


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MILITARY HISTORY JOURNAL

No 2, February 1987

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THE HUMAN FACTOR IN WAR

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 2, Feb 87 (signed to press 21 Jan 87) pp 3-10

[Article, published under the heading "The Decisions of the 27th CPSU Congress in Life," by Army Gen I.N. Shkadov, Hero of the Soviet Union]

[Text] The Soviet Armed Forces for 69 years have defended peace and progress. During this period the Army and Navy have withstood many severe testings, having covered their colors with immortal glory.

On the eve of the glorious jubilee the Soviet people and their armed defenders are working fruitfully to carry out the responsible tasks posed by the 27th Party Congress. The historic forum of the Soviet communists adopted a magnificent program which outlines the paths for a planned and all-round improvement in socialism and for the further advance of Soviet society toward communism on the basis of accelerating the nation's socioeconomic development.

The successful fulfillment of this program depends upon many factors among which the 27th CPSU Congress has particularly focused on two dialectically interrelated ones: a cardinal acceleration in scientific and technical progress and the activating of the human factor. "The congress has placed in the forefront," states the Resolution of the 27th Party Congress on the Political Report of the CPSU Central Committee, "the task of carrying out a profound technical reconstruction of the national economy on the basis of the most scientific and technical achievements."(1)

But no matter how advanced technology may be, it is controlled by man. This is why the Political Report of the CPSU Central Committee to the Congress pointed out: "The most essential thing on which we must presently focus all the force of party influence is to have each person realize the acuteness of the moment being lived through and its pivotal nature. Any plans of ours will remain unrealized if they leave people indifferent and if we are unable to arouse the labor and social activeness of the masses, their energy and initiative. The primary condition for accelerating the nation's socioeconomic development is to turn society toward new tasks and to focus the creative potential of the people and each labor collective on carrying them out."(2) The CPSU Program also emphasizes: "The party links the successful execution of the designated tasks to a rise in the role of the human factor."(3)

The human factor.... For us, the military directly involved in strengthening the combat potential of the Soviet Armed Forces, this concept includes a great deal. The Army and Navy are primarily people, their relationships, their moral-political and professional readiness to defend the fatherland. The role of the human factor grows particularly under the conditions of conducting combat operations, in a war where courage, steadfastness and valor on the part of each man are most vividly apparent.

The human factor is a concrete concept. This means a thorough knowledge of people, a daily and complete study of subordinates, the conducting of constant and effective individual work in the area of the political, military and moral indoctrination of the personnel and the manifesting of every possible concern for man, his professional, spiritual and cultural growth.

Having written these lines I cannot refrain from quoting the immortal words of Lenin which clearly define the essence of strengthening ties with the masses.

"To live in the very thick of them.

To know their moods.

To know everyone.

To understand the masses.

To be able to reach them.

To win their absolute trust.

Not to separate the leaders from the led masses, the vanguard from the entire army of labor."(4)

To profoundly understand the leader's instructions concerning the importance of a close link between the commander and subordinates and to take to heart the demands of the 27th CPSU Congress concerning the necessity of mastering Lenin's methods of daily ideological indoctrination in the masses--all of this means to maintain in the troop collectives an atmosphere of friendship, solidarity, firm discipline and organization, effectiveness in indoctrinating and training dependable defenders of the motherland and, consequently, to activate the human factor. This is a major task for the commander and the political worker, the staff and headquarters officer, the party and Komsomol worker, the propagandist, that is, everyone who is called upon to form in the servicemen a strong ideological conviction, political awareness, and develop high moral qualities and a feeling of personal responsibility for the defense of the socialist fatherland. An officer, whatever position he holds, is not only a military leader and a specialist but also a proponent of party policy in the masses of soldiers. He must carry out organizational work in close unity with the indoctrination of the personnel and should realize that his every action is visible to all.

Closeness to the men and a concern for them have always been and remain the primary duty of the Soviet officers. The Internal Service Regulations of the USSR Armed Forces obliges the commander and superior to thoroughly study the personnel by personal contact with them both in service and in everyday life. If the officer not only out of duty but also out of human concern is in constant contact with his subordinates and unswervingly observes the moral standards of conduct and relations with them, if he possesses high political

standards and profound professional knowledge, if he is disciplined, principled and tactful, if he knows well the attitudes of the men, their needs, requests and dreams and if he shows them human warmth, his activities undoubtedly will bear fruit and in a combat situation the men will follow such a man.

If I were asked in what period of service I most strongly felt how great was the importance of the human factor and the significance of the closeness of the commander to his subordinates, the solidarity of the officer with his men, I would, of course, mention the unforgettable terrible years of the Great Patriotic War. In the course of the war I for a long time commanded the Order of the Red Banner, Order of Suvorov, Dneprodzerzhinsk 52d Separate Tank Regiment. With great emotion I recall my combat comrades, the officers, sergeants and soldiers who in fierce clashes with the enemy set an example of courage and heroism, of unprecedented loyalty to the motherland and unswerving execution of a battle order.

The fighting was heavy and bloody. But, regardless of the difficulties, it was essential to find time for the training and indoctrination of the men. This was a difficult question as life posed for me a number of problems involving the activities of the regiment in a combat situation and my subordinate officers, NCOs and soldiers also had to carry out difficult missions. Under those conditions, I realized how important it was to unite the men, for myself to be close to them, to bring the officers close to the soldiers and instill in subordinates the idea that any combat mission can be carried out much easier if everyone acts energetically and skillfully.

Without exaggeration I can say that I had good officers. They shared with the soldiers the same ideas, the same goals and served as an example in everything for them. This was the main lever for activating the human factor in the war and not only in the war.

I recall several combat episodes linked to the above-voiced ideas.

At the end of August 1943, our regiment was attached to the 46th Army. As part of it it participated in the combat operations of the Steppe, Southwestern and Third Ukrainian Fronts. In the fighting for a small population point to the southwest of Kharkov, the regiment fought together with the 353d Rifle Division, the 513th Separate Flamethrower Tank Battalion and the 1816 Self-Propelled Artillery Regiment.

Particularly active were the operations of the tank group headed by the commander of the medium tank company Sr Lt N. Zaytsev who in the previous fighting had distinguished himself in the ability to think originally. His subordinates were ready to follow him in any mission. In this fighting, too, Zaytsev's tank troops distinguished themselves. By an unexpected assault against the flank of the defending enemy they liberated the southern part of the population point the fighting for which had swung back and forth for more than a day. As a result they destroyed 26 guns of different caliber, 8 mortars, 8 pillboxes, 32 machine guns and around 500 enemy soldiers and officers. The commander of the 46th Army, Maj Gen V.V. Glagolev, in summing up the results of the previous fighting, noted the skillful actions,

organization and combat capability of our regiment as well as the continuous and good cooperation with the infantry and artillery.

In 1943, our regiment participated in liberating the Krasnyy Gigant Sovkhoz. On 4 September, on the basis of the received battle order, we made a march to the Bespalovka area with the task of advancing in the direction of the sovkhaz together with units of the 236th Rifle Division.

On 5 September, the regiment's subunits actively attacked the enemy. The Ferdinand field guns and the Panther tanks, with artillery support, repeatedly counterattacked. In this difficult situation the Soviet tank troops fought unstintingly. The tank of Lt V.A. Yevtushenko was one of the first to appear on the enemy's fortified defensive line. During the very first minutes of combat, with fire and by using its tracks, it destroyed two Nazi tanks, two antitank guns, four machine gun nests and up to an enemy infantry platoon. The Nazis set the tank of Communist Yevtushenko afire, but after this, until the shells ran out, the burning combat vehicle continued firing at the enemy. The heroic crew perished without leaving the tank.

Our tankmen also distinguished themselves in the fighting for the liberation of Dneprodzerzhinsk. Thus, the crew of the medium tank commander Lt N.B. Yagunov destroyed an enemy 75-mm cannon, three mortars, an observation post, a weapons dumps, two pillboxes and up to an enemy infantry company.

The crew of the medium tank headed by Lt R.I. Kryazhev showed limitless courage and valor. In the area of the population point of Nadiya, it broke out into the enemy rear. The Nazis unleashed all the might of their artillery and small arms fire against the bold men. But the tank troops did not flinch. They neutralized the enemy firing points and destroyed enemy personnel and equipment. For courage and valor shown in the fighting, the communist Lt R.I. Kryazhev was awarded the Order of the Patriotic War, 1st Degree. For personal bravery and skillful leadership of the tanks in fighting during the period from 22 through 27 October 1943, the Order of Aleksandr Nevskiy was presented to the commander of the medium tank company, Officer N.N. Zaytsev.

Fighting heroically in these battles were the regiment's officers P.I. Kolyuzhnyy, P.F. Tulov, M.A. Negrov, I.N. Kiselev, A.I. Topov, A.Ya. Brodskiy, V.Ye. Shpakov, N.I. Nemolyayev and Z.A. Sopilnik. In the order of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, the 52d Separate Tank Regiment was mentioned among the outstanding units and was given the honorific designator of "Dneprodzerzhinsk." The regiment received the Order of the Red Banner.

I write about this in order to stress the idea that the successes of the subunit or unit in combat are impossible without a leading role played by the officers as precisely they serve as a unique pacesetter in activating the human factor and in mobilizing subordinates to carry out heroic deeds and accomplishments.

I have especially described actions of Soviet officers under extreme conditions for I am profoundly convinced that war and combat are the touchstone on which the moral-political, psychological and professional qualities of a man, his courage and valor are tested. Combat also tests the

character of a soldier and shapes it, for a war and combat are a sphere where the human factor is manifested.

But it would be wrong to feel that in peacetime service does not demand from an officer or soldier the full manifestation of his courage, valor and heroism which inspire subordinates and lead to new heights in military skill. I would put it this way: wherever an officer may be (in exercises, in the classroom, on the testing range or firing range), he should always be ready for a feat.

Once in the Red Banner Carpathian Military District I happened to be talking with a group of young officers. A discussion was struck up about service, the indoctrination of soldiers and NCOs and relations between juniors and superiors, in a word, about the demands which are presently placed on an officer.

The others discussed with understanding their high assignment and military duty. But when the issue was raised of the moral and combat qualities of an officer and his assignment to be out front, some said that such qualities were manifested in combat. It could be felt that not all the comrades realized that military service was a special sort of human activity and that even in peacetime it places greater demands on a person and at times puts him in conditions which possibly even the veterans did not experience.

Here is just one example which has already gone down in the history of the Soviet Armed Forces.

During a cruise, an exceptionally complex situation arose in one of the submarine compartments. The men were in total isolation, in darkness, without food and water. Command of the compartment was assumed by the secretary of the submarine's party organization, Capt-Lt B.A. Plyakov. For several days under the conditions of the severest storm and low temperatures, the sailors fought for the survival of the boat. And all during this time officer Plyakov, feeling personal responsibility for the lives of the men and for the survival of the ship, gave no indication that it was intolerably difficult for him. He encouraged the men and by his example showed that it was not only necessary but possible to hold out and be victorious.

The courageous officer was awarded the Order of the Red Banner while high decorations were presented to the seamen and petty officers who were with him in the submarine compartment. Loyalty to military duty and a profound knowledge of their job helped them endure, but most importantly it was the dedication of the communist officer whom they emulated in overcoming the unbelievable difficulties.

It can be firmly asserted that virtually every officer in our Armed Forces, in being in an analogous situation, would act the same as Communist Plyakov. Such a readiness is instilled by our entire way of life, in the family, at school, in the production collective and of course in the military school, as well as during service in a unit and on a ship.

Here we would particularly like to mention the question of young officers. From the experience of the Great Patriotic War we know that young men from 18

to 23 years of age during all periods of the war comprised a large portion of the platoon and company commanders. The main burden of the war rested precisely on their shoulders and it was they who were the immediate indoctrinators and leaders of the soldiers who frequently considered them as their fathers.

How service commences for a young officer in a unit or on a ship and how he is met by the troop collective--this determines a great deal and leaves an impression on subsequent service by yesterday's military school graduate.

I remember well how we were met as young lieutenants in the 2d Mechanized Brigade of the Separate Red Banner Far Eastern Army where we received our appointment after military school. At the station we were cordially greeted by the representatives of the command we all set off to the camp where the brigade was stationed at that time. After a meal in the mess the formation's commander and commissar spoke with us. The discussion was about the military-political situation in the Far East which at that time has been sharply exacerbated due to the fault of the Japanese militarists as well as about our coming service.

We, four lieutenants, were sent to the 2d Tank Brigade where the commander, Capt N.M. Grigoryev, and the commissar, Sr Political Instructor Tulyakov, spoke with us. We realized that we had fallen into a close family of combat comrades and an awareness of what was expected from us and that we were needed here eased the excitement and made things easier. The company commander, Sr Lt I.I. Kazakov, brought me up on things, described in detail every soldier and sergeant in the platoon and then introduced me to the platoon which I was to command.

I recall with particular gratitude my company commander, Sr Lt I.I. Kazakov, an energetic man, a decisive and thoughtful indoctrinator. He knew the equipment magnificently. We all envied him. It seemed that if you were to wake up Kazakov in the middle of the night and ask him something about the tank's design he could answer clearly and without faltering. The senior lieutenant shot like a sniper and drove the tank skillfully, demonstrating to all the company personnel that in able hands the equipment was a mighty force. His lessons came in very handy in the fighting at Lake Khasan.

In addition to the company commander we, the young officers, were greatly helped by the battalion commander and commissar who taught us to work with the men, to indoctrinate the train them. They were our first educators and from them we learned to plan our work.

Work with the men is a complicated matter and does not tolerate formalism or indifference. It is a true art to understand a man and penetrate his inner world. The prominent Russian pedagogue K.D. Ushinskiy emphasized that the indoctrinator should endeavor to understand a man as he is in reality with all his spiritual needs. Only then will the educator be successful. How much is lost by leaders who poorly know and do not study their subordinates and there are persons who are unable or who do not permit themselves to ask, to seek or recall themselves.

The prominent Soviet military leader, MSU K.K. Rokossovskiy, in his book "Soldatskiy dolg" [A Soldier's Duty], pointed out: "...The essential qualities of any superior are his self-possession, calmness and respect for subordinates. And this is particularly true in a war. Just ask an old soldier: in combat there is nothing more precious for a man than the awareness that he is trusted, there is confidence in his forces and they rely on him...."(5)

In practice, unfortunately, this is sometimes not the case. During inspections and exercises and in carrying out complex tasks, individual senior chiefs, in protecting themselves, do not permit subordinates to take an independent step, thereby fettering their initiative. What does a commander learn if he is constantly in the role of a stand-in and does not show his own initiative. Excessive interference gives rise to irresponsibility and parasitic attitudes and a person ceases thinking creatively and is always relying on someone else. For this reason a correct balance of power and responsibility, trust and supervision on all levels are an indispensable condition for the effective training and indoctrination of officer personnel.

The effectiveness of individual work, and this is precisely what we are discussing, very often depends upon how measures of commendation are employed for earnestness in service and training, for high indicators for mastering military equipment and for courage shown in a training or combat situation.

Let me refer again to my own experience. When I was a regimental commander, we presented orders and medals to officers, sergeants and soldiers decorated for combat distinguishment in a frontline situation in breaks between fighting in a ceremony with our colors. Leaflets were devoted to the outstanding men and the army and front press wrote about them. I know persons who still keep the leaflets and newspapers of those times.

In the presence of everyone insignias were presented to an officer who had been promoted. The best men were photographed with the unfurled regimental colors. Other forms of moral and material commendation were widely practiced.

The example of the senior chief is very important in the spiritual formation of a serviceman's personality. A commander leaves his mark in the awareness and heart of a subordinate primarily by his words and deeds. Even F. Engels pointed out that "young officers...can very quickly master their service, in constantly observing the actions of senior officers."(6) It can be put this way: a commander should participate in the fate of a subordinate and in addition he should show an inherent demand to be actively involved in his fate.

During the years of the last war there were many such commanders on all fronts and in all field forces, formations and units. Without imposing their opinion, they could talk tactfully with a subordinate about a comment read in the army newspaper, about a concert held somewhere on the edge of the forest or a film viewed. Such talks not only brought them closer together but made it possible for the commander to have some idea of what the young officer was doing during the break between fighting, how he was concerned for his spiritual growth and whether the war was depressing his will.

It is possible to give many examples showing that a young officer opens up only to a person who approaches him with an open heart, who does not emphasize his superiority but rather shows understanding for his interests and habits. A senior comrade plays the role of an experienced sculptor who, in removing everything superfluous and unnecessary, patiently creates the required image.

The principles for relations between seniors and juniors, chiefs and subordinates are set out in the general troop regulations. A senior commander (chief) should cautiously use the rights granted him, always observe tact and in no circumstances belittle the personal dignity of a subordinate or put him in a position of a maladroit pupil. It is particularly important to observe this demand under wartime conditions and in extreme situations.

During the years of the Great Patriotic War, I did, albeit not frequently, meet with the front commanders, the prominent military leaders S.K. Timoshenko, R.Ya. Malinovskiy and F.I. Tolbukhin. Demanding commanders, they clothed the harsh bluntness of the military orders in a form which did not belittle the self-esteem of subordinates or their human dignity but rather created an atmosphere of mutual respect and confidence. I can say quite categorically that they were soldiers in the highest and noblest meaning of this word. They considered their primary duty to be their observance of strictest discipline, military order and subordination but never, under any circumstances, did they betray their habit of always remaining highly cultivated persons.

No one has the right, under any circumstances, to belittle human dignity. From experience I know how important it is to see and find the good in a person and develop and encourage his good aspirations. Alas, this truth has, unfortunately, not been learned by all officers.

The response of a superior to a mistake or shortcoming of a subordinate can vary. Everything depends upon the nature of the mistake as well as the experience and knowledge of both the superior as well as the guilty party and, of course, upon the restraint and reasonableness of both.

In this context I recall a lesson which the front commander K.K. Rokossovskiy taught one of the formation commanders.... Having arrived in the division to inspect the state of its defenses, the commander immediately noticed that not all his orders had been carried out.

The commander who had not met the front commander previously expected a dressing down. However, Rokossovskiy kept his external calm and this placated the divisional commander. He decided that the superior commander had not noticed anything.

Dinner time was approaching. The heartened division commander, hoping that after the meal the superior commander would be even in a better mood, invited Rokossovskiy to the table. Rokossovskiy looked closely at him and in a calm voice said: "Thank you for the invitation, but I cannot eat with a commander where there is such disorder. When you have put things in order, I will not refuse the invitation." After this he returned to his vehicle.

The rebuke expressed in this manner touched the self-esteem of the divisional commander. "This is my fault, I will put things in order," he resolved, "and then the front commander will dine with me."

The exactingness of a superior is just only when it is legitimate and proceeds from the interests of the matter. Only in this case is it perceived by the men as proper and has an indoctrinational force. Bias toward others and accentuating only shortcomings without considering positive aspects cause others to lose confidence in their force and bring passivity. This has a negative influence on the spiritual state of the troop collective as well as its moral and psychological climate.

The strength of the ties of a military leader with the collective and his ability to activate the human factor depend largely upon how profoundly he knows and in his activities consistently realizes the recommendations of military pedagogics and psychology. V.I. Lenin emphasized that "policy is carried out through people...." "...It is imperative to learn to approach the masses," he commented, "particularly patiently and cautiously in order to be able to understand the particular features and unique traits in the psychology of each stratum, profession and so forth of this mass."(7)

The importance of psychological and pedagogical knowledge in the activities of officer personnel has increased particularly under present-day conditions in line with the nature of a probable war. This has been caused also by a number of other factors, primarily by the increased role of the officers in all spheres of Army and Navy life and activities. This has been caused by the arming of the Armed Forces with weapons of enormous might, with complex combat equipment as well as by the intensifying of the troop training and indoctrination process and by the carrying out of tasks related to further strengthening the indoctrinational role of the Soviet Armed Forces. It is also important to consider the qualitative changes in the personnel.

* * *

The activating of the human factor holds an important place in successfully carrying out the vast and responsible tasks raised by the 27th Congress. At present, it is particularly essential to improve work with the men and help each man master the increased demands of the command. In the modern era, when the socialist and imperialist states possess armed forces equipped with mighty combat equipment, the outcome of a war will be decided in favor of that belligerent where the people have higher morale, where there is greater steadfastness, courage and organization and where the level of military art is higher. "In a war the victory will be on that side," wrote V.I. Lenin, "where there are greater reserves, greater sources of strength and greater tenacity in the masses of people."(8) This conclusion by V.I. Lenin was manifested with particular vividness during the years of the Great Patriotic War.

The socialist social and state system was victorious in the monstrous clash against Naziism. The sources of the strength of the Soviet Union were: the leadership of the Communist Party, the socialist social system, the socialist economy, the sociopolitical and ideological unity of the society, Soviet

patriotism and the friendship of the Soviet peoples, the solidarity of the people with the Communist Party as well as the unprecedented heroism and courage of the Soviet soldiers.

The decisive role of the human factor was apparent more vividly more than at any other time in the great victory which was won by our people over the Nazis and their allies.

Under present-day conditions the role of the human factor has grown immeasurably in strengthening the defense capability of the nation. Collective weapons require clear and dedicated actions by each man of the crew, by each operator, technician and engineer. Naturally, the role of the party and Komsomol organizations has increased in the question of employing the human factor to strengthen combat readiness, military discipline and order.

FOOTNOTES

1. "Materialy XXVII syezda KPSS" [Materials of the 27th CPSU Congress], Moscow, Politizdat, 1986, p 102.
2. Ibid., pp 85-86.
3. Ibid., p 140.
4. V.I. Lenin, PSS [Complete Collected Works], Vol 44, p 497.
5. K.K. Rokossovskiy, "Soldatskiy dolg" [A Soldier's Duty], Moscow, Voenizdat, 1980, p 88.
6. K. Marx and F. Engels, "Soch." [Works], 2d Edition, Vol 17, p 155.
7. V.I. Lenin, PSS, Vol 45, p 123; Vol 41, p 192.
8. Ibid., Vol 39, p 237.

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STRATEGIC COOPERATION FROM EXPERIENCE OF GREAT PATRIOTIC WAR

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 2, Feb 87 (signed to press 21 Jan 87) pp 11-19

[Article, published under the heading "Soviet Military Art," by Chief Mar Art V.F. Tolubko]

[Text] The experience of the Great Patriotic War reaffirmed that the achieving of the goals of armed combat depends largely upon the coordinated joint actions of the diverse forces involved in this. For this reason the questions of cooperation were constantly at the center of attention of the command and staffs of all levels. The organization and maintaining of cooperation on a strategic scale comprised an important function of the Soviet Supreme High Command in the leadership of the Armed Forces.

The essence of strategic cooperation consisted in the coordinated employment of large troop groupings (forces) conducting operations in one or several theaters of operations (strategic sectors) in the interests of achieving the aims of the strategic operations, campaigns and the war as a whole; in coordinating the efforts of the Soviet Army with the armies of the anti-Hitler coalition as well as with foreign formations on the Soviet-German Front.

With the significant scope and decisiveness of military operations, with the involvement in them of large masses of troops armed with diverse weapons and with the diversity of the tasks to be carried out, the organization of strategic cooperation represented a difficult problem but in the course of the war it was carried out as a whole successfully and was further developed. The mastery of the art of strategic cooperation along with other factors was an important condition for the Soviet Army to achieve victory over the Nazi troops.

