


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SOVIET UNION SOCIOLOGICAL STUDIES

No 1, JAN-FEB 1987

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THEORETICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL PROBLEMS

BASIC GUIDELINES FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL REORIENTATION OF PERSONNEL OF AGROINDUSTRIAL COMPLEX

Moscow SOTSIOLOGICHESKIYE ISSLEDOVANIYA in Russian No 1, Jan-Feb 87 (signed to press 21 Jan 87) pp 3-13

[Article by Vladimir Ivanovich Staroverov, doctor of philosophical sciences, professor, sector head at the Institute of Sociological Research, USSR Academy of Sciences, and one of our journal's permanent contributing authors]

[Text] The 27th CPSU Congress specifically focused attention on the largely subjective nature of the causes of negative trends and difficulties in national development in the 1970's and early 1980's: "There was no timely and proper assessment of changes in the economic situation and the need for major advances in all spheres of life, and these were not carried out with the necessary persistence" (3). This weakened financial and moral incentives to augment labor productivity and production efficiency and caused departmentalism, overcompensation, and misleading reports to flourish. A fear of bold decisions, irresponsibility, bureaucratism, and conservatism impeded the institution of necessary reforms and innovations. The fact that some rank-and-file laborers had lost their sense of being "masters of production" and "masters of the land" also had an adverse effect on economic growth rates in the country in general and in rural areas in particular.

In its program for an uncompromising and consistent struggle against everything "impeding the fuller use of the capabilities and advantages of the socialist order and deterring advancement" (3), the party underscored the need to seek nontraditional means and methods of solving the current problems of the Soviet society. Great importance is being attached to the development of a new style of thinking and behavior in each citizen in line with the principles of the concept of socioeconomic acceleration. "We constantly reaffirm the need for resolute reforms," M.S. Gorbachev stressed when he addressed a meeting of the Khabarovsk party aktiv on 31 July 1986, "and we will continue to do so until we have secured fundamental advances, especially in the thinking of our administrative personnel and in the thinking and mentality of the entire laboring public and the entire society" (4).

The distinctive features of the old style of thinking, which became a relatively independent force and started to impede socioeconomic reform, are dogmatism, onesidedness, the inability to coordinate the interests of the worker,

enterprise, and department with national goals, and disregard for the contradictions of life. This is the reason for the reliance on old methods and the fear of anything new or unfamiliar. For this reason, the psychological reorientation of personnel will consist essentially in surmounting these and related tendencies, in establishing the dialectical approach to the evaluation of the current situation in the individual's assigned field and of prospects for development, and in the ability to see problems and find creative and scientifically valid solutions.

A radical change in thinking and behavior is a complex matter. It entails changes in the very realities of present-day life, especially the economic mechanism of societal functioning and development, and the molding of public opinion in line with the nature and content of ongoing changes.

The objectives of the first group in relation to the agroindustrial complex were analyzed in detail in the decree of the CPSU Central Committee and USSR Council of Ministers "On the Further Improvement of the Mechanism of Economic Management in the Country's Agroindustrial Complex" (5). We have discussed them in earlier publications (7). Here we will discuss some aspects of the second group of objectives, the purpose of which, in Ye.K. Ligachev's words, consists in "reorienting the mentality and thinking of personnel in line with the new approaches worked out at the congress, and in getting rid of obsolete stereotypes. It will be necessary to simultaneously ensure that each Soviet person realizes the purpose of the CPSU's innovative proposals. In addition, it will certainly be exceptionally important to secure the unity of theory and practice and to prevent situations in which seemingly new slogans are adopted but the work is performed in the same old ways" (6).

As a specific case of this general trend, the new style of thinking of agroindustrial complex (AIC) personnel is distinguished by the thoroughness with which their thinking and behavior reflect the party agrarian policy as a program for the realization of the social interests of all Soviet people. This style of thinking is based on an awareness of the social aims, multiple aspects, and comprehensive nature of agrarian policy and far transcends the narrow interpretation of the latter, still common among many AIC personnel, only as a system of investments in physical objects in the sphere of agriculture and measures to increase wages to the maximum.

V.I. Lenin said "we use the term agrarian program to signify the specific guiding principles...of policy on the agrarian question--that is, policy toward agriculture and toward various classes, strata, and groups of the rural population" (1). Unfortunately, many AIC personnel are still far from an awareness of agrarian policy as a comprehensive strategy of action for the party and the Soviet people, reflecting the common economic, social, and ideological interests of each Soviet individual and the society as a whole. Sociological studies conducted from 1983 to 1986 by the Sector on the Social Problems of the Rural Community and the Peasantry of the ISI [Institute of Sociological Research], USSR Academy of Sciences, revealed that many personnel in the complex are still inclined to base their reasoning on a fairly extensive and tenacious group of incorrect and obsolete stereotypes and that this is impeding the rural community's acceptance of the strategy of socioeconomic acceleration through the intensification of agricultural production.

Many of these stereotypes are connected with a tendency to deliberately ignore the central position of agriculture in the AIC structure. This became possible when the malignant tumor of departmentalism spread through the national economic organism in recent decades and diminished the fundamental role of farming and animal husbandry in the agrosphere and the entire agro-industrial complex. This situation has been perpetuated because it still benefits certain categories of people by securing their comfort and prosperity under the guise of active participation in reforms.

It seems obvious that many of the branches and production units of the first sphere of the AIC were established as relatively autonomous entities so that they could serve farming and animal husbandry, supply them with new equipment, mineral fertilizers, and biological resources, etc. It also seems obvious that the third sphere of the complex is needed to bring what field and farm workers produce up to consumer standards. And if this is the case, then it is natural that farming and animal husbandry workers can and should decide the operational parameters of the branches and production units of the first and third spheres of the complex. We should recall V.I. Lenin's famous instructions to the "producers of food" to "direct cooperation, assist small-scale industry, and develop local initiative and action in such a way that they augment and reinforce the turnover of farming and industry" (2). The fact that developed socialist agriculture is served by large-scale rather than small-scale industry does not change the essential meaning of the statement.

In the 1960's, and particularly in the 1970's, Lenin's requirement began to be ignored under the influence of the departmental interests of agriculture's more energetic partners. Many of the normative acts prepared by departments confused the true nature of relations in the agroindustrial complex. Around 29,000 union acts were fed into the computer of the Scientific Research Institute of Soviet Legislation, and the lion's share of them regulated the relations of AIC partners and were composed by these partners in their own interest. Farmers and animal husbandry workers are already accepting the fact that they have ceased to be the masters of the situation. Here is a simple example: Even today, after the promulgation of many new acts and statutes, funds for spare parts are still managed by enterprises of the former Selkhoztekhnika Association, and a kolkhoz or sovkhoz with a good workshop of its own cannot repair equipment on its own, at times convenient for it, and therefore frequently agrees to add its own repair work to the plan of these enterprises, and even to pay for this work, in exchange for spare parts.

"We sent our sovkhoz UAZ's to the Slutsk Automobile Repair Plant for repairs," driver I. Sikora from the Protasovshchina Sovkhoz in Shchuchinskiy Rayon in Grodno Oblast related a typical incident. "A month later the plant wired a request for 2,080 rubles for the repairs. We had not even seen what they had done or how they had done it, but we were already being asked to pay. We had no other choice but to pay. When we went to pick up the vehicles, we could not believe our eyes. It was not that they had been repaired badly--they were missing parts that had been there prior to the repair. They did not even have any sparkplugs. I was advised to assemble my own vehicle. I spent several days doing this, then loaded the UAZ on a truck because it still would not go by itself, and I took it home. I spent another 2 weeks repairing it in the sovkhoz workshop, reconstructing the denuded vehicle" (10).

Our studies indicated that, in formal terms, farmers now understand that they are expected to make the main contribution to the fulfillment of the Food Program and their partners acknowledge the leading role of agrarian branches in the AIC. An analysis of the specific decisions of partners testifies, however, that two-thirds of them are made primarily in departmental interests and assign only secondary importance to the needs of agricultural production and the final results of the AIC as a whole. This is what reveals the actual line of reasoning of AIC partners, their outdated and conservative way of thinking, because the actual intentions and opinions of people are expressed not in eloquent words, but in deeds, in actions, and they are obviously inconsistent with the new requirements of the rural community and the entire society.

The attitudes of the period of primarily extensive economic management dominate the thinking and actions of AIC personnel as well. For example, relatively few of the surveyed specialists and managers of kolkhozes, sovkhozes, and agroindustrial associations in Uzbekistan who were asked to name the five primary objectives of their collectives for the promotion of economic growth mentioned ways of securing the intensification of production by organically combining the achievements of the scientific-biotechnical revolution with the socialist organization of production and the better use of the human factor. The majority still set their hopes on larger deliveries of technical equipment, mineral fertilizers, and combination feeds and regard the construction of new production facilities, wage increases, a larger team of workers, and increased assistance from cities as the primary objectives (Table 1). A much smaller number put the emphasis on the improvement of labor discipline, the reduction of overhead costs and product losses, the better use of means of production, the conservation of human resources, the mastery and incorporation of the achievements of the scientific-biotechnical revolution, technological reorganization by means of a transition to intensive, industrial technologies, and the protection of public property, as well as objectives connected with the intensification of production and the comprehensive use of the entire system of technological, economic-organizational, social, and ideological factors.

Our studies in recent years have invariably recorded the extremely backward socioeconomic thinking that is still characteristic of the management practices of many personnel in the agrosphere. It is reflected primarily in the inability to appreciate the new possibilities afforded by the use of the achievements of the scientific-biotechnical revolution. In a sense, these are stereotypes of pre-industrial economic thinking, with no indication that science has become a productive force. This is precisely why many personnel in various links of the AIC feel that the promotion of production growth is mainly a matter of larger deliveries of equipment, mineral fertilizers, combination feeds and other resources, although a large part of the material and technical base of the complex is not being used or is being used inefficiently. It is no secret--and this is corroborated by the experience of the best farms in the country, such as the Rodina Kolkhoz in Vologda--that the better organization of production can eliminate the need for half of the equipment already present in rural areas. But this, of course, means that people have to give up many traditional points of reference, especially in material and

technical policy and in the use of labor resources. This is a psychologically difficult task, however, because the renunciation of the familiar complicates one's life, requires initiative, and entails risk.

As a result of the lack of interest in conserving labor and natural resources and of the limited capital investments in the production infrastructure, for decades agricultural managers and specialists gave little thought to the more efficient use of these resources. The result was the unrestrained growth of the herd of livestock and of sowing area, which secured the extensive growth of the product of animal husbandry and farming. Under the conditions of scientific and technical progress and the intensive transfer of labor resources from agriculture to other sectors of the national economy, this practice gave rise to acute conflicts: The severely reduced labor force had to rely on technical equipment and industrial technology for the efficient use of vast amounts of plowland and livestock, but resources were scattered and were therefore inadequate for the comprehensive mechanization and electrification of all agricultural work. The value of fixed capital, with consideration for wear and tear, at the beginning of the current 5-year period was only 570 rubles per hectare of farmland, but, after all, just one tractor can cost 15,000 rubles, a kilometer of road can cost 150,000 rubles, and a single small dairy farm can cost 300,000 rubles. Guided by traditional points of reference, which took shape when the extensive approach was to their advantage, agricultural organizers and specialists demanded larger capital investments out of habit, without even wondering whether the time had come for the more creative use of other elements of agroindustrial production by establishing the optimal "land-load" per worker with a view to the currently feasible supply of fixed capital. The considerable potential of this approach is attested to by an analysis of the effectiveness of over 2,000 dairy sovkhozes in the Russian Nonchernozem Zone (Table 2).

If, in addition to the data in the table, we add the information that there is a 6-fold difference between the extreme groups of sovkhozes in terms of gross farming product and a 20-fold difference in terms of animal husbandry output, and that the farms in the top group obtain 13 times as much milk from the same amount of arable land as the farms in the lowest group (8), the need to reduce sowing area and to concentrate fixed capital with primary consideration for the potential use of farmland and the intensification of production becomes self-evident.

If the transition to the intensive use of land could be made everywhere at once, we could already begin the substantial reduction of sowing area and the vigorous restoration of fallow land, meadows, and cultivated pastures, and thereby increase the output of agricultural products in animal husbandry as well as in farming.

Let us take a look, for example, at potatoes. Each year they are planted on more than 9 million hectares with an average yield of less than 120 quintals per hectare. Furthermore, in Mordovia the yield is only 63 quintals per hectare, in Chita and Yaroslavl oblasts it is 65 quintals, in Ryazan Oblast it is 72, and in Orel Oblast it is 85. The average for the RSFSR is under 90 quintals. At the same time, the average yield in the Chuvash ASSR,

bordering on the Mordovian fields, is 120-125 quintals, in Leningrad Oblast it reaches as high as 140-160, and in Moscow Oblast it is 130-160 quintals. And hundreds of kolkhozes and sovkhoses now have an average yield of 200 or more quintals per hectare. For example, the North Osetian ASSR gathered approximately 212 quintals per hectare in each of 4 years of the last five-year plan, and 292 quintals per hectare in 1983. And this is not a matter of the quality of land, but the quality of care. A simple analysis indicates that increasing the output of potatoes by raising the yield costs only one-third as much as increasing the size of fields. The bureaucratic need for "insurance," however, gives rise to the unrestrained plowing of all land, even areas unsuitable for farming. And this is not all. Pastures are sometimes plowed "on the sly," and the crops raised on them are added to the output of the planned sowing area, artificially raising its yield. For example, an inspection on the Yuzhnyy Sovkhoz in Salskiy Rayon in Rostov Oblast revealed that the reported 13,500 hectares of arable land were actually 15,100 hectares--a difference of 1,600. In all, 11,000 hectares of so-called above-balance plowland had not been recorded in the rayon. The same was true of other rayons in the oblast, in Stavropol and Krasnodar krais, and in the Dagestan, Kabardino-Balkar, North Osetian, and Chechen-Ingush ASSR's. This practice turned out to be quite common in the Kazakh SSR and the Central Asian republics.

Practices in animal husbandry also reveal the obviously counterproductive nature of the obsession of some kolkhoz and sovkhos managers with the quantitative growth of fixed capital and, conversely, the advantages of the better use of existing means of production.

We know that an increase of 3.9 million tons in the output of meat has been planned for the current 5-year period. Let us compare the relative potential of extensive and intensive animal husbandry. The former will require the augmentation of the number of livestock turned over for slaughter by 11 million calves, and the doubling of the entire herd. This will entail billions in expenditures: additional buildings, equipment, and other facilities for a total of 21.7 billion dollars, enough fodder for 98.1 million additional tons of feed units, and labor expenditures of 4.2 billion man-hours (9). (Incidentally, it is precisely the emphasis on the continued growth of the herd--that is, on the extensive development of animal husbandry--that is making the construction of new animal husbandry facilities a matter of urgency. In the periodical press this problem is still usually treated as something of vital importance. However, although it is an acute problem in some locations, the use of the achievements of the scientific-biotechnical revolution, securing the intensification of animal husbandry, will certainly alleviate the problem or even eliminate it.)

Another means of the intensive development of animal husbandry consists in augmenting the average delivery weight of each head. It is now 350-360 kilograms. In all, from 25 million to 26 million head are delivered. It is easy to calculate that an increase of 50 kilograms will be enough to reach the projected figure.

But the question of whether this increase of half a quintal is realistic is quite valid. Let us look at the figures. In the last year of the last

five-year plan the farms in Belorussia brought the average delivery weight of cattle up to 404 kilograms, and the figure was raised to 424 kilograms in Cherkassy Oblast, to 428 kilograms in Moldavia, and to 435 kilograms in Lithuania. Therefore, if the union average could be raised to meet the Belorussian figure, the objective set by the 27th party congress could be attained without increasing the herd or the number of workers and without building new animal husbandry facilities. All it would take is a new way of thinking and acting. After all, the emphasis on the herd also stems from the same bureaucratic desire for "insurance." This approach gives no thought to the overhead costs of maintaining each new head or to the fact that each additional kilogram of meat from the new herd will require twice or three times as much fodder, because most of the feed maintains the weight of live-stock instead of increasing it.

Table 1. Primary Means of Promoting Agricultural Development, According to Surveyed Specialists, %

<u>Objectives</u>	<u>Farm managers, chief specialists</u>	<u>Practical specialists</u>	<u>Middle-level management</u>
Larger deliveries of technical equipment and improvement in its manufacture and repair	68	52	52
Larger deliveries of mineral fertilizers and combination feeds and their better use	18	82	19
Construction of more production facilities, roads, and housing	53	18	30
Lower prices on equipment, fertilizer, and feed, or higher prices on agricultural products	47	8	18
Higher wages	44	68	73
Reduced product losses	39	54	62
Lower overhead costs	41	28	58
More workers	50	33	42
Better labor discipline	32	14	67
More assistance from cities	29	11	35

Note: The total number of responses in each column was 500. The difference is accounted for by responses made by only a few specialists.

An inability to appreciate the new possibilities of the technological revolution and, in part, a reluctance to make use of them are characteristic of many practical workers and even of many scientists in the agroindustrial complex. For example, achievements in genetic engineering have produced crop strains capable of restoring the fertility of the land, with no need for chemicals. But plans for research and breeding projects still focus primarily on the search for more effective methods of applying mineral fertilizers and developing strains with the best response to chemicals. International trends in the development of genetic engineering indicate, however,

that in the next few years the monopoly in agriculture will belong to the first to accumulate sufficient quantities of seeds of fundamentally new crop strains.

Table 2. Effectiveness of Sovkhozes in Relation to Supply of Labor Resources and Producer Goods

Indicators	Hectares of arable land per worker:								
	(A)	(B)	(C)	(D)	(E)	(F)	(G)	(H)	(I)
Number of sovkhozes	153	236	278	532	446	325	174	80	102
Fixed capital (thousands of rubles) per:									
worker	16.4	17.7	14.9	13.8	13.8	12.8	13.2	13.2	13.9
100 hectares of plowland	566	347	212	145	111	83	71	62	51
Gross product (thousands of rubles) per:									
worker	4.2	4.6	4.2	3.9	4.0	4.0	4.3	4.2	4.4
100 hectares of plowland	144	90	60	41	32	26	23	20	16
Grain yield (quintals per hectare)	19.0	19.1	15.9	14.3	13.3	12.0	11.4	10.8	9.9

Key:

- | | |
|------------|----------------|
| A. Under 4 | F. 14-17 |
| B. 4-6 | G. 17-20 |
| C. 6-8 | H. 20-23 |
| D. 8-11 | I. 23 and over |
| E. 11-14 | |

The second widespread type of mental stereotypes of the period of primarily extensive economic management is connected with the failure to realize that the organic combination of the technological revolution with socialist organization turns science into a social force as well as a direct productive force.

We will cite a few examples of this underestimation. With the best of intentions, theorists of population settlement patterns--and, on their recommendations, the appropriate agencies--decided to provide the rural population with cultural and consumer comforts equal to those in the cities, and for this purpose they formulated and began acting on the theory of "promising" and "unpromising" rural communities. Today everyone knows the damage caused by the implementation of this theory, which encouraged rural inhabitants to move from "unpromising" communities to the cities and which led to the decay of tens of thousands of villages and to the collapse of their economy.

What gave rise to this ruinous but, luckily, quickly renounced theory? When we think about this, we cannot fail to see the separation of social objectives from the social potential of scientific and technical progress. The theorists who chose the promising settlements were guided by the assumption

that only centralized utilities and consumer services could secure the necessary level of comfort in rural life, and they were economically feasible only in large settlements; that centralized housing construction was profitable only after its considerable concentration; that cultural and other establishments of the social infrastructure could be "attached" only to large settlements, and that otherwise their operating costs would be too high. They did not even consider the fact that the fields, woods, and bodies of water which were kept viable by the inhabitants of small and medium-sized communities would not move with the people and would therefore decay without daily care; that the individual is an entire world in which the connections between the present and the future and between the present and the past are personified, and that the loss of one component of this triad would change his behavior radically. It was assumed that people would move from unpromising rural communities to promising ones, but they went a step further, deciding that if a fundamental break with the past had to be made, they might as well move right away to the city, where the level of cultural, consumer and other conveniences was still incomparably higher than in even the promising rural communities.

Was there a need for all of this? If we look at history, we can clearly see that this idea reflected the eternal dream of urban-rural communities, which came into being long ago, when there were no scientific or technical preconditions for any other solution to the problem of civilizing the rural community. By the time this theory was elaborated, however, even the rural community had reached certain heights of civilization, and the scientific and technical potential for the continued elevation of its cultural and consumer standards existed and, what is more, had already been tried and tested. There were special automatic heaters, with the aid of which each rural home could have a relatively cheap supply of hot water, and there was equipment for the biological treatment of sewage and other equipment for the maintenance of the self-sufficiency of the individual farmstead; there was experience in the in-plant manufacture of rural homes and in their assembly with minimal labor expenditures on any small construction site; finally, there were effective methods of organizing inter-community cultural and consumer services, both abroad and in our country. But the stereotypes of anachronistic thinking did not allow the planners of the "new" settlement patterns to see these genuinely new social capabilities of the scientific-biotechnical revolution.

Here is another example attesting to the slow development of non-agrarian links of the agroindustrial complex in rural areas. Many persist in assuming that the necessary resources for this do not exist in rural areas. Auxiliary industries for the manufacture of simple unfinished pieces of wood for urban enterprises were regarded as the only possibility. There was no consideration, and frequently there is still no consideration, for the fact that today's rural youth is not inferior to urban youth in terms of education and cultural and technical background and that it is capable of mastering any kind of complex technology; that the achievements of the scientific-biotechnical revolution allow for the establishment of large-scale specialized production with minimal labor resources, especially if it is automated and robotized. This kind of production is essential in rural areas: first of all, to neutralize the seasonal nature of agricultural labor; second, to provide jobs for young

women, for whom there are fewer and fewer jobs left in agrarian production; third, to improve the social conditions of rural life and promote the further cultural and technical development of the rural community. In regions with a labor surplus, especially in Central Asia, where the attachment of the inhabitants to rural ways has deep and strong roots, this is now the most efficient way of using their colossal labor resources.

Another group of stereotypes of conservative thinking is connected with the underestimation of the increased capabilities of labor for self-management. There is no need to repeat the party's criticism of the practice of "directing" each step of the farmer's work from above. But we cannot assume that the transfer to cost accounting will automatically eliminate the style of management that is so firmly established in some minds. The quarter of a century of experience in the use of contracted self-funding collectives proves that these minds even strive to channel cost accounting in what they regard as the right direction. Contracted collectives are frequently formed with no regard for the principle of voluntary membership, arbitrary changes are made in the conditions of their work, commitments to them are not honored, etc. At the basis of all this, we can see, on the one hand, the desire for absolute authority and, on the other, a lack of faith in the constructive potential of the creativity of the masses, in their administrative intelligence and, in the final analysis, in their social maturity. Is it necessary to mention the extent to which this position impedes the development of proprietary feelings in all laborers?

The fourth group of stereotypes of anachronistic thinking is the product of the tendency to forestall the determination and attainment of current objectives. These "forestallers," who seem to be ultra-progressive people, strive for the early completion of party programs. Demagoguery, however, was also present in the appeals and actions of some of them. It would be difficult, for example, to overestimate the importance of social homogeneity as a long-range goal of the comprehensive improvement of socialism according to plan through socioeconomic acceleration. Unilateral and frequently premature measures to equalize the wages of unskilled and highly skilled workers and the compensation for highly productive and almost unproductive labor, however, violate the basic principle of socialist distribution "from each according to his abilities and to each according to his labor" and only delay the attainment of this goal. It requires something else, namely the elimination of unproductive and unskilled labor. The effective equalization of the wages of machine operators with the wages for draft animal and manual labor diminished the prestige of this central group of AIC personnel and motivated them to move to other spheres of production. And now that first-rate machine operators are paid just slightly more than semiskilled machine operators, the latter are in no hurry to improve their skills. The problem is even more acute in the case of people engaged in highly skilled mental labor.

The all-round development of democracy as a long-range goal of the improvement of socialism is equally important. Sociological research indicates, however, that the "ultra-progressive" people do not take the trouble to elaborate specific forms of democracy for different spheres of activity and transplant the democratic forms of societal self-government into the sphere

of production in an effort to keep up with the times. The latter forms are known to have been developed long ago and to have reached fruition, but moving them directly into production, which, by its very nature, requires strict technological discipline, is ineffective and creates chaos. Besides this, the "ultra-democrats" themselves are usually inclined to use "democracy" simply to submerge their personal responsibilities in it.

The underestimation of the possibilities of cooperatives simply because public ownership is a more progressive long-range goal is also anachronistic. In the past this underestimation took the form of the premature and far from always necessary conversion of kolkhozes into sovkhozes, and today it is apparent in the efforts to portray the agroindustrial association as a functioning form of communist ownership, which is also ultimately related to the view of kolkhoz-cooperative ownership as a virtually completed stage. State ownership, however, is no less, and perhaps even more, a temporary form of property relations. The founders of Marxism-Leninism had good reason to speak of communism as a society of associated producers.

The fifth group of stereotypes is connected with a misunderstanding of the integral nature of the AIC and the rural community as a single entity comprised of a material complex and production, economic, and social organizations, and a consequent underestimation of the social infrastructure. According to the results of a survey conducted in Uzbekistan, 63 percent of the workers on kolkhozes assigned priority to the economic effectiveness of the AIC, and only 22 percent mentioned the equal importance of its economic and social goals. Respective figures for other links of the complex were 71 and 25 for sovkhozes, 55 and 31 for agroindustrial associations and complexes, 56 and 37 for the rayon agroindustrial administration staff, and 48 and 40 for the personnel of the republic agroindustrial administration.

It is noteworthy that the present conditions of the development of the AIC and rural areas sometimes obscure the organic unity of economic and social objectives. More effort must be made to establish and develop a correct understanding of the actual connections between national economic and social affairs.

In general, more than enough has been said about the need to reorient the thinking and behavior of personnel, especially the need for sociopsychological reorientation, by social scientists, particularly economists, sociologists, psychologists, and jurists. The lopsided nature of many statements, however, is striking. Journalist and political economist G. Lisichkin justifiably, in our opinion, criticizes the excessive bias of sociologists for an "educational" program for the elimination of shortcomings in economic management and recommendations that enterprises concentrate on satisfying the individual's labor needs, with no consideration for the problem of regulating the need for various types of activity (11, pp 3-10). Jurists often underscore the inviolability of the normative side of the matter, without considering that progress, which is based on norms, ultimately violates them and advances new normative criteria. Many economists--and it seems to me that even G. Lisichkin himself does not escape this--see the reorganization of economic administrative relations as a panacea, without considering that the economic sphere contains not

only production-distributive (or economic) relations, but also others, social, moral, and legal relations, which must be considered to preserve the integrity of economic administrative activity: Otherwise, it goes into a skid, so to speak.

The objectively integral nature of economic administrative activity, reflecting all of the variety of social relations, requires a search not for decisions on a single aspect, but a comprehensive approach that takes the organic unity of the economic, ideological, and political aspects into account. Furthermore, these aspects not only interact, but also intermingle, and they are only relatively separate. Difficult tasks lie ahead in the improvement of production relations and socioeconomic policy, but equally complex tasks, and perhaps even more complex ones, lie ahead in the sphere of consciousness. V.I. Lenin said that "rebuilding all work habits and morals will take decades," and it will require the colossal efforts of the party and the entire society.

Guided by the results of comprehensive studies of social factors and reserves, the party has ordered the consolidation of the efforts of agricultural sociologists and of representatives of related fields, especially the applied sciences. The documents approved by the May (1982) CPSU Central Committee Plenum and the 27th party congress reinforce the methodological bases for this kind of cooperation. The agroindustrial complex is seen by researchers as an intricate socioeconomic phenomenon, securing the organic combination of territorial, sectorial, and special-program planning and management. It encompasses not only agriculture and industry, but also the non-production sphere, and not only the countryside, but also the cities. The fulfillment of the Food Program is closely related to the problem of urban and rural convergence, which is described in detail in the new edition of the CPSU Program. Furthermore, in contrast to the ideas about "pulling up" rural areas to the urban level, the policy of their mutually enriching convergence has been elaborated.

In light of these tenets, the so-called overlapping problems of the socioeconomic and cultural development of rural areas and the agricultural sphere, including problems engendered by the technological revolution and urbanization and by the combination of these with developing socialist social relations, which are of a comprehensive nature, have become more visible. All of this creates extensive opportunities for the further augmentation of the practical value of scientific research and its role in the psychological reorientation of personnel and, consequently, in the accelerated socioeconomic development of the country.

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THE FIRST STEPS HAVE BEEN TAKEN. NOW WHAT?

Moscow SOTSIOLOGICHESKIYE ISSLEDOVANIYA in Russian No 1, Jan-Feb 87 (signed to press 21 Jan 87) pp 13-17

[Article by Vadim Borisovich Olshanskiy, candidate of philosophical sciences and specialist in personal sociology. Author of a review in our journal (No 3, 1986)]

[Text] It appears that the "anti-alcohol boom" has started to subside. Statistical indicators attest to a substantial decline in sales of alcoholic beverages. The number of "binge-related" crimes has also declined. It is more common to speak of alcohol abuse in the past tense.

This topic swept through the pages of the press like a veritable tornado: Everything conceivable and inconceivable was written about the evils of alcohol, including all types of "horror stories." "Civilized drinkers" were wholly and completely exposed as abettors of drunks. Now that this weeding process has removed the "tops" of the problem and there is virtually nothing else to write about it, it is time to go after the "roots" and to begin a serious sociological analysis of the phenomenon of alcohol abuse and the planning of a long-term, effective anti-alcohol policy.

I would like to preface this discussion with an old sociological parable. An ape was led to a palm tree. It began shaking the tree, but the fruit did not fall. "Look around and think," the experimenter told the ape. The ape took the advice, saw a stick, and used it to get the coconuts. Then a human being was put in the same situation and also began shaking the tree. "Look around and think," the experimenter advised him. "What is there to think about?" the man shouted with gusto, "I have to keep shaking!"

There is something to think about because the problem of alcohol abuse has not been solved. In fact, it has changed its appearance and has gone "underground," settling in the sphere of home and personal life, and has become invulnerable to social control. It is not easy to get liquor, but where there's a will there's a way. All it takes is money. And if the person does not have enough money, he drinks cologne and other, more harmful "substitutes." It is obvious that prohibition alone does not solve the problem, but merely drives it into hiding.

We need sociological studies of the real values which--by virtue of some kind of sinister biochemical "irony"--manifest themselves in a state of alcoholic euphoria. We cannot deny that some people see the world as an alien and hostile place, but even these people strive to develop their own personality. With the exception of cases of clinical pathology, the main values are genuine, "open" human communication and the alleviation of the daily pressure of social roles. In general, I believe that the socialization of the individual is a continuous process of ego development, a process of self-education.

This might sound more than strange. Alcohol, which destroys the personality, and self-education are incompatible. It would be an obvious oversimplification, however, to blame the appeal of alcohol on addiction. In my opinion, there are social mechanisms of personality integration in the system of social relationships that reproduce alcoholic behavior. We must look for these mechanisms and consider how the full quality of human life can be secured in alcohol-free situations. If we simply "shake the tree" without thinking, the sole result will be bureaucratic precision in statements and statistics, accompanied by latent alcohol abuse. I see this as the chief danger of the present stage of the "anti-alcohol campaign." I will not cite the results of surveys, but will describe specific social events.

Around a dozen people gathered for a housewarming. New potatoes were boiling on the stove, and fresh tomatoes, cucumbers, and juice were on the table. A guest who brought a bottle of vodka was greeted with delight: "He took the trouble to find some! Somehow he got some!" The vodka was poured out carefully. Everyone got his share, and no one refused. The rapt silence typical of these situations was shattered by a playful exclamation: "You know, at work I am the secretary of the temperance society." The laughter grew louder when someone else introduced himself: "And I am the chairman. So let us obliterate the damned stuff," he said as he raised his glass. They were as happy as schoolchildren who trick the teacher and take delight in a taste of freedom.

But is it possible that children do not know that the teacher does what he does for their own good? Was it not in the public interests and in response to numerous requests that the well-known decrees were passed to combat alcohol abuse? Are the primary organizations of the All-Union Voluntary Temperance Society not associations of people who share the same opinions, are they not unions freely joined by individuals who realize what kind of irreparable injuries alcohol inflicts on society, production, the family, and future generations?

The answer turns out to be yes and no. The "chairman" explained that he was ordered to get 90 percent of the collective to join. "Well, our people are used to this. Here, they say, take 2 rubles and leave me alone. A person does not refuse. It could ruin his reputation. Of course, we did not ask any obvious drunks to join." And the man who brought the vodka told of his experience: "There was a huge crowd of people who had been waiting in line since morning. I work nearby, so I rushed into work, made sure the boss noticed me by asking a question or two, and then got back in line." Everyone

joined the conversation. Someone mentioned a rural community that turned out to be in a "temperance zone"--all of the wine stores were closed. Now cars and even tractors ride around neighboring rayons looking for wine shops. "Any line," a guest with a dignified appearance remarked, "is a bad thing. But a specially organized line is almost always ill-intentioned, unless, of course, it is a case of mere stupidity." Someone thought the conversation was getting too serious. "They kept us drunk for so many years," he joked, "and now they will not let us have the hair of the dog." But no one appreciated the joke. "Things are not any harder for the abusers." A woman--she worked in a medical establishment--diplomatically remarked: "A bottle of vodka is just as harmful whether it is bought in a store at two in the afternoon or from a black-marketeer at eleven at night.... And the purpose of the struggle against alcoholism is certainly not to drive those who cannot afford cognac or champagne to drink something else that is even more harmful."

I must admit that I simply copied these remarks from newspaper articles by reporters who were disturbed by the excessively formal administration and campaigning in anti-alcohol undertakings and argued that public opinion had to be influenced and people had to change their minds before the stores were closed.

Incidentally, there is another point of view. Some people call the current undertakings halfhearted and are demanding stricter control and more severe penalties. They want to repress everyone: sick people suffering from alcoholism, although the law says they are to be treated; malicious violators of law and order, although there is a criminal code to deal with them; and completely normal people, although there is nothing illegal about their behavior. Administrative zeal is often accompanied by frightening demagoguery: "What is your problem, are you against spiritual health?" In response to these temperance extremists, V. Yegorov conclusively proved on the pages of PRAVDA (1) that spiritual health is incompatible with authoritarian methods and with the humiliation of individuals.

The arguments of the supporters of stern measures have their own logic: Things got better when the drunks were restrained, and it is therefore time to tighten the screws. But this is the logic of a struggle against the symptoms of disease rather than the disease itself. I would like to point out one extremely important fact that has not been mentioned in the press yet. There is no question that alcohol abuse results in substantial production losses and inhibits reform, but can we not assume that alcohol abuse itself is engendered largely by some of the obsolete practices that we encounter every day and that were discussed with a Leninist adherence to principle at the 27th CPSU Congress? Is it not true that alcohol abuse has performed some of the social functions involved in the individual's adaptation to these practices? If this is true, then the successful and complete resolution of the problem will depend not on prohibition, but on the quickest possible completion of the group of revolutionary reforms now known as the "acceleration strategy."

Unfortunately, the social functions of alcohol, especially the latent functions, have been virtually ignored in scientific literature, perhaps because they have not had time to become established and are still only tendencies. I will cite

a few arguments suggesting that alcoholism has performed the function of compensating for gaps in social organization.

Just recently the production of alcoholic beverages added much to the budget. This seemed to be an effective way of reducing the gap between rising public demand and inadequacies in supply. The sale of liquor was responsible for the overfulfillment of plans by grocery stores (in rural communities, for example, vodka accounted for more than half of the sales volume) and restaurants, and created the illusion of prosperity. A bureaucratic structure with an objective interest in increased alcohol consumption took shape. This interest was shared by the substratum of trade personnel dealing in vodka.

The contradiction between the quality of manpower and employment opportunities became more pronounced in recent decades. Whereas 401 out of every 1,000 workers had a higher or secondary education in 1959, the figure was 849 in 1986. The respective figures of 226 and 741 attest to the rising educational level of kolkhoz members (2). Almost half of all jobs, however, require monotonous, semiskilled, manual, and heavy physical labor. Alcohol reduces the creative needs of people and lowers the labor potential of society to a level corresponding to an obsolete and essentially pre-industrial technological base.

It is paradoxical but true that a person who comes to work drunk is penalized, but a sober person can fool around as much as he wants. This suggests that a pseudosocialist stereotype of labor as a "sphere of activity," and not as a way of making a living, has become firmly established in the public mind. A lack of organization in production has been combined with economic impunity and financial security. This view was mutually complementary with alcohol abuse in production and in establishments.

Drinking also compensated for the disparity between the increasing amount of free time and the opportunities for its intelligent use. Here alcohol served as a means of reducing the surplus of free time and channeling social activity in a safe direction for the traditional bureaucratic confusion in the society. Drinking companions saw to the pseudosatisfaction of the social needs of people, open communication was replaced by the exchange of "confidential information" over a bottle, and self-control and responsibility gave way to dim-witted obedience and the hope of a drink after work.

Alcoholic beverages performed the function of a "common denominator" in latent exchanges, filling the gaps in the organization of labor and in the service sphere. When rush work became the norm, for example, it was so much more convenient to pay workers for overtime work with alcohol ordered for technological purposes or to simply give them a 5-ruble bill each, which God himself had intended for the purchase of a bottle, than to fill out overtime vouchers. Vodka or alcohol can also be used in payment for illegal services. Studies have shown that people who abuse alcohol are likely to frequent places distinguished by the least order and discipline.

Therefore, we encounter a real contradiction: Although widespread alcohol consumption undermines the economic, social, and moral foundations of society,

when a social system is in a state of stagnation it contributes to its preservation, and certain groups with an objective interest in the development of a need for alcohol come into being in the society.

The reproduction of alcohol abuse and alcoholism is accomplished not only on the level of the social organization as a whole, but also and primarily within the confines of the habits of daily life. There is also another contradiction here, connected with the fact that the values of socialism sometimes seem to exist in themselves, while the behavior of individuals is only indirectly related to them. There is even a new "theory" distinguishing between the accepted standard of the way of life (the Soviet way of life) and the actual way of life (the way of life of the Soviet people). This separation stems from the not easily surmountable gap between words and actions, and this contributes to the social reproduction of alcoholism. The main problem is the following: "Between the culture, as the system of societal spiritual values and the common experience of a class, a nation, or all mankind, and the standard of culture, as the quality of individual and group behavior, there is a system securing the assimilation of these values by each individual and the introduction of these values into the individual's mind. This transmission of culture, its transformation into an individual standard of culture, begins with the development and elevation of spiritual...needs--that is, with what we regard as the weakest link of current indoctrinational work, its Achilles heel" (3).

This might sound trivial, but the family plays a special, exceptionally important role in the development of social immunity or predisposition to alcohol, and it does this during the earliest stages of socialization. In unhappy families, children do not gain the proper view of life, they suffer from an inferiority complex and develop feelings of resentment and bitterness. A person often becomes an outcast at birth, and his perceptions of the world are clouded by feelings of inadequacy and incompatibility with society. An unhealthy emotional atmosphere in the home keeps a child from learning the fundamentals of morality and culture. And a person who has not mastered the fundamentals of interpersonal communication will certainly become a "reject" with the other losers and outsiders. It is possible that inherited social flaws are more dangerous than the tendency toward addiction.

Socially inept people constitute the majority of groups distinguished by deviant behavior. When V.S. Khomik studies two comparable groups of adolescents--one group of teenagers who were in a corrective labor camp for crimes committed under the influence of alcohol, and another group of the same age in school--he learned that the first were more impulsive and were more likely to rely on luck than on their own abilities. Family and health are not important to them. The long-range ambitions which impose certain requirements and responsibilities on the individual are crowded out by a prevalence of short-term goals.¹ In addition to everything else, the use of alcohol and other drugs is their way of escaping real life and living in a world of imagination and artificially stimulated emotions. All of this gradually destroys the personality. From the psychological standpoint, the most significant preconditions for the reproduction of alcoholism are the intensity, severity and duration of conflict situations; ideas about the possibility (or

impossibility) of their effective resolution; the tendency to use alcohol as a traditional means of alleviating tension.

The social reproduction of alcohol abuse and alcoholism is the subject of interdisciplinary research. Medico-biological, psychological, social, and economic factors are intermingled here. The main preconditions for alcoholic behavior, however, are present in the specific state of the social environment. The present reorganization of social life by the party and the entire Soviet population will mobilize the colossal reserves of the human factor and will strengthen the individual's social responsibility for his own future and the future of his children.

FOOTNOTES

1. The author is grateful to V.S. Khomik for the permission to use his unpublished research findings.

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SYSTEMATIZATION OF ANALYTICAL TOOLS OF FAMILY SOCIOLOGY

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[Article by Mikhail Semenovitch Matskovskiy, candidate of philosophical sciences and senior research associate in the Family Sociology Department of the Institute of Sociological Research, USSR Academy of Sciences. He is the author of the monograph "The Contemporary Family and Its Problems" (1978, co-authored) and the brochures "The Law of Scales, or the Emotional Features of Family Life" (1980, co-authored) and "The Young Family in a Big City" (1986, co-authored). His articles printed in our journal are "The Changing Status of Women and the Future of the Family" (No 1, 1979), "Experiment in the Development and Use of Subject Categories in Family Sociology" (No 4, 1982), and "Experience in Alcoholism Prevention in Finland" (No 3, 1983)]

[Text] Scientific research in the field of family sociology can be made more effective by the improvement and development of the concepts used in this field. The maturity of a science depends on a complete set of concepts distinguished by inner logic. From this standpoint, family sociology is one of the most advanced fields of sociological knowledge.

This is attested to, in particular, by the articles and monographs in which the family is examined as a topic of historical materialism (1, 2) and in which the fundamental approaches to the study of family and marital relations are analyzed and their distinctive features are investigated (3, pp 24-62). The systematizing and informative functions of theories¹ are carried out by means of the use of complex theoretical concepts in scientific discussions and the development of systems of categorization and classification. There have been thorough analyses, for example, of such concepts as family functions (2, 3, 6, 10), marriage quality (7), the need for children (8; 9, pp 53-61), the family and public health (5), the way of family life (10), roles and interaction (3), family structure (11), family authority and leadership (11, 12), motives for marriage (6, 13), causes of divorce (2, 6, 14), etc. The "conceptual maturity" of family sociology is also confirmed by the fact that researchers have proposed theoretically valid systems of classification and categorization as well as precise definitions of many terms (15). In some publications (but, unfortunately, in far from all), they have empirical correlates. The categorization systems aiding in the disclosure of differences in the development of marital and family relations include the system for the classification of marriage values (16, p 37), high divorce risk categories

(17), reproductive situation categories (9, p 95), and spousal conflict categories (18).

