to shape its ideological and political outlook more consciously we must thoroughly examine the present conditions of our alliance policy, revitalize the political work that is being done by way of direct ideological means, especially among our intelligentsia, and more consistently apply the new and not so new, but in the past few decades neglected, means and methods this requires.

We must learn to live with these phenomena, not in the sense of a passive coexistence but by revitalizing the work style of our party's political work and its policy toward the intelligentsia, and by readjusting it to reflect today's real situation. This would require greater possibilities for more open discussions and ideological clarifications of various issues which concern our intelligentsia and a more unequivocal commitment on our part to making political decisions that are more open, more convincing and more democratically developed. Our party must ensure that these kinds of debates receive proper publicity and must shape the structure of the public in such a way that the processes that are set in motion by these decisions, the unfolding debates and the need for critical analyses of our social development serve the realization of our party's alliance policy objectives as well as our efforts aimed at winning over an increasingly greater segment of our intelligentsia to supporting our socio-political goals.

9379

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JURISDICTIONAL ADJUSTMENTS IN WAKE OF ADMINISTRATIVE CHANGES DISCUSSED

Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP in Hungarian 17, 20 Jan 84

[Interview with Pal Furcht, deputy chairman of the Council Affairs Bureau, by reporter Valeria Revai, date and place of interview not given]

[17 Jan 84 p 4]

[Text] More Modern Supervision, Greater Independence Without Extremes

These weeks, under not entirely cloudless conditions and amidst numerous unclarified and as yet unanswered questions, the councils are learning to get along without jarases. All of the councils are more or less aware of the reasons for the reorganization, understand its objectives, know in essence the new system for the supervision of villages and are striving to identify with the altered situation. But they find it unusual that the central statutory regulations provide no guidance regarding several essential partial questions.

What the system of relations between the councils at the various levels should and will be like is already a much-debated question. The megyes, town councils, and the councils of large communities with town status are interested primarily in the extent, methods and content of cooperation in the megye supervision of the villages. These are the questions we discussed in an interview with Dr Pal Furcht, department head within the Council Affairs Bureau.

Last Word

[Answer] We should start out first of all from the fact that what we are talking about is development of a new system of relations, between the megyes and the towns, between the megyes and the villages, and between the towns and villages. This of course does not mean that the proven basic principles of megye supervision must be changed entirely. There will be no change, for example, in the role and task of the megyes in that they must assert the principles of central supervision and at the same time represent the local councils' interests before the central organs. We adhered to this principle also when we

left unchanged, at least for the time being, the megyes' supervising role in economic and financial matters. Actually the megye councils and their executive committees have already been supervising the corporate organs of the villages directly, and their decisions have been addressed not to the jaras offices, but to the local councils and the village council executive committees. In practice, however, matters cannot continue in the customary manner.

[Question] What do you mean by this?

[Answer] The point is that under the new system the responsibility of the megye council's corporate organs will be much greater. In their supervisory activity, for example, the megye council's corporate organs must consider whether sufficient emphasis is being placed on village factors. For it is a declared basic principle that megye supervision must strengthen the villages' independence and ensure that the village corporate organs truly have the final say in determining their own development and in deciding the most important local questions. The megye corporate organs are unable to do this without placing ever-greater emphasis in their work on analyses of local questions. An "everyday" indication of this is how often and how demandinglly the megye corporate organs place on their agenda the affairs of the villages.

Not Merely Indirectly

[Question] Why are we attributing such great importance to this?

[Answer] Because we know that there are bad ingrained habits For example, when a megye corporate organ debates a topic--when it evaluates, say, the youth situation in the given megye--it makes mostly general statements of principle and outlines comprehensively the situation in the megye. A typical shortcoming of such investigations and written megye reports is that they almost never include discriminating analyses tailored to the villages. But there are many bad ingrained habits also in discussing a distinctly "village topic." When such items were on the agenda, "debate" usually was followed by the adoption of a perfunctory resolution that "the topic is to be discussed by the executive committees of the village councils." Rarely was a distinction made between villages in terms of their different situation and specific conditions. No attention was paid to the question of where debate on a given topic was more timely and where it was less so, or where there might have been greater need for analysis of an entirely different kind or based on a different concept. But let us add immediately that in most cases the megye council's corporate organs were motivated to act in this manner by the fact that they were able to present themselves in a more favorable light on the basis of comprehensive and nondiscriminating megye analyses. In other words, the "better indicators" of the megye seat and towns projected a more favorable picture of the entire megye. In the future the megyes will truly be able to supervise the villages directly only if they will not have merely an indirect picture of the situation in the villages.

[Question] In the introduction we mentioned that the statutory regulations provided merely a framework for supervising the villages. In many respects, however, the megyes themselves may decide how to exercise this supervision. In this context we have already heard that the towns are having certain misgivings.

What Is Not Feasible

[Answer] Most of these misgivings are not entirely without foundation. For this very reason, a suitable balance would be necessary. But I should add immediately that this balance is a rather delicate one. The basic principle is that the megye council's organs develop their working relations with the villages in a differentiated manner. At the same time, in view of the different specific conditions in the individual megyes, it would be irresponsible to provide uniformly applicable guidance on where and to what extent the cooperating communities should be included in exercising supervision. Such loose regulation, of course, harbors a certain amount of danger. For example, the specialized administrative apparatus of a megye council could exert pressure on megye officials by arguing that the towns and the large communities with town status have been given larger payroll budgets and more staff, but the megyes must operate with the same staff as before, therefore there is no other solution than to transfer to the towns a large share of the megyes' tasks. The situation is made more difficult by the fact that we have not had time as yet to thoroughly brief the deputy chairmen of the megye councils and the heads of the megye specialized administrative organs. In any event, the megye councils' specialized administrative organs will unavoidably have to review their present methods of supervision and control, and adapt them to the new situation. Thus there are no central regulations and guidelines; it will be necessary to work out everywhere independently what must be done, where and how. One thing, however, is already certain: the towns and the large communities with town status must be included in megye supervision in a different way and to a different extent in those megyes where there are fewer settlements but of larger size, as compared with the megyes with many small settlements. And there are considerable variations even between these two extremes.

[20 Jan 84 p 4]

[Text] Not the Same Stereotype

To what extent should the megye councils include the towns, and the large communities with town status, in the supervision of the villages, and what should be the form and content of cooperation? In the Tuesday issue of our paper, in the first part of our interview with Dr Pal Furcht, department head within the Council Affairs Bureau, we concluded that in supervision it would be necessary to take into consideration in every case the specific conditions of the megyes and towns.

[Question] What would happen if in the central guidelines the definition of the tasks were uniform and mandatory?

[Answer] Such a stereotype solution would not be a fortunate one by any means. The megyes were given full discretion because they know best the local conditions, including the network of settlements, the availability of experts at the local councils, and the situation of the villages. It will perhaps be of interest to cite two extreme examples. Differences in determining the extent and methods of cooperation in megye supervision are warranted also by the fact that

there are many villages in some megyes but few in others. Borsod Megye, for example, has 150 villages, while Szolnok Megye has only 40. Different solutions are warranted also because the zones of attraction of the individual towns or communities with town status differ. Different methods have to be employed where the number of villages in whose megye supervision a town must cooperate is only one or two, and again different when their number is 15 to 20. Of course, it would neither do for a megye to shoulder every responsibility, nor to delegate by ordinance too many responsibilities to its cooperating partners. Thus a sensible division of labor must be the yardstick everywhere.

Who Will Have Authority

[Question] In the new situation, who will have authority to order the executive committees of the village councils to render an account of their work?

[Answer] Such authority will always be vested in the megye; ordering the executive committees of the village councils to render an account of their activity is a task that cannot be delegated to the cooperating partners under any circumstances. So far as the essence of practical realization is concerned, several solutions are possible. For example, the megye council may consider as separate items on its agenda the reports of the individual large communities, or of the smaller settlements that are of outstanding importance as recreational or tourist centers. Or the megye council may decide to consider, together with the reports of the executive committees of the towns and large communities with town status, also the activity of the corporate organs of the settlements in their districts.

[Question] Let us talk about control, the role of which is to increase significantly in the future. What kind of division of labor appears expedient in control?

[Answer] The megye councils will have to conduct the comprehensive control audits in towns, large communities with town status, and naturally also in the large communities under direct megye supervision. And preferably the megye councils should do so in the other settlements. In exceptional cases a town or a large community with town status also may help out in this, in accordance with the programs and principles specified by the megye. A new element of the control audits is that whenever the activity of a town comes under scrutiny, it is always necessary to rate also the quality of the cooperation that the town has undertaken in megye supervision. Even when a megye does not include the towns in the control audits in the villages, it is still warranted for the megye to ask the towns' specialized administrative organs how they rate the administrative practices of the villages.

Villages Not the Towns' Subordinates

[Question] Then also the methods of the control audits can be expected to differ?

[Answer] Certainly, but the essential thing is that thorough preparation and conformity to the plan will gain in importance. We have reminded the megye councils to prepare their supervision plan already now, at the beginning of

the year, and to send it to the towns, specifying when the executive committees of the individual local councils will be audited. The plan should also state where and to what extent the specialists of the towns and communities with town status will be required to assist. However, two important requirements must be taken into consideration already now. First, only the megye should audit personnel work in the villages and rate the personnel. Secondly, the comprehensive evaluation following the control audit must be drafted by an official of the megye council, and not by the town officials (or officials of a community with town status) who conducted the audit or participated in it. This applies even when the audit is conducted predominantly by town officials. This restriction only seems perfunctory; actually it reinforces the basic principle that the villages are not the towns' subordinates. And the evaluation must be presented where the audit was held, at the session of the village council, which a megye official also should attend.

[Question] We have referred repeatedly to the fact that the megye councils have been given a free hand to develop the forms and methods of cooperation. Sooner or later, however, the documents defining the system of cooperation between councils at the various levels will have to be presented in their final form. How is this work proceeding?

[Answer] The executive committees of the megye councils will be adopting decisions on this within the next few weeks. Which does not mean that they will lay down and "inscribe in stone" final and unalterable regulations on their first try. As in every area of change, here too we need patience and especially flexibility, a continuing comparison of the ideas with reality. Under no circumstances should we insist tooth and nail on something that is less workable or perhaps stems from error. In other words, opportunity must be provided for corrections and reassessment. Incidentally, we already know of several noteworthy initiatives. Szolnok Megye, for example, is experimenting with establishing a liaison network under which every village council will have assigned to it a member of the megye staff who will strive to maintain comprehensive liaison between the megye council and the village council. There is no question of his having to solve every tricky question himself, but the network does appear to be a good way of maintaining intensive liaison, communicating back and forth, sending reminders in due time, etc. Of course, adoption of this method by every megye cannot come into consideration because conditions vary considerably by megyes.

Representing the Villages' Interests

[Question] Everything considered, can we hope to have smoothly and efficiently operating megye supervision fairly soon?

[Answer] The important thing is to strive for flexible regulation that adapts to practice. I am confident that the members of the megye councils will soon become more active, because considerable tasks await them in the consistent and principled representation of the villages' interests. Which also means that we can expect the sessions of the megye councils to become literally more militant and passionate. For now--with the abolition of the jaras offices, among other things--village interests can be brought before the megye councils more directly.

FULL EMPLOYMENT, EFFICIENT MANPOWER UTILIZATION POLICIES DISCUSSED

Budapest KOZGAZDASAGI SZEMLE in Hungarian No 11, Nov 83 pp 1312-1318

[Article by Ferenc Boszormenyi and Laszlo Toth: "Full and Efficient Employment?"]

[Text] The fact that the debate on the interpretation of employment, and on possible unemployment and its evaluation, has lately become more lively indicates that the questions of employment are again in the center of the expert's, and the general public's, attention. Noteworthy books and articles--for example [1], [3], [4], [5], [7] and [8]--discuss the presumed or real contradictions of full and efficient employment and reach different--and occasionally diametrically opposite--standpoints regarding the assessment of the situation as well as the proposed solutions.

In our article, after briefly reviewing the social and economic contradictions of employment, we wish to outline a direction of the employment system's further development, one that we regard as expedient and as a possible sensible compromise between keeping unchanged the content of the present ratios of employment on the one hand, and the extreme alternative of large-scale overt unemployment on the other. In our opinion, the outlined direction of development could serve as the basis for formulating the concept of employment policy for the coming period.

Employment Policy's Sphere of Competence and Strategic Objectives

There was as yet no comprehensive concept of employment policy when Hungary switched to a planned economy, but its objectives were already formulated unambiguously. Thus the main strategic objective of employment policy was to provide employment that ensured a secure livelihood, social equality, economic growth and efficiency.

In the late 1940's and early 1950's, at the given level of the productive forces and amidst the undeveloped system of institutions providing social security, secure livelihood could be based only on full employment; the state leadership was able to offer the members of society only employment, but that it offered everyone. In practice it followed almost automatically that the basis of livelihood could only be work, the participation of the population of work age in activities organized and controlled by the state.

When we establish that society's scale of values centered on work, we must also see that the definition of work which gained general acceptance was a narrow one: the official standpoint recognized as work only activity conducted within a framework organized by society. And even within this framework, physical labor performed at large enterprises of the state sector ranked first and was valued accordingly, while physical labor in agriculture, intellectual self-employment or entrepreneurial activity, for example, ranked at the bottom of the scale. Household work (including the raising of children and the care of the elderly) and an entire series of useful activities that fell outside or on the periphery of the division of labor organized by society were rated especially low. This politically inspired rating of work had very tangible consequences, primarily in remuneration.

Due to the decisive role of the employment-linked distribution of material wealth, an ever-larger proportion of the manpower resources was assigned to work organized by society; the size and proportion of the economically active population rose constantly, independently of all other circumstances and considerations.

All this naturally led to the view that employment could be regarded as full only at maximum utilization of the available manpower resources, and that accordingly only participation in work organized by society entitled one to social benefits. At the same time, social considerations also asserted themselves strongly in the distribution of earned income, in remuneration: the functions of wage policy and of social policy overlapped.

The conditional guaranty of a secure livelihood, contingent on participation in work organized by society, essentially expressed realistically the requirements that stemmed from the social and economic conditions that existed in the first period of building socialism. This basic principle is still valid even today. (Health care, to which every citizen is entitled, is one of the exceptions to this principle.) However, the official view on work has changed significantly. Furthermore, the sectoral differentiation has been relaxed, slowly at first and then at a faster rate. And finally, the views and value judgments associated with the type of work and the size of the enterprises have undergone striking modifications.

In addition to secure livelihood, also the assertion of equality and society's openness has been linked from the very beginning predominantly to work organized by society.

To keep income inequalities within suitable limits, wage differentials were narrow. This necessarily led to a "depressed" wage level, to the large-scale employment of women, and to the emergence of the two-wage-earner family model.

The efforts to make eight years of primary education mandatory, to encourage further study, to expand vocational training, and in general to develop education likewise played an important role in liquidating the inherited social inequalities. Due primarily to the fact that employment policy--explicitly or implicitly--regarded as a criterion of full employment also employment in a breakdown by educational level and formal vocational training. As the shortage of skilled labor declined, however, it became increasingly difficult to achieve full employment in this sense.

In retrospect it can be established that the efforts to narrow inequalities liberated significant social energies: they promoted even by themselves the development of society's dynamism, especially in the initial period when equality was a mobilizing objective for the overwhelming majority of society. In principle the opportunity for social advancement was open to everyone, predominantly through employment, through work organized by society.

In the final outcome the objectives and values that were to be achieved through employment accurately reflected the requirements stemming from the level of social and economic development at that time. Although they contained simplifications (e.g., equalization and unification were confused with equality), these were not evident for some time. But later, when the strong and occasionally stormy macrostructural changes had ended and the rate of the quantitative changes had slowed down, and under the influence of the altered requirements stemming from the higher level of development that had been attained in the meantime, the contradictions arising from these simplifications became increasingly evident in employment.

Under our present conditions, the view that equates equality with equalization acts increasingly as a retarding factor: in the short term it holds back performance, in the long term it undermines the motivation to work, and in the final outcome it manifests itself in the worsening utilization of the working capacity available to society.

The efforts to upgrade physical labor, in the spirit of "equalizing" blue-collar and white-collar work, led to similar consequences. They willy-nilly triggered a devaluation of qualified white-collar performances and of entrepreneurial ability. This devaluation, of course, must not be regarded simply as a side effect of the aforementioned efforts, but also a consequence of the fact that the economic organizations are able to use less white-collar labor than what is available, whereas they need unskilled labor.

The very rapid rise of the employment of women likewise was not free of certain harmful side effects. Although this process itself was proceeding in the right direction from the viewpoint of the equality of women, it was not accompanied by the introduction of work schedules that took the peculiarities of employing women into consideration, by a suitable expansion of the network of services, the necessary adjustments in the division of labor within the family, etc. At the same time the care of children, the activities that are necessary to keep the family together, and humane activities in general, lost their previous standing. (This circle of phenomena is investigated comprehensively in [6], among others.) Therefore the very high employment level of women contributed, albeit in an extremely indirect manner, toward a decline of the willingness to have children, an increase in the number of divorces, a loosening of ties between parents and children, and the loneliness of the elderly.

The ratios of employment that evolved bear also the consequences of the fact that manpower was perceived as a source of economic growth. Additional manpower seemed a factor that always accelerated growth. It is a peculiar paradox that although the improvement of the efficiency of employment has always been (and still is) one of our most important economic-policy objectives, the substantial increase of the labor force in production during the past decades accelerated our economic growth only partially [2].

While the quantitative manpower reserves that thus accumulated during the past decades could become a serious burden for the economy in the coming period, the uncovering of the reserves in the quality of manpower must be assigned an important and growing role in the economy's development.

It is of course obvious that in the long run the utilization of the possibilities inherent in the quality of manpower will require also substantial outlays and investments. At the same time it is likewise obvious that even in itself (i.e., without substantial additional outlays) the removal of the social and economic mechanisms that bar the assertion of the performance principle would liberate forces that accelerate economic growth, but this cannot be imagined without transforming the employment ratios outlined above.

Necessary Direction of the Employment Ratios' Transformation

In principle three types of concepts can be or have been advanced to adjust the employment ratios to the changed conditions. One type of concept regards as possible or necessary only minor modifications in the present system of employment, for the purpose of improving efficiency. According to this type of concept, the demand for manpower would continue to exceed the supply, which automatically would amply ensure full employment, but constant external pressure by the state to improve efficiency would be indispensable. This is the very reason why concepts of this type seem unsuitable for the solution of the tasks awaiting us. A series of examples from recent decades proves that attempts to alleviate the manpower shortage by "ranking" the demand (classifying the enterprises, introducing mandatory labor placement), or to raise productivity and uncover internal reserves by means of central organizational programs and similar external incentives, are not very promising.

Another type of concept advocates the exact opposite: acceptance of open unemployment, parallel with increased social security. Regardless of how the debate among experts will end on whether or not unemployment motivates workers to greater and better performances, in our opinion large-scale open unemployment is not acceptable under our social and political conditions.