Due to the well-known conditions in the initial period of the war, the Soviet Army in the first stage of hostilities against the aggressor was forced to conduct a strategic defensive. Here it was necessary to achieve a coordinating of efforts by our troops fighting on the main sectors so as to thwart the enemy's plan to capture vitally important areas and centers of our country, to tie down and as much as possible weaken the enemy assault groupings and gain time for preparing and deploying the reserves necessary for going over to a counteroffensive.

It was not easy to solve this problem since the enemy, in possessing the initiative and superiority in forces, launched attacks on those axes which it considered advantageous and moreover at a convenient time for itself. Under these conditions, strategic cooperation was organized in a limited time and often there were not enough forces for parrying the enemy's thrusts.

Nevertheless, in the course of the first defensive operations, experience was gained in organizing cooperation. This showed: in order to halt the large enemy strategic grouping, it was essential to concentrate the main efforts of the available forces, including the reserves, primarily on the axis of the main enemy thrust. Due to this it was possible to reduce the enemy's numerical superiority, to deprive the enemy of offensive capability and establish conditions for defeating it. For example, for repelling the offensive of the Nazi groupings on the near approaches to Moscow, Hq SHC [Headquarters Supreme High Command] committed the troops of the Western and Kalinin Fronts, the right wing of the Southwestern Front, air defenses covering Moscow, the aviation of the Moscow Military District and the air units of the RVGK [Reserve Supreme High Command]. The main strategic reserves were also concentrated here.(1) The well organized cooperation between these troops and forces contributed largely to the fact that the enemy on the western sector was halted and defeated. Cooperation was closest between the Western and Kalinin Fronts. During the tense and difficult moments of the defensive engagements on the approaches to Moscow, the troops of the Kalinin Front by their active operations forced virtually the 9th German Army to swing the front to the north and thereby prevented the enemy from using its forces for an offensive directly against the capital.

In organizing strategic cooperation, in the interests of achieving the aims of the defense on the main sectors, an important role was assigned to individual offensive operations conducted on other areas of the front. These operations made it possible to divert and tie down significant enemy forces. In particular, in July-August 1941, in the aim of diverting enemy forces and assisting our troops on the defensive in the Smolensk area, offensive operations were organized and conducted by the 21st Army on the Bobruysk sector and the 24th Army in the Yelnya area. During the period of the intense defensive engagements on the close approaches to Moscow, Soviet troops in November 1941 went over to active offensive operations at Tikhvin and Rostov. As a result of this the Nazi Command was unable to withdraw a single division from the Army Groups North and South for reinforcing the troops on the Moscow sector.

In the subsequent strategic defensive operations, the active offensive actions by our troops in the aim of assisting the groupings defending the main sectors of the Soviet-German Front assumed a wider scale. For example, during the period of the defensive engagements on the Stalingrad and Caucasian sectors, offensive operations were conducted at Leningrad as well as in the areas of Demyansk, Rzhev and Voronezh. For repelling these strikes, the Wehrmacht Command was forced from the beginning of August until mid-November 1942 to use a portion of the reserves for reinforcing Army Groups North and Center. During the period of the Kursk Battle on 17 July 1943, an offensive was commenced by the Southwestern Front in the Izyum area and the Southern Front

on the Mius River. The attacks by the fronts not only tied down significant enemy forces (the 1st Panzer Army and the 6th Army) but also forced the Nazi Command to move the II Panzer Corps from Belgorod to the south.(2)

One of the important tasks of strategic cooperation on the defensive was to support the flanks and boundaries of our main troop groupings. In the initial period of the war, this task was entrusted to the front commanders and was carried out by them by the corresponding positioning of the front reserves which, as a rule, were of limited size. Subsequently, in the aim of a more dependable cover of the flanks and boundaries of the fronts fighting on the most important strategic sectors, Hq SHC employed its own reserves. For example, in July 1941, it deployed the 34th Army on the boundary of the Northwestern and Western Fronts, and the Central Front on the boundary of the Western and Southwestern Fronts. In May-June 1942, the newly organized 3d and 5th Tank Armies were deployed to cover the boundary of the Bryansk and Southwestern Fronts.

At the same time, the task of organizing cooperation in the aim of dependable support for the flanks and boundaries of the strategic troop groupings during the first period of the war was not completely carried out. In a number of instances the enemy succeeded in making deep thrusts with superior forces on the boundaries of our main groupings, putting them in a difficult position (the breakthroughs of the Nazi troops in the area of the Bryansk Front in September 1941 into the rear of the Southwestern Front and in June-July 1942, on the Voronezh sector).

In the course of the strategic defensive Hq SHC had the important task of coordinating the joint efforts of the fronts, fleets, aviation and air defense troops.

The fleets and flotillas, as a rule, were put under the operational subordination of the fronts fighting on the maritime sectors. They provided support to the ground troops by the firing of ship ordnance and coastal batteries as well as by air strikes. The major maritime cities, the naval bases and ports defended themselves both independently and together with ground troops and amphibious forces were landed in the enemy's rear. These conducted independent operations on the enemy lines of communications, they supported the sealanes and moved military cargo and troops.

The efforts of aviation were basically directed at supporting the ground troops and assisting them in carrying out tasks to defeat the enemy assault groupings. Long-range aviation was most often employed for attacking the enemy's military-economic and political centers as well as its operational and strategic reserves.

The cooperation of the fronts and the air defense troops consisted chiefly involving the anti-aircraft artillery and air defense aviation in covering the troops, frontline installations and lines of communications as well as for combating enemy ground troops and repelling enemy air raids together with the aviation of the fronts.

The experience gained in the defensive campaigns in organizing strategic cooperation was creatively employed in conducting the Soviet Army strategic offensive.

During the first two offensive campaigns (the winter of 1941-1942 and the winter of 1942-1943), when the Soviet Command was struggling to seize the strategic initiative, the main efforts of our troops were focused on defeating the most dangerous and active enemy groupings at Moscow and Stalingrad. Under these conditions, strategic cooperation was aimed at carrying out the following main tasks. In the first place, it was essential to coordinate the efforts of the groups of fronts fighting on the major strategic sectors in the aim of dealing a maximum defeat to the enemy groupings as their rout would fundamentally alter the situation on the Soviet-German Front. Secondly, it was essential to promptly utilize the results achieved on the sector of the main thrust for widening the front of advance and for developing it in depth. Thirdly, it was essential to firmly tie down the enemy forces on the other sectors in order to prevent the enemy from utilizing them against the fronts carrying out the main task of the campaign. These tasks as a whole were successfully carried out by the Soviet Supreme High Command.

An instructive example of successful cooperation on a strategic scale was the campaign of the winter of 1942-1943. The counteroffensive which commenced on 19-20 November 1942 at Stalingrad with the close cooperation of the Southwestern, Stalingrad and Don Fronts, ended with the encirclement of the main forces of two enemy armies. In order to make maximum use of the achieved success, Hq SHC decided to continue the offensive on a wide front, launching the main thrust on the southwestern strategic sector. Five fronts were involved in this offensive: Bryansk, Voronezh, Southwestern, Southern and Transcaucasian. In carrying out the instructions of Headquarters, the Southwestern, Southern and Transcaucasian Fronts in the beginning of February 1943 reached the Severskiy Donets River, the approaches to Rostov and the Azov Seacoast. The armies of the Northern Caucasus Front liberated Krasnodar on 12 February. Simultaneously with the decisive offensive by the Soviet Army on the Southwestern sector, the Leningrad and Volkhov Fronts conducted an operation to break the Leningrad blockade. As a result of the precise coordinating of efforts between the groupings fighting on the main and other strategic sectors, our troops in 4 1/2 months of continuous offensive actions advanced 600-700 km in depth, having defeated over 100 enemy divisions.(3)

The art of organizing strategic cooperation underwent further development in the 1943 summer-autumn campaign and in particular in the Kursk Battle. Thus, the over-all plan of the counteroffensive envisaged that at the moment the main enemy forces would be involved in the defensive engagement on the Kursk salient, thrusts would be launched against the Orel enemy grouping by the left wing of the Western Front and by the Bryansk Front. The going over to the offensive by these fronts on 12 July was of important significance in thwarting the plans of the Nazi Command on the Kursk axis.

Cooperation was carried out very skillfully with the development of the counteroffensive into a general offensive. Even before the completion of the Orel and Belgorod-Kharkov Operations at the beginning of August the Kalinin and Western Fronts went over to the offensive on the Smolensk and Roslavl axes

as well as the Southwestern and Southern Fronts on the Donbass axis. As a consequence of this the enemy not only could not strengthen its groupings in the Orel and Belgorod areas but was also forced to remove significant forces from here in order to check our advance on other axes.

In the spring and summer of 1943, strategic cooperation was enriched by the experience of conducting air operations (engagements) in the aim of winning and holding air supremacy as well as interdicting enemy railroad movements. These were conducted according to a single plan of Hq SHC and were characterized by significant scope. For example, on the eve and during the defensive period of the Kursk Battle for maximum weakening of enemy aviation and primarily bomber, the Soviet Command conducted two major air operations involving the six air armies of the fronts and the long-range aviation. This provided favorable conditions for the fighting of the ground troops in the summer of 1943.

Cooperation with partisans assumed a wide scope. With the organizing of the Central Partisan Movement Staff in the summer of 1943 as well as the Ukrainian Republic and several oblast staffs, the opportunities for coordinating actions by partisan detachments and formations with the Soviet Army field forces were broadened significantly in terms of target, place and time. Thus, in 1943, as a result of powerful and simultaneous strikes against railroads and carried out according to a plan of the Central Staff by partisans of Leningrad, Bryansk, Smolensk and Kalinin oblasts as well as Belorussia and the Ukraine, enemy transport operations were significantly undermined during the most intense period of the Kursk Battle.(4)

The scale of strategic cooperation in the 1943 summer-autumn campaign significantly increased. The efforts of nine fronts were coordinated in an offensive which developed along a front of 1,300 km. Their actions split the enemy forces and prevented the maneuvering of enemy reserves, including large panzer field forces and formations. As a result, each of the enemy groupings, without being reinforced, was to rely solely on its own forces.

In the 1944 campaigns, strategic cooperation was enriched with the experience of its organization and support in the course of a strategic offensive carried out simultaneously as well as successively along the front and in depth on different axes. Thus, in the 1944 winter campaign, strategic cooperation was achieved by conducting a simultaneous offensive on the southwestern and northwestern sectors in the aim of defeating the enemy flank groupings. Along with this individual offensive operations were carried out by the First Baltic, Western, Second and First Belorussian Fronts on a sector from Polotsk to Pripyat. The Nazi Command was forced to shift three divisions from Army Group South to the Kovel sector and this weakened the enemy grouping on the Right Bank Ukraine, where the Soviet Army was to launch the main thrust.

In the 1944 summer-autumn campaign, strategic cooperation was achieved by conducting successive operations of the fronts and groups of fronts on adjacent axes. As is known, on 10 June, an offensive was commenced by the Leningrad and Karelian Fronts in cooperation with the Baltic Fleet on the Karelian Isthmus and in Karelia. Then on 23-24 June, in Belorussia, with the active involvement of the Dnieper Naval Flotilla and partisans, the First

Baltic, Third, Second and First Belorussian Fronts went over to the offensive. The Soviet Army launched the main thrust there. The successful actions of the Soviet troops in Belorussia created favorable conditions for the development of the offensive in the Baltic, Western Ukraine and Moldavia. In line with this on the Baltic sector, troops of the Leningrad, Third and Second Baltic Fronts in cooperation with the First Baltic Front went over to the offensive. On 13 July, the First Ukrainian Front began an offensive on the Lwow sector. On 20 August, the Iasi-Kishinev Operation was started by the Second and Third Ukrainian Front in cooperation with the Black Sea Fleet and the Danube Naval Flotilla. Following the Lwow-Sandomierz Operation was the thrust of our troops into the Eastern Carpathians and after the Iasi-Kishinev Operation the Belgrad and Budapest Operations were carried out.

The thrusts of the Soviet Army which were coordinated by a single plan and launched on different axes over comparatively short intervals of time in their development merged into a powerful strategic offensive along an enormous expanse and this ensured the firm holding of initiative, it contributed to the achieving of surprise in the actions of our troops, it deprived the enemy of the opportunity to make effective use of its forces and impeded the organizing of a new defensive front. As a result, all the main enemy groupings including the Army Groups North, Center, Northern Ukraine, A and Southern Ukraine were defeated. The total losses of the Nazi troops in the summer and autumn of 1944 were 1.6 million men, 6,700 tanks, 28,000 guns and mortars and over 12,000 aircraft.(5)

The successive conduct of strategic operations on several axes along the front and in depth required the involvement of a significant amount of forces. Thus, a total of 12 fronts were involved in the campaign of the second half of 1944, and 7 of these successively participated in two strategic operations. This substantially complicated the problem of organizing strategic cooperation but it was successfully resolved by the Soviet Supreme High Command.

Along with organizing cooperation between the groupings fighting on different strategic axes, Hq SHC gave great attention to coordinating the efforts of the fronts, aviation, naval forces and air defense troops carrying out the general task within a single strategic offensive operation (operational-strategic cooperation).

One of the instructive examples on this level was the Iasi-Kishinev Operation (20-29 August 1944) in which the author of these lines happened to participate. Here cooperation was provided between two fronts supported by two air armies and the forces of the Black Sea Fleet and the Danube Naval Flotilla.

In accord with the overall plan of the operation, the cooperating fronts were to launch deep thrusts against the most vulnerable places in the enemy defenses. The main assault grouping of the Second Ukrainian Front was to advance around the Iasi and Tirgu-Frumos fortified areas as this would allow it to seal off the 6th German Army from the 8th and skirt the impassable ranges of the Eastern Carpathians to the south. The Third Ukrainian Front by a thrust from the Kitskan bridgehead on the Husi axis was to split the forces of the 6th German Army and the 3d Romanian Army and together with troops of

the Second Ukrainian Front destroy the 6th German Army. The left wing of the front, with the support of the Black Sea Fleet, was to encircle and defeat the 3d Romanian Army. The Black Sea Fleet by the firing of ship ordnance and air strikes was to provide support for the troops on the maritime flank of the Third Ukrainian Front, disrupt enemy sealanes, destroy enemy ships as well as launch massed air strikes against enemy military bases. The Danube Naval Flotilla was to land amphibious forces to the northwest and south of Akkerman and when the Third Ukrainian Front had reached the Danube, it was to assist its troops in crossing the river.

As was envisaged by the plan, by the end of 23 August in the first stage of the operation the main forces of the Army Group Southern Ukraine had been encircled and good conditions created for completing their defeat and for continuing a rapid offensive. In the second stage of the operation, the Soviet Command, having left 34 divisions to destroy the surrounded grouping, sent the main forces of the Second and Third Ukrainian Fronts (over 50 divisions), including the 6th Tank Army, to continue the offensive deep into Romanian territory. The main forces of the air armies involved in the operation were also directed here.

The well organized cooperation between the troop groupings employed to defeat the surrounded enemy and those advancing on the exterior perimeter prevented the Nazi Command from stabilizing the front and forced the enemy to move far to the west. In advancing rapidly, our troops quickly moved the external perimeter 80-100 km from the surrounded grouping and thereby created good conditions for its complete elimination.

The final campaign in Europe in 1945 began by the simultaneous conducting of several major strategic offensive operations on a front from the Baltic Sea to Budapest. Such a vast offensive became possible due to a further rise in the might of the Soviet Armed Forces and to their greater combat skill.

Hq SHC gave special attention in organizing cooperation in this campaign to launching a powerful thrust on the Warsaw-Berlin axis and to dependable support for the main strategic grouping from the north and south. The first task was carried out by coordinating the efforts of the strongest fronts, the First Belorussian and the First Ukrainian. Their successful operations were supported by the conducting of operations in East Prussia, the Carpathians and Hungary.

Particularly instructive was the experience of organizing cooperation in the Berlin Strategic Offensive Operation (16 April-8 May 1945) the plan for which envisaged the launching of several simultaneous and successive strong strikes on a broad front, the encircling and splitting up of the Berlin enemy grouping and the rapid piecemeal destruction of it.

In accord with the over-all plan, cooperation in the operation was organized in the following manner: the main thrust directly against Berlin was launched by the First Belorussian Front from the Kustrin bridgehead with the forces of five combined-arms armies and two tank armies. For supporting the main assault grouping to the north and south two auxiliary thrusts were planned by the forces of two combined-arms armies each. The First Ukrainian Front was to

launch the main thrust with its right wing to the south of Berlin. There were two versions for using its tank armies. According to one of them, the 3d and 4th Guards Tank Armies were to reach an area located 30-35 km to the southwest of Berlin and according to the second they were to attack Berlin directly from the south in cooperation with the First Belorussian Front. The Second Belorussian Front, in going over to the offensive 4 days later, was to defeat the enemy grouping fighting to the north of Berlin. The Baltic Fleet was to assist the troop offensive by the front along the seacoast. Each front was assigned one air army to support the ground troops. Moreover, in the zone of the First Belorussian Front there were plans to employ the 18th Long-Range Air Army. The air defense troops were to be involved in covering the rear facilities of the fronts.(6)

Simultaneously with the offensive by our troops against Berlin, the Fourth, Second and Third Ukrainian Fronts were to attack Czechoslovakia and Austria. This would make it possible to tie down large enemy forces and deprive it of the opportunity to reinforce the Berlin sector. As a result of the clearly organized strategic cooperation between the Soviet troop groupings, the Berlin Operation was carried out at a rapid pace and ended with the complete defeat of the main enemy forces.

Thus, strategic cooperation of the Soviet troops was carried out in different ways. In some instances they coordinated the efforts of the strategic groupings fighting on separated axes and carrying out independent tasks. In other instances this was achieved by conducting successive operations of the fronts and groups of fronts on adjacent strategic axes. Finally, strategic cooperation was provided by coordinating the actions of the fronts and groups of fronts advancing simultaneously on one or several adjacent strategic axes. Depending on the specific military-political and strategic situation, each time Hq SHC chose that method of cooperation which ensured achieving the aim of the campaign.

At the same time there were also substantial shortcomings in organizing strategic cooperation. For example, the efforts of the Western, Reserve and Bryansk Fronts were not very clearly organized on the western sector and the Southwestern Front on the left bank of the Dnieper, to the south of Kiev, and this led to the defeat of a large grouping of our troops in September 1941. In the 1941-1942 winter campaign, the actions of the Kalinin, Western and Bryansk Fronts were not properly coordinated on the western sector as well as the Leningrad and Volkhov Fronts around Leningrad. This was one of the reasons for the incompleteness of certain offensive operations in the winter of 1942. In May 1942, the offensive of the Southwestern Front against Kharkov was not properly supported by the adjacent fronts. As a result, by attacking the flanks of the main grouping of the front, the enemy succeeded in dealing a major defeat to our troops. There were flaws in organizing cooperation between the ground troops and naval forces. For example, due to the fact that the enemy Kurland grouping was not completely sealed off from the sea, the latter was not completely eliminated and the Nazi Command in the winter of 1945 gained an opportunity to shift up to 10 divisions from Kurland to the Berlin sector.

One of the important and complicated tasks of strategic cooperation was the coordinating of efforts with the armies of the anti-Hitler coalition. The difficulties were caused by the remoteness and separation of the theaters of operations. A number of obstacles was created by the governments of the Western Allied states which were endeavoring to assume a predominant position in Central Europe and the Balkans. Nevertheless, the Soviet government and the Supreme High Command was able to surmount many of these difficulties. Cooperation was reached by systematic correspondence by the heads of government of the Allied powers on military-political and strategic problems and goals, by the periodic holding of conferences and by the reciprocal informing of high-level military representatives. The exchange of military missions was widely practiced. After the landing of the Allies in France and the opening of a second front in Europe, the coordinating of efforts with the Allied Command assumed a more concrete and regular nature. In particular, each day information was provided on the situation on the fronts and objectives were agreed upon and allocated for bombing both by Soviet and Allied aviation. The coordinated actions of the Allied armed forces in many instances impeded the maneuvering of enemy forces between the strategic fronts and this helped to achieve the aims of the operations being carried out.

Starting with 1943, Czechoslovak and Polish troops began fighting as part of the front forces of the Soviet Army against the Nazi invaders, and from the second half of 1944 this also included Romanian, Bulgarian and Yugoslav troops. The actions of the foreign formations and the Soviet troops were coordinated in accord with an agreement between the governments. The Czechoslovak, Polish, Bulgarian and Romanian field forces and formations carried out battle tasks, as a rule, in zones assigned to them, being in operational terms subordinate to the commanders of the fronts and armies which also organized cooperation with them on the basis of instructions of Hq SHC.

The Belgrad Operation (28 September-20 October 1944) was an example of operational-strategic cooperation between Soviet and foreign troops. In it Hq SHC together with representatives from the national military-political leadership coordinated the efforts of the Soviet, Yugoslav and Bulgarian troops. Cooperation between them was based upon the over-all concept of the operation considering the combat capabilities of the troops, their experience, supply levels and other conditions and was carried out according to tasks, methods of execution, sectors and time.

Hq SHC and the General Staff were the direct organizers of strategic cooperation. They established the bases for cooperation in working out the overall plan of the operation, in adopting the plan and in determining the tasks for the fronts.(7) After working out the overall concept and plan for the strategic operation, the main questions of cooperation in it were settled. This was done initially on maps with the calling in of the commanders and chiefs of staffs of the fronts, fleets, air formations and air defense troops. Then the main job of cooperation was shifted directly to the fronts which were to be involved in this cooperation. During this period, usually under the leadership of representatives from Hq SHC and the General Staff, all the questions of cooperation were worked out in detail, including on maps, mock-ups and directly in the field, and in certain instances, also in command-staff exercises (military games). Other methods of organizing cooperation were also

employed. For example, after determining the over-all concept of an operation worked out by Hq SHC, the issuing of operational directives and instructions for the cooperation of the General Staff, all work related to organizing and maintaining this was carried out in the field under the leadership of the representatives of Hq SHC with the reporting of the essential data to the Supreme High Command.

In the process of organizing and maintaining strategic cooperation, the representatives of Hq SHC went deeply into the questions of the air and artillery defensive, the breaching of enemy defenses, the committing of mobile formations and field forces to battle, the combating of enemy reserves, the encirclement, splitting up and destruction of enemy groupings.

At different times, the representatives of Hq SHC were G.K. Zhukov, A.M. Vasilevskiy, K.Ye. Voroshilov, S.K. Timoshenko, B.M. Shaposhnikov, A.I. Antonov, A.A. Novikov, N.G. Kuznetsov, N.N. Voronov, L.A. Govorov and others.

The methods elaborated for organizing the maintaining cooperation, in proving effective during the years of the Great Patriotic War, have largely not lost their importance under present-day conditions. This applies primarily to the centralized coordinating of the main questions of cooperation by the strategic headquarters bodies with the granting of initiative to the commanders and staffs, to the detailed elaboration of cooperation in carrying out the most important tasks of the operation on the axis of the main thrusts, to clearly determining the tasks for the troops and the methods of carrying them out and so forth. A study of this experience and its creative application is an important task for our military personnel.