The most important and meaningful categories, however, are probably categories dealing with the family as a whole--from systems of classification based on structural features--nuclear and extended families, broken and complete homes, etc. (2, 15)--and stages of the life cycle (19) to classification based on relations between spouses--authoritarian or egalitarian (2, 12) and traditional, collectivist, or individualistic (20). The demographic categorization of families (21) and categorization of family groups (22) could also be included in this list. The categorization of families on the basis of cohesiveness and the nature of family values is also quite productive--the united family with an emphasis on social goals; the united but socially passive family, and the disunited family with antisocial views (23).

These systems of classification and categorization do not only perform a systematizing function. They reflect concepts, and sometimes hypotheses, requiring empirical verification. The last of the categorization systems, for example, is based on an extremely important hypothesis in the development of the theory of family socialization--the hypothesis that two factors influence the upbringing of children and teenagers: the unity of the family and the social implications of the psychological atmosphere in the home.

The strictness, internal hierarchy, and unambiguous interpretation of the set of concepts are even more important in the performance of the explanatory and forecasting functions of family sociology. This entails the construction and empirical verification of analytical systems, models, forecasts, and hypotheses. The most interesting analytical projects of recent years include models of the effects of living conditions on reproductive behavior and the determination of birthrate factors (9), the theory of historical types of birthrates (24), the practical model of birthrate management (25), and the prognostic models of birthrate based on demographic methods of calculation (26).

Most of these models and systems are of an interdisciplinary nature, connecting family sociology with social demography. This is largely due to the existence of the detailed and orderly statistics of social demography, based on precise quantitative indicators (birthrate, marriage rate, divorce rate). The latter allow for the comparison of information in extensive time and space frames. A similar set of informational statistics in family sociology can be established only with the aid of an analytically sound system of variables and, consequently, empirical indicators. The improvement of analytical tools is an essential prerequisite for the construction of this kind of system.

The development of the categories and concepts of family sociology is being impeded by several serious unresolved problems. They include the insufficient analytical substantiation of concepts and their sometimes inconsistent and illogical hierarchy, which obscures the clear connection between the analytical and empirical levels of sociological knowledge. As a result, different terms are often used to refer to the same phenomena and processes, and, conversely, the same term is often used without any consideration for its exact meaning.

For example, S.I. Golod uses the term family stability as a synonym for marital stability (16, 27). It is obvious, however, that the first term should refer not only to spousal relations, but also to such phenomena as the deterioration of the bonds between parents and children, the separation of the young family from the parental family, the severance of ties between siblings, etc. The absence of a system is probably also the reason that some terms (family structure, family functions, integral features of marriage quality) are given considerable attention, while others (family standards, kinship patterns, aftereffects of divorce, etc.) are virtually ignored by researchers.

This (along with other factors) is the reason for the slow and uneven accumulation of sociological knowledge about the family. The group of reliable statements is quite small, and only a few of these can be categorized as natural laws with complete justification.

Without downplaying the importance of the theoretical clarification of certain concepts and groups of concepts and the connections between them, we must say that the improvement of the entire set of concepts will be impossible without a comprehensive analysis of all of the connections and relationships between concepts.

Our strategy for this kind of analysis includes deductive and inductive stages. The first consists of the gradual reduction of the fundamental terms of family sociology to empirically operationalized variables. The second consists of a systematic analysis of empirical indicators for the purpose of their generalization and their elevation to the status of theoretical concepts.

The deductive stage begins with the choice of "points of departure"--the precise definition of the system of coordinates marking the framework of family studies. A consistent analysis of the research subject matter reveals the main theoretical problems and their hierarchy, separates primary from secondary ones, and clarifies the definitions of concepts. It should always be borne in mind that the family is a social phenomenon with the features of a social institution and a small group. It is analyzed as a social institution in studies of public awareness in the sphere of marital and family relations and the common features of the family behavior of various population groups in different economic and cultural situations. This approach can elucidate a number of extremely important matters. How does the development of social needs influence the nature of marital and family relations and the family lifestyle? What types of family behavior are functional or dysfunctional in relation to social needs? To what extent does the institution of the family perform its main functions in different ideological, political, socioeconomic, and cultural situations, and how do family standards and values differ in these cases? What are the causes and consequences of the failure of the family institution to function effectively under certain conditions? What is the social mechanism involved in the change of family standards and values, and what will they be in the near and distant future? What is the relationship between the standards, values, prescribed patterns of behavior, and other elements of social ideology in the sphere of marital and family

relations and the actual performance of roles, behavioral patterns, and inter-relations of spouses?

Of course, this list could be continued, but we feel that it constitutes the foundation of analysis on the theoretical and empirical levels, a foundation for the determination of the criteria to be used in the choice of concepts for family sociology.

The second common approach to family studies presupposes the analysis of the family as a small social group. This approach is used to reveal the patterns and nature of relations between family members, the motives and reasons for divorce, the nature of parent-child interaction, etc. This analysis can answer questions about the structure of family authority and obligations, parent-child relations, the causes of family conflicts, motives for divorce, etc.

The main indicators used in studies of the family as a small group can be divided into three conditional categories. The first includes descriptions of the family group as a whole--its goals, size, composition, and structure, signs of group unity and group activity, the nature of familial interaction, division of authority, and communication, etc.

The indicators of the second category describe the family group's ties and relations with other social communities and institutions. These could be the nuclear family's ties with relatives; contacts with neighbors and friends; the family's relations with service establishments, pre-school establishments, schools, etc.


Finally, the third category consists of indicators of contacts and relations between the family as a whole and its members. It includes the individual's need for marriage and a family, family discipline, sanctions, values, standards, and models of behavior, the individual's inclusion in the family, his satisfaction with marriage, etc.

Whereas the precise difference between these two approaches is obvious on the level of the special sociological theory of the family, it is not always recognized on the empirical level. And this is not simply a matter of insufficient theoretical reflection. The causes lie deeper, and they are of an objective nature, dictated by the peculiarities of contemporary marital and family relations.

The approach to the sociological study of the family as a sociopsychological group focuses on its stability. The group functions of the family, however, in contrast to institutional functions, are connected with the effectiveness of interpersonal communication, and not with the influence of social values, standards, and sanctions on the behavior of family members. This field of research is becoming increasingly relevant as the outside forces supporting the family become less important in comparison with the factors of internal unity. This is also connected with the fact that the family's performance of its most important social functions (and, therefore, its existence as a social institution) is possible only in an atmosphere of effective group interaction,

particularly the stability of the family group and the satisfaction of each spouse with the marriage.

Although the family organically includes the features of the social institution and the small group, from the standpoint of analytical interests it often has to be analyzed either as an institution or as a group. This distinction must also be borne in mind when analytical tools are being chosen. On the other hand, on the empirical level--that is, on the level of variable and operationalized empirical indicators--a single system can be constructed, and its elements will be related to the concepts of the institution and the group. A diagram of this would have the following appearance:



This diagram aids in the formulation of the two main criteria for the choice of appropriate concepts.

The first is the criterion of the analytical connection between a particular concept and a term on a higher level. In family sociology this means the determination of analytical referents in the system of concepts of the institution and the group. This connection permits the development and improvement of the analytical tools of family sociology and of the theory of groups and institutions. In our opinion, family sociology would be enriched greatly by the use of the concepts elaborated in detail in the Soviet theory of small groups (28): goal-oriented unity, effective group identification, etc. On the other hand, such terms as family functions, quality of marriage and so forth could be used successfully in the development of group theory. The relevance of this criterion also stems from the need to standardize concepts in studies of different social subsystems for the purpose of the further development of Marxist general sociological theory. A precise and uniform description of the subsystem in special sociological theory simplifies the use of analytical tools and empirical information on the general sociological level.

Systematic Analysis of Concepts Pertaining to Social Institution, Small Social Group, and Family Sociology

Components of social system	Concepts of social institution	Concepts of small social group	Concepts of family sociology
External ties and relations of system	General social conditions in which social institution functions. Interaction with organizations, other institutions, and social subsystems. Social needs of institution. Nature of institution's social needs. Nature of performance of social functions.	General social conditions in which group functions. Immediate social surroundings of group. Interaction of group with institutions, organizations, and other social subsystems. Interaction of group with other groups. Interaction of group members with members of referent groups. Social needs of group. Nature of satisfaction of group's social needs. Nature of group's performance of social functions.	General social conditions of family activity. Immediate social environment of family. Material conditions of family life (including details of household management). Public opinion in sphere of marital and family relations influencing family activity. Interaction of family with institutions, organizations, groups, and social subsystems. Social orientation of family. Family ties with relatives. Family ties with friends. Family ties with neighbors. Social needs of family. Social functions of family. Nature of satisfaction of family's social needs. Nature of family's performance of social functions.
Elements of system	Social standards and values. Customs and traditions. Prescribed patterns of behavior. Social roles. Real models of behavior.	Group standards. Status of group members. Group roles. Individual needs. Attitudes. Motives. Group activity.	Traditions and customs in marital and family relations. Social standards and values in marital and family relations. Prescribed patterns of family behavior. Family status. Family roles. Familial standards and values of family members. Individual needs and attitudes. Motives of family members in marital and family relations. Family activity.

[Table continued on next page]

[Continuation of table]

Components of social system	Concepts of social institution	Concepts of small social group	Concepts of family sociology
Internal ties and relations of elements of system	System of formal social control (legal standards and sanctions influencing role behavior and interaction). Assimilation of values and standards of institution by individuals.	Role interaction of group members. Group communication patterns. Structure of authority and leadership. Group unity. Unity of group values and outlook. Satisfaction of group members with interpersonal relations. Inclusion of individual in group. Nature of group's satisfaction of individual needs of members.	System of formal social control (marital and family legal standards). System of informal social control in marital and family relations (moral standards and public values influencing functioning of family, and standards and values of immediate social environment in the sphere of marital and family relations). Patterns of family interaction. Patterns of family communication. Structure of authority and leadership. Family unity. Unity of values and outlook of family members. Inclusion of individual in family. Nature of family's satisfaction of individual needs of family members. Satisfaction of family members with marital and family relations.
Formative stage of system	Establishment of main elements of institution and connections between them, and their adaptation to social conditions. Formation of system of social control.	Establishment of group on the basis of common needs and interests. Establishment of interactive roles and communication system. Distribution of authority and leadership. Formation of common values and outlook.	Preparation for future family life in parental home. Premarital sexual experimentation. Premarital values and attitudes toward marriage and family. Behavior, interaction, and interrelations of future spouses during courtship. Legal and actual creation of family. Creation of material conditions of cohabitation.

[Table continued on next page]

[Continuation of table]

Components of social system	Concepts of social institution	Concepts of small social group	Concepts of family sociology
Developmental stage of system	Changes in basic elements and ties of institution and in nature of its functions under the influence of changing social conditions	Change in status of group members. Change in structure of inter-active roles, communication, leadership and authority as a result of changing external conditions or changing needs and motives of group members	Change in material conditions of family activity. Change in structure of inter-active roles, communication, leadership, and authority. Change in needs and motives of family members during family activity. Change in nature and volume of family activity. Change in family composition and relationships (including the birth of children). Change in values and outlook of family members.
Stage of system's collapse (or disintegration)	Collapse of institution due to reduction or elimination of social needs for its functioning or its internal resources.	Collapse of group due to modification or elimination of general needs and interests for weaker group unity and common values and outlook.	Reasons and motives for divorce. Nature of pre-divorce situation. Changes in material conditions of divorced couples. Interrelations of divorced couples with children and other members of broken home. Patterns of communication between former spouses. Changes in needs and motives of former spouses as a result of divorce.

Concepts with precise empirical referents are chosen in accordance with another criterion--empirical connection. Information establishing the significance of the variable in question should be accumulated with the aid of identical empirical indicators. It will "work" in confirming or refuting hypotheses only in the presence of sufficient empirical facts applying to different time periods and different economic and sociocultural conditions. Differences in the values of variables due to changes in analytical tools, stemming from the use of different empirical procedures for the study of identical objects, must be excluded. The role of the standardization of empirical indicators should be noted in this context. It will improve the quality of research findings, reveal opportunities for the use of a large group of mathematical methods of processing primary sociological information, and reduce research expenses. Besides this, standardization meets the requirements of the repeated confirmation of theoretically established tendencies.

In order to construct a single system of variables for sociological studies of the family, satisfying the criteria discussed above, we attempted to correlate the fundamental concepts of the theory of social institutions, small social groups, and sociological studies of the family. We proceeded from the assumption that the prerequisites exist for the integration of the two approaches within our view of the family as a social system.

The main components of the system are the following: a) objects (or things)--units making up the system; b) properties of the system--peculiar to each class of objects; c) internal and external ties of objects; d) relations (internal and external) not having the physical energy or underlying features of ties; e) functional phase of object; f) various phases, stages, degrees, levels, and branches of object's development (29).

The existence of the two approaches listed above is the reason that different terms are used to refer to the same features of the system. The correlation of the latter by means of a comprehensive approach is important, however, for their standardization. This entails certain difficulties: It is not enough to establish the existence of various ties; they must be visualized in an operational form as uncontradictory, logically related, and directly comparable entities. The results of this work are illustrated in the table.

The main elements of the social system (in accordance with the list presented above) are in the first column of the table. The next two columns are concepts from Soviet and foreign literature describing the functioning of the social institution and small group. This was followed by their logical correlation with the main elements of the social system in the first column, performing the functions of a classification network in this case. Finally, the last column contains all of the concepts used in literature on marital and family affairs and reference works (30), which were compared to the already systematized information in the previous three columns. This entailed inter-supplementation and clarification, and, on this basis, the standardization of all the concepts included in the table. For example, "individual functions of the family" is a popular concept in literature on family sociology, but this term is absent from the theory of groups. On the basis of an analysis of the

significant features of the group, we included the term "individual functions of the group" in the set of concepts referring to the small group. In the same way, the system of family sociology concepts was supplemented with "the inclusion of individuals in the family," "family sanctions," "prescribed patterns of behavior," etc. The systematization of the main components of the family allow for its analysis within the context of other systems--for example, the family lifestyle, the theory of organization, the theory of management, etc.

In addition to illustrating the theoretical correlation of concepts and assessing the completeness of the set of concepts of family sociology, the table provides initial information for the classification of variables. Our efforts to create this classification system were based on the assumption that its subject headings should, first of all, agree with theoretically defined concepts of family sociology and, second, correspond to empirical research practices.

The construction of the classification system followed a specific procedure. It began with the composition of a list of variables used in published programs of sociological studies of marriage and the family (31) or explicated in working documents for the collection of information on this topic. This was based on the assumption that the questions in questionnaires, interviews and so forth usually serve to measure completely definite variables. Unfortunately, the connection between variables and questions is not always clear, and wherever this connection was not clarified, we derived the logical explication of variables from an analysis of questions in 50 questionnaires. This quantity was quite sufficient for the repetition of explicated variables.

The explicated variables were compared, contrasted, and clarified, and similar ones were grouped together. Then they were all correlated with two series: the concepts in the last column of the table and the subject headings of our classification system for the analysis of the subject matter of family sociology publications (32). The result was an orderly set of variables used in Soviet sociological studies of marital and family relations (31) and a system for the classification of family sociology variables meeting the requirements listed above.

Several of the concepts in the last column of the table (the inclusion of the individual in the family, the nature of family satisfaction with social functions, etc.) were not reflected directly in the classification system. This was due largely to the fact that the terminology of family sociology includes concepts related to the empirical level by means of special analytical structures (indices, categories, etc.).

In our opinion, this system will function much more effectively if the variables are worded in standardized terms and in combination with their standard empirical indicators.

Therefore, the system of concepts connecting various levels of sociological knowledge has the following appearance: the standardized terms of the sociological analysis of the family; concepts describing stages in family

development and functioning; a system of variables of empirical family research; a set of standard indicators for this system of variables.

FOOTNOTES

1. The informative function of theory, according to G.I. Ruzavin, consists in theory's ability to provide necessary information which is not contained in even well-ordered and systematized facts. This information is contained in abstract concepts with only an indirect connection with the empirical world, mental experiments, analogues, comparisons of the facts in question with facts from other fields, etc. (for more detail, see 4).

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PROBLEMS IN DEVELOPMENT OF SOCIOLOGICAL SCIENCE

RESULTS OF 11TH WORLD SOCIOLOGICAL CONGRESS

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[Text] The 11th World Sociological Congress (New Delhi, 1986), just as earlier forums of this kind, represented an important milestone in the development of sociological thought and summed up the results of the international sociological community's activities in the last 4 years. Ever since the third congress (1956 in Amsterdam), Soviet scientists have participated directly and actively in all the meetings of the International Sociological Association, established in 1949 under UNESCO auspices. The international sociological forums disclose the most complex unsolved problems and simultaneously demonstrate with the utmost clarity the different, sometimes diametrically opposed, approaches to their resolution.

The discussion of issues of war and peace, social change, and the social affairs of society has become traditional at meetings of this kind. In New Delhi, these issues were once again the main topics of discussion and aroused the most heated arguments.

The congress agenda was quite full and included numerous subdivisions, and for this reason it would be difficult to cover all of its aspects in a single article. It would probably be best to focus on the main topics of discussion at the congress, to comment on some debates, and to describe fundamental approaches to the issues in question.

The main theme of the 11th international forum of sociologists ("Social Changes: Problems and Prospects") and the location of the meeting--India--called for pointed discussions of the real problems of our day, and not for scholastic and abstract arguments and debates. This was the first time the world sociological congress was held in an Asian state, in a country with considerable influence in the dissemination of knowledge, science, and ideology in the developing regions. India is distinguished by a variety of structures and forms of social life and by the multitude of acute problems it has

encountered during the process of its development. It is understandable that the search for ways of using sociological methods to solve them aroused the greatest interest. The ideological roots of Indian sociology stretch far back into the past, and modern sociological thought was conceived in the crucible of the political struggle for national independence. Sociology here is the topic of heated ideological arguments and an arena of vigorous battles.

The critical reassessment of Western and pro-Western sociological theories and concepts is characteristic of the developing countries, and is conducted either within the framework of nationalist, ethnocentric traditionalism or is based on a national-democratic, revolutionary-democratic platform. This is reflected, on the one hand, in the ideas of "Buddhist socialism" and the models of the "Islamic state," using traditional, including religious, cultural values for the needs of social development, and, on the other, in the stronger influence of the revolutionary-democratic ideology on university sociology and in the growing interest in Marxism and in the theory and practice of sociological research in the countries of real socialism. As Professor J. Singh from Nehru University in Delhi declared, "Indian sociologists are using the methods and categories of Marxism in social research, whether they are studying the agrarian structure and the formation of classes or analyzing feudalism and capitalism as socioeconomic systems. The spread of Marxist sociological thought is now occurring primarily on the strength of its creative promise as a philosophical and scientific system. The dialectical method is more valid than all other approaches to the interpretation and analysis of social changes or stratification in India" (1).

All of this was cogently demonstrated at the 11th congress, where 1,000 Indian sociologists, as well as scientists from other developing countries, displayed great interest in the speeches and reports of Marxist scientists.

The main topics of discussion were questions connected with promising and alternative social reforms in general and in countries with different levels of socioeconomic development in particular; the forms and conditions of change, their subjects and agents (or driving forces), and the connection between reforms and revolutions in today's world. The main job of the sociologist, speakers stressed, is the choice of the correct changes to rid the world of poverty, wars, and social ills and to firmly establish the principles of justice and cooperation. The Marxist concept of change, consistently adhered to by sociologists from the socialist countries and frequently supported by scientists from developing countries, was clearly expressed in these discussions.

The issue of social determination, which rightfully occupies a central position in the science of sociology and which encompasses a broad group of methodological questions, is directly related to social practices and policies. Congress speakers attempted to reassess social changes in today's world and analyze the theories explaining and interpreting them. The tone in the discussion of these issues was set at a plenary session by President F. Cardozo of the International Sociological Association, who spoke at length on matters connected with the role and place of sociological theory in the explanation of social changes. He presented a brief historical analysis of the sociological

theory of changes and its main concepts and paradigms, noting the limited nature of structural functionalism, the theory of modernization, and the theory of conflicts. Even today, he said, there are no theories presenting a completely accurate explanation of current changes in the world. In the 1960's the "neo-Marxists" tried to reinterpret Marx with a view to new problems that had arisen in the last few decades. The very idea of progress, Cardozo stressed, was subjected to revision. The appearance of nuclear weapons in the world inspired fear, shook the faith in the technological revolution, and engendered technical pessimism. The concepts that are occasionally proposed do not explain ongoing changes. Marx' theory, in his opinion, is no longer universal either, because the world revolution did not take place, and the proletariat lost its place in the accomplishment of social changes to new driving forces--women, blacks, and the Latin American "ecclesiastical communes." These tendencies are not explained in sociological theories, and this reaffirms the inapplicability of contemporary concepts of development to the real world and social practice.

Therefore, Cardozo concluded, the interaction of cultures and societies in today's world nullifies any egocentric attempt to view the Western world as the only model, and to view the road taken by the United States and some European countries as the high road to liberty, equality, and the good of all mankind, although the industrial civilization and the Western cultural model do have some historical significance. This is why the struggle for social changes is being waged not by a single social force, but by many forces, and this is why people have not just one universal option, but a variety of historical alternatives. New analytical sociological theories are needed to explain all of the complexities of today's world, and Cardozo proposed that these be created by means of a synthesis of existing theories. Sociologists have proved, he stressed, that the universalization of science can be of great practical value. Despite significant cultural differences, it is one world that scientists must study.

These remarks were supported by some bourgeois sociologists and some representatives from developing countries. Marxist scientists subjected these statements to logical criticism, revealing their eclectic and subjectivist nature and their evidence of a desire to downplay the main conflict in today's world--between capitalism and socialism--and to conceal the incompatibility of capitalist relations with the nature and prospects of the technological revolution. Now that many developing countries have reached the point of choosing between the socialist or capitalist pattern of development, these discussions are quite relevant.

Soviet scientists emphasized the Marxist interpretation of all matters discussed in the congress subdivisions they headed, especially sessions of symposiums (V.I. Ivanov, A.G. Zdravomyslov, N.I. Lapin, B.A. Grushin) and ad hoc groups (Kh.N. Momdzhyan). Because all of the reports were published, we will not discuss their contents (2-8).

The driving forces and agents of social changes were discussed to some extent in virtually all congress subdivisions. In the reports by sociologists from the socialist states and Marxist-oriented scientists from capitalist and

developing countries, classes and the class struggle were viewed as the structural bases of changes, and classes were called the chief agents of the world historical process. The contrasting interpretations and definitions of classes within the framework of two sociological concepts--Weberian and Marxist-Leninist--were revealed. The fundamental importance of the comprehension of the socioeconomic structure in the analysis of social changes was underscored. Western sociologists (particularly W. Himmelstrand) attempted to transcend the bounds of the tendency to contrast revolution to reform and tried to describe a more diverse range of changes. For example, they advanced the hypothesis of the "stalemate" inhibiting changes as a result of the balance of conflicting forces in social life--a problem connected with the resistance of change and with stagnation in social life. M. Archer (Great Britain) and P. Blau (United States) expressed the belief that social structures and subjects of activity are independent of one another, that structures are created for the activity of subjects and are changed by the latter during this activity. The logical separation of structures and subjects of activity has its limits, however, because they can only exist together, and the individual has the properties of a subject only as a part of society. Through diverse activities, many social subjects create the social processes we try to control. As G.V. Osipov stressed, this requires empirical knowledge capable of revealing the interaction of social subjects, allowing for the modification of relations and structures, and defining the activity of each subject and the result of all activities--the social process in a specific country at a specific time.

This is precisely what cannot be done on the basis of structuralism, which has definite potential in the study of isolated phenomena but only limited potential for theoretical generalizations in the broader context, and this was cogently substantiated in the reports by Marxist sociologists A.G. Zdravomyslov, Zh.T. Toshchenko, L. Beskid (Poland), M. Loetche (GDR), and others.

Two approaches were suggested during the discussion of the interaction of mass social movements and institutionalized organizations. In contemporary societies social movements are losing their precise organizational structure and connection with the social structure, and their role is being confined more to the construction of "models" of social change, the supporters of the first approach argued (J. Gusfield, United States). In the developing countries and in "countries with a one-party system," movements and institutions, including the government, can give one another mutual support and have a "procedural interrelationship"--this was the point of view of the supporters of the other approach (T.K. Ooman, India).

In his report, G.G. Diligenskiy (USSR) said that the first approach virtually contrasts movements to organized forms of social activity and does not acknowledge the connection between mass movements and the needs and interests of classes and other social groups, the motivational aspects of movements, and the different types of movements. The practical and sociopsychological significance of the institutionalized organization in the creation and development of movements is not taken into account in this approach either. For this reason, the second approach seems more valid.

Issues of war and peace occupied the most prominent place on the congress agenda. Kh.N. Momdzhyan's report at the plenary session underscored the need to preserve human civilization and avert the danger of thermonuclear war. He called upon all sociologists in the world, regardless of their class, national, and racial affiliations and their political, philosophical, and religious beliefs, to fight in earnest against the forces of destruction and death.

Conflicts, wars, and peaceful coexistence were discussed at a special session of the symposium on "The Causes and Consequences of Militarization." Several bourgeois sociologists again advanced the thesis of the "equal responsibility of the United States and USSR" for the arms race, which had already been voiced at earlier congresses. This point of view was logically refuted (S.A. Tyushkevich, V.A. Mansurov, L.N. Moskvichev).

Many matters of central concern to the world sociological community were connected with the high speed of social changes under the influence of the technological revolution, the effects of which lead to conflicts with new social experience. Positive and negative implications of scientific and technical progress were mentioned repeatedly in symposiums, research committees, working groups, and ad hoc groups, and changes in the production structure of the society and the anticipated and desired effects of the technological revolution in the spheres of labor, daily life, culture, family, social affairs, and computerization were discussed.

Attention was focused on problems connected with the influence of new technologies on changes in the labor of workers and employees, the employment of youth and women, social planning, the quality of manpower, and the quality of life. The lively debates (particularly in the "Labor Sociology" research committee) attested to the desire to comprehend the social implications of the introduction of new technologies. The level of technical development in various states was defined by Western sociologists in terms of the speed with which these countries respond to scientific and technical progress, and particularly in terms of their success in the widespread introduction of new technologies (M. Maurice, France; H. Mannari, Japan; W. Georg, FRG; and others).

The social implications of new technology and its effects on the labor situation and the productivity of the labor of workers and employees have been a matter of constant concern to scientists for more than a quarter of a century now. This has recently been most clearly reflected in the inception of the so-called sociotechnical paradigm. The intense computerization of production in the 1980's, marking the beginning of a qualitatively new stage in the technical resolution of production problems, was an objective prerequisite for the new methodological approach to the study of changes in labor. The main component of computerized production is the control network, consisting of three levels: the control of individual machine tools, of groups of machine tools--that is, production cells--and, finally, of the entire enterprise, in which case a powerful computer coordinates the work of all computers on the second level. These matters were analyzed in detail in reports by sociologists from France, Japan, the FRG, and Finland. The change

from "mechanical" to microelectronic technology--and, in the broader context, to informational technology--is leading, in their opinion, to a new system for the organization of labor, permitting the better use of the human being's creative potential, and to a new type of industrial enterprise (from the model of Taylor and Ford to a fundamentally new model, now in its formative stage). In other words, this is a transition from models adapted to mass assembly line production to models with constantly developing flexible automation.

The efficient organization of work in shifts and the high quality of manpower, allowing for the fuller use of the creative potential of labor resources, were mentioned when Japanese production was analyzed. The extremely lengthy process of the study, development, testing, and production of new technologies in a large production system (industry, corporation, combine) was underscored. Under these circumstances, small enterprises become centers for the generation of advanced technology (this is particularly true of enterprises with mixed and private ownership of the means of production), and this, in the opinion of Western sociologists, is one of the most productive ways of stepping up scientific and technical progress in capitalist countries, because these enterprises develop the initiative of workers, encourage the fuller use of their skills, and promote the acceleration of innovative processes--that is, they are more effective. Western sociologists proposed the "humanization of scientific and technical progress" by expanding the range of private enterprise.

Scientists from the socialist countries stressed that the introduction of new technologies is usually connected with serious changes in the status of workers, and this calls for the organic unification of the economic, technical-organizational, and social aspects of labor collectives (R. Stolberg, GDR) and the improvement of social planning at the industrial enterprise (Ch. Kyuranov, Bulgaria). In other words, the Marxist scientists believe that only the unity of economic and social policy and the coordination of scientific and technical progress with the achievements of socialism make positive changes in the life of the laboring public possible.

Technological changes are known to take less time than political, ideological, and social changes. This once gave several authors an excuse to single out the nature of technology as the main criterion and only basis for the classification of levels of socioeconomic development and to propose technological concepts as an alternative to K. Marx' theory of socioeconomic development. Various modifications of these concepts were also supported at the congress in New Delhi.

It is particularly noteworthy that some speakers tried to link specific problems (for example, problems in urban and regional development, education, culture, labor, etc.) with global problems in the overall development of certain countries. In particular, they discussed such matters as the nature of the economic cycle, the activities of transnational corporations, the need to surmount the poverty and destitution of the masses in the developing countries, and the spatial aspects of social changes at a time of scientific and technical progress. Urban development in the socialist countries aroused

the greatest interest in these discussions. Mention was made of the fundamentally different approaches to territorial development in the socialist countries, based on a combination of the purposeful direction of economic and social affairs with the definite autonomy of different regions (O.I. Shkaratan, L.A. Khakhulina, S. Grundman, GDR).

Problems in communication gave rise to interesting debates. The development of new mass news media, speakers noted, leads to the segmentation and individualization of society as well as to integration. This conclusion was drawn from the current process of the denationalization of the mass media in France, Italy, and several other European countries: They once belonged to the government but are now being taken over by private businessmen. Indian sociologists stressed that the spread of new technology in the mass media is having a negative effect on the preservation of the national culture, traditions, and creative activity of the population of their country. Only a socialist society can cope with these problems (V.S. Korobeynikov, M.K. Gorshkov).

Speakers discussed the issue of "industrial democracy" at a time of technological revolution on the most diverse levels of social organization (the society as a whole, the corporation, the firm, the worker), and analyzed it from different standpoints and in different social systems. Some bourgeois sociologists discussed the spread of "industrial democracy" in capitalist production: the expansion of worker control, participation by workers in management in the capacity of "co-owners," and the development of self-management and cooperation on this basis as a method of the effective resolution of production problems and conflicts (R. Russell, United States). Some speakers, however, criticized capitalist practices and the increasing bureaucratization of the government, labor unions, and in-house management (Sedberg, Sweden); the diminished authority of the government and labor unions in various countries in recent years was noted (G. Schell, FRG).

K. E. Scouby (Denmark) analyzed the tendencies toward decentralization, leading to actual cuts in spending on the social needs of the population, on education, public health, and crime prevention. American scientists N. Feinstein and S. Feinstein criticized the reactionary essence of "Reaganomics" as a political current which has actually impoverished the American cities and has made things worse for the underprivileged and unemployed. The issue of conflicts on all levels was discussed at length in this context. Some bourgeois sociologists ignored the social nature of conflicts and tried to confine them to the level of government policy. The reports and speeches of Marxist sociologists stressed the need to study conflicts on the governmental and intergovernmental levels and in all spheres of human relations--in labor, culture, and family life, on the level of intergroup and interpersonal relations.

Heated arguments broke out during the discussion of the social nature of the values giving rise to certain types of conflicts. The attempts of some speakers, particularly R. Reinagui (Colombia), to substantiate the idealistic, utopian beliefs about some kind of natural, purely human substance of values and the biased comparison of the Inca culture, as a example of a "Third World

culture, to the rest of Western civilization, were criticized. European expansion, in the speaker's opinion, cultivated an ideology and policy which took the place of basic natural values and turned the human being into an ideological robot devoid of emotions. The popularity of esoteric and gnostic sects in Latin America, he believes, attests to the growing distrust in this civilization and in its ideology and policy, which are endangering all life on earth.

Marxists (B.A. Grushin, T. Szyoczke (Hungary), and others) stressed that in today's world, distinguished by considerable social, ethnic, cultural, and other differences and the pronounced polarization of the needs and interests of various groups of people, real values are generally of a group, including class, nature.

Besides this, the idea that consideration for the processes of the formation and transformation of value systems as a cognitive factor in the decision-making process is acquiring greater importance was emphasized. Values give rise to certain changes in social life and are themselves subject to reproduction and to historical influence. This is the Marxist explanation for the complex and contradictory relationship between economic growth and social development, taking the form of the dynamic interaction of values connected with the productive activity of people on the one hand, and strictly reproductive activity, presupposing the preservation of the conditions needed for human life, on the other.

A large group of topics connected with socioeconomic development, the negative effects of colonialism, and the distinctive features of scientific and technical progress in the world's underdeveloped regions were discussed in almost all of the research committees on the social problems of India and other developing countries. The fate of national cultures in developing countries and the contradictions and national aspects of their development were discussed. Reports and speeches by Marxist sociologists, particularly M.P. Mchedlov, on the socialist civilization as a factor of change in social life aroused special interest. Human rights in education were discussed at a special meeting organized by UNESCO. Sociologists from Nigeria, Colombia, Ghana, India, and the Philippines reported on various aspects of education under the conditions of efforts to surmount the effects of colonialism and a struggle against neocolonialism, racial discrimination, and segregation.

Soviet scientists (F.R. Filippov, M.Kh. Titma, A.A. Matulenis) and sociologists from socialist countries (A. Meier, GDR; T. Kozma, Hungary) stressed the positive effects of the socialist states on the organization, functioning, development, and improvement of a unified educational system, securing not only the eradication of mass illiteracy, but also a high level of education and culture, and analyzed several new problems connected with education and mobility.

The congress in New Delhi demonstrated the much greater interest in the social status and role of the younger generation in today's world, the broader range of international comparative studies, and definite changes in subject matter--specialists have moved on from the investigation of the

causes and consequences of the "youth rebellion" of the 1960's, the "generation gap," and the protest movements to the study of the social status of contemporary youth. The general approach of Western sociologists to this subject matter has not undergone any significant changes and is still based on familiar concepts and theories. In their reports and speeches, Marxist sociologists countered this approach with the contemporary Marxist concept of the social development of young people, based on comprehensive studies of their way of life and social image (V.I. Chuprov, USSR; P. Mitev, Bulgaria; V. Dubsky, CSSR).

Several reports by Western sociologists and sociologists from developing countries dealt with the real problems of the younger generation in their countries: unemployment (M. Albergo-Andres, Spain; G. Lowe, H. Kron, T. Hartnoll, and I. Tammer, Canada); the effects of economic crises on employment (G. Kartner, FRG); health problems, drug addiction, and caste relations (I. Simhandri, V. Aryena, and R. Aradval, India); and the elevation of national consciousness in the anti-imperialist struggle in Latin American countries. The congress discussed the increased activity of youth in the antinuclear movement and in the struggle for peace and disarmament, despite the presence of significant social and regional differences.

Family problems were discussed at length, just as they had been at earlier sociological congresses. In particular, speakers discussed tendencies in the development of the contemporary family: the weaker influence of society on family life; nuclearization--that is, the move from the extended family with three or more generations and a broad network of kinship ties to the family consisting of a married couple and a few children; the increasing number of single people of marriage age; the lower age for first marriages; the changing nature of spousal relations and the increased importance of the individual in the family; the declining birthrate; the increasing number of divorces. It was also noted that social-class and ethnic features and the distinctive types of social relations in different countries have a substantial effect on the functioning of the family, its problems, and the methods of solving them.

The attempts of some sociologists, particularly D. Watson (Great Britain), to biologize family behavior and to balance quantitative and qualitative methods in a combination of the sociological and ethnographic approaches to family research aroused lively debates. Questions of social policy and of its role in changes in familial functions occupied a prominent place in reports.

The congress clearly demonstrated that bourgeois sociology is now undergoing perceptible changes. And although it would be a gross oversimplification to view it as something integral, there is a common trend--the absence of dominant theories and feverish searches for appropriate concepts. Western sociology is now represented by an essentially new generation. The names of its founders--Parsons, Merton, Touraine, Rostow, and Lazarsfeld--have already gone down in history, and the global sociological theories (functionalism, structuralism, the theory of modernization, the theory of conflicts, etc.) have almost disappeared. Bourgeois sociology has undergone a theoretical

and practical reorientation and is clearly becoming an instrument of social control.

Nevertheless, several bourgeois sociologists at the congress tried to substantiate the need for a new general sociological theory. In particular, D. Alexander (United States) described the main stages in the history of sociology, connected with the names of Marx, Weber, and Parsons, and concluded that the stage of "theoretical synthesis" should come next. K. Tominaga (Japan) spoke of the need for the more thorough and complete consideration of functionalism in theory; G. Strasser (FRG) proposed a new "theory of change"; N. Smelser (United States) focused attention on methodological problems in the explanation and interpretation of social changes. The need for a new theory was also substantiated by ISA President F. Cardozo. This attests to the desire of some sociologists to have their say in science, proceeding, on the one hand, from the need to explain many contemporary phenomena and, on the other, from the impossibility of analyzing the actual course of historical development on the basis of existing theories.

In essence, however, no major theoretical precepts with any perceptible signs of originality in comparison to the discredited views were proposed at the 11th congress. The attempts to create a synthesized theory are not new. They were also made at earlier congresses, attesting to the crisis of Western social thought. In fact, this is the reason for the attempts of many bourgeois sociologists to adapt Marxism to their own needs and to develop eclectic paradigms. Whereas they ignored Marx' sociological theory or viewed it with outright hostility prior to the 1960's, in recent years, and this was clearly demonstrated by the discussions in New Delhi, the tenets of Marxist-Leninist sociological theory are being used more frequently in social practice. Instead of the earlier silence or flagrant distortion, direct references to Marxism are considered to be a mark of sophistication today, even though some of these are misinterpretations. Western authors are employing the economic principle more frequently in the analysis of social developments, and are using Marx' ideas to explain the current problems of capitalist society and the developing countries.

Marxism's influence is also reflected in the terminology of sociological theory (social movements, question of nationality, antagonisms, relations of nations, class struggle, etc.). Even theorists with anti-Soviet views quote Marx--on the one hand, for a show of scientific objectivity and, on the other, to prove the "departure" of real socialist practices from Marxism with tendentiously interpreted statements. The positive experience in cooperation by sociologists from the socialist countries has strengthened the position of Marxist-Leninist sociology throughout the world, has increased its influence on the minds of foreign sociologists in the struggle against unscientific social theories, and is arousing the interest of broad segments of the progressive intelligentsia in the world. The reliance on Marxist concepts was demonstrated quite clearly at the congress by representatives of developing countries, especially India. Indian sociologists frequently stressed the importance of Marxist theory and constantly displayed an interest in the social problems of the USSR, the socialist way of life, and the state of sociological science in the socialist countries. This is specifically

attested to by the publication and translation of many works on Marxism in India, including works on sociology in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Yugoslavia, and the GDR (9).

In general, the atmosphere of the congress was businesslike and promoted the frank exchange of opinions. The overwhelming majority of scientists in the West repudiate anticommunism and the policy of escalating international tension and organizing ideological subversive activity and interference in the internal affairs of socialist countries. The attempts of some renegades to advertise their own anti-Soviet books at the congress were unsuccessful. The Soviet delegation worked in close contact with scientists from the socialist countries, making joint decisions on all fundamental matters. This was an important factor influencing the successful congress proceedings.

M. Archer (Great Britain) was elected president of the International Sociological Association, A. Meier (GDR) was elected vice president, and G.V. Osipov was elected member of the executive committee from the USSR. Many prominent Soviet scientists and representatives of socialist countries were elected to the executive bodies of research committees.

The congress proved that the successful resolution of problems connected with our participation in the work of the International Sociological Association is made possible only by cooperation with sociologists from other countries. Soviet scientists must take a more active part in international research and undertakings, take vigorous steps to publicize Marxist-Leninist sociology, and promote the translation of works by Soviet scientists into foreign languages. An analysis of the current state of bourgeois sociology, including the results of empirical research in the West, will permit a more competent assessment of the new social realities in the capitalist world. The state of sociology in the developing countries also warrants closer attention, and contacts should be established with specialists from Asian, African, and Latin American countries. The results of the last congress provided additional conclusive evidence of the need for this.

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SOME DISTINCTIVE FEATURES OF MERCENARY CRIMES

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[Article by Valeriy Ivanovich Litvinov, candidate of juridical sciences, militia colonel, and docent in the Criminal Procedure Department of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs Academy. He is the author of "The Motivational Patterns of Group Juvenile Delinquency," an article published in our journal (No 2, 1983)]

[Text] The struggle against unearned income and the planning and implementation of additional measures "against parasites, people who vandalize socialist property, and people who take bribes, against those who have taken a road alien to the industrious nature of our order" (1, p 47) are among the important conditions for the socioeconomic acceleration of the country and the realization of the principles of socialist justice. The work of law enforcement agencies and crime prevention activity must meet higher standards, and legislation must be improved. The impact of specific forms and methods of this work will depend largely, however, on economic and social reform, on a healthier spiritual atmosphere in society and, above all, on the elimination of existing negative behavior and tendencies. All of this was confirmed by the results of a study conducted by the Academy of the USSR MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs].

The people who were studied had committed mercenary crimes (thieves, looters, muggers, swindlers, and extortionists). These acts represent one way of acquiring unearned income and account for the highest percentage of crimes. From 1980 to 1985 we used questionnaires and interviews to survey more than 9,000 people who had committed mercenary crimes in 19 oblasts, krais, and republics in the country. It was the first conviction for the overwhelming majority, and most of them had been in prison for about half a year at the time of the survey. Respondents were chosen at random. The sample group consisted mainly of people under 40, and almost half were under 25. The study also included the analysis of documents and an expert poll of MVD personnel.