This leaves the third concept as the only one that appears acceptable. Essentially it calls for ending the overall and chronic excess of demand over supply in the labor market, with the state guaranteeing full employment. This situation would actually be a mirror image of the present system of employment.

At a consistently slow rate of economic growth, of course, it is hardly possible to imagine a solution that is simultaneously and equally perfect from the viewpoint of both efficient and full employment. But we may regard as certain that the necessary shift in emphasis between the two objectives, in favor of efficient employment, will occur only when guaranteed full employment becomes an actual state task and not merely a declared one.

Proposed Employment System's Functioning, Prerequisites

To develop the proposed system of employment, three interrelated prerequisites must be met simultaneously:

1. An end to the chronic excess demand for manpower over its supply.
2. A new type of division of responsibilities and tasks in employment, between the state and the economic units.
3. An end to the overheated manpower supply.

Re 1. The manpower shortage, the excess demand over supply, cannot be made to cease solely by administrative methods limited to the labor market, but only within the framework of streamlining the entire economic mechanism. In the following, therefore, we will regard this prerequisite as an external condition for changing over to the new system of employment, as a task that lies outside employment policy's competence and sphere of influence.

Re 2. Although we have been declaring for some time that full employment is the state's task, while the economic units must ensure the efficiency of employment, actually this division of tasks could not be achieved so far. In practice the exact opposite applies: the enterprises' "soft budgetary limit" has made it unnecessary to set up a system of state institutions for maintaining full employment, and the promotion of higher efficiency has become a state task.

Fulfillment of the first prerequisite not only makes possible but even necessitates setting up a system of state institutions to ensure full employment. For under such conditions the influencing of manpower supply is indispensable, but in itself not sufficient, to achieve and maintain the labor market's relative equilibrium. Under a flexible supply policy--ending the overheated manpower supply--the influencing of manpower demand (including the creation of jobs) and the improvement of mobility, in terms of willingness and ability, assume decisive importance in easing the difficulties of finding employment.

State influencing of how the demand for manpower develops could be based on financial, credit, tax or regional-development instruments, depending on whether the difficulties in finding employment are of an occupational, sectoral or regional nature. For example: jobs could be created with budgetary resources in the service industries; ancillary activities of the agricultural cooperatives could be encouraged by means of regulatory and financial incentives; the instruments of investment policy could be used to promote the expansion of labor-intensive activities; the number of small businesses could be increased by means of credit and tax measures.

We emphatically underscore the importance of having the state influence the demand for manpower also because professional public opinion tends to underestimate this importance, arguing that dismissed workers would find employment anyhow in the infrastructure or at efficiently operating enterprises. Even if we disregard the budgetary limits on creating infrastructural jobs, the structural incompatibility of these branches makes them unable to employ large numbers of workers who have suddenly been dismissed elsewhere. And so far as the efficiently operating economic units are concerned, their first response under a rigid budgetary limit might be to lay off their redundant workers, or their demand for manpower might vary in accordance with their growth prospects and the business cycle.

From the preceding it follows that, if the outlined prerequisites are met, the state promotion of job creation will play an outstanding role in maintaining full employment, and so will a system of retraining and further training that will help those unable to find jobs in a given geographic area to change their occupation or to resettle elsewhere. Naturally, these two activities will have to be in harmony.

Re 3. As a first step along the road toward cooling the overheated supply of manpower, a definition broader than at present should generally be adopted for work as the basic value of society.

As a part of work organized by society we should recognize gainful employment outside the state and cooperative sectors, alone or in groups and mostly of an entrepreneurial nature (considerable progress has been made in this respect in recent years); and also the family and household activities that provide the indispensable background of "income-producing work." What we must achieve first of all is that society suitably reward, both financially and morally, the home care of children, the sick, the disabled and the elderly; and that, linked to home care, there develop a nursing network which would make it possible to fit humane activities into the system of work organized by society.

In addition, the conditions of distribution must be perfected to broaden the scope of social entitlements that are indispensable to a secure livelihood. Although this principle obviously can be realized only in the long run, it is important that also our everyday actions point in this direction (for example, aid for nursing children, and family allowances should be declared civic rights).

Furthermore, a successful policy on manpower supply presupposes that individuals are free to market their labor power; and that employers are free to decide, on the basis of business considerations, whom they will employ and how. Free bargaining between employees and employers would presumably help to balance manpower supply and demand. More flexible forms of employment, more varied work schedules, etc. could develop that presumably would help to resolve the tight contradiction between work organized by society, and other activities--mostly of a humane nature--that likewise are socially useful.

If work is equated with socially useful activity and security of livelihood is reinforced, full employment will mean that every person seeking a job will find one, but it will not necessarily be in accord with his education and training; the employee will have to undertake to participate in retraining when necessary.

Expected Results

We must emphasize once again that perfection of the system of employment can be imagined only as a part of the efforts to streamline the economic mechanism; both the improvement of employment efficiency and the attainment of relative equilibrium in the labor market extend far beyond employment policy's competence and sphere of influence.

But if the prerequisites discussed above are met, will the outlined transformation of the system of employment provide sufficient guaranty that unemployment can be avoided? The significant unemployment in the developed capitalist countries during years of recession is a warning that the state, besides using the discussed instruments, must reserve for itself the right to resort also to imposing on a specified circle of enterprises the responsibility to provide employment. In this case the criterion of economic efficiency would have to be made subordinate to the objective of full employment also in the proposed model of employment.

Thus not even a clear division of the employment-related tasks between the state and the enterprises would free the latter from assuming any kind of social burden. Under state ownership of the means of production, it is impossible to imagine a division of social and economic life that assigns economic rationality to the microeconomic sphere and makes the assertion of broader social values the responsibility of the state. (This question is investigated comprehensively in [9].) Today such an extreme division of functions is not typical even in the developed capitalist countries.

But then is it at all worth while to rearrange the ratios of employment and to accept the new type of tensions that this will create? In our opinion, it is: the net balance of the proposed employment system's social and economic costs and yields would be positive. For under the present system of full employment the economically unwarranted surplus manpower is present as if in a "concealed" manner, and the loss of efficiency is spread over the entire economy. It is obviously better if overemployment and the resulting loss of efficiency are localized, and hence can be managed purposefully and reduced to an unavoidable minimum.

Intentionally accepted localized overemployment would also enable us to increasingly assert the requirement of efficiency, without jeopardizing full employment, in those areas of the economy that are of key importance from the viewpoint of our participation in the international division of labor.

From the preceding it follows that the predictions of unavoidable unemployment in case of the economic mechanism's consistent modernization are unfounded. But no less one-sided is the view that the maintenance of full employment precludes in principle any improvement of the efficiency of employment. Amidst relatively slow economic growth, our social conditions appear to make possible and desirable the realization of the objective of full and more efficient employment.

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1014

CSO: 2500/203

DETERIORATION OF YOUTH BEHAVIOR, NORMS DEPLORED

Budapest NEPSZAVA in Hungarian 27 Nov 83 p 3

/Article by Antal Szalay: "Profiles"/

/Text/ Scenes repeated almost daily: at the tram station a couple of teenagers turn over the garbage can; in the subway groups of boys and girls are molesting unaccompanied women late at night; on the metro escalator a group of half-drunk, running youths push aside the old people; on the playground children hardly in their teens break the freshly planted trees and ruin the swings. Meanwhile, those witnessing these scenes are developing increasingly radical opinions in proportion to the peace disturbance, vandalism and lawlessness. They mention flogging and prison. And much is revealed about the situation developing in public places by the fact that, here and there, low-tone references are also made to terrible, tragic and genocidal historical events citing them as possible ways to stem the acts disturbing the peace of the majority.

The warning sign in these scenes is precisely this: those seeking a more solid order, in their impotent anger, will soon no longer weigh things. The destructive words they shout at those disturbing the peace are just like the destructive behavior of those against the public order. And the extremist passions are just as ready to pounce on the regular customers of disreputable saloons as on workshirkers flagrantly offering contraband goods, on occasional beggars and on vagrants looting cars.

It is as if an invisible, broad front would be forming at our public places. On one side the minority of disturbers of the peace and ruffians, and on the other side the other--hopefully--minority of those voicing extremist judgment and demanding imprisonment, flogging and breaking on the wheel.

But no matter how invisible this front blending age, sex, crime and intention is, its existence attests to the frequent absence of other, smaller fronts. It attests to the fact that the order and discipline according to the interests of the majority--to put it mildly--leaves something to be desired in a large part of smaller communities. In families and at workplaces, in the gatherings of friends and in schools, and among the neighbors of streets with housing units or family homes alike. That often the parent fails to discipline his child; that the neighbor fails to stop the adolescent breaking trees; that the supervisor at work is powerless against absentees and the ones frequenting saloons; that in

class, the bad, undisciplined student is the one who has authority among his classmates; that it is just a good joke to many to get advantages at the expense of others; that it is the sign of cleverness to become rich not only by unethical but even by illegal means.

At least two things follow from this. One, that at that broader, invisible front there is great need--instead of extremist emotions--for a consistent calling to account and strict judgment based on the law, as it is the intent of the modified minor offense code, or as recently stated by the plenary session of the Supreme Court. There is need for it now because it gets replaced by loudly voiced or merely quietly formulated opinions--which are in any case detrimental to our public opinion--suggesting some freakish action. The damage caused by these is hardly less than the damage caused by vandals.

On the other hand, from the often repeated scenes at public places it also follows--perhaps first of all--that the control of public order disturbances and ruffians cannot be truly successful without reinforcing the smaller fronts and without making unequivocal the value systems in tune with the social goals. Even if this is a less spectacular task and requires a longer time.

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CSO: 2500/189

HUNGARY

DRUG ABUSE AMONG YOUTH ADMITTED WITH CARTOON IN PPF DAILY

Budapest MAGYAR NEMZET in Hungarian 19 Feb 84 p 8

[Text]



— Pirike már nagylány, narkós!

(Vaevári Anna rajza)

Pirike is a big girl already, she's a narco!

CSO: 2500/230

CULTURAL INSTITUTIONS GRANTED MORE FINANCIAL INDEPENDENCE

Budapest MAGYAR NEMZET in Hungarian 20 Nov 83 p 3

/Text/ In recent years, there has been much criticism of the management system of our public educational institutions which has helped less and less the attainment of cultural policy goals. In the recent past, the appearance of several new legal measures served the modernization of public education. According to information from Sandor Kormos, head of the Main Department of Public Education in the Ministry of Education, additional new regulations can be expected in the near future.

It is undoubtedly true that, while in the economy the incentive system and the regulatory system have been continuously changing and improving in recent years, in public education, in 1983 we were still trying to do our job within the framework of economic regulations instituted in the 1960's. The continuous functioning of public educational institutions was increasingly hampered by the outdated legal regulations. To be precise, if an institution or organization tried to provide a socially useful service on the basis of population demand--which, in addition was also useful to cultural policy as a whole--it would have been futile for it to achieve excess income because this could not be redirected to aid less remunerative areas.

A directive issued jointly with the Ministry of Finance, when properly used, already provides the possibility of eliminating such situations. In the future, the head of the institution will manage certain groups of money within the budget under his own discretion and the budget can be restructured. If there is surplus income from work outside of the institution's basic function, this will also provide material advantages to the workers because it will increase the base for bonuses. Thus the paradoxical situation which held back the cultural activity of the institution and of those frequenting it, of course, can be eliminated.

2473

CSO: 2500/189

WORLD AFFAIRS OPINION POLL RESULTS DISCUSSED

Warsaw POLITYKA in Polish No 2, 14 Jan 84 p 3

[Article by Tomasz Goban-Klas: "The Hopes and Fears of the Poles"]

[Text] As always, at the end of every year public opinion research institutes conduct a poll of social attitudes, and in particular the degree of optimism and pessimism, fears and hopes as to the immediate and distant future.

Last year, of course, was no exception. Among the many studies of this type a poll financed by several of the largest world dailies (including the FINANCIAL TIMES, ASAHI SHIMBUN, INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE), conducted in six West European countries, Japan and the United States, was outstanding due to its international scope. There is no need to give the results of this poll because they were reprinted in the weekly FORUM (No 50, dated 15 December 1983). Nevertheless, it is well to point out that the greatest worry in all Western societies was unemployment, followed by the arms race, the threat of a world war, inflation, and the growth in crime. But although unemployment was given somewhat less often than a year ago in most of the countries surveyed, nuclear arms and the threat of a nuclear war as a cause of worry were not only high on the list of potential dangers but were listed much more frequently than before. Thus, unemployment and war appear to be the two main dangers to the West at the present time.

The Great Unknown

Polish public opinion researchers also are interested in the changes in social attitudes. The Public Opinion Research Center at Polish Radio and Television conducts studies each year on the level of optimism-pessimism, opinion on the chances of an outbreak of war, etc.

Also the Journalism Research Center in Krakow conducts, although not so regularly, periodic studies on the evolution of the viewpoints of society on important national problems, confidence in public institutions, susceptibility and resistance to propaganda of various types and from various sources. At the end of the year it conducted a poll of social attitudes; however it expanded the subject matter by more threats than often appear in similar studies, for the state of awareness of today's Poles remains a great unknown. All kinds of hypotheses can be advanced on this subject. For example, can we expect that pessimism will

dominate, particularly in the younger generation, or on the contrary, can we expect that viewpoints of the "what's to be will be" type, or even of moderate optimism, will prevail. In our assessment of the opinions of other people we remain under the influence of the so-called "mirror effect", i.e., we ascribe to others our own opinions and attitudes. At the same time, the phenomenon of the so-called "pluralistic ignorance" appears widely, i.e., a false perception of opinions which really dominate.

Preliminary Research

Because we wanted to know which of the actual dangers to today's world and to our countries appear to be particularly threatening to Poles, we gave each person interviewed a list of these hypothetical dangers (and also, let us add, in another question we asked about their hopes), asking them to make a dual assessment: to show, in relation to each of them, what the degree of danger is (on a scale of large, medium or small) and to name the three greatest dangers.

Of course, we must admit at the outset that first, this type of research procedure to a certain degree creates public opinion, since not all of those asked think in the terms suggested to them (naturally, it was possible in the questionnaire to reply "I don't know", "it is hard to say", or "I have no opinion", and there was also an additional question asking for other real threats or hopes). However, in mass research where the comparability of particular questionnaire interviews is also important, this is an unavoidable distortion. Second, mass polls always leave more questions than they give exhaustive answers.

Nevertheless, one must always begin somewhere. Mass polls, despite their imperfections, are a good point of reference for deeper research as well as for an analysis of the directions of change. There will be time for an analysis of trends in changes of opinions and attitudes in a year. This is, by the way, an expression of the author's moderately optimistic attitude.

The first conclusion that can be drawn from the poll is that in the awareness of Poles, unfavorable reports arousing anxiety--reports flowing from various sources but mainly from the mass media--dominate over reports that are favorable and that imbue with hope. Although probably in the daily flow of information there is no lack of either the former or the latter, in more equal proportions, a fact remains a fact. When the question was asked (given here in an abbreviated form): "Did you learn anything recently which caused you to be anxious about the fate of the country?" only every fourth person did not answer, or answered in the negative. However, when a similar question was asked concerning information which would give hope, as many of three-fourths of those questioned (that is, three times as many) actually replied negatively. We see the dangers and we overlook the hopes.

What Do We Fear?

What dangers are believed to be the most serious? The list given those polled contained 12 different types, the same for Poland as for the world. The point was to be able to compare the answers: what one considers to be dangerous for one's own country, and what is dangerous for others.




Figure 1. Threats to the World and to Poland

The readers of POLITYKA, more than Poles in general, fear the following for our country: environmental pollution, anarchy and chaos, and poverty; and less than others: world war, drug addiction, and breakdown of customs. To some degree these differences can be explained by the different demographic composition (more city-dwellers, better educated), but there are also certain singular characteristics (fear of anarchy and less concern about customs and morality).

The overall results of the 24 questions on the particular dangers (separately for the world, and separately for Poland) are shown in Fig. 1. The length of the bars represents the percentage of persons assessing the degree of danger as great or small, while the distance between the particular pairs of bars shows the percentage of persons assessing the dangers at the average level (together with those who had no opinion).

An analysis of all the questions and answers shows that the degree of dangers deemed to be most serious differs somewhat--but most characteristically--in the case of Poland and the world. Our country seems to be more threatened by alcoholism, while the world perceives a general war as the most threatening. But the differences here are small.

The threat of the destruction of the national environment was in second place insofar as the world is concerned, and third in relation to Poland. These three dangers: world war, alcoholism, and destruction of the natural environment, appear to constitute the first category of dangers, those that are most serious. The second group is made up of civil war, breakdown of customs and decline in morality, drug addiction, anarchy and internal chaos, and poverty. The third--least threatening in the opinion of those polled, and completely minimal in relation to Poland--consists of hunger, epidemic of diseases, terrorism, and unemployment. Although there is no place here for a comparison with the Western poll, it cannot help but be noted that in the West unemployment causes great anxiety, while in Poland it is alcoholism (although probably if a question on drug addiction had been included in the Western survey, that would have been perceived as a far greater danger than alcoholism). It is interesting that although much has been written in the press about the increase in drug addiction, still in the opinion of the Poles this does not constitute a particular danger to our society.

The Discreet Influence of Television

The rather universal feeling of the threat of war, similar in degree to the Western societies, cannot, of course, be surprising. More surprising is the rate of change. In its last studies, the Public Opinion Research Center (OBOP) obtained a feeling that war is a threat very similar in degree to that given now, i.e., almost two-thirds. In its earlier studies in December 1982, OBOP determined this amount to be one-fourth. Therefore, a rapid growth in anxiety took place in several months. And this is not difficult to explain. In recent months, the mass media, and especially television, has reported extensively on the nuclear rearmament of NATO countries, and the disturbance to the balance of forces in Europe that this has caused. But then, according to general opinion, and according to survey data, the credibility of our means of communication, and particularly the television news, is still not at all impressive. The Poles could not have learned about rearmament from anywhere but the press. Why, then, do they fear rearmament when they themselves willingly admit that they do not fully believe their media? The answer, despite everything, is very simple: the feeling of a threat of war is higher not only in the persons who have full confidence in television, but also in those who look at the news more frequently, and this means most of the nation. In other words, television (and to a lesser degree the other media) has quite an influence on what people are thinking about, and less on what they are thinking. It is the same elsewhere.

The survey showed a rather large uniformity of viewpoints in different categories of persons questioned, i.e., the opinions of young people did not contrast with the opinions of retirees, rural dwellers-Warsavians, nonparty people-party members (particularly rank-and-file). But similarity does not mean sameness. Certain significant differences in estimation can be perceived.

Thus, rural dwellers see the danger of world war as greater than do the residents of the large cities, but people from the small towns are even more disturbed by it. Retirees fear war slightly more than do the young people; men more than women; and the less educated more than the higher educated. It is the same on the opinions regarding the danger of alcoholism, although here the women tend to be more severe in their judgment. However, an almost reverse tendency appears in the estimate of the threat of the destruction of the natural environment and drug addiction. In these cases the city dwellers, young people, and better educated, show a greater anxiety. The middle-aged people fear anarchy and chaos, and poverty, more than do the other people. The young people somewhat more frequently point to the danger of civil war. But there are no differences--which is characteristic--in the assessments of the threat of terrorism and unemployment, since they are almost imperceptible in all social groups.