FOOTNOTES

1. See: "Sovetskaya Voyennaya Entsiklopediya" [Soviet Military Encyclopedia], Moscow, Voenizdat, Vol 1, 1976, pp 493-496.
2. "Velikaya Otechestvennaya voyna 1941-1945: Entsiklopediya" [The Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945: An Encyclopedia], Moscow, Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya, 1985, pp 298, 450.
3. "Istoriya voyennogo iskusstva" [History of Military Art], Moscow, Voenizdat, 1985, pp 208, 209.
4. "Operatsii Sovetskikh Vooruzhennykh Sil v Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyne" [Operations of the Soviet Armed Forces in the Great Patriotic War], Moscow, Voenizdat, Vol II, 1958, pp 459-460.

5. "Sovetskaya Voyennaya Entsiklopediya," Vol 2, 1976, pp 63-64.
6. See: "Operatsii Sovetskikh Vooruzhennykh...", Vol IV, pp 305-307.
7. VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, No 5, 1985, p 37.

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OPERATIONAL-TACTICAL TRAINING OF AIR FORCE COMMAND PERSONNEL, STAFFS BETWEEN CIVIL AND GREAT PATRIOTIC WARS

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[Article by Col V.N. Chernetskiy, candidate of historical sciences: "Operational-Tactical Training of Air Force Command Personnel, Staffs Between Civil and Great Patriotic Wars"]

[Text] The first experience in organizing tactical training in air formations (separate air detachments and squadrons) goes back to the end of the Civil War, when aviation began to be involved in "field troop training" exercises.(1) On 3 January 1921, the RVS [Revolutionary-Military Council] of the Western Front approved the Manual on the Employment of Aviation in Joint Operations With Other Branches of Troops. This was worked out by a commission chaired by the chief of the front's Air Fleet, Ye.I. Tatarchenko. Among the 14 appendices to the Manual were three programs: familiarizing the various branches of troops with the Air Fleet, tactical exercises with the pilots and spotter pilots and joint tactical exercises for aviation with the other branches of troops.(2) In accord with their content, participation in troop maneuvers was considered to be the main form of tactical training for the aviators. But in practice this had an irregular and limited nature.

Planned exercises in tactical training began to be conducted in the Air Fleet from 1923.(3) Along with the systematic involvement of aviation in troop maneuvers, other forms were also employed. For example, in May 1923, the first two-sided aviation game in the Air Fleet was conducted in the Separate Reconnaissance Air Squadron of the Moscow Military District (MVO). The aim of the game was to provide practical skills to the middle-level command element in leading combat operations of an air squadron and the work of its staff in organizing air reconnaissance and liaison.(4) Some 2 months later in the MVO, under the leadership of the chief of the district Air Fleet, an aviation training assembly was held where the participants worked on tasks and exercises against a background of a specially created operational-tactical situation.(5)

Field trips became a new form of training for the air commanders. These were held in all military districts in the aim of studying the air navigational and natural-climatic conditions of their territories, the possibilities for basing

aviation there, the organization of the rear services and supply, the influence of the designated factors on the organization and conduct of combat operations of the Air Fleet (from 1924, the Air Forces) and air defense. Each field trip was accompanied by a military game in the field.(6) In the mid-1920s, such a form of training as air maneuvers appeared. For example, in 1925, maneuvers were conducted in the Western Military District. These involved three reconnaissance squadrons, one light bomber squadron, two fighter squadrons and two corps air units.(7)

In these same years, there was intense work done on the theoretical elaboration of the questions concerning the combat employment of aviation. The first scientific works and textbooks appeared. Air fleet tactics was incorporated in the training programs of all flight schools and in the training of spotter pilots became the main training discipline. The first postwar aviation regulations and manuals were published, including: Drill Manual of USSR Aviation, Provisional Manual on the Combat Employment of the USSR Air Forces (Part I and Part III), Field Manual of the RKKA [Worker-Peasant Red Army] Air Navigation Service (Part I and Part II), Manual on Conducting a Military Game in the Air Fleet, Manual on Signals in the Worker-Peasant Red Air Fleet and others.

The order of the chief of the RKKA Air Forces Directorate of 31 October 1924 was of great importance for improving the operational-tactical training of commanders and staffs.(8) In accord with its demands, military games, staff drills and command-staff exercises were incorporated in the commander training system. In the summertime the air formations began moving to the combined-arms camps where theoretical exercises, one-sided and two-sided tactical flight exercises (LTU) began to be held with them. All camp courses ended, as a rule, with combined-arms (fleet) exercises or maneuvers in which they also participated. At the same time, due to the absence of aviation ranges, the actual working out of tactical procedures and many elements of combat employment was often not carried out.

The lack of highly-trained senior and higher command personnel was a serious problem impeding better operational-tactical training in the Air Forces. For this reason, in December 1943, according to the order of the RVS the Air Fleet Academy imeni Prof N.Ye. Zhukovskiy opened an Air Fleet Service Faculty (from 1926, a command faculty) with a 3-year period of instruction and entrusted with the training of air commanders with a higher military education. But in 1927, with its first graduating class, the faculty was closed down and the training of senior command personnel began to be carried out at advanced training courses for senior supervisory personnel which were opened under the academy. Command positions in the Air Forces were also filled by specialists who had completed other military academies and analogous courses at them.

In the second half of the 1920s, operational-tactical training in the Air Forces was organized and carried out in accord with the demands of new manuals and regulations: the RKKA Infantry Field Manual (1927) which had a special section "Aviation in Infantry Combat"; the RKKA Field Manual (1929); the RKKA Air Forces Field Manual (1929); the Manual of Ground Attack Aviation (1927).

The new step in organizing and conducting operational-tactical training was linked to the rapid development of aviation which occurred during the years of the first two five-year plans and turned it from a separate type of weapon initially into an independent branch of troops and then a USSR Armed Service.(9) This served as an impetus for the accelerated development of the main problems in the combat employment of the Air Forces. These were reflected in the RKKA Provisional Field Manual (PU-36), the RKKA Air Forces Field Manual (Part I), the Provisional Instructions on the Independent Operations of the RKKA Air Forces, the Instructions on Air Combat (IVB-38) as well as fundamental works by many prominent military theorists of those years. The formation in Soviet military art of a new independent area, Air Forces operational art, was a result of the development of military theory and military aviation thought.(10) Its provisions began to define the content of operational-tactical training.

Higher effectiveness in training was largely aided by the adoption of measures aimed at improving the training of command personnel. In 1930, the command faculty was restored at the Air Forces Academy imeni Prof N.Ye. Zhukovskiy. From January 1933, here they began operating courses for the retraining of higher command personnel and these soon were turned into an operations faculty with a year-long period of instruction. Aviator commanders with a higher military education were also trained at the aviation division opened up in 1931 at the Operations faculty of the military academy imeni M.V. Frunze. The introduction at the military aviation schools of stable programs and training plans which envisaged greater time for study of military disciplines, including Air Forces tactics, significantly increased the level of tactical training for the young aviation commanders.

Starting in 1930, decisive measures were taken to improve commander training in the line units. Some 42 hours a month began to be assigned for this instead of the former 6-8. Operation-tactical disciplines held a significant place in the training plans. Each month three 8-hour days were assigned for training the leadership of the units and formations (separate squadrons and air brigades).(11) In the military districts under the leadership of the chiefs of the Air Forces directorates, they regularly held group exercises, two-sided military games and exercises with trips to field airports. Participating in these along with the leading flight personnel were the staffs in the aim of acquiring skills in unit command and in supporting their actions under field conditions.

A higher form of operational-tactical training for the commanders and staffs was their involvement in aviation and combined-arms exercises and maneuvers; the subject of these was determined by the annual orders of the people's commissar of defense. Here the subject of each LTU was first worked out at command-staff games and group exercises. From 30 to 50 percent of the flight resources assigned for combat training was given over for participating in exercises with the troops, the fleet and air defense, depending upon the type of aviation.(12)

A major event was the publishing in 1936 of the Provisional Instructions on Independent Operations of the RKKA Air Forces. The study and actual elaboration of its provisions underlay all the operational and tactical

training. For this purpose in May, under the leadership of the Chief of the RKKA Air Forces Directorate, Ya.I. Alksnis, an introductory course was conducted with the Air Forces leadership.(13) Its participants heard six reports on the pertinent problems of the operational employment of the Air Forces and these were based upon the provisions of the new Instructions. The course ended with an operational game involving the working out of Air Forces operations in the initial period of a war in repelling a surprise attack by enemy aviation, launching strikes at major enemy political and economic centers and checking its operational movements. The results of the game were generalized in a thorough-going report which was given at the analysis by Ya.I. Alksnis. In the then following field trip and at major maneuvers involving the First Special-Purpose Army (AON), the air forces of the Leningrad, Moscow and Belorussian Military Districts (a total of over 500 aircraft), the air commanders and staffs reinforced the obtained knowledge.

Analogous introductory courses as well as operational games, intergarrison exercises and field trips and exercises for the squadrons involving the study and working out of the provisions of the designated Instructions were conducted in all military districts. However, one of the fundamental training principles--the senior teaches the junior--was not always and everywhere carried out. The leaders of the air brigade LTU, for example, were often not the senior chiefs but rather the commanders of these formations and as a consequence of this neither they nor the staffs gained the necessary practice in organizing combat operations and their command.

The operational-tactical training in 1937 was marked by high intensity and effort. In March, an operational game was held involving the Air Forces commanders and staffs of the Leningrad, Belorussian, Siberian and Volga Military Districts, the first AON, the commanders of the air corps and brigades as well as the chiefs of certain aviation schools. In July, two major interdistrict exercises were held. In the game and exercises they worked out the actions of the Air Forces of the fronts and the air army during the initial period of a war.(14)

From 20 through 30 August, under the leadership of the Chief of the RKKA General Staff, B.M. Shaposhnikov, the largest prewar air maneuvers were held involving the Air Forces of the Belorussian, Kiev and Kharkov Military Districts and the first AON (a total of 821 aircraft).(15) The subject of the maneuvers was "Operations of the Front Air Forces and Air Army of the High Command in the Initial Period of a War and Under the Conditions of a Full-Scale Front Operation." The air units were to work out a broad range of questions. But since the Staff of the RKKA Air Forces was unable to establish the required operational-tactical situation (the designating of groups of ground troops, staffs, motor transport movements and so forth) using its own forces, the second part of the subject was only partially played out.

Similar introductory courses, operational games and air maneuvers helped to develop in the leadership uniform views on the questions of the strategic and operational-tactical employment of the Air Forces. A major testing of the maturity of the air commanders was the involvement of many of them in combat operations in Spain and China, at Lake Khasan, on the Khalkhin-Gol River and in the war against Finland. The experience gained there as well as the

experience in the first campaigns of the commenced World War II were taken into account in combat and operational-tactical training as well as in the training and indoctrination system for the personnel of the Soviet Air Forces.

From 1939, by an order of the people's commissar of defense "in the aim of increasing the tactical training of commanders and developing their independent skills in working out the questions of Air Forces tactics," obligatory written works on tactics were introduced for all command personnel. The written work was done on one of the subjects indicated in the appended list at their choice.(16) In the following year, a list was set for the theoretical studies for the Air Forces commanders of the military districts by an order of the chief of the Main Air Forces Directorate. In the beginning of 1941, the Air Forces Staff provided a list of subjects for the staff officers of the Air Forces in the military districts and the air divisions. The elaboration of the individual subjects was viewed as a most important measure aimed at improving the operational and tactical training of the command personnel.

In the aim of increasing the training level of the air staffs, the USSR People's Commissar of Defense in January 1941 issued orders to the military district commanders and to the chief of the Main Air Forces Directorate to assign the staffs of the air formations, including the long-range bomber corps, to the appropriate army headquarters and a portion of them to the military district staffs.(17)

Conferences on the most urgent problems of the operational-tactical employment of the Air Forces became an important form of training. For example, the military-theoretical conference held in February 1941 at the Military Academy for Red Army Air Forces Command and Navigator Personnel and examining the problem of the fight for air supremacy was a major event.(18)

However, there were shortcomings along with the obvious successes. Thus, the district and interdistrict exercises as well as the maneuvers on the Air Forces scale and which until recently had been the main forms of operational-tactical training more and more frequently began to be replaced by games employing maps and by field trips for the staffs. If they were held, this was done, as a rule, in the summer. Here aviation operated without sufficient tension and frequently without working out tactical procedures and elements of combat employment. Many of these shortcomings were a consequence of oversimplification in combat training. Due to the fear of flight accidents in the units there was the predominant working out of individual piloting techniques and group teamwork during the day under good weather conditions. In the fighter aviation higher aerobatics was limited and the flight personnel was trained for air combat predominantly using a horizontal maneuver while group air combat was to be in close combat formations.

Many commanders and staffs let up on supervising the conduct of operational-tactical training and this was explained by their involvement in carrying out many other pressing tasks such as: forming and shaping up new air formations and units, rearming with new aviation equipment and the retraining of the personnel, the preparation of the theaters of operations in aviation terms and so forth. Moreover, almost one-half of all levels of commanders due to the

short periods they had held their positions did not have sufficient experience in leading the units and formations assigned to them. Unfinished work in the area of military aviation theory was also a negative factor as this had not yet been able to provide clear recommendations on a number of questions related to the problems of the fight for air supremacy, air operations under the conditions of an enemy surprise attack and so forth.

At the same time the military danger hanging over the nation required the immediate elimination of the existing shortcomings. The party Central Committee adopted a decision to reorganize combat and operational-tactical training in the Red Army in accord with the demands of the times. A commission of the Main Military Council was established to generalize combat experience and work out specific measures to implement the given reorganization.(19)

On 21 April 1940, the subcommission for the Air Forces headed by Ya.V. Smushkevich submitted its proposals consisting of seven sections. The first section and supplements as a whole were devoted to operational-tactical training. In particular, they proposed the elaboration of a Manual on the Operational Employment of the Air Forces with the subsequent testing out of its main provisions in an aviation game, a regulation governing the command of aviation in wartime and Instructions on Operational Air Movements; operational military games were to be conducted regularly with the working out of cooperation of aviation with the troops in battle and an operation. It was recommended that they keep the then existing system of courses for the higher Air Forces leadership under the General Staff Military Academy and the annual field trips for the air commanders and staffs; in the bomber aviation for all newly appointed commanders (from the squadron on up) there would be a preliminary tour of duty in positions of chiefs of staff and so forth. In the tactical training of flight personnel there was to be the working out of methods for attacking small-sized targets from a dive, night operations in small groups and low altitudes to disrupt and thwart enemy movements and so forth.(20)

The submitted proposals were reflected in the orders of the USSR People's Commissar of Defense of 16 May 1940 and 29 January 1941. The principle of "teach the troops only what is needed in a war and only as is done in a war" became the main thing in combat and operational-tactical training and in the entire system of training and indoctrination for the Air Forces personnel. Its implementation in practice established the bases for the future victories of the Soviet Air Forces in the Great Patriotic War.

An analysis of the history of the genesis, development and improvement of operational-tactical training for aviation command personnel during the interwar period shows that its content was determined by the development level of tactics and operational art of the Air Forces and its state by the ability of the commanders and staffs to provide troop training in accord with the last achievements of military science and the demands of practice. Here, as in any undertaking, the crucial role was played by such leadership qualities mentioned by M.S. Gorbachev at the April (1985) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee as "competence, a feeling for the new, initiative, boldness and a

readiness to assume responsibility; the ability to pose a problem and fully resolve it...."(21)

Operational-tactical training is in a dialectical relationship with the air skills of the personnel. Any provision of Air Forces tactics and operational art, no matter how correct and advanced it may be, is only a theoretical recommendation in the absence of crews capable of realizing this in the air. In exactly the same way there is no practical importance to having the flight crew work out piloting techniques and combat employment irrespective of the requirements of Air Forces tactics and operational art. To teach the troops what is required in a war today remains the underlying principle of operational-tactical training for the air command personnel. In realizing this an important place is held by the study, generalization and creative employment of the experience of local wars and military conflicts.

The experience of the past shows that the high-quality execution of operational-tactical training is impossible without the appropriate field manuals, regulations and other official guides giving this a scientific nature, an organizational structure and effectiveness. At the same time, in peacetime this type of training has been and remains the sole base for actually checking out the existing operational-tactical concepts as well as for elaborating new ones.

FOOTNOTES

1. TsGASA [Central State Archives of the Soviet Army], folio 30, inv. 3, file 256, sheets 277, 278.
2. Ibid., folio 29, inv. 7, file 33, sheets 110-151.
3. Ibid., file 123, sheet 385.
4. See: VESTNIK VOZDUSHNOGO FLOTA, No 4, 1923, pp 20-22.
5. Ibid., No. 6, pp 14-16.
6. TsGASA, folio 29, inv. 7, file 209, sheets 3, 4.
7. Ibid., file 123, sheets 176-178.
8. See: VESTNIK VOZDUSHNOGO FLOTA, No 4, 1925, p 21.
9. See: "Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy voyny 1939-1945" [History of World War II of 1939-1945], Moscow, Voenizdat, Vol 2, 1974, p 179.
10. See: Ibid., pp 179, 180.
11. TsGASA, folio 4, inv. 3, file 3304, sheet 180.
12. Ibid., inv. 11, file 41, sheets 310-332.
13. Ibid., folio 29, inv. 34, file 133, sheets 1-5.

14. Ibid., file 241, sheets 25, 26.
15. Ibid., file 204, sheets 1-188.
16. Ibid., folio 4, inv. 15, file 88, sheets 218-225.
17. See: M.N. Kozhevnikov, "Kommandovaniye i shtab VVS Sovetskoy Armii v Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyne 1941-1945 gg." [The Command and Staff of the Soviet Army Air Forces in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945], Moscow, Nauka, 1977, pp 28, 29.
18. See: VESTNIK VOZDUSHNOGO FLOTA, No 3, 1941, p 169.
19. See: "Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy...", Vol 3, 1974, p 430.
20. TsGASA, folio 29, inv. 34, file 563, sheets 5-19.
21. PRAVDA, 24 April 1985.

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JOINT OPERATIONS OF PARTISANS WITH TROOPS IN RZHEV-VYAZMA OPERATION

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 2, Feb 87 (signed to press 21 Jan 87) pp 26-32

[Article by V.A. Perezhugin, candidate of historical sciences: "Joint Operations of Partisans With Troops in Rzhev-Vyazma Operation"]

[Text] The Rzhev-Vyazma Offensive Operation (8 January-20 April 1942) was one of the first operations in the Great Patriotic War during which cooperation of the troops with the partisans reached a large scope, and when their leadership began to be directly provided by the front's command. The command coordinated the actions of the Soviet Army units and the partisan formations in the enemy rear, particularly in the concluding stage of the operation, when the advancing troops entered areas where large partisan forces were located.

By the start of 1942, the party bodies in Kalinin, Smolensk and Orel Oblasts, the political directorates of the Western and Kalinin Fronts as well as the intelligence bodies of the troops and the NKVD [People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs] had succeeded in establishing contact with numerous partisan detachments in these oblasts. By the start of the operation the command of the Kalinin Front possessed, for example, data on the combat activities of 68 partisan detachments and 37 sabotage groups, totaling 2,205 men, in the area of the forthcoming offensive.(1) The Staff of the Western Front had information on the activities in the Smolensk area of 67 partisan detachments numbering over 16,000 fighters and controlling extensive areas of the oblast.(2)

The complexity and specific features of leadership over the partisan forces during this period were that there was no single body for their control. Leadership over the partisan detachments was provided by the oblast (rayon) party committees, by the political, operational and intelligence directorates (sections) of the fronts and armies as well as by the NKVD bodies. And these did not always act in a coordinated manner and this led to duplication in the work and a scattering of forces.

In the Rzhev-Vyazma Operation the tasks were set for the partisan detachments, as a rule, by special representatives from the command of the front (army) or liaisons which were sent into the enemy rear on the eve and in the course of the operation. Thus, during the winter of 1941-1942, the staffs of the

Western and Kalinin Fronts sent several groups of political workers headed by senior instructors from the political directorates to the partisan detachments of Smolensk, Orel and Kalinin Oblasts.(3) Later on, with the establishing of radio contact, the tasks for the partisan detachments began to be set by radio. The partisans were usually instructed to conduct reconnaissance, to organize sabotage on the lines of communications and attack enemy staffs, reserves and columns. The larger detachments were given tasks of liberating population points and holding them until the approach of the Soviet troops.

In endeavoring to coordinate the actions of the troops and the partisans in greater detail in terms of goal, place and time, the staffs of the fronts (armies) made a great effort to improve the forms and methods of leading the partisan movement. However, it took too long for the instructions of the military command to reach the partisans using liaisons and messengers and sometimes they did not arrive at all. With the greatest possible support of the military councils of the fronts and the party obkoms, the scattered partisan detachments in the course of the operation began to be united into larger formations including united detachments, regiments and formations and this significantly eased leadership over the partisan forces. The staffs of the fronts were able to provide radio equipment for the largest partisan formations. But a majority of the detachments maintained radio contact with the staffs of the fronts and the armies using radios of the troop units and formations operating in the enemy rear.

Considering the growing resistance in the enemy rear, the military councils of the fronts (armies) for leading the partisan movement began organizing special departments or operational groups consisting of two-three men.(4) In contrast to the sections (departments) which continued to exist under the front (army) political bodies and which were basically concerned with work among the population in the occupied oblasts and with the party-political leadership of the partisan movement, the newly organized bodies were entrusted with the operational military leadership of the partisan formations, organizing closer cooperation of the partisans with the advancing units and formations as well as supplying the partisans with ammunition, weapons and radio equipment. Thus, in March 1942, under the Intelligence Section of the Staff of the Western Front, a department was organized headed by Lt Col A.A. Prokhorov for directing the partisan movement. This included representatives from the staff of the front, from the Smolensk and Orel Party Obkoms as well as the NKVD bodies. The department established contact with 51 partisan detachments numbering around 19,000 men(5) and directed their combat activities in the interests of the advancing troops of the front.