Before I analyze the results, I should clarify some of the procedures. Socio-legal literature correctly underscores the absence in the socialist society of any specific trends "of its own" that engender crime (2, p 184; 3). This

does not mean that crime is "without motive" or that it can be blamed wholly on vestiges of the past or on the influence of alien ideologies. This point of view disorients both science and practice. The deformation of the individual's values, needs and interests lies at the basis of most criminal acts. It, however, has social causes. We must disclose the exact nature of social conditions and the ways in which they influence personality development. Sometimes the problem is reduced to the influence of the microenvironment (the individual's family, his closest friends, etc.). In our opinion, this approach transfers the problem to the sociopsychological plane. Macro factors (the functioning of legal standards, social control, the system of distributive relations, moral and ideological processes, etc.) seem to be taken into account in these cases, but they are assigned a virtually passive role: The individual either accepts or rejects (or ignores) principles, precepts, and values. The results of studies, including our own, testify that the situation is much more complex.

As G.M. Minkovskiy accurately points out, some negative tendencies, especially recidivistic "unprofessionalism," in general offenses under ordinary law and in economic crimes were not disclosed and assessed in a timely and appropriate manner by scientists (2, p 185). The point of view that the main causes of mercenary crimes are the relaxation of social control and of state and economic discipline and the excessive material demands of some people, which can reach the point of an obsession with possessions, was and is quite common. Of course, the latter circumstance can (and does) put the person on the road to crime. The results of our study also confirm this (see tables 1 and 2), but, after all, the desire for wealth and for acquisitions does not emerge from a vacuum. It stems from the material--and, I repeat, fundamental--needs of the individual. In short, it is not enough to ascertain the existence of mercenary motives. It is important to know why material needs are perceived in distorted terms and why their satisfaction becomes a goal in itself, a goal warranting criminal means of attainment. This is all the more important because these are not inveterate criminals or declassé elements, but ordinary (up to a certain point, of course) citizens. For example, according to our study, most of the respondents took part in socially useful activities prior to conviction, and only 26.2 percent did not take part in it.

The social distinction of mercenary crime consists, in our opinion, in its existence at a time of improving material circumstances. Obviously, we cannot assume that demand rose more quickly than material well-being. This approach is contradicted by the mere fact that the connection between the standard of living and demand is always mediated by opinion, especially public opinion. It was here that the problems lay. The constantly rising standard of living was publicized in the mass media and in ideological indoctrinational work. At the same time, "the intensity of contradictions in the way of life was frequently ignored and there was no realistic assessment of the actual state of affairs in the economy, in the social sphere, and in other spheres" (1, p 87). In particular, the existence of intraclass social differentiation, including differences in the standard of living of different socioprofessional groups, was "not noticed." Yes, the slogan "To each according to his labor" was always present on the pages of newspapers and magazines, but it was usually accompanied by pictures illustrating the enhanced well-being of

production leaders. As a result, exaggerated standards of consumption, exceeding the actual rate of increasing prosperity, took shape in the public mind. In short, the discrepancy between the ideal and reality made many people dissatisfied with their financial circumstances.

Table 1. Goals of People Who Committed Mercenary Infringements (A--On Personal Property, B--On State or Public Property), percentage of respondents*

<u>Long-Term Goals</u>	<u>A</u>	<u>B</u>
A high salary	26.1	27.6
Possession of a car, a home, and a vacation home	21.7	23.5
Possession of money and the latest fashions	14.6	17.9
Spiritual and physical development	19.9	20.7
Other (material) ambitions	17.7	10.3
<u>Career Goals</u>		
Financial well-being	34.2	34.1
Prestige and a position of authority for the purpose of acquiring material goods	22.1	21.8
Possibility of professional privileges	20.6	21.2
Possibility of working for the good of society	12.9	11.2
Other (material) goals	10.2	11.7
<u>Goals of Criminal Acts</u>		
Acquisition of goods, especially fashionable and prestigious items	30.6	28.6
Acquisition of money and other valuables	31.0	32.3
Acquisition of money for the purchase of liquor	10.7	9.0
Acquisition of liquor	14.3	12.6
Acquisition of food	1.5	2.2
An easy, carefree life, including funds for amusement and socializing	5.9	4.9
Assistance of friends or relatives	2.4	3.0
Acquisition of money for musical or athletic pursuits	1.5	2.6
Acquisition of valuables for participation in other leisure pursuits	3.6	3.9
Acquisition of money for other purposes	4.3	4.7

* Respondents were allowed to choose several answers.

In itself, this kind of situation is unpleasant but reparable. Furthermore, the "scissors" between needs and the possibility of their satisfaction represent one of the cornerstones of labor. Shortcomings in the management of the economy and the economic mechanism, however, inhibited people's natural desire to earn money. On the one hand, incidents in which people

received a "full-value" salary for listless work and the limited opportunities to increase income by means of a larger labor contribution and, on the other, the shortage of many goods and services (or, more precisely, their acquisition by others than oneself) led, in our opinion, to a situation in which the high consumption standards of some people governed their behavior and turned into an obsession with material possessions. And it was not only a neurosis, because "some people now strive for dishonest additional gains only because they see no opportunity to solve material problems by intensifying their own professional labor" (4, p 61).

Table 2. Some Distinctive Features of the Motivational Patterns of the Criminal Personality (A--Infringements on Personal Property, B--On State or Public Property), percentage of respondents

<u>Responses to question: "What kind of people do you envy?"</u>	<u>A</u>	<u>B</u>
People who have enough money	28.5	28.1
People who wear the latest styles and designer clothes	22.0	22.5
People with cars, homes, and vacation homes	17.0	17.8
Spiritually and physically developed people	9.3	10.1
People who frequently go to restaurants, cafes, and parties	6.4	6.5
People with no other goal but prosperity	4.4	4.7
No precise response	12.4	10.3

Motives for commission of crimes

Desire for gain, for quick and easy wealth	60.1	60.2
Regular consumption of alcohol	12.2	12.5
Possibility of profiting at the expense of others or of taking something within easy reach	9.7	13.0
Influence or threats of experienced criminals	4.9	3.8
Imitation of colleagues or friends	3.4	2.8
Desire to stand out from the crowd	2.6	2.2
Other motives	7.1	5.5

It is significant that a mercenary outlook is the result of distorted demands and of distorted ideas about the possibilities and methods of their satisfaction, the result of the belief that material goods can be acquired without any special effort. There was good reason for this point of view. Incidents of mismanagement, the squandering of public property, and the irresponsible treatment of equipment, materials, and nature made people underestimate the importance of their labor and its results. According to our study, the overwhelming majority of respondents witnessed such incidents numerous times, particularly the following: 16 percent--embezzlement, 13.3 percent--the indifference of collectives to cases of looting, employee theft, etc., 9 percent--overstatements of operational indicators and payment for this service with money and gifts; 8.3 percent--disregard for laws protecting socialist property; 5.3 percent--misleading reports. Besides this, some people who witnessed these incidents not only learned to ignore petty theft, but also began committing the same offenses. The admission of a PRAVDA

reader is indicative: "If the state can waste millions of rubles, why should I deny myself the pleasure of snatching two or three hundred?" (5). According to our data, 79.6 percent of the respondents were caught embezzling state property or stealing items and money from others before they were charged. Mercenary aims were also nurtured by the weaker enforcement of regulations and the insufficient development of legal knowledge. Additions to reports, the falsification of report figures, contempt for workers' rights on the pretext of the completion of production assignments, the authoritarian behavior of some managers, and bureaucratic red tape--all of this, combined with the inadequate propaganda of legal knowledge, undermined discipline, created an atmosphere of irresponsibility and recklessness, and diminished the preventive impact of legal standards. "The law does not only suppress, it also educates, and this education proceeds when it is observed unconditionally and when it is sidestepped, ignored, or observed only formally, for show. But these are diametrically opposed aspects of education" (4, p 65).

In short, a curious phenomenon took root in the public mind, expressed in the aphorism "Taking a little from a larger entity is not theft, but merely sharing." As we know, there is a grain of truth in any joke. We cannot say that living on unearned income was encouraged. No, "non-workers" were condemned and despised. But their income was another matter.... It acquired certain respectable features in the public mind, and its appeal automatically obscured many other considerations. An episode from "Night Patrol," a film from the early 1950's, is indicative in this respect. A colleague arrives at the home of an unscrupulous warehouse manager. Delicacies of all types are quickly cleared off the table, leaving only tea and a modest snack: God forbid that the colleague should ask where the money came from for the feast. Today's criminals in the "Experts Are Investigating" series feel no need to hide luxuries even when a policeman comes to the door. This, of course, is plain brazenness, but it has a solid foundation. The line between earned and unearned income has become less distinct. The ruble that is acquired in other ways than by the sweat of one's brow can no longer be called a work ruble with complete justification, and the same is true of gains consisting of items acquired at the "right" price but by "pulling strings" or from an unauthorized distributor.

Here is an indicative trait. Whereas "traditional" criminals usually reject socially meaningful values, in our case the situation is slightly different: Exaggerated material standards coexist with socially approved standards. Only 8.9 percent of the respondents had ambitions diverging dramatically from the latter. Another 37.7 percent underscored the importance of social standards and values. For completely understandable reasons, some respondents tried to whitewash their moral character, and the number of "individualists" is probably higher. It is interesting, however, that the classic motives in the criminal world--a craving for alcohol, the desire for an idle and care-free life, etc.--occupy a fairly modest position (see tables 1 and 2). On the contrary, more than two-thirds of the respondents performed social duties, including 43 percent who performed them on a permanent basis. It is true that the majority (57.3 percent) took a formal approach to social work. But after all, the same figure could be found in virtually any study of ordinary labor collectives.

Now that we are concentrating on social aspects, I must repeat that the facts and circumstances we have discussed are not the causes of mercenary crime in themselves, but become causes only in the context of a criminal situation. The sociopsychological processes of interpersonal interaction "mediate and transform the influence of economic, demographic, and other factors" (2, p 185). The reasons for criminal behavior have been studied quite thoroughly by specialists (see, for example, 6). For this reason, we will cite only the most indicative results in this respect. Around 58.5 percent of the criminal acts were committed in a group. Almost 60 percent of the respondents were surrounded by people with negative traits (ex-convicts, alcohol abusers, parasites, etc.). It was particularly disturbing to learn that the family, relatives--that is, exactly the people whose opinions and behavior have the greatest influence on the individual's outlook--had a corrupting effect on many respondents, especially the young adults. For example, 43.4 percent said that the consumer mentality prevailed in their families, and selfish egotistical interests were cultivated. As a rule, this atmosphere was characteristic of families whose members regularly tried to enrich themselves at the expense of others and who had earlier convictions, and many of these were broken homes.

In summation, we should take special notice of the fact that the current reforms in the economy and the social sphere will play an indisputably important role in the struggle against unearned income and in the prevention of deviant behavior. Socioeconomic successes, however, cannot automatically lower the rate of mercenary crimes, particularly because it takes a long time to change public opinion. This means that the choice of specific methods and forms of work should be based on a precise knowledge of social realities.

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DRUG ADDICTION: BITTER FRUITS OF THE SWEET LIFE

Moscow SOTSIOLOGICHESKIYE ISSLEDOVANIYA in Russian No 1, Jan-Feb 87 (signed to press 21 Jan 87) pp 48-53

[Article by Anzor Aleksandrovich Gabiani, doctor of philosophical sciences, professor, and head of the Criminal Sociology Research Laboratory of the Georgian SSR Ministry of Internal Affairs. He is the author of the books "Ugolovnaya otvetstvennost za pretupleniya, sovershennyye v sostoyanii opyaneniya" [Criminal Liability for Crimes Committed Under the Influence of Alcohol] (1969), "Nekotoryye voprosy geografii prestupnosti" [Some Aspects of the Geographic Patterns of Crime] (1982, co-authored), "Normativno-tsennostnaya propaganda i puti povysheniya yeye effektivnosti" [The Propaganda of Standard Values and the Means of Heightening Its Effectiveness] (1985, co-authored), and "Ot vrednoy privyichki k tyazhelomu zabolevaniyu" [From a Bad Habit to a Grave Illness] (1986, co-authored)]

[Text] Until recently people thought and said that drug addiction was supposedly not a widespread problem in our country in comparison with alcohol abuse and alcoholism and with other forms of deviant behavior. This atmosphere of complacency was one of the main reasons why this impending danger and severe social problem was not noticed in time. Drug addiction is not confined to isolated communities whose members are steeped in social and moral degradation. This evil has spread to various social groups and has stricken members of the most capable segment of the population.

These disturbing trends are specifically attested to by the experience in combating drug abuse in Georgia. Special measures began to be planned for this purpose in the republic almost two decades ago. What is more, their scientific validity was a matter of the greatest concern. In 1967, for example, an interdepartmental commission was formed to study and combat drug addiction. One of the first sociological studies of the problem in our country was conducted from 1967 to 1974.

Ten years after the commission ordered the first survey, the Criminal Sociology Research Laboratory of the Georgian SSR Ministry of Internal Affairs conducted a follow-up survey. We surveyed (in 1984 and 1985) a fairly large group of drug users, including 500 people serving prison terms for various crimes. The survey covered almost one out of every two officially registered drug addicts.

Table 1. Sociodemographic Structure and Living Conditions of Drug Users*

<u>Sociodemographic Features</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>Living Conditions</u>	<u>%</u>
Sex		Place of residence	
Male	91.7	Tbilisi	38.1
Female	8.3	Other cities in republic	49.0
Age		Urban settlements	4.0
Under 16	0.2	Rural communities	4.3
16-19	4.4	Outside the republic	4.0
20-24	27.4	No permanent place of residence	0.6
25-29	33.5	Type of dwelling	
30-34	21.0	Detached home	46.5
35-39	8.6	Separate apartment with conveniences	44.7
40-44	2.0	Communal apartment	4.3
45 and over	2.9	Dormitory	0.4
Marital status		Basement room	1.9
Single	44.5	No permanent dwelling but rents room or part of a room	0.9
Divorced	5.5	No response	1.3
Widowed	1.0	Living area per family member	
Married	49.0	Under 4 square meters	2.5
With children	89.9	4-7	12.0
One child	54.3	7-10	17.5
Two children	37.5	10-14	18.4
Three or more	8.2	Over 14	46.2
		No response	3.4

* These and subsequent data on marital status, place of residence, employment and so forth for people in prison refer to their situation prior to conviction.

The results of our study testify that drug addiction is most common among urban males under the age of 35. It is particularly disturbing that one-third of them are under 25 (see Table 1). What is more, our data are not a completely accurate reflection of the situation, because young drug users are quite elusive. Besides this, although drug addiction is primarily an urban problem, it is also present in rural communities. According to available data, the geographic dimensions of narcotic drug use have been expanded in the last 10 years, and the fatal weakness has even spread to some remote rural regions. It is true that there are several obstacles to drug addiction here (strong national traditions, the distinctive way of life, the high percentage of teenagers and young adults engaged in private subsidiary farming, etc.). On the other hand, there are the increasing urbanization of the republic, the higher earnings of the rural population, and the better transportation services. The situation could grow worse if action is not taken now.

In terms of education, the respondents differ little from others in their age group. The overwhelming majority (83.8 percent) have a secondary, partial higher, or higher education. Their parents are also well-educated people. In particular, almost one-fourth of them are VUZ graduates (see Table 2). Virtually all of their parents work and occupy good socioprofessional positions: Either the father or mother of 5.4 percent of the respondents is a top-level administrator, and 8.8 percent of the mothers and 23.6 percent of the fathers are CPSU members or candidates for party membership.

The financial status of the respondents is not bad either. Most have good living conditions, and almost half live in their own home (see Table 1). Here we should explain that a privately owned home in a city is usually an indicator of wealth, but in Georgia this is quite common. Many of the residences in the republic's medium-sized and small cities--that is, the places where many respondents live--are private homes. Income per family member is higher--in fact, much higher in most cases--than the average for 61.6 percent of the respondents, below the average for 19 percent, and average for 10.5 percent (8.9 percent did not respond). Some indirect data and personal conversations suggest, however, that the families of respondents are even more wealthy than they say, because some of their parents and other relatives have considerable unearned income in addition to wages.

Here is another important fact. The mothers of 15.5 percent of the respondents and the fathers of 35.2 percent are dead. Almost one out of every two lost one or both parents 10 or more years ago. In view of the ages of the respondents, we can conclude that many were orphaned at an early age.

While we are still on the topic of the family, we should note that 49 percent of the respondents are married and the majority have children (see Table 1). Drug addicts are not inclined to marry or have children, and our indicators therefore suggest that some of them became addicts after they already had families. As for their interrelations at home and with their parents, 45 percent described them as good, 33.1 percent said they were satisfactory, and 15.2 percent said they were strained (6.7 percent did not respond). A more thorough analysis indicates, however, that the situation might not be as good as they say. Around one out of every two lives in a home where one of the family members abuses alcohol or drugs, has a criminal record, or is severely ill--frequently with mental or nervous disorders.

What are these drug addicts like? Around 61.7 percent of them work, 5.8 percent are in school, 5.2 percent work and go to school, and 24.8 percent neither work nor go to school (2.5 percent did not respond). There was a particularly high percentage of parasites (45.8 percent) among those who are now in prison. Despite the fact that most of the respondents are engaged in socially useful activities, including activity in such fields as education, science, and public health (see Table 2), drug addicts are usually poor workers and neglect their duties. And those who have gone too far in giving in to their weakness are incapable of performing their duties even when they want to. At the same time, a high percentage of the respondents are people with earlier convictions (46 percent), almost one out of every two has been charged with drug-related crimes, and one out of every four has been charged

with illegally producing, acquiring, storing, transporting, or mailing narcotic substances without the intent to sell them (Article 252, Part III, Georgian SSR Criminal Code).

Most drug users are indifferent to alcohol, or, more precisely, always prefer the former to the latter. Many chronic drug addicts, especially opium addicts, cannot endure alcohol or have unpleasant side-effects from it. Although 72 percent of the respondents drink, two-thirds do this rarely, and only 2.3 percent drink regularly. Furthermore, they drink vodka and other strong liquor only when they have no drugs.

The use of several drugs was quite common: 83.9 percent of the respondents use hashish, 46.7 percent use morphine, 43.8 percent use opium, 11.7 percent use cocaine, and 2 percent use heroin.

As far as heroin is concerned, it is rarely available on the black market, and the 2 percent of the respondents who mentioned this drug had tried it only once or a few times. The majority, around three-fourths, began with hashish. Contrary to the common opinion that hashish is supposedly almost harmless, its after-effects can be quite serious. And this is not the only problem. People move on from hashish quite quickly to stronger and more dangerous substances--morphine, opium, etc. In short, the struggle against the spread of drug addiction is largely a struggle against hashish use.

Table 2. Socioprofessional Status of Respondents and Their Parents, %

<u>Indicators</u>	<u>Respondents</u>	<u>Mothers</u>	<u>Fathers</u>
Socioprofessional groups			
Workers	63.7	31.8	40.0
Kolkhoz members	2.9	8.0	7.3
Engineering and technical personnel	9.1	4.4	18.3
Employees	8.9	15.6	8.1
Service personnel	4.5	11.8	7.1
Scientific personnel	0.6	1.6	1.7
Artistic intelligentsia	1.6	1.4	1.1
Pedagogues	0.6	11.4	3.6
Physicians	0.4	5.7	3.6
Housewives	0.6	1.0	--
Retired	--	1.6	1.0
Other occupations	3.9	4.9	6.3
No response	3.2	0.8	1.9
Educational Level			
No education	--	6.8	4.5
Elementary	2.7	7.1	4.1
Partial secondary	12.5	9.6	7.8
Secondary	66.6	52.9	51.7
Partial higher	9.3	1.1	0.9
Higher	7.9	21.0	29.1
No response	1.0	1.5	1.9

Table 3. Some Features of Drug Use, Percentage of Respondents

<u>Duration and Intensity of Drug Use</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>Motives and causes of drug use</u>	<u>%</u>
Age at first incident of drug use		Motives*	
Under 16	9.8	Desire to experience sense	
16-19	35.8	of euphoria, to "get high"	68.3
20-24	35.8	Imitation of others	25.3
25-29	12.0	Dissatisfaction with life,	
30 or over	4.5	desire to forget	9.6
No response	2.1	Curiosity	7.5
Duration of drug use		Mental distress	2.3
Under a year	9.8	Treatment with prescription	
2 years	12.2	drugs	1.3
3 years	13.2	People influencing decision	
4 years	15.7	Companions	35.7
5-10 years	28.0	Friends and acquaintances	33.7
Over 10 years	17.6	Neighbors	13.9
No response	3.5	Strangers	3.9
Frequency of drug use		Schoolmates	3.5
Three or more times a day	26.5	Co-workers	2.3
Twice a day	19.4	Fellow students	1.5
Once a day	21.2	Brothers	2.5
Three or more times a week	16.2	Husbands (or wives)	1.4
Twice a week	6.2	Lovers	1.6
Once a week	4.6		
Several times a month	4.2		
No response	1.7		
<u>Circumstances of drug use and sources of drugs</u>			<u>%</u>
People with whom drugs are used*			
Companions			49.4
Friends and acquaintances			33.5
Drug addicts who are casual acquaintances			41.5
Brothers			2.5
Husbands (or wives)			1.7
Lovers			4.9
Other people			13.9
Use drugs alone			71.3
Sources of drugs*			
Black market			70.2
Companions			53.1
Friends and acquaintances			39.6
Personnel of:			
pharmacies			16.7
medical establishments			15.1
veterinary establishments			1.2
Relatives			4.5
Produce own substances			14.4

* The respondent could choose several answers.

It is also alarming that the majority of respondents can be categorized as chronic drug addicts--that is, people who have taken drugs regularly for a long time (see Table 3). Their treatment and rehabilitation can be extremely difficult, and not only from the medico-biological standpoint. First of all, the suppliers and users of drugs must be identified.

Most of the respondents (77.1 percent) acquired a craving for the poison under the influence of others, while the rest did this on their own. The tempters were usually friends and acquaintances (see Table 3). All of them were drug addicts themselves. It is noteworthy that it is quite common for the latter to lure others into their nets--especially friends and neighbors. They are sometimes quite inventive, using various methods to arouse an interest in drugs, and exert strong psychological pressure. Two-thirds of the respondents were motivated to try the lethal poison by hedonistic desires and a craving for strong sensations, and one-fourth did this because they wanted to be part of the crowd, to stand out from the crowd, etc. (see Table 3). Few started using drugs because they were trying to forget a shocking experience or personal tragedy, or were drawn to drugs because they were dissatisfied with their lives. These data refute the still common opinion that the main cause of drug use is the desire to alleviate suffering and achieve emotional peace and tranquility. Incidentally, group use was just as common as "individual" use among our respondents, and often in the presence of people who are not drug addicts but who "sympathize" with them--in other words, who approve of what is happening. These situations usually arise at gatherings of hedonistic youth, where the use of drugs, especially smoking hashish, is prestigious and fashionable. These attitudes are the first step in the metamorphosis from "witness" to "participant."

Where do the respondents get narcotic substances? Most of them are bought on the black market or from the personnel of medical establishments (see Table 3). According to our data, the current strict records and control of the use of medicines in the Georgian SSR do not allow for the accumulation of large amounts for the purpose of their subsequent sale. Nevertheless, some unscrupulous public health personnel still find opportunities to profit from underground trade. This is why there must be stricter verification of the observance of all rules regarding the recording, storage, and issuance of narcotic substances. The main emphasis, however, should be on a struggle against the criminal elements who bring narcotics into the republic, because they are the ones who keep the black market alive.

Users pay high prices for drugs. It is true that sometimes a companion, friend, or relative offers a "dose" as a refreshment or help. As a rule, "favors" of this kind are reciprocal. Even the independent producer has high expenses. On the whole, the situation is the following: 2.3 percent of the respondents spend up to 20 rubles a month, 5.9 percent spend from 20 to 50 rubles, 10.8 percent spend from 50 to 100, 11.8 percent spend from 100 to 200, 6.5 percent spend from 200 to 300, 8.4 percent spend from 300 to 500, 13.7 percent spend from 500 to 1,000, and 22.2 percent spend from 1,000 to 3,000 rubles (18.4 percent refused to answer the question). Obviously, the majority of drug users can only obtain these sums by criminal means, because many of them do not work, and they do not make this kind of money even

when they do work. Why is there such a wide range--from 20 to 3,000 rubles? The most expensive drugs on the black market are opiates, especially morphine. Their users are chronic opium addicts and spend sums that are inconceivable by common standards. Those who mentioned small (relatively, of course) sums of from 20 to 100 rubles are mainly people who have just begun smoking hashish, which is comparatively cheap.

In all, according to our calculations, the respondents spend 1,013,000 rubles a month or 12,156,000 rubles a year. In view of the fact that the respondents understated their expenses for completely understandable reasons, these figures should be at least tripled for a more realistic view of the situation. In other words, underground traders in narcotics in Georgia alone make around 36.5 million rubles a year. And what amount of money could make up for the injuries to the health and lives of many people, their families, and their friends!

We will not discuss the complex and serious subject of the social and economic implications of drug addiction. This matter requires special investigation and additional study. It is already obvious, however, that the most resolute assault on this dangerous trend must be launched without delay.

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DEMOGRAPHY

EVOLUTION OF ESTONIAN BIRTHRATE OVER 300 YEARS

Moscow SOTSIOLOGICHESKIYE ISSLEDOVANIYA in Russian No 1, Jan-Feb 87 (signed to press 21 Jan 87) pp 54-61

[Article by Kalev Albertovich Katus, candidate of economic sciences and senior instructor at the Estonian SSR State Art Institute. This is his first article for our journal]

[Text] An analysis of changes in the birthrate in Estonia is interesting primarily because sociologists in the republic have demographic information covering more than three centuries, and while it might not be complete, it is nevertheless quite detailed.¹ Besides this, some new trends in Estonia are not apparent in other parts of the country yet.

Let us begin with a few preliminary observations. The traditional type of birthrate must be examined in the broad social context, because procreative behavior was always associated directly with marital and sexual behavior in the past (3, 4); the latter had to be confined to marriage (otherwise, it was condemned and severely punished), and childbearing was regarded as its obligatory result. In turn, marital behavior performed "instrumental" functions to a much greater extent than it does now. As a rule, marriage was less an expression of personal preferences, expectations, and feelings than a union dictated by social, primarily economic, necessity. The social "requirements" of marriage gradually became traditions. For example, when a marriage partner was chosen, there was a clear preference for a bride or groom from one's own farmstead (or estate) or parish. H. Palli cites the following figures for 1661-1696: 59 percent of the men chose brides from their own farmstead, 39 percent chose brides from other farmsteads in the parish, and only 2 percent chose brides from other parishes (6, pp 105-106).

Outside influences on marriages were also reflected in their distinct seasonal nature. At the end of the 17th century around five-sixths of all the weddings in Estonia took place in the 3 months of November, December, and January, and in the 18th and early 19th centuries the "wedding season" became slightly longer, and there were two distinct peaks in the wedding curve--in fall and in spring (1, vol 2, p 41; 5).

There was no birth control within marriage, and the birthrate was high, declining as women grew older--that is, the rate was dependent on natural fertility (see Table 1).

Table 1. Age Coefficients of Marital Birthrate in Karuze and Ryuge Parishes in 17th and 18th Centuries (number of births per 1,000 women)

Age of women	Ryuge, women born in 1661-75	Karuze, women married in 1712-60
20-24	385	429
25-29	412	390
30-34	358	386
35-39	*	342

* Data unavailable.

Source: (6, p 109; 1, vol 2, p 104).

The lack of birth control in the home is also attested to by the intervals between births. The interval between the wedding and the birth of the first child was 16.3 months on the average, and the intervals between the subsequent births (through the fifth) were 28.6, 30.8, 31.5, and 32.1 months respectively (1, vol 2, p 106). The fact that the first interval is much shorter than the rest is due to the absence of a period of breast-feeding. Therefore, there were no significant differences in the length of intervals depending on birth sequence, and the slight increase in their length was connected with the mother's age. When a child died in the first months of life, the next child usually arrived within 10 or 11 months (1, vol 2, p 87).

In principle, any woman who was married from the age of 20 to the end of her fertile period could give birth to eight or nine children on the average. In fact, however, the number was much lower because the death of the spouse ended the marriage prematurely. Only two-fifths of the marriages lasted until the end of the woman's fertile period. As a result, the average couple had four or five children, but only one child was born in 20 percent of the marriages, two or three were born in another 20 percent, and from four to seven were born in 35 percent (1, vol 2, pp 58, 106).

The general birth rate fluctuated widely, although much less dramatically than the general death rate. The destabilizing effect was caused by changes in age, marital status and so forth, but primarily by the constantly varying death rate. At the end of the 17th century the general birthrate in Estonia was 40 per 1,000 population on the average, in 1730-1734 it ranged from 37 to 40 in northern Estonia and from 40 to 45 in southern Estonia, and later it was again around 40 births per 1,000 population (1, vol 2, p 88).

By the end of the 17th century the traditional type of birthrate in Estonia was already undergoing certain changes. There were several new trends which became increasingly significant. One was the weaker connections between marital, sexual, and procreative behavior, which are clearly reflected in the spread of the so-called European type of marriage rate.² In Estonia the trend apparently began in the 17th century. This can be judged from the general marriage rate, which already did not exceed 10 per 1,000 population at that time (10). At the beginning of the 20th century the rate dropped

below 8 per 1,000 population. By the end of the 18th century early marriages had almost disappeared. Around 57.4 percent of all the people over the age of 14 were married, 7 percent were widowed, and 35.6 percent were single (1, vol 2, p 9). The average age of the bride, according to the data of one parish, was 21.8 years in the first half of the 18th century and 22.7 in the second half. The average marriage age continued to rise and had reached 26.8 by the 1930's.

Table 2. Special Coefficients of Estonian Birthrate (number of births per 1,000 women from 15 to 49 years old)

<u>Years</u>	<u>All women</u>	<u>Married</u>	<u>Unmarried</u>
1880-84	122.2	223.5	13.4
1897-99	113.6	213.2	15.8
1901-08	105.8	*	*
1910-14	96.0	*	*
1915-19	70.0	*	*
1920-24	69.4	127.5	8.8
1925-29	64.1	118.9	9.7
1930-34	61.0	110.2	12.0

* Data unavailable.

Source: (11, pp 109, 114).

In the absence of birth control, the new marital behavior led (as a result of the shorter duration of the marital state during the most fertile years) to a decline in the number of births and other birthrate indicators. To a certain extent, the increased number of illegitimate children was the opposite side of the coin of the European type of marriage rate, and this also attests to the weaker connections between marital, sexual, and procreative behavior. In rural Estonia the percentage of illegitimate children was under 2 percent at the end of the 17th century, it was slightly higher in the 18th century, it had already reached 3-4 percent in the first half of the 19th century, and it was 5-6 percent in the second half. The figure continued to rise later.

These trends and some other new and gradual tendencies indicate that the birthrate of the traditional type was already obsolete. This led to changes in the mechanism of population reproduction in general and the mechanism securing the socially necessary birthrate--that is, it led to the process later known as the demographic revolution or demographic transition.

Table 2 illustrates the dynamics of special birthrate coefficients. They declined to less than half their original level during the period in question. At the beginning of the 20th century the decline was so pronounced that World War I was not followed by the usual compensatory rise. The rate continued to drop. The data of the 1934 census on the average number of children born throughout the lifetime of women of different generations were: 4.1 for women over 69, 3.4 for women from 50 to 69 years old, and 2.0 for women from

30 to 49. The respective indicators for married women were 4.5, 4.0, and 2.5 (11, p 126).

The system of indices with which E. Cole illustrates the transition to the modern type of birthrate is quite informative (12). The indices were the following for the final stage of this transition in Estonia (Table 3).

Table 3. Estonian Birthrate Indices in 1922-23 and 1933-34

<u>Indices</u>	<u>1922-23</u>	<u>1933-34</u>
Total birthrate	0.192	0.153
Legitimate births	0.404	0.289
Illegitimate births	0.025	0.030
Proportion of women married	0.440	0.476

A comparison of these data with similar data for the USSR (13, pp 168, 202) leaves no doubt that the traditional type of birthrate had already disappeared in Estonia by the 1930's. The indices of total and legitimate births during this period were lower than the union averages today, and much lower than in 1958-59, when the transition to the new type of birthrate was essentially completed for the majority of the population of the USSR (ibid., p 155).

Table 4. Distribution of Women According to Number of Children and Residential Community, %

<u>Place of residence</u>	<u>Number of children</u>					
	<u>0</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>5 or more</u>
Cities	48.9	16.6	12.0	7.6	5.2	9.0
Tallin	52.7	16.4	11.1	6.8	4.5	8.5
Cities with population of 10,000-100,000	46.9	16.0	12.5	8.3	5.6	10.7
Cities with population of under 10,000	44.0	17.0	12.9	8.3	6.0	11.8
Settlements	40.1	15.3	13.2	9.3	6.6	15.5
Rural areas	37.5	13.1	12.0	9.9	7.8	19.7

Table 5. Distribution of Women According to Number of Children and Economic Activity, %

<u>Women who:</u>	<u>Number of children</u>					
	<u>0</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>5 or more</u>
Work in national economy	55.8	13.5	9.1	6.4	4.8	10.4
Do not work in national economy	33.9	14.5	13.6	10.5	8.0	19.5

The extremely low birthrate in Estonia in the 1930's was partially due to the fact that the decline was virtually simultaneous in all parts of the republic. Other factors, however, gave rise to significant birthrate differences: type

of residential community, economic activity, and social group (see tables 4-6, in which the distribution is standardized according to age and 1934 census data).

Table 6. Distribution of Women According to Number and Children and Social Group, %*

Social group	Number of children					
	<u>0</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>5 or more</u>
Proprietors using hired labor	24.8	33.3	22.6	13.3	7.4	8.7
Proprietors working with family members	15.5	17.5	16.0	14.6	11.9	22.5
Proprietors working alone	26.4	25.5	18.0	10.8	7.1	12.2
Workers	25.6	24.7	18.4	10.7	7.0	13.6
Employees	26.8	26.7	23.3	11.3	5.3	6.6

* These are the groups used in bourgeois Estonia's statistics.

The average number of children and the distribution of women according to the number of children and affiliation with particular territorial and social groups are quite different, as we can see. One reason is the different times at which various population strata and groups "experienced" the demographic revolution (13, p 130; 14). Another reason was the increased variety of probable procreative results.

It is a well-known fact that in the traditional type of reproduction the results of procreative behavior differ, and mainly under the influence of factors unrelated to demographic development: wars, epidemics, poor harvests and so forth had negative effects on the birthrate. Procreative behavior itself excluded the possibility of deliberate birth control. Ideas about desirable results were essentially just beginning to take shape. And since there was no objective basis for a preference for a certain number of children yet, members of each social stratum or class solved the problem in different ways. As the modern type of birthrate was established, these differences gradually disappeared.

The normal course of demographic development was disrupted by the war, which could not fail to affect the birthrate. The postwar period was distinguished by a compensatory rise. In Estonia it was perceptible, particularly in comparison to the negligible growth after World War I. By the end of the 1950's the birthrate was declining again, although the rate in general was slightly higher than in the 1930's. Besides this, there were some structural changes (a lower percentage of women with many children or no children, marriage at an earlier age, etc.). Another important consideration was the fact that the positive migration balance in Estonia was 218,400 in 1951-1982 (15, 16); since the migrating population is younger than the permanent population, migrants were responsible for a particularly high birthrate in the younger age groups. In some age groups the number of migrants was only slightly lower than the number of native inhabitants. Therefore, it is quite probable

that the procreative behavior of the new inhabitants influenced the birthrate in the republic.

The positive migration balance consisted mainly of new arrivals from the RSFSR, the Ukraine, and Belorussia. Demographic development has been perceptibly different in these republics than in Estonia. First of all, the demographic revolution ended 20 years later than in Estonia; second, the European type of marriage rate did not become common. For this reason, despite some similiary in quantitative indicators, the procreative behavior of migrants and natives in Estonia differed in many respects.

Wherever possible, we will strive in the rest of this article to compare birthrate dynamics for the Estonian population to general trends in the birthrate, confining our discussion to two matters: an analysis of the general trend in the birthrate and its effect on population reproduction as a whole.




Figure 1. Dynamics of General Ratios of Birthrate in Estonian SSR (1930-82)

General ratios will be used to illustrate birthrate dynamics (Figure 1). Judging by this indicator, which is not affected by fluctuations in the age structure, the birthrate in Estonia from the 1930's through the 1960's was lower than the average for the last 25 years. A change in total ratios suggests that the birthrate, which reached its lowest point at the end of the demographic revolution, is now rising. In Estonia this tendency is particularly distinct in the native population. The birthrate for migrants has not reached its lowest point yet, and it is still declining.

Figure 2 clearly illustrates the "progressively younger" birthrate and its equalization in terms of age, reflected in the rise of the extreme point. The birthrate for women over 35 is constantly declining. Whereas this portion of the curve in the 1930's had the convex shape characteristic of the traditional type of birthrate curve, it began taking on a concave shape in the 1960's, which can probably be considered typical of the modern type. This serves as additional evidence that the birthrate declines during the course of the demographic revolution less as a result of the spread of new demographic relations than as a result of the disruption of old ones--when it reached its lowest point, the general features of the traditional curve were still present in Estonia.

In addition to total ratios and age coefficients, age group indicators also attest to the rise in the birthrate in the last 25 years. According to

census data, in 1979 women born from 1924 to 1934 had the lowest number of children, and women of the next age group (who were still fertile) had more children.




Figure 2. Age Coefficients of Birthrate for Estonian Women Living in Estonia. 1--1978-79; 2--1969-70; 3--1958-59; 4--1933-34.

In an article of this length we do not have room for a thorough analysis of the extremely important and relevant issue of birthrate trends under the conditions of the modern type of population reproduction. We will make only a few observations. Let us return to Figure 1. There have already been two periods when the birthrate rose in Estonia since the end of the demographic revolution (excluding the postwar compensatory rise). The first rise began in 1968 and reached its highest point 4 years later. The period of decline continued until 1980. In other words, it was almost three times as long as the period of rise. Furthermore, the former was not as intense as the latter: The lowest point in 1979-80 was much higher than the birthrate of the mid-1960's. In 1981 another rise was apparent, and again it reached its peak relatively quickly. In 1984 the birthrate was the same as in the previous year, but data for 1985 suggest a decline. We can assume that fluctuations in the birthrate consist of phases of growth and decline in an approximate correlation (in terms of length) of 1:2.5 or 1:3.

As we know, a rise in the total ratio can be a result of changes in the birth-calendar or of an actual rise in the birthrate of a particular age group. Structural changes resulting from calendar changes are difficult to measure in quantitative terms, but they can be assessed in part by analyzing the "progressively younger" or "progressively older" birthrate.

Figure 3 indicates that the rise in the birthrate at the end of the 1960's occurred at a time when it grew "progressively younger," and the influence of calendar changes therefore cannot be excluded. On the other hand, the

birthrate has already exceeded the rate of the 1960's for 15 or 20 years, and this cannot be a result of this influence. Changes in the birthrate calendar can affect relatively short-term indicators. When the birthrate rose in the 1980's, it was no longer growing "progressively younger." Older age groups were mainly responsible for the rise, while birthrate age coefficients even declined among women from 15 to 20. There was a simultaneous dramatic rise in the percentage of third children. Apparently, calendar changes played a much less important role in the second rise than in the first.




Figure 3. Correlation of birth ratios in Estonian SSR in years of change in birthrate trend (with ratios for year prior to rise equivalent to 100%)

Even if the hypothesis regarding the intermittent rise of the birthrate during the establishment of the modern type of reproduction is confirmed, we still will not know what the average birthrate will be, and we will not know whether it will secure simple reproduction. Judging by data for the entire Estonian population, the answer to the second question will be negative. If we consider only native inhabitants, however, we learn that ever since the first rise at the end of the 1960's the birthrate has not fallen below the level securing simple reproduction (according to data for the hypothetical generation)--that is, the second wave of growth was preceded by an already "normal" rate.

Therefore, the Estonian experience reveals two fundamentally different periods in modern demographic development: the final stage of the demographic revolution, when the birthrate remains below the level of simple reproduction for a fairly long time, and high growth potential³ secures population growth, and the period of the establishment of the modern type, when the birthrate reaches the level of simple reproduction but accumulated negative demographic potential inhibits population growth. It is still difficult to predict the birthrate of a stable age structure. We also do not know if fluctuations in the birthrate will gradually disappear.

The theory of the demographic revolution suggests that, in the same way that the decline of the birthrate did not begin simultaneously in all groups, the rise during the establishment of the modern type of reproduction will not be characteristic of the entire population at once. Studies indicate that the groups leading the population in demographic changes are the leaders in the broader social context (see, for example, 18) and that the rise in the

birthrate is secured by the more educated and socially active people. Besides this, citydwellers were completely responsible for the second rise in the birthrate since the beginning of the 1930's, while the rural birthrate has declined steadily. The further clarification of ideas about the groups leading the population in demographic processes could be quite useful in the planning of specific demographic policies.

FOOTNOTES

1. For a discussion of the historical sources of demographic data and the possibilities of their use, see (1, vol 1, pp 18-66; 2).
2. This term was suggested by J. Hajnal to describe the type of marriage rate that became widespread in Europe "west of the line running from (not strictly as the crow flies) Leningrad to Trieste" (7). Its main features are later marriages and a high percentage of people who do not marry at all. For more, see (8, 9).
3. This term refers to the effects of the age structure on population size (17).

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FACTS, REPORTS, NOTES (FROM THE SOCIOLOGIST'S DESK)

DYNAMICS OF SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF NORTH OSETIAN RURAL POPULATION

Moscow SOTSIOLOGICHESKIYE ISSLEDOVANIYA in Russian No 1, Jan-Feb 87 (signed to press 21 Jan 87) pp 68-69

[Article by Aleksandr Borisovich Dzadoziyev, candidate of historical sciences and senior research associate in the Sociology Department of the North Osetian Scientific Research Institute of History, Philology and Economics. This is his first article for our journal]

[Text] In our study of the social structure of the North Osetian rural population we concentrated on a comparative analysis of various nationalities and ethnic groups--Ossets, Russians, Ingush, Kumyks, and others. The materials of the all-union censuses of 1959, 1970, and 1979 and the results of a special sociological study conducted in 1983 by the Sociology Department of the North Osetian Scientific Research Institute of History, Philology and Economics were used in the analysis. After the creation of a multistage sample group, 1,200 people were surveyed. The questionnaires were then processed by the computer center of the North Osetian ASSR Statistical Administration under the supervision of R.G. Gutnov.