It is significant also that the inhabitants of the western regions of our country assess the danger of war somewhat higher, and the eastern-region dwellers give alcoholism a higher figure. The more highly industrialized regions show a greater anxiety about the destruction of the natural environment, which is understandable, while the more agricultural regions, and particularly the people in the villages, see alcoholism, the breakdown of customs, and crime, as greater threats.

We lack space here to compare the Western survey with ours, but one observation is simply obvious. In both cases, top place was given to those dangers which individuals are familiar with in their (and that of others) daily life. For the West it is unemployment, for us--vodka. On the other hand, the dangers about which a great deal is said and written in the mass media are given second place, and probably even lower as to the intensity of the anxiety they cause.

The Forces of Hope

What do the Poles see as factors which would stand in opposition to the dangers that have been indicated? --that was the next problem in the survey. The technique for collecting answers was the same as before: we prepared a list of potential positive factors (11 for the world, 9 for Poland) and asked those polled to determine their importance.

The results in response to the questions are not surprising perhaps, but nevertheless they are instructive. Among the "forces of hope" factors, the one described as "the wisdom of governments", i.e., the recognition of the government's role in the determination of collective happiness, was in first place. As many as 82 percent of Poles listed it as being significant! How, then, can this figure be reconciled with the opinion, expressed in some places, that anarchism is innate in our nation?




Figure 2. Factors Which May Help to Conquer Dangers

The readers of POLITYKA, more than Poles in general, tend to regard the following factors for conquering the dangers to our country as being of significance: wisdom of governments, understanding and free exchange of information, science and engineering; and less than others: religion, help from rich countries, and, although only slightly less, conscientious work by all. These differences derive from the sociodemographic characteristics of the readership public, but only in part.

The answer "conscientious work by all people" was in second place, as it relates to Poland, but very close to second place was "understanding, free interchange of information", or what can be termed "public communication."

Therefore, even if we accept that Poles like to talk about good work but are less ready to work honestly, then in the area of attitudes and opinions on conquering the dangers (and in our Polish case this means overcoming the crisis) the triad: GOVERNMENT-WORK-DIALOGUE, stands out, and more precisely, WISE GOVERNMENT-CONSCIENTIOUS WORK-PUBLIC DIALOGUE.

The next group of "hope" factors is made up of: religion, science and engineering, and a social peace movement. The third group, not very significant in social awareness: help from rich countries, sacrifices by ordinary people, and, mentioned very rarely, materialistic philosophy.

To the list of hopes for the world we added two more questions: activity of international organizations (e.g., United Nations, UNESCO) and the abandonment of world-power and imperialist ambitions. It turned out that although the first question, in the awareness of Poles, is of average significance, the second one, as it relates to the world, was almost at the top of the entire list.

In comparing the factors of hope for the world and Poland, it is easy to see (if only by looking at Fig. 2) that the forces of hope are more evident in the answers relating to our country than to the world. The reverse of the dangers.

Rose-Colored or Dark Glasses?

The same holds true also in the answers to the indicator questions pertaining to optimism-pessimism as to the future (in the year 2000 time-frame) fate of the world and Poland. About half of those asked do not believe that any basically favorable or unfavorable changes will occur, but although among the remainder the number of pessimists as to the fate of the world is twice that of the optimists, as relates to Poland the number of optimists and pessimists is equal. Such an almost random distribution of answers in essence proves that Poles do not yet have clearly established attitudes, but it also proves that the belief that everything is seen through dark glasses is false.

In examining the results of these questions from various social-demographic groups, we cannot determine the existence of any groups that are outstanding in their pessimism or optimism. What is interesting is that the young people do not differ here from the older people (except that the mature generation is a wee bit more optimistic). Only people with higher than average education often said they were pessimistic about the country's future, but they also more rarely than others gave the answer "I don't know, it is hard to say." Of all of the groups analyzed, party members stood out in their optimism--the proportion of optimists was almost twice that of the entire studied body. But these were the only questions in the entire poll where differences in opinions were so clear. In the assessments of dangers and forces of hope the nonparty people and the party members did not differ very much.

The results of one poll, and particularly the fragments cited here, naturally do not make it possible to pass judgments on either the state of awareness or the mental state of today's Poles, male or female. Nevertheless, they point to the existence of a larger consensus, a universal agreement, than the disputes taking place in the privacy of the home or in small groups would indicate. True, this consensus pertains more to the values and resources that are defined in the most general terms, in the abstract, and therefore it can dwindle or even disappear when concrete problems are examined, where immediately differences in group interests become apparent. Nonetheless, this concurrence of at least some attitudes and opinions contradicts the radical judgments that deep divisions exist and establishes a base for new forms of social order.

How Was the Poll Conducted?

The Journalism Research Center in Krakow, the scientific-research center of RSW "Press-Book-Movement", in 1973 established a national network of pollsters, based on 17 regional groups (in the old provinces).

The pollsters are volunteers. All they receive is a subscription to selected press titles. This network makes it possible to conduct polls, several times a year, on a quota-sampling basis, using from 1,000 to 10,000 people. The polls also have the advantage over newspaper questionnaires in that responses are obtained from representatives of all regions, social-demographic groups, and sociopolitical orientations.

The poll presented here was conducted in October and the first 10 days of November last year, on a representative sample of adult population in Poland, numbering, after structural corrections, 1,231 people.

9295

CSO: 2600/608

PRON ISSUES STATEMENT ON ELECTION LAW

Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish No 13, 16 Jan 84 p 3

[PRON position on assumptions to the draft plan of the election law regarding people's councils]

[Text] I. In declaring itself in favor of the socialist renewal of social life, PRON [Patriotic Movement for National Rebirth] strives to strengthen the Polish nation, to improve the system of socialist democracy, to strengthen the role of democratic representative institutions, to unleash constant social activeness and to increase the subjective position of citizens, their initiative and responsibility for state-related matters.

The movement favors the kind of reform of people's councils which would strengthen their role and function as regional organs of state authority and territorial self-government. This postulate is being implemented. This is guaranteed by the law on the system of people's councils and territorial self-government.

The movement has postulated "carrying out a change in the election law and mechanism which would make it possible for citizens genuinely to elect their representatives from among several candidates and to participate on a broad scale in the process of nominating candidates for deputies and councilors". We regard the "Assumptions to the Draft Plan of the Election Law Pertaining to People's Councils" presented by the State Council as the first vital step toward the implementation of such a model of the electoral system.

These assumptions constitute the basis for the search for a model of the electoral system and law which, conforming to the principles of the political system of the PRL and the substance of socialist renewal, would meet social expectations halfway.

The participants of PRON are aware of the fact that along with the stabilization of the sociopolitical situation in the country, the strengthening of the socialist state and the consolidation of society around the program of socialist renewal, the electoral system and laws will be developed and perfected in accordance with the resolutions of the First PRON Congress.

II. The National PRON Council states that the "assumptions" contain a series of new solutions and proposals accepted in broad consultation involving nearly a million citizens. Among these solutions and proposals are, above all, the following:

1. the principles governing the nomination of candidates for councilors, which take into account broad consultation in social and political organizations endowed with the right to nominate candidates, and genuine consultation with voters at pre-election meetings. At these meetings, the voters should express their opinion of the candidates and they may decide whether to offer them support or refuse their acceptance. In this way, a realistic opportunity has been created for the citizens to influence the deciding element of the election process, which is the establishment of candidate lists;
2. the institution of electoral colleges, which reflects the coalition process of fulfilling authority and the role and position of PRON in the PRL political system;
3. the possibility of legally contesting the election of a councilor or the validity of the election;
4. the procedure of recalling councilors.

III. The consultation on the assumptions has created considerable interest and animation within the movement. Despite the short period of time, according to many PRON activists, the consultation made it possible to evaluate the assumptions, their assets and shortcomings, and also made it possible to determine the direction of changes which should be taken into account in the election law.

In summing up the results of the consultation, the PRON National Council stresses that part of the solutions proposed in the assumptions do not meet the aspirations of its participants. Therefore, the National Council proposes the following modification of the assumptions, which constitute an attempt at finding a median for the various trends and opinions presented during the consultation.

The PRON National Council proposes:

1. the appointment of basic level councils [colleges] pertaining to the PRON issue by appropriate echelons of signatories within a set mode determined by the national electoral college. The functions of the leading councils of all levels ought to be carried out by the representatives of the local structures of the movement;
2. that in accordance with the Constitution, the power to nominate candidates for councilors be granted to legally acting organizations which unite citizens from urban as well as rural areas;
3. that the role of PRON and its tasks in organizing the process of nominating candidates for councilors, in conducting the election campaign and in the process of recalling councilors be precisely defined;

4. that the right to nominate candidates for councilors be granted to organs of urban and rural area residents' self-government and to sociopolitical organizations which function in work establishments;

5. that the right to nominate candidates for councilors be granted to appropriate PRON structures. This would greatly expand the democratic formula of nominating candidates and increase the influence of nonparty citizens on the election process, as well as their chances for participation in people's councils;

6. that the procedure for conducting pre-election meetings be precisely specified;

7. that the future electoral law be supplemented with a rule which specifies that elections to people's councils are to take place on the basis of a PRON election declaration which will constitute the framework for the formulation of local joint election programs of the movement.

The PRON National Council treats these programs as a vital element of shaping civic attitudes and instigating social initiative and activeness. They should implement the assumptions of national documents and programs and take into account local conditions and needs as well as the realistic possibilities of satisfying them. In the coming years, local election programs, which constitute the basic activity of people's councils, will be conducive to the full exploitation of their broad powers and at the same time constitute a criterion for their social evaluation.

IV. In taking into account the series of critical remarks made during the course of the consultations, the PRON National Council is of the opinion that in comparison with the assumptions, the draft plan of the election law should greatly increase the democratization of the electoral process and meet social expectations to a greater extent. The National Council states, among other things, that in the opinion of the consultation participants the assumptions enable citizens to make use of the right of election to a very small degree. In connection with this, the National Council proposes that two candidates for one position be placed on the ballot. The form of the ballot and the way in which the candidates are placed on it should create the possibility of carrying out a true choice between them.

Taking into consideration the results of the consultation, the National Council considers the search for an election law formula which foresees election districts with a small number of mandates to be advisable and desired. On the ballot, candidates could be placed in twos (as in one-mandate districts). In the instance that the ballot is returned without a crossed-off name, the vote goes to the first candidate.

The National Council feels that the future election law should strengthen the legal and organizational guarantees of observing the full and unhampered right to secret voting. They are one of the fundamental conditions for the credibility of elections.

Future elections should strengthen the social acceptance and authority of people's councils. For this reason, besides specifying the minimum amount of participation in elections, the National Council postulates the setting of a minimum amount of valid votes which a candidate must receive in order to be elected.

V. The National Council states that the variant of indirect elections to people's councils on the provincial level was not met with broad understanding and approval during the consultation, despite support from several provincial PRON councils. The majority was in favor of direct elections.

With full appreciation for the significance of the participation of social activists on the provincial level in the work of future provincial people's councils and that of the councils themselves as specific representatives of local self-governments, many consultation participants spoke in favor of a form of elections which would ensure their required representation. The introduction of, for example, separate provincial lists of candidates alongside district lists would be in keeping with this postulate.

VI. The Patriotic Movement for National Rebirth emphasizes that besides a change in legal regulations, the reform of the election system requires a change in legal regulations, the reform of the election system requires further progress in the socialist renewal of sociopolitical life on all levels as well as the shaping of conscious civic attitudes of the vast majority of the public. An important role in this process can and should be played by elections to people's councils; they will constitute an important phase on the road to the normalization and stabilization of sociopolitical relations. The course of the election campaign and the election results will serve as testimony of patriotic responsibility for the present and the future of Poland and its international standing and credibility.

VII. Following the elections to people's councils, PRON will analyze and evaluate the functioning of the new election law in practice and will also submit recommendations and proposals to the State Council aimed at introducing changes in the law.

VIII. The PRON National Council obligates the Presidium of the Executive Committee to present to the State Council their position with regard to the aforementioned law and detailed results of consultations conducted within the framework of the movement.

The National Council of the Patriotic Movement for National Rebirth

Warsaw, 14 January 1984

9853
CSO: 2600/582

POLAND

EPISCOPATE CLARIFIES AGRICULTURAL FOUNDATION PLANNING

Katowice GOSC NIEDZIELNY in Polish No 5, 29 Jan 84 p 1

[Text] Press Bureau Report From the Polish Episcopate on the Planned Creation of an Agricultural Foundation

Over the course of recent months, a number of statements have been made regarding the creation of an agricultural foundation for the purpose of organizing aid for the private Polish farmer. The aid is to be based upon foreign funds.

The Conference of the Polish Episcopate provided basic information on this project in one of the points of a communique issued to the faithful on the occasion of the 197th Plenary Conference of the Polish Episcopate, on 17 November 1983. The item reads as follows:

"The bishops have discussed the issue of creating an agricultural foundation. Over a year ago, the Polish Episcopate took the proper steps toward ensuring the acquisition of funds to improve and modernize Polish agriculture. This was done through the mediation of the Episcopates of Western Europe and America. This initiative was received favorably. The government of Poland also reacted positively to this program. Currently, talks are being held on legal-organizational questions, to ensure that foreign aid is utilized to its best advantage, in compliance with the intentions of the donors and for the good of private Polish farmers, trade and the entire society. In conjunction with this, the bishops express the hope that the foundation will begin its operations next year. It should be explained that the foreign funds will be transferred to farmers and tradesmen on condition of payment, and the funds acquired in this way will be used by the foundation in Poland for social purposes. We extend our thanks in advance to all future donors and to people of good will that are fostering this important initiative for Poland."

Often the shortage of information, its fragmentary nature and inaccuracy in Polish transmission and in foreign commentaries lead to misunderstandings regarding the goals, the extent and the forms of the planned endeavor.

1. The major purpose of the project and the foundation created to implement it will be to extend aid to private farming, whose production is crucial for meeting the nutritional needs of the nation, in a manner that enables this agriculture to increase its productivity that has declined over the long years of the shortage of the means of production and was destroyed by the severe lack of market stability in recent years.

This aid can and should increase the efficiency of the management of private farm resources and should stimulate private and group enterprise. It is anticipated that in addition to designating the means of production directly toward farms, material assistance likewise will foster the development of trades that serve agriculture. To the extent that it is possible, this aid also will be used to strengthen the domestic production of several important means for agricultural production such as fertilizers, for example.

It is anticipated that the programs will be "self-multiplying," that is, they will be implemented in the future on the basis of monies refunded by farmers and tradesmen. (The programs will include projects for supplying rural areas with water that will take a longer time to implement).

The zlotys obtained from farmers and tradesmen for the goods supplied to them will be used to finance programs of social assistance that have the purpose of improving the living conditions of the rural population, the development of agricultural education and the like. No repayment obligation will be included here.

2. The preliminary assessments of Polish and Western experts have set the amount of desired aid at the sum of 5 billion West German marks, or about \$2 billion. This sum is based upon the extent of efforts over several successive years to obtain financial aid through donors and aid in the form of foreign deliveries of the items needed to implement specific programs.

In the spring of 1983, Polish experts presented the donor experts with a draft of the operating programs of the foundation. This draft, approved by Western experts, stipulates the stages of the implementation of aid. In the initial stage, whose goal is the indispensable verification of the operation of the foundation and the forms of aid, deliveries implemented over the course of a year will encompass goods valued at more than 20 million marks. The second stage anticipates the implementation of programs covering deliveries valued at about 2.5 billion West German marks. Work continues on the development of programs that have already been prepared and on increasing the scope of aid within the framework of the extent of needs as laid out in advance.

In many statements and commentaries, it has been suggested that the amounts projected are unrealistic and that the help offered compared with the needs of Polish agriculture is insignificant.

3. The state of preparations for creating the agricultural foundation indicates that it will open during the first half of 1984, if the law is passed regarding foundations and if a full understanding is reached between state authorities and church officials on the creation of the foundation. Talks continue in

this area. In the subsequent consultations of experts invited by the Episcopate with government representatives and experts, preliminary discussion has been held on the directions of operation of the foundation and on the drafts of several programs that have been consulted upon with donor experts.

Many procedural matters must still be worked out and agreed upon. This will require joint effort and good will on the part of both sides. The need should be emphasized for such solutions that, in addition to enabling the efficient operation of the new forms of cooperation of institutions implementing planned endeavors, would also guarantee the full reliability of this work on the part of donors and society.

Press Bureau of the Polish Episcopate, Warsaw, 14 January 1984

8536

CSO: 2600/636

CHANGES IN OPERATION OF SFRY PRESIDENCY

Belgrade SLUZHBI LIST SFRY in Serbo-Croatian No 69, 30 Dec 83 pp 1921-1924

[Text] On the basis of article 315, item 10 of the Constitution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the SFRY Presidency at the session of 7 December 1983 adopted the following:

Resolution on Changes and Supplements in the Standing Orders for the Operation of the SFRY Presidency.

Article 1

In the Standing Orders for the Operation of the SFRY Presidency (SFRY OFFICIAL GAZETTE) No 6, 1981, article 3, paragraph 1, the words "by the SFRY Constitution and these standing orders" are replaced by the words "by the SFRY Constitution, these standing orders, and other acts of the Presidency."

Article 2

In article 6, after the word "conclusions," the words "and other acts" are added.

Article 3

In article 10, paragraph 1, the words "with the participation of the representatives of republics and autonomous provinces" are deleted.

Paragraph 3 is changed and the new text is:

"Before deciding on the necessity or the need to issue a law or another regulation on temporary measures, viz on the declaration of the enforcement of the law on temporary measures, the Presidency examines the given issue and afterwards decides whether it will agree with the necessity or need for issuing a law or another regulation on temporary measures, viz whether it will proclaim the enforcement of the law on temporary measures or if the process of coordinating the positions of republics and autonomous provinces on given issues will be continued."

After paragraph 3, paragraph 4 is added, which runs like this:

"Before examining issues from paragraphs 1 to 3 of this article, the Presidency cooperates with the presidencies of republics and autonomous provinces, seeks their opinion and many decide that these issues should be examined at the sessions of the Presidency with the participation of the chairmen of the presidencies of republics and autonomous provinces."

Article 4

In article 14, after paragraph 2, two paragraphs are added which run like this:

"When the Presidency decides to convene a session of the Federal Executive Council and to put certain issues on the agenda of that session, the chairman of the Presidency will inform the president of the Federal Executive Council about it, for the sake of the realization of the decision of the Presidency.

In the case contemplated in paragraph 2 of this article, the chairmen, viz a member of the Presidency designated by the Presidency, will state at the session of the Federal Executive Council the reasons for convening this session and the Presidency's position on the issue which has been put on the agenda."