Bodies involved in directing the partisan movement also began to be organized in the armies. The order from the chief of staff of the Western Front of 17 March 1942 to the commander of the 16th Army, Lt Gen K.K. Rokossovskiy, for example, stated: "In the area of Barsuki, Tolvinka, Psur and Buda there are several partisan detachments operating: the Dyatkovo with 300 men, the Bytosh with 400 men, the Zhukovka with 400 men, the Ordzhonikidzograd with 300 men, the Lyudinovo and a number of small detachments.... The commander-in-chief has ordered that the leadership of the designated detachments be entrusted to the military council of the 16th Army and for this purpose the VPU [auxiliary control post] will be set up in the area of Verkhulichi.(6)

In the planning documents of the fronts and armies, the staffs began taking up the questions of cooperation with the partisan formations, in seeking a more complete and effective employment of the partisan forces in the interests of the advancing troops. In certain armies, on the eve of an operation they planned, for example, anticipatory strikes by the partisans on the enemy lines of communications. Thus, upon the orders of the command of the 22d Army, the Andreapol Partisan Detachment (commander, I.M. Kruglov; commissar, I.S. Borisov) on 3 January blew up a bridge on the Toropetskiy Highway and destroyed five motor vehicles, on 4 January it derailed a troop train 4 km from the Andreapol Station and on 5 January destroyed a bridge across the Western Dvina at the village of Kozlovo. When the army went over to the offensive, the partisans through their liaison officers established direct contact with the army units and together with them participated in the liberation of Zakharino, Velikchkovo, Andreapol and other population points.(7)

The command of the 4th Assault Army in the course of the January offensive assigned the partisans of Toropetskiy Rayon the task of knocking out the Toropets--Velikiye Luki Railroad and reconnoitering the enemy garrisons at Sverst, Antropov, Usvyaty and at Kunya Station. The partisans successfully carried out the given tasks. They, in particular, blew up three bridges on the Toropets--Velikiye Luki Mainline and took a direct part in the fighting to liberate their home city. In carrying out the order of the staff of the 4th Assault Army, nine detachments from the Batya Partisan Formation (commander, N.Z. Kolyada) emerged on the Demidov--Dukhovshchina, Dukhovshchina--Prechistoye, Smolensk--Demidov and Smolensk--Dukhovshchina Highways. The partisans attracted units of two enemy divisions and forced the Nazis to move only in large columns along these roads.(8)

The partisans provided substantial aid to the troops of the Kalinin Front, supplying the command and the staffs with intelligence data about the enemy. Information came continuously from the partisans about troop movements and regroupings as well as about the size of the enemy garrisons. With their aid they established the strength of the occupiers in such major strongpoints as Usvyaty, Surazh, Velizh.(9) The partisan detachments operating in the area of the Kalinin Front just during the period from January through 15 March 1942 destroyed 8,500 enemy soldiers and officers in open combat and from ambushes, they blew up 17 railroad bridges and 23 highway bridges, destroyed 6 enemy staffs, and annihilated 36 ammunition and fuel dumps, around 400 trucks and cars and 10 tanks(10) having provided substantial aid to the advancing troops.

The partisans cooperated actively with the troops of the Western Front. During the first days of the offensive, as soon as the units of the 10th Army reached the approaches to the cities of Kirov, Lyudinovo, Zhizdra, the army staff sent the battalion commissar M.I. Chazov to direct the partisan detachments in the enemy rear. Through the liaison officers of the detachments with whom the army military council maintained constant contact, Chazov quickly established contacts with the partisans of Lyudinovskiy, Dyatkovskiy, Kletnyanskiy, Zhukovskiy, Rognedinskiy, Kirovskiy and Kuybyshevskiy Rayons of Orel and Smolensk Oblasts (now rayons of Bryansk and Kaluga Oblasts).

With the commanders and commissars of the partisan detachments, M.I. Chazov at the end of January 1942 held two group conferences which established united staffs for directing and coordinating the combat activities of the partisans of the Dyatkovo and Rognedinskiy groups. Each of the detachments received specific tasks or operations in the areas assigned to them. For carrying out sabotage on the Bryansk--Roslavl Highway, two Zhukovka partisan detachments were sent out. For disrupting the lines of communications on the Lyudinovo--Bytosh and Dyatkovo--Zhizdra sections, the Bytosh and Lyudinovo detachments were assigned. The partisans of the Rognedinskiy group received the task of cutting the enemy escape routes on the Kirov--Roslavl Railroad. The detachments received explosives and ammunition for conducting sabotage.

By 2 February the chief of staff of the detachments from the Dyatkovo group N.M. Sentyurin reported to the staff of the 10th Army on the mining of the Bryansk--Lyudinovo Highway. Here over a period of several days 9 enemy tanks and more than 20 motor vehicles were blown up. On the Bryansk--Zhizdra Highway the partisans from the Lyudinovo and Bytosh detachments routed a large enemy wagon train. On 14 February, partisans from the Bryansk area liberated the town of Dyatkovo and drove the Nazis from the entire territory of the rayon. As a result of the energetic actions by the partisans, enemy traffic along the Bryansk--Lyudinovo railroads and highways was interrupted.(11)

For organizing cooperation with the partisans of Smolensk Oblast, on 17 January the staff of the Western Front dropped the battalion commissar A.I. Razgovorov with radio operators into the enemy rear. In being the representative of the command of the front and the Smolensk party obkom, he held a meeting with the commanders and commissars of the partisan detachments in Znamenskiy (now Ugranskiy) Rayon and explained to them the tasks related to the landing of a Soviet assault force on the rayon's territory.(12)

Upon instructions of the staff of the Western Front, the partisans prepared and covered in the Znamenka--Zhelanye area landing sites where during the period from 18 through 22 January two paratrooper battalions were landed from the 201st Airborne Brigade and the 250th Rifle Regiment (a total of over 1,640 men). Under the cover of the partisans, the landing and assembly of the force was carried out in an organized manner and without losses. During the subsequent days the landing troops in close cooperation with the partisans launched attacks against the nearby enemy garrisons and cleared the Nazis out of around 100 population points.(13) The commanders of the fronts (armies) often gave the partisan detachments tasks for conducting independent operations as well. Thus, the detachments of Smolensk partisans Uragan [hurricane] (commander, F.N. Demenkov), Dedushka [granddad] (commander, V.I. Voronchenko) and Ded [grandfather] (commander, V.A. Kiselev), in carrying out the order of the commander of the Western Front, by a joint attack liberated the town of Dorogobuzh on 15 February.(14)

The establishing of radio contact with the partisan detachments made it possible for the command of the fronts (armies) to more effectively employ the partisan forces for joint strikes against the enemy and more effectively solve the questions of cooperation.

On 21 March, the Main Staff of Partisan Detachments in Smolensk Oblast (established in February 1942) reported to the commander of the Western Front on the concentration of the Partisan Regiment imeni 24-y Godovshchiny RKKA [24th Anniversary of the RKKA] (the former DF Detachment, commander, F.D. Gnezdilov) to the east of Yelnya and the Partisan Detachment imeni S. Lazo (commander, V.V. Kazubskiy) to the south of the city. At that time the detachments had over 2,500 fighters (mainly servicemen), artillery, mortars and tanks.(15) Having received this information, Army Gen G.K. Zhukov adopted a plan to have the partisans take the city and the railroad station of Yelnya and also cut the major line of communications over which the Nazis were shifting reinforcements to the area of Vyazma and Yukhnov. On the same day, over his signature, the Main Staff of Partisan Detachments in Smolensk Oblast was sent a radiogram: "Lazo and DF Detachments are to intensify their operations and no later than 1 April take Yelnya."(16) For coordinating the partisan combat operations, the representative of the front's staff, the political instructor M.M. Ostashov, was sent there and he subsequently maintained regular contact with the front command.(17)

The fighting for the town lasted from 22 through 27 March. The enemy garrison was on the brink of defeat. The enemy had lost around 1,300 soldiers and officers killed and wounded and only the emergency shifting of tanks and motorized infantry to help the garrison saved it from complete destruction.(18)

In assessing the partisan operations, the commander of the security troops and the chief of the rear area of Army Group Center Gen von Schenkendorf in April 1942 reported to the staff of Army Group Center: "...They operate in large, militarily trained units. They have a large amount of heavy infantry weapons, and partially also artillery and other weapons and, as the major attacks on Yelnya and Bryn (17 km to the northeast of Yelnya) have shown with a preliminary 3-hour artillery softening up from 10 weapons, are capable of conducting offensive actions."(19)

The presence of dependable radio contact provided the possibility for the command of the Western Front to promptly shift partisan operations to carrying out those tasks which were most acute according to the developing situation. For example, as soon as reconnaissance spotted increased enemy rail traffic in the rear of Army Group Center, the front commander on 27 March sent the following radio message to the Smolensk and Bryansk partisans:

"To Comrades Kiryukhin and Popov, to Capt Orlov, to Koritskiy....

"1. The enemy is presently straining every effort to establish food, fuel and ammunition supplies.

"2. The main task for all the large and small partisan detachments is to prevent the enemy from moving fuel, food and ammunition to the front.

"My orders are:

"a) To halt temporarily, with the exception of the town of Yelnya, the fighting for population points and all forces of the detachments are to be

concentrated on the railroads, highways and dirt roads in order to prevent the enemy from transporting all freight and resupply the front.

"Operate chiefly using ambushes and bold raids. Roads are to be mined. Wreck trains on the railroads.

"b) The main roads are to be: Smolensk--Vyazma, Smolensk--Roslavl, Roslavl--Chipliyayevo, Roslavl--Bryansk, Bryansk--Zikeyevo.

"c) Personal responsibility for preventing traffic along the roads is to be entrusted to: the Zhukovka brigade for the Roslavl--Bryansk Road; the Dyatkovo brigade of Orlov for the Bryansk--Zikeyevo, Bryansk--Lyudinovo Roads; the Koritskiy regiment for the Pohep--Bryansk, Navlya--Bryansk Road.

Zhukov"(20)

In carrying out the order of the front commander, the partisan detachments of the Smolensk and Bryansk areas intensified sabotage activities on the lines of communications of Army Group Center, preventing the planned supply of enemy troops. Partisans in the northwestern rayons of Smolensk Oblast, for example, in April-May blew up 17 railroad bridges and 49 highway bridges, they organized the wrecking of 8 trains and killed over 700 enemy soldiers and officers. The partisan detachment under the command of G.I. Orlov derailed 8 enemy trains and destroyed over a thousand Nazis.(21) As a result of the active partisan operations, the operation of the enemy rear in many areas was paralyzed.

A vivid example of the close cooperation of the partisans with the Soviet Army units was the 5-month struggle of the Smolensk partisans together with the troop group of Gen P.A. Belov consisting of the I Guards Cavalry Corps and the IV Airborne Corps fighting in the enemy rear in the area of Dorobobuzh--Vyazma and Yelnya.

The forms and methods of cooperation of the partisans with the regular troops in the course of an operation were the most diverse. The joint forces of the Soviet Army units and the partisans were employed in defeating large enemy garrisons, in conducting sabotage on the enemy lines of communications and in the joint defense of Soviet territory which had been liberated from the Nazis. The partisans secured the rears and flanks of the Soviet Army units in combat and conducted reconnaissance in their interests.

As a particular feature we should note the incorporation of the partisan detachments from Smolensk Oblast as part of the troop group of Gen P.A. Belov. By a decision of the command of the Western Front and the Smolensk Party Obkom, several of the oblast partisan detachments numbering up to 15,000 men were put under Gen Belov.(22) The corps staff set the combat areas for the detachments, the tasks and methods of carrying them out as well as the forces to be involved in the operations. For receiving the tasks, the commanders of the partisan formations, as a rule, were summoned to the command post of the group commander. Here they were given their battle tasks and the combat operations of the troops and the partisans were coordinated in terms of goal, place and time.

The main efforts of the troops and the partisans fighting in the enemy rear were aimed at disrupting rail traffic. Thus, units of the troop group of Gen P.A. Belov and partisans from the Severnyy Medved [Polar Bear] Detachment liberated and for a long time held the large stations of Ugra, Volosta-Pyatnitsa, Vertekhovo and Baskhakovka on the Zanoznaya--Vyazma Railroad. The railroad bridge across the Ugra River was destroyed. As a result, rail communications between Zanoznaya and Vyazma were completely broken off for 4 months, from the first days of February until the end of May. On the rail line between Zanoznaya and Smolensk sabotage was carried out by partisans from the regiments imeni S. Lazo and imeni 24-y Godovshchiny RKKA as well as by subunits from the 2d Guards Cavalry Division. This section was frequently put out of operation and it was usually little used by the enemy.

The combat cooperation of the partisans with the cavalry and assault troops was expressed not only in joint fighting. The extended stay of the 7,000-strong group of Soviet troops in the enemy rear sharply posed the question of replenishing the troop group of Gen Belov with personnel, as well as supplying ammunition and weapons, food and fodder. The command received enormous aid in carrying out these tasks from the partisans, the population and local bodies of Soviet power which had been restored in the liberated rayons of the oblast.

When the command of the Western Front permitted Gen P.A. Belov to bring the corps divisions up to strength using partisans and the population of the liberated areas, the local bodies of Soviet power took an energetic part in the mobilization work. Around 11,000 recruits from the liberated areas joined the regular Soviet Army units. The personnel from the Severnyy Medved Partisan Detachment numbering 860 men on 4 April was completely incorporated in the 329th Rifle Division.(23)

The partisans from Znamenskiy Rayon of the Smolensk area cooperated closely with the 33d Army. When the group of Lt Gen M.G. Yefremov entered the rayon's territory, the partisans covered the left flank of the advancing troops on the side of the Yukhnov--Vyazma Highway. In disrupting enemy troop traffic, detachments under the command of A.G. Kholomyev and M.G. Kirillov blew up a bridge across the Sigosa River at the village of Yekimtsevo, they routed a motor vehicle column carrying ammunition at the village of Slabodka, near the village of Dobroye they blew up 3 enemy tanks and not far from the village of Bogatyr destroyed an enemy reserve company. With the active help of the local population, the partisans organized the supply of food and fodder to the army formations. When Gen M.G. Yefremov was ordered to break out of the encirclement, the partisans provided the march columns of the group with experienced guides.(24)

In assessing the combat activities of the partisans in the Rzhev-Vyazma Operation, MSU G.K. Zhukov wrote in his memoirs: "The partisans actively aided both Yefremov and Belov in fighting the enemy as well as in supplying their troops with food and fodder."(25)

On 20 April 1942, the Western and Kalinin Fronts, upon orders of Hq SHC, went over to the defensive. The troops fighting beyond the front line were ordered to link up with the main forces. The Rzhev-Vyazma Offensive Operation was

over, however the joint actions of the partisans with the units of the troop group of Gen P.A. Belov and M.G. Yefremov which remained in the enemy rear continued until 20 June. In particular, in accord with a plan worked out by the staffs of the I Guards Cavalry Corps and the Partisan Regiment imeni S. Lazo, the partisan detachments covered the flanks and the rear of the retreating troops and by a stubborn defense supported the breakthrough of the troop group of Gen P.A. Belov across the front line in the zone of the 10th Army in the Kirov area.

* * *

In the course of the Rzhev-Vyazma Operation for the first time in the Great Patriotic War, cooperation of the partisans with the Soviet Army units assumed a mass nature and was aimed directly at carrying out the specific tasks confronting the troops. The coordinated attacks against the enemy were launched by the troops and the partisans both close to the front line as well as in the operational depth. In carrying out the orders of the front and army command, the partisans conducted reconnaissance, they defeated enemy staffs and garrisons, they carried out sabotage on the enemy lines of communications and in the enemy rear held extensive areas of liberated territory.

The military councils of the fronts and the armies in the course of the operation constantly sought out ways for improving leadership over the partisan forces in carrying out the operational and tactical tasks and endeavored to establish closer cooperation with the partisan detachments. Leadership over the partisan formations began to be assigned to the operations sections of the front (army) staffs and these began organizing small (two or three men) operations groups (departments) for these purposes.(26) The groups were usually organized from officers of the operations, political and intelligence directorates (sections). In terms of their purpose, the groups were a prototype of the partisan movement staffs under the military councils of the fronts (armies).

The rich experience gained in the course of the Rzhev-Vyazma Operation in the joint combat operations of the troops and partisans was generalized by the staffs and political directorates of the Western and Kalinin Fronts, and then by the Central Partisan Movement Staff(27) and played a major role in improving the military art of the partisans in the subsequent operations of the Great Patriotic War.

FOOTNOTES

1. TsAMO SSSR [Central Archives of the USSR Ministry of Defense], folio 213, inv. 2016, file 91, sheet 389.
2. "Ocherki istorii Smolenskoy organizatsii KPSS" [Essays From the History of the Smolensk CPSU Organization], Moscow, Politizdat, 1970, p 330.
3. TsAMO, folio 208, inv. 2526, file 78, sheets 13, 14; folio 213, inv. 2016, file 79, sheet 50.
4. Ibid., folio 208, inv. 2552, file 218, sheets 263, 264.

5. Ibid., inv. 2513, file 213, sheet 1.
6. Ibid., file 209, sheet 158.
7. Ibid., folio 213, inv. 2016, file 110, sheets 141, 142, 169.
8. Ibid., file 93, sheet 323; file 110, sheets 159, 261.
9. "Na ognennykh rubezhakh Moskovskoy bitvy" [On the Fiery Lines of the Moscow Battle], Moscow, Moskovskiy Rabochiy, 1981, p 196.
10. TsAMO, folio 213, inv. 2016, file 91, sheets 392, 393.
11. "Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy voyny 1939-1945" [History of World War II of 1939-1945], Vol 4, p 351.
12. TsAMO, folio 208, inv. 2526, file 78, sheets 11, 12.
13. VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, No 11, 1964, p 102.
14. TsAMO, folio 208, inv. 2511, file 1027, sheet 96.
15. Ibid., file 1402, sheets 114, 115.
16. Ibid., file 1027, sheet 99.
17. G.S. Amirov, "Nepokorennaya zemlya" [The Unconquered Land], Alma-Ata, 1975, p 110.
18. TsPA IMEL [Central Party Archives of the Institute of Marx, Engels and Lenin], folio 69, inv. 1, file 66, sheet 3.
19. VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, No 7, 1960, p 91.
20. "Shli na bitvu partizany" [The Partisans Go Into Battle], Bryansk, 1972, p 117.
21. M.A. Kasatkin, "V tylu nemetsko-fashistskoy armii 'Tsentr'" [In the Rear of the Nazi Army Center], Moscow, Mysl, 1980, pp 277, 278.
22. "Ukhodili v pokhod partizany" [The Partisans Go on Campaign], Smolensk, 1973, pp 195, 196.
23. P.A. Belov, "Za nami Moskva" [Moscow is Behind Us], Moscow, Voenizdat, 1963, pp 259, 264.
24. Ya.I. Makarenko, L.F. Mikhanov, "Ugranskiy nabat" [The Ugra Alarm], Moscow, Moskovskiy Rabochiy, 1980, pp 85, 96, 122.
25. VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, No 10, 1966, p 82.

26. TsAMO, folio 208, inv. 2552, file 219, sheets 263, 264.

27. Established by a decision of Hq SHC on 30 May 1942 soon after the completion of the operation.

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CULTURAL-EDUCATIONAL WORK, ITS ROLE IN STRENGTHENING MILITARY DISCIPLINE

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[Article, published under the heading "Party Political Work," by Maj Gen O.V. Zolotarev, chief of the Order of the Red Star Lvov Higher Military Political School: "Cultural-Educational Work, Its Role in Strengthening Military Discipline"]

[Text] Cultural-educational work, in being an important part of ideological activities in the Army and Navy, plays an active role in the political, military, moral and aesthetic indoctrination of the personnel, in mobilizing them to successfully carry out the tasks of combat and political training, in raising vigilance and combat readiness and in strengthening military discipline. This has been carried out in the Soviet Army since the first days of its founding. Using the specific means of the cultural and educational institutions, the Red Armyman was indoctrinated as a conscious fighter for the cause of the workers and peasants, and a feeling of civil duty, troop comradeship, organization and efficiency was developed in him. In 1919, V.I. Lenin pointed out that "our victories on the Don have been possible exclusively due to the stronger party and cultural-educational activities in the ranks of the Red Army."(1)

During the years of the Civil War the party committees and cells and the cultural-educational commissions were the organizers of cultural-educational work in the Army and Navy and with the formation of the All-Russian Bureau of Military Commissars, the military commissars and political bodies did this. The regulations and instructions issued in October-December 1918 set out the goal and the procedure for organizing the cultural-educational institutions and their political role. These documents, in particular, posed the task of turning the club into a means of political indoctrination for the masses and emphasized that with a good organization of the work the club "will become a furnace in the flames of which from the flabby and vacillating we will forge steadfast fighters and revolutionaries."(2)

The Mobile Red Army Club imeni V.I. Lenin under the political section of the Southern Front was very popular in the operational army. In being almost constantly in the forward units, it organized meetings and concerts and frequently set up discussions as well as the collective readings of books and

periodicals. Every day the club workers sent out books, pamphlets and newspapers to the units.(3)

On 1 October 1919, the Red Army had 1,315 clubs, 2,393 libraries, 800 reading huts, 250 theaters, 143 dramatic circles and 161 movie projectors. By the end of 1920, the number of clubs had increased significantly, while the number of libraries surpassed 10,000.(4)

The indoctrination of the soldiers and commanders in a spirit of conscious military discipline was a most important task for cultural-educational work during the period of peacetime socialist construction. The enormous successes of the nation in the area of the economy, culture and public education helped to improve the training of the personnel for the Soviet Army clubs and to widen the network of cultural-educational institutions and improve their physical plant. Along with the establishing of central cultural institutions and artistic organizations, year after year the number of cultural institutions increased in the units and formations. At the start of 1941 the Army had up to 2,000 clubs, 27,000 Lenin rooms, 450 Soviet Army clubs and garrison clubs. An extensive network of museums was operating in the country.(5)

The workers and aktiv of the clubs, libraries, Soviet Army clubs, museums and theaters systematically propagandized the ideas of Marxism-Leninism, they explained the successes of socialist construction and in disclosing the aggressive essence of fascism, urged vigilance and helped to strengthen the unity of the Army and the people and friendship between men of different nationalities.

With the outbreak of the Great Patriotic War, the Communist Party under new conditions initiated cultural-educational work in the aim of developing in the men high moral-combat qualities, of further strengthening conscious military discipline and developing flawless efficiency. A network of mobile cultural-educational institutions was established for carrying this work out in the operational army. In the divisions and separate regiments they organized field clubs with libraries and the necessary propaganda equipment (movies, radio and photographic equipment). Front and army Soviet Army clubs were opened up as well as front dramatic theaters and front and army [musical] ensembles were organized. Agitation brigades worked constantly in the troops. Cultural-educational work was also conducted in the units using mobile facilities such as agitation trains, agitation vehicles and agitation carts.

Cultural-educational facilities helped the commanders and political workers in explaining the requirements of the military oath and regulations to the soldiers and sergeants, they widely propagandized the heroic feats of the Soviet soldiers and skillfully showed how important discipline is in combat. For this they held talks, gave reports and lectures and employed visual agitation, the periodic press, political and artistic literature, films and the radio. Amateur artistic activities were organized.

The agitation vehicles of the Western Front over the period from 1 January through 15 May 1942 made 36 trips lasting 10-15 days each, visiting all the armies. In just 2 months, 263 lectures and talks were held many of which were

devoted to the questions of discipline; there were 278 movie showings and 255 amateur artistic concerts.(6)

The bulletins, posters, photoleaflets and newspapers and express leaflets put out by the cultural and educational institutions helped to profoundly explain to the personnel the need for high organization, preciseness and efficiency in carrying out the battle tasks. Poignancy and timeliness were the mark, in particular, of the so-called "live newspapers" which first appeared in the winter of 1941 on the Northwestern Front(7) and then became widespread in the troops. These popularized able and efficient soldiers, disseminated their experience and criticized the undisciplined.

The periodic press was widely employed in the work of the cultural and educational institutions. The Soviet Army clubs organized newspaper displays, "agitation windows," and stands on which they put up the Sovinformburo [Soviet Information Bureau] summaries published in the newspapers, the orders of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief and announcements about feats of the Soviet soldiers. The periodic press provided rich material for the activities of the agitation brigades and the amateur artistic collectives.