The proportional number of employed people in North Osetia increased by almost 15 percent between 1959 and 1979. For the sake of comparison, we should say that the respective figures for neighboring autonomous republics, the Kabardino-Balkar ASSR and the Chechen-Ingush ASSR, were 4.5 percent and 18 percent, and the respective averages for the North Caucasus and the RSFSR were 1.3 percent and 2.1 percent, while there was a decrease of 5 percent in the figure for the USSR as a whole (1; 2, p 151).

The following fact is noteworthy: Whereas in 1959 the rate of variation (RV) in the proportional number of employed people of various nationalities living in rural locations in the North Osetian ASSR was 0.24, 25 years later it was already 0.09--that is, it decreased by a factor of almost 2.7. The rural working class is growing and is accounting for a higher percentage of the employed rural population (see table). This growth has been particularly noticeable among Ossets and Kumyks, for whom the indicator in 1959 was relatively low in comparison to Russians and Ingush: 21.1 and 24.3 percent as compared to 41.9 and 51.3 percent.

The convergence of various nationalities in terms of the proportion accounted for by social groups in the social structure of the able-bodied population can

be expressed in general terms through the rate of variation. The RV for the proportion accounted for by the working class in the employed rural population of the republic was only one-third as high in 1983 as it had been in 1959, declining from 0.36 to 0.12. Similar processes of equalization and the reduction of this rate have been recorded in neighboring autonomous republics and in the USSR as a whole (3).

The absolute and relative numbers of kolkhoz members in the republic were reduced by almost half during the period in question (see table). The RV for the relative number of kolkhoz peasants in North Osetia rose slightly, from 0.20 in 1959 to 0.23 in 1983, as a result of some differences in the socio-economic development of regions inhabited by different nationalities.

One of the distinctive features of the contemporary development of rural North Osetia is the growth of the group of intelligentsia and employees. The increase was 32 percent during the period in question, and the relative number of these people in the employed rural population rose from 13.3 to 17 percent. It is significant that the dynamics of this process are not the same for different nationalities and ethnic groups. It has been most intense among the Ingush and Kumyks, for whom the indicator in 1959 was relatively low in comparison to the republic average for a number of historical reasons.

Dynamics of Socioethnic Structure of Employed Rural Population of North Osetian ASSR, %

<u>Categories</u>	<u>Ossets</u>	<u>Russians</u>	<u>Ingush</u>	<u>Kumyks</u>	<u>Total</u>
1959					
Workers	21.1	41.9	51.3	24.3	27.9
Employees	13.8	13.4	3.3	5.4	13.3
Kolkhoz members	65.1	44.7	45.4	70.3	58.8
1979					
Workers	52.1	56.9	57.3	41.2	53.9
Employees	19.1	16.1	10.6	11.6	17.0
Kolkhoz members	28.8	27.0	32.1	47.2	29.1
1979 in % of 1959					
Workers	247	136	112	170	194
Employees	138	122	321	223	128
Kolkhoz members	44	61	71	67	49

Source: (4; 2, p 156).

The rise in the relative number of intellectuals and employees in the social structure of the employed rural population of North Osetia was the result of substantial socioeconomic reforms in rural areas. The educational level of rural inhabitants rose considerably, and this increased the number of high- and middle-level specialists. For example, between 1970 and 1983 their relative number in the total group of rural intelligentsia and employees in the republic rose from 48 to 77 percent, including a rise from 52 to 78 percent for Ossets, from 52 to 76 percent for Russians, from 34 to 49 percent for

Ingush, and from 37 to 51 percent for Kumyks (calculated on the basis of the data of a sociological analysis of the economic records of rural populated points included in the research sample group).

As the table indicates, the RV for the relative number of intellectuals and employees in the social structure of nationalities and ethnic groups in the North Osetian rural population decreased by a factor of 2.2 between 1959 and 1983, from 0.53 to 0.24 (3). This attests to the equalization of the proportion accounted for by this category in the different nationalities inhabiting the republic's rural areas.

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FAMILY INTEGRATION AS THE OBJECT OF RESEARCH

Moscow SOTSIOLOGICHESKIYE ISSLEDOVANIYA in Russian No 1, Jan-Feb 87 (signed to press 21 Jan 87) pp 70-73

[Article by Alina Zhvinklene, post-graduate student in the Institute of Philosophy, Sociology and Law of the Lithuanian SSR Academy of Sciences. This is her first article in our journal]

[Text] Sociologists and social psychologists distinguish between two methods of the individual's inclusion in a social entity--adaptation and integration. We will attempt to apply these concepts to the study of family and marital relations. Because the family has the greatest potential for the socialization of the individual, "it is important to distinguish between integration, as the organic inclusion of the individual in the social whole, a process presupposing personal choice, and adaptation, as a set of external and passive adjustments to living circumstances" (1). Only integration can secure the genuine stability of the family.

The concept of integration was developed for labor collectives (2), but it is also applicable in the study of the family. In connection with the two types of integration--professional and moral-psychological--in the family, which can also be viewed as a collective, there are specific forms of integration reflecting the ability of spouses to solve family problems and their moral and psychological attitudes toward family affairs. Whereas family integration represents the socially dictated agreement of the group to perform joint activity, disintegration disrupts the integrity of the group, but this can be deterred by the efforts of spouses to adapt to even situations that are not conducive to family preservation.

In our study of the mutual adaptation of spouses and family integration, we made use of the theory of marital clearing (from the English word "clear"). This theory is based on the development of methods for the maximum coordination of the needs of two partners to secure the optimal mutually beneficial union. The very concept of marital clearing is based on the initial premise that the marital union is polyfunctional and is supposed to satisfy the needs of spouses under the conditions of close and prolonged contact (3). Therefore, marital potential in general consists of a multitude of factors of differing significance, of which the most important, in the opinion of G.S. Vasilchenko and Yu.A. Reshetnyak, are physical, material, cultural, sexual, and psychological (4).

The urban Lithuanian family was the object of our empirical research; couples with from 9 to 12 months of "experience" represented 30 percent of the total group; 40 percent had been married for 12-15 months, and 30 percent had been married for 15-18 months. Neither spouse in any of the couples was over the age of 30, and it was the first marriage for all respondents. The time limits (up to 18 months) were chosen in line with the data of psychological consultations in the municipal civil registry office, which indicated that 20 percent of the couples who divorced in 1983-1985 actually separated within the first year of marriage (5).

The sample group consisted of 225 married couples. The social composition was characteristic of the urban population: workers (30 percent of the men and 12 percent of the women), employees (47 percent and 50 percent), and students (22 percent and 27 percent). The indicators for education were the following: secondary (14 percent of the men and 17 percent of the women), specialized secondary and partial higher (55 percent and 60 percent), and higher (30 percent and 21 percent). Both partners had the same educational status in 49 percent of the families.

Table 1. Motives for Marriage, %

<u>Motives</u>	<u>Men</u>	<u>Women</u>
Desire for a family, children, and a home of one's own	82	81
Desire to love	82	86
Desire to be loved	78	85
Desire to be independent	42	43
Fear of staying single	7	20
Desire to legalize intimate relationship	24	29
Parental influence	3	6
Desire to improve material and personal circumstances	8	11
Opinion that single people are looked down on in society	3	5
Example of friends and acquaintances	13	9
Pregnancy	--	16

The ideal model of family and marital relations is known to be shaped by the influence of various sources, but the young people could only judge the validity of the knowledge they acquired about marital and family relations after they had started their own families.

In the opinion of respondents, they acquired accurate ideas about the family from scientific literature and special lectures (40 percent of the men and 20 percent of the women) and from fiction (28 percent of all respondents). Parents gave 15 percent of the men and 27 percent of the women correct information about family relations. It is indicative that twice as many women as men were given correct information about family life. Apparently, girls take a greater interest in family relations and, besides this, parents themselves, especially mothers, take more trouble to prepare girls for their future role as wives and mothers in the fear that a lack of awareness in this area will have negative consequences.

According to 15 percent of the respondents, no one told them anything about family life. In our opinion, this could be connected with a high opinion of oneself (responses like "I taught myself everything I know") and a lack of interest in family affairs prior to marriage.

Therefore, many young people who get married have not been adequately prepared for family life.

One of the conditions for a successful marriage is the desire of both partners to establish a harmonious relationship. Only 55 percent of the respondents were clearly aware of this fact.

One indicator of the stability of family and marital relations is satisfaction with the marriage, which is closely related to the expectations of both partners (6). The expectations of 65 percent of the men and 61 percent of the women were completely confirmed; 4 percent of the respondents were disillusioned; 82 percent of the men and 75 percent of the women would choose the same partner again, and 5 percent of the respondents would not get married at all if they had a second chance.

Data on motives for marriage are presented in Table 1.

The wish to live and to be loved was cited by the majority of respondents, and it is natural that these motives correspond to the desire for a family, children, and a home of one's own, because the standards and values of the socialist society permit the satisfaction of these needs only within marriage. Approximately one out of every four respondents wanted to legalize an intimate relationship. This motive correlates with the number of premarital pregnancies.

Table 2. Degree of Agreement of Partners on Various Aspects of Family and Marital Relations

<u>Views on various aspects</u>	<u>Degree of agreement</u>
Marital expectations	74
Leisure pastimes	67
Intimate relations	75
Solutions to financial and personal problems	82
Distribution of income	70
Reproductive aims	92
Effect of child on family relations	55*
Interrelations with parents	75

* The degree of agreement was calculated for the 43 percent of the families (of the total group) with children.

It seems to us that the fear of remaining single can be combined with the opinion that single people are looked down on in society. These motives are indicators of the social prestige of marriage and of behavioral and mental

stereotypes. These motives were cited by twice as many women as men, which could be the result of the traditional disrespectful attitude of some people toward unmarried women. Furthermore, in the Lithuanian language a woman's last name indicates her marital status.

Disagreements are unavoidable in family life, but the behavior of spouses can either turn them into prolonged conflicts or quickly settle them. Around 12 percent of the men and 30 percent of the women said that they were the ones who started arguments, 21 percent of the men and 8 percent of the women blamed arguments on their partners, 41 percent of the men and 34 percent of the women said that arguments were started by both partners, and 26 percent of all the respondents never argue.

According to the women, they started almost two and a half times as many of the arguments, which indicates their high expectations in connection with marriage and, consequently, their high demands on their partner. Unfortunately, most of the conflicts arise under the influence of alcohol.

Methods of settling family arguments are indicative. For example, 26 percent of the respondents try to settle conflicts together. Around 26 percent of the men and 20 percent of the women said they initiate reconciliation; in the case of differences of opinion, 56 percent of the respondents feel that both partners try to concede to one another's wishes; 6 percent of the men and 12 percent of the women said that neither partner would concede. In our opinion, when the respondents answered these questions, they gave us a truthful and realistic account of the atmosphere in their homes. We can conclude this from the fact that the degree of agreement in views on methods of settling family disagreements and on the initiators of reconciliation was 60 percent.

As we have already said, we have virtually no studies of family integration, and the corresponding indicators in the group of families we surveyed are therefore of considerable interest. In our study the main criterion of integration was the agreement of the beliefs and opinions of spouses with regard to various aspects of family and marital relations (Table 2).

As the table indicates, the agreement of the opinions of spouses depends on the stage of family development and planning. For example, 40 percent of the respondents with children said that the birth of a child strengthens the family, 35 percent said that relations between spouses stay the same, and 15 percent said that relations deteriorate.

The average rate of family integration suggests that two-thirds of the couples in the second year of marriage are fairly stable. This is attested to by the responses of 84 percent of the men and 76 percent of the women, who said that they had "never considered divorce."

The urgent need for further studies of family integration is dictated by the generally unfavorable demographic situation in the country. These studies could help to improve family and marital relations and strengthen the Soviet family.

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IS THERE A CONNECTION BETWEEN LARGE FAMILIES AND HEALTH?

Moscow SOTSIOLOGICHESKIYE ISSLEDOVANIYA in Russian No 1, Jan-Feb 87 (signed to press 21 Jan 87) pp 73-77

[Article by Vladimir Mikhaylovich Lupandin, doctor of medical sciences, senior researcher at the Institute of Sociological Research, USSR Academy of Sciences, and author of the following articles in our journal: "On the 'New Approach' to the Resolution of the Problem of Mental Retardation in the United States" (No 1, 1979, co-authored), "Alcoholism and Posterity" (No 1, 1980), and "Labor Resources at a Time of Intensified Agricultural Production" (No 4, 1981), and Miroslav Andreyevich Povkhanich, chief physician at the Sinevirsk District Hospital in Mezhgorskiy Rayon in Transcarpathian Oblast. This is his first contribution to our journal]

[Text] Sociologists and medical personnel have recently been concerned about the spread of non-infectious diseases (cardiovascular disease, malignant neoplasms, and nervous and mental disorders) (1). In many cities, around one-fourth of all the people between the ages of 30 and 55 suffer from arterial hypertension (2). Experts believe that such anomalies as the impairment of vascular tonicity and neurocirculatory asthenia among schoolchildren have acquired the nature of an epidemic and have become a social problem (3).

In any case, the way of life is always included in the discussions of the causes of vascular dystonia in adolescents and cardiovascular disease in adults (2). The impairment of vascular tonicity is found more frequently in schoolchildren living in large cities and in the children of workers engaged in mental labor, and, conversely, it is more rare in rural inhabitants and those engaged in physical labor. Frequent colds in early childhood, overweight, accelerated physical development, hypodynamia, and mental and emotional stress are major factors contributing to vascular dystonia in children. This was the initial empirical picture of the connection between disease and the way of life the Department of Social Problems of the Family of the Institute of Sociological Research, USSR Academy of Sciences, used as the basis for a program to study the spread of chronic non-infectious diseases in rural populations (the term "population" is used here as it is defined in social ecology--a group of people inhabiting the same place and having the same relationship to the living environment) (4).

The use of the population level of analysis is justified by a number of facts. First of all, one of the major features of the population is its heterogeneity

in terms of several characteristics, including the predisposition of the organism to various diseases. Second, the interaction of people is taken into account in this case, and this means that the role of social and biological factors in the onset of the disease is studied. The connection between health and occupation is equally significant (5). The instrumental aspect of this problem is expressed in the concept of the territorial-production complex (TPC) as the socioecological environment in which production and natural surroundings represent a system geared to the survival of the population and the preservation and development of its health (6).

A study of rural populations inhabiting regions of intensive technological farming (northern Caucasus) revealed a high rate of the chronic non-infectious diseases characteristic of large cities (7). What is the reason for the similarity in diseases among the urban and rural inhabitants?

In spite of significant differences in their way of life, rural and urban inhabitants have something in common--small families (only one or two children). To clarify the matter, studies were conducted of the state of health of populations in the European part of the country with large families. These were rural communities or administrative regions with children under the age of 14 making up from 30 to 50 percent of the total population. The studies revealed unique patterns of disease: The previously widespread infectious and parasitic diseases have been eliminated, and the rate of chronic non-infectious diseases has not risen.

One study was conducted in Mezghorskiy Rayon in Transcarpathian Oblast. This is a typical large-family population, with children under the age of 14 representing 30 percent of the total. The inhabitants of this region live 550-900 meters above sea level. The rural family has retained its traditional economic function: A large private farmyard (with two or three cows, a few bull calves, a brood sow, etc.) completely satisfies the family's needs for the main food products. Considerable importance is attached to the labor of children and teenagers. Family forms of labor are also used extensively in the public sector (an order is issued to a single kolkhoz or sovkhoz worker, but his entire family works on it). Traditions which have disappeared from the lives of people in the European part of the country have survived in alpine villages. They include the preference for large families (five or six children), the birth of the first child at an earlier age for the mother (from 18 to 20), negative feelings about the artificial termination of pregnancies, the earlier training of children for work, and the authority of parents, older brothers, and elders in general.

A comprehensive study of the state of health of 1,020 women in the Sinevirk medical district was conducted in 1984 and 1985. These were native inhabitants of the region with from 1 to 14 children. The state of health was evaluated by a brigade of eight rayon specialists (a therapist, a surgeon, a gynecologist, an oncologist, a neuropathologist, an otolaryngologist, a stomatologist, and an oculist). All of the women were examined twice in 2 years. Only those who were not sick at the time of the first and second examinations were included in the healthy group. The ages of the women during the period of study ranged from 30 to 69. Half of them (510) had from one to three

children (few births) and an equal number had from four to fourteen (many births). The number of women with few births and many births was equal in each age group.

Although the differences between the two groups were insignificant in terms of all types of illnesses per woman, they were quite sizeable in terms of specific types of illness. For example, diseases of the cardiovascular system and circulatory organs were found in 2.5 times as many women with few children, but more acute diseases (such as bronchitis, radiculitis, etc.) were found in 2.2 times as many women with many children. The biggest differences were found in the age group from 30 to 39. At this time the reproductive activity of women with few children has come to an end, but it is continuing in women of the other group. When we analyzed differences in other chronic non-infectious diseases and the average number of illnesses per woman, we learned the following: first, that women with four or more children were always healthier than the women with from one to three; second, that pregnancy and lactation have strong protective functions. We also learned that the great difference between the two groups in terms of acute disorders was present in all age groups. Apparently, they are connected with the nature of the labor performed by the mothers of large families--that is, frequent work in the open air. The influence of the "physical peculiarities of the organism of women who have given birth many times" cannot be excluded either.

Our analysis and the diagnostic picture of diseases would be incomplete, however, without consideration for other important factors. We will describe them in brief.

The factor of the age of women at the birth of the first child: This factor is known to have a protective effect against breast cancer and other hormone-related tumors (8). Mothers of small families who have their first child late in life have almost seven times the risk of getting this disease. For women who have their first child before the age of 18, the risk is only one-third as great as for women who have their first child after the age of 35. Women with many children usually begin bearing children earlier--that is, they have their first pregnancy at an earlier age than the women with few children. It would seem that pregnancy and childbirth between the ages of 18 and 20 change the hormonal system in such a way as to promote better protection against malignant neoplasms. In view of the universal role of hormones, we can assume that the woman's age when she gives birth for the first time is one of the reasons for differences in the state of health of women with many or few children.

The factor of the number of children: It has been established that this has a pronounced defensive effect in relation to hormonally dependent tumors and begins having this effect after the birth of the third child, or more frequently after the fourth (8). According to the data of international research, the rate of breast cancer is only one-third as high among married women with six or more children as among women who have given birth fewer than four times. (8).

The factor of breast-feeding: This has recently been assigned more importance than before in the development of breast cancer. We can assume that breast

feeding has a positive effect on the functioning of the endocrine glands and prevents lipometabolic disorders, which frequently lead to cardiovascular disease.

The factor of contraception: A normal sex life, including the woman's acquisition of male sex hormones, is now regarded as one of the factors preventing the development of breast cancer. Mothers of large families who do not use any kind of contraceptives, including so-called barrier methods of protection, are in a better position than women with few children, who naturally use contraceptives more frequently. It has been suggested that the rate of breast cancer is 4.5 times as high among women who use "barrier" contraceptive devices (8).

Connection Between Birth Order and Average Number of Childhood Illnesses in the First 2 Years of Life in Mezhgorskiy Rayon in Transcarpathian Oblast

<u>Birth order:</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>Over 5</u>
Number of children	774	680	603	453	234	180
Average number of illnesses per child						
All illnesses						
Under 1 year	3.2	1.8	0.8	0.7	1.1	2.0
1-2 years	5.1	2.8	1.4	1.0	1.6	2.7
Acute respiratory inflammations, pneumonia						
1-2 years	2.6	1.1	0.6	0.4	0.5	1.1

Genetic factor: The higher rate of acute respiratory inflammations among women with many children in comparison to those with few children does not depend on age and is constant. Apparently, the organism of the mother of many children is inclined to react to hazardous conditions in the same way as the young organism--that is, with inflammations--whereas the woman with few children reacts in the same way as the elderly--that is, with destructive processes.

According to our data, giving birth several times is not a negative factor in itself and does not deteriorate the mother's health. We can assume that the rate of illness among mothers of large families depends more on the quality of medical care, the standard of living, and the distinctive features of the community than on the number of children.

The data indicating that children in large families are less likely to suffer from acute respiratory diseases and pneumonia were verified in a follow-up study conducted according to the procedures of the All-Union Scientific Research Institute of Social Hygiene and Public Health Care Organization imeni N.A. Semashko in 1985. In all, 2924 boys and girls born from 1968 to 1970 were surveyed. All of them were born in Mezhgorskiy Rayon in Transcarpathian Oblast, and the parents of the overwhelming majority were also natives. Medical records listed all of their illnesses in the first 2 years of life. The diseases on the World Health Organization list (for

example, acute respiratory inflammations, pneumonia, rachitis, exudative diathesis, etc.) were taken into account among the illnesses in the first year of life. The results presented in the table show that the fourth-born child is the safest from the biological standpoint. The first-born child, on the other hand, is the most vulnerable--that is, has the highest risk of disease. The average number of illnesses begins to climb again with the fifth-born child, but it does not reach the level of the first-born.

The connection discovered between the predisposition of the organism of women to various diseases and pregnancy (or birth) order can be explained by the theory of adaptation (5). The process of the adaptation of the foetus to the mother and the mother to the foetus has certain distinctive features. Our data indicate that it is a slow process in the first, second, and third pregnancies. Adaptation reaches its optimum in the fourth-born child.

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CONTENT AND TONE OF MUSIC FOR THE YOUNG

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[Article by Stanislov Lvovich Katayev, candidate of philosophical sciences, docent at the Zaporozhye Industrial Institute, and author of the article "The Musical Tastes of Youth" in our journal (No 1, 1986)]

[Text] The object of the research I will be discussing is the rock song, an innovative style of music that developed in the 1980's. I will immediately point out the fact that the goals of the sociologist and of the music critic will not coincide completely in this case. Most rock songs do not meet the criteria of "artistic" words and music and are therefore extremely vulnerable to criticism. The flaws in certain songs are usually ascribed to the rock culture as a whole. The criticism of specific groups, however, often has the paradoxical effect of making them more popular.

The rock song is of interest to the sociologist primarily as an expression of the young frame of mind, the product of a spiritual process by which real social problems and social attitudes are expressed in artistic "code." Of course, this does not mean that the sociology of culture has nothing to say about the aesthetic evaluation of the artistic merits of specific works. Arguments about this are pointless, however, unless the socioaesthetic positions of the artist and critic, who might express the views of different subcultures, are brought into the proper balance. In this connection, it is a significant fact that when the latest cultural developments (and the rock song is one of these) are being studied and when public opinion has not solidified, it is easy to mistake personal tastes for "objective" judgments. It is here that the sociologist must provide sound conclusions about the social and cultural significance of the new phenomenon.

The study of the musical preferences of various strata of young listeners is of prognostic value in the assessment of tendencies in the public's artistic development. These studies are being conducted by a number of organizations and institutions (1). Another important matter which has hardly even been mentioned in literature to date concerns the subject matter and tone of rock songs. The content and intonation of a song indirectly reveal changes in the relevant concerns and emotional mood of youth. According to B.V. Asafyev's definition, the song is "a concise intonation with a short 'sound range'" (2).

The use of the term "intonation" in music differs considerably from its general use. There is a close connection, however, between the use of the term to signify a means of the phonetic organization of speech, a method of expressing the emotional attitude toward statements, and a specific way of organizing a text, the result of the accentuation of various elements of the form and content in music, speech, poetry, etc. In this sense, intonation can be used to describe oral information and can also apply to any other art form.

Popular songs are sociocultural documents. In particular, we analyzed tapes of the concerts of 21 well-known rock groups: Time Machine, Dynamic, Carnival, Alliance, Aquarium, DDT, Gulliver, Health, Turnips, Alisa, Telephone, Strange Games, Sample 1000, Cruise, Picnic, Dialogue, Zoo, Avenue of Night, Primus, and Stagecoach.¹

The sample group was divided into two subsamples of 10 and 11 groups to heighten the reliability of the research. The data for the subsamples deviated from the average within a range of 10-15 percent, and this attests to the sufficient stability of the characteristics discovered. The difference between rock music and the traditional style of popular vocal and instrumental groups (VIG) is clearly demonstrated below in comparative data on the content and tonal structure of the songs of vocal and instrumental groups.

We analyzed 11 recordings of taped concerts from the 1980's. These were tapes of the Red Poppies, Semiprecious Stones, Veras, Ariel, Hello, Song, and Bluebird groups and recordings of songs by A. Derbenev, V. Kharitonov, and V. Dobrynin. There were 100 songs in all. The distinction between the terms "VIG style" and "rock song" is a conditional one. The first term is used to signify the style of popular songs of the 1970's, and the second refers to the innovative current of the 1980's. The VIG style is firmly established on the professional concert stage, and rock is mainly developed through the efforts of non-professionals.

Table 1. Tonal Structure of Songs for the Young, % of total in given style

<u>Intonation</u>	<u>Rock</u>	<u>VIG</u>
Expansive (enthusiastic, cheerful)	19	46
Lyrical	11	30
Ironic	28	2
Ironic accusatory disclosures	12	--
Irony with a positive ideal image	7	2
Contemplative-analytical	16	4
"Asthenic"	10	16
"Seriously concerned"	15	2
With clearly expressed pathos	7	2
Prophetic-accusatory	4	--
Edifying-educative	4	--
Neutral-narrative	2	1

An analysis of Table 1 suggests the following: 1. The VIG style is distinguished by a relatively uniform tonal structure. Two intonations prevail:

We will call them "expansive-cheerful" and lyrical. There are some asthenic intonations in primarily the "plaintive" register. 2. The "rock" style is distinguished by a greater variety of intonations. Here expansively expressed demands alternate with questions and edifying lessons with an ironic and analytical approach to problems. The prevailing tone is ironic, and the rock song also differs significantly from VIG songs in content. We conducted a content analysis of the words of the songs of one subsample consisting of 10 groups. The results are presented in Table 2, where the most important features of songs of both styles are illustrated quite clearly. Above all, it is striking that VIG songs are distinguished by an extremely narrow range of sociomoral thinking, usually confined to love lyrics. In the rock song we find complex poetic language, many artistic devices, an abundance of symbols, disruptions of familiar lexical connections, "illogical" lyrics, etc. The rock song does not "coddle" the listener, but makes maximum demands on his mind and imagination. In this context, it is significant that rock musicians resolutely dissociate themselves from the traditional concert stage. Although rock music is categorized as popular music in the present system for the classification of musical genres, its musicians are striving to put themselves in a separate class.

Table 2. Content of Songs for the Young, % of total

<u>Subject matter</u>	<u>VIG</u>	<u>Rock</u>
Sociomoral subject matter	4	45
Moral choices, ethics	1	17
Ethical precepts and lessons	3	20
Sociopsychological subject matter	5	25
Problems in communication	1	4
Sociopsychological portraits, human nature	2	2
Expression of mood and feelings	2	11
Scenes from life of young people	--	8
General social subject matter	4	10
Antiwar songs	1	5
Ecological issues	2	4
Theme of love, relations between men and women	76	18
Theme of music and dance	5	6
Sports	2	2
Juvenile subject matter	4	--

The polythematic structure of the rock song is one of its distinctive features. Several themes can be concentrated in a single song. This, incidentally, gave rise to difficulties in the categorization of content. We had to categorize songs according to the subject matter referred to in the highest number of lines.²

Songs about the meaning of life represent an important group. The statements made in the songs cover a broad range: from high pathos to biting irony. We can conditionally distinguish between five different approaches to life in rock songs. 1. An extremely serious attitude toward life and death, the desire for a meaningful and worthwhile existence. 2. A contemplative and

investigative attitude toward life. Attempts to remain oneself or to adapt to the social environment without any pronounced effort. 3. Aggressiveness, a utilitarian attitude toward life, vigorous attacks on depression and apathy. 4. A lack of faith in the meaning of one's own life, a sense of futility and pessimism. 5. An ironic attitude toward life's problems.

It is striking that there are only one-fourth as many rock songs about love as VIG songs. In our opinion, the main reason is the rock musician's show of reluctance to repeat old themes or to follow the beaten track. Rock musicians usually avoid the cliches of lyrical heroes and strive to be completely frank and to tell only the truth about real situations and events. This kind of maximalism sometimes leads to the aesthetization of crudity and the formation of a counterculture. It is also possible, however, to interpret this phenomenon in another way: The writers strive for a vivid and striking portrayal of disgraceful and outrageous practices in order to shock their listeners and force them to give some thought to their own lives. This approach is dangerous because it could serve as an aesthetic form of psychological defense for outright crudity and a justification for vulgarity.

In any case, the sociological analysis of rock songs can aid in the comprehension of the significance of this new artistic phenomenon in our culture.

FOOTNOTES

1. We chose groups which are consistently popular with the fans of Soviet rock music. In all, we analyzed 201 songs.
2. Of course, the issue of content is not confined to the calculation of thematic units. A complex theory of text analysis is used in aesthetics and literary criticism, but this study was conducted for the purpose of determining the prevailing themes in the works of a few dozen writers, and it was therefore impossible to avoid some oversimplified abstraction.

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SOCIOLOGICAL PUBLICITY

FOR WHOM DOES THE BELL TOLL?

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[Article by Yuriy Petrovich Shchekochikhin, LITERATURNAYA GAZETA correspondent, member of the Union of Journalists of the USSR, and author of the books "Trudnyy podrostok" [The Difficult Juvenile] (1980), "Podrostok v trudnoy situatsii" [The Juvenile in a Difficult Situation] (1982), and others. This is his first contribution to our journal]

[Text] On an early spring evening I was visiting some friends. Suddenly there was noise outside the window, unintelligible shouts and heavy footsteps. I quickly threw my jacket over my shoulders, took the elevator down, and went out on the street. A column of young people wearing identical red and white hats and scarves of the same colors marched down the sidewalk, pushing other pedestrians against the walls of buildings. They were led by a young man who was walking backwards and keeping time with a red and white umbrella while he led the column in cheers: "Spartacus the champion," "Spartacus the champion."

Who were they? Where did they come from? How did they get together? Why were they on the street?

"Fanats"

Is it possible that their affection for an athletic club was enough to unite these young people? Was this kind of idolatry warranted by Spartacus and by the other athletic clubs whose fans followed the example of the Spartacus fans and loudly made their presence known in big cities? There was too much of a disparity between the young people's fanatical screams in support of the soccer team and the meager successes of the soccer players.

The passions aroused by soccer games gradually broke out of stadiums onto streets and squares. The walls of buildings, fences, and telephone booths were covered with challenges and slogans praising the favorite team or, conversely, insulting its rivals. Seemingly trifling and petty matters--the colors of hats and scarves--turned youngsters from the same courtyard and from the same school into adversaries, prepared to forget their school friendships and courtyard attachments for the sake of "their own" colors. Soccer matches frequently ended in fights between young fans, who started to call themselves "fanats."

Is it possible, I wondered, that soccer is strong enough to unite its spectators? But the more I saw of the "fanats" on the streets and in the editorial offices, the more I was certain that soccer was not the main thing. Soccer was more of a symbol, to rally round and to defend.

I first realized this when I met 17-year-old Kirill, the same young man who had been waving the red and white umbrella. I saw him several times after that spring evening, both in the stadium and on the street. He always yelled louder and waved his arms or umbrella more vigorously than anyone else. Once I asked him to come to the editorial offices and explain all of this hulla-baloo, and he, to my amazement, readily agreed (later I learned that young people not only want discussions of this kind with adults, but also strive for them; unfortunately, we do not always want this kind of dialogue and are not always ready for it).

Of course, what Kirill had to say was interesting: He talked about trips to other cities with teams, fights with local fans, an unexpected autograph from Rinat Dasayev, a popular record he sold to pay for a plane ticket to Tbilisi (there was a match there!), his mother's reaction, a policeman's visit, the torn hat of an adversary, and a black eye. What a world of experience, unknown to us adults, was opened up by ordinary soccer fever! But most of all, I was amazed by Kirill himself. I was amazed by how he introduced himself: "Kirill, Spartacus fanat"; how he referred to the fans of other teams: as if they were not other people of his own age, but extraterrestrials with no known address or habits; how he repeated the word "team" over and over, using it to refer to the team of soccer players and to his own team of "fanats." I felt at that time (and this feeling has never left me during all of my meetings with spokesmen for different teams) that he did not think of himself simply as a 17-year-old boy, a school graduate, a citydweller and so forth, but as a spokesman for a specific group of young defenders of specific symbols. At that time, during our first meeting, Kirill was certain that I would not be able to understand these symbols--I was not on his team; this is probably why he spoke with such passion: He was a fanat, there were many of them, and they acted as a group. Perhaps this was why he agreed so readily to visit the editorial offices.

I had never encountered this kind of openly declared affiliation with a group before, and I therefore categorized Kirill as a spokesman for a "new wave" of young people.

This was followed by so many other meetings!

Once some parents came to the editorial offices: "Our son is hanging around with 'skateboarders.' They do not simply skate around on their boards; they have meeting places, and the skateboards are only an excuse to meet." A letter from a teacher said: "The upperclassmen have formed a 'Court' group and are picking on anyone who is not on their side." An item in a municipal newspaper I received from Siberia said that a group of young people were wearing shirts of the same dark color and were decorating them with all sorts of ominous symbols.

The more of these young people I met, the more I realized that it is not important what they call their teams or what words they use to define their status among their peers. It was important to them to call themselves something and to set themselves apart from adults and from the majority of their peers.

How should adults, the ones who raise and educate them, react to this? Should they pretend not to notice? Should they stay out of it? Should they ask "Uncle Policeman" for help?

They must first understand what is happening, and this means that they have to listen, pay attention, and ask questions. This is how we at LITERATURNAYA GAZETA got the idea of instituting direct telephone contact with those who call themselves fanats during certain hours on certain days. After all, quite often all of our misunderstandings are due precisely to a reluctance and inability to pay attention to younger and less experienced people.

Therefore, they were asked to call 208-87-35 any Thursday from 1500 to 1800 hours.

Dialogues

At three in the afternoon on Thursday, the telephone rang. I lifted the receiver:

"LITERATURNAYA GAZETA?" "Yes." "My name is Lena." "Lena, how old are you?" "Eighteen." "What would you like to say?" "It is odd.... I read your article and was surprised. It was written in an odd tone." "I do not understand. Why do you call it odd?" "We are usually scolded or given instructions: 'You must do this, children, and not this,' but your newspaper asks us questions instead of lecturing us." "We are trying to find out what is going on. It is difficult for us to do this alone, without your help. We could be wrong." "Do you at least know who joins the young groups?" "I think I do, but I might be wrong. Do you represent any team?" "Yes, I am a Spartacus fanat." "Some of your members have already come to our offices." "Well, why not? They are determined individuals, are they not?" "They vary...." "Well, this is how it is, Yuriy. The members of these teams are sons and daughters of successful parents, and they simply have nothing to do." "Lena, I do not agree. I know that they have parents of all types, and not necessarily 'successful' ones, as you say. It seems to me that they simply want to stand out from the crowd in some way." "But all of us want to stand out, we all play this game...., at least as far as I know my own group. Our leader's favorite phrase is 'Our life on this earth is so tedious, ladies and gentlemen, so very tedious.'" "Lena, it seems to me that the opposite is true. Things cannot be tedious for you fanats, as you call yourselves. You have soccer. Something is always happening in soccer: The team wins, the team loses, a player is driven off the field or kicked off the team." "Most of us have no interest in sports whatsoever. Our 'fanaticism' is a way of asserting ourselves and setting ourselves apart. Some people are known for their clothes, some are known for their familiarity with musical groups, and some are known, as we are, for being fanats." "Do you mean that you do not even go to matches?" "We usually meet on the playground next to the school." "Lena,

how did you become a fanat, or a fanatess? I do not know the precise term for a girl." "One evening I could not find anything to do. I went to the theater but the movie was terrible! I felt like a degenerate for going. Then I saw some friends. They offered me tickets to a discotheque in a night club. But the people there were nothing but trash! I do not know what the hell was going on there! You go in there and you cannot get back out. Suddenly I met a group of people. They invited me to a cafe and told me they were fanats. I liked them and I wanted to be like them." "Lena, is it easy for a new person to join your team?" "A new person has to pass some tests." "Tests? This is the first time I have heard anything about them. What are they like?" "They are tests of endurance and faith." "Faith in what?" "In the team. For instance, last year the members of our group stood in doorways and asked people what team they liked while pretending to be Dynamo fans. If a person was intimidated and said he was a Dynamo fanat, he was not for us." "But if he defended your team, the Spartacus team, he would pass the test?" "Of course."

I hung up the receiver. The phone rang again.

"Hello, half an hour ago I read your newspaper and I think I can tell you why young people are joining all sorts of teams." "Go ahead." "Let me introduce myself so that you will know with whom you are speaking. I am 18 and I just entered the university. For 2 years, in the ninth and tenth grades, I was the secretary of the school Komsomol organization." "Excuse me, what is your name?" "My name is Aleksey, and I know about all of these groups. I also know that there are Komsomol workers who do not want to know that these groups exist." "Aleksey, have you met Komsomol workers like this?" "Of course. They usually say: 'Boys and girls, I refuse to discuss these matters.' I personally hate this attitude. Do you agree?" "Well, I agree in general. We in the editorial offices want to learn all the facts and then consider all of them carefully." "That is the right thing to do. I went to an average school and we had many people from these teams. Did anyone work with them? No. They always have so much to say about formalism, but when it comes right down to it, they forget everything they have said and work in the same tired old ways. Please remember what I said." "Thank you, Aleksey, we will."

I lifted the receiver again and I heard the noise of the street, the roar of traffic, and through the sounds of the city I heard the voice of 17-year-old Andrey:

"We call our group 'Rock on Wheels.'" "Then you are rockers? Do you ride motorcycles?" "Yes. We meet at the same playground every evening." "But besides your motorcycles, do you have anything else in common?" "Are you really interested in this?" "Yes, of course." "How strange.... Do you plan to write about us?" "We shall see." "Well, all right. We meet every day. The group is almost the same every day, but some new people also come and immediately become part of our group. We even have some young married couples." "What are your distinguishing features? How do people recognize you?" "Mainly by our leather jackets. We wear blue or black helmets." "And you meet every day?" "Every evening. Usually at nine or ten. Sometimes

the police come and tell us not to congregate! We make excuses and pretend that we have come together by accident.... In fact, we do not bother anyone. When we are ordered to separate, we separate and then meet again." "But why, Andrey?" "Well, we can talk to each other about everything, we visit each other's homes, or we simply ride around the city. We like to be together. Come and join us if you like, you will see for yourself." "Thank you for the invitation...."

The next call was from 15-year-old Igor. I lifted the receiver.

"Hello, this is Igor, nicknamed Foranger, and I am a Central Academy Sports Club fanat." "Are there many of you?" "There were. Now many of our members have gone their separate ways, but we still have a strong clan and we can still stand our ground." "What do you mean 'stand your ground'? Against whom? For whom?" "We have a good relationship with the fanats of other teams who live in our village. We call each other names, of course, but we do not fight. But as for the ones who are not from our settlement, you know how it goes...." "When do the fights usually start?" "Sometimes after a match. We recently had a fight with the Torpedo fanats. They turned out to be stronger, but we got some licks in." "But why do you fight? After all, fighting is not a very good thing. Personally, I can understand how the police feel when they have to break up your fights." "But you wrote that 'Uncle Policeman should not be called for help,' and now it seems that you are saying the opposite." "But you must agree that something has to be done about these fights." "I have personally been in fights with people from different groups. Recently we fought with some pacifists. They joined the Torpedo fans against us. They were Lyuberetskiye pacifists, I know them." "What kind?" "From Lyubertsy.... I have fought with punks too...." "Igor, this sounds like a lot of fights." "I realize you find this ironic (this is exactly what he said--Yu.Shch.). This boy, you are thinking, is trying to make himself sound like some kind of hero." "No, it just seems sad to me that so much effort and energy is wasted over the colors of an athletic banner. This is nonsense!" "Nonsense?" "All right, I did not mean to say that. But you understand that we not only want to learn what is happening in your life today, we also want to do what will be good for you. Is it good for you to fight?" "The fact is, I am not a leader. Well, I am a leader, but not an important one. The fights are started by the big leaders, and we just support them. I just think that a club should be opened for young fans, and then nothing like this would happen." "The Spartacus fanats want the same thing. But the fights between you are preventing the establishment of these clubs. Who needs clubs of hooligans?" "But we are not the only ones to blame. Other people usually back off when our fights start. And, incidentally, they are certainly fine people themselves. For example, in one subway station we boarded a car with our usual shouts of 'Moscow Army team.' A subway attendant said: 'I would drive all these fans into a corner.' Is this right?" "I was in this kind of situation once. I must frankly say there was nothing pleasant about it." "It does not matter! This happens because we are not allowed to yell in the stadiums. Do you understand?" "You think it is just a matter of letting people yell 'Spartacus the champion!'" "But we also want to be together!"

Igor called several times after that. Eventually, during the Thursday telephone sessions, I grew used to hearing: 'Hello, this is Igor, nicknamed Foranger.' Later he came to the editorial offices. By this time he had turned 16. He called the other people on his team "my loonies" and smiled. He reflected out loud and at length on why the team was a good thing. We were amazed to learn how much he read. His favorite writer was Mikhail Bulgakov. He was amazed that we read Bulgakov too. I eventually forgot that our first conversation was so aggressive in tone. But I had to cite it in this essay. An element of deliberate intimidation was present in this conversation, the desire to make other people fear oneself and one's team, the kind of intimidation with which, we later learned, many young people embellish their stories about their own life. It is as if we adults first have to be frightened, and then charmed. Otherwise, we will not listen, we will hang up the phone, we will say that this is all "childish" and call it "nonsense," a "boyish whim," and "ironic." They want people to listen and pay attention.

The next conversation was not an easy one for me. Adults called the number every Thursday without fail, usually with suggestions and advice on the proper upbringing of youth. Each time I had to politely remind them that this telephone line was reserved for young people. Otherwise, it would be difficult for them to break through our long serious discussions.

But I could not bring myself to interrupt this caller.