Article 5

In article 16, after paragraph 1, a new paragraph 2 is added, which runs like this:

"When the Presidency sets a proposal from paragraph 1 of this article, it will designate its representatives who will participate in the work of the competent council of the SFRY Assembly, viz its working bodies, and relay the positions of the Presidency. The Presidency can also designate commissioners who can, as the need arises, at the sessions of the competent council of the SFRY Assembly, viz its working bodies, give information and explanations of issues referring to the set proposals."

Previous paragraph 2 becomes paragraph 3.

In the previous paragraph 3, which becomes paragraph 4, the words "paragraphs 1 and 2" are replaced by words "paragraphs 1 to 3."

Article 6

In article 25, paragraph 3, before the words "of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia," the words "of the Central Committee" are added. In article 4, after the word "session," the words "from paragraph 3 of this article" are added.

Article 7

In article 26, paragraph 3 is added which runs like this:

"The invitation to the session of the Presidency, on the basis of the decision of the Presidency chairman is signed by the secretary general of the Presidency, if the Presidency chairman does not decide differently."

Article 8

After article 26, two new articles are added, which run like this:

"Article 26a:

Proposals for acts and other material that has to be examined by the Presidency are forwarded to the Presidency, as a rule, with a proposal of pertinent conclusions.

Proposals for acts and other material that has to be examined by the Presidency which are prepared by agencies of federal administration and federal organizations, are forwarded to the Presidency through the Federal Executive Council with the opinion and proposals of the Federal Executive Council.

Exceptionally, proposals for acts and other material from paragraph 2 of this article can be forwarded directly to the Presidency, if the Presidency determines it or if an urgent decision, viz position of the Presidency is sought.

Federal secretary of defense immediately forwards to the Presidency proposals for acts and other material relating to direction and command of the SFRY Armed Forces.

Article 26b

Proposals for acts and other material that must be examined by the Presidency are forwarded to the secretary general of the Presidency.

Secretary general of the Presidency can return to the proponent for further elaboration or completion the proposal for acts or other material which in his judgment has not been forwarded in the form necessary for the discussion at the session of the Presidency."

Article 9

In article 34, after paragraph 1, a new paragraph 2 is added, which runs like this:

Other officials in federal agencies, according to paragraph 1 of this article, and representatives of other federal agencies and organizations, viz communities in the federation or federal social councils can participate in the work of the Presidency by invitation and without the right of decision."

In the previous paragraph 2, which becomes paragraph 3, after the word "presidents," the words "viz representatives" are deleted, the words "25,

paragraph 3" are replaced by words "22, paragraph 1," and at the end of the paragraph, the words "and other social organizations and self-management organizations and communities" are added.

Article 10

After article 34, a new article 34a is added, which runs like this:

"Article 34a:

The secretary general of the Presidency attends the sessions of the Presidency in agreement with the decision of the Presidency. The secretary general can participate in the work of the Presidency, without the right to decision, when the agenda contains issues referring to the rights and duties of the secretary general of the Presidency as determined by these standing orders or another act of the Presidency, and to the organization and work of Presidency services.

The Presidency sessions can be attended, by invitation, by other officials and directors of the Presidency services who can give information and explanation on issues that are being examined, if the Presidency, viz the Presidency chairman demands it."

Article 11

In article 40, paragraph 2 is added which runs like this:

"Secretary general of the Presidency forwards conclusions from paragraph 1 of this article, if these standing orders do not determine otherwise or if the Presidency does not determine otherwise."

Article 12

In article 45, item 1 is changed and runs like this:

"1) on the necessity, viz need for issuing a law or other regulation about temporary measures and on the proclamation of the enforcement of the law on temporary measures;".

At the end of item 7 the following words are added: "and acts on the authority of the Presidency chairman during the state of war, immediate war danger, and other similar extraordinary circumstances when the Presidency cannot meet."

Article 13

After article 47, a new section 4 and a new article 47a are added which run like this:

"4. Meetings of the members of the Presidency.

Article 47a.

Members of the Presidency hold meetings as necessary to exchange opinions on questions of the work of the Presidency and to deliberate on the work and realization of tasks. A note is made on the meeting of the members of the Presidency, signed by the secretary general of the Presidency.

If during the meeting it is established that it is necessary to take an immediate decision on a question within the Presidency's competence, this part of the meeting is proclaimed a session of the Presidency and is conducted according to the provisions of these standing orders on the work at the session of the Presidency."

Article 14

At the end of article 48, the period is replaced by a comma and the following words are added: "and in directing and commanding the SFRY Armed Forces, it issues instructions, rules and other acts."

Two new subsections are added, which run like this:

"In the cases and under the conditions determined by the SFRY Constitution, the Presidency issues regulations which have legal power on issues concerning the SFRY Assembly. Working bodies of the Presidency can issue acts from paragraph 1 of this article, when they are explicitly authorized to do so."

Article 15

In article 50, paragraph 1 is changed and runs like this:

"The Presidency takes decisions when it decides: on the necessity, viz need to issue a law or another regulation on temporary measures; on proclaiming the enforcement of regulation on temporary measures; on amnesty; on withholding the enforcement of regulations of the Federal Executive Council which have a general political significance; on changing or completing the standing orders and on other issues envisaged by the SFRY Constitution, the federal law or these standing orders."

In paragraph 2, the words "appointment and dismissal of officials in these bodies and offices," are replaced by the words "selection of members of these working bodies and nomination, viz appointment of officials and leading workers in the services of the Presidency."

Article 16

In article 52, the first two paragraphs are changed and run like this:

"The Presidency gives guidelines for people's defense in the cases determined by the SFRY Constitution and in the performance of the jobs of directing and commanding the SFRY Armed Forces.

The Presidency draws conclusions when it examines questions of its work and the work of its working bodies, and in other cases when it does not issue other acts on matters within its competence."

Article 17

In article 58, paragraph 2, the period at the end is deleted and the following words are added: "whose composition, scope and authority are determined by the decision on establishing the commission."

Paragraph 3 is deleted.

Article 18

In article 60, paragraph 1 is changed and runs like this:

"The Commission for Organizational Issues performs tasks related to the organization and work of the Presidency, its working bodies and services, and manpower and material-financial issues pertinent to organization and work of the Presidency; it proposes candidates for membership in working and other bodies that are elected, viz nominated by the Presidency; it proposes candidates for officials and managing workers in the Presidency services who are nominated, viz appointed by the Presidency, and it also appoints certain managing workers; it issues, in agreement with regulations and social agreements, general acts on personal income and other incomes and compensations of certain material expenses of the members of the Presidency, officials and managing workers in the services of the Presidency, and it decides on personal income and other rights of work and on the basis of work, if regulations and other general acts do not determine otherwise; it establishes the proposal on estimating the means for the work of the Presidency, examines the performance of the estimate, and performs other tasks entrusted to it by the Presidency."

After paragraph 1, paragraph 2 is added which runs like this:

"The commission proposes candidates for the election of chairmen and judges of the Yugoslav Constitutional Court and members of the Council of the Federation; it issues general acts within the competence of the Presidency on personal incomes and other salaries and compensations of certain material expenses of the members of the Council of the Federation, officials, and managing workers in the services of the Council of the Federation, and it decides on personal incomes and other rights of work and on the basis of work, if regulations and other general acts do not determine otherwise."

Previous paragraph 2 becomes paragraph 3.

Article 19

Article 64 is changed and runs like this:

"The commission has a chairman and a certain number of members elected by the Presidency, and it can also have a certain number of members that are delegated by other organs, viz members ex officio.

The Presidency elects the chairman of the commission from among the members of the Presidency. The Presidency chairman is the chairman of the Commission for Issues on Directing and Commanding the SFRY Armed Forces.

The Presidency elects members of the commission from among the members of the Presidency, officials in the federation, republics and autonomous provinces, and from the circles of scientific, professional and other public workers.

The competent organ in each republic and autonomous province delegates one member to the commissions from article 58, paragraph 1 of these standing orders, except for the Commission for the Issues on Directing and Commanding the SFRY Armed Forces and the Commission for Issues of Organization.

The Presidency may decree that certain officials of federal organs or officials in the Presidency services are members of the commission ex officio."

Article 20

In the title before the article 66, after the word "occasional" the words "and other" are added.

Article 21

In article 67, after paragraph 2, a new paragraph 3 is added which runs like this:

"Occasional working body stops working when it fulfills the task for which it was founded."

Article 22

After article 67 a new article 67a is added which runs like this:

"Article 67a

When a federal law or a social contract concluded by the Presidency warrants it, the Presidency can by its own decision establish a working body entrusted with the performance of certain tasks determined by the federal law or the social contract.

The Presidency determines the composition of the working body from paragraph 1 of this article in agreement with the character of the tasks whose performance has been entrusted to this working body."

Article 23

In article 68, paragraph 1, after the word "occasional," the words "and other" are added, and the word "conclusion" is replaced by the word "act."

Paragraph 2 is deleted.

Article 24

In article 71, paragraph 1, after the words "assumes the duty," the words "the next day" are added.

Article 25

After article 77, a new article 77a, chapter VIIla "Work Programs and Plans," and 4 new articles are added. They run like this:

"Article 77a

The Provisions of these standing orders on the rights and duties of the members of the Presidency refer, if these standing orders do not determine otherwise, to the members of the Presidency during the time while they are, in agreement with the SFRY Constitution and these standing orders, elected as the chairman, or vice-chairman of the Presidency.

VIIla. Work Programs and Plans

Article 77b

As a rule, the Presidency issues an orientational yearly work program which determines the tasks and jobs for implementing the Presidency's constitutional competences.

Article 77c

Secretary general of the Presidency prepares and submits the draft of the work program. Before submitting it to the Presidency, the draft of the work program is sent to the SFRY Assembly, the Federal Executive Council, and the presidencies of republics and autonomous provinces to hear their opinion. Before the Presidency session, working bodies of the Presidency examine the draft of the work program. The work program produced by the Presidency is forwarded to the SFRY Assembly, the Federal Executive Council, the presidencies of republics and autonomous provinces, and other organs, viz organizations determined by the Presidency.

Article 77d

Working bodies of the Presidency and secretary general of the Presidency take care of the implementation of the work program. The Presidency, occasionally and as the need arises, examines the review of the implementation of the work program prepared by the secretary general of the Presidency.

Article 77e

The Presidency produces work plans for organizing and coordinating the implementation of tasks and jobs determined by the work program. The secretary general of the Presidency prepares and submits the draft of the work plan."

Article 26

In article 80, paragraph 1 is changed and runs like this:

"The Presidency has a secretary general."

Previous paragraph 2 is replaced by two new paragraphs which run like this:

"The secretary general helps the Presidency chairman in the preparation and convocation of Presidency sessions and in jobs connected with the implementation of these standing orders and other acts of the Presidency; he takes care of the preparation of material and information, and of ensuring other conditions for the work of the Presidency, members of the Presidency and working bodies of the Presidency; he takes care of the implementation of the Presidency conclusions and immediately realizes the Presidency conclusions in his own sphere of action or as determined by the Presidency; he also performs other jobs related to the work of the Presidency as determined by these standing orders or by the Presidency or the Presidency chairman.

The secretary general directs the Presidency services, organizes and coordinates the work of the services in the fulfillment of tasks and jobs, according to the needs of the Presidency and its working bodies, takes care of a uniform functioning of the services, and is responsible to the Presidency for a legal and efficient work of the Presidency services."

Previous paragraph 3 becomes paragraph 4.

Article 27

This decision becomes effective on the 8th day after the day of its publication in the SFRY OFFICIAL GAZETTE.

Belgrade, 7 December 1983.

The Presidency of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia

Chairman: Mika Spiljak

On the basis of article 4, paragraph 2 of the Law on Federal Constitutional Council (SFRY OFFICIAL GAZETTE, No 57/83), the SFRY Presidency at the session on 7 December 1983 adopted the following decision:

On the nomination of the chairman and the members of the Federal Constitutional Council

1. The following persons are nominated to the Federal Constitutional Council:

a) as chairman--Lazar Kolisevski, member of the SFRY Presidency;

b) as members:

--from the ranks of members of SFRY Presidency--Petar Stambolic and Vidoje Zarkovic;

--from the ranks of officials in the organs of sociopolitical organizations in the federation, in agreement with these organs--Franjo Herljevic, member of the Slovene LC Central Committee.

2. In agreement with article 4, paragraph 3 of the Law on Federal Constitutional Council, the following are members ex officio of the Federal Constitutional Council: the chairman of the Federal Executive Council, the federal secretary for internal affairs, the federal secretary for defense and federal secretary for foreign affairs.

3. This decision will be published in the SFRY OFFICIAL GAZETTE.

The Presidency of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia

Belgrade, 7 December 1983

Chairman: Mika Spiljak

12455

CSO: 2800/194

DISPUTES OVER 'CONSTITUTION DEFENDERS' ANALYZED

Zagreb START in Serbo-Croatian No 388, 3 Dec 83 pp 15-17

[Article by Mirjana Kasapovic: "The Background of the Great Debates"]

[Text] The division of participants in political life into constitutionalists (constitution defenders) and opponents of a constitution in the history of modern societies marked the existence of an extremely divergent attitude toward the existing constitutional order. The former staunchly defended the system, while the latter demanded radical change. There are differing economic, political, ideological, national or cultural interests of various social groups at the basis of that division. The mention of such a division in Yugoslav political life today, though it prove only to be apparent, offers vivid evidence of the state it is in.

Although it is mentioned out loud only in the newspapers, the division of participants in political life into constitutionalists and opponents of the constitution is a reflection of the public political confrontations and polarizations in the institutions of the political order and of the statements of individuals representing the opposing sides. The division into constitutionalists and opponents of a constitution from that segment of the uninstitutionalized public in which the present debates and disputes are referred to as a new aspect of the "perpetual" Yugoslav complex: the conflict between "centralists" and "federalists."

The division in the conceptions of figures on what is referred to as the public political scene has been established, at least declaratively, within the same ideological discourse, which imposes a "moderate position" on both sides.

The "constitutionalists," defending the constitutionality of the political order, acknowledge the need for reevaluation, indeed even for modification of a number of essential components of the system (for example, electoral procedure, the assembly system, especially the functions of certain chambers, relations between the bodies of the legislative and executive branches of government, the position of sociopolitical organizations in the system, and so on).

The "critics of a constitution" emphasize, on the other hand, that they do not question the fundamental principles of regulating political and social

relations either, but are demanding a change in a number of solutions embodying the system at almost all levels of political organization. According to the outlook of both sides, the Yugoslav political system would continue to be instituted and organized as: a) a political order based on the sovereignty of separate national communities and organized accordingly in separate state-political institutions; b) the self-management system grounded on the principle of work and organized in institutions representing workplace interest as forms of direct mediation of the interests of the workers. The character of the system, then, would continue to be defined by federalism and socialist self-management.

Within the boundaries of the confrontation so defined, it is difficult to speak of opposing positions of constitutionalism and anticonstitutionalism as features of political relations. It is rather a question of ideologically allowable differences and approach to particular political and social problems which do not point toward a process of radical schism in political ideology.

How is one to account, then, for this appearance of a "constitutional dispute"?

The problem becomes considerably clearer if we bear in mind the boundaries of division in political opinions and conflicts which are drawn along national-state, that is, republic-province, lines. This pattern of opposition in our country has always been attributed to a differing approach to the regulation of interethnic relations. Since two opposing models of the regulation of ethnic relations have been historically evident and tried under Yugoslav conditions, on this occasion they would once again have to be subjects for political differences of opinion.

The phrase about reviving the traditional conflict between "centralists" and "federalists" arose out of that kind of simplified derivation.

Without entering into an analysis of the validity of that kind of division, much less its interpretation, it seems extremely important to point up a number of implications and consequences for the political life of Yugoslav society of a real or only perceived existence of a division into "centralists" and "federalists."

First of all, it reestablishes the republics and provinces (that is, their government and political bodies and leadership groups) as the sole principals of political life at the level of the Yugoslav community. All the differences which they manifest in approaching particular social problems are attributed to their national-state (republic-province) positions and interests which are supposedly inherent in them: from economic to literary and cultural interests. This makes it more difficult to recognize and accept fundamental solutions to common problems; what is more, there is an "unspoken" doubt about the possibility of their being articulated at all.

Further, the emergence of the "republics" and "provinces" on the Yugoslav "political scene" as exclusive representatives of individual social communities,

as a prerequisite of the possibility of articulating the respective position at the "higher," Yugoslav, level, implies a certain unity of economic, political and cultural interests within those communities themselves. The emergence of the "republics" and "provinces" suggest the need for, and then also the appearance of, a certain political unanimity in the appraisal of their own respective problems and of common problems, establishment of a kind of monolithic political stand by the members of a nationality and the citizens of a republic or province vis-a-vis the others. This certainly does not preclude the possibility of reconciling views and reaching agreement with some, most or all principals concerning particular solutions, but on the equal principle and at the same level.

Since it is assumed that the interests of the working class as the ruling social and political force of the nationalities have been institutionalized within each political entity, the differences among the republics and provinces necessarily emerge as a split of the working class or, more accurately, of its state-political bodies, of the "worker governments," in the approach to and solutions of a number of social and political problems. When they speak out on behalf of the interests of the workers, they express differing and indeed even directly opposite assessments of the issues concerning the class and social status of the workers: from giro accounts of basic organizations of associated labor to the constitutional position of the republics and provinces!

This truly paradoxical situation can be clarified only if the debates concerning a number of problems in dispute--from economic to cultural--are conceived as a singular type of mediated political speech. Debate of one problem is so instrumentalized that an opinion is expressed about something else. On that basis, for example, positions concerning the giro accounts of basic organizations are read as attitudes concerning the country's present federal system!

Which is not at all to say that there are no questions in dispute, nor that all statements concerning them are disguised forms of "craftier" political ambitions, but simply that establishment of this type of political speech and behavior dangerously threatens the possibility of fundamental and open political debates in general.

This kind of situation could also serve as a real basis for manipulation of ethnic (as well as other) interests and nationalistic passions. If at the same time both personal and group problems also begin to seem to individuals to be primarily the consequence of their handicapped life in a particular republic or province, regardless of which, or the consequence of ethnic handicaps imposed by relations within the Yugoslav community, then one can realistically assume that demands might be made to alter those relations on behalf of ethnic interests.

It is not difficult to show that such tendencies do in fact exist. The suggestion, which has not become politically conscious, to the effect that, say, the quite frequent blackouts in Croatia are the consequence of an absence of solidarity on the part of others who have power--and not above all the consequence of unbalanced development and the incompetence of republic economic

and government agencies to guarantee the prerequisites of life's normal cost, of inability to conduct affairs, which, there is no escaping it, lie in their "sovereign power"--is only a quite recent contribution to creation of a public impression of "one nationality being deprived" because of the behavior of others. The paradigmatic cases of such an approach are the series of attacks on the supply of the Slovenian market, this being intimated as the reason for the impoverished shops of others.