Along with the newspapers and magazines, the political and artistic literature was an important means for indoctrinating high moral-political and combat qualities in the men. During the war over 255 million books and pamphlets were dispatched to the front as well as more than 250,000 specially organized libraries.(8)

The active use of diverse means, forms and methods of cultural-educational work during the war years helped indoctrinate the personnel in a spirit of the strictest execution of the orders and instructions of the command as well as the requirements of the oath and regulations. All of this helped to increase the combat capability of the Army and Navy as well as mobilize the men to defeat the Nazi invaders.

The materials of the 27th Party Congress as well as the decisions of the subsequent plenums of the CPSU Central Committee point to the growing importance of discipline under present-day conditions, during a period of an abrupt change in the life of Soviet society. "Progress will be all the faster," pointed out the Political Report of the CPSU Central Committee to the 27th Party Congress, "the higher the discipline and organization and the greater the responsibility of each for the assigned job and for its results."(9)

The Army and Navy cultural and educational institutions see their most important task in carrying out the party's decisions and its instructions on the reforming of ideological and organizational activities in each area. Working under the leadership of the commanders and the political bodies, they are endeavoring to effectively employ the presently available rich opportunities for an ideological and political influence on the men. They have done a great deal in the aim of explaining to the personnel the Leninist ideas of the vital necessity of strong military discipline. The cultural and educational institutions help the men turn ideas into specific actions, to profoundly realize their personal responsibility for the security of the

motherland and the need for unfailing fulfillment of military duty and the strictest observance of the requirements of the Soviet laws, military oath and regulations.

In being concerned with improved political, military and moral indoctrination of the personnel, the cultural and educational institutions have helped to increase the propaganda skills for the leaders of the officer Marxist-Leninist training groups, the warrant officer ["praporshchik"] political studies and the political exercises for the soldiers and NCOs. Thus, in the unit club headed by the officer V. Rykhlov it has become a tradition to invite the leaders of the political training groups to question and answer evenings and special legal knowledge mornings as well as for "roundtable" talks on the most pressing subjects.

The exercises conducted in the club on the principles of political and military indoctrination, pedagogics and psychology as well as the meetings with scientists and figures of literature and art are aimed at improving the quality of work done by the non-T/O propagandists.

The non-T/O lecture groups under the officer clubs have made their contribution to forming a correct and profound understanding by the men of the need to observe the manuals and regulations as a most important condition predetermining the motives for the actions and deeds of the servicemen. They give particular attention to reading lectures and reports on the questions "Sources of Heroism of Soviet Soldiers in the Great Patriotic War," "Concern of the CPSU for Increasing Vigilance and Military Discipline," "The Significance of Military Discipline Under Present-Day Conditions," "Discipline--The Mother of Victory," and others.

Recognized forms of work at many officer and soldier clubs are the Lenin and congress sociopolitical readings, special-subject evenings and lecture cycles devoted to the Leninist teachings of the defense of the socialist fatherland, to the urgent questions of Communist Party policy, and to noteworthy dates in the history of the Soviet state, the Armed Forces and the life of the Union republics. Delegates of the 27th CPSU Congress and the congresses of the Union republic communist parties, as a rule, participate in them.

For example, an informative congress reading was held at the unit club where Sr Lt P. Dzhumaylo is the chief. Vivid and moving talks were given by the delegate of the 27th CPSU Congress, I. Tropinin, Officers I. Petrov and V. Kalmykov and Sgt M. Kravchenko. These were devoted to an analysis of the problems of further strengthening the discipline at the present stage and contained specific examples of heroic actions by soldiers carrying out their international duty in Afghanistan and eliminating the disaster in Chernobyl.

In drawing on the experience of the Great Patriotic War, the cultural and educational institutions are shifting the center of gravity of their work to where combat skill is formed, that is: in the field, to the testing ranges and tank driving ranges and to the subunits standing alert duty. The commanders and political bodies are working so that the Lenin rooms, the clubs and all elements of cultural and educational work operate effectively together with the troops in the exercises, field exercises, combat training firings and

flights. The forming of high moral-psychological qualities and discipline in the servicemen are positively effected by the performances organized at tactical exercises of ensembles, artistic agitation brigades of the officer clubs, exhibits and mobile exhibitions of troop museums.

The establishing of radio-television centers for the period of the exercises has proven to be very beneficial. For example, there was a strong emotional impact from the broadcasts of such a center headed by Lt Col Yu. Savin in the tactical exercises. The films made in the course of the combat training actions helped assess the level of teamwork of the subunits, to disclose unused reserves and eliminate individual shortcomings. At the same time, they helped indoctrinate a spirit of pride for the subunit's successes, they united the servicemen, raised their spirit and strengthened discipline.

The cultural and educational institutions are endeavoring to improve their activities in the exercises and maneuvers. In line with the increased dynamicness of the combat training tasks and the greater role of the subunits in carrying them out, the concert brigades are being split into small groups (of two or three men) and perform, as was the case on the front, directly on the "forward edge." The incorporating of lecturers and propagandists in them helps in practice to carry out the ideas of the 27th CPSU Congress of increasing the effectiveness of the ideological influence on the men. This makes it possible to more fully consider the requests of the soldiers, to study public opinion and better help the commanders and political workers influence the moral and psychological state of the troop collectives over the period of "combat" actions.

In the activities of the cultural and educational institutions relating to indoctrinating in the servicemen a respect for the laws, the military oath and troop regulations a significant place has been given to legal propaganda such as: under the leadership of the political bodies explaining to the men Soviet legislation, their rights and duties as citizens of the USSR and defenders of the socialist fatherland and indoctrinating in them a feeling of high responsibility to the motherland. For this purpose stands and corners of legal knowledge have been organized in the unit clubs and Lenin rooms. The evenings of legal propaganda are very popular with the servicemen and members of their family and here military lawyers speak regularly, special-subject and documentary films are shown and exhibits of special literature arranged.

The maintaining of firm proper order in the unit and subunit is an essential condition for strengthening troop discipline. The troop centers of culture are endeavoring to propagandize in an interesting and instructive manner the experience of the best commanders, political workers and party and Komsomol organizations who are concerned with firm prescribed order.

Rich experience in this work has been gained in the unit club where Sr Lt G. Kharlamov is the chief. Upon the initiative of the club council and the library, here they hold special-subject mornings such as, for example, "Advanced Experience for Everyone," and competitions "Live by the Regulations and Win Honor and Glory," "Live by the Regulations Is to Serve the Motherland Honorably" and debates on "Discipline and Combat Readiness." The activists of the unit library regularly organize reviews of new literature, book exhibits,

talks by bookshelves and keep files of newspaper and magazine articles on the subjects "The 27th CPSU Congress and the Questions of Strengthening Military Discipline," "Experience of Advanced Subunits in Life" and others.

In the Lenin rooms of the subunits with the aid of the club they have organized galleries of photographic portraits under the theme "They Serve According to the Regulations," and have selected materials on the leading sergeants who are the proponents of strong prescribed order. All of this has actively influenced the establishing of an atmosphere of exactingness and high organization in the unit.

In the maintaining and strengthening of military discipline an important role is played by the exactingness of the commanders and their ability to combine methods of persuasion and coercion in indoctrinational work. "The party gives fundamental importance to such qualities of a leader," states the CPSU Program, "as a feeling for the new, closeness to the people, a readiness to assume responsibility...and exactingness for oneself and others."(10) Those cultural and educational institutions proceed correctly when they are constantly concerned for developing these qualities among the most numerous category of commanders, the young officers. In a majority of the clubs they have organized for them a forum of advanced experience in the training and indoctrination of the men. Here they give lectures and reports, talks and bibliographic reviews are held. Leading commanders and political workers are invited by the clubs to talk to the young officers.

Of great importance for strengthening discipline is the indoctrination of the personnel in the revolutionary, labor and combat traditions of our people and their Armed Forces. Unflagging interest in the invaluable experience of the wartime years and the feats of the heroes draw the men to the museums and rooms of combat glory where they have assembled remarkable mementos and documents which are proof of the courage and self-sacrifice of the soldiers and commanders on the battlefields.

Among the effective forms of indoctrination in combat traditions are certainly the portrait evenings of veterans of war and labor and Heroes of the Soviet Union. The portrait evenings organized in our school for Col (Ret) R. Bedzhanyan, Col I. Podobed and others have left an indelible impression on the personnel. In speaking to the students here, the veterans described the role of discipline in combat and its importance in successfully carrying out the tasks confronting the troops.

The cultural and educational institutions pay particular attention to propagandizing the measures adopted by the party and the government to eradicate drunkenness and alcoholism and to combat unearned income and other negative phenomena.

Positive experience in the antialcohol campaign has been acquired in the officer club, where Maj A. Ochkin is the chief. The servicemen had been enormously influenced by the meetings organized here with physicians, as well as the talks by lawyers and addiction prevention specialists on the pernicious consequences of drunkenness. It has become a firmly established practice to employ such forms of work as film festivals on "No Other Way to Overcome the

Evil," the lecture cycle "The Way of Life and Harmful Habits," a specialized showing of feature, documentary and scientific-popular films, special-subject evenings and so forth. The library workers at the officer club N. Cherkisova and T. Pistunova have organized a permanent book exhibit on "Sobriety--The Standard of Life."

One of the most important areas for increasing the effectiveness of the work done by the cultural and educational institutions to prevent infractions is an improvement in individual indoctrination of the subordinates. All activists of the troop cultural centers are engaged in improving this and in strengthening measures to prevent infractions. For example, the chief of the unit club Officer O. Yakubenko is constantly concerned with this. He gives great attention to indoctrinating the members of the club councils and unit library and to providing help to the commanders and political workers in the subunits in selecting members of the Lenin room councils, the editorial boards of the wall newspapers and teaches the activists to work with others.

The chief of the unit club, Officer A. Prodanov, maintains close contact with the servicemen of the subunits. He is constantly among the men studying public opinion and influencing its formation. The club council headed by him as well as the library and subunit activists, in participating actively in the All-Union Festival of Folk Creativity devoted to the 70th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution, are continuing to work steadily on enriching the spiritual world of the men and establishing in the troop collectives prescribed relationships and an atmosphere of friendship and troop comradeship. This has brought tangible results and has contributed to having the personnel achieve high indicators in training and discipline.

In the work of the cultural and educational institutions a significant place is held by the organizing of the leisure of the personnel and satisfying the growing cultural and aesthetic needs of the servicemen. A majority of the officer and soldier clubs are working out and consistently carrying out measures to improve the organization of the leisure of the servicemen on Sundays and holidays. The troop cultural centers take an active part in holding excursions and tourist trips to the sites of revolutionary, military and labor glory. Due to their efforts there has been a growing number of people's theaters and special-interest clubs, amateur creative circles and amateur artists; this has helped largely in establishing a healthy moral atmosphere in the troop collectives.

Thus, in acting as the dependable assistants of the commanders, the political bodies and the party organizations, the army cultural institutions with the forms and methods of work inherent to them are effectively influencing the personnel of the units and subunits, they are contributing to a strengthening of military discipline and are making a worthy contribution to indoctrinating courageous and able defenders of the motherland.

FOOTNOTES

1. V.I. Lenin, PSS [Complete Collected Works], Vol 38, pp 35-36.
2. TsGASA [Central State Archives of the Soviet Army], folio 8, inv. 2, stor. unit 547, sheets 28-29.
3. TsPA IML [Central Party Archives of the Marxism-Leninism Institute], folio 17, inv. 65, stor. unit 151, sheet 24.
4. TsGASA, folio 9, inv. 13, stor. unit 38, sheet 359.
5. "Kulturno-prosvetitel'naya rabota v Vooruzhennykh Silakh SSSR" [Cultural-Educational Work in the USSR Armed Forces], Moscow, Voenizdat, 1984, p 54.
6. TsAMO SSSR [Central Archives of the USSR Ministry of Defense], folio 32, inv. 15798, file 18, sheet 385.
7. Ibid., folio 221, inv. 50777, file 2, sheet 179.
8. "KPSS i stroitel'stvo Sovetskikh Vooruzhennykh Sil. 1917-1964" [The CPSU and the Organizational Development of the Soviet Armed Forces. 1917-1964], Moscow, Voenizdat, 1965, p 324.
9. "Materialy XXVII syezda KPSS" [Materials of the 27th CPSU Congress], Moscow, Politizdat, 1986, p 24.
10. Ibid., p 184.

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BIOGRAPHY OF MSU KURKOTKIN

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[Article, published under the heading "Generals and Military Leaders," by Hero of the Soviet Union, MSU V.G. Kulikov: "MSU S.K. Kurkotkin"]

[Text] The 70th birthday is being celebrated for one of the active builders of the Soviet Armed Forces, Hero of the Soviet Union and USSR Deputy Minister of Defense and Chief of the USSR Armed Forces Rear Service, MSU S.K. Kurkotkin.

Semen Konstantinovich [Kurkotkin] was born in the village of Zaprudnaya in Ramenskiy Rayon of Moscow Oblast on 13 February 1917 (according to the new style of dating). He, like all the Soviet people born in the same year as October, has lived in a new socialist society, helped build a new life and defend it against enemies.

When the threatening clouds of fascism hung over Europe, S.K. Kurkotkin was studying in the Moscow Industrial Pedagogical Technical School. However, regardless of the fact that he liked his selected profession, he determined to become a military man. In 1937, he entered the Orel Armored-Tank School. Since then he has been continuously in army service.

At the school the commanders and instructors immediately spotted the capable youth. The ability to lead comrades and attract them marked the officer candidate S.K. Kurkotkin from among the others. His speeches at seminars and meetings were always persuasive and concrete. It was no surprise that after successfully completing the school in 1939, the young lieutenant was appointed to the position of the political instructor of a tank company.

When the Great Patriotic War broke out, Semen Konstantinovich was serving in the Transbaykal area in a separate reconnaissance battalion of the 114th Rifle Division. In September 1941, the formation was moved to the front around Leningrad. Here it became part of the 7th Separate Army. In May 1942, he was appointed the military commissar of the 475th Separate Tank Battalion which as part of the 6th Army was engaged in heavy defensive battles to the northwest of Voronezh. And now, when one reads the terse lines from the recommendation to award Semen Konstantinovich the Order of the Red Banner, it seems that one

hears the echoes of that distant battle at Voronezh, when the commissar of the tank battalion, Sr Political Instructor S.K. Kurkotkin eight times led the battalion into combat against superior enemy forces and by his courageous conduct helped successfully carry out the battle tasks confronting the battalion.

After the abolishment of the institution of military commissars and the institution of one-man command in the Soviet Army, S.K. Kurkotkin in October 1942 was appointed commander of the 475th Separate Tank Battalion, and in December of the same year, the deputy commander of the 262d Separate Tank Regiment. In October 1943, the bold and enterprising officer was appointed deputy commander of the 14th Guards Tank Brigade of the IV Kantemirovka Guards Tank Corps. S.K. Kurkotkin was part of this glorious formation during the entire subsequent period of the war.

In mid-November 1943, the Nazi troops went over to a counteroffensive on the Kiev axis, endeavoring to retake Kiev. The IV Guards Tank Corps came to reinforce the 60th Army which was holding the defenses here. The 14th Tank Brigade met the attacking enemy on the Voznya River to the south of Malin. The enemy tanks constantly attacked the positions held by the brigade. On 9 December, the brigade commander Maj V.M. Pechkovskiy was killed in an unequal battle. Maj S.K. Kurkotkin assumed temporary command of the brigade. The tank troops successfully drove off the attacks by large enemy infantry and tank forces.

In the course of the offensive, the corps commander moved up the 14th Guards Tank Brigade in the direction of Vysokaya Pech, skirting Zhitomir to the west. The forward detachment from the brigade was led by Maj S.K. Kurkotkin. By the rapid infantry assault and by the bold outflanking maneuver of the tank formations, the Soviet troops on 31 December took Zhitomir. The 14th Guards Tank Brigade was mentioned among the formations and units which had distinguished themselves in battle in the order of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief. The brigade was awarded the designator Zhitomir. Many officers, including Maj S.K. Kurkotkin, were decorated with high governmental awards. In assessing the tactical skill of the young officer, his boldness and resourcefulness, the corps commander, Lt Gen Tank Trps P.P. Poluboyarov, wrote: "Guards Maj Kurkotkin in combat behaved exceptionally bravely and by his personal example demonstrated models of courage and heroism."(1)

The 14th Guards Tank Brigade also distinguished itself in the liberation of the large railroad junction of Shepetovka. During the fighting for it, the brigade commander Lt Col V.A. Petrov was killed. Maj S.K. Kurkotkin temporarily led the formation. Under his command, the brigade participated in the storming and taking of Shepetovka and then in repelling the strong enemy counterattacks. For outstanding combat in the liberation of Shepetovka, the 14th Zhitomir Guards Tank Brigade received the designator of Shepetovka and was awarded the Order of the Red Banner, while Maj S.K. Kurkotkin received the Order of the Patriotic War 1st Degree.

Recognition of the commander talent and combat accomplishments of Semen Konstantinovich was his appointment in December 1944 as commander of the 13th Guards Tank Brigade of the IV Guards Tank Corps. Under his command the

brigade fought successfully against the Nazi troops in the concluding operations of the Great Patriotic War.

The Sandomierz-Silesian Operation was a vivid page in the Great Patriotic War. In it an important role was assigned to the IV Guards Tank Corps. In giving the formations and units tasks to continue the offensive after breaking through the enemy defenses, the corps commander entrusted the brigade of Lt Col S.K. Kurkotkin with the responsible task of outflanking the Krakow enemy grouping to the northwest. The decisive actions of the brigade were to predetermine the success of not only the tank corps but also the cooperating rifle formations of the 59th Army in the storming of Krakow.

The tank troops prepared well to breach the enemy defenses on the Szreniawa River. The 13th Guards Tank Brigade, in fighting on the right flank of the corps, crossed the river and without a pause captured the strong enemy defensive center on the approaches to Krakow, the town of Skala. Then, having executed a deep outflanking maneuver, the brigade broke into Krakow from the west and reached the crossing over the Vistula. The Order of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief on the occasion of the taking of Krakow noted the outstanding actions of the 13th Guards Tank Brigade. The brigade commander, Lt Col S.K. Kurkotkin, was awarded the Order of Kutuzov 2d Degree.

The orders of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief I.V. Stalin commended another three times the combat actions of the brigade under the command of Lt Col S.K. Kurkotkin: for outstanding actions in the taking of the Dombrow Coal Area and the cities of Katowice and Dresden.

After the end of the Great Patriotic War, S.K. Kurkotkin commanded a guards tank regiment. Having completed the Military Academy of the Armored and Mechanized Troops in 1951 with honors, Semen Konstantinovich was appointed the deputy division commander and a year later the division commander. He trained and indoctrinated his subordinates persistently and effectively, generously sharing his rich combat experience with them. The 4 years in command of the division became for Maj Gen Tank Trps Kurkotkin (this rank was awarded to him in 1955) a truly irreplaceable school of commander maturity.

In 1958, Semen Konstantinovich completed the General Staff Military Academy and after this he successively commanded a corps and an army. Everyone who knew him at that time commented on the breadth of view and the capacity to see the development prospects of military affairs. Precisely these qualities largely contributed to the further growth of S.K. Kurkotkin as a military leader. He successfully fulfilled the duties of first deputy commander-in-chief of the Group of Soviet Troops in Germany and later was the commander of the Transcaucasian Military District. In 1971, he was appointed the commander-in-chief of the Group of Soviet Troops in Germany. Semen Konstantinovich made a significant contribution to the theory and practice of rear troop support, being from July 1972 in the responsible post of USSR deputy minister of defense and chief of the USSR Armed Forces Rear Services.

Over these years significant changes occurred in the development of the Soviet Armed Forces Rear Services. Under the leadership of S.K. Kurkotkin and with his direct involvement there was an all-round improvement in the rear services

considering the latest scientific advances and the appearance of new types of weapons, military equipment and the methods of conducting armed combat. The rear services became more maneuverable, technically equipped and capable.

In his activities Semen Konstantinovich has constantly relied on the political bodies and party organizations, skillfully combining collectivism with the highest personal responsibility for the assigned job. In 1940 he joined the Communist Party and since then has carried the high title of communist with honor and dignity.

Semen Konstantinovich has taken an active part in the sociopolitical life of the nation. Since 1976 he has been a member of the CPSU Central Committee. He was a delegate to the 22d, 23d, 24th, 25th, 26th and 27th Party Congresses and a deputy to several sessions of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

The high accomplishments of S.K. Kurkotkin have been highly praised by the Communist Party and the Soviet government. On 18 February 1981, he was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union and on 26 March 1983, the military rank of Marshal of the Soviet Union. He has been awarded four Orders of Lenin, the Order of the October Revolution, three Orders of the Red Banner, the Order of Kutuzov 2d Degree, Bogdan Khmel'nitskiy 2d Degree, two Orders of the Patriotic War 1st Degree, Orders of the Red Star, "For Service to the Motherland in the USSR Armed Forces" 3d Degree as well as many medals of the Soviet Union in addition to orders and medals of foreign states.

On the day of his 70th birthday, his combat comrades, friends and fellow servicemen wish Semen Konstantinovich good health, long years of life and further successes in strengthening the defense might of our motherland.

FOOTNOTE

1. The personnel file of S.K. Kurkotkin.

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CRITIQUE OF MAIN AIMS IN BOURGEOIS FALSIFICATIONS OF SOVIET MILITARY HEROISM

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 2, Feb 87 (signed to press 21 Jan 87) pp 52-58

[Article, published under the heading "Against the Bourgeois Falsifiers of History," by Doctor of Historical Sciences V.A. Sekistov and Capt V.M. Gobarev: "Critique of Main Aims in Bourgeois Falsifications of Soviet Military Heroism"]

[Text] The heroism of the Soviet people has long been an object of attack by bourgeois propaganda in endeavoring to play down the importance of the moral-political potential of the Soviet state and its Armed Forces.

Here the tone has been set by those reactionary authors who openly play up to the most militant "hawks" in the Reagan Administration and the military-industrial complex. In this campaign conducted by bourgeois propaganda to "deheroize" the Soviet soldier one can clearly see two specific aims: to distort the essence and sources of the mass heroism of the Soviet soldiers in the last war; to debunk and blacken the feats of the current generation of the defenders of the socialist motherland. Along with propagandizing the myths about the "red militarism," "the Soviet military threat" and "Soviet expansion," the "deheroization" of the Soviet soldier holds an important place in the "psychological warfare" against the USSR.

We do not have the right, states the Political Report of the CPSU Central Committee to the 27th Party Congress, "to forget that 'psychological warfare' is the struggle for the minds of people, their understanding of the world, their living, social and spiritual guidelines...."(1) The unmasking of the bourgeois falsifications of the heroism of the Soviet soldiers is an important component in the fight against bourgeois ideology.

The current campaign of "deheroization" goes far back in history as attacks on the "man with a gun" who was the defender of socialism began even at the dawn of Soviet power. The wave of these attacks had both high points and low points. Thus, during the years of the Civil War and the Soviet military intervention, the bourgeois press, in benefiting from the virtually complete absence of correct information in the West about Soviet Russia, frightened the man in the street with tales about the bloodthirsty "Red bear." In the course of World War II, the leaders of the Western powers were forced to recognize

the unprecedented courage of the Soviet soldier. However, at the end of the war, the campaign to "deheroize" the Soviet soldier got a "second breath." This was essential for those who were unleashing the Cold War.