"They meet at...(I was told the name of a cafe I had heard of a long time ago). I asked her what they do there. She replied: 'We drink coffee and eat pastry.'" "As far as I know, the cafe does not serve anything else." "She told us: 'All the people there are fine and interesting people....' But we have friends who have traveled abroad and have seen the same kind of hippies there. They dress in rags and do not comb their hair. My husband said: 'That's it, Mother, we no longer have a daughter.'" "But aren't you exaggerating the danger?" "As soon as she starts talking to her institute classmates, my hair stands on end: They use words like 'girl' ["gerl"--Russian transliteration of English word] and talk about walking down the 'street' ["strit"--Russian transliteration of English word]." "But when you were young, you also used all kinds of slang." "We never used any words like these." "I am certain you did. After all, 'chuvak' was a popular word with your generation, the people who are in their forties today." "I have thought about this.... 'Chuvak' was an inoffensive word, a harmless joke and nothing more." "Isolated words are not the worst thing imaginable, after all."

From accounts similar to this one, I know that the real trouble starts when the person is driven away from his own home, and when this home becomes an alien and cold place.

"This is exactly what I am afraid of. Yesterday we had such a frightening conversation. She said: 'You do not understand me, you do not love me, I am just in your way.' Then she threatened to leave home." "Maybe you could try inviting her friends over?" "Yesterday I said I would not even let them cross the threshold." "This is the exact opposite of what you should have done. When parents talk like this, their children invariably begin looking for places

to get together with other people, for some kind of substitute for the home."
"Then you think it would be worth inviting them?"

I repeated that it would be worth a try. There was no other choice. What other advice could I have given her?

The next call was from 18-year-old Aleksey.

"I support global measures." "What kind?" "I have noticed that the press coverage of any kind of young people's group--whether it is a karate club or an amateur student singing group--goes through several phases. The first phase: Maybe this is a good thing? The second: This is definitely a good thing! The third: But is it that good? The fourth: No, it is absolutely bad. Just the first phase of your coverage of the teams has begun." "But we are in no hurry to go on to the next phases. Why should we hurry? First we must know everything that is going on...." "Then find out what is going on! My opinion is that youth must be trusted. Support all of the good things that come up. After all, we are not so stupid or still so young that we cannot tell right from wrong...."

Sixteen-year-old Nastya phoned on one of the first Thursdays:

"In any case it is strange...", she began, "because from what I know about attitudes toward all of these groups, the attitude of adults is usually absolutely negative. But your newspaper is trying to find out what is going on." "Nastya, do you belong to any group yourself?" "I sympathize with one." "Which one?" "The punks." "And who are these punks?" "Do you know what their motto is? 'We are plebeian, and we can do whatever we want.'" "Are you saying that these are normal youngsters who pretend to be hooligans?" "Exactly. As far as they are concerned, there is no such thing as embarrassment. I saw one boy--he had green hair. He was quite handsome. In any case, he did not look like everyone else." "But these are external differences. What about internal ones?" "In general, they are rotten kids." "But you said you sympathize with them." "Well, I don't want to be alone! I want to stand out from the crowd and to be with other people...."

Then there was the dialogue with 20-year-old Aleksandr, who had been an Academy fanat for 7 years. Sasha first called on the telephone and then came to the editorial offices.

"Sasha," I asked him at the beginning of the conversation. "Why did you refuse to come when someone just like you, a Spartacus fanat, was here?" "I do not want to talk to him! Not about anything!" "I do not understand. What kind of animosity is this?" "I have been going to the stadium since I was 14, and when the Spartacus team moved up to the first league, a group of young people wearing red and white hats and scarves, the Spartacus fanats, started coming to the stadium too, and it was horrible!" "What do you mean, 'horrible'?" "We would come to the stadium, and a mob of the red and whites would try to chase us and start fights. We had to go home through back alleys! Then we reconsidered: How much can we take? There are not many of us, but we will not take this anymore! We should fight instead of hiding!" "Fight over what?"

Over nonsense? Over the fact that your hats are red and blue instead of red and white?" "But we could not even show our faces anymore! And one day.... I even remember the date, it was 8 September 1980.... At that time they still had two matches a day in the stadium. The ones with the earlier match had the advantage." "What kind of 'advantage'?" "The Spartacus fans would leave the stadium early and set traps and ambushes. On 8 September someone had an idea: 'Enough! We have to fight!' We all rode to the station from which--as we knew--the Spartacus fans always went home. This was new, unfamiliar, and strange." "Did you go too?" "Yes, of course. In all, there were 70 of us, and we were supported by the Dinamo fans. There were at least 300 of them. It was the first time I saw the Spartacus fans running--running away in all directions. This naturally made me happy!" "Sasha, you have already grown up! Take a look at all of this and see how stupid it is. Even governments can reach agreements. Fanatical behavior is now more important than being a soccer fan. These people have already forgotten about soccer. And, besides this, you were the ones who started these fights. Now they are self-perpetuating...although the new youngsters do not remember what these fights were about!" "We were only retaliating!" "Sasha, you are accusing the Spartacus fans of the same thing that the Spartacus fans accuse you of! Incidentally, it was the Spartacus fans who once asked that they be put in charge of maintaining order in the stadium, and for this they were allowed to cheer as much as they wanted." "That is right, and the experiment was a success. We had the same thing. Everybody yelled and cheered and made as much noise as they wanted at the match and then went home. And there were no unpleasant incidents. I even saw our fans with banners on television." "You see, your common interests outweigh your animosity, which leads to nothing. No one wants fights: Not you, no matter which team you support, and not the police." "I agree. But nothing came of this! They never did open clubs for young fans! They prohibit cheering in the stadiums, they take off our hats, and they take away our scarves." "But this is because of those fights!" "Well, yes, probably.... At first we defended ourselves, and then we started to attack. Now the whole thing has its own momentum." "What should be done with this momentum now?" "I do not know.... What do we have to do with it? We have already grown up. In any case, we will not fight. And the new ones hardly ever go to the stadiums. They act fanatical around each other. There is nothing good about this...."

At three o'clock on Thursday I turn on the phone. What will I hear today? What will I answer? Who will argue with me? What questions will I be unable to answer? "Hello, at your service!"

"You wrote that teenage gangs have a 'high crime rate'...." "Excuse me, what is your name?" "My name is Leonid. Let us say that I am a teenager." "And what are you really?" "A teenager. I am almost 18 and I am enrolled in the tekhnikum." "All right, we will say you are a teenager. Now what, Leonid?" "I just came home from the beach. Now I will rest for awhile, have something to eat, and then go somewhere to dance. The weather is good. It is summer vacation. I am going to a discotheque. But it closes at ten. And then you could say that I am at the mercy of the streets. Until midnight I have nothing to do. And when people just wander the streets, any damned thing might come into their heads. Just because they have nothing to do." "Lenya, what should

be done for people like you? Where should you be taken so that 'nothing will come into your head'?" "The simplest thing would be to have cafes for young people--and I emphasize, just for young people--where they could go at eleven and at midnight. They do not necessarily have to serve vodka. As far as I am concerned, they do not have to serve it at all. But we have to have someplace to go!" "Do you think that these cafes would solve all of the problems of young gangs?" "Not all of them, but some. We need diversions." "What kind, for example?" "I mentioned one. Now, another. It could even be television! If one of us asks what is on television today, the rest of us laugh for half an hour. It is true that they recently began showing the 'World and Youth' program, but it tries to force its views on us. This is irritating. The music they play is not worth discussing. Just sit down and listen to it." "Lenya, you could be accused of having a consumer attitude toward life. Give me this and give me that. You are right: Our cities still do not offer enough leisure pastimes for youth, but everyone has different tastes and needs!" "But these differences have to be taken into account too! I am not even mentioning the fact that clubs for young sports fans, music fans, engineers, motorcyclists, and artists could have been opened long ago. And we, who are already adults, are always being told to go to Pioneer palaces and build airplane models. It is the same thing as with young fashions." "I did not understand you. What do fashions have to do with it?" "The bad opinion adults have of young styles. Frankly, this is very irritating." "Now adults are wearing young styles. There is no big difference. At least, not the kind there was 10 years ago." "Our styles have taken a big jump away from the styles of people in their twenties and thirties. Not to mention people in their forties, who start talking about your clothes on the bus." "Do you really look that different? I never would have thought so!" "But we are absolutely new, you have to understand that!"

The phone rang when I was already leaving the office. I turned the switch, opened the door...and then had to return.

"Hello, how can I help you? What is your name?" Through the receiver I heard a young man's voice: "Vyacheslav. I am 18." "Well, Slava, how can I help you?" He said nothing. "Slava, how can I help you?" "Are you interested in talking to us?" "To whom?" "We hate people like you..." "Not bad!" "You write here about all kinds of fanats. I was a fanat myself, I began that way." "And then you decided to try something new?" "I just got fed up with it. There was nothing interesting about it anymore. Marching around with these scarves on eventually gets boring." "Slava, you are probably one of the ones wearing black shirts now." "Well, what if I am?" "Do they know about you at home?" "Yes, they know. But my father goes to the other extreme. We discuss these matters quite often, and he is naturally negative about all of this." "Slava, I am interested in your emotional makeup, in your feelings about the grief or misfortune of others." "To tell the truth, other people's grief does not bother me much." "But what if someone in your crowd is hurt?" "We take revenge." "Slava, do you know how much you are hated by the young people belonging to all of the other groups? And also, of course, by those who do not belong to any group. And these are the majority." "I know. But we exist." "And this is what made you call the editorial offices?" "No, I simply did not believe the number was real."

"Just in the same way that this conversation we are having might not seem real."

He said nothing, and then he hung up. It has been some time since that talk, but I still cannot understand why he called. What for? What kind of answers did he want to hear?

A call from 17-year-old Igor:

"Now there are music fanats. They are a little younger than the soccer fans: from around 12 to 16. Are you interested?" "Yes, of course." "I do not know who else might come along. The names they call themselves are not the important thing." "What is?" "Do you know what interests me? After all, none of this existed before. There was nothing, and suddenly there is all of this. Bands and singing groups have been around for a long time. Spartacus has been around since 1935. But why were all of these teams of fans formed only in the late 1970's and early 1980's? How do you explain it?" "I do not know, Igor, I would like to find out myself...."

The phone rang again, but there was silence at the other end. Later, finally: "Tell me, were you writing about everyone?" "What do you mean, 'about everyone'?" "What if a person belongs to no group at all?" "Like you?" "Like me." "What is your name?" "Tanya. I am 16, and I am all alone." "Tanya, sometimes it seems that you are all alone and that you have no one, but it turns out that you are surrounded by friends." "No, sometimes it seems that you are surrounded by friends, but you are really alone. It is very strange when you are all alone."

This was the 30th or maybe the 50th call from a person dreaming about some kind of team, gang, friends, or group. I would estimate that this applied to one-fifth of all the calls that came in after the 208-87-35 number was announced.

There was another visitor to the editorial offices. It was just the same as the other visits: First a telephone call, then a request for a meeting, and then a knock on the door: "How do you do, I called you earlier."

This time it was 18-year-old Aleksey, a "skateboarder"--that is, one of the young people practicing and advocating the new popular pastime of riding skateboards.

"Aleksey, the skateboards are actually just a pastime, such as, for example, bicycles. Or do you believe that a skateboarder can be put in the same category as soccer fanats?" "No, this is naturally a completely different thing. Earlier, when I was in these groups, there was...well, I wouldn't call it faith, but some kind of basis for meeting as a group, and now we just get together to spend our free time together." "This is what I thought." "But skateboards are an extremely progressive pastime, not run of the mill, but original. Incidentally, it is hard to learn. I know from experience! I fell down a lot in the beginning." "But those who learn are then united?" "Yes, of course, this unites us. But not for any special goal. Not at all. We

get together in a group, and for some reason some people do not like this. Once a group of hooligans, a huge mob, approached us. They said: 'What are you, some of these...skaters?' The right word is 'skateboarders.' But they... Luckily, we did not have our boards with us. We played dumb: 'Certainly not, we are just regular guys.' They went away...." "But what do you do that bothers them?" "The hooligans take away our boards and break them in front of our eyes." "But why? Why do you think they do this?" "I have no idea," Aleksey shrugged his shoulders. "Maybe they get it from adults. Anything new is incomprehensible." "Oh, I see. You mean that the young are copying their elders?" "Not all of them.... If they do not understand you at home, at the stadium, in the cafe, or in a club, you look for a place where people will understand you. You can be certain that I will not forbid my children to do anything. They will be able to ask me questions about anything at all, and I will give them answers." "Time will tell.... It would be interesting to see how you deal with your children." "Time will tell...."

Another call and another...the 10th, the 100th, the 200th!

"Hello, how can we help you?"

New Waves

And exactly who is it that we are trying to help? What surprises us? What worries us? What 'new waves' do we see in the smooth sea of life?

Throughout history, teenagers everywhere have always formed groups. They have been united by common pastimes, courtyards, classes in school, and sports sections. What surprises us about our children and younger brothers who have grown up in an absolutely peaceful and trouble-free time?

The biggest surprise is probably the fact that never before has membership in a group or team caused the teenager to submit so completely to the rules and standards of the group: from ways of dressing and musical tastes to unique methods of expressing themselves that are often unfamiliar and incomprehensible to adults.

Writers have often called teenagers "infantile." Their critics have said that their favorite pastime is "fooling around"--that is, watching life go by while they lie on the couch and listen to music. They have been scolded for a lack of social involvement. The teenagers of the "new wave" write "I want to be a fanat" in paint on the walls of buildings. In other words, they want to defend their own symbols, however trivial they might seem to us adults. They want to distinguish themselves from adults in their lifestyle and to test the understanding, sympathy, and empathy of adults.

I will never forget the "team," the small group of just a few people, who bought 10 carnations each and then gave the flowers to passersby in the center of the city: "Here, please take this, it is from us. Do not be afraid, do not run away, we will not hurt you, we want you to walk down the street with good feelings...." They offered people the flowers and watched with amazement and then with rage as people backed away in horror from the outstretched

bouquets. "They were afraid of us because they expect only violence from us," the leader of the group said.

In my opinion, this urge to back away is the very reason that we cannot understand the most elementary things: What are they telling us? What do they want us to say?

I sympathize with the readers' reaction: Who would not have backed away from teenagers holding flowers in just the same way as the people on that street? Who cares about their intentions? For all we know, there might be brass knuckles hidden under the carnations!

Besides this, when teenagers test adults, they are usually prepared to go to extremes. And this is not just a matter of various acts of hooliganism.

Once I met some teenagers close to midnight in the center of the city. When I bumped into them in an underground crosswalk, already empty at that hour, I could not understand what was happening at first. Were they making a movie? Were sociologists studying something?

"Comrade!" A young man in jeans, brand-new ones, jumped in front of a tired pedestrian loaded down with shopping bags. "Wait a minute, Comrade! You know what is happening there, in... (he named a distant foreign country), you know that children there starve to death every day! We must help them, Comrade!"

"Wait, I beg of you!" a girl of about 17 blocked the path of a well-dressed couple, probably theatergoers. "Everything is going well for you, and for us too, but people there are starving! I beg of you, please help them!"

"Did you read today's paper?" a young man in a long coat hanging down to his heels and in a wide-brimmed elegant hat said to two women in a calm and serious tone and even with a pain in his eyes. "You know what is happening there! We can give them a little help! It does not have to be much! The amount is not the main thing! You are!"

Their voices echoed in the almost empty crosswalk.

I recall that I stood there, flabbergasted by what I was seeing and frantically trying to recall what was going on in the distant exotic state in that part of the world, when another boy in jeans, but worn ones this time, and in a sweater with a small red heart embroidered on it, stopped in front of me and, looking straight into my eyes and smiling politely, began talking quickly about the starving people in that part of the world and about my duty as a human being.

What could I do? After all, they were smiling instead of threatening me, and they were asking instead of demanding, and they were not even asking for the money for themselves! Of course, it was unusual to collect money here, in an underground crosswalk, but so many unusual things happen in life and we are surrounded by so many unusual people.

I had already reached into my pocket, but then this boy (who looked no more than 17) suddenly did something completely unexpected in a situation like this. He giggled like a child, then tried to look serious again, failed, and then let his face settle back into what was no obviously a foolish grin, making almost no effort to contain his laughter.

I said the first thing that came into my head: "Look at your watch! All of the stores are closed!" The boy in the sweater with the little red heart let out a laugh and then told me in a conspiratorial tone: "But the maitre d' in the restaurant will give us a bottle for 10 rubles! Didn't you know? This is elementary! No problem...."

It was close to midnight and there was not much life in the underground crosswalk. The boys--as I recall, there were five or six of them--were now standing all together in a huddle, shifting from one foot to the other and happily elbowing each other, like fifth-graders during recess. Off in the distance, in the shadows, so to speak, the girl of about 17 was working (no other word will do) with a dowdy older woman.

I did not leave. I stood there and looked at them. Maybe now, I thought, their radiant smiles would be replaced, like a frame in a movie, with the cold grin of a cynic or the insolent smirk of the mugger who makes his living by sidling up to frightened passersby in the evening and mumbling: "Some money for a bottle of wine, old man, or you will get it!" But this did not happen! Their smiles stayed the same, their expressions stayed the same, and their words stayed the same.

I waited to see some sign of greed in them, some sign of the pathological ability to take what is easy to take and what presents more difficulty, the contemporary "philistine mentality" (in the portrayal of which, it seems to me, we have already been sufficiently entangled). No, they showed none of these signs. Calmly, without any sign of tension and certainly without any sign of greed, like a person who does not care about the amount and who will hold money solely for the purpose of having something to do with his hands, Garik (the one with the coat down to his heels--we had already introduced ourselves) calculated his evening earnings. And when the girl, who had finally finished her job, threw 20 kopecks to Garik and he tried to catch the coin but missed, no one rushed to pick it up. On the contrary, one of the boys kicked it away like a soccer ball.

Perhaps, I thought, their expressions would suddenly show some repentance, or at least a sense of internal discomfort, that they had so easily--and in such a manner!--fooled dozens of adults. No, there was neither repentance nor discomfort. There was not even the fear that one of the passersby would return and sternly ask the exact name of the organization collecting the funds--no, there was not the slightest trace of fear. I, a casual passerby, had been standing next to them for 10 or 15 minutes. They were fully aware that I had seen everything and I understood everything. But this meant nothing to them! I did not make them feel ashamed, and I am almost certain that no one else could have either.

Eventually the entire gang (and I) went up to the street. A chilly wind was blowing, and the lights in the buildings were going out.

Garik gently pushed the boy in the sweater with the embroidered heart toward the entrance of a hotel restaurant.

They hung around for awhile, talking about nothing in particular: A popular group was performing somewhere; someone's father had brought back a tape recorder from abroad; summer was coming and it would soon be time to go south and get some sun. The girl asked what time it was and then ran to a phone booth to call her mother, someone else suddenly remembered that a scholarship depended on a test the next day, and someone else said that he would not go home today because he was tired of hearing "their objections."

I did not know what they called themselves, but I saw and understood that this was another team. Everything was so familiar and recognizable. No, it was not their actions, but the way they clung together, the way they were united by common items of clothing and long hair, and the way they spoke to each other. As for their act, or, it could be said, their test.... Behind their inoffensive untidiness and unrestrained gestures stood a completely real act. Could we say they were speculating on pain and suffering? For them, I then sensed, it had become possible to behave in ways that other people do not behave. And not because of some kind of recorded laws (although these laws most probably do exist), but because of the most elementary human laws, which tell us we do not break into a dance when we have to say goodbye to our favorite person in the world, and we do not beat up old people or children.

Yes, we could scream at them with rage: "What are you doing?!" But it is even more important to ask: "Why is this happening?" And then we have to listen to what they say. What if we suddenly hear something of social importance? After all, there is nothing more dangerous than accusing people without hearing what they have to say, scolding people without accepting criticism of one's own actions, and making instantaneous decisions without considering the future, including their future. And it is so important to them to be heard! To be noticed!

I was convinced of this once again by one of our young guests. I had already been speaking with 17-year-old Sergey for an hour when I felt that I could ask him some of these questions: "Excuse me, but do you feel that you are all alone?" "This is a hard question....," he thought for awhile. "I have friends who feel the same way I do, but I also have a sense of my own insignificance in the face of banality. This makes me lonely. My best friend is not a member of our team. He says things like: 'I am training myself to be unsophisticated because I believe that crowding my brain with world problems is unnecessary and, what is most important, will not change anything.'" "But what does he mean by 'unsophisticated'?" "He means the kind of person who is only interested in himself, his family, and his circle of friends and who guards his nervous system against any kind of negative emotion. He does not try to help anyone and does not want to change anything. And it does not depend at all on his circumstances: He could have antique furniture or live in a dingy apartment. The unsophisticated man is locked up in his own world

and feels comfortable there. He lives in a state of banality, produces banality, and defends banality." "Do you think about this often, Sergey?" "I think about it all the time."

And is this not a healthy sign, that some young people are concerned not only with the moment, but also with what is important in our life, that they are worried not only about themselves, but also about all of us? Is this not close to our own point of view? Are these young people who reflect on things and are able to judge the good and the bad, the genuine and the artificial, not exactly the kind of young people we want?

And yet I was all set to argue with him when he first called on a Thursday.

On the phone he introduced himself in this way: "Sergey. I am 17 and I am a punk."

Well, here was a punk.... Lately the word had been turning up in letters from readers, usually with an indignant inflection. But who were these youngsters?

Sergey, judging by all indications, was prepared to justify his stance. I asked him to come to the editorial offices, he agreed, and the next day, on Friday, I ran into a young man on the stairs whose every step was accompanied by the tinkling of a bell. "Sergey?" It would have been impossible not to recognize him in the editorial corridors. Around his neck he wore a narrow black tie, or, more precisely, two ribbons. A round badge with some kind of musical symbol was on his left knee. There were around 15 large safety pins on his jeans, his shirt, and his sweater. Finally, there was a bell attached to the side of his jeans, just above the knee. It was a combination representing either a challenge to conformity or a youthful whim, either a harmless joke or malicious intent.

It all began, he said, when he was graduating from the eighth grade. "I did not know who I was then, but I wanted to be someone. My self-expression at that time consisted in a pair of pants, a black shirt, and a black tie. This one," he said, touching the ends of his tie. "I shaved my temples, convinced some of my friends to do the same, and we walked along the street, putting ourselves on display. Being the center of attention did not get on our nerves. In fact, it did the opposite." "But this was when you were 15. What about now, today?" "Putting ourselves on display is the principle of our team. We want people to turn around and look at us, to notice us. It is fun to walk along the street and to see the confused expressions of the people we pass. For instance, some sedate man walks by, gives you a supercilious look, and you feel that your very appearance has somehow offended him." Sergey emphasized this word. "And this makes you happy?" "Yes, happy. It is heart-warming."

I wanted to argue with Sergey, to tell him that he should make a name for himself in some other way: in academic performance, in science, in sports, in knowledge and culture. I wanted to tell him that clothes produce only a first impression, but I suddenly remembered that I had read and heard exactly the same words when I was Sergey's age.

Maybe this is the problem. They are new, but we are offering them advice that was current when we were their age. They are new, but we are offering them the outdated lifestyle to which we have become accustomed and they have not. They are new, but we are forcing them to sing the songs we liked.

And why are they so new? Because they are one of the first generations of Soviet teenagers whose parents do not remember all the horror of war and the pain of deprivation. They are an authentic peacetime generation and are therefore undergoing new ordeals that are unknown to us--the ordeals of prosperity.

Sergey wants to attract attention by wearing a bell on his knee, but he--and let us think about this carefully!--is so much more defenseless than, for example, the wheeler-dealer who builds himself a mansion, towering over the rest of the neighborhood, or who buys a Mercedes on an income of unknown origin. Try to tell him that he should make a name for himself in science or culture. He will laugh in your face. Never before has so much prestige been attached to the possession of certain makes of cars and various goods in short supply or the possibility of foreign travel. In view of this, can we condemn Sergey for wanting to be noticeable and to stand out from the crowd? How else can he attract the attention of, for instance, that "sedate man"? Should he block his path and recite "Queen of Spades" to him? This is what I was thinking while I was listening to him. After all, he wants to be noticed, and if he looked like everyone else, who would notice him? Who would need him? Who would take an interest in him?

When he first called, I asked him (as I asked everyone) what had made him call. Sergey replied:

"I want people to listen!"

But not to the sound of his bell! He and his friends do not walk through the crowds in the street just to show off!

He needs more! He wants the people who, as he puts it, "live in a state of banality and defend banality" to look at him and shudder and to at least feel somewhat shocked. What is the significance of the ordinary bell, which could be taken as a joke? For whom does the bell toll?

Today it is extremely important to Sergey that his voice be heard in the crowd, and that the people who hear it start wondering: How do they live? What are they saying? What do they think about?

Sergey attends the institute and is majoring in a field he likes. He has what he describes as an excellent relationship with his parents (they argue with him but they understand him!), and this is not so common. He has friends--that is, he is not alone. He is fed and clothed. What is missing from his life? He wants to be understood! He wants people to listen to what he has to say!

I was thinking about this when I was sitting with him in the editorial room. I gave him my hand when he was leaving and asked: "But maybe now you could remove them?"

He nodded his head: "Certainly." Then he removed the bell and 12 or 15 safety pins. After all, these were not the issue! I understood: The scarves and bells will disappear when we finally notice them.

Granted, we must foresee the threat posed by teenage gangs united by various symbols and put an end to acts of hooliganism if they are committed. Foreseeing means studying, observing, asking questions to distinguish one group from another, and being able to carry on a conversation with any of them without fear. But it is so much more important not to lose sight of the rational aspect of this new wave, to keep it from being drowned out, and to not be afraid of them just because they are not like we were at their age.

After all, young people do not form these teams for a chance to "act like hooligans." They feel good when they are with each other. And however ludicrous and illusory their life might seem to an outsider, the life they dream of is a good one and a real one.

Yes, I thought, the three last pins will eventually come off, and Sergey will probably realize that shocking passersby with his external appearance and arousing other, already forgotten feelings in them is a futile and counter-productive practice. It will all pass, he will grow up. But it is so important that he not lose the dream of a life in which there will be no room for banality. This dream is so much more admirable than that of his friend who is training himself to be unsophisticated.

I want to put my faith in this, I want to very much, and there are grounds for this faith.

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COMMENTS ON ESSAY

Moscow SOTSIOLOGICHESKIYE ISSLEDOVANIYA in Russian No 1, Jan-Feb 87 (signed to press 21 Jan 87) pp 94-96

[Comments by I.M. Ilinskiy, doctor of philosophical sciences and director of the Scientific Research Center of the Higher Komsomol School of the Komsomol Central Committee, I.S. Kon, doctor of philosophical sciences, and V.I. Chuprov, candidate of philosophical sciences and head of the Sector on the Social Aspects of the Communist Indoctrination of Youth of the Institute of Sociological Research, USSR Academy of Sciences, on essay by Yuriy Petrovich Shchekochikhin]

[Text] I.M. Ilinskiy, doctor of philosophical sciences and director of the Scientific Research Center, Higher Komsomol School, Komsomol Central Committee: I have known Yuriy Shchekochikhin for a long time and have the deepest respect for his affectionate, kind, and responsible treatment of the young men and women united in so-called informal groups. Many adults do not even try to understand them and are therefore quick to turn away from them, but Yu. Shchekochikhin has a passionate interest in the object of his research--and there is no question that he is a researcher. If only every scientist could have this kind of passion! We would learn so many truly reliable and useful facts about our society and about life in our society!

This does not mean that I agree with all of his conclusions. Above all, I cannot agree that young people unite in these groups "not for a chance to act like hooligans." This is one of the reasons. In any case, our surveys have shown that almost 6 percent of the members of informal groups display asocial behavior. I would answer yes to the question "Can a teenager be condemned for wanting to be noticed or to stand out from the crowd?" Just as not everything old is bad, not everything new is good. Striving for better things should not destroy the good things. The dialectic of continuity, the "selection" of old and new in social development, is an intricate matter requiring the greatest skill. It demands a great deal of knowledge and wisdom from journalists, from writers, and from teachers, but most of all from scientists.

We are witnessing the phenomenon of rapidly growing informal associations. What are the reasons for this "explosion"? There are many, of course, but the main one, the most common one, is the increasing diversity of the interests and needs of young men and women as a result of their higher level of education,

awareness, and prosperity and the inability of existing organizations to meet these needs and interests. More precisely, it is the reluctance and inability of many Komsomol workers and activists to concern themselves with the real problems of young people, of inquisitive, restless, rebellious, defiant, and "difficult" youth. This is not a simple matter! It is much easier to organize all types of undertakings with crowds, and music, and the press, with all work in plain view, and with you yourself on the speaker's platform or the presidium. The logic of our life today, however, requires more intense individual work with people. Many strictly personal, individual interests and needs are ignored or overlooked by the Komsomol organization. The formalism in the Komsomol's work consists precisely in the organization's tendency to overlook the Komsomol member who joins not only for the purpose of self-realization, not only to "give" his activity, but also to "receive" attention from the organization for the satisfaction of the specific needs and requirements he could not satisfy on his own. One example is the need for communication, with a form and content consistent with the present intellectual and spiritual level of youth. I am certain that the growth of informal associations of young people is largely a reaction to formalism in Komsomol activity and to the failure of the methods of this activity to correspond to the spirit of the times and to the intellectual and cultural level of youth.

In any case, the existence of so many diverse informal associations along with the Komsomol could hardly be called normal. Against the background of the passivity of young people in the Komsomol, their heightened activity in informal associations resembles some kind of challenge. There is only one solution: The work of Komsomol organizations must be intensified, and its goals and aims must coincide with the personal interests of young people.

I have another comment to make. The current phase and the new objectives of the development of our society demand a qualitatively different kind of trust in youth than in the past. It is no longer a matter of what and how much we can trust young people with ("Now that we have entrusted them with priority construction projects, let us entrust them with the mastery of new technology"). There are problems which can be solved and are being solved only by young people. The qualitatively new trust in young people should take the form, in my opinion, of greater tolerance for their way of life--their thinking, language, manners, clothes, music, and other interests. It is time for the older generation to learn to listen and pay attention to young people, and it is time to substitute persuasion for sermons and reprimands and to substitute calm and respectful dialogue for loud monologues.

We are good at prohibitions and punishments and we have blind faith in them as the best means of combating vices. This is far from always true! Losses have exceeded gains to date. Criminologists have told us, for example, that many of the young men and women who are incarcerated before they are 18 for crimes they have committed will retain their mental aberrations and distorted values until the end of their lives. Neither impunity nor the indiscriminate punishment of offenses can have positive results. I think this matter requires thorough special investigation. We need a well-planned system of measures to develop respect for law and order and a more flexible system of social control and social sanctions.

It is probable that the more tolerant treatment of youth will entail certain difficulties, especially at first. But how can we cure the passivity and indifference of some young people by denying their right to express themselves? How can we break down the wall dividing the moral code young people actually profess from the morals they display to others without giving them some outlet for their real emotions and feelings? Unless we are especially tolerant of those who have not made the transition to unlawful behavior yet, we cannot disclose the real thoughts and opinions young people hide from their parents, teachers, and the Komsomol organization.

The "double standard," the feeling of "being alone in a crowd," and the asocial behavior discussed so frequently in our central press are not only the result of age-related psychological changes or deviations from the psychological norm. To a much greater extent, they are the result of "prohibitive instincts" and the desire to "hang on without letting go."

The movement of the soccer fans (or "fanats") started in the late 1970's. How have government agencies reacted in, for instance, Moscow? The gorispolkom published a special decree to prohibit cheering in stadiums, the congregation of fans on streets, etc. The text of the decree was taped and then played before every match. The result was that many young fans were taken into police custody.

The idea of opening a club for fans came up long ago. Unfortunately, the organizations capable of rendering real assistance have no time for this. But after all, the establishment of this kind of club would be in everyone's interest.

Or consider the discotheques. In many cities they are constantly closed and reopened, but is it really possible to abolish the strong need of young people for communication and for physical and emotional release? Only the building can be closed. The result is that young people get together in their homes. The problem is not alleviated, but complicated, because there is more opportunity for antisocial behavior.

It is time to realize that the need of young people to have their own forms of activity for the sake of self-expression and self-assertion is an objective need. And if they are not provided with the necessary social forms, inferior substitutes come into being. The result is that everyone loses: the young people themselves, the people responsible for their upbringing, and the society.

Doctor of Philosophical Sciences I.S. Kon: It was established long ago that youth in any society, including ours, is heterogeneous, and that there is not one youth subculture, but several different ones. We are used to discussing this topic primarily on the basis of information from abroad--as if it is more visible from far away. And, of course, less disturbing. Some authors have even called the very term "youth subculture" bourgeois. This makes it even less disturbing....

But events take their normal course, and various types of groups, currents, and pastimes have come into being, developed, and disappeared along with

official organizations and sometimes in opposition to them. Sociologists have paid almost no attention to them. Journalists have to pay attention to them. And the most prominent among them has been the former captain of "Alyy Parus," Yuriy Shchekochikhin, who has the rare talent and ability of entering almost any young group or gang, starting an interesting conversation, arguing, and learning something new without compromising himself. This is essentially the first phase of informal sociological research.

This essay is a brief description of meetings with some members of the young groups most of us know only by hearsay. I think that this will be of interest to the sociologists who read the journal. Obviously, there is no theoretical analysis here or answers to questions about where these groups come from and why they are formed. There are no simple answers. Most of the youngsters Yu. Shchekochikhin writes about are inoffensive. We adults do not want to know them and acknowledge them, and this can be dangerous to both sides. But after all, antisocial groups also exist. Can they be treated in the same way, and if they must be treated differently, then how? Most of the people who work with teenagers are volunteers who get little support or help from public educators. I have seen several completely legal clubs for teenagers which are known throughout the country, such as the Planet Club in Leningrad, and all of them have operated in an atmosphere of poorly disguised persecution, or of suspicion at best. I recently heard on the "12th Floor" television program that the Rostov "ETO" ("Aesthetics--Creativity--Communication") club had been closed for some reason. It is therefore not surprising that teenagers find ways of amusing and entertaining themselves without our help.

But the issue here is not leisure activity, but ideology. We must learn to understand and listen in each specific case. The sociological questionnaires designed for mass public surveys equalize all individual distinctions and cannot be of much help in this work. Can we revive the methods of personal observation? In addition, there would be no harm in borrowing the methods of such journalists as Yuriy Shchekochikhin.

Candidate of Philosophical Sciences V.I. Chuprov, head of the Sector on the Social Aspects of the Communist Indoctrination of Youth, Institute of Sociological Research, USSR Academy of Sciences: The "fanats" are almost obsolete. Former members of "teams" are graduating from VUZ's, have served in the army, and are working. Today's teenagers are "fanatical" about other things: music, amateur groups, theater, etc. The forms change, but youth's desire for informal associations stays the same.

Yu. Shchekochikhin's article raises many questions: Why do they unite? Why are they so fanatical? Is this good or bad? What should we do? Pay no attention, prohibit, or encourage? We will try to answer them. First of all, the phenomenon as a whole is essentially not new. Young people have always united in informal groups, and their specific interests have depended on historical conditions. The degree of correspondence between group and societal interests has been different for different generations. Under some socioeconomic conditions these interests have converged, and under others they have diverged, sometimes considerably. This is a result of the objective creation and development of social interests in the class society. For this

reason, the phenomenon is a problem with psychological, moral, ideological, social, and other aspects. Above all, the phenomenon is connected with the age-related distinctive features of youth. The youthful consciousness, which is in its formative stage, is unstable and variable by its very nature. This is the reason for the morbid preoccupation of young people with their own feelings, their inclination toward self-reflection, and their search for specific means of self-assertion. This state of mind has been researched sufficiently by psychologists. The teenager feels secure and comfortable in a peer group united by common interests. The more the interests of the group members coincide, and the more autonomous relationships within the group become, the more opportunity a teenager has to assert himself in the process of realizing his own interests. This is why informal youth groups guard themselves so zealously, and sometimes even aggressively, against interference by adults and other people of their own age, and this is why teenagers prefer stairways and basements to homes and palaces of culture.

From the psychological standpoint, the unification of teenagers in informal groups is just as natural as the desire of children to play together. The only important thing here is that some games develop the child morally and physically, and others traumatize him. In an informal group a young person learns, often for the first time, the value of friendship, loyalty, and devotion. And all of this is taken to youthful extremes, to the point of fanaticism. But this is also where he often encounters greed, deceit, cheating, and mercenariness. For this reason, from the standpoint of morality, the problem consists in directing the group interests of teenagers. When young people have no opportunity to express themselves in institutionalized forms, they find other, frequently deformed means of self-realization. For example, the lack of information about a popular music group arouses an interest in finding this information in Western journals, and the latter never forget to set ideological traps. This is how the ideological aspect of the problem arises.

The contemptuous attitude of many cultural establishments toward the needs of youth unavoidably gives rise to speculation, embezzlement, and other forms of unearned income connected with the distribution of audio and video cassettes, postcards, badges, etc. At this point, the phenomenon evolves into an acute social problem. Nine out of every ten violations of the law by youthful offenders take place in informal groups.

The social aspect can be seen in the forms of association and in the factors contributing to the spread of this phenomenon. Incidentally, this aspect has been studied least of all. Above all, young people themselves have changed, their social image is different, but the forms and methods of work with them have remained virtually the same for a long time. During the period of extensive national development, the attitude toward youth took shape primarily as an attitude toward an object of socialization and social influence. This "technocratic approach" led to the insufficient development of various forms of self-control, to a primarily administrative attitude toward it, to suspicion, and to the attempt to use young people as the executors of earlier decisions. The other side of the coin in this approach was the pragmatic attitude of the young people toward society, production, and the system of education and

indoctrination. The "fanats" described by Yu. Shchekochikhin are practicing a specific form of alienation from the traditional institutions of socialization. Young people react in their own way to widespread discrepancies between words and actions, signs of bureaucratism, and violations of social justice. It is no coincidence that some young groups have resolved to "combat" this kind of behavior.

The leisure time of all segments of the population has increased perceptibly. Young people have one-third as much free time as adults. New problems are arising in the family, which is becoming increasingly nuclear. In the last 20 years the number of working women has increased and the number of broken homes has risen considerably. The result is the decline of family influence on the current generation of youth.

What should we do? It is no longer possible not to notice the informal young groups: They are loudly making their presence known. Prohibitions are unnatural. The other alternative is encouragement, but what should we encourage? The positive processes of the renewal of our society presuppose the promotion of constructive forms of association by young people. In addition, it will take the concerted efforts of all of the organizations concerned to work out reliable ways of preventing all types of deviant and antisocial behavior. To this end, we must study specific ways of including the younger generation in social relations and tendencies toward change in the social activity of young men and women and we must overcome formalism, indifference, idle talk, and our distrustful and supercilious attitude toward youth.

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SOCIAL PROBLEMS IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES

INDIVIDUAL LABOR ACTIVITY (HUNGARIAN EXPERIENCE)

Moscow SOTSIOLOGICHESKIYE ISSLEDOVANIYA in Russian No 1, Jan-Feb 87 (signed to press 21 Jan 87) pp 105-113

[Article by Svetlana Pavlovna Glinkina, candidate of economic sciences, research associate at the Institute of the Economics of the World Socialist System, USSR Academy of Sciences, and expert on the economy and social policy of Hungary]

[Text] The development of productive forces in the socialist countries has raised the standard of living considerably, and this has been accompanied by higher, more complex, and more diversified demands on the part of the laboring public. Socialist production satisfies most of them, but it is difficult to satisfy some, especially the demand for exceptionally scarce and fashionable goods and for some services, within the confines of large economic organizations. Small state enterprises cannot also render effective assistance in this area either, because the current common methods of internal organization and management mean that they are small only in terms of the number of people employed, and not in terms of the nature of their operations, which therefore lose some of their advantages, such as profitable small-series production, mobility, sensitivity to changes in market demand, etc. The fuller satisfaction of the laboring public's demands has necessitated, in addition to the more efficient operation of large and medium enterprises, more flexible means of organizing small-scale production, and not only in the state sector, but also in the private sector, which should help to increase the output of manufactured goods and services, diversify the assortment, and improve their quality.

The growth of small-scale production is not a negation of the role and significance of large-scale production, which constitutes the basis of the socialist economy. Individual labor activity is of great assistance to the state in the resolution of many problems. After all, the law of the superiority of large-scale to small-scale production is in effect, as V.I. Lenin pointed out, only when "all other conditions" are equal (and this is far from always the case) (1).

In the political report to the 27th CPSU Congress, M.S. Gorbachev remarked that "the state will promote the development of various means of satisfying public demand and performing services," for the purpose of which specific plans have

been made to "carefully consider suggestions regarding the more efficient organization of individual labor" (3). A law has been passed in the USSR to this end.

Until recently, economic theory in the socialist countries equated individual production with private production and described it as a vestige of pre-socialist forms of production, the preservation of which indicates economic underdevelopment, contradicts socialist principles, and must be eliminated in the near future. Experience proved that these conclusions were the result of inadequate analyses of socioeconomic changes in recent years. Nowhere and never has small-scale production represented a separate method of production; it has also existed within the framework of the prevailing method in the given society (for example, feudal or capitalist) (2). Consequently, given the correct economic policy, it can be integrated into the system of socialist production relations and can aid in the attainment of certain economic objectives.

The level of economic development in the socialist countries limits the activities of individual manufacturers primarily to the service sphere. In other sectors it is difficult for the individual to compete with the state. In Hungary, for example, the proportion of individual producers in the service sphere exceeds 60 percent, whereas the figure is just under 1.5 percent in industry.

The discussion of pricing methods and of the optimal forms and scales of individual production during the current stage of the development of socialist society and in the near future requires an analysis of current practices. We will examine the experience of the Hungarian People's Republic, where individual production is not the main entity filling the marketplace with consumer goods and services, plays an auxiliary role in relation to large and medium socialist enterprises, creates only 5.5 percent of national income, and uses the labor of only 4.4 percent of the people employed in the national economy, but performs several important national economic functions and provides, in our opinion, interesting material for some generalizations.

During various stages of the construction of socialism in Hungary, ideas about the scales and forms of small-scale production and the motives for its use underwent significant changes. In general, the development of this sector can be divided into the following stages.

During the period of transition from capitalism to socialism, during the years of the first socialist reforms, the threat of the revival of capitalist exploitation caused people to view small-scale production as a "necessary evil," the existence of which had to be accepted in view of the underdeveloped economy. Later, stern administrative measures and economic pressure dramatically reduced the number of small-scale producers (by more than four-fifths between 1949 and 1952), and the result was a shortage of consumer goods and services and the decline of the laboring public's standard of living.