Certainly the most significant consequence of all these phenomena lies in the repression of political and social relations as problems except in ethnic terms both at the Yugoslav level in general and also within the individual political communities separately. The penetration of ethnic relations to the heart of political discussions and life is only a consequence of the more general tendency to reestablish the predominance of political participants and factors in social life and to push back self-management to the "status" of an instrument for partial democratization of workplace relations. In our context permanent establishment of such a relationship would also signify a reaffirmation of a political order of the one-party type, "corrected" by forms of worker participation in enterprises. The only new thing compared to the model of "state socialism" which has been historically tried might be that this order would not have to be reestablished at the level of the federal state--but could be reestablished, assuming recentralization of the economic and political order--but at the level of the federal units. That would give us "state socialism" within the federal units. Under those conditions the conduct of "nationality policies" would be a necessary function of state-political bodies, agencies and organizations, and their interest-related difference would be a consequence of unequal conditions for life of the individual national (state) communities. The "nationality" question would once again rise up continually as the country's central political problem, since the exclusive political structure and organization of public life would accentuate objective differences in the conditions for life of the separate national communities and, then, the objectively differing interests between them as well.

That kind of relationship can be overcome through the development and institutionalization of power in those forms of the organization of society which are coming into being and functioning according to the new--work, that is, nonpolitical--principles. Such institutions could then show themselves to be new means of social integration within the Yugoslav community. Since in our social development that role has been given to the work-interest or self-managing institutions, it seems a primary task to study their status, power and influence. And since that position is traditionally measured against the status of conventional state-political institutions, there is good reason to study their position, power and influence as well.

There is no lack of reasons for raising this problem. It is sufficient on this occasion to refer to the official opening--in Bosnia-Herzegovina--of debate of the position in the system, functions and political power of an extremely important institution of the political system--the sociopolitical chambers of the assemblies of sociopolitical communities. It is not difficult to conclude that this has opened up discussion not only of a political

institution examined in its own right, but--which seems still more important--of the role in the system, modes of operation and operational forms of those sociopolitical organizations which make it up. Aside from that, certain essential theoretical, ideological and political uncertainties about the way in which the present political system is instituted and organized, and indeed about its nature, are related to that institution as they are to very few others.

The sociopolitical chambers in the assembly system were established apart from the two types of principle for structuring and organizing the political system in general: the traditional principle of geographic political origin, which is expressed in the chambers of opstinas (or of local communities) and the new principle of the workplace, expressed in the chambers of associated labor. Individuals make up those chambers on the basis of the general right to vote--as citizens--and on the basis of the right to work--as workers. Yet the sociopolitical chambers come into being according to the principle of the particular political allegiance of people in certain political organizations. Regardless of the fact that a great number of our citizens are formal members of at least one political organization, that pattern of constituting political institutions is objectively derived from the special political rights of members of political organizations by contrast with other citizens. It also opens up a fundamental problem about electing the deputies in those chambers, the question of who is supposed to elect their members?

Though those questions may seem merely formal, actual relations in sociopolitical chambers, and indeed also their position in the political system, leave no doubt as to the need to study them. That is, political membership in one of the five Yugoslav sociopolitical organizations, as a criterion for making up those chambers, comes down in practice to membership in the party. Following the 1978 elections all representatives in the Sociopolitical Chamber of the Croatian Assembly were members of the League of Communists, as were 97 percent of deputies of those chambers in assemblies of opstina communities and 91 percent of deputies in the same chambers of assemblies of opstinas in Croatia. Given those circumstances, the positions taken by delegations of the League of Communists quite expressly become instructions for the behavior of all or the enormous majority of the delegates in the chambers, which have obligations toward the positions taken by the party delegation and toward the positions taken by the party organization.

This makeup of the membership of the chamber accentuates the topicality of the problem of the activity of other political organizations, which in the electoral procedure favor party members as their nominees for the highest delegate-political positions. It is not difficult to surmise the causes of this kind of behavior. They certainly lie in large part in the fact that the members of the League of Communists are usually the most active, and quite often even the only active members of other political organizations, which objectively makes them representative spokesmen of those organizations. If that is really so, then this only opens up the real problem of the character of those organizations. Does this mean that they are functioning and being maintained only or largely thanks to the involvement of party members and, among other things, as a form for meeting political obligations to the party?

The constant demands for young people who are members of the party to become involved in the Socialist Youth League are, for instance, a model example of insistence on those obligations. Yet if that is not the case, why is no different situation manifested in the election of delegates of those organizations to the highest political-delegate bodies?

Complete empirical data do not exist indicating the causes of this kind of behavior of sociopolitical organizations. Yet the findings that do exist, obtained by systematic study of electoral processes in opstinas, do offer a partial explanation. First of all, they confirm that political organizations perform the role of the principal initiator of the candidacy and election of individuals to the sociopolitical chambers of assemblies, which means that this process is not flowing through channels which have not been normatively foreseen. In both the 1978 and 1982 elections they initiated the election of about 89 percent of the delegates of "their own" chambers. The only initiator of election of any significance aside from them were the specific bodies for election and the coordinating committees, which influenced the election of 9.6 percent and 7.4 percent of the delegates, respectively. The influence of informal groups and also of the constituency and delegate bodies in work organizations and local communities was altogether excluded from the process of their election. In other words, political organizations do in fact control the election of their own delegates to opstina assemblies, which certainly could not be said of the relationship of the delegate constituency and the delegates in the election of the other two chambers of the assemblies.

What is the most frequent criterion in proposing delegates of sociopolitical chambers? How do political organizations usually justify their nominations?

Convincingly the most outstanding argument in favor of an individual's nomination for the position of a member of a sociopolitical chamber is "moral and political fitness." This was the reason given for nomination of 42 percent of the members of those chambers, so that this type of argument is used twice as often as it is in elections of delegates to the other two assembly chambers.

Arguments related to the actual activity of individuals are used considerably more rarely: previous successful performance in the delegate system (10.9 percent) and involvement in the processes of self-management (3.6 percent), and, along with what we might refer to as certain ideological, professional and moral attributes--involvement with the interests of the workplace (9.1 percent), standing in the community (5.5 percent), knowledge and familiarity with problems (3.6 percent), and so on.

Not once was there mention of responsibility and independence in performance as a feature of individuals to be entrusted with the performance of political functions. Indeed these qualities had an only token representation as a supporting argument for the election of delegates to the other two chambers. Further, not a single delegate of the sociopolitical chamber was elected on the basis of his position in the production process. One is amazed by the exceptionally small representation of so-called formal attributes of individuals: age (1.8 percent), sex (1.8 percent), education (3.6 percent) and

especially the datum that no one was nominated and elected because of nationality. On the basis of everyday experience and indeed political acknowledgment of the significance of ethnic proportions, and slightly less those having to do with age, sex and education, in the makeup of political bodies, it is difficult to believe in the complete validity of the data obtained. Probably some of the causes lie in the reluctance of the respondents themselves to attribute their own election to high delegate-political posts to mere possession of that type of characteristic, but also in the hesitation of proponents to publicly support their own decisions with that type of justification.

Supporting election of delegates on the basis of "moral and political fitness" is not in and of itself sufficient to explain political behavior. It becomes relevant only when we bear in mind that the conception and application of that category is reduced. What is meant by "moral and political fitness"? It is easier to answer that question by the "negative process": by eliminating some of the content offered to the delegates as possible justifications of their political election and which ought to be components of one's imagined conception of "moral and political fitness." Those are all those attributes previously indicated related to the performance and ideological traits of individuals: involvement in self-management and delegate processes, responsibility and independence, standing in the community, familiarity with problems, and so on. All those features ought to be inherent in individuals entrusted to perform public political functions, which also opens up the way to personal political advancement. However, those features are at the bottom of the scale of frequency of choices. This means that the category "moral and political fitness," which was used in arguments supporting election of the delegates, has been largely or even utterly emptied of those contents. It was used, then, in another sense, in the sense of a formally ascertainable moral and political allegiance of individuals, which in our context is equated with membership in the party.

In spite of public political denials of the reduced conception and application of the category "moral and political fitness" in political and social life, up to now it has still been mainly reduced to formal membership in the League of Communists. At the same time, this reduced category was then broadened to almost all areas of work-occupational, political and social advancement of individuals. This expansion certainly was not a consequence solely of confidence in the truly public importance of all affairs for whose handling "moral and political fitness" was sought, but was also a consequence of the bureaucratic conduct of "personnel policy" in which an attempt was made to substitute zealous and tried-and-true meeting of political requirements for personal and collective responsibility for "personnel moves." The double vulgarization of the demands for "moral and political fitness"--without entering at all into their fundamental justification--also led to a singular response on the part of some of the individuals who were or perceived themselves subject to those demands in the form of "enrollment in the party." Certainly, this does not mean that those with the principal reasons in recruitment of party membership, but the situation referred to unambiguously "strengthened the motives" of some of the members to enroll in the League of Communists. The influx of members of that kind did not thereafter fail to have an influence on the political and ideological makeup of the party, which

again, by reverse action, jeopardizes its capability of exemplary performance of its social and political role.

What is the position of the sociopolitical chambers within the assemblies?
How much political power do they have in the decisionmaking processes?

The difficulties in studying the position and power of these chambers derive in large part from the imprecise constitutional definition of their jurisdiction. This resulted from two tendencies in defining their real position: one is manifested in the exaggeration of jurisdiction and the awarding of decisionmaking rights even in matters which ought to have remained in the power sphere of the other two chambers; the other tendency is manifested in what would seem to be the altogether opposite form, in depriving the sociopolitical chambers of any area of independent decisionmaking. But so that they would not be left without "work" in legislative bodies, they were then awarded the status of an equal chamber in decisionmaking on matters within the jurisdiction of the other assembly chambers. The possibility is thus created for exercising influence indirectly through the other bodies. Researchers warned that under such conditions the sociopolitical chambers resort to "preventive functioning." In a situation where they are excluded from the process of direct decisionmaking, they know how to resort even to publication of so-called binding positions, which the decisions being deliberated must also be in conformity with. Although seemingly opposed, the tendencies concerning performance of the functions of the sociopolitical chambers in the political system may be pictured as differing forms of concentration of the same influence and of political power.

There is yet another view--so far not sufficiently verified by experiment, but relatively easy to check--of the real function of the sociopolitical chambers in the assembly system and the political system in general. According to this view, they are institutional forms by means of which it is possible in a relatively easy, but also undemocratic way, to profile the personnel composition of the highest political decisionmaking bodies. They are a "channel built into the system" for placement of professional and veteran officials of political organizations in the highest legislative and executive bodies of the political system. Accordingly, thanks to these chambers, it has become easier for political power centers to control the entire political system. The danger of establishing this kind of function of sociopolitical chambers in the system becomes clear only when we bear in mind the empirical findings to the effect that political power remains concentrated in the traditional centers, especially in the executive bodies of the assemblies. If, then, the power is further structured according to the oligarchical format, and its institutional supports are as referred to, then the consequences for political and social relations could be far-reaching.

All of those fundamental and practical difficulties make the institution of the sociopolitical chamber truly debatable. Incidentally, it has in fact been so described in most recent analyses of the political system. It seems that the examination of the sociopolitical chambers ought to be aimed in two directions: analyzing its role as a political institution in which the political will and interests of political organizations, that is, of the social

strata which they represent, are articulated, and determining its formal and real relationship to the other chambers of assemblies; and discussion of the possibility and degree of instrumentalization of that institution for the purpose of actual political disenfranchisement of the assembly bodies in general. Both aspects of the analysis require very detailed studies of the functioning of the political system, from electoral processes, as an act in institutionalization of political power, to the making of the most general, and therefore also the most important, decisions concerning the life of the community.

7045

CSO: 2800/179

OLD LAW-CURRENT DELINQUENCY RELATIONSHIP IN KOSOVO

Belgrade INTERVJU in Serbo-Croatian 9 Dec 83 pp 40-41

Interview with Brahmin Hodza, common law judge in Pec, Kosovo, by correspondent Dejan Lucic: "Family Heads Responsible, Not Children"; date of interview not given

Text In Junik, a village near Pec, the Hodza family has passed judgment on common law for 25 generations. Brahmin Hodza is the current head of the family, and he suggests how it might be possible to prevent the violence of irredentists.

Stories about juveniles causing trouble are for children. No mischief takes place without the family head knowing about it. Even our Albanian politicians know this, and if they would resolve to do so, they could get rid of all these provocations with a good and honest agreement with the family heads and the clans. The institution of the family head is a reality, and anyone who won't admit this has his head buried in the sand.

Customs in Kosovo have been preserved longer than they have been in most places, especially the custom concerning traditional rules of behavior; often only one law is recognized in this regard, the old common law, which is called the Canon of Lek Dukadzin.

In the immediate vicinity of Pec is a village named Junik. Here there is a family, known far and wide, which has passed judgment on common law for 25 generations. The family is now headed by Brahmin Hodza. Many call this striking old man, with his cherished moustache, the chief justice of the Kosovo Albanians. Alienated Albanians, dissatisfied with the verdict of the courts, come to the Hodza house so that he, after hearing everything, can have his say.

Hodza, dressed in the traditional costume appropriate to the knowledge and rank it proclaims, fully aware of the standing he enjoys amongst his fellow countrymen, gladly agreed to an interview. We sat in one of the cafes of the Pec spa where this elderly man is convalescing. People at the neighboring tables stopped talking out of respect. I had the impression that everyone in the cafe was listening to our conversation.

Question Judge Hodza, people say that your verdicts are widely obeyed, although you have no means of enforcing your decisions.

Answer One can evade the enforcement of state verdicts. There is no evading verdicts in the common law of Lek Dukadzin. When someone comes to me to settle a dispute, I first ask him if he has a guardian of trust, whom the Albanians call a dorzon, that is, a man of reputation, who guarantees that my decision will be carried out with his life. If he does not have a guardian of trust, I won't talk to him. Both sides choose one among their dependable friends. The debtor is obliged with his life to pay the creditor. This means that every one of my decisions is guaranteed with someone's head. Thus, there is no evading the execution of a verdict.

Question Who comes to you for a decision?

Answer Those who fear a blood feud, mostly Albanians from the villages. I settle disputes for Romies in the same way. There are rare cases in which Serbs and Montenegrins come to me to settle a dispute, but they do take place, especially when there is fear of a blood feud.

Question Are there many who lose their heads?

Answer Not as many as there use to be, more than people might think! My job is to keep that from happening. Up to now, I have settled over 2000 disputes. This has saved at least three times as many lives.

Question Who presents the greatest danger?

Answer The strong family heads, houses which have the most adult males and who have strong clans. Such a family head acts like an armed commander; he thinks he has more rights and power than other people, especially those who have weak modern families with one or two men. In a strong clan, the father thinks that not even the state can do anything to him. His most important duty is to take care of arming his men. He has to buy them arms when they are old enough to bear them, and he must train them. If an injury is done, if the honor of the family is besmirched, every male member of the family can hardly wait to take out revenge. In the interests of the family, the leader can command some, or all of the men to refrain from taking revenge. However, he can also choose someone to carry out an act of revenge. He does not give such a command to someone who is timid and unskilled. Most often, he and his men agree on who that person will be, how the revenge will be carried out, and who to beat up, wound, or kill. In choosing someone, they take into consideration bravery, cleverness, skill in the use of arms, so that his campaign will achieve the desired results.

Question While he is planning all of this, does he take into consideration the legal system, punishment by imprisonment?

Answer Of course. He makes sure the chosen man is well aware that he is to defend himself before the government court according to a plan agreed upon ahead of time, and that he is not to betray his brethren who helped and encouraged him.

Question By what other criteria is the one who carries out the blood feud chosen?

Answer It is better if he has a lot of brothers and that he be unmarried, so that he won't have to worry about a family while in jail. It is best that he be a capable, older juvenile, who will not be severely punished by the state court, and who will be taught some sort of trade while in prison.

Question Juveniles often come before the court also because of mistreatment of neighbors, and various offenses. Does all of this take place with the knowledge of the family head?

Answer Nothing happens without his knowledge. Before a quarrel, or an armed conflict, the men of the household agree as to who will cause what kind of trouble, how it will be done and against whom. The word of the family head is law. Thus, one should not call to account children for disturbing graves and monuments, but the family head, because nothing can take place without his knowledge. Stories about underage youths are for the naive. Why don't these children cause damage in their own homes, or cause mischief against those who have a strong and well-armed family? Violence which is carried out is intended against a weak neighbor in order to drive him out. Even our Albanian politicians are quite familiar with this. If they would resolve to do so, they might get rid of all this trouble with a good and honest agreement with the family heads and the clans. The institution of the family head is a matter of fact, and anyone who won't recognize this has his head buried in the sand. The head of the family is strong both in the village and in the city. Every evening before dinner, all members of the household confess to him. When a house has a respected master, according to the Canon of Lek Dukadzin, he pays for the sins of his children, or he leads them bound to the injured party and says to them: "Punish him!"

Question Brahmin Hodza, how do you pass judgment for damage done by children?

Answer The judgment is always for double the damage, because even a child knows what belongs to someone else. However, the family head usually teaches the children to give false confessions, especially before state courts, in order to protect the adults. There are cases of juveniles themselves telling the police that they were the murderers as part of a feud, or that they were responsible for damage. He who makes trouble for another plans out in advance how he will defend himself. That is why they often rig the evidence in their defense.

Question How do they usually defend themselves for murder?

Answer They usually deny premeditation, ascribing the outcome to an accident or to a moment of heated passion. They sometimes use an alibi. The family head usually does not carry out the crime personally, but does it through his young men. He is mindful of his responsibility before the court, and reserves the possibility of excusing himself because of disobedience in the family, if pressed by evidence. An alibi is created by having him go away on a visit, or by an actual trip.

Question How do you refute a questionable alibi?

Answer I recognize it only if every man in the family has it. If even one of the young men cannot prove that he could not have committed the crime, the whole family alibi is in doubt.

Question Obviously, in situations like these, the small families are in a much more difficult situation?

Answer An unarmed man is no match for one with arms. The Albanian villagers say this, and so do the Serbian villagers. Everyone knows this proverb, and they behave accordingly. If it comes to a real or a provoked disagreement over water or land, the weaker one will move out, after soberly appraising his unequal position. Appealing to the normal court process is a slow and futile matter, especially in Kosovo.

Question Can they defend themselves with the help of the police?

Answer This is also ineffective, the police can hardly cover all the hills and valleys. However, I am for settling the disputes, because people remember everything, and they collect payment during periods of anarchy! We lived in relative peace even under the Turks, when things were tough for all of us, but these modern times lower the morale, even that of the old Albanians. Recently, a father-in-law in Djakovica murdered his daughter-in-law because she wouldn't sleep with him. It is no longer so rare that the daughter-in-law will agree. Some family heads even have children by their daughters-in-law while the husbands work abroad. The offense is less of a disgrace than if the wife sleeps around and because of this the offender is murdered. What can I tell you?