Gradually a number of versions developed (about the "herd instinct," the "spontaneity," "the defense of the family hearth," "traditional fanaticism" of the Russians and so forth), that is, the methods of falsifying the heroism of the Soviet soldiers became diversified. Characteristic of American bourgeois historiography up to the beginning of the 1970s were the works of Turney, H. Salisbury, J. Toland, C. Salzberger and H. Baldwin. These assert that the actions of the Soviet soldiers were directed by a "feeling of revenge," a "thirst for destruction," a "fear of punishment" and so forth.(2)

In subsequent years, certain American bourgeois authors have abandoned the too odious theses "debunking" the heroism of the Soviet soldier. Their attacks became more refined. An analysis of the works published in the United States in the 1980s indicates that, having adapted their concepts to political trends, these authors have largely returned to the image of the Soviet soldiers established during the period of the Cold War. What are the main areas of modern bourgeois falsifications of the heroism of the Soviet soldiers?

First. The main, one might say traditional, method of falsifying the heroism of the Soviet soldier as before remains silence. For example, at that time when the entire world community was widely celebrating the 40th anniversary of the end of World War II and the Great Patriotic War, when the peoples of many countries were paying a tribute of respect and exaltation to our people, to the Soviet Armed Forces, that is, to those who stopped and destroyed the "brown plague," President Reagan in addressing Congress on the occasion of the 40th anniversary of the end of hostilities in Europe, directed no kind words toward us.

The American leaders did not find any words of gratitude for the Soviet soldiers and officers in June 1984 during the splendid ceremonies on the occasion of the 40th anniversary of the landing of Anglo-American troops in Normandy. However, it is well known that, in bearing the main burden of the fight against Nazi Germany on their shoulders even after the opening of the second front, the Soviet troops by their heroic actions created good conditions for the offensive of the Western Allies.

The ignoring of the mass heroism of the Soviet soldiers in the last war is a strategem designed primarily for the youth. With good reason a significant portion of the young Americans does not even know on whose side the Soviet Union fought. The strategic aim of our ideological opponents is understandable: to remove the heroic image of the Soviet liberator soldier who saved world civilization from Nazi slavery from the awareness of hundreds of millions of people in the world.

Present-day Western propaganda has endeavored to present the Soviet soldier as a "stupid, bloodthirsty red murderer who threatens the West." Such an image has been shown to us in the pages of the American press and in movies, where

anti-Soviet fighters of the type of "Rambo. First blood. Part 2," "Rocky IV," "Invasion of the U.S.A.," and "Commando" are in style.

Second. Certain bourgeois historians give facts of the steadfastness and bravery of the Soviet soldiers and officers (the term "heroism" is avoided), but here they deny the mass heroism of the Soviet people which was one of the sources of the victory in the Great Patriotic War. They explain the defeat of Nazi Germany by the mistakes of Hitler and the German General Staff as well as by the vast Russian expanses, fatal circumstances and so forth. Such a viewpoint, in particular, was shown in the article by the major of the American Army Klaus M. Mullinex published in the April (1985) issue of the journal MILITARY REVIEW.(3) This same opinion has been supported by another representative of the new generation of American historians, P. Blakemore, from the University of Georgia.(4)

The obvious discrepancy of such assertions with the truth is confirmed by numerous statements of American political, state, military and public figures made during or immediately after the war. For example, the Chief of Staff of the American Army, Gen G. Marshall, in a telegram of greetings on the occasion of the 26th anniversary of the Soviet Armed Forces (23 February 1944) wrote: "We share your pride and admiration of its (the Soviet Army.--Author) exceptional successes, courage and the tenacity of all its soldiers and the Russian people...."(5) And here is an excerpt from a telegram from the Commander of the 5th American Army in Italy, Gen M. Clark, to the National Council of American-Soviet Friendship (21 February 1944): "From the very outset of the heroic defense by the Red Army of its homeland up until the recent months of its continuous offensive in fighting against the merciless invaders, the feat of the Red Army soldiers has caused my profound admiration and the admiration of the soldiers under my command."(6)

Mass heroism was inherent only to the new type of army. It was linked to the conscious defense of the victories of socialism, the socialist fatherland and the ideas of proletarian internationalism. In 1920, V.I. Lenin said with pride that "Russia is capable of producing not just individual heroes...Russia can provide these heroes in hundreds and thousands."(7)

The victory of the Soviet people in the Great Patriotic War to a significant degree was achieved due to the heroism, courage and military skill of millions. One of the vivid indicators of the mass heroism shown by the personnel of the Soviet Armed Forces was the birth of the Soviet Guards in the fierce fighting around Yelnya. Born over 45 years ago, the Soviet Guards embodied the best traditions of the Russian guards units and formations from the time of Suvorov and Kutuzov and inherited the legendary glory of the Red Army in the Civil War. The 100th, 127th, 153d and 161st Divisions became the first guards divisions. By the end of the war in Europe, guards titles had been awarded to 11 combined-arms armies, 6 tank armies, 82 corps, 215 divisions and a large number of separate units as well as many naval formations and ships.(8) The Guards became the embodiment of the high moral-political and combat qualities inherent to the army of a socialist state.

Many formations and units were awarded honorific designators of the cities liberated by them. Over the war years Soviet regiments and divisions received

orders over 10,900 times and 29 units and formations were awarded 5 and more orders.

More than 7 million defenders of the Soviet motherland received battle orders and medals. The higher degree of distinction involving the committing of a heroic feat--the title of Hero of the Soviet Union--was awarded to 11,638 men, including 115 twice.(9) Thus, the heroism of the Soviet people in the war years was truly mass.

Third. Bourgeois historians explain the heroism of the Soviet soldiers by traditional Russian patriotism, in completely denying its class nature. Russians in battle, supposedly, are motivated only by the "attachment to the homeland" and this is unrelated to communist ideals. This thesis has been constantly transferred from one book to another. For example, a staff member from the Military History Directorate of the U.S. Department of the Army, E. Howell, has written that the courage and steadfastness were "simply Russian national pride which had nothing in common with politics."(10) The book by the professor at the University of Montreal, F. Knelman, "Reagan, God and Bomb," states: "...We must recognize the courage shown by the Russian during the years of World War II. Many of them fought in the Great Patriotic War, thereby expressing love for Mother Russia and in no way because they supported the Soviet ideology."(11)

Patriotism was born and developed in the age-old struggle of the people for liberty and national independence. After the occurrence of the Great October Socialist Revolution in Russia, the concept of patriotism assumed a new content, that is, the conscious defense of the social and class victories of the revolution and, consequently, the socialist motherland, the socialist fatherland. In endeavoring to deprive the Soviet soldier of his main spiritual weapon, a communist ideology, bourgeois ideologists do not wish to admit that precisely communist ideals motivated the Soviet people to mass heroism.

An unshakable belief that they were defending the socialist state and loyalty to the cause of Lenin's party have been and will be the main sources of the heroism of Soviet soldiers. "That people will never be conquered," emphasized V.I. Lenin, "where the workers and peasants in their majority recognized, felt and saw that they were defending their own Soviet power, the power of the workers...."(12)

During the difficult war years, the ranks of communists were filled out by the best soldiers. In their applications the soldiers and officers wrote that they wanted to enter battle for the motherland and for Soviet power as communists. Just in the second half of 1941, some 137,000 soldiers were accepted as candidate party members, that is, 4-fold more than in the first half of the year. As a total over the war years, more than 5 million Soviet people joined the party. Three million communists perished in the fighting against the Nazi invaders.

In 1986, the 7th edition was published of the book "Govoryat pogibshiy geroi. 1941-1945 gg." [The Dead Heroes Speak. 1941-1945] where literally each document, letter and note left by the deceased defenders of the motherland

clearly show that the main force fostering their heroism was a love for the socialist fatherland. We also find evidence of this in our own days. Lt Aleksandr Ivanovich Demakov, in carrying out his international duty in Afghanistan, in close fighting used his last grenade to blow up himself and the dushman surrounding him. Before his death he radioed: "Commander, I am wounded a fourth time...one grenade left. Tell everyone I die as a Soviet man!"(13) Moreover, in falsifying the sources of our victory in the Great Patriotic War, bourgeois historians assert that this victory belonged just to the Russians. Some of them have intentionally concealed the multinational composition of the Soviet Army, thus ignoring the association of peoples and nations in our country in the fight against Nazi Germany. Others, in endeavoring to play down the importance of this historical fact, ascribe all sorts of negative qualities to the soldiers of non-Russian nationality. Thus, the American "specialist" on the USSR, H. Dinerstein, has endeavored to persuade his readers that "the soldiers arriving on the front from the border republics of Russia were in their majority...passive."(14)

This is slander. The sons and daughters of all the Soviet peoples fought heroically along with the Russians (the basic nucleus of the Army and Navy). Among the Heroes of the Soviet Union there were 8,182 Russians, 2,072 Ukrainians, 311 Belorussians, 161 Tatars, 108 Jews, 96 Kazakhs, 91 Georgians, 90 Armenians, 69 Uzbeks, 61 Mordvins, 44 Chuvash, 43 Azerbaijan, 39 Bashkirs, 32 Ossetins, 18 Maris, 18 Turkmen, 15 Lithuanians, 14 Tajiks, 13 Latvians, 12 Kirghiz, 10 Komi, 10 Udmurts, 9 Estonians, 9 Karelians, 8 Kalmyks, 7 Kabardins, 6 Adygey, 5 Abkhaz, 3 Yakuts as well as representatives of other nationalities.(15) Never before in the history of mankind have multinational masses of people shown such patriotism and heroism in the defense of their motherland.

Fourth. In falsifying the nature of the heroism of the Soviet military, bourgeois authors have endeavored to ascribe to it certain militaristic traits. The victories of the Soviet Army, won due to the unprecedented courage and self-sacrifice of the Soviet soldiers and officers, are depicted by them as a result of the "militaristic treatment" of the Soviet people. The great liberating mission of the Soviet Army in 1944-1945 is described as the initial source of the "Soviet threat."(16) Even the activities of the CPSU in the area of patriotic indoctrination are viewed by bourgeois propaganda as a "manifestation of militarization." One of the American military journals, for example, has termed the national hikes of youth to sites of the revolutionary, military and labor glory of the Communist Party and Soviet people as practical forms of "mass militarization."(17) As a whole, the leading staff member of the Brookings Institute, S. Kaplan, concludes that the USSR "is building muscles for expansion."(18)

Bourgeois Sovietologists intentionally ignore the fundamental distinction between the patriotic indoctrination of the Soviet people and the militarization of bourgeois society. The political and professional preparation of Soviet citizens for active service in the Army is carried out in a spirit of the principles and demands of the peace-loving foreign policy of the CPSU and the Soviet state and the defensive military doctrine of our nation considering the very rich experience in defending the socialist fatherland.

The Western propagandists deny the existence of such an inseparable quality of the modern Soviet soldier as internationalism. The present generation of Soviet people, they assert, "has not known internationalism from its own experience and does not conceive of its content."(19)

Such arguments ignore the real facts. The internationalism inherent to the Soviet people is being constantly developed and strengthened. A limited contingent of Soviet troops in Afghanistan is providing international aid to the Afghan people in defending the victories of a people's democratic revolution. Indoctrinated in a spirit of internationalism, Soviet troops have shown conscious heroism for the sake of class, humanistic and democratic goals. But bourgeois propaganda and in particular the slanderers from the journal MILITARY REVIEW, depict the Soviet soldier as an all-devouring monstrous "Juggernaut" which "seeks fierce reprisal from the peaceful Afghan populus."(20) Thus, the major in the U.S. Army, Joseph Collins, has filled his article "Soviet Military Experience in Afghanistan" with terms from the practices of American imperialism: "scorched earth tactics," "mass genocide," "repressive bombings" and so forth.(21) This slander has been unmasked by the numerous typical proofs of the humane actions of the Soviet military in Afghanistan. For example, in Kabul, without thinking about saving his own life, Lt Col I.F. Piyanzin, was able to direct a damaged and flame-engulfed helicopter away from a 5-story building. The helicopter fell on the only open piece of land.(22) The life of scores of Afghans was saved.

Another characteristic instance occurred not far from the Afghan city of Jalalabad. Afghan children had detonated a dushman mine. The first to reach the site of the explosion was the Komsomol member, Jr Sgt Anatoliy Sinotov and his comrades. There were no combat engineers and one of the young boys still alive required immediate help. Then Anatoliy entered the minefield. Holding his breath, making his way to the severely injured boy and picking him up, the Soviet soldier returned back.... The child was saved.(23)

Heroism under the conditions of the war undeclared by imperialism in Afghanistan has also been shown by the military medics in providing aid to the wounded Afghan servicemen and to the peaceful inhabitants of the country. For labor heroism shown in carrying out international duty, Doctor of Medical Sciences and Col Med Serv I.D. Kosachev was awarded the highest decoration of the motherland, the Order of Lenin. Sr Lt Med Serv Aleksandr Pchelkin, nurse Galina Kislitsina who was awarded the medal "For Valor,"(24) and many other military medics are honorably carrying out their highly humane mission.

Fifth. Bourgeois historiography has steadily denied the spiritual link between the generations of Soviet people and the succession of heroic traditions of the Soviet military. For this reason the reader is fed the notion that it was a major war which the Russians somehow won, however, the courage shown by them in the past and the feats, if they did exist, had long been forgotten. The current generation of Soviet people, the Western propagandists assert, is devoid of heroic spirit. In a word, the authors of the collection "Civil-Military Relations in Communist Systems" exclaim, the heroism shown in the war years was rather quickly forgotten in the years of the extended postwar period.(25) In feeling that the feats of the Soviet

soldiers in Afghanistan clearly do not fit into the scheme thought up by them, the authors outrightly deny the very fact of these feats. Here they can find nothing better than to refer to the opinion of the Afghan dushman who in a cowardly and base manner attack the peaceful villages from behind. For example, the major of the American Army columns writes that the dushman had a low opinion of the Soviet soldiers, having called them "excessively controlled," "without initiative" as well as that the "Soviet soldiers in their mass are undisciplined, they are isolated and have a poor assessment of the situation."(26) We want to point up the fact that many of the feats committed by Soviet soldiers in wartime have been repeated by the current generation of the motherland's defenders. Sr Lt N. Shornikov, Sr Sgt N. Chepik(29) and Lt N. Kuznetsov(30) who were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union blew up themselves and surrounding dushman with their last grenade (mine). The last alive and bleeding heavily, Pvt I. Chmurov (now Hero of the Soviet Union) fought until the last.(31)

It is not surprising that we presently place the names of the heroes of the Great Patriotic War and the present side by side. In the city of Kurgan two streets have been named in honor of the Heroes of the Soviet Union Vladimir Petrovich Mironov and Nikolay Yakovlevich Anfinogenov. Each was 19 years old and the difference was merely that the former carried out a feat in 1945 and the latter in our times.(32)

The Soviet soldiers, among whom Army youth comprises an absolute majority, perform heroic feats also in their daily life in exercises in a situation as close as possible to actual combat in testing out new complex combat equipment in mine-clearing and so forth.

Heroism has also been shown by the Soviet military in emergency conditions, for example, in eliminating the consequences of the disaster at the Chernobyl Nuclear Plant. "In the most difficult, the most dangerous areas, one could see officers, warrant officers, sergeants and soldiers. High competence, courage, self-sacrifice and initiative--this is what distinguished the army specialists who came to our aid in the disaster," wrote the senior turbine control engineer at the nuclear plant, A. Shevchenko.(33) These words with full justification can also be addressed to the lieutenants of interior service Viktor Kibenok and Vladimir Pravik who headed the Komsomol-youth fireman patrols and have been entered in perpetuity in the Honor Book of the Komsomol Central Committee.(34) For courage and heroism in eliminating the disaster at Chernobyl, they were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union (posthumously).

Thus, the heroic combat traditions have become deeply rooted in the Soviet people, embodying the powerful spiritual potential of our socialist society.

The provocative and slanderous nature of the campaign to "deheroize" the Soviet soldier is linked closely to the heightening of tension in the international situation, to the growing wave of chauvinism and to the unrestrained exalting of the American military as the "dependable defender" of Western democracy against the "Soviet threat."

Under these conditions the falsifying of the heroism of the Soviet military is essential for the imperialists of the United States and the other NATO countries in order, in deceiving the peoples of the capitalist countries, to instill in them hate for socialism and the Soviet Army. However, the peace-loving forces of the world know well the true face of the defender of the socialist motherland. The Soviet soldier indoctrinated by the Communist Party, by the socialist system and by the Soviet way of life in the immortal heroic traditions of our people, possesses an unshakable morale. Mass heroism has always been, is and will be a characteristic trait of the Soviet Armed Forces.

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ARTICLE ON DEFEAT OF BASMACH MOVEMENT IN CENTRAL ASIA

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[Article by Lt Col A.A. Kotenev, Candidate of Historical Sciences: "On the Defeat of the Basmach Bands in Central Asia" and published under the rubric "Scientific Papers and Information"]

[Text] The Basmach movement was an armed, counterrevolutionary nationalistic movement of feudal-bey elements, the bourgeoisie, the Muslim clergy and the rich peasants against Soviet power. It was supported by foreign imperialists and reactionary circles in Turkey, China, Afghanistan and Iran.(1) The immediate leaders of the Basmach movement were the counterrevolutionary organizations of Shura-i-Islam, Ulema, Alash and others. Having founded the counterrevolutionary Kokand autonomous government in 1917, these organizations formed Basmach bands and began an armed struggle against Soviet power in the aim of removing Turkestan from Soviet Russia and establishing in it the rule of the national bourgeoisie and feudal rulers under the protectorate of foreign states.(2)

The first Basmach detachments which were headed by the criminal Irgash who had been the head of the district-city militia, appeared at the end of 1917 in Kokand. Here the soviet consisted basically of Mensheviks and SRs (they organized the persecution of the Bolsheviks) and the local bourgeoisie was grouped around a national-Muslim core under the flag of "autonomy for Turkestan." Each day in the city "there were attacks and murders of citizens suspected of sympathizing with the 'Turtynchi' (the name given to the Bolsheviks in the elections for the Constituent Assembly of Lists No 4)."(3) There were no substantial changes after the Great October Socialist Revolution. In Fergana the bodies of Soviet power included many persons who were not on the side of the working class. By their actions they defamed Soviet power and drove the working population from it. "Instead of nationalizing production," wrote M.V. Frunze, "there was outright plunder not only by the bourgeoisie but also the middle layers of the population. Instead of protecting the Muslim poor against the beys, the poor suffered all sorts of indignities. Units of the Red Army troops fighting here in the hands of certain leaders were turned from the defenders of the revolution and the working people into a weapon of violence over them. On these grounds the movement known as the Basmach was created."(4)

During the night of 12 February 1918, an armed clash occurred between the supporters of the autonomous government of Kokand and the Soviets. With the aid of detachments of the Red Guard which hurried up from Tashkent, the troops of the autonomous government were defeated. Having declared war against the "infidels," Irgash with his detachments retreated into the mountains. Thus began the Basmach movement(5) which, in engulfing all of Turkestan, was strongest in Fergana, Bukhara and Khorezm.

In Fergana Oblast, for example, Irgash proclaimed himself the ruler of Fergana and the commander-in-chief of its armed forces. In acquiring the glory of a fighter for Islam and a protector of the have-nots, he grouped around himself those dissatisfied with Soviet power. Gradually all power in the Kokand district "with the exception of the city and the railroad moved into the hands of Irgash.... Each kurbashi [superior commander] of his detachment was assigned a certain area in which the gang was fed by the local population...."(6)

In the spring of 1918, the Irgash detachments initiated active operations in the area of the city of Osh. At the end of 1918, in the western part of Fergana Oblast, the Basmach groups of Madamin Bek appeared. The bands made surprise attacks on the small Red Army garrisons, industrial installations, railroad stations, warehouses and population points. The raids were accompanied by mass murders, fires and destruction. The Basmach dealt particularly harshly with the party and soviet workers as well as the women who had thrown off their veil.

By the start of 1920, Madamin Bek became the chief leader of the Basmach movement. His detachments were operating throughout the entire Fergana, with the exception of Kokand District and the Aravan area, where the Irgash and Khal-Khodzhi bands were predominant. The areas of command (zones of responsibility) were strictly allocated between the tribal leaders and the violating of their frontiers led to fierce clashes between the kurbashi(7) even to the point of employing weapons. The economic, kinship and other ties which linked the Basmach to a certain area, on the one hand, were their main force and, on the other, created opportunities for fighting against them. Considering this circumstance, the Fergana Oblast Revolutionary Committee provided an opportunity for anyone who volunteered to break with the Basmach. In one of its appeals to the workers of the oblast it stated: "...Any Basmach who returns to his residence with arms or without them...is obliged first of all to report to the local authorities and to the chief of the police, to hand in his weapons and register."(8) The representatives of the local authorities were ordered to supervise these actions; the Basmach who lived illegally were to be arrested and turned over to the court along with the persons who concealed them.

The appeals of the Soviet authorities and the explanatory work among the population were supplemented with measures of a military nature. The command of the Turkestan Front shifted additional units into Fergana. Due to these measures, the approaches to the Kokand, Uzgen and Alay Valleys were closed off and screens were set out along the Namangan--Marshkhan line in the aim of blocking the path of the Basmach into other areas. In accord with the

operational plan worked out, the main forces of the Red Army units (basically cavalry), in operating on a wide front, were to repel the enemy attacks from the Namangan--Fergana line to the east and then move with the left flank along the Bazar--Kurgan--Lyanchar salient and then attack to the south and thereby force the Basmach up against the mountain passes.(9) By the summer of 1921, units of the 3d Turkestan Division, the 9th Cavalry and 8th Rifle Brigades, the 15th, 16th, 17th and 19th Cavalry Regiments and the 26th Air Detachment had arrived in Fergana and begun active combat operations.

As a result of the joint actions "of the Red Army and the volunteer formations from February through 11 October 1922, some 119 bands (out of the 200) numbering 4,400 Basmach were defeated in the Fergana Valley. In December 1922 alone, 511 men were killed, wounded and captured while 127 men voluntarily surrendered to the Red Army."(10)

Subsequently, the fight against the Basmach assumed even greater scope. In October 1923, the RVS [Revolutionary Military Council] of the Fergana Front conducted a special operation involving highly maneuverable operational groups which cooperated closely among themselves and relied on base, heavily fortified military garrisons located in the administrative centers. The main forces of the Basmach in Fergana were defeated and the oblast workers were able to celebrate the 6th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution in peace.