As the socialist economy developed, new conditions were established for the use of small-scale production based on individual labor. Although this view

was approved by supreme party organs as early as the late 1950's (the June party conference of the MSZMP [Hungarian Socialist (Communist) Workers' Party]), it was not supported, as speakers pointed out at the 9th MSZMP Congress (in 1966), by middle- and lower-level management. The period from the beginning of the 1960's to the middle of the 1970's could be described as a time of "passive" use of individual production, when its services were not completely refused, but no serious efforts were made to promote its more intensive development. This is why the rise in the number of craftsmen in 1957 and 1958 subsequently slowed down, and then the number resumed its decline.

By the middle of the 1970's the development of social relations had reached the point at which all economic affairs were completely controlled by the socialist state. In 1975, 95 percent of all the people employed in the national economy were already working at state and cooperative enterprises, and it was here that 98 percent of national income was produced (4). Socialist production relations were clearly prevalent, and small-scale individual production consequently ceased to be a potential base for the revival of capitalist relations. This was one side of the problem. Another, equally important side was the tendency of the partial satisfaction of increasingly complex and diverse demands to lead to illegal and semilegal forms of satisfaction. For example, Hungarian economists estimate that around 250,000 people performed unauthorized services for the population in the middle of the 1970's (5), that 40 percent of all paid services were performed illegally at the beginning of the 1980's, and that their value in quantitative terms reached 22-27 billion forints a year (according to the official Gosbank rate of exchange, 100 forints are equivalent to 5 rubles 65 kopecks) (23). After improving the mechanism for the use of individual production, the Hungarian leadership was less determined to expand individual production as such than to direct it into legal channels. When the state determined the judicial and economic conditions of the activities of craftsmen and small merchandisers, it was attempting to put individual production under judicial, financial, and planning control, to secure additional budget revenues, and to protect citizens from the inordinate appetites of illegal businessmen. This created a situation in which the operational conditions of the small-scale trade sector could be reviewed.

It is indicative that the MSZMP policy statement for the long range (1975) and the documents of the 12th and 13th party congresses contain no mention of private property and refer only to personal property, acquired through personal labor, and it is assumed that small-scale production will be assigned a definite role in future plans as well (5, 6).

It is interesting that during the process of the integration of small-scale production with socialist production the socioeconomic features of the former undergo definite changes: It loses its private (in the strict sense of the term) nature and, in most cases, remains uncollectivized only in the formal sense and, under the influence of many economic and administrative levers, functions within the framework of the overall system of national socialist production and should be regarded as an element of the system of socialist social relations.

The fact that we are now dealing essentially with individual, and not private, labor activity is also confirmed by an analysis of the use of hired manpower in small-scale production. Existing legal standards secure the right of craftsmen and small merchandisers to hire three workers, three apprentices, and six assistant family members in all professions but construction. Builders, in view of the exceptional importance of their work, have been authorized to recruit more people since 1983: six hired workers and six family members (or qualified retired workers). In the public catering sphere they are allowed to have from 5 to 12 assistants (7). In spite of the opportunities they have been granted, however, craftsmen and tradesmen do not use hired manpower because of the high special tax, which can be as high as 20 percent of the wages paid to the worker. The use of hired labor deprives the employer of many privileges and entails the observance of stricter social security requirements.¹ The modest scales of the use of hired workers are also due to the small scales of production.

As a result of the effects of many economic levers, 89 percent of all craftsmen hired no workers in 1983, and only 4 percent had more than one assistant. On the average, there was one hired worker for every four craftsmen that year (8).

Experience indicates that individual production can change its economic roles and social functions depending on social conditions. In the middle of the 1970's, for example, the Hungarian economy had to make the transition to intensive methods of economic management, which presuppose the more efficient and thorough use of existing reserves. By this time the country had effectively exhausted all sources of extensive growth (reserve manpower and then reserve investment capital): Adverse proportions of exchange in the world market complicated the conditions of economic management. All of this gave rise to a number of problems, which could be solved in part by the more active use of individual labor activity.

What kind of problems can it solve? First, the production of consumer goods and services can be expanded considerably without large capital investments; second, small local sources of raw materials and the by-products of large-scale production can be used more extensively; third, the production of goods and services moves closer to the consumer, and this is particularly important to the inhabitants of small cities and rural communities, because it equalizes levels of service in populated points of different sizes; fourth, retired workers, students, housewives, the disabled (that is, all those who have difficulty working in large-scale production because of its technological features), and people who wish to make money in their free time can be involved in labor activity; fifth, "reserve" jobs are created, offering opportunities for the regrouping and, when necessary, release of manpower in state production; sixth, people do not simply have a chance to earn additional income, but represent actual use value; last but not least, part of the material and financial resources of the population, previously used exclusively for personal consumption, can enter the production sphere.

In view of the abovementioned benefits the economy derives from individual labor activity, the rules governing the issuance of permits for individual

work were changed on 1 January 1982: Whereas the permit was previously issued at the discretion of the local council, which decided whether or not the work of a particular craftsman was necessary, now the local council must issue a permit to any citizen who applies if he is not a serviceman, is an adult, and has a permanent place of residence, references, and the necessary skills or service record. Therefore, the consumer now decides the value of the craftsman's work. The right to engage in individual labor activity is now a civil right (9). Several regulations limiting the sale of products were also rescinded in the beginning of the 1980's. Now craftsmen can serve the population directly and they can also receive large orders from the state and issue requisitions to the state for their own needs (10). The pricing system in individual production is also being improved. In accordance with the current procedure, depreciation and the cost of invention and licenses can be included in overhead expenses. Hourly wage differentials for different skill categories are now included in overhead costs and product prices (9). The technical equipment of workshops is now the object of closer scrutiny. At the beginning of the 1980's only 10-15 percent of them could be categorized as modern in this respect, and around 40 percent were actually unsuitable for production (7). To promote their modernization, the depreciation terms of machine tools and equipment were cut in half (from 10 to 5 years) in 1982; owners were granted the right to deposit part of their income in a tax-exempt fund for the technical development of their enterprises. The national savings bank credit limit was raised to 200,000 forints a year. In view of the special importance of the work of builder-craftsmen, they were granted the right to lease costly equipment from state and cooperative enterprises after passing a test for an operator's license.

The state can influence the development of individual production and its scales directly with the aid of a flexible tax system. For example, since the middle of the 1970's, when the need arose to encourage the development of the individual sector, the taxes paid by craftsmen throughout the country have been reduced by 200 million forints; tax credits ranging from 5 to 40 percent, depending on income, were instituted in 1980; income tax exemptions were instituted for tobacco, newspaper, and notions stands with a turnover of under 1 million forints, for candy stores, creameries, bakeries, and other such enterprises with a turnover of under 2 million, for snack bars in plants and establishments, grocery stores, and consignment shops with a turnover of under 3 million, and for hotels, boarding houses, and camping grounds with a turnover of under 4 million (11). The tax privileges have a social purpose: The retired and the partially disabled are exempt from taxation if their annual income does not exceed 60,000 forints (10). As a result of these measures, the number of craftsmen and small merchandisers is steadily rising (Table 1).

As the table indicates, in terms of social composition, individual production is no longer an element isolated from the rest of society. Most of the new craftsmen are people who combine individual enterprise with their main profession. The number of these increased 2.5-fold between 1975 and 1985. There was a corresponding rise in their proportional number in the craftsman category--from 22.9 to 35.2 percent. Besides this, more than half of them are under 40--that is, they are people who were raised in the socialist system and who acknowledge the primacy of socialist social relations.

Table 1. Number of Craftsmen and Private Merchandisers, in thousands

<u>Categories</u>	<u>1970</u>	<u>1975</u>	<u>1980</u>	<u>1985</u>
Handicrafts				
Those who work only in this sector	72.0	57.4	63.7	77.3
Those on pensions	--	7.5	11.6	17.1
Those who work here only in their free time	14.1	19.3	28.1	51.2
Total craftsmen	86.3	84.2	103.4	145.6
Hired employees	16.4	14.4	16.5	23.0
Apprentices	13.9	5.3	3.6	6.0
Private trade	9.7	10.2	11.4	25.5

Source: (12).

Individual production now serves as an important source of consumer goods and services for the marketplace. Craftsmen account for 60 percent of all the services offered to the public in cost terms, perform 80 percent of all building repairs and preventive construction work, are diversifying the assortment of consumer goods considerably, and respond quickly to changes in fashions. Drivers of private vehicles have secured the complete satisfaction of public transportation needs for more than a year and have improved the quality of service considerably. Economists estimate that private vehicles with a total value of around 3.6 billion forints are now operating in the sphere of passenger transport. Taxi licenses are issued to private individuals now. The only eligibility requirements are 2 years of driving experience and a vehicle of any model in good working order and less than 6 years old.

Individual production plays an important role in trade and public catering: This includes the many cafes, cafeterias, and fast-food restaurants which adapt to public needs, shops selling all types of goods, and specialty stores. Craftsmen frequently build cooperative workshops and consumer service centers at their own expense. As mentioned above, differences in the levels of public service in various parts of the country are being reduced by the activities of individual producers. The state is encouraging this activity by gradually lowering taxes and offering certain privileges (10). As a result, two-thirds of the workshops are in small communities, where they ensure the virtually complete satisfaction of public demand. Builder-craftsmen are responsible for almost all rural residential construction. Individual labor plays an important role in the organization of trade and public catering in outlying districts.

Craftsmen have recently been active in the development of industrial support units (the production of spare parts, components, small-series instruments, etc.), thereby relieving large enterprises of unprofitable operations. Whereas the production volume in 1976 was valued at 150,000 forints, the figure exceeded 500,000 in 1985.

Flexible organizational forms of cooperation between state enterprises and individual producers were developed in recent years. For example, the

All-Hungary Council of Small Craftsmen was established in the 1970's to institute some form of planning in individual labor activity. Its agency for the organization of handicrafts negotiates agreements with craftsmen on the production of items needed by the national economy. In 1981, for example, it concluded 20,000 agreements with 3,000 craftsmen. Agency turnover at that time was equivalent to 730 million forints (8, 13). The agency not only awards contracts to craftsmen, but also supplies them with raw materials, negotiates agreements for them with large enterprises on the processing of waste products, buys machine tools and equipment and leases them to craftsmen, and purchases patents for promising inventions from them. It also plays a definite role in organizing the export of the products of individual enterprises. It negotiates production and delivery agreements for them with foreign firms and organizations. Cooperative and customer-financed projects are organized. In these cases the craftsmen are supplied with raw materials, accessories, and samples for the organization of production. Export volume reached 200 million forints in 1981. The agency also maintains contact with 25 Hungarian foreign trade enterprises and firms exporting the craftsmen's products.

A delivery and sales office was opened on 1 January 1980 by the terms of an agreement between the council of small craftsmen and Skala, the largest cooperative department store in Budapest. In accordance with the agreement, craftsmen, supplied with raw materials, semifinished goods, and instruments, produce items needed by the state. The office finds machine tools and equipment which are not being used at full capacity in large enterprises but which could be used successfully by craftsmen, buys new machine tools, and leases this equipment. In 1981 raw material and equipment warehouses were opened in Budapest and five other cities in the country for supply operations in the individual production sector (14).

The agency is helping to heighten the effectiveness of individual production, promote its technical development and modernization, and establish "job security"; it relieves craftsmen of the need to perform the unproductive operations, connected with the acquisition of raw materials, semifinished goods, and equipment, that take up around 30 percent of their time on the average.

In spite of the growth of individual production in the national economy, there is no reason to fear the excessive development of this sector. This is attested to by the data in Table 2. For example, the increase in the number of craftsmen and small merchandisers had slowed down by the end of 1983. People who began individual operations in fields unauthorized until 1 January 1982 accounted for 54 percent of the increase in 1982 and 1983. The indicator is even higher for part-time craftsmen--92 percent (16).

The national leadership realizes that administrative methods alone cannot limit high income. This requires the resolution of a group of problems connected with filling the domestic market with goods and offering the population the necessary variety of services. When the state simplified the permit application procedure and created the necessary conditions for the establishment of small crafts enterprises in the 1980's, it was striving to eliminate

the earlier monopoly status of individual craftsmen with unjustifiably high incomes. A balance between supply and demand is an important condition for the reduction of high profits.

Table 2. Proportion Accounted for by Individual Production in National Economy, percentages*

Indicators of individual production	1970	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985
Number employed	3.3	3.4	3.5	3.6	3.7	4.4	4.4
including in agriculture	1.7	**	**	**	**	1.4	**
Value of fixed capital at beginning of year	0.7	0.4	**	**	**	**	**
Production of national income	2.6	3.0	3.0	4.2	5.1	5.5	5.5
Gross industrial product	1.0	0.7	0.7	**	1.35	1.5	**
Construction and installation work	6.3	8.3	9.6	10.0	11.4	13.0	**
Retail trade	0.8	0.8	0.9	1.1	1.5	1.6	1.9
Public services	52.0	50.0	50.0	**	54.0	59.1	61.1

* Source: (12, 15).

** Data unavailable.

Note: Statistics of the retail trade turnover of small merchandisers cover only the products they acquire from socialist organizations. The figures would be much more impressive if they included products acquired from craftsmen and from owners of private subsidiary plots. According to available data, small merchandisers account for 4-5 percent of national retail trade.

As a result of this policy, many permits for individual activity were returned. In 1983, for example, an average of 47 craftsmen returned previously acquired permits each day. During that year, 3,500 (18 percent) small stores and public catering enterprises shut down. This indicator had ranged from 10 to 12 percent throughout the 1970's (17). According to available data, 20 percent of the permits issued were returned during the first year of work, and only 40 percent of the people now engaged in individual production have been doing so for more than 5 years (18).

There are different reasons for this. In addition to competition, other reasons cited by Hungarian researchers are insufficient demand for services, low income, and the higher social security contributions instituted in 1982 (19).

It must be said that the ideas about the "superprofits" of craftsmen and about incomes that are supposedly far in excess of labor contributions usually have no real basis. According to statistics, in 1980 the annual income of one-third of all craftsmen did not exceed 36,000 forints, and 18 percent paid taxes on from 36,000 to 60,000, 10,000 paid taxes on from 68,000 to 80,000, and 7 paid taxes on an income of over 100,000. Only two people paid income

taxes on amounts exceeding a million forints. The average wage in the national economy in 1980, on the other hand, was around 48,000 forints a year (8).

Income tax figures can be regarded as accurate indicators of real income because they are calculated on the basis of quite competent analyses. An expert commission of the council of small craftsmen verifies the accuracy of profit reports, taking the distinctive features of each profession and the relationship of supply to demand into account. The commission sends its recommendations (or conclusions) to local councils for individual decisions on each specific enterprise.

In spite of the tangible benefits the state derives from individual labor activity, there is no question that the ability of the existence of small-scale production to give rise to a private-ownership mentality in some people must be considered. Given the existing contradictions in distributive relations in the socialist society, broader access to individual production could weaken material incentives and, consequently, labor discipline at socialist enterprises. Hungarian researchers have noted that unless state enterprises can offer approximately the same wages as those earned for equivalent work in the individual sector within the near future, this could exacerbate socioeconomic contradictions.

Regardless of how strict state control might be, some individual producers will always strive to circumvent the laws and take advantage of shortages to reap huge profits. The influence of individual labor on the all-round development of abilities is not always the same either. After all, the efforts to earn additional income take up much of the individual's free time. This reduces his opportunities for adequate rest and recreation, cultural pursuits, and participation in sociopolitical activity. It has been estimated that three-fourths of the people who receive extra earnings use the money for the maintenance of their production units, and 9 percent use it to raise their standard of living (21).

Nevertheless, the positive results of the use of individual labor activity far outweigh its negative results (6, 22). The Hungarian experience proved that the state has considerable potential to almost completely exclude negative tendencies, make conscientious and efficient labor of high quality the only source of income, and use individual production to improve public services as long as there is an economic and, consequently, a social need for this.

FOOTNOTES

1. Since 1 January 1982 virtually the same social security regulations have applied to craftsmen and tradesmen as to socialist sector personnel. This means that a much higher percentage of private sector income is deducted for this fund. Besides this, eligibility for social security depends on several factors, including the use of hired labor. For example, hospitalization coverage is paid from the first day of illness only if the entrepreneur does not use hired labor. If, on the other

hand, he has more than one employee or family member assisting him, hospitalization is paid only after the 30th day and in the amount of 50 percent of his average earnings.

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LETTERS TO EDITOR

IN THE FIRST PERSON

Moscow SOTSIOLOGICHESKIYE ISSLEDOVANIYA in Russian No 1, Jan-Feb 87 (signed to press 21 Jan 87) pp 117-118

[Letter to editor from A.N. Sukhov (Moscow); last paragraph is editors' reply]

[Text] Dear Editors: I suggest that you add a new section to your magazine, in which anyone who is interested in the social sciences could express his own ideas about the strategy of scientific inquiry in sociology. The section could be called "In the First Person" (although the rubric, of course, is not the issue). Then what is?

In my opinion, there should be more opportunity for "rank-and-file" members of the scientific community to participate in the investigation and discussion of matters of scientific policy. It would be wise to apply all of the results of sociological studies of consciousness and scientific expertise to sociology itself for the purpose of the intensification of scientific labor. This would be in line with the party policy of the further democratization of public life, more extensive publicity, and the stimulation of personal initiative and responsibility. As far as "hidden" reserves in the labor of sociologists are concerned, it is precisely the general discussion of fundamental issues in the social sciences that would disclose these reserves. They exist. What we need is the concentration of creative efforts in the most promising fields of scientific inquiry. This is what necessitates the exchange of opinions.

Experience has shown that each sociologist has his own view of "sociology," its place in the system of social sciences, its priorities, and its chief concerns. This image of the science is not simply the result of subjective preferences and tastes. It comes into being during the process of professional adaptation and corresponds to the method by which the individual is included in the science as a social institution. This is a process of "natural history," an objective process influenced by material factors. The personal point of view should not be regarded as only "subjective," "arbitrary," or "authoritarian." The personal point of view is legitimate and even essential in the social sciences. It has its positive features, reflecting the uniqueness and creative individuality of the person expressing it. Science develops through the efforts of individuals. "Positive subjectivity" in the assessment and interpretation of events leads to discoveries, inventions, innovations, and bold hypotheses and experiments.

"There are as many definitions of sociology as there are sociologists"--there is a great deal of truth in this well-known joke. It would be odd to deplore the fact that people's ideas about the society in which they live do not always coincide in all respects. And it is equally odd to regret the lack of unanimity in sociologists' ideas about the subject of sociology. A predetermined, absolutely perfect understanding of any "subject" (including the "subject of sociology") cannot and does not exist. The blind faith in this kind of absolute was sarcastically ridiculed by A.K. Tolstoy and the Zhemchuzhnikov brothers, who invented Kozma Prutkov's "plan" to "establish unanimity in Russia." The fact that sociologists belong to a group of people engaged in the professional study of society and of people's ideas about the society does not mean that they take the position of an "unconcerned bystander" or an "omniscient observer," which would in itself secure the absolutely perfect understanding of social processes. Real professionalism does not put the sociologist "outside" the society or "above" it. It only gives him the ability to reinforce his views with logical arguments. A sociologist who is active in civic affairs is more aware as an individual of his personal responsibility for the future of his people, and the more interest he takes in genuine scientific inquiry and in the exchange of opinions on various subjects.

Now I want to say a few words about the rubric. Sociologists traditionally use an impersonal style, and I would even call it a technocratic style. Sometimes the reader of a sociological article wonders who the author is--a live human being and citizen or a screw in the bureaucratic computer. There is the assumption that the avoidance of personal comments is a guarantee of scientific objectivity. But after all, this is not true. In the political report to the 27th CPSU Congress, M.S. Gorbachev directed attention to technocratism as an obstacle impeding the intensification of the mental labor of social scientists. In my opinion, the editors of SOTSIOLOGICHESKIYE ISSLEDOVANIYA should draw the appropriate conclusions from this.

From the Editors: We could try this. We will accept articles written "in the first person," and we hope that the views expressed will be backed up by logical arguments.

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TO AVOID THE LOSS OF CONTINUITY

Moscow SOTSIOLOGICHESKIYE ISSLEDOVANIYA in Russian No 1, Jan-Feb 87 (signed to press 21 Jan 87) p 118

[Letter to editor from B.Z. Doktorov (Leningrad)]

[Text] When I think about the development of sociology in our country over the last quarter of a century and I analyze the more than 10 years of activity by SOTSIOLOGICHESKIYE ISSLEDOVANIYA, I am firmly convinced that the journal should have a section entitled "From the Contemporary History of Soviet Sociology." It could include the results of purely historico-scientific investigations, previously unpublished research findings and documents reflecting the work of sociological teams, chronicles of events of past years, and memoirs.

Why am I making this suggestion?

First of all, a quarter of a century is not a short period of time for a science, and the time has come for the thorough analysis of all past experience. Sociological science of the "new era" can already be divided into distinct periods, an understanding of the origins of certain fields of research is essential to their further productive development, all of the methods of sociology should be described and developed, etc.

In the second place, the sociologists of today from 25 to 30 years of age are already the third generation of specialists. They know virtually nothing about the development of sociological research in the 1950's and 1960's, the establishment of fields of science, and the creation of research teams. This period seems like ancient history to them. Consequently, the continuity needed for the effective functioning of the science is not being fully secured, and the heuristic role of the school and traditions is being diminished.

In the third place, there is a regrettable lack of established procedures for the description of the research process itself in our sociology. One of the main reasons is the unfamiliarity with the creative laboratory of acknowledged experts in this field. Centers of sociological documentation can be counted on one's fingers. A great deal of valuable information about research is stored only in the memory of participants or in their personal papers. Today every effort should be made to avoid the loss of accumulated experience.

In the fourth place, the further we move away from the seemingly recent past, the more difficult it becomes to reconstruct the atmosphere that was such a salient feature of the contemporary stage of Soviet sociology, but this is extremely important to an understanding of many problems in its future development.

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RESULTS, PLANS, IDEAS

SOCIOLOGISTS HONORED WITH STATE AWARDS

Moscow SOTSIOLOGICHESKIYE ISSLEDOVANIYA in Russian No 1, Jan-Feb 87 (signed to press 21 Jan 87) pp 119-120

[Interview with Vilen Nikolayevich Ivanov, doctor of philosophical sciences, professor, and director of the Institute of Sociological Research, USSR Academy of Sciences; Natalya Mikhaylovna Rimashevskaya, doctor of economic sciences, professor, and department head at the Central Economic Mathematics Institute, USSR Academy of Sciences; and Yuriy Petrovich Kovalenko, candidate of philosophical sciences and sector head at the Institute of Sociological Research, USSR Academy of Sciences]

[Text] Orders and medals were recently awarded to a group of sociologists by order of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium. The award winners included our authors--V.N. Ivanov, V.S. Kruzhkov, N.M. Rimashevskaya, and Yu.P. Kovalenko.

In this issue we are publishing a conversation with Professor V.N. Ivanov, doctor of philosophical sciences and director of the ISI [Institute of Sociological Research], USSR Academy of Sciences; Professor N.M. Rimashevskaya, doctor of economic sciences and department head at the Central Economic Mathematics Institute, USSR Academy of Sciences; and Yu.P. Kovalenko, candidate of philosophical sciences and sector head at the ISI, USSR Academy of Sciences.

Correspondent: Vilen Nikolayevich, which of the institute's achievements in the last 5 years do you regard as the most important?

V.N. Ivanov: In my opinion, some large-scale sociological studies should be mentioned first. In particular, these were the all-union study of the way of life of Soviet people (supervised by Doctor of Philosophical Sciences I.T. Levykin), the study of indicators of the development of the Soviet society (supervised by Doctor of Philosophical Sciences G.V. Osipov), the study of the most important areas of activity by the contemporary family, particularly its role in the improvement of the social structure of the Soviet society, education, and the prevention of alcoholism (supervised by Doctor of Philosophical Sciences A.G. Kharchev), and the study of the social aspects of the economic experiment (supervised by Doctor of Philosophical Sciences N.I. Alekseyev).

A distinctive feature of these research projects was the emphasis on the investigation of current problems in social practice and the creative search for solutions to urgent problems in socioeconomic development. The results have

attracted the attention of the scientific community and of party organs and economic managers. The decisions of party and state organs were based on some of them. The research findings of the Department of the Social Problems of the Family were used in the preparation of a normative act. I also mentioned these projects because they led to the accumulation of useful organizational and procedural experience in cooperation with other academic institutions and scientific centers in the union republics. This experience will be used actively and developed in the 11th Five-Year Plan.

As far as institute publications are concerned (there were many of them in the last 5 years, and not all of them were published only by the Nauka Publishing House), I would like to first mention the collective work "Razvitiye sotsialnoy struktury obshchestva v SSSR" [The Development of the Social Structure of Society in the USSR]. It is interesting not only by virtue of its content, but also as an attempt to unite the efforts of scientists from many parts of the country working in this field of sociology. I would also like to make special mention of the book "Burzhuaznaya sotsiologiya na iskhode XX veka. Kritika noveyshikh tendentsiy" [Bourgeois Sociology at the End of the 20th Century. Criticism of the Latest Trends]. It played an indisputably positive role in the preparations of Soviet social scientists for the 11th World Sociological Congress.

As for joint publications with foreign scientists, I should first mention "Sblizheniye rabochego klassa i inzhenerno-tekhnicheskoy intelligentsii sotsialisticheskikh stran" [The Convergence of the Working Class and the Engineering and Technical Intelligentsia in the Socialist Countries]. It is based on the results of international comparative research conducted by the Commission on International Cooperation by the Academies of Sciences in the Socialist Countries in the Field of Sociology. The book "Molodezh i vyssheye obrazovaniye v sotsialisticheskikh stranakh" [Youth and Higher Education in the Socialist Countries] also warrants mention.

Correspondent: You once headed a commission for the preparation of proposals regarding the institution of higher sociological education in the country. How do you evaluate the results of its work?

V.N. Ivanov: The commission performed useful work. It was formed soon after the June (1983) CPSU Central Committee Plenum and it quickly drafted the documents needed for the institution of higher education in the specialty of "Applied Sociology." In accordance with a decision of the Ministry of Higher and Secondary Specialized Education, applied sociology departments were established at Moscow and Leningrad universities. It is gratifying that leading institute researchers take an active part in the teaching of sociology at Moscow State University.

It must be said, however, that we still have much to do to encourage joint research with VUZ scientists in line with the recommendations of the All-Union Conference of Social Science Department Heads.

Correspondent: What is your own most satisfying accomplishment as a scientist? Which of your works or which of the works in which you participated do you remember best of all?

V.N. Ivanov: Probably the book "Sotsiologiya i propaganda" [Sociology and Propaganda] published by Nauka. This work took a great deal of effort. An interesting team of authors, scientists with the same point of view, took shape during the work on the book. This relatively young field of sociology is extremely important for the organization of all ideological work on a scientific basis and for the study of public opinion. The latter is acquiring increasing importance in the research of the institute, particularly in connection with the establishment of its new structural subdivision, the Center for the Study of Public Opinion.

Correspondent: Do you have any secret desires you could reveal to us?

V.N. Ivanov: I do. Although I would not describe them as very secret. My strongest desire is that the science of sociology will play a more important role in the 12th Five-Year Plan and that its status will change so that it can take its rightful place in the mechanism of social control.

It seems to me that social scientists (and they are not the only ones) are realizing more and more that the tendency of the social sciences to lag behind the needs of practice cannot be surmounted without sociology. The realization alone, however, is not enough today. Concrete steps must be taken to train sociological personnel on a broader scale, to continue developing sociological services (and not only in production), to cultivate a sociological (by analogy with the economic) way of thinking in administrative personnel, and to provide sociologists with new technical equipment (especially computers).

Correspondent: Now a question for you, Natalya Mikhaylovna. We know that any press organ must be a collective organizer. In your opinion, what organizational functions should a journal of the social sciences perform?

N.M. Rimashevskaya: In an age of intensive scientific and technical progress, when intellectual potential is the decisive factor in social development, it is necessary to make a transition from centralized administrative methods to management aided by economic and social mechanisms. The latter seem more refined and more effective to me. To date, they have not been studied in their entirety, and there is not much experience in their use. The maximization of the human factor, however, will be impossible without their thorough comprehension.

Let us consider such social phenomena as needs, health, and the family. It is obvious that their investigation, the disclosure of their internal mechanisms and external relations, modeling, measurement, and the creation of instruments to influence the development of social objects all require the efforts of specialists from different fields of knowledge and branches of science. We need comprehensive projects with participation by sociologists, economists, jurists, demographers, psychologists, medics, biologists, etc. Experience has shown that the most interesting results can be obtained only with this kind of interdisciplinary approach, at the point where different fields of science meet.

A perceptible role could be played in the process by SOTSIOLOGICHESKIYE ISSLEDOVANIYA, which is expected to consolidate the efforts of sociologists

and of specialists in other fields of knowledge. This includes the publication of the results of completed comprehensive research projects, debates by scientists working in different fields of science, roundtable discussions of major questions of theory, and much more.

Correspondent: Now a traditional question: What do you plan to work on next?

N.M. Rimashevskaya: A study of public welfare on the family level. The more I look into this matter, the more clearly I can see the mainsprings and mechanisms that largely determine the behavior of the individual in the sphere of consumption and in the sphere of social production. In recent years I have been particularly interested in public health problems, which I associate with public welfare. I think that socioeconomic research in this sphere should be actively encouraged, because the results would of exceptional value to the party and the state in their management of social development.

Correspondent: Yuriy Petrovich, you head a sector studying ideological processes in the intelligentsia. Can you give us a brief description of what the sector research team has done in the last 5 years?

Yu.P. Kovalenko: Around 40 "field" studies have been conducted, during which around 25,000 people were surveyed. More than 60 final documents have been prepared. Several monographs have been published. I would like to make special mention of two books--"Problemy povysheniya effektivnosti ideynopoliticheskogo vospitaniya sovetskoy intelligentsii" [Problems in Enhancing the Effectiveness of the Politico-Ideological Indoctrination of the Soviet Intelligentsia] (1983) and "SShA: pokhod protiv podlinnykh prav cheloveka" [United States: Campaign Against Genuine Human Rights] (1984). The manuscript of a future monograph is now on my desk. Its preliminary title is "Ideologicheskii protsess. Metodologiya prikladnogo issledovaniya" [The Ideological Process. Methodology of Applied Research].

Correspondent: Our editorial group heartily congratulates all of you on these high government awards. We hope that your cooperation with the journal will be just as productive in the future.

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SCIENTIFIC AFFAIRS

THE WORK OF THE EDITORS MUST MEET NEW REQUIREMENTS

Moscow SOTSIOLOGICHESKIYE ISSLEDOVANIYA in Russian No 1, Jan-Feb 87 (signed to press 21 Jan 87) pp 121-123

[Report on meeting of SOTSIOLOGICHESKIYE ISSLEDOVANIYA editorial board and editorial office staff on 13 October 1986]

[Text] The thorough and truly revolutionary reform in all spheres of social life, the program for which was drawn up by the 27th CPSU Congress, sets new requirements for the social sciences, including the theory and practice of sociological research. The work of the SOTSIOLOGICHESKIYE ISSLEDOVANIYA editors must also meet these new requirements.

A comprehensive discussion of the objectives stipulated in the decree of the CPSU Central Committee "On KOMMUNIST Magazine" and the proceedings of the All-Union Conference of Social Science Department Heads was conducted at a meeting of the editorial board and editorial office staff of SOTSIOLOGICHESKIYE ISSLEDOVANIYA on 13 October 1986. The main topics were the restructuring of journal activities and the reinforcement of its impact on the development of sociology and the improvement of research quality.

Calling the meeting to order, journal editor-in-chief A.G. Kharchev underscored the importance of the CPSU Central Committee decree in the reorganization of the social sciences. Editorial office personnel and the journal's contributing authors must also draw serious conclusions from the proceedings of the conference. It revealed the direct connection between the serious flaws in the management of the economic, social, and cultural development of society and the state of research in the social sciences.

Sociology--and, consequently, the central sociological journal--must assume a large share of this responsibility. We must take more resolute steps to surmount stagnant thinking and the gap between theoretical and applied research and the needs of practice. Sociological work still contains a great deal of superficiality, banality cloaked in pseudoscientific terms, confusing conclusions, and good intentions disguised as scientific recommendations. We must wage a persistent and uncompromising struggle against all of this.

The main reports were presented by F.R. Filippov, deputy editor in chief, and M.N. Rutkevich, member of the editorial board.

F.R. Filippov recalled that the CPSU Central Committee decree "on KOMMUNIST Magazine" specified the main directions of the development of sociological science: "Sociological research must be developed on a broader scale, including questions pertaining to the coordination of public, group, and personal interests, the analysis of the requirements and stimuli of human activity, and the study of the socioeconomic and political-moral bases of the socialist way of life, family and marital relations, and public opinion."

The work of SOTSIOLOGICHESKIYE ISSLEDOVANIYA must be reorganized in accordance with several major guidelines. Above all, the content and style of published articles of a methodological nature require substantial changes. Their authors should concentrate on the most urgent and acute problems of acceleration and present innovative ideas rather than scholastic theorizing, arguments about definitions, and pontifications having nothing to do with reality. Articles about the results of applied research must be closely related to progressive experience in economic activity, social planning, and management, and must reveal the social potential for acceleration. It would probably be a sound practice for the editors to suggest investigations of current problems, assisting scientists and practical workers in the choice of the most important research topics and reliable research methods. The journal must provide extensive coverage of the activities of sociological services, the status of which was recently consolidated. Articles in the journal will be somewhat more timely in connection with the transfer to six issues a year. These new possibilities, however, must be utilized effectively.

Scientific criticism and debates on complex and controversial issues should play a much more important role. We must put an end to the practice of mutual praise and reject the characteristically benign tone of so many publications in the past. There is an exceptionally great need today for the pointed discussion of issues and the clash of opposing points of view, but, obviously, without the settlement of old personal or group scores and the use of insults.

In addition to considerably expanding our group of contributing authors, we must improve the structure of the editorial office staff and surmount shortcomings in its work--the unsatisfactory editing of some articles and the misrepresentation of the author's point of view. It might be best to restore the old editorial departments. It is time to review the composition of the editorial board, to recruit new members from among the most active scientists and practical workers, and to get rid of those who have not taken part in the journal's work for a long time.

M.N. Rutkevich discussed the proceedings of the All-Union Conference of Social Science Department Heads and directed attention to the most important theoretical aspects of the development of sociology, underscoring the special importance of ideological-theoretical activity as one of the methods of establishing a scientific basis for the further development of socialist social relations.

Sociology is one of the social sciences closest to practice. In the last quarter of a century it has undergone considerable development, but there are still some signs of stagnation.

The 27th party congress' assessment of the state of affairs in the economic and philosophical sciences was supplemented in Ye.K. Ligachev's report with an assessment of the theory and practice of sociological research, which are still far below current requirements.

It is a fact that journalistic articles in newspapers and magazines have discussed serious problems earlier and more thoroughly, especially recently, than books and articles by sociologists.

In his speech at the conference, M.S. Gorbachev underscored the "appeal of the emotional intellectuality of Marxism-Leninism." There is an acute shortage of emotion and of regret for lost opportunities, however, in sociological works. The "academic impartiality" in many of them is accompanied by attempts to conceal a scarcity of ideas and the weakness of concepts with an excessive preoccupation with formal procedures. The latter are necessary when they reveal a concept, but they only frighten the reader when they are used solely for the purpose of giving the text a pseudoscientific and complicated appearance.

The reorganization of the social sciences, including sociology, will consist in the resolute coordination of research as closely as possible with the needs of practice. But this should not be interpreted as a disparagement of the fundamental theory and methodological bases of sociological research. In his speech, M.S. Gorbachev specifically explained the essence of the frequently employed concept of "the new way of thinking." This is dialectical thinking, and it is called new because life has faced Marxist-Leninist theory and party policy with new foreign and domestic policy issues.

The party's instructions are of special importance to sociology, because ideas which were rejected back in the 1960's, particularly the reduction of sociology only to its applied aspect, have recently been publicized under the banner of "newness." Even in the Marxist-Leninist sociological curriculum of the Moscow State University Sociology Department our science is given the modest title of "Applied Sociology." This could diminish the intensity of sociological studies of new processes and inevitably lead to the underestimation of dialectical materialism as an aid in the analysis of social phenomena. Neither scholasticism or creeping empiricism can be surmounted without raising research to a higher methodological and theoretical level, and both of these extremes are present in sociology.

The study of contradictions in social development occupied a prominent place in M.S. Gorbachev's speech and in the political report to the 27th party congress: "The restructuring and renewal of our life are accompanied by an acute, not always overt, but uncompromising struggle of ideas, psychological attitudes, and styles of thinking and behavior." In this connection, it is significant that theoretical and empirical works on sociology often do not even mention the contradictions of life, and if they do mention them, there is usually no indication of their causes or of the conflicting interests of social groups, strata, and nationalities. This "subjectless" examination of contradictions is the wall separating science from practice. It is the party's policy to reveal these contradictions and resolve them on the basis of common national, group, and individual interests.

Well-organized debates play an exceptionally important role in surmounting conflicts in science. Scientific journals must initiate the kind of creative discussions that are so necessary to the creation of a "zone of high intellectual intensity and inquiry" (Ye.K. Ligachev). Sufficient experience has recently been accumulated in unsuccessful philosophical debates. This applies, for example, to the debates on the contradictions of socialism and the factors of social development. In this first of these the thesis regarding the antagonistic contradictions in the socialist society, which was contrary to what Lenin had to say about the matter, was foisted on the reader; in the second an attempt was made to supplement the objective and subjective factors of social development with a third factor--the development of the individual, although the individual is only part of society and although the development of the individual depends on a combination of objective and subjective influences. Our journal cannot brag about well-organized scientific debates either.

Now that we are drawing up the plan for the work of the editorial office in the near future, we should consider the organization of debates, "round-tables," and other discussions to focus the attention of sociologists, practical workers, and scientists working in related fields of the social sciences on the urgent problems in whose resolution sociologists will play the leading role.

V.A. Popov, journal executive secretary, discussed the draft long-range plan for the editors' work in the 12th Five-Year Plan, and plans for coming issues. They were drawn up with a view to the proceedings of the 27th CPSU Congress and the All-Union Conference of Social Science Department Heads and the CPSU Central Committee decree "On KOMMUNIST Magazine." The two most important areas of editorial organizational work are prominent in the long-range plan: the section of theoretical articles and the rubric "Applied Research." The projects of scientists from the Institute of Sociological Research, USSR Academy of Sciences, and other academic institutions and of collective and individual members of the Soviet Sociological Association were given maximum consideration in the plan. One of the plan's distinctive features is its emphasis on the resolution of interdisciplinary problems and the encouragement of as many people as possible who are working productively in the Soviet social sciences to contribute articles to the journal. In addition, the informational sections of the journal will be expanded considerably: "Scientific Affairs," "Book Reviews," and "Foreign Panorama." A "Counseling" rubric is to be added to the journal to raise the procedural standards of plant sociologists and to aid VUZ sociology students.

M.A. Manuilskiy, journal science editor, told of his experience working with authors representing the VUZ sector of the social sciences. This category of authors requires special attention because it is sometimes quite difficult for the VUZ scientist to secure the use of his research findings in practice. For these scientists, publication in a sociological journal is something like a certificate of authorship and a real opportunity to attract the attention of sociologists working in the national economy and of managers of enterprises and organizations. It would also be best to print more articles addressed specifically to people in business, in a style accessible to the reader who is

not a sociologist. To this end, a new rubric, "Social Projects, Models, Standards," should be added to the journal.

A.I. Kravchenko, editorial science adviser, proposed that the rubrics "Social Development Service" and "Experience in Incorporating Sociological Recommendations" be oriented more specifically toward the needs and wishes of plant sociologists. In particular, he said that the journal has an essentially established format and that the annual increase in subscriptions testifies that readers approve of our methods of organizing the articles in an issue. Sometimes, however, we have sections dealing with specific problems. Rubrics should not be too specific. They should encourage not the shallow or superficial treatment of subjects, but a broad overview and thorough analysis of the subject matter. The titles of articles are not always appealing, and the cover is dull. The editorial secretaries should set more serious goals for themselves.

When the long-range plan was discussed, proposals were made regarding its supplementation with new topics. The editorial staff was requested to collate all of these additions and clarifications and submit a new draft of the plan.

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PUBLIC OPINION STUDIES IN SOCIALIST COUNTRIES

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[Report by V.D. Voinova]

[Text] The first meeting of the working group on "Public Opinion Analysis" of the Third Problems Commission for Multilateral Cooperation by Academies of Sciences in Socialist Countries was held in the ISI [Institute of Sociological Research] of the USSR Academy of Sciences last October and included a symposium on "Public Opinion and Its Use in the Management of Social Processes."

In his introductory speech, Professor V.N. Ivanov, doctor of philosophical sciences and director of the ISI, USSR Academy of Sciences, underscored the complexity and variety of tasks now facing public opinion researchers, directing special attention to the possibility of quick responses by scientists to the needs of social practice.

The problem of finding new approaches to the study of public opinion at a time of accelerated socioeconomic development in Soviet society was discussed in a report by Doctor of Philosophical Sciences V.G. Britvin. In particular, he feels that the sociological approach to public opinion research should be based on the examination of the broad context of "social consciousness and the social environment," on the determination of its role in the system of social relations and, finally, on an awareness of it as a state of consciousness.

The discussion of new approaches to the study of public opinion was continued in a report by Doctor of Philosophical Sciences V.S. Korobeynikov on "The Emotional and Practical Nature of Public Opinion, Determining the Choice of a Research Strategy." There have been no significant advances in the last few years in the analysis of the mechanism by which value judgments are translated into action. The more thorough analysis of this aspect will require the investigation of the transition in public opinion from the reflective to the transforming (or practical) state in connection with its materialization in the system of social standards, social regulation, and control.

Actual relationships always underlie the views and opinions of people. This idea was expressed by Professor K. Richtarjik (CSSR) in his report on "Some

Aspects of Public Opinion Research in the CSSR." The speaker discussed several important procedural matters connected with the class nature of public opinion, its intensity, and its validity.