In a time of respectability, violation of grave sites was punished by public hanging, and the house of the offenders was burned to the ground. The family was banished from the area, the livestock were cut down. Today, to judge these crimes in this way can no longer be done. This is a disgrace and a blot on the honor of the whole Albanian people. The rape of a young woman, even of an old woman--which happens, I am told--is equal to committing murder. For something like this, death is the only punishment. However, no one passes judgment in this way, and no one is afraid of a law which is so lenient!

Question How do you reconcile the two parties in the case of murder?

Answer If a man is killed by another, the culprit must pay 48 gold Turkish lira, which is 65 million dinars. In the case of a woman, then half of this, half the blood. The same is to be paid for wounding a hero. In this way, blood is paid for and the families are reconciled.

Question What do you do in the case of theft? Bozidar Despotovic, the director of Feronikal from Glogovac, recently presented evidence that items valued at half a million dollars were stolen during the construction of this huge plant. What would you recommend?

Answer Theft is not honest work, and a thief is obliged to pay two times the value of the best quality item of the object which had been stolen, according to the Canon of Lek Dukadzin. For stealing a cheap Russian watch he would have to pay the equivalent of the value of two Sufhauzen. This is called "two for one," and is paid regardless of whether the one committing the crime is an adult or a child. If organizations of labor would punish thieves in the manner set down in the Canon of Lek Dukadzin, people would think things over carefully before engaging in theft.

Question How can troublemakers be restrained so that they respect other people?

Answer One has to put the squeeze on troublemakers--strong judicial authority is necessary--one must not even pardon his own child if he does injury to honest people. Those who forget that law exists should be reminded of the old ways of the village. He who blocks the flow of water shall have his own way blocked, he who cuts down a fruit tree shall have his whole orchard cut down. When that happens, he will remember that law and justice exist, and he will give in.

Question People say that the Canon of Lek Dukadzin has also had unfavorable consequences for Albanians?

Answer People who say that don't know much, the modern scholars. The Canon has saved Albanians from mutual physical extermination. In the time of the Turks, only 30 percent of Albanians died a natural death. Judges, my ancestors, have settled their disputes for centuries now, and this was better than having the chain of death grow longer. But it would be better without blood feuds and without Lek Dukadzin. A just, strict and strong authority, especially one which cannot be bribed and which does not rely on tribal connections, is necessary to save and defend the people. Without fear there is no honor among our people.

9548

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LETTERS TO EDITOR ON SITUATION IN KOSOVO

Belgrade INTERVJU in Serbo-Croatian 23 Dec 83 pp 3, 13; p 9

[Letter by Vlastimir Todorovic, professor, Nis: "Brahim Hodza's Example One To Be Followed"]

Letter in response to: "Family Heads Responsible, Not Children"; INTERVJU No 66

[Text] Having read this article, I can state enthusiastically and without reservation that this is one of the most candid and credible statements of truth to come out of Kosovo, concerning Kosovo. This is particularly reflected in the quotation, quite popular in Kosovo: "Stories about under-age youths are for the naive. Why don't these children cause damage to their own homes, or cause mischief against those who have a strong and well-armed family? Violence which is carried out is intended against a weak neighbor in order to drive him out. Even our Albanian politicians are quite familiar with this."

Being well-acquainted with the situation in Kosovo, I feel free to supplement this quote with a question: What becomes of such a child when it grows up?

Baca Brahim says: "An unarmed man is no match for one with arms. The Albanian villagers say this, so do the Serbian villagers. Everyone knows this proverb, and they behave accordingly."

Great injury, and even greater torment and misfortune for me and my family took place because I did not hear this proverb in time, nor did I understand it "correctly." Perhaps I heard it, but there was no one to interpret it for me in the Kosovo manner. I came from a family of soldiers. During the occupation my father was interned. My mother, my older brother, and my oldest sister were fighters after 1942. Our house was full of members of the underground: Pavle Jovicevic, Sinan Hasani, Haljilj Fejzulahu, Bosko Cakic, Abdula Preseva, and others...

After the liberation, I completed teacher's school, and while working finished the Advanced Pedagogic School, and the school of philosophy. I worked in accordance with both communist awareness and conscience, and with youthful enthusiasm, as a teacher, an instructor, an assistant to the school's director,

the director of culture and education for the regional assembly, counselor in the educational and pedagogic office, director of the school.

Besides my regular job, I was also able to perform successfully different socially useful, humanitarian, and political duties. I completed two party schools. I was president of the Regional Committee of the Regional Assembly in Tabanovac, near Kumanovo. In Gnjilane: I was president of the local branch of SAWP, president of the local committee of the city's SAWP, a member of the Executive Committee of the Local Branch of SAWP; chief of the unit of the Scout's Association, vice-president of the Local Branch and member of the PO; vice-president of the Inter-Regional Council of the Association for the Deaf and Mute, and member of the PO; secretary of the branch of the LCY and member of the political activists of the Regional Committee of the LCY, leader of the activists of the school's director, etc., etc.

My life was normal, successful, and without problems, until some Albanian nationalists and Serbian careerists had it in for me, and...

In 1967, I was director of the trilingual Musa Zajmi Elementary School, one of the best organized and best known schools in the province of Kosovo. My brother, Nikola Todorovic, professor of world and Yugoslav literature, a Regional Assembly fellowship holder, member of the LCY, applied for a position at the Skender Beg Teacher's School in Gnjilane. He was rejected. All of the Albanian members voted not to accept Nikola, and all the Serbian members voted to accept him. The principal participant in this irredentist ruse was the then political secretary of the Regional Committee of the LCY, Sevcet Mustafa.

Because of this and some other, similar offenses, Sevcet Mustafa and I came into conflict with one another. In the same year, 1967, I visited Sinan Hasani in Belgrade, and pointed out Sevcet's frailties. Sinan sent me to Veli Deva, Deva sent me to Blazi Radonjic, the organizational secretary of the Kosovo Provincial Committee. I recorded everything I said in a notebook, and I was then told, word for word: "Tomorrow in Gnjilane there is an extended meeting of the Regional Committee of the LCY, and you can present freely all that you have said to me, and I will inform Veli Deva on this matter."

And I presented everything according to Communist awareness and conscience. A hush ended. Then a six-hour discussion took place, or rather, a dialogue back and forth between the LCY secretary and myself. Since Sevcet could not win over any of the discussants at that time to support him and attack me, he dismissed all the secretaries of the LCY branch, members of the Political Activists, and me, of course, from the meeting.

The same day, a closed session of the Regional Committee RC of the LCY was held. There they decided to form a committee and investigate international relations at the Musa Zajmi Elementary School collective. And...a 15-year struggle began between the unarmed and the armed....

The commission of the RC LCY came to the school's LCY activists' group with a written analysis and a proposal to exclude me from the LCY--even though I had been an excellent worker and organizer as director--because ideologically I had gone astray...The activist group categorically rejected the proposal of the RC LCY commission and would not even accept any kind of punishment for me.

Then the commission went to a meeting of the Branch, where its proposal was rejected with the same force. Only 13 of the 130 members agreed with the proposal of the commission. The commission of the RC LCY then presented their analysis to the branches in the city, trying particularly to get every Communist to vote "either for the RC LCY analysis, or for Vlastimir Todorovic." Of the 700 LCY members, 130 came out for the analysis of the RC LCY commission.

After this, the RC LCY excluded me from the LCY...

Baca Brahim says: "Appealing to the normal court process is a slow and futile matter, especially in Kosovo."

After the RC LCY commission and my exclusion from the LCY came a newly formed commission of the Regional Assembly, which took up the same ceremonial work, this time concerning my release from the duties of school director.

The Regional Assembly commission recognized my organizational ability and the positive results of the collective, but, considering that I was not a member of the LCY, and that I had contributed to dividing the collective into "two camps representing two nationalities," it was not necessary nor desirable to have me remain at my job as director. They tried to get me to submit my resignation. I refused. Then marathon meetings lasting until dawn again took place. Every day, members of administrative organs in the RC, LCY, Regional Assembly, and Internal Affairs Council were called in for discussion.

Then the Regional Assembly formed a commission in order to consolidate the two city schools. Even this proposal failed, because it turned out that the two collectives were already too unwieldy...

The collective and I, as director, carried on our work in a quite normal way, figuring that everything was in the past, but all of a sudden I received a notice informing me of a decision concerning my dismissal from the duties of director. On the notice was the date of a meeting of the school's council which had been held, a date upon which no sort of meeting of the school had been held, not even a meeting of the school's council. However, the notice had been signed by the council's president. I took to task the council president, Saip Destani, and he confessed everything to me. He didn't know who had typed out the decision, but he told me that the decision had to be signed, and he had signed it in the office of the chief of the Internal Affairs Council, Aleksandar Peric, member of the commission of the Regional Assembly.

I brought forth charges of forgery...

I was angry then because of the conduct of these people, but I am not now, because this has become the most lucrative venture in Kosovo. Let us take a couple of examples, as well as the example of myself.

After these events, Aleksandar Peric obtained four public-housing apartments for his family. For his three daughters, he got three two-room apartments, as well as jobs for them. For himself and his son he got a three-room apartment, publicly owned, in the newest apartment building, the Lepa Brena, while it was being built, and now, since the tenants have moved in, an apartment in the Internal Affairs Council. In addition, Peric has a privately-owned house on the sea at Tivto, and a house with an unspoiled estate in Raniluk.

After signing the forged notice, Saip Destani very quickly became the school's director, and is still holding this job. He has obtained a comfortable two-room apartment.

And I, after each of my appeals, have received new things to endure, harassments, and maltreatment. I sold my house in Gnjilane, and bought one in Nis. Not having found a job suitable for one with a university degree, 32 years experience in education, and 52 years of age, I have become a travelling salesman. I sell books.

12/13/83

[Letter by Dr Mlutin R. Djuricic, Pec: "Historical Feeling of Insecurity"]

Letter in response to: "The Forced Emigration of Serbs and Montenegrins From Kosovo Is An Exceptionally Dark Spot in the History of the SFRY"; INTERVJU no 65

[Text] The public has been given an incomplete picture of the emigration of Serbs and Montenegrins from Kosovo. The complete picture is rather murky. Some think the reason for emigrations is pressure exerted by irredentists over the last 17 and 18 years. Others say that Serbs and Montenegrins try to find more favorable economic conditions outside of Kosovo. The most important reason is suppressed--an historical sense of insecurity.

This historical sense of insecurity originated back in 1941. From that time through WW II almost all of the villages of settlers in Kosovo were burned down. Large-scale genocide was carried out which went unpunished after the war. At that time, mass emigration of Serbs and Montenegrins out of Kosovo took place.

A large number of emigrants did not return to their homes after the war. For that reason, they lost their agricultural land. After being devastated by genocide, they were again punished. And during the war the irredentists attained, to a large extent, their goal, which was created in the time of Ahmet Beg Zogu.

The peasants who did return after the war were never able to resume their agricultural activities, at least to the pre-war level. The community helped them only in the reconstruction of their homes which had been burned down, but not in restoring their livestock herds and the destroyed garden plots, and not in raising their auxiliary buildings. Serbs and Montenegrins found themselves in economic straits. They could not even use the mountain pastureland.

Not even the peasants' cooperatives were able to help them. That is why they "sold voluntarily" or gave up their wretched agricultural land, and fled to other parts of the country, for economic reasons. By "giving up" ownership of agricultural property they attempted to find employment and establish a permanent work relationship. The plots of many were "bought up" at low prices which were dictated to them by the buyer.

Then, 17 and 18 years ago, the irredentists took advantage of this to create an ethnically pure Kosovo. This has been widely written about in the press. Those who had been economically devastated, pressured by irredentists, lost the historic sense of security of living in Kosovo. The sense of insecurity, created (with a short interruption) over a period of 40 years by burnings, plundering, war crimes, post-war indifference, and irredentist pressure--which still goes on--cannot be quickly and easily banished. No one believes political slogans. That is why there are far more Serbs and Montenegrins still moving out of Kosovo than there are those wishing to return under the present conditions. This sense of insecurity can be removed by deeds, not words. Hic Rhodus Hic galta!

9548

CSO: 2800/182

ARRANGEMENTS FOR YOUTH DAY CEREMONIES DEBATED

Belgrade MLADOST in Serbo-Croatian 12 Dec 83 p 2

[Article by Rasko Kovacevic]

[Text] If it were not for the set design on this year's "Youth Day," who knows whether or when people would start thinking of this demonstration in a way different from the protocol.

The author of the design thought that he could "transpose a strongly architectural sculpture like Krsinic's monument to Tito in Titovo Uzice as a design element in the JNA stadium in order to evoke the monumentality of the personality whom the sculpture represents." Some people, however, and among them were some high government officials, characterized this "design element" as an "expression of religiosity" or of a "personality cult." This is just to remind the reader of the initial issue which later transcended its original significance, so that the whole thing was "transposed" sometimes into tasteless discussions in which everything was literally muddled (which is the common denominator)--both the artist's right to "transpose artistically," and the right of those for whom this transposing was made to give their judgment of it. Some spoke of "kitsch," others are proving, by their professional and unquestioned knowledge, that they simply could not make kitsch, etc. The SSOJ Presidium discussed this later and then, recently, a "round table" was organized in Tjentiste, where there was talk about the "conception" of the concluding festivity of the Youth Day, and in recent days the SSOJ Presidium organized one more talk session. The topic: "Youth Day--How to Keep It Going?"

The idea was that the meeting should be attended by many--sociopolitical workers, artists, writers--who would give their contribution to this issue. There was fog, a traffic jam, and the meeting was visibly impoverished by the absence of some people as well as by the presence of others. The talk lasted a full 4 hours without interruption, and at the end there were half as many people as at the beginning. Some had said what they had to say and left; some, on the other hand, said nothing. Well, that's the way it is, and we (the course of our journalist's career) must deal with those who said something.

Borisav Dzuverovic asked for permission to talk after a rather long and disagreeable pause (everybody would like to be the last to talk at such meetings),

and made many remarks about this demonstration, having in mind some of the ones held in the last decades.

"This demonstration, related to the more colorful aspects of the liveliness and creativity of youth, pushed into the background everything that appears to the young generation as a wealth of cultural life and as the emergence of new values and new strivings. This is why I think that a talk like this should have been organized much earlier, and especially after Comrade Tito's death. The right moment to reflect on this thing was probably then."

Dzuverovic then made a number of suggestions, advocating mostly a conception that would, in fact, represent a synthesis of all the creativity of youth (while the concluding celebration could extend to 1 or 2 days), and which should include everything that represents the cultural and contemporary desires of the young generation.

"Such a concluding celebration, a finale of cultural creativity, should certainly be enriched with a temporary organization, if you want: let us say, of cultural-entertainment-musical demonstrations. Research has clearly shown that precisely such musical content is at the top of the cultural wish-list of the youth. Further, young people rank sporting-recreational contents highly, viz., they feel the need to tie all this together, which is a logical consequence of the effects of mass culture and mass media."

Djoko Stojicic stated first that the debate to date about the concluding celebration approached the issue in an upside down way. He said that one cannot talk about the set design while neglecting the content. This is like beginning the alphabet with the letter "Z." Stojicic thinks that the SSO must put the question to itself whether what we have is indeed the content which corresponds to youth's sensitivity and its spiritual, social and political strivings. "I think that it is not. It is not, because it is rather one-sided; as has been said, everything is a pose in the demonstration; it is overorganized, with very little spontaneity. The material shows very well that some elements of the relay have already been surpassed and that it cannot remain as it is. This has become a political race, it no longer has a sporting character."

Proposing that thought should be given to some antique models, Stojicic literally said: "The final celebration is all parade, it is all, I would say, not on the main track of young people's sensibility. If we asked a foreigner who knows nothing about Yugoslavia's young persons, but has attended the celebration at the JNA stadium, to tell us something about these persons on the basis of what he has seen, he would get everything wrong. Our youth is richer in every sense of the word than one might conclude from the final celebration."

Renata Godik thinks that the discussion should have been organized first in activist groups of the youth organization, which was agreed upon but not implemented. Godik thinks that the lack of input from the "base" opens tremendous possibilities to the eminently subjective approach to this topic, and this can make the entire debate extremely unproductive.

"I agree that everything concerning the relay and the concluding celebration contains many unnecessary details and a lot of ceremonial. It often happens

that it is precisely us who insist on these details, only in order to make things more magnificent and prove something that otherwise has to be proved in other ways."

This is probably the most significant thing that could be heard during these talks. Most of the youth officials present were definitely in favor of changing the existing approach, but hardly any of them would in his or her basic group demand decisively that the relay should not be accompanied by 20 automobiles and whatnot else. Therefore, the basic condition for change, including a change in the concluding celebration, is breaking away from the Potemkin syndrome which has become rather ingrained.

Renata Godik's suggestion, expressed at the end of her exposition, seems quite coherent: "When the question is posed of how to keep it going I think that it cannot be answered properly unless the SSO looks for such an answer through its system, viz., through a more thorough consultation of its membership. We have things which were proven worthy, which deserve attention, which can assemble youth and brilliantly demonstrate the spirit of today's young generation. I think that we should think along this line in this and any similar talk."

Horhe Mihaeli opposed the generally predominant idea that the concluding celebration should be a synthesis of youth's creativity. "A broad presentation of youth's creativity means at the same time the introduction of the competitive spirit into the entire show, which is not good in my opinion. And it is difficult to achieve some spontaneity among young people now, because we must keep in mind that whatever is spontaneous and unorganized can turn into anarchy, especially when large numbers of people are involved."

Branislav Brkljac opposed most participants in the discussion, who based their statements on the principle: "I like it, I don't like it."

"It seems that the essence of the whole thing is whether the relay baton will weigh 5 or 8 kg. I think that the key question we must elucidate here is whether we, as an organization, have sufficient organizational power to lead such a discussion in our basic organizations and thus acquire full legitimacy for such a discussion."

This "key question" was not discussed. Nobody even touched it during the rest of the debate.

Jovan Komsic devoted a considerable part of his speech to some "controversies" he found in the preliminary material itself which had to serve as an "intellectual provocation" to the participants. This is what provoked Komsic:

"The expectation that by reading the program and being presented with our ideas, all in one day at the concluding celebration, youth will radically change its position and way of living, is a utopia. I think that we must not subordinate the normal rhythm of youth's working and sociopolitical life, which has its own logic stemming from the rhythm of the sociopolitical work of all subjective forces, exclusively and only to 25 May. If somebody expected our

youth to live an exclusively creative life during these 45 minutes at the JNA stadium, he has greatly missed the basic idea."

Komsic joined those who think that one must insist on the thesis of the need for a unique Yugoslav manifestation, for the development of communality and collective spirit, interpenetration of cultures and destinies, "on the most beautiful conceptual foundations."

"Consequently," Tomsic said, "appropriate changes in the thematic conception of the concluding celebration are necessary. I think that next talks have to be quite concrete and should have as their goal future avoidance of these negative aspects, which we all know."

Slavko Banic thinks that the concluding celebration at the JNA stadium is "a little too ideologized" and that it frequently contains elements of socialist realism.

"I think that we must first free ourselves from this excessive ideologization and from socialist-realist elements, and have more play of colors, of steps, of movements, and that only through this, secondarily, we should express our ideological positions about the young generation."