In Eastern Bukhara, the most dangerous Basmach leader was the former military minister of the Ottoman Empire Enver Pasha, who arrived in Bukhara in October 1921. Under the slogan of uniting all the peoples who professed Islam into a single Central Asian Muslim State, he succeeded in creating an army (with around 16,000 men) from the scattered Basmach bands. In February 1922, the Basmach captured Dushanbe(11) and assumed control over a significant portion of the Bukhara People's Soviet Republic. In considering the developing situation, the Soviet Command established a special Bukhara Troop Group consisting of the 1st and 2d Separate Turkestan Cavalry Brigades, the 3d Turkestan Rifle Division and two squadrons of cavalry command forces [cadets]. Later this group was filled out with troops arriving from the Moscow and Belorussian Military Districts. N.Ye. Kakurin and P.A. Pavlov who were successively in command of this group had available 4,500 bayonets, 3,030 sabers and 20 guns.(12)

At the beginning of June 1922, together with the local Red Army formations, the volunteer and people's militia detachments, the troops of the Bukhara group began a wide-scale operation to defeat the main forces of Enver Pasha and Ibragim Bek. Operational groups made up of cavalry carried out the tactics of surrounding and destroying the Basmach detachments. Having defeated large bands in the Baysun area, Soviet troops pursued the remnants of them in the Surkhan Darya Valley. On 22 June, Kabadian was liberated and on 14 July, after fierce fighting, Dushanbe.(13)

The Basmach leaders Enver Pasha and Ibragim Bek endeavored to break through to the Afghan frontier. But they did not succeed. Having captured the prevailing heights along the assumed passes through the mountains, the Red Army units established strongpoints here. Ibragim Bek hid out in the

mountains while Enver Pasha hurriedly organized a defense in Baldzhuane. After an artillery softening up, the Soviet troops went over to the attack. The stubborn fighting lasted 3 days and on 4 August 1922, the surrounded Inver Pasha band was destroyed and its leader killed. Approximately 12,000 out of the 13,000 previously fighting Basmach returned to their villages. The remnants of the Basmach headed by Ibragim Bek fled to the mountains. In endeavoring to avoid clashes with the Red Army units and the volunteer detachments, they made raids on the villages and small garrisons.(14)

By the end of 1922, on the territory of the Bukhara People's Soviet Republic, a difficult situation survived in the Matchi area, where well armed detachments from a number of tribes were fighting. On 18 March 1923, in employing the already battle-tested tactics, the Red Army units began an operation to defeat the Matchi Basmach. The local self-defense detachments which protected the main lines of communications provided great help to a special detachment from the XIII Rifle Corps headed by S.M. Shevtsov. On 2 April, the operation ended successfully and the population in the headwaters of the Zeravshan could return to their peaceful labor.

On 29 August 1923, the Basmach center was eliminated in the area of Karategin and Darvaz. A reinforced vanguard of Soviet cavalry without a pause overwhelmed the Basmach battle outposts and attacked the bands of Fazayla Maksum. The main forces committed to battle completed the defeat; the leader of the band crossed the Afghan-Soviet frontier and the remaining members surrendered.

The fight against the Ibragim Bek bands lasted rather a long time. Having lost the support of the main tribes(15), Ibragim Bek was completely supported by foreign states. The alpine areas, the uninhabited sands of Turkmenia and the border regions of neighboring states became the basic locations of his groups.(16) In fighting against the Basmach primary importance was given to reconnaissance and to parrying surprise attacks. For defeating the bands in the alpine areas, raid detachments were sent out and aviation, assault forces and ambushes were employed. In areas where the bandits were active, security for the villages was organized. The size of the garrison, depending upon the size of the village and the situation, varied from a squad to a company (squadron).

Regardless of the adopted measures, the Soviet authorities constantly diverted significant forces to combat the Ibragim Bek bands which launched raids from the territory of Afghanistan. The operation to eliminate these bands was carefully prepared during the spring and a part of the summer of 1926. Upon the decision of the party and soviet bodies, additional minority Red Army units and volunteer detachments were organized, and the state frontier was strengthened, particularly in river areas. The troop units operating against the Basmach were filled out with party and soviet workers for adopting measures to strengthen the local authorities and for carrying out political work among the population. The main assault forces were the 8th Separate Turkestan Cavalry Brigade (82d and 84th Cavalry Regiments), the 3d Turkestan Rifle Division and the 7th Cavalry Brigade which had fought previously against the Basmach. Also involved in the operation were subunits of border troops, a Tajik cavalry division and an Uzbek rifle battalion and aviation. The

operation was directed by the member of the USSR RVS, S.M. Budenny, who had arrived in Central Asia in the spring of 1926 and the commander of the Turkestan Front, K.A. Avksentyevskiy.(17) It was decided to conduct the operation along a broad front in order to tie down the Basmach bands and prevent them from escaping across the frontier. In the course of the fighting, the main Basmach forces were eliminated. During the night of 21 June 1926, Ibragim Bek with a small guard succeeded in escaping into Afghanistan. Only on 26 June 1931, after an incursion into Tajik territory with a band of 800 men was he arrested and condemned.(18)

Khorezm was a major center of the Basmach movement. In November 1919, workers from the city of Khiva began a popular revolt against the dictatorship of Dzhunaid Khan. The rebels turned for aid to the Soviet government. The joint forces of the Khiva revolutionary detachments and the Red Army units dealt a series of defeats to Dzhunaid Khan who was actively aided by the vestiges of the White Cossack troops. At the end of January 1920, the band was broken up and the former ruler of Khiva fled into the desert. On 1 February, revolutionary detachments entered the Khan's capital. On 26 April, the 1st All-Khorezm Kuraltay [Assembly] of People's Representatives met in Khiva and proclaimed the founding of a people's republic and adopted the first constitution. The Khorezm People's Soviet Republic which arose on the ruins of the Khiva despotism in 1923 was turned into a Soviet socialist republic.

With the generous and active aid of English intelligence, Dzhunaid Khan assembled around 10,000 men (predominantly from the representatives of the feudal lords, former tsarist officials, reactionary clergy and White Guards). On 27 October 1920, the Basmach captured Kungrad and by the end of the year had surrounded Nukus. For 14 days the soldiers of the garrison and the people's volunteers defended themselves and they were aided in driving off the constant enemy attacks by the approaching Red Army detachments. The Soviet authorities proposed that Dzhunaid Khan lay down his arms and atone for his crimes against the people, but he rejected this proposal.(19) Fighting against the bands were two groups of the Red Army consisting of five companies and three squadrons. At Adzhi Kul Well, they succeeded in defeating the main enemy forces. The remnants of the bands together with Dzhunaid Khan fled into the desert and for some time were inactive. However, at the end of 1923, they resumed their anti-Soviet struggle and intensified the terror against the party and soviet aktiv. Benefiting from the campaign that was then being carried out to deprive the clergy of landholdings and political rights, Dzhunaid Khan captured several population points and on 19 January 1924, beseiged Khiva and Novo-Urgench. The workers rose to the defense of the city and they were aided by units of the Turkestan Front which rushed across the Karakum Sands. The arriving volunteer detachments without a pause attacked the Basmach. By the end of 2 February, after many days of continuous fighting, the enemy was forced to retreat.

By the end of the spring of 1924, all the large Basmach formations on the territory of the Khorezm Republic had been eliminated. Dzhunaid Khan entered into talks with representatives of Soviet power and surrendered. Being given an amnesty, he continued to maintain contact with English intelligence and the counterrevolutionary emigres and began to put together new Basmach detachments.(20) Having obtained weapons and ammunition from overseas during

the summer of 1927, Dzhunaid Khan on 19 September led a new revolt against Soviet power. His bands carried out raids against the villages, they attacked the population and persecuted the Soviet activists. The population took an active part in the fight against the Basmach bands. They voluntarily supplied the Red Army units with fodder and food. The Turkmen Central Executive Committee and Council of People's Commissars declared Dzhunaid Khan to be an outlaw. For eliminating the Basmach the RVS of the Central Asian Military District established two troop groups: the southern and northern. From 27 October, cavalry regiments with air support(21) began to pursue the Dzhunaid Khan bands. In the area of Orta Kuyu Well, the Basmach were caught and defeated. Here the cavalry squadrons under the command of A.A. Luchinskiy and the Serb G.S. Markovich distinguished themselves. For several months, Dzhunaid Khan hid out in the Karakum Sands and in June 1928, made his way into Iran, where he continued to engage in anti-Soviet activities.

By 1927, the main Basmach forces had been defeated, however individual groups continued to terrorize the population. In the spring and summer of 1931, their actions were particularly active. Trained on money from the Western intelligence services, the Basmach bands crossed the Afghan-Soviet frontier and invaded the territory of Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. With the support of the population, the Red Army eliminated these bands, putting an end to the Basmach movement once and for all.

Why did this struggle in Central Asia last so long (almost 14 years)? One of the reasons was that the "Basmach," as M.V. Frunze pointed out in his orders to the troops of the Fergana Front of 23 May 1920, "are not merely brigands; if this were the case, understandably they would long-since have been finished. No, the main Basmach forces were made up of hundreds and thousands of those who in one way or another had been offended or insulted by the former (Tsarist.--Editors) power...."(22)

The second reason was that in endeavoring to widen their social base, the Basmach leaders endeavored to give their actions the appearance of "legality": they established local authorities, they assigned and allocated zones of influence to the kurbashi, and introduced a system of taxes instead of outright plunder which caused open dissatisfaction among the poor; they conducted anti-Soviet propaganda among the population, presenting themselves as "fighters for the faith," "protectors of Islam" and "supporters of national rights."

The next reason was that the Basmach movement was constantly supported, armed and directed by the special services of several foreign states. The Basmach were closely tied to the English and Turkish secret services, to the Russian White Guards as well as the Panturkic and Panislamic organizations.

Finally, the last factor is the well-organized reconnaissance and unique tactics of the Basmach. They had a widespread network of agents who were mullahs, tea shop owners, merchants, traveling artisans and so forth. "In virtually all of the planned...operations, the Basmach learned of them several days before the start."(23) The Basmach tactics was of a partisan nature and they operated predominantly "in groups of from 100 to 500 fighters. A system of enticement, false attacks and retreats brought our distracted units under

accurate small-arms fire of the best Basmach marksmen.... In difficult moments the Basmach split into smaller groups and took cover in the mountain gorges and it seemed as though the band ceased to exist, however 5-7 days later the band reappeared in another area and attacked...."(24) Considering the specific military-political situation in Central Asia, the methods of Basmach fighting, the balance of class forces and the behavior of the various strata of the population, the Communist Party worked out a strategy for combating the Basmach movement. This was based upon the consistent execution of the nationality, socioeconomic and military policy of Soviet power combined with great political work among the population and in the Basmach bands themselves. Tactics of armed combat was worked out and this consisted in the following. In the largest administrative and economic centers, strong garrisons were established. At the same time, highly maneuverable flying combat detachments (they were also called flying operational groups) were sent out and these were assigned to certain areas and maintained constant contact between the garrisons. They enveloped the operational and food supply bases of the Basmach bands, the water sources and mountain passes, and drove the bandits into places where it was easier to surround, capture or destroy them. Well coordinated in terms of place and time, the actions of the detachments usually led to success.

A knowledge of the real conditions of the armed struggle made it possible for the Orgburo [Organizational Bureau] of the Uzbekistan Communist Party for Tajikistan in July 1925 to formulate its resolution on the work done by this time in the following manner: "Military pressure, on the one hand, and economic and political measures of the Tajik government, on the other, have led to a situation where the Basmach which previously was a movement closely tied to the population has begun to be turned into a bandit movement divorced from its tribal grounds and supported from beyond the frontier."(25) In other words, the Basmach as a particular, specific form of armed combat by the counterrevolutionary forces degenerated into banditry and was doomed to military defeat, as it was antipopular in its sociopolitical essence. Its support by the population could not be mass and protracted.

FOOTNOTES

1. "Voyennyi entsiklopedicheskiy slovar" [Military Encyclopedic Dictionary], Moscow, Voenizdat, 1983, p 68.
2. "Bolshaya Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya" [Great Soviet Encyclopedia], Moscow, Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya, Vol 3, 1970, p 29.
3. "Kratkiy ocherk vozniknoveniya i razvitiya basmachestva v Fergane. Po dannym k 1-mu marta 1922 g." [Brief Essay on the Rise and Development of the Basmach Movement in Fergana. According to Data on 1 March 1922], Moscow, 1922, p 12.
4. M.V. Frunze, "Izbrannyye proizvedeniya" [Selected Works], Moscow, Voenizdat, 1951, p 101.
5. "Kratkiy ocherk vozniknoveniya...", p 14.

6. Ibid., p 15.
7. Among the Basmach there were unique military ranks which, as a rule, reflected the status of the person bearing this rank under peacetime conditions. The inferior command personnel were: decurions (unbashi), centurions (yuzbashi); the higher command personnel (kurbashi); the commander of a separate detachment (pansat), the commander of a region or area (lyashkar-bashi) and a commander bringing together several lyashkar-bashi (emir lyashkar-bashi). The junior command personnel had insignias including two red circles (one inside the other) on the right side of the chest for the unbashi and the same circle but with a cross in the middle and two crescents on the right sleeve above the elbow for the yuzbashi. However, a standard uniform or insignias did not exist in the Basmach ranks; everything depended upon the whim of not only the kurbashi but also the Basmach themselves.
8. TsGASA [Central State Archives of the Soviet Army], folio 7631, inv. 1, file 46, sheet 202.
9. Ibid., folio 4, inv. 3, file 253, sheet 21.
10. A.I. Zevelev, Yu.A. Polyakov and A.I. Chugunov, "Basmachestvo: vozniknoveniye, sushchnost, krakh" [The Basmach Movement: Rise, Essence and Collapse], Moscow, Nauka, 1981, p 102.
11. Ibid., p 115.
12. Ibid., p 120.
13. Ibid., p 121.
14. Ibid., pp 127-128.
15. At the end of September 1923, a group of Isakhodzh tribal elders even turned to him with a proposal to put down his arms. Certain tribes and kinship groups were completely against the Basmach.
16. A.I. Zevelev, Yu.A. Polyakov and A.I. Chugunov, op. cit., p 133.
17. Ibid., p 146.
18. Ibid., p 167.
19. Ibid., p 146.
20. Ibid., p 151.
21. Ibid., p 152.
22. M.V. Frunze, op. cit., p 101.
23. "Kratkiy ocherk vozniknoveniya...", p 34.

24. TsGASA, folio 7631, inv. 1, file 48, sheet 23.

25. Ibid., folio 33988, inv. 2, file 660, sheet 34.

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HISTORY OF WORLD WAR II AND MODERN TIMES

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[Article by Lt Col G.A. Ostreyko and I.N. Fiokhina: "History of World War II and Modern Times"]

[Text] The Military History Institute of the USSR Ministry of Defense has held an international symposium on "Basic Problems in the History of World War II and Modern Times"(1) devoted to the 45th anniversary of the start of the Great Patriotic War and to the completed publishing of the 12-volume "Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy voyny 1939-1945" [History of World War II of 1939-1945] and the joint work by scholars of the socialist countries "Vtoraya mirovaya voyna. Kratkaya istoriya" [World War II. A Concise History].

The symposium was conducted by the Military History Institute of the USSR Ministry of Defense, the Marxism-Leninism Institute Under the CPSU Central Committee, the Institute for History of the USSR of the USSR Academy of Sciences, the Institute of World History of the USSR Academy of Sciences and the Board of the All-Union Znaniye [Knowledge] Society upon the decision of the Presidium of the USSR Academy of Sciences with the agreement of the academies of sciences and scientific institutions of the socialist countries. Its aim was, in light of the tasks posed by the 27th CPSU Congress and by the congresses of the communist and worker parties in the fraternal socialist countries, to generalize the experience of the joint research of scholars on the history of World War II and to determine the prospects for further collaboration in creating collective works.

Participating in the work of the symposium were Soviet scholars, prominent military leaders, veterans of the Great Patriotic War, members of the Main Editorial Commission, military consultants, representatives from the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces, the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy, the military schools of Moscow, Voenizdat, Izdatelstvo Nauka, scientific co-workers from the Marxism-Leninism Institute Under the CPSU Central Committee, the Military History Institute of the USSR Ministry of Defense and the institutes of the USSR Academy of Sciences, scholar historians from Bulgaria, Hungary, Vietnam, the GDR, Poland and CSSR.

The international symposium was conducted under the chairmanship of the USSR First Deputy Minister of Defense and Commander-in-Chief of the Joint Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact States, MSU V.G. Kulikov. In his introductory speech, V.G. Kulikov emphasized that the Great Patriotic War has become the main and crucial component part of World War II lasting some 6 years and having no equal in terms of scope and fierceness. The past is inseparably linked to the present and to the future. In our times there is the particularly acute question of vigilance, opposing the aggressive forces of imperialism and the threat of World War III. In developing cooperation in a further study of the problems of World War II and an ideological struggle against the supporters of militarism and aggression, historians from the USSR and the other socialist countries have helped unite the peace-loving forces of the world against the nuclear danger and the arms race and for preserving and strengthening universal peace.

Welcoming the symposium participants on behalf of the USSR Academy of Sciences was its vice-president, Academician P.N. Fedoseyev. The Chief of the Military History Institute of the USSR Ministry of Defense and Corresponding Member of the USSR Academy of Sciences, Lt Gen P.A. Zhilin, gave a paper "Scientific Results and Experience of the Elaboration in the USSR of a Multivolume Work on the History of World War II."

In the course of the symposium two plenary sessions were held during which the following presented scientific papers: the Chief of the Military History Institute of the High Staff of the Bulgarian People's Army, Doctor of Historical Sciences, Col N. Kosashki, the Deputy Chief of the Military History Institute and Museum of the Hungarian People's Army, Doctor of Historical Sciences, Col A. Godo, the Chief of the GDR Military History Institute, Doctor, Prof, Maj Gen R. Bruhl, the Chief of the Military History Institute of the Polish Ministry of National Defense, Doctor, Prof, Col K. Sobczak, the Deputy Director of the Institute of Czechoslovak and World History Under the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences, Doctor, Prof W. Pesa, the Sector Head of the Marxism-Leninism Institute Under the CPSU Central Committee, Doctor of Historical Sciences N.I. Makarov, Academicians A.M. Rumyantsev and A.L. Narochnitskiy, the Chief Scientific Co-Worker of the Military History Institute of the USSR Ministry of Defense, Doctor of Philosophical Sciences, Prof, Maj Gen (Ret) S.A. Tyushkevich, the Directorate Chief of the Military History Institute of the USSR Ministry of Defense, Doctor of Historical Sciences, Prof, Maj Gen A.I. Babin, and the Sector Chief of the Institute of World History of the USSR Academy of Sciences, Doctor of Historical Sciences, Prof O.A. Rzheshhevskiy.

The speech of welcome, the report and the scientific papers generalized the experience of the joint research, preparation and publishing of the multivolume monograph "Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy voyny 1939-1945" and the collective work by scholars from the socialist countries "Vtoraya mirovaya voyna. Kratkaya istoriya" worked out on the basis of Marxist-Leninist methodology. The speeches emphasized that the history of the last war continues to remain an object of acute ideological struggle. In this struggle the scholars from the socialist commonwealth countries must better utilize the experience gained by the CPSU, the fraternal communist and worker parties in organizing and conducting counterpropaganda in the war years.

The symposium pointed out that the publishing of "Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy voyny 1939-1945" has been a convincing example of coordinating efforts by a number of scientific institutions in studying the problems of the last war. The work was created by the Military History Institute of the USSR Ministry of Defense together with the Marxism-Leninism Institute Under the CPSU Central Committee, the Institute of World History and the Institute for the History of the USSR Under the USSR Academy of Sciences. Also involved in its elaboration were prominent Soviet military leaders, party, soviet and diplomatic workers.

Soviet historians have made a worthy contribution to the scientific and correct treatment of World War II, having created the first fundamental work in the USSR on this problem. It from an interdisciplinary approach examines complicated military-political problems of World War II, it provides a scientific basis for its periodization, it brings out the sources and causes, the sociopolitical nature, the rise and functioning of the anti-Hitler coalition, the questions of the economy and the fundamental turning point. It shows the real contribution of the various states and peoples to the defeat of Nazi Germany and militaristic Japan, it examines the problems of the development of military art and discloses the results and lessons of the war and their direct tie to the modern world. In the opinion of the scientists from the socialist countries, this publication is unique in world historiography. "Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy voyny 1939-1945" has been translated and published in Bulgaria, Hungary, the GDR, Poland, the CSSR and Mongolia (Vol 11) as well as distributed in more than 30 states by subscription.

The comments of the Soviet and foreign scholars pointed out that the publishing of the work "Vtoraya mirovaya voyna. Kratkaya istoriya" in the eight socialist commonwealth countries has made it possible to provide a uniform coordinated over-all view of World War II from the position of historical truth. This is of important significance under present-day conditions, when the West has not ceased its anti-Soviet, anticommunist propaganda with yet another proof of this being the symposium on the subject "The Evolution of Russian and Soviet Military History" held in October 1986 in Colorado Springs, United States. It was also emphasized that the work has gained particular international character both from the viewpoint of examining the problems of the last war as well as the coordinating of the scientific activities of scholars from the socialist states by the International Editorial Board.

The speakers were unanimous in the view that the 12-volume "Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy voyny 1939-1945" and "Vtoraya mirovaya voyna. Kratkaya istoriya" are in no way solely of a theoretical nature. They are timely and useful for the actual defense of the socialist countries and play an important role in the patriotic and international indoctrination of the people. For example, these works are being used in organizing and conducting exercises in the area of political and Marxist-Leninist training in the Bulgarian People's Army. In the higher schools and in the Military Academy imeni G.S. Rakovski they are essential for exercises on the history of military art and other disciplines. In the units and formations the political workers, the party and Komsomol activists turn to these monographs in organizing and conducting ideological indoctrination. The given works are also found in the reading rooms of the

military libraries and in the Dimitrov Glory Rooms. As one of the most valuable awards, these publications are presented to the pacesetters of the socialist competition and to the outstanding men in military and political training.

The GDR Military History Institute with representatives from a number of scientific and training military facilities as well as troop units has held a conference on the importance of the Soviet multivolume work and the opportunities for employing it in ideological-theoretical and political work. As an aid in studying the questions of the history of World War II, this work can be successfully employed not only by instructors and teachers but also the students and officer candidates of the F. Engels Military Academy and the W. Pieck Military-Political School.

The symposium emphasized that all the painstaking research work in studying World War II is aimed at warning those who avoid its lessons. Mention was made, for example, of the beneficial results of having representatives of Soviet science participate in the 16th International Congress of Historical Sciences held in 1985 in Stuttgart (West Germany). In discussing the subject of "The Economy in World War II," Soviet scientists gave the papers "Economic Strategy of the USSR During the Years of World War II" and "Production of Weapons and Military Equipment in the USSR During the Years of the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945." The materials employed in their papers from the 12-volume "Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy voyny 1939-1945" on the economic results of the war were proof of the decisive contribution of the Soviet Union to the defeat of Nazi Germany and militaristic Japan.

All the symposium participants pointed out that the publishing of works on the history of World War II has served as a powerful incentive for the dissemination of scientific knowledge and for shaping Marxist-Leninist concepts about the last war. This has provided scope for research on many problems related to a thorough elaboration of its causes, course and results. The course of creating "Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy voyny 1939-1945" has been studied and employed in the socialist countries in work on similar problems, for example, the 4-volume "Istoriya Otechestvennoy voyny Bolgarii 1944-1945 gg." [History of the Patriotic War of Bulgaria of 1944-1945] published in that country.