In his analytical report on "The Social Dynamic and the Preliminary Study of the Range of Opinions," Candidate of Economic Sciences B. Chakalov (Bulgaria) defined the specific stages in the establishment of individual and group opinion and distinguished between indicators of this phenomenon.

In his report, Doctor S. Kwiatkowski (Poland) stressed the importance of the extensive coverage of the results of public opinion studies for propaganda purposes and asked the people present at the meeting to give this matter special consideration and contribute to the development of world public opinion on current international issues--above all, issues of war and peace.

During the symposium, procedural aspects were closely related to the results of specific sociological studies. L.G. Nagy (Hungary) reported the empirical findings of the Scientific Center of Mass Media Studies. It was learned that the expectations of people are determined to a considerable extent by their past experience and present realities. For example, the number of social problems categorized as disturbing in Hungarian public opinion studies did not decrease between 1980 and 1985, but, rather, increased. The following problems are in the lead: environmental pollution, the increase in traffic accidents, and deviant behavior.

The report by Professor K. Doktor (Poland) on "National and International Experience in Public Opinion Studies in Socialist Countries" and the report by Professor T. Seczkyi (Hungary) on "Distinctive Features of Comparative Studies" aroused lively discussion. Participants in the discussion decided that it would be useful to conduct at least parallel studies of the most urgent problems.

Sanchez Cartos, consultant in the Revolutionary Orientation Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Cuba, reported on the work of the National Public Opinion Research Center. This work is now undergoing radical reorganization. The optimal structure is being sought. The chief aim is quick and efficient research meeting high scientific standards and the effective procedural guidance and coordination of the activities of provincial and municipal groups conducting public surveys.

Professor B.A. Grushin, doctor of philosophical sciences, took part in the discussions. He focused attention on the need to clarify the terms of cooperation in public opinion research. In his opinion, there are three types of difficulties in this work, and efforts should be united to surmount them: 1) the distinctive features of the economic mechanism, sociocultural and political traditions, and so forth in the socialist countries. But these features should not be overestimated, particularly in public opinion analyses; 2) the distinctive features of the situation connected with the study of public opinion and its functions in the political structure of socialist countries. This is the main difficulty; 3) difficulties on the level of theory. When the process of the formation of public opinion is being studied,

the topic should be the interpenetration of various factors, resulting in new types of awareness. It is also important to develop different approaches to the subjects of public opinion, which breaks down the barriers between groups, strata, and classes.

Speakers concluded that there was a need for the continued exchange of procedural and organizational experience and the results of public surveys.

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DISCUSSION OF PROSPECTS FOR FAMILY RESEARCH

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[Report by G.A. Zaikina]

[Text] The urgent need for an active social policy in the sphere of marital and family relations and for its scientific substantiation has been underscored in many party documents of recent years. Nevertheless, the study of the natural trends and contradictions distinguishing the development of the family today is still not meeting the requirements of practice. What direction should family studies take? Which problems demand the closest scrutiny? These questions were the main topics of discussion at an extended meeting of the Academic Council of the ISI [Institute of Sociological Research], USSR Academy of Sciences, and the Family Sociology Section of the Soviet Sociological Association on 27 October 1986.

The report of the Department on the Social Problems of the Family stressed that the augmentation of the family's social potential and its activities in all spheres of life in the socialist society is directly connected with the work on the program for the accelerated socioeconomic development of the country and the fuller use of the capabilities and potential of the human factor. In turn, these objectives can be attained only on the condition of more vigorous investigations of marital and family relations and united effort by representatives of different fields of science. This is why the discussion focused on problems in the coordination of research with practice and on interdisciplinary cooperation in this work.

The need to improve legal methods of regulating marital and family relations was discussed by Candidate of Juridical Sciences Yu.A. Korolev (USSR Supreme Soviet Department of Act Promulgation). Now that the protection of the family by the state has been secured in the Constitution of the USSR, the exact standards of this protection must be determined. As we know, the law is only a reflection of societal needs. If these needs are misunderstood, legislation cannot stay in step with life. It is the job of sociologists to determine these needs. Unfortunately, they are still not providing legislative bodies with all of the necessary information and recommendations. Yu.A. Korolev also suggested a longer interval between the application for a marriage certificate and the registration of the marriage, the restriction

of the right of alcoholics, drug addicts, and the mentally ill to marry and have children, and the improvement of the divorce procedure. The need for close cooperation with scientists was also underscored by A.F. Severina, chief of the Family and Marital Affairs Department of the Moscow Gorispolkom. The work of strengthening the family in the capital is being constantly expanded and its forms are being diversified. There are, however, many problems of an organizational and procedural nature which cannot be solved without strong scientific support. Above all, this applies to family counseling and social introduction services. The time has come for a new study of the Moscow family, to clarify the goals of our efforts and point up the best approaches to specific types of families. In short, practical workers are extremely interested in closer contact with scientific establishments, and especially with sociologists. One of the "sore spots" of this interaction, according to Candidate of Philosophical Sciences V.A. Sysenko (Population Studies Center of Moscow State University imeni M.V. Lomonosov), is the resource side of scientific projects. Even a modest sociological research project requires substantial material and labor expenditures, and clients often do not even suspect this. For example, the preparation of the program and research tools for the "Newlyweds-83" survey took 8 months, the survey itself took 3 months, and the processing of the results took another year. The time has come to consider the financing of scientific projects by the organizations using their results.

The present state of family studies and trends in this field aroused lively debates. Doctor of Philosophical Sciences A.I. Antonov (ISI, USSR Academy of Sciences) said that the present situation is quite disturbing. In his opinion, the main indicator of the family's diminished social potential is its small size. This is disturbing because the society's need for a certain number of births is not being fully satisfied and because significant deviations in the socialization of children have been observed in one- and two-child families. Therefore, small families are becoming a moral problem. In view of the difficulty of finding viable models of medium-sized and large families in the European part of the country, A.I. Antonov believes that the Central Asian family should be studied and used as an example. Candidate of Economic Sciences A.G. Volkov (Scientific Research Institute of USSR Central Statistical Administration) objected to this approach. He objected to the description of the small family as some kind of social pathology. Under the influence of colossal social transformations, the family in our country has become a different kind of entity, and its structure and functions have changed radically. Furthermore, these changes stem from objective factors, are natural, and reflect tendencies in the development of the society as a whole. Therefore, the assessment of such phenomena as divorces must not be oversimplified. The old family, with its rigid assignment of roles and the subordinate and inferior status of women, may have been stable but it cannot serve as a model today. The earlier indissolubility of marriage did not make the family happier. Under present conditions, the road to stability does not lie through a stricter divorce procedure, but through the more thorough preparation of young people for marriage. In reference to the present state of family studies in the country, A.G. Volkov said that they do not correspond fully to the social significance of the family as one of the pillars of society. Research projects are widely dispersed, are conducted by small

teams, are poorly coordinated, and lack the necessary material support. It will be particularly important to organize close interaction by demographers and sociologists, particularly in studies of the effectiveness of demographic policy. The family assistance measures taken in recent years have produced a definite impact, but we still do not know what played the most important role--the partially paid leaves and grants for the birth of the first three children, or the change in the social atmosphere and in attitudes toward the family in general. Without a knowledge of the precise causes, it will be impossible to make the correct decisions in the further improvement of measures to influence demographic behavior. It has been assumed, for example, that since normal population reproduction requires families with two or three children, the bearing of three children should be encouraged first. As A.G. Volkov pointed out, however, young couples experience the greatest difficulties after the arrival of the first child. These problems motivate them to postpone, or even to decide against, having a second and third. Family assistance should not depend on the number of children. This will establish the necessary conditions for couples to act on their own wishes regarding family size.

This point of view was corroborated by the results of research conducted by Candidate of Economic Sciences I.A. Gerasimova (Central Economic Mathematics Institute, USSR Academy of Sciences). The opinion regarding the "conspicuous consumption" of young couples and their preoccupation with prestigious values, which is seen as something just short of the main reason for the reduction of family size, is quite common in our country. In reality, however, most young couples experience substantial financial difficulties and have poor housing (almost a third live in dormitory facilities or rented dwellings). And they are experiencing these difficulties at a time when they must make decisions on such complex matters as household affairs, the bearing and raising of children, and professional advancement. The analysis of the process by which the family is established, of the careers of couples, and of their social and professional mobility requires, in I.A. Gerasimova's opinion, a comprehensive approach, and this will reveal the depth of the family's inclusion in the socioeconomic and spiritual life of society.

Agreeing with A.G. Volkov's statement about the need for a sober assessment of the present situation, Doctor of Juridical Sciences G.M. Minkovskiy (Academy of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs) stressed the importance of developing a model of the modern mid-sized family. Attempts to mechanically revive past traditions or to rebuild the Russian, Ukrainian, or Baltic family according to Central Asian patterns cannot produce the necessary results. Besides this, the traditional Central Asian family has negative features as well as positive ones. Analyzing the ability of the family to nurture unlawful behavior, G.M. Minkovskiy noted that this topic is of common interest to sociologists and criminologists. Its investigation first presupposes an answer to the question of whether or not the social, including educational, potential of the family has been diminished, and if so, then what are the fundamental elements and determinants of this process and how can the negative trends be neutralized. Research indicates that serious mistakes are made in the raising of children in one out of every two or three families, and the development of criminal tendencies in children is

actually encouraged in one out of every four. In this context, it does not seem right to preserve the family at all costs. A broken home and unhappiness are two different things. The fact is that two-thirds of all juvenile offenders come from outwardly happy and financially secure but educationally deficient families. This is why the emphasis now must be placed on the development of theories of upbringing and the establishment of effective social control of the behavior of children and teenagers under the difficult conditions of competition with informal sources of information, "feelings of being fed up" (Yu. Bondarev), and the longer period of guardianship.

In his concluding speech, Doctor of Philosophical Sciences V.N. Ivanov, director of the ISI, USSR Academy of Sciences, said that an intense search for new forms and methods of activity is now going on in the institute. The extended session of the academic council represents an important and productive step in this direction. The discussions demonstrated the advantages of the interdisciplinary approach to the analysis of social developments and processes. The participation of practical workers in the discussion was also quite useful. The institute research team sees closer contact with practice as one of its main objectives.

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PREMARITAL COUNSELING OF YOUTH

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[Report by I.S. Kon]

[Text] The fifth international seminar on "Forms and Directions of Activity in the Guidance of Premarital Behavior and Family Life" was held in Warsaw last October. It was attended by prominent scientists--sociologists, psychologists, medics, and pedagogues, including Julian Heddy, regional director of the International Planned Parenthood Federation, and Belgian scientist F. Devin. The seminar included five discussion groups: 1) family assistance and government population policy; 2) birth control and responsible parenthood as the key to family happiness and stability; 3) the preparation of youth for family living; 4) the role of premarital and family counseling in the prevention of social pathology; 5) divorce, its determinants, and its social and personal consequences.

In an introductory speech, Professor M. Kozakiewicz, president of the Polish Family Development Society and the Polish Pedagogical Association, described the general state of affairs in marriage and family counseling in Western Europe and Poland. In particular, the speaker discussed the organization of the activities of the Polish Family Development Society, founded in 1957. It now has 22 premarital and marriage counseling centers, most of which were opened in the 1980's. They employ 67 specialists, including 21 physicians, 29 psychologists, 4 pedagogues, 4 jurists, and 2 midwives. These centers are not part of the state system of premarital and marriage counseling assistance, but they work in close contact with agencies of the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare. All counseling is free. In 1985 the centers provided 6,556 consultations, including 2,573 psychological, 2,636 sexological, 487 legal, and 860 gynecological consultations. As a rule, people come to the centers for advice on marital and family conflicts, difficulties in conjugal relations, and problems connected with child care, contraception, and infertility.

Special medical centers provide another type of counseling. There are now seven of them, and they employ 73 specialists (36 gynecologists, 8 psychologists, and 2 psychiatrists). In 1985 they provided around 100,000 consultations, most of them gynecological and sexological. There is a fee for these consultations, but the fee can be waived for low-income families. The centers

are well equipped from the technical standpoint. Finally, there are the counseling centers opened after 1982. These are establishments for youth. There are three in Poland, but they provide close to a thousand consultations a year. The problems discussed here are usually connected with the start of sexual activity, conflicts with parents and teachers, the prevention of pregnancy, and difficulties in making contact with members of the opposite sex. The premarital and family centers operate four child care schools, and these annually offer around 20 three-month courses for future and young mothers (around a third of the women attend the courses with their husbands). These courses are quickly becoming popular.

The society has also done much in the training of professional personnel. It is important to bear in mind that the society works in conjunction with state family centers, and its work with teenagers is coordinated with premarital counseling and sex education classes in the schools. The Catholic Church represents a definite alternative to this. It is also active in this field, but with different ideological aims. Lectures and family counseling sessions (conducted by professional psychologists) are held regularly in many Catholic churches.

The number of family consultations is also rising quickly in other socialist countries, such as the GDR and the CSSR, where they have existed for a long time. In Hungary, according to A. Meszaros, there are now 12 counseling centers, each of which employs from 10 to 15 specialists per 30,000-50,000 inhabitants. The quality of counseling, the level of the professional training of counselors, and the development of interdisciplinary cooperation are being special attention everywhere. In a report on "Counseling Ethics," Professor L. Aresin (GDR) stressed that counselors should be able to "adjust to the requirements of the specific situation and the needs of the client." Seminar speakers presented conclusive evidence that marriage and family counseling not only enhances the stability of marriage and the quality of family life but can also aid in preventing a number of social deviations (rape, juvenile delinquency, etc.). This was the subject of a report by renowned Polish scientist J. Godliewski.

How does the situation in our country look against this background? Frankly, it looks bad. It is true that there have been positive advances in recent years, and these were discussed at the seminar by Ye.R. Mushkin, editor of the NEDELYA family and consumer affairs division. But only the first steps have been taken. The main problem is the low professional level of counseling, particularly in the case of the psychology of family relations and the sexual aspects of marriage. Lectures and counseling sessions are frequently conducted by people with no special professional training. In the case of some matters, there is simply nowhere to acquire this training. Soviet psychology is virtually unconcerned with the distinctive features of male and female behavior, not to mention sexual matters (sexology is incorrectly associated with sexopathology in the public mind).

In Poland, on the other hand, medical sexology is closely related to sociology, differential and social psychology, ethnography, and culturology. The leading experts--K. Imelinski and Z. Lev-Starowicz--employ historico-cultural as well

as clinical data. In our country, however, there is a complete lack of interdisciplinary contacts in this sphere. For example, an all-union conference on sexopathology was held in fall 1986, but the Ministry of Health did not invite any psychologists, sociologists, or demographers to attend it. A well-known stereotype is apparently at work here: It is better to ban scientific data than to make them public. For example, a guide to sexopathology (edited by G.S. Vasilchenko) cannot be sold on the open market, and it cannot even be read in the science library without special authorization. The state of affairs is particularly unsatisfactory in the education of teenagers. The new school curriculum includes some elements of sex education, but the instruction has been extremely timid and inconsistent. Furthermore, even the topics listed in the curriculum are often not mentioned in textbooks. In addition, instructors are not knowledgeable enough. The USSR Academy of Pedagogical Sciences is preoccupied, as it has been in the past, with the "ethical and aesthetic" aspects of sex education. But what is the point of discussing moral education if teenagers are not given truthful and scientifically sound answers to even the most elementary questions about their psychosexual development?

The 27th CPSU Congress underscored the need to strengthen the family. Mere moralizing cannot do this. This requires the same kind of realistic thinking and radical reform as other spheres of life. The experience of fraternal countries could be quite useful to us. It is also time for the USSR to consider joining the International Planned Parenthood Federation.

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REFLECTIONS ON NEW BOOKS

USSR WORKING CLASS: TRENDS AND CONFLICTS IN SOCIOECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

Moscow SOTSIOLOGICHESKIYE ISSLEDOVANIYA in Russian No 1, Jan-Feb 87 (signed to press 21 Jan 87) pp 131-137

[Article by Mikhail Nikolayevich Rutkevich, corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences and head of the Marxism-Leninism Department of the USSR Council of Ministers Academy of the National Economy, and Fridrikh Rafailovich Filippov, doctor of philosophical sciences and division head at the Institute of Sociological Research, USSR Academy of Sciences. Both are permanent contributing authors to our journal; first paragraph is SOTSIOLOGICHESKIYE ISSLEDOVANIYA introduction; passages enclosed in slantlines are printed in italics in source]

[Text] The party's instructions to reorganize the social sciences will necessitate the primary consideration of new and unresolved problems in social development and a thorough and discerning analysis of the achievements and shortcomings of research projects. "The search for truth must include the comparison of various points of view, debates and discussions, and the elimination of old stereotypes," M.S. Gorbachev said. In line with journal tradition, the editors are offering readers expert appraisals of the book "Rabochiy klass SSSR: tendentsii i perspektivy sotsialno-ekonomicheskogo razvitiya" [The Working Class in the USSR: Tendencies and Prospects of Socioeconomic Development] by L.A. Gordon and A.K. Nazimova.

The working class is one of the main topics in Marxist-Leninist sociological literature. This is understandable because the prospects for social progress are indissolubly connected precisely with labor and the struggle of the working class. The working class, at the head of the entire laboring public and in a strong alliance with it, is securing the accelerated socioeconomic development of the country under the guidance of the Communist Party. "The political experience of the working class, its high level of consciousness and order, and its strong will unite all elements of our society. The rising general educational, cultural, and professional level and the increasing labor and sociopolitical activity of the working class are reinforcing its vanguard role in the improvement of socialism and the construction of communism," the new edition of the CPSU Program, approved by the 27th party congress, says (2).

Today, now that our country has entered a stage of profound reforms in the economy and in social relations, scientific works on the working class are of

special interest, particularly since the approaches, analytical methods, and interpretations of data they offer are far from identical. Differences of opinion are natural in science, just as they are in discussions of complex social problems.

The working class is distinguished from other topics by the fact that different interpretations of its features are of great political and ideological significance. This is true, for example, of the structure of the working class, its internal differentiation into social strata and sectorial, ethnic, and territorial segments, and changes in its professional composition. The development of the working class is sometimes given a onesided interpretation in Soviet scientific literature as a process of mere integration. As a result, tendencies toward differentiation are viewed in isolation from the dialectically related processes of the integration of the working class and the socialist society as a whole.

It is precisely from this standpoint that we wish to share with the readers our thoughts about the new book by L.A. Gordon and A.K. Nazimova on the working class (4), the latest work in the series published by the Institute of the International Workers Movement, USSR Academy of Sciences (5-8).

As the authors say in the very beginning, they have deliberately confined themselves to an analysis of changes in the size and composition of the USSR working class and the effects of scientific and technical progress on the skills, professional structure, and education of workers (4, p 4). This is understandable, because it would be impossible to cover all aspects of the social development of the USSR working class in a single book. What is more, in this way the authors maintain the validity of a separate examination of the /social composition/ of the population and of elements and subelements of the social structure as direct agents and subjects of social-class relations. There have been arguments about this in scientific literature, often leading to the categorical demand that the emphasis be transferred to the examination of /relations/, and not of their agents. It would seem that the subjects and agents of social relations, their activity, and the social relations taking shape during the course of this activity should be examined in their dialectical unity. Just as the evolution of social relations cannot be comprehended without the knowledge of what happens to their agents and what kind of changes take place in the objective status and way of life of classes and social groups and of their separate strata and segments, the subjects and agents of these relations and their efforts to change social relations cannot be comprehended without the investigation of the evolution of the connections and relations between them.

The authors' prognostic efforts warrant a positive evaluation. They strive to examine not only the composition of the Soviet working class today, but also the prospects for changes in it as a result of the technological revolution. The extensive and quite innovative use of state statistics is also noteworthy. We know the importance V.I. Lenin attached to statistics and we know of his insistence on "a series of social studies" (1). In spite of certain difficulties stemming from the limited nature of published statistics, the authors were able to list some extremely meaningful categories. This permitted an

approximate estimate of the size of USSR working class strata, categorized on the basis of a specific technological type of production--pre-industrial and early industrial (which have not disappeared completely from our country yet); industrial; scientific-industrial. The authors reveal tendencies toward changes in the correlation of these strata. In their calculations of the number of workers engaged in scientific-industrial labor, however, we feel that they do not give enough consideration to the profound structural changes included in the plan for the period up to the year 2000 in the equipment and technology of production in the USSR. This field of research has already been assessed thoroughly in the pages of our magazine (9), and this eliminates the need for any further discussion of this matter.

The reading of new books on the contemporary Soviet working class repeatedly urges us to underscore the /dialectical-contradictory/ nature of its socio-economic development. Tendencies in the /development/ of the structure and image of the working class and the nature of labor overlap and interact with tendencies in the /reproduction/ of certain features of stagnation and conservatism (and this is demonstrated quite well in the book). For example, the increasing percentage of industrial and scientific-industrial labor (using the authors' terminology) is combined with the tenacity of pre-industrial forms. The increasing concentration of most of the working class at large enterprises and in production and scientific-production associations is combined with the dispersal of many workers among the small labor collectives that are characteristic of, for instance, the service sphere and of shops and sections on kolkhozes, and work at home.

There are other matters of fundamental importance which would seem essential to a discussion of the future development of working class studies in light of M.S. Gorbachev's speech at the all-union conference of social science department heads (in October 1986) and Ye.K. Ligachev's report at that conference. In particular, the report said that "the theory and practice of sociological research are far below present requirements. The state of affairs is no better with regard to the development of the theory of scientific communism" (3).

Problems in the development of the socialist working class are studied by the sociology of Marxism and the theory of scientific communism, and the connection between these fields of science is exceptionally important. We will discuss two "overlapping problems" revealed by a reading of the book by L.A. Gordon and A.K. Nazimova.

The first concerns the connection between social statistics and /sociological research/. The fact that statistics should be fully taken into account in research by sociologists is an axiom which is not disputed openly, but many works in which authors try to avoid the use of statistics are still being published. It is also important to underscore another side of the matter: Statistics alone cannot guarantee a thorough understanding of complex social phenomena.

Attempts to contrast statistical information to sociological research and to study complex social processes, including those taking place in the working

class, without the use of research findings cannot be justified. This is quite evident from all of the experience of sociological research in the USSR and the countries of the socialist community.

Sociological research provides, first of all, answers to several questions that cannot be explained by statistics but are essential to the more comprehensive study of social objects. The general theoretical sociology of Marxism--historical materialism--secures a /comprehensive/ approach to social phenomena. Specific sociological studies, particularly in view of the scarcity of social statistics, can expand the informational basis of studies of the working class. Second, only sociological research can reveal the relationship between the /subjective/ (or evaluative) and /objective/ aspects of any social process, including research on the status and social activities of the working class and on its leading role in society.

It is extremely indicative that in recent years the USSR Central Statistical Administration has frequently resorted to sample surveys of the population on topics traditionally regarded as the sphere of the sociologist's activity. For example, there have been studies of the career plans of rural school-children (10) and of some sociodemographic and sociocultural processes. Several such studies have been included in the 12th Five-Year Plan. We can only applaud the more extensive use of sociological methods by state statistical agencies and hope for the more extensive publication of their results.

Just as the insufficient use of statistics is a serious mistake in some sociological studies, it is an equally regrettable error to ignore the findings of sociological research conducted in various parts of the country, even though a great deal of information has already been accumulated precisely with regard to the Soviet working class (11-13). The fact that the authors of this work do not conduct this kind of research themselves is no reason to avoid a comparative analysis of the findings of other scientists. There is no question that this kind of analysis would enrich the book perceptibly and would elucidate the subject matter more completely.

To avoid making unsubstantiated statements, we will cite some facts. In their analysis of the dynamics of the size of the working class and the social sources of its growth, the authors calculate that the annual increment in the working class will rarely exceed 2-3 percent of the total in the near future and that this class will be increasingly "self-reproducing" as time goes on, acquiring most of its new members from the urban laboring public (4, p 41). This is an important statement; it agrees with the conclusions of sociologists regarding the smaller scales of social changes, and it requires a serious investigation of the new situation in connection with working class supplementation. But the authors should have summarized these figures for the last few years in various parts of the country and thereby made their prediction more valid and revealed the distinctive features of social sources of working class growth in different regions, as these are quite significant distinctions (the central region, the Urals, the Baltic region, Central Asia, etc.).

In connection with this, we should recall that from 50 to 70 percent of the workers surveyed by M.A. Aitov at enterprises in the Volga and southern Urals

inherited the social status of their parents. Among the highly skilled workers and intellectual workers, however, there were from seven to eight times as many from intellectual families than among unskilled laborers (11, pp 25, 27). Therefore, there is a connection between the social status and social origins of workers. Estonian sociologists found that this connection is usually mediated by the level and nature of the education the younger generation acquires (14, p 288). These facts (just as many others), which confirm and considerably supplement the authors' conclusions, were nevertheless ignored by the authors, as were sociological data on the regional features of the social mobility, outlook, and career plans of youth, etc.

The authors use statistics to illustrate changes in the distribution of labor among various economic sectors (4, p 44). Calculations attest to higher rates of increase in the number of workers engaged in trade, public catering, material and technical supply, and procurement (from 49 percent of the total number of laborers in these sectors at the end of the 1950's to 79 percent in the middle of the 1980's). The labor collectives in these sectors, however, usually consist of a few workers (an average of seven in trade and of eight in public catering), and the higher percentage of workers in these economic sectors (which was already mentioned above) has two kinds of social consequences: On the one hand, it strengthens the role and influence of the working class in the non-traditional sphere and, on the other, it scatters workers among many small collectives, leading to many changes in organizational and indoctrinational work. The authors of the book, however, do not use the data of sociological studies of the distinctive features of different segments of the working class, and this is apparently how they avoid the discussion of the conflicting effects of changes in its sectorial structure. It is here, however, that we encounter an extremely important theoretical and political problem, because the industrial working class (especially the nucleus employed directly in industry) is still playing the most important role in the consolidation of the entire working class, in converging its segments, in surmounting the differences between the working class and the intelligentsia, and in enhancing the working class' leading role in all spheres of life in the socialist society in the USSR. Obviously, the differences sociologists have discovered in the labor and social activities, needs and interests, and way of life of different segments and strata of the working class must be taken into account.

Here we come up against the second fundamental question a reading of this new book raises. This is the /correlation of the social and professional structures/ of Soviet society at a time of accelerated socioeconomic development and, consequently, of the working class in the country. The objectives announced at the 27th CPSU Congress assign special importance to this matter.

We already said that the authors' calculations connected with the distribution of workers among different groups depending on the technical and technological level of production (4, p 123), the level of education and required professional training (ibid., p 164), and professional categories differing in terms of the nature and complexity of labor, are of indisputable interest. The tables included in the book permit an assessment of the internal structure of the Soviet working class in terms of several important social characteristics. The authors were obviously unable, however, to see and provide a detailed description

of the internal contradictions in the social development of the Soviet working class. The authors see only the positive side of almost all of the processes they analyze. It would be futile to search for theoretical discussions of the negative and stagnant tendencies in the structure of the working class in this book. Is this not an indication of the "definite isolation from life's requirements" discussed at the 27th party congress, and the "reluctance to tackle the investigation of acute problems in the development of the Soviet society" discussed at the all-union conference of social science department heads? We are compelled to ask this question because there are many negative and inhibiting aspects of the development of the Soviet working class, and their elimination is one of the main objectives of reform. This is why we cannot agree with the authors' interpretation of some processes and tendencies.

Here, for example, is what they have to say about the interrelationship between scientific and technical progress and the increasing socialization of production. Their initial premise is indisputable: The revolutionary and profound changes in the technical base of production as a result of scientific and technical progress and the higher level of production socialization in general are the most important trends in the new stage of our country's socioeconomic development (4, p 18). But can the effects of these trends be regarded as a continuous line of ascent? After all, changes in the actual use of public ownership of the means of production by labor collectives are related not only to increased socialization, but also to the more pronounced economic independence and responsibility of labor collectives and their managers. A qualitatively new level of socialist production organization is the result of the interaction of the conflicting tendencies toward increased centralism and increased democracy. Anyone who analyzes changes in the structure of the working class in this context must see both sides, and not just one of them. Sociological researchers have noticed the transfer of workers in some parts of the country from industry to other, less collectivized sectors of the national economy, such as trade, and this is only one facet of this process.

The authors also describe urbanization as a one-way process. Is it possible not to consider the increasing differentiation of urban and rural settlements depending on their production, administrative, and social functions, particularly the increasing differences between giant, big, medium, and small cities, in analyses of the social significance of urbanization? After all, these differences unavoidably leave their mark on the entire structure of the urban segment of the working class, which is extremely heterogeneous from this standpoint, and this heterogeneity is even growing more pronounced. Furthermore, administrative agencies in the central and northern RSFSR and in some other parts of the country are striving to compensate for the loss of too many rural workers by encouraging citydwellers, usually yesterday's rural teachers, to move to kolkhozes and sovkhoses by building housing, paved roads, and a social infrastructure in rural areas.

An extremely important tendency in the development of the social-class structure of Soviet society is "the convergence of the working class, kolkhoz peasantry, and intelligentsia, and the establishment of a classless social structure, with the working class playing the decisive role in this process" (2, p 155). One of the main stages of this process is the convergence of

workers engaged in physical and mental labor, especially in physical production, where this convergence has been most intense. The social aspect of this process consists in the convergence of the highly skilled stratum of the working class and the engineering and technical intelligentsia. The workings of this process, particularly the formation of a border stratum of worker-intellectuals, whose way of life today provides the clearest reflection of the convergence of the working class and engineering and technical personnel, have been discussed at length in Soviet scientific, especially sociological, literature. The actual existence of this stratum is not disputed by the authors of the book either (although it is true that they prefer to call it "worker-specialists") (4, p 55). But this is not a matter of terminology. What we need is the further investigation of the specific patterns of this convergence, to learn whether the process is onesided (only complicating and intellectualizing the labor of workers) or has another side as well (simultaneously changing the nature of the labor of workers and of engineering and technical personnel). We have written so much about the increasingly technical labor of the intelligentsia and about the creation of a specific stratum of intellectual workers engaged in the maintenance of particularly complex modern equipment and the resolution of new production-technological problems. Of course, the significance of these tendencies is not confined to the changes in the organization of the labor of engineering and technical personnel in production, particularly the experimental inclusion of engineers in production brigades, and changes in other facets of the intelligentsia's way of life--especially its largest segment, the engineering and technical personnel with the most important production, economic, and social functions. The fundamental importance of this process consists in the fact that we are witnessing the creation of a qualitatively new industrial segment of the laboring public, still socially heterogeneous but having many quite significant common features.

Contradictions in the development of this border stratum, connected on the one hand with the use of some engineering and technical personnel in jobs not requiring this high level of training, and on the other with the preference of many specialists to work outside their specialty for various reasons, which depreciates the country's accumulated intellectual potential, have been pointed out repeatedly in sociological literature. The widespread nature of this phenomena is attested to by sociological research conducted in the late 1970's and early 1980's (9). It has been recorded in CPSU Central Committee documents that one out of every two specialists with a higher education works in industry in a job not requiring his skills and specialty (15).

What do the authors of the book have to say about this exceptionally important historical process? Singling out the skill structure and characteristics of labor as some kind of independent indicator and thereby isolating the skill structure from the social-class structure, they arrive at the following odd conclusion: "The elimination of differences from the status of workers is still being displayed most clearly by the least qualified people engaged in mental labor--non-specialist employees" (4, pp 55-56). They go on to say: "In reference to the increasingly equal living conditions of the least qualified employees and workers, we should bear in mind that in the majority of cases the non-specialist employees are not bordering on the nucleus of the working class, but on its peripheral, objectively less developed segments"

(ibid.). It would appear that the social convergence of workers and the intelligentsia is essentially concentrated along the periphery of both social groups. But is this true? There is no question that non-specialist employees have been included in the processes of social convergence. It is just as indisputable that the social status of many professional groups of employees is close to the status of workers. The convergence of people engaged in physical and mental labor, however, is essentially taking place not on the periphery, but precisely in the center, where the social distinctions are being erased between workers engaged, to use the authors' terminology, in industrial and especially in scientific-industrial labor, and technicians and engineers engaged in industrial production. This has been repeatedly corroborated by the results of special sociological studies published in the scientific press (see, for example, 13, vol II, pp 11-28). But these authors, we repeat, show no interest in specific sociological studies.

The reliance on statistics alone does not make an accurate quantitative assessment of this phenomenon possible. According to the population census of 1979 (these data are cited in the book: 4, p 77), the number of "worker-intellectuals" is calculated as the total number of workers with a secondary specialized, partial higher, or higher education--7.5 million people. This figure seems too high. First of all, people with a partial higher education (night and correspondence courses) can be engaged in any kind of labor. On the other hand, as we have mentioned above, many specialists are employed in jobs or perform the labor of unskilled or semiskilled workers or, in general, have degrees in fields having little to do with the professional duties they perform.

It appears that the authors do not see the basic and major /social-class/ structure behind the /socioprofessional/ structure, and this is attested to by summary Table No 19 at the end of the book (4, p 192). The authors include various skill strata of the working class (for example, those engaged in unskilled and semiskilled labor) and various segments (agricultural, industrial, consumer service, and even "information processing-related") in the socioprofessional categories. They lose sight of the fact, however, that the social-class structure of the society in the USSR includes not only the main elements (classes and social groups), but also their subelements--social /strata/ and /segments/, and that there are social differences between the latter as well as the former, and in many cases the latter are just as significant as the former.

Referring once again to the data of sociological research, we can easily see significant differences between segments of the working class in many meaningful social characteristics, both objective and subjective (13, vol II).

Therefore, this generally interesting and useful monograph contains much that is debatable. We must say this with all frankness in view of the special importance of its subject matter. The tasks set for social scientists by the 27th party congress and clarified in the decree of the CPSU Central Committee "On KOMMUNIST Magazine" and in the materials of the all-union conference of social science department heads (1-3 October 1986) demand the restructuring of the social sciences, theoretical initiative, and the thorough analysis of all of the complexities and contradictory features of current processes in society.

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AUGMENTING THE SOCIOECONOMIC POTENTIAL OF THE WORKING CLASS

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[Article by Yurik Vartanovich Arutyunyan, doctor of historical sciences, professor, head of the Sociology Division of the Ethnography Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences imeni N.N. Miklukho-Maklay, and permanent contributing author to our journal, Valeriy Borisovich Golofast, candidate of philosophical sciences, acting sector head at the Institute of Socioeconomic Problems of the USSR Academy of Sciences, and permanent contributing author to our journal, and Vitaliy Semenovich Lelchuk, doctor of historical sciences, professor, and senior researcher at the History Institute, USSR Academy of Sciences. This is his first contribution to our journal]

[Text] The strategy of accelerated socioeconomic development is aimed at the qualitative transformation of all facets of Soviet society: the radical renewal of its material and technical base with the aid of the achievements of the scientific and technical revolution; the improvement of social relations, especially economic relations; profound changes in the nature and content of labor and in the material and spiritual conditions of human life; and the heightened activity of all political, social, and ideological institutions (1). The working class has an exceptionally important role to play in the accomplishment of these reforms.

It would be difficult to name another topic of social research arousing this much interest. The bibliography of philosophical, historical, and sociological works on working class affairs lists thousands of publications. The quantity of research, however, is not always accompanied by improved quality. Furthermore, dogmatism and scholastic theorizing, the tendency to deliberately ignore actual trends, including negative ones, in our life, tendentiousness, and the practice of shuffling facts to fit into preconceived formulas are widespread in research in the social sciences. This, as M.S. Gorbachev remarked, kills "the vital spirit and all of the appeal of the emotional intellectualism of Marxism-Leninism" (2).

This problem-free vision of social development has been reflected in the definite idealization of the working class in recent years. The unthinking ascertainment of its vanguard role and the convergence and flourishing of all social groups and strata in the Soviet society has frequently caused

researchers to anticipate achievements. The weak link in social research, in our opinion, is the issue of the effects of economic relations, or production relations in the broader context, on the social composition and way of life of the working class. Above all, this applies to stagnant phenomena in the economy, the lower growth rates of labor productivity, the declining effect of wages on final results, the widespread unsubstantiated equalization of wages, the artificially created shortage of manpower, the delays in the retooling of production, the "expenditure" principle of planning, etc. Obviously, these tendencies cannot fail to affect the social development of the working class. Social scientists, however, have preferred to underscore the cultivation of "proprietary feelings," although the worker's actual status as the proprietor of socialist production has left something to be desired and has therefore often been only a parenthetical title. The need for studies of the actual socioeconomic circumstances of the working class in the country, problem studies which not only describe the state of affairs but are also geared to the future, is particularly urgent today.

The book by L.A. Gordon and A.K. Nazimova (4) is of professional interest and warrants discussion for several reasons. First of all, it analyzes and summarizes large quantities of statistical information, especially the results of four all-union censuses and large-scale sociological studies conducted in the 1970's under the supervision of L.A. Gordon and E.V. Klopov in Taganrog and of V.A. Yadov (with the participation of A.K. Nazimova) in Leningrad (on the strength of its indices alone, the monograph could serve as a statistical reference work--although a brief one--on the working class). In general, the connection between sociology and statistics was of much less interest to the authors than the immediate object of their research--the social image of the working class--but the procedures of the sociological and statistical approaches are of exceptional importance--at least as far as the investigation and analysis of the authors' line of reasoning are concerned--and we will be discussing these in greater detail below. In the second place, despite all of the importance of the empirical base of research, it cannot be a goal in itself. The data are absolutely "obedient" and do not escape, as is frequently the case, the authors' control. Furthermore, they are strictly subordinate to the highest level of research--the hypothetical vision of the social situation--and the real problem is always the focus even when the text resembles the methodical and meticulous "mastication" of empirical facts. We must admit that the study covers an extremely broad range of topics. L.A. Gordon and A.K. Nazimova examine the traditional topics representing the main elements of the theory of the social structure of society (these include, for example, prospects for surmounting social-class differences and the reinforcement of the working class' leading role) and "subjects" that appear to be of little significance on the surface. One example is the statement that "the labor of the automatic lathe operator or the operator of gas heaters often consists of a limited group of specialized and extremely simple actions within the capabilities of any person" (4, p 110). A closer look reveals extremely interesting and complex problems, the resolution of which will determine today's guidelines and the rate of socioeconomic development for decades to come. In this case they are referring to the partial automation that reduces the worker to a secondary "component" of the machinery. It is indicative that the authors expand the subject matter of their work by outlining or noting a problem rather

than bypassing it, even when the solution is unclear and requires more detailed analysis. Obviously, this approach will leave them open to criticism, but we are convinced that the authors have a sincere interest in this. In the third place, the monograph contains a relatively complete discussion of the theory of technical and technological types of production as the main factor contributing to changes in the social image of the working class. The analysis and objective assessment of this theory, various aspects of which have been elucidated in earlier works by L.A. Gordon and A.K. Nazimova,¹ and by E.V. Klopov (there is reason to regard him as the co-author of this point of view, because his recently published book (5) could be combined with the study by Gordon and Nazimova into a single entity), are extremely relevant and necessary.

The fact is that the traditional view of the dynamics of the social structure in general and of the socioeconomic development of the working class in particular does not explain many actual trends and contradictions in social life. With some reservations, we could say that the theory of the "self-development" and "self-improvement" of socialist production relations dictated an oversimplified interpretation of the external dialectical connection between the technological methods of production and the socioeconomic development of society. The authors have been able to find a new and interesting approach to this matter, and we will discuss its strong and weak points below. Here we can confidently say that the important job of developing a Marxist alternative to "technological determinism" has begun.

There is also another feature of the monograph which would be wrong to ignore. The very title clearly defines the authors' intention: They wish to describe not only the directions of the growth of the working class' production and social potential (this has been done by many researchers), but also to reveal upcoming changes in its size, composition, and relations with other social groups (even when predictions of this kind have been made, they have been extremely general). Works of a prognostic nature are always useful, but they are particularly important at turning points in history, when there is an obvious change of stages in the advancement of productive forces and production relations. Our society has now reached this kind of frontier.

Let us concentrate on three basic questions we find debatable and try to determine how valid the authors' arguments and conclusions are. These are the question of the possibilities and limitations of using statistical methods in sociological research, the problem of the interrelationship between the class and socioprofessional structures and, finally, the theory of technical and technological stages. It goes without saying that the contents of the book are not confined to these matters, and this discussion is dictated by a desire to examine the most debatable statements.

Statistical or Sociological Approach?

The inadequacy of our social statistics is no secret. This is not simply a matter of quantitative indicators, but of the categorization criteria used in statistical publications. As far as the working class is concerned, specialists have no opportunity to work with systems of classification in which such

major characteristics as skills, education, age, wages, and the content of labor are all taken into account simultaneously. There are no published data on intra- and inter-sectorial differences in earnings, etc. The main "unit of computation" in statistics on the social structure is the profession, but the number of publications on the distribution of the employed population among professions has regrettably decreased from census to census. Suffice it to say that census results were published in 56 volumes in 1926, 17 volumes in 1959, 7 volumes in 1970, and 1 volume in 1979! We could easily continue our list of complaints, but we must return to our discussion of the book.

The monograph contains several conclusive examples of the intricate recomputations researchers must make in order to establish the tendency they are investigating. In this context, tables are valuable in themselves. For example, Table 9, "The Distribution of Workers Engaged in Labor of an Industrial Nature in the USSR National Economy by Groups Depending on the Technical and Technological Level of the Production in Which They are Engaged (Estimates, Percentages)" (4, p 123), is the valuable result of research.

It is easy to see that the authors approach the data of surveys with considerable restraint. Sociological information is usually local and is limited in space, time, and meaning. In addition to everything else, this means that the conclusions drawn from a survey can be extended beyond the surveyed group and the specific time period only on the level of theoretical--or, more precisely, heuristic and approximate--comparisons. The procedurally accurate comparison of data by means of the construction of tables is quite rarely practiced in sociology, and the reason is the lack of standard tools of measurement. This is particularly true of subjective-judgmental indicators, comparisons of which presuppose procedural experiments, including experiments in the "equalization" of variables. Even in interregional and all-union studies, where standardized tools of research can be used, the comparison of sociological data is not automatically reliable. For this reason, specialists concerned about the accuracy of the quantitative analysis of information must limit the empirical base of their conclusions considerably. L.A. Gordon and A.K. Nazimova were in this kind of situation when they took statistics as their basis and used the results of sociological research as material for generalizations. This is apparently one of the reasons for their preference for all-union census results. We can only regret that the interesting sociological projects of Soviet scientists were not taken into account by the authors. Their results could have enriched and clarified the analysis of the workers' way of life considerably.