And so forth, and so forth.... The thing took place, and only the future will tell whether it really happened. It is indicative, and also illustrative, symptomatic, recognizable...that few participants touched (and no one in the right way) on the essential issues of the "Youth Day" demonstration. As any attentive reader may have noticed--and we think that we have presented the most important parts of the talks--there was talk mostly about the formal aspect of the whole thing.

Why? We are dealing here with powerlessness to move and solve something essentially, and to offer a more dynamic conception of the celebration which, by this very fact, would be closer to what this celebration allegedly intends to show, i.e., it would be closer to the so-called sensibility of youth.

Nothing will essentially change as long as we talk about these (or similar) things without an elementary idea of the actual role and status of the young people here and now, which is as it is, and well known to everybody. It is known that society's (this is not the right expression) relation to youth is directly followed by the youth's relation to such official so-called youth festivities. It is simply impossible to change anything significantly without changing these relations, however much we might want it. However, it seems that this elementary dialectical context interested nobody, and if such interest does exist, it begins and ends with behind-the-scenes articulation. Tradition-alism and ideologization of this entire business seem to represent too big an obstacle, against which it is not difficult to stumble, especially as nobody seems particularly to mind such stumbling. Thus it is quite logical that the participants of the round table "Youth Day--How To Keep It Going" mainly offered partial solutions which, obviously, contribute to the preservation of the essence of the existing ways. If the technique of partiality or

partialization, as a rule, offers at least the impression that something can be changed, this time even such an impression was lacking.

Thus, how to keep it going is a rhetorical question which quite definitely implies appropriate answers. We have just offered one more proof of this.

12455

CSO: 2800/158

DRAMATIZATION OF DOBRICA COSIC WORK CRITICIZED

Belgrade KOMUNIST in Serbo-Croatian 20 Jan 84 p 23

[Article by Milorad Vucelic]

[Text] A clear disservice, even misuse, has been made of a work by Dobrica Cosic in the presentation "The Battle of Kolubar." Based on the novel "A Time of Death," the dramatization was done by Borislav Mihajlovic Mihiz, and the performance was directed by Arsenije Jovanovic.

Commonly a forced act, dramatization requires the selection of one dimension alone of a nondramatic literary work. In eliminating a number of elements from the storyteller's fabric, the dramatist from the beginning is in the position of an interpreter. He stresses certain data, regroups literary facts and shifts certain values in order to make a particular side of the work, which he regards as suitable for transformation into dramatic form, as expressive as possible. Besides interpreting metaphoric layers that are peculiar to drama as a literary genre, the dramatizer must also confront the problem of scenic potential, or the adaptation of a prose text to be attractive in direct theatrical presentation. Thus the dramatizer is forced into simplification. When simplification--reduction, in this case--becomes necessary, it does not follow from this that the artistic dimension is forfeited. Moreover, the need to simplify is justified by the fact that we are dealing here with two different mediums. "The Battle of Kolubar" is a typical example of the kind of problem that emerges when the entire reduction process is subordinated to extra-artistic reasons and goals, when the gain of its political simplification and national position is falsified in the reality and the subject of the dramatization. The dramatist and the director of "The Battle of Kolubar" carried out their own special trivialization and poor commercialization of Cosic's work. By their particular political involvement (both in terms of interests and spiritual inspiration), in this case extremely undifferentiated nationalism, as well as the obvious creative impotence, the authors have perpetrated an esthetic reduction that has eliminated all elements of tragic content, in which truth, pain, joy, brute force and humanity do not become any sort of esthetic, theatrical category.

Art in this way has denied its own criteria and become subordinated to a defined, poorly perceived national purpose, it has become operational and thereby has negated its own essence. That multifarious reductionism,

impoverishment and vulgarization followed lines destructive of all possible differentiated and critical speculations about the Serbian people (this approach is drastically apparent in the scene: "What more do you want from me, power, state, army?--one can struggle against God, but not against the Serbian soldier, even when he uses brute force). The socialist and progressive theatrical places of "A Time of Death," which Dobrica Cosic himself advocated directly and openly, have been circumvented. The personality of Vukasin Katic is virtually nonexistent on the stage. It is deprived of certain of its fundamental features, particularly those relating to patriotism and the relationship between personal convictions and life, which may or may not be sacrificed to the fatherland, and which in any case even today have a paradigmatic value on his or any other soil. Also missing is the dilemma about the pupil-sergeant and whether and how winning the war can be costly to peace... All of these factors resulted in the de-dramatization of the artistic material itself and of the action of this "strategic drama in two parts." Since there is no internal drama, it had to be achieved by the relationship between the existing and the presented material toward the military opponent as the exclusive dramatic moving force and the source of dramatic conflict, while the verbally invoked and implied enemy was absent from the scene.

The static and undramatic character and empty rhetoric of a modest radio drama, which "The Battle of Kolubar" reminds us of more than anything, were attacked by the conscientious realization of the well-known, jaded and discredited dramaturgy of Bulajic and an esthetics that strives only for mindless passion, achieving its dramatic effects exclusively by shots, attacks and movements of army groups. "The Battle of Kolubar" is an express example of the continuation of the Bulajic dramaturgy with somewhat varied costumographic and musical elements.

The presentation of "The Battle of Kolubar" by dramatist Borislav Mihajlovic Mihiz and director Arsenije Jovanovic resembles a sort of uninventive reconstruction of bad prewar presentations. It is full of mediocre pathos, elevated tones without substance, superficiality and antiquated dramaturgical and directing techniques. In brief, "The Battle of Kolubar" is one of the most anachronistic theatrical presentations in Belgrade in the last decade.

This type of tailored and constructed presentation, or more accurately a poorly-assembled solemn academy, counts on a very low level of theatrical activity. The tragic character and dramatic nature, the conscious evaluation, the artistic skill and invention, or more precisely their absence, are compensated for by showing the flag, by parading national passions, or as might be said "philosophically", by presenting the "proud joy of belonging" to the nation and the army as something unmitigatedly unquestionable and undifferentiated. A presentation composed in this manner can truly become the cause for unconscious national excesses and excitement with compensating effects. In addition to everything that has been said, attention and suspicion should also be directed to the fact that this year another presentation belonging to the so-called, certainly varied, militarist cycle formed by the plays "A Military Secret" and "Secret of the Black Hand" by Lj. Ristic and now, "The Battle of Kolubar."

We are talking certainly of a possible, but in any case illegitimate reading of Cosic's or any other literary work. "The Battle of Kolubar" is an example of how the creative impotence and political a priori approach of the author of the dramatization and the director, in seeking legitimate cover for the impotence, end in an illegitimate reading of the literary work and in a bad and in places even malicious functionalization. In addition, it is a typical example of the transformation of bad political and national reasoning into good consumption. This "strategic drama in two parts" by both its ideological approach and its anachronistic theatrical and artistic nature represents a true witness, actually a document, on the absence of any sort of strategy by those who supposedly attribute the truth to it and by which, eventually, a people can only obscure their glorious past, while at the same time postponing a confrontation with current problems, their pressing historical challenges and their dimensions in civilization and socialism. This may perhaps sound overly tragic, but unfortunately, it is brutally true!

The presentation of the Yugoslav Drama Theater points out the bad features of the objectivization of a great and significant literary work. That work is not only in danger of being praised without obliging anyone to do anything, but also appears to attribute responsibility only to those who have the least rights to the work and who can only perceive the most problematical and unconscious uncritical manner of determining responsibility. This sort of presentation and everything that now accompanies it and will accompany it in the future have created a serious obstacle to its own productive legacy and to problems that occupy concrete literature and Cosic's literary opus itself. We can agree perhaps that very diverse objectivizations are the lot of every work, the tribute and the bane of democracy, yet it seems that in the case of this misuse, not even Dobrica Cosic himself can be relieved of all responsibility.

The efforts of the actors ensemble deserves all praise, with special accolades to the dedicated work and artistic craft of Misa Janketic, but the rest of them are trapped by the bad dramatization and the bad directing.

12131

CSO: 2800/177

LCY PAPER STARTS SERIES ON 'REVITALIZED' RELIGION

Belgrade KOMUNIST in Serbo-Croatian 13, 20 Jan 84

[Series of articles by Stipe Pojatina: "Religion, the Churches and Society"]

[13 Jan 84 p 22]

[Text] Religious Renewal or Revival of Church Ideologies

In recent years we have been witnesses to an intensified invigoration of the churches, of a characteristic effort on their part to reaffirm religious consciousness, of religious institutions and church ideology, and of their role and influence in contemporary social and ideological developments in the world.

It is not so long ago that diagnoses were made, perhaps at times too superficially, to the effect that religion and the church, under the pressure of existing and ongoing changes, would be thrust to the very margin of social life and would thus lose irrecoverably any role or influence of any significance on the scene of national life or indeed relations in the world. Present events, however, provide an abundance of examples which indicate the need for a reassessment and, what is more, for correction of such conclusions. There is evidence of this in the invigoration of various religious directions, the historical train of events, and the current influence which religion and church organizations are having on the ideological, cultural or sociopolitical situation and developments in certain countries or parts of the world, depending on the particular social, general-cultural and political context. In countries and regions of the world with different social systems and different historical and cultural realities and traditions, there have in fact been more processes of invigoration of the religious factor than up to now, processes which are ambiguous and quite often even contradictory, aimed at a strengthened role of the church and church ideology in resolving the urgent problems confronted by individual societies or by the world as a whole.

Contemporary Religious Developments

These tendencies are a kind of challenge for more comprehensive research and analysis in order to arrive at a more sophisticated insight and an answer to the question of the social causes, especially the ideological and political

background, of these processes, certainly the causes are complicated, and certainly we cannot seek them in any particular doctrines or teachings of the various religious leanings, nor indeed can all this be explained by arguments about religion as a "inherent human characteristic," about the "indestructible need for religion," or about some sort of "eternal indestructible and invariable vitality of religions," about "its lasting liberative potential," etc. The manifestations of a livelier interest in religion, certain religious events, and especially the increasingly evident activism on the part of institutional religions, the church, today, are rooted primarily in the features of the contemporary world, in its increasingly complex contradictions: in the crisis of socioeconomic systems, of relations and values, in the relations of social and especially class forces, in difficulties arising out of the division of the world into blocs and the crisis of detente, in the dangers of nuclear war, in the gap and opposition between the advanced and underdeveloped parts of the world, and so on. In short, all of these real "secular" and "temporal" social factors are encouraging the churches to make more and more use of the "space" opened up to them as man and the contemporary world confront urgent contradictions and on that basis to build a strategy of a more offensive role and influence on the direction of social developments. The churches are accordingly striving to establish a functional relationship between religious consciousness and various social topics in order to assume the role of a modulator of everyday social life and thereby to actually overcome the crisis as to their identity and as to the secular role which they have had historically.

Reinforcement of the Spirit of Conservativism, Fundamentalism and Integralism

Quite often in the case of the official churches these endeavors manifest a stronger spirit of conservativism, fundamentalism and integralism, a desire to reaffirm the role of the hierarchy and of discipline, a kind of renewed dynamism of certain religions, a tendency to mobilize large events to bring the churches closer to the people and to serve as the skeleton for the broadest possible rallying of the masses of believers, and so on. There are similarities in all the persuasions, although it can be said that these processes, depending on the circumstances and those who manifest them, are often mediated through differing motives and goals. Research into the contemporary practice of religious organizations shows that the motives and social impacts of their activities do not all go in the same direction and quite often are contradictory: from the support of conservative social political solutions and systems to the formation of leftwing-oriented currents and movements within the framework of particular religious leanings which contribute through their activity to the development of progressive and democratic movements, indeed even revolutionary and liberation movements.

In the face of these developments, especially when we analyze the manifestations of the revival of religion and church ideologies, we cannot remain at the level of abstract treatment and explanation of "religion as such." In undertaking a study of phenomena of this kind, distinguishing religion and religious consciousness from the church and church ideology, we should first examine the role which the historical forms of religion have had under the specific conditions of the class struggle. Only in this way is it possible

to identify or, more precisely, determine the importance of particular religious movements and their role in the formation or renewal of particular ideologies and social movements. Just as the social basis, regardless of the existence of similar or related characteristics, differs, so are the reasons for the invigoration of the religious factor different, for example, in the highly advanced industrial countries, where in spite of the high level of secularization there are still social conditions for the reproduction of religious consciousness, from those in the developing countries, where the role of religion in the mass movements, especially in the more recent period, has increased.

We should also be mindful of the fact that the religious persuasions today constitute very complicated structures and organizations, and indeed within them there may exist differing and indeed even opposed currents at one and the same time.

In other words, particular religious movements within a particular church do not always follow the views and practice of the official governing hierarchy. There is sufficient evidence of this in the increasingly numerous examples of leftwing-oriented currents, some of which, inspired by religious teachings and attitudes, are actually joining certain liberation movements, by contrast with their own hierarchy, which often is even resisting such movements. Both in matters of religion and also on sociopolitical issues the protagonists of this kind of activity are quite often in opposition to the governing hierarchy.

One must likewise distinguish the views and actions of the official church when, for instance, it favors peace in the world, opposes nuclear war, supports disarmament, equal relations among nationalities, solidarity, ecumenicalism and dialogue and tolerance, from those conceptions and practice in which "religious truths, the Holy Book and principles" are taken not only as the basis of the religious world-outlook, but indeed as foundations for construction of contemporary societies and culture, accompanied by simultaneous intolerance and exclusiveness in the domain of social consciousness, which is manifested as an integralist ideological and political exclusiveness in certain social communities. Regardless of the protagonists and the ultimate interests they may be pursuing, in the first case we are referring to efforts which fit into the constructive values of all humanity, and accordingly in progressive aspirations of the contemporary world. In the other example, however, it is more or less a question of positions which lead to revival of church ideologies and clericalism, which today are explicitly expressed, for example, as Catholic or Orthodox integralism, the ideology of pan-Islamism or Islamic fundamentalism, and which offer their own religious sociopolitical doctrine for solving the problems of the contemporary world or of specific societies, quite often in a coalition with reactionary social forces.

The "Christian Way" in Solving Expressly Secular Problems

The Catholic church is even today an example of a persuasion in which it is possible for differing currents to exist simultaneously, especially with reference to sociopolitical issues. The most recent processes which have been

taking place in that church at its official level show, however, a halting of the trends toward the opening of dialogue toward other ideological, cultural and historical realities of the contemporary world. Although the processes today by no means signify the church's return to the situation before the Second Vatican Council or even a complete abandonment of the "Aggiornamenta," the church and its hierarchy are more and more proclaiming their "truths" and their own convictions to be self-sufficient as the basis for furnishing answers to the key existential issues of the contemporary world and of man under the conditions, as it is put, of the "utter moral crisis" and in the situation when various "'ideologies,' especially Marxism, have lost their plausibility." In that sense Christianity and Christian humanism are being offered to a world in crisis as the only alternative able to give answers to the existential crisis of our time.

Following the period of dialogue, Pope John Paul II, putting emphasis on the self-sufficiency of church doctrines, is opening up a period of specific neo-integralism which is supposed to help the church strike firmer roots into present-day society and knit the Catholic community more strongly together. The pope, then, is imparting a certain dynamism to the church and is making a turn toward mass or what is referred to as "popular" Catholicism. Following a relatively passive attitude toward the multitudes of the faithful, a more active position is now on the rise, a position manifested in various forms of events, from the pope's numerous and often spectacular trips and statements to the practice of large rallies and religious events.

The tendency toward an increasingly all-inclusive activity in the pastoral area also contains a programmed effort to qualify the church as a moral force of world importance which through a "worldwide moral renewal" would concern itself, among other things, with peace, social security, human rights and freedoms, the rights and interests of nationalities, and which through its actions would take on the role of modulator of everyday social life (demands for greater influence on upbringing and education, the news media, the culture media, etc.). These neointegralist tendencies and attitudes are regarded, for example, by religiously based movements such as "Comunione e liberazione," and especially "Opus dei," as a stimulus for proposing once again the "Christian way" in solving expressly temporal problems. One of the strategic commitments of the official church today has to do with projection of a Christian alternative of unity to the ideological and social systems of a disunited Europe. Numerous activities have been launched as part of this, from the celebration throughout Europe of Saint Benedict and Saints Cyril and Methodius as defenders of Europe, various international congresses on joint Christian roots of Europe or symposiums of European bishops from East and West, to the pope's messages during numerous visits to European countries. In that same context Pope John Paul II made an emphatic statement in September 1983 during a visit to Austria, when he sent a renewed appeal to Europe to "lift its artificially created divisions and boundaries and build its own unity on its own indigenous rights and foundations, and that is 'Christianity.'"

[20 Jan 84 p 22]

[Text] Manipulation of Religious Sentiment

Portraying itself as an institution over and above society (that is, over and above classes and the state), the church is more and more taking on the features of an institution pronouncing judgments and issuing guidelines for solving social and international problems from the standpoint of its specific religious conceptions. A particularly important place is given to the experience of Poland as the strongest example of the "tenacity of a nation," where for centuries the so-called "lasting values" have been emphasized: the Christian faith, the nationality, homeland and culture, by contrast with the "transient" values, the specific forms of the social system, various social movements, or even the class struggle.

The Ideology of Ayatollah-ism

A particular type of invigoration of the religious factor has become especially important in certain developing countries, especially in some countries where Islam is present as a religious commitment. Here we encounter an augmented role of religion in mass social movements. Specifically, under the conditions of certain national liberation movements in which immense masses of the population become active, religious sentiment is still present as the dominant form of social consciousness, so that social and especially national aspirations are expressed in religious form. Under the aegis of Islam, for example, the revolution against the shah was carried out in Iran and numerous developments are still taking place in religious trappings in the Arab countries. Precisely because of the religious form they take, certain movements in that part of the world are also showing contradictions: although in terms of their national liberation struggle and aspirations they might be classified as progressive, the example of Iran especially shows that they offer as ultimate solutions political conservatism and a fundamentalist Islamic orientation. The installation of the ideology of Ayatollah-ism and the strengthened role of Islam as an "entire and not merely religious world outlook" is an example of a new bureaucratic form of government which typically manipulates the religious sentiment of the masses and establishes a sociopolitical system based on religious teachings and the leading role of the clergy.

Depending on the specific conditions, integralist tendencies are also present today in the activity of the hierarchy within the Orthodox faith, in which certain churches are offering Orthodoxy as the basis for solving specific social problems, tending especially toward an enlarged role of the church in national life. In the more recent period ever greater emphasis is being put on the need for stronger coherence of Orthodoxy in order to create conditions for more significant influence on the world scene.

We have merely indicated in brief outline some of the tendencies and developments related to the revival of religious ideologies. We should emphasize that in the area of social commitment present-day religions certainly do not manifest themselves in their "pure form" or real significance, but rather the religious organizations or religious movements cross over the boundaries of

the specific sphere of the religious, striving to assume the role of a more significant factor in resolving certain social issues, relying in this on their philosophical, moral and social teachings.