With the publishing of the multivolume work and the collective monograph by the socialist countries on World War II, emphasized MSU V.K. Kulikov in his concluding speech, an important stage has been concluded in the development of military history science. At present, historians are confronted with the new, more complex tasks stemming from the decisions of the 27th CPSU Congress and the congresses of the communist and worker parties in the fraternal countries. Scientists can and should do a good deal so that the revolutionary changes in thinking and in the approach to the questions of war and peace become a reality and meet the demands of the nuclear space age. For this reason the intensifying of research on the history of World War II, the study of the wars and conflicts of the postwar period and a deepening of scientific analysis of the military-political processes occurring in the contemporary world are now particularly important. The growing dynamism of international life and the rapid development of military affairs require a skilled assessment. This is

essential in resolving the questions of increasing the combat readiness and capability of the Soviet Armed Forces and the other Warsaw Pact armies. The task of scholars is also to generalize the experience of the joint activities of our armies in the Warsaw Pact and on a basis of the experience of the last war and the postwar years, to review the ways and methods of improving the military and political training of the personnel as well as advancing troop and fleet command.

The Warsaw Pact countries have gained rich experience in joint military-scientific research and in the military-patriotic and international indoctrination of the youth and military. This should contribute to a further strengthening of the commonwealth of our peoples and armies, to the establishing of the high ideas of patriotism and socialist internationalism as well as to the preserving of peace and security in the world.

Presently, the USSR is completing work on the book "Vtoraya mirovaya voyna. Tsifry i fakty" [World War II. Facts and Figures] and has begun preparing the work "Vtoraya mirovaya voyna. Istoriografiya" [World War II. Historiography] which are of great importance in debunking the myth of the "Soviet military threat" and the fabrications concerning the social purpose, aims and tasks of the USSR Armed Forces and the other Warsaw Pact states.

In accord with the long-term program of international collaboration in the area of social sciences, as approved in May 1986 at the 7th Conference of Vice-Presidents of the Academies of Sciences of the Socialist Countries in Havana, scientists from the socialist states by the 50th anniversary of the start of World War II must create one other joint work "Prichiny vtoroy mirovoy voyny. Dokumenty i kommentarii" [Causes of World War II. Documents and Commentaries]. The facts and documents given in it will serve as powerful arguments in the struggle against modern warmongers and the apologists of reactionary philosophy who preach the thesis that world problems can be solved by the means of violence and by the means of a military clash.

In the break between the plenary sessions, there was the first meeting of the International Editorial Board for the work "Prichiny vtoroy mirovoy voyny. Dokumenty i kommentarii." This examined organizational questions and the primary tasks of the work. The Corresponding Member of the USSR Academy of Sciences, Lt Gen P.A. Zhilin, was elected chairman of the International Editorial Board and Doctor of Historical Sciences, Prof O.A. Rzheshhevskiy is to be his deputy. Considering comments, a structural work plan was approved and a schedule for elaborating this was examined and approved. Prospects were set for collaboration by social scientists from our nation and the fraternal socialist countries on further research in the experience and lessons of World War II.

The new International Editorial Board has also included a representative from Vietnam, the Director of the Vietnamese History Institute, Prof Wan Tao. In a talk with workers from VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, he commented that for Vietnamese specialists collaboration with colleagues from the socialist countries is valuable. A member of the Vietnamese Society for the Struggle for Peace, Wan Tao emphasized that in opposing American aggression, the Vietnamese people again were convinced that it is essential to fight for peace

and happiness. In the difficult international situation, when the aggressive imperialist circles are intensifying the arms race, including for nuclear arms, the solidarity of peace-loving forces is all the more essential.

FOOTNOTE

1. The materials and documents from the symposium will comprise a collection which is being prepared by the Military History Institute of the USSR Ministry of Defense.

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RESULTS, LESSONS OF WORLD WAR II

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 2, Feb 87 (signed to press 21 Jan 87) pp 68-73

[Book review, published under the heading "Criticism and Bibliography," by Army Gen A.M. Mayorov of the work "Vtoraya mirovaya voyna. Itogi i uroki" (World War II. Results and Lessons), Moscow, Voenizdat, 1985, 447 pages]

[Text] More than 40 years have passed since the end of World War II. However, the events of that distant time as before continue to stir the minds of mankind. This war was the cruelest in the history of our planet and the human victims and material losses were enormous. The past is inseparably tied to the present and to the future and for this reason interest in the events of World War II, its causes and outbreak, the course of combat, results and lessons has not weakened. Readers will greet with satisfaction the major work "Vtoraya mirovaya voyna. Itogi i uroki" [World War II. Results and Lessons]. It has been written on the basis of the 12-volume research "Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy voyny 1939-1945" [History of World War II of 1939-1945]. The Main Editorial Commission included: Chairman, USSR Minister of Defense, MSU S.L. Sokolov; Deputy Chairmen, MSUs S.F. Akhromeyev and V.G. Kulikov, Lt Gen P.A. Zhilin and Academician P.N. Fedoseyev.

The single-volume work consists of an introduction, 5 parts, 12 chapters, a conclusion and appendices. A characteristic feature of the book is that it for the first time with sufficient completeness and in a dialectical relationship examines the entire range of military, sociopolitical and economic questions resolved under the conditions of World War II.

It has been more than a year since the publishing of "Vtoraya mirovaya voyna. Itogi i uroki." Over this time it has been repeatedly reviewed on the pages of the Soviet periodic press and has rightly gained high praise. However, for a more profound and thorough analysis of any fundamental and diverse work, time is required as this provides an opportunity to objectively assess both its merits as well as the existing shortcomings.

The first part entitled "The Rise and Course of the War" and consisting of 6 chapters examines events of the prewar period and discloses and analyzes in detail the reasons for the outbreak of World War II. The most important economic and political factors which caused it are examined.

The work emphasizes, and this conclusion, in our view, is of enormous importance under present-day conditions, that the sources of World War II (like the war of 1914-1918) lay in the very nature of imperialism, are rooted in its aggressive essence and are expressed in the policy of the ruling circles of the bourgeois states. World War II was caused by the antagonistic contradictions of the imperialists. The immediate instigators of the war were the bloc of aggressive states: Hitler Germany, Fascist Italy and imperialist Japan. The work convincingly shows the struggle of the Soviet union in the prewar years to establish a system of collective security with the aim of checking the aggressors and preventing a war. However, the ruling circles of England, the United States and France rejected the proposal to organize a collective rebuff of Hitler Germany. At the same time, American and English loans helped to quickly establish a strong military industry in Germany and this provided Hitler's Army with modern combat equipment.

World War II arose long before the first engagements developed on the fields of Europe and the expanses of the oceans.... Now we know more than then about who helped the Nazi ruling clique arm and how, to heighten the potential for aggression and prepare for military adventures.

The following figures given in the book show the growth of the German military economy and the German Armed Forces: "While in 1934, Germany produced 840 aircraft, in 1936, the figure was 4,733. Military production from 1934 through 1940 increased by 22-fold. In 1935, Germany had 29 divisions and by the autumn of 1939, there were already 102 of them" (p 20).

With the appearance of the world's first socialist worker and peasant state, the imperialists did not abandon the desire to destroy it by military means. For this reason their propaganda constantly proclaimed the growing Soviet threat and called for a campaign against the USSR. However, the war did not break out as the governments of the leading capitalist states had assumed. It began with a clash between the imperialist groupings within the capitalist system.

The conclusion of the Soviet-German Non-Aggression Pact in August 1939 thwarted the plans of international imperialism to set the USSR against Nazi Germany and to create a single anti-Soviet front and made it possible to gain time to rebuff the aggressor.

The book in a well-reasoned manner discloses the reasons for the rapid defeat of Poland which at a critical time for itself was abandoned by its Anglo-French Allies, the aggression by Hitler's Germany against Yugoslavia, Greece, Denmark, Norway and a number of other European countries is described, and the reasons for the defeat of France in May-June 1940 are analyzed. The measures of the Communist Party and the Soviet government to strengthen the defense might and security of the Soviet frontiers under the conditions of the commenced World War II are shown.

A separate chapter is devoted to the treacherous attack by Nazi Germany on the USSR and to the heroic resistance of the Soviet people to the aggressor. Also described is the enormous role of the Communist Party in organizing the rebuff

of the enemy and turning the nation into a united military camp. The work emphasizes that the defeat of the Nazi troops at Moscow became the start of a fundamental change in the Great Patriotic War which thwarted the enemy plan for a blitzkrieg.

Among the merits of the work one must put the just analysis of the defeats of the Soviet Army in the spring and summer of 1942 leading the German troops to Stalingrad and to the Caucasian foothills. The book shows that the main event in the hostilities on the Soviet-German Front in the second half of 1942 was the Stalingrad Battle. It is emphasized that the defeat of the Nazis on the Volga became the start for a fundamental turn in the course of the war. As a result of the victories of the Soviet Army on the Kursk Salient and the successful crossing of the Dnieper, a fundamental turn was made not only in the course of the Great Patriotic War, but in World War II as a whole.

A separate chapter is devoted to the conclusion of the war in Europe. Here are shown the decisive victories of the Soviet Army in the fight against the Nazi occupiers for liberating the peoples of Eastern Europe from the Nazi yoke, and it is emphasized that the diverting of the main Wehrmacht forces to the Soviet-German Front was a major factor ensuring the successful landing by the Allies in Normandy and their rapid advance.

The concluding chapter in the first part is devoted to the end of the war in the Far East. It examines the fighting of the troops and navies of the United States and Great Britain against the Japanese Armed Forces on the islands of the Pacific Ocean and in Southeast Asia. Of significant interest is the persuasive demonstration of the decisive role of the Soviet Armed Forces in the defeat of imperialist Japan and in concluding World War II.

The second part of the work traces the sociopolitical results of the war. The world historical victory of the Soviet Union and the anti-Nazi forces over German Nazism and Japanese militarism was an event of world historical importance. The defeat of the major reactionary forces raised a powerful wave of sociopolitical changes throughout the world and was a powerful accelerator of the revolutionary process. As a result of the developing class struggle in a number of capitalist nations, People's Democracies were established. The participation of the colonial and semicolonial peoples in the anti-Fascist struggle told on the growth of their political awareness and on the strengthening of the national liberation movement. This led to the complete collapse of the colonial system of capitalism.

Using specific examples the work shows that the Soviet Armed Forces played the decisive role in the defeat of Nazi Germany and imperialist Japan as well as their satellites. Thus, until the summer of 1944, fighting against the Soviet Armed Forces were an average of 15-20 times more Nazi troops and their allies than against the United States and England. Even after the landing in Normandy, in the West there were 1.8-2.8 fewer Wehrmacht formations than on the Soviet-German Front (p 120). Precisely here the Nazis suffered 4-fold more casualties than in Europe and Africa, up to 75 percent of the tanks and assault guns, 74 percent of the artillery and over 75 percent of all the downed aircraft (p 121).

The work gives proper due to the military valor of the Allied soldiers from the United States, Great Britain and France and to the steadfast and courageous struggle of the Yugoslav people and their People's Liberation Army. Also shown is the joint fighting with the Soviet Armed Forces against the Nazis by the Polish Army and the Czechoslovak People's Army and in the last stage of the war, also the armies of Bulgaria and Romania and military units from Hungary. Not forgotten is the struggle against the Nazis and Italian Fascists of the peoples of Albania and Greece as well as the participants in the Resistance Movement in the occupied European countries.

The close combat association of the Soviet Armed Forces is shown with the great Chinese people and the troops of Mongolia in defeating militaristic Japan. Patriots of Vietnam, Korea and other Asian countries waged a stubborn struggle against the invaders.

The formation of the anti-Hitler coalition and the joint combat operations against the common enemy persuasively show, and this is one of the essential lessons of the war, that between countries with different social systems mutual understanding and successful collaboration can be achieved. The increased Nazi threat forced the Western Allies to soberly assess the international situation and find mutually acceptable solutions together with the USSR.

The book points out that a most important factor in the victory of the Soviet Armed Forces in the Great Patriotic War was the inspiring and organizing activities of the Communist Party. It is emphasized that the main sociopolitical result of the war was the military and political defeat of Naziism and militarism. In the uncompromising clash of the two ideologies, the communist one won out, having persuasively shown the superiority of the socialist system.

At a price of millions of lives and unbelievable effort, the Soviet Union not only defended its liberty and independence but also protected other peoples of Europe, Asia and Africa against Nazi enslavement. For this reason, as a results of World War II, imperialism, as a system was weakened, it lost a significant part of its previous positions and the sphere of its domination was sharply restricted. Socialism, on the contrary, emerged from the war strengthened, its international authority had risen and its influence throughout the world had grown stronger. The victory over the aggressor fundamentally altered the political situation and had a profound impact on all subsequent events in the world.

For this reason, the thesis of the CPSU Program is so timely now in stating: "The Great Patriotic War was a severe testing of the new system. Having rallied around the party and shown unprecedented heroism, the Soviet people and their Armed Forces launched a crushing defeat against German Naziism, the shock detachment of the world imperialist reaction. By its victory, the Soviet Union made a decisive contribution to liberating the European peoples from Nazi slavery and to saving world civilization. The defeat of Nazi Germany and militaristic Japan opened up new opportunities for the peoples to struggle for peace, democracy, national liberation and socialism. The victory

of the Soviet people raised high the international prestige of the Soviet state."(1)

The third part of the work in detail, on the basis of extensive factual material, lays out the economic results of the war. The war showed that the Soviet Union had not only endured but had demonstrated its military-economic superiority over the aggressive Nazi bloc. The correctness of V.I. Lenin's thesis was confirmed that "a war is a testing of all the economic and organizational forces of each nation."(2) During the war years, the Soviet Union withstood with honor the severe testing of the viability of the Soviet social and state system.

The work shows the enormous work carried out by the Soviet people under the leadership of the Communist Party during the prewar years in preparing the nation for defense. Here the basis was the socioeconomic changes carried out during the first five-year plans in industrializing the country and collectivizing agriculture.

The struggle against Naziism demonstrated the inexhaustible opportunities, strength and invincibility of our social system engendered by Great October, the advantages of the socialist economy and its high effectiveness. In the course of the war our nation produced 1.8-fold less electric power than Nazi Germany together with the countries occupied by it, we cast 2.6-fold less steel and mined 4.8-fold less coal. However, in terms of the output of combat equipment, the Soviet economy surpassed the enemy one. Our Armed Forces were provided with airplanes, tanks and guns which were the equal in quality to the weapons of the Wehrmacht and even surpassed it. During the period from July 1941 through August 1945, the USSR produced: 834,000 guns and mortars (651,000 in the United States and 398,700 in Germany); 102,800 tanks and SAU [self-propelled artillery mount] (99,500 in the United States and 46,300 in Germany); 112,100 combat aircraft (192,000 in the United States and 89,500 in Germany).(3)

Abroad, and primarily in the United States and Great Britain, various "scientific research" and articles endeavor to prove that the U.S. defense industry was the "arsenal of victory" for the nations in the anti-Hitler coalition. Here they excessively exaggerate the American deliveries under Lend Lease to the Soviet Union. Some of the so-called "Sovietologists" even go so far as to assert that these played the crucial role in the victories of the Soviet Army.

Actually the American military deliveries to the USSR under Lend Lease were only around 4 percent of the total volume of Soviet products. A significant portion of the Allied aid reached the USSR only in 1943-1944, when the Soviet Army had achieved a turning point in the war. Few know that under the so-called reverse "Lend Lease" the United States received from the USSR 300,000 tons of chromium ore and 32,000 tons of manganese ore as well as other valuable raw materials (p 246).

The Soviet people are grateful to the American and English peoples for the aid in the joint struggle against the terrible common enemy, particularly for the motor vehicles, food, fuel and certain types of strategic raw materials.

However, the Soviet Army fought and won its victories with Soviet-produced weapons.

World War II in a most convincing manner showed that our socialist state possesses an economic organization which permits the most effective and efficient utilization of all material and human resources for defeating the enemy.

The fourth part devoted to the armed forces and to military art is of particular interest for the Army and Navy officers, generals and admirals. It examines the characteristic traits and specific features in the armed combat of the armies of the different states during the years of World War II. Here an emphasis is placed on the vastness of the land and sea (ocean) theaters of operations and the employment by both sides of multimillion land armies as well as large air and naval forces.

The authors bring out such trends apparent in the course of the hostilities on the fronts of World War II as the increased spatial scope, the increase in the surprise factor and the greater technical equipping of the armed forces. Convincingly shown is the superiority of the military organization of the Soviet Armed Forces and which was continuously improved in the course of the war over the organization of the Allied and enemy armies. It is shown that the decisive force in the fight against Hitler Germany was the Soviet Army which made the main contribution to defeating the enemy. Suffice it to say that active hostilities on the Soviet-German Front comprised 93 percent of the time the front existed. On no other front was there such intense and fierce fighting. Using specific examples, the work shows that the main trends in strengthening the combat might of the Soviet Armed Forces were a constant rise in technical equipping, greater tactical and technical performance of the types of weapons as well as higher combat skill and moral-political qualities of the personnel.

The section "Development of Soviet Military Art" emphasizes that "the victory over the strongest army of the capitalist world fully disclosed the progressive nature of Soviet military art--strategy, operational art and tactics--and their superiority over the military theory and practice of the Nazi and militaristic states" (p 292).

Of significant interest for the military reader is an analysis of the development of Soviet strategy which conformed fully to the policy of the Communist Party and was marked by efficiency, profound scientific prediction as well as decisiveness of goals and plans. All of this was reflected in the 9 campaigns and more than 50 operations by groups of fronts carried out by the Soviet Armed Forces in the war years. High operational art was demonstrated in approximately 250 front operations and tactical skill in thousands of engagements and battles.

One of the characteristic traits of World War II, as is pointed out in the work, is the participation in it of new type armies, the armed forces of the People's Democracies which rose to fight against the Nazi invaders and fought shoulder to shoulder with the men of the Soviet Army. In the course of World

War II, a combat alliance was born between the fraternal armies and this underwent further development in the Warsaw Pact.

The work also examines the military art of our Allies (United States and Great Britain). The landing operations in the Pacific are analyzed as well as the landing of major forces in North Africa, Italy and Normandy and the specific fighting in the North African Theater.

The section devoted to the military art of the countries of the Nazi-militaristic bloc unmasks the adventurism in the strategic military doctrines of Germany, Italy and Japan and shows the miscalculations made by the Wehrmacht Command in the course of fighting against the Soviet Armed Forces.

A special chapter is devoted to strategic leadership of the hostilities. Here it is emphasized that one of the most important factors which caused the world historical victory of the Soviet people in the Great Patriotic War was the well-organized, skillful and effective strategic leadership.

Even on the second day of the war, a decree of the VKP(b) [All-Union Communist Party (Bolshevik)] Central Committee and the Soviet government organized the Headquarters of the High Command which subsequently became the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command and on 30 June 1941, the State Defense Committee.

In the course of the war, Hq SHC was the superior body for strategic leadership of the Soviet Armed Forces. Precisely it evaluated the strategic situation, forecast its development, determined the forms and methods of military operations, worked out the over-all concepts and adopted plans for conducting campaigns and strategic operations and set the tasks for the fronts and Armed Services.

Headquarters constantly supervised the carrying out of adopted decisions and here it was constantly concerned with a further improvement in the composition and organization of the Soviet Armed Forces, with the development of military equipment and the seeking out of new methods for conducting armed combat considering the altered conditions.

The work describes the organization of strategic leadership over the English, American and French Armed Forces, it describes its characteristic features and takes up the establishing and leadership of the joint Allied commands. Also examined are certain aspects in the organization of armed combat in the countries of the aggressive bloc and the disparity of the strategic plans of these states to their economic capabilities and to the real balance of forces is emphasized.

The fifth part is devoted to the lessons of the last war and to their importance under present-day conditions. Initially examined are the fundamental changes in the balance of forces on the world scene which have occurred since the end of World War II. Here the decisive changes in favor of socialism are pointed out. The main result of World War II was that the victory over Nazi Germany and imperialist Japan led to the weakening of the imperialist system, to a strengthening of socialism and to its greater influence throughout the world.

The defeat of the aggressive bloc led to the profoundest changes in the world: to the rise of the world socialist system, to the strengthening of the communist and worker movement in the capitalist nations, and to the conclusion of the complete collapse of the colonial system of imperialism. On the ruins of the latter were formed many new independent states which set out on a path of noncapitalist development. A portion of these followed a policy of building socialism.

The chapter emphasizes the need to combat the bourgeois falsifiers who endeavor to distort the history of World War II and primarily the reasons for its outbreak, and understate the contribution of the Soviet Armed Forces in the defeat of the aggressors.

The final chapter of the work is entitled "Preserving Peace, Preventing Nuclear War--The Main Problem of Modern Times." The reactionary circles in the imperialist states, primarily the United States, Great Britain and FRG, do not find the results and consequences of the last war to their liking. For this reason they have developed an intense arms race and are preparing for World War III in the course of which weapons of unprecedented destructive force might be employed.

World War II reminds one again that war must be combated before it has started. This is particularly important under present-day conditions. It is essential to mobilize all the antiwar forces, to develop a mass movement of all the people against the danger of war and constantly unmask any type of revanchist, neofascist and other proponents of aggression.

The achieving of lasting peace in our days is a completely realistic task. Such a conclusion was drawn by the CPSU and by the other Marxist-Leninist parties on the basis of a thorough analysis of the main trends of modern international development.

The lessons of World War II show that the drive of the imperialists for world domination is doomed to defeat and the attempts of the reactionary circles to halt or constrict world socialism and impede the national liberation movement are completely unsuccessful. The old world is no longer capable of imposing its will on the peoples who seek progress, peace and socialism.

World War II which was started by the imperialists taught vigilance to the peoples of the world. This is why the Soviet Union and the socialist commonwealth countries are constantly on guard and keep their powder dry. As long as the threat to peace exists, the Warsaw Pact states will do everything necessary in the future to protect themselves against any encroachments. In carrying out defense policy and in the organizational development of their armed forces, the socialist commonwealth countries drawn widely on the enormous experience of the Soviet Army and Navy gained during the years of the Great Patriotic War.

For precisely this reason the fundamental work "Vtoraya mirovaya voyna. Itogi i uroki" is a useful publication not only for military historians but also for

all generals, admirals and officers of the Soviet Armed Forces. It has also gained recognition among wide circles of the Soviet public.

In praising highly the content and practical significance of the work for the daily activities of the Soviet Armed Forces, it would be desirable if in republishing it, along with considering the changes which have occurred in recent years on the international scene, the evolution of military art in the course of World War II could be more fully shown. It would also be advisable to trace the development of combat equipment of the belligerents in 1939-1945, its impact on the improving of tactics, operational art and strategy. One might also desire the showing of the development prospects for military art considering recent scientific and technical achievements.

The value of the work "Vtoraya mirovaya voyna. Itogi i uroki" is in the profound analysis of the past as well as the specific conclusions and recommendations for the present and future.

FOOTNOTES

1. "Materialy XXVII syezda KPSS" [Materials of the 27th CPSU Congress], Moscow, Politizdat, 1986, p 126.
2. V.I. Lenin, PSS [Complete Collected Works], Vol 39, p 321.
3. For the United States, production is from December 1941 through August 1945 and for Germany, from September 1939 through April 1945.

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