When we read the book, we can see that the role of statistical information in the study of social problems must not be overestimated. Many data are acquired by means of polling (for example, during the census) or other methods of calculation whose accuracy leaves much to be desired, particularly when the data recorded are the respondent's self-appraisals (for example, the census includes a question about "fluency" in other languages). In spite of probable systematic errors, however, statistical information is indispensable to the sociologist, and the authors have proved this.

Both sociological and statistical indicators have their strong and weak points and it is hardly valid to say that one is better than the other. Sociology is

distinguished not by the survey, but by the investigation of problems and the comprehensive and specific analysis of social processes.

Social-Class and Socioprofessional Structures

This is a traditional problem in the science of sociology. The idea that the social structure of the contemporary Soviet society is not confined to the balance of the working class, kolkhoz peasantry, and intelligentsia has been expressed several times in literature. Nevertheless, the majority of works dealing with this topic repeat the well-known statements based on this three-part formula. In the book in question, another attempt is made to give us a deeper understanding of the social structure of society during the current stage in its development.

What do the authors suggest?

They proceed from the assumption that social-class division constitutes the basis of social relations. They believe, however, that this is a necessary but inadequate basis for the comprehension of the great variety of social connections and for the consideration of the interests of different population groups in social policy.

This is precisely why intraclass and interclass divisions, especially socioprofessional ones, occupy a prominent place in the concept suggested by L.A. Gordon and A.K. Nazimova. The socioprofessional structure is determined not only by the technical homogeneity of labor operations, but also by many significant common features of the social image of various categories of workers: the similar conditions and nature of the social functions of their labor, the existence of specific interests, and differences in family circumstances, culture, mentality, and way of life (4, p 158). Socioprofessional groups should not be contrasted to classes. The authors stress that these socioprofessional divisions are not solely responsible for the creation of different relationships to the means of production and forms of ownership. But these facets often reflect significant features of the social image, and the system of socioprofessional groups and strata therefore represents an important cross-section of the social structure of society and, as the authors call it, a specific subsystem (4, p 159). Nevertheless, the emphasis on socioprofessional division unwittingly causes the authors to lose sight of, for example, a class-forming criterion as important as the form of ownership. This criterion is extremely important to an understanding of the social image of workers.

The gradual establishment of the classless but still heterogeneous structure of our society does not mean the near disappearance of all social divisions. The current stage is distinguished by the much more complex process by which one type of social distinction--class-related--loses its strength while others retain their significance: socioprofessional, sociodemographic, socio-territorial, etc. As M.S. Gorbachev stressed, we need "a more precise understanding of the interests of various social, sociodemographic, and professional groups" (3).

The conceptual approach to the analysis of specific statistics and sociological findings on the basis of socioprofessional criteria allows the authors to reveal the complex and contradictory nature of processes in the social development of the working class and the Soviet society as a whole. For example, L.A. Gordon and A.K. Nazimova use statistics to prove that the eradication of differences in the status of workers and employees has been most intense on the periphery of these groups to date. In the future, however, the convergence of workers and specialists engaged in the industries securing scientific and technical progress will be of decisive significance. The fact that significant sociocultural differences still exist here attests to the need for special measures to retool the workplaces of industrial workers, improve their skills, and develop socialist economic self-management.

What is of exceptional importance to practice in this context?

The retention of sectors of the national economy where industrialization is just being completed and where large groups of workers perform operations connected with the pre-industrial or early industrial types of production nurtures conservative economic thinking and maintains the force of inertia and old mental and behavioral stereotypes. This conservatism is reinforced by objective features of the social psychology of some groups of managers and workers whose traditions, habits, and methods of economic management took shape at a time of extensive economic development.

Theory of Technical and Technological Types of Production

Sociologists rarely engage in historical analysis. The dialectics of the historical and the logical, however, provide colossal opportunities for the investigation and resolution of social problems. The authors of the monograph in question reveal qualitative changes in the social composition and way of life of the working class between the end of the 1930's and the middle of the 1980's, changes engendered by the industrial transformation of the country.

L.A. Gordon and A.K. Nazimova examine the changes with an obvious impact on the working class and they also analyze the processes that have just become apparent and are beginning to gather strength. This approach is based on a set of concepts distinguishing between three types of production in the Soviet economy: pre-industrial and early industrial, developed industrial, and scientific-industrial. This makes it possible to examine the working class in connection with the group of socioeconomic changes leading to a qualitatively different state of the economic system.

As we can see, the context of research changes significantly: The social image of the working class is effectively associated with the interaction of productive forces and production relations.

There are two striking features in the logical substantiation of this set of concepts. Intensive industrialization influenced the dynamics of the social structure of Soviet society, especially in the 1930's, 1940's, and 1950's. Stressing that this stage of development was historically natural, the authors remark that the centralized management of economic processes according to plan

made it possible, first of all, to surmount and, to some extent, to neutralize disparities and temporary delays in some sectors; second, future advances can be anticipated from the fact that our country experienced the industrial stage of urbanization in the 1950's, 1960's, and 1970's, and that a new phase in its development is due.

The diversity of working class sociocultural potential, which is the result of technical and technological advances and of high-speed mass migration to the cities, could generate or impede progress. Demands for the accelerated quantitative growth of cities and the political and economic support and regulation of mass migration are giving way to the imperatives of qualitative, proportional, comprehensive, and balanced social development and the psychological, social, and cultural mobilization of the most advanced, mature, politically aware, and enterprising workers. Real opportunities exist for the radical augmentation of the social potential of the entire population, the establishment of a new quality of life, the further improvement of labor morality and, on this basis, the acceleration of social development.

One of the results of this guiding concept is the possibility of studying the connection between the reform in economic management and the projected changes in the social quality of different strata. It goes without saying that methods of economic management, types of production, and directions and goals of social policy in real life do not have the clear distinctions they have in the authors' proposed scheme. This scheme, as they acknowledge, "covers phenomena only in their most general form, reflecting the fundamental laws and tendencies toward change, but leaving many other important facets of the real social process unexplained. In particular, the succession of stages in the development of production is only perceptible over a long period of time, while elements of different technical and technological structures coexist in production at any given time" (p 98).

An analysis of the dynamics of worker employment in the early industrial, developed industrial, and scientific-industrial types of production over the last four decades suggests that the start of the new reconstruction on the basis of scientific and technical progress (the establishment of scientific-industrial production) in the USSR national economy today is being accompanied by the completion of the industrialization of many divisions and even fields of production (the reduction and, in the future, the gradual elimination of pre-machine labor). At the end of the 1970's around 35 percent of all industrial workers were engaged in various types of pre-industrial or early industrial labor, and only around 13 percent were engaged in scientific-industrial labor (4, p 123). This reveals the scales of the dual process of national economic development, all of the complexities of the projected reforms, and the problems and contradictions connected with the acceleration of socioeconomic progress.

The establishment and consolidation of scientific-industrial production are indissolubly connected with the technological revolution, the thorough reorganization of the economic mechanism, and the establishment of an effective and flexible system of management. Something else is also noteworthy. Scientific-industrial labor is performed in the majority of cases by workers with high

professional and general standards, workers who want broader, more enterprising, and realistic participation in management and who want to have more influence in the organization of production and in the distribution and use of the results of labor. Therefore, both the technical and technological organization of production and the "quality" of the human factor indicate the need for the more radical reform of economic management and a transition to economic methods of management on all levels and the thorough democratization of public life. This is not simply a matter of a reflection of the current socioeconomic situation, but of strategic guidelines for the future development of the country. L.A. Gordon and A.K. Nazimova have taken a quite definite position. "Measures connected with the establishment of elementary order are not enough for a transition from industrial production to scientific-industrial production," the authors write. "The successful combination of the socialist economy with the technological revolution will require, in addition to elementary improvements, the thorough reorganization of the economic and socioeconomic mechanism; this presupposes the gradual replacement of methods of administrative-directive management with a system consisting of a variety of forms of primarily indirect regulation by means of plans, in which economic and social units will have considerable powers and possibilities for self-organization. Within the framework of this reorganization it will be necessary to secure the increased independence and responsibility of enterprises by means of genuine cost accounting and the extensive use of contract and commodity-money relations, and of 'economic' methods of economic management in general" (4, pp 208-209). This position warrants approval and support.

In addition, there is some obvious absolutization in the authors' approach to the determination of the dependence of working class development on the rates and scales of industrialization in the economic sectors where pre-industrial and early industrial types of labor still prevail, and reforms to expand the sphere of scientific-industrial labor. Without losing sight of the considerable amount of manual labor used in the national economy, we should remember that such concepts as pre-machine and early industrial labor and so forth are conditional to some extent. We must not ignore the general changes in the social development of the country, the cultural, scientific, and technical progress of Soviet society, including the working class, and the effects of these changes on all laboring strata. Just as in the years of the pre-war five-year plans, under the conditions of the current technological revolution the difference in labor productivity between technologically advanced and backward enterprises depends not only, and sometimes not as much, on the technical level of the workplace as on the organization of collective labor. New forms of economic management and production organization and the establishment of efficient specialization and cooperation will multiply the output of products.

Excessively categorical and rigid formulas could lead to the misinterpretation of the position taken by the authors, who have concentrated only on a few tendencies in the development of the working class. The vantage point they have chosen for their analysis could also be disputed, along with the theoretical logic revealing the effects of technical and technological progress on the social image of the working class, the statement that socioprofessional differences will be the deciding factor of differentiation after the transition

to the classless structure of the socialist society, and some other issues raised in the book. But this is precisely the kind of debates we need today.

Obviously, the book cannot claim, and certainly does not claim, to be the final authority on matters which are frequently interpreted in different ways. By giving rise to unavoidable arguments, it stimulates thought, and this is an indisputable achievement in any scientific work.

FOOTNOTES

1. Some of them are included in the bibliography of the article by M.N. Rutkevich and F.R. Filippov in this issue--Ed.

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BOOK REVIEWS

MODERN ECONOMIC THINKING

Moscow SOTSIOLOGICHESKIYE ISSLEDOVANIYA in Russian No 1, Jan-Feb 87 (signed to press 21 Jan 87) pp 144-145

[Review by M.A. Manuil'skiy of book "Sovremennoye ekonomicheskoye myshleniye" by K.A. Ulybin, Moscow, Politizdat, 1986, 239 pages]

[Text] The topic of this work is as much a sociological as an economic issue, and the author is fully aware of this. Two aspects can be discerned in his approach. The first is connected with the analysis of contemporary economic views and the economic mechanism. Economists and management experts have the deciding word in the assessment of these matters, but the sociologist is not indifferent to this subject either, because it concerns human activity and, what is more, this is something that lies at the basis of social organization. The second aspect concerns the "odyssey" of concepts and views. We must immediately say that the kind of problems studied in the sociology of thinking were not analyzed separately, although they are mentioned by the author.

The aim of economic thinking, the author stresses, "is the comprehension of the fundamental and basic sphere of society for the purpose of revealing real and actual processes in the functioning of social production and its history, objective laws, and developmental tendencies" (p 11). Elaborating on this approach, the author bases his analysis on the following principles: First, that economic thinking as a part of human thinking is a social process. It became something more than logic long ago, and ceased to be the monopoly of men in offices long ago. Second, that thinking is always subjective, belonging to a specific subject, and, consequently (and third), that it is directly related to the interests of people, especially their material interests.

The author goes on to analyze the ways in which these principles are revealed in economic practice. Above all, he examines the composition of economic thinking, correctly focusing attention on the fact that it reveals its real nature only in practice. In this connection, K.A. Ulybin analyzes the transition from theory to practice through the chain of "hypotheses, concepts, economic theories, and scientifically substantiated economic recommendations and decisions."

The organic connection between thinking and historical practice permits the correct assessment of a matter as important as the socialist type of economic

thinking. Its distinguishing feature is that it is "essentially the thinking of associated producers, equal co-proprietors of social production, taking an active part in its organization and management" (p 21). What keeps an individual from feeling like a full-fledged and efficient proprietor? This is not simply a matter of gnosiological barriers. Analyzing the change in styles of thinking, the author directs attention to methods of management and specific economic objectives. The extensive development of the economy gradually led to a situation in which "an indicator of the overall results of production alone was chosen as the basis for evaluation" (p 88). Moreover, the indicator (gross volume, standard net product, profits, etc.) began to rule minds. It was regarded as the key to the resolution of pressing problems. But the economy is not a bookkeeping office. It must produce products, and not indicators. The main criterion of the effectiveness of social production, the author correctly stresses, "can (and must!--M.M.) be the maximal satisfaction of the individual's needs with minimal expenditures of social labor" (p 97).

These objectives can be attained only by people who have become genuine co-proprietors of social production. If we follow the author's example and look at the situation from their point of view, we immediately see how dramatically the range of economic thinking has grown. It is necessary to secure the priority development of the national economic sectors satisfying the cultural and material needs of people, dramatically increase "investments in the individual" in production and elsewhere, and take the ideological, moral, and psychological factors and ecological consequences of production into account--in order words, base any economic decision on "thorough and comprehensive social expertise" (p 47).

Unfortunately, one important element is missing from the new points of reference the author suggests. Today the effectiveness of decisions depends not only on the agreement of various elements and material reinforcement, but also on their correspondence to the principles of social justice and their ability to secure these principles. Genuinely new and progressive economic thinking is always a moral act.

How does contemporary economic thinking take shape? First of all, old stereotypes and biases must be surmounted, methods of accelerating socioeconomic development must be explained in detail to administrative personnel, and active participation in reforms and in the implementation of new principles of economic management must be secured. Unfortunately, these ideas have not become the rule in everyday life yet. Why not? Part of the reason is the tendency to isolate indoctrinational work and economic education from specific economic problems. Another reason is the oversimplified view of the subject of economic activity that was the prevailing opinion for many years. Not long ago people thought that the fertile soil of a high level of consciousness would guarantee the success of any new undertaking. Later, after a difficult struggle, this opinion was supplanted by the generally accurate opinion that an idea can only be implemented if the individual has a material interest in it. And this is not all. After all, any influence on the worker is mediated by the entire system of his personal qualities, and not only by his views or his physical needs. The author demonstrates that the development of the new way of economic thinking is indissolubly connected with the development of the individual.

The emphasis on the fact that this kind of thinking can be fully characteristic only of the active individual is of great methodological and practical importance. In this case and in several others, however, the author frequently confines himself only to the ascertainment of the problem. His discussion of, for example, the connection between theoretical and practical thinking is inadequate. He also fails to reveal the interconnection of economic thinking with morality, particularly such fundamental features as conscience and dignity. It seems to us that the book would be greatly enriched by the more extensive use of sociological information and the latest data of legal, sociopsychological, and ethical research. After all, the author's topic is interdisciplinary by its very nature.

Economic thinking is only contemporary when it is also sociological. It is exceptionally difficult for the worker and the minister to employ new approaches to the realities of economic life. Under these conditions, the very ascertainment of the problem raised for the first time, as far as we know, by K.A. Ulybin and the thorough and original resolution of several of its aspects warrant maximum support. It will be easier for those who continue the work the author has begun: They will certainly learn something from the strong and weak points of this necessary and, in general, useful book.

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DEVIATIONS FROM THE NORM IN THE SOCIALIST WAY OF LIFE AMONG YOUTH: ESSENCE AND CORRECTION

Moscow SOTSIOLOGICHESKIYE ISSLEDOVANIYA in Russian No 1, Jan-Feb 87 (signed to press 21 Jan 87) pp 146-147

[Review by V.G. Alekseyeva of book "Otkloneniya ot norm sotsialisticheskogo obraza zhizni v molodezhnoy srede: sushchnost i puti preodoleniya" by S.I. Plaksiy, Moscow, Molodaya gvardiya, 1986, 285 pages]

[Text] "The future will depend largely on...the kind of young people we raise today. This is the job of the entire party and the entire population. This is the most important, fundamental job of the Leninist Komsomol," M.S. Gorbachev said at the 27th CPSU Congress. The greatly heightened interest of social scientists in comprehensive studies of the problems of youth and the disclosure of the successes and shortcomings of our social indoctrination are therefore no coincidence today.

The qualitative reorganization of different spheres of life presupposes, on the one hand, the further improvement of socioeconomic conditions and, on the other, the elimination of the deviations from socialist morality and law that are actually impeding our advancement; for this reason, one of the main areas of ideological indoctrination is "the eradication of morals inconsistent with our socialist way of life" (p 51). This important but insufficiently investigated problem is the subject of S.I. Plaksiy's book. As the author points out, a comprehensive investigation of problems in surmounting deviations from the norm in the socialist way of life cannot be accomplished in a relatively short work. This requires the efforts of many scientists and of several fields of science in general, and for this reason the author of this book concentrates on deviations from socialist communal living among youth, especially deviations of a moral nature and pre-criminal behavior. This limitation of his research goals allowed the author to concentrate on a thorough analysis of his topic, which considerably enhances the scientific and practical value of the work.

In the socialist way of life the norm always reflects the public interest; consequently, deviant behavior is contrary to this interest. Proceeding from this assumption, the author tries to reveal the sources and mechanisms of deviant behavior in youth. Using this approach, he concludes that the conflicting interests of individuals, of various social groups and strata, and of

the society as a whole must be taken into account, because these conflicts ultimately decide whether the individual accepts or rejects certain standards.

In line with this, the author lists the basic levels of deviant behavior in youth: the general social level, reflecting the most deep-seated tendencies in the younger generation's integration into the social structure of society; the group level, on which the sociopsychological determinants of violations of the norms of socialist communal living play the main role; finally, the personal level, depending largely on the mental "constitution" of the individual, and particularly on mental and biological defects.

The author examines different types of deviant behavior in various spheres of public life--these are violations of moral and administrative standards in production, in the home, and in society. The causes of this behavior, S.I. Plaksiy notes, are not confined to individual circumstances. The unsatisfactory organization of production, delays in the supply of workplaces with raw materials, unfinished work pieces, and tools, the absence of the necessary accounting and control, the low consumer service standards, and the limited opportunities for leisure activity are of decisive significance.

The tenacity of the consumer mentality is discussed at length in the book. Social scientists and practical workers have had some difficulty in defining its fundamental features and criteria. The most general explanation of this mentality, cited in the book, is the thesis that the individual is "a slave to possessions," which apparently signifies a preoccupation with material possessions to the detriment of spiritual values. This beaten track, however, leads the author to a procedural blind alley because it does not reveal the essence of these deviations: This requires the kind of specific indicators that would stem logically from the definition. But because this definition is a borrowed metaphor rather than the result of logical analysis, it cannot reveal even the ethical features that put this mentality and the individuals possessing it into a specific "deviant" category. In fact, the terms "practical," "mercenary," and "utilitarian," to which the author resorts in this case, are equivalent to the "consumer mentality" in terms of the level of abstraction and do not reflect a mental progression from the abstract to the concrete. Furthermore, adjectives such as "practical" are not always negative because there are different kinds of practicality.

In our opinion, the author was more successful in his attempt to explain the phenomenon of "possessiveness" through the concept of "reasonable demands," implying the "correspondence of the individual's needs to the objective capabilities of society" (p 174). Ideally, in the author's opinion, this should be a matter of the "correspondence of the individual's needs to his labor contribution" (p 175). To date, according to his research data, the needs of a relatively broad segment of youth (especially students) are far in excess of aims regarding labor contribution.

Singling out alcohol abuse and the encouragement of teenagers to drink alcohol as one of the most dangerous forms of deviant behavior, S.I. Plaksiy cites research data to prove that these practices are rooted in the traditions of group and family socializing. Without questioning the accuracy of this

conclusion, we must say that the author should have analyzed the socio-economic and psychological factors promoting alcohol consumption and revealed the connection between alcohol abuse and shortcomings in family and school training and the low moral and aesthetic standards of some young people.

The prevention and elimination of deviations from the norm in the socialist way of life are discussed at length in the book. Above all, the discussion concerns the role of public opinion and the ways and means of encouraging more vigorous educative efforts by labor collectives. The author examines public opinion as a shaper and "regulator" of moral attitudes. According to research findings analyzed in the monograph, it has the greatest influence on the behavior of youth in the production sphere, which clearly attests to the labor collective's considerable potential to develop a socialist attitude toward labor. In practice, however, this potential is still rarely used. This is an extremely important conclusion from the standpoint of the improvement of indoctrinational work, but it would be even more significant if the author had clarified it with a thorough investigation of the factors diminishing the socio-educational potential of student and labor collectives, especially since he offers conclusive evidence of the dramatically increased influence of informal groups in the establishment and modification of the fundamental values of youth and the duality and conflicts engendered by the conflicting roles teenagers play in systems of formal and informal communication.

In conclusion we must say that the author's line of reasoning and conclusions on several matters discussed in the book would certainly be more complete and more conclusive if he did not confine himself to his own opinions but also used--employing the method of secondary analysis--the many theoretical and empirical arguments already accumulated in sociological science. This would make the author's remarks about the dependence of deviant behavior and its prevention on urbanization, migration by youth, the social environment, and informal groups more valid.

Obviously, these remarks and comments should not obscure the significance of the task the author has successfully completed in this interesting and necessary work, especially since they apply only to certain aspects of the research summarized in the book, which in itself signifies a serious advance in the investigation of a relevant and complex topic.

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SMALL AND DISPERSED ETHNIC GROUPS IN EUROPEAN USSR (GEOGRAPHIC PATTERNS OF SETTLEMENT AND CULTURAL TRADITIONS)

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[Review by E.L. Melkonyan of book "Malyye i dispersnyye etnicheskiye gruppy v yevropeyskoy chast'i SSSR (geografiya rasseleniya i kulturnyye traditsii)," edited by I.I. Krupnik, Moscow, MFGO, 1985, 130 pages]

[Text] Sociologists do not lavish their attention on everyday communication between ethnic groups and inter-ethnic contacts. A close examination, however, reveals that these matters are among the most difficult and pertinent problems in the practice of sociology. The subject of this review, an anthology prepared by the ethnography commission of the Moscow branch of the USSR Geographic Society, provides clear evidence of this. The book is relevant not only because of the abundance of new and original ethnographic-historical information it contains, but also--and this is its chief merit--because it solves many theoretical and methodological problems in the study of ethnic minorities as a unique social phenomenon. In particular, the articles on the Jewish and Armenian ethnic groups are of definite interest from the standpoint of the more detailed classification of ethnic minorities.

The Jewish ethnic minorities living in various countries (they took shape after the Romans conquered Jerusalem in the 1st century BC) and the Armenian communities in different countries (this applies only to those living in strange lands as a result of the Young Turk policy of genocide and the deportation of Armenians from West Armenia in 1915) can be put in a special category because of the specific reasons why they had to leave their native lands. In our opinion, the term "diaspora" can be used in reference to it. This term, which was originally used only in reference to the history of the Jews, essentially has no strict scientific status today and is frequently used in reference to virtually all known types of ethnic minorities. There is a significant difference between ethnic groups which take shape as a result of emigration of a political nature, not to mention an economic nature, and a true diaspora, however, and this difference is that in the latter case the overwhelming majority of the ethnic group is driven out of its homeland by force and settles outside its own ethnic territory with no chance of returning home.

On the other hand, as the history of the Jews and Armenians testifies, the restoration of a government on their ethnic territory (or part of it) does not

lead to the automatic repatriation of all or even most of the other members of the group in the diaspora category, because they gradually become integrated into the sociocultural environment of the specific society in which they live.

The functioning of any ethnic minority is distinguished by two parallel and interrelated but conflicting processes--assimilation and the maintenance of ethnocultural differences. The mechanisms of the second process represent one of the central issues raised in the anthology. We will discuss it in greater detail. First, we must stress that the functioning of any ethnic community necessarily presupposes the existence of a specific class of means (we will call them ethnopreserving mechanisms of culture) of promoting its reproduction in space and in time. These, in turn, can be divided into ethnodifferentiating and ethnoprotective mechanisms. On the level of the ethnosocial organism, different elements of the ethnic culture perform the ethnodifferentiating function. As far as ethnic minorities are concerned, these elements (such as language and religion) serve as ethnoprotective mechanisms, securing the self-maintenance of the community in a different ethnic cultural environment--that is, within the confines of another ethnosocial organism. There are also some specific mechanisms promoting the consolidation of the members of ethnic groups (ethnic associations, charitable organizations, etc.). The members of any ethnic minority have a certain set of ethnoprotective means, connected primarily with the ethnocultural traditions of maternal ethnic groups and with the distinctive features of the sociocultural environment in the host country. The gradual transformation of certain means and the replacement of some with others that are more effective in the preservation of the ethnic group are also natural processes. In spite of all the diversity of ethnoprotective mechanisms, some are common to virtually all minorities. One is the factor of territorial settlement patterns. The anthology correctly stresses that compact settlement is an essential condition for the maintenance of the unique features of the ethnic culture. The spatial (or territorial) consolidation of the ethnic minority is one of the necessary prerequisites for the organization of communal activity, the reinforcement of ties within the group, and the optimization of the mechanisms of ethnocultural continuity. The initial efforts of ethnic minorities to settle in compact communities in their new host countries, however, were not always successful. This usually happens in rural areas, but only when land is available and manpower is scarce. This is what happened when the Armenian rural communities were founded in the Abkhaz ASSR. M.Yu. Chumalov notes that in these cases--that is, when the economic development of a region became necessary--the state not only established "the legal bases for colonization, envisaging privileges for new settlers," but also took measures to attract colonists from abroad (p 108). In general, the rural settlements of the Ukrainians in Canada and the Armenians in the San Joaquin Valley in California were created under the same circumstances in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. It would be difficult to overestimate the importance of rural settlements in the self-maintenance of ethnic minorities, especially in view of their distance from cities, the very structure of rural life, the absence of widespread inter-ethnic contacts, etc. As one article says, "settlement patterns within small communities helped to keep the traditional Jewish culture alive longer here than anywhere else" (p 67). This is equally true of other ethnic groups, such as the Kurds in Georgia and Armenia (p 119).

Ethnic minorities function under qualitatively different conditions in cities, especially large ones, where inter-ethnic contacts are quite intensive. It is true that the majority of immigrants of the same ethnic group usually settled first in a specific neighborhood or region. The initial stage of socio-cultural adaptation to the local environment, however, was followed by the social differentiation of this generally homogeneous community. Members of the second generation, and especially the third, who had been educated locally and therefore enjoyed a higher socioprofessional status--and, consequently, greater mobility--separated from the group and settled outside the original community (the prolonged existence of Chinese neighborhoods, or Chinatowns, in some cities in the West is the result, in our opinion, of racial as well as ethnocultural differences from the dominant ethnic group).

In light of this, it is understandable that the specific settlement patterns of ethnic minorities are an important part of their history, and it is not surprising that the authors of several articles dealing specifically with this topic do not confine themselves to a simple description of settlement patterns but try to disclose universal trends and natural laws. This is attested to, in particular, by the extensive use (often with a new interpretation) of well-known concepts--"dispersed," "ethnodispersed," "compact," and "dense" settlement patterns--and the introduction of new concepts--"peripheral ethnic territory" (p 59), "ethnoenclave model of settlement" (p 77), etc. Although not all of these new terms are adequately substantiated (for instance, we feel that the term "ethnoenclave" is virtually identical in meaning to the terms "ethnocompact" and "ethnoconfined"), this is nevertheless not the mere "invention of terms," but the result of attempts at a more detailed analysis of a complex and little-researched matter--the relationship between the ethnic group and the territory. In this connection, we would like to point out the fact that the meaning of the terms "dispersed" and "compact" is not constant and depends on the level on which the ethnic groups and the territory they settle are examined. It is one matter when we say that the Armenians in the Abkhaz ASSR, the Ashkenazi Jews in Russia, the Jews in Lithuania, and the Kurds and Assyrians in Armenia are compact or dispersed, and quite another matter when we discuss the settlement patterns of these groups in the specific rayons, rural communities, and cities they inhabit. On the other hand, the territorial dimensions and the total population of each specific location must be taken into account. Let us compare, for example, the Armenian communities in Los Angeles and Beirut today. The number of Armenians in both is the same, around 200,000, but the total population of the first city is over 8 million and the population of the second is 1.3 million. The territory occupied by the Los Angeles urban agglomerate (over 10,000 square kilometers) is almost equal to the territory of all Lebanon (10,400 square kilometers). Finally, the Armenians in Beirut live in specific neighborhoods and regions, whereas in the Los Angeles agglomerate they live in Los Angeles itself and in Hollywood, Glendale, Pasadena, etc. All of this naturally creates qualitatively different conditions for the self-maintenance of the two communities.

One of the overt and unconcealed forms of discrimination against ethnic minorities in the class-antagonistic society is their so-called ghettoization. In the anthology this phenomenon is illustrated by the "Jewish Pale," the legal establishment of which began as early as the late 18th century in Russia.

This form of discrimination can still be seen today in the treatment, for example, of immigrant labor and of Gypsies in the capitalist countries of the West. The negative implications of this policy are self-evident. It leads to the retarded socioeconomic and cultural development of ethnic groups in comparison to the dominant group, which precludes their integration into the society, gives them an inferior status (as "second-class citizens"), creates stereotypes on both sides, etc. On the other hand, it must be said that the enforced concentration of ethnic minorities within specific territorial boundaries (even when other groups are present) does much to preserve their ethnic culture. In an atmosphere of discrimination and outside pressure, internal unity grows stronger, group barriers become impenetrable (one sign of this is the low number of mixed marriages), and everything distinguishing this group from other communities becomes more pronounced.

This reverse effect was the reason that the policy of ghettoization was abandoned in the class-antagonistic societies. It was replaced by a policy of so-called equal rights, including comparative freedom in the choice of a place to live. The purpose of this policy is obvious--the integration of the minority into the sociocultural and economic structure of the society under the conditions of dispersed settlement unavoidably accelerates the acculturation processes and the transition to the final stage of assimilation. This explains the paradoxical fact that some ethnic minorities in Western countries seriously consider the desirability of a certain degree of ghettoization, which is regarded as an alternative ethnoprotective means.

We have mentioned only a few of the many topics discussed in the anthology. We have not discussed some equally important matters of indisputable scientific interest--the interaction and reciprocal influence of the cultures of the ethnic minority and the dominant ethnic group, the historical dynamics of inter-ethnic marriages, and their dependence on the socioeconomic and cultural features of the communities in contact, the formation of subethnic groups in ethnic minorities, etc. We can only hope that the anthology will arouse the interest of social scientists in the most diverse fields in the comprehensive and systematic study of ethnic minorities, especially the ethnic groups in our country.

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BOURGEOIS SOCIOLOGY AT THE END OF THE 20TH CENTURY: CRITICISM OF LATEST TRENDS

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[Review by G.S. Batygin of book "Burzhuaznaya sotsiologiya na iskhode XX veka: kritika noveyshikh tendentsiy," edited by V.N. Ivanov, Moscow, Nauka, 1986, 279 pages; passages enclosed in slantlines are printed in italics in source]

[Text] The historian of social thought who must write about what he himself has witnessed is in an incomparably more difficult position than the researcher submerged in "the affairs of bygone days." It would seem that there is nothing more simple than to write--accurately and objectively--about everything that is going on today in sociology. After all, sources of information are readily available: These are scientific periodicals. It is no coincidence, however, that historians of science feel they are taking an inconceivable risk by writing about the latest trends--the probability of error is too great. The discoveries leading to breakthroughs in theories about the world and to new and promising projects are usually almost imperceptible at the time of their inception and they can usually be found in obscure specialized publications rather than in profound and lengthy monographs. This means that a scientific discovery has to be "rediscovered"--by science itself, by the scientific community--and it is possible that the greatest credit must be given to the historian of science who is responsible for this "rediscovery."

This applies completely to sociological research, in which, as we know, inventions are not registered and patents are not issued. It is an exceptionally difficult task to understand what is going on today in bourgeois sociology, which seems to the reader of several dozen specialized journals (of course, this reader might only be a figment of the imagination) to be an inexhaustible jumble of observations, proved and unproved hypotheses, strict formalized models, philosophical debates, and unadorned ideas. It may be a trivial point, but the historian of sociology in the 19th century or the first half of the 20th is aided by the history of sociology itself. It provides him with an anthologylike system of "coordinates." For example, the names Simmel, Weber, Pareto, Sorokin, and Parsons do not refer merely to authors, but also to types of sociological thinking, and these names serve as "navigational" marks in the ocean of literary sources. It is a different matter today, when the names of Schluchter, TenBroek, Sprondel, Riesebrodt, Munch, Gorz, and the other Western sociologists named in the monograph still say little to specialists. At the

very least, we must correlate these names with "classic" methodological points of reference. Nevertheless, the book on bourgeois sociology at the end of the 20th century can be read as a book of historical forecasts: The authors have taken on the job of answering the question "How is contemporary bourgeois sociology developing?" and of assessing not only the recent past but also at least the "end" of the 20th century. Have the authors been able to disclose truly new trends in Western sociological thought or will history reveal different ideas and methodological points of reference that are now indistinguishable in the diverse conglomerate of publications? Time will tell. It will help us completely understand what we are witnessing today, discern the internal mechanisms and driving forces of the development of sociological thought, rid ourselves of superfluous impressions, and eventually separate the "grain" from the "chaff." We can confidently say, however, that this work is not only a scrupulous and complete overview of the latest trends in bourgeois sociology, but also a thoroughly systematized analysis of the logical "unfolding" of sociological ideas in today's world. The logical side of the matter, in my opinion, even surpasses the factological aspect. Incidentally, it would be wrong to criticize the authors for ignoring certain concepts. It is already difficult to correlate the usual anthologylike list of ideological currents in the West (positivism, functionalism, phenomenology, post-industrialism, etc.) with actual processes. Interdisciplinary and "paradigmatic" boundaries are being energetically erased, and there is a growing awareness of the need to work out a new system for the classification of currents, trends, and schools. This is a highly important task, especially in view of the fact that the authors of this book had to "guess" the ideological content of not fully articulated ideas. This task has been performed on a high professional level. Evidence of this can be found in the comparative analysis of J. Turner's basic work (the fourth, revised and supplemented edition was published at the same time as "Burzhuaznaya sotsiologiya na iskhode XX veka"). The range of subject matter is the same in both books. It is interesting that Turner wrote a new chapter on N. Luhman, whose theory has already been given a Marxist assessment. It is probable that only the views of the "late" J. Habermas and A. Giddens are still a "blank" to us. In all other respects, the book presents a quite representative picture of Western sociology, although there could be some complaints about insufficient analysis. These complaints, however, are a matter of taste. It is impossible to encompass the unencompassable, and the authors are justified in writing about what they regard as the most important topics. And what they regard as the most important aspect of sociology at the end of the 20th century are the methodological problems connected with the interpretation of the nature of social reality. In essence, current trends in Western sociological thought (it is significant that its "center" is gradually moving to Europe, especially the FRG) consist in a search for "stabilizing" criteria, for the restoration of the objective view of the world that was almost destroyed and turned into something like a mirage by the philosophical-epistemological "rebellions" and "rejections" of the 1960's and 1970's.

Therefore, the logic of the transition from the "crisis" mentality to the "stabilizing" frame of mind is presumed to lie at the basis of the conflicting and confusing reversals in Western sociological thought. There seems to be no reason at first to doubt this. Stronger conservative feelings and the

attachment of greater social value to political stability and to a mere sense of security are the present realities of everyday life in the capitalist countries. The authors, however, are not prone to primitive sociology in the explanation of the complex phenomena of the spiritual culture--sociological thought is only a conceptual crystallization of what already exists in the form of unarticulated social impulses. The endogenous causes of the self-development of sociological knowledge are more important to researchers, and it turns out that these causes were "inserted" into the crisis-related concepts, and that "stabilization" is the natural and logical result of total "deobjectification."

We should recall that the sociocultural and ideological roots of "deobjectification" were examined in sufficient detail by Yu.N. Davydov in his works on the criticism of neo-Marxism. It was neo-Marxism that made the view of sociology as an alienated-illusory, "rarefied" form of consciousness popular. The criticism of the idea of "deobjectification" reaches its culminating point in the book "Burzhuznaya sotsiologiya na iskhode XX veka": The "innermost secrets" are revealed, the internal causes of the regeneration of leftist radicalism as sociological radicalism, the dilution of any objective definition in the spontaneity of pure action. This is not simply a matter of the priority of various explanations of social reality. The empirical basis of sociology, without which traditional sociology is inconceivable, suffers the greatest damage. Let us look at the text of the monograph: "In the orbit of the all-destroying 'antiscientific' criticism (because it is easy to accuse any sociologist of an 'objectified' approach for the mere conviction that 'facts are a stubborn thing'), we can find not only representatives of theoretical sociology, but also--and perhaps to an even greater extent--all empirical sociology. After all, whatever the case may have been in other fields, in empirical sociology there was more than enough of the 'bourgeois-positivist' attitude toward facts ('the factual?') and statistical data ('the given data'?!). The leftist extremist frame of mind--summed up in the words 'Everything is propaganda, the entire world is propaganda!!--penetrated the science of sociology and threatened it with total destruction" (p 34). It would not have been as bad if the destruction of the object of science had come from outside and had not been accepted by the analysts of the logical-epistemological current, specialists to whom subjectivist skepticism would seem to be absolutely alien. This is why the objective basis of traditional sociology began to be destroyed from within.

There is one fact that was not mentioned by the authors but is quite important to an understanding of the fate of traditional sociology. It is not always clear what the latter term means, but there is reason to believe that this is the kind of empirical sociological research that is frequently categorized as "positivist-naturalist." The book conveys the impression that traditional sociology has become an innocent victim of unbridled sociological radicalism. People forget that the criticism of traditional sociology by the "Frankfurtians," the phenomenologists, the post-positivists, and even the positivists was completely justified--"quantophrenia is quantophrenia." It is quite a different matter that sociological radicalism could not offer a reasonable alternative to "traditonalism." Where is this alternative?

It is difficult to criticize the book, although a non-reflexive sense of resistance to the completely tangible pressure of the authors' line of

reasoning is aroused, or at least it was in the author of these lines, from the very first pages. It is difficult to escape this peculiar intellectual "pressure." The text has tremendous persuasive potential, combined with faultless logic and impressive arguments. It is only after the book has been set aside that the authors' point of view can be disputed and some of their statements can be doubted.

We can assume that the "pendulum" of attitudes in Western sociology has swung to the right and is speeding toward the point of "stabilization." But sociological radicalism--even if its secrets have been revealed--cannot be surmounted by the mere criticism of scientism, especially since the criticism was so totally devastating and aroused amazement and even fear in professionals. It is possible that "the hypercriticism of leftist radical sociologists was not widely supported by professional sociologists" (p 34), but width is not the issue here. The sociologist looking at a column of figures will always know that no rational interpretation can be portrayed as the only reasonable one. How did the "rebellion" affect the science of sociology? It introduced an alternative style of scientific thinking, which not only permits but even prescribes the transcendence of the boundaries of science, legalizing the "living world," the "ethos," and even "passion." In any case, the object and subject of social knowledge will never again stand in opposition to one another, as the traditional sociologists once believed. Even if sociological radicalism has outlived its usefulness, it taught people a great deal and no "stabilizing" trend is capable of freeing itself of this influence.

Besides this, it seems to me that the authors take some liberties with the material: The "stabilizing" concepts are "resisted" because they are the opposite of radical concepts. As described in the book, "stabilization" seems to be a "renaissance" of Weber and Parsons, and Luhman's theory of "self-sufficient systems" is gaining increasing popularity, but is all of this not an attempt at just another liberal interpretation of the same line of criticism in methodology that dates back to the neo-Kantian school? Arguments in favor of this can be found in the text of the book; in the introduction the authors categorically contrast the "stabilizing" trend to the "crisis" trend, and in their analysis of specific problems they reveal that "stabilization" in Western sociology is somewhat reminiscent of a myth. Let us consider, for example, the "Weberian renaissance." In essence, this is a renaissance of the criticism of the rational approach, associated with the Popperian tradition of "critical rationalism." It is wholly and completely permeated by the neo-Kantian methodology of reflection, and Yu.N. Davydov has every reason to write that "/how deep-seated/ must the contradictions of contemporary bourgeois sociology be...to make even the /'critical state' of the Weberian mentality, which is not devoid/ of nihilistic overtones, appear to be the manifestation of a desire for the 'stabilizing' mentality" (p 110). Let us consider Luhman's theory, which is probably the most "stabilizing" of all those discussed in the book. The idea of total social systems--comprehensive and self-referent systems--is astounding in its ability to rise to the level of superhuman autonomy and, consequently, independence of externally caused upheavals. No! "Luhman sees the society of his time not so much as 'calm' and 'stabilized' as moving in the direction of increasing misalignment," A.F. Filippov writes. "It does not know where it is going, what form evolution

will push to the surface next, how stable this form will be, and how it will change overall reality in the system" (p 168). If even the thinker whose views are distinguished by "glacial sobriety" (ibid.) is a "militant relativist" and "positivist" (p 16), what does the "stabilizing" trend actually represent? This is apparently not a matter of a separate type of bourgeois mentality, but of a reaction to a "crisis" within the "crisis" mentality. This is openly declared in one part of the book: "'Stabilizing' trends are still nothing more than good intentions and more or less /conflicting attempts/ to emerge from the 'state of crisis'" (p 110).

As far as the monograph as a whole is concerned, there is no question that it has some relatively boring descriptive passages and some phrases that I felt were not as well turned as they might have been. For example, the title of the third chapter, "Sociological Aspects of Political Problems and Political Aspects of Sociological Problems," should be taken with a grain of humor. Defects of this kind, however, do not change the weather, as the saying goes.

In conclusion, I would like to say a few words about the investigative style of the monograph, which meets the highest criteria of scientific rationality, the ideals of which are defended so consistently by the authors. This style is distinguished by the accurate and logical criticism of non-Marxist sociological theories and is based on a profound interest in the resolution of the problems discussed, an adherence to party principles, and professionalism. The text is virtually devoid of the kind of general and noncommittal statements and stereotype judgments that were a staple of the criticism of bourgeois sociology for so long. All of this testifies that the team of authors conducted a thorough investigation whose results will have a significant effect on the development of Marxist sociology.

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SOCIOLOGIST'S BOOKSHELF

Moscow SOTSIOLOGICHESKIYE ISSLEDOVANIYA in Russian No 1, Jan-Feb 87 (signed to press 21 Jan 87) pp 157-158

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