In any case, the sociology of religion today records that purely religious expression or the church's appeal to the masses concerning dogmatic attitudes and questions of faith are more and more losing their significance, while at the same time there is growing interest in everything the church says or commits itself to in practice in the area of altogether secular problems, such as the problems of war and peace, disarmament, human rights and freedoms, the rights and interests of nationalities, social systems, and so on. So if it can be said in this connection that contemporary societies, because of the urgent crisis, are also favoring an intensified reproduction of various forms of religious consciousness, it is difficult to accept those views to the effect that we are dealing today with a "universal religious renewal." It would be far closer to the truth to speak of the revival and invigoration of various church ideologies.

In our context we also confront manifestations of an increasingly committed offensive on the part of churches and religious communities and their tendency to reaffirm the role and influence of church ideologies in various aspects of social life. In an analysis of this phenomenon we must turn to the question of how related this domestic phenomenon is to the problems which Yugoslav society is facing today and to what extent this is a specific reflex of developments in the world at large. Both factors we have mentioned should be taken into account at the outset, but at the same time particular respect must be paid to the historical features of the role of churches on our soil and to the character of a socialist self-managing society.

The Genesis of Clericalistic Manifestations

It is not possible in a brief essay, of course, to enter into all the aspects of the diversity of church-religious activities in which the tendencies of clericalism are manifested. We will therefore deal only with that area in which contemporary clericalism is rooted most pronouncedly, and that is the treatment of relations between the religious and the ethnic within the large traditional faiths (Catholic, Orthodox and Islam). There is evidence that this is the case in the fact that conflicts in relations between society and the church have in recent years been occurring predominantly in this area. It is no accident, then, that at public meetings and also in journalism emphasis is very often put on manifestations of Orthodox, Catholic and Islamic clericalism, the abuse of the religious and the ethnic, the practice of identifying those areas, there is criticism of the thesis to the effect that the church is a defender of ethnic identity and the interests of the nationality, and finally, clericalism and the linking of clericalism and nationalism are criticized. In the context of a multinational and multistate community, in a community which is mixed in its religious and ethnic makeup, with all the complexity of the religious-church factor, and especially in a country where the principle of ethnic equality and relations is being implemented on socialist foundations, these tendencies toward revival of church ideologies have particular weight and importance.

Since even on our soil political clericalism has always been rooted in an abuse of religious sentiment in the direction of shaping, renewing and invigorating national and political ideologies on a religious basis, primarily by means of institutional religion, the church, there is good reason for us to recall the genesis, essence and influence of this form of consciousness. The historical and indeed even current modalities of the correlation of religious and ethnic consciousness on our soil display, that is, an abundance of examples of how goals in the religious and ethnic area are very frequently instrumentalized through a linkage of these phenomena. Religious consciousness has in this become a particularly suitable instrument for manipulation to meet various ideological and political needs, certainly as a function of which social and class forces were under various circumstances shaping the content and performing the function of the national ideologies.

One favoring circumstance in this has, of course, been the significant historical influence of religious consciousness and the church on development of the consciousness of ethnic and later national allegiance, as well as on the development of the culture and tradition of more or less all of our nationalities. The history of political clericalism within the Catholic church in Croatia shows that it has always arisen and developed as a church ideology aimed against those secular social forces and movements which on a lay foundation shaped the content and function of the national ideologies and thereby threatened the church's monopoly in the domain of social consciousness. That is why religious indifference, secularism, modernism, liberalism, materialism, atheism and, especially later, communism came under particular attack in "defense of the faith and the church." The All-Croat Catholic Congress of 1900, which encouraged a stronger tendency toward identification of Catholicism and Croat identity, was actually a reaction against the development of national and political ideas and social ideas which displaced the social role of religion. A marked example of that reaction is the clericalistic confrontation with the peasant movement of the Radic brothers. Ever since that time organized clericalism has been manifested more and more, and it received a thrust from the period of Catholic action (the Eagle and Crusader lay organizations) carried out under the motto "God--Church--Nation" toward the goal of "restoration of a Catholic society" and the extreme demand for creation of a Civitas dei, that is, "God's Croatia." In the Slovenian context that church ideology developed in the direction of Catholic political parties.

Identification of the religious and the ethnic, whose tradition goes back even to the times of the Turks, when the church had a highly developed role in the people's affairs of an expressly secular nature, is very pronounced within Orthodoxy. Orthodox clericalism permanently adopted the myth of Saint Vitus' Day and Saint Sava as the alpha and omega of the history of the Serbian people, while the church stood as the custodian and interpreter of those myths and of the national ideology in general. Under the circumstances of monarchistic Yugoslavia, the Serbian Orthodox Church, constantly obtruding the right of a "state church," also strongly emphasized the role of a defender of the centralistic and monarchistic principle and thereby was in fact an accomplice and ideologue of Great Serbian nationalism.

The Islamic faith has also been used for various ideological and political purposes: either in the context of Croatian or Serbian national claims, through the formation of an aggressive clerical-nationalistic Young Muslim organization, etc.

In short, in the prewar period identification of the faith and the nationality and the politicization of churches on that basis mainly pursued the direction of the most conservative rightwing ideologies, political conceptions and practice: in the context of the unresolved nationality question, the class struggle and the political confrontations of that time, the church ideology and the clericalism based on it were carried over wholesale into politics and were used in the ideological and political struggle against leftwing democratic orientations, especially communism. Historical experience shows what clericalistic nationalism has meant on our soil: from religious enmity, mutual exclusiveness of the faiths, aspirations to monopoly in the field of social consciousness and church ideologies, and homogenization of the people the path led easily to chauvinism, nationalism or fascism. It is no accident, then, that certain spokesmen of clericalistic nationalism were also protagonists of intellectual and propaganda activity within the Quisling structures and at leading church institutions and figures identified themselves with an antisocialist and anticommunist orientation, which in fact led them into betraying their nationality.

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BARRACKS COMMANDER DESCRIBES DUTIES, PRIVATE LIFE

Sarajevo OSLOBODJENJE in Serbo-Croatian 25 Dec 83 p 5

[Article by Mehmet Vejzagic: "Fear--No; Responsibility--Yes"]

[Text] Even as a child, by virtue of circumstances, he played with bombs and a pistol, later to fulfill his childhood dreams, when he became associated with the military uniform--"The superior officer has to be foremost in everything. He has to be an example," emphasizes Milosav Gagovic, the commander of the "Slavisa Vajner Cica" Barracks.

"Good morning. If you please. Please park the car on the right. Yes, yes, I know. The commander is waiting for you. Wait a second while I check."

After he telephoned, the officer on duty at the main gate of the "Slavisa Vajner Cica" Barracks informed us that the commander would receive us in about ten minutes.

After we waited in the reception room, for exactly ten minutes, the duty officer led us into the office of the commander of the "Slavisa Vajner Cica" Barracks, Lt Col Milosav Gagovic.

In a room filled with flowers, we were awaited by Commander Gagovic and his primary coworkers, Lt Col Veljko Drobac and Major Vehbija Karic.

"Don't be angry over this short wait; we had a mandatory daily meeting." We were addressed by Lt Col Gagovic, a YNA [Yugoslav National Army] officer. At first glance we could not believe that he could hold the post that he does, since this tall officer, a Montenegrin we immediately concluded from his accent, confirms the well known belief that Montenegrins are people who act young, even though they are advanced in their years.

"Well, 'Fourth Estate,' what shall we drink?"

"Coffee, naturally, since the day has just begun."

In the office is the soldier Slavko Cutic, a blond young man from Gospic, whom his commander jokingly calls "Whiskers," although the first whiskers have just grown on this smooth-chinned young man with a boyish appearance.

"Coffee--count heads."

We had not even made ourselves comfortable, when the coffee arrived.

"It's bitter," we observed.

"I don't like sweet coffee. We have sweet (TULUMBA) and (KADAIF)," Gagovic immediately replied. "If you'd like something sweet, go ahead."

"Would you like a cigarette?" we asked, in order to smoke up the clean and airy room more easily.

"You smoke by yourselves. I gave it up exactly 10 years ago, and I smoked for 22 years. What do you smoke?"

"The Sarajevo 'Drina' with a filter."

"I was also a 'filter user.' They say there's less nicotine. And there's the same thing for you."

"You seem young for a commander?"

"That's relative. In the war, people my age were division commanders."

"Since we're already on this, when were you born?"

"In 1937, in the village of Bezuja, the Pluzina opstina, the Piva district, in Montenegro. My father Blazo and my mother Andja had five of us. Two sisters, Vidosava and Vukosava, my older brother Kosta, and my younger brother Djoka. Today we are spread out across the country."

From Desire to Reality

"We were a little late. We see that your working day has already begun on a large scale. When did you come to the Barracks this morning?"

"This morning at 6:45, when the bus with the officers arrived in front of the Barracks."

"The bus, Commander?"

"What are you surprised about? It's like that here; we all come by bus."

"Does the working day begin at seven?"

"Often even earlier. You know how it is in the army."

"And?"

"In accordance with the new modified Service Regulations I receive a report from the duty officer, make the rounds of the guards, and find out what has happened during the night. After this there is a meeting with the closest officers, in which we analyze the previous day and make plans for the current one. After that I issue assignments and the day begins. A tour of the area and the installations, a morning inspection, reports and a visit to a unit, usually during the hour for political instruction, and later military-professional training. Naturally, during the day there are also other obligations, all of them according to the plan, and sometimes unusual ones. Yesterday we..."

The telephone rang.

"Yes, Lt Col Gagovic. Go ahead. Yes, yes, good, that's right."

"Where were we? Yes, the last few days it was different. We were in Kalinovka, but that is something else."

"So you get up early?"

"About five, for the most part."

"And you do that every day?"

"That's my duty."

"You said duty. How did it begin?"

"Well, you've heard similar stories, but I'll tell you. In my time children played differently. A rifle and a pistol were in my hands since I was little. This was precisely my main 'toy,' and that's the reason for the love of duty and the uniform. I grew up in the area where the fifth offensive and part of the fourth one were conducted, and where rifles, bombs, and other weapons were found at every step, in the region where airplanes clashed. And thus we children, hiding them from our parents, began what was for us an innocent but very dangerous game."

A stop. Again the telephone. Again a report from a unit. Again a mild but authoritative conversation.

"Our playing was dangerous, dangerous. A good friend of mine, Danilo Dubljevic, who is an agronomist today--I know he had his last service in Foca--lost a hand. My first cousin Natalija Gagovic, a seven-year-old girl, even lost her life playing with these 'toys,' which were our only ones at that time."

Thus Lt Col Gagovic, going back to the wartime days, told us about how he first encountered the uniform. He immediately liked it, dreaming about how one day he would have his own pistol that he would not have to hide from anyone.

His long-ago wish as a child has become a reality.

And They Play Soccer

"I entered the gymnasium in Niksic, but that was not what I wanted. After the sixth--today the second--grade, I entered the Noncommissioned Officer School in Sarajevo. That was in 1955. After graduating, I went to the Military Academy in Belgrade, where I graduated in 1962. That year I also received my first job. I remained in the Marshal Tito Barracks, and my first post was deputy platoon commander. The specific characteristics of my career then led me to Slovenia, to Crnomerje, where I got married, then to Klan near Rijeka, and, after finishing the Command-Staff Academy, I was first an instructor at the Center of Military Schools of the Land Army, and in 1975 I came to this barracks."

"And now you are the commander?"

"For the sixth year now. I became the commander of the Barracks in 1978."

Captain First Class Fikret Muslimovic came into the office.

"Allow me to congratulate the commander."

A kiss and a handshake.

"And congratulations to you as well," Lt Col Gagovic said cordially.

That day was the eve of 22 December--YNA Day. These congratulations were only being given in advance; at the moment we were "realizing it."

"And we also congratulate you, Commander."

"Well, nothing can be hidden from you 'Fourth Estate.' Thanks, but let's wait until tomorrow, when it will be official."

Our assignment also required us to be there the next day, at the celebration at this barracks, when to the unanimous and thunderous applause of the soldiers and senior officers and the attending guests, the order was read by which Lt Col Milosav Gagovic was promoted to the rank of colonel.

"A colonel, and you are only 47?"

"I am not the only one. In our army there is a large number of young people in the same kind of position as I am. A superior officer, and especially the commander, has to be foremost in everything. He has to be an example. He has to demonstrate something. And it's worth while to play soccer, to run with these young people. You see, most of the officers are young people. A large number of officers are getting their first experience and their first duties right here, in this barracks, as the commanders of units, platoons...."

The "Slavisa Vajner Cica" Barracks is "bursting" with youth--young officers and 18- or 19-year-old soldiers.

According to the Service Regulations

"It's true that every beginning is difficult," Gagovic said as if he foresaw our next question, "but this year's results give us the right to be satisfied. The average grade is 4.00. This is the assessment from the superior Command, which means that the situation in the units is at the level appropriate to the type of service in which we live and work. Efforts are being made, but results are being achieved."

"Young people are coming into the army; are they much younger than used to be the case?"

"Today secondary school graduates, students, are coming in. Educated people. What an educated force this is, and what material this is for the individual superstructure--there is nothing to conceal, this is good. But at the same time, it is a great obligation, of a certain kind. There is a reason for this."

"On the other hand?"

"As I have said, the obligation and duty of an officer is much greater and more complicated, since these are young people with their own habits. They have had a free way of life before coming into the Army. They slept as much as they wanted, got up when they wanted, read, went to the movies, a cafe, with a girl. One also feels--not with all, but with some--that they are spoiled."

"What?"

"Well, physically they are somehow 'skinnier' than previous generations."

Drobac, the deputy, who had previously left the office, came in:

"Commander, is everything going according to plan?"

"Fine."

"Permit me to leave."

That is the kind of conversation conducted by the two lieutenant colonels. To tell the truth, it had "leaked out" that beginning the next day Gagovic would have one more star, but would remain in the same post. But even without this, this kind of conversation and similar ones are conducted in accordance with the Service Regulations. This is what Commander Gagovic said in response to a question about how things were going with his coworkers:

"According to the spirit of the existing regulations."

What was going according to plan had to do with the general test prior to the holiday the next day.

"Well, think, here's just one case--a soldier from Slovenia who has been used to having his own room since he was little had to sleep with about forty young men. He requested a separate room. Ok, that is an exceptional case, but for the most part there have not been any problems. The most important thing is that it is the boys who are responsible for this. They very quickly master military skills. They become good soldiers."

While we went around the Barracks and viewed the preparations for the following day, the soldiers and officers greeted us. One could see their respect and sense of military discipline. Colonel Gagovic--we could now write that way already--caressed each soldier with his glance, but also pointed out mistakes.

"Are you acting somewhat strictly?"

"I am not in favor of that word--strictness. It is better to replace it with principles. You know, I--and my officer colleagues know this--do not want to have someone afraid of me. And believe me, an officer who is afraid of a superior, who, as you said, is frightened, is not a good one. But it is another matter when someone is frightened if he has not fulfilled his duty. That is a question of responsibility."

Trust, and Something Else

"That's what things are like at the Barracks; what about at home?"

"Ask my wife Cvetka, my son Robert, and my daughter Radmila. I am just the same at home, even though I don't have my belt with me."

His wife Cvetka, a Slovene from Crnomerje, employed at Slovenijales, his son Robert, who is finishing transportation school, and his daughter Radmila, 18 years old, a year younger than her brother, who is graduating from a special secondary school in language studies, do not have the privilege of associating with their father and husband a lot. His work is of such a nature that it could not have been any different.

"Although I really do not have much time for those closest to me, I am not one of those people who neglect their families. I understand them, and they understand me. It is not that I am a soldier, but at home they know who is senior. I help in matters that are for the husband and father, but I do not interfere in the kitchen. A man has to have an affinity for that. My brother Djoko is an excellent cook, but I don't even know how to fix eggs for a meal, so there's no reason for me to interfere. I don't interfere in the children's business either. I have complete confidence in them, as they have in me. But as long as we're on the subject, you have to be in contact with children. You have to do so especially now, when all sorts of things can be seen on television, when cafes, drugs, a flood from the West, have gained currency. I don't have any problem with this, except that with respect to music, we have different tastes. The children like popular music and I like folk music, especially original music, although I have developed my ear "a bit."

Col Gagovic, when he is at home, spends most of his time reading. OSLOBODJENJE and VECERNJE NOVOSTI are mandatory reading. He also finds time for a good book. And on television, in addition to the news, he likes to watch a certain domestic series and folk music. Naturally, he does not miss the sports broadcasts. He is a Red Star fan.

"It's not really going well for the Star, is it?"

"The Star is not a bad team, but the current trainer, ZEC, is getting away from today's modern soccer. Maybe I shouldn't criticize, but I think that in this bush--there is a rabbit [ZEC in the original]."

This assessment is from a former active soccer player on the First Partisan team from Crnomerje, and the champion of the Military Academy in shot-putting and discus-throwing. We also spoke about the match with the Bulgarians that was being played that afternoon. Col Gagovic spoke with reservations about the outcome of this match. Although he is an optimist, he was worried about the final outcome. Later it was shown that Commander Gagovic has a "good nose."

In the talks, we did not pass over Lepa Brena and her rival Lana.

"Lepa Brena is unsurpassed. I think that Lana is not as able as Brena is to show the audience everything she knows and has.

"Lepa Lukic, Hanka, and other singers are unjust when they dispute Brena's quality. She has it, that is indisputable, just as they do. Hanka tried to sing one of Brena's songs in that Novi Sad broadcast, and you saw what happened. But Brena, in my opinion, is capable of singing any song well."

Letters to Parents and From Parents

Major Vehbija Karic brought in the letters that had arrived at the Barracks in the last few days. The contents of almost every one of them talked about the barracks where we were, the officers, and the commander.

"We receive a fair number of letters from the parents, former soldiers and Pioneers. Our practice, as was reported in EKSPRES, is to send every parent a letter when his son joins the Army. We say that he arrived safely and that we are taking care of him now."

We read one of the letters:

"Comrade Commander, Thank you very much for your letter in which you informed me that my son Veljko Bozic arrived safely at your barracks and that military officers are taking care of him, and that he will have all the necessary living conditions, and also that he will be brought up in the spirit of our self-managing socialism idea. I wish to make use of this opportunity to say that your letter has manifold useful significance in the positive sense of the word, for which I once again thank you very much. Sincere regards to you and all of Veljko's other officers. Vuko Bozic."

Letters with similar contents arrived from Podujevo, Mostar, Ljubljana, Titograd, Belgrade, Zagreb...

The parent Kadri Kastrati wrote from Decan, and Milka and Janez Rozanec from Begunj.

Salih Haziri from Vucitrno wrote:

"I would like you to inform me of everything negative and positive on my son BASRI's part so that I can also make a full contribution...."

The miner Zivan Despotovic from Tuzla wanted the same thing as Haziri, that the commander or the superior officer write him about how his son was behaving.

That is what it was like at the "SLAVISA VAJNER CICA" Barracks. That is what it was like to spend a day with the commander, the newly promoted Colonel Milosav Gagovic. And such a day would be the same or similar, certainly, if we had been at any other barracks throughout our country.

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